**A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF POST-CONFLICT PEACE BUILDING IN AFRICA:
A CASE STUDY OF RWANDA AFTER 1994.**

BY

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DECLARATION

This dissertation is my original work and has not been presented for a Masters/ Degree or Diploma in any other University.

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This dissertation is has been submitted for examination with my approval as a University Supervisor.

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<u>DEDICATION</u>

This work is dedicated to my family, who have played a great part in who I am today.

ABSTRACT

Conflict is endemic in the African Continent. Many regions in Africa have experienced conflict or are still in conflict. It is therefore important for us in Africa to manage post-conflict situations. This is where Post-Conflict Peace Building comes in. The challenge at hand is not to eradicate conflict, but how to manage it.

Many conflicts in Africa are as a result of the resources that we have. They may be environmental, such as Land and Minerals or Political Power to control such resources. Post-Conflict Peace Building cannot just be militarized. It needs to focus on the root cause of the conflict and how to change that. In the case of Africa, it needs to focus on equitable distribution of resources. This can be done through Institutional reforms, Political reforms and any other initiatives that will ensure that positive peace is achieved in post conflict situations.

Many Governmental and Non-governmental organisations are involved in post-conflict peace building. This has really been instrumental in mainstreaming peace- building. The field is really growing fast. In Africa, where conflict has happened a lot and could happen anytime, post-conflict peace building is very important and needs to be embraced by all of us.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

RFR	-	Rwanda Patriotic Front
FAR	-	Forces Arms Rwandaises
PCPB	-	Post-Conflict Peace Building
ECOWAS	-	Economic Community of West African States
UNOMSIL	-	United Nations Observer Mission to Sierra Leone
UNDPKO	-	United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations
RUF	-	Revolutionary United Front
RPA	-	Rwanda Patriotic Army
UN	-	United Nations
TRC	-	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UNAR	-	United Nations in Rwanda
MRND	-	Movement Revolutionnaire National Pour Le Development
NRM	-	National Resistance Movement
NRA	-	National Resistance Army
PSD	-	Parti Social Democrate
OAU	-	Organisation of African Unity
DMZ	-	Designated a Demilitarized Zone
BBTG	-	Broad Based Transitional Government
UNOMIR	-	United Nations Observer Mission in Rwanda
UNAMIR	-	United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda
NMOG	-	Neutral Military Observer Group
HROC	-	Healing and Rebuilding our Communities
LIP	-	Local Initiative Peace
NURC	-	National Unity and Reconciliation Commission
GLJI	-	Great Lakes Justice Initiative
NGO	-	Non-Governmental Organization
DAC	-	Development Assistance Committee
OECD	-	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Chapter outline

This study has five chapters.

Chapter one: Post conflict peace building in Africa.

This chapter will cover the background information on conflicts in Africa, specifically in Rwanda. It also introduces and defines the concept of post conflict peace building examining the contribution of different scholars and experts.

Chapter two: An overview of the Rwanda conflict

This chapter will give a detailed background of the Rwanda conflict. It will discuss how it started and its development and how it got to a genocide in 1994.

Chapter three: The Case of post-conflict peace building in Rwanda

This chapter will record all the findings on post conflict peace building in Rwanda from both the primary and secondary sources.

Chapter four: Data Analysis on post-conflict peace building in Rwanda

Chapter five: Summary, conclusions and recommendations

This chapter will cover summary, conclusions and the study's recommendations.

Conclusion

The chapter was an introductory chapter which ventured to justify and give the objectives of the study. The study basis its concept from the peace research paradigm and data specifically targets the Post-conflict Rwanda and how they have gone on to resolving their issues. The chapter sets study in motion and concludes by providing the chapter outline for the whole of the research.

CHAPTER ONE

1.0 POST-CONFLICT PEACE BUILDING IN AFRICA

1.1 Background to the Study

"They (the international community) simply ran away from responsibility and left people to be killed in the thousands. They have no moral authority whatsoever. They can not lecture to us. If they are so concerned about human rights, why did they allow hundreds of people to die here during the genocide, when they knew it was going to happen? .... Afterwards they did not come forward in a tangible manner to help Rwanda. So what moral authority do they have?" [1]

This study will assess post conflict peace building in Africa and further use Rwanda as a case study. Actions of different actors involved in post conflict peace building in Rwanda will be analysed.

Conflicts continue to constitute one of the greatest challenges facing the African continent in the 20th Century, and will no doubt be with us well into the 21st Century. Issues of governance, identity, resource allocation, and power struggle coupled with personality cults and the problem of state sovereignty have indeed conspired, not only to cause staggering losses of human lives, destruction of property and environmental degradation, but have provided Africa with the unenviable record of hosting more than seven million refugees and over twenty million displaced persons. [2]

While conflicts are a constant in history, and are part and parcel of the dynamics of society, African conflicts should be viewed in their specific historical context. According to this dynamic perspective, the nature and intensity of African conflicts are the results of a complex, dialectic relationship between internal social factors and the structure of the external environment. What changes is the nature and intensity of conflict, as a result of two main factors: internal social factors, such as ethnicity, class and religion, and changes in the sub regional, regional, and international environment, which have various degrees and levels of influence on the internal situation.

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[1] Speech by Rwandan president Paul Kagame, August 2002.
[2] William Nhara, 'Conflict *management and peace operations:The role of OAU and sub regional organisations'* Published in monograph No.21, Resolute partners, Feb 1998.

Over more than a decade Africa's Great Lakes Region has been characterized by bad governance and leadership, weak institutions, patterns of state collapse, genocide and apparently intractable conflicts.[3] The genocide in Rwanda, the devastating rebellion in Northern Uganda, the never ending conflict in Burundi and the destabilization of the DRC constitute the major conflict formations that claimed millions of victims in the region.

Despite, some would even say because of abundant natural resources, the majority of people lack basic services and infrastructure, as well as an environment that can guarantee their basic needs. Despite this legacy of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity that hang heavily over the region, positive steps have recently been taken towards the restoration of justice, peace and democratic rule. In 2006 we witnessed successful elections in Burundi, Uganda and the DRC. The local, parliamentary and presidential elections in the DRC that saw the inauguration of Joseph Kabila as the first democratically elected president of the DRC brought an air of optimism in the whole region. Then, to use an old metaphor, one could say, when the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) sneezes, the entire region catches a cold, and vice versa. Due to inextricable crossborder dynamics (cross-border ethnic links, economic ties and war economies) conflicts in one country usually have a regional dimension. This explains why pacification efforts should take this regional dimension into account in order to have a sustainable impact.[4] In addition to this regional dimension, the proneness of the Great Lakes to various forms of external involvements (multinational companies, states) also requires a particular attention from the international community. In this era, during which Africa is seen as being at the crossroads, we have to focus on the way in which Africa will travel particularly in terms of the capacity of Africans to manage their own conflicts and to conduct peace operations.

At the political level, leaders of the region officially display a commitment to ending the spiral of violence by increasingly using the channels of preventive diplomacy. The Summit of the Great Lakes Region held in Nairobi in December 2006 brought together eleven heads of State and government

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[3] Rugumamu,S. "*Conflict management in Africa: Diagnosis and prescriptions*" in Assefa, T. etal (eds) *Globalization, democracy and development in Africa: challenges and prospects.* Addis Ababa: OSSREA 2001:3-38.
[4] Tony Addison, ed., <u>From conflict to recovery in Africa</u> (New York: Oxford university press,2003)pp 35-41

who signed a landmark regional pact on peace, security and development. This pact aims to disarm rebel groups, commits regional leaders to a non-aggression and mutual defense protocol, and prescribes a long list of governance, humanitarian and economic programs. Additional steps have recently been taken at a bilateral level between Uganda and the DRC, DRC and Rwanda as well as Uganda and the CAR. Each country committed to refrain from acts, statements or attitudes likely to negatively impact the national peace process of its neighbours. However, preventive diplomacy is still not producing the expected results.[5]

The state of conflict in Rwanda is an outcome of historical developments during the colonial and post-colonial periods, the genocide of 1994, and developments in the post-1994 period. The German and later Belgian colonial policy of divide-and-rule tended to favor Tutsi hegemony through differential education and employment access.[6] In order to further consolidate their colonial rule over Rwanda, particularly the Belgians, they created and promoted ethnic identities based on socially constituted categories from the pre-colonial past. By the late 1950s, the socio-economic disparities between the Tutsi and Hutu, and the animosity this engendered were so strong that the struggle for independence and power was fought more along the Tutsi-Hutu divide than from an anti-colonial position. The Hutu revolted against their growing social, economic and political marginalization based on artificial ethnic grounds.

Both the first and second Hutu majority governments under Gregiore Kayibanda and later under the military rule of General Juvenal Habyarimana pursued policies   championing the interests of elite while perpetuating widespread human rights abuse and the norm of active discrimination along predominantly ethnic lines. Both regimes vigorously promoted ethnic identity in favor of the Hutu by introducing not only national identity cards, but most importantly, by ensuring that the percentage of

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[5] Ibid

[6] Adekanye, J. *Rwanda/Burundi:"Uni-Ethnic" dominance and the Cycle of Armed Formations.* Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1995.

Tutsi in schools, universities, the civil service and the private sector did not surpass the proportion that they represented in the entire population. As a result, many refugees fled Rwanda, including a heavy flow to Uganda during 1959-63. These Uganda-based refugees formed the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) in 1990. The RPA and its political wing, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), undertook to challenge the Forces Armies Rwandaises (FAR) of the incumbent government through military activities within Rwanda. In response to the hostilities of the early 1990s, there was an attempt at a regional peace process (leading to the Arusha Peace Agreements) involving many of the major parties to the conflict in Rwanda.

Following the signing of the Regional Peace Agreement in Arusha, on 6 April 1994 the plane carrying the presidents of both Rwanda and Burundi was shot down under mysterious circumstances. This event triggered a carefully orchestrated and premeditated genocide in Rwanda of the Tutsi and moderate Hutu by FAR government forces, irregular militia (known as Interahamwe) and ordinary citizens. First, over a 100-day period close to 1 million Tutsi and moderate Hutus were killed in the worst genocidal atrocity of recent times. Only the advancing of RPA forces stopped the killing.[7]

Second, in the face of RPA's advance some 1.5 million Hutus fled in a mass exodus to former Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo) and Tanzania. Among the fleeing Hutu refugees were the regular (FAR) and irregular (Interahamwe) armed forces that had perpetrated the genocide. These forces have continued their attacks from their Congo base and constitute a real threat to Rwandan stability. Third, in a massive reversal, the larger part of the 2 million self-exiled Rwandans returned en mass in a matter of less than three weeks in late 1996. This high level of movements, in turn, led Rwanda to move its army beyond the Congolese borders, for security reasons, becoming a de facto occupying army.

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[7] Amnesty International. *Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance.* London, 1994.

The 1994 genocide amply demonstrated two important contradictions. On the one hand, it showed how deep ethnic hatred had been cultivated by the leaders of the First and Second Republic.[8] On the other hand, it showed the extent to which the mentality of the general population will have to be transformed in order to social engineer a peaceful and democratic society. In the post-conflict Rwandan context, capacity building was and continues to be a formidable long-term challenge. The restoration and nurturing of human capital and institutions of democratic governance in the immediate post-conflict phase, though essential in establishing the requisite base for rebuilding the economy and society, unfortunately was given only fleeting attention by most aid donors.

Since the end of 1994, the RPF government has restored relative stability in most parts of Rwanda. Gradually, the economic recovery began to pick up and the country embarked on daunting tasks of rehabilitation, reconstruction, reconciliation and development. The international community provided generous support conditional on compliance with the standard package of structural adjustment policies involving changes in macro-economic management. These include the removal of price distortions in foreign exchange, capital, and essential commodities, improved fiscal and financial discipline, the reduction of marketing monopolies and state controls, and civil service reform. The government set up participatory political structures at the national and local levels, restored law and order, and took many unpopular decisions required to enforce the changes demanded by the adjustment policy.[9]

1.2 Statement of problem

Much has been carried out in the name of peace building. In an international workshop organized in 2002 to mark the anniversary of the *Agenda for peace* by IDRC in Canada and entitled: What kind of peace? It sought to clarify who was benefiting from the many peace building programmes and was

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[8] DANIDA. *International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience.* DANIDA, 1997.pp12-15
[9] Donna Pankhurst "Issues of Justice & Reconciliation in complex political emergencies: Conceptualizing Reconcialiation, Justice & peace," Third world Quarterly,20:1(1999)pp(240-254)

part of a growing acknowledgement that building sustainable peace in the world was challenged by more traditional understandings of peace and security.[10]

One of the persistent obstacles to more effective peace building outcomes is the chronic inability of international actors to adapt their assistance to the political dynamics of the war-torn societies they seek to support. The internal - external disconnect manifests itself at the conceptual, policy, operational and institutional levels. Two issues come to the fore. One is the perennial difficulty faced by external actors in aligning their efforts and interests to the domestic political realities of the war-torn societies they seek to support. The second thesis is that while peace building policies and practices have advanced significantly in the last decade, the environment within which peace building flourished in the 1990s has dramatically changed after 9/11. Thus, the advances that were achieved during a brief and experimental decade did not have a chance to be consolidated sufficiently before they were overtaken by other international priorities.[11]

Yet, the picture of international peace building strategies pursued throughout the 1990s is one of ad hoc, piecemeal, and fragmented responses by a multitude of actors without an overall political framework or an institutional base. Many crises in the last decade involved combined humanitarian, peacekeeping and peace building operations. While humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts had institutional homes, peace building was (and still remains) an institutional orphan.[12]

Confined largely to small, designated units and an equally small cadre of dedicated staff, peace building basically remained outside the mainstream of the operations of development agencies. Despite repeated commitments to "mainstreaming" peace building, development agencies found it

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[10]Wendy R Lambourne "Justice &Reconciliation: Post-Conflict Peace building in Cambodia & Rwanda", PhD Thesis, University of Sydney,2002.

[11] Tschirigi Necla, Post-Conflict Peace Building revisited: Achievements, limitations, challenges, Policy Paper, NY: International Peace Academy,2004.

[12] Date-Bah, Eugenia, ed. *Jobs After War: A Critical Challenge in the Peace and Reconstruction Puzzle* (Geneva: ILO, September 2003).

difficult to integrate peace building into their core mandates. While many agencies gained a better understanding of the challenges of post-conflict peace building, their capacity to translate those into their operations were severely constrained by institutional politics, human resource shortages, and competing priorities. Inconsistent policy directions at the governmental level also constrained the role of post-conflict peace building units.[13]

Critics argue that wealthy countries are more interested in securing their frontiers from instability in the south and population migration than providing the kind of development and humanitarian assistance which would help countries to long - term recovery from the devastation of war.[14] The gradual diminishing of development assistance has taken place despite early recognition that peace building required some continuum between emergency relief, rehabilitation and development.

As Sir Brian Urquhart recently noted: "In the twentieth century war was pronounced, belatedly, to be too important to be left to the generals; in the twenty-first century peace, prosperity, and security have already turned out to be much too complex to be left to the politicians. In a dangerous, high-speed, information-logged, globalized world, disastrously divided between the prosperous and the impoverished, the old distinctions between war and peace, civil and military, national and international, private and public, have become increasingly blurred."[15]

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The broad objective of this study is to critically analyze the process of post conflict peace keeping in Africa. The specific objective is to examine post conflict peace building in Rwanda which is a recent example of a post war country. This study will in particular critically analyze the different peace building efforts undertaken by both state and non-state actors.

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[13] Tschirigi, Necla (2004) *Post-Conflict Peace building revisited: Achievements, limitations, challenges, Policy Paper*, NY: International Peace Academy.
[14] Duffied, Mark *Global Governance and the New Wars: The merging of development and security.* Zed Books, London. 2002.
[15] Brian Urquhart, "The Good General," *New York Review of Books* 51, no. 14 (September 23, 2004).

1.4 Literature Review

The literature review shall be divided into three parts. The first part shall be a detailed review of what other scholars and experts have written on post-conflict peace building and the second part shall be a case study of post conflict peace building in Sierra Leone. The last part shall be an analysis of the literature.

Post-conflict peace building (PCPB) has become one of the primary concerns in current world politics. International organizations, as well as Western donor countries, have in recent years begun to prioritize and mainstream peace building in their external policies. This trend has recently been evidenced by the decision of the United Nations to reinforce its peace building capacity, namely by creating a Peace building Commission. [16]

The term peace building entered the international lexicon in 1992 when UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined it in *An Agenda for Peace* post-conflict "action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict."[17] Since then, peace building has become a catchall concept, encompassing multiple (and at times contradictory) perspectives and agendas. It is indiscriminately used to refer to preventive diplomacy, preventive development, conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. Cousens defines it as strategies designed to promote a secure and stable lasting peace in which the basic human needs of the population are met and violent conflict do not occur.[18]

This paper focuses on the original definition of peace building. More specifically, it examines non-military interventions by external actors to help war torn societies not only to avoid a relapse into conflict, but more importantly, to establish the conditions for sustainable peace.[19]

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[16] *Post conflict peace building: How to gain sustainable peace. Lessons learnt and future challenges;*
Conference held at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, 11-14 October 2004.

[17] Charles Call, "*The Problem of Peace building: How UN Thinking Has Evolved in Recent Years,*" draft paper prepared for DPA, 27 August 2004.

[18] Elisabeth Cousens and Chetan Kumar (eds), *peace building as politics: cultivating peace in fragile societies* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2001), pp 1-20.

[19] "Peace building as the link between Security and Development" (IPA Reports, Dec.2003)

While substantial improvements have been made over the years, there are still considerable gaps in the development of concepts, policies and practice that would make Post-Conflict Peace Building more effective "The Security Council acknowledges that serious attention to the longer-term process of peace building in all its multiple dimensions is critically important, and that adequate support for peace building activities can help to prevent countries from relapsing into conflict," it said in a statement read out at the conclusion of the daylong meeting by Ambassador Ellen Margrethe Løj of Denmark, which held the Council's rotating presidency for May 2005. [20]

According to Doyle, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, peace buildings were identified as one of a series of instruments in the UN's toolkit to respond to conflicts at the end of the Cold War. Originally, peace building referred to action to identify and support structures to consolidate peace in post-conflict countries in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. In the 1990s the concept became more expansive, combining conflict prevention, conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction. Today, peace building is no longer an exact term; it often needs the qualifier "post-conflict" peace building to refer primarily to the non-military or civilian dimensions of international efforts to support countries emerging from conflict—even though it might accompany or succeed military operations. Despite over ten years of practice, there is no commonly agreed post-conflict peace building policy or doctrine.[21]

According to Call 2004, the impetus for peace building came from multiple sources but found its strongest expression at the United Nations. Throughout the 1990s, the UN provided both the rationale and the operational principles for post-conflict peace building.[22]

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[20] Security council session 2005.

