UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

INSTABILITY IN SOMALIA AND ITS IMPACT ON REGIONAL SECURITY: A CASE STUDY OF KENYA AND ETHIOPIA

BONIFACE NDUVA MWILU

REG NUMBER: R50/75922/2014

SUPERVISOR:

DR. KIZITO SABALA

A project presented in partial fulfilment of a degree in Masters of Arts in International Studies, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi.

2015

DECLARATION

This is my original project and has not been presented for a Diploma or Degree to any other University.

....

Boniface Nduva Mwilu   **Date**

REG. No. R5075922/2014

This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor

....

Dr. Kizito Sabala   **Date**

(Lecturer IDIS)

University of Nairobi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

It is with pleasure that I acknowledge my supervisor Dr. Kizito Sabala for his guidance and direction through-out this project. I would also wish to acknowledge the assistance accorded by the National Defence College in conjunction with Nairobi University for the providing me with a conducive studying environment.

So many thanks to my colleagues at National Deference College, and those at my place of work for moral and material support.

Finally, special thanks to my family for understanding and support during the entire period.

TABLE OF CONTENT

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIAI   - AL Ittihad Al Islamiyya

AS   - Al Shabaab

ATPU   - Anti Terrorist Police Unit

AU   - African Union

CIA   - Central Intelligence Agency

EAC   - East African Community

FGS   - Federal Government of Somalia

GOS   - Government Of Somali

ICU   - Islamic Courts Union

IGAD   - Intergovernmental Authority on Development

ITERATE   - International Terrorism Attributes of Terrorist Events

NGO   - Non Governmental Organizations

NIS   - National Intelligence Services

SALW   - Small Arms and Light Weapons

SNA   - Somali National Army

SNM   - Somali National Movement

TFG   - Transitional Federal Government

UDUB   - United People's Democratic Party

UN   - United Nations

UNHCR   - United Nation High Commission for Refugees

UNHCR   - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNOSOM   - United Nation Mission for Somalia

US   - United States

USSR   - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

ABSTRACT

Somalia is one of the nations that has struggled and still does today in order to function well. It is one of these rare places where there is ongoing civil war and it has no central government. The Somali conflict was initially triggered by the dictatorial tendencies of the Mohammed Siad Barre regime in 1991. Subsequently, the conflict has become destructive with negative consequences for the country's moral social fibre, as is manifested by die wanton killing of innocent people, particularly women and children. The overall objective of the study aims to look for linkages between instability in Somalia and its effects on Kenyan and Ethiopian security situation. This study aimed to contribute to scholarly material on effective management of trans-border insecurity in Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia, which will strengthen intelligence information, security skills enhancements and understanding proper border management key stakeholders.

The study employed Realism theory. A key concept under realism is the international distribution of power referred to as system polarity. The conflict in Somalia has continued for over 20 years, amidst several attempts to mitigate the situation. This has caused Somalia to top Foreign Policy's Failed State Index from 2008 through 2011. The research adopted Case study design. The study used probability method to come up with the sample population. A population is defined as a complete set of individuals with some common observable characteristics. The study applied both primary and secondary data collection techniques.

The final results were presented in form of narrative, pie chart, bar graph and frequency tables. The analysed data was presented in both qualitative and quantitative manner. The study reveals that clannism was the main cause of Somalia collapse – they reveal that most of the fights have been over resources such as land and water, which were seen as fundamental resources to survive. The study found that exacerbates the conflict over resources is the harsh famines that happen throughout most of Somalia.

The study also concludes that competition over new and growing urban settlements is a more immediate driver of conflict in the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia border area. The study recommends regional countries need to shade of their national interests and assist Somalia to come out of instability. Border security has been neglected by the regional states and needs to be boosted and enhanced.

MAP OF THE STUDY AREA (Somalia/Kenya/Ethiopia)

Source: Masibo (2010)

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.0   Introduction

This section is where the study creates the initial impression of the work. The study has looked at the problem globally and narrowed it down to the region, then country and finally local area; giving a clear narrative of the problem associated with instability in Somalia and its overall impact security in the region especially Kenya and Ethiopia.

1.1   Background to the Research Problem

The instability in Somalia has caused the region a tremendous effect to the point that countries within the Horn and East Africa Region will have to deal with its impact on regional security for quite a long time to come. The continued instability and incessant conflicts in Somalia will continue to pose security challenge in the neighbouring states. The Somalia problem has created a conflict system in the region which poses a security challenge to the entire area.

Somalia descended into the state of anarchy in 1991 after the fall of President Siad Barre. Since then there have been more than fifteen attempts through which the people of Somalia and the international community have tried to establish a government in Somalia from the rabble the country has witnessed. Yet in all these attempts, no new government has survived a good deal of time to establish a durable structure of governance for a unified country. Instead, more and new militia factions have been sprouting and engaging each other in a civil war in controlling their tuffs and possibly the whole country.[1]

---

[1] Masibo, Moses; *The Political Impact of the Instability of Somalia to the Horn and East Africa*. Missouri State University Press, United States of America, (2010), p 2.

Somalia is an extremely fragile state, in a situation of prolonged crisis characterised by intermittent conflicts and armed violence, structural and deep-rooted poverty and a high dependency on external humanitarian assistance and diaspora remittances. During entire period of incessant instability most Somali people lived under clans in societies without rulers, a system broadly termed as pastoral democracies where Somali society was segmented along lineages, clan family, sub clans and sub sub-clan.[2] This trend has reflected and manifested itself into the current society which has contributed to present instability in the Horn of Africa earliest democracy. The repercussions of the Somalia state of affairs have not just internally displaced its people and caused many deaths, but also poses dire consequences to other neighbouring countries in the Horn and East Africa region as a whole, particularly in Kenya and Ethiopia.

Bihuzoh[3] states that chronic instability along the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia border zone is part of a larger pattern of state failure, lawlessness, and communal violence afflicting the Kenyan border areas from Uganda to Somalia, frequently described as "not peace not war." Local communities suffer levels of insecurity, displacement and casualties akin to civil war, but in a context of sporadic, low-intensity communal clashes punctuated by periods of uneasy peace. The same security situation is replicated in the Horn of Africa region notably Ethiopia which also shares a large porous border with Somalia. The instability in Somalia and cross-border incursions is cause to worry for governments in the neighbouring countries which have to deal with threats to national security emanating from Somalia.

The relationship Kenya and Somalia has been tenuous. Kenyans believe that the Somalia conflict and the state of affairs in that country is responsible for the increased crime in the North

---

[2] CIA. *The World's Facts Book*, Central Intelligence Agency, United States of America (2009).
[3] Bihuzo, Rigobert; *Unfinished Business, Framework for Peace in the Great Lakes Region*, African Center for Strategic Studies, African Security Brief Press, Dakar, (2012) No1. p. 21.

Eastern province of Kenya and in a suburb of Nairobi called Eastleigh and the coastal areas of Kenya notably Mombasa; the second largest town in Kenya. Eastleigh like the North East Region of Kenya is inhabited mostly by people of the Somali descent. Eastleigh in Nairobi is referred to as "little Mogadishu"[4] and is where most Somali refugees settle and also is home to many Somalis who are Kenyan citizens. It is here where they engage in various and suspicious activities like trade and business which comes with illicit deals.[5]

Masibo[6] states that Ethiopia has also faced turbulent skirmishes with Somali militia groups who have continuously been launching rockets and other forms of attacks within its borders. These instances led Ethiopia to invade and fight the militant groups right inside Somalia. This was not the only reason but at least a major one to show that instability in Somalia is a time bomb waiting to explode in the region.

The recent intervention activities by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISON) soldiers were necessitated by continued instability in Somalia which is becoming dire every day. The situation calls for an urgent and strategic African and international solution to mitigate the deteriorating state of affairs in Somalia. Otherwise, Somalia is increasing harboring terrorist elements that may continue to unleash the worst ever attacks in the region and possibly to other parts of the world. Al Shabaab terror group is domiciled in Somalia and has operatives in Kenya, Ethiopia and indeed the entire region. Already piracy is becoming a nightmare and the international community is proving incapable in addressing the piracy problem.[7]

Distinguishing characteristics of the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia border areas include: the complete absence of a state counterpart on the Somalia side of the border; the existence of more

---

[4] In reference to the capital of Somalia-Mogadishu and since it is in Kenya and smaller they called it little.
[5] Masibo, Moses; *The Political Impact of the Instability of Somalia to the Horn and East Africa*. Missouri State University, United States (2010), p 2.
[6] Ibid, pp 2-3.
[7] Ibid, pp 3-4.

robust forms of local, informal governance and conflict management than anywhere else in Kenya's border regions; the rise of vibrant trade of commercial goods most of them contrabands, cross-border insecurity involving weapons smuggling and cattle rustling; and the dominance of a single ethnic group (the Somalia). Somalia State collapse has had its toll on security situation in the East Africa and Horn of Africa regions. Kenya has been at the epicentre of different insecurity episodes associated with collapse of Somalia. Kenya has borne several cases of runaway insecurity most from across the border with Somalia. Terrorism and radicalisation cases are on the rise whereas movement of small light weapons arms have increased in the region with Kenya and Ethiopia suffering the effect the most. Young people have crossed over from Kenya to fight the ideological war associated with Al Shabaab and Al Qaida. The same groups hardened by fighting in Somalia find their back to the originating countries and form a pool of goons for hire, a phenomenon too hard to deal with by security agencies.[8]

1.2   Statement of the Research Problem

The Somali conflict was initially triggered by the dictatorial tendencies of the Mohammed Siad Barre regime which abruptly ended in 1991. Subsequently, the conflict has become destructive with negative consequences for the country's moral social fibre, as is manifested by die wanton killing of innocent people, particularly women and children. Lately, the conflict has intensified with new actors emerging; complicating mediation process because of die ever changing issues driving it.

A significant portion of Somalia remains unable to break free of the lethal cocktail of armed conflicts, violent crime, extremism, communal violence, political instability, and state failure that has plagued the region for decades. Most of Somalia's armed conflict and instability today are concentrated near border areas that pose a major risk of spill-over of crimes which

---

[8] Lecture at National Defence College by Director, Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Kenya, May 2015.

features powerful cross-border drivers, interests, and actors. However, few regional states have the capacity to effectively administer their remote, expansive porous border areas. As a result, much trans-border conflict management and prevention falls on the shoulders of local communities and local authorities, in partnership with governments and interstate organizations.

Kenya and Ethiopia shares longest permeable border with Somalia mostly unmanned which has led to cross-border insecurity and incursions in both countries all closely linked to lawlessness in Somalia. The most vicious and common crimes in Kenya and Ethiopia are terrorist attacks, livestock thefts, inter/intra communal conflicts, clan skirmishes, illegal immigrants, human smuggling, drug trafficking, trafficking of arms, kidnapping, abductions, extortion, piracy and lately poaching which are all correlated and linked to skirmishes in Somalia. All these threats to security are compounded by presence of illegal small arms most of them proliferated from conflict systems in Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Regions. It is for these reasons that the study aimed to investigate the instability in Somalia and its impact on regional security, with a sharp focus on Kenya and Ethiopia - with the aim of finding possible solutions.

1.3   Objectives of the Study

The overall objective of the study aims to look for linkages between instability in Somalia and its effects on Kenyan and Ethiopian security situation. The study was guided by the following specific objectives;

i.   To analyse contributing factors to the collapse of Somalia State and the continued instability in the Country.

ii.   To examine the relationship between instability in Somalia and the cross-border insecurity in Kenya and Ethiopia.

iii.   To identify the actors that promote (in)stability in Somalia and the cross-border insecurity in Kenya and Ethiopia.

iv.   To explore whether there are linkages between Al Shabaab terror group operating in Somalia and terrorist activities in Kenya and Ethiopia.

1.4   Research Questions

i.   What are the contributing factors to the collapse of Somalia State and continued instability in the Country?

ii.   What is the relationship between instability in Somalia and the cross-border insecurity in Kenya and Ethiopia?

iii.   Who are the actors that promote (in)stability in Somalia and the cross-border insecurity in Kenya and Ethiopia?

iv.   Does an Al Shabaab terror group operating in Somalia have any linkage between them and terrorism activities in Kenya and Ethiopia?

1.5   Hypotheses

The following hypotheses has been used to guide the study.

1.5.1 Part of the insecurity in Kenya and Ethiopia is largely caused by instability prevailing in Somalia.

1.5.2 Al Shabaab is one of the key actors in the insecurity in Kenya and Ethiopia which is largely caused by instability and anarchy in Somalia.

1.6   Justification of the Study

1.6.1   Academic Justification

This study aims to contribute to scholarly material on effective management of trans-border insecurity in Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia, which will strengthen intelligence information, security skills enhancements and understanding proper border management key stakeholders. The study can be used as guide for those who may not be aware and not privy to security matters. Generally the research findings and recommendations will be added to the body of knowledge on instability in Somalia and its impact on trans-border security.

1.6.2   Policy Justification

The study will highlight the instability in Somalia and its effects on Kenyan and Ethiopian security situation. The study will be used as guide on how and who manages the crisis with identification of the possible gaps that can threaten the national security. The study will thus inform policy makers on threats associated with the instability in Somalia and inform formulation of appropriate security policies to regulate the effects.

Kenya and Ethiopia and other countries affected by effects of Somalia crisis need to formulate security policies to curb and minimise cases of trans-border insecurity. This research can be used by policy makers to inform on the best approaches and practices on security policy formulation on terrorism and radicalisation among other heinous crimes. Countries in the region need to safeguard national security against jihadist perpetrators hence the research work.

1.6.3 Knowledge Justification

Eighteen years after the state collapse, this study focuses on understanding of the real linkages between instability in Somalia and its effects on Kenyan and Ethiopian security situation, with the hope of building on past lessons and not repeating the approaches that led to the failure of a whole series of peace processes in the past – so as to build sources of new knowledge on what may have been previously over-looked.

1.7   Literature Review

Wallensteen and Sollenberg[9], state that conflict and instability trends in East Africa—encompassing the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes, and the traditional East Africa region (Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania)—continue to make it one of the most unstable regions in the world. The region's chronic instability stands in sharp contrast to the notable successes in conflict management across most of the rest of Africa. Conflicts in South Sudan, southern Somalia, Darfur, and eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo-combined with heavily armed communal clashes in some other parts of the region-wreak havoc on local, state, and regional security.

Wallensteen and Sollenberg[10], further observe that trans-border criminal networks seek refuge in remote and weakly governed borderlands. While parts of the region are relatively stable and peaceful today, significant portions of East Africa remain unable to break free of a brutal and prolonged history of armed conflicts, violent crime, violent extremism, communal violence, political instability, displacement, human rights abuses, and state failure. The inability of central governments to protect their citizens from this violence-in some cases, government complicity in the crises-has eroded communities' trust in the state.

---

[9] Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg; "*Armed Conflict and Regional Conflict Complexes, 1989-97*," Journal of Peace Research 35, 5 (1998) pp. 621-634.
[10] Ibid, pp. 635.

Zartman[11] in his writings analyses the concept and anatomy of state collapse and argues that state collapse is not a post colonial phenomenon. Zartman argues a state which is an authoritative power collapses when it fails to exercise its sovereign authority which entails the state's intangible source of power and national identity.[12] The author argues that a state is deemed a failure when it fails to be a guarantor of security for its populated territory. He further argues that a state is deemed to have failed when it longer functions it roles of decision-making, its legitimacy is cast in doubt whereas law and order is not maintained. When social cohesion and political coherence has ceased to exist and is not maintained then that state is deemed to have failed and collapsed. The role of the state in the economic front of functional balance of inputs and outputs are destroyed. Simply put the state lost the ability to rule.

In highlighting the case of Somali in 1980 Government of Siad Barre lost its legitimacy and control of northern Somalia when such authority was seized by rebels and militia groups. Terrence Lyons and Almed Samattar[13] argues that the syndrome of a state collapse begins when a state loses its ability to satisfy various demands from bearing groups in a society as resources for the country continues to dry up. They further argued that as dissatisfaction grows resulting in turn to excessive use of weapons by security forces to suppress the growing demands by the masses.

The nation state of Somalia effectively collapsed when in January 1991 a popular uprising drove the disgraced President Siad Barre from a bunker in Mogadishu on to a military a tank which drove him to exile for good. This development in the political and military scope is analysed by different scholars to have succeeded in ushering of an exit of a bad regime but did

---

[11] Zartman, William; *Collapsed States; The Distinction and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*. Indiana University Press, United States of America. (1996), p 5.
[12] Ibid, pp. 5-6.
[13] Terrence Lyons and Almed Samattar, *Somalia; State Collapse, Multilateral Interventions and Strategies for Political Reconstruction*. Amsterdam University Press, Netherland. (1995), pp 1-2.

not usher a good one either. There was no competent regime at the time to succeed and fill in the vacuum that as left by the Siad Barre regime, but instead competing faction fought to take charge of the situation. Anarchy filled the resulting power vacuum. With the state collapse Somali people suffered horrible brutality of living in hobbesian world without law or institutions to protect the most vulnerable from the most vicious.[14] The authors illustrate that the insecurity in Somali has been ongoing, for a very long time, propagated by political instability, clannism and weak security institutions.

Violence took centre stage killing the lines of productions which led to high inflation which exposed Somali people to vulnerabilities of high inflation, diseases, hunger and famines that killed thousands. Million of Somalis were forced to exodus and exile to neighbouring countries. The control of territory and resources was characterized many forces pitting militias and clan warlords. Clans and militias fought complex wars inside and outside Somalia territory thus bringing the element of cross-border insecurity into fore.[15] In 1992 United Mission for Somalia (UNOSOM) intervention led by American troops failed terribly and the country dredged to more anarchy.

In Somalia alone there are at least half a dozen groups that the state department of United States of America (USA) believes have links with Al Qaeda or other related elements. Since the fall of Siad Barre, about two decades ago it is unbelievable that Somalia remains a training and breeding ground for terrorist organizations. The US and most of the Western world believed that the fall of Siad Barre had given rise to instability in Somalia. They argued that the country was too unstable and ungoverned and therefore situation was conducive environment for militants to

---

[14] Ibid, pp 2-3
[15] Ibid, pp. 4-5

train and learn the guerrilla tactics. However, the thought was immediately jettisoned after Ethiopia invaded and removed the Islamist government in Mogadishu.[16]

According to The Daily Nation[17], in 1998, Kenya, along with Tanzania, suffered terrorist attacks that collectively killed over 250 people and injured nearly 5,000 others, mostly Kenyans. Then in 2002, another terrorist attack in Kenya killed 13 people and injured 80. Recently in 2013, Kenya suffered yet another spate of horrible attack when terrorists attacked an upmarket Westgate supermarket complex in Nairobi where over 67 deaths were reported and collateral damage to property caused. Kenya has suffered isolated terrorist attacks associated with Al Shabaab terror group in northern eastern province, coastal region and Nairobi with most the attacks targeting innocent civilians, security agents, social places, religious places, business premises and tourists.

A variant of the "narrow" approach to defining the problem of terrorism has been to identify a special class of terrorist activity, that is, "international," or "transnational," terrorism. This conceptualization has gained currency among policy-makers, particularly in "global powers" of the West, as it appears, on surface, to focus on a particular subset of terrorist actions with "global scope," thereby inferring that this subset of terrorism stands as a direct threat to the "global social order." The concept is based on two important, implicit, *a priori* assumptions: first, the West, and particularly the US, is the recognized authority leading the establishment of an emerging global order and, second, the actions taken by the leading authorities in establishing and maintaining the emerging global order are either legitimate by definition (an extended form

---

[16] Masibo, Moses; *The Political Impact of the Instability of Somalia to the Horn and East Africa*, Missouri State University, United States (2010), p 2.
[17] Daily Nation; *Terrorism Attacks*, (November 29, 2002), p. 23.

of the classic *raison d'état*) or that the interests of populations affected by the global order are adequately represented within the emerging global political system. This narrow form of terrorism, then, is conducted by those, usually non-state actors who may or may not receive support from dissident states or populations, who are intent on challenging, and changing, the terms of the prevailing social order.[18]

Zartam[19] states, that at independence in 1960 Somalia had an efficient army of three thousand (3000) personnel. Immediately afterwards Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) trained a Somali army with numbers skyrocketing to 12,000 troops. In 1977 during the Ogaden war with Ethiopia the army was boasting of 37,000 soldiers. In 1982 the army had a suffocating number of 120,000 soldiers. The number of the soldiers at the moment was impossible to manage efficiently and payment of the troops became a nightmare. Most of the armed personnel resulted to fending themselves by harassing the civilian populations.

The army became oppressive and quickly devolved to an army of repression. Barre borrowed from USSR, the concept of *nomenkklatura* (a system of appointing loyal agents of politicians and military officers to run public institutions) for fear of being toppled and to maintain a tight grip in all sectors. He appointed his cronies and family members in sensitive government and public institutions. Clan and family members surrounded his government to the chagrin of the greater Somali people. Military became an oppression tool going to an extent of killing those who opposed Barre's autocratic rule. Barre also adopted the Concept of *clanklatura* from USSR which loosely translated to 'clan bourgeoisie' which was used to divide and rule.[20]

---

[18] Paul R. Pillar; *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC (2001), p. 12.
[19] Zartman, William, *Collapsed States; The Distinction and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*. Indiana University Press, United States of America, (1996) p 71.
[20] Ibid, pp. 88 - 89.

Barre's regime ended up tribalising of central authority with his autocratic rule. The masses started opposing this rule but military was used to suppress any uprising and discontentment. The suppression could not go forever and Barre's regime was soon to be suppressed by popular uprisings. The oppressor became the oppressed.

The Somali army extricated from a central authority has since disintegrated into smaller units. Some of the army elements have being used by the warlord in the militia setting. Some of the remnants of Somali army joined Al Qaida and Al Shabaab terror groups and became merchants of doom spreading terror in the region. It is worth noting that some of the former soldiers were in 2006 retrained in Kenya and Uganda to form the newly formed Somali National Army (SNA) under the auspices of Transitional Federal Government (TFG) but most of these reintegrated soldiers have since defected and joined Al Shabaab rank and file thus contributing to further instability in contemporary Somali situation.

Some scholars have opined that Somali ethnicity, clan differences and communal disputations are also causes of instability and conflicts in Somalia which characterised the State since pre independence and post independence period.[21] Although Somali people share common language (Somali), subscribe to same religion (Islam), culture and descent they are ethnically divided along clan and communal lines. Culturally Somali belong to Hamitic ethnic group closely related to Cushitic people found in Ethiopia and Eritrea. They have also assimilated features acquired from Arab lineages who once occupied Somali. Somali people are also closely connected to Oromos of Ethiopia and Bantu people found in Kenya.[22]

---

[21] Kinfe Abraham; Somali *a Calling: The Crisis of Statehood and The Conquest For Peace*. EIIPD Press. UK (2002), p. 6.
[22] Ibid, pp 6 - 10.

Kniffe Abraham[23] avers that although Somali people have so much in affinity, the Somali nation does not constitute a unitary state before or even after independence because 'national' identity is based and measured on kinship. Somali people belong to one of the six kin-based 'clan families', namely Dir, Isaaq, Darood, Hawiye, Digile and Rahanwein which are again divided into patrilineally into smaller sub-clans and sub-sub clans. The clans have trade propensities with Darood, Dir,Isaaq and Hawiye being predominantly nomadic pastoralists whereas Digil and Rahanwein (aka Digil Mirifle) mainly agro-pastoralist.

