

CONFLICT IN SLUM UPGRADING PROGRAMME
A CASE STUDY OF KOROGOCHO SLUM IN NAIROBI

By:

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DECLARATION

I declare that this project paper is my original work and has not been presented for award of a degree in any other university.

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Signature.....

Date.....

This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the University supervisor.

Dr. Herbert Misigo Amatsimbi

Signature.....

Date.....

DEDICATION

I dedicate this Research Project to my two loving sons, Michael Mburugu Kariuki and Celestine Kinyari Kariuki, for their patience and belief in what I have been doing throughout the course.

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I sincerely thank the Almighty God for giving me the required Grace for endurance. He has made me complete the long academic journey in good health.

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
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Map II: Korogocho Slums Map



Source: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFD	Agency Française de Développement
AIHD	African Institute for Health and Development
CBOs	Community Based Organization
CCN	City County of Nairobi
CHW	Community Health Workers
DCP	Directorate of City Planning
DID	Development-Induced Displacement
EPM	Environmental Planning Management
FBO	Faith Based Organization
FGD	Focus Groups of Discussion
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoK	Government of Kenya
HIV/AIDS	Human Immune deficiency Virus/Acquired immune Deficiency
IACC	Inter Agency Coordination Committee
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KENSUP	Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme
KISIP	Kenya Informal Settlement Improvement Programme
KOA	Korogocho Owners Association
KOSLA	Korogocho Spiritual Leaders Association
KRA	Korogocho Residents Association
KSUP	Korogocho Slums Upgrading Programme

KTU	Kenya Tuna Uwezo
M & E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MoLG	Ministry of Local Government
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGOs	Non-Governmental organizations
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement
PIU	Programme Implementation Unit
PMU	Programme Management Unit
PNU	Party of National Unity
RC	Residents Community
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Policies
SEC	Settlement Executive Unit
SIDA	Swedish International development Agency
SUP	Slum Upgrading Programme
TOL	Temporary Occupation License
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Centre for Human Settlements
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to find out the factors linking conflict and development, with particular example of the slum upgrading in urban areas in Kenya. The study was focused in Korogocho Slum area which is located in the Kasarani Division, in Eastern Nairobi. Korogocho borders the largest Dumping Site in Nairobi which poses environmental health and security risk for the residents and the surrounding settlements. The specific objectives of the study were to investigate the informal settlement in Korogocho Slums and the impact of the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programmes.

The study was also to examine the linkage between the Upgrading Programme and conflict in slums. Through the use of secondary and primary data the study established that the residents were not participate in the initial implementation of the programme. This was key in the sustainability of the programme. The programme also did not adequately achieve some of its objectives which include, housing, poverty, health and most of the issues that affected the slum dwellers. Land tenure which was the main cause of conflict between the landlords and the tenants was not adequately addressed.

The study was based on participation and self-help exercise and the development theory. The theories aimed to visualize the nature of participatory development and its challenges. The community participation is pertinent in the success of developmental projects. The participatory theory emphasises on bottom-up process. This stimulates the ownership of the stakeholders. Korogocho was selected because the participation was inconsistent. The community leaders mostly who were the landlords organized the information to suite their self-interest. This denied the main culprits to benefit from the upgrading programme.

The study covered the Korogocho slum area with its eight villages. Due to its cosmopolitan nature it has faced perennial conflict and violence based on ethnicity and politics of Nairobi and Kenya at large. The dumping site is used by the slum dwellers earn their daily bread. It has also one of the largest poor population with no access to minimum government services. The interviewees included the slum dwellers, through its elected leadership, the administration personnel and the focused groups the youth who were the majority and the most affected.

OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS

Development: Change from an unsatisfactory state to a better level in accordance with clearly defined societal objectives¹.

Debt-For-Development Exchanges: an important tool for development which makes debt relief more politically and practically attractive to the donor countries and serves the development of recipient countries through cancellation of external debt in exchange for funding of important development projects.

Development-Induced Displacement: The art of forcing communities and individuals out of their usual areas of residence for the purposes of economic progress.²

Globalization: an on-going process generally recognized by many observers, as synonymous with ‘Westernization’ or even ‘Americanization’ especially after the breakdown of the communist bloc.³

Informal Settlements: Defined as dense settlements comprising communities housed in self-constructed shelters under conditions of informal or traditional land tenure.⁴

¹Bjorn Hettne, (2009), *Thinking about Development*, Zed Books Limited, New York and London

²UDHR, Article 5, “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”.

³Berner, E and Korff, R (1 March 2011); *Working Paper No. 25, “Globalization and Local Resistance: The Creation of Localities in Manila and Bangkok”*, University of Bielefeld, Bielefeld.

⁴Hindson and McCarthy, (1994), “*Squatter Settlements, Poor: Housing*”; S.A. KwaZulu-Natal, Indicator Press, Dalbridge, S.A.

Slum: A term which first appeared in the 1820s, and currently associated with the poorest quality housing, and the most unsanitary conditions, a refuge for marginal activities including crime, ‘vice’ and drug abuse; a likely source for many epidemics that have ravaged urban areas and a place apart from all that was decent and wholesome.¹

Modern: An image which encompasses a vision of rationality and culture which is transnational.² In the context of this research it is associated with new housing and infrastructure.

Youth: Young people in the age bracket of 15 to 30 years as stipulated in the Kenya National Youth Council Bill drafted on 24th2009. It is still pending in parliament for debate. However it influences the decisions affecting the youth in Kenya.

The Slum Upgrading Programme (SUP): A global programme for alleviation of the poor living standards of slum dwellers consisting of physical, social, economic, organizational and environmental improvement to slums.³

¹UN- Habitat (2007); *What are Slums and Why do they exist?*, UN-Habitat HQs,Nairobi

²Rupesinghe, K (1994);”*The Culture of Violence, Forms of Violence and its Transformation*”, The United Nations University Press, Washington DC

³What Is Slum Upgrading?" Accessed 3 December 2010, www.unhabitat.org

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

The study was carried out in Korogocho slum, the fourth largest slums in Nairobi. It is located in the Kasarani Division, in Eastern Nairobi, approximately 11 kilometers from the Central Business District. It is estimated to house between 100,000 and 120,000 people on 1.5 square kilometers of land owned by the Government of Kenya. It borders the largest dumping site in Nairobi, the Dandora dumping site, which poses environmental, health and security risks for the residents and surrounding settlements.

The chapter discusses the slum upgrading programme. With a focus in Korogocho slum area and the reason for the necessity of the government, development partners initiating the programme for the beneficiaries who are the poor and marginalized. At the same the slum dwellers have constantly resisted the development programmes initiated by the government. This is due to the approaches used to implement some of the programmes. As an example is the Nubian people in Kibera who opposed the upgrading of their village, saying that they would be disposed their land. Their argument was that they were not consulted by the government, them being the rightful owners held as community. They vowed to challenge the decision to court. They reasoned that they had lived in the area for 100 years.¹ The government failure is to prescribe development without involving the beneficiaries. Local participation is vital. Programmes have to be designed with a bottom-up approach in order to meet and prioritize the specific need of the

¹ Victor Nyongesa, The Standard Newspaper, *Nubians oppose Kibera Slum Upgrading Project*, Tuesday July 31st 2012

slum dwellers and supporting the previous point. At the same time it can help solutions to be implemented easier by using resources that are more appropriate or available in the area. This is also fundamental since, as it has been said before, information and documentation of slum areas is not always available. At the same time what might sound to be the “ideal” solution might be questioned by the community. This also can contribute to enabling, empowering and inclusionary approaches.

Rapid urbanization and inadequate capability to cope with the housing needs of people in urban areas have contributed to the development of informal settlements. Living in these settlements often poses significant health risks.

Overcrowding is associated with a low space per person, high occupancy rates, cohabitation by different families and a high number of single-room units. Many slum dwelling units are overcrowded, with five and more persons sharing a one-room unit used for cooking, sleeping and living.¹ Korogocho being one of the populated slums exhibits the phenomenon. The area is crowded. There is no space for development. That is why the upgrading was important in creating space for sanitation, roads and other amenities. However the residents resisted the development fearing displacement whereas they were the beneficiaries.

Lack of security of tenure is a central characteristic of slums, and regard lack of any formal document entitling the occupant to occupy the land or structure as prima facie evidence of illegality and slum occupation. Informal or unplanned settlements are often regarded as synonymous with slums. Many definitions emphasize both informality of occupation and the non-compliance of settlements with land-use plans. The main factors contributing to non-compliance are settlements built on land reserved for non-residential purposes, or which are

¹ The Challenge of Slums: *Global Report on Human Settlements*,2003,Pp 14

invasions of non-urban land.¹ The land in Korogocho belongs both to the government and the private. This posed a challenge in its demarcation and redistribution to the slum dwellers.

1.1 Historical Background of the Study

Secure and adequate housing is one of the most crucial human needs. Neuwirth compares the right to have a place to live with the right to breathe.² Shelter is one of the basic need for the survival of human beings. Despite the importance associated with secure housing, the right to live in urban areas has recently become increasingly challenging because of lack of adequate housing. Deficiency in housing has been informed by high number of rural-urban migration that characterized the beginning of the 21st Century. Large migrations to urban areas has led to unprecedented urban growth in population, which does not go along with construction of affordable housing to accommodate low income earners. United Nation Population Fund (UNFPA) foresees a further problem by anticipating that the urban population is expected to almost double in the near future.³ Such development presents a range of challenges in terms of social, economic and environmental stress to the urban population. It is evident that a rapidly urbanizing world faces major challenges when it comes to proper housing especially in the cities. This explains why it is estimated that ‘one third of the global population does not live in adequate conditions and lacks access to safe water or sanitation’.⁴ The stress has generated the urban-poor who occupy marginal, overcrowded slums or dwell on pavements and lack basic services and stable livelihood.

¹ Ibid

²Neuwirth, R., “Proper squatters, improper property”, in: *Shadow cities: A billion squatters, a new urban world*, New York and London: Routledge, 2005, pp. 281 - 306.

³UNFPA (2007) *State of World Population 2007, Unleashing the Potential of Urban Growth*, United Nations Population Fund, Available on <http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2007/presskit/pdf/sowp2007_eng.pdf>.

⁴ UN-HABITAT, *Global Report on Human Settlements: The Challenge of Slums*, London: Earth Scan, 2003.

Despite the continuing evidence of urban deterioration and documented increases in “slum-like” conditions developing across cities in the global south, there is little research on conflicts that emerge in attempts to up-grade the slums. It is clear that there must be socio-economic factors that characterize such conflicts which can be included in the research on slums. To ignore conflicts emanating from up-grading programmes, social and economic factors that influence such conflicts ultimately limit our knowledge on the impact of any slum redevelopment programmes that seek to improve the urban condition. Environmental and architectural determinism provide governments and implementing organizations the theory for which slum upgrading interventions has been justified without mentioning the conflict that emerge during the up-grading programmes. It is based upon this circumstances and knowledge that this study is justified.

Slum upgrading operates under assumption that the solution is not to demolish the housing but to improve the environment.¹ The United Nations supports slum-upgrading programmes, however, there remains an unclear delineation between slum upgrading and slum redevelopment with regard to the methods used and if conflicts are experienced. This confusion is manifested through the case of Kenya’s Slum Upgrading Program (KENSUP), which continues the demolition and displacement of a number of slum dwellers.

In the United Nations Habitat (UN-HABITAT) report, Nairobi has some of the most populated, unsanitary and insecure slums in the world. It further says almost half of the city’s population lives in over 100 slums and squatter settlements with little or inadequate access to safe water and sanitation. In 2000, Habitat initiated the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP). The

¹Werlin, H. (1999) The slum upgrading myth. *Urban Studies*, 36, 1523 - 1534. Wit, J.W. de (1997) Decentralization, empowerment and poverty alleviation in urban India: Roles and responses of government, NGOs and slum communities. Working Paper Series No. 267, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague.

programme started in Kibera, Nairobi's largest slum, and is still ongoing. It is jointly funded by Habitat, World Bank Cities Alliance and the Government.

When Singapore gained independence in 1965, it was confronted with a range of problems just like Kenya or even worse. They included high unemployment and low income levels which led to mushrooming of numerous slums. The Government made tackling the two problems; unemployment and low incomes top priority. It also endeavoured to provide decent housing for all Singaporeans. By 1970s, most Singaporeans lived in decent houses and slums became history. Today, the country is among the highly developed nations in Asia. The Singapore Government began its slum elimination programme soon after independence and today, statistics indicate almost every citizen is decently housed. This was achieved by enhancing political stability, adequate infrastructural facilities and a disciplined work force. Such conditions attracted many multi-national companies, which brought in new skills and created numerous job opportunities.¹

1.2 History of Nairobi and Emergence of Slums

The origin of Nairobi can be traced back to the onset of colonialism which means by 1900 a racially segregated railway town had been established.² During this time the urban layout was designed by government-sanctioned population segregation, implying the installation of separate enclaves for Africans, Asians and Europeans. The colonial capitalist development imposed by the British administration was responsible for the occupation and control over land from local people, and mainly to have a labour resource for the settler farms and emerging urban centers.

¹ The Standard Newspaper, Friday, 21 November 2008 13:12

² K' Akumu, O.A. and Olima, W. H. A. The dynamics and implications of residential segregation in Nairobi, Habitat International, 31, 2007, pp.87-99

The development of slums was caused through the highly unbalanced allocation of public resources towards the above mentioned different enclaves.¹

The post-colonial period was characterized by a relaxation of the colonial residential segregation policies as well as a major population shift. The phenomenon of rural to urban migration prevailed and the formation of slums covered the town because of employment opportunities. Most striking features of residential segregation in the city were its dynamics that involve “transformation into different socio-spatial manifestations”. “Nowadays, almost 65% of the total population of Nairobi lives in slums that cover only 5% of the city’s area.”²

After Kenya’s independence in 1963, rapid urban population growth did not accompany provision of housing which resulted in poor population settlements. Most of the informal human settlements developed after independence. “Slums that are home for the majority of Nairobi’s population can be divided in two types, squatter settlements and illegal subdivisions of either government or private land. Between 1971 and 1995, the number of slums within Nairobi rose from 80 to 134 and the estimated total population of these settlements increased from 167,000 to 1,886, 000”.³The natural growth or rural to urban migration continues to contribute to the growth of Nairobi’s informal agglomerations. Despite the desperate and poor living conditions, the number and size of slums is expanding. Apparent discrimination, particularly along ethnic lines, results in most ethnic groups leaving smaller entities of their own ethnic background.⁴ The emergency of the informal settlements followed in the following manner;

¹*Ibid.*, p.1.

²*Ibid.*, p.71.

³*Ibid.*, p.1.

⁴*Ibid.*, p.1.

- *Mabatini (Mathare)* is a settlement within the larger Mathare area and predates the country's independence, having been first settled by immigrants from Asia before being taken over by Africans. This low-income, unplanned area is highly under-serviced and is characterised by very high population density, with a population of more than 28,260 peoples within an area of 0.35 square kilometres.¹
- *Majengo* evolved out of rural-urban migration without corresponding provision of adequate shelter. The Majengo “slum” was established in the 1920s when Africans were moved from the Pangani area to facilitate settlement of the Asian community. It is located about 2 km east of the city centre and covers an area measuring 0.17 square kilometres. It comprises of a population of more than 16,287 people and is divided into four smaller settlements of Sofia, Mashimoni, Katanga, and Digo.²
- *Nyayo Estate Embakasi* developed in the 1990s as a tenant purchase scheme and is managed by the country's largest pension fund: the National Social Security Fund (NSSF).⁵ The estate is considered a middle-income gated neighbourhood and is located in Nairobi's expansive Embakasi area, about 15 km east of the city centre. To date 2,506 houses have been sold and occupied. Currently, it is estimated that the ratio of tenants to owners occupying the units is at 65:35%.³

Several policy initiatives have been carried out and institutions as well as facilities have been established for addressing the issue of slums namely; the “Nairobi Slums Coordination Committee, Nairobi Situation Analysis, The Poverty Reduction Strategy and the Local Authority

¹ Diane Davis and John Tirman, (2012), Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence Case Study of Nairobi, Kenya.Pp.5 (GoK,2009).

