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**COUNTERTERRORISM IN AFRICA: COUNTERING RADICALISATION IN
KENYA**

**A Research Project Submitted in Partial Fulfilment for the Award of
Master of Arts in Diplomacy**

2015

DECLARATION

I certify that this research project is my original work and contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma, in any university or other tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text.

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This project has been presented for examination with our approval as University Supervisors

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DEDICATION

This project is dedicated to my entire family: dad George, mum Susan, Bob, Rael, Rogers, Davy, Moses and niece Beyoncé.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

My special thanks goes to the almighty God for the earnest mercies and favours that have seen me through this academic journey.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADF Allied Democratic Front

AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia

AQIM Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb

ATA Antiterrorism Assistance

ATPU Anti-Terrorism Police Unit,

AU African Union

ACSRT African Centre for Study and Research of Terrorism

AIAI al-Ittihad al-Islami

CVE Counter Violence and Extremism

DoD Department of Defence

EIJ Eritrean Islamic Jihad

FATF Financial Action Task Force

FIU Financial Intelligence Unit

GSU General Services Unit

ICU Islamic Courts Union

OAU Organisation of African Unity

ONLF Ogadeni National Liberation Front

OLF Oromo Liberation Front

PTA Prevention of Terrorism Act

LRA Lords' Resistance Army

RECs Regional Economic Communities

TFG Transitional Federal Government

TSCTP Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership

ABSTRACT

Terrorism has been a dark feature of human behaviour since the dawn of recorded history. Africa cannot help but be drawn into the fight against terrorism, bearing that it is a phenomena that has plagued its land for long. Terrorist organizations in Africa, pose an increasing threat to regional peace and security. The degree to which they become more transnational also raises grave concern to the international community.

Building a resilient society in which individuals and communities are able to withstand violent extremist ideologies and challenge those who espouse them. There is no quick fix for the level of radicalization seen in Kenya and the continent at large. Developing an effective, long-term counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation strategies that will reduce the appeal of radicalism – and de-radicalisation – persuading people who are already in radical organisations to leave them – are long-term processes that require tact and patience.

This study intends to illustrate how radicalization is viewed and perceived in societies and how it has created ample breeding and recruiting ground for terrorists. The target population in this study was residents of Nairobi city who were of the age of eighteen years and above. The study targeted 90 respondents and 78 successfully participated in answering questionnaires, together with one focused group discussion and an interview with a key informant.

From the study findings, it was established that a big number of Kenyans are aware of terrorism and radicalisation activities in the country, with economic drivers being highly rated as the major causal priority, followed by religious, then political and other social factors. The study concluded that Kenyan in one way or the other have been affected adversely by terror activities be it loss of lives, properties or employment. It also settles that religion plays a critical role in propagating radicalisation, even though the exploits of terror are more political and location specific.

Media plays a critical and important role in knowledge and information sharing among the public, and this can be employed to counter the radical rhetoric through appropriate programming and informing the public.

There is need for review of security laws and policies in the country, and establish an inter-command security unit as an appropriate measure. The government is called to task to deal with the issue of youth unemployment in the country which has become an exploiting ground for those conscripting for terror groups. There is also need for the government to form an effective and appropriate counter-narrative to terrorism and radicalisation regarding that most policies and interventions cannot only work in a vacuum.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION.

1.1 Background of the study

Terrorism has been a dark feature of human behaviour since the dawn of recorded history. Great leaders have been assassinated, groups and individuals have committed acts of incredible violence and entire cities and nations have been put to the sword, all in the name of defending a greater good. Terror attacks are generally meant to communicate a message. The message may be intended for the direct victims of the attack, other members of that society, members of the terrorist group, members of other societies, or both. Terrorism is usually an instrument through which its perpetrators, lacking mass support, attempt to realise a political or religious project.

Terrorism is pegged on three basic categories of causes ranging from structural and psychological causes, as well as those related to the concept of rational choice. In understanding why people engage in such actions in the name of a group based on ethnicity, religion and nationalism or ideology, these arguments present rooted issues in economic and socio-psychological dimensions of human motivations.¹

In Crenshaw's "The causes of terrorism" she outlines an approach conducive for the analysis of the causes of terrorism in order to distinguish "a common pattern of causation from the historically unique."² Differentiating between three groups of variables: strategic, structural and psychological, Crenshaw emphasizes the idea that terrorism is a product of rational political choice. A conceptual distinction is drawn with the division of the structural variables into preconditions (root causes) and precipitants (trigger causes). Preconditions are further

¹Martin G (2009), *Understanding Terrorism, Challenges, Perspectives and Issues*, 3rd Ed, Sage Publications.

²Crenshaw, M. (1986) 'The psychology of political terrorism', in Hermann, M.G. (ed.), *Political Psychology*, pp. 379-413.

divided and classified into enabling (or permissive) factors that provide opportunities for terrorism to occur, and situations that serve as direct motivations for terrorist campaigns.

Africa cannot help but be drawn into the global war on terrorism. While the war on terrorism usually relates to internationally linked terrorists, mostly referred to as transnational terrorism, the continent of Africa face other security threats of equal or greater significance that calls for focus in counterterrorism efforts.³ There are several organized rebellions or insurgencies in Africa, while not always classified as terrorists, which wreak terrible havoc on African people and threaten national stability. African terrorist groups, such as al-Shabab, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, and Ansar Bayt Al-Maqdis (ABM), threaten the security and prosperity of Africans across the continent. Various terrorist groups have operated in Somalia since it experienced state collapse in the early 1990s. Rotberg notes that Somalia is the model of a collapsed state: a geographical expression only, with borders but with no effective way to exert authority within those borders.⁴

Two years after the events of 9/11, then United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan in his address to heads of state - at a conference on *Fighting Terrorism for Humanity: A Conference on Roots of Evil*- stressed the need to address the root causes of terrorism in order to be able to fight it, stating that if we are to defeat terrorism, it is our duty, and indeed our interest, to try to understand this deadly phenomenon, and carefully to examine what works, and what does not, in fighting it.⁵ He emphasized that it was just as erroneous to believe that terrorism is unrelated to political and social factors, as it is to assume that terrorists are merely products of their environment.

The first significant manifestation of the growing threat of extremism in East Africa can be traced back to the 7 August 1998 attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Al Qaeda is synonymous and a symbol to the globalization of terrorism in the 21st century. Although terror ring and its leaders, Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Al Zawahiri became known much to the world after the 911 attack.

³Lyman P. N (2008) *The War on Terrorism in Africa*, from *Africa in World Politics* by John Harbeson, Reprinted by permission of WESTVIEW PRESS, a member of Perseus Books Group.

⁴Rotberg (2006), p. 131.

⁵United Nations Secretary General, 2003. <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sgsm8885.doc.htm>.

The region has experienced prolonged and severe intra- and interstate conflict, leading to instability, poverty, and political isolation that make it vulnerable to terrorist exploitation. The porous quality of the Somalia-Kenya border, a steady flow of arms and refugees between Yemen and Somalia and Ethiopia, the ease of money laundering (or traceless money transfers), and the widespread availability of inexpensive light weapons and ammunition all provide openings for Al Qaeda infiltration, the effective suborning of local officials, and the coalescence of terrorist surges. Since Kenya invaded its northern neighbour in late 2011 ostensibly to tackle Islamic militants, al-Shabab, a backlash of grenade and gun attacks blamed on the group's operatives and sympathisers has hit the country on a frequent and alarming rates, raising concerns of the state of security in the country.

Radicalisation is a context-bound phenomenon par excellence. Global, sociological and political drivers matter as much as ideological and psychological ones. The current wave of radicalisation into terrorist violence is predominantly related to individuals and groups that use a religious discourse refers to a well-known phenomenon. Polarising tendencies and radicalisation processes can be witnessed within many religious, ethnic and cultural population aggregates.

The phenomenon of “weak states” providing safe haven and breeding ground for terrorism is one that has plagued Africa in recent years. Weak or failed states may provide an environment conducive to the emergence or operation of terrorist organizations which may target local or international interests. The unstable situation in Somalia, the Arab uprising in the Sahel and the on-going crisis in Syria are feared to have impact on terror activities in Africa.⁶ Lawless Somalia over the past two decades became the cradle of Al Qaeda’s East African cell. Existing instability and potential sources of future conflagration offer added opportunities for infiltration, interference, and backing for extremists.

Many regional and sub-regional organisations also have adopted agreements to address the threat of terrorism. The African Union (the OAU’s successor) has taken a broad approach

⁶Whitaker B. E (2010) Compliance among weak states: Africa and the counter-terrorism regime Review of International Studies, British International Studies Association, UK.

based on a framework of treaties aimed at countering terrorism.⁷These treaties entail provisions on extradition, the exchange of information, capacity building, and other elements aimed at strengthening cooperation in the area of counterterrorism in Africa.

In 2004 the AU established the African Centre for Study and Research of Terrorism (ACSRT) based in Algiers, Algeria to specialise on matters relating to terrorism and implementation of the AU counterterrorism programme. It operates a highly integrated network of state and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) focal points through a central coordination mechanism.

The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted by General Assembly resolution 60/288 in 2006, and states that terrorism "constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security".

The struggle against terrorism, however, is never-ending. Terrorism owes its survival to an ability to adapt and adjust to challenges and countermeasures and to continue to identify and exploit its opponent's vulnerabilities. For success against terrorism, efforts must be as tireless, innovative, and dynamic as that of the opponent.⁸ Therefore research-driven policy and legal reform is needed to ensure appropriate, proactive and preventative counterterrorism action in Africa. The global counter-terrorism effort is premised upon national-level lawful actions to prevent and prosecute terrorist activity. Although counter-terrorism strategies are complex and multidimensional, a preventative, criminal justice-based response.⁹

Counterterrorism as defined can take form of "actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks."¹⁰The struggle against terrorism, however, is never-ending. Terrorism owes its survival to an ability to adapt and adjust to challenges and countermeasures and to

⁷The Organization of African Unity (OAU) counter-terrorism convention of 1999 was adopted in reaction to the 1998 al Qaeda strikes in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam; the African Union counterterrorism plan of action of 2002; and the AU protocol to the convention of 2004.

⁸Ibid 1.

⁹ Ford J. (2009) *Beyond the 'War on Terror' A study of criminal justice responses to terrorism in the Maghreb*, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa.

¹⁰Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Counterterrorism*, Joint Publication 3-26, November 13, 2009.

continue to identify and exploit its opponent's vulnerabilities. For success against terrorism, efforts must be as tireless, innovative, and dynamic as that of the opponent.¹¹

The development of counter-terrorism policies reflected domestic political processes and different national approaches, and could be explained by different self-conceptions and institutional practices. Thus a counter-terrorism strategy constitutes "those state actions that aim to suppress terrorist violence, utilizing any or all tools of statecraft including the use of military force, criminal law measures, intelligence operations, regulatory controls, and diplomacy"¹². In Norton Bensahel's words counter terrorism is both a preventive and a responsive mechanism to terrorist activities.

Building a countering terrorism strategy requires partnerships. Achieving goals will require an integrated approach not only by the state, but by all levels of government, law enforcement agencies, the private sector and citizens, in collaboration with international partners and key allies.

The challenge in combating terrorism in Africa is to balance a legitimate program of security improvements with a continuing and sustained attack on poor governance, poverty, and deprivation of human rights. U.S. military personnel work hand-in-hand with their African counterparts to increase military capacity in countries threatened by terrorism. The Department of Defence (DoD) provides much needed equipment to empower African partners' ability to halt terrorism. U.S. military personnel provide specialized training to African counterparts to increase military capacity in countries threatened by terrorism.

The United States has been the greatest sponsor of multinational exercises to increase collaboration and strengthen bonds among African partners. The U.S.-led Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is designed to build the capacity and cooperation of military, law enforcement, and civilian actors across North and West Africa to counter terrorism. TSCTP has been successful in building capacity and cooperation despite setbacks

¹¹ Ibid "2".

