

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

**MANAGEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM THREATS:
A CASE STUDY OF THE MOMBASA REPUBLICAN COUNCIL IN KENYA.**

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R50/69706/2013

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**A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment for the Award of the Master's Degree in
International Studies**

APRIL, 2014

DECLARATION

I, MunyemboMwachala, hereby declare that this thesis is original work and has never been presented for any degree in any other university. I also declare that any secondary information used has been duly acknowledged in the thesis.

Student.....

Signature.....

Date.....

Supervisor.....

Signature.....

Date.....

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Many people have contributed immensely towards the finalization of this thesis. I may not name all of them. I wish however to sincerely acknowledge the invaluable assistance I received from Prof. Maria Nzomo, my supervisor, who supervised this study to completion.

I will forever be indebted to her and all other scholars that added value to this study.

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to all those who very deliberately, shake off the self imposed intellectual inertia and the misplaced morbid fear of the epistemology and ontology of knowledge out there, to yet again make it back to school. The knowledge horizon out there is amazingly refreshing. I therefore sincerely appreciate those who offered me the means to do the programme, those who challenged me, and those that urged me along.

ABSTRACT

Terrorism is a threat to peace and security internationally. The September 11,2001 terror attacks in the United States of America where over 3,000 lives perished in an Al-Qaeda coordinated attack using hijacked passenger planes, was a grim reminder to the world that terrorism was alive and capable of wreaking havoc anywhere in the world, including within the borders of the world's super power. Similar attacks have occurred at US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar Salaam, Tanzania in August 1998; and simultaneously at two locations in Kampala, Uganda in July 2010. Kenya bore the brunt of a terror attack again on 21st 2013 at Westgate mall, Nairobi.

It was against this background that the study was undertaken on Management of International Terrorism Threats. The Mombasa Republican Council in Kenya was used as a case study,in an attempt to examine and establish the extent to which, the insurgent movement, answered to the definition of terrorism. The purpose of this study was therefore to examine the group, its objectives and activities with a view to establishing whether it contributes to terrorist threats for Kenya. The study further analyzed factors that fuel spread of international terrorism by examining fundamental issues that the group cites as the basis for their quest to break away from the Republic of Kenya to become an independent State. This portends a threat to Kenya's national interests.

The study used both primary and secondary data. Primary data was generated through the administration of questionnaires on Mombasa County chiefs while secondary data was collected through review of relevant literature. Data was both qualitative and quantitative. Quantitative data generated and analyzed was specific to the management of the group by security agencies as perceived by the chiefs in Mombasa County. Conclusions and recommendations were done based on the findings.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION	i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	ii
DEDICATION	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS	v
LIST OF TABLES	viii
Table 1.1 Frequencies of Definitional Elements in 109	viii
Definitions of Terrorism 19	viii
Table3.1 Mombasa County Administrative Units 27	viii
CHAPTER ONE	1
1.0 INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Background to the Study	1
1.2 Statement of the Problem	4
1.3 Objectives of the study	5
1.3.1 General Objective	5
1.3.2 Specific Objectives	5
1.5 Literature Review	5
1.6 Conceptual Framework	12
1.7 Hypotheses	14
1.8 Justification of the Study	14
1.9 Limitations and Assumptions	16
1.10 Methodology	16
1.11 Chapter outline	16
CHAPTER TWO	18
DEFINITION AND EVOLUTION OF TERRORISM	18

2.0	Introduction	18
2.1	Definition of Terrorism.....	18
2.2	Evolution of Religious Terrorism to Sep 11. The 1968-1979 period.....	22
2.3	Conflict as a breeding ground for Insurgency and Terrorism	24
2.4	Frustration- Aggression and Relative-Deprivation Theories.....	27
2.5	National Security.....	28
2.6	International Security	31
	CHAPTER THREE.....	36
3.0	INTRODUCTION	36
3.1	The Mombasa Republic Council: History	39
3.2	Leadership/ Command Structure.....	40
3.4	The MRC Manifesto.....	40
3.5	Geographical and Historical Background.....	48
3.6	Fundamental Issues.....	50
	CHAPTER FOUR.....	71
	DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION	71
4.0	Introduction	71
4.1.	Qualitative Data Analysis.....	71
4.2	Quantitative Data Presentation and Interpretation.....	78
4.3	Gender of Respondents	79
4.4	Age Bracket of the Respondents	80
4.5	Marital Status of the Respondents	81
4.6	Educational Background of the Respondents.....	82
4.7	Original Home of Respondents.....	83
4.8	The type of residence.....	84
4.9	Faith professed by the Respondents.....	85
4.10	Time served as Chief.....	86
4.11	Terms of service.....	87
4.12	Mombasa County Security Apparatus.....	88
4.13	MRC in Normal Conversations.....	89
4.14	Spotting of MRC Official.....	90
4.14	MRC sympathizers	92
4.17	General Population Support for MRC Agenda.....	94
4.18	Chiefs' View of MRC Agenda.....	95
4.18	Grievances of MRC.....	96
4.19	View of MRC.....	97

4.20	MRC in Criminal Acts	98
4.21	Gangs Hijacking MRC Agenda	98
4.22	MRC Breaching Peace & Security	99
4.22	Government Management of MRC	100
4.23	Government Containment of MRC	101
4.24	MRC Emerging Again.....	102
4.25	Government Dealing with MRC and other threats in the Future	104
4.26	Chief’s proposal in dealing with similar threats in the future	105
CHAPTER FIVE		106
CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATION AND SUGGESTED AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH		106
5.1	Introduction	106
5.2	Determination of whether MRC is a terrorist organization.....	106
5.3	The Determination of Fundamental Issues behind the MRC insurgency	108
5.4	Government Management of MRC	111
5.5	Recommendations.....	112
5.6	Recommended Area for further Research.....	113
BIBLIOGRAPHY		114

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1	Frequencies of Definitional Elements in Definitions of Terrorism	109 19
Table 3.1	Mombasa County Administrative Units	27
Table 3.2	Land Use in Taita/Taveta District	47
Table 3.3	Road Infrastructure in Coast Region	64
Table 3.4	Accesses to Narcotic Drugs by Region	69
Table 3.5	Out Patient Morbidity Statistics in Under Five Years by Province – 2011	
Table 3.6	Kenya Population Numbers by 2009	73
Table 3.7	Kenya Coast Survey, Development, Marginalization, Security and Participation	77
Table 4.1	Terrorists Organizations	83
Table 4.2	Gender of Respondents	
Table 4.3	Age Bracket of the Respondents	89
Table 4.4	Marital Status	90
Table 4.5	Educational Background	91
Table 4.6	Original Home of Respondents	92
Table 4.7	Type of Residence	93
Table 4.8	Faith Professed	94
Table 4.9	Time Served As Chief	95
Table 4.10	Terms of Service	96
Table 4.11	Part & Parcel of the Mombasa County Security Machinery	
Table 4.12	MRC in Normal Conversations	98
Table 4.13	Spotting of MRC Officials	99
Table 4.14	MRC Sympathizers	101

Table 4.15	Hidden Support for MRC	102
Table 4.16	Population Support for the MRC Agenda	103
Table 4.17	Chiefs' View of MRC Agenda	104
Table 4.18	View of MRC	105
Table 4.19	MRC in Criminal Acts	107
Table 4.20	Gangs Hijacking MRC Agenda	107
Table 4.21	MRC Breach of Peace and Security	108
Table 4.22	Government Management of MRC	109
Table 4.23	Government Containment of MRC	110
Table 4.24	MRC Emerging Again	112
Table 4.25	Government Dealing with MRC and other Threats in the future	

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 3.1	Mombasa County Map	41
Figure 3.2	Kenya Coast Survey	68
Figure 4.2	Gender of Respondents	88
Figure 4.3	Age Bracket of the Respondents	89
Figure 4.4	Marital Status	91
Figure 4.5	Educational Background	92
Figure 4.6	Original Homes of the Respondents	
Figure 4.7	Type of Residence	93
Figure 4.8	Faith Professed	94
Figure 4.9	Time Served As Chief	95
Figure 4.10	Terms of Service	97
Figure 4.11	Part & Parcel of the Mombasa County Security Apparatus	97
Figure 4.12	MRC in Normal Conversations	99
Figure 4.13	Spotting of MRC Officials	100
Figure 4.14	MRC Sympathizers	101
Figure 4.15	Hidden Support for MRC	102
Figure 4.16	Population Support for MRC' Agenda	
Figure 4.17	Chiefs' View of MRC Agenda	104
Figure 4.18	View of MRC	105
Figure 4.19	MRC in Criminal Acts	107
Figure 4.20	Gangs Hijacking MRC Agenda	108
Figure 4.21	MRC Breach of Peace and Security	109
Figure 4.22	Government Management of MRC	110

Figure 4.23	Government Containment of MRC	111
Figure 4.24	MRC Emerging Again	112
Figure 4.25	Government is dealing with MRC and other Threatsin the Future	113

CHAPTER ONE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This Chapter will discuss the Background to the Study by looking at the Mombasa Republican Army against the backdrop of international terrorism, its evolution and variants. The Statement of the Research Problem, Purpose of the Study, Objectives of the Study, Research Questions, the Conceptual Framework and the Justification of the Study will also be covered under this Chapter.

1.1 Background to the Study

Terrorism has evolved over the years since its popularity during the French revolution of 1793-94. This is when the French rose against the absolute monarchy and the feudal system in a revolution led by Maximilien Robespierre. The revolutionary adopted the “regime de la terreur” as a tool to cracking down on the subversives and other remnants and sympathizers of the old order bent on undermining it.¹ This inspired an anti-monarchical sentiment in other parts of Europe where the impression that the monarch was divine would later be challenged. The industrial revolution and its attendant socio-economic development, where the human factor in the capitalist production system, was critical, would influence the thinking of Karl Marx (1818-1883), a philosopher, social scientist, historian and revolutionary to interrogate this system.² Karl Marx avers, “the worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces, the more his production increases in power and range. The worker becomes an even cheaper commodity the more commodities he creates. With the increasing value of the world of things proceeds in direct proportion to the devaluation of the world of men. Labor produces not only commodities; it produces itself and the worker as a

¹ Howard, D. R and Sawyer, R.L, *Terrorism and Counter Terrorism*, (McGraw-Hill Companies 2004) pp. 4

² www.historyguide.org/intellect/marx.html

commodity and does so in the proportion in which it produces commodities generally.’’ His works inspired a new thinking and hence the new ‘terrorism’ emerged which was basically anti-state and revolutionary. The person who personified this brand of terrorism was Carlo Pisacane (1818-1857) an Italian Revolutionary and Libertarian socialist. Pisacane was killed leading a revolutionary expedition against the kingdom of Naples. He advocated use of violence as not only a means to drawing attention to the cause and generating publicity, but also as a way to rallying the masses in a revolution. He maintained that pamphlets, wall posters or assemblies couldn’t replace the cardinal purpose of violence.

This doctrine came to be known as the, Propaganda by Deed. ³ This dictum would later be put to use by Narodnaya Volya of Russia, an organization that had been formed to challenge the state they considered autocratic and oppressive. They assassinated Tsar Alexander II in 1881, the emperor of Russia from 2nd March 1855 and hence influencing other terrorists in striking against leaders they considered oppressive. This period ushers in the First World War prior to which there were unrests in Turkey by the Armenians against the Ottoman Empire, Macedonia in Bulgaria and the Serbs in Bosnia whose defining characteristic was the nationalistic fervor for an independent homeland. In the 1930s, terrorism took a different meaning by describing totalitarian regimes in Italy under Benito Mussolini, Nazi Germany under Hitler and Russia under Stalin. These leaders employed the element of extreme fear and coercion to rule the people. This was terror unleashed through the secret police and the party machinery. This was terror by state actors.

After the Second World War in the 1940s and 1950s, the word recaptured its revolutionary context as indigenous people revolted against colonialists in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. The ‘terrorists’ would acquire the legitimate appellation ‘freedom fighters’ in their

³ Robertgraham.wordpress.com/2011

quest to seek attention from the world community, regarding the atrocities unleashed on them by the colonialists. Indeed many third world countries used this tag as they fought their wars of liberation from the British, French, Italians and other European countries. The ‘freedom fighter’ was hence the vernacular adopted by these countries. The usage of this was best exemplified when the Palestine Liberation Organization leader, Yasser Arafat, addressed the United Nations General Assembly in November 1974 and elucidated that whoever fights for the freedom and liberation of his land from the invaders, the settlers and the colonialists cannot be called a terrorist. In the 1990s, however, the word terrorism came to denote threats to the stability of a nation by non-state actors and non-governmental processes and organizations

Variants of Terrorism

Variants of terrorism have been described in 4 broad areas.⁴ Ethno-nationalist and separatist, left wing, Right wing and Religious groups. Ethno-nationalist and separatists seek international recognition and political self-determination in situations where they believe they are suppressed by the state dominated by a different ethnic group. The Left wing group would seek to change the governance structure of a state to an extremist leftist model. The inspiration would be Marxism-Leninism. The Right wing group would not necessarily share an ideology akin to the converse group but would be inspired by a sense of racist nationalism intolerant to other persons. The Religious groups would consider other civilizations decadent and depraved and hence target them from this perceived moral and religious standpoint.

Mombasa Republican Council

The history of the group can be traced to 1996-1998 during the Kaya Bombo insurgency that was dismantled by the Government of Kenya. It reactivated itself into the MRC in 2009 and

⁴www.transnationalalterterrorism.eu

draws membership from various indigenous coast populations namely the Mijikenda, Swahili and the Arab. It has a Chairman, Secretary General and Spokesman. The group raises funds through sale of manifestos, t-shirts, calendars flags, membership cards and sympathizers. They advocate for secession from Kenya on the basis of marginalization by the Government on land matters, employment, and access to the sea, political appointments, tourism and port proceeds and development. Several attacks in the Kenyan coast leading to fatalities have been attributed to the group.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The leader of the Mombasa Republican Council, Mr. Omar Mwamnuadzi was arrested and arraigned before Mombasa laws courts on 15th October 2012.⁵ The group has gone quiet since. This is in spite of Goldsmith⁶(2011) earlier submitting that the reactive approach exhibited by security agencies in dealing with MRC would fail because new nodes would arise in their place and reconfigure itself. Kisiangani⁷ (2012) et al compared MRC with other groups that were founded on genuine grievances like the Boko Haram of Nigeria and Lord's Resistance Army of Uganda. They later evolved into terrorist and criminal networks that are still a challenge to the respective countries. He identified a key feature in their transformation to be the way Governments responded to them.

⁶Goldsmith, P. '*Conflict Assessment: Threats and Opportunities for Engagement*', (USAID, 2011)

⁷Kisiangani, E. and Lewela, M, '*Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis*' (ISS Nairobi, 2012)

But was MRC a terrorist organization and hence a threat to the Kenyan national interests; and has the state extinguished it? The MRC did not just happen. There must be factors leading to the insurgency and this need to be carefully analyzed.

The problem that this study seeks to investigate and assess the Kenyan Government's management of the MRC insurgency, and by extension potential terrorist threats.

1.3 Objectives of the study

1.3.1 General Objective

To determine whether the Mombasa Republican council is a terrorist organization; and the manner in which the Kenya government has managed this group's activities that pose a threat to Kenyan national interests.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

1. To analyze the nature, purpose, leadership structure, ideology and activities of the MRC.
2. To determine the fundamental issues behind the MRC.
3. To examine Government response to the MRC.

1.4 Research Questions

- i. Is the MRC a terrorist group?
- ii. What are the fundamental issues behind the MRC insurgency?
- iii. Has the Government of Kenya dealt effectively with the MRC threat?

1.5 Literature Review

This section will look at literature by various scholars on the management of terrorism threats

with a view to getting different perspectives and convergences. Despite lack of clear definition of terrorism, there is an avalanche of literature on the same due to the chilling and gripping effects of this vice. The fear of a terror attack lurks in the shadows and constraints the freedom of man to walk in the free world.

As Kaplan ⁸(2010) notes, the power of terrorism is its ability to frighten and change the way people ordinarily live their lives. He recommends further areas of research on the Fifth Wave concept having analyzed the Khmer Rouge and the Lord's Resistance Army and the Janjaweed. He describes the Fifth Wave as those groups that survive and evolve beyond their founding dogmas. This in essence means terrorist groups will and have evolved beyond what Rapoport⁹ (2002) had described in 135 years following the September 11, 2001 terror attack against America, leading to President Bush declaring 'war on terror'. He describes the First Wave as Anarchist in the 1880s, which continued for 40 years. The second Wave was Anti-colonial, and it began in the 1920s. The Third was the New Left and the Fourth as the Religious Wave that began in the 1979. Kaplan's Fifth Wave Theory and his recommendation for further research is clearly indicative of inability to propose practical means of managing terrorism threats to date.

The Kenya Government reacted to the MRC threat typically and expected within the Realism theory. The group is now quiet, but is it out? The Fifth wave theory might explain the future of the MRC and as long as it in the discourse, it will be a potential threat in the future. Kaplan has not particularly mentioned the MRC in the study. It is hence critical that this writer looks at MRC within the Kenyan security context. The September 11, 2001 the deadly terror attack that caused about 3000 fatalities in the United States of America galvanized the world into action. This coordinated attack by the Al-Qaida involved hijacking of four passenger planes

⁸ Kaplan, J., *'Terrorist Groups and the New Tribalism, Terrorism Fifth Wave'*, (Routledge, 2010) pp. 1.

⁹Rapoport, D. C., *'The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11'*, (Anthropoetics, 2002) 8 no 1.

and suicide crushing two of them into the World Trade Centre in New York, one at the Pentagon and one aborting at Pennsylvania. Zimmerman, D. and Wenger, A.¹⁰ (2007) Documents how leading countries reacted by instituting counter terrorism measures. They maintain that a balance is critical between the legal, political, civilian and military means in combating terrorism and their legitimacy in the eyes of the affected population on the other hand.

The world espouses liberties that may be at variance with the aforementioned means. A strong civil society in democratic countries will always keep a check on those means with the net effect of slowing them down or halting them all together. Despite the economic and military might of countries like USA, Britain, Germany and others it will be impractical to fully implement counter terrorism measures within the Liberal Democratic realms. Indeed Lutz and Lutz¹¹, (2009) contend that counterterrorist techniques may threaten the presence of civil liberties in the society though they also submit that a totally free society is very vulnerable. The dilemma remains in the fact that any government that intends to totally root out and deal with terrorists will invariably fall into the trap of transforming a democratic political system to something else all together. As this balance is being thought through, so do terror groups ferment, reconfigure and grow. They quickly submitted that no one solution exists for dealing with all types of dissident groups and enumerated possible responses to terrorist threats as the provision of greater security, better detection and prevention, disrupting finances, repression, retaliation or punishment for foreign supporters of dissident groups, pre-emptive action, special counter terrorism units, granting concessions and instituting reforms and diplomatic approaches and international cooperation. They reiterate that there is absolutely no counter terrorist technique that will suffice as a solution posed by

¹⁰ Zimmerman, D. and Wenger, A. '*How States Fight Terrorism*' (Lynne Rienner, 2007) pp. 125

¹¹ Lutz, J. M and Lutz, B. J. , '*Global Terrorism*', (Routledge, 2008) pp. 279

the terror groups and that the techniques are available to all governments, just as terrorists' techniques are, to all kinds of groups.