One of the pivotal roadblocks to peace has been highlighted as historical rivalry between clans pitting the two main clans Hawiye and Darood. According to Lewis, Somali people irrespective of clan or community have distinctly maintained Islam as a religion and way of life.[24] He further goes to say that clanism is the Somali version of generic of ethnicity and what also as termed as tribalism. Clanism represents primordial cleavage and cultural fragmentation within the Somali society. He further states that clanism is a product of elite political manipulation. It usually escalates in times of calamities like wars, conflicts, famines and droughts. But the worst has been political manipulation of clanism to achieve political goals.

These large grouping of bantu ethnic cluster are linked to cross-border insecurity in Kenya and Somalia. Some of the descended tribes are pastoralists while another set is agriculturalists. Recent attacks in Mpeketoni, Hindi, Lamu in Kenya and across Somalia are associated with skirmishes between these diverse tribes. They have traditionally fought over land, water and pasture all as result of environmental degradation due to over usage of land. Whenever attacks are carried out the attackers find safe haven in ungovernable Somalia. Some of

---

[23] Ibid, (2002) pp 12 - 14.
[24] Lewis, I. M; *Modern History of Somali*, East African Studies, Kenya (2002), pp. 4 - 15.

these tribes are also known to support Al Shabaab and are privy to trans-border attacks associated with the terror group.

A cross section of analysis by different scholars indicates that clanism and ethnicity has torn Somali into small segments which have destroyed national pride and identity. This has contributed to conflicts, counter conflicts, fighting, insecurity, crisis, instability and incoherence thus tearing apart the national cohesion which has polarised the country as well as undermining socio-economic fabric of the society and national security. This situation has in turn has contributed to gross cross-border insecurity in Kenya and Ethiopia and other neighbouring countries in the region.

The emergence of militia groups and self-styled warlords moved in Somalia towns and rural areas and established their fiefdoms and areas of control. The warlords controlled all sectors of security and economy. They also imposed *sharia* laws and collected taxes enriching themselves. They in essence continued the self-rule which was started by dictator Siad Barre. The situation got more complex because there was no central authority to discharge government functions. The general populace continued to suffer and exodus of the weak and vulnerable continued unabated as the country transited to more anarchy and instability. The situation was reflected in the cross border insecurity in the region with Kenya and Ethiopia bearing the blunt of the violence brewed from across Somalia.

At the urging of Al-Shabaab, an increasing number of terrorist attacks in Kenya have been carried out by local Kenyans, many of whom are recent converts to Islam. Estimates in 2012 placed the figure of Kenyan fighters at around 10% of Al-Shabaab's total forces. Referred to as the "Kenyan Mujahideen" by Al-Shabaab's core members, the converts are typically young and overzealous, poverty making them easier targets for the outfit's recruitment activities. Because

the Kenyan insurgents have a different profile from the Somali and Arab militants that allows them to blend in with the general population of Kenya, they are also often harder to track.[25]

Reports suggest that Al-Shabaab is attempting to build an even more multi-ethnic generation of fighters in the larger region. One such recent convert who helped mastermind the Kampala bombings but now cooperates with the Kenyan police believes that in doing so, the group is essentially trying to use local Kenyans to do its "dirty work" for it while its core members escape unscathed. According to diplomats, Muslim areas in coastal Kenya and Tanzania, such as Mombasa and Zanzibar, are also especially vulnerable for recruitment.[26]

Because of precarious situation in Somali two main Islamic movements which believed in Sufi Islamic dogma came into Somalia scene which saw the creation of Al Jamaa Al Islmiya (AJAI) which came into being in 1982 and later muted into AL Ittihad Al Islamiyya (AIAI). In 2006 in unprecedented move AIAI transformed itself to Al Shabaab (AS), a violent extremist Somali group. Scholars who have studied the entry and emergence of all these militant groups basically assert that AS formed and became a conglomeration of youths who were revolting against the tyrannical role of Said Barre. The emergence of these groups exploited an existence of Al Shabaab which had established its roots in 2003 as a different outfit with different ideology. After years of operation Al Shabaab was incorporated as an islamist organization and in 1998 United States American State department and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) declared Al Shabaab as terrorist organization.[27]

---

[25] Reuters. *Special Report*: *In Africa, A Militant Group's Growing Appeal*. Reuters Internationals, (2012), p. 16.
[26] Ibid, pp. 19 – 20.
[27] David Shinn; *FPRI Conference Annual National Security in Washington DC on September*. Reserve Office. United States of America (2011), pp. 2-3.

The group further states that Al Shabaab has steady financial flow most of it being transacted through ubiquitous Hawalas by Somali populations within and those in diaspora. The Hawala system has been on the scrutiny by international investigators and indeed has been proscribed but moneys are still being sent using the system. Lately there has been emergence of mobile transfer system in Somalia which is being used by Al Shabaab to make transactions without much scrutiny. The Al Shabaab has devised a method of giving its aficionados money to invest and return the monies with profits. This has made the financial arrangement to be attractive and popular venture with its devoted followers. According to the analyzing group Al Shabaab also makes money from levying its adherents the *Zakat* (Alms Giving) and *zadaga* (charity). *Zakat* and *Zadaga* are both enshrined in the pillars of Islam although Al Shabaab used the two in furtherance of its cause and has interpreted the two concepts to conveniently support the *jihad* (holy war).[28]

Dagne[29] cites that terrorism, piracy, human trafficking, arms smuggling and the incessant famines now affecting parts of southern Somalia as symptoms of the wider instability that has plagued Somalia since the collapse of the authoritarian regime of Siad Barre in 1991. The situation is further complicated by entry of foreign fighters from all the world who have joined rank and file of Al Shabaab fighters whose aim is to topple the Somalia shaky and unstable government and install a sharia compliant system of government. Lastly the group notes that Al Shabaab has managed to thrive through its effective mode of communication. It runs an elaborate media with fm radios, yu tube, tweeter and emails websites which are often closed after security scrutiny but others open almost immediately. These media channels broadcast live in the heart of

---

[28] International Crisis Group. *Working to Prevent Conflict Worldwide: Its Policy Briefing- African Briefing,* US (2014), No.9 dated 26/06/2014.
[29] Dagne, Ted; *Somali - Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace*. CRS Report RL33911. Kenya (2011), p. 101.

Mogadishu and areas under Amisom, African Union (AU) forces, Somali National Army (SNA) and in most of areas by controlled Somali Federal Government (SFG).[30]

Problem associated with refugees started way back in the wake of Ethiopian conquest and re-conquest of Ogaden region in 1977 which saw influx of refugees from Ogaden region of Ethiopia to Somali Republic of non Somali Oromos which put some strain with local populace. In 1980 the refugee situation escalated into a crisis with 20% foreigners being injected into local population. The regime of Siad Barre started to recruit soldiers from the refugee camps thus integrating foreigners into the local army which gave the first signs of militarising refugees for personal or institutional gain in the name of Siad Barre's regime. During the last two years of rule of Barre anarchy pitched to all-time high. The difference between the pre and post said Barre years was thus a qualitative one Kniffe Abraham argued.[31]

Another turn of event was witnessed when Barre's autocratic regime became to terrorise its residents in the rural areas causing a big exodus of refugees who streamed to the capital. Mogadishu capital became swollen as refugees trooped from other regions raising the population to an all –time peak. The immigrant population and refugee situation was aggravated by incessant wars which sent Somali diaspora with over 3,000,000 people being sent to exile mostly in surrounding countries. In 2014 Kenya witnessed numerous terrorist attacks the most recent one being September 2013 Westgate shopping mall attack in Nairobi. Most these crimes were planned and facilitated by refugees in Dadaab who colluded with locals and outsiders to perpetrate the heinous crimes.

---

[30] Ibid, pp. 101-102.
[31] Kinfe Abraham; *Somalia Calling: The Crisis of Statehood and The Conquest for Peace*. NINA Press Uppsala, Sweden (2002) p 38.

Among Somali's neighbour Kenya has borne the blunt refugees influx and problems associated with militarised refugees. Data and statistics compiled in 2012 by United Nation High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and REfWorld indicates that Kenya was home to over 1,000,000 refugees, asylum seekers and stateless people most of them found in Kakuma and Dadaab. The data from the two agencies indicates that Refugees hailed from Somalia were 512,100.[32] This influx has not only brought with it an economic burden, strain to physical and social constraints but it is also a source of cross- border security in Kenya and Ethiopia. Refugees bring and carry with them illegal arms or are themselves convenient conduits of such arms which are sold cheaply and contribute to surge of runaway insecurity.

Sheikh and Healy[33] stated that regional influences allow the conflicting parties in Somalia to access funds, arms and strategic support. Instability also favours indirect confrontation among rivals in the region. This has been the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea, whose territorial dispute found expression in the uncontrolled Somalia situation, whereby the two countries supported rival factions in order to engage in a war by proxy. The Somali conflict has also allowed non-state actors to roam freely across borders. In particular, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism worries all countries in the region, particularly those that host large Somali communities like Ethiopia and Kenya.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

---

[32] UNCHR; *The UN Refugee Agency and RefWorld: Updated data September 2014*, United States (2014), pp. 14 - 18.

[33] Hassan Sheikh and Sally Healy; *Somalia's Missing Million: The Somali Diaspora and its Role in Development*, Report for UNDP, (2009), p. 22.

The Realism Theory - the study considers employing Realism theory. According to Erskine[34] states (or nations) are always engaged in a struggle for power. Realist theory advocates the use of power to fulfil the interest of a nation. "National power" is composed of geography, economy, natural resources, population, military strength and preparedness, national character and moral, and the competency of the national government.

Realism theory emphasizes the anarchic nature of the international system and human aggressiveness as prime causes of war. A host of other causes that might lead to war include a state's craving for military and material power that immediately alerts its rivals, the lack of a central authority to manage global affairs, revisionist goals of certain states and the absence of morality in foreign policy. In brief, the gloomy human nature and lawlessness in the international system create permissive conditions for war. The effective way to deter wars and aggressions, the classical realists opine, is to form balances of power that might discourage states to wage wars and help promote conditions for the status quo.[35]

Realism is based on the assumption that states act rationally and that any two states in a similar situation will act in a similar way, regardless of internal politics which leads to balance of power. Realism holds that the priority of state leaders is to ensure the survival of their state and protection of territorial integrity. Realism relies on the use of force or its military capability to achieve the desired ends only after 'deterrence has failed', for realism is not about war, realism seeks security and order.[36]

---

[34] Erskine, T., "*As Rays of Hope to the Human Soul*"? *Moral Agents and Intelligence Gathering', Intelligence and National Security*. New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. USA. 19, (2), (2004), pp. 359-381.

[36] Stephen M. Walt, *Beyond bin Laden: Reshaping U.S. Foreign Policy, International Security*. V. 26, No. 3, President and Fellows of Harvard College and Massachusetts Institute of Technology Winter, USA (2001), p. 56.

There are still, of course, some guiding themes within this collection. One of these (which emerged from a series of discussions among many of the contributors) is that only by coming to terms with the shifting nature of "the political" in International Relations can we understand the various axes of the contemporary debate in security studies. In this light, the very name of the field-security studies-should give us pause. The implication is that scholars in the field are studying security. But what, precisely, does this mean? A moment's reflection reveals a basic problem: security is a derivative concept; it is in itself meaningless. To have any meaning, *security* necessarily presupposes something to be secured; as a realm of study it cannot be self-referential. Walt[37] states that political realism, *Realpolitik*, 'power politics', is the oldest and most frequently adopted theory of international relations. Every serious student must not only acquire a deep appreciation of political realism but also understand how her own views relate to the realist tradition. Realism is a limited yet powerful and important approach to and set of insights about assessing the cross-border situation in Africa and linkages between instability in Somali and its effects on Kenyan and Ethiopian security situation.

1.9   Research Methodology

1.9.1   Study Design

The research adopted Case study design. A case study is a research method which allows for any in-depth examination of events, phenomena, or other depth examination of events, phenomena, or other observations within a real observation within a real-life context for purposes of life context for purposes of investigation, theory development and testing tools for learning.

---

[37] Smith and Donnelly; *Provide Book-Length Introductions That Focus Exclusively on Realism.* Cambridge University Press, United States of America (1986), p. 17.

Case studies provide rich raw material for advancing theoretical ideas. They provide insight at all stages of the theory building process and probably most valuable in testing new theories, and new information that holds across many cases can stimulate new theoretical thinking. In addition they can be used as both a research and teaching tool.

1.9.2 Target Population

The study used probability method to come up with the sample population. A population is defined as a complete set of individuals with some common observable characteristics. Sample is a subject of the population. If a sample is too small, it does not represent the characteristics of the entire population.[38]

The main target populations for this study included Defence Ministry, Ministries of foreign affairs, Anti-terrorism Police Unit (ATPU), National Counter Terrorism Center, Ethiopian embassy, Somali embassy, Immigration agencies, security agencies, and civil societies, National Intelligence Service (NIS), Ministry of Defence, Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Directorate of Refugee Agency, National Registration Bureau, the Ministry of Interior and National Coordination, County administration (County Commissioner) and other experts. The study therefore employed purposive sampling specifically to pick out these key informants.

The study pre-tested the questionnaires before sending them to respondents. The questionnaires was pre-coded the respondents for future reference and confirmations. The respondents were assured of their privacy and confidentiality applies.

---

[38] Mugenda O. & Mugenda A; *Research Methods-Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches*. Acts press, Nairobi, Kenya, (1999), p. 18.

1.9.3   Data Collection

Secondary data was collected from books, journal, articles and periodicals. This helped capture what has already been done on intelligence from a global, regional, national and up to the local level, this information will help creating undertaking of intelligence agencies. Primary data collection was done using the qualitative research approach.

Primary data from questionnaires from key stakeholders - because the study is about feelings, experiences, attitudes and behaviours of human beings which cannot be measured as such qualitative research methodology was used to collect primary data. This involved using various methods of interviews and questionnaires which were determined and implemented.

1.9.4   Data Analysis

The collected data was then sorted and analyzed using descriptive analysis, document analysis and thematic analysis techniques, based on the emerging issues under study. Document analysis (refugees government document, constitution, recent security laws, Somali policy document, KDF deployment document, the creation of the anti-terrorism police unit, counter terrorism strategy, anti-piracy document, counter drugs document, money laundering, small arms document, counter radicalization strategy) is a form of qualitative research in which documents are interpreted by the researcher to give voice and meaning around an assessment topic.

Analyzing documents incorporates coding content into themes similar to how focus group or interview transcripts are analyzed. Thematic analysis is a qualitative analytic method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data. It minimally organizes and describes the main data set in great detail.

1.9.5 Data Presentation

The final results were presented in form of narrative, pie chart, bar graph and frequency tables. The analysed data was presented in both qualitative and quantitative manner.

1.10 Scope and Limitation of the Study

Most of the research work was limited to Kenya although it may involve extensive travels to Kenya–Somalia and Ethiopia–Somalia borders to get first hand information on the effect of trans-border insecurity. Depending on prevailing security situation inside Somali there may be a need to venture inside Somali to carry out interviews.

1.11 Chapter Outline

Chapter 1: Introduction to the study.

Chapter one makes up of a brief introduction to the study. This section is made up the background of the study Key components of this section are the problem statement, objectives, literature review, theory, justification and methodology for the study.

Chapter 2: Contributing Factors to Collapse of Somalia State and Continued Instability. States succeed or fail across all or some of these dimensions. But it is according to their performances-according to the levels of their effective delivery of the most crucial political goods-that strong states may be distinguished from weak ones, and weak states from failed or collapsed ones

Chapter 3: Instability in Somalia and the Cross-border insecurity in Kenya and Ethiopia. Chronic instability along the Kenya-Somalia border zone is part of a larger pattern of state

failure, lawlessness, and communal violence afflicting the Kenyan border areas from Uganda to Somalia, frequently described as "not peace not war."

Chapter 4: The Main Actors and Groups Operating in Somalia. Al-Shabaab's terrorist activities have mainly focused on targets within Somalia, but it has also proven an ability to carry out deadly strikes in the region, including coordinated suicide bombings in Uganda's capital in 2010 and a deadly raid on a Nairobi mall in 2013.

Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusion and Recommendations. This chapter sums up the major findings in line with the objectives and hypotheses of the study, on the issues addressed in the research. It makes several key conclusions and recommendations on the way forward.

CHAPTER 2

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO COLLAPSE OF SOMALIA STATE AND CONTINUED INSTABILITY

2.0   Introduction

This section of the study is where the research examined the contributing factors to collapse of Somalia state and continued instability. It is in this area where the study focussed more specifically on how continued instability in Somalia has been caused by different factors some internal and other from exterior milieu.

2.1   History of Somali Conflict

The collapse of the Siad Barre regime[1] in Somalia in 1991 plunged the country into a state of civil war. Between late 1991 and mid 1993, tens of thousands of Somalis were killed and close to a million displaced from their homes and forced to flee across borders to neighbouring countries, especially Kenya.[2] Armed and clan-based factions battled to gain control of the country particularly Mogadishu but none seemed strong enough to impose its control over the country in general.[3]

The fall of Barre's rule led to an intensified and increased free-flow of guns and other unauthorized weapons in to the hands of many Somalis. It was unimaginable that two years after Barre was deposed that the number of unsolicited weapons in circulation in Somalia were unprecedented. As Godwin Murunga[4] has noted by this time "there were more arms than food in Somalia". It must be noted that Siad Barre used millions of dollars in building the military and buying of armour of all kinds. Scholars are still assessing the intentions of such massive military

---

[1] Ghalib M. J; *Cost of Dictatorship; The Somali Experience* , , Lilian Barber Press, New York (1995), p. 16.

[2] International Crisis Group; "*Salvaging Somalia's Chance for Peace*" Africa Briefing, (9th December 2002), p. 56.

[3] Gassim Arif Mariam; *Somalia: Clan Versus Nation*, United Arab Emirates: Sharpah, India (2002), p . 46.

[4] Godwin, Murunga; *Conflict in Somalia and crime in Kenya: Understanding the Trans-Territoriality of Crime*. African and Asian studies Vol. 4, No. 142 Kenya (2005.), p. 144.

build-up, but some have noted that regional strategy and irredentism were possibly the major ones. At this time of the cold war, Barre did not have problems of getting military assistance because what he only needed to do was to play the tune of one superpower and its allies or to the other. Somalia's geostrategic in the region enabled Barre to easily lure the support of either the United States of America or the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic and their allies.

Barre's government received a lot of aid from Britain, Italy, U.S.A, and the USSR. He used the funds he got to boost the government's expenditure on the military beyond anyone's imagination. Analyzing the expenditure Godwin[5] has argued that "Somalia National Army (SNA) grew both in numbers and in armament from a force of 10,000 in 1963 to 37,000 in 1978. The army further expanded to 96,000 in 1980, 115,000 and eventually 123,000 by 1984-5". Evidently, the military would later become a vehicle through which the regime used to oppress, corrupt, and overly intimidate the general public. By 1985, the proliferation of arms in Somalian society and militarization of civilians had become quite rampant. In addition, the west and east became too involved and as such worsened the already complicated state of affairs. Unsurprisingly, the west was interested in Somalia because of its strategic location in relation to India, Middle East, and the Suez Canal. The two blocks therefore manipulated the Somalia government in order to keep their interests in the region, but Somalia too obtained a lot of support militarily and in arms sales. But the same arms that Barre took pride in became the tool to fight him from office.

---

[5] Ibid p, 145.

According to Lewis[6], since then the country has been under various administrations including the armed militias groups. Several attempts have made to restore order through international peace agreements spearheaded by UN, AU, IGAD, Arab league and neighbouring countries which in essence only managed to produce an ill assorted succession of short-lived dysfunctional administrative transnational administration whereas the real powers remained with a monopoly of the anarchic warlords. Violence took centre stage killing the lines of productions which led to famines that killed thousands and exodus and exile of thousands. Control of territory and resources characterized many regions pitting militias and clan warlords. Clans and militias fought complex wars inside and outside Somali thus bringing out the element of cross border insecurity and humanitarian catastrophe into fore. United Nation Mission for Somalia (UNOSOM) speared and led by American troops failed terribly and the country dredged to more anarchy.[7]

Analysis of dynamics of a failed State of Somalia has indicated that the collapse led to emergence of militias and warlord who controlled Somalia and aggravated its fast drifting to anarchy and instability.[8] The collapse of government of Siad Barre opened floodlight for militias who quickly moved in to occupy the vacuum left by the government which was in exile in Kenya. In 1992 militia group mainly from pastoral Hawiye Habr Gedr ethnic group associated with General Mohamed Farah Aideed took control of north and west of Mogadishu. In the same scope militia associated Ali Mahdi Mohamed (a civilian) who led native trades people of Hawiye

---

[6] Lewis M. Loan; *Making and Breaking States in Africa. The Somalia Experience*. East African Studies, Kenya (2010), p. 50.

[7] Ibid, p. 50.
[8] Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst; *Learning from Somali: The lesson of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*. (1997), pp. 4 - 5.

Adgal, majority pre- civil was majority occupied the rest of Mogadishu. The two groups fought complex wars pitting clans.[9]

This period was also characterized by emergence of other warlords who quickly extended their personal and clan influence to other rural areas occupied by smaller weaker and marginal clans. These clashes of personality and personal lust for power by the two leaders or more clan warlords made the situation in Somalia more complex with intense clan fighting, proliferation or arms, high levels of corruption, disfranchised armed forces, low lines of production, exodus of weak from the rural areas to the urban areas as internally displaced people (IDPs) and later most of them went to exile fearing the clan wars, high cost of living, inflation, famines and diseases. This trend which manifested itself has never changed and continues to be witnessed in current Somalia situation.[10]

Somalia State collapse has had its toll on security situation in the East Africa and Horn of Africa regions. Kenya has been at the epicentre of different insecurity episodes associated with collapse of Somalia. Kenya has borne several cases of runaway insecurity most from across the border with Somali. Terrorism and radicalisation cases are on the rise whereas movement of small arms have increased in the region with Kenya bearing the blunt. Cross border skirmishes and lawlessness bordering on stock thefts, inter/intra clan conflicts, smuggling of contrabands, kidnapping, exhortation, poaching, influx of refugees, illegal immigrants, human trafficking, piracy, money laundering and other trans - border crimes have characterised Kenyan scene.[11]

---

[9] Ibid, pp 5 - 6.
[10] Stephen Ellis; *The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War.* New York University Press, United States, (2001) p 104.
[11] Mary Kaldor, *New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Polity Press, Cambridge United Kingdom (1999), p 75.

Crimes associated with Al Shabaab mostly terrorist attacks and kidnappings have also being on the increase all courtesy of instability in Somalia. Cross border security associated with instability in Somali has also been witnessed in Ethiopia courtesy of belligerents and armed groups from Somali.

2.2   Factors Contributing Factors to the Collapse of the Somalia State

States become more fragile as a result of violent conflict; particularly, violent conflict is more likely to occur in fragile states. The enduring nature of conflict is one of the most common characteristics of failed states. Heterogeneity in the ethnic, religious, and clan composition of the state has been found to contribute to state fragility.[12] Social cohesion among groups in a state is necessary for creating effective political institutions. The state's ability to provide political goods is diminished by tension between groups.