¹² Norton. Bensahel, N. (2006). "A Coalition of Coalitions: International Cooperation against Terrorism." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 29: 35-49.

caused by coups d'état, ethnic rebellions, and extra-constitutional actions that have interrupted work and progress with select partner countries.¹³

Critics who are opposed to military operations have asserted that only a continual intensive attack on the root causes of terrorism and violence, that is, poverty, authoritarianism, discrimination, weak states, and similar conditions, will effectively combat such threats. They oppose that a focus that relies too heavily on security will encourage authoritarian practices and undermine Africa's move toward more democratic governance.

This study attempts to examine the contribution radicalisation has made in fanning terrorism in Kenya and how counter measures against it can help curb or end the ever growing threat to the state.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The Horn of Africa has been the most conflicted part of Africa during the last 50 years.¹⁴ Although there have been long-standing disputes in places like Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi, and the Congo, no other region on the continent has had as many conflicts over such a long span of time. The United States has properly identified East Africa and the Horn as the region in Sub-Saharan Africa most threatened by indigenous and international terrorism.¹⁵ This part of the continent also stands out for the number of internal and regional conflicts that it has experienced in recent decades.

Terrorist organizations in Africa, pose an increasing threat to regional peace and security. The degree to which they become more transnational also raises grave concern for the international community. The process of radicalization is a very complex phenomenon.

¹³ Donovan C. Chau. 2008. U.S. Counterterrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa: Understanding costs, cultures, and conflicts. Pg. 24-28. Available at: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB821.pdf>

¹³ Diamond L (2002) *Winning the New Cold War on Terrorism: The Democratic-Governance Imperative*,

¹⁴ Shah A. (2010) Conflict In Africa – Introduction, Global Issues.

<http://www.globalissues.org/issue/83/conflicts-in-africa>. Accessed on 13 March 2015.

¹⁵ Shinn H. D (2014) Terrorism in East Africa and the Horn: An Overview, the Journal of Conflict studies, The Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society.

Radicalization, particularly in the form of religious extremism can be largely attributed to the crises facing the state, especially lack of strong institutions and capacity for social service delivery.¹⁶

Radical groups ride on the normal defensive retrenchment to value money and lowered complexity of thinking in the face of globalization threats, and work to intensify it through their ideology. There are strong structural foundations for radicalization in East Africa. Radicalization has continued to spread building both on the economic decline, violent conflicts and lack of strong and legitimate states.

Islamic radicalism, while it has been at the centre of much political and policy interest may not be the only source of radicalized violence. Nevertheless, it is easy to discern the causes of political Islam and radicalization than other forms of radicalization, youth vulnerability to fringe movements, such as left and right wing terrorism, the Neo Nazi Movement, street gangs and cults.

When access to resources is based on ethnic, cultural or religious characteristics or there is a growing divide between the 'haves' and 'have nots' in countries and communities, economic conditions further contribute to instability. Ethnicity and religion divide Kenyans politically and socially and have caused several violent clashes (the post-election violence in 2007 is the most recent manifestation of this). The reality is that ethnic coalitions and the rural-urban divide polarise politics in Kenya.

Somalia's growing Islamist radicalism is spilling over into Kenya. The militant Al-Shabaab movement has built a cross-border presence and a clandestine support network among Muslim populations in the north east and Nairobi and on the coast, and is trying to radicalise

¹⁶The Current Analysis (2009) Drivers of Youth Radicalization in East Africa.
<http://currentanalyst.com/index.php/conflictsregional/165-drivers-of-youth-radicalization-in-east-africa>.
Accessed on 14 March 2015.

and recruit youth from these communities, often capitalising on long-standing grievances against the central state.¹⁷

Unemployment, poverty and political marginalization are said to be contributing to the Islamic radicalization of Kenya's youth. Youth unemployment is extremely high, as are levels of political disenchantment. An estimated 75 percent of out-of-school youths are unemployed.¹⁸

Despite Kenya being a secular country, historical political marginalization of Muslims has long kept them on the borders of national agenda. Equally, it causes the government and non-Muslims to question the patriotism of Muslims, a perception that was strengthened by the fact that after independence the Somalis started agitating for a separate homeland with the option of joining their brethren in Somalia, resulting in the so-called Shifta War.¹⁹

Such influences of marginalisation and segregation can, or have contributed to radicalisation into some kind of agitation and in the long run turn extreme if not attended. Therefore this study seeks to investigate extent to which these factors can be a motivation or key driver of radicalisation to extreme violence.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The overall objective of this study is to explore and establish the various inter-linkages between radicalisation and terrorism in Kenya and how dealing with causal factors will go a long way towards countering terrorism in the country.

Specific objectives of the research will be to:

¹⁷ International Crisis Group (2012) Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation Africa Briefing N°85. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/b085-kenyan-somali-islamist-radicalisation.aspx>. Accessed on 21 March 2015.

¹⁸ USAID (2013) Education and Youth, <http://kenya.usaid.gov/programs/education-and-youth/51>

¹⁹ Botha A (2013) Assessing the vulnerability of Kenyan youths to radicalisation and extremism, ISS Paper 245, ISS, Pretoria.

1. To investigate the state of radicalisation and extremism in Africa and the most affected target group.
2. Analyze the various forms of radicalization and terrorism in Kenya; actors and factors facilitating.
3. Examine how radicalization contributes to terrorism and other forms of extremism at all levels of analysis.
4. Explore the strategies that could be employed to counter terrorism and radicalisation.

1.4 Research Questions

1. What is the state of terrorism and counterterrorism in Africa?
2. What is the link between radicalization and terrorism in Kenya?
3. What are the causes of (push and pull factors) radicalisation?
4. What are the forms of radicalisation and who the players are?
5. Does the public have adequate understanding of radicalization and what is their role in countering it?

1.5 Justification of the Study.

This research is intended to justify the existence of the link between radicalisation and transnational terrorism in Kenya. The findings of the study will be relevant to several players in the security sector who may use the finding of the study to design programmes in countering radicalisation and also provide basis for policy review.

This study intends to illustrate how radicalization has manifested in various societies in the country and how it has created ample breeding and recruiting ground for terrorists.

Academically, this study will add to the existing literature in the areas of international relations in the context of diplomacy and peace building. Researchers and scholars may find the study useful as a basis of further research. General and contextual problems in the

interrelationship between terrorism and radicalisation in Kenya, as case study in Nairobi, whose results may be applied by researchers to other terror prone areas in the country and Africa.

1.6 Scope and Limitation of Study

A survey mode of research will be adopted for the purpose of this study, targeting Nairobi urban area. The study involves primary and secondary data collection, where a desktop research will be conducted for background study of the research phenomena, while primary data to ascertain the hypothesis of the study will be conducted through survey and interviews with key informants. Data collection tools which will be employed include questionnaires, face to face interviews with key informants.

The study will utilize both quantitative and qualitative research techniques for data collection to accomplish the set objectives. Quantitative approach in this case is meant to come up with numerical data and results, while qualitative making indepth analysis of the objectives of the study.

The researcher anticipates that the study will encounter few limitations which include time and financial factors and which may affect the total number of samples to be studied.

However, in spite of all these limitations, efforts will be made to ensure the quality of the study the use of sources.

1.7 Research Hypothesis

The study is premised on following hypotheses

- There is an increasing level of radicalization of fighters to join terrorist movements operating within and without the country.
- What is attracting people to join terror groups- both push and pull factors?
- What is the government and the stakeholders not doing right in the fight against

radicalisation in the country?

1.8 Basic Assumptions of the study

The study made the following assumptions in developing the methodology of study and hypothesis

- A major assumption was that the respondents will be objective and honest with no bias or stereotypical thinking.
- The assumption was also made about co-operation from the respondents in truthfully in answering the questions and participating fully in the interviews and focused group discussions
- The characteristics of the sampling population will be distributive enough for results to be generalizable enough.

1.9 Definition of key terms

The following terms will be restricted to the definition and explanation as given or as used in this study.

Terrorism: politically motivated violence, perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine state agents. Causes ranging from structural and psychological causes based on ethnicity, religion and nationalism or ideology.

Counter-terrorism: actions taken in/directly against terrorism networks to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorism networks.

Community: is a social group of any size whose members reside in a specific locality, share government, and often have a common cultural and historical heritage. It is a locality inhabited by such a group.

A social, religious, occupational, or other group sharing common characteristics or interests and perceived or perceiving itself as distinct in some respect from t

he larger society within which it exists (usually preceded by the): the business community; the community of scholars.

Government: The group of people with the authority to govern a country or state; a particular ministry in office. The action or manner of controlling or regulating a state, organization, or people.

National Security: This is the freedom from danger or threats to a nation's stability to protect itself, promote its values and interest, and enhance the well-being of its people.

National Security Threat: Increase in crime wave, crisis and violent conflict, which endanger people's lives and the safety of the properties a nation. It may as well destabilize a seating government and make a country ungovernable to particular levels.

Radicalisation: increasing extremity of beliefs, feelings, and behaviours in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defence of the in group. It is the process by which an individual, group, or mass of people undergo transformation from participating in the political process via legal means to the use or support of violence for political purposes in this case radicalism.

Deradicalisation: is used to refer to programmes that are generally directed against individuals who have become radical with the aim of reintegrating them into society or at least dissuading them from violence.

Ideology:

The body of doctrine, myth, belief, etc., that guides an individual, social movement, institution, class, or large group.

Such a body of doctrine, myth, etc. with reference to some political and social plan, as that of fascism, along with the devices for putting it into operation.

Rhetoric: The art or science of all specialized literary uses of language in prose or verse, including the figures of speech. The study of the effective use of language.

1.11. Chapter Outline.

The study is divided into five chapters. Chapter one is the introduction and covers the background of the study, statement of the problem, objectives, research questions and significance of the study. Chapter two examines the literature review dealing with detailed study of existing literature on the root causes of radicalisation both continentally and nationally.

Chapter three is research methodology and covers data collection procedures and analysis techniques. Chapter four is data analysis and presentation of findings of the study. Chapter five will provide the summary of findings, conclusion and recommendations of the study.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

This part attempts to discuss the conceptual framework upon which this study is anchored. It further describes the existence of radicalisation and the challenges to security of a nation and the consequences arising out of these challenges.

2.1 Understanding Terrorism

Terrorism is perhaps best viewed as the archetypal shark in the water. It must constantly move forward to survive and indeed to succeed.²⁰ Although survival entails obviating the governmental countermeasures designed to unearth and destroy the terrorists and their organization, success is dependent on overcoming the defences and physical security barriers designed to thwart attack.

There are three typologies of terrorism, these being 'Political Terrorism', 'Crime related Terrorism' and 'Pathological Terrorism'.²¹ By grouping acts and motivations of terrorism within their respective typologies, effective measures to counter such acts become manageable. The *Modus Operandi* or the distinct pattern of working associated with terror activities. The tactics have evolved since early 60s becoming more sophisticated from skyjacking to cyberspace. In order for any counter terrorism strategy to be effective, it is imperative that questions around the 'who' (target) and 'how' (*modus operandi*) are essentially highlighted.

²⁰Hoffman B.R (2002) Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Copy right Taylor & Francis, Arlington, VA, USA.

²¹Schmid, A.P and Jongman, A.J. 1988. *Political terrorism: A guide to actors, authors, concepts, data basis, theories and literature*. Amsterdam: North Holland.

US State Department's defines terrorism as premeditated, politically motivated violence, perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine state agents.²²

Terrorism has been defined by the European Union's Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism of 2002 as “an intentional act which may seriously damage a country or an international organisation, committed with the aim of seriously intimidating a population, unduly compelling a Government or an international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, seriously destabilizing or destroying fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures by means of attacks upon a person's life, attacks upon the physical integrity of a person, kidnapping, hostage-taking, seizure of aircraft or ships, or the manufacture, possession or transport of weapons or explosives”. Terrorism can originate from far-left and far-right extremist groups, lone actors, and nationalist and separatist entities.

Organised terrorism emerges in the 19th century as an instrument available to nations, ethnic minorities, religious communities, and oppressed classes who seek to assert in a militant way their unrecognised differences or, to raise the consciousness of their own people and promote their own identity.

Terrorism conducted by organizations in the region against neighbouring countries includes a series of attacks by Somalia-based *al-Ittihad al-Islami* (AIAI) against civilian targets in Ethiopia in the 1990s. The Sudan-based Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ) has conducted attacks inside Eritrea that have killed civilians although the intended targets may have been military.

