

**THE IMPACT OF CONFLICTS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA**

**A CASE STUDY OF KENYA**

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## DECLARATION

I, hereby declare that this research project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

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This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor;

Signed..... Date.....

Supervisor: Dr. Martin Ouma

## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this research work to my entire family and colleagues at work for their endless support.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

The completion of this project could not be possible without the help of many supporters. In this regard I take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Ouma who provided me with the basic foundations on writing my research work.

## ABSTRACT

The Horn of Africa has witnessed many incidences of violent conflicts in the last few decades as compared to any other part of the world. Conflict and instability trends in the Horn of Africa make the region one of the most unstable regions in the world. Many parts of the Horn of Africa remain unable to break free of armed conflicts, violent crime, communal violence, extremism, political instability and state failures that have plagued the region for decades. Most of the region's zones of armed conflicts and instability today are concentrated near border areas; pose a major risk of spillover; and feature powerful cross-border drivers, interests, and actors. In recent years, regional governments have made a much greater effort to protect their borders, and their renewed commitment to address trans-border and spillover conflict issues constitute an important window of opportunity. However, few regional states have the capacity to effectively administer their remote, expansive border areas. As a result, much trans-border conflict management and prevention falls on the shoulders of local communities in partnership with central governments and interstate regional organizations. The resilience and adaptability of this collection of local and regional actors are critical factors in determining whether, and to what extent, cross-border conflict and instability issues are successfully managed. The study focused on the following major areas: The overview of conflict in Africa; An analysis of the Somali Peace Process and Sudan peace process, the causes of conflict and the impact of spill over conflict into Kenya from the conflict in the Horn of Africa. The study aimed at assessing the impact of conflicts in the horn of Africa with a special focus on Kenya. The study used the realism theory to explain conflicts and international relations. To undertake the study, the researcher utilized library and internet research. In this case, published and unpublished data was used to put issues into context and to justify the research study. All these materials were explored to help understand the prevailing situation in other parts of the world. The findings of the study revealed that resolution and management of conflicts in the horn of Africa has posed a major challenge to regional organizations, states, regional and the international community. The conflicts in the Northern Region of Kenya are no exception. These conflicts are mainly concentrated in the borders of Somalia and Sudan involving pastoralists. In recent time's conflicts between host and refugee communities and within the community itself over the management of natural resources has span over time. There have been numerous attempts made by the government of Kenya to resolve these conflicts. Policies papers and documents have been written and revised, conventions have been held, but the major problem lies on the implementation of the various resolutions. Further the findings of the study revealed that recognition of conflict resolution and management in the Horn of Africa is lacking and the states in the region have not come out with detail policy document which can effectively tackle conflict in the region, beginning from the root causes of the various conflicts, how it evolved, and parties' concerned, attempted measures to resolve these conflicts. The international community is not more concerned with how to punish the perpetrators of these conflicts. The study recommended that Regional bodies and institutions in the Horn of Africa should play a significant role as platforms for interstate collaboration on security issues and conflict management. Protracted conflicts, regional insurgencies, and cross border criminality stress border and national-level response systems, and regional organizations should be considered very essential for monitoring, prevention, and cross border response mechanisms.

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AoGs	Arm opposition Groups
CECORE	Centre for Conflict Resolution
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
IGAD	Inter Governmental Authority on Development
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
RESCSA	Regional Centre on Small Arms

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

#### 1.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the background of the study, problem statement, the research objectives, literature review, justification of the study, research hypothesis, the theoretical framework and finally the chapter outline.

#### 1.1 Background of the study

The term ‘conflict’ may be defined as an antagonism that occurs between two or more adversative peoples, groups, ideas and interests as a result of an incompatibility of goals<sup>1</sup>. Conflicts are prevalent in society. They usually arise from an incompatibility of goals between two or more people, ideas or interests. When an inherent incompatibility of interests and objectives of two or more characters or forces takes place, a conflict is inevitable

Conflicts have political, economic, social, and cultural implications and contribute to the lowering of economic productivity, weakening of political institutions of governance, incapacity to provide essential services, destruction and depletion of existing resources, loss of food production, and capital flight.<sup>2</sup> It may be possible to measure the cost of conflict in economic terms by assessing the loss of potential foreign and domestic investment due to fear of crime and insecurity, loss of income from tourism, and losses in government sectors like agriculture. Other direct consequences of violent conflict are the

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<sup>1</sup> Young, John 2007 ‘Emerging North-South Tensions and Prospects for a return to war’ *Small Arms Survey*, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva.

<sup>2</sup> Thomas, Edward 2010, ‘Decisions and Deadlines: A Critical Year for Sudan’ A Chatham House Report, January

influx of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP) from neighboring countries into Kenya. This is further complicated by the prevalence of small arms and light weapons in major towns and in pastoral areas in northern, northeastern, coastal and western Kenya along its international borders. This phenomenon is aggravated by neighboring civil wars and regional drought.

The border areas of Kenya have, over the last three or four decades, been a major arena for a variety of low-intensity conflicts, some of which are linked to wider cross-border and regional conflicts. The roots of these conflicts are ecological. A history of economic and social marginalization looms large in all border conflicts within the Horn of Africa. Increased competition over resources, reduced access to land, water, and other natural resources due to increasing demographic and environmental pressure from within and without, and reduced access to credit, markets, and extension services that culminate in poverty, all play a role.

Collier<sup>3</sup> asserts that conflicts in Africa take the form of civil wars as opposed to the past where conflicts around the world were mostly international. In recent years most of the civil wars that have taken place in the world have been in this continent: e.g. the cases of Angola, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Kenya and Sudan.<sup>4</sup> Also, given the fact that the international community has done little to stop civil wars under the belief that nothing can be done because they are fighting among themselves and we need not

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<sup>3</sup> Collier, P. (2003) *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, Washington, DC 20433: WB and Oxford University Press

<sup>4</sup> Intriligator, M.D. (1975) 'Strategic Considerations in the Richardson Model of Arms Races,' *The Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 83(2)

intervene, we realize that the consequences of these civil wars are tremendous both nationally and internationally.<sup>5</sup>

## **1.2 Problem Statement**

The nature of state power in the Horn of Africa is a key source of conflict, political victory assuming a winner-takes-all form with respect to wealth and resources as well as the prestige and prerogatives of office. Irrespective of the official form of government, regimes in the Horn of Africa are, in most cases, autocracies essentially relying on ethnic loyalties. The military and security services, in recent times emerging from a liberation front background, ensure the hold on power of these militarized regimes.<sup>6</sup> Other factors contributing to conflicts in the horn of Africa include insufficient accountability of leaders, lack of transparency in regimes, non-adherence to the rule of law, lack of respect for human and peoples' rights made political control excessively important and the stakes dangerously high.

Moreover, political competition in the Horn of Africa is not rooted in viable economic systems. All of the region's states are barely capable of reaching a level of economic development at which even the basic needs of their populations are met. Economic activities are strongly skewed towards primary commodities for export which are subject to the whims of the fluctuating prices of the international commodity market. Economic activities are also hampered by external dependence, inadequate infrastructure, shortage of capital, shortage of skilled manpower and misguided development policies. Moreover, the state is unable to provide adequate health and education services and to

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<sup>5</sup> Collier (2003, p. 1-10).

<sup>6</sup> Medhane Tadesse (2004) 'New Security Frontiers in the Horn of Africa.' Friedrich- Ebert-Stiftung Dialogue on Globalization.

remedy mass unemployment which partly results from unsustainably high population growth.<sup>7</sup>

Furthermore, in order to hold on to power, to hold the state together and to defend it against the claims and attacks of other states and rebel movements, governing regimes build and maintain military forces of large dimensions. They spend a large share of national expenditure disproportionate to available economic resources and existing security threats. This kind of excessive militarization eventually entails an increased burden especially in the present times of dwindling resources and economic crises. Excessive military spending is essentially a wasteful expenditure because of which social projects in education or health remain stagnant or even nonexistent. It also heightens the perception of mutual threat with a wide range of unintended political consequences. On the one hand, external threats will be used, as mentioned earlier, to distract attention from real internal problems. On the other hand, a politicized, compromised and restless military with its proneness to usurp state power and resources represent a grave danger to inherently fragile regimes as well as their political and security structures.<sup>8</sup> This study therefore aimed at assessing the impact of conflicts in the horn of Africa with a special focus on Kenya.

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<sup>7</sup> Getachew Mequanent (2008) 'Human Security and Regional Planning in the Horn of Africa.' *Human Security Journal*, vol.7.

<sup>8</sup> Wasara, Samson (2002) 'Conflict and State Security in the Horn of Africa: Militarization of Civilian Groups.' *African Journal of Political Science*, vol.7 no.2

## **1.3 Research Objectives**

### **1.3.1 General Objective**

The general objective of this study will be to assess Kenya's role in conflict management in the horn of African sub-region with special reference to the Somalia and Sudanese peace process 2002 - 2005.

### **1.3.2 Specific Objectives**

- i. To provide an overview of conflict in the Horn of Africa.
- ii. To critically analyze the role of Kenya in conflict management as it has been the main mediator in both Somalia and Sudan peace processes.
- iii. To analyze the impact of spill over conflict into Kenya from the conflict in the Horn of Africa

## **1.4 Literature Review**

### **1.4.1 Literature on Conflict Management**

The term "conflict" is variously defined to mean disagreement. Several definitions emphasize the incompatibility of goals. For example, <sup>9</sup>explains that conflict occurs in the event of "escalated competition between two or more parties, each of which aims to gain advantage of some kind-power, resources, interest, values.... At least one of the parties believes that conflict is over a set of mutually incompatible goals." Similarly, "when two or more parties perceive that their interests are incompatible, they express hostile attitudes, or... pursue their interests through actions that damage the other parties.