² *Ibid* Pp.6.

³ <http://www.nssf.go.ke>.

Transfer Fund. Over all, policies and practices to address slum dwellers needs have been poorly developed and implemented, because all lack a clear and precise policy which would have been necessary to guide as well as facilitate urban development in Kenya. As an alternative urban interventions are often made on an ad hoc basis”.¹

The latest master plan for the city was developed in 1973, but has since been unable to respond to the continuing urban growth. The Physical Planning Act (1996) refers responsibilities of planning to local authorities, which means the Directorate of City Planning (DCP) has the mandate to coordinate development activities, particularly slum upgrading or municipal reforms. Despite this mandate, neither economic nor physical planning is integrated as well as harmonized with land use and land taxation.²

Da Cruz et al further note that a precise definition of the concept of slum is missing and is responsible for the lack of an effective policy response. It can be summarized that the city lacks a “common vision to guide its development.” Formal housing has been favored by urban development but was incapable to deliver on an appropriate scale and rate as well as to provide affordable housing. Moreover, since coherent and effective Nairobi-wide urban policies are rare, the situation for the inhabitants of Kenya’s and especially Nairobi’s slum dwellers remains severe.³

It can be concluded that slums in Nairobi are characterized by disparities like density of population, physical structure, size and availability of basic urban services. The current situation

¹Da Cruz, F. Sommer, K. and Tempira, O. (2006) Nairobi – Urban Sector Profile, UN-HABITAT, Kenya

²*Ibid*, p.31.

³*Ibid*. p.1.

requires that policy instruments and tools must be multi-dimensional which includes for example, regularization or upgrading of slums or formalization of the informal settlements. The response to spatial segregation should be based on an understanding of local needs and factors such as age, gender, socio-cultural and economic activities.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

The purpose of this study was to identify the effect of slum upgrading programme that encountered obstacles in its implementation phase. The slum dwellers the intended beneficiaries resisted the development. The development programme has elicited conflict and hence violence. In 2008 Kenya launched Kenya *Vision 2030*, which is an outline for Kenya's development until 2030. Among the pillars of the vision is to attain an adequately and decently-housed nation in a sustainable environment. Better development of and access to affordable and adequate housing. The government initiated a nationwide urban planning and development campaign, starting with Kenya's major cities and towns.¹

In addition, Kenya adopted a new constitution that guarantees every citizen the right to accessible and adequate housing, and to reasonable standards of sanitation. In a bid to fulfill the Vision 2030, the government partnered with international development institutions, notably the World Bank, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), and Agence Française de Développement (AFD), who would eventually provide loans to develop another

¹ Kenya Vision 2030 social pillar – Housing and Urban Development

slum upgrading program, the Kenya Informal Settlement Improvement Program (KISIP), to complement Kenya Slum Up-grading Program in building decent houses.¹

On most occasions, they face violent resistance from slum residents and yet little is documented on conflict arising from slum upgrading programmes in Nairobi, which has been undergoing an urban transformation through slum up-grading. Korogocho slums in Nairobi, offer the perfect case study to observe for the purposes of this study.

The challenge of ethnic relations in Kenya is a fairly sensitive one. In the slums it is epitomized by poverty and marginalization. It is in this context that conflicts primarily emanate because any programme of slum up-grading is either ethnicized or politicized.

This massive project is supposed to improve lives of the current residents of Korogocho Slums. Previous similar projects in Kibera and Mathare 4A have however raised major questions on their success in terms of benefiting slum dwellers and contributing towards ridding our cities off slums.

Lack of sensitivity to needs of the intended beneficiaries of these developments is what drives them to look for tenants who can afford to live in these houses. Due to their economic status, the houses become a bother since they must spend money to live in them. They would rather the houses were a source of income.

If the target of such developments is people with low incomes, it only makes sense that the government makes heavy initial investments to come up with a solution that would be 'low cost'

¹Kamau, H. and Ngari, J. (2002). Assessment of the Mathare 4A Development Programme Against the Sustainable Livelihoods.

to maintain during occupation. However, this has not been the case as one of government's main procurement and operation strategies is to keep costs down.

It is not a secret that beneficiaries of such projects usually end up renting out their houses while they find their way back into the slums. What these projects achieve therefore is slum relocation, not upgrading.

In the design, a layout for such houses is not the normal two or three bed house plan. It has to be flexible in a manner that allows usage of the house as one unit or separate units. This allows an able individual use the entire house as one unit while those who need to supplement their incomes may rent out some rooms of the house without compromising on the security and privacy of the main house where they should be living.

1.4 Objective of the Study

The conflict arising from Slum Upgrading Programmes. It is based on a case study of Korogocho Slums, the fourth largest slums in Nairobi, after Kibera, Mathare Valley, and Mukuru-Kwa-Njenga.

1.4.1 Specific Objectives

The specific objectives of the study include:

- i. Investigate the informal settlement in Korogocho Slums.
- ii. Investigate the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme in Korogocho Slums.
- iii. Investigate the link between Slum Upgrading Programme and conflict in the area.

1.4.2 Hypotheses

The study was guided by the following hypothesis;

- i. Relocation of low in-come earners led to origin of Korogocho Slums.

- ii. Slum upgrading programme improved the condition of Korogocho slum dwellers.
- iii. Slum upgrading the source of conflict in Korogocho Slums.

1.5 Justification of the Study

The study was important due to the transformation dynamics of the world population. The United Nations is projecting that globally the level of urbanization is expected to rise from 50 per cent from 2009 estimates, to 69 per cent by 2050 due to number of factors, primarily rural to urban migration and displacement by political, economic and environmental disruptions.¹

Most of this growth has been reported in the global South, particularly within Sub-Saharan Africa. United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) has observed that Kenya is one of the highest urbanized countries in the recent times. And associated with rapid urbanization there has been an increase in the development of informal settlements.

The conflicts that arise from the upgrading programmes have been addressed adequately. The slum dwellers have not been engaged in the process of the upgrading programme as the stakeholders. This is why the timeliness of this research is relevant. The factors which influence conflict have to be considered for the analysis.

Further investigations of community participation in development of the slums is relevant in this study. The concept of participation in development practice is often stereotyped without being questioned or re-examined. The study aims at critically analyzing community participation and

¹United Nations, *United Nations: Urban Agglomerations 2009*, New York: United Nations Population Division, Economic and Social Affairs, 2010

its implication in Korogocho slums. It is also going to identify some areas of possible conflict in the slum upgrading programmes in the context of slum dwellers' lives.

The study also aims to provide the necessary information for policy makers to harness the vitality of these, though aesthetically unpleasant, vibrant communities and go beyond the physical improvement of their living conditions.

1.6 Scope and Limitation of the Study

The study area was selected because the Slum Upgrading Programme faced resistance from the slum dwellers. Like the other slum settlements in Nairobi, Kibera, Mathare and *Mukuru- Kwa-Njenga* has a large poor population with no access to minimum services, living largely in structures made out of temporary and recycled building materials of timber, mud walling, and roofing made up of substandard materials such as sacks, carton paper and polythene. There is no proper sanitation and waste management. Water reticulation is limited and the road network is inadequate.

The study faced a couple of challenges, the slum dwellers refused to be interviewed until they were paid some money for lunch. They argued that the time spent during the interview would have been used to do some work for the day's food.

They also felt cheated by the previous researchers who frequented the slums and made promises especially to the youth on finding jobs for them. They never fulfilled their promises.

They were not very ready to give full information in some areas, like matters of insecurity in the area for fear of being victimized later.

The administration personnel were also hesitant to share some information due to the government restrictions.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

This study is based on participation and self-help in practice and development theory. The theory aims to conceptualize the nature of participatory development and its challenges, specifically to assess pre-conditions, barriers and stimuli for community participation in slums in particular. The theory was chosen because Korogocho Slum Upgrading Programme process of community participation seems flawed in that communities targeted by the project do not seem to have been fully engaged.

There are a variety of explanations on how to understand the term participation. The debate about participatory approaches is here represented in two dimensions. Cleaver, a proponent of the theory, describes the distinction between ‘participation as a tool’ to achieve satisfactory programme or project outcomes and ‘participation as a process which enhances the capacity of individuals to improve their own lives and facilitate social changes for the advantage of disadvantaged or marginalized groups’.¹The idea is supported by Berner who argues that participation by slum residents in upgrading programmes as a means should ensure quality and

¹Cleaver, F.,“Paradoxes of participation: Questioning participatory development”, *Journal of International Development*, 11, 1999, pp. 597 - 612

sustainability of achievements through beneficiaries' ownership and increase efficiency through their contributions so as to avoid resistance.¹

The theory is relevant because it brings out the issues of decision making which excludes beneficiaries, the idea of patronage and exclusion. Patronage and exclusion is always the danger that results from decision-making at the community-level falling into the hands of a small and self-perpetuating clique, which may act in its own interests with disregard for the wider community. In this regard, Friedman has used the term 'positioning for patronage'.² Local elites, gatekeepers, slum leaders or brokers wish to attract outsiders' interest and to speak out for the community needs. Then, no recognition of exploitation and marginalization inside the settlement is observed.³ The poorest, disabled, in-debtor similarly disregarded slum dwellers benefit the least, if ever. The picture of selected Korogocho slums demonstrates how the most vulnerable groups are excluded from making their choice and from increasing their voice therefore leading to violence against a programme which would benefit the residents.

The so-called 'community leaders' are often deliberately controlling information channels from the intervening agency towards the community to prevent losing power or to ensure more support from the 'bottom' to address those 'above'. Lacking appropriate information or commonly having odd news, slum dwellers may be hesitant to participate. Local politicians play sometimes the role of brokers or middlemen slum leaders may also be members of a supportive

¹Berner, E. & B. Phillips (2005) Left to their own devices: Community self-help between alternative development and neoliberalism. *Community Development Journal*, 40, 17 - 29.

² Friedman, S. S. (1993). Economic Change, National Policy and the System of Cities. In S. S. Fainstein, N. I. Fainstein, R. C. Hill, D. R. Judd, & M. P. Smith, *Restructuring the City: The Political Economy of Urban Redevelopment* (pp. 1-27). New York: Longman Inc.

³*Ibid.*, p.8.

political party to spread opportunistic information and announcements. The gradual role of political interest in slum population is further described in examination of slum improvement programmes and in Korogocho's case in particular.

As De Wit shows, political representatives 'may influence officials to implement a programme in a particular slum just before an election, so making it clear that the slum people should be grateful to him, and that he expects them to vote for him. These promises are rarely fulfilled and fleeting politicians' willingness threatens slum dweller participation. Rarely satisfied expectations decrease a readiness to participate.¹ Slum dwellers' memories count and as noted before, the synergy between participation as a 'tool' and an 'empowerment' is needed. Remembering 'process without product that leaves communities feeling that nothing is really happening other than a lot of talking, and that time, money and social energy is lost'.

Although the participatory and self-help theory articulates important issues of conflict that emerge from slum upgrading efforts, it does not address issues of development. The theory will therefore be complemented by the development theory. According to Preston, the concept of "development" cuts across many levels. It refers to macro issues such as patterns of a nation's growth as much as it refers to *meso* problems such as river-basin plans, or to micro problems such as local community development. All three levels, macro, *meso*, and micro, are interwoven. And at all levels, many different dimensions economic, cultural, religious and gender affect and are affected by development. Development should be understood as a process, not a product. Societies are always changing. Some improve, while others fail. Development theory aims at explaining both processes. Development practice intends to provide tools that can be applied to

¹*Ibid.*, p.2.

entire societies or specific communities. Such interventions are intended to move communities or societies from a situation in which they are believed to be worse off to a situation in which they are assumed to be better off.¹ This is the real idea behind the proponents of slum upgrading projects.

1.8 Literature Review

The word upgrading usually refers to an effort to improve living conditions in particular urban areas characterized by poor-quality housing and inadequate infrastructure and service delivery.² The global emphasis on the upgrading programmes and self-help housing emerged broadly in the 1970s when the World Bank searching for an alternative to widespread slum clearances and evictions started to stress a new ‘paradigm’ for the urbanizing world. The Bank’s initiative was considerably affected by John Turner, the English architect, who advocated slum improvements free of government intervention to allow their residents to change their living conditions by themselves. Berner describes the prevailing recognition as follows: ‘In the last four decades it self-help housing is increasingly recognized as the only means available to fulfill the immense demand for mass housing in the cities. Housing economists declared squatting to be a solution rather than a problem, and saw it as evidence for the superiority of market-based solutions over ‘distorting’ government interventions’.³ However, these analyses do not show if there are conflicts anticipated during the said slum improvement efforts. Berner reports that one of the failures of sites-and-services schemes was the quickly increased land prices and the fact that

¹Preston, P.W., *Development Theory: An Introduction to the Analysis of Complex Change*, Wiley-Blackwell, 1996,

²Hardoy, J. E., Mitlin, D., Satterthwaite D., ”Tackling Environmental Health Problems,” In: *Environmental problems in an urbanizing world*, London: Earth scan, 2001, pp. 209 -269.

³Berner, E. (2007),“Of slums and gated communities: Failure of formal and informal land markets in developing cities. Paper presented at the ISS/Development and Change Symposium Cities of Extremes”, The Hague, 15th – 16th October 2007.

wealthier groups who purchase and control the land benefited. Access to secure tenure for the lowest-income households was endangered. Indeed this is the situation in Korogocho.

The displacement of the slum dwellers has often been included in the slum upgrading schemes creating problems even more complex than the ones they were trying to solve.¹ This has led to thinking of slum upgrading without displacement and successful effort carried out in Danukusuman Sub-district, Surakarta City-Indonesia.

The bottom-up process in slum upgrading is based on the community aspirations. Rarely does it involve displacement of the inhabitants. The Surakarta City successfully carried out the slum upgrading by involving the slum dwellers in the management of the slums. They were legalized and the administration could not displace them. The city won an award from the government in slum upgrading process that involved the inhabitants.

The analysis showed that the upgrading process was carried out through bottom-up planning, involving the local community throughout the process starting from finding the problems, planning the programme, construction and maintenance process.

Community-based and driven development projects have become an important form of development assistance with the World Bank's portfolio alone allocating billions of funds. Community-based development and its more recent variant, community-driven development are among the fastest-growing mechanism for channeling development assistance. Community-

¹ United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, UNESCAP 2008.

based development is an umbrella term for projects that actively include the beneficiaries in their design and management. The communities have direct control over key development projects.¹

The potential gains from the community-driven development are large. It has the explicit objective of reversing the power relations in a manner that creates agency and voice for the poor people, allowing them to have more control over development assistance. This is expected to to make the allocation of development funds more responsive to their needs, improve the targeting of poverty programmes, make governments more responsive, improve the delivery of public goods and services, and strengthen the capabilities of the citizenry to undertake self-initiated development activities.²

This vision has become one of the cornerstones of the World Bank's Comprehensive Development Framework, with its increasing emphasis on empowerment.³ However the vision is universally shared. Skeptics have reservations about the basic principles of the approach and more practical concerns with the challenges of implementing such projects. Summers (2001) for example is concerned that local institutions promoted under the auspices of such projects could undermine democratically elected governments.

The cornerstone of the community-based development initiatives is the active involvement of the members of the defined community in at least some aspects of the project design and implementation. Although participation can occur at many levels, key objective is the incorporation of the local knowledge into the project's decision-making process. When potential beneficiaries also make key projects decisions, participation becomes self-initiated action. What

¹ Ghazala Mansuri and Vijayendra Rao, *The World Bank Research Observer* Vol. 19, no.1

² *Ibid*,

³ Dongier et al, (200), Narayan (2002)

has come to be known as the exercise of the voice and choice or empowerment Participation expected to lead to better designed projects, better targeted benefits, more cost-effective and timely delivery of project inputs, and more equitably distributed project benefits with less corruption and other rent-seeking activity.