Terrorism against state by indigenous organizations such as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and Allied Democratic Front (ADF) in Uganda and the militant wing of the Ogadeni National Liberation Front (ONLF) and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in Ethiopia that have used terrorist attacks in Uganda and Ethiopia respectively. The LRA has occasionally operated out of southern Sudan and the ADF out of the eastern Congo while the OLF at various times has had support from Somalia, Eritrea, and Sudan. Both of these kinds of

²²US Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice/[Topics](#) > [Crime and Prevention](#) > [Terrorism](#)
<http://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/terrorism/welcome.htm> Accessed on 12th April 2015.

terrorism are intended to embarrass, harm, or even overturn an established government in the region.²³

The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy²⁴ and the holistic approach it represents offer an opportunity to recalibrate counterterrorism efforts in the sub-region. By elaborating a broad range of counterterrorism measures, underpinned by the commitment to uphold the rule of law and human rights, the Strategy offers countries in East Africa the broad-based, long-term framework needed not only to thwart and respond to terrorist attacks, but to prevent the violent radicalization of local populations which might resort to terrorist violence in the future and which may be the greatest strategic challenge to counterterrorism efforts in the sub-region.²⁵

According to the UN Strategy, “conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism” include “poverty, prolonged unresolved conflicts, dehumanization of victims of terrorism, lack of rule of law and violations of human rights, ethnic, national and religious discrimination, political exclusion, socio-economic marginalization and lack of good governance.

In light of the Strategy, the Task Force created nine Working Groups to carry forward key initiatives highlighted in the strategy, in which the Task Force had specific expertise and could provide added value. The creation of the Working Group on “Addressing Radicalisation and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism,” was a response to Member State demand for help in furthering their understanding of what makes a terrorist a terrorist and in identifying effective policies and practices to prevent this from happening.

²³Shinn H. D (2014) Terrorism in East Africa and the Horn: An Overview, the Journal of Conflict studies, The Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society.

²⁴The September 2006 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy calls for a holistic and inclusive approach to counter-terrorism. United Nations General Assembly, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 60/288, A/RES/60/288, New York, 8 September 2006, Section I

²⁵Rosand E., et al (2009) Implementing the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in East Africa, Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, Washington, DC 20036.

Indeed, for years the Horn of Africa, filled with weak, corrupt, and warring states, was seen as fertile ground for Islamists. Following the 9-11 attacks against the United States, the Horn again came under intense scrutiny by counter-terrorism specialists and it remains a strategic focal point in the American war against terrorism. Helping to eliminate the conditions that give rise to the alienation of groups that use terrorism, better intelligence on those that persist anyway, and carefully designed counter-terrorism programs are the most effective ways to deal with the threat in East Africa and the Horn.

Sudan became a safe haven for Islamic extremist groups in the early 1990s, when the Sudanese government actively supported the activities of terrorist groups. Osama bin Laden used Sudan as a base of operations beginning in 1992 to support various jihad efforts around the world, before he was expelled in May 1996.²⁶

Al Shabab an off-shoot of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) which splintered into several smaller factions after its defeat in 2006 by the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is a clear pointer of the Political power struggles. Al Shabab which until recently was in control of large territories in central and southern Somalia, where they had imposed harsh Islamic “Sharia” laws on the natives, running a revenue collection system parallel to that of the transitional government. Al Shabab employs extremist intimidation and terror tactics designed to in still fear in the population. Its so-called religious police mete out severe punishments, including floggings, amputations, stoning, and beheadings, for violations of its strict interpretation of Islamic law.²⁷

On July 11, 2010, 76 people were killed in near simultaneous bombings in Kampala, Uganda. Somali Islamist insurgent group, al Shabab, with ties to Al Qaeda, claimed responsibility, marking the group’s first successful attack outside Somali territory.²⁸ Al Shabab has threatened attacks in Uganda and Burundi, which have deployed troops to the African Union

²⁶Wright L. (2006) *The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

²⁷Human Rights Watch (HRW), *Harsh War, Harsh Peace: Abuses by Al-Shabab, the Transitional Federal Government, and AMISOM in Somalia*, April 19, 2010.

²⁸Ploch L. (2010) *Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U.S. Response*, Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R41473.

(AU) peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and has threatened other countries and Western targets in East Africa.

Al Qaeda and affiliated groups have had a presence in East Africa for almost 20 years, although the extent of their operations there has varied over time. The region's porous borders, proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, weak law enforcement and judicial institutions, pervasive corruption, and, in some cases, state complicity in terrorist activities, combined with the almost 20-year absence of central authority in Somalia, have provided an enabling environment for Al Qaeda and other violent extremist groups. Some countries in the region have served at various times as terrorist safe havens, staging areas, or transit points.

The prefix "counter" in words such as counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and counterespionage is intended to mean that any effort taken would be proactive, aggressive and offensive, as opposed to any reactive or defensive strategy which is implied by terms such as the prefix "anti" in anti-terrorism. There are obviously, then, more policy options with counterterrorism than with antiterrorism.

The two most successful strategies for ending terrorist groups since the late 1960s have been either policing or the initiation of a political process. These strategies were the main reason for the ending of over 80 per cent of terrorist organisations that ceased operation. Only ten per cent of terrorist groups could be said to have achieved their goals and only seven per cent were eliminated by full military engagement.

Building a resilient society in which individuals and communities are able to withstand violent extremist ideologies and challenge those who espouse them. A resilient society is one that is able to mitigate the impacts of a terrorist attack, ensuring a rapid return to ordinary life.

2.2 Radicalisation

Radicalisation to any form of terrorist violence is a phased process.²⁹ Although radicalisation has increasingly been subjected to scientific studies, a universally accepted definition of the concept is yet to be developed. Nevertheless, faced with pressure to tackle radicalisation, policy makers have developed a few definitions.

Definitions of radicalisation most often centre around two different foci:

1. On violent radicalisation, where emphasis is put on the active pursuit or acceptance of the use of violence to attain the stated goal, and;
2. On a broader sense of radicalisation, where emphasis is placed on the active pursuit or acceptance of far-reaching changes in society, which may or may not constitute a danger to democracy and may or may not involve the threat of or use of violence to attain the stated goals.³⁰

Violent extremism can be identified as a process by which individuals are introduced to an explicitly ideological rhetoric and belief system that encourages movement from modest, conventional beliefs towards extremist views. This becomes a threat to national security when individuals or groups espouse or engage in violence as a means of promoting political, ideological or religious objectives.

There are various descriptions in the relevant social science literature with regard to the number and type of phases, stages or steps within the radicalisation process. “Violent radicalisation” involves embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism. Actually, the term “violent radicalisation” originated in EU policy circles and was coined after the Madrid bombing of 11 March 2004. It is not widely used in social science as a concept but it obviously refers to a process of socialisation leading to the use of violence.

²⁹The European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation (2008) Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism, Official Journal of the European Union.

³⁰Veldhuis T and Staun J (2009).

Two principal schools within the contemporary debate tend to stress either ‘cognitive radicalisation’, emphasising a person’s beliefs, or ‘behavioural radicalisation’, which emphasises a person’s actions, as the measurable criteria.³¹

McCauley and Moskaleiko focus more on its mechanisms and on group dynamics in defining radicalization as: Increasing extremity of beliefs, feelings, and behaviours in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defence of the in group.³²

In Crossett and Spitaletta broader review of psychological and sociological concepts in radicalisation, they define it as the process by which an individual, group, or mass of people undergo transformation from participating in the political process via legal means to the use or support of violence for political purposes in this case radicalism.³³

Muslim youth have joined extremist groups as a counter-reaction to what they see as government-imposed ‘collective punishment’ driven by the misguided perception that all Somali and Kenyan-Somalis are potential terrorists. As long as Kenyan citizens exclusively identify with an ethnic/ religious identity that is perceived to be under threat, radicalisation will increase.

If radicalization refers to some kind of process of change, there are some who argue that process is often intentionally and systematically facilitated or directed by others. The nexus between socialisation and radicalisation are essential according to Hogan and Taylor in the making of a terrorist.³⁴The involvement in terrorism results from gradual exposure to and socialisation towards extreme behaviour and increasing legitimisation of the use of violence to achieve political ends.

³¹ Dawson L., et al (2014) LEARNING AND ADAPTING: The Use of Monitoring and Evaluation in Countering Violent Extremism. Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) Whitehall, London, UK.

³² McCauley C. and S. Moskaleiko S. (2008) Mechanisms of political radicalization: Pathways toward terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence.

³³ Crossett C. and Spitaletta J. (2010) Radicalization: Relevant psychological and sociological concepts Ft. Meade, MD: U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, 10.

³⁴ Horgan J. and Taylor M. (2001) The making of a terrorist, *Jane’s Intelligence Review* 13(12) 16–18.

Somalia's growing Islamist radicalism is spilling over into Kenya. The militant Al-Shabab movement has built a cross-border presence and a clandestine support network among Muslim populations in the north east and Nairobi and on the coast, and is trying to radicalise and recruit youth from these communities, often capitalising on long-standing grievances against the central state.³⁵

Instead, local conditions have enabled growing frustrations to become worse, enabling al-Shabab to strengthen its foothold in Kenya. The consequences of the country's inability to address growing radicalisation has not only enable al-Shabab to recruit foreign fighters in Kenya, but has also facilitated the spread of al-Shabab in the country and the broader region. Confronted with this growing threat, both security policymakers and practitioners are urged to carefully reassess the strategy and tactics they employ to respond to al-Shabab.

The sectarian element of al-Shabab's raids in Lamu, Mandera and recently Garissa between July 2014 and May 2015, and a growing trend of radicalisation among Mombasa's youth brought the threat of political Islam to the forefront of Kenya's political discourse. The steady indication of al-Shabab's infiltration into Kenya and the rebranding of their operations as "Kenyan" under the name al-Hijra has made it increasingly clear that they have sources of support within Kenya and that the country is not simply "an innocent victim in the war on terror."³⁶

It is important to recall that al-Shabab's roots are in Somalia, but the increasing acceptance of al-Qaeda and al-Shabab's philosophy in traditional African communities has allowed al-Shabab in particular to spread throughout the broader region, including in Kenya. Despite being victims of al-Shabab attacks, Kenyans are also directly involved in recruiting their

³⁵ International Crisis Group (2012) Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation, Africa Briefing N°8525 <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/b085-kenyan-somali-islamist-radicalisation.aspx>

³⁶ Forster R. and Waterman A. (2015) Beyond Mombasa: Rethinking counter-radicalisation in Kenya, Consultancy Africa. http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1748:beyond-mombasa-rethinking-counter-radicalisation-in-kenya-&catid=60:conflict-terrorism-discussion-papers&Itemid=265. Accessed on 19 May 2015.

fellow nationals to join the organisation's ranks, initially, after being radicalised. This trend also gradually changed in that locally marginalised, radicalised and recruited individuals started being used to execute attacks in their own countries.

There is no quick fix for the level of radicalization seen in Kenya. Developing an effective, long-term counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation strategies that will reduce the appeal of radicalism – and de-radicalisation – persuading people who are already in radical organisations to leave them – are long-term processes that require tact and patience.

Counter-radicalisation refers to policies and programmes aimed at addressing some of the conditions that may propel some individuals down the path of terrorism. It is used broadly to refer to a package of social, political, legal, educational and economic programmes specifically designed to deter disaffected (and possibly already radicalized) individuals from crossing the line and becoming terrorists.

The term deradicalisation, on the other hand, is used to refer to programmes that are generally directed against individuals who have become radical with the aim of reintegrating them into society or at least dissuading them from violence.

Radicalisation is a grave threat to Kenya's security and stability. Formulating and executing sound counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation policies before it is too late must be a priority. To deal with radicalisation in Kenya, it will require a two-pronged, i.e. the need to strengthen rule of law and homogenise the response by security services towards terrorist threats and criminal behaviour across ethnic groups, thus nullifying concerns over the uneven, and at times discriminatory, policing across Kenya. Secondly the government needs to strengthen social and development programmes in areas of need, encouraging job creation and access to education and credit to prevent situations where disaffected youth are drawn to a life of purpose via radicalisation.