[21] Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "*International Peace building: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis,*" *American Political Science Review* 94: 779.

[22] Charles Call, "*The Problem of Peace building: How UN Thinking Has Evolved in Recent Years,*" draft paper prepared for DPA, 27 August 2004.

According to the United Nations, as the number of crises on the Security Council's agenda increased, the Council as well as the Secretary-General began to acknowledge the limitations of UN peacekeeping and peace building efforts. As a result, they began to turn to conflict prevention to complement the UN's broader peace building agenda. By early 2001, conflict prevention and peace building were being used interchangeably at the UN.[23]

Dahrendorf(2003) talks about peace building being part of a larger, activist post–Cold War international agenda. Throughout the 1990s, there was a gradual elaboration of an expanded normative framework for international affairs under the UN umbrella.[24]

Berdal and Malone note the emergence of a critique of the motivations behind the global peace building agenda. This first took the form of drawing attention to the way that international aid in conflict can fuel rather than reduce it. Allowing armed groups to live off aid in various ways. It led to donor agencies to seize on the exhortation to 'Do no harm' and fed into a growing literature on economic agendas in civil war (Anderson, 1999).

Fitzduff (2004)has written about a counter-discourse, which we can broadly call 'peace building from below'. According to him, it emerged from the field of conflict resolution in the 1990s, which served as a conceptual umbrella for a range of activities, particularly among international NGOs. A number of the latter emerged in this period dedicated to peace building work of varying kinds.[25]

In an edited volume of essays on the Salvadoran peace building process published in 1996, Boyce (1996) alerted the world to the dangers of this assumption in a country recovering from war. The

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[23] See the United Nations, UN Doc S/PRST/2001/5

[24] Dahrendorf, Nicola, et al. "*A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change*" (London: International Policy Unit, Kings College, March 2003).

[25] Fitzduff, Mari (2004) civil societies and peace building: the new Fifth Estate: http://www.un-ngls.un-ngls.org/cso/

assumption was that the global peace building project emerged alongside a global economic project in which a model of economic development which we know as neo-liberalism has been promoted ultimately as beneficial to all humanity. Neo-liberal economics do not prioritize and often contradict with urgent post-conflict tasks.[26]

Tschirigi 2004, notes that peace building proceeded on multiple tracks during the 1990s. It became the focus of a rich body of multi-disciplinary research and policy analysis. It stimulated the elaboration of new international norms, policies and institutional innovations. It engaged the efforts of an expanding range of actors, and it led to the design and implementation of many new programmes and projects on the ground.[27]

An Agenda for Peace stimulated significant new thinking and policy development within and outside the UN. The 1995 *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*, for example, noted the linkages between conflict prevention and peace building: "Demilitarization, the control of small arms, institutional reform, improved police and judicial systems, the monitoring of human rights, electoral reform and social and economic development can be as valuable in preventing conflict as in healing the wounds after conflict has occurred." It also acknowledged that implementing peace building could be complicated requiring "integrated action and delicate dealings between the United Nations and the parties to the conflict in respect of which peace building activities are to be undertaken."[28]

Chesterman(2004) in his book, *you, the people,* observes that between 1992 and 2001, the UN moved from a linear view of the transition from war to peace in the post–Cold War era to an integrated approach to conflict prevention, conflict management, and peace building. It came to view peace building as requiring the full range of its capacities (military, political, humanitarian, human rights,

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[26] Boyce, James K.(ed) (1996) *Economic policy for building peace: The lessons of El Salvador*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner.
[27] Tschirigi, Necla (2004) Post-Conflict Peace building revisited: Achievements, limitations, challenges, Policy Paper, NY: International Peace Academy,2004.
[28] Supplement to an agenda for Peace (1995) January

and socioeconomic) at the policy and operational levels. The UN also realized that peace building involved the active engagement of many external actors with multiple mandates and capacities.[29]

Dobbins(2005) says that, the international approach to peace building and conflict prevention is grounded in the concept of "liberal peace" which derives from a long tradition of Western liberal theory and practice. The liberal peace thesis views political and economic liberalization as effective antidotes to violent conflicts. Thus, promotion of human rights, democracy, elections, constitutionalism, rule of law, property rights, good governance, and neo-liberal economics have become part and parcel of the international peace building strategy.[30]

According to Rajagopal(2003), peace building was part of a larger, activist post–Cold War international agenda. [31]Throughout the 1990s, there was a gradual elaboration of an expanded normative framework for international affairs under the UN umbrella. In the early part of the decade, a series of international conferences sought to generate a global agenda on issues ranging from population and sustainable development to human rights and gender. These conferences served to underline the importance of multilateral approaches to addressing global problems and affirmed the role of the United Nations as an important instrument of global governance. The Millennium Declaration was a culmination of these processes and provided a global plan of action to deal with the world's most persistent problems.

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[29] Chesterman, Simon. *You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).pp89-116

[30] James Dobbins et al., *The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Belgian Congo to Iraq*, vol. 2 of Rand's

History of Nation-Building (RAND National Defense Research Institute, forthcoming 2005).

[31] See Ralakrishnan Rajagopal, *International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). pp34-67

Addison writes that, viewing peace building as a temporary phase, development agencies initially responded by creating specialized and designated units to address theinstitutional and programming void between humanitarian assistance and development aid.[32] These units had narrowly defined responsibilities and designated budgets to address immediate and short-term priorities. Nonetheless, they were instrumental in designing and implementing new "peace building" programs, projects and activities that fell outside

conventional humanitarian or development assistance. De-mining, DDR, election monitoring, and civilian policing became new areas of programming for development actors.

According to Tschirigi(2004), peace building is a Multi-Dimensional Enterprise with Several Pillars: While various actors define these pillars differently, there is consensus that peace building has political, social, economic, security and legal dimensions, each of which requires attention. Distinguishing it from conventional development, peace building is understood to be a highly political project involving the creation of a legitimate political authority that can avoid the resurgence of violence.[33]

Shepard (2000) contends that one of the important yardsticks for gauging the international commitment to post-conflict peace building is the scale of financial resources mobilized across agencies, governments and international organizations. Paradoxically, in an area where quantification is technically possible, there is insufficient and highly fragmented information about the total costs of post-conflict peace building in the last decade. Part of the difficulty derives from the fact that governments and agencies define peace building differently.[34]

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[32] Tony Addison, "From Conflict to Reconstruction," Discussion Paper No 2001/16 (UNU: WIDER, June 2001).

[33] Tschirigi, Necla Post-Conflict Peace building revisited: Achievements, limitations, challenges, Policy Paper, NY: International Peace Academy, 2004.

[34] Shepard Forman and Stewart Patrick, *Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Post-Conflict Recovery* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).pp45-57

1.5 Case study

In Sierra Leone, a country that was engulfed in a brutal civil war for more than ten years, peace was hard won – a peace that would not have been possible without the presence and active post-conflict assistance of the United Nations (UN). However, Sierra Leone remains in a precarious state, being one of the poorest countries in the world, and needs the commitment of the international community in ongoing post-conflict peace building efforts to sustain its delicate peace.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) undertook various initiatives aimed at a peaceful settlement in Sierra Leone – including the deployment of peacekeepers in 1997. Initially, this was done with a view to reinstating a democratically elected government in Freetown, which had been toppled in May 1997. In June 1998, the UN Security Council decided to establish the United Nations Observer Mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) for an initial period of six months. The mission had the task of monitoring and facilitating efforts to disarm the combatants and restructure Sierra Leone's security forces. Unarmed UN teams under the protection of ECOMOG documented reports of ongoing atrocities and human rights abuses (UNDPKO 2001a:1).[35] But UNOMSIL was never more than a 'lame duck' UN presence alongside ECOMOG and no meaningful progress could be made towards the UNOMSIL mandate in a highly unstable security environment. In these circumstances, the rebels began a second offensive to retake Freetown and managed to overrun most of the city towards the end of 1998. Once more this resulted in a toppling of a civilian government in Freetown.

ECOMOG struck back and again installed a civilian government, although thousands of rebels were reportedly still hiding out in the countryside. The UN Security Council commended ECOMOG on its role in supporting the restoration of peace and security in Sierra Leone. However, ECOMOG was unable to stamp its authority on the hinterland beyond Freetown and rebels continued to terrorize and

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[35] UNDPKO(United Nations Department of Peace keeping Operations) 2001.Sierra Leone.
(www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamsil/mandate.html)

brutalize the population (Malan 2000:5–6)[36]. On 22 October 1999, the Security Council decided to terminate UNOMSIL and to establish UNAMSIL, a much larger mission with a maximum strength of 6 000 military personnel, including 260 military observers. UNAMSIL was given the task of assisting the government and rebels in carrying out the provisions of the Lomé agreement (UNDPKO 2001a:2). According to a UN Security Council Resolution of February 2000 (a revised version of Resolution 1270 of 22 October 1999) UNAMSIL was given the following mandate (UNDPKO 2001b:1): To provide security at key locations and government buildings, particularly in Freetown, important intersections and major airports To facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance along specified thoroughfares, to provide security in and at all sites of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, to co-ordinate with and assist the Sierra Leonean law enforcement authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities to safeguard weapons, ammunition and other military equipment collected from ex-combatants and to assist in their subsequent disposal or destruction. In accordance with its mandate, UNAMSIL was given the task of helping to disarm an estimated 45 000 former combatants. This was a mammoth task since only 6 000 troops were deployed into the theatre, although 11 000 troops were mandated by the Security Council on 7 February 2000. By May 2000 it was reported that 16 000 former combatants had been disarmed, but an estimated 28 000 continued to roam the countryside (Adeyemi 2000:2).[37]

In a letter to the Security Council dated 7 March 2000 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated that progress in the peace process had been slow. He made specific mention of little progress in disarmament in the northern and eastern parts of the country and reported that the security situation generally 'remained tense and volatile'. He also referred to several incidents involving UNAMSIL and combatants, and elements from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) having seized a large number of weapons, ammunition and vehicles from a UNAMSIL contingent (UN Secretary-General 2000:5)[38]. As the UN deployed further to reinforce peace in Sierra Leone, RUF rebels and renegade

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[36] *www.iss.so.za/Pubs/ASF/8No4/Malan.html*
[37] Adeyemi, S 2000. UNOMSIL: A long road to peace. *Jane's intelligence review,* 18 may 2000(online) Available at <www.janes.com/geopol/editors/UNOMSIL.html>
[38] UN Secretary-General 2000. Third Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in

government troops continued to disrupt the peace process, carrying out a number of attacks on UN personnel (Adeyemi 2000:2). After a disastrous encounter with the RUF in May 2000, when the UN suffered one of its worst setbacks in the history of UN peacekeeping, the UN made significant strides towards achieving its goals in Sierra Leone. Having moved speedily to increase the capacity of its mission after observers and critics hammered UNAMSIL severely for its role and profile, the UN forces in Sierra Leone appeared to be better organized and equipped. To this end, UNAMSIL was able to play a meaningful role in helping Sierra Leone's war-ravaged population move towards an election process. In his report of 14 March 2002, the Secretary-General reported the following with regard to the peace process (UN Secretary-General 2002:2–5):

The overall security situation in Sierra Leone was generally stable, the disarmament process had progressed well with a total of 47, 076 combatants disarmed between 18 May 2001 and 17 january 2002 Some 1,723 ex-combatants had been selected for reintegration into the Sierra Leonean army. Substantial progress had been made in preparing for presidential and parliamentary elections, political parties could continue to prepare for the scheduled elections.

The Secretary-General furthermore reported that the disarmament process and the deployment of UNAMSIL throughout the country had created a relatively more secure environment, which provided the opportunity for Sierra Leone to hold free, fair and credible elections, and to concentrate on national reconciliation and recovery, as well as building sustainable institutions. Against this background, the general elections of 14 May 2002 represented a significant step forward in Sierra Leone's elusive search for peace and democracy. Though the elections did not result in a change of government, the participation of the RUF signaled a commitment to both peace and the democratization process. One of the remarkable features of the 2002 elections was the level of public engagement and the peaceful nature of the campaign process.[39]

Sierra Leone, S/2000/186, New York, 7 March.

[39] Jalloh, M 2002. Voting for peace and democracy in Sierra Leone: reflections on the May 2002 general

elections. *Africa Insight*, 32(4):59–63.

Another remarkable or most outstanding feature especially significant from a peace building perspective was the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) under the Lomé Peace Agreement of 1999 between Sierra Leone's government and the RUF. The TRC, clearly meant to be a nation-building project, was intended to address impunity, to break the cycle of violence, to provide a forum for both victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their story, and to obtain a clear picture of the past in order to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation. Modeled on similar past commissions in Chile, Guatemala and South Africa, the TRC intended to investigate the causes, nature and extent of human rights violations that occurred in the country, help restore the human dignity of victims, and promote national reconciliation. Apart from fostering national reconciliation through the TRC, it was also decided to establish a Special UN Court to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law in Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996. This means that the tribunal have power to prosecute those who committed crimes against civilians, including murder, torture and rape, as well as those who committed or ordered the commission of serious violations against the Geneva Convention .[40] In what has been described as 'welcoming news' and 'momentous events in Africa, [41]Charles Taylor, the former president of neighboring Liberia who backed the RUF insurgency by providing arms and training to the RUF in exchange for diamonds, was arrested and on 3 March 2007 charged by the UN's Special Court for Sierra Leone with crimes against humanity,

violation of the Geneva Convention and other serious violations of international humanitarian law (Special Court for Sierra Leone 2007:1). [42]

[40] IRIN (United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks) 2002. *Sierra Leone: focus on the challenges of reconciliation* [online]. Available at <www.irinnews.org/report.asp=West_Africa>

[41] Aboagaye, F 2006. West Africa's horrific wars catch up with Taylor. *ISS Today*, 9 May 2006 [online]. Available at <www.iss.co.za/index.php>

[42] Special Court for Sierra Leone 2007. The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Case no SCSL-03-I, The Prosecutor

Other issues that received attention in the peace building process relate to programmes in the fields of humanitarian assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons, the consolidation of civil authority, the promotion of human rights and good governance, and also the restoration of the legal system.

Approximately five years after its creation, UNAMSIL approached the end of its mandate in December 2004. Amongst other successes, UNAMSIL managed to disarm some 75 000 former combatants, facilitated significant improvement to infrastructure, expanded state authority, and almost rebuilt the national police to the target of 9 500 officials. Although UNAMSIL enjoyed considerable success, certain challenges remained. Low levels of public confidence in the capabilities of the police and armed forces, especially, posed serious security challenges. However, it was generally felt that should the peace process – and post-conflict peace building – prove to be successful, it would represent a major success in international peacekeeping in one of Africa's most conflict-ridden states . [43]All in all, it could be said that the post-conflict peace building process in Sierra Leone clearly involved a human security approach, specifically based on a liberty/rights and rule of law dimension; a freedom from fear/safety of people's dimension; and a freedom from want/equity and social justice dimension. Moreover, it involved a willingness to make a difference on the ground in preventing conflicts or establishing the basic conditions for making sustainable security and development possible.

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against Charles Ghankay Taylor, also known as Charles Ghankay Macarthur Dapkpana Taylor, Indictment

[online]. Available at <www.sc-sl.org/Documents/SCSC-03-01-I-001.html> [

[43] Molukanele, T et al 2004. United Nations peacekeeping missions: Sierra Leone. *Conflict Trends*, 2(42):59-63.

1.6 Analysis of the literature

In analyzing the literature review there are a number there are a number of issues that come to the forefront. One is that the UN and other non-state actors are important players in the process of post conflict peace building. It could be very difficult to have effective peace building without these actors. Call (2004), talks about the impetus for peace building coming from multiple sources, especially the UN.[44] The other issue is that peace building efforts require the involvement of all stake holders, as elaborated by Chesterman(2004).[45] It will be difficult to achieve the desired results if some actors are excluded.

We also realize that peace building is multi-disciplinary. For example in an *Agenda for peace*, we see the link between conflicts prevention and peace building.[46] Peace building is not just about post conflict reconstruction but conflict prevention and conflict management.[47] Peace building entails social and economic development, institutional reforms (e.g. judicial and police reforms), human rights etc. Peace building cannot be effective without all these.

The international community has made efforts to prioritize and mainstream peace building. This is evident through the work being done by international non-governmental organizations, western governments' efforts in peace building and the United Nations creation of a peace building commission.

Finally, we have learnt that peace building needs to be looked at in the long term. This will prevent countries from relapsing into conflict. Peace building efforts should no longer be just about military

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[44] Charles Call, "*The Problem of Peace building: How UN Thinking Has Evolved in Recent Years*," draft paper prepared for DPA, 27 August 2004.

[45] Chesterman, Simon. You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

[46] Supplement to an agenda for Peace (1995) January

[47] Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "*International Peace building: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis*," *American Political Science Review* 94: 779

interventions which are short term, but long term structures and strategies like institutional reforms and economic development which will ensure that conflicts do not occur or recur.

1.7 Justification of the Study

A full decade after it became a high-profile international commitment, post-conflict peace building remains a fragile undertaking with mixed results. While there is little doubt that peace building will continue to require international attention, the lessons of the last ten years do not add up to a successful record. Yet the record of peace building is at best mixed, and two nagging questions confront analysts and practitioners alike: Why is it that after more than ten years of practice, the international peace building project is still experimental, amorphous and tenuous in nature? And how can the knowledge and experience gained to date be better put to use to achieve more effective outcomes?

This paper seeks to address complex political, institutional, policy or   operational

challenges in an international environment. Addressing them in an international environment characterized by deep cleavages, lack of consensus on the threats to international peace and security, and ongoing wars involving major states presents overwhelming challenges to the entire peace building project. The paper will research on whether there is considerable room for the United Nations and the international community at large to improve peace building policy and practice. Post-conflict peace building project is at risk of being overtaken by other agendas which have emerged in the post 9/11 environment, including the attempt to conflate peace building with the narrowly-cast national security agendas of powerful member states.

While the term peace building is relatively new, external assistance for post-war rebuilding goes back to the reconstruction of post–World War II Europe and Japan. What was new in Boutros Boutros-Ghali's formulation, and what caught the world's attention, was a realization that the end of the Cold War opened new possibilities for international action.

