REGIONAL COLLECTIVE SECURITY MECHANISMS IN EASTERN AFRICA: THE
CASE OF THE EASTERN AFRICA STANDBY FORCE FROM 2004-2015

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SUPERVISOR: PROF. MARIA NZOMO

A Research Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the
Degree of Masters of Arts in International Conflict Management.

October 2015
DECLARATION

This Research Project is my original work and has not been submitted for the award of a degree in any other institution of higher learning.

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Reg No: R50/63690/2010

Supervisor.

This Research Project has been submitted for examination with my approval as a University of Nairobi Supervisor.

Signature: ……………………………… Date:………………………

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Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies
University of Nairobi
DEDICATION

To my late dad, J.J Omanyo for having instilled in me the importance of education and the need of going to greater lengths in all aspects of life; and to my wonderful children, Imani, Joshua and Alma, whose precious time I sacrificed to complete this project.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to thank the Almighty God who has given me life, strength, health and tenacity to complete this project that was so near yet far.

I humbly express my gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Maria Nzomo for her invaluable advice and correction, patience, effective guidance, and understanding in the course of writing this research project.

Special thanks to my special family for your patience, prayers and support throughout this long journey of seeking knowledge.

My sincere gratitude to the team leader George, for the invaluable encouragement even when the journey seemed like it would never come to an end. Thank you!

God bless you all!
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMIB</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Burundi</td>
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<td>AMIS</td>
<td>AU Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>Africa Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Union Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>CADSP</td>
<td>Common African Defence and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CEWARN</td>
<td>Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism</td>
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<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Continental Early Warning System</td>
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<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for East and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>COMWARN</td>
<td>COMESA Conflict Early Warning System</td>
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<td>CPMR</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution</td>
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<td>CSSDA</td>
<td>Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMZ</td>
<td>Demilitarized Zone</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<td>EACDS</td>
<td>Eastern African Chiefs of Defence Staff</td>
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<td>EAPSA</td>
<td>Eastern African Peace and Security Architecture SALW</td>
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<td>EAPSM</td>
<td>Eastern Africa Peace and Security Mechanism</td>
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<td>EAPSS</td>
<td>Eastern African Peace and Security Secretariat</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>EASBRIG HQ</td>
<td>Eastern Africa Standby Brigade Headquarters</td>
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<td>EASF</td>
<td>Eastern Africa Standby Force</td>
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<td>EASFCOM</td>
<td>Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism</td>
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<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Ceasefire and Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Western African States</td>
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<td>ELF</td>
<td>Eritrean Liberation Front</td>
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<td>ESA</td>
<td>Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>ESF</td>
<td>ECOWAS Standby Force</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>F.O.C</td>
<td>Full Operation Capability</td>
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<td>FOMAC</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Standby Force</td>
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<td>GLR</td>
<td>Great Lakes Region</td>
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<td>ICGLR</td>
<td>International Conference on the Great Lakes Region</td>
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<td>ICPAT</td>
<td>IGAD Capacity Building Program against Terrorism</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Community of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter- Governmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>IGADD</td>
<td>Inter- Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification</td>
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<td>IGASOM</td>
<td>IGAD Peace Support force in Somalia</td>
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<td>IPSTC</td>
<td>International Peace Support Training Centre</td>
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<td>JEM</td>
<td>Justice and Equality Movement</td>
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<td>LD</td>
<td>Logistics Depot</td>
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<td>LOGBASE</td>
<td>Logistics Base</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>LoN</td>
<td>League of Nations</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>NARC</td>
<td>North African Regional Capability</td>
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<td>NASBBRIG</td>
<td>North Africa Regional Standby Brigade</td>
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<td>NASBRIG</td>
<td>North African Regional Capability Standby Force</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NCM</td>
<td>National Coordination Mechanisms</td>
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<td>NMOG</td>
<td>Neutral Military Observer Group</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Union</td>
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<td>OLMEE</td>
<td>OAU/AU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea</td>
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<td>PAN</td>
<td>Protocol on Non-Aggression</td>
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<td>PLANELM</td>
<td>Planning Element</td>
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<td>PMAD</td>
<td>Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
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<td>PTA</td>
<td>Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>RECs</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities</td>
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<td>RECSA</td>
<td>Regional Center for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<td>RIMC</td>
<td>Regional Inter-Ministerial Committee</td>
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<td>RINR</td>
<td>Regional Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources</td>
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<td>RSCT</td>
<td>Regional Security Complex Theory</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCT</td>
<td>Security Complex Theory</td>
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<td>SHIRBRIG</td>
<td>Standby High-Readiness Brigade</td>
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<td>SPLM/A</td>
<td>Sudanese Peoples’ Liberation Movement /Army</td>
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<td>SRO</td>
<td>Sub regional Organizations</td>
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<td>SSF</td>
<td>SADC Standby Force</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur</td>
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<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda</td>
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<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>The Unified Task Force</td>
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<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in South Sudan</td>
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<td>UNOMUR</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Uganda and Rwanda</td>
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<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
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<td>UNSAS</td>
<td>United Nations Standby Arrangement System</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Peace and Security Council</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
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<td>VMT</td>
<td>Verification Monitoring Team</td>
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ABSTRACT

The modern state has had limitations as the sole provider of peace and security to its people. This is related to the post-cold war security challenges such as the increased number of intra state conflicts, the effects of globalization on security matters and other new security challenges like non-conventional warfare. These new security dynamics call for concerted efforts among states in managing conflicts and maintaining peace and security, both at the international level, regional and sub-regional levels. In Africa, based on Chapter VIII of the United Nations Organization security Charter which provides for pacific settlement of local disputes through regional arrangement or sub regional agencies, and based on the need for concerted efforts in responding to African problems using mechanisms that best suit the continent, the continent formed the Organization of African Union, and later the African Union to help manage conflicts in the region. At the sub-regional level, several regional economic communities with overlapping membership and competing objectives were formed in the Eastern Africa to help the region achieve economic growth and development. However with the realization that human security was important to achieving economic growth and development in the region, most of these RECs had to restructure so as to include security in their agendas.

The Eastern Africa region has been regionalizing its peace and security initiatives through the existing RECs and regional development organizations. The latest security mechanism that has been developed to help address security threats in the region and beyond is the Eastern African Standby Force. This is the Eastern Africa’s sub regional branch of the continental collective security mechanism-the African Standby Force.
This study is based on the theory of Regional Security Complex (RSC) and the Systems theory. In the EAR region, security is a significant issue through which both patterns of amity and enmity take part in shaping the region. The participation of both formal and non-state actors like rebels has created a region where the decision of one actor affects directly or indirectly the neighbouring states or countries. Eastern Africa therefore constitutes a ‘security complex’, which Buzan (et. al.) describes as, a “set of states whose major security perception and concerns are so inter-linked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another”.¹ In a RSC, a part from the politico-military issues, other security issues are also put into focus.² In the EAR region, social and environmental conflicts continue to be experienced alongside the political upheavals.

This study seeks to examine the structures, designs and effectiveness of the EASF as a security remit for collective security in the Eastern Africa region, alongside the other security organizations in the region. The study will also seek to identify the factors that may hinder the EASF’s full operational capabilities and thereby suggest areas for further research in the area of study.

² Ibid. p.198.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Background

Regional organizations and collective security have become key features in contemporary conflict resolution, with every country being at least a member of one or more regional or sub-regional organization. The modern state has had limitations as a provider of welfare, peace and security and thus the need for the policy community in sharing the burden of security and conflict management.3

In the Post-Cold War period, the United Nations has led in carrying out collective security initiatives. Other regional organizations such as the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) have contributed towards conflict management, and so have multi-national military organisations such as NATO and the UN’s Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG).

The security environment in Africa has been dynamic, and in the immediate post-colonial period, security issues were mostly addressed unilaterally.4 In view of this, the AU, through its Constitutive Act sought to take over a more robust role than its predecessor the Organisation of African Union (OAU) in dealing with issues of peace and security within the continent. Its role in conflict management in countries such as Burundi, Sudan and Somalia demonstrate the proactive role the organization has taken in issues of Peace and Security.

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Sub-regional organizations have a role to play as well in collective peace and security. ECOWAS in West Africa has carried out peacekeeping functions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, while South Africa, under SADC, has played significant peacekeeping and mediation roles in West Africa and in the Great Lakes region. IGAD has also played mediation roles in the Sudan and Somalia.

Eastern Africa is also regionalizing its peace and security initiative not only through Regional Economic Communities (RECs) such as the East African Community (EAC) but also through security and development organisations such as the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), and the East African Standby Force (EASF). The formation of RECs was initially informed by economic considerations but with the realization that security and stability was a prerequisite to sustainable economic development, the RECs expanded their mandate to include peace and security measures. For instance, the revised EAC treaty emphasized the notion that economic development and regional integration can help prevent conflicts and enhance security. In 1998, the organization drafted a Memorandum of Understanding on Common Defense and Security, a prelude to the 2000 Memorandum of Understanding on Interstate Security which provided for the establishment of border committees to stabilize border areas that experience (d) tensions.

Unlike in West Africa and South Africa where RECS (ECOWAS and SADC respectively) incorporate most of the regional states; and Nigeria and South Africa are the lead nations in issues of security in the respective sub-regions, Eastern Africa has a number of RECs,

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5Eastern Africa as a sub region includes the Greater Horn, East Africa, the Great Lakes Region (including E. Congo) and the Indian Ocean islands.
each having different capabilities and conceptions of threats and solutions to regional security; and four separate groupings of states: the Horn, East Africa, the Great Lakes and the Indian Ocean Islands—all having different histories, demographics, geography and interests. The sub-region also lacks a lead nation in peace and security matters. In such a region of immense competition and mistrust, overlapping membership in organizations and different levels of development, it is very difficult to make collective decisions on peace and security.

In order to harmonize the continent’s numerous security initiatives and to ensure that the continent’s limited resources are applied efficiently and effectively, the AU, through its larger framework of the African Union Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), established the concept of an African Standby Force (ASF) as an example of a collective security initiative in the continent. The five regionally based multinational brigades/forces of the ASF are based on the five economic regions (North, West, Central, South and East), and were to operate as a multinational integrated rapid reaction peace support operation under strict guidelines. The EASF is the ASF force for Eastern Africa with the vision of contributing to regional and continental peace and stability, through a fully operational and multidimensional joint and integrated Force ready for deployment by 2015.

The choice of this study was informed by the need to enhance peace and security in the Eastern Africa region through regional collective security arrangements. The successful operation of the EASF is based on the harmonization of policies and the political will of the member states of the various RECS/groupings of states within the sub region. The shortcomings

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10 An integrated force in this sense refers to a multidisciplinary peace support operation including military, police and civilian components.
presented by these multiple institutions already posit challenges in collective security and functionality of the EASF. This study therefore seeks to establish the requisite conditions necessary for an operational and effective East Africa Standby Force.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Eastern Africa region has suffered some of the world’s longest and most bloody wars with notable conflicts still continuing in DRC Congo, Somali, Sudan and southern Sudan. Some of the effects of the war in the region have been death, influx of refugees and IDPS, and this has generally affected efforts to ensure stability and prosperity.  

Although under the OAU, a number of RECS were formed to steer development in their subsequent sub regions, and that the provision of peaceful settlement of disputes through negotiation, mediation, conciliation and arbitration constituted its guiding principle since its inception in 1963, the organization, burdened by its own structural incompetence was unable to dictate the course of Africa’s development and settlement of disputes, leading to the formation of the AU which took a robust role in issues of peace and security, more especially after the post-cold war era and after the 1990s events in Somali and Rwanda. Under the APSA framework, the AU established the ASF, a multinational peacekeeping force that was to intervene and bring to an end violent conflict in the continent. The emphasis on the development of an ASF vis à vis other conflict management mechanisms could have been informed by the continuance of violent conflict and threats to security in the continent, and the unwillingness of the international community to

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engage their troops directly in the continent. Peacekeeping is a multidimensional practice which incorporates a number of conflict related activities other than peace enforcement by the military.\textsuperscript{16}

In Eastern Africa, although the existing RECS have tried to address the problem of insecurity in the region, the phenomenon has continued to be a prevalent in the sub region. The North-South conflict in Sudan and the Somali civil war were both among the longest lasting conflicts in Africa. Similarly, the 1994 genocide in Rwanda also shows how deadly conflict can be in this sub-region. Other forms of insecurity like terrorism, piracy, drug and human trafficking and low level intensity conflicts orchestrated by rebels like in Uganda continue to be witnessed as well.

The need for a functional peacekeeping force like the EASF is thus welcome especially in a region which is prone to conflicts, yet it cannot intervene collectively in regional conflicts. Once operational, the EASF will be a conventional military force. However a gap exists between the ASF force structure and the nature of current conflicts in the Eastern Africa which are mostly intra state and low level intensity conflicts. The use of a regional force in a conflict within the same region may be also challenging: the political interests of participating countries are likely to impose serious constraints to the functionality of the EASF, as is clearly the case in the context of the Horn of Africa. Another factor that needs consideration is the existence of the complexity of the relationship between the AU, the RECs and individual nations.\textsuperscript{17} The study thus seeks to critically assess the performance and in particular the functionality of the EASF in addressing protracted conflicts in the Eastern region of Africa. In so doing, the study is guided by the following questions: what is the relationship between the EASF and the RECs in Eastern Africa? How does the current design of the EASF affect its functionality in the Eastern Africa region?

What are the pre-operational requirements of a standby force? What measures should be put in place to enhance the optimal performance of the EASF?

1.3 Objective of the Study

The main objective of the study is to appraise the regional collective security efforts / mechanisms in the Eastern Africa region and assess the challenges facing the EASF as a security initiative. The specific objectives are to:

a. Examine the current design of the EASF structures and process.

b. Identify and assess the performance of the EASF to date in various parts of Africa.

c. Assess the factors that constrain optimal performance of the EASF.

1.4 Justification of the Study

The long history of conflicts experienced in Eastern Africa region and other security threats that the region still faces like maritime piracy, terrorism and trafficking in arms, drugs and humans continue to pose serious challenges to regional security dynamics, sometimes causing strained relations among countries of the sub-region. The capacity of individual states to address these transnational and irregular threats has also been weakened over time. Countries in the sub-region will therefore need to embrace increased regional cooperation which will require some level of integrated defense and security system in order to effectively contain these threats.

By realizing that peace and security is a prerequisite to meaningful development, regional and sub-regional organizations/ mechanisms in Eastern Africa and other stakeholders in the region have had security cooperation as a top priority. However, conflict in the region with its devastating effects continues to be experienced, because of, among other reasons, issues such as
competition and duplication of efforts by the sub-regional mechanisms. A deliberate and concerted policy of collective security and self-reliance occasioned by military cooperation incorporated with the existing regional mechanisms will help eliminate insecurity and encourage development in the sub region and in the entire continent. A thorough examination of the current design of the proposed sub-regional standby force is therefore indispensable and examination of the necessary factors that will enhance the functionality of the EASF will be important. More research on security mechanisms will enable regional institutions and stakeholders to have a focused approach in developing their policy and capacity-building efforts towards achieving security in the sub region. Such a focused approach in a resource-limited sub-continent like Eastern Africa will have a bigger impact and increase the chances of success.footnote{18} The primary purpose of this study is to explore a number of key issues that will positively influence the EASF to be functional and effective, now and in the future by identifying solutions to the constraints that may hinder its performance.

It is hoped that this study will contribute to the growing international debate on the theory of regional collective security and the systems theory as far as it applies to matters of peace and security in the sub-region; and in particular to (East) Africa’s ability to ensure its own future prosperity and development. The findings from this research could help those in relevant government, academic, and military positions of authority in their quest to establish an effective sub-regional security mechanism or peacekeeping capability, as opposed to national mechanisms.

1.5 Literature Review

The review of literature is classified under three sub-headings: security, regions and regional security and standby forces.

1.5.1 Security

Security is a contested concept. However, there seems to be an agreement amongst scholars that at the basic level security implies the absence of threat to the fundamental values at the individual and collective levels. The concept of security can be understood in different forms depending on its objects: threat perception, the protected values, and the means through which these values can be protected.\textsuperscript{19}

For the better part of the twentieth century, realism dominated the study and analysis of security. The nature of security was purely militaristic and its subject was the state. ‘Security’ was usually referred to as ‘national security’\textsuperscript{20} - external military threats to the nation state\textsuperscript{21}. For realists, the international system is anarchic, and all states maintain military capabilities for their own defense or “self-help”. The independent action of a state as it pursues self-help may lead to rising insecurity for others. States cannot therefore escape security dilemma as military power of other states will always appear offensive.\textsuperscript{22} The effect of the security dilemma is that interstate cooperation is limited because of the security competition which takes precedence. In realism, states seek to consolidate power, thus peace/stability in international relations can only be achieved with the balance of power.\textsuperscript{23} Regional cooperation would therefore largely be focused

on balance of power through alliances. As an instrument of policy, military power has got a variety of uses among them peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and can help wield other tools of influence such as diplomacy and propaganda.

