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DECLARATION

I declare that this research project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.

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This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor

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I would like to acknowledge and appreciate my supervisor for the patience, advice, and guidance. I would also like to acknowledge my friends and post graduate fellows for their encouragement.
DEDICATION

I hereby dedicate this research project to my family.
ABSTRACT

The overall aim of this study was to provide an understanding of the role external actors play in Somali internal conflict. To achieve this, the study was guided by three objectives: To examine the role of external actors in internal conflicts, to examine the extent to which external actors contribute to the internationalization of the Somali conflict and, the nexus between external and internal actors to examine peace and stability in Somalia. In order to do so the study applied the conceptual framework based on the ‘new wars’ idea proposed by scholars such as Kaldor and others. The concept explains the changing context and transnational character of wars in the new era. The study thus explored the internationalization of the internal conflict in Somalia that is made so by the involvement of external actors. These actors are states and non state actors. The study reveals that the Somali conflict hosts variety actors who get involved due to different reasons and interests. The study thus, from the findings recommended for extensive international and regional efforts that are based on the motivation for reconstructing Somali and enhancing sustainable peace.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

Somalia has experienced violent conflict and instability since 1991, when central authority broke down in the country. As a result of the severity of the conflict, including regional spillover, external actors have become entrenched in the conflict.\(^1\) These actors have played the role of both secondary and third party actors. External interventions in civil war-like situations continue to be practiced by states in the international system. In such circumstances, typically a party tends to intervene in another party’s armed conflict in order to support one of the belligerents for their own interests. This can be done either directly or indirectly through military support of any kind.

According to Bradbury and Healy\(^2\) military engagement need not be the only option. A turn to political dialogue, reconciliation and an effort to overcome ethnic- and clan-based security dilemmas could also be strategically fruitful. Although complicated to achieve without more forceful responses, that is, continued military deployment, this is the path that both domestic and international actors eventually need to walk. Experiences and lessons learned can be drawn from other civil wars (Bosnia-Herzegovina). Jones\(^3\) articulates that, to initiate conflict resolution mechanisms that do not lean explicitly on armed force, but are rather coupled with such, regional trust needs to be built. In this light, the study seeks to analyze the aspects of external actor’s involvement in the long running Somali conflict.

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1.2 Background to the internationalization of the Somali Internal Conflict by External Actors – (2000-2014)

Post-independence Africa has generally seen a proliferation of civil wars and other forms of intrastate conflict and unrest. In some countries, armed conflicts have turned into protracted wars, often highly destructive and bloody, in which the adversaries’ goals simply seem incompatible and irreconcilable. Crocker\(^4\) and others argue that, commonly, leaders view such situations as a zero-sum game, and there are often players involved who benefit more from war or a stalemate, than from a settlement. Somalia, situated which is in the Horn of Africa, is a country caught in such an intractable conflict. Somalia became independent in 1960. Until 1969 the country was ruled by a civilian government, in a system of rather corrupt and dysfunctional multiparty democracy.\(^5\)

Shifting allegiances and divisions between Somalia’s clan and sub-clan structures have shaped a complex environment. Mohammad Siad Barre took control of the country in a coup d’état in 1969. He believed the only way to govern Somalia was to break the back of clan influence and attempted to enforce the state’s authority through imposing a highly centralized government and a form of socialism. Civil war erupted in 1988, and in 1991, Siad Barre fled Mogadishu.\(^6\) As Menkhaus\(^7\) states, multiple solutions to state formation and conflict have been pursued since 1991 - some succeeded and others failed. External actors continue to influence the conflict and the prospects for peace. Ethiopia, Kenya and other members of the African Union, seek to secure themselves from the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda, as well as to exert

\(^6\) Ibid
influence in their border lands. Humanitarian actors such as Western donors have been driven to curtail the threat of Al-Qaeda and of criminality, and forced migration from the country. Western countries and the EU have funded AMISOM, UNSOM and UN agencies for humanitarian, development and peace-building assistance, as well as the UK which has been strongly associated with efforts to align aid to Somali national peace-building, state-building and stabilization frameworks, with Prime Minister David Cameron sponsoring two international conferences in London on the subject in 2012 and 2013.  

International oil and gas investors are the latest external actors to get involved. The Provisional Draft Constitution does not articulate the resource-sharing arrangements between Mogadishu and the states. Regional entities such as Puntland and Somaliland are issuing concessions for oil activities in their areas. “Wildcat” companies are willing to deal directly with these regional entities, but the larger established companies prefer to deal with the government in Mogadishu. These issues will become more politically charged as explorations go forward.

1.3 Statement of the Research Problem

In the post-Cold-War period, Africa’s internal conflicts have mutated into new forms. According to Kaldor, the new forms are characterized by a blurring of the lines between war organized crime, and large-scale human rights violations, these ‘new wars’ have demonstrated new modalities which distinguish them from earlier, more conventional ‘civil wars’. In conformity, Henderson and Singer add that, in terms of the actors typically engaged in Africa’s internal

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conflicts, the processes of globalization have widened the number and type of participants. External parties representing the international and regional community are also drawn into internal conflicts. This is a view set out by Shawcross\textsuperscript{12} who also states that, the goals of the protagonists are also more diffuse. Africa’s internal conflicts in the post-Cold-War period have also demonstrated an expanded repertoire of strategies for pursuing conflict goals, most notably strategies that involve serious human rights violations. Thus the actors of these conflicts have played different roles that affect the conflict, be it in peace building of even protracting the conflict. The role of external actors is therefore of particular importance to this study, be it as mediators or sponsors of the conflict.

Internationalization of internal conflict has been seen as imposed, inevitable or as resulting in further interstate conflict, yet it has not been defined as varied result of actors’ strategies. The study seeks to argue that this is a serious omission and that in order to overcome it, it is necessary to posit a two step question: when and why internationalization is decided and secondly, in the case that it is decided, how can we account for the form it adopts? This perspective adds crucial component to the existing studies and allow for the observation of external actors and how they interact internally and externally. These dynamics of the conflict as the study seeks to proof, has led to the protracting nature of the Somali conflict.

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The overall objective of the study is to analyze the role of external actors in Somali’s internal conflict.

\textsuperscript{12} Shawcross, W. \textit{Deliver Us from Evil: Warlords and Peacekeepers in a World of Endless Conflict}. London: Bloomsbury, 2000, p.169
Specifically the study aims to:

i. To examine the role of external actors in internal conflicts

ii. Examine the extent to which external actors contribute to the internationalization of the Somali conflict

iii. Examine the nexus between external and internal actors to peace and stability in Somalia

1.5 Research Questions

i. What is the role of external actors in internal conflict?

ii. How have the external actors contributed to the internationalization of the Somali conflict?

iii. What is the nexus between external and internal actors to peace and stability in Somalia?

1.6 Literature Review

Internal wars often have an external component. Some external effects are purposive, where external actors aid and abet internal factions and governments. Some external effects are unintended. According to Smith\textsuperscript{13}, this category includes actions by international financial institutions (IFIs), the actions of humanitarian agencies, and well-intentioned mediators. There are cases, however, of purposive international action that prevented, mitigated, resolved, or managed internal conflicts. It is only important to understand the actual concept of the involvement of external component in internal conflict that internationalize the conflict and impact it in one way or another. This is highlighted below.

1.6.1 The Concept of External Actors in Internal Conflicts

According to Brown\textsuperscript{14}, all thirty-five of the wars in 1997 were primarily internal; that is, they are fought over who shall rule within an internationally recognized territory. Although there has not been an appreciable increase in the number of civil wars since the 1980s, the wars of the 1990s


were tremendously costly; by one estimate 5.5 million people have died in them, making this the bloodiest decade since the 1940s. He added that, the horrendous costs that such wars bring to the peoples most directly involved, often have devastating regional impacts, as refugees flee their homes and place burdens on host countries, and combatants cross borders in search of supplies and sanctuary. Smith\textsuperscript{15} asserts that, parties in civil wars tend to use rhetoric of total war that portrays the character of their opponent as the cause of the war.

To term these conflicts ‘internal’ may make the key dynamics be ignored or missed - in how they start, rage, fizzle, and end. Almost every internal conflict has an external component. Some effects are purposive; external actors aid and abet internal factions and governments. States and rebels in the midst of war require arms, ammunition, and capital; rebels need sanctuary and supply routes. More particularly, Prendergast\textsuperscript{16} has also noted that, some external effects are unintended. This category includes actions by IFIs, which, while narrowly focusing on the requirements of good economic policy, insist on economic programs that disproportionately affect disgruntled ethnic groups within a country or undermine a reformist government under threat from disaffected regions or ethnic groups. The humanitarian agencies, which, while aimed at relieving suffering of vulnerable populations, provide warring groups with needed food and supplies to continue a war. The well-intentioned mediators also fail to see likely problems in the agreements they create.

As Jones\textsuperscript{17} points out, when journalists, NGOs, and citizens urge international actors to intervene in deadly wars, they probably already have for a long time - often with disastrous


results. There are cases, however, of purposive international action that prevented, mitigated, resolved, or managed internal conflicts. Civil wars pose profound challenges to our collective sense of decency. Lying behind those challenges is a tangle of ethical questions.

1.6.2 Understanding the Dynamic Nature of ‘New Wars’

Warfare and the nature of armed conflict have undergone some fundamental changes since the end of the Cold War. Wars between states are less common today, and intrastate fighting has instead become the predominant form of armed struggle. According to Creveld organized violence persists and war is fought for different reasons and by using different methods than before. Kaldor and Munkler have termed these wars new wars and identified some common characteristics which set them apart from what we understand as traditional interstate wars. In short, contemporary conflicts, a majority of which have taken place in Central America, the Middle East, South East Asia and Africa, have typically shared a number of characteristics. First, conflict is seldom confined to a specific front or battle ground, but is instead manifesting itself as widespread, omnipotent political violence. Second, the new wars tend to result in a large number of civilian casualties as violence is often deliberately directed at civilians. Third, the distinction between war and crime has often become blurred in contemporary war-torn societies guerrilla warfare and the use of terrorist methods have also become increasingly common.

The most noteworthy way in which methods of warfare have changed, is that in the new wars battle confrontations between opposing factions are rare, and instead most of the violence is

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18Ibid
targeted at civilians. As noted by Whitaker\textsuperscript{22}, in some of these cases, it is deliberate, as during the wars of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, during the genocide in Rwanda, or more recently in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Other times the large number of civilian casualties may result from the difficulty of distinguishing combatants from non-combatants. A main distinguishing feature of the new wars is according to Munkler\textsuperscript{23} the multitude of actors which have vested interests in the war, and for whom disadvantages of peace may outweigh the advantages. The contemporary civil wars can furthermore not be understood in isolation from international capital linkages. In this light, Goodhan\textsuperscript{24} asserts that the international community may have contributed to creating an environment conducive to war through policies of structural adjustment and trade regulation. Transnational networks of illegal trade in drugs, arms or other goods are also often essential in funding the new wars. The economic aspects of contemporary warfare will be discussed in more detail in subsequent sections.

The concept of new wars has attracted a number of critiques. The most frequently mentioned criticism is that there is nothing new about the new wars. Proponents of this view argue that many, if not all, of the characteristics of the so-called new wars were also in one form or another present in earlier wars. In this line, Zeleza\textsuperscript{25} argues that the literature on new wars fails to include a historical perspective, in the sense that the dichotomies drawn between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ wars are “untenable on historical and empirical grounds”.

\textsuperscript{23} H. Munkler.\textit{The New Wars}. Op cit.
Ohanwe\textsuperscript{26} posits that armed conflict in Africa have focused on greed and grievance related issues, but in addition identified factors which have proved significant to understanding conflict taking place specifically on the African continent. This includes the colonial legacy, ethnic and religious divisions, bad leadership and economic decline are among common explanations for Africa’s seeming proneness to conflict.

\textbf{1.6.3 External Actors in the Somali Conflict}

Increasingly, analysis of the causes of internal conflict in the Third World has emphasized the importance of indigenous factors, while virtually ignoring the influence of external forces. However, due to important developments over the last decade, analysts and policy-makers need to reassess the role of external forces in promoting and facilitating internal conflict. Various actors have been intimately linked to Somalia’s civil war for the past decade, and in some instances for much longer. Somalia’s neighbors have had a huge interest in how the civil war developed, closely linked to their disputed territorial boundaries, differing ethnicities, ideology, and religious and cultural identity. This has had an important impact on these countries’ state- and nation building processes. However, there are also other external actors shaping the future of Somalia, each of them with their own vested interests. These actors can be categorized as multilateral (UN), regional (AU, EU) and sub-regional (IGAD) and other international players, such as the US.