According to the UN, the persistence of intra-state and civil conflicts in different regions, the breakdown of peace processes, and the relapse of a number of countries into violent

conflict, and the emergence of new conflicts ensure that the demand for post-conflict peace building will continue unabated in the coming years and decades despite its multiple

shortcomings and weaknesses. [48]

Hence, this study is important in analyzing post-conflict peace building in Africa. It will seek to critically analyze past efforts in post conflict peace building, and therefore help different actors come up with concrete and comprehensive policies on how to make peace building more effective and ultimately achieve high levels of peace and development.

1.8 Conceptual framework

The main concepts to guide the development of arguments behind this research are derived from the peace research paradigm.

Johan Galtung(2004) has helped shape the philosophical basis of peace research. The study will apply peace research orientation of peace building. The peace research paradigm looks at the deep rooted causes of the conflict which are found in its structure. It is conceptually associated with the structuralist theories of international relations. The notion of structural conflict[49] has influenced profoundly the study of conflict, and introduced new complexities and insights to conflict management. The existence of structural conflict means that it is necessary to look beyond the immediate physical violence and take into account the structure that underlies social relationships, since it might itself be a source of conflict[50]. To be successful, post conflict peace building must address the underlying causes of conflict in addition to the surface manifestations.

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[48] www.un.org
[49] see Johan Galtung, 'violence, peace and peace research' Journal of Peace Research vol. 3 (1969) pp.167-191.
[50] see Makumi Mwagiru, 'Conflict in Africa; Theory, processes and institutions of management (Nairobi : CCR Publications, 2006) p.24

The primary motivation of peace research is to improve the human condition, to aim for a better life in a safer world for all. Peace researchers emphasize the need to promote values like justice, humanity and empathy within society. International approach to peace building and conflict prevention is grounded in the concept "liberal peace".[51] It views political and economic liberalization as effective antidotes to conflict, thus promotion of human rights, democracy, elections, constitutionalism, rule of law, good governance have become part and parcel of international peace building strategy.[52]

A central concern for this school is the role of structural violence in stunting development and undermining justice. Conflicts can only be changed by changing the underlying structure.[53]

1.9 Hypotheses

The following hypotheses are germane to this study:

- H_0: The peace research approach of conflict has a positive effect on post conflict peace-building.

  H_1: The peace research approach conflict has a negative effect on post conflict peace building.

- H_0: Both state and non state actors have succeeded in peace-building in Rwanda

  H_1: Both state and non state actors have not succeeded in peace-building in Rwanda

1.10 Methodology of Research

Data on post conflict peace building efforts from the 1990s to date will be required to make an assessment. This study will therefore use both primary and secondary sources of data.

For primary data collection, the study will use a non-probability sample design known as the convenience sample. Sampling units conveniently available will be used. In this case, Rwandese refugees in a Nairobi suburb will be interviewed. Further visits will be made to different non governmental organizations and other actors involved in post conflict peace building in Rwanda. In

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[51] James Dobbins et al., The United Nation's role in Nation Building: From the Belgian Congo to Iraq, vol.2 of Rand's
[52] A review of key policy documents by OECD DAC, the EU, the UN, and other bilateral and multilateral organisations.
[53] Chesterman, Simon. You , the people: The UN, transitional administration and state building (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004)

these cases, interviews both focused and non-directive will be conducted. Questionnaires will also be used. Focused interviews permit the researcher to obtain details of personal reactions, specific emotions and the like.

Sources of secondary data will include local university libraries both public and private and resource centres of different organizations involved in peacebuilding. The mass media, and the internet will also provide valuable information on the subject under study. Periodicals such as journals, daily newspapers, pamphlets and audio visual materials will provide valuable information.

CHAPTER TWO

2.0 AN OVERVIEW OF THE RWANDA CONFLICT

2.1 Introduction

The Rwanda genocide was the systematic murder of the country's Tutsi minority and the moderates of its Hutu majority in 1994. It is difficult to overstate the scale of brutality of the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Between 6th April and 17th July, the Rwandan state engaged in an act of mass carnage against its own population, targeting a minority ethnic group and political opponents.[54]This chapter attempts to give a historical background and overview to the conflict from pre-colonial, colonial, post-independence up to the genocide in 1994.

This chapter will examine the underlying causes of the Rwanda conflict. These include political, social, economic and institutional problems. These are causes that have always existed within the society's structure (structural) and hence first transformed into manifest conflict form latent conflict. It also examines the roles played by different actors, individuals or institutions. The policies pursued by the political elite in Rwanda (post-independence) the contribution of colonialist and also the pre-colonial (political system). All these will enable us to understand the post conflict peace building efforts being pursued in Rwanda. It also examines how the wave escalated form low intensity civil war to genocide.

2.2 Pre-colonial setting

In the fifteenth century the Tutsi were the rulers of most of today's Rwanda, with some Hutus among the nobility. Tutsi were a minority of the population, mostly herders and the majority while Hutus were mostly croppers. It seems incontestable that by the end of the nineteenth century when the colonizer arrived, Rwanda was a kingdom with a Tutsi king and a predominantly Tutsi court. What

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[54] Bruce D. Jones. *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure*. Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2002, P. 1

were the levels of mutual control, exchange and obligation between Tutsi and Hutu? What possibilities for upward mobility, if any, were open to Hutu?[55]

When the kings, known as Mwamis began to centralize their administrations, they distributed land among individuals rather than allowing it to be held by the hereditary chieftains, who were mainly Hutu. Unsurprisingly most of the chiefs appointed by the Mwamis were Tutsi. The redistribution of land, between 1860 and 1895 under Mwami Rwabugiri resulted in Tutsi chiefs demanding manual labour in return for the right of Hutus to occupy their property. This system of patronage left the Hutus in a self like status with Tutsi chiefs as their feudal masters. With Mwami Rwabugiri on the throne, Rwanda came on expansionist state. Its rulers did not bother to assess the ethnic identities of conquered people brought under their sway simply labeling all of them "Hutu".[56] The "Hutu" identity consequently was to be a trans-ethnic one. Eventually, "Tutsi" and "Hutu" were seen to be economic distinctions, rather than particularly ethnic. In fact, there was social mobility between the Tutsi and Hutus, on the basis of hierarchical status. One could kwihutura or lose "Hutuness" with the accumulation of wealth.[57] Conversely, a Tutsi benefit of property could gucupira or loses "Tutsiness".

The king preferred to rely solely on the Tutsi, helping to cement their dominance, and thereby making the Hutu-Tutsi ethnic boundary more rigid. Rwabugiri's administration imposed a harsh regime of the formerly semi-autonomous Tutsi and Hutu lineages, confiscating their lands and breaking their political power. He also manipulated social categories, and introduced an "ethnic" differentiation between Tutsi and Hutu based on historical social positions. Polarization and politicization of ethnicity thus began before the advert of European colonialism.[58]

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[55] Bereket P. Fessehaye,*The Internal and External Dimensions of the Rwanda Ethnic Conflict*, 1990-1998, M.A Dissertation, UoN, Oct. 2001.
[56] V. Jefremovas. *"Treacherous Waters; The Politics of History and the Politics of "Genocide in Rwanda and Burundi"*, Review Article, Africa, 70(2) 2000, P. 267-301.
[57] Mahmood Mamdani. *When Does a Settler Become a Native? Reflections of the Colonial Roots of Citizenship in Equatorial and South Africa*, University of Cape Town, 1998 (13 May) Pp. 5-6.
[58] L. Wolgemuth and T. Sellstrom, *"Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors, Journal of Humanitarian Assistance,* 1996, P. 1

Guy Vassal Adams[59] argues that, four hundred years ago, the Tutsi established feudal kingdoms in the card now called Rwanda and Burundi. They formed a land owning and cattle owning aristocracy, ruling over the Hutu. In return for their labours, Hutu were granted the use of land and cattle and the protection of their overloads. Guy Vassal-Adams also argues that the Tutsi controlled the three main sources of power; the cattle economy, the monarchy and religious life. Their reign was reinforced by an oral mythology which taught the Tutsi were inherently superior and that their dominance was ordained of God. The Tutsi Mwami (king) stood at the apex of this complex social order, which encompassed three different sets of chieftaincies over land, cattle and the military.[60]

2.3 Colonial period, 1886 – 1962

In the Berlin conference of 1886, Rwanda and Burundi were annexed by the Germans, with this state of affairs in effect until 1919 treaty of Versailles, when they were ceded to Belgium, as a trustee colony. A recurrent theme in the literature on underdevelopment in Africa and the weakness of the African state traces the source t the impact of colonial rule on the process of state formation.[61] One early focus of this literature was the impact of colonial boundaries on the formation of national identity, especially problems associated with mapping a series of prior ethnic, tribal or clan identities onto the outlines of newly formed, bounded states.[62] During the periods of first German (1897 – 1919) and then Belgian (1919 – 1962) colonial rule, and into independence, Rwanda's borders went largely unchanged. European colonists encountering Rwanda met with a political system whose boundaries roughly conformed to the borders of the colonial and the modern Rwandan state. Nevertheless, European interaction with Rwandan society was important, not for its impact on borders but for its impact on social relations within those borders.

The intention of the colonial structure was not to establish and promote the well-being of the indigenous population or the development of the colony, but to satisfy the needs of the colonial

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[59] G. Vassal-Adams. "Rwanda*: An Agenda for International Action:* Oxford Oxfam UK and Ireland, 1994, P. 7
[60] Ibid
[61] See Mohammed Ayoub "*State Making, State Breaking and State Failure*" In Chester A. Crocker, Fen O. Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall (eds), *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict* (Washington, Dc: Us. Institute for Peace, 1996). Pp. 37-51
[62] See Anthony D. Smith, *State Sand Nation in the Third* World (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983)

metropolis, its companies and its population. The resources of the colonial masters, and expatriated colonial, elite had to make use of the indigenous elite in the colony, joining efforts in order to achieve this goal. Local leaders were only allowed to manage strictly indigenous affairs in the framework of an indirect rule. It is important to note that, in Rwanda, capitalism was essentially opportunistic. It exploited the pre-colonial class divisions for its interests. This deepened class contradictions and hence antagonism in Rwanda. They used and consolidated the monarchical structure, more so long pre-colonial class relations in pursuit of establishing colonial relations that would serve the metropole.[63]

In this view, they re-asserted the predestination of the pastoralists to rule over the agriculturalists. On the political front, they won for themselves an alliance with the ruling class. This saved them the cost of dismantling the system and engaging expensive personnel from home. To justify the maintaining of Tutsi domination, they advanced an ideology that stressed their unique qualities to rule. The German explorers and early colonial representatives were the first exponents of the application to Rwanda of an anthropological or social argument known as the hamitic thesis, which was used throughout the colonial period to explain the domination of certain African group over others, and thus to justify European comprador (intermediary) arrangement with some of those groups for the consolidation of their colonial presence.[64]

Germany's first encounter with Rwanda was of a sophisticated kingdom and peoples, with a developed court system, including a rich language specific to its functions.[65] Seeming to dominate this system were a tall, light skinned people – the Tutsi – who appeared to dominate a shorter darker people – the Hutu. According to historians such as Catherine and David Newbury, and anthropologists such as johan pottier, the terms Hutu and Tutsi in pre independence Rwanda referred

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[63] Dixon Kamukama, *Rwanda Conflict; Its Roots and Regional Implications,* Fountain Publishers, Kampala, 1993. Pp.20-21
[64] See John Hanning Speke, *Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile* (London, 1863).
[65] See Esp. D. Newbury, Kings and Clans

to a complex set of social relations that had some of the elements of class, caste and social status.[66] Accordingly, they successfully pursued the policy of divide and rule. First, they helped King Musinga to consolidate his power on the pretext that the Tutsi were de facto rulers. They took up most of the pre-colonial state machinery and functionaries and used them under the mantle of indirect rule. This machinery was overwhelmingly dominated by the Nyinginya or Tutsi (pastoral) class. These become comprador administrators and civil servants and got high posts in the coercive machinery. As a result of these colonial policies, by the 1950s the Tutsi held 43 chiefdoms, 549 out of 559 sub-chief positions, 83% of posts in such areas as the judiciary, agriculture and veterinary services.[67]

After World War I, colonial authority over the Rwandan territory passed from Germany to Belgium. The Germans system of rule in Rwanda thus came into contact with the oppressive system of rule that had developed in what was first known, ironically, as the Belgian free state and then as the Belgian Congo.[68] The development of colonial systems of rule under Belgium would prove to be a critical moment in laying the groundwork for decades of civil tension and conflict in Rwanda. When the Belgians began to establish control over Rwandan territory, they imposed on the country an intellectual and administrative simplification that equated "Tutsi" with "ruling class".[69] The Belgian colonists relied on Tutsis to fulfill the administration of the League of Nations mandate under which the Belgian presence was formally legitimized. The Belgians even went so far as to introduce a system of identity cards that specified ethnicity to aid the administrative system.[70] Later we shall see how this played a big part in the genocide. The creation of this internal discrimination system, which allowed the Tutsi privileged access to the state, to jobs, and to the church, would have a profound impact by creating an ethic hierarchy. The period was short lived, but the memory of Tutsi domination and subsequent competition would cycle through Rwandan history to the contemporary

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[66] C. Newbury.*The Cohesion of Oppression*; See also Johann Pottier, "*The Self in Self Repatriation; Closing Down Mugunga Camp, Eastern Zaire* in R. Black and K. Kosher (eds) The End of the Refugee Cycle (Oxford: Bergahn, 1999)
[67] Dixon Kamukama, *Rwanda Conflict; Its Roots and Regional Implications*, Fountain Publishers, Kampala, 1993. P. 21
[68] See Thomas Pakeanham, *The Scramble for Africa*. 1876 – 1912 (New York: Random House, 1991
[69] C. Newbury, *Cohesion of Oppression*; See also Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis.
[70] Bruce D. Jones, "*Peacemaking in Rwanda, The Dynamics of Failure*". Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001. P. 19

period. This historical moment of dominant relations would remain embedded in the Rwandan consciousness.

The unquestionable harsh colonial era was like a condominium. The people of Rwanda were subjected to both monarchical and colonial exploitation and oppression. Watson[71] rightly points out that deepened ethnic divisions that produced much of the bitterness by advancing the Tutsi at the expense of the Hutu for 40 years. On the eve of independence, they switched support to the Hutu. Suffice it to note that colonialism and capitalism were essentially opportunistic. They could change whenever the survival of their interests was at stake. The consequences of the monarchical or comprador colonial exploitation and oppression pointed to an impending explosion from the majority. To forestall any possible calamity and exonerate themselves, they tactfully shifted supported to an overwhelming force in the equation.

The lace 1940s and 1950s saw the development of emerging modern elite among Hutu as well as Tutsi parts of Rwandan society colonialism had ushered in a structural change. The few Bahutu who joined formal education found it an avenue for enlightment and advancement. Education gave rise to an elite middle class among the oppressed. This led parts of the Belgian administrative structure to open doors to Hutus, giving them access to jobs, promotions, and access to an increasingly monetized economy, through schools and the church. Competition between these groups became intensified as pressure for democratic change mounted in Rwanda. The 1950s saw the beginning of a movement for decolonization and independent governance. In the late 1950s, this movement began to take on an ethnic character as political leaders, not for the last time, used ethnic identification to generate political mobilization against competing elites. This was particularly true of the PARMEHUTU, a movement of educated Hutu elites who circulated manifestos calling for Hutu freedom, not only from Belgian colonization but from Tutsi overlordship.[72]

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[71] Watson C, *Exile From Rwanda; Background to an Invasion*, New York, 1991.
[72] Newbury C. *The Cohesion of Oppression. Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda*, 1860 - 1960

In the late 1950s, when emergent Hutu elites had been given increased access to church, it markets the high point of ethnic tension in pre-independence Rwanda. They gained some social status and began to react against the dominance of the Tutsi and to use this dominance as a focal point for generating political support. It led to the mobilization of ethnic identities in the Rwandan society (the Rwandan revolution). It was a series of clashes, some violent, between Tutsi and Hutu elements in Rwanda over who would control decolonization and who would emerge dominant in an independent Rwandan state.[73]

Violence started when members of the dominant Tutsi party, the union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR) drew up plans to eliminate members of the emergent Hutu elite.[74] On November 1st 1959, when UNAR activists attacked a Hutu sub-chief, a key figure in PARMEHUTU called Mbonyumutwa Dominique. In retaliation, the Hutu attacked a notable Tutsi chief who belonged to UNAR. The attack set in motion ethnic violence that degenerated into a bloody civil war. Watson points out that the Belgian authorities reacted by arresting 919 Tutsi compared to 312 Hutu. The Belgian administrators supported the Hutu, when the UNAR tried to crash the emergent Hutu opposition. The target of this UNAR policy in turn reacted against the Tutsi elites, sparking the killings of thousands of Tutsi in Kigali and the countryside and causing a mass out flux of Tutsi to neighbouring Uganda, Tanzania and Burundi.

2.4 Post independence period

Rwanda has experienced a disturbing and prolonged cycle of violent conflict since 1959, three years before it gained its independence. Independence was worn in 1960 and saw and saw the PARMEHUTU win elections giving them control over the newly independent state. A two way flow of violence had continued on a moderate scale until after independence. It is in this moment of ethnic competition and the creation of a large exodus population in the neighbouring countries that we find one of the long term roots of the Rwandan civil war in the 1990s. The civil war in 1990 would be launched by the descendants- familial and political of this period of competition and the money of

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[73] Ibid
[74] Newbury C. *The Cohesion of Oppression and Prunier*, The Rwanda Crisis.

Tutsi dominance, however brief, would be a critical factor in the political mobilization toward genocide.

The objectives of the 1959 revolution, which brought the Hutu to power, were to end colonialism and to change the socio-political and socio-economic relations that it had created. Unfortunately, though it succeeded in changing the colonial socio-political relations, it failed to crush the ethnic stereotypes that continue to haunt the country. Hence, if there was anything revolutionary about the 1959 revolution, it was the elitist role-reversal whereby Hutu elites succeeded in taking the reins of power from the Tutsis.[75] Since independence, both Hutu and Tutsi elites continued to manipulate ethnic hatred for socio-political advantage. The second phase of the conflict came during the early 1970s, when Juvenal Habyarimana initiated a coup that replaced the nationalist President Gregoire Kayibanda. Although this phase of the conflict had interethnic connotation and implication, it was more of an intra-Hutu regional conflict – a protest of the northern Hutu, represented by Habyarimana, against the exclusionist tendencies of the Kayibanda regime, which was mainly dominated by the Hutu of the south and central part of the country.[76] The third phase of the conflict was the Tutsi return to power, sparked by the October 1990 invasion of the Rwandan conflict has been killing of tens or even thousands of innocent civilians and forcing of hundreds of thousands of others into exile as refugees.

