

# **New Media and Political Mobilization: Implications for Presidential Campaigns in Kenya, 2000-2013**

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Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Faculty of Arts

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## DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work and has not been presented for examination in any other University.

Signature.....

Date.....16-11-2015

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The undersigned supervisor certifies that he has read and hereby recommends for acceptance, of University of Nairobi, the thesis entitled, **New Media and Political Mobilization: Implications for Presidential Campaigns in Kenya, 2000-2013.**

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## DEDICATION

*To my lovely, loving and beloved Parents in memorarium.*

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis is the product of a journey that began three years ago, and in that time many people have helped the project unfold to its completion. I owe a debt of gratitude to each one of them. This thesis would not have existed at all had I not been offered the opportunity to study on a fully funded Departmental Scholarship and thenceforth gained an academic mentor in Dr. Solomon Owuoché who painstakingly read through the numerous manuscripts of this work from its inception and dutifully guided me in refining the analytical focus of my topic.

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To all the people whom I have inadvertently left out of this note; thank you, your contributions were no less valued. This thesis is the product of all your contributions and I am sure it will make a unique contribution to the literature on Presidential campaigns in Kenya. Any remaining errors in the work and analysis remain, of course, entirely my own.

## **ABSTRACT**

This study sought to find out the influence of new media in voter mobilization in Presidential campaigns in Kenya between 2000 and 2013. During this period, Kenya experienced an exponential growth in the uptake of new media communication tools and official incorporation of new media in Presidential campaigns in Kenya. Using a conceptual framework, the study explains the utility and shows the entry-point of new media in the mobilization of voters in Presidential campaigns in Kenya. Through a survey research in Kibra Constituency and structured interviews, the study examined ways through which new media changes the resource dimension in Presidential Campaign mobilization and also whether new media is altering the strategic salience of ethnicity in voter mobilization in Presidential campaigns. The findings of the study show that new media tools make Presidential campaigns more expensive and do not change the importance of ethnicity as the primary basis of political identity and mobilization in Presidential campaigns in Kenya. The study concludes that new media makes a substantial a difference in a Presidential campaign when aggressively used in mobilizing campaign resources and in targeting their bases through bunkum and aggressive Get-Out-The-Vote campaigns.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION .....	ii
DEDICATION .....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	iv
ABSTRACT .....	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	vi
MAPS .....	x
LIST OF TABLES .....	xii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .....	xiii
DEFINITION OF KEY CONCEPTS .....	xiv
<b>CHAPTER ONE .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Background .....	1
1.2 Statement of the Problem.....	2
1.3 Research Questions.....	3
1.4 Study Objectives.....	3
1.4.1 General Objective.....	3
1.4.2 Specific Objectives.....	4
1.5 Justification of the Study.....	4
1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study.....	4
1.7 Literature Review .....	5
1.7.1 Mobilization Thesis.....	6
1.7.2 Normalization Thesis.....	10

1.7.3 Equalization Thesis .....	12
1.8 Conceptual Framework.....	13
1.9 Research Hypothesis.....	16
1.9.1 General Hypothesis .....	16
1.9.2 Operational Hypothesis .....	16
1.10 Methodology .....	17
1.10.1 Study Area .....	17
1.10.2 Research Design.....	17
1.10.3 Study Sample .....	18
1.10.4 Sampling Procedures .....	19
1.10.5 Data Collection and Administration of Instruments.....	20
1.10.6 Data Analysis and Presentation.....	21
1.10.7 Reliability of Data Collection Instruments .....	21
<b>CHAPTER TWO .....</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>HISTORY OF TRADITIONAL MEDIA AND POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN</b>	
<b>KENYA.....</b>	<b>22</b>
2.1 Introduction .....	22
2.2 Advent of Mass Media in Kenya.....	23
2.3 The Media and Politics in Kenya between 1963 and 1991 .....	24
2.4 Pluralist Politics and Mass Media; the post 1991 era .....	28
2.5 Mass Media and Election Coverage in Kenya .....	31
2.6 Mass Media and Campaign Advertising.....	32
2.7 Conclusion.....	35

<b>CHAPTER THREE .....</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>NEW MEDIA AND COST OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS IN KENYA.....</b>	<b>36</b>
3.1 Introduction .....	36
3.2 Political Factors and New Media in Presidential Campaigns .....	37
3.3 Social Factors and New Media in Presidential Campaigns .....	39
3.4 Economic Factors and Logistical Sustenance of New Media in Presidential Campaigns .....	42
 <b>CHAPTER FOUR.....</b>	<b>46</b>
<b>NEW MEDIA AND EMERGING PATTERNS OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN KENYA.....</b>	<b>46</b>
4.1 Introduction .....	46
4.2 Ethnic Voter Mobilization in Context .....	47
4.3 New Media and Ethnic Voter Targeting in Presidential Campaigns.....	49
4.4 New Media and Factors of Voter Response to Ethnic Frames .....	53
 <b>CHAPTER FIVE .....</b>	<b>57</b>
<b>SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION.....</b>	<b>57</b>
5.1 Introduction .....	57
5.2 The Influence of New Media in Presidential Campaigns .....	57
5.3 (a) New Media and the Factors of Cost of Political Mobilization .....	58
5.4 Recapitulation of the Hypotheses .....	60
5.5 Conclusion and Recommendation .....	62



**REFERENCES..... 64**

**APPENDICES..... 70**

Appendix I: Survey Questionnaire ..... 70

Appendix II: Interview Guide ..... 73

## MAPS


1. Map of Nairobi County.....	xi
2. Map of Kibra Constituency.....	xi

# STUDY AREA

## I. Map of Nairobi County



## II. Map of Kibra Constituency



## LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1: Frequency Distribution of Voters Exposure to New Media by Age .....	53
Table 4.2: Percentage Frequency Distribution of Voter Response to New Media by Education Levels .....	54
Table 4.3: Percentage Frequency Distribution of Voter Response to New Media by Monthly Income.....	55

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

CCK	Communications Commission of Kenya
CORD	Coalition for Reforms and Democracy
DP	Democratic Party
FM	Frequency Module
GOTV	Get Out the Vote
IDEA	International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IEBC	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KBC	Kenya Broadcasting Corporation
KNA	Kenya News Agency
KNBS	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
KPU	Kenya Peoples Union
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement
PNU	Party of National Unity
SMS	Short Message Service
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
TNA	The National Alliance Party
TV	Television
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
URP	United Republican Party
US	United States (of America)
VoK	Voice of Kenya

## DEFINITION OF KEY CONCEPTS

**New Media:** Refers to media through which political information can be accessed anytime, anywhere, on any digital device, as well as interactive user feedback, unregulated participation and community formation around the information or content. New media include internet, blogs, mobile phones and social networking sites. In this study, new media refers to mobile phones and social networking sites; Facebook and Twitter.

**Political Mobilization:** The process by which candidates, political parties, party activists and groups induce other people to participate in politics with the sole aim of winning elections.

**Social networks:** Internet applications on which users can easily communicate their ideas, feelings and freely exchange information. The most commonly used are MySpace invented in 2003, Facebook in 2004, YouTube in 2006 and twitter in 2007. They are accessible on personal computers and mobile phone handsets.

**Traditional (old) Media:** Traditional media or *old media* include print media such as books, newspapers, magazines, fliers and billboards. Other traditional media are the electronic media such as radio, television, movies video and audio recordings.

# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Background

Mobilization plays a central role in explaining participatory political behaviour. Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) argue that “having been asked” is the single most important determinant of participation. While political mobilization initially relied entirely on face to face contacts, the advent of media transformed how politicians targeted voters. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century rapid technological innovations have led to a bubble in the use of new media as political parties and candidates step up their internet presence, and they increasingly rely on social networks and mobile phone technology to win support.

In Kenya, new media was first used in 2002 by leading Presidential candidates though it was limited to texting (Mungai, 2010) and their party websites<sup>1</sup> on which they posted their election manifesto (Nyabuga & Mudhai, 2009). As the number of Kenyan internet users grew, the number of Presidential candidates that set up campaign websites increased each electoral cycle.

The invention of social networking sites like Facebook, Youtube and Twitter among others, is an important highlight in the use of new media, particularly web 2.0 technology in political mobilization. Members of the social networks meet (virtually) to discuss ideas, exchange information and even impel each other to action (Panagopoulos, 2009). On these networks, people engage in debates on political topics and events. The success in application of social networking tools and texting by Barack Obama in 2008 campaign for US president to create a grassroots support base marked a watershed moment and effectively demonstrated how new media could serve as important tools for mobilizing voters.

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<sup>1</sup> Political parties like KANU, DP and later NARC established their websites for 2002 campaigns.

As the 2013 Presidential campaigns began in Kenya, candidates inevitably factored in new media in their campaigns, not as a reinforcement strategy, but as a key medium by which to mobilize for political support. With the growing popularity of social networking among the Kenyan voters and the ability to access internet from mobile handsets, political parties and candidates created pages on Facebook and Twitter. This study examines the influences the new media has on political mobilization in Kenya.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

Mobile penetration in Kenya grew from 0.38% in December 2000 (CCK, 2008) to 78% in December 2012 (CCK April 2013). As the competition grew stiffer in the communication sector due to liberalization, mobile phones became more and more affordable to most Kenyans even as the cost of data and calling fell.<sup>2</sup> A significant number of Kenyans could therefore access political information without necessarily relying on traditional media. By December 2012, 99.06% of internet subscriptions in Kenya were mobile data subscriptions<sup>3</sup>. As such most internet users in Kenya access the service from mobile phones or mobile modems.

As the uptake of new media grew, there was a corresponding increase in citizen participation in political activity as evidenced by increase in voter turn outs at the 2002, 2007 and 2013 Kenya Presidential elections.<sup>4</sup> Incidentally, turnout was highest in 2007 and 2013 when internet and mobile telephony uptake was highest coupled with the growing popularity of social networking among Kenyans. As indicated by statistics on [www.alexacom](http://www.alexacom), the most

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<sup>2</sup>Liberalization began in 1999 with breaking up of Kenya Posts and Telecommunication Corporation. Kenya has 4 mobile network providers: Airtel, Safaricom, Orange and YU

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.CCK

<sup>4</sup> According to IDEA voter turnouts at Presidential polls increased from 57.18% in 2002 to 69.09% in 2007 to a massive 85.91% in 2013. Most of the increase coincided with the period in which social media grew (between 2007 and 2013)



visited internet sites in Kenya are the social networks Facebook.com and Twitter.com<sup>5</sup> with an average monthly active users above two million each according to statistics on [www.socialbakers.com](http://www.socialbakers.com). The statistics reveal why all the 2013 Presidential candidates used at least one of these social networks to reach out for support.<sup>6</sup>

While studies on the influence of new media on Presidential campaigns have been comprehensively carried elsewhere, there is a gap in the literature on how new media affects the aspects of Presidential campaigns relating to the cost and patterns of mobilization in Kenya. In view of the foregoing, this study examines whether the new media tools make a Presidential campaign cheaper and also examines whether these new media tools are helping in mobilizing votes beyond the candidate's traditional ethnic voter bases.

### **1.3 Research Questions**

The study was guided by the following research questions:

1. In what ways do the new media alter the resource dimension in political mobilization in Presidential campaigns in Kenya?
2. To what extent do the new media create new patterns for political mobilization in Presidential campaigns in Kenya?

### **1.4 Study Objectives**

#### **1.4.1 General Objective**

The main objective of the study is to examine the influence of new media in mobilizing for political support in Presidential campaigns in Kenya.

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<sup>5</sup><http://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/KE> accessed on 24-04-2013. alexa.com is an online monitoring website that monitors trends on traffic flows into websites.

<sup>6</sup> Uhuru Kenyatta has 405,334 local followers on Facebook, 174,829 on twitter. Raila Odinga has 137,862 followers on Facebook, 149,300 on twitter. Peter Kenneth has 193,831 followers on Facebook and 95,365 on Twitter <http://www.socialbakers.com/statistics/> accessed on 27-04-2013

### **1.4.2 Specific Objectives**

1. To determine whether the new media is altering the cost of political mobilization in Presidential campaigns in Kenya;
2. To examine whether new media is creating new patterns of political mobilization in Presidential campaigns Kenya.

### **1.5 Justification of the Study**

This study is a response to the growing popularity of new media in Presidential campaigns in Kenya by examining whether the increase in the uptake of these new media tools make significant changes on the overall financial outlay of a Presidential campaigns and also whether such uptake alters the existing ethnic patterns of mobilization.

The findings and recommendations of the study will be useful for Presidential campaign organization and execution of campaign mobilization and communication strategies by the candidates, political consultants and professional campaign administrators. In a nutshell, the rationale for this study lies the absence of systematic study in this area and its invaluable contribution to the literature on organization of modern hi-tech Presidential campaigns that incorporate new media as tools for communication and mobilization.

### **1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study**

The study examines the influence of using new media in Presidential campaigns. Specifically, the study focuses on the utility of social networks and mobile handsets, largely grouped as new media, in canvassing for political support in Presidential campaigns in Kenya. The scope covers the period between the year 2000 and March 2013 with much attention given to the Presidential election years; 2002, 2007 and 2013.

