PRINT MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE KENYA DEFENCE FORCES’
OPERATION ‘LINDA NCHI’ IN SOMALIA:
A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF NATION AND THE STANDARD NEWSPAPERS

BY

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2015
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this is my original work and that it has not been presented at any other University for award of degree therefore, no part of this document should be reproduced or copied without the permission from the author or the university.

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APPROVAL

This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the supervisor.

............................................................................................................
SIGNATURE                                       DATE:

SUPERVISOR: DR. SAMUEL SIRINGI
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Finally, my appreciation goes to my colleague Amos Kibet of the 2011/12 class at School of Journalism and mass communication for his advice throughout the period of study.

May God richly bless you all.
DEDICATION

I dedicate this project to my beloved wife, Mary, daughter, Amy, and my extended family for their entire support during my studies.
ABSTRACT

War coverage has since time immemorial been a challenge due to its complexity. From previous wars, reporting has been a challenge in the sense that the media rely a lot on news given out by the combat forces. In the Kenyan case, the Kenya Defence Force was engaging in a maiden international war. Similarly, the Kenyan media were engaging in the first international war coverage. The principal objective of this study was to determine the manner and extent to which print media covered the Kenya Defence Forces incursion on Somalia, otherwise dubbed Operation ‘Linda Nchi’. The study will also seek to establish who or what the sources of news were during the operation. The study also sought to find out techniques used by the media and also to find out if the media made the audience believe in the conduct of Operation ‘Linda Nchi’ in Somalia. The following theories were used: the theory of agenda setting, gatekeeping theory and the propaganda theory. Content analysis research methodology was used. The study was confined to a content analysis of two leading newspapers in Kenya, the Daily Nation and The Standard. The key findings of this study were that the media relied a lot on news from Government agencies instead of residents and eyewitnesses accounts of the combat in Somalia. The study recommends the need for media houses to train and deploy independent journalists for the sole purpose of gathering news independent of the official Government sources. This is so because, if they rely on Government agencies for news, then it will be in the whims of these agencies to release any news and to have reporting done the way they (agencies) want it done. It was also found that most news were done and reported from Kenya. Very little reporting was done from Somalia which raised the issues of credibility of the news presented to the public. The media were embedded in the troops and so opted to remain in the tactical centres rather than venturing out in the live combat areas. The study thus recommends the need to get facts from the ground of the operation. Further, the study recommends that much needs to be done in terms of training and equipping journalists to beef up war reporting in Kenya bearing in mind that the Kenyan media was exercising a maiden responsibility since the Kenyan troops had never gone to war with another nation before.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>American Broadcasting Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>Columbia Broadcasting System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>Cable News Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoK</td>
<td>Constitution of Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPJ</td>
<td>Coalition to Protect Journalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEFSHE</td>
<td>Defence Forces School of Higher Learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNA</td>
<td>Daily Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSC</td>
<td>Defence Staff College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBU</td>
<td>European Broadcasting Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Electronic Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPS</td>
<td>Inter Press Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPSTC</td>
<td>International Peace Support and Training Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDF</td>
<td>Kenya Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMG</td>
<td>Nation Media Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>National Broadcasting Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPS</td>
<td>Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Standard Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STD</td>
<td>Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## DEFINITION OF TERMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alshabaab</td>
<td>Is a militant group in Somalia that practices radical Sunni Islam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embedded Journalist</td>
<td>Journalist accompanying fighting troops. He/she is facilitated administratively by the troops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gate keeping</td>
<td>Ensuring the appropriate information reaches the public and the unnecessary or sensitive information is churned out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incursion</td>
<td>An invasion into another country just as KDF did in Somalia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linda Nchi</td>
<td>Kiswahili words meaning ‘secure the nation’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutralise</td>
<td>Render ineffective by applying an opposite force or effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation</td>
<td>Concerted action involving armed forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paradigm</td>
<td>It is a way of viewing something or a point of view</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Print Media</td>
<td>Refers to newspapers and magazines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propaganda</td>
<td>Information, especially of a biased or misleading nature, used to promote a political cause or point of view.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehat</td>
<td>Joint forces in an operation such as KDF rehated into Amisom on 16th October 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>It is a subset of a population representing the entire group.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.0 Overview
This chapter gives the introduction to and background of the study, study area, problem statement and research objectives, both the main and specific objectives. The chapter further dwells on the research questions, rationale, justification and the scope and limitation of the study.

1.1 Study Background

1.1.1 World View on Media and War Coverage
Research literature has amply established that mass media play a major role in the starting, continuation and termination of any war (UNESCO, 1978). This is why we have to continually assess the performance of the mass media in reporting wars and other crises. Such assessments become even more important when the media are handling a war taking place in a foreign country and in which their home governments are directly or indirectly involved or interested (Nwosu, 1987). In such situations, as Paraschos and Rutherford (1985) rightly pointed out, the mass media are often accused of presenting a biased and inaccurate picture of a war, costly to civilians and combatants alike.

1.1.2 The Angola Civil War Coverage
The media in African countries seem to be the guiltiest of the charge of inadequate interpretation; they tended to depend mainly on the stories from the wire services and failed to supply necessary backgrounds, for instance sending correspondents to Angola (Nwosu, 1987). Nwuneli and Dare (1977) studied the coverage of the Angolan crisis by five influential Nigerian newspapers and found most of the above charges to be true. They found support for their hypotheses, that these newspapers would be overly dependent on international news services for news on the crisis, that they would devote less space for the interpretation of news about the war and that most of the war would receive little attention in the front pages of the newspapers. Harsch and Thomas (1977) in their book-length study of the Angolan war reported that there was an unholy marriage between the American press and their government’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) – a situation that can bring about pro-government reporting. A research done on how six USA and British newspapers sourced their news while reporting the Angola Civil War
indicated that the New York Times’ the Guardian, used as much as 90.3% of its total news space or 65.4% of its total number of items for stories supplied to it by foreign or special correspondents. Only 0.8% of its total number of items was local by line stories, 7.2% were wire service stories and 1.7% was from unidentified sources (Nwosu, 1987).

Nwosu (1987) underscores the fact that, the findings as stated lie in the fact that they seem to run counter to the suggestion of some critics that the Western mass media tend to be overly dependent on the wire services in their coverage of Third World or African news events. In fact, some of the critics would blame this alleged dependence on wire services as the major cause of the shallow or uninterpreted treatment which stories from Africa and other parts of the Third World receive in the Western mass media (Ayanru, 1978).

The study seems to show that the reason for this uninterpreted or shallow reportage may lie elsewhere, not on the dependence or non-dependence on wire services. The data generated in the study also suggests that even when most of the newspapers depend more on their own correspondents than on the wire services, the stories still remain largely uninterpreted (Nwosu, 1987).

1.1.3 Operation ‘Linda Nchi’

An operation dubbed Operation ‘Linda Nchi’ in Somalia started on 16th October 2011 and went on until early June 2012 when the Kenyan forces rehated to Amisom. The African Union formally took over command of the operation from the Kenyan forces. An overall command was established and the various troops deployed in Somalia assigned various operation sectors to advance on. The KDF troops were assigned the central and southern sectors of Somalia where the objective was to capture Port South Kismayu which was the main base where the Alshabaab operatives launched their operations from due to its strategic location at the Somalia coastline (Ombati, 2011). There was need to provide information to Kenyans on the progress of the operation in Somalia. This is because, Kenyans wanted to know if their sons and daughters were safe in Somalia- a war torn nation.

1.2 Problem Statement

The issue of print media coverage of war scenarios has been contentious dating back to the first and second world, the cold as well as the Vietnam wars. The coverage of these wars raised more
questions than answers. The ways and extent to which these wars were covered have remained issues of critical concern. In Africa, several media houses have covered a number of conflicts in a manner that raises doubts with regard to their coverage.

In Kenya, the KDF had never engaged in war prior to Operation ‘Linda Nchi’ in 2011. As a result, Kenyan journalists too were getting first-hand experience in covering the war in Somalia. The study is therefore important to find out how the key print newspapers, the *Nation* and *standard*, covered the operation in Somalia.

1.3 Research Objectives

The objectives of this study were:

1.3.1 General Objective

The principal objective of this study was to determine the manner and extent to which print media covered Operation ‘Linda Nchi’ in Somalia.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

i. To establish the sources of news during the operation in Somalia.

ii. To find out the placement of stories published by print media in Somalia.

iii. To find out if the media made the audience believe (or not believe) in the Government justification of the Operation ‘Linda Nchi’ in Somalia.

1.4 Research Questions

The research questions for this study were as follows:

i. What were the sources of news for the two media houses during the KDF operation ‘Linda Nchi’?

ii. What significance did the two newspapers accord the covering of the Operation ‘Linda Nchi’ in Somalia?

iii. How did the media attempt to convince the audience towards believing in the Government justification of the Operation ‘Linda Nchi’?
1.5 Rationale of the Study

The Kenyan media undertook a maiden role of reporting war involving the national defence force and the Alshabaab. Being their first such assignment, challenges were insurmountable including the propensity to have relied on official sources of news to inform the public on Operation ‘Linda Nchi’. The study attempts to inform how the Kenyan media to be specific and in this maiden task covered the war in Somalia. This research will also help me graduate with a Master degree in communication studies.

1.6 Justification of the Study

The findings of this research will be used as a basis for future research since it endeavoured to fill the knowledge gap brought out in the problem statement. It will also be used by policy makers such as the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Information and Communication in making guidelines for change in media institutions and others that shape public opinion with regard to news gathering and reporting. The research will be important to the KDF with regard to developing austerity measures that will endeavour to provide information sought by the media for the interest of the Kenyan citizens.