From the social revolution until the time of the genocide, sporadic organized killings of Tutsi citizens transpired. Between December, 1963 and January 1964, roughly 14,000 Tutsis were killed in an organized governmental effort after the Kayibanda regime squelched and incursion into southern Rwanda by Tutsi guerillas. In 1973, following the political turmoil in neighbouring Burundi, which resulted in an influx of Hutus into Rwanda, then President Gregoire Kayibanda and his army Chief Jurchal Habyarimana organized committed of public safety which led to several hundred deaths and an exodus of over a hundred thousands Tutsis from the country. Author Philip Gourevitch described

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[75] Mohammed O. Maundi, (et al) *Getting In; Mediators Entry into the Settlement of African Conflicts*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC 2006
[76] *Rwanda; wrapping democracy in violence*, 1992. Africa confidential 33, no.20 (October 9).

the trend, saying "killing Tutsis was a political tradition in post colonial Rwanda, it brought people together".

The second phase of the conflict came when Juvenal Habyarimana, initiated a crop against the incumbent President Gregoire Kayibanda. When he took over, the bases for a relative peace were gradually restored in Rwanda but the ethnic question remained unresolved. Each ethnic group guarded the memory of members who were killed in the massacres.[77] The Kayibanda and Habyarimana regimes had sought to assert their legitimacy through the use of two separate discourses: one was the ethnic, "social revolution" argument, tailored for local consumption; the other was a "development" legitimization, aimed at both he international community and the domestic audience.[78]

Of course, preferences given to southern Hutu clans during the first republic (Kayibanda) led to resentment among northern Hutu clans. Indeed, it was a movement of northern Hutu that deposed Kayibanda in what is referred to as a bloodless coup that took place in 1973 under the leadership of Juvenal Habyarimana.[79] The coup initiated the second republic and the second phase of evolution of Rwandan politics and power structures.

As mentioned earlier, Habyarimana initial period of rule was one of calm, prosperity and relative tolerance between socio ethic groups. He used the state to attempt to level some of the imbalances between ethnic groups that characterized the Kayibanda era. For example, Habyarimana's party, the Movement Revolutionnaire National Pour Le Development (MRND), instituted such measures as a quota system that guaranteed Tutsis and southern Hutus roughly equal access to state jobs and economic opportunities.[80] Also during the 1970s and well into the 1980s, Rwanda excelled attracting aid from foreign donors and had a successful economy. Today, we can see that this optimism masked

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[77] See, Bereket P. Fesselaye, *The Internal and External Dimension of The Rwanda Ethnic Conflict*, 1990-1998, M. A Dissertation, UoN, Oct. 2001.

[78] P. Uvin, Aiding Violence, The Development Enterprise in Rwanda. West Hartford; Kumarian Press, Inc. 1998 P. 6

[79] The Coup may have been Bloodless in its Implementation but Members of the Kayibanda Regime Were Executed Following Habyarimana's Ascension to Power.

[80] Bruce D. Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda; The Dynamics of Failure*; Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2001, P.1

a far different feature of real politics, one that would have profound relevance for the calamitous events of the 1990s. In reality, during the second phase the state was progressively being captured by a movement of northern clan members related by clan-family to Habyarimana.

After gaining power in a coup in 1973, the members of Habyarimana's regime consolidated both formal and informal control over the Rwandan state and through it the main channels of Rwanda's commercial, intellectual and cultural life. In the arena of formal power, the Bushiru Hutu dominated the Rwandan state through the MRND, which President Habyarimana declared to be the only legal party. At the elite level, the inner circles of power, state enterprise, army command, regional prefectures and church leadership were dominated by Habyarimanas clan family – indeed, so closely knit as this circle that it earned the nickname "little house" or Akazu. Senior members of the Akazu controlled the state banks and led the major enterprises, which were financed with concessionary state loans and received virtually all government contracts.

In line with its ideology of the "socio revolution", the new Hutu establishment adopted a policy of systematic discrimination against Tutsi especially in areas of political power – the government, the army, the single party – and in state jobs, education and foreign training.[81] According to Gerald Prunier, "there would not be a single Tutsi bourgmestre or prefet, there was only one seventy and there was only one Tutsi minister out of a cabinet of between twenty five and thirty members.[82]

While enforcing the "ethnic" quota system, which was based on the population of each ethnic group, Tutsis were discriminated against. It was, based on fictions statistics and the regime allocated to 90 percent of educational and employment opportunities to Hutu. Tutsi and Twa got only nine percent and one percent respectively.[83] In the armed forces, for instance, only Hutu were allowed to joint and

[81] P. Uvin, *Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda,* P. 34
[82] G. Prunier, Op cit. P. 75
[83] A. Destexhe, *Rwanda and Genocide in the 20th Century*. London Pluto Press, 1995, P. 44

in order to keep the "purity" of the Rwandan armed forces, no army officer was permitted to marry a Tutsi woman.[84]

The ruling clique kept intact the system of ethnic identity cards introduced by the Belgian colonial masters. This helped facilitate the operation of its policy of political discrimination. Individual ethnic identities were quickly identified by a mere glance at one's identity paper. In a 1964 speech, president Kayibanda warned Tutsi refugees that if they attempted to regain political power, the "whole Tutsi race will be wiped out". [85] During the early years of Habyariman rule this ideology was dormant. However, in 1990s, it become radicalized quickly and attained a genocide stage by 1994.

As Lomarchand put it, by reinforcing, structuring and exacerbating ethnic identities, colonialism had planted the seeds of two radically different and incompatible nationalist myths.[86] These myths and realities made the relationship between the two ethnic groups toward each other more rigid mistrust and fear intensified and thus when Habyarimana dissolved the PARMEHUTU and organized a single party, Mouviement Revolutionnaire National Pour Le Development et la Democratie (MRND) in 1975, the Tutsi were not allowed to join the party.[87] He controlled the party with an iron first and it became, next to the army, the second pillar of his power. He even denied Tutsi refugees the right to return arguing that Rwanda was already "over populated" and could not absorb any more people.[88]

The Akazu's domination of Rwandan political and economic life began to come under strain, however, it what can be seen as a third phase the late 1980s, which saw an increase in social and political tension in Rwanda precipitated by economic decline and exacerbated by intersecting international pressures. The public support Habyarimanas regime enjoyed initially had dwindled. By the late 1980s the country was socially strained, economically and environmentally destitute and

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[84] T. Kakwenzire et al.
[85] P. Uvin, "*Prejudice, Crisis and Genocide in Rwanda*". Op cit, P.23
[86] Quoted in S. Utterwulghe, "Rwanda's *Protracted Social Conflict Considering the Subjective Perspective in Conflict Resolution Strategies*", Op Cit, P. 12
[87] T. Tschuy, Ethnic, Op cit, P. 47
[88] African Rights, Op cit, Pp. 16-17

politically fractured. The years since independence had seen large population growth and the consequent exacerbation of problems regarding population density and the availability of arable land. By the late 1980s, Rwanda was one of the poorest countries in the world, had the highest population density in the continent and had experienced a decade's worth of declining land productivity. A short rainy season in1989 also led in 1990 to widespread food shortages and in some regions, famine. The situation rapidly deteriorated further in July 1989 as a result of a dramatic fall in world coffee prices, which came at the same time as a diminishing coffee yield in Rwanda following years of already low prices. Coffee was one of the major export earners for Rwanda. A large drop in Rwanda's foreign export earnings resulted.[89]

As a result these, Rwanda experienced a 40 percent reduction in its budget.[90] This also meant cut on spending on social services as well as opportunities for elites to enrich themselves. This declines triggered negotiations with the international monetary fund (IMF), which led to drastic curtailment of budgetary spending. This case of foreign intervention in the form of structural adjustment program (SAP) also helped weaken the regime at a critical moment. Rwanda experienced all of the social ills associated with the budget cuts, including high levels of unemployment among youths. By early 1990, the unemployment had begun to manifest itself in student and other forms of political unrest. The combination of economic contraction, budgetary retraction and political unrest meant that by mid 1990 by Habyarimana regime was much weakened.

2.5 The civil war

The Tutsi refugee diaspora was by the late 1980s a coherent political and military organization. Large numbers of Tutsi refugees in Uganda had joined the victorious rebel national resistance movement (NRM) during the Ugandan bush war. They formed the Rwanda patriotic front (political wing) which had a military wing, the Rwanda patriotic army (RPA). On the international stage this movement is

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[89] See Peter Uvin, *Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda* (West Hartford, Ct: Kumarian Press, 1998).
[90] G. Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 84.

known as the Rwanda patriotic front (RPF). Some of the RPF leaders held high profile jobs in Uganda's security and political set up.

The RPF launched an attack in October 1990. This October 1990 civil war was a classic case of a centralist internal conflict based on the struggle for the control of central authority. A number of external and internal factors contributed to the timing of the RPF invasion from Uganda. First, was the Rwandan government policy of denying hundreds of thousands of refugees, the right of return to the country of their nationality. This amounted to denationalizing them or condemning them to permanent refugee status, and thus an invitation to a forceful return. The majority of them, against the backdrop, happened to be Tutsi.[91]

Second, the role of the Rwandan refugees – who later constituted the backbone of the RPF – in helping bring Yoweri Museveni to power in Uganda in 1986, their numerical presence, and the high positions some of them attained in the Ugandan national resistance army (NRA) raised hostile nationalistic sentiment among Ugandan's themselves, especially those who were opposed to Museveni.[92] These xenophobic sentiments and the subsequent sidelining of the Rwandan top officials within the NRA created among the refugees a feeling of being unwanted and a fear of future harassment and hastened preparations for their return. Thus the invasion was neither accidental nor spontaneous it was carefully planned.

Within Rwanda, the RPF was helped by growing internal opposition against Habyarimana's regime. Rwanda like everywhere else in Africa in the 1990s was being blown by the winds of political change. Thirty years of dictatorial leadership, human rights abuses, dismal economic performance, nepotism, corruption and the north-south political rift provided an impetus for civil society to mobilize for political transformation.

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[91] Mohammed Maundi, et al. *Getting in Mediators Entry into these Settlement of African Conflicts,* United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C. 2006
[92] Prunier.G, *The Rwanda crisis: History of a genocide*. New York: Columbia university Press, 1995.

Inspired by the democratic changes taking place in other African countries and donor nations conditionalities that tied foreign aid to political reform, courageous politicians, intellectual and journalists called for the introduction of multiparty system. This call posed, for the first time, a serious threat to Habyarimana's single party rule.[93]

Another internal factor was Habyarimana's apparent change of heart on his refugee policy. In February 1988, he had formed a joint commission with Uganda to deal with the refugee problem, but nothing serious was done. Following the world congress of the Rwandan refugees held in Washington D.C, in August 1988, which passed a resolution on the "right of return" even by force if necessary. Habyarimana started to pay more serious attention. During its third session held in July 1990, the joint commission came up with a document that spelled out the modalities that would have guided the Rwandan officials the list of the refugees to be repatriated from Uganda, effective in November.[94] However, the return came earlier and much differently than the joint commissioned envisioned.

If the timing of the war was propitious, it was not entirely accidental. Major-general Paul Kagame, military head of the   RPF for all the first few weeks of the invasion, he said that the timing of the invasion came from the failure of diplomatic efforts to resolve the question of the rights of refugees to return to Rwanda. More credibly, both "push" factors – the increasing tensions around the Banyarwanda population in Uganda – as well as "pull" factors – the mounting tensions in Rwanda itself – appear to have been salient. The extent of the tension in Rwanda and the disarray within government circles were certainly brought to the RPF attention in August 1990 by the defection from Kigali, the capital of Rwanda, of Pasteur Bizimungu, a senior figure in government. (He later become president of RPF led government).

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[93] Prunier.G, *The Rwanda crisis: History of a genocide*. New York: Columbia university Press, 1995.

[94] "Rwanda". Special issue of *Journal of refugee studies* 9, 3 (September 1996)

The October 1990 RPF invasion occurred at the Uganda – Rwanda border crossing of Kagitumba. At the time of the invasion, the RPF had about 2000 men, most of who had fought with Museveni in Uganda. From this they had obtained arms and experience. They fought along the Gabiro highway, winning a series of rapid victories against their government – force opponent, the Forces Armies Rwandaise (FAR) which was caught in disarray. Within days, the RPF had captured Gabiro. However, they suffered one important loss when the military head of the RPF, Major Fred Rwigyema, took a bullet in the forehead on the first day of battle.[95] The FAR was taken by surprise and the bulk of RPF troops that invaded in October had deserted their posts in Uganda's NRA, taking with them weapons, ammunitions and trucks.[96] This contributed to their initial victories.

At the moment of the invasion, President Habyarimana was at the United Nations in New York. He flew directly to Europe to request military support from Belgium with whom Rwanda had colonial ties and France with whom it enjoyed close relations. The Belgian government agreed to provide troops but limited only to protection of Belgian nationals. Infact, they were in Rwanda only for a matter of days. France was more forthcoming; President Francois Mitterand intervened directly. This was in keeping with French postcolonial tradition in francophone Africa[97] and was in line with a 1975 defense agreement between Rwanda and France. On 5th October, France sent roughly 150 paratroopers from bases in the nearby Central African Republic to Bolster Habyarimana's regime. This troops backstopped the FAR in the capital, Kigali, securing the airport and other major sites, freeing the FAR from defensive tasks and thereby enhancing their capacity to engage in RPF in the north. Habyarimana also sought support from Zairean President Mobutu agreed to send 1000 men from his paratroop division to fight in Rwanda. In the fighting of 1990, about three hundred and fifty thousand people had been temporarily displaced.[98]

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[95] D. Kamukana, *Rwanda Conflict; Its Roots and Regional Implications.* Fountain Publishers, Kampala, 1997 P.46

[96] O. Ottumu. "*Rwandese Refugees and Immigrants in Uganda*" and "*A Historical Analysis of the Invasion by the (RPA)*". In Howard Adelman and Astir Suhrke. New Brunswick, NT: Transaction Publishers, 1999.

[97] A. Rouvez. "*French, British and Belgian Involvement*", in David Smock (ed). *Making War and Waging Peace: Foreign Intervention in Africa* (Washington, D.C: U.S Institute for Peace, 1993) P.27-51

[98] G. Prunier. "*The Rwandan Patriotic Front*", Op Cit. Pp. 130 – 131.

The RPF were repulsed but after a brief period of regrouping in Uganda, the RPF divided into two groups. Major Kagame had been recalled from a training program at fort Leavenworth to take over the reins of the RPF. Kagame's RPF began a classic guerilla campaign of hide and harass. By mid 1991 the RPF had limited the FAR's offensive options and disrupted economic activity in the north, thereby straining government revenues. A January 1991 attack on Ruhengeri succeeded in freeing sympathetic prisoners, capturing military hardware and most important, making a strong psychological imprint on the country.[99] The January 1991 surprise RPF attack on the northern prefecture caused a major upheaval. The front quickly pulled back after its success and began operating in the Byumba region. The fighting was of a small scale, but he combatants were able to cut off the highway to Uganda forcing all the imports and exports of land-locked Rwanda to pass through the longer Tanzania route.[100]

The fighting was interrupted from time to time by occasional attempts of cease fires and negotiations. The government of Rwanda was more consumed with fighting a variety of political battles with Kigali. In April 1992, the Habyarimana government was forced to give way to pressure for multiparty politics and introduce a coalition government. The momentum of the war gave way to momentum in the political negotiations, which were propelled forward by moderate members of the new coalition government. It was the Mouvement Democratique Republican (MDR), Parti Liberal (PL) and the Parti Social Democrate (PSD) that were able to oblige Habyarimana to enter into meaningful negotiations with the RPF.

2.6 Beginning of the peace process

Responses to the RPF invasion were immediate and varied, according to the way the actors perceived the conflict. The government of Rwanda, while aware of the internal sources of the conflict, quickly tried to internationalize it by turning it into an interstate conflict between Rwanda and Uganda. After

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[99] Watson, C. *Background to an Invasion*; Washington D. C: U.S Committee for Refugees, 1992
[100] Ibid

all, the invaders came directly from Uganda and the initial 2,500 invaders were all soldiers of the Ugandan army who eternal Rwanda still in Uganda uniform and ranks.[101]

Buying the "invasion – from – outside" perception, France, Belgium and Zaire responded quickly by sending troops. The Belgians, nonetheless, had a two track response. They sent troops and at the same time, initiated a diplomatic offensive by dispatching a powerful delegation to Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Ethiopia to hold talks with the heads of state of those countries and the secretary general of the organization of African unity (OAU). The offensive was aimed at encouraging the regional leaders and the OAU to prevail on Uganda to stop the invasion rather than to force Habyarimana into accepting mediated talks with the RPF.

The regional response was initiated by Tanzania and Zaire and continued later on with the active involvement of the OAU. On the basis of the "interstate conflict" and "government – versus – rebels" misperception of the conflict, the flurry of regional summits that took place at various venues between October 17, 1990 and September 7, 1991, concentrated on engaging the heads of state of Uganda and Rwanda. The RPF initially was not directly involved in the talks because from the interstate conflict perspective, it was war not a party to the conflict, and from the government – versus- rebels' perspectives it was regarded as illegitimate. Belgian shuttle diplomacy in the region to encourage the regional leaders to intervene diplomatically. The region responded by convening the Mwanza summit on October 17, 1990; the Gbadolite summit on October 26, 1990; and the Goma summit on November 20, 1990. The RPF successful attack at Ruhengeri, the home province of president Habyarimana on January 23, 1991 prompted the Zanzibar summit on February 17, 1991, the Dar-es-salaam summit on February 19, and the N'sele summit on March 29.[102]

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[101] J.G. Stein, ed, *Getting to the Table; The Process of International Prenegotiation*, Baltimore; John Hopkins University Press, 1989. Pp 97-106

[102] Maundi, M.O, ed. *Getting in; Mediators Entry into the Settlement of African Conflicts,* United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C. 2006. Pp. 42-46

The regional conference on refugees was preceded by an experts meeting (January 17-18, 1991) and a ministerial meeting (January 19-20, 1991). It was during these two meetings that the draft declaration on the refugee problem was examined and adopted. The regional conference itself was held in Dar-es-salaam under the chairmanship of president mwinyi. It was attended by the president of Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and the prime minister of Zaire. At its conclusion, the Dar-es-salaam declaration on the Rwandan refugees' problem was adopted.