Due to the absence of a clear legal framework<sup>7</sup> that makes it mandatory for Presidential campaigns to openly declare their sources of campaign funds and the total amount of money spent, there was opaqueness on the exact figures a campaign spent. It even became more difficult when one of the interviewees confessed that campaign finances are not controlled from a central point. The researcher therefore relied of secondary sources of data to qualify the findings.

### **1.7 Literature Review**

Over the years, academic interest in political campaigning has increased significantly, particularly with regard to understanding its importance in elections and effects on voter choices and turnout. Attention has also focused on the changing face of the campaigns with the incorporation of new media communication technologies in contacting and targeting voters. While the available literature incorporates the effects of new media technologies in political campaigns elsewhere on the globe, the very recent arrival of these tools on the political scene in Kenya means a comprehensive understanding of their implications for political campaign practice is yet to be fully developed.

This section on Literature Review is organized into the three broader theses of literature; 1) Mobilization; 2) Normalization; and 3) Equalization. The analysis in each section is geared toward pointing at the existing gap in the literature on influences of new media in Presidential campaigns in Kenya.

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<sup>7</sup> By March 2013 when Parliament was prorogued, the Elections Campaign Bill had not passed through all the stages of legislation and was later re-introduced in the (new) 11<sup>th</sup> Parliament and assented to by the President in December 2013.

### **1.7.1 Mobilization Thesis**

Conventionally, behavioural theories of political participation have shown that socioeconomic characteristics of voters such as education and income are the most important variables in explaining whether one votes. Voter behaviour is also affected by race, ethnicity, age, gender and attitudinal factors such as partisanship, political efficacy and political interest (Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995). While a litany of research documents the demographic and psychological determinants of political participation, recent studies suggest that integration of new media technology in politics plays an important role in influencing voter behaviour.

Johnson & Kaye (2003) conducted an online survey of politically interested web users in the 1996 and 2000 US Presidential elections to examine the extent to which relying on political information on the internet influences political interest, campaign interest, political involvement, the likelihood of voting and voter choices. The study found that political involvement is the strongest correlate and is significantly and positively associated with reliance on the web for political information. Interestingly, the study found that the young, less educated and people with the least trust in government relied on the information on the web which they considered most reliable. Therefore internet was found to have an effect on civic life in terms of psychological rewards and personal empowerment that comes from using media for political purposes.

Howard (2005) argues that consumption of online political information is an example of interaction with the political culture. Using ethnographic and survey evidence from four electoral seasons between 1996 and 2002 in the US, Howard concludes that new media has resulted in deepening of democracy in terms of diffusing rich data about political actors, policy options and the diversity of actors and opinion in the public sphere. This information contributes to participatory and deliberative democracy via social networks.

The invention of social networking sites, like MySpace, Facebook, Youtube and Twitter among others, marked a watershed in the use of new media in political mobilization. Users of the social networks meet (virtually) to discuss ideas, exchange information and even impel each other to action (Panagopoulos, 2009). On these networks users are able to engage in debates on politics. Online networks formed around specific candidates, ideas or issues have become common. Creation of pages or groups or causes on a social network like Facebook sparks interest in a candidate's friends as the additions appear on their social network minifeed as notifications. Social networking has been used to create a bandwagon effect; that is to either readily offer a candidate support or in some cases to deny a particular candidate support. This was aptly captured in the 2008 Democratic party primaries when social media was used as a campaign strategy to stop Hillary Clinton from clinching the Democratic party ticket. The 'Stop Hillary Clinton' campaign on Facebook proved effective as it helped Barack Obama win the Democratic ticket. Such campaigns have been replicated in Kenya where Facebook campaigns like 'Stop Raila Odinga Now!!!!' and 'Not Another Kikuyu President Please' were so intense and couched with ethnically derisive messages that the National Cohesion and Integration Commission raised a red alert over a possible recurrence of poll related violence in the 2013 Presidential elections.

The 2004 US Presidential campaign of Howard Dean set the trend in using social networks in campaign fundraising, designing a campaign and as a virtual and physical tool for organising for support (Hendricks & Denton Jr., 2010 p.4). This campaign illustrated the democratic potential of a particular pattern of interplay between political organizations, political messages, technologies of freedom and an electorate that increasingly wants an expanded autonomy, and by extension it showed how genuine network politics can transform the political process. While Dean ultimately lost the nomination, the use of social media in campaigns achieved success in stimulating political engagement and creating a campaign that

was exceptionally democratic at its core since internet is seen as the ultimate technology of freedom whose diffusion is hailed as a potential saviour from the ills of representation and participation. New media enables a candidate to freely interact with the most ardent of supporter; listen to their views and give a response on an issue considered important. As Howard Dean puts it, 'It is not about communicating our message to you anymore; it's about listening to you first before we formulate the message.' (Panagopoulos, 2009 p.12)

Barack Obama's 2008 campaign for US president marked a significant shift in how Presidential campaigns are organised and run. Obama vigorously employed both old and the new media technologies especially texting and social networking to target young first time voters whose support was easily winnable. Grassroot mobilization efforts revolved around extensive use of popular social media and peer-to peer online platforms whose discussions were led by politically minded young persons (Hendricks & Denton Jr., 2010). In addition, the Obama team established a Youtube channel through which they posted campaign activities' videos which bypassed the traditional media outlets. These videos often had the effect of 'firing up' the support base and winning over new support through posted adverts and videos showing contradictory positions taken by opponents. In deed as the Obama 2008 campaign manager, David Plouffe (2010) writes, "at the outset, the campaign figured out how to communicate with and target voters with a fresh set of eyes....traditional media would be important, but the campaign placed a huge premium on new media...which would make their campaign message ubiquitous" (p. 378).

The Obama campaign team developed an elaborate text messaging strategy to reach out to the core support of the Democratic party: the inner-city low income earners, blacks and hispanics. The Obama team had built a database of about three million mobile phone users; a database that would be important in the Get-Out -To-Vote efforts later in the campaigns. In fact the announcement of Obama's choice for Vice President was initially done through a text

message before it was picked up by the media (Condon, 2008). Stern (2008) argues that the Obama team would rely on text messages to shore up voter turnout among the young first time voters who had ‘registered in record numbers and shown unprecedented interest to turn out in the previous surveys.’

The competitive nature of political contests has made campaigns put more emphasis on mobilization for a favourable turnout. In deed previous research has confirmed the mobilizing ability of the new media. Nickerson (2005) studies how partisan mobilization by use of phone banks in GOTV initiative affects voter turnout. He arrives at the conclusion that this form of mobilization resulted in an increase in turnout by 3.2 percentage and could make the difference in closely contested race. Gerber & Green (2000) too confirmed new media increases turnout even in cases of non-partisan targeting, while Bennion (2005) adds that such non partisan GOTV increases the turnout among the youth more than the old.

Osborn et al (2010) argue that voter turnout makes the difference between winning and losing a competitive race. They argue that by vigorously employing new media especially texting and social networking to target young, mostly first time, voters, the Obama 2008 campaigns registered a success that must have come as a result of the turnout in that election. As such, voter turnout delivered victory for Obama due to the mobilization efforts employed by the Democratic party and his campaign. Aggressive mobilization strategies influence how people perceive the election specific issues and the resulting high turnout is the variance between structural component of turn out.<sup>8</sup> In deed, new media has transformed the course of political agenda setting through its unique opportunity structure within which a candidate could attract political attention (Bekkers et al, 2011).

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<sup>8</sup> Economic status is considered a structural component of voter turnout. Studies have demonstrated that higher economic status is directly associated with voter turnout. In a cross-electoral study, a turnout that overly exceeds the previous elections is deemed to have resulted from aggressive mobilization strategies and how people perceived the issues in that election. Obama benefitted from high turnout among the low income earners who considered the economy a big issue and viewed John McCain as lacking in ability to turn around the credit crunch.

This study seeks to bridge the gap in the mobilization thesis in the context of electoral politics in Kenya. While Nyabuga (2007) argued that the internet has a potential to mobilize and stimulate political interest, the study was exploratory and was done when penetration of new media was still quite low as compared to 2013.

### **1.7.2 Normalization Thesis**

The normalization thesis is centred on the argument that the new media reinforces rather than transforms existing power relationships and patterns of political participation (Davis, 2005; Norris, 2001). Davis (2005) argues that the new media is dominated by those who are young, well educated, affluent, and powerful. The new media facilitates the civic engagement of people who are already informed and motivated, but does not change the involvement level of people who are disenfranchised (Norris, 2001). According to this thesis, the new media is less likely to mobilize the disengaged and more likely to reinforce established political actors who can take greater advantage of using political information on the network, deepening the digital divide between the information haves and have-nots (Norris, 2001).

According to the normalization thesis, the ability to effectively access and utilize new media in political campaigns depends on the resources a campaign has at its disposal and how much could be raised. The success of the Obama 2008 campaign that heavily invested in the new media as a key strategy to reach out to voters is attributable to the fact that the campaign was able to raise so much money from traditional Democratic donors and new funders. This reinforced the view that only the well-oiled campaigns can use new media in their campaigns (Druckman et al, 2009). As Gibson & Ward (2012) conclude from repeated researches on party websites across Europe, Australia and North America, key parties and candidates



operate more sophisticated e-campaigns and wider range of new media campaign tools than minor parties.

In 2011 Uganda Presidential elections, Yoweri Museveni successfully used the new media to popularize his rap music and its ringtones in an attempt to ‘strike cord’ with the youthful voters. This strategy paid off with a victory of 68% of the total votes cast and entrenched reluctance in the people from participating in the protests called by the opposition led by Kizza Besigye.<sup>9</sup> An interesting contrast lies in the fact that while Museveni won the vote by a landslide, in North Africa, leaders who had been in power for long, just like Museveni, were being ousted through protests that were largely attributed to the mobilization capabilities of the new media.

The new media is mostly used to ‘fire-up’ traditional party support bases with little effort at reaching out to new support. The new media is therefore not changing the existing patterns of political mobilization. Otenyo (2002) documents how the websites put up for political parties and Presidential hopefuls in Kenya in 2002 did not indicate any significant departure from their usual modus operandi. Most of the information online was about the party candidate with little information on the stand of the party or candidate on social issues. This scenario prevailed in 2007 Presidential elections with little interactive communication made possible (Nyabuga & Mudhai 2009).

In their GOTV efforts, political parties and candidates have always stuck to their traditional support bases, mostly ethnic group of the candidate and resorted to pre-existing ethnic stereotypes to mobilize for support. As documents Mungai (2010), political party spin-doctors aggressively used mobile texting (popularly known as SMS) to fire up their support

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<sup>9</sup> See, for example, Elizabeth Palchik Allen, “Rapped Up: Museveni’s Use of Social Media to Keep Power in Uganda.” While the election had been allegedly marred by vote rigging and other irregularities, Museveni’s popularity among the youth had shored up greatly, thanks to his rap song that had become a popular club hit, that no one would willingly protest against his election.  
<http://www.newrepublic.com/article/world/84143/museveni-uganda-social-media-power#> accessed on 6-6-2013

bases by using derogatory references on their opponents. The explosive potential of these texts was blamed for the post 2007 poll violence in Kenya.

This research looks at how the advent and growth of newer variants of new media like social networking are changing mobilization patterns. The research answers whether, with the new media in Presidential campaigns, it is still 'politics as usual' in Kenya or there is an emerging pattern of political mobilization. From the findings, it will be shown that political mobilization in Kenya is still ethnic in orientation as it was before advent of new media.

### **1.7.3 Equalization Thesis**

New media have the unrivalled advantage of cost. The marginal cost of contacting another potential voter is nearly zero. In this respect, new media have a huge advantage over traditional media in the context of personalized political mobilization. This specific price structure is one of the major driving forces in the growth in popularity of new media in political processes (Ward & Vedel, 2006).

The cost dimension has made it possible for nondescript candidates to reach a wider audience than they would have done were they to purchase advertising space on traditional media. This has often resulted in unprecedented success at very low cost (Gibson & Ward, 2012). Within social networks are multiple sources of political information that is not centrally produced, edited and disseminated. This has increased opportunities for 'outsider' groups to communicate their message to a wider range of voters thereby eroding the dominance of mainstream actors. The successes of Reform party candidate Jesse Ventura in 1998 Minnesota Gubernatorial elections and that of Roh Moo-Hyun in the 2002 Presidential elections in South Korea is largely attributable to new media, especially the internet.

A candidacy may be seen as standing no realistic chances of making an impressive run at the beginning. Strategic application of new media by the weaker candidates has

enabled them to reach out to millions of voters and to raise funds with varying degrees of success. Through the use of new media, the long shot candidate in 2004 US Democratic Presidential nomination, Howard Dean managed to raise millions of dollars and recruit thousands of volunteers to his campaign (Trippi, 2008).