Terrorism fed on myriad of reasons and excuses with propensity for attacks around the world, will not go away soon. Governments will not always find and implement the best technique and the events, circumstances and issues that feed into terrorism will always come. But what measures has Kenya put in place to deal with terror threats within the land? Does the country have the political, economic, military and civil muscle to effectively deal with terror threats and in the event of attacks the wherewithal to quickly mobilize resources to mitigate the effects and return to normalcy within the shortest period possible? We need to look at the systems we put in place following the September 11 watershed that as mentioned galvanized the others into action by deliberately evaluating their systems and crafting policies and legislation specific to terror threats. Kenya should however guard against falling into the trap of State terrorism, which has been described by Blakeley¹² (2009) as a threat or act of violence by agents of the state intended to coerce target audience into changing some particular behavior. One such tool is disappearance of the civilians in the hands of the state agents. The Preamble in the New Constitution of Kenya promulgated on 27th August 2010 clearly declares, 'We the people of Kenya, recognizing the aspirations of all Kenyans for a Government based on the essential values of human rights, equality, freedom, democracy, social justice and the rule of law. Adopt, Enact and give this constitution to ourselves and to our future generations.'¹³The Government has a duty to protect citizens' freedoms enshrined in the constitution while pursuing safety for the state and the same citizens therein. This hence calls for professionalism by the state actors. There was a furore that emerged following the enactment of the Kenya anti-terrorist legislation, The Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012.

¹²Blakeley, R. , *'State Terrorism and Neoliberalism'*, (Routledge, 2009) pp.1

¹³ Republic of Kenya, *'The New Constitution of Kenya'*, (Government Press, 27th August, 2010)

The law is expected to make it easier to disrupt the networks of financiers and sympathizers, terrorists use to carry out their crime. Persons who engage in terrorism or help terrorists risk jail terms of up to 30 years imprisonment without the option of a fine. Muslim leaders had opposed the Bill claiming that it targeted members of their faith. This act has been cited here to vindicate the point that the public is alive to misuse of state power by state actors, if and when it occurs, in pursuit of terrorism threats prevention.

Bjorgo and Horgan¹⁴, (2009) offer some very refreshing thoughts on disengagement from terrorism contrary to the maxim that –‘once a terrorist, always a terrorist.’ They argue that most individuals involved in terrorism eventually disengage from it and attempt to answer questions and provide answers on why and how it happens and how this process can be hastened up. They say that facilitating disengagement should be a core element in counter-terrorism policies since disengagement reduces the economic, social and human costs of terrorism. Promoting collective disengagements from terrorism may also help end terrorists campaigns, which will disrupt radicalization early in a terrorist’s career. They look at this disengagement from the angle that a terrorist may continue being violent and destructive even if aware that their struggle is lost due to the helplessness in the absence of an exit option, apart from death or life in prison. They sum up the study by proposing questions that need to be explored in depth in subsequent studies, namely what would be the goals to be achieved in the disengagement program, the circumstances under which offers of amnesty could be extended and whether the offers should be done before or after a judicial process, should they be time –limited and finally how the victims of terrorism could be given a proper role in the process. These questions indicate how grey the matter still is and in the absence of evidential success of this program anywhere in the world, it can be concluded that it calls for further

¹⁴Bjorgo,T and Horgan, J. , *‘Leaving Terrorism Behind’*, (Routledge,2009) pp.1

research. This can be a challenge due to the shadowy environment under which terrorists operate and their propensity to evolve into different groups to cope with the changing surveillance regimes. Groups closer home are hereby briefly analyzed from the literature available in terms of their current status vis a viz the state responses.

Boko Haram

Boko Haram is officially known as Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad, which in Arabic means 'People committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad'. The radical Salafist group transformed into a Salafi-jihadist terrorist organization in 2009 following a violent crackdown by the Government in which its leader and founder Mohammed Yusuf was killed. Boko Haram accuses the Government of the Republic of Nigeria of corruption, and hopes to Islamize the country by fighting westernization. This is intended to protect adulteration of Islam. Liolio¹⁵ (2013) develops a Class Theory of Terrorism in analyzing the group where he explains the root cause of terrorism as the global capitalism practised by the majority of states. He argues that this leads to the stratification of society in classes namely the Ruling, Middle, the Working and the Lumpen class. This ferments class antagonism where the frustrated Lumpen category joins sectarian groups to fight the Ruling class. The State machinery is unleashed against this group to protect the Ruling class interests and this becomes a cycle. The international system gives the affected state support making it global. Ahokegh¹⁶ (2012) lends his thoughts to this when he writes that the Northeast part of Nigeria suffers the worst indices of under- development in Nigeria. The state of, Borno, has a history of over 1000 years as a Muslim state. The resistance could

¹⁵Liolio, S.E., (2013) '*Rethinking Counterinsurgency: A Case Study of Boko Haram in Nigeria*', at www.culturaldiplomacy.org/pdf/case-studies/Samson_Eyituoyo_Liolio

¹⁶Ogunrotifa, B. A., (2013) '*Class Theory of Terrorism. A Study of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria*', at www.academia.edu/2498763

therefore only have been framed within the Islam context. He concludes that bad governance has been identified as one of the factors responsible for the rise of the group in Nigeria.¹⁷


The Lord's Resistance Army

Formed in the late 1980s, The Lord's Resistance Army is a sectarian military and religious group operating in Northern Uganda and Sudan. It seeks to overthrow the established order and rule according to the 10 commandments. It is led by Joseph Kony, who professes to have spiritual powers and has operated in Uganda until 2005-2006, when it moved to the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo and what would later become the Southern Sudan. This was due to pressure by the Uganda Government. At the height of the conflict, nearly two million people were displaced in Northern Uganda. Kisiangani¹⁸(2012) traces the emergence of the group to internal circumstances during the colonial period where Uganda's political power was domiciled in the southern part while the military and political leaders came from the north. The country had been portioned into different economic zones where south of Kyoga was designated for cash crop growing and industries with the north creating the labor reserve. The Baganda from the south dominated the civil service while the army was controlled by the Acholis among other northern tribes. This led to economic disparities, which were not, addressed post -colonialism. With President Museveni's National Resistance Movement, a perceived southern group ascending to power by toppling Tito Okello, a northerner, the seeds of rebellion were fanned. Kony and his LRA mounted an armed rebellion against the government that continues to date. He concludes that these circumstances must be addressed as a means to arriving at the solution. Studying the MRC case in Kenya that is presently quite, will offer useful insights in dealing with insurgencies elsewhere for sustainable peace.

¹⁷Ahokegh, A. F.,(2012) '*Boko Haram. A 21st Century Challenge in Nigeria*', at ejournal.org/index.php/esj/article/view/334/363

¹⁸www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/03/186734.htm

1.6 Conceptual Framework



The Conceptual Framework looks at MRC within the broader environmental influences that define it. It also depicts the relationship with the Government and the response emanating from the latter's defense of the Kenya's national interests that are enshrined in the Kenyan constitution. The reaction by Government is best explained through Realism Theory that argues that the state security interest is paramount and must be protected at all costs. Realism is anchored on four core assumptions namely that the states are the most important actors in world politics. This means states are seen as dominant and non-state actors are not given much attention. Non-state actors in this situation would include the MRC. Realists

would view this as an irritant out to undermine the state and deal with it decisively using the coercive state machinery. This is based on another assumption about states being unitary actors. The state cannot allow internal dissents that would affect its posture as a holistic and solid unit within the international system. Any attempts by any person or groups of persons to attempt to give a view through words and deeds contrary to the conventional thought of this unitary unit called state, is viewed with suspicion and can be socially constructed as being disloyal and subversive to the state's interest. Realism basically takes a pessimistic view of the human kind as one who is uncouth, violent and untrustworthy and generally up to no good. This character should therefore be reined in through the state apparatus. The other assumption is that the state is a Rational Actor, a concept which presupposes that a government is a unitary actor that makes decisions through a rigorous distillation process of clearly defining the problem, focusing on the objectives, weighing the options and consequences and arriving at the best choice of decision. Studies have however shown that decisions are not necessarily arrived at through this model. Individuals head institutions that make decisions and human weaknesses and personal idiosyncrasies can cloud judgments and invariably feed into the decisions. The last core assumption is national security, which is seen as the overriding concern of all states.

An insurgency is a conflictual situation that threatens this core concern by all states. Conflicts can be managed through established paradigms namely the Strategist, the Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher. Groom (1990) explains how the three paradigms are anchored on three respective approaches namely the Realist, the World Society and the Structuralist approaches. The Realist approach, viewing states as dominant actors, will focus on retention and use of power through its coercive state apparatus. The Strategist paradigm, founded on this approach, will look towards its military, police and judiciary in settling conflicts fast and

decisively. Force is therefore the weapon of choice for Realists. This approach however has weaknesses in the sense that this being a zero-sum game, the vanquished will only retreat, amass other capabilities and might rise again. This makes the conflict endemic.

This study will seek to establish if indeed the Government adopted the Strategist paradigm within Realists approach and demonstrate the appropriateness of applying a different methodology for enduring peace and security. This will be possible through application of Psychological theories in explaining MRC insurgency, namely the Frustration-Aggression and Relative Deprivation theories. The purpose is not to justify any actions by the group, but propose best approaches in addressing conflicts from this theoretical standpoint.

1.7 Hypotheses

- 1 The evolvement of MRC as an insurgency group is due to the inability of the Government to address fundamental issues.
- 2 The manner in which Government manages the MRC activities can either neutralize its threats or turn it into a more dangerous organization.

1.8 Justification of the Study

1. Academic. The September 11th terror attack in the USA can be viewed as another major event within the study of International Relations, to occur after the cold war. This attack and many others across the globe have demonstrated the need to interrogate terrorism more deeply due to its threat to international peace and security. It has also brought to the fore the issues in globalization where the effects of an attack at one corner of the global village reverberates across the entire edifice within a very short while. The threats to state security don't emerge from other states but from non-state actors within many

states bound by ideology and religion. The focus is now on non-state actors within states due to their potential to wreck havoc and destruction through very unconventional means. This is where research should focus to analyze and propose approaches in dealing with the menace. This will promote state security and ultimately contribute to international peace and security.

Ramsbotham et al¹⁹ (2005) poses the question as to whether other pre Sep 11 violent conflicts analyses are now outmoded. This is an affirmation that research needs to be deepened in this area since as Jarvis submits, ‘ If events such as 9/ 11 sparked a renewed determination to address the long -standing problem of definition, they also reinvigorated a similarly enduring search for the causes of terrorism’.²⁰

2. Policy. The Republic of Kenya enacted its first laws ever specifically targeting terrorism. The law, Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012 has been majorly influenced by the terrorists’ acts in Kenya the deadliest of which then was the 1998 American embassy attack in Nairobi, Kenya. The act is intended to disrupt the terrorism networks in Kenya and prescribe punishments that include 30-year jail terms for terrorists and their sympathizers. This act is a manifestation of how central the Government views terrorism as regards its propensity to threaten its national interests. The research will be available to the Government and the findings can be used in addressing this menace in the society over and above legislation. Policies are formulated on the basis of relevant information and hence the research findings could possibly be used in the security policies in the future.

¹⁹Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T., and Miall, H.,’ *Contemporary Conflict Resolution. The Prevention, management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*’, (Polity Press, 2005) pp. 67

²⁰Jarvis, L., ‘*The Spaces and Faces of Critical Terrorism Studies*’, (Security Dialogue, 2009) Vol. 40/ Issue 1, pp.5-27

This study will look at MRC as an insurgency that threatens the Kenyan national interests and the Government's response to the insurgency. As a member of the global community, the strategies that successfully resolved the matter, if at all, can be applied elsewhere for global peace and stability.

1.9 Limitations and Assumptions

The time, resources and the essence of the study will not allow the researcher to interview all key personalities both within the state actors fraternity and others. Every effort will however be made to get the key and right people for an in-depth interview.

1.10 Methodology

The study used both primary and secondary data. Primary data was collected through identification of the group's key stronghold, Mombasa county and generating information by administering questionnaires on government agencies, the chiefs in Mombasa county. Efforts to gather data from the group's leadership were unsuccessful. The study also interviewed people viewed as sympathetic to the group's course with a view to getting insights on the Organization, Doctrine and other key concepts that define the group. The instruments used were questionnaires and oral interviews.

Secondary data was collected through reviewing writings from books, journals, newspapers, websites and other relevant sources.

1.11 Chapter outline

Chapter one is the Introduction. It provides the Background to the Study, and Statement of the Problem and the Objectives of the Study. The Chapter will also discuss the Research

questions, Literature Review and look at the Conceptual Framework adopted in the study. The Hypotheses, Justification, Limitation and Assumptions, and the Methodology adopted in gathering critical data for the study will be discussed under this Chapter.

Chapter two is on the Definition and Evolution of Terrorism. It will focus on what constitutes terrorism and the conflictual situation it portends between the state and insurgency. The impact of terrorism and conflict to the national and international security will be discussed in this Chapter.

Chapter three is on The Mombasa Republic Council, Fundamental Issues and Kenya Government's management of the insurgency. The chapter will look at the Case Study pursuant to the Conceptual Framework in terms of the Structure of the Group, the fundamental Issues, and the Government response to the insurgency and generate data to answer to the hypotheses.

Chapter four is on Data Analysis. This analyses data collected in the previous chapter while Chapter five is the Conclusion, Recommendations and Suggestions for further research.

CHAPTER TWO

DEFINITION AND EVOLUTION OF TERRORISM

2.0 Introduction

This chapter will discuss the definition of terrorism and briefly look at the evolution of the religious variant with a view to determining the dangers it portends to state and international security when insurgents organize along religions. The nexus between conflict management and terrorism will also be explained in this chapter.

2.1 Definition of Terrorism

Schmid²¹ (1998) makes an attempt of defining the term but concedes from the onset that it is a contested concept²² since there is no universal legal definition approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations and; submits that the Revised Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism (2011) puts it at referring, *on the one hand, to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties.* He further analyzed the content of 109 definitions of terrorism in his scholarship upon which he identified 22 elements within this kind of violence that separate it

²¹ Hoffman, B., 'Inside Terrorism', (Columbia University Press, 1998) pp. 1-28.

²² Schmid A. P., 'Handbook of Terrorism Research', (London, Routledge, 2011) pp.86-87.

from other forms. The results are set out hereunder in what Guelke²³ calls the most rigorous effort there had ever been to define terrorism.

Table 1.1

Frequencies of Definitional Elements in 109 Definitions of ‘Terrorism’

Element	Frequency(%)
1. Violence, Force	83.5
2. Political	65
3. Fear, terror emphasized	51
4. Threat	47
5. Psychological effects and anticipated reactions	41.5
6. Victim-target differentiation	37.5
7. Purposive, planned, systematic organized action	32
8. Method of combat, strategy, tactic	30.5
9. Extranormality, in breach of accepted rules Without humanitarian constraints	30
10. Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance	28
11. Publicity aspect	21.5
12. Arbitrariness; impersonal, random character, indiscrimination	21
13. Civilians, noncombatants, neutrals, outsiders as victims	17.5
14. Intimidation	17
15. Innocence of victims emphasized	15.5
16. Group, movement, organization as per preterm	14
17. Symbolic aspect, demonstration to others	13.5

²³Guelke,A., ‘*The Age of Terrorism and the International Political System*’,(London.Tauris&co. Ltd. 1998) pp. 18

18. Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of Violence	
19. Clandestine, covert nature	9
20. Repetitiveness; serial or campaign character of violence	7
21. Criminal	6
22. Demands made on third parties	4

Source: Alex P. Schmid

There is therefore a lack of clear definition of Terrorism but the actions as described above constitute the means through which the groups try to achieve their ends. Ramsbotham²⁴ et al (2005) contend that terrorism is not a new phenomenon though for a long time it used to be analyzed as a stand-alone and not within the mainstream conflict analysis framework. The upshot of this statement is that terrorism constitutes conflict and need to be interrogated within the acceptable conceptual frameworks of conflict analysis. They categorize terrorism in four types, the first of which is the unavoidable kind of terror that manifests during armed conflicts. During armed conflicts, acts of terror are likely to be visited on the victims. This situation covers groups who fight unconventionally and are therefore not regulated by international war as regards combatants, civilian populations and prisoners. The second type covers situations where in an asymmetrical conflictual situation; terror is a weapon of choice as a supplementary measure in enhancing the influence of the groups. These two types can be addressed through negotiation and political agreement. The third variant is that which uses

²⁴Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T., and Miall, H., ' *Contemporary Conflict Resolution. The Prevention, management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*', (Polity Press, 2005) pp. 67-75

terror and therefore views this choice as more important than traditional armed action. They equate this type with quest for economic opportunity or greed and fit the Lord's Resistance Army within this realm averring that this may need ways of dealing with, beyond the aforementioned, and then there is the radical religious groups like Al-Qaida which operate internationally. Whatever the type of group, terrorism is best seen and described as particular actions and strategies and not necessarily the actors and political purposes. For purposes of this study, conflict will be confined to non-interstate conflict meaning it is not about conflicts between states.

It is worth noting that acts of terrorism are not confined to individuals and non-state actors. Governments can also deploy such acts against own people to further some economic or political interest. Totalitarian states would ordinarily engage in terror to suppress some opposition and maintain the status quo. This will involve internal repression of groups or individuals from pursuing particular interests, which might be at variance with the interests of the ruling class, which gets enmeshed, with state interests. Sometimes individuals in power pursue own interests in the name of the state and hence use the state apparatus like the police and military. This is typical of Marxian arguments about classes in society based on economic variables where the dominant class, the bourgeoisie exploits the proletariat class leading to societal tensions and conflict. The elites within the exploited class join hands with the exploiters to repress own people through employment of state machinery. These elites are known as the comprador class.

The repressed class could rise against the compradors that would then use the state machinery at the disposal of their compatriots to clamp down on the proletariat and this becomes a vicious cycle. The typology of terrorism has been used by states and some academia in illegitimizing the claims of the groups and therefore clouds focus of states from seeking to

get into the bottom of the insurgencies by examining the fundamental issues. It is highly improbable that a group would form and organize around a cause and risk limb and life from state violence at non-issues.

Tellidis²⁵(2008) hence submits that terrorism, as an activity cannot exist or studied, secluded and isolated from a socio-political context. In other words terrorism and attendant issues emergent need contextualization. It is a mistake to view terrorism as acts driven by lunacy or psychopathy. Due to the gravity of their actions, it is human nature to socially construct them in these adjectives thereby ignoring some fundamental underlying factors behind the acts. Due to the monstrosity of their actions it is urgent and critical to delve into what triggers such actions considered by the mainstream public as acts of lunacy and psychopathy. Loss of lives and property remains just that, and there is no justification whatsoever for any act that brings pain and suffering to human beings outside judicial means. But how does terrorism evolve particularly the religious kind to create a security nightmare in the world? The purpose of this analysis is to project the real and present danger of MRC being catapulted into a deadly extremist religious group by state actions or inactions.