To the general public, the research will give them an insight towards the nature of the news reporting and gathering with regard to how it was done in Somalia. The research will also aid media players in formulating policies to guide regulation of reporting during war times.

1.7 Scope and Limitations

The scope of this study was limited to the Nation and Standard newspapers and their coverage of operation ‘Linda Nchi’. The study focused on the first three months of the Operation ‘Linda Nchi’. It did not focus on the last three months due to time and resource constraints.

The three months spanned between 1st October 2011 and 31st December 2011. The newspapers were chosen purposively based on which newspaper had intense media reporting and activity that warranted and reflected constant coverage of Operation ‘Linda Nchi’. Relevant stories were picked from the newspapers. Selected stories contained information that touched on Operation
‘Linda Nchi’ which started on 16th October 2011 to 17th June 2012. In depth analysis was done to identify news items with information on the operation in Somalia.

1.8 Justification for Selection of Newspapers

The Nation and the Standard have an advantageous position in the African market in that they form part of the largest media houses in Central and Eastern Africa, the Nation Media Group (NMG) and the Standard Group (SG) respectively. NMG and SG not only run newspapers, but also TV stations, mobile platforms, websites and radio. The two are the oldest newspapers in Kenya. According to the quarterly audience research done by Ipsos Synovate, the Nation newspaper is leading in terms of reach and share of audience readership followed by the STD newspaper.

![Market share of various newspapers in Kenya](image)

**Figure 1.1: Market share of various newspapers in Kenya**

*Source: Ipsos Synovate*
1.9 Conclusion

This chapter sought to develop the road plan for the study. The chapter constitutes: Study Background, Problem Statement, Research Objectives, Research Questions, and Rationale of the study, Scope and Limitations and Justification for Selection of Newspapers.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

This chapter reviews the literature that is relevant to the research by looking at what other authors have written that could add more insight into the topic under study. The study will seek to use literature on the military and media, media and agenda setting, military and gate keeping, theoretical framework and conceptual framework. This will be done by making reference to theories already in existence.

2.1 Military and Media

A US Army General described the relationship between the military and the media as akin to a marriage whose honeymoon is long since over and the couple has seen the best and worst of each other. He further remarked that the two cannot divorce or even think of asking for a permanent separation, they are forever linked and stay together for the sake of the children who are the audience. There is friction in any relationship, and this characterises the military-media relationship. The US General further says that some friction is healthy and good, but as it is usually known, too much of it leads to a sour relationship (Boylan, 2011).

The US General continues to argue that the military expects the media to be accurate and to characterize the events covered in the proper context. In turn, the military provides access and timely information. This is because; the first media organization to report on the events drives recognition and dollars. The media must recognize that the earlier information about complex and dynamic events is released, the more likely the information will have errors. He however retorts that the media does not make errors on purpose, but due to the dynamics of combat or a crisis, errors will occur when information is provided before all the facts are in. He further states that military has to do the best it can, and the media must be aware that truth changes as events become clearer. He advises that, for the military and the media to succeed in their overtures, the military must rely on trust and relationships between its spokespersons and reporters. Reporters have to understand that the military is putting out the best information it has at that time (Boylan, 2011).
Boylan further exemplifies how the media and military information interplay came out in the reporting of the 2nd May 2011 killing of Osama Bin Laden, the Al-Qaida terrorist group leader. This served as an example of the changing face of military news. Initial reports came out hours after the operation, followed by more and often conflicting information. Multiple briefers delivered the information, using their own filters, and as the information matured, more clarity emerged that changed the original narrative (Boylan, 2011).

In the same vein, Porch (2002) describes how many within the military ranks, from privates to senior leaders, desire to control the media. However, he remarks that this desire encourages a strained relationship between media and the military. He says that it is public knowledge that from history, the relationship has always been rocky and has nothing to do with control, or as the media may call it, censorship. He says that the basic explanation is that the natures and goals of the two institutions are fundamentally in tension. For its part, the military, like most world bureaucracies, prefers to do its business behind closed doors all the more so because the nature of its business is so often shocking to the sensitivities of the public, on whose support it must rely. Therefore, the military inherently sees the media as a subversive, rather than a positive, social entity. He notes that the press, however, responds to the requirement of democracy which is to expose the actions of the government — including, especially, the military — to public scrutiny.

Mbugua (2013) notes that the media, often dubbed the fourth estate in the global power dynamics, exerts significant influence in peace support operations. He says that the media has been described as a double edged sword that can promote the course of peace or fuel conflict. Media also influences people and shapes the perception of the world they live in. Mbugua appreciates the fact that the study of mass media activities in conflict situations is of great importance given that the success of any mission is highly dependent on media support and consequently public acceptance and support of such missions.

It is evident from the above scholars’ arguments that, the relationship between the military and the media has never been that cosy. They have never really got to a point where either of them fully trusts the activities of the other. The media suspects that the military is at all times ready to conceal some information from them. On the other hand, the military also suspects that the
media will distort and sensationalise news and even at some point unknowingly give adversaries information regarding the secrets of the nation which are to be highly safeguarded at all times (Boylan, 2011).

The relationship between the media and the military has changed over time. At times, the media have either championed acts of war as happened in the Spanish-American war or opposed it like during the Vietnam War. It has always been a complex and contentious relationship, with the two institutions eyeing one another with some distrust and occasional disdain that was worsened by the very sour experience of the Vietnam conflict and its coverage. The relationship has arguably become even worse since the end of the Cold War (Snow, 1943).

However, media has relied on military and government as their source of information. A September 2013 study from Pew Research found that in the wake of the chemical weapons attack in Ghouta in August, the coverage of the Syrian war debate on cable news networks from supposedly different viewpoints was almost identical. The study found that Al Jazeera America, CNN, and BBC America all framed their reports in substantially similar ways and relied on substantially similar sources, including by far their most common three sources: the White House, Congress, and the military (Corbett, 2013).

Some journalists do not even get to the ground to gather stories and verify for themselves events as they unfold. They rely on unofficial reports from untrained people ending up misreporting events. Corbett (2013) cites a case in the early days of the Syrian conflict. Western media outlets including CNN relied on dubious activist Danny Dayem, known as “Syria Danny,” for coverage on the ground in the war-torn country. However, after Syria Danny was exposed staging his reports, Anderson Cooper, an American TV personality and a Journalist invited him on his programme, not to explain why he was staging fictitious reports, but how the evidence of that fakery made its way onto the internet.

Ayeni (2012) acknowledges the fact that the media relied on military sources while reporting on the Iraq war which former US President George W. Bush declared victory in May 2003. He remarks that, media relied heavily on the military for access to the battle front. He further advances his argument that, when the mass media are involved in the coverage of hostilities
between their state and another, reliance on the military, and domestic elite sources within the government, become almost inevitable.

Ayeni (2012) further illustrates the idea of reliance on military sources for information by saying that, many reporters need the military protection to be able to reach the hotspots on the battleground. When one looks at the bits and pieces of information that the reporters send in from the frontlines, the analysis by selected experts, and a high dosage of Pentagon briefings, whatever is served the audience becomes a blurry representation. He quotes Donald Rumsfeld, a former US Defence Secretary who referred to the stories out of Iraq as “slices” of news, suggesting that there are bound to be ambiguities and hidden news elements.

McClellan (2003) with regard to the Iraq war says journalists should take every bit of information they have from embeds, and treats it as a tiny slice of the battlefield. They should compare it to what they are getting from the military briefings, Al Jazeera, Iraq Television, and every other conceivable source and weigh each piece depending on the source, and talk to their analysts. Then, they should drop it all in a big bag, shake it up, and hope that what they come up with is some sort of clarity. This basically shows how the journalists grapple with the dilemma of sourcing for reliable and self-ascertained information. It proves to be a mirage and so the alternative is to rely on the military and other sources as well.

### 2.1.1 Los Angeles Times Poll on News sources

A Los Angeles Times poll of 2012 on Iraq War reporting, CNN, NBC, ABC, FOX and CBS television networks showed how the media relied on military sources for information and official sources. In the 17-month study, over 600 sources were identified from the 3597 total newscasts for the selected five networks. This did not include live feeds from embedded journalists who were stationed in the battlefront. Of NBC’s 176 myriad of sources a total of 39 items or 22.15% coverage came from official sources while military sources, including retired and active duty military personnel contributed to 29 items or 15.9%. Expert sources were 15.6% and all other sources including civilian sources, families of military personnel totalled 23.4%.

The sources used by CNN were mainly military personnel, accounting for about 27% of the sources while official sources provided 21% of the news material, and others like commentators, civilians from across the world, provided a hefty 42%. This may be due to the worldwide
recognition of CNN and its ability to attract commentaries from people from far and near who may not necessarily be directly involved with the hostilities. FOX relied heavily on official sources and has been criticized for being overtly biased in its war coverage in Iraq. Almost 58% of the sources used were from the United States government either working for the Pentagon, the White House, or State Department.

For the CBS, official and military sources of news were used almost 30% of the time apiece while other sources accounted for 31.3%. Expert sources were used 12% of the time. At ABC which had less than the other networks in terms of coverage of the war, 63% of the news was from official sources while military and other sources that were used accounted for 23% and 20% respectively. Overall, of the more than 600 sources categorized, official sources accounted for 33% of the news while military sources accounted for 26% of the news stories (Ayeni, 2012).

