

**SHIFTING INTERNATIONAL BALANCE OF POWER IN AFRICA: AN ANALYSIS OF
KENYA'S RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
2003-2012**

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DECLARATION

This research project is my original work and has not been presented for an award of a degree in any other University.

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This project has been submitted with my approval as a University Supervisor.

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Dr. Ibrahim Farah

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AGOA	Africa Growth and Opportunity Act
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
CNOOC	China National Offshore Oil Corporation
CRBC	China Road and Bridge Corporation
CNOOC	China National Offshore Oil Corporation
COMESA	Common Market of East, Central and Southern Africa
EAC	East African Community
EAMUP	East Africa Monetary Union Protocol
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FOCAC	Forum on China Africa Cooperation
FORD-A	Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-ASILI
FORD	Forum for the Restoration of Democracy
FORD-K	Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Kenya
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICC	International Criminal Court
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JTH-HOA	Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KADU	Kenya African Democratic Union
KDF	Kenya Defense Forces
KPU	Kenya Peoples Union
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
NAK	National Alliance Party of Kenya

NARC	National Rainbow Coalition
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAU	Organization of African Unity
ODM	Orange Democratic Party
PEPFAR	President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
PNU	Party of National Unity
RDJTF	Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TIFA	Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
UNAMID	United Nations Assistance Mission in Darfur
UNO	United Nations Organization
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USSR	Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics

ABSTRACT

This study has focused on the shifting balance of power in Africa within the context of its relations with China and the United States of America. This has been due to the perceived competition by both China and the US to exploit and influence policies in Africa. The case study has been based on Kenya's relations with China and the US. The discourse has mainly strived to: provide an overview of Kenya's relations with China and the US, critically analyze Kenya's relations with China and the US, as well as interrogate the shifting balance of power in Africa. The thesis has been anchored on the classical realism and neo-realism theories of international relations. The research methodology used involved a detailed analysis using both primary and secondary sources of data. One of the key findings of the study was that; the balance of power pattern in Africa is still concentrated within regional blocs. However, the individual hegemons within the blocs are still reluctant in asserting their influence in the region. Nevertheless the increasing concentrated engagements between the anchor states in Africa, such as Kenya, with the US and China has raised their profile amongst their peers in the continent. This, as a result, has affected the overall distribution of power patterns across the various regions in the continent.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Background

The international balance of power is linked to the creation of the modern state system in Europe at the end of the Thirty Years War. The Thirty Years War, under the leadership of Sweden and France on one hand and Austria on the other hand, sought to promote imperialistic policies of mostly Sweden and Austria, while keeping in check the ambitions of each alliance.¹ The war ended with the signing of the 1648 Westphalia Peace Treaty leading to establishment of the modern state system. The key features that defined a nation-state, after the Westphalia Peace Treaty included: the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence.² For over three centuries these principles have remained the defining features of the modern nation-states, including Kenya.

The Westphalia Peace Treaty also contributed to the anarchical nature of the international system. This was due to the partition of Europe into numerous independent nation-states.³ The lack of a centralized system governing the conduct of sovereign states thus led to the need for a balance of power system. This was necessary to avoid constant tensions and conflicts as each nation-state pursued its own national interest in an attempt to survive. This aspect has been explained by realism and neo-realism scholars such as Waltz while discussing the “third image” of international relations.⁴

¹Hans J. Morgenthau. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*.6th edition, (New Delhi, Kalyani Publishers,2012), p.209

²John Baylis, et.al. *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p.41-43

³Michael Sheehan. *The Balance of Power: History and Theory*,(London: Routledge,1996), p.37

⁴ Kenneth N. Waltz. *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*,(New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), p.160

The purpose of balancing power in the twenty first century, just like in 1648, has been to ensure stability in the international system. The art of balancing power requires states to formulate external policies on how to relate with each other. The foreign policy of a state has always been interpreted as the pursuit of its domestic policy regardless of the prevailing ideological differences in the international system, with an aim of securing its national interest.⁵ Nevertheless a country's foreign policy at any particular time conventionally reflects the prevailing international system, with an aim of either retaining the status-quo or replacing it with a new balance of power system, for its own national interest.⁶

Africa, since the foundation of the modern state system has played a less significant role in influencing the international system. Olajide for instance explains that no African state has had global or even continental ambitions, with their main preoccupation being domestic unity, stability and economic development.⁷ African countries prior to the 1960s were mainly spheres of European influence. The foreign policies formulated by the colonial powers thus applied to their colonies as well.⁸ The foreign policy of Britain, for instance, was colonial Kenya's foreign policy too. The 1960s saw most African countries start to attain self-rule. Nevertheless their foreign relations continued to be influenced by their former colonial masters. This trend continued during most of the twentieth century, amidst the Cold War politics between the Soviet Union and the United States.

In December 1991, the bipolar balance of power was replaced with a unipolar international system following the collapse and disintegration of the Soviet Union. The end of

⁵I. William Zartman. "National Interest and Ideology", *African Diplomacy: Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy*, Eds. Vernon McKay, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1966), p. 30.

⁶Hans J. Morgenthau. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, (New Delhi, Kalyani Publishers, 2012), p.231

⁷Olajide Aluko, Eds. *The Foreign Policy of African States* (London: Hooder and Stoughton, 1977), p.2

⁸Charles Hornsby. *Kenya: A History Since Independence*, (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2012), p.29

the Cold War led to preponderance of the United States as the major global economic and military power. The lack of formidable power to balance that of the United States led to the decline of client states, especially in Africa.⁹ The emergence of a new world order dominated by the United States led to the need for Kenya and other African states to re-orient their foreign relations. The United States' relations with Kenya changed resulting in aid being given only when certain conditions had been met. However, towards the end of the twentieth century and start of the twenty first century, African countries including Kenya started to forge closer bilateral ties with China and other emerging Asian economies.

The increase of China's influence in Africa has led to tensions in the relations between the United States and China. The competition by both great powers to assert their influence and dominance in Africa has led to what has been referred to as the "Second Scramble for Africa". The study therefore attempts to look at how Kenya, as a case study of other African countries, can formulate and projects its foreign relations policy. This will ensure Kenya attains meaningful relations in a world characterized by dynamic shifts in the balance of power relations. The current systemic stability is perceived to be mainly a struggle for power between China and the United States.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Kenya's foreign relations since independence have mostly been influenced by Western powers. The two dominant powers have been Britain and the United States. In contrast Kenya's relations with the East, China and Russia, has been less engaging since independence in 1963.¹⁰ However towards the end of the twentieth century, China's global influence has gradually increased across

⁹Miriam Elman. "The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in Its Own Backyard". *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 25, No. 21995,p. 171

¹⁰Hornsby, op. cit., pp.89-90

the globe. The rapid influence can be attributed to China's rapid economic growth. This fact has not only tended to balance the United States' interests globally but in Africa as well.

The seeming shift in the nature of the international balance of power has resulted in competition between China and the United States. In Africa the contentions between China and the United States have superficially been concentrated in resource rich and strategically located African states. This has seen China and the United States make attempts to influence the foreign policies of the anchor states in Africa. As a result Kenya and other African countries need to review their foreign policy to reflect the dynamic twenty-first century international balance of power system.

In Kenya, attempts to formulate a coherent foreign policy, has been met by institutional and constitutional challenges. The foreign policy of Kenya was first documented in 2009, forty six years after independence.¹¹ Despite the documentation, the conduct of Kenya's foreign relations has mainly been a prerogative of individual presidents, aided by a close-knit set of elites.¹² The formulation of Kenya's foreign policy based on a rational model,¹³ has undermined the input of critical institutions and instruments, such as the Parliamentary Committee on Defense and Foreign Relations. This has in essence compromised the quality of Kenya's foreign policy and its relations with international actors. The trend is thus contrary to the 2009 Kenya's Foreign Policy Framework that outlines the need for multilateral engagement in the policy formulation process.

The second challenge which Kenya faces with regard to the conduct of its foreign relations is that of the Constitution, touching on sovereignty. The 2010 Constitution provides for

¹¹Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kenya, 2009, *Kenya Foreign Policy Document*, (Nairobi: Kenya, 2009), p.7

¹²Peter J.Schraeder, Korwa G. Adwar, Eds., *Globalization and Emerging Trends of in African Foreign Policy: A Comparative Perspective of Eastern Africa*. (Maryland: University of America, Inc., 2007). Volume II, p.1

¹³Graham T. Allison. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), pp. 3-9

a two-tier system of government; the national government and the county governments. It further states that sovereign power belongs to the Kenyan people and is merely delegated to both the national and county governments, through democratically elected representatives.¹⁴ However, neither the Constitution nor the 2009 Foreign Policy Framework provides a clear guideline on how the two different levels of government need to conduct their external relations with other sovereign states. Therefore, with regard to these challenges; the key guiding question for this study is: How can Kenya and other African states ensure that their relations with China and the United States, which are currently considered as the two great global powers, competing for both resources and influence in the continent, are beneficial to their national interests amidst the shifting, and dynamic balance of power system?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The overall objective of the study is to analyze the shifting international balance of power in Africa, within the context of Kenya's foreign relations with China and the United States between 2003 and 2012.

More specifically the study aims to:

- i) Provide an overview of Kenya's relations with China and the United States during the study period.
- ii) Analyze Kenya's foreign policy towards China and the United States.
- iii) Interrogate the shifting international balance of power in Africa within the context of Kenya's relations with China and the United States.

¹⁴See Kenya Constitution, Chapter I, Article 4(a) and 4(b), 2010.

1.4 Literature Review

1.4.1 Introduction

The literature review will start by a discourse on the international balance of power, followed by a candid discussion on Kenya's foreign relations. The scrutiny of the two variables will be done within the context of Kenya's relations with China and the United States. It is imperative to note that the two concepts– balance of power and foreign policy– are related and both influence each other. The focus of the review will be on the balance of power amidst increased competition between China and the United States over regional influence and access to Africa's natural resources. The review ends with a literature gap that will serve as the lacunae of the study.

1.4.2 Balance of Power

The balance of power concept has various meanings depending on the context under which it is used. According to Morgenthau the balance of power can be used as; a policy aimed at a certain state of affairs, as an actual state of affairs, as an approximate distribution of power, or as any distribution of power.¹⁵ The multifaceted nature of the balance of power concept is supported by Claude who states that the various meanings attached to the balance of power concept can be used to explain the dynamic nature of relations between states.¹⁶ For this particular study, the balance of power is illustrated as a state of affairs in which power is distributed among several nations with proximate equality, as well as a policy focused on a particular state of affairs.

According to the realism school of thought the balance of power is seen as a means of minimizing anarchy and ensuring systemic stability, which may result into conflicts among the

¹⁵Hans J. Morgenthau. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*,(New Delhi, Kalyani Publishers,2012), p.187

¹⁶Inis L. Claude. *Power and International Relations*,(New York: Random House,1962), p.13

various actors comprising the international system.¹⁷ Deustch and Singer, while discussing the anarchic nature of international relations in an attempt to explain multipolar stability, argues that whenever a system is perturbed, it will either undergo a series of changes to reinstall the previous equilibrium or it might undergo transformations that will produce a totally new balance of power system.¹⁸

However, according to idealists, the balance of power thesis is not only the best form of maintaining systemic stability, but also negates the need for cooperation between nation-states. Idealists' consider cooperation among states as a necessary ingredient in the maintenance of international peace and security. In the opinion of idealists such as Hobson, collective security, international trade, and world government are the best means of ensuring systemic stability.¹⁹ The competition for global influence between China and the United States is therefore detrimental to the systemic stability.

Nonetheless in reality, the changes in the systemic balance of power in most occasions have continuously been characterized by tensions and conflicts. This has been the case since the eon of the Holy Alliance in 1814, to the modern epoch of the United Nations Organization. Morgenthau, like most realist scholars who view the world as anarchic, states that:

“There can be no peaceful transition of power from one international system to another... each of the three world wars of the last one and a half centuries was characterized by attempts to establish an international government which aimed at preserving the status quo for the victors while, the defeated nations always plotted to overthrow the status quo. Examples include; the Holy Alliance at the end of Napoleonic Wars, which was replaced by the Concert of Europe, the Concert of Europe was replaced by the League of Nations after World War I, and the current attempts to preserve the status quo are represented by the United Nations Organization, following its formation by victors of the Second World War.”²⁰

¹⁷John Baylis, et.al. *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp.87-88

¹⁸Karl W. Deutsch, David J. Singer. “Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability” *World Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 3.,1964, p.319

¹⁹John Baylis, et.al. op. cit., pp., 102-103

²⁰Hans J. Morgenthau. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. 6th edition, (New Delhi, Kalyani Publishers, 2012), p.481

Therefore it can be claimed that the transition from pre-World War II, multipolar balance of power system, to the bipolar post-World War II system, was as a result of violent attempts by the revisionist German state, under Adolf Hitler, to overthrow the status-quo and replace it with a German hegemony across Europe and by extension, globally. To underscore this notion, Morgenthau, while discussing the political weakness of the League of Nations further states that:

“Germany deliberately pursued policies of undermining the Treaty of Versailles immediately after joining the League of Nations in 1925, by using the principle of national self-determination to break the foundation of territorial status-quo upon which the League was established.”²¹

After the Second World War, a bipolar balance of power was established with the United States and the Soviet Union as the two competing poles. The period during the bipolar balance of power, popularly known as the Cold War era, was characterized by tensions and conflicts. This eventually gave way to the unipolar balance of power system, with the United States as the single global hegemon, following the collapse of the Soviet Union in December, 1991. Based on these upheavals it is exigent to ask whether the emergence of China and other economic powerhouses in the twenty first century, is likely to lead to a peaceful or tempestuous change in the systemic balance of power. This is because the actions of China and the other states, such as Russia, can be interpreted as aimed at containing the hegemonic status of the United States.

The peaceful or violent rise of China is debatable among realists and idealists. Idealists view the rise of China as likely to be peaceful and devoid of conflict. They base their reasoning on the fact that China’s rise is likely to be in line with the existing international law and norms, as well as utilizing the established international regimes, such as the United Nations

²¹Ibid, p.499

Organization to facilitate its peaceful rise.²² Therefore the prevailing liberal economic and political international system is likely to play a significant role in the peaceful and orderly admission of China into the elite great powers' group of nations. This is likely to reduce the chances of a costly and dangerous total war with the United States. The chances of war are also minimal between China and the United States due to the fact that they are both nuclear powers. This theory is advanced by the notion that a nation that has reached nuclear weapons capability has realized its military potential, both in terms of deterrence and of the actual waging of nuclear war.²³ The chance of a violent transition of the current status quo, dominated by the United States, is thus minimized on the basis of nuclear deterrence.

The peaceful rise of China can further be explained by its decision to adopt soft power diplomacy in its dealings with great and small powers across the globe. Traditionally the test of the great power status of a nation was in its military strength, but currently, great power status is heavily leaning towards technological development, education and economic suaveness as measures of internal power greatness of nation-states.²⁴ The debate about China's stance on soft power tactics is in conformity with Suzuki's discussion on the "Myth and Reality of China's soft power". Suzuki argues that:

"The rapid economic growth and massive global investments of China can be explained by China's desire to find its rightful place among great global powers without antagonizing the prevailing status quo."²⁵

These arguments thus support idealists' world view of the peaceful rise of China.

²²Charles Glaser. "Will China's Rise lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism" *Foreign Affairs*, 2011, Council on Foreign Relations,

²³Hans J. Morgenthau. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 6th edition, (New Delhi, Kalyani Publishers, 2012), p. 440

²⁴Joseph S. Nye, Jr. "Soft Power", *Foreign Policy*, No. 80, *Twentieth Annivesary*, 1990, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, p. 154

²⁵Shogo Suzuki. "Myth and Reality of China's soft power", *Soft Power and US foreign Policy, Theoretical, Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, eds. Inderjeet Parmar and Michael Cox (New York, Routledge, 2010) p.199-200.

However, according to realists, the rise of China, especially its rapid and sustained economic growth since 1978 following the liberalization of its economy, is likely to lead to a tumultuous hegemonic power struggles. Bijian, writing for *Foreign Affairs* magazine in September 2005 explains that:

“China has averaged 9.4 percent annual GDP growth, one of the highest growth rates in the world. In 1978, it accounted for less than one percent of the world economy, and its total foreign trade was worth \$20.6 billion. Today, it accounts for four percent of the world economy and has foreign trade worth \$851 billion, making it the third largest economy in the world, while attracting hundreds of billions of dollars of foreign investment and more than a trillion dollars of domestic non-public investment.”²⁶

Based on the above explanation, it's proper to state that the rise of China is in line with the rise of past great global powers. The pattern involves acquisition of economic power followed by military and cultural influence.

China's generally increased economic, political and cultural activities globally and particularly in Africa is already attracting a backlash from the United States which views China's move as an attempt to clip America's influence in region. This is especially as a result of the competition for Africa's natural resources, notably oil, between the United States and China. The fact that the United States which is the largest consumer of global oil at 20 million barrels per day, with China as the second largest consumer at 7 million barrels, has already led to tensions between the two states over regional leverage in Africa, on issues such as the need to promote good governance and human rights.²⁷

²⁶Zheng Fijian, “China's "Peaceful Rise to Great-Power Status”. *Foreign Affairs*, 2005, Council on Foreign Relations,

²⁷David Shinn, “Africa, China, the United States and Oil”, *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, June 10, 2014.

The regional tension between the two states over exploitation of Africa's resources reflects the realist pessimism of a peaceful rise of China.²⁸ The antagonistic relationship illustrates a pattern of balancing power, instead of cooperation, between China and the United States. This may act as a premonition towards a bipolar balance of power system in the twenty first century.²⁹ The tensions and conflict as China rises is thus in accordance to the typical ideology of imperialism with regard to foreign policy formulation and projection.³⁰ The desire for China to pursue an assertive foreign policy with regard to its national interest is likely to trigger a pattern of either direct opposition or of competition from the United States.³¹

1.4.3 Kenya's Foreign Policy

Kenya, since its independence in 1963, has conducted an active foreign policy with its regional neighbors and other states comprising the international system. This is despite the lack of a formal foreign policy document during the first forty six years of its independence.³² However, the lack of documented foreign policy guidelines has not been a barrier to the successful conduct of Kenya's external relations.³³ Contrary to expectations, Kenya has played both an active and an assertive role, on the regional and international stage since its independence. This has seen Kenya take both radical and moderate stance on international and regional issues.³⁴ This is

²⁸Charles Glaser. "Will China's Rise lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism" *Foreign Affairs*, Council on Foreign Relations, 2011.

²⁹Fijian, op. cit., 2005

³⁰Hans J. Morgenthau. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, (New Delhi, Kalyani Publishers,2012), p.104

³¹Ibid, pp. 192-194

³²Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kenya Foreign Policy Document, Nairobi, 2009,p.2

³³Korwa G. Adar."Kenya's Foreign Policy", *Globalization and Emerging Trends in African Foreign Policy*, Vol.2, edited by Korwa G, Adar and Peter J. Schraeder.(Maryland: University Press of America, Inc.2007), p. 72-76

³⁴John Howell, "An Analysis of Kenyan Foreign Policy" *The Journal of Modern African Studies* vol.6, No. 1,May 1968, Cambridge University Press, p.29

antithetical to international relations scholars who expected that Kenya would turn out to be a more radical socialist state, leaning towards China or the Soviet Union.

The argument was based on Kenya's violent struggle for independence against British colonialism. The violent agitation for independence was generally viewed as a struggle against Western imperialism. The United States in particular associated Mau Mau, Kenyan liberation movement, with the spread of international communism, a fact that was of great concern to the United States' foreign policy towards Kenya.³⁵ It is also important to note that long before Kenya's independence, Jomo Kenyatta who became Kenya's first president had created for himself the reputation of a radical and strong supporter of the pan-African movement.³⁶ However the linking of Kenyatta to Mau Mau was erroneous as he repeatedly refuted having any links with the movement.

With no documented guideline to steer Kenya in the murky and competitive nature of international relations, the country relied on the institution of the presidency in the formulation of its foreign relations. Kenya's foreign policy decision making process has thus been centered on the rational model of decision making process. The rational model as one of the three models of policy decision making process, perceives decision making as a unitary and independent act.³⁷ The decisions are considered as objective, rational and aimed at maximization of a country's national interest. The other two models include; organizational model and bureaucratic model, which ideally should all be incorporated in the policy formulation process.³⁸

³⁵P. Godfrey Okoth, *United States of America's Foreign Policy toward Kenya, 1952-1969: Issues, Application, and Implications* (Nairobi: Gideon S. Were Press, 1992), p.29.

³⁶Samuel M. Makinda. "From Quiet Diplomacy to Cold War Politics: Kenya's Foreign Policy". *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 5, No. 2, Africa: Tensions and Contentions, 1983, Taylor & Francis, Ltd, p.304

³⁷Graham T. Allison. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), p.3

³⁸Ibid, p.3

Kenya, like all other sovereign and independent states, has always formulated and projected its foreign policy with the aim of securing and promoting its national interest. This it has done while taking into consideration the fact that the primary goal of a state is its survival.³⁹ In emphasizing the survival of nation-states as central theme in foreign policy, Sheehan in particular argues that:

“The balance of power has guided the conduct of foreign policy of governments and provides an explanation for the recurrence of certain patterns of international relations, hence the guiding principle of international relations.”⁴⁰

This fact is especially true for small states such as Kenya whose foreign policy decision-making is highly influenced by the prevailing international system dominated by great powers. Zartman describes this as the subordination of African states in the international system by great powers.⁴¹ The subordination has consequently conditioned small states to operate along the periphery of the international system dominated by great powers. This as a result has led to small states’ dependence on great powers for economic and military subvention.⁴²

At independence, Kenya’s national interest mainly involved economic prosperity and state security. The economic interest is explained by Kenya’s decision to adopt “*African Socialism*”, through Sessional Paper Number 10 of 1965.⁴³ The policy document aimed at promoting and preserving private entrepreneurships without resorting to nationalization of businesses like it was the case in most independent African states. The need for economic prosperity saw Kenya retain close links with Britain, which had massive investments in Kenya,

³⁹Hans J. Morgenthau. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, (New Delhi: Kalyani Publishers, 2012), p.31

⁴⁰ Michael Sheehan. *The Balance of power: History and Theory*, (New York: Routledge, 1996), preface

⁴¹I. William Zartman. “Africa as a subordinate state system in international relations.”, *International Organization: A journal of economic and political affairs*, Vol.21,1967.Cambridge University Press, p. 545

⁴²Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 218.

⁴³Sessional Paper No.10,*African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya*, Republic of Kenya, 1965 p.8

while at the same time courting the United States.⁴⁴ The nurturing of close links with Western capitalist states was contrary to Kenya's adoption of the Non-Aligned Policy in the conduct of its foreign relations.⁴⁵

The need for territorial integrity amidst attacks and threats of attack from belligerent neighboring states such as Somalia also made security a cornerstone of Kenya's foreign policy since independence. Adwar, for instance, debates that:

“Territorial integrity is the fulcrum around which Kenya's foreign policy vis-à-vis Somalia has largely been based since Kenya's independence in December, 1963.”⁴⁶

Over the years, Kenya's long term national interest has remained consistent unlike its short and medium range goals which have metamorphosed with the changing international system.

Foreign policy ideologies are classified into three categories, which can be used to explain Kenya's foreign policy orientation. The ideologies include; an ideology of status quo which strives to maintain the prevailing balance of power, an ideology of imperialism which aims to overthrow the status quo, and an ideology of ambiguity which lacks clarity on whether it supports the status quo or aims for change in the international system.⁴⁷ The foreign policy of Kenya during the bipolar and earlier unipolar period can be classified as pro-status quo, always supporting the dominant states with the aim of preserving systemic stability. This is explained in the various instruments upon which Kenya's foreign policy has been anchored since independence.⁴⁸

⁴⁴Charles Hornsby. *Kenya: A History Since Independence*. (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2012), p. 54

⁴⁵John Howell, “An Analysis of Kenyan Foreign Policy” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* vol.6, No. 1, May 1968, Cambridge University Press, p.35

⁴⁶Korwa G. Adar. *Kenya Foreign Policy Behavior Towards Somalia, 1963-1983*. (Boston: University Press of America, Inc.1994), pp.1-2

⁴⁷Hans J. Morgenthau. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, (New Delhi: Kalyani Publishers, 2012), pp.104-110

⁴⁸See Sessional Paper No. 10/1965 on “*African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya*”; Sessional Paper No.1/1986 on “*Economic Management for Renewed Growth*”; Manifestoes of the ruling Political Parties; *The*

The foreign policy of Kenya during the bipolar system was mainly in support of the Western capitalist system. This was in contrary to the Soviet Union's communist ideology of replacing the bourgeoisie government system across the world with pro-proletariat governments. In the course of the unipolar system following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kenya's foreign policy was heavily aligned to that of the United States. This was mainly due to its reliance on foreign aid and investments from Western capitalist states, an indication of Kenya's, pro-status quo stance in international relations.

However towards end of the twentieth century, with the emergence of new and influential economies such as China, India, Brazil, South Africa as well as Russia's assertive re-emergence, Kenya's foreign policy has been more ambiguous, if not in support of overthrowing the existing status quo in the international system. The eagerness of Kenya to align more with China and the new economies by adopting the "Look East" policy is an indication of the shifting international balance of power.