In Kenya, there have been phony Presidential candidacies which have generated so much interest in online forums and have thus become household names. The candidacies of John Wajackoyah and Kingwa Kamencu ahead of the 2013 Presidential elections generated so much debate and they became overnight household names even though their names did not eventually appear on the Presidential ballot papers. Because of the extensive use of new media by these candidates, their candidacies captured public attention on social media. Other factors notwithstanding, several other candidates that were erstwhile considered 'long shot candidates' eventually mounted serious campaigns in the 2013 election because of their prudent use of new media in popularizing their candidacies.<sup>10</sup>

### **1.8 Conceptual Framework**

The influence of new media technologies in political mobilization cannot be explained using a single social theory, but can only be possibly explained by adopting a conceptual framework that incorporates existing social theories and theories of communication. The functionalist approach to mass media maintains that media serve to survey the environment, to correlate various events in the environment, to transmit culture or social heritage, and to entertain members of the mass audience (Lasswell, 1948). Surveillance refers to the collection and distribution of information concerning events in the environment, both outside and within any particular community, therefore corresponding approximately to what is popularly envisaged as the handling of news. Acts of correlation would mean

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<sup>10</sup> In 2008, opinion polls showed that Raila Odinga would win the Presidency by 56percentage votes. His closest challenger Uhuru Kenyatta would garner 17 percentage of the total votes cast.

attaching meaning to information about the environment and prescriptions for conduct in reaction to these events. This activity is variously considered propagandistic. Transmission of culture includes activities designed to communicate a group's social norms and values from one generation to another or to newcomers. Entertainment is any communication principally intended to amuse people with little or no regard to any influential effects it might have (Anderson & Meyer, 1975).

Lasswell's functionalist account seems intent on asking the many-sided question "who says what, through what medium and to whom with what effect?" This framework therefore assumes content analysis approach, a research technique which aims to infer an objective and systematic meaning to the manifest content of communications (Wright, 1960). This study benefits from the functionalist theory through adoption of a content analysis approach in trying to understand the motivations behind the frames that a Presidential campaign chooses in its communication with voters. The frames may be of a high entertainment value, but the utility of such frames lies in their ability to polarize and mobilize votes for the candidate.

By their very nature, new media are networks through which people find information and exchange ideas. Network theory as developed by Manuel Castells explains how the uniqueness of new media can be useful for political mobilization and activism. The networks, particularly the internet, aid in creation of social ties, albeit weak ones; guarantee anonymity and promote unrestricted and uncensored communication.

Weak ties are generally considered useful in providing access to new important information and opening up opportunities at a low cost (Granovetter, 1973). The new media allow the formation of weak ties with strangers, in an 'egalitarian' pattern of interaction where social characteristics are less influential in framing, or even blocking communication and the communication proceeds in an uncensored pattern (Castells, 1996). The effectiveness

of any tie forged depends on the duration, the emotional intensity, the mutual understanding, and the shared services within that tie (Granovetter, 1973). The networks created by the new media are built on brief acquaintances with people whom one might share common interests, beliefs or goals with, or may simply have mutual friends. The strength in such weak ties lies in their capacity to mobilize us into accepting new ideas and new information, and the new media technologies like social networking sites and SMS allow these ties to be forged with incredible speed over vast geographical areas.

Granovetter (1973) relates how interactions within small groups aggregate into large scale phenomena as social mobility, community organization and political structure. In weak ties, he argues, there lies the potential for “diffusion, social mobility, political organization, and social cohesion in general,” across different networks. The advantages of weak ties over strong ties lie in their ability to diffuse information and ideas across social groups. Granovetter illustrates this theory by using the example of spreading a rumour. If one shares a rumour with his closest friends (strong ties) and those individuals pass the rumour to their close friends, some individuals are likely to hear the rumour multiple times. Thus, the information is contained within a single social group. As such new media is important in spreading new information in its raw form from one cohort to another with an unmatched speed thus is useful for building bandwagon and a snowball effect in a campaign thus making the candidacy euphoric.

In political mobilization, new media works in more or less the same pattern. When one posts some information on social media for example, this information is likely to be shared amongst different networks of friends and thus it spreads quite fast to new recipients outside the original sender’s network. This ability of the new media to spread information over a vast geographical range and across different social networks is more important in spreading propaganda or mobilizing for protests against the status quo as was the case in the

People Power II protests against President Joseph Estrada in Manilla, Philipines in which protestors were mobilized by use of text messages (Castells, 2007, p. 199).

In Egypt, protestors against Hosni Mubarak administration capitalized on the weak ties forged online through social networks, such as Facebook and Twitter, and they were able to not only circulate their calls for political mobilization, but also began a dialogue that fostered the attitude for political activism in Egyptian communities that on January 25 2011, masses gathered at Tahrir square (Green, 2011). As dialogue builds up, specific grievances are synthesized into a political stance. Through this process, the new media indirectly play an agenda setting role within the community through the ‘crossovers between micro- and macro mobilization’ (Bekkers et al 2011).

The reality that new media technologies have deeply penetrated the deepest in the lives of majority of the Kenyan voters creates a political reality. In effect, the internet and cell phone technologies have created an opportunity structure that is useful in political mobilization and agenda setting for Presidential campaigns.

## **1.9 Research Hypothesis**

### **1.9.1 General Hypothesis**

The use of new media in Presidential campaigns increases support

### **1.9.2 Operational Hypothesis**

1. New media reduces the cost of political mobilization in Presidential campaigns in Kenya
2. New media is changing the patterns of political mobilization in Presidential campaigns in Kenya.

## **1.10 Methodology**

### **1.10.1 Study Area**

A survey was carried out in Kibra Constituency in Nairobi County chosen through convenience sampling technique.

Kibra Constituency covers an area of 12.10 sq. km and has a total population of 178, 284 persons (KNBS, 2009) and 101, 352 registered voters (IEBC, 2012). The constituency has a total of five (5) County Assembly wards namely; Laini Saba, Lindi, Makina, Sarang'ombe and Woodley/Kenyatta Golf Course. The Choice of Kibra is informed by certain peculiarly contrasting features within its demography such as income disparities, levels of education, and existence of an informal settlement in Kibera and well manicured residences for middle income earners in Woodley, Jamhuri and Kabarnet Gardens.

While Convenience Sampling is generally acknowledged for the fast and generally inexpensive way by which it enables a researcher to arrive at a desired study area and sample size, it is important to note that it is fraught with inherent biases that would make the sample unrepresentative of the total voter population in Kenya. This carries with it the risk of undermining the generalizations from the sample (Bryman, 2008). However, this may not necessarily mean that the findings of the research do not satisfy the criterion for evaluation of social research which includes reliability, replication and validity tests.

### **1.10.2 Research Design**

This research adopted both qualitative and quantitative research methods. Through a survey research, the study examined how new media influences voter choices in Presidential elections. The study employed probability sampling to administer 234 questionnaires proportionally distributed across the five County Assembly Wards as follows; Sarangombe (62), Woodley/Kenyatta Golfcourse (55), Makina (50), Laini Saba (35) and Lindi (32). The

questionnaires were strictly administered to persons registered to vote in the Constituency stratified along sex; alternating male and female respondents.

This study also employed the use of structured interviews to gather more information on the strategic motivations in using new media in the voter contact plans Uhuru Kenyatta, Raila Odinga and Peter Kenneth in the 2013 elections. These perspectives were important in understanding the motivation behind the official incorporation of new media in Presidential campaign communication and how such communication strategies were executed. In conducting these interviews, twenty questionnaires were sent via email with no responses at all! The researcher then opted for a face-to-face, over the table interviews between April 24<sup>th</sup> and June 2nd, 2014.

Participant Observation: The researcher is a follower of three 2013 Presidential candidates on Facebook and carried out a content analysis of candidates' posts and responses on their Facebook pages between February 1<sup>st</sup>, 2013 and April 1<sup>st</sup>, 2013. The three candidates are: Uhuru Kenyatta, Raila Odinga and Peter Kenneth who have been conveniently sampled because they are the candidates with the biggest following on Facebook at the time conducting the study.

### 1.10.3 Study Sample

The study had a total sample of 264<sup>11</sup> respondents broken down into the following categories; 234 randomly sampled respondents and structured interviews conducted with five

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<sup>11</sup>The sample size was arrived at by the following formula:

$$n = \frac{t^2 \times p(1-p)}{m^2}$$

- n** = required sample size
- t** = confidence level at 95% (standard value of 1.96)
- p** = estimated national mobile phone penetration (78%)
- m** = margin of error at 5% (standard value of 0.05)



respondents four drawn from Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga campaigns, and one from Peter Kenneth's campaign.

#### **1.10.4 Sampling Procedures**

##### **a) Simple random Sampling**

In administering the questionnaires, the research stratified the sample into wards then employed simple random sampling technique in selecting respondents who must be registered voters in the said electoral Ward within Kibra Constituency. The respondents were stratified along gender lines by administering questionnaires by alternating male and female respondents.

##### **b) Purposive Sampling**

The study sample included persons with 'special' knowledge and understanding on how new media has been used in Presidential campaigns in Kenya. Structured questionnaires were sent to 2013 Presidential campaign strategists with no response at all! Face-to-face interviews were later held between them and the researcher.

##### **c) Convenience Sampling**

Convenience sampling was employed as a technique in identifying the study area. This choice was guided by the available resources and the constraint of time. Kibra is easily accessible from the University of Nairobi and the researcher could easily commute to the study area.

Convenience sampling was also employed in sampling the 2013 Presidential candidates whose staff would be interviewed. In this regard, the researcher settled on Raila Odinga,

Uhuru Kenyatta and Peter Kenneth based on the large following each of the three candidates enjoyed on new media networks at the time of 2013 Presidential elections.

### **1.10.5 Data Collection and Administration of Instruments**

#### **a) Structured Interviews**

The study employed both open ended and closed questions compiled in a questionnaire to collect data from respondents who were randomly chosen [appendix I]. The researcher was assisted by two persons who were familiar with the geography of Kibra and could easily translate the questions into the locally used slang, *sheng*.

An interview guide was used in gathering information from respondents who worked at campaign secretariats [appendix II].

#### **b) Participant Observation**

The researcher is a follower of the three Presidential candidates on Facebook and did a content analysis of the posts on their walls and responses posted between February 1<sup>st</sup> 2013 and April 1<sup>st</sup> 2013 when the winner of the 2013 Presidential election was officially declared by the Supreme Court of Kenya.

#### **c) Secondary Sources of Data**

Secondary sources of data were relied upon in the preparatory phase to gather background information on the use of new media in political mobilization. These sources include journal articles, books, newspaper articles, books, newspaper articles, working papers, Government sources, conference reports and internet sources.

### **1.10.6 Data Analysis and Presentation**

#### **a) Analysis of Quantitative data**

Quantitative data collected from closed questions was edited and entered into computer for analysis using Epidata Software.<sup>12</sup> For all categories, Epidata information was then converted to Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) for further analysis and to arrive at generalizations.

#### **b) Analysis of Qualitative data**

Ordinal data from questions that sought respondents' value ranking was analyzed using the Likert scales to identify general trends in correlations among variables. From participant observation, the researcher was able to infer general trends on how new media technologies affect political mobilization in Kenya.

### **1.10.7 Reliability of Data Collection Instruments**

A pilot study was conducted between March 18<sup>th</sup> and March 24<sup>th</sup>, 2014 on representatives of all categories of respondents. This pilot study provided an opportunity to test the stability of the research instruments by administering and re-administering the instruments. Similar findings were generated as proof.

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<sup>12</sup>Epidata is computer software that allows one to enter numbers assigned to responses collected from the field. Epidata gives room for control check in the assigned numbers and subsequent quick transfer of data into SPSS

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **HISTORY OF TRADITIONAL MEDIA AND POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN KENYA**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

The essence of the mass media in a democracy is to continually provide citizens with information with which they are able to hold their government to account and to form political opinions on which they base their political choices. Presidential campaigns involve competition between contending candidates to establish the hearing and interpretation of issues considered most important in that election. People grapple with opposing frames intended to influence public opinion preferences by opinion leaders during debates. The choice of a frame for media broadcast plays a vital role in defining what the audiences believe to be the most significant aspects of an issue. The premise, therefore, is that the media plays a prominent role in shaping people's political thinking and behaviour.

This role is magnified during Presidential campaigns when political journalists, media organizations, party electoral machines and candidates accelerate their political coverage efforts. Presidential candidates in Kenya organize their campaign launches around media needs thus making the media the arena of election campaigning. Sizeable media entourages travel around the country with political leaders to cover specially staged events such as donations to the needy, street walks or visits to historical shrines or respected elderly statesmen.

As such, the mass media is the most common source for information about Presidential election campaigns in Kenya. In terms of the sheer volume of information available to citizens via the media on issues, political parties and candidates, election campaigns often represent a high point for political coverage. However, concerns about

political bias in the mass media lie at the heart of discourses on the influence of the media in Presidential elections. Subsumed in these concerns is the assumption that there may be effects, intended or unintended, on public opinion, political behavior and ultimately electoral outcomes.

This chapter traces the advent of mass media in Presidential politics and campaigns in Kenya. The chapter recapitulates on the historic dynamics in an attempt to explain the entry point for new media communication tools as viable alternatives for political communication in Presidential campaigns in Kenya. The chapter also examines the nature of state-media relations in order to offer a clearer understanding of the roles the media has played in shaping public choices during Presidential elections.