2.2 Evolution of Religious Terrorism to Sep 11. The 1968-1979 period

Moore²⁶(2013) identifies what he calls the ‘ Dawn of Modern International Terrorism’ as 1968-1979, where the creation of Israel engendered Marxists and anti-Western transformations and movements in the Arab and Islamic world. These movements viewed the Western world as a supporter to Israel and opposed to Islam and chose terrorism as an effective tool to pursue political interests. Following Israel’s defeat of Arab forces in 1967, the Palestinian leaders accepted that they could not win a battle militarily giving rise to urban

²⁵Tellidis, I., ‘*Preventing Terrorism? Conflict Resolution and Nationalist Violence in the Basque Country*’, (University of St. Andrews, 2008) pp. 75-80

²⁶Moore, J at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/target/etc/modern.html

terrorism as opposed to guerilla and rural based warfare. The radical groups such as Al Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) internationalized their struggle by taking advantage of modern telecommunication. They engaged in hijackings, kidnappings and bombings and shootings, culminating in the kidnapping and killing of Israel athletes during the 1972 Munich Olympic Games. These groups became an inspiration to other secular groups around the globe. They created a major network and channel for the spread of terrorist techniques worldwide. While these groups were secular, religious and extremist groups also grew in the Middle East in the wake of the failure of the Arab nationalism in the 1976 war. They provided an alternative source of social welfare and education like the Muslim Brotherhood and enjoyed a measure of acceptance by the populations.

The 1979-1991 Period

Key events occurred during this period one of which was the Iranian Islamic revolution that led to the downfall of the American backed Shah regime sparking fears of the wave of revolutionary Shia Islam. This is also the period, which saw the Soviet Union invade Afghanistan and therefore the anti-Soviet Mujahedeen war lasting from 1979 to 1989. Volunteers from many parts of the Islamic world fought in Afghanistan supported by countries like Saudi Arabia and Yemen. He submits that in Yemen, the Riyadh backed Islamic Front was established to facilitate Yemen volunteers into the war. The Afghan experience churned out a pool of well trained and battle hardened militants that would later be used in insurgencies in other parts of the world like Kashmir, Chechnya, Bosnia and the Philippines. Other groups arose that enjoyed state sponsorship. Hezbollah, the pioneers of suicide bombers were allegedly supported by some Middle East states. This group was linked with 1983 bombing and deaths of the American marines in Beirut, Lebanon together with other atrocities targeting US and Western civilians and Government officials. Hezbollah is a

radical Shia group formed in 1982. It is strongly anti –Western and anti-Israel. The group allegedly has cells in Europe, Africa, South America, North America and Asia. Other radical groups emerging during this period include the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) and Al-Gammat Al-Islamiyya.

1991-2001 The Globalization of Terror

This has been traced to the disintegration of post-cold war states thus creating vacuums of stability and absence of governance in areas such as the Balkans, Afghanistan and now Somalia. These areas offer recruitment and training grounds for terrorism. Key groups in the new phase of militant Islamic terrorism include the Al-Qaeda, Armed Islamic Group, Aden-Abyan Islamic Army, Harakatul- Mujahidin, Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-i-Taiba. Al-Qaeda associated with the late Osama Bin Laden aims to coordinate a transnational mujahedeen network with a view to establishing a Muslim state throughout the world by overthrow of corrupt regimes in the Islamic world and the removal of foreign presence. The group provides logistical support to extremists in the world and with their call to Muslims to take up arms and kill U. S. citizens and their allies anywhere in the world is a dangerous and deadly call that can be taken up by disgruntled and unemployed youths in our part of the world with horrendous consequences. The evolution of terrorism demonstrates the potential danger out there for creation of linkages with these deadly groups and the urgency again for all actors to nip in the bud, any local insurgencies that might attract the support of the aforementioned groups. The unstable Somali, just like Afghanistan, can provide a training ground for terrorists. There is therefore need to address conflicts that can evolve into deadly terror actions.

2.3 Conflict as a breeding ground for Insurgency and Terrorism

It should be in the interest of a state to address conflicts that manifest through insurgencies

and acts of terror as fast and as comprehensively as possible. Conflicts are costly to both the state and populations in the conflict zones.

Mwagiru²⁷ (2006) explains that conflict arises when two or more parties have incompatible goals. This incompatibility comes into play due to different perceptions and ideas about how to achieve some of the goals. An unattended to conflict, festers in as long as actors in the conflict ignore it for dissonance will only be resolved through coming together to address it. The actors in the conflict muster support as the conflict rages by way of sympathy. The conflict in the Kenyan coastal stronghold of the MRC, is therefore about different sets of incompatible goals with the Government of Kenya. The conflict is therefore between MRC and the Government of the Republic of Kenya. Conflicts ultimately cause a breakdown of social order and may lead to injury or even deaths where they end up being full-blown conflagrations between actors. This will get to this level because of inability or unwillingness of parties to appreciate the other sides view of the situation. The bottom line therefore is for both parties to accept that the resolution of the conflict must start with the realization that they have different perceptions to the issues and seek ways to reconcile their divergent perspectives.

The causes of conflict can be attributed to several factors and as long as human beings are around, conflicts will always be with humanity since they are endemic and an inalienable part of human life. Conflicts can also be beneficial in the sense that they trouble shoot relationships and warn actors that things might be getting out of hand in society and hence call for preemptive remedial action. Due to the endemic nature of conflicts, the focus should

²⁷Mwagiru, M., '*Conflict in Africa, Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*', (Escape Printers, 2006) pp. 1-23

be on the management of the conflicts, if and when they emerge and not eradication of conflicts per se.

There is need to identify conflicts before they become full blown and he avers that some of them are not seen physically until they manifest through violence. But at close scrutiny potential conflicts in society can be understood by looking at structural relationships. This is best illustrated through the 'happy slave adage' where the inequitable distribution of power and resources is illustrated. The slave toils for the master who continues to amass wealth from the sweat and hard work of the former. The master maintains this relationship through manipulation and does not change this relationship to mutual benefit. The slave believes in the dignity of slaving for the master until a time comes when he examines the relationship closely and discovers the exploitation and the injustices therein. The slaves become the wiser and the relationship crumble leading to conflicts and revolutions in some instances to change the status quo. The central point of this argument is that exploitative relationships will in the fullness of time lead to conflict. The structures upon which such relationships are predicated upon need addressing to enable a win-win scenario for both actors. There will be for example industrial unrests as long as the captains of industry do not pay a decent wage. This is the reason why in Kenya, the Government prescribes a minimum wage to forestall disgruntlement by the workers. This regards formal employment. Might there be situations that foment disgruntlement in relationships outside employment? Where the local population doesn't seem to reconcile the resources they have within their environment and the poverty that afflicts them, from generations gone by, and the generations to come, there only needs a small trigger, and a self prophesied messiah, for a conflict to erupt. These might be the issues society grapples with as time goes by. As long as such issues go unresolved or notdiscussed and therefore unventilated, the conflicts will fester like a wound. Some of the inequalities that

could be associated with the comprador class will be embedded deep in the collective psyche of the society as underlying issues and could lie latent for a long time. Conflicts will flare up through trigger issues that simply bring to the fore the embedded issues. This may lead to conflict, which can be explained through Psychological theories.

2.4 Frustration- Aggression and Relative-Deprivation Theories

The two theories though limited in explaining all social conflicts, can be applicable in the study. The Frustration-Aggression theory posits that aggression though not innate in human beings, can be triggered by frustration at meeting some basic needs. Though this approach is more appropriate in explaining individual behavior, I argue that an individual forms the basic building block of the overall society and therefore this concept can be applied at the societal level. This can be further explained by examining the Hierarchy of Needs by Abraham Maslow²⁸, where human needs are categorized in a pyramidal diagram, where people are motivated to fulfill some needs upon which they move to the next rung. The lowest level in the pyramid is the made up of the basic needs or physiological needs for human survival like food, water, shelter and warmth. Upon these needs being met, they move to the next rung, which is about Security needs in terms of safety. The next level is the Social needs followed by Esteem and Self-actualization needs. When the basic needs are unfulfilled, a situation that happens in the conflict area, due to grinding poverty, people may feel frustrated, irritable and aggressive particularly where they locate their frustration at the inability of the system to provide for them despite the wealth around them. Satisfying these lower level needs alleviates unpleasant feelings and consequences. This goes together with Relative – Deprivation theory where groups compare themselves with others and associate and relate their deprivation of the means to meet their basic needs with the relative endowment of the

²⁸psychology.about.com/od/theoriesofpersonality/a/hierachyneeds.htm

others. They therefore rightly or wrongly assume that their plight of poverty is as result of others benefiting unfairly, from their resources. These feelings might have been harbored for a long time as latent, and only explode into conflict when triggered by seemingly unrelated events. This is due to structural differences where Galtung²⁹ (1958) defines structural violence as that which emanates from economic, social and psychological structures in a society that breed inequalities thereby causing tensions and ultimately conflict. The ensuing conflict will have a bearing on national security. The management of the conflict will also determine the extent to which the actors will accept the resolution of the conflict with the state and move on with their lives. I submit that mismanagement of conflict within the global village can reconfigure the actors into deadly terrorists.

2.5 National Security

States look after their national interests, which are the majoritarian interests of a nation, which in effect are the compromise of all conflicting interests of a nation. Core to these is security, which hinges on the survival of the state, sovereignty, protection of the belief system from external influences and change and the protection of the political system. National interests are therefore protected by states and this includes protection of the political, cultural, economic and social systems from disruptions through internal and external threats. The national interests can be categorized into supreme, vital, strategic and tactical. The supreme interests comprise the very survival of the state and this is where the security arm of the state focuses on, to deter and prevent threats by responding appropriately. Threats can be explained as actions and events that are aimed at undermining the national security over a brief span of time leading to the degradation of the quality of life in a nation.

²⁹Galtung, J., *'Theories of Conflict', Definitions, Dimentions, Negations, Formations,* (Columbia University, 1958) pp. 25-39

A threat is therefore a situation, which narrows down the policy options of response by states to use of force.

Buzan³⁰(1983) submits that the physical base of a state comprises its territory and population including its natural and manmade wealth within its borders. The physical base of all states faces common threats because they are similar despite variations in terms of extent, configuration, level of development and resources. Territory, which defines a state within the international system, can be threatened by both internal and external sources. Internal threats will include secessionist movements, which might undermine the very foundation of a state as a unitary entity. Some particular part of a state may be of immense value unlike others and therefore it will be the cardinal role of the state to safeguard it from annexation. The Kenya coast is the gateway to the landlocked countries of the East African region and hence puts the country in a strategic geopolitical advantage. States must protect the very statehood from both internal and external threats.

States are the actors within the international system founded at Westphalia in 1648, which effectively recognized the sovereignty and independence of states³¹. The Westphalia Treaty ended the Thirty Years War in Europe over the religion to be practised in different territories in Europe. The modern international system is therefore based on the building blocks of sovereign states. States therefore control territory and are responsible for their existence in view of lack of a leviathan to protect them. There is no world Government to tell states how to behave towards one another or even restrict belligerence of one state to another. This absence of a higher state is called anarchy, and therefore states operate within an anarchical

³⁰Buzan, B., *People, States and Fear. The National Security Problem in International Relations*, (The Harvester Press Ltd, 1983) pp. 16

³¹Rosenau, J. N., and Durfee, M. *Thinking Theory Thoroughly. Coherent Approaches to an Incoherent World*, (Westview Press, 2000,) pp.17-23

environment. States must therefore look out for themselves and strive to acquire capabilities, economic, military and political in order to favorably compete and survive in the international system. States therefore give security concerns the greatest priority and therefore enhance their security from military threats. This is all with a view to protecting the sovereignty of the state but it will portend a bigger challenge to protect self from external aggression from a weakened position due to internal uprisings and insurgencies. The state should therefore ensure that they are solidly secure internally as a unitary actor to enable it face the formidable external challenges in the anarchical system where there is a security dilemma. A state's power would therefore be predicated on the size of the population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence in diplomacy. Any insurgencies will undermine these capabilities, particular the weak states whose defining characteristic is their concern with domestically generated threats to their governments.

Insurgencies have been defined to refer to protracted political-military struggle directed towards subverting or displacing the legitimacy of a constituted government or occupying power and completely or partially controlling the recourses of a territory through the use of irregular military forces or illegal political organizations. They ordinarily pursue some common objectives to undermine the legitimacy of the government and bolster their own standing with the population. Insurgents could provoke the governments into committing abuses that will drive neutral civilians towards the insurgents. Governments are therefore expected to guard against this trap. Insurgents can also easily gain international recognition and attract financing which will cause a security nightmare for the state.

There are several counterinsurgency approaches to handling insurgencies that states have traditionally used. An enemy-centric approach that emphasizes the destruction of insurgent fighters and their infrastructure is easily adopted by states through over-reliance of the police and militaries. The other approach is population -centric, which targets to bolster the governments standing before the respective population. The aim is to undermine the insurgents by isolating them from the general population. The third approach seeks to punish not only the insurgents but also the general population. This was the approach adopted by the colonialists in Africa. The British not only fought the freedom fighters, the Mau Mau but also targeted the Kikuyu whom they believed were sympathetic to the fighters.

2.6 International Security

There is a nexus between international and national security in the sense that international threats to security and stability emanate from states and therefore international security is the sum total of all national securities. Globalization has globalized national securities. Insurgencies and civil wars will therefore threaten stability beyond the national realm. Booth³² (1991) argues that sovereignty and statehood does not hold that critical meaning as it used before. He says sovereignty is a token of its former self and that states only exist juridically. This is due to interdependence, advances in telecommunications, huge population growth that must survive beyond the state borders, the growing scope of non-state actors and the internationalization of the world economy among other factors. This blurs the physical boundaries of states and clearly indicates globalization which comes along with challenges including the peoples' demand for more meaning and fulfillment in their lives as they embrace a global identity. People can no longer be prevented from seeing how other human

³²Booth, K., '*Review of International Studies*', Vol. 17, No. 4, (Cambridge University Press Oct., 1991), pp.313-326

beings live elsewhere and would always compare their lot and demand more from their respective governments. While inter-states war has declined over the years, there is an upsurge in internal violence. While territorial threats may still exist, there are more urgent threats to the human beings and nations across the world through economic collapse, political oppression, scarcity, ethnic rivalry and terrorism.

The whole security concept has therefore changed from the traditional narrow military focus on external threats. Governments therefore should promote human rights and economic advancement to forestall ethnic rivalries and conflicts that can threaten domestic instability with international implications like the refugee problems and inter state conflicts. The M23 problem in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo has security implications in Uganda and Rwanda. This demonstrates that internal conflicts reverberate across other neighboring nations and hence configure as conflict systems through internalization. How do states therefore deal with this? Through emancipation as proposed by Critical theorists?

Emancipation is the process through which individuals and groups are empowered through removal of constraints that prevent them from pursuit of self-improving goals. The constraints are poverty, poor education, political oppression and marginalization from decision-making processes within their areas. This is what will produce true security and prevent conflicts that could evolve into terrorism trends. It is the role of states to provide the direction and see the people as ends and not means while states are the means towards achievement of social equity. This would make the people the referent object of security, contrary to the traditional thinking where states are the referent object of security. After all states exist for the people and not the other way round where people should exist for the state.

It should not be lost to us that despite social- economic inequalities, religious beliefs and political grievances, not all individuals turn to terrorism but these premises are key in addressing conflicts that may evolve into terrorism. Jarvis³³ (2009) also weighs in with tying terrorism with absolute poverty, relative deprivation and social injustice and at the global level; the economic stratification can be identified as a significant systematic factor behind contemporary terrorism. Terrorism could therefore be a reactionary backlash against advanced capitalism with its attendant economic asymmetry between states and within states, between the haves and the have-nots. The discontent, hopelessness and frustration that emerge in our lands of plenty need to be addressed before the same flourishes into political violence against the symbols of affluence. Religion, particular the type that emphasize self – sacrifice become the breeding ground for inspiration of hopeless folk. Lindauer boldly identifies three most common motivations for engaging in terrorism as, political, economic and social. Within the political aspect, individuals through fundamentalism are called upon to participate in contrast to a political culture that apply in most African countries where citizens are reduced to spectators as their rulers make decisions on their behalf. Individuals may also turn to terrorism because of the economic benefit. Jihad is a job³⁴. Individuals may also engage in terrorism because of companionship, fellowship and warmth promised to forlorn masses. The challenge to states is to focus on factors that breed disgruntlement of individuals by being a means to their ends. Nying'uro³⁵(2013) submits that it is important to understand the motives of the terrorists if counter terrorist measures are to be effective and argues that some terrorists and researchers have revealed a number of goals that terrorists attempt to achieve. Some of these are Terrorism for Subversion where terrorists subvert the legitimate administrations with a view to proving to the citizens the ineptness of particular

³³ Jarvis, L., *'The Spaces and Faces of Critical Terrorism Studies'*, Security Dialogue, Vol 40/Issue 1, (SAGE Publications, 2009) pp. 5-27

³⁴ Jessica, S., *'Mind Over Martyr'*, (Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2010) pp. 95-108

³⁵ Nyinguro, P. O., *'New Terrorism, Information Revolution and International Security'*, (Paper presented to the National Defense College, Kenya, Course 16/2013 in December, 2013)

governments at protecting or economically providing for the citizens. This is therefore aimed at sowing the seeds of disaffection by citizens as regards their government. Another motive would be self-determination. This motive is closely related to the preceding one in the sense that the government is portrayed as a failure to the citizens who would therefore be well provided for under self-determination. Terrorism has also been employed as a revolution tool aimed at weakening regimes. The targeted group gets intimidated, paralyzed and could over react and repress moderates. This might not necessarily lead to regime change but to reforms within the political system. He further assesses the challenges posed by international terrorism to international system by evaluating the potential of terrorist groups as international actors. These groups like other actors can affect international relations despite their illegitimate nature. International actors have been described as an autonomous unit that can influence the behavior of other autonomous actors. An international unit must pose autonomy and independence of other units where its behavior is not predicated on the activities of others or determined by other units. Al-Qaeda is one such group going by the 9/11 terror attack and others elsewhere.

An international actor is capable of triggering behavior in other units. Terror attacks have in this sense therefore forced other international actors within the international system adopt policies to counter the behavior of these illegitimate actors. Many states came up with the enactment of Anti-Terrorism legislations in the wake of therefore mentioned terror attack in the US and elsewhere. This transformed the U.S foreign policy behavior where counter terrorism became the focus of it policy effectively replacing the containment of communism situation that shaped its foreign policy during the cold war period. Aware that fighting global terrorism requires a multilateral approach the U. S has embraced many countries that it would have otherwise bullied. An example that demonstrates U. S. A shift of policy on other actors

is the case of its relations with Pakistan. The U.S.A lifted the sanctions it had imposed on Pakistan immediately after the 9/11 attack. The sanctions had been instituted to arm-twist General Musharaf into returning the country to civilian rule. U. S. A needed an ally in the fight against terror and icy relations with other actors had to thaw to bring them onboard the fight. Improved relations between countries are therefore critical in forging a common front to confronting this scourge. Countries have also been forced to reorganize their security apparatus to handle terror threats. The emergence of Homeland Security department in the U. S. A is an example of this internal reorganization of government in response to contemporary terror threats. Its role is to prevent terror attacks in the U.S.A and identify and eliminate terror threats before reaching the homeland. Terrorism has therefore impacted on the states within the international system. The new terrorism has embraced the revolution of information that has been brought about by globalization. Internet has enhanced the capabilities of terrorists to coordinate attacks across the globe without the presence of a hierarchical organization that can be penetrated and its actions thwarted by security agencies. The virtual networks that transcend territorial boundaries are used to spread extremists' ideas and also to recruit gullible and frustrated men and women.