2.3 Countering Terrorism in Kenya

Terror attacks and networks across regions are creating a shift in the security systems. No single state in the region can claim that it is exonerated from such attacks. Therefore, there is need for deliberate renewed commitment of the partner states between governments, private sector and security institutions in fighting the vice. An effective counterterrorism policy must go beyond uncompromising efforts to thwart those who seek to harm us today. Cooperation is essential to meet this threat, and we must ensure that new terrorist recruits do not come to take the place of those we have defeated.³⁷

The sub regional cooperation and partnership at East African Community Inter-forces made tracking of terrorists groups easier. The forces share information and intelligence that can be used to prevent terrorist activities in the region. This effort is also supported by the governments of each country. For instance, the suspects in the July 2010 Kampala terrorist attacks were extradited from Kenya and Tanzania to Uganda.³⁸

Kenya remains one of Africa's largest beneficiaries of the US government's Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program focused on building law enforcement capacities in the areas of border security, investigations, and crisis response, and on the institutionalization of counterterrorism prevention and response capabilities. Customs and Border Patrol assistance provided multinational training including Kenya for rural border patrol units such as those in the Kenya Police Service and the Kenya Wildlife Service.

With US training and assistance, the government established an Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, the Joint Terrorism Task Force (later disbanded), a National Counter-Terrorism Centre, and a National Security Advisory Committee. Kenya has cooperated to capture terrorist suspects fleeing violence in Somalia, and has allowed a significant level of US military activity in the eastern part of the country. These various efforts have disrupted terrorist operations in the region.

³⁷Benjamin D (2008) Strategic Counter Terrorism, Foreign Policy at Brookings, Policy Paper No. 7.

³⁸ Ibid "6".

Kenya's 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2011 Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act, and 2010 Prevention of Organized Crime Act together provided a strong legal framework under which to prosecute acts of terrorism. Kenya's National Assembly passed no new general legislation on terrorism in 2013, but new amendments to the landmark 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) were passed in 2013 that strengthened the criminalization of financing acts of terrorism. The regulations established the police and the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) as the institutions that are to collect and respond to reports of terrorist activity. The regulations also formalized the process for freezing assets, deeming a person a suspected terrorist, and sharing information between government agencies. The most recent but highly controversial legislation in Kenya is the Security Laws (Amendment) Act of 2014.

The Kenyan judiciary continues to demonstrate increasing independence and competence. The Kenyan law enforcement was hampered by limited resources, insufficient training, and endemic corruption. Counterterrorism functions were divided between the three branches of the newly-restructured National Police Service: the Kenya Police (including the investigative Antiterrorism Police Unit and the paramilitary General Services Unit), the Directorate of Criminal Investigation and the Administration Police, and non-police agencies such as the National Intelligence Service and elements of the Kenya Defence Forces. Kenyan authorities identified crisis response and border security as key areas for improvement, and discussed possible additional assistance with partner nations including the United States.

Even prior to the passage of the 2012 law, Kenyan authorities began prosecutions in high profile cases of plots targeting Western interests, convicting and sentencing to life in prison Iranians Ahmad Abolfathi and Sayed Mansouri on explosives charges in May, and continuing the ongoing trial of British citizen Jermaine Grant on charges of plotting to kill Western tourists on behalf of al Qaeda.

The September 2013 al-Shabab attack on Nairobi's Westgate Shopping Mall focused the world's attention on Kenya and Kenyan counterterrorism efforts, highlighting significant shortcomings in the Kenyan security forces' response. The attack appeared to strengthen Kenyan resolve to fight al-Shabab, including increased operations by Kenya Defence Forces units under the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

Other unclaimed attacks by individuals or groups appearing to be sympathetic to al-Shabab or al-Qaeda included numerous shootings, grenade, and improvised explosive device attacks against security forces, aid workers, civilians, and refugees in hotels, restaurants, mosques, and vehicles. Hardest hit areas were the northeast border counties of Garissa, Mandera, and Wajir, but attacks also took place in Nairobi, Mombasa, Kilifi, and Lamu counties.

Kenya is also a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. The National Assembly passed the 2013 Finance Act containing amendments to the 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act that strengthened Kenyan legal provision criminalizing the financing of terrorism. While the Financial Reporting Centre made a good start at addressing the formal financial system and expanded the number of reporting entities that it will serve, those efforts did not yet include informal money/value transfer services and exchange houses.

The Central Bank of Kenya ordered closure of all informal money transfer systems, Hawalas believed to be conduit for terrorism financing and took steps to encourage more people to use the formal financial sector in order to increase financial integrity by ensuring regulatory oversight. Some NGOs believed to have terror ties were closed in the wake of a crackdown measure following most recent al-Shabab attack on a university in Garissa that claimed 148 lives.³⁹

Kenyan law enforcement agencies work with regional organisations and the broader international community, to increase their counterterrorism capacity and secure land, sea, and air borders. Kenya's primary contribution to supporting counterterrorism capacity building in other nations was its significant troop contribution to AMISOM. In addition, Kenya hosted numerous trainings involving law enforcement professionals from neighbouring nations to build counterterrorism capacities and increase regional cooperation.

³⁹Kenya criticised for closure of money transfer firms following Garissa attack <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/apr/10/kenya-closure-money-transfer-firms-garissa-attack-al-shabaab>. Accessed on April 2015.

2.4 Countering Radicalisation and Extremism

The state has the obligation and primary responsibility to prevent and combat terrorism, as well as to respect and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. However, the state needs to draw on the support of society in general, including civil society and businesses, to successfully counter this phenomenon.⁴⁰

Strategic approaches to counterterrorism often encompass several objectives, addressing different chronological stages in the occurrence of terrorism. These objectives can be broadly categorised as

1. Preventing men and women from becoming terrorists.
2. Providing opportunities and support to individuals on a path to, or involved in.
3. Denying terrorism the support, resources and means to organize or plan and carry out attacks.
4. Preparing for and protecting against terror attacks.
5. Responding to terror attacks through appropriate measures to mitigate

UN Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) imposes a legally binding obligation on all states to establish appropriate legislative, regulatory and institutional frameworks, UN Security Council resolution 1456 (2003) and subsequent resolutions oblige states to ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism complies with international law, in particular international human rights law, refugee law and humanitarian law.⁴¹

The role of counter terrorism intelligence is to retrieve timely and credible information on details of a terrorist attack and prevent such attacks. Major components of intelligence are collection, analysis, and dissemination to relevant parties. In addition to the gathering of

⁴⁰Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2014) Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach, Transnational Threats Department OSCE Secretariat Wallnerstrasse 6, A-1010 Vienna, Austria.

⁴¹ Resolution 1373 (2001) adopted by the UN Security Council at its 4345th meeting, on 28 September 2001 (S/RES/1373 (2001), <[http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/specialmeetings/2012/docs/United%20Nations%20Security%20Council%20Resolution%201373%20\(2001\).pdf](http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/specialmeetings/2012/docs/United%20Nations%20Security%20Council%20Resolution%201373%20(2001).pdf)>., Resolution 1456 (2003) adopted by the UN Security Council at its 4688th meeting, on 20 January 2003 (S/RES/1456 (2003), <<http://www.unrol.org/files/UNSCR1456.pdf>>.

intelligence, effective intelligence analysis provides either a warning of terrorist attacks or an assessment of terrorists. The process also guides further collection of intelligence to fill gaps in the assessment. Intelligence analysis may determine the intentions, capabilities and the threat of terrorist organizations.⁴²

The inter-dependence of security and development is clearer. The fragility of governments impacts on the stability of the region and the ability to combat both poverty and security threats, which are on the rise. Poverty creates inherent instability that can impact on uncontrolled migratory flows. Lack of education and employment opportunities for young people contributes to tensions and makes them prone to cooperate with terror groups or organized crime for financial reasons or to be radicalized and recruited by these groups. Development issues and resource utilization can have social and political repercussions that go far beyond purely economic concerns, and violence and terrorism often become part of the equation. Promoting economic opportunity among at-risk populations can address a condition conducive to violent extremism. Women can be particularly critical actors in local CVE efforts.

Countering violent extremism, targets the pull factors of terrorist recruitment and influence by building resilience among populations vulnerable to violent radicalisation. Over the last decade, government initiatives on CVE have developed from being a reflexive response to terrorist events and become an integrated part or work stream of a co-ordinated national policy to tackle terrorism and address radicalisation to violence.

Considering radicalisation to be a mere security issue can be misleading. It is a multi-faceted problem that requires multidisciplinary and multi-institutional responses, multi-agency approaches within the State and developing a shared understandings of the nature of violent extremism among governmental agencies and non- governmental actors.

Public–Private Partnerships can strengthen contribute to radicalisation efforts by providing narratives and messages against violence; presenting alternative and non- violent means to reach shared goals; and promoting institutional diversity. It is fundamental for the state to

⁴²Hunsicker, A. 2006. *Understanding International Counter Terrorism*. Washington: Universal Publishers.

build trust with communities and ensure meaningful participation in order to mobilise the resources of a community. Law-enforcement agencies should acknowledge that one of the most vital rules of CVE is building trust with those particularly at risk.

2.5 Theoretical Framework

This study adopted the Game Theory to assess critically the subject. Appropriate theoretical methods in Game Theory say that strategic behaviour among rational players is assumed to allow a player to anticipate the response of others to their own actions.⁴³

Game theory is the formal study of conflict and cooperation.⁴⁴ It was established as a field in its own right after the 1944 publication of the monumental volume *Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour* by von Neumann and the economist Oskar Morgenstern.⁴⁵ In 1950, John Nash demonstrated that finite games always have an equilibrium point, at which all players choose actions which are best for them given their opponents' choices. This central concept of non-cooperative game theory has been a focal point of analysis since then.

Game Theory as discipline studies, draws methods classical for mathematics and the human behaviour in situations in which the final outcome depends on the actions taken by various decision-makers involved in it.⁴⁶ Because of the interactions between terrorists and counterterrorism agencies, game theory emerges as an ideal tool for understanding terrorist behaviour. The theory captures the strategic interactions between terrorists and a targeted government, where actions are interdependent and, thus, cannot be analysed as though one side is passive.⁴⁷

⁴³Sandler, Todd and Enders, Walter (2007). "Applying Analytical Methods to Study Terrorism" *Non-published Research Reports*. Paper 89. http://research.create.usc.edu/nonpublished_reports/89. Accessed on 09 August 2015.

⁴⁴ Turocy L. and Stengel B. (2002) *Game Theory*, CDAM Research Report LSE-CDAM-2001-09, Encyclopedia of Information Systems, Academic Press.

⁴⁵ Fragnelli V. (2015) *Game Theory as a Tool for Analyzing Terrorism*, Università del Piemonte Orientale, Alessandria, Italy.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Sandler T. and Daniel G. (2003) *Terrorism and Game Theory*, Forthcoming, *Simulation & Gaming* Vol. 34 (3) http://www.utdallas.edu/~tms063000/website/Terror_Games.pdf

Usually, the scenario involves two main actors, in this case, the government on one side and the terrorist organizations on the other one, where each player sets out their strategies which are not known to their opponent player. This determines the utility function for each player i.e. the gain or loss that each agent gets as consequence of each possible outcome. Games are played between terrorists and a government, among targeted governments, among terrorist groups, or among factions within terrorist groups.

The *sine qua non* of game theory is that a player is expected to be rational, in the sense that his choice is driven by the possibility of reaching a final situation from which he obtain a higher utility and is supposed to be intelligent, in the sense that he knows all the possible outcomes of the situation and which subset of outcomes can be obtained after his strategic choice.

Sandler and Arce also illustrate the advantage of cooperation through a game-theoretic model that uses two countries and a terrorist group to illustrate a prisoner's dilemma.⁴⁸ The prisoner's dilemma is an analogy of two thieves held suspect of a crime and there is no judicial evidence for this crime except if one of the prisoners testifies against the other. If one testifies, he will be rewarded with amnesty, whereas the other will serve a long prison sentence. If they both testify, their punishment will be less severe and on the other hand if they cooperate with each other and not testify at all, they will only be imprisoned briefly. Deciding between the two now constitutes their dilemma.