Realists like Walt argue that security studies are about war and can be defined as “the study of threat, use, and control of military force” and that any attempt to widen the security agenda to include issues such as pollution would destroy the intellectual coherence of ‘security’. Bellamy too defined security as the “relative freedom from war coupled with a relatively high expectation that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that should occur.”

The definition of ‘security’ as essentially state centric and militaristic was later criticized as it ignored other nonmilitary threats of the modern era such as terrorist groups, transnational criminal organizations, and the like. Further, assuming that the object of security threat is the state ignores the fact that threats and violence can be directed exclusively at certain groups, and even individuals within states and those threats can sometimes emanate from the state itself.

Most neo-realists, while still holding on military approach as the defining key to security, “loosened’ their state centrism ideology. Chipman for instance argues for widening of the concept if concerns about the threat or the actual use of force are between political actors, who in essence could be states, peoples and nations or even alliances.

Arnold Wolfers made a distinction between objective and subjective security, the former implying the “absence of threat to acquired values” or real threat, while the later referred to the “absence of fear that such values will be attacked”, or perceived threat. He further adds that the

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realists conception of security were idealistic too because by demanding a policy of strength based on armament, it reflected value judgments and an ordered set of priorities about which social objectives are to be pursued or prioritized in terms of government attention and spending. Consequently, absolute security cannot be obtained at any given level. Based on Wolfers’ definition, Baldwin reformulates security to be: ‘a low probability of damage to acquired values’. He thus emphasizes on preservation of ‘acquired values’ which according to him, are protection of ‘political independence’ and ‘territorial integrity’; although other values are sometimes added. He adds that such values should always be specified to avoid confusion.

For social constructivist, ‘security’ is a social construction, and is an outcome of a process of social and political interaction. The meaning to “security” is therefore given by people through inter-subjective consensus. Basically, “security is what actors make of it”. Katzenstein argues that the construction of security generally is shaped by national and regional culture because this helps shape the way actors understand perceived threats, and the particular responses that will be taken to these understandings. Dalby adds that the Western construction of security is that of “power by someone over something or someone else and it is imposed by the power of the state and its military organization”. To analyse sub-regional security in Eastern Africa consideration of various cultures and other dynamics in member state, as opposed to Western definition of security, is important so as to develop an effective security strategy.

In an attempt to broaden the security agenda, Buzan and Ullman felt that the concept of security should encompass the military, environmental, societal, economic and political sectors.

which equally affect people in the everyday life; and the ‘referent’ object of security to include the state, the individual and the international system. All the sectors and referent objects contribute to security and according to Buzan, although each sector formed a focal point for analysis, they interrelated and remained inseparable parts of the complete whole. The reason for broadening the security concept was to capture the changing realities of the world such as effects of interdependence and globalization; the concept had political qualities and it had potential as an integrative concept for international relations. Buzan defines security as “the pursuit of freedom from threat”, and that “other types of threats were rising in importance regardless of the military concerns”. Mwagiru too argues that the term security must be redefined taking into account the broadened concerns and the special security concerns of third world and African states. The understanding of security as constructed by Western metaphysics may not wholly capture the African setting whose operating environment largely conditions the threats to security. While concurring with Buzan’s idea of “rising density” of the international system, Mwagiru adds that the realities of globalization, and processes such as internationalization of national affairs, conflicts, politics, and those of interdependence cannot be ignored in security studies as they have necessitated the case of system analysis. Sub-regional organizations have therefore had to redefine themselves and their roles in the globalized and globalizing world.

The broadened concept of security brought about the concept of ‘securitization’ and ‘desecuritisation’. To “securitize” an issue or threat was to get priority for action and use of exceptional measure in dealing it. Waever posits that something becomes a ‘security issue’ if it

38 See Sheehan, (2005), op. cit, P.7.
appears to pose an ‘existential threat’ to a particular group or institution. But as Wolfers already argued, how an issue is securitized depends on how those in positions of power define it. Waever, further argues for desecuritization of as many issues as possible, arguing that the term security carries with it the history and connotation of militarism. Desecuritising an issue removes it from the realm of existential survival thereby encouraging more cooperative forms of problem solving.

Deudney and Huysmans also argue that securitizing issues like the environment and migration may prevent them from being addressed in a holistic politically progressive manner. In Eastern Africa, conflicts are trans boundary and the issues of refugees and environmental conflicts, for instance, are so sensitive that, if addressed only from a state-centric point of view could escalate conflicts among peoples and states. But again as earlier mentioned, issues get political importance when they are securitized. So with desecuritisation, groups at the sub state and supra-state level may lose the ability to mobilize support for their agenda.

The traditional definition of security meant in practice that the security needs of some groups in society were largely ignored. The broad agenda has therefore brought into political importance other existential concerns, initially marginalized, like world poverty. The security concerns of the individual can also be directly addressed, not necessarily via the state, and security can be seen at the system / sub-system level. Many factors that create and accentuate conflicts cannot be fully understood at the state level without reference to the sub-region.

Recently, while agreeing on the need to construct a conceptualization of security that would embrace many sectors but without losing coherence, Buzan et al defined security as

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relating to how “human collectivities relate to each other in terms of threats and vulnerabilities”. Dangers to human collectivities that are life-threatening and emanate from the calculated activities and policies of other human beings should be considered as security threat. Units can seek to reduce their insecurity by reducing their vulnerabilities or by preventing threats.

Other scholars from the functionalist school of thought like Deutsch explored the idea of security communities (SC) arguing that cooperation in economic and cultural areas was far better way in forming peaceful and independent communities than cooperation through military alliances. Since security was a social construction, through inter-subjective consensus, states and societies could alter behavior and transform relationships among states from enemies to friends. In a security community “there is real reassurance that the members of the community will not harm each other physically but will settle their disputes in some other way.” Adler and Barnett have supported this approach by adding that tightly coupled security communities demonstrate commitment to “cooperative security measures…” However, unlike Deutsch’s restrictive definition of totally peaceful and independent communities, they posit that a SC goes through the ‘nascent, the ascendant and the mature phases’. After the developmental phase of a SC, there are internal dynamics that institutions experience before mature communities can be achieved. These later argument by Adler and Barnett could apply to (Eastern) Africa when looking at regional security institutions since totally peacefully states in the region are virtually nonexistent.

43 Ibid, p.5
1.5.2 Regions and Regional Security

The end of the Cold War reduced the incentives for global penetration into the domestic affairs of the third world states making the ‘region’ the focus of security studies. It also necessitated the re-examination of the term security. States came to be recognized by their regional orientation rather than by their former ideological alignment to the superpowers. Buzan\textsuperscript{46} argues that the region is important in security studies as it allows an intermediate level of analysis where highly interdependent “security complexes” operate between the international system and the state. Issues that affect regional stability are projected onto both the state and international level.

A ‘region’ is usually associated with different continents of the world while sub-regions are geographically distinct sub-areas of continents. But, geography alone doesn’t define the term ‘region’ in world politics. Regions are political and imagined constructs shaped both by local countries’ concepts of identity and connections, and by the way outsiders view and react to them; and they can be ‘made’ as part of a conscious policy programme. This is why regional arrangements may leave out countries that seem geographically to belong to the region; why several security related groups with different memberships and agendas can coexist on the same territory; and why a security defined region may not have the same boundaries as it does for economic, climatic, cultural or other purposes.\textsuperscript{47} Initially, it was said that balances of power were predominately the organizing force for a region. But ‘because balances of power are susceptible to external influences, they are a less reliable guide to security relations at the regional level.’\textsuperscript{48} Buzan’s Security Complex Theory (SCT) reduced the significance of the power factor with reference to the definition of a region. For Buzan, a region is “a distinct and

significant sub-system of security relations that exists among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into close geographic proximity with one another”. Buzan identifies four major characteristics of a security region: it comprises two or more states; the states must be in relative geographic proximity to one another; security interdependence on or within the regional level is more pronounced than at the global level and, a security region is defined by the patterns found within the security practices.

Regions are frequently defined by a common ad hoc problem which establishes the conditions for an interdependent security environment. The uniqueness of the ad hoc problem and its specificity to the region is what is known as a regional security complex (RSC).

Bailes and Cottey identified four models of regional security cooperation that have been relevant for the 21st century: alliances, collective security, security regimes and security communities. Alliances are designed for both defence and attack (typically by military means) against a common external, or even internal, threat or opponent. Membership into an alliance excludes the enemy.

Collective security refers to a collective action as a response to a collectively identified threat. It is formal in character and it is only feasible if it draws on the fundamental interests of all states in a region or the world, and aims at protecting those interests by concentrating force. Apart from the UN, the AU may be viewed as an institution that aims at, and partially produces collective security. The AU’s collective security system originates from the Protocol establishing the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), which is ‘a standing decision-making organ for the

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49 Buzan, B. (1991), Op cit, p.188.
prevention, management and resolution of conflicts” and “a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situation in Africa”. 53

Although IGAD has no special organ responsible for peace and security 54, Article 18 of the IGAD Agreement provides that ‘member states shall act collectively to preserve peace, security and stability, which are essential prerequisites for economic development and social progress.’

The limitation of collective security is the challenge of arriving at a common judgment and common will to act against offenders because of the larger membership. But it works well when there is consensus among the major powers, and vice versa. The veto powers at the UNSC have sometimes failed to agree on issues that require collective action.

Regimes define norms of a cooperative and generally positive nature for states’ behavior and often provide ways to implement support and verify these norms. A security-related regime may cover broad norms such as the non-use of force or may regulate certain types and uses of weapons or activities like military movements and transparency. Regimes with functional security goals may not restrict their membership on the basis of geographical borders.

A security community refers to a group of states among which there is a ‘real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way’. 55 These four models can help in understanding the nature of, prospects for and limitations of particular forms of regional security cooperation.

There have been emerging patterns and functions of regional security cooperation since the 1990s and a generic framework for understanding this cooperation has been proposed 56:

security dialogue and conflict management, new forms of military cooperation, democracy and human rights, and economic integration and the wider security agenda.

Regional security institutions serve as frameworks for communication and dialogue among their members. This helps to build trust between states, and develop a sense of common interests and identity. The AU has established new mechanisms for conflict management, and has engaged in a number of political mediation missions for internal conflicts in member states. The mediation efforts of IGAD in Somalia and Sudan have also been significant.

Contemporary military cooperation as opposed to traditional one can be characterized as ‘defence diplomacy’ where there is multilateral and bilateral dialogue among defence ministries and armed forces aiming to foster confidence and transparency and establishing democratic, civilian control of militaries. Humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and peace enforcement are also areas of focus for these militaries. The AU’s Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), the basis on which the E (ASF) is formed is a case in point.

Democracy and human rights have increasingly come to be viewed as part of the security agenda. Democracies are said to be less prone than authoritarian regimes to engage in genocide or other forms of mass violence against their own citizens. The links between governance and security is also gaining in significance and human rights abuses are seen as major threats to human security. Regional organizations with comparable cultures and histories may promote and protect good governance and human rights among states. The AU’s goals as defined by its

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59 The ASF is to comprise of 20 000 military, police and civilian personnel, based on five brigades to be provided by each of the continent’s five sub-regions.

Constitutive Act include the promotion of ‘democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance’ and ‘human and peoples’ rights.’ However, the selective application of discipline on member states by the organization has been criticized. The AU has been said to be reticent about what some see as a drift towards authoritarianism in Ethiopia.

Although many regional institutions are primarily economic in character, they are often implicitly designed to promote stability, conflict avoidance and the collective viability of their communities. Since economic interdependence between states increases the costs of using force and creates shared interests, economic cooperation and integration reduces chances of political or military conflict. Economic regionalism has also been a protective response to economic globalization as working together in regional groups helps states to protect markets and industries in their region, increase their competitiveness in the global economy and strengthen their bargaining power in global economic forums such as the World Trade Organization.

The idea of a wider security agenda has been pursued mainly through regional organizations/institutions thus bridging the gap between traditional definitions of security and wider concepts of security such as democracy, human rights, economic and environmental issues. The EAC and IGAD for example, have fronted for general security of member states, among other concerns like economic, environmental, developmental and human security.

1.5.3 Standby Force

At the end of the Cold War, Africa was ravaged by intrastate conflicts that negatively impacted on peace, security and economies of its states. These events coupled with the apparent “Africa fatigue” by the West and the international community, with reference to the lack of

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61 Constitutive Act of the African Union (note 26), Article 3.
timely and effective response in the Rwanda conflict in 1994, provided a strong socio-economic impetus for the establishment of a continental force towards collective security. The African leadership thus resolved to demonstrate political will in ‘finding African solutions to African problems’, by seeking to put up structures capable of interventions, create conditions necessary for, and allow time for the transfer of mandates to the better -resourced UN.63

The delay in the arrival of troops in the mission area is sometimes the reason for major security instability in the targeted country. One way to overcome this inadequacy is the establishment of the so called "stand by" forces by member states.

The objective of a “standby force” is to offer an alternative supra-national intervention force that is large to deal with global /regional security, and it pre- supposes a ready to be deployed military force of modest dimensions, including police and other civilians personnel deployed into a conflict zone at a short notice. The rationale for this is that preventive action, through a combination of conflict resolution, diplomacy and even prompt deployments, is far more cost-effective than later, larger forces introduced three to six months later, the time which, the situation within the affected country can change dramatically and reduce the chance of a peaceful resolution. The need for a suitably organized, structured, trained and equipped force that is readily available when required is therefore important.64

Although the concept of a ‘pan-African army’ dates back to the 1960s when Kwame Nkrumah proposed the establishment of the ‘common defence system with African high command’65, the African Standby Force has been said to be conceptually closer to the United

Nations Standby Arrangement (UNSAS)’s (SHIRBRIG)\textsuperscript{66, 67}. This however marks an important development in Africa’s continental self-emancipation.\textsuperscript{68} The importance of peace and security issues in Africa has been underlined in the adoption of The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union in July 2002 and the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy in February 2004. The PSC Protocol provides a legal base of APSA- a system of conflict prevention, management and resolution tools, and in Article 13(1) of the Protocol, the ASF ‘shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice’\textsuperscript{69}. Most conflicts are complex and of long duration, and thus call for various approaches and capabilities in addressing not only security and military aspects, but also the political, humanitarian, developmental and institutional dimensions of the conflicts.

The standby arrangement personnel, while in their countries of origin, are to participate in various pre-deployment activities, including training and joint exercises, which are organised on a regular basis by RECs/ RMs to keep them prepared for deployment.

The Eastern Africa Standby Force is part of the ASF. While SHIRBRIG offers the idea of a rapid deployment force with the same training standards, operating procedures and interoperable equipment, the EASF (and ASF) seems to be far away from being fully operational, and even if it were, chances of its use would be challenging because of the network

\textsuperscript{66}In his Supplement to an Agenda for Peace presented in January 1995, Boutros-Ghali recommended the idea of UN rapid deployment force in order to have forces available for a rapid deployment at short notice. Denmark, Austria, Canada, Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Sweden established a rapid deployment force for peacekeeping and humanitarian operation- SHIRBRIG, within the framework of (UNSAS).

\textsuperscript{67}Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark, “Background Paper about establishing a Multinational UN Standby Forces Brigade at High Readiness (SHIRBRIG), New York, 26 September 1996.


of interconnected and interrelated interests by various actors, especially external actors. The EASF, being part of the larger ASF may not adopt policies or procedures based on the mutual understanding of the countries involved, without consultation with the ASF and the donor countries from the international community. These limitations question the legitimacy of ‘African solutions to African problems’ and lead the study in identifying the pre-operational requirements if the EASF is to function effectively and efficiently.

1.6 Theoretical Framework

Violent conflicts and their devastating consequences in the Eastern Africa region, and other security threats have locked states in the region into mutual security vulnerability such that one country’s security is now linked to peace and stability of another neighbouring state. Responses and interventions in domestic security matters therefore require a regional approach in containing, managing and resolving them. The relational nature of security in Eastern Africa which can be said to be a “security complex” calls for the application of Buzan’s Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT). Buzan posits that “security complexes cannot be limited to state and interstate relations and politico-military issues; they must make room for other types of security units and issues”. Apart from the militaristic and political intricacies that have engulfed the Eastern Africa region, the concept of security in the region has encompassed other sectors such as environmental, economic and human security.

According to Buzan and Weaver, regional security complex (RSC) is “defined by durable patterns of amity and enmity taking the form of sub-global, geographically coherent patterns of

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72 “A set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another.”

73 Ibid, p.198.
security interdependence”. Its main elements separate yet interrelated are: boundaries, anarchic structure, polarity and socially constructed patterns of amity and enmity. In Eastern Africa, the effect of boundaries in regional security is significant. Most borders are blurred making some countries’ membership in a region change relatively quickly. Tanzania for instance, balances between South and East Africa. Most borders in the region are also comparatively porous and so most conflicts and crises have been trans-boundary. States and peoples are also locked into geographical proximity with each other, and because of the security dynamics, mutual security interdependence or vulnerability is likely to be seen. For instance, the national security and stability of the neighbouring states of DRC affect its own national security.