This phenomenon is explained by Kenya's Foreign Policy Document, 2009. The document states that the forceful entry of China as a competitor for resources in Africa has intensified tensions in the West resulting in a "new scramble" for Africa.⁴⁹ The rise of China and other economic power houses indicates a shift in the balance of power away from the United States. This is in consideration of the fact that military power has become a less significant determinant of power capabilities of a state in the post-Cold War epoch.⁵⁰

The new emerging issues such as global warming and international terrorism have also greatly re-oriented Kenya's foreign policy. This is especially following the terrorist attack in

Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation, 2003-2007; Kenya Vision 2030 and Foreign Policy Document, 2009. p.2

⁴⁹Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Kenya Foreign Policy Document*, Nairobi, 2009, p.13

⁵⁰Joseph S. Nye, Jr. "Soft Power", *Foreign Policy*, No. 80, *Twentieth Anniversary*, 1990, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, p.154

Nairobi in August 1998, and the 9/11 bombing of twin towers in New York, USA in 2001.⁵¹ The globalization of terrorism has resulted in tight security relations between Kenya and the United States. The renewed Pan African spirit, following reformation of Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU), has seen Kenya include a new pillar into its foreign policy, called “Diaspora” diplomacy. This is in line with the African Union Constitutive Act. The Act considers Africans in the Diaspora as the sixth frontier of Africa, and calls for greater unity and solidarity between the African countries.⁵² Kenya’s foreign policy can thus be seen as dynamic, influenced by both internal and external factors as well as the desire to secure and promote its national interest.

1.4.4 Kenya- United States Relations

The United States opened its embassy with independent Kenya immediately after the country attained its freedom in 1963. The strong relations between the two countries have seen the United States embassy grow into the largest American diplomatic mission across Africa. The relations between Kenya and the United States, immediately after independence was not as close as compared to Kenya’s relations with Britain. The low key relations between countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and the United States can be explained by the concluding remarks made by the US Senate Report, commissioned by President Harry Truman, in its point 4 Program that:

“The Sub-Saharan Africa region had no significant contribution to America’s national interest.”⁵³

In the case of Kenya, the lack of vital economic interests such as huge and valuable mineral resources led to disenchantment of the United States relations with Kenya, unlike the

⁵¹Kenya Foreign Policy Document, op. cit., p.13

⁵²See Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 3(a), 2001

⁵³P. Godfrey Okoth, *United States of America’s Foreign Policy toward Kenya, 1952-1969: Issues, Application, and Implications*(Nairobi: Gideon S. Were Press, 1992), p.8

enchanted relations of the United States with the then Zaire, currently the Democratic Republic of Congo, which is endowed with large deposits of rare and valuable natural resources.⁵⁴

However, as the Soviet Union and China started to increase their influence in the Horn of Africa region, the United States gradually increased its relations with Kenya. This was mainly aimed to counterbalance the role of the Soviet Union and China in the Eastern Africa region. The main trigger of America's active engagement with Kenya was the Zanzibar Revolution, which was considered by the United States as a threat to Kenya's Western leaning capitalist government.⁵⁵ The United States believed that the Zanzibar Revolution lead by a Cuban trained military leader, Field Marshall Okello, was a stepping stone for the Soviet Union to spread communism across the region. The Soviet Union's support of the Somali government's military campaign, to hive off the Northern Frontier District of Kenya, populated mainly by ethnic Somalis, and link it up with Ethiopia's Ogaden region to form a pan-Somalia state also led to the United States' increased military support for Kenya.⁵⁶

The renewed close relations between the United States and Kenya can thus be explained in terms of cooperation under anarchy. The logic states that, sometimes states do realize common goals through cooperation under anarchy.⁵⁷ The fear of an external attack by Kenya from its belligerent neighbors coupled with the threat imposed on America's national interests in the East Coast of Africa by the Soviet Union, made Kenya and the United States to establish close military cooperation aimed at promoting each other's national interest. The primary objective of the United States' policy in Sub-Sahara Africa during the Cold War was to prevent the region

⁵⁴Charles Hornsby. *Kenya: A History since Independence* (London, I.B Tauris & Co Ltd, 2012), pp.96-97

⁵⁵Okoth op. cit., pp. 88-89

⁵⁶Korwa G. Adar. *Kenyan Foreign Policy Behavior towards Somalia, 1963-1983*, (Boston University Press of America, Inc. 1994), p.9.

⁵⁷Kenneth Oye. "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies", *World Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 1, 1985, Cambridge University Press, p.1

from succumbing under communist domination.⁵⁸ The long term United States' interest to control Kenya's coastline and establish military relations was reinforced by the signing of the bilateral agreement between President Carter of the United States and President Moi of Kenya on June 26, 1980.⁵⁹ The establishment of this military pact allowed the United States to set up the Rapid Deployment Joint Taskforce at the port city of Mombasa, in exchange for increased military assistance to Kenya.

The other key area of cooperation between Kenya and the United States during the Cold War period was cultural diplomacy. This was mainly in the form of educational exchange programs. In 1964, over one thousand Kenyan students were studying in the United States. America viewed cultural relations as a key factor in cementing relations with Kenya and edging out the Soviet Union's influence in Kenya. This was in line with the notion that cultural imperialism is one of the most effective forms of imperialism in the power relations between two nations. As Morgenthau argues:

“Cultural imperialism is the most subtle, and if it were to ever achieve success by itself alone, it would be the most successful of imperialistic policies. It aims not at the conquest of territory or at the control of economic life, but at the conquest and control of the minds of men as an instrument of changing the power relations between two nations.”⁶⁰

Realism thus informed the United States foreign policy towards Kenya, resulting in massive funding of cultural projects.⁶¹

The end of the Cold War, following the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 led to a unipolar balance of power, with the United States as the dominant global power. The defeat of international communism led to a change in the United States' foreign policy towards

⁵⁸Charles Hornsby. *Kenya: A History since Independence* (London, I.B Tauris & Co Ltd, 2012), p.89

⁵⁹Ibid, p.104

⁶⁰Hans J. Morgenthau. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, (New Delhi: Kalyani Publishers, 2012) p.74

⁶¹Hornsby, op. cit., p.145

Africa. American foreign policy shifted from containment of the Soviet Union's incursions to that of promoting democracy, liberal economic policies and human rights issues.⁶² In Kenya, the end of the Cold War, led the United States to demand for economic and political reforms. The pressure for economic liberalization and structural adjustments as conditions for provision of external aid was met with resistance from the government and ordinary Kenyans. This was due to the extra cost they had to incur to access basic goods and services which had earlier been subsidized by the government.⁶³ However, the high dependence on foreign aid, exceeding US \$ 1 billion in 1989, and comprising three quarters of Kenya's development budget, forced Kenya to bend to the demands of the International Financial Institutions, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, as well as the United States.

In the mid-1990s, and as Kenya moved towards the twenty first century, several factors continued to shape Kenya's foreign relations with the United States. However, the economy and security concerns remained Kenya's national interest upon which its relations with the United States were based. According to the Foreign Policy Document 2009, Kenya and the United States have forged close links in combating international terrorism in the Horn of Africa region.⁶⁴ The number of Kenyans living and working in America has also increased from one thousand in 1964, to over 1.8 million by 2005, which has led to the incorporation of "Diaspora" diplomacy as a key element in Kenya's Foreign Policy Document.⁶⁵ Trade relations have also improved between Kenya and the United States, despite the "Look East Policy" adopted by Kenya in the mid-1990s to diversify its trade and development partners.

⁶²F. Ugboaja Ohaegbulam. "The United States and Africa after the Cold War", *Africa Today*, Vol. 39, No. 4, Africa, Indiana University Press, 1992

⁶³Gerrishon K. Ikiara, Njuguna Ndung'u. "Kenya". *Adjustments Employment & Missing Institutions in Africa: The Experience of Eastern and Southern Africa*, edited by Willem Van Der Geest and Rolph Van Der Hoeven (Geneva, 22 Switzerland: International Labor Organization, 1991), p.89-100

⁶⁴Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Kenya Foreign Policy Document*, Nairobi, 2009, p.31

⁶⁵Ibid, p.22

1.4.5 Kenya-China Relations

Bilateral relations between the East African coast and China can be traced way back to the ninth century.⁶⁶ The period during the Ming dynasty in China provides documented evidence of the trade relations between the former and the East African coast. In the twentieth century as more Africa nations such as Kenya started to clamor for independence, China began to provide military, political and financial assistance to liberation movements across the African continent. In Kenya, Odinga, who was the country's first vice-president, in his autobiography, *Not Yet Uhuru*, provides a detailed description of his life in China three years before independence.⁶⁷ During this period he received political mentorship from communist China, which defined his political ideology after Kenya's independence.

The close relations between Odinga, who became independent Kenya's first Vice-President, and China led to a short lived military cooperation between the two countries. This resulted in an offer by China to provide military training to a small group of Kenyan soldiers shortly after independence. Prior to Kenya's independence more than 400 young Kenyans had received military training in China. This exercise continued after independence with the help of Odinga and Pinto, a freedom fighter.⁶⁸ China's relations with Kenya immediately after independence were much more cordial, especially after Kenya adopted a Non-Aligned Policy in its relations with other states in the then bipolar international system. The warm relations can be explained by the visit of a high powered Kenyan delegation to China and the Soviet Union, led by Odinga between April 18, and May 11, May 1964.

⁶⁶Robert I. Rotberg. "China's Quest for Resources, Opportunities and Influence in Africa", edited by, Robert I. Rotberg. *China into Africa: Trade, Aid and Influence*, (Washington D.C, Brookings Institution Press, 2008), p.

⁶⁷Oginga Odinga. *Not yet Uhuru: Oginga Odinga*. (Nairobi: Heinemann Publishers, 1968), p.53

⁶⁸Charles Hornsby. *Kenya: A History since Independence* (London, I.B Tauris & Co Ltd, 2012), p.144

While in China, the delegation met Mao Zedong and Premier Chuo En Lai, who offered economic assistance to Kenya worth US \$ 15 million for agricultural development projects in Kenya's Tana River district.⁶⁹ However Kenya's relations with China started to wane as Kenyatta's Kenya Africa National Union (KANU) faction continued to align itself more with Britain and the United States. The decline in relations between China and Kenya can partly be explained by the rational model of foreign policy analysis.⁷⁰ The Constitution provided the president with the sole prerogative of crafting foreign policy decisions, without necessarily engaging other institutions or referring to documented foreign policy instruments.⁷¹ Therefore Kenyatta through Tom Mboya, Kenya's minister for Economic Planning and Development, utilized the provisions of the constitution which gave the president massive powers to alienate China away from Kenya and advocated for closer relations with the western powers.

The deterioration of relations between Kenya and China can thus be linked to the domestic power struggle and ideological differences between the moderates in KANU, led by Kenyatta, and the more radical leaders in KANU led by Odinga.⁷² Odinga was seen as a threat to Kenyatta's government due to his close relations with China dating back to pre-independence days, as compared to Kenyatta who, after assuming power, retained closer relations with Britain and the United States. On the basis of domestic factors being one of the key determinants of a country's foreign policy orientation⁷³, Kenya's domestic power struggles and ideological differences between its leaders played significant role in the country's foreign policy orientation.

⁶⁹Ibid, p.144

⁷⁰Graham T. Allison. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis", *American Political Science Review*, Vol.63, 1969, pp.693-694

⁷¹See Kenya Independent Constitution, Part 3 (1) and (2), 1963

⁷²David H. Shinn and Joshua Eisenman., *China and Africa: A Century of Engagement*. (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), p. 266

⁷³P.A Reynolds, *An Introduction to International Relations*, (New York: Longman Publishers, 1994), p.25

Relations between China and Kenya further deteriorated in 1966 following China's open support for Odinga's ideologies.⁷⁴ In 1967, the Kenyan government banned works by Zedong and expelled Chinese diplomats. This trend had earlier been set by Burundi, Ghana and Tunisia earlier in 1965.⁷⁵ However, with the death of Kenyatta in 1978, Kenya-China relations increased especially in the mid-1990s. This has mainly been due to the need for Kenya to diversify sources of its external aid and investments, amidst the stringent conditions attached to aid by the United States and other Western powers, as well as the International Financial Institutions.

1.4.6 Literature Gap

Based on the foregoing discussion, it is subtle that the role of Africa in the international system only exists at the periphery and not at the core of international relations discourse. This is despite the potential and putative power capabilities of Africa. Most international relations scholars, such as Morgenthau, have discussed Africa's relations with the world only as an afterthought in the international relations discourse. However, in the recent past Africa has continued to attract the attention of emerging economic powerhouses such as China. This fact has partially but gradually threatened America's traditional influence in the region. The struggle over influence in Africa between the two great powers has led to a phenomenon described as the "Second Scramble" for Africa. The sensation of regional power struggle in Africa, between China and America, coupled with Africa's potentiality to shape the systemic balance of power provides the impetus for this study.

⁷⁴Charles Hornsby. *Kenya: A History since Independence* (London, I.B Tauris & Co Ltd, 2012), p. 80

⁷⁵Godfrey Mwakikagile. *Nyerere and Africa :End of an Era* (Pretoria: New Africa Press, Fifth Edition,2010) p.188

1.5 Justification of the Study

This study seeks to contribute towards an understanding of shifting balance of power in Africa. The thesis aspires to analyze the shifting balance of power in Africa within the context of renewed interest in the continent by foreign powers, led by China and the United States. The case study will be Kenya's relations with China and the United States between 2003 and 2012. The twenty-first century has been characterized by a renewed interest in Africa, mainly between China and the United States. This has mainly been propelled by the economic rise of China as it seeks markets and raw materials abroad for its manufacturing industries.

The increased influence of China in Africa has met resistance from the United States and its Western European allies. This has mainly been due to the traditional preponderance of the United States and European states in Africa, which makes the entry of China in the continent to be interpreted as aimed at unsettling the balance of power. However unlike the nineteenth and most periods of the twentieth century, when African countries lacked national interests to either secure or promote, the twenty first century African states have subtle Westphalia outlook which demands that they set the pace, or at least relate with foreign powers more objectively. The increasing renewed interest in the continent requires that Kenya and other African countries review their foreign policies. This will ensure that Africa plays a more assertive role and maximize gains from its relations with China and the United States.

The study also strives to provide solutions to the policy challenges beleaguering Kenya's relations with China and the United States. To accomplish this, the study will discuss the internal and external issues, challenges and prospects of Kenya's foreign relations with China and the United States. It is important to note that both internal and external environments determine the

foreign policy formulation of a state.⁷⁶ The reliance of Kenya on foreign direct investments and external aid for economic growth and development requires the country to diversify and maintain cordial relations with the two great global powers.

Finally the limited academic discourse on the role of Africa in international relations has also provided an impetus to analyze the distribution of power in Africa. This will provide an understanding of how Africa can impact and is impacted upon by the twenty first century systemic balance of power. The limited study of African countries' relations has been pointed out by several scholars. For instance McKay argues that:

If power is a prerequisite for a foreign policy, can weak African states really have enough of a foreign analysis to merit analysis?"⁷⁷

The past peripheral role of Africa in the international system is also vividly captured by Morgenthau who states that:

"It's only from the late nineteenth century that there could be any discussion of an African balance of power, due to competition for power among African and non-African nations."⁷⁸

The barrenness of scholarly discussion on African foreign relations and the international system persisted after the independence period in the 1960s. Thus by looking at the shifting balance of power in Africa, the discourse aims at adding knowledge to the existing literature on international relations in general and foreign policy in particular.

⁷⁶ P.A Reynolds, *An Introduction to International Relations*, (New York: Longman Publishers, 1994), p.25

⁷⁷ Vernon McKay, *African Diplomacy: Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy*", (London: Pall Mall,1966), p.6

⁷⁸Hans J. Morgenthau: *Politics Among Nation: The Struggle for Power and Peace*.(New Delhi: Kalyani Publishers,2012), pp. 218-219

1.6 Hypotheses

The study tested the following hypotheses:

- i) Kenya's past relations with China and the United States has led to an increase in its socio-economic and political development.
- ii) The attainment of Kenya's socio-economic and political interests is dependent on the projection of its relations with China and the United States, amidst their power struggle.
- iii) The shifting international balance of power, especially due to power struggle between China and the United States, has had profound effects on the regional distribution of power across Africa.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

This study is grounded on the realism and neo-realism theories of international relations.⁷⁹ This is because the theories aptly explain the balance of power and foreign relations between nation-states. As Sheehan opines;

“The key characteristic of the systemic balance of power theory is the state behavior, which is controlled by the nature of the system, regardless of individual ideological differences between states.”⁸⁰

Therefore it can be argued that a country's foreign policy is conventionally formulated in relation to its national interest, as well as external factors such as the prevailing balance of power system.

⁷⁹The neo-realism theory is an offshoot of realism. The various shades of neo-realism include structural realism which places emphasis on the significance of the structure of the international system and the state as the significant actor in international relations. The other forms of realism are offensive and defensive realism, which is used in the discussion of security studies.

⁸⁰Michael Sheehan. *The balance of Power: History and Theory*. (New York: Routledge, 1996), p.81

Realism as a theory can be traced to the works of classic political philosophers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, an Italian philosopher and Thomas Hobbes from England. In the twentieth century the most prominent advocates of realism were Hans Morgenthau and neo-realist Kenneth Waltz.

Realism has tended to explain the international system as it actually is, rather than how it ought to be, hence the use of the term “realism”. Morgenthau, while discussing international political system, explains that there are six fundamental principles of realism.⁸¹ One of the central tenets of realism is that of a state as the primary actor in international relations. This principle provides the reasoning behind why states behave as they do. It explains that the behavior of states is usually designed with the sole purpose of the need to survive.⁸² Based on this principle, the foreign policy of a nation-state is formulated with the primary goal of achieving its national interest and survival in the anarchic international system.

Realists believe that relations between states must only be between sovereign and independent states. A sovereign and independent state must acquire the status of an international legal personality.⁸³ Thus the relations between Kenya, the United States and China are valid as a result of their universal recognition as being sovereign by other independent states.

The liberal theory contests the idea of states as the primary actors in the international system and considers them as merely one of the numerous players in international relations. On the balance of power and foreign relations, liberal thinkers such as Hobson believe that the balance of power is the principle cause of war and that instead nation-states need to cooperate in forming a world government.⁸⁴ Such a government should have powers to mediate and enforce decisions

⁸¹Hans J. Morgenthau: *Politics Among Nation: The Struggle for Power and Peace.*(New Delhi: Kalyani Publishers,2012), pp.4-13

⁸²Ibid, p.4

⁸³Malcolm N. Shaw. *International Law*, (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press India, 2008), pp. 195-197

⁸⁴John Baylis, et.al. *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, (New York: Oxford University Press,2011) p.103

upon states. Realism therefore provides the best foundation upon which this study is based due to its principle of interests defined in terms of power.

The three key features of a state includes: statism, self-help and survival.⁸⁵ These principles can be used to explain the tensions between China and the United States in their competition to influence the foreign relations of African states. The realism principle also accounts for Kenya's pragmatic foreign relations as aimed at maximizing its national interests, while guarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

1.8 Research Methodology

This study involved a descriptive analysis of Kenya's foreign relations with China and the United States. The analysis relied mainly on secondary data supported by limited primary data. The primary data was collected through interviewing officials from Kenya's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the United States, and Chinese embassies in Nairobi. The study used concurrent research design involving both quantitative and qualitative analysis of data. The big data for the study was qualitative supported with quantitative data as the small data.

The sample for this study included selected officials from Kenya's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the United States and the Chinese embassies in Nairobi, as well as scholars of international relations. The sampling procedure for the study was non-probabilistic as it provided an opportunity for deliberate selection of people with relevant information on the conduct of foreign relations. The study used several research instruments and tools, such as content analysis, interviews, and observation of current trends in the conduct of foreign relations between Kenya, China and the United States. The data collected was analyzed descriptively due to their narrative form.

⁸⁵Ibid

The limitations to this study involved the collection of primary and secondary data. With regard to the primary data, the sensitivity of a state's foreign relations led to reluctance by officials from the embassies and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in providing detailed information of their respective states' foreign relations. The problem of bureaucracy in booking and getting appointments from selected officials limited the set date for completion of the study. Concerning the secondary data, the limited documented data on Kenya's foreign policy and its relations with China and the United States impeded the pace of the study. This was due to the tedious process of assembling relevant but scarce documented data on Kenya's foreign relations.

1.9 Chapter Outline

The study has been structured around five main chapters as:

Chapter One: Introduction to the Study

Chapter Two: Shifting International Balance of Power: An Overview

Chapter Three: Shifting International Balance of Power: An Analysis of Kenya's Relations with China and the United States of America, 2003-2012

Chapter Four: Shifting International Balance of Power and Kenya's relations with China and the United States: A Critical Analysis

Chapter Five: Conclusion

CHAPTER TWO

SHIFTING INTERNATIONAL BALANCE OF POWER: AN OVERVIEW

2.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, through discussion of the literature review, background of the study, and theoretical framework, it came out explicitly that the history and development of the theory and practice of the balance of power concept is inextricably interwoven with that of international relations. It is important to note that Africa did not feature much in the early discourse on the balance of power concept until towards the mid eighteenth century following the “Scramble and Partition of Africa.”⁸⁶ The Berlin Congress of 1878 thus provided the impetus to colonization of Africa by European imperial powers. This eventually led to the creation of the current modern political map of the African nation-states. The motive of European colonization was to exploit and plunder Africa’s resources.⁸⁷

This chapter traces the shifting nature of the international balance of power concept from the Renaissance era, at the start of the fourteenth century, to the eon of post-internationalism in the twenty first century. The discussion on the renaissance period will be characterized by the rudimentary balance of power concept, especially among the Italian city-states. The discourse will then focus on the foundation of the modern-state system. The concept of the modern state system was in line with the Westphalia Peace Treaty in 1648 and the Utrecht Treaty in 1713. The two treaties are credited with the official recognition of the balance of power practice in Europe. The last part of the chapter will look at the balance of power concept between the eighteenth and the twenty first century.

⁸⁶Hans J. Morgenthau. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. 6th edition, (New Delhi, Kalyani Publishers, 2012), p. 219.

⁸⁷Walter Rodney. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, (Nairobi: East African Education Publishers, 1989), p.135.

2.2 From Renaissance to the Pre-World War I

2.2.1 Renaissance Europe

The Renaissance period in Europe is considered to have started in the fourteenth century and came to a close towards the end of the seventeenth century. The era was characterized by a revolution in the way of thinking and reasoning involving all aspects of life. This was unlike the feudal medieval ages where religious dogma, authority of the Pope and the will of the emperor was considered supreme. The balance of power concept is thus attributed to have had its origins in the Renaissance period. This was due to the evolution of critical thinking on state relations during the period. The idea of a balance of power had no place in mediaeval thinking, and its origin is attributed to the Renaissance in Italy, towards the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth centuries.⁸⁸

In the course of the Renaissance period, the subtle form of the balance of power principles emerged between the Italian city-states towards the end of the fifteenth century. The five city-states were Venice, Florence, Naples, Milan and the Papal states. The dominant city-state was Venice, whose power had always been balanced by a triple Alliance of Florence, led by Lorenzo de Medici, Milan and Naples.⁸⁹ Despite the existence of the balance of power concept during this period, certain significant features of the balance of power were still missing. This included the existence of a well-defined international system comprising of sovereign independent states, as well as a foreign policy devoid of religious and ideological attachment. These crucial factors which are an important element in the theory and practice of a balance of power principle had to wait until the mid-seventeenth century, following the Westphalia Peace Treaty in 1648.

⁸⁸Per Maurseth, "Balance-of-Power thinking: From the Renaissance to the French revolution", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1964, Sage Publications, p. 120.

⁸⁹Michael Sheehan. *The Balance of Power: History and Theory*, (London: Routledge, 1996), p.32

The theoretical development of the balance of power towards the end of the fourteenth century can be credited to Italian scholars, such as Machiavelli.⁹⁰ However the notion of balance of power developed by Machiavelli was far from perfect and did not reflect the modern theories of a balance of power system. Despite Machiavelli's remarkable contribution to the development of international relations theory, he nevertheless played a less significant role in the formulation of the balance of power theory, which is an essential feature of the international system.⁹¹ The misunderstanding of the balance of power concepts by the earlier scholars is illustrated further by Guicciardini's remarks that:

“Weaker states were bound to support stronger states in case of war.”⁹²

This kind of thinking was an outright antithesis of the balance of power concept that advocated for weaker states forming an alliance to balance the power of one or more greater powers.

Regardless of the shortcomings of the balance of power practice and theory during the fifteenth century, the balance of power thinking had established its roots in the conduct of relations between sovereign entities. At the start of the seventeenth century the balance of power had taken an advanced form with a sub-regional balancing pattern across Europe. The importance attached to the balance of power concept in the early seventeenth century is illustrated by the works of scholars such as Sir Thomas Overbury, who in 1606 wrote “*Observation on the State of France in 1609 under Henry IV*”. Overbury provided a description of Christian Europe as a dual balance with Spain, France and England on the west while Russia, Poland, Sweden and Denmark occupied the east, and Germany was left as a dominant power at the center of Europe.

