

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

**SECURING PEACE IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF THE ROLE OF RWANDA
DEFENCE FORCE IN UNITED NATIONS AND AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN
DARFUR (UNAMID)**

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TABLE OF THE CONTENTS

DECLARATION.....	i
DEDICATION.....	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ABBREVIATIONS.....	vii
CHAPTER ONE.....	1
1.1 Introduction.....	1
1.2 Statement of the Problem.....	4
1.3 Objectives of the Research.....	4
1.4 Justification of the Research Problem.....	4
1.5 Literature Review.....	5
1.5.1 Causes of African Conflict.....	5
1.5.2 Responses to Conflict.....	8
1.6 Theoretical Framework.....	15
1.6.1 Human Needs Theory.....	17
1.6.2 Conflict Resolution Theory.....	18
1.7 Hypotheses.....	20
1.8 Methodology of the Research.....	20
1.9 Limitations of the Research Project.....	20
1.10 Chapter Outline.....	21

CHAPTER TWO.....	22
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA.....	22
2.1 Introduction.....	22
2.2 National Response to Conflict.....	23
2.3 Third Party Intervention.....	26
2.3.1 Peace Process.....	26
2.3.2 Sub-regional and Regional Responses.....	30
2.3.3 United Nations.....	35
2.3.4 Rwanda Involvement in Peacekeeping Operations.....	39
2.3.5 Conclusion.....	43
CHAPTER THREE.....	45
UNDERSTANDING THE DARFUR CONFLICT.....	45
3.1 Introduction.....	45
3.2 Brief History of Darfur.....	46
3.3 The Root Causes of Darfur Conflict.....	47
3.4 Parties to the Conflict and International Actors.....	49
3.5 Development of the Conflict.....	50
3.6 Conclusion.....	52
CHAPTER FOUR.....	53
THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION IN DARFUR CONFLICT.....	53
4.1 Introduction.....	53
4.2 Peace Process.....	54
4.3 UNAMID Overview.....	56

4.4 Role RDF in UNAMID.....	60
4.4.1 Pre-deployment Training.....	61
4.4.2 Operations.....	62
4.4.3 Serviceability and Self-sustainment.....	62
4.4.4 Quick Impact Project.....	63
4.4.5 Leadership.....	64
4.4.6 Statements on the Role of RDF in UNAMID.....	65
4.5 Conclusion.....	69
CHAPTER FIVE.....	70
ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS ON THE THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION IN THE DARFUR CONFLICT.....	70
5.1 Introduction.....	70
5.2 Peace Process.....	71
5.3 Involvement of UNAMID.....	74
5.4 Role RDF in UNAMID.....	77
5.4.1 Political and leadership.....	77
5.4.2 Operational Readiness.....	80
CHAPTER SIX.....	87
CONCLUSION IN RECOMEDATIONS.....	87
REFERENCES.....	95

SECURING PEACE IN AFRICA: A CASE OF THE ROLE OF RWANDA DEFENCE FORCES IN UNAMID

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Some African countries have been and continue to be vulnerable to intrastate armed conflicts and wars in spite of their liberation from colonial regimes over the last 40 years. Sporadic incidences of wars and civil strife continue to plague countries like, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Darfur, Mali, and Central Africa Republic (CAR)¹.

Data sets such as Uppsala Conflict Data Program show a global shift from inter-state conflict to intra-state conflict in the post World War II era, with a big pick in the early 1990s when over 50 of these conflicts were recorded.² However the scale of intrastate armed conflicts which poses a threat to international peace and security is on the decline as African states continue on the path of the democratic transition. The nature and source of the conflicts include inter alia, the fragile nature of the state, endemic poverty, identity, economic inequality and exclusionary governance system that not allow participatory political arrangement. It is now accepted that without enduring peace there can be no meaningful development in Africa.³

The type of intra-state conflicts that we are witnessing today in Africa divide the population in a state by undermining interpersonal and social trust, and consequently destroy the social norms, values and institutions that have regulated and coordinated cooperation and collective action for

¹ Dokken, D., *Security Politics Redefined*, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2008.

² Francis D.J (ed), *Peace and conflict in Africa*, Zed Books Ltd, London, 2008.

³ Dokken, D., *Security Politics Redefined*, p37, Palgrave MacMillan, New York 2008.

the well-being of the community.⁴ Too many attempts at resolving conflicts in Africa have failed. The failures of these effects are attributable to the lack of sufficient information regarding the nature of source of the conflicts. At times, conceptualized resolution mechanisms have escalated the problems instead of providing solutions, which complicate the situation even further.⁵ One fundamental cause of the repeated failure of the international organizations is probably that their identification of actors is insufficient, both in relation to who they are and in relation their particular interests in a possible prolongation of war. The international strategies in the field of conflict management are still mainly focus mainly on military approaches such as developing enough capacity to conduct peacekeeping operations at regional and sub regional level.

The facts that most violent conflicts in Africa today have obvious regional aspects has made African politicians as well as members of donor societies realize that sustainable solutions to the conflicts must be regional in character.

Conflict prevention, peace and security have been long acknowledged as global program spearheading by the United Nations and pursued by at different levels by its various organs. Africa needs an early warning and response system if the tragedy that befell Rwanda in1994 is not to happen again. Accurate assessment and credible warnings of conflicts may, in some cases, lead to preventive action. Early knowledge about major hot spots and a viable institutional response to any of these hotspots, can save many lives and more cost efficient than any subsequent humanitarian response.⁶

⁴ Ibid p69.

⁵ Nhema , A.G. (ed), *The Quest for in Africa: Transformations, Democracy and public policy*, OSSREA, Addis Ababa, 2004.

⁶ Ibid p95.

Although indigenous approaches to conflict management in Africa have been constantly neglected by the international community, solutions to some African problems will have to have home grown solutions.⁷

In the societies with a recent history of human rights violations, it becomes imperative to formulate a long-term strategic plan to prevent further atrocities..⁸ This would require that truth is told, that justice is done and that reparation is provided to victims. It was in such a scenario that countries like South Africa, Nigeria and Sierra Leone set up the truth and Reconciliation commissions.

The Darfur region has been destroyed by civil war in 2003. Despite the different peace agreements between the parties and the deployment of the peacekeepers, sporadic clashes between the belligerent and attacks on the peacekeepers persist.

The involvement of Rwanda in United Nations peacekeeping is based on a moral duty motivated by its responsibility in the international community, influenced and shaped by Rwanda's recent history, the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. The first contingent of Rwanda Defense Force (RDF) was deployed in Darfur in 2004 under the African Union (AU) Mission in Sudan (AMIS) i and together with other peacekeepers, the RDF managed to prevent the conflict from escalation. The study seeks to contribute to the ongoing search for ways of securing peace conflict in Africa in general with particular focus on the Darfur as selected case study.

⁷ Dokken D., *Security Politics Redefined*, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2008.

⁸ Nhema A. & Tiyayembe P.Z (eds), *The Resolution of African Conflicts: The Management of Conflict Resolution and Conflict Reconstruction*, OSSERA, Addis Ababa, 2008.

1.2 Statement of the problem

The prevalence of conflicts in Africa has been a major source of concern to individuals, families and the society at large. Different mechanisms of conflict resolution have failed to restore peace and stability in the DRC and Darfur and even new wars are emerging. The problem of this study, therefore, is to identify the ways that can help secure peace in Africa with emphasis on Darfur region, and using the Rwanda's role in peacekeeping operations.

1.3 Objectives of the research

The objectives of the research project are the following:

- a. To identify the ways of securing peace in Darfur.
- b. To examine and analyze the role UNAMID peacekeeping operations in Darfur.
- c. To examine the challenges in securing peace in Africa and the way forward.

1.4 Justification of the research problem

There is a wide and rich literature on the African conflicts that shows the failure and the successes of different interventions. The different approaches to the on-going conflicts seem not lead to lasting peace. The Darfur region has been plagued by conflict for a decade. The significance of this research project is that it will contribute new knowledge that can help understand better the ways that could help restore and maintain peace in Darfur. It is also envisaged that the findings of this study would contribute an important input into policy making and implementation.

1.5 Literature Review

There is a common understanding peace and stability cannot be obtained if the roots causes of conflict roots causes of conflict in Africa are not addressed. This section reviews the literature on the main causes of African conflicts and different approaches aimed at securing peace on the continent.

1.5.1 Causes of African Conflicts

One of the causes of the conflict is a weak or fragile state. Henderson (2009) examines the malfunction of the African States and concludes that instead of achieving the citizens' allegiance to the state, states resort to repression and thus insurgency.⁹ Ghaffer offers a case study of Sudan, an African state he describes jeopardized by not only religion, ethnicity and language but economic inequity which has escalated into strife caused by distrust between North and South Sudan.¹⁰ One consistent theme is the strong correlation between state fragility and conflict. The World Bank identified 37 fragile situations in 2010 – and all bar a small handful are post conflict or conflict affected. A lack of state capacity usually results in an inability to mediate between competing interests.

Fondo Sikod (2009) points out the implication of war or violent conflict in Africa mainly as poverty and food insecurity which also perpetuate conflict as a result of frustration brought on by lack of social reciprocity and tolerance for different ideas.¹¹

⁹ Henderson, A. *When States Implode: Africa's Civil wars* Cited In Volume 10, Issue 4 Spring 2009. [Http://www.africa.ufl.edu/](http://www.africa.ufl.edu/). Retrieved on 18/08/2013 at 19:37.

¹⁰ Ghaffer A. A. *Multiple Complexities and Prospects for Reconciliation and Unity*. [Http://www.africa.ufl.edu/](http://www.africa.ufl.edu/). Retrieved on 18/08/2013 at 19:37.

¹¹ Henderson, A. *When States Implode: Africa's Civil wars*, cited in Volume 10, Issue 4 Spring 2009. [Http://www.africa.ufl.edu/](http://www.africa.ufl.edu/). Retrieved on 18/08/2013 at 19:37.

According Stewart F et al (2008), the coupling between cultural identities and poverty increases the significance of inequality and can contribute to violence.¹² . These authors further state that conflict and poverty are clearly linked. However, the direction of causality has been debated. Most research on poverty and conflict contends that poverty in itself is rarely a direct cause of conflict; yet it is evident that conflict exacerbates poverty. Karin Dokken (2008) argues that poverty is both a cause and consequence of conflict, that the relationship is reciprocal.¹³ Most authors now contend that it is relative deprivation, rather than poverty per se, that makes violent conflict more likely.¹⁴ As argued by Draman (2003), there are a number of theoretical and empirical studies that have established links between poverty and conflict. These studies show that poverty, inequality, scarcity of resources and external economic factors all combine to affect the political stability.¹⁵

Natural resources are most likely to engender conflict when exclusion is linked to resource exploitation. Control and exploitation of these resources appear to be playing a big role in all phases of the conflict cycle. Drawing on African conflict experience, Andrew (20)10 posits that a given resource has a higher chance of fuelling conflict when it has characteristics that require

¹² Stewart, F. ‘‘Violence, Identity and Poverty’’, *Journal of Peace, Research*, vol. 45, No.2, pp.5-15.

¹³ Dokken, D., *Security Politics Redefined*, Palgrave MacMillan, New York 2008.

¹⁴ Stewart F ,Brown G.K., Langer A., , *Major Findings and Conclusions on the Relationship Between Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict*, Palgrave Macmillan , New York,2008.

¹⁵ <http://www.amazon.com/International-Conflict-Resolution-U-S-USSR-Middle/dp/0300051751>>. Retrieved on 15/09/2013 at 20:45.

less specialized skills for its exploitation and refinement, has high liquidity, and is easily portable.¹⁶

Where there are large inequalities between rich and poor, the latter become frustrated and organize themselves to improve their economic position, if necessary by means of violence.¹⁷

According to Holmqvist, G. (2012), the risk of civil war is much higher in poor than in rich countries. It is much cheaper to recruit rebels in a poor country, where wages are low and unemployment high, than in a rich country. Gurr also argues that a large gap between a group's expected and actual economic and living conditions can fuel conflict. However, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2004) find that income inequality is insignificant in determining the probability of conflict, and even reject altogether the argument that grievances cause conflicts.¹⁸

The prevalence of conflicts in Africa has been a function of governance and leadership failures, and the authoritarian, violent and oppressive administration. It is evidenced that most countries ended up with oppressive autocrats and dictators who enriched themselves at the expense of their peoples. Most of African leaders failed to embrace governance practices that promoted the collective good. African elites perpetuated a governance ethos that rewarded patronage, personal wealth accumulation and graft. Typical examples of resource-rich countries vividly damaged by corruption: Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Angola, Sudan and Equatorial Guinea.¹⁹

¹⁶ Andrews, A., *Besides Greed and Grievances: Natural Resource Characteristics and Conflicts in Africa*, 2010.

¹⁷ books.google.com/books?id=rrCIgtnS1MYC.

¹⁸ Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2004) *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*. in: *Oxford Economic Papers*. 56(4): 563-59. <http://www.africa.ufl.edu/>. Retrieved on 18/08/2013 at 19:37.

¹⁹ moonofthesouth.com/african-conflicts-result. Retrieved on 26/09/2013 at 18:28.

Ali Mazrui points out religion, ethnicity and racism, which he identifies as aspects of pluralism which is dangerous to society's harmonious co-existence.²⁰ York Shaw-Taylor (2009) suggests Civil wars and communal conflict in Africa are often attributed to the strength and prevalence of ethnic identity over national or civic identity and its attendants affect on political and social allegiances.²¹ The nature of inequality is increasingly recognized as important factor to the conflict and it is argued that inequalities based on ethnic or religious identities will certainly result in conflict.

The role of external powers has also been cited as one of the causes of the African conflicts. For much of the cold War, where in such counties, the rivalry between the superpowers fueled much of the conflict in Africa. But since the demise of the Soviet Union, the nature of welfare in Africa has shifted to mostly to intra-state conflicts. Concomitantly, this change has been a lowering of the geostrategic importance given to Africa by the superpowers. Hence, in the presence of conflict and failing states, the west has either failed to respond, or responded with some reluctance, and exemplified in the situations prevailing in such countries as Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi and Democratic republic of Congo.²²

1.5.2 Responses to conflict

Encouraging indigenous state formation efforts and constructive bargaining between social forces and governments might prove a more fruitful approach for donors to the problem of

²⁰ www.beyondintractability.org/essay/identity.

²¹ *ibid.*

²² Godfrey. P.O., "Conflict Management in Post Cold War: The role of International Actors", in Nhema, A.G(Ed): *The Quest for Peace in Africa: Transformation, Democracy and Public Policy*, OSSREA, Addis Ababa, 2004.p 65-81

Africa's failed states.²³ Conflict can be prevented on some occasions and managed on others, but resolved only if the term is taken to mean the satisfaction of apparent demands rather the total eradication of the underlying sentiments, memories or interests. Conflict transformation is a process of engaging and transforming the modern social, economic and political structures underlying a conflict, including the transformation of the relationship, interests and discourse.²⁴

. Kriesberg (2003) points out that nuanced interventions are needed in identity-based conflicts that reconcile democracy and justice, guaranteeing the rights of both majority and minority groups. These include the re-conceptualization of identities and cultural diversity, application of traditional justice approaches that may address more directly the identity questions involved.²⁵ Traditional African approaches and methods of conflict resolutions have often been criticized for the arbitrary nature and disproportionality of their sanctions relative to the offence but in general, the traditional approaches and methods underscore the significant culture in conflict management.²⁶ The literature indicates that if effort is made to talk about the past injustices and related atrocities, it can help secure peace in Africa. These are the cases of south Africa, Nigeria, Sierra Leone with the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions. In the case of Rwanda, the Gacaca Courts were found as important tool for unity and reconciliation. According to Nhema (2004), in most mature democracies, the stability of the state has depended on the leadership ability to work together with the major groups in civil society in accommodative

²³ <http://africacenter.org/security/topic/identity-conflict> .Retrieved on 24/09/2013 at 17:53.

²⁴ Dokken, D., *Security Politics Redefined*, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2008.

²⁵ Kriesberg,L. *Identity Issues.Beyond Intractability*. <<http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/identity-issues>. Retrieved on 28/08/2013 at 15:50.

²⁶ Omeje K C., “Understanding conflict resolution in Africa”, in Francis D.J., *Peace & Conflict in Africa*,Zed BookLtd,, London, 2008.p 65-81.

manner.²⁷ According to OSSERA (2002), when seeking solutions to Africa, one cannot ignore examining the type of governance that currently exists in African states. There is unanimous consent that the theory and the practice of democracy that espouses the provisions of basic needs, wider participation, and respect of human rights and accountability of the leadership are practices that are now widely accepted in Africa. One cannot expect the attainment of peace in atmosphere of corruption, excessive economic inequality, plunder of natural resources by a small political elite and the suppression of democratic rights and freedom of the people. Improved levels of economic and political equality therefore also need to be promoted.

Bloomfield, Barnes and Huyse (2005) point out that the role of civil society in conflict prevention, resolution and post-conflict reconstruction usually takes different forms depending on the actors involved at each stage and the context in which conflict occurs. In the different phases of conflict, civil society can be directly or indirectly involved in peace negotiations to resolve stalemates or be active in post-conflict reconstruction. Civil society also provided input in the drafting of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act, which led to the national assembly's creation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission mandated to promote and facilitate reconciliation and healing.²⁸ In several instances, governments have also worked alongside or supported the efforts of private mediators as peacemakers in African conflicts; for example, the world Council of Churches and All Africa Conference of Churches in the Sudanese negotiations of 1971-72.²⁹ Third party intervention occurs when conflict goes beyond the

²⁷ Nhema, A.G. (ed), *The Quest for in Africa: Transformations, Democracy and public policy*, OSSREA, Addis Ababa, 2004.

²⁸ Bloomfield, Barnes & Huyse. *"Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook*, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance Stockholm, 2005.