According to Soliman, the European Union has a range of instruments available to it in its external relations with the Horn of Africa in general and Somalia in particular. Its main policy components are political dialogue, crisis management, development cooperation and humanitarian aid. There is a realization within the EU that the various forms of aid efforts are insufficient, but must be seen in context. Hagstrom Frisell and others note that crisis management is the fastest growing area of the EU’s engagement in both the Horn of Africa and Somalia. Such support includes operations under the Common Security and Defence Policy, the African Peace Facility (APF) and the Instrument for Stability. The US has been an active, mostly covert, supporter of various armed groups and alliances in Somalia. It has repeatedly engaged in military attacks on various positions inside Somalia. Sabala notes that the US is currently opting for a policy of providing limited, indirect diplomatic and military support to the TFG in the hope that it will provide a bulwark against militant Islamist forces in Somalia.

The current geostrategic interests in Somalia need to be seen in a wider context. Somalia has become an important battle ground in the framework of the so-called war on terror, which originated from the events of 11 September 2001. Stopping the spread of Jihadism in East Africa (and any spillover into the Gulf) has been a priority, in order to undermine any threats to US or Western vital interests. The US, as well as other actors such as the UK, Israel, Italy, Turkey and the Gulf states, is all important to an understanding of the political complexity of Somalia.

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30 Ibid: 108
1.7 Justification of the Study

The study aims to fill a gap in the literature in providing a systematic analysis of the Somali conflict and the drivers behind it, based on theory and a detailed case study. The limited existing literature on intractability of conflict also makes this study distinctive. When it comes to Somalia, surprisingly few comprehensive studies have been conducted on the topic of conflict in the country in general. A great deal of the academic literature available on Somalia focuses on the country and people from an anthropological or historical point of view; on the first stage of the civil war after the fall of Siyad Barre; on the collapse of the state; and on the United Nations (UN) missions to Somalia in the early 1990s. Studies that deal with the Somali conflict tend to focus on the visible manifestations of conflict, while leaving less visible, underlying factors unaddressed. As Menkhaus\textsuperscript{31} notes, research concerned with the drivers of the Somali conflict quickly become outdated as the conflict evolves. Since the early 1990s there have been significant shifts in the dynamics of the crisis as well as in the vested interests of key actors.

Furthermore, most literature perceive the situation in Somalia as too intricate, complex and difficult to understand. In the media, as well as in academia, Somalia is repeatedly called the ultimate ‘failed state’, which contributes to a sense of ‘hopelessness’ among observers. Consequently, too little time is spent attempting to understand the underlying causes, as well as the driving forces, behind the Somali conflict. As Menkhaus\textsuperscript{32} states, the terms ‘failed state’ as well as ‘collapsed state’ have become throwaway labels to describe a wide range of political crises. This study takes the position that the ‘failed states’ notion, which is often used to describe and explain the crisis in Somalia, is counterproductive to the management of the conflict as it

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid
fails to take into consideration the various structural, relational and external factors which makes the conflict intractable.

The research study seeks to benefit the policy making and formulation, relevant academia as well as the general public. From the findings, the study will add to the existing literature relevant to the research, and contribute to the engagement of external actors and how the government and the Somali people receive them and work with them in rebuilding Somalia, and create public awareness on the these roles, the negative and positive aspects of it. In policy formulation, the study will benefit with the on-going peace and reconstruction efforts. It will as well benefit the academia adding to the existing body of literature, particularly filling the gap therein.

The study also seeks to enlighten the general public and different roles played by external actors in Somali conflict. More so the study will highlight all emerging issues that will be important for further studies. This will play the role of enlightening the public and helping them work together with external actors in ways that benefit in reconstructing Somalia. Peace-efforts initiated by external actors have to date been unsuccessful. In future peace processes, it is imperative for everyone involved, Somalis and foreigners alike, to fully understand the reasons behind the conflict, and the elements behind its self-perpetuating nature. Without such a profound comprehension putting an end to the cycle of violence will be very difficult. The study thus aims to make a contribution to the policy, academic and general public on Somalia’s conflict, by providing an analysis of the reasons behind its seeming intractability, particularly in regard to the involvement of external actors, which are crucial to understand from the point of view of future peace-building.
1.8 Conceptual Framework

Somalia does not lend itself to an easy definition of war. As stated by Vaquez\textsuperscript{33}, Somalia’s complex history, the multitude of agents, the structural challenges and the vast range of interests inside and beyond make the armed conflict there an ongoing social process that is constantly changing. Hence a discussion is worthwhile on the different ways of thinking about the conflict in Somalia. This may lead to a better understanding of the complexity of the situation in which external interventions take place, thus how best to define the conflict in Somalia. A number of distinctive characteristics can be identified as typical of contemporary wars, which sets them apart from previous wars. Scholars have used a variety of terms to describe such conflicts, including ‘privatized war’, ‘post-modern war’, ‘wars of the third kind’, and ‘fourth generation warfare (4GW)’.

This study on Somali conflict will elaborate on the ‘new war’ concept, relying predominantly on Kaldor’s\textsuperscript{34} work, and accordingly adopting her terminology. It must however be noted that the new wars idea is used herein less as an explanatory framework; but rather in a descriptive manner in order to arrive at a comprehension of how war is waged today, in Somalia. The old wars against which Kaldor\textsuperscript{35} contrasts the new wars are wars which, in accordance with Clausewitz\textsuperscript{36} theorizing, were waged between states, by state armies. The goals of these wars were often geopolitical, and the methods used to achieve them were chiefly the capturing of territory through battle. Such wars were in essence financed through taxation and by mobilizing a large part of the population to sustain a self-sufficient, centralized war economy. Four main

\textsuperscript{34} Kaldor, Mary. 2009. “New Wars op cit.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid: 15
aspects can thus be identified in which the new wars are different: the character of the warring parties; the political goals; the methods of warfare; and the financing of the war.

Using the concept presented by Kaldor, the conflict in Somalia is best treated in the so-called ‘New War’ debate. In line with her reasoning, Somalia neatly fits the criteria of a new war by its nature as a complex social mass embodying a multitude of social conflicts including war, organized crime and human rights violations against civilians, and being non-rules-based with blurred boundaries between private and stated-based armed groups, indistinct external-internal military engagements and unclear central-local boundaries. Thus, from this viewpoint, the armed conflict in Somalia is first and foremost a complex civil war in which domestic parties fight each other to gain territorial advantage and control over governance.37 This in turn suggests that a comprehensive approach is applied when dealing with the Somalia conflict. Like many modern civil wars, Somalia is also a battleground where a number of actors that are actively engaged in the conflict. Secondary parties in this regard are external actors that side with the primary parties. For example, beside its open support for the Federal Government of Somalia, Ethiopia supports groups such as Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa (ASWJ, the People of the Sunna and the Majority) and Marehan clan militias. Kenya, on the other hand, supported Ogaden-based actors (Madobe and Ghandi) and the Ras Kamboni militia.

In general, these secondary parties engage either actively as warring parties or through proxy support for various local actors in the civil war. According to Berekekeeteab, 38 Secondary parties can sometimes shift to become primary or third parties, depending on their motives. Third parties are actors that have interests in the conflict, but which can act as impartial actors, such as

37 UCDP, UCDP Definition of the Somalia Conflict Available at: http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=141#. Accessed on 05.07.2015
mediators or facilitators, such as the UN or IGAD. The US can be considered both a primary and a secondary party, although judging from its own self-view (statements and behaviour) it can sometimes be understood as only a third party. From a policy perspective a strategy to engage with Somalia could be to single out more clearly what role external interveners play. One of the challenges posed by this theory is to determine if the actors are in Somalia for the sake of national interest or for the purpose of creating genuine peace. Another policy relevant aspect is that the donor community can signal their readiness to support intervening partners that can transcend their identities from being a secondary to a third party, a notion shared by Halden.\textsuperscript{39}

The concept of ‘new wars’ has not gone without a considerable amount of criticism. Historical narratives note that the features of new wars have been present in earlier wars, too, not only in modern or contemporary wars. Much of the criticism is that the term “new” in new wars is not solely used to describe the new reality of warfare. Rather it is a term used to highlight the need for developing new approaches to conflict analysis. However, new wars concept seems to bring forth the idea that number of civilians and displaced people has grown as a proportion of all casualties in recent violent conflicts\textsuperscript{40}. In addition, it brings out the distinction between public and private combatants, warlords, criminals and common thugs that have become a common trait of modern violent conflicts.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{40} Newman, E., “Human Security and Constructivism”. International Studies Perspectives 3, No. 2 (2001) 239–251
1.9 Hypothesis

The study will test the following research hypothesis:

1. External actors in internal conflicts play key roles in the security and peace stability of conflict societies

2. The involvement of external actors has contributed extensively to the internationalization of the Somali conflict

3. There is a clear relationship between external and internal actors’ outcomes for peace and security in the Somali conflict

1.10 Research Methodology

The study explored the research methodology that aims at addressing the research objectives and questions. The study sample and instruments for the study drew data from both primary and secondary sources of information. Primary data was derived from interactive interviews from key players in research, analysis and relations with Somali and the conflict therein such include individuals from think tanks, diplomats and the Somali diaspora. Secondary data was sourced from a collection and review of published and unpublished material, journals, academic papers and periodicals. These were taken through intensive and critical analysis.

1.10.1 Research Design

Research design is the plan and structure of investigation so conceived as to obtain answers to research questions. The plan is the overall scheme or program of the research. The study adopted a design that seeks to describe a unit in detail and is a way of organizing educational data and looking at the object to be studied as a whole. A case study is a research method common in social science. In this study, the case study is Somalia.
1.10.2 Population and Sampling Design

Population
Target population in is the specific population about which information is desired. The available population for this research is the public and private sectors in relations to the Somali conflict. Such include individuals from think tanks such as ISS, Crisis Group, diplomats, the Somali Diaspora and international NGOs.

Sample Frame
The sampling plan describes how the sampling unit, sampling frame, sampling procedures and the sample size for the study. The sampling frame describes the list of all population units from which the sample will be selected. The sampling design involved interviewing the population that has been involved and affected by the Somali conflict. This means the target was the academia and policy making and leadership arena in public and private sector and grass root. The grass root is important for the notion of ‘the rights of the arrested persons and community policing. The questionnaires were given out to be filled and the interviews conducted by interviewing one person at a time as well as groups.

Sampling Technique
The study used random sampling. This involved a random sample from each stratum taken in a number proportional to the stratum's size compared to the population. Random sampling was employed in the study in order to ensure fair representation and generalization of the findings to the general population.

Data Collection Methods
This study will collect quantitative data through interview. The reason for choosing interviews as the data collection instrument is primarily due to its practicability, applicability to the research
problem and the size of the population. It is also cost effective and gave adequate time for the respondent to carefully think and answer.

**Research Procedures**

The interview questions were designed by the researcher based on the research questions were pre-tested to ascertain the suitability of the tool before the actual administration. Pre-testing was done by interviewing five respondents will be selected randomly from the sample size. This enabled the researcher to fine-tune the questions for objectivity and efficiency of the process. The questions were estimated to take fifteen to thirty minutes to complete.

**1.11 Chapter Outline**

This study consisted of five chapters outlined below.

Chapter one introduced the study, by conceptualizing core ideas and theory and providing a contextual background. This chapter detailed the background of the study, and the statement of the problem, discussing the external actors involved in the Somali conflict while highlighting the inadequacy of literature in that manner. The chapter also discussed the literature review which entailed the concept of new wars as introduced by Kaldor among other proponents of this concept, while highlighting the critics of the ‘new wars’ concept. The research methodology is as well laid down in chapter one and the policy and academic justification.

Chapter two consists of a comprehensive literature review on the aspects of external actors of conflict and the internationalization aspect, and will thus expand on the theory introduced in Chapter One. Chapter two goes ahead to discuss the types of external actors – the state actors, non-state actors as well as the multilateral actors such as the AU. It also discussed the involvement of the three types of actors and how they internationalize the internal conflicts.
Chapter two adopts a general global perspective, while narrowing down to the region of Africa, before the study narrows further to the case study- Somalia in Chapter three.

Chapter three presented the case study, that is Somalia, and provided a historical background, as well as a descriptive overview of the current Somali conflict. In this chapter, state actors, non-state actors and multilateral actors are discussed and their involvement in the Somali conflict. This included outlining the involvement of state actors such as Kenya, Ethiopia, and US, as well as the Gulf and Arab states among other states that internationalize and add the external factor to the Somali conflict. Non-states actors are also discussed due to their humanitarian and peace keeping efforts in Somalia during the conflict.

Chapter four which is the critical analysis of the previous chapters (one, two and three) analyzes the objectives of the study as for the conflict in Somalia, by positioning the findings of the study in chapter three within the theory outlined in chapter two. It examines the nexus between the external and internal actors in peace for Somalia and the internal peace-building frameworks.

Chapter five which is the conclusions, summary and recommendations based on the findings of the study were drawn. The conclusions and summary are drawn from each objective of the study which is articulated in each chapter of the study. Thus chapter five concluded each chapter of the study, with a summary of each of the examined factors and actors in each chapter of the study. The recommendations were made for the effective and peace oriented involvement of external actors in Somali conflict and the opportunities for future study will be identified.
CHAPTER TWO
EXTERNAL ACTORS IN INTERNAL CONFLICT

2.1. Introduction
Chapter one highlighted the key components of the study on the roles of external actors in the Somali conflict which are the purposive and unintended. This part of the study extends the examination of these roles with emphasis of how external actors can protract or complicate peace-building and security and how they can also add to the mediation process as well as how they internationalize the conflict. This chapter will examine different roles of external actors in internationalizing conflict and thus expand on the theory introduced in chapter one. It adopts a wider view of external actors applied in conflicts all over the world, before narrowing to Somalia in the chapter three.