⁹⁰F. H Hinsley, *Power and Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States*.(London: Cambridge University Press, 1963), p.157

⁹¹Sheehan, op. cit., p.30

⁹²Ibid

The writings of Bacon also significantly contributed to the understanding of the importance of balance of power in the systemic stability of Europe. Bacon's book, "*Essays*" involved discussion of ancient empires. In one of his writings he opined that:

"First for their neighbors; there can no general rule be given (the occasions are so variable), save one, which ever holds it; which is, that princes do keep sentinel that none of their neighbors do overgrow so (by increase of territory, by embracing of trade, by approaches, or the like); as they become more able to annoy them than they were."⁹³

Bacon, writing about the empire, was thus describing the fragility of the balance of power between France, England and Spain. The three states had to preserve peace and systemic stability through a confederation of two states against one, and if necessary resort to war, where two states would form an alliance to oppose the state which threatened the balance of power. Bacon illustrates this phenomenon of balancing power further by explaining that:

"None of the two could win a palm of ground but, the other two would straightaway balance it, either by confederation, or, if need were by war."⁹⁴

The struggle for power in the seventeenth century eventually morphed into a bipolar balance of power system between France and Spain. During this period the advisors of the two poles advised them to adhere to the balance of power in their foreign policy orientation.⁹⁵ This was an indication of the increasingly advanced nature of the balance of power in thinking and practice.

2.2.2 Between the Peace of Westphalia and the Utrecht Settlement Treaty, 1648-1713

The Westphalia Peace Treaty came into force in 1648, following the signing of the Treaty of Osnabruck and Munster. The Osnabruck Treaty was between the Roman Empire and Sweden, while the Munster Treaty was between France, the Roman Empire and their respective

⁹³Francis Bacon. *The "Essays" of Francis Bacon*, edited by Mary Augusta Scott, Ph.D. (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1908), p.85

⁹⁴Ibid.

⁹⁵Sheehan, op. cit., p.37

confederates and allies.⁹⁶ The peace treaty led to the end of the Thirty Years War, which was initially a religious war between the Protestants and the Catholics, but later metamorphosed into a conflict involving a plethora of other issues which were of concern to European nation-states. The Westphalia Peace Treaty led to the sub-division of Europe into numerous nation-states. The nation-states each had its own right to self-determination. The four significant attributes of the peace treaty to the European nation-states included: authority, sovereignty, territoriality and citizenship.⁹⁷ These attributes have persisted to define the balance of power in the modern twenty first century international system.

These four outcomes of the Westphalia Peace Treaty enabled nation-states to start recognizing and respecting the legitimacy and capacity of each independent entity. This required that individual nation-states to rule within its own sphere of influence without external interference. The outcome of the peace treaty not only led to positivism and the establishment of a balance of power system, but also led to the end of an era of “*just wars*” between states. The sovereignty and equality of states made one state unable to justify whether the actions of other states were just or not. This therefore ensured that states balanced each other by peaceful means without resorting to war.⁹⁸ This aspect of the Westphalia Peace Treaty thus enhanced peace and stability in the international system, unlike the period prior to 1648.

The first major threat to the Westphalia Peace Treaty was due to France’s pursuit of a policy of expansionism across Europe, with utter disregard to the existing systemic balance of power. The actions of France under Louis XIV led to a series of wars and conquests. This

⁹⁶Leo Gross: “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648 -1948”, *American Journal of International Law*, 1948, p. 21

⁹⁷James A. Caropaso “Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public Authority, and Sovereignty” *International Studies Review*, Vol. 2, No. 2, Summer, 2000, Blackwell Publishers, p.2

⁹⁸Malcolm N. Shaw. *International Law*, (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press India, 2008), p. 1120

perturbed the systemic stability of Europe for the first time since the Westphalia Peace Treaty.⁹⁹ Thus providing an impetus to the first great alliance of nations in 1668, led by England, to counter the threat posed to territorial integrity of European nation-states by France's imperialistic tendencies. The aggressive policies of Louis XIV thus led to the formation of the Triple Alliance, consisting of England, Sweden and the Dutch Republic.¹⁰⁰

The aim of the Triple Alliance was to stop France's hegemonic tendencies and use military force to ensure negotiation between France and Spain over who would ascend to the Spanish throne. In May 1702, England declared war on France with the aim of restoring liberty and preserving the balance of power in Europe by curtailing the aggressive tendencies of France. The war, which came to be known as the War of Spanish Succession came to an end in 1713. This was after the signing of the Utrecht Treaty, with England under William II, as the central actor in the European political system.¹⁰¹ The Treaty of Utrecht was the first ever agreement to acknowledge the significance of the balance of power concept as an important policy in the maintenance of peace and stability in Europe.¹⁰²

Morgenthau affirms this notion by stating that the central theme of all major coalition wars waged between 1713 following the Treaty of Utrecht and 1772 during the first partition of Poland, were all aimed at preserving the balance of power which had been established by the Treaty of Utrecht.¹⁰³ This fact is made clear by the three successive partitions of Poland, equally

⁹⁹Amos S. Hershey. "History of International Law since the Peace of Westphalia" *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 6, No. 1, Jan., 1912, American Society of International Law, p.38

¹⁰⁰Michael Sheehan. *The Balance of Power: History and Theory*,(London: Routledge,1996), p.37

¹⁰¹Ibid, p.52

¹⁰²John Baylis, et.al. *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*,(New York: Oxford University Press,2011), p.38

¹⁰³Hans J. Morgenthau: *Politics Among Nation: The Struggle for Power and Peace*.(New Delhi: Kalyani Publishers,2012), p.209

between the Hapsburgs and the Bourbons to promote European balance of power between 1772, 1793, and 1795.¹⁰⁴

The balance of power in Europe during the first half of the eighteenth century was bipolar, comprising of France and Austria. However, in 1740, during the second half of the century, the rise of Russia led to the disturbance of power across Europe.¹⁰⁵ The dominance of Russia threatened the European balance of power due to its imperialistic tendencies which was fortunately, balanced by Prussia. The instability of the European balance of power was further worsened by competition for trade routes and spheres of influence between England, Spain, and France which led to the Seven Years War.¹⁰⁶ The Seven Years War was the first outright war involving all the major continents, including Africa. The contention was mainly over the control of international trade routes. At the end of the war, seventeen belligerents had fought in over one hundred and eleven battles across the world.¹⁰⁷

2.2.3 The French Revolution, Napoleonic Wars and the Vienna Settlement

The French Revolution started in 1789 and had significant implications on the balance of power in Europe and beyond. Despite the French Revolution having been triggered by France's internal problems, such as the refusal of the old aristocrats to reform France, the Revolution perturbed the balance of power across Europe and became something bigger than merely about France's domestic reforms.¹⁰⁸ The year 1789 thus became a key reference to societies across the world that desired democratic governance. This fact has been supported by most international relations

¹⁰⁴Ibid, p.199

¹⁰⁵F. H Hinsley, *Power and Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States.*(London: Cambridge University Press, 1963), p.191

¹⁰⁶Michael Sheehan. 'The balance of Power: History and Theory'. (London: Routledge,1996), p.53

¹⁰⁷Hinley, op. cit., p.279

¹⁰⁸Paul W. Schroeder. *The Transformation of European Politics:1763-1848.*(New York: Oxford University Press,1994), p.53

scholars. For instance Lincoln opines that none of the numerous global political events have attracted the thinking and imagination of historians and political scribes like the 1789 French Revolution has done.¹⁰⁹

The French Revolution was the origin of an epoch which led to a steady decline of the cosmopolitan aristocratic society. This has continued to influence the moral orientation and obligation of most states' foreign policy up to the present times.¹¹⁰ However, the immense contribution of the French Revolution to the balance of power was realized much later in Europe, almost two generations after it took place in France. The disillusionment and resistance to the French Revolution across Europe, which delayed its impact, was mainly due to France's aggressive tendencies across Europe. France's imperialistic outlooks made the rest of European powers view the revolution as an attempt by France to spread its imperialistic ideals across the continent.¹¹¹

Between 1792 and 1814 France, under Napoleon I, embarked on an aggressive expansionist war. This was despite the fact that the French parliament had earlier on May 21, 1790, following the end of the French Revolution, renounced the use of force and war as tool of expanding its territories.¹¹² The Napoleonic Wars were merely a ploy by Napoleon to conquer Europe and create monarchial hegemony over Europe, while hoodwinking other European powers that the intention was the restoration of the feudal system.¹¹³ The defeat of Napoleon by a

¹⁰⁹C. H. Lincoln. "Rousseau and the French Revolution", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 10., Jul., 1897, Published by: Sage Publications, Inc., p.54

¹¹⁰Hans J. Morgenthau: *Politics Among Nation: The Struggle for Power and Peace.*(New Delhi: Kalyani Publishers,2012), p. 267

¹¹¹Schroeder op. cit., p.56

¹¹²Sheehan, op. cit., p.121

¹¹³Hinley, op. cit.,p.192

coalition of European nation-states was thus seen as a victory over the first major threat against the Westphalia state system since its formation in 1648.¹¹⁴

To achieve his goal Napoleon had created a system in which all states, except Britain and Russia, were independent and able to withstand his military power. Nevertheless both Britain and Russia could still not withstand French military strength on their own. This gave Britain and Russia little option but to form a coalition with other small powers to counter the hegemonic threat of France in Europe. Between 1801 and 1812, every major power in Europe tried as much as possible to appease Napoleon, even much more than Chamberlain had tried to appease Hitler just before the start of the First World War.¹¹⁵ The massive strength of France could only be countered through a coalition of European powers. This led to the Anglo-Russian coalition resulting in a series of wars between 1799 and 1815. This gave way to Napoleon's defeat at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815.

With the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1814, a new balance of power system led by the victors emerged, restoring political order in Europe while ignoring the powerful clamor for democracy and nationality across the continent.¹¹⁶ The aim of the victorious powers(s) at the end of each war has always been marked by the desire to maintain the post-war status quo. This notion is explained by Levy's statement that;

“Great world wars, such as was the Napoleonic wars, have always led to the restructuring of the international system in favor of hegemonic power or alliances, as has been the case in most past major global wars.”¹¹⁷

This view summarizes the desire of Britain at the end of the war to retain its position as a balancer of power, and Russia to continue with its desire for a hegemonic status in the post-

¹¹⁴Michael Sheehan. *The Balance of Power: History and Theory*, (London: Routledge, 1996), p.121

¹¹⁵Paul W. Schroeder. “Napoleon's Foreign Policy: A Criminal Enterprise”. *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 54, No. 2, Apr., 1990, Society for Military History pp.152-153

¹¹⁶Amos S. Hershey, “History of International Law since the Peace of Westphalia” *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 6, No. 1, Jan., 1912, American Society of International Law, p.46

¹¹⁷Jack S. Levy. “Theories of General War”, *World Politics*, Vol. 37, No.3, April 1985, Johns Hopkins, p.349

Napoleonic Wars period. To establish and maintain the post-war status quo, a series of congress meetings were held in Vienna between 1814 and 1815. In 1815 the Holy Alliance was established, with Christendom as the unifying strand in the relations between European nation-states. The treaty however excluded the Pope and the Sultan in the conduct of European affairs.¹¹⁸

The need to restore the pre-Napoleonic European territorial integrity thus formed one of the key aspects of the peace treaty.¹¹⁹ However Morgenthau differs with Hinsley by stating that from the outset, the understanding of what kind of status quo that was to be preserved differed markedly between two of the victorious great powers, Britain and Russia. While Britain's thinking of the status-quo was confined to the territorial settlement of 1815 preventing Napoleon's lineage from ascending to the French leadership, Russia, and later Austria, Prussia and France viewed the treaty as aimed at preserving unlimited territorial status- quo. This fact therefore gave them, unlike Britain's thinking, permission to interfere in other states' internal affairs which was seen as being aggressive.¹²⁰

The conflicting views on post- war status-quo never changed during Canning and Castlereagh's reign. This fact later isolated Britain in the Holy Alliance as Austria, Prussia and France sided with Russia's view, eventually leading to the demise of the Holy Alliance. The other treaties signed to enhance peace included the Paris Peace Treaty of November 1815, between Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia, which defined France's frontiers and conditions of peace with it. The Treaty of Chaumont led to a binding agreement between all the European powers against French aggression, as well as ruling out the return of the Bonaparte family

¹¹⁸Sheehan, op. cit. , p.28

¹¹⁹F. H Hinsley. *Power and Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States.*(London: Cambridge University Press, 1963), p.194

¹²⁰Hans J. Morgenthau: *Politics Among Nation: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, (New Delhi: Kalyani Publishers, 2012), pp.484-485.

lineage to the throne of France. Article IV of the Treaty of Chaumont also established a congress system where European great powers would converge to discuss pertinent issues affecting systemic stability of the European continent.

2.2.4 The Concert of Europe

The Concert of Europe, just like the Holy Alliance, was a government of great powers consisting of at least five European powers at any given time of its existence.¹²¹ The conditions which led to the formation of the Concert of Europe, like other international organizations, echoed the four prerequisites, as outlined by Claude, necessary for the formation of international organizations.

“The first two prerequisites are objective in nature i.e. the world must be divided into a number of states, which function as independent political units, with a substantial measure of contact existing between the states, while the second two conditions are subjective in nature, i.e. states must recognize problems arising out of their co-existence resulting in the need to establish institutions to regulate their relations with each other.”¹²²

The aim of the Concert of Europe was to ensure the maintenance of systemic stability and peace through ad-hoc meetings to solve issues of concern to the peace and stability of Europe. The Concert in its lifetime was able to hold thirty congresses, which helped to resolve thorny political issues and thaw tensions, thus minimizing conflicts between European states.¹²³ Among the landmark congress meetings held during the period of the Concert of Europe was the 1878 Berlin Congress which led to the sub-division of the African continent among the great European powers. The scramble and partition of Africa marked a significant period in the balance of power in Africa. This was due to its reshaping of the boundaries of the continent, creating the modern-day political map of African states.

¹²¹Ibid, pp.488-489

¹²²Inis L. Claude. *Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organizations*. (New York: Random House, 1971, Fourth Edition), p. 21.

¹²³Ibid, p. 25

The Concert of Europe was able to maintain peace for over ninety years save for the Crimean War between 1854 and 1856, which Morgenthau described as serendipitous.¹²⁴ The Crimean War was a struggle by Orthodox Russia and Catholic France to control the holy sites in Turkey. The war led to Britain and France forming an alliance to fight against Russia, a member of the Concert of Europe. This fact later contributed to the collapse of the Concert.¹²⁵ Despite the numerous challenges, the Concert of Europe went out of its way to maintain peace in Europe throughout its existence. This can be explained by its decision to go against the Treaty of Chaumont to include non-Christian Turkey as a member to balance power in Europe.

Several scholars have attributed the success of the Concert of Europe to the multipolar nature of the European system.¹²⁶ Claude for instance, attributes the success of systemic stability in Europe during the Concert period, to exclusiveness of the great powers to consult and make decisions for other small European powers.¹²⁷ However Schroder in dismissing this notion, points out the variation in the power of states which constituted the Concert of Europe. He explains that the Vienna Settlement was more bipolar in nature, with Britain and Russia being the two most powerful states. Therefore their individual economic and military strength could not be counterbalanced by an alliance of France, Prussia or Austria.¹²⁸

After the Crimean War, the Concert of Europe started a steady decline which eventually led to the First World War in 1914. The breakout of the Crimean War saw each great power fight in at least one major war with each other between 1854 and 1870. The wars often led to

¹²⁴Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, (New Delhi: Kalyani Publishers, 2012), p.489

¹²⁵William B. Moul. "Balance of Power and European Great Power War, 1815-1939: A Suggestion and Some Evidence", *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol.18. no.3, Sep. 1985, Canadian Political Association, p.293

¹²⁶Karl W. Deutsch; J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability", *World Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 3.Apr., 1964, Johns Hopkins University Press, p.393

¹²⁷Claude, op. cit., p.25

¹²⁸Paul W. Schroeder. "Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?" *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 97, No. 3 (Jun., 1992), The University of Chicago Press, p.687

territorial changes which had been established by the Vienna Settlement.¹²⁹ The series of revolutions across Europe also led to the collapse of the Concert. The older generation of statesmen who had dominated the European political system, was replaced by a new generation of leaders. These leaders, such as Bismarck of Prussia and Louis Napoleon of France had less regard for the Concert of Europe compared to their predecessors, thus marking the end of the Concert era.¹³⁰

2.3 World War I and the League of Nations

The First World War was basically due to the disturbance of the balance of power principle set by the victors following the end of Napoleonic Wars. The European landscape prior to the war was bipolar, with each pole competing for dominance. The Triple Entente comprising Britain, France, and Russia, was balanced by the Triple Alliance made up of Germany, Austria and Italy.¹³¹ Germany in particular had emerged as a European powerhouse and aimed at forcefully asserting its influence in Europe. The revisionist tendency of Germany was supported by Austria which was against the principle of the balance of power established by the Vienna Settlement. France, meanwhile, was determined to settle scores and revise the status quo set by the Vienna Settlement that annexed most of its territories and awarded them to Germany.

The immediate cause of the war was the assassination of the heir-apparent of Austria-Hungary, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, by the Serbian Gaurilo Princip on June 28, 1914.¹³² The Sarajevo assassination was however seen as merely a trigger of the First World War. There were several underlying issues and should the assassination not have happened, then some mundane

¹²⁹John Lowe. *The Concert of Europe: International Relations, 1814-70*. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1990), p.113

¹³⁰Michael Sheehan. *The Balance of Power: History and Theory*, (London: Routledge, 1996), p.13

¹³¹Garrison A. Craig, *Europe since 1815*. (Illinois: Dryden Press, 1974), p.310-311

¹³²*Ibid*, pp. 318-319

issue would still have triggered the war.¹³³ The assassination only provided an opportunity for the eruption of tensions in Europe which had built up among the European great powers for nearly a century. The war continued between 1914 and ended in 1918 following victory by the Triple Alliance over the Triple Entente. This was followed by the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, which later gave rise to the League of Nations.

The League of Nations can be acknowledged as the first comprehensive attempt at creating an all-inclusive formal international organization with norms and rules. This was unlike the previous attempts which mainly involved a coalition of hegemonic powers.¹³⁴ The League of Nations, as outlined in Article 10 of the Treaty of Versailles aimed at ensuring peace and stability. To attain this goal the League legitimized the status quo established by the victors while punishing the losers such as Germany, who were viewed as having caused the war.¹³⁵ It can therefore be stated that the Treaty of Versailles, like all treaties at the end of major wars, had the distribution of power as its main goal.¹³⁶

One of the key elements of the League of Nations was the aspect of collective security which was seen as an alternative to the balance of power principle. The Collective Security argument was introduced by Woodrow Wilson in his “*Fourteen Points*” speech to the United States Congress in January 1918. Following the speech, an armistice agreement between Germany, its allies and the Triple Entente was reached. The Collective Security proponents viewed the balance of power as insufficient in ensuring systemic stability. The League of

¹³³F. H Hinsley. *Power and Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States.*(London: Cambridge University Press, 1963), p. 289

¹³⁴John Baylis, et.al. *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, (New York: Oxford University Press,2011), p.44

¹³⁵See The Peace Treaty of Versailles, Article 10, June 1919

¹³⁶Hans J. Morgenthau: *Politics Among Nation: The Struggle for Power and Peace.*(New Delhi: Kalyani Publishers,2012), pp. 490-491

Nations thus undermined the balance of power theory through Article 11 of the treaty. The Charter of the League of Nations proclaimed that:

“Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the high contracting parties or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the League, and the high contracting parties reserve the right to take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. It is hereby also declared and agreed to be the friendly right of each of the high contracting parties to draw the attention of the body of delegates or of the Executive Council to any circumstances affecting international intercourse which threaten to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.”¹³⁷

The League of Nations maintained the balance of power until 1945, following the start of the Second World War. The ineffectiveness of the League of Nations to prevent the outbreak of the Second World War has been attributed to constitutional, political and legal challenges.¹³⁸ The failure of the League has also been attributed to the utopian intellectual theories of liberalism at a time when countries and statesmen were more guided by the realist thinking¹³⁹ Carr blames the failure of the League on what he describes as:

“The application of one-sided intellectual Lockeian liberalist, thinking in the molding of an international organization.”¹⁴⁰

He states further that:

“An organization of the magnitude of the League of Nations, which was more diverse, required a rational approach in its development.”¹⁴¹

The above myriad statements thus explain the failure of the League of Nations in stopping the Second World War.

¹³⁷See The Peace treaty of Versailles, Article 1. June 1919.

¹³⁸Morgenthau, op. cit., pp. 496-499

¹³⁹Edward Hallet Carr. *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*. (New York: Harper and Row Publishers Inc., 1964), p.28-29

¹⁴⁰ Ibid

¹⁴¹ Ibid

2.4 World War II and the United Nations Organization

The multifarious failures of the League of Nations coupled with an aggressive Germany under Adolf Hitler, led to the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe. The Treaty of Versailles lacked moral validity, and hence it was not possible to restrain the expansionist ambition of Hitler, despite being appeased numerous times by great European powers.¹⁴² Germany's intransigence was displayed by its disregard of the Versailles Peace Treaty, while selfishly manipulating the balance of power in Europe. The imperialistic foreign policy of Germany informed and guided its actions throughout the Second World War.

The course of the Second World War is outlined in three main phases.¹⁴³ The first phase was in May 1939 following Germany's invasion of Poland and its subdivision into two regions, one occupied by Russia and the other by Germany. The second phase of the war started in May 1940, following Germany's invasion of France. The overwhelming military strength and organizational skills of Germany saw France fall to Germany's occupation after the signing of an armistice agreement between the two countries. The fall of France fundamentally shifted the balance of power in continental Europe, giving Hitler control of territory almost equivalent in size to Napoleon's during the intercession between the eighteenth and nineteenth century.¹⁴⁴

After occupying France, Germany's planned operation to conquer Britain in June 1940 failed due to Britain's tactical skills and Germany's blunders. The failure to conquer Britain led to Germany's invasion of Russia under *Operation Barbarossa*. German's attack of Russia has been recorded as the largest invasion of ground troops in history. The German invasion included

⁵⁸A.J.P. Taylor. *Origins of the Second World War*. (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2001), p. 15

¹⁴³William R. Keylor and Jerry Bannister, *The Twentieth Century World: An International History*, Canadian Edition.(Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 180

¹⁴⁴Ibid.

four million men, 3,300 tanks and 5000 aircraft.¹⁴⁵ The attack was in total disregard to the peace treaty which Russia had signed with Germany in 1939 during the start of Germany's European invasion. Russia's repulsion of German was aided by its peace settlement with Japan, which saw it bring its troop from Asia to deter Germany which was simultaneously engaged in war with Britain.¹⁴⁶

The third stage of the war which started in 1941 to 1945 drew other states outside Europe into it.¹⁴⁷ The United States joined the war indirectly against Germany to protect its national interest. Germany, in response viewed the neutrality of the United States as over and declared war on the United States and its interest. However the aggressive act of Japan, which led to the attack on the American fleet in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on December 7, 1941, is what led to America's direct involvement in the war. The entry of the United States into the war led to a shift in the balance of power in its favor while Europe's economy declined as a consequence of the war.¹⁴⁸

As the war entered into the third phase and escalated across the globe, Africa, unlike in the First World War, became actively involved in it. Despite the lack of direct combat in Sub-Saharan Africa, the European imperial powers saw Africa as an integral part of their territories. The Allied European powers, mainly France and Britain, recruited Africans to fight alongside their armies. While Britain recruited Africans to fight in Burma against Japan, France mainly sent its African recruits to fight alongside the French army in North Africa.¹⁴⁹ The march to North Africa by a combined force of African and French soldiers, led by the French General

¹⁴⁵Ibid,p.182

¹⁴⁶ J. M Roberts. *Europe 1880-1945: A General History of Europe*. Second Edition,(New York: Longman Inc., 1967), p.551

¹⁴⁷Ibid,p.155

¹⁴⁸ Ruth Henig. *The Origins of the Second World War: 1933-1941*, (New York: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1985), p.4. See George Lichtheim. *History of Civilization: Europe in the Twentieth Century*, (New York: Praeger Publishers Inc., 1972), p.278.

¹⁴⁹James Mayall. *Africa: The Cold War and After*. (London: Elek Books Ltd, 1971), p. 80

Leclaire, resulted in the fall of the North African region to the Allies. Africa also acted as a strategic location for the British and French forces to replenish and strategize on the course of the war. For instance, during the course of the war, Congo Brazzaville acted as temporary headquarters for the French government in exile.

The Second World War came to an end in August 1945, following a series of defeats by the Axis.¹⁵⁰ The first defeat involved Italy, which was conquered by Britain and American troops on July 10, 1943. This was followed by the rescue of France, under *Operation Overload* on June 6, 1944. The amphibious operation for the liberation of France from German forces led to what was called the D-Day invasion. The French invasion was followed by the assault of Germany from all directions by the Allied forces. This eventually led to the collapse of Berlin under Russian invasion in April 1945, leading to the surrender of Germany following Hitler's suicide. The swift end of the war can be attributed to President Truman of the United States who authorized the use of atomic bombs on Japan.¹⁵¹ The bombings facilitated faster signing of the Tokyo Bay document on September 2, 1945, marking an end to the Second World War.