I submit that conflicts and insurgencies, dealt through government clampdowns, might address the effect and not the underlying causes. Force and coercion settle conflicts without addressing the conflicts. In a zero sum game, the vanquished could retreat to emerge in the fullness of time, into a more capable and deadlier actor in a conflict. Globalization and the emergence of radical terror groups might easily hijack seemingly low intensity conflicts and radicalize the actors into terrorists.

CHAPTER THREE

THE MOMBASA REPUBLICAN COUNCIL, FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES AND GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT OF THE GROUP

3.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter will investigate, examine and analyze the nature and role of the Mombasa Republican Council in order to contextualize the fundamental issues and the Government's management of the insurgency group.

Qualitative and quantitative data will be generated in this chapter to answer to the hypotheses. Qualitative data will be acquired through primary and secondary documents. Quantitative data will specifically be generated as regards government's management of the insurgency through collection of primary data by way of administration of questionnaires. The sampling design in the study is stratified sampling where due to the limitations of time in getting a sample from the entire coast region, I zeroed down on Mombasa County. A stratified sampling is a situation where the population is divided into several strata or sub populations on the basis of common characteristic. A typical stratified sampling would further have several sub populations and hence many strata upon which to draw a representative sample.³⁶ The key characteristic here is the cosmopolitan nature of the target county compared to Kwale, Taita/Taveta, Kilifi, Tana River and Lamu counties. Mombasa is also the capital city within the coastal region and indeed it was the provincial headquarters of the Coast Province before devolution took shape and did away with provinces. Mombasa will

³⁶ Kothari, C. R., '*Research Methodology, Methods and Techniques*' (New Age International Publishers, 2004) pp. 62

also constitute a heterogeneous population in terms of ethnicity and faiths unlike say Kwale, for example, which is predominantly Digo and Islam or Taita/Taveta County which is predominantly Taita and Taveta ethnically constituted and Christian. Mombasa would also be arguably more aware of the MRC factor in the Coast region due to the highly publicized court cases, which were heard and determined in the town. Upon choosing Mombasa on the basis of the aforementioned reasons, I choose a particular cadre of persons to administer the questionnaire upon, the Chiefs. This is another stratum in the Mombasa county population. This is a critical cadre in security and indeed they form part of the security apparatus of a region. Chiefs are appointed by government from where they reside and are therefore very knowledgeable of happenings within their locations. They are also likely to come from different faiths and ethnic groups due to the cosmopolitan nature of the city and would therefore give a fairly objective response to the questions. Chiefs are also part and parcel of their populations and serve and retire in the same general area unlike other public servants who serve in different regions of the republic. Chiefs therefore have institutional memories of their locations and one key criterion for appointment of chiefs is a thorough knowledge of the area he or she applies to serve. I consider them the best target group to give me the required information. In view of their numbers in Mombasa County, we will cover the entire population. To ensure unrestrained responses, we will not require them to give their names and stations in the questionnaire. The MRC factor being a security issue and therefore sensitive, this assures the chiefs of confidentiality and therefore non-attribution to any response that could be at variance with the general government position. The questionnaire will clearly ask them NOT to give their names and indeed assure them of confidentiality in handling the responses. The table below gives a snap shot of the County and the administrative units, specifically the locations where the questionnaires will be administered. Administratively, the County is divided into four sub-counties namely; Mvita, Changamwe,


Kisauni, and Likoni and thirty county assembly wards. These are further sub-divided into twenty locations and thirty-five sub-locations as shown in the Table 3.1 below.

Table 3.1 Mombasa County Administrative units

Sub-County	Area in km 2	Number of Locations	Number of Sub-locations
Mvita	14.6	7	11
Kisauni	22.9	2	6
Nyali	106.3	2	3
Likoni	41.1	4	6
Changamwe	29.0	3	5
Jomvu	16.0	2	4
Total	229.9	20	35

Source: Mombasa County Development Profile, 2013

Fig 3.1 Map of the Mombasa County



Source. Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2010

3.1 The Mombasa Republic Council: History

The history of the group can be traced back to the 1996-1998 dreaded Kaya Bomb sect that was dismantled by the Government. The group reactivated into the Mombasa Republic Council in 2009 and draws its membership from the indigenous coastal populations of the Swahili, Arab and the Mijikenda.

3.2 Leadership/ Command Structure

The group has a hierarchical leadership structure that starts with the Chairman, the Secretary General and Spokesman. The structure devolves to the grassroots level where there is a point's man in the South Coast, who is the chairman of the Council of Elders. The officials are concentrated within Kwale and Mombasa counties. Analyses of their names indicate that they all profess the Islam faith.

The group has increased its membership by opening operational secretariats in most locations at the coast, which are mandated to mobilize finances through fundraisings within their respective areas to augment sources from selling their manifestos, Pwani Si Kenya (Coast is not Kenya) T/shirts, calendars with their ideologies, group's flags, membership cards, donations from politicians and businessmen and off shore sympathizers including *allegedly*, groups like Al-Shabab. The agenda for the group is secession from the Republic of Kenya due to marginalization in land administration, employment opportunities, access and benefits from the sea, political appointments, and lack of stake in proceeds emanating from tourism and the Kenya Ports Authority and development in general.

3.4 The MRC Manifesto³⁷

In the introduction, The Mombasa Republican council indicate that they are not concerned with the Kenyan constitution and in effect do not consider themselves to be under this sacrosanct law of the Republic of Kenya. Their reasoning is that the Coast region is a separate legal entity under a protectorate. They also indicate that the Coast region is actually Mombasa, which extends from the Indian Ocean to Sultan Hamud in Makueni County of the former Eastern province and from LungaLunga of Kwale County to Kismayu in Somalia.

³⁷<http://jukwaa.proboards.com/thread/5762>

The Mombasa country is owned by the Mijikendas³⁸ who are the Giriama, Duruma, Digo, Jibana, Kambe, Chonyi, Rabai, Kauma and Ribe; and Taita, Pokomo, Bajuni, Arabs, Hindus and other indigenous groups of the coastal region. The manifesto claims that the aforementioned groups have suffered a lot of injustices since Kenya gained her independence from Britain in 1963. They further claim that the region has been looted of her wealth by other Kenyans. They demand that their colonial masters, Kenya, repeal the 8/10/63 agreement, CMND 2161. They also demand that Kenya removes its administration and grants them independence.

They argue that during independence for Kenya in 1963, the Protectorate was deemed unprepared for autonomy due to lack of organization then, hence the British and the Zanzibar administrations placed the region under the protection of the Kenyan Government. It further claims that this was pursuant to agreement CMND 2161, where in paragraph 4, the third and fourth lines, the Kenyan Government took certain undertakings as regards the protection of the region. The reasons for this were allegedly well illustrated in the colony and Protectorate of Kenya sessional paper no. 9 of 1961, chapter 'v'. It states that some people in the region wanted to maintain a relationship with Her Majesty's government so as to defend the region from the invasion of upcountry tribes. This was allegedly captured in the letters exchanged between M. Shamte and Mr. Jomo Kenyatta in London, 5th October 1963. Time is therefore ripe for self-administration by the Mombasa Republican Council. The Government of the Republic of Kenya is hence being urged to nullify the 8th October 1963 agreement. This would remove the colonial and cruel Kenyan masters for independence. The Mombasa Republican Council would then form own government and the coast region will cease being a

³⁸ www.kenya-information-guide.com.Mijikenda_tribe.html. The Mijikenda are Kenyan Coastal Bantu tribes consisting of nine closely related sub-tribes'. The word Mijikenda directly translated means 'Nine Homesteads', implying a common ancestry. They each have own dialects that are closely related. They profess Christian, Islam and Traditional faiths. Islam is however more spread among the Digo.

province of the Republic of Kenya but an autonomous state. This will enable the state appoint own people to run regional based parastatals and other sectors of the economy.

The Mombasa Republican Council thus demands the removal of their administrative apparatus from the office of the president to the local village elders, since the government is illegally administering the region going by the 8th October 1963 agreement. This explains the government's use of force in grabbing land in such areas like Vipingo-Kikambala, Watamu and the Mswambweni area for titanium mining. The people are totally fed up with the current administration that kills and loots innocent people. This therefore is the reason to have a very strong and fair administration made up of very well trained, disciplined and well-kitted security forces.

The elected President will not be above the law and will be liable for prosecution in court when there is a breach of law. The Government would also closely monitor the performance of ministers. The government would specifically do the following, pursuant to the manifesto:

Administration

- Port Authority. The government will ensure that the port services are competitive, efficient and fast in transacting business.
- Provision of Identification Documents. The government would provide birth certificates, identity cards and passports free of charge, six months following the birth of a Mombasa citizen.
- Freedom of Worship. These freedoms will be safeguarded and all the worship places like churches, mosques, kayas, Hindu temples and other recognized will be protected.
- Harassment of wananchi. Police will apply rules fairly without harassing the people.
- Administration. The administration will be composed of indigenous coastal people that will not demolish and burn owners' houses, assaulting the people, killing them,

land grabbing, bad governance and other ills witnessed in the Government of Kenya administration.

- Hawkers. They will not be harassed and land will be set aside for conduct of their businesses.
- Public Toilets. There will be reinstated for the convenience of the people.
- Justice. This will be maintained at all times and fairly to all people.
- Difference. The Mombasa Government will be made significantly different from the region currently under the Kenya government colony.

Land and Settlement

- Upon Mombasa attaining independence, all the land will belong to the Mombasa citizens.
- All the land held by foreigners (Kenyans) will be reviewed with a view to establishing ownership and acquisition.
- All the grabbed land will be returned to the wananchi.
- A new land law to guide distribution and ownership will be enacted.
- Regional Independence Land committees will be established to distribute land to all coastals and hence making them proud of the mother land.
- The land title deeds will be under the Government of Mombasa.
- The term squatters and crown land will not be relevant anymore.
- The government will provide proper and permanent settlements to all citizens.
- The Government will form a home care unit for the widows, orphans, elders and the disabled.

Education

- The education fund will be properly used as per the intended purposes.
- The government will build and equip and finance institutions from kindergarten to the

universities.

- The students will be accorded free education.
- The educated will be given employment opportunities in the home companies and other sectors according to their professions.
- The citizens will be allowed to further their education from where they terminated during the Kenyan Government administration to spur performance.
- Students will be given opportunities to study abroad.

Finance

- The government will provide free religious education.
- The Mombasa government will make sure all resources are distributed equally.
- The Mombasa government will ensure an international market for the cash crops.
- They will engage with both developing and developed countries on trade matters to uplift the economy.
- Funds will be appropriated to ministries as approved by parliament.
- There will be a friendly taxation regime to businesses unlike the current practice.
- The government will also reduce the taxes levied to the landlocked East African neighbors who use the port facilities in recognition that they have no options.
- 68% of revenue collected in the region will go to the marginalized areas of Kinango, Ganze, Magarini and others.
- The government will ensure that basic needs of the citizens are met.
- The government will fairly collect taxes from own wealth like titanium mining, ocean resources like petroleum, agriculture, tourism, wildlife, livestock and industries.
- All unemployed citizens will be provided with a monthly subsistence.
- Small-scale businesses will operate without licenses or permits.

Health

- There would be modern technology and free medical care for the citizens.
- Trained doctors will be given an opportunity to work in the health sector, presumably public health sector.
- All public hospitals will be properly equipped with medicines.
- All citizens will be medically covered.

Tourism/Wildlife & Natural Resources

- The tourism sector will be improved and protected.
- The cultural heritage of the people will be exhibited in properly erected entertainment places along the beach and hotels.
- The national heritage in terms of museums, cultural and traditional dress, dances and sites e.g. Gede ruins will be protected and projected globally.
- All the forests and rangelands will be reserved for wildlife.
- There will be a strong fresh water board to ensure sufficient water for the people and livestock.
- Minerals will be protected and exploited for the benefit of the people.
- The land where gemstones will be discovered will be set aside and mined under the Government.
- The locals will get preferential treatment as regards sea resources for economic empowerment. The ocean being a god given gift to them.
- The locals will get the best tourism sector training for empowerment in the industry akin to what Utalii College offers.
- The wildlife will be properly protected.
- The hotels and cottages will be maintained at the best standards to enable them compete globally.
- The fees will be reduced to attract more tourists and revenue for the country.

- The beach boys and operators will be licensed and expected to be disciplined and harass tourists not.
- The government will ensure the tourists are protected. Good roads will be done in the parks.
- Terrorism will be fought through well-trained police.
- Animal parks will be extended and animals acquired from other countries.
- Only well trained tour guides will offer their services in the industry.

The manifesto implores all the indigenous Kenyan coastal people to join hands, wake up and get all the that has been mentioned and many others that they cannot get under the current leadership of selfish masters.³⁹

Activities of the Group

The Kenyan security agencies indicated that the group had intensified its activities in the region, which constituted a major security threat by aggressive recruitment of new members, administration of oaths and combat training. The group had also allegedly established links with off shore sympathizers who would offer training. They openly addressed their followers and articulated their secession agenda fearlessly and spreading propaganda regarding their hopes of an independent Coast region. They also fueled fear among non-indigenous coastal populations by identifying their properties for distribution if and when they evicted them out of the independent region. Violence attributed to the group had been witnessed at Chena Gade Administration Police post in Kaloleni, Riketa in TanaDelta, killing of the Cabinet Minister then Kingi's police escort in October, 2012 and disrupting Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission mock elections in Malindi in October, 2012.

The group also formed a shadow cabinet to oversee the implementation of their agenda with

³⁹ibid

coordinators in Kwale, Kilifi, Mombasa, Lamu, Tana River and Taita-Taveta Counties. The MRC precursor, was the Kaya Bombo Group. This group was made up of the Coast youth bitter with alleged discrimination in the land policies at the region. This group was formed in the count down to the 1997 general elections. The group derived their name from their base at Kaya Bombo in Kwale County. The raiders dressed in peculiar uniform bearing a star and a crescent moon and armed with rifles and machetes targeted upcountry people for extermination. On the night of 13th August, 1997 hundreds of people invaded Likoni police station stealing guns and killing thirteen people among whom were six police officers. Several raids followed this brazen attack targeting the upcountry people with the aim of having them leave the region. The raiders sited marginalization by the government in support of the foreigners

Training

The security sources indicated that the group had been receiving training from Kenyan ex-servicemen in forests around Likoni, Kilifi and Malindi and in a neighbouring country. Trained members were also reported to be radicalized and mandated to attack security agencies for purposes of obtaining arms and thereby recommended full application of the constitution, persuading the youth, elders and religious leaders to denounce the group in public gatherings, intensify intelligence gathering and sharing in the region, intensifying security patrols to maintain critical presence in all prone areas, liaising with the media to deny the group coverage, monitoring the activities of the ex-servicemen, proper custody of weaponry and a formation of a supervisory team to closely monitor the situation on the ground.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Kenya Security Agencies. , *Mombasa Republican Council Report*, (October 2013)

Ndifi (2013) refers to the group as socio-political and secessionist movement pushing for the agenda to establish self-governance on the basis that the coastal region is no longer part of Kenya. This is based on an agreement allegedly signed between Kenya's first Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta and the Zanzibari's Mohamed Shamte to have the region under Nairobi governance for only 50 years beginning 1963 until 2013. He submits that most of the MRC membership is not in support of secession but feel neglected and deprived of opportunities. Official data indicate that four of the poorest counties are from the coastal region and the number of people living below the poverty line in the region ranges between 70% to 80 %. One of the grievances is on land administration where 82% of non-coastal people have title deeds while only 38% of Coastal born have these important documents.⁴¹

3.5 Geographical and Historical Background

The Coast Region of Kenya consists of a coastal strip on the Indian Ocean that is inhabited by the Mijikenda, Swahili and Arabs with an estimated population of approximately 22.5 Million. This region came under the rule of Omani Arabs based in Zanzibar following the expulsion of the Portuguese colonialists in the late 18th century. The Sultan of Zanzibar leased the region then known as 'al-Zanj' to the British East African Company in 1888. An 1895 treaty between Britain and the Sultan put the region under the formal protection of the British, where the residents remained the subjects of the Sultan and not the British crown. This is the point where the MRC lays claim to the its independence from post independence Kenya couple with the earlier mentioned treaty between Kenya's first Prime Minister and his Zanzibar counterpart in 1963. Evidence has not been sufficiently adduced.

In 1908 the British ordinance transferred uncultivated land from the traditional owners to the state as crown land, which gave the state power to distribute same, as it deemed appropriate

⁴¹ Ndifi, T., 'Dealing with Mombasa Republican Council', Horn of Africa Bulletin (March-April 2013) pp. 1-4

during the post-colonial Kenya. The crown land has therefore been distributed to non-Coastal people for industrial and settlement purposes at the chagrin of the indigenous people. The locals face massive unemployment and the wealth from the tourism and port does not make its way into the hands of the locals. Many young people get sucked up into drugs and commercial sex industry. The Coast residents believed that independence would transfer the land back to them from the colonial power and not to the new administration.

The evolution of the MRC

The group pursued its secessionist agenda initially through the Coast and employed the Pwani Si Kenya slogan and “NchiMpyaMaishaMapya” meaning Coast is Not Kenya and New Country New Life as clarion calls for their quest for independence. The movement was banned in October 2010 upon which it moved to court and subsequently had the ban lifted at the Mombasa high court on July 25th July, 2011. The police were however instructed to arrest the MRC leaders in a subsequent ruling.

Masinjila (2011) submits that the MRC is not a new movement but an extension of the past attempts by the region to find their place in the post-independence Kenya and argues that even during pre-independence Kenya, the issues then revolved around the Coast region remaining isolated from the rest of Kenya. This was borne out of fear of domination by the Arabs from the gulf region and the settlers from upcountry communities. This would later explain the formation of the Islamic Party of Kenya in 1992 whose identity was castigated as being anti-African Arabs that were interested in reintroducing decolonization and slavery. This led to the formation of the state sponsored United Muslims of Africa, which drew its support from Muslims of African background and this would serve as the beginning of violent politics in the region. Since IPK was becoming popular among sections of the Muslims, UMA was formed to split the powerful Muslim constituency forming, along racial

lines. UMA was therefore not formed to fulfill any aspirations of the African Muslims but to sabotage the IPK by

“various operations which included petrol bombing of targeted areas, fighting, invasion of Old Town (neighborhood in Mombasa) and hijacking of Khalid Balala and others”⁴².

Transitional politics of 1997 would draw out the Kaya Bombo group and in effect militarize issues at the coast⁴³.

3.6 Fundamental Issues

i. Land ownership and management

This has been cited as one the major historical injustices to be committed on the people of the coast region. Despite the National Assembly making recommendations on the matter upon past enquiries on the issue, implementation by the executive has not been done.