2.2 Typology of External Actors in an Internal Conflict
External actors can be divided along thematic lines that are according to the type of interaction and function they serve. According to Pugh and Cooper, the dynamics underpinning specific conflicts are not easily demarcated because they frequently overlap, and specific cases may reflect more than one element. For example, the shipment of weapons can be understood either as a military matter or as part of the economic sphere. Sometimes, refugee camps are used as recruiting grounds for so called 'refugee warriors', transforming a social network to a military element. Nevertheless, together with the categories developed above these dimensions should be encompassing enough to have a reasonable heuristic function.

The military category pertains to all actions that are directly linked to the fighting, be they the provision of military support or the cross-border movement of troops, either in form of

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intervening regular armed forces or as transnational rebels. Political networks are open or covert relationships between conflict and external actors, which can come in the form of alliances or rivalries. Also, civil war has a destabilizing effect on regional political order.

Economic networks refer to the cross-border movement of goods in general, but in the context of civil war are commonly associated with illicit trade in conflict goods (such as diamonds from Sierra Leone, Coltan from the DRC or opium from Afghanistan) and local war economies as well as negative effects on the regional economy. While generally interactions here will be purely profit-oriented, this category also includes non-military support from external actors.

Social linkages comprise all forms of identity-based cross-border ties and solidarities (such as tribal, ethnic/clan, national, religious or ideological). This includes external identity-groups in general as well as connections resulting from large-scale migration or flight. As already mentioned these categories are not clear-cut and naturally affect each other. It is especially likely that non-actor-specific and/or immaterial dimensions provide the underlying structures for concrete transactions between actors. For example, military support will probably be organized along the lines of political alliances; trade in conflict goods will follow established regional shadow trade networks; refugees will turn toward areas where kindred groups live. Moreover, even on the same level certain dimensions may be functions of each other. Political relationships for instance often correlate with ethnic or religious linkages and external military support may be paid for with conflict goods.

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2.3 Involvement of External Actors in Internal Conflicts

Conflict approaches that focus on the involvement of external actors in civil wars go one step further in their treatment of external dimensions in the sense that the conflicts are by definition not purely internal. They are also less abstract as they deal with active decisions of concrete actors and not with seemingly inevitable effects. The contagion logic was very early criticized by Brown as being “simplistic and mechanistic”, relying on “crude analogies to diseases, fires, floods, and other forms of nature spilling over from one place to another through a process that is always beyond human control”.

According to Brown, states hold two different characteristics in conflict: states as “passive victims of turmoil in the region” and as “active contributors to military escalation and regional instability”. There is a variety of reasons why states would intervene in internal conflicts. During the Cold War, third-party involvement was usually seen as a function of superpower rivalry, where each bloc supported one side in proxy wars of domestic groups. Since the Cold War ended, a great deal of attention has been paid both by policy-makers and researchers to “humanitarian interventions” by the international community, although the vast majority of interventions were actually carried out by regional powers, often directly neighbouring the conflict state. Regardless of the intervener however, foreign interventions are generally being treated as a form of conflict management, which is either focused on a neutral approach to bring the parties to the negotiating table or biased towards one side, trying to help them to win the conflict. In the former tradition, Walter finds that external involvement can help

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46 Ibid: 26
in negotiating an end to the quarrels by providing a solution to credible commitment problems.\textsuperscript{48}

In this regard, Lindsay and Enterline have argued that interventions supporting one side shorten the duration of civil war not only because they make a military victory more likely, but because they also raise the chance for a negotiated settlement.\textsuperscript{49} What has been mostly neglected until recently however is the role of third-parties having other goals than to end the conflict (be it for humanitarian or opportunistic reasons). Additionally, Cunningham argues that in many interventions external actors tend to pursue independent objectives in the war outside of the goals of the domestic combatants.\textsuperscript{50} Under this condition, the setting of the conflict becomes increasingly complex and even more difficult to solve, because the intervening state not necessarily supports the decisions of its domestic allies. This is especially true when external actors do not intervene in an ongoing conflict but are already involved in its outbreak from the beginning.

While in the logic of the contagion-framework\textsuperscript{51} outbreaks of civil wars are influenced more by indirect and structural transnational dimensions, in this case they are the result of discrete, deliberate decisions by governments to trigger conflicts in nearby states for political, economic or ideological purposes of their own. Such conflicts, one could say, are caused by bad neighbours rather than bad neighbourhoods.\textsuperscript{52} States that meddle in the affairs of their neighbours causing or influencing civil war usually act in an alliance with domestic armed


\textsuperscript{52} Ibid p.25
groups to advance their goals, either in joint operations with their own troops or as proxy forces which they materially sustain.53

2.4 Internationalization of Conflict by External Actors

More recently, attention has focused on international, as not only on the regional, spill-over of intra-state conflict. In the past few years this debate has been fuelled by the perceived rise of global transnational terrorist threats. Internationalization is seen by many as an inevitable consequence of globalization and its effect on markets and communications, which have provided rebel groups with the means to pursue armed conflict and a global platform to make their case. The rise of extremist groups is perceived to bring an additional element to this internationalization - a shared grievance and a common goal between diverse rebel groups. The US-led war against Al-Qaeda is premised on this perception of a conflict without a single territorial location in terms of grievance, the parties involved or the potential of its impact. Ironically, the perspective of the global war on terrorism and its logic of internationalized motivation have led to increased emphasis on the isolation of intra-state conflicts.54

External actors as well as domestic governments are increasingly pursuing or supporting strategies to contain and isolate intra-state conflicts perceived to have ‘global’ motivations or grievances. Such an approach almost inevitably aligns international support with the perspective of the government party to the intra-state conflict.55 In so doing it has, arguably, reduced international pressure and engagement for a negotiated end to a number of conflicts. Two of the

most obvious examples of the effect of the global war on terrorism on the pursuit of a policy of international isolation of intra-state conflict in 2004 were the conflicts in Chechnya and in Aceh. The interplay between the location of a conflict and its national, regional and international dimensions is another example of the diversity and complexity of intra-state conflict and demonstrates, yet again, the difficulty of classification and generalization.

The term “internationalized armed conflict” describes internal hostilities that are rendered international. The factual circumstances that can achieve that internationalization are numerous and often complex: the term internationalized armed conflict includes war between two internal factions both of which are backed by different States; direct hostilities between two foreign States that militarily intervene in an internal armed conflict in support of opposing sides; and war involving a foreign intervention in support of an insurgent group fighting against an established government. The most transparent internationalized internal armed conflicts in recent history include NATO’s intervention in the armed conflict between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1999 and the intervention undertaken by Rwanda, Angola, Zimbabwe, Uganda and others, in support of opposing sides of the internal armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) since August 1998.

The proliferation of nuclear weaponry and its inhibiting impact on direct forms of aggression during the Cold War led to many less transparent internationalized armed conflicts, which although superficially internal were in fact “wars by proxy”, taking place in the territory of a single State with the covert intervention of foreign governments.

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58 Ibid
government’s support of the contras in Nicaragua in the early 1980s is perhaps the best documented example. Motivations for intervention in civil wars may have changed since the end of the Cold War, but the increased economic interdependence of States born of globalization, the development of nuclear capabilities among previously incapable states, the greater incidence of terrorism in Western countries and the increasing scarcity of natural resources all provide continuing incentives for foreign intervention in domestic conflicts. As a reflection of that reality, internal conflicts are presently more numerous, brutal and damaging than their international counterparts, despite the fact that the State remains the main war-waging machine. There is almost invariably some form of foreign state involvement in internal armed conflicts.60

2.5 External Actors of Conflicts in Africa

Rarely can internal conflicts remain sequestered from the wider international system, and separating their internal and external aspects is not straightforward when internal actors seek external sponsors and when external actors are constrained by the necessity of using and accommodating to local agents. Africa’s internal conflicts pose particular conflict management challenges, not least because they tend to be more intense and intractable than inter-state ones. Such has been the case with Somalia and will be analyzed further in the subsequent chapters to this study. These African conflicts tend to be more severe and costly in terms of lives and refugees than most inter-state conflicts, although there are clearly some exceptions. For example, since 1960 a full third of Africa’s mainly internal conflicts experienced more than 10,000 deaths.61 In the same period 10 major conflicts alone claimed the lives of between 3.8 and 6.8

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million people, and in total, an estimated eight million Africans have lost their lives as a direct result of war — five and a half million of whom were civilians.\textsuperscript{62}

The severity of civil wars is also revealed in the statistics on refugees and displaced persons. Africa has the highest level of internal displacement and some of the largest refugee flows in the world. In 2000, there were 11 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Africa and another three million cross-border refugees. In many cases, these refugees became the source of new conflicts, such as in Sierra Leone and Zaire in 1996.\textsuperscript{63} This is also a case debated in Kenya (2015) after several attacks and claimed radicalization in refugee camps. Conflicts that lie at the more severe end of the spectrum, as Africa’s internal conflicts clearly do, have been shown to be far more difficult to resolve. One of the most alarming aspects of conflict in Africa is the increasing use of extreme forms of violence, particularly in the post-Cold-War period.

Violence is now deliberately targeted at civilians rather than armed groups, and at entire groups rather than individuals. In the conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Mozambique, Northern Uganda, Sudan and Angola, violence has taken appalling forms. Mutilation, torture of women and children, violent rituals and the forcible involvement of relatives, children and spouses in killing and rape are used as a means of waging war primarily by militia groups and by some state proxies. In some instances, such violence is part of ritual that binds militia groups together. Extreme violence can be used as a means of humiliation or revenge. More frequently, it is used as a means of intimidation, as is the case with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone. Here, mutilation was brutally applied as part of a strategy to stop people from voting or from gathering the harvest or to spread control over territory by sheer terror and fear,
thus avoiding the need to fight.\textsuperscript{64} Related to these terror tactics, there has been an alarming rise in the forcible recruitment of children into rebel armies. It is estimated that there are presently around 200,000 child soldiers in Africa, many of them forced into fighting for the LRA in Uganda, the RUF in Sierra Leone, the Interahamwe in Rwanda, and UNITA in Angola.\textsuperscript{65}

The external context of internal conflicts also impacts on their management. Internally based conflicts are difficult enough to resolve, but when these conflicts draw in surrounding states and spill across national boundaries, the task becomes all the more problematic. Actually, internal conflicts nearly always draw in neighbouring states in one manner or another.\textsuperscript{66} Fragile politics, by definition, are easily permeable. Therefore, internal issues in Third World societies get transformed into interstate issues quite readily. All of Africa’s worst conflicts have involved multiple interventions from external parties. In fact, Africa has the highest rate of external intervention in conflicts, including the Middle East, which also experiences a great deal of intervention. External intervention is not a primary cause of Africa’s conflicts, but more an exacerbating factor. It is directly related to the failure of the African state. In other words, because African political systems “are internally incoherent and because aspects of their internal form are projections of the external environment, they are easily manipulated from the outside.”\textsuperscript{67}

The external linkages in internal conflicts are manifested in the high level of direct military intervention by outside states. Military intervention into Francophone politics continues to be an important pillar of French policy in Africa, although there are signs that this is diminishing. In the post-Cold-War period, French troops have been most visibly involved in

\textsuperscript{64} Department for International Development (DFID) 2000:para.24
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid Para 25
\textsuperscript{67} Salehyan, I.. Transnational Insurgencies and the Escalation of Regional Conflict: Lessons for Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA. 2010b
Rwanda (1994), Comoros (1995), and the Central African Republic (1998). The current levels of external intervention in Africa’s conflicts are historically linked to Cold War politics. Superpower competition for clients from the 1960s onwards saw the Soviet Union and the USA successfully carve for themselves spheres of influence by virtue of the predominant roles they played both ideologically and militarily in Africa. Particularly in the Horn of Africa and southern Africa, Cold War competition had a pronounced effect. In each case, an exacerbation of local cleavages provided the entry point.⁶⁸

A direct effect of Cold War interventionism was the massive militarisation of many regions, erecting obstacles to future conflict resolution efforts. Large quantities of weapons were shipped to the Horn of Africa by the superpowers in what became a futile pursuit of influence. By one estimate, a total of US$8 billion in weapons was delivered to Ethiopia and Somalia between 1972 and 1990 alone.⁶⁹ Since then, of course, much of this weaponry has been lost to insurgent groups or found its way onto the black market. By the early 1990s, the entire region was so awash with arms that international efforts to limit arms shipments to the region will continue to have minimal effect on the level of fighting for many years to come. Several African conflicts that were caused directly by internal disagreements, therefore, were internationalised by the Cold War due to the readily available supplies of weapons systems to warring factions.