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<sup>9</sup> S. Lancken. *The Preliminary Conference: Option or Necessity?*. Australian Dispute Resolution Journal. (2000) 196 (11)

These parties may be individuals, small or large groups and countries.”<sup>10</sup> observes that human perception of reality is very important in the understanding of a conflict situation. <sup>11</sup>has identified five key features of conflict interaction that: Conflict interaction is characterized by moves and counter-moves which are themselves determined by the power wielded by the parties involved; Pattern of behaviour tends to be sustained; Steps taken in the course of such interaction are products of the larger environment in which they take place; There is a general understanding of the direction of such interaction; and such interaction impacts on relation between the parties involved. It is also important to state that conflicts occur at different levels. These levels are: intra-personal, inter-personal, intra-group or Community and inter-group or community.

In a case of North- East Nigeria, <sup>12</sup>asserted that even though the different levels of conflicts exist, communities in North-East Nigeria including the Fulbe of Adamawa appear to record higher cases of inter-personal and intra-group/community conflicts. These conflicts, he observes, usually involve cases like theft, debts, adultery, wife abduction and homicide. Sa’ad<sup>13</sup> also reported that there are various ways of managing and resolving conflicts in the communities of the zone. Some of the approaches are individualistic and formal, while some others are communal and informal. Conflicts could also be managed peacefully or in extreme cases with violence.

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<sup>10</sup> I. O. Albert. Introduction to Third Party Intervention in Community Conflicts (Ibadan: John Archers Publishers) (2001) Ltd.

<sup>11</sup> W.L.F Felstinger. Influences of Social Organisation on Dispute Processing. In Law and Society Review. Vol. 9 N0 1. (1974)

<sup>12</sup> A. Sa’ad. Continuity and Change in the Methods of Conflict Resolution in some North-Eastern Nigerian Communities. In Journal of Social Sciences and Administration. UDU, Vol 1, N0 1. (1999)

<sup>13</sup> Ibid

### 1.4.2 Causes of Conflicts

Intractable conflicts are ones that remain unresolved for long periods of time and then become stuck at a high level of intensity and destructiveness. They typically involve many parties and concern an intricate set of historical, religious, cultural, political, and economic issues. These matters are central to human social existence and typically resist any attempts at resolution. In fact, parties often refuse to negotiate or compromise with respect to such issues. As a result, each side views the rigid position of the other as a threat to its very existence. They may develop a mutual fear of each other and a profound desire to inflict as much physical and psychological harm on each other as possible. This sense of threat and hostility often pervades the everyday lives of the parties involved and overrides their ability to recognize any shared concerns they might have.<sup>14</sup>

As conflict escalates, any tangible issues may become embedded within a larger set of values, beliefs, identities, and cultures. Disputes about land, money, or other resources may take on increased symbolic significance. Over the course of conflict, the original issues can even become irrelevant as new causes for conflict are generated by actions within the conflict itself. Those on opposing sides come to view each other as enemies and may resort to highly destructive means. Eventually, the parties become unable to separate different issues and may see no way out of the conflict other than through total victory or defeat.<sup>15</sup>

Conflicts and their causes vary according to culture, security or season. The causes of conflict among communities are diverse, reflecting the geographical, socio-

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<sup>14</sup> R. Charlton. & M. Dewdney. *The Mediator's Handbook. Skills and Strategies for Practitioners*, 12-15. (2004)

<sup>15</sup> *ibid*

economic and political differences of the regions. However, for most traditional rural communities in Southern Sudan, competition over natural resources appear to be the main cause of conflicts and other disputes between groups or within them. Natural resources include land for settlement, grazing lands, arable land for crop cultivation and water sources upon which the livelihood of communities depends.<sup>16</sup>

Disputes over natural resources include ownership and use of arable land, trespassing of animals into agricultural land and use of water sources, and occupying plots of the people forced out by the civil war. The Sudanese civil war was an important factor in the perpetuation of conflict within the entire social structure in Southern Sudan. Other sets of interconnected factors such as trans-boundary cattle rustling should also be taken into consideration when trying to identify types and causes of conflicts in Southern Sudan.

### **1.4.3 Conflict Management Mechanisms in the Horn of Africa**

Ways of managing organizational conflict are as varied as its causes, origins and contexts. The purpose of conflict management, whether undertaken by the parties in conflict or whether involving the intervention of an outside party, is to affect the entire structure of a conflict situation so as to contain the destructive components in the conflict process (e.g. hostility, use of violence) and help the parties possessing incompatible goals to find some solution to their conflict. Effective conflict management succeeds in (1)

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<sup>16</sup> R. Charlton. & M. Dewdney. *The Mediator's Handbook. Skills and Strategies for Practitioners*, 12-15. (2004)

minimizing disruption stemming from the existence of a conflict, and (2) providing a solution that is satisfactory and acceptable.<sup>17</sup>

One can describe efforts directed towards containing or limiting some aspects of behaviour as strategies of conflict settlement and efforts directed towards the parties' attitudes, situations as well as behaviour as strategies of conflict resolution. Skilled administrators are aware of these methods and techniques and know how to utilize them effectively. All organizations, however simple or complex, possess a range of mechanisms or procedures for managing conflict. These are built into the organizational structure and are consciously employed by administrators to influence the course and development of a conflict<sup>18</sup>.

### **1.5 Justification of the Study**

This study aimed to analyse the impact of conflicts in the Horn of Africa with a focus on Kenya. The results of this research maybe be useful for policy makers, scholars, academicians, lecturers, students, diplomats, NGOs, IGOs and the general public to evaluate and appreciate Kenya's efforts in bringing peace and stability in the region and what it means to the country and the people of the region.

The general public needs to knowledge of a the country's effort in maintaining another country's efforts in maintaining another country's state of peace is not a conceivable factor of importance yet it is therefore imperative that efforts to restore peace where non or where its threatened have far reaching effects than as seen on the surface.

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<sup>17</sup> J. P. Folger, Working Through Conflict (New York: Educational Publishers Inc, 2007)

<sup>18</sup> Ibid

The study analyzed the role of special envoys as displayers of the face of Kenya and realizes their personal non conspicuous roles are a force behind great achievements. Policy makers may need to assess political temperature levels through knowledge in conflict management so as to make sound and informed decisions as regards the country's foreign policy which beneficial.

### **1.6 Research Hypotheses**

This study will seek to test the following hypotheses:

H1: There are frequent conflicts in the Horn of Africa.

H0: There are no frequent conflicts in the Horn of Africa.

H1: Kenya has played a role in conflict management as it has been the main mediator in both Somalia and Sudan peace processes.

H0: Kenya has not played a role in conflict management as it has been the main mediator in both Somalia and Sudan peace processes.

H1: There is an impact of spill over conflict into Kenya from the conflict in the Horn of Africa

H0: There is no impact of spill over conflict into Kenya from the conflict in the Horn of Africa

### **1.7 Theoretical Framework**

Realism is a theory in international relations that came up as an academic study during and after the Second World War in response to the theories that had been popular

in between the two world wars.<sup>19</sup> The rise of realism was partly a response to theories that had become popular after the First World War. In its aftermath, leaders of that war's victorious nations were driven by "the passionate desire to prevent war".<sup>20</sup> These leaders saw war as "a disease of the international body politic". Realism is an approach to international relations that has emerged gradually through the work of a series of analysts who have situated themselves within, and thus delimited, a distinctive but still diverse style or tradition of analysis.<sup>21</sup>

Realism emphasizes the constraints on politics imposed by human nature and the absence of international government. Together, they make international relations largely a realm of power and interest. Human nature has not changed since the days of classical antiquity.<sup>22</sup> According to realists, is at its core egoistic, and thus inalterably inclined towards immorality. As Machiavelli<sup>23</sup> puts it, in politics it must needs be taken for granted that all men are wicked and that they will always give vent to the malignity that is in their minds when opportunity offers.

Most realists recognize that men are motivated by other desires than the urge for power and that power is not the only aspect of international relations. Thus Niebuhr couples his harsh doctrine of original sin with an insistence that individuals are not consistently egoistic. He even argues for an adequate view of human nature, which does justice to both the heights and depths of human life. Likewise, Morgenthau argues that

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<sup>19</sup> Dunne, T and Schmidt, C (2005), 'Realism', in J Baylis and S Smith (ed.), *The Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to international relations*, 3rd edn, Oxford University Press, New York, NY.

<sup>20</sup> Carr, EH (1981), *The Twenty Years' Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, Palgrave, New York, NY.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid

<sup>22</sup> Thompson (1985).

<sup>23</sup> Machiavelli (1987)

“to do justice and to receive it is an elemental aspiration of man.”<sup>24</sup> Nonetheless, realists characteristically give primary emphasis to egoistic passions and the tragic presence of evil in all political action.<sup>25</sup>

## **1.8 Methodology**

This study utilized library and internet research. In this case, published and unpublished data will be used to put issues into context and to justify the research study. Additionally, data from books, journals, protocols, reports and other relevant published materials were incorporated in the study to build the literature review and put issues in the conflict into perspective. All these materials were explored to help understand the prevailing situation in other parts of the world.

This study encountered several constraints; it was limited by the time factor in two main ways: First, it was carried out within three months, a time too short to gather enough data on the subject. Therefore, both secondary and published and unpublished primary data were used instead. Secondly, time constraints limited the scope of research. It is not possible to conclusively collect primary data. More time is required to collect enough information from each and every of the two states. Thus this study was limited to the understanding conflict in Kenya.

## **1.9 Chapter outline**

The study is organized into five chapters:

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<sup>24</sup> Spykman (1942).

<sup>25</sup> Morgenthau (1946) page 203.

- Chapter one: An introduction to the study.
- Chapter two: Conflict in Africa: An overview.
- Chapter three: An analysis of the Somali Peace Process and Sudan peace process, the causes of conflict.
- Chapter four: The impact of spill over conflict into Kenya from the conflict in the Horn of Africa.
- Chapter five: Summary, Conclusions and recommendations.

## CHAPTER TWO

### CONFLICT IN AFRICA: AN OVERVIEW

#### 2.1 Introduction

Chapter one, which forms the basis of this research, introduced the study. It presented the statement of the problem, objectives, literature review and a theoretical framework from which hypotheses of the study are derived. It also looks at the research methodology.

