DECLARATION

This research project is my original work and has not been presented for any academic award or qualification in any institution of higher learning. Appropriate referencing has been made where citation of other people’s work has been done.

Signature.............................................. Date..............................................................

FABIAN TOM MPAKA

Supervisor

This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the appointed University supervisor.

Signature.............................................. Date..............................................................

DR. ROSEMARY ANYONA

Supervisor
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my wife, Allen for her support, encouragement, quiet patience and unwavering love were undeniably the bedrock upon which my life have been built. Finally, it is also dedicated to my mother, who taught me that even the largest task can be accomplished if it is done one step at a time.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to thank The Almighty God for giving me the gift of life to write this thesis. Most importantly, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Dr Rosemary Anyona, for her support, patience, and encouragement throughout my studies. It is not often that one finds a supervisor that always finds the time for listening to the little problems and roadblocks that unavoidably crop up in the course of performing research. Her academic input and editorial advice was essential to the completion of this thesis and has taught me innumerable lessons and insights on the workings of academic research in general.
Finally, my thanks to the leadership of the National Defence College, whose steadfast support of this project was greatly needed and deeply appreciated.
# TABLE OF CONTENT

DECLARATION ...........................................................................................................i
DEDICATION ...........................................................................................................ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ........................................................................................... iii
TABLE OF CONTENT ........................................................................................... iv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................... vii
ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................. x
MAP OF STUDY AREAS ..................................................................................... xi
MAP OF AFRICA .................................................................................................... xi
MAP OF RWANDA .................................................................................................. xii
MAP OF SUDAN (DARFUR-REGION) ................................................................. xiii

Chapter One ............................................................................................................. 1
  1.1 Background ....................................................................................................... 1
  1.2 Statement of the Research Problem ................................................................... 5
  1.3 Objective of the Study ..................................................................................... 6
  1.4 Literature Review .......................................................................................... 6
  1.4.1 Conflict in Africa ....................................................................................... 6
  1.4.2 Conflict- Generating Factors ..................................................................... 12
  1.5 Conflicts Management in Africa ...................................................................... 13
    1.5.1 Conflict Management in Rwanda ............................................................. 19
    1.5.2.1 Pre genocide period ............................................................................ 19
    1.5.2.2 International response in Rwanda ......................................................... 20
    1.5.2.3 The Genocide period ............................................................................ 21
    1.5.2.4 Post 1994 genocide period in Rwanda ............................................... 23
  1.6 Conflict and Conflict Management in Darfur ................................................ 25
    1.6.1 International Responses ......................................................................... 28
  1.7 The role of the Government in perpetrating Genocide, the 1994 Genocide in
    Rwanda ............................................................................................................. 32
  1.8 Lessons Learnt in Conflict Management and Genocide .................................. 33
  1.9 Justification of the Study ................................................................................. 34
  1.10 Theoretical Framework ................................................................................ 36
    1.10.1 Human Needs Theory (HNT) ................................................................. 36
1.11 Hypothesis ...........................................................................................................42
1.12 Research Methodology .......................................................................................42
1.13 Chapter Outline .................................................................................................43

Chapter Two ..............................................................................................................44
Conflict and Conflict management in Rwanda .........................................................44
2.1 Introduction .........................................................................................................44
2.2 Build-up to the 1994 Genocide ...........................................................................44
2.2.1 The Pre-colonial Times ..................................................................................44
2.2.2 The Colonial Times ......................................................................................46
2.4 The pre genocide conflict management initiatives ..............................................57
2.4 The 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi .................................................................60
2.4.1 Premeditation of the Genocide .....................................................................60
2.4.2 April 6, 1994: Execution of the Genocide ......................................................60
2.5 The Church involvement in the Genocide ..........................................................67
2.6 Consequences of the 1994 Genocide Conflict ....................................................67
2.6 Summary of Conflict management Efforts in Rwanda .......................................70
2.7 Summary ............................................................................................................75

Chapter Three .............................................................................................................77
Conflict and Conflict Management in Darfur ............................................................77
3.1 Introduction .........................................................................................................77
3.2 Build up to the Darfur Genocide .......................................................................77
3.2.1 Pre-colonial Times .......................................................................................82
3.2.2 The Colonial Times .....................................................................................85
3.2.3 The Darfur Genocide ...................................................................................88
3.3 Conflict Management efforts in the Darfur .........................................................94
3.4 The Current Situation in the Darfur Region .......................................................108
3.5 Summary ............................................................................................................110

Chapter Four ..............................................................................................................112
Conflict and Conflict management a Comparative Analysis of Rwanda and Darfur Genocides .................................................................112
4.1 Introduction .........................................................................................................112
4.2 Comparison of Rwanda and Darfur Genocides ..................................................113
4.2.1 The Dynamics of conflict in Rwanda and Darfur .........................................113
4.2.2 The Dynamics of conflict management in Rwanda and Darfur .................117
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

‘G’          Genocide
APROSOMA     Association pour la Promotion Social des Masses
ASEAN        Association of South-East Asian Nations
AU           African Union
BBTG         Broad-based Transitional Government
CAR          Central African Republic
CCR          Centre for Conflict Research
CDCC         Cooperation Committee
CDR          Coalition for the Defence of the Republic
CIS          Commonwealth of Independent States
CPMR         Conflict Prevention, Management and Reduction
DPA          Darfur Peace Agreement
DRC          Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC          East African Community
ECOWAS       Economic Community of West African States
FAR          Rwandan Armed Forces
FDLR         Democratic Forces for Liberation of Rwanda
FES          Friedrich Ebert Stifling
ICC          International Criminal Court
ICTR         International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
IDPs         Internally Displaced Persons
IGADD        Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development
JEM          Justice and Equality Movement
JPMC         Joint Political Military Committee
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MCPRC</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MJE</td>
<td>Movement for Justice and Equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRD</td>
<td>Mouvement Révolutionnaire Développement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRND</td>
<td>Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRF</td>
<td>National Redemption Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARMAHETU</td>
<td>Parti du Mouvement de l’Emanicpation Hutu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADER</td>
<td>La Rassemblement Democratique Rwandais</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTML</td>
<td>Radio Télé vision des Mille Collines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>South African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Coordination Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>Sudan Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAPEM</td>
<td>South African Political and Economic Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLA</td>
<td>Sudan Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLM/A</td>
<td>Sudan Liberation Movement/Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV</td>
<td>Television</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UHCG</td>
<td>Convention on Prevention &amp; Punishment of the Crime of Genocide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>United Nations-African Union mission</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
US       United States
WFP      World Food Programme
ABSTRACT

The state of peace and security on the African continent remains a preoccupying phenomenon, with successes and continuing challenges. Conflict management and peace building are issues which have become very topical in debates and discussions on Africa for a very long time. Conflict management refers to the outcomes of a conflict situation that must satisfy the inherent needs of all. The conflict in Darfur being one of the most violent after the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, there is a need, therefore, to find a lasting solution to such conflict. This study aimed to examine on how to manage genocide in Africa, drawing lessons from Rwanda for Darfur. The study started by observing that following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the international community repeated the vow made after the Holocaust that it would "never again" allow genocide to occur. This study aims to apply Human needs theory (HNT) and the study hopes to provide new knowledge that will be beneficial to policy makers, scholars and conflict managers as well as contributes immensely to the main stream conflict prevention, management and resolution mechanisms and the scholarly literature available. The study used secondary data sources, which were collected through books, journal, articles and periodicals and internet. The collected data was then sorted and analysed using document analysis and thematic analysis techniques, based on the emerging issues under study. The Rwandan conflict has been defined in different ways. Analysed carefully, it was clear that the relationship of the Hutus and Tutsis were nowhere as strained before the European colonists arrived. The study noted that the problem of the definition of genocide automatically calls for a delay in action. As for similarities and differences, the analysis finds that both cases demonstrate a similar character of violence, but that in Rwanda the violence was more intense, more exterminatory, and more participatory than in Darfur. When it comes to the role of main actors in Darfur and in Rwanda, the study revealed a number of players, including, United Nations, African Union, Civil Society, Governments, Non-governmental organizations, private individuals and state actors. The study concluded that Darfur may not have been in conflict now, had the international community learnt lessons from Rwanda and put systems in place to prevent further conflicts after Rwanda - the past experience in Rwanda would have been the best teacher to inform the best way forward with regard to the current situation in Darfur. The study, therefore finds that genocide is an old crime against humanity that has been given a relatively new label. History is full of examples of one group of humans exterminating another group of humans. Thus the study highly recommends a reflection on the past experience, vigilance and active involvement of the international community in conflict management efforts that affect Africa today and the world at large. In order to transform post-conflict societies, Rwanda’s path can be instructive not only in Darfur, but even to other countries, still experiencing conflict situations or emerging from conflict.
MAP OF STUDY AREAS
MAP OF AFRICA

Source: Google (2015)
MAP OF RWANDA

Source: Google (2015)
MAP OF SUDAN (DARFUR-REGION)

Source: Google (2015)
Chapter One

Introduction to the Study

1.1 Background

The conflicts in Africa have cumulatively claimed million lives, even made many people refugees and displaced. The state of peace and security on the African continent remains a preoccupying phenomenon, with successes and continuing challenges. The March 2005 report of the Commission for Africa, squarely acknowledged that much more must be done to prevent conflict in Africa if development in the continent is to accelerate. In passing, the report called for practical means to implement ‘agreed criteria for humanitarian intervention and the use of force, drawing on the principles of the “Responsibility to Protect” human life.’

According to Mwagiru, conflict Management and peace building are issues which have become very topical in debates and discussions on Africa. This is not only because Africa has been characterized by many conflicts, but much more so due to the realization that the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socioeconomic and political development of the continent. The conflicts in Africa and especially the sub-Saharan Africa, have cumulatively claimed million lives, others made refugees and displaced.

Boutros-Ghali captured the sense of growing optimism among many statesmen in the early 1990s that the international community had entered a new era where combined action by its members could reduce conflicts and alleviate the suffering of those affected.

---

2 Mwagiru, Makumi, (2001), Conflict Management in Africa: Lessons Learnt and Future Strategies; Nairobi: Centre for Conflict Research (CCR) and Friedrich Ebert Stifling (FES).
by them.\(^3\) In spite of this, only two years after the Secretary-General wrote so confidently of new attitudes and possibilities over a million people were brutally killed in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and civil war as the international community stood by and watched.

According to the United Nation’s outreach programme, Africa continues to struggle for peace as conflict has affected many countries over the past three decades. The 21\(^{st}\) Century in particular, has witnessed greater challenges to peace, stability and development in all areas than ever before.\(^4\) The plight of the 1994 Genocide against Tutsi in Rwanda is engraved in most memories - over 800,000\(^5\) people were killed in the span of just a mere hundred days. This genocide is believed to be one of the worst genocides in the history of mankind and represents an egregious failure on the part of the international community.

Regardless of the pledge of "never again" made both after the Holocaust and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the international community has not done much to alleviate the atrocities that are being committed in Darfur for eleven years now. It should not matter whether the killing in Darfur is categorized as genocide, mass murder, extermination or ethnic cleansing, for the international community and particularly, the United Nations Security Council to take necessary action.\(^6\)

In addition, in 2000s, more than forty percent of the approximately fourteen million refugees and asylum seekers worldwide were in Africa - of the twenty one million internally displaced persons (IDPs) globally, ten million people live in Africa, of which, according to the United Nations (UN) estimates, 2.7 million Darfurians remain in internally displaced persons camps and over 4.7 million Darfurians rely on humanitarian

---


\(^5\) The UN (2004) estimate the number killed as 800,000. The Rwandan Government estimate is 1,071,000. RWANDA: No consensus on genocide death toll, Agence France-Presse.

\(^6\) The U.N. can utilize both non-forceful and forceful intervention under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter when a situation requires it to "maintain or restore international peace and security." U.N. Charter art. P 39.
aid. In view of this, resolving the Darfur conflict is important not only for the people of Darfur, but also the future of humanity and the stability of the entire region.7

Darfur may not have been in conflict now, had the international community put systems in place to prevent further violent conflicts after Rwanda - the past experience in Rwanda would have been the best teacher to inform the current situation on the best way to address conflicts of this nature and magnitude as well as tackling future calamities facing humanity. This, therefore, remains a major concern to the conflict affected societies, international community and other interest groups.

Phillips notes that the word “genocide” gets used a lot these days. Whenever a large number of people are killed, it is common for someone to suggest that the event qualifies as genocide and for someone else to dispute that classification.8 The recent violent conflict in Africa that has attracted classification as genocide includes - Rwanda and Darfur. According to Lemkin, there have been ongoing disputes among academics over how the genocide concept should once and for all, be defined and interpreted. While these disputes have been vigorous, at times, even acrimonious, they have led to substantial and significant misuse of the term. For some, genocide equates directly with war; for others, with language extinction; for yet others, with colonialist occupation; and for some, with population collapse caused through natural famine or disease.9

Lemkin further observes that, the end of the Cold War, Africa became a theatre of violent conflicts, from Rwanda to Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Sierra Leone, Burundi to Somalia and Guinea to Sudan, spreading all the way to Darfur. The indelible mark of the new wars is that they are linked to resources and identity -

particularly ethnic identity.\textsuperscript{10} There are many identity markers such as race, nationhood, kinship, class, religion, language, gender, age, geographic location, cultural preferences, and occupation - such as military function or herders and tillers - by and large ethnicity and resources are identified as the dominant axis about which conflicts have revolved.\textsuperscript{11}

After the horrible events of the Second World War, the international community, the United Nations (UN), accepted the Genocide Convention in 1948. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (\textbf{CPPCG}) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948 as General Assembly Resolution 260. The convention entered into force on 12 January 1951.\textsuperscript{12} The UN recognizes that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity. The Genocide Convention of 1948, the definition of genocide is stated under Article II of the convention;

\textit{In the present Convention - genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: Killing members of the group; Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.}\textsuperscript{13}

The Convention further states that; ‘the following acts shall be punishable: Genocide; Conspiracy to commit genocide; Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
Therefore the experience of the 1994 in Rwanda and the 2003 Darfur genocides reveals the weaknesses within international systems, and most notably that of the failure to learn from the past and in this case, to draw lessons from experience in Rwanda to prevent the present-day Darfur killings as well as future catastrophes.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Following the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the international community repeated the vow made after World War II that it would "never again" allow genocide to occur. Even so, some are starting to believe that, as Rwanda was the last genocide of the 20th century, Darfur is the first genocide of the 21st century. For the past eleven years, Darfur has endured systematic killings, rape, and genocide. Despite the rhetoric of avoiding genocide following Rwanda, the international community has stood on the sidelines while the stretched United Nations and African Union forces have been unable to stop the violence, protect the refugees, and stop the Darfur killings. Darfur now seemed well on its way to becoming "the next Rwanda". A question then emerges, whether Rwanda taught the world any lessons that might help prevent Darfur from following in its footsteps.

Rwanda and Darfur present two of the most recent examples where genocide has occurred while the international community is reluctant to act or doing very little to stop it. The two genocides therefore are a reminder of the historical facts regarding international community’s ineffectiveness despite the rhetoric of “never again” to genocide as mentioned earlier. Ever since the United Nations adopted the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of genocide in December 1948, it has consistently seemed to fail to stop genocide wherever it occurs. The question remains, why? Currently very few scholars have attempted to do a comparison of both genocides.

but there is still scant literature when it comes to borrowing lessons from Rwanda to avert the one in Darfur or even prevent future tragedies and yet the two cases appear very similar.

In light of this, this study seeks to call for the international community to consider drawing lessons from the 1994 genocide in Rwanda for managing the genocide in Darfur. The study proposed the use of human needs theory framework for the better management of the current Darfur situation and the post conflict phase.

1.3 Objective of the Study

The specific objectives of this study are as follows;

1.3.1 To examine the conflict management mechanisms in Rwanda and Darfur.
1.3.2 To examine the role of the international community in Darfur and Rwanda genocides.
1.3.3 To identify the lessons from the 1994 genocide in Rwanda for Darfur.

1.4 Literature Review

The sub-headings reviewed literature on the following themes: Conflicts, Conflict management, International response and lessons learnt in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and last but not least the Conflict in Darfur.

1.4.1 Conflict in Africa

During the four decades between the 1960s and the 1990s, there have been about 80 violent changes of governments in the 48 sub-Saharan African countries. During the same period, many of these countries experienced different types of civil strife, conflicts, and wars. At the beginning of the new millennium, there were 18 countries facing armed rebellion, 11 facing severe political crises, and 19 enjoying more or less various states of stable political condition. And some of the countries in the last two categories have only
recently moved from the first category.\textsuperscript{15} A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) representative paints the picture in these terms;

\textit{A snapshot of explosive conflict in today’s Africa presents a worrying picture: Of Eritrea and Ethiopia; of the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Sudan, the last with the longest-running civil war on the continent; of Sierra Leone with gruesome atrocities against civilians; of Somalia, Burundi, Guinea Bissau and Lesotho, the latter reeling from South Africa’s recent intervention” (Gordon-Summers 1999, 328).}\textsuperscript{16}

The methodology of bringing to the barest minimum, the number of violent conflict situations in Africa, is at the core of the challenges facing the African Union (AU). According to Egena the avalanche of violent crises in the African continent has made the region very volatile and depicts an environment where violent conflict has been institutionalized.\textsuperscript{17} The African Union, which is the successor body to the Organization of African Unity (OAU), was born in 2001.\textsuperscript{18} Prior to the birth of the AU, the OAU in its declarations acknowledged that the scourge of conflicts must be controlled, for socioeconomic progress to be made in Africa but failed to actualize such desirable control.

The OAU (now known as African Union) declaration, establishing a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Management, had admitted that: no single internal factor has contributed more to the present socioeconomic problems in the continent than the scourge of conflict in and among African countries. They have brought about death and human suffering, engendered hate and divided nations and families.

\textsuperscript{15} Abdalla Bujra, African Conflicts: Their Causes and Their Political and Social Environment (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia), P. 1
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid, p. 1
\textsuperscript{17} Agena, G. (2011): “The African Union (AU) and Mediation Efforts in the Crisis in Darfur Region of Sudan” Nigerian Journal of Social Sciences 7(2) 19-31
Conflicts have forced millions of African people into a drifting life as refugees and displaced persons, deprived of their means of livelihood, human dignity and hope. Conflicts have gobbled up scarce resources, and undermined the ability of African countries to address the many competing needs of Africans.\textsuperscript{19}

The existence of a conflict reflects the presence of antagonisms, which, by and large, originate from a difference of interests between two or among parties.\textsuperscript{20} In order for the conflict to escalate, the parties should not only have or pursue incompatible interests, but they should also more importantly become aware of that situation.\textsuperscript{21} There does no doubt the fact that, it is not easy to understand, analyse or manages or resolve a conflict before defining it, understanding its nature, causes and content. Based on this, a number of scholars have made attempts to offer the meaning of the conflict. The word conflict is derived from the Latin word “Confligere\textsuperscript{22}”, which means to “strike together”\textsuperscript{23}. Although conflict is endemic in society, it is not easy to define.\textsuperscript{24}

Originally it had a physical rather than moral connotation, though, the English word has both, in the physical sense of two or more different things moving to occupy the same space at the same time, and the logical inconsistency and the process of solution are identical.\textsuperscript{25} To take another definition of conflict, Michael Nicholson defines it as an activity which takes place when conscious beings (individuals or groups) wish to carry out mutually inconsistent acts concerning their wants, needs or obligations.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{20} Anastase Shyaka “The Rwandan Conflict: Origin, Development and Exit Strategies ”,(National University of Rwanda, Butare, Rwanda, 2004)), p. 5
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid, p 5
\textsuperscript{23} Quincy Wright, Problems of Stability and Progress in International Relations (University of California Press, 1954), p. 143
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid, p 15.
an escalation of a disagreement, which is its common prerequisite, and is characterized by
the existence of conflict behavior, in which the beings are actively trying to damage one
another.\textsuperscript{27} Rakhim lists some manifestations of conflict behaviour, starting with
disagreement, and followed by verbal abuse and interference.\textsuperscript{28}

According to Stanger, the conflict conception is too broad and leaves room for
over simplifying. For instance, competition is not conflict, because unlike in a conflict, in
a competition energies aim at the goal at stake without utilizing any ones' resources on the
other competitor and competitions do not often commence from truculence.\textsuperscript{29} According
to Burton, conflicts are concerned with issues that are not negotiable, issues that relate to
ontological human needs (human needs theory) that cannot be compromised.\textsuperscript{30} Boas and
Jennings, argues that, as the new wave of violent conflicts has ravaged African borders
and conventional peace processes have done little to contain them.

A cold war between Ethiopia and Eritrea has had a contagious effect in Somalia, where
Eritrea has supported the Jihadist group \textit{al Shabaab} in its fight against the
Ethiopian-backed government in Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{31} There are actually a lot of ways to define
conflict due to how it is used in many areas. Hence, to keep it simple for the layman,
conflict pertains to the opposing ideas and actions of different entities, thus resulting in an
antagonistic state.

Terrorist groups like the \textit{al Shabaab} have helped fuel terrorism, proliferation of
arms and terror attacks in Kenya, as recently witnessed in Nairobi at West Gate mall, in
which 67 innocent people lost their lives. Sudan and South Sudan have supported
insurgencies in each other’s backyards, and Sudanese \textit{Janjaweed} militias have fought in

\textsuperscript{27} Michael Nicholson, Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict, (Cambridge University
\textsuperscript{28} M. Afzlar Rahim, Managing Conflict in Organizations, (Transaction Publishers 2010), P. 17.
\textsuperscript{30} Dennis J. D. Sandle, Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application (Manchester
University Press, 1993), P. 55
\textsuperscript{31} Bøøs, M. and Jennings, K.M. (2014), \textit{War in the Great Lakes Region and Ugandan Conflict Zones:
Micro-Regionalisms and Meta-Narratives}, p.16.
eastern Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). Likewise, the Darfurian rebels have fought in eastern Chad and southern Sudan. Therefore, there is no doubting the fact that today conflict pervades many of the countries in Africa and the conflict is to some extent intertwined to geopolitical and cultural aspects.

According to, Ball and Peters, the diversity that gives rise to conflict need not have an objective base such as economic or racial differences. All differences are not sources of conflict at the public level because; the differences between tall men and short men do not give rise to political conflict. On his part, Halebsky has among other factors opined that racial, ethnic, linguistic, and other cultural traits are frequent sources of group differences and conflict. However, it appears as if self-interest is at the root of all conflicts. Thus, the self-interest games that manifest in Africa and indeed elsewhere as conflicts are beginning to dovetail into intractable issues. However, contrary to popular belief, Africa's civil wars are not due to its ethnic and religious diversity.

Using recently developed models of the overall incidence of civil wars in 161 countries between 1960 and 1999 shows that, the relatively high incidence of conflict in Africa is not due to the ethnolinguistic fragmentation of its countries, but rather to high levels of poverty, failed social contract, political institutions and economic dependence on natural resources and external factors. The nature of the African conflicts thus becomes attributable to what Kamrava sees as discontinuities and lack of coherence in the political culture of most Third World Countries.

However, Halebsky in his analysis, it would have been better to mention the root causes of poverty instead of discussing poverty factor in isolation. According to Munya,

---

32 Ibid.
Africa, research findings and conclusions, have shown that Africa has never experienced a lasting peace. Peace and stability proved elusive in pre-colonial and colonial Africa. The scourges of the slave trade, inter-tribal warfare and the imposition of colonialism did not allow it.\textsuperscript{37} Under such circumstances, parochial loyalties maintain supremacy over national ones, often to the extent that the central government is unable to gain widespread popular legitimacy.

Halebsky on his part argues that the best and fastest strategy to reduce the incidence of civil war in Africa and prevent future civil wars is to institute democratic reforms that effectively manage the challenges facing Africa's diverse societies.\textsuperscript{38} Halebsky continue to argue that, in order to promote inter-group cooperation in Africa, specially tailored political governance and economic management institutions are needed.

In the case of Rwanda, while there was an important ethnic dimension to the conflict and genocide, ethnicity per se was not the cause of the 1994 genocide. Rather, what was critical was the manipulation and abuse of ethnicity, as extremists sought to make ethnicity the sole lens through which people viewed the country’s problems and the sole determinant for finding possible solutions. Secondly, to over-focus on ethnicity is to neglect other important cleavages that contributed to the violence in Rwanda.\textsuperscript{39} Likewise, in Darfur, many conflict managers tend to view the causal factors using the same lens, too is quite misleading, when in fact, the culprit remains the manipulation and abuse of ethnicity and not ethnicity per se.

The causes of the conflict and genocide in Africa and particularly Rwanda and Darfur, are heavily debated, and one particular issue that has received considerable attention is the part that ethnicity played in these events in both Rwanda and Darfur. The

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid, p. 283.
conflict is perceived to be related to ethnic extremism in both areas. However, to describe the conflict as being solely or primarily about ethnicity is far too simplistic. During the pre-colonial era in Rwanda, the labels “Hutu” and “Tutsi” denoted social, rather than ethnic, and differences were entirely related to status, wealth and way of life.⁴⁰

Therefore, as alluded to, ethnicity may be exploited to achieve self-interest, but is not an end in itself. In fact, there other contributing factors like the colonial ideology of divide and rule which is directly related to genocide ideology. Others include bad governance, fight over scarce resources, marginalisation, a failure of the social contract, lack of basic human needs among others. The above mentioned failures, once not attended to, most of the time tend to lead to a situation, as described by many scholars, like Burton, Ball and Peters, Michael Nicholson of the incompatible nature of the views, needs, goals and interests.

However, incompatibility of interest should not be seen as a limitation per se; instead, the focus should shift to the underlying causes that sometimes lead to irreconcilable interests rather than reconcilable ones. Further to this, there have varying opinions on causes of African conflicts and indeed the causes are diverse, however, this study argues that, the role played by negative ethnicity (the ideology of negative ethnicity is a mindset that claims some ethnic communities are superior and deserve more resources, while others are inferior and deserve less), should be given much attention especially when discussing issues linked to Rwanda and Darfur.

1.4.2 Conflict- Generating Factors

Countries forming the African continent are very different by their history, culture and geography, by their internal policies and international relations. The sources of the conflicts which are devastating them reflect that diversity and complexity. Some are the

result of internal factors, others depend on the dynamics of a region, and others comprise even significant international dimensions. Some originate from historical processes implying collective identifying conflict-generating perceptions, others arise from cyclical factors linked to among other things the violation or the absence of satisfaction of ontological needs. However, and beyond all the underlying causes, the role of the rulers and the attitude of those aspiring to rule are constantly at the heart of political violence and conflicts.

In spite of their diversity, the sources of conflict in Rwanda and in Africa of the Great Lakes in general and of course Darfur- can be classified into three categories: colonial heritage, chronic bad governance and inadequate and conflict-generating political systems. This study reasons that, for quite some time, the diagnosis of African chronic illness focused on symptoms instead of the real causes which has steered recurring conflicts, therefore better understanding of the source of the problem will from now lead to the right approach to resolving African conflicts.

1.5 Conflicts Management in Africa

In the realm of peace and security in Africa, the 90s saw dramatic and profound changes all through the continent. With the end of the Cold War, some of the major pulls between East and West over African battleground were noticeably eased. South Africa and Namibia installed democratically elected governments. Relative peace and stability was established in Mozambique after three decades of confrontation between conflicting parties. Several dozens of African countries held democratic elections. Indisputably, all these are positive and important signs toward peace, stability and development.

However, while many parts of the world moved toward greater stability and

political and economic cooperation, Africa remained one of the cauldrons of instability. Political insecurity and violent conflicts became increasingly persistent realities of the development scene in Africa. Internal conflicts with deep historical roots flared in many countries on the continent. Ironically, while the international community paid less and less attention to African security affairs, the continent's institutional and organizational capacity to manage its pervasive conflicts was not developing at the same pace as conflict escalations. Against such a backdrop, peace and peacemaking in Africa emerges as one of the critical issues of great importance in global politics.44

One of the primary defining features of the post-Cold War era in Africa is the increase in the number, scope, and intensity of domestic conflicts that have spilled, or have the potential to spill over national borders into neighbouring states. According to Donald Rothchild, observed that almost half (16) of the 35 wars waged throughout the world, with battle deaths exceeding one thousand per year, have taken place in Africa.45 Beyond their direct toll of death, violent conflicts in Africa have periodically assumed horrendous proportions, spawning population displacements, refugees and migration. Some statistics are nothing short of staggering. By 1997, the world’s recognized refugee population continued to hover around the 13 million mark. Internally displaced persons were estimated at 17 million worldwide. However, the number of countries deemed to be in violent conflicts differs widely depending on whose definition one uses.46

As earlier pointed out, most of the contemporary violent conflicts in Africa underline the reality that the security threats to the state and the population are less external to the continent and less military than they are economic, environmental and social in nature. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the African continent has acquired a

dubious honour of being number one in hosting the largest number of armed conflicts and complex emergencies.

In his 1998 Report to the Security Council, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan lamented Africa's insecurity situation:

“Since 1970, more than 30 wars have been fought in Africa, the vast majority of them intrastate in origin. In 1996 alone, 14 out of 53 countries in Africa were afflicted by armed conflicts, accounting for more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide and resulting in more than 8 million displaced refugees, returnees and displaced persons. The consequences of these conflicts have seriously undermined Africa's efforts to ensure long-term stability, prosperity, and peace for its people preventing such wars are no longer a matter of defending states or protecting allies. It is a matter of defending humanity itself”. 47

This study, to rehash the causes of violent conflicts in Africa - suffice it to mention that the sources of continent's conflicts are complex and multifaceted, involving many actors and thus, making them impossible to reduce to a single cause or source: local, national, regional and international forces have combined to fuel almost every war on the continent. To explain why violent conflicts happen, most theories distinguish between structural causes of conflict (or "root causes" or "imbalance of opportunities"), accelerating, and triggering factors. Structural factors include political, economic and social patterns such as state repression, lack of political participation, poor governance performance, the distribution of wealth, the ethnic make-up of a society, and the history of inter-group relations. They increase a society's vulnerability to conflict. Accelerating or triggering factors often consists of political developments or events that bring underlying

tensions to the forefront and cause the situation to escalate.\textsuperscript{48}

According to Azar and Burton, can include new radical ideologies, repression of political groups, sharp economic shocks, changes in or collapse of central authority, new discriminatory policies, external intervention, and weapon.\textsuperscript{49} However, Scholars may disagree on the nature, sources, appropriate categorization, and most effective Management mechanism for the conflicts in Africa, such disagreement may in fact lead to eventual clarification of the critical issues by applying new thinking and a fresh approach to analyzing old problems and resolving new ones.\textsuperscript{50} However, in general Africa could be said to have witnessed four major types of conflicts, these include secessions, genocides, civil wars, regional conflicts, and internal crises.