It has been argued that the media often take sides of the institutionalized sources when it comes to issue of covering conflicts. This is because the media rely on the convenience provided by traditional sources of official informants. Invariably, those who are likely to provide alternative definitions through their critical views will not just have minimal access but may also be attacked if their commentaries are considered as unpatriotic (Wolfsfeld, Avraham and Aburiya, 2000).

Ayeni (2012) concludes that the striking fact from the categories of sources was that military sources, which are most certainly another version of the dominant view of the government in uniform, dominated the source of our Iraq war news. Accordingly, Ayeni (2012) goes on, it could be argued that based on the skewed reliance of the media on official and military sources most of the time, bias must have set in to compromise the truth and objectivity and credibility of the journalism profession.

Bias is defined as a perceived attribute of a news source whereby the individual news source, or the group the news source represents, has a clear vested interest in a cause or action relative to maintaining or changing the status quo (Rouner, Slater and Buddenbaum, 1999). Whoever the source may be, reporters can easily hazard a guess of the ideological, political or economic interests of the source. The results here have shown a discrepancy between the acclaimed
journalistic value of presenting balanced and exhaustive views of issues and the actual process of news gathering and dissemination (Ayeni, 2012).

2.2 Media and Propaganda

Harold Lasswell, the main proponent of the propaganda theory defined propaganda in 1927 as a technique of influencing human action by manipulation of representations which may be spoken, written, pictorial and musical. Since propaganda mainly reaches people through press platforms, the study’s focus on a section of Kenya’s print media – the Daily Nation and Standard newspapers – is appropriate and may offer a foundation for understanding the potent effect that the media have over public opinion on various issues.

To conduct propaganda, there must be some barrier between the public and the event (Lippmann, 1922). The media has the ability to manipulate events or present limited information to the public. This information may not match public perception of the event. The Standard and Nation newspapers could have acted as a barricade between Kenyans and the KDF operation in Somalia. Due to distance and the nature of war, it was not possible for Kenyans to get to know by themselves what transpired in Somalia and so they relied on the media information.

Lippmann further suggested that average people cannot govern themselves and thus there is need for powerful media to govern them. This undue media influence may have shaped the public perception of the operation in Somalia that it was for the common good of the Kenyan people regardless of political affiliation, tribe or origin and religion.

According to Lasswell, for propaganda to be successful, symbols must be created and people must be gradually taught to associate specific emotions such as love or hate with them. It may be argued that the Standard and Daily Nation could have played an instrumental role in shaping meanings and experiences that the public associated with the KDF operation against Alshaabab.

2.3 Military and Gate Keeping

General Maurice Baril a Canadian General once said “There is a great deal of difference between not releasing information and telling the truth. We’re telling the truth; we are just not releasing some information” (Williams, 2002). Military control of information during war is also a major
contributing factor to propaganda, especially when the media go along with it without question. The military recognizes the values of media and information control very well. The military often manipulates the mainstream media, by restricting or managing what information is presented and hence what the public is told. For them it is paramount to control the media. This can involve all manner of activities, from organizing media sessions and daily press briefings, or through providing managed access to war zones, to even planting stories. This has happened throughout the 20th century. Over time then, the way that the media covers conflicts degrades in quality, critique and objectiveness (Shah, 2005).

What the military is wary of is the use of ill-informed sources and misinformation. This is far more dangerous for the military-media relationship than is clear, accurate, in-context, and properly characterized reporting. However, this is where the media can help themselves. The media are fragmented, competitive, frequently ignorant of the military, and they constantly vacillate between the demands of the market and those of journalistic ethics (Boylan, 2011).

Current military doctrine espouses information superiority as the solution to the numerous dilemmas posed by new media. The US military believes that for it to succeed in its operations, it is necessary for its forces to gain and maintain information superiority. In USA Department of Defence (DOD) policy, information superiority is described as the operational advantage gained by the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006).

Snow (1943) argues that there have been two major concerns about the relationship of the media to national security matters. The first has to do with what is reported, a concern that centres especially but not exclusively on combat operations. The positions are diametrically opposed. From the vantage point of the press, coverage should be as complete and unfettered as possible. They should be allowed to report what they observe. The media’s underlying value is the public’s right to know what its government’s representatives (in this case its military) are doing. This viewpoint creates two problems for the military; first, whether unfettered coverage will provide too much information, including material that, in the hands of the enemy, could compromise the integrity of military operations and even put soldiers at additional risk.
Reporting the locations and outcomes of battles and the directions of troop or other movements are examples of how reportage could aid or jeopardize our own forces. The other concern is that reportage, particularly of less than successful military actions, can have a negative impact on public morale and giving solace to the enemy.

The solution to this dilemma historically has been military censorship. Reporters at the front could get their stories to their media outlets only by using military means of communications, thereby allowing the military to inspect outgoing material and remove anything it viewed as objectionable. The reporter had to believe the censor was acting out of legitimate security concerns and not trying to hide evidence of military ineptitude (Snow, 1943).

The interaction between the media and the military in Vietnam transformed the relationship to one of nearly total animosity. Early in the war, the relationship was tranquil because reportage was passive: the military would tell the press its version of what happened in the fighting, and the press would dutifully report that information. The picture painted was uniformly positive and suggested not only that progress toward winning the war was occurring but that victory was imminent. Tranquillity was destroyed when the enemy launched an exhaustive attack on them and this made the media dismayed at the magnitude of the attack casting a doubt that if the big numbers of enemy casualties presented were anything to go by, the enemy could have not managed such an attack. The conclusion was that, the military had lied about enemy casualties and that the media had been duped to report the inflated figures. As a result the media lost trust in the military as the military complained of the media not reporting its successes (Snow, 1943).

2.4 Media and Agenda Setting

2.4.1 The Vietnam War coverage

Sara (2007) with regard to the Vietnam War posits that, reporters and photographers went through a big change in the War period and changed the style of reporting for future journalists. They went from reporting directly of press releases and forming happy, enthusiastic stories to investigative reporting and writing cold, hard truthful stories. The stories coming from Vietnam and the photos coming from the frontline did more than sway public opinion, they helped end the war.
The media began to report the true awfulness of war and the politics behind it to the American public. Because of the effort to reveal the truth from correspondents, many Americans began to doubt the government and the war. The media and the American people alike began losing hope in the government and war. The credibility of the American government suffered its biggest loss when the Pentagon Papers information was leaked to the public. The Pentagon Papers were published in the New York Times and later the Washington Post as well as other newspapers. The Pentagon Papers, revealed by journalists, contained numbers from the war that included far higher rates of American casualties and far less successful battles than the officially released government statistics had indicated. These documents were top-secret historical studies, contracted by the Pentagon, about the war, that showed how the government was misleading the US public in all stages of the war (LaborLawTalk, 2005).

The media would not just accept press releases from the government, now they began more investigative journalism to check for the truth behind the official reports (Sara, 2007). Whatever the grounds behind the official reason for withdrawal from Vietnam, the media and photos from the war undoubtedly had an effect on the American public. Whether or not the American public eventual overwhelming opposition to the war was part of the reason for withdrawal can be argued (Sara, 2007).

2.4.2 How Photos ended the Vietnam War

According to Lester (2005), photos were a major contributing factor towards the end of the Vietnam War. When the military tried to hide the reality of war in Vietnam, the media brought the explicit news as it were in Vietnam. The Pentagon was insisting on success, but on the contrary, more troops were being killed in combat. These photos changed the opinion of Americans and support for the war was changed too. Many photos that were taken during the Vietnam War not only shocked the public, but were partly responsible for helping to shift American’s public opinion against the war.

The photos from the war also prove the incredible power of photography and how it can reveal the brutal side of a war (Digital, 2005). As Now You See It, Now You Don’t author Michael Tennant (2005) said, “Pictures, whether still or moving, have shaped our opinions of the wisdom of both going to war and remaining at war”. The famous photo of a Viet Cong soldier being
executed on 1 February 1968 by General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, a South Vietnamese National Police Chief, became one of the most recognizable photos of that time. Loan shot the suspect in the head on a public street in front of journalists. The photo sparked additional protest against America’s involvement in the war (Lester, 2005). The execution provided another image that helped sway public opinion in the United States against the war (Lester, 2005). At 1/500\textsuperscript{th} of a second, Eddie Adams captured the moment of swift judgment by Loan and the brutal execution of the prisoner (Lester, 2005). The suspect was thought to have killed Loan’s best friend, a police major, and the major’s wife and six children (Lester, 2005).

Another famous photo from the Vietnam War was the picture from Kent State University in Ohio. For many people, this brought the war home, literally. The National Guard had been called to the campus to quiet some demonstrations that were being held against military involvement in Vietnam and Cambodia in 1970. The photo captured Mary Vecchio kneeling over the bloodied body of Jeffery Miller (Lester, 2005). Americans realized that not only was killing going on in Vietnam, now it was happening on their home soil. Many people thought the photo by college student John Filo using a borrowed camera (Lester, 2005) was the last straw. The photo, which was spread over newspaper front pages all over America showed the public that if Americans started killing Americans over this war on homeland no less, maybe there was something wrong with the war after all (Cossa, 2005).

Yet another famous photo from Vietnam is of a nine-year-old girl, running naked and screaming in pain after a napalm attack on her village burned her (ESCRC, 2005). Another photo that helped shift public opinion was of a Buddhist monk calmly burning himself to death in protest of the US-backed South Vietnamese government. These photos startled the American public and helped change their minds about the war. It revealed the truth of what was happening in Vietnam and they did not like what they saw.