²⁹ Godfrey, P.O., *Conflict Management in Post Cold War: The Role of International Actors*, in Nhema A.G(Ed): *The Quest for Peace in Africa: Transformation, Democracy and Public Policy*, OSSREA, 2004.p79-90.

resolution capacity of the direct disputants or warring parties to involve an external intervener (mediator, facilitator, observer, peacekeeping, or peace enforcement).³⁰

Agreements become possible when the contending interests, assisted by third party facilitators recognize that the existing forms of conflict are mutually destructive and show sensitivity toward each other's basic fears and wishes.³¹ Three major peace negotiations on the conflict of Sierra Leone took place, which resulted in the following agreements: the Abidjan Peace Agreement of 30 November 1996; the Conakry Peace Plan of 23 October 1997; and the Lomé Peace Agreement of July 1999.³² There are the so-called spoilers, that is, groups (including Signatories) who renege on their commitments or otherwise seek to undermine a peace accord by violence. Groups and individuals obviously sign peace accord for a variety of reasons, some of which are not favorable to peace. According to Brahimi Report, spoilers threw Angola, Sierra Leone, and Somalia back into war, and spoilers orchestrated the Murder of 800,000 Rwandese in 1994.³³

Chapter VII of the UN charter acknowledges the importance of such groupings and urges members to seek pacific settlements of local disputes through such regional arrangements or such regional agencies before referring to the Security Council.

Although the principle of non- interference remained a stated principle of the organization. Art 4(g) of the AU Constitutive Act(2000), the AU has now the right to' intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war

³⁰ Omeje, K C., "Understanding Conflict Resolution in Africa", in Francis, D.J., *Peace & Conflict in Africa*, Zed Book Ltd, London 2008, p 65-81

³¹ Ibid pp90

³² ADETULA, V.O ., "The role of Sub- regional integration schemes in Conflict prevention and management: A framework of a working system promotion of peace system", in Nhema A.g. & Zeleza P.T(eds), *The Resolution of African Conflicts: The Management of Conflict and Post-conflict Reconstruction*, James Currey, UK, 2008, p 73-90

³³ Brahimi Report(A/55/305 – S/2000/809), 2000.

crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, as well as in instances of threat to legitimate order³⁴.

To solve a violent conflict, it is necessary to involve more than one country, even if the conflict has its epicenter in only one country. The necessity of more countries working together in conflict prevention and peace building is recognized by most African intergovernmental organizations.

The above considerations, and also the growing awareness in Africa that the pursuit of economic development by regional integration schemes is only possible under a peaceful atmosphere, have been at the base of the increased attention given to issues of peace and security by regional and sub-regional organizations. The sub-regional organizations have undertaken a number of initiatives to maintain and consolidate peace, stability, and security within the region. Concerted efforts by sub-regional organizations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), have also played a decisive role in preventing violent outbreak in fragile states and in bringing states back to the fold.³⁵ This applies to the role of the ECOWAS in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau, the SADC in Lesotho and Mozambique, Intergovernmental Authority and Development (IGAD) in Somali and Sudan, and the Arab- Maghreb Union in Western Sahara. William O'Neill (1993) argues that the intervention of ECOWAS in Liberia was considerably less than a failure and that a bottom-line suggestion will be that one solution to resolution of African crisis may be found in sub-regional organizations like ECOWAS.³⁶

³⁴ African Union Constitutive Act, 2000 Art 4(g).

³⁵ Hagg, G. and Kagwanja, P., 2007, Identity and Peace: *Reconfiguring Conflict Resolution in Africa*, African Journal on Conflict Resolution, , vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 9-36. 2007.

³⁶ William O'N. "Liberia: An Avoidable Tragedy," *Current History*, 1993.

<http://www.unz.org/Pub/CurrentHistory-1993may-00213>. Retrieved on 12/10/2013 at 15: 36

The origin, development and progressive expansion of IGAD have been linked to the need of concerted regional response to the environmental, political and developmental challenges of states within regional framework. The protracted civil conflict in Sudan and Somalia, Uganda and the Ethiopia-Eritrea civil war have since increasingly forced IGAD to develop and develop regional peace and security programs including early warning mechanisms and responses.³⁷ The Southern African Development Community (SADC) played an active role in Burundi, Zimbabwe and Madagascar.

Despite their obvious shortcomings, sub- regional organizations still largely represent primarily units of security and conflict management for the African continent. Both the UN and other major actors have given explicit approval to the increased engagement of Sub-regional organizations in conflict management.³⁸ The AU has tried to respond to urgent crises, such as those in Somalia, Darfur, South Sudan, Côte d'Ivoire, Madagascar, , Niger , albeit with varying degrees of success and pace.³⁹ The UN charter, which gives the United National Security Council (UNSC) the responsibility for initiating collective action, provides the necessary statutory frame work for the creation of peacekeeping operations by the world body.⁴⁰ As an organization of sovereign states, the UN is dependent upon its membership for approval of its actions as well as for financial and military backing. When the membership is divided about

³⁷ Omeje, K C., “Understanding Conflict Resolution in Africa”, in Francis D.J., *Peace & Conflict in Africa*, Zed BookLtd, London , 2008, p92

³⁸ ADETULA.,V.O., “The role of Sub- regional Integration Schemes in Conflict prevention and Management: A framework of a working sys promotion of peaces system”, in Nhema A.g. &Zezeza P.T(eds), *The Resolution of African Conflicts: The Management of Conflict and Post-conflict Reconstruction*, James Currey, UK, 2008, p105.

³⁹ Omorogbe E.Y, *Can the African Union Deliver Peace and Security?* Journal of Conflict and Security, Oxford University press,2011. <http://www.jcsl.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2011/02/25/jcsl.krr001>.Retrieved on 15/09/2013 at 14:34.

⁴⁰ United Nations Charter,1945.

the purposes of a particular intervention, or when the UN peacekeepers lack sufficient force to maintain order or to implement their policies, the organization may suffer a serious loss of credibility. Good examples are the cases of Rwanda and Somalia.

The UN and the sub-regional organizations apply various strategies at different stages of a conflict. These include mediation, peacekeeping or peace enforcement in the framework of humanitarian intervention.

The United Nations Secretary General (UNSG) acknowledges that in all efforts across Africa, the UN benefits from reinvigorated regional organizations. They are playing a stronger and strategic role as key partners. He cited the prompt reaction of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to the crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR) and capacity building partnership with AU.

The failures of different interventions are attributable to the lack of authentic data regarding the nature and source of the conflicts. Berdal and Keen (1997) notes that conflict can only be tackled by taking into account the non-political functions of violence and the economic benefits it can bring.⁴¹

Today, Rwanda is the sixth Major Troop and Police Contributing Country (T/PCC) in the UN, with over 4,000 troops, over 500 Police, and 13 Military Observers in seven UN Missions, including the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). Rwanda's

⁴¹ Berdal, M. and Keen, D., 'Violence and Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: Some Policy Implications', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, London, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 795-818. 1997. [Http://www.africa.ufl.edu/](http://www.africa.ufl.edu/). Retrieved on 18/08/2013 at 19:37.

contribution still remains characterized by its several battalions deployed in Darfur.⁴² The Rwanda has also contributed 850 troops in the AU mission in CA.⁴³

1.6 Theoretical Framework

Peace is perceived as a precondition for human development, as well as a deep human universal aspiration. The contemporary wars involve a broad range of actors, destroy economies and the environment, and take a terrible and disproportionate toll on civilians.

Traditional mechanisms for preventing or resolving conflicts are often rendered ineffective when acute conflict engulfs entire societies. Although they are anonymous, conceptually and analytically distinct, the two critical concepts in this study-conflict and peace- are however, still both defined and viewed against the backdrop of security and stability.

Peace is a period of time when there is no war or fighting. Conflict is generally defined as an interaction between interdependent people who perceive compatible goals and who expect interference from the other party if they attempt to achieve their goal.⁴⁴ The basic starting point of peace is conflict. Broadly we conceive of conflict resolution is as any marked reduction in social Conflict. More specifically, we may conceive of conflict resolution as a result of conscious settlement of issues in dispute. The forms of conflict resolution as diverse as the forms, nature of conflicts. The resolution of conflict in complex settings turns in the relationship between structures and behavior. Foremost among main concerns are the structural bases for change in strategy from competition to a cooperative orientation where parties attempt to develop a new relationship through problem- solving. These are evidences that the person or group when

⁴²<http://www.Rwandaun.org/>. Retrieved on 15/10/2013 at 16;48.

⁴³ UNSC Res 2017, October 2013.

⁴⁴ Dokken D., *Security Politics Redefined*, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2008.

deprived of some essential human needs cannot be socialize or induced to behave according to the dictates of law. The conflict resolution processes are analytical and problem-solving and its approach is within a theoretical framework or explanation of the conflict. Conflict resolution is concerned with prediction and with policy formation that is based on political philosophy that asserts that the satisfaction of human needs that are universal must be the ultimate goal of survival of societies.⁴⁵ The resolution of conflict is only a minimalist condition of achievement of peace. The first real condition is to understand the nature and character of conflict in Africa. This implies two things: an identification of salient issues and adoption of the appropriate methods. On the question of issues, some of the important ones might be the causes of conflict, the nature of dynamics of conflict, the patterns of conflict, the effect of conflict, the involvement of external power in Africa conflict, the style and nature of this involvement and what it entails for peace and security not only of country or countries directly involved but for the peace and security of the sub region.⁴⁶

A conflict is not a single-event phenomenon but is a dynamic process having different stages. The objectives of the parties involved, their approaches, the intensity levels, the likely damage all change between the various phases of a conflict's life cycle. Therefore an optimum conflict management strategy differs from stage to stage. This makes it necessary to have a thorough understanding of the dynamics of conflict throughout its life cycle for application of conflict prevention and management strategies. The potential for conflict will always exist in a society with its members having different mores, interests, and socio-economic conditions and

⁴⁵ Denis .J.D.S, Hugo, N.M., Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice.

<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/...1/Sandole.htm>. Retrieved on 29/10/2013 at 20;15

⁴⁶ Peace, Conflict and Development in Africa, 2007.[http:// www.ukm.my/.../Africa%20-%20Conflict](http://www.ukm.my/.../Africa%20-%20Conflict). Retrieved on 26/10/2013 at 18 :13.

needs. Adequate efforts are often not made to address the root causes of the conflict. It needs to be emphasized that at each stage, there would be governance issues involved.

Following revision of various conflict and conflict resolution theories, it was found that theories of conflict resolution are closely intertwined with broader assumptions about conflict. One should recognize that each of the main theoretical approaches to understanding conflict implies an approach to conflict resolution.⁴⁷ Two theories were identified and will help identify the ways that could secure peace in Africa. These are the Human Needs Theory and the Conflict Resolution Theory.

1.6.1 Human Needs Theory

Human Needs Theory as a generic or holistic theory of human behavior. It is based on the hypothesis that humans have basic needs that have to be met in order to maintain stable societies. As John Burton(1991) notes: “We believe that the human participants in conflict situations are compulsively struggling in their respective institutional environments at all social levels to satisfy primordial and universal needs - needs such as security, identity, recognition, and development. They strive increasingly to gain the control of their environment that is necessary to ensure the satisfaction of these needs. This struggle cannot be curbed; it is primordial”.⁴⁸

This theory recognizes and legitimizes the minority needs.

Paul Sites (1990) argues that nearly everyone concerned with human needs would agree that there are physiological needs such as food and shelter. Unless these are gratified there is human suffering and perhaps death.⁴⁹ The argument is that human needs are analogues of primary

⁴⁷ Burton J. ,*Conflict Resolution as a Political System*, in Vamik Volkan, et al (eds.), *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships: Volume II: Unofficial Diplomacy at Work*, ,, Lexington Books, Lexington 1991, p. 82-3.

⁴⁸ <http://www.Internationalpeaceandconflict.ning.com>.Retrived on 05/10/2013 at 15:38.

⁴⁹ Sites, P., *Legitimacy and Human Needs*,in Burton,.J. and Dukes, F., *Conflict: Readings in Management &Resolution*, MacmillanPress Ltd, London,1990,p118-119.

emotions and since the primary human emotions are ontologically given, so are human needs. People will not feel secure when they are experiencing fear, their lives will not be meaningful when they are angry because their needs are not addressed and they will not have they self-esteem when there is experiencing depression. In addition all the people want to obtain basic universal human needs such as security, identity and recognitions among others. The security of the citizen is used and misused as reason for a variety of state actions and many citizens willingly comply with these actions. Thus the need for security as it relates to the survival of the self is important. John Burton emphasizes that many authors believe if those basic needs are frustrated, this situation will lead to social conflicts. For the people these fundamental needs should not be negotiated, rather be attained, if not intractable conflicts will occur. He further notes other theorists, focus on the way the needs are understood and the way in which they are addressed and satisfied.⁵⁰ This is the approach applied in this study.

1.6.2 Conflict Resolution Theory

Burton distinguishes between conflict resolution, management and settlement. Management is by alternative dispute resolution skills and can confine or limit conflict; settlement is by authoritative and legal processes' and can be imposed by elites. Burton suggests by contrast that conflict resolution means terminating conflict by methods that are analytical and that get to the root of the problem.⁵¹ Conflict resolution, as opposed to mere management or 'settlement', points to an outcome that, in the view of the parties involved, is a permanent solution to a problem.

By accepting the assumptions and hypotheses of the Human Needs Theory, Burton suggests that

⁵⁰ Burton, J. and Dukes, F., *Conflict: Readings in Management & Resolution*, Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 1990, p118-119.

⁵¹ <http://www.Internationalpeaceandconflict.ning.com>. Retrieved on 05/10/2013 at 15:38.

there is a need for a paradigm shift away from power politics and towards the reality of individual power'.⁵² In other words, individuals, as members of their identity groups, will strive for their needs within their environment. If they are prevented from this pursuit by elites, other identity groups, institutions and other forms of authority, there will inevitably be conflict. The only solution is for the groups to work out their problems in an analytical way, supported by third parties who act as facilitators and *not* authorities. This is particularly relevant when the conflict is over needs which cannot be bargained and not material interests, which can be negotiated and compromised.

Conflict is due to an assertion of individualism. It is a frustration based protest against lack of opportunities for development and against lack of recognition and identity. Whether the tension, conflict, or violence has origins in class, status, ethnicity, sex, religion, or nationalism, we are dealing with the same fundamental issues.

Burton further notes that: Conflict resolution is, in the long term, a process of change in political, social, and economic systems. It is an analytical and problem solving process that takes into account such individual and group needs as identity and recognition, as well as institutional changes that are required to satisfy these needs.⁵³

Traditional approaches to conflict management or regulation have largely been based on mediation and negotiated settlements. These approaches will only work when the conflicting parties are amenable to negotiation and have something tangible they are able to bargain. When a situation explodes into violent conflict, most of policy-makers look for a political explanation and a political solution. While politics may be involved, other relevant factors such as poverty and

⁵² <http://www.Internationalpeaceandconflict.ning.com>. Retrieved on 05/10/2013 at 15:38

⁵³ Burton, J. and Dukes, F., *Conflict: Readings in Management & Resolution*, Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 1990, p118-119.

issues of inequality are overlooked. It is being increasingly recognized that addressing the issues of access to resources and participation in the decision-making can provide more sustainable and realistic solutions to conflicts on the African continent. While the policy-makers may understand structural causes of the conflicts, rarely does this inform their responses nor do they give structural causes urgency as other conflict management and stabilization measures. The significance of ethnic conflict management in Africa is informed by African underdevelopment and the significance of this theory is that it recognizes and legitimizes both the minority needs.⁵⁴

1.7 Hypotheses.

The following hypotheses were identified:

- a. African armies will contribute to sustainable peace in Darfur.
- b. The Rwanda Defense Force will help secure peace in Darfur.
- c. The political will of African leaders is a key factor in the restoration of peace in Darfur.

1.8 Methodology of the Research.

The study was based on a literature study and available factual data. The study investigates the root causes of African conflicts and examines the approaches to conflict resolution with particular emphasis on the Darfur conflict as selected case study. Specific qualitative measures such as scheduled interviews, questionnaires and field research were not be used during the research. Only secondary sources were used during the research. These include books, journals, newspapers, periodicals and online sources.

1.9 Limitations of the Research project

The research is limited to the conflict in Darfur, yet there other conflicts in DRC, Mali Somalia and CAR that need to managed and brought to an end. It was not be possible due time and means

⁵⁴ ibid

to get primary data from the parties to the conflicts and other actors.

2.0 Chapter outline

The first chapter of the paper will deal with the introduction of the research. It will contain the research problem, the objectives and the justification of the research project. The theoretical framework will be explained, the hypotheses will be identified, and the significance of the study will also be highlighted in this chapter. The methodology to be used during the research will be further clarified to the reader. The chapter two of the study will examine the various approaches to conflict prevention and management in Africa with emphasis on the peacekeeping missions, and single out the Rwanda involvement in peacekeeping operations the causes and the nature of African conflicts and also identifies the responses to these conflicts. The Chapter three is the first part of the case study and helps understand the Darfur conflict. The Chapter four will discuss the role of the third party intervention in the conflict with emphasis on the role of the Rwanda Defense in UNAMID as case study. Chapter five will critically analyze the findings of this study. The last part of this study will cover the conclusion and recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA

2.1 Introduction

The management of conflict in Africa has been a subject of significant concern to the world community in the post-Cold War era. Images of starvation in Somalia and of genocidal violence in Rwanda have pricked the conscience of the developed world, leading to controversial humanitarian interventions that called into question the ability of the international community to resolve complex intra-state conflicts but neither Africa nor the world has yet found a satisfactory solution to the problem of extreme intra-state violence.⁵⁵ Conflict can be prevented on some occasions and managed on others, but resolved only if the term is taken to mean the satisfaction of apparent demands rather the total eradication of the underlying sentiments, memories or interests. Conflict resolution aims at addressing the causes of conflict and seeks to build new and lasting relationship hostile parties by helping them to explore, analyze questions and reframe their positions and interests; it moves conflicting parties from the destructive patterns of zero-sum conflict to positive sum (win-win) constructive outcomes.⁵⁶

Whereas a sovereign state fails to manage its conflicts effectively and governance breaks down, the responsibility for dealing with disputes may fall for a limited time on external agents. In that event, they seek to help the rival parties return to regularized rules of relationship, the essence of

⁵⁵ Management system International(2002), *Rwanda Conflict Vulnerability Assessment*, Washington,DC: Great of Horn of Africa Peace Building project.