Peace negotiations between the two warring parties began on 10th august 1992 and lasted thirteen month. In June 1992, the Rwandan government agreed to the launch of comprehensive political negotiations to lead toward a peace settlement. The agenda covered the establishment of the rule of law and a culture of human rights, power sharing in all public institutions, the transitional arrangements that would obtain until elections were held, the repatriation of refugees, and the resettlement of internally displaced persons and the integration of the two opposing armies. A cease-fire agreement, as an amended version of a twice amended cease-fire, which originated in N'sele, was quickly reached.[103]

Between September, 1992 and January 1993 the discussions had dealt initially with power sharing arrangements. In October 1992 delegates reached agreement on the issue of the nature of presidential power under a broad based transitional government (BBTG). It was agreed that the BBTG would last for no more than twenty two months and would be followed by free elections to determine the government of the country.[104] There was doubt about the sincerity of president Habyarimana concerning the negotiations. The president would agree to proposals made under pressure at the negotiations table but would retract them later when his own hard liners applied countervailing pressures.[105]

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[103] A. guichaoua (ed). *les crisis politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda* (1993-1994). Paris: karthala 1995. p 632
[104] B. d. jones. "*jones Arusha peace process*". Op cit, p. 138
[105] T. sellstrom, op cit, p/10

In January 1993, after seven months cease fire the negotiations stalled. On 8th February, the RPF launched a major offensive from positions in north eastern Rwanda. Within days of launching the attack, the RPF had fought to within twenty – three kilometers of Kigali. With French intervention, the RPF halted its offensive. Subsequent negotiations saw the RPF return to its pre-offensive lines; with the territory they gained during the offensive being designated a demilitarized zone (DMZ) monitored by UN and OAU observer troops.

The return to the negotiating table was accompanied by an expansion of the UN's so far peripheral involvement in the peacemaking process. In March 1993, the department of political affairs and peacekeeping operations sent a joint mission to Rwanda in order to bring the RPF back to the bargaining table. [106] The expansion of UN involvement represented an important shift in responsibility for the peace process, an increased international role that would diminish that of the OAU. One early effect was to supplant the OAU's neutral military observer group (NMOG) by a UN observe force, proposed by Museveni and deployed in the summer of 1993 as the UN observer mission to Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMIR). The deployment of UNOMIR laid the groundwork for the UN's eventual agreement to deploy the UN assistance mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) to "secure" the transitional arrangements specified by the Arusha peace accords.[107]

Political negotiations continued for another six months, resulting in august 1993 in the Arusha accords, signed by the government of Rwanda, the RPF and a series of external third parties. During this time, and for nine months following the signing of the peace accords, there was once again a general cessation of hostilities between the two armed forces.[108]

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[106] UN Department of Political Affairs, Mission Report (New York; March 1993).

[107] B.D. Jones. *Peacemaking in Rwanda; The Dynamics of Failure,* Lynne Reinner Publishers, Colorado, Zool P.34

[108] M. Leitenberg. "*Rwanda, 1994: International Incompetence Produces Genocide. Peace Keeping and International Relations* 23, 6 (November/ December 1994): 6-10

2.7 The genocide

An internationally brokered peace agreement signed in Arusha, Tanzania led to a UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda and a power sharing agreement between the government and the rebels.[109] As the agreement moved closer to implementation, extremists within the government prepared to exterminate all the Tutsi in Rwanda rather than share power. On 6th April 1994, a series of confusing events threw Kigali into turmoil. First, Habyarimana and a handful of senior aides, as well as the president of Burundi, all returning from Tanzania, were shot down and killed as their aircraft passed the Kanomber barracks, close to the Kigali airport.

When the president was killed, the conspirators executed their plan with devastating speed and effect. Within forty eight hours of the of habyarimana's flight, an interim government had been formed under leading CDR figures. Among them was colonel Bagasora, whose penchant for violence and doomsday rhetoric had earned him the nickname "*the colonel of death*." In one negotiation session, he had threatened apocalypse if a peace deal was implemented in Rwanda. Now, the colonel of death was in charge of fulfilling his own prophecy.[110] Extremists in government would not hear anything about power sharing and would rather exterminate all Tutsis.[111]

When the president was killed while returning from implementation talks on 6 April 1994, the conspirators executed their plan with devastating speed and effect. The army and the interahamwe militia aided by local police, were the principal agents of the genocide. The interahamwe, created by the government to slaughter Tutsi , sprang into action and encouraged or forced Hutu peasants to join them. Tens of thousands of Tutsi and Hutu who resisted lost their lives. Hundreds of thousands lost their lives in more carefully organised and executed massacres.[112]

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[109] Peace Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and The RPF was Signed on 4th August 1993 (http://www.grandslacs.net)

[110] Jones .B.D, *Peacemaking in Rwanda; The dynamics of failure*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, 2001. P.38

[111] Steering committee of the joint Evaluation of Emergency assistance to Rwanda, The international response to conflict and Genocide (Copenhagen), 1996.

[112] Seybolts ,T.B., *Humanitarian Military Intervention; conditions for success and failure* (Stockholm international peace research institute); Oxford university press, oxford,2007.

Typically, initial murders caused large groups of Tutsi to congregate in public buildings, especially schools and churches, in search of protection. Local police arrived at the planned site of a massacre shortly before the soldiers, to seal off all exits and make sure the area was well surrounded by militia. When the soldiers arrived they used assault rifles and hand grenades to slaughter the civilians, who either fought back or begged for mercy. The interahamwe used machetes, hoes and nail studded clubs to cut down anyone who tried to escape and then entered the sanctuaries to kill those who had survived the initial onslaught. The gruesome process was coordinated from the capital through tightly controlled bureaucratic lines of authority and the pro-government radio station.[113]

In the first days of the killings, this interim government organized the execution of the Tutsi population of Kigali and wiped out the ranks of moderate politicians and civil society leaders, most of them Hutu. These were the "traitors" who had negotiated and made peace with the RPF. They were also journalists, lawyers, human rights activists, church activists and opposition intellectuals who supported the peace process. Moving throughout Kigali, the presidential guard wiped out this primary threat; Hutu who could make peace with the RPF. Over the next three months, the *genocidaires,* unchecked by any international force, systematically slaughtered Tutsi populations across the country.

A critically important aspect of the genocide is that massacres began in hundreds of locations within one to three days of Habyarimana's death. The killing did not originate solely in Kigali and spread across the country, as many believe. The killers worked with lightning speed. By the end of the first month, the majority of victims had already fallen.[114] By mid-may the pace stowed, but only because the killers found fewer and fewer victims.[115] The speed of the genocide was one of the primary constraints of the efficacy of intervention. If outside governments had acted with dispatch as soon as they realized what was going on, they could have saved tens of thousands of people, but they would have been too late to save the majority of the people who were killed.[116]

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[113] African rights(note 113),passion; and des Forges(note 111), pp. 180-260.
[114] African rights(note113), pp.262-548; and Gourevitch(note113), p.133.
[115] Gourevitch(note113), pp.151,155.
[116] Kuperman,A., *the limits of humanitarian intervention*: Genocide in Rwanda (Brookings Institute Press: Washington, DC, 2001).

The FAR had two tasks: some units helped implement the genocide while others attempted to forestall the RPF's offensive. It is critical to be clear that the genocide was not spontaneous, not an eruption of ancient tribal hatreds, as it was quickly portrayed by the western media. Rather it was a planned, coordinated, directed, controlled attack by a small core. Indeed, Filip Reyntjens maintains that no more than two dozen figures controlled the genocide machine. [117]They were supported by senior military figures, *prefets* and other senior members of the CDR. Finally, they had the support of elementsof the state machinery and arguably as many as 100,000 but possibly as few as 50,000 "henchmen"-essentially, a large section of the FAR plus the 15000-20000 militia members, all under the direct control of central authorities.[118]

Foreign governments knew at the time that Rwanda was the scene of mass killing.[119] Not a single government with the power to act had any interest in stopping it. The initial reaction at the UN was to reduce the size of the existing United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) force. As public awareness of the genocide became impossible to ignore, the security council reversed its decision, authorized reinforcements for UNAMIR and approved a French led intervention known as operation Turquioise.[120] In the meantime the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the military arm of the RPF, broke the ceasefire agreement, defeated the government army, stopped the genocide, and drove over one million Hutu refugees into Tanzania and the DRC. The RPA had no trouble prevailing against the army and the presidential guard, which were very effective at killing unarmed civilians but completely incompetent as fighting forces, partly because they put so much effort into the genocide.

2.8 Conclusion

 Shakespeare's tragedy could not much the Rwanda genocide on how the plot was crafted and executed. The pre-colonial, colonial and post colonial division that existed was ripe for self centered opportunist villain to exploit them. Yet the state, local and international actors dragged their feet amidst a cloud of doom. The death of Habyarimana and the president of Burundi could not have come at a perfect timing for the Hutus hard liners. The bitterness they harbored, their talents in killing and

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[117] Reytnjens, Trois jours
[118] See, Des Forges, *Leave none to tell the story*, 15-16, and Prunier, The Rwanda crisis, 261-265.
[119] United Nations, Department of Public Information: New York,1996.
[120] UN Security Council Resolution 929, 22 June 1994.

the negative role media was used to enhance hatred propelled their swiftness for executing such a massacre. The world watched in disbelief but the world knew for sure, it was a party to the genocide.

CHAPTER THREE

3.0 POST-CONFLICT PEACE BUILDING IN RWANDA

3.1 Introduction

This chapter will record all the findings on post-conflict peace building in Rwanda from both the primary and secondary sources. As indicated in Chapter 1, data on post-conflict peace building efforts from the 1990s to date was used to make an assessment.

This study used both primary and secondary data. The sources of primary data were interviews with Rwandese refugees in Nairobi suburbs. In addition, visits were made to different non-governmental organizations and other actors involved in post-conflict peace building in Rwanda for purposes of data collection. In these cases, both focused and non directive interviews were conducted. Questionnaires were used. Focused interviews permitted the researcher to obtain details of personal reactions, specific emotions and general views and opinions.

Sources of secondary data included; local university libraries - both public and private and resource centres of different organizations involved in peace building. The mass media and the internet also provided valuable information on the subject under study. Periodicals such as journals, daily newspapers, pamphlets and audio visual material were valuable sources of information for this research.

3.2 Overview

Rwanda is a country full of contradictions[121]. Its government preaches reconciliation and downplays ethnicity only a few years after the previous regime perpetrated the most extreme form of ethnic-based killing that could possibly occur . A successful counterinsurgency campaign has removed from Rwandan soil the terror and attacks sown by the groups dedicated to continuing the genocide, but human rights groups continue to criticize sharply the Rwandan government for its abuses both in Rwanda and the Congo[122]. The government has initiated a bottom-up strategy to widen participation

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[121] Filip Reyntjens (2004), "Rwanda, ten years on: From genocide to dictatorship", *African Affairs*, 103(2), pp. 177-210

[122] Humphreys, Macartan, and Jeremy Weinstein. 2005. "Disentangling the Determinants of Successful Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration." Stanford University, manuscript.

and create a new political structure without most of the old elites, but some observers - including many Rwandans - criticize these reforms as dressing up a dictatorship. They point to the Hutu ministers who have left the government, the exclusion of non-RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) insiders from decision-making circles, and the discrediting or disappearance of credible Hutu interlocutors.[123]

3.3 The Status of Insurgencies in Rwanda (and Burundi)

In the aftermath of the huge return of refugees following Rwanda's attack on the Zairian refugee camps in 1996, thousands of ex-FAR/Interahamwe (the former Rwandan army and associated militia that carried out the 1994 genocide) infiltrated back into Rwanda and stepped up its brutal insurgency. The insurgent largely targeted civilian populations, including bus passengers, local government officials, and schoolchildren. The insurgency aimed at making the northwest ungovernable, restoring the former government, evading justice for those that committed the genocide, and continuing and completing that genocide. The command-and-control structure remains largely intact from that which executed the 1994 genocide[124].

During 1997 - 98, ex-FAR/Interahamwe attacks dramatically increased in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri prefectures and occurred occasionally in Gitarama, Kibuye, and even Kigali. Combining wave after wave of anti-Tutsi propaganda, the insurgents continued to use the politics of hate as their mobilizing message, which they targeted at the northwest as the traditional headquarters of Hutu extremism. Thousands of people - including women and children - residing in the northwest appear to have participated in the attacks or at least provided information and logistical support, further confusing the line between civilian and combatant. The insurgents destroyed the economy of the northwest, once the breadbasket of Rwanda. Families have been torn apart, and many fields left unplanted.[125]

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[123] J Adebayo Adedeji, (ed.) (1999), *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts: The Search for Sustainable Peace & Good Governance*, (London & New York: Zed Books), pp. 141-173; and, United States Agency for International Development, Rwanda Country Office, Democracy and Governance Office (2001), *Rwanda Integrated Civil Society Strengthening Project (ICSSOP): Scope of Work*, (Kigali: USAID).

[124] Ibid

[125] Chen, Siyan, Loayza, Norman V., and Reynal-Querol, Marta. 2007. "The Aftermath of Civil War." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4190.

The Rwandan army's counterinsurgency was itself often brutal[126]. The army's operations aimed at separating civilians from militia were harsh and violent, and non-combatants were frequently caught in the middle or even indistinguishable from insurgents given their use by ex-FAR/Interahamwe units as human shields. Soldiers also conducted revenge attacks and in some cases extorted or looted from civilians. All told, thousands of civilians, genocidaires, soldiers, Congolese-Tutsi refugees, and prisoners were killed during this two-year period.

Late in 1997, the Rwandan government transformed its counterinsurgency strategy into a much more political and social effort, which within a year, broke the back of the insurgency. Stability was restored to northwest Rwanda, although some human rights abuses continue. Most ex-FAR/Interahamwe militia were driven into the Congo, even more deeply when Rwanda, Uganda, and their Congolese-rebel allies launched their war against the Congolese government in August 1998. Rwanda and Uganda both say that the main reason they invaded was that the Congolese government under Laurent Kabila had begun to train and equip ex-FAR/Interahamwe forces as early as April 1998.

3.4 Organizations that Focus Specifically on Peace building and Reconciliation in Rwanda

The data collected points towards a number of non-governmental organizations, both local and international, operating in Rwanda with a view towards post-conflict peace building and reconciliation initiatives. As observed in the literature review, these organizations target different groups in the Rwandese population with a view to getting all parties involved in the post-conflict peace building and reconstruction of the republic of Rwanda. From the data, many international NGOs operate in Rwanda and fund many local initiatives, most of which are church-based, involved in the peace building and reconciliation of Rwanda. Below is a list and summary of the main activities of the major non governmental organizations in Rwanda.

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[126] Filip Reyntjens (2004), "Rwanda, ten years on: From genocide to dictatorship", *African Affairs*, 103(2), pp. 177-210

3.4.1 African Great Lakes Initiative, Healing and Rebuilding Our Communities (HROC)

AGLI is just developing its program which takes groups of people from both sides of the conflict (Hutu and Tutsi) and engages them in workshops meant to restore normal relationships between the two sides. Currently, they are conducting workshops in Cyangugu for students and faculty of a school there where many of the students display symptoms of deep trauma and are doing experimental workshops in Ruhengeri with the goal of determining how the community can sustain itself in its individual and community healing process. The Alternatives to Violence Project (AVP), conducts workshops in the "hot-spot" area of Nyamata. With AVP-Goma and AVP-Rwanda, AGLI will conduct international AVP workshops with half the participants from Goma, Congo and half from Gisenyi, Rwanda. AGLI will continue the work-camps with Rwanda Yearly Meeting building classrooms for the street children's program. In the past AGLI also trained Gacaca judges.

The purpose of the AFR Rwanda initiative is to enhance the reconciliation process in Rwanda and the Great Lakes region. In January 2001 in Kigali, a Creators of Peace conference used the Franco-German example and the video For the Love of Tomorrow to focus on the role of women in peace building. Once a month a group of genocide survivors take food they have prepared to inmates (implicated in the genocide) in the prison hospital. A working relationship has developed with Kigali Independent University where conflict resolution/reconciliation workshops have been held since April 2001, marking the anniversary of the 1994 genocide.

3.4.2 Catholic Relief Services: Local Initiatives for Peace

Local Initiatives for Peace (LIP) supports small-scale initiatives that encourage tolerance, mutual understanding and Peace building. The fund supports a wide array of activities, which serve to not only address poverty, but to bring people together. LIP provides small grants to local associations such as survivors' groups, orphans, widows/ers, women's groups and churches, and provides them with training in project management, conflict resolution, and other capacity strengthening skills. Funds have been used by demobilized soldiers to purchase fishing equipment, by a Batwa community to purchase school uniforms to help reduce stigmatization, and by an association of genocide widows to build each other's homes.

3.4.3 Federation of African Women's Peace Networks (FERFAP)

The objectives of Networks are: To create an institutional framework of women's peace movements to participate in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts; To coordinate and rationalise the development of activities aimed at the participation of women in the field of conflict prevention, management and resolution and the consolidation of peace in Africa, to act as a network for its members, provide information to the general public and governmental organisations; To promote the protection and rights of refugees and internally displace peoples, to promote the work of the African Women's Peace organisations; To cultivate and promote principles of democracy and good governance, to promote a culture of peace in Africa, and to participate and advocate for equal participation of women at local, national, and regional level in the prevention of conflict and maintenance of peace in Africa.

3.4.4 Friends Peace House

The activities of Friends Peace House are wide and varied but focus primarily on building the capacities of leaders, the state, grassroots associations, civil society institutions, and the general population of Rwanda to respond to situations of conflict and violence in their homes and communities. In 2004, the Alternatives to Violence Project trained more than 1300 village-court judges, teaching them listening and conflict resolution skills.

Women in Dialogue brings together women survivors of the genocide and women whose husbands have been imprisoned for genocide-related crimes to participate in a series of seminars about trauma healing and conflict resolution. In their Women's Rights programmes, they teach women to assert their rights, challenging traditions that deny them inheritance rights and force them to remarry after their husband dies. The Youth Department currently supports twenty-five youth associations working for peace, health, and human rights in their local communities.

3.4.5 National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (Government of Rwanda)

Since it was established by the government of national unity, NURC has strived to become a platform where Rwandans of all social conditions can meet and discuss the real problems of the Nation, especially those related to unity and reconciliation, culture of peace, tolerance, justice, democracy and development. The main justification of NURC is educational function at the service of the communities.

3.4.6 Never Again

Never again[127] is an international youth network founded at the Institute for International Mediation and conflict Resolution's 2001 Symposium at The Hague. Never again, a group of students and young graduates from around the world, created a collaborative international partnership.

Never again aims to alert the international community to both the causes and effects of genocide and facilitate the exchange of ideas between young people - those who have lived through genocide and those who wish to learn from them. Never again aims to provoke ideas and action for the prevention of future conflict by bringing people together to cross borders.