The process included legal certification of land ownership, giving them better legal standing. The upgrading included physical improvements of houses and infrastructure. Without displacing, it was found that people felt more comfortable and safety. By upgrading it was for them to improve their economy City.¹

One of the main causes of displacement or eviction is the strong role capital interest in the planning of cities.² Lands which previously had been planned for settlement may have been developed into commercial uses, not serving the social interest of the communities. The displacement often caused new and more complex problems leading to large scale-scale urban poverty. The new poor would then increase in numbers and had to live in not livable places. In the top-down planning the local communities could not speak for their interests and express their aspirations to stay in their lands.³ Davis argues that, influenced by Turner's work, the urban poor have been gradually perceived as the best developers or survivors to secure a shelter for almost nothing. Aside from upgrading programmes, sites-and-services schemes were designed to be executed.

¹ Sunarti et al. , Slum Upgrading without displacement at Danukusuman Sub-District Surakarta pp 213

² Uitermark and Loopmans, 2013: UNESCAP, 2008.

³ Boonyabanha, 2009, UNESCAP, 2008

Another example from South Africa; Van Rensburg *et al* (2001) undertook four surveys of the residents of Freedom Square in Bloemfontein, South Africa, relating to the social impact of upgrading and low-income initiatives within the community, he came to two conclusions Firstly, the upgrading projects resulted in the residents having a better quality of life by making their living conditions more healthy and giving them hope for the future. Secondly, the upgrading programme brought about true ownership of sites by the residents by having proper documents of ownership which empowered their lives and also brought them freedom and independence. Generally slum dwellers consider themselves not being free due to their poor conditions they live in the terms and conditions as dictated by the elite class who are the main employers and pay them meager wages that do not meet the required standards of living, coupled with the human rights violations.

According to Werlin,(1974) in the results of the studies done in Nairobi, they were quite contrary to Turner's theory. Soldiers and police played a cynical and counterproductive 'cat and mouse' game with the slum dwellers. In November 1970, for example the Nairobi City Council authorized the demolition of 49 illegal settlements, containing perhaps 40,000 people. This resulted in a swelling of housing demand, a decreasing housing supply and greater exploitation of tenants in the remaining unauthorized settlements where an estimated third of the population lived.

On the contrary, Crooke (1982) suggests that as a result of slum upgrading, the increased attractiveness of legal plots to non-residents may encourage owner occupiers to sell at a profit. This positive impact may change the household income composition of the area such that the

upgrading benefits the higher income families than the originated beneficiaries. In Lusaka a similar evaluation was carried out by Rukodi (1988) who failed to consider that upgrading displaces the existing households by the higher income groups.

Kleinhans (2003) examined the implications of housing stock restricting programmes in the Netherlands where the housing stock and the living environment was improved through demolition and upgrading of social rented housing and the construction of new occupied dwellings. This policy had triggered major residential moves in and beyond some neighbourhoods, like Utrecht and Hague. It was found that the residents who were displaced upwards in their career as a result their improved housing situation while the unfulfilled promise of new construction in Utrecht caused much distress and complaints about the range of available relocation options among those displaced. The negative effects of demolition and relocation on neighbourhood social ties were limited in the two case studies as firstly, many of those who still remained in the same neighbourhood. However, forced relocation causes much distress and conflict in resettlement and upsets the personal lives of the residents. That is why there is always resistance and demands for participations by the affected in order to address some of the conflicting issues, which is mostly ignored by the development initiators.¹

During the 1970s, when the slum clearance was wide-spread, the UN officials estimated that governments were destroying annually more low-income housing than they were building. These

¹ Housing And Social Development: Emerging Theoretical Issues in Asia-Pacific, 5-6 February 2004, The University of Hong Kong, Impact of Public Housing Upgrading on Residents, Shi-Ming YU, National university of Singapore.

officials pointed out that there had been almost 50% rise in the Least Developed Countries (LDC) urban population.¹

Consequently, governments were less and less able to meet the needs of their improvised city residents. As nearly half of the Least Developed Countries population became urbanized towards the end of the 20th century, an estimated one-quarter lacked access to safe drinking water and 60% to sanitation.²

The slum upgrading approach could also be justified for other reasons: the potentially violent or politically troublesome reaction of slum-dwellers; the economic costs of removing slum dwellers from sources of employment; and, the disruption of social or ethnic support systems.¹

Between 1972 and 1990 the Bank helped finance a total of 116 sites-and-services and/or slum upgrading schemes in 55 nations'.³ He says Turner 'stressed a 'sites-and-services' provision of basic 'wet' infrastructure and civil engineering approach to help rationalize and upgrade self-help housing'. In reality it meant a clearance of land where an illegal settlement had been located in favour of self-help constructions. He concludes that the implications were rather disappointing but does not mention if there were violent resistances.

From history, two leaders dealt with the slum issue decisively and created cities that we all love and adore today. These are Napoleon Bonaparte in Paris and Pope Sixtus V in Rome. Both of were authoritarian rulers whose decisions could not be questioned. They ruthlessly demolished

¹ Hauser et al., 1982, Population and the Urban Future

² Sirvaramakrishnan, 1994, p.3. The Slum Upgrading Myth

³ Davis, M., *Planet of slums*, London: Verso, 2007, pp. 70 – 94.

slums, evicted slum dwellers and built the cities they envisioned.¹ While we may not take the same approach, this shows that the kind of vision and commitment required from our leaders to deal with the slum issue borders on being dictatorial.

Politics has been a major impediment to slum upgrading efforts. If politicians and powerful organizations peg their survival on existence of slums, all these efforts would come to naught.

Werlin describes four principal fundamentals for slum improvements which were not stressed enough in the first programmes between the 1970s and 1980s. Being underestimated, he states, maintenance, land acquisition, tenure and community participation have contributed to make upgrading a 'myth'. First there has been a clash between quality of improvements and scale of the programme while the installment was inadequate for instance not enough water hand pumps for the total slum population or no provision of improved sanitation and of poor quality. The problem of maintenance appears to be acute in upgrading programmes providing facilities to be shared for example toilets or water hand pumps.² However, Werlin does not discuss how the problems he mentions inform conflicts during slum upgrading.

Secure housing, as a prerequisite improvement of slums to be sustainable, and to avoid further erosion of slum dwellers' assets, has been recognized as one of the pillars of slum upgrading.

World Bank report states that titling became a mainstream development approach when the World Bank started to run revised upgrading initiatives in the 1990s: *World Bank Housing Policy Paper* recommends developing market oriented systems of property rights and allocates

¹ Lukorito W. Jones, www.nation.co.ke/lifestyle/DN2/Kibera-upgrading.../-/index.html Jun 25, 2015

² Werlin, H. (1999) The slum upgrading myth. *Urban Studies*, 36, 1523 - 1534. Wit, J.W. de (1997) Decentralization, empowerment and poverty alleviation in urban India: Roles and responses of government, NGOs and slum communities. Working Paper Series No 267, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague.

priority to upgrading systems of land titling and regularizing tenure in squatter settlements'. These recommendations were based on clearly visible profits of the slum regularization which stimulate slum dwellers 'investments in their 'capital' and enhance participation of the urban poorest in theory.¹ The work is very informative to this study which aimed at identifying issues that arise from slum upgrading programme.

Payne argues that if the slum residents realize the value of the land, the higher price of a plot may attract them to sell it and move to dwell somewhere else which is usually back to the slums.. Payne follows that such actions may therefore actually result in an increase in informal settlements rather than a decrease. In addition the 'full property' stimulates unauthorized constructions or improvements in a settlement as is witnessed in Korogocho slums.²

The slum population represents an increasingly significant vote bank.³ The large scale upgrading implementation was influenced by the recognition of slum dwellers as an important electoral base for a politician to be re- elected. Interest about urban poor had increased while they had been eligible to vote for a candidate in return for food, more secure housing or service provision.⁴ Davis concludes that upgrading and site-and-services schemes are attractive to governments for simple reasons: promise of stability, votes and taxes 2007. In many cases slum dwellers are easily seen as a tool, instead of a target for policies.

¹World Bank, *World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.

²Payne, G. (2001) *Urban land tenure policy options: titles or rights?* Habitat International 25, 415 - 429.

³Wit, J.W. De *Poverty, Policy and Politics in Madras Slums, Dynamics of Survival, Gender and Leadership*, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage, 1996. See also, Wit, J.W. de, *The socio-political impact of slum upgrading in Madras, The case of Anna Nagar 1982 – 1990*, Urban research working paper.VrijeUniversiteit Amsterdam, 1992.

⁴*Ibid.*, p.2.

In Kenya those living in ‘irregular’ settlements lobbied hard to be labelled as ‘slums’ to ensure the ‘advantages’ of an upgrading programme.¹ Moreover, politicians themselves were keen to support a formation of slums to enlarge their vote banks. In a simplified way, slum upgrading has been perceived advantageous for both local government and slum dwellers. Globally, ‘a fifth of the study households involved in upgrading reported that their economic circumstances have improved’. If increased housing stability, regular electricity and the basic sanitation enables slum dwellers to generate an income through home-based and self-employment activities and is supposed to improve the living standards of slum dwellers.

As noted by Mutsotso B. and S. Kinyanjui (ed) in their publication: *A Ticking Time Bomb: Nairobi's Informal Settlement* (2002), slums are by their nature prone to violence. Not only are the majority of the slum inhabitants unemployed, but the informal settlements provide an ideal retreat for criminals. With time, the slum dwellers have developed survival tactics, key among which is the tendency among people of the same community to live together in closely-knit ‘ethnic villages.’²

In sum, survival difficulties among the poor and the unemployed, compounded by pressure for political liberalization in the 1990s, heightened ethnic consciousness to a level that Kenya had never known before. Ethnic and political violence in their current forms have been the natural result.

¹Government of Kenya, *Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP): Implementation Strategy*, Ministry of Lands and Housing, Nairobi: Government Printer, 2003.

² Okoth Okombo and Olanga, BALAA MITAANI, *The Challenge of Mending Ethnic Relations in the Nairobi Slums* pp.15

1.9 Methodology

This study also used secondary data source from library services where relevant materials from textbooks, scholarly articles and reports on the subject were sourced. Other materials were sourced from the internet for the current articles and debates on the subject, data from UN-Habitat, Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, World Bank, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), and Agence Française de Développement (AFD) websites.

The research also utilized the participatory observations in slums and interviews with landlords and tenants. Both have been fighting for tenure of the land and houses. The research was focused on the situation in Korogocho Slums, the eight villages. The research used an inductive approach of the data analysis which aimed to answer research questions with respect of conflict in the slums associated with property ownership. There was an emerging need to understand the role of slum upgrading programme and political contacts in development practice.¹ Tools for data gathering included questionnaires, semi-structured and open-ended interviews, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and key informant interviews and questionnaires. The list of open-ended questions is attached in the annexes and limited participatory assessment methods.

The primary data gathering was done in four selected informal settlements in Korogocho. Interviews were conducted with fifty six respondents from the slums, among them thirty seven females and thirteen males. In addition, six other respondents were questioned. These six were from Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), government or were officials and university

¹Rakodi, C., "A livelihood approach – conceptual issues and definitions", In: Urban livelihoods: a people-centred approach to reducing poverty. RAKODI, C. and LLOYDJONES, T. (ed.). London: Earthscan, 2002, pp. 3 – 22.

experts from relevant institutions. Selected slums were identified according to the following criteria: location in North or Central Korogocho, proximity to each other, daily accessibility, considered to be de-facto, recognized or formalized settlements, involved in government upgrading programmes in the past or recently, and having no more than three thousand households.

CHAPTER TWO

SLUM UPGRADING PROGRAMMES IN KENYA

2.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses the Korogocho slum and the upgrading programme in the area. The initiative aimed at improving the living conditions of the slum residents and enhancing their socio-economic welfare. At the initial stage, the residents resisted the programme for fear of being disenfranchised, displaced and being further marginalization. The programme was also to address the issue of conflict that had been frequent in the area. There was a major fight between the structure owners, who were the landlords, and those who rented the structures to the new comers from the other slums. The young are involved in crime, drugs and other social deviance.

2.1 History of Slums in Kenya

Kenya is a nation located in East Africa with a population of about 40 million people.¹ The elimination of colonial restrictions on freedom of movement at independence, in 1963, meant a rapid increase in rural-urban migration of the local African population into the country's urban centres.² Kenya's urban population is approximately 30% of the total population, however 70% of these urban dwellers inhabit informal settlements that have limited access to water and sanitation, housing, employment, social services and secure tenure. These problems of poor infrastructure and services are further exacerbated by environmental degradation in these informal settlements.

¹ Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, *Kenya Census 2009: Population and Housing Census Highlights*, Nairobi: Government of Kenya, 2010.

² Lee-Smith, D., and Lamba, D., Social Transformation in a Post-colonial City: The Case of Nairobi, in M. Polese and R. Stren, *The Social Sustainability of Cities: Diversity and the Management of Change*, Toronto: University of Toronto, 2010, pp. 250-279

There is no single cause for increase of slums in Kenya. Their manifestation is a result of complex social, environmental, economic and political factors. UN-Habitat attributes the continued proliferation of illegal slums in Kenya to increased urban poverty and inequality in poor neighborhoods, the high cost of living, the inability of the urban poor to access affordable land for housing, insufficient investment in new low income housing, and poor maintenance of the existing housing stock.¹ The history of social and spatial exclusion in urban planning, both under colonial regimes and democratic governance structures is also an important factor, particularly in the case of Nairobi.

Nairobi, the capital city of Kenya, received its name from the *Maa* Clan phrase *Enkare* Nairobi, which means “The place of cold waters”. It is the largest city in Kenya, as well as the only urban province in the country.² It is the commercial and political capital of the nation and where the concentration of urban poverty resides. The population of Nairobi is approximately over 3 million people. However, it is difficult to quantify the population due to the unplanned living areas of Nairobi’s informal settlements. Nairobi has a total of 183 slums, which accommodate approximately 40% of the city’s population.³

The colonial town of Nairobi was formed through exclusionary planning policies and enforced by British laws. The city’s history of social exclusion has structured the way institutions operate as much as, or more than, it has structured physical space. It is within this context that social

¹UN-Habitat, *UN-Habitat and the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme*, Nairobi: United Nations Human Settlements Programms (UN-Habitat), 2007.

²Medard, C., “City Planning in Nairobi: The stakes, the people, the sidetracking”, in H. Charton-Bigot, and D. Rodriguez-Torres, *Nairobi Today: Paradox of a Fragmented City*, Dar es Salam: MkukinaNyota, 2010

³Shack/Slum Dwellers International, *Slum Upgrading: Making Cities Inclusive*, Nairobi: Shack/Slum Dwellers International, 2010

norms were also created and borders were formed both legislatively and socially on the premise of ethnic lines. Africans were legally prevented from owning freehold property in the city until 1920s, when the British government prohibited separation of the races. Thereafter, the settlers prevented such ownership through zoning and social pressures.¹

The proliferation and/or contraction of Kenya's slums are a physical representation of government policies that are either moving them towards an era of inclusivity or of social exclusion by their very presence. The Korogocho Slum is the greatest illustration of the social and spatial exclusion. The presence of slums has been attributed to explicit government policy and decades of official indifference by lack of inclusion for the provision of low-income housing in the budgetary process.² Historically, policy intentions to house Nairobi's population were not implemented and the state sponsored initiatives have been falling short of demand.

Nairobi's slums differ from the conventional ad-hoc and owner-builder relationship that is attributed to informal settlements. These informal spaces, much more frequently, manifest as a landlord-builder tenant relationship, in response to the issue of housing affordability and demand, which is a primary reason migrants settle into the slums instead of other areas. Rental accommodation in Kenyan towns has usually been associated with low-income households, but it has also become the main form of housing for middle-income households and new urban residents of all income levels.³

¹*Ibid.*p.22.

²Muraya, P. W. (2006). Failed top-down policies in housing: The cases of Nairobi and Santo Domingo Cities, 23(2), 2006, pp. 121-128, see also, Amnesty International, *Kenya-The Unseen Majority: Nairobi's Two Million Slum Dwellers*, London: Amnesty International, 2009.