In principle, some key priorities relating to reducing risks of war and conflict in Africa are easy to outline. Conflict prevention activities are required to reduce manifest tensions and/or prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict. Once violent conflict has started, conflict reduction activities become a priority; to prevent the escalation of violent conflict, reduce its intensity or geographical extent, and bring the conflict/war to an end. Thereafter, peace-building activities come to the fore - to address underlying causes of violent conflict and/or to enhance resilience against risks of resurgent violence. This includes conflict management activities to manage underlying disputes or divisions.\textsuperscript{51}

In practice, enormous international attention and resources have rightly been devoted to efforts in order to manage, resolve, reduce and end wars, and to promote post-conflict stability, reconstruction and peace-building in Africa but the outcome is still


wanting. Conflict prevention, management and reduction (CPMR) and conflict
turmoil in Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), and South Sudan, Libya and
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), just to highlight a few—remains a serious a
concern to the continent and the international community at large. The civil war in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been the deadliest of them all, long subject to
cross-border invasions by either neighbouring states in pursuit of armed groups or rebel
incursions from DRC to her neighbours, notably Rwanda and Uganda.\footnote{Ibid, p 4.}
These conflicts are not new, but they have never been more linked than they are today.

According to Boas and Jennings, conflict management refers to the outcomes of a
conflict situation that must satisfy the inherent needs of all.\footnote{Bøås, M. and Jennings, K.M. (2014), War in the Great Lakes Region and Ugandan Conflict Zones: Micro-Regionalisms and Meta-Narratives, p.16.} According to Saideman,
although conflicts are taken to be an inherent aspect of human relations whether at the
group, national or international levels, the prevalence of conflicts on the African continent
in contemporary times has assumed the dimension of a scourge, indeed so serious an
issue has the problem become, that it is arguably the greatest impediment to any

On his side, Regan argues that, intervenors by definition seek to affect the
duration of conflicts, which is in effect a conflict-management function. Indeed, while it
may be difficult to measure the interests of third parties, we can more easily assess the
motives of third party actors. If the purpose of the intervention is to manage a conflict –
that is, to affect the process of the conflict in such a way as to hasten its abatement and to
save lives – evaluating whether the intervention had a “life saving” function.56

It is a timely response to the needs of academics, conflict practitioners and policy makers and it stimulates the debate on the qualitative development of mechanisms and structures devoted to conflict prevention and management in Africa. At the same time, it is a reminder that the qualitative development of conflict Management structures and mechanisms is a continuous process. Lastly, by emphasizing conflict prevention – as opposed to the “reaction to conflict” approaches – it represents a significant shift in both conflict Management theory and practice relevant to addressing African conflicts.

Based on the opinions of different scholars, it emerges that, there is a deep understanding of conflict causes and diverse approaches in resolving them. However, the reality on the ground is different and much wanting. Possibly, the reasons behind the failure, lies with the approaches being employed. Failure to comprehend this has led to the wrong recommendation of the best course of action to take and persistent conflicts. In fact Africa has never fallen short of conflict Management mechanisms per se, the issue hinges on the above mentioned gap.

This study has observed that, conflict experts and policy makers when dealing with conflicts on the continent- in most times tend to look at solutions from one lens point of view- that is- the use of the western model (classic mainstream conflict Management mechanisms), and this has continuously hindered conflict Management efforts in Africa. In fact, there is need to revisit the current model of conflict Management to restructure it to match emerging security challenges based on practicalities, local understandings, best practices and lessons learnt, in order to achieve the desired effect.

1.5.1 Conflict Management in Rwanda

1.5.2.1 Pre genocide period

The Rwandan conflict has been defined in different ways. Those differences in the definition have generally been the result of how people have understood the Rwandan society and its components. Hutu, Tutsi and Twa communities have been given different definitions according to writers and periods.\(^{57}\) They have been qualified as being races, tribes, social status or social classes. As a matter of fact, in neighbouring countries such as Uganda and DRC, where there is an important Rwandophone community, all Rwandophone people have been considered as members of the same ethnic group, that of Banyarwanda (people of Rwanda).

The distinction between the Hutus and the Tutsis has only been made very recently, due to the discourse on divisionism and successive anti-Tutsi pogroms in the two Belgian ex-colonies, which became more radical after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The reverse phenomenon, "Hutufication", a kind of social deterioration, was also true for the Tutsis who could find themselves deprived of their herds. Those facts show clearly that, at that period, "Tutsiness" and "Hutuness" did not have, in the concerned persons’ mind;” a genetic dimension" contrarily to clan belongingness for instance.\(^{58}\)

This situation has had an impact on the “cultural reservoirs” of social cohesion and of conflict Management in such a way that, in the face of the development of the factors of division and conflicts, the Rwandan people have not been capable of “becoming immune” against contamination and of producing “antibiotics” to fight the

---


\(^{58}\) Anastase Shyaka (2004), "The Rwandan Conflict: Origin, Development and Exit Strategies ".(National University of Rwanda, Butare, Rwanda), p.2
disease imposed on them by those factors. Therefore, the conflict which has been devastating Rwanda for several decades is an identity-based conflict which led to the 1959 - massive influx of Tutsis to neighbouring states, killings and subsequent genocide in 1994.

1.5.2.2 International response in Rwanda

Once the civil war broke out in 1990, increasingly there were warnings, supported by evidence that large-scale civilian massacres were imminent. Nevertheless, virtually no-one anticipated genocide on the scale that took place. Preparations to deal with the contingency of massive violence that targeted civilians were inadequate.\textsuperscript{59}

Failure of the international community to deal with the festering refugee problem prior to 1990, this also sets the stage for future conflict. The build-up of tension leading to the 1990 invasion by the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) was never given considerable attention despite repeated calls by Rwandese refugees in various countries.\textsuperscript{60} The civil war triggered intense and effective conflict Management efforts through diplomatic process that eventually secured a peace agreement.\textsuperscript{61}

The process was initiated and led by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the regional states, particularly Tanzania, and received considerable international attention and support. The United Nations assumed formal responsibility for overseeing the implementation of the consequent Arusha Accords, but failed to make adequate use of the OAU and local African states in this regard. As a consequence, there was a disjuncture between the mediation and implementation phase, which contributed to


\textsuperscript{60} Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide International panel of eminent personalities: The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events was created by the Organization of African Unity. As the genocide was unprecedented in African annals, so is the Panel. p.36.

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid, p. 8
undermining the Accords.\textsuperscript{62}

\textbf{1.5.2.3 The Genocide period}

On April 6\textsuperscript{th}, 1994, President Habyarimana was killed when his plane was shot.\textsuperscript{63} Within hours of Habyarimana’s death the genocide began; the presidential guard, the Interahamwe, and other Hutu militiamen began setting up roadblocks and murdering Tutsis. Extremist radios, like Radio Mille Collines, announced that the RPF and UNAMIR were responsible for the murder of Habyarimana and encouraged Hutus to kill Tutsis. The death of Habyarimana served as catalyst to the well-planned genocide that had just begun.\textsuperscript{64}

As in the case of atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia around the same time, the international community largely remained on the sidelines during the Rwandan genocide. A United Nations Security Council vote on April 1994 led to the withdrawal of most of a UN peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) and this created a huge gap which came to be exploited later. In the Rwandan case, powerful international actors chose not to use the word “genocide.” US State Department spokespeople were told that they could only refer to “acts of genocide.” That directive led to the now infamous exchange in which spokeswoman Christine Shelly was pressed on whether genocide was happening in Rwanda but would only acknowledge “acts of genocide.” How many “acts of genocide” does it take to make genocide? She was asked. Shelly would not answer.\textsuperscript{65}

As reports of the genocide spread, the Security Council voted in mid-May to deploy a more robust force, including more than 5,000 troops. By the time the force


arrived in full, however, the genocide had been stopped in Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) for months. In a separate occurrence, French intervention approved by the United Nations, French troops entered Rwanda from Zaire (DRC) in late June. In the face of the RPF’s rapid advance, they limited their intervention to a “humanitarian zone” set up in southwestern Rwanda, saving some Tutsi lives, but also helping some of the genocide’s plotters–allies of the French during the Habyarimana administration to escape.66

Despite the UN good intentions of maintaining international peace and security, however, for the case of Rwanda - it was the opposite. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda exposed glaring weaknesses in the capacity of international and multilateral institutions to prevent or respond to such violence, while raising troubling questions about international willingness to do so.67 Most important to note is that, during the period of Arusha negotiations between Rwanda government and the RPF, this study observes that, although Regional/Sub regional and international actors were busy trying to look for an immediate solution to the Rwandan problem, never paid attention to lessons learnt from previous violent conflicts for Rwandan problem, hence negotiations led to a flawed outcome. Likewise, in Darfur- a relationship definitely exists, between the two case studies; Darfur like Rwanda, the aspect of borrowing lessons from Rwanda for Darfur seems far from reality.

In prospect of this, if Africa is to make headway towards managing internal problems, there is a need to identify the existing gaps and be addressed appropriately. The continued mismatch between the approaches/or mechanisms employed in managing and resolving conflicts in Africa and the conflict systems remains a major obstacle to conflict management.

67 United States Institute of Peace: Conflict analysis, (Education and Training Center, 2008) p. 3 http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/academy/OnlineCourses/Conflict_Analysis_1-30-08.pdf
This, therefore, calls for a re-look on our past to inform the future. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda can offer insights on how to deal with the Darfur crisis. Secondly, suffice to mention that, once human needs don’t be given due attention, the conflict becomes inevitable. Rwanda like Darfur, the issues with regard to identity need to be addressed to achieve lasting peace in Darfur.

Twenty one years down the road, there are key lessons that international community ought to have learned from the sad experience of Rwanda to inform future strategies in preventing and managing violent conflicts and the occurrence of other future genocides in Africa and globally. It is natural for scholars, practitioners and policy makers to contemplate the relevance of this endeavour. The analysis of lessons learnt, the role of the regional/sub regional and traditional methods of conflict Management is not a new phenomenon, the existing literature on these institutions and processes is inward-looking, presenting them as if they existed in a political and structural vacuum.

1.5.2.4 Post 1994 genocide period in Rwanda

Pronk states that although Rwanda experienced one of the most violent conflicts of the 20th century, the country has achieved a lot of success in reconciliation, reconstruction and development since the genocide ended. This was the result of a combination of leadership, national ownership, and innovative approaches to governance and employment generation with the support of the development partners. The post genocide period, as part of efforts to reconstruct the country and nurture a shared national identity, the country embraced two prolonged approaches in an effort to achieve her dreams following the aftermath of genocide.

Firstly, drew on aspects of Rwandan culture and traditional practices to enrich and

---


adapt its development programmes to the country’s needs and context. The result is a set of Home Grown Solutions - culturally owned practices translated into sustainable development programs.  

Secondly, the framework of a regional approach, in this respect, much effort has been put into the promotion of regional integration as a mechanism for conflict prevention and social economic development. The home grown solutions are clustered into nine specific homgrown policies. Gacaca (Community justice) jurisdictions have been pivotal to the justice, reconstruction, reconciliation and restoration of accountability in post-genocide Rwanda. Abunzi (Mediation Committees) also re-emerged as a tool of informal settlements of disputes and smaller criminal offences and have become formalized in the jurisdiction.

Ubudehe (Credit Scheme) represents the group of home grown solutions to stir pro-poor economic development and aims at poverty eradication through community action and should stimulate pro-poor economic growth and decisively contribute to poverty reduction. Girinka (One cow per poor Family) is an extensive programme for rooting out extreme symptoms of poverty, such as malnutrition or absence of dairy products through the distribution of cows to the poorest segments of the society. Umuganda (Community Works) has been re-deemed as the ultimate state-building projects through community engagement in small projects, which would benefit the whole community or individuals in need. 

---

70 Rwanda, Past, Present, Future, Rwandapedia breaks new ground by collecting in one place the documents, images, videos and audio recordings that together tell the story of Rwanda's development. Funded by the African Development Bank, the project showcases advances across the social, economic and governance sectors as well as key cultural and historical events in Rwanda. http://rwandapedia.rw/archive?field_abunzi_document_type_tid=186&page=22. Retrieved 18 April 2015.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid.
Imihigo (Performance contracts) has been established as a tool for management of public affairs implying competition and the self-commitment of an individual or a group of people, which is scrutinized by the public. Itorero (National Academy) is a loose concept set to educate all Rwandans at all levels of the society towards patriotism and self-esteem. Promoting of cultural values and positive traditions for sustainable development are guiding principles of the leadership in today’s Rwanda. Umushyikirano (National Dialogue) brings annually all segments of the society for a broad dialogue platform that would be used to discuss various national issues in order to assess the country’s development progress and plan for the future.\(^\text{73}\)

Lastly, Umwiherero (National Leadership Retreat) brings together leaders from the central to local government, to reflect on the achievements and challenges anticipated to have taken place over the past year as well as priorities for the year to come. Based on this, the study argues that, appreciating best practices is not a failure at all but a positive mind. Therefore, there is a lot outside there, which can help in unlocking some dilemmas facing Africa.\(^\text{74}\)

In view of this, there is needed to make a wise decision on the best approach with respect to the Darfur nightmare.

1.6 \textbf{Conflict and Conflict Management in Darfur}

The region of Darfur is roughly the size of France. The people of Darfur are predominantly Muslim. There are large populations of both Arabs and Africans. Tensions over land and grazing rights between Arabs, most of whom are nomadic herders, and

\(^{73}\) The documentation of Home Grown Initiatives/Solutions (HGI/S) and Best Practices (BP) is an activity recommended by the Cabinet Meeting of the government of Rwanda held on 4th November 2011. The concerned policies that constitute the area of research on the documentation of HGI/S in the first phase are: Abunzi, Gacaca, Girinka, Imihigo, Ingando, Itorero, Ubudehe, Unuganda, Umushyikirano (National Dialogue) and Umwiherero (National Leadership Retreat). http://www.rgb.rw/departments/governance-research-and-monitoring/home-grown-initiatives/. Retrieved 19 April 2015.

\(^{74}\) National Leadership Retreat is organised by the Office of the President together with the Office of the Prime Minister. The President is the chair. Over 250 leaders, from central and local government, heads of parastatals and civil society attend. All sectors are discussed; ranging from economy, politics, justice, infrastructure, health, to education and others. Retrieved 19 April 2015.
Africans, who are mainly farmers, have existed for most of the region’s history. More recently, the African population has been frustrated by what it claims is the central government lack of support during has prolonged droughts and near-famine conditions. Many believe the government favours Darfur’s Arab population.75

Opposition groups also state that the African populations of Darfur have long been marginalized by the government. They observe that Darfur was left out of the peace negotiations with southern Sudan in which issues such as representation within the government were discussed. The Sudanese government, on the other hand, claims that the conflict in Darfur is rooted in competition for land among various ethnic groups in the region.

Since the initial rebellion in 2003, violence between rebel forces and government militia and the Janjaweed has spread across the region. The government militia and the Janjaweed have targeted civilians and villages that it claims are harbouring rebel forces. Aerial bombing has destroyed numerous villages. Although the government denies its involvement in the bombings, it is the only force in Sudan that owns helicopters and planes.

At the same time, the Janjaweed as looted and burned villages and crops, and poisoned water supplies. Tens of thousands of civilians have been killed by various groups in the conflict and many more have been raped.76 Opposition groups have forced many young boys within refugee camps to join their forces. Fighting among rebel factions occurs both within the camps and outside of them. Other groups, capitalizing on the instability, rob supply convoys and international aid efforts.

The conflict in Darfur is in its eleventh year and has and is believed to have caused over 200,000 deaths and led to 2.5 million people being displaced, according to

the United Nations. The roots causes of the crisis lie in natural resources, ethnic conflicts, political and economic marginalization and ecological factors.77

The lack of infrastructure, investment in physical and human resources, absence of basic human services and rare employment opportunities for the vast majority of people in the region are all at the core of the conflict. The crisis developed from long-standing tensions between nomadic Arab herders and their African farming neighbours. Nomad, semi-nomadic groups and farmers have long co-existed in social and economic interdependence.78

When disputes arose over the scarce grazing land and water, localized armed conflict was usually settled by traditional means.79 Conflicts initially occurred between the Fur cultivators and nomads, moving south in search of pastures. The tensions in Darfur were exacerbated by the lack of resources, basic needs in the region and civil strife putting communities against each other in competition for water and land. Ecological devastation and its consequences for the population is one of the root causes of the current situation besides the ethnic factor and the political situation.

The region has three distinct ecological zones: Camel nomads roam the northern zone of Darfur, which is part of the Sahara. The both farmers and nomads- moving south in search of water and pastures have been commonplace periodically flaring into bitter fighting between the two groups during the dry season over water and the Arabs driving their herds on the farmers land.80

In 2004, the United States declared the on-going conflict in Darfur to be ‘genocide.’ In this conflict, the specter of genocide was raised amidst findings that Khartoum's strategy in combating the insurgency was essentially to depopulate the

79 Ibid, p. 29.
countryside of "sympathetic" Darfurian civilians, mostly from the members of the Fur, Massaleit, and Zaghawa tribes.

By arming and providing air support to Arab militias called Janjaweed, who would attack villages, kill, rape, and forcibly displace at will.\(^81\)

1.6.1 International Responses

Darfur like Rwanda had to endure for quite some time before the intervention by international community arrived. Darfur also fell victim of a “negative” case in that a concrete policy to stop the killing never took shape in this particular episode. International attention to the Darfur conflict largely began with reports by the advocacy organizations Amnesty International in July 2003 and the International Crisis Group in December 2003.

However, widespread media coverage did not start until the outgoing United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan, Mukesh Kapila, called Darfur the "world's greatest humanitarian pupita in March 2004.\(^82\)

Analysing this case it offers some insight into why or why not. After Rwanda, analysts and activists gleaned certain lessons about how to generate an effective international response to genocide although it fell into unresponsive ears. However, these lessons, once considered in turn, can make a difference to Darfur. In addition, the strategies that emerged around Darfur have not yet been successful in leading to a policy to halt the violence.

In April 2004, African Union (AU) led international political efforts to manage the conflict saw the signing of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement in N’Djamena on 8


\(^{82}\) Prunier, pp. 124-148.
April 2004 by the Government of the Sudan, Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). It was not until early July 2004, when UNSC resolution 1564 was passed that, both the African Union and European Union sent monitors to monitor the implementation of the Humanitarian cease-fire agreement signed in Ndjamena, Chad April 2004. This was the basis of origin of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS).

However, it was not able to effectively contain the violence in Darfur, and as a result a more sizable, better equipped UN peacekeeping force was proposed for deployment. On December 31, 2007, a Hybrid United Nations-African Union mission (UNAMID) force close to 20,000 troops was authorized to use force to protect civilians. However, despite this mandate, too few were sent and they lacked the necessary equipment to carry out their mission.

In 2008, the president of Sudan, Omar Bashir was faced with an indictment from the International Criminal Court (ICC) for genocide and crimes against humanity and, in 2010; a warrant for arrest on charges of genocide was issued. The government forcefully expelled aid agencies. This has also seen continuous threats to expel peacekeepers from Darfur, further endangering the conditions for thousands of displaced and marginalized civilians.

Besides this, the role of external actors has also appended a fresh dimension to the complexity of the situation. This has been seen through endeavours by China and Russia, both permanent members of the Security Council to appease the Sudanese government in blocking numerous United Nations Managements in council meetings. China is Sudan’s

---

86 Ibid.
chief diplomatic ally and invests heavily in Sudanese oil. Sudan’s military is supplied by Chinese-made tanks, fighter planes, bombers, rocket launch propelled grenades, and machine guns. According to Amnesty International report, 8 February 2012, Arms sales from China and Russia are fuelling serious human rights violations in Darfur. These arms transfers highlight the urgent need to strengthen the existing ineffectual UN arms embargo and for governments to agree an effective Arms Trade Treaty. The United Nations report indicates that, more than 2.7 million people are internally displaced and more than 350,000 are refugees in neighbouring Chad. More than 400,000 have been killed; approximately 5,000 people die each month. The Sudanese government denies any culpability for the violence, displacement, and deaths.

Grounded on this, events are repeating themselves, by allowing Darfur, as another Rwanda, due to failure to act and also treating the symptoms and ignoring the causal agent. It was not until the genocide started that, some circles within the international community knew the truth about stopped genocide. However, the question of whether the Genocide Convention places a duty upon states to intervene militarily to stop the killings is still elusive and largely unanswered.

This study underlines the relevance of the lessons learnt as well as attention to human needs as a way forward in the prevention and management of genocides in Africa. Besides, the Darfur conflict has attracted a wide range of analysis as to whether the atrocities amount to genocide or not. While states are very reluctant to use the ‘G’ word (Genocide) due to its implied obligation on the international community to act, the United

---

States of America was bold enough to state that the atrocities amounted to genocide.  

In addition, genocide is considered the ultimate crime against humanity; this is mainly because the crime of genocide has the capability of destroying all or part of the targeted or protected group, unlike in crimes against humanity where the perpetrator need not have such intention. The underlying genocidal offences must have the potential, even if remote, to contribute to the complete or partial destruction of the victims’ group. Unlike crimes against humanity, the crime of genocide need not be widespread or a systematic attack against a civilian population. While crimes against humanity can be committed against any individual, genocide can only be committed against individuals who belong to the protected groups categorised by their nationality, ethnic, racial, or religious identity. In the case of Darfur for instance, the group can be identified by their belonging to the same ethnic and racial group of black Africans. 

In order to sustain a conviction for genocide, it must be proved that the underlying acts were directed with the intention of destroying, in whole or in part, one of the protected groups. With the evidence available, it could be argued that the acts of the government of Sudan and its Janjaweed militia were directed at the destruction of the black African group in Darfur, although the destruction so far achieved has been limited. It is therefore a matter of conjecture what the level of destruction would have been if the international community did not raise the alarm over the atrocities in Darfur. 

However, if we were to infer from the continued attack on the group by the

---

91 Ibid, p. 40
government and its allied Janjaweed \(^97\) militia, it would become obvious that the government wants to wholly destroy the group. Ali Nafi Ali, a presidential assistant to President Omar Hassan al Bashir.\(^98\)

The determination and eventual declaration that acts of genocide have occurred in such a situation is a process of both legal and political decision-making. Meanwhile, while this process of labelling or branding is going on, thousands of lives continue to be lost. It is apposite to mention that while the United States and the world were debating as to the correct labelling of the Darfur situation in 2004, thousands of Darfurians were being killed or forcefully removed from their homes by the Government of Sudan backed Janjaweed militia.

Further to that, this begs the question as to what the differences between Rwanda and Darfur account for the Bush administration’s use of the rhetoric of genocide without an expectation of intervention in Darfur, as contrasted to the Clinton administration's conscious avoidance of such language so as not to impose upon itself this unwanted obligation in Rwanda.\(^99\)

1.7 The role of the Government in perpetrating Genocide, the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda

Rwanda and Sudan present two of the most recent examples of governments responsible for perpetrating genocide.\(^100\) The extremist ethnic Hutu government planned and executed the 1994 Rwanda genocide against the Tutsi ethnic minority culminating in

---

\(^97\) The Janjaweed, formed from the Arabic words for "man", "gun" and "horse"; also transliterated Janjaweed are a militia that operate in Darfur, western Sudan, and eastern Chad. Using the United Nations definition, the Janjaweed comprised Sudanese Arab tribes, the core of whom are from the Gyhayna (camel herder) background with significant Lambo recruitment from the Baggara (cattle herder) people. In the past, they were at odds with Darfur's sedentary population over natural grazing grounds and farmland, as rainfall dwindled and water became scarce.\(^98\) Ibid.\(^99\) Eric A. Heinze, The Rhetoric of Genocide in U.S. Foreign Policy: Rwanda and Darfur Compared, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 122, No. 3 (Fall, 2007), pp. 359-383.\(^100\) Scott Straus, Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal Volume 1 | 2006 Issue 1 | Article 8, p. 44
the death of close to one million people in just one hundred days. Similarly, the predominantly Arab Sudanese government conducted acts of genocide against African communities of the Darfur region in western Sudan since 2003 in which hundreds of thousands lost their lives and millions were internally displaced.  

The two tragic events are a reminder of the historical trend of state-sponsored genocides around the world such as the genocide of the Holocaust of Jews by the Nazi government in the 1930s and 40s, and, the Cambodia genocide by the Khmer Rouge government in the 1970s. This study critically analyses the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, with a view to draw lessons from Rwanda for Darfur. It also explores the failure of the international community to stop genocide in both countries and recommends a practical approach to prevent and/or stop genocide in the future.

1.8 Lessons Learnt in Conflict Management and Genocide

As the World remembers Rwanda, and recommits to prevent and to protect the victims of mass atrocities in our time. Indeed, while urgent protective action is needed now in Darfur and other conflict affected areas, civilian appeals for help fall on the deaf ears of the international community as a bystander. The World must break this cycle if we are truly to learn the requisite lesson. Within a period of three months in 1994, over one million were killed as a result of genocide against the Tutsi and moderate Hutus in Rwanda. Large numbers were physically and psychologically afflicted for life through maiming, rape and other traumas; over two million fled to neighbouring countries and may be half as many became internally displaced within Rwanda. This human suffering was and is incomprehensible. The agony and legacy of the violence created continuing suffering, economic loss and tension within the Great Lakes Region.

This growth reflects the worldwide proliferation in recent years of so–called

complex emergencies. These tend to have multiple causes, but are essentially political in nature and entail violent conflict. They typically include a breakdown of legitimate institutions and governance, widespread suffering and massive population displacements, and they often involve and require a range of responses from the international community, including intense diplomacy and conflict management efforts, UN policing actions, and the provision of multilateral and bilateral humanitarian assistance from official and private agencies.

A complex emergency tends to be very dynamic, characterized by rapid changes that are difficult to predict. Thus, complex issues are raised regarding the timing, nature and scale of response.\textsuperscript{102} The Rwanda complex emergency shares all these characteristics and more.\textsuperscript{103}

On the same note, citing the example of the post genocide Rwanda, as part of efforts to reconstruct the country and nurture a shared national identity, the Government of Rwanda drew on aspects of Rwandan culture and traditional practices to enrich and adapt its development programs to the country’s needs and context. The result is a set of Home Grown Solutions - culturally owned practices translated into sustainable development programs which might be a good lesson that can be borrowed by conflict managers and policy makers.

1.9 Justification of the Study

The ongoing crisis in Sudan provides an extremely topical basis for an assessment of what has, and has not, changed since the 1994 genocide in Rwanda regarding the

\textsuperscript{102} IOCHA Orientation Handbook on Complex Emergencies, (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 1999), P. 6.

international community’s response to massive human rights abuses.\textsuperscript{104} The point is that, never was genocide unknown to the international community, but national interest outweigh the responsibility to protect, it appears that the public acknowledgement of genocide continues to be avoided by member states for as long as possible because of the obligation to intervene that it then places on UN member states.\textsuperscript{105} Unfortunately, modern logic seems to that if national interests are not at stake, the intervention may not be considered necessary. This exactly justifies why the international community spent a lot of time debating on the intervention and whether Atrocities in Rwanda amounted to genocide.\textsuperscript{106} All this can be attributed to the missing link between the past, the present and the future.

It is, therefore, necessary to re-evaluate the historically recorded events to guide the future strategies in the field of conflict management. Therefore, this study sought it wise to consider suggesting the use of lessons learned from Rwanda for managing genocide in Darfur. Last but not the least, is the fact that, presently no attempts have been made in the academic circles to consider using lessons from Rwanda for Darfur, this clearly exposes the gaps which must be bridged.

Furthermore, after observing the existing gaps in terms of contemporary approaches or mechanisms employed in the prevention and management of conflicts in Africa and globally, as well as having appreciated the fact that, there are now sufficient data suggesting that genocides can be avoided, the study strongly suggests the attention to lessons learnt from Rwanda for Darfur and to the future recurrence of genocide in Africa. Therefore, this study will provide new knowledge, and information in the context of


global best practices- to address current and future genocides, and other related violent conflicts globally. This new knowledge will be beneficial to policy makers, scholars and conflict managers as well as contribute immensely to the main stream conflict Management mechanisms and the scholarly literature available.

1.10 Theoretical Framework

1.10.1 Human Needs Theory (HNT)

In order to live and attain well-being, humans need certain essentials. These are called human needs or basic human needs. Human needs theorists argue that conflicts and violent conflicts are caused by unmet human needs. Violence occurs when certain individuals or groups do not see any other way to meet their needs, or when they need understanding, respect and consideration for their needs. Rosenberg states that violence is a tragic expression of unmet human needs, implying that all actions undertaken by human beings attempts to satisfy their needs. If we are able to connect with our needs and those of others, we will therefore be able to look at other ways of meeting such needs, avoiding violence and destruction.107

Violence is not human nature. This was the clear conclusion of the meeting of scientists in Seville in 1986.108 The Seville Manifest convincingly argued that violence was not genetic, and was simply a social construct, an invention. Unfortunately, it has not been given much attention.109 One theory which looks at the roots of conflict, is Human Needs Theory (HNT). Often ignored and neglected by peace researchers, HNT may offer valuable insights into the sources of conflict, and thus possible resolutions. In view of this, this study sought prudent to suggest considering using the HNT to resolve the violent

conflict in Darfur. Based on the prevailing situation in the area, it clearly demonstrates that the current mainstream approaches have been unable to manage the situation.

This theory has been a cornerstone for conflict resolution scholarship (CRS) as it was conceived by John Burton and other pioneers of the field. Intuitively, HNT makes sense. There are fundamental needs that all human beings have that, if violated may cause conflict. Indeed, only those conflicts that are due to the violation of such needs can truly be deep-rooted. There are various individuals who have applied human needs theory, like, the proposals of Abraham Maslow (hierarchy of needs), John Burton, Marshall Rosenberg and Manfred Max-Neef will briefly be explored.\textsuperscript{110}

In his Pyramid of Human Needs, Abraham Maslow puts emphasis on the hierarchy of needs, stating that some are more urgent than others. On the base of the pyramid he places, food, water, and shelter. On a second level, he places the need for safety and security, followed by belonging or love. The need for self-esteem is found on a fourth level, and finally on a fifth and final level, personal, fulfilment.\textsuperscript{111}

John Burton has been applying human needs theory more actively to current social and political conflicts. In his work on protracted, social conflicts, he looks at how universal human needs often are neglected, leading groups to use violence to claim their rights and satisfying their needs. In what is really a compatibility of human needs, Burton argues that education and culture make parties manipulate the issues and dehumanising the other parties.