There are not specific programs listed under the Never again calendar, but they do organize trips for international youths to visit Rwanda and learn about the genocide and work with Rwandan youth. Never Again partners with Global Youth Connect.

3.4.7 Norwegian Church Aid: Rwanda's women peacemakers[128]

The main area of intervention for Norwegian Church Aid in Rwanda is reconciliation. Norwegian Church Aid, through its partners, has sought to address reconciliation by identifying and dealing with the root causes of the genocide, which include illiteracy and poverty.

Additionally, Norwegian Church Aid has supported programmes that contribute toward the achievement of lasting and sustainable peace. In all these, the role of women in reconciliation and

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[127] Anna Obura (2003): Never again: education reconstruction in Rwanda, Linéale Production, UNESCO, Paris.

[128] OECD DAC (2006) Rwanda Aid Effectiveness Survey 2006 – Donor Self-Assessment Workbook, or the OECD-DAC Survey pack at http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/monitoring

societal healing has been recognised. Norwegian Church Aid and partners are urging women to convince their relatives and the community at large to fully participate in the Gacaca courts.

3.4.8 Oxfam Ireland[129]

Oxfam Ireland in partnership with Oxfam Great Britain has supported Peace building and National Reconciliation work in Rwanda since 2002. Oxfam works at grass roots level with individual communities training key representatives in conflict management skills. The community's Njyanama (a council of all adult community members) is then offered a poverty reduction grant. Through the process of discussing how best to use this for the benefit of the community, issues arise, conflicts are dealt with and the community learns and 'practices' how to work better together for the common good.

3.4.9 Search for Common Ground- Radio and Peace building

The activities of Search for Common Ground- Radio and Peace building are wide and varied but focus primarily on building the capacities of leaders, the state, grassroots associations, civil society institutions, and the general population of Rwanda to respond to situations of conflict and violence in their homes and communities.

3.5 Addressing the Roots of Conflict

To adapt an old metaphor, when Rwanda sneezes, the Congo and Burundi catch a cold. It is widely understood that conflicts in the Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi are linked inextricably through cross-border insurgencies, cross-border ethnic linkages, and cross-border economic ties. The legacy of genocide[130] - both the 1994 Rwandan genocide in which nearly a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed and the smaller, but no less significant, 1972 genocide of Hutus in Burundi - and major communal massacres, such as the 1993 massacre of Tutsis in Burundi, hangs heavily over the Great Lakes region. The cycles of violence and the culture of impunity that have intensified as a result of these ordeals must be overcome if peace and reconciliation are to be possible in Central Africa.

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[129] Ibid

[130] Gérard Prunier (1998), *The Rwanda Crisis, 1959 - 1994: A History of a Genocide*, 2nd edition, (Kampala (Uganda): Broadview Press), chapter 1.

The Rwandese government's initial efforts to contain the post-genocide insurgency in the northwest were brutal and one-dimensional[131]. However, over time adjustments have been made, and the problem addressed more holistically. The government realized it could not deal with the insurgency solely from Kigali, as the insurgents were mostly the sons (and some daughters) of many of the families residing in the northwest. Consequently, it enlisted Hutu leaders from the northwest to help develop and implement a multifaceted strategy, which included: gathering information with the help and participation of local leaders on the location of infiltrating ex-FAR/Interahamwe units; providing resources to ease the suffering of the residents of the internally displaced camps; discouraging reprisals against the thousands of people who abandoned the insurgents beginning in early 1998; organizing a political campaign to demonstrate that the government is not exclusively Tutsi by sending out key Hutu ministers to tour the northwest and talk about Rwanda's future; making known the government's presumption that most insurgents undertake their actions under extreme duress, so only those convicted of participation in the genocide will be punished.

Constructing a public education campaign involving churches, community leaders, and others to isolate the genocidaires and separate civilians from militia members; providing resources to returnees and internally displaced populations; stepping up efforts to reintegrate ex-FAR into the Rwandan army and once reintegrated using some of these soldiers and officers to convince other insurgents to return; deploying to the northwest ex-FAR Hutu commanders who had been reintegrated into the Rwandan army; and creating and training local defence forces, selected by the resident populations, which are partially responsible for the security of their own areas.

3.6 Encouraging Peace and Reconciliation Processes

The Arusha Accords, the power-sharing arrangement agreed to in 1993 by most of the key political forces in Rwanda, were perceived to be such a threat to the existing power bloc that the genocide was planned and executed to forestall its implementation. With that historical context and the widespread participation in the genocide by the previous ruling class, the Rwandan government does not view

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[131] Filip Reyntjens (2004), "Rwanda, ten years on: From genocide to dictatorship", *African Affairs*, 103(2), pp. 177-210

negotiations as sufficient to achieve peace and reconciliation in Rwanda, particularly with elements associated with those that organized the 1994 genocide.

The National Reconciliation Commission has initiated consultations throughout the country on issues related to coexistence. It seeks to highlight common problems and solutions and to promote a common history for all Rwandans, remove myths, and confront bigotry in all its forms[132]. Perhaps its most innovative mandate is to monitor all government programs to determine how they affect peace, reconciliation, and national unity. With former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere as convenor, the Arusha peace process got underway in mid-1998. Its objective was to negotiate a transitional arrangement and timetable for elections. To its credit, Arusha made progress in getting various opposing groups to sit together and begin to talk about needed reforms. Donor[133] and regional governments have both worked to create incentives and pressures designed to push the negotiation process forward. The United States and other international actors sought means to facilitate dialogue and promote other incremental processes that addressed the emergency posed by the escalation in violent conflict. Immediate interaction and dialogue among the parties in conflict are essential to restore order and salvage the peace process in Arusha.

At the local level, a handful of organizations, many of them church-based, are involved in grassroots reconciliation efforts in Rwanda.

3.7 Democratic Institution Building

The Rwandan government is carefully managing the post-genocide political transition process. National elections followed the extended transition and the introduction of a constitution, but the government has initiated a number of interim steps designed to promote discussion about the nature of democratic participation and to establish a bottom-up approach to rebuilding governance in Rwanda[134]. The inherited legacy of over-centralization, in which blind obedience to authority was the

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[132] J Adebayo Adedeji, (ed.) (1999), *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts: The Search for Sustainable Peace & Good Governance*, (London & New York: Zed Books), pp. 141-173; and, United States Agency for International Development, Rwanda Country Office, Democracy and Governance Office (2001), *Rwanda Integrated Civil Society Strengthening Project (ICSSOP): Scope of Work*, (Kigali: USAID).

[133] OECD DAC (2006) Rwanda Aid Effectiveness Survey 2006 – Donor Self-Assessment Workbook, or the OECD-DAC Survey pack at http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/monitoring

[134] Gleditsch, Nils, et al . 2002. "Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research*, 39(5), 615-637.

objective of the leadership, made state-sponsored genocide possible. The bottom-up process aims to decentralize decision-making power and destroy a culture of blind obedience to authority.

Like some of the other governments (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda), which have been called a "new generation of African leaders," Rwanda is attempting[135] to destroy the old elite-based political leadership structure. Like Eritrea, Rwanda has outlawed ethnically based parties in the future. Elements of Rwanda's current transitional strategy include: a Constitutional Commission, which will elicit wide input and discussion on the nature of the constitution, the form of elections, and issues related to ensuring Hutu participation and Tutsi security; a bottom-up election process, starting with the cell and sector levels, aimed at moving up the chain of political and social organization, culminating eventually in national elections; a series of "Saturday discussions" in which President Kagame hosts debates about the central issues facing Rwanda; a decentralization process aimed at transferring to the local-level, decision-making authority for development and other critical responsibilities, initially through community development committees; a series of meetings between Rwanda's political parties on the nature of a future political system and their roles in it; and a more participatory justice process.

3.8 Human Rights Promotion

The issue of justice for those accused of participating in the genocide is one of the most politically-charged issues in the Great Lakes today. Roughly 130,000 people are detained in Rwanda as a result of being accused of participating in the genocide[136]. In the five-plus years since the genocide, the foundation[137] of the justice system has been rebuilt and nearly 1,000 people have been tried for genocide and crimes against humanity.

The progress of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has been much slower, having only tried a handful of suspects and not coordinating well with the authorities in Rwanda. After five years,

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[135] Emile Rwamasirabo (2007) Reconciliation in Rwanda: 13th Peace Building Seminar Forum (Peace-Building in Africa) UNHCR / Waseda University (Institute of International Strategy)

[136] Hideaki Shinoda, (2001) : Peace-building by the rule of law: An examination of intervention in the form of international tribunals, Hideaki Shinoda, Institute for Peace Science, Hiroshima University, First press, www.theglobalsite.ac.uk

[137] Wamala Edwardet al (2005), University Human Rights Teachers Guide, Haki Afrika, Faculty of Law Makerere University, Makerere University Printers, Kampala, p64-115

it had spent over $200 million despite just thirty-eight suspects being in custody. Bureaucratic delays and internal power struggles combine to handcuff progress on the Tribunal's work.

The formal justice system, including the new process of plea bargains and confessions adopted by Rwanda to expedite handling of the genocide caseload, has begun to work, albeit much too slowly. Because of this painfully slow progress, a political decision was made to move the process of justice along at a faster pace by initiating in early 2000 a Rwandan justice instrument called gacaca, derived from a traditional, dispute-resolution mechanism. This process is expected to allow communities to establish the facts and decide the fate of the vast majority of those accused of lesser offences, while at the same time addressing reconciliation objectives and involving the population on a mass scale in the disposition of justice. The court system will continue to try planners and organizers of the genocide, while the cell, sector, and commune levels will handle the rest of the cases.

Furthermore, some members of the Catholic Church are urging that the Church undertake its own process of "gacaca christu" in advance of the regular gacaca process. The concept is that before Christians talk about crimes in front of strangers, crimes should be told within the Church and the killers should be forgiven.

Accusations of participation in the genocide can be a powerful and dangerous weapon in Rwanda today and can be used as a tool for political control. This has certainly been abused in the five years after the genocide. The RPF recently issued a statement which condemned accusations made without solid evidence and charged that such accusations are tantamount to attempted murder. Such statements from the RPF can reassure Rwandans that the rule of law is the basis of state legitimacy.

3.9 Economic Peace Building

Rwanda's admission to the East African Community[138] (EAC, a regional mechanism for cooperation) is a major step toward regional economic integration and development. Perceptions abound that the

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[138] Emile Rwamasirabo (2007) Reconciliation in Rwanda: 13th Peace Building Seminar Forum (Peace-Building in Africa) UNHCR / Waseda University (Institute of International Strategy)

Rwandan government discriminates in favour of Tutsis over Hutus in many spheres[139]. Although there has been some evidence to the contrary, many anecdotes support the allegation that the issue must be taken seriously.

Villagization constitutes another major socioeconomic initiative in Rwanda. To minimize the tension that villagization engenders, the government has made assurances that it is not coerced, that it maximizes scales of efficiency, that services are provided to more people, that security is indeed enhanced, that resource use is better rationalized, that it fully recognizes the ties people have to their land, and that compensation is provided to those whose land will be used for the construction of villages or associated infrastructure.

| POVERTY and SOCIAL	Rwanda	Sub-Saharan Africa
2006		
Population, mid-year *(millions)*	9.2	770
Average annual growth, 2000-06		
Population *(%)*	2.4	2.4
Labor force *(%)*	3.0	2.6
Most recent estimate (latest year available, 2000-06)		
Poverty *(% of population below national poverty line)*	60	..
Urban population *(% of total population)*	20	36
Life expectancy at birth *(years)*	44	47
Infant mortality *(per 1,000 live births)*	118	96
Child malnutrition *(% of children under 5)*	23	30
Access to an improved water source *(% of population)*	74	56
Literacy *(% of population age 15+)*	65	59
Gross primary enrollment *(% of school-age population)*	120	92
Male	119	98
Female	121	86

Source: World Bank Report: Rwanda at a Glance (2006)

Breaking from the security links to the economy and sticking on the economic data extracted, by 2006 Rwanda was better off than the average sub-Saharan African country its labour force was growing at 3% which was faster than the 2.4% represented by the sub-Saharan African. When compared to Sub-Saharan Rwanda was found to be better off in with 7% fewer children malnourished, 18% more people could access an improved water source, 6% more literate people above 15 years and a 28% more of gross primary enrolment.

GDP on the other hand has shown slow but consistent improvement since 1996 after slumping to 1.4, 2005 it increased to 2.1 in 2005 and 2.5 in 2006.

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[139] Filip Reyntjens (2004), "Rwanda, ten years on: From genocide to dictatorship", *African Affairs*, 103(2), pp. 177-210

Rebuilding through Education

Number of Primary Education Candidates , 1991-1999

Source: International Institute for Educational Planning[140]

In the very early stages of reconciliation education was the first economic instrument to be given priority as not only does it ensure future inflow of skilled workforce but it can also be used as a social tool to bridge the gap between conflicting factions. Graph1 showed that increased level of examination enrolment which was on acceleration in 1993 with 100,000 students registering for the Primary education examination took a reverse gear in 1994 to an all time low of just below 60000 candidates. Efforts were however underway to improve the situation and by 1998 there slightly above 90000 candidates who had registered for primary education final examinations.

3.10 Security Enhancement

A key element in undermining the insurgency in northwest Rwanda has been the reintegration of ex-FAR forces into the Rwandan army[141]. The soldiers-turned-insurgents-turned soldiers now have a new uniform, a modest salary, and a stake in the country's future. They also have become an important component of both the command and rank and file of the Rwandan forces deployed in the northwest. The joint military commission created by the Lusaka agreement is charged with apprehending and disarming the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and other militia forces. Their job will be much easier if a serious international initiative aims at demobilizing and reintegrating ex-FAR/Interahamwe forces not accused of participating in the genocide.

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[140] Anna Obura (2003): Never again: education reconstruction in Rwanda, Linéale Production, UNESCO, Paris.

[141] Humphreys, Macartan, and Jeremy Weinstein. 2005. "Disentangling the Determinants of Successful Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration." Stanford University, manuscript.

The program includes setting-up demobilization camps in Congo under international auspices and UN-peacekeeper protection that would provide education and training (including civic education) to these demobilized forces. At the end of this period, they will choose whether to return to Rwanda or to resettle elsewhere. At the outset of the program, individuals are vetted to determine whether they are hard-core genocidaires, and, if so, they would have to return to Rwanda.

The Population Evolution from March 1994 to 2000,
Calculated from the Genocide Transition Survey (n = 1,926)

	Hutu		Tutsi		Twa	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
Number alive March 1994 = 1,926; missing data in 2000 = 131[a]						
Ethnicity registered	1,620	100	151	100	24	100
Number alive in 2000	1,344	82.9	62	41.0	13	54.1
Fate unknown in 2000	111	6.8	0	0	5	20.8
Dead by 2000	165	10.1	89	58.9	6	25.0
Death						
Dead by 2000	165	100	89	100	6	100
Died in 1994	45	27.2	79	88.7	4	66.6
Died 1995-2000	73	44.2	4	4.4	1	16.6
Year of death unknown	47	28.4	6	6.7	1	16.6
Cause of death (year known and unknown)						
Cause of death unknown	10		0		0	
Number of natural deaths	112		10		5	
Number of violent deaths[b]	43	100	79	100	1	100
Killed by Interahamwe	9	20.9	67	84.8		
Killed by FAR	1		6	7.5		
Killed by RPF	21	48.8				
Killed by other	5	11.6				
Killer unknown	7	16.2	6	7.5	1	

NOTE: FAR = Rwandan armed forces; RPF = Rwandan Patriotic Front.
a. Missing indicates that for a number of household members of the 1989-1992 survey, no information could be obtained, meaning that neither were they present in their original dwellings, nor could we register any information from informants or neighbors on these individuals.
b. Death in Congo, Burundi, or Tanzania was registered as violent death unless the person interviewed stated that the death was not directly related with war. Granted, this is very difficult to say for Congo, but from the 112 deaths of Hutu registered as "natural deaths," only 4 were located in Congo.

Source: Survey[142] by Philip Verwimp in 2003

On the security front the data 44% of Hutus were killed in post genocide period compared to 22% killed in 1994 supposedly in the genocide, while 4% of Tutsis have died in post genocide period

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compared to 88% who died during the genocide. 48% of the killings were said to be have been caused by Rwanda Armed forces. The circumstance leading to the death would not be claimed with certainties but with situation on the ground either the hard core Hutu criminals were being killed in exchange of fire with the army, or while trying to escape the hand of law. One would however not rule out a possibility of heavy handedness by the army and even vengeance or intolerance by Tutsi soldiers who benefit from impunity by the Government. Hopefully this would not be the case because it would make peace elusive in an area seen to be making huge strides in education and economy.

3.11 Attitudes towards Rwanda Peace Process

The other important aspect in understanding whether Rwanda was progressing in their quest to finding lasting peace amongst its people and forge ahead with development depended highly on the attitudes different players had on the current Rwanda. These players included donors, Rwanda's local and foreign journalists, international community, Rwanda neighbors and Rwanda citizens and residents.

3.12 Donors Perception of Effectiveness of Rwanda AID

A survey[143] conducted in Rwanda on Donor funding showed that : Whilst the results of the Survey are encouraging, it is clear that the Government of Rwanda and its development partners still have some way to go before meeting the targets for 2010 as set out in the Paris Declaration on Aid; Half of the aid disbursed to Rwanda in 2005 was not reflected in the

Government's budget, highlighting the need for better donor alignment and information flows, as well as improvements on the Government's side in the preparation of the budget; Use of Rwanda's public financial management and procurement systems by donors remains low, and there is a need for both the Government and its partners to work together to reduce transaction costs by ensuring that more aid is managed in the context of Program Based Approaches, and using mechanisms that simplify the delivery of aid. All of this must happen in the context of continued improvements in Government systems, in some instances; donors remain institutionally constrained, and are unable to move towards the use of more effective aid instruments as rapidly as the Paris targets may require them to do so.

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[143] 2006 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness Rwanda's Submission to OECD-DAC

3.13 Local and International Journalists and Analysts Views

Linda Slattery[144] in 2004 noted that the country was going backwards and not as reported and that it was operating on a fragile situation with a lot of militias hovering in the neighboring countries ready to pounce on any security vulnerability presented by the Rwandan Government. She claimed that raped victims were still traumatized and HIV prevalence was rising instead of declining. She also claimed that literacy levels were not rising as had been suggested and that economy was performing dismally especially since Rwanda was focused on paying debt more than it was using funds for its development.