Globalisation and Africa’s violent internal conflicts is yet another aspect of internationalization that has led to external factors of conflicts. According to Kaldor. In the post-Cold-War period, Africa’s internal conflicts have mutated into new forms.⁷⁰ Characterised by a blurring of the lines between war, organised crime, and large-scale human rights violations, these

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⁶⁹ Department for International Development (DFID) 2000:para.45
“new wars” demonstrate new modalities which distinguish them from earlier, more conventional civil wars. In terms of the actors typically engaged in Africa’s internal conflicts, the processes of globalisation have widened the number and type of participants. Along with the principal protagonists of government armed forces and insurgents, it is not uncommon to see a range of other internal groups such as ethnically based militias, specialised security services, semi-mercenary units, armed religious cults, warlords, and criminal gangs. External parties representing international constituencies are also drawn into internal conflicts, such as humanitarian agencies, peacekeepers, foreign mercenaries, private military companies (PMCs), entrepreneurs and international capitalists. The goals of the protagonists are also more diffuse. Traditional ideological and political objectives, such as regime overthrow or secession, often overlap with chauvinistic ethno-nationalist and/or economic aims.

Africa’s internal conflicts in the post-Cold-War period have also demonstrated an expanded repertoire of strategies for pursuing conflict goals, most notably strategies that involve serious human rights violations. Although the use of terror by civil war armies has been commonplace throughout history, the atrocities witnessed in Rwanda, Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, to name a few, have articulated a new lexicon of terms to describe the horrors experienced by civilian populations, ethnic cleansing, mass rape, genocide, politocide, child soldiers.

The outcomes of these conflicts have also increased in their range of possibilities. While some have resulted in regime change (Liberia) or secession (Eritrea), others have settled into almost permanent conditions of state collapse and protracted conflict (Somalia), war-lordism.

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(Sierra Leone), or cycles of ceasefire followed by further outbreaks of fighting (Angola, Sudan, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo). A few have resulted in fragile political settlements enforced by powerful external actors as the case in Central African Republic, Lesotho, while an even smaller set had reverted to conditions of semi-state-collapse in Democratic Republic of Congo.

2.6 Summary

This particular chapter has examined the dynamics of external actors in internal conflicts. From this part of the study, it is clear that the insight that civil wars cannot be treated as purely domestic affairs, being contained within a country’s borders and having no meaningful security implications for the region they are situated in has become common in recent years, and particularly in post-cold war era. Indeed certain cross-border aspects influence and bring the risk of civil war onset in neighbouring countries as external actors meddle in the affairs of states in crisis. In the subsequent chapter – chapter three, the research will embark on the actual analysis of role of external actors in Somalia. This will include a detailed examination of the types of external actors involved in the Somali conflict, both military and non-military aspects of actors.
CHAPTER THREE
EXTERNAL ACTORS AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE SOMALI
CONFLICT (2000-2014)

3.0 Introduction
The Somali conflict has different actors that get involved in pursuit of their interest and others dragged into conflict due to issues that affect them due to the conflict. This chapter explores the actors, from non-state to state actors such as Kenya and Ethiopia and as well as the multilateral organizations such as AMISOM and the European Union and other states such as USA, Britain and Turkey. Increasingly, intractable armed violence has been attributed to weak, fragile, biased or incapacitated external actors involved in peacekeeping and peace-building, or regional and national agents of the state as well the armed conflict itself. For the ‘positive’ players of conflicts, such outsiders are often described as approaching peacemaking tasks or peace-building objectives ineffectively, as hindering or hurting the chances for peace.73

Since contemporary African conflicts have been shown to display cross border, international and regional dimensions, attaching rigid boundaries between outsiders and more locally-rooted agents can result in oversimplification. Also, parties to conflict can manipulate or harm outsiders (and civilian non-combatants) in order to strengthen their own chances for victory or meet other interests74. This chapter seeks to address the extent of the roles played by these actors in conflict and peace in Somalia, focusing on the roles of international and regional actors, particularly in internationalizing and prolonging the Somali conflict.

3.1 State Actors

Sustainable peace in Somalia is necessary to the region in general and the neighbouring states in particular. Conflicts and insecurity in one country spread and affect other countries in one way or another. As highlighted in the previous chapter, the study characterizes the Somali conflict as “new wars” thus that conflicts and wars involve a myriad of transnational connections of global and local actors who fight for particular political goals at times using terror tactics and destabilization as well as criminalized economy.\(^75\)

Developments in Somalia need to be understood within the broader context of the region, wherein Somalia is often the battleground for divisions between its African and Arab neighbours and the world. Somalia is a member of the African Union. As part of Africa, it is automatically a member of the African Union. Regional actors have been involved in the conflict and peace process and have shown support to the clan groups in Somalia in extending their influence. In fact, incompatible regional interests have been critical in delaying national reconciliation and a political resolution to Somalia’s problems. Interference by external states is further complicated by cross-boundary clan relations.\(^76\)

The borders of Somalia were imposed externally without much consideration for clan configurations, thus dividing kindred clans across boundaries such as across Kenya and Ethiopia. This situation has led to armed conflict and diplomacy among states being shaped as much by interactions between governments as by cross-border relationships among clans. African states and organizations have played pivotal roles in the Somali peace process. The African Union is expected to play a key role in providing support to peacekeeping in Somalia, and several regional

\(^{75}\) Kaldor, Mary.. New and Old Wars. 3rd edition, Stanford University Press: Stanford, California, 2012

states, both African and Arab, appear committed to shoulder the reconstruction of Somalia. All these actors and more are highlighted in this chapter.

### 3.1.1 Ethiopia’s involvement

Ethiopia has been involved in the Somalia conflict which continues over two decades. The hostile history between the two countries followed by the nature of conflicts to “spill over” in nearby countries and affect them in different ways motivated the Ethiopian involvement in the Somali conflict. This is a case conflicts spread quickly and creating instability in the neighbouring states in a variety of ways including transfer of weapons and cross border attacks.\(^{77}\)

Based on Ethiopia’s proximate and underlying security concerns in the Somalia conflict, it applies multiple approaches to increase its national security and interest; those approaches include creation of bilateral collaborations with influential entities and individuals in the conflict. For example, Ethiopia supports and collaborates with the authorities in Puntland and Somaliland in the security and political aspects.

Ethiopia has a border line with both entities and this decreases its security concern over the conflict in Somalia. It also allows its forces to deal with its national security threats in the areas controlled by those entities. Similarly, Ethiopia has a good relationship with some of the influential warlords in Somalia and provides them military support to fight against the Islamists.\(^{78}\) In this situation, Ethiopia’s strategies to increase its national security through bilateral relations with individual entities in the conflict could be perceived as negative impact

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towards a holistic resolution to Somalia’s conflict. This could also be interpreted as Brown’s\(^79\) explanation that neighbouring states are often active contributors to violence, escalation and regional instability.

Ethiopia played roles in many peace initiatives in Somalia. However, Ethiopia undermined some of the efforts in which its interest was at stake such as challenging the Cairo peace process by recruiting and persuading two main Somalia faction leaders to boycott the process. The fact that Egypt has unstable relations and disputes at times with Ethiopia over the Nile River water sharing, Ethiopia was unhappy with the process, which was facilitated by Egypt, for the former thought it was unlikely to produce friendly Somali institutions to Ethiopia.\(^80\) Ethiopia intervenes in Somalia’s conflict not only to protect its national security from threats posed by actors in Somalia, but also wants to prevent other states, such as Eritrea that allegedly supported Somali factions as well as Ethiopian opposition in Somalia as proxy.

Ethiopia would benefit greatly by the trade routes that can be offered through Somaliland and would support the recognition of Somaliland, however the African Union’s insistence on maintaining the colonial borders has presented a challenge to Somaliland garnering the support they need. As of 2007, both the European Union and the African Union has sent delegations to discuss the international recognition of Somaliland. So far, Ethiopia is the first State to officially recognize Somaliland as a Sovereign State.\(^81\)

Ethiopia has increased trade with Somaliland. After the 2000 war with Eritrea and its inability to rely on Assab port, Ethiopia increasingly channels exports and imports through the

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\(^{80}\) Keating, Joshua.. "If it Makes Oil Deals Like a Country, or Jails Journalists like a Country, is it a Country?" Foreign Policy Magazine, 2012. p.18.

\(^{81}\) Ibid
port of Berbera. It also cooperates with Somaliland on shared issues of concern, such as security. Ethiopian Airlines flies regularly to Somaliland, and Ethiopia has opened a liaison office in Hargeisa. Somaliland’s relations with its other neighbour, Djibouti, have been uneven, particularly given Djibouti’s perceived support of the Transitional National Government and its stance in defense of reconstituting a unified Somali state. 82

3.1.2 Kenya’s Involvement

Kenya shares historical factors with Somalia in regards to ethnic and geographical aspects. The north eastern province of Kenya is predominantly inhabited by a Somali ethnic population, but unlike Ethiopia, Kenya had no interstate wars with Somalia. However, tensions between the two countries over the Somali inhabited region occurred right after the independence of Somalia. The first Somali independent state declared its intention to unify the Somalia inhabited regions in the horn of Africa under one state in which north eastern province of Kenya includes. Northern Frontier Liberation Army (NFLA), an ethnic Somalia secessionist movement, was established in the early 1960s to fight against Kenyan rule in this region. 83

The Somali government at the time backed up this movement and provided them moral and material support. In spite of history, Kenya has always been friendly with the Somali people since the war broke out in Somalia in 1991. Kenya accommodated the largest number of Somali refugees who fled the war in Somalia. According to UNHCR Kenya hosts about a half a million Somali refugees as per this year, while the conflict in Somalia still continues. 84 The fact that all

conflicts affect regional countries in several ways, the scale of Somali refugees in Kenya could hugely affect this country in variable aspects. Even though Kenya hosts the largest number of Somali refugees in the world, Kenya’s role in the Somali conflict remained quite neutral for many years. It has been involved in mediation processes between internal actors and hosted several peace processes meant to reconcile conflicting parts in Somalia.

This included the one held 2002-2004 under the auspices of IGAD member states and international community producing the TFG. Regardless of its role in the conflict, Kenya always experienced insecurity incidents posed by this conflict since it broke out in 1991. Due to the changing dimensions of Somalia’s conflict, the threats it poses against Kenya increased when Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda, who controlled larger areas in South-Central Somalia threatened, to destabilize Kenya. The terrorist organization carried out several attacks inside Kenya targeting tourism and other economic sources of the country. Moreover, the group started to recruit youngsters of Kenya, Somalis in Kenya and other Muslim nationals inside Kenya to join them. The Kenyan governments perceived this as serious security problem against its national security and interest.

Consequently, the Kenyan government changed its behaviour towards the Somali conflict by sending the Kenyan defence forces (KDF) into Somalia to fight Al-Shabaab and prevent their attacks against Kenya. In relation to its dimensions and the behaviour of the actors in it, Somalia’s conflict can be classified as what Kaldor explained to be “new wars”.

Recruitment of young men of different nationality by Al-Shabaab and involvement of Al-Qaeda

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indicates a new war character in this conflict. Furthermore, local conflicts have great potential to “spill over” and create military problems for neighbouring states. In the case of Somalia, Al-Shabaab abducted aid workers and tourists in Kenya creating security and economic instability in that country. The group kidnapped two Spanish aid workers in northern Kenya and wounded several others. This created a crisis for aid organizations to help refugees and other aid dependent people in Kenya.  

Even though the Kenyan troops intervened in Somalia and engaged in fighting with Al-Shabaab, the terrorist organization still remains an active and crucial threat to Kenyan internal security. In response to the challenges affecting the national security and interest, Kenya decided to increase the involvement in Somalia by integrating the Kenyan forces in Somalia with the AMISOM peacekeeping forces operating under the mandate of the AU and UNSC. The Kenyan forces operating in Somalia initially invaded Somalia with an individual self-defense decision by the Kenyan government. The AU and UNSC officially allowed KDF to join AMISOM.  

Although the Kenyan forces now operate in Somalia under the mandate of the AU and UNSC, they are interested and critically involved in the settlement of Jubaland. The Kenyan troops operate in the Jubaland region and play a prominent role in the establishment of this regional autonomy. Kenya explains this as part of her efforts to assure her own national security. Thus so, it gives a hand to the Somali community living the nearby border regions to get an administration that guarantees them peace and security. However, Somalia’s federal

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government in Mogadishu refused to recognize the outcome of the community negotiations to create the Kenya backed Jubaland administration.

3.1.3 Other State Actors

Eritrea and Yemen have been cited as supporters of domestic opponents of Somalia’s government, particularly Al-Shabaab. Eritrea and Yemen have, according to some scholars, provided military and political support to the opponents of the TFG/SFG and AMISOM in recent years – although little concrete evidence exists to support or discredit these claims either way. Both states are argued to have hosted Union of Islamic Courts officials fleeing Somalia in 2006, while Eritrea is said to have supported Al-Shabaab until recently. This has been interpreted as a continuation of the on-going Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict by proxy, originating in a border war between the two states during 1998-2000. Eritrea’s involvement and interests in Somalia are little known and scholars agree that the country’s foreign policy is decided in a highly personalised manner by the unpredictable and anti-Western president Isaias Afwerki.

