

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

**CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS OF RECONSTRUCTION AND
PEACEBUILDING: CASE STUDIES OF HAITI, CAMBODIA AND
MOZAMBIQUE**

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DECLARATION

This Dissertation is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

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This Dissertation has been submitted for examination with our approval as University Supervisors.

Prof. Maria NzomoDate.....

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my family who believed in me and has always supported me in their own special way.

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I highly appreciate the contribution and support received from various individuals for the successful completion of this Dissertation. I wish to express my sincere appreciation to my supervisors Prof. Maria Nzomo and Dr. Musambayi Katumanga

ABSTRACT

Based on the experience of three countries- Haiti, Cambodia and Mozambique; this study set-out to examine how various peace building strategies could be used to formulate a framework for post conflict reconstruction. Informed by the premise that research on the formulation of a comprehensive framework for reconstruction is sparse and limited, the study found its worth in filling the knowledge gap occasioned by insufficient understanding about the prerequisite human and material conditions necessary for effective and sustainable post conflict reconstruction. The democratic peace theory was utilized here in the context of accounting for requisite conditions necessary for favourable security, humanitarian and relief efforts, economic recovery, democratization and governance, and longer-term development in post-conflict societies. In this regard, the democratic peace theory focuses on the construction of state capacity by taking both collective security and human security as the core of peace building and to a larger extent state building with a broad strategy of preventing, managing and resolving conflicts in the long-run as well as restoration of comprehensive peace and security in the short run. In its methodology, this study adopted a case study design and used an open ended questionnaire method for data collection. Post conflict reconstruction data on Haiti, Cambodia and Mozambique was collected from officials in the diplomatic corps, UN Officers, People working with international organization like AU, military officers, Government officers, media professionals and Academicians with proven knowledge on post conflict reconstruction globally. The study used Proportionate stratified sampling and Purposive Sampling Techniques. Proportionate stratified sampling was used to identify the necessary study population in Haiti, Cambodia and Mozambique. Purposive sampling was used to identify the six study units which included: officials in the diplomatic corps, UN Officers, Media professionals, academicians, Government officers and military officers who were in one way or another well informed and involved in issues surrounding reconstruction of post conflict societies. The findings of this study indicate that fragile post conflict societies require multiple interventions in their reconstruction process. The experiences of Haiti, Cambodia and Mozambique indeed underscore the fact that post-conflict reconstruction is a central feature on the international developmental agenda. Nonetheless, these interventions must address the key pillars of the post conflict reconstruction framework, namely: legitimacy, trust and authority of the state, political will for transparency and accountability, rule of law, social capital and social cohesion, economic reconstruction and service delivery and finally, security and cross border movement. Subsequently, the study recommended that future post conflict reconstruction strategies must pay attention to the issue of entry and how to harmonize policies and make them converge towards the common goal of sustained development and prosperity. Furthermore, post conflict reconstruction processes must be alive to the fact that governments should always strive to identify an appropriate mix of policies; and they need to know where and when to start, and what follows what? Hence, for the political and managerial leadership, great capacities are required with regard to empathy and timeliness for action. Finally, reconstruction cannot be successful without strategic partnerships with international institutions, which is crucial towards strengthening local governance capacities.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADB- African Development Bank

AU- African Union

BAI- Bureau Des Avocats Internationaux

BLDP- Liberal Democratic Party

BPD- People's Development Bank

CAR- Central African Republic

CC- Control of Corruption

CEC-Extraordinary Chamber (Cambodia)

CMAA- Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority

CMAC- Cambodian Mine Action Center

CPP- Cambodian Peoples Party

CRS- Coordination for Reconstruction and Stabilization

CSR-Security Sector Reform

DDR- Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

DRC- Democratic Republic of Congo

ECCC- Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia

ESAF- Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility

EU- European Union

FRAPH- Front Revolutionnaire Pour L'avancement et Le Progres' Haitiens

FRELIMO- Mozambique Liberation Front

G-7- Group of Seven Industrialized Countries

GDP- Gross Domestic Product

GE- Government Effectiveness

GPA-General Peace Agreement

HIPC- Heavily Indebted poor countries

ICT- Information and Communications Technology

IDP's- Internally Displaced Persons

IFI'S- International Financial Institutions

IMF- International Monetary Fund

IOM- International Organisation for Migration

IRI- International Republican Institute

LDC'S- Least Developed Countries

LICUS- Low Income Countries under Stress

MDG'S- Millennium Development Goals

MDM- Mozambique Democratic Movement

MDRI- Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative

NDI- National Democratic Institute

NGO'S- Non-Governmental Organizations

NSDP- National Strategic Development Plan (Cambodia)

OAS- Organisation of American States

OAU- Organisation for African Union

ODA- Official Development Assistance

OECD- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

ONUMOZ- United Nations Operations in Mozambique

PCRD- Post-Conflict Reconstruction Development

PDK- The Khmer Rouge

PRSP- Provincial Reintegration Support Program (Mozambique)

PV- Political Stability Absence of Violence

RECS- Regional Economic Communities

RENAME- Mozambique National Resistance

RL- Rule of Law

SAF- Structural Adjustment Facility

SNC- Supreme National Council

UD- Democratic Union (Mozambique)

UN – United Nations

UNDP- United Nations Development Program

UNHCR- United Nations High Commission for Refugees

UNMAS- United Nations Mine Action Service

UNMIK- United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

UNTAC- United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

UNTAET- United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

US- United States

USAID- United States Agency for International Development

WGI- Worldwide Governance Indicators

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

After World War I, most conflicts were intra, rather than inter-state, and since World War II most armed conflicts which are mostly intra have occurred at a regional or local level primarily in the developing world. These conflicts are deeper, more pervasive and more intractable than the Cold War super power struggle, which was driven largely by geopolitical and ideological forces. Some, such as the Korean, Vietnamese, and Arab-Israeli conflicts, have threatened world peace. The cessation of hostilities, as per a peace agreement, does not necessarily mean that conflicts have been resolved and that security will be established and maintained. In fact, managing conflict means not only avoiding escalation in a crisis but also creating a durable basis for peaceful alternatives through democracies, market economies and civil institutions that promote human rights. With an increasing number of decentralized power centers around the globe, decision makers must be able to draw on different techniques for preventing, managing, and transforming conflict.

Societies emerging from conflict continue to be a growing concern for the international community. There is awareness that while war has ended, peace, especially sustainable peace, is not so easily forthcoming. Dire poverty, ongoing ethnic, political or religious rivalry, the proliferation of arms, nonexistent governance institutions and infrastructure

all pose tremendous threats that can easily lead a country back into war. Simultaneously and despite the overwhelming challenges, the post conflict period is also a period of hope and opportunity. Coming after years or even decades of fighting, it is a time, albeit brief, when financial and technical resources are available to help address the root causes of war and shape the future of a nation.