⁵⁶ Miall h., *Conflict transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Track*, 2004.

successful governance.⁵⁷ This chapter examines the various approaches to conflict prevention and management in Africa with emphasis on the peacekeeping missions, and singles out the Rwanda involvement in peacekeeping operations.

2.2 National response to conflicts

Conflict in Africa can be minimized in an environment that encourages substantive participation in the economic, political and economic realms. Attempts to exclude the ordinary citizen from such participation create a rift between the rulers and the governed. Open political system that safeguard basic civil liberties, basic needs and freedom of expression are less likely to be confronted by debilitating conflicts.⁵⁸ Conflict transformation is a process of engaging and transforming the modern social, economic and political structures underlying a conflict, including the transformation of the relationship, interests and discourse.⁵⁹ Today there is a general agreement that there are certain pillars of conflict prevention and post conflict reconstruction that need to be obtained in order to safeguard long-lasting peace:⁶⁰

- a. Security including all aspects of public safety;
- b. Justice and reconciliation, that is, dealing with past abuses through formal and informal mechanisms in order to resolve grievances that have arisen from conflict and to create an impartial system for future;

⁵⁷ Godfrey, P.O., *Conflict management in Post- Cold War: The role of International Actors*, in Nhema G. Alfred (ed), *The Quest for peace in Africa: Transformations, Democracy and Public Policy*, OSSREA, Addis Ababa, 2004, p 73-90

⁵⁸ Mackie, G., *Democracy Defended*, Cambridge: CUP, 2003. <http://www.catdir.loc.gov/catdir/samples/.../2003048469>. Retrieved on 06/11/2013 at 19:26.

⁵⁹ Lederach, J.P., *Preparing Peace: Conflict Transformation across Cultures*, Syracuse University Press, **Place?**, 1998.

⁶⁰ Doken, k, *African Security Politics Redefined*, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2008.

- c. Social and economic well-being, that is, safeguarding fundamental social economic needs.

Governance and participation, including the creation of legitimate, effective political and administrative institutions and participatory processes. Given the radical nature of western cultural influence on African states and societies, many contemporary critics contest the relevance and place of traditional approaches in the face of complexity of modern social structures and the conflict they generate in Africa. There are others who argue that traditional approaches methods on dispute resolution should be confined local communities while the Western alternatives should be applied to cities, formal sector institutions and state systems. The most important philosophy underlying traditional African approaches to dispute resolution seems to be captured in Swahili concept of *Ubuntu*. *Ubuntu* is humanistic philosophy which connotes collective personhood and is best captured in Zulu maxims.⁶¹ This concept is significant in the traditional justice that was implemented in post-apartheid South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation commission. This approach was subsequently adopted in varying degrees by post-war and deeply divided societies such as Liberia and Sierra Leone. This was philosophically by informed by the *Ubuntu* tradition. Similarly, The Gacaca transitional justice established in post-genocide Rwanda which combines both punitive and restorative justice, African customary and western laws, is in concept an expression of *Ubuntu*.

Traditional African approaches and methods of conflict resolutions have often been criticized for the arbitrary nature and disproportionality of their sanctions relative to the offence but in general, the traditional approaches and methods underscore the significant culture in conflict

⁶¹ Masina, N., Xhosa *Practices of Ubuntu for South Africa*, in Zatman, I.W.(ed), *Traditional Cures for modern Conflicts: African Conflict Medicine*, , lynne reinner, Boulder, 2000.

management.⁶² The role of civil society in conflict prevention, resolution and post-conflict reconstruction usually takes different forms depending on the actors involved at each stage and the context in which conflict occurs. In the different phases of conflict, civil society can be directly or indirectly involved in peace negotiations to resolve stalemates or be active in post-conflict reconstruction. Second, civil society can be productive in cases where it does not take part directly in negotiations but provides input by using its influence and talking to parties to the conflict which take part in these negotiations.⁶³

In post-conflict reconstruction processes when peace and reconciliation commissions are viewed as a conduit for healing communities and individuals affected by the conflict, civil society organizations can serve as the repository for evidence gathered when working with communities during the conflict and through contacts established during conflict.⁶⁴ In Liberia, the Liberian Women Initiative played an active role in highlighting the difficulties faced particularly by women and children, the abuse of women and the use of children as child soldiers during the war. Other Liberian organizations focusing on human rights issues, such as the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission and the Centre for Law and Human Rights Education, carried out extensive work in identifying and chronicling the massive abuses meted out to citizens by the belligerents.⁶⁵ Civil society also provided input in the drafting of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act, which led to the national assembly's creation of the Truth and Reconciliation

⁶² Omeje, C. K., "Understanding Conflict Resolution in Africa", in Francis J. David, *Peace & Conflict in Africa*, Zed Books Ltd, London, 2008.

⁶³ Bloomfield, Barnes & Huyse *Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook*. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance Stockholm, 2005

⁶⁴ Ibid

⁶⁵ Backer D. and Carroll D., *NGO's and Constructive Engagement, International Politics*. 38 1–26 pp, 2001. <http://www.palgrave-journals.com › Journal home › Archive › Articles>. Retrieved on 16/10/2013 at 16:27.

Commission mandated to promote and facilitate reconciliation and healing. To enforce this, a coalition of civil society organizations put together the Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG). The TJWG and other civil society groups highlighted proceedings, shortcomings and decisions taken by the commission and made this information available to citizens.⁶⁶

In several instances, governments have also worked alongside or supported the efforts of private mediators as peacemakers in African conflicts; for example, the world Council of Churches and All Africa Conference of Churches in the Sudanese negotiations of 1971-72. Unofficial mediators can at times contribute significantly to the negotiation process, communicating between the rival parties, clarifying misperceptions and misinformation, identifying points of contention, influencing preferences, recommending compromises and even helping to set agenda. Occasionally, the private mediator has tempted to act as catalyst in the mediatory process. For examples the Liberian Council of church, played a role in the negotiations between the government of the president Samuel doe and the national patriotic front of Liberia.⁶⁷

2.3 Third party intervention

2.3.1 Peace process

Debates have raged over the role of local, national, and international actors in conflict resolution and post- conflict strategies in Africa. It is indisputable that, for any conflict resolution strategy

⁶⁶ Atuobi S., "State-Civil Society Interface in Liberia's Post-conflict Peacebuilding" , Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC) *Occasional Paper no 30,2011*. <http://www.kaiptc.org/Publications/Occasional-Papers/>. Retrieved on 28/08/2013 at 11:46

⁶⁷ Godfrey, P.O, "Conflict management in Post- Cold War: The role of International Actors", in Nhema G. Alfred(ed), *The Quest for peace in Africa: Transformations, Democracy and Public Policy*, OSSREA, Addis Ababa, 2004. P 73-90.

to work, the various opposition forces must have confidence in the various mediation strategies and particularly those individuals and institutions that are involved in the process.

Third party intervention occurs when conflict goes beyond the resolution capacity of the direct disputants or warring parties to involve an external intervener (mediator, facilitator, observer, peacekeeping, or peace enforcement). Third parties bring additional resources, skills and perspectives to the conflict process and too often their presence rubs off and changes the relational structures, physical dynamics and the outcomes of the conflicts. In both theory and practice, the entire facilitative projects of conflict mediation, prevention, management, resolution, settlement and transformation are essentially a third party phenomenon.⁶⁸ Some peace agreements collapsed during the implementation or post agreement, peace- building phase. Agreements become possible when the contending interests, assisted by third party facilitators recognize that the existing forms of conflict are mutually destructive and show sensitivity toward each other's basic fears and wishes.⁶⁹ Also, civil society organizations and international organizations have become significant players in conflict situations because they are generally perceived as neutral actors and therefore assume a prominent role as mediators. In the case of Liberia conflict, civil society organizations acted without the consent of government in providing much needed services to affected communities and were engaged in the in diplomatic negotiations aimed at ensuring lasting peace. Apart from the role civil society played in the actual resolution of the conflict, NGOs and advocacy groups demonstrated against the war and

⁶⁸ Ibid

⁶⁹ Khalil M., "Conflict Resolution in Africa", *Journal of African Economies*. Vol.5? No9, 2000.p 15-21.

rejected certain provisions in peace agreements that sought to appease rebel groups by providing a certain quota for their representatives in transition governments.⁷⁰

Regional leaders negotiated Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi signed on 28th August 2000.⁷¹ This was later followed by the signing of a ceasefire agreement between the transition government of Burundi and the two rebel groups in October 2002.⁷²

In the case of Sudan conflict, IGAD has organized several meditative meetings which resulted in the consensus on the declaration of principles in which the conflicting parties namely the central government in Khartoum and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM/A), agreed on the principle and conditions for self determination for the South Sudan in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2005.⁷³ Similarly, IGAD has convened and taken part in a multiplicity of peace talks to resolve the conflict in Somalia.⁷⁴

Three major peace negotiations on the conflict of Sierra Leone took place, which resulted in the following agreements: the Abidjan Peace Agreement of 30 November 1996; the Conakry (ECOWAS) Peace Plan of 23 October 1997; and the Lomé Peace Agreement of July 1999.⁷⁵ In the Aftermath the hostilities in which ECOMOG troops suffered many casualties in January 1999, ECOWAS, together with the OAU and the UN, the UK, and the United States initiated

⁷⁰ Bloomfield, Barnes & Huyse *Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook*. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance Stockholm, 2005.

⁷¹ Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi (August 2000).

⁷² AU Communique(14 January 2003), Central Organ / MEC/Comm,LXXXVIII.

⁷³ Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2005

⁷⁴ Ghebremeskel, A., "Regional Approach to Conflict management Revisited: The Somali Experience", *Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 4,NO. (2), 2002.p 21-28.

⁷⁵ ADETULA,V.A.O., "The role of Sub- regional Integration Schemes in Conflict Prevention and Management: A framework of a Working Promotion of Peace System", in Nhema G.A. and Zeleza, P. Z (eds), *The Resolution of African Conflicts:The Management of Conflict Resolution & Post-Conflict Resolution*, James Carry ltd, london 2008.p 9-21.

series of diplomatic efforts aiming at opening a dialogue with the rebels. Negotiations between the government and the rebels resulted into the signing of Lomé Accord on 7 July 1999.⁷⁶

Many factors have undermined peace processes in different African conflicts. First, there are the so-called spoilers, that is, groups (including Signatories) who renege on their commitments or otherwise seek to undermine a peace accord by violence. Groups and individuals obviously sign peace accord for a variety of reasons, some of which are not favorable to peace.⁷⁷ According to Brahimi Report (2000), spoilers threw Angola, Sierra Leone, and Somalia back into war, and spoilers orchestrated the Murder of 800,000 Rwandese in 1994.⁷⁸ Second, and related to the first point, is the availability of alternative sources of income to parties in the conflict. The incentives to spoil peace accords are significantly greater when their alternative sources of income that pay soldiers, buy guns, enrich faction leaders. Third, neighboring countries can effectively spoil a peace accord if they allow free passage to conflict-supporting groups or individuals, if they provide bases for fighters, or if they serve as financial or political middle-man in the Conflict. Fourth, the sources of the conflict will affect the difficulty of the peace implantation. The sources can be related to economic issues, political, or environmental issues. Some of these issues are probably more open and subject than as such as resource needs, ethnicity or religion. Fifth, difficulties with peace implementation are related to the number of parties included in the conflict and the degree to which the goals of these parties diverge. The DRC conflict is an example with a high number of parties who have also strongly divergent aims. The worst case scenario is a situation with three or more parties of varying commitment to peace, with divergent

⁷⁶ Ibid

⁷⁷ Doken, k., *African Security Politics Redefined*, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2008.

⁷⁸ Brahimi Report(A/55/305 – S/2000/809),2000.

aims, with independent sources of income and arms. And with neighbors who are willing to buy, to sell and transit illicit goods.⁷⁹

2,3.2 Sub-regional and Regional responses

For its inception in 1945, the UN anticipated the involvement of regional/sub-regional arrangements for the international peace and security. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter acknowledges the importance of such groupings and urges members to seek pacific settlements of local disputes through such regional arrangements or such regional agencies before referring to the Security Council. In his ‘‘Agenda for Peace’’, Boutros-Ghali(1992) acknowledges the need for the need for cooperation with regional or sub-regional organizations arrangements.⁸⁰ In his report of 1998, the then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, maintained the view expressed by Boutros Ghali and emphasized that providing support for regional and sub-regional organizations is both necessary and desirable. A major reason why regional arrangements have considered suitable for military enforcement action is their geographical closeness the conflicts in which three supposed to intervene.⁸¹

The AU was established in 2002 with aim of responding effectively to the problems of contemporary Africa, including armed conflicts.⁸² To that end, it has put in a framework for managing peace and security in Africa. The creation of the AU was linked to the mixed success of the international mechanisms to guaranteeing peace and security in Africa in the late 1980s and 1990s. The centrality of peace and security to the AU is seen first in the organs and mechanism provided for decision making on peace and security and intervention actions. The

⁷⁹ Doken. K., *African Security Politics Redefined*, Palgrave MacMillan, New York 2008.

⁸⁰ Boutros Boutros Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, 1992.

⁸¹ Doken k, *African Security Politics Redefined*, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2008.

⁸² Au Constitutive Act, July 2000.

Peace Security Council (PSC) protocol provides that the PSC is a collective security and early warning arrangements to provide mandate mandates for missions as well as the rules of engagement.⁸³ The promotion of peace, security, and stability on the African Continent is a core objective of the African union- detailed in Article 3(f) of its Constitutive Act Constitutive Act. Although the principle of non-interference remained a stated principle of the organization,⁸⁴ The AU has now the right to' intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, as well as in instances of threat to legitimate order.⁸⁵

There is a new realization in Africa that , while the role of external actors is indeed laudable, Africa will rely increasingly on its own to provide long-term solutions to its own problem in the framework of its sub-regional groupings, and the African Union . It can be noted that what are lacking very often in the initiatives that are currently implemented by the AU are the financial resources and logistical support that are essential that the peacekeepers fulfill their mandate in an efficient and comprehensive manner. More resources would therefore be devoted by African leaders to their peacekeeping operations in the continents.⁸⁶

To solve a violent conflict, it is necessary to involve more than one country, even if the conflict has its epicenter in only one country. The necessity of more countries working together in conflict prevention and peace building is recognized by most African intergovernmental organizations.

⁸³ Protocol Relating to The Establishment of the peace and Security Council Of the African Union (2002), Art 7(1)

⁸⁴ AU Constitutive Act, July 2000, Art 4(g).

⁸⁵ Ibid, Art 4(h).

⁸⁶ Nehma G.(Ed), *The Resolution of African Conflicts: The Management of Conflict Resolution & Post-conflict Reconstruction*, James Currey, UK,2008.

In 1995, after the Genocide against the Tutsi, the OAU came up with an initiative for conflict prevention, management and resolution. However, this new mechanism did not include the possibility of intervention once a conflict broke out. As a result, this role was left to sub-regional organizations. This is the case of the sub-regional organizations that have undertaken a number of initiatives to maintain and consolidate peace, stability, and security within the region, such as ECOWAS in Liberia (1990), Sierra Leone (1997), and Guinea.⁸⁷

Despite the killings in Liberia, the international community failed to intervene. Instead, ECOWAS organized a military intervention to resolve the conflict. Although many deficiencies have been observed in this intervention, it also is a highly significant development. It reflects the first important effort by an African sub-regional organization to conduct military peacekeeping operations. This attempt to deal with the management of an African conflict without waiting for the United Nations response was an important development in the maintenance of regional security. Reports indicate that there was a poor coordination among the contingents' peacekeepers and the relation between Taylor and ECOMOG remained tense. He even launched a major offensive to capture Monrovia but ECOMOG decisively countered the attack and protected the capital city. Financial constraints were also one the main obstacle to success of ECOMOG's operations. Renewed crisis in Liberia made ECOWAS initiate a second peacekeeping operation in the Country. After the Comprehensive peace agreement was reached on August 18, 2003 the UNSC approved conversion of the ECOWAS mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) into a UN international stabilization force (UNMIL) from 1st October 2003.⁸⁸ The

⁸⁷ Francis D. *The politics of National Regionalism*.2002.http://www.igd.org.za/.../igd_occasional_paper_5...Retrieved on 06/11/2013 at 21:39.

⁸⁸ Omeje, C. K, „Understanding Conflict Resolution in Africa, in Francis J. David, *Peace &Conflict in Africa*, Zed Books Ltd, London 2008.p 73-90.

operations of ECOMOG within the framework of peace enforcement action allowed it to defend itself against aggression and to execute counter-offensive actions such as retaliatory expeditions against the national Patriotic front of Liberia.

In Sierra Leone, formal authorization of ECOWAS intervention was granted until three months after Nigeria intervened in August 1997. A war conducted in a foreign territory is viewed to be very difficult. Insufficient number of helicopters and trucks as well as weapons and ammunitions affected the outcomes of the operations. The combination of the shortcomings of ECOMOG and the lack of international commitment made it possible for the rebel forces to make their way back to Freetown in September 1998. ECOMOC was replaced by a UN mission in 2002.⁸⁹

ECOMOG also intervened in Guinea Bissau in reaction to a coup d'état in June 1998 with limited success. This was due to poor coordination and the mandate was not clear.⁹⁰

The origin, development and progressive expansion of IGAD have been linked to the need of concerted regional response to the environmental, political and developmental challenges of states within regional framework. The protracted civil conflict in Sudan and Somalia, Uganda and the Ethiopia-Eritrea civil war have since increasingly forced IGAD to develop and implement regional peace and security programs including early warning mechanisms and responses. Two major conflicts, those of Sudan and Somali have more than any greatly tested and challenged the initiatives and capacity of IGAD and the ability of its members to act independently.⁹¹. IGAD is confronted with the problem of lack of funds. None of the member

⁸⁹ Ibid p128.