³Mwangi, I. K., "The Nature of Rental Housing in Kenya", *Environment and Urbanization*, IV(2), 2007, pp. 141-160.

2.1.1 Life in Slums and need to upgrade

In many Sub-Saharan African cities, the slum population accounts for over 70% of the urban population. By 2030, with rapid urbanization, slum dwellers will have doubled to reach two billion. Although improving the lives of slum dwellers is a target of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), their living conditions are still harsh; they have inadequate access to safe water, sanitation and other infrastructure; poor quality housing; overcrowding and insecure residential status.¹

Consequently, the physical and mental health of slum dwellers is worse than those of non-slum dwellers. Kenya is getting urbanized rapidly. The results showed that poverty is very common in the slums of Kenyan urban areas, rates of illiteracy are high and unemployment is very high. The living conditions are poor, with lack of basic amenities such as access to clean drinking water and poor sanitation facilities. The people live in temporary shelters such as thatched huts or tents or on pavement/railway platforms. Among those who live in temporary shelters, a big percentage does not have provision of drinking water facility and toilet facilities. The health conditions detected in the study population are poor with frequent respiratory illness and other infections. Anemia was significantly higher among females of all age groups. There is prevalence of underweight among children aged 5-10 years.²

A slum is an overcrowded and squalid district of a city or town usually inhabited by very poor people. Slums can be found in most large cities around the world. They are usually characterized by high rates of poverty and unemployment. Slums are breeding centers for many social

¹ World Development Report 2011, pp 62

²Hellen O'Connell (1994) *Women and Conflict Violence against women as a barrier to sustainable development*; pp4

problems such as crime, drugs, alcoholism and despair. And in many poor countries they are also breeding centers for disease due to unsanitary conditions.¹ The term ‘slum’ speaks volumes about the plight of the urban poor. Around the world over one billion residents live in inadequate housing, mostly in slums and squatter settlements, where living conditions are poor and services are insufficient. The situation is worst in Sub-Saharan Africa where 60% of urban housing units are temporary structures.²

Slums in developing countries lack access to safe drinking water, which is one of the essentials for good health.³ Though there are municipal taps in Korogocho slums, the water is of poor quality and totally unsuitable for drinking. Regarding lighting system, as one of the measurements of quality of life, it is seen that nearly all households in slums have no electricity in their dwelling units. In the absence of electricity, kerosene lamps are largely used in most households.

2.1.2 Korogocho Street Upgrading Project

The Street Upgrading Project was executed as an activity within the framework of the larger Korogocho Slum Upgrading Programme. The programme wanted to implement some initial physical changes while advancing on the community mobilization and trust building, as the preparation of the situation analysis was being finalized. Attempts to upgrade the area had been done before but failed and this was reason for a quick physical implementation. The streets were implemented as quick win projects before the planning was done because planning had to await

¹Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia

²World Resources Report, 1998 –99: 134 – 137

³World Resources Report, 1998 – 99: 68

enumeration and a socio-economic survey.¹ The selection of streets as an infrastructure intervention was based on the priorities identified by the residents' committee during the numerous consultations and particularly at the training workshop in August 2008.

In this forum, the main priorities were stated as drainage systems, streetlights and access roads. Consequently, the upgrading of the streets in the community was identified as a project that would help to establish the residents' confidence in the overall upgrading programme and avoid resistance. The motivation was to do a project that, covering the whole area and reaching all villages, would make the entire community feel beneficial.²

The infrastructure improvement of the streets aimed at integrating Korogocho with other parts of Nairobi, improving accessibility and connectivity to both a larger context and also to neighbouring estates, as well as developing security through increasing business opportunities and street lighting. The project was envisioned to improve the image of the area and bring a sense of pride among the residents. Furthermore, the streets were thought to open up the area for development, facilitate planning and security of tenure provision, together with acting as a testing ground in terms of community acceptance of the programme.

¹ UN-HABITAT, (2012), Korogocho Streetscapes, Kago, J. "Re: *Questions about Korogocho street upgrading*". Personal e-mail dated 22 May 2012. *Documenting the role and potentials of streets in citywide slum upgrading*. Pp.45

² Ibid,

2.1.3 Sanitation in the Slums

Next to housing and safe water, sanitation is important not only for healthy living but also for ensuring a non-polluted environment. According to WHO, nearly two-thirds of urban population in developing countries do not have adequate sanitation. They lack a flush toilet, a sanitary latrine, or a pit that can be covered over. The sample survey reveals that no latrine facility of any kind was available for about 79% of slum households, hence they had to use the open fields.¹ Again, the incidence of non-existence of latrines is higher among the slum dwellers of other slums of Nairobi. Only 5% of the total Korogocho slum households had underground sewerage system, which means that 95% of the households lacked this facility.²

2.1.4 Access to Primary Health Care

Hospitals are also few in most slum areas. Though free health care facilities are available from the nearby government hospitals for minor ailments, they have to spend money on medicines for major illness, which was beyond their ability. The number of households borrowing on grounds of health has also increased in all slums around the world. The entire slum population is vulnerable. For instance, if a fire or flood wipes out peoples' temporary dwelling places, or urban authorities decide to embark on a slum clearance programme without providing alternative living spaces. Living conditions in many urban slums is worse than those in the poorest rural areas of the country.³

¹Sundari, S. (2003). "Quality Of Life Of Migrant Households In Urban Slums" in Martin J. Bunch, V. Madha Suresh and T. VasanthaKumaran, eds., *Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Environment and Health, Chennai, India.*, Chennai: Department of Geography, University of Madras and Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University, pp 6

²*Ibid*, pp 6

³World Bank Report, 1993

This can be attributed partly to the slums exceptionally unhealthy environment. Many of the most serious diseases in cities are ‘environmental’ because they are transmitted through air, water, soil and food or through insect or animal vectors. The concentration of people in areas where the provision of water, sanitation, garbage collection and health care is inadequate creates the conditions where infectious and parasitic diseases thrive and spread. Around half the urban population in developing countries is suffering from one or more of the diseases associated with inadequate provision of water and sanitation.¹

2.2 The Korogocho Slums

The origin of Korogocho slums can be traced back to between 1972 -1978. The slum started as settlements for quarry workers and the victims of demolitions of slums close to the city. The demolitions led to influx of people who created villages such as Kisumu Ndogo, mainly because most of those who moved to this village were of the Luo origin.² They were relocated from Grogan and Highridge areas and settled in Korogocho by the City Council through the influence of a former mayor of Nairobi Andrew Ngumba 1977-1980. Other inhabitants were members of the Kikuyu community who were displaced by the quarry which is the present Dandora Dumpsite.

Initially Korogocho area was grassland and bushes with some wild animals living on it. During the colonial period the entire land on which Korogocho Slum stands was government (*crown*) land. Dominic Gatheca bought some of the land from the government in the early 1980s. Squatters settled on both parts of the land. Those occupying the crown land received letters of

¹Development of International development,(*DFID*),2001:20

²Kago, J (1 May 2011); Ethnic Mobilities and Conflicts in an informal slum settlement of Nairobi, Creating WP5: Mobility & Identities, University of Nairobi, Nairobi

allotment from the Government. Those occupying Gatheca's land were allowed to construct structures and stay as squatters but on condition that whenever the land was required they would leave or face eviction without any compensation. A few of the original squatters constructed rental structures on both government and Gatheca's land and became structure owners. They charged Ksh.500/= monthly as rent to the occupants. Gradually, these Landlords moved away and only came to collect rent when due.¹

By 1980s, Korogocho had expanded and attracted many unemployed and poor people. It represented extreme situations of poverty, deprivation, disease, violence and marginalization.² In fact in Kikuyu language, '*Korogocho*' means chaos and confusion.³ Indeed the way the slum started and developed speaks volumes about it as a place of chaos. Some residents of Korogocho believe that, there existed an old man who was the first occupant of Korogocho. He was doing farming and in the *shamba* he erected some tins to scare animals such that, when it was windy, the tins would make noise "*kuruguchu*" that was later translated to Korogocho hence the name.⁴

The Korogocho slum is divided into eight ethnically based villages, the main ethnic being the Luo, Kikuyu, Luhya and Borana. Although there are the eight villages, one ethnic group may occupy more than one location due to its population in the area. Thus it is not automatic that each village is occupied by one ethnic group and most of the 42 ethnic groups of Kenya are represented in these villages. The villages include, Highridge, Grogan, Ngomongo, Ngunyumu,

¹ Fr. John and Fr. Stephano, Korogocho Upgrading Programme, www.korogocho.org/english/-31 Jan 2008

² Agbonkhanmeghe E. Orobator, S.J. From Crisis to Cairo: The Mission of the Church in the Time of HIV/AIDS, Refugees and Poverty, 2005, p. 94

³ Oral interview, Peter Mureu, April, 2012

⁴ Ochien'g M.O., "Aids Epidemic in Korogocho Slums", Working Paper, Hekima College Jesuit School Of Theology A Constituent College Of Catholic University Of Eastern Africa, 2006

Gitathuru, Kisumu Ndogo, Nyayoand Korogocho. Each village is headed by an elder who is elected by the residents. These elders are very powerful and control businesses in the slum.¹

According to the 2009 population census, Korogocho Slum houses some 120,000 dwellers crowded with an average of 5-6 persons per room. It is one of the more than 200 slums of Nairobi, covering together a mere 5% of the city territory. Two and a half million people out of the total of 4 million Nairobi residents live in the slums. Korogocho borders the largest dumping site in Nairobi, the Dandora Dumping site, which poses environmental health and security risks for the residents and the surrounding settlements. Korogocho slum is the fourth largest slum in Nairobi, after Kibera, Mathare Valley, and Mukuru-Kwa-Njenga. It is located in Kasarani Division, in eastern Nairobi, approximately 11 kilometres from the Central Business District.²

Poor hygiene prevalent in the slum has resulted in the rapid spread of cholera, malaria, typhoid, dysentery, and water and air borne diseases. Sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS are also widespread. In addition, increasing violence and crime in Korogocho, which are often met only with a repressive response, create insecurity reinforce social and ethnic tensions, and undermine social cohesion in the slum. AIDS epidemic causes much suffering to the residents of Korogocho.³ The slum has no doctors and nurses, and the real situation is of appalling poverty and deprivation. Moved by these through the Catholic Church, Medical Mission Sister Gill Horsfield started Home Based Care Programme which possesses very limited material assets. The programme is situated at the heart of the slums. It also houses a feeding programme which attempts to assist the larger population in the area.

¹*Ibid.* p.17.

²Fr. Paolo Latorre and Fr. John Webootsa, (2008), *Upgrading Korogocho*, St John Catholic Church, Korogocho.

³Ochien'g M. O., (2006), "aids Epidemic in Korogocho", Jesuit Hekima College, (C.U.E.A.), Nairobi.,pp 3

The census report enumerated the total number of households to be 18,537, with the largest of the eight villages being Korogocho, consisting 3,481 households. They live largely in structures made of temporary and recycled building materials. Some structures are made from timber or mud walling, and roofing is made up of substandard materials such as sacks, cardboard and polythene. There is neither proper sanitation nor waste management. Water reticulation is limited and the road network for access into the slums is inadequate.¹

Unemployment rates are high in Korogocho. Majority of the unemployed are youth who lack the necessary skills and education for formal employment. Most women are engaged in Small and Medium scale Enterprises (SMEs) to make a living. As in other slum settlements, many are employed as casual workers in the formal sector industries in Baba Dogo and Ruaraka area and in construction industry especially in the production of building materials including stone cutting. The rest of the population is employed in the informal businesses, with most women operating road-side business units that offer goods at cheaper rates compared to formal shops. Men on the other hand, prefer more manual based income generating activities such as carpentry, welding, and construction.²

There are several social and religious groups working in Korogocho to try and improve the people's life. They include, St. John Church which is managed by the Comboni Missionaries. The Comboni Sisters are involved in the health care and youth employment in the area. They ran a big dispensary and a dressmaking school for underprivileged girls from the neighbouring

¹Fr. Paolo Latorre and Fr. John Webootsa, (2008), *Upgrading Korogocho*, St John Catholic Church, Korogocho.

²*Ibid.*, p.30.

slums.¹ The Missionaries also had a plan to take over a plot of land adjacent to the slums and build permanent, affordable housing which the government could not demolish.² However, any efforts to upgrade the slum face a lot of resistance from the so called landlords. It is believed that most of the structure owners in Korogocho have paid a fee for permission to occupy the land. This has led to a struggle between structure owners, tenants and those who want to upgrade the slum over land and tenure rights.

Viral fevers are very common among the slum dwellers and are linked to contaminated water. Almost all households do not boil drinking water because they are poor and want to economize on fuel. Therefore, dysentery and water borne diseases were largely found among slum households of Korogocho.³ Most women respondents of younger age were anemic and stated that they suffered from frequent headaches, and nausea caused by the foul smell from the ditches, garbage dumping places, and dirty water canal beds. Rapid urbanization has adversely damaged the urban environment through air, water, solid waste and noise pollution. Slum dwellers are the worst victims of urban environment degradation.⁴

¹*Ibid.*, p.32.

²PAIGE AAHUS, Daily Nation Newspaper, *Slum Residents Build Homes without Government Assistance* December 13, 2011.

³ Oral interview, Peter Kinyanjui, April 2012, Korogocho Slums

⁴ Oral interview, Moses kiragu April 2012, Korogocho, Slums

2.3 Conclusion

Slum people are mostly the underprivileged, weakest section of our society. They are deprived of the minimum basic amenities like housing, water supply, drainage and sanitation. Women and children are the most victims because of their vulnerability. They are affected physically, mentally and emotionally. With such poor living conditions, various governments, in partnerships with humanitarian groups launched various slum upgrading projects such as the one done in Korogocho. The objectives of the efforts is to clear the slums especially those located in vulnerable areas and to resettle them in self-contained hygienic houses with basic amenities near the urban limits. There is need to prevent private land owners from evicting the slum dwellers from their huts. And to provide security of tenure for the latter, basic amenities like drinking water supply, roads, storm water drain, one public water connection, sewerage disposal and street lights in all the slums.

CHAPTER THREE

KOROGOCHO SLUM AND UPGRADING PROGRAMME

3.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses the slum upgrading in Korogocho Slums Kenya, today's best practice in slum upgrading and a historical overview of urban upgrading. The rise of the informal settlement has been on the increase in the past couple of decades. There have been also major discussions on the globe on how to find long-term solution. However, there are few successes especially in the third world where the majority of the poor reside in the slums. The noted achievements in some countries have not been used as models in resolving the problem. The debate continues in many forums.

3.1 Korogocho Slum Upgrading Efforts

The Korogocho upgrading programme came about through the Debt-For-Development Exchanges, an innovative response to the Global Financial Crisis by the western countries in 1987.¹ Two decades later, in 2007, it was estimated that these financial techniques had resulted in the cancellation of US\$ 5.7 billion of debt and the application of US\$ 3.6 billion to development projects working group on debt exchanges for education.² The efforts by the western countries gave birth to the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP) which was destined to improve the lives of those living in poor slum conditions. Kiarie and Kiberenge observed that the broad goal of the KENSUP program was to improve the livelihoods of people

¹Ross P Buckley, (2011), Debt-for-development Exchanger, Cambridge University Press, New York

²UNSECO, August, 2007, Draft Report for the Director-General..

living and working in slums and informal settlements in the urban areas of Kenya through provision of security of tenure, housing improvement, income generation and physical as well as social infrastructure.¹

KENSUP had the following objectives; to create conditions that can sustain long term nationwide slum upgrading in Kenya, harness political will, strengthen nascent forms of organization of slum dwellers, by promoting an inclusive process based on consensus and partnership, which included leadership and empowerment. It also aims at addressing inappropriate policies that contribute to the growth of informal settlements and further address and mitigate the prevalence and impact of HIV/AIDS.