At the international level, there is acknowledgement that in many cases, “winning the peace” poses a bigger challenge than ‘winning the war’ and that nation-building is a complex and long-term process.¹ There is also an understanding that no single institution can address every issue.

With increasing intensity since the end of the Cold War, post-conflict reconstruction, has become a central part of today’s international relations and international development activities and is increasingly integrated with military and security roles in many post-conflict countries.² In addition, nearly all international development agencies, have established units to systematically address post-conflict challenges.³

¹ Carafeno, J & Dillon, D. (2005). *Winning the Peace: Principles for Post Conflict Operations*. Background: Heritage Organization. No. 1859

² Section 1.6 of Chapter 1 provides the definition of various terminologies.

³ For example, the World Bank has two units: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit and the Low-Income Countries under Stress (LICUS) Initiative, which also includes post-conflict countries. The UN has established the UN Peace building Commission and the U.S. Department of State has established the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.

Since 1989, the frequency, scale, scope, and duration of these missions have steadily risen. In the 40-year period from 1948 to 1988, the UN had just 15 peacekeeping operations around the world. In the ten-year span from 1989 to 1999, however, that number jumped to 35.⁴

In addition, there is now widespread recognition that failed states can provide safe havens for a diverse array of transnational threats, including epidemic diseases, terrorist networks, global organized crime, and narcotics traffickers. Given the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 and threats posed by instability in war-torn countries, post-conflict reconstruction can no longer be viewed solely as “charity work” because it encompasses national and global security. Thus, the driving force behind increasing international engagement in post-conflict countries is the spill-over effects of insecurity and instability in war-torn countries.⁵

Most importantly, the cumulative effect of all nation-building activities has been measurably beneficial. Several studies show that peacekeeping has proved to be the most-cost effective instrument available to the international community. UN peacekeeping is both effective and cost-effective when compared to the costs of continued conflict and the toll in lives and economic devastation such conflict entails. Although it is tough to

⁴ United States Institute of Peace, “*Peacekeeping in Africa*,” *Special Report 66*, February 13, 2001. <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr66.html> (Accessed September 25, 2014).

⁵ For example, Chauvet and Collier (2004) *argue that the cost of doing nothing exceeds the cost of aid intervention intended to turn around fragile states.*

turn around a failed state, the cost of doing nothing is often higher.⁶ These interventions must address the key pillars of the post conflict reconstruction framework, namely: Legitimacy, trust and authority of the state, political will for transparency and accountability, rule of law, social capital and social cohesion, economic reconstruction and service delivery and finally, security and cross border movement.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Despite more than a decade of sustained international engagement in various nation-building efforts, post-conflict reconstruction remains a significant global development challenge. An assessment of the history of post-conflict reconstruction and the effectiveness of international intervention in rebuilding post-conflict countries, the record over the last six decades indicate mixed results. Japan and Germany are often regarded as examples of best practices in post-conflict reconstruction. These two cases demonstrated that with political will and strong international support, sustainable peace can be restored and post-conflict countries can achieve turnaround. In addition, Namibia, Mozambique, El Salvador, Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor have achieved some success after international interventions. These countries have experienced relative peace and some level of economic growth during their post-conflict periods.

On the other hand, the collapse of state institutions in Somalia and political instability in Haiti are examples of failures of international interventions and post-conflict

⁶ Collier, P. & Hoeffler, A. (2004). *The Challenge of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil War*". London: Oxford University.

reconstruction efforts.⁷ Although most of the post-conflict countries during the 1990s achieved some success in security, humanitarian, civil administration, democratization, and economic reconstruction, the majority of these countries have suffered from a risk of renewed conflict. In comparison to global averages, African conflicts are even more prone to reignite: Half of African peace restorations last less than a decade.⁸ Given this challenge, it is often argued that democratization and sustainable development require long-term engagement of the international community in rebuilding the post-conflict countries.

Although there is already a substantial body of work on policies that contribute to the economic growth of developing countries, little is known about the effectiveness of policies in countries emerging from conflict. It is actually a disturbing fact that despite a number of decades of post conflict reconstruction we still have no consistency on how post conflict reconstruction is undertaken. In response to this knowledge gap, this study seeks to investigate and generate a comprehensive and consistent framework for attaining sustainable peace and reconstruction of post conflict societies employing case studies of Haiti, Cambodia and Mozambique. The study is guided by three key research questions: a) what are the factors that make the process of post conflict reconstruction successful in one country and a failure in another? b) what are the critical components of a post conflict reconstruction programme whose presence or absence determines the success or failure of post conflict reconstruction process? and c) is it possible to make informed

⁷ See Dobbins et al. (2003) and Dobbins et al. (2005).

⁸ Betty, B., Collier, P. & Sambanis, N. (2000). "Policies for Building Post-Conflict Peace," *Journal of African Economies*, Vol 9, No 3, pp. 323-348.

deductions on specific patterns in post conflict reconstruction which when applied make a post conflict reconstruction a success and when not a failure?

1.3 Research Objectives

The general objective of this study was to examine how the various peacebuilding strategies that could be used to formulate a framework for post-conflict reconstruction using the case studies of Haiti, Cambodia and Mozambique.

1.3.1 The specific objectives are:

- (i) To examine the nature of post conflict societies and identify common pillars used for their reconstruction;
- (ii) To identify and assess the critical policy factors that were necessary for establishing peace and stability in the post conflict Haiti;
- (iii) To evaluate the sequencing order of the post–conflict reconstruction policies used in Cambodia;
- (iv) To determine the extent to which participatory governance system, institution building and security reforms contributed to successful post conflict reconstruction in Mozambique;
- (v) To develop a framework for post–conflict reconstruction in societies emerging from conflict.

1.4 Justification of the Study

Research on the formulation of a comprehensive framework for reconstruction is sparse and limited. One reason for this lack is that research on war-torn countries runs into particular methodological difficulties and data limitations. Since this area is under-researched, there is insufficient understanding about how to use resources most effectively over the long term. The development of a framework for reconstruction of post societies will assist in successful post conflict reconstruction for several reasons. First, budget constraints may preclude implementing all policies at once. Second, some problems must be addressed early in order to demonstrate that peace has indeed been established or returned. Third, some programs, such as sweeping civil service reform and poorly designed liberalization and privatization programs, launched by the international community in the past had been counter-productive to peace objectives.

Given this background, this study contributes in many ways to knowledge and policy. Academically, this study systematically examines the linkages between security and development by exploring combinations and sequencing of security and development interventions to stabilize fragile states. The study adds value to general theory of reconstruction and peacebuilding in post conflict societies. It is relevant to students and researchers in International Studies, Political Science and related disciplines.