Chapter two gives a general overview of conflict in Africa. It will also give an overview of conflict in the horn of Africa Eastern Africa. The chapter examines IGAD and conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa. It further discusses the role of Kenya in conflict Management at the Horn of African Region.

#### 2.2 General Background: Conflict in Africa

Ethnic unrest and tension are prevalent in today's world. Newspapers and television are rife with stories about ethnic violence among the people of Africa, the Middle East, India, China, Srilanka, Ireland, etc. Many other societies in little danger of civil wars---such as the United States, Britain, Canada, most of the Western Europe, and Japan---are nevertheless torn by ethnic strife. In many ways they are more seriously divided along ethnic lines, marked by racial, lingual, religious, and national differences, than they were a generation ago<sup>26</sup>. It has been noted that violent conflicts around the globe are

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<sup>26</sup> Yinger, J. Milton. (1997). *Ethnicity: Source of Strength? Source of Conflict?* New York: State University of New York Press.

increasingly based on ethnic divisions. Only a tiny proportion of wars now occur between states; the vast majorities are civil wars with ethnic dimensions.

Comprising the largest share of ex-colonial states of the world, Africa is caught up in a range of intra - to inter-state conflicts. Since independence, about one-third of the countries of Africa have experienced large-scale political violence or war.<sup>27</sup> But not all African countries are affected to the same degree. In some African countries, a whole generation has never experienced peace since independence and has internalized war as a legitimate part of life<sup>28</sup>. For instance, within only four decades time (i.e., between the 1960s and the 1990s), approximately 80 violent changes in government in the 48 sub-Saharan African countries took place<sup>29</sup>. Strangely enough, Africa has seen over seventy coups in the last quarter of the 20<sup>th</sup> C<sup>30</sup>. Roughly in the same period, Africa has suffered the greatest number of armed conflicts in the world”.

The Horn of Africa region is regarded as highly susceptible to conflicts, and is one of the most conflict-prone areas in the continent. The Horn is the sub-region of protracted conflict and instability. Over the past six decades there was no single year when the sub region had free from conflict. In the Horn, the conflicts that have occurred since 1960s have largely been internal. Border conflicts have been rare and most of the wars in this part of the continent during the last decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> C have been described in terms of ethnic conflicts. For example, the civic unrest in Darfur, the protracted war between Ethiopia and Eritrea (before its independence in 1993), ethnic violence in Kenya

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<sup>27</sup> Ali, Mazrui .(2004). Conflict in Africa: an overview: Key note speech, in the proceedings of the international conference on African conflicts: management, resolution, post conflict recovery and development. 29November-1 December, 2004. Addis Ababa: OSSREA, Ethiopia

<sup>28</sup> ibid

<sup>29</sup> Adedeje, 2011

<sup>30</sup> (Ali, 2004:9).

after the 2007 presidential election, among other, are some to mention. Some even contend the Horn of Africa region as highly complicated because politics and ethnicity are deeply interwoven. Similarly, the region is known for the pastoralist movement from place to place leading to almost continuous local warfare and frequent forced migration. In general, the sub-region is often considered as the most volatile area in the world despite some progress made in ending long lasting regional wars.<sup>31</sup>

### **2.1.2 An Over View of Conflicts in the Horn of Africa**

The Horn of Africa has been Africa's problem area for many decades. Internal conflicts have been almost chronic in most of the countries of the Horn. The secessionist conflicts in Ethiopia, the problems of Southern Sudan, and later the almost total disintegrations of Somalia are some of the extreme manifestations of the problems. As Mwaura and Kiplagat (2002) viewed Horn of Africa as the region has been embroiled in endless wars for more than forty years and represents one of the most complex conflict systems in the world. It has been the site of several armed conflicts (both intra and inter-state), severe environmental degradation, and general livelihood insecurity.

Indeed Horn of Africa has become common place to assert that "Violent conflict disruptive of the state is endemic in the region. The Horn has been faced with the same arbitrariness of borders inherited from European colonial rule and with the inevitably resulting problems of state making and nation building among disparate peoples and in contested territory where there were cultural links with people across those borders.

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<sup>31</sup> Dereje, Seyoum (2010).The role of local governments in conflict management: The case of Mieso woreda, in Anthropology of peace and security research, Institute of peace and security studies in collaboration with Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Addis Ababa Ethiopia

These features, found throughout Africa and other ex-colonial territories, were intensified by factors specific to the Horn, each of which further enhanced the likelihood of internal and inter- state conflict: an ethnically homogenous state, Somalia, whose nationalism embraced neighboring Somalia minorities; European colonialism but also from becoming an empire, Sudan straddling the cultural divide between Africa south of the Sahara and the north.

For the Horn of Africa the situation is much more complex in comparison with that of Rwanda and Burundi. Oddly enough only Somalia appears to be similar to Rwanda and Burundi regards with similarity of language and religion. The other countries of the Horn are far more complex. Apart from religious issues that simmer beneath the political surface, Sudan is severely torn between north and south in a renewed conflagration of armed conflicts<sup>32</sup> Djibouti exists with an unresolved tension between the Affars and the Issas.

In general, Healy put the common features of conflicts in the Horn of Africa. The first feature of conflict in the Horn of Africa is its prevalence: there have been consistently high levels of violent conflict throughout the region for the best part of the last century and before. Conflict has occurred at every level-within states, between states, among proxies, between armies at the center and in the periphery. This appears to have created habits of war, including reliance on the use of force to achieve political goals, which in turn contribute to the persistence of violent conflict. Another common feature is a very poor record of governance in the case of this sub-region. Democratic

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<sup>32</sup> Mesfin Woldemariam. *The Horn of Africa: Conflict and Poverty*. Commercial Printing Press, 1991.

accountability has been largely lacking. There is a history of regime change through violent rather than peaceful means, toughened by culture militarism. While conflict takes different forms according to local circumstances and traditions, armed rebellion of one sort or another is always high among the options for dealing with political grievances.

### **Conflict in Sudan**

Civil war between northern and southern Sudan preceded independence, beginning in 1955. Southerners expected to be politically discounted in a unified Sudan, a view substantiated by the installation of a military regime in 1958 and the subsequent banning of southern political parties. Following seventeen years of war, both sides signed the Addis Ababa accords on March 27, 1972. These accords guaranteed<sup>33</sup> autonomy for a southern region, encompassing the provinces of Equatoria, Bahr al Ghazal, and the Upper Nile, with a regional president appointed by the national president on the recommendation of an elected Southern Regional Assembly<sup>34</sup>.

After ten years of tenuous peace, the Addis Ababa accords were abrogated by the Sudanese government under Gaafar Mohamad Nimeiry following the discovery of petroleum resources. The National People's Assembly and the Southern Regional Assembly were dissolved, and the national introduction of Islamic Sharia law took effect on September 8, 1983. Conflict reignited between north and south, further intensified by repeated regime changes in Khartoum and a protracted suspension of peace negotiations following the

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<sup>33</sup> Edgar O'Ballance, *The Secret War in the Sudan: 1955-1972* (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1977): 48-53.

<sup>34</sup> Douglas H. Johnson, *African Issues: The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003), 222.

August 16, 1986 shoot-down of a Sudan Air civil airliner by southern insurgents.<sup>35</sup> Deep-rooted ethnic divisions were further polarized along religious lines by the Islamist agenda of the National Islamic Front (NIF) government that came to power in 1989.

Several peace negotiations were initiated throughout the 1990's, all of them ineffective. The southern insurgency was divided into several factions that failed to attain a unified bargaining position. Southern opposition eventually coalesced at the turn of the century under the leadership of John Garang and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), which had until then steadfastly asserted sovereign autonomy for the south of Sudan. On January 9, 2005, the government of Sudan and the Sudan People Liberation Movement signed the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Naivasha Kenya, which "effectively ended the 21-year old civil war and triggered a six-year interim period"<sup>36</sup>.

The current crisis reflects underlying tensions and mistrust among South Sudanese leaders and ethnic groups that date back to Sudan's civil war (1983-2005), and before. While the war was described broadly as a north-south conflict, infighting among southern rebel commanders in the 1990s nearly derailed the southern bid for self-determination, as leaders of the insurgency, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/SPLA), competed for power and mobilized supporters along

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<sup>35</sup> Edgar O'Ballance, *Sudan: Civil War and Terrorism: 1956-99*(New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000): 156. The Nimiery regime was ousted by a coup in 1985.

<sup>36</sup> Dagne and Congressional Research Service, "Sudan: The Crisis in Darfur and the Status of the North-South Peace Agreement," 15. The authors misidentify Nairobi as the signing location. Other sources indicate a preference for independence within southern Sudanese public opinion, ironically coincidental with a pervasive distrust of the interim Government of South Sudan (GoSS). See "The Leading Website for South Sudan Secession and National Independence," (n.d.) <http://www.southsudannation.com>(accessed August 10, 2007).

ethnic lines, resulting in atrocities by all sides.<sup>37</sup> The Sudan government in Khartoum fueled SPLM splits by financing and arming breakaway factions. The major factions reconciled in the early 2000s, although several smaller southern militias continued to operate. In 2005, the Khartoum government and the SPLM signed a peace agreement to end the north south war. That deal, known as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), paved the way for national elections and a southern referendum on independence, after which South Sudan, led by the SPLM in Juba, seceded on July 9, 2011. The relationship between the two countries remains tense, with parts of the CPA yet to be fully implemented. Starting in January 2012, South Sudan's government, angered by Khartoum's unilateral decisions regarding exports of South Sudanese oil (which transits through Sudan for export), and by border disputes, suspended oil production for more than a year. This led to fiscal austerity measures and economic shocks in both countries.<sup>38</sup>

### **2.3 IGAD and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa**

In politics, regions are measured as sub-divisions of the globe. Africa seems as region of the world polity that is made up of different and sometimes overlapping sub – regions. Sub regions may have corresponding organization. IGAD is also one of the sub regions that represented the Horn of Africa. IGAD and its member states are in place to develop forums for civil society, community based organization, and important NGOs to participate in promoting peace efforts in Somalia and Sudan. To this end, IGAD has

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<sup>37</sup> U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), "Pillay Urges South Sudan Leadership to Curb Alarming Violence Against Civilians," December 24, 2013.