Syrjänen asserts that, with regard to the above mentioned aims, the KENSUP implementation strategy defines several programmatic principles and values which are perceived as a pre-condition for the success of the program, such as “decentralization, sustainability, democratization and empowerment, transparency and accountability, resource mobilization, secure tenure, expansion and up-scaling and partnerships and networks”.² To achieve this, there was need to establish the following institutional structures; the Inter-Agency Coordination Committee consisting of the Ministry of Infrastructure, the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, the Ministry of Local Government, the Ministry of Water as well as the City County of Nairobi. The second institution was a national KENSUP-Secretariat at the Ministry of Infrastructure and the final institution was the Program Implementation Unit (PIU) located at the Housing Development Department of the City County Nairobi. Fourthly, a Settlement Program

¹Kiarie, J. and Kiberenge, K. (2010).Korogocho’s new housing irony.The Standard, 3 July, pp.1.

²Ibid. p.72.

Implementation Unit is based in each of the targeted settlements. And last was a Settlement Executive Committee (SEC) made up of community members in each settlement. Korogocho informal settlements in Nairobi become one of the beneficiaries of the upgrading programme.

In Nairobi, the implementation of slum upgrading programme commenced in Korogocho informal settlement, specifically in various villages. Various preparatory activities were undertaken in these villages including socio-economic and physical mapping, enumeration of residents, preparation of a physical land use plan and the construction of access roads.¹ Due to the high densities in the villages, a strategy was developed in which residents were to be temporarily relocated in order to pave way for upgrading of the settlement. In view of this, the government planned to obtain two hectares of decanting site situated across the settlement for purposes of constructing housing units to serve as temporary relocation premises for the Korogocho residents.² However, the process was slowed down by court cases because of the land disputes in the area.

Upgrading in Korogocho began as an effort by civil society groups in the early 2000s to engage in improving the living conditions of slum dwellers within Kenyan slums after decades of neglect from the government.³ Fueled by rural-urban migration and an inadequate amount of affordable housing in urban areas, initial settlements within Korogocho began forming in the

¹Huchzermeyer, M., *Slum upgrading initiatives in Kenya within the basic services and wider housing market: A housing rights concern*, 2006

²Huchzermeyer, Marie, *Cities with 'Slums': from informal settlement eradication to a right to the city in Africa*, UCT Press, 2011.

³Huchzermeyer, Marie. "Tenement City: The Emergence of Multistory Districts through Large scale Private Landlordism in Nairobi." *International journal of urban and regional research* 31.4 (2007): 714-732.

1970s. Several deadly fires in the settlement, in 1995, 1997 and 1999, attracted the attention of Pamoja Trust, a newly formed civil society organization.¹

A global campaign for secure tenure, which focused on partnerships, negotiated resettlements and access to land and finance in informal settlements, was launched in 2000 by UN-HABITAT.² This led to Pamoja Trust initiating its first project in Korogocho by carrying out a needs assessment survey. This established pressing community needs in areas of sanitation, health and housing improvement, as well as fears over a constant threat of eviction stemming from unsecured land tenure. Pamoja Trust thus began organizing the community around housing and land security.

A detailed intervention framework was developed in conjunction with the community, which involved mobilization through community governance structures, enumeration and mapping, as well as strategies for land tenure; participatory planning and budgeting through housing designs, income sources, management and participatory project implementation and management.³

However, the good efforts of slum upgrading in Korogocho faced numerous challenges among them, complexities of slum settlements with regard to tenure arrangements. Slum settlements have no formal tenure arrangements. Their high densities, haphazard development, lack of planning, poor housing, lack of infrastructure and the religious, cultural and political inclinations

¹*Ibid*

² UN-HABITAT and the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme Strategy Document May 2008 available at <http://www.scribd.com/doc/24935826/UN-HABITATandtheKenyaSlumUpgradingProgrammeStrategyDocument> (accessed January 27, 2013).

³ Kenya Slum Upgrading Project (KENSUP) available at <http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?cid=668&catid=206&typeid=13> (accessed January 14, 2013).

involved are some of the conditions that pose a challenge in proposing the type of tenure that is best suited to the residents' situation.¹

The upgrading processes also faces varied political, cultural and religious challenges which characterize inclinations amongst the residents, and those of their leaders have contributed in creating suspicion and mistrust amongst the residents thus slowing down decision making. It is because of these cultural and political differences that conflicts are common in Korogocho. The differences have led to the creation of the notion of us versus them even when dealing with a situation that affects all the residents.² The condition of cultural and political differences is even made worse by the competing interests of various groups such as Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Community-Based Organisations (CBOs), and Faith-Based Organisations (FBOs), Central Government, Local Authorities and donor agencies. These stakeholders have their own interests in the slum, most of which conflict therefore they are a major drawback to the slum upgrading programme in Korogocho.³

Lack of adequate land for upgrading is another major issue. There is limited land space to cater for all residents within the slum settlements, and scarcity of land for re-location where necessary because land ownership is private in most settlements. Lack of planning of informal settlements by the local authorities is a challenge towards upgrading the settlements. The land owners do feel

¹OkothOkombo&Olang' Sana, BALAA MITAANI, The Challenge of Mending Ethnic Realities in the Nairobi Slums, (2010) Fredrich Ebert Stftung (FES), Nairobi, Kenya.

² Oral interview, Moses Kiragu, April 2012, Korogocho Slums

³ Oral interview, Peter Njoroge, April 2012, Korogocho Slums

that the upgrading project might dispossess them of their land. They therefore always resist any effort to build on such land.¹

When the Kenyan Government and UN Habitat planned to upgrade the slums areas and to build standard houses with sanitary systems. Strongest opposition came from the slum dwellers themselves. Once the houses are in a better condition, also the rent would rise, and people will have to move to other slums. Upgrading benefited only the rich who could afford to live in standard houses. The people did not trust the government that they will be protected because, so far, it had not given them security of tenure. Behind the concern for maintaining standards of housing and hygiene lies an anti-migrant legislative tradition.² According to the slum dwellers the government was not interested in helping the poor but to drive them out of the city. Therefore upgrading served as a means of discrimination.

Partnership concepts also have the disadvantage of generating several parallel activities that often derail the implementation schedules. There are also issues with regard to governance and involvement of communities in decision making which have various complexities and pose challenges to the success of the project. There is lack of partnership particularly between the tenants and landlords when it comes to upgrading projects. Conflicts between tenants and landlords are therefore common due to their varied interests. The fact that nearly 85% of slum dwellers are tenants is a unique aspect of Kenyan slum settlements which greatly hampers progress in slum upgrading.³

¹ Oral interview, Japheth Oluoch, April Korogocho Slums

² (Shorter, in: Pierli/Abeledo, 2002, p. 66)

³ Government of Kenya, *Population and housing census: Analytical report on population projections*, VII. Nairobi: CBS, MFP, 1999.

3.2 Slum Upgrading Programme as a cause of Conflict

Key Challenges

The first key challenge in the implementation of the Korogocho programme was the management of the participation of the community. This is because the community had diverse interest groups ranging from youth groups, FBOs, Community Based Organisations (CBOs), “landlords”, structure owners, residents, with divergent views and interests. Moreover, there was polarisation of the community along ethnic and religious lines, requiring efforts to ensure that the community spoke with one voice. A second challenge the programme faced was scepticism due to past failed attempts to upgrade the slum. At the inception of the programme, the residents took time to engage with the partners because of mistrust. Nevertheless, the residents showed a lot of confidence with the government as they were optimistic that the government would adequately resolve the land tenure issue. Third, difficulties were experienced in the information dissemination. While the programme sensitized the residents on related activities through community *barazas*, rumours arose occasionally creating confusion among the residents. When distorted information touched on sensitive issues such as security of tenure, tensions were experienced among the residents.

The landlord-vs-tenant conflicts that erupted after the December 2007 polls have particularly popularized neighbourhood vigilantism. In the wake of the post-election violence, most of the landlords in Kawangware, Kangemi, Dandora, Kariobangi, Huruma, Korogocho and Mathare have hired vigilantes to secure their structures from destruction and to forcefully evict the tenants who illegally took occupation of their houses. Businessmen have also relied upon the services of

vigilantes to protect their shops from looting or burning. Equally, illegal tenants have constituted vigilante groups to keep away the landlords and their agents and to do “intelligence” work.¹

But the militia have also been active in land-related conflicts since the mid-1990s. With the under-developed government and public infrastructure and utilities in the slums against a background of widespread corruption among the police and land office personnel, the rate of land-grabbing in Nairobi has increased. The land grabbers have found it convenient to hire the militias to demolish temporary structures and to displace occupants. The same militias have also been used to fence off and guard the grabbed land. In situations where large populations have suffered displacement, or public utility facilities such as playing fields are lost after land grabbing, there has always been the temptation to organize a fight-back operation leading to bloody confrontations between the estate residents and the militias. Embakasi and Westlands constituencies have been particularly affected by land conflicts in the recent past.²

Slum upgrading has been defined by CITIES ALLIANCE on its web portal as a process through which informal areas are gradually improved, formalised and incorporated into the city itself, through extending land, services and citizenship to slum dwellers. It involves providing slum dwellers with the economic, social, institutional and community services available to other citizens. These services include legal land tenure, physical infrastructure, social crime, education and economic.³

¹ Okoth Okombo and Olang ,BALAA MITAANI, *The Challenge of Mending Ethnic Relations in the Nairobi Slums* pp.22

² Ibid,pp23

³ Ronald matende omwoma, March 2013, *Land tenure systems in the slum settlements of Nairobi: implications for slum upgrading programmes*, Department of lands, ministry of land, Housing and Urban Development.

Earlier attempts to upgrade slum settlements in Korogocho, Mathare 4A and Huruma in Nairobi city, had been met with a lot of resistance over the issue of land rights. The conflict was mainly between the residents and structure owners who have a de facto claim on the land but reside outside the settlements. These land related conflicts had devastatingly negative impacts on the slum upgrading processes leading to either abandonment of the projects or delays in implementation which led to escalation in costs and minimal achievements.

Although slum upgrading programmes in Korogocho faced a lot of challenges among them conflict arising from clash of interests, it achieved substantially in terms of improving the livelihood of life. It assisted in trying to address the three great scourges of slum life: namely: crime, disease and congestion. Inadequate housing and impoverished neighborhoods were key factors that explained these scourges. They worsened the quality of life for slum dwellers and negatively impacted the development of children, which, in turn, limited the potential that cities offer to the poor for overcoming poverty.

Interventions to help alleviate Korogocho slum poverty include, programmes aimed at improving living conditions, mainly through slum upgrading, public housing and sites and services projects, providing access to business credit, infrastructure improvement, utility subsidies and programs aimed at improving the income of the poor, such as job training and microenterprise development.¹ Among slum upgrading programs, there are very few that were implemented in an experimental mode in which some units such as neighborhoods, slums, schools, or households

¹Gramlich, E. M., "Infrastructure Investment: A Review Essay," *Journal of Economic Literature* 32 (3), 1994, pp. 1176-96.

were randomly given the program while others were randomly allocated to the control group. In fact, the programs usually took place in specific locations targeting certain populations.¹

Slum upgrading programmes in Korogocho comprise a wide range of interventions. On the one hand, there are integral programs, in which combined interventions take place to improve the living conditions of slum dwellers. These interventions usually include infrastructure works, provision of urban services, activities in education and health, and community development and relevant integral programmes that progressively aggregate social component into their basic infrastructure design.² Substandard housing conditions are usually found in marginal neighbourhoods of Korogocho that have certain characteristics that affect individual outcomes. Also, neighbourhood characteristics, both physical and socioeconomic, play a key role in defining the opportunities available to individuals and their families. Housing and neighbourhood conditions strongly influence the health, nutrition, education and environment of the residents. All of these factors combine to determine their access to economic opportunities and their vulnerability to social ills.³

One of the common characteristics of slum dwellers is that they live in houses without formal property rights. Property rights are of two types: the use rights the owner's right to use a good or asset for consumption and income generation and the transfer rights the owner's right to transfer it to another party as a sale, gift, or bequest.⁴ In addition to these rights, a property right also

¹Gulyani, S. and D. Talukdar, "Slum Real Estate: The Low-Quality High-Price Puzzle in Nairobi's Slum Rental Market and Its Implications for Theory and Practice," *World Development* 36(10), 2008, pp. 1916–37

²Henderson, V., "Urbanization in Developing Countries," *World Bank Research Observer* 17(1), 2002, pp. 89–112.

³*Ibid*, pp. 89-112

⁴Hutton, G. and L. Haller, *Evaluation of the Costs and Benefits of Water and Sanitation Improvements at the Global Level*, Geneva: World Health Organization, 2004.

implies the right to contract with other parties either by pledging, renting, or mortgaging the good or asset, or allowing other parties to use it. When property rights are effective, it means that the ownership structures are well defined which is not the case of Korogocho and other slums in Nairobi.

There are two main channels through which property rights affect economic development and cause conflicts during slum upgrading in Korogocho. The first channel is through the promotion of private housing investments by owners who do not feel secure about their property rights, and feel that to make long-term capital investments or plans for the future threatens their ownership rights. Secured tenure is sometimes a precursor to public investment but if not well explained to the people, they might think it is a way to rob their property.

The second channel is related to the income generation interpretation of use rights. Property rights enable owners to use their property as collateral to secure loans or as proof of assets ownership. This credit can be invested in productive projects for increasing productivity and income, and also in housing upgrades. The lack of formal property rights makes capital investments in untitled parcels highly illiquid. The assets represented by the investments cannot be recouped easily because assets without clear title are difficult to sell or use as collateral. Moreover, the lack of formal property rights denies poor families formal titles to their homes, which is a valuable insurance and savings tool that provides protection and security during challenging economic times. Without clear access to home ownership via secure property rights, people are forced to rely on informal market mechanisms, which do not always offer security of ownership.

3.3 Landlord-Tenant Relationships

One aspect of the post-2007 election violence, and the attendant lawlessness, that clearly stands out in the Nairobi slums is the unhealthy landlord-tenant relationships. As the Waki Report (p.198) states:

“The violence was also characterised by forceful displacement and evictions while areas such as Dandora and Mathare North saw deep-seated rent disputes escalating to violence.”

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter provides a review of the empirical evidence on the evaluation of slum upgrading programmes in Korogocho and of frequent components of these programmes, classifying the impact into three main groups, housing outcomes, neighborhood outcomes, and individual outcomes. The studies included in this section provide a body of evidence that suggest some conclusions regarding the effectiveness of certain types of programmes and how they can be a recipe for conflict if the underlying issues are not addressed.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONFLICT ARISING FROM KOROGOCHO UPGRADING PROGRAMME

4.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses how the Korogocho slum upgrading project in Nairobi is a case of a development project which causes conflict. This occurs through evictions and indirectly through the impairment of livelihoods by upgrading changes. The inequality between development beneficiaries and those who must bear the majority of the development costs is also discussed. The study sought to establish how conflict is linked to the KSUP the major concerns that affect the slum dwellers. It also addresses the causes of perpetual violence.

4.1 Slum Upgrading Induced Conflict in Korogocho

The Korogocho slum is one of Nairobi's largest slums. Proposals for upgrading Korogocho have been around for many decades but were delayed until after 2000 because of political wrangling over the ownership of land on which the slum stands. The slum upgrading project was integral to the Kibaki government development vision namely *Vision 2030*. It is believed that the upgrading initiative would displace many people who have nowhere to go apart from the slum. Unknown number of people, ranging somewhere in thousands, were to be affected by the disturbance of construction. The justification given for this upgrading project was that it would bring enormous benefits to thousands, whilst displacing relatively few people.¹

¹ Oral interview, Moses April 2012, Korogocho Slums, St. John Catholic church

4.1.1 Conflict Emanating from Displacement

The displacement as a result of the upgrading project in Korogocho is primarily because of one or two reasons, either the people were being displaced as a result of their restricted access to their normal life upon which they depend for their lives and livelihoods, or they are being displaced as a result of the development-induced.¹ While there are many different groups of people who are both displaced and made vulnerable to displacement as a result of the slum upgrading development project.² These displaced people include such categories as those who are being outright evicted to make way for the construction of new structures, and also those who are not formally recognized as project affected persons, since they are being evicted to make way for the buildings. The conflict arises because those who are being displaced is as a result of losing a part of the structures which they earn a living from.³

Included in this category are people who are not actually losing their land to construction but will be losing surrounding lands which they use for other important purposes. Finally, there are those whose environment alter to the point of putting their economic livelihoods in jeopardy, including people who customarily occupy or utilize public land in areas which are targeted for rehabilitation sites and who as a result must share surrounding environmental resources with these additional people.⁴ The Korogocho slum upgrading project affected some people's economic security in some very fundamental ways. Many people who were directly displaced as a result of the project received no economic compensation whatsoever. People who were displaced as a result of the building new structures were not compensated. Indeed, many received

¹Sánchez-Garzoli,(2003),Selected Bibliography on Displacement Caused by Development Projects.
<http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/65ParentDoc/InvoluntaryResettlement?Opendocument>

² Oral interview,faithWanjiku, April Korogocho, St. John catholic Church.

