

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND ARCHAEOLOGY

M. A. RESEARCH PROJECT

**ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF 2007/08 POST ELECTION VIOLENCE ON
THE GIRL CHILD IN THE KIBERA SLUM, 2008-2013**

Presenter: Christopher Mumo Musyoka

Reg. No. C50/72172/2008

Research paper submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Master of Arts degree in Armed Conflict and Peace Studies, Department of History and Archaeology, University of Nairobi.

OCTOBER, 2014

DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, declare that this research paper is my original work and that it has not been presented to any other university or institution for any academic recognition

Signature: _____

Date:

Name: Christopher Mumo Musyoka

Reg. No: C50/72172/2008

This research work has been submitted for examination with our approval as the University

department supervisors:

Signature: _____

Date:

Professor Godfrey Muriuki, EBS

Signature: _____

Date:

Dr. H. Misigo Amatsimbi

DEDICATION

This research work is dedicated to the Almighty God for His grace and sufficiency, my beloved wife Belindah, my two daughters, Favour and Joy, and my son Dominator, my parents Julius and Rose, my beloved brother Peter and my dear friend Benjamin.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

To God, remain all the glory for His mercy and grace. This work would not have been a success without the patronage of my able supervisors, Professor Godfrey Muriuki, EBS and Dr. H. Misigo Amatsimbi. Their support, guidance and excellence spirit gave me the tenacity to attain completion of the work.

Many regards to my family members, my sisters and my brothers. May the Almighty God richly bless you; your continuous spiritual, emotional, social and physical sustenance was my strength in this study.

I acknowledge the Pastors Love Association (PLA) members in Kibera for their healthy discussions and responses towards this work. I feel indebted to you a lot.

Special thanks to Peter Mutie's family for accommodating and introducing me to the Kibera residents. I highly treasure you in my heart.

Finally, to all my friends who laboured in assisting me in data collection, analysis, compilation and presentation. I sincerely appreciate your efforts.

ABSTRACT

The main purpose of this study is to identify the impact the girl child experienced in the 2007/08 Kenyan post-election violence and to ascertain how such impact did affect the girl child's positive beliefs and behaviour in actualizing her dreams in Kibera slum. Specifically, the study seeks to examine the causes and impact of the post-election violence in Kibera slum, determine if there was any gendered relationship in the impact of the violence on the girl child, discover if the girl child used any strategies to cope with the violence and establish if the coping mechanisms led to the girl child life's success or failure after the violence.

The study was conducted in Nairobi's Kibera slum. It adopted a survey design through interviews and questionnaires. The subjects of the study comprised 75 questionnaire respondents and 16 interviewees from a representative population of the Kibera slum administrative units (villages). Three sessions of different discussion groups were also held. Purposive, quota and snowballing sampling procedures were used to sample the study respondents. The data collected was analyzed using descriptive statistics.

The study utilized Anomie strain and feminist theory. The Anomie strain theory argues that delinquency results from the blockage of goal-seeking behavior. Unable to achieve valued goals, regardless of the causal factors thereto, individuals become frustrated and may turn to criminal acts or other forms of anti-social behaviour as a result. This helps the study in investigating the causes and gendered impact of the post-election violence on the Kibera girl child. The feminist theory on the other hand analyzes the status of the girl child in the society as defined by male dominant culture.

The study found out that the girl child in Kibera slum was largely impacted by the political violence due to her vulnerability. Respondents across the age groups and gender reported diverse impacts on the side of the girl child. Despite the optimism in their coping mechanisms, the impacts of the political violence seemed to have had tow on the girl child's otherwise bright future.

The study mentions adaptive coping approaches to adversity on the part of the girl child including adaptation of new skills, counseling, and joining therapeutic groups. The regime and her partners should guarantee respect of the rule of law and human rights discouraging harmful cultural prejudices in support of the girl child.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Declaration.....	i
Dedication.....	ii
Acknowledgments.....	iii
Abstract.....	iv
Table of contents.....	vi
List of tables.....	viii
List of figures.....	ix
List of acronyms.....	x
Operational definitions.....	xi
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.0 Background of the Study.....	1
1.1 Historical background of the Kibera slum.....	6
1.2 Statement of research problem.....	10
1.3 Aims and objectives.....	12
1.4 Justification of the Study.....	12
1.5 Scope and limitations of the Study.....	14
1.6 Literature review.....	14
1.6.1 Literature on the girl child political violence in Kenya and the world.....	15
1.6.2 Literature on the girl child violence in Kibera slum.....	19
1.7 Theoretical framework.....	20
1.8 Research hypotheses.....	22
1.9 Methodology.....	22
CHAPTER TWO: THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF KIBERA SLUM.....	25
2.0 Introduction.....	25
2.1 The development of informal settlements in Nairobi.....	25
2.2 The emergence of Kibera urban slum, 1902 ó 1920.....	29
2.3 Kibera slum before independence, 1920 ó 1963.....	34
2.4 Kibera slum after independence, 1963 ó 2008.....	37
2.5 Conclusion.....	42

CHAPTER THREE: 2007/2008 POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN KIBERA SLUM	44
3.0 Introduction	44
3.1 Use of Political Violence in elections	45
3.2 Causes of Political Violence in Kibera	47
3.2.1 Social-economic causes	47
3.2.2 Political causes	57
3.3 Impact of Political Violence in Kibera	63
3.4 Conclusion.....	68
CHAPTER FOUR: 2007/2008 POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND GIRL CHILD IN KIBERA SLUM.....	70
4.0 Introduction	70
4.1 General overview of the girl child and Violence in Kibera slumí	71
4.2 Impact of 2007/2008 Political Violence on girl child in Kibera slum.....	73
4.2.1 Positive impact.....	73
4.2.2 Negative impact	76
4.3 Conclusion.....	84
CHAPTER FIVE: COPING MECHANISMS OF THE GIRL CHILD.....	86
5.0 Introduction	86
5.1 Coping mechanisms	88
5.2 Conclusion.....	95
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION	97
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	106
APPENDIX 1:QUESTIONNAIRE	a
APPENDIX 2:INTERVIEW SCHEDULE	e

LIST OF TABLES

Nairobi informal settlements estimated population í í í í í í í í í í í í í í í í . **29**

LIST OF FIGURES

- i. The Map of Kibera slum 10
- ii. Distribution of informal settlements 30
- iii. Kibera population percentages by tribe 36
- iv. Map of Kibera villages 38
- v. Graphical presentation of Kibera slum population 39

LIST OF ACRONYMS

CEDAW:	Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
FGM:	Female Genital Mutilation
IDP:	Internally Displaced Person
KANU:	Kenya African National Union
KAR:	Kingø African Rifles
NCGD:	National Commission on Gender and Development
NGOs:	Non-Governmental Organizations
UNFPA:	United Nations Fund for Population Activities
UNICEF:	United Nations Childrenø Fund
UNIFEM:	United Nations Development Fund for Women
ANPPCAN:	African Network for the Prevention and Protection against Child Abuse and Neglect.

OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS

Girl childó In this study, a girl child will refer to a female who is between the ages of 6 and18 years.

Post-election violence –This study adopts the following definition: òThe commission of violent acts such as murder, assaults and sexual abuse motivated by a desire, conscious or unconscious, to obtain or maintain political powerö usually after an electioneering period. ¹ In this study, it refers the 2007/08 Kenyan political violence.

Violence – In this study, violence will mean a behaviour which is intended to hurt, injure or kill physically or emotionally.

¹ Moser C. and Clark F., Victims, perpetrators, or actors? Gender, armed violence and political violence, New York: St Martin Press, 2001.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.0 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

It is disputable, though in my own opinion, pretty difficult to conceive of a human community without violence among its subjects or between members of the community and outsiders. This is an aspect which makes violence an integral aspect of life. Violence involves efforts of two or more mutually opposed parties. The efforts are usually geared towards competition for scarce resources at each other's expense. The means to the end result takes the form of destructions, injurious acts, thwarting, or otherwise violently controlling opponent parties.² Political violence, as focused by this study, is distinct from other forms of violence in the way it manifests itself in a range of densities depending on what is being contested in terms of value and worthness. Its model usually takes ethnic and tribal alignments.

The pattern of political violence can be traced back to the post-colonial Kenya. Precisely, an immediate connection of political violence to colonialism is explicable. Kenya's boundaries were arbitrarily demarcated by the colonialists. The colonialists demarcated political boundaries creating political authorities out of innumerable lineage and clan groups. With the inheritance of these political boundaries, ethnic alignments were probable.³ Secondly, the 'divide and rule' colonial policies, meant for firm control, may have escalated inter-community violence, the brunt of which may still have had significance for the prevalence of today's political violence. The construction of a colonial state on colonial legacies following independence may have sustained consequences of inequality, land ownership, and regional differences.⁴ These were very prevalent from the colonial masters. This connection of political violence to the post-colonial Kenya shows the depth of the subject in its examination beyond the present violent situations.

In the post-colonial Kenya, political history has its foundation in violent uprising and repression. Kenya became a *de facto* one-party state, with Jomo Kenyatta as her leader and President. The

² Mack R. and Snyder R. 'The analysis of social conflict: towards an overview and synthesis', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1957, 1: 212-248.

³ See The Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee to investigate Ethnic Clashes in Western and Other Parts of Kenya, September 1992; the report of the National Council of Churches, *The Cursed Arrow: Organized Violence Against Democracy in Kenya*, April 1992 and *Divide and Rule, State-Sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya*, Human Rights Watch, November 1993

⁴ Ibid

Kenya African National Union (hereafter KANU) saw victory in the 1963 elections. Following the victory, Jomo Kenyatta banned attempts of creating an opposition party associated with the Luo ethnic group which led to the perception that Kenyatta, an ethnic Kikuyu himself, was promoting Kikuyu interests over national interests.⁵ Since then, political violence in Kenya has been evident in almost all political transitions and specifically so, along ethnic lines. The violence, though extant, may have been unvoiced to a certain degree, until the year 1991, when the then president Moi re-introduced the multiparty political participation. Kenyan politics have always taken the path of tribal and ethnic alignments as witnessed from the very many political parties representing all regions that followed thereafter. The most significant political activities and changes in leadership throughout Kenya's history as an independent state have been followed, and to some extent formed, by violence, usually framed along tribal or ethnic lines.⁶ President Moi, pursued policies that may have benefited parts of his own ethnic group, the Kalenjin, while excluding individuals from other ethnic groups from gaining public office or accessing state resources. The rise of the Kalenjin elite became the normal way of rule under Moi (1978-2002) resulting, before the end of the one-party regime (1982-1991), to a decrease in the number of Kikuyu ministers. Kalenjin presence in the bureaucracy grew at the expense of Kikuyu, while the Luos never improved their position and were underrepresented.⁷ To facilitate such, repression of the political opposition had to be a common practice in the Moi's government. Repression included excessive use of force, torture, indefinite detention, and other measures. These factors alongside others, which followed multi-partism, are relevant to the exploration of political violence exhibited in the 2007/2008 post-election violence.

Ethnicity has generally been considered as an indicator for voting and partisan attachment in politics. In addition to ethnicity, regional affiliation has a strong effect on voters' preferences and on the degree of partisan attachment.⁸ Kenyan politics makes no exception. Ethnic competition leads to

⁵Africa Watch, *Divide and rule: state-sponsored ethnic violence in Kenya*, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993, <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1993/kenya1193.pdf>, accessed 15 May, 2009 pp 6-8

⁶ Bunting M. "The violence in Kenya may be awful, but it is not senseless savagery", *The Guardian*, 14 January 2008, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jan/14/kenya.world>, accessed 3 May 2009.

⁷ Battera F., "Ethnicity and Degree of Partisan Attachment in Kenyan Politics", *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 2013 48 <http://jas.sagepub.com/content/48/1/114>, accessed on 5/08/2014

⁸Lipset M. and Rokkan S. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*. New York, NY: Free Press, 1967.

ethnic confrontation.⁹ However, since no single Kenyan ethnic group has absolute majority, ethnic groups have always been forced to ally in order to secure a central position in the state. This study will seek to establish how Kenyan political violence, in reference to the 2007/2008 post-election violence, manifested itself along these ethnic lines. Kenyan political violence has overtime taken forms such as disruptions of campaign rallies, evictions of citizens from their homes or constituencies, verbal threats and intimidations, looting, abductions, arson and destruction of property, torture, sexual and physical assault and human rights abuses, obstruction of voting or nomination processes and death. Such expressions have been intended to change voting patterns in ensuring that some sections of the electorate do not participate in the system or to reshape demographic trends in order to achieve political objectives. The question of how the girl child has borne the brunt of all the above is the substance of the study. Firstly, the study is informed by the various gender societal discriminative roles, which situate the girl child in a disadvantaged position. Secondly, the vulnerability of the girl child as a tool of sexual violence guides this study in seeking to discover how it was uncovered in 2007/2008 Kenyan political violence.

Between 1992 and 2002, most political violence was witnessed during the pre-election phase, at the time of voter registration, party campaigns and nominations. However, the severity of the 2007 general elections political violence unfolded in a span of fifty-nine days, between December 27, 2007 and February 28, 2008, a day when a political compromise was reached. The political violence magnitude, speed and scale brought a shock to Kenyans and the outside world.¹⁰ The trauma following the violence was also a bombshell. The study considers such unanticipated outbreak of the violence, the magnitude, speed and scale to exceptionally isolate the 2007/2008 political violence for exploration.

Kibera as an informal settlement hosted Kenya African migrants who had moved to Nairobi in search of wage labour during the colonial era. The migrants were from different tribes and ethnic groups. Kibera's proximity to the city saw the colonial government settle their service sector employees in it. These employees represented the different Kenyan tribes. Even so, the Kibera

⁹Horowitz D. (1985) *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, University of California Press Ltd. London, England, 1985.

¹⁰ Maupeu H., "Revisiting Post-election Violence" *The General Elections in Kenya 2007*. IFRA, 2009 pp.187-223

slum settlement was separated by ethnic groups.¹¹ The complexity and diversity of living arrangements increased following independence. The influx of relatives and friends of the existing Kibera residents followed the very pattern of separation by ethnic lines. This made Kibera a cosmopolitan society representing almost all tribes in Kenya separating them by ethnic lines. Nonetheless, the ethnic representation is not at all equal in proportion. As reported earlier, Kenyan politics is torn on tribal and ethnic lines and, as such, Kibera would make a good research outcome owing to its unique population. This study seeks to explore this representative population in searching answers on the impacts of political violence on the girl child. More so, Kibera was one of those areas mostly affected by the 2007/2008 post-election violence. Being part of the constituency represented by Raila Odinga, one of the presidential candidates engrained in a hotly contested campaign against incumbent Mwai Kibaki then, such enormity was apparent. According to the Waki Commission, Kibera was a major site of death, injury, destruction of property, displacement, and sexual violence.¹² The population of Kibera slum is also of interest. The residents of Nairobi's informal settlements, constitutes 55 percent of the city's total population and yet grounded onto less than 5 percent of the total land in the city.¹³ Of these informal settlements, Kibera slum is the largest and most densely populated in Nairobi and all sub-Saharan Africa.

Kibera slum is located 7 kilometres southern east of Nairobi city and covers an area of 550 acres. It slopes downwards towards the Nairobi dam which was once a source of drinking water for city residents but overgrown with hyacinth weed is now the depository of raw sewage and waste flowing downstream from Kibera drains. Kibera is divided into administrative units referred to as villages; namely, Kianda, Olympic, Soweto-east, Raila, Gatwekera, Karanja, Kisumu Ndogo, Makina, Kambi-muru, Mashimoni, Laini Saba, Lindi, Silanga, and Soweto west.

Owing to their age, young children may not always present adult-like responses to disaster and violence, as this study is intended to investigate. Exposure to disasters and violence poses serious threats to the psychological and physical health to the girl child, especially in the face of gender

¹¹Mitullah W. and Kibwana K. "A tale of two cities: Policy, law and illegal settlements in Kenya". In Fernandes E. and Varley A. (Eds.), *Illegal cities: Law and urban change in developing countries*, 1998, pg. 191-212. New York: Zed Books Ltd.

¹² Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (CIPEV), October, 2008


¹³Aloys B., "Review of poverty in Kenya", in: Institute of Policy Analysis and Research, UON Press, 1997 pg.1

discrimination,¹⁴ which may be apparent in slums. Unequal access to the resources and rewards of society, as posed by social environment in Kibera slum, may have pushed the girl child to less powerful positions and opportunities in society. Such a situation may be said to worsen in times of violence. As political violence in Kenya normally takes the pattern of ethnic alignment, the complexities become more with multiethnic communities. The disparate access may not necessarily discriminate openly or consciously against the concerned individuals until in a state of lawlessness.¹⁵ This state may be obvious in political violence and worse still in an informal settlement. With extended violence or even after the violence, such may maintain a system of inequality. This study will thus explore the disadvantages the Kibera girl child encountered during and after the 2007/2008 political violence.

¹⁴ La Greca M., Silverman K., Vernberg M., and Roberts C., *Helping children cope with disasters and terrorism*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2002

¹⁵ Thomas W., *The study of human relationships*; Houghton Mifflin, Harcourt Publishing Company, 2005 (5th edition.)

1.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE KIBERA SLUM



Nairobi city has a very short history as an urban space; one which Ferraro argues, owes its very existence to the forces of colonialism.¹⁶ The space which hosts today's Nairobi city was founded in 1899 when railway authorities determined that, the area's central location, flat landscape, and moderate climate made it an ideal setting for a colonial administrative centre that could service the rural economies.¹⁷ The colonial administration chose not to establish an industrial base in Nairobi city with the intention to keep the city a home for non-Africans. Therefore, many African labourers in Nairobi were brought in on short-term contracts to work in the service sector, while a second group of mission-educated literate Africans filled lower level administrative posts in the colonial government.¹⁸ Within Nairobi, Africans were assigned to live in 'native reserves' at the edge of the city where they were separated by ethnic group and provided temporary accommodations and minimal services.¹⁹ But as sanctioned African housing became scarce and a host of unauthorized African migrants moved to Nairobi in search of wage labour, informal settlements developed throughout the city.²⁰ Kibera was one of these informal settlements.

While this influx of African migrants greatly contributed to Kibera's growth, the area's first residents were retired Sudanese soldiers who had served in the British East African army, known as the King's African Rifles (hereafter KAR). In 1904, KAR officials set up army barracks a few kilometers southwest of the city along Ngong Road.²¹ The military was also allocated a large forested area next to the barracks, which the Sudanese soldiers called 'kibra', or forest. This

¹⁶Ferraro G., 'Nairobi: Overview of an East African city', *African Urban Studies*, 3, 1-13, 1978/9.

¹⁷Kamau G. and Gitau K., 'Actors and interests: The development of an informal settlement in Nairobi, Kenya'. In Hansen K. and Vaa M. (Eds.), *Reconsidering informality: Perspectives from urban Africa*. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2004.

¹⁸Furedi F., 'The African crowd in Nairobi: Population movements and elite politics'. *Journal of African History*, 14 (2), 1973, pg. 275-290

¹⁹Mitullah W. and Kibwana K. 'A tale of two cities: Policy, law and illegal settlements in Kenya'. In Fernandes E. and Varley A. (Eds.), *Illegal cities: Law and urban change in developing countries*, 1998, pg. 191-212. New York: Zed Books Ltd.

²⁰Macharia K., 'Slum clearance and the informal economy in Nairobi', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 1992, 30 (2), pg. 221-236

²¹De Smedt J. 'Kill me quick': A history of Nubian Gin in Kibera. *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 2009a, 42 (2), pg. 201-220.

location was chosen so that soldiers would be available to the central government and could reach the city centre on short notice.²²

The military established a shooting range near the barracks, but largely let the soldiers use the remainder of the land as they saw fit.²³ As these soldiers grew older and became unable to continue their military service, they began to set up more permanent residence on the land. Because these Sudanese soldiers were not native Kenyans, they had no pre-existing local reserve where they could go to retire, and most did not wish to return to their homeland. So in 1912, the KAR permitted nearly 300 Sudanese soldiers to settle in this area rent-free, as an unofficial pension for 12 years of military service.²⁴ The KAR soldiers used their land permits as unofficial titles to rent out the land for residence and farming, in some cases adopting agricultural clients or registering them as personal servants.²⁵ In 1928, the military handed over control of the land to the civil administration, which led to an influx of new residents as civil authorities exercised less control over Kibera.²⁶

During colonial rule the British leaders expressed loyalty toward the first-generation KAR Sudanese, though their feelings of loyalty did not extend to all Kibera residents. As the Commissioner for Lands and Settlement in Kenya stated in 1931, "The old Nubian is a man to whom the colony owes much, but the second generation and the hybrids arising from mixed unions are degenerate."²⁷ As a result, the colonial administration reluctantly agreed to abide by its obligation to tolerate Kibera but did nothing to develop it.²⁸ Two possible end-results for Kibera remained. Firstly, the conditions on the ground would become so unpleasant that residents would voluntarily choose to resettle elsewhere. In what Parsons terms "malicious neglect," the

²²Parsons T. "Kibera is our blood": The Sudanese military legacy in Nairobi's Kibera location, 1902-1968. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1997, 30 (1), pg. 87-122.

²³De Smedt J. "Kill me quick": A history of Nubian Gin in Kibera. *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 2009a, 42 (2), 201-220.

²⁴Wangui E., and Darkoh M., B., Geographical Study of Kibera as an example of an uncontrolled settlement, *Journal of East African Research and Development*, 1992, 22, pg.75-91.

²⁵-Op cit

²⁶De Smedt J. "Kill me quick": A history of Nubian Gin in Kibera. *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 2009a, 42 (2), 201-220.

²⁷Zwanenberg R., History and Theory of Urban Poverty in Nairobi: The problem of slum development. *Journal of East African Research and Development*, 1972, 2(2), pg.163-205

²⁸-Op cit

government attempted to force the Sudanese out by rendering Kibera unlivable.²⁹ They refused to provide services, believing that doing so would only dampen the spirit of others to settle on this land. Secondly, the permitted KAR Sudanese would eventually die, at which time the colonial administration could reclaim the land. However, the colonial government did not anticipate the complexity and diversity of living arrangements that could come about through years of informal settlement.

During Kenya's state of emergency at the time of Mau Mau rebellion (1952-1958) there was a large migration of rural Kenyans from Central, Western and Nyanza to Kibera.³⁰ In the mid 1950s throughout 1960s and continuing to 1970s the government adopted a new plan for Kibera to transform it from a Sudanese ghetto into a planned settlement open to all. These efforts saw the demolition of semi-permanent structures with modern houses that met city council standards being put into place.

The independent Kenyan government tried to eliminate slums throughout Nairobi by demolishing some and withholding basic municipal services from others.³¹ Yet Nairobi's Kibera population exploded, as rural Kenyans felt more incentive to move into the city. The government reclaimed Kibera's land putting up private housing estates and transferring Kibera residents to these flats. Nonetheless, the plans to develop Kibera were trashed by the appointment of Kinia Kamau as the chief of Kibera in 1974. The chief single handedly ruined the National Housing Corporation policy of resettlement by allowing immigrants to settle and build temporary housing in Kibera.³² The chief engaged in a very lucrative scheme of bribery the result of which was a huge increase in the growth of temporary structures in what is today Kibera.

The present Kibera, Africa's oldest and largest slum, is a massive community of mile after mile of mud construction and corrugated roofs where one can dimly see the Nairobi city skyline in the distance. Recent unofficial population estimates range as high as one (1) million although the

²⁹ Parsons T. "Kibera is our blood: The Sudanese military legacy in Nairobi's Kibera location, 1902-1968." *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1997, 30 (1), pg. 87-122.

³⁰ Barcotte S., "Youth culture, NGO involvement and collective violence in Kibera, Nairobi - East Africa's largest slum." *Unpublished Honours Thesis*, University of North Carolina, 2001, Pg.49

³¹ Akumu A., and Olima W. *The dynamics and implications of residential segregation in Nairobi*, Habitat International, 2007 31(1), pg. 87-99.

³² Bodewes C., *Parish Transformation in urban slum: Voices of Kibera Kenya*, Paulines Publications Africa, 2005, pg 36

official population estimates during the 2009 census was estimated at 170,000.³³ The Kibera population lacks any squatter property rights. Residents neither built their homes nor have any community ownership, instead the house occupants pay rent to wealth land owners. Piles of trash line every street and alley with sewage sluices running alongside water pipes where the latter exist. By over an unofficial estimation of 50% unemployment, crime is rife in the slum with high levels of rape and violence. Compounding these high levels of violence and crime are the widespread use of cheap drugs and the drinking of the high methanol local brew known as changaa. Glue sniffing which causes brain damage and death in several cases is widespread among children.

1.2 STATEMENT OF RESEARCH PROBLEM

During violence, girls are subject to widespread and, at times, systematic forms of human rights violations that have mental, emotional, spiritual, physical and material repercussions. These violations may include illegal detention with or without family members, abduction and forced removal from families and homes, disappearances, torture and other inhuman treatment, amputation and mutilation, forced recruitment into fighting forces and groups, slavery, sexual exploitation and increased exposure to HIV/AIDS. Girls may also suffer a wide range of physical and sexual violations, including rape, forced pregnancy, forced prostitution, forced marriage and forced child-bearing.³⁴ Firstly, the violations affect the girl child significantly because of gender societal discriminative roles which situate the girl child in a disadvantaged position. Secondly, the violations may be as a result of the vulnerability of the girl child as a tool of sexual violence. There is thus an urgent need for better documentation, monitoring and reporting on the extreme suffering that violence inflicts on girls, as well as on the many involuntary roles girls play during violence and the aftermath. Such information is needed for the purpose of strengthening and developing policy and programmes to prevent and or address the may be grave rights violations of the girl child.

Political violence is one of the common conflicts in Kenya. The history of Kenyan politics particularly after the 1991 Multi-party inception can be described as a history of chaos and

³³ Liotta P. and James M. *The Real Population Bomb: Megacities, Global Security & the Map of the Future*, Potomac Books Inc., 2012.

³⁴ UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children: Excluded and Invisible*, New York, 2006, p. 14.

violence. The 2007/2008 post-election violence actually represents one of the major conflicts that almost brought the country to a verge of grave ethnic divisions and marked one of the country's darkest hours in history. Much of this Kenyan political conflict has been looked into though not with specialty. The generalization has left a gap in informing the effect of the subtle nature of the girl child in violence. This study takes into account this factual reality in exploring the impacts of the post-election violence on the girl child.