The formation of the United Nations Organization following the end of the war took the familiar balance of power trend. The United Nations aimed at maintaining systemic stability by preserving the post-World War II status quo. The United Nations, just like the League of Nations was a conglomerate of great powers.¹⁵² However, in reality only the United States and the Soviet Union could actually be ranked as great powers.¹⁵³ This view is reiterated by the fact that the

¹⁵⁰Norman Lowe. *Mastering Modern World History*.(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp.104-108

¹⁵¹C.E Black and E.C Helmreich, *Twentieth Century Europe: A History*.(New York: Alfred A. Knopf,1961), p.581

¹⁵²Hans J. Morgenthau: *Politics Among Nation: The Struggle for Power and Peace*.(New Delhi: Kalyani Publishers,2012), pp.501-502

¹⁵³Ibid, p.503

United Nations was merely a continuation of the League of Nations with minimal necessary changes added to steer it from the predicaments of the latter.¹⁵⁴

2.5 The Effects of the First World War and the Second World War

The First and Second World Wars both led to profound shifts in the international balance of power.¹⁵⁵ Following the end of the Napoleonic Wars, and the emergence of the Concert of Europe, the great powers of Europe included; France, Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary and Russia, with Britain playing the role of the “balancer” of power across Europe. According to Morgenthau:

“The balancer of power is a nation-state which does not align its policies with either the status quo or the imperialist state and their allies, with its main aim being to maintain the balance with minimum regard to policies of the balance.”¹⁵⁶

However at the end of the First World War, a new set of great powers emerged, including Britain which had ceased to be “the balancer” of power. The other major powers included France, Russia and Germany. Nevertheless, among the four powers, only Britain and Russia could count as actual great powers due to their massive power capabilities. The United States, however, had assumed Britain’s role as a neutral state concerning the balance of power in Europe. This neutrality is illustrated by Woodrow Wilson’s insistence that the United States’ relations with Europe were unique.¹⁵⁷ The isolationist policy of the United States was further reinforced by the United States Senate decision barring it from joining the League of Nations.

The re-arrangement of the balance of power system was even more profound at the end of the Second World War. Germany had been defeated and the weak European economy led to the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower in the immediate aftermath of the war.

¹⁵⁴Leland M. Goodrich. “From League of Nations to United Nations”, *International Organization*, Vol. 1, No. 1 Feb., 1947, The MIT Press, p.21

¹⁵⁵J.P. Taylor. *Origins of the Second World War*. (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2001), pp.7-8

¹⁵⁶Morgenthau, op. cit., p.213

¹⁵⁷William Keylor and Jerry Bannister. *The Twentieth Century World: An International History*, Canadian Edition. (Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.67

However, with Russia's amalgamation of Eastern European satellite states to form the USSR, the international system became bipolar in structure. The United States and the Soviet Union both balanced each other. The two powers also got involved in competition for allies, mostly amongst developing countries.

Africa was equally affected by the events of the two world wars, although the effects of the First World War on the continent were less significant as compared to those of the second. The First World War sowed the first seeds of liberation movements across Africa. This was mainly due to the recruitment of Africans, especially in French colonies, who went ahead to fight in Europe alongside the Triple Entente. The skills gained from the war, coupled with deflation of the mysticism of Europeans as a more superior race by Africans, motivated the Africans returning from the war to wage wars of liberation against the European colonialists.¹⁵⁸ In Egypt, the formation of a popular political movement called *wafd* accelerated its independence, leading to its nominal freedom in 1922.¹⁵⁹ The clamor for independence and self-rule was however halted by European colonial powers that embarked on sustained exploitation of the continent to rebuild war weary Europe. The First World War also affected the European balance of power in Africa, with Germany stripped of its colonies by the victors.¹⁶⁰ This thus reduced Germany's global influence.

The Second World War, apart from shifting the balance of power across the globe, also had a profound impact on Africa. The main effect in Africa was the renewed fight against colonialism, which had been initiated at the end of World War I. The formation of the United Nations and the emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union, both superpowers who resented colonialism, boosted the fight for independence in Africa. The signing of the Atlantic

¹⁵⁸Robin Hallet. "Africa since 1875: A Modern History". (Nairobi: Heinemann,1975), p.57

¹⁵⁹Ibid, pp.57-59

¹⁶⁰James Mayall. "*Africa: The Cold War and After*".(London: Elek Books Publishers, 1971), p.80

Charter in 1941 was viewed by African liberation movements as a purge towards ending colonialism. This was more so due to the United States, being a key member of the United Nations, was viewed as an anti-colonial power, especially after it vouched for the independence of India.¹⁶¹

2.6 The Cold War and its Effects

The Cold War can be defined as a state of affairs in which the key factor was the mutual hostility and fear by the two superpowers and their alliances of each other.¹⁶² The origin of hostilities between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States can be traced towards the tail end of the Second World War. This was mainly due to the convergence of Russia and the United States in the center of Europe after the defeat of Germany by the allied forces.¹⁶³

The Cold War can also be attributed to the fear by Russia of a nuclear armed United States. The possession of the atomic bomb made the United States, for the first time in world history, the most powerful state than the combined power of all other states.¹⁶⁴ This threat made Russia to embark on an arms race to counter the threat posed by the United States.

The stalemate in central Europe between Russia and the United States was settled through the subdivision of Europe into pro-Western and pro-Eastern spheres of influence. Following the division of Europe, Russia took control of Eastern European states to form the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, while the United States formed an alliance with Western Europe. The balance of power and fear of each other also determined the defense systems of the two superpowers, as each rushed to win over allies. The competition for allies led to the

¹⁶¹James Mayall. *"Africa: The Cold War and After"*.(London: Elek Books Publishers, 1971), p.77

¹⁶²Peter Calvocoressi. *World Politics since 1945*, (New York: Longman publishers, Sixth Edition 1991), p.3

¹⁶³William R. Keylor and Jerry Bannister.*The Twentieth Century World: An International History*, Canadian Edition.(Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.193

¹⁶⁴Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 3

formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) by the Western powers, comprising of twelve members led by the United States. NATO member states, through Article V, agreed to form a Collective Security defense system.¹⁶⁵ NATO was counterbalanced by the Warsaw Pact, formed in 1955 by the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies.¹⁶⁶ Although the Cold War was initially centered in Europe, more specifically in Germany, it eventually spread to other regions across the world.

The struggle for power between the United States and the Soviet Union was an indication of the shift in the systemic balance of power from Europe. Europe however was reluctant to accept its declining global influence which had started with the end of the First World War. Even the Soviet Union and the United States could not come to terms that power had shifted despite wielding more influence over world affairs. This perhaps explains their uncertainty and reluctance to assert their influence in the newly independent African states, as well as globally.¹⁶⁷

The Cold War had profound implications across the globe especially in Africa where new states were quickly gaining freedom after years of colonial rule. As more African countries became independent in the 1960s, they were soon sucked into the struggle for power between the United States and the Soviet Union. This situation made it difficult for African countries not to entirely align with either of the two poles, despite the Non-Alignment Policy which had been adopted by some newly independent states.¹⁶⁸ Having colonized Africa, the Western capitalist countries allied to the United States had an upper hand in the influence of policies in their former colonies.

¹⁶⁵See Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949

¹⁶⁶A. Ross Johnson. *"The Warsaw Pact: Soviet Military Policy in Western Europe"*. (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 1981), p.3

¹⁶⁷James Mayall. *"Africa: The Cold War and After"*.(London: Elek Books Publishers, 1971), p.77

¹⁶⁸Olajide Aluko, Ed. *The Foreign Policy of African States* (London: Hooder and Stoughton, 1977), p.14

This was mainly due to the long colonial period which had predisposed Africa to European cultural, economic, and political civilization, unlike the Soviet Union and China, whose influence in Africa was hindered by language barrier and the lack of significant financial investments in the continent.¹⁶⁹ However, the close links with the West did not deter several African countries from embracing socialism. African countries such as Tanzania under Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, and the then Zaire (present day Democratic Republic of Congo), led by Patrice Lumumba, were allies of China and the Soviet Union respectively.¹⁷⁰ Although Nyerere through the “*Ujamaa*” policy advocated for a unique form of African socialism devoid of reliance on either the East or the West, Tanzania nevertheless was closer to communist China than to capitalist Western powers which provided it with financial assistance¹⁷¹.

The demise of the Cold War epoch was a culmination of a series of several disastrous economic and military lapses both in the domestic and international environment of the two poles. The 1980s marked the start of a rapid decline of the Soviet Union’s economy and its resignation to defeat by the United States in the technological and arms race. The United States on the other hand was weighed down by the massive military spending in its quest to entrench itself as global hegemonic power.¹⁷² The domestic challenges bedeviling the two poles contributed to the thawing of the hard-line stance which had characterized their earlier relations. The softening of relations led to a roller-coaster of events, which eventually marked the end of the Cold War. The first series of meetings towards ending the Cold War started with the Reykjavik Summit in October, 1986 on nuclear arms reduction. This was followed in December

¹⁶⁹Ibid, pp.14, and 15

¹⁷⁰Thomas Kanza. “Zaire’s Foreign Policy”, *The Foreign Policy of African States*, edited by Olajide Aluko,(London: Hooder and Stoughton, 197), p.239

¹⁷¹David H. Jones. “The Foreign Policy of Tanzania”, *The Foreign Policy of African States*, edited by Olajide Aluko (London: Hooder and Stoughton, 1977), p.200.

¹⁷²William R. Keylor and Jerry Bannister. *The Twentieth Century World: An International History*, Canadian Edition.(Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.349

1987 with an agreement by the two poles to ban all intermediate range nuclear war heads located in central Europe. On November 19, 1991 following the Conference on Security and Cooperation, the Soviet Union drastically reduced its military personnel in Europe.

Apart from the military factors, political and economic issues also encouraged rapid expiration of the Cold War. The political and economic disenfranchisement of the populace in the Soviet Union's Eastern Europe client-states led to popular uprisings which the Soviet Union could not contain. This was unlike the 1956 and 1968 Hungarian and Czechoslovakia uprisings which Russia had easily suppressed. The indifference of the Soviet Union to the uprisings was due to its weak economy, which made the satellite states more of a liability than an asset.¹⁷³

The revolutions across Eastern Europe led to the independence of satellite states culminating in the collapse of the Berlin Wall in October 1990. This was followed in November 1990 by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and eventual collapse of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991 after the resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev as the president of the USSR. The indifference by Gorbachev was driven by a desire to achieve faster political and economic reforms without intimidation by internal and external actors.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷³Ibid,p.348-349

¹⁷⁴Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil "Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System". *International Organization*, Vol. 48, No. 2, 1994, The MIT Press, p.217

2.7 From Post-Cold War to Post- Internationalism

Despite the tension caused by the competition for power between the two poles during the Cold War, several realist scholars such as Waltz believed that theoretically the bipolar balance of power played a key role in maintaining systemic stability.¹⁷⁵ However as the Cold War faded and the United States' hegemonic tendencies surfaced, coupled with a longer period of relative peace, several scholars started to build theories in support of unipolar systemic stability. The collapse of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991 led to a significant shift in the balance of power, with the United States left as the single most powerful state globally. The emergence of a unipolar system can solely be attributed to the triumph of the United States over the Soviet Union.¹⁷⁶

Unipolar systemic stability can be described as a structure in which one state's capabilities are too overwhelming to be counterbalanced by another individual state or an alliance of states in the international political system.¹⁷⁷ Some scholars believed that the emergence of a unipolar balance of power system provided the best environment for systemic stability.¹⁷⁸ Based on the definition of unipolar stability, the scholars embarked on a study to counter the notion advanced by realist savants that the unipolar balance of power was merely a transition towards either a multipolar or a bipolar balance of power system.

The notion of realist thinking however seems to have prevailed, especially with the emergence of China and East Asia as global economic powerhouses in the post-Cold War era. This has contributed to the evolution of a multipolar system, at least in economic sense. By the

¹⁷⁵Kenneth Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World". *Daedulus*, Vol.93.No.3, Population, Prediction, Conflict, Existentialism, 1964, MIT Press, p.881.

¹⁷⁶John Baylis, et.al. *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p.69

¹⁷⁷William C. Wolfhorth. "The Stability of a Unipolar World", *MIT Press Journal*, p.9

¹⁷⁸*Ibid*, p.9

end of 2005, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea and other Association of South East Asian Nations countries contributed 33 percent of the world economy, with China being the leader of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) pack.¹⁷⁹ Thus in the eon of the post-Cold War era, military power has ceased to count much as a parameter of power capability in the ranking of nations as great powers. The application “soft power” has become much more significant in securing and promoting a country’s national interests.¹⁸⁰ This view is illustrated by China’s soft power coupled with its economic diplomacy which has escalated its global influence, juxtaposed to the United States’ increasing overseas military bases.¹⁸¹

The other most poignant characterization of the post-Cold War era has been the seeming collapse of territorial boundaries, at least with regard to the economic system.¹⁸² This phenomenon came to be described as globalization, a notion that had not been thought of prior to the end of the Cold War. Globalization shrunk distances across the world, mainly due to advanced technology in communication, leading to the coining of the term “global village” in reference to increased interconnectedness.

The post-Cold War international system has also been characterized by the escalation of rancorous non-state actors’ competition for power with states. This has been the case in Somalia, where the Islamic Court Unions (ICU) and the Al-Shabab terror group have been waging war against the Transitional Somalia Government.¹⁸³ However the main act of a non-state actor challenging states within the set international system was in 2001 following the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York. The 9/11 bombing by Al-Qaeda operatives completely

¹⁷⁹Horace Campbell. “China in Africa: challenging US global hegemony”. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.29, No.1, 2008, p.97

¹⁸⁰Joseph Nye Jr. “Soft Power”, *Foreign Policy*, No. 80, *Twentieth Anniversary*, 1990, p.154

¹⁸¹Campbell, op. cit., p. 95

¹⁸²John Baylis, et.al. *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p.69

¹⁸³Cedric Barnes and Harun Hassan, *The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu’s Islamic Courts*, Africa Program, London: Chatham House, 2007

polarized and shifted the international balance of power politics. The visibility of the cleavages formed by the bombing was captured in President Bush's speech to the joint session of Congress in the aftermath of the bombings.¹⁸⁴ The speech categorized the world along religious and political formations, pitting fundamental Islamic organizations and states sponsoring terrorism, against the United States and its allies.

2.8 Conclusion

The balance of power concept has evolved over the centuries, starting from the Renaissance era to the current post-internationalism epoch. However, the common strand which has characterized the balance of power over the centuries has always been the struggle between the victorious and defeated powers. While the victors have always desired to maintain the status quo, the vanquished states have often had an impulse to overthrow the status quo. The other significant feature in this discourse has been the minimal role of Africa in international affairs. Nevertheless as we advance into the twenty first century, Africa has exhibited propensity to actively participate in shaping the international system. The penchant towards active engagement can be attributed to the maturity of Africa's political, economic and legal institutions, buttressed by the realization of Africa's potential and putative power capabilities.

¹⁸⁴CNN, President Bush address to a joint session of the congress in the aftermath of 9/11, September 20, 2001

CHAPTER THREE

SHIFTING INTERNATIONAL BALANCE OF POWER IN AFRICA: AN ANALYSIS OF KENYA'S RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 2003-2012

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter has mainly been a historical overview of the balance of power theory and practice from the Renaissance era to the post-Cold War epoch. The core discussion was the origin, pattern and practice of the balance of power in continental Europe, starting with the Italian city-states during the Renaissance, through the 1648 Peace of Westphalia settlement, to the eon of post internationalism. The concentration of the balance of power theory and practice in Europe was mainly due to Europe's reputation as the origin of the balance of power concept. However in the course of the discourse, it is palpable that the balance of power concept proliferated outside Europe resulting in states such as the United States, Japan and China playing a significant role in the international systemic balance of power.

This chapter will focus on the balance of power concept and practice in Africa. As independence became a reality, most African countries started to acquire the vital traits of a nation-state, such as the right to self-determination and territorial integrity, as well as recognition within the set international system. The independent African states had to formulate and project their foreign policies in tandem with the anarchic and dynamic nature of the international system. To provide cognizance of the shifting international balance of power and its implication in Africa, this chapter aims to look at the foreign relations between Kenya, as a commissary for the African continent, with China and the United States. The United States and China have emerged as the dominant great powers competing for influence in Africa and globally in the recent past.

3.2 Shifting Balance of Power in Africa

The balance of power and political history of Africa can be unearthed to the pre-colonial period. This is contrary to the perspective that has been propagated by most European historical scholars, that relates the balance of power politics in Africa to the onset of the “scramble and partition” of Africa in the late nineteenth century.¹⁸⁵ The pre-colonial history of Africa can be divided into three polities. The polities were often arraigned against each other in the struggle for power. The first polity included the established kingdoms, such as the ancient kingdoms of Morocco, Ethiopia and the Ashanti in West Africa; the second polity was comprised of stateless societies, who in most cases were hunters and gatherers; and the last polity was a hodgepodge of stateless and established kingdoms.¹⁸⁶ However, despite the existence of these polities, the political map of pre-colonial Africa still lacked clear-cut territorial boundaries.

The establishment of the borders separating modern African states can thus be attributed to the dynamic balance of power among European imperial powers. This was mainly towards the end of the nineteenth century. The extreme desire for spheres of influence in Africa was driven by the growing nationalism and competition between European nation-states at the end of the Napoleonic Wars.¹⁸⁷ The European powers viewed Africa as strategic to the advancement of their national interests. This was due to Africa’s strategic location, as well as its possession of huge natural resources. This view of Europe towards Africa is explained by the struggle for control over Egypt by France and Britain as early as 1882. The escalation of tensions among great European powers led to the convening of the Berlin Congress in 1878, to discuss the

¹⁸⁵Fred Burke. *Africa*. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company Ltd, 1970), pp.81-119

¹⁸⁶Robin Hallet. *Africa since 1875: A Modern History*. (Nairobi: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd,1975), p.13

¹⁸⁷*Ibid*, p.47

partition of Africa into European spheres of influence.¹⁸⁸ The Berlin Congress was followed six years later by the West African Conference, which set up the modern boundaries of African states.¹⁸⁹

The European-drawn boundaries led to the disturbance of the balance of power patterns in the pre-colonial African polities. For instance in West Africa the demarcation of modern day Nigeria led to the amalgamation of the Fulani, Yoruba, Ibo and the Hausa, four main previously independent polities, into a single Nigerian polity.¹⁹⁰ This blatant disregard of the ethno-political fabric of African polities, later after independence, led to civil strife among the diverse ethnic groups with demands for secession and restoration of pre-colonial boundaries. Examples of such secessionist movements across Africa included; the Biafra secessionist war in Nigeria, Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army, and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front, as well as the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC).¹⁹¹

The balance of power among African countries during the colonial epoch was mainly an extension of the European systemic stability. This notion is best illustrated by the role of African states in the course of the two world wars, where Africans were recruited to fight alongside established European armies. For instance in Kenya, African soldiers in the King's African Rifles, apart from fighting in East Africa during the Second World War against the Italians, were also deployed in other regions of the British Empire after defeating Mussolini in the region.¹⁹² However with the end of the Second World War, the formation of the United Nations, and emergence of newly independent African states, the balance of power started to take shape in

¹⁸⁸Macharia Munene, "Africa-China Mutual Attractions". *China-Africa Partnership: The Quest for A Win-Win Relationship*, Edited by James Shikwati (Nairobi, Inter Region Economic Network, November 2012), p.155

¹⁸⁹R.J Gavin and J.A Betley, *The Scramble for Africa: Documents on the Berlin West African Conference and Related Subjects 1884/1855*, (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1973), p.192.

¹⁹⁰Hallet, op. cit., p.47

¹⁹¹Edmond J. Keller, "Secessionisms in Africa", *The Journal of African Policy Studies*, Vol.13, No. 1, 2007

¹⁹²Charles Hornsby. *Kenya: A History Since Independence*. (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2012), p.38

Africa with the new states asserting their sovereignty globally through defining their national interests beyond their territorial boundaries.¹⁹³

As more countries gained independence across Africa, they expeditiously found themselves entangled in the bipolar balance of power dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union. The divisive nature of the Cold War politics made it difficult for most African states to practice the Non-Aligned Policy as had been outlined in the OAU Charter.¹⁹⁴ This fact therefore led to the alignment of African states with either the United States, its Western European allies or with the communist Soviet Union and China.

Prior to the formation of the OAU, Africa was divided into two main rival blocs: the Casablanca Group and the Monrovia Group, with each oscillating around the Soviet Union and the United States respectively.¹⁹⁵ The two groups counterbalanced each other and were determined to shape Africa's political, economic and social destiny. The Casablanca Group, comprising Ghana, Mali and Guinea, was more radical in calling for the immediate unification of Africa into a political federation. Meanwhile the Monrovia Group, led by Liberia, was more moderate in advocating for the gradual unification of Africa through economic and social integration, before eventually forming a political federation.

The division of African states into two rival camps undermined the unity of the continent, thus confining it to act along the periphery of the international system. The systemic stability of the African continent was also affected by the proxy wars fought by the two poles.¹⁹⁶ In the Horn of Africa, Somalia's aggressive tendency across the region to create a pan-Somali state was

¹⁹³Hans J. Morgenthau. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. 6th edition, (New Delhi, Kalyani Publishers, 2012), p.219

¹⁹⁴The OAU Charter, Article III, Principle No. 7. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 25th day of May, 1963.

¹⁹⁵C.O.C Amate. *Inside the OAU: Pan-Africanism in Practice*, (London: MacMillan Publishers, 1986), pp.47-48.

¹⁹⁶Samuel M. Makinda. "Conflict and the Superpowers in the Horn of Africa", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 4, No 1982., p.93

supported by the Soviet Union. This position was counterbalanced by the decision of the United States and Britain to provide military support to Kenya and Ethiopia.¹⁹⁷ The proxy war maneuvers were mainly acts by the two poles to pit African States against each other for their own national interest.

The Soviet Union collapsed on December 25, 1991, marking the official end of the Cold War era. The sudden end of the Cold War not only perturbed the international system, but also tremendously shifted the balance of power in Africa, as well as its relations with the rest of the world. The United States emerged as the most advantaged country in terms of its economic, military and cultural superiority.¹⁹⁸ The United States, buoyed by its superpower status started to impose its ideals across the globe. This mainly involved liberalization of political and economic policies. In Africa, political reforms following the end of the Cold War saw many African countries adopt multiparty democracy. The political reforms shifted the balance of power as most long-term African leaders were toppled either democratically or through coups. This led to a new crop of leaders across many countries in Africa. In the first nine months after the collapse of the Cold War more than nine African regimes had been dislodged from power either through the ballot or military coups.¹⁹⁹

Economic liberalization was however faced with domestic resistance across the continent. This was mainly due to the effects of a liberalized economy, which were viewed as a form of neo-colonialism. In the case of Zambia, between 1985 and 1987, President Kaunda's attempts to implement the unpopular policies of the World Bank's and the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) structural adjustments programs were met with resistance. The

¹⁹⁷Peter J. Schraeder, "The Horn of Africa: US Foreign Policy in an Altered Cold War Environment". *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 46, No. 4, 1992, p.583

¹⁹⁸John Lewis Gaddis. "Towards the Post-Cold World War" *Foreign Affairs*, Spring, 1991

¹⁹⁹Margurite Michaels. "Retreat From Africa: Continents Momentum for Change Stalls" *Foreign Affairs*, 1992

widespread opposition to the foreign economic reforms made him to abandon them and pursue domestic policies.²⁰⁰ The political and economic upheavals in Africa led to a power vacuum in some countries. This was mostly in countries where political transitions had not occurred more urbanely. This gave room to the emergence of non-state actors, such as terrorist cells, that competed with states for power. This phenomenon was witnessed in Somalia following the struggle for power between the Islamic Courts Union and Transitional Federal Government.²⁰¹

Towards the mid-1990s, the conditions for attaining external aid from the Western countries gradually became more stringent. The provision of aid was mainly attached to economic and political reforms. This made most African countries to diversify their sources of financial aid by forging close relations with emerging economies. The emerging economies were mainly concentrated in Asia, with China being the most significant. The “Look East” policy was reinforced by the rapid growth of China and other East Asian nations as global economic powers.

The relationship between Africa and China was thus seen as mutual. Africa served as a market for Chinese products and source of raw materials for its growing manufacturing sector, while Africa got access to external “unconditional” aid from China. However it is important to note that although the means by which African countries are able to access Chinese aid are less bureaucratic, Chinese aid is not totally devoid of conditions. This is because both China and the United States have their own national interests as the first priority in their engagement with African countries.²⁰²

²⁰⁰Thomas M. Callaghy. “Africa and the World Political Economy: Still caught between a Rock and a Hard Place”. *Africa in World Politics: Post-Cold War Challenges*. Edited by, John W. Harberson and Donald Rothchild. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press Inc., 1995), p. 51.

²⁰¹Cedric Barnes and Harun Hassan, *The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu’s Islamic Courts*, Africa Program, London: Chatham House, 2007

²⁰²Interview, Macharia Munene, International Relations Lecturer, USIU, Nairobi, 31, July 2014.