<sup>38</sup> Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Linda Thomas-Greenfield, Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), *The Situation in South Sudan*, January 9, 2014.

created permanent secretaries to both Sudan and Somalia to spread its peacemaking efforts.<sup>39</sup>

IGAD and the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) consisting of twenty countries, the UN, the World Bank, and EU have assisted in peace processes. The main focus of IGAD is on capacity building and awareness creation, and on the Early Warning of conflicts. In September 2002, the prominent mission in this regard is the establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) around the intra- state conflicts in the Horn of Africa. There are also various forms of intra –state conflicts.

In Somalia, there has been conflict between the transitional government and Al-shahbab to control state power. The terrorists of Al-shahbab attack the transitional government. Terrorism is not the issue only in Somalia but also to all members of the IGAD. Then, IGAD Heads of Governmental and state summit in Khartoum in January 2002 approved a resolution on regional cooperation to combat Terrorism.

### **2.2.1 Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanism of the IGAD**

The issue of peace and security has been the priority in the Horn of Africa region to harmonize and coordinate peacemaking and building activities. And, IGAD works in one of its priority areas that is conflict prevention, management and resolution in the Horn of Africa. Now days, economic growth and poverty reduction programs are associated with the peace and security agenda. So to secure sustainable development, common security is the major prerequisite.

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<sup>39</sup> ibid

The issue of peace and security in the Horn of Africa is prioritized after revitalization of IGAD and its move ahead a broader development mandate. IGAD authorized its peace and security strategy during the 2003 summit. For the commonly security of the collective goal of member states, IGAD had specific agreements and mechanisms. From these, program on conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution; and the protocol on the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) in 2003 are the programs and mechanisms.

In the Sub-region of IGAD, the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra state conflicts are going through the dialogue by the aim of promoting peace, security and stability as well as creating mechanisms to act collectively. But regarding the legal status, the mechanism shall become an integral part of the Inter Government Authority on Development (IGAD). In this mechanism, “only member states which have ratified this protocol are entitled to participate in the activities. The Mechanism has twelve functions: Promote the exchange of information and collaboration among member states of IGAD on conflict early warning and response; Gather, process and analyze information about conflicts; establish network of cooperation in early warning and response among member states; Create, manage and disseminate data bases of information on conflict on early warning within region; Develop close cooperation among in-state early warning and response mechanism in the member states; Establish collaborative relationships, including information sharing with similar international and sub-regional mechanism in Africa; Communicate such information and analysis to decision makers.

Regarding with the collaboration of the protocol of CEWARN especially in the execution of the mandate of the mechanism, the member states cooperate and collaborate one another. In the establishment of CEWARN, the mechanism provides technical assistance to the member states by the approval of the executive secretary. The mechanism may also collaborative with inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations by the approval of the Council of Ministers of IGAD .The mechanism may enter into agreements with similar mechanisms.

However, the mechanism shall have operational autonomy and headed by a Director who shall report to the Executive Secretary. Executive Secretary is the chief Executive Officer of IGAD. But, the IGAD secretariat and the mechanism share personnel, facilities, and equipment to the greatest extent possible. In terms of utilizing documentation facilities of the Secretariat (the executive body of the Authority) the mechanism shall use it. In terms of accessing the documentation facilities, the member states shall have the right to use it.

Furthermore, the resources of the mechanism emanates from the contribution of member states and grants, donations and contribution from other sources that is approved by the assembly of Head of States and Government of IGAD on the advice of the Council of Ministers of IGAD. In co-ordination with the chief executive officer of IGAD, the mechanism shall have the power to ask and receive grants and donations that is related to the performances of its functions. Regarding disputes settlement of the protocol, “it shall be settled friendly or harmoniously, if not, the dispute shall be referred to the Heads of state and Government of IGAD.” Finally, “A Conflict Earning and Prevention

Mechanism for IGAD member states for implementation” is the CEWARN framework project.

### **2.2.1 The IGAD – AU Relations in Conflict Resolution**

Relationship between any entities can be defined in terms of co-existence, cooperation, competition, or conflicts. “IGAD has established liaison office to the AU, mainly to work together with the Departments of Peace and Security, Political Affairs, and Economic Affairs. IGAD, through its liaison office in Addis Ababa attends the meetings of AU Peace and Security Council. In the meetings, the office gives information about the common positions of IGAD. Subsequently the liaison office services contact between the two organizations. On numerous occasions the resolution of IGAD has been adopted by the AU, promoting policy harmonization.

However, in order to institutionalize the relations between IGAD and AU, IGAD has signed a memorandum of understanding with the AU and other Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to coordinate peace and security activities in 2008. Additionally, IGAD and the AU had shown significant level of coordination when the Amazon was deployed. Obviously, IGAD, through its facilitator’s office holds monthly coordination meetings in Nairobi with the AU and the UN about the familiar position of IGAD towards peace and security .And they share information and agree on next steps or strategies and assign activities to avoid duplication of work. (Ibid) During the meeting member states are represented by their resident Ambassadors. This all can show the cooperative relations between the IGAD and AU.

## **2.2.2 Cooperation and Interference Among the members of IGAD in Conflict Resolution**

The IGAD member states-in particular Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya- have exerted substantial efforts in dealing with the lengthened conflict in Somalia as well as the rest of the region. The member states also showed their commitment when they agreed to organize a peace keeping mission like in Somalia in 2005. The member states are ready to amend the mandate of IGAD, which did not permit sending troops to member states. But the main problem for their cooperation is an agreement by IGAD member states which are sensitive about the issue of sovereignty and internal affairs.<sup>40</sup>

Actually, the IGAD member states involved in one of its members one another when there are conflicts in the region of Horn of Africa that factor for the regional instability .In a sense that, there is hostility and rivalry among them. And they interfere in one another indirectly as the same time they also cooperate and work together in their common issues such as boundary disputes, tribal conflicts, the issue of terrorism and others.<sup>41</sup>

Since 1990s, in Djibouti, still there is a kind of intra-state conflict between the Afar and Issa on the ethnic tension. The major contentious issue is to control the state power, and Somalia and Eritrea interfered on it. In the other, from early 1990s-2006 in Uganda, there was civil wars on the contentious issue of autonomy then Sudan interfered on it. In 1993-2005, in Sudan, there was civil war between SPLA and the central government on the question of secession and then Ethiopia and Uganda involved in

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<sup>40</sup> Gordon-Summers, Trevor. 1999. In *Comprehending and mastering African conflicts*, edited by Adebayo Adedeji. London: Zed Books.

resolving the civil war. Since 1991 in Somalia, there was civil war among clans, factions, militia groups on the issue of control of state power, key towns, and ports, and then Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya interfere at the time in the civil wars. There are also interferences among the member states.<sup>42</sup>

Furthermore, from 1960s-1991, there was civil war in Kenya to control the state power. And, Sudan and Somalia were the active actors in interfering on the war. From 1991 up to the present in Ethiopia, there has been intra-state conflict between the small scale armed resistances like that of OLF and ONLF and the central government to control state power and succeeded. Then Eritrea and Somalia interfere on it. All the above factors shows us that there are co-operations and interferences among the member states of IGAD. As well, the IGAD member states, however, consistently engaged their energy, time, and resources to solve the prolonged conflict, which are sensitive about the issue of sovereignty and internal affairs. In the other, the member states work together to solve conflicts in the horn of Africa. Therefore, they cooperate as the same times interfere in one of its members through IGAD and themselves. But most of the time, the member states interfere indirectly in another state for the sake of their political wish as mentioned the above.

## **2.4 Conflict Management at the Horn of African Region**

The characteristics of conflict in the Horn of Africa made the development of peace and security mechanisms both more urgent and more difficult than in other regions

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<sup>42</sup> Harris, P. and B. eds. (1998). *Democracy and Deep Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiations*. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

of Africa<sup>43</sup>. Conflict had occurred at every level – within states, between states and among proxies as well as between government armies. The use of force to achieve political goals was the regional norm and democratic accountability was largely absent. Regime change was generally achieved through violent rather than peaceful means, just as political grievances were typically addressed through armed rebellion. Inequitable sharing of national resources and lack of representation in the structures of government lay at the root of many of the internal conflicts. Large communities experienced economic marginalization and political exclusion, often mirroring ethnic, religious and racial or clan fault lines<sup>44</sup>. Major change has taken place in Somalia since the release of this report in December 2006. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, backed by Ethiopian troops and air power, completely and swiftly dislodged the Islamic Courts movement from power in the capital, Mogadishu, and in Kismayo, the second major city. As a result, the dangers of a “proxy” war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in Somalia and that of a larger regional war, as discussed in the report, seem to have receded.

## **2.6 Chapter Summary**

It has been noted that violent conflicts around the globe are increasingly based on ethnic divisions. Only a tiny proportion of wars now occur between states; the vast majorities are civil wars with ethnic dimensions. The Horn of Africa region is regarded as highly susceptible to conflicts, and is one of the most conflict-prone areas in the

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<sup>43</sup> G.M Khadiagala. *Eastern Africa: Security and the Legacy of Fragility*. (New York: International Peace Institute, 2008b).

<sup>44</sup> S. Healy. ‘Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa: How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel’, *Chatham House Report*. (London: RIIA, 2008).

continent. The Horn is the sub-region of protracted conflict and instability. Over the past six decades there was no single year when the sub region had free from conflict. The next chapter seeks to give some historical insight into the manifest and latent causes of the Somalia and North-South conflict in Sudan as well as the series of events that ushered-in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement; and actors and provisions.