According to Population Reference Bureau, in some areas of the world men outnumber women by 5 in every 100.³⁵ Because of prevailing cultural beliefs, boys are thought to bring more prestige or wealth to a family than girls do, and as such parents have a preference for sons. As a result, an explanation may be given for the evident widespread practice of sex-selective abortion in a number of countries. Women and men may choose to terminate a pregnancy once they learn that the child is female. Without sex-selective abortion therefore, natural sex ratio is 1.05 (about 105 boys born for every 100 girls).³⁶ However, in countries where sex-selective abortion takes place, the birth ratios are much higher than 1.05, meaning a disproportionate number of boys are born. This shows the societal perceptions that give different values to children based on gender to the disadvantage of the girl child. This study takes concern in finding out whether such gendered preference alongside other gendered actions might have shaped the behaviour towards the girl child during the post-election violence. Other reasons for the continued gender discrepancy include, among other things, harmful attitudes and practices, such as female genital mutilation, early marriage, including child marriage, violence against women, sexual exploitation, sexual abuse, discrimination against girls in food allocation and other practices related to health and well-being. The question of whether this prejudicial situation might have taken control in worsening the girl child impact in the post-election violence is what this study sought to answer. The vulnerability of the girl child and whether it exacerbated her impact in the Kenyan political violence is of interest in this study.

The literature on gender and violence and on girl child and violence has grown steadily over the last 20 years. This has included writings dealing with the ways in which violence generally affects women and girls differently from men and boys. However, the particular vulnerabilities

³⁵ Population reference bureau; the world's women and girls 2011 data sheet

³⁶ Ibid

suffered by the diverse groups and their endurance capacities are also of interest. With minimal research on children's psycho-social functioning following political violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, and most research focusing on physical health and mortality, immediate balance is expected. This study seeks to add to knowledge by extending extant findings in examining negative psycho-social changes in girl child following the 2007/08 Kenyan political violence.

The study focuses on the weakness of gender analysis on long term effects of political violence in the available literature to assess the impacts of violence on the girl child. The study investigates the severity of the impacts on the girl child in relation to the duration of the violence, but more so on gender involvement.

1.3 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

The aim of the study was to determine the impacts of political violence on the girl child as a victim of the 2007/2008 post-election violence in Kibera.

The main objectives of the research are to:

- i. Examine the causes of 2007/2008 post-election violence in Kibera slum.
- ii. Examine the impact of 2007/2008 post-election violence on the girl child in Kibera slum.
- iii. Examine the coping mechanisms of the girl child in 2007/2008 post-election violence in Kibera slum.

1.4 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

The Kibera slum is the largest of the Nairobi slums and hosts a large population. The Kibera population is largely of the poor and the unemployed youth who, completing primary and secondary levels of education, come to look for new avenues, considering the life there to be cheap and affordable. This blend made a very good representative group of the target population of the girl child.

Kibera slum was vastly affected in the period of 2007/2008 post-election violence posting high negative political, economic and social experiences from the violence. It can be argued that, the slum may have become an easy prey because of the evident large and cosmopolitan population.

With record of such an enormity of violence and in turn the impacts, coupled with its multi-ethnic representative nature, Kibera slum put up as a virtuous place for case study in relation to other areas affected by the 2007/08 post-election violence.

During violence, girls are subject to widespread and, at times, systematic forms of human rights violations that have mental, emotional, spiritual, physical and material repercussions. These violations include illegal detention with or without family members, abduction and forced removal from families and homes, disappearances, torture and other inhuman treatment, amputation and mutilation, forced recruitment into fighting forces and groups, slavery, sexual exploitation, increased exposure to HIV/AIDS, and a wide range of physical and sexual violations, including rape, enforced pregnancy, forced prostitution, forced marriage and forced child-bearing.³⁷ There is urgent need for better documentation, monitoring and reporting on the extreme suffering that violence inflicts on girls, as well as on the many roles girls play during violence and its aftermath. Such information and response mechanisms are needed for the purpose of strengthening and developing policy and programs to prevent and or address these grave rights violations. This study sought to document such imperative information on the famous 2007/08 Kenyan political violence in the Kibera slum.

During violence, children are greatly affected by what happens to the adults in their lives. As teachers are targeted and killed schools close down, as health care workers are killed or flee, clinics close their doors or provide only rudimentary services. Teachers and health care and social workers are a frontline of defense for protecting children from the ravages of armed conflict, when they are not there children are increasingly at risk. Additionally, the killing, death, disappearance, detention or flight of parents and caregivers results in hundreds-of-thousands of single parent households and tens-of-thousands of street-children, orphans and child-headed households, some headed by children as young as eight years of age. Kibera slum violence was no exceptional.

The girl child is vulnerable considering the discriminative societal gender roles. She is also one of the evident targets of sexual violence which may be translated as a weapon of violence. In her prime age, which generation is the determinant of our future, and without proper preventive

³⁷ UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 2006: Excluded and Invisible*, New York, 2006, p. 14

policies with special attention to the girl child, informed through research, the future generation may be threatened. This study was intended to inform and add knowledge to fill the gendered analysis on the impacts of violence gap on the girl child.

1.5 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The study covered the period between 2007 and 2013. The 2007/2008 post-election violence started after the announcement of the presidential results, although prior to the elections, violence had already been taking place in Kuresoi, a constituency in the predominantly Kalenjin Rift Valley. This violence was similar, in form and outcome, to that experienced under Moi regime during the politically-instigated clashes that occurred during the lead up to the General Elections of 1992, 1997 and 2002.³⁸ The intense violence ceased after a political compromise was arrived at on 28th February, 2008. Elections in Kenya are held every five years. The coalition government which took over after the political compromise governed up to March 2013. The study assessed the girl child impacts during the coalition government period.

Various factors impeded the collection of data for the study; chief among being the nature of the information sought which was confidential in itself. Many of the girls, who were affected by then, were at the time of this research work grown-ups who were either married with children or single mothers. Some of them were not prepared for the instigation to remember the evils they went through during the violence leave alone sharing them. However, the study applied the ethics of research of informed consent alongside support from the available organizations and institutions both government and private, like the NGOs, churches and mosques among others. It is worth noting at this point that religious leaders and teachers were of great help in overcoming this challenge.

1.6 LITERATURE REVIEW

The study carefully examined the relevant body of literature. The review typically included scholarly journals, articles, books, published and unpublished information and primary sources

³⁸ Kenya's Darkest Hour, a video series by Nation Media Group and Kenya History and Biographies Company Limited Production. An NTV video library footage presented by Hilary Ngweno.

all pointing toward the answer to the research objectives. The literature review about the girl child is structured starting from Kenya and the world and then in Kibera.

1.6.1 Literature on the girl child political violence in Kenya and the world

According to Apter, political violence often destabilizes existing social realities and discourses even as it produces new ones. Apter, further argues that violent acts in the service of expressing a political 'truth' are often plurally interpreted by differently located individuals and groups.³⁹ These plurally interpreted acts of violence also translate to blanket interpretations of the effects of violence that follows. However, in his article on discursive and political deployments of the 2002 Palestinian women suicide bombers, Hasso addresses the manner in which four women produced and situated themselves as gendered-political subjects, and how their self-representations, images, and acts were deployed by individuals and groups in the region.⁴⁰ Crucial to the political and discursive significance of the suicide bombers was that these were the bodies and blood of women, dramatically made relevant in ways that challenged the sexual and feminized forms usually associated with the victimized, violated or raped woman.⁴¹ This gendered aspect of violence came out so strongly only in their involvement as women in the violence, but not in the impact that followed thereafter.

In her conclusion, while managing the final stages of UNIFEM research and analysis in ending violence against women in different regions, Fried says that framing violence against women in human rights terms has boosted the movement's credibility and fostered a common language. Advocates' use of human rights claims has helped effect greater political will on the part of governments. Indeed, as her claims speak for many, violence against women is far more visible today as a public issue, and continues to be, that receives sustained attention than it was some years ago.⁴² Different advocacy groups have lobbied for legislation, policies, and practices that

³⁹ Apter E., *The Legitimization of Violence. Political violence in analytical perspective.* Palgrave Macmillan 1996, pg. 1-32.

⁴⁰ Hasso F., *Discursive and Political Deployments by/of the 2002 Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers/Martyrs.* *Feminist Review, No. 81 (Bodily Interventions), 2005, pg. 23-51*

Author(s): URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3874340> Accessed: 11/05/2010 10:01.

⁴¹ Ibid

⁴² Susana T. *Violence against Women: Health and Human Rights: An international journal* Vol. 6, No. 2, 2003, pg. 88-111. Published by: Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4065431> .Accessed: 05/06/2013 09:28

provide women with protection, services, and redress for survivors, and appropriate punishment for perpetrators.

In his article about the Liberian civil war, Uta discusses young females as active agents who alternatively used different tactics in their attempts to cope with the challenges posed by the violence and exploit the opportunities provided by the conditions produced thereon. The author theorizes how agency is manifested and deployed across the full range of girl child violence experiences whether in terms of victimhood or empowerment.⁴³ However, Uta does not categorize those passive agents in the war who also employ different alternatives in dealing with the violence and how they are at the end impacted negatively by the violence.

In the Eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (hereafter DRC) in its period of brutal war, a report was compiled at the Doctors on Call for Service/Heal Africa Hospital in Goma.⁴⁴ From the report, cases of 4,715 women and girls who suffered sexual violence between April 2003 and June 2006, of whom 702 had genital fistula, presented personal experiences of seven survivors whose injuries were severe and long-term, with life-changing effects.⁴⁵ The armed groups from the DRC and neighbouring countries committed atrocities and systematically used sexual violence as a weapon of war to humiliate, intimidate and dominate women, girls, their men and communities. Armed combatants, on the other hand, took advantage with impunity, knowing they would not be held to account or pursued by police or judicial authorities. A particularly inhumane public health problem did emerge from the situation: traumatic gynaecological fistula and genital injury from brutal sexual violence and gang-rape, along with enormous psychosocial and emotional burdens.⁴⁶ Many of the women and girls, who survived, later found that they were pregnant and/or infected with STIs/HIV with no access to treatment.

In its resolution, the UN recognized that empowerment of and investment in girls, are critical for economic growth and the achievement of all Millennium Development Goals, including the

⁴³Mats U., 'West-African Warscapes: Victimcy, Girlfriending, Soldiering: Tactic Agency in a Young Woman's Social Navigation of the Liberian War Zone', *Anthropological Quarterly*, Vol. 78, No. 2 (Spring 2005): pg. 403. Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4150840> .Accessed: 05/06/2013 09:06

⁴⁴Longombe A., Masumbuko K. and Ruminjo J. 'Fistula and Traumatic Genital Injury from Sexual Violence in a Conflict Setting in Eastern Congo: Case Studies', *Reproductive Health Matters*, Vol. 16, No. 31, May, 2008, pg. 132-141. Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25475373> .Accessed: 05/06/2013 08:52

⁴⁵ Ibid

⁴⁶ Ibid

eradication of poverty and extreme poverty, as well as key in breaking the cycle of discrimination and violence and in promoting and protecting the full and effective enjoyment of their human rights. The General Assembly thus designated 11th October as the International Day of the Girl Child, to be observed every year, beginning 2012.⁴⁷ In his speech during the 2nd International Day of the Girl Child held on 11th October 2013, the Secretary-General of the UN, Ban Ki-moon, said that "To achieve meaningful results, we need fresh solutions to girls' education challenges and we must heed the voices of young people. Empowering girls, ensuring their human rights and addressing the discrimination and violence they face are essential to progress for the whole human family."⁴⁸ This call should be closely enhanced in times of violence when challenges of the girl child are highly registered.

Other literature try to explain the differential impacts of violence on men and women not merely by recourse to biological differences, but also by tracing the different vulnerabilities that derive from the social roles men and women assume, voluntarily or involuntarily. As Moser has argued, a gender analysis assists in understanding why men and women as social actors and with differential access to resources are differentially affected by violence.⁴⁹ Taking gender seriously also means that, despite focusing on the harm that violence imposes on the girl child, we must not disregard the harm suffered by the boy child as either perpetrator or victim. In certain contexts, non-combatant men and boys can be singled out for massacres, as happened in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, at the same time as large-scale sexual and other abuse and violence was inflicted on women and girls.⁵⁰

In their article, Plümper and Neumayer demonstrate clearly how women on average suffer more from the indirect and long-term consequences of armed violence, which calls for much greater attention being paid to these effects.⁵¹ However, their article does not justify the neglect of civilian men and boys in humanitarian crisis evacuations, with emphasis only on the specific

⁴⁷Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 19 December 2011[on the report of the Third Committee (A/66/462/Add.2)] 66/170. International Day of the Girl Child

⁴⁸United Nations for gender equality and the empowerment of women

⁴⁹Caroline M. "The Gendered Continuum of Violence and Conflict". In *Victims, Perpetrators or Actors*, Zed Books London, 2001, pg. 30-51

⁵⁰Murdoch C. and Sandler T., "Economic Growth, Civil Wars, and Spatial Spillovers". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46 (1), 2002, pg. 91-110.

⁵¹Neumayer E. and Plümper T., "The Unequal Burden of War: The Effect of Armed Violence on the Gender Gap in Life Expectancy". *International Organization*, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Summer, 2006), pg. 723-754, Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3877825> .Accessed: 05/06/2013 08:51

effects of the girl child. Such can go contrary to the very aim of evacuating those most vulnerable. Carpenter supported this non-justification forcefully in his argument in the context of evacuations in the Yugoslav violence.⁵²

In his study about sexuality and women's rights in armed violence in the 19 year old civil war in Sri Lanka, Tambiah argues that in areas where the subject or domain of rights discourse is contested or controversial like sexuality, human rights advocates appear less prepared to promote and defend such rights.⁵³ In his paper, he explores the complex sexual choices women and girls in Sri Lanka have had to negotiate and focus on issues of bodily integrity and sexual autonomy and implications for sexual rights within a context of ethnic violence, militarization and war.⁵⁴ Sexuality and gender may be amorphous in the context dominated by violence and the customary order in society is, by and large, subverted in such conditions. Women and girls have had to negotiate self-determination as well as take responsibility for heading households and earning income, in spite of contrary community pressures. The challenge to women, girls and human rights advocates is how to articulate sexual autonomy as a necessary right on a par with others, and strategize to secure this right during armed violence and post-war reconstruction. The suggestions are that control over securing and deploying material resources during or after the violence could enable the means to make sexual choices other than by conventional social prescriptions, if women so chose.

Generally, a sexually compromised woman or girl foregoes the chance of marrying. The sexual ordering of society is often-times subverted in conditions of armed violence, however, where the rule of law is largely suspended.⁵⁵ As it was the case in Srilanka, very young women, for example, including young teenage girls, were forced into marriage by parents in the belief that marriage would provide protection against increased sexual vulnerability.⁵⁶

According to the World Bank report of 2007, children in Sub-Saharan Africa below the age of 15 composed 44% of the population, and millions of these children were exposed to man-made

⁵² Carpenter C. "Women, Children and Other Vulnerable Groups: Gender, Strategic Frames and the Protection of Civilians as a Transnational Issue". *International Studies Quarterly* 49 (2), 2005, pg. 295-334.

⁵³ Tambiah Y., Sexuality and Women's Rights in Armed Violence in Sri Lanka: *Reproductive Health Matters*, Vol. 12, No. 23, 2004, pg. 78-87. Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3775974>. Accessed: 08/02/2010 13:04

⁵⁴ Ibid

⁵⁵ Parker A, Russo M, Sommer D, et al. (editors). *Nationalisms and Sexualities*, 1992, New York: Routledge.

⁵⁶ Ibid

disasters due to civil wars and political violences in the region.⁵⁷ Researchers estimate that one in five people are negatively affected by armed violence in Sub-Saharan Africa.⁵⁸ Yet, there is little research categorizing and examining the negative effects of political violence on the children and specifically on the girl child.

1.6.2 Literature on the girl child violence in Kibera slum

Getting reliable and comprehensive data on gender and violence against women and girls in Kenya is a challenge. This is because in most cases the data collected or stored is not gender disaggregated. Nevertheless, available data indicates that at least half of all women have experienced violence in one way or the other since they were fifteen years old.⁵⁹ Young girls aged between 10 to 15 years are considered the most vulnerable to sexual violence according to the Government records.⁶⁰ Some of these girls are marginalized and not given equal opportunities for education as their boy-child counterparts. The Kenya Well-being Survey equally shows an increase in offences committed mainly against women and girls.⁶¹ Sexual abuse, especially defilement and incest, is common in many communities in Kenya.

Culturally, many of the ethnic communities in Kenya are patriarchal in structure with women and girls having few entitlements to family or community resources.⁶² Female Genital Mutilation (hereafter FGM) as an initiation or rite of passage for girls is a common traditional practice among many different communities.

According to Sagi-Schwartz, Seginer, and Abdeen, the under-studied man-made disasters, such as the political violence in Kenya, are important to study because political violence has

⁵⁷ World Bank, World development indicators, 2007, Washington, DC: World Bank. Retrieved June 6, 2008, from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/table2_1.pdf

⁵⁸ Kimenyi S. and Ndungu N., Sporadic ethnic violence: Why has Kenya not experienced a full-blown civil war. In Collier P. and Sambanis N., eds, *Understanding civil war: Evidence and Analysis, Vol. 1: Africa, 2005*, pg.123-156. Washington, DC: World Bank.

⁵⁹ KDHS, Kenya Demographic and Health Survey, 2003: Central Bureau of Statistics, Nairobi.

⁶⁰ Ibid

⁶¹ Republic of Kenya, Wellbeing in Kenya: A socio-economic profile 2008, Nairobi, Government Printer.

⁶² Chege, F. -He put his hands between girls' thighs' Using student teachers' memories to tackle gender violence. In F. Leach and C. Mitchell (eds) *Combating Gender Violence in and around Schools*, 2006, pg. 189-198 London: Trentham Books.

specifically been linked to a variety of negative child outcomes.⁶³ They have been linked to aspects of children's negative adjustment, such as a weakening sense of control, physical and emotional disturbances, heightened aggression, fear, withdrawal, and post-traumatic stress symptoms. Kenyan political violence occurred with little warning and lasted 3 months without a definitive ending point, which is a characteristic of disasters which have been found to enhance negative consequences already associated with exposure.⁶⁴ However, their study only sought to examine changes in children's psycho-social adjustment following political violence.

1.7 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Firstly, study adopted anomie strain theory. Anomie may apply when there are not enough legitimate means to reach legitimate societal goals. This can occur when society is in a state of disorder and disintegration, as opposed to stability and integration. On the other hand, strain may apply with those who wish to pursue societal goals but lack the legitimate means of doing so. Depending on the theorist, anomie strain theory has been applied to the acquisition of wealth, the attainment of status, or the expression of cultural or class values. Current strain theories argue that delinquency results from the blockage of goal-seeking behavior. Unable to achieve valued goals, individuals become frustrated and may turn to delinquency as a result.

In Agnew's General Anomie Strain Theory of Crime and Delinquency, a micro-level social psychological revision of strain theory, criminal and deviant acts are one possible adaptation to stress.⁶⁵ Deviance is most likely to occur when the response of the individual to any of the stressors is anger. Factors such as peer associations, beliefs, and attributions of causes, self-control, and self-efficacy will affect each individual's reaction to stress. Agnew also expands the concepts of strain to include not only objective and subjective strains, but also vicarious and anticipated strains. Agnew's revision of anomie strain theory examines several possible sources of strain that may result in criminal activity: failure to achieve positively valued goals, removal of

⁶³Sagi-Schwartz A., Seginer R. and Abdeen Z. Chronic exposure to catastrophic war experiences and political violence: Links to the well-being of children and families. *International Journal of Behavioral Development*, 2008, Vol. 32, pg. 257-259.

⁶⁴Morris M., Terranova F., Sonya S., Kithakye M. and Amanda S. The Kenyan Political Violence and Children's Adjustment. *Child Development*, July/August 2010, Volume 81, (4), Pages 1114-1128.

⁶⁵ Agnew, Robert. (1985). A revised strain theory of delinquency. *Social forces*. 64(1), 151-167.

positively valued stimuli, and confrontation with negative stimuli.⁶⁶ This would help to explain the causes of post-election violence and the gendered violation and involvement of the Kibera girl child in the conflict.

Secondly, study was guided by the feminist theory by Melanie Lord, Anthony Greiter and Zuflo Tursunovic which is one of the major contemporary sociological theories. The theory analyzes the status of women and men in society with the purpose of using that knowledge to better women's lives. In her review essay on feminism and family research, Ferree states that "feminists agree that male dominance within families as part of a wider system of male power, is neither natural nor inevitable, and occurs at women's cost."⁶⁷ Feminist work explores and articulates the ways in which violence against women is a critical component of the system of male power. Violence may grow out of male and female inequality with male dominance and female subordination within the home and outside. The theory explains two relationships; structural oppression and gender differences, inequality and oppression.

In explaining structural oppression, the theory draws heavily from the works of Marx and Engels, who argued that women's subjugation coincided with the rise of private property during industrialization. Feminist theories view women's subordination as part of the overall exploitation and injustice that they see as inherent in all male dominated societies whether branded capitalist, socialist or communist.⁶⁸ This argument guided this study in trying to understand the reason for the specific yet singular impacts of the girl child in violence. The leading question in this study, guided by this theory, was whether the male dominance in ownership of property and the related mind-set contributed to the continued disadvantage of the girl child in political violence.

On the other hand, the feminist theory seeks to analyze the conditions which shape women's lives and to explore cultural understanding of what it means to be a woman. Feminists refuse to accept that inequalities between women and men are natural and inevitable and insist that they should be questioned. Thus, thinking like a feminist involves challenging much of what has counted as "knowledge" of the girl child as an object of knowledge than the producer of it. The theory also

⁶⁶ Agnew, Robert. (1985). A revised strain theory of delinquency. *Social forces*. 64(1), 151-167.

⁶⁷ Ferree M. Beyond separate spheres: Feminism and Family research. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 52, 1990, pg. 866 - 884

⁶⁸ Feuer S., Marx and Engels: Basic writings on Politics and Philosophy, New york: Anchor books, 1989

questions the differences between women, including how race, class, ethnicity, and age intersect with gender. It is mostly concerned with giving a voice to women and highlighting the various ways women have contributed to society. In this study, examination of how the girl child employed different coping mechanisms in political violence situations was done. The question of how the girl child succeeded, however scarcely, through the complexity that came with the 2007/08 Kenyan political violence can be well answered in relevance to this theory.

1.8 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

This study is designed to test three hypotheses as follows;

1. The 2007/2008 post-election violence causes had gender role aspects.
2. The 2007/2008 post-election violence impacted on the girl child.
3. The girl child developed coping mechanisms to deal with the political violence.

1.9 METHODOLOGY

The research was to a higher percentage qualitative and utilized both secondary and primary sources. Apart from oral sources, information was gathered from books, publications, journals, newspapers, and internet. The bibliography list shows the sources that were used to provide background information, and to complement, support and verify, or contradict, the oral information, and put it into a context. For the early history I relied almost entirely on books and articles, Newspaper articles and news from the media were used to complement primary data. More so, website articles with the appropriate access dates were of a great help hence largely utilized by the study.

The libraries used included the University of Nairobi's Jomo Kenyatta Memorial Library, General Service Unit Training School Library, Nation Media housed in Nation House and Standard Media housed in I & M House in Nairobi. The primary sources, such as unprocessed written materials like reports from Human rights watch, Kenyatta National and Nairobi Women's hospitals, humanitarian organisations working, or having had worked, in the Kibera slum and religious organisations were of help in bridging the gaps found in books and scholarly journals. Further, oral interviews both at individual and group discussion levels highly assisted the study in getting first hand information.

The study was conducted through field work research. The field work was conducted by ten visits to Kibera slum. During the visits, administration of questionnaires was done and interviews and group discussions steered in line with the study. One focus group of religious leaders was engineered. Two group interviews with the youth were also conducted. The personal interviews, largely targeted teachers, administrative leaders, security agents, and religious leaders. A total of 25 respondents were interviewed. However, for their protection and on their own volition, the identity of 9 informants has not been exposed. The 9 of them declined the mention of their names in the study. More than 100 questionnaires were distributed but only 75 were filled and collected. The interview schedule had open questions expected to guide, though leaving the interviewee with room to give additional information regarding the study.

I encountered few obstacles while doing research in Kibera. Surprisingly though insecurity was not one of them, walking through Kibera, or parking my car inside the slum was not a problem because i engaged community leaders. Simple problems, like people cancelling interview appointments, or simply not being at home at the agreed time, as a normal part of doing research happened regularly (sometimes for good reasons). One difficulty I encountered was the silences, that is, the issues people did not want to talk about or be reminded of. The traumatic incidences of the violence and the witnessed injustices were some of the issues respondents never wanted to remember or share at all. However, to overcome the expected trauma and negative emotional experiences being revisited, the study constantly engaged the wisdom and services of religious leaders and other local leaders and employed to a greater percentage the research ethics of informed consent. The respondents attention was captured through good introductory remarks followed by careful explanations at every stage, gradually ensuring their voluntary participation.

The target population from whom information was collected came from various respondents representative of more than half of the Kibera administrative units (villages). Snowballing method was applied by the study in achieving this aim. Initial subjects with desired characteristics were identified, in turn naming others whom to their knowledge possessed the capability to provide the intended information. I used a research assistant who is a resident of Kibera slum to organise interviews where necessary. The main advantage in being introduced by someone people knew, someone from their own community, was to create a certain measure of trust, which made the respondents agree more easily to doing an interview. Their openness was

quite noticeable when talking to them about the impacts of post-election violence to the girl child. The research assistant led me to an association of forty five (45) religious leaders (initial subjects) who helped identify subjects well known to them for the questionnaires. The sampling method seemed effective in reaching the target population. Other key initial subjects and informants were community leaders and security personnel. The study, as mentioned earlier, was largely qualitative in nature.

The data collected was analysed through descriptive statistics. All the three hypotheses and the study objectives formed the foundation of the data analysis.