Second, from the policy prospective, this study provides a roadmap for peace-building or an analytical framework that will enable practitioners, such as the UN, the international financial institutions (IFIs), bilateral donors, and post-conflict governments, to determine

which policies (programs) work best under what circumstances so that practitioners may target resources (mainly manpower and money) to areas which have the most-strategy impact on post-conflict countries' turnaround. In addition, the findings of this study will help governments and multilateral institutions adopt more proactive conflict prevention strategies in "failing" countries as well. Of key importance in this regard will be the evaluation of the role of security policies vis-à-vis the role of economic reforms such as fiscal reform, price liberalization, and trade liberalization.

1.5 Literature Review

This section reviews the relevant literature on policy priorities and the theory, timing, scope, speed and sequencing of reform. There are mainly four types of literature on the construction of a framework for reconstruction of post societies: the literature on the theoretical grounding of post-conflict reconstruction; literature that looks at the historical trend in development priorities; the literature that looks at the experiences in rebuilding post-conflict countries; and the literature that looks at the underlying causes of conflict and try to identify policy priorities for reconstruction.

1.5.1 Theoretical Grounding of Post-conflict Reconstruction

The end of the Cold War and the dismantling of a bipolar world were seen as a window of opportunity to transition to a peaceful and democratic international system. A growing sense of victory was evident among many scholars and politicians in the West: the fall of the Berlin Wall represented, foremost, the victory of liberal democracy, not only in terms of the bipolar ideological confrontation, but also as the most suitable political contract

between the state and the individual. Only democratic societies could assure the necessary equilibrium between security and liberty, and consequently guarantee a peaceful sociability.

A form of democratic moralism developed in the hearts of those engaged in defining a new world order. In his 1991 speech, George W. Bush proclaimed the “forging” of a new world order that should foster “a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations”.⁹ The promotion of democracy, at a national and international level, was perceived as the only path to international peace.¹⁰

Though there was much debate, two liberal theoretical strands underlay this broad assumption. On one hand, Fukuyama drew the picture of the last man as a democratic political individual, given his Hegelian understanding of history as a coherent evolutionary trail of human societies towards an ending point, where a form of society that satisfied its needs and requests would be attained. In this portrayal, Fukuyama presented democracy as the final stage of political evolution.¹¹ On the other hand, Democratic Peace theorists found a revival and update of Kantian propositions in the 1990s. Democratic pacifism was sanctified internally as well as internationally.¹² It

⁹ These are excerpts of the television speech President George W. Bush gave shortly after the attack commenced in 6 January 1991.

¹⁰ Holm, H. & Sørensen, G. (1995). “Introduction: What has changed?”, in Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sørensen (eds.), *Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War*. Boulder: CO: Westview Press. pp. 1-17.

¹¹ Fukuyama, F. (1992). *The End of History and the Last Man*. London: Penguin Books.

¹² Russett, B. (1993). *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. pp. 31-32.

espoused a clear sense of peaceful exclusivity based on causal relations between political regimes and international peace, which excludes non-democracies. Accordingly, the solution for an international peaceful order was to advocate for intervention at the state level and promotion of democracy worldwide.¹³

Indeed, the prospects of a new world order became entwined with an optimistic democratic feeling, binding the scope of modernity to its liberal expression. Democracy came to be identified as the missing political element to achieve peace and deliver modernity to underdeveloped areas of the world.

The “new wars” which erupted in the 1990’s curtailed some of this optimism, but at the same time turned out to be a key moment to expand this liberal project. In fact, notwithstanding the destruction brought on by these violent conflicts, their treatment as deviant behavior that must be put right has reinforced (1) the political program of liberal modernity as a path to peace and (2) the international consensus around this image. Peace-building emerged as the key strategy to bring modernity to such scenarios.

Applying to new conflicts the label of “deviant” not only safeguarded hope for post-Cold War Peace, but also reinforced the need to intervene. Indeed, liberal modernity proposes an understanding of violent conflicts that offers a rearrangement of practices, institutions

¹³ Archibugi, D. “*Cosmopolitan Democracy and its Critics: a review*” *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 10, No. 3, September 2004), pp. 437-473.

and social meanings in accordance with modernity.¹⁴ The idea of opposition between domestic disorder and modernity led to a vision of conflict resolution that enabled the international community (spaces of peace) to offer a solution for war-torn societies.¹⁵

Undeniably, liberal modernity not only kept its international legitimacy, but indeed reinforced it. Despite the shock caused by the violence of these new wars, the modern international system was able to study the causes of conflict and provide prescriptions for their resolution, thus reaffirming the liberal modernity political project as the desirable ideal for peaceful societies, and portraying it as the correct way to achieve a new world order.

This assertion that modernity was the answer to conflicts was present in Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace*,¹⁶ which became a political statement in which the project of modern liberal democracy is conceptually presented as the intervention strategy necessary to attain lasting peace in conflict scenarios. His *Agenda for Democratization* canonized the role of democracy in war-torn societies, stating that "peace, development and democracy are inextricably linked".¹⁷ This statement came to be a part of Kofi Annan's political legacy, when in 2000, as Secretary-General of UN, he argued for the promotion of democracy as a highly effective means of preventing conflict.

¹⁴ Fetherston, A. (2005). "Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution and Peace building: a reconsideration of theoretical frameworks in Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham (eds.), *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution*. Abingdon: Frank Cass. pp. 190-218.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace" (1992).

¹⁷ Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace" (1992).

Making the places ‘standing outside’ a part of liberal democratic political modernity meant, and still means, creating a new agenda of intervention where the values and theory of modernity could be brought to bear on violent conflicts. This modernity crusade in the 1990s took the form of peace-building missions and principles. The concept of good governance became the guiding principle behind this modern crusade and was considered to be the new political prerequisite for Peace. Its inherent logic of control assumed conditions shaped by the necessity to contain and reverse deviant behavior through the principles of accountability and transparency in two complementary manners: (1) the international community’s supervision of the restructuring processes and the necessary cooperation of national governments, and (2) the vigilance at a national level over a society guided by democratic principles.

The “*greed versus grievance*” theoretical discourse is one major theoretical paradigm that comes-in hand to supplement the issues extrapolated herein in the context of the Democratic Peace Theory. Paul Collier’s¹⁸ authoritative account of intra-state conflict maintains that groups of different political, socio-cultural and /or economic persuasions get into vicious situations of protracted intra-state conflict (as was the case in Rwanda, Burundi, Sierra Leone and Liberia among others, in the 1990s); due to various forms of deprivation, marginalization and/or political exclusion. At the same time, William

¹⁸ Collier, P and Hoeffler A. 2004, *Greedy and Grievance in Civil War*. World Bank/ Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford.