⁹⁰ Ibid 174.

⁹¹ Ibid p 181

states is rich enough to provide support, in the sense that Nigeria supported ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

The creation in 1992 by the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) of a special conflict mechanism, the organ for politics, security and Defense, underscores the community's quest for regional peace.⁹² The SADC has authorized both of South Africa and Botswana to deploy their troops to Lesotho to quell a mutiny by country's defense forces and prevent chaos.⁹³ The joint intervention was able to quickly restore order and political stability in Lesotho.

In practice, the UNSC has legitimized the AU initiatives in peacekeeping operations through approval, commendation and strong support. The AU's success in responding to Africa's peace and security challenges depends on the effective discharging of its mandates.

The AU has tried to respond to urgent crises, such as those in Somalia, Darfur, South Sudan, Côte d'Ivoire, Madagascar, Darfur, Niger, albeit with varying degrees of success and pace. The AU plays a crucial role in Somalia with the deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and in Côte d'Ivoire as a mediator, among other interventions to maintain peace and security on the African continent. The African Union has done well in minimizing the number of victims in Darfur with its African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) troops and with UNAMID. The AMISOM has also made efforts to bring Somalia out of its

⁹² Makofo, K. F., *Conflict resolution in Southern Africa: Trading Democracy for Peace*, in Nhema G. Alfred (Ed), *The Resolution of African Conflicts: The Management of Conflict Resolution & Post-conflict Reconstruction*, James Currey, UK, 2008.

⁹³ Omeje C. K., *Understanding Conflict Resolution in Africa*, in Francis J. David, *Peace & Conflict in Africa*, Zed Books Ltd, London, 2008. p 73-90

⁹³ *Ibid* p135.

condition of statelessness.⁹⁴

The PSC authorized the deployment of AMISOM to support the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and was to provide support to the TFG institutions, to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance and create conducive environment to long -term stabilization and reconstruction of Somalia.⁹⁵ According the Secretary General' report, AMISOM has demonstrated its ability TFG institutions.⁹⁶

Recently, a decision of the PSC of the AU held on 19 July 2013 and the United Nations Security Council's Resolution 2017 (2013) of 5 December 2013 authorized the establishment and deployment of AU-led International Support Mission to the CAR (MISCA). France maintains a force of 1600 men in CAR while the AU peacekeeping force has a combined contingent of over 5,300, coming from Rwanda, Burundi, DRC, Chad and Cameroun.⁹⁷

2.3.3 United Nations

The UN underwent major changes since 2000 when it started to analyze its peacekeeping experience and introduce some reforms to strengthen its capacity to address the challenges to peacekeeping operations. This was as result of the complexity of the new missions where troops were required to deploy in wide areas and in a volatile situation such as the case of Darfur. In addition, peacekeepers were asked to operate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter without sufficient capabilities which would allow them to protect themselves and the civilians.

⁹⁴ AU PSC Report(2010).

⁹⁵ AU Communique(19 January 2007)/PR/Comm(LXIX)(8).

⁹⁶ UNSC, Report of the Secretary General on Somalia (" October 2009).

⁹⁷ UNSC Res 2017 (2013).

In its 1992 “An Agenda for Peace” , the Secretary-General recommended a greater role for regional organizations in peace-related activities.⁹⁸ The 1995 “Supplement to An Agenda for Peace” outlined the forms that cooperation between the UN and regional organizations was taking at the time in the context of maintaining peace: consultation, diplomatic support, operational support, co-deployment, and joint operations.⁹⁹ UNAMID is one of the latest and most articulate and developed examples of this cooperation between the UN between and a regional organization, the AU this instance. Cooperation with the AU has indeed become a priority for the U N in recent years.

The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is currently leading with over 120,000 personnel; including troops, police, and other military personnel (Experts). There are also about 17,000 civilian personnel and 2,000 UN 2,000 UN Volunteers from over 160 nations.¹⁰⁰

UN operations have been the foremost conflict management and resolution mechanism in Africa. The UN maintains 9 peace operations deployed in Africa. The peacekeeping role of the UN has varied. Norrie MacQueen (2006) demonstrates this diversity by classifying the different UN operations that have been completed in Africa according to the characteristics of the conflict and the political environmental context in which these operations have been deployed. First, there have been operation responding to failed or collapsed states, aiming at state capacity. Second , there have been operation responding to conflicts spurred by internal divisions and contested state legitimacy, where the state has come under challenge either from groups excluded from power within it or from the outside by other states or by their clients. Third, the UN has assisted in the conflicts spurred by decolonization and the transfer of power to post-colonial regimes.

⁹⁸ Boutros, B. G, An Agenda for Peace” (A/47/277 – S/24111), 1992.

⁹⁹ Supplement to An Agenda for Peace” (A/50/60 – S/1995/1), 1995.

¹⁰⁰ <http://www.rwandaun.org/>. Retrieved on 19/08/21013 at 18: 24.

Last, the UN has deployed operations in order to oversee and implement peace agreements after territorial disputes between states.¹⁰¹

The first UN operation in Africa was in Congo in 1960-64. The mission experience became a classic example of discrepancy between mandate and situation, and the problem encountered when a peacekeeping operation is deployed in the absence of peace to keep, a ceasefire to monitor, or a legitimate authority to grant consent to the operation.¹⁰² After the Collapse of UNSOM I (1992), UNISOM II was deployed in 1993. This mission ended in spectacular failure when the US withdrew its forces in October 1993 after the killing of 18 US rangers in unsuccessful attempt to capture one of the rebel warlords. This led prevented The UN from providing troops in African conflicts as it was observed during the genocide against Tutsi that took place in Rwanda 1994 when the UN failed to reinforce the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) despite the continuous request from the Force commander. It is argued that if a timely intervention had been decided, many people would have been saved.

For the first time, ECOWAS established ECOMOG sent troops to intervene in conflict in the 1990s. This intervention In Liberia was not successful, and the UN was eventually brought in. In 1992, a peace agreement known as the Cotonou Agreement was signed between parties, and The UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was deployed to oversee its implementation with ECOMOG. This was the first UN peacekeeping experiment in Africa alongside a regional organization¹⁰³.

¹⁰¹ <http://uk.linkedin.com/pub/norrie-macqueen/20/358/455>. Retrieved on 12/09/2013 at 1932.

¹⁰² Francis, D., "Linking Peace, Security and Developmental Regionalism: Regional and Economic Integration in Africa", *Journal of Peace and development*, Vol.2N03, 2006.

¹⁰³ Williams, z.T., Frost, D. and Thomson A.(eds), *Africa in Crisis: New Challenges and Possibilities*, Pluto Press, London, 2002.

Just as the UN assisted in postcolonial crises, so also the organization has been involved in managing decolonization process. It assisted in the independence of Namibia from South African rule. In Namibia, the United Nations Transition Assistance Group(UNTAG) was deployed with Specific mandate to assist the Namibian transition to independence and in the implementation of the peace agreement between the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), and South Africa. Deployed from 1989 to 1990, UNTAG was the first major peace support operation to be launched after the end of the cold war. UNTAG succeeded in monitoring the withdrawal of the South African Forces from Namibia, the disarmament of the SWAPO forces, and the return of refugees.

Only two interventions of the many peacekeeping ventures in Africa have been concerned with border disputes between sovereign states .These are between Chad and Libya over Aouzou Strip and between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The United Nation Aouzou Strip observer group oversaw the successful withdrawal in a short mission in May and June 1994. In 2000, after a ceasefire, the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) was deployed to form a buffer in the security zone between the countries. The UN presence provided a very effective and secure line of separation between the sides, and despite regular peaks of in tensions, there have been no return to war on the border.

The three operations – in Congo, Somalia, and Liberia alongside the UNASMSIL from October 1999-2005 and the MONUC now MONUSCO deployed in DRC from 2001 to date are the examples of peace operations that have taken place in the context of the ultimate challenge of Africa posed to the international system: the disintegration of the state as a viable Unit.

The UN peacekeeping missions are affected adverse way by the reluctance on the part of the western countries to commit their national troops in Africa under UN mandate. This emerged after the disastrous peacekeeping mission in Somalia in which American soldiers were killed by the militia leading to Washington's withdrawal of its forces as mentioned above. Some of the leading Western powers have resorted to a rather ambiguous mechanism of intervention in the conflict as lead nations independent of the UN mission. The trend has occurred with UK in Sierra Leone, France in Cote d'Ivoire, in Mali and recently in CAR, the US in Liberia, and the Joint France- Belgium operation in Ituri in the DRC.¹⁰⁴ The NATO intervention in Libya is viewed in the same context.¹⁰⁵

2.3.4 Rwanda involvement in peacekeeping operations

The new reform agenda and initiatives within the United Nations offer the space for renewed discussions on supporting peacekeeping and on the role of troop-contributing countries (TCCs).¹⁰⁶

The current conjuncture is particularly favorable for conducting an assessment of the involvement of Rwanda – a major troop-contributing country – in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Indeed, Rwanda currently contributes to seven UN peacekeeping missions with the deployment of 4,965 personnel as of end of December 2013 and Rwandan nationals have made the supreme sacrifice during their service, most notably in Darfur. Rwanda's commitment to


¹⁰⁴ ADETULA, V.O., *The role of Sub- regional Integration schemes in Conflict Prevention and Management: A Framework of a Working Promotion Of Peaces System*, in Nhema A.g. & Zeleza P.T(eds), *The Resolution of African Conflicts: The Management of Conflict and Post-conflict Reconstruction*, James Currey, UK, 2008.p 65-81

¹⁰⁵ Omeje C. K, *Understanding Conflict Resolution in Africa*, in Francis J. David, *Peace & Conflict in Africa*, Zed Books Ltd London, 2008.p 73-90

¹⁰⁶ Brahimi Report(A/55/305 – S/2000/809), 2000.

contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security is based on the firm belief that the international community has a responsibility to prevent conflict and act when confronted with challenges to peace and security. This principle is influenced by the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi and the failure of the international community to intervene.

Rwanda deployed its first peacekeepers to the AMIS in 2004. Today, Rwanda is the sixth Major Troop and Police Contributing Country (T/PCCs) in the UN, with over 4,000 troops, over 500 Police, and 13 Military Observers in seven UN Missions, including: UNAMID; the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS); the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH); the UN UNMIL); the UN Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA); the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI); and, the UN Integrated Peace-building Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS).¹⁰⁷



Source: DPKO (2012)

¹⁰⁷ <http://www.rwandaun.org/> Retrieved on 25/08/2013 at 15:38

Rwanda's main stake in peacekeeping lies with UNAMID, with approximately 3,200 troops, 225 Police, and 7 Military Observers.¹⁰⁸ Consequently The UN headquarters nominated Rwandans to senior posts in UNAMID during different periods. These include the Deputy Special Representative to the UN Secretary General, Force Commander, Deputy force Commander, Chief of staff(Force headquarters), Chief of Staff of the Police Component ,Chief of staff of the Ceasefire Commission, and Deputy Sector Commander, and Sector North Police Commander. In addition to these posts, two Rwandans were nominated to the posts of Force Commander and Police Commissioner in Mali and Cote d'Ivoire respectively. Rwanda also deployed 850 troops to UNMISS in early 2012 and contributed much needed military helicopters to the same mission.¹⁰⁹

Rwanda has deployed about 500 Police Officers deployed in MINUSTAH, UNMIL,UNOCI, UNAMID, MINUSMA, and UNMISS. Rwanda is today the third highest contributor of female police officers and the second highest African contributor of female police officers.¹¹⁰

In addition to the mandated tasks, Rwandan troops and police officers are involved in the Quick impact projects (QIPs), These include the construction of classrooms and health facilities in the training on the use of energy-saving stoves and organize communities works especially in Darfur and Darfur where they work in collaboration with other stake holders.

The pre-deployment training of the Rwanda peacekeepers is facilitated officers from the US Army under the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program run by the US Department of State. While opening a workshop on peacekeeping operations, Col. (Rtd)

¹⁰⁸ <http://www.un.org/>. Retrieved on 25/11/2013 at 14:11.

¹⁰⁹ <http://www.rwandaun.org/>.Retrieved 28/09/2013 at 21:05

¹¹⁰ Ibid

Timothy Rainey, said:” the Rwanda Defense Forces leave an outstanding reputation wherever they serve. Most times they are faced by huge challenges but they usually find a way of going about them.” He went ahead and said: “Recently after being informed on a very short notice they were still able to prepare and deploy in the Central African Republic (CAR) on time and that’s phenomenal.”¹¹¹

The RDF deployment in CAR follows a decision of the Peace and Security Council of the AU held on 19 July 2013 and the UNSC’s Resolution 2077 (2013) of 5 December 2013 which authorized the establishment and deployment of MISCA which is mandated to protect civilians, restore security and public order.¹¹² The deployment of the RDF in CAR comes at a time when Rwanda is marking the twentieth anniversary of the 1994 Genocide that claimed over one million Tutsi. No country understands the consequences of indecisiveness by the international community, especially when human lives are on the line, more than Rwanda. This is what makes Rwanda’s Peace Support missions in countries like CAR seem like a ‘natural’ reaction. It is also in observance of the ‘Responsibility to Protect Principle and the ‘Never Again’ vow.¹¹³

The UN Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson, speaking at an event in New York to mark the twentieth anniversary of the genocide against Tutsi noted:” When people are killed or violated in the name of religion, race or ethnicity, everybody’s humanity is diminished. We are all brutalized — victims and perpetrators as well as bystanders.¹¹⁴” He added: “the niggling question is what you do when you are ‘brutalized’, when your own humanity is diminished? He also said that history shows that the international community, under the umbrella of the UN,

¹¹¹ <http://www.mod.gov.rw/>.Retrieved on 25/01/2014 at 11:42

¹¹² UNSC Res 2077(5 December 2013)

¹¹³ <http://www.mod.gov.rw/>.Retrieved on 25/01/2014 at 11:42

¹¹⁴<http://www.allafrica.com/>Retrieved on 23/03/2014 at 19:46

chose to be bystanders, only to ‘plead guilty’ after the victims had already gone through the throes of gruesome death’’. He further noted :’I interprets the readiness of Rwanda to put its troops and police officers in harm’s way in countries like Sudan, Haiti, South Sudan, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau and Ivory Coast as a resolve not to be bystanders like the rest of the world was when the 1994 Genocide was unraveling in our own backyard. It is a fulfillment of the ‘Never Again’ vow and also said that the Rwandan troops have exhibited exemplary professionalism and discipline wherever they have been deployed.

The Director of the AU Peace and Security Department, Elghassim Wane, during his visit to the Rwandan peacekeepers base in Bangui, appealed to the Rwandan peacekeepers to share good practices, professionalism and discipline with their colleagues following the rescue of nearly 2,000 civilians. The Rwandan troops have since taken up more responsibilities, such as protecting top government officials, including the president and prime minister, as well as escorting convoys of essential humanitarian and commercial supplies from the Cameroon border to Bangui.¹¹⁵

2.3.5 Conclusion

Many African conflicts have their roots in domestic politics. However, most of the conflicts have a regional dimension. This makes a regional approach to the resolution of African conflicts imperative. The above considerations, and also the growing awareness in Africa that the pursuit of economic development by regional integration schemes is only possible under a peaceful atmosphere, have been at the base of the increased attention given to issues of peace and security by regional and sub-regional organizations. Both the UN and the AU have intervened in African

¹¹⁵ <http://www.allafrica.com>. Retrieved on 22/02/2014 at 19:25.

crises and have registered failures and successes. African countries are committed to peace and security in Africa. This was demonstrated by the role played by sub regions in African conflicts, particularly the involvement of African troops in the on-going conflicts in Somalia, Darfur, Mali and Central Africa Republic

Rwanda remains one the major troop and police contributing countries is currently serving in seven UN peacekeeping missions has the bulk of its troops in UNAMID where it is playing a key role in the restoration of peace in Darfur.

CHAPTER THREE

UNDERSTANDING THE DARFUR CONFLICT

3.1 Introduction

Since its independence, Sudan has suffered two civil wars between the central Government and the oil-rich south, each as bloody as today's crisis in the western region of Darfur. The North-South conflict, which killed over 2 million people and left 4.6 million homeless, pitted Christian rebels against the Muslim-dominated central Government in a fight over oil, land and political control.¹¹⁶ These conflicts can be attributed to the deeply rooted regional, political, and economic inequalities that have persisted throughout Sudan's colonial and post-colonial history. These inequalities are exemplified by the political, economic, and cultural hegemony of a small group of Arabic-speaking Sudanese elites who have held power and systematically marginalized the non-Arab and non-Muslim groups in the country's peripheries.¹¹⁷

The conflict that erupted in 2003 caused hundreds of deaths and left millions of homeless people. This situation attracted the African Union and the international community which became involved in a series of peace negotiations with subsequent deployment of the AMIS which later replaced by UNAMID.

¹¹⁶ <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/>. Retrieved on 23/09/2013 at 16:31

¹¹⁷ Kotze D., *Issues of Conflict Resolution*, African Journal on conflict Resolution,2(2). 77-98.
<http://www.ehistory.osu.edu> Retrieved on 18/10/2013 at 16:26.

Since the signing the Doha Peace Document in 2010 and Despite the deployment of UNAMID, isolated cases of atrocities, including killing of civilians, attack on peacekeepers continue.¹¹⁸

This chapter covers the first part of the case study. It gives a brief history of the Darfur region, highlights the root causes of the conflict, identifies the parties of the conflict and the international actors, and finally examines the development of the conflict.