CHAPTER TWO

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF KIBERA SLUM

2.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter is intended to show the growth of Kibera from being a temporary settlement of retired Nubi soldiers to the Kibera slum. The growth of Kibera's population may be an explanation on how a large number of Nairobi's population is forced to live in informal settlements within the city amidst challenges thereof. The chapter recounts how Kibera informal settlement has existed since the Nairobi inception, despite efforts by the government to gobble it up or upgrade the houses. Successive governments have failed to respond to the plight of slum dwellers accordingly in general even after being classified as illegal. Although illegal, the government's efforts to obliterate informal settlements through forced evictions have been met with resilient disapproval from the residents often leading to conflicts. As an end result, the informal settlements lack the basic infrastructural and social facilities and services usually obligated to the government. Kibera slum is one of these informal settlements. The precarious situation renders the slum residents easy targets of increased gender based violence (hereafter GBV) and insecurity. As the final consequence, increasing deviance and high crime rate, discrimination and high social welfare needs possibly will be evident. Such situation is expected to intensify during political violence as people take advantage of lawlessness. The coping alternatives at disposal during political violence may be detrimental to the supposedly bright future of the upcoming generation.

2.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS IN NAIROBI

Nairobi city owes its very existence to the forces of colonialism.⁶⁹ The city's site was identified in 1889 due to its ideal central location to the Nairobi ó Uganda Railway authorities. The now Nairobi city began as a temporary camp at the turn of the twentieth century upon a chance decision by George Whitehouse. He, being the engineer in charge of construction of the Uganda Railway, proposed this camp location as the springboard for embarking on the challenging phase

⁶⁹Ferraro G., "Nairobi: Overview of an East African city", *African Urban Studies*, 3, 1-13, 1978/9.

of laying the railway tracks across the Rift Valley. This temporary camp, the most unlikely of locations, by default became Kenya's capital city and a commercial hub for the East and Horn of Africa region. The area also had a flat landscape and a moderate climate which meant an ideal colonial administrative centre.⁷⁰ The colonial government structure as established allowed the town to be a home for non-Africans. Africans were barred from the city's designated residential areas since they were reserved for Europeans and Asians.

However, with the need of labour, African workers were brought to the town on short-term contracts to work in the service sector. Another group of mission educated literate Africans were engaged to lower level administrative posts in the colonial government.⁷¹ These workers had to create informal residential settlements outside the central business district and the planned residential areas which were largely ignored by the colonial government.⁷² The Africans who came to the city found residence in the informal residential settlements.

Nevertheless, the colonial government limited the influx of Africans in to the town by restricting their movement and settlement. It aimed at having the only Africans engaged in the service sector in Nairobi. The 1915/1919 labour laws, which declared that 'unauthorized huts' could be demolished and saw unemployed Africans forcibly removed from the town, and pass laws were instituted.⁷³ Africans were assigned to live in 'native reserves' at the edge of the city under temporary structures and with minimal social welfare services. The strategy of segregated housing policy was justified by the separation of so called diseased 'Africans' from healthy Europeans.⁷⁴ Despite the restrictions employed by the colonial government, unauthorized African migrants moved to Nairobi in search of wage labour. Housing became scarce leading to the development of informal settlements.

⁷⁰Kamau G. and Gitau K., 'Actors and interests: The development of an informal settlement in Nairobi, Kenya'. In Hansen K. and Vaa M. (Eds.), *Reconsidering informality: Perspectives from urban Africa*. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2004. Pg. 52-55

⁷¹Furedi F., 'The African crowd in Nairobi: Population movements and elite politics'. *Journal of African History*, 14 (2), 1973, pg. 275-290

⁷²Amnesty International Publications; *The Unseen Majority: Nairobi's Two million Slum-Dwellers*, 2009

⁷³Macharia K.: 'Slum clearance and informal economy in Nairobi'. *The journal of modern African studies*, 30(2) 1992 pg. 221-236

⁷⁴Mitullah W. and Kibwana K. 'A tale of two cities: Policy, law and illegal settlements in Kenya'. In Fernandes E. and Varley A. (Eds.), *Illegal cities: Law and urban change in developing countries*, 1998, pg. 196-199 New York: Zed Books Ltd.

Informal settlements in Nairobi can be said to be a consequence of both explicit government policy and decades of official indifference. In particular, informal settlements were excluded from city authority planning and budgeting processes. The successive governments ignored their existence until a time when national authorities and international bodies started outlining the dangers of informal settlements to humanity. The complexities surrounding informal settlements in the city, from inception, have made it difficult for the governments to pass workable policies aimed at improving them. Such kind of policies, if enacted and applied in the right way could help Kenya improve informal settlement. In Nairobi therefore, the lack of official recognition of informal settlements as residential areas denies residents a range of essential services obliged to the government and available to other residents of the city.

Informal settlements are scattered within Nairobi's nine administrative divisions (Figure 2). Residents in these marginalized areas live in very inhumane and disturbing conditions with severe lack of clean water supply, improved sanitation, housing, health services, and solid waste management facilities.⁷⁵ In addition to this, slum dwellers face inadequate schooling facilities, unemployment, high crime rates, and lack of proper governance, including security services. This has resulted to life threatening outcomes which lead to mass poverty, contagious diseases, conflicts, and other social, ecological and economic hazards.

Some of the Nairobi's informal settlements include;⁷⁶


Table 1- *Umande Trust Kibera, 2007*

Informal settlement	Year formed	Estimated population
1. Kibera	1912	950,000
2. Mathare	1963	500,000
3. Korogocho	1980	150,000
4. Mukuru Kwa Njenga	1958	100,000

⁷⁵ Umande Trust Kibera; *The Right to Water and Sanitation in Kibera in Nairobi, Kenya, 2007*

⁷⁶ Table 1 figures extracted from a report of Umande Trust Kibera; *The Right to Water and Sanitation in Kibera in Nairobi, Kenya, 2007*

DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMAL SETTLEMENT IN NAIROBI



Adapted from survey of Kenya maps and latest google maps

Figure 2: Distribution of informal settlements in Nairobi Administrative Sub-counties⁷⁷

⁷⁷ Information used in drawing the Kibera informal settlements is from Survey of Kenya maps in addition to the latest google maps.

2.2 THE EMERGENCE OF KIBERA URBAN SLUM, 1902 – 1920

In the early twentieth century the East Africa Protectorate's army administration allowed its Nubian ex-soldiers and their families to settle on a military exercise ground near Nairobi. Today that military area is a sprawling slum called Kibera, with hundreds of thousands of people packed in an area of 550 acres, where the descendants of these ex-soldiers form only a small minority. They distinguish themselves from the other people by religion, language, food and dress code. And they still claim to be the only and rightful owners of Kibera, given to them as their pension after retirement from the British colonial army.

In 1896 Nairobi was only a staging depot for the oxen and mules of the Protectorate's Government, along the main road from Mombasa to Kampala. Some years later, in 1899, the railhead reached Nairobi and the Kenya-Uganda Railway headquarters was subsequently moved from Mombasa to Nairobi. In the same year, the Ukambani provincial headquarters, situated too far from the railway, was transferred from Machakos to Nairobi. In 1905, the East African Protectorate government relocated administratively to Nairobi. Within a few years Nairobi had become a town with streets, shops and hotels; by 1906 Nairobi had around 11,000 inhabitants, and in 1907 it was accepted as the official capital of British East Africa.⁷⁸

Segregation of races was a key concept in the early 20th Century Nairobi. The Nairobi Master Plans, mainly done by South African planners in 1905, systematically established racial zones in Nairobi, with extremely unequal residential densities, allegedly for reasons of disease and sanitation. Europeans, Indians and Africans all had their own locations, with extremely unequal residential densities.⁷⁹ Africans were only tolerated in Nairobi as a temporary workforce, not as permanent inhabitants, and certainly not with entire families.

Already from 1901 Africans needed a special pass to be in Nairobi, but there was no provision to accommodate even those that were allowed to work and live in Nairobi. Most employers did not provide accommodation to their employees; it was left to the African labourers to fend for

⁷⁸Mungeam G.: *British rule in Kenya, 1895-1912: the establishment of administration in the East Africa Protectorate.* Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1966

⁷⁹Amis H. *A shanty town of tenants: the commercialisation of unauthorised housing in Nairobi, 1960-1980.* Unpublished dissertation, University of Kent, UK, 1983

themselves. They slept in sheds at work, in the store rooms, in the streets, or rented cheap rooms, sharing with many other men, often in illegal settlements.⁸⁰ Kibera was one of these settlements.

Initially the army barracks for the East African Rifles were established just north of the Nairobi River. Around 1903/4 the barracks, then of the King's African Rifles (hereafter KAR) were moved to Ngong Road, just a few kilometres south-west of the city centre. The barracks were intended to be erected effectively outside Nairobi's municipal boundaries. In 1904 the adjacent area of about 5 acres, part of present day Kibera, was allocated to the army as military exercise grounds. The Kibera area was surveyed by the government only in 1917, and gazetted as 'Nairobi Military Area' in 1918.⁸¹ It was in this area that the retired Sudanese soldiers would be allowed to settle, a place that they would call 'Kibra', a bushy place, a forest; empty, save for the occasional Maasai herders and wild animals.⁸² In principle, only retired soldiers with at least 12 years of service in the KAR were allowed to settle in Kibera, and only with an official 'shamba' pass. The soldiers were granted holdings at Kibera, after discharge from the Military Forces in lieu of repatriation expenses, this seems to indicate that (part of) the Kibera land was given to the Nubis. However, the official army permit to settle in Kibera, the so-called 'shamba pass' stated that the bearer 'has permission to make a shamba in the Military Reserve', while later shamba passes gave permission to 'live in the KAR Shamba and build one [or more] house'⁸³ – this would indicate that the Kibera land was not given to the Nubis, but rather just for their temporary use. Although official settlement in Kibera was allowed from 1912, it is unlikely that Nubis would not have settled there from the beginning: probably some informal settlement of the area close to the barracks took place from 1904 and as such, Sudanese families appear to have taken residence on it from that date.

The first years people lived near the barracks in a small settlement called 'Kambi KAR' or 'KAR shamba' (near to where now the City Mortuary is). Over the years they probably spread out over Kibera, moving further away from the barracks. Most likely a major movement took place from 1912, when settlement was officially approved, and the Nubis were told to make their

⁸⁰ Kimani M. 'The structure of landownership in Nairobi.' *Journal of East African Research & Development, Vol. 2, No 1*, 1972, pg 101-124.

⁸¹ The Official Gazette, Kenya, Government Notice No. 204, p 577, July 10, 1918.

⁸² Parsons T. 'Kibra is our blood: the Sudanese military legacy in Nairobi's Kibera location, 1902-1968.' *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 30(1), 1997, pg 87-122.

⁸³ Major Edwards' memorandum, 1936, Kenya National Archives (KNA) RCA (MAA) 6 2/1/3 ii

own selection within specified areas. Of the 291 shamba passes ever issued, 101 were given out in 1913.⁸⁴ The Nubis settled in small villages, or rather clusters of compounds, in the higher parts of Kibera, often together with relatives and people of the same original Sudanese ethnic group. The sloping land towards the rivers was used for agriculture, while livestock was grazed further away. Makina became the main village in Kibera, situated near the main road passing through Kibera, where the weekly market was held. Some areas were inhabited by only a few families, like Laini Shabaa (the shooting range)⁸⁵ Galalima and Gumberedu (see map 3 below).

Over the years, an increasing number of people would settle in Kibera without any permit at all. For example, the sons of Sudanese permit holders would marry and build their own houses in Kibera without actual permit, retired Nubis from other Nubi villages in Kenya would move to Kibera and settle there without permit, and more so, some local people looking for land, work, or a place to stay.⁸⁶ In the first years people lived near the barracks in a small settlement called -Kambi KARø or -KAR shambaø near the present day City Mortuary. However, over the years they probably spread out over the big Kibera, moving further away from the barracks. Most likely a major movement took place from 1912, when settlement was officially approved.

Leadership and authority in the Kibera community was provided by the councils of elders. There were several of these councils in Kibera, each covering one or more villages, solving problems and guiding the people. An informal sub-chief or headman called -liwaliø was chosen by the council of elders to run their affairs. Around 1919 the first Liwali was appointed, representing the Nubi community, and overseeing Kibera on behalf of the government. There was also a council of elders for the whole of Kibera, possibly created by one of the Liwalis, with weekly meetings, and open to all people.

As earlier pointed out, the area was first known as -kibrah,ø which was changed to -Kibiraø and finally -Kibera.ø -Kibrahø is a Nubian lexeme meaning 'forest,' but as the Bantus could not pronounce the word, it was converted to -Kibira.ø The process of time with cultural diffusion saw the modification of the name to -Kiberaø The area was densely forested, but the Nubians soon


⁸⁴ Major Edwards memorandum, 1936, Kenya National Archives (KNA) RCA (MAA) ó 2/1/3 ii

⁸⁵ Moyse-Bartlett, H. (1956) *The King's African Rifles. A study in the military history of East and Central Africa, 1890-1945.* Gale & Polden Ltd, Aldershot

⁸⁶ Parsons T. 'Kibra is our blood': the Sudanese military legacy in Nairobi's Kibera location, 1902-1968. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 30(1), 1997, pg 87-122.

started clearing the bushes and erecting structures. Most of them settled near Otiende, which is now an estate with the same name. As the Nubians did not want Kenyans overtaking their land, the population remained fairly homogenous for some time. The agricultural work in Kibera was mainly done by landless Kikuyu or Meru shamba boys looking for a way to survive. Since they were working for the Nubis, these shamba boys were in principle the only outsiders (non-Nubi) allowed, staying in Kibera. However, past 1920 the colonial government then allowed settlements to grow and opened gates to other tribes from across the country.

Kibera in 1920s map adapted from survey of Kenya Maps



2.3 KIBERA SLUM BEFORE INDEPENDENCE, 1920 – 1963

From the 1920s, the Nubis were well established in Kibera. They lived scattered around the area, growing their own food in their *shambas* keeping livestock and doing small scale business. Additional income came from jobs in town. The Nubis were of a better social class than the other ordinary Africans because of such treatment from the colonial government. The population of Nairobi continued to grow rapidly: from 20,000 in 1920, to less than 30,000 in 1926, to 33,000 inhabitants in 1930, to 49,600 in 1936 to 108,900 in 1944.⁸⁷ The population in Kibera, nonetheless, increased gradually but remained low.⁸⁸ After World War I, more demobilised Nubi soldiers settled in Kibera, also some coming from other Nubi villages like Eldama Ravine. When in 1927 the African settlement of Kileleshwa (also in Nairobi) was demolished, some Nubi families living there moved to Kibera. In 1934 the Nubi population in Kibera was estimated to be 1500-1700.⁸⁹ Other people, *outsiders* started moving to Kibera as well as some Kikuyus looking for land for survival, as well as shamba boys, house helps and other staff and servants working for the Nubis. Furthermore, there was some intermarriage with women of other African ethnic groups. But this was all on a small scale and the Nubis were firmly *in charge* in Kibera as they were officially still the only ones allowed to live there. Proposals were made in the late 1920s to demolish and relocate Kibera, as it was within the zone of European residential holdings. However, the residents objected to these proposals and the colonial government considered proposals to reorganize Kibera instead.

The influx of *outsiders* increased further when in 1928 Kibera was quietly handed over from military supervision to civil administration as it fell under the Nairobi District Commissioner, not the Nairobi City Council. Under civil administration, control of the area became even slacker than it had been under the KAR. As a result Kibera became more attractive to other Africans, non-Nubis, looking for work and accommodation though insufficient then in Nairobi. With scanty opportunities to survive, it is possible that many of them had to survive through illegal activities like prostitution and theft.⁹⁰ Such trend was expected to continue amidst the challenges.

⁸⁷Ferraro G., *Nairobi: Overview of an East African city*, African Urban Studies, 3, 1-13, 1978/9.

⁸⁸*Ibid*

⁸⁹This figure is based on a census done in 1934, mentioned in the *Kibera survey report* of 1944

⁹⁰Parsons, T. *Kibera is our blood: the Sudanese military legacy in Nairobi's Kibera location, 1902-1968*. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 30(1) 1997pg 92-93.

Kibera became also known for its illicit liquor, the Nubian gin. Possibly already before the 1920s the Nubis had started to commercialise their Nubian gin; they produced increasing quantities of their traditional liquor, drawing many people (mainly natives) to Kibera, especially in weekends.⁹¹ Despite liquor raids and increased fines and prison sentences, the production of Nubian Gin increased further during the 1930s. It provided a much-needed source of income for an increasing number of Nubi families: though the Nubis produced enough food in their shambas to survive, their standard of living was affected by the economic depression that hit Kenya in the 1930s.⁹²

In the 1930s, several areas around Nairobi, and as far as Thika (about 40 kms from Nairobi), were selected and investigated. However, all these options for resettlement of the Nubis away from Nairobi had to be discarded, for a multitude of reasons: wildlife conservation, resistance from local ethnic groups or European residents, unsuitability for farming, insufficient rainfall, the owners refused to sell, or because it was going to be too expensive to compensate the owners.⁹³ Furthermore, the Nubis did not make it easier for the British to find suitable land: they did not mind moving, but insisted on farmland and pasture, and a place near enough to Nairobi to continue their jobs in town.⁹⁴ Moreover, they benefited from the lack of Government control in Kibera and the possibilities for the Nubian Gin trade; it is likely that they were unwilling to move just anywhere, unless possibilities for similar trade existed, to equal the profits made in Kibera – this basically meant staying near Nairobi. This meant the continued establishment of Kibera settlement. The Nubis deserved, or so they thought, respect in view of their past military record and support to the British colonial administration. To them, it would be a grave mistake in policy for the British not to recognise the loyal services rendered by the Sudanese ex-KAR soldiers, by some generous settlement in regard to Kibera land. The Nubis gratefully exploited these sentiments.

During the following years no suitable land could be found to move the Nubis to. With World War II about to start, the Kibera issue was forgotten, and laid to rest for some time. However,

⁹¹ Leopold, M. "Legacies of slavery in North-West Uganda: *The story of the 'one-elevens'.*" *Africa (the Journal of the International African Institute)*, Vol. 76 No 2, pp 180-99.

⁹² Kibera Survey Report, 1944, p3

⁹³ Parsons, T. "Kibera is our blood: the Sudanese military legacy in Nairobi's Kibera location, 1902-1968." *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 30(1) 1997 pg 92-93.

⁹⁴ Ibid

the government saw no reason to support the Nubis or make their life easier. Liquor raids in Kibera continued, and no permission was given to supply clean piped water to the area with the excuse that it was undesirable that the settlement there should be permanent. It was thought that neglecting the settlement would eventually force out the inhabitants.⁹⁵

By 1947 the housing shortage in Nairobi was desperate, and a growing number of people moved into Kibera: there was simply no alternative housing for Africans to be found in Nairobi.⁹⁶ Moreover, Kibera was close to town and cheap compared to other African settlements in town.⁹⁷

African settlement discontent increased until it erupted in the Mau Mau civil war. The State of Emergency was declared on 20 October 1952.⁹⁸ During April 1954, in a month-long operation dubbed 'Operation Anvil' some 16,500 people, practically all Kikuyu, Meru and Embu, were removed from Nairobi and detained or taken to their native reserves.⁹⁹ During this operation, the Kikuyu-dominated low-income housing area of Mathare Valley was demolished. As a result, Kibera remained one of the few areas offering cheap accommodation for Africans. People from western and eastern Kenya came to replace the Kikuyu workers in Nairobi. Settlement in Kibera was henceforth apparently actively encouraged, it being considered a 'loyalist' area.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, Kibera was popular with the new migrants from mainly western Kenya, because it was relatively safe.¹⁰¹ The influx created an additional market for rental rooms in Kibera. Towards the end of the 1950s restrictions on African movements were relaxed and the migration rate to Nairobi increased. People from western Kenya preferred to live in Kibera because it was relatively safe and not a Kikuyu-dominated area.

The hiving off of Kibera land continued after world war II: the Nairobi Dam was built right after the war; in 1948 the railway line to Uganda was removed from the city centre and realigned to go around Nairobi, cutting through Kibera, where a small railway station was built as well; Woodley

⁹⁵ Kibera Survey Report, 1944, p3

⁹⁶ Throup D. Economic & social origins of Mau Mau. James Curry, London, 1987

⁹⁷ Amis, P. 'Squatters or tenants: the commercialization of unauthorized housing in Nairobi.' *World Development*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1984, pg 137.

⁹⁸ Bagonko S., Kenya 1945-1964; a Study in African National Movements. Kenya Literature Bureau, Nairobi, 1980

⁹⁹ Clayton A., The killing fields of Kenya 1952-1960. British military operations against the Mau Mau. Transafrica Press, Nairobi, 1976

¹⁰⁰ Amis, P. 'Squatters or tenants: the commercialisation of unauthorised housing in Nairobi.' *World Development*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1983 pg 152-153.

¹⁰¹ Clark D. 'Unregulated housing, vested interest, and the development of community identity in Nairobi.' *African Urban Studies*, 1975, pg 7.

estate was built in the early 1950s; in 1952 land along Ngong road was given to some sports clubs (now the Impala and Harlequin Sports Clubs), and in 1950-53 the Royal Agricultural Society of Kenya built their new Agricultural Showground; in the early 1950s the Public Works Department had 150 African employees living in the Public Works housing at the end of what is now Karanja Road.¹⁰² And like before, the Nubis continued to protest, to no avail, against the government using their land for its own purposes. Around Independence less than 1200 acres remained of the original 4198 acres of Kibera land.¹⁰³

2.4 KIBERA SLUM AFTER INDEPENDENCE, 1963 – 2008

After Kenya became independent in 1963, a number of forms of housing were made illegal by the government. The new ruling affected Kibera on the basis of land tenure, rendering it an unauthorized settlement. However, the then President of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, allowed some Kenyans to settle in Kibera, at a distance from the Nubian settlements. Nonetheless, the latter staged demonstrations claiming they did not want Kenyans on their land. In response, the Member of Parliament, Mwangi Maathai, liaised with the then PC of Nairobi, who together convinced the President to allow Kenyans to settle in Kibera.

Despite Kibera being an unauthorized settlement, people continued to live there, and by the early 1970s landlords were renting out their properties in Kibera to significantly greater numbers of tenants than were permitted by law. The tenants, who were highly impoverished, could not rent legal housing, finding the rates offered in Kibera to be comparatively affordable. The number of residents in Kibera thus, increased despite its unauthorized nature. By 1974, members of the Kikuyu tribe dominated the population of Kibera, and had gained control over administrative positions, which may have been retained through political patronage.

Kibera witnessed an influx of migrants from the rural areas subsequently becoming the largest urban slum in Kenya.¹⁰⁴ Eventually the slum translated to one of the largest slums in Africa with an average population of approximately more than nine hundred thousand people by 1980.¹⁰⁵ The

¹⁰² Cemiride "Covert racism." Report by the Centre for Minority Rights Development, Nairobi, 2002

¹⁰³ Memorandum of the Kibera Committee to PM Harold Macmillan, 3/1/1963.

¹⁰⁴ Macharia K. : Slum clearance and informal economy in Nairobi. *The journal of modern African studies*, 30(2) 1992 pg. 221-236

¹⁰⁵ Umande Trust Kibera; The Right to Water and Sanitation in Kibera in Nairobi, Kenya, 2010

slum stands on an approximate area of about 2.5 square kilometres and is roughly five kilometres away from the city centre.

By 1981, many Kenyans had been allocated spaces in Kibera by the Provincial Administration. The first beneficiaries were Kikuyu and Kamba, and the population grew so rapidly that available plots were soon occupied. The situation deteriorated during President Moi's regime, when rural-urban migration increased and chiefs allocated lands to those people who went to them for help. Presently, Kibera's residents represent almost all the major Kenyan ethnic backgrounds, with some areas being specifically dominated by peoples of one ethno-linguistic group. Many new residents come from rural areas with chronic underdevelopment and overpopulation issues. The multi-ethnic nature of Kibera's population combined with the tribalism that pervades Kenyan politics has led to Kibera hosting a number of small ethnic violent conflicts throughout its century-long history. Initially, the Kikuyu tribe dominated Kibera slums population. However over the years, the Luo tribe has grown dominant as shown in Figure 3.




Figure 3; Kibera Population by tribe (Data Source: Umande Trust in Kibera, 2007).

From 1990s people of all Kenyan ethnic groups were squeezed within the area that is now Kibera, with houses even on the steeper slopes and close to the rivers. Though people live mostly ethnically mixed, certain patterns of ethnic clustering have been established. Kibera is now divided into a number of villages as earlier shown, each with its own characteristics in ethnic makeup. While most villages have people of all ethnic groups, often one group is dominant. Some of the old Nubi village names have disappeared, replaced by names of Kikuyu or other origin, or referring to the dominant ethnic group of that village.

The Kenyan government owns all the land upon which Kibera stands, though it continues to not officially acknowledge the settlement. No basic services, schools, clinics, running water or lavatories publicly provided. Nonetheless, services that do exist are privately owned. The settlements' names help reveal their history: 'Mashimoni' ('holes') had many pits and 'Kisumu Ndogo' ('Little Kisumu'), which is predominantly Luos, was named after the city of Kisumu. There is also a settlement called 'Raila' after the former Prime Minister Raila Odinga. These various settlements in Kibera are sub-divided by the railway line, pathways or trenches. Kibera settlement is located on two Nairobi divisional administrative areas; Dagoretti and Langata divisions. The slum is divided into 14 villages with varying populations - Kianda, Olympic, Soweto West, Gatwekera, Raila, Karanja, Kisumu Ndogo, Makina, Kambi Muru, Mashimoni, Lindi, Laini Saba, Silanga and Soweto East.




Figure 4: A map of villages in Kibera informal settlements.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁶ Information used in drawing the Kibera informal settlements is from Survey of Kenya maps in addition to the latest google maps

Figure 5 shows Kibera's population by village. Makina, with a population of 130,000 people is the largest village by population. Mashimoni, Katwekera, Kianda and Laini Saba villages equally accommodate large populations of more than 80,000 people per village. Since government policies have not focused on making low-cost housing available or providing slum-dwellers with viable long-term alternatives, the state has contributed to the proliferation of informal settlements. In the absence of other affordable housing, many people who migrate to Nairobi have no realistic alternative to life in the slums.




Figure 5: Kibera slums population; Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2010; Umande Trust

In 2002, Kenya's national government, acknowledging Kibera's slum problems, severity and persistence, took definitive action by creating the Kenya Slum Upgrading Program (hereafter KENSUP). The programme focuses on implementing projects that are sustainable, inclusive, democratic, accountable, and transparent. It aims at providing communities with improved housing and access to basic services, secure tenure, and opportunities to generate income. One of KENSUP's pilot projects is the Kibera Soweto Project. This is a joint effort between the Kenyan government and UN-HABITAT that focuses on just one of Kibera's fourteen (14) villages of 70,000 inhabitants. While the project's benefits remain to be seen, some valuable lessons have already surfaced; the fact that communities must be engaged from the programme's initiation and seen to appreciate the same is prominent. More so, every effort must be made to maintain affordability throughout a project, and institutional development must occur well before a project is instituted.