³ Oral interview, Peter Njoroge, April 2012, Korogocho, Slums

⁴ Oral interview, Moses April 2012, Korogocho, Slums

little or no compensation for land lost, and no compensation for other resources, such as small business, destroyed by the project. For those who were supposed to be covered under the resettlement and rehabilitation program, there were still many forms of economic victimization.¹

The structure owners felt that they were the original owners of the Korogocho properties especially land.² This made them not appreciate the KSUP programme.³ The study established that the cause of the conflict and disagreement was the implementation of KSUP programme and most of the respondents interviewed stated a numbers of reasons for the conflicts. Some respondents reported that the cause of the conflict was non-involvement of Korogocho slum dwellers in the formation and implementation of KSUP. Another alleged cause was corruption in KSUP whereby resources allocated for all people were used by a few people leaving others to suffer. The respondents further stated that jobs in projects initiated by KSUP were allocated to the relatives and friends of those in leadership of KSUP. Further the respondents felt that conflict was caused by not resettling those people whose houses were demolished during construction of roads in Korogocho area. Land was also an important cause of conflict as Korogocho Owners Association (KOA) had not agreed with KSUP on the issue of security of tenure of the land they were occupying. Members of KOA felt that KSUP wanted to alienate its land after building good houses.

There were doubts by some of the residents, as to whether KSUP was really a government project or an NGO. People feared eviction and hence permanent displacement. The elders also raised the issue of charges of beacons. Owing that each was required to pay Kshs 30,000 for each

¹*Ibid*, Oral Interview

²Fr. Paolo Latorre and Fr. John Webootsa, (18th Oct 2008) A letter: UPGRADING KOROGOCHO.

³Oral Interview, April 2012, at St. John Catholic Church, Korogocho.

structure, the owners felt that this cost was too high. The elders argued further that though Korogocho Owners Association (KOA) claimed to be owners they actually did not have documents to prove such ownership. They explained that residents proposed that organizations should partner with them either by building of the houses, and the residents would pay on monthly basis.¹

Senior Chief Nyabuto noted that there were cases where previous owners of land were the people who settled earlier in Korogocho area. They rented the structures to new comers as tenants and moved to stay in the other better estates. They came every end month to demand for rent. When KSUP started they came back to claim their plots. He also acknowledged that there was conflict in regard to survey fees. There has also been conflict with KSUP because of demolitions when construction of roads began before relocating residents. Another conflict among KOA members was the scramble for leadership.²

There was a common response to the development of slums during the 1970s and 1980s, particularly in political environment predominated by centralized decision-making, weak local governance and administration, non-democratic urban management, non-recognition of civil society movements and lack of legal protection against forced evictions.³ When it became clear to the public authorities that economic development was not going to integrate the slum populations, some governments opted for a repressive option with a combination of various forms of harassment and pressure on slum communities, leading to selective or mass eviction of

¹Oral interviews, April, 2013 Faith Wanjiku and Peter Mureu, at St. John Catholic Mission.

²Oral Interview April 2013 Nyabuto Senior Chief, Chief's Camp, Korogocho.

³Slum Upgrading Policies,<http://www.unhabitat.org>

slum dwellers.¹ Those who live in lower “levelled” estates like Grogan in Korogocho Slums still live under the constant threat of eviction as it was done in 1994. In this incident, 89 households were displaced when the city council sought to expand the playground for one of their schools. The authorities in the area claimed that the affected residents had been given notice to vacate for the expansion of the school where the children of the “better off” in that area go.²

Negotiations with slum dwellers who were considered to be illegal squatters were rare. Communities living in informal settlements were rarely offered viable alternative solutions, such as resettlement, and, more often than not, no compensation whatsoever was paid to evicted households.³ Korogocho chief Rebecca Balongo, a local government official, said

“The dredging of the Nairobi River is part of the authorities’ slum-upgrading scheme, the people will have to move but we will facilitate their relocation, there is room for them. I will make sure there is orderliness in the process and that there is no disruption to schooling.”⁴

A defiant pastor, Caleb Alingo, who set up the Korogocho School, said: “My prayer is that what God has planned and built, let no man demolish”. He continued and said, “pulling down the school would “dump these children back to the dumpsite” situated just a few metres away and from where most of the children’s parents scavenge for a living.”⁵

¹*Ibid*, Slum Upgrading Policies, <http://www.unhabitat.org>

²www.begakwabega.com/articolo2-eng.htm View shared post

³*Ibid*,

⁴Susan Njani, (June 2009) Nairobi slum residents speak out against eviction

⁵Susan Njani, (June 2009) Nairobi slum residents speak out against eviction.

4.2 Conflict Induced by Culture

Many of the slum dwellers are also victimized in terms of their cultural well-being. Perhaps the most important means of cultural victimization is the policy stance taken by the Government of Kenya in trying to resettle the slum residents out of areas that they are used to. Most of Korogocho residents have a feeling that they would be left landless if the project succeeded because they hold no legal title to land. However, in cultural terms, resettling out of Korogocho is a loss.¹ For many it would mean moving away from other important family and other social ties they have created in the slum. To the slum dwellers, resettlement threatens to culturally victimize people in other ways. These displaced people must adapt their lifestyle in that they are often moving from relative isolation and independence to a high degree of dependence on public institutions and services to protect against disastrous consequences of the move.²

4.3 The Socio-Economic Resources that led to Conflict

The residents of Korogocho revealed that their needs were violated. For instance by allocating open spaces to outsiders and previous owners who were not registered. This led to violence where the original residents vowed not to allow the new comers in the area.³ Another conflict area is the Dandora Municipal Dump Site, which is adjacent to Korogocho slums. The dumpsite has been in place for over thirty years, a direct contravention of international environmental laws, which require that dumpsites be closed down after ten to fifteen years of usage. The main victims of this eye sore are hundreds of slum dwellers from Korogocho who frequent the dump site to sort and sell garbage. Over thirty acres of solid waste is encroaching into the residential

¹ Oral interview, Moses, (April 2012), Korogocho Slums

² Oral interview, Moses (April 2012), Korogocho Slums

³ Interviewed (April 2012), Senior Chief Nyabuto, Chief's Camp, Korogocho.

houses in Dandora. The site also affects Dandora, Kariobangi and Baba Dogo residential areas with a total population of about 900,000 inhabitants.¹

The dumpsite is believed to be a multimillion dollar industry and the local politicians are believed to be highly involved in maintaining the status quo while taking different positions over the relocation of the dumpsite depending on which position is convenient to them at a particular point in time. Conflicts however arise between members of the above co-operatives and slum upgrading stakeholders. While they support slum upgrading activities which improve infrastructure and housing, they resist efforts to develop a solid waste management system which they claim would deny them market for the wastes they collect, sort and sell. This explains why they resist relocation of the dumpsite. Youths who are involved in garbage collection from households also attempt to frustrate these efforts.²

4.4 The Influence of Politics and Ethnicity on Conflict

The historical reality in Kenya since political independence in 1963 has been that political power is the single most predictable determinant of the fortunes and misfortunes of communities, especially in terms of the availability of and accessibility to medical, educational, transport, financial and other resources that enhance their well-being. While the well-being of individual citizens may depend on their personal efforts in such areas of enterprise as education, business, professional careers, interpersonal and networking, politics plays a bigger influencing role.³

¹Oluoch Japheth Ogola and Fr. Daniel Moschetti (Combon Missionaries), Report on Upgrading Korogocho.

²*Ibid*, Report on Upgrading Korogocho

³OkothOkombo&Olang' Sana, BALAA MITAANI, The Challenge of Mending Ethnic Relations in the Nairobi Slums, (2010) Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Nairobi, Kenya

For instance, the communities that had a lot of political power at independence, especially the Luo and the Kikuyu, have become bitter rivals over state power. The flames of this rivalry have been fanned by politicians to the extent that it sometimes threatens the very existence of Kenya as a nation. Whereas ethnicity in itself need not be a problem, politicized ethnicity has been observed to be a big threat to national integrity.¹ The Korogocho slums being part of the population has experienced much antagonism as regards to ethnicity.² Most of the structures are owned by the Kikuyu who rent them to the Luo tenants. At some point the Luo tenants vowed not to pay rent because the land belonged to the government. However, the Kikuyu had built the structures, but thus, they needed to return whatever money they had used to construct the structures. In view of this, the Kikuyu would collect rent while armed with pangas and machetes in case of any eventuality or resistance from the tenants.

Another reason for conflict in slums is the landlord-tenant relationships. One aspect of the 2007 PEV and the attendant lawlessness, that clearly stood out in the Nairobi slums is the unhealthy landlord-tenant relationships. As quoted in the Waki Report;

*....“the violence was also characterised by forceful displacement and evictions while areas such as Dandora and Mathare North saw deep-seated rent disputes escalating to violence”.*³

¹*Ibid.* pg.9

²Our Creative Diversity: Report of the World Commission on Culture and Development, (Unesco, 1995:55)

³Waki Report (Pp.198)

4.5 Conclusion

Development is supposed to be beneficial. It is supposed to be the creation of a better life. Within the context of a nation, the state is supposed to be committed to the whole development of all the people. It has a responsibility to ensure equitable distribution of the costs and benefits of development projects, especially when they are state projects. Yet the potential benefits of the creation of the slum upgrading seem to be against the real poor people who are supposed to be a target. In turn, the costs are largely being born by an already disadvantaged segment of society.¹ This becomes a recipe for violence against the projects sometimes meant to be of benefit to the poor people. The poor tend to prefer the status quo because development comes with uncertainties and fear that more dominant economic players may outwit them. Consequently conflicts usually arise between targeted beneficiaries and implementing agencies.

¹Amnesty International (June 2009), Kenya: *The unseen majority Nairobi's two million slum-dwellers* Oral interview, Rose Owino, KiberaSlums,pp 27

CHAPTER FIVE

IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT ON KOROGOCHO

5.0 Introduction

There are divergent perspectives about the influence of slums on public safety and security, social life, economic productivity and local governance of residents of cities. For some, cities are the dominant civilizing factor and hubs of innovation. The concentration of people, capital and resources has afforded exceptional opportunities for political, social, cultural and economic advancement. Yet for others, cities and their informal settlements are chaotic infernos in which disorganized and aggressive groups co-exist with legitimate authorities, and where for many, criminal violence and poverty are dominant forms of living. This section considers some impact of violence in Korogocho and its implications for poorer segments of society who live in the area.

5.1 Conflict and Violence as a Driver of Underdevelopment

The direct and indirect effects of slum violence are experienced acutely by the urban poor. This is because urban insecurity tends to be spatially concentrated in poorer neighborhoods and slums and in some cases intentionally so. Korogocho is highly associated with police repressions and intimidation or extortion by organized criminals in slums. As such, neighborhood gangs and vigilante groups may mobilize for the purposes of self-defense or predation, but, alternately, can put themselves at the service of politicians and business people as has been the case from Korogocho.¹

¹ Oral interview, Peter Njoroge (April 2012), Korogocho Slums

While many of the direct physical manifestations of Korogocho slum violence are documented, its indirect consequences are often more intangible and difficult to track. Korogocho slum violence is most clearly expressed by the annual tally of conflict deaths, homicides, assaults, robberies and sexual violence. Yet it is underneath the surface that the medium to long-term effects of violence are extensive. It is also detected in transformed livelihoods, voluntary and involuntary migration patterns to, from and within affected neighborhoods, and the reconfiguration of social and market organization and the legitimacy of municipal institutions. Slum violence transforms the administrative, symbolic and material landscapes of inner cities and suburban neighborhoods. Pervasive fear, for example, has led to the physical separation of insecure zones from surrounding areas by urban planners and the police, resulting in constant fear.¹

The restricted access of residents living in high-crime neighbourhoods to social and economic opportunities on the outside can in turn reinforce their sense of exclusion and segregation as predicted by social disorganization and stress theorists. These sentiments can give rise not only to social and psychological stigmatization, fear and evasion as has been amply researched in Korogocho, Kibera and Mathare slums but also to more frustration and ultimately renewed violence. In the long-term, reduced contact amongst neighbours of the same city reinforces perceptions of insecurity among wealthier residents, who may alter their habits and still isolate themselves further. In these and other ways, urban violence creates a vicious cycle in which relationships among urban residents are transformed along with the ways in which they relate to their built environment.² Aside from claiming lives, causing tremendous physical pain and

¹ Oral interview, Moses (April 2012), Korogocho

² Oral interview, Moses (April 2012), Korogocho

emotional suffering, conflict and armed violence disrupts markets, displaces populations, destroys schools, clinics and roads, and scars families, communities and societies.¹

Slum violence comes with a lot of tangible and measurable aspects of human welfare: aspects that are less easily measured such as the psychological effect of conflict and armed violence are no less important. In *Combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases*, the World Bank reports that places affected by violence are home to forty percent of persons living with HIV/ AIDS.² The Geneva Declaration reports that poor living conditions, increase in sexual violence and prostitution, and introduction of infected combatants back into society are some ways in which diseases flourish in conflict affected and fragile environments.³ On the upgrading of the Maternal Health Care, the Economic Commission on Africa reports that all countries with the highest maternal mortality ratio in 2008 were in conflict or were post-conflict.⁴ The Geneva Declaration writes that conflict and violence can result in the diversion of state revenues from health care, destruction of infrastructure, and the displacement of women. All these are factors that prevent improvements to the conditions of Maternal Health Care.⁵

The impact of violence on women's mental health is hard to overestimate. Violence erodes their self-esteem, and confidence to work at lifting themselves out of poverty. Social sanctions often prevent women from discussing violence openly: By '*bottling it up*' they compound their emotional problems, as well as cut themselves off from potential sources of support.⁶ In

¹Geneva Declaration, *Armed Violence Prevention And Reduction Challenge For Achieving The Millennium Development Goals* (2008), p7.

²*Op cit* World Bank, p 62.

³*Op cit* Geneva Declaration, p 18.

⁴*Op cit*Economic Commission for Africa, p 65

⁵*Op cit*Geneva Declaration, p 18.

⁶*Violence against Women as a Barrier to Sustainable Development, women and conflict* by Helen O'Connell, pp 4

Korogocho slums the population is affected by similar events. Sexual violence, especially targeting women and children both girls and boys, is prevalent in the slums. In February 2011, World Bank trust fund financed an action research programme in Nairobi's Korogocho informal settlement to monitor conflict, crime and violence. Working with the African Institute for Health and Development (AIHD), the project supported locally elected groups to assemble monthly and discuss their communities' problems and drivers of conflict, crime and violence. During the discussions, community members noted that incidents on robbery, murder, theft, rape, stabbing, gang violence and similar issues, were documented in detail in an anonymized database.¹

5.2 Death and Victimization in the City

Arguably, the most visible and widely reported manifestations of slum violence in Korogocho area has fatal consequences. Such violence can occur within the home amongst intimate partners or family members, on the street with unknown assailants, and as a result of encounters with public, police and paramilitaries or armed groups. Korogocho slum settings tend to register comparatively high rates of such violence, partly owing to the more sophisticated reporting systems in the slums.² Public authorities and scholars alike have long observed how slum homicide rates in particular tend to be higher than the national average. Indeed lethal violence tends to be clustered in slum areas of cities. Homicidal violence, in particular, appears to be concentrated in lower income areas, and amongst lower-income families. Across time and space, lower income urban areas tend to experience higher rates of violence and victimization and within these areas, poor, marginal and vulnerable social groups are more at risk than others.³

¹World Bank Report, p 55.