Admiral Grant Sharp believed that the coverage of the Tet Offensive (a direct combat between the American forces and the Iraq forces) convinced the American public and the government that the war was being lost and the only option was to withdraw from Vietnam. Many Americans believe the war was fought through photos and horrifying stories which eventually led to the US withdrawal. Whatever the backing for the decision, on 15 January 1973, citing progress in peace negotiations, President Nixon announced the suspension of offensive action in North Vietnam.
which was later followed by a withdrawal of troops from Vietnam. The Paris Peace Accords were later signed on 27 January 1973 officially ending US involvement in the Vietnam conflict (ESCRC, 2005).

2.4.3 The Iraq War Coverage

The war on Iraq, however swift in its short three week period, was accompanied by propaganda from many angles. From the ridiculous claims of the Iraqi information minister that the Americans will surrender or perish, or that they were nowhere near Baghdad (while coalition tanks could be heard just a mile from where he said that!) to the subtle propaganda of Coalition nations’ media, that at times minimized the civilian casualties, highlighted the awesome military force of the coalition, minimized geopolitical discussion and context, and often jumped at unconfirmed reports as confirmed news (Shah, 2007).

It is well known and an accepted part of war that Iraq had attempted to control media reports, monitor foreign journalists, and even expel them (including CNN and even Al Jazeera for a while). Occasionally reporters point out the same thing on the other side, with coalition forces. ‘Embedded’ reporters travelling with Coalition forces sometimes highlighted on television reports that they were under strict control and unable to say some things as well. This control is understandable and even desirable aspect from a military perspective. In the past, for example, in Vietnam, the press was not looked on favourably. In the Gulf War between 1990 and 1991 and Kosovo conflict of between 1998 and 1999 for example, the media was managed using pools that could be fed official information from press briefings and a media version of a tour guide to managed areas of the conflict (Shah, 2007).

The idea of embedding reporters and managing them in this way comes from the public relations industry: Embedding reporters within US and British combat units is a ‘brilliant strategy’ because ‘it’s all about relationships’, Katie Delahaye Paine (2007) wrote a story in ‘The Measurement Standard’, a public relations industry publication. ‘The better the relationship any of us have with a journalist, the better the chance of that journalist picking up and reporting our messages,’ Paine, the founder of The Delahaye Group, pointed out. A relatively quick war against an overwhelmed and outmatched foe – sanitized of civilian casualties – has been a tonic for a Pentagon hungry for good publicity. From day one, live transmissions of grainy pictures
from embedded reporters surrounded by a phalanx of tanks or armoured vehicles hunkered down in swirling sandstorms, helped define the war for an information-hungry and voyeuristic American public. Embedding reporters is the brainchild of Victoria ‘Torie’ Clarke, the Assistant Secretary of Defence for Public Affairs. Clarke brings considerable public relations experience to the task of winning the spin war (Shah, 2007).

Berkowitz (2003) noted thus: Our people in the field need to tell our story. Only commanders can ensure the media get to the story alongside the troops. We must organize for and facilitate access of national and international media to our forces, including those forces engaged in ground operations…. To accomplish this, we will embed media with our units. These embedded media will live, work and travel as part of the units... to facilitate maximum, in-depth coverage.

Independent journalists have often been looked at with suspicion, for they cannot be guided and controlled as much as ‘embedded’ journalists. For example, four independent journalists (two from Israel and two from Portugal) were beaten by American troops and expelled from reporting on the Iraq war. Embedded journalists have not suffered from the same problems, as military spokesmen on television reveal. Other journalists have been fired for airing dissenting views, or in the case of a well-known American NBC reporter, Peter Arnett, for simply being interviewed by an Iraqi television station (Shah, 2007).

The Guardian newspaper reported that the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) head of news, Tony Naets, said that the British and US forces had created a caste system with embedded journalists – usually from countries in the so-called coalition who can associate with the troops – and the truly unilateral broadcaster who is prevented from coming anywhere near the news. Jean Stock, the EBU Secretary General was also quoted, saying that US central command policy was actively restricting independent newsgathering from southern Iraq. Reporters and camera crews who put their lives at risk had been detained by American and British troops and returned to Kuwait (Shah, 2007).

The one clear thing is that most Iraqis do not trust the media. “Most of the news about Iraq is imperfect news; the numbers for US soldiers killed by the Resistance and also the Iraqis killed by road or car bombs, I see different numbers from channel to channel,” Safa Muayad, a 25 year-old student at Baghdad’s Islamic University told IPS (Conley and Rashid, 2006). There exists
palpable mistrust of the media among Iraqis as Joel Campagna a Middle East coordinator for the Coalition to Protect Journalists (CPJ) told IPS. He says that it was being reported from foreign and Iraqi correspondents that there exists hostility towards the media when it came to reporting on political violence. This hostility has increased particularly over years whereby one gets to hear stories from even journalists in their local communities operating under tremendous pressure (Conley and Rashid, 2006).

But locally and internationally, Iraqi journalists are inevitably essential to reporting Iraq. “The language factor and the knowledge of the place help the reporter to get material more than the Western one,” Bassam Sebti, an Iraqi who works for the Washington Post told IPS (Conley and Rashid, 2006). Some section of the media can be independent, supportive or against the government. Media can rally the populace towards a political ideology of war. Media influences the course of peace or fuels violence through its choice of topics to cover, the time allocated to the issues of the day (selectivity in approach and manipulation) and exclusive interpretation pattern. Media can create trust among ethnic groups and nations and can spread the spirit of tolerance especially after a peace agreement. It is often the first to arrive on the scene thereby setting the agenda and defining the terms and context within which the crisis is henceforth discussed (Mbugua, 2013).

Snow (1943) exemplifies how media set an agenda in the Vietnam War. He says that, the concern, especially in Vietnam where media was seen as the agenda setters, stimulated many US forces veterans (in the military during Vietnam War) who got convinced that adverse coverage of the war effort after the Tet offensive was decisive in forcing an unsuccessful termination of the American participation in the conflict. It is, of course, a matter of major disagreement whether the US could have prevailed in the Vietnam conflict under any circumstances, and the argument that the media helped force the American withdrawal- thus preventing victory- has obscured that argument for many critics.

2.4.4 The Kenyan Media Coverage of War

The Kenyan Government sent its troops to Somalia due to sustained attacks launched by the Alshabaab operatives in Kenya. McKenzie (2011) says the Kenya- Somalia incursion was necessitated by a series of attacks meted on among others foreigners visiting, staying or working
in Kenya. The first prominent incident was the kidnapping of two aid workers attached to Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) who were kidnapped by alleged Alshabaab operatives from Daadab Refugee Camp in northern Kenya. On 19th September 2011, CNN carried a story on the attack of foreign tourists, David and Judith Tebbutt, at the Kenyan coast in which it claimed that the Alshabaab was responsible for the killing of David and abducting Judith.

Another incident was when a French Citizen, Marie Dedieu was kidnapped at gun-point at her beach side home at Manda Island by suspected Alshabaab militia operatives. The story alleges that there was a shootout between Kenyan security officers and the kidnappers. The kidnappers disappeared into Somalia through the porous border between the two countries (Bocha and Agutu, 2011).

KDF crossed into Somalia on 16th October 2011 with the aim of pursuing Alshabaab into Somalia. The force also wanted to establish a buffer zone at the Kenya-Somalia border to enhance security against attacks by suspected Alshabaab members who often would disappear into Somalia after conducting terror on Kenyan soil. The incursion received approval by the Transition Federal Government (TFG), a caretaker Government in Somalia led by the now former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed (Odowa and Abtidood, 2011).

With the KDF incursion into Somalia, the Kenyan media journalists got embedded with the KDF and they crossed into Somalia on 18th October 2011 (McKenzie, 2011) This marked an all new way of news reporting since Kenya had never been involved in a war of such an international magnitude. There were bound to be changes in terms of news gathering, processing and eventual reporting. Thus it becomes necessary to analyse and take stock of the kind of news the journalists reported to Kenyans.

They also wanted to know if the objectives of the war were being achieved as outlined to them. The right to access of information is enshrined in the Kenyan constitution (Constitution of Kenya, 2010). Chapter Four, Part Two article 35 clause 3 stipulates that the state shall publish and publicize any important information affecting the nation. Similarly, article 34 clause 2a states that, the state shall not exercise control over or interfere with any person engaged in broadcasting, the production or circulation of any publication or dissemination of information by
any medium. This right to information demanded that the media had to go to Somalia and report
the progress of the war (Constitution of Kenya, 2010).

The constitution protects the media against any government interference thus, there is so little
that can be done but only to allow the media to inform the public regarding any events happening
that the public need to be informed about. The Constitution also provides for the safeguarding of
the national secrets for the sake of national security. This also culminates into asking questions
with regard to the extent to which we can reliably determine the reliability of the information that
was being divulged by the KDF to the media (CoK, 2010).

Oosthuizen (1996) defines gate keeping as the process through which some information passes a
series of checkpoints (gates) before being finally accepted as news material. Gate keepers
therefore are the people or groups within the news organization that ultimately decide what is
going to appear and how it is going to appear in the media. The primary effect of gate keeping
and also regulation is that it changes the media’s original message in some way. Oosthuizen
(1996) further posits that what readers read in the newspaper is thus seldom an accurate
reflection of reality.

2.5 Theoretical Framework

This study was informed by the gate keeping, agenda setting and propaganda theories.