## **2.2 Advent of Mass Media in Kenya**

The introduction of mass media in Kenya can be traced to the nineteenth century white settlers, colonialists and Christian missionaries who used print media as a channel for social communication amongst themselves. Later on Asians began to invest in mass media when in 1902 Alibhai Mulla Jeevanjee set up *The East African Standard*. For the Asian community, the media was a tool for justifying their second position to the white European settlers in Kenya (Ochilo P. J., 1993). In 1928, radio was also started by colonialists to act as a medium for relaying news from England.

The clamour for self-rule by the indigenous Kenyan population, starting from mid-1920s led to the establishment of several pamphlets in indigenous African languages. These publications were essentially the medium by which anti-colonial movements put across their demands for freedom, justice, and equality, and were also useful in spreading their liberation agenda among the indigenous African communities (Ochilo P. J., 1993). In this era, the

overriding motivation was the utility of such publications in mobilizing African population to join the movement for independence (Ochilo & Wanyande, 2007).

### **2.3 The Media and Politics in Kenya between 1963 and 1991**

At independence, only the state-owned broadcaster Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC), later on Voice of Kenya (VoK), had a near national coverage. There were also *Daily Nation* and *the Standard* newspapers that were published daily. The first post-colonial administration embarked on eradication of poverty, ignorance and disease, and also building a sense of nationhood among the citizens of Kenya. In this endeavour, the mass media was incorporated by the Kenyatta regime as an important tool for rallying the citizens around the administration's agenda (Kadhi & Rutten, 2001).

In the post-colonial Kenya, the patterns of media ownership and development proceeded on the same template as set under the colonial rule. The Government of Kenya inherited the colonial statecraft in lock, stock and barrel, and the electronic media was run by the ministry of Information and Broadcasting whose employees were appointed by the President. The VOK was nationalized in 1964 and the Kenya News Agency (KNA) was run by command of the state that effectively controlled the content of broadcast under the pretext of consolidating national unity, peace and stability in Kenya. As government gained more control of the content for broadcast, the state run media turned into a propaganda mouthpiece for the ruling party. The Kenyatta regime effectively used VOK to sway public opinion with a single aim of consolidating the regime by fighting off dissenting political voices that were branded "enemies of state" and "friends of communist regimes" ostensibly intent on "reverting Kenya to colonialist rule."<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> See, for example, President Jomo Kenyatta's speech during the opening of Nyanza General Hospital in Kisumu in November 1969.

The privately owned newspapers, *Daily Nation* and *the East African Standard* were fairly independent in their editorial policy. Even though they had a strong financial base that they had built overtime, these papers were still not immune from state interference in their reportage. The government controlled the reporting via political representations through conformist reporters and editors and threats to sue through courts of law (Kadhi & Rutten, 2001). Since the print media was owned by foreigners, they became very cautious of the content of their publication lest they upset the Kenyatta administration and risk the loss of their business licences.

As internal political intrigues took shape in the ruling party KANU in the 1960s, the media became an important tool for either faction in the furtherance of their agenda. The conservative faction allied to President Jomo Kenyatta, for instance, increasingly became intolerant of dissenting political opinion and introduced an 'ideology of order' which limited freedoms of expression. Kenyatta co-opted and controlled media for propaganda purposes (Allen & Gagliardone, 2011). The radical faction allied to Jaramogi Oginga was not left behind in this! They resorted to populism using the privately owned media and publications against the administration, some of which were done out of the country.<sup>14</sup> As opposition led by Jaramogi Oginga grew more popular, the Kenyatta administration introduced laws that curtailed civic liberties and began to instill fear in supporters of Kenya Peoples Union (KPU) so that the opposition would find it difficult to mobilize a huge following of loyal supporters willing to stick out their necks on behalf of the party.<sup>15</sup> For a short period, the only platform that was available for the opposition to spread their political message was funerals before the

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<sup>14</sup> For fear of administration's backlash, local publishers could not print KPU manifesto and the manuscript was sent to 'friends of the party' in London for production and later smuggled into the country through Uganda.

<sup>15</sup> The sixth amendment to the independence constitution through the passing of the Preservation of Public Security Act in June 1966 curtailed freedoms of speech, expression and association, and provided for detention without trial. This amendment was targeted at the oppositionists in the KPU in order to limit their capacities to mobilize for political support from among the electorate. For further reading on this, see Susan Dorothy Mueller, (1972) *Political Parties in Kenya: Patterns of Opposition and Dissent 1919-1969*, PhD dissertation submitted to Princeton University, USA.

government declared the use of such platforms illegal in 1968. As Mueller (1972) notes, the Kenyatta administration went further ahead and banned the leader of KPU, Jaramogi Oginga, from speaking in campaign rallies for the by-election in Gem in 1968 following the demise of Argwings Kodhek.

As the dissenting political opinion was locked from the national press, the news frames that were made available to the public were only those that were intended to indoctrinate the public into unquestioningly embracing the whims of the Kenyatta regime. A commonly used frame was to portray holders of dissonant political views as saboteurs of peace and development. Development was framed to mean personal rewards that accrue to an individual when they kowtow to the demands of the regime and Kenyatta employed state resources to reward people who openly chided oppositionists. Because of the power of persuasion that comes with the individual rewards and the frequency of exposure of such frames as developed and spun by the regime, the Kenyatta administration succeeded in defining the terms and agenda of political discourse during this time. Coupled with the coercive power of the state, the regime succeeded in manipulating political opinions of the voters to its favour by sending sufficiently loud signal with the intensity of unmatched proportions. The frames developed by the regime were more effective in stimulating a distribution of opinions in their favour than the competing frames from the oppositionists as seen in the eventual outcomes of parliamentary elections and the lack of the sheer will to challenge President Kenyatta for the Presidency in 1969 and 1972. While much of this might have been as a result of the fear of the repressive and/or the manipulative power of the administration, the consequential impact of the force that manifests itself in voter apathy or the decision to conform to the demands of the ruling elite. Either way, the administration succeeded in consolidating the Kenyatta regime and disenfranchising opposition.



Under Daniel arap Moi, state control of mass media intensified as the regime grew more and more unpopular as a result of unresponsive and exclusionist leadership characterized by rising unemployment, food shortage, rising inflation, deteriorating education standards, poor quality healthcare and low wages. As national wave of strike by government employees gained currency, the Moi regime seemed to be keen on micromanaging informational flow in order to avoid opposition-led popular revolt or a recurrence of a military coup after the aborted 1982 coup. The administration swiftly moved to effectively close all avenues for political expression by legally making Kenya a single-party state. The media was made out-of-reach for dissenting political views as the administration decreed that any political concerns be channeled through the only and ruling party, KANU.

The media houses that exercised independence in their editorial policy and dared to publish an iota of criticism of the regime's excesses were either proscribed or forced to unwind through phony tax charges and/or libel charges that would render them too broke to continue publishing. Journalists were arbitrarily arrested, detained and tortured for publishing what the Moi administration considered seditious. Even foreign journalists were deported. Sadly, even the academe was not spared and any writing or public lectures that could spark political activity among university students were proscribed under the pretext of preserving national peace and tranquility.<sup>16</sup>

Left with an unfettered national coverage, the state run KBC was the purveyor of the vile propagandistic epithets of the Moi regime against opposition politicians while sanitizing the administration with as much as more than three quarters of the news broadcast about the 'development' undertakings of the President and government functionaries. Most of such news items came from the Presidential Press Service (PPS) and the editors at KBC obligated to air it in its entirety (Kadhi & Rutten, 2001...p244).

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<sup>16</sup> See, for example, President Moi's address at a political rally in Nakuru in June 1982 in which he castigated some unnamed six lecturers for teaching politics of subversion. What followed was a series of arrests targeting university professors and their academic writings either confiscated or proscribed.

In this kind of environment, therefore, however persuasive the frames by the opposition would have been, there was absolutely no room for broadcasting such information to the people. The media was not free to lead in the agenda setting in Presidential politics. As such the strength of the frames or the persuasiveness of the opposition narrative could not influence political opinions in any way for the sheer volume of the regime propaganda outdid the little that came from the opposition. In sum, it is the regime's propaganda that was frequently repeated and was the loudest in the mass media thus exerting unmatched influence on the political opinions and by extension the Kenyan political culture.

#### **2.4 Pluralist Politics and Mass Media; the post 1991 era**

The reintroduction of political pluralism in Kenya led to liberalization of the Kenyan media space. There was an implosion of press freedom in the 1992 Presidential campaigns as opposition-allied magazines, newspapers and tabloids proliferated and began to publish reports about issues that would hitherto invite grave punishment from the regime. Majority of the publications were owned by politicians in the opposition (Nyanjom, 2013). As more media outlets proliferated, a new kind of bias in political coverage would begin to set foot as shareholders' financial interests became the new impediment to fair and balanced coverage of all Presidential aspirants. With KBC and KANU regime-owned *Kenya Times* newspaper under tight control of the administration, politicians with Presidential ambitions started their own media outlets to broadcast their political activities. Unable to sustain themselves, most of the publications withered out of business soon.

Political pluralism inevitably led to the expansion of civil liberties and liberalization of the economy thus widening of the space for private investment in media. As more and more privately owned media mushroomed from mid 1990s, competition grew for audiences and the public sphere within which citizens could express their opinions, frustrations,

ambitions and aspirations widened. Political content increased in the news media as politicians in both the opposition and the ruling parties competed for coverage. As political analysis grew into a fad in the newly established FM and TV stations, and weekend papers, Presidential politics and campaigns were effectively mediatized. Voters became increasingly reliant on privately owned media for political information due to fair coverage of political activities by both the ruling party and opposition parties.

The 2002 Presidential polls were conducted in a competitive media environment in which the ruling party KANU and united opposition led by Mwai Kibaki aggressively competed for votes. In this competitive media environment, the most persuasive frames win support from the voters. The opposition campaign frames were crafted around the failures of the Kenyatta and Moi regimes including economic stagnation, rampant corruption, wanton abuse of power and disrespect for civil liberties. Because these are issues that the electorate was familiar with, the frames easily struck chord with the populace and the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) won with a landslide.

In the Mwai Kibaki administration, Kenya experienced a burst in press freedom as the media became extremely critical of the government with increase in media diversity with massive private investments in vernacular FM stations which represent 51% of the radio stations on air (Mwanzia, 2009). The vernacular radio stations hold call-in talk shows, on topical political issues, in which even the less and/or un-educated and the rural communities are able to voice their opinions and contribute to debates on critical issues and are more informed on Presidential politics.

Through these stations, Presidential candidates have been able to spin news and target voters by use of specific messages, often loaded with ethnic overtones, intended to fire up their voter base so as to mobilize them to turn out and actively own the campaign process and eventually vote the candidate. It is through such targeted campaigns that Kenya had the

highest political activity at the 2005 constitutional referendum and 2007 general election.<sup>17</sup>

Vernacular stations have a high mobilizing capability as the targeted messages appeal to the emotions and souls of majority of the voters. Presidential politics being a struggle over control of the power to allocate state resources and because successive regimes have perfected patronage by rewarding ethnicities considered strategic in their power matrix and because ethnic groups would be preternaturally willing to share state resources equally, Presidential candidates have perfected the science and art of using vernacular stations to cement their ethnic support bases as a means for coalition building or winning elections. In a minimalist fashion, the candidates have harped on the fears of their ethnic bases to shore up intolerance toward other ethnic groups. It is through such intolerance that Kenya experienced the worst post poll violence in 2008. The complicity of vernacular stations in inciting political bases of Presidential candidates into ethnic conflict is evident in the indictment of vernacular radio journalist, Joshua Sang, by the International Crimes Court for criminal liability in the 2008 post Presidential poll violence.

In the following Presidential electoral cycle, the mass media in Kenya exercised extreme caution in their coverage of elections. The coverage of elections was only limited to what was considered as fortifying peace while somewhat deliberately neglecting its watchdog role over irregularities and mishandling of the elections by the electoral commission. This 'self-gagging' led to giving total media blackout to activities and concerns aired by other Presidential candidates and their supporters over vote malpractices. It is at this point that the new media and social media in particular served as a more reliable source of information on the political activities of all Presidential candidates.

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<sup>17</sup> Several joint initiatives by the civil society, government institutions like the electoral commission and the media were variously carried out in order to mobilize people to register as voters, carry out voter and civic education, and to mobilize a high voter turnout.

## **2.5 Mass Media and Election Coverage in Kenya**

The media supplies the electorate with important information and entertainment to the public, and is also a social forum for debate, exchange of ideas and creating a bandwagon effect. A free media is an important gauge for the legitimacy of elections and the state of elections in general (Makokha, 2010). The legitimacy of elections is not only manifest in the voting, but also in the media conditions under which such elections take place, whether both the voter and candidate are able to freely express their political opinions. Freedom of media and expression are an important concomitant of democratic elections, for it is through media that perceptions that guide political choices are built. Free speech shapes public opinion and influence elections that, in turn, determine the social climate and steer government. It is this freedom of expression that offers the voters a ‘marketplace of ideas’ from which they can arrive at better ideas for governance. Free speech therefore buttresses the legitimacy of a political system as election losers honorably accept their fates and remain loyal to the system.