2.5 CONCLUSION

With between 800,000 and 1.2 million people living on about 600 acres of sloped government land, the intense overcrowding and the complete lack of infrastructure present the greatest physical challenges. These highly congested living conditions intensely increase health risks and diminish quality of life for Kibera's residents. The living conditions are harsh and profoundly unforgiving. The deprivations people face on a daily basis are fundamental. These have included severe overcrowding, terrible sanitation, chronic diseases, malnutrition, and insecurity. The conditions have evolved over decades of indifference and neglect by both municipal and national governments.

Based on the knowledge from this study in addition to other scholarly work from an inventory by the Pamoja Trust,¹⁰⁷ low quality housing and the general lack of basic infrastructure in slums, especially sanitation, drainage, access to energy and clean water supply, result in poor social and environmental conditions. In turn, this leads to high levels of unemployment and low income ultimately giving rise to violence.¹⁰⁸ This fact has not been different with Kibera slum. Given the above challenges and the ethnic separation pattern of the Kibera slum, which hosts almost all

¹⁰⁷ Pamoja Trust, an Inventory of the Slums in Nairobi, Matrix Consultants, 2009. Smith, L., & Hanson, S. Access to water for the urban poor in Cape Town: where equity meets cost recovery. *Urban Studies* 40(8): 1517-1548, 2003.

¹⁰⁸ *ibid*

Kenyan ethnic groups, then any given political violence would pose a risk. Elections in Kenya, as witnessed in the past, follow ethnic divisions and tribal alignments and so is political violence. The history of Kibera slum thus, creates a prolific scenario in explaining the impact of political violence on the girl child in Kenya.

The chapter shows clearly that ethnicity in Kibera build slowly since her first settlement years and did not disappear after Kenya's Independence. The same has rather become an important tool for mobilising support in national politics. Other communities like the Luo, Kamba and Kikuyu have become the main powerbrokers in Kibera, replacing the Nubis who are now only a small community in Kibera. Without political support or leverage the Nubis have lost their supremacy in Kibera, and even lost control over part of their rental rooms. This process in fact already started much earlier, when the Nubis could not stop the influx of 'outsiders' in Kibera, in the 1970s. The 'outsiders' were protected and aided by the authorities that were of the same ethnic group.

The government of Kenya partnered with UN-HABITAT on slum-upgrading project in Kibera. While some residents moved to these new housing developments in 2009, the process has been slow and many residents are hesitant to relocate their homes and businesses. However the good intentions by the government to the Kibera residents, these upgrades are perceived as typically more expensive and less hospitable to informal economic activities by the residents. The Kibera residents also, seem to have had received the idea without confidence and with great caution as they have known the government to deceive them in the past. Ultimately, as argued, 'instead of improving the lives of slum dwellers by enabling access to adequate housing, poorly targeted slum upgrading improves the lives of the better-off and displaces the original residents into expanding or newly forming slums.'¹⁰⁹ Such good intentions of improving social and environmental infrastructure would be a major boost towards prevention of recurrence of political violence, but should be reconsidered to involve the Kibera residents in understanding the purpose. Political leaders should also stop interfering with and taking the benefit of such genuine drive to fulfil their selfish political goals.

¹⁰⁹ Huchzermeyer M. Slum upgrading in Nairobi within the housing and basic services market: A housing rights concern. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 43(1), 2008, pg. 19-39.

CHAPTER THREE

2007/2008 POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN KIBERA SLUM

3.0 INTRODUCTION

Political violence has played out in different manners throughout Kenya's history. The Kenyan slogan of peace, love and unity well known since independence was in many ways a myth waiting to be shattered judging from her unstable violent election spells. Early in 2008, the Ugandan writer and commentator Kalundi Serumaga wrote about the Kenyan middle class' capacity to "normalize the absurd." If anything, the surprise was that it had taken so long for the bubble of normality to burst.¹¹⁰ Many factors helped foment the violent election spells: rampant corruption from the president downwards, some of the starkest economic inequalities on earth, fragmentation of already corrupt ruling elite along ethnic lines, and a disproportionately young population.¹¹¹ The cauldron simply boiled over in 2007. The failure of the 2007 elections was merely a trigger for events that would have taken place at some point in the future. There had long been an overwhelming sense of exclusion and alienation among large sections of the populace. For Kenya's alienated youth, the 2008 political violence was, in a tragic way, the most significant moment of collective empowerment they had ever experienced from the political leaders. In my tour of research within Kibera I realised that this sense of empowerment explains the total lack of regret among the very many youths who carried out violent acts in Kibera slum.

The city of Nairobi has through the years provided the barometer for Kenya's volatile politics from colonial times to the present. This may have been true through the contribution of the large population living in Nairobi's informal settlements. Kenya's enduring political violence in the city is frequently explained with reference to the mobilization of ethnicity from above, and relatively little attention has been paid to the participation of ordinary people especially from these informal settlements. Focusing on the political violence that followed the 2007 general elections, this chapter explores how bottom-up processes of poverty, unemployment and gender identification interacted with incitement and ethnicity from above to exacerbate violence in

¹¹⁰ John Githogo, Foreign affairs magazine; Fear and Loathing in Nairobi, the Challenge of Reconciliation in Kenya july/august 2010 issue

¹¹¹ -Ibidø

Kibera. The durability of these bottom-up deeper roots, as well as their inherent plasticity, has significant implications for the potential of further violence and the prospects for long term impacts. The chapter narrates a brief history of the use of political violence in Kenyan elections and the factors in the Kenyan society that contribute to a tendency of utilising violence as a means of obtaining political influence.

3.1 USE OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN ELECTIONS

As earlier noted in chapter one (in expounding the background of my study), violence was part and parcel of the colonial state. The colonial state used it to ensure control. Both the colonialists and indigenous Kenyans used violence in their pursuit of political objectives, most clearly evident from the 1952-1960 Mau Mau rebellion and its repression.¹¹² The same may have been inherited after independence with the use of violence mainly concentrated in the hands of the state, rather than outside it. Indeed, episodes of ethnic violence have characterized Kenyan elections even before the transition to multi-party politics in 1992. Notably also, wealth of literature that has explored the country's tendency towards violent ethnic politics is readily available. During President Kenyatta's reign, the first president in independent Kenya, opposition parties were subjected to political harassment with those individuals opposing the status quo experiencing various types of repression and even detention without trial. The government is believed to have been responsible for the murder of three political figures, Pio Gama Pinto, Tom Mboya, and J. M Kariuki, the last two of whom were viewed as threats to the then regime and potential contenders for political power.¹¹³

Under president Moi's rule, institutionalization of detention without trial and routine torture of perceived and real dissenters almost became the norm particularly, due to the unsuccessful attempt by parts of the Kikuyu elite to keep him off from presidency in 1978 and the attempted coup of 1982. In turn, a dissent against his rule by a growing opposition movement of politicians, lawyers, university students among others was generated. As opposition to president Moi's rule grew over the years, civil society became increasingly vocal and donors increased pressure on him, including the use of financial sanctions to democratise. The end result was the multi-party

¹¹² Berman B. and Lonsdale J., *Unhappy valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa*, London: James Curry Publishers, 1992.

¹¹³ Report on the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (CIPEV), October, 2008 pg 26

democracy of 1991. It was in this period of 1990s in the history of Kenyan politics that violence showed signs as a means to achieving political ambitions.¹¹⁴

In the 1992 election campaign, the voting itself and the immediate aftermath of the election, were characterised by threats, harassments and the occurrence of violent clashes between supporters of different parties, claiming the lives of around 1,500 Kenyans and displacing more than 300,000.¹¹⁵ Like the 1992 elections, the subsequent 1997 elections were associated with violence. During the six months prior to the elections, KANU party activists allegedly backed armed gangs who attacked non-native ethnic groups in the Coast Province, causing the death of more than 100 and leading to the displacement of more than 100,000.¹¹⁶ This was like an igniter of the violence that followed there after. Moreso, after the election politically motivated violence between ethnic groups took place. Over 120 Kenyans lost their lives in the then Rift Valley province when KANU supporters clashed with armed youths most of whom belonged to the Kikuyu ethnic group.¹¹⁷ Although in 2002, the election campaign (and its aftermath) was characterised by a significant decrease in political violence compared to its two predecessors, political rallies did on some occasions lead to violence.¹¹⁸ History from Kibera resident respondents confirmed of unrest and violent actions of youths in every election period since multipartism. More than half of the interviewed respondents either run home during the time of elections, or they at-least knew someone who did so for fear of violent outcomes during every election period since 1992. An interviewee said, "As much as elections normally coincided with Christmas holidays, many people from Kibera went home not out of their own planning but due to the fear of a violent possibility. They always felt something bad can happen during election times."¹¹⁹

Reports from NGOs, such as Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Watch, and two Government Inquiries, the Kiliku report and Akiwuni Commission, showed evidence of election related violence in 1992 and 1997 Kenyan elections. Each of these reports implicated politicians

¹¹⁴ Insight of the paragraph from Andrew Morton's *Moi: The making of an African statesman*, 1998

¹¹⁵ Human Rights Watch, *Playing with fire: Weapons Proliferation, Political Violence, and Human Rights in Kenya*, New York, 2002, pg. 20621 www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2002/kenya/, accessed 15 May 2009.

¹¹⁶ Ibid

¹¹⁷ Amnesty International, *Kenya: political violence spirals*, London: Amnesty International, 1998, www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR32/019/1998, accessed 1 May 2009, 1.

¹¹⁸ Human rights watch, *ballots to bullets. Organized Political Violence and Kenya's Crisis of Governance*, 20(1), 2008

¹¹⁹ Interview with Majimbo -11th September, 2014 at Kibera Gatwekera.

as the organizers of the violence and killing for political ends. A pattern seemed to have been established of forming groups and using extra-state violence to obtain political power. From the reports, warriors and gangs of youth were paid and/or promised land and jobs after evicting upcountry dwellers. On the above basis, gangs such as Mungiki, Taliban, Chinkororo, Kamjeshi, Baghdad Boys have grown and multiplied within the context of a political culture that has both tolerated and used state violence.¹²⁰ With the political violence being ethnically directed, it has increased distrust among different groups and vastly eroded any sense of national identity. The basic issue left facing the nation of Kenya is how to deal with this conception and instil national values on Kenyan leaders and citizens.

3.2 CAUSES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN KIBERA

Much of political violence in Kenya has been fanned on ethnic animosity¹²¹ however, this does not adequately explain the political violence in Kibera. The violence thus needs to be disaggregated and analyzed carefully to better understand the various kinds of causes. The causes as analysed here under have been categorised to social-economic and political causes.

3.2.1 SOCIAL-ECONOMIC CAUSES

3.2.1.1 Wide spread poverty

From the Kibera respondents, there seemed to be a sense among some observers that agents of political violence in Kenya are fundamentally dissatisfied with social and economic conditions of life and specifically in Kibera slum. Kenya has an estimated two million unemployed youth.¹²² Many of these youths live in the informal settlements as they look for opportunities. Out of the the Kibera resident respondents, who were youths, more than half of them had no means of livelihood while others were employed temporarily or on contract basis. Only one respondent was a permanently employed professional teacher. To such young people with daily basic human needs, joining a gang may, for some if not all, be seen as a way of life that can increase

¹²⁰ Report on the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (CIPEV), October, 2008 Pg 30-35.

¹²¹ Jacqueline K. & Kamungi P., *Violence and Elections: Will Kenya Collapse?* World Policy Journal, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Winter, 2007/2008), the MIT Press and the World Policy Institute.

¹²² Report on the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (CIPEV), October, 2008 pg 35

possibilities of economic growth. This may have been precipitated by the fact that over the course of decades, Kibera slum dwellers may have developed a general distrust of government. In part because of disappointment over government promised provision of basic social amenities and upgrading projects that never materializes, and on the other hand the non-facilitation of truly participatory process and carrying out of residents' identified priorities. It is often those higher up the economic ladder who own the power to participate in planning of the community affairs, without continuous involvement of the slum dwellers, which mostly skews what gets expressed as a community's needs and desires. As an independent observer, it seemed to me that political affairs, accords and negotiations don't take into regard the views and interests of slum dwellers. Leadership foundation, instead, is formed on the basis of election arithmetic, but not on shared perceptions of the plight of the youth, particularly the great majority of the urban poor living in slums. The community's potential activities as felt from sixty percent (60%) of the interviewed respondents ranged from setting up pre-schools, helping children into public schools, training children and adults on good hygiene and sanitation to raising awareness on the importance of children's rights and working with local police and healthcare workers to improve services. With such there is always a mismatch from what is provided by the leaders, occasioning negative expressions which take feat during violent encounters characterised by lawlessness as was evident in 2007/2008 post-election violence.

During an interview with one of the youth, a standard eight male drop out, poverty subjugation affected his success story. Consequently he was forced to engage in whichever kind of activity regardless of its cost implications as long as it generated some money to him. These were his words, "my parents divorced in July, 2006 and I was left with my mother who had virtually nothing to sustain herself, leave alone me and my siblings. The so called "government" was nowhere for us. I was forced to do casual jobs to cater for my primary school, a duty that was too hard for me. The only option left for me was just to drop out of school and seek for means of livelihood as young as I was. I dropped out of school in 2010 after class eight even after repeating two classes. Though too painful to date, it was the only available bitter option. Up to date it is a do or die way of life"¹²³ When these gangs engage in political violence, members are sometimes promised payment for their activities, and also less organised perpetrators can benefit from looting. With these youths being faced with challenges of unemployment, harassment by organs

¹²³ Interview with wasike, a 22 year old youth from Kibera Silanga on 10th September, 2014.

of the state, exclusion from political participation, poverty and uncertainty of tomorrow, they generally become an angry lot and prone to manipulation by a power hungry elite. It becomes like a -snareø to them.

Seventy eight percent (78%) of the interviewed adult respondents, many of whom were religious leaders, argued that poverty and opportunism had a significant impact on villagersø and shanty town dwellersø willingness to engage in political violence. One of the adult respondents, a leader of an upcoming savings and investment society, had this to say, øFor many of the perpetrators in political violence who turn out to be the unemployed youths, political agendas may be less relevant to them than prospects of enrichment.ö¹²⁴ The poor economic conditions prevailing in the Kibera slum have encouraged the mushrooming of militia groups. Unlike the vigilantes, the militias are more aggressive, better organized and inclined to take advantage of weak security apparatus to make economic gains from the slum residents and the political leaders. Despite many risks involved, the militias also provide a ready source of employment to thousands of idle youth. Further, it provides a sense of satisfaction. Evidently, the militias have also emerged to fill security void left by the State in the Kibera slum becoming as big business from which the police, politicians and thousands of unemployed youth benefits. This was strong machinery employed in the 2007/08 political violence.

3.2.1.2 Unequal distribution of resources

The post-election events in 2007/08 in Nairobi Kibera slum which to some extent may have served as an epicenter of violence were a strong reminder of the appalling living conditions causing frustration and tensions within the slum. Participation in the political violence may have been furthered by a widespread sense of dissatisfaction in the distribution of wealth and more so, because of the slum where a general feeling of marginalization may have been existing.¹²⁵ Distribution of wealth is extremely unequal in Kenya. Kenya ranks as the tenth most unequal country in the world, and the richest ten (10) percent of the population controls forty two (42) percent of the countryø wealth, while the poorest ten (10) percent own less than one (1)

¹²⁴ Discussion with the Kibera Pastorø Love Association (PLA) members on 9th august, 2014.

¹²⁵ From oral interview with a primary school teacher on 10th september, 2014

percent.¹²⁶ Access to resources varies highly from region to region.¹²⁷ With these lenses, political violence may be viewed as a way of demonstrating dissatisfaction with the cruel conditions of life that stand in contrast to the elite's comfortable way of life. This kind of life is perceived by the poor to result from political connections and corruption. Sixty nine (69) percent of the respondents attributed their fate to unfairness from government officials, corruption and lack of political connections. However the level of education in the Kibera slum may also be a contributing factor. A young couple from Silanga qualified their poor status as a result of absence of ears to listen to the cry of less fortunate in society. The couple felt their life ought to have been better than it was if only the resources at the countries disposal were fairly distributed. They thus, saw political violent conflicts as a way of expressing their constitutional right as Kenyans, for it seems as the only way people could give ear to their woes. The couple also justified the acts of looting and destruction of property in such violent times as a way of communicating and forcing fairness in distribution of resources from those who have to those who do not have. Such opportunities according to the couple should not be forcefully stopped at all by the government security machinery. Instead, with all persuasiveness and understanding a message of discontent ought to be deciphered by those in leadership positions.¹²⁸

3.2.1.3 Police Response to Insecurity

Before the 2007/08 political violence Kibera slum as in the other Nairobi slums was one of the most poorly patrolled enclaves of Nairobi. In majority of the villages, respondents reported that they had never seen a policeman on patrol either during the day or at night before the political violence. The reason why the Kibera slum was poorly patrolled was due to some sections being impenetrable by police security patrol vans. Secondly, the slums served and still serve as hide out for hardcore criminals. This had made (the situation is still so as at the date of this study) some villages too insecure for police officers on foot patrol. Criminals had on a number of occasions attacked policemen on patrol, killed and robbed them of their guns which were then used for

¹²⁶ Society for International Development, Pulling apart: *Facts and Figures on Inequality in Kenya, Nairobi*: Society for International Development, 2004, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/2223295/Pulling-Apart-Facts-and-Figures-on-Inequality-in-Kenya>, accessed 14 May 2009.

¹²⁷ Ibid

¹²⁸ This is a one on one interview with a young couple (Mr and Mrs Otieno) on 10th September, 2014 at Kibera Soweto East.

criminal missions. And with the eventual un-cooperation of community policing services, criminals sought to establish safe havens in the slums out of police reach. Additionally, the criminals who operated in the slums were reportedly better armed than the police. However, the government has since 2008 made efforts to step up security in the Kibera slum by increasing police presence and by responding to actual incidents of violence. A police patrol base and several reporting police booths were sited during my tour of the Kibera slum along the road running across the slum. The police have so far to this end managed, with the support of the residents, to obtain credible information about criminals.

Lack of access roads and security lights predispose women and girls to rape and sexual violence. Social problems such as trade in hard drugs, drug abuse, child prostitution, robbery with violence, burglary, and murder also thrive. According to the respondents, the most insecure seasons in Kibera slum are during the long and short rainy seasons (April-June and September ó October respectively) when criminals take advantage of heavy rains to break into houses and more so in election periods. The 2007/08 political violence made this situation to be worse than any other time. Although the Kibera slum dwellers appreciated on-going efforts by the police to crack down on crime and general insecurity since the 2007/08 political violence, they complained that the number of police officers posted in the slum is far too small compared to the size of the population it is supposed to protect. Secondly, they accused some police officers of collaborating with criminals and sharing the proceeds after crime. Generally in their opinion, police response is as yet too little, too late, and too unreliable to contain the degenerating security situation. Out of frustrations, the local slum residents respond to crime by administering mob justice on the suspects or through other readily available though unlawful means.

3.2.1.4 Land issue

Despite several attempts at reforms, land grievances dating back to the colonial era continue to constitute a major obstacle to peaceful cohabitation in Kenya especially between distinct ethnic groups. From the analysis of the interviewed adult respondents during a group discussion, those who understood Kenyan history explained how land issues in Kenya could be summarised in one phrase as follows: "When Kenya became independent in 1963, the most fertile areas that had been occupied by white settlers were handed over to the new government instead of the people

who had lived there before. Besides selling pieces of this land on market terms, Kenyan governments have continuously allocated these areas to shifting supporters for patronage purposes.¹²⁹

At least two dimensions are relevant when considering land distribution and ownership as a cause of political violence. Firstly, many families can barely make a living from the small piece of land they own. This is a major factor in Kibera. As pointed out generally during our discussion group with the leaders, land is a national cake, and everybody should have at least a small piece of it. However, whereas some have plenty, most have little. The shortage and unequal distribution of land have in many occasions led to dissatisfaction with those in government with violence as the only available means of expressing such frustrations. Secondly, long-lasting problems of land ownership and distribution have created tensions between communities. In Kibera, for example, the Nubis have constantly claimed part of Kibera, Makina precisely, as their tribal land, hence their never-ending assertions on the Kibera land. In fact a Nubi respondent categorically considered Kibera their tribal home area, the place where they were born and grew up.¹³⁰

Disputes over land ownership are historically related to colonial and post-independent regimes, unfair taking and allocation of land (and the colonialists' forceful resettlement of individuals from certain ethnic groups). Such disputes remain an unsolved problem that political leaders can escalate by making reference to ethnicity. By doing so, the problem acquires the potential for inter-community conflict, as has indeed been a characteristic of political violence throughout Kenya's history. Such land issues have been characteristic of Kibera slum. Land commissions like the Ndung'u commission on irregularly and illegally acquired land appointed in 2003 have continuously made recommendations on Kenya's land problems including the issue of resettlement of the internally displaced people and the landless as a result of the post election violence. Nevertheless, the recommendations have largely not been implemented but remains at the core of addressing the Land question in Kenya.¹³¹

The logic behind land struggles in the Kibera slum can thus be simply summarised: Incidents of land-related conflicts and violence are higher on government land than on private lands that make

¹²⁹Discussion with the Kibera Pastor's Love Association (PLA) members on 9th August, 2014.

¹³⁰Interview with Abdi Mohammed - 11th September, 2014

¹³¹Paul Maurice Syagga, Land Ownership and use in Kenya, Chapter 8 - Policy prescriptions from an inequality perspective

up the Kibera slum. Indeed, controversy surrounds the process of acquiring government land in the slum however temporary. Whereas some early migrants to Kibera simply identified vacant spaces and built something on it, a significant majority said they were assisted by the provincial administration, especially the Chiefs and their councils of elders to acquire space. The residents insist they paid money to the Chiefs for which official receipts were issued. Some structure owners also alleged they were sold the lands that they currently occupy by City Council of Nairobi and official receipts were supplied to authenticate the transaction. In a nutshell, government officers assisted structure owners to obtain government land.

Indeed, as discussed during the focus groups it was a common trend during the period of single party rule for the head of state and high ranking party officials to grab and distribute government land to party supporters or an ethnic group as a token of appreciation for their loyalty to the party and especially the head of State. Hundreds of slum residents became beneficiaries of such corrupt schemes as did individual politicians. Past and present political leaders in Nairobi as well as Councilors at the then Nairobi City Council exploited weak legislations to identify and grab large chunks of land which they subsequently redistributed not only among themselves but also to their ethnic clansmen on which their political support base hung.

The problem with this kind of illegal land transactions is that different people were sold or allocated the same piece of land. Since the law of the jungle is a common practice in the Kibera slum, the strongest or the most organized group would apply violence on opponents in order to retain the contested piece of land. Secondly, some individuals were allocated private lands. In such situations, the actual owner of the land would find it prudent to avoid the protracted legal tussles by simply hiring thugs/militias to forcefully evict invaders. Thirdly, the eviction of tenants squatting on land reserved for public utility projects has not been easy without a fight. In the wake of state-led land reforms, the City Council of Nairobi has had to engage Kiosk owners whose business premises were threatened with demolition on repeated physical combats some of which left behind a trail of destruction and even fatalities.

The government has been reluctant to recognize the Kibera slum because doing so would imply losing government titles to individuals, a move which would increase land conflicts. Recognizing the slum as official settlements would also deny the government opportunity to develop these lands as required by law once funds become available. Further, it gives the government leverage

in displacing or relocating the squatters whenever slum-upgrading-programs are rolled out like it happened in the Kibera slum after the 2007/08 political violence. But left unaddressed, the squatter problem complicates the prospect of ensuring long lasting stability in the Kibera slum.

3.2.1.5 High rate of unemployment

As the common saying goes "an idle mind is the devil's workshop," the respondents generally cited the high rate of unemployment among the Kibera youths as one major reason that caused desperation to the point of their misuse by those in power and able to access their service through monetary recompense. This gave the politicians a window to lure the unemployed youths with material things and abuse them to achieve their political ambitions. In my tour of Kibera slum, eighty five (85) percent of the youths that I met were a representative group of standard eight drop outs and form four leavers, all of whom did not have any formal employment. Fifty five (55) percent of those youths mostly involved themselves with casual jobs and small scale businesses. The other forty five (45) percent of them were idling around the slum having no means of livelihood. During my interview with a group of youths, I discovered that twenty three (23) percent of the group had fathered children out of wedlock. The main reason for such vice according to them was the redundancy among themselves. This shows how these idling youths are culpable of falling to any wave of "opportunity" that meets them and thus, the danger in time of elections.

The magnitude of the unemployed population in the Kibera slum appeared to be a structural problem and had a strong class dimension. Analytically, from the discussion groups, it seemed a deliberate design by the government, business class and politicians to keep a huge reservoir of people out of employment so as to make their exploitation and manipulation possible especially during elections. Below are some of the consequences of the problem of massive unemployment among the Kibera slum youth as highlighted in the discussion groups:-

- The temptation and motivation among the youth to join militia groups and even the terrorist network had increased.
- Young people in Kibera slum found difficulties in avoiding crime for survival. This had further undermined security situation in the Kibera slum.

- Unemployment had increased the number of young people in Kibera slum willing to take risks because they had nothing to lose.
- Drug abuse among the Kibera slum youth had increased tremendously. The number of drugs addicts had surged over the period prior to the political violence and even after.
- Unemployment had increased domestic violence among households, some leading to fatalities.
- Among the girls, poverty had increased the rate of school dropouts, early pregnancies and early marriages.
- Poverty and unemployment had increased the level of ethnic consciousness amongst the Kibera slum population. This had continuously served as a recipe for inter-ethnic conflicts.
- Unemployment and deplorable socio-economic situation in the Kibera slum had served to sustain tribal ideology among slum dwellers. Various ethnic groups, especially the dominant ones involved in power struggles, saw each other as opponents and each hope their deplorable situation could only improve if one of their own ascended to presidency. Conscious about such misplaced hopes, politicians retained contact with their ethnic clansmen not so much to help them out of their apathy but to embed tribal ideology. Consequently, the aim to win or retain presidency had to a large extent been life and death tussle in the Kibera slum. This had always led to the increasing number of youth willing to risk their life for presidential candidates. It is the prevalence of such beliefs that fuelled the 2007/08 political violence in the Kibera slum. Interestingly, seventy nine (79%) percent of Kibera slum residents who secured well-paying jobs had migrated to other residential areas and eventually lost contact with politicians.