## CHAPTER THREE

### KENYA'S ROLE IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

#### 3.1 Introduction

Chapter two gave a general overview of conflict in Africa. It will also give an overview of conflict in the horn of Africa Eastern Africa. It will also examine IGAD and conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa. Further the study will discuss the role of Kenya in conflict Management at the Horn of African Region.

This chapter critically analyzes the role of Kenya in conflict management in the horn of African sub-region with special reference to the Somalia and Sudanese peace process 2002 - 2005.

#### 3.2 Role of Kenya in Sudan and Somalia peace processes

Kenya has suffered the brunt of instability in the region, notably the influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees as well as illegal arms. The characteristics of conflict in the Horn of Africa made the development of peace and security mechanisms both more urgent and more difficult than in other regions of Africa.<sup>45</sup> Inequitable sharing of national resources and lack of representation in the structures of government lay at the root of many of the internal conflicts. Large communities experienced economic marginalization and political exclusion, often mirroring ethnic, religious and racial or clan fault lines.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> G.M Khadiagala. *Eastern Africa: Security and the Legacy of Fragility*. (New York: International Peace Institute, 2008b).

<sup>46</sup> S. Healy. 'Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa: How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel', *Chatham House Report*. (London: RIIA, 2008).

Major change has taken place in Somalia since the release of this report in December 2006. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, backed by Ethiopian troops and air power, completely and swiftly dislodged the Islamic Courts movement from power in the capital, Mogadishu, and in Kismayo, the second major city. As a result, the dangers of a “proxy” war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in Somalia and that of a larger regional war, as discussed in the report, seem to have receded.

Further agreements were negotiated on security arrangements, power sharing and wealth sharing over the next two years, culminating in the signature on 9 January 2005 of Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The Sudan and Somalia peace processes both relied heavily on Kenyan diplomatic capacity. Kenya supplied the chief negotiator in each case: General Sumbeiywo as mediator in the Sudan process and Ambassador Bethwell Kiplagat for the Somali process. Without Kenya’s neutrality after 1995 IGAD’s Sudan process might not have survived<sup>47</sup>. Kenya went on to play a key role in securing government agreement on the Declaration of Principles when Khartoum was under maximum pressure. Similarly Kenya provided a neutral venue in 2002 for the different Somali parties backed by Ethiopia and Djibouti.

### **3.2.1 Kenya’s Role in Provision of Human Resource Support**

Conflict parties use military means to reach their aims, sometimes killing thousands or tens of thousands of people in the process. During a peace process, conflict parties may slowly realize that they can gain more from negotiating than from fighting. This takes time, however. It also takes people who talk to the conflict parties to try and

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<sup>47</sup> Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). ‘Lessons learnt from the Sudan and Somalia Peace Processes, Brief Report of the Mombassa workshop on July 9-11. (2007a)

understand their motives and intentions, and why they have chosen arms as their means of settling issues. Many mediators attempt to limit the number of intermediaries to keep a peace process manageable. While there is an emerging support infrastructure for peace processes, there is little, if any, support capacity that ensures negotiations are ongoing after a violent conflict has ended. At present, mediation support is mainly perceived as a strategy to find a negotiated exit out of an armed conflict. However, the need to support new transitional pacts as peace agreements are implemented is well known, but too little is done in practice to support these.

### **3.3 Kenya's Role in the Horn of African Region**

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### **3.3.2 Mediation Process**

Mediation is also an important aspect of peace building and, if properly utilised could achieve not just a settlement of conflict but facilitate a full transformation of relations. If peace building is defined as identifying and supporting those structures that

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<sup>48</sup> Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). 'Lessons learnt from the Sudan and Somalia Peace Processes, Brief Report of the Mombassa workshop on July 9-11. (2007a)

can strengthen and solidify peace in the aftermath of peacemaking and peacekeeping then peace building encompasses a range of activities and structures before, during and after formal peace agreements between parties are signed. It is also therefore a dynamic process of resolving conflict and rebuilding societies involving mechanisms and structures that can prevent, terminate, transform or resolve conflict. It further involves mechanisms and structures that can strengthen the capacity of a society to manage change without violence. This may involve addressing the root causes of conflict through long-term economic and social provisions as well as policies of reconciliation.

There is a growing recognition of the potential of mediation outside its traditional role in conflict resolution. The OECD highlighted the role of mediation in strengthening the resilience capacity of states and state-society relations. Important elements include supporting dialogue processes between civil society, the private sector and state institutions.<sup>37</sup> Mediation initiatives have also strengthened private sector investment in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Between 2004 and 2006, local mediators resolved disputes between companies and thereby facilitated the release of €8 million in private-sector investments. These examples illustrate the potential gains of mediation support activities for economic development. Identifying the value added of current mediation practice provides important insights into strengthening political accords and economic conditions in war-to-peace transitions.

Defining a role for development agencies as strategic partners for peacemaking is therefore an important element to managing the transition from war to peace. Their engagement during a peace process can help create a new vision of the economy and society that convinces parties that it is worthwhile to stop fighting. If a future without

armed conflict becomes a more viable reality, the parties to a peace process may increase their commitment in negotiations as companies commit to post-conflict economies before the signature of a peace agreement. In addition, development actors can marshal important financial flows into conflict countries that could be used as incentives for peace.

In Summary, contextually, the civil society led by international non-governmental organizations such as the Carter Foundation which made several efforts to mediate in the conflict prior to the involvement of IGAD, the stalemate reached by both the SPLM/A and NCP brought about by the collapse of the Cold War and acceptance of IGAD, especially Kenya, to lead the mediation process gave the process legitimacy.

### **3.4 Kenya's Achievements in Conflict Management at the Horn of African Sub-Region**

Kenya's conflict-resolution activities have displayed a clear, unresolved tension, characterized by mutual suspicion, alliance-building and power play among states, the regional organisation – seeking to develop the institutional capacity to improve peace and security and give practical assistance towards conflict resolution<sup>49</sup>. The key question is what impact Kenya's reconciliation activities have had in enhancing peace in the region, among states as well as within Sudan and Somalia<sup>50</sup>. In the case of Sudan an assessment of the success of the CPA cannot ignore the conflict that erupted in Darfur towards the end of the CPA negotiations. The negotiation of the CPA could be seen as a contributing

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<sup>49</sup> G. L. Khadiagala. *Eastern Africa: Security and the Legacy of Fragility*. (New York: International Peace Institute, 2008a).

<sup>50</sup> S. Healy. 'Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa: How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel', *Chatham House Report*. (London: RIIA, 2008).

cause of the Darfur rebellion because it provided an example to other marginalised groups that armed struggle could secure political advantage.<sup>51</sup> It also aroused fears among the Darfur is that their own marginalization would be entrenched since the CPA negotiations purported to be a national settlement but involved only two parties.<sup>52</sup>

Despite bringing an end to the war in the South, the CPA has been widely criticized for the limited scope of the negotiation to address the problems of Sudan as a whole. It was confined to the Northern government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (excluding other key constituencies in the country, including in the South) and failed to involve civil society or other stakeholders who were needed to build a sustainable peace<sup>53</sup>. Some of its weaknesses are implicitly a product of how the problem was framed when the organisation was first seized of the matter<sup>54</sup>. As befits a forum for regional co-operation, Kenya's frame of reference was to settle a troublesome conflict rather than to achieve the transformation of Sudan. It was about empowering the South, upholding their right not to live under Sharia law and giving them the option to gain independence. On all these scores the CPA can be regarded as a considerable success.

However, when there is not enough of a given resource to satisfy everyone's needs or wants, and no more can be found or created, the conflict becomes a "win-lose" situation. The more one party gets, the less the other party gets (or the more he or she "loses"). When the item in question is very important or valuable, these conflicts tend to become very intractable. For example, conflicts over water in arid lands are high-stakes classic distributional conflicts. In the Western United States, as well as many other arid

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<sup>51</sup> P. Woodward. 'Somalia and Sudan, a Tale of Two Peace Processes', *Round Table* 375: 469-82 (2004).

<sup>52</sup> Nathan (2007).

<sup>53</sup> J. Young. *The Sudan Peace Process, a study commissioned by IGAD* (2007).

<sup>54</sup> L. Cliffe. 'The Sudan-IGAD Peace Process: Signposts for the way forward', *African Security Analysis Programme Occasional Paper* 86, (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2004).

regions, water is extremely valuable, as life cannot exist without it. Because there is not enough water to go around, endless conflicts arise about who gets what amount of water for what purpose. Although individual disputes get resolved, another dispute over the same water will almost certainly arise again later on.<sup>55</sup>

Domination conflicts are a special type of high-stakes distributional conflict in which the resource to be distributed is social status. Because most groups want to be on top of the social, economic, and/or political hierarchy, there is often a perpetual struggle between those at the top and those at the bottom. Conflicts over social status can occur between individuals or between nations. Because issues of social status are connected to matters of unequal economic power, the divide between the rich and poor has contributed to intractable conflict both within nations and across international society as a whole.<sup>56</sup>

### **3.5 Chapter Summary**

This chapter looked at the role of Kenya in Sudan and Somalia peace processes. Specifically this chapter discussed Kenya's role in provision of human resources support and also her role in Mediation process. The next chapter will summarize key findings from the study and make policy recommendations based on the findings.

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<sup>55</sup> K. Domenici & S. W. Littlejohn. *Mediation Empowerment in Conflict Management*. Prospect Heights, (IL: Waveland Press, Inc. Education, Inc. Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 2001).

<sup>56</sup> P. Woodward. 'Somalia and Sudan, a tale of two peace processes', *Round Table* 375: 469-82 (2004).

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **THE IMPACT OF SPILL OVER CONFLICT INTO KENYA FROM THE CONFLICT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

Chapter three critically analyzed the role of Kenya in conflict management in the horn of African sub-region with special reference to the Somalia and Sudanese peace process 2002 - 2005. This chapter will discuss the impact of spillover conflicts into Kenya from the conflict in the Horn of Africa. The chapter discusses the factors contributing to Conflicts in the Northern and North Eastern Regions of Kenya.