The Parliamentary Departmental Committee on Administration and National Security; and the Select Committee on Equal Opportunity, on the Matter of Inquiry into the Activities of the Mombasa Republican Council identified the land problems in terms of illegal and un-procedural adjudication of Government land where settlement schemes in Lamu and Taita/Taveta clearly violated people’s right to own land.⁴⁴ The schemes created resettled people brought from upcountry. Kijibwa settlement scheme was allegedly allocated to the rich at the expense of the deserving squatters. The Kilifi Golf Club in Kilifi was allocated land belonging to the Chonyicomunity. The few that their land has not been taken do not have titles to their parcel. Most land in the coastal region is not adjudicated, making it low in

⁴²Ndzovu, H., ‘Muslims and Party Politics and Electoral Campaigns in Kenya’, (ISITA 2009) pp. 6-7

⁴³Masinjila, M., ‘The Transformation of Violence through an African Comparative Lens: Lessons for Violence Prevention’,(NPI- Africa 2011) pp. 9-11

⁴⁴Kenya National Assembly., ‘The Report on the Joint Departmental Committee on Administration and National Security; and The Select Committee on Equal Opportunity, on the Matter of the Inquiry into the Activities of the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC.)’ Clerk’s Chambers, August 2012

value so that on the willing seller- willing buyer, the indigenous people do not get real value for their land. The lack of titles also renders the land useless as collateral for securing financial resources from banks and other lenders. This has fueled exploitation by fraudsters who grab land from the illiterate locals thereby rendering them landless. In Ganze area for example 99% of the land was not demarcated at 2012. It was further alleged that most of the arable land had either been grabbed by the Arabs or the upcountry people, where titles were processed leaving them squatters on their own parcels.

The people displaced during the post election violence of 2007/2008 were allegedly allocated land. This is at variance with the treatment of the indigenous people who have not been resettled anywhere after they were disposed of their land. State officers had also misused their offices by allocating land to people of their own ethnic group.

Syaga⁴⁵(2009) submits that in the past land in Coast was allocated contrary to the laid down procedures. Powerful officers abrogated the power to allocate land on themselves for very curious reasons. The Provincial Administration and politicians have been fingered as the culprits in the land transactions. These offices had absolutely no legal authority to allocate land, which was seen as a resource to be dished out to politically correct individuals and interested buyers, leading to inequalities and abuse of protected areas like forests, riparian areas and historical sites. Such cases for example involved a Provincial Commissioner for the Coast Province in the 1970s who allocated beach plots along the Indian Ocean Coast. This was contrary to the laid down procedures where one was required to make an application to the Registrar of Titles in Mombasa who would in turn forward the same to the Commissioner

⁴⁵Syaga, M., '*Public Land, Historical Land Injustices and the New Constitution*', Constitution Working Paper No. 9 (Society for International Development, 2009) pp. 14-15

of lands for appropriate action. Allegedly, the then Provincial Commissioner made recommendations for allocation directly to the Commissioner of lands to enable him facilitate acquisition of prime beach plots by powerful individuals outside the Coast region. During Mahihu's time, however, he made the recommendations for allocation directly to the Commissioner of Lands to facilitate the acquisition of beach plots by powerful individuals, mostly from outside Coast Province

Syaga further submits that;

“Seven years after independence, President Kenyatta issued a quiet decree on the acquisition of beach plots and what came to be known as second-row plots. Only Coast Provincial Commissioner, Eliud Mahihu could identify and recommend those qualified for these plots. The reality was that those who earned Mahihu's favour were highly placed political and civil service elites and their business associates.

Mahihu used his position to feather his own nest – building a multi-million shilling empire that made him one of the richest people in independent Kenya. He owned expansive land in Coast Province, including prime beach plots and hotels on the vast stretches of the Indian Ocean coastline. His signature meant the difference between being the proud owner of a beach plot or not, as he had the sole responsibility of approving purchases. Even Charles Njonjo, the former powerful Attorney General, wrote to Mahihu on government letterhead in both English and Kikuyu as he sought help for his friends.

Having very few people of their own in the right offices, the coastal communities largely missed out on the ensuing scramble for the beach plots, now worth billions of shillings. Coast Province bears the dubious distinction of having the largest number of squatters in Kenya – an anomaly that started in the colonial period, but which was deepened by the Kenyatta government. The land grabbing by the independence elite disinherited millions of Coast residents”.

ii. Allocation of National Resources

The Mombasa Port and the tourism industry is a major contributor to the country's GDP but the resource allocation to the region has not been commensurate with what it generates. Due to lacuna in law, some counties in the coast region have not fully benefitted from the resources therein. TaitaTavetaCounty for example is endowed with enormous mineral wealth. It has both industrial and gemstone minerals from iron ore, muscovite,dolomite,kaoline,magnetite, vermiculite, graphite, marble and kainite. It also has tanzanite, yellow tourmaline, amethyst, red garnet, iolite, chewier garnet, green tourmaline, green garnet, pyrite, rhodolite, ruby, pink tourmaline and blue sapphire. It is said that part of this district lies within gemstone belt that extends along the Africa East past from Malagasy and Mozambique into Sudan and Arabia. Mining is a capital-intensiveundertaking, which has led to the influx of people from outside the district with recourses for the activity supported by the district comprador class. The feelings of depravity by the locals would have been reasonably tempered if the exploitation of these recourses went into the local administration to improve services. By 2009, mining was still governed by the Mining Act Chapter 306 of the Laws of Kenya, which came into effect on 1st October, 1940, which vests the minerals under or upon any land in the Government. It is also the commissioner of Mines with power to issue dealer's licenses and that all royalties were then payable to the national government. Mined land is rendered useless after the excavation for use for any other productive purpose. To exemplify this further Taita/Taveta county land mass is categorized as shown on the table below:

Table 3.2 Land Use in Taita /Taveta District

S/No	Description	Area in km2	%
1	Tsavo East and West National parks	10,539	62
2	Range lands	4,057	24
3	Arable land	1,930	11
4	Lakes, wetlands and rocks	449	11

Source: Taita District Development Plan 2008-2012

This tells that the parks occupy the better part of the land leaving only 11% to arable farming. Within the parks are tourist establishments, which are approved and erected through the National Government pursuant to the wildlife act, Chapter 376 of the Laws of Kenya. The act mandates the director of Kenya Wildlife service to control, manage and maintain all national parks. How much is channeled back to the county to improve services and generally enhance the standards of living of the local populace?⁴⁶ What formula is used by the Commission of Revenue Allocation in sharing out resources to the counties?

iii. Infrastructure

⁴⁶Mwachala, J. E., ' *Factors Affecting Provision of Services in Local authorities: A Case Of Taita County Council* ', (A Research Project, Institute of Business Studies, Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology, 2009) pp. 18-20

This is another issue that breeds disaffection among the residents in the region. The road network is generally poor in the region. The Lamu County for example does not have any tarmac road and even roads that link the country to other states have been neglected. Successive administrations have not addressed the dilapidated Mwatate-Taveta road that links the country to the Republic of Tanzania. The road from the city to Moi International airport is a poor state single carriageway despite it leading to the beach tourism hub. Malindi airport has not been improved and expanded despite the huge tourism potential, unlike the case for Kisumu airport that was quickly upgraded.

Below is a table depicting the road infrastructure across constituencies in the coast region.

Table 3.3 Road Infrastructure in Coast Region

Constituency	Paved kms	Unpaved kms				
Bura	178.46	0				
Changamwe	9.81	0				
Galole	44.48	26.62	Priority roads for bituminization (in order of priority)			
			Road link within the Constituency			Kms
			Road ID	From	To	
			B8	Hola	Wenje	26.62
Ganze	0	11.12	Priority roads for bituminization (in order of priority)			
			Road link within the Constituency			Kms
			Road ID	From	To	
			C115	Magogoni	Kitsoeni	11.12
Garsen	81.231	50.03	Priority roads for bituminization (in order of priority)			
			Road link within the Constituency			Kms
			Road ID	From	To	
			B8	Wenje	Kokani	50.03
Jomvu	11.22	0				
Kaloleni	61.869	6.47	Ongoing road bituminization in the constituency (if any)			
			Road link within the Constituency			
			Road ID	From	To	Kms
			C107	Kaloleni	Chalani/Mihingoni	6.47
Kilifi North	69.76	17.676	Ongoing road bituminization in the constituency (if any)			
			Road link within the Constituency			
			Road ID	From	To	Kms To

			C107	Mavueni	Ngomboni	4.54	
			Priority roads for bituminization (in order of priority)				
			Road link within the Constituency				Kms
			Road ID	From	To		
			C115	Tezo	Magogoni	13.136	
			C103			4.54	
Kilifi South	21.63	22.01	Ongoing road bituminization in the constituency (if any)				
			Road link within the Constituency				Kms
			Road ID	From	To		
			C107	Chalani/Mihingoni	Ng'ombeni	19.01	
			Priority roads for bituminization (in order of priority)				
			Road link within the Constituency				Kms
			Road ID	From	To		
			C115	Kitzoeni	Dzitsoni	3	
Kinango	53.15	81.32	Priority roads for bituminization (in order of priority)				
			Road link within the Constituency				Kms
			Road ID	From	To		
			C107	Kinango	Mariakani	42.04	
			C106	Kinango	Marere	15.07	
			C106	Kinango	Mwereni	24.21	
Kisauni	7.05	0					
Lamu East	0	0					
Lamu West	11.33	82.23	Priority roads for bituminization (in order of priority)				
			Road link within the Constituency				Kms
			Road ID	From	To		
			C112	Nyangoro	Mokowe Jetty	82.23	
Likoni	12.3	0.78					
LungaLunga	41.48	44.43	Priority roads for bituminization (in order of priority)				
			Road link within the Constituency				Kms
			Road ID	From	To		
			C106	Mwereni River	A14 Junction	27.17	
			C108	Mrima	Bumbani	17.26	
Magarini	64.59	56.64					
Malindi	10.34	41.42	Priority roads for bituminization (in order of priority)				
			Road link within the Constituency				Kms
			Road ID	From	To		
			C103	LangoMbaya	Malindi	41.42	
Matuga	35.2	35.61	Priority roads for bituminization (in order of priority)				

			Road link within the Constituency			Kms
			Road ID	From	To	
			C106	Kwale	Marere Bridge	12.23
			C108	Milalani	Majimboni	23.38
Msambweni	36.61	10.52	Priority roads for bituminisation (in order of priority)			
			Road link within the Constituency			Kms
			Road ID	From	To	
			C108	Majimboni	Mwabungo	10.52
Mvita	25.03	0				
Mwatate	28.1	55.47	Ongoing road bituminisation in the constituency (if any)			
			Road link within the Constituency			Kms
			Road ID	From	To	
			A23	Mwatate	Modambogho	17.9
			Priority roads for bituminisation (in order of priority)			
			Road link within the Constituency			Kms
			Road ID	From	To	
			A23	Mwatate	Mwakitau	37.57
Nyali	6.869	0				
Rabai	34.088	0				
Taveta	0.138	55.252	Priority roads for bituminisation (in order of priority)			
			Road link within the Constituency			Kms
			Road ID	From	To	
			A23	Mwakitau	Taveta	55.252
Voi	149.207	182.639				
Wundanyi	1.892	0.636	Priority roads for bituminisation (in order of priority)			
			Road link within the Constituency			Kms
			Road ID	From	To	
			C104	Wundanyi	D536 Junction	0.636

Source: Ministry of Roads and Infrastructure, Kenya

iv. Religious Discrimination

The Muslim community within the region believe that the fight against terror has led to stereotyping Muslims as potential terrorists. Shetret et al (2013) posit that the Kenyan security forces are behaving badly among the marginalized communities of coastal Kenya. The counterterrorism agenda seemingly has spurned unethical practices against the people by the security services. This has in effect elicited disaffection by the people in what they see as repressive tendencies against them. This is not only confined to Kenya but it is allegedly the

general feeling in the East African region. Many people do not view the quest on professionalizing the police department to have any major impact on the police practices.

They still feel, despite the ongoing police reforms, that they still don't respect human rights and continue to hold suspects in prolonged detention contrary to what the law provides for, on allegation of belonging to certain groups. Cases of torture were also alleged on the basis of what they perceive to be an inherent Muslim bias when conducting operations that revolve around terrorism. Fears were expressed that the security agencies labeled stereotyped all Muslims as being sympathetic to terrorism, which is entirely incorrect. The terror suspects who happen to be Muslims do not represent the faith in their nefarious acts. General interviewees allegedly cast aspersions as to the capacity of the police to competently investigate and prosecute crime. They are also underfunded and ill equipped to deal with complicated crimes and hence are tempted to look for soft targets they profile as terrorists on the basis of faith. Some cited the force as being more reactive as opposed to being proactive in combating crime and nipping it in the bud before the fact. They expressed concern that many a times the security services react to bombing attacks and not to terrorism prevention.

These negative perceptions on the security services unfortunately undermine the war against crime, including terror. The local communities are not duty bound and morally obligated to share critical information they could have on crime. This could perhaps explain why one of the al-Qaeda terror suspects Fazul Abdulla Mohammed found sanctuary in Malindi and managed to escape police dragnets. He was one of the al-Qaida's top operatives in Africa who had a \$ 5m bounty from the US on his head and managed to escape a police raid in his hideout in Malindi in 2008. He was associated with the masterminding of simultaneous al-Qaida attacks in Mombasa in 2002. A car packed with explosives rammed into an Israeli-

owned hotel, killing 15 people, and two surface-to-air missiles were fired at an Israeli charter plane, narrowly missing their target. He has been indicted in the US for involvement in earlier attacks on the American embassies in the Kenyan capital Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, which occurred in 1998 killing 235 people.⁴⁷

More than half of the country's four million Muslims live in the coast province and there are perceptions that they suffer discrimination when attempting to secure government jobs, official documents and public services. This was attributed to the Christian based civic education put in place by the British colonial rule which created a mismatch between what Muslims school offer and the national qualifications sought for public office. This creates structural inequalities, which are amplified further when graduates of the colonial education system are posted to preside over public affairs in Muslim communities. Violent extremism in public discourse is more often than not couched within the Islamic context thereby deepening the fissures of discrimination.

v. Discrimination In National Appointments

The region feels marginalized in national appointments and unhappy with how their sons and daughters are hounded out of office. They cite the case of Jecinta Mwatela who left the Deputy Governorship of Central Bank under unclear circumstances.

vi. Drugs and substance abuse

Drug and substance abuse is a national problem but statistics indicate that it might be more at the coastal region. The National Authority for the Campaign Against Alcohol and Drug Abuse, NACADA Authority carried out a Rapid Situation Assessment of The Status of Drug and Substance Abuse in Kenya and came up with the some revealing findings about the problem in terms of all regions.

⁴⁷ Rice, X., The Guardian Monday 4 August 2008 14.14 BS

Table 3.4 Accesses to Narcotic Drugs by Region(%)

Type of Drug/ Substance	Region	Very Difficult	Fairly Difficult	Fairly Easy	Very Easy	Do not Know	N
Bhang	National	29	13.4	15	34.2	8.4	2558
	Nairobi	21.5	9.9	13.9	42.1	12.6	302
	N. Eastern	43.0	24.7	11.8	20.4	-	93
	Coast	31.4	9.3	6.2	43.4	9.7	226
	Central	9.2	10.6	22.8	48.1	9.2	368
	Eastern	27.8	10.8	15.4	35.2	10.8	389
	R. Valley	39.7	12.2	14.9	23.9	9.3	624
	Nyanza	26.2	20.3	14.1	37.2	2.1	290
	Western	37.2	19.5	14.3	22.9	6.0	266
Cocaine	National	57.5	6.3	3.6	5.1	27.6	2549
	Nairobi	57.8	10.0	3.7	7.6	20.9	301
	N. Eastern	79.6	5.4	1.1	6.0	9.7	93
	Coast	50.0	10.2	5.3	27.6	19.9	226
	Central	43.7	8.7	7.7	20.9	35.5	366
	Eastern	63.8	6.2	2.8	9.7	23.8	387
	R. Valley	56.1	2.9	2.4	19.9	35.5	622
	Nyanza	77.7	6.9	2.1	35.5	10.3	291

	Western	46.8	3.0	2.7	23.8	43.0	263
Heroin	National	58.5	4.9	2.6	35.5	29.3	2530
	Nairobi	59.3	3.9	2.7	10.3	22.0	300
	N. Eastern	80.6	1.6	1.1	4.3	10.8	93
	Coast	50.4	3.1	4.9	15.5	20.4	226
	Central	48.2	0.7	3.9	3.9	36.8	361
	Eastern	66.1	1.9	1.6	1.8	24.9	386
	R. Valley	55.6		3.1	2.3	36.9	615
	Nyanza	78.1		0.7	2.8	14.9	288
	Western	44.4	1.5	1.9	6.1	46.0	261

Source: NACADA, 2012

Drug traffickers have turned East Africa into a drug trafficking hub. This is due to the weak maritime border controls in Kenya and Tanzania which is evidenced by the fact that most cocaine and heroin seized in the two countries has come through sea ports.

According to a report by the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) East and West Africa seem to be gaining in prominence with regard to routes for maritime trafficking. A new maritime route going southwards from Afghanistan via ports in the Islamic Republic of Iran or Pakistan is increasingly being used by traffickers to reach consumer markets through East and West African ports. Since 2009, seizures of heroin have risen sharply in Africa, especially in East Africa, where they increased almost 10-fold.⁴⁸ Weldon⁴⁹(2013) argues that illicit drug abuse and HIV/AIDS have increased rapidly in the past 10 years along the coastal line. As a major drug transshipment country the coast has also become a major consuming

⁴⁸ UNODC, 'World Drug Report 2013', (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.13.XI.6)

⁴⁹Korir, W., 'An Analysis of Drug Abuse Along the Coastal Region of Kenya', (International NGO journal vol. 8(7) October 2013) pp. 153-158

market. He advances the argument that if the trend continues the coast region might miss a whole generation. The negative impact of drugs is not only felt on the individual but on the families and friends, businesses and government. Individuals succumb to ill health, which might ultimate lead to death. This would include deaths through contraction of needle borne conditions like hepatitis and HIV and AIDS by way of injection drug use.

Children and other dependents are also abused or neglected by drug users resulting into emotional and physical strain, lack of medical care, food, water and appropriate shelter. Crime to support the drug addiction becomes a menace within society. There is also a strain on government resources through rehabilitation programs. A drug and substance abuser becomes economic unviable with the net effect of dependency that stifles growth and affects adequacy of resources. This phenomena unfolding in the MRC strongholds conjure perceptions of neglect by government which leads to economic strain on the healthy population in the midst of poverty.