3.2 Brief History of Darfur

Darfur was incorporated into British Egyptian Condominium in 1916. The British used the outbreak of the World War one to legitimize its conquest of the Sultanate of Darfur and amalgamate it within the Sudan. Although the population of Darfur is Islamic, the historical and the geographical separation of Darfur from Khartoum remains a reminder of the arbitrariness of the construction of colonial territories and the difficulties faced by post-colonial states engendering national integration.¹¹⁹ In 1820, the Egyptian led by Mohammad Ali Pasha, expanded southward conquering the Kingdom of Senna, which approximately covers the area of most of present day Central Sudan.¹²⁰ West of Senna was the Kingdom of Darfur which was invaded by the Egyptians but remained unconquered, except for a brief period from 1881-1883. During the Madhist interlude from 1883 until Sudan was re-conquered, Darfur retains its autonomy, within the Madhist state and Sultan Ali Dinar preserved its independence until the successful British invasion in 1956. The colonial conquest of Darfur and its subsequent

¹¹⁸ UNSG Report (15 January 2014) S/2014/26 <http://www.reliefweb.int/report/.../special-report-secretary-general-review> Retrieved on 11/01/2014 at 16:48.

¹¹⁹ Basil D. in the Black Man's Burden: *Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State*, Times Book, New York, 1992.

¹²⁰ Holt P.M, and Daly M.W, *A History of the Sudan: From the Coming of Islam to the Present Day*, Longman UK, London, fourth edition, 1988.

attachment to the Sudan was not followed by a real attempt to assimilate the province into the wider politics of the Sudan.¹²¹

The radicalization of identities in Darfur has its roots in the British colonial period. The British colonial 'divide and rule' policy (1899-1956), which divided Sudan along both geographical and ethnic lines to enhance central imposition of political and social orders, created a Sudan that is deeply divided between Muslim-Arab and the African blacks, and between North and South. These elements created the divisive, exploitive and discriminatory practices that provided the potential for ethnic and political clashes in both colonial and the independent Sudan state.¹²² As early as the late of 1920s the British tried to organize two confederations in Darfur: Arab and Black. Radicalization in Darfur is connected to racism. There were also fights over land, these conflicts therefore, could not be limited to ethnic conflicts. The land issue is related to the colonial system and the environmental degradation which led to conflict between the nomadic and the tribes with home-lands.

3.3. The root causes of the Darfur conflict

Environmental degradation, especially drought and the consequential desertification of northern Darfur are often presented as the underlying cause for increasing the scale and frequency of the conflict throughout the region.¹²³ The origin of the conflict can be found in the devastating famine that affected Sudan in 1987, which in turn was caused partly by a process of desertification of arable lands. The three provinces comprising of Darfur are largely inhospitable;

¹²¹ Bassil N. Noah, The Failure of the State in Africa: *The Case of Darfur*, Australian Quaterly, Vol.76, No.4, pp23-29,40,2004.

¹²² Williams Z. Tunde, Frost D. and Thomson A.(ed), *Africa in Crisis: New Challenges and Possibilities*, Pluto Press,2002.

¹²³ Bassil N. Noah, The Failure of the State in Africa: *The Case of Darfur*, Australian Quaterly, Vol.76, No.4, pp23-29,40,2004. Web

they range from the sand desert in the north to the savannah in the south. Other underlying causes of conflict include economic under development, widespread of illiteracy, and poor infrastructure. The existence of a weak Sudanese unable to exercise authority over much of the country created an opportunity structure for local actors to fill the vacuum. A struggle over energy was also integral to the conflict.¹²⁴ The conflict between pastoralists and agriculturalists over access to resources can be trace in the history of Darfur. The disputes that occurred in the Colonial and early post-colonial period though, seem to have been settled cooperatively and bloodshed minimized. However, this has all changed as recent times as result of the dismantling of the old order related to the land ownership with replacement of a viable system of governance.¹²⁵ Surprisingly, in a context of the historical and geographical, neither SLA nor JEM have argued for secession from Sudan and neither have they attempted to construct a framework for conflict resolution in Darfur that would that would undermine the territorial integrity of the Sudanese State. This suggests that the conflict in Darfur is not about national self-determination but predicated by determination for recognition within the national political structure.¹²⁶ In fact there is no evidence to support the claim that the Darfurians are agitating on the basis of difference of identity with the rest of Sudan, which perceives itself as Arab character.

In addition to internal conflicts, the instability has negatively impacted on the situation in Darfur. Some ethnic groups live in Darfur and Chad, which has made the conflict easier to spread across borders.¹²⁷ .

¹²⁴ <http://www.personhingered.com/> Retrieved on 08/09/2013 at 17:41.

¹²⁵ O'Fahey, R. *A Distant Genocide in Darfur*, <http://www.haverford.edu/relg/selles/reports/>. Retrieved On 25/09/2013 at 17:50

¹²⁶ De Waal A., "Dafur's Deep Greavances Defy all Hopes for an Easy Solution", *The Guardian*, 2004.

¹²⁷ Williams Z. T., Frost D. and Thomson A.(eds), *Africa in Crisis: New Challenges and Possibilities*, Pluto Press, London, 2002.

3.4. Parties to the conflicts and international actors

The Darfur conflicts erupted in February 2003 between the Sudanese Government and Arab Jan Janjaweed militias in the one hand and two rebel forces – the Sudanese Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/N) and the Justice Equality Movement (JEM) on the other. The number of warring parties increased over the years contributing to blurring picture and jeopardizing mediation attempts. These include the following:¹²⁸

- a. Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA/AW) led by Abdel Wahid Nur.
- b. SLA/AS led by Ahmed Abdel Shaafie, a breakaway faction from SLA/AW
- c. SLA/G19 (SLA/Unit) led by Khamees Abdalla. Khamees Abdalla has been the original leader of his group, but the group since split into several factions.
- d. SLA/MM defectors. These groups have defected from MINI MINAWI including those led by Salah Bob and Majzoub Hussein.
- e. Revolutionary Democratic Front Forces/Popular Forces Army (Rdff/PFA) led by Gibril Salah, an Arab rebel movement.
- f. National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRND) led by Gibril Abdelkarim Bari. This group broke away from in 2004.
- g. Sudanese Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA) led By Ahmed Diarige.
- h. National Redemption Front (NRF) led by Kharil Ibrahim. It is an alliance formed in Eritrea in June 2006. While initially effective as military alliance, it has yet to find any political cohesion.

¹²⁸ <http://www.standnow.org/.../STA>. Retrieved on 18/10/2013 at 15:40.

It is recognized that both Chad and Libya played an important role in the conflict of Darfur. This was observed during the civil wars in Chad in which Libya supported groups who used Darfur as a rear base and later in Darfur conflict, some factions were sheltered and supported by the same country.¹²⁹ The discovery of large oil fields in western and south Sudan led to heightened outside interest in the region especially on the part of Chinese corporations. Even as the humanitarian crisis deepened, Sudan experienced an investment boom by French, German, Swiss and Middle Eastern companies alongside Chinese ones. The international actors included also the United States, Russia, energy corporations, and the support of Arab states for Sudan's government.¹³⁰ The Sudanese leader's indictment was opposed by China, Russia, Arab League and Arab states and the non-alignment movement.

3.5. Development of the conflict

The Darfur conflict erupted in the region on February 26, 2003, when the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF) publicly announced an attack on Golo, the headquarters of Jebel Marra District. Some early warnings have indicated the imminent conflicts as rebels had attacked police stations and troops' on movement and the government had conducted air and assault in the mountains occupied by the rebels. The rebels succeeded in their operations when they attacked an army garrison on the mountain on February 25, and the government realized that there was a unified rebel group. Julie Flint and Alex de Waal (2006) state that the beginning of the rebellion is better dated to 21 July 2001, when a group of Zaghawa and Fur met in Abu Gamra and swore oaths on the Qur'an to work together to defend against government-sponsored attacks on their villages.¹³¹ The Darfur

¹²⁹ <http://www.origins.osu.edu/.../worlds>. Retrieved on 17/09/2013 at 16:19

¹³⁰ <http://www.pesonhinghered.com/> Retrieved on 17/09/2013 at 16:19

¹³¹ Flint J. and De Waal, A, *Darfur: A Short History of a Long War*, Zed Books, London, 2006,

conflicts erupted in February 2003 between the Sudanese Government and Arab Jan Janjaweed militias in the one hand and two rebel forces – the Sudanese Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/N) and the Justice Equality Movement (JEM) on the other. These rebels conducted a surprise attack on a sleeping Garrison in al-Fashir. This attack was followed by the destruction of the government bombers and gunships on the ground. And the killings of soldiers and pilots and captured others including the Air base commander, a Major General. The Sudan government had never a rebel's success of that nature during long-standing war in the South.¹³²

Reports indicate that By January 2005 more than 2 million persons had been displaced by the conflict.¹³³ The al-Fashir raid was a turning point, both militarily and psychologically. The armed forces had been humiliated by the al-Fashir raid and the government was faced with a difficult strategic situation. The Central government decided to construct a third party having Darfur credentials, a militia called Janjaweed which was full supported by Sudanese army. The better-armed Janjaweed quickly gained the upper hand. By the spring of 2004, several thousand people – mostly from the non-Arab population – had been killed and as many as a million more had been driven from their homes, causing a major humanitarian crisis in the region. The crisis took on an international dimension when over 100,000 refugees poured into neighboring Chad, pursued by Janjaweed militiamen, who clashed with Chadian government forces along the border.

The world's attention was attracted the humanitarian disaster in Darfur when about a quarter of a million people had died and close to 2 million other people had been displaced , a quarter of a

¹³² *ibid*

¹³³ UNSG Report (15 January 2014) S/2014/26 <http://www.reliefweb.int/report/.../special-report-secretary-general-review>-Retrieved on 11/01/2014 at 16:48.

million had become refugees in neighboring Chad. According to the World Health Organization, about 20 percent of the deaths were attributable to direct violence and 80 percent to drought related diarrhea.¹³⁴ The humanitarian agencies were unable to supply food and medical requirements. This was hampered by the government's operations.

Despite the deployment of UNAMID, the security situation remains volatile. Sporadic killings of civilian persist, ethnic clashes take place, attack on peacekeepers and humanitarian workers have been reported, the implementation of the peace agreement is slow.¹³⁵ The third party intervention in the conflict with emphasis on the role RDF in UNAMID will be examined in the next chapter of this study.

3.6 Conclusion

Various conditions have made the country ripe for conflict but also contributed to prolonging the war. Although, the security situation remains volatile, UNAMID has significantly reduced killings of innocent civilians. Both The UN and the AU closely monitor the evolution in the field and provide guidance to the mission accordingly. They also involved in the implementation of the Doha Peace Document, trying to bring together the parties to the conflict and peacekeepers are also involved in the reconstruction of the region.

¹³⁴ <http://www.pesonhinghered.com/> Retrieved on 17/09/2013 at 16:19

¹³⁵ UNSG Report (15 January 2014) S/2014/26 <http://www.reliefweb.int/report/.../special-report-secretary-general-review> Retrieved on 11/01/2014 at 16:48.

CHAPTER FOUR

THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION IN THE DARFUR CONFLICT

4.1 Introduction

Third party intervention can be of varying levels and take different forms such as discussions of the problem in international or bilateral forums, fact-findings, condemnations, mediation or conciliation, arbitration, and peacekeeping.¹³⁶ In the case of Darfur conflict, the third party intervened in the form of mediation and peacekeeping. Most conflicts that deserve the qualification of intractable are characterized by the absence of military solution. Consequently, the quest for peace most of time takes the form of a conflict resolution process based on negotiations, whose ultimate objective is to broker a sustainable peace agreement endorsed by all the warring parties.

In his report covering the period from 1October to 31December 2014, the U NSG states that intermittent clashes between government and armed movement forces, attacks on peacekeepers, resource-based inter-communal fighting and widespread banditry continued to place civilians at serious risk of physical violence.¹³⁷

The UN peacekeeping operations remain one of the international community's most effective tools to manage threats to international peace and security, but it is now at the crossroads. The year 2010 marked the tenth anniversary of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, also known as the Brahimi report. Operational demands on UN peacekeeping

¹³⁶ Rioux J.Sebastien, *Third Party Intervention as Conflict Management: The Case of Africa, 2003*. www.institutidrp.org. Retrieved on 18/09/2013 at 20:35

¹³⁷ UNSG Report (15 January 2014) S/2014/26 <http://www.reliefweb.int/report/.../special-report-secretary-general-review>-Retrieved on 11/01/2014 at 16:48.

continued to grow. As of 27 December 2013, the number of personnel serving in the 16 missions led by the DPKO reached 118,575 including 84,851 military personnel, police and 1,843 Military Experts on Mission (MEM). In addition, there are now 5,128 international civilian personnel, 11,694 local civilian staff and some 2,029 UN Volunteers from 122 nations¹³⁸. Faced by increasingly complex mandates and the deployment of peacekeeping troops in often harsh environment and under difficult conditions, the UN has been forced to reassess peacekeeping as a whole. The new reform agenda and initiatives within the UN offer the space for renewed discussions on supporting peacekeeping and on the role of TCCs. The current conjuncture is particularly favorable for conducting an assessment of the involvement of Rwanda – a major troop-contributing country – in the UN peacekeeping operations particularly the role of RDF in UNAMID. This chapter briefly identifies the peace processes in the Darfur conflict, gives an overview of UNAMID and examines the role of RDF in UNAMID as a case study.

4.2 Peace process.

In 2004, Chad brokered negotiations in N'Djamena, leading to the April 8 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement between the Sudanese government, the JEM, and the SLA. One group which did not participate in the April cease-fire talks or agreement – the National Movement for Reform and Development — splintered from the JEM in April. Janjaweed and rebel attacks continued despite the ceasefire, and the AU formed a Ceasefire Commission (CFC) to monitor its observance. The Darfur peace Agreement was signed between the Government and the faction of The SLA led by Minni Minawi on 26 May 2005. Another faction of SLA led by Abdul

¹³⁸ *Fact sheet as of 31 December 2013.* [Http:// www.un.org](http://www.un.org) › Home › Resources › Statistics. Retrieved on 15/11/ 2013 at 16:18

Wahid al Nur JEM did not sign as expected.¹³⁹. Several regional and international actors were involved in the peace process and witnessed the signing of the agreement. These include the African Union, the UN, the US, the UK, the EU, the Arab League and Nigeria as host.¹⁴⁰ Following the violations of the ceasefire and the failure of the implementation of the DPA, new peace talks were initiated in Sirte but were boycotted by the most important rebel groups.¹⁴¹ In 2009, the African Union established a High Level Panel on Darfur, headed by the former South African President Thabo Mbeki. This brought another vision for peace, namely a round-table process of negotiation, involving all stakeholders including non-belligerents (traditional leaders, civil society, women, and political parties), leading to a global political consensus on all the issues facing Darfur and its position within Sudan. Possibly this is the most distinctively “African” solution: it conjures up the image of settling an issue by discussion under a tree¹⁴².

In parallel, the Joint UN-AU Chief mediator led a process, hosted by the Government of Qatar, which had two additional visions of peace. The first of these was a deal among the fighting men: a classic elite political settlement including an amnesty for all. The assumption was that if the main belligerents reached a deal, then the rest would follow. This is not an agreement as such, rather the “Doha Document for Peace in Darfur,” that provides benchmarks against which the Sudanese government’s performance can be assessed, incentives for the rebels to join, funds for rehabilitation and development activities, and an implementation plan that rests heavily on the AU-UN peace support mission in Darfur.¹⁴³ The Doha Document was signed by the

¹³⁹ Kessler, Glenn and Emily Wax, “Sudan, Main Rebel Group Sign Peace Deal”, the Washington Post, May 2006.

¹⁴⁰ Uppsala Conflict Data Program , Conflict, Sudan, 2010.

¹⁴¹ *Struggle to salvage Darfur talks*, Sudan Tribune ,October 2007..

¹⁴² *ibid*

¹⁴³ *ibid*

Government of the Sudan, the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) and the Justice and JEM in July 2011.¹⁴⁴ However, all those peace initiatives failed and the signatory parties to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur(DDPD) made limited progress towards its implementation according to the UNSG report¹⁴⁵

4.3 UNAMID overview

In August 2004, the African Union sent 150 Rwandan troops in to protect the ceasefire monitors as part of AMIS. This force was not sufficient and later Nigeria deployed a contingent of same numbers. This action of the African Union was commended by the UNSC in the resolution 1564¹⁴⁶. In April 2005, AMIS was increased to about 7,000 and became AMISII.¹⁴⁷

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN, the Security Council, by its resolution 1769 of 31 July 2007 decided that UNAMID is authorized to take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities in order to:

- a. Protect its personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its own personnel and humanitarian workers;
- b. Support early and effective implementation of the DPA, prevent the disruption of its implementation and armed attacks, and protect civilians, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁴ Doha Document for peace in Darfur(July 2011).

¹⁴⁵ UNSG Report (15 January 2014) S/2014/26 <http://www.reliefweb.int/report/.../special-report-secretary-general-review>-Retrieved on 11/01/2014 at 16:48.

¹⁴⁶ AU Report (June 2005).

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ UNSG Res 1769(2007).

The Mission has encountered two of the major political obstacles through its deployment: the persistence of an ongoing conflict with no real peace to keep as the Darfur peace agreement was only signed by one rebel group in Darfur that later fragmented, and the continued lack of consent on the part of the Khartoum Government. This difficult political environment then had an impact on the operations of UNAMID as such.

There were three main interrelated problems that plagued UNAMID: a slow deployment as figure 2 below illustrates, a limited operational capability and problems with field support.