3.2.1.6 Manipulation of Ethnicity

“It’s a sad day for Kenya,” said Michael E. Ranneberger, the American ambassador to Kenya. “My biggest worry now is violence, which, let’s be honest, will be along tribal lines.”¹³² Such a

¹³² The information is from a video series “Kenya’s darkest hour” by Nation Media Group and Kenya History and Biographies Company Limited Production. An NTV video library footage presented by Hilary Ngweni.

clear statement from a non-partisan individual explained to a greater extent the direction that the political violence was almost taking in its advent.

When forming government, many political leaders have rewarded and ensured advantages to individuals from supportive ethnic groups, while marginalising or excluding individuals belonging to ethnic groups associated with political opponents. The Waki Report, for example, notes how President Moi rewarded his supporters, particularly the Kalenjin, through appointments to political offices and with jobs in the public service and the military.¹³³ It also notes how during the 1980s and 1990s land grabbing and the allocation of public land as political patronage were part of the gross corruption of this period, a practice that had been subsequently inherited.¹³⁴ Ethnicity in Kenya is responsible for underdevelopment, corruption, the rigging of elections and violence.¹³⁵ In my own opinion, in the public domain and from what I gathered in my tour of research in the political sphere, leaders appeal to people of their own tribes when they want support. They also use their tribes as leverage when they bargain for positions and favours from the government. The 2008 Kenyan political violence was largely attributed to ethnic differences due to the evident fact of Kenyan elections simply being a matter of life and death in tribal confrontations.¹³⁶ One of the respondents echoed this statement by describing the 2007 elections as all tribalistic and the violence that followed as based on ethnic enclaves.¹³⁷ Ethnic groups saw the fate of their individual person as the chance of the entire ethnic group and putting their individual leader on the line meant putting the said ethnic group in jeopardy. The respondent reported. "Raila Odinga, one of the presidential candidates, took advantage of this situation and ganged up the other forty one (41) tribes against the Kikuyu - led government of Mwai Kibaki. He mobilized political heavy weights from most of the other tribes to form the ODM (Orange Democratic Movement)."¹³⁸ The major reason for tribalistic groupings in Kibera and generally in Kenya during the 2008 political violence was for the purpose of competition and confrontation over power and resources. The political leaders mobilised their ethnic groups for

¹³³ Report on the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (CIPEV), October, 2008

¹³⁴ Ibid

¹³⁵ Alan E Masakharia Focus on tribalism in Kenya, 30 November, 2011

¹³⁶ A Suich, beyond tribalism: Kenya's violence is not just about ethnicity. Age and poverty are factors too, Newsweek, 3 January 2008, <http://www.newsweek.com/id/84257>, accessed 20 May 2013.

¹³⁷ From an interview with peter, a religious leader in Kibera Soweto on 11th September, 2014

¹³⁸ Ibid

their selfish gain though, on the other hand, the mobilised groups' motivation could mean the expected reward once the leader gets to the position of power.

3.2.2 POLITICAL CAUSES

3.2.2.1 *Hate speech and political incitement*

Prior to the 2008 political violence, political leaders had engendered an overwhelming nationwide sense of alienation, a sense of exclusion and loss of dignity among the majority of Kenyans from some communities. In the run-ups to the 2005 referendum and the 2007 election, political leaders from the then government administration (names withheld) had perpetuated this perception by uttering outrageous insults towards the minorities. One minister essentially called all Kenyan Somalis 'a bunch of refugees.'¹³⁹ Opponent political leaders from minority groups rallied support by citing the rhetoric of their rivals and countering with their own tribalist invective. The leaders specifically from Riftvalley region (names withheld) used language comparable to that heard in Rwanda before the genocide, describing outsiders as 'madodoa' (Swahili word for spots) needing to be removed or cleansed.¹⁴⁰

As election rhetoric for 2007 campaign heated, the political climate changed from being smooth and peaceable to one which was charged and delicate. The heated campaigns between opponent political parties brought about a thrilling political climate. Leaders started to incite the youth against opponent tribes. A meeting in November, 2007 led by Simeon Nyachae, then the leader of Ford People political party, saw several youths armed with bows and arrows cause mayhem and show ciphers of depraved things in the making. Nyachae himself said in a statement, 'and it's not only these. I have now a lot of youth to protect Ford People.' He said so as he pointed to the armed youth present in his meeting.¹⁴¹ This was one incident among many that were experienced in the political campaigns. Nairobi's Kibera slum chaos had started as early as late October of 2007 with stone throwing youths repeatedly clashing with one another. A Nubian lady was quoted saying, 'We have no peace in Kibera, and our children are being killed. We have no

¹³⁹ The information is from a video series 'Kenya's darkest hour' by Nation Media Group and Kenya History and Biographies Company Limited Production. An NTV video library footage presented by Hilary Ngweni.

¹⁴⁰ The information is from a video series 'Kenya's darkest hour' by Nation Media Group and Kenya History and Biographies Company Limited Production. An NTV video library footage presented by Hilary Ngweni.

¹⁴¹ Ibid

peace.¹⁴² This was even before the elections. The real political intra-party wrangles hate speech and political incitement showed up in chaotic nominations of 14th November, 2007 held for all parties. What followed the nominations were numerous defections with a lot of blame game.¹⁴³ A 40 year old Luo resident of Kibera Silanga village for 15 years quantified negative utterances from politicians as a major cause of the 2008 political violence. She quoted one politician backing presidential aspirant Raila Odinga who said, *ōhatutakubali matokeo yanayoonyesha kuwa tumeshindwa,ō* meaning *ōwe will not accept any results showing that we are defeated.ō* According to the respondent, the politicians' overconfident utterances brought the notion of *stolen elections* and triggered the violence. She compared it to the 2002 elections which were peaceful because politicians had preached peace and always uttered positive words through out the process.¹⁴⁴ They had expected either win or loss outcome from the elections and prepared their supporters consequently.

3.2.2.2 Personalization of power

All forms of violence may relate to power in one way or the other. Relating to power, political violence is defined as *the commission of violent acts motivated by a desire, conscious or unconscious, to obtain or maintain political power*¹⁴⁵ Political violence thus, relates to acts of violence that are carried out primarily as a means of achieving political influence or power. As noted in the Akiwuni report and in a number of articles on Kenyan politics, the checks and balances normally associated with democracies are very weak in Kenya and so in Kibera. The state is not seen as neutral but as a preserve of those in power. The understanding of many is that, irrespective of the laws, the executive arm of the government determines what happens. The same has not been different from the members of the parliament. Kibera politics have for several decades revolved around Raila Odinga whence there came a slogan of *no Raila no peace.* With *their man* in the presidential race, Kibera residents saw their only window of hope which they were not ready to let go and so was *their man.* Because of the experience and knowledge of

¹⁴²Thomas H. *Political Violence in Kenya A Study of causes, responses and a framework for discussing preventive action* ISS paper 205, 2009

¹⁴³ Ibid

¹⁴⁴ Interview with Matata (not real name)

¹⁴⁵ Moser C. and Clark F., *Victims, perpetrators, or actors? Gendered armed conflict and political violence.* New York: St Martin Press, 2001, pg 36.

weak checks and balances in the Kenyan democracy, the Raila men hoped against hope that their man must become the president through all means. Sixty three (63) percent of the questionnaire respondents cited situations where men were ready to die in defence of their only hope. This idea prompted a very heated debate from the youth and adult discussion groups and was strongly supported by a ninety eight percentage of the respondents. To them Raila was their life, hope and future.¹⁴⁶ For example, a political leader from Kibera was quoted saying, "nothing, and repeat nothing, will stop the people of Kenya from acquiring what they want."¹⁴⁷ Raila's strong patron-client relationship with Kibera residents has always empowered him as a national politician and in his current role as the opposition strong man. This kind of client relationship attests his political room for manoeuvre. This focus on Raila's "big man" status in Kibera illustrates the pressures faced by Kenyan politicians in mediating between their public roles and the demands of their voters. Patronage and violence are the methods by which some of the most influential politicians in the Kenyan government today, like Raila, Martin Shikuku, James Orengo, Johnstone Muthama, used to rise to prominence, and those who have mastered the art have tended to gain fantastic fortunes.¹⁴⁸

3.2.2.3 Drive for power and unwillingness to accept defeat

Seventy five percent (75%) of the questionnaire respondents described one of the causes of the violence as the political leaders' selfish drive for power and the unwillingness to accept the verdict of the voters. The view was that, the institutions of political succession in Kenya being under the control and direction of the president until the promulgation of the current constitution, had a major significance to the political violence. Examples included, the president was empowered with wide discretionary powers to appoint and fire all cabinet ministers - including the vice-president and all civil servants. He nominated parastatal heads or and senior administrative officers. The appointments of senior administrative officers (particularly Provincial Administration), helped cultivate a patronage system in which all parts of the country enjoyed some of the facets of patronage. This ensured that political recruitment and mobilization

¹⁴⁶ Many of these respondents were from Kisumu ndogo village.

¹⁴⁷ The information is from a video series "Kenya's darkest hour" by Nation Media Group and Kenya History and Biographies Company Limited Production. An NTV video library footage presented by Hilary Ngweni.

¹⁴⁸ Thomas H. Political Violence in Kenya A Study of causes, responses and a framework for discussing preventive action ISS paper 205, 2009

of people occurred within a rapidly shrinking political space in the exercise of the presidential powers. It is such structural foundations that drove individuals and their communities to be driven to power through any available means.

The crisis of governance, where many leaders work not for the country as such, but for themselves and their political supporters, is sometimes said to follow from a system where power was until the promulgation of the current Kenyan constitution, centralised in the hands of few individuals since independence. This statement is factual noting that Kenya's then constitution, despite continuous talks of a fundamental amendment, was until the political violence, based on its colonial-era form where the president was awarded with extensive powers. As also argued by a scholar, "The East African experience provides a third model", initially it was based in the Westminster experience, and the Prime Minister derived his legitimacy from Parliament. When the East African Countries went 'Presidential' not in the direction of the American system, the relationship between the President and Parliament changed - it was no longer a system in which the President derived legitimacy from Parliament, nor one in which the President was constitutionally separate from the legislature, but one in which the Parliament in reality came to derive its legitimacy from the President.¹⁴⁹ In a sense then, gaining political office had been seen as 'a struggle for survival' if power was obtained, the perception was that access to sparse resources was ensured, and if not; marginalisation and exclusion was reckoned to follow.

The respondents mentioned in their questionnaires how the voting process was smooth and voters spoken through their votes. Nevertheless, the outcome was not accepted by those who mostly mattered in accepting it, that is, the leaders. By virtue of the leaders refusing to accept defeat due to their selfish drive for power, the voters would only follow suit in support of their unjustified opinions. According to a respondent's opinion, the president who won the elections and several members of parliament were not the ones expected to enjoy the powers and the privileges of the presidential and related offices but should have given chance to 'others' This showed how strong the drive for power was so strong and letting go was no option for the time.

¹⁴⁹ Lakidi D. & Mazrui A., *Parliament, parties and the presidency in East Africa experience: Political survival and national legitimation, 1973*. Paper presented at the third international congress of Africanists. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,

3.2.2.4 Rigging of votes

The long wait for announcement of the presidential election results, especially from central Kenya, only helped to cause anxiety and suspicion amongst the voters and their leaders. The respondents felt that there must have been an anomaly by that very fact of long delay. Moreover, under the intense competition between the main two presidential candidates (Raila Odinga and Mwai Kibaki), the exit poll predicted Raila Odinga to be slightly in the lead for the presidential seat. The exit poll suggested that Raila Odinga would win the presidential seat registering 46.1 percent of total votes against Mwai Kibaki's 40.2 percent.¹⁵⁰ Allowing for sampling error of $\pm 1.32\%$ points, Odinga's victory could have been easily established with statistical significance. This scenario was the attitude of Kenyans just before they voted and would easily translate to a 'rigged vote' in case of a turn around.

In the discussion groups a respondent who was applauded by others in agreement said, "The opposition rejected the results and vowed to inaugurate its leader, Raila Odinga, as 'the people's president,' which the government warned would be tantamount to a coup. Even Western observers had said Kenya's election commission ignored undeniable evidence of vote rigging to keep the then government in power." Another respondent said, "both sides stole votes, but personally I think that Kibaki stole more, and they stole it inside the tallying centres either at the polling stations or the main tallying centres at the Kenyatta International Conference center (KICC)."¹⁵¹ In addition, as examined from the questionnaires, rigging of votes caused bitterness to those who had peaceably elected their leaders and violence was the emotional manifestation of the resentment. I asked the group discussion participants the open question, "What triggered the political violence in Kibera slum?" The majority of respondents (78%) thought election irregularities and a weak Electoral Commission were the main factors that triggered electoral violence. Of course this may not necessarily mean that this was the cause of violence, but just what ignited violence. This discussion would lead one to conclude that rigging of votes contributed to the cause of the 2007/08 political violence.

¹⁵⁰ *General Elections 2007: Presidential Exit Polls". IED Africa. Retrieved 2010-05-01.*

¹⁵¹ A one on one interview with Bishop Ibuka, a religious leader from Kibera laini saba

3.2.2.5 Corruption, lack of transparency and unfairness in the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK)

The old constitution provided for the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) consisting of a chairman and a maximum of 21 members appointed by the president. Its core duties were defined by the constitution as: The registration of voters and the maintenance and revision of the register of voters, directing and supervising the Presidential, National Assembly and local government elections, promoting free and fair elections and promoting voter education throughout Kenya. Generally, the Electoral Commission of Kenya had been bestowed with the main function of supervising and overseeing the whole electoral process to ensure it was effective and efficient.

The commission had succeeded with its mandate and responsibility to a greater deal having already been in charge during Kenya's general elections in 1997, 2002 as well as a constitutional referendum in 2005. However as it seemed they had failed in 2007/08 general elections. Sixty percent (60%) of the respondents argued that poor monitoring and coordination by the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) led to poor and unfair judgement of the results. The commission, while responding to agitated crowds before the announcement of the presidential results, seemed not to be confident with their reporting and the ECK chairman was quoted as saying, "I do not know who won the elections."¹⁵² This showed lack of commitment with deliberate evil intention of making the government of the day win the elections. According 90% of the group participants, this "obvious" compromise is what caused the later disbandment of the commission.

The unfairness seemed to have started five hours before the expiry of ECK's ten-year term in November 2007 and barely a month before elections, when Mwai Kibaki, the then sitting Kenyan president stunned Kenyans and politicians alike by singlehandedly appointing members of ECK. The adult group participants general view was that by doing it alone in the all crucial 2007 elections and by doing so at the last minute, it was very possible that Mwai Kibaki's election office had already included ECK in its strategy to rig elections. One participant said, "because there is no other logical explanation as to why a sitting President could have gone out of his way to single-handedly appoint members of such a crucial Commission without consultation with a

¹⁵²The information is from a video series "Kenya's darkest hour" by Nation Media Group and Kenya History and Biographies Company Limited Production. An NTV video library footage presented by Hilary Ngweni.

concerned opposition. The argument was that these appointments were not made earlier because then, the Kibaki strategists could have been faced with the problem of long drawn-out accusations in the media by the opposition that it was planning to rig elections, accusations that were, nevertheless, raised with varying degrees of media attention.

3.3 IMPACT OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN KIBERA

3.3.1 Kibera children: a lost generation?

Kenya is a country with an annual growth rate of over four percent, one of the highest in the world.¹⁵³ The average Kenyan woman has between six to eight children; and over half the Kenyan population is under fifteen years of age.¹⁵⁴ Accordingly, children suffered in proportion in the Kenyan political violence. Africa Watch found out that in most of the Internally Displaced Persons camps visited, the number of children was double that of the adults.¹⁵⁵ As a result of the crowded camp conditions, many of those children suffered infectious diseases such as respiratory problems and tuberculosis as well as scabies and malnutrition.¹⁵⁶ The 2008 Kenyan political violence deeply affected the children. In my tour of New Hope Academy in Kibera Silanga, I learned through the teachers that some of the children, who are students in the school, witnessed their family members being killed and/or their houses being burned down and in several cases, they themselves suffered injuries from attacks. These children acquired a keen awareness of their ethnicity and that of their attackers whence their negative attitude towards colleagues related to their attackers' ethnic groups and vice-versa. One of the respondents, a teacher said, "Prior to the political violence, children of all ethnic groups would play with each other. Immediately after the violence, and extending long after the violence, actually as long as now, former friends from different ethnic groups have become sworn enemies. Evidence of children displaying aggressive behaviour or bringing knives to school had been reported by teachers in the school. When I hold group discussions with the different class levels, I keep on realising that many of the children suffered nightmares from the violence they had witnessed and

¹⁵³ Africa watch, divide and rule: state sponsored ethnic violence in Kenya, New York: *Human Rights Watch*, 1993, <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1993/kenya1193.pdf>, accessed 15 May, 2009.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid

¹⁵⁵ Africa watch, divide and rule: state sponsored ethnic violence in Kenya, New York: *Human Rights Watch*, 1993, <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1993/kenya1193.pdf>, accessed 15 May, 2009.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid

that this has impacted their lives negatively up to date.¹⁵⁷ This to me calls for a lot to be done to be able to revive the good relationship denied to these children and their almost shattered dreams of facing the future with hope and confidence with one another. The scars from the political violence if not permanently dealt with, may build a foundation of ethnic cleavage that would be difficult to deal with. The question that lingered was whether these children will ever live happy in the generations to come and whether the good relationships in our institutions of learning which at long last leads to family unions in the institutions of marriage will ever be restored in the Kibera slum. With the girl child on the marriage receiving end in the African culture, she is bound to lose marriage opportunities with limited ethnic choices.

3.3.2 Ethnicity across the Kibera administrative divisions

Ethnicity in Kibera is indicative of two important elements similar to the Kenyan society: first, it is a typical mode of thought in everyday life and social interaction, and second, that ethnicity and land, or perhaps more accurately territory, are inextricably linked.¹⁵⁸ Kibera's administrative units have even before the 2008 political violence represented distinct ethnic groups with the violence heightening the ethnic divisions. The 2008 political violence was divided across ethnic lines. In fact one interviewee was quoted as saying, "The political violence can only be described in one word as a tribal war" This is because people re-grouped in their ethnic groups and termed the other ethnic groups as enemies throughout the violence.¹⁵⁹ The ethnic attachments intensified after the violence due to fear of its re-occurrence, forcing Kibera residents to regroup more tightly in their ethnic administrative divisions. From the respondents, what followed the violence called for forced readjustments of settlements befitting ethnic enclaves. Landlords with houses outside their ethnic administrative divisions relinquished them for free to whoever was fortunate at the time, citing real security concerns. For example during my tour of Kibera slum, I met three (3) households who lived in houses without paying rent because the landlord had not resurfaced since the political violence. Evident from various practices in Kibera administrative villages as at the date of this study, Kibera is still informally divided into ethnically homogeneous zones. Examples are the kamba in Kibera Silanga, the Luo in Kisumu Ndogo among others. The religious leaders contributing in an open forum discussions noted how such ethnic groupings had

¹⁵⁷ This was an oral interview with Faith, a primary school teacher on 10th September, 2014 in Kibera.

¹⁵⁸ Sarah J. Ethnicity, violence, and the immigrant-guest metaphor in Kenya, *African affairs*, 111/445, 5766596 doi: 10.1093/afraf/ads051 oxford university press, 2012

¹⁵⁹ The interviewee is a 44 year old religious leader interviewed on 10th September, 2014 in Kibera.

posed challenges in the church ministry.¹⁶⁰ A pastor from Kibera in an interview said, “Since the political violence, the members I pastored from different ethnic groups left the church for good. To date their religious faith has been permanently shaken.”¹⁶¹ The girl child has not been able to participate freely and maximise her potential in areas where her ethnic enclave is missing or at stake, for example in competitions, religious events, drama festivals, sports and even in social functions like watching football matches.

3.3.3 Destruction of property and infrastructure

More than half of the respondents, who were present in Kibera during the onset of the ferocious political violence, described how youths immediately became chaotic and broke out virtually everything on site. One interviewee said, “The youths looted, destroyed property with arson becoming rampant, hence, forcing people to move to the “ethnic enclaves” they perceived as safe as ethnically aligned gangs took over and exercised total control.”¹⁶² The interviewee narrated how Toi Market in Makina area which prior to elections had housed over 3,000 traders was burnt down on the day of the violence onset. During my site visit to Kibera, I visited Toi market and was informed by local residents that the market had since been restored to capacity and provided employment to an estimated figure of three thousand five hundred (3,500) people exclusive of suppliers ranging one thousand to one thousand five hundred (1000 ó 1500). All these people depend on the proceeds from this market for livelihood not overlooking the estimated three thousand (3,000) customers the market serves. Many young girls from the Kibera slum depend on the second hand wear called “mtumba” which were not readily available or expensive because of the infrastructural breakdown. Moreso, the small scale businesses operated by the girl youth like tailoring were largely affected.

3.3.4 Death

Over 1300 people in Kenya succumbed to the political violence including dozens in Kibera.¹⁶³ Eighty percent (80%) of the respondents cited some of the effects of the 2008 Kenyan political

¹⁶⁰ Discussion with the Kibera Pastors’ Love Association (PLA) members on 9th August, 2014.

¹⁶¹ Ibid pg 55

¹⁶² Interview with a then resident of Makina who had a business in toy market before the political violence on 10th September, 2014

¹⁶³ “Al Jazeera English – News – Kenya Ethnic Clashes Intensify”. 2008. Archived from the original on February 20, 2008. Retrieved August 24, 2013.

violence as loss of their relatives and friends. During my oral interview, I met four families who at least knew of a person who had died of the political violence. One respondent from Kibera Silanga explained painfully to me how he lost a neighbour and a workmate. This is how he narrated the incident, "personally I never ran to go home because I had a 1 month old baby and so I chose to stay. I used to lock my wife and the baby inside as I went to look for food from the shops which were at the time hard to find because they were either looted or burned. I remember very well one day when I was almost killed. I was in a group of about 10 men as we returned from town carrying some foodstuffs. We met with another group of men with pangas who started chasing us. I ran as fast as I could. At a distance I looked back to see my neighbour whom they had already caught up with being slashed to death. I also witnessed my workmate colleague being slashed. Luckily, before they caught on me a contingent of police officers came for our rescue and that's how I escaped death that day. It was so bad."¹⁶⁴ This is one out of many respondents who testified of many people who died in the political violence. In analysing their data, the Waki Commission recorded that in Nairobi there were a total of 125 who lost their lives during the violence, 23 of whom died from gunshot wounds. A further 342 victims were admitted to hospital during the period, 61 with gunshot wounds.¹⁶⁵

3.3.5 Sexual harassment and rape

One of the well known and regrettable tragedies of major conflicts and breakdowns of law and order is sexual violence. Sadly so, it was not a different situation in the 2007/08 Kenyan political violence. Referring to the reports given to the Waki Commission, sexual violence included heart wrenching tales of rape, gang rape, sexual mutilation, loss of body parts, and hideous deaths.¹⁶⁶ In my interview with a couple at Kibera Mashimoni, the lady narrated to me that, "various forms of genital violence against innocent victims at that time were not just one-off tragedies but major life-changing events whose effect is being felt up to this date. One cannot just forget the pain of family members being forced to stand by and witness their mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers, and little children being raped, killed, and maimed. This showed immediate and long term pain that accompanied sexual violence. A lady respondent, who works at Kenyatta National Hospital, narrated the experience of innocent victims contracting HIV/AIDS after being sexually assaulted.

¹⁶⁴ An interview with a 40 year old male resident of Kibera Silanga on 10th September, 2014

¹⁶⁵ Report on the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (CIPEV), October, 2008 pg 393

¹⁶⁶ Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (CIPEV) October, 2008 pg. 240-260

She said that, "because of the breakdown of law and order and the deteriorating security situation at the time, the victims were kept from accessing medical care soon enough to prevent contracting the HIV/AIDS. Also many husbands abandoned their wives who had been defiled. For example, during the discussion group with the pastors association, I learned of five (5) families who had separated due to the aftermath of the political violence. Such inevitable psychological burden of powerlessness and hopelessness left the individuals who had experienced sexual violence feeling alone, isolated, and unable to cope, not just for one moment in time, but possibly forever."¹⁶⁷ Some victims of sexual violence already had HIV/ AIDs and others contracted it as a result of being raped and being unable to access medical services in time to reduce the chances of, or prevent, infection. This was as a result of the breakdown of essential infrastructure services due to the persistence of the political violence.

3.3.6 Economic social and political opportunities

The 2007/08 Kenyan post-election violence in Kibera slum caused institutional change that emerged during the conflict. This institutional change brought about substantial effects both negative and positive, on the lives and livelihoods of Kibera slum populations. Some people lost residential houses to others particularly in Kibera Silanga Village where the new occupants occupied without even paying rent. At the time of this study, there were several residential houses with occupants who were still not paying rent with the real owners just leaving them in avoidance of violence. Other assets Kibera slum like private water boreholes and business temporary shades changed ownership in the violence melee.

Political power in Kenya has been perceived as vital for obtaining access to public goods. In a sense, gaining political office has been seen as "a struggle for survival". If power is obtained, the perception is that access to sparse resources is ensured and if not, marginalisation and exclusion is reckoned to follow. Political power thus comes with political opportunities particularly for the political leaders and their political supporters.

¹⁶⁷ The interviewee is 35 year old female employee of Kenyatta National Hospital interviewed on 11th September, 2014.

3.4 CONCLUSION

Political violence is a shared approach used by individuals, groups and even governments around the world to achieve political ends. Kenya's political history evidently demonstrates groups and individuals' personal beliefs that their political systems do not and may never respond to their political demands. As a result, they believe that violence is not only justified, but also necessary in order to achieve their political objectives. In my opinion, by the same token, many governments around the world believe they need to use violence in order to intimidate their populace into acquiescence. This, as earlier explained, was evident with the first and second presidents of Kenya. This knowledge of apparent use of political violence in elections was of help in establishing the very social-economic and political causes of 2008 political violence. These, as mentioned, are all tied to the main stem of achieving political goals.