The Gulf and Arab states are as well actors in the Somali conflict. Somalia is also a member of the League of Arab States (LAS). It has a long-standing historic ties based on common cultural and religious affinity give its membership in the LAS. It is argued that this dual membership makes it captive to the divergent interests of both African and Arab states, which have their own interests in the political arrangement of Somalia. In South-central Somalia, peace efforts consistently are thwarted by rival regional ambitions. Even the current peace process is plagued by regional rivalries. The Arab states and Djibouti backed the Transitional National

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Government (TNG) and are reported to favour a strong central authority in Mogadishu, while Ethiopia is said to have supported the Somali Reconciliation and Reconstruction Council to further the establishment of regional entities in Somalia.\footnote{Dua, J.. A sea of trade and a sea of fish: piracy and protection in the Western Indian Ocean. Journal of Eastern African Studies, 7, no.2, 2013, pp: 353-370.}

Ties between South-central Somalia and the Gulf states have strengthened since the end of the Barre regime. Nearly US$800 million of Somalia’s trade exchange has shifted from Europe to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and large numbers of Somalis have escaped the civil war to seek refuge and employment in the Arab states. In the absence of social services in South-central Somalia, Arab states have also provided social assistance through Islamic charities. There are accusations that the charities are fronts to promote a brand of Wahhabism but it appears that these allegations are exaggerated and that extreme forms of Islamic ideologies have limited appeal to Somalis.\footnote{Ibid} It is alleged that Djibouti, with a large Somali population and membership in the LAS, has also cooperated with the Arab states to consolidate support for the TNG. Ethiopia is considered to have a strong interest in developments in Somalia and has consistently supported clan groups that are willing to protect its interests.

Unlike South-central Somalia, Puntland does not have close ties with the Arab states. Instead, it appears to enjoy a close relationship with Ethiopia, which vies with the Arab states for influence on the outcome of the peace talks.\footnote{Bryden, M.. “Somalia redux? Assessing the new Somali Federal Government. A report of the CSIS Africa program.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2013} Interestingly, although relations between Somaliland and Puntland are strained, Somaliland also has a good relationship with Ethiopia, which has steadily improved since the collapse of the Somali state. Ethiopia’s positive stance toward Somaliland ensures that both a potentially expansionist pan-Somali nationalism and the
spread of Islamic fundamentalism are kept at bay. It appears that the Somaliland regional administration has made a concerted effort to prevent Islamic fundamentalists from increasing their power and, by following the principle of separation of state and religion, has excluded religious fundamentalists from the regional administration.95

Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are also increasingly important political and economic players in Somalia, with Harper noting that the former assisted Hassan Sheikh Mohamud financially in his successful 2012 campaign for the Somali presidency.96 This reflects a general observation in recent literature that the SFG is looking beyond traditional Western donors and institutions in their approach to international relations and securing external support.

Historically, both global actors the Soviet Union and the US played an active role in escalating the war by selling weapons to the both countries Somalia and Ethiopia. The US provided political and military support for Ethiopia until 1974, while the Soviet Union also supported Somalia. With the coming of a military regime in Ethiopia in 1974, the leader of the military government in the country Mengistu Haile Mariam began to increase its relations with Moscow. Throughout the Ogaden War, the Soviet Union supported Ethiopia, such as the deployment of the Soviet military troops and the helping of deployment of the Cuban military troops in the country to fight against Somalia. In 1974, the Soviets signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Somalia. In December 1976, the Soviet also signed a military agreement with Ethiopia. Somaliland independence represent the kind of separatism Russia normally opposes, as when it fought two wars to prevent secession of its province of Chechnya in the 1990s and 2000s could be a wild card in the recognition of Somaliland. Traditionally, Russia will side with China on issues regarding Sovereignty; however they will not hesitate to break up

96 Ibid
a country when it suits their own national interests. As in the case of the Ukraine, the sovereignty of the Ukrainian boarders mean nothing to Russia when there is an interest in the Crimea to break away that would also align with Russia’s national interest. 97

The United States of America, from the past, has played an active role in escalating the war by selling weapons to the both countries Somalia and Ethiopia. The US provided political and military support for Ethiopia until 1974 the US began to reduce the degree of the relationship with Ethiopia and increased its partnership with Somalia, aimed to decrease the influence of the Soviet Union in the region. 98 In the 1970s and the 1980s, Somalia became the country that received the largest financial aid of the US in Africa but most of the money was used for the military expenditures by the regime of Siad Barre. The Ethiopian-Somalia War reflected the struggle for power among the global powers over the Horn of Africa and illustrated the nature of the proxy war in the region. Along with much of the rest of the European Union would promote and support the separation and recognition of an independent Somaliland. Historically, these countries have supported and even encouraged, when it fits their national interests, the shifting of power down to the people. Examples that can be drawn would be Kosovo, Czechoslovakia, and the Scotland referendum.

Turkey also plays in the Somali conflict. A range of commentators highlight the growing importance of Turkey in Somalia’s political economy. During the 2011 Somali famine Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan visited Mogadishu with his family, precipitating a large injection of humanitarian donations and assistance from the Turkish population. 99 Ankara is also increasingly involved in humanitarian activities, in training Somali soldiers and in convening diplomatic summits aimed at assisting Somalia’s political and economic development. Somalis

97 Ibid
99 Interview, Turkish Embassy Kenya, 15th June, 2015
are reportedly far more favorably inclined towards Turkey than Western states for a range of reasons including its focus on humanitarian rather than security issues, the willingness of Turks in Mogadishu to live and work amongst the Somali population as opposed to the westerners living in heavily-protected ‘secure zones’, and direct delivery of aid to recipients. A 2012 assessment of Turkey’s role in Somalia by International Crisis Group nevertheless criticized Ankara’s involvement as overly unilateral and ad hoc.\textsuperscript{100}

China does present the biggest external challenge to the recognition of Somaliland. China will always respect the sovereignty of a State over all other factors. Therefore, if Somalia is not in support of the separation, it is unlikely the Somaliland will get any support from China. With its eyes toward its own secessionist provinces, China tends to support existing governments and existing borders. However, if the government of Somalia in Mogadishu favours division of the country, China might be willing to accept a legally achieved and legally accepted decision.\textsuperscript{101}

3.2 Multilateral States actors

3.2.1 The African Union

The African Union has legitimate interests to stabilize Somalia while the Arab League may also have its own Islamic agenda. The AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has done tremendous work to stabilize the country since its entry in 2007. For the first time, Soalia has an internationally recognized official government which was formed inside the country. Embassies have been reopened and AMISOM is in place to support the new government. However, it is facing asymmetrical resistance from Al Shabaab who continue to operate mostly in rural areas. Continued collaboration between AMISOM and United Nations is critical in turning Somalia

\textsuperscript{101} Interview, ISS Nairobi, 12\textsuperscript{th} June 2015
around. AMISOM must also understand perceptions of the Somali people towards their presence in Somalia so that they can respond appropriately. 102

Currently, there have been attempts by the African Union (AU) to provide stability within the State of Somalia without fully giving complete independent recognition to Somaliland. The policy of the AU to hold to colonial boards has been a common policy. Furthermore, the instability that could continue in the region if Somaliland would be allowed to succeed from Somalia completely concerns the AU greatly. 103 Instead, the AU established the AMISOM or the African Mission to Somalia to broker peace (AMISOM).

The AU is also running its major peace support operation under the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This makes its responsibility all the more onerous as an actor already on the ground, despite its limited mandate. In the light of these commitments, for the AU and people on the continent, inaction in the face of such devastating tragedy would be both irresponsible and inexcusable. Indeed, there is not any other moment of need for Africa to show its solidarity with Somalis and apply these norms of non-indifference than this one. Although the AU was slow in responding to the crisis for a whole range of understandable factors, it has since initiated a process for mobilising resources towards averting the catastrophe facing Somalia. On 12 July 2011, the AU issued a press statement for the first time on the subject. In that statement, the AU Commission Chairperson called on all AU member states to contribute in whatever way they can to the alleviation of the suffering of the affected populations. He also called on African humanitarian NGOs to contribute to the ongoing efforts. 104

104 Ibid
The FGS security forces and AMISOM troops, mainly from the neighbouring countries, including Ethiopia are fighting with Al-Shabaab in Somalia\textsuperscript{105}. Though AMISOM and the Somali national army are engaged in wars with Al-Shabaab and dislodged them from many areas, the group is still active and poses eminent threats against neighbouring states, regional and international security. This persist Ethiopian national security concern about possible attacks from groups in Somalia. In response to the increased support of international community for Somalia’s government in fighting the militant groups, Al-Shabaab officially joined Al-Qaeda and intensified violence in Somalia and the region. Al-Qaeda welcomed the move and pledged assistance for the group.\textsuperscript{106}

In efforts to pose the fight against the militant groups, the Ethiopian military in Somalia officially joined the AMISOM peacekeeping mission, a mission that Ethiopia was not part of in its previous operations in Somalia. Since Ethiopia’s national security is priority in its involvement in Somalia, the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) under AMISOM operate in the south-western region of Somalia. Even though, ENDF operate under the mandate of AMISOM, their geographical operational area has not changed; they operate in regions close to Somalia-Ethiopia border to create a buffer zone for Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{107}

External factors can play a more positive role if there is a common agenda between the AU and UN. This research established that AMISOM is well received in Baidoa and Mogadishu. Somalis generally do not like foreign intervention in their country, though the Djibouti AMISOM contingent is also well regarded in Baladweyne. Therefore, external involvement must be well informed on local political and cultural dynamics. External parties must not exacerbate


\textsuperscript{107} AMISOM, 2014 op cit.
prominently as providers of development aid, of training to AMISOM and Somali forces, and of anti-piracy mechanisms in the region.\(^\text{108}\) The EU has been criticised by several AMISOM states – notably Uganda – and some scholars as not providing adequate financial support to the operation since 2007 although these grievances have been less commented upon in recent years.\(^\text{109}\) As with the UN and US, European donors are viewed with suspicion by many Somalis as overly supportive of the TFG/SFG and Ethiopian interests.

The EU has nevertheless been praised for attempting to implement a more comprehensive approach to deterring piracy in the Horn of Africa by taking into account the developmental as well as security-related aspects. The UK has attempted to bring a broader range of Somali actors into political dialogue in the London conferences in 2012 and 2013, while UK ministers have recently sought to work with Barclays Bank following the bank’s decision to withdraw banking services to money service businesses, which has a large effect on Somali diaspora remittances.\(^\text{110}\)

### 3.3 Non-State Actors

#### 3.3.1 International Humanitarian Aid Agencies

The resurgence of conflict in south central Somalia since 2006 has created the world’s worst humanitarian crises. At the same time, humanitarian agencies have experienced a catastrophic deterioration in access. This paper has highlighted reasons for this and some of the challenges and dilemmas faced by the humanitarian community.\(^\text{111}\) For two decades, the international community has responded to the crisis of state collapse and war in Somalia with a mixture of diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, and state-building programs in the past two decades, the

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response of the international community to the crisis in Somalia has been multifaceted and often incoherent. The imperatives to meet, on the one hand, recurring humanitarian need and, on the other hand, to stabilize the crisis through state-building, peace-building, or military intervention and counterterrorism have often been in contradiction with each other. International aid has also waxed and waned, reflecting regional and global interests in the country. 112

In the early 1990s, the international community responded to the civil war and famine with the first major post-Cold War humanitarian and peacekeeping operation, of an unprecedented scale. As international interest declined in the second half of the 1990s, so did the aid. Between 1993 and 2000, annual assistance raised through the CAP fell from $200 million to less than $50 million. Humanitarian assistance also declined as a proportion of overall aid, as more was expended on rehabilitation and aid was used as a “peace dividend” and made conditional on security and good governance. Consequently, as insecurity persisted in south central Somalia an increasing proportion of assistance was spent in Somaliland and Puntland.113

The events of 9/11 provoked a renewed interest and engagement in Somalia, reflected in revived levels of aid. In 2000, for example, funding through the CAP was just $36 million. By 2009, this had increased to over $500 million (although this was only 60% of requirements), the largest proportion of which was food aid.114 Development aid was greater than humanitarian assistance, but the trend towards more investment in the north was reversed. In 2004, for example, Somaliland received 37% of aid compared to 41% for south central Somalia.