The best and most often used example of a failed state, or what some term a collapsed state is the country of Somalia which according to the 2011 Failed States Index – in the seven years of the Failed State Index, Somalia has had the ignominious distinction of occupying the worst spot for four years straight. Others have noted, for the past two decades Somalia has become the supreme example of failed state with warlords laying waste to Mogadishu and well-intentioned outsiders from bewildered Marines to hapless United Nations (UN) forces intervening at their peril.

2.2.1   Social Division

Somalia embodies one of postcolonial Africa's worst mismatches between conventional state structures and indigenous customs and institutions. The fact that Somalis share a common ethnicity, culture, language, and religion might seem to be an excellent basis for a cohesive

---

[12] Coyne, Christopher; *Reconstructing Weak and Failed States: Foreign Intervention and The Nirvana Fallacy*. Foreign Policy Analysis. Earhart Foundation and Mercatus Center. Oxford. United Kingdom (2006), pp. 343–361.

polity, but in reality the Somali people are divided by clan affiliations, the most important component of their identity. Repeated attempts to impose a centralized bureaucratic governing structure have managed only to sever the state from the society that should have been its foundation, yielding the world's most famous failed state.[13]

A majority of the more recent examinations of the Somali political crisis are based on fallacies and simplistic generalisations of the supposed uniqueness of the Somali people as a culturally homogenous entity.[14] They often tend to fall into a reductionist trap, ignoring the intricacies of Somali political reality, while engaging in a one-dimensional exploration of `conflict based on clanship'. The classical argument is that all Somali people belong to one ethnic group, speak the same language, follow the same religion and share the same culture and tradition. However, a closer examination of this assertion shows that it is inaccurate and misleading. According to Mukhtar,[15] "It is a myth invented by outsiders. Somali society has always been divided into nomadic pastoralists in the north and southern agro-pastoralists `which have distinctively different cultural, linguistic, and social structures."

The importance of livestock in relation to subsistence agriculture is regionally variable; with rural households in the south depending on agriculture and northerners relying more on remittances and livestock. Indeed, people inhabiting the inter-riverine regions speak a different language, known as *Mai Mai*, a combination of colloquial local dialects, Swahili and Somali. Throughout the colonial period, there also grew up distinct territorial, linguistic and administrative traditions in the original territories. Their official languages were French in

---

[13] Coyne, Christopher; *Reconstructing Weak And Failed States: Foreign Intervention And The Nirvana Fallacy*. Foreign Policy Analysis. Earhart Foundation and Mercatus Center. Oxford. United Kingdom (2006), pp. 343–361.
[14] Wood, E. *Forging Democracy from Below: Insurgent Transitions in South Africa and El Salvador*, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom. (2000) p. 301.
[15] Torres, M. and Anderson, M; *Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction', Policy Division, Department for International Development* (DFID); London, UK. (2004), p 5.

Djibouti, Amharic in Ethiopia, English in Somaliland, Italian in Somalia and Swahili and English in the NFD (Northwest Frontier District). Moreover, some territorial boundaries also roughly corresponded to clan boundaries.

Concentrating exclusively on clans and lineage structures, many observers have elevated clanship to the most dominant factor in the analysis of the current crisis. Understanding clan and lineage in the contemporary Somali politics, while necessary, is not sufficient to unlock their social and political organisation.[16] Elaborate charts illustrating clan genealogy, superimposed over acronyms of the many factions; litter the literature on Somali society. These charts have become an operational lexicon for many agencies, imperiously displayed in virtually every regional NGO or UN office. Indeed, visitors often use them as `road maps'. Understanding state collapse in Somalia requires looking beyond clanism and ongoing factional intrigue, which is a symptom of state collapse rather than its cause.[17]

The question of the compatibility of the Somali civil society structure with the postcolonial (centralised) state has recently featured in some analyses of the Somali state collapse. It is argued that institutional structures that incorporated concepts entirely alien to the existing Somali institutions were imposed under colonial rule. As a result, a discrepancy emerged between the highly decentralised pastoral structures and the highly central nature of the postcolonial state. It is not simply a coincidence that the strongest opposition to the centralised state has come from the north, where a pastoral mode of production is still predominant.[18]

This incompatibility was intensified by the transfer of power and authority from pastoral groups to centralised and urban-based political structures. As a result, pastoralism was `treated

---

[16] Ibid,, pp. 5 - 6.
[17] Ibid, pp. 34 - 40.
[18] Ibid, pp. 81 - 82.

less as a distinct way of life and more as an economic resource to be tapped'. Others disagree with this approach of analysis, describing it as `historical' and not particularly relevant to current problems, as it assumes that the social structure of the Somali society remained intact following its integration into the world economy. They argue that the `contemporary' commercialisation of pastoralism transformed society as early as the 1920s, and that traditional structures have changed even more dramatically since independence.[19]

The Somali population with some 13 to 14 million people, including Somalis living in neighboring states is divided into four major clans and a number of minority groups. Each of these major clans consists of subclans and extended family networks that join or split in a fluid process of "constant decomposition and recomposition".[20] Like tribal societies elsewhere in the Greater Middle East, the clans use deeply ingrained customary law to govern their communities completely independently of modern state structures. Although somewhat weakened in the South from decades of urbanization, violence, and attempts to create a centralized state, these traditional groupings still hold immense influence over society.

Since the failure of the state some twenty years ago, the parts of the country that have achieved the most stability are those that are based on these clans. The Haarti grouping (a subset of the Daarood) created a semiautonomous region in the east called Puntland, while in the northeast the Isaaq clan led the effort to build Somaliland. Many other parts of Somalia have been similarly governed by local groupings, which have used the traditional governing system to resolve disputes and encourage some investment even in the absence of a formal state.[21] Among

---

[19] Torres, M. and Anderson, M. '*Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction'*, Policy Division, Department for International Development (DFID); London, United Kingdom. (2004), pp. 90-91.
[20] Ibid, p 97.
[21] Hassan Sheikh and Sally Healy; *Somalia's Missing Million: The Somali Diaspora and its Role in Development*, Report for UNDP, (2009), p. 23.

these regional entities, Somaliland has been the most successful, declaring itself independent and holding a series of free elections. Despite or, perhaps, because of - a dearth of assistance from the international community, it has been able to construct a set of robust governing bodies rooted in traditional Somali concepts of governance by consultation and consent. By integrating traditional ways of governance - including customary norms, values, and relationships, within a modern state apparatus, Somaliland has achieved greater cohesion and legitimacy while - not coincidentally - creating greater room for competitive elections and public criticism than exists in most similarly endowed territories.[22]

These dynamics suggest that any eventual solution to the problem of state building in Somalia will have to take fully into account the country's indigenous social fabric and institutions, and will have to build from the bottom up, integrating communal ways of working together into state structures. The international community will have to abandon its attempts to impose a top-down, centralized, and profoundly artificial state model and begin to work with, rather than against, the grain of Somali society. A central government could be retained, but its functions should be strictly limited in scope and its institutions in number.[23]

2.2.2   Economic Division

Scott[24] notes that Somalia was once considered one of Africa's few real nation-states, based upon a shared Somali language and single ethnic culture. The five points of the star on its flag were meant as a call to 'lost' Somalis in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti left out in 1960 when Independence led to the union of British Somaliland and the UN trust territory under Italian

---

[22] Ibid, pp 28 - 30.

[23] Dagne, Ted; *Somalia; Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace*. CRS Report RL33911. Kenya (2011), p. 101.

[24] Scott, Peterson; *Me against My Brother*. Routledge, New York, United States (2000), p. 21.

administration, a cause for which Siyyad Barre's regime (1969-91) attacked Ethiopia in 1977-78. Yet in 1991 Somalia's capital, Mogadishu, hosted forty distinct, mostly clan-based armed groups. Shortly before, the dying regime killed 50,000 fellow Somalis in a failed attempt to repress rebellion in the north.

According to Crocker and Osler[25], Somalia has been in chaos since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 and the subsequent civil war. When a U.N. humanitarian mission's mandate ended in 1995, the Transitional Federal Government was forced to rely on the African Union's peacekeeping mission to Somalia to protect civilians. A new provisional constitution was passed in August 2012, and the end of the TFG mandate in September led to the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia. Somalia's economy is based largely on agriculture and livestock herding, which account for 60 percent of GDP. The population is dependent on overseas remittances and foreign aid. However, economic growth is slowly expanding from Mogadishu, which has been in recovery since the terrorist group Al-Shabaab retreated to rural parts of Somalia in 2011. The African Union peacekeeping force continues to conduct operations against al-Shabaab.[26] Traditionally, the concept of 'war economy' has been understood as a centralised, autarchic system in which a large part of the population participates in the war effort in various ways.

Kaldor[27] explains how the 'new wars' have seen an emergence of a new type of war economy, the "globalized" war economy, which is in essence the complete opposite. This type of war economy exists in fragmented societies where the state apparatus is weak and decentralised.

---

[25] Chester Crocker and Fen Osler; *Managing Global Chaos*, United States Institute for Peace, Washington DC, (2001), pp. 141-154.
[26] Ibid, p. 160.
[27] Kaldor, M; New *and Old Wars*. Polity Press, Cambridge UK, (2006), pp 100-106.

Participation in the war effort is low due to lack of legitimacy of the warring parties, and due to lack of resources to pay salaries. In such contexts, there is "very little domestic production, so the war effort is heavily dependent on local predation and external support" [28] Besides generating a general predatory social condition, a war economy typically also entails the privatisation of military forces, diversion of aid and remittances, and the proliferation of illegal circuits of trade.[29] Despite the lack of effective national governance, Somalia maintains an informal economy largely based on livestock, remittance/money transfer companies, and telecommunications. Agriculture is the most important sector with livestock normally accounting for about 40% of GDP and more than 50% of export earnings. Nomads and semi-pastoralists, who are dependent upon livestock for their livelihood, make up a large portion of the population. Livestock, hides, fish, charcoal, and bananas are Somalia's principal exports, while sugar, sorghum, corn, and machined goods are the principal imports. Somalia's small industrial sector, based on the processing of agricultural products, has largely been looted and the machinery sold as scrap metal. Telecommunication firms provide wireless services in most major cities and offer the lowest international call rates on the continent.

Mogadishu's main market offers a variety of goods from food to electronic gadgets. Hotels continue to operate and are supported with private-security militias. Somalia's government lacks the ability to collect domestic revenue, and arrears to the IMF have continued to grow. Somalia's capital city - Mogadishu - has witnessed the development of the city's first gas stations, supermarkets, and flights between Europe (Istanbul-Mogadishu) since the collapse of central authority in 1991. This economic growth has yet to expand outside of Mogadishu, and within the city, security concerns dominate business. In the absence of a formal banking sector,

---

[28] Ibid), pp 107.
[29] Ibid, pp 109-111.

money transfer/remittance services have sprouted throughout the country, handling up to $1.6 billion in remittances annually, although international concerns over the money transfers into Somalia currently threatens these services.

2.2.3   Political Division

Ever since the fall of Barre, Somali has yet to be fully recognized by a single member of the international community, nor have any governments shown sympathy for its causes. The irony being that most regional organization and their members continue to lobby for political stability in Somali. After decades of waiting, however, many Somalis question for how much longer their sovereignty will remain the property of a state that no longer exists. Conventional Somali historiography is mainly derived from the assumption that the society has been and remains a nation *sui-generis*, *a priori*, or what Somalis call *Muqadas* (holy) nation. This title, as it were, represents a long line of research that depicts the society as a self-same nation, downplays, and sometimes violently oppresses any mention of social and political fault lines.[30]

Lewis[31] states that the struggle for democracy has been a central element in the history of Somaliland's liberation and its subsequent reconstruction. Peace and government have been built from the ground up, retaining power in diffuse and decentralized institutions. Popular aspirations for participatory democracy do daily battle with entrenched attitudes and habits formed under the authoritarian and highly centralized military dictatorship that ruled Somalia for 21 years. With peace still fragile and war a recent memory, the desire for freedom of thought, speech and act must be weighed against the need to preserve political stability and social harmony. Nowhere are these contradictions so clearly evident as in the evolution of Somaliland's media.

---

[30] Benedict Anderson. *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*. New York: Verso, United Stated, (1983) p.6
[31] Lewis, I. M. *Blood and Bone*, Red Sea Press, New Jersey, United States (1994) p 120.

According to Lewis[32], under the dictatorial regime of Siyaad Barre the Somalis suffered two decades of brutal repression. Freedom of speech, association, and movement was denied. In Somaliland, these abuses gave rise to popular rebellion in the form of the guerrilla movement, the Somali National Movement (SNM), which eventually liberated the northwest and contributed to the overthrow of the Barre regime. The establishment of the Republic of Somaliland on 18 May 1991 offered an opportunity to restore basic freedoms and to embark on a new chapter in democratization. Successive community peace conferences have since served to broaden the participation of the people in the process of decision-making. Community elders, religious and literary leaders, businessmen, poets, women's groups, and the press have made strenuous efforts to put an end to armed conflict and consolidate peace in Somaliland.[33] These early efforts culminated in the 1993 Grand Boorame Conference that oversaw the peaceful transfer of power from the SNM to the present civilian administration - no mean achievement.

Samatar[34] notes that as the political organ that gave birth to democratic experimentation in Somaliland, and is still guiding it in more ways them one, it has learned how to forgive, how to compromise and accommodate, and how to relinquish state power when this is dictated by the principles for which it was struggling, even at the temporary cost of its own internal unity the SNM did not find it difficult to transfer state power even prior to the disarmament of its liberation forces and the armed militia of other clans who opposed it during its guerrilla warfare against the military dictatorship.

Hargeysa Conference stipulated a schedule for the transition from the beel (clan) flyrtem under which Somaliland had so far been governed, to a multi-party system characterized by free and

---

[32] Ibid, pp 127-130.

[33] Harris, Peter and Reilly, Ben; Democracy *and Deep-rooted conflict*, Stockholm: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance IDEA, Sweden (1998), pp 234 - 235.

[34] Samatar, I. M; *Light at the End of the Tunnel*, Red Sea Press, New Jersey, United States, (1997), pp. 203-205.

fair elections (GOS-Constitution: 1998). The provisional Mcadtution would govern the country until the completion of the transitional period. In the meantime, parliament would debate and review the new constitution. p by article, until both legislative chambers approved a final draft. Following a great civic education campaign, voters would be asked to approve or reject the *post-colonial constitution* in a nationwide referendum. The constitution would legalize the limitations of political parties, which would then contest local, parliamentary and presidential elections.

It seems unlikely that these will take place on time, but a postponed election means that the mandate of the government will have to be extended - an issue that needs to be addressed constitutionally. The government insists on holding the presidential election as scheduled, whereas the other two parties, Kulmiye and United People's Democratic Party (UDUB), want the election to take place on 30 May. After consulting die government and the parties, the National Electoral Commission has publicly decided to hold the presidential election on 31 March citing technical and financial challenges - a move seen by the Guurti (the House of Elders), which alone has the power to authorize an extension of the government's mandate, as violating the constitution.

One universal expectation of the central government is that it should provide security throughout Somaliland - albeit in a benign, unthreatening way. Somali everywhere recognize the importance of peace and security as a precondition for economic and social development. The central government appears to agree: in 1999, the government reportedly spent over 70% of the national budget on security forces - an indication of the high priority it awards to the preservation of security. Small but sufficient security forces have been deployed in all regions: most are uniformed, draw token salaries and have received basic police training. The government is committed to reducing the number of security personnel on its payroll and thus freeing scarce

resources for other purposes, but this will require a carefully planned programme of demobilization and - more importantly - a broad commitment to mitigating the tensions that lurk beneath Somaliland's ostensibly stable political landscape.

Although all regions have grievances, the sense of estrangement is greatest in eastern Somaliland, where administrative development and economic growth have lagged behind the western part of the country - a sentiment neatly captured by an Ceerigaabo market woman: "Ood kaa dheeri kuma dhaxan tirto."1' Among the Dhulbahante and the Warsangeli clans of Sool and eastern Sanaag regions, attitudes towards Somaliland have long been divided. Many are persuaded by the combination of economic, cultural, historical and political ties that bind them to Somaliland, feel that the government needs to ensure a more equitable distribution of benefi Others are attracted by Puntland's clan-based approach to federalism which pa the unity of the Harti Darood clans (Warsangeli, Dhulbahante and Majerteen) a asserts a claim to much of Sool region and several districts in eastern Sana Puntland supporters identify the Somaliland polity with the Isaaq clan, and feel d their own interests can best be served through affiliation with more closely relal kin-groups.[35] The problem of divided loyalties is unlikely to be resolved any time soon. In other words of one Dhulbahante garaad: We have interests on both sides of the aisle, and' can't trade one for the other.

Local elections, many Somali remain unclear about what the devolution of administrative authority to local level would entail. Existing legislation on the (ambiguous and suggests a process of devolution rather than true decent. Fiscal management remains subject to tight central controls, helping to e leakages but limiting the authority of local government. In an unpublished

---

[35] Ibid, p. 206.

the topic, one analyst noted that many Somalilanders tend to view the issue t leans of "political autonomy - regional self-government - ignoring the committee need for fiscal autonomy".

In other words, few people realize that if they t local self-government, they will have to be prepared to bear its costs. Critical challenge facing Somaliland is to improve the level and quality of a s political participation. Traditionally, women have been excluded from the said political process, although they have played an active role in mobilizing i peace and war. Women took part in the liberation struggle against the Barre, raising funds to sustain the war effort, nursing the wounded, and a small ty even joined in the fighting. Since Somaliland's inception, however, no ten have served in parliament or the judiciary, and political representation has i strictly limited. Only two women were elected to district council seats in the 1 election, and between 1991 and 2003, only three women served as cabinet

2.2.4   Military Division

In 1991 President Barre was overthrown by opposing clans. But they failed to agree on a replacement and plunged the country into lawlessness and clan warfare. In 2000 clan elders and other senior figures appointed Abdulkassim Salat Hassan president at a conference in Djibouti. A transitional government was set up, with the aim of reconciling warring militias.[36] But as its mandate drew to a close, the administration had made little progress in uniting the country.

The fledgling administration, the 14th attempt to establish a government since 1991, faced a formidable task in its efforts to bring reconciliation to a country divided into clan fiefdoms. Its authority was further compromised in 2006 by the rise of Islamists who gained control of much of the south, including the capital, after their militias kicked out the warlords

---

[36] Samatar, I. M; *Light at the End of the Tunnel*, Red Sea Press, New Jersey, United States, (1997), p. 191.

who had ruled the roost for 15 years. With the backing of Ethiopian troops, forces loyal to the interim administration seized control from the Islamists at the end of 2006.[37] Islamist insurgents - including the Al-Shabaab group, which later declared allegiance to al-Qaeda and in 2012 announced its merger with the global Islamist terrorist group - fought back against the government and Ethiopian forces, regaining control of most of southern Somalia by late 2008. Ethiopia pulled its troops out in January 2009. Soon after, Al-Shabaab fighters took control of Baidoa, formerly a key stronghold of the transitional government.

2.3   Consequences of Somalia State Collapse and Continued Instability

Despite building the discussion of colonial boundaries on West Europeans' subjugation of Africans in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this study does not disregard the existence and significance of the dire history of social oppression that predates the European invasion. Nevertheless, most of the problems pertaining to the obscene disruption of Africa's rhythm of life trace their roots to slavery and colonialism, making it pertinent that we briefly revisit the efficacy of imperial frontiers in the area of study.

On the surface, the arbitrary partitioning of Africa by European powers interrupted the tradition of transhumance of pastoral people in the area of study by introducing restrictive formalities to movement and interaction. In the case of the Somali people, imperial partitions often resulted in ethnic reinforcement across imperial frontiers. The vagueness of the colonial boundaries promoted intertribal conflicts over water and good pasture, and in the long term created a justification for secessionism and interstate conflicts.

---

[37] Benedict Anderson; *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*. New York: Verso, United States (1983), p.8.

Most of Somalia has not been stabilized and people continue to be very vulnerable for disasters like drought. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG), established in 2004, is internationally supported but it is still a weak effort to set up a legitimate authority and rule of law. On the one hand it is threatened by warlords; on the other hand by radical Islamic groups, which are also fighting each other. In June 2006, warlords who were powerful in the Mogadishu region were defeated by the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which took control of the capital. Islamization then was a pragmatic way to bring law and order as an alternative to warlordism. But this led to an Ethiopian invasion in December 2006 and eventually to the collapse of the ICU regime. Ethiopian troops left the country in January 2009 and the moderate ICU joined the TFG making it in practice an Islamist government, although a tolerant one towards non-Muslim members in the cabinet and Parliament.

Al-Shabaab consolidated its position as the most powerful insurgent group by driving its main rival, Hizbul Islam, out of the southern port city of Kismayo in October 2009. But al-Shabab was wrongfooted by a series of government and African peacekeeper offensives and a Kenyan army incursion in 2011. They withdrew from Mogadishu in August 2011, the port of Baidoa in February, the key town of Afgoye in May and the port of Merca in August, and lost their last urban stronghold - the major southern port of Kismayo - in October 2012, along with the major inland town of Wanla Weyn. In a sign of growing confidence, Somalia's first formal parliament in more than 20 years was sworn in at Mogadishu airport, marking an end to the eight-year transitional period. Parliament chose Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, an academic and civic activist with little political experience, as president in September 2012. He in turn appointed an economist and businessman, Abdi Farah Shirdon Saaid, prime minister with a brief to stamp out nepotism and clan rivalry.

2.4   Collapse of Somalia State and its Security Impact in Kenya and Ethiopia

In Somalia alone there are at least half a dozen groups that the State department believes have links with Al Qaeda or other related elements. Since the fall of Siad Barre, about two decades ago it is unbelievable that Somalia remains a training ground for terrorist organizations. The US and most of the Western world believed that the fall of Siad Barre had given rise to instability in Somalia. They argued that the country was too unstable and ungoverned and therefore was not conducive environment for militants to train and learn the guerrilla tactics. However, the thought was immediately jettisoned after Ethiopia invaded and removed the Islamist government in Mogadishu.[38]

Following Ethiopia's invasion, several commentators such as Scott Baudauf have considered it as "foreign occupier" of Somalia. Baudauf argued that "Islamist forces were able to pull back, regroup, and recruit thousands of new fighters, at home and abroad, to repel a foreign and Christian occupation of their country". It is evident the invasion made matters worse for the already unstable country.[39] The long-standing absence of authority in the country led to Somali pirates becoming a major threat to international shipping in the area, and prompted Nato to take the lead in an anti-piracy operation. International efforts were seen to bear fruit in 2012, when pirate attacks dropped sharply.

In 2011, the plight of the Somali people was exacerbated by the worst drought in six decades, which left millions of people on the verge of starvation and caused tens of thousands to flee to Kenya and Ethiopia in search of food. After the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, the north-west part of Somalia unilaterally declared itself the independent Republic of

---

[38] Kaldor, M; *New and Old Wars*; Polity Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom (2006), pp. 104 - 105.
[39] Chester Crocker and Fen Osler.; *Managing Global Chaos*, Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2001), pp. 141-54.

Somaliland. The territory, whose independence is not recognised by international bodies, has enjoyed relative stability.