2.5.1 Propaganda Theory

Wartime propaganda has been a major influence in many, if not all, of the major wars. One of
the first known uses of war propaganda was by Alexander the Great. After being forced to
retreat in battles, Alexander the Great realized that it would be a disadvantage to show he was
weak and had to retreat. He overcame this problem by using propaganda to intimidate the
opposing army. Alexander’s army made oversized armour and helmets and left them behind as
they retreated. His intent was that the opposing army would be intimidated and not pursue his
army because the oversized armour made Alexander’s army look like giants (Labash, 2001).

Lasswell gave four major objectives of propaganda which include mobilising hatred against the
enemy, preserving the friendship of others, procuring the co-operation of neutrals if possible, and
demoralising the enemy.
Edward Bernays – another propaganda theorist – examined public relations, propaganda, and public opinion. Bernays (1928) states that we are governed, our minds are moulded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of. Vast numbers of human beings must cooperate in this manner if they are to live together as a smoothly functioning society. He notes that sometimes the newspaper is a conscious propagandist in both news and headlines; sometimes propaganda is so obviously news, and so obviously a matter of importance to the its readers, that the paper presents it knowing that the readers themselves will recognize it for what it is and evaluate it for them.

### 2.5.2 Agenda Setting Theory

Agenda setting refers to the idea that there is a strong correlation between the emphasis that mass media place on certain issues (such as based on relative placement or amount of coverage) and the importance attributed to these issues by mass audiences (McCombs & Shaw, 1972).

Shaw and McCombs (1977) describe media’s role as the agenda setters as its ability to mentally order and organize our world for us. This study aims at helping to understand how agenda setting can be used by the media to hide inconsistencies in news presentation as the public are confined to a certain issue of discussion as already charted by the media. In other words, judgments and attitude formation are directly correlated with “the ease in which instances or associations could be brought to mind” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).

Priming occurs when news content suggests to news audiences that they ought to use specific issues as benchmarks for evaluating the performance of leaders and governments. It is often understood as an extension of agenda setting. There are two reasons for this: both effects are based on memory-based models of information processing. These models assume that people form attitudes based on the considerations that are most salient (that is, most accessible) when they make decisions (Hastie and Park, 1986), and, based on the common theoretical foundation, some researchers have argued that priming is a temporal extension of agenda setting. By making some issues more salient in the minds of people (agenda setting), mass media can also shape the considerations that people take into account when making judgments about political candidates or issues (priming) (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987).
Information processing theories suggest that people attending to a message and engaging in some level of elaboration of it are most likely to recall information about it later (Eveland, 2004). In short, the accessibility of an issue—and therefore its place on the issue agenda—may be higher when people attend to messages about it. Thus, agenda setting and framing may appear to operate by similar phenomenological processes. Nonetheless, there is at least one important distinction here. Attention to messages may be more necessary for a framing effect to occur than an agenda setting effect. Mere exposure may be sufficient for agenda setting, but it is less likely to be so for framing effects.

Scheufele et al (1997) and Scheufele (2000) summarize this distinction as follows: Agenda setting [sic] looks on story selection as a determinant of public perceptions of issue importance and, indirectly through priming, evaluations of political leaders. Framing focuses not on which topics or issues are selected for coverage by the news media, but instead on the particular ways those issues are presented. Along with the manner in which the news is presented, the frequency of publication plays an important role. Readers tend to consider items which are reported on frequently as being very important. From the readers’ perspective, agenda setting is more important when issues are relatively new or unknown, since the need for orientation would then be greatest (Oosthuizen, 1996).

Related to the agenda setting theory is the idea that the media, and especially the press, also have a long term effect on readers: the media set the climate within which individual issues are perceived and evaluated (Oosthuizen, 1996). The problem of assessing the effects of the media on people and society led some scholars to emphasise the media’s power to determine what people should think about (Kevins 2003).

Cohen (1963) in a study of the media and foreign policy in the United States claimed the news ‘may not be successful in telling people what to think but it is stunningly successful in telling them what to think about’. The power to push people into thinking about certain kinds of issues became to be known as ‘agenda setting’. Agenda setting research was a response to growing disenchantment amongst American scholars ‘with attitudes and opinions as dependent variables and with the limited effects model as an adequate intellectual summary’ (McCombs, 1981).
McCombs and Shaw (1972) developed the hypothesis in researchable form in their examination of the news coverage of the 1968 US presidential election campaign. They examined the content of the political news of the campaign in the newspapers, news magazines and on television, and conducted a survey of people’s views of the importance of particular issues covered in the media. They found a ‘high level of correspondence between the amount of attention given to a particular issue in the media and the level of importance assigned to that issue by people in the community who were exposed to the media’ (De Fleur and Ball Rokeach, 1989). While there was a strong correlation between the issues that appeared on the media’s agenda and the salience and importance attached to issues by voters, it was not clear whether the media influences the public or the public sets the media’s agenda. McCombs and Shaw (1972) initially assumed the media influenced their audiences, but others argue the media simply respond to the public, including many working in the media who see themselves as giving the people what they want. Subsequent agenda setting research has tried to resolve in which direction influence operates.

The struggle to set the agenda in elections across the world, as well as in relation to a number of issues, has concerned scholars (Iyengar and Reeves, 1997). One crucial piece of work by Iyengar and Kinder (1987) attempted to overcome the limitations of earlier research through a series of experiments (Iyengar et al., 1982). They sought to test whether the issues that gained prominence in the national news became the problems the viewing public regarded as the nations most important. Under laboratory conditions individuals were asked to view newscasts over a period of a week, some of which were altered to place more emphasis on certain issues. At the beginning of the week they were asked to rank in order of importance a number of issues, an activity they repeated at the end of the week. They found people shown television broadcasts doctored to focus attention on a particular problem assigned greater importance to that problem. These people attached more importance than they did before the experiment as well as in comparison to people in control groups in which other, different problems were emphasised (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987).

2.5.3 Gate Keeping Theory

Gate keeping refers broadly to the process of controlling information as it moves through a gate or filter (Barzilai-Nahon, 2008) and is associated with exercising different types of power (such as selecting news, enforcing the status quo in parliamentary committees, mediating between
professional and ethnic groups, and brokering expert information). The literature on gate keeping is fragmented in terms of epistemologies, theories and models, vocabularies, heuristics, and research challenges both within and between disciplines and fields. This happens because discourse on the topic of gate keeping is conducted within each discipline, in relative isolation.

Shoemaker (1991) defined gate keeping as follows: “Simply put, gate keeping is the process by which the billions of messages that are available in the world get cut down and transformed into the hundreds of messages that reach a given person on a given day.” Ten years later, Shoemaker admitted a broader concept of gate keeping: “However, the gate keeping process is also thought of as consisting more than just selection…. In fact, gate keeping in mass communication can be seen as the overall process through which social reality transmitted by the news media is constructed, and is not just a series of ‘in’ and ‘out’ decisions” (Shoemaker, Eichholz, Kim, & Wrigley, 2001).

White (1950) suggested a simple model to explain the selection process in newspapers and argued that news items were rejected for three reasons: personal feelings of the gatekeeper, insufficient space, and whether the story had appeared previously. The primary effect of gate keeping and also regulation is that it changes the media’s original message in some way. What readers read in the newspaper is thus seldom an accurate reflection of reality (White, 1950).

This study endeavoured to seek understanding how the military safeguards and controls the information released to the public without jeopardizing national security at the same time safeguarding state secrets. To achieve this, the study presents a detailed analysis of the print media coverage of the operation against Alshaabab in Somalia between 1st October 2011 and 31st December 2011.

2.6 Conceptual Framework

From the conceptual framework illustrated, it is evident that, the military comes in between the media and audiences. The media wants to report candidly about war but the military wants to reveal the positive side about the war, that is, the successes. The media more oftentimes sets the agenda, it carefully gives prominence to the news items it deems important to the audience. It chooses the sources, the utilities and how to package the news item.
The military on its part, it wants to safeguard national interests and national security by censuring the kind of information it divulges to the media for the audiences consumption. The military always wants to safeguard its image and cast the enemy as the weaker opposition. The audience being in so much of news is bound to be subject to the effects that the media wants to create out of it. The audience may be patriotic to their country by supporting the war or it may be relegated to confusion due to propaganda being traded.

![Figure 2.1: The Conceptual Framework for the Study](source: The researcher 2015)

### 2.7 Conclusion

This chapter looked into the various studies which have been done in the area. It was realized that the media plays a big role in Agenda setting while the military plays a big role in gate keeping.
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0: Introduction
This chapter aims at outlining the methodology adopted in the study. It will describe the philosophical paradigm, research approach, research methods, population and sampling, data collection tool, data analysis and presentation. The chapter will also provide an overview of reliability and validity of data collected as well as the ethical considerations.

3.1 Research Design

This study used the descriptive design. Nachimias and Nachimias (2007) notes that descriptive design is achieved through studies designed to generate data and information that describe current status of organizational programmes or projects for example current trends, performance, relationships and practices that exist in relation to the phenomenon under study. This design was appropriate for this study since it captures a diverse range of information pertaining to the trends and characteristics we see in media, the military and the general audience.

Descriptive design studies are conducted in communities to establish the extent of a range of issues such as health, nutrition, education, crime etc. The studies are limited in geographic scope and hence tend to be logistically easier and simpler to conduct (Mugenda, 2008).

3.3 Study Area

The study was confined to describing the way print media covered Operation ‘Linda Nchi.’ What the news sources were and comparatively looked at the extent and manner in which the two leading newspapers in Kenya covered the operation.