In a RSC, there exists a minimum of two autonomous units in a system. Most states in Eastern Africa are sovereign states (although there lacks a lead country- an important element in peace and security operations). Concerning patterns of enmity and amity in (Eastern) Africa, there are relatively durable alliances and rivalries between states. Notable political tensions and rivalries have existed between some states, most notably Ethiopia and Eritrea. In addition, every country plays more or less an important role in a RSC. All member states in the EASF have a role in the project; from the probable regional powers and possible pillars of the EASF like Kenya and Ethiopia to regional bystanders like Tanzania, Madagascar and Mauritius.

The East African RSC has a specific character and involves numerous threats and challenges to peace and security among them interstate and intrastate tensions and conflicts. The RSCT and security complexes can be useful in providing a good framework to discuss issues of

threats and vulnerabilities that are endemic in the region. If the solution can be found from within the context of the complex, then national security and international security policies for states can be made from within this context as well.

The World society’s System theory will also be inferred in this discussion as the approach enables a systemic view of conflict and its management thereof. Because conflict in the Eastern Africa is usually trans-boundary, the regional and international implications of conflict must be factored in its analysis. The international community and other non-state actors must be factored in conflict management efforts in the region in as much as the region endeavors to have conflict management approaches tailored to African conditions. Ignorance of the systemic view in addressing conflicts in the Eastern Africa region would therefore be dangerous.

1.7 Hypothesis.

- The current design of the EASF constrains its functionality.
- The current design of the EASF does not constrain its functionality.
- The current design of the EASF has no relationship with its functionality.

1.8 Research Methodology

The research method that was used in this study is qualitative research and it was presented using both historical and descriptive analysis. Although descriptive research is quantitative, open-ended questions were asked to yield qualitative data during the interviews. The researcher did an extensive review of related literature in the fields of peace and security, peacekeeping and conflict management more broadly, conflict in Eastern Africa.
1.8.1 Research Design

The main objective of this research is to assess the efforts of the sub-regional mechanisms in Eastern Africa in addressing peace and security issues and the challenges faced in harmonizing their efforts which is important towards achieving an effective regional collective security strategy. A case study of the Eastern Africa Standby Force was chosen to help determine factors and relationships among the security mechanisms in the EAR.

1.8.2 Target Population and Sample

This study targeted the staff of the EASF based at Karen, Nairobi. The researcher used questionnaires for both the military and civilian staff of the EASF. The site of data collection being in Nairobi was accessible to the researcher. The sampling techniques that were used in this research were largely qualitative like the random purposive sampling and snowball sampling. Although purposive sampling was be used to get in depth information, the random purposive sampling technique will gave credibility to the data collected. The mentioned sampling techniques were appropriate in this study since the sample size is small.

The efforts made by these sub-regional mechanisms were examined through both primary and secondary data. Secondary data was obtained primarily from books, academic journals, articles, publications by respected authors in their respective fields, previous research papers, EAC, IGAD and EASF protocols, communiqués, periodicals, minutes of meetings, reports and the internet. For the primary data, data collection instruments that were used were semi-structured questionnaires and analysis of documents. Questionnaires were given out with the consent of interviewees and open-ended questions were employed to obtain in-depth information.

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from the research persons. The secondary data from document analysis helped the researcher to acquaint with the area of study in so far as the issues and theoretical debates involved in this study.

1.8.3 Data Analysis

The process used was data reduction, data displays and drawing of conclusion. The narrative analysis which seeks to understand social phenomena through the form and content of stories that are analyzed by participants was used in this study. Narratives can contribute towards persuading, rationalizing and even offer perspective. The participants’ views were obtained through the semi-structured interviews during the EASF 2015 open day and through questionnaires.

The period of analysis of this study stretches back to the formation of the OAU in 1963 and further looks ahead to what the future holds for the ASF/EASF. To address ethical issues, the researcher sought permission from the relevant sources before collecting and compiling data. The resource persons were informed what the study was about and that the purpose of the study was purely academic. Their participation in data providence was voluntary so as to ensure that the information received is handled and analyzed properly without any prejudice.

1.9 Chapter Outline

This study is presented in five chapters:

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Chapter One gives an introduction to the study, statement of the problem, objectives, literature review, the framework of study, and the methodology that will be used in collection and analysis of data.

Chapter Two while developing on the theory advanced in chapter one, examines the current design and structure of the EASF by first looking at the concept of collective security more so in the Eastern Africa, the nature of conflict in the Eastern Africa region and the historical perspective of other regional mechanisms and institutions that have been put up to address the security situation in the region and then the development of the EASF.

Chapter Three seeks to assess the performance and achievement of the EASF in the area of peace and security in the various parts of Africa.

Chapter Four, having assessed the performance of the EASF in Chapter three, will be dedicated to identifying and assessing the factors that constrain the optimal performance of the EASF.

Chapter Five presents major points of analysis in the previous chapters and highlights the key findings that were made and the recommendations for further research in the area under study.

CHAPTER TWO
THE EASTERN AFRICA STANDBY FORCE: STRUCTURES AND DESIGN

2.1 Introduction
The new security dynamics in the Post-cold War era led to African states’ realization that concerted efforts among member states in managing conflict and maintaining peace was imperative. Incidences such as the Rwanda genocide and the need to redefine security in its broadness triggered the need to develop jointly effective prevention and mitigating mechanisms to deal with conflicts in the region and the need for a people-centered approach to security. Consequently, the concept of ‘Pan-Africanism’ in the area of security became once again more alive given that security in one region was linked to security in another region.

Since the mandate of old institutions in the African region limited their performance in view of the new security requirements, institutions in the region led by the African Union have embarked on an elaborate normative and institutional transformation to reflect the security realities on the ground. Article 4(h) and (j) of the AU Constitutive Act empowers member states to intervene in certain situations. The AU further adopted the Protocol that embraces an expanded and comprehensive agenda for peace and security through the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Under APSA is the African Standby Force which is multidimensional given the new security environment is multifaceted. The ASF is tailored to carry out modern day peace support operations among them conflict prevention. The ASF has five standby forces among them the Eastern African Standby Force that was established to carry out the functions of peace and security in a timely manner and in accordance with the constitutive act of the AU.

This chapter is dedicated to an examination of the current structure, processes and design of the EASF. The concept of collective security in the Eastern Africa region will be discussed followed by an analysis of the environment under which the EASF carries out its functions by
first looking at the nature of conflict in the region and the role of the African union and of the existing security and development institutions, in the Eastern Africa collective security.

2.2 Meaning of Collective Security

In the post-cold war period, conflicts and wars in different parts of the world escalated necessitating the need for collective responses at global, regional and national levels. The League of Nations (LoN) and its heir, the United Nations Organization (UN) were established for the maintenance of peace and security in the international system by promoting a collective security system that would address major threats to global peace and security. The objective of collective security is to counter any attempt by states or any aggressor to change the status quo or the world order of independent sovereign states with overwhelming force.\(^79\)

Collective security is a concept that evolves and is varied in meaning. Before the Post-Cold War period, security was state-centric. Today, emphasis is on human security and the responsibility to protect (R2P). The international community through the UNSC has the responsibility to protect, where a state is unable or unwilling to protect its people from violations against humanity.\(^80\) The AU too, unlike the OAU, adopted the principle R2P as one of the basic tenets of its existence. Collective security is thus an integrated organization that can avert threat or intervene in the internal affairs of states to stop crimes against humanity, the prohibition stated in article 2(7) of the UN Charter, notwithstanding.

In collective security states attempt to preserve the security of member states against a common enemy or adversary.\footnote{Ulusoy H, ‘Possible transformation of collective security arrangements in the post-September 11 era.” P.1.} States being “coercion- wielding organizations”\footnote{Tilly, C. (1992) Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992, Cambridge: Blackwell, p.1.} are exposed to threats and vulnerabilities against their security. They thus seek to assure their own security against possible aggressors through collective organizations that take collective measures for dealing with threat to an established international order, or peace.\footnote{Schwarzenberger, G. (1951) Power Politics: A Study of International Society (2nd ed.) London. p.521.} Collective security is “an arrangement arrived at by some nations to protect their vital interests, safety or integrity against a probable threat or menace by means of combining their powers.”\footnote{Chaturvedi, A. K. (2006) “Dictionary of Political Science”. New Delhi: Academic India Publishers. P.150.} An institutionalized army or police force at the global or regional level is put in place to deter any member state from acting in a manner likely to threaten the international order.\footnote{See Ebegbulem J C. The Failure Of Collective Security In The Post World Wars I and II International System International Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies (Ijpcs), Vol. 1, No. 1, October 2012, p.2} Collective security that is based on regulated and institutionalized balancing against the aggressor promotes trust and a more cooperative international environment, making inter-state rivalry and aggression unlikely.

Collective security as a development on the idea of an ‘alliance’ can refer to a group of states who through a collective body, defends its members from security threats that are directed from outside the group. The threat can also be an internal one.\footnote{Van der Waag I.J. (1989) “Interstate Collective Security: its development and decline in Scientia Militaria,” South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 19, no 1.,p.32} In this context, states under security communities share the same threat perception and would be better off if they deal with the threat collectively as a group rather than individually. Collective security implies thus, that peace is indivisible. A potential aggressor would be scared of the concerted actions of all other states against him. This has, however, not been the case with either the LoN or the UN.\footnote{Duchacek I, D. Nations and Men; International Politics Today, p. 348.}
The UN is the basis of the current concept of collective security in the world. Based on Chapter VIII of the UN Charter which provides for “pacific settlement of local disputes before referring such disputes to the United Nations Security Council” by regional organizations, the EU, the AU, the EAC and ECOWAS among others came up with policy instruments to manage local security and settle conflicts and disputes within their regions in a collective manner.

Collective security is based on four principles: all countries forswear the use of force except in self defence, all agree that peace is indivisible, all pledge to unite to halt aggression and restore the peace, and finally all agree to supply whatever resources that are necessary for the collective security.\(^{89}\) While for Standley a workable collective security system should include *representativeness* in composition and adequate financing, \(^{90}\) for Ziring et al, the essential elements include *consensus* that peace is indivisible and members share the same threat perception, *commitment* to act based on the system’s principles and *organization*, and the capacity to deter most potential violators and to defeat an actual aggressor in short order.\(^{91}\)

Collective security has been said to be unrealistic. States may not abandon conceptions of self-interest as a guide to policy in preference of a world society interested in preserving law and order everywhere.\(^{92}\) Many countries would not take up an act thought to be too risky or expensive. Contrary to Article 43 of the UN Charter that member countries provide assistance in maintaining international peace and security, most countries in the UN have been reluctant to entrust their sovereign interests to collective action, only doing it if it is of interest to them.\(^{93}\)

\(^{88}\) Articles 48 and 49 of the the UN charter.
\(^{92}\) Dyke, V. N. (1957) “International Politics”. New York: Meredith Corporation
\(^{93}\) Rourke, J. and Boyer, M. op cit, 279.
The disparity of power among the member states within organizations also renders collective security challenging. A world society may defeat aggression by a smaller country, but the same may not occur to great powers, who may even take unilateral action, in contrary with the decision of the collective organization. The US and Britain unilateral action in Iraq in 2003 is a case in point.\textsuperscript{94} In between the two World Wars, the LoN did not respond to Japan’s invasion of Manchuria and Italy’s assault on Ethiopia “because of lack of commitment on the part of other states and an unwillingness of the International Community to act in concert”.\textsuperscript{95} In addition, the U.S.A’s refusal to join the LoN and the rise of the Soviet Union outside the League contributed to the organization’s lack of the necessary leverage against the aggressor states. A successful Collective security therefore requires membership of the entire system: the exclusion of states with powerful economies and of strong militaries reduces its chances of success.\textsuperscript{96}

Overdependence of the UNSC on the member-governments, for assistance, especially the principal financiers like the US, is a challenge to the UN. Some of these nations act unilaterally without approval of the UNSC or even defy its orders thus contradicting the principles and intentions of collective security. Concerning representation, the UN has not completely applied the Principle of Collective security on a universal basis. Africa is not represented in the permanent membership of the UNSC neither does it have any veto powers in the organization.

Despite all these challenges, the UN as the present basis of collective security organizations has provided the framework for managing conflicts thus reducing tensions among states in the international community. The great powers may have used the veto powers in their own national interest, but they have also greatly reduced interstate conflicts using the same

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid p.7
powers, consequently encouraging other pacific mechanisms to manage conflicts among states. The UN’s enforcement action against North Korea in 1950 also proved and reinforced the idea that collective security under the organization was possible.\(^\text{97}\)

### 2.3 Evolution of Collective Security in Eastern Africa

In Africa, the old economic and security entities created with a ‘state-centric’ approach to security had to be restructured and new ones established to respond and adequately address the new demanding security concerns. The OAU was restructured to AU, while in East Africa, the Inter-governmental Authority in Drought and Desertification (IGADD) was changed to IGAD.\(^\text{98}\)

The AU has embraced a more proactive role in peace and security activities with some of its peace support operations (PSO) having been in DRC Congo, Somalia and Sudan. The organization has also established continent wide African standby Peacekeeping force (ASF) as a collective security initiative. Member states have a role to play in regional security, under the sub-regional standby forces and through the sub-regional RECS and security mechanisms.

The adoption of the Kampala Document that had called for the establishment of a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDA) initiated a paradigm shift in the understanding of security in Africa, the emphasis being that security, stability and cooperation were pillars of development in Africa. In essence then, “the security and stability of each African country was inseparably linked with the security of all African countries” and for Africa to progress, collective, lasting solution to its problems of security and

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\(^{97}\) Although critics have argued that the issue was not collective action against North Korea, but a matter of collective defence against N.Korea which was an enemy of the U.S.A and its allies.

stability was needed. A security community of African states where the security of every state and its people was assured was necessary for purposes of peace, unity and development.

The Rwanda genocide and the new growing need to redefine security in its broadness triggered the need to develop jointly effective prevention and mitigating mechanisms to deal with conflicts in the region and the need for a people-centered approach to security in the continent. Hence restructuring of most of the security institutions in Africa to reflect the security realities on the ground took place. Security was thus defined as the freedom from fear or want. ECOWAS, for instance, in 1975 had adopted the Protocol on Non-Aggression (PAN) and in 1981 the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence (PMAD) - the former emphasizing on territorial integrity and the latter declaring that “…any armed aggression directed against any member state shall constitute a threat or aggression against the entire community”. In 1991, based on the PMAD, ECOWAS deployed the ECOWAS Ceasefire and Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia. In 1999, ECOWAS further adopted another conflict management mechanism which provided for internal conflicts that threaten human security, peace and security of the sub region. A supplementary protocol on Democracy and Good Governance was also adopted in 2001 upon which, in 2003, ECOWAS and partners deployed two peace operations in Cote d’Ivoire and in Liberia; and also in Togo (2005) and Guinea (2007).

Eastern Africa has also embraced the concept of collective security through its security and development organizations. These institutions have made greater efforts to curb insecurity in

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100 Bah S, A Op cit 20. P. 273
the region\textsuperscript{106}. They include RECs like the East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), security and development organizations such IGAD, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the East African Standby Force (EASF). All these co-existing organizations, sometimes with overlapping membership, form the Eastern African Peace and Security Architecture (EAPSA).\textsuperscript{107} EAPSA however faces some challenges, among them the extremely conflict prone region lack of clear policies and framework under which the collective organization can work. To evaluate collective security initiatives in this region, a discussion of the nature and dynamics of conflict in the region is necessary.

\subsection*{2.4 Nature and Dynamics of Conflicts in Eastern Africa}

Eastern Africa as a sub region includes the Greater Horn, East Africa, the Great Lakes Region and the Indian Ocean islands. In this paper, countries in the Eastern Africa region comprise of countries in the EAC, IGAD, ICGLR and the EASF. These are Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, and the ocean islands of Seychelles, Mauritius and Madagascar. The region is characterized by a long history of conflicts and also accounts for some of the world’s deadliest conflicts.\textsuperscript{108} There are also non-conventional and transnational security threats like terrorism, yet the capacity of individual states to address insecurity has weakened over time.

Insecurity continues to render the region unstable despite the efforts put in place to ensure peace and stability. Recent accounts of insecurity include several terrorist attacks especially in

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{107} Fanta E Regionalising Peace and Security in Eastern Africa: Credible Hope or Elusive Dream \textit{UNU – CRIS. P.2}
  \item \textsuperscript{108} For example the Somali civil war, The Sudan civil war, Ethiopian civil war, Eritrean war of Independence, Ethiopian-Eritrean war, Ogaden war, the Rwanda genocide, the Darfur conflict and the DRC instability
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Kenya, electoral conflicts, ethnic/tribal conflicts like in the new independent state of South Sudan between the Dinkas and the Nuer, and conflicts related to constitutions such as the recent civil unrest in Burundi over President Nkurunziza’s ‘third’ term in office.