²Rev. Fr. Dr. NdikaruWaTeresia,(December, 2011), *Crime Causes and Victimization in Nairobi City Slums*:International Journal of Current Research Vol. 3, Issue, 12, pp.275-285,

³*Ibid*.pp 275-285

Without clear compensatory methods to the so called landlords in Korogocho, Landlords formed armed militias to assist in resisting upgrading projects. Unless power and control are addressed, issues of land tenure or the control of neighborhoods by predatory gangs often in collusion with state authorities, urban renewal schemes are purely cosmetic.¹ Many of these and other early slum upgrade efforts were noticeably quiet on issues of safety and security. In the past, slums were often viewed by urban elite as dangerous no-go areas and so-called under-governed spaces where non-authorized groups and informal economies held sway. In Korogocho, there are a slew of reasons for the limited engagement of urban planners and upgrading efforts more generally with questions of urban safety. In some cases, issues of urban crime were considered to be the purview of national or state-level policing actors and thus too sensitive for local municipal engagement. The fear of politicizing already volatile community-based processes frequently discouraged more proactive partnerships across sectors.

Although men are more likely to kill or be killed in urban and rural settings alike, the rates of non-fatal victimization by violence are more equal by gender. Overall, men are only slightly more likely than females to be victimized by violence in urban settings. While males tend to experience higher rates of physical assault and violent robbery, women tend to suffer from dramatically higher rates of sexual violence, including rape.² Of course, the costs and consequences of Korogocho slum violence extend far beyond violent death and non-fatal injury. There are also dramatic and long-lasting psychological and behavioral implications associated with exposure to violence in urban settings. New insights from neurology, biology and the

¹ *Tenure options for informal settlements: Assessment of tenure options in selected informal settlements in Kisumu and Nairobi*, Shelter Forum (2007).

² *Ibid*, pp 275-285

behavioral sciences confirm the ways in which direct forms of violence result in physiological changes in both perpetrators and victims.¹

5.3 Socio-Economic Welfare in the City

There are many ways in which overlapping forms of violence in Korogocho contributed to and exacerbate poverty in the slum. The debate on the relationships between organized violence and poverty is particularly well developed in the conflict studies literature and extends across several decades. Researchers all over the world show that domestic and intimate partner violence impoverishes women and girls, as well as their children. Interpersonal and collective violence also generate a disproportionate effect on the assets of the poor as compared to the assets of other groups. Slum violence also appears to exacerbate urban inequality and vice versa.² Violence, poverty and inequality are linked in a vicious cycle: inequality spawns violence, which in turn worsens poverty and increases inequality even more. Urban violence has long-term and potential inter-generational implications for the poor. In slums and shantytowns affected by persistent violence across Nairobi, one encounters long-term stigma of the residents and stubborn persistence of poverty.³

This confluence of stigmatization, violence and poverty generate prolonged impacts on local coping and adaptation strategies including geographic and socio-economic mobility. Poorer households can bunker down, sometimes for generations, as a protective measure further eroding

¹*Ibid*, pp 275-285

²Geneva Declaration, Armed Violence prevention and Reduction Challenge for achieving the millennium development goals,(2008), pp 7

³Op cit World Bank, pp 62

their access to precarious entitlements.¹ More research into the long- term effects of urban violence on constraining individual, family, household and community exposure and interaction is required. Urban violence slows economic growth and impedes social development. The most obvious cost generated by violence is the value of resources used to attempt to control it or treat its consequences, public and private expenditures on police, security systems and judicial services.² Urban insecurity also curbs macro and micro- economic productivity in several ways. In many crime-affected cities, employees are reluctant to work after dark when the streets are considered insecure. Employers and investors are less inclined to invest in cities where their assets are likely to be destroyed or stolen. All of these deterrents can negatively influence the foreign and domestic revenues and ultimately the sources of livelihood for the poorest quintile groups.³

5.4 Erosion of Urban Governance in the City

Slums are at the axis where formal government occurs and where states and citizens mediate the social contract. Global, national and local governance challenges are also most immediate and visible on the city frontlines. Regardless of whether they want to or not, municipal leaders and activists are often impelled to address the direct and indirect effects of slum violence well before national governments, much less international or regional entities.⁴ But as this chapter shows, the symptoms of Korogocho insecurity are not just a result of a failure of County Government or even Central Government, law and order or even socio-economic inequality, but also the degradation or collapse of the equilibrium of expectations between public authorities and

¹Op cit Geneva Declaration, pp 18

²World Development Report, (2011), Conflict , Security and Development

³www.ecineq.org/milano/WP/ECINEQ2011-197.pdf, by L Becchetti - (2011)

⁴*ibid*,pp 3-4

citizens. The physical and psychological separation arising from slum violence can lead to “divided cities” and socio- symbolical segregation that undermines the social and economic structures and formal and informal organizations that constitute a city’s mode of governance. The progressive deterioration of relations between authorities and citizens and the ways in which people are excluded from participation and planning can unravel the social contract.¹

5.5 Displacement to and from the City

Across urban settings real and perceived violence influences the decision of individuals and households to stay in their homes or to relocate elsewhere. Whether in upper or lower income settings, it is affluent households and in particular those with pre-school and school-aged children that are inclined to leave first with the poorer often staying behind. This exodus of human capital frequently results in neighborhoods being deprived of their most educated and productive populations and a decline in the quality and quantity of services.² There are other pronounced forms of population movement associated with armed conflicts and organized criminal violence in slums.³ As in centuries past, before, during and after intense bouts of armed conflict, refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) often temporarily or permanently relocate to cities for sanctuary. A considerable number often the poorer and more vulnerable relocate and resettle in temporary “camps”, some of which become protracted and acquire city-like characteristics. In addition to violence, there are a host of more subtle factors shaping individual and household decisions to flee or migrate to or from urban areas.⁴

¹Tewdwr-Jones, M., &Allmendinger, P. (1998), deconstructing Communicative rationality: Environment and planning, 30, 1975-1989.

²Nairobi's Silent Majority Fights Back, by Rasna Warah [www.peopleandplanet.net] - 11 May 2004

³*The International Network on Displacement and Resettlement* - <http://www.displacement.net>

⁴*Ibid*, - <http://www.displacement.net>

The 2007-PEV was a landmark event in Kenya's history in general, and for the slums community in particular. The life was not the same any more. It was beginning the life from the start. Coupled with other resources related conflict the slum dwellers were faced with a very gloomy future. There were urgent interventions required to return some kind of normalcy. But beneath the violence lie some immeasurable long-term consequences about which only a little thought is usually given. Killings, displacement, destruction of property and looting needed some solutions in order to create some hope in the mind of the people.¹

On the social front, post-election violence provoked mistrust and bitterness between ethnic communities on both sides of the political divide. In the Korogocho slums, a joint force of mainly Luo and Luyhia youths who identified with ODM vented their anger against the Kikuyu, Embu, Meru and later the Kamba, the majority of who were perceived to identify with the PNU. The attacks were met with resistance, counter-attacks, and revenge which only increased loss of lives and destruction of property. Indeed, more than a hundred people perished in the area alone, while thousands were hurt and an unknown numbers displaced through arsonist activity and forceful evictions.

The landlord-versus-tenant conflicts that erupted after the December 2007 polls had particularly popularized neighbourhood vigilantism. In the wake of the post-election violence, most of the landlords in Kawangware, Kangemi, Dandora, Kariobangi, Huruma, Korogocho and Mathare hired vigilantes to secure their structures from destruction and to forcefully evict the tenants who illegally took occupation of their houses. Businessmen had also relied upon the services of

¹Susan Njani, (June 2009), Nairobi Slum Residents Speak Against Eviction.

vigilantes to protect their shops from looting or burning. Equally, illegal tenants had constituted vigilante groups to keep away the landlords and their agents and to do “intelligence” work.¹

But the militia had also been active in land-related conflicts since the mid-1990s. With the under-developed government and public infrastructure and utilities in the slums, against a background of widespread corruption among the police and land office personnel, the rate of land alienation in Nairobi had increased. People who grabbed land had found it convenient to hire the militias to demolish temporary structures and to displace occupants. The same militias had also been used to fence off and guard the alienated land. In situations where large populations suffered displacement, or public utility facilities such as playing fields were lost after land alienation, there was the temptation to organize a fight-back operation leading to bloody confrontations between the estate residents and the militias. Embakasi and Westlands constituencies had been particularly affected by land conflicts.²

As noted by Mutsotso B. and S. Kinyanjui in their publication: “slums are by their nature prone to violence. Not only are the majority of the slum inhabitants unemployed, but the informal settlements provide an ideal retreat for criminals. With time, the slum dwellers have developed survival tactics, key among which is the tendency among people of the same community to live together in closely-knit ‘ethnic villages.’ In sum, survival difficulties among the poor and the unemployed, compounded by pressure for political liberalization in the 1990s, heightened ethnic consciousness to a level that Kenya had never known before. Ethnic and political violence in their current forms have been the natural result.”³

When asked some of the consequences of conflict in Korogocho slum, the leading consequence was named as fights, followed closely by deaths, destruction of property, increase in insecurity

¹Okoth Okombo and Olang BallaaMitaani, (2010),The Challenge of Mending Ethnic Relations in the Nairobi Slums,Pp. #22by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES),Nairobi.

²*Ibid.* Pp. #23

³Mutsotso B and S. Kinyanjui, (2002),A Ticking Time Bomb: Nairobi’s Informal Settlement

and displacement of residents.¹ The fights were triggered by poor common sharing of resources and tribal emotions. The culture of cartelism and gate-keeping in Korogocho is a recipe for inter and intra-community conflicts. A small clique who came to the limelight as leaders of Korogocho Owners Association (KOA), tenants groupings, village elders, community representatives in several Community Based Organization,(CBO) and Faith Based Organization (FBO) working in Korogocho turned themselves into a cartel which no longer cared about the welfare of the people they represented and the difficult circumstances which led to their ascension to positions of community leadership

Individuals who lost friends, relatives and property are still bitter, and some are ready to revenge should an opportunity arise. The problem of internal displacement emerged in tandem with food scarcity, orphan-hood and unattended children, broken marriages, uncertainty, and general insecurity caused by the militias. Many residents are still traumatized by their experiences during the violence. On the economic front, businesses were destroyed through looting, vandalism, and arson. Unemployment became an immediate problem in the slums because small-scale businessmen lost their uninsured sources of income. Investors' confidence also fell sharply owing to widespread insecurity and uncertainty about the future of the Orange Democratic Movement and Party of National Unity coalition occasionally characterized by power struggles between the two principals.

Tenants who occupied houses without paying for them during post-election violence in most parts of Nairobi, especially in slums, agreed to surrender the houses to the owners. The residents of Kiambiu, Mathare, Korogocho and Kibera slums agreed to return the houses that did not

¹Peter Mureu, Oral Interview, in April 2012, Korogocho

belong to them in the spirit of reconciliation, healing and national cohesion. The tenants agreed towards unity after a series of dialogue initiated by the Kenya Tuna Uwezo (KTU) civil society group in partnership with Peace Net Kenya, spanning over the past five years. Some youth could not identify the owners of the houses. They were seized by individuals during the violence and were sold or rented to the third parties. However, after the reconciliation and healing discussion they were now willing to return the properties.¹

With the mounting uncertainty about the future development of the slums, fewer people are likely to invest in the slum rental structures because of the high risks involved in the enterprise. Already, a number of structure owners have sold out their parcels and shifted to areas considered less risky. Consequently, the demand for housing has surged in the slums against a sharp drop in supply, thereby increasing rental costs. There are also indications that some investors, who chose to stay put, employ the subtle use of militias to enforce compliance from errant tenants. In general, it is difficult to make a concrete generalization on the future of landlord-tenant relations in Nairobi's slums. Perhaps, the relations will be influenced more by the character and dispositions of the parties in a contract, so that good landlords get good tenants and vice versa. However, there are indications that landlords are likely to become more selective, uncompromising and innovative in dealing with tenants.

5.6 Conclusion

Korogocho slum violence affects city neighborhoods and their communities in myriad ways. In some cases, this neglect can fuel resentment and resistance. This chapter has noted how the conflict affects life in Korogocho. It also shows how urban violence is often a function of a

¹Rawlings Otieno, *Conflict Mitigation and Civil Society in Slums*, Saturday Newspaper, Tuesday, August 27th 2013

convergence of risk factors and a failing of protective factors. Moreover, urban violence can also change over time as a result of value-based codes sanctioning violence, transitioning into forms of revenge and vengeance, reproduced in the political arena as protest and then reemerging later as a form of criminality.¹ In almost all cases, public institutions shape its direction, incentivize or deter its reproduction, and play a role in its expansion, containment and termination. In certain fragile cities, political elite may in fact be driving urban violence either to secure new rents, distract attention from persistent challenges, or otherwise.

This chapter has shown that there are conflicts that keep erupting in the community either at family, institutional or village level. The conflicts are resolved through local conflict resolution mechanisms.² The most frequent conflicts in all the villages were due to, robbery, tribalism, politics, domestic issues, backbiting, debts, provision of security by vigilante groups, tenancy and roadside business spaces.³

¹R.A. Dahl and B. Stinebrickner [Modern Political Analysis- Sixth Edition]

²Okoth Okombo & Olang' Sana, (2010), The Challenge of Mending Ethnic Relations in the Nairobi Slums; *The Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI)*, pp.34, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Nairobi

³ Okoth Okombo and Olang, Ballaa Mitaani, (2010), The Challenge of Mending Ethnic Relations in the Nairobi Slums, Pp. #17-24, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Nairobi.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

6.0 Conclusion

Over one billion people around the globe live in slums and according to the United Nations as many as 1.4 billion will be living in slums by 2020.¹ The United Nations observes that there is need for concerted focus on upgrading the slums. Slum upgrade programs became increasingly common since the 1970s as a counter to more traditional strategies, such as razing slums and resettling populations. Indeed, the seventh United Nations Millennium Goal calls for the improvement of the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020 and a host of guidelines have emerged to set out principles for positive slum upgrading.²

The high urban migration rates to towns and cities in developing countries has often resulted in very crowded unplanned developments referred to as informal settlements. These are typically characterized by lack of infrastructure and other basic amenities. The relevant government and quasi-government agencies charged with responsibility of housing provision are unable to cope with the high demand resulting in the relegation of the task to the users. Consequently, proliferation of poor housing and slums within the towns and cities in Kenya is currently a serious problem especially for the low-income earners. The solution to the housing problem is left to the people themselves using their own means.

¹Task Force on Improving the Lives of Slum Dwellers,(April 18, 2003) *The World at Six Billion and World Urbanization Prospects*:pp.4

² *Ibid*, pp.7

Many other social vices emanate from the poor living conditions because of tight spaces and congested living that is inhumane. Due also to poor basic facilities the residents are prone to disease outbreaks and epidemics. There is a definite socio-economic cost to the country due to the negative consequences in the slum areas. The socio-political situation and advantages for the policy makers could be one of the factors that contribute to the apparent laissez-faire attitude.

The discussion presents the summary of the study findings. It also presents conclusion on the undertaking of the study. Korogocho an area identified with a couple of hurdles but the residents find themselves still surviving. Promises have been made by many who try to find solutions for the many challenges affecting the residents. Some of the solutions do not last long before any tangible mark is realized. Both the NGOs and the Kenya government seem not organized in finding a lasting solution. However, the effort faces a lot of challenges. The first key challenge in the implementation of the Korogocho programme was managing the participation of the community.¹ This was because the community had diverse interest groups ranging from youth groups, FBOs, CBOs, “landlords”, structure owners, residents, with divergent views and interests. Moreover, there was polarisation of the community along ethnic and religious lines, requiring efforts to ensure that the community spoke with one voice.