Todd Sandler and Daniel Arce use game theory to describe what they call a "deterrence race" between two countries. If the home country increases domestic deterrence efforts, the terrorists' costs associated with attacking the home country increases. As in the case of al-Shabab continued loss of ground in Somalia, has made its attacks inside Kenya more brazen, frequent and gory, finding Kenya as the perfect ground to advance its ideology of violence and bloodshed.

⁴⁸Sandler, T., & Arce M., D. G. (2003). Pure public goods versus commons: Benefit-cost duality *Land Economics*, 79, (3), forthcoming.

Most governments' anti-terrorism policies are either proactive or reactive. Proactive policy involves aggressively going after the terrorists and eliminating their resources, infrastructure, and personnel, while reactive policy concerns protective measures either to divert the attack or limit its consequences.

Game theory can also be used to dictate policy for future events. Harvey Lapan and Todd Sandler use a simple model to describe when and if a government should concede to terrorist demands.⁴⁹ Game-theoretic notions of bargaining are applicable to hostage negotiations and terrorist campaign-induced negotiations over demands. Uncertainty and learning in a strategic environment are relevant to all aspects of terrorism, in which the terrorists or government or both are not completely informed.

2.6 The Psychology of Radicalisation.

Becoming radicalised is, for most people, a gradual process and one that requires a progression through distinct stages and happens neither quickly nor easily.⁵⁰ A person may not become radical overnight, although the influence of an incident may act as a 'catalytic event' (such as an experienced act of discrimination).

The major assumption underlying many psychological studies on extremism and radicalisation is that they are in one way or the other not normal and that the insights from psychology and psychiatry are adequate keys to understanding.

Although terrorists often commit heinous acts, they would rarely be considered classic "psychopaths." Studies have found that the prevalence of mental illness among samples of incarcerated terrorists is as low as or lower than in the general population.⁵¹ In reality, psychopathology has proven to be, at best, only a modest risk factor for general violence, and all but irrelevant to understanding terrorism. In fact, "the idea of terrorism as the product of

⁴⁹ Lapan H and Sandler T (1988), "To Bargain or Not To Bargain: That is The Question," *The American Economic Review* 78, no. 2: 16–21

⁵⁰ Horgan J (2005) *The Psychology of Terrorism*, London: Routledge.

⁵¹ Borum, R. (2004). *Psychology of terrorism*. Tampa: University of South Florida.

mental disorder or psychopathy has been discredited".⁵² Radicalization as a process involves an individual moving toward believing and engaging in activities that violate important social norms.

Rogers et al. in view of social and psychological processes that might contribute to terrorism, contrast rational decision making versus cognitive dissonance versus group identity, and pressures to conform including the role of authoritarian personality on perpetrating violence.⁵³

Seeking a better framework within which to examine the question of why an individual becomes a terrorist? Crenshaw further questions why do terrorists persist despite the risks involved and the uncertainty of reward is much important.⁵⁴ On the contrary she also notes of the high rate of abrasion in terrorist organizations, which itself begs for a greater understanding of how and why some exit or leave terrorist organizations or even desist from terrorist behaviour.

Key psychological influences in understanding whether, how and which individuals in a given environment will enter the process of becoming a terrorist are motive and vulnerability. Motive in this sense is defined as an emotion, desire, physiological need, or similar impulse that acts as an incitement to action, while vulnerability refers to susceptibility or liability to succumb, as to persuasion or temptation.

In her work, Crenshaw proposes at least four categories of motivation among terrorists, them being the opportunity for action, the need to belong, desire for social status, and the acquisition of material reward.⁵⁵ The quest to understand vulnerabilities should not be confused with a search for one's personality. Psychologist John Horgan has framed the issue of vulnerability as factors that point to some people having a greater openness to increased

⁵² Crenshaw, M. (1992). Decisions to use terrorism: Psychological constraints on instrumental reasoning. *International Social Movements Research*. 4:29-42.

⁵³ Rogers MB, Loewenthal KM, Lewis CA, Amlot R, Cinnirella M, et al. (2007) The role of religious fundamentalism in terrorist violence: a social psychological analysis. *Int Rev Psychiatry* 19: 253-262.

⁵⁴ Crenshaw, M. (1986). The psychology of political terrorism. In M.G. Hermann (Ed.) *Political psychology: contemporary problems and issues* (pp.379-413). London: Josey-Bass.

⁵⁵ Crenshaw, M. (1985). An organizational approach to the analysis of political terrorism. *Orbis*. 29(3):465-489.

engagement than others.⁵⁶ Based on a review of the existing literature three motivational themes which are - injustice, identity, and belonging - appear to be prominent and consistent and are determined by one's potential openness or vulnerability.

These three themes - injustice, identity, and belonging – have been found often to co-occur in terrorists and to strongly influence decisions to enter terrorist organisations and to engage in terrorist activity.

While an individual may believe that there is a requirement upon them to act in response to a particular event, it is of course far from the case that this normally leads to violent action.

Personality, culture, or situational factors could impact any and all of these themes and, thereby, contribute to the process of radicalization or deradicalization. For instance, the need for cognitive closure or the trait of dependency could contribute to conformity and the tendency to go along with the group consensus, which in turn, could well increase some individuals' tendency to adopt the consensual ends and means that their group supports.

It is perhaps the ideologies of groups which are the key area where a difference can be seen between radicalisation and violent radicalisation. For many years scholars have differed over the question of whether does ideology matter as a motivating factor in terrorism? The rhetoric approach which ideology is based upon sets the premises for any course. For example the allowability of violence is premised on the notion that the enemy is responsible for harm and thus presupposition that destruction of the enemy as an exclusive method of defence.⁵⁷ For terrorists, ideology helps to provide “the moral and political vision that inspires their violence, shapes the way in which they see the world, and defines how they judge the actions of people and institutions.

For successful deradicalisation key relations leading to radicalisation need to be addressed. At an abstract level, radicalisation and deradicalisation are indeed mirror images whose processes that promote deradicalisation reverse those that promote radicalisation. For

⁵⁶ Horgan, J. (2003). The search for the terrorist personality. In Silke, A., Ed. *Terrorist, victims, and society: Psychological perspectives on terrorism and its consequence* (pp. 3-27). London: John Wiley.

⁵⁷ Ganor, B. (2002). Defining terrorism: Is one man's terrorist another man's freedom fighter? *Police Practice and Research*, 3, 287–304.

example the notion that terrorism and violence are ineffective means to victory and hence to significant gain, denies terrorists the claim that it is effective and productive. This though should not be confused with disengagement which is only a discontinuation of active participation but rather look into the whole belief system that supports radicalisation.

It is possible to distinguish between explicit deradicalisation attempts aimed directly at terrorism justifying ideologies and implicit attempts that eschew ideological confrontations processes of radicalisation and deradicalisation and focus on needs and emotions. Explicit, approaches aim to delegitimize the use of violence, whereas implicit introduce alternative means to significance and/or alternative goals compatible with those means. It might be said that whereas the direct confrontational approaches address the minds the indirect, motivational approaches are aimed at the hearts.

2.7 Critical Approach to Terrorism

The events of 9/11 Attack in 2001 led to a drastic demand on academics to find ways of understanding how and why such incidents happen in order to provide practical ways of comprehending terrorist activities. This has resulted in the significant increase in number of studies of terrorism within the last decade even though it's not a new phenomenon.

Two prepositions of studying terrorism have since emerged i.e. the orthodox and the critical approach. Proponents of orthodox approach have tended to look more into the question of how terrorism occurs, rather than answering why. The orthodox approach scholars have been influenced by mainstream social science which asserts that social phenomenon as well as their meaning have an independence existence.⁵⁸

On the other side critical approach scholars who are identified as critics of the orthodox approach have adopted the concepts developed by the Welsh School of Critical Security Studies. The critical approach does not believe that objects exist autonomously, but objects

⁵⁸ Bunyavejchewin P. (2010) The Orthodox and the Critical Approach toward Terrorism: An overview. University of Hull, RCAPS Working Paper No. 10-3.

and subject 'shape each other in a dialectical, never-ceasing dynamic. Their argument is based on the socio-political interaction, and focuses on both actors and contexts.

2.8 Relative deprivation theory.

Relative deprivation theory refers to the idea that feelings of deprivation and discontent are related to a desired point of reference. The theory connects individual mobilization of aggression and political violence to social, economic and political circumstances. Feelings of relative deprivation arise when desires become legitimate expectations and those desires are blocked by society.

Deprivation may be absolute, or alternatively, it may be relative, produced by an increasing gap between expectations and satisfaction. It may also be relative in the sense that some social or ethnic groups are more affected than the general populace. Systematic studies find support for deprivation theories both at the micro- and macro-levels of society.⁵⁹

Sociologist Samuel A. Stouffer is credited with developing relative deprivation theory after World War II with his "The American Soldier" study. Stouffer conducted the research upon which the relative deprivation theory is based while serving as the director of the U.S. military's Research Branch. Relative deprivation theory focuses on feelings and actions. For example, the theory encourages the exploration of an individual's feelings of deprivation that may result from comparing his or her situation with that of a referent person or group as well as the behavioural effects of deprivation feelings.

While modern relative deprivation theory developed in the 1940s, the concept of relative deprivation itself has a longer history in the social sciences. The social sciences have long recognized that deprivation relative to some another person or group can influence behavior. This hypothesis is illustrated in the well-known 'Davies' J-Curve' (Davies 1962: 69). It is argued that tension based on the perception of *deprivation* is the basic condition for participation in collective civil violence.

⁵⁹ Gurr R. (1970) Why Men Rebel

For example, Toqueville and Marx, in the 19th century, used the idea of relative deprivation in their respective analyses of the French Revolution and the problems associated with the rise of capitalism and personal property. Stouffer built on the social science concept of relative deprivation to build and cement his formal theory of relative deprivation following World War II.

Critics debate and question numerous aspects of relative deprivation theory. Namely, critics question the link between feelings of deprivation and the rise of social movements and argue that studies of relative deprivation must recognize egoistic deprivation, fraternal deprivation, and self-referenced relative deprivation.⁶⁰

The second serious criticism of relative deprivation theory concerns a lack of focus on the individual. Critics assert that sociologists using relative deprivation theory tend to examine individual and collective relative deprivation but ignore self-referenced relative deprivation. Sociologists who dismiss self-referenced relative deprivation believe that self-referenced relative deprivation may have more impact on the efforts that individuals make to change their individual situations rather than on group-level political or social action.⁶¹

Sociologists use relative deprivation theory to explain the origins of social movements. Social movements refer to a deliberate voluntary effort to organize individuals who act in concert to achieve group influence and make or block changes. Social movements are power-oriented groups rather than participation-oriented movements. This distinction means that the group actions of social movements are not necessarily of primary benefit to individual members but instead serve the groups' larger goals. Coordinated group actions are undertaken to make changes in the larger socio-political context. Social movements tend to be most successful in open, democratic societies in which social mobility and social change are accepted concepts. Norm-oriented social movements are more common than value-oriented social movements.

⁶⁰ Morrison, D. (1971). Some notes toward theory on relative deprivation, social movements, and social change. *The American Behavioral Scientist* (pre-1986), 14(5), 675.

⁶¹ Krahn, H. & Harrison, T. (1971). 'Self-referenced' relative deprivation and economic beliefs: The effects of the recession in Alberta. *Canadian Review of Sociology & Anthropology*, 29(2), 191-209.

CHAPTER THREE:

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction.

This chapter discusses the research methodology used in this study and provides a general framework for this research. The chapter presents details of the research design, target population, sample and sampling procedures, description of research instruments, validity and reliability of instruments, data collection procedures, data analysis techniques and ethical considerations while conducting the study.

Methodology in any study is very important understanding its critical link between theory and practice. It guides the study in collecting evidence in their real environment of study.