Conflict in the EAR, more so the intra state one, can be attributed to persistent high level of poverty and the rise in the susceptibility of many parts of Africa to drought. Environmental factors like climate change have caused conflict in the region. One of the factors attributed to the Darfur conflict is competition for the scarce water resources and grazing lands.

Conflict in the region has been shaped by resource abundance and the struggle to control the exploitation these resources. In the Great Lakes region, competition to control these high value minerals has been a major conflict driver. Sudan and South Sudan still have a dispute over the control and exploitation of revenue from oil and natural gas deposits in Abyei. The spillover effect of such conflicts also attracts external actors with their own interests in the conflict.

The geostrategic importance of the region contributes to its insecurity. The effects of the Cold war and the superpowers left the region with many weapons hence contributing to the continuous problem of SALW proliferation. The post 9/11 anti-terrorism campaign has also contributed to the strategic importance of the EAR. Incidences of insecurity in the region have been high given that both terrorism and counter-terrorism acts come into play in the region.

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111 East Africa Regional Conflict and Instability Assessment final report U.S. Agency for International Development 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NY. p.32
Most countries in the EAR have experienced political instability\textsuperscript{114} related to factors such as the alienation of state structures and processes from the public, and the decline of constitutionalism and lack of democratic forms of governance.\textsuperscript{115} The post-election conflicts in Kenya and Ethiopia\textsuperscript{116} and in Uganda in 2006\textsuperscript{117} can attest to this fact.

The violent acts of insurgent groups are common in the region and they not only affect innocent civilians but threaten the survival of regimes or states. Insurgent activities have sometimes led to secessionist states. The violent insurgent activities by the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) eventually led to a new Eritrean State\textsuperscript{118} while the rebellious actions of the Sudanese Peoples’ Liberation Movement /Army (SPLM/A) against the Khartoum government eventually led to the new South Sudan government.

In the EAR region, some heads of state have themselves come to power through rebel groups that overthrew the Central governments. Out of perceived fear of the existence of other rebel groups, such governments often use of military force to silence the rebel groups, and or support insurgent groups to fight proxy wars against the enemy of the regime, usually a neighbouring state. The conflict in Sudan, before secession of South Sudan, and the insecurity in Northern Uganda had greatly been sustained by the acts of insurgency supported by the Khartoum government and the Ugandan government.\textsuperscript{119} In the Darfur region, Chad has been


accused of supporting the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Khartoum government of supporting the Janjaweed militias.\textsuperscript{120}

Inter-ethnic relations across the porous international borders exist in the EAR, and hence the regionalization of conflicts because of the spillover effects. This may cause political and social conflicts, or proxy wars between the concerned countries.\textsuperscript{121}

Disputes over international borders in the region have sometimes resulted into armed conflict between states. The Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia and the Ethio- Eritrean war over a border territory are examples.\textsuperscript{122} Other territorial disputes in the region continue to be witnessed such as the Kenya and Uganda dispute over a barren rock island in Lake Victoria, and the Sudan-South Sudan dispute over their common border in the Abyei region.

The dynamics of conflicts in the EAR region discussed herein can define almost all countries in the region. Consequently, there is no individual state in the region that can plan for its own security without taking into account the security dynamics of the neighbouring states. Security interdependence and collective approach to security in the region is thus not a choice.\textsuperscript{123}

With reference to the CSSDA, the EAR region has been regionalizing its collective security and conflict resolution initiatives to address the security challenges in the region under several security sub regional organizations or RECS that are autonomous and with cross-cutting functions. However, the African Union has taken important steps towards harmonizing the continent’s security initiatives, by among other things, creating regionally based multinational brigades as part of an African Standby Force and limiting official co-operation to

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{122} Fanta E. Op cit, Pp.10-11
\end{thebibliography}
seven organizations so as to prevent needless duplication of efforts and to ensure effective use of the continent’s limited resources.\textsuperscript{124}

### 2.5 Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms in Eastern Africa and their role in Eastern Africa Collective Security

Regionalization of peace and security initiatives at the regional and sub-regional level has been going on under the strategic guidance of the continental political body: the AU. In the EAR, despite the efforts to address peace and security issues, there have been persistent challenges like overlapping membership in organizations and the problem of finance. For substantive efforts in this field to be realized, there is need for better collaboration between the AU, the SROs/RECs and other partners. Article 3 of the AU Constitutive Act recognizes RECs as the “implementing arms” of the AU’s goal of a peaceful and prosperous continent. This was based on the role RECS play in ensuring political stability and their role in regional development.

The AU which is the regional body with which all sub regional organizations align their policies, strategies and guidance in matters of peace and security, and is also the author of the APSA framework, upon which all the regional security mechanisms should be anchored, will be briefly discussed before an analysis of the various RECs/ROs in Eastern Africa is done.

#### 2.5.1 The African Union and Regional Security in Eastern Africa

The African Union was founded in March 2001 in Libya with a broader mandate than its predecessor the OAU. The AU Constitutive Act, while recognizing the respect for territorial integrity and respect for sovereignty of nation States, mandates the organization

pursuant to a decision of the Assembly, to deal with human rights issues which are no longer regarded as matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States, in Member States.  

The organization thus forms the basis of collective security mechanism in the Eastern Africa. The Constitutive Act also provided for the establishment of the APSA in which a rapid reaction force under the African Standby Force (ASF) was envisaged. The ASF has five subregional brigades in which the participation of all countries in regional peace and security initiatives is expected. The Eastern Africa component of the ASF is the EASF.

While the AU provides strategy, guidance and policies for regional peace and security, RECs play a major role in the development of APSA as coordinating and facilitating instruments towards a holistic approach to peace and security in Africa. The AU also lacks the capacity to provide centralized guidance and authority and has therefore delegated some of its decision-making to SROs which are conversant with the local realities and are able to carry out policies based on the related comparative advantages.

The relationship between the AU and the RECs has a legal basis in the Protocol on Relations between the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities signed between the AU and eight RECs in 2008. Article 6 of this protocol specifically refers to collaborative efforts to ensure “the full operationalization and effective functioning of the APSA”.

The AU therefore through its PSC has the responsibility of monitoring and intervening in conflict on the continent and also mandates and oversees an African force capable of rapid

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126 APSA is the collective term for the key AU mechanisms for promoting peace, security and stability in the African Union. The APSA pillars are mentioned in Article 2 of the 2002 Protocol establishing the African Union’s Peace and Security Council (PSC). They include the PSC, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Stand-by Force (ASF), a Panel of the Wise (PoW), and the AU Peace Fund (APF).
128 See the Protocol on Relations between the African Economic Community and the Regional Economic Communities, 1998.
129 Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in the area of peace and security between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades. June 2008.
deployment and conducted in a manner consistent with both the UN and the AU Charters and the Cairo Declaration of 1993.\textsuperscript{130} The AU protocol relating to the Establishment of the PSC Protocol and the APSA also realized the importance of RECs and Regional Mechanisms in CPMR.

\textbf{2.5.2 Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)}

IGAD was founded in 1996 to replace IGADD which had earlier been founded in 1986 to address, alongside national efforts of Member States, the recurring natural disasters that had caused severe hardship in the Eastern Africa region. Member states are Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda.\textsuperscript{131}

IGAD’s mandate goes beyond the promotion of greater regional political and economic cooperation. It is also aimed at promoting peace and security in the region by seeking to “create mechanisms for the CPMR of inter and intra-State conflicts through dialogue; facilitate repatriation and reintegration of refugees, returnees and displaced persons and demobilized soldiers” and member states to deal with disputes “within the sub regional mechanism before they are referred to other regional or international organizations”.\textsuperscript{132} For IGAD, threats to regional security therefore comprises of developmental, environmental and economic issues.\textsuperscript{133}

The key organs of IGAD are the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, and the Committee of Ambassadors. Other organs are the IGAD Member States’ Speakers of Parliament, the Civil Society Forum, and Partners Forum (IPF).

\textsuperscript{132} See article 7, 8 and 13 of the Agreement establishing IGAD on its aims and objectives.
In 2000, IGAD established sub regional mechanisms for CPMR of inter-state and intra-state conflicts.\(^{134}\) Member states adopted the protocol on the “Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism” (CEWARN) \(^{135}\) to assist in conflict prevention through information gathering and early responses to any detected problem. IGAD develops capacity in the management of arms proliferation through the Regional Center for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA). The IGAD Capacity Building Program against Terrorism (ICPAT) is a counter-terrorism initiative supported by IGAD partners.\(^{136}\)

IGAD has prioritized the establishment of a Mediation Support Unit\(^{137}\). IGAD’s considerable experience in mediating conflicts has largely contributed in the Sudan and Somalia peace processes.\(^{138}\) IGAD had also proposed deployment of a Peace Support force in Somalia (IGASOM) in 2102 but it failed to materialize because of lack of consensus among the member states. Having signed a Protocol on Relations between the AEC and REC\(s\) on 25 February 1998, IGAD also collaborates with COMESA and the EAC to avoid project duplication.

IGAD has also contributed in conflict prevention by initiating and promoting programmes and projects geared towards food and environmental security. IGAD recognizes the need to meet the basic needs of the society as a way of ensuring that peace and security prevail.

Although IGAD has done fairly well in contributing towards regional peace and security, it has faced certain challenges. Lack of resources occasioned by factors like non-remittance of

\(^{134}\) See art. 3.2 in the “Khartoum Declaration” of the 8th Summit of Heads of State and Government, 23 November 2000, at www.igad.org/library/docs/8th_summit_declaration_khartoum.pdf.


\(^{137}\) African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) 2010 Assessment Study. P.54

members’ annual contributions has subjected the organization to depend on external support, for which purpose an “IGAD Partners Forum” has been established. IGAD also lacks the institutional and political authority attributed to widespread inter and intrastate conflicts, deep political divisions and the absence of hegemony among IGAD countries. There is also a fundamental absence of economic prosperity and good governance in its member states. Hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea are still there; and the possibility of having a lead nation is bleak as the two possible countries for this role: Ethiopia and Kenya, each are prominent in different dimensions of power and none of them is strong enough for domination.

Multiple memberships by IGAD Member States in other RECs have hampered the effective coordination of activities and create duplication of resources. Conflict management efforts in Eastern Africa have also often occurred bilaterally or through external actors, instead of IGAD and EAC. IGAD does not have the capacity to respond militarily to conflict situations and its mandate limits it from intervening in internal conflicts of member countries.

Despite these challenges, IGAD has played an important role in the area of peace and security more so in the conflicts in Sudan and Somalia leading to its recognition in the AU peace and security framework and by the international community. However, the success of IGAD has been hampered by the rivalry between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Sudan and South Sudan and the conflict in Somalia. IGAD is yet to streamline its mandate and structures to reflect the current APSA.

139 See the interview with the IPF chairman, Guido La Tella, in IGAD News, no. 3-4 (July-August/September-October 2002), pp. 6-7.
2.5.3 International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)

The ICGLR is an inter-governmental organization of the countries in the Great Lakes region. The formation of the organization was motivated by concern by the UNSC, through its resolutions 1291 and 1304, for the long and deadly conflicts that were going on in the Great Lakes Region, and by the spillover effect of conflicts in the region.

The main objective of ICGLR as a regional mechanism is to transform the Great Lakes region into a place of sustainable peace and security, stability, democracy and development through the coordinated efforts of the member countries. The organization also values the importance of working together with other stakeholders in particular the Group of Friends and Special Envoys and the AU for financial, diplomatic, technical and political support.

The legal framework of the ICGLR and its agenda is guided by the ICGLR Pact. The Pact which contains many protocols, action programmes and projects geared towards the ICGLR objective came into effect in 2008, after ratification by 8 of the 11 Member States’ Parliaments. The Pact places special emphasis on non-aggression and mutual defence in the ICGLR region. The headquarters is based in Bujumbura and the functions of the Secretariat involve coordination, facilitation, monitoring and thus the implementation of the Pact in order to attain peace, security, political stability and development in the GLR. The four pillars of the ICGLR are peace and security, good governance, economic development and humanitarian issues.

The ICGLR experts and authorities meet regularly to fast track implementation of its projects and protocols. The Regional Inter-Ministerial Committee (RIMC) which is the

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144Member countries include Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, DR Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia.

146Church, W and Jowell, M “Conflict Circuit Breakers in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, the ICGLR”, *African Security Review*, 16 (1), 2007, p3
Executive board of the ICGLR is in charge of assessing the progress made. There are also National Coordination Mechanisms (NCM) with representatives from civil society, women and youth, to ensure follow up and implementation of decisions made by the Summit and the RIMC.

ICGLR has been involved in many activities aimed at conflict prevention such as Joint security management of common borders which involves projects related to disarmament and repatriation of Armed Groups in Eastern Congo, development of border zones and promotion of human security and demining of the GLR. ICGLR also has a programme on inter-state cooperation on peace and security through projects that deal with the fight against the proliferation of SALW and against Transnational Crime and Terrorism.\textsuperscript{147} Under the Protocol on the Fight against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, ICGLR has developed The Regional Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources (RINR) which aims at cutting the link between armed conflicts and revenues from natural resources. This is done within the framework of the ICGLR Regional Certification Mechanism. A certification manual to this effect has been developed and approved by the eleven Heads of State.\textsuperscript{148}

As a new and long term initiative, ICGLR must seek to adjust structures that cause conflicts in the Eastern region and collaborate with other regional security initiatives towards achieving this objective.

\textbf{2.5.4 The East African Community (EAC)}

The EAC comprises of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi and its headquarters are in Arusha, Tanzania. Initially comprising of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, EAC was originally established in 1967 to promote regional economic integration, but collapsed in

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid
\textsuperscript{148} The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR): \textbf{Congo Gold} : A Southern Africa Resource watch project.
1977 due to political and ideological differences among its member states.\textsuperscript{149} The Community was re-established by the EAC Treaty in 1999 and entered into force in 2000 following its ratification by Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. Rwanda and Burundi became members of the EAC in 2007.

The main organs of the EAC are the Summit of Heads of State, the Council of Ministers, fourteen ministerial-level Sectoral councils, the Co-ordination Committee, the East African Court of Justice, the East African Legislative Assembly, and the Secretariat.\textsuperscript{150}

The primary focus of the EAC is regional economic integration. EAC however recognizes the importance of regional security in fulfilling its mandate.\textsuperscript{151} Articles 124 and 125 of the EAC Treaty deal with defense and security respectively. While defence largely refers to military matters, security broadly refers to matters such as the police reforms, education and infrastructure. Chapter 5 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC provides that peace, security and good neighborliness in the region shall be among the fundamental objectives of the Community. Areas of collaboration in security and defense among member states include the fight against SALW proliferation, cooperation among partner state police forces aimed at stemming cross border criminal activities. These activities are restricted to joint exercises and collaboration between member states. The EAC has no authority over national troops.\textsuperscript{152}


\textsuperscript{150} For the functions of EAC organs see African Union Handbook 2014: A Guide for those working with and within the African Union. P.127.


The EAC has cooperated with ECOWAS, IGAD and AU which operate various types and levels of early warning mechanisms in the establishing its own Early Warning Mechanism (EWM) considered as one of the most important pillars of conflict and crisis prevention. The EAC also put up the Nyerere Centre for Peace Research in Tanzania, to provide informed policy options, training and research to the EAC in the field of peace and security as well as promote peace and security as the main requisites of integration and development in the region.

The EAC just like IGAD gets funds from a partnership fund from which partners fund specific projects. The organization however funds for its daily running from the member states.

Some of the challenges facing the EAC include lack of resources and adequate personnel, slow enforcement of agreements made at EAC meetings at the national level and the difficult for EAC to act on military security matters within member states since the community has no authority over national troops. In addition, Tanzania seems to be reserved concerning the envisaged political federation of East African countries.

Despite these challenges, the security activities of EAC which fall under the broader definition of security complement those of other security mechanisms like the EASF, whose activities may be largely militaristic.

2.5.5 The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)

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153 C.A. Mumma-Martinson, Op cit, p.19
155 Ibid, p.1
COMESA is a regional integration grouping of twenty African sovereign states\textsuperscript{156} who have agreed to promote regional integration through trade development and to develop their natural and human resources for the mutual benefit of all their peoples.\textsuperscript{157}

COMESA was established in 1993 by the COMESA treaty to replace the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA). Other regional organizations operating within the region covered by COMESA include the EAC, IGAD, Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

The main organs of COMESA are Authority of the Heads of State and Government, Council of Ministers, Inter governmental and technical committees and the secretariat which has nine divisions, gender and resource mobilization units among them.

In Article 3 of the COMESA Treaty, one of the objectives of COMESA is to cooperate in the promotion of peace, security and stability among its member states. The COMESA peace and security agenda came up following the growing concern over the widespread and persistent armed conflicts occurring in Member States, especially in the GLR and in the Horn of Africa, and the devastating impact of these conflicts on the COMESA agenda.\textsuperscript{158}

A structure for dealing with preventive diplomacy was established in 2000 and it was built on existing national and regional capacity to avoid competition and duplication between COMESA and other organizations. So far, a comprehensive framework for dealing with piracy and money

\textsuperscript{156} COMESA member states are: Angola, Burundi, the Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, the Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.