The promotion of slum upgrading is based on an assumption that poverty alleviation interventions in informal settlements can stimulate transformations in urban safety and ultimately real and perceived security.² It is worthy noting, however, that the outcomes of slum upgrading are still highly contested with some observers detecting varying socio-economic dividends for

¹ Oral Interview, (April 2012), Senior Chief Nyabuto, Chief’s Camp, Korogocho Slum

² Toepfer,(1999), “Cities For All”, ‘The Urban poor are the most excluded in group in cities’, Habitatpress@unchs.org.

the urban poor. The impact of slum upgrading reveals some incremental gains with regard to service delivery, including security promotion, and also reveals occurrences of violence resistant methods. Some of the more negative experiences with upgrading programmes are attributed to weak government institutions, challenges in acquiring the land on which communities were to be re-settled which led to major delays, overvalued pricing, and poor quality of physical works. In some communities, there have been major problems including violent armed resistance.¹

This study has shown that slum upgrading programmes or efforts were aimed at closing the gap between formal and informal settlements and reduce the social distance between communities while marginalizing more repressive and illicit structures and institutions.² While focused predominantly on poverty reduction, a host of interventions seeking to improve living conditions in slums over the past two decades have sought to indirectly engage with questions of urban safety. The Local Partnership for Urban Poverty Alleviation Project in Korogocho were launched by national and City Council governments to upgrade essential infrastructure, promote open public spaces, formalize land title and tenure and improve housing.³ Many were complemented with targeted interventions to promote income generation through job training and micro-finance schemes and support for local enterprise. In some cases, they also invested in health care systems and leisure centers and other education opportunities for at-risk groups.⁴

¹*Impact Evaluation for Slum Upgrading Interventions*: Erica Field and Michael Kremer, Harvard University, NBER, and BREAD. Email: efield@latte.harvard.edu, Harvard University; Brookings Institution; NBER, and Center for Global Development. Email: mkremer@fas.harvard.edu.

²Amnesty International, (June 2009), Enabling shelter strategies, pp.160-161.

³Government of Kenya, (2009a), Ministry of Local Government (MOLG), Government printing press, Nairobi.

⁴UN-HABITAT, Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP)

At the same time, a number of urban upgrade and slum renewal schemes have also aimed to improve livelihoods while also directly influencing safety and security.¹ Many of these interventions emphasize a combination of investment, service delivery, physical infrastructure investment and training. Inspired by theories associated with social connectivity, they also seek to deliberately bring together the formal and informal areas of cities and promote more exchange between them. It is anticipated that this multi-track approach successfully builds up the local stock of capital while also bridging divides. Alongside the push for urban renewal and support for slums has been a growing chorus to transform modes of urban governance in order to stimulate social cohesion and economic development.² The fact is that governments are central to planning and implementing interventions designed to address violence in the city. At the root of many failed strategies is not always a lack of political will, but according to the director of the urban governance program for UN-Habitat, a lack of ability amongst municipal governments who do not have the requisite personnel, skills and capital to address rapid urbanization.

In this conclusion it was noted that the world is rapidly urbanizing and the share of urban dwellers residing in impoverished corners of cities is expanding. The shifts in urban growth and concentrations of urban poverty are especially pronounced in Nairobi city and other cities across the Sub-Saharan Africa. Across these regions and others, a considerable number of large and middle-sized cities are confronting chronic and acute forms of urban violence. A widely dispersed range of policy makers and scholars are becoming aware of the dilemmas posed by urbanization, urban poverty and urban violence. Cities are in some instances more nimble than nation states which are increasingly finding it difficult to manage and navigate global dilemmas.

¹Korogocho Slum Upgrading Programme (KSUP), Website: www.ksup.org

² Millennium Project, (April 18, 2003), Task Force on Improving the Lives of Slum Dwellers, pp 7-8

Large-scale environmental risks and volatile markets operate far outside the control of solitary countries, and states are also often too overwhelmed to adequately address the diversity of needs found within dynamic and pluralistic urban areas.

The research has significantly indicated that there is some anecdotal evidence that effective interventions to prevent and reduce conflict amongst the urban poor combine both hard control and soft prevention tactics. Where subjected to controlled study, it is also apparent that short-term measures ranging from the enforcing by-laws on firearms and alcohol, targeted policing interventions, and certain forms of urban renewal can generate sharp reductions in organized violence. But it is also the case that the effects are often limited over time. Much less is known about medium- to long-term interventions that de-concentrate poverty, promote more income and horizontal equality, or sanction norms condemning urban violence. The cost-benefits and value for money of these measures are seldom interrogated.

This research has shown how urban violence is often a function of a convergence of risk factors and a failing of protective factors. Moreover, urban violence can also change over time as a result of value-based codes sanctioning violence, transitioning into forms of revenge and vengeance, reproduced in the political arena as protest and then reemerging later as a form of criminality. Urban violence affects city neighborhoods and their communities in myriad ways. Yet community residents particularly in poorer areas are often neglected by municipal authorities in the identification and design of intervention priorities and strategies. In some cases, this neglect can fuel resentment and resistance. This study has noted how the creation of mechanisms and platforms for “communication” and “cooperation” are a central pillar of any “full

community” response. As is widely recognized by development practitioners, the participation and ultimately ownership of interventions by communities is central to ensuring their longevity, much less effectiveness.¹

It is only through their active participation can that trust be rebuilt, social networks reactivated, and collective action achieved. Community engagement is not just an add on, but an essential feature of the social contract and legitimate governance in most urban settings affected by chronic violence.² Moreover, the ways in which intermediaries are themselves influencing or affected by urban violence are also under-examined. Finally, the implications of overzealous external engagement is also known to negatively influence community participation in complex ways, including by reducing local leverage in response to newly empowered nodes of authority. There is a need for more research on local strategies of cooperation, cooptation and resistance in relation to urban violence, particularly amongst the poor

A second challenge the programme faced was skepticism due to past failed attempts to upgrade the slum. At the inception of the programme, the residents took time to engage the partners to avoid mistrust. Nevertheless, the residents showed a lot of confidence in the government as they were optimistic the government would adequately resolve the land tenure issue. Third, difficulties were experienced in information dissemination. While the programme sensitized the residents on related activities through community barazas, rumours did arise occasionally

¹Korogocho socio-economic survey report_June_9_2010, Participatory Training Promotions Institute Ltd pp 19,

²Landaeta, G., (2004), Living in unauthorized settlements – housing improvement and social participation in Bolivia, Lund, Sweden: Department of Housing Development & Management Construction and Architecture – Lund Institute of Technology.

creating confusion among the residents. When distorted information touched on sensitive issues such as security of tenure, tensions arose among the residents.¹

The study concluded that KSUP programme would improve housing and life in Korogocho slums. With improved housing and infrastructure; there would be enhanced security, improved sanitation and sewerage system and reduced congestion and openness of area due to improved roads. The construction of better roads would greatly improve their businesses.² Even in the midst of crimes, insecurity and evictions, the informal settlement residents have demonstrated their ability to mobilize resources, devise survival strategies and build social capital and organizations to address the problems posed by the physical and social realities of their residences. To this end, an important goal of the SUP and policies of the 1990s has been to reduce the constraints faced by these communities by unveiling initiatives that provide the needed support for improvement without disrupting the social - economic fabrics of the target people.

By addressing the issue of security of tenure and access to services and better housing, the upgrading of informal settlements and their integration into the fabric of the city is a necessary step towards more equitable and habitable cities. Upgrading initiatives not only have the potential to build new models and paradigms of urban inclusion and planning, but should also be considered as realistic ways to face the challenges of urbanization and poverty eradication in the cities of the developing world. This is because they can facilitate full use of existing and hidden resources at community and municipal level. The KSUP should also effectively engage all

¹Government of Kenya, Ministry of Local Government [MOLG]. (2009a). Economic Survey

² Interview, Oluoch Japheth Ogola and Fr. Daniel Moschetti: report on Upgrading Korogocho.

parties and stakeholders affected by the programme; this includes the Residential Community (RC) and Korogocho Owners Association (KOA) so as to solve wrangles between them. Currently, Korogocho Owners Association (KOA) feels that KSUP want to grab their land; hence there is need for KSUP and the agitated parties to arrive at a consensus on the issues that affects them. The study concluded that KSUP should come up with ways to incorporate the youth and women in the housing upgrading process as a way of reducing conflict and enhancing transparency among the residents.¹ This can be done through accommodating more women and youth in the leadership team of KSUP and communicating any development that is taking place in the area for transparency purposes.²

Catholic priests, the village elders and the Chief, acknowledged that housing in Korogocho was poor and it was characterized by semi-permanent housing with leaking roofs, no title deeds and no policy. This status led to congestion in the slum, poor and limited services and social amenities. On the other hand, elders felt that demolitions affected the water and sanitation due to removal of pipes and demolition of toilets. They also indicated that the environment was not friendly improper disposal of water and increased poverty in the area. There were issues and challenges of ownership which led to conflict between the Residential Community (RC) and Korogocho Owners Association (KOA).³

Despite some successes and the support of the World Bank and the UN-Habitat, not all people believe slum upgrading is the ideal choice for solving the problem of slums. In fact, there are a

¹Oral Interview, (April 2012), Fr. John and Fr. Stephano, St. John Catholic Church, Korogocho.

²Oral Interview (April 2012), Peter Mureu, Korogocho, Slum.

³Interview, (April 2012), Moses Korogocho Slum.

number of different players such as local politicians who would like to see the status quo concerning slums remain. Yet beyond petty local politics, there are major problems with the slum upgrading approach, some of which have to do with the very nature of many slums themselves. For example, in order to lay infrastructure for slum upgrading projects, the governments inevitably have to buy land. However, this raises tremendous difficulties when trying to figure out which land to buy, since slums are by definition so densely populated that some houses are literally on top of one another, making it difficult to bring any sense of organization in the areas.

The second problem with slum upgrading stems from the fact that land ownership is not clear. Many times slum dwellers are either transient dwellers or have informal arrangements with the community around them. As a result, as many governments try to go in and establish land rights, difficulties ensue. The World Bank has attempted to separate land ownership deeds and the actual development of infrastructure, but this creates whole new problems of its own. After all, if ownership is not clearly established, tenants are often unlikely to pay for the utilities they receive as a result of the slum upgrading projects. Developing nations cannot afford to provide free utilities for an extended period of time, so this creates a huge problem for attempts at slum upgrading.

Another criticism of slum upgrading is that the infrastructure built as a result must be maintained. In fact, because many governments try to cut the costs of slum upgrading via lower quality infrastructure, subsequent costs of maintenance are often higher. In fact, a minority of the World Bank's urban projects are considered sustainable. Thus, for many of the projects, the one-

time cost is not enough: slum upgrading projects are long-term commitments unless they are referred with the ability to recover costs through revenue. Finally, there is difficulty in establishing community and group efforts to bring about real improvement within the slum community. Slums are areas in which violence and conflict are rampant yet often outside of the scope of knowledge of the government. Because community participation can significantly help the people who are actually doing the slum upgrading by shedding light on community issues that would otherwise hamper slum upgrading efforts. Not engaging the community either for lack of effort or inherent lack of ability, makes slum upgrading much more difficult. Government response is generated and shaped by the political context.¹

The conclusion of this study is that contemporary slum conflicts have both national and international underpinnings, and include political, social and economic parameters. On the socio-political side, the conflicts are directly related to the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of property ownership, ethnicity composition of the infrastructures, and the more often cited causes generally subsumed under the generic label governance. It also shows that the increased migration and expansion of informal structures, which occurred after independence, has exacerbated the level and intensity of the conflicts.

¹Fr. Paolo Latorre. And Fr. John Webootsa (18 October 2008)*Upgrading Korogocho*.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Questionnaire for Korogocho Slum Dwellers

Introduction: I am a continuing student at the University of Nairobi. As part of the requirements for my MA degree in Armed Conflict and Peace Studies, I am conducting a study on conflict in informal settlement a case study of Korogocho slum villages. I kindly ask you to respond to the questions raised in this questionnaire to enable me obtain the data that I need for this purpose. Confidentiality and anonymity are guaranteed as you do not have to give your name on this questionnaire. Only the investigator will have access to the responses. Thank you in advance for your cooperation.

Questionnaire Number	
Date Administered	
Village	
Name and contact of respondent(optional)	

1. Age

- (1) 25-30 (2) 31-34 (3) 35-39 (4) 40+

2. Education level

- (1) Nil (2) Primary incomplete (3) Primary complete (4) Secondary incomplete
 (5) Secondary complete (6) Tertiary (7) University

3. Marital status

- (1) Married (2) Single (3) Divorced (4) Widowed (5) Separated

4. Are you the final decision maker on the affairs of this house?

- (1) Yes (2) No 3) Not sure

5. For how long have you lived in this area:

	Less than 12 months	1-2 years	3-4 year	5-6 years	7+ years	Can't remember
(a)House						
(b)Village						
(c)Korogocho						

6. How many people usually live in this house?

- (1) 1 only (2) 2 people (3) 3-5people (4) 6-8 people (5) 9+ people

7. What is the main thing you do to earn income?

- (1) Employed in formal sector(2) Employed in informal sector (casual labour)

- (3) Small scale business(4) other (specify)_____

8. What would be your assessment of the following services and utilities in Korogocho?

(Rate on a scale of Very Good to the lowest Very Poor).

Service utility	Very good	Good	Poor	Very poor
Water supply				
Electricity supply				
Roads				
Cleanliness				
Rent affordability				
Health services				
School security				

9. Have you ever heard of the KSUP in this area?

- (1) Yes (2) No (3) Can't remember

10(a).If Yes in 9, how were you/ have been involved in the activities of this programme?

10 (b). Would you say that the views of women/youth are effectively represented in the ongoing KSUP in Korogocho?

- (1) Yes (2) No (3) Not Sure

10 (c). If No/Not sure in (b), give reason for this

11. Do you know of any person in this area that was/is involved in the activities of KSUP?

- (1) Yes (2) No (3) Not Sure

12(a). Do you think that the KSUP will improve the conditions of housing and life of women/youth in Korogocho?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Not Sure

12 (b). Give reason for your response in 12(a) above:

13(a). To what extent would you say that women/young people generally approve of the houses built in Korogocho under the KSUP?

Highly approve (2) Fairly approve (3) Disapprove (4) Highly disapprove

13 (b). Give reason(s) for your response in 13(a)

14. In what ways would you say that KSUP can change the living conditions for women/youth in Korogocho?

15. How would you rate the parts of Korogocho in which KSUP has been implemented on the following issues:

Service utility	Very good	Good	Poor	Very poor
Water supply				
Electricity supply				
Roads				
Cleanliness				
Rent affordability				
Health services				
School security				

16(a). Have you ever heard of any conflicts/disagreements in this area about KSUP?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Can't remember

16 (b). Were women/youth involved in this (these) conflict(s)?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Can't remember

16 (c). What was the cause of the conflict?

16 (d). How have these disagreements been resolved?

16 (e). In your view, how can such conflicts be prevented?

16 (f). How best can women/youth be involved in the search for their solutions?

17. In general, how can the concerns of women /youth be best addressed under the KSUP to avoid related conflicts? _____

Appendix B: Key Instructed Questionnaire

Introduction: Purpose and scope of the interview.

- (1) What are the issues relating to housing and related services in Korogocho (*Probe for the challenges often faced by women and youth with regard to these issues mentioned*)
- (2) How have you been involved in the implementation of KSUP?(Probe for how he/she was integrated, the role played and usefulness of this involvement to women and youth)
- (3) What are the concerns (views, attitudes values) often expressed by women and youth about the KSUP?
- (4) Have there been conflicts linked to the KSUP in this area? What have been the major causes (Probe for women and youth concerns, violations their concerns). How they are often solved and are these approaches appropriate to sustainable resolution of the conflicts and overall requirements of women and youth?
- (5) What rules, regulations and policy requirements stipulated under the KSUP would you say are in conflicts with the needs, aspirations, practices of the youth and women in this community?
- (6) What about the expectations of the various stakeholders? (Probe if they are in tandem with the requirements of women and youth in this community)