Zartman's¹⁹ account of the "ripe moment" is specific to management of on-going conflict as opposed to situations of post-conflict reconstruction.

¹⁹ Deng M. Francis and Zartman William 1991, *Conflict Resolution in Africa*, Washington: The Brookings Institution.

1.5.2. Historical Trend in Development Priorities

The priorities of development aid have changed over time. Immediately after the Second World War, the focus of development was the reconstruction and rebuilding of the war-torn country's infrastructure. During the 1960s and 1970s, agriculture (the "green revolution") and social development became main priorities, respectively. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, key development priorities included macroeconomic balances, trade liberalization, interest rates, the inflow of foreign direct investment, and the privatization of state-owned enterprises.

Although many policies and practices broadly associated with expanding the role of market forces and constraining the role of the state were put into practice well before the end of 1980s, in 1989, the "Washington Consensus", a summary of policy advice offered by the Washington-based institutions (including the World Bank, IMF and U.S. Treasury) to Latin American countries for the recovery of Latin America from the financial crisis of 1980s, outlined the preferred strategies of economic reform in developing countries. Williamson (1990) summarizes the set of policy reforms that most of the officials in Washington thought would be good for Latin American countries: (1) Fiscal discipline; (2) A redirection of public expenditure priorities toward fields offering both high economic returns and the potential to improve income distribution, such as primary health care, primary education, and infrastructure; (3) Tax reform (to lower marginal rates and broaden the tax base); (4) Interest rate liberalization; (5) A competitive exchange rate; (6) Trade liberalization; (7) Liberalization of inflows of foreign direct

investment; (8) Privatization; (9) Deregulation (to abolish barriers to entry and exit); and (10) Secure property rights.²⁰

Although at least in theory, these reforms were widely accepted among economists, the sequencing and the priorities were widely criticized. The core of the argument against these policy priorities and their sequencing was that these policies were formulated for tackling the specific problems of Latin American countries and thus should not be equally applied to all other developing countries.

Even when there is agreement on what types of reforms are necessary, there is no agreement among policy makers and academicians on how fast reforms should be introduced. Those who are in favor of “gradualism” argue that if you rush you are bound to make serious mistakes because the capacity to manage change is limited in poor and developing countries. Proponents of gradualism believe reforms should be introduced slowly to enable the consolidations of gains.²¹ On the other hand, those in favor of the “big bang” argue that reforms should be introduced rapidly in order to establish policies’ credibility and tackle the difficult issues before opposition can develop.²²

Nonetheless, there is near consensus among the development community on three main lessons from policy reforms: First, it is not the policy itself that matters much but the

²⁰ John, W. (1990). “*What Washington Means by Policy Reform,*” in John Williamson, ed., *Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?*. Washington, D.C: Institute for International Economics.

²¹ Jonathan, H. (1998). “*The Reconstruction of War-Torn Economies.* CAER II Discussion Paper No. 23

²² Joseph,S. (2002). ‘*Globalization and Its Discontents*’, 1st edition. New York: Norton

specifics of the policy being carried out. Second, institutions, both as rules and as organizations, matter for the effectiveness of policies.²³ Third, there is need to recognize the need to tailor specific programs for each and every developing country involving more flexibility in the pacing and sequencing of economic reforms.²⁴

Now the question is whether lessons from historical trends on development priorities are helpful for designing policy priorities for post-conflict reconstruction. The reconstruction of war torn societies is based intellectually on the current consensus around universally accepted values such as market-oriented economic reform, democratization, civil society building, human rights, rule of law, and good governance. Most practitioners and policy makers agree that these values advance peace, prevent conflict and help poor societies develop. However, the methods used to promote economic development in poor countries that have not been torn apart by war could prove ineffective or counter effective in countries emerging from conflict.

War-torn economies differ in several ways from peaceful economies. Post-conflict countries face a high risk of reverting to conflict. World Bank Research shows that there is a 44 percent chance of reverting to conflict during the first five years after the onset of

²³ Michael, R & Radelet, S. (1991). "Macroeconomic Reform in Developing Countries," in Dwight H. Perkins and Michael Roemer, eds., *Reform Economic Systems in Developing Countries*. Cambridge: Harvard Institute of International Development.

²⁴ Saleh, M. (2002). "The Speed of Adjustment and the Sequencing of Economic Reforms: Issues and Guidelines for Policy Makers," IMF Working Paper WP/02/132.

peace.²⁵ In addition to the problems in other developing countries, war-emerged countries also experience extensive population movements, widespread insecurity, worsening infrastructure, a renewed emphasis on subsistence agricultural sector, worsened social indicators and weakened institutions.²⁶ The prevalence of the psychology of war and distrust and urgent needs related to emergency relief, security, justice, and human rights add more challenges in defining development goals.²⁷ According to Eizenstat et al. (2005) there are three unique characteristics of war-torn countries: a security gap; a capacity gap; and a legitimacy gap (i.e., the governments of war-torn economies typically lack clear authority).²⁸ Dobbins et al (2005) assess the role of the international community during the post-conflict period, dividing it into five broad categories: security, humanitarian, civil administration, democratization, and economic reconstruction.²⁹ This study is guided by reconstruction work that takes place during these broad dimensions of post conflict period.

Although capacity gaps exist both in war-torn and not-war-torn developing countries, security and legitimacy gaps are two unique characteristics of countries emerging or recently emerged from conflict. Post-conflict countries are also different from other developing countries in the sense that they provide an opportunity for bold changes

²⁵ The World Bank. (2003). *The Role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development: An Evolving Agenda*. Washington. D.C: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit.

²⁶ Jonathan, H. (2002). *The Reconstruction of War-Torn Economies and Peace-Building Operations*, in *Japanese Bank for International Cooperation, "Development Assistance Strategies in the 21st Century: Global and Regional Issues*. Research Paper 16.

²⁷ Patricia, W. (2005). *Conflict Reconstruction and Reintegration: The Long-Term Challenges: Case Studies of Haiti and Bosnia and Herzegovina*.

²⁸ Stuart, E., Porter, J & Weinstein, J. (2005). *Rebuilding Weak States*, *Foreign Affairs*.

²⁹ James, D et al. (2005). *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq and the UN Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq*. California: RAND.

because the post-conflict period may present relatively amenable conditions for political reform. People expect change and old vested interests may have been weakened. In some cases, previously approaches rejected for political, legal, or administrative reasons may now be received with more openness.³⁰

More recently, some organizations dedicated to development are paying more attention to the development of fragile countries. There is an emerging consensus that, in addition to economic analysis, the socio-political analysis of these countries is important and the response to fragile states' agendas should include a marriage of security and development issues. The World Bank includes post-conflict countries in a group of fragile countries, also known as the "Low Income Countries under Stress (LICUS)." There are three types of LICUS countries: countries emerging from conflict; volatile countries with weak governance and limited capacity; and stagnant countries. However, it is argued that policy should be distinctive in post-conflict settings because the underlying and persistent characteristics of post-conflict countries are very different from other fragile countries.