This research was undertaken in Nairobi. The University of Nairobi’s Jomo Kenyatta Memorial Library was the source of study materials that is the secondary sources (books, magazines, journals and newspapers). The DEFSHE and IPSTC- Karen Libraries as well as the DSC- Karen Library were instrumental while conducting the study.
3.4 Research Approach

Some authors use the words research approach and research techniques interchangeably. (Jwan and Ong’ondo, 2011). There are two types of research approaches namely the quantitative approach and the qualitative approach (Mugenda, 2008). The qualitative mode of inquiry according to Glesne and Peshkin (1992) include ethnography, case studies, educational critiques, feminine theory, participatory research or evaluation among several others.

This study used the qualitative research approach was used. An in depth analysis of the two leading newspapers in Kenya was done. Jwan and Ong’ondo (2011) illustrate that, in qualitative research, emphasis is put on case study as concentrating on experimental knowledge of the case and that close attention is paid to the influence of its social, political and other contexts. The authors further observe that, the data that make up a case study can entail observations, interviews, transcripts, notes and documents.

Jwan and Ong’ondo (2011) posit that, the distinctive feature of a case study is not so much on the source of its data, or pre-set procedures for its collection, but rather its focus on attempting to document the story of naturalistic – the routine moves that participants make in a clearly known and readily defined discursive, conceptual and professional space (the case), and the consequences of people’s actions, foreseen and otherwise, for learning and for the on-going conduct of research project.

There are various types of case studies among them being the intrinsic, instrumental and multiple case studies (Jwan and Ong’ondo, 2011). This study utilized the intrinsic case study which according to Jwan and Ong’ondo (2011) a study is undertaken because one wants to understand better a particular case. The intrinsic case study therefore, is concerned with the particular case in order to learn about it more deeply. Case studies utilize both quantitative and qualitative data (Yin, 2003).

3.5 Research Method

Investigators in scientific inquiry, use a set of methods commonly referred to as “Quantitative” methods. Quantitative methods comprise the identification of a research problem, defining the
variables of the study, stating testable hypotheses, probability sampling from a defined population and the measurement of variables using appropriate tools (Mugenda, 2008). This study employed a content analysis—newspaper accounts which were analysed. A comparative study was also conducted between the Daily Nation and the Standard newspapers. A code sheet schema was developed where the selected variables between the Standard and the Daily Nation were recorded. The data obtained from this study was analyzed qualitatively and presented in form of charts and graphs as well as descriptive narratives.

The following are the major variables that were identified for Coding purposes:

1. The name of the newspaper being examined.
2. Story Types: Defined as (A) Straight news, (B) Features (C) Editorial
3. Journalistic Sources: Defined as (A) Local Residents (B) Eyewitnesses, (C) Military Commanders (D) Ex-Military Personnel, (E) Other News Media.
4. Geographic Location: Defined as (A) Somalia (B) Kenya (C) Others.
5. Story Placement or Positioning: Defined as (A) Front Page Main lead story (Headline), (B) Front-page sub-story (C) Back-page story and (D) Inside-page Story.
6. Subject Categories: Defined as (A) Actual War, (B) Arms Supply (C) Ideological/Political consideration, (D) Economic Aspects, (E) Humanitarian Considerations, (F) Internal Security
7. Photography: (A) Photo, (B) No Photo

3.6 Population and Sampling Technique

This was chosen based on a 3 (three) month time frame. The target population consisted of 380 articles which were collected from a total number of 180 newspapers for a span of 3 months (from 1st October 2011 to 31st December 2011) from both the Daily Nation publication and the Standard. Purposive sampling was then used to select specific news articles for study. A total of 269 articles were obtained as the sample.

Mugenda (2008) defines purposive sampling as a sampling technique that allows a researcher to use cases that have the required information with respect to the objectives of his or her study. Cases of subjects are hand-picked because they are informative or they possess the required characteristics. Below is a table showing the distribution of articles in each month:
Table 3.1: Purposively Selected Articles as Distributed in Each Month of the Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The Standard</th>
<th></th>
<th>The Daily Nation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>October</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>November</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>December</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Totals: 126</strong></td>
<td><strong>Totals: 143</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grand Total: 269

*Source: Researcher, 2015*

Figure 3.1: Trends in Operation 'Linda Nchi' Articles Published in Three Months in 2010.

X-axis shows percentage of articles published in a month.

*Source: Researcher 2015*
As illustrated from the graph, there was a steady rise in the articles published in the month of October and a steady fall in the month of December.

### 3.7 Data Collection Tools

The purpose of a research tool or instrument is to measure the variables of the study (Mugenda, 2008). The researcher evaluated and coded the information from both the *Daily Nation* and the *Standard* print newspapers in exactly the same criteria and code sheet to achieve a comparison platform. The schema was used to code the evaluation parameters between the two newspapers. The design and structural differences formed the basis of the coding sheet design. The articles were considered separately each day and assigned a category based on structural differences. Tabulation was used with the following content being sought:

**Table 3.2: Table showing type of Content Sought from the Newspapers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the newspaper</th>
<th>The <em>Standard, The Daily Nation</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Story Types</td>
<td>News, Editorial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalistic Sources</td>
<td>Eyewitnesses, Military Sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic Location</td>
<td>Kenya, Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Story Placement or Positioning</td>
<td>Headline, Back Page story</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photography</td>
<td>Photo, No Photo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject Categories</td>
<td>Actual War, Arms Supply</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Researcher 2015*
3.8 Data Analysis and Presentation

Yin (2003) defines data analysis as an exercise which involves looking at the data, assigning categories and putting together emerging issues into themes in an attempt to answer the research questions. According to Jwan and Ong’ondo, 2011), data analysis is a systematic process of transcribing, collating, editing, coding and reporting the data in a manner that makes it sensible and accessible to the reader and researcher for the purpose of interpretation and discussion.

Mugenda (2008) notes that in a scientific inquiry, data is transformed into knowledge when it is properly analysed, interpreted and interpretations given meaning. After conducting the study and gathering the data, the next step involved analysing the data, which generally called for the use of statistical techniques.

The researcher used qualitative approach of data analysis to provide an ideal method needed for descriptive explanation. The Excel programme was used in analyzing data. The method assisted the researcher to establish the status of the problem under investigation. Qualitative method was used to analyse and generate information; this helped in making comparison Qualitative data, statistical summaries were used to communicate the nature of the information. The analysed information was presented through diagrams, percentages, charts, graphs, tables and descriptive narratives.

3.9 Reliability and Validity of Data Collected

Reliability for the study was established by first using internal consistency approach followed by carrying out a pilot study. The pilot study was conducted among three expert respondents who were well informed on the operation purposively chosen. These elite respondents were able to put all matters into perspective before conducting the research itself.

In research, it is also important to check validity and reliability of the instruments that will be used. Validity therefore refers to the appropriateness, meaningfulness and usefulness of specific inference made from test scores. Instrument validity was ascertained in a number of ways: In pre-testing for reliability and validity of the research instruments, expert views and suggestions of the supervisor were incorporated in the research aimed at capturing specific information from
the newspaper analysis, literature review done on the area proved vital in establishing the validity of the subject matter.

### 3.10 Ethical Considerations

These are the moral principles that guide research from its inception through to its completion and publication of results (ESRC, 2005). Permission to carry out this research study was granted by the University of Nairobi, College of Humanities and Social Sciences through the School of Journalism. The authorization letter was then submitted to the relevant authorities. Rights and privacy of the subjects was highly protected. Confidential information was protected. Sources that sought anonymity were thence kept anonymous as sought. Participation in this research was voluntary and subjects were at liberty to withdraw from the study at any given time without any repercussions. In other words, participation was based on informed consent where the participants were clearly informed on the implications of participating in the research so that they could make informed decisions.

### 3.11 Conclusion

This chapter developed the research methodology that was used for the study. Various tools were developed including the research design, the research method, data collection tools and various ethical considerations that were observed while undertaking the study.
CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS, INTERPRETATION AND DISCUSSION

4.0 Introduction

This chapter analyses the findings of the study based on the articles reviewed from the Nation and the standard newspapers. The data was analysed using Excel and the results were presented in the form of charts, tables and bar graphs.

4.1 Findings

4.1.1 Comparative Analysis of Stories Sampled in Percentages

Each newspaper captured the stories in different ways as explained in the figure below.

![Format of stories analysed](image)

**Figure 4.1: Analysis of the Stories in the Newspapers.**

For STD n= 126; for DNA n= 143

*Source: Researcher 2015*

As indicated in Figure 4, it is clear that the *Standard* newspaper covered the operation mainly in the form of news items (96%). This shows the prominence which this newspaper apportioned
towards this operation. This was meant to keep the audience abreast with the news with regard to the war. However, little was done to provide in depth interpretation of the events in the war front.

The DNA too apportioned most of its reporting of the war to news items (82%). The DNA devoted a bit of its time in trying to interpret news on the war in the form of editorial and feature items. However, compared to the Standard, the DNA gave less prominence to news coverage on the war compared to the STD as evident in Figure 4.

![Figure 4.2: News Sources for the Stories; n= 13](image)

Source: Researcher 2015

As evident in Figure 5, the media relied heavily on government officials, the military and the police as their main sources of news. Some 77% of the news sources were from government agencies- government officials, the military and the police. The military contributed 26% of the news.