Currently, the international aid system in Somalia comprises a range of development, humanitarian, and military actors, including the UN political office, UN technical agencies, donor governments, the EC, ICRC, INGOs, Somali NGOs, and Islamic charities. AMISOM also

112 Ibid p.48
114 UN Consolidated Appeal for Somalia 2009, p.15.
contributors to aid operations by securing the Mogadishu port and airport and also provides some limited humanitarian assistance. International and Somali NGOs include a spectrum of agencies, from those solely delivering humanitarian assistance to multi-mandated relief and development agencies and peace-building organizations.\textsuperscript{115}

Humanitarian coordination in Somalia is structured around the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and the Inter-Cluster Working Groups (ICWG). The IASC is the humanitarian policy body for Somalia that brings together the UN and NGOs. Another important forum is the NGO Consortium, which has over 60 members, both foreign and Somali. All of these coordination structures are located in Kenya, from where the great majority of international aid agencies (including those in Somaliland) have operated cross-border programs since UNOSOM’s withdrawal in 1995. This is not only extremely costly (according to some estimates, only 40% of assistance is actually spent in Somalia) but also means that many aid operations are managed remotely from Kenya.

The increase in attacks on aid workers is due to several reasons. First, ransoms paid by donor governments for the release of their foreign nationals have created an internal market for hostage taking.\textsuperscript{116} Although violence against aid workers and agencies has declined since 2009, there has been a reported increase in looting of the property and assets of humanitarian agencies.\textsuperscript{117} This also suggests that attacks on aid agencies are, in some instances, motivated as much by financial as by ideological interests. Second, humanitarian aid workers and aid operations have become victims of the conflict between Islamic militants and counterterrorism operations of Western governments.

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid  
\textsuperscript{117} Interview with manager of international NGO, Nairobi, Kenya, June 2015
Attacks against aid workers have also been linked to political processes in Somalia. The highest number of attacks in 2008 occurred at the time of the Djibouti peace talks, a period when splits occurred within the warring factions and old scores were being settled. A fourth factor contributing to attacks on aid workers has been the “accountability-free zone” created in Somalia by the silence of donor governments and the UN over the human rights abuses perpetrated by the TFG in 2007 and 2008. A fifth reason is the lack of political or humanitarian dialogue with groups proscribed as terrorists, which limits any possibility for reinforcing humanitarian principles.

Flight of Western INGOs is primarily a result of targeting by Al-Shabaab as representatives of ‘imperialist’ US and Ethiopian interests, a state of affairs not helped by the prominence of US and other Western flags on many humanitarian aid parcels, and efforts by UN officials to incorporate INGO support into political processes in Mogadishu. Most INGOs managed to come to a de facto arrangement with Al-Shabaab during the later 2000s which allowed them to operate and provide some aid in Al-Shabaab held areas. This has been frustrated, however, since 2010 by legal restrictions placed upon the transfer of resources to and through terrorist organisations in Somalia by the US Government; WFP pulled out of Somalia in 2011 citing not only security concerns but “inability to meet donor obligations”. These restrictions have been criticised by some commentators as preventing the delivery of vital humanitarian aid to Somalis under Al-Shabaab rule.

A growing number of INGOs from Muslim majority states have become increasingly prominent as facilitators and providers of humanitarian aid. Not viewed or presented as US or

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Western ‘puppets’ by Al-Shabaab and other local Somali groups, these organisations have continued operating in much of south/central Somalia while their Western counterparts have been forced to withdraw. It is to be noted that the Organization of Islamic Cooperation has become an increasingly important provider of humanitarian assistance to Somalia since the outbreak of famine in 2011 and is viewed by Somalis as a more culturally sensitive and sincere donor than most Western states and organizations.121

3.3.2 The Somali Diaspora

Money transfers fall under the umbrella of ‘financial flows’, as does the business behind them. The economy and the value of a currency are mutually related. Money is a key element of social and economic mechanisms. “It not only facilitates transactions and minimizes market risk, but the shilling also symbolizes the persistence of the Somali economy in the face of considerable turmoil”.122 About half the Somali population does not have any cash revenues beside the money they receive from relatives abroad.

The Somali diaspora has been on-going since 1990, and numbers have increased further since 2000. According to Kettler significant diaspora communities in the United States, in Canada and the United Kingdom123, where the access to an income generating job is more likely. Literally tens of millions of US dollars are remitted annually from cities throughout the world, and there is little question that this flow has had a positive influence on the country’s economy, including its money. Theories about war economies claim that remittances contribute to the

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121 Menkhaus, K. The Somali Spring. Foreign Policy. 2012, September 24http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/24/the_somali_spring
122 Interview, Youth Focus Group, Somali Diaspora, June 2015
123 Ibid
perpetuation of war, thus financing warlords’ business.\textsuperscript{124} In the case of Somalia it is not clear to what extent warlords and war-businessmen profit from looting remittances, but it is probable that they at least demand a certain percentage. To transfer money an informal practice called Hawala or Hawilaad (meaning ‘transfer’ in Arabic) is used, which is difficult to trace and control. The system is based on trust combined with the use of clan-affiliation and personal memory acting as a kind of identity card. The ‘money houses’ and ‘banking houses’, where this service is provided are, in fact, spread all around the world. “Using a mix of telephone, fax and HF radio, and relying on a worldwide network of agents, the hawala companies can instantly transfer money from a Somali in Canada to his family in Bosasso”. The system is also used by businessmen in the region, because it is extremely dangerous to go onto the streets with a large amount of cash. The commission charged for this service runs from 3 to 7 percent. As this informal banking system lacks transparency, it is no surprise that it is also used for money laundering.\textsuperscript{125}

Apart from economic and development roles, the diaspora’s other role is in the political and policy sphere, as many politicians are in the diaspora, and/or have played central roles in the peace processes.\textsuperscript{126} In 2011, an estimated two-thirds of the TFG cabinet were diaspora members. The number is probably lower in the SFG, but there is a still a difficult balancing act in harnessing the skills of the transnational community without alienating local people by taking away jobs and opportunities. Similarly, if the diaspora members in power are seen to be out of touch with local priorities and problems, they will likely risk losing support. However, the ‘social remittances’ brought by diaspora members (skills, ideas, and values) can contribute to


\textsuperscript{125} Ibid

peace building. Diaspora members are expected to promote democratic values, but there is little evidence that they have had much impact on Somalia’s political and civic democracy.\textsuperscript{127}

3.5 Conclusion

The study has highlighted the roles played by external actors in the Somali conflict, both positive and negative external influences. Indeed external states continue to influence the evolution of the Somali state. They take sides in Somali conflicts by allying with clans who are sympathetic to their aspirations and strategic interests. The opposing interests of these states negatively impact Somalia. On the positive side, African Union and several African states are playing a crucial role in the peace process as well as the EU, Arab states, and other countries and organizations are also providing development assistance to Somalia. Since this conflict hosts different external actors, such as transnational radical elements creating security concern in Somalia, the entire eastern African region and beyond, the Somali conflict can be considered as a conflict that has an international impact. Accordingly, this suggests that any resolution to this conflict needs multilateral efforts since it affects international peace and security. Without a unified international involvement, it is difficult to foresee a sustainable peace in Somalia. Moreover, any peace effort should include all Somali actors and the regional states, particularly those directly affected by the conflict in Somalia.

CHAPTER FOUR

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF EXTERNAL ACTORS IN INTERNAL CONFLICT IN SOMALIA

4.1 Introduction

As seen in chapters one, two and three, war-torn societies are host to windows of misfortunes as well as opportunities that can open up to building peace. For the case of Somalia, numerous prior peace building efforts and attempts at building a centralized national government have failed. The conditions and risks that have sustained the conflict for decades continue to exist: the collapse of the central state and lawlessness in some areas; a fractious society ridden by clan politics; widespread poverty, environmental devastation and youth unemployment; a booming war economy that benefits a powerful elite; the emergence of radical interpretation of Islam, in the form of the al-Shabaab insurgency; and a fragmented international community which has pursued competing objectives. This chapter looks at the key issues that have emerged from the previous chapters. These key issues include the relationship between the external and internal actors for peace in Somalia, the very positive role of external actors in peace building in Somalia.

4.2 The Nexus between External and Internal Actors in Peace for Somalia

Over the two decades of conflict, Somalia has evolved into a regional collage, with wide variations in governance, institutions, economic opportunity and security. Multiple solutions to state formation and conflict have been pursued since 1991, some succeeding and others failing. In the north, Somaliland and Puntland enjoy relative security and stability, with basic functioning state institutions and markets and a need for long-term development investment.128 In 1991, Somaliland declared its independence (not secession) from Somalia as a revocation of the 1960

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voluntary union. Its priority is to achieve recognition of independent statehood. When analysts studied the causal factors in Somaliland’s success in state formation, they found that an absence of foreign aid and intervention was significant (along with secondary education and a widespread desire for safety).

From the study, it is clear that, since 1991, many transitional federal governments have attempted to re-exert state authority over Somalia. Harper notes that these governments have been the result of nearly twenty international conferences and have lacked popular legitimacy because they were seen to be foreign creations, to be ineffectual, and to have lacked a permanent presence inside Somalia.\(^\text{129}\) In this government vacuum, alternate forms of governance emerged. Warlords and powerful clan leaders, supported by businessmen, divided the country into fiefdoms. According to Menkhaus, a dominant driver of the conflict was the emergence of a war economy based on control of diverted aid and illicit goods (such as illegal weapons and other forms of criminality).

Many of these actors (warlords and business) interests emerged at the expense of traditional clan authority in the South. The growth of a war economy exacerbated tensions and capitalized upon the lawlessness that grew out of the collapse of the Somali central state. In parallel, a successful class of entrepreneurial actors started to provide services. One report argued that while some business elites had benefited from the war economy, “A strong autonomous business class has emerged that recognizes the need for a viable government. Early in the conflict many businesses engaged in illicit activities, which benefitted from a lack of viable government. A move to legitimate productive investments has seen the business class shift in support of a strong government. There is a sense of emerging partnership between government and the state, with unconventional public private partnerships being developed in response to current government

Local alternate governance systems also developed through Sharia courts. The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) grew as a loose affiliation of these courts and clans in opposition to warlords and criminal business interests. By 2006, the UIC was in control of much of South-Central Somalia, including Mogadishu. The UIC provided a degree of security and services to Somalis. Ethiopia and the West judged the UIC to pose a violent Islamist extremist threat, and the West backed the Ethiopian-led offensive in 2006 to push the UIC out of Somalia’s major cities in favor of the internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Harper argued, “The USA and its allies…mistakenly equated a homegrown form of political Islam with the internal al-Qaeda franchise…In its original form, the UIC did not represent a new front for violent Islam.”

According to Menkhaus, also discussed in chapter three, there is a notable change in the nature of the Somali conflict after the 2006 intervention. Enmity between Somalis and Ethiopian forces, and between Somalis and predatory TFG forces, led to an energized and radicalized insurgency that recruited from radicalized youth and marginalized clans, and that spread across South-Central Somalia in opposition to the TFG and its backers. The extremist al-Shabaab movement grew from the UIC and its downfall. In 2010, al-Shabaab publicly announced its links to al-Qaeda. Al-Shabaab’s cells have severely limited the space for humanitarian, civil society and political actors to operate inside South-Central Somalia, while offering basic services of its own in the areas it controls. External actors continue to influence the conflict and the prospects for peace. Arab countries and Turkey support a centralized, capable state that shares moderate Islamic learning. Turkey is seeking to innovate in the country through a hybrid, public-

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130 “Private Sector Investment and Barriers to Growth Analysis in South-Central Somalia and Puntland” Adam Smith International Report for DFID, May 2013.
private model of engagement, which reflects Turkey’s own experience in state formation.\(^{133}\) Somalia’s Arab allies also seek to counter-balance Ethiopian influence in the region. Ethiopia, Kenya and other members of the African Union, seek to secure themselves from the threat posed by al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda, as well as to exert influence in their border lands. AMISOM has been deployed since 2007, and is currently composed of Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sierra Leone and Uganda, with police contributions from Ghana and Nigeria.