Research methodology the systematic way to solve a problem. It is a science of studying how research is to be carried out. It is also defined as the study of methods by which knowledge is gained. Its aim is to give the work plan of research.⁶² As a logical and systematic search for new and useful information, research investigates solutions to scientific and social problems through objective and systematic analysis.⁶³

Empirical research always leads to new contributions to the existing knowledge which makes progress in a field. Research is done with the help of study, experiment, observation, analysis, comparison and reasoning. Social research helps find answers to social problems. It helps explain social phenomena and seek solution to social problems. Such description of how you have addressed the research questions and/or hypotheses is termed as the methodology that guided your study. The methods should be described in enough detail for the study to be replicated, or at least repeated in a similar way in another situation.⁶⁴

⁶² Rajasekar S., Philominathan P. (2013) Research Methodology, School of Physics, Bharathidasan University, Tiruchirapalli – 620 024, Tamilnadu, India.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ University of Manchester (2015) Research Methodology, Faculty of Humanities Study Skills Website. http://www.humanities.manchester.ac.uk/studyskills/assessment_evaluation/dissertations/methodology.html. Accessed on 15 August 2015.

Research methodology is a systematic way to solve a problem. It is a science of studying how research is to be carried out. Essentially, the procedures by which researchers go about their work of describing, explaining and predicting phenomena are called research methodology. It is also defined as the study of methods by which knowledge is gained. Its aim is to give the work plan of research.

3.1 The Scope of Study

The scope of research methodology is wider than that of research methods. The study refers to research methodology, the researcher not only talks of the research methods but also considers the logic behind the methods the study adopts and explain why use of certain method or technique and why not using others so that research results are capable of being evaluated either by the researcher himself or by others.

3.2 Research Design

The central role of research design is to minimize the chance of drawing incorrect causal inferences from data. Research design is the logical task undertaken to ensure that the evidence collected enables the researcher to answer questions or to test theories as unambiguously as possible. When designing research it is essential that the study identifies the type of evidence required to answer the research question in a convincing way.

Research design `deals with a logical problem and not a logistical problem. In social research the issues of sampling, method of data collection, design of questions are all subsidiary to the matter of `What evidence do I need to collect.⁶⁵ Oso and Onen refer to research design as the nature of the pattern the research intends to follow. It describes the plan or strategy for conducting the research. This study will base on both primary and secondary sources of data and the research design that will be employed is content analysis.

Research needs to be structured in such a way that the evidence also bears on alternative rival explanations and enables us to identify which of the competing explanations is most compelling empirically. It also means that we must not simply look for evidence that supports

⁶⁵Ibid.

our favourite theory: we should also look for evidence that has the potential to disprove our preferred explanations.⁶⁶

The function of a research design is to ensure that the evidence obtained enables us to answer the initial question as unambiguously as possible. Obtaining relevant evidence entails specifying the type of evidence needed to answer the research question, to test a theory, to evaluate a programme or to accurately describe some phenomenon. One of the fundamental purposes of research design in explanatory research is to avoid invalid inferences. Recognizing that causation is more than correlation highlights a problem. While we can observe correlation we cannot observe cause. We have to infer cause.

People often confuse correlation with causation. Simply because one event follows another, or two factors co-vary, does not mean that one causes the other. The link between two events may be coincidental rather than causal.

This study therefore will adopt the simple random sampling also known as the chance sampling or the probability sampling. This will provide an even and equal opportunity of inclusion to everyone in the population and each one of the possible sample. A sample of 90 respondents from the population which covers Kenyan citizens residing in Nairobi who have attained adult age of 18 years and above. Understanding that Nairobi which is the capital city of the country and one of the regions which have been worst hit by terrorism and other radicalisation related form of insurgency will be the primary location of study.

The benefits of simple random sampling makes it possible for the research to apply both quantitative and qualitative operations and it is unobtrusive method of data gathering and hence the problem of undue influence on the subject of study and participants is ruled out. This method of sampling ensures a high degree of representativeness and it's simple to administer when considering time and resources.

3.3 Target Population

⁶⁶De Vaus D. (2001) Research Design in Social Research, Sage Publications, London.

Before the sample survey can be conducted, a clear, concise description of the target population is needed. The description of the target population must explicitly identify the resource of interest and include criteria for determining whether a resource unit is in or out of the target population. This study will therefore target residents of Nairobi city who have attained age of eighteen years and above as its population to study. The study sample will comprise of one hundred respondents who will be drawn randomly from the population.

3.4 Sample and Sampling Procedure

Sampling is a powerful tool for accurately measuring opinions and characteristics of a population. A representative sample is one that contains essentially the same variations that exist in the population and which therefore when studied provides useful descriptions of the total population.

There are basically two ways to choose a sample from a sampling frame: probability and non-probability. The differences between nonprobability and probability sampling procedures are often difficult to discern but are extremely important for determining how the results of the research can be used. Well conducted probability samples provide the researcher with the ability to gather information from a relatively small number of members of a large population and accurately generalize the results to the entire population. On the other hand nonprobability sampling techniques can provide valuable information but the results cannot be generalized to a larger population nor can statistics indicating the reliability of the results be calculated.⁶⁷

Mugenda and Mugenda define sampling as the process of selecting a number of individuals for a study in such a way that individuals selected (the sample) represent the large group from which they are selected (the population). In addition samples enable the researcher to calculate statistics that indicate the precision of the data.

⁶⁷Fair County Department of Neighbourhood and Community Services (2012) Overview of Sampling Procedures. <http://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/demogrph/pdf/samplingprocedures.pdf>

However sample size can be determined by methodology, cost and time among other factors. Krejcie and Morgan⁶⁸ explain that sampling is to provide a table for determining sample size from a given population. It is on the basis of this table that the sample was arrived.

For various reasons including limitation of time, funds and resources, it will not be possible to scrutinize entire population under study.

3.5 Research Instruments

This study employs the survey model using multiple sources of evidence which include literature review and analysis, questionnaires and focused interviews with key informants for the study. The main data collection instruments that will be used in this study administering of questionnaires. This will be used for the purpose of collecting primary quantitative data, while for the purpose of qualitative data the study will adopt interviews and focused group discussion.

The term “instruments” in the social sciences usually refers to written forms on which the researchers or the people being studied record information.

This kind of inquiry is held to be most applicable to explanatory type question of “how” and “why”. In addition the case study allows new insights to be obtained which would not emerge from a survey approach. The approach was very appropriate for this study.

3.6 Data Collection

To meet objectives of this study, both quantitative and qualitative data will be collected. The study used descriptive research design with the preferred data collection method being content analysis. Wikipedia (online encyclopaedia) indicates that descriptive research, also known as statistical research, describes data and characteristic about the population or phenomenon being studied. This type of research answers the questions *who, what, where, when and how*.

Kothari (1990) notes that descriptive research includes surveys and fact-finding enquiries of different kinds. He states that the major purpose of this research is description of the state of

⁶⁸Krejcie, R.V., & Morgan, D.W., (1970). Determining Sample Size for Research Activities. *Educational and Psychological Measurement*.

affairs as it exists at a particular time. Kothari goes on to say that the main characteristic of this method is that the researcher has no control over the variables; he/she can only report what has happened or what is happening.

Collecting the data: In dealing with any real life problem it is often found that data at hand are inadequate, and hence, it becomes necessary to collect data that are appropriate. There are several ways of collecting the appropriate data which differ considerably in context of money costs, time and other resources at the disposal of the researcher.

Primary data will be collected through simple random survey. The survey will collect primary data using the following methods.

- A. Through personal interview: a rigid procedure will be followed in quest to answer a set of pre-conceived questions through personal interviews. This will be through interviews with major key informants in the study. This method of collecting data is usually carried out in a structured way where output depends upon the ability of the interviewer to a large extent.
- B. By mailing of questionnaires: This will be the major method of collecting the bulk of the intended primary data. A Questionnaire developed through an electronic online survey tool “Survey Monkey” will be deployed in this study. The nature of the tool gives respondent advantage of use in the sense that they are able to respond to the questions electronically and submit results immediately. Web-based surveys have the same strength as paper versions in that they allow respondents to take their own time to complete the survey. They have been found out to be better at addressing sensitive questions and in case is this this study. Email is less expensive and the results are recorded immediately the respondent finishes all the questions.

The link to the questionnaire will be sent to the selected sample’s email addresses and other social media platforms which will basically take less than fifteen minutes to complete. A pilot study of the questionnaires was carried out to prove effectiveness in collecting relevant information.

C. Use of Social Media for Focused group discussion: to effect the use of focused group discussion social media platforms will be used. Most preferred due to wide and ease of use are *facebook* and *whatsapp* applications will be deployed. Already tests on these platforms have been conducted. It will involve getting contacts of the respondents who will be selected randomly and will have equal right to respond and will interact freely with the rest of the respondents. Two focused group discussions will be conducted with each having a limited number of 7-10 respondents.

3.7 Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis is the major entity of analysis in a study. It is the ‘what’ or ‘who’ that is being studied. Units of analysis are essentially the things we examine in order to create summary descriptions of them and explain differences among them.

According to Schultz⁶⁹ unit of analysis is the level of social life which the research question is focused. The unit of analysis is what the researcher actually counts and assigns categories. The unit of analysis for this study will be the forms/ nature of radicalisation that is existent and is being employed to pull people into extremist religion and terrorism. This is the nature of communication that recruiting agents of the terror organisations are deploying to pull fighters into their course. This will be analysed through the feedback received from the respondents in the study.

3.8 Content Analysis

In conducting a content analysis, researchers quantify and analyse the presence, meanings, and relationships of words and concepts within the cultural artefacts they are studying. They then make inferences about the messages within the artefacts and about the culture they are studying. At its most basic, content analysis is a statistical exercise that involves categorizing some aspect of behaviour and counting the number of times such behaviour occurs.

The qualitative content analysis consists of techniques for systematic text analysis. Qualitative content analysis defines itself within this framework as an approach of empirical,

⁶⁹ Schulz, D. E. (1991) “Integrated Marketing Communications: The Status of Integrated Marketing Communications Programs in the US. Today.” /ourtle/ of Promotion Management I, 1 pages: 37-41.

methodological controlled analysis of texts within their context of communication, following content analytical rules and step by step models, without rash quantification.⁷⁰

Two approaches central to qualitative content analysis are: inductive and deductive. In inductive, the main idea of the procedure is, to formulate a criterion of definition, derived from theoretical background and research question, which determines the aspects of the textual material taken into account. As for deductive analysis, application works with a prior formulated, theoretical derived aspects of analysis, which brings them into connection with the text. The questions of the study are methodologically controlled under categories formulated in respect to theory and material which are completed step by step.

3.9 Coding

Coding will entail putting the units of analysis into the already constructed content analysis categories. But before embarking on the actual coding of content, a code sheet and code book will be constructed and then pilot exercise of coding conducted. Coding is necessary for efficient analysis and through it the several replies may be reduced to a small number of classes which contain the critical information required for analysis.

3.10 Data Analysis

Analysing data will employ both qualitative and quantitative techniques that will use systematic scientific numerical information. The objective of quantitative is to develop and employ mathematics models, theories and hypotheses pertaining to natural phenomena. In this study quantitative technique will involve reducing text to numbers and then those numbers counted, summed up and compared. Data will be analysed using Statistical Packages for Social Sciences (SPSS) edition 15.0 and Microsoft Office Excel 2013.

Deploying statistics in research is an important functional tool in designing research, analysing its data and drawing conclusions therefrom. Large volumes of raw data must be suitably reduced so that the same can be read easily and can be used for further analysis. Classification and tabulation of the research finding help achieve this objective, but we have

⁷⁰Krippendorff, K. (1980). *Content analysis. An Introduction to its Methodology*. Beverly Hills: Sage.

to go a step further and develop certain indices or measures to summarise the collected/classified data. Only after this we can adopt the process of generalisation from small groups (i.e., samples) to population.

The qualitative data generated from open ended questions will be categorized in themes in accordance with research objectives and reported in narrative form along with quantitative presentation. The qualitative data will be used to reinforce the quantitative data.

3.11 Ethical Considerations

The researcher will be committed and will apply the ethics of research during and after data collection. This will involve the treatment of research respondents with sensitivity, care and dignity. The researcher will ensure that the respondents remained anonymous and one way of achieving this will be by not asking the respondents to write their names address and contacts on the questionnaire. The researcher will undertake to explain the purpose of the research and the right of the respondents at the beginning of every interview. The respondents will be given opportunity to ask questions for clarity of the exercise before and during the interview.