In the Fast Update[145] of April 2007 claimed that there was reluctance by people of Rwanda to participate on National Mourning days due to the following reasons: They were seen to be emphasizing collective Hutu guilt, encouraging genocide ideologies especially on the western and southern parts of Rwanda which increased violence against those involved in Gacaca tribunals. Fast Update[146] also claimed that there were tendency showing that Kagame's Government was muzzling critical media and other civil society. This was because due to imprisonment of Agnes Nkusi and declaration of Proffesor Idesbald Byabuse to be "Persona Non Grata". The two were said to written and taught views that were perceived to be anti-government. On security[147] the update claimed that assailants had thrown stones at the house of an Umudugudu in Kabgayi accommodating some 140 genocide orphans. The tensions were still rife and rumors were flying that Government created such situations in order to use reprisal to terrorize the population. Similarly the release of prisoners was being interpreted as an aim at creating a climate of insecurity that will justify repression.

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[144] Slattery, L(2004), Rwanda—10 years since the genocide, International Committee of the Fourth International
[145] Fast Update(2007) , Rwanda: Trends in Conflict and Cooperation, Rwanda Nos 2: March to April, Switzerland, www.swisspeace.org
[146] Ibid
[147] Ibid

3.14 Citizens and Residents Views

In a survey done by John Hopkins centre and Ministry of Justice (Rwanda) some key findings were noticed as far as source of information was concerned, understanding social and emotional problems facing Rwanda.

Table 1 showed that in Rwanda Radio was the most powerful tool in passing information. Newspapers, community meetings, friends, local authority and television were also powerful with varying degree in rural and urban areas.

Table 1: Source of Information on Social Issues

	Urban	Rural
Radio	89.9%	81.0%
Television	24.9%	6.8%
Newspaper	32.3%	17.4%
Community Meetings	19.6%	24.3%
Friends	23.1%	18.1%
School and Workplace	2.6%	0.9%
Local Authority	5.2%	9.2%
Church	0.4%	0.7%
No Source	3.1%	5.5%

Source; Survey on Gacaca[148] Law

Table 2 showed that the major social problem experienced by Rwanda post genocide is poverty, insecurity, lack of trust and trial of genocide suspects, all of which have a link to the genocide.

Table2: Major Social Problem

	Major Social Problems
Poverty	81.9%
Insecurity	20.6%

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[148] John Hopkins Centre for Communications Programs and Ministry of Justice, Rwanda (2007): Perception About the Gacaca Law in Rwanda: Evidence from a Multi-method study.

Lack of Trust	14.8%
Trial of Genocide Suspects	12.6%
Health Problems	10.2%
Emotional Problems	4.4%
Poor Education System	4.0%

Source; Survey on Gacaca[149] Law

Table 3 showed that those assaulted during the Genocide had emotional problems with fear of repeated assault, melancholy, insecurity and trauma as the main identified emotional problems.

Table 3: Emotional Problem by People Assaulted During the Genocide

	Major Social Problems
Fear of Repeated Assault	43.5%
Melancholy	26.7%
Insecurity	12.9%
Trauma	6.6%
Anger	4.7%
Fear of Revenge	4.2%
Distrust	2.9%
No Specific Feeling	11.7%

Source; Survey on Gacaca[150] Law

3.15 Primary Data Findings

In the methodology that was proposed primary data was to be collected in form of self administered questionnaire using convenient sampling, group discussion and interviews. The data collected from interview and group discussions would be discussed in the next chapter because they were more

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[149] Ibid

[150] Ibid

analytical than descriptive, however data derived from the questionnaires would be provided in this chapter.

Table 4 showed that there were 44 respondents compared to a target of 50 respondents. Interviews and discussion forum were received 100% response while questionnaires, 2 and 8 respectively while questionnaire received 85% (34) response.

Table 4: Respondents Rate[151]

	Respondents	**Sample**	**Response Rate**
Questionnaires	34	40	85%
Interviews	2	2	100%
Discussion Forum	8	8	100%
Total	**44**	**50**	**88%**

Source: Primary Data Instrument Including: Questionnaires, Group Discussion and Interviews

Figure 3.3 showed that 25% (11) of the respondents were female and the rest were men.

Figure 3.3: Gender Respondents[152]

Source: Primary Data Instrument Including: Questionnaires, Group Discussion and Interviews

Figure 3.4 showed that 27% (12)of the respondents were Rwandans Citizens while 73%(32) were not.

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[151] Summation of all respondents whose views were extracted from the three primary data collection instruments: see appendix 5, 6 and 7 to see invitation of the respondents.
[152] Ibid

Figure 3.4: Respondents Citizenship[153]

Figure 3.5 showed that 27%, 37%, 16% and 9% of the respondents were Rwandans, Kenyans, Ugandans and Tanzanians respectively.

Figure 3.5: Respondents by Country of Citizenship[154]

Figure 3.6 showed that 30% of the respondents were doing their trades in Kenyan while the rest in Rwanda.

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[153] Ibid

[154] Ibid

Figure 3.6: Respondents by Occupation's Location[155]

Respondents Occupation's Location

30%

70%

☐ Rwanda ☐ Kenya

Figure 3.7 showed that 30%, 20%, 14% and 11% of the respondents were teachers, students, business people; working in IT related functions and transport respectively.

Figure 3.7: Respondents Occupation[156]

Engeneering	5%
Others	7%
Transportation	11%
IT Related	14%
Business	14%
Students	20%
Teachers	30%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35%

Figure 3.8 showed that 64%, 20%, 11% and 5% of the respondents were single, married, widowed and divorced respectively.

Figure 3.8: Respondents Marital Status[157]

Divorced	5%
Widowed	11%
Married	20%
Single	64%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%

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[155] Ibid

[156] Ibid

[157] Ibid

Figure 3.9 showed that 50%, 34%, 11% and 5% of the respondents were below 30, between 30 and 40, between 40 and 50 and above 50 respectively.

**Figure 3.9: Respondents by Age**[158]

Figure 3.10 showed that 45%, 30%, 11% and 7% of the respondents resided in Rwanda, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda respectively.

Figure 3.10: Respondents by Permanent Residence[159]

Figure 3.10 showed that 45%, 30%, 11% and 7% of the respondents resided in Rwanda, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda respectively.

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[158] Ibid

[159] Ibid

3.16 Respondents' Attitudes on Rwanda's Peace Endeavors

Table 5 showed that 65% of the respondent did not think that Rwanda genocide could be repeated, while 47% thought Rwanda was more peaceful than Kenya after the post election violence in Kenya, while 53% having less confidence that Rwanda could be a regional economic power house in five years time. 71% of the respondents were however satisfied with the progress made by peace building initiatives with 76% claiming that it the initiatives were bearing fruits. 53% of the respondent thought Rwandans was less tribal with 56% thinking that tribe did not play a major role in Rwanda politics. 53% of the Rwandans claimed that people in Rwanda had reconciled to a large extent while 79% claimed that the Rwandan people were genuinely committed to avoid things that would raise hatred.

Table 5: Perceptions of Respondents on Rwanda's Peace and Reconciliation Issues[160]

	Yes	No
Is Rwanda's Genocide likely to be repeated soon?	35%	65%
Is Rwanda more peaceful than Kenya after Kenya's post election violence?	47%	53%
Is it possible for Rwanda to be able to compete economically with its neighbors in the next five years?	47%	53%
Are you satisfied with the peace building initiatives done after the genocide?	71%	29%
Have the peace initiatives had positive fruits in Rwanda?	76%	24%
Is Rwanda less tribal compared to periods before the genocide?	53%	47%
Does tribalism play a bigger role in Rwanda politics	44%	56%
Have people in Rwanda reconciled to a large extent?	53%	47%
Are people of Rwanda genuinely committed to avoid things that may raise hatred that brought genocide?	79%	21%

Source: Response of the Questionnaire

3.17 Conclusion

Rwanda's approach to post-conflict peace-building was multidimensional which should be commended. Almost all aspects had been covered, education, security, economical issues, human rights protection, addressing the root cause, democracy, media and national reconciliation process. All the efforts were commended plus the use of many points of intervention by both international and

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[160] Response to Questionnaire Questions 11-19 see Appendix II

local non state actors and state actors. The effects of these interventions however were mixed. Some of the survey's showing that both international players and state were not achieving their desired target and that the state had become more of a monster in its quest to reconcile the nation which was counter productive. On the other hand some survey showed that confidence on whether peace-building process was headed in the right direction most people thought that the situation was improving.

All in all signs that all was not well with Rwanda peace building process were starting to show. Lack of cohesion and fear that it could repeat soon and that it peace in Rwanda depended largely on the peace in the neighboring countries showed that Rwanda was still vulnerable and that she would not sleep well cause the ghosts of the genocide were still lingering around like a dark cloud.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 DATA ANALYSIS ON THE POST-CONFLICT PEACE BUILDING IN RWANDA

4.1 Introduction

To adapt an old metaphor, when Rwanda sneezes, the Congo and Burundi catch a cold. It is widely understood that the conflicts in the Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi were linked inextricably through; cross-border insurgencies, cross-border ethnic linkages, and cross-border economic ties. The legacy of genocide - both the 1994 Rwandan genocide in which nearly a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed and the smaller, but no less significant, 1972 genocide of Hutus in Burundi - and major communal massacres, such as the 1993 massacre of Tutsis in Burundi, hangs heavily over the Great Lakes region. The cycles of violence and the culture of impunity that have intensified as a result of these ordeals must be overcome if peace and reconciliation are to be possible in Rwanda and indeed Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the greater Central Africa.

The previous chapter focused primarily on the status of post-conflict peace-building in Rwanda. This chapter analyses the data collected and reported in chapter 3 and examines the state of affairs in Rwanda, the impact of the peace-building initiatives, the impact of the country on the region, the region's effect on it, and ways to advance political and economic participation and the rule of law.

4.2 Counterinsurgency

A successful counterinsurgency campaign has removed from Rwandan soil the terror and attacks sown by the groups dedicated to continuing the genocide, but human rights groups continue to criticize sharply the Rwandan government for its abuses both in Rwanda and the Congo. The government has initiated a bottom-up strategy to widen participation and create a new political structure without most of the old elites, but some observers - including many Rwandans - characterize these reforms as dressing up a dictatorship. They point to the Hutu ministers who have left the government in the few months preceding this report, the exclusion of non-RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) insiders from decision-making circles, and the discrediting or disappearance of credible Hutu interlocutors.

In addition, the Rwandan government characterizes its war in Congo as one for its own survival, while much of the rest of Africa sees it as an arrogant power play aimed at expanding Rwanda's political and economic influence.

Perspectives on Burundi are equally divergent but for different reasons. In contrast to Rwanda's bottom-up program, Burundi is pursuing a top-down strategy of change aimed at an accommodation among elites, although the government claims that its efforts to hold seminars and debates at the local level constitute its own version of a bottom-up approach. Some view the Burundian peace process that commenced in Arusha, Tanzania, as a stage upon which all of the parties postured, but no serious negotiations occurred. Others see the Arusha process as the only hope for a peaceful transition to eventual majority rule. Still others see internal Burundian efforts to forge a coalition government as the most hopeful process, while some charge that buying off individuals does not represent true power-sharing and democracy.

In both countries, governments perceive themselves as the careful stewards of volatile processes of change, but much of the outside world perceives them as minority regimes unwilling to share real power. Both are perceived as being controlled by narrow cliques with common origins: in Burundi, they are southerners from Bururi Province, while in Rwanda they are the returned refugees from Uganda. The reality, as always, is much more complex.

4.3 Organizations Focusing on Peace-building and Reconciliation in Rwanda

Despite the relatively large number of organizations focusing on peace-building and reconciliation in Rwanda, at the height of the insurgency in the northwest, human rights groups focused more on the nature of the counter-insurgency than the genocide insurgency itself, rightly pointing out that Rwandan-government forces were committing abuses on a large scale. But these analyses often exaggerated the extent of the government's abuses. Lack of clarity about who was actually being killed - civilian or combatant - in many cases further inflamed the situation, and the difficulty of accessing these areas made rumour and allegation the primary sources of "evidence" for much of the reporting during this period. Ex-FAR/Interahamwe abuses were often underreported by critics of the

government and the post-genocide historical context underappreciated. No compelling evidence has emerged that the government's policy was or is to encourage these abuses.

Amongst the greatest challenges faced by the organizations focussing on peace-building and reconciliation in Rwanda, a static economy, severe demographic pressures, high levels of poverty and unemployment, and shrinking land holdings per family all add serious strains to conflict management and reconstruction. If the economy is not structurally reformed to allow greater opportunity, the potential for violence will persist.

4.4 Addressing the Roots of Conflict

One of the most important strategies for ending the insurgency that is heightening divisions within Rwanda would be the adoption of a multifaceted approach of luring refugees and combatants back to Rwanda or - in the case of those accused of genocide - to face justice. Such a strategy has not yet been clearly articulated but would require political, judicial, economic, social, and military elements, some of which are already in place, including: movement toward more democratic economic and political participation, due process and a presumption of innocence until proven guilty, social rehabilitation through support for initiatives aimed at coexistence, mutual respect, and reconciliation, economic support for reintegration and restoring livelihoods, allowing local populations to decide whether any accusation will be lodged against returnees to Rwanda, thus determining whether the individual will reintegrate or face justice, certainty that returnees not accused of genocide can take back their old houses, reintegrate into economic life, and run for local office if they so choose, and major demobilization and reintegration programs to provide training and employment to demobilized militia.

The strategies adopted in the counterinsurgency drove the insurgents into the Congo and displaced the conflict onto Congolese soil; an outcome that benefited Rwanda but severely destabilized the Congo.Success in the northwest was however jeopardized as a result of drought and unavailability of seeds and tools for those returning to their homes. This kept malnutrition rates high, production low, and security problematic. To forestall another crisis, increased donor assistance must be forthcoming for basic humanitarian and reintegration requirements.

4.5 Encouraging Peace and Reconciliation Processes

The Arusha peace process got underway in mid-1998. Its objective was to negotiate a transitional arrangement and timetable for elections. To its credit, Arusha made progress in getting various opposing groups to sit together and begin to talk about needed reforms. But many analysts charge that substantive negotiations took a back seat in Arusha to procedural manoeuvring, posturing, and horse-trading over future positions.

Furthermore, the principal armed opposition groups were not represented at the talks, thus undermining agreements on security matters in particular. Arusha appeared to seek balance between the opposition and government on the battlefield as a prerequisite for forward movement in the negotiations. Progress is also dependent on healing the political and military splits within the key Hutu organizations, an objective that remained elusive.

Despite there being other initiatives, the Arusha process remains the most significant one. But a number of enhancements are needed to increase its success. Four committees exist within the Arusha structure to address four issues: the nature of the conflict, institutions and good governance, security, and economic reconstruction.

At the local level, a handful of organizations, many of them church-based, are involved in grassroots reconciliation efforts in Rwanda and Burundi. Nevertheless, the elite-driven nature of the conflict and manipulation of ethnic differences, the context of genocide, and the hierarchical structure of these societies often inhibit meaningful discussions at the local level on the issues.

4.6 Democratic Institution Building

The Rwandan government is carefully managing the post-genocide political transition process. Despite the effort to achieve greater ethnic parity in the cabinet and among prefects (regional governors), the government has been heavily criticized for the narrowness of the ruling clique and it's silencing of certain voices of dissent. The challenge for the government is to increase meaningful Hutu participation while maintaining security for Tutsi populations.

Discussing democratic values, allowing participation, and focusing on problem solving are seen as methods to lay the groundwork for the transition to some form of multiparty democracy.

Rwanda's attempts to destroy the old elite-based political leadership structure is a prerequisite to building a new, broader, more participatory base of authority, but runs the risk of human rights abuse in the interim and the entrenchment of the new elite in the long run. Allowing for maximum political and economic competition is a key safeguard against this possible outcome.

4.7 Human Rights Promotion

The impartiality of the Rwandan justice system will be key to genuine reconciliation and social development. Both Hutus and Tutsis need to be convinced that justice will be done if crimes are committed, no matter who the perpetrator and the victim. Moreover, the Rwandan population needs to be convinced that the justice system is being rebuilt in an impartial manner, such as by increasing the number of Hutu judges and lawyers. Ensuring that the civilian justice system will respond to the new cases and issues that are now emerging is challenging but important.

On the downside, gacaca holds the potential for undermining the rule of law and perpetuating the culture of impunity if friends, family, and neighbours refuse to hold people accountable for their crimes. Furthermore, the undertaking of "gacaca christu" in advance of the regular gacaca process has the potential for emasculating the actual gacaca process and predetermining a sort of religiously sanctioned impunity.

Breaking the cycle of impunity for crimes committed by the armed forces is an ongoing challenge. By most accounts, the transparency and efficiency of the military justice system are improving, though still plagued by accusations of official disregard for potential cases against key commanders accused of war crimes. This undermines the government's credibility and may increase support for the insurgents. The Rwandan government is attempting to increase the transparency of its justice efforts and educate its army on the rules of war.

4.8 Economic Peace Building and Security Enhancement

Peace and reconciliation themes ring hollow for many Rwandans (and Burundians and their Congolese neighbours) in the absence of economic opportunity. The success of peace building and reconciliation initiatives in the northwestern Rwanda was jeopardized as a result of drought and unavailability of seeds and tools for those returning to their homes. This kept malnutrition rates high,

production low, and security problematic. Rwanda continued to make progress on poverty reduction and on gender equality. The current EDPRS has gone a long way in mainstreaming gender issues into the growth and development processes in Rwanda by including gender issues in all sectors of the strategy.

In December 2006 the National Institute of Statistics (NIS), with the support of the DFID-funded project, published a report[161] and comparing the findings with the results of the earlier survey conducted in 2000/01.TheDecember 2006 report revealed[162] that, over the period between the surveys, household consumption grew at 3 per cent per annum per adult, while poverty fell from 60.4 per cent in 2000/01 to 56.9 per cent in 2005/06, a reduction of 3.5 percentage points. There were important regional dimensions to this: the poverty headcount fell substantially in Eastern Province, fell by smaller amounts in Northern Province and the City of Kigali, and actually rose slightly in Southern Province. Calculations show that 68 per cent of the total reduction in poverty was accounted for by the poverty reduction in Eastern Province[163]. An important part of the story was an increase in inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient. The level of inequality was already high in 2000/01, with a Gini coefficient of 0.47, and rose to 0.51 in 2005/06. The high initial level of inequality[164], and the fact that inequality worsened over this period, were important factors making the consumption growth less effective in terms of poverty reduction – in more technical terms, lowering the growth elasticity of poverty reduction. Inequalities rose in Southern and Western provinces in particular. Even though the consumption growth rate was positive in Southern Province, poverty also rose. With sustained efforts by the government, latest reports from the UN on the Millennium Indicators show that Rwanda is on course towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals targets[165] on universal primary education, gender parity, reduction in child mortality and environmental sustainability.