#### **4.2 The Spillover Conflicts in Kenya**

Just like Ethiopia, Kenya shares historical factors with Somalia regarding ethnic and geographical aspects. The Northeastern province of Kenya is predominantly inhabited by a Somali ethnic population, but unlike Ethiopia, Kenya had no interstate wars with Somalia. However, tensions between the two countries over the Somali inhabited region occurred right after the independence of Somalia. The first Somali independent state declared its intention to unify the Somalia inhabited regions in the horn of Africa under one state in which northeastern province of Kenya includes. Northern Frontier Liberation Army (NFLA), an ethnic Somalia secessionist movement, was established in the early 1960s to fight against Kenyan rule in this region. The Somali

government at the time backed up this movement and provided them moral and material support.<sup>57</sup>

In spite of history, Kenya has always been friendly with the Somali people since the war broke out in Somalia in 1991. Kenya accommodated the largest number of Somali refugees who fled the war in Somalia. According to UNHCR<sup>58</sup> Kenya hosts about a half a million Somali refugees as per this year, while the conflict in Somalia still continues (UNHCR, 2014). The fact that all conflicts affect regional countries in several ways, the scale of Somali refugees in Kenya could hugely affect this country in variable aspects. This exemplifies Brown's concept on regional dimensions in internal conflict. He explains that refugee is a result of internal conflict and it mostly affects the neighboring countries.<sup>59</sup>

Even though Kenya hosts the largest number of Somali refugees in the world, Kenya's role in the Somali conflict remained quite neutral for many years. Kenya has been involved in mediation processes between internal actors and hosted several peace processes meant to reconcile conflicting parts in Somalia. This included the one held 2002-2004 in under the auspices of IGAD member states and international community producing the TFG.<sup>60</sup> Regardless of its role in the conflict, Kenya always experienced insecurity incidents posed by this conflict since it broke out in 1991.<sup>61</sup> This relates to

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<sup>57</sup> Moller, Bjorn, (2009). The Somalia Conflict, the Role of External Actors. Danish Institute for International Studies, 34

<sup>58</sup> UNHCR. (2012). Refugee Population in Kenya. (<http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/tehis/vtx/home>)  
Accessed: May.21-2014

<sup>59</sup> Brown, Michael E. (1996). The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict. Center for Science and International Affairs. John F. Canady School of Government, Havard University, Cambridge. Massachusetts

<sup>60</sup> Moller (2009) page 3.

<sup>61</sup> Miyandazi, Luckystar. (2012). Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia: An intricate Process Policy & Practice Brief. Issue 19. The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes.

Brown's explanation about provocative actions of internal conflicts against neighboring states arguing that problems of refugee and insecurity "spill over" are amongst factors that can lead regional states to involve in local conflicts.<sup>62</sup>

Due to the changing dimensions of Somalia's conflict, the threats it poses against Kenya increased when Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda, who controlled larger areas in SCS threatened, to destabilize Kenya. The terrorist organization carried out several attacks inside Kenya targeting tourism and other economic sources of the country. Moreover, the group started to recruit youngsters of Kenya, Somalis in Kenya and other Muslim nationals inside Kenya to join them.<sup>63</sup>

The Kenyan government perceived this as serious security problem against its national security and interest. Recruitment of youngsters could provide the terrorist organization a capacity to destabilize Kenya through "home grown" elements. Consequently, the Kenyan government changed its behavior towards the Somali conflict by sending the Kenyan defense forces (KDF) into Somalia to fight Al-Shabbab and prevent their attacks against Kenya.<sup>64</sup>

In relation to the dimensions and the behavior of the actors in the Somalia conflict, the conflict can be classified as what Kaldor explained to be "new wars".<sup>65</sup> Recruitment of young men of different nationality by Al-Shabaab and involvement of Al-Qaeda, indicates a new war character in this conflict.

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<sup>62</sup> Brown (1996) page 591

<sup>63</sup> Ibid page 160

<sup>64</sup> ICG. (2012). The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia. International Crises Group. African Report. Feb. 15-2012. No.184

<sup>65</sup> Kaldor, Mary. (2012). New and Old Wars. 3rd edition, Stanford University Press: Stanford, California

According to Kaldor,<sup>66</sup> actors in the new conflict era indoctrinate fighters through identity or ideology such as religion, political and clan identity. Therefore, Al-Shabaab's behavior in Kenya is an obvious characteristic of "new wars". Furthermore, Brown<sup>67</sup> explained that local conflicts have great potential to "spill over" and create military problems for neighboring states. He argues that internal conflict generates instability in neighboring states, creating political and economic instability. In the case of Somalia, Al-Shabaab abducted aid workers and tourists in Kenya creating security and economic instability in that country.

In response to the challenges affecting the national security and interest, the Kenyan government increased its involvement in Somalia by integrating the Kenyan forces in Somalia with the AMISOM peacekeeping forces operating under the mandate of the AU and UNSC. The Kenyan forces operating in Somalia initially invaded Somalia with an individual self-defense decision by the Kenyan government. The AU and UNSC officially allowed KDF to join AMISOM peacekeeping forces through in UNSC resolution 2036 of February 2012. The resolution provides legal framework, mandates and resources to the Kenyan forces to fight Al-Shabaab in Somalia.<sup>68</sup>

In the context of security threats coming from fighting groups in Somalia, Kenya's interventionist action in Somalia indicates what Brown called a "Defensive intervention"; Brown points out that states take such interventions in internal conflicts when their national security and interest are threatened by actors in nearby conflicts.<sup>69</sup> However, the motive for this type of intervention is not to end the conflict in the first

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid Page 164

<sup>67</sup> Brown (1996), page 599-600

<sup>68</sup> African Union Mission in Somalia. (2014)

<sup>69</sup> Brown (1996) page 596

point, but to stop it from spreading into Kenyan borders. States do this in different approaches, but the core motive is defending own national security.

In this context, in order to protect its own national security, Kenya strives for peace and stability in Somalia, particularly in the nearby regions. Therefore, in order to get security in her territories, an active Somali regional state in the nearby regions is an option for Kenya. This creates a security buffer zone to protect Kenyan national security and interest. Moreover, Kenya argues that such an authority can create a safe and secure environment for Somali refugees living in Kenya to return and resettle in their country.<sup>70</sup>

Even though Somalia's conflict has prolonged and passed through different dimensions and multiple identities, the intervention by neighboring states such as Kenya and Ethiopia can lead the conflict to a new dimension with new identities based on regional states. The behavior of Kenya in this conflict is unlikely to produce a holistic solution for Somalia's conflict; it rather focuses on a partial solution in which its national interest is bounded. Even though, Kenya explained this as an action of defensive intervention which Brown explains to be when states intervene others' conflicts with the objectives of self-defense and target "to bring cross-border problems (such as refugee flows or military assaults) to an end, to keep wars from spreading or more ambitiously, to bring wars to an end".<sup>71</sup> However, Kenya's action in backing up specific communities in a local conflict looks like what Brown explained as "protective intervention". Brown,

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<sup>70</sup> Eriksson, Mikael (2013). Somalia's Civil War, Security Promotion and National Interest. Swedish Defense Research Agency FOI-R--3718—SE. ISSN 1650-1942. Mainstay of defense

<sup>71</sup> Brown (1996) Page 597

explains such an intervention is “designed to protect or assist ethnic brethren involved in hostilities elsewhere”.<sup>72</sup>

Even though Kenya’s action in this conflict is necessitated by national security threats, its behavior to back up Jubbaland can be perceived as “protective intervention”. In line with this, the FGS criticized the Kenyan government of aiding specific communities in Somalia; The Ogaden clan who predominantly occupies Jubbaland has also a strong influence in Kenya.<sup>73</sup>

### **4.3 Causes of Spill over Conflicts in the Horn of Africa**

#### **4.3.1 Postcolonial Global Environment**

The global environment in the postcolonial era has also contributed to the region’s inter-state and intra-state conflicts, although external intervention has also been life-saving, especially during calamities. The ideology and politics of the Cold War, for example, had a significant influence on the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict (1961-91). US strategic interests in general and its interest in inheriting a communications base left behind by Italy following the fall of its East Africa empire in 1941 was one of the factors that led to the ill-fated federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia.<sup>74</sup>

The intensity of the Ethiopia Somalia conflicts was also exacerbated by the rivalry of the superpowers in arming the two countries. The imposition of structural adjustment programmes through the conditionalities of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank represented another intervention that intensified social inequalities and the

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<sup>72</sup> Ibid Page 597

<sup>73</sup> Erickson (2013) page 57.

<sup>74</sup> Yohannes, O.,( 1997), The United States and the Horn of Africa: An Analytical Study of Pattern and Process. Boulder CO: Westview Press

rift between the modern and traditional economic sectors. The post-September 11 War on Terror is another factor that has divided the countries of the region into different camps and facilitated external intervention in Somalia's civil wars. External support to regimes who profess to be partners in the War on Terror, despite their poor record on human rights and democratization, also seems to be worsening state society relations.<sup>75</sup>

#### **4.3.2 Massive Environmental Degradation**

Another contextual factor that has contributed to the conflicts and instability of the Horn of Africa is the highly increasing rate of environmental degradation the region faces. Much of the region is arid or semi-arid and has over the last five or so decades faced rapid environmental degradation, manifested in frequent droughts and chronic food and water shortages. Global climate changes and various human activities, including rapid population growth, changes in land-use patterns and chronic conflict, have contributed to the environmental degradation, which has culminated in economic and social dislocation, displacement and widespread resource-based conflicts. Deteriorating environmental conditions have exerted increasing pressure on the region's populations, especially peasants and nomads, and have resulted in land and water-based communal conflicts.<sup>76</sup>

Ecologically, the North-Rift and North-Eastern regions of Kenya are an arid and semiarid region, characterized by steady erosion of natural resources from which households and communities construct their livelihoods. Given the fact that cattle rustling

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<sup>75</sup> Woodward, P., (2006), *US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa*. Hampshire, UK and Burlington, USA: Ashgate.