The DNA in this case relied substantially on government agencies for information. Up to 73% of news originated from government officials, the military and the police. Only 8% of news items
were from the local people of Somalia. Comparatively, the STD relied more on government news sources compared to the DNA as evident in Figure 4.1

![Pie charts showing story placement in The Standard and Daily Nation newspapers](image)

**Figure 4.3: Percentage of the Story Placement in the Newspaper; n= 269**

*Source: Researcher 2015*

With regard to story placement, most news articles were on the inside pages of the newspapers especially on pages 4, 5 and 6. Also 20% of the news stories were lead stories in the STD. The stories were given prominence which shows how important the news was. Most of the news items were in the inside pages of the DNA. 80% of these news appeared on pages 2, 4 and 6 while 17% of them were lead stories (Figure 6). As it can be seen in this figure, the STD presented more lead stories 20% compared to the DNA 17%.
From Figure 7 above, 63% of the news for the STD and 67% for the DNA were accompanied by a photograph mostly showing the KDF troops in action. The significance attached to photos in journalism is immense in the sense that, photos help the audience to internalise how events are unfolding. These photos helped shape the thinking of Kenyans that the troops were on top of things and that the war would be won in no time.

However, in the Kenyan case, photos from the warfront did indicate how the KDF was gaining ground against Alshabaab in the war hence uplifting the trust and confidence of Kenyans in winning the war. Sampled pictures/photos are attached as appendices.
A high news in the *Standard* was devoted towards the actual war (38%) followed by internal security issues at 25%. From Figure above, the DNA coverage dwelt immensely on the actual war (49%) followed by issues to do with ideology (15%).
Most of the stories in the *Standard*, that is, 76% were reported from Kenya in Nairobi while only 18% were reported from inside Somalia. It must be argued that there is always a gap left if war is reported away from its theatre. This is because of the fact that there will arise issues on accuracy, question on immediacy of the news and if indeed the reporters witnessed what they were reporting. It is possible that reporters can rely on other media and other unreliable sources to report (Figure 9). From the same figure, it was evident that 69% of the news items in the *Nation* were reported from Kenya while 27% were reported from inside Somalia and 4% were reported from other countries for instance the USA.
From Figure 10, it is evident that most messages dwelt on the positive side of the war posting 81% and 83% coverage deemed positive by the STD and the DNA respectively. Negative stories accounted for only 19% in the STD and 17% for the DNA. The positive stories narrated how the war was taking a successful trend, how the KDF troops were triumphing over the Alshaabab and the importance of fighting the war. While the negative ones reported in the contrary.
Figure 4.8: Gender involvement in the Reporting of the Operation 'Linda Nchi'

Source: Researcher 2015

Figure 11 shows that more males were involved in covering the war than females. The STD recorded a total of 84% males covering the war while 16% percent females participated in the covering the war. On the other hand, 90% percent of males and 10% of females covered the war for the *Daily Nation*. The STD had more females covering the war compared to the DNA.
4.1.2 Comparative Analysis of Stories Sampled in Number

![Figure 4.9: Format of the Stories in the News; n = 269](image)

Source: Researcher 2015

The *Nation* newspaper compared to the STD undertook diversified coverage of the military stories during the period of analysis. 117 articles of the DNA were news items while for the STD’s 121 articles were news items (Figure 12). This indicates that the STD allocated more space and prominence to the issue of KDF coverage in terms of news items during the period of analysis as compared to the DNA. Notably, the *Standard* had less features and editorial stories compared to the *Nation*.

The media did contribute so immensely on setting the war agenda through its intense publication on the war. It helped shape the mind-set of most Kenyans that KDF was fighting a just war. The media portrayed the Alshabaab as monsters hell-bent on bringing the country to its knees economically, socially and even religiously.
The highest frequency of news sources was attributed to government officials (40 articles), military spokesperson (24 articles) as per the STD. The *Nation* and the *Standard* attributed an almost equal number of stories to government officials (40 and 39 respectively). The media gave minimal coverage to Alshabaab officials and this may have been informed by the military strategy of embedding journalists. At the same time, the media did not get deep into the operation area but was limited to KDF tactical centres. The media also did not do much in obtaining information directly from eye witnesses’ accounts and residents in Somalia. It relied so much on government and military information which was availed to them. They did not really get to the live combat areas so as to report on verified information on the KDF and Alshabaab combat (Figure 13).

Bearing in mind that the military sifts information for the interest of national security, it is possible that as gatekeepers, they could have avoided giving out information that could have portrayed them in bad light.

**Figure 4.10: News Sources; n = 13**

*Source: Researcher 2015*
From the above figure, most of the 269 articles that were analysed were from the inside pages of the newspapers. The lead stories were 49 in number. This is an indication that majority of the stories were allocated prominence in the print media. The media tried to put into perspective the war as well as win public support. The media as an agenda setter utilized the intense news coverage to influence the audience that the war being waged by the KDF was just and necessary for the survival of the Republic. Some of the news messages were given prominence so as to set the agenda for the public.
Majority of articles analyzed in both the *Nation* and the *Standard* were accompanied by photographs. Some 98 of the articles analyzed in the *Daily Nation* and 80 in the *Standard* had photographs. Use of photos in telling the story is key in achieving credibility in journalism. Photos of Kenyan troops capturing towns in Somalia for instance: Afmadow, BurGavo, Jana Qabdala, Baidoa, Dhobley, Bardheere, Kismaayo, Bilis Qooqani, Busar, Bu’aale and many other towns gave the public confidence that the KDF was winning the war. However, at no point did they show the KDF facing resistance from the Alshabaab. This was intended to frame the thinking of Kenyans that the war would be won and ended as soon without loss of lives on the part of KDF (Figure 15).
Figure 4.13: Themes in the News Stories

\[ n = 269 \]

**Source: Researcher 2015**

Figure 16 shows the actual war narrations of the occurrences during the war were majorly covered in the news articles analysed. Some 118 of the articles analysed reported on the actual war with the *Nation* covering more on the actual war (70 articles). On ideological and humanitarian considerations, the DNA had 32 articles compared to *Standards*’ 27 articles.
The majority of stories reported in both the *Nation* and the *Standard* were reported from within Kenya (190 of the articles) while 70 stories were done from Somalia. The *Nation* had majority of the stories done from Somalia as well as majority of those done from Kenya. This might have contributed towards overreliance on information given by the military and government officials at the expense of getting information from those directly affected by the conflict – victims and residents. This could have easily paved way for the use of propaganda at the expense of accurate information. For instance, there were some cases where both the KDF and the Alshabaab were accusing one another for the use of propaganda (Figure 17).

*Figure 4.145: Geographical Location of Reporting the Stories*

*Source: Researcher 2015*
CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents summary of findings, conclusion and recommendations of the study in line with the objective of the study. The study sought to find out how print media covered the KDF operation ‘linda Nchi’

5.2 Summary of Findings
The media can enhance good and accountable governance. However, such capacity depends on its ability to provide accurate or truthful and robust reporting on issues of war reporting. This can further be enhanced by its capacity to investigate malpractices, excesses and failures and provide information necessary for the development and promotion of robust war journalism.

The media did not provide a platform and channel through which local residents and eyewitnesses could offer their testimonies with regard to the war being fought. The media also did not offer space through which the ordinary voices of the war victims could be heard. It gave in to the whims and interests of government agencies at the expense of informing the public appropriately.

Moreover, the media neither upheld the professional tenets of truth and accuracy, objectivity, fairness, balance, impartiality nor did it embrace fully the principles of accountability, patriotism and transparency while doing their work. Most of the news stories were reported from within the Kenyan borders instead of being reported from the theatre of war right inside Somalia. Further, most of the news stories published were positive about the war hence setting the agenda for the public to believe in the war. Most stories were reported by male journalists.

5.3 Conclusion
It is clear that the relationship between the military and the media has never been friendly. It is riddled with mistrust, suspicion and dishonesty. As the military strives to provide information that it deems right to give out, the media wants to dig more into it. This strains the relationship of the two institutions. Hence the military practices gatekeeping of information given out to the media. The media keeps on agitating for the information that they feel they need from the
military. They set the agenda in the public domain to try and rally support to push for the information they want.

Therefore if such is the kind of a relationship that exists, then it is rather inconceivable on how to expect the media to be fully furnished with war events as they unfold. It is important for the media to devise ways and means of getting access to information without relying on government officers and agents since they can only get news which promote the government agenda.

It is evident that the media relied heavily on government agencies for news as illustrated in the previous chapter. The government officials, the military and the police were the main sources of information on the war. By the fact that these agencies censor information before giving it out to the media, it is possible that the information that was being divulged was that which these agencies thought was palatable to them and not necessary based on exactly what transpired in the battlefield. Having relied heavily on news easily made available to them, it was possible that the media was at some point fed on propaganda which was being traded by the KDF and Alshabaab (Figure 4.2; See also Appendix III Photo 4 and 5).

The media devoted a lot of time towards influencing Kenyans to believe in the resolve of undertaking the war. This was evident from how they devoted a lot of front news pages and photos to make the public believe that the war was going to be short and the KDF troops were on the top of the situation. The media neither showed the audience any resistance faced by the Kenyan troops nor the casualties suffered by the KDF as purported by Alshabaab (See Appendix III Photo 2 and 3).

The research found out that most news were done and reported from Kenya, little was done from Somalia which raises the issues of credibility of the news that were presented to the public. The media was embedded in the fighting troops and so opted to remain in the tactical centres rather than find out what was going on in the live combat areas (Figure 4.6). This might have allowed the thriving of propaganda at the warfront (See Appendix III Photo 4 and 5).

The research also found out that, as the media played the role of agenda setting, the military played the role of a gatekeeper. The media really needed information to satisfy the needs and wants of their audiences while on the other hand, the military kept on insisting on responsible journalism. This shows that the military was ready to give out information that did not bear on
their operational integrity which could portray them in a bad light. The military did not want information that could turn the hearts and minds of Kenyans against the war (Figure 4.3, See also Appendix III Photo 1, 2 and 3).