Identifying causes of the 2007/08 Kenyan post-election violence was a problematic task in this study because viewing the political violence as an outcome of particular societal features easily gave way to the perception that its emergence was unavoidable. Nevertheless, the said interpretation was heard to avoid. Generally, since the support and resistance to political leaders have often followed ethnic lines, it has always followed suit that when forming government, the leaders have rewarded and ensured advantages to individuals from supportive ethnic groups, while marginalising or excluding individuals belonging to ethnic groups associated with political opponents. This cycle, very well evident in Kibera slum, has been hard to break. The study learned through the respondents that such has been the foundation of the cause of political violence in Kenya and that all other factors which have caused violence are either directly or indirectly related to this cycle. Essentially, from the respondents and the interviews' analysis all the causes of 2007/08 post-election violence were tied to marginalization and unfair distribution of resources. Rigging of votes seemed only as a trigger factor.

The nature, magnitude and duration of the effects of post-election violence on individuals and households in Kibera slum was largely determined by the way in which different people and groups responded and adapted to the violence-induced shocks. These violence-induced shocks came from the unexpected destruction of property and infrastructure, deaths of loved ones and the stigma that came along with sexual violence. The destruction of productive assets, businesses and infrastructure weakened the access of victims of violence to their sources of livelihood and

economic survival. Those that faced sudden losses of property, dwellings, and other assets were left without the means to earning a living or providing food and shelter for themselves and their families. These losses in turn impacted significantly on the ability of affected households to recover their economic and social position in the post-conflict period.

Worse still the violence not only affected household endowments in terms of physical capital, but also the access to and accumulation of human capital. Empirical research evidence indicates that, while in some circumstances physical capital can be recovered through reconstruction programmes and aid, losses in human capital are often irreversible and may last across generations ¹⁶⁸

The accumulated evidence from this research has shown that the 2007/08 Kenyan violent conflict resulted in largely negative and long-lasting effects to children particularly in significant psychological and educational losses. These harmful effects can often be observed many years after the end of the conflict, sometimes even for decades.

On the other hand, the negative effects of violence in Kibera slum were counteracted by economic, social or political opportunities created by the conflict itself. Some victims and individuals benefited from the proceeds of looting. The redistribution of assets like Kibera residential houses benefited some groups who started enjoying leaving therein without paying rent. In my tour of Kibera for example, I came across a private water point where people used to fetch water at a fee. However, after the violence the owner never went back to follow up on it and since then residents have been using the water for free.

¹⁶⁸ Justino P. *War and Poverty* in Michelle G. and Skaperdas S.(eds.), *Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict*, Oxford University Press. Chapter 27, 2012.

CHAPTER FOUR

2007/2008 POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND GIRL CHILD IN KIBERA SLUM

4.0 INTRODUCTION

The issue of violence against the girl child and generally all women has become a subject of specific sociological inquiry only recently. Previously, violations of women were dealt with within the general purview of law dealing with assault. Within the African context, there is still not much literature to go by and this is attributable primarily to lack and/or scarcity of reported cases and the inadequacy of data gathering methods.¹⁶⁹ Further compounding the problem is the diversity of actions that constitute violations of women not considered by criminal law or perceived of as crimes. Violence against the girl child takes various forms. It could comprise physical violation of the girl child's body through such acts as kicking, pushing, burning, punching, pulling hair and may result in minor bruising or death. It may also constitute sexual violence such as rape or psychological tormenting through verbal abuse, harassment, deprivation of resources or denial of access to various facilities.¹⁷⁰ This diversified approach to violence against the girl child is what this chapter intends to deal with.

In many Kenyan traditional societies, a woman's sexuality is linked to concepts of honour. The legacy of African cultural teaching, in which the sexual honour of women revolves around their innocence and subservience, still lingers. In this context, violence against women, who are seen as being the property of the males, by a rival social group, becomes a means of defiling the honour of that social group. It then becomes important for such groups or society to protect its women from the violence of the other. The societal cultural perceptions and beliefs about the girl child was apparent in the 2007/08 post election violent acts. This chapter explores political violence in Kibera within this context and examines the impacts to the girl child thereof.

Life adversity experienced following exposure to violence to the girl child in Kibera included loss of life, livelihood, and traumatization. From the respondents, complications associated with

¹⁶⁹ Flowers B., *Women and Criminality*, Practitioner Greenwood Press, USA. 1987

¹⁷⁰ Kamatsiko, V. *The future in our hands: Children displaced by conflicts in Africa's Great Lakes region*. Nairobi, Kenya: World Vision Africa. 2007

adversity were self-doubt, worries, inclination to crime, fatalism, vengefulness, and alcohol abuse among others.

4.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE GIRL CHILD AND VIOLENCE IN KIBERA SLUM

Gendered political violence and that against the girl child are serious and persistent issues in Kenya. From the UNICEF report, the level of violence against children in Kenya is at very high levels, and in particular sexual violence. From the Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) news, The UNICEF representative in Kenya emphasised the need to get people talking, to break the silence around violence and make sure that everyone knows where to go to get help.¹⁷¹

Girl children from slums and streets are vulnerable to harassment and physical and sexual abuse. The latter, seen as offenders, are criminalised and frequently arbitrarily arrested, beaten and ill-treated by security officers.

The persistence of certain unfavourable cultural norms, traditions and stereotypes, as well as discrimination regarding their role in society, perpetuates violence against women and girls in Kenya. In this respect, some international organisations like the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) have been seen to express concern to “State parties to take sustained and systematic actions to modify or eliminate stereotypes and negative cultural values and practices against women”¹⁷². Kenya is amongst these state parties.

The biggest challenge of violence against women and the girl child is the painful fact that, most cases remain unreported, or at least unpunished, and this occurs in particular with respect to sexual violence. Besides the fact that rape occurs regularly in Kenya, as frequently reported in the media, the lack of adequate systems within the relevant institutions means that such cases may be marred by irregularities and lack of sufficient evidence, consequently most cases not being fully prosecuted. Some of these cases are treated even by the officers of the law as a private affair.

¹⁷¹ IRIN News (2 Jan 2008), “Rape on the Rise in Post-Election Violence”, Nairobi See <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=59759>.

¹⁷² Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) is the body of independent experts that monitors implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.

This has led to a lack of confidence in the Government's response and has had the additional effect of further inhibiting women and the girl child from reporting violence inflicted on them.

The already vulnerable situation of women and the girl child was exacerbated by the 2008 political violence. Sexual violence against the girl child increased with the intensity of the violence culminating in camps set up for internally displaced persons (IDPs). The political violence exposed many of the girls to the dangers and vulnerabilities of women and girls in conflict situations. During the political violence at the beginning of 2008, girls who fled their homes and those who sought sanctuary in the Internally Displaced Person (IDP) camps were exposed to and experienced gender-based violence ranging from all forms of sexual abuse and exploitation to physical and domestic violence. Sexual exploitation was also a concern as girls were coerced into exchanging sex for basic resources such as food, sanitary supplies and transport. Indeed, as a respondent reported, internally displaced girls were constantly exposed to violence. According to her, girls were raped either in their homes or in the surrounding neighbourhood. In Jamhuri IDP camp, which hosted many of the Kibera residents, a respondent reported that many girls survived through sexual favours to those in charge of food, clothing and other related quantifiable items. According to the respondent, "this seemed the only survival mechanism and after all it was all about one's fate."¹⁷³

The findings of an inter-agency report, undertaken by the Gender-Based Violence (GBV) Subcluster, found that encamped girls repeatedly expressed fears of sexual violence as a result of makeshift sleeping arrangements in the IDP camps where males and females (not of the same family) were forced to sleep together in one tent. There were also concerns expressed over the lack of regulations and screening procedures at the camps which allowed men from outside to enter the camp without verification of their IDP status or posing as volunteers.¹⁷⁴ From the inter-agency findings, it was revealed that in the course of the violence, perpetrators exploited the conflict by committing sexual violence with total impunity, and efforts to protect or respond to the needs of girls were remarkably insufficient. Sexual violence was used as a fear-instilling

¹⁷³ Oral interview with Peter, a pastor, on 11th September, 2014. The pastor had visited the camp for encouragement and prayer after the violence subsided.

¹⁷⁴ Myrum W. and Marsh M.: A Rapid Assessment of Gender-based Violence during the Post-election Violence in Kenya, Nairobi: UNICEF, UNFPA, UNIFEM, CCF, 2008. Accessible from: <http://www.humanitarianreform.org/humanitarianreform/Portals/1/cluster%20approach%20page/Kenya/GBV/GBVreportfinalMar7.pdf>.

tactic as women were told that they and their girl children would be raped if they did not abandon their property within a designated time frame; often the threat was realised.¹⁷⁵ From the information of Kibera respondents, the highly volatile situation in Kibera prevented the girl child from accessing immediate post-rape care and some only received treatment as late as after three months. For most of them, this was too late.

Ensuring adequate protection for the girl child from ill-treatment and other abuses during the post-election violence remained a challenge. The complexity was in the perpetrators of the violence against girls, who according to the respondents included state security agents, members of organized gangs, neighbours, relatives, supposed friends, and individuals working in IDP camps. The sought for protection solutions became more complicated as the girl child victims were slum dwellers with related negative social and environmental encounters. The Government never took a non-partisan approach to address human rights violations concerning the girl child in the violence, and to protect her from all forms of violence regardless of the perpetrators.

4.2 IMPACT OF 2007/2008 POLITICAL VIOLENCE ON GIRL CHILD IN KIBERA SLUM

4.2.1 POSITIVE IMPACT

4.2.1.1 Gender consideration in choice of participation in mediated peace processes

Recent discussion around women's participation in mediated peace processes in Kenya may be said to have led to a more nuanced debate, which can be divided into two distinct areas: the participation of women in peace processes, and the inclusion of issues of importance to women in the substance of the talks. While these aspects are closely linked, increased participation of women does not immediately lead to addressing gender in the substance of mediation processes.¹⁷⁶ For Kenyan women and girls, many concerns remain, which must be addressed in the mechanisms and processes arising from the mediation process.¹⁷⁷ Kenyan women's

¹⁷⁵ Ibid

¹⁷⁶ McGhie P. & Wamai E., Beyond the numbers: Women's Participation in the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD), 2011

¹⁷⁷ Wanyeki M., Lessons from Kenya: Women and the Post-Election Violence. Feminist Africa 10, Militarism, Conflict and Women's Activism African Gender Institute, University of Cape Town, South Africa, 2008

movement responded to the post-election violence with attempts to document women's experiences and respond with increased services, as well as with advocacy to ensure that those involved in the humanitarian and relief effort did the same. However, a lot of work lied ahead to ensure justice for the women and girls who were affected.¹⁷⁸ Specific expertise, information and attention, in addition to participation, are required. Such may translate to an impact on the sustainability and success of a peace agreement. Both participation and inclusion thus, require specific set of strategies. This distinction is brought into sharp relief with an examination of the Kenya mediation process after the crisis following elections in December, 2007. While the Kenyan process may have been hailed as an example of good practice due to the high level and high profile of women involved, this did not tell the full story of both the successes and the challenges of addressing gender issues in the mediation process.

The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR), under the auspices of H. E. Kofi Annan and the African Union (AU) Panel of Eminent African Personalities, sought to resolve the violent dispute over the results of the presidential elections of December 2007. After 42 days of negotiations, President Mwai Kibaki and Hon. Raila Odinga signed a power-sharing agreement, bringing an end to the violence and political stalemate. The mediation process then went on to negotiate a series of agreements on the longer term issues at the root of the conflict. The representation of women within this process was high by previous standards of formal mediation processes. One in four of the members of each negotiating team (25%) were women. Mrs. Graça Machel was one of three eminent persons on the Panel, and a number of the senior advisors from the United Nations and the AU in the Panel's mediation team were women.¹⁷⁹ One of the two staff seconded to support the mediation by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue was also a woman, as was the advisor on Transitional Justice. As such, the Kenya process represents a strong example of inclusion of women in mediation processes. Such may be argued as a consequence of the violence's effect on the women and the girl child. However, this focus only on the numbers, rather than how representation of women's issues played out, can only be said to serve to reduce the difficulties of women's representation other than the solutions being sought.

¹⁷⁸ Wanyeki M., -Lessons from Kenya: Women and the Post-Election Violence.øFeminist Africa 10, Militarism, Conflict and Women's Activism African Gender Institute, University of Cape Town, South Africa, 2008

¹⁷⁹ McGhie P. & Wamai E., Beyond the numbers: Women's Participation in the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD), 2011

Also the question of the girl child full representation by those eminent persons considered gender representative in such high level peace processes is very debatable.

4.2.1.2 Sensible after thoughts on the side of the girl child

One astounding factor that came out from the respondents is that of sober considerations in what can be said as 'learning through the hard way'. One female respondent narrated a story of her Luo cousin who had dropped out of school in form three to get married to a Kikuyu husband just before the 2008 political violence. Three months to their marriage, the violence started and the lady had no other available option other than to run back home. The lady told me, 'Fortunately or so to say when she returned to her parents, she had no child neither gotten pregnant. The parents welcomed her home and showed her their concern to take her back to school. She went back to school and managed a mean grade of C + (plus) thereafter. She is now happily married with two children.' The ladies also thought that an important lesson on their means of livelihood was learned. One Kibera respondent, a teacher, reported of attitude change on part of the girl child in fighting for their own means of livelihood rather than depending on men. She said, 'The girls have learned the importance of having their own employment before marriage because a man may not be to them 'everything' in circumstances of violence and anarchy.'¹⁸⁰ This explains their improved performance in school, in business or in their employment. They had a renewed spirit and strength to stand independently before committing themselves to the union of marriage.

4.2.1.3 Girl child courage in soldiering on

The girl child respondents whom I managed to interview during my research tour in Kibera, most of who had experienced the effects of the 2008 political violence, recounted how despite the trauma that came with the violence, they had gained the tenacity to face such an ordeal with courage. One of them said, 'I believe I can face such a situation with courage and tell off the men who may think they would have my body that easy.'¹⁸¹ Through questionnaire responses, it was revealed that women and girl children enrolled and engaged themselves in defensive physical

¹⁸⁰ From a teacher at New Hope Academy (name withheld), on 11th August, 2014

¹⁸¹ One on one interview with a 20 year old female form four graduate in Kibera Silanga

training like karate giving them the courage to protect themselves in such volatile situations. This shows the new mechanisms employed by the girl child to soldier on with life.

4.2.2 NEGATIVE IMPACT

4.2.2.1 *Sexual violence disgrace*

While addressing commissioners, Waki had the following to say about sexual violence as a vice, “Sexual violence is ‘silent’ and ‘preying’ because it is under-reported, under-investigated and ‘insufficiently addressed.’”¹⁸² Such a statement shows how sexual violence victims may be neglected by the society because of how the vice is perceived. Millicent Obaso, a Sexual and Gender Based Violence Advisor for CARE International, in her testimony to the Waki Commission had recounted several terrible tales from victims of sexual violence which hit the girl child the worst. These sexual violence acts to the girl child may have been a direct consequence of the long-term societal existing inequalities between men and women in the Kenyan society.¹⁸³ The same affected the way in which husbands responded to the rapes of their wives and daughters. Obaso explained that, “over 75% of the individual victims interviewed in Kibera had been raped at home in front of their spouses and children, causing a great deal of stress that resulted in them being abandoned by their husbands and fathers.”¹⁸⁴ This only exacerbated the situation of the victims. In my interview with one of the teachers at New Hope Academy in Kibera Silanga, I learned of a rape case of a girl who was aged 15 years then and in the process got pregnant. The teacher narrated, “She was left alone and raped after her father and mother escaped through a window of their room when a gang broke into their house. The girl later gave birth successfully though painfully to a child without a known father. She has never appreciated her child of six years since, and has hated all men including her own father. With such an emotional breakdown, she has vowed never to be married in life.”¹⁸⁵ This disclosure informs how rape ordeal can discredit a girl tearing her worth into pieces. The society is supposed

¹⁸² Part of the speech by Justice Philip Waki, the Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (CIPEV) on the first day of the Commission’s hearings.

¹⁸³ Herve Maupeu, *Revisiting Post-election Violence: The General Elections in Kenya 2007*. Dares salaam:mkuki na nyota publishers ltd, 2008 pp.187-223

¹⁸⁴ Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (CIPEV) October, 2008 pg. 240-260

¹⁸⁵ One on one interview with a primary school teacher in Kibera Silanga on 11th September, 2014.

to repair such girl's worth but instead, mostly, isolates and disregards her may-be bright future. This only continues to add to her disgrace and generates more emotional breakdown.¹⁸⁶

Through an interview with Majimbo, it was clear that many of the victims of rape and other sexual violence never came back to Kibera again but opted for other places where they could have renewed hope of life with people they had not met.¹⁸⁷ They sought for new societies which would give them new social relationships. They also opted to keep silent about their experiences avoiding the stigma and pressure from the society on learning their entanglement. However, the emotional pain has continued to drain them individually slowly by slowly as evident from their quiet and reserved lives.

4.2.2.2 Loss of parents

Quite a number of the young people lost their parents in the political violence. The trauma of losing a parent leave alone in such sullied circumstances is enough to bring a long term emotional disturbance. A respondent mentioned a relative who had lost her father in the political violence while in form three. Although a very bright student since her primary school, she immediately started performing dismally following the effect of the political violence, and later only managed a D- in form four. Her vibrant dreams of becoming a doctor have since been crushed. Comparably her brother never suffered such emotional drain and it seems his dreams are alive after securing a B+ in his Kenya Certificate Secondary Examinations (KCSE). This shows a silent impact of the 2008 political violence to the girl child who without a confidant to give her assurance and hope brought emotional collapse on her part.

4.2.2.3 Trauma

Trauma is any experience or event that threatens a child's sense of safety and security to such an extent that it is perceived to be unmanageable.¹⁸⁸ Trauma causes shock and organ shutdown¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁶Njoroge, Jesse. "Kenyan IDP Camps offer little refuge from rapes" Kenya Environmental and Political News Blog. 29th January 2008

¹⁸⁷ Interview with Majimbo, a 40 year old male from Silanga, who was present in Kibera through the post-election time.

¹⁸⁸ Walton, T. R. & Irvin, D. Y. Treating anxiety disorders. San Francisco: Jossey & Bass Publishers, 1997

which if not healed may disturb the victims' mental and emotional equilibrium. According to a study children exposed to traumatic events like the one posed by the post-election violence suffer from academic struggles and adjustment.¹⁹⁰ The accounts of the exposure of women and girls in IDP and refugee camps in Kenya exposed them to increased level of risk are consistent. Both Kakuma and Dadaab refugee camps for example report considerable levels of rape and other forms of sexual violence against women and girls.¹⁹¹ A coordinator from IDP camp in Nakuru reported, "At least four women had reported being raped in the Nakuru camp since it was set up on 30 December. "One of the young women was working in my information office and was being extremely uncooperative and uncommunicative. I was becoming very irritated with her until one of her friends revealed that she had actually been raped a few days earlier; obviously she was deeply traumatized."¹⁹² The level of insecurity in the camps compels many women to seek some form of male companionship to increase their sense of safety. Some end up in unhappy unions which, sadly, may be the start of a cycle of rape and violence, unwanted pregnancies, economic dependence and emotional and mental trauma, which collectively lock the woman into a cycle of abuse.¹⁹³ From the respondents, the girl child suffered from mental and physical health problems as a result of the political violence. Abused girls were subject to depression and personality disorders such as high levels of anxiety and somatic disorders. This affected the girl child's confidence and self esteem greatly.¹⁹⁴ A teacher at New Hope Primary School narrated a story of her cousin who was raped and eventually got pregnant. She explained to me how to date she hates men, including her own father. According to her, men are the cause of her downfall and her unrealised dreams. Other girls who went through the political violence ordeal have never regained their self confidence as learned through the questionnaires.

¹⁸⁹ Feltham, C. What's the good of counseling and psychotherapy? The benefits explained. London: Sage Publishers, 2003

¹⁹⁰ Jamila, M. & Stevens, M. S. Academic performance and adjustment of children exposed to traumatic events (Research that Promotes Sustainability and (re)Builds Strengths (January 15-18, 2009).

¹⁹¹ [www.creawkenya.org/pdf/2009/women paid the price 2.pdf](http://www.creawkenya.org/pdf/2009/women%20paid%20the%20price.pdf) accessed on 10/05/2013

¹⁹² Jesse Njoroge camp coordinator Nakuru- cited from Kenya Environmental and Political News Blog-Article "Kenyan IDP Camps offer little refuge from rapes" 29th January 2008

¹⁹³ [www.creawkenya.org/pdf/2009/women paid the price 2.pdf](http://www.creawkenya.org/pdf/2009/women%20paid%20the%20price.pdf) accessed on 10/05/2013

¹⁹⁴ Nairobi Women's Hospital, The Gender Violence Recovery Centre Interim report for post election violence, 2008

4.2.2.4 Loss of friends

The human toll of crisis was very high. A few months after the end of the civil conflict, 30 percent of the population reported a specific personal impact of the post-election violence.¹⁹⁵ These impacts included personal injury, displacement from home, property destruction, or the death of friends or relatives.¹⁹⁶ A fresh wave of anguish may have flooded over the girl child in Kibera as she recalled the good relationships enjoyed with friends prior to the political violence. Those who had been best friends, sisters of the heart before the political violence were no more, and the relationships were destroyed. The girl child needed to deal with the intense pain and come to terms with the shattered relationships. To some, this could have led to unhealthy coping mechanisms associated with such loss. One respondent, a youthful but newly married lady had this to say, "As one goes through this painful process, unhealthy actions like withdrawing may result leading to negative outcomes."¹⁹⁷ Realizing that going through a destroyed relationship leaves you with a choice to become bitter or better may not be an easy task for the girl child in order to make the right choices.

4.2.2.5 Early marriages

Abandonment after sexual violence might have been the beginning of the horror that visited the girl child. This desperation exhibited itself from the respondents as a major reason why the girl child opted for marriage to cushion self from such pressure. A female respondent described her emotional pain as unbearable in school after going through sexual violence experience. She thus opted for any man in need of a wife. She has since been married. According to her, "the only social set up a little better for her, or so it seemed, though not perfect was the family."¹⁹⁸ This is an example among many girls who opted for early marriage not as the better option, but as the only option which seemed less agonizing for them. One young lady respondent pointed out the way her father left them after a rape ordeal to avoid the shame that followed the family. The

¹⁹⁵ Romaro G., Kimenyi S. & Dercon S. The 2007 Elections, Post-Conflict Recovery and Coalition Government in Kenya. Improving Institutions for Pro-Poor Growth (iiG) Research Consortium Working Paper. 2008

¹⁹⁶ Dupasy P. & Robinsonz J. Coping with Political Instability: Abstract Micro Evidence from Kenya's 2007 Election Crisis June 25, 2009

¹⁹⁷ An interview conducted in Kibera Mashimoni on 11th September, 2014

¹⁹⁸ The information was collected during a group discussion with youthful girls in Kibera on 20th August, 2014.

young girl also, feeling the pain too much to carry within that family set up opted for marriage to someone who at least had no information about her background. She is now married with 2 children, though not happily as per her expectation.¹⁹⁹

4.2.2.6 Instilled with fear and uncertainty

The result of 2008 Kenyan political violence against the girl child was degradation, humiliation and belittling of the girl.²⁰⁰ This in turn engendered a sense of fear and insecurity in the girl victims. From the knowledge gathered in the study, the violence prevented the girl child from leading independent lives and curtailed their freedom of movement. This may have increased the girl child's vulnerability and dependence. The overall effect as analysed in the study is that of their potential remaining unrealized and their energies being stifled. The effect of the violence prevented the girl child from participating fully in the life of the family, the community and society at large. One respondent said, "Due to the disgrace and trauma from the events of the political violence, the girl child felt unwanted by Kibera community, unprotected, unworthy, insecure and also went to an extent of thinking that they are not people who could be needed in the community any more."²⁰¹ Victims of rape for example often face insurmountable obstacles in trying to bring the perpetrators to justice. Many women who have suffered rape or other forms of abuse are too intimidated by cultural attitudes and state inaction to seek redress. To do so can lead to hostility from family, the community and the police, with little hope of success. Those who do seek justice are confronted by a system that ignores, denies and even condones violence against women, and protects perpetrators, whether they are state officials or private individuals.²⁰² In conflict situations especially, as was in 2008, it is difficult to see high levels of cases reported particularly where there are no mechanisms to provide confidentiality and expedient legal redress and psycho-social support.²⁰³

¹⁹⁹ Ibid

²⁰⁰ Jacqueline K. & Kamungi P., Violence and Elections: Will Kenya Collapse?, World Policy Journal, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Winter, 2007/2008), pp. 11-18

²⁰¹ This was an interview with Mama Wasike, an adult respondent from Kibera Soweto on 11th September, 2014

²⁰² [www.creawkenya.org/pdf/2009/women paid the price 2.pdf](http://www.creawkenya.org/pdf/2009/women%20paid%20the%20price%20.pdf) accessed on 10/05/2013

²⁰³ Kenya Human Rights Commission report, "Let's we forget the faces of impunity in Kenya, 2011

4.2.2.7 Loss of property

Property was generally lost across the category groups of women, men, and boy and girl child. The girl child reported the loss of personal belongings including although not limited to school uniform, shoes, books and study tables. From a poor background of Kibera slum, a small loss like of school books, was a total turn around of the girl child's life to an unfavourable direction. Also infrastructural breakdown affected their schools, hospitals, shopping centers among other facilities. Indirectly, as their parents lost the source of livelihood, the girl child was affected in different ways. Most importantly, as noted by the respondents and for the objective benefit of this particular study, the girl child helplessness after the loss of property either directly or indirectly had far reaching repercussions. A respondent noted that the girl child lacked the boldness to resist the tension of the time hence surrendering to fate.

4.2.2.8 The girl child "damaged goods"

The girl child lost her selfworth through rape. She was no longer the same girl adored and regarded by the society. The African culture adores the girl child's virginity to the point of marriage. In many African societies, the expectation of dowry payable to the girl's parents upon marriage is tagged on the girl's virginity worth. The girls who lost their virginity in the political violence, through rape or any other means, eroded their society's attachment of worthness. As one respondent would have it, such left the girl child feeling useless and without any price tag. Many also who got unwanted pregnancies opted for unsafe abortions. The acts of aborting left the girl child with a guilty mind, bitterness and battered personality traits. The turn around made the girl child a different person all together, with a new but distressed mind and emotions.