Table 3.5 Out-Patient Morbidity Statistics in Under Five Years by Province-2011

PUBLIC HEALTH									
OUT-PATIENT MORBIDITY STATISTICS IN UNDER FIVE YEARS BY PROVINCE – 2011									
DISEASE	Nairobi	Central	Coast	Eastern	N-Eastern	Nyanza	R-Valley	Western	Total
No. of Expected reports in the District	4188	11124	6672	13752	2040	10464	21588	5640	75468
No. of Timely rep. received in the District	726	3273	4307	4242	459	5756	7274	2237	28274
Total no. of rep. received in the District	1707	8343	5763	10713	1668	8829	15739	4497	57259
Report timelessness (%)	17.3	29.4	64.6	30.8	22.5	55	33.7	39.7	37.5
Report completeness (%)	40.8	75	8604	77.9	81.8	84.4	72.9	79.7	75.9
Diarrhoea	138,862	210,647	268,366	323,749	127,144	287,792	521,510	173,297	2,051,367
Tuberculosis	8,726	3,257	4,132	6,123	1,072	11,014	10,395	3,709	48,458
Dysentery	3,455	2,384	18,618	11,086	2,852	21,860	17,943	8,831	87,029

Cholera	50	1	36	162	2	314	18	66	649
Meningococcal Meningitis	461	101	78	446	14	652	333	109	2,194
Neonatal Tetanus	56	43	66	241	12	63	272	49	802
Poliomyelitis (AFP)	88	20	72	194	1	138	111	81	705
Chicken Pox	14,495	38,245	33,322	21,273	2,495	23,885	69,502	12,375	215,592
Measles	1,408	1,425	1,014	2,832	591	2,977	6,631	1,707	18,585
Infectious Hepatitis	1,445	983	1,294	6,325	349	6,833	4,824	2,707	24,760
Mumps	2,517	9,431	6,811	12,454	461	10,260	26,177	8,488	76,599
Clinical Malaria	82,102	237,866	676,259	1,905,437	131,924	1,869,028	2,014,405	1,522,433	8,439,454
Confirmed Malaria	60,318	87,381	249,102	590,342	62,464	627,742	419,844	584,165	2,681,358
Urinary Tract Infection	65,785	107,695	120,170	154,037	59,778	82,809	143,488	55,956	789,718
Typhoid Fever	49,167	65,205	12,725	89,735	13,375	127,445	193,180	100,878	651,710
Bilharzia	3,238	6,939	17,513	6,868	2,888	3,645	3,884	2,175	47,150
Intestinal worms	16,394	65,000	33,051	111,244	19,781	45,883	60,188	29,053	380,594
Malnutrition	4,941	3,037	13,716	11,956	10,839	10,161	19,551	6,224	80,425
Anaemia	9,022	9,341	44,845	22,922	11,907	28,475	34,451	16,411	177,374
Eye Infections	34,537	137,762	62,569	143,284	20,586	80,028	169,612	48,895	697,273
Ear Infections	27,521	63,232	66,997	105,055	26,446	70,240	121,670	38,984	520,145
Other Dis. Of Respiratory System	633,438	1,915,497	1,379,170	2,058,782	396,784	1,370,930	2,650,102	830,454	11,235,157
Pneumonia	63,401	113,309	111,353	173,992	65,576	163,815	301,393	122,321	1,115,160
Mental disorders	14,464	23,842	9,301	13,379	1,257	5,667	17,237	6,731	91,888
Dental disorders	48,651	87,314	45,337	102,299	9,693	55,919	128,066	33,361	510,640
Dis. Of the skin (incl. wounds)	127,917	435,494	373,653	516,255	59,025	393,775	710,383	297,334	2,913,836
congenital anomalies	1,231	801	1,211	1,997	205	1,343	2,167	819	9,774
Poisoning	4,918	6,456	6,151	8,222	846	6,712	11,563	4,646	49,514
Accidents - fractures, injuries, etc.	40,740	120,314	76,081	147,499	13,156	103,726	207,173	80,937	789,626
Sexual assault	2,164	3,510	2,202	3,569	332	4,354	8,069	3,548	27,748
Burns	6,082	15,350	15,951	21,458	5,075	21,301	39,498	12,903	137,618
Bites - Animal, snake, etc.	3,221	14,963	10,445	28,751	4,727	17,040	37,065	16,790	133,002
Diabetes	11,117	37,839	11,080	19,454	1,049	13,520	23,945	7,585	125,589
Epilepsy	2,710	4,184	5,667	9,296	1,357	6,477	9,917	4,768	44,373
Dracunculosis	115	7	56	147		352	47	1,155	1,879
Yellow fever	198	26	121	103		88	134	89	759
Viral Hemorrhagic fever	814	13	28	112		226	33	91	1,317
New Aids cases	4,570	3,858	4,062	4,610	30	18,003	9,486	3,179	47,798
Plague	47	17	576	297	7	622	157	177	1,900

Brucellosis	4,497	4,313	2,564	16,455	1,239	7,756	29,779	4,688	71,291
All other diseases	478,260	1,388,645	933,986	1,207,346	124,089	718,796	1,604,313	348,935	6,804,370
TOTAL NEW CASES	1,973,214	5,225,822	4,619,837	7,859,866	1,179,510	6,221,760	9,628,589	4,397,181	41,105,779
No. of first attendances	1,103,455	3,282,552	2,499,835	4,617,855	754,579	3,802,909	6,599,684	3,168,749	25,829,648
Re-attendances	627,710	2,315,858	4,775,152	1,966,364	243,191	1,382,692	2,415,594	1,022,267	14,748,828
Referrals in	17,475	23,122	8,970	46,128	2,931	27,138	94,829	18,984	239,577
Referrals out	16,242	36,171	27,992	36,481	2,428	118,702	75,645	34,584	348,245

Source: Ministry of Health & Sanitation, Kenya

For ease of comparing data it is important to bounce it against the populations, province by province as per the population census results of 2009. The provinces have since ceased to exist as administrative units due to devolution.

Table 3.6 Kenya Population Numbers by 2009

Provinces	Population Numbers
Nairobi	3,138,369
Central	4,383,743
Coast	3,325,307
Nyanza	5,442,711
Rift Valley	10,006,805
Eastern	5,668,123
North Eastern	2,310,757
Western	4,334,282

Source: Kenya National Bureau of statistics, 2009

vii. Low Standards of Education

Education standards in the region are low. This is exemplified by the number of schools and

colleges compared to other regions in the country.⁵⁰

vii.National identification

Acquiring national registration documents is a critical process in Kenya. These are very vital documents, which confirm if indeed one is a Kenyan and they are services that can only accrue to the Kenyans on the basis of proof of citizenship. Among the purposes for which a national identification card serves is enjoyment of rights of citizenship the absence of which therefore limits these rights, the right to participate in the political processes. For one to register and vote, one would need a national identity card. Delay in processing the documents therefore impedes on the individual to make political choices in the country. This would therefore curtail an individual from seeking and possibly getting effective representation in the policy processes of the country. Absence of an identity card for eligible persons denies them free movement in their country. This would be through harassment by security agencies when unable to produce the document on demand. Time and money is lost in trying to prove citizenship or in attempting to ward off accusations of illegal entry into the country by the absence of the proof of citizenship. This effectively curtails freedom of movement. The document is also critical in acquiring travel documents. Many Kenyans travel out of the country in pursuit of livelihoods. This is curtailed. Kenyans are also denied the right to own property without these crucial documents. One would need an identity card to purchase property or open an account for normal business transactions. The denial therefore impinges on the individual to own and enjoy property like other Kenyans. The identity card is also crucial in admission to universities and other institutions of higher learning, acquisition of a driving license, entry to government offices, access of government services and even access to relief services in the event of calamities because the card is the only document of identification. Employment opportunities and even the right to legally found a family are

⁵⁰ Wolf, T., '*Kenya Coast Survey Development, Marginalization, Security and Participation*', (Ipsos Ltd 2013) pp 19 -20

compromised in the absence of the national identity.⁵¹ The acquisition process for these crucial documents is longer in the border districts than other places. The vetting process is aimed at minimizing the risk of registering non-Kenyans from across the border. A Taita, Taveta or Digo for example can not acquire these documents in Nairobi unlike other Kenyans from non-border districts like Nyeri, Nakuru or Kakamega. There is more demand of proof of Kenyan-ship than the latter. The rigorous and security scrutiny the applicants from the coastal region are subjected to has been cited as discrimination by various quarters. Open Society Justice Initiative summarize the plight some of the Kenyan communities undergo is seeking for this document as hereunder;

“Unlike most Kenyans, Nubians and individuals from certain other ethnic groups are subject to heightened screening procedures in order to obtain Kenyan identity documents, which can entail both furnishing additional proof of citizenship and submitting to questioning before a vetting committee. All Kenyans apply for ID cards at age 18, but those “typically Kenyan” ethnic groups, who do not face additional scrutiny and vetting committees, can expect to secure an ID card without significant delay. By contrast, for some Nubians, the wait is interminable, forestalling any hope of entering the job market, and condemning a generation to a life of poverty and marginalization. Heightened screening procedures apply to selected border groups such as Kenyan Somalis, Borana, Gabra, Maasai, Kuria and Sabot, but also to non-border groups such as Nubians, Coastal Arabs, Asians, Duruma, Digo, Samburu and a number of other specific ethnic groups. Like the Nubians, many of these groups are primarily of Muslim faith. Both registration officials and vetting committee members have wide discretion to probe whether a Nubian is “really Kenyan,” including by asking for forms of documentation that have no bearing on citizenship under the law, such as grandparents’ birth certificates, title deeds and sworn affidavits. Thus, even if they are not required to go before a vetting committee, members of select ethnic groups are often asked to furnish documents that may be difficult or impossible to obtain.”⁵⁰

⁵¹ Kenya national Commission on Human Rights., *‘An Identity Crisis, A Study on the Issuance of National Identity Cards in Kenya’* (Final IDs Report,2007) pp. 5

The figure overleaf depicts a study carried by Ipsos Public Affairs in October 2013 entitled Kenya Coast Survey, Development, Marginalization, Security and Participation. The study sampled 3,100 participants out of the total coastal population of 1, 711, 549 people and helps in profiling the age, religious affiliation, education levels, household income, main source of income and employment variables per county. This assists in focusing at the real situation regarding issues considered fundamental by the MRC.

Fig 3.2 Kenya Coast Survey

COUNTY	Population aged 18 and+ (according to 2009 census)				Sampling		
COUNTY	RURAL	URBAN	TOTAL	%	PPS Allocation	Boost Sample	Final Study Sample
Mombasa		581,047	581,047	34%	883		883
Kilifi	355,310	159,902	515,212	30%	783		783
Kwale	234,968	65,072	300,040	18%	456		456
Taita – Taveta	121,290	37,865	159,155	9%	242	150	392
Tana River	86,120	17,262	103,382	6%	157	150	307
Lamu	41,118	11,595	52,713	3%	80	200	280
			1,711,549		2,601	500	3,101
Age Bracket	Total	Mombasa	Kwale	Kilifi	Tana River	Lamu	Taita - Taveta
18 – 24	23%	24%	22%	24%	29%	21%	18%
25 – 29	20%	23%	22%	19%	15%	17%	17%
30 – 34	15%	15%	17%	14%	15%	18%	15%
35 – 40	15%	14%	14%	16%	13%	15%	17%
41 – 44	5%	5%	4%	5%	5%	4%	6%
45+	22%	18%	22%	23%	23%	24%	27%
Religious Affiliation	Total	Mombasa	Kwale	Kilifi	Tana River	Lamu	Taita-Taveta
Catholic	15%	19%	7%	14%	12%	11%	22%
Protestant-Mainstream (ACK/PCEA/MCK/SDA/etc)	26%	27%	8%	31%	19%	13%	51%
Protestant-Evangelical (Pentecostal/charismatic/others)	15%	13%	9%	27%	8%	8%	16%
Islam	41%	41%	75%	19%	61%	68%	10%
None	2%	1%	1%	7%	0%	0%	0%
Education Level	Total	Mombasa	Kwale	Kilifi	Tana River	Lamu	TaitaTaveta
Illiterate	10%	4%	17%	12%	17%	11%	3%
Functional Literate	4%	2%	3%	4%	10%	9%	1%
Primary Incomplete	17%	9%	23%	22%	22%	19%	17%

Primary complete	24%	19%	28%	28%	22%	27%	26%
Post Primary Training	2%	2%	2%	1%	1%	1%	6%
Secondary Incomplete	9%	9%	8%	8%	8%	7%	13%
Secondary Complete	21%	31%	13%	17%	16%	16%	22%
Post Secondary Training	10%	18%	4%	6%	4%	6%	11%
University	3%	6%	3%	2%	1%	3%	1%
Total Secondary And Above	34%	55%	20%	25%	21%	25%	34%
Estimated Monthly Household Income	Total	Mombasa	Kwale	Kilifi	Tana River	Lamu	Taita-Taveta
Less than Shs. 5,000	17%	7%	24%	21%	27%	18%	13%
Shs. 5,000 -9,999	32%	21%	36%	35%	40%	36%	38%
Shs. 10,000-24,999	26%	29%	17%	22%	23%	33%	34%
Shs. 25,000-50,000	9%	17%	6%	5%	5%	6%	8%
Over Shs. 50,000	4%	10%	1%	2%	2%	2%	1%
DK/NR	12%	16%	16%	15%	4%	5%	7%
Main Income Source	Total	Mombasa	Kwale	Kilifi	Tana River	Lamu	Taita-Taveta
Public Sector	10%	15%	7%	7%	10%	10%	10%
Private Sector	25%	39%	17%	21%	15%	25%	20%
Self Employment (business owner/Trader)	39%	35%	44%	44%	29%	45%	35%
Agriculture (Own/ Household)	15%	1%	21%	18%	31%	8%	24%
Livestock	1%	0%	2%	0%	10%	0%	0%
Given by Others	6%	6%	6%	5%	2%	8%	8%
Other	2%	2%	2%	2%	3%	1%	4%
Main Source	Total		Coastal		Up-Country		
Private Sector Wages	25%		21%		38%		
Agriculture (Domestic Farm)	15%		16%		8%		
Public sector wage	10%		8%		15%		
Given money by Other	6%		6%		3%		

Livestock		1%		2%		0%	
Other		1%		1%		2%	
DK/RTA		1%		2%		1%	
Employment Status	Total	Mombasa	Kwale	Kilifi	Tana River	Lamu	Taita- Taveta
Self- Employed	32%	31%	38%	36%	30%	29%	28%
Unemployed	29%	27%	29%	28%	29%	29%	32%
Casual/ Part time	9%	11%	8%	8%	7%	10%	9%
Employed Private Sector	7%	12%	4%	6%	2%	7%	4%
Family Subsistence	6%	1%	7%	8%	12%	6%	7%
Employed in Public sector	5%	6%	5%	4%	5%	6%	6%
Student	4%	6%	2%	4%	3%	3%	2%
Employed in a Family Business/Farm	3%	1%	2%	2%	4%	3%	6%
Retired	2%	3%	2%	1%	3%	1%	5%
Other	3%	2%	4%	3%	5%	5%	1%

Source: Adapted from the Ipsos Report on the Kenya Coast Survey conducted on behalf of USAID/ Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI)- Coast Programme (Oct 2013)pp.

17-23

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

4.0 Introduction

This chapter covers data analysis at both qualitative and quantitative levels.

4.1 Qualitative Data Analysis

This involves looking at documents relevant to the objectives of the study.

The nature, purpose, leadership structure, ideology and activities of the MRC.

The MRC is an organized group with a clear leadership and command structure. The group has openly been calling for the cessation of the Coastal region from the rest of Kenya due to marginalization. The veracity of the claim that the region is not part of Kenya has been interrogated by looking at relevant documents. One of which is an article carried by the Glasgow Herald newspaper of 9th October 1963. It reported on the agreement that was signed in London, United kingdom on 8th October 1963 regarding the coastal strip, which was hitherto the coastal protectorate, becoming part of Kenya on the day of the independence. The strip 200 miles long and 10 miles wide forms a protectorate administered with Kenya under an agreement of 1895 between the British government and the Sultan of Zanzibar to whose dominions it then belonged and whose sovereignty is still recognized by Britain. Under the agreement the Sultan and his Government relinquished all claim to financial compensation in respect of the surrender of sovereignty and of any revenue derived from the coastal strip stretching from the border of Somalia to Tanganyika. The Sultan had been paid 16,000 pounds a year for the lease.

During the Kenya independence conference proceedings in London, then, the ministers had given assurances concerning the protection, after Kenya had acquired independence, of the interests of the Sultan's subjects in the coastal strip, which includes the port of Mombasa.

The agreement was signed by Mr. Duncan Sandys, Secretary of state for the colonies, the Sultan of Zanzibar, Mr. Jomo Kenyatta and Mr. Mohammed Shamte, Prime Minister of Zanzibar.⁵² The agreement does not indicate that the coastal strip is independent of the rest of Kenya. It was important to further inquire into how the coastal strip came to be in the possession of the Zanzibar sultanate?

Mwaruvie (2011) explains this as he addresses the genesis of the land question at the coast. He submits that earlier documents confirm that Africans inhabited the place and specifically the Periplus of the Eritrean Sea written around 100 AD by an anonymous author. This mentions the inhabitants of the region as black people of great stature ruled by chiefs. These inhabitants who used wicker baskets for fishing, and who traded with merchants from the Mediterranean, India and China would probably be the Waswahili. They were the people who therefore controlled the coastal areas before the arrival of the Portuguese from 1500. The Portuguese would later establish a ruthless and unpopular rule, which led to the black indigenous people, the Waswahili getting into some treaties with the Arabs. He further explains that in 1660, the Waswahili sent a delegation to Muscat, Oman to request for military support in removing the Christian Portuguese from the area. This delegation included the head, Mwinyi Nguti, Mwinyi Mole bin Haji, Mwinyi Ndao bin Haji, Motomatowa Mtorogo and Kubo wa Mwamzungu. These are obviously coastal names. The request was turned down. The very fact that a delegation was sent to Oman vindicates the point that the Waswahili had been trading with the Arabs. The second delegation was sent in 1729. The request then was accepted leading to the ouster of the Portuguese in East Africa in 1798 after a series of battles in Mombasa. The Arabs would stay and Sultan Said Seyyid transferred his headquarters from Muscat, Oman to Zanzibar in 1856. This allowed him full control over the

Glasgow Herald, 'Kenya Takes over the Coastal Strip, Agreement Signed in London', 9th October, 1963

East African region, which would lead to signing of treaties with the Germans and British regarding the ten-mile coastal strip. They believed he was in charge of the inhabitants of the strip. They would indeed pay rents for use of the strip⁵³. This was what led to the signing of the agreement between the Sultanate of Zanzibar and the Kenyan delegation on 8th October 1963.