In Marshall Rosenberg’s approach, human needs are universal and meeting them is essential to human survival and well-being. Rosenberg groups the needs in sub-groups, and is open to the existence of needs beyond what he has defined. He states that our education and culture often alienate us from connecting with our real needs, and through

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid, p. 3  
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid, p. 3
Nonviolent Communication, he proposes a model for connecting with our own and others’ needs, an approach he applies at all levels of society and which he has used in mediation in several countries.

The Chilean economist Manfred Max-Neef also proposes nine universal human needs, through which he argues that we can achieve human development and peaceful societies. Max Neef defines his main proposal, Human Scale Development, as "focused and based on the satisfaction of fundamental human needs, on the generation of growing levels of self-reliance, and on the construction of organic articulations of people with nature and technology, of global processes with local activity, of the personal with the social, of planning with autonomy, and of civil society with the state."\(^ \text{112} \)

Like Burton and Rosenberg, Max-Neef agrees that no need is superior to others, and that they are all complementary and essential to human life. Thus, Human Needs Theory offers insights into a range of peace building processes that are involved in “the reduction of both direct and structural violence.”\(^ \text{113} \)

Usefulness of Human Needs Theory, Much can be said to the usefulness of HNT in working with violent conflict. Firstly, it has wide applicability. While some see it merely as a tool to be applied in the prevention or post conflict peacebuilding, practitioners like Marshall Rosenberg also use HNT in mediations of violent conflicts. It has also been useful in reconciliation efforts, and Nonviolent Communication (NVC) is being used currently in restorative justice structures in countries like Rwanda and the. Equally, it can be applied at all levels of society, for intra- and interpersonal conflict, inter-group conflict and in an international setting. Secondly, it focuses on the source of conflict, looking at how best the parties can have their needs met, and those of others.

\(^ \text{112} \) Gert Danielsen  Becario Rotary Pró-Paz, Meeting Human Needs, Preventing Violence: Applying Human Needs Theory to the Conflict in Sri Lanka, (Universidad del Salvador Buenos Aires, 2005), P.3
\(^ \text{113} \) Ibid.p. 3
Finding strategies to meet underlying needs, we may be able to reduce the use of expensive peacekeeping, peace enforcement and creating of buffer zones. Thirdly, HNT emphasises common humanity. In a world context where differences are accentuated, HNT attempts to unify human beings from different regions and cultures, creating a common understanding of who we are and how others need and feel the same way we do. Susan Marker also notes a fourth advantage, in that HNT points out that human needs are non-negotiable.114

HNT is, in sum, widely applicable, may provide sustainable solutions as it focuses on the source of the conflict, it promotes understanding from a base of our common humanity and it highlights the distinction between negotiable and non-negotiable issues in a conflict. It is based on the hypothesis that humans have basic needs that have to be met in order to maintain stable societies. As John Burton describes;

*It is believed that the human participants in conflict situations are compulsively struggling in their respective institutional environments at all social levels to satisfy primordial and universal needs - needs such as security, identity, recognition, and development. They strive increasingly to gain the control of their environment that is necessary to ensure the satisfaction of these needs. This struggle cannot be curbed; it is primordial.*115

Human Needs Theory is the most significant contribution of the past ten years to the emerging study of basic human needs. Especially when it comes to conflict - Human Needs Theory makes a case for the idea that deep-rooted social conflict springs from unsatisfied basic needs, and that the task of conflict resolution is to develop new methods of understanding and satisfying them.

---

114 In Marker, Susan, op. cit
This struggle for primordial needs is theoretically related to the Frustration-Aggression theory which is based on the stimulus-response hypothesis. The frustration of not satisfying these needs leads to aggression and subsequent conflict. What distinguishes Human Needs theory from the Frustration-Aggression theory is that the former is concerned only with absolute requirements (needs) while the latter is also concerned with wants and desires. Burton further states:

*Now we know that there are fundamental universal values or human needs that must be met if societies are to be stable. That this is so thereby provides a non-ideological basis for the establishment of institutions and policies. Unless identity needs are met in multi-ethnic societies, unless in every social system there is distributive justice, a sense of control and prospects for the pursuit of all other human societal developmental needs, instability and conflict are inevitable.*

In view of this, the conflict in Darfur is a as a result of the failure by the Khartoum government to address grievances of Darfurians. The economic, social, and political marginalization of Darfur, together with the political manipulation of racial, ethnic, and tribal roots, led Darfurians to organize and start a rebellion against the central government in 2003. The conflict in Darfur, there is currently more going on than just a rebellion. While many typical rebel movements operate today in Darfur, changing patterns in the conflict have led the Justice and Equality Movement, one of the two original Darfur rebel movements, to amend its strategies and aims and become a revolutionary movement with a goal to take over power in Sudan and make profound and fundamental changes in the country in an effort to address the long-standing marginalization.

The significance of this theory is that it recognises and legitimises both Rwanda’s

---

past experience and current Darfurian scenario (needs of Darfurians) in Sudan. The needs of Darfurians must be met, not the needs of one at the expense of the other. This helps to move the conflict from zero-sum to win-win. The abstraction of 'human needs' helps to eliminate the sense of mutually exclusive goals. Rather than fighting over the legitimate future of the region, with the mutually exclusive goals of maintenance of the one Sudan, the situation shifts to one in which both communities seek to fulfil their needs such as security, identity, recognition and development.

These needs are not satisfied at the expense of the other community, but are realised along with the other community's needs. These needs are not mutually exclusive or gained at the expense of another; they are universal. There are bold assumptions in this theory. "This struggle cannot be curbed, instability and conflict are inevitable", these are contentious statements with far reaching implications.

If the hypotheses of this theory are correct, if there are certain human needs that are required for human development and social stability, then the solution to the conflict must be the ability to create an environment in which these needs can be met by all segments of societies. By accepting the assumptions and hypotheses of the Human Needs Theory, Burton suggests that there is a need for a paradigm shift away from power politics and towards the 'reality of individual power'.\textsuperscript{119} HNT remains vital towards finding a long lasting solution to Darfur nightmare.

This approach is suitable to ethnic conflict and explains that ethnic groups fight because they are denied not only their biological needs, but also psychological needs that relate to growth and development. These include the peoples' need for identity, security, recognition, participation, and autonomy. This theory provides a plausible explanation of ethnic conflicts in Africa, where such needs are not easily met by undemocratic regimes.

\textsuperscript{119} John Burton, 'Political Realities' in Volkan, 1991, p. 21., p. 84.
However, there is a real need to step away from the specifics of the conflict and take a holistic approach. This abstraction will accomplish the goal of being more objective in the search for an adequate explanation towards Darfur crisis. Lessons learnt from Rwanda can be of immense help towards realising the actual problem and hence prescribing the right medicine in the circumstances. Human needs As Burton states:

Referring to situations in which there is a breakdown in relationships and a challenge to the norms and to authorities. Conflict is due to an assertion of individualism. It is a frustration based protest against lack of opportunities for development and against the lack of recognition and identity. Whether the tension, conflict, or violence has origins in class, status, ethnicity, sex, religion, or nationalism, we are dealing with the same fundamental issues.\textsuperscript{120}

The study draws attention to HNT to help clarify ethnic conflicts in Africa and how can be mitigated, particularly the Darfur conflict.

1.11 **Hypothesis**

1.11.2 Conflict management can only achieve the desired aim or result in the presence of the political will.

1.11.3 Lessons learned from Rwanda could help to proffer a solution to the Darfur crisis.

1.12 **Research Methodology**

The study is a qualitative desk-based research having explorative design and will base its data on secondary sources. The study used secondary data sources. Secondary data was collected through books, journal. The term "secondary data" refers to data that were collected for other studies. This helped to capture what has already been done on conflict resolution and lesson learnt from a global, regional, national and local perspective; this information assisted in creating a better undertaking of the subject matter. Secondary data is information that has been collected for a purpose other than

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., p. 84.
your current research project, but has some relevance and utility for your research. The collected data was then sorted and analysed using document analysis and thematic analysis techniques - based on the emerging issues under study.

Secondary data come from resources that have already been published. You may have a running list of certain sources, but there are so many published items in the world, it can be hard to find the one thing that will make a difference to your project. Collection of data from secondary sources is a treasure hunt and we are skilled researchers with an eye for diamonds. The outcomes were presented to allow a reader to assess whether or not the interpretation is supported by the data.

1.13 Chapter Outline
The study was guided by the outline as follows:

Chapter one: introduction to the study, background to the research problem, statement of the problem, objectives, literature review, theoretical framework, justification of the research, hypothesis, research methodology and finally the chapter outline.

Chapter two: the study analysed causes of genocide, actors and attempts at management in Rwanda.

Chapter three: the chapter looked at causes of conflict, actors and modes of management. Chapter Four: presented a comparative analysis of Rwanda and Darfur genocides. The chapter will analyse lessons from the management of the 1994 genocide in and how they can be applied to Darfur.

Chapter Five: it consisted of the summary, conclusions and recommendations.
Chapter Two

Conflict and Conflict management in Rwanda

2.1 Introduction

This chapter analysed literature identified with the development to the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, the literature incorporates; pre-colonial times, the independence times, the civil war and the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. In addition, it gives a critical audit, identifies the gaps, highlights the consequences of the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and finally identifies the conflict management mechanisms applied during the civil war and genocide.

2.2 Build-up to the 1994 Genocide

2.2.1 The Pre-colonial Times

The Rwandan conflict has been defined in different ways. Those differences in the definition have generally been the result of how people have understood the Rwandan society and its components. Hutu, Tutsi and Twa communities have been given different definitions according to writers and periods. They have been qualified as being races, tribes, social status or social classes.¹²¹

As a matter of fact, in neighbouring countries such as Uganda and DRC, where there is an important Rwandophone community, all Rwandophone people have been considered as members of the same ethnic group, that of Banyarwanda (people of Rwanda). The distinction between the Hutus and the Tutsis has only been made very recently, due to the discourse of divisionism and successive anti-Tutsi pogroms in the two Belgian ex-colonies (Rwanda and Burundi), which became more radical after the 1994

genocide in Rwanda. The reverse phenomenon, "Hutufication", a kind of social deterioration, was also true for the Tutsis who could find themselves deprived of their herds. Those facts show clearly that, at that period, "Tutsiness" and "Hutuness" did not have, in the concerned persons’ mind;” a genetic dimension" contrarily to clan belongingness for instance. Then, a question emerges- at what level, is the cause of conflicts situated and how has it functioned?122

According to Marysse, de Herdt, and Ndayambaje, the real troubled and complex dynamics of the relationship between the Hutu and the Tutsi far outdate the Rwandan Genocide.123 It is therefore best to take a look back at the past centuries, in order to have a better understanding of how the tensions in Rwanda developed over time and culminated into genocide. According to the existing literature written by the western historians, the Tutsis were cow herders in the distant past and the Hutus were farmers. As a monarchy, Rwanda was ruled by Tutsi kings.124 Macchiavello, Rocco and Ameet Morjaria states that, the Tutsi, or originally Cushite, people migrated to Rwanda from the southern Ethiopian highlands, and were much taller and thinner in physique than the Bantu or Twa.

Historians further emphasize that the Cushitic people arrived as conquerors. The Cushite was mainly cattle-herding warriors, and they impressed their power upon the Bantu (and Twa) of the region.125 Macchiavello, Rocco and Ameet Morjaria further states that by the 15th century, the Cushite had gained complete rule. They established a pyramid-style political structure, with the head being Mwami, a king of supposedly divine origin. The reign of the Tutsi Mwami over Rwanda continued for several hundred years very successfully. Hutus who were wealthy enough were accepted as part of the elite

122 Anastase Shyaka (2004), "The Rwandan Conflict: Origin, Development and Exit Strategies ".(National University of Rwanda, Butare, Rwanda), P.2
124 Ibid, p 50.
along with the Tutsi, while poorer Hutus lived quite comfortably for themselves, provided they pay a tax to the Mwami in the form of foodstuffs. In brief, the Tutsi were in power and as such elevated themselves to a higher class than the Hutus.  

It therefore seemed that one race was submissive to the other in harmony, and the relationship remained relatively civil, until approximately the 19th century.

2.2.2 The Colonial Times

The pre-colonial Rwanda, according to Nyirubugara observes that prior to German colonial reign (1897-1916) Hutu and Tutsi had little conflict and lived in segregated communities as a result of their livelihood. Communities relied on prominent local lineages for public goods, and non-monetary goods were voluntarily exchanged for protection and representation. The lineage system traditionally served in lieu of a functioning government and cattle played a prominent role, serving as the primary medium of exchange.

The Berlin Conference of 1884 assigned the territory to Germany and began a policy of ruling through the Rwandan monarchy; this system had the added benefit of enabling colonization with small European troop numbers. European colonists, convinced the Tutsi had migrated to Rwanda from Ethiopia, believed the Tutsi were more Caucasian than the Hutu and were therefore racially superior and better suited to carry out colonial administrative tasks. King Yuhi V Musinga welcomed the Germans, whom he used

127 Nyirubugara, Olivier (2013) Complexities and Dangers of Remembering and Forgetting in Rwanda, Sidestone Press.
to strengthen his rule.\textsuperscript{132} Belgian forces took control of Rwanda and Burundi during World War I, and the country was formally passed to Belgian control by a League of Nations mandate in 1919 after the defeat of the Germans.\textsuperscript{133}

The 19th century brought with it two separate factors that increased the tensions between the Hutus and Tutsis. According to Destexhe,\textsuperscript{134} these factors were colonization coupled with land redistribution problems. The land problems created a system of patronage known as Uburetwa or Ubuhake. These words mean “to work for access to land”, and consequently, implementation of this system made the Hutus and poor Tutsis who were not part of the nobility serfs that worked on the land and cows. The colonists did a lot to engender the future tensions between the two races. Their worst contribution was racial science.

The German colonization of the kingdoms of Rwanda and Burundi, which officially began in 1900, accentuated the divisions between Hutu and Tutsi. Although Rwanda and Burundi had formed separate pre-colonial states, Germany united them as one colony, Ruanda-Urundi.\textsuperscript{135} Unlike most areas in Africa, then, the boundaries imposed by the colonial authorities’ largely corresponded to distinct pre-colonial political entities. Ruanda-Urundi was administered by only a small number of the colonial authorities and they relied on the Tutsi traditional leaders already in place to enforce their rule. Rwanda and Burundi after the defeat of the Germans was formally passed to Belgian control by a League of Nations mandate in 1919.

In 1935, Belgium colonial masters introduced identity cards labelling each individual as Tutsi, Hutu, Twa or Naturalized. While it had previously been possible for

particularly wealthy Hutu to become honorary Tutsi, the identity cards prevented any further movement between the classes.\textsuperscript{136} The Catholic Church became increasingly important in Rwanda, as the Belgian government relied on the clergy's local knowledge; many Rwandans became Catholics as a means of social advancement.

In addition, according to Rothschild, as the colonial authorities sought to consolidate their power, they exacerbated tensions between Hutu and Tutsi by interfering with their traditional leadership structures. The German colonial authorities used the Tutsi Mwami and other traditional Tutsi leaders to subject the entire territory to colonial rule.\textsuperscript{137} In the late 1950’s during the great wave of decolonization, tensions increased in Rwanda.

After World War II, a Hutu emancipation movement began to grow in Rwanda, fuelled by increasing resentment of the inter-war social reforms, and also an increasing sympathy for the Hutu within the Catholic Church. Catholic missionaries increasingly viewed themselves as responsible for empowering the underprivileged Hutu rather than the Tutsi elite, leading rapidly to the formation of a sizeable Hutu clergy and educated elite.\textsuperscript{138}

According to Destexhe, a British Indian army officer John Hanning Speke was the creator of the racialist hypothesis known as the “Hamitic Theory”. In his writings, Speke suggests that the Tutsis are more European than the Hutus. Their Caucasoid facial features, combined with their smoother personalities were proof enough for him that they were more cultured than the Hutus. This theory was the basis for all racial and cultural divisions between the Hutu and Tutsi in later years.\textsuperscript{139} This theory made specific definition as to how one race was superior to the other, therefore giving said superior race

\textsuperscript{136} Gourevitch, Philip (2000) \textit{We Wish To Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families} (Reprint ed.). London; New York, N.Y.: Picador, pp. 56–57.
\textsuperscript{139} Blattman, Christopher and Edward Miguel (2010), \textit{Civil war}, Journal of Economic Literature, 2010, pp. 3 - 57.
much power and influence.

Blattman, Christopher and Miguel argue that, the Belgian rule was characterised by divisionism among Rwandans. After World War I, Belgium was given control over Rwanda. The Belgians increased the divide between the Hutus and Tutsis through the use of the eugenics, which was rather popular at the time (i.e. Nazi Germany). Skull measurements showing larger brain size, greater height, and lighter skin tones all reaffirmed the Tutsis’ superiority over the Hutus, by providing proof of their apparent greater purity and closer ancestry to Europeans. Belgian colonialists arrested that evolution and solidified the terms Tutsi and Hutu into a simplified, race-based immutable designation that profoundly impacted subsequent social and political life in Rwanda.

The colonialist definitions of Tutsi and Hutu persisted in various forms through Rwanda’s first thirty-five years of independence and had a major impact on both Hutu presidents’ rule, and the 1994 genocide. Over the years the Germans, and Belgian, officials maintained that the Tutsi were superior to the Hutu and, therefore, naturally better suited to serve as leaders. The build up to the Hutu, Tutsi hatred is generally blamed on European colonial policies for initiating and perpetuating the conflict. According to the narrative shaped by the media, the conflict revolved around what was characterized as the European’s divide and conquer tactics, playing one group of Rwandans against the other.

\[140\] Willa Friedman, Local Economic Conditions and Participation in the Rwandan Genocide, (University of California at Berkeley, 2010),p.15


\[143\] Ibid, P. 69

Later in their rule, the Belgians came to redefine the boundaries between the two groups by economic status, more so than by ethnicity. As earlier pointed out, in the early 1930s, for example, the Belgians in Rwanda classified an owner with ten or more cows as Tutsi and a poor citizen as Hutu regardless of ethnic identity. Tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi groups had been made worse by Rwanda's colonial rulers – Germany from the 1890s, then Belgium from the First World War. They both reinforced the gap between the two social classes.

In 1957, a group of Hutu scholars wrote the "Bahutu Manifesto". This was the first document to label the Tutsi and Hutu as separate races, and called for the transfer of power from Tutsi to Hutu based on what it termed "statistical law". It is alleged that on 1st November 1959 a Hutu sub-chief, Dominique Mbonyumutwa, was attacked in Gitarama by supporters of the pro-Tutsi party and rumours began spreading that he had been killed by the Tutsis, when in fact was alive. Hutu activists responded by killing Tutsi, both the elite and ordinary civilians, marking the beginning of the full scale violence against the Tutsi. The Tutsi remained on the defensive response side, but by at this stage, the Hutu had full backing from the Belgian administration who wanted to overturn the kingdom of Rwanda.

In early 1960, the Belgians replaced most Tutsi chiefs with Hutu and organised mid-year commune elections which returned an overwhelming Hutu majority. The king was deposed, a Hutu dominated republic created, and the country became independent in Des Forges cites that by 1954, King Rudahigwa insisted total independence for Rwanda and the end of the Belgian occupation.

---

145 Ibid, p. 726 - 800.
During the independence movement, under the influence of the Roman Catholic Church, a Hutu catechist name Gregoire Kayibanda was a key player in the Hutu Manifesto publication, a document that demanded that political authority be granted to the Hutu majority (when the Belgians leave). This was the basis for the ideology of Hutu Power during the genocide. The Church further encouraged Kayibanda and his associates to form political parties.

This resulted in the creation of two political parties that championed Hutu interests: APROSOMA (L’Association pour la Promotion Social des Masses) and RADER (La Rassemblement Democratique Rwandais). During this time of political upheaval, King Rudahigwa mysteriously perished in Bujumbura, Burundi. Common speculation is that the Belgian elite were involved in his death. Rudahigwa was succeeded by his half-brother, King Kigeli V Ndadinhurwa. At this time a third political party, Parti du Mouvement de l’Emanicpation Hutu (PARMAHETU) came to the forefront. They were also formed under the direction of the Catholic Church, by proponents of independence, who were also openly anti-Tutsi.

While the politics of Rwanda were undergoing radical change, Belgian Commando Colonel, G. Logiest, organized a large group Hutus and killed thousands of Tutsis and forced the exile of hundreds of thousands others. This was immediately followed by elections, less one part of the population, which had been deliberately forced out of the country. Hutus extremist with the support of Belgian colonial masters declared Rwanda an independent republic and elected the first Hutu president, Gregory Kayibanda.

---


150 Guillaume “Guy” Logiest (1912 - 1991) was a Belgium special military resident (1959–1962) and High Representative (1962) of colonial Rwanda. Under his guidance, the political framework was laid for democratic elections in 1962 and independence.

Mass killings of Tutsis occurred during the transition to Hutu rule, hinting at things to come. During Kayibanda’s tenure as leader, there was an increasing exodus of Tutsi from Rwanda into neighbouring nations. Hutu power quickly became centralized and all Tutsis were removed from positions of power. At this point, Tutsi rebellions occurred, which all failed, and Tutsi killings began. Under President Kayibanda, anti-Tutsi legislation was passed, such as the 10% quota for Tutsis, which applied to school and university seats, and the civil service.

This denoted the real start of the operationalization of the negative ethnicity, the philosophy, of "Us and Them" and consequent genocide of 1994 in Rwanda. However, it’s important to note that, the longstanding and planned fault lines that Tutsis and Hutus have a much more seasoned legacy of aversion between the two races, is entirely wrong; it was essentially a production of the colonialist to kill the social fabric as a method for softening the ground in order to entrench the divide and rule system into Rwandans.

According to Barnett, the violent incident sparked a Hutu uprising in which hundreds of Tutsi were killed and thousands displaced and forced to flee to neighbouring countries, this marked the start of the so-called ‘Hutu Peasant Revolution’ or ‘social revolution’ lasting from 1959 to 1961, which signified the end of Tutsi power and the sharpening of ethnic tensions. By 1962, when Rwanda gained independence, over 120,000 people, primarily Tutsis had taken refuge in neighbouring states to escape the violence which had accompanied the gradual coming into power of the Hutus.

According to Mann, during this period, further mass killings of Tutsis increased

---

during the transition to Hutu rule, hinting at things to come.\textsuperscript{155} Mann states that in 1965, Gregoire Kayibanda was re-elected and Juvenal Habyarimana became Minister of Defense. In 1969, PARMEHETU was renamed MDR (Mouvement Democratique Republicaine) and Kayibanda was once again re-elected, despite accusations that the election was not valid. During this entire period, Tutsi killings continued.\textsuperscript{156}

A new cycle of ethnic conflict and violence continued after independence. Tutsi refugees in Tanzania and Zaire seeking to regain their Rwandan identity began organizing and staging attacks on Hutu targets and the Hutu government. Ten such attacks occurred between 1962 and 1967, each leading to retaliatory killings of large numbers of Tutsi civilians in Rwanda and creating new waves of refugees.\textsuperscript{157}

The first Tutsi refugees left Rwanda in 1959 for the neighbouring Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire (DRC). Starting in 1961, some of these Tutsi refugees, calling themselves Inyenzi (or “cockroaches,” to signify their persistence) attempted to return to power in Rwanda—and to reinstall the Tutsi Mwami, or king—by launching attacks from bases in Uganda and Burundi. Rwanda's hard-liner Hutu nationalist government retaliated by escalating oppression of, and attacks against, Tutsi within the country.\textsuperscript{158}

The most successful of the Inyenzi attacks occurred in 1963 – when Tutsi from Burundi came within ten miles of the Rwandan capital, Kigali – but this also triggered the most intense outburst of reprisal killing against Tutsi in Rwanda. Ultimately, the government's tactics, though horrific, proved effective in reducing the incidence of Inyenzi attacks, which ended in 1967.

\textsuperscript{156} Ibid, p 10.
Overall, from 1959 to 1967, some 20,000 Tutsi were killed and another 200,000 Tutsi population in Rwanda was driven from the country as refugees. As a result, the Tutsi percentage of Rwanda's population kept decreasing. After the Inyenzi invasions, the remaining Tutsi population of Rwanda was spared any major outburst of violence for over two decades. There was one minor occurrence in 1973, an attempt by the failing regime of Rwanda’s first President to win popular Hutu support by scapegoating the Tutsis.\textsuperscript{159}

On 5 July 1973 Major General Juvenal Habyarimana staged a bloodless coup d’état against incumbent president Gregoire Kayibanda. In the months prior to Habyarimana’s coup President Kayibanda had intensified persecution of Tutsi through the formation of vigilante committees to ensure enforcement of the required ethnic quotas. Nonetheless, the policies and views of the government never changed, and Tutsi killings continue. The violent attacks, even intensify when in 1974, there is public outcry (mainly Hutu) that there was Tutsi over representation in the elite fields such as education and medicine. Many Tutsi professionals are forced into resignation and exile.

In 1975, President Habyarimana established the Mouvement Révolutionnaire et National pour le Développement (MRND), the ruling party from 1975 through to 1994 and during the genocide. The widespread killings of Tutsis continue, and increase with the advent of the government paid militia, the Interahamwe, which were a militant wing of the MNRD.\textsuperscript{160}

According to Gerard by the end of the 1980s, some 480,000 Rwandans had become refugees, primarily in Burundi, Uganda, Zaire and Tanzania. They continued to call for the fulfilment of their international legal right to return to Rwanda, however, Juvenal Habyarimana, then president of Rwanda, took the position that population

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid, p 19.
pressures were already too great, and economic opportunities too few to accommodate large numbers of Tutsi refugees.\textsuperscript{161}

The Hutu-led government used the same system of racial oppression that existed during colonialism, except that now they were in control. After Habyarimana seized power, the Hutu from his northwestern region came to dominate Rwanda, engendering resentment from both Tutsi and other Hutu.\textsuperscript{162} The Tutsi also were subjected to quotas for education and other government benefits, in proportion to their percentage of the population, as part of an affirmative action program on behalf of the Hutu. Moreover, Habyarimana blocked the return of Tutsi refugees, whom he apparently viewed as a potential threat to his power. However, in the absence of any further attempted invasions by Tutsi refugees, the Tutsi in Rwanda was spared any organized violence for 17 years.

The Tutsi refugees, lacking the means or organization to force their way home, instead did their best to make living in their new lands. At the same time, they retained their Rwandan language and culture and dreamed of eventually returning home.\textsuperscript{163} According to Murekatete observes that in some states such as Tanzania and Burundi, the refugees were relatively welcome, while in others, such as Zaire and Uganda, they were objects of intermittent discrimination and abuse. Of the four neighbouring African states, Uganda was the site of the best and worst times for the Rwandan Tutsi refugees, because they became entangled in intra-Ugandan power struggles.

Initially, Uganda was quite welcoming to the refugees in the expectation that their stay would be short. Local political leaders such as Milton Obote supported legal protections for the Rwanda refugees even prior to Uganda’s 1961 independence. However, Ugandan resentment soon built against the Rwandan Tutsi for at least three

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid, p 36.  \\
\end{flushright}
reasons: the refugee camps were being used as rear bases and recruitment areas for Inyenzi attacks into Rwanda; the refugees received special benefits from the United Nations, creating jealousy and resentment among some Ugandans; and the Tutsi allied themselves with a culturally-related Ugandan ethnic group, the Hima, who were resented locally as elitists.164

In the 1980s, a group of about 500 Rwandan refugees in Uganda, led by Fred Rwigyema, fought with the rebel National Resistance Army (NRA) in the Ugandan Bush War, which saw Yoweri Museveni overthrow Milton Obote.165 These soldiers remained in the Ugandan army following Museveni’s inauguration as Ugandan president, but simultaneously began planning an invasion of Rwanda through a covert network within the army’s ranks.166

In October 1990, Rwigyema led a force of rebels from Uganda, advancing 60 km (37 mi) into Rwanda under the banner of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Rwigyema was killed on the second day of the attack, and France and Zaire deployed forces in support of the Rwandan army, allowing them to repel the invasion.167 Paul Kagame took command of the RPF forces, organising a tactical retreat to the Virunga Mountains, a rugged area of northern Rwanda.168

It suffices to note that, not until the civil war erupted in Rwanda, that the international community started thinking about conflict management efforts? A question may be asked—whether conflict management mechanisms existed during the period? These are some of the pertinent questions which will lead us in identifying the reasons behind endurance of conflicts on the continent.

---

168 Ibid.
2.4 The pre genocide conflict management initiatives

In 1991, when the violence intensified, conflict management initiatives were initiated and this saw parties to the conflict sign the N’Sele ceasefire agreement on 29 March 1991 - between the Government of the Rwandese Republic and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, as amended at Gbadolite, 16 September 1991, and in Arusha, 12 July 1992. This agreement establishes a cessation of hostilities and a zone of separation between the belligerent forces and provides, among other things, for the release of prisoners of war and the withdrawal of foreign troops. The agreement also establishes the framework for future talks.\(^ {169}\)

However, despite the efforts to avert hostilities, widespread killings of Tutsi in Rwanda continued during this time in locations such as Kibirira, Bigogwe, Bugesera, and Kibuye. During the ceasefire period, violence continued as the government did not implement the framework agreement for the transitional government negotiated on 9 January 1993. A new ceasefire agreement was signed in March 1993; and the parties agreed to advance negotiations, which led to the signing of the Arusha Accord (Comprehensive Peace Agreement) on 4 August 1993.

Tanzanian President Ali Hassan Mwinyi played the most important role in getting to the final accord. This accord was comprised of six different protocols, including the 1991 N’Sele Ceasefire Agreement.\(^ {170}\) The accord stated that a transitional government would be instituted, giving both the Rwandese Government and the RPF a power sharing. It seemed as if peace had been brokered.\(^ {171}\)

Rising tensions based on racial divisions and the oppression of some groups of


\(^ {170}\) Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, (2012) University of Notre Dame, 100 Hesburgh Center for International Studies, USA.

people set the stage for the horrific events that occurred in 1994. Hutu officials began preparation to carry out a massive genocide of the Tutsi minority. They trained and armed militias and gave arms to civilians. They distributed lists of people who were to be targeted and killed. Messages of hate were broadcast over the radio, encouraging the killing of Tutsi and opponents to the Hutu regime. The messages portrayed Tutsis as evil cockroaches and rats.172

By October 30, 1992, the first portion of the power sharing agreement was signed in Arusha.173 Two weeks later, under significant pressure from the Akazu and the extremist elements within his government, President Habyarimana described the Arusha Accords as ‘shreds of paper’ and congratulated the Interahamwe for their recent (illegal) activity.174

And seven months later, this became evident when the president was supposed to swear in a new government as per the provisions of the accord, instead he was sworn in alone as the president of the newly formed government, when in fact never existed. Following this situation of uncertainty, President Habyarimana, on his way back from Arusha meeting, Sometime around 8:20 pm, the President’s plane neared the Gregory Kayibanda (Kigali International Airport). As the plane headed towards the runway, a missile was launched towards the plane, hitting one of the wings. Immediately after, a second missile hit the rear of the plane, engulfing the plane in flames. The plane hit down the presidential palace garden grounds, missing the runway entirely.175

The government of Rwanda, its armed forces and the Interahamwe paramilitaries engaged in genocide against ethnic Tutsis. MNRD and other Hutu interest parties pinned

---

173 Jacques Morel, La France au Couer de Genocide des Tutsi. (Izuba, 2010). (133)
the blame on Tutsi “cockroaches” and spread propaganda messages of Tutsi hate, throughout the media. This quickly instigated the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The killings began the night that Rwandan President Habyarimana was killed when his plane was shot down near Kigali Airport. The President’s own supporters, Hutu extremists, are believed to have orchestrated the attack in order to prevent the President from signing peace agreements although the exact circumstances have never been determined.