4.2.2.9 Dropping out of school

Turma following political conflicts and violence disrupts people's daily activities, including learning in schools.²⁰⁴ The respondents reported a high rate of school drop outs especially by

²⁰⁴ African Research Review, The Effect of Inter-tribal Post Election Violence Conflict Trauma on Academic Performance among Secondary School Students in Mt. Elgon District, Kenya An International Multidisciplinary Journal, Ethiopia Vol. 5 (6), Serial No. 23, pg 248-259, November, 2011

those who had suffered the ordeal of rape. A respondent, a mother of a girl caught up in the melee of the violence said, "It was hard to access medical care and some of the rape cases resulted to serious life conditions. Some were not even able to control their bladder any more."²⁰⁵ The girl child with such a case could not tolerate the humiliation and ridicule from her school mates and hence they had to drop out of school. Also from the respondents, those who lost their parents and/suffered destruction of property were disoriented with some leaving school and opting for early marriages. It was evident from the analysis of the data collected that such confusion brought about by the spontaneous political violence had its implication on the girls' education.

4.2.2.10 Unwanted pregnancies

Some of the girl children who suffered sexual violence found themselves with unwanted pregnancies. The end result was a dilemma between keeping the pregnancy and aborting the child. Those who chose the latter bore the consequences that accompany abortion, dominant among them, death and infertility. On the other hand, those who opted for the former option, better still, suffered from the stigma of a "fatherless child." A respondent described a mother of a child conceived through rape during the political violence as a mother, "full of hatred and unsupportive to her child." This, according to the respondent, is the psychological consequence of the rape ordeal as opposed to the mere fact of giving birth (a blessing in disguise).

4.2.2.11 The girl child was displaced

The dislodgement of people in the aftermath of the political violence occurred in a staggered manner. Many who relocated to safer parts of Kenya became internally displaced while those others who ran to neighbouring countries like Uganda became refugees. Because of the pattern of the political violence many of the displaced girl children took shelter with their relatives who resided in areas dominated by their own tribesmen. The violence uprooted children and youths from their homes at a time when their lives most needed stability. Too often than not, the rights of displaced girl children were violated, resulting in abuse, discrimination, or even death.

²⁰⁵ One on one interview with Alice, a respondent who was a house wife in Kibera. Kisumu ndogo village.

Displacement exacerbated poverty and caused the breakdown of family and community structures. Faced with disintegration of her social norms, displaced girl child found herself without basic necessities, such as shelter and food, and her education was either disrupted or terminated. The displacement made the girl child most vulnerable to the point of being forced out of school into early marriages, cheap labour and casual sex work. As a result, the girl child lost the opportunity to realize full educational and developmental potential.

4.2.2.12 Stigma and rejection

Sexual and gender-based violence is one of the most pervasive violations of the rights of women and girls during conflict and displacement. It is often employed as a strategy by armed groups or gangs to attack the values of the community, punish, terrorise the enemy, instil fear, intimidate and inflict injury on the opponents or provide gratification for the fighters / armed groups. Women and girls were at higher risk of sexual and gender-based violence in most internal displacement camps. Such was the case of gender-based violence faced by women following the bungled 2007 presidential elections in Kenya as women and girls were raped in hundreds. It is worth noting at this stage that sexual violence against the displaced women and girls remains an under-reported aspect of conflict. Often, sexually abused and displaced women and girls do not report incidents of abuse and violence to medical and humanitarian organizations. This was confirmed by the Waki Commission report (CIPEV 2008), which established that 82% of the victims did not formally report their experiences of sexual violence, especially to the police. The Commission was told that the reasons for non-reporting ranged from having been attacked by the police (32%), fear of being attacked again (24%), thinking that nothing could be done (45%) and not being able to identify the rapist (31%). Others the Commission was told did not know where to report the matter (34%) or did not know how to do so (27%).²⁰⁶

It is clear that sexual violence most often goes under-reported for many different reasons that include fear of retaliation; distrust and dysfunction of the criminal justice system; a sense of shame; and fear of rejection by partners and society.²⁰⁷ This only solves the outside shame and

²⁰⁶ *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (CIPEV)*, October, 2008

²⁰⁷ Aranburu X., *Sexual Violence beyond Reasonable Doubt: Using Pattern Evidence and Analysis for International Cases*. *Law & Social Inquiry*, Journal of the American Bar Foundation, Volume 35, Issue 4, 8556879, Fall 2010

stigma but leaves the affected person with emotional turmoil. In the aftermath of the post-election violence, fifty five percent (55%) of girls in Kibera managed to reunite with their families and communities in the hopes of beginning a new life. However, reintegration was often highly problematic. In some instances, when family and community members learned of their girl child's rape, some of them experienced severe stigmatization and rejection. The religious leaders mentioned six (6) cases of families who had difficulty in encouraging their daughters back on life course after sexual abuse during the political violence. According to them it took the counselling skill from them together with other counselling leaders and time for their healing, which as at the date of this study two (2) cases were still continuing. The ongoing distress that the girl child faced as a result of the rejection was expressed by the girl respondents in the questionnaires.

4.4 CONCLUSION

Different respondents cited possibilities of diverse effects in the 2008 political violence for the different category groups of the youths and adults. Though all were affected by the violence as mentioned, a majority of the respondents explicated how the youth-group was the most affected. The respondents who were for adults as the most affected, gave the factual reason of their concern for the youths as their children, hence the hard-pressed obligation to shield them at all cost. One of the respondents narrated another reason of the violence's effects to the adults as a result of their ordinary attachment to their property which was at stake or being destroyed. The explanation for their much involvement was thus due to the above mentioned two reasons which gave them the tenacity to guard their radiance.

In mentioning the youth as the most affected group, the respondents referred to one main reason, that they were the main participants in the violence. They involved themselves in the violence whether with permission from their parents/guardians or against their will. This may have been motivated by monetary incentives from the political leaders. One youth respondent said, "It was all about employment for if anyone asks you for your service in exchange for money, then you are earning regardless of the service, *Kazi ni kazi bora pesaö*."²⁰⁸ (Meaning any work is alright provided money). While on the front line, the youth were likely to be injured or meet their death. With the destruction of property and consequent negative effect to the economy, the young

²⁰⁸ Interview with a youth respondent from Kisumu ndogo village in Kibera on 11th September, 2014

people seeking for employment were bound to be affected twofold even after the political violence.

Other respondents comparatively compared the two categories of youths and adults. They explained the way violence lacks the lens to discriminate between individuals and therefore affecting all in equal measures. From the category of the youths, the girl child was pointed out by the respondents as the most affected by the political violence. The reason mentioned thereof by the respondents and analysed in this paper included sexual violence, high on the girl child, and its succeeding aftermaths. Other reasons are displacement and its accompaniment negative effects on the girl child, high school drop-out cases due to unwanted pregnancies, the feeling of fear and insecurity among others. The girl child's impact as compared to the rest of the other category groups and from the view point of the respondents had distinct successive damages some of which are evident to date. An example is a case of sexual violence which resulted to unwanted pregnancy to a girl then aged 16 years. The respondent, a teacher at New Hope Primary School in Kibera Silanga, narrated of the victim's predicaments to date. The victim, as narrated, gave birth to a baby girl whom she hates with passion as she remembers of the rape incidence every moment she sees her. The same ordeal has deeply disturbed her social life as well as her attitude towards all men. Also, the institution of marriage to her has since been negatively affected.²⁰⁹

The follow up impact of the political violence as recorded in this study, is evidently more on the girl child than any other group. The different groups might have suffered equally. As some of the respondents would have it, violence does not know discrimination, however, the sustained aftermath did affect the girl child more than any other category group. The above argument, as drawn from the data of respondents of the different groups, implicated that seventy eight percent (78%) of the questionnaire respondents supported the sustained aftermath of the girl child. This chapter of the study thus concludes that the impact of the post-election violence to the girl child was weightier in comparison to the other groups.

²⁰⁹ The story was narrated by Faith, a teacher at New Hope Academy on 10th September, 2014 during a one on one interview with her. The victim is the teacher's cousin and who is a close friend to her.

CHAPTER FIVE

COPING MECHANISMS OF THE GIRL CHILD

5.0 INTRODUCTION

Coping mechanisms refer to the collective or individual girl child's activities and efforts directed at managing post-violence problems and emotions by influencing physical and psychological outcomes. This chapter explains how the girl child typically conceptualized mediating variables elicited as she experienced the impact of post-election violence as a stressor and, partially or completely explicates the relationship between the post-election violence stressor and the outcome thereof.

Populations affected by violent conflict resort in very flexible ways to a myriad of informal opportunities. These are in general however, not enough to compensate for the negative impacts of conflict on their earning capacity, but may result in the acquisition of productive skills that may be relevant for economic recovery in the post-conflict period.²¹⁰ Generally, after violence many individuals leave to refugee and displacement camps, migrate to safer urban/rural areas or move abroad. At the same time, numerous people live in conflict areas and survive, carrying on their daily lives in the midst of fear of conflict and violence.²¹¹ In Kibera slum, the girl child victims of violence displayed various degrees of resilience as in other conflict affected areas.²¹² Some of them did well out of the conflict, while others exhibited conditions of fear and extreme destitution. Basically, levels of resilience of the girl child depended on a series of factors both within and without control. These factors may be grouped into the magnitude and duration of the

²¹⁰ Dr. Patricia Justino, High level expert forum on food insecurity in protracted crises. Resilience in protracted crises: Exploring coping mechanisms and resilience of households, communities and local institutions, Institute of Development Studies, 2012

²¹¹ Center for Rights Education and Awareness (CREAW): Women paid the price. Sexual and gender-based violence in the 2007 post-election conflict in Kenya, 2008 <http://www.creawkenya.org/creaw-publications/women-paid-the-price/>

²¹² Engel S. and Ibanez A. "Displacement due to violence in Colombia: A household level analysis." *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 55: 335-365.

effects of violence, the type of coping strategies that the girl child was able (or allowed) to access and the effectiveness of the strategies adopted to cope with the effects of violence.²¹³

The magnitude of violent conflicts is a characteristic of their destructive nature, including the intentional destruction of strategies available to the victims for survival, such as social networks and family ties, food produce, and infrastructure. Violent shocks from conflicts such as the 2007/08 Kenyan post-election have a tendency of affecting whole communities and regions. However, individual victims with characteristics that are salient like the girl child may be specifically targeted in such conflicts. This was often the case of victims with visible vulnerabilities or other characteristics that marked them as targets of violence in Kibera slum. The girl child in Kibera slum as an obvious target of the violence had to devise coping mechanisms to help her survive the aftermath of the 2007/08 post-election violence.

The type of coping strategies that are available as may have been the case with the Kibera slum girl child, during and after the conflict, are restricted.²¹⁴ Limitation was as a result of marginalization, lack of infrastructure and the volatile nature of Kibera slum. The volatile nature of Kibera slum denied access by the Non-Governmental Organisation who offered avenues for coping mechanisms. These coping strategies were both adaptive and maladaptive. Adaptive coping mechanisms included adaptation to new skills, religion based approaches, counseling, and comfort in sexual intimacy and joining therapeutic groups. Maladaptive coping mechanisms were reflected in apprehension, uncertainty, suspiciousness and learned helplessness. The consequences of maladaptive coping strategies took the form of promiscuity, disrespect of authority, disrupted education, drug abuse and participation in illegal activities. The resilient were those Kibera slum girls who had strong religious affiliation and were socially supported. These effects were aggravated by the breakdown of families and communities, the rise of distrust towards displaced populations and the consequent failure of informal social protection mechanisms and social networks.²¹⁵

²¹³ Justino, P., Brück, T. and Verwimp, P. A Micro-Level Perspective on the Dynamics of Conflict, Violence and Development. Oxford University Press, 2009

²¹⁴ Bundervoet T. Vernimp P. and Akresh R., Health and Civil War in Rural Burundi: *Journal of Human Resources*, 44 (2).2009

²¹⁵ Kondlylis f. òagricultural outputs Conflict Displacement: Evidence from a Policy intervention in Rwanda HiCN working paper n. 28 Households in Conflict Network (www. Hicn .org), 2007

5.1 COPING MECHANISMS

5.1.1 Participation in illegal activities

In most cases of the 2007/08, children participated in illegal activities or supported armed groups simply in order to survive. Indeed, a vigilante group like the famous Mungiki was something of a refuge, serving as a kind of surrogate family for those who had no alternative of survival. The girl child joined the vigilante groups on the firm belief that it was the only way to guarantee her protection, regular meals or clothing. A respondent said, 'Kibera was so bad that you needed to identify yourself with an organised gang which was well known for you to survive.'²¹⁶ The girl child was used in support functions such as cooking, washing, messengers and spies. While these functions seemed to be less harmful for her, they entailed great hardship and risk. Worse still, is when the girl's participation often necessitated the provision of sexual service. Prostitution, abusing drugs and sniffing of glue are some of the illegal activities that came along as a result.

5.1.2 Running to IDP camp sites

Most girl children affected by violence in Kibera minimised their risk either by moving somewhere safer, or by resorting to activities that will not attract undue attention from the opposing groups. These activities included compromising with the illegal activities of the armed groups like wanton destruction of property, giving information, satisfying them sexually among others. Migration from conflict areas may have been long-term or permanent for those victims of violence who settled in other locations. Also it might have taken on a more temporary nature, with individuals moving frequently between their home and other urban environments, fleeing at night and returning during day or moving only part of the family.²¹⁷ This was the case in Kibera slum during the 2007/08 post-election violence.

The girl child opted for IDP Camp sites whose availability was thought to offer psychosocial health support care and support material provisions. Such were thought as safe havens which could offer renewed hope lost in the political violence. Despite the hopeful belief some IDP camps aggravated their concerns as the in-charges took advantage of the volatile situation to

²¹⁶ From Alice, a 24 year old lady from Kibera Silanga 6 interviewed on 11th August, 2014

²¹⁷ Raeymaekers T., *Forced Displacement and Youth Employment in the Aftermath of the Congo War: From making a living to making a life. MICROCON Research Working Paper 38*, Brighton, 2011.

subject them to sexual violence and harassment. Nevertheless some institutions in IDP camps stood in support of the girl child vulnerability to help her socially and materially. With the renewed hope the girl child was able to withstand the emotional break down and recollect her life again with enthusiasm.

5.1.3 Re-allocation of labour

As a result of the impact of conflict and violence, one of the most significant livelihood adaptation strategies adopted by households is a change in customary gender divisions of labour. Kibera slum experienced significant increases in female participation in small scale labour market. This was as a result of two factors; firstly, the increase in the number of female-headed households due to the death and disappearance of male workers and secondly, the fact that income generating opportunities men relied on before the conflict such as, construction and other casual jobs, were no longer available. The girl child stood out in helping her mother or elder sisters in bringing food home. The girl child participated actively particularly in low skilled jobs and in the informal sector like selling vegetables and second hand clothes. Through that experience the girl child was able to learn survival tactics to counter many social and economic constraints that came along with the violence as they participated in income generation activities.

This form of coping strategy may, however, have had severe negative consequences to the long-term welfare of the girl child, particularly if it affected the educational and personal development of the girl child.

5.1.4 Recruitment into and support for armed groups

In addition, livelihood support strategies of individuals and households in areas of violent conflict may also include fighting, looting, support for armed groups and participation in illegal activities.²¹⁸ Armed conflicts may lead to new opportunities and many individuals and households have made use of conflict contexts as a means to improve their social, economic and political status. One of the ways in which individuals may use conflict to their advantage is through recruitment into armed groups. While some studies have emphasised the role of

²¹⁸ Justino, P., Brück, T. and Verwimp, P. A Micro-Level Perspective on the Dynamics of Conflict, Violence and Development. Oxford University Press, 2009

individual greed in recruitment into armed groups²¹⁹ recent empirical evidence suggests that ordinary individuals join armed groups in order to avoid destitution, as a livelihood coping strategy, and to secure protection from violence for themselves and their families.²²⁰

The girl child living in Kibera slum during the 2007/08 violent conflict faced enormous challenges, and often adopted a mix of legitimate and illegal, formal and informal activities in order to survive and protect their livelihoods. These included the participation in and support for warring factions. There were several accounts of how the girl child survived and protected themselves through various forms of voluntary and involuntary support for opposing tribal groups including the provision of shelter, food and information. The famous Mungiki vigilante group which applied 'mafia-like' methods to control the Kenyan public transport sector and local business owners, became a haven for the girls in the face of impunity. Forty percent of the questionnaire respondents described the group as one which took advantage to recruit youths. One group participant said he saw two of her friends surrender themselves to the group for their survival, she said they had since become Mungiki stout members. Family units made of different warring tribes was a highly prey in this fact. For example during my tour I met one family from a Luo and Kikuyu community who though the husband was not a Mungiki affiliate was forced by the situation then. Information from the questionnaire respondents pointed out a family that survived by the woman compromising to give information and translating the language of the attackers. This study's empirical evidence suggested that the girl child joined opposing groups in order to avoid destitution, as a survival coping strategy.

5.1.5 New opportunities

The 2007/08 post-election violence provided a conflict context with a means to improve girl child's social, economic and political status. The Conflict led to new opportunities particularly for some who after migrating to other areas thrived in their businesses. Some of the households who did not afford their children's school fees were able to pay for them through the help that came from well wishers. The girl child was temporarily employed by the NGOs in distribution of

²¹⁹ Collier, P. and Hoeffler A. 'Greed and grievance in civil war', Oxford Economic Papers 56 (4): 563-595.

²²⁰ Petersen, R. Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001

food and other necessities. They also gained in training and counselling services organised by volunteer organisations particularly in the IDP camps.

The discussion group described Jamhuri Park IDP camp, which was next to the Kibera slum as one of the largest in Kenya. People fled there to escape tribal violence and the skirmishes within their former homes. One of the religious leaders who was a frequent visitor to the camp explained how African Network for the Prevention and Protection against Child Abuse and Neglect (ANPPCAN) was quick in visiting the camp. The organization then took the necessary steps to establish a Children's Centre. From humble beginnings, the Children's Centre soon became the focus point for anything to do with children. Other organizations such as UNICEF, GOAL Kenya, Child Line and World Vision put their collective resources towards the newly founded Children's Centre. The Children's Centre at the Jamhuri Camp enabled organizations to provide services not possible at other camps. There was counselling for children, temporary schools set up with volunteer teachers, games, toys and plenty of education materials. The organizations also made arrangements with Health Centres to ensure every child was able to remain healthy during this difficult time.

During the discussion group session, I learned that the collaboration and teamwork set up between ANPPCAN and other organizations also helped when it came to protecting children. Volunteers at the Children's Centre were able to prevent several cases of attempted Child Trafficking within the camp. In one case, a group tried to traffic 87 children before volunteers at the Children's Centre intervened.

5.1.6 Staying away

Staying away from the abuser and investing in close friendships was a characteristic of the girl child in persisting through the political violence. Fifteen percent (15%) of the girl children from the questionnaire respondents ran away never to return to Kibera slum again. They sought for new relationships and new peers and friends and chose not to remember the Kibera slum ordeals any more. During my interview, I met a woman who told me of her neighbours who left Kibera then to Kawangware and never returned again.

5.1.7 Problem-solving skills

The girl child who took responsibility of her siblings in the absence of parents learned through experience some social skills. The IDP camps were places of meager resources and always in competition spirit of Charles Darwin's principle of "survival for the fittest". Women and girls were always in contention for the limited resources, an experience that taught them problem solving skills. The Jamhuri park camp for example, saw people selling bananas and mangoes to the users of the main road majorly on personal cars. Some of them used to give them even more for their upkeep which kept them going.

5.1.8 Avoidance, such as wishful thinking or social withdrawal

Social withdrawal is not a clinically defined behavioural, social, or emotional disorder in childhood. Indeed, some individuals appear content to spend most of their hours and days removed from others. In the cases of the avoidance of social company and the isolation from social company, solitude could hardly be construed as psychologically or socially adaptive. It is not the display of solitude per se that may pose a problem; rather, the central issue is that social withdrawal may reflect underlying difficulties of a social or emotional nature. The expression of social withdrawal represents the developmental outcome of particular temperamental dispositions. It is this underlying difficulty and disposition that might have been brought by the 2007/08 political violence.

Due to the political violence twenty percent (20%) of the parents interviewed exhibited that their girl children, who went through the ordeal of the violence, had signs and symptoms of shyness, unfounded fear of rejection, hypersensitivity to criticism, and a pattern of social avoidance. With such signs and symptoms a diagnosis of avoidant personality disorder can often be indicated. The study concluded the outcome was due to the disgrace of sexual violence. These feelings of self-doubt and fear in new and unfamiliar social or personal relationships are not unusual, nor are they unhealthy, as these situations may trigger feelings of inadequacy and the wish to hide from social contact in even "would be" the most self-confident individuals.

5.1.9 Concealment and selective disclosure

In his seminal work on the impact of stigma, Goffman argued that because stigma works to taint and discredit, efforts are made by individuals to control and manage the discrediting attribute²²¹. Some of the respondents recounted the events that unfolded during the political violence with a lot of disappointment wishing not to remember what had happened either to them or their friends. Evidence of girls who chose to withdraw and forget all about the ordeal was shared in the youth discussion groups. “More than half of the girls never reported anything but kept it as a secret to themselves.”²²² A female respondent reported from the discussion group. Such mechanism might have cushioned them from the ridicule of the society though to the girl child it may turn out to be a big emotional pain.

5.1.10 Letting go and allowing fate to take course

From the evidence of the research, twelve percent (12%) of the girl child victims in Kibera slum chose to let life take its course. This mostly happened when the available coping strategies were typically not sufficient to bring a relief to them and foster adjustment in post-conflict situation. The choices determining the girl child actions were made within the available options and although such actions may have relieved the girl child from continuous stress, many wrong choices followed their decisions with dire consequences. An example is two (2) girls identified by the adult focus group who joined the street families not to come back to their uncle whom they were staying with in Kibera. One other lady who since the political violence turned a prostitute was also identified.

5.1.11 Help from charitable organisations and Non Governmental Organizations.

From the respondents, the study established that, in the middle of the crisis, organizations in Kenya came together to reach out to women and girls who had experienced sexual violence following the 2007 elections. They gathered under the auspices of the Inter-Agency Gender Based Violence sub-cluster co-chaired by the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) and the National Commission on Gender and Development. This umbrella group included a variety of different groups from departments in the ministries of gender, health and the

²²¹ Goffman, E. *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*. Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1968.

²²² Name of the respondent withheld. Discussion held on 11th August, 2014.

judiciary, various UN agencies (e.g. UNFPA, UNIFEM), the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and from various local and international NGOs. The sub-cluster responded to the post-election sexual violence, particularly against women, by providing victims with medical, psycho-social and other counselling services. This functioned as a safe haven for the girl child to recollect her emotions and keep her hope of life alive.

5.1.12 Guiding and counselling services

During my research tour in Kibera slum, I learned that several Centers for guiding and counselling in aid of the girl child were established even in hospitals for example, the Nairobi Womens Hospital in Hurligham. Such institutions, as learned from the study, offered voluntary services and did a lot of follow up their after. It is worth noting that, due to their nature of work, the data held by these institutions concerning the girl child violation is enormous. Organisations like African Network for the Prevention and Protection against Child Abuse and Neglect and Child Line established such centers in Jamhuri IDP camp and inside the Kibera slum. These volunteer services though not enough for the witnessed cases gave the girl child encouragement and hope. The girl child was able to appreciate, though dimly, the motivation for her to face their blurred future with confidence.

5.1.13 Peer support structures

Children from the New Hope Academy in Kibera Silanga reported that when they experienced distressing violence-time memories, they sought the comfort, solace, and encouragement of other violence-affected children. In the aftermath of the conflict, children appeared to develop informal peer-support networks that broke down their sense of isolation and distress. A pupil in the school was quoted as saying, "I was comfortable to talk to my friend about the violence. She also lost her parents through the violence. We used to discuss in secret, we cried over it. I felt terrible. My friend was always there for me."²²³ It is interesting to note that throughout the research process, I discovered that those girl children who suffered similar violent abuses had a common bond as long as they possessed the knowledge of each others predicaments. They would regularly meet to discuss their issues particularly those who had met as classmates or school mates.

²²³ Narration by Faith, a class teacher at New Hope Academy Primary School, who conducted regular discussions with class 6-8 regularly

5.2 CONCLUSION

Some coping mechanisms highlighted in this chapter were identified as potentially effective in coping with violence among the girl child victim in Kibera slum. These strategies included staying away from the abuser, peer support structures, guidance and counselling services, engaging in new opportunities and investing in close friendships. As some authors have suggested generally, problem solving skills as well as cognitive restructuring which encompass the above coping strategies are efficient to girl child victims experiencing childhood abuse.²²⁴ This was true for the Kibera girl child who considered putting the said coping strategies to practice as a post-violence resilience measure.

Unfortunately though, some of these potentially helpful coping strategies seemed less common among the Kibera slum girl child victim. On the contrary, a few girls identified potentially ineffective coping strategies like avoidance which included wishful thinking or social withdrawal. Others identified were selective disclosure, supporting opposing gangs as well as emotion-focused or internal-focused strategies. The internal focused mechanisms were like blaming oneself leading to low self esteem. These ineffective coping mechanisms made the Kibera girl child to surrender to fate instead of recollecting herself back to reset life towards the right course.

Frydenberg study established that girls report more efforts to seek help than boys.²²⁵ This was a similar occurrence in the case with Kibera slum girl child. Moreover, some studies have suggested that girls benefit from social support to a greater extent than boys²²⁶. The respondents about the Kibera girl child reported how coping strategies showing avoidance tendencies were related to an increase of behaviour and emotional problems among the girls. The Kibera slum girl child preferred avoiding a situation in which she felt helpless. Avoidance prevented the girl child from reaching out for support while experiencing negative post-violence behaviours. This result

²²⁴ Gipple E., Lee M., and Puig, A. Coping and dissociation among female college students: Reporting childhood abuse experiences, *Journal of College Counseling*, 9, 33-46, 2006.

²²⁵ Frydenberg, E., and Lewis, R., Boys play sport and girls turn to others: Age, gender and ethnicity as determinants of coping. *Journal of Adolescence*, 1, 253-266, 1993.