2.5   Chapter Summary

The literature reviewed notes that territorial narrative, on the other hand, constructs the social boundary of Somaliness neither on genealogy nor on the existence of a cultural core, but rather on social, moral, and territorial priorities. It assumes that the Somali society is homogeneous on an abstract idealized level, but in its everyday reality, consists of different groups with different social values and modes of production. The study further observes that as simple as it may seem, this narrative discredits the notion of the a priori nation by acknowledging the existence of previously oppressed social identities, including but not limited to language, caste, and or radicalized social identities. In other words, those suppressed groups are no longer accepting their fate.

Another reason for the crisis is that the idea of segmentation has been totally misconstrued in that both the state and Somali scholars have portrayed lineage segmentation as essentially egalitarian, while in reality it embodies an explicit social hierarchy. In short, clan differentiation in Somalia takes the form of social stratification. These clan-based hierarchies produce similar stratification arrangements as that found in racial and ethnic societies. In other words, it determines who gets what, when, and where. The current Somali civil war must, therefore, be seen as a contradiction between the territorial and state-supported lineage-narrative culture.

CHAPTER 3

INSTABILITY IN SOMALIA AND CROSS-BORDER INSECURITY IN KENYA AND ETHIOPIA

3.0   Introduction

The section looked deeply into chronic instability along the Kenya-Somalia border zone is part of a larger pattern of state failure, lawlessness, and communal violence afflicting the Kenyan border areas. In the same context this section also looked at Ethiopian security situation which bears hallmark to Kenyan situation all attributable to instability in Somalia. The section gives highlights of host of trans-border criminal activities in Kenya and Ethiopia associated with perennial instability in Somalia.

3.1   Cross-Border Insecurity

Johnson[1] notes that the Horn of Africa with its millions of pastoralists who are constantly in search of fertile grasslands, its cross-border communities that share social and ethnic relations, ideally is a region that should have a great interest in peaceful borders, localised mutual border administration, and flourishing regional trade and movement. The reality is that many states in the region tend to take the position that the lack of defined or secured borders encourages violent conflicts and tempts traffickers to defy check-points and border guards.

According to Smidt[2] many of the borders in Africa are porous and constitute no real obstacle to the borderland communities, especially the borders in the Horn of Africa region which have quite symbolic meanings that are contested and fought over. Whereas overall only 20 per cent of African boundaries are demarcated, yet do not cause conflict, in the Horn of Africa

---

[1] Johnson, D; *When Boundaries Become Borders: The Impact of Boundary Making in Southern Sudan's Frontier Zones. Contested Borderlands*. Rift Valley Institute, Kenya (2010), p. 20.

[2] Smidt, W; *The Tigrinya Speakers Across the Borders. Discourse of Unity & Separation in Ethno Historical Context. In: Borders and Borderlands as Resources in the Horn of Africa*, ed. Dereje Feyissa and Markus Hoehne. Woodbridge, UK; Rochester, NY: James Currey (2010), pp. 61 - 84.

borders are a common conflict trigger.[3] Consequently, James[4] notes that although the Ethiopia-Somalia border and the Kenya-Somalia border are not openly contested, the borders are quite insecure. The recent preposition by the two governments to install a buffer zone inside Somalia – in order to curtail the threat of the Somalia jihadist group like al-Shabaab and Al Qaeda crossing over clearly shows the severity of border insecurity in the region.

Woodward[5] observes that accelerated processes of globalization and cross-border flows of information, communication, militants, money and materials are reconfiguring the geopolitics of insecurity in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. According to Woodward, domestic and external drivers of cross-border insecurity are increasingly intermeshed as problems transcend national boundaries and can no longer be contained within states. Issues have become transnationalized as supra- and sub-state networks of exchange bypass state controls.

The previously localized conflicts have developed regional and trans regional dimensions, knitting together the zones of instability, while the growth of powerful and violent non-state actors poses a profound challenge to existing security arrangements and the international order.[6]

Woodward[7] concludes that new mechanisms of collaborative and multilateral approaches have emerged to tackle these issues. However, they have largely failed to address the underlying problems generated by the erosion of local carrying capacities, governing capabilities and a crisis of political legitimacy and authority in the two regions.

---

[3] Ibid.
[4] James, W. *War and Survival in Sudan's Frontierlands: Voices from the Blue Nile*, Oxford University Press United States, (2007) p. 11.
[5] Woodward, Peter; *Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations*, London: I.B. Tauris, (2003), pp. 132-33.
[6] Ibid, pp. 133-34.
[7] Ibid, p. 135.

According to Schlee and Watson[8] in the Horn of Africa, the multiple cross-border flows of violence and instability have undermined state-based approaches to conflict resolution and management and rendered them increasingly obsolete. The disintegration of state and society in Somalia after 1991 was the most prominent. These conflicts transcended national boundaries, especially in Somalia and Somaliland, and in Ethiopia and Eritrea. The dynamics of conflict in Sudan accelerated its division into separate political entities. These exacerbated the fluidity (and artificiality) of national boundaries drawn and redrawn to suit centralized bureaucracies rather than as a reflection of established socio-cultural and economic realities on the ground.

Boucek[9] notes that the notions of statehood especially in the Horn of Africa, is now further challenged by the advancement of interventionist foreign policies and the sponsoring of proxy forces in neighbouring countries, as external forces regularly intervened in ostensibly domestic contests for a variety of ends. Moreover, cross-cutting economic themes, including the regional impact of localized conflict, drought, land rights and remittances, differential levels of access to the sea and trading routes, inequitable sharing of natural resources, and interstate tensions over the management of water and river flows (particularly in the White and Blue Niles), have long been constants in regional politics and international relations in the Horn.

Recognition of their significance has come in efforts to promote regional and multilateral frameworks of policy making in response.[10] At the moment a broader approach to regional security should be based on maintaining social cohesion, the intangible bond that holds members of any society together and facilitates coexistence among diverse groups and communities. This foundation stone of the sustainability of any polity has been frayed by the legacies of conflict.

---

[8] Gunther Schlee and Elizabeth Watson; *Changing Identities and Alliances in North-East Africa*, Berghahn Books New York, (2009), p. 15.
[9] Boucek, Christopher; *War in Saada: From Local Insurrection to National Challenge*, Carnegie Middle East Paper, Saudi Arabia (2010), No. 110, p. 2.
[10] Ibid, p 9.

The re-entry of Ethiopian troops and heavy armaments into Somalia raised the stakes greatly considering the negative consequences of their 2007–2008 occupation of parts of the country.

3.2   Dynamics and dimensions of Cross-Border Insecurity

The chronic instability along the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia border zone is part of a larger pattern of state failure, lawlessness, and communal violence afflicting the Kenyan border areas from Uganda to Somalia, frequently described as "not peace not war." Local communities suffer levels of displacement and casualties akin to civil war, but in a context of sporadic, low-intensity communal clashes punctuated by extended periods of uneasy peace. Spoilers embrace armed conflict not in pursuit of victory but to create conditions of "durable disorder" from which they profiteer. Conventional conflict prevention and management approaches have generally been frustrated in the face of these unconventional conflict dynamics.

Most of peace and security challenges afflicting the Horn of Africa can be identified. This region, specifically Somalia remains a country of grave concern in the global map. Beyond, the devastating famine, the country still remains devilishly trapped in a precarious security situation. Since the January 1991 collapse of Barre's regime, the country hobbled without effective and representative central authority. There are many consequences of cross-border insecurity challenges, including leadership crisis and militarization of politics marked by incessant internal fractionalization, terrorism, piracy, refuges crisis, money laundering, environmental crimes, political polarization and competitive politics in a never-ending shifty and mutative political repositioning.

3.2.1   Refugees as Cross-border Insecurity

The problem of the world's refugees and internally displaced persons is among the most complicated issues before the world community today. Odhiambo[11] argues that refugees' influx in the Horn of Africa is as a result of instability and conflict. He argues that there is no adequate refugee sensitive security framework in the region that addresses the social and physical well being of refugees. He notes that the existing refugee security framework among humanitarian bodies, agencies and government focuses on physical protection rather than human needs.

Prolonged conflicts in Africa have generated thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons. In the Eastern African region Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania have played host to thousands of refugees for long periods of time, some even exceeding 20 years. Williams[12] is of the view that refugee movements occur in periods of regional instability and intensified political manoeuvring, where the governments of both host and sending countries have a variety of political, security and economic interests at stake, as do local authorities. As zones of concentrated resources and people, camps become integrated into the political and security context of the region, making it unlikely that they could be neutral, non-politicized places. Instead, camps are often viewed as components of the conflict, security threats and as resources to further political ends.[13] Most of the worst cases of camp insecurity occur in regions where the refugee flows and refugee camps have a long history of militarization.

Kenya and Ethiopia both are both located near the intersection of the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa conflict systems and thus been the recipient of mass influx of refugees from countries in the two conflict systems. According to Mwagiru[14], Kenya serves as a gathering place

---

[11] Odhiambo-Abuya, E; United *Nations High Commissioner For Refugees And Status Determination in Taxing Kenya: An Empirical Survey*, in Journal of African Law, Kenya (2004), 48 (2), pp. 186-206.

[12] Ibid, pp 300 – 303.

[13] Zolberg, A. R., Suhrke, A. and Aguayo, S; Escape *from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World.* New York: Oxford University Press, (1989), p. 7.

[14] Mwagiru, Makumi; *Human Security: Setting the Agenda for the Horn of Africa*. Nairobi, Africa Peace Forum, Kenya (2008), p 100.

and potential country of asylum for displaced persons from all of these countries. Nairobi is the consulate capital of the region, where high commissions and embassies station their immigration officers to screen refugee applicants for resettlement. This geography of asylum makes Kenya in general and Nairobi in particular attractive places for refugees.

Mwagiru further states that the Kenyan government has attempted to maintain strict control of refugees by containing them in camps, but the reality is that not all refugees live in the camps. Despite efforts to order disorder within the camps, their borders remain porous to refugee movements. Though some live in the camps, many refugees opt for other arrangements.[15]

There are over 640,000 registered refugees in Kenya. Kenya's refugee camps have existed for over twenty years, and mainly host refugees from Somalia and South Sudan. The refugee camps are in Dadaab complex and Kakuma with small number living in other major urban centres. According to Muggah[16] militarization can be acute where refugees deal with arms trafficking or host community is also involved in the trafficking or where refugee camps are themselves part and parcel of a military strategy by belligerents or terrorists. Disarming of incoming refugees have not been very effective due to the mass influx coupled with poorly armed custom and UNHCR official.

Trafficking and smuggling of people, abuse of asylum procedures and difficulties in dealing with unsuccessful asylum-seekers are additional compounding factors. Asylum countries in many parts of the world are concerned about the lack of resolution of certain long-standing refugee problems, urban refugee issues and irregular migration, a perceived imbalance in burden- and responsibility sharing, and increasing costs of hosting refugees and asylum - seekers.[17]

---

[15] Ibid, p 100.
[16] Muggah, Robert; *No Refugee: The Crisis of Refugee Militarization in Africa*. London, Red Books, Unied Kingdom (2006), p 4.
[17] Ibid, p 6.

3.2.2 Weapons Proliferation and Circulation as Cross-border Insecurity

In comparison with major conventional weapons systems, the global trade in small arms and light weapons has been much more difficult to estimate, much less to control. Very few national governments publish statistics on the sale or transfer of small arms and light weapons, even less so private companies (although in many countries private sales must be authorized by governments). Moreover, much of the trade is carried on through black market and other illicit channels. In most case, 'brokers' work outside the control of any state, arranging transfers between two countries while working from the territory of a third country.

An important distinction to bear in mind is that between the proliferation of major weapons systems and the diffusion of small arms and light weapons. As noted by Klare[18], where "proliferation suggests an increase in the number of weapons possessed by certain governments, or in the number of states possessing a particular weapon system, diffusion suggests the dispersion of arms within societies, extending not only to governments and state-owned entities but also to private armies and militias, insurgent groups, criminal organizations, and other non-state actors. East Africa has been faced with a major flow of arms as a result of the continued conflicts in Somalia and the Great Lake Regions. Insecurity was on the rise with increased cases of gun related crimes and cattle rustling. In 1999 when the East African Community (EAC) was formed, it was suggested that sub-regional initiatives were necessary to help alleviate the problems caused by SALW proliferation.[19]

---

[18] Michael Klare,; *Light Weapons Diffusion and Global Violence in the Post-Cold War Era*, in Jasjit Singh, ed., Light Weapons and International Security, Indian Pugwash Society and British American Security Information Council, New Delhi, (1995), p. 3.

[19] Owen, Green; *Examining International Responses to Illicit Arms Trafficking*, Crime, Law and Social Change, University of Bradford, West Yorkshire, England (2000) 33: p 159.

According to Njoroge[20], the proliferation of small arms and light weapons[1] is one of the biggest security challenges currently facing Kenya and the East African sub-region such as, Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya. The trafficking and wide availability of these weapons fuel instability, conflict and pose a threat, not only to security, but also to sustainable development. The widespread proliferation of small arms is contributing to alarming levels of armed crime, in both rural and urban areas, which exacerbates armed cattle rustling and conflicts in pastoralist areas.

Sabala[21] states that Kenya shares porous borders with some of the most politically unstable countries in Africa such as Somalia and South Sudan. Kenya's long and isolated borders with Tanzania, Uganda, Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia – and its 536 km coastline – are difficult to patrol owing to limited resources and insufficient training. Poor and corrupt policing of the borders between Kenya and its neighbours has facilitated the influx of large quantities of small arms into Kenya. Individuals have been able to acquire weapons for overt criminal purposes. The fact that the borders are not properly and effectively policed means that arms traffickers and bandits find easy entry points along the porous borders.

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) affects security in many parts of Africa, while anti-personnel mines and explosive remnants of war kill and maim both people and livestock long after the end of hostilities. Both can have destabilizing effects on social, societal and economic development and can represent major challenges to regional and national security.[22] According to Linen[23], small arms proliferation has been particularly devastating in

---

[20] Njoroge, Mbugua; *Small Arms and Light Weapons in Kenya*, African files, Kenya. (2007) pp 10 – 12.

[21] Kizito, Sabala; *The Proliferation, Circulation and Use of Illegal Firearms in Urban Centers: Case of Nairobi, Kenya*. Bonn: BICC (2002), pp 13-15.

[22] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); *Small Arms and Light Weapons and Mine Action* (2014), p 10.

[23] Christopher L; *The Social Impacts of Light Weapons Availability and Proliferation; International Alert*, A discussion paper the UNIDIR, (1995) pp 200 - 201.

Africa, where these weapons have been used in deadly conflicts between states and at sub-national levels in Sudan, Uganda, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and other African countries. They are frequently recycled from country to country, and their ownership is transferred among fighters, security forces and war profiteers.

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) is one of the biggest security challenges facing the East African region as a whole and Kenya and Uganda in particular. The spread of SALW has, among others, increased various forms of conflict, undermined peace, and contributed to increase in criminal activities especially in urban areas in the region.[24] Collier[25] observes that the number of SALW that permeate this region further exacerbate the suffering of the civilian population. The proliferation of SALW stems mainly from struggles against colonialism and the Cold War. More recently, civil wars in Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan have ushered in a boom in the illegal market in, and illicit use of, SALW. These weapons are now being used in conflicts over natural resources and cattle rustling, and have contributed to soaring violent crime rates in cities such as Nairobi, Mogadishu, and Kigali.

3.2.3 Cattle Rustling as Cross-border Insecurity

The arid/semi-arid northern regions (Turkana, Baringo, Marsabit, Samburu, Laikipia) are part of a conflict-affected region, ravaged by internal and cross-border conflict with raiders from Uganda, Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia.[26] These pastoralist groups in these regions, usually have highest poverty (among 10 poorest Kenya districts), lowest education levels with large numbers out-of-school, highest food insecurity (crisis status on famine-index), and experience highest

---

[24] "Statement by His Excellency Hon. Daniel T. arap Moi," at the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa Conference on Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons," Nairobi, Kenya, (March 14, 2000), p. 3.

[25] Collier, Paul. *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*. World Bank (2003), p. 17.

[26] Amisi, B.K; *Conflicts in the Rift Valley and Western Kenya: Towards an Early Warning Indicator* Identification. A paper prepared to USAID Conference on Conflict Resolution in the Greater Horn of Africa, Nairobi, (1997) pp 34 - 35.

levels of civil insecurity. 90% are dependent on animal husbandry and subsistence agriculture. Unreliable rainfall and cyclical drought impoverishes, causes food scarcity, malnutrition, and high child mortality. Competition over scarce pasture and water is often severe and violent. Cattle rustling, traditionally practiced, has become core destructive with increasing poverty and proliferation of illicit arms and the influence of external political and economic motives.[27]

Amisi[28] observes that the violent conflicts involving pastoralists have become widespread and increasingly severe in the North Rift and North Eastern regions of Kenya, as well as some parts of Ethiopia. The patterns of conflict in the North Rift and North Eastern regions are complex. There are many factors contributing to the risk of violent conflict involving pastoralists, and these have tended to become mutually reinforcing. These conflicts involving pastoralists finally results in the loss of human life, property, displacements of large segments of the communities, disruption of socio-economic activities and livelihoods, increased hatred between communities, environmental degradation and threat to water catchments areas, increased economic hardships as a result of loss of livelihoods, high levels of starvation and malnutrition among the displaced groups and unprecedented dependency syndrome on relief food are the main negative impacts of the increasing and severe inter-ethnic armed conflicts in northern Kenya and Ethiopia.

Munyes[29] states that a key cause of livestock rustling is the geographical, social, and political marginalization of the agro-pastoralist communities living in Eastern Equatoria and the neighbouring regions of Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya. These communities suffer from a lack of basic services, unreliable water supplies, poor leadership, depressed local economies, insufficient

[27] Amisi, B.K.; *Conflicts in the Rift Valley and Western Kenya: Towards an Early Warning Indicator Identification.* A paper prepared to USAID Conference on *Conflict Resolution in the Greater Horn of Africa*, Nairobi, (1997) pp. 34 - 35.
[28] Ibid, pp 36 - 37.
[29] Munyes, John; *The International Conference on Peace and Development among the "Ateker" communities in the Horn of Africa*, *Juba, Southern Sudan,* Unpublished concept paper, Kenya, (2007) p 17.

responses to drought, widespread poverty, and extremely poor health and education. As a result, a culture of cattle rustling has flourished among pastoralist communities, exacerbated by widespread access to and misuse of firearms. Governments' attempts to 'pacify' these communities have tended to be antagonistic, repressive, uneven, and top-down militaristic disarmament operations that have done little to address the root causes of local conflict while failing to provide security for disarmed communities, or to act in the interests of the local people.[30]

Cattle are the main source of livelihood across the Horn of Africa, mainly neighbouring areas of Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia. Cattle provide milk and meat, as well as being a source of wealth and prestige. Ochan[31] notes that traditional livestock raiding, aided by firearms and influenced by commercial, political, and military interests, has degenerated into a free-for-all of vicious attacks and revenge attacks, often involving large numbers of cattle and significant loss of life. The attacks have a strong cross-border dimension and a very major security threat, which can include the abduction of children, and in some cases are organized by cartels controlled by individual military commanders. Ochan[32] further observes that castle rustling occurring in isolated areas, these attacks are often carried out with impunity, as it is extremely difficult to apprehend cattle raiders without mobile and well connected security forces.

According to Mkutu[33]culture of retribution in the region, especially in the absence of any legal method of obtaining justice or compensation for victims, is a major influencing factor in the decision to counter-raid. The need to augment livestock numbers and compensate for thefts in order to survive, support families, and contribute to the productivity of the community, also

---

[30] Ibid, p 18.
[31] Ochan, Clement. *Responding to Violence in Ikotos County, South Sudan: Government and Local Efforts to Restore Order.* Medford, MA: Feinstein International Center, (2007) p. 150.
[32] Ibid, p. 151.
[33] Mkutu, Kennedy Agade; *Small Arms and Light Weapons among Pastoral Groups in the Kenya–Uganda Border Area.' African Affairs*. African Affairs, Kenya. Vol. 106, No. 422, (2007) pp. 47–70.

plays an important role. All pastoralist communities in the region are required to obtain bride price before marrying, creating enormous pressure to acquire cattle.

According to Makumi[34] *et al.*, conflicts along and across the border is complex as some conflicts such as raiding have a long history and have to some extent become aspects of pastoralist culture. The pastoral groups in Kenya living or grazing their livestock along the borders, often get into scuffles with those from neighbouring Ethiopia, Somalia, and Uganda. Turkana county revealed a high number of trans-national raids by Tepeth (Uganda), Jie (Uganda), Dodoth (Uganda), Matheniko (Uganda), Moroto (Uganda), Merilee (Ethiopia), Dongiro (Ethiopia), Dassenech (Ethiopia), Toposa (Sudan), Nyagatom (Sudan) groups. The causal elements, discussed in greater detail in later chapters, are essentially the drawing of administrative boundaries between nation states across traditional migratory routes, as well as the ecological changes such as shrinkage of Lake Turkana basin wholly into Kenya (earlier stretched into Ethiopia).

3.2.4   Piracy as Cross-border Insecurity

Piracy in Somalia dates back many years. According to Murphy[35], dhows and fishing vessels were occasionally attacked off the coast of Somalia even during the 1950s. The roots of the current problem, however, lie in the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 when struggles between clans for political influence and supremacy erupted into a full blown civil war. International interventions to place and support a central government in Mogadishu proved futile according to Menkhaus.[36] Even in 2010 the prospects for a united well-governed Somalia are remote. Pirates take advantage of the easy availability of weapons and men trained in their use,

---

[34] Makumi M; Macharia M,Karuru N; *Understanding Conflicts And Its Management: Centre For Women And Law In East Africa*, West mark printers limited, Nairobi, Kenya (1998), p. 103.

[35] Murphy M; *Somalia: the New Barbary? Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa".* Columbia University Press, United States of America (2010) p.17.

[36] Menkhaus K; *Dangerous Waters,"* Survival, Naval Institute Policy51 (1), Philippines (2009), pp. 21-25.

as well as the abdicated governance in Puntland. Local elites share in the proceeds of piracy and therefore leave pirates to negotiate ransoms in peace from ships openly moored a few nautical miles off the coast for periods of several months as stated by Menkhaus.[37] Local communities are employed in the guarding and feeding of hostages, the negotiation of ransoms and benefit from the secondary effects of pirates spending their ransoms on locally produced goods and services (as well as beautiful brides).

A study by Cockburn[38] observed that the pirates of the Horn of Africa are mainly in the trade for the huge ransoms that they get in exchange of release of crew taken hostage. Following the ousting of the Somali dictator, Siad Barre, Somalia was thrown into a complex conflict of rivalries between warring factions. Post 1991, the state has remained without any central government that led to a general collapse of all semblance of institutions and government. The seas much like the land area was left unguarded and the international illegal fishing companies took advantage of the situation to plunder the Somali waters off all their resources. Unfortunately, international toxic waste handling companies turned Somalia waters into a dumping site for at times even radioactive material.[39] This angered the local fishermen and they started attacks to protect their heritage.[40]

The problem escalated from that of safeguarding their resources to some factions appointing themselves marine guards who would be the 'Somali marine government'. With the help of local warlords, they armed themselves and engaged in attacking ships and holding the crew hostage awaiting ransom payment. These resources would further finance more high tech pirate attacks plus would also be used to exert their presence on the land.