Figure 2: Deployment of UNAMID personnel from November 2007 until April 2011

The figure 10 above clearly shows that the Rwandan troops were among the first peacekeepers deployed on the field of operations in January 2008. The four Rwandan battalions were thus tasked to uphold the mission’s mandate with very limited means in a very large geographical area. The facts that Rwandan peacekeepers had, in reality, no peace to keep meant that there

were deployed in a very unstable and unsafe environment. Several armed groups targeted them, leading to the death of a number of Rwandan nationals.

Indeed, the difficulties linked to the slow deployment illustrated above were compounded by limited operational capabilities and the fact most of the existing African battalions in Darfur and those poised to deploy did not meet UN standards of ‘self-sustainability’.¹⁴⁹ Concretely, the military contingent-owned equipment capabilities of the units in Darfur were a challenge as some contingents remain critically under-equipped and do not meet the desired serviceability and self-sustainment standards as required under the approved contingent-owned equipment manual.¹⁵⁰ When it comes to the implementation of its mandate to restore a stable and secure environment throughout Darfur, UNAMID has often not been able to respond effectively to incidents of tension or conflict because of restrictions on movement imposed by the Government of the Sudan and an absence of military aviation assets, most notably of 18 medium-lift helicopters, that remains a critical gap in operational capability,¹⁵¹ even though the limitations imposed on the freedom of movement of UNAMID are contrary to the Status of Force Agreement.

UNAMID continued to have problems with field support with long logistics and communications lines in a very harsh and arid environment. The second one is a much broader issue that has a direct impact on the safety and security of peacekeepers. Indeed, peacekeepers are increasingly “sent to address complex and ongoing intrastate conflicts where peace agreements are weak or non-existent, consent does not come easily and peacekeepers are tasked to use force to protect

¹⁴⁹ *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations*, Center on International Cooperation, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder & London, 2010 .

¹⁵⁰ UNSG Report (S/2010/543).

¹⁵¹ *Ibid* p.68.

civilians and extend the authority of fledgling or contested governments. Such operations contexts demand substantial resources, both human and logistical, and even more importantly, firm political foundations from which to operate.”¹⁵² All these are crucial elements that appear difficult to harness in recent years.

As at 27 December 2013, the strength of UNAMID civilian personnel stood at 93 per cent of the approved strength of 4,369 (2,920 national staff, 1,032 international staff and 417 United Nations Volunteers). The strength of UNAMID military personnel stood at 14,779.¹⁵³




Figure3: Troop Contribution to UNAMID

¹⁵² *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2010*, Center on International Cooperation, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder & London, 2010,.

¹⁵³ UNSG Report (15 January 2014) S/2014/26 <http://www.reliefweb.int/report/.../special-report-secretary-general-review> Retrieved on 11/01/2014 at 16:48.

The figure 3 above shows that most of the TCCs are African countries. The hybrid operation focuses on the protection of civilians, the facilitation of full humanitarian access and the return of refugees and IDPs to their homes. Despite the challenges which include the environmental conditions, the attacks on peacekeepers and humanitarian workers, inadequate logistic support especially the lack of utility helicopters, UNAMID peacekeepers have significantly improved the situation on the ground. First, their physical presence in different parts of the region has limited the threats to civilians on one hand and by the armed groups on the other. Second, they are able to carry out night patrols as opposed to how AMIS forces were conducting their operations. Increase in both numbers and frequency of day and night patrols have prevented attacks on civilians and other criminal activities and facilitated humanitarian access. Third, with the introduction of the concept COE, the majority of the UNAMID troops have been able to comply with the UN standards and therefore improved their operational readiness.

4.4 Role of RDF in UNAMID

The involvement of Rwanda in peacekeeping is first a constitutional obligation to participate in the settlement of international peace and security¹⁵⁴. It is also based on a moral duty motivated by its responsibility in the international community, influenced and shaped by Rwanda's recent history, the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. As such, Rwanda is a unique example of how a country, having emerged from genocide, can negotiate a peaceful transition based on its own conflict resolution techniques and its own vision of meaningful and enduring development. Other underlying motives include the Rwanda's intention to expand her military diplomacy and professionalize her defense force¹⁵⁵. This section examines the pre-deployment training, the

¹⁵⁴ Rwanda Constitution (2003)

¹⁵⁵ *Speech of the of Rwanda Minister of Defense, 2011*, www.mod.gov.rw. Retrieved on 28/09/2013 at 17:24.

operational readiness, Commander's leadership, the Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and further illustrated the performance of the RDF with examples.

4.4.1 Pre-deployment training

RDF has a peacekeeping training centre which delivers pre-deployment training for units selected for peacekeeping operation. In order to succeed in a peacekeeping mission, troops are required to undergo a pre-deployment training. This training focuses to the specific mission and aims at orienting the operational readiness of the troops. This brings the required skills and knowledge especially related the authorized equipment. On several occasions, the reports of the UN pre-deployment inspection teams indicate that RDF troops' training meets the required standards. In the inspection report, the UN team noted: 'the battalions are well trained, well led and motivated and are ready to deploy'.¹⁵⁶ The team requested the RDF battalions to demonstrate a range of selected tactical and logistical based exercises. These demonstrations, which were arranged at short notice, confirmed the battalions 'capabilities had the necessary core skills. With regard to the combat power, the mindset of the RDF soldiers is highly tuned to the complexities, nuances and conflicting demands of modern peacekeeping operations. The team noted high levels of competence. Safe weapons handling, accurate shooting and fire control discipline were clearly evident. With regard to force preparation, good use has been made of officers with recent operational experience in Darfur; following tours of duty they have been posted into the RDF training community so that they can pass on the benefit of their experience

¹⁵⁶ UN team pre-deployment report, 2008.

to those who are about to deploy. The team further observed that the battalions are well equipped and possess the overall capacity to operate effectively in Darfur.¹⁵⁷

Ambassador Eugène Richard Gasana, Rwanda's Permanent Representative to the UN, expressing support for assessing pre-deployment training during the 6987th Security Council meeting, said that his country 'defense had invested heavily in different training opportunities.'¹⁵⁸

4.4.2 Operations

During the period from 1 October to 31 December 2013, The UNSG reported that UNAMID military personnel conducted 9,806 patrols, including 5,478 routine patrols, 2,070 night patrols, 733 administrative patrols, 638 humanitarian escorts, 624 short-range patrols and 263 long-range.¹⁵⁹ Being the leading force in UNAMID, Rwanda contingent successfully conducted the highest number of operations covering the widest area of operation. Since its deployment in UNAMID, Rwanda peacekeepers have successfully executed its mandated tasks and effectively responded to aggressor's attacks. This does not mean that every success of UNAMID is due to RDF actions only because their operations are limited to their area of responsibilities and other contingents have recorded some good achievements.¹⁶⁰

4.4.3 Serviceability and Self-sustainment

T/PCCs contribute equipment to the UNAMID to assist in accomplishment in their assigned tasks. The UN reimburses/PCCs for the use of the equipment- Contingent-owned equipment (COE)-at rates established by the UN General Assembly and specified in the memoranda of

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ 6987th Security Council Meeting (26 June 2013)

¹⁵⁹ UNSG Report (15 January 2014) S/2014/26 <http://www.reliefweb.int/report/.../special-report-secretary-general-review>-Retrieved on 11/01/2014 at 16:48.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

understanding(MoUs) established by the UN and the T/PCCs.¹⁶¹

As of 27 December 2013, regarding the operational capabilities of troop and police contingents, 29 of the 44 military and police units currently deployed to UNAMID have a major equipment serviceability rate below the 90 per cent threshold. Furthermore, the equipment serviceability of several units has declined so that five are now at or below 44 per cent. The shortfalls, which pertain mainly to the serviceability of armored personnel carriers, continue to undermine the effectiveness of UNAMID. In the area of self-sustainment capabilities, only 5 out of 44 units fully meet the requirements stipulated in the relevant memoranda of understanding. For RDF units, the equipment serviceability has remained above 95 percent since UNAMID was established. Similarly, the self- sustainment is reported to be of the same percentage. These standards are a result of a sound maintenance strategy that was put in place by RDF Headquarters which ensures that unserviceable equipment is repaired or replaced in timely manner, hence the operational readiness is guaranteed.¹⁶²

4.4.4 Quick impacts projects

As part of the Mission strategy to assist in the development of Darfur, UNAMID funds QIPs that are implemented by local partners in various localities in Darfur. During the reporting period, a total of 22 QIPs were completed; 56 additional projects are ongoing and at various stages of completion. A total of 67 new projects were approved for implementation.¹⁶³ Specific projects were implemented by RDF contingents at their own expenses. These include construction of classrooms, health facilities and improved cooking stoves. The latter is very is very important as it offers a solution to a certain extent, to the scarcity of fire wood which is a result of the

¹⁶¹ <http://www.un.org> / Retrieved on 06/02/2014 at 14:50.

¹⁶² Equipment verification report, September 2013.

¹⁶³ UNSG Report (15 January 2014) S/2014/26 <http://www.reliefweb.int/report/.../special-report-secretary-general-review>-Retrieved on 11/01/2014 at 16:48.

environmental degradation. In addition the (QIPs), the RDF contingents introduced the community works, commonly called ‘*Umuganda*’ in Rwanda which include among others, cleaning and construction of houses. These home grown initiatives bring together many people for mutual support, thus help gain hearts and minds of the local population.

4.4.5 Leadership

Few months after the deployment of the first Rwanda contingent, the President of the Republic of Rwanda, Paul Kagame visited the troops on ground in Darfur¹⁶⁴, an initiative which is rarely undertaken by very very important personalities from the troops contributing countries. This is a manifestation of good leadership and government strong support to peacekeeping particularly to its peacekeepers. This visit was followed by that of RDF Chief of Defense Staff and regular visits are conducted by senior staff officers from RDF headquarters with a view of ascertaining operational readiness of the troops and discuss challenges they are facing in the mission area.

An effective leadership of peacekeeping missions’ is a great factor for the success of all peacekeeping operations. The UN missions are required to optimize the scarce resources and also motivate the peacekeepers; they ensure coordination and emphasize on team work at the strategic level as well as at the operational level; and they are also involved in the state and peace building in multidimensional approach. This new set up requires a dedicated leadership of the senior leaders. The reputation of the UN will be a result of a leadership grounded with integrity and competence. The individual leadership qualities of the team are of importance but they have to complement each other at all levels and in different operations. In his letter appointing the current UNAMID Force Commander, the UNSG expressed his deep appreciation to Lieutenant General Nyamvuba, a Rwandan General and Mission Leadership Team member for his

¹⁶⁴ [Http://mod.gov.rw/news-detail/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=1757&cHash](http://mod.gov.rw/news-detail/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=1757&cHash). Retrieved on 03/12/2013 at 18:48.

dedication and invaluable service during his tenure in UNAMID.¹⁶⁵ RDF generals and senior officers were nominated to senior posts in UNAMID during different periods including, the Deputy Commander and the force Commander and other senior staff officers. Currently, the post of Force Chief of Staff and the Chief of Staff of the Ceasefire commission are held by RDF senior officers. They displayed good leadership, exercised effective command and Control over all UNAMID military personnel.

4.4.6 Statements on the role of RDF in UNAMID

The role of the RDF in UNAMID was emphasized by the UN authorities, Rwanda Government and others senior officials from different countries. The UN Under Secretary-General Jan Eliasson, speaking at an event in New York to mark the twentieth anniversary of the Genocide against the Tutsi noted: "I interpret the readiness of Rwanda to put its troops and police officers in harm's way in Countries like Sudan, Haiti, South Sudan, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau and Ivory Coast as a resolve not to be bystanders like the rest of the world was when the 1994 Genocide was unraveling in our own backyard". He further said that it is a fulfillment of the 'Never Again' vow and that the Rwandan troops have exhibited exemplary professionalism and discipline wherever they have been deployed.¹⁶⁶ In March 2011, Rwabatt25 troops were awarded UN/AU medal. The ceremony was presided over by Mohamed Yonis, the Deputy Joint Special Representative (DJSR) and UNAMID Force Commander Lt Gen Patrick Nyamvumba. In his speech, the Deputy joint Special Representative (DJSR) appreciated this unit and other Rwanda battalions for their commitment, hard working and maximum cooperation with the

¹⁶⁵ USG Report,SG/A/1410, BIO/4477, PKO/352.

¹⁶⁶ [Http://mod.gov.rw/news-detail/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=1757&cHash](http://mod.gov.rw/news-detail/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=1757&cHash).Retrieved on 03/12/2013 at 18:48.

Darfurians and other UNAMID members and Lieutenant General. Patrick Nyamvumba, the Force Commander also thanked them for their discipline and hard work.¹⁶⁷

In the letter of appreciation dated 19 March 2014 addressed to the Rwanda Contingent Commander in Darfur, Lieutenant General Paul Mella, the UNAMID Force Commander said: ‘I wish you to congratulate you and your battalion for the courageousness and gallantry acts of performance by one of your patrols. It demonstrated extraordinary skills and fought bravely in protecting their lives and UN property in line with the rules of engagements’. He further wrote: ‘the successful repel of such attacks can be attributed to your good leadership that trickles down to your soldiers. It is against this background that UNAMID appreciated your good initiative and leadership qualities.’¹⁶⁸

In the congratulatory note to one of the Rwandan battalion commanders dated 19 March 2014, Lieutenant General Paul Mella, the UNAMID Force Commander wrote: ‘I congratulate you and your battalion for the exemplary acts of good performance and devotion to duty. This was clearly demonstrated by your officers, men and women of your unit during the inter-tribal clashes between Abbala and Gimir from 04 March to 07 March 2014 in Salaf Umra despite some serious challenges and some logistic constraints’. He further noted; ‘Your timely response by your presence and sending reinforcement in managing the crisis is highly appreciated.’¹⁶⁹ During the clashes the Rwandan battalion performed a number of actions to contain the situation and these include the protection of the civilians and the mediation which led to the signing of Ceasefire Agreement between the tribes in conflict. The clashes led to about 100,000 internally displaced

¹⁶⁷ <http://www.africadefensejournal.wordpress.com/.../.30 March 2011>). Retrieved on 12/11/2013 at 14: 52.

¹⁶⁸ Letter of Appreciation, UNAMID/FHQ/FC/01/12. 19 March 2014.

¹⁶⁹ Congratulatory note, UNAMID/FHQ/FC/01/12. 19 March 2014.

persons (IDPs) who camped in the vicinity of the battalion team site. Tribal clashes are one of the threats to UNAMID's efforts at protecting civilians. This is because if these clashes erupt, the population is displaced and the only place to seek protection in UNAMID bases.

Following the commendable actions of the RDF units, the Force headquarters commented: 'Even though guidelines for the physical protection of civilians have been issued to team sites, the success of its implementation rests with various team sites. The SARAF UMRA incident provides valuable lessons regarding the protection of civilians. The Rwanda team site adhered to guidelines on the protection the civilians issue recently when about 100,000 displaced people sought protection at the team site in the Aftermath of the tribal clashes between the ABBALA and the GIMIR tribes of 07 March 2014.'¹⁷⁰ It further requested the Sector headquarters to come up with lessons learnt so that they can be shared with other team sites to serve as guidance in the event that they face similar situation in the future.

In an exclusive interview with *The New Times Rwanda*, the Sudanese ambassador to Rwanda, Salah A.S Elgunied said: 'Rwanda is an active nation in peacekeeping, and we do appreciate the positive role of the Rwandan contingent in Darfur, because they have been very professional and doing their work in a manner that is appreciated by the local community and the government of Darfur.'¹⁷¹

The pre-deployment training of the Rwanda peacekeepers is facilitated officers from the US Army under the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program run by the US Department of State. While opening a workshop on peacekeeping operations, Col.(Rtd)

¹⁷⁰ FHQ Letter, lessons Learnt, 22 March 2014.

¹⁷¹ Godwin,C.,Exclusive Interview with Ambassador of Sudan,**New Times, Rwanda, November 2013**

Timothy Rainey, said:” the RDF leave an outstanding reputation wherever they serve. Most times they are faced by huge challenges but they usually find a way of going about them”.¹⁷²

The former RDF Chief of Defense Staff (now the Minister of Defense), General James Kabarebe has commended the performance of RDF in peacekeeping operation in Sudan’s conflict-torn Darfur region. Addressing the peacekeepers, he said that Rwanda is proud of the work being done by the peacekeeping mission and added that RDF peacekeepers are successfully restoring peace in the troubled region of Sudan. He remarked that the RDF has achieved global prominence in a very short time because of discipline and commitment especially in their excellent performance in Darfur.¹⁷³

The UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon went to Rwanda after President Paul Kagame threatened to end participation in a joint UN/African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur because of a controversy over alleged atrocities in the neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo. The head of DPKO, Alain Le Roy told reporters that President Kagame, who was in New York that week to attend the UN General Assembly’s annual gathering of world leaders, confirmed that Rwandan troops would stay in Darfur and he said: “We are extremely pleased by the decision.”¹⁷⁴

Rwanda contingent is operating in a mission which is still facing many challenges. According to the UNSG report stated above, UNAMID movement were regularly obstructed and access to some areas was restricted. Safety and security of peacekeepers were compromised as attacks on

¹⁷² www.mod.rw

¹⁷³ Ibid

¹⁷⁴ Reuters . mg.co.za/.../2010-09-25. Retrieved on 05/12/2014.

them were perpetrated. On seven occasions, troops were attacked resulting into four deaths. Government authorities denied flight requests on several occasions. The restrictions tended to be imposed by government security officials on movements in areas of ongoing or recently concluded hostilities between government and armed movement forces. This brings to 16 the number of peacekeepers killed in hostilities in Darfur in 2013 and to 57 the number killed since UNAMID was deployed in 2008.¹⁷⁵

4.5 Conclusion

Rwanda is the leading troop contributing country to UNAMID and was the first country to deploy peacekeepers in the war-torn region of Darfur. RDF units maintain high levels of serviceability of contingent-owned equipment and self-sustainment, key determinants of the operational readiness. Despite the challenges they are facing in the mission they are hailed for their discipline and good performance. However the conflict persists due to various reasons. RDF contingents managed to successfully execute their mandated tasks in their area of operations. However failure was observed in some areas controlled by other units. In addition, there is a slow implementation of The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur coupled with ceasefire violations by the parties to the conflicts and some of them did not sign the peace document. Insufficient logistical support especially the limited number of aviation assets remain a serious challenge.