The Hutus used different “tools” or methods to carry out the genocide: assassinations, death lists, hate propaganda, demonising, civilian militias, and rape. This is the time the media in Rwanda proved that it can really shape the public opinion and indeed succeeded in luring the Hutus into the killings of their brothers and sisters. The hate media organs in Rwanda – through their journalists, broadcasters and media executives – played an instrumental role in laying the groundwork for genocide, then actively participated in the extermination campaign.

Over one million people were killed during a span of 100 days of genocide. The United Nations "estimated that at least a quarter-million women were raped" during the genocide. The Hutu Ten Commandments propaganda aimed to convince the Hutu population that the Tutsi were their archetypal enemies. The propaganda evoked images of war, slavery, oppression, injustice, death and cruelty.

According to Murekatete, the genocide was 100 days of the horrific massacre of Tutsis and other innocent Rwandans by the Interahamwe Hutu militia. Millions of lives were lost in the genocide, and the UN did nothing to stop it. Their mandate was immensely inadequate for the situation. They only recognized the Rwandan massacre as genocide after extensive “investigation” by the UN High Commission of Human Rights,

long after it mattered.\textsuperscript{179}

The catholic church in Rwanda, was very much pronounced in having played a role in the genocide. According to the Organisation for African Unity's report on the genocide described the church in Rwanda as carrying a "heavy responsibility" for failing to oppose, and even promoting, ethnic discrimination.

It said the church offered "indispensable support" to the Hutu regime during the killing and described church leaders as playing "a conspicuously scandalous role" in the genocide by failing to take a moral stand against it.\textsuperscript{180}

\section*{2.4 The 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi}

\subsection*{2.4.1 Premeditation of the Genocide}

Before discussing the genocide, it is important to briefly mention that it was a deliberate, premeditated, and well planned cold-blood political strategy to exterminate the Tutsis. Once President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, unleashing of the plan went into immediate effect by the Hutu extremists. First, weapons were imported into Rwanda from China between 1992 and 1994 in preparation for the execution of the genocide because this would be the main weapon used to kill people.\textsuperscript{181}

\subsection*{2.4.2 April 6, 1994: Execution of the Genocide}

Between April and July 1994, Rwanda was the scene of one of the most brutal genocides in the history of humankind. It is estimated that at least one million people were killed within that three-month period. After the genocide, a deep division between genocide survivors and former genocide perpetrators, as well as their respective family

\textsuperscript{179} Murekatete, Jacqueline (2005), \textit{100 Days of Genocide in Rwanda}. University Press.


members was evident.182

In October 1993, the President of Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye, who had been elected in June as the country's first ever Hutu president, was assassinated by extremist Tutsi army officers.183 This was about a year earlier to the execution of genocide in Rwanda. The Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR) and the Power wings of the other parties realized they could use this situation to their advantage. The idea of a "final solution," which had first been suggested in 1992 but had remained a fringe viewpoint, was now top of their agenda, and they began actively planning it. They were confident of persuading the Hutu population to carry out killings, given the public anger at Ndadaye's murder as well as the hate messages of Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) and the traditional obedience of Rwandans to authority.184

According to Prunier, immediately after the demise of President Habyarimana, a crisis committee was formed. This committee, headed by Theoneste Bagosora, took power in the country following Habyarimana's death, and was the principal authority coordinating the implementation of the genocide.185

Bagosora immediately began issuing orders to kill Tutsi, addressing groups of Interahamwe in person in Kigali, and making telephone calls to leaders in the provinces.186 Other leading organisers on a national level were Defense minister Augustin

---

182 Sentama Ezechiel, Peacebuilding in Post-Genocide Rwanda: The Role of Cooperatives in the Restoration of Interpersonal Relationships, (Goteborg, Sweden, 2009), P.1
185 Ibid, p 60.
186 Bagosora, now 67 years old, was a retired colonel and chief of staff in Rwanda's defence ministry when, in April 1994, he gave the order to implement a longstanding plan to exterminate his country's Tutsi minority. One hundred days later, about 800,000 people had been murdered in one of the most extensive
Bizimana, commander of the paratroopers Aloys Ntabakuze, and the head of the Presidential Guard, Protais Mpiranya. Businessman Felicien Kabuga funded the RTLM and the Interahamwe, while Pascal Musabe and Joseph Nzirorera were responsible for coordinating the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi militia activities nationally.

Prunier states that in the hours following the Habyarimana’s assassination, Rwandan military units moved through Kigali. Within twelve hours many Tutsi elite and all moderate Hutus in influential positions in Kigali were murdered.

Among the first victims were Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana and her husband, the Minister of Agriculture, and the Minister of Labour and the UN soldiers guarding the Prime Minister. Within a few hours the streets of Kigali had been taken over by armed Hutus who put up road blocks to prevent anyone from escaping the city. The streets of Kigali were systematically ransacked, and all suspect Tutsi or moderate Hutu were killed.

In Kigali, the genocide was led by the Presidential Guard, the well trained elite unit of the army. They were assisted by the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi, who set up numerous road blocks throughout the capital; each person passing the road block was required to show the national identity card, which included ethnicity, and any with Tutsi cards were slaughtered immediately.

The militias also initiated searches of houses in the city, slaughtering the Tutsi and looting their property. Kigali governor Tharcisse Renzaho played a leading role, touring the road blocks to ensure their effectiveness and using his position at the top of the Kigali provincial government to disseminate orders and dismiss officials who were not

---

189 Ibid, 105.
sufficiently active in the killings.\textsuperscript{190}

Encouraged by the presidential guard and radio propaganda, an unofficial militia group called the Interahamwe (meaning those who attack together) was mobilised. At its peak, this group was 30,000 members strong. Soldiers and police officers encouraged ordinary citizens to take part. In some cases, Hutu civilians were forced to murder their Tutsi neighbours by military personnel. Participants were often given incentives, such as money or food, and some were even told they could appropriate the land of the Tutsis they killed.\textsuperscript{191}

The Radio Télévision des Mille Collines (RTLM) radio station began naming Tutsis and moderate Hutus who were to be killed, specifying addresses and number plates for those with vehicles. Right from the beginning of the genocide, the RTLM supported the Interahamwe by passing on information during broadcasts about the direction in which victims were trying to escape. After a few days thousands of decomposing corpses were piled high in the streets of Kigali.\textsuperscript{192} In rural areas, the local government hierarchy was also in most cases the chain of command for the execution of the genocide.\textsuperscript{193} The governor of each province, acting on orders from Kigali, disseminated instructions to the district leaders (Bourgmestres), who in turn issued directions to the leaders of the sectors, cells and villages within their districts.\textsuperscript{194}

According to Luis, in April 1994, the Interahamwe continued to set up roadblocks in Kigali. They started to round up all Tutsis and any moderate or sympathizing Hutus.

The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) had been in Rwanda

since October 1993, with a mandate to oversee the implementation of the Arusha Accords.\textsuperscript{195} UNAMIR’s mandate and strength were adjusted on a number of occasions in the face of the tragic events of the genocide and the changing situation in the country. UNAMIR commander was, however, constrained by his headquarters, on one occasion, Romeo Dallaire learned of the Hutu Power movement during the early phase of deployment;\textsuperscript{196}

in January 1994, a government informant alerted Dallaire to a group who were rapidly arming militias and planning mass extermination of the Tutsi, and led UNAMIR to a secret arms cache.\textsuperscript{197} The UN refused Dallaire’s request to raid the arms, and rebuked him for exceeding his mandate.\textsuperscript{198}

During the peak of genocide, UNAMIR proved ineffective and failed to protect the people of Rwanda, which led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands.\textsuperscript{199} UNAMIR’s mandate came to an end on 8 March 1996.\textsuperscript{200} Generally, the UN Secretariat interpreted UNAMIR’s mandate and terms of engagement narrowly, and on several occasions denied the force commander (FC) permission to search and seize arms caches,\textsuperscript{201} and UNAMIR (UN) forces were not allowed to intervene, but only to ‘monitor’ the situation.\textsuperscript{202} Luis states that the genocide itself, the large scale killing of Tutsi on the grounds of ethnicity, began within a few hours of Habyarimana's death.\textsuperscript{203}

\textsuperscript{195} Dallaire, Roméo, \textit{Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda}, (London Dallaire 2005), p. 98
\textsuperscript{196} Dallaire, Roméo, \textit{Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda}, (London Dallaire 2005), Pp. 146–150
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid, p.150
\textsuperscript{198} Dallaire, Roméo, \textit{Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda}, (London Dallaire 2005), p. 146
\textsuperscript{203} Ibid, pp 532–544.
The military leaders in Gisenyi province, the heartland of the Akazu\textsuperscript{204}, were initially the most organised, convening a large gathering of Interahamwe and civilian Hutu; the commanders announced the president's death, blaming the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) for the shooting of the plane, and then ordered the crowd to "begin your work" and to "spare no one", including babies. The killing spread to Ruhengeri, Kibuye, Kigali, Kibungo, Gikongoro and Cyangugu provinces during 7 April; in each case local officials, responding to orders from Kigali, spread rumours amongst the population that the RPF had killed the president, then followed that with the command to begin killing Tutsi.\textsuperscript{205}

Maximo notes that the Hutu population, had been prepared and armed during the preceding months, and maintained the long-standing Rwandan culture of unconditional obedience to authority, carried out these orders without question. There were few killings in the provinces of Gitarama and Butare during the early phase of genocide, as the governors of those areas were moderates opposed to the violence; the genocide began in Gitarama on 9 April and in Butare on 19 April, following the arrest and murder of Tutsi governor Jean Baptiste Habyarimana.\textsuperscript{206}

The 1994 genocide never affected areas under RPF control, including parts of Byumba and eastern Ruhengeri provinces. About a week after the outbreak of mass violence in the capital, massacres started to take place in rural areas. This illustrates how carefully things were planned in advance. Orders were passed down from above through the administrative machinery. Prefects informed mayors and sub-prefects, who in turn explained to their closest staff members how the commands were to be passed on to the actual murderers. In most cases, school and hospital directors, local councillors and

\textsuperscript{204} Ibid, pp 532–544.
\textsuperscript{205} Maximo, Dady De (2012). A Genocide that could have been avoided. New times.
businessmen were involved in the murder plans. Because of their authority and influence they were instrumental in inciting ordinary people to carry out the killing.\textsuperscript{207}

Whereas in Kigali the murderers had been well-equipped government troops and militiamen with automatic rifles and hand grenades, in rural areas simple farmers murdered with machetes, knives, spears, wooden clubs studded with nails, and screwdrivers. Because initially the murderers were not very skilled or experienced, these primitive methods of massacre were bloodier than in the capital.\textsuperscript{208}

During the remainder of April and early May, the Presidential Guard, the gendarmerie and the youth militia, aided by local populations, continued killing at a very high rate. Prunier estimates, that during the first six weeks up to 800,000 Rwandans may have been murdered – the ultimate goal was to kill every Tutsi living in Rwanda.\textsuperscript{209}

In rural areas, where Tutsi and Hutu lived side by side and families all knew each other, it was easy for Hutu to identify and target their Tutsi neighbours. In urban areas, where residents were more anonymous, identification was facilitated using numerous road blocks manned by military and Interahamwe; each person passing the road block was required to show the national identity card, which included ethnicity, and any with Tutsi cards were slaughtered immediately.

In view of this, Policymakers in France, Belgium, and the United States and at the United Nations were aware of the preparations for massive slaughter and failed to take the steps needed to prevent it or even use the word genocide.\textsuperscript{210} Aware from the start that Tutsi were being targeted for elimination, the leading foreign actors refused to


\textsuperscript{208} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{210} The human rights watch, IGNORING GENOCIDE. During the early weeks of slaughter international leaders did not use the word "genocide," as if avoiding the term could eliminate the obligation to confront the crime. The major international actors—policymakers in Belgium, the U.S., France, and the U.N.—all understood the gravity of the crisis within the first twenty-four hours even if they could not have predicted the massive toll that the slaughter would eventually take. http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno15-8-01.htm#. Retrieved 20 April 2015.
acknowledge the genocide. Not only did international leaders reject what was going on, but they also declined for weeks to use their political and moral authority to challenge the legitimacy of the genocidal government.

They refused to declare that a government guilty of exterminating its citizens would never receive international assistance. They did nothing to silence the radio that televised calls for slaughter. Even after it had become indisputable that what was going on in Rwanda was genocide, American officials had shunned the g-word, fearing that it would cause demand for intervention.211

2.5 The Church involvement in the Genocide

The Church is supposed to represent a place of reverence, peace, and a safe heaven for people during times of war. However, the 1994 genocide proved the opposite. When the genocide began, many people fled to the church in hopes of protection from the killers. Yet, the church became another place for the slaughter of millions of Tutsis and moderate Hutus. The church, Sainte Famille, opposite Kigali, was the site of the killing of many lives.212

2.6 Consequences of the 1994 Genocide Conflict

The 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the world opened its eyes to this crisis, but unfortunately no lesson was learned. After the genocide ended, the country was on the brink of an economic collapse. All the farms and agriculture that roamed the country were either burned or destroyed. Since the population decreased over 70%, there were no workers to start a reconstruction of their country. As of today, Rwanda is still dealing with genocidal forces based in the neighbouring DRC as well as other countries that believed to have a hand in genocide

Maximo estimates that out of a population of 7.3 million people, the majority of


whom were Hutu, followed by Tutsi and Twa, the official figures published by the Rwandan government estimated the number of victims of the genocide to be 1,174,000 in 100 days (10,000 murdered every day, 400 every hour, 7 every minute).

After genocide very few Tutsi survived the genocide. Thousands of widows, many of whom were subjected to rape, are now HIV-positive.\textsuperscript{213}

Furthermore, is the threat of genocide ideology, that has spread like the wildfires in the great lakes region, this is also associated with an increased campaign of genocide denial, like the recent BBC Two, documentary by the producer and Director John Conroy.\textsuperscript{214}

In addition, the other consequence is that related to the psychological trauma which has not only affected the victims, but also other generations that were born after the genocide, just to mention a few.

The 1994 Rwandan genocide is one of the most violent episodes in recent history, killing at least 800,000 people, in approximately one hundred days. The rate of killing during the genocide makes one of the most efficient mass killings. However, the war was short and the country was taken over by a relatively well-organized regime after the end of the hostilities. Armed conflicts often have immediate negative economic impacts and Rwanda is no exception.

Rwandan per capita GDP plummeted significantly and consumer prices increased during the genocide but by 1996 had returned to near pre-war levels (all figures from the IMF, 1998). Coffee exports, the predominant export crop in Rwanda, also declined in 1994 but returned to pre-war levels in 1995. Given the rapid return to pre-war economic

\textsuperscript{213} Maximo, Dady De (2012). \textit{A Genocide that could have been avoided}. Newtimes, p 5.
\textsuperscript{214} Ibid, p 13.
levels, the long-run impacts might not be severe.\textsuperscript{215}

As of 8 November 1994 the UN Security Council decided to set up a tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda and abroad between 1 January and 31 December 1994.\textsuperscript{216} In spite of all the literature reviews of the chapter, the study notes that, there is a general agreement of failure to act by the international community. Secondly, the international intervention once authorised takes time to reach those in danger.

Thirdly, the current conflict management structures are more reactive than proactive and tend to ignore warning signs before emerging to full scale conflicts. Fourth, this study has observed that, the aspect of lessons learnt has not been well internalized in the UN system, hence contributing to recurring conflicts worldwide.

Fifth, there is a deliberate campaign for 1994 Tutsi genocide denial through the media due to its efficacy, and yet nothing has been done to side with victims to stop it.

This, therefore, is an indicator that history has taught us nothing and this justifies the slow response towards human catastrophes. Furthermore, Rwanda's genocide deniers, exhibiting the usual mixture of self-serving and perverse motives, fall generally into three categories. First are Hutu Power sympathizers and perpetrators, second category; outsiders, with close ties to the long-serving Rwandan regime whose extremist core planned the genocide. Thirdly newcomers to Rwanda whose first introduction was as attorneys (or their associates) for those accused of genocide being tried by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).

All the accused everywhere should have the right to a rigorous Defense. But some among this group made the giant leap from arguing that their clients were innocent of the crime of genocide to arguing that no genocide had been carried out at all. Genocide

\textsuperscript{215} Maximo, Dady De (2012). \textit{A Genocide that could have been avoided}. Newtimes, p 5.

\textsuperscript{216} Ibid, p 20.
experts understand denial as a second cruel ordeal for survivors and families of victims - first the event, then the pain and insult of denial. All of us need to demonstrate our sensitivity to this searing issue.

2.6 Summary of Conflict management Efforts in Rwanda

Conflict management can be said to be a function of capacity, interest and commitment as well as information that involves acquiring skills related to conflict resolution, self awareness about conflict modes, conflict communication skills, and establishing a structure for the management of conflict in your environment.217

In the Rwanda case, the relevant actors knew at a critical stage that the situation was unstable and dangerous.218 Yet the sustained and careful attention necessary to successful management of the conflict was lacking. Admittedly, some individual or collective actors did their best with limited resources under difficult or adverse circumstances to save lives.

The Tanzanian government acting as a “facilitator”, undertook a sustained and skilful mediating effort that was critical in bringing about the final agreement and was a key player and struggled to turn the Arusha process into effective conflict management tool, but this was not possible due to lack of political will.219 Likewise, UNAMIR tried to function proactively despite tight reins prior to 6 April, and many remaining units - along with the ICRC and bravely sought to save civilians once the killings started. This could not compensate, however, for the overall failure of the international community-including

UNAMIR to prevent, mitigate or stop the genocide. Having a reflection on the conflict management initiatives prior to the 1994 is pertinent to link up events of the period before genocide and those after genocide, although they separating them may not be easy.

When the crisis struck, and it later became clear that a massive genocide was unfolding, there was still no effective international action. For Salim, the Arusha process was a challenge to demonstrate that the OAU could make a critical contribution to conflict resolution in Africa. To this end, Salim had just established a new OAU Conflict management mechanism that would deal with internal as well as interstate conflict.\textsuperscript{220} In one sense, this inaction can be seen as a propensity of states to be guided by narrow self-interest rather than moral obligations to uphold international norms of justice.\textsuperscript{221}

The Arusha process – as it came to be called in Tanzania, where the peace talks were formally launched on 12 July 1992 – was pursued at a very high level in the region, drawing in heads of state and foreign ministers to resolve the Rwandan conflict while it was still at its infancy stage.\textsuperscript{222}

The core negotiations on a future peace agreement had participant-observer delegations from five African states (Burundi, Zaire, Senegal, Uganda and Tanzania with its “facilitation” team), four Western countries (France, Belgium, Germany and the United States), and the OAU. The UN was brought in at the invitation of the OAU, and UNHCR attended as observers. Britain, Canada, the Netherlands and the European Union – important members of the Western donor community in the region – closely monitored the process from their local embassies. Nigeria was represented at the Arusha-linked Joint

\textsuperscript{220}Ibid.p. 23
\textsuperscript{222}Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, \textit{The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience} (Strandberg Grafisk, Odense 1996)ibid, p 23.
The Arusha process was a challenge to demonstrate that the OAU could make a critical contribution to conflict management in Africa. To this end, Tanzania had just established a new OAU Conflict management Mechanism that would deal with internal as well as interstate conflict and the formal approval was expected at the Cairo OAU Summit meeting in 1993. Given the traditional OAU sensitivities on internal affairs, it would be gratifying to have a freshly mediated peace agreement to put before the Summit.224

However, The Arusha process represented a multi-pronged strategy of conflict management. A preliminary phase was designed to obtain a ceasefire. The earlier N’Sele and Gbadolite ceasefire agreements were amended to form the basis of the Arusha ceasefire, announced on 12 July 1992. All the ceasefires were violated, but the process permitted continuous communication and led to the establishment of monitoring machinery. In particular, the Arusha process implemented a mechanism agreed to in earlier negotiations: a Joint Political Military Committee (JPMC) ran parallel to the Arusha talks and provided an escape valve that allowed all parties to discuss violations of the ceasefire without derailing the broader negotiations. The negotiations on substantive issues of the conflict, which started in mid-1992, covered the rule of law, the establishment of transitional institutions, the repatriation of refugees and resettlement of the internally displaced, and the integration of the two armed forces into one integrated national army.225

The central problem lay elsewhere. Given the starting point of an authoritarian regime, it was evident that any progress in the negotiations would require significant

223 ibid, p 23.
224 Ibid, p 23.
concessions from the government. The existing power-holders had already tasted loss when reluctantly agreeing to a coalition government. This was nothing, however, in comparison with the radical changes spelled out in the full Arusha accords. In effect, the Accords represented a veritable coup d’état for the RPF and the internal opposition, as a close observer later noted by Reyntjens.\textsuperscript{226}

The Accords moved Rwanda from a presidential to a parliamentary system of politics. Most of the power of the Presidency would be transferred to a Council of Ministers. President Habyarimana, who was to occupy the Presidency during the transition period prior to elections – was left with a ceremonial position. During the transition period, seats in the Council of Ministers of a Broad-based Transitional Government (BBTG) would be divided between the government and the internal opposition parties as well as the RPF.\textsuperscript{227}

The ruling party (MRND) was given 5 out of 19 portfolios, which were shared amongst other opposition parties, to the authoritarian government, this was seen as politically insignificant. The regime also would lose power in local administrative structures and the judicial branch.

The distribution of portfolios agreed to at Arusha accentuated the dramatic nature of the change. Ideologically and politically, the Broad-based Transitional Government represented a frontal attack on the power base erected by the Habyarimana government during twenty years of ruling the country a denial of authoritarian rule, of “Hutu power”, and especially north west-based Hutu power, which was the regional constituency and political backbone of the regime.

The terms of the Agreement signalled a pluralist state and a civil society, and the

\textsuperscript{227} The Arusha Accords (also Arusha Peace Agreement, or Arusha negotiations) were a set of five accords (or protocols) signed in Arusha, Tanzania on August 4, 1993, by the government of Rwanda and the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), under mediation, to end a three-year Rwandan Civil War.
idea of a people united by a common Rwandese nationality rather than divided along narrow lines into Hutu versus Tutsi. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda was sadly accompanied by a lack of significant and concerted international reaction, especially from the UN. On the contrary, at the peak of genocide, the UNAMIR force numbers, were scaled down, the UN evidently could not stop the massacres.

The Role of the United Nations (UN) in both Rwanda and Darfur. In the case of Rwanda, the Rwanda of 1994 was ground zero of a country and an organization. It wrecked the lives of a million people. It also shattered the credibility of the UN conflict management system.

Twenty one years since the genocide in 1994, Rwanda can be considered as having embarked on a practical post-conflict reconstruction and healing process. In 2003, a new constitution was adopted, while development plans were further laid out. The efforts have paid off as Rwanda’s economy is said to be growing and the rule of law has been restored while efforts towards healing and reconciliation are ongoing.

Rwanda is a much highlighted case study of post-conflict reconstruction in the scholarly, policy and practice community. Moreover, Rwanda may serve as a good lesson in exposing the gaps within the international system.

Efforts towards rebuilding peace in Rwanda have been geared to addressing the deep-seated origins of the conflict, reconciling Rwandans and building trust among Rwandans. The Gacaca courts were set up to pave way for accountability by trying approximately 1.5 million cases of genocide (Article of the Organic Law, 2010). The Gacaca courts tried cases of crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity which were committed from October 1990 to 31 December 1994. With the conclusion of the Gacaca

228 The Arusha Accords, Tanzania on August 4, 1993.
229 Touko Piparinen. The Transformation of UN Conflict Management: Producing Images of Genocide from Rwanda to Darfur and Beyond. (Routledge, 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Oxon OX1441, 2010), P. X
court hearings in 2010, and the positive review of this mechanism, the Rwandan
government has had to institutionalize traditional methods of conflict management in its
legal system.

The rationale provided by the government in institutionalizing traditional methods
of conflict management was that this would ensure that Rwandans remain empowered to
address their problems before resorting to the formal court system. This has been made
possible through the promotion of various home grown solutions (endogenous systems)
including the Abunzi, which is a mechanism for mediation.

2.7 Summary

The 1994 civil war and genocide in Rwanda can be attributed to three main causal
factors; Firstly, the negative influence of colonialists in Rwanda. Secondly, the failure of
the government and international community to give attention to basic human needs like
the issue of identity, security and many others. Refugees in neighbouring countries were
denied the right to nationality – hence conflict was inevitable. Third, is the failure of the
international community to draw lessons from past experiences like the holocaust, the
Armenian and many others to prevent future genocide. The colonialists manipulated the
ethnicity to entrench the divide and rule system. The post-independence governments
worked to serve the interest of colonial masters and the institutions inherited were
basically colonial tailored, meant to serve former masters. Conflict management
endeavours were not conclusive and lacked ownership, probably, due to the fact that, it
was externally driven and had some gaps.

Analysed carefully, it is clear that the relationship of the Hutus and Tutsis were
nowhere as strained before the European colonists arrived. Despite the Hutus being
submissive, their relationship with the Tutsi was relatively comfortable. The colonists

Press.)
were the factor that soured the relationship, and led to the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. This is viewed from the role played by divisive politics, which characterised Rwanda’s governance system, since independence to genocide period. Therefore, this study argues that, the attainment of independence only symbolised a change of colour from white to black – it was now Africans oppressing fellow Africans. Further, it has been observed that since the convention on the prevention of genocide was ratified in 1951, the international community has continuously failed to learn lessons from the past tragedies so as to produce strategies to prevent future genocides.

Furthermore, fundamental universal values or human needs must be met if societies are to be stable. That this is so thereby provides a non-ideological basis for the establishment of institutions and policies. Unless identity needs are met in multi-ethnic societies, unless in every social system there is distributive justice, a sense of control and prospects for the pursuit of all other human societal developmental needs, instability and conflict are inevitable.232

Finally, Rwanda can serve as a rich knowledge hub to extract information in form of lessons to help avert current crisis in Darfur and future violent conflicts and genocide as well post conflict peace building mechanisms.

232 Christian Ndubueze Anyanwu, Creative Strategies for Conflict Management & Community Building (Bloomington, Indiana, United States of America, 2009), P. 60.
Chapter Three
Conflict and Conflict Management in Darfur

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Build up to the Darfur Genocide

This section analyses, literature identified with the developments to the 2003 Genocide in Darfur, these incorporate; the origin of the conflict, Pre-colonial Times, the colonial times, the 2003 Genocide in Darfur. It likewise gives a critical audit, identifies the gaps and finally identifies the conflict management endeavours in Darfur, Current Situation and summary.

Ten years after the Rwanda genocide occurred while the world watches and refuses to say its name. The failure of the United States and the international community to act in Rwanda a decade ago led to the loss of over 800,000 lives. Now, up to 1 million people face a similar fate in Darfur, western Sudan, as a result of an ongoing government campaign to destroy a portion of its population.233

Darfur means that the ‘land of the Fur’ people. It is located in the modern western Sudanese region, inhabited by between 5-7 million people of different ethnic groups.234 The population is predominantly Muslims. Semi-nomadic, farmers and nomadic groups had co-existed in social and economic interdependence and when disputes over scarce grazing land and water rose, it was normally settled by traditional means.235

Sudan is the largest country, by area, in Africa and the tenth largest country in the world. Sudan has been embroiled in internal conflicts since independence in 1956. Most recently, a violent conflict involving the central government, armed militias, and several opposition groups has devastated Darfur, the westernmost region of Sudan. Darfur’s

233 Salih Booker and Ann Louise Colgan (2004), Genocide in Darfur. The Nation Press.
conflict is complex, involving many factions and spreading into neighbouring countries.

Since early 2003, the government of Sudan has responded to an insurgency by rebel groups in Darfur by unleashing its proxy Janjaweed militias on the rebel tribal groups. The government supported the resulting ethnic cleansing campaign with well-coordinated air strikes and joint ground operations. The two main rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), are recruited mainly from the largely agrarian Fur and Massalit and the mostly nomadic Zaghawa, the three largest Darfurian groups of African descent.236

The strategy of the government has been to ‘drain the swamp’ by driving civilians from their villages, thereby denying the rebels sanctuary in much of Darfur. This campaign has left more than 200,000 dead, most from conflict-related disease and malnutrition. More than two million have been forced from their homes.237

Flint and Dawaal states that the conflict in Darfur has escalated for quite some time now - this, despite much international attention received both from international law and international relations scholars. While the media are more interested in sensationalising the conflict, scholars are interested in determining the category of crimes, if any, that the atrocities fit in.

Although opinions seem to differ as to the correct categorization of the crimes and those responsible, there seems to be a consensus that the atrocities constitute, at the minimum, violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law.238

Some in the international community, including the United States, has called this conflict

237 Ibid, p. 262
genocide. Others have argued that the conflict, although exceedingly violent, cannot be called genocide.

According to the Genocide Convention, the atrocities in Darfur clearly constitute genocide according to the legal standards set forth in the convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide of 1948 (genocide convention), the genocide convention established a three-pronged test to determine genocide:

First, article one states that the acts in question must be perpetrated against a “national, racial, ethnic or religious group.” Second, the accused party must have committed one of five enumerated acts: killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, imposing conditions on a group calculated to bring about their destruction in whole or in part, preventing births within the group, or forcibly transferring children from the group, and finally, the accused party must have perpetrated the acts in question with the intent to destroy the group in whole or in part.

Anderson observes that since violence erupted in early 2003, the Sudanese government’s indiscriminate aerial bombings, military attacks and raids by the government backed militias have claimed more than 70,000, others put the numbers to 400,000 lives and displaced millions internally and internationally. The situation is termed “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis” or “genocide” by the United Nations and the United States respectively.