3.12 Potential Threat to Validity

The design selected for the study will control the effects of the most common threats to the internal validity to which experimental studies are often susceptible. Because the respondents will only be interviewed once and no more other meetings will be organised between them and the researchers, factors such as instrumentation, testing and history, will not threaten the validity of the study. The researcher will pilot the test questionnaires before the interviews to ensure the wording is clear and free from ambiguity.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION

4.0 Introduction

This chapter summarizes data analysis. The basic steps in the analytic process consist of identifying issues, determining the availability of suitable data, deciding on which methods are appropriate for answering the questions of interest, applying the methods and evaluating, summarizing and communicating the results. Analytical results underscore the usefulness of data sources by shedding light on relevant issues. Data analysis was undertaken under the guiding objectives of the study, and specifically explored to answer the following research questions.

1. Analyze the various forms of radicalization and terrorism in Kenya; actors and factors facilitating.
2. Examine how radicalization contributes to terrorism and other forms of extremism at all levels of analysis.
3. Understand the available mitigation measures and policing, and how they can be exercised in the process of deradicalisation.

The data analysis involved respondents derived from regions in Nairobi. In total of 78 respondents managed to complete the questionnaire of the study. Some more 7 respondents, participated in the focused group discussion for qualitative data. To ensure that the data are appropriate for the study, an investigative wide range of details such as whether the target population of the data source is sufficiently related to the target population of the analysis, the variables and their concepts are relevant to the study, whether the longitudinal or cross-sectional nature of the data source is appropriate for the analysis, whether the sample size in the study domain is sufficient to obtain meaningful results and whether the quality of the data, as outlined in the methodology is sufficient.


4.1 Response Rate

A total of 90 questionnaires were administered both electronically using survey monkey and in-person. 78 questionnaires were returned completed, representing 87 % of the total, a very good response which according to Mugenda and Mugenda was above the response rate of 70% which is rated very well.

4.2 Demographic Presentation

Demographics are characteristics of a population. It is the design of a study the breakdown of survey response data into meaningful groups of respondents. The study sought to establish information on various aspects of respondents' background such as age, academic or professional qualification. Understanding demographic representation of a study sample can provide important explanations of observed economic and social trends.⁷¹ This information aimed at testing the appropriateness of the respondent in participating in the study.

4.3 Gender of respondents



⁷¹Legislative Assembly of New Brunswick (2015)What Is Demography And Why Is It Important?<https://www.gnb.ca/legis/business/committees/previous/reports-e/demog/what-e.asp>. Accessed on 21 September 2015.

Figure 4.1

The Figure 4.1 above represents the gender distribution of the respondents in the study. 60 per cent of the participants in the study were of male gender, while 39.7 per cent were female. This means that there were more male respondents than female counterparts.

4.4 Age of respondents




Figure 4.2

The findings presented in figure 4.2 above represent the age of the respondents, represented in age brackets of ten years interval. Greatest age bracket of respondents was that between 35-54 making a representation of 42 per cent. 22 per cent of the respondents were aged 25-34, while those aged 18-24 years were 28 per cent. Only 8 per cent of respondents were aged 55 years and above.

4.5 Religion




Figure 4.3

From findings in figure 4.3 above, it was very critical to get the religious distribution of the respondents understanding the various assumptions that have been made in relating terrorism with religion. Most of the respondents are represented above were protestant Christians, making 40 per cent of the participants, while their catholic counterparts made up 25 per cent of the total number. Total combined representation of Christians is at 65 per cent, with Muslims representing 33 per cent as compared to the equal share of representation of Hindus and Atheists of 1 per cent. There was no representation of indigenous religion recorded in the study.

4.6 Level of education




Figure 4.4

From figure 4.4 above, the level of education for respondents was very important to understand their educational background and their understanding of the topic. Greatest percentage of the respondents at 37.2 per cent had attained university level of education, with 14.1 per cent having attained post university level. 28.2 per cent have tertiary/ vocational training, while 14 per cent have studied up to secondary school level. 6.4 per cent have acquired only basic primary education. According to the record above, almost 93 per cent of the respondents have basic education and in this sense are well placed to respond objectively to the questions of the study.

4.7 Understanding of Terrorism in Kenya.




Figure 4.5

In the table provided above, a great percentage of the respondents are aware about the subject matter with a 75 per cent majority score. Thirty per cent of the respondents are fully aware of terror activities in the country and their linkages, while 45 per cent are have normal understanding of terrorism in the country. Six per cent are not sure whether they are aware as compared to the fourteen per cent who claim to have partial understanding, while three per cent seem not to be understanding about terrorism. From this data, it is evident that there is an overwhelming percentage of knowledge of terrorism, mostly due to reporting of the matter by the media. Almost all understanding of the issue recorded is effect-affect knowledge rather than complete understanding.

4.8 In the provided choices, which ones in the order of priority do you believe is the most causal factor of terrorism?




Figure 4.6

According to findings presented in figure 4.6 above, the greatest drive factor that respondents cited to cause terrorism is for economic drivers in the order of preference provided above were 39.8 per cent, while those who cited religious factors as the greatest motivator as their major priority were 26.9 per cent. 21.7 per cent tended to believe that major cause of terrorism in Nairobi is due to political reasons while the least percentage at 14.1 per cent tended to believe it's through other social factors.

4.9 In your own understanding, what do you believe is the cause of terrorism in Kenya?

In this question of what causes terrorism in Kenya, the response of unemployment and idleness amongst the youth featured prominently, where respondents quoted youth finding alternative employment, with good payment in engaging in terror activities. Poverty also is a major concern according to the responses with many opting to get into terrorism to shake off the shackles of poverty. This is tied to the perception of economic benefits of fighters enlisting with terror groups. The issue of religion though it highlighted in the responses, it showed the critical role that religion plays, with almost all respondents asserting that Islam has played a central role in contributing to having affection for terrorism, through radical teaching.

Lastly corruption among law enforcement and legislation has helped fan terrorism and radicalisation. The question of bribing for culprits and police and court officials not doing thorough investigations for rightful trial for propagators is a concern too. Culprits has been known to get away with committed crimes because police didn't do thorough investigations and thus court setting them free due to lack of sufficient evidence.

4.10 In what ways does terrorism affect us as a country?

When asked in what ways terrorism would affect us as a country, the participants mostly cited loss of life and destruction of property as the greatest effect of terrorism in the country. This was due to information from reports carried out in the media. The economic effect which arose as from the focused group discussion was loss in our tourism industry which has become the greatest casualty of travel advisories.

Loss of employment for those who directly depend on tourism has been greatly felt due to investors shying away or those in the country choosing to invest elsewhere to avoid terror related losses. This was very evident after the Westgate Mall attack in September 2013, which even after the Mall re-opened; business is seemingly low even after high security ion and around the mall has been assured.

The sectarian stand-off that is threatening to happen due to terror attacks targeting mainly Christian churches in the country. Though such incidents have reduced in the year 2015, still there is that fear of spontaneous attacks after the Garissa Attack in April 2015 and many other foiled attacks.

4.11 Do you think the government is doing enough to fight terrorism in Kenya?




Figure 4.7

Figure 4.7 above presents the findings of the question seeking perception of the respondents on whether they think the government is doing enough to fight terrorism in the country. A great majority 85.9 per cent cited that the government is not doing enough to curb terrorism in the country, giving reference to the West Gate Attack and the two Garissa attacks in October 2014 and the university attack in April 2015. From the focused group discussion, it emerged that the government was not appointing the right people to operate the security sector in the country basing evidence of incompetence from former minister of Internal Security Joseph Lenku, head of Intelligence Michael Gichangi and inspector general of the police who had to be forced to step down due to various incidents of attack.

Other concerns raised were the Kenya military operation in Somalia against the al-Shabab which was frequently cited as the main cause of frequent terror attacks in the country, claimed by the militant group. It was raised in the discussion that the government of Kenya was fighting an extended war of United States in Somalia and should review its operation there.

Only 14 per cent believe that the government is enough within its capacity to curb terrorism terming that the government has engaged in many military operations to weaken the terrorist cells citing the military operation in Somalia bearing much benefit both in Somalia and

Kenya. The crackdown in 2013 that followed immediately after Westgate Attack to rid of the country illegal immigrants who are claimed to be conduits of smuggling arms and explosives was claimed to have been successful by those believing that the government was doing enough.

4.12 Do you believe that Radicalization exists in Kenya?




Figure 4.8

A brief description of what radicalisation entails was provided and the response was overwhelmingly accenting positively that radicalisation not only existed but was a major issue affecting the country. 88.5 per cent believe that there is existent radicalisation in the country, while 9 per cent believe that it is not existent, as compared to 2.5 per cent who did not know whether it is existent or not.

The type of radicalisation mostly quoted was religious extremism which featured in almost every form of radicalisation for those who had a positive response. The blanket condemnation of Muslim youth has attracted sympathy from many who are not willing to engage but to assist in resources for radicalisation. Engagement by the security authorities towards some of these youths has literary pushed them right into the arms of al-Shabab.

4.13 Is the Government of Kenya doing enough to counter radicalization in Kenya?




Figure 4.9

The response for this question was to get the perception of respondents on whether they believe that the government of Kenya is doing enough to counter radicalisation in the country is presented in figure 4,9 above. 83 per cent believe that the government is not doing, while 14 per cent believe that the government is doing enough. 3 per cent don't know whether the government is doing enough or not.

4.14 What do you believe should be done to stop radicalization?

What should be done to stop radicalisation	Frequency	Percentage
Security	22	28.2
Amnesty and Pardon	7	8.9
Alternative income generation	11	14.1
Religion	14	17.9

Community policing and leadership	9	11.5
School and Curricula	4	5.1
Parenting and family set up	3	3.8
Role of Media	8	10.2
Total	78	100

Table 4.1

This was an open ended question that attracted very many responses in understanding what the government needs to do to curb radicalisation. The responses provided below are just a summary of what was cited by the respondents, many which are more or less related so in reporting I decided to note them in themes. Much of the responses recorded below were cross cutting bearing that respondents listed answers that bared more than one theme.

Security

As shown in the table above, 28.2 per cent believe that security is of great concern in order for the government to deal with radicalisation, there has to be enough security and intelligence mechanisms that will help government gather intelligence from the areas identified as alarming.

There is need for training of security personnel to understand on how to deal with cases of radicalisation, to avoid spin-offs effects brought about by the highhanded way of handling radicalised persons.

Amnesty and pardon

8.9 per cent want the government to offer amnesty and pardon to those who are ready to denounce the principles of extremism they are holding and undergo reform to be integrated back into society. Full grant of amnesty should be exercised fully and no reproach or victimisation of those ready to reform.

Alternative source of income

As revealed above, 14.1 per cent call for an alternative source of income, since most of those who engage in radicalisation to terrorism is due to economic empowerment. The government needs to provide alternative source of income for these radicalised individuals and after they have been reformed they can find meaningful employment/ source of income to overcome the pull factors that are presented to them to join extremist movements.

Role of Religion

According to responses noted in the table, 17.9 per cent cite that religion plays a very critical role in radicalisation to extremism. From the response recorded earlier, apart from economic factors, religion follows closely as a motivator to radicalisation. The role religious leaders play in helping to counter radicalisation where tolerated religion can be preached instead. Role of Sabbath, Sunday schools and Madrasas are sources of religious teaching and can help to teach the correct values.

Community policing and leadership

11. 5 per cent of the respondents believe that community policing and leadership is critical with some emphasising the role of community policing in countering radicalisation. Some responses received were the effecting of the “Nyumba Kumi Policy” within neighbourhoods. Leaders both national and communal play a critical role in acting as voice of advice and reason in guiding a community and they are required to step-up to this role.

Schools and curricula

Children from early age of education need to be taught effectively to prevent being drawn into terrorism, and that is why 5.1 per cent of the respondents want school programmes to have security studies. Responses recorded were that such morals and ethics should be enshrined in the education curricula from early ages of learning. This will help in sealing the gaps in knowledge that terrorists exploit through popularising certain view.