[37] Menkhaus K. ; *Dangerous Waters*, *Survival*, Naval Institute Policy, Philippines (2009) 51 (1), pp. 21-25.
[38] Cockburn, Andrew "*Somalia_A Failed State*" National Geographic (2002), p. 19.
[39] Mohamed BSc. MSc. Abdullahi Elmi; *Causes and Effects of Deforestation and Hazardous Waste Dumping in Somalia*, Somali Centre For Water and Environment (2003).
[40] Khalif Abdulkadir ; *How Illegal Fishing Feeds Piracy,* Somaliland Times Issue 200, Putland, Somalia (2005). Pp2-7

Wilfried notes that piracy in Somalia is deeply rooted in a number of socio-economic factor, predominantly poverty, hunger and civil insecurity of the coastal population. Puntland is currently the epicentre of piracy. This is due in no small part to the fact that vessels can be identified and targeted much more easily as they travel through the Gulf of Aden. Several groups of pirates currently operate in Somali waters, according to reports from the United Nations Secretary General and an experts group convened by the Secretary General's Special Representative for Somalia in November 2008. Organized predominantly along clan lines and based in distinct, remote port towns, the groups have varying capabilities and patterns of operation, making generalized responses more difficult.[41]

Pirates say ransom money is paid in large denomination US dollar bills. It is delivered to them in burlap sacks which are either dropped from helicopters or cased in waterproof suitcases loaded onto tiny skiffs. Ransom money has also been delivered to pirates via parachute, as happened in January 2009 when an orange container with $3 million cash inside it was dropped onto the deck of the supertanker MV Sirius Star to secure the release of ship and crew. To authenticate the banknotes, pirates use currency-counting machines, the same technology used at foreign exchange bureaus worldwide.[42] Somali pirates allegedly get help from the Somali Diaspora.

3.2.5   Terrorism as Cross-border Insecurity

Somalia has been a laboratory for political, religious Islam and an incubator of radical Islamist theory and practice. The struggle for Islamism and religious fundamentalism and those who did not ascribe to the belief became vicious from the earlier days of independence. Scholars

---

[41] Hermann, Wilfried; *Maritime Piracy and Anti-Piracy Measures.* Volume 25 issue Ikken, Massip Farid, Marinetime Studies, United States (2009), p. 33.
[42] Rice Xan; Glendinning Lee; *Pirate Anchor Hijacked Supertanker off Somalia Coast*. Guardian. London, United Kingdom. (2009).

have provided wide insights of re-islamisation of Somalia public life which gave birth to Islamic groupings known as AL Itihad AL Shaaad (AI AI) and first in 1994 and later again 1997 the Islamic Courts were established. The two became precursor to violent extremism, militancy and later became launching pad for AQ Qaida and Al Shabaab ideology which is a source of insecurity in the entire region.

The islamisation led to intra religious struggle which resulted to conflicts with many religious zealots trying to impose *sharia* laws in both secular and religious sectors in Somalia.[43] The conflict was taken to another level and Islamic fundamentalists started advocating for creation of Islamic state and a caliphate in the Eastern Region. The jihadist Islamic conflict and religious extremism has been taken out of Somalia and was quickly spurred, spread and entrenched in Ethiopian and Kenyan society. Another group of religious extremism emerged in the 1980s which was presented to the society in form of Tablique and later Al Islaah which had its origin in Pakistani and Afghanistan and was spread first in Bakaarah area, the main Somali market in Mogadishu. There were no clear-cut doctrinal and ideological boundaries between these religious groups and adherents could change from one group to another but the ultimate goal was to Islamize the country while carrying militancy activities as quickly as possible. The religious and militancy activities propagated by the groups spread from Mogadishu and found its way in Kismayo, Puntland, Barrawe, Merka and Bosaso.

The ideology crossed the borders to Kenya and Ethiopia and other countries in the region but in a more militancy form with advocates determined to make sure the islamisation was entrenched in the region by hook or crook.

---

[43] Alex De Waal; *Islamism and its Enemies In the Horn Of Africa*, C Hurst & Co. Publishers Ltd, United, Kingdom, (2004), pp. 20-70.

The religious supremacy struggle has over a period of time taken a new dimension with most youths and religious leaders getting radicalised, indoctrinated and made to believe that there was religious supremacy which led perceived wars in the region between Islam and other world religious faiths. Many radicalised youths and Violent extremist get their training and tutorials from ideologues and indoctrinators operating in safe haven in unstable somalia. The main aspiration and goal is to create East African Islamic Caliphate.

Historically, Kenya has been among the more accessible and functional places in the region from which Al-Qaeda is said to operate. Parts of its Muslim population are considered vulnerable to radical Salafist or even jihadist appeals, and its society is more open and its institutions and infrastructure more developed than the majority of its neighbours - particularly Somalia. The Kenyan government is among the strongest supporters of western counter-terrorism efforts in the region, including through efforts to bolster capacities of civilian and military authorities. However, al-Shabaab has clearly taken advantage of long, porous borders with Somalia and limited state presence in the northeast to carry out cross-border operations like kidnappings.

The US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania have already been the site of high-profile attacks by Al-Qaeda in 1998 and 2002. Despite the fact that both Kenyan-born Somalis and Somalis from Somalia have deeply vested interests in Kenya, the country is likely to remain a target, especially given the potential for Al-Shabaab to recruit from Somali communities in Eastleigh (a Nairobi neighborhood), Dadab (where Somali refugees have lived in northeastern Kenya since the start of the civil war in the early 1990s) and/or the Mundera region of the northeast (where ethnic Somalis have traditionally lived). The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), states that between 1970 and 2012 there

have been more than 250 terrorist attacks in Kenya. These attacks killed more than 1,000 and wounded more than 5,000 people. More than half of the terrorist attacks in Kenya were concentrated in six cities: Nairobi (61 attacks), Garissa (27 attacks), Mandera (19 attacks), Mombassa (12 attacks), Wajir (12 attacks), and Dadaab (11 attacks).[44]

Kenya's incursion into southern Somalia started after the kidnapping of two Spanish women, who were working for Medicines Sana Frontiers at the Dadaab refugee camp. The abductions were allegedly carried out by Al Shabaab militants.[45] The Kenyan government deployed troops in pursuit of the terrorist amid claims that its troop deployment had received approval from the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG). The Kenyan military said that there was no set exit date for the operation, but the indicator of the mission's success would be a crippling of Al-Shabaab's capacity.[46]

The first attack by Al-Shabaab in the year 2011 was on a blue-collar bar known as Mwaura's in downtown Mfangano Street in Nairobi in October 2011. The hurled grenade left one person dead and wounded more than 20 people. Police said that the weapon used was a Russian-made *F1 grenade*.[47] A second blast occurred later the same day, when a grenade was tossed out of a moving vehicle into the Machakos bus terminus. About fifty nine men and ten women were subsequently hospitalised, of which two were in intensive care and five people were confirmed dead.[48] The group's most lethal attacks are often characterized by assaults on military targets leading to extended clashes, or mass-casualty bombings like that in 2010 that killed scores of civilians gathered to watch a World Cup soccer game in Kampala, Uganda. Thirty of Al-

---

[44] The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [START]. *Al Shabaab Attack on Westgate Mall in Kenya*. Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate's Office of University Programs through Award Number 2012-ST 061-CS0001, CSTAB (2013), pp. 3 - 1.

[45] Leftie, Peter; *The General Tasked With Wiping Out Al-Shabaab*. Allafrica.com (2011), pp. 23 - 29.

[46] Ibid, pp. 37 - 40.

[47] Reuters. *Special Report: In Africa, a militant group's growing appeal*. International (2012), p. 18.

[48] Ibid, pp. 11 - 21.

Shabaab's 548 attacks between 2007 and 2012 were carried out by suicide bombers. These attacks killed 331 people, including the attackers.[49]

In the case of Kenya the Al-Shabaab's most commonly used tactics include bombings and armed assaults, which comprise 72.6 percent of their attacks. Although the group is responsible for almost 90 kidnapping events between 2007 and 2012, it did not carry out any hostage-barricade attacks, like the one at Westgate mall, during this time period.[50] In Kenya, to date, the attack at Westgate mall is Al-Shabaab's only recorded hostage-barricade attack, in which perpetrators occupy a location and hold hostages on site rather than abducting them. As we observed in Nairobi, perpetrators of these events often engage in a stand-off with security forces before the situation is resolved. Hostage-barricade attacks have occurred nearly 800 times worldwide between 1970 and 2012 and some have been highly lethal.[51] Ethiopia has been spared by Al Shabaab terrorist attacks. However attacks in Ethiopia have been isolated which is attributed to Ethiopian security agencies crackdown on elements associated with violent extremism which prevented Al Shabaab menace in Ethiopian territory.

3.2.6 Clan and Tribal Clashes

Belying the simplicity of Somalia's arid landscape and time-honoured poetry is a clan system based on intricate communal arrangement of extensive blood ties. The social structure is distinguished by inter and intra clan rivalry over everything from governing affairs to foraging rights and water privileges.[52] Somalia clans and sub clans are most united when there is an

---

[49] The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [START]. *Al Shabaab Attack on Westgate Mall in Kenya*. Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate's Office of University Programs through Award Number 2012-ST 061-CS0001, CSTAB (2013), pp. 3 - 11.
[50] Ibid, pp. 7 - 13.
[51] Ibid, pp. 3 - 11.
[52] Kenneth R. Rutherford; *Humanitarianism Under Fire; The US and UN Intervention in Somalia*. Somalia. Kumaria Press, United States of America. (2008), pp. 1-10.

external threat. They cobble together an alliance to take on the threat and then break apart after the passes. Perhaps the most unifying factor among all Somalis is their combined loathing of distribution of land to Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti by the colonial powers who demarcated Somalia land as it formed the protectorates.[53] This was resisted vigorously by combined and united forces made of clans. This led to cross- border wars in the neighbouring countries. In Kenya it came in form of Shifta war whereas in Ethiopia there was the Ogden war. As the Somali clans waged these wars the region experienced instability.

Clan units break apart or unite in reaction to circumstances. The traditional Somalia governing system is an anarchic condition, dependent upon clan self–regulation for sanction. The clan conflicts has been exacerbated and exported across the border. During the regime of Said Barre the Somali clans turned against each other fighting complex wars inside Somalia territory and across the border. When Barre was being deposed from power in 1991 Somalia clan based rebels joined the gun running battles with government forces fighting and pillaging the capital and all towns. After the exit of Barre the situation in Somalia degenerated into anarchy with clan based militia turning the guns into one another. Most of the general fighting targeted Darod and Issaq clans and sub clan of Marehan who supported Barre's regime. Historical hostility towards northerners violently manifested itself once the Barre threat unifying them disappeared as the country returned to time-honoured clan grouping.[54]

Again the disfranchised clan conflicts have impacted negatively on border security where deadly clan wars have been fought in Kenya and Ethiopia. High levels of poverty , unemployment, alienation , environmental degradation, conflicts over water and rangeland and political reasons there has been complex inter and intra clan conflicts in North Frontier Districts

---

[53] Ibid , pp. 10-11.
[54] Ibid, pp. 12.

(NDF) in Kenya especially Mandera, Wajir and Garrisa districts. Spillover from protracted state collapse in Somalia has been a key driver in the border areas producing destabilising flows of refugees, gun smuggling, banditry, warfare, kidnapping and other cross –border problems. The trend towards clan or tribally based locations in Kenya, ethno-states in Ethiopia (Ogaden region)and proportional clan based representations in Somalia has led to hardening ethnic identities , localised ethnic cleansing and clan tensions which has led to periodic communal violence in the three countries. These clan differences can be classified as a source of cross-border insecurity both Kenya and Somalia.

3.2.7   Radicalization of youths

Radicalisation is a subjective process through which individuals usually young people, are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages them to move from beliefs that are generally moderate and mainstream, towards very extreme views, which are violent in nature to redress social grievances. Radicalisation and violent extremism therefore, starts in the mind. It manifests itself through a grievance, genuine or not. The perception of a grievance is fuelled and spurred by an extremist motivating ideological narrative. When these two are accompanied by a degree of operational capability and a triggering agent that propels the aggrieved into action, a terrorist act is, most likely, bound to occur.

There are three clearly defined stages for one to get radicalised and join the pool of violent extremist group. The first phase is the predisposition stage where the aggrieved person become aware of their grievance and in an uncompromising manner, they demand its absolute, radical and immediate redress in this case the grievance can be economic, social or political exclusion or any other, genuine or not. The second phase is the vulnerability stage, which is the defining stage in the process. The aggrieved person identifies the extent, nature and the cause of

their grievance. Jealousy, hatred and demonization of the group or class that is perceived to be responsible for the state the aggrieved find themselves in. The last phase is the precipitators stage where society's inability to provide a solution that could diffuse the growing tension opens the door for preachers, agitators, radicals and opportunists to chip in, construct an ideological narrative that gives sense and legitimacy to the grievance, justification and blessing to terrorism as an instrument of political activism.

In Kenya, and in indeed in other countries in the region radicalization as a process has evolved over time. The desire by Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab operatives to create a significant pool of radicalized youth, easily deployable for terrorism missions and carry out attacks in the region has largely been achieved. The desire to perpetuate AQ's and its surrogate Al Shabaab's ultimate goal of creating an East African Islamic caliphate has been the driving force behind radicalisation. Indoctrinators and recruiters offer very few incentives in form of money and good life to potential recruits. These factors have left members of the public, especially the youth, susceptible to the influences of extremist ideology.

In East Africa and Horn of Africa regions, radicalization and recruitment of youth continues to take place in various regions with indoctrinators using specific Mosques and Madrassas where distributing video Compact Disks (CDs) propagating radicalism narrative is done. Their message urges the youth to go to Somalia and fight alongside Al-Shabaab and also to wage war against their country in pursuit of the establishment of Pan- Islamic state in the region. The proximity of Kenya to Somalia, open internet, slow growth of regional economies which are unable to absorb many job seekers, poverty, corruption perceived marginalisation and historical injustices has made radical extremists and Jihadists some operating from Somalia to find the

Kenya a fertile recruiting ground for both radicalisation and terrorism. n Islamic caliphate in the region.

The active attempt to recruit youth to fight on behalf of Al Shabaab has led to a considerable flow of youth from Kenya to Somalia. There has been a significant number of youth going to Somalia to take part in combat operations or attend training camps. The movements of the youths sometimes reverse and many Kenya who are trained in the rank and file of Al Shabaab return to Kenya depending on the security situation in both countries. Those who have returned in the country as *returnees* and pose security threats as those youths are highly trained and can be used as goons for hire. Looking at the recent attacks on Churches, Social places, mass transport vehicles and street protests in Kenya, there have been clear indications of local extremists, who were trained and hardened in Somalia, returning to the country to carry out such attacks.

Radicalization of youth is the epicentre of terrorism and extremist activities in region and constitutes the biggest threat to peace and security in the entire region. The nexus between radicalisation and extremism in the states bordering the unstable Somalia has manifested itself in different ways over the past years. Radicalisation and extremism are the precursors and the foundation upon which terrorism thrives. The fight against radicalisation and extremism should be considered as the first line of defense against terrorism. Al Shabaab is actively seeking to recruit Kenyans to travel to Somalia to fight for Al Shabaab and to carry out attacks in the country. Recruitment and indoctrination done in unregistered Madrassas and Duksis spread across the country. Non Muslims also targeted for recruitment for operational purposes. Recruitment is usually conducted by local and foreign radical clerics under the cover of religion. Three of the Westgate mall attackers were madrassa teachers in Eastleigh, Nairobi. They have

mostly exploited poverty, hopelessness, perceived injustices and marginalization to radicalize and recruit youth. Violent take over Mosques, Madrassas and Islamic Welfare Institutions in Kenya for radicalization of youth. Men armed with knives and other crude weapons offer security to radical clerics to prevent security personnel and other hostile people from entering the mosques. Invitation of radical preachers from foreign countries to deliver radical sermons.

The sermons urge believers to attack security personnel, non-believers, churches, tourists, western interests, and vital installations.Militant Jihadist Conventions (Masjid Musa incident on 02.02.14) while flying Al Shabaab Flag. •Majorly bank rolled by business tycoons both in Kenya and Somalia, with divergent interests. Misappropriated funds from Islamic foundations which engage in humanitarian activities. The Al Shabaab has managed to develop an effective radicalization support infrastructure in Kenya, which involves recruiting, indoctrinating, and training youth to unleash terror on fellow Kenyans indoctrination is usually done in Specific Mosques and Madrassas, Refugee Camps Educational Institutions Media/internet

Closely related to radicalisation Kenya and the entire East and Horn of Africa sub-region has experienced different forms of other threats in form of violent extremism. This is adduced by reports from the community level suggesting that underground extremists have built networks across the region going by different names and leadership structures. The recent terrorist attacks in Nairobi Westgate Mall and earlier though small but significant assaults in Eastleigh suburb of Nairobi, Garissa in Nothern Kenya and Mombasa in Coast offers evidence that Kenya is increasingly becoming home to violent extremist groups. The recent attacks have been blamed on Al-Shabaab and other underground extremist networks in retaliation for Kenya's deployment of troops in neighboring Somalia in 2012 intended to drive out Al-Shabaab terrorists blamed for a series of attacks on Kenyan territory. In the past there have been cases of violent extremism in

Ethiopia although the threat has largely been subdued through sustained security operation backed by community engaged inside Ethiopia and in the common borders.

3.3   Impact of Cross-border Insecurity in Kenya and Ethiopia

According to Karimi[55], cross border conflicts between the pastoral communities have been attributed to many factors which include inadequate policies guiding the utilization of the natural resources across and along the borders and the fact that any land between two neighbouring countries is considered no man's land. Other factors include diminishing role of traditional governance systems and competition over control and access to natural resources such as pasture and water and land issues, political incitements by the leaders of warring communities.

There are allegations that economically powerful people encourage conflicts to flush out would be supporters of political opponents. Kamenju *et al*. [56], notes that the prevalence of insecurity in the area has spawned the gun culture in a bid for pastoralists to protect themselves and their livestock from aggressors. Armed violence not only kills, but also causes fear, migration and disrupted livelihoods. Seasonal pastoral mobility, both internal and cross-border, has also been negatively affected by widespread confiscations of communal pastoral land to make way for agricultural projects, conservation areas, and national parks, and the privatisation of water and grazing land (ibid). The insecurity of border areas, and concerns about the spread of trans-border animal diseases, are also among the reasons why national policies have often discouraged such livestock movements and trade.

Another major impact of cross-border is results in closely related to radicalisation Kenya and the entire East and Horn of Africa sub-region has experienced different forms of other

---

[55] Karimi M; *Conflict in Northern Kenya*: *A Focus On The Internally Displaced Conflict Via Northern,* ITDG –EA, United States Institute of Peace (2003), pp. 90 - 99.

[56] Kamenju, Mwachafi, Wairagu; *Profiling Small Arms and Insecurity in the North Rift Region of Kenya,* Oakland Media Services Ltd, Nairobi, Kenya (2003), p. 6.

threats in form of violent extremism. This is adduced by reports from the community level suggesting that underground extremists have built networks across the region going by different names and leadership structures. The recent terrorist attacks in Nairobi Westgate Mall and earlier though small but significant assaults in Eastleigh suburb of Nairobi, Garissa in Nothern Kenya and Mombasa in Coast offers evidence that Kenya is increasingly becoming home to violent extremist groups.

The recent attacks have been blamed on Al-Shabaab and other underground extremist networks in retaliation for Kenya's deployment of troops in neighboring Somalia in 2012 intended to drive out Al-Shabaab terrorists themselves blamed for a series of attacks on Kenyan territory. In the past there have been cases of violent extremism in Ethiopia although the threat has largely been subdued through sustained security operation backed by community engaged inside Ethiopia and in the common borders. Al-Shabaab sympathizers in Kenya and Ethiopia and other underground extremist networks have established significant presence across social media outlets where they control several well-moderated *Facebook* pages that propagate Jihad and anti-democracy narratives, free distribution of Jihadi publications. It is suspected that radical Muslims propagate their ideology and recruit unsuspecting youthful population. They have mastered a strategy of attacking moderate scholars using vulgar and abusive language with the aim of undermining their influence in the society and discouraging their involvement in the social media. Major victims of this very effective campaign are prominent Muslim scholars opposed to extremist interpretation of religious teachings and classical traditions.

Another aspect which has come into the fore is spread of Salafi Jihadist ideology is accompanied by a recruitment drive where hundreds of poor Muslim youth from across the country and indeed in region are brainwashed and recruited to fight for the Al-Shabaab in the

guise of jihad. Sizeable Muslim youthful population has rebelled against mainstream religious leadership and established their own youth led organized and vulnerable groups. Extremist cells blamed for recruitment of Kenyan youth who joined Al-Shabaab militants in Somalia are still active and currently involved in nourishing a pre-existing sense of Islamic revivalism in Kenya. This precarious situation poses a huge security threat as many disillusioned Kenyan youth get persuaded to join extremist groups. The security threat posed by these extremist networks operating both in remote rural and urban villages is aggravated by limited capacity of religious leaders to effectively counter their narrative and protect the youth from possible recruitment by highly radicalized closely-knit and secretive *Salafi Jihadists* taking advantage of the leadership vacuum. Most of these extremism cases are bred in expansive refugee camps and fraternity spread in the country where foreigners have found safe haven to propagate the asymmetrical ideology.

3.4 Possible Solutions to Cross-border Insecurity in Kenya and Ethiopia

Cross-border herd mobility - a traditional strategy for livestock trade and production and for mitigating the risks of drought and conflict - has long been constrained. Mobile pastoralist systems are still viewed in a negative light and national government policies have therefore sought to 'modernise' pastoralist communities and encourage them to settle**.** The regional nature of pastoralism and the importance of adopting a regional approach to reducing the vulnerability of pastoral communities to drought, conflict and other risks are increasingly recognised in policy debates. Addressing cross border issues for drought management in drylands of the Horn of Africa is critical, since the major livelihood, pastoralism, spans national borders, which often cut across landscapes, watersheds and ethnic groups. Mobility is a crucial drought coping strategy for pastoralist communities as well as being essential for economic and environmental

71

development. Land use planning, livestock health, natural resource management, peacebuilding and marketing interventions all have obvious cross border dimensions in dryland areas.

Cross border implementation where a single activity is implemented with communities on both sides of the border, as if the border was not there e.g. rehabilitation of a water point that is used by both communities where both communities jointly identify, plan, implement and manage the activity. The contentious question of reverting control to tribal elders in contrast to pushing the rule of law remains unresolved. The power of the elders and respect afforded to them in by virtue of their positions remains strong, and many support the restoration.

Some Kenyan state actors have been a source of conflict rather than a source of prevention and mediation. Under the previous administration, government officers reportedly were complicit in commercialized livestock rustling in the region. Today, some Members of Parliament in the region are accused of fomenting ethnic tensions in pursuit of parochial political gain. When it comes to Kenya, especially the northern border areas, the mediated state approach may be the only alternative to anarchy in the short to medium term. As an approach to state-building, it has a number of advantages. It is flexible with regard to selection of local partners; it provides the state with governing partners who possess deep knowledge of local affairs and who are real stakeholders in promoting peace; and it allows external aid agencies seeking to assist with both state-building and conflict prevention the opportunity to work both to improve government capacity and provide local Community Based Organizations (CBOs) with needed support.