The power of traditional media in Presidential elections primarily lies in its ability to disseminate information to a wide audience within a short space of time. News media thus exerts considerable power with regards to which issues, attributes and frames people consider important and relevant. According to Alger (1990), the coverage of elections is concerned with: 1) the game of strategy employed; and 2) the substance of elections. As a game of strategy, mass media tends to depict elections as a ‘horse-race’ where prominence is given to a candidate’s style in speech delivery and the techniques employed in geographic and demographic voter targeting, and the image of the candidate given the (in)formal positions they hold in the society. This centres the campaign on personalities thus giving the voter very little on the policy choices that the candidates have to offer. Election coverage that focuses on substance is centred on analytical coverage of elections in which prominence is given to the policy alternatives as presented in party or candidate manifesto.

Election coverage in Kenya has a mix of the two models albeit with prominence given to the strategies employed by the Presidential candidates. For instance, the political analyses of Presidential campaigns focus more on the viability of coalitions built along ethnic voting blocs than ideological convictions behind the formation of such coalitions. The dominant theme in the analyses is winning *vs.* losing, thereby decisively determining the choices that voters make through a bandwagon effect. The news frames shape the thinking and ultimate choices of the voter. The choice of the headline news item, for instance or the front page images of a political rally attended by huge crowds exerts considerable influences on the voter. Media bias, therefore, heavily influences the preferences, beliefs and choices of the individual voter. As writes McAllister (1992), the live coverage of important political events like rallies has made television the election itself.<sup>18</sup>

## **2.6 Mass Media and Campaign Advertising**

Each Presidential election cycle in Kenya has witnessed differing intensity of campaign adverts whose major aim is to sell the candidate and their agenda for the electorate. Just like in sales advertising, the candidate is carefully branded, packaged and presented to the voter as a product with the twin agenda of winning new support while retaining the old. Campaign teams use old media to give their candidate publicity and to build popularity in order to win. Here campaigns employ catch phrases and slogans which sum up the candidate's campaign narrative. For instance, Mwai Kibaki, the 2002 opposition candidate's campaign narrative that centred on constitutional reforms and reviving the economy was effectively summarized as *Mwenge* or burning torch implying his commitment to guide Kenya into a developmental state and to light 'the flame of freedom and liberty'.

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<sup>18</sup> Quoted in Haswell (1999)

Presidential campaigns spend big monies to advertise on TV, radio, newspapers and other publicity material such as posters, fliers, pamphlets, billboards, banners, wall paintings and writings, t-shirts and caps emblazoned with a candidates image and party colours. Publicity materials are designed to appeal to different segments of the voter population depending on their ethnicity, income levels, education or age. For instance, t-shirts, banners, caps and posters are effective in giving Presidential candidates an unrivalled visibility among low income earners while large advertisement billboards are preferred in middle income neighbourhoods in urban areas.

Campaign adverts are important in giving candidates an unrivalled visibility among the electorate. They are important in sparking political interests and Get-Out-The-Vote campaigns and educative to the public on how to cast their vote. These adverts are important in targeting voters and reaching out to the undecided voting blocs. Campaigns usually concentrate their adverts and publicity material in battleground areas. For instance, in 2013 Presidential elections, Nairobi city County was seen as a battleground for the frontrunners, Raila Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta campaign teams, that tried to outdo one another by concentrating campaign adverts on city FM stations and other campaign paraphernalia to increase visibility and saturate the public sphere with an aim of shoring up their support.

Campaign advertising on traditional media is done with dexterity by political parties and candidates through techniques that involve storytelling and carefully woven storylines that always show the voters that they are the ultimate bearers of the power of the supreme. These storylines capture the day-to-day struggles of the average voters and how much the candidate understands their struggles and will be instituting policy reforms to improve their standards of life. Given the first-past-the-post electoral system in Kenya, Presidential campaign is a zero-sum game intended to build loyalty through emotional appeals, political parties weave grand elaborate stories that capture the imaginations of the voter and give a

sense of history and importance to the future lives of the voter while at the same time questioning the credentials and the abilities of their opponents to achieve the same (or even higher) fete. Most of these stories are about injustices committed to the people in the past, the obstacles and the heroic deeds of the candidate in leading the struggle and triumph over them. These heroic deeds are always linked with the common man's struggles thereby giving a sense of concern about interests of the people.

Spending on adverts is a relatively new phenomenon in Kenyan politics. While it is a very effective way of sparking political interests in the people, it remains unreachable to under-funded candidates in an election. In 2007, for example, only the incumbent Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga were able to run campaign adverts on newspapers, radio and TV stations in Kenya because of they were sufficiently funded.<sup>19</sup> The campaigns adverts are usually designed by consultants and the campaign teams, thus making them a preserve of only well-oiled campaigns that are able to flood every available space with their publicity materials. Therefore, in politics money is speech for it is only a well-oiled campaign machine that is able to hire campaign staff and advertisement spots on mass media while the penniless politicians won't easily communicate.

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<sup>19</sup> There were no legal limits on campaign spending by Presidential candidates in 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007 and 2013 Presidential elections. A UNDP report on 2007 Presidential elections, *The Money Factor in Poll Race: A Monitoring Report of the 2007 General Elections*, indicates that Mwai Kibaki's PNU spent sh. 2.1billion on campaigns out of which 358million was spent on mass media advertising and publicity tools. Raila Odinga's ODM spent 1.2billion out of which 191million went to mass media advertising and publicity materials.



## **2.7 Conclusion**

Traditional media is a very powerful tool for mobilizing political support in Kenya. While state control limited the effectiveness of mass media in political mobilization under one party rule, the continued liberalization of the media space occasioned by the reintroduction of multiparty politics and technological advancement have made it easy for the opposition politicians to gain considerable airtime in the mass media. Use of alternative platforms of communication to market Presidential candidates has also grown exponentially in the recent past. While advertising on mass media remains unreachable to underfunded Presidential candidates, there has been a considerable expansion in the uptake of new media by the voters and politicians have considerably begun to use these platforms to reach voters. As the discussion turns to new media, the question that this dissertation will seek to answer in the following chapter is whether new media is altering resource dimensions in political mobilization in Presidential elections in Kenya. Is new media taking the place of mass media and is it making Presidential campaigns cheaper? Are there significant political payoffs?

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **NEW MEDIA AND COST OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS IN KENYA**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

A Presidential campaign is a communication process that usually involves application of three basic resources to accomplish - time, money and people. Aware that these economic resources are always scarce in a campaign and that they can come together in an unlimited number of permutations, managers in a Presidential campaign endeavour to select the best possible combination in order to use all three resources in the most efficient manner. In deciding the media to use for voter contact, Presidential campaigns settle on the medium with the lowest opportunity costs and that will result in the largest impact as seen in size of audience reached with least costs incurred to persuade target voters, identify supporters and turn out the vote.

Traditionally, voter targeting in Presidential campaigns in Kenya have been done through advertisements in the traditional media. The invention of new media and the ever increasing uptake of such communication tools by voters have necessitated their incorporation into Presidential campaigns in Kenya for purposes of voter contact and targeting. This chapter is concerned with assessment of the extent to which equalization thesis is applicable to Presidential campaigns in Kenya. The chapter draws conclusions from results of a survey research and interviews with former Presidential campaign strategists.

The chapter is organized into three sections. The first section looks at the political factors such as candidates' willingness to incorporate new media in campaign communications and legal-political rights and how such variable contribute to the growing popularity of new media in Presidential campaigns in Kenya. The second section looks at the

social factors and the link to the rise of new media in Kenya, and the final section will look at the economic factors and the logistical sustenance of new media in a Presidential campaign in Kenya.

### **3.2 Political Factors and New Media in Presidential Campaigns**

Presidential campaigns take place within a political system. The ideological predisposition of the state determines the media structure. The Kenyan media structure is modeled along liberalist-pluralist school<sup>20</sup> of thought with a deep belief in the freedom and independence of the media. Through citizen driven reporting and sharing, the new media plays an important role in the campaign process by constituting a source of information that is independent of the candidate or the government in place. In this sense, therefore, the new media is also one of the countervailing sources of information which prevent a disproportionate concentration of information among the elite thus presenting a counterbalance between the elite and the masses thereby giving possibilities for power change.

The transfer of the power of information to the citizens begins by the candidates' willingness to meaningfully incorporate new media tools in execution of voter mobilization strategies in their campaigns and the national legislations governing the use of new media for political campaign purposes. Kenyan laws do not inhibit the incorporation of such technologies in political campaigns. As argued a source at Raila Odinga campaign in 2013, the liberal political environment encourages candidates to use new media in campaigns freely without undue fear of recrimination by the state for perversion or illegal activities which would bring unbearable political costs to the candidate and slow down the gravitas of their

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<sup>20</sup> For a further reading on theories of the media, see Denis McQuail. 2010. Mass Communication Theory 6<sup>th</sup> ed.. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications.

campaigns.<sup>21</sup> The new media has, in many ways, helped democratize not only the dissemination of Presidential campaign news but the process of political discourse in Presidential campaigns in Kenya.

New media is thus a public arena in which all individuals can freely participate in campaign activities such as forwarding financial contributions toward campaign organization mostly done through mobile money services<sup>22</sup>, contact candidates or the campaign managers and mobilizing attendance to political events like rallies and voter turnout on voting day. This liberalization of the political space has therefore inadvertently encouraged participation in Presidential campaigns at the local level thus the new media has served as an effective tool for sparking political interest in the interested and disenchanted citizens. As such, more and more citizens involve in mainstream politics<sup>23</sup> by freely expressing their thoughts on new media and willfully asking their networks to join the cause. This is emphasized by the increasing number of females who admitted to engaging in politics through new media thus contributing to gender mainstreaming in Presidential election campaigns.

While the liberalization of the political space has enabled little known candidates to seize on the new media tools and effectively utilize them to mobilize support, resources and thereby make their candidacies an instant hit, the results of the survey in Kibra constituency show that majority of the voters were not influenced by the information on social media in deciding the Presidential candidate they voted for in 2013. Of the eighty three percent that admitted to have used new media for political purposes, a further sixty two percent contended that what is shared by the campaign pages and their peers on social media had no consequence on their political choices, but regarded that information as very rich in entertainment value [see tables 1, 2 and 3 in chapter four]. An often cited reason for this was

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<sup>21</sup> Interview done on June 1<sup>st</sup>, 2014 at Orange House.

<sup>22</sup> Mobile money service is where mobile phone users are able to send and receive money through the mobile handsets.

<sup>23</sup> Mainstream politics is party politics and campaigns done through constitutionally recognized modes of citizen participation in influencing public policy.

the contention that numerous social media accounts that post political information on social media are phony and that several non-starters have resorted to new media while they are not seriously competing for the presidency as was the case with John Wajackoyah and Kingwa Kamencu. A social media strategist for Uhuru Kenyatta's 2013 campaign agrees that candidates whose real intention is not to win, but to act as vote spoilers for other serious candidates resort to new media tools for execution of their intentions.<sup>24</sup> Whether such strategy succeed or not depends on how persuasive their frames on new media spaces are and how much information they distort to their advantage. Political liberalism therefore opens up the political sphere to the possibility of gross misrepresentation of facts about issues in the Presidential campaign and often leaves the old media as the reliable source of political information and news on Presidential campaigns in Kenya.

### **3.3 Social Factors and New Media in Presidential Campaigns**

Presidential campaigns take place in a social setting. An individual voter's social network is important in explaining how individuals develop a participatory political behavior in a Presidential election. Fundamental to the idea of participatory politics is the recognition of humans as social beings, embedded in friendship, interest, and identity-based networks. These networks are available for not only sharing information, but also calls for mobilization, the sharing of skills that help navigate campaigns, and facilitating political participation at reduced costs through technological advances. Networks built on new media platforms are a component of the social resources that are mobilized individually or collectively in Presidential campaigns to shore up support for a candidate.

In Presidential campaigns, the new media networks become an important political resource when campaign activists and managers find an issue of interest that motivates them

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<sup>24</sup> Interview at the Laico Hotel on 24<sup>th</sup> April, 2014.

to write about. The activists try to mobilize their social network for what they consider as an important political cause by sending e-mails or text messages that encourage members of their cohorts to act in the same way or in some instances update their statuses on Facebook or twitter and spark debates on the issue. In this interest driven digital social networks, there are norms, networks, and skills that members of the networks acquire which are a kind of social capital with the latent capacity for building a mass following and a bandwagon effect in a Presidential race. It is this capacity that Presidential election candidates tap into by employing new media professionals to run their digital campaigns by trying to build a wide following on Facebook and Twitter as much as possible. It is through such large fan bases that candidates are able to pass on their campaign message to potential voters with the single aim of winning their support. In the 2013 Presidential campaigns, Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga incorporated bloggers with large online following to run campaigns through new media in order to reach millions of voters within the shortest space of time.<sup>25</sup>

As alluded a source at Uhuru Kenyatta campaign headquarters in 2013, the campaign tried to maximize voter contact by operating a number of accounts in the candidate's name to concentrate candidate visibility in the digital sphere and to give ubiquity to their campaign message.<sup>26</sup> Through these numerous accounts, the campaign shared campaign videos which were not played in prime time news, pictures showing the candidate interacting with hoi polloi and in relaxed private life, and specialized campaign messages targeting a segment of the voter population. Through this strategy, Uhuru Kenyatta was able to successfully bypass broadcast and print media to reach potential voters through a YouTube channel that was used to share unfiltered videos of his campaign rallies, news conferences, adverts and targeted video messages to millions of followers who repeatedly shared the videos through their own social media networks until they became viral online. Through the viral sharing and trending,

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<sup>25</sup> Uhuru Kenyatta campaign hired such popular bloggers as Dennis Itumbi and Bogonko Bosire among others and Raila Odinga campaign had Robert Alai leading the online charge.