Parenting and family set up

Some 3.8 per cent of the respondents hold that there is role the family institution has to play in curbing radicalisation. According to some responses, parents need to monitor actions of

their children both in and away from home to ensure that they don't fall into traps of radicalisation. They need to understand the challenges their children face and be able to have an open relationship to understand them more. The family in extension can be a good source of monitoring activities of each other, made possible by family gatherings where they are able to keep tabs of each other.

Role of Media

10.2 per cent say media can be used as a tool to help people relate and understand better issues of radicalisation. Through proper programming and alerting the public on incidents and how they can be able to identify and report them. Media campaigns can be utilised to help in informing the public and educating them.

4.15 Who do you believe should be involved in countering radicalization




Figure 4.10

The bar graph above in figure 4.11 indicates response in regard of who the participants believe should be involved in countering radicalisation in Kenya. The responses above were from an open ended question but the responses have been grouped into the presented categories for convenience of presentation of these views. The greatest percentage at 29.5 believes the government should be involved, with 24.4 per cent believing that everyone is required. 14.1 per cent want the youth to be involved, 2.6 per cent citing communal

leaders.16.7 per cent say religious leaders should be involved as compared to the 12.8 per cent who want the media to be involved.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter presents summary of study, conclusion and recommendations of the study in line with the study on Counterterrorism in Africa: Countering radicalisation in Kenya.

5.1 Summary of the study

The study intended to fill the gap left by other researchers by investigating counterterrorism in Africa: countering radicalisation in Kenya. The study used descriptive survey research design.

The target population in this study was residents of Nairobi city who were of the age of eighteen years and above as its population to study. The sample population was ninety respondents who were drawn randomly from the target population. The study used questionnaire for data collection, interview guide for the key informant and focus group discussion guide. Data was analysed using descriptive statistics. Out of the 90 questionnaires administered, 78 were returned completed, one focused group discussion was conducted together with an interview of a key informant.

5.2 Summary of study findings

From the study findings, it was established that a big number of Kenyans are aware of existence of terrorism in the country. This awareness is extensive among those with higher level of education, understood by the depth of answering open ended questions and responses during the focused group discussion. Such knowledge is drawn greatly from reports and analysis carried out in the media, of terror events that have plagued the country.

The study also found out that in order of priority of the causal factors of terrorism in Kenya, economic drivers were highly rated as the major priority, followed by religious, then political and other social factors in that order. Lack of employment especially for the youth was cited as the greatest economic driver to enlisting to fight for terror groups, through perceived benefits for new recruits.

The concern of religion also came out from responses over its contribution to terrorism over radical/ extremist teachings, mainly linked to Islam by isolated recruiters who have found religion to base their course even though it could be political, in case of al-Shabab. A good percentage of respondents asserted that Islam religion played a central role in contributing to terrorism, through radical teaching by some of its isolated religious teachers/ preachers.

The issue of corruption in law enforcement/ judicial organs has contributed to proliferation of terrorism through bribing of officials who are left vulnerable to such situations over the large amount of bribe culprits are able to part with in order to secure their freedom.

According to the findings of the survey, loss of life and property was cited as the greatest effects of terrorism both personally and collectively as a country. Many service industries like tourism have been the greatest casualties of terror attacks and travel advisories that are imposed on the country. At personal levels it's the loss of employment for those who are servicing these industries.

From the findings of the research, many Kenyans believe that the government is not doing enough in countering terrorism in the country, giving reference to the Westgate Mall Attack in September 2013 and Garissa University attack in April 2015. The concern of employing the right people in the security docket and intelligence gathering were greatly cited, apart from lack of proper coordination mechanism in such incidents.

The study found out that Kenyans have knowledge and are aware of what it means or entail in the process of radicalisation. This has been case by the recruiting agencies for terror groups which have harboured in places of worship, locations well known to the authorities and some religious leaders. The approach to the whole terrorism issue by the security officers has also contributed to radicalisation. This was so according to reports from respondents who cited the government not doing enough to curb radicalisation, but rather contribute to its perpetration.

The study found out that in order to deal with radicalisation amicably, there is need to enhance security and intelligence mechanisms in the country and get give the right training to

our security officers. There is need to give full amnesty and pardon to those who have been radicalised without any form of victimisation. Also provide the youth who are the greatest bulk of those vulnerable, with alternative source of income.

The study also found out that there is need for community policing through the “Nyumba Kumi” initiative, apart from ensuring that activities of each individual in a community are well known to other members.

Findings from the study revealed that everyone needs to be involved in the process of countering radicalisation and extremism. The media also plays a big role in highlighting and informing the public to take action and this as it emerged is an important tool for use.

5.3 Conclusion

From the findings of the study stated in brief in the summary of findings and in depth in the preceding chapter, the study results confirm that there is comprehensible knowledge by Kenyans on the issues of terrorism and radicalisation which have been greatly acquired through reporting of the media, both in print and electronic formats.

The study concluded that Kenyan in one way or the other have been affected adversely by terror activities be it loss of lives, properties or employment due to the diminishing foreign investments into the country due to fear of terror. Also, citizens don't have confidence in the government over handling of terrorism and radicalisation in the country and want more public participation in structuring of counter-terrorism measures.

From the findings, the study concluded that many Kenyans of youth age are drawn into radicalisation mostly for economic benefits, which perpetrators have set to exploit their financial vulnerabilities created by lack of employment.

The study also concludes that religion plays a critical role in propagating radicalisation, even though the exploits of terror are more political and location specific. Religion plays a significant factor both emotionally and psychologically to whip the psyche of the course and make it widely acceptable by adherents.

The study concludes also that no proper comprehensive mechanisms have been put in place to fight radicalisation, rather than use of security and intelligence apparatus. This is the case where the government has been blamed for being helpless in stopping conscriptions of new fighters who are reportedly crossing the border to fight in Somalia or deployed to carry out attacks locally.

From the findings of the study it can be concluded that media plays a critical and important role in knowledge and information sharing among the public, basing that many of the respondents in the study have drawn their information from media reporting.

The study concludes that community policing is proportionately important to the security measures that the government is deploying and therefore should ensure that community policing structures like “Nyumba Kumi” are efficiently working and there are mechanisms of reporting back and forth. The family composition can be greatly placed into task for many at times failing to report some of the cases of radicalisation understanding that extraction of individuals are made from these same families.

5.4 Recommendation

With the study having explored extensively the causes of radicalisation to terrorism in Kenya, the following recommendations are made in lieu

- i. The government requires forming a national taskforce that will look extensively into the issue of terrorism and radicalisation and advice the government on policy. There is need to re-assess the criteria and threshold for terrorism and radicalisation.
- ii. Need for further review of the Security Laws (amendment) Act 2014 which the court has nullified eight clauses but still there is need for extensive consultation with members of the public.
- iii. The Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2012 which focuses mostly on trans-national terrorism and doesn't talk on radicalisation has not stopped or helped reduce terror attacks and it is in its legislation that two severe attacks have been made in the

country. Therefore this study recommends recall of The Law for review to bolster its enactment.

- iv. The formation of an inter-command security unit and have them deployed in every country and mostly ones affected by terrorism to gather on intelligence and deter further attack.
- v. Government to look critically into the issue of youth unemployment and provide safety nets to avoid exploits of the vulnerable youths who are enlisted to joining terror groups.
- vi. Government should grant full amnesty without victimization, for those who are willing to denounce extremism or terror links. Much of the acclaimed amnesty programme by the government has been used to coerce the deserters to squeeze intelligence out of them, with fear of prosecution.
- vii. There is need for the community policing mechanisms like “Nyumba Kumi” to be made effective and functional in ensuring that a community and its composition is known both by its members and the government and effective reporting mechanisms instituted.
- viii. There is need for the government to form an effective and appropriate counter-narrative to terrorism and radicalisation regarding that most policies and interventions cannot work in vacuum.

5.5 Recommendations for further study

- i. A similar study is recommended in other terror prone areas in the country to assess the validity of the research findings.
- ii. A similar study is recommended to compare effects of radicalisation in urban and rural centres.

- iii. A more specific study is recommended in the country on the pertinent issues of economic and religion to ascertain to what further extent they can have effect in a society.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Introduction Letter



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September 15, 2015

To Whom It May Concern

Re: **Elisha M. Ratemo - R51//69605/2013**

Mr. Elisha Ratemo is a bonafide student at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS), University of Nairobi pursuing the Master of Arts Degree Diplomacy. He wishes to carry out research on "Counterterrorism in Africa: Countering Radicalization in Kenya"

Any assistance given to him to facilitate data collection for his research project will be highly appreciated.

A circular purple stamp from the University of Nairobi, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies. The stamp contains the text 'UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI', 'APPROVED', and 'SIGN:'. A handwritten signature in black ink is written over the stamp.

Prof. Maria Nzomo
Director, IDIS

&

Professor of International Relations & Governance

Appendix: B

Research Questionnaire

Counter-Terrorism study in Kenya

COUNTERTERRORISM IN AFRICA: COUNTERING RADICALISATION IN KENYA

1. Sex

- Male
- Female

2. Age.

- under 18
- 18-24
- 25-34
- 35-54
- 55+

3. Religion:

- Protestant
- Catholic
- Muslim
- Indigenous
- Atheist
- Hindu

Others



4. Level of Education (optional)

- Primary
- Secondary

- Tertiary
- University
- Post Graduate

5. Marital Status

- Single
- Married
- Separated
- Divorced

6. What is your understanding of terrorism in Kenya?

- fully aware
- aware
- not sure
- partially aware
- not aware

In your own understanding, what do you believe is the cause of terrorism in Kenya?

7. In the below provided choices, which ones in the order of priority do you believe is the most causal factor of terrorism?

- Economic
- Social
- Political
- Religious

Others

8. In what ways does terrorism affect us as a country?

9. Do you think the government is doing enough to fight terrorism in Kenya?

- Yes
- No

If YES, how? If answered NO, What should be done?

10. Radicalization is a process by which an individual or group comes to adopt increasingly extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations that reject or undermine or reject contemporary ideas in progressive change of society. Radicalization can be both violent and nonviolent.

In the above provided text do you believe that Radicalization exists in Kenya?

- Yes
- No
- I dont know

In your own words what are the forms of radicalization you can identify

11. Is the Government of Kenya doing enough to counter radicalization in Kenya?

- Yes
- No
- I dont know

In what ways?

An empty text input field with a light gray border. On the right side, there are three small square buttons stacked vertically: a top button with an upward-pointing triangle, a middle button with a downward-pointing triangle, and a bottom button with a downward-pointing triangle. On the left side, there are two small square buttons: one with a left-pointing triangle and one with a right-pointing triangle.

12. What do you believe should be done to stop radicalization? *

An empty text input field with a light gray border. On the right side, there are three small square buttons stacked vertically: a top button with an upward-pointing triangle, a middle button with a downward-pointing triangle, and a bottom button with a downward-pointing triangle. On the left side, there are two small square buttons: one with a left-pointing triangle and one with a right-pointing triangle.

13. Who do you believe should be involved in countering radicalization?

An empty text input field with a light gray border. On the right side, there are three small square buttons stacked vertically: a top button with an upward-pointing triangle, a middle button with a downward-pointing triangle, and a bottom button with a downward-pointing triangle. On the left side, there are two small square buttons: one with a left-pointing triangle and one with a right-pointing triangle.

Finish Survey

Appendix: C

Interview Guide for the Key Informant

1. Comment on the state of security in the country
2. Do you think terrorism situation has influenced the state of security in the country?
3. If yes explain how?
4. In your own view, what is the cause of radicalisation in the country?
5. What are the forms of radicalisation currently prevalent in the country?
6. In what best ways can a country/government deal with the issue of radicalisation and terrorism?
7. According to your own views, who do you think should be involved in countering radicalisation?
8. Can you recommend for any policy shift to help deal with terrorism and radicalisation?

Appendix: D

Guide for Focused Group Discussion

1. Can you comment on the situation of terrorism in the country
2. In what ways does terrorism affect you as an individual?
3. What is the major cause of terrorism in the country?
4. What is your understanding of radicalisation?
5. What forms of radicalisation are you aware of?
6. Do you believe the government is dealing with radicalisation amicably?
7. If yes/no what is it doing/not doing?
8. How can we as a country deal with radicalisation as a country?
9. How responsible are we as the public in ensuring that radicalisation is dealt with?