The Sino-Africa relations grew very fast and at the turn of the twenty first century; China had not only surpassed the United States' trade volume but also threatened America's age-old influence in Africa.²⁰³ The solidification of Africa's "Look East" policy can be attributed to a myriad of United States myopic policies towards Africa.²⁰⁴ For instance the United States policy of ignoring Africa and embracing Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War provided a power vacuum in the continent. The United States disinterest in Africa thus provided China with an opportunity to start reasserting itself on the continent. It is on the backdrop of China's increased engagement with Africa, amidst the seemingly declining influence of the United States in Africa that this study aims to analyze Kenya's relations with the two great powers.

3.3 Kenya- China Relations, 2003-2012

3.3.1 Economic and Trade Relations

Kibaki was elected as Kenya's third president in December 2002 under an umbrella party, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). Upon assuming power, he escalated the close relations between Kenya and China. The close ties had been established during the previous Kenya Africa National Union (KANU) regime under President Moi. The decision of the NARC regime to maintain close links with China was a two pronged approach. The first aim was to increase the diversification of Kenya's diplomatic relations, while the second approach was measured at attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and external aid into Kenya.²⁰⁵ The tightened relations were mainly due to actual and potential mutual benefits between Kenya and China.²⁰⁶

²⁰³Horace Campbell, "China in Africa: Challenging US global hegemony", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No.1, 2008, p.93

²⁰⁴Peter J.Schraeder. *United States Foreign Policy towards Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 250-257.

²⁰⁵Interview, G.K Ikiara, International Economics Lecturer, University of Nairobi, 25, June 2014.

²⁰⁶Joseph Onjala. *A Scoping Study on China-Africa Relations: The Case Study of Kenya*. (Nairobi: Institute for Development Studies, 5 March, 2008), pp. 4-5

The minimal bureaucratic conditions in accessing China's financial assistance, as compared to the protracted measures by the United States also led Kenya to tighten its relations with China.²⁰⁷

The strategic location of Kenya on the East Coast of Africa made China view it as an ideal entry point to the wider market of mostly landlocked, East and Central African countries. The driving force of Kenya's relations with China was due to China's massive economic growth rate. Kenya thus viewed China as an alternative development partner to its traditional Western multilateral and bilateral partners. This arrangement refutes the popular claim that Kenya's "Look East" policy was aimed at alienating the United States in favor of China.²⁰⁸ In contrast, Kenya under the Kibaki regime maintained close relations with China while engaging the United States on security related issues.²⁰⁹

In August 2005, relations between Kenya and China were significantly boosted. This was due to Kibaki's state visit to Beijing along with a colossal Kenyan delegation.²¹⁰ The visit was one of the most comprehensive between the two countries, touching on both technical and economic cooperation agreements. The list of signings included; a framework on Chinese concessional loans to Kenya, air service agreement, establishment of Chinese media center in Kenya, and an offer by the Chinese government to upgrade the Kenya Bureau of Standards²¹¹ In April 2006, almost a year after Kibaki's visit, Hu Jintao, China's President, visited Kenya. The visit resulted in the signing of six more economic deals. The highlight of the agreements was Kenya's licensing of the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) to explore oil in Kenya.²¹² The other economic deals included; the construction of a malaria research center, rice-

²⁰⁷Macharia Munene, "Africa-China Mutual Attractions", *China-Africa Partnership: The Quest for A Win-Win Relationship*, Edited by James Shikwati (Nairobi, Inter Region Economic Network, November 2012),p.153

²⁰⁸Interview, G.K Ikiara, International Economics Lecturer, University of Nairobi, 25, June 2014.

²⁰⁹Interview, Macharia Munene, International Relations Lecturer, USIU, Nairobi, 31, July 31, 2014

²¹⁰China Daily, "Kibaki visit yield lucrative development aid", September 21, 2010.


²¹¹Xinhua News Agency, August 20, 2005.

²¹²BBC News. "China's Hu boosts Kenyan business". Friday, 28 April 2006.

irrigation farming scheme, and China’s renovation of the Moi International Sports Center, Kasarani.

The established diplomatic relations facilitated an increase in the Sino-Kenya trade relations. Trade volumes peaked constantly between 2003 and 2012, with an annual growth rate of 30 percent. However the Sino-Kenya trade has been marked by massive trade imbalance in favor of China, (See Figure 1). The imbalance of trade can be attributed to the contrasting economic structure between Kenya and China.²¹³ The Chinese economic structure is well developed as compared to Kenya’s merely over fifty year old economy, a fact that has contributed to the trade imbalance.

Figure 1: Kenya-China Exports, Imports, and Trade deficit, 2003-2012



Source: Kenya Economic Survey and Statistical Abstracts, 2003-2012. KNBS (Nairobi Kenya)²¹⁴

²¹³Ikiara, op. cit., 25, June 2014.

²¹⁴Kenya Economic Survey and Statistical Abstracts, 2003-2012. KNBS (Nairobi Kenya)

Nevertheless several measures have been undertaken to reduce the huge trade deficit between the two states. Among the measures China has taken to balance trade with Kenya has been the lowering of tariffs on Kenyan exports to 8.9 percent and 15.9 percent. This has mainly been on manufactured and raw agricultural products respectively, between 2010 and 2013.²¹⁵ In 2010, China also eliminated non-tariff barriers such as import quotas on Kenyan products. To underscore the significance of Kenya in China's economic strategy, it's important to note that the 2007/2008 Post-Election Violence had negligible impact on the volume of its trade with Kenya.

3.3.2 Foreign Direct Investments and Foreign Aid

Increased trade through open economies is one of the surest modes of raising the living standards of nations.²¹⁶ This logic is evidenced by China that started to achieve double-digit annual economic growth after embarking on liberal economic policies. Initially prior to 1978 China mostly operated a closed economic model. However with the ascendancy of Deng Xiaoping to power, China took a shift in its economic policies in December 1978, following the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee.²¹⁷ This phenomenon led to the outgrowth of Chinese companies as they aimed to invest their surplus capital across the globe.

In Kenya, Chinese capital inflow peaked in 2003 due to the re-establishment of cordial relations between the two states. The huge Chinese investments in Kenya can be attributed to several other factors such as; Kenya's relative political stability since independence, its position as the largest and most diverse economy in the region, as well as its geo-political strategic


²¹⁵George Omondi. "China lowers trade tariffs to Kenya". *Business Daily*, Tuesday, March 19 2013. 20:54.

²¹⁶Paul A. Samuelson and William D.Nordhaus, *Economics*, Nineteenth Edition (New Delhi, McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2010), p.430

²¹⁷Clem Tisdell, "Economic Reform and Openness in China: China's Development Patterns in the Last 30 Years", *Economic Analysis and Policy*, Vol. 39, No. 2, September 2009, p. 275

location in Africa.²¹⁸ The geo-strategic location of Kenya has made it the focal entry point for most Multinational Corporations into landlocked Eastern and Central African countries.

Figure 2: Comparison of FDI in-flow into Kenya from the USA and China, 2001-2012



Source UNCTAD FDI/TNC database²¹⁹

By 2013 China had become the largest foreign direct investor in Kenya, with an investment Portfolio worth US \$ 474 million.²²⁰ The Chinese corporations are epitomized in almost all key sectors of Kenya’s economy, such as tourism, building and construction, mining as well as in the information and telecommunication.²²¹ The affirmation of Kenya-China strong economic links was further illustrated by the negligible outflow of Chinese FDI stock and investment during the

²¹⁸Interview, Macharia Munene, International Relations Lecturer, USIU, Nairobi, 31, July 31, 2014

²¹⁹UNCTAD FDI/TNC database

²²⁰Liu Guangyuan. “China and Kenya Achieving Shared Dreams Hand-by-Hand”. *Capital News*. August 16, 2013.

²²¹Interview, Economic and Commercial Counselor’s Office of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Kenya, 23, June 2014

2007/2008 post-election disturbances. This is unlike the United States' FDI inflow into Kenya that was significantly disrupted by the political instability over the same period. (See figure 2).

However, with regard to foreign aid, China's aid to Kenya as compared to other African countries has remarkably been low. This fact can be attributed to the lack of valuable mineral resources that China heavily craves. This reflects a subtle pattern in China's economic ties with Africa that is concentrated in nature (See Figure 3). The relations between China and Africa have mainly involved mineral resource-rich countries, as well as those states with which it has had long term unbroken relations with since independence.²²² In East Africa, Kenya, as compared to Tanzania and Uganda, has been lacking in vast valuable mineral deposits. This fact has made Chinese foreign aid to Tanzania much higher as compared to either Kenya or Uganda.²²³ The huge aid to Tanzania is therefore meant to endear China to Tanzania and facilitate easy access and exploitation of Tanzanian mineral resources by China.

Nonetheless, Kenya's crucial strategic location in the region has made it impossible for China to overlook it. The continued discovery of oil deposits in Kenya has also led to China's increased aid to Kenya. For instance in 2005, China was ranked as the second largest bilateral donor to Kenya, providing 13 percent of Kenya's total aid as compared to a mere 0.08 percent in 2001.²²⁴ In spite of this, due to the annual variation of aid among donor states, it is challenging to pinpoint China as a serial major contributor to Kenya's development aid.²²⁵ China's aid to Africa can be grouped into six categories as: financial assistance, debt relief, investment, technical

²²²Mary-Francoise Renard, "China's Trade and FDI in Africa", Series N° 126, *African Development Bank Report*, Tunis, Tunisia, May, 2011, p.15.


²²³A Joint Report, "Big Brother China Pumps \$11 billion into East Africa", *The East African*, Saturday May 4 2013

²²⁴See UNDP, *Kenya Development Cooperation Report*, Nairobi: UNDP, 2006.

²²⁵Michael Chege. "Economic Relations between Kenya and China, 1963-2007". *US and Chinese Engagement in Africa: Prospects for Improving US-China-Africa Cooperation*, Edited by Jennifer Cook. (Washington D.C, CSIS Press, 2008), p. 25

training, tariff exemptions, and more recently, peacekeeping initiatives.²²⁶ In the case of Kenya, Chinese aid has mainly been in the areas of technical training, investment and exemption of tariff barriers.

Figure 3: Top Ten African Trade Partners with China, 2004 (Imports)



Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of trade statistics (Washington DC: IMF, 2005²²⁷)

3.3.3 Political and Cultural Relations

The political relations between Kenya and China, like other African States, are based on the “One China” policy. The policy views Taiwan as part and parcel of China and not an independent state. By 2009 China had diplomatically urged most African countries to sever bilateral relations with Taiwan. Only four African states –Swaziland, Burkina Faso, The Gambia,

²²⁶Raphael Kaplinsky et al. *The Impact of China on Sub-Saharan*, (Brighton: IDS Publication, November 2007),p.32

²²⁷International Monetary Fund, *Direction of trade statistics* , Washington DC: IMF, 2005

and Sao Tome and Principe, still recognized Taiwan.²²⁸ Kenya's political relations with China, in tandem with other African states, are also based on mutual reciprocation. The relations have seen China seek Africa for international political backing and natural resources, while Africa has been keen to gain economic capital and use its relations with China as leverage against Western countries' browbeats.²²⁹

The mutual Sino-China relations are exemplified by the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) which was formed in October 2000. The forum outlined four main significant commitments through which China and Africa could cooperate towards creating a new international political and economic order.²³⁰ One of the commitments required China to use its position as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to protect Africa's interests in the Security Council.²³¹

An illustration of China's willingness to defend African states' interests is the firm stance it took in November 2013. The position was in support of Kenya at the Security Council's deliberations concerning the deferral of Kenyan cases at the International Criminal Court (ICC). The argument advanced by China was based on Kenya's role in counter terrorism and peace building efforts across Africa.²³² However this can be merely viewed as a reiteration of the FOCAC commitment, in upholding the mutual relations between China and African countries, in this case Kenya. China's commitment to defend African countries in the Security Council is important given the surge in intra-state conflicts that are localized in Africa. By the end of 2012

²²⁸Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa, Lesley Masters (Rapporteurs). *Taming the Dragon? Defining Africa's Interest at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)*, Policy Advisory Group Seminar Report, Pretoria: Center for Conflict Resolution and Institute for Global Dialogue, 13-14, July 2009, p. 20

²²⁹Macharia Munene, "Africa-China Mutual Attractions", *China-Africa Partnership: The Quest for A Win-Win Relationship*, Edited by James Shikwati (Nairobi, Inter Region Economic Network, November 2012), p.159

²³⁰Ian Taylor, *The Forum on China- Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)*,(Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011) p.39

²³¹Chris Alden, "China's Interest in the Promotion of Peace and Security in Africa", *China's Growing Role in African Peace and Security*, Edited by Emily Speers Mears,(London: Safe world Publication, 2011), p. 23

²³²Press Release, United Nations Security Council, 7060th Meeting, *Security Council Resolution Seeking Deferral of Kenyan Leaders' Trial Fails to Win Adoption, With 7 Voting in Favor, 8 Abstaining*.15 November 2013.

the highest concentration of peace operations globally was in Africa; with seven out of the nineteen operations under UN command.²³³

Cultural imperialism is one of the most effective forms of imperialism.²³⁴ To augment its position as an economic power China has seemingly embarked on “soft power” tactics to endear itself to the world. Nevertheless in Kenya some Chinese scholars have downplayed this popular notion that the increased Chinese engagement with Kenya is an attempt geared towards rivaling the United States’ long term relations with Kenya.²³⁵ They explicitly state that Kenya-China relations are purely based on the South-South friendly cooperation, established over long periods of time. However they admit that the increased Chinese economic engagements with Kenya have led to a high number of Kenyans seeking to learn Chinese language for business and cultural purposes.²³⁶ This therefore underscores the increasing influence of Chinese involvement in Kenya.

The flagship of China’s cultural diplomacy has mainly been the proliferation of Confucius Institutes globally.²³⁷ In Africa, Kenya was the first African country to host a Confucius Institute. This followed an agreement between the University of Nairobi and Tianjin Normal University on December 19, 2005. The second Confucius Institute was established two years later at Kenyatta University. A third Confucius institute focusing on agriculture and technology was launched between China’s Nanjing Agricultural University and Kenya’s Egerton University in 2013. The institutes have mainly focused in promoting cultural exchange between China and Kenya.²³⁸ This has resulted in the institute awarding between 25 and 30 scholarships

²³³SIPRI Yearbook, 2013, Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security, Stockholm, 2013, p.5

²³⁴Hans J. Morgenthau. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. 6th edition, (New Delhi, Kalyani Publishers, 2012, p.74

²³⁵Interview, Guo Hong, Director, Confucius Institute- University of Nairobi, 23, July, 2014

²³⁶Ibid.

²³⁷Ibid.

²³⁸Ibid.

annually to Kenyan students travelling to China for academic exchange programs.²³⁹ In addition, the Chinese embassy in Nairobi has been providing over 200 scholarships annually to Kenyan students pursuing higher education in China.²⁴⁰

The increase in the number of Chinese tourists to Kenya has not only been a boost to Kenya's economy, but has also enhanced cultural ties between the two countries. In the financial year 2012/13, the number of Chinese tourists to Kenya increased to 38,000.²⁴¹ This made China to be ranked among the top ten sources of tourists to Kenya.²⁴² The increase in Chinese visitors to Kenya has partially been due to Beijing's approval of Kenya as a tourist destination for its nationals.²⁴³ The increase in Chinese tourists to Kenya has led to enhanced cultural awareness between citizens of the two countries. This has been in the form of language as well as the breaking up of cultural stereotypes.

3.4 Kenya-United States Relations, 2003-2012

3.4.1 Security and Political Relations

Kenya-United States relations have mostly involved security and political issues, with minimal economic engagement.²⁴⁴ This trend of the United States' foreign policy towards Kenya did not change despite Kenya undergoing a regime change in 2003. Instead the security relations tightened even further. This was especially due to the escalation of international terrorism. The peak of Kenya's engagement with the United States on security issues was witnessed during the

²³⁹Ibid

²⁴⁰Liu Guangyuan. "China and Kenya Achieving Shared Dreams Hand-by-Hand". *Capital News*. August 16, 2013.

²⁴¹Kenya Economic Survey and Statistical Abstracts, 2013, KNBS, Nairobi, Kenya

²⁴²Ibid

²⁴³Bob Wekesa, From Cold War to bosom friends; how Kenya became China's ally allies, *Business Daily*, Aug 19 2013

²⁴⁴Interview, Macharia Munene, International Relations Lecturer, USIU, Nairobi, 31, July 31, 2014

next five years after the 9/11 New York bombing in 2001.²⁴⁵ This was mainly due to the localization of terrorist activities in the Horn of Africa region.

The proliferation of terrorism in the East African region was escalated by political instability in Somalia. The proximity of Somalia to Kenya and Kenya's hosting of various United States and other Western European interest made it a prime target for terror acts. This can be explained by the bombing of the United States embassies in Nairobi and Dar as Salaam in August 1998. Kenya has since witnessed a series of terror activities targeting both Kenyan and foreign interests. Prior to the terrorist bombings, the United States mainly engaged Kenya on democratic and good governance issues.²⁴⁶ However, the magnitude of the bombings fundamentally shifted the focus of the United States policy towards Kenya and Africa. The shift in the United States policy was now more directed at counterterrorism measures, though it still emphasized its traditional role of ensuring good governance and democratic ideals.

The concerted efforts by the United States to combat international terrorism led to increased financial assistance to Kenya. This pushed Kenya to the top ten global recipients of United States foreign aid between 2000 and 2013. (See figure 4). A major chunk of the United States counterterrorism funding has mainly been through Foreign Military Financing. The funds have mainly been channeled to the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF), as well as other internal security departments. Notwithstanding this, the United States has also provided funds to civilian counterterrorism measures in Kenya. For instance between 2010 and 2014, Kenya received over US \$ 39.5 million making Kenya the fourth largest recipient of funds from this unique kitty worldwide.²⁴⁷ The other forms of US military aid to Kenya have included training of Kenya's


²⁴⁵Jason Rosen, "Strategic Posture Review: Kenya". *World Political Review Report*, January 21, 2014

²⁴⁶David H. Shinn. "Fighting Terrorism in East Africa and the Horn", *Foreign Service Journal, Focus*, 2014, pp.36-37

²⁴⁷Robert Godec, Press Statement on Security. June 21, 2014.

security personnel as well as providing military hardware for use by Kenyan security forces. (See figure 5).

Figure 4: Top Ten Recipients of USA Aid, FY 2012(in millions of current US dollars)



Source: Congressional Budget Justification Summary Tables, FY2013, Country/Account Summary (spigots) FY2012 estimates.²⁴⁸

In countering direct threats from terrorist networks, the United States has provided over US \$ 814 million to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). AMISOM was formed as an active, regional peacekeeping mission in 2007 by the African Union Peace and Security Council. The AMISOM constitutes military forces from various African countries including Kenyan forces. The AMISOM forces have managed to establish and maintain relative stability in Somalia and the Horn of Africa region despite increasing terrorist activities in Africa. The other significant security cooperation between Kenya and the United States was an agreement on

²⁴⁸Congressional Budget Justification Summary Tables,(Green Book) FY2013, Country/Account Summary (spigots) FY2012 estimates

trying and sentencing pirates captured by the United States Navy within the Indian Ocean waters in Kenyan courts of Law. This was after the Kenyan Court of Appeal declared in October 2012 that Kenya had a jurisdiction to try suspects allegedly involved in international piracy, regardless of the locality of the crime.²⁴⁹

Despite the enhanced security relations between Kenya and the United State on counter-terrorism, some Kenyans, mostly Muslims and human rights activists, have viewed the relations with angst. The disquiet is due to the perception among Muslims that they are the main targets of the war on terror.²⁵⁰ This perception has not only strained relations between Kenyan Muslims and their view of the United States, but has also shifted how Kenyan communities relate to each other. The Kenyans of Somali descent have erroneously been perceived as sympathizers of terror groups.²⁵¹ This has mainly been due to the fact that most terrorist suspects are from Somalia. However there have been numerous incidents of suspected terrorist with roots among other Kenyan ethnic groups.

Politically, the United States has played a significant role in influencing several political events in Kenya. Prior to the 2002 elections, senior officials in President Bush's administration held a series of high level talks with President Moi, urging him to peacefully transfer power at the end of his official term in office.²⁵² The United States also played a significant role in seeking solutions to the 2007/2008 post-election crisis. This is contrary to the aloof stance by China in the peace process despite being a key investor in the Kenyan economy.²⁵³

²⁴⁹Rebecca Di Leorndo, "Kenya Appeals Court allows jurisdiction over international piracy cases", *Jurist*, October 18, 2012

²⁵⁰Clar Ni Chongahlie, "Kenyan Muslims fear the worst over proposal to boost police power". *The Guardian*, Thursday 27 September 2012


²⁵¹Ibid

²⁵²Joel D. Barkan, "Kenya after Moi", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2004), p.90

²⁵³Interview, Ambassador Oginga Ogego, Former Kenyan Ambassador to the United States, 26, July 2014.

Nevertheless, the United States’ political influence in Kenya has at times tended to polarize Kenya’s ethnic centered politics. This aspect of the United States’ relations with Kenya was witnessed following the commencement of trials of high ranking Kenyan leaders at the ICC. The United States’ support for the trials, as well as statements made by the United States officials in the run up to the 2013 elections, can be interpreted to have been aimed at swaying the election outcome. This was in favor of particular presidential candidates who the United States could openly engage with.²⁵⁴

Figure 5: Total Military Aid to Kenya from the United States, 2001-2012



Source: US Overseas Loans & Grants, Prepared by USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services on March 28, 2014²⁵⁵

However, the election was won by Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto as Kenya’s President and Deputy President respectively. Uhuru and Ruto were both facing charges of crimes against humanity at the ICC. This fact complicated relations not only between Kenya and the

²⁵⁴Kevin J. Kelley. “Election Choices have consequences, US tell Kenyans”, *Africa Review*. Thur., February 7 2013,

²⁵⁵US Overseas Loans & Grants, Prepared by USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services on March 28, 2014

United States, but with the AU member states as well.²⁵⁶ This was due to the opposition by the AU in protest of trial of a sitting head of state. Kenya rallied other African states for an extraordinary AU summit in Addis Ababa in October 2013. Following in the footsteps of the AU summit meeting, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) foreign ministers released a joint communiqué in support of deferral of Kenyan cases.²⁵⁷ The IGAD stance was in support for deferring the Kenyan cases at the ICC.

3.4.2 Economic and Trade Relations

Kenya's economic relations with the United States have not been as deep-rooted as compared to China. Several factors, such as the long distance between the two states, have been attributed to the low trade volume. However, the main factor that can be attributed to the low Kenya-United State trade ties is Kenya's insignificant deposits of valuable minerals.²⁵⁸ The United States economic engagements in Africa have mostly been with countries endowed by large deposits of natural resources, mainly oil. Nevertheless, with recent reports indicating discovery of huge deposits of bio-fuels in Kenya, there is a likelihood of increased trade interest between Kenya, the United States. As of 2014, Kenya had discovered 600 million barrels of oil in the Turkana region.²⁵⁹

The emergence of Kenya as an important source of oil, coupled with its global geostrategic location is likely to increase competition between China and the United States over control of Kenya's oil. This is likely to be facilitated by the mere fact that both countries are

²⁵⁶Interview, Macharia Munene, International Relations lecturer, USIU, Nairobi, 31, July 31, 2014

²⁵⁷See Communiqué of the Joint Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development and the East African Community, 12, October, 2013, Addis Ababa, pp.2-3

²⁵⁸Interview, G.K Ikiara, International Economics Lecturer, University of Nairobi, 25, June 2014.

²⁵⁹Mugambi Mutegi, "Tullow Announces Fresh Oil and Gas Finds", *Business Daily*, Tuesday, June 24 2014

massive consumers of oil due to the sheer size of their economies and population.²⁶⁰ According to the International Energy Agency, China, which is currently the second largest consumer of oil, is likely to overtake the United States as the largest consumer by 2030.²⁶¹ The competition for Kenyan oil is thus likely to benefit Kenya depending on how Kenya projects its policies with the two great global powers.

The past and current trends in Kenya-United States trade have mainly been in favor of the United States. However the trade imbalances between the two countries are not as huge as Kenya's trade with China (See Figure 6). This can be attributed to the fact that the United States as compared to China has, since independence, been a traditional key export destination for Kenya's mainly agricultural products. In return Kenya's imports from the United States include mainly machinery and manufactured products. By the end of 2013, Kenya's exports to the United States stood at US \$ 451million, while imports averaged US \$ 655 million, reflecting an annual 16 percent growth rate in trade volume.²⁶²

The trade relations between Kenya and the United States, like other developing countries, are conditioned on good governance and economic liberalization policies. The trade agreements, such as the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), have to be renewed annually by sub-Saharan African states on the basis of good governance.²⁶³ The AGOA Act, which came into force in May 2000, has provided a launching pad for Kenyan exports into the United States market, averaging US\$ 349 million, due to the duty free imports on mostly agricultural products.²⁶⁴

²⁶⁰Interview, Ambassador Oginga Ogego, Former Kenyan Ambassador to the United States, 26, July 2014.