<sup>26</sup> Interview carried on 24<sup>th</sup> April, 2014 at Laico Hotel, Nairobi.

Uhuru Kenyatta's campaign found unrivalled utility of new media in spreading propaganda with the single aim of manipulating voters in their favour.

While the voters and campaign managers appreciate the power of new media in mobilizing for political support, there is a social barrier to effectiveness of new media in Presidential campaigns. Facebook is the most popular social network amongst Kenyan voters; its reach is limited to voters with at least some basic formal education, but remains more popular amongst youthful voters than the elderly voters. Voter targeting using new media is much easier when the targeted demographic group is the young voters of a specific ethnic and/or political suasion. Majority of voters contend that new media campaigns are primarily targeted at younger voters who incidentally are the bulk of the voters in Kenya and have the unmatched potential of swinging support in a candidates favour. As a campaign operative for Raila Odinga opines:

It was a deliberate tact for the ODM and later CORD in 2013 to hire younger campaign operatives with huge social media following to run online campaigns by packaging the candidate to appeal more to young first time voters who probably did not witness the struggle for multiparty in the early '90s and are only concerned about superficial things like the pictorial appeal of a poster design or whether such designs are in synchrony with the predominant pop culture to which their peers subscribe. In this regard, we hired popular youthful bloggers and high quality graphic designers and social media strategists based at our campaign headquarters.<sup>27</sup>

The cosmetic appearance in the graphic designs and the decision to trend them on social media is a testimony of the premium that Presidential campaigns attach to votes from the youth. While this may have paid off, it is clear from the results of the survey that much premium can only be attached to votes from urbane youth who are deemed to have little or no sentimental attachment to their ethnic groups.

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<sup>27</sup> Interview carried on Saturday June 7<sup>th</sup>, 2014 at the Imperial Hotel in Kisumu.

In conclusion, therefore, the utility of new media in campaigns lies in the networks that individual voters have and can use to spread political messages across such networks. When a particular aspect or issue in a Presidential election is made to trend, there is a value that accrues the campaign without necessarily having to spend an extra penny to individually contact voters. Through their new media friendships, voters are able to impel their networks into action at their own cost without necessarily being supported by the campaign managers thus the cost of building a winning majority through conscious or unconscious efforts from voters and activists lowers the resources the candidate would have spent in contacting voters. These social networks make campaigning cheaper in terms of the amount of time spent by campaigns to run personalized voter contact than it would have been the case with the old media. This can, however, be counterproductive when distortion of information has been deliberately orchestrated to malign a candidacy. The speed with which information travels via new media from one cohort to another is so uncontrollably fast that it would require a campaign to respond by devising information spinning strategy to counter such a charge.

### **3.4 Economic Factors and Logistical Sustenance of New Media in Presidential Campaigns**

From the foregoing, information on new media travels uncontrollably fast and is always raw and unfiltered. For the candidate, there is the advantage of economies of scale in the sense that the costs incurred in contacting as many as a million is the same as the cost of reaching just one voter on email, social media or internet-run bulk texting, and is more convenient than having to walk and mobilize attendance of political rallies, distribution of campaign paraphernalia, door-to-door campaigns or other forms of personalized voter contact.



The power of new media has enabled candidates to easily fundraise. The use of mobile money transfers by candidates in soliciting money to run campaign logistics has marked an important milestone in reducing costs of organizing fundraising events and risks associated with transferring hard cash contributed from such events. As noted by a source at the Raila Odinga campaign in 2013, it was a deliberate move by the campaign and the candidate to incorporate fundraising via mobile cash transfers in order to cash in from both the rich and poor with donation bills from as low as a hundred shillings. Such a strategy would make voters from across the economic spectrum feel part of the campaign and such ownership would be crucial for mobilizing a winning majority at the ballot.

While the new media has greatly reduced the costs incurred in voter contact and getting cash from donors, it is important to note that since the voters need connectivity to internet and the new media equipment, e.g. mobile handsets and computers, in order to enjoy the benefits of new media, this cost has been transferred to them. From the survey, two thirds of those polled in Kibra Constituency accessed internet through mobile phone handsets and 48% of them contend that accessing information has become more financially costly as compared to when such information is broadcast via old media like campaign paraphernalia whose costs are fully borne by the candidate.

However, it is important to note that while the new media has greatly reduced the cost of individualized voter contact, the overall cost of Presidential campaigns in Kenya has markedly increased in the 2007 and 2013 election cycles.<sup>28</sup> As admits a source at Uhuru Kenyatta 2013 campaign secretariat, the candidate heavily invested in new media campaign tools and hired new media communication experts and consultants who were paid salaries between sh. 200, 000 and sh. 1,800,000 per month<sup>29</sup> besides other campaign staff. In this

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<sup>28</sup> In 2007 the top two candidates Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga are estimated to have spent sh. 2.1B and 1.2B in their campaigns respectively (Coalition for Accountable Political Financing, 2008).

<sup>29</sup> *The Standard* newspaper 13<sup>th</sup> March, 2014 ran a story on how much new media consultants were paid by the Uhuru Kenyatta campaign.

way, the incorporation of new media seems to increase the cost of Presidential campaigns in Kenya and since only the big names<sup>30</sup> in Presidential politics could make reasonable impact in their new media campaigns, it also shows that the success of new media in a Presidential campaign in Kenya depends on how well-oiled a candidate is. Uhuru Kenyatta heavily invested in new media campaigns more than his opponents and this is what his 2013 campaign agents see as the source of his victory, other factors notwithstanding.

In an interesting revelation, the Finance Director at the Raila Odinga 2013 campaign admitted during an interview with the researcher that it was difficult to tell the exact amount the campaign had cost.

The campaign funds came from different sources. Most of the sources were the candidate's own networks some from as far as the United States of America and they were wired into different bank accounts. The ODM party has its own bank account which mainly received nomination fees from candidates for lower posts, but there was also the candidate's official Presidential campaign kitty and also the Coalition's secretariat had its own operations account.

Yet some donations in cash or kind were given directly to the candidate.<sup>31</sup>

Coincidentally, at the Uhuru Kenyatta campaign, no one could tell the exact amount that was spent as finances were managed by the group of very close aides and family members. The absence of a clear legal framework that required full disclosure on the Presidential campaign budgets, finances and other resources makes it difficult to tell exactly how much a Presidential campaign spent on new media.

In the final analysis, therefore, the incorporation of new media in Presidential campaigns does not reduce the overall financial cost of voter contact, but has instead resulted in an increase in the amounts Presidential campaigns spend on voter contact. From an on-looker's point of view, the Uhuru Kenyatta campaign invested more than Raila Odinga and Peter Kenneth in new media campaign tools and was more ruthless in applying these tools in

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<sup>30</sup> While seven out of the eight candidates in 2013 elections officially run campaign pages on social media, only seasoned politicians made meaningful impact on these media.

<sup>31</sup> Interview carried out at ODM party headquarters on May 30<sup>th</sup>, 2014

appealing to voters. Given that Uhuru Kenyatta is the son to Kenya's first president, Jomo Kenyatta and therefore has reliable political resources coupled with wealth<sup>32</sup>, the success of a new media campaign strategy in a Presidential campaign in Kenya tends to heavily rely on how seasoned a politician the candidate is and whether they command reliable sources of campaign finances which could be spent in the campaigns. Only the politically connected and well-oiled campaigns with the goodwill of the candidate enjoy the benefits of new media in their voter contact plans.

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<sup>32</sup> See for Example, Forbes Magazine on November 26<sup>th</sup>, 2011, Uhuru Kenyatta was ranked as the 26<sup>th</sup> richest person in Africa. [http://www.forbes.com/lists/2011/89/africa-billionaires-11\\_Uhuru-Kenyatta\\_FO2Q.html](http://www.forbes.com/lists/2011/89/africa-billionaires-11_Uhuru-Kenyatta_FO2Q.html) accessed on 17th July, 2014.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### NEW MEDIA AND EMERGING PATTERNS OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN KENYA

#### 4.1 Introduction

The Kenyan political superstructure has been in transition from the authoritarian edifices to democratic ideals since the re-introduction of pluralist politics in early 1990s. As transition progresses, there are attendant internal structural reforms which alter the balance of power and weaken the control of the state thereby offering an opportunity for the powerful elite to harness popular support to capture state power. As a society in which ethnic identity is the most important basis for identity, the elite have found convenience in mobilizing ethnic groups in competition for state power.

Since the re-introduction of multiparty elections in 1991, ethnically dominated political parties have been predominant in the Kenyan political landscape each electoral cycle. With little or no clear-cut variations in ideological and policy positions, political parties are distinguished from one another based on the personalities that lead them rather than the policies and programs they espouse. While this may be traced to the legacy of the ethnic client-patron politics entrenched by the first post colonial regime, ethnic political mobilization is perpetuated by reasons that could be broadly categorized as supply and demand within the political system. On the demand side are the readily available voters co-joined by a collective psychological and material desire to have *one of their own* in control of state power while on the supply side are their co-ethnic elite with sharp political entrepreneurial acumen with which they identify the opportunities in the transitional political system and turn ethnic identities their bases of political power.

As entrepreneurs, Presidential candidates activate ethnic bonds in the political arena on the basis of incentives that come in form of rewards that accrue a group when *one of their own* commands the executive power of the state. In this endeavour, the candidates take advantage of limited information that the voters hold and harp on the existing ethnic stereotypes by use of ethnic cues to guide voters towards a definite but favouring ethnic categorization. Under these conditions of severe informational constraints, candidates deliberately manipulate voter choices to their advantage by only giving information that will manipulate and endear voters to their course. Being a zero sum game, a Presidential campaign would employ every available tool of communication to gain competitive advantage over competitors.

This chapter is devoted to examining how Presidential campaigns use new media in voter targeting and mobilization of core ethnic bases. The chapter is organized into three sections. The first section is historical: it contextualizes ethnic political mobilization in Kenyan Presidential elections. The second section is evidential: drawing on the findings of the survey research, posts on the candidates' official social media feeds and interviews carried out, it shows that the public resources are desired by all voters and Presidential campaigns use new media to appeal to their core ethnic bases. The third section answers to the second hypothesis of this study and explains how new media engenders ethnic political mobilization in Kenya.

#### **4.2 Ethnic Voter Mobilization in Context**

Kenya is essentially a patronage democracy in which the political leadership is chosen through competitive elections and the state monopolizes access to opportunities for individual upward mobility, and elected officials have power to distribute the vast resources controlled by the state to voters on individual basis. Over the years since independence, Presidential

politics has assumed an ethnic mobilization pattern in which ethnic parties<sup>33</sup> have emerged as the most viable vehicles for capturing and consolidating state power. While the message that Presidential candidates send to the electorate is often laced with highlights of the policy issues that are considered salient, the frames chosen by the candidates in their delivery are often loaded with ethnic overtones intended to dichotomize the voters into us versus them and to appeal to the candidates' ethnic bases. Candidates, therefore, essentially rally voters around shared ethnic identities.

While other factors such as space (Rothchild, 1969) and ethnic administrative boundaries may have contributed to voters organizing into ethnic groupings in order to gain numerical advantage over other groupings against which they are in competition, the utility of political mobilization along ethnic lines cannot be gainsaid. As writes Lonsdale (1970: 628) ethnic mobilization began in the colonial era by a few educated Kenyans forming ethnic unions to lead the clamour for self-rule. The end of the clamor for independence opened new frontier for ethnic competition to control state power as the new administrative structure brought with it a new system of social stratification based on the elements of modernization (Bates, 1974) which ranked modern state jobs as highly prestigious due to the service value, high degree of responsibility, high income and better working conditions as compared to traditional roles.

For candidates in a Presidential race, traditional cultural networks based on a common ascriptive trait provide convenient channels to mobilize backers. As a multi-ethnic country where elected leaders have discretion over state-controlled resources, there tends to be a self-enforcing equilibrium of ethnic favouritism in Kenya, in which voters mainly target co-ethnic politicians for favours, and politicians mainly target co-ethnic voters (Chandra, 2004). Similarly, the dominant theses in the literature on ethnic politics characterize politicians as

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<sup>33</sup> An ethnic party is a political party or group of political parties that presents itself to the electorate as a champion of the interests of a particular ethnic category to the exclusion of others and the party makes such representation the central theme of its voter mobilization strategy (See Chandra, 2004 p.3).

representatives of the interests of their own ethnic communities in competition with other groups for control of valuable state-controlled resources and voters support them for both the material gains such as land, jobs and markets that accrue them (see for example Bates, 1974) and the psychological benefits of having “their own” in power (See for example; Horowitz 1985). With a first-past-the-post electoral system, the victor in the electoral game of a Presidential race in Kenya, in essence, is the most successful candidate in “mobilizing their own” by maximizing support from their bases and building winning multiethnic coalitions with other politicians, as illustrated by findings in the next section.