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[161] Preliminary PovertyUpdate Report giving the main results of the second household survey, the *Enquête intégrale sur les conditions de vie des ménages de Rwanda* (EICV: Integral survey of households' living conditions in Rwanda) of 2005/07

[162] Ibid
[163] Ibid
[164] Ibid
[165] Ibid

Notable improvements have also been made in health, education and housing. In the health[166] sector, the frequency of medical consultations has increased, since almost half the population is now covered by health insurance, the vast majority by mutual insurance arrangements. The health insurance scheme mitigated the occurrence and adverse effect of catastrophic health expenditure that is now associated with health sector reforms inmost developing countries. Similarly, the use of pre-natal services has increased significantly and differences in utilization between poorer and less poor households have narrowed. But the 2005/06 integral survey on households' living conditions (EICV2) revealed that only two-thirds of households have access to safe drinking water. Significant progress has been made in education. According to national sources, enrolment in primary schools[167] has increased substantially, from 74 to 86 per cent over the period 2000/01 to 2006/07. Both the urban and rural populations have witnessed an increase in enrolment rates. However, many children in primary schools are above the official primary school age range[168], because of late entry and delays in their schooling. A small fraction of children completes primary education and goes on to secondary education. The secondary school net enrolment rate has shown only a small increase over the period, from 7 per cent to 10 per cent. In the rural areas, only 8 per cent of children aged 13 to 18 years are in secondary education.

Household expenditure on primary school students has remained roughly constant after adjustment for inflation at an average RWF 1 845 per student per year. Uniforms are the largest single element of educational expenditure. The cost of secondary schooling[169] is much higher, with households spending an average of around RWF 68 000 each year on secondary school students. Wealthier households spend much more than poorer households on secondary schooling. According to the Fast Track Initiative Assessment of September 2006, unemployment among Rwandans with only some primary education is as high as 61 per cent compared to the sub-Saharan average of 29 per cent.

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[166] Ibid
[167] Ibid
[168] Ibid
[169] Ibid

In housing, the survey[170] revealed that the number of dwellings increased by 280 000 during the period 2000/01-2005/06. The increase has been roughly proportionate between the different zones, comprising the City of Kigali and other urban and rural areas.

However, the number of dwellings in other urban areas[171] has increased at a slightly faster rate. The prevalence rate[172] of HIV-positive people among adults aged 15 to 49 in Rwanda is now 3.1 per cent. The prevalence rate is higher among women (3.6 per cent) than men (2.3 per cent). The prevalence is considerably higher in urban areas (7.3 per cent) than in rural areas (2.2 per cent). About 200 000 HIV-positive Rwandans needed antiretroviral (ARV) drugs last year, according to the Treatment and Research Aids Centre (TRAC) [173]. Of these, around 50 000 HIV-positive patients needed urgent treatment, although only 3 200 or 1.6 per cent

4.9 Analysis of Donor Attitudes on Post Genocide Rwanda's Progress

Donors have been very keen on overseeing Rwanda's peace process and it is true to say that Rwanda has been rebuilt by outsiders. Rwanda's economy is still heavily aid-dependent[174], as is reflected in large fiscal and current account deficits. During the period 1994-95, aid flows peaked at around USD 700 million a year, but then averaged around USD 340 million annually since 1997.By the end of 2007, external aid continued to finance about half of Rwanda's total budget. Their main concern has been to ensure those funds are utilized as earlier agreed and that projects meet their goals. Duplication of effort, poor accountability and evaluating whether projects objectives set at the initiation of the project were still relevant in a country faced with a multiplicity of social problems had been cited as a hindrance towards making investment of these projects results expected yield in the contemporary Rwanda. Yet the funds are burdening Rwanda with a repayment dilemma where although repayment is compulsory but it is not a priority for Rwandan people who are still languishing in Poverty.

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[170] Ibid
[171] Ibid
[172] Ibid
[173] Ibid
[174] Ibid

To the donors however repayment would be business as usual and they would not expect any less from Rwandese Government. Donors had good intentions but were slow to react at changing needs of the Rwanda and they would pursue projects that would not be of major importance to Rwanda. Donors from France were pursuing divisive politics and were open in showing their resentment of Kagame. Donors in Rwanda were in most cases satisfied with projects undertaken in Rwanda, they were not bothered by any injustices orchestrated or perceived to be orchestrated by Kagame's government and hence would least be concerned with putting any pressure in pushing for more democratic space in Rwanda even if it would be lacking.

Donors operated in a business like attitude and their businesses were doing well hence they would put more effort in the rebuilding of Rwanda in the best way they thought was possible and making minor adjustments from time to time on their projects to suit the needs of the people of Rwanda. These attitudes by Donors in Rwanda needed to change drastically.

4.10 Analysis on Local and International Journalists' and Analysts' Attitudes on Post Genocide Rwanda's Progress

As all Journalist would behave those that cooperate with Kagame and his Government would not be involved in questioning or setting sanctions even if he acted inappropriately for as long as their mother country benefited from the relationship with Rwanda. Those whose mother country opposed Kagame like France and other EU countries, and then they would poison the people of Rwanda to rebel against Kagame. They would also be intolerant to Kagame's errors and omissions, criticize every Kagame policy whether it would benefit the people of Rwanda or not. They would never praise Kagame's efforts in any manner, form or shape whatsoever.

The Gacaca Survey[175] showed that radio being the main source of information with BBC London having a considerable number of listener-ship. This showed that if positive reform and reconciliatory message were passed through radio then it would play a big role in enhancing healing and unity amongst the people of Rwanda without necessarily creating Kagame and Government sycophants nor enhancing genocide mentality.

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[175] John Hopkins Centre for Communications Programs and Ministry of Justice, Rwanda (2007): Perception About the Gacaca Law in Rwanda: Evidence from a Multi-method study.

Self regulation by journalists in Rwanda is required without Government interfering with free press and silencing those who oppose them. The media should be courageous to provide information without fear or favor as their profession would suggest but they should be sensitive too especially to avoid rupturing the skin of a healing wound.

4.11 Analysis of Rwandan Citizens or Residents Attitudes on Post Genocide Rwanda's Progress

The Gacaca[176] survey showed that poverty and insecurity were still prevalent in Rwanda. Fear, insecurity, trauma and distrust amongst tribes were also playing a role in creating tensions and slow pace of wounds created by genocide to be fully healed. Rwanda people were seen to be less religious as less people indicated that they primarily sourced information from their churches[177]. Religion is a tool that can bring people together if the tool is used well and in Rwanda it seemed that the route needed to be used widely.

4.12 Issues Raise from the Primary Data
Some unique issues were picked from the three instruments

4.12.1 Questionnaire
The respondents who filled questionnaires represented by mostly East Africans doing their trade in Rwanda had a lot of optimism on Rwanda road to recovery. They were also hopeful that Rwanda had bigger belief in Rwanda people reconciliation.

4.12.2 Reconciliation
Figure 4.1 showed that the people of Rwanda's commitment to create room for peace was mainly driven by fear of repetition of genocide experience and increased literacy levels.

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[176] Ibid
[177] Ibid

Figure 4.1: Reasons for Optimism about Rwandans Commitment on Reconciliation[178]

Reasons for Optimism about Rwandans Commitment on Reconcilliation

Figure 4.2 showed that the doubt of people of Rwanda's commitment to create room for peace was mainly caused by perceived or actual autocratic tendencies exhibited by President Kagame and instability in the neighboring countries

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[178] Response to Questionnaire Questions 19 see Appendix II

Figure 4.2: Reasons for Doubting Rwandans Commitment on Reconciliation[179]

Reasons for Doubting Rwandans Commitment on Reconcilliation

- Easy Access of Fire Arms — 14%
- Revenge Mentality — 14%
- Instability in Neighbouring Countries — 29%
- Kagame's Autocracy — 43%

4.13 Repetition of Rwanda Genocide

Figure 4.3 showed that the belief that Rwandans would not allow a repetition of genocide was mainly caused by people not wanting to experience war again and the commitment by the international community. The situation seemed to fragile and that peace and reconciliation was founded on fear and external players showed that it required more time for people of Rwanda to reconcile and reduce the tensions that exist or the Government needed to re-look at its strategies of unifying the Rwanda people. Unity seem to be scarce and leadership though praised scantily by the respondents needed to be enhanced and refined to accelerate reconciliation spirit in Rwanda.

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[179] Response to Questionnaire Questions 19 see Appendix II

Figure 4.3: Reasons for Doubting Repetition of Rwanda Genocide[180]

Reason Why Rwanda's Genocide is not likely to be repeated soon

| Category	Percentage
Improved Democratic Space	5%
Goodwill of the Current Government	9%
Kagame's Leadership	9%
Commitment by International Community	14%
Not wanting to experience war again	64%

Figure 4.4 showed that the fear that Rwandans would allow a repetition of genocide was mainly caused by corruption, Kagame's autocracy and instability in neighboring countries. This showed that international community needed to be vigilant and the African Union should play a bigger role in resolving conflict in the central regions of Africa. The donor community also were required to put pressure on Kagame to widen the democratic space and hence increase accountability.

Figure 4.4: Reasons for Fearing Repetition of Rwanda Genocide[181]

Reason Why Rwanda's Genocide is likely to be repeated soon

Category	Percentage
Easy Access of Fire Arms	8%
Revenge Mentality	8%
Instability in Neighbouring Countries	17%
Corruption	33%
Kagame's Autocracy	33%

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[180] Response to Questionnaire Questions 11 see Appendix II
[181] Response to Questionnaire Questions 11 see Appendix II

4.14 Issues Raise from the Interviews and Group Discussion

Resource allocation and bad politics seem to be the main factors that trigger tribal segregation and tensions. Corruption at the boarders and accessibility of fire arms were the root cause of tension in the central region of Africa. Lack of commitment by African union also featured as hindrance to peace in Rwanda. There was however optimism that education, donor funding and possible improvement in agriculture as the main issues that would direct Rwanda towards peace and reconciliation.[182]

4.15 Conclusion

Rwanda seemed to be vulnerable from its neighbors' state of affairs. Peace in their neighborhood translated to peace in their country and vice versa. The peace process was successful because of fear of repeat genocide rather than strong institutions and healing process. State as an actor seem to have failed in reconciling the country and was less trusted. The peace process approach was not at fault however for the individual actors mistakes. The process seemed to be bringing fruits that had not been witnessed before. State was required to play a bigger and better role. The international community and the African union needed to play their part without fear or favor.

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[182] Response to Interview and Group Discussion see Appendix III, IV and V

CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations.

5.1 Summary

The broad objective of the study was to critically analyze the process of post conflict peace keeping in Africa. The specific objective was to examine post conflict peace building in Rwanda which was a recent example of a post war country. This study particularly critically analyzed the different peace building efforts undertaken by both state and non-state actors.

These objectives were met as the study found out that

5.2 Conclusion

The research also had two hypotheses which were first to measure the positive effect of peace research approach and success of state and non-state actors in peace building in Rwanda.

For the first hypothesis which was

- H_0: The peace research approach of conflict has a positive effect on post-conflict peace-building.

  H_1: The peace research approach conflict has a negative effect on post conflict peace building.

We accept the null hypothesis because the finding showed that the peace research has had a positive impact on post-conflict peace-building. The evidence was provided by most of the respondents feeling that there was less likelihood of the repeat of genocide, that the economy was improving, literacy level were improving, trust in international community commitment in resolving the conflict and that the Rwandese were genuinely united in the spirit of reconciliation.

The second hypothesis which was;

- H_0: Both state and non state actors have succeeded in peace-building in Rwanda

- H_1: Both state and non state actors have not succeeded in peace-building in Rwanda We reject the null hypothesis because the research found out that although state should be commended for its efforts in creating a peaceful Rwanda a lot was still left for them to be considered successful. Evidence was provided by the poor human rights record and negative publicity

that the government was creating for itself which would create perception of its inability to create a lasting peace. The lack of cohesion between State and international players in bringing reconciliation was evident. The weaknesses by African union in taking the lead especially in small arms minimisation as well as vulnerability of Rwanda towards its neighbours' action was discouraging.

5.3 Recommendations

In recommendations the study would give it in three fold. First the study would give recommendation for peace building to the peace-building practitioners, then it would give academic recommendations and lastly recommendations for further studies.

5.3.1 Recommendations to Practitioners

There needs to be a number of enhancements to the Arusha peace process to increase its success, including; expanding the number of professional mediators, reducing the number of parties represented at the talks, and increasing the effectiveness of the committees. More specific technical assistance to these committees from the international community would increase the chances of success. When roadblocks are identified, donors and regional governments could apply focused incentives and pressures to encourage forward movement.

Building on the progress and momentum of the local elections, the United States and other interested countries must support and advocate for the rapid movement to commune-level and parliamentary elections. There should be continued forward and upward movement in this bottom-up democratic initiative, which cannot happen overnight but should not take a decade, either. Participation and freedom of association must be widened and perceived to be widened. Media criticism should be allowed without repercussion. Taxation authority should be decentralized to complement the effort to decentralize development planning. A full democratic system -tailored to local sensitivities and context - should be developed with some urgency.

Establishing accountability and breaking the cycle of impunity are key to creating conditions for peace and stability, so timely and transparent justice for those that stand accused is vital.

It is all the more important, therefore, that the thousands of people who will be administering the process at the local level be educated and trained for their responsibilities. President Clinton's Great Lakes Justice Initiative (GLJI) resources can be catalytic for this purpose. The GLJI could make a specific contribution toward supplies, logistics, and support for the participatory elements of the initiative. At the same time, rebuilding a decimated formal justice system is a long-term effort which will require several years of international aid, including by the United States.

Moreover, the Rwandan population needs to be convinced that the justice system is being rebuilt in an impartial manner, such as by increasing the number of Hutu judges and lawyers. Ensuring that the civilian justice system will respond to the new cases and issues that are now emerging is challenging but important. Impartiality in military justice is also vital.

Military justice is an area in which the United States could make a much greater contribution. Stronger international advocacy for prosecution of war crimes in both Rwanda and Congo would help particularly if coupled with some institutional support and training.

If Congress were closely involved, the administration could fashion a program from the GLJI designed to promote more effective military justice. The GLJI should not just fund projects; is should also be a mechanism for advocating an equitable justice system, both military and civilian.

One of the most important prerequisites for reconciliation is broad-based economic development. Social harmony in Rwanda and in the region requires improvements in material well-being. A comprehensive strategy for peace-building should be constructed by donors, the government, opposition parties, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for the Great

Lakes. Greater investment in productive infrastructure and activity is needed to expand the pie and generate the revenue necessary for sustainable social development.

The Rwandan government should consider a limited-time, affirmative-action policy in favour of disadvantaged Hutu-owned businesses for government contracting, Hutu students for scholarships and admission into universities, and Hutus for government employment.

To ensure maximum support from Rwandan villages, the government should consider a more decentralized, participatory process of decision-making about how villagization is implemented. The more local communities are able to decide about their living and working arrangements, the more supportive the new arrangements will be.

To forestall another crisis, increased donor assistance must be forthcoming for basic humanitarian and reintegration requirements.

In accordance with the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the terms conflict prevention and peace-building describe a fast-developing field that covers four broad areas of intervention: equitable socio-economic development, good governance, the reform of security and justice institutions and truth and reconciliation processes.

Conflict prevention activities share the goal of averting the outbreak of violence. Peace-building work focuses on reducing or ending violent conflict and/or promoting a culture of peace. An indicative list of work themes within these four areas is detailed below.[183] The Rwandese government and other stakeholders in the peace-building and reconciliation efforts in Rwanda should model their initiatives around the same model.

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[183] DAC Networks on Development Evaluation & on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, '

Table 1: Peace Building Model

Social Economic Development	Good Governance	Reform of Justice and Security Institutions	Culture of truth, Justice and Reconciliation
Balanced physical reconstruction	Civil society development	Security sector reform (police, military, intelligence)	Enhancing non-violent dispute resolution systems
Sound and equitable economic management	Freedom of expression, association and press media development	Small arms and light weapons reduction	Dialogue among conflicting groups
Equitable distribution of development benefits	Power sharing Participatory process	Non-violent accompaniment	Prejudice reduction or diversity training
Gender equality	Improved access	Community policing	Trauma healing
Equitable access to services	Democratisation Electoral process	Peace-keeping Non violent observers	Conflict resolution skills training
Repatriation/reintegration of displaced persons	Transparency and accountability	Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants	Peace education Transitional justice War crimes trial
Sustainable use of (and equitable access to) natural resources	Anti-corruption and good governance programs Human rights protection Rule of law	De-mining	Reparations
Transforming Attitudes, Structures, Relationships and Behaviours			

5.3.2 Academic Recommendations

The peace building process theories were challenged significantly by the findings of the study. Doyle and Dahrendorf peace building theories were challenged as seeing peace building as an instrument of UN's toolkit as UN failed to be effective in Rwanda.

 Berdal and Malone, Anderson, Fitzduff and Boyce critique of Peace building process by international community was quite spot on especially in Rwanda's case. Especially Boyce critic that the neo-liberal economics do not prioritize and often contradict with urgent post-conflict tasks. He also rejected the Dobbins theory that political and economic liberalization as effective antidotes to violent conflicts.

The case of Rwanda as a case in point supports the Boyce critic since the world left the situation in Rwanda to escalate to genocide level because of lack of focus and priority. The research would also reject Shepard theories that one of the important yardsticks for gauging the international commitment to post-conflict peace building is the scale of financial resources mobilized across agencies, governments and international organizations. Financial resources might have been important for Rwanda but it lack of decisive actions by organisations like African Union still put the Rwandese at risk.

The study however, supported theories forwarded by Addison who writes that creation of specialized and designated units to address the institutional and programming void between humanitarian assistance and development aid was a better response to the post-conflict peace building process. It also supported Tschirigi theory that peace building should proceed on multiple tracks. Peace building as a Multi-Dimensional Enterprise with Several Pillars which comprised of political, social, economic, security and legal dimensions, each of which requires attention

It was therefore of paramount importance to support Addison's and Tschirigi's theories to cultivate right actions and avert situations like the genocide experienced in Rwanda.

5.3.3 Recommendation for further Studies

The study in its venture to meet its objectives and authenticate or reject the research hypotheses came along areas that would require more information to be collected and studied. The areas are as stated:

- Role of media in conflict resolution in Africa; a comparative study between pre and post Rwanda genocide case and pre and post election violence in Kenya.

- The role of African union in conflict resolution in Africa

- The vulnerability of African countries to their neighbours' instability

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