¹⁷⁵ UNSG Report (15 January 2014) S/2014/26 <http://www.reliefweb.int/report/.../special-report-secretary-general-review>-Retrieved on 11/01/2014 at 16:48.

CHAPTER FIVE

ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS ON THE THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION IN THE DARFUR CONFLICT

5.1 Introduction

There are various approaches to conflict management. When a conflict breaks out, the third party will be in different forms. In the case of Darfur conflict the intervention has been of varying levels and has taken different forms. Mediation process reached a ceasefire agreement, followed by the deployment of a peacekeeping mission and the peace agreement was facilitated by several actors and signed by some of the parties to the conflict. Described as non inclusive agreement, the DPA was not implemented as planned, each party playing a role that negatively impacted on the outcome of the intervention. The initial peacekeeping mission, AMIS was replaced by a UN mission, UNAMID with a big size of troops and more resources. Subsequent peace initiatives that took place in different locations and coordinated by different actors culminated into the signing of the DDPD whose implementation is also facing challenges.

This chapter evaluates the peace processes that were undertaken since the beginning of the Darfur conflict, examine the involvement of the UNAMID peacekeepers and further analyzes the role of RDF in the management of the Darfur conflict.

5.2 Peace process

The outcome of a peace process is considered as a function of the conflict resolution techniques employed. The significance of the conflict situation to which the techniques are either applied or are not systematically taken into account, downplayed, or even completely neglected.

The AU played a big role in bringing together the parties to the conflict. The Chadians were accused of impartiality and limited experience in mediation. During the mediation of the ceasefire in September 2003, the President Chad favored of the Government of Sudan and the agreement proposed a peacekeeping mission with no clear mandate as the issue of the protection of civilian was not addressed.¹⁷⁶ Following the ceasefire violations, the African Union replaced the Chadians in the negotiations. However, the continental organization's mediators were also unable come up with an effective negotiation process. The evolution of the conflict showed that Chad could not be a credible mediator as it was supporting some of the rebel groups and subsequently entered into conflict with the Sudan government.

Different factors contributed to the Darfur peace process. These include lack of trust between the parties to the conflict, the incompetence of the mediators, limited representation in the negotiations, the proliferation of the rebel groups, and the power and resource-sharing issues that were not adequately addressed in the DPA.

¹⁷⁶ Julian Thomas Hottinger, "The Darfur Peace Agreement: Expectations Unfulfilled." <http://www.c-r.org/accord.../darfur-peace-agreement-ex...> Retrieved on 15/01/2014 at 15:55.

Mutual trust is an important contributing factor to the outcomes of the negotiations that can lead to a sustainable peace agreement. If there is mutual trust, the parties to the conflict will encourage negotiating and compromising towards fruitful negotiations. During the Darfur peace process, it appears that there was lack of trust between the Government of Sudan and the rebels has been. This impacted on the on the negotiations effort in N'Djamena and during the subsequent negotiations of Abuja.¹⁷⁷ Furthermore, Khartoum has continuously violated the ceasefire agreements and the government could only negotiate under the pressure of the international community.

Mediators and external factors contribute greatly to the success or failure of a peace process. The strategies applied may sometimes influence positively or negatively the outcome of the negotiations. It appears that the mediators seek focus more on a short-term solution. The mediators of the Darfur peace process are accused to be incompetent and could not address the root causes of the conflict. This led to the collapse of the Abuja negotiations.¹⁷⁸

Any peace process has to be inclusive. In most cases of the civil war, a peace process which excludes some stakeholders cannot reach a comprehensive agreement. The parties that are not involved in the negotiations of a peaceful agreement likely become spoilers and the peace process is not sustainable. It is argued that if one the rival parties doubts of its security after the signing of the agreement, chances to spoil that agreement will be high.¹⁷⁹ From the beginning of the Darfur peace process, all the rebels have never been represented and those who were not

¹⁷⁷ Laurie Nathan, "Failings of the DPA," *Conciliation Resources* (2006), <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sudan/dpa-failings.php>. Retrieved 19/10/at 15;34.

¹⁷⁸ *ibid*

¹⁷⁹ Laurie Nathan, "No Ownership, No Peace: The Darfur Peace Agreementt." <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sudan/dpa-failings.php>. Retrieved 19/10/at 15;34.

brought on board later acted as spoilers by attacking civilians, humanitarian workers and the AU peacekeepers. This situation remains a big challenge to peace and security of the region.

In the intrastate conflict, power and resource-sharing, security requirements appear to be the main pillars of negotiations process and if there are not addressed a durable peace cannot be obtained. These issues not well talked in the case of Darfur conflict and as results, the security situation deteriorated after the signing of the DPA.

The case of Darfur is not the only one where peace agreements were broken. Three peace agreements failed in Sierra Leone, however this did not prevent from reaching the settlement of the conflict. The Arusha Peace Agreement between the government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front had given hope to the restoration of peace in Rwanda and to the return of refugees after 30 years in exile; instead a state- sponsored genocide was planned and claimed about one million lives. This is a clear indication that the government of Rwanda was not ready to implement the agreement. In the contrast, the 2003 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation agreement between the government of Burundi and the rebel movement is considered to be success. Similarly, in the case of Mozambique a peace accord - the Rome Agreement - was achieved between the RENAMO and FRELIMO in 1992 and the war came to an end after two years. In the contrast, in Angola, two peace agreements in 1991 and 1994 were concluded in order to terminate the war between the government, the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), and the insurgents, the Uniao Nacional para Independência Total de Angola (UNITA). The country relapsed into full-scale war after a brief period of negative peace.

The AU, the UN, the mission leadership and the mediators should monitor closely the implementation of the Doha Peace Document and enforce it where possible. This is one the key pre-condition to the restoration of peace and security in Darfur.

5.3 Involvement of UNAMID

Experience has shown a delay in intervention in conflicts that required a quick response. This is due mainly to lack of political will of the UN/UN member states, bureaucracies or financial constraints, especially of the regional and sub-regional organizations.

In the case of Darfur conflict, the Au made diplomatic effort to bring the international community and the major powers on board to stop the killings; however this effort did not bear fruits. AMIS was established one year later after conflict erupted in 2003. Although the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda had led the UN to rethink about how it could prevent such atrocities or manage war crimes if they were committed. However, similar situation occurred one decade later again in the Horn of Africa. A set of questions need to be answered: Why the international community did remained silent? What the essence of the responsibility to protect? What is the relevance of the slogan ‘‘ Never Again’’ after the holocaust and after the genocide in Rwanda? Others questions are when and where the intervention should take place? France intervened on several occasions in African Conflicts. These include the cases of Cote D’ivoire, Chad, Joint operation with Belgium in DRC, intervention Mali and currently in CAR where it maintains 2000 troops but Darfur was ignored The recent NATO-led operation that led to regime change in Libya is also a good example

The United Nations Security council decisions are hampered by the disagreement between the permanent members which veto various decisions that are not in line with their interests. This was witnessed by the continued support of both Russia and China to Sudan while paying little attention to the situation in Darfur. This informed the slogan ‘‘African solutions to African problems’’. The AU therefore succeeded to mobilize African countries and persuaded them to

contribute troops. The AU peacekeeping practice has manifested a subsidiary and complementarily in relation to peacekeeping operations. Before the deployment of UNAMID, the AU PSC stressed, in relation to the Darfur crisis, the need to continue to lead the efforts to resolve the crisis and in this respect, welcomed the support extended by the international community, including the UN Security Council.¹⁸⁰ The basis on which AMIS was established could be Article 7(c) of the PSC protocol, which empowers this organ to authorize the deployment of peace support missions. The PSC stated that ‘the African character of the mission, including through its composition and leadership’, as well as ‘the lead role of the African Union in the overall peace process’, should be maintained in order, as much as possible, to secure the cooperation of all parties, which is necessary to achieve the lasting solution to the Darfur conflict.¹⁸¹

Despite various challenges AMIS gradually reached strength of 7000 troops and was able to prevent further mass killings. These actions are similar to the successful intervention of ECOWAS in Sierra Leone and Liberia. The sub-regional organizations have already shown their effectiveness in African conflicts. They can easily avail troops but the financial constraints remain the main obstacle to their peacekeeping operations.

From the beginning of the conflict, the UN passed several resolutions about Darfur and UN was only deployed four years later. Over one million people were killed in Rwanda in a period of three months only. What should be expected if the intervention is carried out one year later for the AU and four years later for the UN? The deployment of a peacekeeping mission is also delayed due to the absence of the consent from the host country, a pre-requisite for any

¹⁸⁰ UNSC 13th Meeting, 27 July 2004, PSC/PR/Comm.(XIII), para 3.

¹⁸¹ PSC 46th Meeting, Communique, 10 March 2006, PSC/MIN.Comm.(XLV), para 3 and 4(b)(i).

peacekeeping operation to take place. In the case of Darfur, the government of Sudan resisted the deployment of UAMID and later the pressure of the international community forced it to accept. Early deployment of this mission would have probably improved the situation.

The UNSC Resolution 1769(2007) endorsed the AU decisions and specified in the preamble that ' the hybrid operation should have a predominantly African character and troops should, as far as possible, be sourced from African Countries. The Case of the AU-UN mission in Darfur thus involves a complex complementarily approach. The UNAMID mandate was agreed between the UN and the AU and specified in their joint report before the UN SC approved it. This seems to reflect the approach that African countries and the regional organizations have a better sense of root causes and realities. The contribution of African troops reflects the good will of African leaders who are committed to peace and security of Africa and beyond. Despite various challenges, African peacekeepers have reduced attacks on civilians and the intertribal clashes. However, there are situations where some peacekeepers are unable to protect themselves on one hand or to protect the civilians on the other hand. This demonstrates the difference in the levels of operational readiness and professionalism. The area of responsibility of each contingent is well defined, with makes easier to identify the gaps in operations and capabilities.

Peacekeepers are also involved in the mediation of the parties. While the Mission leadership especially the Special representative of the UNSG, who is at the same time the joint chief mediator, works hard to bring together the governments and the rebel movements, peacekeepers mobilize the population with a view of preventing intertribal clashes. Arguably, if UNAMID were to have used these powers against the government, it would be engaged in a enforcement action, but this would not really be the position because UNAMID was not initially meant to act against the government but was deployed with government consent. If then the Government had

adversely interfered in its activities, UNAMID should have been able to enforce its mandate, even against the government. This fits with the authorization to use force as agreed the Sudanese government that concerted to UNAMID's deployment. However, the action of the UN is limited to the condemnation of the government's actions instead of using the coercive power that UNAMID has. This is another major challenge to the success of the mission.

In addition the mandated tasks of the UNAMID, peacekeepers are involved in the reconstruction the Darfur region. In the framework of the QIPs, they are in involved in construction of schools, health centers, house and road construction and also provide training to civilians in human right issues. This demonstrates another step of the UN in the national building, an area which has been neglected by the international body for a long time. These actions facilitate a close relationship between the peacekeepers and the people of Darfur.

5.4 Role of RDF in UNAMID

Rwanda is committed to international peace and security and has played an important role not only in the management of the Darfur conflict but also in other AU/UN missions such as in South Sudan and CAR. The political will of the Rwanda government, the operational readiness of RDF in the mission area and their discipline are key determinants of the role of RDF in UNAMID.

5.4.1 Political will and leadership.

By 2010, the authorized strength was not reached and until now the mission is still suffering of logistical problems especially the lack of transport helicopters. Nearly 90% of the UNAMID troops were provided by African countries. This is a sign of the readiness of African leaders to commit their troops with a view of securing peace and security in Africa. However, of 54

African countries, only 10 contributed troops, Rwanda accounting for more than 3,200 military personnel. More countries would have also contributed but the reasons stated above probably justify that reluctance. Rwanda was the first country to deploy its troops where there was no peace to keep and is currently the sixth largest troop contributor to UN and maintains 850 troops in Central African Republic.

The UN Under Secretary General Jean Marie Gueheno, head of PKO said that the international community's 'often faltering support for UN peacekeeping operations was making it difficult to maintain gains in conflict areas. He affirmed that he could understand why some countries would not put troops on the ground for the reasons that he thought could be acceptable but he stated that he could not understand why the countries could not spare a couple of helicopters which could be effective in sustaining effective operations'.¹⁸² However, Rwanda with its limited resources offered utility helicopters to UNAMID and these were redirected to South Sudan (UNMISS) where they were urgently needed shortly before their deployment in Darfur was effected. The UNSC recently voiced concern about the strategic gap in mobility for the mission, and the continuing critical need for aviation capacity and other mobility assets, including military utility helicopters for UNAMID.¹⁸³ He urged UN member states "to redouble their efforts to provide aviation units to the mission. Following the recent hostilities in south Sudan the UN requested to provide more troops to UNMISS where it remains the largest contributor. This simply means that UN appreciates the role the RDF plays in Darfur which is also extended South Sudan.

¹⁸² <http://www.un.org/>

¹⁸³ *ibid*

Good leadership of the TCCs, of the mission's leaders and that of unit's commanders is one of the key factors for the success of any peacekeeping operation. The first RDF contingent was briefed by Paul Kagame, the president of the Republic of Rwanda and Commander in Chief of the Rwandan Armed forces prior its departure to the war-torn area in Sudan and few months later he visited the troops on the ground. There is no doubt that the aim of this visit was to get the first hand information on the situation in Darfur and to provide moral support to his servicemen and women. This reflects his political will as other Head of States rarely do the same in peacekeeping missions and even some military leaders rely only on the reports from the contingent commanders. In the contrast, the RDF Chief Defense Staff visited several times the troops in Darfur and senior staff officers conduct regular visits in peacekeeping missions to ascertain the operational readiness and assess the needs and gaps and advise the RDF headquarters on the way forward. This approach illustrates the good leadership of the Government of Rwanda with regards to the peacekeeping operation. This was emphasized by the Rwanda minister of defense when he said: " the involvement of Rwanda in peacekeeping is first a constitutional obligation to participate in the settlement of international peace and security. It is also based on a moral duty motivated by its responsibility in the international community, influenced and shaped by Rwanda's recent history, the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. The UN demonstrated the trust it has in RDF as key player in UNAMID by appointing Rwandan generals and senior officers to senior appointments at different times since the peacekeeping mission was established in Darfur. These include among others the post o the UNAMID Force Commander for four years, the Deputy Force commander and the Chief of staff. The term of the Force Commander was extended from one year to four years. This demonstrates the appreciation of his leadership as it was expressed by the UNSG in the letter of appointment the in-coming Force

Commander. Bad leadership in the mission area is one of the factors that could lead to the failure of peacekeeping missions. Good leadership was recently displayed by one the RDF commanding officer when he managed to protect the civilians under attack. The UNAMID Force Commander in his letter of appreciation to a Rwandan commander noted: “ the successful repel of such attacks can be attributed to your good leadership that trickles down to your soldiers. It is against this background that UNAMID appreciated your good initiative and leadership qualities.”¹⁸⁴

5.4.2 Operational readiness

The main factors that characterize the operational readiness of a peacekeeping force are the training, the levels of COE serviceability and self-sustainment, discipline and the conduct of the operations.

In the pre-deployment inspection report, the UN team observed:” the RDF battalions are well trained, well led and motivated and are ready to deploy and with regard to the combat power, the mindset of the RDF soldiers is highly tuned to the complexities, nuances and conflicting demands of modern peacekeeping operations.”¹⁸⁵

The quality of the RDF pre-deployment training is in line with the emphasis of missions’ leaders during the Security Council 6987th Meeting.¹⁸⁶ They reminded that training was of vital importance and ensured the success of any mission and expressed strong support for capacity standards.

¹⁸⁴ Congratulatory note, UNAMID/FHQ/FC/01/12, 19 March 2014.

¹⁸⁵ UN Team pre-deployment report, 2008

¹⁸⁶ <http://www.awild.org/2013/07/page/3/>. Retrieved on 07/12/2013 at 20:43.

The COE system was adopted by the UN to simplify the means by which countries are reimbursed for providing equipment, personnel and self-sustainment support services to formed military or police contingents in peacekeeping missions. The mission conducts verification inspections and forwards reports to the UN Headquarters on a quarterly basis. The reimbursements to the TCCs are based on these reports. Operational readiness inspections are also conducted at least each six months of service by the contingent in the mission.

According to the UNSG reports, RDF have maintained both the serviceability and the self-sustainment levels above 95% while some UNAMID contingents are do not meet the UN requirements. This reflects the RDF operational readiness which has impacted positively on the security situation in their area of operations. The reasons behind the low levels of serviceability of those units may be associated with the lack of political will where countries fail to comply with MoU provisions, lack of maintenance policy and discipline of their troops. RDF ensures that equipment is well maintained through a sound maintenance policy and that beyond repair is timely replaced. Other countries are therefore encouraged by the mission leadership to comply with the MOU in order to successfully undertake their assigned tasks.