²⁶¹International Energy Agency, *WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013 FACTSHEET: How will global energy markets evolve to 2035?*, Paris, 2013, p.4


²⁶²Kenya Economic Survey and Statistical Abstracts, 2013, KNBS (Nairobi Kenya)

²⁶³Sabina Dewan and Greg Randolph, "The African Growth and Opportunity Act: Growth without Opportunity?" *Huffington Post*. Thursday, 10 July, 2014.

²⁶⁴Jibril Adan. "Uhuru banks on US tour to bolster ties". *Sunday Nation*, Sunday July 27 2014, p.64

The United States has also favored regional economic communities as the ideal means of conducting trade. In 2001 for instance, the United States signed the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with Common Market of East, Central and Southern Africa (COMESA), and in 2008 with the East African Community (EAC), both regional economic blocs of which Kenya is a member.²⁶⁵ This aspect of the United States regional trade can be explained as aimed at ensuring the United States spreads its influence over wider regions in Africa to counter China’s economic influence on the continent.

Figure 6: Kenya-USA Exports, Imports, and Trade deficit, 2003-2012



Source: Kenya Economic Survey and Statistical Abstracts, 2003-2012. KNBS (Nairobi Kenya)²⁶⁶

²⁶⁵Luke Anami, “Kenya Seeks New trade deal with the US”. *Standard Business News*, Tuesday, October 23, 2012,

²⁶⁶Kenya Economic Survey and Statistical Abstracts, 2003-2012, Nairobi, Kenya

Despite the discourse on trade relations, the hallmark of the United States economic engagement with Kenya has mostly involved aid.²⁶⁷ Financial aid has in large been channeled through Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), as opposed to state institutions. This is in line with the United States' position as the top external aid donor worldwide.²⁶⁸ However the channeling of aid through NGOs has tended to dim the United States' economic cooperation with Kenya as compared to China.²⁶⁹ This is because most NGOs lack capability of implementing visible, large scale infrastructural developments as compared to the government.

The United States economic aid has mainly been directed at funding social and health projects in Kenya. In December 2009, Kenya and the United States signed a five year agreement on Partnership Framework on HIV/AIDS. Between 2004 and 2011, the United States had provided over \$ 2975.4 million in the fight against HIV/AIDS, (See table 1).

Table 1: PEPFAR Bilateral Funding for Kenya (US\$ in millions)

FY2004	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	FY 2011	Total
\$92.5	\$141.3	\$208.3	\$368.1	\$534.8	\$565.0	\$548.1	\$517.3	\$2975.4

Source: US President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief/Partnership to Fight HIV/AIDS in Kenya FY, 2004-2011²⁷⁰

The Kenyan government has also been a beneficiary of financial aid from the Global Fund, of which the United States is the single largest contributor. These funds have been used in the fight against malaria and tuberculosis as well as HIV/AIDS.

²⁶⁷Interview, Macharia Munene, International Relations lecturer at USIU, Nairobi, 31, July 31, 2014

²⁶⁸David Tovrov. "Top Ten Largest Recipients of US Aid", *International Business Times*, February, 6 2012

²⁶⁹Interview, G.K Ikiara, International Economics Lecturer, University of Nairobi, 25, June 2014

²⁷⁰US President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief/Partnership to Fight HIV/AIDS in Kenya, FY,2004-2011

3.5 Shifting Balance of Power in Kenya

The dynamic nature of Kenya's national relations has been influenced by both internal and external factors since pre-independence. The communities in pre-colonial Kenya organized and identified themselves in polities, with their own socio-economic and political identity. The communities, which acted like nation-states, often engaged in pseudo-balance of power tactics with neighboring communities through wars to increase their territories or for sheer dominance.

However with the advent of colonialism, all the various Kenyan communities were amalgamated by the British to form a single nation, Kenya.²⁷¹ In the course of colonialism, as atrocities committed against Africans by the British increased, various ethnic communities realized that they had a common enemy and joined forces to fight against British colonial rule. The struggle for independence finally culminated with Kenya's independence on December 12, 1963.

Upon achieving independence, Kenya was thrust into the divisive politics that characterized the international system. The system was dominated by a bipolar balance of power, pitting the Soviet Union against the United States. The anarchic external environment influenced the internal distribution of power in Kenya. This led to the formation of two centers of power in the ruling party, KANU.²⁷² The faction led by Kenyatta and Mboya was aligned to Western capitalist states, while Odinga, Kenya's first Vice-President, led an alliance that was inclined towards the communist bloc.

However the ideological differences between Kenyatta and Odinga were short lived. The Kenyatta and Mboya faction, aided by the United States and Britain, emerged victorious in the control of Kenya's political and economic future. The defeat of Odinga's faction, which

²⁷¹Charles Hornsby. *Kenya: A History since Independence* (London, I.B Tauris & Co Ltd, 2012), p. 25

²⁷²Ibid, pp.142-143

eventually led to his resignation in 1969, can partially be attributed to rivalry between China and the Soviet Union over the best form of communism.²⁷³ The Sino-Soviet conflict began in the late 1950s and continued into the 1980s. With Odinga out of KANU, Kenyatta started the unilateral implementation of the Sessional Paper No.10, which in theory was a mixture of African socialism and capitalism but in reality was a pure form of capitalism.²⁷⁴ Capitalism has thus characterized Kenya's economic aspect since independence. This was especially so following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the liberalization of Kenya's economy in the early 1990s. Nevertheless there are still significant proponents of socialism in Kenya.

With the formation of the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU), which was a socialist opposition party, a bipolar balance of power emerged with each competing for state power. KANU, led by Kenyatta, was more conservative and pro-capitalist. Kenyatta was more concerned with consolidating his leadership and suppressing criticism. However the opposition, KPU led by Odinga was largely radical in its pursuit of socialist leaning policies. The power struggles thus led to the banning of KPU on October 30, 1969 following violent protests in Kisumu. This was after a tense and open confrontation between Odinga, his supporters and Kenyatta in Odinga's home turf, Kisumu.²⁷⁵

Apart from the short-lived ideological based politics in Kenya during the first years of independence, the key feature of Kenya's dynamic politics has revolved around ethnicity. At independence a second polity, Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) was formed. The party was mainly made up of minority ethnic groups who feared being dominated by the majority Luo and Kikuyu in KANU. This made them to come up with an alternative form of government

²⁷³David Shinn and Joshua Eisenman, *China and Africa: A Century of Engagement*. (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), p.30.

²⁷⁴Sessional Paper No.10, *African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya*, Republic of Kenya, 1965

²⁷⁵Hornsby, op. cit., p.214

structure called *majimbo*.²⁷⁶ *Majimboism* was a decentralized form of government that was meant to guard the interests of minority ethnic groups as opposed to a centralized presidential system of governance that was dominated by the major ethnic groups.

The proponents of the decentralized form of government included Ronald Ngala, Moi, Masinde Muliro and John Keen. The KADU leaders also received support from European settlers, such as ex-Governors Baring and Blundell. The European minority viewed KADU as a more moderate political party that could safeguard their interests after independence as opposed to the more radical KANU.²⁷⁷ KADU continued to balance KANU both in and out of the Legislative Assembly. However in November 10, 1964 its leader, Ngala, crossed over to join KANU making Kenya a *de facto* one party state.²⁷⁸ KADU had mainly been weakened by KANU with the sole aim of containing its internal power struggles, as well as channeling its energy towards national development as opposed to confrontational politics.

Although ethnic rivalry started at independence, it was escalated during the Kenyatta regime, especially towards the tail end of his tenure. With the containment of socialist Odinga, and the dissolution of KADU, the balance of power started to oscillate around Kenyatta and a clique of close knit Kikuyu elite called “the Family.”²⁷⁹ This group of Kikuyu elites fanned ethnicity and factionalism, through the “Change-the-Constitution” movement. Their main aim was to retain state and economic power within a small clique of Kikuyu elites.²⁸⁰ To achieve their objective the “family” had to deter Moi, the then Vice-President and a non-Kikuyu, from

²⁷⁶Ibid, pp.7-12

²⁷⁷Ibid, p.62

²⁷⁸Steven Brown, “Authoritarian leaders and multiparty elections in Africa: how foreign donors help to keep Kenya’s Daniel Arap Moi in Power”, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.22, No.5, 2001,p.726

²⁷⁹Richard Hodder-Williams, “Kenya after Kenyatta” *The World Today*, Vol. 36, No. 12 (Dec., 1980), p. 476

²⁸⁰Katumanga Musambaya, “After the Flood-The Rainbow: Contextualizing NARC’s Election Victory Lessons Learnt and the Challenges Ahead”. *Political Succession in East Africa: In Search of a Limited Leadership*, Edited by Chris Maina Peter and Fritz Kopsieker (Nairobi: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Kituo cha Katiba, May 2006), p.15

ascending to power as was outlined in the Constitution.²⁸¹ The “Change-the- Constitution” group was counter-balanced by a rival group of mainly Kikuyu elites led by Kenya’s then Attorney General, Charles Njonjo and Kibaki.²⁸² Kibaki had earlier served as Kenya’s minister for Finance and Economic Planning in both Kenyatta and later Moi regime. The Njonjo allied group won the struggle for power and Moi was sworn in as the second president of Kenya on October 10, 1978, following Kenyatta’s death on August 22, 1978.

President Moi continued maintaining close links with the United States that had been initiated by Kenyatta. However, he also initiated the restoration of diplomatic and economic relations with China.²⁸³ Despite engaging with China, Moi was still avers to socialism, as explained by KANU’s decision to bar Odinga and his party, KPU from contesting the 1979 elections.²⁸⁴ Nevertheless in a conciliatory tone, Moi later appointed Odinga as head of the Kenya Cotton Lint and Marketing Board. He further released political prisoners who had been detained by the Kenyatta regime. However Odinga was later barred from participating in politics for referring to Kenyatta as a “land grabber.”²⁸⁵

Moi’s honeymoon was however short-lived as opposition to his rule escalated. The antipathy was due to the brazen looting and corruption of state institutions by the ruling elites and their close associates. The corrupt dealings in government, coupled with increasing authoritarianism, fermented dissent against the Moi regime. The criticism was led by Odinga and George Anyona who together had formed the Kenya Africa Socialist Alliance (KASA) party. The rising dissent against KANU led to a constitutional amendment that transformed Kenya

²⁸¹See Kenya’s independent, Constitution, Chapter II, Part 6, 1963

²⁸²Hodder-Williams, op. cit.,p.476

²⁸³See China Embassy Website, Bilateral Relations between Kenya and China

²⁸⁴Charles Hornsby. *Kenya: A History since Independence* (London, I.B Tauris & Co Ltd, 2012), p.340

²⁸⁵Maureen Odiwuor. “Man who stepped down for Jaramogi”, *Sunday Standard*, Nairobi, August 5, 2012.

from a *de facto* to a *de jure* one party state on June 9, 1982.²⁸⁶ The constitutional amendment further consolidated and strengthened Moi's hold on power, which made him able to suppress the increasing dissent to his regime. The anarchic domestic state of affairs eventually gave way to a military coup on August 1, 1982, led by junior Kenya Air Force (KAF) officers. The mutiny was easily crushed by loyalist forces resulting in massive loss of life and destruction of property.²⁸⁷ The attempted coup escalated Moi's authoritarianism throughout the 1980s until the end of the Cold War in 1991.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moi was forced to repeal Section (2A) of the Kenyan Constitution and allow for multiparty democracy in December 1991.²⁸⁸ The return to multiparty democracy was mainly due to pressure from the United States, which advocated for liberal political and economic policies in Kenya. The United States also openly took sides with advocates clamoring for a multiparty political system in Kenya. The United States envoy to Kenya, Smith Hempstone, as well as other Western European diplomats openly spoke against the KANU government and critiqued Moi publicly.²⁸⁹

The open opposition to Moi's regime by Western powers thus pushed Kenya to cement relations with China as an alternative source of economic aid. This was due to China's policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Moi's close engagement with the West was further strained following restricted funding to Kenya to the tune of US \$350 million in November 1991 by the Paris group of donors.²⁹⁰ This was due to pressure from Western powers,

²⁸⁶Makau Mutua. "Justice Under Siege: The Rule of Law and Judicial Subsistence", *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 23 No. 1, February 2001, p.96

²⁸⁷Hornsby op. cit., pp. 376-377

²⁸⁸Kithure Kindiki. "The Emerging Jurisprudence on Kenya's Constitutional Review Law". *Kenya Law Review*, (Nairobi 2007) Vol. 1:153, p.153

²⁸⁹Smith Hempstone, *The Rogue Ambassador: An African Memoir*, (Sewanee, Tennessee: University of South Press, 1997), pp.226-227, and 301-302

²⁹⁰Steven Brown, "Authoritarian leaders and multiparty elections in Africa: how foreign donors help to keep Kenya's Daniel Arap Moi in Power", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.22, No.5, 2001, p.726

which pegged economic and political reforms to aid. With the re-introduction of multiparty politics in 1992, the ethnic factor resurfaced in Kenya's politics. The initially united main opposition party, the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), split into two factions, FORD-Kenya and FORD-Asili, along ethnic lines.

The disunited opposition parties thus made Moi to retain power following the December 1992 General Elections but with a mere 40 percent of the total popular votes cast.²⁹¹ The ethnic balance of power was at play again during the 1997 elections, with the main political parties receiving massive support from their ethnic strongholds. Once again the divided opposition provided an easy victory for Moi. However, despite the win, a new crop of leaders emerged who together with seasoned politicians openly defied Moi's policies.²⁹² This perception is explained by James Orengo's, an opposition Member of Parliament, no-confidence motion against Moi's regime in 1998. The motion was defeated by 137 votes to 67, with six Members of Parliament abstaining from voting.²⁹³

In 2002, with Moi serving his last term in office, a coalition of opposition parties formed the National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK) with Kibaki as its presidential candidate. In October 2002, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) comprising of dejected KANU leaders led by Raila Odinga joined NAK to form an opposition alliance, NARC. The joining of forces between LDP and NAK nevertheless had no ideological basis; the only unifying factor was dislodging KANU and preventing Moi's handpicked candidate, Uhuru Kenyatta from ascending to power. To create a united force, LDP and NAK based their winning strategy on equal sharing of power after the elections. Kibaki was chosen as the presidential candidate, while Raila was promised

²⁹¹Musambaya, op. cit., p.32

²⁹²Joel D. Barkan, "Kenya after Moi", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 1 Jan. - Feb., 2004, p.90

²⁹³Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard), 15th October, 1998.

the Prime Ministerial position through constitutional amendments upon NARC assuming power.²⁹⁴

The elections were held on December 27, 2007 and the NARC coalition emerged victorious with over 62 percent of the popular votes cast and 137 seats in Parliament, with KANU managing to win a paltry 64 seats.²⁹⁵ The smooth transfer of power can partially be attributed to the United States' pressure on Moi to peacefully hand over power to a newly elected regime.²⁹⁶ However the NARC administration was mired in a struggle for power during its entire lifetime. The three main formations in the struggle for power included; the old clique of leaders who surrounded Kibaki as his advisors and had been with him since the Kenyatta era, young leaders who had been deeply involved in the struggle against Moi's authoritarian regime, and the Raila-led faction which had been shortchanged by Kibaki and his allies.²⁹⁷ The two fronts allied to Kibaki joined forces against the Raila-led faction culminating in the sacking of Raila and his allies from government. This was due to the defeat in November 2005 of the Kibaki side led constitutional referendum by the Raila faction.

Following the 2005 referendum, the balance of power shifted as the LDP faction joined forces with the weakened opposition KANU members. KANU was mostly dominated by leaders from the Rift Valley region who in alliance with the LDP found an opportunity to reassert themselves in the dynamic Kenyan politics by campaigning against government policies. In 2007, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) was formed with Raila as its presidential candidate to face off with the Party of National Unity (PNU) led by the incumbent Kibaki in the General Elections. Ethnic balancing of power was at play again as the leader of Official

²⁹⁴David Throup. "The Kenya General Election: December 27, 2012". *Africa Notes*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, No. 14, , Washington D.C Africa Program, January 2003, p.4

²⁹⁵European Union Election Observation Mission Final Report, *Kenya General Elections 27 December 2002*.

²⁹⁶Barkan, op. cit., pp.92-93

²⁹⁷Ibid

Opposition, Uhuru Kenyatta, and abandoned KANU to support Kibaki. This nature of Kenyan political parties was thus in tandem with what Mutua had described as a lack of ideology and concern for national interest among Kenyan political parties.²⁹⁸ A third force, led by Kalonzo Musyoka who had broken ranks with the Raila-led ODM, also joined the race for the presidency. His breakaway faction was known as the ODM-Kenya.

The 2007 elections were the most controversial in independent Kenya's history as both Raila and Kibaki claimed victory. The subsequent swearing in of Kibaki for his second term led to a spontaneous outbreak of violence across the country, even as Kalonzo backed Kibaki in a clear pattern of balance of power politics. At the end of the conflict over 1,500 Kenyans had lost their lives and thousands of others displaced from their homes.²⁹⁹ Mwangi explains that despite the violence having been triggered off by the electoral dispute, the organic and dynamic nature of the violence showed the existence of long-term underlying issues of concern.³⁰⁰ The issues of concern were mainly land related injustice along ethnic lines.

On February 28, 2008 following mediation talks between ODM and PNU under Chief Mediator Kofi Annan, a National Accord was signed between the two parties and their affiliates, which led to the formation of a Grand Coalition Government in April 2008. The concerted efforts to seek peace by various international actors underscored the importance of Kenya as one of the anchor states in Africa. The Peace Accord led to the amendment of the Constitution to accommodate Odinga as Kenya's Prime Minister. The formation of the Grand Coalition was a

²⁹⁸Makau Mutua, "Political Parties in Transition: The Kenyan Experience". *Political Succession in East Africa: In Search of a Limited Leadership*, Edited by Chris Maina Peter and Fritz Kopsieker (Nairobi: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Kituo cha Katiba, May 2006), p.114

²⁹⁹Report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, Vol. 1 (Nairobi: Published by TJRC, 2013), p.14

³⁰⁰Makumi Mwangi. *The Water's Edge: Mediation of Violent Electoral Conflict in Kenya*. (Nairobi: Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies publication, July 2005), p.3&5

measure aimed at ensuring stability in a culturally and politically fragmented society.³⁰¹ Despite the reduction of hostilities, peace was only on the surface while tension between the Coalition's partners still persisted.

In the course of the Grand Coalition Government, a new Constitution was promulgated in 2010. The Plebiscite provided for two centers of power, the county and central governments. Kenya's balance of power was also influenced by the indictment and subsequent start of trials of key Kenyan leaders at the ICC during the second Kibaki regime. The trials have continued to polarize Kenya along ethnic cleavage. This was witnessed during the run up to the March 4, 2013 elections. The March 2013 elections were thus partially determined by the ICC trials. Kibaki's regime came to an end on April 9, 2013 after officially handing over power to Uhuru. The election of Uhuru and Ruto was historic. This was due to the fact that Kenyans had in a democratic process elected a President and his deputy who were both facing trials over crimes against humanity.

3.6 Conclusion

This discourse has covered three main sections; the first part analyzed the balance of power in Africa. A huge chunk of the discussion has covered the post-colonial period, from the scramble and partition of Africa to the post-internationalism era. The second part examined Africa's relations in the twenty first century. Kenya's relations with China and the United States were analyzed as a commissary for the African continent. The Kenya-China-United States relations covered economic, political, security and cultural relations. The final discourse involved a precise scrutiny of the domestic balance of power in Kenya from independence until March

³⁰¹Karuti Kanyingi, *Hobbling along to Pay-offs: The Kenya Grand Coalition Government*.(Nairobi: Institute of Development Studies, University of Nairobi, April 2009), p.3

2013. The debate looked into the three regimes that have ruled Kenya since 1963, as well as key influential actors in the country.

CHAPTER FOUR

SHIFTING INTERNATIONAL BALANCE OF POWER IN AFRICA AND KENYA'S RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter has mainly been an analysis of the nature of shifting balance of power in Africa. The focus has been on Kenya's relations with China and the United States in the course of the Kibaki regime. The discussion mainly revolved around economic, political, security and cultural relations between the three states. The discourse, apart from being based on available sources of secondary data, also benefitted from first hand views of various international relations scholars as well as practitioners of foreign relations. The chapter finally analyzed the shifting domestic balance of power in Kenya within the lieu of its relations with China and the United States since independence.

This chapter aims at critically analyzing selected issues that have emerged from the previous chapters. The first part of the discussion will involve a critical analysis of the influence of China and the United States on regional balance of power within Africa. It is important to note that since the start of the twenty first century, both powers have emerged as the dominant players in the international system. This is especially due to the sheer size of their economies and populations. The United States and China are thus the largest consumers of resources, mostly oil, found in Africa. The second part of this chapter will look at the nature and impact of Kenya's politics on its relations with China and the United States. Finally the discourse will look at the challenges and opportunities in the Africa-China-United States relations, with specific focus on Kenya, before concluding with a myriad other issues in the relations between the three states.

4.2 Emerging Issues

4.2.1 The Shifting Influence of China and the United States within the Context of Africa

Regional Balance of power

It is significant to point out from the start that based on the study; there are varied opinions among international relations scholars on the concept and practice of the balance of power in Africa. This is explained by the fact that the balance of power theory, which is the most commonly referred to theory of international relations, is not exhaustive in explaining the distribution of power in Africa.³⁰² This is mainly due to the fact that there is no clarity in the preponderance of power linked to a single particular hegemon in Africa.³⁰³ The balance of power theory as developed by western scholars does not take into account the pattern of power struggle in Africa. However despite the lack of clear hegemonic status in Africa, there is an emerging pattern of reluctant hegemons across various regions in the continent.³⁰⁴

The distinctive feature of these regions, as outlined by the African Union, is their classification according to six main regional economic blocs.³⁰⁵ The classification also reflects the geopolitical stratification of Africa. These regions are: the Eastern Africa region, with Kenya and to some extent Ethiopia as the dominant power; the Southern Africa region with South Africa as the reluctant hegemon and Nigeria dominating the Western Africa region. The Central Africa region is fluid, but Angola, due to its economic might, can be considered as a proxy hegemon, while the Northern Africa region is dominated by Egypt. The sixth region constitutes the African's in diaspora as outlined by the African Union.

³⁰²Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment", *World Politics*, Vol.43, No.2, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p.233

³⁰³Interview, Ambassador Oginga Ogego, Former Kenyan Ambassador to the United States, 26, July 2014

³⁰⁴Interview, Macharia Munene, International Relations Lecturer, USIU, Nairobi, 31, July 31, 2014

³⁰⁵ See the African Union website. www.au.org.

Traditionally, the United States has had tremendous influence in Africa. This is despite the onslaught by the Soviet Union in the competition for client states in Africa during the Cold War. The advantage of the United States over the Soviet Union was due to the long economic, political and cultural ties between former European colonial powers and Africa. The relations had been strengthened during the colonial eon, which saw most countries adopt Western values and culture. In the post-colonial Cold War era most of the European colonial powers, which still had influence in their former African colonies, were allied to the United States. This fact made the United States to have leverage in influencing African countries policies as compared to the Soviet Union.

The influence of the European colonial powers in Africa could thus be viewed as an extension of United States policy in Africa. This aspect therefore presented the communist Soviet Union and China with an underdog status in their pursuit to dominate and influence newly independent African states during the Cold War era. The structural and historical past of the United States relations with Africa further cemented its relations with the continent. This was due to the United States having had no earlier colonial ambitions in Africa. This fact made African countries to view the United States engagement with the continent as based on “genuine” relations.³⁰⁶ The Soviet Union and China also shared the historical advantage with the United States of having had no past colonies in Africa.

The decline of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the United States as the preponderant global hegemon. Nonetheless at the start of the twenty first century, the world started to take the shape of a multipolar balance of power system. This was mainly as a result of the emergence of economic powerhouses in Europe and Asia. China emerged as the center of power amongst the

³⁰⁶Peter Anyang' Nyong'o, “State and Democracy in Africa: A Critical Appreciation of African Politics as a Heritage”, *Readings in Constitutional Land and Politics in Africa: A Case Study of Kenya*, eds. Kivutha Kibwana, (Nairobi: Claripress Ltd, Faculty of Law, 1998), p.58

new and evolving Asian economies. Its huge economic growth in terms of GDP at 9.8 percent between 1979 and 2007 led to China's ranking as one of the largest global economies.³⁰⁷

However the United States has continued to maintain its position as the most dominant military power globally. The United States' annual military expenditure as of 2012 stood at US \$ 729 billion, while China's total military spending was estimated at US \$ 106 billion during the same period.³⁰⁸ The use of military capability in ranking a country's power within the current international system has however been contested by certain scholars. Nye for instance claims that the use of "Soft Power", which has mostly been adopted by China, has endeared it more to the developing African countries than the United States and Europe.³⁰⁹ This is mainly due to African nation-states' admiration of China's economic and technological growth. The elements that constitute the soft power of a state include its cultural, political and economic values. These elements, when combined together form the bedrock of a country's foreign policy with a capacity to control the minds and actions foreign nationals.