1.5.3. Experiences in Rebuilding Post-Conflict Countries

The reconstruction of Japan and Germany is often regarded as the most ambitious example of post-war reconstruction. It has been well-accepted that democratization coupled with reconstruction contributed to the stability and growth of these countries. In the same vein the Marshall Plan involved the U.S. in a long-term commitment in the

³⁰ Sanjeev, G et al. (2004). "Rebuilding Fiscal Institutions in Post-conflict Countries," Paper Prepared by the Fiscal Affairs Department. Washington, D.C: IMF

development of Europe by bringing U.S. financial and investment resources to Europe and the post-war European countries to re-build their economies. In case of Japan, the U.S. provided a large-scale humanitarian assistance in the earlier phase of reconstruction followed by major supports for political reform and economic reconstruction.

However, it is argued that the post-conflict reconstruction priorities adopted in Japan and Germany may not be of great help given the fact that the situations of Japan and Germany were fundamentally different than the situations faced by today's post-conflict countries. Contrary to the today's post-conflict countries, which have human and institutional resources and limited aid absorption capacity, Germany and Japan had strong institutional capacity.³¹

Many experts argue that the cases of reconstruction of Germany and Japan are distant past but the international experiences in rebuilding several war-torn countries during the 1990s could greatly contribute in formulating policies for future intervention. Since the early 1990s, a plethora of international interventions—from Mozambique to East Timor to Afghanistan—have expanded the knowledge related to the post-conflict reconstruction. If international support in the form of both money and manpower tapers off after a few initial years of the post-conflict phase and leaves weak and vulnerable countries to their own devices, the recurrence of violence is fairly predictable. However, the long-term

³¹ Patricia, F. (2005). *“Conflict Reconstruction and Reintegration: The Long-Term Challenges: Case Studies of Haiti and Bosnia and Herzegovina.*

international engagement alone may not guarantee peace and prosperity given that the post-conflict reconstruction is a complex problem.

Today's complex post-conflict environment requires interventions with the number of critical characteristics including (a) multi-lateral (involvement of more than one country or one agency), (b) multi-sectoral (in terms of what the international community is doing on the ground (security and development tasks), (c) multi-leveled (in terms of how much should be done) and (d) multi-staged (in terms of when the international community should be involved).³²

Given the increasing complexity of the reconstruction environment, complex missions would be more effective if reconstruction tasks are priorities and sequenced properly. Policy researchers and multilateral organizations have developed models to describe the phases of nation-building. Fukuyama (2004) divides the task of rebuilding post-conflict countries into three distinct phases: (1) the initial stabilization of a war-torn society; (2) the creation of local institutions for governance; and (3) the strengthening of those institutions to the point where rapid economic growth and sustained social development can take place.³³

³² Michael, L. (2003). *What Kind of Peace is Being Built? Assessing Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Charting Future Directions*. Canada: IDRC

³³ Francis, F. (2004). *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

A post-conflict society may achieve higher or lower economic growth depending on the effectiveness of policies during each phase of post-conflict reconstruction. Thus, the policies in different phases of post-conflict reconstruction are interlinked and identifying these linkages will greatly contribute to developing a more effective framework for reconstruction.

Moreover, given the multidimensional impact of a program or policy, it is often hard to estimate the real impact of a particular program on peace building. Anand (2004) mentions that a police training program could have a very high impact on conflict prevention dimension, some impact on improving governance but very little impact on poverty reduction.³⁴ On the other hand, a program for strengthening local non-governmental agencies might have a significant impact on poverty but lesser impacts on governance and conflict prevention.

Most importantly, as mentioned by the Panel on UN Peace Operations in 2000 (the “Brahimi” report), ensuring post-conflict security and achieving broader peacebuilding are interdependent goals, and post-conflict reconstruction necessitates a multi-sectoral approach.³⁵ The report loosely classifies policies into four broad categories namely; security, government and democratization, social policies and economic policies and shows that post-conflict reconstruction consists of several distinct yet interrelated

³⁴ Anand, B. (2004). “*Getting Infrastructure Priorities Right in Post-conflict Reconstruction*,” *UNU/WIDER Conference on Making Peace Work*.

³⁵ Lakhdar, B. “Statement by Lakhdar Brahimi, Special Advisor to the Secretary-General of the United States” in *Beyond Cold Peace: Strategies for Economic Reconstruction and Post-Conflict Management Conference Report*, Berlin Federal Foreign Office, October 27-28, 2004.

categories of tasks. However, what is not yet clear is how these elements fit together, which policies are most effective and what circumstances foster successful post-conflict reconstruction.

Haiti, the poorest country in the western hemisphere, witnessed two nation -building enterprises in a decade.³⁶ The disorder of 2004 is directly attributable to the failure of the international community and the Haitian government to make a concerted effort to achieve political, security as well as socio-economic stability for the advancement of Haitian people during the mid and late 1990s. Even after a decade of post conflict reconstruction, political, economic and social conditions in Haiti failed to improve. This study assesses why the UN-led reconstruction effort in the mid-1990s failed to improve the political and economic situation of Haiti.

An UN-brokered peace agreement in October 1992 ended the conflict between Mozambique's Marxist government and foreign-backed rebels. Since then, Mozambique has simultaneously and successfully undertaken three transitions: From war to peace; from one-party state to formal liberal democracy; and from state-centered economy to market economy³⁷.

More than twenty years have passed since Cambodia emerged from a prolonged conflict. However, the progress towards peace, development and democracy in Cambodia

³⁶ Annan, A. (2004). "*Haiti: This Time we must get it Right.*" Wall Street Journal.

³⁷ African Capacity Building Foundation. (2003). "*Studies in Reconstruction and Capacity Building in Post-Conflict Countries in Africa: Some Lessons of Experience from Mozambique.*"

generates mixed views. Cambodia has restored peace and a sense of normalcy and achieved national reconciliation. National elections and local election have been held regularly and successfully since 1991, the year Cambodia's warring factions signed the peace agreements. Cambodia has also been able to achieve some level of sound macroeconomic management. The web of media and civil society has spread rapidly. Cambodia was able to secure some level of economic growth led by the tourism and garment industries, supported with foreign aid³⁸. However, Cambodia still faces key challenges. The rule of law continues to be extremely weak. Despite regularly national and local elections, Cambodia still lacks a functioning democracy. The opposition parties and civil society are weak and the ruling party has used elections to consolidate its own power. Accountability and transparency problems along with weak governance overshadow the progress made towards economic reforms and stabilization.