Low levels of COE serviceability were also observed in other missions. The Office of the Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of the management of MONUSCO. The audit was conducted to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of MONUSCO's risks management; control and governance process in providing reasonable assurance the effective management of COE and compliance with the relevant MoUs and the UN policies and procedures. The overall results of the audit of management of COE in MONUSCO in relating to the effective management of COE were unsatisfactory. From unserviceable major and minor equipment reports for the period from 1 July 2009 to 31 October 2010 prepared by the COE unit

it was noted that eleven of the Mission's 26 infantry battalions (42 per cent) had COE serviceability percentages below the required 90 per cent for two consecutive years(ranging from 25 per cent to 90 per cent); nineteen of the Mission's 21 enabling units(hospitals, engineering companies) had serviceability percentages below the required 90 per cent(ranging from 43 to 90 percent).¹⁸⁷This status of the COE serviceability demonstrates inappropriate operational readiness could be one of the contributing factors to the limited success of MONUSCO. The reimbursement should enable TCCs to contribute equipment to the UN at rates established by the UN. The Mission should ensure that operational readiness inspections are regularly conducted to establish that COE conform to the terms and conditions of the relevant MoUs. The OIOS also conducted an audit of the management of COE in peacekeeping missions (MINUSTAH, MONUSCO, UNAMID, UNMIL, UNMIS, UNFIL) and UNOCI). The audit concluded that the overall results were partially satisfactory and recommended that those missions should establish procedures to ensure that monthly major equipment serviceability reports are compiled.¹⁸⁸ The fact that RDF has been able to comply with the UN standards justifies its operational effectiveness and reflects the good will of the government which provides continuous logistical support to its troops.

Peacekeepers are tasked to protect the civilians in the temporary conflicts and this makes their work more and more complex. The credibility and the authority of the international body depend on the ability of the peacekeepers to protect the civilians. UMAMIR withdrew from Rwanda leaving innocent civilians in the hand of the killers and this was a shame for the international community in general and a shame particularly for a military force that was unable to protect innocent people. Rwanda was the first country to deploy deployed in Darfur under AMIS in a

¹⁸⁷ UN Audit report 2011.

¹⁸⁸ UN Audit report 2013.

vast area where there is no peace to keep, under severe conditions and was conscious of possible attacks on its troops as it is happened in other missions. Despite the loss of a number of peacekeepers, RDF stand firm in the mission as opposed to the UNAMIR or the US that prematurely left Rwanda and Somalia respectively . What would be the difference between the UNAMIR forces and RDF if the latter were to take similar posture? Rwanda contingents managed to protect themselves and the civilians in Darfur and have recently rescued about 2000 Christians under attack by the Muslim. Similarly, various attacks claimed many lives of soldiers in others missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone but peacekeepers resisted until peace and security were restored in those countries. This kind of behavior suggests that African countries are committed to African peace and security. Similar situation is observed in the on-going mission (UNAMID) with the bulk of the force being from Africa. In line with this, Uhuru Kenyatta, the president of The Republic of Kenya said at the commemoration of the 20 the Anniversary of the Genocide :''Our region also stood aside, and for that we owe the most profound apology to the people of Rwanda, we have learned that no one from far away can be relied on to come to our aid; we must build an independent capability and will to protect the lives of our children and their futures''. He further noted:'' This is why as the chairman of the East African Community, I believe that we must ensure that our region is as strong on security and mutual aid, as it is in trade and economic integration; building an EAC in this second decade of the 21th century that would have intervened in 1994 is the least we can do to honor the memory of the dead.''¹⁸⁹

The UN HQ receives regular reports from different missions on the performance of contingents and the contents inform further courses of action or decisions. First, the UN informs TCCs about their shortfalls in terms of COE, discipline of their troops, operational readiness. Second, they

¹⁸⁹ Butamire,J.,Speech of the President of the Republic of Kenya New times, Rwanda, April 2014

serve as the basis for the UN to constitute a standby list of countries- that have shown good will and capacity that would be consulted in case peacekeeping operation is required. UN and other high ranking officials hailed the performance of RDF in UN/ AU peacekeeping missions and expressed their satisfaction either in statements or in their letters of appreciation. Mr Eliason, the Under UN Secretary General said that the Rwandan troops have exhibited exemplary professionalism and discipline wherever they have been deployed.¹⁹⁰ In addition the statement of the UN official, the UNSG had earlier travelled to negotiate with Rwandan authorities when the latter threatened to withdraw its forces. The way RDF conducts their operations influence the reaction of the UN leaders.

In his two consecutive letters of appreciation to Rwanda commanders in Darfur, the Force Commander expressed his satisfaction about the RDF's performance that troops demonstrated extraordinary skills in those particular operations and that their success could be attributed to the Commander's good leadership and initiative qualities. The UNAMID force commander observed that: 'The SARAF UMRA incident provides valuable lessons regarding the protection of civilians and the handling of the crisis by the team site with the assistance and the guidance from the battalion headquarters and the sector headquarters was commendable''. In view of the above, he requested the sector headquarters to come up with lessons learnt so that they can be shared with other team sites to serve as guidance in the event that they face similar situation in the future. In addition to the protection of the civilians, the RDF unit managed to bring together rival tribes and secured a ceasefire agreement. The blue helmets successfully persuaded the ethnic factions to sit together and resolve their differences amicably. This success has never been credited to any other UNAMID unit and this is even hardly achieved by experienced negotiators.

¹⁹⁰ <http://www.un.org/>

The process of unit and reconciliation in Rwanda in which RDF play an important role could be a driving factor of that mediation between the tribes in conflict. The outcomes of this unique operation are not only confined within RDF area of operation but also are likely to be extended to the entire mission if the lessons learnt are put into good use as it is recognized by the UNAMID authorities.

RDF has been commended for their professionalism in other missions. Major General Moses Bisong Obi, the Force Commander of the United Nations Missions in Sudan (UNMIS) said: ‘The 6th Rwandan Contingent was saddled with the responsibility of providing security to UNMIS Compound 08, the UNMIS Headquarters UNMIS HQs), in addition to providing clerical and administrative assistance to these HQs. It is to the credit of the contingent that during their tour of duty, there was no single security breach at the UNMIS HQs.’¹⁹¹ The successful completion of the tour of duty of this contingent informed the UN request for contribution to the new mission (UNMISS) where Rwanda maintains 850 troops and an aviation unit. Rwanda is currently the largest contributor in this mission.

While commenting on the issue of discipline in peacekeeping operations, the UNSG said: ‘The UN expects that all peacekeeping personnel and adhere to the highest standards of behavior and conduct themselves in a professional and disciplined manner at all times. The UN personnel should respect local laws, customs and practices treat host country inhabitants with respect, courtesy and consideration act with impartiality, integrity and tact’’. Unfortunately despite the UN’s official ‘‘ Zero-Tolerance’’, reports indicate cases of misconduct involving peacekeepers. By 2004, investigations turned up with 150 allegations of sexual misconduct by peace keepers

¹⁹¹ http://mod.gov.rw/news-detail/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=1757&cHash. Retrieved on 03/12/2013 at 18:48.

and UN Staff in MONUC (now MONUSCO).¹⁹² Some isolated cases were recorded in UNAMID but no single case of such behavior has been observed within the ranks of RDF contingents over a period of ten years. The status of the force discipline contributes largely to the success of peacekeeping missions. Reports on sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers threaten to overshadow their positive contributions that help prevent instability and secure peace. The UN has implemented significant reforms to curb and address sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, including conduct and discipline units at headquarters and in the mandatory pre-deployment training.

In what is now dubbed peacekeeping with a difference, RDF peacekeepers are not only providing security to the people of Darfur but are also work hard to transform the lives of Darfur residents by introducing Rwandan community outreach programs. The RDF peacekeepers have built schools, provided medical care, constructed water facilities in the dry region, as well as saved Darfur women from possible rape as they wander about in search of wood fuel by making charcoal saving stoves known as ‘‘*Rondereza*’’ in Rwanda. This is another example that illustrates the role of RDF in the conflict management of the Darfur conflict. Similarly, in order to build social cohesion in the religiously divided Bangui, RDF brought all communities together in community works known as ‘‘*Umuganda*’’ in Rwanda, where they were taught the value of working together as a community to solve common problems.

¹⁹² <http://www.un.org/>. Retrieved on 16/01/2014 at 16:11.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The nature and source of the conflicts include inter alia, the fragile nature of the state, endemic poverty, identity, economic inequality and exclusionary governance system that not allow participatory political arrangement. In Africa there are very few conflicts which are totally immune from influences emanating from outside a country where they occur and therefore are subject to purely internal government management and resolution of the conflict. However the scale of intrastate armed conflicts which pose a threat to international peace and security is on the decline as African states continue on the path of the democratic transition. Attempts to exclude the ordinary citizen from such participation create a rift between the rulers and the governed. Open political system that safeguard basic civil liberties, basic needs and freedom of expression are less likely to be confronted by debilitating conflicts. Most conflicts thus become quickly regionalized and hence the difficulties of resolving these conflicts by looking at them as purely internal conflict to a country

The AU's more specific vision for conflict management reflects awareness that the precondition for achieving this overarching goal is security and stability on the continent. As we all know the AU now has the right to intervene in conflicts which are causing extensive and serious human rights violation.

This study has reviewed different approaches that were applied in conflict management and found that many attempts at resolving conflicts in Africa have failed. The failures of these effects are attributable to the lack of authentic data regarding the nature of source of the conflicts. At times, conceptualized resolution mechanisms have escalated the problems instead of providing

solutions, which complicate the situation even further. One fundamental cause of the repeated failure of the international organizations is probably that their identification of actors is insufficient, both in relation to who they are and in relation their particular interests in a possible prolongation of war. Spoilers were also identified as contributing factor to failure of the peace process. The international policy responses in the area of conflict management are still heavily focused on short term measures, which consistent largely on military approaches such as developing capacity to plan and execute peace support operations and sub-regional and regional level. They focus less on the national building which aims establishing solid institutions, and addressing the underlying issues .Today there is a general agreement that there are certain pillars of conflict prevention and post conflict reconstruction that need to be obtained in order to safeguard long-lasting peace. These include social and economic well-being that is, safeguarding fundamental social economic needs.

The facts that most violent conflicts in Africa today have obvious regional aspects have made African politicians as well as members of donor societies realize that sustainable solutions to the conflicts must be regional in character. International initiatives in Africa to promote preventive diplomacy, manage and resolve conflict and promote development have traditionally neglected indigenous resources and capacities for peace building and reconstruction. However the solutions to some African problems will have to have home grown solutions. Indigenous and endogenous approaches to peace and conflict resolution provide us with insights into how more inclusive and community- based processes can be utilized.

The research indicates that the AU has made tremendous effort in the management of the African conflict. It was also realized that the African peacekeepers have been able to restore peace in different sub-regions despite various challenges. The centrality of peace and security to the AU

is seen first in the organs and mechanism provided for decision making on peace and security and intervention actions. The PSC protocol provides that the PSC is a collective security and early warning arrangements to provide mandate mandates for missions as well as the rules of engagement. To solve a violent conflict, it is necessary to involve more than one country, even if the conflict has its epicenter in only one country. The necessity of more countries working together in conflict prevention and peace building is recognized by most African Intergovernmental organizations. This is illustrated by the successful intervention of the sub-regional organizations in conflict particularly in West Africa. When ECOWAS intervened in the crises of in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the early 1990s, it had important effects. It appears here that interveners with regional interests are more efficient in conflict management role. While may see the UN as a legitimizing body for peacekeeping operations, it may not have the conflict abatement role needed in some situations. The delay in deployment by the UN or the AU has led to humanitarian disaster in different conflict in Africa. The will of some countries may have more to deal with the development of the peace process on one hand and deployment with the evolution security situation on the ground. The question remains here:” When should the third intervention take place? The call for intervention should be quickly assessed and actions should not be delayed if it is to save human lives. The presence of the OAU in Rwanda was unable to prevent or to stop genocide against the Tutsi. This would have informed timely decision and effective actions in similar situations .The AU will have identify which conflicts are associated with third party intervention and why and also examine factors associated and it is important to distinguish among various measures of success and failure. The ultimate goal of the study was to better our understanding of the processes and results of third party interventions in order to yield

better intervention policies, a goal which seeks to find better management to solutions of African conflicts, especially the on-going conflict in Darfur.

Peacekeeping operations in their nature are costly affairs. The African Union has no effective mechanism for obtaining financial contribution from its members. This has affected the AU in the management of its field operations. Experience has shown that the AU can deliver peace in Africa if financial constraints are addressed.

The Darfur region has been devastated by civil war since 2003. The Darfur conflict is not only a problem for the Sudanese, but is also a regional problem. The conflict has been threatening the stability in other regions of Sudan, and in neighboring countries like Chad, and the Central African Republic.

Third party intervention has been of varying levels and taken different forms such mediation that led to the signing of different peace agreements and peacekeeping operations. Many factors have undermined peace processes and peacekeepers faced. The UN peacekeeping missions are affected adverse way by the reluctance on the part of the western countries to commit their national troops in Africa under UN mandate. UNAMID is of African Character as near 90 percent of the forces were contributed by African countries and Peacekeepers have able to protect civilians, to participate in the reconstruction of the region and were also involved in the peace process. This confirms that the political will of the African leaders remain a driving force of the restoration of peace and stability in that region. There is no doubt that if African countries had not intervened, the conflict would have plagued the whole region in intractable conflict with a humanitarian disaster.

This study examined various approaches to the Darfur conflict. It identified the causes of the failure of the peace processes, particularly. It also uncovered main challenges to peacekeeping operations that have contributed to the limited success of UNAMID. The theoretical framework offered by researchers on conflict resolution guided this study. In discussing these different approaches, it is important to recognize that no single approach is set to deal all conflict scenarios. Contingents faced challenges in form of finance, equipment, and mandate which all affected their operation in Darfur.

Foreign policy of any nation serves as a mirror of its domestic reality. It begins with identification and articulation of national interests. It is very important to assert that whatever this nation's interest represents, serves the principal consideration in the formulation and execution of national policies both at domestic and international levels. One of the cardinal points of Rwandan foreign policy is the maintenance of peace and security in Africa. This enabled her to play an active role in peacekeeping operations. Rwanda has provided a bulk of her troops to the hybrid peacekeeping mission in Darfur though Darfur did not constitute a threat to Rwanda and no particular interest in that region that would have motivated her to deploy troops. The maintenance of peace and security, especially on the continent of Africa, is an abiding interest that Rwanda is committed towards.

The serviceability of COE and self-sustainment are key determinants of the contingents' operational readiness. So far the evidences suggest that RDF have able to effectively handle this aspect. Although adequate resources are essential for a military to accomplish its objective, from an armed forces perspective, ultimate success or failure is viewed in large part as a contingent upon the ability and motivation of its personnel.

In addition discipline is also of crucial importance to the success of a military operation. Discipline is at the heart of the military operation profession and few professions are as dependent on discipline as the military. Whether during peace or war, it can spell the difference between military success and failure. Discipline is particularly important to military forces, which are routinely required to apply force or the threat of force in the course of their duties. Moreover all military members are subject to unlimited liability, and can be ordered into conditions that could result in their deaths or serious injuries. This readiness to fight requires that members of the military often suppress their own interests, including ultimately the preservation of their own lives. The UN's image, credibility, and ultimately its effectiveness have often been tied to its peacekeeping activities. While that image has been tarnished by peacekeeping scandals involving sex, drugs, and corruption, contributor nations have largely escaped public condemnation. Nevertheless, some progress has been made. The UN is taking steps to improve the efficiency and accountability of its procurement and deployment systems, as well as the quality of guidance and training that it delivers to peacekeepers to make missions more effective. Rwandan troops have been hailed for high levels of discipline in this regard.

Rwanda involvement in peacekeeping operations in Darfur has been reviewed as stated in this study and the facts speak for themselves. After the massive failures of international governments to protect civilians from systematic violence throughout the 1990's, and with the brutal conditions created by modern conflict, the international community has begun to recognize its responsibility to better protect civilians from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and other crimes against humanity. RDF was hailed on several occasions by the UN officials for the successful operations that they conducted despite various challenges faced by the mission and the main task was to protect the civilians. The study looked into these challenges faced by

Rwandan contingents and their achievements against this backdrop. Rwanda will profit from her experience in Darfur for even better results in the future.

There is new urgency among African policymakers in search of effective mechanisms for resolving African conflict. African states have constructed their own continental and regional institutions. African states together have come together into blocs that would enhance their leverage in world affairs. The establishment of peace and security provides foundations for political stability and development that are global values towards which Rwanda is similarly committed. This makes Rwanda towards global peace and security through involvement in resolution as that of Darfur an obligation. This is the reason why today Rwanda is currently the sixth largest troop contributing country to UN peacekeeping mission and is the leading contributor both in UNAMID and UNMISS. It was noted that RDF used home-grown approaches in the mediation of the tribes in conflict. This unique attitude could serve as good example to others contingents. Rwanda's commitment to contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security is based on the firm belief that the international community has a responsibility to prevent conflict and act when confronted with challenges to peace and security. Rwanda is a unique example of how a country, having emerged from genocide, can negotiate a peaceful transition based on its own conflict resolution techniques and its own vision of meaningful and enduring development.

From the findings of this research following recommendations are made:

- a. While acknowledging the crucial role of the international community, African solutions to African conflicts should be the dominant strategy for conflict prevention and management. Afro-centric policy on peacekeeping operations should be based on clear strategic objectives. There is need for the African Union to find an effective mechanism

for financing peacekeeping operations.

- b. African states have demonstrated their political will and their committed to peace and security. With the limited resources they should look for means and support the sub-regional organizations and the African Union.
- c. African Union should speed up the operationalization of the African Standby Force.
- d. Third party intervention should address the underlying causes of the conflict in order to bring lasting peace and security. In the case of Darfur all the conflicts to the conflicts should be brought to the negotiating table. Home-grown approaches are to be taken into consideration.
- e. Once African states are committed to UN or AU peacekeeping operation, they should comply with the agreed standards in order to enhance the operational readiness of their contingents, especially in Darfur.
- f. Contingents should properly trained and maintain high levels of discipline. The outcomes of the peacekeeping of operations are tied with the discipline the forces.
- g. As the Darfur conflict persists, further research on the role of RDF in UNAMID or any other contingent in Darfur is recommended with a view of drawing attention of the leadership to the lapse if any and suggests improvement for the future.
- h. There is a need for troop contributing countries to formulate a national security policy on peacekeeping operations.

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