Anderson further states that the structural causes of the Darfur conflict are rooted

---

240 Kofi Annan’s April 7, 2004 Action Plan to Prevent Genocide, the 10th anniversary of the 1994 Genocide In Rwanda, Annan announced his Action Plan and announced the future appointment of a Special Advisor on Genocide Prevention.
241 Article II, In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such : (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
in two major elements: the legacy of colonialism in the Sudan and the formation of a post-colonial ‘predatory’ state.\textsuperscript{243}

According to Khalid, Sudan or ‘Bilad al Sudan\textsuperscript{244}’ (the land of the blacks) is the largest country in the African continent. Sudan’s vast territory is rich in natural resources, including oil, gold, and various minerals. Its territory is also dominated by the Nile and its tributaries; therefore, Sudan enjoys major resources for hydropower.

In addition, the fertile soil along the Nile is the key hub for agricultural development that has made Sudan the ‘bread basket’ of the continent. Sudan’s administrative central government was established and located in the northern region of Khartoum; but recruited labour (slaves) and exploited resources (mostly agricultural products such as cotton, grains, spices, and later oil revenues) hail from the southern and western regions.\textsuperscript{245}

The ‘metropole’ economy created by the colonial structure left a heavy imprint on the modern Sudanese state which inevitably became dependent on the exploitation of its regional resources - in both natural and human labour matters.\textsuperscript{246}

The region of Darfur is roughly the size of France. The people of Darfur are predominantly Muslim. There are large populations of both Arabs and Africans. Tensions over land and grazing rights between Arabs, most of whom are nomadic herders, and Africans, who are mainly farmers, have existed for most of the region’s history. More recently, the African population has been frustrated by what it claims is the central

\textsuperscript{243} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{244} The name Sudan, originally it comes from the term ‘Bilad -al- Sudan’ which means “Land of Blacks”. So the term is a mere derivation from the Arabic word ‘Sauod’ meaning ‘Blacks’ as an indication to the skin colour of the inhabitants living in the region. The term is said to be used by Arab travelers, geographers and historians who first wrote the history of the region. In course of the African part known as Sudan, ancient history indicates to the area lying from Ethiopia and Eritrea on the Eastern Coast of Africa stretching to Ghana, Guinea and Mali on the Western Coast of Africa. On such basis, ancient history divides the region into three divisions: Eastern Sudan, Central Sudan and Western Sudan.
\textsuperscript{246} Ibid, p 16.
government lack of support during has prolonged droughts and near-famine conditions. Many believe the government favours Darfur’s Arab population.247

Opposition groups also state that the African populations of Darfur have long been marginalized by the government. They observe that Darfur was left out of the peace negotiations with southern Sudan in which issues such as representation within the government were discussed. The Sudanese government, on the other hand, claims that the conflict in Darfur is rooted in competition for land among various ethnic groups in the region.248

Since the initial rebellion in 2003, violence between rebel forces and government militia and the Janjaweed has spread across the region. The government militia and the Janjaweed have targeted civilians and villages that it claims are harbouring rebel forces. Aerial bombing has destroyed numerous villages. Although the government denies its involvement in the bombings, it is the only force in Sudan that owns helicopters and planes. At the same time, the Janjaweed has looted and burned villages and crops, and poisoned water supplies. Tens of thousands of civilians have been killed by various groups in the conflict and many more have been raped.249

Opposition groups have forced many young boys within refugee camps to join their forces. Fighting among rebel factions occurs both within the camps and outside of them. Other groups, capitalizing on the instability, rob supply convoys and international aid efforts. The conflict in Darfur is in its eleventh year and has and is believed to have caused over 200,000 deaths and led to 2.5 million people being displaced, according to the United Nations. The roots causes of the crisis lie in natural resources, ethnic conflicts,

political and economic marginalization and ecological factors. The lack of infrastructure, investment in physical and human resources, absence of basic human services and rare employment opportunities for the vast majority of people in the region are all at the core of the conflict.

The crisis developed from long-standing tensions between nomadic Arab herders and their African farming neighbours. Nomad, semi-nomadic groups and farmers have long co-existed in social and economic interdependence. When disputes arose over the scarce grazing land and water, localized armed conflict was usually settled by traditional means. Conflicts initially occurred between Fur cultivators and nomads, moving south in search of pastures.

The tensions in Darfur were exacerbated by the lack of resources in the region and civil strife putting communities against each other in competition for water and land. Ecological devastation and its consequences for the population is one of the root causes of the current situation besides the ethnic factor and the political situation. The region has three distinct ecological zones: Camel nomads roam the northern zone of Darfur, which is part of the Sahara. The both farmers and nomads- moving south in search of water and pastures have been commonplace periodically flaring into bitter fighting between the two groups during the dry season over water and the Arabs driving their herds on the farmers land.

3.2.1 Pre-colonial Times

The Sultanate of Darfur was a pre-colonial Nile Valley state in present-day Sudan. It functioned independently from 1603 to October 24, 1874. According to Ahmed, Abdel and Manger, Darfur is composed mostly of semi-arid plains that cannot support a dense

---

252 Ibid, 29.
population. The one exception is the area in and around the *Jebal Marra* Mountains. It was from bases in these mountains that a series of groups expanded to control the region. The *Daju* and the 14th century migrants the *Tunjur* were the earliest powers in Darfur according to written records. The transition of power from the Daju to the Tunjur was facilitated through marriage.²⁵⁴

Eventually the Tunjur began marrying amongst the Fur people producing Sultan Dali, a celebrated figure in Darfur histories, who was on his mother's side a Fur, and thus brought the dynasty closer to the people it ruled. Dali divided the country into provinces, and established a penal code, which, under the title of Kitab Dali or Dali's Book, is still preserved, and differs in some respects from Quranic law. His grandson Suleiman (or "Sulayman", usually distinguished by the Fur epithet Solon, meaning "the Arab" or "the Red") reigned from 1603 to 1637, and was a great warrior and a devoted Muslim.²⁵⁵

Suleiman Solon is considered as the founder of the Keira dynasty and the sultanate of Darfur. During the 17th century, the Keira sultans introduced the feudal *hakura* system into Darfur.²⁵⁶ For several centuries, the Fur was the dominant political power in the region, particularly in the pre-colonial era. In the seventeenth century, they established a kingdom that shared many of the characteristics of other Muslim states in the Sahelian belt. (The Sahel or the Sudanic belt refers to the region south of the Sahara Desert, stretching from the Atlantic Ocean in the west to the Nile basin in the east.) From its capital at Al-Fasher, the Darfur kingdom established extensive political and commercial links with these states as well as with Egypt and North Africa.²⁵⁷

The Fur kingdom remained the leading regional power until it was destroyed in

²⁵⁵ Ibid.
1874 by the forces of Al-Zubair Rahmad, the northern Sudanese trader and adventurer, who brought it under the Turco-Egyptian colonial administration (1820-1884). Turco-Egyptian rule was overthrown in 1884 by an Islamic revivalist movement, known as the Mahdiyya-led by Muhammad Ahmad Ibn Abdalla, who claimed to be the Mahdi or the guided one. Many Darfurians supported the Mahdiyya and were among its most loyal followers. The Khalifa `Abdullahi, successor of the Mahdi, was a native of Darfur.

The Mahdist state ruled the Sudan until 1898 when it was conquered by the Anglo-Egyptian armies. Following the establishment of an Anglo-Egyptian regime, the kingdom of Darfur was revived by Ali Dinar, a descendant of the royal lineage of the earlier kingdom, and a general in the Mahdist army.

The Sultanate of Darfur remained independent until World War I. However, as a consequence of Ali Dinar's links with the Ottoman Empire during the war, the British invaded and annexed Darfur into the Anglo-Egyptian domain in 1916.

Since its independence in 1956, Sudan has been bedeviled by a succession of civil wars and political instability. The Darfur conflict should be seen as part of these larger, ongoing series of Sudanese crises, with one conflict spilling from one part of the country to another. The first and the most notorious of these struggles was the North–South conflict, which ended with the signing of the peace agreement in 2005 (after two rounds of fighting, 1955-1972 and 1983-2005). Regional conflicts also occurred in the Nuba Mountains, the Upper Blue Nile, and the Beja region in the eastern parts of the country.

These conflicts can be attributed to the deeply rooted regional, political, and economic inequalities that have persisted throughout Sudan's colonial and post-colonial history. These inequalities are exemplified by the political, economic, and cultural


84
hegemony of a small group of Arabic-speaking Sudanese elites who have held power and systematically marginalized the non-Arab and non-Muslim groups in the country's peripheries.\textsuperscript{263}

3.2.2 The Colonial Times

Under the British, there was little or no development in Darfur; for young Darfurian men, there were from the 1930s onwards, basically, two options, to join the army or work in the Gezira cotton fields. If they opted for the former, they often ended fighting in the South under Northern officers, if the latter, they came under the influence of the Mahdist or Umma political movement; they were thus either cannon or voting fodder.

This continued long after independence, but with the added dimension that what little development there was in Darfur (largely around Nyala and the southwest) was in the hands of the jallaba, Northern Sudanese leaders, the ethnic kin of the ruling quasi-colonial administration based in the Mudiriyya or province headquarters in al-Fashir.\textsuperscript{264}

The first stirrings of Darfur discontent came in the mid-1960s with various movements, Suni and Red Fire, largely Fur in membership (the largest ethnic group in Darfur) and largely the work of disgruntled soldiers returning from the South. A change came in 1966 with the establishment of the Darfur Development Front, in which the small group of Darfur students at the University of Khartoum attempted to mediate between the tribal ruling establishment at home and the national political establishment in Khartoum.\textsuperscript{265} At first, this mediatory role was quite successful, but there was a tendency for Darfur interests to be subordinated to those of the centre.

Also at the heart of the competition over resources is the question of land

\textsuperscript{263} Prunier, Gérard (2005), \textit{Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide}. London: Christopher Hurst, pp 212.


\textsuperscript{265} Ibid.
ownership. The land tenure system in Darfur has evolved over several centuries, producing a current hybrid set of practices that have tended to increase inter-communal tensions. Under the Fur kingdom, land ownership was based on the Hakura system. The term came from Arabic Hikr, meaning ownership. 266

According to this system, each group was given a Hakura, or Dar, which is regarded as the property of the whole community. The local chief was the custodian of the Dar and was responsible for its allocation to members of his group for cultivation. The Dar was revered by the people of Darfur. Belonging to a Dar became an integral part of the person’s identity. 267 At the same time, successive rulers of Darfur allocated land to specific individuals - such as high-ranking officials of the kingdom - for personal ownership.

Still under British colonial rule, the land tenure system was modified to suit the system of indirect rule or what was called native administration. As in other parts of Africa, colonial officials in Darfur found it convenient to assume that local chiefs had defined authority over ethnic groups and jurisdiction over corresponding territory. Hence, the application of native administration involved the assignment to each group of specific territories. Local chiefs were then given the authority to allocate land to the residents. 268

Both the system of land tenure and native administration underwent major changes during the post-colonial period. Post-independence Sudanese rulers regarded native administration as an archaic system that was part of the colonial legacy and gradually dismantled it. Most importantly, these policies led to the erosion of the chiefs’ authority. 269 In turn, the changes to the land system diminished their ability to settle inter-

269 Chorbaijan, Levon (1999), Introduction. In: Chorbaijan, Levon and George Shirinian eds. Studies in
communal disputes.

The British understood early on that Darfur could only be run through a system of “controlled violence”, that is in an area of ethnic and ecological diversity, of permeable borders across which ethnicities can change very rapidly, of disparities of power, and very long ethnic memories, mechanisms for averting or containing violence were vital. These mechanisms came from above and below; from below they were embodied in practices like the judiyya, the diya or “blood compensation” (sometimes called sadaqa), reconciliation across ethnic boundaries (sulh or musallaha, mediated by the “elders” or ajawid)) and the like, designed to minimize or contain violence.\textsuperscript{270}

These institutionalized forms of conflict management, which were not formally judicial procedures, had as a fundamental purpose the avoidance of the involvement of the centre, from above, under the sultans, if a conflict ended up in al-Fashir, there was only one punishment, death. This system continued under the British, who could alone inflict the death penalty.\textsuperscript{271}

The destruction of the old order, or its delegitimisation simply meant that the mechanisms for controlling violence were no longer in place. This loss of legitimacy was being played out against environmental changes that were scarcely understood at the time. With the politicization of the conflict from the mid-90s, the response of the Khartoum Government was to arm Arab nomad militias, the Janjaweed, which in turn produced political movements of resistance. The conflict became internationalized in 2003 and the situation has deteriorated drastically ever since.\textsuperscript{272}

The government in Khartoum had never been freed from the impact of colonialist policy. Khartoum, the administrative and political capital, were built on exploitive and

\textsuperscript{270} Ibid, p 71.
\textsuperscript{272} Ibid, p 60.
divisive culture dating back to the Turco-Egyptian and Anglo-Egyptian colonial periods in the 18th century. The ‘divide and rule’ strategies that the rulers have applied since then have brought about “the problems of the unequal distribution of wealth present in the modern Sudan and the irregular modern development.”

The Egyptian penetration and assimilation of the Nubia region began as early as the Old Kingdom since 2575-2134 BC. During the overlap of Mahdiyya (1881-98) and Turco-Egyptian (1885-1899) periods, Arab-Muslim dominion in the Sudan was intensively promoted. In contrast, the British colonial ‘divide and rule’ policy (1899-1956), which divided Sudan along both geographical and ethnical lines to enhance central imposition of political and social orders, created a Sudan that is deeply divided between Muslim-Arab and the African blacks, and between North and South.

Africans were converted to Christianity and enjoyed government privileges. These elements created the divisive, exploitive and discriminatory practices that provided the potential for ethnic and political clashes in both colonial and the independent Sudan state. Darfur was a sultanate that emerged in 1650 in the area of the Jebel Marrah plateau and survived with some interruptions until it fell into the British hands in 1917 and was incorporated into the Sudan proper.

3.2.3 The Darfur Genocide

Fast forward nearly twelve years in the Darfur region of western Sudan. Since February of 2003, when Darfurian rebels rose up against what they perceived as increasingly heavy-handed and oppressive rule of the Islamic government in Khartoum, a brutal counterinsurgency has been underway that has resulted in hundreds of thousands

275 Ibid, pp 120 - 124.
of civilian deaths and millions more displaced.\textsuperscript{276}

In this conflict, the spectre of genocide was raised amidst findings that Khartoum's strategy in combating the insurgency was essential to depopulate the countryside of "sympathetic" Darfurian civilians. The majority were from members of the Fur, Massaleit, and Zaghawa tribes? By arming and providing air support to Arab militias called Janjaweed, who would attack villages, kill, rape, and forcibly displace at will.\textsuperscript{277}

Many of the displaced would starve to death in flight or die slowly of disease and malnutrition in refugee and displacement camps.\textsuperscript{278}

The killings began in 2003 and continue still today, as the first genocide in the 21st century. Darfur conflict which has been considered as genocide in Sudan has escalated to become the world’s greatest humanitarian crisis.\textsuperscript{279} Regrettably various organisations tend to differ when it comes to categorization of the conflict, whether to be qualified as genocide or otherwise and this has contributed to continuing sufferings of innocent civilians. This controversy has led to unclear reports regarding total fatalities as a result of conflicted related causes. Some reports indicate as high as up to 300,000 deaths and two million displaced persons now indicate the scale of casualties.\textsuperscript{280}

The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) estimated in early 2006 that

\textsuperscript{276} Heinze Eric A. The Rhetoric of Genocide in U.S. Foreign Policy: Rwanda and Darfur Compared, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 122, No. 3 (Fall, 2007), pp. 360
\textsuperscript{278} Heinze Eric A. The Rhetoric of Genocide in U.S. Foreign Policy: Rwanda and Darfur Compared, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 122, No. 3 (Fall, 2007), pp. 360
\textsuperscript{279} Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, (2004), The Crisis in Darfur, Written Remarks to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
\textsuperscript{280} Andrew S. Natsios (2012), Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur: What Everyone Needs to Know, (Oxford University Press, New York), P. xx.
more than 3.5 million people in Darfur are in need of food.\textsuperscript{281} An estimated 13,000 humanitarian aid workers, mostly the Sudanese working for the international organizations, are providing aid to victims.\textsuperscript{282}

The conflict in Darfur has historical roots, but escalated in February 2003, when two rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) drawn from members of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa ethnic groups, demanded an end to the chronic economic marginalization and sought power-sharing within the Arab-ruled Sudanese state. They also sought government action to end the abuses of their rivals, Arab pastoralists who were driven onto African farmlands by drought and desertification and who had a nomadic tradition of armed militias.\textsuperscript{283}

The Khartoum government was adamant in providing a positive answer to their concerns, and as a result the inhabitants from the aforementioned tribes, opted to carry out an armed attack against the government. In the Darfur conflict, the religious aspect does not seem to be a factor for the reason that the parties involved are predominantly Muslim. Ethnic distinctions in the region are often ambiguous—there are some 30 ethnic groups settled in the Darfur region with intermarrying mixes of African and Arab.\textsuperscript{284}

Nevertheless, the conflict is often depicted as between Arab nomadic groups and African settled tribes. This depiction has been enhanced by the government-supported militias called Janjaweed, or “devil on a horse,” Arab militias who have used and operated alongside the Sudanese government security forces in attacking villages, burning villages, rape and to uproot settlements of rebel groups in Darfur.

According to the United Nations human rights council, more than 2.7 million

\begin{itemize}
  \item World Food Programme (2005), \textit{Seeks to feed more than half Darfur’s population}. United Nations.
\end{itemize}
people are internally displaced and more than 350,000 are refugees in neighbouring Chad. More than 400,000 have been killed; approximately 5,000 people die each month. The Sudanese government denies any culpability for the violence, displacement, and deaths.\textsuperscript{285}

Discrimination along ethnic lines, marginalization of the African tribes from the central government power, and uneven distribution of national wealth has a long history and has produced overt violence in the Sudan – the protracted north-south civil war is an example. Pervasive resistance has been a constant threat to Khartoum authority over the country.\textsuperscript{286}

Therefore, “whether in the interest of security, access to resources, ideology, race or religion and sometimes all of the above - Sudan's government is willing to destroy the lives and livelihoods of millions of its own citizens to maintain its grip on power”. The failure of the Sudanese government to synchronize their exertion of power over Darfur resulted in a bloody conflict.\textsuperscript{287}

Conflict between pastoralists and sedentary farmers, caused in part by environmental pressures and changing land ownership patterns, was an important cause of the Darfur violence. Pastoral nomadism is the main means of livelihood for many Darfurians. One of the most prominent cattle-herding groups in this region are the Arabic-speaking Baqqara, who are scattered between Kordofan and Darfur provinces. The Baqqara consist of several ethnic groups such as the Ta’isha, Rizaiqat, Beni Helba, Misairiyya, and others.\textsuperscript{288}

The desert region of northern Darfur is inhabited by camel-owning nomads who were known locally as \textit{abbala} (camel owners). The nomads were not part of the hakura system. Hence, the nomads had to rely on customary rights to migrate and pasture their

\textsuperscript{285} Ibid, p 112.
\textsuperscript{287} Ekwe-Ekwe, Herbert (2007), \textit{Biafra revisited}. Dakar, African Renaissance.
animals in areas dominated by farmers. As the nomads moved between the northern and the southern part of the region, specific arrangements for animal routes were made by their leaders and those of the farming communities, and these arrangements were sanctioned by the government.\textsuperscript{289}

The system worked for decades until the drought of the 1980s. As the climate changed, the expected dates of crop harvest became unpredictable, and many farmers began to switch to animal husbandry and needed grazing land. Environmental degradation and competition over resources can be understood as principal causes of communal conflict in Darfur, but the ongoing carnage is also a product of a long history of ethnic marginalization and manipulation by Sudan's ruling elites.\textsuperscript{290}

The post-colonial governments were dominated by the Arabic-speaking elites from the central and the northern parts of the country. In addition to concentrating economic development in their home regions, these elites tried to forge a national identity based on Arabism and Islam. These policies generated a tenacious resistance by the non-Arab and non-Muslim groups in the marginalized region of the South, the Nuba Mountains, and the Red Sea region.\textsuperscript{291}

A number of regionally and ethnically-based rebel movements emerged in the 1950s and the 1960s, particularly in the South where a civil war raged for several decades. In Darfur, an organization called the Darfur Development Front was formed in the mid-1960s to advocate the region's demands for economic development and greater autonomy, but it remained a relatively small movement.

Nonetheless, a strong sense of deprivation continued to prevail among Darfurians and continued to shape their relationship with the Khartoum governments. If internal tensions were not enough, Darfur has also suffered from the instability and conflicts that

\textsuperscript{289} Ekwe-Ekwe, Herbert (2007), Biafra revisited. Dakar, African Renaissance, p 89.
\textsuperscript{290} Ibid, p 91.
have plagued its neighbours, particularly Chad and Libya. A number of Darfur ethnic groups such as the Zaghawa, Masalit, and Mahiriyya also live in Chad, which has made it easier for conflicts to spread across borders.  

Porous, ethnically intertwined borders affected Darfur during the Chadian civil wars of the 1980s, in which Libya became heavily involved. In addition to mounting a series of military adventures in Chad, Libya supported various Chadian factions who used Darfur as a rear base, pillaging local farmers and cattle-herders and pouring large quantities of arms into the region.  

The scheme involved recruiting and arming discontented Arabic-speaking and Tuareg groups in the Sahel into what came to be known as the "Islamic Legion" as the spearhead in Libya's offensive in Chad. Some of the legion's members were also drawn from the Arabic-speaking pastoralists in Darfur.  

Subsequent negotiations with the government commenced, but instead of yielding positive results, left the rebel groups breaking apart into splinter groups and thus contributing to the complexity of the problem. When conflict broke out in Darfur early in 2003, there were just two major rebel groups. Since then, the insurgents have splintered into an array of competing factions, complicating already tense peace negotiations.  

The SLM splits into two major factions–SLM-M and SLM-A. In May 2006, the SLM-M was the only rebel party to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) with the central government and has since become part of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in Khartoum. In fact, the SLM-M has been acting as a military force in Darfur for the

292Ibid, p 5.  
Another significant rebel group is the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), a broader political movement that is reportedly backed by the NIF founder Hassan al-Turabi. Al-Turabi is based in Eritrea and the JEM movement has been linked to unrest in the eastern border of Sudan. In June 2006, these groups, who did not sign the DPA, reformulated into a new organization called the National Redemption Front (NRF). Nevertheless, the rebel groups have splintered to as many as 15 factions at any one time.\(^ {297} \)

The number of interacting factors, including ethnic conflict, and a perception of Darfur marginalization, led to the formation of two political and military resistance movements Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) against the government in Khartoum. They have since formulated and articulated political demands and have indicated their willingness to negotiate.\(^ {298} \)

The rebels complain against the central government come as a result of long neglect of the vast arid region since independence. The political marginalization and economic inequality exacerbated the conflict and resulted in the current situation. The Government’s response, however, was to politicize the conflict by allying with the Arabs and labeling the rebels as simply a gang of bandits and ignoring their political agenda.\(^ {299} \) The government launched a major offensive in July 2003 that led to an escalation of the current crisis resulting in the displacement of millions of people.

### 3.3 Conflict Management efforts in the Darfur

A ceasefire negotiated in neighbouring Chad with the aim of ending the conflict collapsed because the government has not kept its part of the deal, such as stop all its

military operations and especially rein in the Janjaweed. In fact Osman Youssef Kibir, the governor of North Darfur, has admitted that militiamen acting in the name of the government executed civilians in his province, although he denied that the government bore any responsibility for their acts. The government overrun a number of camps held by the fighters of the Movement for Justice and Equality (MJE), one of the fighting factions in Darfur. Then it turned its wrath against the other faction, the Sudan Liberation Army and has surrounded Jebal Marra, their stronghold, with the full might of its armed forces and its allies.

Much of the tension in Darfur results from the same issues that led Southern Sudan to take up arms back in 1983 - a central government that exploits local resources, imposes its cultural beliefs on the indigenous African population and consistently plays off local tribes and ethnic groups against each other for short-term gains. The Darfur Liberation Front – which later changed its name to the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) – took up arms last February because the Khartoum government had ‘introduced policies of marginalisation, racial discrimination and exploitation that had disrupted the peaceful coexistence between the region’s African sedentary and Arab nomad communities’.

Since the rebellion erupted the province is a war zone, with tremendous suffering inflicted on the civilian population by the army and the armed militias. SLA complains that the government in Khartoum, like all its predecessors, is dominated by the northern Arab elite and has ignored their needs. They argue that Darfur too should be offered a slice of a power-sharing deal and that its natural resources developed for the benefit of the local population.

301 Maximo, Dady De (2012). A Genocide that could have been avoided. New times, p 32.
302 Ibid, p 34.
Calling for a separation of state and religion, the SLA/SLM has spelled out their objective ‘to create a united democratic Sudan’ where the unity of the country will ultimately be based on the right to self-determination of the various peoples of Sudan. Also, they are asking for the establishment of an economy and a political system that addresses the uneven development and marginalisation that have plagued the country since independence. Yet these claims have no effect on the government. It continues to refuse to acknowledge the political motivation for the unrest and accuses Eritrea and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) of supporting and arming the rebels.\(^{303}\)

The peace process in the South has split both sides to the conflict. Tensions within the ruling circles in Khartoum and within the opposition SPLA have given rise to two anti-government militias. The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) have historical links to the Islamist regime, and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) to the southern guerrilla movement. The Justice and Equality Movement organised as part of the Hassan Turabi faction of the Islamists. Darfur, historically the mainstay of the Mahdist movement, was Turabi’s major claim to political success in the last decade.

When the Khartoum coalition – between the army officers led by Bashir and the Islamist political movement under Turabi – split, the Darfur Islamists fell out with both sides. JEM was organised in Khartoum as part of an agenda for regaining power. It has a more localised and multi-ethnic presence in Darfur and has been home to many who have advocated an ‘African Islamic’. The SLA is linked to the SPLA, which first tried to expand the southern-based armed movement to Darfur in 1990, but failed. The radical leadership of that thrust was decapitated in a government assault. Not surprisingly, the

---

new leadership of SLA has little political experience.\textsuperscript{304}

The present conflict began when the SLA mounted an ambitious and successful assault on El Fashir airport on 25 April 2003, on a scale larger than most encounters in the southern civil war. The government in Khartoum is also divided, between those who pushed the peace process, and those who believe too much was conceded in the Naivasha talks.\textsuperscript{305} This opposition the security cabal in Khartoum, responded by arming and unleashing several militias known as the Janjaweed. The result is a spiral of state-sponsored violence and indiscriminate spread of weaponry.

In summary, all those opposed to the peace process in the south have moved to fight in Darfur, even if on opposing sides. The Darfur conflict has many layers; the most recent but the most explosive is that it is the continuation of the southern conflict in the west.

Based on this, the UN raised the alarm about the crisis in Darfur in 2003, and finding a lasting resolution has been a top priority for the Security Council and two consecutive Secretaries-General. Under the auspices of the African Union (AU) and with the support of the UN and other partners, the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed on 5 May 2006. As few parties signed on, a renewed peace process under a joint AU-UN mediator took place in Doha, Qatar, over 2010 through June 2011, producing a framework document. Intensive diplomatic and political efforts to bring the non-signatories into an agreement with the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur continue.\textsuperscript{306}

The United Nations African Union hybrid mission IN Darfur (UNAMID) which stands at current strength as of 30\textsuperscript{th} September, 2014) 20238, (15,996 total uniformed personnel, 12,656 troops, 299 military observers, 3,041 police - including formed units,

\textsuperscript{305} Ibid.
1,022 international civilian personnel, 2,914 local civilian staff and 306 United Nations Volunteers\textsuperscript{307} are struggling to maintain peace- where in fact, there is no peace to keep due to lack of political will.

International leaders are pressuring the Sudanese government to support the humanitarian effort and to take positive steps in ending the violence. The leaders are mediating between Darfur rebel groups and the government of Sudan in hopes of achieving a peace agreement. Despite these negotiations, however, reports of attacks on civilians continue to emerge from Darfur and the situation appears to be worsening.

Meanwhile, public citizens from around the world are organizing websites, demonstrations, and campaigns to demand results from their governments in ending the suffering in Darfur. The world has shamelessly stood by as the atrocities are committed in Darfur, Sudan for the last several years. While 200,000-400,000\textsuperscript{308} have been killed and an estimated 2.5 million displaced\textsuperscript{309}

While various countries and institutions have characterized the killing in Darfur as "genocide" including the United States Government and others-various other key international actors, such as the United Nations\textsuperscript{7} ("U.N.") and certain international non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") have not done so. In fact, there is good reason to

\textsuperscript{307}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{308}A survey by the Coalition for International Justice puts the fatality figures near 400,000 from February 2003 to April 2005. See Eric Reeves, Quantifying Genocide in Darfur, SUDAN TRIB., and September, 17, 2006. Other studies have used figures of 170,000-255,000, 220,000-270,000, and even 500,000. See id.; see also Current Situation in Darfur: Hearing before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 53 (2007) (statement of Hon. Tom Lantos, Chairman, and Comm. on Foreign Affairs) (using a figure of "as many as 400,000 people ...."); Eric Reeves, Quantifying Genocide in Darfur (Part I), SUDANREEVES.ORG, April, 28, 2006, http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article/02.html (putting figure at over 450,000).
\textsuperscript{309}Warren Hoge, U.N. Secretary General to Meet Sudanese Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2007 ("An estimated 2.5 million people have been forced from their land in Darfur"). Human Rights Watch currently appears to be using the figure 2.4 million displaced. See human rights watch [hrw], darfur 2007: chaos by design peacekeeping challenges for amis and unamid 5 (2007), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2007/sudano9o7/sudan 9o7web. pdf [hereinafter chaos by design]. As of October 2007, the Office of the United Nations ("U.N.") Deputy Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General for Sudan U.N. Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator put the figure at 2,387,000 displaced, with 4.2 million "conflict-affected."
conclude that the killing is genocide.\textsuperscript{310}

In light of this, the most affected in the war torn Darfur, are the three major tribes which include; Zaghawa, who are in North Darfur; Masseleit, of West Darfur; and, Fur, who reside around the Jebel Marra Mountains in the eastern part of North Darfur. The name Darfur means “land of the Fur.” These three African tribes are generally identified with the resistance in Darfur and have been the victims in the conflict throughout. For decades, the traditional tribes have been attacked by nomadic groups in the competition for land and resources in the hostile Sub-Saharan climate; settled farmers require land to grow crops while nomadic herders need the land for the grazing of their livestock.