<sup>76</sup> Salehyan, I., (2008), "From Climate Change to Conflict? No Consensus Yet", *Journal of Peace Research* 45(3):315–26.

is the main source of income, competition over control and access to natural resources such as pasture and water have contributed to the violence among pastoralist communities. The tensions between the communities tend to intensify during prolonged droughts and this shrinks economic prospects for affected groups.<sup>77</sup>

#### **4.3.3 Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons**

The widespread ownership and easy availability of small arms in the border areas is widely cited as an intensifier of armed conflicts in the Horn of Africa. The flood of small arms in the Horn of Africa is well-documented, as is the devastating impact of semi-automatic weaponry on communal conflicts in the region. Criminal violence produces much higher casualty levels, criminal and militia gangs now often outgun police and military units, and the number of people a militia can massacre in a raid is vastly higher thanks to semi-automatic guns. The result is that casualty rates in contemporary violence in the border area are much higher than was the case fifty years ago, overwhelming customary law designed to handle conflicts from an earlier, less lethal era.<sup>78</sup>

Given the chronic insecurity and porous borders in the region, small arms proliferation will remain a dangerous reality for border area communities for the foreseeable future. Some modest efforts in Wajir have succeeded in disarming youth, but prospects for large-scale disarmament in the region are remote for now. In southern Somalia, the only factor which has reduced the lethal risk posed by near-universal

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<sup>77</sup> UNHR (2004)

<sup>78</sup> Kieh, G. and Mukenge, I. ed. (2002) *Zones of Conflict in Africa: Theories and Cases*, London: Greenwood Publishing Group

ownership of semi-automatics is the substantial rise in the cost of ammunition, which has shortened the duration of armed clashes since the early 1990s.

The infiltration and abuse of guns is also a major cause and intensifier of conflict in northern Kenya. Small arms, including automatic and semi automatic rifles have become widely available (especially in Wajir) and are increasingly used in the pastoralist districts. This has led to the militarization of the communities, fuelled insecurity and criminalization of the traditional practice of raiding. Pastoralists claim to use these guns for security and protection. Besides protection and raiding, guns are also kept for prestige, especially among the youths. In Marsabit, informants hinted that ownership of a gun is greatly valued in the district. According to the document —Profile of Internal Displacement: Kenya, which was prepared by UNHCR in 2003, there are about over 100,000 illegal guns in districts of Turkana, Samburu, and West Pokot.<sup>79</sup>

The weapons come from a variety of sources, including conflict prone neighboring countries like Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia and Northern Uganda. In West Pokot district the guns are sourced from Pokot and Turkana gun merchants. Some GoK officials also conspire with the community by selling guns to them. Each community is trying to arm itself, creating a local ‘arms races’. Guns are paid for in terms of animals. It is therefore safe to assume that the rustling activities are motivated by the gun culture.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> UNHCR (2004)

<sup>80</sup> Sanders, E., (2009), “Changing Climate, changing Lives – Fleeing Drought in the Horn of Africa”, *The Los Angeles Times* (25 October)

#### **4.3.4 Porous Borders**

The existence of the borders shared by Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya are themselves a periodic contributor to conflict. The principal role they play in conflict is as a source of safe haven for armed groups - criminal gangs and militia - which commit acts of violence and then cross to the safety of their home country and disappear. The shared border area near Mandera is known locally as the "Bennuda triangle" for precisely this reason. This dynamic points to a curious aspect of the borders - they are relatively unpatrolled, ungoverned and porous, but not irrelevant. Kenyan military do not cross the border in hot pursuit of Somali bandits for fear of attack; Somali militias cross into Kenya in pursuit of rival combatants only reluctantly, for fear of encountering the Kenyan military or police; and Somali armed bandits take the same risk when mounting a cross-border raid. In practice, this has meant that the Kenyan Garre have been able to use the border to launch attacks on EI Wak in Somalia and retreat across the border with little fear of Marehan counterattack, a tactic which infuriates the Marehan and has led them to accuse Kenya of favoring the Garre. Further south, Somali bandits have until recently stolen vehicles and even looted the Kenyan police station at Liboi and then retreated back to Doble. On the Kenyan-Ethiopian border, militia and possibly Ethiopian paramilitary forces have crossed into Kenya to commit devastating livestock raids.<sup>81</sup>

#### **4.3.5 Failure of Regional Governance**

The failure of the region's states in transforming their socioeconomic structures and institutional systems is compounded by the failure of regional and continental intergovernmental organisations. The countries of the Greater Horn are members of

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<sup>81</sup> Pkalya, R., Adan, M., and Masinde, I. (2003) Conflicts in Northern Kenya. A Focus on the Internally Displaced Conflict Victims. Edited by M. Karimi. Nairobi: ITDG.

IGAD, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), as well as the African Union. Yet none of these intergovernmental bodies has been effective in reducing the conflicts of the region. Although the continent is replete with border disputes, intergovernmental organizations, including the African Union, have yet to develop effective mechanisms for settling boundary disputes before they escalate into war. These organizations have also not been able to develop mechanisms that would ease the challenge of fragmented ethnic identities.

Somalia's attempts to redraw its colonial boundaries in order to unite all Somalis under one state received little support from other African states or the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in the early 1960s. The OAU decided that colonial boundaries are sacrosanct since tampering with them was likely to open a Pandora's Box and lead to wars all over the continent. Undoubtedly, redrawing colonial boundaries would be risky. However, the OAU and AU have not instituted mechanisms that would allow populations divided by national boundaries to maintain their economic and cultural ties with each other through flexible borders. Furthermore, despite the numerous conflicts the region as well as the continent face, the regional organizations as well as the African Union have yet to establish effective conflict-resolution mechanisms.

The patterns of conflict in the North Rift and North Eastern regions are complex. Many factors contribute to violent conflicts involving pastoralists and these factors have tended to become mutually enforcing. Historically, conflicts in Kenya are closely linked to land tenure issues and the country's colonial past. However, recently conflicts over access to water and pasture are also considered the major causes of violence and displacement among pastoralists in Northern Kenya. Physical boundaries cutting across

traditional migratory routes and wars in neighboring countries bring increased problems in accessing traditional grazing resources. These conflicts are often exacerbated by prolonged drought and the proliferation of small arms. There are also rife allegations that the economically powerful people are behind livestock thefts and politicians encourage conflicts to flush out potential supporters of their political opponents. All these factors plus the remoteness and nomadic nature of pastoralists compound and complicate the whole conflict management process in Northern Kenya.<sup>82</sup>

#### **4.3.6 Cattle Rustling and Banditry**

Historically, animal raiding between tribes was considered a cultural practice, with a long history. It was sanctioned and controlled by the elders. The Pokot, Turkana, Marakwet, Tugen and Keiyo raided each other but lived harmoniously (until the onset of multi-party politics in the 1990s). Yet there has emerged a new system of predatory exploitation of the pastoral economic resources manifesting itself in the form of banditry and cattle rustling. Political parties were formed following tribal lines, and as a result, the tension between tribes increased leading to a displacement of the pastoralist community. The result is that a big section of the pastoralist community has been displaced.

As the practice gained political character, raiders began to disregard the seasonal aspect of cattle theft and the raids eventually acquired diligent and criminal tendencies.<sup>83</sup> Proliferation of illicit arms, inadequate policing and state arrangements and the diminishing role of traditional governance systems are among the factors that have

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<sup>82</sup> UNHCR (2004).

<sup>83</sup> UNHCR(2003)

contributed to the transformation of traditional conflicts to increasingly destructive and unmanageable events.<sup>84</sup>

#### **4.4 Impact of Spill Over Conflicts**

As a consequence of the spill over conflicts, the human security situation in the Northern part of Kenya has been deteriorating. In the North-Rift and North-Eastern region of Kenya, more than three-quarters of the population lives below the poverty line. The general characteristics include poor infrastructure; inadequate health; poor education and low income generating avenues, and high level of starvation and malnutrition. Most of the population lives 25km averagely from water sources and health clinics are situated around the same distance too. Given the risky nature of the environment, in the recent years disease killed about 60 % of the livestock in the region. Statistically, as a consequence of pastoralists' conflicts, 164,457 people were displaced with 70 % being women and children below 14 years. The Northern districts are among the ten poorest districts in Kenya in all the development indices. School enrolment rates are below national average and a majority of people depending on relief food. The spillover conflicts have resulted to the violation of the rights of the displaced especially women and children who register an increased number of rape cases, physical assault and child labor.<sup>85</sup>

Due to conflicts, residents in the Northern Kenya have been forced to move from their homes because of life threatening reasons. Some of the reasons being natural or manmade disasters such as civil conflicts, political persecutions and human rights

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<sup>84</sup> Pkalya, R., Adan, M., and Masinde, I. (2003) Conflicts in Northern Kenya. A Focus on the Internally Displaced Conflict Victims. Edited by M. Karimi. Nairobi: ITDG.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid

violation. People living in the borders of Kenya and Somalia lack access to basic social needs such as food, employment, education, and health care, and still face consistent violence and human rights violations as a result of the spill over conflicts.

The number of internally displaced people have increased tremendously in the Northern Kenya. However their plight has not received adequate national and international attention. Since internally displaced persons do not cross international borders and they do not receive international protection and related support after crossing the border, these individuals face relatively more problems in getting assistance and protection than refugees. Even after the displacement, many of them are exposed to violence and other human rights violations.<sup>86</sup> A strong correlation between displacements and rape cases, physical assaults, prostitution, growing number of street rogues and child labour was noted.<sup>87</sup> Often IDPs have no or only very limited access to food, employment, education and health care.<sup>88</sup>

Among IDPs, particularly children, women and elderly are seriously suffering from their situation. Displaced children, who consists about 75% of the displace people, are mainly suffering from psychological issues and living situations. Many of the children displaced end up as street children in urban areas like Nairobi where they are being beaten and often killed by the police. Many of the displaced children had witnessed the death of close family members or they themselves are injured, or orphaned. As a

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<sup>86</sup> UNHCR (2006)

<sup>87</sup> Pkalya, R., Adan, M., and Masinde, I. (2003) Conflicts in Northern Kenya. A Focus on the Internally Displaced Conflict Victims. Edited by M. Karimi. Nairobi: ITDG.