#### **4.3 New Media and Ethnic Voter Targeting in Presidential Campaigns**

Between 2000 and 2013, Kenya has had three Presidential election cycles. In each of the elections, there have been two main contenders: Mwai Kibaki vs. Uhuru Kenyatta in 2002; Mwai Kibaki vs. Raila Odinga in 2007; and Uhuru Kenyatta vs. Raila Odinga in 2013. In order to illustrate how ethnic vote targeting was variously done by the candidates, this study examined how much campaign time and resources the candidates allocated for their co-ethnics vs. allocations for campaigns across ethnic groups, the motivation for building coalitions with other political players and how salient ethnicity was in the new media strategies used in executing the voter mobilization.

A Presidential campaign is generally more successful in Kenya if it employs a strategy that will see the campaign spend a lion’s share of its time maximizing on turnout from the candidate’s ethnic support bases rather than harping on ideology, principle or candidate’s past development record. Prior to the 2002 Presidential polls, Mwai Kibaki’s party DP concentrated its political activities mainly in Central Kenya and parts of Rift Valley and Nairobi in which he enjoyed a good following that could be attributed to a substantial presence of Kikuyu inhabitants. Similarly between 2004 and 2006, Raila Odinga’s political

itinerary seemed to intensify presence in his native Luo Nyanza by numerous appearances at political rallies, church events and funerals, and engaging the Luo through vernacular radio stations with the sole view of consolidating the votes ahead of the 2007 Presidential polls.

As observes a source at Uhuru Kenyatta 2013 campaign, the launching pad for the 2013 campaign was the numerous campaign rallies guised as prayer rallies that were meant to consolidate the Kikuyu vote behind the candidate. The campaign begun by finding an issue around which to unite their ethnic group and the issue had to be an emotive one that would easily drive a wedge between the group and other ethnic groups thereby creating a dichotomy that is useful in a political contest. The candidate initially spent a lot of time in campaign rallies in his ethnic backyard to maximize his popularity. In this exercise, the vernacular radio stations were very useful and the new media was considered as counterproductive at this stage, as the source observes. In fact, the candidate limited posts on his official Facebook page to informing the public about his official duties as the Minister for Finance and the Deputy Prime Minister.

As the campaigns gained momentum, Uhuru Kenyatta then begun to expand the scope of his campaign communications with the voters as new media communication tools were officially incorporated to appeal to a wider audience. The initial target was to maximize voter registration among the ethnic Kikuyu so as to build a *tyranny of numbers*<sup>34</sup> that would give an easy sail into victory. Concurrently, the campaign was preoccupied by efforts at building ethnic coalitions with other politicians or candidates who had successfully mobilized their ethnic groups behind them. The natural target for Uhuru Kenyatta was William Ruto with whom they shared indictment at the International Crimes Court; a highly emotive issue that would mobilize their ethnic groups behind them and isolate the then frontrunner Raila Odinga

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<sup>34</sup> Tyranny of numbers is a phrase that was commonly used by Uhuru Kenyatta strategists ahead of the 2013 elections to build a narrative that the Uhuru/Ruto coalition had a necessary and sufficient kikuyu/kalenjin ethnic backing to win the Presidential race. See for example interview with Moses Kuria, *Daily Nation*, August 7<sup>th</sup>, 2014. <http://mobile.nation.co.ke/counties/Kuria-Ex-altar-boy-who-believes-money-makes-the-world-go-round/-/1950480/2411932/-/format/xhtml/-/gdax53/-/index.html>



from the vote rich Kalenjin and Kikuyu. The source at Uhuru Kenyatta 2013 campaign reveals that the campaign invested heavily in new media to gauge the initial public reaction and to build acceptance for the coalition among the users of new media by posting graphic designs of the duo in order to appeal to the young, urbane voters. It was on the basis of this acceptance and the apparent numerical advantage that the coalition of the two most populous communities in Kenya enjoy that the *jubilee* coalition was built, the coalition that eventually won the 2013 Presidential election.

For both Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga campaigns, new media was widely relied on to mobilize the candidates' ethnic support bases. Uhuru Kenyatta's *jubilee* coalition brought together The National Alliance (TNA) party whose membership is mainly the Agikuyu<sup>35</sup> and William Ruto's United Republican Party (URP) whose membership is primarily Kalenjin. To maximize turnout in their bases, Uhuru Kenyatta campaign used both new media and vernacular radio stations as was Raila Odinga. Each of their coalition partners individually reached out to their co-ethnics via discussions on community discussion fora on Facebook and targeted messages as status updates which fired up these bases then synergizing the individual support with their coalition partners and snowballing into a winning euphoria. In other instances, social media discussion fora like *Not Another Kikuyu President* provided a conducive platform for mobilizing communities against Uhuru Kenyatta by openly highlighting what is perceived as injustices and inequalities in regional development that came as a result of the leaderships of Jomo Kenyatta and Mwai Kibaki, both of Kikuyu ethnic extraction.

For Uhuru Kenyatta, the utility of new media lay in its ability to uncontrollably spread their campaign propaganda against a populist opponent, Raila Odinga. According to the source at Raila Odinga campaign, the *jubilee* coalition's vile propaganda was intended at

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<sup>35</sup> Agikuyu is a word used to collectively refer to kikuyu, Meru, Embu and the Mbeere communities that occupy the bases of Mt. Kenya.

stonewalling the Agikuyu and the Kalenjin voting blocs from Raila Odinga and making him appear as a vulnerable contender through 'stage-managed defections' thereby rendering him weaker in the contest. Towards the end of the campaigns, the Uhuru campaign concentrated its efforts at mobilizing a maximum turnout in their bases among the Agikuyu and the Kalenjin with the sole intention of winning the vote in the first round of Presidential voting.

For Raila Odinga, as was Mwai Kibaki in 2002, the fundamentals in ethnic mobilization were similar, but the execution was somewhat different. The candidate spent relatively little time in his home ethnic area during the campaign, but instead spent the bulk of the time courting out-groups, specifically those groups that did not have a candidate in the race and the cosmopolitan voting region of Nairobi. It is important to note that Raila Odinga's home ethnic group, the Luo, forms just about 0.8million voters and his 2013 running mate, Kalonzo Musyoka's, the Kamba, forms just about half a million voters, therefore not sufficiently large to serve as a winning coalition against the coalition of Agikuyu and Kalenjin that would jointly form about three million voters. With no ability to alter the strategic salience of ethnic categories in the course of the 2013 Presidential election campaigns, the Odinga-Musyoka coalition roped in politicians from smaller ethnic groups in an attempt to remain competitive and the coalition was christened a nationalist reform alliance meant to institute democracy and reforms in governance thus employing a strategy that looked more like persuasion than ruthlessly mobilizing to maximize turnout among core supporters. Despite its more persuasive ideological grounding, Raila Odinga's campaign could not win more votes than Uhuru Kenyatta's thereby confirming that the game in a Kenyan Presidential campaign is not what issues a party represents, but whom it represents. The numerical strength of ethnic coalitions determines the eventual winner.

In essence, the success of a candidate in Kenyan Presidential campaigns is determined by how much support the candidate is able to mobilize from his core support base. The

strategic importance of ethnic groups in determining the votes a candidate garners can only be complemented by the new media in keeping the voters polarized between the frontrunners, an important factor for building euphoria and creating a bandwagon effect to maximize turnout from core support bases.

#### **4.4 New Media and Factors of Voter Response to Ethnic Frames**

The study sought to find out the influence of ethnic frames on voter choices at the ballot. In seeking to know the influences, the study asked whether the information received on new media platforms influenced the voter choices at the 2013 ballot. There were 234 sampled voters from Kibra constituency. Factors of voter response such as age, levels of formal education and average monthly income are presented in the tables below. In the final analysis, the influence of new media on the voter choices at the 2013 elections in terms of reliability, information value and in effect the ultimate support for a Presidential candidate.

**Table 4.1: Frequency Distribution of Voters Exposure to New Media by Age**

Age	18-35	36-50	51-65	Over 65	TOTAL
Exposure to New Media	114	72	7	1	194

**Source: Field Survey June 2014**

Out of the 234 sampled respondents, 54 percent were male while 46 percent were female. The study found out that majority of the users of new media fall in the age bracket of 18-35 years representing 48.7% of the total sample. This indicates that new media is mostly used by youthful voters in Kenya. The percentage of users that fall in the age bracket 36-50 years represents 37.1% of the total sample. From the survey results, it can be deduced that the older the voter population is, the lower the voter exposure to new media. The popularity of

new media among the youthful voters is attributable to the introduction of such communication technologies and their incorporation in the formal education curricula Kenya institutions of learning.

**Table 4.2: Percentage Frequency Distribution of Voter Response to New Media by Education Levels**

Highest Level of Education	None	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	TOTAL
Exposure to New Media	2	26	34	38	100

**Source: Field Survey June 2014**

From the survey results, we can also correlate the exposure to new media to levels of education. As indicated in the frequency distribution table 4.2, the higher the education levels, the more the exposure to new media. It is imperative to note that the number of voters with as low as primary school level education who are actively users of social media communication tools are statistically significant as to make a difference in the outcome of the Presidential vote if the numbers are extrapolated to the whole universe of total number of registered voters in Kenya.

As indicated in the trends in the uptake of new media tools (see, for example Ncube, Lufumpa & Kayizzi-Muregwa, 2011), the demands for new media products continue to expand due to the integration of important aspects of life including communication, financial transactions and access to internet in mobile handset devices. With increasing literacy levels as a result of free primary, subsidized high school education and expanding opportunities for college education in Kenya, new media is likely to be a useful arena for voter contact in future Presidential elections.

**Table 4.3: Percentage Frequency Distribution of Voter Response to New Media by Monthly Income**

Average Monthly Income	<20 000	20000 - 49999	50000 – 99999	Over 100000	TOTAL
% Voter Exposure to New Media	38	32	21	9	100

**Source: Field Survey June 2014**

From the results of the survey, voter exposure to new media communication tools seems to be highest in middle income voters. However the high response numbers among those earning below Ksh. 20,000 per month seems to correspond to the general economic endowment levels of the residents of Kibra constituency as characterized by the informal settlements in the area and lack of other basic tools of communication other than new media tools like mobile phones which are often relied on as a source of information. As such, new media is a potent means of voter contact with low income populations for a Presidential campaign and can be quite effective in GOTV campaigns.

In terms of voter response to the frames posted on new media by different Presidential campaign teams, the study sought to gauge how such frames influenced the voter decision in the 2013 Presidential polls. The sampled respondents were asked to rate how much the information about Presidential candidates they found on new media shaped their decisions in terms of how much they were informative, reliable and influential on a scale of 1-10. Using Likert Scales generated using SPSS for each variable, the median for each was generated and summative analysis for the ordinal data was generated.

From the generated results, it was found that the median measure for reliability of information on new media was 1.4, for informative was 2.42 and for influence was 3.3. In the foregoing, it can be deduced that voters respond more positively to ethnic frames on new

media. The information that is available on new media is regarded as somewhat reliable. Since the median for the three variables tend toward the middle of the scale used [1-5] and their average is 2.37, which lies at the lower half, a generalization could be reached that while new media is not building a new trend for political mobilization in a Presidential campaign in Kenya, the new media remains a powerful tool for reaching out to a candidate's core ethnic support bases. From a content analysis of a litany of responses to ethnically targeted campaign messages posted on new media networks by the candidates in 2013, it is clear that Kenyan voters respond more positively to campaign messages loaded with ethnic frames with an unmatched intensity either for or against the candidate.

New media is therefore important in a Presidential campaign in so far as the retention of a candidate's core support base is and in maximizing turnouts from these bases using ethnically targeted GOTV campaigns. In essence, majority of Kenyan voters respond positively to ethnic frames in a Presidential election campaign and the success of a candidacy squarely depends on how ruthlessly the campaign employs the new media communication tools in consolidating their ethnic support bases.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

This chapter summarizes this study by specifically responding to four tasks. The first task is the recapitulation of the core objectives of this study; evaluating the extent to which each task has been met. The second task is to recap on the hypothesis of the study. The third task is to anchor the conclusion of this study by firming up its central theses and finally to offer recommendations for incorporating new media as a campaign strategy in a Presidential campaign in Kenya.

#### **5.2 The Influence of New Media in Presidential Campaigns**

Presidential campaigns in Kenya heavily rely on mobilization as a central strategy for winning. As the uptake of new media communication tools keeps rising among Kenyan voters, therein lies an opportunity for Presidential candidates to use such media of communication in their voter contact plans. The influence of the new media in a Presidential campaign cannot be overstated. This influence can be seen in the willingness by the candidates to incorporate the new media tools for mobilization purposes in the course of the Presidential campaigns and the debates that take place on these media.