Peace and security can also be achieved by strengthening the governing capacity of the mediated state helps local communities manage conflicts, but does little to address the underlying sources of conflict afflicting the border area. A more comprehensive conflict

prevention policy must also address key conflict drivers themselves. Endemic poverty and low levels of education in the border areas are other major conflict drivers which urgently need attention. Local residents consistently cite lack of access to education as a major impediment for regional development, and international aid agency data back them up.

3.5   Chapter Summary

The study notes that instability in Somalia and cross-border insecurity in Kenya and Ethiopia is not as simple as it seems. This instability has been on-going for quite some time now, as the instability which periodically plagues the Kenya-Somalia border area is part of a broader, complex pattern of state failure and communal violence afflicting much of the Horn of Africa. Violence and lawlessness are particularly acute in remote border areas where states in the region have never projected much authority. When they have, state authorities have sometimes been the catalysts of insecurity rather than promoters of peace.

The Somali-Kenya border thus is doubly troubled – by the chronic failure of the Kenyan government to establish a meaningful administration in its border areas, and by the complete and prolonged collapse of the state in Somalia. But the region's general crisis of instability is by no means unique. Similar patterns of communal violence and lawlessness occur throughout Somalia and all along Kenya's and Somali's border.

CHAPTER 4

MAIN ACTORS AND GROUPS OPERATING IN SOMALIA

4.0   Introduction

This chapter analyzed the findings, interpretation and a presentation of data in line with the objectives of the study – whose aim was to look for linkages between instability in Somalia and its effects on Kenyan and Ethiopian security situation. This study sought to answer what are the contributing factors to the collapse of Somalia State and continued instability in the Country? What is the relationship between instability in Somalia and the cross-border insecurity in Kenya and Ethiopia? Who are the actors that promote (in) stability in Somalia and the cross-border insecurity? *Al Shabaab* terror group operating in Somalia have any linkage between them and terrorism activities in Kenya and Ethiopia?

4.1   Data presentation and analysis

The main target populations for this study included Ministry Of Defence, Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Anti-terrorism Police Unit (ATPU), National Counter Terrorism Center, Ethiopian Embassy, Somali Embassy, Immigration Agencies, Security Agencies, and Civil Societies, National Intelligence Service (NIS), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Directorate of Refugee Agency, National Registration Bureau, The Ministry of Interior and National Coordination, County Administration (County Commissioners) and other experts. The study employed purposive sampling specifically to pick out these key informants. This is a form of non-probability sampling in which decisions concerning the individuals to be included in the sample are taken by the researcher, based upon a variety of criteria which may include specialist knowledge of the research issue, or capacity and willingness to participate in the research.

4.2   Rate of Response

The informants were obtained from the initial (60) key respondents initially targeted as shown in figure 1.

Figure 1: Rate of Response

Figure 1 shows the rate of informant response, (57) out of (60) questionnaires that were administered were successfully filled and returned. This represented (95%) response rate, ensuring that the sample size remained as close to the original size as possible.

4.3   Socio-Demographics

4.3.1   Age

The informants gave their age, as shown in table 1.

Table 1: **Age of Respondents**

Age	Frequency	Percent (%)
Under30 years	6	16.2
30-39 years	11	28.7
40-49 years	13	35.1
50-59 years	7	18.9
Total	**57**	**100.0**

The table shows the ages were grouped into four classes with a difference of ten years apart. The Modal class being the ages in 30 - 39 which was represented by 35.1%, followed by 40-49 which had a percentage of 29.7%; 50-59 years had 18.9% while those who were below 30 had 16.2%. The table shows that the majority of informants were found in age group 40-49 years.

4.3.2 Gender

The informants indicated their gender as shown in figure 2.

GENDER

35% 65%

Figure 2: Gender of informants

Figure 2 on the gender of informants found that (65%) of the respondents were male, (35%) were female. Security being a slightly male dominated filed was expected to have more men.

4.3.3 Marital status

The informants indicated their marital status as shown in figure 3.

Figure 3: Marital Status of Respondents

Figure 4 on the marital status of informants found that (60%) married, (21%) single, (12%) divorced and (7%) widowed respectively. Defence and security being a slightly male dominated field was expected to have more men.

4.3.4   Education

The informants were asked of their level of education as shown in table 2.

Table 2: **Education level of informants**

Level of Education	Frequency	Percent (%)
Secondary	2	5.4

Tertiary College	12	32.4
First Degree	14	37.8
Postgraduate	9	24.3
Total	**37**	**100.0**

The study found that 37.8% of the informants had attained a university degree at the graduate level, 32.4% had a tertiary college education, and 24.3% of the respondents had attained postgraduate level of education while 5.4% had secondary education.

4.3.5 Occupation of the Respondents

The respondents were asked to indicate their occupation - the responses are presented in figure 3.

Figure 5: Occupation of Respondents

The figure 5 indicates that majority of the respondents were civil servants (26), security (12), business (10) and Non-governmental organization (9). This was a clear indication of their understanding of the field of study.

4.3.6 Awareness of instability in Somalia

The respondents were asked to indicate their awareness of the instability in Somalia.

Figure 4: Awareness level of respondents

The figure 4 indicates that 57 (98%) of the respondents were very much aware of the term defence diplomacy, while only 3 (2%) were quite unsure of its true definition.

4.4   Instability in Somalia

4.4.1   Contributing factors to Somalia Collapse

Majority of the respondents (80%) stated that clannism was the main cause of Somalia collapse – they reveal that most of the fights have been over resources such as land and water, which were seen as fundamental resources to survive. Tribes and clans have re-emerged as the

form of social and political order and over time the situation has proved not as violent as depicted in many movies, especially in comparison to other countries. (10%) indicated that the contributing factor to be bad politics, and while the remaining (10%) the cause as poverty. One responded state that, *warlords and few other individual like warlords benefit from the chaos in Somalia by operating illegal businesses*.

Clanism was defined by the respondents as a bidding bond between members of the bigger family through patrilineal kinship. This influences the being of the people in the society whether political or social allegiances, which are determined by descent in the male line and can change depending on one's prevailing interest in the community. Many informants describe Somalia as a "pawn" of the Cold War, as the United States and the Soviet Union competed for global influence.

The study found that influence of colonialism, the Cold War, an undiversified economy, and failed structural adjustment programs have been analyzed to explain Somalia's decline. The study notes that finally these factors led to clan warfare, the collapse of state under Siad Barre, squandered foreign food aid, and the sole reliance on the shadow economy after 1991.

Semi-arid, pastoralist zones in the border areas of Kenya constitute the "frontier" area, where state capacity to exercise authority is weak to non-existent. The absence of the state in these areas breeds lawlessness and compels local communities to rely upon informal systems of protection, usually involving a combination of tribal or clan militias (for deterrence and retaliation) and traditional authorities and customs (for conflict management and justice).

Distinguishing characteristics of the Kenya-Somalia border areas include: the complete absence of a state counterpart on the Somali side of the border; the existence of more robust

forms of local, informal governance and conflict management than anywhere else in Kenya's border regions; the rise of vibrant cross-border trade of commercial goods and cattle; and the dominance of a single ethnic group, (the Somali), on both sides of the border.

The study found that a number of local factors have contributed to improved security and informal governance on both sides of the Kenya-Somalia border, especially in north-eastern Kenya. Progress suggests that local peace and conflict prevention mechanisms have real promise; however, since 2004, serious armed clashes in *Mandera* and *El Wak* have rendered the region highly insecure and are indicators that local conflict prevention mechanisms are not a panacea and face limits in their ability to stem conflicts born of much broader, structural forces at play in the region.

Chronic instability along the Kenya-Somalia border zone is part of a larger pattern of state failure, lawlessness, and communal violence afflicting the Kenyan border areas from Uganda to Somalia, frequently described as "not peace not war." Local communities suffer levels of displacement and casualties akin to civil war, but in a context of sporadic, low-intensity communal clashes punctuated by extended periods of uneasy peace. Spoilers embrace armed conflict not in pursuit of victory but to create conditions of "durable disorder" from which they profiteer.

4.4.2   Relating instability in Somalia to Kenya and Ethiopia

Majority of the respondents (58%) noted that this conflict has increased the proliferation of weapons in the region and insecurity. The study found that as the warlords continue to pursue their personal objectives, the state of affairs in Somalia has attracted the influx and stockpiling of weapons most small and light weapons. Some neighbouring states and others away from the

Horn of Africa region with geopolitical interests in the reconstruction of Somalia continue to arm various political and military factions. These arms not only circulate in Somalia but also find their way to other neighbouring countries; they find their way to Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia as well as regions beyond the Horn of Africa.

Some respondents (12%) noted that the abundance of weapons has changed the face of criminal activities in the region as cattle rustlers, bandits and rebel groups acquire weapons from Somalia. Cattle rustling and banditry has changed from low intensity to high intensity conflict making large areas of the Horn of Africa and East Africa ungovernable. However, the small arms themselves do not cause conflict or criminate activities but their availability in a volatile environment causes the violence. Communal and clan tensions which escalate to full pledge conflicts and clashes were noted by some respondents as the order of the day in Somalia.

Others (16%) noted that situation in Somalia has led to escalating terrorist, militarization and radicalization of the vulnerable groups. Militarization of Somalia conflict by Barre's Regime Ayittey carries the review of 52 African states and the militarisation process, which has affected the character of these nation states. Effects on the Kenyan Security Kenya greatly suffered the misrule of Barre's regime from the shifta war fought in the northern frontier to incursions by fleeing soldiers after the collapse of the nation. The internalisation of the conflict by Barre had immediate security impact on the Kenyan borders.

This increased banditry, proliferation of small arms and continuous hit and run battles affecting the whole of the northern region. The end of the shifta war did not improve the security or living conditions in NFD as fast as expected due to the hostilities between the various Somalia

clans found astride the common border. The flooding of the region with small arms led to their proliferation in all parts of Kenya.

The impact on security in the region one primary impact in the region as observed by many is lawlessness after the collapse of the nation-state. This as informants stated, *that factional leaders want to control the key towns, ports and agricultural land. The ongoing crisis in Somalia was accelerated by external support of rival clan warlords.*

The Kenya–Somalia–Ethiopia borderlands constitute a dynamic livestock trading zone that supports the livelihoods of thousands of people. Despite the political turbulence of the last 20 years, the export of animals to feed the growing Kenyan market for meat has expanded and flourished.

The trade networks have proved resilient and resourceful in adapting to a host of political challenges, including changing 'regimes' in Southern Somalia since state collapse. The overall result has been a shift in direction of the livestock export trade away from the Middle East and towards East Africa, thus building closer economic ties in the region. The nature of the cross-border trade poses challenges to national and local-level authorities, both in terms of development and revenue collection and for border security management.

4.5   Groups operating in Somalia

4.5.1   The Al Shabaab

Majority of the respondents (90%) noted Al Shabaab as one of the most notorious groups operating in Somalia.   Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (HSM) more commonly known as *Al-Shabaab* (Arabic: "The Youth"), is the Somalia-based cell of the militant Islamist group al-

Qaeda. As of 2012, the group controls large swathes of the southern parts of the country, where it is said to have imposed its own strict form of *sharia* (law). Al-Shabaab's troop strength as of May 2011 was estimated at 14,426 militants.[1] In February 2012, Al-Shabaab leaders quarrelled with Al-Qaeda over the union, and quickly lost ground.[2]

Militant Islamic influence has existed in Somalia for decades but did not have a meaningful impact on the political situation during the dictatorial rule of President Siad Barre. With his overthrow in 1991, followed by the total collapse of the central government, a number of different Somali forces quickly took advantage of the political vacuum and expanded their influence. For the first fifteen years or so, Somali warlords held most of the power, although various Islamic groups also became more assertive. Some of the Islamist organizations were benign and had a strictly Somali agenda. Others, including Al Shabaab, developed a program based on Islamic power and increasingly became subject to foreign influence.[3]

Literally, the Arabic word, Shabaabʿ means ,the youth.ʿLike all Islamist groups in Somalia, al-Shabaab is the by-product of the larger Islamic Awakening Movement (IAM) of Somalia, ,the non-Sufi Islamic phenomenon that began to trickle into Somalia since the early 1960s, shortly after Southern and Northern Somali territories declared their separate independences from the Italian and British colonies, respectively, and formed the modern-day Somali state. Prior to that, the salient Islamic orientation in Somalia was decidedly Sufi. ʿThe IAM can be divided into two major orientations (itijah): the Salafi and the Ikhwani orientations'.[4] Harakat Al-Shabaab has since 2006 attracted increasing attention. The use of suicide bombings, the presence of foreign fighters, various declarations of loyalty towards the

---

[1] Abdisaid M. Ali; *The Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahidiin*: *A Profile of the first Somali Terrorist Organization*. Institut für Strategie Politik Sicherheits und Wirtschaftsberatung (ISPSW), Berlin, Germany,(2008), p. 19-23.
[2] Ibid, p. 39.
[3] Schmitt, E., Gettleman; *Qaida Leader Reported Killed in Somalia*. The NY Times, (May 2, 2008), p. 57.
[4] Ibid, p. 58.

international AL-Qaeda network, and the Kampala attacks on the 11 July in 2010 are factors that have contributed to this development, as have reports that the Al-Shabaab has trained Islamists from other African countries, such as Kenya and Nigeria.[5]

The organization is also global, in the sense that it has reached out to the Somalis in diaspora, a fact that has made Western countries more concerned over Al-Shabaab's activities. These factors might have contributed to the United States declaring it a terrorist organization in 2008. Australia doing the same in 2009, and the United Kingdom and Canada following suit in 2010, it has also been targeted by the United Nations Resolution 1844, as well as the EU's EC 356/2010 directive, supporting the definition of Al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization. The group also has training camps indoctrinating Somali youths in the teaching of Al-Qaeda, and it functions as a practicing ground for recruits inspired by the global worldview of Al-Qaeda drawn to Somalia by a quest for jihad but potentially able to take the struggle back home.[6]

The reports of the International Crisis Group (ICG) are also based on researchers conducting in-depth field research on Al-Shabaab. Since the Crisis Group has followed Somalia over time, its work provides a unique opportunity to follow Al-Shabaab in an English text. The group has several reports on Counter-Terrorism in Somalia. Losing Hearts and Minds and Somalia's Islamists' provide the background in which the organization crystallized, a shadow war between the United States and Al-Qaeda in East Africa, in which the United States attempted to use warlords to kill members of the network. It was in a setting as the reports examine, that a new group of more radical Somalis, the nucleus of Al-Shabaab is said to have emerged in 2003.[7] The reports also explore how the group drew upon the *Ayr* clan for protection

---

[5] *Stockholms Tingrett*, 'dom DOM B 7277-10 2010-12-08,'Stockholm, Sweden (12 August 2010), pp. 45-55.
[6] Ibid, pp. 55-56.
[7] Oliver Roy. *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. London: Hurst,* United Kingdom (2004), pp. 78-80.

in the early phase. The 2010 report Somalia's Divided Islamists contained an in depth analysis of the organization and suggested that its popularity was in decline partly because of Ethiopian withdrawal in 2009 and partly because of its drastic use of suicide attacks, especially the 2009 attacks on graduation ceremony.[8]

Al-Shabaab ideology is most usually analyzed using the expressions Salafism, Wahahbish and Takfirism – Salafism and Wahhabism being left poorly defined. Insufficient attention is given to the differences between a defensive international jihad, in which individuals are committed to defend my country attacked by a non-Muslim power a defensive revisionist jihad in which individuals are committed to defending Muslims all over the world, removing the borders separating Muslims and favoring reforms and nationalist-Islamism stance in which Islam is seen as one identity marker of Somaliness. This might be due to what Partrick Desplat refers to as blurred ideological lines-the fact that various ideological stands might overlap and change from setting to setting and clear ideological distinctions are hard to identify on the ground.[9]

Al-Shabaab was perhaps the first Somali Organization that drew non-Somali fighters into its ranks, often attracted by its global rhetoric and also at times by money. At the same time Somalis in the diaspora returned to fight for Al-Shabaab, creating the possibility for what Western intelligence called blow back a trained or indoctrinated fighter returning to a Western country and staging a terror attack. Radicalization theory identifies several issues that can radicalize individuals. Tedd Robert Gurr[10] for example, stresses relative deprivation the feeling of not getting what you believe you are entitled to.

Ibi, pp. 78-80.

[9] David Shinn; *Al-Shabaab's Foreign Threat to Somali*, Orbis, Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, USA (2011), p. 98.

[10] Ibid, p. 98.

Issues of foreign occupation and general humiliation have also been touched upon by several researchers. Identity issues are discussed in depth by Olivier Roy and Turfy Choudhury and Jeff Vistoroff[11] presents a good overview of psychological issues. Poor political and socio-economic integration is also an issue. The Somali diasporas is in itself vulnerable in many of these accounts, in general Somalis abroad are poorer and less educated than other diaspora groups, creating a sense of humiliation. However, it should be noted that examples of radicalization often come from rather well – off strata inside the diaspora in fact jihadists seem to be well educated young men with families. Humiliation and occupation are nevertheless important, but rather indirect.[12]

4.4.2   Al Qaeda

The study notes that to begin with, Al-Qaeda's known presence on the continent has been primarily within the countries of North and East Africa. The North African role in the story of global jihad is closely linked to the founding of Al-Qaeda. In 1989, when Soviet troops left Afghanistan, scores of North Africans returned to their home countries, feeling proud of their role fighting alongside the Afghan *mujahideen* in what they felt was a successful jihad against an infidel superpower that had invaded a Muslim country. They returned to Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya and Egypt, where many joined local radical Islamist groups. The largest number of these returning North African fighters was Algerians. Upon returning to their home country

---

[11] Somalia's wing of the Muslim Brotherhood is known by the name Harakat Al-Islah or "Reform Movement". Nonetheless, the Brotherhood, as mentioned earlier, has inspired many Islamist organizations in Somalia. Muslim Brotherhood ideology reached Somalia in the early 1960s, but Al-Islah movement was formed in 1978 and slowly grew in the 1980s. Al-Islah has been described as "a generally nonviolent and modernizing Islamic movement that emphasizes the reformation and revival of Islam to meet the challenges of the modern world", whose "goal is the establishment of an Islamic state" and which "operates primarily in Mogadishu"

[12] Joannis Gatsiounis; *Somali Terror Group Curtailed. Washington Times*. (10 July 2011). Pg

they found a growing Islamist movement that offered a natural home for the sentiments of these self-described holy warriors.

Majority of the respondents (92%) state that after more than a decade of combating Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the United States now faces an increasingly diverse threat from Al Qaeda affiliates in the Middle East and Africa and from emerging groups that have adopted aspects of Al Qaeda's ideology but operate relatively or completely autonomously from the group's senior leadership. Since the 2001 attacks of September 11, groups espousing Al Qaeda's ideology have proliferated in the Middle East and Africa. Some of these groups have pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri, and others have not. Even among the groups that have formal alliances with Al Qaeda, there is significant variation over the extent to which they are operationally integrated with Al Qaeda's senior leadership in practice. Some of these groups, despite the formal alliances, emerged in the context of local conflicts and are self-sustaining.

In a 2014 interview, Zawahiri appeared to acknowledge a degree of decentralization more often structured into "Cell System", stating that "Al Qaeda is a message before it is an organization." President Barack Obama in a speech at West Point in May 2014 stated, "Today's principal threat no longer comes from a centralized Al Qaeda leadership. Instead, it comes from decentralized Al Qaeda affiliates and extremists, many with agendas focused in the countries where they operate." While the groups discussed in this report focus the majority of their attacks on local targets, they have been identified by U.S. officials as posing a credible threat to the United States or its allies, or to U.S. interests in the Middle East and Africa.

The rise and rapid expansion of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and more recent Islamic Stale in Libya (ISIL) has reignited a debate over the type and scope of policies and

legislation needed to provide the tools to fully address the threats posed by such groups. In addition, the ongoing debates within Al Qaeda itself, over leadership and tactics may prompt a re-examination of previous understandings of the group, and the ways in which it may have evolved since the September 11 attacks.

The Swahili Coast of Africa has had a significant Muslim presence, though rarely demonstrating any radical tendencies. While staying in Sudan, it is known that bin Laden sent operatives to Nairobi, Kenya and established an NGO as a cover for them. The study noted that (80%) Al-Qaeda has conducted operations and recruited members in Africa. It has included a number of bombing attacks in North Africa and supporting parties in civil wars in Eritrea and Somalia.

The study further observed that as soon as the allied Somali and Ethiopian forces drove the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) out of Somalia in January 2007, U.S. accused Eritrea of providing safe haven for some of their leadership. America also condemned Eritrea since it continued to "fund, arm, train and advise the insurgents" attacking the Somalia government.

4.4.3 Somali Pirates

The majority (99%) acknowledge that piracy in Somalia has been a threat to international shipping since the second phase of the Somali Civil War in the early 21st century. Since 2005, many international organizations have expressed concern over the rise in acts of piracy. Piracy impeded the delivery of shipments and increased shipping expenses, costing an estimated $6.6 to $6.9 billion a year in global trade in 2011 according to Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP). Insurance companies significantly increased their profits from the pirate attacks, as the firms hiked rate premiums in response.

Piracy off the coast of Somalia is growing at an alarming rate and threatens to drastically disrupt international trade. It provides funds that feed the vicious war in Somalia and could potentially become a weapon of international terrorism or a cause of environmental disaster. Piracy off the coast of Somalia has more than doubled in 2008; so far over 60 ships have been attacked. Pirates are regularly demanding and receiving million-dollar ransom payments and are becoming more aggressive and assertive. The international community must be aware of the danger that Somali pirates could become agents of international terrorist networks. Already money from ransoms is helping to pay for the war in Somalia, including funds to the US terror-listed Al-Shabaab. Piracy could cause a major environmental disaster in the Gulf of Aden if a tanker is sunk or run aground or set on fire. The use of ever more powerful weaponry makes this increasingly likely.

A United Nations report and several news sources have suggested that the piracy off the coast of Somalia was caused in part by illegal fishing ostensibly perpetrated by foreign ships. With the country's 3,300-km coastline virtually unprotected, industrial fishing vessels from Europe and Asia entered Somalia in large numbers and plundered Somalia's rich maritime resources. Having over-fished their home waters, these sophisticated factory ships invaded one of the world's richest remaining fishing zones. The foreign boats are illegal, unreported and unregulated – part of a growing international criminal fishing enterprise. The battles off the coast of Somalia were closely connected to the onshore crisis in the country, where again there was heavy foreign use of military force.

Despite known links between certain pirates and Al-Shabaab insurgents and anecdotal evidence of pirates threatening to sell hostages to Al-Shabaab, Somali piracy is unlikely to evolve into maritime terrorism. So far relationships between elements of the insurgent leadership

and certain pirate groups have been ad hoc and pragmatic, taking place at the individual rather than the organizational level The Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG).[13] Commonalities between Al-Shabaab insurgents and pirates have been described as primarily operational. Traditionally, Somali piracy is undertaken for profit only and is devoid of political, religious, or ideological motives. Pirates do not necessarily avoid attacking on Islamic holidays or during Ramadan (unless these fall in the monsoon season) and regularly hijack ships owned and operated by Muslims (Shortland and Vothknecht). So far none of the ransom demands has had a political dimension. Although occasionally ransoms negotiations have included demands for the release of fellow pirates held in foreign countries, in practice ship-owners have avoided cross-issue bargaining and negotiations over ship releases have concluded with payment of ransom only.