²²⁶ Landman-Peeters C., Hartman A., Van der Pompe G., Den Boer A., Minderaa B., and Ormel J., Gender differences in the relation between social support, problems in parent-offspring communication, and depression and anxiety. *Social Science and Medicine*, 60, 2549-2559, 2005

was worrisome, given the poor outcomes associated with avoidance in general, and also harmful to the girl child due to their need to rely more often on social support than boys or adults do. The girl child who was the target of sexual and psychological violence often felt that she exercised no control over her life. However to some extent, girls who applied the effective coping mechanisms particularly the maladaptive ones like counselling and investing in close available friends and neighbours had less impact of the post election violence than others.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

This is the final chapter of the research work. The chapter endeavours to put together in summary the substance of the study and the findings thereof. Though the study sought to interpret responses at every step of analysis the part of conclusion in this ultimate section of the study pulls the strands together in a broader perspective. The recommendation for further study that follow the conclusion is achievable and appropriate.

Violence and insecurity are frequent occurrences in today's world. Insecurity emerges when a government, faced with conflict and violence (be it political, social, economic, or generated by organized crime), cannot or will not ensure the protection of its citizens, organizations and institutions against threats to their well-being and the prosperity of their communities. Such threats may come from the State itself or from non-State actors.

In Kenya for example, organized crime, terrorism, trafficking, civil unrest and political differences have supplanted armed conflict as the main sources of violence and insecurity. Like armed conflict, the 2007/08 political violence exposed the Kibera slum population to widespread human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, torture and ill-treatment, disappearances and arbitrary detention. Women and girls continued to be particularly affected the political violence and insecurity exacerbated pre-existing patterns of gender discrimination and put them at heightened risk of sexual, physical and psychological violence. Striking a balance between the response to existing threats and the obligation to protect whole populations against violence and insecurity is not at all a easy task. At times, the Kenyan state resorted to repressive responses which engendered further violations and failed to address the root causes of insecurity.

As indicated earlier, the purpose of this study was to investigate the 2007/08 Kenyan political violence with an aim of examining its causes and impact on the girl child in Kibera slum. More so the study endeavoured to establish whether the impact may have dragged the prospects of the girl child and examine the coping strategies employed by the Kibera slum girl child in conflict. With this drive, the study employed questionnaire method of data collection and interview schedules. The interview schedules were conducted both at individual and group level. The data collection and analysis went hand in hand throughout the research period and was thus done

simultaneously. For ease of information gathering in establishing specific impacts of the political violence, several category groups were established; adults and youths, and the girl child and boy child among the youth category group.

During data analysis, the study established that, all groupings as categorised were affected by the 2007/08 post-election violence. However, more than half of the respondents mentioned the youth group category as the most affected group by the violence. To add to this evidence were the interviewees whom amongst 12 out of the 15 interviewed agreed that the youth group were truly affected by the violence more than the other groups. Also from the discussion groups it was evident from the weighty of contribution. The reason for this fact, as analysed from the questionnaires and discussion groups, was because of their large involvement as participants in the political violence. The respondents showed how the Kibera youths came in large numbers in throwing stones to cars and destroying infrastructure such as the roads and railway. One interviewee said,

“The youths came in force to put their strength together and pulled the railway line passing through Kibera .. most of them were male youths but with a minimal number of daring female youths.”²²⁷ Because of their much involvement, it followed that they were more affected than the other category group of adults.

Those respondents who mentioned the category of the boy child among the youth as the most affected cited their participation in the violence as the major reason that instigated their effects from the violence more than the other category groups. Some respondents revealed how manhood during the violence period was appraised by the degree of involvement in the political violence. The greater effect suffered by the boy child ranged from injury to death either from the police or the perceived enemies.

The effect of the girl child from the political violence was different. It was evident for those who participated in the violence and those who did not as well. On 25 January 2008, the IRIN news service reported that “children and women had borne the worst of the violence in Kenya”, emphasising that sexual violence had increased especially in camps set up for internally displaced

²²⁷ Response from a 44 year old male religious leader from Kibera during person to person interview conducted on 10th September, 2014 in Kibera Mashimoni.

persons (IDPs), where girls and women exchanged sex for biscuits, or for other services. Indeed, internally displaced women and girls were constantly exposed to violence.²²⁸ The Gender Violence Recovery Centre in Mombasa also reported that cases of sexual violence had doubled since the elections crisis and there had been an increase in sexual assaults, most of whose victims were girls under the age of 18.²²⁹ Out of the youths, the respondents also pointed out that, the girl child whether involved in the violence or not was highly impacted by the violence in proportion because of their vulnerability. Their susceptibility reasons as analysed, majorly was because of the way they were prone to sexual violence, a sharp weapon which seemed to work easily in the 2008 Kenyan political violence. Most respondents cited rape as a major crime committed against the girl child. One respondent pointed out that, "most of them depended on men for security, notably, their long known friends, neighbours, or government officials, who in the midst of the anarchy turned their back on them by manipulating and misusing their bodies."²³⁰

From the analysis of the study, it is evident that all the group categories were affected differently by the violence. Some effects came from direct involvement in the violence while to others; participation in the violence was not a determinant factor. From the evidence of the study, the boy child impact mostly came in participation while for the girl child it was apparent with or without her participation. The girl child victim seemed to have borne and faced the double side of the sword. She continuously became the prey to the cruelty regardless of whether she was in the violence or hiding from it. Those who were left in their houses as men went out suffered almost the same with those who were in the fore front of the violence. In addition, those who sought for safer haven like the IDP camps or places of worship did not escape as they met their perpetrators anyhow. This put the girl child in a very alluring position of dilemma more than any other category group who faced the same violence.

Political violence in Kibera slum uniquely affected the girl child. Although legal instruments had been in place for decades, even before the political violence, to protect the girl child, thousands of brutal acts of violence and neglect specifically targeting the girl child were observed around the Kibera slum on a daily basis. As informed in the two mixed primary schools visited in Kibera

²²⁸ Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) news

²²⁹ See <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=25414&Cr=kenya&Cr1>.

²³⁰ The female respondent, Annette, who was then 17 years old and a resident of Kibera is now a secondary school teacher in Kiambu County.

slum, girls continually faced the threat of sexual harassment and abuse in their homes, workplaces and schools during the political violence. Violence against the girl child can be said to have become a powerful and all-too-common tactic in that time of conflict and humanitarian disaster.

Significantly, while it is true that girls and boys have their rights violated during armed conflict, and this paper focuses on grave violations of girl child rights, it is incorrect to reduce girls only to the role of passive victim. In Kibera slum political violence for example, twenty five (25%) of the girl child took an active role in supporting violence. Such are the girls that made calculated decisions during the violence, about how to access shelter, food, medicine, and best ways to keep themselves and their family members safe. Sometimes the best way for them to achieve this was to support or join various political parties, vigilante groups or gangs. The girl child had come to believe in the logic of violence when confronted with unjust and violent settings like it was with 2007/08 political violence. Hence, the findings from this study that; one should not underestimate the potentially pervasive harmful effect of violence on the girl child's sense of 'security' and 'justice' in periods of so-called peace.

At the same time, the girl child played a primary role in maintaining the livelihoods of their families. At times these activities put them at great risk and were detrimental to their own education and development. The girl child also took on additional responsibility to keep themselves, their families and their families' assets safe. Consequently then, she must be understood and engaged as thoughtful, insightful and active agent who is able to shape her own life and the community in which she lives or finds herself.

Chief among the causes of political violence cited in this study is tribalism, which political leaders nurtured on their own volition, and for their own benefit as it was the case in Kibera slum. Largely thus, the political leaders remain the main agents to blame for the 2007/08 political violence. If Kibera slum case study is anything to go by, political violence in Kenya seems endemic, out of control and used routinely to resolve political differences. This being true political violence threatens the future of the Kenyan nation. More so, due to the ethnic nature of the political violence, ethnic fears and hatred have been elevated in importance and could turn violent again even more easily than has happened in the past. Paramount among the requirements

in support of addressing the root causes of political violence among the political leaders, is political good will and some basic wise and skillful choices to change the way politics is conducted, as well as to address its intersection with other issues related to land, marginalization and inequality, and youth unemployment. Short of the above, political violence in Kenya, including violence not related to elections, will continue to appear and will may be ignited ever more readily.

Within the findings of this study is the knowledge that, tribalism is a retrogressive practice which needs to be kicked out at all cost. In Kibera slum, it made some citizens to demean and belittle others by disrespecting and making fun of their cultures and customs, which diversity should have been embraced to their advantage. To manage such attitude, especially in cosmopolitan settlements like Kibera slum, it is necessary to enforce strict laws that regulate discriminatory practices in the provision of services. Also tolerance is obviously a major requirement if Kenyans are to be united in diversity, so that citizens learn to accept and accommodate customs and practices that are different from theirs. In my own opinion if the issue of tribalism is adequately addressed, the main cause of political violence will have been diffused and in time, governance would improve and corruption decrease. Such also would encourage investment with infrastructural developments raising living standards for Kenyans living in informal settlements like in Kibera slum. Most importantly tribal violence whether political or otherwise will be eradicated in the country. All this will be aimed at reducing the impacts that accompany political violence in Kenya.

From the Kibera slum study analysis, there were exceptional challenges encountered by the girl child in Kibera slum in the midst of the political violence, these included;

6.1 *Eminent threats from male counterparts*

Life opportunities in Kibera slum by the date of this study had been competitive and with the rise of feminism it seems men have always felt endangered from their original culture protected male positions. The chauvinistic perceptions and attitude conceived threats in men which were aimed at devaluing, demeaning and de-humanising the Kibera slum girl child whether consciously or unconsciously. This was in order to promote men's dominance in leadership and influence

choices and outcomes in their favour. A structural system founded on such male dominance posed a great challenge to the girl child in the 2007/08 conflict situation. These manifestations which may have influenced even electoral outcomes were evident in 2007 political violence in Kibera. For example, on October 16, 2007, at Kibera Primary School in Langata constituency, an aspirant, said: *ōWanawake endeni mkapikeō* (women go and cook) and *ōtokeni ama tutawarapeō* (go away or else we shall rape you). All the women present ran away. The alleged reasons for the comments were the women's support for one of the male aspirants who opposed the aspirant.²³¹ This analysis shows insecurity on part of the girl child in making independent decision in volatile situations. The girl child is left under the mercy of a chauvinistic society which may call for inner courage and determination with limited odds. This kind of atmosphere was only exacerbated by the 2007/08 Kenyan political violence with minimal reflections of its impacts to the Kibera girl child from the already prejudiced society.

6.2 *Fear and insecurity*

The disquiet that surrounded the 2008 Kenyan political violence was of grave concern on the part of the girl child. Sexual violence directed to them as a weapon of conflict had converted their bodies to a battle field within a very short time. This came as a shock to the girl child. The perpetrators encompassed both their enemies and confidants, including government security agents who were supposed to protect them. The complexity was heightened by the fact that there was no safe harbour for them, not even in places of worship or the IDP camps. Having no safe haven and anchorage, what was left of them was a state of fear and insecurity having no one but only themselves to trust.

One of the reasons that cause fear and insecurity is past experiences. This extends deeper than low self esteem because it is one that can govern it. Past issues with rejection, betrayal, abandonment and an abnormal childhood can subtly influence our everyday lives. Twenty percent (20%) of the Kibera slum girl child tended to be insecure about people leaving or about someone abusing her trust. This to her was worse because those who ought to have been confidants subjected her to these regrettable experiences during the political violence. The

²³¹ Interview with a Faith, female teacher who was present at that time conducted on 10th September, 2014.

history of abuse (whether physical, verbal, emotional or sexual) delineated a path of insecurity that appeared to be unchangeable even after normalcy resumed.

6.3 Girl child - The Silent Sufferers

Discussions of corruption, human rights violations and impunity tend to take place in the abstract, focusing more on the perpetrators and the legal issues involved, and leaving out the many silent victims of these acts. The 2008 Kenyan political violence bred countless girl child victims who were unheard, denied justice, their grievances and injuries having no redress. The respondents counted many cases of rape and other sexual violence which were never followed up even after being reported. Other cases, and which were pointed out as of higher percentage than those which had been reported, have never been reported for fear of neglect and estrangement from the society. The culture of impunity experience in the political violence bred lawlessness and disrespect for the law, recurrently creating yet another group of victims, the survivors of crime, sexual and gender based violence and discrimination. This group of victims forms largely the girl child target because of her palpable vulnerability.

Further, the findings show that violence against the girl child in Kibera slum is a matter of grave concern, cutting across boundaries of culture, class, education, income, gender, ethnic origin and age. Some groups or categories of children are especially vulnerable to specific forms of violence. The study identifies gender as playing a key role in this regard, ðas girls and boys are at different risk for different kinds of violence.ö²³² Essentially, States are scholarly advised and urged to adopt a gender approach to designing and implementing policies and programmes to prevent and address violence.²³³ Many forms of girl child violence remain hidden. Major reasons for this include fear and stigma. The need for social acceptance is another significant factor. Moreover, many types of violence are invisible because there is no safe or trusted place for girl child to report it. All data on the prevalence and incidence of violence against children must therefore be treated with caution. Nevertheless, the study notes that certain forms of violence for

²³²Pinheiro, P. *World Report on Violence against Children, United Nations Secretary-General's Study on Violence against Children*, Geneva, 2006.

²³³United Nations General Assembly, *Report of the Independent Expert for the United Nations study on violence against children, A/61/299*, United Nations, New York, 29 August 2006 (2006b).

example; sexual exploitation and armed conflict receive the bulk of attention. These present significant risks to the girl child's mental and physical health.

Research shows that broader inclusivity in formal peace processes, of civil society as well as of women, increases the credibility of the process and contributes to the sustainability of the agreements reached. Peace processes characterised by heavy involvement of women have been found to be more legitimate and sustainable compared to those with little or no women's involvement. Women, and indeed the girl child, in peace processes may serve as important counterweights to what are, often, political or tribal interests. Despite this growing consensus on the importance of women's participation, many challenges still remain. These vary from the cultural acceptability of having women and specifically the girl child participate in such peace processes. Despite the apparent need, there is always a generalised perception of lack of capacity of women and girl child who could be effective representatives within a formal peace process. Interestingly, in the Kenyan 2008 political violence case, these traditional challenges were considerably less than in other cases studied due to the inclusiveness of women. This study borrows a lot from the above mentioned research findings to conclude on positive effect of inclusivity and thus recommend on further research on this area.

To present date, the response of the Kenyan government to conflict management has been mainly the use of police service and military force. The root and trigger causes of insecurity and political violence have been allowed to persist over time without any sign in sight of their solutions even with the new Constitution. The condition has been worse in our Nairobi city slums. In order to preserve our democracy and our entity as a country these root causes of insecurity and political violence need to be addressed instantly with a wider range of policy responses considered. The failure of government to address basic issues relating to resource control will give impetus to the current cycles of violent political conflicts and insecurity in the country to persist beyond our imagination.

it must be important to know that political violence has always been traced to someone within the political environment. The government attitude of looking away from the substantive issues and culprits being allowed to go while injuries continue to deepen until it explodes and becomes a major disaster is the thorny concern. Our political elites must be

encouraged to play politics of tolerance and not do or die affairs. Our legal institutions must be empowered to stripe off any politician or political party of their victory in any election they are found to have used force or threat of force to secure their victory without fear of favour. There must be an equal ground for all to express their popularity before the electorate. Politics of bitterness, win ówin politics must give way to fairness and justice and popular choice.

Government must begin to hold traditional leaders/rulers, governors, political office holders and political elites responsible for any breach of peace in their domain or political entity. It has been muted throughout this study that most political conflicts and insecurity are fomented by these groups of people for their political greed and interest.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Oral interviewees

Alice Atango a resident of Kibera, Kisumu Ndogo village ó a house wife interviewed on 21st August, 2014

Annette Peter ó a Secondary School teacher based at Kiambu ó 30th August, 2014

Augustine Wanyama, a resident of Kibera, Kisumu Ndogo village ó a male youth interviewed on 11th September, 2014

Bishop Sammy Ibuka ó a religious leader ó 5th September, 2014

Evans Mrefu Wasike, a resident of Kibera Gatwekera village ó a standard eight pupil interviewed on 11th September, 2014.

Faith Afandi, a resident Kibera Makina village ó a 27 year old female teacher at New Hope Academy Day Primary School interviewed on 11th August, 2014

Leonora Otieno, a resident of Kibera Silanga village ó a 29 year old Early Child Hood (ECD) teacher interviewed on 11th August, 2014.

Mercy Peter, a resident of Soweto East village ó a 20 year old girl with a child out of wed lock interviewed on 16th August, 2014. .

Mr. and Mrs. Stephen Otieno, residents of Kibera Raila village ó a couple of 5 years interviewed on 16th August, 2014.

Mr. Dhaka- a religious leader ó 5th September, 2014

Mr. Joseph Nthenge ó a senior GSU police officer who used diplomacy in dispersing youth rioters in Kibera Silanga during the Post Election Violence interviewed on 9th August, 2014.

Mrs. Dickson M. ó a senior teacher at New Hope Primary school - 30th August, 2014

Patrick Majimbo, a resident of Kibera, Soweto West village ó a 40 year old male interviewed on 21st August, 2014

Paul Mungai, a resident of Kibera Laini Saba village ó a 23 year old 3rd year student at Baraton University interviewed on 11th August, 2014.

Rev. Peter Mutie ó 10th August, 2014

Ronald Emmanuel, a resident of Kibera, Silanga village ó a male youth interviewed on 11th September, 2014

Books and Articles

African Research Review, the Effect of Inter-tribal Post Election Violence Conflict Trauma on Academic Performance among Secondary School Students in Mt. Elgon District, Kenya *an International Multidisciplinary Journal, Ethiopia* Vol. 5 (6), Serial No. 23, November, 2011

Robert Agnew, A revised strain theory of delinquency. Social forces, Emory University, 1985

Aloys B. Ayako, Review of poverty in Kenya, institute of policy analysis Research, 1997

Bundervoet T. Vernimp P. and Akresh R., Health and Civil War in Rural Burundi: Journal of Human Resources, 44 (2).2009

Christine Bodewes, Parish Transformation in urban slum: Voices of Kibera Kenya, 2005

Collier, P. and Hoeffler A. õGreed and grievance in civil warö, Oxford Economic Papers 56 (4)

Convention on the rights of the child Article 2 paragraph 1

David Apter E., The Legitimization of Violence. õ*Political violence in analytical perspective.*” Palgrave Macmillan, 1996

Dr. Patricia Justino, High level expert forum on food insecurity in protracted crises. Resilience in protracted crises: *Exploring coping mechanisms and resilience of households, communities and local institutions*, Institute of Development Studies, 2012

Emily Lungano and Julius Ngundo, Final report: *A participatory urban appraisal study of Mashimoni, Kambi muru, Lindi and Shilanga villages* ó Kibera Informal Settlement Oxfam GB, May 2001

Engel S. and Ibanez A. "Displacement due to violence in Colombia: A household level analysis." *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 55

Feltham, C. *What's the good of counselling and psychotherapy? The benefits explained.* London: Sage Publishers, 2003

Ferree, M. M. (1990). Beyond separate spheres: Feminism and Family research. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 52

Hasso F., "Discursive and Political Deployments by/of the 2002 Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers/Martyrs", *Feminist Review*, No. 81 (Bodily Interventions), 2005

Herve Maupeu, *Revisiting Post-election Violence: The General Elections in Kenya 2007.* Dares salaam: mkuki na nyota publishers ltd, 2008

Jacqueline Klopp and Prisca Kamungi, Violence and Elections: Will Kenya Collapse? *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Winter, 2007/2008), The MIT Press and the World Policy Institute.

Justino, P., Brück, T. and Verwimp, P. *A Micro-Level Perspective on the Dynamics of Conflict, Violence and Development.* Oxford University Press, 2009

Kalyvas, S. N. 2006. *The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kamatsiko, V. V. *The future in our hands: Children displaced by conflicts in Africa's Great Lakes region.* Nairobi, Kenya: World Vision Africa.

Kondlylis f. "agricultural outputs Conflict Displacement: Evidence from a Policy intervention in Rwanda" HiCN working paper n. 28, *Households in Conflict Network* (www. Hicn .org), 2007

La Greca, A. M., Silverman, W. K., Vernberg, E. M., & Roberts, M. C. (2002). *Helping children cope with disasters and terrorism.* Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Leopold, M. "Legacies of slavery in North-West Uganda: The story of the 'one-elevens'." *Africa (the Journal of the International African Institute)*, Vol. 76 No 2, pp 180-99.

Liotta P. and James M. *The Real Population Bomb: Megacities, Global Security & the Map of the Future*, Potomac Books Inc., 2012.

Liversidge, P. & P. Mackenzie. (2004) "RSM Suleman Ahmed, 3rd Battalion King's African Rifles." *Journal of the Orders and Medals Research Society*. Vol 43, No 2 (263), June 2004,

Mack R. and Snyder R. "The analysis of social conflict: towards an overview and synthesis," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1957, 1:

Meredith Preston McGhie and E. Njoki Wamai, *Beyond the numbers: Women's Participation in the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD)*, 2011

Moser C. and Clark F., *Victims, perpetrators, or actors? Gender, armed violence and political violence*. New York: St Martin Press, 2001.

Moyse-Bartlett, H. (1956) *The King's African Rifles. A study in the military history of East and Central Africa, 1890-1945*. Gale & Polden Ltd, Aldershot

Muthoni Wanyeki, "Lessons from Kenya: Women and the Post-Election Violence." *Feminist Africa 10*, Militarism, Conflict and Women's Activism African Gender Institute, University of Cape Town, South Africa, 2008

Petersen, R. *Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001

Sarah Jenkins, "Ethnicity, violence, and the immigrant-guest metaphor in Kenya." *African affairs*, 111/445, 5766596 doi: 10.1093/afraf/ads051 oxford university press, 2012

Schwartz Barcotte, "Youth culture, NGO involvement and collective violence in Kibera, Nairobi's East Africa's largest slum." *Unpublished Honours Thesis*, University of North Carolina, 2001.

T. Parsons, "Kibera is our Blood." "The Sudanese Military Legacy in Nairobi's Kibera Location." *In the International journal of African Historical Studies* vol. 30 no. 1 (1997) and Schwartz Barcotte, "Youth culture, NGO involvement and collective violence in Kibera, Nairobi's East Africa's largest slum." *Unpublished Honours Thesis*, University of North Carolina, 2001.

Thomas Obel Hansen, *Political Violence in Kenya: A Study of causes, responses and a framework for discussing preventive action* ISS paper 205, 2009

UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 2006: Excluded and Invisible*, New York, 2006,

United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989

Xabier Agirre Aranburu *Sexual Violence beyond Reasonable Doubt: Using Pattern Evidence and Analysis for International Cases*. *Law & Social Inquiry Journal of the American Bar Foundation* Volume 35, Issue 4, 855-879, Fall 2010

Reports: Governments, NGOs and other organisations

A Suich, *beyond tribalism: Kenya's violence is not just about ethnicity. Age and poverty are factors too*, *Newsweek*, 3 January 2008, <http://www.newsweek.com/id/84257>, accessed 20 May 2009.

Cemiride, *Covert racism*. Report by the Centre for Minority Rights Development, Nairobi. **2002**

Divide and Rule, State-Sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya, Human Rights Watch, November 1993

http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/FinalReport_consolidated.pdf

http://www.khrc.or.ke/documents/violating_the_vote.pdf

Kenya Human Rights Commission (2008): *Violating the Vote. A Report on the 2007 General Elections*. Final Report, September 15, 2008.

Memorandum of *the Kibera Committee* to PM Harold Macmillan, 3/1/1963.

Nairobi Women's Hospital, *The Gender Violence Recovery Centre Interim report for post election violence*, 2008

Report of the Independent Review Commission on the General Elections held in Kenya on 27 December 2007 ("Kriegler-Commission").

The report of the National Council of Churches, *The Cursed Arrow: Organized Violence Against Democracy in Kenya*, April 1992

The Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee to investigate Ethnic Clashes in Western and Other Parts of Kenya, September 1992

The Report on Kibera by the Senior Health Inspector, 1956.

Internet downloads and websites

[www.creawkenya.org/pdf/2009/women paid the price 2.pdf](http://www.creawkenya.org/pdf/2009/women%20paid%20the%20price%20.pdf) accessed on 10/05/2013

http://haibafoundation.org/ni/the_land_question.html

URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3874340> Accessed: 11/05/2010 10:01.

URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40210203> .Accessed: 17/06/2013 13:59

Daily Nation Newspapers

-Why Kivuitu must be held accountable for poll chaosødated 05 January 2008.

-I accuse the Press for igniting post election violence: fact or scapegoat?ødated 29th February 2008

-GSU officer uses reason instead of button to disperse riotersødated 3rd July, 2008.

-Polling agent shot dead as two injuredødated 28th December, 2008.

Media Library

Kenyaø Darkest Hour, a video series by Nation Media Group and Kenya History and Biographies Company Limited Production. An NTV video library footage presented by Hilary Ngweno.

Unpublished works

Pascaline Dupasy and Jonathan Robinsonz , Coping with Political Instability: Abstract Micro Evidence from Kenyaø 2007 Election Crisis June 25, 2009

Date of interview í

Period as Kibera resident í .

Location/division (administrative unit) í í í í í í í í í í í í í í í í í í .

Please answer the following questions by ticking or writing the correct answer where applicable

SECTION A

Q1 (a) Where you in Nairobi during the 2007/2008 post-election violence? Yes No

Q1 (b) If yes, where were you residing at that time? í í í í í í í í í í í í í í í í

Q2 (a) where you affected in anyway by the 2007/2008 post-election violence Yes No

Q2 (b) if yes how where you affected?

- Lost children
- Lost relatives
- Lost friends
- Displaced
- Relocated
- Lost property
- Others(pleasespecify) í ..
í ..
í ..

Q3 (a) was the entire community of Kibera affected by the 2007/2008 post-election violence

- Yes No

Q3 (b) if yes, how was it affected

- Many people died
- Loss of livelihood
- Lack of social amenities
- Insecurity

APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Personal details

Year of birth

Place of birth

Tribe

Resident kibera village

Level of education

Occupation

Religious affiliation

Contact address/mobile telephone number

ISSUES OF DISCUSSION

1. How kibera villages are affiliated to ethnic background
2. Representation of different ethnic groups in Kibera slum
3. Characteristics of 2007/2008 political violence in Kibera slum
4. Ethnic divisions and enmity during the 2007/2008 political violence
5. The experiences of the girl child in the 2007/2008 political violence
6. The aftermath of the 2007/2008 political violence in Kibera
7. The impact of the girl child in the 2007/2008 political violence in Kibera slum
8. Alternatives available for survival of the girl child the during the violence.