AMISOM’s mandate is to stabilize the country, in order to create the conditions for humanitarian support, and to extend the writ of the Somali government and UN. AMISOM and Ethiopian operations have pushed al-Shabaab out of many of the strategic towns and ports in South-Central Somalia (Mogadishu in August 2012, Beletweyn in December 2012, Baidoa in February 2012 and Kismayo in September 2012). At the time of writing, AMISOM continues to claim the remaining towns and ports of South-Central Somalia from al-Shabaab. Western donors are driven to curtail the threat of al-Qaeda and of criminality, and forced migration from the country. The Security Council shares these security objectives. In 2013, the United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) was mandated to provide policy advice to the Somali government and AMISOM on peace-building and state-building. Western countries and the EU have funded AMISOM, UNSOM and UN agencies for humanitarian, development and peace-building assistance, as well as other multilateral security and rule of law frameworks. The UK has been strongly associated with efforts to align aid to Somali national peace-building, state-building and stabilization frameworks, with Prime Minister David Cameron sponsoring two international conferences in London on the subject in 2012 and 2013.\(^{134}\)

\(^{133}\) Ibid p.58
\(^{134}\) Menkhaus, K.. “Somalia: They created a Desert and called it Peace-building”, op cit
International oil and gas investors are the latest external actors to get involved. The Provisional Draft Constitution does not articulate the resource-sharing arrangements between Mogadishu and the states. Regional entities such as Puntland and Somaliland are issuing concessions for oil activities in their areas. “Wildcat” companies are willing to deal directly with these regional entities, but the larger established companies prefer to deal with the government in Mogadishu.\footnote{Scheck, J, et al” Former BP Chief’s New Quest: Wildcatting on the Edge of Danger; Tony Hayward, After Deepwater Horizon Debacle, Seeks Oil in Somalia”, The Wall Street Journal November 11, 2013} This issue will become more politically charged as explorations go forward. The Mogadishu-based Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) was created on September 9, 2012, with the election of President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud by Parliament, in accordance with the Provisional Federal Constitution. President Hassan Sheikh’s election marked the end of the “transitional” period that commenced in 2004 with the creation of the first Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

Many expected a fraudulent election and the reelection of the incumbent Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. The election of the relatively unknown civil society actor, Hassan Sheikh, combined with AMISOM’s successful offensive against al-Shabaab, unleashed a burst of optimism amongst Somalis and foreigners alike, and a renewed commitment to invest in peace-building and security in the country. The political tasks before President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud are to negotiate a final constitution, to hold elections in 2016, and to navigate the interests of Somalia’s elites and the country’s external partners towards a successful conclusion in which the country continues to exit violent conflict. Somali elites and external actors are still confronted by the most contentious questions of power: resources and revenues, power-sharing arrangements, state institutions (security, justice, political, and service delivery institutions) and the depth of decentralization and federalism between Mogadishu and the states. Consensus will
be challenging to build. Segregation and division among clans and sub-clans continues. The war economy and corruption thrive and require lawlessness to operate. Confidence needs to be built among Somalia’s political elites and among its many governmental entities. Al-Shabaab remains a force to be reckoned with as it is able to recruit from a marginalized and alienated base of youth, to control rural areas and to conduct deadly terrorist attacks.

4.3 External Actors in Internal Peace-building Activities

External actors bring multiple perspectives and interests to the table. External Actors’ Peace-building Frameworks in Somalia International learning on peacebuilding would point to a need for external actors to focus now on a tightly defined number of measures, which are led and shaped by Somali leaders to: Identify early confidence-building measures that start to rebuild trust and dialogue among Somalis, including among the “grassroots”; Build Somali elites’ “ownership” of policies and processes aimed at starting to address the causes of conflict; Start to build state legitimacy in the eyes of the people. In this regard, security, justice and jobs have been heavily emphasized in the literature; carefully calibrate programs based on the trade-offs between arrangements which bind the most powerful Somali elites in pacts (the constitutional dialogue, formation of new states and so forth) and processes which involve Somalis more inclusively, so as to avoid a relapse into violent conflict.

There is need to also start to support a very long process of institutional development and transformation, which is realistically grounded in the Somali political context, and builds upon existing, not externally-driven, Somali institutions and capacities; identify external actors who

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may have empathy and the relevant recent experience to support Somalis to define and pursue their own peace-building objectives. There are three major categories of external actors’ activity related to peace-building: National, sub-national and security frameworks.

National peace-building frameworks involves a donor effort to align aid to Somalia’s New Deal Compact and to build a more legitimate and capable central Somali state, and related and overlapping political support to Somalia’s political negotiations; the sub-national peace-building frameworks: Diplomatic, donor, military and regional efforts to support sub-national entities and “bottom-up” approaches to peace-building with a view to building the Somali state’s legitimacy, including: mediation between states and Mogadishu, and between newly forming political entities in South-Central Somalia; civil society efforts to support local and “grassroots” reconciliation processes; and donor and regional support for “bottom-up” stabilization and peace-building processes. 138

Security frameworks entail a range of security efforts in pursuit of counter-terrorism, counter-piracy and counter-insurgency objectives. All have implications for Somali peace-building and an eventual political settlement, but are also driven by providers’ national security objectives. A meta-question which emerged from the study relates to the strategic logic which shapes donor practices and decision-making in the country. Donors support both a centralized aid compact predicated on state sovereignty governed by Mogadishu, and bottom-up investments in state formation in Somaliland, Puntland and South-Central Somalia. Donors may be hedging their bets across Somali institutions in the absence of a strong Somali consensus, pursuing both

“top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches. However, it is not clear how these investments form a coherent Somali peace-building strategy.

4.4 Internal Peace-building Frameworks

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has been strongly focused on building sovereignty and ownership. This should not be surprising given the history of transitional governments with weak popular legitimacy. This assertion of sovereignty has manifested in a clash with Somalia’s neighbors (whom the FGS worries are meddling in Somalia’s internal affairs) and a more assertive stance with development and humanitarian donors on Somali ownership and leadership of policy and programs. President Hassan Sheikh announced his Six-Pillar Policy upon being elected. The policy committed the government to: (1) stability (security, rule of law and justice), (2) economic recovery, (3) peace-building (removing the main drivers of conflict), (4) government capacity for service delivery, (5) international relations (close ties with neighbors and allies), and (6) the unity and integrity of the country. Drafting a permanent constitution, the implementation of federalism, and preparations for elections by 2016 were absent. This omission corresponded with a Somali suspicion that the new administration was not committed to the establishment of a federal state.

The President’s Six-Pillar Policy has been superseded by the Somalia Compact, which emerged from the New Deal for Somalia Donor Conference in Brussels in September 2013. Somalia became a signatory to the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States in 2013. The Compact outlines aid priorities under the International Dialogue’s five Peace-building and State building Goals (PSGs). The first PSG focuses on inclusive political processes, the finalization of

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139 Ibid
the federal constitution by December 2015, and elections in 2016. The other PSGs prioritize security, justice, revenue and services, and economic development.

Adoption of the Somali New Deal Compact in Brussels in 2013 was viewed by many Western donors as a significant step toward building Somali sovereignty and ownership of peace-building priorities. Bilateral donors, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank pledged an approximate €1.8 billion in support of the Compact. The FGS created an Aid Coordination Office in the office of the Prime Minister and a New Deal desk in the Ministry of Finance to manage donor funding. A multi-donor Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF) was launched to align aid with nationally-agreed programs and Somali budget expenditure cycles.\(^{141}\) The aim is to build Somalia’s capacity to directly manage the budget support it receives. The approach is to first build FGS capacity in priority-setting and oversight, and eventually, government capacity in public financial management and service delivery.

This assistance can be directed to support the FGS, with some support allocated to the governments in Puntland and Somaliland. At the time of the survey, it was not clear how program funds would be disbursed at the point of service delivery, which mechanisms would be used, and how programs would be designed or monitored to build early confidence and legitimacy between Somalis and the FGS. The FGS’ credibility with donors on public financial management took a serious blow in 2013 when the new Central Bank Governor resigned over allegations of fraud and threats to her safety. There is a degree of skepticism over the speed at which the Compact was developed to meet the Brussels conference deadline in September 2013, and doubts as to whether the process and donor timelines gave Somalia enough space to negotiate Somali priorities and to identify early confidence building measures.

\(^{141}\) Bryden, M. “Somalia Redux: Assessing the New Somali Federal Government,” op cit
There remain a wide range of fundamental political, institutional and economic questions pertaining to Somalia’s future, which have yet to be addressed formally by Somali leaders through negotiations. These include the form and authorities of the state, revenues (control of natural resources, port customs and other revenues), the future of power-sharing arrangements, and the design of state institutions (political, justice, security and service delivery).¹⁴² Donor aid allocation and implementation decisions have implications for these negotiations and how power is distributed, and thus the development of Somalia’s political settlement. At the time of conducting the survey, donor and Somali aid allocation priorities and implementation tools were still under consideration. It appeared possible in the absence of Somali consensus and strategy on major questions pertaining to the country’s political settlement, that donor implementation practices could become fragmented, driven by individual donor priorities, or overly focused on more traditional “top-down” state-building processes and service delivery-oriented activities¹⁴³.

Many external actors are working at the sub-national level toward a variety of stability and peace-building objectives, ultimately with a goal of building peace and the legitimacy of a Somali political settlement alongside the FGS. Efforts delivered at the sub-national level include: AMISOM is working at the regional level to pursue consolidation of security and the extension of the federal government’s territorial control. Their objective is security, with a view to creating space to extend the writ of the Somali government. They have worked alongside Somali clan-based militias and Somali Security Forces, and encourage reconciliation between clan militias.

¹⁴² Ibid
They are mandated to assist on the ground in the implementation of Somalia’s National Security Stabilization Programme (NSSP).  

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is involved in brokering regional political dialogue. Most prominently, this includes the 2013 agreement to create the Interim Juba Administration in South-Central Somalia. IGAD is likely play a role in brokering the emergence of a “South-West State” (although at the time of writing, the boundaries were deeply contested). The UK Stability Fund, the US Government, and the UN are providing civilian support in key areas recovered from Al-Shabaab and other accessible areas, although according to differing uses of the terms “recovery” (a UN approach to providing “needs-based” assistance); and peace-building and stabilization (ranging from definitions around politically driven “effects-based” assistance for government in recovered areas, to community-level service delivery and recovery, to approaches to reconciliation and grievance resolution, and efforts to link to national peace-building efforts).  

Bilateral and multilateral actors are involved in mediating regional state formation and peacebuilding processes inside regional entities and between regional entities and Mogadishu, in support of the FGS. Civil society organizations are supporting “bottom-up” community reconciliation processes to address the causes of conflict and to build local institutions and capacities for peace. Building on these community efforts, organizations are encouraging collaboration between communities to enable them to advocate for their interests at the regional and federal level. Out of AMISOM’s military operations against al-Shabaab, the outlines of  

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Somalia’s future federal states may now be starting to emerge as Somalia and external actors seek to fill the void left by the removal of al-Shabaab and to extend the writ of the Somali government. Leaders of coalitions in South-Central Somalia are currently trying to negotiate the formation of future federal states, with varying degrees of recognition. The processes to form new regional entities are contentious because they shape the balance of power between local, regional and national elites.

In 2013, the tensions surrounding federalism and regional authority in Somalia were clearly illustrated when the communities of “Jubbaland” formed a Constitutional Congress to create a new federal state and to elect a president. The FGS insisted that only it could create new states. This resulted in a 6-month stand-off among the clans, political and militia actors and the FGS, and between the FGS and IGAD, who supported the formation of a new state. The FGS and the nascent “Jubbaland State” came to a compromise agreement in August 2013. The FGS accepted the fact of the Jubbaland initiative. The Jubbaland factions accepted an interim two-year administration status. According to the agreement, a formal Federal Member State would be established according to a constitutional process. The port and airport were recognized as national assets. Within six months the FGS was to take over management of these assets, although revenues would continue to be exclusively invested in Jubba priorities. The Jubba militias would also be integrated into the Somali national forces.

It is possible that the Jubbaland agreement will provide a model for the formation of other states. Since the formation of the Interim Jubba Administration, the focus has shifted to the formation of a “South West State” around Baidoa. There is controversy over whether this new

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state will supersede the Interim Jubba Administration territory or will simply exist alongside it. Other entities are seeking recognition. In the central regions, competing “states” claim the same or overlapping territories – Galmudug, Himan and Heeb, Central Region State, and El Bur State. These political processes are unfolding in the context of the ongoing presence and threat to peacebuilding of the Al Shabaab movement. Bryden highlighted, “Al-Shabaab’s residual influence can be explained by three main factors: the determination and discipline of its core leadership (irrespective of divisions between them); the absence of rival authorities across much of southern Somalia; and Al-Shabaab’s skill in appropriating and exploiting legitimate local grievances for its own purposes. The jihadists’ territorial ‘footprint’ on the Somali map thus corresponds closely with areas inhabited by disgruntled and disaffected clans.”

There is wide international agreement that investments in sub-national governance are necessary to the long-term stability of Somalia. However, there is disagreement over the importance of order, approach and proportionate investment. Some approaches are geared towards political results, and some towards community-level service delivery activities. Some are aligned to security priorities, and some are aligned to the identification of community needs. There is no evidence of clarity on strategic questions of inclusion, grievance resolution and justice, particularly for disaffected and marginalized communities. Funding is also flowing from multiple external actors and funding mechanisms to the sub-national level. These inconsistencies and coordination challenges pose the risk of approaches and efforts undercutting Somali peace-building efforts and one another.

Civil society advocates pointed to Somalia’s turbulent history with strong centralized governments and the deep suspicion this has bred amongst Somalis, as well as Somaliland and Puntland’s relative successes in pursuing peripheral state formation processes. Civil society

actors argued that external focus and investment in the periphery and in reconciliation was too low. Many donor actors argued that timelines and imperatives in Somalia mitigated against adopting purely “bottom-up” approaches, although there was no strategic agreement among actors on the relative weight of efforts.\textsuperscript{149} The diversity of investments may reflect external actors hedging their bets across Somali institutions.

In order to consider the differing approaches to “bottom-up” peacebuilding and stabilization, and which frameworks may have traction and be scalable in the Somalia context, the study sampled external actors’ activities in newly forming regional entities in South-Central Somalia (with comparable clan and security dynamics). This is to examine whether efforts to support local reconciliation and institutional development have led to improved local formal and informal governance capacity (institutions, authorities, resources, service delivery), and over time, whether this yields improved local perceptions of Somali state legitimacy.