In the mid-1990s, some self-defense militias were organized among the Masseleit tribes in Western Darfur in response to raids by nomadic groups. In 1995, the Governor of West Darfur exacerbated an already tense situation by dividing traditional Masseleit lands into 13 emirates and allocating some of them to Arab groups.\textsuperscript{311} On the other hand, the Zaghawa tribes have significant military experience, with many members having been professionally trained in the Chadian and Sudanese armies. In March 2002, a new consolidated movement amongst the tribes gave the Chairmanship to the Fur, Military command to the Zaghawa, and Deputy Chairmanship to the Massaleit.\textsuperscript{312}

The Zaghawa forces continued to grow with support from the Zaghawa in the Chadian army. Sudanese president Al-Bashir accused Chadian president Idriss Déby, who is from a Zaghawa tribe, of supporting the rebel groups in Sudan. On February 2003, the three Darfur tribes launched the Darfur Liberation Front and changed its name to the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A). The rebels attacked police stations and a


\textsuperscript{311} Ibid.

government arms cache at the airport in El Fasher, the capital town of North Darfur. This was the spark that has since escalated the violence in Darfur.

For the reason that a considerable number of the government forces were committed in the southern Sudan conflict at the time, the government recruited local groups from the predominantly-Arab nomads to thwart the rebel movement in Darfur and this is how the Arab nomads (Janjaweed) came in. These Janjaweed militias went on a campaign of destroying Darfur villages, most often in coordination with government air support.

The Darfur crisis has been aggravated by the government’s lack of clear policy on the sharing of scarce resources, longstanding marginalisation, lack of attention to basic human needs among others. The approach of the government to use the Arab nomads as government militias against their fellow African Darfurian inhabitants, to carry out attacks, rape and destroy of villages has also aggravated the situation. As earlier alluded to, since 2003, an estimated two million people have been internally displaced in Darfur (IDP). Camps have reached capacity and humanitarian organizations in Darfur face continuous threats of expulsion from the Sudanese government.313

The United Nations African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), due to the vastness of Darfur has not been able to provide protection to civilians. Reports of killing and rape continue to emerge from Darfur. The UNAMID in Darfur is also not spared with regard to threats of being expelled out of Darfur.314 The estimates of deaths from the conflict have been wide-ranging. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimated there have been between 40,000 and 70,000 deaths in camps during a seven-month period of study in 2004. The U.S. Department of State estimated a two-year casualty total in Darfur, as of January 2005, of between 63,000 and 146,000 deaths. Independent researchers have

313 ibid, p. 9.
produced higher estimates of the number of casualties since 2003, approaching 400,000 deaths.\footnote{Ibid, p. 18.}

For several years, the African Union (AU) was reluctant to intervene because of the objection from Sudan and only after Sudan had been pressurized by external forces to agree, did the AU intervened. The intervention in Darfur led by international political efforts was initiated and in April 2004, the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement was signed in N’Djamena on 8 April 2004 by the Government of the Sudan, Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). It was not until early July 2004, when both the African Union and European Union sent monitors to monitor the Darfur crisis cease-fire signed in April 2004. This was the basis of origin of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). By the August of 2004, the African Union sent 150 Rwandan troops in to protect the ceasefire monitors. It, however, soon became apparent that 150 troops would not be enough, so they were joined by 150 Nigerian troops. The AMIS force was increased by 600 troops and 80 military observers. In July 2005, the force had increased by about 3,300 (with a budget of 220 million dollars).\footnote{David Lanz, Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace Processes: Sudan/Darfur, Abuja Negotiations and the DPA, p. 78.}

Shortly thereafter the N’Djamena agreement on 8 April 2004, in July 2004, the Inter-Sudanese Talks on Darfur, the “Abuja negotiations” commenced. The talks were co-mediated by Chad and the African Union (AU) and took place in Abuja, where they were held until their conclusion in May 2006. There was very little substantive progress in the first rounds of talks. It was only in July 2005 that the parties adopted the Declaration of Principles defining the core principles for the settlement of the Darfur conflict which also never materialized.\footnote{Ibid.} In April 2005, the AMIS force had reached 7,000 (at a cost of over
450 million dollars).\textsuperscript{318}

Under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1564, AMIS was to "closely and continuously liaise and coordinate at all levels" its work with the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).\textsuperscript{319} AMIS was the only external military force in Sudan's Darfur region until UNAMID was established. However, it was not able to effectively contain the violence in Darfur, more sizable, better equipped UN peacekeeping force was originally proposed for September 2006, but due to Sudanese government opposition, it was not implemented at that time. AMIS' mandate was extended repeatedly throughout 2006, while the situation in Darfur continued to escalate, until AMIS was finally replaced by UNAMID on December 31, 2007.

By July 2004, the U.S. Congress declared that genocide was occurring in Darfur. In September 2004, then-US Secretary of State Colin Powell agreed: “The study concludes that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility”.\textsuperscript{320} By contrast, the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the UN Secretary-General of January 2005 concluded that the Government of Sudan had not pursued a policy of genocide but that certain government officials and other individuals may have committed genocidal acts.\textsuperscript{321}

The Commission then produced a sealed list of suspects from the Sudanese government who is accused of violating international humanitarian law and human rights law and hindering the peace process. The list included, among others, Sudan’s Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior, security chief, and senior military commanders. The U.S. is not signatory to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in Hague, Netherlands, but

\textsuperscript{320} Ibid.
abstained on UN Security Council Resolution 1593 in March 2005 to allow the Commission’s referral of the cases to the ICC.\textsuperscript{322}

The Sudanese government is also not a signatory to the ICC and therefore does not recognize the validity of ICC involvement. The referral of individual names to the ICC sparked the Government of Sudan to threaten severe consequences for international forces if they move into Darfur. The African Union (AU) has repeatedly mediated in attempts to reach an agreement and has organized workshops on wealth sharing, power sharing, and security-related issues. By 2005, mediators were using the CPA of the southern Sudan conflict as a model framework. The result was the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), which was agreed to by the SPM-M. The U.S. continues to support a negotiated settlement between the remaining rebel groups and the Government of Sudan.\textsuperscript{323}

The challenge remains to get the different rebel groups to consolidate their demands in the negotiation process. The international community’s evasion of responsibility in large part lies in Africa’s lack of economic and strategic interest which leads to mediocre attitude from the West. The global community must be engaged in peacemaking efforts in Sudan by accelerating the pressure on the warring parties. This section will be looking at how some of the international players such as the Africa Union, the United Nations, the United States and how China responded to the crisis taking place in Darfur.

The African Union is made up of fifty-four African nations. In 2003 when the crisis began, they sent monitors to oversee the peace negotiations.\textsuperscript{324} Yet, the negotiations failed and they send about 3,000 troops in 2004 to protect and provide security for the


\textsuperscript{323} Ibid.

people in Darfur. Currently, there about 7,000 troops in Darfur. The AU has continued to try and negotiate peace talks between the government in Khartoum and the Darfur rebels, SLM and JEM. Early in 2004, the AU operated an overstretched 7,000-strong force in Darfur to provide safety for the Africans. As a result of financial constraints, the AMIS have been unable to stop the violence. With the deployment of the hybrid mission, in Darfur, the expectations from the Darfuri was that, UNAMID will make a significant difference, however, this is yet to be seen.

The UN was in a terrible position regarding the crisis in Darfur for a couple of reasons. First, they were already negotiating in the Naivasha peace agreement between the north and south people in Sudan. Then, the Khartoum kept playing Darfur against Naivasha; ultimately, they wanted to keep Darfur from getting military help from the international community. Secondly, the UN was at the forefront between humanitarian efforts in Southern Sudan and Darfur. Third, Kofi Annan, Secretary of the UN knew that the U.S administration did not like him, and they were willing to do anything to make sure that he took moves that could eventually end up being deadly. Fourth, the Arab/Black African split caused many tensions within the UN.

Lastly, the EU and America kept pushing the world body to take action and they were acting as if they weren’t responsible. Annan knew that the genocide convention in 1948 referred to the member states to take actions and Annan was afraid that the member state would force him to take action, but then negligent him by not providing the necessary resources such as financial, military and political support to assist in the crisis. Annan tried to act without upsetting things, but he appeared weak because the U.S. and some of his staff were insisting on more actions to be taken.

In June 2004, Annan was booed by protesters in Harvard Square and he stated,

325 Ibid.
327 Ibid. 142.
“Based on reports I have received I cannot at this stage call it genocide or ethnic cleansing yet.”\textsuperscript{328} Still, the pressures built up for the UN to take some actions in the crisis, and the more the situation heightens, the more Annan resisted the pressures because he knew that some of the people putting pressure had no real intention of taking action.\textsuperscript{329}

The International Criminal Court decided to start investigating the situation in Darfur in June 2005. They have decided to investigate the people involved in crimes against humanity: war crimes, genocides and other violations that took place. On February 27, 2007, the UN and the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague for the first time indicted the first two suspects for committing crimes against humanity.

Also, on April 27, 2007, “the ICC pretrial chamber issued warrants for Sudan’s state minister for humanitarian affairs with Ahmed Haroum and the Janjaweed militia leader Ali Kosheib for series of attacks in West Darfur in 2003 and 2004.”\textsuperscript{330} The Sudanese government publicly announced that they will not cooperate with the ICC in terms of prosecuting people; instead, they will try the victims in Darfur themselves. Then, they were supposed to hand over Haroum to the ICC, and the Sudanese government decided to nominate him as co-chair of the human rights investigation in Darfur.\textsuperscript{331}

Ultimately, it seems that the ICC is trying to establish some type of presence and is trying to prosecute the victims. However, since the Sudanese government is refusing to work with them, it makes it extremely hard to establish any sort of conclusion regarding the crimes against humanity. There were pressures being put on President Bush to do something about the crisis taking place in Darfur. There were pressures coming from different sides of the public about taking action and because they were still in the middle of the peace agreement between north and south Sudan, and people in his office did not

\textsuperscript{328} Ibid., 144.
\textsuperscript{329} Ibid., 147.
\textsuperscript{330} “Q & A: Crisis in Darfur.” Human Rights Watch. 4 May. 2004.
\textsuperscript{331} Ibid, p. 17.
really want them to put pressure on Khartoum. However, In July, 2004, the US Congress passed a Resolution urging the President to call the situation in Darfur Genocide but he did not call it genocide because he knew that they would not be taking any actions.

On Sept.9, 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell testifying in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called the situation in Darfur “Genocide.” He said: “When we reviewed the evidence, we concluded-I concluded- that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility and that genocide may still be occurring.” One would think that because this action was deemed genocide immediate actions would be taken place, but Powell went on to say, “No new action by the U.S is dictated by this determination.”

This was the first time since the 1948 convention on genocide prevention that someone has actually declared a tragedy that clearly qualifies as genocide, genocide. The U.S did not send any military intervention into Darfur; instead, promises were made that was never fulfilled or without any form of commitment. Immediately when Bush was reelected president, the U.S. interest in Darfur dropped.

However, Bush then decides to start fulfilling some of the promises that he made to the public before reelection.

In 2006, the Bush administration decided to appoint Andrew S. Natsios as a special envoy to the region and he continued to press for peace agreement between the Darfur government and the two rebel groups. The U.S. is deeply concerned about the violence taking place in Darfur killing innocent civilians, human rights workers and peacekeepers. The U.S has even asked China to use its influences with the Khartoum to work on a peace agreement. President Omar Al-Bashir of Darfur promised to end the violence in Darfur and he has not done so.

333 Ibid., 21.
334 Prunier, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide, 140.
On March 6, 2007 the US State Department released a damning human rights report on Sudan, which listed Sudan as a state guilty of genocide. The US government stated that genocide continued in Darfur and blamed both government and rebel forces for widespread impunity for crimes including torture by government authorities throughout the country and of rape and gang rape. According to the State Department, “genocide continued to ravage the Darfur region of Sudan. The government and government-backed Janjaweed militia bear the responsibility for the genocide in Darfur and all parties to the conflagration committed serious abuses.”

Throughout the year, the government still continued with their method of aerial bombardment. The discovery and exploitation of oil reserves in the South have since become a catalyst in the current situation of the prolonged civil wars. This has devastated economic structures and destabilized the social, political and religious life of the Sudanese people. Instead of uniting the country, the rush for oil and complicity of international corporations meddling in the Sudanese affairs has further polarized racial and religious identities.

China is one of the country that has great economic interest to the Khartoum government, and because of this interest, the process for peace in Darfur has slowed down. When the United Nations tried passing solutions to solve the problems, China would abstain because they believed that it would not be ‘morally’ good to get involved in the Darfur’s problems since they have a working relations with them. The president, Hu Jianto stated, “As for the cooperation between China and Africa, which is for the well-being of the peoples of both sides.

The study tried to impose our social systems and values and ideologues on other countries. The author believed that other countries have the wisdom and the right to

---

decide their own way of development.”

China is one of the most powerful countries and they play a major role in making decisions in terms of taking action in another country. If China decided to veto the resolution, much action cannot be taken from the rest of the other countries. According to the Online News Hour report, “China’s state owned China National Petroleum Corp is the largest foreign investor in Sudan’s oil sector.”

It is also reported that in 2005, they sold $24m worth of military materials to Sudan. Instead of them trying to take responsibility and using their power with the Sudanese government, they are solely concerned about themselves and making sure that their economic relations does not get affected. At the expense of salvaging geopolitics and business interests, these governments argue that “no political or intervention in internal affairs” even if it means local people suffer the consequences of such arguments.

3.4 The Current Situation in the Darfur Region

The security situation in Darfur has remained volatile since 2003, with significant inter-communal violence and fighting between government forces and rebels. The instability in the region continues to cause large-scale displacement. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that over 460,000 people had been displaced in Darfur in 2013, more than the number displaced in 2011 and 2012 combined.

On 27 October, the Misseriya and Salamat fought near Mukjar, Central Darfur, reportedly resulting in more than 20 deaths. These communities clashed again in several towns in Central Darfur from 6-8 November 2004, leaving a large number of dead and displaced persons. According to the American Refugee Committee, approximately 10,000

---

<http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/china-darfur_04-25-06.html>
338 Ibid.
Salamat were displaced by the fighting in November.\textsuperscript{339}

On 3 November 2005, rebels from the Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minnawi (SLA-MM) ambushed Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) soldiers in North Darfur, allegedly seizing two dozen SAF vehicles during the fighting and both sides apparently sustaining heavy casualties. On 10-11 November 2005, fighting between the Salamat and Taisha over land in South Darfur reportedly left more than 100 dead and over 300 people wounded. After members of the Hamar community killed a member of the Ma’aliya during a dispute over grazing land, inter-ethnic violence between the two communities erupted on 5 December in Um Deibut, West Kordofan. Twenty-two Hamar and 16 Ma’aliya reportedly died in the fighting, which displaced over 6,000 people.\textsuperscript{340}

On the 31st of July in 2007 the people of Darfur could finally see the end of a five year long genocide through the resolution 1769 mentioned above. The power of media would however be one of the strongest pulling forces in creating change in the UN. Many individuals, since the outbreak of the genocide in Darfur, reacted strongly in the public media to the fact that, the UN and UNSC were so slow in taking actions against the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed. The Chinese Olympics in Beijing around the corner in 2008, and prominent individuals such as Eric Reeves started to use mass media in order to promote the Olympics as the Genocide Olympics. The Olympics were of major importance to China as the Chinese would finally get the chance to show their great developments as a nation – and any kind of negative publicity could potentially destroy their vision of showing their success.\textsuperscript{341}

The force of the new promoted Genocide Olympics hit hard on China, and in 2007 the world could finally watch as the Resolution 1769 finally was voted through the UNSC.

without any abstentions and the UNAMID was finally set in order to face and end the genocide in Darfur.\textsuperscript{342}

The ICC investigation in Darfur and Sudan was officially opened by the prosecutor on June 5\textsuperscript{th}, 2005 after a demand from the UNSC. Even in the current phase, there are four ongoing cases which have suffered from major complications as the Sudanese government has refused to comply with the ICC. However, some prosecuted have appeared willingly in front of the court.\textsuperscript{343} The president of Sudan at the time of the genocide, among others, received arrest warnings issued in 2009.

Moreover, all the underlying acts need not be committed by the perpetrator for it to amount to genocide. One of the enumerated acts would be enough to sustain a conviction for genocide if the other aspects of the definition are proved. The literature reviewed shows that the Darfur region is inhabited by tribal groups that can be classified in different ways. However, the distinctions between these groups are not clear-cut, and tend to sharpen when conflicts erupt. Nevertheless, individual allegiances are still heavily determined by tribal affiliations. The historic tribal structure, which dates back many centuries, is still in effect in Darfur, although it was weakened by the introduction of local government during the time of Nimeiri’s rule. Some of the tribes are predominantly agriculturalist and sedentary, living mainly from crop production during and following the rainy season from July to September. Some of the sedentary tribes also include cattle herders.

3.5 Summary

The conflict in Darfur appears like a recent development, but a deeper examination reveals that the crisis is deeply rooted in ages of resources and racial conflict.

\textsuperscript{342} Resolution 1769 2007.
\textsuperscript{343} International Criminal Court, 2013.
between Durfurians of Arab and African descent. The roots of the Darfur crisis can be traced right from the colonial times and subsequent governments in the post independence Sudan. In view of this, the conflict in Darfur is a as a result of the failure by the Khartoum government to address grievances of Darfurians. The economic, social, and political marginalization of Darfur, together with the political manipulation of racial, ethnic, and tribal roots, led Darfurians to organize and start a rebellion against the central government in 2003. In considering whether the crimes in Darfur amount to genocide, the following issues need to be considered. First, do the acts themselves fall within the acts as articulated by the Genocide Convention of 1948. The study notes that, debates on whether a crime amounts to genocide or not, still persists and leads to a delay in action.

The study also argues that the acts of genocide as outlined in the genocide convention of 1948 above, in the case of Darfur the acts qualifies to be called genocide despite, the ongoing debates. Acts like killing the members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to the members of the group and deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part are in existence in Darfur. It could also be argued that the act of rape by the Janjaweed is aimed at imposing measures intended to prevent births within the black African group. This is especially the case when viewed against the backdrop of the Arab culture of ascending miscegenation.

Ibid, p. 1
Chapter Four

Conflict and Conflict management a Comparative Analysis of Rwanda and Darfur Genocides

4.1 Introduction

The central purpose of this chapter is to compare the two genocides in Rwanda and Darfur, with the sole aim of generating a theoretical and practical understanding of both genocides. The study further examines the conflict patterns in both cases, the conflict management mechanisms, the role of various actors in order to ascertain the lessons that can be drawn from the 1994 genocide in Rwanda to help resolve the conflict in Darfur. The study will also determine whether the objectives of the study were achieved and test the hypothesis.

In view of the above, this study does not make normative claims about differences between the two cases, but from a comparative analytical perspective, empirical similarities and differences in terms conflict patterns and conflict management efforts are important to note because they can generate insights about the causal dynamics of mass violence.\(^{346}\) For the reason that the analogy between Rwanda and Darfur is often made and because critical analysis can yield valuable insights that can expose lessons from Rwanda that can be borrowed and applied in Darfur to stop the crisis.

The genocides in Rwanda and Darfur have created a need for a change through the actions of the international community as it has become globally known that the two genocides were difficult to both face and address.\(^{347}\) From the time when the Darfur crisis began in 2003, the Rwandan genocide of 1994 has been a frequent comparative point of reference and some analysts have called the violence in western Sudan region of


Darfur “another Rwanda,” others a “slow-motion” Rwanda.

More often, the comparison has had three primary connotations. The first is concerned with the violence itself and how genocide was transpiring again in Darfur, and yet, a convention on prevention and punishment of genocide was in place, and it was in terms of the genocide in Rwanda that the findings of this convention for the first time would be used in practice and not only in theory, and hence Darfur was like Rwanda.

The second connotation concerned the international replication to the violence. As in Rwanda, the international community was not acting to stop genocide, and hence Darfur was like Rwanda. The third and very crucial connotation, which has not found any place in conflict management agendas in Africa, is in line with drawing lessons from the past experience—like in the case Rwanda to help avert future atrocities facing humanity. However, the analysis shows that, Africa continues to intervene in a reactive manner after the tragedy had already occurred as opposed to adopting a proactive approach of prevention.

4.2 Comparison of Rwanda and Darfur Genocides

This section will cover two key areas: Firstly, analysis of the conflict dynamics (pattern of violence) and the analysis of the conflict management efforts in Rwanda and Darfur. Most important to note is that, the Analysis of the extent of violence, the level at which the violence was effected and various involvements of different actors will provide an insightful knowledge which helps in the development of mitigating measures.

4.2.1 The Dynamics of conflict in Rwanda and Darfur

The similarities and differences can be best analysed by looking at the dynamics of conflict patterns of violence in Rwanda and Darfur. This approach is very significant in a way that offers a wider view of the level at which the violence was effected and thus

---

348 Ibid.
prevention measures can be easily designed accordingly. The nexus of comparison between the two cases first and foremost, concerns the planning of violence.

The 1994 genocide in Rwanda, it is important to mention that it was a deliberate, premeditated, and well planned cold-blood political strategy to exterminate the Tutsis. This can be justified by the actions that preceded the killings. By the time the genocide began, 85 tons of ammunition are thought to have been distributed countrywide.\(^{349}\) Furthermore, between 1992 and 1994 in preparation for the execution of the genocide, machetes were supplied from China by a company called Oriental Machinery, and this turned to be the main weapon used in the killings.\(^{350}\)

In the case of Darfur, the analysis reveals that, the approach by the government towards its own people qualifies the element of well thought-out, and well planned cold-blood political strategy to exterminate the Darfurian of African origin.\(^{351}\) The Khartoum government deliberately exacerbated tensions between the Darfurian of African origin and Arab nomads. The rationale can be analysed in the actions that preceded the genocide. When the conflict flared in 2003, rebels in Darfur took up arms, accusing the government of neglecting the region.\(^{352}\)

The government responded with a counterinsurgency campaign. Since then, civilians have come under attack from government troops, using aerial terror campaign and organizing as well as arming the pro-government militias drawn from Arab tribes


who have used scorched-earth tactics against the rebels' communities.\textsuperscript{353} The situation is termed “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis” or “genocide” by the United States.\textsuperscript{354}

The intensity of violence, in particular the rate of killing (that is, the number of deaths over time). Firstly, the analysis finds that both cases demonstrate a similar character of violence, but that in Rwanda, the violence was more intense, more exterminatory, and more participatory than in Darfur.

Secondly, both episodes (Rwanda and Darfur) took place in the midst of civil war, in periods of political transition, in countries with histories of ethnic nationalism, and in areas where the conflicting ethnic populations lived in relative proximity.

Third, in Rwanda the state is more compact, centralized, and effective, which may explain the variation in intensity of violence.

Fourth, duration of violence, The plight of the 1994 Genocide against Tutsi in Rwanda in which an estimated 800,000 to one million people lost their lives, the genocide was executed in the span of just a mere hundred days and the violence occurred in almost every part of the country under government control and orders.

With regard to Darfur, large-scale attacks on civilian populations have endured to close to eleven years now, since the outbreak of the conflict in 2003, with some variation over time.\textsuperscript{355} And the number of deaths in this period is a subject of some controversy. Some estimate between 63,000 and 200,000\textsuperscript{356} violence-related civilian deaths, while others put the number at 400,000. The estimate comes from a 2006 US State Department report put the death tolls to about 400,000. In view of this, resolving the

\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}
Darfur conflict is important not only for the people of Darfur, but also the future of humanity and the stability of the entire region.

Sexual violence, has also been analysed in both cases. Rwanda, like Darfur, experienced significant levels of sexual violence. Some authors estimate that 250,000 to 500,000 rapes were perpetrated during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. However, that number is a somewhat imprecise estimate: it is based on the number of pregnancies from rape reported after the genocide. Sexual violence is so commonly reported in Darfur that it may be more prevalent in that case than in Rwanda.\(^{357}\)

The perpetrators of violence. With regard to the planning and execution of genocide, in both episodes, respective governments instigated the killings. Therefore, the perpetrators of the genocide in both Rwanda and Darfur are mainly government soldiers and militias. In Darfur, the Sudanese Air Force has also participated in attacks by bombing villages before soldiers and militias launch ground attacks. There is considerable evidence that the militia, army, and air force act in a coordinated fashion. Soldiers and militias sleep in the same camps; the government also has supplied the militias, who most frequently go by the name ‘‘Janjaweed.’’\(^{358}\)

How does all this compare with the situation in Rwanda? The killings were ordered, supervised and executed by security forces and proxy militias- the Interahamwe. In general, the character of violence was similar in both cases, the violence was directed by the state, targeted at a particular ethnic population, and intended to destroy that ethnic population in whole or in substantial part.

The consequences. In line with the consequences, both episodes show that, Darfur and Rwanda have been affected greatly. In Rwanda, some of the effects can be viewed in

---


\(^{358}\) Ibid, p. 43

116
the context of internal related challenges and external. In terms of internal, these include, among others: social, economic and environmental. As for the external related challenges, some of these are - the genocidal forces after committing genocide in Rwanda, who escaped to Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and have since then using DRC as the springboard for trying to destabilise Rwanda. Furthermore, they act as a breeding ground of genocide ideology and also wreaking havoc in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where they are terrorising the local population and profiting from the area's rich natural resources.

The spiral effects include, among others: instability, spread of genocide ideology, conflict involving many countries, the deployment of the UN force, and mistrust among neighbours.

In the context of Darfur, the study analysed that, Darfur like Rwanda, the conflict has had adverse effects on the region such as: A spiral effect to the neighbours of Darfur such as Chad, CAR, S. Sudan, among others. This led to trends of flight of population from Central Darfur to Chad, which included both former Chadian refugees (returnees) and new Darfurian refugees in Chad. Equally the conflict led to cross border attacks from Chad.

**4.2.2 The Dynamics of conflict management in Rwanda and Darfur**

**4.2.2.1 International response**

This subsection examines similarities and differences in the management of conflicts in Rwanda and Darfur in terms of involvements by various actors. The comparison of these cases (Rwanda and Darfur) will yield valuable insights that can expose lessons from Rwanda that can be borrowed and applied in the Darfur situation.

Darfur and Rwanda are instructive for what they demonstrate not only about the causal factors, but also about prevention strategies (or lack thereof). Darfur and Rwanda
are “negative” cases in that a concrete policy to stop the killing did not take shape in either episode. Analysing the cases together offers some insight into why or why not. The Analysis of both cases can help to identify certain lessons that can shape the international response strategies as well as proffer an effective international response to genocide and in particular Darfur. The current strategies that emerged around Darfur have not yet been successful in leading to a policy to halt the violence.

The Genocide Debate, in the analysis with regard to interpretation of the word “genocide”, Rwanda and Darfur both show(ed) that terminology debates are central, and probably inevitable, when crises of such magnitude break out. In particular, whether to label each case one of “genocide” was (and continues to be, in the case of Darfur) a major point of discussion, though the outcomes differed.

In the Rwandan case, powerful international actors chose not to use the word “genocide.” US State Department Spokespeople were told that they could only refer to “acts of genocide.” In order to avoid responsibility, they played around with the word by calling other names such as crimes against humanity so that they would not act.

The saddest moment was when the UN arrived at a decision to scale down the numbers of peacekeepers at the peak of the genocide, leaving helpless Tutsis and moderate Hutus in the hands of killers.

However, Darfur slightly differs from Rwanda, as in 2003, as the crisis spread-out, Darfur received some international attention. In 2004 during the tenth anniversary of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the year that the violence in Darfur deepened, this propelled the response from the international community, although it came too late and

---

361 Agence France Presse, “World ‘Abandoned’ Rwanda during Genocide”: Kagame, (Agence France Presse, 2009). - Skulls of victims of the massacres during the 1994 Rwandan genocide are displayed at the Genocide Memorial Site such as church of Ntarama in Nyamata, Rwanda, in 2004. Rwanda President Paul Kagame on Tuesday slammed the cowardice of an international community that “abandoned” his people, 15 years on from the 1994 genocide in which 800,000 people died. (AFP)
never made a difference.

Given the experience of Rwanda a decade before, one focal point for activists was to pressure US officials to label the violence “genocide.” During the summer of 2004, in particular, President George W. Bush came under pressure from an unusual coalition of actors to call Darfur “genocide.” Congress passed a unanimous and historic declaration labeling the violence in Darfur “genocide.” In response, Secretary of State Colin Powell hired an NGO, the Coalition for International Justice, to conduct a survey that would allow him to make a determination. That, NGO, in turn, helped establish the Darfur Atrocities Documentation Team (ADT), which travelled to Chad and conducted an innovative survey of more than 1,100 Darfuri refugees.

The analysis reveals that, the two cases do have similarities and differences in terms of labeling the violence genocide. In the case of Rwanda qualifying the atrocities as genocide came late after the genocide had been stopped by the Patriotic Front/Army. In Darfur, the response to the labeling violence as genocide was somewhat never delayed like in Rwanda.

Action by international community. The analysis in both episodes, showed differences in terms of response time to labelling of violence genocide. But, both cases have demonstrated similarities in terms of the international community’s failure to act.

4.2.2.2 The role of regional/ Sub regional Actors

The role of regional and sub regional actors in both Rwanda and Darfur has some similarities and differences. In the case of Rwanda, when the civil war began, the Tanzanian government acting as a “facilitator” in the negotiations between Rwanda government and Rwanda patriotic front (RPF), in the framework of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), undertook a sustained and skilful mediating effort that was critical.

---

in bringing about the final agreement. Tanzania proved a key player and struggled to turn
the Arusha process into an effective conflict management tool, but this was not possible
due to lack of political will, especially from the government of Rwanda and her proxies as
well as external state actors with interest in Rwanda.

Likewise, in Darfur, when the war broke out in 2003 between the Sudan
government and two rebel movements, the JEM and SLA, there were some efforts by the
AU in trying to bring the parties to the negotiating table.

On 8 April 2004, in Chad a humanitarian cease fire agreement between the
government of Sudan, the SLA and the JEM was signed. This paved the way for an
agreement signed in Addis Ababa on May 28, 2004, under which 80 AU monitors were to
observe the ceasefire supported by a protection force of 300 Nigerian and Rwandan
troops. The mission did not manage to reach its military and humanitarian aims.
05.05.2006 – under the mediation of the African Union Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA)
was signed by the government and the SLM/A – fraction of Mini Arko Minawi. However,
this also could not stand the test of time, shortly thereafter, the security situation
dramatically deteriorated because of conflicts between government and rebel groups as well
between various rebel factions supporting or opposing the DPA.

The analysis reveals that both Rwanda and Darfur, despite the regional and
international efforts, the conflict management mechanisms applied were flawed, hence
the brokered peace agreements never saw the light of the day. Secondly, besides the gaps,
the peace agreements in both cases lacked political backing. For instance, in Rwanda, the
Arusha Peace Accords were negotiated but were never implemented, it was not until the
RPF came to power that some provisions were operationalised.