To the extent that users of new media can use these platforms to freely engage in discussions about Presidential elections and candidates, the new media has markedly contributed to the widening of the public sphere and liberalization of the political space which in turn deepen democracy in Kenya. It is from such freedom of expression, debates and discussions that political interests are sparked.

In some instances, new media tools have been successfully used in polarizing voters in order to stone-wall support bases and in Get-Out-The-Vote campaigns to maximize turnouts. Since Presidential campaign is a zero-sum game, it is deeply rooted in *realpolitik* and must therefore readily employ all the legally acceptable tools of ruthlessness in order to swing votes in their favour. It is only through ruthless application of new media in Presidential campaign activities that will make a difference in a Presidential campaign in Kenya. The difference could only come in the form of mobilization for a favourable turnout from traditional bases. In a close race, this would make the difference between a win and a loss.

### **5.3 (a) New Media and the Factors of Cost of Political Mobilization**

In a Presidential campaign, the costs come in three facets; political, social and the financial. In a liberal democracy in which citizens are free to air their political opinions, express their intentions to lead in political capacities and canvass for support without undue interference from the state, the losses associated with participation in political processes greatly reduce. Coupled with the social ties that are built on new media, there is the benefit of convenience in using new media in a Presidential campaign.

In terms of the financial costs incurred in using new media a Presidential campaign, the incorporation of new media in political campaigns has led to a sharp increase in the amounts spent on campaigns. The costs of acquiring the new media, the operational costs including the amounts spent on the new media marketers drives the overall cost of a Presidential campaign high. In a comparative sense, in the 2007 and 2013 Presidential elections in which new media tools were widely used by the frontrunners, the total financial



costs incurred by these candidates were estimated at more than 1.2 billion shillings.<sup>36</sup> The implication for campaign planning, organizing and running a Presidential campaign is that the financial costs involved increase in case a Presidential campaign has to incorporate new media in its voter contact plan. As a matter of fact, only the well funded Presidential campaigns are able to fully maximize the benefits of the new media.

### **(b) New Media and Ethnic Political Mobilization**

In Kenya, like most Sub-Saharan African countries, ethnic identity is essentially the basis for political identity and mobilization. The re-introduction of pluralist politics led to a shift in the balance of internal power as new hegemonies began to establish in a Neo-Gramscian sense of mobilization co-ethnics and co-optation of friendly ethnic groups. This gave prominence to ethnic dominated political parties.

While it could be concluded that new media lead to a multiethnic approach to mobilization in a Presidential election due to its widespread usage among the schooled, empirical evidence shows that political mobilization still fundamentally proceeds on an ethnic template and that it is the level of ruthlessness with which a candidate mobilizes their core ethnic bases that would give victory. These strategies have led to an increase in degree of participation in political activities and voter turnout, thus deepening democracy. As such, Kenya has grown into an ethnic-multiparty state rather than an ideological multiparty state. As argues Hickman (1995), ethnic identities in African politics lead to significant liberalization and democratization since this kind of identity is instrumental rather than primordial.

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<sup>36</sup> See for example, Mwaura Kimani and Christine Mungai, "Campaign finance: Price tag of Kenya 2012 Presidential race likely to hit \$130 million." *The East African*, February 5<sup>th</sup>, 2012 accessed on 18/08/2014 via <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Campaign+finance++Price+tag+of+Kenya+2012+Presidential+race/-/2558/1320582/-/vs3x00/-/index.html>. See also Report by the Coalition for Accountable Political Financing on the 2007 Presidential Election Campaign Finances accessed on 14/04/2014 via <http://capf.or.ke/document/CAPF%202007%20Election%20Campaign%20Finance%20Report.pdf>

While several scholars<sup>37</sup> have advanced the argument that ethnic identities slow the process of democratization in Africa in the minimalist sense of exclusion from access to opportunities for advancement based on one's ethnicity, it is important to note that the democracy needs to be conceptualized in a holistic sense to encompass rule of law, levels of political awareness and freedoms to freely take part in economic and political processes including voting, debating and freely expressing one's political opinions (Freedom House, 2012; Munck & Verkuilen, 2002). On this score, ethnic political mobilization has played a key role and new media has been quite instrumental in deepening liberalism and democratic practice in Kenya. In the words of Chabal (1992), 'there is nothing specifically African about politics in Africa.' Ethnicity, as a basis of political identity and mobilization is not unique to Kenya, but is a global feature in Presidential campaigns even in developed countries.

#### **5.4 Recapitulation of the Hypotheses**

This study was guided by the general hypothesis that the use of new media in a Presidential campaign increases support. The operational hypotheses for the study were: 1) new media reduces the cost of political mobilization in Kenya; and 2) new media is changing the patterns of mobilization in Presidential campaigns in Kenya. The general hypothesis is appended on the personalized contact that the candidate is able to have with millions of voters over a vast geographical area within a very short time.

The first and second operational hypothesis is therefore a subset of the general. The former is premised on the assumption that the cost of contacting as many as one billion voters in a personalized manner has greatly been reduced when such contacts are made via new media, for instance, emails or mobile phone texts. Further, in a liberalized political environment it is tenable for a Presidential campaign to use new media in contacting voters

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<sup>37</sup> See for example Bayart, J. F. (2009). *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly*. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor: Wiley Publishers.

without facing political risks that a closed regime would always subject politicians with dissenting viewpoints to and at times helping in avoid the logistical hitches associated with organizing face-to-face voter contact plan. From a social ties point of view, the new media is effective in assisting a candidate known and mobilizing voters based on the virtual friendships developed over these networks. However, from the findings of the study, it can be shown that the incorporation of new media in a Presidential campaign only pushes up the cost of campaigns and only the well oiled campaigns can effectually benefit from new media. The study also shows that the utility of new media is only as far as making a candidate known and not in any way building popularity.

Empirically a Presidential candidate's popularity is seen in terms of the number of votes garnered at the ballot. While many candidates may be so actively engaged in discussions over new media platforms, their popularity may be too low that it remains negligible. For instance, during the 2013 Presidential election campaigns, Peter Kenneth garnered a paltry 87,000 votes against a social media following that exceeded 200,000 people. A possible explanation to this could be that majority of his fans were not registered voters or did not turn up to vote, but the more convincing thesis would be that social media fan base does not automatically translate into votes on the polling day.

What this means for Presidential campaigns is that the Kenyan political culture is only alive to voter mobilization along ethnic lines and any deviation from this fundamental truth would only result in humiliating defeat. While Peter Kenneth tried to build an ethnically broad-based following, his campaign did not concentrate on adopting a bottom-up approach that his opponents Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga ruthlessly employed to consolidate their ethnic groups and built coalitions with other ethnic blocs and thus ended up as formidable contenders. New media, therefore, plays a crucial role in the furtherance of ethnic mobilization strategies.

While the Political Parties Act (2011) provides that all political parties must have broad based ethnic membership with membership in majority of the forty seven counties, the reality dictated by the Kenyan political culture is that for any political party, there has to be an ethnic group with a predominant membership. It is that predominant group that is the lifeblood of the party and the basis on which pre-election coalitions are crafted to build a formidable election vehicle.

### **5.5 Conclusion and Recommendation**

This study has examined the influence of new media in Presidential campaigns in Kenya. It began by tracing the history of media in political mobilization in Kenya from the activities of anti-colonialist movement through the reinvention of multiparty politics and the era of existence of numerous vernacular radio stations. The central thesis of the study was that new media increases political participation in a Presidential election campaign and was guided by two hypotheses: 1) that new media reduces cost of political mobilization and; 2) that new media introduces new patterns of voter mobilization.

From the findings of the study, it can be concluded that indeed the new media does increase the levels of political participation in Presidential elections in Kenya. It is through new media that voters can freely exercise their freedoms of speech, opinion and expressions in an election with little regard to their economic or social statuses. As such new media is an important contributory factor to the deepening of democracy and liberalism in Kenya.

In the Presidential campaign parlance, new media increases the financial costs involved in campaigns. While it may be helpful in making a long-shot candidacy popular, the ultimate prize can only be won when a campaign effectively raises funds and spends in acquiring the new media tools for campaigns and hiring a dedicated staff to run campaigns on

new media. The new media campaign tools therefore make Presidential campaigns more expensive to adopt new media in the campaign voter contact plan.

As for ethnic mobilization, new media is used in the furtherance of mobilization of voters along ethnic lines. The fundamentals of ethnic political identity and mobilization remain intact, but the new media plays a key role in targeting voters based on the psychological and material urges that push people to freely support their co-ethnics in the Presidential polls. A mobilization strategy that deviates from this fundamental will have only dismal results to show as can be seen in the votes that Peter Kenneth won in 2013.

The study therefore makes the following recommendations:

1. To organizers of Presidential campaigns:
  - a) Since ethnicity is salient in political mobilization in Kenya, maximization of voter turnout from the candidate's own ethnic base and the bases of members of their party or coalition could be the difference between winning and losing in a Presidential contest. Through a ruthless application of new media tools, a campaign can successfully build candidate popularity, intensify voter polarity by use of bunkum and successfully mobilize turnouts through targeted GOTV campaigns.
  - b) While new media tools can be effective in mobilization of funds and cost less when contacting an extra voter, their incorporation in a Presidential campaign will require a larger financial outlay for the campaign. This calls for a more aggressive campaign fundraising in order to enable a campaign to take full advantage of the new media tools in a Presidential campaign. However, success here again depends on how much the campaign is professionally disciplined.
2. To researchers: Further research on the influence of new media in Presidential campaigns in Kenya is highly recommended in the future to falsify the findings of this research.

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix I: Survey Questionnaire

Hi. My name is . I am from the Department of Political Science, UoN and am conducting a survey research on New Media and Political Mobilization in Kenya for my MA coursework. I request that you allow me to take 20 minutes of your time. Your identity will be kept anonymous and we will really appreciate if you can answer in a truthful way.

<b>Part A: General Information</b>	
Date of Interview	
Ward	
Participant No.	
<b>Part B: General Demographics</b>	
1. Gender	i. Male ii. Female
2. Age	i. 18-35 <input type="checkbox"/> ii. 36-50 <input type="checkbox"/>
	iii. 51-65 <input type="checkbox"/> iv. Over 65 <input type="checkbox"/>
3. Marital Status	[1] Single [2] Married [3] Divorced/Separated [4] Widowed [5] Cohabiting

4. Highest level of Education attained	[1] None [2] Primary [3] Secondary [4] College/Tertiary [5] Graduate [6] Post Graduate
5. Occupation	[1] Student [2] Self Employed [3] Employed [4] None
<b>Part C: Economic Proxies and Exposure to New Media</b>	
6. What is your overall monthly personal income? [ksh.]	[1] Under 20,000                      [2] 20,000-49,999 [3] 50,000-99,999                      [4] Over 100,000
7. Do you own any of the following:	[1] Television                              [2] Radio [3] Mobile phone                              [4] Computer
8. Do you use internet?	[1] Yes [2] No
9. How do you access it (internet)?	[1] Computer [2] Mobile phone
10. How frequent do you use the internet?	[1] Several times a day [2] Once a week [3] 2 to 3 times a week [4] Once a month [5] Never

<p>11. How much do you spend daily to access the internet from your phone or modem?</p>	<p>[1] 0 - 99 [2] 100 - 200 [3] 201 - 500 [4] Above 500</p>
<p>12. I) Do you use social media?  II) If yes which one(s)?</p>	<p>[1] Yes                      [2] No  a) Facebook b) Twitter c) Youtube</p>
<p>13. How often do you use social media?</p>	<p>[1] Daily [2] Weekly [3] Once a month</p>
<p>14. Do you find the information on social media... [mark on the scale, where 1 is not reliable at all and 5 is very reliable]</p>	<p>[ 1] Reliable                      [0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [2] Informative                      [0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [3] Influential                      [0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]</p>
<p>15. Did the information you received from social media determine your choice of Presidential candidate at the 2013 election?</p>	<p>[1] Yes [2] No</p>
<p>16. Would you say social media made you vote for the Presidential candidate from same ethnic group as yours?</p>	

## Appendix II: Interview Guide

1. What was your level of engagement in the campaigns?
2. What mobilization strategies did you employ, generally?
3. Which strategy did you consider the most effective?
4. What's your own understanding of the new media?
5. Since Presidential campaigns are run by hired professionals, how much did your candidate understand and regard the new media as important in the campaigns?
6. What forms of new media did you employ?
7. Which was the most effective?
8. Is there a particular voter group you targeted using new media in terms of:
  - a) Age
  - b) Ethnicity
9. How would you compare the success of such targeting using new media to old media?
10. And in your opinion, how did new media change the campaign landscape in terms of:
  - a) Costs
  - b) Efficiency
11. Would you attribute your candidate's failure/success to new media?
12. In your own rating, who among Raila Odinga, Peter Kenneth and Uhuru Kenyatta used new media more effectively in the 2013 Presidential campaigns?
13. Going forward, what can be done to make new media more effective in Presidential campaigns in Kenya?