<sup>88</sup> IDMC(2006)

result, some of them are displaying aggressive behaviour or suffering from nightmares. The education of displaced children is often disrupted in many cases permanently.<sup>89</sup>

Displaced women are often suffering from sexual assaults and security risks. According to the study from UNHCR's report on —Profile of Internal Displacement: Kenya, after becoming displaced, gender inequalities were exacerbated. Women become the victims of rape, beatings, exposed to sexually-transmitted diseases, poverty, manipulation, hunger, fear, anger, anxiety, trauma, despondency, dehumanization, heavy workload, and physical fatigue. Unprotected sex also causes a high rate of HIV/AIDS infection among displaced women. Unprotected sex often happens violently or is forced by the poor living situations.

#### **4.5 Chapter Summary**

Spill over conflicts have indeed caused enormous human suffering and produced devastating impacts on political order and economic growth in the Horn of Africa, so a shift in interest to processes of internationalization is understandable. The conflict affects various states in the region and poses a threat to both regional security and stability, and emerges as a key concern for policy-makers. Indeed, conflicts have been elevated to the domain of high politics, a realm previously occupied by international crisis, ideological conflict, and interstate war. Given the continued complexity and importance of the issue, it is important to identify a framework for understanding the spill over conflicts. The argument is that specific combinations of institutions and ethnic composition can inhibit internationalization by directly influencing the distribution of capabilities among leaders of groups.

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<sup>89</sup> UNHCR(2001)

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

This study aimed to assess the impact of conflicts in the horn of Africa with a special focus on Kenya. The first objective of the study aimed to provide an overview of conflict in Somalia and Sudan: Drivers and Dynamics. The second objective aimed to critically analyze the role of Kenya in conflict management as it has been the main mediator in both Somalia and Sudan peace processes and the final objective aimed to analyze the impact of spill over conflict into Kenya from the conflict in the Horn of Africa.

#### **5.2 Summary**

Chapter two gave an general overview of conflict in the horn of Africa Eastern Africa. It also examined IGAD and conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa and discussed the role of Kenya in conflict Management at the Horn of African Region. It was noted at the end of the chapter that the Horn of Africa region is regarded as highly susceptible to conflicts, and is one of the most conflict-prone areas in the continent. The Horn is the sub-region of protracted conflict and instability. Over the past six decades there was no single year when the sub region had free from conflict. The next chapter seeks to give some historical insight into the manifest and latent causes of the Somalia and North-South conflict in Sudan as well as the series of events that ushered-in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement; and actors and provisions.

Chapter three critically analyzed the role of Kenya in conflict management in the horn of African sub-region with special reference to the Somalia and Sudanese peace process 2002 – 2005. It was noted that Kenya has played a major role in conflict management in Sudan and Somalia. This has been in the form of provision of human resources as well as well as the undertaking of mediation processes.

This chapter four discussed the impact of spillover conflicts into Kenya from the conflict in the Horn of Africa. The chapter further discussed the factors contributing to conflicts in the Northern and North Eastern Regions of Kenya. It was established that as a result of the spillover conflicts, the human security situation in the Northern part of Kenya has deteriorated. In the North-Rift and North-Eastern region of Kenya, conflicts have resulted to increased levels of poverty with more than three-quarters of the population living below the poverty line. Spill over conflicts have also resulted to the displacement of population in the Northern Kenya with more and more residents being forced to move from their homes because of life threatening reasons; with some of the reasons being natural or manmade disasters such as political persecutions and human rights violation.

### **5.3 Conclusions**

The resolution and management of conflicts in the horn of Africa has posed a major challenge to regional organizations, states, regional and the international community. The conflicts in the Northern Region of Kenya are no exception. These conflicts are mainly concentrated in the borders of Somalia and Sudan and also involve pastoralists. In recent times conflicts between host and refugee communities and within the community itself over the management of natural resources has span over

time. There have been numerous attempts made by the government of Kenya to resolve these conflicts. Policies papers and documents have been written and revised, conventions have been held, but the major problem lies on the implementation of the various resolutions. The International Community too has been actively involved in seeing that the quality of life of those affected by these conflicts in Northern Kenya is improved. The inflow of humanitarian/development assistance is something worth mentioning.

In spite of the inflow of resources from the international community for the resolution the conflict and consequent development in the Horn of Africa, the results are very minimal as compared to the resources tailored for its development. So the question is; if all these attempts to resolve the conflict and develop this region have proved to be ineffective, what are the ultimate measures which could be adopted for the resolution and management of conflicts, likewise the development of area to improve livelihood patterns?

The recognition of conflict resolution and management in the Horn of Africa is lacking and the states in the region have not come out with detail policy document which can effectively tackle conflict in the region, beginning from the root causes of the various conflicts, how it evolved, and parties' concerned, attempted measures to resolve these conflicts, etc. On the other hand, the international community is not more concerned with how to punish the perpetrators of these conflicts. A regional policy has also not been adopted for the resolution and management of conflicts in the Horn of Africa. As a result, the states cannot adequately facilitate the control of certain pertinent issues directly or indirectly related to conflict management in the region.

The humanitarian/development aid provided by the international community has gone a long way to improve on the lives of stakeholder's community in Northern Kenya. The humanitarian/development aid has increase dependency, laziness and in some cases conflicts between the refugee and host community especially in the Northern Kenya. This is mainly because finances have been channel through wrong sources and also directed to wrong projects with limited follow-up. It is worthwhile mentioning here that most of the projects in Northern Kenya are concentrated on relief and especially in the refugee camps. The few developmental projects in the host community are generally not sustainable, with little or no proper methods of monitoring and evaluation.

The key issue why development in the Horn of Africa is not proportionate to the resources geared towards its development is because the projects are misdirected with little or no involvement of stakeholders directly affected by these conflicts. By so doing these projects have always failed because there is no sense of ownership of the projects by the communities involved because they consider them foreign.

#### **5.4 Recommendations**

Regional bodies and institutions in the Horn of Africa need to play a significant role as platforms for interstate collaboration on security issues and conflict management. Protracted conflicts, regional insurgencies, and cross border criminality stress border and national-level response systems, and regional organizations should be considered very essential for monitoring, prevention, and cross border response mechanisms. The intergovernmental relations must be improved across the region, particularly between Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and South Sudan, and provide new opportunities for conflict management.

The most important aspect of regional conflict mitigation mechanisms in the Horn of Africa should be the growing region-wide commitment to managing conflict and instability along borders. This must be combined with some hopeful signs of improved levels of trust and cooperation between regional states in order to maintain support for existing regional institutions engaged in conflict early warning and mitigation.

Regional organizations must expand their existing cross border peace-building programs along the Somali-Kenya border. The organizations must have programs with components designed to strengthen all three pillars of borderland governance and conflict mitigation in the Horn of Africa to actively foster and routinize cooperation between these three pillars.

The Peace II model along the Somali-Kenya border builds on the highly successful work of USAID in northern Kenya since the late 1990s, in support of local civic peace builders. Peace II has effectively expanded and refined that model and has built a strong network of civic conflict management along the border. It has also advanced a peace dividend approach along the border, encouraging shared use of valuable services (schools, health posts, markets) across the border. Southern Somalia is now in the midst of major political changes: the rollback of AlShabaab in border areas, and the end of the transitional government. This is a period when effective borderland governance needs continued support. The study recommends, as a result, that the Peace II project be extended along the Somali–Kenya border.

The study also recommends that the Peace II model be extended across other parts of the Horn of Africa and possibly along the Ethiopia-South Sudan and the Sudan-South

Sudan borders wherever local and central governments are amenable and as far as budgetary constraints will allow. The model may require adaptation in Ethiopian border areas due to restrictions on Ethiopian civic organizations, but this has already been managed with the CEWERUs.

Finally, there must be continued and carefully calibrated support to the CEWARN system mechanism in IGAD. Despite frustration with some aspects of CEWARN's performance, it remains an essential pillar of borderland peace building, and continued support to CEWARN is important to regional states such as Ethiopia. Also, there should be more attention and resources on specific capacity-building initiatives to strengthen monitoring and reporting mechanisms as well as systematic dissemination of this information to key stakeholders and groups responsible for border conflict prevention and management.

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**APPENDICES**

**Appendix 1: Questionnaire**

Section A: Demographic information of the respondents

1. Designation: .....

2. Organization: .....

3. How long have you worked in your capacity? .....

4. Gender

Male [ ]

Female [ ]

5. Age

(Tick where appropriate)

18-24 years [ ] 25-34 years [ ] 35-44 years [ ] 45-54 years [ ] Over 55 years [ ]

6. Education

(Tick where appropriate)

Formal [ ] Informal [ ]

7. How many years have you worked in the region?

(Tick where appropriate)

1-10 years [ ] 10-20 years [ ] Over 20 years [ ]

Section B: Information spill over conflicts in Kenya

8. What are the causes of spillover conflicts in Kenya? Explain

.....  
.....

9. How has the Kenya Government responded to the spillover conflicts?

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.....  
.....

10. What actions have been taken by regional organizations to mitigating spillover conflicts in Kenya and what tools are used?

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.....  
.....

11. To what extent has the interventions helped?

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.....  
.....

12. How does the regional organizations coordinate peace dialogues/initiatives between states and communities in the Horn of Africa?

.....  
.....  
.....

13. To what extent does regional organizations a partner with states in the Horn of Africa in trying to promote peace between communities and states in the region?

.....  
.....  
.....

14. Who is responsible for the coordination of the peace initiatives within Horn Africa?

.....  
.....  
.....

15. What are the challenges faced by regional organizations in the implementation of peace initiatives between states and communities involved in violent conflicts in the Horn of Africa?

**THANK YOU**