5.4 Recommendations

Given that the print media relied heavily on KDF to report the Somali war, the study recommends that there should be established a broad-based reporting and cooperation framework for fair coverage of war activities that should maximize public participation and multi-stakeholder engagement. Further, there is need to engage community in war reporting because they bear the direct brunt of war. The media should also expedite the process of timely news provision by government agencies and civilians.

Given that the media relied on embedded journalism, the study thus recommends upgrading the journalists’ equipment and provides enough facilitation while engaging in war reporting so as not to rely only on embedded journalism where the media cannot report unfavourably on the combat troops.

Given that the media mostly relied on information from government officials, the police and the military spokesperson to write their stories, this could have been at the expense of those that were directly affected by the conflict-victims and residents. The study thus recommends empowering public as well as media institutions on information sharing in issues to do with conflict management. This will also improve public confidence in law enforcement agencies with regard to the conduct of war.

Given that the media dwelt on the positive side of the war; how the war was taking a successful trend, and how KDF was triumphing over the Alshabaab and importance of the war, the study also recommends the media to be reporting intensively on the negative side of the story. It should clearly highlight and justify what led to the start of the war, what effects has the war had on Kenyan and Somalia economy, how people have lost lives, how insecurity is affecting Kenyans.
5.5 Recommendations for Further Research

Since this study explored the way the print media covered the Kenya Defence Forces operation *Linda Nchi*, the study recommend that similar research should be conducted on the impact of skewed war reporting on the conflict affected audiences. It also recommends a study on the impact of sourcing of news from the directly affected audiences in prevention of war propaganda. This will allow for proper generalization and avoid war propagandas.
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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Map of Kenya – Somalia Border; Source: Google Maps
Appendix II: Map of Somalia and her Neighbors; *Source: Google Maps*
Appendix III: Photography

Photo 1; Source: The Standard Newspaper, October 2011
Kenya builds alliances with Somalia’s neighbours to boost regional support for Operation Linda Nchi as forces train sights on strategic Kismayu port

Strategy unfolds

Fond Memories
Kenya honours Mboya to mark Heroes’ Day

By TONY MACHAHA and ATUMWA AMAR

The moment President Kibaki unwrapped the statue of Tom Mboya on Mboya Avenue was still a day away, and a few minutes after he was assassinated, a slight rust began to fall. The moment will be etched in the minds of Kenyans forever, as it marked the end of a chapter in the country’s history. At the same time, it marked the beginning of a new chapter, as Kenyans begin to come to terms with the loss of one of their most beloved leaders.

The event was preceded by a ceremony in which President Kibaki unveiled the statue of Tom Mboya. The ceremony was attended by various dignitaries, including former presidents Daniel arap Moi and Mwai Kibaki, as well as former prime minister Raila Odinga.

The statue of Tom Mboya was erected in recognition of his contributions to the Kenyan independence movement. Mboya was one of the key leaders in the struggle for independence, and he played a critical role in the negotiations that led to the independence of Kenya.

Mboya’s death was a tragedy for the country, and it marked the end of an era. His legacy continues to inspire Kenyans today, and his contributions to the country will never be forgotten.
Sustained Attacks

Joint Kenyan and Somalia TFG forces kick militants out of their strongholds in 3 border towns

Shabaab beaten in firefight

Photo 3; Source: The Standard Newspaper, November 2011
Despite being weak in military terms, the militia group is stoking a battle for patriotism in Somalia which could determine the course of the war, writes KENAN MIRUKA

In the ongoing Operation Linda Nchi in Somalia, the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) and the militia group Al Shabaab are battling to spread propaganda to win both the war and international support.

Elisha, Major Emaculated Chichibi has been leading the war in Somalia on social media and Al Shabaab has not been left behind.

Through the Hurahat Al Shabaab, the KDF's Public Relations Officer New Media, the militia group has been spreading messaging targeting the KDF, Kenyan public, Somalis in the Diaspora, Kenyan forces from Burundi and Uganda and their families and Muslims across the world.

By December 14, the group claimed to have tweeted 300,000 times since launching the account. On the Twitter account, the group describes itself as an Islamic movement that governs South and Central Somalia and is part of the global struggle towards the revival of Islamic Shabaab (Islamic State).

“Al Shabaab have no option but to surrender, or swim across the Indian Ocean to nowhere.”

The main objective is to paint the KDF as a futile and inimical to civilians considering the failure of previous military invasions by other countries. This thread has been consistent to show that foreign interventionalist will never liberate Somalia and Somalis will always fight for their country. On December 20, the group tweeted: “With millions of websites & newspapers disseminating their propaganda, the US couldn’t end up to be this much. What a tragedy!”

SERIOUS ATTACKS

In one of the tweets on December 26, Al Shabaab posted: “A KDF increasingly target civilians, the client is very hungry! We should not be surprised as they are killing people alongside their parents among the dead!”

On December 27, the group tweeted: “This is how Kenya is armed. Al-Shabaab will attack the KDF and the Somali Armed Forces. The KDF will not be able to stop the attack!”

The group has also actively engaged Twitter to push the Burundian government to negotiate for the release of their military officer captured in Somalia.

On a hilarious tweet sent to Major Chichibi, Al Shabaab says: “Your boys are a grotesque parody of an army? They can compare us as world-class runners by far. Indeed, they Run like a Kenyan.”

On December 9, the group tweeted that the Kenyan mission in Somalia was not going to achieve its objectives due to declining public support and shortage of finances seeing that KDF was barely able to cover the mission.

On his part, Kenya’s military spokesman, Major Chichibi has actively tweeted updates on the war in Somalia.

A photo at the soldiers on his official Twitter account shows messages addressed to the Al-Shabaab and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces and the world audience.

On December 21, he tweeted: “We need peace; looking forward to support Al-Shabaab and the KDF forces and the world audience.”

“With millions of websites & newspapers disseminating their propaganda, the US couldn’t end up to be this much. What a tragedy!”

Losing War

Another tweet sent to Major Chichibi asked the Burundian government to negotiate for the release of their military officer captured in Somalia.

The group has also actively engaged Twitter to push the Burundian government to negotiate for the release of their military officer captured in Somalia.

On January 6, the group tweeted: “This is how Kenya is armed. Al-Shabaab will attack the KDF and the Somali Armed Forces. The KDF will not be able to stop the attack!”

The group has also actively engaged Twitter to push the Burundian government to negotiate for the release of their military officer captured in Somalia.

On January 6, the group tweeted: “This is how Kenya is armed. Al-Shabaab will attack the KDF and the Somali Armed Forces. The KDF will not be able to stop the attack!”

The US government is increasingly getting worried about the influence of the KDF's media spreading messages on behalf of Al-Shabaab.

A week ago, the Americans indicated that the group is using legal tactics to hijack the KDF account in the interest of the war against terrorism.

On the other hand, the Americans indicated that the group is using legal tactics to hijack the KDF account in the interest of the war against terrorism.

On the other hand, the Americans indicated that the group is using legal tactics to hijack the KDF account in the interest of the war against terrorism.

Lethal Force

With the rise of Al-Shabaab propaganda through fabricated reports, the group is using the KDF's media spreading messages on behalf of Al-Shabaab.

The group is using the KDF's media spreading messages on behalf of Al-Shabaab.

The group is using the KDF's media spreading messages on behalf of Al-Shabaab.

The group is using the KDF's media spreading messages on behalf of Al-Shabaab.
Appendix IV: Certificate of field work

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
COLLEGE OF HUMANITIES & SOCIAL SCIENCES
SCHOOL OF JOURNALISM & MASS COMMUNICATION

REF: CERTIFICATE OF FIELD WORK

This is to certify that all corrections proposed at the Board of Examiners' meeting held on 9-14-2015 in respect of M.A./Ph.D final Project/Thesis defence have been effected to my/our satisfaction and the student can be allowed to proceed for field work.

Reg. No: K50/7960512012
Name: OBWOGI CLIFF ODGA
Title: PRINT MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE KENYA DEFENCE FORCE'S OPERATION 'LIMPA NCHI' IN SOMALIA: A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF DAILY NATION AND THE STANDARD NEWSPAPERS

Dr. Samuel Siringi  
SUPERVISOR

Dr. Samuel Siringi  
PROGRAMME COORDINATOR

Dr. Neil Ndiri  
DIRECTOR

9-10-2015  
SIGNATURE

9-10-2015  
SIGNATURE

3-11-2015  
SIGNATURE/STAMP
Appendix V: Certificate of Corrections

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
COLLEGE OF HUMANITIES & SOCIAL SCIENCES
SCHOOL OF JOURNALISM & MASS COMMUNICATION

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P.O. Box 30197-00100
Nairobi, GPO
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REF: CERTIFICATE OF CORRECTIONS

This is to certify that all corrections proposed at the Board of Examiners meeting held on 20/10/2015 in respect of M.A/PhD. Project/Thesis Proposal defence have been effected to my/our satisfaction and the project can now be prepared for binding.

Reg. No: K50/79605/2012
Name: OBWOGI CLIFF OOGA

Title: PRINT MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE KENYA DEFENCE FORCES' OPERATION 'LINDA NINI' IN SOMALIA: A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF DAILY NATION AND THE STANDARD NEWSPAPERS

Dr. Samuel Singh
SUPERVISOR
 SIGNATURE
 3-11-2015

Dr. Samuel Singh
M.A. COORDINATOR
 SIGNATURE
 3-11-2015

Dr. Nelly Aloah
DIRECTOR
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 3-11-2015