The emergence of China and the United States as the two most significant economic powers has shifted the distributive balance of power in Africa. The rise of China as a dominant power has made African countries to gradually play an assertive role in the international system. This has mainly been due to China's increased economic engagement with Africa. The search for natural resources for China's industries has led it to establish close links with most regimes in Africa. This has been done without consideration of their democratic credentials unlike the United States' engagement with African states. China's relations with African states have been "unconditional", with most African states required to merely reiterate the "One-China policy".

³⁰⁷Denise E. Zheng, "China's Use of Soft Power in the Developing World: Strategic Intentions and Implications for the United States" *Chinese Soft Power and its implication for the United States: Competition and Cooperation in the Developing World*, Washington D.C, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009, p.3

³⁰⁸SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2013, Stockholm, 2013

³⁰⁹Joseph S. Nye, "China's Soft Power deficit", *Wall Street Journal*, May 9, 2012

This has provided most African countries considered as pariah states by the United States and its European allies with latitude to actively participate in the international system. This has been the case in China's relations with Sudan and Zimbabwe. Speaking during a meeting with Zhou Tienong, Vice-Chairman of the People's Congress of China in November 2011, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe stated that:

“The imperialist countries of Britain, Europe and the US have continued to undermine our country. This is because of our resources but we are grateful to the stance China has always taken in defending our sovereignty.”³¹⁰

This statement clearly indicates China's willingness to conduct relations with African countries regardless of their internal problems. In this case China was mainly driven by the need to exploit Zimbabwe's natural resources, such as gold and diamonds.

China thus provided Mugabe with economic options, despite Zimbabwe's cold relations with the United States and European countries. The European Union imposed economic sanctions on Zimbabwe in 2002. This was followed by the United States economic sanctions on 7, November 2003, through Presidential Executive Order No.13288, targeting individual ruling ZANU-PF officials.³¹¹ However the sanctions on Zimbabwe have since failed, mostly due to the entry of China in the vacuum created by Western states mining companies.³¹² The economic rise of China has thus minimized the browbeating of African states by Western powers as compared to the eon of unipolar balance of power.

In the case of Sudan, this aspect was witnessed by events surrounding Darfur conflict and China's role in delaying the efforts of the United Nations Security Council, led by the United States in finding solution to the conflict in 2007. The fact that China is a key international trade partner with Sudan, accounting for 71 percent of Sudan's oil export gave it leverage to influence

³¹⁰The Zimbabwean, “Mugabe Thanks China for Support”, November 9, 2011

³¹¹Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of Treasury, *Zimbabwe Sanctions Program*, December 18, 2013, p.3

³¹²Murithi Mutiga, “Why Zimbabwe Sanctions Boomerang”, *New York Times*, November 7, 2013

the ruling National Congress Party to stop the violence in Darfur.³¹³ However due to China's heavy reliance on Sudan's oil, it had to diplomatically lobby Sudan's government first before making a decision at the Security Council. The agreement by the Sudan government eventually led to the formation of the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), in line with the United Nations Security Council resolution 1769.³¹⁴ The fact that China had to lobby Sudan, amidst United States' protest, thus shows the leverage that African countries have acquired due to the entry of China as a key investor in Africa.

This trend by African states is unlike the Cold War era when most African states' policies oscillated around Western capitalist or Eastern communist blocs. Therefore it is evident that the emergence of a multipolar balance of power, with China as its center, has provided Africa with an iota of leverage on international relations issues. This has been enhanced by the possession of vast natural resources, which Africa has used to its advantage. However, despite the accusations and counter-accusations over good governance in Africa, both China and the United States are purely driven by their individual national interests. The national interest of states is always defined in terms of power.³¹⁵ This notion is best explained by the massive trade deficit between African countries with China and the United States. The trade imbalance, as illustrated by Kenya's trade with both countries, is in favor of both China and the United States. (See Figures: 1 and 6).

The data indicates that, while China's main interest in Africa is economic cooperation, the United States relations have primarily focused on security and governance issues. China's view of Africa is two pronged in nature. The first view is that of a market for its manufactured

³¹³See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1769 (2007), 5727th Meeting, 31 July 2007, p.3

³¹⁴Mary Françoise Renard, "China's Trade and FDI in Africa", *Working Paper No. 126*, (African Development Bank, Tunis, Tunisia, May 2011), p.18

³¹⁵Hans J. Morgenthau. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. 6th edition, (New Delhi, Kalyani Publishers, 2012), p.4

products, while the other view is of Africa as a source of natural resources. The major natural resource that China imports from Africa is oil which it uses to sustain its economic growth. China's trade as discussed earlier is devoid of interference in internal affairs of sovereign states' governance. This can be witnessed by the fact that as at 2010, 25 percent of China's oil import from Africa, contributing to US\$ 1.5 billion per year of Chinese investment in Africa, was mainly from the Gulf of Guinea and Sudan.³¹⁶ These two countries, Equatorial Guinea and Sudan, have a record of gross violation of international human rights. In the case of Sudan its leader Hassan Al- Bashir has been indicted by the ICC for crimes against humanity.

The localized nature of China's economic interest in Africa is further evidenced by its trade cooperation with specific African countries. Based on data from the African Development Bank, China mainly deals with countries which are either endowed with large deposits of natural resources, such as Angola, or which are geopolitically and strategically located in Africa, such as Kenya. (See, Figure 3). For instance in 2007, 60 percent of China's exports were destined for only six African countries, while 70 percent of its imports from Africa originated from only four countries.³¹⁷

The common strand in all the African countries that China trades with is that they are all major oil producers. Although China's main import from Africa is oil, it is important to note that it also seeks other natural resources across the continent.³¹⁸ China has also increased its trade in textile apparels across the continent. This tendency of China to engage with a few selected countries has shored up their dominance within Africa. This is due to the relative increase in

³¹⁶Desire Assogbavi, "The Role of China in Peace and Security in Africa", *Chinese and African Perspectives on China in Africa*, Eds. Axel Harneit-Sievers, Stephen Marks and Sanusha Naidu, (Nairobi: Pambazuka Press 2010), p.194

³¹⁷Mary Françoise Reinard, "China's Trade and FDI IN Africa", *China and Africa: An Emerging Partnership for Development?* Ed. Richard Schiere et.al Tunis, Tunisia: African Development Bank Group, 2011 ,pp.31-32

³¹⁸Ian Taylor, China's Oil Diplomacy in Africa, *International Affairs*, Chatham House, 82:5,2006, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, p.938

their GDP as compared to their peers within the region which lack natural resources or geopolitical strategic location.

Security and political relations between Africa and China have not been as significant as its economic engagements. This can partially be attributed to China's policy of non-interference in other nation's domestic affairs. This stand by China is quiet contradictory even to the African Union's view of peace and security within the continent. According to Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act 2000, the AU has a responsibility to interfere in the internal affairs of member states.³¹⁹ The specific circumstances under which the AU can intervene in the internal affairs of a state include; gross violation of human rights by a ruling regime, or unconstitutional ascension to power by political or military actors within a particular state.

However China seems to be gradually changing its security and political relations with Africa. This can be explained by China's realization that to safeguard its economic interests in Africa, it must play a significant role in building and maintaining peace on the continent. This is evidenced by China's decision in 2008 to deploy a fleet of its navy along the Gulf of Aden so as to secure the sea lines of communication from attacks by Somali-based pirates.³²⁰ This is due to China's reliance on the Indian Ocean sea routes for its trade with the Eastern and Central Africa region. This move by China has mainly been interpreted as aimed at protecting its own national economic interests. However some analysts have pointed out that the increased involvement of China in Africa is mainly aimed at shoring up its image as a responsible global power (*fuzeren*

³¹⁹See The African Union Constitutive Act, Article 4(h), 2001

³²⁰Andrew Erickson and, Augustine Strange, "China and the International Anti-Piracy Effort, *The Diplomat*, Nov. 1, 2013

da deguo).³²¹ This view therefore opposes the popular view of China as a red-eyed realist out to promote and protect its own economic interests across Africa at all costs.

In attempts to measure up to its economic influence as a responsible power, China has also been involved in peace keeping missions across Africa. As at 2007, 75 percent of all Chinese peacekeeping forces were operating in Africa.³²² This can be viewed as an indication of China's increasing role in the peace and security of the continent. The involvement of China in the United Nations peacekeeping operations is contrary to its past stance. China, upon joining the United Nation Security Council in 1971, totally disapproved of the peacekeeping operations.³²³

The Chinese peacekeeping missions in Africa have mainly been in resource-rich but conflict prone zones. The peace efforts include operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, and Liberia. However Chinese peace keeping operations in Africa have also involved resource- poor countries, such as its peace keeping mission in Western Sahara in 2007 through the United Nations Mission for the Referendum of Western Sahara (MINURSO). China has also supported efforts of regional bodies at promoting peace and security in Africa. This can be explained by China's donation of US \$ 1.8 million to the African Union towards peacekeeping efforts in Sudan in 2008.³²⁴

The United States' relations with Africa at the end of the Cold War have historically been aimed at promoting democracy and good governance. These aspects of the United States' relations are contradictory to the Cold War era when it ignored issues of international morality in its dealings with Africa. In the course of the Cold War, the United States' policy towards

³²¹Ian Taylor, "China's Role in Peacekeeping in Africa", China's Peace Keeping Presence in Africa, *The China Monitor, Issue 33*, Center for Chinese Studies, September, 2003, pp.6 & 8

³²²Martyn J. Davis, "China's Peace Keeping Presence in Africa", *The China Monitor, Issue 33*, Center for Chinese Studies, September, 2003, pp.6 & 8

³²³International Crisis Group, China's Growing Role in UN peacekeeping , Asia Report No. 166, 17 April 2009, p.1

³²⁴Davis, op. cit., p. 8

Africa did not view the continent as significant. In contrast American policy towards Africa was basically a tool to counter balance the Soviet Union and China's communist advances.³²⁵ The main interest of the United States' was thus not the economic development of Africa, but to prevent the spread of communism.

This is illustrated by the paradox of capitalism across Africa. According to Nyong'o, capitalism, which was seen as the drive towards economic growth in the continent, has instead led to widespread underdevelopment.³²⁶ This is despite the liberalization of economies following the end of the Cold War in December 1991. The failure of capitalism can be explained to the self-enrichment by the new African bourgeoisie who had replaced the European colonialists. Nevertheless, the anarchic power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union significantly shaped regional balance of power in Africa. This notion can be illustrated by the shifting alliances between the United States-the Soviet Union-Ethiopia and Somalia in the Horn of Africa region between 1940s and 1970s.³²⁷

After the Cold War, the United States' policy towards Africa changed. The policy advanced was mainly aimed at promoting economic and liberal policies, in line with the United States as the sole preponderant global power. However in the twenty first century the United States policy towards Africa has mostly involved security relations. The change in policy can be attributed to the proliferation of international terrorism. In the aftermath of the 9/11 al-Qaeda terror attacks in New York, the United States increased its counter terrorism campaigns in

³²⁵Peter J. Schraeder, "The Horn of Africa: US Foreign Policy in an Altered Cold War Environment", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 46, No. 4, Middle East Institute, 1992, p.571

³²⁶Peter Anyang' Nyong'o, "State and Democracy in Africa: A Critical Appreciation of African Politics as a Heritage", *Readings in Constitutional Land and Politics in Africa: A Case Study of Kenya*, eds. Kivutha Kibwana, (Nairobi: Claripress Ltd, Faculty of Law, 1998),p.56

³²⁷Schraeder, op. cit., p.571

Africa. This led to the formation of the Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (JTH-HOA), with its base in Djibouti.³²⁸

The establishment and expansion of Camp Lemonier has thus elevated Djibouti's strategic profile in the Horn of Africa region as a partner in counter-terrorism. The strategic profile of Djibouti has seen various Western powers such as France, Japan and Italy, scramble for space to establish bases in the country.³²⁹ The United States also increased its financial support to specific regions in Africa which it considered as terrorist hubs. The East Africa region specifically benefited from United States security funding to the tune of US \$ 100 million in 2003.³³⁰

The influence of the United States in the shifting balance of power within the pretext of counterterrorism has also been witnessed in the Horn of African region. This was obvious in 2006 when Ethiopia invaded Somali with tacit support of the United States to lodge out the Islamic Courts Union from ascending to power. The Ethiopian and United States governments instead favored the Somalia Transitional Federal Government. According to the Bush administration, the Islamic Courts Union was seen as a terrorist organization, with some of its top leaders linked to al-Qaeda who had been involved in the bombing of the United States embassies in Nairobi and Dar-as-Salaam in August 1998.³³¹ The United States' actions in this case were driven by pure realist thinking in protection of its national interest. This is explained by its hypocritical stance to fund the Ethiopian government which was seen as autocratic and out of line with democratic values eschewed by the United States in the continent.

³²⁸Eric Schmitt, "U.S Signs New Lease to Keep Strategic Military Installation in the Horn of Africa", The New York Times, 5 May 2014.

³²⁹Ibid.

³³⁰Princeton Lyman, "The War on Terrorism" eds.by, John W. Harberson and David Rothchild, *Africa in World Politics: Engaging a Changing Global Order*, New York Westview Press, Perseus Books Press, January 2013

³³¹The Washington Post, Editorial, *War in Somalia*, December 27, 2006

The main aspect of the United States security efforts in Africa has mainly been aimed at counter terrorism measures. However the United States security operations in Africa have also involved protecting vital oil supply routes. The increased United States security operations in Africa are thus directly proportional to the rising significance of Africa as a future source of bio-fuels. For instance, the security operation of the United States in the Gulf of Guinea has purely been based on securing the vital oil fields found in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Equatorial Guinea.³³² The need to protect and improve a favorable investment environment for the United States' oil firms has seen increased military spending by the United States to oil-rich African countries. For instance, foreign military sales to African countries rose from US \$ 25.6 million in 2003 to US \$ 61.5 million during the 2004 financial year.³³³

The United States has also been actively engaged in internal political processes in Africa. This is quite unlike China whose policy of non-interference in domestic affairs has made it an observer in African countries' power struggles. It's important to point out that for China, even the provision of peacekeeping operations has involved lobbying with local regimes for their consent before deployment. This was the case with China's involvement in peace keeping operations in Sudan in 2007. The United States' direct involvement in Africa has led to cases of explicit regime change and attempts at influencing political outcomes across the continent.

This has in one way or another affected the balance of power within the continent. A case in point was the involvement of the United States-led intervention in Libya. The intervention led to the overthrow of Muammar Gadhafi in 2011. Acting through the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, President Obama outlined on March 18, 2011 that the United States

³³²Michael Klare and Daniel Volman, "America, China and the Scramble for Africa's Oil", *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol.33, No.108, 2006, p.299

³³³Ibid, p.299

was prepared to use military force against the Gadhafi regime.³³⁴ This remark followed a private meeting between the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the opposition Interim Transitional National Council in March 2011. The United States eventually led the first phase of the strike against Libyan forces under operation Odyssey Dawn, before other NATO members followed suit.³³⁵

The ouster of Gadhafi from power through United States-led NATO forces has led to long term instability not only in Libya but in the North and Western Africa region as well. The majority of armed groups that have continued to engage in belligerent acts in Libya are transitional in nature. This has been attributed to the recruitment of mostly Tuaregs, Malians and Chadians into the Libyan army by Gadhafi starting in the 1970s, but which escalated with the onset of the Libyan revolution.³³⁶ It is important to note that despite the autocratic nature of Gadhafi's regime, Libya was characterized by relative economic and political stability.

4.2.2 The Nature and Impact of Kenya's Political Relations

Like all countries, Kenya's foreign policy orientation is not only determined by internal variables but to a large extent by external variables as well. This is in line with the dual perspective of a state's foreign policy. The first perspective is the view of foreign policy as a state's policy oriented to its international environment, while the second is the perception of foreign policy as part of the system.³³⁷ The two main factors that have continued to influence Kenya's foreign relations include domestic competition for power and systemic polarity. Therefore to analyze the

³³⁴Christopher M. Blanchard, "*Libya: Unrest and US Policy*", Congressional Research Services, March 18 2011, p.7-8

³³⁵Varun Vira et.al, "*The Libyan Uprising: An Uncertain Trajectory*" Washington D.C, Center for Strategic and International Studies 20 June 2011, p.47-48

³³⁶Security Assessment in North Africa, *Libya's Fractious South and Regional Instability*, Small Arms Survey, Dispatch No. 3, Geneva February 2014

³³⁷William Wallace. *Foreign Policy and the Political Process*, (London, Macmillan Press Ltd, 1971), p.17

nature and impact of Kenya's external relations, it is imperative to look at both the domestic and international political environment.

Internally Kenya's political scene since independence has been characterized by competing variables. There are five main competing themes which have defined Kenya's political struggle for power since independence.³³⁸ After independence, Kenya's politics was mainly ideological in nature following along the lines of socialism and capitalism. The capitalist won the struggle for power and have always had an upper hand in formulating Kenya's foreign policy. This has been evident in the defeat of socialist leaning politicians in subsequent elections since independence in 1963. Of all the themes in Kenya's domestic politics, ethnic chauvinism has remained the most dominant thread.

The political parties and the voting patterns have mostly been along ethnic cleavage. However there is no single ethnic group which can dominate Kenya's national politics. This aspect is reflected by the percentage composition of Kenya's largest ethnic group. The largest ethnic groups comprising 70 percent of Kenya's population are Kikuyu (22%), Luhya (14%), Luo (12%), Kalenjin (12%) and Kamba (11%).³³⁹ It is crisp clear from the above data that no single ethnic community voting as a bloc can produce a winning presidential candidate. Therefore, various communities have always formed coalition parties, along ethnic alliances, in pursuit of state power. However due to the difficulties in the balancing of the various ethnic communities along "it is our turn to eat" mantra, there has always been a feeling of disenchantment by communities out power.³⁴⁰ This has led to frequent and predictable ethnic clashes around the General Election period. The ethnic violence started mainly after the re-

³³⁸Charles Hornsby. *Kenya: A History since Independence* (London, I.B Tauris & Co Ltd, 2012), pp.7-11

³³⁹Kenya National Population Census Report, 1999

³⁴⁰Karuti Kanyingi, "Governance Institutions and Inequality in Kenya", *Readings on Inequality in Kenya: Sectorial Dynamics and Perspectives*, (Nairobi: Society for International Development, East Africa), 2006, p.355

introduction of multiparty politics in Kenya in 1992. This gloomy picture of Kenya's ethnic-based politics can be traced to the colonial period. The colonial administration created reserves for holding each ethnic group in Kenya. These were administered separately as a strategy of divide and rule.³⁴¹

The ethnic factor has in the end weakened Kenya's internal politics. This has further frustrated the formulation and projection of Kenya's foreign relations.³⁴² Foreign policy has thus, for most of the time in independent Kenya's history, been used as a tool by the ruling regimes to establish or re-establish their legitimacy in power. This has mostly been the case where there is contested legitimacy of the ruling regime by domestic political actors. This aspect was clearly witnessed following the 2007 controversial presidential elections. The closely contested elections led to instant and simultaneous protests across the country. This, in essence, undermined the legitimacy of the second Kibaki regime among members of the international community. Therefore the use of foreign policy during this period by Kibaki was an attempt to shore up his mantle as an international statesman among his peers, as well as showcase Kenya's international standing among the community of nations.³⁴³

The Bush administration at first recognized Kibaki's victory, but in a rejoinder withdrew the statement. This was due to increased political tension and violence in the country. As a result, the United States and other Western European countries increased pressure on the government and the opposition to find peaceful resolution to the conflict. The concerted efforts by the United States to find a solution to the conflict underscored the influence of the United States on Kenyan politics compared to the lukewarm stance taken by China.

³⁴¹Ibid.

³⁴²John Howell, "An Analysis of Kenyan Foreign Policy", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.8, No.1, 1968, p.30

³⁴³William Wallace. *Foreign Policy and the Political Process*, (London, Macmillan Press Ltd, 1971), p.42

The aspect of the “winner takes it all”, characterized by the centralized presidential system as outlined in the 1963 independent Kenya’s Constitution, also had an impact on Kenya’s foreign relations. The “winner takes it all” posture undermined the input of opposition parties in the formulation and projection of Kenya’s foreign policy. The formulation of Kenya’s external policy thus followed the rational policy decision making process. The rational policy views government behavior as chosen by a unitary, rational, centrally controlled, decision maker that is completely informed by value maximization.³⁴⁴

In this case, policy was dictated by an individual, the president, without the input of significant foreign policy instruments and institutions. This in the end undermined the quality of Kenya’s relations with other countries as policy was based on the whims of an individual. This type of foreign policy formulation process was witnessed when Kenyatta chose the route of capitalism as the best economic model without engaging other institutions. The foreign policy decisions of Moi were also more rational as he operated in a centralized political system without the input of Parliament in the decision making process. However, it is important to note that Kenya’s reliance on a small clique of elites in formulating its foreign policy is not unique to the country. Despite the evolution of foreign policy, most modern states still rely on a small set of elites in the determination of their foreign policy. Foreign policy is thus considered an elite process influenced by mostly the executive wing of government, even in developed states.³⁴⁵

However the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution and dilution of presidential powers is likely to shift and enhance the policy formulation process in Kenya. The strengthening of Parliament through the input of the Parliamentary Defense and Foreign Relations Committee (PDFRC) is likely to improve the quality of Kenya’s external relations. This is because the

³⁴⁴Graham T. Allison. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), p. 691

³⁴⁵Wallace, op. cit., p.40

policy formulation process is likely to involve both bureaucratic and organizational processes formulation. The organizational model views the decisions of leaders as based less on deliberate actions but more as an output of large organizations working according to a standard pattern of behavior, while the bureaucratic model looks at the functioning of the government as more of an intra-national governmental output.³⁴⁶ Compared to the old Constitution, the new Constitution incorporates all models of foreign policy decision making processes and more significantly the last two models. The incorporation of the two models in decision making is likely to enhance effective and efficient processes in policy formulation. This is especially significant due to China and the United States' renewed interest in Africa and Kenya in particular.

One of the most significant political issues that have influenced Kenya's domestic and international relations has been the ICC trials. The trials, which started during the second term of the Kibaki regime, persisted to influence the outcome of the March 2013 General Elections. The trials have also reverberated beyond the 2013 elections. Internally, the trials galvanized ethnic sympathy for Uhuru and Ruto's support base, thus propelling them to power. They fashioned their campaign along "the fight against Western neo-imperialism" theme. This followed the United States and Western European nations' warning to Kenya of the negative impacts of the possibility of electing suspected criminals to power. In February 2013 in response to a high possibility of Kenyans electing Uhuru and Ruto, Johnny Carson stated that:

"We live in an interconnected world and people should be thoughtful about the impact that their choices have on their nation, on the region, on the economy, on the society and on the world in which they live. Choices have consequences."³⁴⁷

The threats by Western powers were perceived as aimed at influencing elections in favor of Odinga who was not facing trials at The Hague. The use of the ICC cases as a campaign tool

³⁴⁶Allison, *op. cit.*, pp.699 &708

³⁴⁷Gabe Joselow, "US Official Says Kenya's Elections Have Consequences", Voice of America, February 07, 2013

was thus used to seek popular support for Uhuru's and Ruto's party, The National Alliance (TNA), domestically and internationally. This aspect was seen by the foreign visits of Uhuru across Africa to drum up support and legitimize his candidature as a presidential contender.

After the elections, the ICC cases have continued to have ramifications not only on Kenya's domestic politics but on its foreign relations as well. This has been seen by the lukewarm relations between Kenya and the United States as compared to its relations with China. The high caliber government delegations between Kenya and China have reflected the tightening of diplomatic ties between the two countries. On the contrary, Kenya's diplomatic relations with the United States has presumably been shaky as explained by Obama's avoidance to visit Kenya during his 2013 African tour.

A myriad of external factors have also influenced Kenya's political relations since independence. The economic rise of China at the start of the millennium is one of the factors that have influenced Kenya's political relations. The rise of China as an economic powerhouse and its impact on Kenya's political relations can be explained by juxtaposing Kenya's relations with China and the United States. Previously, Kenya's politics was heavily subordinated to that of the United States due to its heavy reliance on the United States for development and military aid. However with the shifting balance of power in favor of China, Kenya's foreign policy has undergone realignment to accommodate the new balance of power pattern. This dynamic and anarchic nature of the international system is best explained by Waltz, when he states that:

“For more than three hundred years, the drama of modern history has turned on the rise and fall of great powers...as some states sank others rose to take their places.”³⁴⁸

³⁴⁸Kenneth Waltz, The Emerging Structure of International Politics, *International Security*, Vol.18, No.2, 1993, p.44

The economic rise of China according to realists is likely to significantly perturb the balance of power globally. It is projected that by 2050 China will have overtaken the United States as the most predominant economic power globally.³⁴⁹

However despite China's high GDP growth, the United States' GDP per capita is still expected to remain greater than China's. Nevertheless, China and emerging economies will still play a more significant role in international relations in a multipolar economic balance of power. The shifting economic balance of power has thus provided successive Kenyan regimes with an alternative development partners. For instance by May 2013, China had emerged as the largest bilateral donor to Kenya, having lent the country US\$ 750million.³⁵⁰ The trend was started by Moi towards the end of his regime and perfected in the Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta's regimes. This has provided economic leverage to the rigid conditions which the United States has in the past attached to provision of aid to Kenya.