\textsuperscript{158} Elizabeth, M. COMESA and the Programme on Peace and Security, National Defense College, 2012, p.84
laundering in the region has been established.\(^{159}\) COMESA has proposed a number of principles like the non-aggression agreement and the peaceful resolution of disputes among member states.

COMESA, working together with IGAD and EAC and funded by the European Union has developed a CPMR strategy for the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) region to fight against War Economy with the aim of de-linking the illegal exploitation of natural resources from propagation of conflicts or relapse to conflict. COMESA encourages Member states to enhance democracy, good governance and the rule of law through implementing Article 6h of the COMESA Treaty. COMESA also bridges the gap between SADC, EAC, IGAD and the Maghreb Union in implementation of peace and security agenda and has provided mediation in many conflicts in its region like in Burundi.

Some COMESA institutions seem to reflect the AU APSA. In 2009, an early warning system was established in line with the CEWS of the AU. Although not fully developed, the COMESA Conflict Early Warning System (COMWARN) endeavors to prevent conflict through preventive diplomacy. Civil Society Organizations and the Private Sector Organizations are also engaged to strengthen COMESA policies at national and regional levels so as to enhance good governance, and offer a good opportunity to actualize multi-track diplomacy. The COMESA Inter-parliamentary Forum ensures the implementation of international instruments and peace agreements while the Committee of Elders that are to work as Peace envoys. These programmes contribute to enhanced regional peace and security and the implementation of APSA.\(^{160}\)

COMESA works in line with the AU Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development policy that was adopted in Banjul in 2006 to ensure that transition from conflict to peace is well coordinated, multidimensional and integrated. COMESA has also been working with DFID and

\(^{159}\) Ibid, p.85  
\(^{160}\) Ibid, p.78
USAID on a project called ‘Trading for Peace’ whose overall objective is to strengthen peace and security through fair and equitable trade. Ten trade information desks have been established at various border posts of the Great Lakes Region to provide small scale cross-border traders with information on pricing, taxes and markets.

Although COMESA has a comprehensive gender policy and a gender unit, it lacks the requisite resources for effective implementation of the gender policy in member states. Just like other RECs, its secretariat and member states have a weak human and institutional capacity base. There is also a weak resource mobilization and utilization capacity as evidenced in member states’ arrears, heavy reliance on donor support and poor coordination of resources.

2.6 The Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF)

2.6.1 The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

Since its inauguration in 2002, the AU has embarked on an elaborate normative and institutional transformation. Article 4(h) and (j) of the AU Constitutive Act empowers member states to intervene in situations involving crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide. The AU further adopted the Protocol relating to the establishment of the PSC, which embraces an expanded and comprehensive agenda for peace and security through the APSA. APSA includes conflict prevention, early warning and preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peace building, promotion of democratic practices, intervention, humanitarian action and disaster management.

The APSA structures includes the AU PSC which is ‘the nerve centre ‘of the APSA and to serve as a standing decision making Organ of the AU. Other institutions of APSA that support

the work of the PSC are the AU Commission, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the ASF and a Special Fund/Peace fund. The AU PSC Protocol underscores the importance of interdependence and synergy between and among the pillars. Articles 8 and 16 of the PSC protocol provide for the Military Staff Committee and Regional Mechanisms for CPMR as additional components of the APSA, hence the importance of having functional RECs/RMs. The success of the APSA therefore largely depends on a synergistic linkage between the APSA structures at one level, and the AU and the RECs/RMs at another.

While early warning information provided to the Chairperson of the Commission through the CEWS would provide the PSC with an opportunity of taking preventive, the Panel of the Wise could be deployed to support efforts of the PSC and also plays an advisory and peacemaking role. But in situations of grave magnitude as envisaged in the AU Constitutive Act, intervention may be needed. The African Standby Force to deal with such eventualities would be of necessity.
2.6.2 The African Standby Force (ASF)

The idea of a ‘Pan-African army’ traces its origin to the proposal to establish a ‘common defence system with an African high command’ brought forth by Kwame Nkrumah in the 1960s. The objective was to defend the continent against any threats to security and to engage the force in the liberation of countries that were still under the colonial rule. However, with the structural weaknesses of the OAU and of member states, the concept was not realized.

Article 13 of the Protocol establishing the AU PSC envisaged the establishment of an ASF to be deployed for peace support mission under the authority of the AU PSC and of the AU Assembly. This involves intervention in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a Member State in order to restore peace and security, prevention of a dispute or conflict from escalating, observation and monitoring missions, peace-building and humanitarian assistance and any other functions mandated by the AU PSC and the AU Assembly. Article 13(1) of the Protocol also provides for the ASF to be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents constituting of civilian, police and military components in their countries of origin, ready for rapid deployment. The ASF concept is based on three levels: continental where the AU Commission is involved; regional with reference to RECs or Regional Mechanisms and national referring to the contribution of individual member states in terms of resources and training in a way that allows for interoperability.

Regionally, the ASF constitutes five regional standby forces composed of multidisciplinary contingents on standby in their country of origin and with formation differing...
across regions\textsuperscript{165}, including full-time Planning Element (PLANELM), Logistics Depot (LD), Brigade Headquarters and Pledged Brigade Units. The five regional forces are the East African Standby Force (EASF), the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Standby Force (FOMAC), the North African Regional Capability (NARC) Standby Force (NASBRIG) and the SADC Standby Force (SSF).\textsuperscript{166} These forces are raised and maintained by the five RECs/RMs respectively: EASFCOM, ECOWAS, ECCAS, NARC and SADC. This structural organization implies that the authority over use and deployment of the ASF lies with the AU and RECs/RMs.

The ASF Policy Framework required that each REC/RM would have prepared by 2010, a multidimensional force of about 5,000 personnel. Where binding legal frameworks lack between the AU, RECs/RMs and their member states as is the case in ASF arrangement, force generation may be challenging since forces are to be pledged by states ahead of the decision to deploy.\textsuperscript{167}

In the PSC Protocol, the ASF is to be prepared for rapid deployment for a range of modern peacekeeping operations so as to respond to a range of conflict scenarios.\textsuperscript{168}

2.6.3 The Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF)

The EASF is the sub-regional standby force of the ASF for Eastern Africa Region whose objective is to undertake in a timely manner, the functions of maintaining peace and security as mandated by the AU PSC and in accordance with the Constitutive Act of the AU.\textsuperscript{169}


\textsuperscript{168} Article 13 of the Protocol establishing the AU PSC.
EASF is a multidimensional force consisting of the military, the police and the civilian components. During the establishment of EASF (earlier referred to as EASBRIG), none of the existing RECs encompassed all the 13 member states of the EAR nor had a directly mandated security role\textsuperscript{170}. Due to IGAD’s recognition by the AU and the international community in the area of peace and security in the region and its inclusion of majority of states of the region\textsuperscript{171}, the organization was tasked to serve as the interim coordinator of efforts towards the establishment of the EASBRIG. Subsequently, under the auspices of IGAD, the Jinja meeting of Experts on the establishment of the EASBRIG was held in February 2004, followed by a meeting of Eastern African Chiefs of Defence Staff (EACDS) that adopted the Draft Policy Framework for the establishment of EASBRIG. The policy framework was approved and a MoU to that effect signed in April 2005 at the 1st Ordinary Summit of the EASBRIG. In the MoU, EASBRIG’s organs were to consist of the Assembly of Eastern Africa Heads of State and Government, the Eastern Africa Council of Ministers of Defense and Security, the Eastern Africa Committee of Chiefs of Defense Staff, the planning element, the brigade headquarters, and the logistics base.\textsuperscript{172} Signatories to the memorandum were the Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, the Seychelles, and Madagascar. By 2011 14 states were technically participating: Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, the Seychelles, Madagascar, Tanzania, Mauritius, and Burundi.\textsuperscript{173}

\textsuperscript{171} IGAD consists of seven Eastern Africa troop contributing countries.
Protests by non-IGAD states in the EAR over alleged monopoly by some IGAD states and IGAD’s lack of the necessary command and control structures required to give technical and political coordination led to the formation of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM), established in 2007 as an independent and all-inclusive coordinating mechanism to take over the coordinating mandate of EASBRIG from IGAD.

The term ‘brigade’ was changed to ‘force’ during the 2010 Council of Ministers meeting to show existence of multi dimensionality. Thus EASBRIG was changed to EASF implying that the newly renamed force would incorporate the military, police and civilian components. EASBRICOM was also changed to the Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM).

Today EASF has ten active members: the Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Burundi. Madagascar, Tanzania, Mauritius have since joined the SSF. Eritrea is not a participant and The Republic of South Sudan has the status of observer in the organization since April 2013.

The legal framework under which the EASF operates has been a memorandum of understanding (M.O.U) signed by all Members States and the EASBRICOM at the Summit level. The ten members signed an agreement on the establishment of the EASF in December 2014.

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2.6.4 The Aim of the EASF

The objective of the EASF is to carry out the functions of peace and security in a timely manner and in accordance with the constitutive act of the AU. To attain this objective, EASF aspires to enhance regional and continental peace through an effective and efficient regional CPMR capability in Eastern Africa and across the African continent. EASF has thus been working on its mission of developing a fully operational and multidimensional integrated force ready for deployment by 2015. The Strategic Development Plan 2010-2015 was approved during the 2nd Ordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government held in Comoros, in March 2010.

2.6.5 EASF Organs

The M.o.U on the establishment of the EASBRIG provided for three policy organs structured at three levels to manage the affairs of the EASF towards the realization of the organization’s mission and vision. These are the Assembly of Eastern Africa Heads of State and Government, the Eastern Africa Council of Ministers of Defence and Security, and the Eastern Africa Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff (EACDS).

The Assembly is the supreme authority of EASF and formulates policy, directs and controls the functioning of the EASF. It also authorizes the deployment of the EASF in accordance with the AU Constitutive Act and the PSC Protocol.

The Council of Ministers of Defence and Security of the EASF Member States manages EASF affairs, appoints Director and Heads of Department of the EASFCOM, the heads of EASF Structures and the EASF Commander upon recommendation of the EACDS for stand-alone missions within the EAR. The Council of Ministers is signatory to the MoU.

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179 Article 3 of the M.o.U on the establishment of the EASF
181 Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the M.O.U on the establishment of the EASF.
The EACDS is also a signatory to the MoU and provides advice on military matters to the Council of Ministers and the Assembly. It also oversees, directs and manages the planning Element (PLANELM) of the EASF, the Standby Brigade Headquarters, and the Logistics Base on all matters and oversees and directs the EASFCOM on technical matters.  

2.6.6 EASF Structures

EASF consists of four command and control structures: the EASFCOM, the Planning Element (PLANELM), the Brigade Headquarters and the Logistics Base.

2.6.6.1 Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM)

EASFCOM serves as the Secretariat for all EASF policy organs, structures and activities. It coordinates EASF activities in consultation with relevant authorities of Member States and the AU. The Director and Heads of Departments of EASFCOM are appointed by the Council of Ministers of Defence and Security. Its mandate includes implementation of EASF policies, development and review of EASF policy documents for approval by the Council of Ministers, mobilization of resources in collaboration with key stakeholders, management of the EASF Fund, dissemination of information and public relation activities and liaison with AU, RECs and other organizations on matters relating to EASF. It is located in Nairobi, Kenya.

2.6.6.2 The Planning Element (PLANELM)

Also located in Nairobi, Kenya, the PLANELM is the full time planning headquarters for EASF and it is multi-national and multidimensional. The main function of the PLANELM is to establish a multidimensional force which is capable of planning and preparing for complex PSO

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in different operational theatres as provided under the six scenarios in the Policy Framework for the Establishment of the ASF.\textsuperscript{183} The PLANELM also ensures that that all the multidimensional elements of the Force are on standby in their respective countries for these operations.

The PLANELM constitutes of a military, police and civilian component, with personnel seconded by Member States. Each component has its head. The Joint Chief of Staff coordinates all the three components. The Military component is responsible for force preparation and pre-deployment planning of the EASF. The police component is charged with developing a police component for EASF PSO while the civilian component undertakes substantive and supportive civilian functions in a PSO mission including but not limited to political affairs, planning and coordination, legal advice, public information, human rights and child protection.

\textbf{2.6.6.3 Eastern Africa Standby Brigade Headquarters (EASBRIG HQ)}

Located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, EASBRIG HQ serves as the command headquarters for preparation and operational command of the military arm of the multidimensional force, that is, the Standby Brigade. It is composed of military and civilian staff seconded by the EASF Member States. EASBRIG HQ works in close collaboration with the PLANELM to prepare the mission Brigade Headquarter structure and plans. The deployment of the EASF is either mandated by the Assembly of EASF or the AU. If the AU mandates the deployment, the PSC of the AU is responsible for the appointment of the commander of the HQ. In the case of deployment, the operational control of the Brigade will be under the AU or UN. Each member state seconds officers to the EASBRIG HQ for a period of two years.\textsuperscript{184}

\textsuperscript{184} Ibid
2.6.6.4 The Logistics Base (LOGBASE)

The EASF Logistics Base is located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It is the central regional base for sub-depots and for maintaining, storing and managing the logistical infrastructure of the EASF. Personnel, material and other resources are sent or dispatched to the LogBase to be maintained and supplied for training and operations of the Force. The Log Base coordinates all activities involving logistics of EASF, and if necessary, the base may perform under the mandate and direct control of the AU.

2.7 EASF Mission Scenarios and Timelines

Article 13 of the PSC Protocol envisaged the ASF as a mechanism to be used for rapid deployment in the various modern day peacekeeping operations and in accordance with Article 4(h) and 4(j) of the Constitutive Act. Consequently, Paragraph 15 of the ASF Policy Framework for the establishment of the ASF and the Military Staff Committee identified six mission and deployment scenarios that the ASF was likely to encounter and respond to. The ASF was expected to meet full operation capability (F.O.C) in these six scenarios by 2010.

The EASF being one of the ASF standby forces and drawing its mandate from the AU constitutive Act has identical mission scenarios as those of the ASF.

Scenario 1 calls for an AU/regional military advice to a political mission with a deployment time frame of 30 days. The EASF would provide military advice to a political mission, as it happened in Côte d'Ivoire. Possible solutions to the conflict would be recommended to avert the likelihood of Force deployment.

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185 See the Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and Military Staff Committee, adopted by the African Chiefs of Defence and Staff at their third meeting held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 14 May 2003 (EXP/ASFMSC/2(1).
In Scenario 2, the EASF would provide a regional observer mission to be co-deployed with a UN mission within 30 days. This is similar to the United Nations - African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and the OAU/AU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (OLMEE)\textsuperscript{187} or the Verification Monitoring Team (VMT) in the Sudan.\textsuperscript{188} Missions typical to these scenarios are those in which the conflict has escalated and a ceasefire agreement has been reached upon.

In scenario 3 missions, a stand-alone AU or regional observer mission is proffered within a time frame of 30 days. EASF would therefore be deployed independently such as the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB).

Scenario 4 entails an AU or regional peacekeeping force for preventive deployment missions, as envisaged in Chapter VI of the U.N Charter, within 30 days. An example is the ECOMOG intervening force in Liberia in the 1990s. The existing relative peace is monitored to ensure that active conflict does not take place or a relapse to active war does not ensue.

Scenario 5 entails an AU Peacekeeping Force for complex multidimensional mission sometimes with low level spoilers (a feature of many current conflicts). It is typical to the peace enforcement operations as envisaged in Chapter VII of the U.N Charter. A more robust mandate, troops, equipment, funds and logistics are required for this kind of mission. Deployment should be done within 90 days with the military component deploying within 30 days.

Scenario 6 involves AU intervention upon clearance by the AU PSC, in grave situations where the international community does not act promptly. Due to the nature of situations demanding intervention, deployment should be done within 14 days with a robust military force.


The most challenging scenarios for the ASF/EASF are scenarios 4, 5 and 6. This is obviously related to the fact that the ASF and its sub-regional forces are constrained in terms of operational and resource capabilities. The operational mandate of these missions also lies with the UN and the AU. As a result the EASF is obliged to work under the AU and UN, and with other partners/donors.

In addition, new and frequent threats in the sphere of security such as terrorism and piracy are now common in the Eastern Africa region. Questions have been asked regarding the place of such threats in the above discussed six mission scenarios that are to be used for ASF deployment.\textsuperscript{189} A review of these scenarios would therefore be imperative.

The short deployment timeframes, especially in scenario 6 shows that the key attribute of the ASF and its sub-regional forces would be its speed of action and deployment. Development of the Rapid Deployment Capability of the ASF/EASF is therefore of utmost importance.