1.5.4 Pillars and Policy Goals of Post-Conflict Reconstruction

John, H. & Sullivan, G. (2002) divide priorities for post-conflict countries into four distinct yet interrelated categories of tasks: security; justice and reconciliation; social and economic wellbeing; and governance and participation.³⁹ Although, they acknowledge that a comprehensive framework with a logical sequence should be developed so that momentum can be built and sustained, and success can be shown early in critical areas

³⁸ International Crisis Group (ICG). (2000). *the Elusive Peace Dividend*. Columbia: ICG Asia Report No. 8.

³⁹ John, H. & Sullivan, G. (2002). "Toward Post-Conflict Reconstruction." *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 4, Autumn 2002, pp. 85-96. Online at <http://www.twq.com/02autumn/hamre.pdf> (as of September 10, 2005).

that may take more time to demonstrate progress, they do not specify any logical sequence of policies.

Dobbins et al (2005) assess the role of the international community during the post-conflict period, dividing it into five broad categories: security, humanitarian, civil administration, democratization, and economic reconstruction.⁴⁰ Although nation-building, defined as the use of armed force in the aftermath of crisis to promote a transition to democracy, involves these five aspects in their studies, Dobbins et al. argue that with peace comes the potential for economic growth and the possibility of democratization, indicating that security is the most basic level of development that needs to be addressed first.

Lund argues that five conditions should prevail to achieve sustainable peace in post-conflict societies.⁴¹ The first priority for building peace is to deal with the actual or threatened widespread violence from armed force (“mere peace”). Secondly, after the presence of a minimal level of security, there need to be accommodative political processes that allow access to decisions and provide mechanism for addressing social grievances. Third, a functioning government sufficient to provide essential public services should be in place. Fourth, sufficient economic development is required to improve the well-being of most people in the society and begin to reduce poverty. Fifth,

⁴⁰ James, D et al. (2005). *America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq and the UN Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq*. California: RAND.

⁴¹ Michael, L. (2003). *What Kind of Peace is Being Built? Assessing Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Charting Future Directions*. Canada: IDRC.

in order to sustain peace and stability in the long run, there should be an absence of egregious social divisions and material inequalities.

It is highly likely that the steps taken in the early stages of a war-to-peace transition determine whether peace will be sustained or conflict will be renewed. However, the objectives for assistance outlined by Lund have some doubts as to whether “addressing social grievances” should have priority over “providing essential public services.”⁴² Among other things it is hard to see how social grievance can be addressed in the absence of a competent public sector.

Paying attention to the unique characteristics of war-torn economies, Haughton (1998) provides a menu of key policy measures for speeding the reconstruction of war-torn societies.⁴³ He outlines a framework that is organized into three conceptual phases: initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability. The initial response phase is characterized by intervention for basic security, stability, and emergency services. The second phase focuses on developing legitimate and sustainable indigenous capacity including reviving the economy, establishing governance, enhancing participation, and securing a foundation of justice and reconciliation. The final phase consolidates long-term recovery efforts. Haughton argues that while a framework within which particular policies may be fitted is important however, flexibility, creativity and judgment will always be needed in the context of any given country.

⁴² Michael, L. (2003). *What Kind of Peace is Being Built? Assessing Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Charting Future Directions*. Canada: IDRC

⁴³ Jonathan, H. (1998). *The Reconstruction of War-Torn Economies*, CAER II Discussion Paper No. 23.

1.5.5 Foreign Aid in Post-Conflict Environment

There is no agreement among development economists regarding when, in which area, and how much aid should be given to post-conflict countries. Some argue that too much aid may contribute to rampant price inflation and widespread corruption. So, the question is: How much aid can a post-conflict country usefully absorb and what should be the effective aid delivery framework for post-conflict reconstruction?

Some studies argue that aid should be provided early in the post-war period. This argument is based on the argument that there are high risks of peace agreements breaking down early.⁴⁴ Chauvet and Guillaumont estimate an economic policy regression and find that when policies are initially very poor, aid has a positive impact on them.⁴⁵ Similarly, Addison argues that since revenue mobilization is very low during the beginning of the post-conflict period, aid has a higher marginal value in the early years of recovery — aid is needed for numerous tasks; to settle refugees, provide primary education and basic health services, establish safer water and sanitation, repair roads, and put micro-enterprises back to business, and so on.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Dan, S. (2004). *“Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together,” Overview Report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding*. Oslo: PRIO-International Peace Research Institute.

⁴⁵ Chauvet, L. & Guillaumont, J. (2004). *“Aid and Growth Revisited: Policy, Economic Vulnerability, and Political Instability,”* in Bertil Tungoden et al., *Towards Pro-Poor Policies, (Proceedings of the 156 World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics)*. London: World Bank/Oxford University Press

⁴⁶ Tony, A. (2004). *“Opponent Note for The Challenge of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil War,”*. Copenhagen Consensus Opponent Note.

However, the idea that the bulk of aid should come early is challenged by World Bank research. Collier and Dollar argue that, the effectiveness of aid depends upon the quality of economic policies, governance and institutions.⁴⁷ In addition, Collier and Hoeffler argue that, while needs are great, the quality of state institutions in post-conflict environment is so low that the capacity to use resources effectively is very limited and returns to aid are limited.⁴⁸

Regarding the form in which aid should be delivered, Collier and Hoeffler are of the opinion that aid in the form of an international military presence can be cost-effective as long as the post-conflict government cuts its military budget to make investments elsewhere, thereby reaping a peace dividend during the external military presence.⁴⁹ They argue that a lower level of military spending delivers additional growth. However, this study does not take into account the fact that the prolonged presence of international troops in post-conflict countries creates political problems.

Collier and Hoeffler looked at the risk factors and found that post-conflict countries are at a very high risk of conflict reoccurrence during the first post-conflict decade.⁵⁰

Approximately half of these risks are inherited from the characteristics that already made

⁴⁷ Paul, C. & Dollar, D.(2002).“*Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction*,” European Economic Review, Vol. 46, pp.1475-1500.

⁴⁸ Paul, C. & Hoeffler, A. (2002). “*Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-conflict Societies*,”. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 2902.

⁴⁹ Paul, C. & Hoeffler, A. (2000). “*Greed and Grievances in Civil War*,”. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 2355.

⁵⁰ Paul, C. & Hoeffler, A. (2002). “*Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-conflict Societies*,” .World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 2902.

a country prone to conflict in the first place.⁵¹ Moreover, they have argued elsewhere that aid is more effective when policies improve during the post conflict period.⁵² Contrary to the conventional sequence that gives the top priority to correcting the macroeconomic imbalances, Collier and Hoeffler argue that social policies (social inclusion, poverty reduction, health, education, etc.) are more important for predicting “sustained peace” in post conflict countries.