Likewise, Darfur like Rwanda, has followed the same path, both the HCA and
DPA and subsequent peace agreements have not seen the light of the day. The analysis
further points out the similarity exists with regard to the sub regional actors who got entangled in the conflict and thus, creating a complex situation in terms conflict management and resolution.

In Rwanda, sub regional actors like Zaire took sides in the conflict openly, providing both morally and materially support to the former Rwanda government. On the other side, the Uganda government was sympathizing with RPF.

Likewise, in the Darfur conflict, the sub regional actors like Chad, Libya, South Sudan have also been involved in the conflict. The involvement of sub regional actors in the conflict, not only constrain the conflict management efforts in place, but as well makes the conflict intractable, endure and spill over to the neighbours.

Furthermore, in both Rwanda and Darfur, the peace process represented a multi-pronged strategy of conflict management. In Rwanda, a preliminary phase was designed to obtain a cease-fire. The earlier N’Sele and Gbadolite cease-fire agreements were amended to form the basis of the Arusha cease-fire announced on 12 July 1992.

With regard to Darfur, similarity exists, the negotiations commenced with the humanitarian ceasefire agreement (HCA) to allow in humanitarian aid to the needy. This was shortly followed by the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) designed to obtain a cease-fire to allow other negotiations to proceed. However, in both instances, all the cease-fires were violated, but the process permitted continuous communication and led to the establishment of peacekeeping machinery.

The analysis also observes that, The Arusha peace process negotiations were a challenge to demonstrate that the OAU could make a critical contribution to conflict management in Africa. Likewise, the Doha peace negotiations have demonstrated the same way that Africa is still far from contributing to conflict management on the continent.
However, a major difference exists in both episodes, especially with regard to the extent of the peace negotiations. In the Rwandan case, the peace agreement specified the details with regard to power sharing in which, the terms of the Agreement signalled a pluralist state and a civil society, and the idea of a people united by a common Rwandese nationality rather than divided along narrow lines into Hutu versus Tutsi. On the contrary, Darfur, the peace process is yet to decide on the future of Darfur.

The other pertinent area of concern is in the area of Peacekeeping and observer missions. The analysis in the area of peacekeeping efforts, going by the available literature and first hand information, the African union played a role in both episodes, but not to the expectations. In the case of the civil war in Rwanda, between the Rwanda Patriotic Front and the Former Rwandan government, the OAU managed to send some observers to oversee the implantation of the negotiated cease-fire agreements, but these were just mere observers who in fact could not command anything on the ground. Likewise, in Darfur the African Union in 2003, when the crisis began, under the arrangement of AU, the member states sent few monitors to oversee the peace negotiations.\(^\text{363}\)

The analysis has also observed that, in Rwanda, the OAU never deployed a peacekeeping force as it is the case in Darfur. It was just a handful of observers to monitor. Whilst in Darfur, AU, authorized the deployment of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1564. The AMIS was an African Union (AU) peacekeeping force with a mandate of carrying out peacekeeping operations related to the Darfur conflict. Originally founded in 2004, with a force of 150 troops, by mid-2005, its numbers were increased to about 7, 000.\(^\text{364}\)

The analysis further points out that, after the failure by AMIS to effectively


contain the violence in Darfur, it never abandoned the people of Darfur. Instead a more sizable, better equipped hybrid peacekeeping force was proposed and deployed— the United Nations-African Union mission in Darfur (UNAMID) on December 31, 2007. With regard to Rwanda, the United Nations Assistance mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) when the situation worsened, the force abandoned Rwandans and were left in the hands of the killers.

Another important difference is that, the Rwanda’s negotiated peace agreement was sadly accompanied by a lack of significant and concerted regional and international support in its implementation. In Darfur, however, the support of the peace process can be visible although constrained.

4.2.2.3 The role of other key actors

The analysis in the area of other key actors, reveals that both cases have similarities and differences. For instance, in Rwanda, the role of the International Red Cross (ICRC) during genocide cannot be underestimated right from the negotiation phase to the genocide and post genocide phase. According to the documentary, “Ghosts of Rwanda,” the

Red Cross never left Rwanda for the time genocide began. They set up hospitals in Kigali and they would care for the survivors by giving them the necessary medical attention that they needed as well as pressurizing the government not to kill the victims and was able to save a handful of lives. The ICRC decided to to take a more active role, and this forced the Hutu extremists to give the ICRC safety throughout Rwanda.

However, in Darfur the situation is somewhat different, the ICRC has not been

seen trying to confront the Khartoum government with regard to the atrocities, despite its presence in Darfur.

The analysis observes that, organizations like the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) have been vocal about the Darfur situation. In early 2006, WFP estimated that more than 3.5 million people in Darfur are in need of food.\(^{368}\) The other organization is the United Nations human rights council (UNHC), which has bravely provided the figure of the victims of the conflict. According to UNHC, more than 2.7 million people are internally displaced and more than 350,000 are refugees in neighbouring Chad. More than 400,000 have been killed; approximately 5,000 people die each month. The Sudanese government denies any culpability for the violence, displacement, and deaths\(^{369}\)

The Role of the of the United Nations (UN) in both Rwanda and Darfur. In the case of Rwanda, the Rwanda of 1994 was ground zero of a country and an organization. It wrecked the lives of a million people. It also shattered the credibility of the UN conflict management system.\(^{370}\) During the genocide in Rwanda, according to the documentary, “Ghosts of Rwanda,” when the genocide began, the United Nations withdrew its peacekeeping force that was in Rwanda.

The UN failed to respond to the genocide even though they had the legal rights, moral responsibility and military actions. One of the main reasons being that, the UN Security did not want to respond to the violence in Rwanda was as a result of the Somalia situation that took precedence. They did not want to make the same mistake they made in Somalia by intervening in Rwanda’s peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

The UN withdrew its forces because they had no interest in Rwanda and because

---

\(^{368}\) World Food Programme (2005), *Seeks to feed more than half Darfur’s population*. United Nations.


\(^{370}\) Touko Piiparinen. The Transformation of UN Conflict Management: Producing Images of Genocide from Rwanda to Darfur and Beyond. (Routledge, 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Oxon OX1441, 2010), P. X
they did not want to risk causalities of their own troops in trying to keep peace in Rwanda. The other factor was not the UN did not fully understand the dynamics of the conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis, and if they did fully comprehend the structure behind the violence, they would have realized that withdrawing the troops from Rwanda was not a smart idea.\textsuperscript{371}

Instead, the UN should have kept the troops there in order to provide military aid and stop the Hutu extremists from executing genocide. If they had performed such actions, then the killings would have never gone on for 100 days.\textsuperscript{372}

By the end of his mission, the UNAMIR force Commander stated that he failed the people because he wasn’t provided with the necessary help that he needed from the United States and the United Nations.\textsuperscript{373}

The analysis of the Darfur crisis, Darfur like Rwanda, the UN was in a terrible position regarding the crisis in Darfur for a couple of reasons. First, they were already negotiating in the Naivasha peace agreement between the north and south Sudan. Then, the Khartoum kept playing Darfur against Naivasha; ultimately, they wanted to keep Darfur from getting military help from the international community.

Secondly, the UN was at the forefront between humanitarian efforts in Southern Sudan and Darfur. Third, Kofi Annan, Secretary of the UN knew that the U.S administration did not like him, and they were willing to do anything to make sure that he took moves that could eventually end up being deadly.\textsuperscript{374}

Fourth, the Arab/Black African split caused many tensions within the UN. Lastly,  

\textsuperscript{372} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{374} Dana Chambers, A Comparative Analysis of the Rwanda and Darfur Genocides -Third, Kofi Annan, Secretary of the UN knew that the U.S administration did not like him, and they were willing to do anything to make sure that he took moves that could eventually end up being deadly. Fourth, the Arab/Black African split caused many tensions within the UN.
the EU and the United States (US) kept pushing the world body to take action and they were acting as if they weren’t responsible.\textsuperscript{375}

Annan knew that the genocide convention in 1948 referred to the member states to take actions and Annan was afraid that the member state would force him to take action, but then ignored him by not providing the necessary resources such as financial, military and political support to assist in the crisis. Annan tried to act without upsetting things, but he appeared weak because the U.S. and some of his staff were insisting on more actions to be taken.\textsuperscript{376}

In general, both episodes, the analysis reveals two scenarios; one, the UN failed to react to the violence in Rwanda and Darfur as per the expectations, leading to loss of lives. Secondly, although in Darfur, a slight difference is does exist in terms of UN presence as opposed to the abandonment in Rwanda.

Since 2007, with the deployment of the UN/AU hybrid mission, no significant step has been made. The people of Darfur continue to suffer, restrictions imposed on peacekeepers and the endurance of the conflict.

The rhetoric of “never again” to genocide. Since the WWII, the vow made after the Holocaust; the analysis clearly indicates that in both cases, the vow has fallen on deaf ears. The commitment by the international community, spearheaded by the UN of not allowing genocide to happen again, such promises has not been upheld, because Darfur is taking place and people are dying.

The International Criminal Court (ICC); the analysis looks at the actions taken by the ICC against the perpetrators in both cases. Following the genocide in Rwanda, the ICC constituted a special court to deal with genocide cases in Rwanda. For the first time in history, an international tribunal - the ICTR - delivered verdicts against persons

\textsuperscript{375} Prunier. Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide, 142.
\textsuperscript{376} Prunier. Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide, 142.
responsible for committing genocide. The ICTR was also the first institution to recognise rape as a means of perpetrating genocide.\textsuperscript{377}

In Darfur, however, the situation demonstrates two different scenarios, scenario one is the similarity in terms of referring the cases to ICC in both areas. The second scenario which differs from that in Rwanda, the cases have been tried and the court collaborates with current Rwanda government.

Whilst in the case of Darfur, when on April 27, 2007, “the ICC Pre Trial Chamber issued warrants for Sudan’s state minister for humanitarian affairs with Ahmed Haroum and the Janjaweed militia leader Ali Kosheib for series of attacks in West Darfur in 2003 and 2004.” The Sudanese government publicly announced that they will not cooperate with the ICC in terms of prosecuting people; instead, they will try the victims in Darfur themselves.

Then, they were supposed to hand over Haroum to the ICC, and the Sudanese government decided to nominate him as co-chair of the human rights investigation in Darfur. Ultimately, it seems that the ICC is trying to establish some type of presence and is trying to prosecute the victims. However, since the Sudanese government is refusing to work with ICC, it makes it extremely hard to establish any sort of conclusion regarding the crimes against humanity.

The role of the United States (US) during the Genocide in Rwanda, the analysis in respect to US role in both cases, the analysis reveals that US was not keen to intervene. The Clinton administration, intervention was not a viable policy option, following the Somalia issue and therefore, top American officials had no appetite for deploying troops in a risky situation in Central Africa and in particular Rwanda. Nor did UN officials want

to expose peacekeepers to increased risk after Somalia.\textsuperscript{378}

The label “genocide” mattered because American officials worried that under the United Nations Convention on Genocide, which the US Senate had ratified, the United States would be obligated to act if the government formally recognized that genocide was occurring, hence tried as much as possible to avoid the word “genocide” despite overwhelming evidence that genocide was indeed occurring in Rwanda.

Therefore, the U.S. did absolutely nothing to aide the people of Rwanda. They had a policy of non-intervention, and along with the UN, they wanted all the troops out of the country. There were about 250 U.S. citizens in Rwanda and they wanted all of them to evacuate and leave the Africans to kill each other.

Likewise, in Darfur, the analysis shows some similarities with regard to pressure being mounted for US to act in both cases. There were pressures being put on the President Bush administration to do something about the crisis taking place in Darfur, the pressure was coming from different sides of the public about taking action and because they were still in the middle of the peace agreement between north and south Sudan, and people in his office did not really want them to put pressure on Khartoum.

However, In July, 2004, the US Congress passed a Resolution urging the President to call the situation in Darfur Genocide but he did not call it genocide because he knew that they would not be taking any actions.

On Sept.9, 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell testifying in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called the situation in Darfur “Genocide.” He said: “When we reviewed the evidence, we concluded- that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility and that genocide may

still be occurring.”

In this regard, since the act had been qualified as genocide, an immediate action would be forthcoming, but Powell went on to say, “no new action by the U.S is dictated by this determination.”

However, the difference exists between Rwanda and Darfur because in the case of Rwanda US tried as much as possible to avoid the use of the word genocide. It is also analysed that, this was the first time since the 1948 convention on genocide prevention that someone has actually declared a tragedy that clearly qualifies as genocide, genocide.

The analysis observes that, after the failure by US to take action in Rwanda, in March of 1998, on a visit to Rwanda, President Clinton issued what would later be known as the "Clinton apology," which was actually a carefully hedged acknowledgment. He spoke to the crowd assembled on the tarmac at Kigali Airport: "We come here today, partly in recognition of the fact that we in the United States and the international community did not do as much as we could have and should have done to try to limit what occurred" in Rwanda.

Analysis of Darfur showed some efforts by the US to bring about significant improvements in the conditions in Sudan through sanctions against the government of Sudan and high-level diplomatic engagement and by supporting the deployment of peacekeepers in Darfur. The US sanctions package includes; financial actions against 29 Sudanese companies and tougher implementation of existing sanctions on 130 other firms, all linked to the government and even went as far as asking China to help bring about political agreement. This was different to Rwanda situation, the international community remained silent including the US.

380 Ibid., 21.
With regard to other actors in both Rwanda and Darfur, the analysis found out that, many external actors got involved in the internal affairs in both cases. Citing the example of Rwanda, two key state actors dominated the scene, that is Belgium and France. While in Darfur, Britain, China and Russia dominated the scene.

The case of Darfur, The analysis revealed that in both instances the mentioned states got involved out of national interest, like in the case of Britain, it was merely during the colonial period and after that, ceased to interfere with the internal affairs of Sudan and Darfur region in particular. Russia and China, are basically pursuing trade gains. China is one of the country that has great economic interest to the Khartoum government, and because of this interest, the process for peace in Darfur has slowed down. When the United Nations tried passing solutions to solve the problems, China would abstain because they believed that it would not be ‘morally’ good to get involved in the Darfur’s problems since they have a working relations with them.

With regard to Rwanda, the analysis reveals that both France and Belgium, have interests in Rwanda. These interests are basically political in nature. The two state actors are believed to have shaped the environment that led to the 1994 genocide. The analysis justifies this, by making a reflection on chapters 1 and 2 on the role of France and Belgium in Rwanda. The two state actors played a key role in the manipulation of ethnicity, divide and rule, marginalization and failure of the social contract by post independent governments in Rwanda.

Likewise, in Darfur, the situation was not far from that of Rwanda. The region went through a similar situation under the British colonial rule.

A similarity also exists with regard to the deployment of forces under the united nations arrangement in both cases. Belgium deployed troops as a part of the larger force of UNAMIR in Rwanda and also France did the same after seeking authorization from the
UN Security Council and on June 22, 1994, launched Operation Turquoise \(^{382}\) and in the end, was unable able to contribute “a real political solution to this crisis.”\(^{383}\)

Darfur also demonstrated a similar situation when China opted to deploy as a part of the UNAMID force with limited significance. Both cases showed similarity in the interference by external state actors in the conflict management efforts due to national interest. Besides similarities, some differences in both episodes have been analysed. The post colonial period in Darfur, the British ceases to play a significant role in the politics of Sudan, as opposed to Rwanda where the situation continued up to the genocide period.

The second difference was in the interest of actors, Darfur saw intrusive powers like Russia and China on the side of Khartoum trying to down play conflict management efforts. The analysis reveals that, the involvement, especially by China is nothing but trade gains in terms of energy (oil) and military hardware.

The discovery and exploitation of oil reserves in the South have since become a catalyst in the current situation of the prolonged civil wars. This has devastated economic structures and destabilized the social, political and religious life of the Sudanese people. Instead of uniting the country, the rush for oil and complicity of international corporations meddling in the Sudanese affairs has further polarized racial and religious identities.

In Rwanda the story is different, Rwanda has no oil and so the question remains as to why both France and Belgium would have interest in Rwanda. The answer lies in the colonial heritage, the influence in the region, cover up for past mistakes by colonial governments and trying to preserve the ideology of negative ethnicity. France remained silent when the human rights violation was being committed before the genocide began, and they refused to admit that president Habyarimana was using “ethnic tactics in order to

\(^{382}\) Destexhe. Rwanda and Genocide, Pp.53-55.
\(^{383}\) Ibid. P.55.
Likewise, in Darfur, both Russia and China have remained silent on the human rights violations. Both China and Khartoum, at the expense of salvaging geopolitics and business interests, these governments argue that “no political or intervention in internal affairs” even if it means local people suffer the consequences of such arguments. By and large, the analysis reveals that in both cases, the external state actors have played a key role in the shaping of the domestic and external environments in the both episodes.

4.3.2 **Summary of similarities and differences**

As for similarities and differences, the analysis finds that both cases demonstrate a similar character of violence, but that in Rwanda the violence was more intense, more exterminatory, and more participatory than in Darfur. Both episodes took place in the midst of civil war, in periods of political transition, in countries with histories of ethnic nationalism, and in areas where the conflicting ethnic populations lived in relative proximity. However, in Rwanda the state is more compact, centralized, and effective, which may explain the variation in intensity.

Furthermore, the detailed discussion on similarities and differences will also touch upon the international community’s role in the crisis, different approaches used by various actors, the magnitude of genocides. Also, another crucial aspect is the terminology “genocide” as one of the issues that brought a lot of debate amongst policy makers, qualifying anarchy in the international system.

By and large both comparative claims are precise, as far as they go. However, the claims in addition, deserve more proximate scrutiny. To what degree are the patterns of violence in Rwanda and Darfur similar? To what degree do they differ? From an international perspective, in what ways are the replication to Darfur similar to and

---

different from what transpired in Rwanda? Answers to these questions have intrinsic epistemological value, but they additionally have theoretical and practical import.

From a theoretical perspective, what do the commonalities and differences between the two cases suggest about why genocide transpires? From a practical perspective, what do the international reactions to both cases designate about the efficacy (or lack thereof) of particular aversion strategies? The historical connection to the two genocides is important and objective two of this study is important when understanding how the international community is not a dependable organization in terms of intervention in times of need.

The post-colonial effect has caused problems in Africa, in which inhabitants have been forced to suffer due to interest from the previous colonizers. This does have a significant meaning for both Rwanda and Sudan. As for the international interference which has influenced the genocide in Rwanda and some extent the genocide in Darfur, practicality will show in terms of the self interest of the countries involved and analysed in this study.

The international interference does indeed matter as the world today is in many ways built upon the international system that is anarchic in which world leading countries dominate the world. The two genocides have similarities in the following areas:

First, in Rwanda and Darfur (Western Sudan), ethnic groups had co-existed peacefully before trouble started. The Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda lived peacefully in the midst of each other before colonialist divided them. Likewise, Africans and the Arabs also lived peacefully alongside each other until both groups were divided.

Second, in both instances, genocide in Rwanda and Darfur, were based on one primary goal, the elimination of other ethnic group for the reasons already discussed in this study. The desire to eliminate was based on ethnic identity.
Third, both groups had their traditional approach to conflict management, these longstanding forms of conflict management, which were not formally judicial procedures, had as a fundamental purpose the avoidance of the conflict and peaceful settlement of disputes. In Rwanda- the Gacaca system and Darfur Judiyya. In both cases the tensions within the community would be resolved amicably using traditional means of elders mediating between the different communities and tribes without spilling blood.

Fourth, a fourth similarity drawn from this study is that the governments here used proxy militia to execute their plans of carrying out the genocidal atrocities against their own people: the Interahamwe in Rwanda, and the Janjaweed in Darfur, Sudan.

Fifth, the immediate cause was the rise of rebellion attempting to demand their rights to an identity and exist in the land and share equal economic and political power. The Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) was formed by the Tutsis mostly from exiles in Uganda, and on the other hand, the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in Darfur. The motivation revolved around the desire of the governments in brutally reacting to the rebellions was the absolute control of state power.

Six, in both genocides, the plans to execute the atrocities have been premeditated and systematically executed with the state machinery supporting it. The government in both cases politicized the local conflicts and used local proxies to crush the rebellion by employing scorched-earth policies.

Seven, both UNAMID and UNAMIR played an insignificant role in bringing the conflict to an end. In both cases, intervention by parties different from the United Nations was needed.

Eight, the UN system ordered the prosecution of the perpetrators of crimes against humanity and genocide. The International Criminal Court (ICC) for trying to prosecute the people involved in committing crimes against humanity and genocide, but the
Sudanese government has not been cooperating with the court

Nine, the genocides took place in the African continent and both genocide share the use of rape as a weapon of war. Even though similarities exist between both genocides, there are also some differences between them.

In the analysis of the genocides in Rwanda and Darfur, there are notable differences:
First, in terms of the number of victims, Rwanda surpassed Darfur. Over a million people were brutally exterminated within a hundred days. The genocide in Rwanda was characterized by swift intensity of the massacres as evident in the graphic documentaries that have been shown around the world. In Rwanda the state is more compact, centralized, and effective, which may explain the variation in intensity.

Second, the 1994 genocide in Rwanda has been recorgonised by the United Nations/International community, whilst the Darfur one is not yet.

Third, in Darfur, the official count to date gives 60,000, others to 200,000 people killed since genocide started nearly six years ago. Although other estimates put the figure at 400,000 people, many critics think they could be more or less.

Fourth, the types of weapons in these cases were and are different. In Rwanda, the weapons consisted mostly of crude machetes, sticks, axes with few instances when they actually used guns. But the Darfur genocides witnessed the employment of modern weapons that include Russian made high altitude bombers, machine guns mounted on trucks and Janjaweed on horses use small rifles imported from China. Explosives are used to blow out water bore holes and burns villages.

Fifth, In Rwanda, identity card was a major method of distinguishing and isolating those to be killed, the Hutus and Tutsis. In Sudan (Darfur), skin colour and occupation is used. Lighter skin colour, Arabs and black Africans gave a natural identification of the
ethnicities in Darfur.

Sixth, the UN and the International intervention differed in both cases. In Rwanda, the UN could not immediately intervene - came in too late. While in Darfur, the intervention was somewhat not too late and not quick enough to make a significant difference.

Seven, UNAMIR in Rwanda, at the pick of genocide force levels were reduced from 3,000 to 400 troops. On the contrary, in Darfur the force was increased from the 7,000 – around 20,000 strong.

The media in Rwanda played a major role in instigating hatred. In Darfur, it is the opposite.

Eight, In the case of UNAMIR, the conflict and genocide were finally halted by the advances of the RPF and it’s capturing of Kigali and if it had not been for the intervention of the RPF, the realities of Rwanda would have been very different, probably exterminating all Tutsis and modulate Hutus thus yielding much larger numbers of civilian casualties.385

In Darfur, both parties seem not. Nine, genocide in Rwanda took one hundred days, and the Darfur one is now over ten years.

4.4 Lessons Learned in Preventing Future Genocides

In the ten years since the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, leaders of national governments and international institutions have acknowledged the shame of having failed to stop the slaughter of the Tutsi population. At the 2004 Stockholm International Forum, "Preventing Genocide: Threats and Responsibilities," many renewed their commitment to

385 Stopping the Genocide. Before April 1994, RPF leaders were well aware of preparations for the killing campaign. They sought to protect their adherents by calling on the international community to speed the implementation of the Arusha Accords. They also sought to strengthen bonds with various Hutu groups and even explored the possibility of joint training with the militia of the MDR or the PSD, as mentioned above. When the genocidal forces began killing in Kigali and elsewhere, the RPF immediately warned that it would renew combat unless the slaughter halted. When the warning was ignored, RPF soldiers took to the field. http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno15-8-01.htm#. Retrieved 20 April 2015.
halting any future genocide.

Honouring that pledge will require not just greater political will than seen in the past, but also developing strategies built on the lessons learnt from the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.

Therefore, this may provide a starting point for those who are determined to act in the defense of humanity. The lessons among others include: prevent the violence before it becomes a genocide, respond promptly and firmly to minimize the effects. Pay close attention to historical facts, the media in situations of potential ethnic, religious, or racial conflict. Be alert to the impact of negative models; and ensure accurate information on what is happening on the ground. Identify, and support opponents of the genocide; Call the genocide by its rightful name and vigorously condemn it; Impose an arms embargo on the genocidal government; Mount pressure on any government seeming to support the genocidal government to change its policy; and be prepared to intervene with armed force.

4.4.1 Prevent violence before it becomes a genocide

The genocide in Rwanda began way back before the downing of the presidential plane, and there warning signs of impending genocide but the international community kept a blind eye. Many people confuse the sudden killing of the president with the start of genocide, but the truth of the matter is that, the night of 6 April 1994 marked the full scale execution of genocide. The attitudes and practices that made it possible developed over a period of years. For decades the government had practiced discrimination against Tutsi, the people who would be targeted during the genocide. The post-independence government categorized citizens by ethnicity and, continuing a practice of the Belgian colonial regime, required all adults to carry documents identifying their ethnic group. These identity documents were used to select Tutsi for slaughter during the genocide.
During the three years before the 1994 genocide, government officials, soldiers, national police, and leaders of political parties incited and directed sixteen massacres of Tutsi, each of which killed hundreds of unarmed civilians. The army also killed hundreds of Tutsis in Kibirira, Bigogwe and Bugesera, during a military operation in 1993. In addition, authorities permitted and in some cases encouraged violence against supporters of rival political parties. Killers and other assailants went unpunished if their victims were Tutsi or members of parties opposed to the authorities. The percentages that were introduced into the education system—what was it signifying? The international community, including national and multinational donors, occasionally expressed concern about the human rights situation but failed to press effectively for an end to abuses or for punishment of the guilty. Even the slaughter of hundreds drew little or at most short-lived criticism.

4.4.2 Respond Promptly and Firmly to Minimise the Effects

Many Rwandans, diplomats in Rwanda, and United Nations (UN) officials knew that the militia was being recruited and trained to kill, but even when an informant told UN peacekeepers that the militia were meant to attack Tutsi civilians, there was no effective intervention to halt militia activities. During the genocide, the militia mobilized and led the general population in the killing Tutsi, often carrying out the orders given to them by the military and national police force. The distribution of arms to the civilian population was widely known and elicited no effective international reaction.

4.4.3 Pay Close Attention to Media

In cases of impending genocide, be prepared to silence broadcasts that incite or provide directions for violence. For three years before the genocide, newspapers like Kangura had identified Tutsi as "enemies of the nation," to be scorned and feared. A private radio (RTLM), supported by influential government, military, and political figure
broadcast the same message with increasing virulence and effect in the nine months before the genocide was launched. The media went so far as to name individuals to be eliminated, including the prime minister. Beginning the year before the genocide, leading Rwandans and international observers all deplored the media campaign against the Tutsi and members of the opposition parties, but no one intervened to stop the calls to hatred or to promote the broadcast of countervailing messages of tolerance. Having had months to build a listening audience, the private radio station was well-placed to contribute to the killing campaign once it began.

The radio incited listeners to violence against Tutsi and others opposed to the genocide, and gave specific orders on how to carry out the killing, including identifying individuals to be attacked and specifying where they could be found. Silencing (jamming) the radio broadcasts would not only have ended this particularly effective form of incitement and the delivery of specific orders; it would have shown that the international community rejected the legitimacy of the genocidal message and those who were delivering it.

4.4.4 Be Alert To The Impact Of Negative Models In Nearby Regions

In late 1993 and early 1994 tens of thousands of Hutu and Tutsi were slain in neighbouring Burundi, a country demographically similar to Rwanda. These killings, skilfully exploited by Rwandan propaganda, significantly increased tensions in Rwanda. Both the slaughter and the absence of international reaction to it encouraged the planners of genocide to proceed with the attempt to eliminate Tutsis in Rwanda. The propaganda machinery frequently talked of the Burundian example on the radio, enhancing the impact of this negative model on Rwandans.

4.4.5 Ensure Accurate Information on what is happening on the ground

In 1994, the governments most involved in Rwanda such as; France, Belgium,
and the United States, had substantial information about the situation on the ground but they shared this information with only a few others. Non-permanent members of the Security Council - with the exception of Rwanda, itself a non-permanent member in 1994 - depended for information on the UN secretariat. From the field, the head of the UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda, General Romeo Dallaire, and the representative of the Secretary-General, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, sent very different descriptions of events to the secretariat in New York. In preparing briefings for the Security Council, the secretariat favoured Booh-Booh's interpretation, which gave no sense of the systematic and ethnically based nature of the killing.

Relying initially on this information, the non-permanent members agreed to the withdrawal of most of the peacekeepers. But when they later learned of the extent and genocidal nature of Human Rights Watch and others, they pushed the Security Council to send a second and stronger UN force to Rwanda. Their efforts produced nothing because the force arrived months after the genocide had been stopped by the RPF.

Accurate, impartial, and analytical reporting on the 1994 genocide could have helped build a public demand for more forceful government action in halting the slaughter. But press coverage was limited, superficial, and often sensationalistic. Journalists usually portrayed the killing as the result of ancient, tribal hatreds rather than as a state-directed attempt to exterminate the Tutsi. Major media outlets gave more attention to the problems of sports stars O.J. Simpson and Tonya Harding than to the deliberate slaughter of more than a million people.

4.4.6 Identify and support opponents of the genocide

At the start a vast number of Rwandans opposed the genocide. When potential leaders of resistance, including military officers, appealed for foreign support in the first days of the killings, they were refused. The people of central and south Rwanda
nonetheless continued opposing the genocide for ten days to two weeks. Instead of supporting these resisters, the Security Council undermined them by reducing the already inadequate number of peacekeepers. The organizers of the genocide, then gained in confidence and decided to push the killing campaign into the regions that had thus far remained relatively peaceful.

They stepped up pressure on the resisters by sending in militia from other areas where the killing was well advanced, by mocking them on the radio, and by removing key local officials who opposed the killing. Faced with this overwhelming pressure and feeling abandoned by the international community, the resisters either went into hiding or became active participants in the genocide.

4.4.7 Call the genocide by its rightful name and vigorously condemn it

Many observers concluded that the takeaway lesson from Rwanda was that, even in the face of resistance to intervention, calling the violence “genocide” would trigger a forceful response. Furthermore, commit to permanently opposing any government involved in genocide, including by refusing its assistance in the future.

Rwandan government officials, military officers, and political leaders whom directed the genocide claimed to be legitimate authorities giving appropriate orders for the self-defense of the population. This pretext of legitimacy made it easier for them to persuade people to violate usual moral and legal prohibitions. By remaining silent during the first part of the genocide and by taking no effective action to stop the killing throughout the period, the international community appeared to acquiesce in these claims to legitimacy.