2.8 Conclusion

Having discussed the EASF’s structures and design vis a vis the environment under which the new security mechanism is supposed to operate in, the next chapter looks at the performance of the EASF, which has now been in existence for more than ten years, in the Eastern Africa region and beyond.

\begin{flushright}
\textbf{CHAPTER THREE}
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PERFORMANCE OF THE EASTERN AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE FROM 2004 TO DATE IN VARIOUS PARTS OF AFRICA

3.1 Introduction

This chapter set out to identify and assess the performance of the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) to date in various parts of Africa. The chapter starts by conceptualizing Peace Support Operations, performance thereof and its measurements. The chapter then delves into providing an overview of pre-EASF Peace Support Operations taking case studies of United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in Somalia and United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR). Further, an overview of EASF Peace Support Operations (2004 to date) is provided, culminating into a comparative analysis, then the chapter conclusion.

3.2 The Concept of Peace Support Operations

Three central ideologies have since the inauguration of United Nations Peacekeeping missions directed the operations of all missions: consensus of the parties to the presence of peacekeepers, neutrality in execution of the peacekeeping command, as well as a regulated use of force.190 Whereas the latter principle was for a while restricted to self-defense, the same has since progressed to incorporate defense of civilian non-combatants and in the enforcement of the mandate. As such, modern day missions involve more than just keeping the peace, to include peacemaking, conflict prevention, peace enforcement, mediation and peace building activities.191

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The UN Charter is has the supreme authority over the conduct of all Peace Support Operations (PSO) globally. The first article in the charter states the purpose of the UN thus: “To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace”.

In fulfilling this responsibility, Chapter VI of the UN Charter provides for the pacific settlement of disputes by a variety of peaceful measures, which include: negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement. Chapter VII of the charter on the other hand, is essentially coercive and designed to deal with threats to peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression perpetrated by sovereign states.

### 3.3 Peace Support Operations Performance and its Measurements

Kruys\textsuperscript{194} conceptualized the term “peace operation readiness” in terms of three variables, namely Individuals’ Mental Readiness, Unit Readiness, and Actual Performance in peace operation readiness. Brainin\textsuperscript{195} et al give a more comprehensive description when they define readiness as the level of preparedness for performing one’s combat mission. In refining the

concept “peace operation readiness” McClure and Broughton\(^{196}\) defined the concept as the state of preparedness of a unit to perform its assigned role.

Thomas and O’Hara\(^{197}\), on the other hand, define peace operation readiness as the measure of a force conducting peace operations successfully against a hostile force. Hooker\(^{198}\) states that general leadership, operational and tactical planning and execution, logistics, intelligence and a host of other factors are critical for peace operation readiness performance. Alternatively, Chukunov\(^{199}\) refers to peace operation readiness as a grocery list for war with quantifiable items that can be tallied, bought and paid for. However, he concludes that Vietnam has proved that such a shopkeeper approach to readiness is inadequate.

Article 13 of the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU)\(^{200}\), signed in 2002, directs the following functions to EASF: observation and monitoring missions; other types of peace support missions; intervention in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a Member State in order to restore peace and security, in accordance with Article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act\(^{201}\); preventive deployment in order to prevent a dispute or a conflict from escalating, an ongoing violent conflict from spreading to neighboring areas or States, and the resurgence of violence after parties to a conflict have reached an agreement.; peace-building, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilization; humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian


\(^{201}\)Ibid
population in conflict areas and support efforts to address major natural disasters; and any other functions as may be mandated by the Peace and Security Council or the Assembly. Against this backdrop, the present study proposes that peace support operations readiness for EASF is measured by resources such as soldiers and other personnel, leaders, equipment and ammunition.

3.4 An Overview of Pre-EASF Peace Support Operations in Eastern Africa

This section provides a detailed overview of Peace Support Operations across the Eastern African region, prior to the formation and operationalization of the EASF. In this regard, two similar peace support operations by the UN organization, but in different theatres are hereby reviewed. These are UNITAF and UNOSOM I and II, and UNAMIR.

3.4.1 Case Study I: UNITAF, UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II in Somalia

Following the assassination of the then Somalia president Abdi Rashid Ali Shermarke in 1969, the army led by its commander Mohamed Siad Barre seized power in a bloodless coup d’état, after which all democratic institutions were dissolved. Despite the undemocratic nature of his regime, Barre’s leadership remained popular for some time, not least because of his espousal of an ideal Greater Somalia that would incorporate the province of Ogaden, then a province within Ethiopia. Barre believed that a weakened Ethiopia would not be able to mount a successful defence of Ogaden and in 1977 he waged war with the intention of annexing the

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province. However, when Ethiopia was reinforced by the USSR and Cuba, the Somali army lost ground and was eventually defeated.

With the ousting of Barre, the ensuing power vacuum, and the absence of any national military to enforce law and order, rebel leaders fought among themselves in a lengthy and bloodthirsty struggle for political power and control of resources. By the end of 1991, the resulting human suffering left over 20,000 people killed or injured. Within two years, it is believed that somewhere between 300,000 and 500,000 people perished, either as a result of the civil war or as a direct result of the famine, with another 3 million affected in other ways. The ensuing broadcast images of suffering Somalis shocked the Western world and pressured governments and the UN to step up efforts to tackle the humanitarian crisis.

The warring factions agreed to a ceasefire on 3rd March 1992. Consequently, the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) was established under the provisions of UNSC Resolution 751 on 24th April 1992 to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu, to provide security for UN personnel and supplies, and to escort humanitarian supplies to distribution centers. However, UNOSOM’s humanitarian effort progressed slowly because member states were reluctant to commit troops to the project. This was because “fighting and looting by various factions seeking to control ports and distribution routes (had become) an important factor in the political economy of the militia”. With little regard for the starving population, the militias even stole humanitarian relief supplies lie food. UN Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali, reported on

28th August that the main challenge was not the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies, but the protection of convoys transporting these supplies to warehouses and distribution centers.

To counteract the action of the militias, UNSC Resolution 775 immediately authorized an additional 3,000 security troops for UNOSOM.\(^{208}\) Under the terms of this new resolution, the newly consolidated 4,219-strong UNOSOM was mandated to provide humanitarian relief, to monitor the ceasefire, to provide security, to carry out demobilization and disarmament, and to assist in national reconciliation. However, even with the additional troops, UNOSOM was ineffectual against strong and determined militia groups who considered plunder and robbery as being necessary for survival. In these circumstances, the UNOSOM mission floundered and, with the broadcasting of graphic images of starvation and death among Somali civilians, the Bush administration was pressured into ordering Operation Provide Relief in August 1992.\(^{209}\)

Under this terms of this order, US military air transports and some 400 personnel were deployed with the intention of airlifting humanitarian aid to remote parts of Somalia, thereby reducing the reliance on trucks to ferry the relief overland and denying the militia groups any opportunity of looting aid. During the six months of Operation Provide Relief, more than 48,000 tons of critically needed relief supplies were airlifted into Somalia.\(^{210}\) However, in spite of this apparent success in aid delivery, the security situation in Somalia and most notably in the city of Mogadishu, deteriorated worse and it was all too apparent that the aid delivery strategy was unsustainable and was contributing little to the peace effort. On 29th November 1992, Boutros-Ghali outlined five options to the UN.\(^{211}\)

\(^{208}\) Supra note 17


The first was to continue to deploy UNOSOM under the established principles of consensual, non-forceful UN peacekeeping, but then given the scale of the humanitarian crisis, this was clearly inadequate. The second option was to abandon UNOSOM mission and withdraw the force, but an admission of failure of this magnitude could not be contemplated and would be unlikely to find support. The remaining three options involved the use of force. UNOSOM could assume a more aggressive stance, particularly in Mogadishu, in the hope of convincing lawless elements to stop abusing international relief efforts. Alternatively, although deemed to be logistically impractical, the UN could launch a countrywide enforcement operation under its own command and control, and finally, and more realistically, the UNSC could authorize a group of member states to carry out such an operation.\textsuperscript{212}

The latter option was preferred and, when the US informed Boutros-Ghali that it would be prepared to take the lead in organizing a UN-sanctioned forceful mission to establish a secure environment for humanitarian operations in Somalia, Boutros-Ghali agreed but insisted that the mission should be precisely defined and limited in time in order to prepare the way for a return to peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building.\textsuperscript{213} On 3\textsuperscript{rd} December 1992, the UNSC, acting under Chapter VII, authorized the use of “all necessary means” to secure the delivery of humanitarian aid to the people of Somalia.\textsuperscript{214} This sanctioning of the use of force for the first time in Somalia grew out of a conviction that UNOSOM’s existing mandate was inadequate for the challenge of alleviating mass starvation in an environment of total anarchy.\textsuperscript{215}

UNSC Resolution 794 required a new response and promised joint, determined, and innovative action by the UN in alleviating the hardship of an entire nation. The Unified Task

\textsuperscript{213}Ibid
\textsuperscript{214}Supra note 17
\textsuperscript{215}Supra note 22
Force (UNITAF) headed by and under the command of the US, was established in order to “feed the starving, protect the defenseless and prepare the way for political, economic and social reconstruction”. The mission was intended to be short and was to pave the way for “the unique UN peace making military administration” UNOSOM II, which would replace both UNITAF and UNOSOM. Although the deployment of UNITAF significantly altered the terms and raised the stake of American involvement in the Somalia at this time, it is difficult to form any reliable assessment of its success or otherwise. However, there was effective and efficient delivery of aid to save lives.

In spite of UNOSOM II’s Chapter VII mandate and its troop strength of 20,000, “there was a widespread Somali perception that the UN-led forces would be weaker than those of UNITAF”. This perception emboldened some Somali factions in Mogadishu, in particular the National Somali administration. However, in submitting recommendations on 3rd March 1993 for effecting the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, the Secretary-General noted that, despite UNITAF, a secure environment in Somalia was not yet established and it still had no effective functioning government or local security/police force.

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218 Ibid
219 Supra note 20
3.4.2 Case Study II: UNAMIR in Rwanda

The endemic Rwandan conflict before the genocide had both immediate and remote causes, which were inextricably intertwined. Ethnicity and historical factors shaped the ethnic conflict and hostilities that the country was experiencing. The upsurge of violence that accompanied the death of the Rwandan President had roots in the history of Rwanda (and Burundi) and the ethnic relationship between the Hutu and Tutsi. The crisis in Rwanda reflects a history of social relations between two ethnically “mobilized” groups, with circles of victimization and reprisals for decades, kept alive in the collective memory to prompt confrontation in episodic instalments. A brief historical review of these hostilities shows that series of ethnic massacres have taken place to consolidate the emergence of a class society with the Hutu who are the majority as servant and a Tutsi minority aristocracy.

By the time Rwanda obtained independence in July 1962 ethnic identity had become the main source of the political division. The Hutu in power led several ethnic cleansing in Rwanda, which resulted in persecution, massacre, mass exodus and exile of the minority Tutsi into Uganda, Tanzania and Zaire. Subsequently the minority Tutsi acquired increased dominance in Burundi through the military to the detriment of the majority Hutu. The Tutsi refugees and their offspring did not give up their Rwandan identity, or their right to return, to Rwanda. The exclusion of the Tutsi from public life and their elimination during periods of political tension led to an uprising in September 1990, which was crushed but not without bloodshed. The

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genocide and mass displacement of Rwanda people in 1994 is the result of the invasion of the Tutsi refugees from Ugandan who had been excluded from political power for a long time.\textsuperscript{223}

Two weeks after the invasion of North Rwanda by the RPF in October 1990, a sub-regional summit was held for the first time in Mwanza, Tanzania on 17 October 1990. Several peace conferences were initiated by neighboring countries Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi and Zaire. Each of these had large number of Rwandan refugees, so they became active in promoting a ceasefire and in arranging political settlement. The outcome was a sub-regional conference of the five heads of states which drew up the declaration of Dar-es-salaam of 1991 calling for a ceasefire and asking for dialogue between the government and the RPF.\textsuperscript{224} Both the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations supported the sub-regional effort. However, the initiative to manage the Rwandan crisis was weak since Uganda was part of the conflict and the problem of Tutsi refugees who were claiming their right to go back home was not resolved. Series of peace conferences were held but did not stop the continuous success of the RPF.\textsuperscript{225}

Complementing the effort of the neighboring countries to resolve the crisis, the OAU played a critical role in negotiating a series of agreement from N’sele (Zaire) in 1990 to Arusha in 1993. The OAU initiated a mediation process that led to the establishment of a 55 man Neutral Observer Group (NMOG) in 1991 to monitor the ceasefire. This was later expanded to 120 man observer force, but this mission was not effective due to lack of logistic (vehicles, communications assets) and the strength of the force was too small to cover more than 150km demilitarized zone (DMZ).\textsuperscript{226}

\textsuperscript{223} Adisa, J. (2003). \textit{The Conflict of Stranger, the Impact of Rwandan Refugees on Neighboring Countries}, African Book Builders Ltd, P.13
\textsuperscript{224} Ibid
\textsuperscript{225} Dickson, Y. (2004). Conflicts Resolution in Africa: Challenges for the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century.\textit{National War College} 8, Abuja, P.28
The Arusha agreement of 1993 called for a neutral international force of the UN for the implementation of the ceasefire in Rwanda, the inauguration of an enlarged transition government, military reforms, demobilization and preparation for elections. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) took over the OAU Neutral Military Observer Group in October 1993. Before the UNAMIR the UN had an observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) in Uganda to monitor the border of the two countries and prevent logistic support to RPF from Uganda.\textsuperscript{227}

The loss of ten Belgium in UNAMIR led the Belgium government to withdraw its contingent from the mission. Consequently, the UN Security Council by its infamous resolution 912 of April 1994 decided to reduce UNAMIR from 2,548 to 270 personnel. Following the downsizing of UNAMIR and the resultant offensive of the RPF, France decided unilaterally to intervene in the south in a humanitarian operation called Operation TURQUOISE.\textsuperscript{228} The aim of the TURQUOISE was to protect Hutus from massacre by the RPF whose troops were recording swift successes across the country. Since the UN did not endorse the operation, UNAMIR refused at the beginning to cooperate with the French. The OAU, the international press and the International Community of the Red Cross (ICRC) criticized the withdrawal of UN from Rwanda. In reaction the UN passed the resolution 918 of 1994 for the deployment of a Force of 5,500 to operate in Rwanda under chapter VII.\textsuperscript{229} The new force would support and ensure safe conditions for the displaced persons. The force’s main task were to ensure stability and security in the north-western and south western regions of Rwanda, stabilize and monitor the situation in all regions of Rwanda, provide security and support for humanitarian assistance operations inside

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\textsuperscript{227} Ibid
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Rwanda, and promote, through mediation and good offices, national reconciliation in Rwanda. In the prevailing situation, the need for reinforcements for UNAMIR remained urgent. Two and half months after the UNSC expanded UNAMIR’s mandate, a part from a number of military observers, fewer than 500 troops were on the ground.230

3.5 An Overview of EASF Peace Support Operations: 2004 to date

The Eastern Africa has experienced most tragic conflicts. Conflicts in the region, including interstate and intrastate conflicts, have detrimental effect on the development of strong regional standby force231,232,233. In this regard, almost all members of the region are in a constant turmoil. Currently, the new state of South Sudan is still recovering from the recent internal ethnic motivated conflicts between the Dinkas and the Nuer, the internal crisis in Darfur is still going on, Eritrea has strained relations with Ethiopia and Djibouti, factional groups fighting unconventional war continues to be witnessed inside Somalia and beyond. These conflicts continue to undermine the progress made and efforts of the Eastern Africa Security Architecture234 of which the EASF forms part.

Although EASF has was established way back in 2004, the security mechanism is relatively new in the area of Peace and security in the EAR. In fact the Full operation capability of this force, just like the other regional standby forces is this year 2015. EASF declared its F.O.C also acknowledged by member states, in November 22, 2014, for full deployment by the

230 Supra note 34
African Union for peacekeeping missions in the region, thus the force which is now waiting for the authority to be deployed EASF has played only a very limited role in the maintenance of peace and security in the region.

The EASF has experienced various interrelated challenges in its formation. But the force has made some milestones in the area of regional security.

EASF has undertaken conflict prevention activities in the region. These include military advice, observer missions and fact finding missions. The EASF is involved though to a limited extent in conflict prevention activities in Somalia and in the ongoing AMISOM operations. On the request of the AU, EASF sent a fact finding Mission to Somalia. The force also conducted a Force generation Workshop to augment the AMISOM forces in Somalia. In 2011, EASF had its personnel participate in the UN Training Needs Analysis Team for the now defunct TFG Military Forces and a team of 14 EASF officers deployed as part of the technical team that was to support AMISOM. EASF has been also incorporated as a part of United Nation Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) Military Technical Working Group Meeting in Somalia. The Force has also deployed in the past deployed a 231-strong police component to AMISOM, thus an important step in the development of the police dimension of the EASF.

237 Ibid,p.28
Besides, EASFCOM has signed MoU with the African Union Commission (AUC) to augment the capabilities of AMISOM, especially, in the areas of operational planning, logistics planning and operations, training, medical support and assistance. Based on the MoU, EASF has deployed 14 officers (including medical and logistics officers) to assist AMISOM, while it is also on the process to engage in different capability areas.