The international community’s optimism has been underpinned by the security gains of the African Union against the al Shabaab insurgency. AMISOM, Kenya and Ethiopia, and the US Government, with the EU and UN, are the dominant international security actors operating in Somalia today.\textsuperscript{150} They are pursuing three objectives: an AMISOM objective to expand the Somali government’s writ and to increase the strategic cohesion of fragmented Somali clan militias in ‘recovered areas’ until reconciliation and the formation of a single Somali security force can take place; an AMISOM/IGAD and Western international counter-terrorism objective to target and dismantle the al-Shabaab threat in Somalia and the region; an internationally coordinated effort to address the threat to commercial shipping lanes posed by piracy off the


Horn of Africa.\textsuperscript{151} This is pursued through maritime security cooperation (primarily Combined Task Force 151), and support to Somali land-based initiatives.

AMISOM supplies and trains the Somali Armed Forces. The unification and centralized command of a large number of militias relies on reconciliation to advance. The dominant view in the international community is that a unified Somali force is unrealistic in the short term and that other models should be considered. The current objective is to increase the “strategic cohesion” of the disparate militias in Somalia, with the expectation that militia integration will follow longer-term political dialogue. The partial lifting of the UN arms embargo to equip the Somali Armed Forces gave a flavor of the very long-term challenge to building Somali security institutions.\textsuperscript{152} The independent expert Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) recently identified, “a number of issues and concerns over current management of weapons and ammunition stockpiles by the Federal Government of Somalia, which point to high level and systematic abuses in weapons and ammunition management and distribution. There are at least two separate clan-based centres of gravity for weapons procurement within the FGS structures. These two interest groups appear to be prosecuting narrow clan agendas, at times working against the development of peace and security in Somalia through the distribution of weapons to parallel security forces and clan militias that are not part of the Somali security forces.”\textsuperscript{153}

Significant resources are dedicated to counter-terrorism operations inside Somalia. Operations are primarily carried out by US forces in the form of targeted drone strikes\textsuperscript{154} and Special Forces raids. In October 2013, US Special Forces attempted to capture or kill a top al-

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid
\textsuperscript{152} UNSC Resolution 2111, 2013
Shabaab external operations planner (identified as Ikrima) in a nighttime raid on Baraawe. Following the raid, there were reports that al-Shabaab used the event as a propaganda tool and opportunity to arrest suspected “spies”, while increasing its presence in the area. In this context, it is vital that the international community considers how its counter-terrorism efforts impact peacebuilding efforts.

If fragmentation and perceptions of recourse to safety and security worsen in areas of international security activity, it is likely that government and external actors’ frameworks for SSR, DDR and justice will urgently need to be updated and tailored to the Somali context, and counter-terror planning will need to reflect upon managing the local impact of operations on peace-building and security. The limited availability of baseline and ongoing aid project data is a key consideration in developing appropriate research designs and presents the most significant challenge to assessing the impact of peace-building interventions. There are two particularly salient data gaps. First, data on public perceptions of the state and the peace-building process are weak. While aid organizations are continuing to collect health, nutrition and economic information, systematic data on the Somali peoples’ political aspirations, confidence in the state and perceptions of security are all extremely limited. Data on aid interventions - where donors as actors are active, how their projects are designed and implemented - also vary substantially across donors.

4.5 Summary

From this chapter, and reckoning with the other chapters, supporting and implementing peace building in Somalia will not be quick or easy. When the World Bank surveyed the timelines for countries that successfully transitioned from conflict in the latter half of the twentieth century, it found that it took the 20 fastest countries in the world, “…17 years to get the military out of politics, 20 years to achieve functioning bureaucratic quality, and 27 years to bring corruption under reasonable control.”157 Today, there is a great deal of optimism about the potential to build a lasting peace in Somalia and a wide range of external actors are investing in efforts to support the Somali people.

However, it is clear that the diversity of actors, objectives and assumptions has resulted in a diverse array of frameworks to secure the country and to build peace. In this environment there is a risk that external actors will implement initiatives that contradict one another’s efforts, and/or may ultimately over-dominate the space needed for a Somali-brokered political settlement. Somalia’s own experience and international learning would underline the need for Somali leadership and ownership to advance first and foremost, coupled with a healthy dose of realism about how long Somali society will take to build peace. The political environment in Somalia is extremely fluid and there are a wide variety of competing interests that leaders must broker to avoid a relapse into violent conflict.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION, SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary

Somalia, as the only case of state failure in modern times, has gone from crisis to crisis making peace very difficult to achieve. The total disintegration of the state made the issue of representation, power, resource sharing and reconciliation a difficult task in Somalia. Moreover, sustainable peace primarily requires committed internal actors.

Chapter one discussed the structure carried out in the study, more so in the literature review, the study discussed the concept of ‘new wars’. The central argument of the new wars as stated in chapter one is that after the end of the Cold War a new pattern of violence has developed and ‘new wars’ can be distinguished from old wars in terms of the spatial context, role of the state, actors, methods, motives, objectives and victims. This study discussed the criticism of the new wars concept and suggested that though indeed contemporary wars have evolved and are threatening the state despite fact that most internal conflicts are present now in modern days, and that the concept has enhanced the understanding of the dynamics of war and the social and economic aspect of war.

Chapter two discussed the general concept of external actors in conflict, typology of eternal actors and the internationalization of internal conflict. From chapter two the study observes that, despite their defining name – ‘internal conflict’, many contemporary armed conflicts cannot be adequately described as being “internal”. Civil wars affect their neighbour through refugee flows, disrupt legitimate and facilitate illicit trade through “shadow economic networks”, hamper the economic development of a region, and make conflict in nearby states more likely through demonstration effects and by providing cheap weaponry. Not only does
unrest in a country inevitably affect other states indirectly, but often the actual fighting itself draws in external actors and territories. A lot of so internal wars are in fact internationalized, with troops from foreign states participating in a non-interstate conflict, prompting the inclusion of a correspondingly named own category in the typology of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD). In many more cases however, despite falling short of such direct military interventions, conflicts are influenced by military as well as non-military support from outside actors. Indeed, outside interference is not an exceptional but a regular feature of “internal” conflicts. Actors, both external and internal are part and parcel of the many violent conflicts in Africa.

Chapter three discussed the roles of external actors in Somali conflict. The study noted that the important actors in Somalia are those who possess some form of power or influence to shape political outcomes, mobilize communities, or to block developments they deem undesirable. More than in most settings, Somali actors have limited ability to drive positive outcomes, but ample capacity to exercise ‘veto power’. More so, Somalia is rich in potential spoilers, due to high levels of clan distrust, the ease with which clan alliances can unravel, ready availability of small arms, and extremely weak capacity of governments to make defections costly. This power to shape or block political initiatives can be derived from multiple sources, including one’s position of respect in a clan, financial resources from private business wealth, shaping public opinion via the media or other outlet, a position of power in government, control over an armed militia, a strong social network, and perceived access to powerful international actors and their organizations hold considerable influence in contemporary south/central Somalia as providers of development and humanitarian assistance to civilians and political, financial, logistical and military support to the SFG and its nascent security forces.
Chapter four discussed the key issues in the three previous chapters. The study thus noted that, contemporary assessments of the impact and role of external actors in Somalia have been largely critical and pessimistic with noting that more than a dozen attempts to build a new Somali government by the international community have failed (since 1991). There is a broad consensus among commentators that Somalis are deeply suspicious of, and hostile towards, Ethiopian and Western involvement in the country and many view AMISOM and the TFG/SFG as ‘informants’ of Addis Ababa and Washington. Al-Shabaab has capitalised on these sentiments, targeting aid agencies and International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) militarily as an assault on ‘Western’ interests. This has forced many INGOs to close their operations in Somalia with the Western support being seen as a ‘liability’ by local actors and that a gradual disengagement from the country should become a centrepiece of Western strategy.

5.2 Recommendations

Based on the findings of the study, the researcher outlines the recommendations below.

The international community should come to the understanding that complex Regional problems can only be addressed through a strong and reliable organization. In this respect, strengthening IGAD is the best available option to facilitate regional peace and development. With this objective the donors have to render their financial support without any further delay or condition. Piracy should also be taken as an opportunity to push the support of the international community for Somalia.

AMISOM is too understaffed and under-resourced to fully discharge its mandate. The Possibility of having additional troops remains low due to the volatile security in Somalia, and the lack of financial and political commitment. AMISOM is struggling to keep its personnel and
government officials safe. The risk of getting attacked by the Al-Shabaab is high as there are allegations that the SFG is infiltrated. Despite all the challenges, AMISOM will continue its mission in Somalia. As long as there is a perceived threat from the radical Islamic groups, the international community is supportive of the SFG; the dominant belief given the current situation is that there is no better alternative other than the current government. Therefore, providing financial and logistical support to reach AMISOM’s mandated size, and fully discharge its responsibilities is urgently needed from the international community. AMISOM’s mandate should not, however, be expanded to include the rules of engagement. AMISOM should avoid civilian casualties as much as possible. Lack of progress on the ground might frustrate AMISOM; hence SFG security forces should be strengthened.

The UN is taking a lead in the Somali peace process, which is commendable after a long period of disengagement. It should however, be more committed to ensure its sustenance. It should look for long-term engagements and commit sufficient resources. The possibility of deploying UN blue helmets remains very low, but the UN should continue to strengthen AMISOM in terms of planning, logistics, and finance and simultaneously should try to bring various groups to the governing coalition to make the SFG, its brain child, more representative and credible. Deploying UN peacekeeping forces is also not advisable, given the current insecurity, considering the history of UN missions in Somalia, and the difficulty of managing multinational forces. Finally, any peacekeeping mission has to go hand in hand with a viable and all-encompassing peace process.

The TFG should vividly engage with various actors and expand its governing coalition. It should strengthen its ties and negotiate power-sharing with various clans and groups as it did with Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jama. More effort should also be exerted in bringing all actors including
those who allied with Al-Shabaab for tactical reasons and are willing to negotiate. The existing
clan division among the radicals should be manipulated. Co-opting and buying some of the
members of should also be considered. The West is currently making an attempt at negotiation
and buying the moderate elements of Taliban in Afghanistan, and the same strategy should be
employed in Somalia. The hardcore elements of the Al-Shabaab should be, however, dealt with
militarily.

The SFG should deal with its internal weaknesses, divisions and rivalries since it has a
very short mandate that ends in 2016. IGAD, the AU, and the UN should encourage such efforts
and develop the SFG capacity to be accountable. Sanctioning Eritrea could temporarily reduce
arms and financial support reaching the radical groups in Somalia. Peaceful mechanisms should,
however, be explored by IGAD to bring Eritrea on board and deal with Al-Shabaab for
sustainable peace in Somalia and the region at large. Most of the local administrations are not
viable in the southern and central parts of Somalia. And, from now onwards, a local initiative
could take a long time to emerge because there are forces against it that are ideologically
equipped, coupled with armed religious forces and external interventions. But, those areas that
have established peace in Somalia - like Puntland and Somaliland - should be consolidated and
developed.

5.3 Conclusion

The study found that the two countries in question have transnational security concern and their
actions and behaviour within this particular conflict is necessitated by their national security
threats posed by the conflict in Somalia. The conflict has become a regional one as it crosses
the borders posing a clear and present danger on the national security of neighbouring states and
the entire eastern African region. Moreover, the “spill over” of the Somali conflict has created a
clear threat to the international peace and security causing violence far beyond the region - terrorism and piracy in the international waters. This confirms that an internal conflict becomes international issue when it crosses its borders and poses a threat to international peace and security.

Through the research study, the findings indicate that clear limitations on external actors, who are still adapting to the new fragile states policies and learning to which donors have committed, is faced with changes. The overall picture emerging is one where international actors are trying to deliver on international learning, and trying to engage with the complexities of the Somali context, but also one where donor aid allocation decisions and timelines risk making de facto decisions for Somalis. Taking a step back to consider how these decisions relate to ongoing Somali political dialogue seems necessary.

The study observed that indeed there are three important dimensions of the conflict in Somalia, namely international, regional and domestic. The civil war has not only threatened political and economic interests of the Somalis but also ‘menaced’ strategic interests of the global actors, notably the EU and the US. Somalia is at the strategic place to control over the Arab peninsula and the oil transportation route. The war in Somalia has led to the thriving existence of terrorism and the emergence of the threat of the piracy off the coast of Somalia which threatens the trading activities of the global actors on the Horn of Africa. The international actors have deployed their operations in order to protect their economic activities, international maritime security and prevent the piracy attacks in the Gulf of Aden, and the off the coast of Somalia.

The study suggests that further field research on this topic from a broader perspective which investigates the cooperation and contradistinctions among the many local and external
actors and oversee the potential for peace within Somalia as well as in the region. More importantly, further study would help to understand how both the Somali conflict and the interventions of external actors, affect the livelihoods of the ordinary people on the ground.
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