The government exploited every apparent demonstration of international acceptance - every time Rwandan government representatives were received abroad, the event was fully publicized on the radio. Rwandan officials and political leaders
understood how dependent their government was on international assistance: they knew that no government could operate for long without such support. Even ordinary Rwandans who lived out on the hills knew the importance of international aid since they or their families benefited from schools or clinics supported by partnerships with foreign communities.

States and other international actors must send clear condemnations of the genocidal government combined with the announcement that direct foreign assistance would forever be denied to the government. This would have called into question not just the legitimacy of the government but also its long-term viability. Rwandans might have well have been less inclined to follow the directives of a government that had little chance of continuing to hold power.

4.4.8 Impose an arms embargo on the genocidal government.

Many killers used machetes or homemade weapons, but soldiers, national police, and thousands of militia used firearms in launching attacks on churches, schools, hospitals and other sites where thousands of Tutsi had gathered. A first wave of assailants, relatively few in number, killed thousands of civilians by using small arms, grenades, and mortars. They left the survivors of such attacks terrorized, vulnerable to assault by a second wave of killers wielding machetes and homemade weapons. The UNSC established an arms embargo, but only late in the genocide. Had the embargo been imposed earlier, the killers would have had fewer arms at their disposal and would have been less effective in their attacks.

4.4.9 Press any government seeming to support the genocidal governments

Some governments, particularly France and several African governments, continued to support the Rwandan government throughout the genocide. This limited the impact of condemnation by those other governments that did finally take a stand against
the slaughter. As official documents show, at least some French officials were concerned that continuing support for Rwanda was damaging their own international standing, but other governments with potential influence on France, like the United States and the United Kingdom, failed to press the French effectively enough to produce a change in policy.

4.4.10 Use of Force

The organizers of the Rwandan genocide were relatively few in number, but they controlled three elite military units. Backed by these forces, they were able to assert control first over other units of the army and national police and then over the administrative system. When the crisis began, the UN peacekeepers had neither the mandate nor the numbers needed for effective action, but had their mandate been broadened to allow the offensive action and had they received support from the French elite, Belgian, and Italian troops sent in, to evacuate their own citizens, the combined force could have blocked the effort of the genocidal organizers to extend their control to other parts of the armed forces and administration. Intervention later would have required a larger force and would have saved more lives, but intervention at any point would have limited the number of civilians killed.

4.4.11 Avoid shortcuts in managing violent conflicts

History has demonstrated that, humans tend to love shortcuts because they take the shortest path to passing the last end. Secondly shortcuts tend to be more friendly in terms resources. However, with critical analysis of this mode of approach, in fact the disadvantages outweigh the advantages. Thirdly, more often than not, shortcuts yield short term effects due to their lack of deep analysis and testing, hence, do not provide long lasting solutions to problems and instead lead to recurring events.

In the case of Rwanda and Darfur, this phenomenon has surfaced several times.
Genocide does not start overnight, it is something which takes time to plan before execution. In that respect there are always signs to show that genocide is being planned. Thus, in light of this, dealing with conflicts, there is a need to have a fuller comprehension of the deep rooted causes, triggers, dynamics involved and epicentres. This data will enable the conflict managers and other interested parties to prescribe the appropriate medication for the right illness as opposed to treating symptoms.

In the event of both Rwanda and Darfur, the challenge, has been that, first and foremost, the failure to learn from Rwanda’s experience to recommend the right strategies for Darfur, leading to sometimes rushing in short term ventures which are more risky than the risk itself.

Genocides are complex phenomena, each with its own peculiar configuration and dynamics. These eleven lessons will not provide the full answer to stopping the next genocide, but they provide a starting point for those who are determined to act in defense of our common humanity.

4.5 Policy interventions in preventing future genocides

After the genocide in Rwanda the international community worked on developing and establishing further regulations in order to ease the ability to intervene timely to save lives. Further to that, following the tragedies in Rwanda and the Balkans in the 1990s, the international community began to serious debate on how to react effectively when citizens’ human rights are grossly and systematically violated.

The question at the heart of the matter was whether States have unconditional sovereignty over their affairs or whether the international community has the right to intervene in a country for humanitarian purposes. In the millennium report of 2000, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan, recalling the failures of the Security Council to act in a decisive manner in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, put forward a challenge to
Member States: "If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to gross and systematic violation of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity.\(^{386}\)"

In light of this, Twenty one years after the genocide in Rwanda, the Security Council condemned without reservation any denial of the genocide and urged member States to develop educational programmes to help prevent similar events. Unanimously adopting resolution 2150 (2014), the Council called upon States to recommit to prevent and fight against genocide and other serious crimes against humanity. Through the resolution, the Council also called upon States that had not yet ratified or acceded to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide to consider doing so as a matter of high priority.\(^{387}\)

In view of this, implementation of UN resolution 2150 (2014), Policy makers and their advisors need to marshal the international, regional, national, public and military will to conduct humanitarian interventions. They must be able to justify their use of force in violation of state sovereignty morally, legally and in accordance with a clearly articulated and universally accepted policy, such as that articulated in The Responsibility to Protect (R\(3\)P). They must also develop and implement an effective bi-polar strategy and obtain an internationally sanctioned mandate to justify their actions.

In order to do so, they must understand the situation on the affected grounds with knowledge of the past and the present in order to develop an effective operational level campaign plan for the future. They must both possess and commit the means to

---


accomplish the mission. These include the financial resources, the clear understanding that the use of force may well be required, the military force capable of providing the necessary force, and the acknowledgement that, despite all efforts, friendly casualties are inevitable. These decision makers must also understand the importance of time. In the near-term, they need to act rapidly, but the midterm and long-term, requirements must be realistically measured in terms of years and decades of commitment.

4.6 Objectives, Hypotheses and Theoretical Framework of the Study

All academic projects have specific objectives to guide the research work. A successful project achieves the target goals and purposes within a designed period of time and must achieved by the end of the study. The general objective of this study was to establish how genocide can be managed in Africa and lessons learned from the 1994 genocide in Rwanda for Darfur. The study was able to establish this in chapter one. An overview of the causes of conflicts in Africa was examined, particularly under literature review part. Chapters two and three further broadened the discussion on the factors responsible for the persistent conflicts in Africa and particularly Darfur.

The causes of most conflicts in Africa are basically structural in nature. These include: problems related to ethnic identity, marginalisation, the failure of social contract by leaders, failures to address human basic needs, access to resources and respect of human rights among many others. It was observed that, while many parts of the world moved towards greater stability and political and economic cooperation, Africa remained one of the cauldrons of instability. Political insecurity and violent conflicts became increasingly persistent realities of the development scene in Africa.

Internal conflicts with deep historical roots flared in many countries on the continent. Ironically, while the international community paid less and less attention to African security affairs, the continent's institutional and organizational capacity to
manage its pervasive conflicts was not developing at the same pace as conflict escalations. Against such a backdrop, peace and peacemaking in Africa emerges as one of the critical issues of great importance in global politics.\textsuperscript{388}

The second objective was to examine the role of the international community in Darfur and Rwanda genocides. Once the civil war broke out in 1990 in Rwanda and Darfur, increasingly there were warnings, supported by evidence that large-scale civilian massacres were imminent. Nevertheless, virtually no-one in the international community took necessary action to prevent this from happening, instead remained silent as atrocities are being committed on the scale that was witnessed. Preparations to deal with the contingency of massive violence that targeted civilians were also untimely and inadequate.\textsuperscript{389} Furthermore, it was also observed that conflict management efforts in most cases were frustrated by both internal and external actors due to political and economic interests.

The third objective which was to identify the lessons from the 1994 genocide in Rwanda for Darfur, this was achieved in chapter four, where various lessons were identified based on what traversed in both areas and the gaps that were identified at regional and international levels. The lessons identified are believed to pave way for filling the gaps in the existing conflict management mechanisms on the continent as well as help in finding a solution to the Darfur crisis. In chapter four the study endeavoured to make a detailed, thorough and critical analytic thinking which was also achieved in both cases (Rwanda and Darfur) where most thematic areas like causes of conflict, management efforts, the pattern of violence, role of actors were discussed and analysed in chapters- one, two, three and four. Therefore, the research objective is achieved.


In the three objectives of the study, three hypotheses were made in which the study sought to seek to confirm or disprove. The first hypothesis states that Conflict management can only achieve the desired aim or result in the presence of the political will.

The prevention, management and resolution of conflicts do not happen in isolation, this must be preceded by other actions like political will, availability of resources and due attention to the situation. Therefore, short of the above, the process of translating theory into practice misses, and hence inaction. In both Rwanda and Darfur, the international community lacked the political will to intervene and save lives.

Secondly, both governments, prepared and executed mass killings, but no one bothered to take action because it was not in their interest. Furthermore, national interest continues to outweigh the responsibility to protect, it appears that the public acknowledgement of genocide continues to be avoided by member states for as long as possible because of the obligation to intervene that it then places on UN member states. Lack of political will of the international community has failed conflict management in Africa.

The second hypothesis stress that, Lessons learned from Rwanda could help to proffer a solution to the Darfur crisis. The ongoing crisis in Sudan provides an extremely topical basis for an assessment of what has, and has not, changed since the 1994 genocide in Rwanda regarding the international community’s response to massive human rights abuses. The point is that, never was genocide unknown to the international community, but the international community has failed to reflect on the past experience to inform the shaping of the future strategies in managing genocide. In the case of Darfur, had the international community learnt any lesson from Rwanda, the Darfur genocide would not have happened.
Last but not the least, policy interventions in preventing future genocides after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, must be translated from theory to practice. The international community worked on developing and establishing further regulations in order to ease the ability to intervene timely to save lives. Following the tragedies in Rwanda and the Balkans in the 1990s, the international community began to serious debate on how to react effectively when citizens’ human rights are grossly and systematically violated.

However, the question at the heart of the matter is whether States have unconditional sovereignty over their affairs or whether the international community has the right to intervene in a country for humanitarian purposes? The identified lessons in chapter four could only be comprehended only and only if there is an international political will which will enable a reflection on the past to inform the future, timely intervention and necessary legal, political, economic actions where necessary. The implementation and realization are greatly dependent on the political will.

4.5 Summary

The study notes that it is clear that an organization like the United Nations may have the power under its Charter and mission to intervene effectively when genocide, like that seen in the Darfur and Rwanda, is taking place. However, in order to be effective in this area, the United Nations must count with full support and commitment from the international community to be successful.

In the cases of Rwanda and the Darfur, this is exactly what was lacking. The Security Council may pass resolution after resolution pledging peacekeepers, equipment and funds to a mission tasked with ending genocide, yet, if the international community does not support these resolutions with people, equipment and funds, then these resolutions are irrelevant, insignificant and ineffective. In the case of Rwanda, for example, the United Nations and the Security Council, were not even willing to pledge
support (even if it did not materialize), the organization overtly decided to scale down UNAMIR's numbers that the genocide in Rwanda was not of interest to the international community and that Rwandans should solve their problem themselves. In the Darfur, a genocide that took place in times when the international community had fresh minds of what transpired in Rwanda, the Security Council pledged support and attempted to look decisive and committed, yet this effort was still half-hearted and while the numbers on the ground were more significant than those in Rwanda, the results were still significant failures.

The United Nations is the organization that is expected to put a stop to genocide as stated in its Charter and in the many declarations and resolutions following the organization's establishment. Yet, before the world witnesses a United Nations that is effective in stopping genocide around the world, it will need to take a stronger stance when claiming “never again,” “not on our watch,” or “responsibility to protect.” The United Nations can only effectively stop genocide if those countries serving on the Security Council are willing to take a decisive stance and authorize intervention immediately, backing words with actions. If the international community is hesitant when it comes to ending genocide, then the United Nations has no power to act and therefore will continue to fail when attempting to end genocide. It is essential that the commitment to never allow genocide to take place is supported by the international community as a whole, regardless of where genocide is taking place, who is committing the genocide, or who the victims are. Until the way in which the international community reacts and responds to genocide changes, it is likely that genocide will continue to take place and the United Nations will continue to deploy unsuccessful missions that are unable to end genocide.

It is evident from this research that both UNAMID and UNAMIR faced great
difficulties in trying to accomplish their mandates, difficulties that were so significant that both missions have been labelled as failures by the majority of the international community. With these two cases, one expects the UN and the international community to learn from their mistakes and take into consideration the failures in both missions and modify its modus operandi for future crises and genocides. In future research, the writer would be interested in knowing the role of the United Nations/African Union hybrid mission will stop the crisis in the Sudan and what changes, if any, has the organization’s peacekeeping mission in Darfur experienced compared to those in Rwanda to better address the genocide and crisis. Lastly, this study has tried to highlight a quite number of strategies that can be useful to help provide some answers to stopping the next genocide. However, they provide a starting point for those who are determined to act in defense of our common humanity.
Chapter Five

Summary of Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

5.1 Introduction

This chapter attempted to give the summary, conclusions and recommendations related to the conflict management mechanisms in Africa with reference to Rwanda and Darfur. It acts as the final and ultimate verdict on the issues addressed in the research.

5.2 Summary of findings

The study examined conflict management mechanisms in Africa with reference to Rwanda and Darfur and began by trying to establish the definition of conflict and genocide. The study revealed that, the state of exception in Rwanda did not spontaneously occur in Rwanda, it was initially developed by German and Belgian colonizers, adopted by two successive Hutu regimes, and nurtured and fed for 35 years of Rwandan independence until its final realization in the 1994 genocide.

In respect to the word “genocide” the study found that genocide have for a long time been blurry and difficult to define universally, and even to date, there are numerous definitions that vary from one to another by a great extent and therefore, the genocides in Rwanda and Darfur has shed new light on this complex matter and created a need for a better understanding of genocide so as to change the approach to resolving and preventing this unique kind of conflict.

The study, therefore finds that genocide is an old crime against humanity that has been given a relatively new label. History is full of examples of one group of humans exterminating another group of humans. From the time, the Darfur crisis started in 2003, the 1994 genocide in Rwanda has been a frequent comparative point of reference. As in the case of Darfur and Rwanda; it is safe to conclude that genocide has been virtually universally condemned as a moral wrong that demands a response by all humans. The
wholesale murder of innocent men, women and children, for no other reason than their identity, is now considered a crime that demands that moral response; based upon the simple premise that genocide must be prevented, suppressed and punished wherever and whenever it threatens our world as per the 1948 United Nations convention on prevention and punishment of the crimes of genocide that came into force in 1952.

The study also reveals that the Convention (Genocide Convention, 1948) “confirms that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which, they (the contracting parties) undertake to prevent and to punish.” It further states that genocide means” any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Ideally, the idea that states are obligated to do something in the face of genocide comes from two provisions in the Genocide Convention. First, the treaty holds that contracting parties are required to "undertake to prevent and to punish" genocide. Second, Article VIII of the convention stipulates that signatories may call on the UN to "take such action for the prevention and suppression" of genocide.

The genocide in Rwanda and the Darfur are clearly two of the darkest chapters faced by the international community in the late 20th century. Both genocides took place under the watch of the international community and the United Nations, and both were unable or unwilling to take action to stop the killings. It is clear that an organization like the United Nations will always have enough information from its people on the ground with regard to genocide prior to execution, but unfortunately, the intervention will depend on the interest of the intervenors. However, in order to be effective in this area, the United Nations as much it may count on full support and commitment from the international community to be successful, it must also be seen walking the talk, as an international organisation responsible for maintenance international peace and security.
In the cases of Rwanda and the Darfur, this is exactly what was lacking. The Security Council may pass resolution after resolution pledging peacekeepers, equipment and funds to a mission tasked with intervention in genocide situation, yet, if the international community does not support these resolutions with people, equipment and funds, then these resolutions are irrelevant, insignificant and ineffective. Secondly, the aspect of walking the talk is very significant to uphold the promise by the UN of “never again” to genocide. In Rwanda, for example, the United Nations and the Security Council, were not even willing to pledge support (even if it did not materialize), the organization overtly decided to scale down UNAMIR's peacekeepers who were deployed at the time. This approach revealed that the genocide in Rwanda was not of interest to the international community and that Rwandans should solve their problem themselves.

In the Darfur, the genocide that took place in times when the international community had fresh minds of what transpired in Rwanda, the Security Council pledged support and attempted to look decisive and committed, yet this effort was still half-hearted. However, compared to Rwanda, the numbers of peacekeepers were more than that of UNAMIR, but the results were still significant failures.

With regard to whether the international community learnt lessons from the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, specifically in relation to the crisis in Darfur today. The study revealed that, the international community has not gotten any lesson from Rwanda for Darfur. Secondly, if the international community had managed to learn lessons from Rwanda, then genocide would not have happened in Darfur. The genocide experienced in Rwanda, is considered one of the most violent of the 20th century.

In addition the study observed that the tragic truth of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda is that the country may have been of no strategic or economic interest or importance on the international level. Therefore no major power had anything to gain
from halting the slaughter. In fact, in the midst of this inaction, the massacres were not described as genocide for fear the term would compel those in power to act. All humans have a right to be protected from war crimes and ethnic cleansing. If their own governments fail to do this the international community is obliged to act under the concept of The Responsibility to Protect (R2P); a concept that developed in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Yet, today in Darfur, there is still slowness to respond to the unbearable humanitarian need and suffering.

Global diplomacy has regularly failed to protect and for Dafurians, reminiscent of Rwanda, have recently warned that Darfur is at high risk of genocide. Twenty one years after Rwanda’s tragedy (1994-2015), the early warning signs of mass atrocities are plainly in evidence elsewhere.

In the spring of 2004, the African Union (AU) assumed the leading role in international efforts to broker a resolution to the conflict in Darfur. Shortly afterwards, on May 25, 2004, the UN Security Council made its first statement on the situation in response to a report by the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights. The Council expressed its concern about the humanitarian crisis in Darfur and indiscriminate attacks on civilians, and expressed support for the mediation efforts of the AU.

The AU efforts resulted in the signing of the N’djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCA) on April 8, 2004, between the government of Sudan, the SLA and the JEM. This paved the way for an agreement signed in Addis Ababa on May 28, 2004, under which 80 AU monitors were to observe the ceasefire supported by a protection force of 300 Nigerian and Rwandan troops. However, the ceasefire was not observed.

In looking at similarities and difference, the study found that Darfur highlights dimensions that fall in both categories. Therefore, comparing the cases offers insight that would not be evident if only one of the cases were considered in isolation. However,
despite the responses as mentioned above, nothing significant that was forthcoming in both episodes due to very slow action but the international community. The international community accepted to have failed to respond quickly to the genocide in Rwanda and as a result, between 800,000 and over a million people died.

During the period of genocide in Rwanda, no one wanted to call the tragedy genocide because they knew that if they called it by such name; they would have to take action. Consequently, they played around with the word by calling other names such as crimes against humanity so that they would not act.

The humanitarian crisis in Darfur is characterized by the roles played by both local actors and external actors such as the Sudanese government, the Darfur armed rebels, the International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), which were the first whistle blowers in this dramatic situation, the International and Regional Organizations and some of the external state actors like Russia and China.

The local actors (the Khartoum government and rebels) have been seen to exercise some kind of authority and do enjoy some level of legitimacy among the local population in Darfur. Indeed, in some refugee camps, the rebels are deemed to be the only legitimate representative of the population. These different degrees of authority and legitimacy of the different local players in the Darfur crisis –as well as in other crises in Africa- have made the efforts of conflict management extremely complex.

Rwanda, despite the dark times it has gone through, has succeeded to launch on a solid path towards reconciliation, reconstruction and development. This has been the result of a combination of leadership, national ownership, and innovative approaches to governance and employment generation, empowerment of women and good use of the support of the international has enabled the country to move forward. In view of this, the extent of achievements in transforming the conflict, addressing the needs of Rwandans,
the strengthening of institutions and reconciling the once divided Rwandan community which has characterised the country since the colonial period. These achievements presents a learning opportunity on the nature and role of leadership capacities in transcending selfish and short-term goals, towards a higher order of collective gain and national stability. Similarly, in the field of conflict management, Rwanda is a good model that can be emulated by other countries and in informing new strategies in the field of prevention, management and resolution of ethnic conflicts.

For the first time in the history of man, Rwanda also can recognised for having stopped genocide, when the international community had remained silent. This move by Rwanda clearly shows that, where there political is, everything is possible with even minimal resources. This contravenes the excuse by the UNAMIR Commander that their failure to act was as a result of lack of resources. If UNAMIR had the will, it would have saved more lives.

Many post civil war countries, continue to struggle to determine this role, and how leadership capacities interact with attitudes and institutions in such a setting to cause the desired transformation. The study also found that post-conflict political reforms are critical to restore integrity, stability and reconciliation.

Finally the study found that the chronic and long-standing structural weaknesses in many African countries may not precipitate violent conflict, but they do generate ongoing and pervasive instability that threatens internal collapse. Political instability, although sometimes accompanied by violence, is qualitatively different from war. Instability is simply a manifestation of societal dysfunction, of discontent and institutional weakness. War or violent conflict is violence that is orchestrated and sustained; it involves two or more opposing actors engaged in a dynamic process of mobilization and escalation of conflict towards war.
5.3 Conclusions

To fully understand the genocide that occurred in Rwanda during 1994, one must understand Rwanda’s history. The country’s beginning was plagued by unfair class structures and hierarchies and unfair treating of a group of its people during the days of it being a colony. Division and conflict was created between its people by the country that colonized it and these divisions remained and grew more and more evident over the years until it eventually overflowed into genocide. These were not the only reasons, however, for the genocide. Rwanda has historically been a rather poor nation and the decline in its economy left its people dissatisfied and frustrated. Many were willing to take any measure to see prosperity in their lives. This even included killing their own neighbour.

The genocide that occurred was devastating not only to the people of Rwanda, but also to the economy and government as well. And even though Rwanda has made a lot of progress in the years following the genocide to try to make things right and to bolster its economy and revamp its government, there is still a lot more that needs to be done in order for Rwanda to be a prospering nation.

The genocide debate and the Darfur crisis are thus instructive for several reasons. First, they have made it clear that "genocide" is not a magic word that triggers intervention. The term grabs attention, and in this case allowed experts and advocates to move Sudan to the centre of the public and international agendas. However, the lack of any subsequent action, showed that the Genocide Convention does not provide nearly the impetus that many thought it would. The convention was intended to institutionalize the promise of "never again." In the past, governments avoided involvement in a crisis by scrupulously eschewing the word "genocide." Sudan--at least so far--shows that the definitional dance may not have mattered.

Darfur also shows that a genocide debate can divert attention from the most
difficult questions surrounding humanitarian intervention. Any potential international action faces serious logistical and political obstacles. Darfur is vast and would require a substantial deployment of troops to safeguard civilians. The area has poor roads, and although it is open to surveillance from the air, ground transportation of troops would be difficult. International action also would need to address the complicated but enduring problems that have given rise to the violence in the first place - the structural challenges.

The study observes that the failure to prevent or stop the 1994 genocide in Rwanda has prompted the need to be examined, with a view to identifying lessons from these failures, which may in turn assist policy makers, conflict managers, experts in the field to consider revisiting the current approach to proffer a solution to the genocide in Darfur. The study further notes that, after Rwanda, observers emphasized the importance of using the label "genocide" and creating domestic constituencies. Darfur showed that both strategies are insufficient and the study concludes that when prevention and the use of non-battle pole means fail, the shift to a battle pole and the use of military force to suppress genocide may be the only viable means of stopping it.

The study, therefore, concludes that while the concept of effective conflict management originally focused on preventing the outbreak of war, extant approaches attempt also to target the structural causes of instability. In the absence of international legal instruments to reconstruct failed or failing states, or to establish more than one sovereign entity from the existing boundaries of such states, the concept of effective conflict management has come to embrace an amorphous set of activities that has produced few tangible results.

These African conflicts have deep-rooted causes, such as the legacy of colonialism which includes extractive patterns of economic development and lack of coincidence between nation and state; ethnic tensions, marginalisation, the suppression of
minorities; corrupt and dictatorial regimes and general failure by states to address human needs have made conflicts to be intractable in Africa. The support for such regimes by some external state actors and regional/sub regional actors has constrained the conflict management efforts. Whatever the causes, the fact remains that successions of civil and regional wars in sub-Saharan-Africa have wreaked national structures within an alarming number of countries.

Therefore, the study concludes that the failure to prevent or suppress the 1994 genocide in Rwanda has often been blamed on a lack of political will by the international community in fear of risking casualties in conflicts within which they had no vital national interests. The failure to respond to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, especially during May and June of 1994, when sufficient evidence confirmed that genocide was taking place, demonstrated the inability of the international community to marshal the will to intervene.

This lack of will was apparent, not only in the international domain, but also within nations, in public opinion and within the military hierarchies of various nations. In order to prevent or stop the crime of genocide, the necessary international, national, public and military will must be marshaled and mobilized.

The study concludes that a quite number of lessons have been learnt from the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, which could be used to reverse the trend of “‘ever-ever again to genocide”. The study was also able to note that, the international community was divided into “nations that lead” and “nations that follow and it remains largely so to this day.

In 1994, the “leading nations,” primarily the P 5on the UN Security Council, failed to provide the required means, to prevent the genocide. Once it started, leading nations abdicated their moral and legal responsibilities to stop the genocide, and, instead,
paralysed UNAMIR with a weak mandate and impotent force that failed to stop it. Follower nations hid behind the apathy of the five permanent members of the UNSC (P5) and could not, on their own, rise to the challenge of enforcing an international response. Before any such response can be conducted, there must exist the international will to recognize that genocide is morally wrong and that the international community must accept its legal responsibilities and obligations to act against it. If a leader nation chooses not to lead, it is up to the follower nations to join together and confront the challenge.

It was further observed that, in order to effectively suppress genocide, the root causes of the genocide must be determined, and they must be vigorously addressed, not just the suppression of the acts of violence themselves, but those root causes must be tackled with a comprehensive, long-term political, economic, social, cultural and human security requirements. Human needs are key to the stability of any society. These needs include security, trust, esteem, positive identity, feelings of effectiveness and control, positive connections to other people, a comprehension of reality and of one’s own place in the world, and transcendence.

Darfur has been viewed as Rwanda in slow motion. Perhaps 400,000 have died during three and a half years of slaughter, over two and a quarter million have been rendered homeless, and, in a particularly gruesome subplot, thousands of women have been systematically raped. During 2006, the genocide began to metastasise, spreading across the border into Chad, where Chadian villagers (and Darfurian refugees) have been butchered and even more women raped by marauding militias supported by the Sudanese government. Sadly, the international response has also unfolded in slow motion. With crimes against humanity like the genocide in Darfur, the caring world is inevitably in a deadly race with time to save and protect as many lives as possible.

It is still shocking that the carnage of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda where over
one million Tutsis were slaughtered, went on day after day, week after week, for one hundred days while the international community remained silent. The massacres in Rwanda were well coordinated, organized, and executed and the killers used all sorts of weapons, including the primitive ones such as machetes and clubs.

Undeniably, the well calculated efforts by the Hutu extremists in the spring of 1994 to eliminate the entire Rwandese Tutsi population, meets the United Nations General Assembly definition of genocide. The study, therefore concludes that, the United Nations cannot realistically and effectively undertake all the peace-building tasks in the world, however, they must be prepared to confront violence and defeat evil wherever they send their forces to uphold the peace. Although the United States did not consider Rwanda, a country of strategic interest, once it became clear genocide was taking place, America might have taken a leading role in rallying the rest of the international community to intervene - instead, it lobbied for the withdrawal of UN forces from Rwanda. Some policy makers, years after the genocide to justify their inaction, have argued that they did not understand the gravity of the killings.

In the reaction to the failure in Rwanda, the UN developed a new system in 2005, called the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) initiative. It obliges states to protect their population from grave human rights violations, genocide and ethnic cleansing. If a state does not fulfil their obligations of protecting their citizens, the international community can assume this responsibility and intervene militarily. In Rwanda, there were sufficient warnings to have prevented the genocide - or to have at least reduced the number of victims. But in spite of these, the international community remained silent.

The study concludes that, genocide is planned and executed by governments and is never spontaneous. The frustration of basic psychological needs by social conditions is seen as one of the sources of group conflicts. These basic needs can be deeply frustrated
by victimization and other traumatic experiences. An important aspect of healing is the fulfilment of these basic human needs.

5.4 Recommendations

Based on the findings, the study recommends the following:

Firstly, prevention, management of genocide requires political will from all the actors. In both Rwanda and Darfur it is evident that political will was lacking. This is why the international community did not act in a timely manner and where they tried to take action has not also yielded positive results. If the slogan “never again” is to be fulfilled, then the political will is a necessary ingredient.

Secondly need for the review of the current mainstream conflict management mechanisms, which have been identified to be not well equipped to confront contemporary challenges like the Darfur situation. The failures after failures can be attributed to the existing gap in the existing mechanisms. Therefore, enduring and intractable conflicts persist because of failure to address this gap.

Need for strengthening and empowering of regional security arrangements. Historically, the UN has not been militarily adequately equipped to respond quickly to crises and is very bureaucratic in its response. The study recommends that in order to be more effective and credible in fostering international peace and security, there is a need for empowering regional conflict management mechanisms through regional economic communities (RECS) for timely and local management of conflicts in respective areas.

The ability to respond quickly with a clear mandate to use force if necessary, is critical, because it can protect groups at high risks and separate opposing adversaries while negotiation efforts are underway.

Finally, there is a need to pay due attention to the fundamental universal human needs by the respective governments if societies are to be stable. This, therefore, justifies the
provision for a non-ideological basis for the establishment of institutions and policies. Unless identity needs are met in societies, unless in every social system there is distributive justice, a sense of control and prospects for the pursuit of all other human societal developmental needs, instability and conflict are inevitable.

The study recommends a collective approach in the fight against genocide denial. Genocide denial once allowed to prevail, it preserves genocide ideology and hence defeats the concept of “never again” and instead becomes “ever and ever” to the genocide.
REFERENCES

Books


University Press.

Kofi Annan’s April 7, 2004 Action Plan to Prevent Genocide, the 10th anniversary of the 1994 Genocide In Rwanda, Annan announced his Action Plan and announced the future appointment of a Special Advisor on Genocide Prevention.
Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, (2012) University of Notre Dame, 100 esburgh Center for International Studies, USA.

Journals


Maximo, Dady De (2012). A Genocide that could have been avoided. New times.


Prunier, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide, 142.


Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 260 (III), Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.


The International Campaign’s coordinator is Genocide Watch (2004).
World Food Programme (2005), *Seeks to feed more than half Darfur’s population*. United Nations.

**Website**

Ghost interview.  
Ghost interview.

Protocol on the Establishment of Humanitarian Assistance in Darfur of 8 April 2004, N’Djamena, Chad, p.113


United States Institute of Peace: Conflict analysis, (Education and Training Center, 2008) p. 3
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/academy/OnlineCourses/Conflict_Analysis_1 30-08.pdf