There has been important progress in the operationalization of the EASF. The independent regional coordination mechanism EASFCOM was created to replace IGAD. This was important in building confidence and ensuring a good working relationship especially among some member states who felt that some IGAD Member States were monopolizing the organization. Such murmurs would have affected greatly the operations of the EASF. It has also been proposed that EASBRICOM will be reconfigured as an Eastern African Peace and Security Secretariat (EAPSS) acting in the framework of Eastern Africa Peace and Security Mechanism (EAPSM). These developments, as well as adoption and implementation of The EASF Strategic Development Plan by Member States demonstrates that despite political tensions, there is mutual understanding among Member States who have worked together to achieve most of the strategic objectives in the plan that were important towards achieving F.O.C.

The EASF has demonstrated that it is a dynamic security management tool. Although not explicitly provided for and in view of its possible future activities in maritime security, the EASF

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240 Supra note 47

has established a Maritime Cell within the Military Planning Element.\footnote{Ibid, p.28.} This is in light of the problem of piracy and the growing importance of maritime transport. The importance of the Lamu port and the LAPSSSET project that is supposed to have a significant effect on the economies of countries in the Eastern region demands a force that is capable of countering threats to maritime security on the waters surrounding Eastern Africa.

The EASF has made relatively important strides in the development of police and civilian components in the force. Initially, the ASF and the sub-regional standby forces placed emphasis on the military components. But owing to the realities of modern peacekeeping operations that need to be multidimensional and multifunctional to address the multifaceted nature of conflicts, EASF has relatively tried to depict this requirement in its establishment. In 2011, there were 176 Civilian Personnel registered in the EASF Standby Roster and 635 police officers had also been trained.\footnote{Bouhuys, J. (2011). The Eastern Africa Standby Force. Enhancing Peace and Security in the Eastern Africa Region [Online]. Available at: http://www.vovklict.nl/intercom/2011/2/27.pdf [Accessed: 31 August 2015]. P. 28} In the EASF 2012 Exercise Njiwa there were over 100 police and civilian participants, working on the development of skills in capacity building for the rule of law institutions.\footnote{Jobson, E. 2012. Mock military operation in Ethiopia simulates all too real African Conflict. The Guardian [Online] 23 November 2012. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2012/nov/23/mock-military-ethiopia-african-conflict [Accessed 27 July 2014].} Beside the multidimensional aspect of the force, EASF, although to a limited extent, recognizes and is trying to implement the UNSC resolution 1325 on gender mainstreaming. In 2011, of the 635 trained police officers, 209 of them were female.\footnote{Bouhuys, J. (2011), op cit 55. p.28.}

EASF has made notable achievement in training its staff individually and collectively both in the EASF structures and in member countries. These training programmes have culminated in successful conduct of various command post exercises and field training exercises.

The EASF has even hosted the African Union Continental Command Post Continental exercise
in Addis Ababa Ethiopia and also conducted the Logistics MAPEX exercise in the same place in 2010. These exercises enable the force to be well prepared for peace support operations in the EAR and beyond and also a help the force towards achieving the EASF strategic objectives.247

Besides, The EASFCOM works with regional training institutions such as the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) with a view of having standardized doctrine and training that follows the UN requirement on doctrine and training for multidimensional forces, but in the case of the EASF, a training that also encompasses African realities. Three regional centres of excellence for peace keeping training in Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda offer common joint pre-deployment training to forces contributed from members contributed from member countries in view of having effective joint peace support operations.248

In August 2015, EASF among the other Standby forces has led the way by creating a special day for Peace in the region in which stakeholders come together and learn about and analyze the performance of the EASF.

EASF can be said to have achieved Full Operational Capability (F.O.C) by 2015. The organization has achieved most of the F.O.C requirement such as operational organizations, among them an established PLANELM and Brigade Headquarters, a 5200 multidimensional, multifunctional and integrated standby forces in member counties, signing of an agreement on the establishment of EASF in 2014 by Member States which is more binding than the earlier arbitrary agreement based on a memorandum of understanding. EASF Member States have also signed framework documents and memorandum of understanding in 2014 on pledged forces. EASF constantly develops military, police and civilian component training and through numerous exercises. EASF has also aligned its policies and training on those of APSA. The

247 ibid
pledged forces come are to come with their own equipment although External donors permanently express their support to the project. The Assembly of the EASF has also recognized the force’s F.O.C. The EASF has thus met almost all the benchmarks required for the F.O.C of a standby force and is only awaiting for the authority to deploy its troops from the Assembly of heads of states and the deployment mandate from the AU PSC. The EASF Headquarters is very well structured and all Members States are equally represented.249

The above discussed contributions may make EASF the first and most advanced among the five sub-regional brigades of the ASF in terms of actively involving in the prevailing AU peace support operations. Eastern Africa Standby Force, though to a very lesser degree, also contributed to peace missions operating in Sudan. EASF provided pre-deployment training for United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in collaboration with other trainers.250 AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and UNAMID also received command and control assistances from EASF.251 Besides, some trained women police officers were also deployed from EASF to United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).252

3.6 Comparative Analysis

Over the period of UNOSOM I deployment, the situation on the ground in Somalia had not changed substantially and, by the time of its departure, the problem of clan rivalries and violence had not abated. As a result, both the humanitarian crisis and the lawless, anarchic environment that is still characteristic of Somalia continued. UNOSOM I’s failure to sustain any

249See APSA Document (2010). P.42
252Supra note 52
degree of societal cohesiveness makes the situation in Somalia unique, while “Somalia’s inability to preserve a central administration over twelve years puts it in a class by itself amongst the world’s failed states”.

UNOSOM II mission eventually fell into disarray due to the fractured nature of its deployment and the lack of a clear road map for nation building. In terms of planning, the mission gave little attention to the fundamental issues confronting Somalia like the nature, prospects and timing of reconciliation that would be needed to rebuild Somalia’s institutions, how to build consensus and conduct DDR programmes UNOSOM II’s leaders had no guidance other than their own judgment about any given situation they encountered and, in their frustration, commanders on the ground had to react as they saw best. This reaction increasingly involved “mission creep” and the adoption of a more offensive stance. With no end or solution in sight, the UNOSOM II mission withdrew from Mogadishu on the 3rd March 1995, after suffering significant casualties. The international intervention in Somalia between 1992 and 1995 was not successful.

The UN intervention in Somalia shows what can happen when the public demands instant response to a situation that no immediate solutions. Given the nature of this civil conflict and the absence of any effective political infrastructure to counter it, there was never any basis for or hope for peace. The delivery of humanitarian aid in these circumstances would need a level of security that could only be achieved by enforcement. The warring factions in Somalia had no intention of backing down and, thus, external intervention to bring peace carried high risk and


low chances of success.\textsuperscript{255} Peace enforcement in such circumstances was never guaranteed although short-term success of the interim UNITAF force was noticeable.

In December 1995, the Rwandan government advised the UN that it did not agree to an extension of UNAMIR mandate beyond its expiration on 8 December on the basis that UNAMIR did not respond to Rwanda’s priority needs. However the Government indicated that it would be receptive to a continued UN presence. UNAMIR mandate was extended for a final period until 8 Mar 1996 but it was also adjusted with a force level of 1,200.\textsuperscript{256} The peacekeeping activities of the UN in Rwanda were not adequately backed by peace building efforts hence the current fear of Rwanda’s relapse into conflict. Rwanda lacked social and economic development, and an effective police and judicial system which could help stabilize the security situation. The situation in Rwanda is an indication that the UN and the AU need to go beyond the traditional peacekeeping activities in order to resolve the multifaceted conflicts in these countries.

In contrast, over the short span of its operations and the discussed milestones thereof, EASF promises to become a more effective security mechanism both in modern day peace support operations and military intervention in response to security threats, a factor lacking in both the UNOSOM and UNAMIR situations. Accordingly, EASF has undertaken a series of preparatory exercises to make the force ready and on standby for full deployment in the aforesaid period. In the first cycle of the exercises, EASF successfully conducted Command Post Exercise (CPX) in Nairobi, Kenya in 2008, a Field Training Exercise (FTX) in Djibouti in November 2009, and a Logistics Mapping Exercise (Logs MAPEX) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in November


\textsuperscript{256} Supra note 34
The first historical joint Field Training Exercise, consisting of about 1,500 troops, police and civilian personnel from 10 countries was also conducted in Djibouti to broaden the peacekeeping capacity of the region and to evaluate the level of preparedness and interoperability of the force.\textsuperscript{258}

This exercise shows that EASF is in a good position of assembling all the regional standby forces for deployment when need arises. By successfully completing these exercises in the first cycle, EASF attained the Initial Operational Capability (IOC). In the second cycle of the exercises, EASF conducted a second CPX in Khartoum, Sudan, in November 2011.\textsuperscript{259} Besides, successful Field Training Exercise known as Mashariki Salam 2013 (FTX13) was held in Jinja, Uganda, from May 2013 to train and examine the level of readiness of the trained forces for Full Operational Capability (FOC) based on the AU training doctrine and objectives. From the above discussion one can appreciate the effort of the EASF across the short span of its active existence towards achieving its full operation capability, already declared by the force in November 2014.

### 3.7 Conclusion

From the foregoing findings, it can be deduced that the EASF, as a sub-regional peace and security architecture is aimed at undertaking the functions of maintaining peace and security in Eastern Africa in particular and, the African continent in general. Due to a multiplicity of interrelated challenges and dynamics, EASF has carried out only a few supportive roles in the UN and AU peace support operations in the region, rather than deploying its own authorized peace-keeping force. This is attributed to the fact that EASF is under the continental force ASF

\textsuperscript{257} Supra note 47  
\textsuperscript{258} Supra note 52  
and therefore draws its mandate in terms of operational activities from the AU. EASF thus has to depend on the ad hoc mechanism of deployment as authorized by the AU PSC and the UN. This is in spite of its ambitious objective of maintaining regional peace and security in a region that indeed requires such measures urgently. Notwithstanding its minimal role in terms of maintaining peace and security in the region, the current trends and activities of EASF show that the organization has good future prospect to make positive contributions to the maintenance of peace and security in the region.
CHAPTER FOUR

FACTORS THAT CONSTRAIN THE OPTIMAL PERFORMANCE OF THE EASTERN AFRICA STANDBY FORCE

4.1 Introduction

The road to the realization of a functioning EASF has not been easy since its inception in 2004. Some of the regional standby forces like the one for the NASBRIG is still far away from achieving the F.O.C. Some of the regional standby forces have not yet to achieve their planning element and operational targets towards attaining either the initial operational capability (I.O.C) and the F.O.C.

Just like other regional mechanisms, EASF, which is not anchored on any regional economic community, has gone through, similar challenges like the other four standby forces but because of the determination of member countries and their mutual understanding, the Force has managed to meet some of the targets towards attaining its F.O.C. Today the force has a standby multidimensional, multifunctional and integrated standby force, a well-established EASFCOM that coordinates the activities of the force and lately an agreement on the establishment of the EASF signed in 2014 by member states. This phenomenon has led to the general view that although the EASF troops have not been deployed in peace support operations, the force is comparatively doing well compared to the other standby forces in terms of attaining the F.O.C by December 2015.

Although the EASF seems to be efficient and the most ready, certain factors that are interrelated have hindered its institutional development. This chapter will briefly discuss these
factors that constrain the operations of the EASF as observed also by other scholars in the field of peace and security.

4.2 Factors that constrain the optimal performance of the Eastern Africa Standby Force

Some factors that hamper the EASF from functioning optimally are discussed in the following part of this chapter.

4.2.1 Lack of Funding

It is apparent that for an organization to successfully conduct a Peace Support Operation (PSO) a huge amount of funding is required. Funds are important in the day to day operations, deployments, training, and exercises and even for observer missions. On the contrary, although the sub-regional forces have the ambition of deploying troops in the field, they lack the finances to facilitate these processes. Their logistical capability is also alarming and this is attributed to the scarcity of finances. At the continental level, the AU which has the supreme authority over the standby forces lacks finances to discharge its duties effectively, and has had to rely on donors and partners to discharge its duties. Member countries have not been regularly contributing to the AU peace fund. Similarly, back at the sub regional level, EASF faces similar challenges concerning funding. Member states are supposed to carry out their obligations among them, financing the EASF, but few have regularly done so either because of low financial capacity or because of their national commitment/priorities. Hull et al adds that this problem is even made worse by cases of mismanagement since the establishment of the EASF.260 Just like in the AU,

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EASF which is supposed to be supported by member state has to work with partners or donors to realize its objectives. Although the partner States are just doing what is expected of the international community in supporting CPMR efforts to ensure international peace and security, the force is likely to be in at a vulnerable position if the source of these finances is cut off or is reduced.

4.2.2 Weak Legal Framework and Lack of Commitment

For over ten years, EASF has had a relatively weak legal basis operating under the Policy Framework for the Establishment of EASBRIG (adopted in 2004) and Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (signed in 2005) which are not binding. It is only in December 2014 that an agreement on the establishment of the EASF was signed by ten participating states.\textsuperscript{261} Although an agreement has been put in place to replace the arbitrary M.o.U that existed before, there still exist several grey areas in the area of pledged forces by member states. There is still no binding arrangement between Members States for force deployment although every year Members States renew their M.o.U.s on pledged forces. EASF operations largely depend on the mutual understanding of states and on the changing political will of states involved. Commitment and contributions of member states towards the activities of the force will depend on the threat perception of the situation and interests of individual nations in the activities of the regional force.\textsuperscript{262}

In addition, even though EASF personnel get standardized training from the regional centres of excellence, their loyalty to the EASF and deployment would be only valid if the

\textsuperscript{261} Speech of EASFCOM Head of Political Affairs during the EASF Day on 21 September 2015, at Serena Hotel Nairobi.
concerned states do not object their deployment. This raises concern over the question of divided loyalty of officers towards the force and towards their countries. This is a serious issue especially if it touches on the integrity of senior officers in the force who formulate and implement principles. Loyalty to the force may also be questioned among member states, especially when deployment in a certain country or area is of pertinent interest to the concerned states, or where intervention is to be carried out in a ‘friendly’ State against the wish of the sitting government.

4.2.3 Poor Structures and Organization

The core functions of the PLANELMs are planning, preparation and training, including the verification of brigade headquarters and standby elements. This is considered a full time requirement, implying that the PLANELMS should be staffed on a permanent basis and where possible, the regional PLANELMs should be co-located with the regional brigade headquarters for ease of command, control and communications. The EASF has its PLANELM located in Kenya while its brigade headquarters are located in Addis Ababa. This renders the coordination of these structures difficult and also causes logistical and communication constraints especially for an organization like EASF, which just like the others in the region is constrained in terms of resources. Arrangements like these may satisfy the countries concerned but they may also jeopardize the effective function of the force. Kenya may be happy to host the PLANELM, and Ethiopia, the EASBRIG HQ, but operationally, these actions constrain the already under sourced organization.

Decision-making especially at the policy and operational level poses a big challenge to the EASF organization. Although EASF operates in a theatre where there is a high presence of international peacekeeping activities attributed to the long and devastating conflicts, it lacks the
decision-making capability to deploy its troops. The structures and institutions upon which EASF is created curtail its sphere of operation and only allow it to be deployed on AD HOC basis by the AU.

4.2.4 Conflicts in the Eastern Africa

The EAR region is characterized by both interstate and intrastate conflicts and this largely affects the development of a strong EASF. Internal conflicts continue to be witnessed in Sudan’s Darfur area, Somalia and in other countries in the region. Hostilities exist between Eritrea and Ethiopia on one hand and Eritrea and Djibouti on the other hand. Conflicts between Eritrea and Ethiopia have even resulted into Eritrea withdrawing its active participation from the EASF. This goes against the principle of inclusivity of all member states for an effective collective security arrangement thus undermining the progress of the EASF. The institutional development of EASF is constrained by conflicts in two dimensions. Internal conflicts within member countries of the EASF affect EASF development as these countries are largely preoccupied with internal insurgencies and devote their best resources first to internal demands rather than to a world order like the EASF with a planned capability of ensuring regional security. In essence, for such states in the EASF regional security duties are only secondary to their national security.\footnote{Hull C, Skeppstrom and E, Sorenson K (2011). “Patchwork for Peace: Capabilities for Peace and Security in Eastern Africa”, Stockholm: FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency. P.20.} This phenomena results to reduced resources to the EASF and it is a no wonder that most of the times member states have been unable to meet their financial obligations or have only pledged limited number of personnel and equipment, probably maintaining a substantial amount of resources to counter internal insurgencies.
In addition, external conflicts in the region like the one in Somalia and Sudan have equally reduced the resources that would have been used on improving on the institutional and capacity development of the EASF. These conflicts have necessitated the deployment of the UN and AU peacekeeping missions in which countries of the EASF participate. Such resources would have been used in strengthening this regional force.264

Tension between countries in the EASF because of among other issues, support for proxy wars by member countries and their international relations, has resulted to mistrust among Member States. This has greatly affected the collaborative efforts required to nurture this new security organization.265

4.2.5 Lack of Resources

The mission scenarios provided in the ASF policy framework provides that missions deployed for Scenarios 1 - 3 should be self-sustainable for up to 30 days, while Scenarios 4 - 6 missions and operations should deploy with up to 90 days self-sustainability, before the AU or the UN takes over the responsibility for sustaining the missions or, if lacking that capacity, the readiness and ability of the AU to start reimbursing TCCs so that these countries can sustain their contingents. Deployment of contingents in 14 days will require regular joint field exercises with all units, a standing fully staffed Brigade HQ. Although EASF is said to be ready for such operations, in real terms, most countries in the EASF that are expected to deploy and contribute resources to the force Log Base, have no adequate resources to sustain these missions within

these ambitious timelines. Such timelines could probably only be met by AU member states with relatively well endowed military establishments like South Africa and Nigeria.\textsuperscript{266}

In addition the force is still limited in terms of airlift capabilities. The force also has a limited number of experts working for it.