According to them, the key priorities for improvement should be social policies first, sectoral policies second, and macro policies last. A possible argument supporting the case for prioritizing social policies (e.g., social inclusion) is that they have the powerful effect of signaling the government’s commitment to peace and reconstruction and reassuring investors of stability.⁵³ However, it is hard to understand how social or sectoral policy reforms could take precedence against the background of hyperinflation, and exchange rate, fiscal and financial crises.

Collier and Hoeffler extended their analysis of conflict in a post-conflict environment. Principally, they focused on three issues: (1) whether risk factors predicting conflict also predict reoccurrence of war in the post-conflict countries; (2) what kinds of policies are

⁵¹Paul, C. & Hoeffler, A. (2004).“*The Challenge of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil War,*” *Copenhagen Consensus Challenge Paper.*

⁵² Paul, C. & Hoeffler, A. (2002). “*Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-conflict Societies,*” .World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 2902.

⁵³ The World Bank. (2004). “*The Role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development: An Evolving Agenda,*” *Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit.* Washington, D.C: Oxford University Press.

effective in the post-conflict environment; and (3) whether aid is effective in post-conflict countries.⁵⁴ At present there is no methodology to calculate the appropriate scale of aid for post-conflict reconstruction.

In sum, the literature on the experiences on post-conflict reconstruction suffers from many limitations. Although there are numerous studies, few give a good sense of what the sequencing and combination of policies should be.

1.6 Theoretical Framework

This research study utilized the democratic peace theory. This theory refers to the idea that democracies as a rule do not go to war with one another, a fact which historically has guaranteed peace between democratic states but not without exceptions. Democratic peace theory is rooted in the works and writings of international relations theorist Immanuel Kant, particularly his work *'perpetual peace'*. Kant claims that peace is a reasonable and a desired outcome of interactions between states with a republican government⁵⁵.

An important argument of the democratic peace theory is that liberal democratic states share a common normative dedication to liberal ideals and they frequently employ liberal justifications for going to war. Michael Doyle another proponent of the theory argues in

⁵⁴Paul, C. & Hoeffler, A. (2002). "Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-conflict Societies," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 2902

⁵⁵ Pugh, J. (2005). *Democratic peace theory: A review and Evaluation*. New York: CEMPROC

the same line and solidifies the argument with assertion that the violent interventions that liberal states engage in 'are publicly justified' in the first instance as attempts to preserve a 'way of life': to defend freedom and private enterprise.⁵⁶ It is therefore evident that democratic peace theory often called liberal peace claim that democratic or liberal states are inherently less violent both in their relations with other states and with internal violence.

The primary claim of democratic peace proponents is that democratic states do not wage war against each other, although a number of scholars have modified the claim to the proposition that democracies are *less likely* to fight wars with each other. A number of other claims have been advanced to further the claims of the theory and it is assumed that when democracies go to war they tend to prevail in the war longer than non-democracies, suffering fewer casualties in the war they initiate and democratic states do not initiate preventive wars.⁵⁷

Democratic states are inclined to trade and have free markets and economies as they offer credible commitments regarding trade terms and capital flows. The perception that war brings interruption of import/export business hence hurt economic growth deters democracies from waging wars against each other. Liberal democracies are predisposed towards peaceful interactions with each other and are inherently trustworthy in their

⁵⁶ Doyle, M. (1997). *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*. New York: Norton & Co.

⁵⁷ Schweller ,R. (1992) .*Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More pacific*. New York: World Politics.

relationships with other liberal democratic states. Therefore, liberal democracies are peaceful towards all states except those who are ‘objectively’ determined to be non-liberal/democratic regimes.⁵⁸

The theory is applicable to post conflict re-construction where failed states and states recovering from a recent war can draw important lessons to aid in peace-building and state re-construction. Political disintegration generates instability and threatens neighboring states through refugee flows, the stimulation of illegal trade in weapons and other contraband, and because the communities imperiled by state collapse often cross borders and can appeal to neighboring groups for involvement as it is evidenced by state disintegration from Haiti in the western hemisphere, Yugoslavia in Europe, Somalia, Sudan and Liberia in Africa up to Cambodia in South East Asia. State reconstruction in these states advocated for democratization and adoption of the principles of market economy and multiparty democracy as global recipes for development, peace and stability. Democratic peace-building associates the state security and peace with democratic development and institutions, the rule of law, human rights and market economy which are usually undertaken or established by international organizations or actors, mainly the United Nations. If the true aim of peace-building operations is to build peace and not to serve the political interests of the interveners, then the best way to do so is to address the underlying causes of the problem and constitutes a long-term peace and security which is based on the values of democracy and justice. Before the escalation of

⁵⁸ Grayson, K. (2003). *Democratic peace theory as practice; re-reading the significance of liberal representation of war and peace*. New York: New York University.

conflict into a full-blown war democratic institutions in the conflict parties will mediate the violence.⁵⁹ This is attributed to norms of compromise and cooperation which prevent their conflicts of interest from escalating into violent clashes.

The democratic peace theory focuses on the construction of state capacity by taking both collective security and human security as the core of peace building and to a larger extent state building with a broad strategy of preventing, managing and resolving conflicts in the long-run as well as restoration of comprehensive peace and security. Boutros-Ghali canonized the role of democracy in war-torn societies, stating that peace, development and democracy are inextricably linked and advocated for the promotion of democracy as a highly effective means of preventing conflict.

Democratic peace theory is integral in the study of peace and posts conflict reconstruction with the fundamental assertion that Democracies don't attack each other'. These assumptions guided the US-led 'war on terror'. After the 9/11 terror attacks, the US adopted amore assertive strategy of democracy promotion believing democracy to be an anti-dote to terrorism. In the Middle East this was conducted through the Middle East Partnership Initiative and the Greater Middle East Initiative and a justification to attack Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein from power and institute democratic government.

⁵⁹ Hill, A. (2011). *Democracy promotion and conflict based reconstruction; the United States and democratic consolidation in Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq*. New York: Routledge

The proponents of democratic peace theory in the modern international arrangement reinforced ideals of the theory in world politics and international relations with a declaration that George Bush made in regard to Middle East peace. Bush said:

“The reason why I’m so strong on democracy is democracies don’t go to war with each other. And the reason why the people of most societies don’t like war, and they understand what war means. I’ve got great faith in democracies to promote peace. And that’s why I’m such a strong believer that the way forward in the Middle East, the broader Middle East, is to promote democracy.”⁶⁰

While there are other theories that account for intra-state conflict; this theory is relevant to the study of post conflict reconstruction because fostering of democratic ideals to a larger extent reduces the avenues for violent confrontation and war in general.