2. The determination of whether the MRC is a terrorist organization

Terrorist organizations do not proclaim their status. It is their actions and purpose that leads experts into defining them as such or otherwise. Their leaders would operate under cover as they plan and execute terror acts. In a sworn affidavit by Randu Nzai Ruwa on 24th November 2010, he petitioned, on behalf of the MRC, Judges Mwera, J., Kasango, J., and Tuiyot, J., to declare the proscription of the group unconstitutional, he indicated that they were a peace initiated group aimed at attaining their rights on matters of land, natural resources, economic and political freedom and advancement of the indigeneous coastal people. He further said that they had held peaceful public meetings at Tononoka Social Hall, C.D. F. Hall Likoni, Vikwatani P. E. T Church and at Amukeni Nursery school. Before the same Judges the Government filed a reply on 10th May 2011 submitting MRC was an active arm of the Republican Revolutionary Council and is not registered as either a society or political party. It is aimed at disenfranchising upcountry people and subsequently reclaim their land. The evidence pointed to was the 2006/2007-post election violence. The government insisted that MRC was a criminal group.⁵⁴ The Government did not call the group a terrorist organization. Information sought further afield looked at the list of designated terrorists organisations as at 28th September, 2012 by the American Bureau of Counterterrorism. This is an organization

⁵³Mwaruvie, J. M., *The Ten Miles Coastal strip: An Examination of the Intricate Nature of Land Question at Kenyan Coast*, (International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Vol. 1 No. 20; December 2011)

⁵⁴[http:// www.kenyalaw.org-page 3/18 Judgment Mombasa Misc. Application No. 468 of 2010](http://www.kenyalaw.org-page%203/18%20Judgment%20Mombasa%20Misc.%20Application%20No.%20468%20of%202010)

that continually monitors the activities of terrorist groups active around the world to identify potential targets for designation. When reviewing potential targets, the Bureau looks not only at the actual terrorist attacks that a group has carried out, but also at whether the group has engaged in planning and preparations for possible future acts of terrorism or retains the capability and intent to carry out such acts. The list is produced below for ease of reference.

Table 4.1 Terrorists Organizations.

Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations	
Date Designated	Name
10/8/1997	Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
10/8/1997	Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
10/8/1997	AumShinrikyo (AUM)
10/8/1997	Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
10/8/1997	Gama`a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) (IG)
10/8/1997	HAMAS
10/8/1997	Harakatul-Mujahidin (HUM)
10/8/1997	Hizballah
10/8/1997	Kahane Chai (Kach)
10/8/1997	Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) (Kongra-Gel)
10/8/1997	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
10/8/1997	National Liberation Army (ELN)
10/8/1997	Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
10/8/1997	Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
10/8/1997	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
10/8/1997	PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC)

10/8/1997	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
10/8/1997	Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N)
10/8/1997	Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)
10/8/1997	Shining Path (SL)
10/8/1999	al-Qa'ida (AQ)
9/25/2000	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
5/16/2001	Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)
9/10/2001	United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)
12/26/2001	Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)
12/26/2001	Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT)
3/27/2002	Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB)
3/27/2002	Asbat al-Ansar (AAA)
3/27/2002	Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
8/9/2002	Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA)
10/23/2002	Jemaah Islamiya (JI)
1/30/2003	LashkariJhangvi (LJ)
3/22/2004	Ansar al-Islam (AAI)
7/13/2004	Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)
12/17/2004	Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)
12/17/2004	al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI)
6/17/2005	Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)
3/5/2008	Harakatul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B)
3/18/2008	al-Shabaab
5/18/2009	Revolutionary Struggle (RS)
7/2/2009	Kata'ibHizballah (KH)

1/19/2010	al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)	
8/6/2010	Harakatul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI)	
9/1/2010	Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	
11/4/2010	Jundallah	
5/23/2011	Army of Islam (AOI)	
9/19/2011	Indian Mujahedeen (IM)	
3/13/2012	Jemaah AnshorutTauhid (JAT)	
5/30/2012	AbdallahAzzam Brigades (AAB)	
9/19/2012	Haqqani Network (HQN)	
3/22/2013	Ansar al-Dine (AAD)	
11/14/2013	Boko Haram	
11/14/2013	Ansaru	
12/19/2013	al-Mulathamun Battalion	
1/13/2014	Ansar al-Shari'a in Benghazi	
1/13/2014	Ansar al-Shari'a in Darnah	
1/13/2014	Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia	
Delisted Foreign Terrorist Organizations		
Date Removed	Name	Date Orginally Designated
10/8/1999	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine -Hawatmeh Faction	10/8/1997
10/8/1999	Khmer Rouge	10/8/1997
10/8/1999	Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front Dissidents	10/8/1997
10/8/2001	Japanese Red Army	10/8/1997
10/8/2001	Tupac Amaru	10/8/1997

	Revolution Movement	
5/18/2009	Revolutionary Nuclei	10/8/1997
10/15/2010	Armed Islamic Group (GIA)	10/8/1997
9/28/2012	Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)	10/8/1997
5/28/2013	Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)	10/11/2005

Source. American Bureau of Counter-Terrorism, 2012

3. The Determination of Fundamental Issues Behind The MRC

The study isolated the issues behind the insurgency. These became the rallying force behind the group and were encapsulated in their manifesto. The most prominent is on the administration of land. This revolves around illegal and unprocedural adjudication of government land in the region which benefited non locals at their expense. Most of the indigenous people do not legally own the parcels they live on due to the absence of title deeds. The schemes created all settled non-indigenous people at the expense of the coastal. While the list of settlement schemes at the coast region was availed, there was no data to disaggregate the ethnic composition in the schemes. General information however seem to partly confirm the same if one was to have a cursory look at Shimba hills, Mpeketoni and Taveta schemes. The question that begs is whether the schemes were strictly meant for the indigenous people or Kenyans in general.

Road infrastructure was also identified as an issue of concern. Despite the tourism potential of the region and therefore the geostrategic significance to the country, investments in this

sector were not commensurate with the status. Lamu, for instance, a pristine Swahili cultural settlement of tremendous historical value to the Republic, did not have a single inch of tarmac. Comparison with the hinterland towns, would speak volumes of skewed regional development.

The resources from the regional wealth in terms of minerals, fauna, sea, port did not reflect on the socio-economic status of the people. Poverty is pervasive and widespread going by data collected and projected by studies. Data analyzed also indicated education standards, monthly incomes, levels of formal employment and employment into the public service as low. There were allegations regarding discrimination of Muslims particularly as regarded the acquisition of key identity documents. It was however not lost to the researcher that the region borders international territory and they would obviously be procedures put in place to guard against registration of aliens. The issue might be on the delicacy of handling this sensitive matter by government officials during the application process.

Drugs and substance abuse is serious issue at the coast. The trade in narcotics as shown is due to lack of effective maritime policing at the sea. This problem is not confined to Kenya but Tanzania suffers this curse too, courtesy of the maritime drug routes. Public health is a fundamental issue too. There is high mobility in the region compared to other places within the country. Data gleaned from the Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation in 2011, banded against population per province then, attested to this.

4.2 Quantitative Data Presentation and Interpretation

This part will look at quantitative data generated through administration of questionnaire to the chiefs in Mombasa County. The questionnaires were sent to all Chiefs as indicated in the

preceding chapter. 18 questionnaires out of the 20 administered were successfully filled and returned. There are 20 chiefs in Mombasa County.

The 90% response rate was considered sufficient for analysis and reporting after data collection and also for drawing conclusions as per Mugenda (2003) who observes that a response rate of 50% is sufficient for research purposes.

Note: Decimal points have been rounded off to the nearest ten in the explanations.

Bio-Background

4.3 Gender of Respondents

The study sought to find out the gender of the respondents. This is bio data information to enable the researcher confirm or otherwise the gender balance in the target population and if indeed it can be considered sufficient for interpretation and analysis. The gender factor simply indicates the completeness of sample.

Table 4.2 Gender of Respondents

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Female	6	33.3	33.3	33.3
Valid Male	12	66.7	66.7	100.0
Total	18	100.0	100.0	

Table 4.2 above and Figure 4.2 below illustrate the gender of the respondents. In this regard the “one third affirmative action” stated in the constitution of Kenya (2010) has been upheld, as there are 33% female chiefs and 66% male chiefs at the Mombasa County.




Figure 4. 2Gender

4.4 Age Bracket of the Respondents

The researcher submits that it is important to know which age segment of the population we would be dealing with. It is generally assumed that the more mature in age, the greater likelihood of giving well thought out responses. Teenagers and generally younger ages group segments would generally be more distracted and might not pay much attention to the questionnaire. There was also need to confirm that indeed we were dealing with the age of majority pursuant to ethical considerations in the research process.

Table 4.3Age Bracket of the Respondents

Age Bracket	Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
22-35	1	5.6	5.6	5.6
35-45	4	22.2	22.2	27.8
45-55	9	50.0	50.0	77.8
Above 55	4	22.2	22.2	100.0
Total	18	100.0	100.0	

Table 4.3 above and Figure 4.3 below show the age bracket of the respondents. The highest age group of chiefs was between the ages of 45-55 at 50% followed by both 35-45 and above

55 at 22%, while only 5% were between 22-35 years. The majority lies between 35 and over 55 years of age. The population is mature going by this age bracket. This creates the perception that the responses will be weighed and objective.




Figure 4.3 Age Bracket

4.5 Marital Status of the Respondents

This again is not only an ice-breaking question but to interrogate maturity as indicated in the preceding question.

Table 4.4 Marital Status

Valid	Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Married	17	94.4	94.4	94.4
Widowed	1	5.6	5.6	100.0
Total	18	100.0	100.0	

Table 4.4 above and Figure 4.4 below shows that Majority of the respondents are married at response rate of 94% and only 5% are widowed meaning that only one of the respondents was widowed.



Figure 4.4 Marital Status

4.6 Educational Background of the Respondents

Literacy is measured through attainment of various academic standards. Literacy is important in the study since it indicates whether the respondents are competent in understanding and reacting to the questions posed.

Table 4.5 Educational Background

Level	Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Primary school	1	5.6	5.6	5.6
Secondary school	11	61.1	61.1	66.7
Post-secondary School	5	27.8	27.8	94.4
University	1	5.6	5.6	100.0
Total	18	100.0	100.0	




Figure 4. 5 Educational Background

Table 4.5 and Figure 4.5 above show that majority of the respondents completed their secondary education at 61% followed by post-secondary education at 27%. Only 5% have completed university and 5% never proceeded to secondary education. These results indicate that the literacy level of the chiefs is not low.

4.7 Original Home of Respondents

This question lets us understand whether the respondents have a stake in the security of the area on the basis of residency. This would also confirm or deny the attention paid to happenings in the County. A resident of Nairobi will for example be very alive and concerned about activities that may have a bearing on their security unlike a passer by who might be therein strictly by reason of business or employment.

Table 4.6 Original Home of Respondents

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Mombasa	10	55.6	55.6	55.6
Coast not Mombasa	5	27.8	27.8	83.3
Upcountry Kenya	3	16.7	16.7	100.0
Total	18	100.0	100.0	




Figure 4.6 Original home of Respondent

Table 4.6 and Figure 4.6 above show the original homes of the respondents. 55% of the respondents have their original homes at Mombasa, 27% are from coast but not Mombasa and 16% are from upcountry Kenya. This Means that a high percentage of the chiefs have their original homes at Mombasa.

4.8 The type of residence

Table 4.7 Type of Residence

	Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Own Home	10	55.6	55.6	55.6
Rental House	5	27.8	27.8	83.3
Institution House	3	16.7	16.7	100.0
Total	18	100.0	100.0	




Figure 4.7 Type of Residence

Table 4.7 and Figure 4.7 above indicate that majority of the respondents live in their own houses at 55.56%, 27.78% live in rental houses and 16.67% live in institutional houses.

4.9 Faith professed by the Respondents

The study had hoped to take advantage of the heterogeneous nature of the County by drawing responses from different faiths. This would help in getting a balanced response not from one faith which might think in that one way.

Table 4.8 Faith professed

	Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Islam	13	72.2	72.2	72.2
Christianity	4	22.2	22.2	94.4
Other	1	5.6	5.6	100.0
Total	18	100.0	100.0	

Table 4.8 above and Figure 4.8 below indicate that the majority of the respondents profess the Islamic faith at 72%, followed by Christianity at 22% then other faiths at 5%.




Figure 4.8 Faith Professed

Professional background

4.10 Timeserved as Chief

This was intended to draw on the experiences and competences of the target group by virtue of years spent on the job, in the assumption that the longer one is in the profession, which demands residency in the area, the likelihood of better knowledge of the place and issues therein.

Table 4.9 Time served as Chief

	Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
0-5	2	11.1	11.1	11.1
5-10	2	11.1	11.1	22.2
10-15	7	38.9	38.9	61.1
Above 15	7	38.9	38.9	100.0
Total	18	100.0	100.0	

Table 4.9 above and Figure 4.9 below show that majority of the chiefs have worked for more than 10 years and more than 15 years both at 39%. On the other hand 11% have worked between 0-5 years and also 11% have worked between 5-10 years. This shows that majority of the chiefs have great experience and understand their communities.




Figure 4.9 Time as Chief

4.11 Terms of service

This was intended to interrogate the terms of service of the target population. Permanent and pensionable terms of service mean that the employee is a permanent employee who will draw a pension upon retirement pursuant to service regulations. Probationary terms is where an employee is engaged for a defined period upon expiry of which will determine either absorption into the P& P terms or rejection. This is based on the observation of competence during the probationary periods. Temporary terms of service means engagement for a fixed term period upon expiry of which, the employer pays the agreed gratuities and disengages the person from the employment. The assumption one would draw from the question is that the more permanent one would be, the freer they would be in responding frankly and honestly. Fears of retribution are allayed, in the unlikely event that the responses are used against them to deny them employment.

Table 4.10 Terms of service

	Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percent
P&P	16	88.9	88.9	88.9
Temporary	1	5.6	5.6	94.4
Probation	1	5.6	5.6	100.0
Total	18	100.0	100.0	

Table 4.10 above and Figure 4.10 below indicate that majority of chiefs are at P&P at 89% and only 6% are at temporary are probation terms respectively. This means that 16 of the chiefs have secure jobs and only 2 don't have.




Figure 4.10 Terms of service

4.12 Mombasa County Security Apparatus

The study sought to find out if the respondents felt as part and parcel of the security machinery at the county. This will confirm or otherwise the levels at which they are seized by the MRC phenomena. A bystander might be nonchalant and totally disengaged from the happenings. This is to indicate whether the chiefs indeed know what the phenomena is all about and are knowledgeable of the security concerns in the County.

Table 4.11 Part & Parcel of the Mombasa County Security Apparatus

	Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
To a great extent	14	77.8	77.8	77.8
Not so much	4	22.2	22.2	100.0
Total	18	100.0	100.0	

Do you Feel part & parcel of the MCSA




Figure 4. 11 Part & Parcel of the MCSA

Table 4.11 and Figure 4.11 above show the results of the questions that were to find out if the chiefs feel like part and parcel of the Mombasa County Security Apparatus (MCSA). Given different choices majority of respondents indicated that they feel to a great extent part of the MCSA at 78%, and 22% indicated that they do not so much feel like part of the MCSA. This shows that majority of the chiefs are knowledgeable about the security system at the coast.

4.13 MRC in Normal Conversations

This question sought to find out if the MRC factor in Mombasa is an issue or not anymore. This can be interrogated by the frequency at which the phenomena creeps into normal and ordinary everyday banter. Kenyans would for example talk about the European teams during the European games season.

Table 4.12 MRC in normal conversations

	Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Valid	Every Day	2	11.1	11.1
	Once in a While	9	50.0	61.1
	Very Rarely	5	27.8	88.9
	Not at all	2	11.1	100.0
	Total	18	100.0	100.0




Figure 4. 12 MRC in Conversations

Table 4. 12 and Figure 4.12 above give the results of a question posed to the respondents seeking to find out if MRC is heard in normal and ordinary conversations within the general members of the public. 50% of the respondents indicated that they do hear it once in a while, 28% of them indicate that they rarely hear it, 11% hear it every day and 11% do not hear it at all. This results indicate that a high percentage of the population still talk about the MRC hence it still a a common subject at the coast.

4.14 Spotting of MRC Official

This question sought to know if the MRC officials have deeply permeated society that they are clearly noticeable within the locations.

Table 4.13 Spotting of MRC Officials

	Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Every Day	1	5.6	5.6
	Once in a While	3	16.7	22.2
	Very Rarely	7	38.9	61.1
	Never	7	38.9	100.0
	Total	18	100.0	100.0




Figure 4.13 Spotting of MRC Officials

Table 4.13 and Figure 4.13 above indicate that the chiefs do not spot the MRC leaders that much in their areas of jurisdiction. Asked if they spot them, 39% indicated that they never see them. 39% indicated very rarely do they see them while 17% indicated that they see them once in a while. 6% of the chiefs indicated that they see them every day. The results indicate that the MRC officials may be centered in one location in the county, fizzling out all together or operating covertly.

4.14 MRC sympathizers

Table 4.14 MRC sympathizers

	Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes Many	3	16.7	16.7
	Yes Few	10	55.6	72.2
	Not at all	3	16.7	88.9
	I don't known	2	11.1	100.0
	Total	18	100.0	100.0




Figure 4.14 MRC sympathizers

Table 4.14 and Figure 4.14 above indicate the level of MRC sympathizers in the chief's locations at the coast. Majority of the respondent indicated that the MRC have few sympathizers in their locations at 56%, 17% indicated that they are many in their areas and 17% indicated that they do not have any at all have and only 11% said they do not know. This shows that MRC still has sympathizers in the County. Majority of the population if we were to draw inferences from the responses, means that majority of the population still support them. To gather more refined data would require a more representative sample from

the general coastal population that would include all the counties, namely Kwale, Kilifi, Mombasa, Tana River, Lamu and Taita Taveta Counties.

Table 4.15: Hidden Support for MRC

	Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Yes they do	7	38.9	38.9	38.9
No they do not	7	38.9	38.9	77.8
Valid I can't Tell	1	5.6	5.6	83.3
I don't know	3	16.7	16.7	100.0
Total	18	100.0	100.0	




Figure 4.15 Sympathizers hiding Support for MRC

Table 4.15 and Figure 4.15 above indicate that they are sympathizers of MRC who secretly support of the group. The results indicate that 39% hide their support by indicating that yes they do, and 39% indicate that that they do not hide their support. 17% of the respondents indicated that they do not know and 6% said they can't tell. This results show that almost half of the sympathizers show their support of MRC openly and also almost a half hide their

support of the group meaning that some may fear victimization from both the MRC and also the security apparatus.

4.17 General Population Support for MRC Agenda

Chiefs comprise the general populations of the jurisdictions under which they serve. They can to an extent be the barometers of perceptions of the general population. Due to limited time and resources of carrying out a study involving the general population, this category gives us a fairly accurate perception of the representation of the population.

Table 4.16: Population Support for MRC Agenda

	Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
50%	3	16.7	16.7	16.7
20%	6	33.3	33.3	50.0
Valid 0%	3	16.7	16.7	66.7
Don't know	6	33.3	33.3	100.0
Total	18	100.0	100.0	




Figure 4.16 Population Support for MRC Agenda

Table 4.16 above and Figure 4.16 above show the results of the level of support given to MRC by the public. The result show that the respondents believe that 20% of the population support the MRC agenda at 33%, others believe that 50% support the MRC agenda at 17%. 17% indicated that 0% support MRC and 33% indicated that they don't know. The results show that 50% of the population at the County in one way or another support the MRC Agenda.

4.18 Chiefs' View of MRC Agenda

Table 4.17 Chief s' View of the MRC Agenda

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Had Genuine Grievances	2	11.1	11.1	11.1
Valid Did Not Have Genuine Grievances	14	77.8	77.8	88.9
Valid I don't Know	2	11.1	11.1	100.0
Total	18	100.0	100.0	




Figure 4.17: View of MRC Agenda

Table 4.17 and Figure 4.17 above indicate the chief's view of the MRC. The results show that 78% of the chiefs believe that MRC did not have genuine grievances, 11% believe that they had genuine grievances and 11% indicated that they don't know. This is an indication that the chiefs to a great extent do not support the MRC agenda.