Lack of resources creates a problem of dependence on external support. Such measures sometimes undermine local ownership of the Force and as a result question the role of the ASF as an ‘African solution to African problems’. The EASF is supported in various ways by a number of countries and organizations associated with it in the forum of ‘Friends of EASF’ established in 2007. Netherlands has played a very instrumental role towards achieving one of the objectives in the EASF strategic development Plan by helping EASF develop a command and control Communication Information System (C2 CIS).\textsuperscript{267}

\subsection*{4.2.6 Duplication of Regional Organizations and Overlapping Membership}

EASF encompasses certain SROs some of them having been formed way back before the establishment of the EASF. These are EAC and IGAD. It is important to appreciate the commitment that member states have to these organizations, their loyalty to these organizations and the impact thereof, positive or negative, depending on the collaboration or lack of it among the SROs. Unfortunately for the EASF, even with the its emergency as a sub-regional security architecture, there have been minimal collaboration among these organizations in the area of security, as evidenced by the actions of the old institutions like IGAD and EAC which continue to take their own actions in the same domain of peace and security. IGAD for instance wanted to send its own force IGASOM, in Somalia. All these organizations require donor assistance as they

\textsuperscript{266}Aliyu, P.33.
\textsuperscript{267}See Bouhuys (2011). P.29.
pursue their objectives in the same field of peace and security thus creating unnecessary competition for donor support. Obviously, the existence of these multiple organizations with overlapping mandates or objectives affects the development of the EASF.

Overlapping membership by Member States creates the problem of commitment and loyalties thus complicating the support of member states for EASF. Member States usually lean towards organizations that best meet their expectations or interests. Tanzania, which is geographically located in the EAC region and is founder Member of the EAC, preferred to join the SSF. Tanzania seems to be also more active in SADC than it is in EAC. On the other hand, Kenya and Uganda are actively involved in the EAC probably as they could be engaged in the EASF. But again, unlike the other standby forces which enjoy the participation of almost all member states because of the existence of one strong REC upon which they are anchored, EASF is greatly affected in terms of commitment by member states as well as competition for external donors with other RECs.

Greater collaboration among member states and among the security and development organizations is important so that members take advantage of the synergies that exist among the different organization and reduce duplication of resource and divided commitment. More collaborative efforts in this area have got to be done to create synergies and reduce competition and duplication of resources in a region that already has constrained resources.

4.2.7 The Ambivalence of some States and Divided Loyalty

Out of fourteen (14) members of the Eastern Region, only 10 States take an active part in the EASF. These are: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. Eritrea has suspended its engagement in the process due to hostile
relations with some of the other countries, most notably Ethiopia and recently Djibouti. At the same time Tanzania, which is geographically in East Africa and is a founder member of the East Africa community, has chosen to work with the SADC countries in the SADC Standby Force (SSF). Madagascar and Mauritius too, have since joined the SSF from the EASF.

Given that the standby forces depend on member states for financial, equipment and personnel, the withdrawal of these countries and or their lack of participation in the force directly affected the development of EASF, more so in terms of capacity building.

4.2.8 Lack of a Lead Nation and Hegemonic Competition

In most situations, security matters are sensitive and therefore call for prompt decisions or actions. In regional security architectures, the significance of a lead nation cannot be underestimated. EASF lacks a clear hegemonic power unlike the case of ECOWAS Standby Force and the SADC Standby Force where Nigeria and South Africa are hegemonies, respectively. ASF/EASF deployment in scenario six which calls for deployment within fourteen days would not be easily realized by sub-regional organizations of the ASF because of the limitations of mandates, and logistics. Only a lead nation would help as happened with ECOMOG intervention force in Liberia led by Nigeria.

In EASF, the two relatively powerful states, namely Ethiopia and Kenya, are in a state of constant competition to secure their respective supremacy in the region. The competition between the two countries was manifested with the onset of EASF creation. Ethiopia’s perceived dominance in IGAD led to a number of States among them Kenya resisting the coordination of EASF affairs under IGAD. Consequently EASBRICOM, and later EASFCOM, was established and is based in Nairobi. Kenya considers EASFCOM as the supreme organ of all other structures.
of EASF, while Ethiopia regards them as equal.\textsuperscript{268} Therefore, even though the EASFCOM was established as a solution, the two countries’ rivalry still continues to affect the smooth running of EASF. The competition between the two countries for supremacy and influence in the region is also best manifested in the allocation of EASF structures. Internal rivalry between the two countries to assume regional leadership leads to separate allocation of elements of EASF in Ethiopia and Kenya.\textsuperscript{269} The EASFCOM and the Planning Element (PLANELEM) are located in Kenya, while the EASF Headquarters and Logistic Base (LOGBASE) are co-located in Ethiopia. Having these elements separated, more so the PLANELEM and the structures of the EASF Brigade Headquarters has affected the coordination of the EASF activities and may further delay the rapid deployment of EASF (Fisher, \textit{et al.}, 2010). For effective coordination, if not all elements of the EASF, then the PLANELEM and the Brigade Headquarters should be in one place for more flexibility and effectiveness.

\textbf{4.2.9 Cultural Diversity and Lack of Interoperability}

Under the authority of the AU PSC and the AU Assembly, EASBRIG HQS are expected to be deploy, when need arises, a multidimensional, multifunctional and well integrated standby force that is to be assembled from member states. For force efficiency and effectiveness, standardized training and doctrine have been carried out by the EASF through the regional centers of excellence. Joint operation courses and exercises have also been carried out to prepare the troops.

Effective operation of combined forces in the PSOs is very crucial. Yet cultural differences among the peoples of Eastern Africa have significant impact on the process of

\textsuperscript{268} Mandrup T (2012), ‘State Fragility and Its Regional Implications for Peace and Stability: The Case of the Greater Horn of Africa’. \textit{ISA Conference}, San Diego, 28\textsuperscript{a} March. P.10.

establishing united forces from states of the region and beyond. These cultural differences are
defined by various ethnicities, culture and values, religion and the Anglophone-Francophone
divide. It is contended that such diverse cultures affect the progress of EASF.²⁷⁰

In operational scenarios, commanders may experience difficulties in communicating with their
troops if they don’t share common values and cultures. Since EASF aims at deploying troops
from different countries, cultural background of the different personnel of the troop contributing
countries have to be integrated in the training programmes, otherwise interoperability of the
force may be jeopardized.

4.3 Conclusion

Despite the above discussed challenges, EASF countries have made accomplishments
towards operationalizing the security mechanism, most notably the establishment of the
independent coordination mechanism, the deployment of small number of personnel in Somalia
and cooperation with the UN in this country, the establishment of a Maritime Cell, successfully
conducted exercises, as well as slow but steady development of civilian and police components.
By troops and heads of armed forces from different states exercising together, meeting and
exchanging views and even sensitive information, the EASF structure provides a unique setting
which has the potential to contribute to security and trust building between member countries.

²⁷⁰ Ibid, p.4
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary of the Study

After the Cold war period, new sets of conflict situations came up in the African continent. The Organization of African Union had been established to protect the sovereignty of new independent states. This was to be observed by members of the organization based on the Principle of Sovereignty and Non-interference so that Member States do not interfere with the internal affairs of sovereign States. Security measures were geared towards countering interstate wars. But with the end of the Cold War, new forms of security concerns came up: most wars and conflicts were internal, either insurgencies against the government in place, the fight for control and exploitation of mineral resources and ethno-political wars like in Rwanda and Somalia. This new security concerns came along with other dynamics like regionalization of conflicts through among other factors, globalization and porosity of borders that aided in transnationalizing conflicts.

The African continent was losing so many lives because of these wars and other threats to humanity like hunger and diseases. The Rwanda genocide and the new security concerns like human and environmental security, led the African leadership into reassessing the continent’s security situation.

The new African Union body that was formed to replace the OAU had a stronger mandate than the previous one with the possibility of intervening in countries where there were grave violations of human rights. The body adopted the principle of responsibility to protect to avoid such incidences as the Rwanda genocide. The continental body also took into concern the
fact that conflicts had a spillover effect in the region, and thus the need for concerted efforts among member states at the regional level and at sub-regional level through Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms to manage these conflicts.

In order to harmonize the Continent’s numerous security initiatives and to ensure that the continent’s limited resources are applied efficiently and effectively, the AU, through its larger framework of the African Union Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) established the concept of an African Standby Force (ASF) as an example of a collective security initiative in the continent. The five regionally based multinational brigades/forces of the ASF are based on the five economic regions (North, West, Central, South and East), and were to operate as a multinational integrated rapid reaction peace support operation under strict guidelines. The EASF is the ASF force for Eastern Africa with the vision of contributing to regional and continental peace and stability, through a fully operational and multidimensional joint and integrated Force ready for deployment by 2015.

The study sought to analyze the place of the EASF in the Eastern Africa Security Architecture as a regional collective security arrangement. The operation of the EASF indeed depends among other factors on the structure, policies and design of the EASF and on the harmonization of policies and the political will of the Member States of the various RECS or groupings of States within the sub-region. Factors that constrain the operation of EASF have been identified by reading books, journals and through primary data and the finding and recommendation of this study are presented herein.
5.2 Findings

5.2.1 Deployment Politics

EASF has been able to contribute to the development of multidimensional and multifunctional forces for modern day peace support operations. However, because such forces are limited by the mandates of both the AU and the UN, EASF has not been deployed anywhere in an autonomous capacity. EASF has only been deployed for technical duties in PSO operations in Somalia. From the discussion also, certain mission scenarios like the ones requiring deployment within 14 days can be attained effectively by hegemons that have military capabilities. In the 2012 crisis in Mali the ECOWAS Standby Force, which is under the AU did not intervene as opposed to the ECOMOG intervention force in Liberia, which had earlier intervened under the leadership of Nigeria.

Another aspect to note is that despite EASF being the security architecture in the region, RECs such as the EAC and IGAD still enjoy unwavering loyalties from the member states. Their commitment to EASF activities largely depends on their interests and their threat perception. The availability of troops from these countries will depend on how much they will be willing to contribute. This is further complicated by the lack of a binding legal basis on force generation.

5.2.2 The EASF Planning Scenarios

None of the six EASF mission scenarios corresponds to the new form of warfare that is asymmetrical in nature. The conflict in Somalia and Mali is typical of this new security threats. But AU was not able to deploy neither EASF in Somalia nor SSF in Mali. Besides, the six
mission scenarios that were based on traditional forms of responding to conflicts ranging from observer missions to rapid intervention in response to grave circumstances like genocide may not cater for eventualities like humanitarian disasters, or earthquakes which indeed require the rapid capability that EASF aspires to attain in the regional security arrangement.

5.2.3 The Relationship between the AU, EASF, and REC/RMs and Institutional Flexibility

While the AU is the principal body that gives policies and guidelines that EASF and other standby forces follow in establishing these sub regional forces, EASF depends on the Member States for funding and force generation and preparation. The Member States were participating in their respective RECs or RMs and most of them are still very loyal to these RECs than even the Standby Forces. The regional organizations are therefore the implementing organs of the AU policies. There needs to be more collaborative relationship between the AU and the RECs more so for the EASF which operates in an environment where countries have overlapping membership, to realize its goals. This is important in strengthening the force which relies on the goodwill of RECs and their member countries.

5.2.4 Strengthening Multi-Dimensionality

EASF has forces that are Multi-dimensional. This is an important aspect in a modern peacekeeping force which should respond to the multifaceted nature of conflicts. EASF has got both civilian, military and police components in its two forms of its structures in Nairobi, and at different hierarchical levels. The force has also tried to balance its staff in terms of gender.
5.2.4 Joint Planning

EASF has a working PLANEL based in Karen Nairobi. Joint Planning is headed by a joint Chief of Staff under whom there are three heads representing the three components of the force: the military, the civilian and the police. EASF has got representatives of partner states who are experts in given fields to offer technical advice. EASF has provided technical services in planning PSO operations in Somalia and has also sent staff in UN Office in Somalia as military advisers.

The most recent planning initiatives between the AU and the UN on Somalia or the joint planning between ECOWAS and the AU on Mali seems to bear fruits in tackling non-conventional warfare. If better results are to be achieved, the planning capacities which are available at the EASF and the RECs will have to be reinforced, and Member States and partners will have to invest more in strengthening the role of the strategic headquarters in Addis Ababa and the planning elements in the regions.

5.2.5 Spelling Out Command and Control

EASF lacks authority over its forces and cannot therefore deploy. Effective command and control of operations underpins both success and credibility, yet this is one of the areas in which room for improvement exists. More can be done to strengthen the role of the headquarters in providing strategic guidance and support, and the mission command and control structures in relation to the conduct of operations, to ensure that operations are managed effectively
5.2.6 Funding and Logistics

EASF, just like the AU lacks funds for its projects and has to depend on the contribution of member states some of whom rarely meet their obligation. For the EASF to effectively implement its activities, finance and logistics are very important. Partnership with donor States is encouraged in modern peacekeeping, but overdependence on these external partners is dangerous.

5.3 Recommendations

Deployment scenarios of EASF need to be re-examined to reflect the new security dynamics like terrorism, organized crime and humanitarian disasters and also establish the type of capabilities that are required to deal with such threats.

More collaborative efforts between the EASF and regional mechanism should be fostered to avoid duplication of activities and create synergy among the organizations in the area of security.

There is need to have stronger institutional structures that would help the organizations carry out its functions effectively. In addition, EASF should come up together with the RECs on a way to effectively ensure that EASF has adequate funds to meet its budgeted activities.
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The UN Charter


Papers and Reports


ANNEX I: QUESTIONNAIRE

CIVILIAN, MILITARY AND POLICE OFFICIALS OF THE EASTERN AFRICA STANDBY FORCE IN KAREN, NAIROBI, KENYA

My name is Nina Helga Omamo. I am a postgraduate student at the University of Nairobi conducting a research on Regional Collective Security Mechanisms in Eastern Africa: the Case of the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) from 2004-2015. This research is part of my Masters programme in International Conflict Management.

I kindly request you to assist me in conducting this research by completing the attached questionnaire. The information provided in this questionnaire will be handled in a confidential manner and will be only used for this study and not shared nor used for any other purpose.

Thank you for taking your time to complete the questionnaire.

Question 1

From which member country of the EASF do you belong to?

- [ ] Burundi
- [ ] Djibouti
- [ ] Ethiopia
- [ ] Kenya
- [ ] Rwanda
- [ ] Seychelles
- [ ] Somalia
- [ ] Sudan
- [ ] The Comoros
- [ ] Uganda
Question 2
Which component of the EASF do you belong to?

- Civilian
- Military
- Police

Question 3
For how long have you been working at the EASF?

- Less than one year
- 1-3 years
- 3-5 years
- More than 5 years

Question 4
Please indicate your gender.

- Male
- Female

Question 5
In which EASF structure are you deployed?

- EASFCOM
- PLANELM
Question 6

What is your designation in the EASF? Briefly indicate your role too.

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Question 7

Have you ever participated in any training while working for the EASF? Please indicate the type of training.

☐ Individual

☐ Collective

☐ none

Question 8

In how many joint exercises under the EASF have you participated?

☐ More than three

☐ three

☐ two

☐ one

☐ none

Question 9

Have you participated before in any peace support operations under the auspices of the EASF within the region and beyond?
☐ Yes
☐ No

If the answer is ‘yes’, please state where. ..........................................................................................................................

Question 10

Apart from the EASF, which other sub-regional organization in the Eastern Africa region is your country a Member State?

☐ IGAD
☐ EAC
☐ ICGLR
☐ COMESA
☐ Any other

Question 11

In your opinion, what is the greatest challenge that affects the performance of the EASF? Kindly indicate:...................................................................................................................................................................................
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Question 12

In your opinion, is the EASF ready for peace keeping duties in the region?

☐ Yes
☐ No

THANK YOU