4.4.4   Transitional National Government

Somalia's current military was first reformed by the Transitional National Government (TNG) in the year 2000, and again from 2004 by the Transitional Federal Government. In the first instance, the TNG recruited freelance gunmen and members of Siyad Barre's military. However, few of those went on to join the TFG military formed in Jowhar in 2004. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) originally performed its tasks from abroad in Kenya. The situation within Somalia was too dangerous for the Government to be located there. Within Somalia, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) ruled over southern Somalia and it was not until Ethiopian military involvement in Somalia allowed for it, that the TFG was able to locate itself in Somalia. At that point it still was not located in Mogadishu, the capital, but instead it was located in the town of Baidoa which was behind the Ethiopian frontline. When Ethiopia pushed

---

[13] The Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) Report (2011).

deeper into Somalia in 2007, it eventually allowed the TFG to move to Mogadishu, where it remains today. The Ethiopian invasion, and successful military operations against the Islamic Courts Union, also generated an important political shift in the Transitional Federal Government. As the conflict evolved, the ICU split and one part of the group engaged in negotiations with the TFG in Djibouti.

Somalia, whose descent into collapse and disorder has come to epitomize the cautionary lessons of state failure, is poised to enter a new phase. Yet, as the international donor community and Somalis meet to lay the foundation for the post transitional government, there are disturbing signs the all parties involved are not fully aware of the dysfunctional conditions of public sector finance over the last twelve years and its continuing impact on the state and society. At the root of this is the pernicious influence of clan politics and elite conduct which combined to systematically undermine the efforts to build a working and accountable administrative structure. Without insight into these fundamental problems, the possibilities of devising a coherent and ultimately successful outcome will be compromised.

4.4.5 Actors Promoting (In)stability in Somalia

Majority of the informants (98%) various actors have been intimately linked to Somalia's civil war for the past decade and in some instances for much longer. Somalia's neighbours have had a huge interest in how the civil war developed, closely linked to their disputed territorial boundaries, differing ethnicities, ideology, and religious and cultural identity. This has had an important impact on these countries' state- and nation-building processes. However, there are also other external actors shaping the future of Somalia, each of them with their own vested

interests. These actors can be categorized as multilateral (the UN), regional (the AU, the EU) and sub-regional (IGAD) and other international players (the US).

Regional configurations such as the AU/AMISOM/IGAD have played an important role in the settlement of various disputes in Somalia over the past 10 years. While IGAD has provided a platform for dialogue and humanitarian assistance, the AU has led a number of Peace Support Operations (e.g. in Sudan and Comoros). The European Union has a range of instruments available to it in its external relations with the Horn of Africa in general and Somalia in particular. Its main policy components are political dialogue, crisis management, development cooperation and humanitarian aid. There is a realization within the EU that the various forms of aid efforts are insufficient, but must be seen in context. Ethiopia is regarded as an influential external actor in the Somali conflict. The country has a long undemarcated border with Somalia in the east. Ethiopia and Somalia have a long hostile history over the Somali inhabited Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia which has resulted in interstate wars between the two countries.

In addition to multilateral arrangements, the US has long had a strategic interest in stabilizing Somalia. The US led an intervention force in 1993, under the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) – a force working in conjunction with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM). The force stayed until 1995, when US soldiers came under fire from local militias leading to several casualties. The US has been an active, mostly covert, supporter of various armed groups and alliances in Somalia. It has repeatedly engaged in military attacks on various positions inside Somalia.

The informants noted that in the case of Somalia, the complexity of actors makes it pertinent to include both domestic and external actors in negotiations if the peace agreement is to

be just and durable. In recent years, key outside parties have not committed themselves to a viable Somali peace. A number of groups did not participate or were excluded from the peace talks. At the same time, a number of Islamists and other groups were left out of the political process or chose not to participate and grant the process legitimacy. Meanwhile, actors such as Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia have pursued their own political interests in Somalia, which risk not only prolonging the conflict, but also becoming a problem for the FGS. Clearly, none of the parties perceive a ripe moment to resolve their incompatibilities by more peaceful means. Nor has any external group experienced a hurting stalemate.

Kenya is deeply embroiled in Somalia's politics. Aside from the military engagement in Somalia, there are a number of regular and shadow relations between the two states. This both enables and complicates the relationship between them (i.e. political, economic and social). Kenya shares a long border with Somalia and, unlike other states in the region; Kenya hosts a large number of Somali migrants and refugees. As is also highlighted in the Kenya case study, this link has given rise to the "Kenyan factor" in Somalia and equally a "Somalia factor" in Kenya. In this sense Kenya has for the past two decades been an "actively passive neighbour" of Somalia's armed conflict. Rather than engaging itself militarily in Somalia, Kenya has made use of the instability in Somalia to establish itself as a politically pivotal state and an economic hub. In recent years this has changed as Kenya has become an active neighbour not least militarily. However, Kenya's engagement has come with a price of further spillover. Nairobi needs to consider whether its current military engagement in Somalia is viable in the long run.

The AMISOM's presence in Somalia will remains essential to continue expanding security across the country in the coming years while Somali security institutions and capacities

are being developed. The UN and AMISOM strategic reviews will be decisive in determining the AU forces' future role in the country and its links with the Somali forces. In view of its continued role, it is vital that a solution for predictable and sustainable financing for AMISOM troops be found. The AMISOM group will help to develop Somali military and police security capability, both coastal and land, that supports the authority of the state across the country, provides for protection of the population, respects human rights, and is fully accountable to political authority and in which the population will have confidence. Reinforce and sustain international mechanisms and UN and AU mandated missions in support of security sector development. Ensure sustainability of AMISOM as an essential guarantee for further development.

Counter-piracy, AMISOM, Kenyan and Ethiopian military interventions and Western counter-terror policies are all part of the picture of (in)security in Somalia. Undoubtedly, military responses have an important role to play – especially in meeting immediate or short-term security needs. But all too often debate around these issues detracts valuable attention away from Somalia's more deep-seated problems. Ultimately there will be no military 'solution' to what are fundamentally political problems in Somalia and so the role of military interventions should not eclipse efforts to promote lasting, sustainable security.

Many small community organizations and NGOs, or committed individual leaders, may lack the capacity to engage with the normal levels of bureaucracy that donors require of grantees and will not be able to absorb large amounts of money. Yet these may often be the very groups and individuals who are best placed in terms of legitimacy and local knowledge to build on areas of stability in Somalia. The fund's managers will need the capacity to administer many small grants with light bureaucracy rather than only a few large grants with more burdensome bureaucratic

requirements. Somali organizations often have the best understanding of the context they operate in and better access to affected populations than outsiders. Where capacity allows, disbursing more aid through Somali organizations may help counter the perception that Somalis have no control over the way these resources are used.

4.6   Problems and Solution to Instability

The collapse of the nation-state, spiral of violence in the county and the breakdown of the rule of law made mediation efforts an unattainable goal. Many resources and efforts have been spent on Somalia for decades searching for peace in the war torn country without success. In addressing the mediation efforts we take into cognizance the past brutal military regimes, clannism and the past colonial history, which influences the present state of affairs.

The challenge is the balancing act when the military force comes to intervene in a volatile situation like Somalia. The neutrality demanded in such a hostile environment is a key element to the success of the mission. This hinges on the population, the clan warlord's and the mandate of the mission. European and American forces have not been effective in peace-keeping operations in Africa in general.

The study revealed that an explanatory dimension of the causes of war in Somalia is simply the role of the Horn of Africa as an important strategic node. There are both strategic and commercial activities off Somalia's coast that are vital to global trade. Economic activity includes, for example: oil and gas shipments and large cargo shipments. Furthermore, the Horn of Africa is a geostrategic location at the nexus between the African continent and the Arabian Peninsula. There are illicit flows of arms, resources and actors across the straits that all have a

bearing on peace and stability in both regions. Finally, the centrality of the Horn of Africa was recognized during the Cold War superpower rivalry.

In summary, there are many different perspectives, methods and sources by which external interventions can be explained. Many of these may overlap in the context of Uganda's, Kenya's and Ethiopia's decisions to intervene in Somalia. Their motives are explained further in the standalone chapters annexed to this report. It is safe to say that external interventions in civil war are increasingly visible phenomena. Typically, one party intervenes in another party's civil war for the purpose of supporting one of the belligerent parties. This intervention can be carried out through either direct or indirect support. In Somalia, neighbouring actors have had a tendency to intervene to maintain or push their own strategic interests rather than for the good of the Somali people.

As a result of these regional security puzzles, Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia have had a historical security presence in Somalia. All three countries have supported or fought armed groups inside Somalia. Neighbouring states have also harboured groups that have rebelled against various rulers in Mogadishu. At times, external interventions in Somalia have been carried out due to a need to fight domestic groups harboured in Somalia. At other times external interventions have been conducted to steer dynamics inside Somalia in a neighbour-friendly direction.

Thus, Somalia has been used as a proxy theatre. Over the years, Ethiopia has had the most immediate stakes in Somalia as a result of perceived threats. Kenya has had fewer stakes and Uganda the fewest. Dynamics in recent years have shifted somewhat in this regard. Kenya has been increasingly challenged by Al Shabaab. Uganda for its part may have regional interests to protect. For example, Uganda wants to maintain its influence in the Horn of Africa.

4.7   Chapter Summary

The study noted that having examined different ways to understand the conflict in Somalia, and outlined a number of theoretical references that may be useful in understanding the behaviour of key actors, the stand-alone chapters provide more in-depth empirical analysis of Kenya's, Uganda's and Ethiopia's external involvement in Somalia. Based on the literature reviewed, the study notes that the changing geographical spread of piracy attacks also alters the countries, industries, and trade routes most impacted by piracy. For example in 2011, piracy has increasingly impacted India, Pakistan, and the Gulf countries. This transformation in the location of piracy attacks also indicates that there may be an escalating impact on the oil-supplying industries and nations within that region.

Nonetheless, perceived instability and risk associated with piracy off the coasts of Somalia and Kenya likely reduces the number of tourists opting to travel to Kenya, and especially those traveling by cruise ship or to beach resorts. Furthermore, in 2011 the alarming trend of Somali militants traveling by sea and kidnapping western tourists from Kenyan beach resorts is likely to have an even greater impact on the tourism industry. Although these instances would not be strictly classified as 'piracy' (under the definition of acts committed against vessels on the high sea), it is widely believed that this development has emerged as an off-shoot of Somali piracy.

CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0   Introduction

This chapter sums up the major findings in line with the objectives and hypotheses of the study, on the issues addressed in the research.

5.1   Summary

The overall objective of the study was to examine linkages between instability in Somalia and its effects on Kenyan and Ethiopian security situation. The study successfully applied the realism theory - the study considers employing realism theory. According to Erskine[1] states (or nations) are always engaged in a struggle for power. A key concept under realism is the international distribution of power referred to as system polarity. The conflict in Somalia has continued for over 20 years, amidst several attempts to mitigate the situation. This has caused Somalia to top Foreign Policy's Failed State Index from 2008 through 2011. A deeper look into the problem shows that the civil conflict not only affects Somalia on the national level, but its effects ripple throughout the region and the international community.

Not only do destructive political instability, devastating violence, and crippling famine lead to struggle on the national level, but refugee issues with neighboring states and indiscriminate piracy also affects both the regional and international community. Somalia has fallen victim to the realist point of view of the international community, which is that states will act in the best interests of themselves, defining their interests by power gains. States have only aided Somalia sporadically, and the aid has not been long lasting; this argument is a bit tenuous since Somalia is effectively a failed state.

---

[1] Erskine, T; *As rays of hope to the human soul"? Moral Agents and Intelligence Gathering,, Intelligence and National Security* (2004), 19, (2), pp. 359-381.

Polarity refers to the number of blocs of states that exert power in an international system. A multipolar system is composed of three or more blocs, a bipolar system is composed of two blocs, and a unipolar system is dominated by a single power or hegemon. The state is the most important actor under realism. It is unitary and autonomous because it speaks and acts with one voice. The power of the state is understood in terms of its military capabilities. One year, is how long it has been since Kenya's military operation against the Al-Shabaab, aptly codenamed *Operation Linda Nchi* was launched. That realism, deriving its fundamentals from power and sovereignty best elucidates the invasion by the Kenya Defence Forces of the Al-Shabaab militia group in Somalia, a country embedded in what was seemingly becoming unending state of anarchy, is irrefutable, and is true at least according to the study.

Realists, have statism as the first basic tenet of realism. Jackson and Sorensen reckon the state is considered to be essential for the good life of its citizens: without a state to guarantee the means and conditions of security and to promote welfare, human life is bound to be perpetually pathetic. The state is therefore a protector of its territory and the populace'. So, the threat to national security, which saw many a state providing huge budgetary allocations to the military, especially in the 1970s, and even today, is the *casus belli* in Kenya's incursion into Somalia.

Somali's instability had increasingly become a source of threat to Kenya's economy (a GDP of $33.62billion as at 2011), which it-Kenya, pegs its survival as a state on. A string of foreign tourist kidnappings is what it took to shake the multi- billion Kenyan tourism industry to the core, the third largest after the horticultural and tea industries respectively. This saw massive cancellations of hotel bookings by tourists and issuance of travel advisories by major Western governments to their citizens, which needless to say not only hurt the Kenyan economy but also dented its image internationally. Investors might have been scared off by the state of

insecurity following those kidnappings since security is the currency potential investors cherish for Kenya.

The study notes that as of today the conflict in Somalia is mainly about the domestic rebellion (home grown terrorism) lead by Al Shabaab. In mid-2013, this armed Jihadist group conducted a number of seemingly well-planned attacks in Mogadishu. Despite months of security improvements, continued attacks signalled the movement's military presence and attempt to further foment discontent and undermine the Somali government. Instability in the capital and elsewhere in Somalia, including the inability of the government to prevent sustained attacks from armed groups, also means that external intervention in Somalia is likely to continue in the years to come. This view was exacerbated by the attack by Al Shabaab in Nairobi in late September 2013. The study had a response rate of (95%), which was good as it was ensured that the sample size remained as close to the original size as possible. The study found that 37.8% of the informants had attained a university degree at the graduate level, 32.4% had a tertiary college education, and 24.3% of the respondents had attained postgraduate level of education while 5.4% had secondary education.

On the contributing factors to Somalia state collapse, the study revealed that clannism was the main cause of Somalia collapse – they reveal that most of the fights have been over resources such as land and water, which were seen as fundamental resources to survive. Armed groups, organized mainly around clan but in some cases Islamism, have actively resisted the Al Shabaab's attempts to gain control of some neighbour-hoods and key sites in Mogadishu. This is an important indication that the Shabaab was tolerated, and enjoyed some support, when it posed as the main source of resistance to Ethiopian occupation, but is not acceptable to most Somalis as a source of political leadership once that existential threat has been removed. While it is still too

early to say, there is a good chance that the AL Shabaab reached its high water mark in late 2008, and is now facing resistance from Somali constituencies and struggling with internal fissures.

Distinguishing characteristics of the Kenya-Somalia border areas include: the complete absence of a state counterpart on the Somali side of the border; the existence of more robust forms of local, informal governance and conflict management than anywhere else in Kenya's border regions; the rise of vibrant cross-border trade of commercial goods and cattle; and the dominance of a single ethnic group, (the Somali), on both sides of the border. Henceforth, further efforts will be needed by the international community to bring domestic and regional actors together in a durable peace. The political framework that currently exists, regarding constitutional referendum and general elections, provides a platform for such prospects. Assisting the government in Somalia to provide stability and basic welfare will decrease support for armed groups in the long term. It is against this backdrop that it is important to consider what regional conditions and alternatives there are to tackle the conflict in Somalia.

The study revealed that various parties (actors) are experiencing a security dilemma. As a result, both domestic and external actors are caught in a negative security and armed conflict spiral. Security for one actor is simply leading to a perceived decrease in security for the opponent. This in turn prompts further security measures among the two. The security dilemma is found at many different levels: between states (such as, Ethiopia and Eritrea including their engagement with Al Shabaab and thereby with consequences for Somalia), and between various clans and rebel groups. Given this security dilemma it seems crucial that all parties further engage in regional talks to settle their differences. Put differently, peace and stability for Somalia depend as much on the dynamics inside Somalia as on the dynamics in the region.

On the hypothesis that part of the insecurity in Kenya and Ethiopia is largely caused by instability prevailing in Somalia. The study concluded that armed groups, organized mainly around clan but in some cases Islamism, have actively resisted the Al Shabaab's attempts to gain control of some neighbour-hoods and key sites in Mogadishu. This is an important indication that the militant group was tolerated, and enjoyed some support, when it posed as the main source of resistance to Ethiopian occupation, but is not acceptable to most Somalis as a source of political leadership once that existential threat has been removed. While it is still too early to say, there is a good chance that the Shabaab reached its high water mark in late 2008, and is now facing resistance from Somali constituencies and struggling with internal fissures.

The Al Shabaab and related jihadist groups already control ample territory from the Kenyan border to the outskirts of Mogadishu and several important ports and airports, and therefore are in a position to engage in acts of terrorism across Somali borders should they so choose. But the fall of Mogadishu to the Al Shabaab would have significant political consequences; the emergence of an Islamist regime with connections to Al Qaeda would almost certainly set in motion some type of security responses from both Ethiopia and the United States, and it would likely usher in a new chapter of armed conflict and instability.

The coalition of clans, militia leaders, civic groups, and Islamists which formed the Mogadishu Group were themselves divided, however, and war erupted between two wings of the group in early 2006. This war was precipitated by a U.S backed effort to create an alliance of clan militia leaders to capture a small number of foreign al Qaeda operatives believed to be enjoying safe haven in Mogadishu as guests of the hard-line Somalia Islamists, especially the jihadi militia known as the *Shabaab*. The level of poverty, unemployment, and

underdevelopment in the Kenya-Somalia border area is among the highest in the country and is a major contributor to crime, insecurity, and alienation.

5.2   Conclusions

The study therefore concludes that realist doctrine of acting in the best interest of the state might actually apply to a state that has complete control of its territory. The issue is more complex than just resolving the conflict, first the fighting must be stopped, and then the conflict must be resolved. This can be done either by ceasefire or by precipitating an environment that would bring about a hurting stalemate–where sides realize that fighting is no longer worth the costs–for parties to the conflict. The issue of the civil war in Somalia has been the target of many humanitarian and peace keeping missions, but the conflict still rages on.

What also exacerbates the conflict over resources is the harsh famines that happen throughout most of Somalia. Shown clearly by this study is the terrible conditions in certain areas of Somalia, with some areas being in critical and very critical condition. This is a strong motivation for conflict as resources in a famine are scarce, and with a lack of governance there is no system for fair and non-violent resource sharing. In the summer of 2011, a massively destructive famine hit the Horn of Africa; especially Somalia–due to the already depleted resources as a result of conflict. The famine left tens of thousands Somalis dead due to malnutrition, three million in need of urgent aid, and 10 million more at the risk of starvation. According to a study done by the World Bank entitled "Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics," "clannism and clan cleavages are a source of conflict – used to divide Somalis, fuel endemic clashes over resources and power, used to mobilize militia, and make broad-based reconciliation very difficult to achieve" (World Bank 2005) Clans began the fighting for control

of the government after the collapse of the Barre regime; without a successor to the regime, the central government imploded leaving Somalia in an anarchical state of being.

With a lack of a central government, there is little to no regulation of the waters off the coast of Somalia. This has led to a proliferation of piracy, causing turmoil for not only states in the region reliant on the trade in the Arabian and Red Seas, but also for the states sending their citizens and ships into pirate infested waters. Piracy has occurred since the early stages of the civil war, and most pirates are based in the Puntland region of Somalia, which is one of the poorest.

The study also concludes that competition over new and growing urban settlements is a more immediate driver of conflict in the Kenya-Somalia border area. Towns and villages are important sites of trade and aid. On the Kenyan side of the border "locations" serve as seats of local government, conferring upon those who control them paid positions as chiefs and assistant chiefs and control over local patronage.

Dramatic expansion of cross-border commerce from Somalia into Kenya has had a variable affect on conflict, at time serving as a force for cross-clan collaboration and basic security, and at other times producing conflict over control of key trade routes. Competing clans increasingly view control over locations not merely in administrative terms but as a means for establishing exclusionary zones within which they can evict or block other clans from access to pasture and business activities. The result is misuse of locations to engage in localized ethnic cleansing, which in turn greatly increases the political stakes for control over locations.

The tangible cause of Somalia's civil wars derives from a militarist state and its brutal repression of a vibrant social reality. In a deeper, historical sense, the state's collapse represents a classic mismatch between the post-colonial state and the nature and structure of civil society.

The study also concludes that the trend toward clan or tribally-based locations in Kenya, ethno-states in Ethiopia, and proportional clan-based representation in Somalia's nascent federal government has led to a "hardening" of ethnic identities in northern Kenya (where identity was previously more flexible and nuanced) and some ethnic groups now face an increasingly exclusionist political environment. Spillover from protracted state collapse in Somalia has been a major driver of conflict in the border areas, producing destabilizing flows of refugees, gun-smuggling, banditry, warfare, and clan tensions. But Somalia's collapsed state is not the sole or even most important source of insecurity in northern Kenya.

5.3   Recommendations

The study recommends that;

5.3.1   Civil education should be provided to the pastoralists and other groups most afflicted by perennial conflicts. The border people need to be informed of all forms of crimes which draws its inspirations and has sources from instability in Somalia. Public awareness of such criminal acts and tenets of incessant crimes need to be brought to the attention of such members of the public. The role of education has progressively been recognised in the international development lexicon not only because of its pivotal role in improving the well-being of households and individuals but also the positive externalities that it generates for society as a whole. There is overwhelming and convincing empirical evidence that consistently indicates the positive impact of education on improving the well-being and reducing poverty and vulnerability of the poor households in the rural and urban settings. Interestingly, the role of education has also been recognised in the discourse on the causation of civil wars. The role of education has progressively been recognised in the international development lexicon not only because of its pivotal role in improving the well-being of households and individuals but also the positive

107

externalities that it generates for society as a whole. There is overwhelming and convincing empirical evidence that consistently indicates the positive impact of education on improving the well-being and reducing poverty and vulnerability of the poor households in the rural and urban settings. Interestingly, the role of education has also been recognised in the discourse on the causation of civil wars.

5.3.2 States should collaborate more often, especially the bodies concerned with security. The free exchange of information among the states to help in interstate intelligence gathering. Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania and Uganda all faces similar security challenges most posed by Al Shabaab and its intricacies of commission of acts of radicalisation and terrorism in the region. There is need to devise strategies of intelligence sharing by the regional states while at the same time conducting joint security operations to minimise threats posed by Al Shabaab and its surrogates. Security is a primary agenda of any state and the more cooperation among states the more chances of success. The same is very true of Kenya, Ethiopia and Kenya both of which have under gone several security related threats need urgent bilateral cooperation with one another to look into Somalia political and security

5.3.3 Provision of development Aid as a possible intervention which can build upon existing commercial cross-clan networks and increase the business community's capacity to serve as a line of communication and promoter of open roads and peace would serve the region well. Consequently regional bodies like AU, AMISON, AFRICA STANDBY FORCE, IGAD and the entire AU Peace and Security Architecture need to think seriously of deploying more stabilising and enforcement troops in Somalia. Consequently UN and the UN Security Council backed by EU, USA, Britain, China and other international powers that can financially and logistically support the regional initiatives. UN Security Council for the sake of Somalia and the region may

consider deploying UN peace keepers and stabilising forces to look for lasting solution. With this international security arrangement in place Kenyan and Ethiopian military engagements in Somalia can slowly be reduced in phased out manner.