4.18 Grievances of MRC

The chiefs were requested to list down grievances that the MRC harbor. They came up with a list of 16 issues as hereunder:

- a. Historical injustices of regarding land,
- b. Lack of land/ land issues
- c. Ownership of 10 miles coastal strip
- d. Lack of job opportunities at the coast
- e. Issuance of identity cards & passports (they have to go for vetting)
- f. 90% of port workers are not indigenous
- g. Marginalization in education and discrimination on employment where opportunities are given to upcountry people.
- h. Lack of good governance
- i. They want to be an independent Republic.
- j. They want to take charge of government institutions
- k. Claim that there is no agreement between the queen and the late president Kenyatta to handover coast after fifty years
- l. Historical injustice of land acquisition along the coast
- m. Claim employment opportunities go to upcountry people ignoring Mijikenda.
- n. They want all elected leaders in coast especially Mombasa (to be Muslims) and not Christians.
- o. The real meaning of MRC is Muslim Republican country (this is their goal eventually)

4.19 View of MRC

The chiefs were asked to indicate their view on the MRC.

Table 4.18 Chiefs' View of MRC

	Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
It is a Rights Group	3	16.7	16.7	16.7
It is a Political Group	2	11.1	11.1	27.8
It is anethical group	3	16.7	16.7	44.4
Valid It a Religiously Radical Group	2	11.1	11.1	55.6
It is aCriminal Group	8	44.4	44.4	100.0
Total	18	100.0	100.0	




Figure 4.18 View of MRC

Table 4.18 and Figure 4.18 above show results of a question seeking to find out the type of group MRC is, according to the Chiefs. The results indicate that MRC is mainly perceived as a criminal group at 44%. 17% of the respondents believe that it is a Rights group while another 17% believe that it is an Ethnical group. 11% indicated that it is a Political group while 11% indicated that it is a religiously radical group.

4.20 MRC in Criminal Acts

The question sought to know if according to the chiefs, MRC has engaged in criminal acts. The question was raised to validate the results emanating from the preceding question on what; in the chiefs' view is the group.

Table 4.19 MRC in Criminal Acts

	Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percent
Yes	12	66.7	66.7	66.7
No	3	16.7	16.7	83.3
I don't Know	3	16.7	16.7	100.0
Total	18	100.0	100.0	




Figure 4.19 MRC in Criminal Acts

Table 4.19 and Figure 4.19 above indicate the level perception of the chiefs regarding the involvement of the MRC in criminal acts at the coast. Given three choices Yes, No, and I don't know, the respondents indicated that they believed MRC was involved in criminal acts at 68%, 17% indicated Notand Don't knowrespectively.

4.21 Gangs Hijacking MRC Agenda

This question sought to know if criminal gangs might have hijacked the MRC agenda.

Table 4.20 Gangs Hijacked MRC Agenda

	Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percent
Yes	10	55.6	55.6	55.6
No	2	11.1	11.1	66.7
Valid I don't Know	6	33.3	33.3	100.0
Total	18	100.0	100.0	

Table 4.20 above and Figure 4.20 below indicate whether criminal gangs might have hijacked the MRC agenda. The results show that 56% of the respondents believe that it was hijacked by criminal gangs, one of the respondents indicated that MRC itself has its own gangs that have been reported of killing people in different locations at the coast, while 33% said they Don't know and 11% said No. This means that the majority believe that criminal elements hijacked the MRC,s agenda to engage in criminal acts.




Figure 4.20 Gangs Hijacked MRC Agenda

4.22 MRC Breaching Peace & Security

The question sought to know if the MRC could have breached peace and security at the coast.

Table 4.21 MRC Breach of Peace & Security

	Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Valid Yes	17	94.4	94.4	94.4
No	1	5.6	5.6	100.0
Total	18	100.0	100.0	

MRC Breaching Peace & Security




Figure 4.21 MRC Breaching Peace & Security

Table 4.21 and Figure 4.21 above indicate the breaching of peace and security by the MRC group at 94% of the respondents while only 6% said that they have not. This is an indication that MRC activities had greatly affected peace and security at the coast.

4.22 Government Management of MRC

The question sought to know what the chiefs think of the Governments management of the MRC.

Table 4.22 Government Management of MRC

	Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Valid Yes	9	50.0	50.0	50.0
No	8	44.4	44.4	94.4
I Don't Know	1	5.6	5.6	100.0
Total	18	100.0	100.0	




Figure 4.22 Government Management of MRC

Table 4.22 and Figure 4.22 above show the results of the management of MRC by the government. The results indicate that 50% of the respondents believe that the government managed MRC properly and 44% said that it did not while only 6% said they don't know. This is an indication that majority of the respondents agree that the government properly managed the MRC situation at the coast, albeit at a slight majority.

4.23 Government Containment of MRC

The question sought to know if the MRC threat at the coast had been contained.

Table 4.23 Government Containment of MRC

	Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Yes	6	33.3	33.3	33.3
No	9	50.0	50.0	83.3
Valid I don't Know	3	16.7	16.7	100.0
Total	18	100.0	100.0	




Figure 4.23 Government Containment of MRC

Table 4.23 and Figure 4.23 above indicate the results regarding the containment of MRC by the government. The results indicate that the respondents believe that the government has not fully contained MRC at 59%. 33% of the respondents answered in the affirmative while 17% entered a Don't Know response. This shows that MRC members might still be operating and alive in different areas at the coast. On how in their view they think the Government has managed the threat, they indicated that this is so because the leaders were taken to court, which has halted the group. The indicator is the reduction of chaos though some said that the group has not been contained because those taken to court were released without any follow up.

4.24 MRC Emerging Again

The question sought to know if the group was likely to emerge again. This was indeed a to validate the responses that would emerge in the preceding question.

Table 4.24 MRC Emerging Again

		MRC Emerging Again			
		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Valid	Most Likely	13	72.2	72.2	72.2
	Not Likely	1	5.6	5.6	77.8
	I don't Know	4	22.2	22.2	100.0
	Know				
	Total	18	100.0	100.0	




Figure 4.24 MRC Emerging Again

Table 4.24 and Figure 4.24 above show the results as regards the possibilities of level the emergence of MRC at the coast. The results show that 72% of the respondents entered a Most Likely response believing that MRC will emerge again. Only 6% said that it's not likely and 22% don't know if it will emerge again or not. This results show that MRC is most likely to emerge again in future.

4.25 Government Dealing with MRC and other threats in the Future

The question sought to know how the Government should deal with MRC or likely threats in future.

Table 4.25 Government Dealing with MRC and other threats in the Future

	Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Through Negotiations	13	72.2	72.2	72.2
Through Courts	3	16.7	16.7	88.9
Through Force	1	5.6	5.6	94.4
I don't know	1	5.6	5.6	100.0
Total	18	100.0	100.0	




Figure 4.25 Government Dealing with MRC and other threats in the Future

Table 4.25 and Figure 4.25 above show the recommendations given by the respondents in the direction that the government should take in dealing with MRC and similar threats in the future. 72% of the respondents indicated that the government should deal with MRC and

other similar threats in the future through negotiation, 17% said they it should deal with such threats through the court, 6% through force and 6% indicated they don't know.

4.26 Chief's proposal in dealing with similar threats in the future

The chiefs were finally asked to propose how the Government should deal with similar threats in the future through an open-ended question. They responded as hereunder;

1. Open negotiations with the MRC members a some are hooligans who take advantage of the true issues
2. Government to stand firm and protect the community properties
3. Empower the youth either by building polytechnics or drop out centers
4. Dialogue with the leaders and listen to their grievances and if they are a political group get it registered and deal with it politically. On the other hand show them the best way to follow after negotiation and if they do not comply arrest them and never release them
5. Involve political leaders, religious leaders and other stakeholders in solving the problem.
6. The community and parents to take responsibility of their children
7. Early system warnings should be put in place and involve officers on the ground when conducting investigations
8. Be alert and share information through nyumbakumi
9. Government should discourage foreigners from doing hawking business e.g. Chinese selling mobile phones in our streets.
10. Mijikenda lands like Waitiki Farm in likoni should be returned to local people and also Vipingo Plantations should be demarcated.
11. Department of survey should fast track land demarcation/survey in Mijikenda and issue tittle deeds to enable them access from bank loans.
12. All lands with colonial tittle deeds where local investors payment to Arabs e.g Msikitinuru Estate, Wayani, MagongoMwisho, Bokolee.t.c Government should compensate these Arabs and allow those who have built structures to get tittles to stop Arabs exploitation of local investors.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTED AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

5.1 Introduction

This chapter will come up with conclusions based on the research findings as analyzed in the previous chapter. Recommendations would then be made and areas of further research proposed.

Part 1. Qualitative Data

5.2 Determination of whether MRC is a terrorist organization

As previously stated, terrorists do not proclaim their status. It is the actions as clearly articulated by Schmid in Table 1.1 that determines whether they constitute that definition. In a sworn affidavit before Honorable Judges Mwera, Kasango and Tuiyot at the Mombasa High Court on 24th November 2010. Randu Nzai Ruwa, the Secretary General of the MRC, declared that it was a peace-loving group championing fundamental issues of land, natural resources, economic and political freedoms and the advancement of the indigenous coastal people. Violent incidents have however been associated with the group, which they however deny involvement in. The American Bureau of Counter –Terrorism has also not designated it as such. The conclusion is that there may be radical extremists in the group who have taken advantage of this group to unleash violence. The violent extremists would most probably be a variant of a religious faith given the composition of the Mombasa and Kwale public, where the activities of the MRC were mostly pronounced. It is concluded from the data reviewed, that the top echelons of the group profess that dominant faith in the area. In the absence of evidence directly linking the known officials with acts of violence, the study concludes that the clarion call, Pwani Si Kenya (Coast is not Kenya) that was openly sounded and

embosomed on t-shirts would cause fear and despondency and in a sense lead to tensions that could trigger conflict. It also gave the impression that the Kenyan coast was a distinct entity from the Republic of Kenya thereby undermining the territorial integrity of the state as configured within the international system. This further hurt the tourism industry in the country whose fair share comes from beach tourism in the coast. This would affect Kenya's prosperity, which is a national interest. The tourism sector, despite its contribution to the GDP is a fragile industry. Any adverse reports lead to travel cancellations. To demonstrate this fact, the Economic Survey, 2013 indicates that the number of international visitor arrivals decreased by 6.1 per cent from 1,822.9 thousand in 2011 to 1,710.8 thousand in 2012. Moi International Airport in Mombasa registered a 22.7 per cent drop in visitor arrivals from 242.3 thousand in 2011 to 187.2 thousand in 2012, as a result of security concerns in the coastal region.⁵⁵

The veracity of the claims as to whether there was any agreement between the Sultan of Zanzibar, Britain and Jomo Kenyatta regarding putting the coastal strip in the hands of Kenya government temporarily, have not been confirmed. Pending any other evidence being advanced in future, the coastal strip is part of the Republic of Kenya. A verbatim report by the Glasgow Herald dated 9th October, 1963 reports:

‘An agreement was signed in London yesterday under which the coastal protectorate known as the coastal strip will become part of Kenya on the day of independence. The coastal strip only 200 miles long and 10 miles wide forms a protectorate administered with Kenya under an agreement of 1895 between the British Government and the Sultan of Zanzibar.’

⁵⁵ Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, (Economic Survey, 2012 GOK) pp. 206

5.3 The Determination of Fundamental Issues behind the MRC insurgency

Maladministration on land matters that gave way to skewed allocation to non-coastal groups was picked, isolated and confirmed. However, Kenya being a unitary state, one can own land anywhere within the borders. It would be a gross violation of human rights if one were given land belonging to another within the realm of ethnicity. No document has been seen that confirms this. The people from the region have however been economically disadvantaged in the absence of land ownership documents that can be used as collateral for credit. No government would also deliberately disenfranchise its own people and therefore any omissions regarding processing of land registration documents for the people, are attributable to individual persons and not that corporate entity known as government.

Road infrastructure, pervasive poverty, low education standards, poor incomes, high unemployment levels, low levels of absorption into the public service are critical issues in the region. Difficulties in accessing key identification documents like birth certificates and identity cards due to security vetting are other issues perceived as discriminating of the people. Drugs and substance abuse due to inadequate policing regimes and provision of public health services are nagging areas at the coast, particularly Mombasa and immediate environs.

Part II. Quantitative Data

Quantitative data on Kenya Government's management of the MRC insurgency was derived from questionnaires administered to the Chiefs in Mombasa County, whose population is twenty chiefs. 33% were female while 66% were male. Majority of these were in the 35 -55 age bracket. 94% of them were married with 61.1 % of them having attained a secondary

level of education. Only 16% had origins outside the coast region. 72.2 % professed the Islam faith, while 22.2 % professed Christianity with 5.6 % were outside the two. They had all served long enough in the county because the majority had done between 5 and above 15 years. 88.9 % of them were permanent government employees on Permanent and Pensionable terms of service. Majority of them felt part and parcel of the Mombasa County Security apparatus. The chiefs therefore constituted a complete sample as regards gender balance, maturity in terms of age, marital status, educational background, knowledge of the region and its dynamics, and religious balance. They were well grounded in the public service and the security machinery as to volunteer objective information important for the study. Based on the aforementioned attributes, the researcher believes that the conclusions drawn from the information will be objective.

Conclusions

MRC still features in ordinary conversations in Mombasa. The conclusion is that it has not fizzled away following the government crack down. It is alive in people's minds and therefore expressed in ordinary conversations. The MRC officials are also not in hiding and are likely to be spotted in everyday lives. Data further indicate that while they don't seem to have a lot of sympathizers, they still command 17% support, which is pretty substantial. The chiefs in this case used as barometers of perception indicate that that 20% of their populations support the MRC agenda. This corroborates the assertion that they still command substantial support from the locals.

The chiefs do not believe that they had any genuine grievances that led to the insurgency. However a percentage of 11.1 percent believes that the MRC had genuine grievances. The import of this is that a number of elites within the government machinery could be supporting the MRC agenda. It cannot therefore be wished away as futile attempts by a bunch of

villagers to attract attention. This should however not be mistaken for support but empathy where an outsider clearly understands where the aggrieved is coming from.

When asked to list down grievances that they believe the MRC harbor, they reiterated what is found in their manifesto as shown in the previous chapters on land, employment etc. There were however two reactions that was slightly outside ordinary where it was indicated that MRC wants all elected leaders in Mombasa to be from the Muslim faith. Do we treat this as farfetched or is it grounded on sentiments expressed in Mombasa that would constitute some form of religious extremism, intolerance and exclusion. This is the fodder that terrorists feed on and there is need to be wary of any machinations that point coast and Mombasa specifically toward this direction. Another said differently, but meaning the same indicated that MRC mean Muslim Republican Country and this allegedly is their goal. Could the fundamental issues be a veneer for deeper divisive religious politics? In a subsequent question, 16.7 % believe that MRC is a Rights group, 11.1 % a Political group, 16.7 % an Ethnical group, 11.1 % a religiously radical group and 44.4 % a Criminal group. The religiously group angle is worth further interrogation. In a subsequent question the majority still believe that MRC was a criminal group.

The majority of chiefs further indicated that criminal gangs may after all hijacked the MRC agenda to cause mayhem. This seems to sanitize the group by laying the blame on whatever violence on criminals outside the control of the group. This is indicative of sympathy and support and would mean that there is belief that the MRC meant well. A respondent though wrote that MRC had killer gangs itself and was engaged in various atrocities in the region. They were however unanimous in their belief that the MRC caused a breach of peace and security through their activities.

5.4 Government Management of MRC

Only a slight majority believes that the Government properly handled the MRC problem. This could mean that the group was not vanquished in totality. A successful management would entail scattering them into the four winds but seemingly this did not materialize if the survey results are anything to go by. A follow up question vindicates this assumption in the sense that majority of the respondents believe that MRC has not been contained. In street lingo, MRC is down but not out. This is a worrying state of affairs. As earlier indicated any threats on security in the tourism belt will have serious ramifications on the Kenyan GDP in view of arrival cancellations. They believed that MRC would therefore emerge again at the majority percentage of 72 compared to only 6% who think it is not likely to emerge. Fears had been raised by Kisiangani about these groups reconfiguring to emerge stronger and more vicious. This could therefore be the likely scenario in the long run. The same majority proposed negotiations as the way to go in dealing with such threats in the future.

Through an open ended question they proposed ways of dealing with the future threats. One of which was through negotiations. This would weed out hooligans from their midst. Genuine issues can be isolated against the spirit of give and take and prosecute them. The government should however ensure that people's properties are protected. The government must therefore adopt a proactive approach and not seem to act long after the fact. The youth should be empowered by enrolling them in government vocational institutions. Idle youth can easily be roped into criminal activities in the absence of better ways of spending their time. The government should not claim the monopoly of dealing with security issues. Religious and local political leaders can also be important in engaging. The breakdown in law and order could also be the result of parents and the general community shunning responsibility towards their subjects. Investigating crime should not be a preserve of one single department. `Police

should involve people on the ground who could process more relevant information. Criminal investigation should not be an exclusive and elitist undertaking. There is also need to use other methods of managing crime like the Nyumba Kumi(Ten Homes Concept).⁵⁶ The government should protect small businesses from the foreigners who are denying Kenyans livelihoods. The Chinese for example should not be allowed to hawk in the streets. All grabbed land should revert to the owners while fast tracking land adjudication and demarcation processes. Absentee landlords should be compensated to allow the locals own the land they have lived on as tenants for ages. The absentee landlords, predominantly Arabic, are exploiting the locals.

5.5 Recommendation

The MRC issue at the Coast had led to death and destruction as has been shown. It is therefore a serious issue that if not dealt with comprehensively will recur time and again in different faces. Politics and societal issues are being militarized at the coast within the infamous realm of terrorism. This could further be located within religious extremism that is an emerging threat globally. The study recommends formulation of a Security Strategy for the region that will address insecurity in totality in the region.

This will involve carefully articulating Kenyas national interests within the coastal region. These will range from the Supreme to the Vital and the Tactical. The state should then formulate broad based objectives that aim at securing the national interests at the region.

The strategy should also identify and critically interrogate the threats that threaten the national interests and deploy all capabilities to address them. This also therefore involves looking at the capabilities. The strategy should not be formulated exclusively by bureaucrats.

⁵⁶ Katana, J., “Why Kenyans Should Support the Nyumba Kumi Initiative”, at [www. Standardmedia .co.ke](http://www.Standardmedia.co.ke). This is a government initiative for Kenyans to know at least ten households within their neighborhoods as a way of fighting crime.

Scholars need to be incorporated into the effort so that we have a knowledge-based strategy that can be activated with clear results. Mombasa is a critical part of Kenya with a rich maritime domain that can be exploited for the socio-economic development of Kenya. The tourism industry in the country is also clearly tied with the region. The region must therefore be properly secured through proactive measures and not the knee jerk reactions by security services that only happen after the fact. The confidence of the Kenyan people and others to work and invest safely in the region must be reestablished.

5.6 Recommended Area for further Research

Radicalization of Kenya youth and the threats to national security. A Case Study of Mombasa County in Kenya.

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