4.2.3 Challenges and Opportunities

In the course of the study, several challenges and opportunities have cropped in the China-Kenya-United States relations. The challenges and opportunities though specific in the case of Kenya, have certain similarities to the other countries within the continent. Majority of countries in Africa gained their independence in the 1960s, thus the challenges and opportunities they have faced over the decades have been quite similar. At independence most analysts of foreign relations opined that there was little worth in the analysis of African countries' foreign

³⁴⁹Uri Dadush and Bennett Stancil, *The World Order in 2050*, , Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2010, Policy Outlook p.10

³⁵⁰Fred Oluoch, "Kenya reaps handsome rewards from its robust "Look East Policy", *The East African*, May 10, 2010

relations.³⁵¹ This was mainly due to the struggle by the newly independent African states to build coherent nation-states. The young African nation-states were thus still fumbling with formulation and projection of their foreign policy within the backdrop of the Cold War politics.

However the bareness of the African countries' foreign policies has gradually been filling up along the lines of the European Westphalia state system. This is despite the myriad challenges that still bedevil the formulation and projection process of African countries' external relations. The anarchic and dynamic nature of the international system has presented challenges and opportunities for African countries. This has mainly been experienced by the African states as they integrate within the wider web of the international system. This section will therefore analyze the challenges and opportunities that Kenya has faced in its relations with China and the United States. The analysis will be conducted within the backdrop of shifting balance of power in Africa. The discourse will first look at the challenges which will then be followed by opportunities.

The issue of economic relations has been one of the most challenging aspects of Kenya's cooperation with China and the United States. Kenya's balance of trade is highly in favor of the two states. At the end of 2013, the Kenya-China trade deficit stood at US \$2.1 billion, while the trade deficit with the United States was US \$205 million.³⁵² This aspect can however be attributed to several factors, but one of the most important is the difference in the economic structure of the three countries. The economic structure of both China and the United States is highly developed as compared to Kenya's economy. China and the United States thus have a well-established manufacturing sector and their economies are diversified. In contrast, Kenya still heavily relies on primary agricultural products for export. The raw products that Kenya

³⁵¹Vernon McKay, *African Diplomacy: Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy*, (London: Pall Mall,1966), p. 6

³⁵²Kenya Economic Survey and Statistical Abstracts, 2013

exports are then imported back into the country with other machinery from China and the United States. The ability of China and the United States to export cheaply manufactured products has led to “dumping” in Kenya. This has further stemmed the growth of Kenya’s cottage industries. Though dumping may be advantageous to a country within the short term, it can lead to a decrease in domestic output and employment in the long run.³⁵³ The economy of scales enjoyed by the established Chinese and the United States multinational corporations operating in Kenya has also stifled Kenya’s fledgling manufacturing sector. This has in the short and long run undermined Kenya’s domestic economic growth.

The issue of labor has also been a problem, more specifically between Kenya-China bilateral cooperation. Although major infrastructural projects undertaken by China have led to technological transfer, there has also been a proliferation of Chinese nationals competing with Kenyans in the small business enterprises. For instance the China Bridge and Road Corporation, (CBRC) which won the tender for construction of the US \$3.8 billion Standard Gauge Railway project, has pledged to import 5,000 Chinese nationals to supplement its 30,000 Kenyan staff.³⁵⁴ This is despite the high unemployment rate in Kenya. According to government sources, the open unemployment rate in Kenya is 12.7 percent, with urban unemployment among Kenyan youths aged between 15-24 years being acute – at 25 percent.³⁵⁵ There have also been observations of Chinese nationals operating small and medium scale businesses in Kenya. This has led to competition for employment opportunities and closure of Kenyan businesses. This is due to the Chinese businesses importation of cheap imports into the country that local entrepreneurs cannot compete against.

³⁵³Robert Mudidda. *Modern Economics*, Second Edition, (Nairobi: Focus Publishers Ltd., 2003), p.366

³⁵⁴Kiarie Njoroge, “5000 Chinese workers expected for railway project”, *Business Daily*, August 10, 2014

³⁵⁵KIPPRA, *Kenya Economic Report 2013: Creating an Enabling Environment for Stimulating Investment for Competitive and Sustainable Counties*, Nairobi, KIPPRA publication, 2013, pp.31-32

The aspect of culture has also proved to be a hurdle in Kenya-China-United States relations. China, as compared to the United States, is lagging behind in terms of language and cultural misperceptions between the two countries. This in essence has hindered effective communication between Chinese and Kenyan entrepreneurs. A sample study of Chinese shops in Nairobi indicates that most of the Chinese business people have resorted to hiring locals. The Kenyan sales-persons act as a link between Kenyan shoppers and the Chinese business owners. The language barrier amidst increased visitors to Kenya has seen Kenyan companies; such as Kenya Airways and tour companies liaise with the Confucius Institute at the University of Nairobi to train interpreters.³⁵⁶ An interview at the University of Nairobi, Confucius Institute, has revealed an increase in the number of Kenyans pursuing Mandarin Chinese. This has mainly been aimed to increase cultural relations as well as improve Chinese language for business.

With regard to the United States, there have been less cultural barriers with Kenya. This has mainly been due to the long term historical connection between the two states. The United States popular culture, promoted by the *Hollywood* industry, has provided an impetus in enhancing Kenya-United States cultural relations. However certain cultures, dressed up as human rights issues have led to frosty relations with African countries. This has mainly been due to the attachment of aid to cultural conditions which are unpalatable to African nationals. For instance the United States' promotion of gay rights across Africa has been met with resistance from most African countries. In February 2014, Uganda signed anti-gay laws which went against the United States' threat of suspension of aid to Uganda. Following the signing of the bill into law, the Obama administration released a statement which reiterated that:

“This law is more than an affront and a danger to the gay community in Uganda, it reflects poorly on the country's commitment to protecting the human rights of its people and will undermine public health...We will continue to urge the Ugandan government to repeal this abhorrent law

³⁵⁶Interview, Guo Hong, Director, Confucius Institute University of Nairobi, 23, July, 2014

and to advocate for the protection of the universal human rights of gay persons in Uganda and around the world.”³⁵⁷

This action by the United States thus shows the tensions which have emerged in the relations between African countries and the United States.

The contrasting political structure between China and the United States has also complicated their relations with African states. While China’s political structure and policies oscillate around communist ideologies, the United States is a democratic state. Meanwhile most African countries have tended to follow the Western democratic governance system. This has mainly been due to the long colonial historical relations that Africa has had with their former colonial masters. The United States, in its attempt to spread democracy globally, has tended to muscle even autocratic African regimes to adopt liberal economic and political policies. This is best captured by Obama’s statement in Accra, Ghana in July 2009:

“Now, make no mistake: History is on the side of these brave Africans, not with those who use coups or change constitutions to stay in power... Africa doesn't need strongmen, it needs strong institutions.”³⁵⁸

The United States subjugation of African states, especially on democracy, is contrary to China’s approach which has been grounded on South-South mutual relations. China’s dealings with African states have been devoid of interference in their domestic political policies. This has attracted a backlash from the United States especially on China’s cooperation with corrupt and autocratic regimes in the continent.³⁵⁹ The United States has viewed China’s policy as aimed at encouraging poor governance in Africa. However China, due to its communist political ideology, has tended to overlook the political structure of most African states in pursuit of its economic

³⁵⁷Sudarsan Raghavan, “Ugandan Leader signs harsh anti-gay law despite harsh warning from Obama administration”, *Washington Post*, February 4, 2014

³⁵⁸The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, *Remarks by the President to the Ghanaian Parliament*, Accra International Conference Centre, Accra, Ghana, 11 July, 2009

³⁵⁹Ian Taylor, China’s Oil Diplomacy in Africa, *International Affairs*, Chatham House, 82:5,2006, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, p.940

interests. China, meanwhile, views the actions of the United States as imperialistic and aimed at undermining the South-South cooperation with Africa.

Despite the challenges, there are also several opportunities for Kenya and other African states in their relations with China and the United States. The first opportunity that Kenya has is its geostrategic location along the Eastern Africa coastline. The location has given Kenya an edge over other countries in the region despite lacking in valuable mineral resources. This has seen the United States and China linked Multinational Corporations establish their bases in Kenya. This can further be witnessed by the fact that both the United States and China have their largest African embassies in Nairobi. Due to its strategic location, Kenya has been ranked among the top United States aid recipients between 2003 and 2012, (See: Figure 3). A large chunk of the United States aid to Kenya is used for counter terrorism measures within the Horn of Africa region.

With regard to China, Kenya's strategic location has seen increased FDI inflow into the country from the Asian economic powerhouse. This has mainly been due to most Chinese Multinational Corporations establishing their operational bases in Kenya. The strategy of setting regional headquarters in Kenya is mainly seen as a means of penetrating through to the landlocked East and Central African countries. The established Multinational Corporations thus provide numerous economic benefits to Kenya. The strategic location of Kenya has also provided it with a double advantage. While it strengthens Kenya's security relations with the United States, the strategic location of Kenya also enhances its economic benefits with China, due to preference by Chinese investors to use Kenya as a launching pad to penetrate the wider East and Central Africa region.

Kenya's relative political and economic stability, unlike most countries in the region, has also provided it with an opportunity to attract FDI. Kenya currently has some of the best infrastructural developments for conducting business. These include communication and technological developments, as well as the Mombasa Port, airports, and a highly trained human resource. These factors have thus given Kenya an edge in the conduct of its relations with China and the United States as compared to other countries in the region. Kenya is currently ranked among the top leaders in Information, Communication and Technology (ICT) across Africa.³⁶⁰ This has been more so with the evolution of mobile phone technology in business operations in the country and the region.

The discovery of bio-fuels in recent years has also placed Kenya in a better position to determine its relations with China and the United States in the best interest of Kenyan citizens. As the top two consumers of oil in the world, and considering Kenya's geostrategic location, both China and the United States are bound to increase their engagements with Kenya. Therefore Kenyan policy makers need to maximize gains likely to accrue from the competition for Kenya's oil. The country should assess its challenges and opportunities in its relations with China and the United States. This will enable it to have leverage in its engagement with other states and non-state actors in the promotion and protection of its national interests.

4.2.4 Other Issues

The increasing number of Kenyans and other Africans in the diaspora has emerged as the other issue in the United States-Kenya-China relations. The AU for instance amended its Constitutive Act in 2003 to include the Africans in diaspora as the sixth African frontier. The amended Article 3(3q) of the AU Constitutive Act states that:

³⁶⁰Mwangi S. Kaimenyi and Josephine Kibe, *Africa's Powerhouse*, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C, January 6, 2014

“The AU hereby” ...invites and encourage(s) the full participation of the diaspora as an important part of our continent, in building of the African Union.”³⁶¹

The Africans in the diaspora have been defined by the African Union as any people of African descent, who live outside the African continent. The act further points out that the Africans in diaspora should be willing to contribute towards the continents development. The participation of Africans in the diaspora in all aspects of the African Union is anchored in the statutes of the Economic, Social, and Cultural Council of the African Union (ECOSOC).

The Kenyan government, in line with the AU, has taken the issue of Africans in the diaspora with keen interest. In the 2009 documented Foreign Policy Framework, the Kenyan government coined the term “diplomatic diplomacy” to tap into the skills of Kenyans in the diaspora for its economic, political and social development.³⁶² With regard to China and the United States’ relations with Kenya, the majority of Kenyans in the diaspora reside in the United States. However as China continues to grow, several Kenyans are moving to live and work in China. Therefore the Kenyan government needs to develop policies which will increase transfer of resources of Kenyans in China to match those from the United States and Western Europe. The integrated remittance from Kenyans in the diaspora is likely to increase its economic growth.

The other emerging issue from the study is that of globalization and human rights. A globalized international system refers to a scenario where the political, economic and social issues become more intertwined with great impact.³⁶³ One of the effects of globalization has been the growth of liberal economic and political policies around the world. This aspect has seen

³⁶¹See African Union Constitutive Act 2001, Article 3(3q), 2001

³⁶²Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Kenya Foreign Policy Document*, Nairobi, 2009, p.22

³⁶³John Baylis, et.al. *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p.8

even China, the bastion of communism; liberalize its economy, along the fashion of the capitalist United States. However China's political system has remained mostly undemocratic. This has made China to continue ignoring the issue of human rights across the continent. This is despite the fact that poor leadership is common across Africa. Most African states have continued to not only undermine the freedom of their citizens, but have also subverted the liberalization of the market.³⁶⁴ This in essence has led to perpetual underdevelopment of the continent as both China and the United States continue to profit from their engagement with Africa.

However, looked at keenly, there is a correlation in both the United States and China's dealings with Africa. They both aim at maximizing their national interests regardless of the forms of African governments they are dealing with. The bottom line of the United States and China's dealing with African states is the stability, predictability, transparency and the protection of their own national interests.³⁶⁵ The accusations and counter-accusations by the United States and China in their dealings with Africa should therefore not to be mistaken as driven by their best interest for Africa's economic, political, and social prosperity.

4.3 Conclusion

This chapter has mainly involved a detailed analysis of some of the emerging issues in the study. The first issue which has been analyzed is the shifting influence of China and the US within the context of African regional balance of power. In this case, it is obvious that the key issues in Africa's relations with both China and the United States are economic and security in nature. However, variations have emerged with regard to the two issues. While China's relations are

³⁶⁴Peter Anyang' Nyong'o leap into the Future: A vision for Kenya's Socio-Political and Economic Transformation(Nairobi: Africa Research and Recourses Forum, 2007,p.170

³⁶⁵Kenneth N. Waltz, "Globalization and Governance", *Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 32, No. 4, 1999, p.694

more driven by economic cooperation, the United States on the other hand is more involved with security and political engagements. The discourse has also looked at the nature and impact of Kenya's political relations. It is obvious from the study that the determinants of Kenya's political relations with China and the United States are dual-pronged. The political relations are both affected by the domestic and international systemic balance of power. The two factors play a key role in the formulation and projection of Kenya's foreign policy orientation. The chapter finally concluded by looking at the numerous challenges and opportunities in Kenya and Africa's relations with China and the United States. This was discussed within the backdrop of shifting balance of power in Africa and globally.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

5.1 Summary

The study looked at the background of the international system within the context of shifting balance of power in Africa. Africa in the twenty-first century has witnessed renewed interest from established and emerging economies. However China and the United States have emerged as the most conspicuous state actors on the continent. The two states have been competing not only for access to resources but also for domination and influence in Africa.³⁶⁶ The key resource that has attracted competition is oil as witnessed by concentrated and diligent engagement of both China and the United States in oil producing African countries.³⁶⁷ This can be attributed to the fact that both the United States and China are ranked as the top two consumers of oil respectively. Nevertheless both states are still engaged in the exploitation of other valuable mineral resources in Africa.

The study is based on classical and neo-realism theories. The literature review provided an informed and varied scholarly opinion of the balance of power concept. The review further briefly theorized Kenya's relations with China and the United States. This helped to minimize biasness in the course of the study. Chapter one ended with research methodology that outlined the scope and domain of the study. The other key sections of chapter one included; hypotheses, objectives, justification of the study and statement of the research problem.

³⁶⁶David Shinn, "Africa, China, the United States and Oil", *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, June 10, 2014.

³⁶⁷Desire Assogbavi, "The Role of China in Peace and Security in Africa", *Chinese and African Perspectives on China in Africa*, Eds. Axel Harneit-Sievers, Stephen Marks and Sanusha Naidu, (Nairobi: Pambazuka Press 2010), p.194; See also Michael Klare and Daniel Volman, "America, China and the Scramble for Africa's Oil", *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol.33, No.108, 2006, p.299

In Chapter Two, the study provided an overview of the shifting balance of power from the Renaissance to the post-internationalism era. The central thread running through the chapter was the anarchic nature of the international system. The struggle for power among nation-states thus necessitated the balance of power concept as a measure for ensuring systemic stability. This was exhibited by the extent of the extreme actions of states within the system.³⁶⁸ The actions of states, since the establishment of Westphalia state system, have revolved around either the maintenance or overthrow the existing status quo.³⁶⁹ However what is most evident is the minimal role of Africa in the early history of systemic balance of power.³⁷⁰

The role of Africa in the systemic balance of power started to take shape during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.³⁷¹ However these maneuvers were mainly seen as an extension of the European balance of power system. The European colonial powers' scramble to control Africa was mainly propelled by the availability of vast natural resources in the continent. It is only in the 1960s that Africa started to assert itself with earnest in the international system. This can be attributed to the existing universal, international regimes such as the United Nations Organization. The 1960s were characterized by a wave of decolonization across Africa, a fact that led to the acquisition of the Westphalia-state system by African countries.³⁷² This made African states to start the process of formulating their own foreign policy in line with their national interests.

In Chapter Three, the focus of the study mainly involved an analysis of the shifting balance of power in Africa, with Kenya as an exemplar for the African continent. The theme of

³⁶⁸Kenneth N. Waltz. *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), p.160

³⁶⁹Hans J. Morgenthau. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, (New Delhi, Kalyani Publishers, 2012), p.231

³⁷⁰Refer to Chapter 2.

³⁷¹Morgenthau, op. cit., pp. 218-219

³⁷²Chapter 2, op. cit.,

the study was a critical look at Kenya's economic, political and cultural relations with China and the United States. The research involved myriad sources of both primary and secondary data to ascertain the nature and importance of Kenya's relations with China and the United States. The last phase of the chapter analyzed the shifting domestic balance of power in Kenya since independence. In the course of the analysis, ethnicity emerged as the central theme that has influenced the dynamic balance of power in Kenya.³⁷³ This theme is similar across Africa where sectarian issues continue to shape domestic politics.

In Chapter Four, the discourse involved a critical analysis of emerging issues from the study. The first part involved an analysis of the shifting balance of power in Africa within the context of the United States and China. The predominant issues that emerged dealt mainly with security and economic cooperation. The two issues were distinctive in Africa's relations with the two great powers. While security dominated the United States' dealings with Africa, economy was a significant issue in China's engagements with the continent. The other major issues that defined chapter four involved the nature and impact of Kenya's political relations. In this regard the chapter analyzed the domestic and external factors that have influenced Kenya's relations with China and the United States. The chapter eventually came to a conclusion by looking at the challenges and opportunities in Kenya's relations with China and the United States.

5.2 Key Findings

The central theme of this discourse has mainly involved an analysis of shifting balance of power in Africa. The context of the discussion has revolved around Kenya's relations with China and the United States between 2003 and 2012. The international system during this period has been characterized by emerging economies. The emerging economies, mainly from Asia, have tended

³⁷³Refer to Chapter 3.

to rival the dominance of the United States and its Western European allies in Africa.³⁷⁴ The most discernible Asian power that has emerged as a counterweight to the United States in Africa has been China. This confirms the perception that China and the United States are involved in a power struggle, but within the context of a multipolar international system.

It is lucid that China and the United States' engagement with Kenya have had profound implications in the promotion and pursuit of its national interest. There are two clear-cut patterns that have emerged in Kenya's relations with each of the two individual states. In the first case, Kenya's relations with China have overly been dominated by the pursuit of economic interests between the two states.³⁷⁵ The second configuration, which involves Kenya's relations with the United States, has mainly been tailored along security and political concerns.³⁷⁶ However, detailed analysis concerning relations between the three states illustrates a pattern of imbalanced engagements against Kenya.

This is exhibited by the huge trade deficit in favor of both China and the United States. The security relations between Kenya and the United States are also mainly geared at securing United States interests in the region. This is exemplified by the frequent security-related travel advisory alerts that have had negative ramifications on Kenya's economic interests. Nevertheless, Kenya has consistently increased its economic and security capabilities due to its cooperation with the two countries.³⁷⁷ The gains for Kenya, although trivial in comparison to those of the United States and China, have uplifted the socio-economic and political welfare of ordinary Kenyans.

³⁷⁴Horace Campbell. "China in Africa: challenging US global hegemony". *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.29, No.1, 2008, p.97

³⁷⁵Refer to Chapter 3.

³⁷⁶Ibid.

³⁷⁷Ibid.

The study has found out that Kenya and the United States have continued to maintain close relations. This is despite the popular perception that Kenya had accelerated its relations with China at the expense of its traditional ally, the United States.³⁷⁸ The perception was driven mainly by the intense economic diplomacy pursued by the Kibaki regime. This resulted in conspicuous Chinese built infrastructure across the country during Kibaki's time in office. Nevertheless the United States still remained a significant development partner with Kenya during this period. This can be witnessed by the United States' large-scale funding in the health sector such as in the fight against HIV/AIDS. The flagship of United States HIV/AIDS funding in Kenya has been the PEPFAR program.³⁷⁹ The increased engagement between Kenya and the United States was also witnessed through high level security cooperation. Indeed, data collected lists Kenya as one of the top ten United States' global aid recipients between 2003 and 2012.³⁸⁰

With regard to the shifting balance of power in Africa, there is no clear cut hegemon yet. However various states within the regional economic blocs are emerging as dominant powers.³⁸¹ The emerging hegemons are defined mostly by their strong economic and geostrategic location. These factors have attracted China and the United States to forge closer engagements with them. The increased economic and security investment by China and the United States in these countries has further raised their status among their peers in the region. This has in essence led to the regional shift in the balance of power across Africa. The increased involvement by China and the United States in Africa has further increased its assertiveness. This in the end has enabled Africa to increasingly play a more active role in the systemic balance of power.

³⁷⁸Refer to Chapter 3.

³⁷⁹US President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief/Partnership to Fight HIV/AIDS in Kenya, FY,2004-2011

³⁸⁰See Congressional Budget Justification Summary Tables, FY2013, Country/Account Summary, Financial Year, 2012 estimates.

³⁸¹Refer to Chapter 4.

5.3 Recommendations

Kenya and other African states need to diversify their relations not only with China and the United States but with other countries and regions as well. In the process of diversifying relations, African policy makers should be driven purely by the national interests of their nation-states. To attain long term socio-economic and political development, the policy makers should avoid knee-jerk reactions in the policy formulation process. African citizens should therefore be more objective and less subjective in electing their national leaders. This will ensure that the leaders elected have the interest of Africa at heart in line with Mandela's aspiration of an Africa that is at peace with itself.

Kenya as a country has had an advantage because of its geostrategic location and most recently as a potential reservoir of bio-fuels. These advantages should provide Kenya with an impetus to dictate terms of engagement with China and the United States. Any deals reached between Kenya and these two countries should be aligned to Kenya's national interest and not tailored along the whims of individuals. This will ensure that Kenya trumpets its foreign policy to achieve maximum gains out of its relations with other states. Kenya should also continue to maintain cordial relations with both China and the United States. This is because security and the economy which the United States and China offer respectively, forms the bedrock of Kenya's national interest.³⁸²

The future scholarly discourse should be based on the formulation and projection process of regional organizations' foreign relations. This is mainly due to the proliferation and the increasing significant role of regional economic bodies in the systemic balance of power. Kenya and other members of the East African Community need to formulate a common foreign policy

³⁸²Refer to Chapter 3

framework. This will provide uniformity in its relations with other countries and regions. The signing of the East Africa Monetary Union Protocol (EAMUP) in November 2013 has already marked a significant step towards regional integration.³⁸³ The Monetary protocol is aimed at harmonizing the long term economic and monetary policies of the member states towards a future federal East African state.

However the bickering between member-states due to lack of a common stand has undermined the objective of the EAC. This was witnessed by the diplomatic row between Rwanda and Tanzania from May to July 2013.³⁸⁴ A common foreign relations guideline is likely to minimize differences and maximize gains for the EAC member-states. The gains likely to be made include; large scale economic infrastructural projects as well as solutions to security challenges. It is therefore imperative that the next study delves into analyzing foreign relations of regional bodies. This should be in line with the gradual integration process towards a federal United States of Africa as outlined by the African Union's aims and aspirations.³⁸⁵ The desire for African unity has always been desired by both moderate and radical advocates of African Unity since the Monrovia versus Casablanca group.³⁸⁶ The only misunderstandings between these two groups have always been the best means towards achieving a federal state.

³⁸³Mwaura Kimani, "East Africa set for historic shift as states adopt EU-type monetary union plan", *East African*, November 30, 2013

³⁸⁴Augustus Muluvi and Paul Odhiambo, "East African Partner States Pulling in Different Directions: What Are the Implications for the East African Community?" *Africa in Focus*, Brookings, December 2, 2013.

³⁸⁵See The 9th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Accra, Ghana, 25 June- 3 July 2007

³⁸⁶Refer to Chapter 3.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I

Research Questions

1. How has the emergence of China as a global economic powerhouse affected the US regional influence in Africa?
2. What factors have influenced relations between Kenya and China; and between Kenya and the United States?
3. What measures have/are being undertaken to balance trade between Kenya and its allies (China vs., US)?
4. What are the implications of the Kenya Constitution (2010) on the conduct of Kenya's relations with China and with the United States?
5. What are the factors (internal and/or external) that have influenced and shaped the shifting balance of power in Africa?
6. What is Africa's role and position in the 21st Century international system?
7. Are there any other comments you would like to make regarding the shifting balance of power in Africa and its impact on Kenya's relations with China and with the United States?