5.3.4 Regional countries need to shade of their national interests and assist Somalia to come out of instability. Border security has been neglected by the regional states and needs to be boosted and enhanced. Border management and border patrol services are key recommendations which should be adopted by all countries bordering Somalia to stem down threats by Al Shabaab which operates across border.

5.3.5 Areas for Further Studies

5.3.6 This study identified the following areas as possible sections for further studies;

5.3.7 Conflict transformation in Somalia

5.3.8 The study notes that almost all established peacebuilding and conflict resolution approaches have been attempted in Somalia over the last two decades: a number of military interventions (by the US, UN, regional armies, African Union), numerous international and regional mediation efforts, bottom-up peacebuilding based on Somali customary approaches, national clan-based peacebuilding as well as all sorts of mixed approaches applying national, international and local efforts in parallel. It is about time the concerned person to consider other

5.3.9 Aid and Peace Building in Kenya-Somali-Ethiopia

5.3.10 Apart from the need for more robust political action, the study illustrates the need for new approaches, such as the use of aid to promote peace in Somali. This Somali case highlights the limitations of traditional diplomacy in conflicts involving multiple non-state actors who may have a limited interest in international legitimacy or the incentives that diplomats may offer.

5.3.11 Terrorism in Kenya-Somali-Ethiopia

5.3.12 Of the three key countries engaged in Somalia (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda), Kenya is the least militarized. Western assistance in fighting al-Shabaab and stabilizing Somalia is obviously a good thing. But it should never have come at the cost of unnecessary internationalization of the conflict. Al-Shabaab has been able to get extra-Somalia assistance partly because it fashions itself as part of the global jihad against the kafir West and their African allies.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abdisaid M. A.; The Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahidiin: A Profile of the first Somali Terrorist Organization. Institut für Strategie Politik Sicherheits und Wirtschaftsberatung (ISPSW), Berlin, Germany, (2008)

Amisi, B.K; Conflicts in the Rift Valley and Western Kenya: Towards an early warning indicator identification. A paper prepared to USAID Conference on Conflict Resolution in the Greater Horn of Africa, Nairobi, (1997)

Benedict A; Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of   Nationalism (New York: Verso, 1983).

Bihuzo, R; Unfinished Business, Framework for Peace in the Great Lakes Region, African Center for Strategic Studies, (2012)

Boucek, C; War in Saada: From Local Insurrection to National Challenge, Carnegie Middle East Paper, (2010), No. 110

Chester C and Fen O; Managing Global Chaos, (Washington, DC: United States   Institute   for Peace, 2001).

Christopher L; The Social Impacts of Light Weapons Availability and Proliferation; International Alert. A discussion paper the UNIDIR, (1995)

CIA. The World's Facts Book, Central Intelligence Agency, USA (2009).

Cockburn, A; Somalia_A failed State; National Geographic (2002)

Collier, P; Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. World Bank (2003)

Coyne, C; Reconstructing weak and failed states: Foreign intervention and the   Nirvana fallacy. Foreign Policy Analysis (2006)

Dagne, T; Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace. CRS Report RL33911. (2011)

Daily Nation, Terrorism Attacks, (November 29, 2002)

Erskine, T; "As rays of hope to the human soul"? Moral Agents and Intelligence Gathering', Intelligence and National Security, 19, (2), (2004)

Gassim, A,MSomalia: Clan Versus Nation United Arab Emirates: Sharpah (2002)

Gatsiounis J; Somali Terrpr Gropu Curtailed. Washington Times. (10 July 2011).

Ghalib, M. J. (1995). Cost of Dictatorship: The Somali Experience (New York, Lilian Barber Press)

Gunther S and Watson El; Changing Identities and Alliances in North-EastAfrica, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009)

Harris, P and Reilly, B; Democracy and Deep-rooted conflict, Stockholm: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA, 1998)

Hassan S and Healy S; Somalia's Missing Million: the Somali Diaspora and its Role in Development, Report for UNDP, (2009)

Hermann, W; Maritime Piracy and anti-piracy Measures. Volume 25 issue Ikken, Massip Farid, (2009)

International Crisis Group. "Salvaging Somalia's Chance for Peace" Africa Briefing, (9th December 2002)

James, W; War and Survival in Sudan's Frontierlands: Voices from the Blue Nile. Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2007)

Johnson,D; When Boundaries Become Borders: The Impact of Boundary Making in Southern Sudan's Frontier Zones. Contested Borderlands. Rift Valley Institute (2010)

Kaldor, M; New and Old Wars. Cambridge: Polity Press, (2006)

Kamenju, Mwachafi, Wairagu. Profiling Small Arms and Insecurity in the North Rift Region of Kenya, Oakland Media Services Ltd, Nairobi, Kenya (2003).

Karimi M., Conflict in Northern Kenya: A Focus on the internally displaced Conflict via Northern, ITDG –EA, United States Institute of Peace (2003)

Kenneth R. Rutherford; Humanitarianism Under Fire; The US and UN Intervention in Somalia in (Somalia. Kumaria Press.) United States of America. (2008)

Khalif A; "How Illegal Fishing Feeds Piracy." Somaliland Times Issue 200 (2005).

Kinfe,A; Somali A Calling: The crisis of Statehood And The Conquest For Peace. EIIPD Press. (2002)

Leftie, P; The General Tasked With Wiping Out Al-Shabaab. Allafrica.com (2011)

Lewis M. Loan; Making and Breaking States in Africa. The Somalia Experience. (2010).

Lewis, I. M; Modern History of Somali. (2002)

Makumi M, M; M,Karuru N; Understanding conflicts and its management: Centre for   women and law in East Africa, West mark printers limited, Nairobi (1998)

Murunga G; Conflict in Somalia and crime in Kenya: Understanding the   trans-Territoriality of crime". African and Asian studies, Vol. 4, No. 142 (2005)

Kaldor M; New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, Cambridge: Polity   Press (1999)

 Masibo, M; The Political Impact of the Instability of Somalia to the Horn and East   Africa. Missouri State University, (2010)

Menkhaus K. "Dangerous Waters," Survival, (2009) 51 (1)

Klare M; Light Weapons Diffusion and Global Violence in the Post-Cold War Era, in   Jasjit Singh, ed., Light Weapons and International Security, Indian Pugwash Society   and British American Security Information Council, New Delhi

Mkutu, Agade Ke; 'Small arms and light weapons among pastoral groups in the   Kenya–Uganda border area.' African Affairs. Vol. 106, No. 422, (2007)

Mohamed BSc. MSc. Abdullahi E; "Causes and Effects of Deforestation and Hazardous Waste Dumping in Somalia." Somali Centre For Water and Environment (2003).

Mugenda O. & Mugenda A; Research methods-quantitative and qualitative approaches. Acts press, Nairobi, Kenya, (1999)

Muggah, Robert. No Refugee: The Crisis of Refugee Militarization in Africa, (London, Red Books, 2006)

Munyes, John; The International Conference on Peace and Development among the "Ateker" communities in the Horn of Africa, Juba, Southern Sudan. Unpublished concept paper, (2007)

Murphy M; "Somalia: The New Barbary? Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa" (2010).

Mwagiru, M; Human Security: Setting the Agenda for the Horn of Africa, (Nairobi,   Africa Peace Forum, 2008)

Njoroge, M; Small Arms and Light Weapons in Kenya, (2007)

North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Small Arms and Light Weapons and Mine Action (2014) NATO, p 10.

Ochan, C; Responding to Violence in Ikotos County, South Sudan: Government and   Local Efforts to Restore Order. Medford, MA: Feinstein International Center, (2007)

Odhiambo-A.E; 'United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and status determination in taxing Kenya: an empirical survey,' in Journal of African Law (2004), 48 (2)

Oliver R; Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. London: Hurst (2004)

Owen, G; Examining International Responses to Illicit Arms Trafficking, Crime, Law   and Social Change (2000)

Pillar P.R.; Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution   Press, 2001)

Pillar, R. Agrees with Caleb (n. 3) that the targets of terrorism are necessarily non combatants, (2002)

Shinn D; FPRI Conference Annual National Security in Washington DC on September. (2011)

Reuters. Special Report: In Africa, a militant group's growing appeal. Reuters Internationals, (2012)

Rutherford K. R; Humanitarianism Under Fire; The US and UN Intervention in   Somalia   in Somalia. Kumaria Press, United States of America. (2008

Sabala K; "The Proliferation, Circulation and Use of Illegal Firearms in Urban   Centers: Case of Nairobi, Kenya." Bonn: BICC (2002)

Shinn D; Al-Shabaab's Foreign Threat to Somali, Orbis (2011)

Samatar, I. M; Light at the End of the Tunnel, Red Sea Press, Lawrenceville NJ, (1997)

Schmitt, E.G; Qaida Leader Reported Killed in Somalia. The NY Times, (May 2, 2008)

Scott, P; Me against My Brother, New York: Routledge, (2000)

Smidt, W;   The Tigrinya Speakers across the Borders. Discourse of Unity & Separation in Ethnohistorical Context. In: Borders and Borderlands as Resources in the Horn of Africa, ed. Dereje Feyissa and Markus Hoehne. Woodbridge, UK; Rochester, NY: James Currey (2010)

Smith and Donnelly; Provide book-length introductions that focus exclusively on realism, US (1986)

Stephen Ellis; The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War, New York: New York University Press, (2001)

"Statement by His Excellency Hon. Daniel T. arap Moi," at the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa Conference on Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons," Nairobi, Kenya, (March 14, 2000)

Walt S. M.: Beyond bin Laden: Reshaping U.S. Foreign Policy, International Security, V. 26, No. 3, (winter, 2001)

Stockholms T; 'dom DOM B 7277-10 2010-12-08,'Stockholm, (12 August 2010)

Terrence L and Samattar A; Somalia; State Collapse, Multilateral Interventions and Strategies for Political Reconstruction. (1995)

The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [START]. Al Shabaab Attack on Westgate Mall in Kenya. Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate's Office of University Programs through Award Number 2012-ST 061-CS0001, CSTAB (2013)

The Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) Report (2011).

Torres, M. and Anderson, M; 'Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction', Policy Division, Department for International Development (DFID); London. (2004)

UNCHR. The UN Refugee Agency and RefWorld: Updated data September 2014, (2014) Wallensteen P, and Sollenberg M; "Armed Conflict and Regional Conflict Complexes, 1989-97," Journal of Peace Research (1998)

Waal D.A; Islamism and its Enemies In the Horn Of Africa, (C Hurst & Co. Publishers Ltd, United, Kingdom, 2004).

Walter C and Herbst J; Learning from Somali: The lesson of Armed Humanitarian Intervention. (1997)

Wood, E: Forging Democracy from Below: Insurgent Transitions in South Africa and El Salvador, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (2000)

Woodward, P; Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003)

Zartman, W; Collapsed States; The Distinction and Restoration of Legitimate Authority. (1996)

Xan R; Glendinning Lee. Pirate anchor hijacked supertanker off Somalia coast. London. Guardian (2009).

Zolberg, A. R., Suhrke, A. and Aguayo, S: Escape From Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World. New York: Oxford University Press, (1989)

Abdisaid M. A.; The Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahidiin: A Profile of the first Somali Terrorist Organization. Institut für Strategie Politik Sicherheits und Wirtschaftsberatung (ISPSW), Berlin, Germany, (2008)

Amisi, B.K; Conflicts in the Rift Valley and Western Kenya: Towards an early warning indicator identification. A paper prepared to USAID Conference on Conflict Resolution in the Greater Horn of Africa, Nairobi, (1997)

Benedict A; Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of   Nationalism (New York: Verso, 1983).

Bihuzo, R; Unfinished Business, Framework for Peace in the Great Lakes Region,African Center for Strategic Studies, (2012)

Boucek, C; War in Saada: From Local Insurrection to National Challenge, Carnegie   Middle East Paper, (2010), No. 110

Chester C and Fen O; Managing Global Chaos, (Washington, DC: United States   Institute for Peace, 2001).

Christopher L; The Social Impacts of Light Weapons Availability and Proliferation; International Alert. A discussion paper the UNIDIR, (1995)

CIA. The World's Facts Book, Central Intelligence Agency, USA (2009).

Cockburn, A; Somalia_A failed State; National Geographic (2002)

Collier, P; Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. World Bank   (2003)

Coyne, C; Reconstructing weak and failed states: Foreign intervention and the   Nirvana fallacy. Foreign Policy Analysis (2006)

Dagne, T; Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace. CRS Report RL33911. (2011)

Daily Nation, Terrorism Attacks, (November 29, 2002)

Erskine, T; "As rays of hope to the human soul"? Moral Agents and Intelligence Gathering', Intelligence and National Security, 19, (2), (2004)

Gassim, A,MSomalia: Clan Versus Nation United Arab Emirates: Sharpah (2002)

Gatsiounis J; Somali Terrpr Gropu Curtailed. Washington Times. (10 July 2011).

Ghalib, M. J. (1995). Cost of Dictatorship: The Somali Experience (New York, Lilian Barber Press)

Gunther S and Watson El; Changing Identities and Alliances in North-EastAfrica, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009)

Harris, P and Reilly, B; Democracy and Deep-rooted conflict, Stockholm: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA, 1998)

Hassan S and Healy S; Somalia's Missing Million: the Somali Diaspora and its Role in Development, Report for UNDP, (2009)

Hermann, W; Maritime Piracy and anti-piracy Measures. Volume 25 issue Ikken, MassipFarid, (2009)

International Crisis Group. "Salvaging Somalia's Chance for Peace" Africa Briefing, (9th December 2002)

James, W; War and Survival in Sudan's Frontierlands: Voices from the Blue Nile. Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2007)

Johnson,D; When Boundaries Become Borders: The Impact of Boundary Making in Southern Sudan's Frontier Zones. Contested Borderlands. Rift Valley Institute (2010)

Kaldor, M; New and Old Wars. Cambridge: Polity Press, (2006)

Kamenju, Mwachafi, Wairagu. Profiling Small Arms and Insecurity in the North Rift Region of Kenya, Oakland Media Services Ltd, Nairobi, Kenya (2003).

Karimi M., Conflict in Northern Kenya: A Focus on the internally displaced Conflict via Northern, ITDG –EA, United States Institute of Peace (2003)

Kenneth R. Rutherford; Humanitarianism Under Fire; The US and UN Intervention in Somalia in (Somalia. Kumaria Press.) United States of America. (2008)

Khalif A; How Illegal Fishing Feeds Piracy Somaliland Times Issue 200 (2005).

Kinfe,A; Somali A Calling: The crisis of Statehood And The Conquest For Peace. EIIPD Press. (2002)

Leftie, P; The General Tasked With Wiping Out Al-Shabaab. Allafrica.com (2011)

Lewis M. Loan; Making and Breaking States in Africa. The Somalia Experience. (2010).

Lewis, I. M; Modern History of Somali. (2002)

Makumi M, M; M,Karuru N; Understanding conflicts and its management: Centre for   women and law in East Africa, West mark printers limited, Nairobi (1998)

Murunga G; "Conflict in Somalia and crime in Kenya: Understanding the trans-Territoriality of crime". African and Asian studies, Vol. 4, No. 142 (2005)

Kaldor M; New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, Cambridge: Polity Press (1999)

Masibo, M; The Political Impact of the Instability of Somalia to the Horn and East   Africa. Missouri State University, (2010)

Menkhaus K. "Dangerous Waters," Survival, (2009) 51 (1)

Klare M; Light Weapons Diffusion and Global Violence in the Post-Cold War Era, in   Jasjit Singh, ed., Light Weapons and International Security, Indian Pugwash Society   and British American Security Information Council, New Delhi

Mkutu, Agade Ke; 'Small arms and light weapons among pastoral groups in the   Kenya Uganda border area.' African Affairs. Vol. 106, No. 422, (2007)

Mohamed BSc. MSc. Abdullahi E; "Causes and Effects of Deforestation and Hazardous Waste Dumping in Somalia." Somali Centre For Water and Environment (2003).

Mugenda O. & Mugenda A; Research methods-quantitative and qualitative approaches. Acts press, Nairobi, Kenya, (1999)

Muggah, Robert. No Refugee: The Crisis of Refugee Militarization in Africa, (London, Red Books, 2006)

Munyes, John; The International Conference on Peace and Development among the "Ateker" communities in the Horn of Africa, Juba, Southern Sudan. Unpublished concept paper, (2007)

Murphy M; "Somalia: The New Barbary? Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa" (2010).

Mwagiru, M; Human Security: Setting the Agenda for the Horn of Africa, (Nairobi,   Africa Peace Forum, 2008)

Njoroge, M; Small Arms and Light Weapons in Kenya, (2007)

North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Small Arms and Light Weapons and Mine Action   (2014) NATO, p 10.

Ochan, C; Responding to Violence in Ikotos County, South Sudan: Government and   Local Efforts to Restore Order. Medford, MA: Feinstein International Center, (2007)

Odhiambo-A.E; 'United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and status determination in taxing Kenya: an empirical survey,' in Journal of African Law (2004), 48 (2)

Oliver R; Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. London: Hurst (2004)

Owen, G; Examining International Responses to Illicit Arms Trafficking, Crime, Law   and Social Change (2000)

Pillar P.R.; Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution   Press, (2001)

Pillar, R. Agrees with Caleb (n. 3) that the targets of terrorism are necessarily non combatants, (2002)

Professor Shinn D; FPRI Conference Annual National Security in Washington DC on September. (2011)

Reuters. Special Report: In Africa, a militant group's growing appeal. Reuters Internationals, (2012)

Rutherford K. R; Humanitarianism Under Fire; The US and UN Intervention in   Somalia   in (Somalia. Kumaria Press.) United States of America. (2008

Sabala K; The Proliferation, Circulation and Use of Illegal Firearms in Urban Centers: Case of Nairobi, Kenya. Bonn: BICC (2002)

Shinn D; Al-Shabaab's Foreign Threat to Somali, Orbis (2011)

Samatar, I. M; Light at the End of the Tunnel, Red Sea Press, Lawrenceville NJ, (1997)

Schmitt, E.G; Qaida Leader Reported Killed in Somalia. The NY Times, (May 2, 2008)

Scott, P; Me against My Brother, New York: Routledge, (2000)

Smidt, W; The Tigrinya Speakers across the Borders. Discourse of Unity & Separation in Ethnohistorical Context. In: Borders and Borderlands as Resources in the Horn of Africa, ed. Dereje Feyissa and Markus Hoehne. Woodbridge, UK; Rochester, NY:James Currey (201

Smith and Donnelly; Provide book-length introductions that focus exclusively on realism, US (1986)

Stephen Ellis; The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War, New York: New York University Press,(2001)

"Statement by His Excellency Hon. Daniel T. arap Moi," at the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa Conference on Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons," Nairobi, Kenya, (March 14, 2000)

Walt S. M.: Beyond bin Laden: Reshaping U.S. Foreign Policy, International Security,   V.z\\\\z 26, No. 3, (Winter, 2001)

Stockholms T; 'dom DOM B 7277-10 2010-12-08,'Stockholm, (12 August 2010)

Terrence L and Samattar A; Somalia; State Collapse, Multilateral Interventions and Strategies for Political Reconstruction. (1995)

The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [START]. Al Shabaab Attack on Westgate Mall in Kenya. Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate's Office of University Programs through Award Number 2012-ST 061-CS0001, CSTAB (2013)

The Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) Report (2011).

Torres, M. and Anderson, M; 'Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction', Policy Division, Department for International Development (DFID); London. (2004)

UNCHR. The UN Refugee Agency and RefWorld: Updated data September 2014, (2014)

Wallensteen P, and Sollenberg M; "Armed Conflict and Regional Conflict Complexes,   1989 97," Journal of Peace Research (1998)

Waal D.A; Islamism and its Enemies In the Horn Of Africa, (C Hurst & Co. Publishers   Ltd, United, Kingdom, 2004).

Walter C and Herbst J; Learning from Somali: The lesson of Armed   Humanitarian Intervention. (1997)

Wood, E: Forging Democracy from Below: Insurgent Transitions in South Africa and El Salvador, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (2000)

Woodward, P; Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003)

Zartman, W; Collapsed States; The Distinction and Restoration of Legitimate   Authority. (1996)

Xan R; Glendinning Lee. Pirate anchor hijacked supertanker off Somalia coast. London. Guardian (2009).

Zolberg, A. R., Suhrke, A. and Aguayo, S: Escape From Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World. New York: Oxford University Press, (1989)

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Letter of Data Collection

I am Boniface N Mwilu, a student/participant attending a course at National Defence College (NDC). Am also undertaking a Masters' of Arts degree on international studies under the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS), University of Nairobi.

The purpose of this letter to request for your kind assistance on data collection for my thesis towards fulfilment of the aforesaid degree programme. I want assure you that the data collected will not be used for any other purpose other than the academic reason and that the information provided will not be divulged to unauthorised person. The information collected will be kept in utmost secrecy.

Your assistance will highly be appreciated. You can call on 0724202211 should there be any query.

Yours faithfully,

Boniface N. Mwilu

Appendix 2: Questionnaire

Serial No................................

Instructions

The study seeks to look for linkages between instability in Somalia and its effects on Kenyan and Ethiopian security situation, and will be guided by the specific objectives. The personal information is optional; be assured that this study is purely for academic purposes only, and everything stated will be private and confidential. It is a requirement that you please give a verbal consent to be a participant in this study, before we begin.

Please discuss the following regarding linkages between instability in Somalia and its effects on Kenyan and Ethiopian security situation. Thank you for taking time to participant in this research, please fill in the questionnaire appropriately.

Part A: Socio-demographics

1. Age of respondents?...

2. Gender?...

3. Occupation?...

4. Office?...

5. Designation?..

6. Duration in office?...

7. The type of work?..

Section B: Relationship between instability in Somalia and its effects on Kenyan and Ethiopian security situation

8. What would you say are the contributing factors to the collapse of Somalia State and continued instability in the Country?

....
....
....
....

9. What is the relationship between instability in Somalia and the cross-border insecurity in Kenya and Ethiopia?

....
....
....
....

10. What is the effect of Somalia instability and cross-border insecurity as experienced in Kenya and Ethiopia?

....
....
....
....

11. Who are the actors that promote (in)stability in Somalia and the cross-border insecurity in Kenya and Ethiopia?

....
....
....
....

12. Is political solution to Somalia crisis an answer to cross-border insecurity?

....
....
....
....

13. What is the relationship between Al Shabaab, radicalisation and violent extremism/violent militancy as the case in Kenya and Somalia?

....
....
....
....

14. How do you rate government efforts in Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia to combat terrorism and other cross-border insecurity?

....
....
....
....

15. What are the possible solutions to numerous cross-border crimes?

....
....
....
....

16. Is terrorism linked to any ideology, belief system, faith or religion?

....
....
....

17. Outline relationship between poverty, social injustice, marginalisation, unemployment and terrorism?

....
....
....
....

18. Do refugees from Somalia contribute to cross-border insecurity in Kenya and Ethiopia?

....
....
....
....

19. Do you think all refugees should be relocated back to their countries of origin which enjoy relative peace?

....
....
....
....

20. Is clannism and ethnicity a trigger to violence in Somalia?

....
....
....
....

21. Others

....
....

-END-