1.7 Hypotheses

This study tested the following hypotheses:

- (i) A thorough knowledge of the origins, rationale, complexities and dynamics of each conflict situation is a preliquisite for designing appropriate post reconstruction responses.
- (ii) When security and political stability precedes socio-economic development in post-conflict reconstruction it leads to better strategies to prevent re-emergence of conflict. (THE REVERSE IS NORMALLY THE

⁶⁰ Ibid

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- (iii) Socioeconomic rehabilitation and reconstruction only lay a strong foundation for lasting peace and sustainable development, but do not restore the economy to its pre-conflict state.

1.8 Methodology

This section provides the research methodology used for this study. The research methodology is presented in following sequence: study design, study site, data collection methods, target population/sampling frame, sampling and sampling size, ethical issues , data analysis and presentation, scope of the study, limitations of the research and chapter outline.

1.8.1 Study Design

Research design is a road map guide of how research itself was conducted.⁶¹ It gives the methods, instruments for data collection and interpretation.⁶² The function of a research design is to ensure that the evidence obtained enables us to answer the initial question as unambiguously as possible.⁶³ The research design used in this study was a comparative case study approach.

⁶¹ Law, J & Lodge, T. (1984). *Science for social scientists*. London: Macmillan.pp.20-46.

⁶³ *ibid*

A case study approach is appropriate for several reasons. First, once a civil war has ended there exists little systematic data on the security, political and economic reform processes. Most data are outcome indicators that fail to provide sufficient insight into the effects of specific reform policies. No data bank provides systematic data on the timing and sequencing of reforms. So, a case study provides important insights into the sequencing of reform and other policy issues. Secondly, the conflicts the three countries faced were viewed in reconstruction terms as fairly recent and often depicted as a failure in Haiti, successful in Mozambique and mixture of success and failure in Cambodia in post-conflict reconstruction cases. It was therefore possible to obtain data on policies and conditions that succeeded and failed under which post-conflict reconstructions were implemented.

The three case studies were developed using existing literature, primary data and peer reviews. In each case, the research focused on the following questions; what were the major components of reforms adopted since the cessation of conflict? When were the various reforms instituted? Were there any watershed events that made reform possible? Who were the actors for reform and what were their roles, goals and motivations? What was the role of economic policies? What was the role of security policies, in particular, the policies on policing and quelling violence, political mediation, and reforming security sectors? What constraints did the donor community face in implementing its programs?

Looking at whether donor efforts met their objectives, the study then assessed the case using a multi-dimensional policy effectiveness matrix. The assessment or rating on each policy was reviewed based on the position of the experts involved in the post-conflict reconstruction of the three countries and the matrix refined as needed.

1.8.2 Study Site

Although the study site was Haiti, Cambodia and Mozambique data was collected from officials in the diplomatic corps, UN Officers, People working with international organization like AU, military officers, Government officers, media professionals and Academicians with proven knowledge on post conflict reconstruction globally but applicable to the situation in Haiti, Cambodia and Mozambique.

1.8.3 Data Collection Methods

A number of data collections methods were used in this study and this included; an open ended questionnaire for the respondents. Open-ended questions were used to obtain the respondents' opinions on post conflict reconstruction. This presented an advantageous side to it because the response was not limiting respondents in answering the questions. Detailed data on the opinions of experts on post conflict reconstruction were obtained through unstructured interviews. The experts included both the practitioners and researchers involved in the area of conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. Secondary data was used in addition to primary data.

1.8.4 Target Population and Sample Size

This study targeted a body of professionals who are well versed with post conflict reconstruction industry globally but have expert knowledge on the three countries of Haiti, Cambodia and Mozambique. The study used Purposive Sampling Techniques identify the six study units which included: officials in the diplomatic corps, UN Officers, Media professionals, academicians, Government officers and military officers who were in one way or another well informed and involved in issues surrounding reconstruction of post conflict societies.

1.8.5 Ethical Issues

While doing research, the researcher was aware of what is considered acceptable and what is not. Neumann states that ethical research does not inflict harm of any sort, be it physical, psychological abuse or even legal jeopardy. Taking these principles into account benefits not only the participants and the researcher but also those who get to read the research work. It helps to establish credibility.⁶⁴ He further maintains that the researcher has a moral and professional obligation to be ethical even when his research subjects are unaware or unconcerned about ethics. The researcher therefore did not take advantage of subject's ignorance about ethics to harm them in any way. The researcher questionnaires took into account confidentiality and any information that respondents gave would only be used for the sole purpose of academics.

⁶⁴ Booth, C. W & Colomb, G.G., & Williams, M. J. (1995). *The craft of research*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. P.258.

1.8.6 Data Analysis and Presentation

The data collected was first coded. Coding involves giving all statements numeric codes based on their meaning for ease of capturing data. After coding there was data entry and analysis. The percentage distribution was then utilized and the results illustrated in terms of explanation in a story form.

1.8.7 Scope of the Study

The study examined the challenges and prospects of reconstruction and peacebuilding using the case studies of Haiti, Cambodia and Mozambique.

1.8.8 Limitation of Research

This study was limited by certain challenges which included sensitivity of information of which many respondents were not willing to provide. To tackle this challenge there was need to convince the informants that the confidential information provided would solely be used for academic purposes. Language barrier also presented another limitation of research since all communities targeted in the research did not share a common language. This necessitated interpreters.

1.8.9 Organization of the Study

This study includes a total of eight chapters. Chapter One is the introduction of the study and includes the problem statement, objectives, hypothesis, justification, literature review, methodology and structure of the study. Chapter Two examines the nature of post conflict societies and analyses the characteristics of post conflict societies in historical,

political and economic terms and how these factors impact on the process of establishing a post conflict reconstruction framework. Chapter Three present the case study on the post-conflict reconstruction in Haiti. Chapter Four present the case study on the post-conflict reconstruction in Cambodia. Chapter Five present the case study on the post-conflict reconstruction in Mozambique. Chapter Six presents an analysis of the data and study findings and discussions on the reconstruction process and presents a framework for reconstruction of the post conflict societies. Chapter Seven concludes by presenting the summary of the results, conclusions and policy recommendations.

1.9 Chapter Summary

In this chapter we have given the background to our study where we indicated that managing conflict means not only avoiding escalation in a crisis but also creating a durable basis for peaceful alternatives through democracies, market economies and civil institutions that promote human rights. There is awareness that while war has ended, peace, especially sustainable peace, is not so easily forthcoming. Dire poverty, ongoing ethnic, political or religious rivalry, the proliferation of arms, nonexistent governance institutions and infrastructure all pose tremendous threats that can easily lead a country back into war.

In addition, there is now widespread recognition that failed states can provide safe havens for a diverse array of transnational threats, including epidemic diseases, terrorist networks, global organized crime, and narcotics traffickers. Thus, the driving force behind increasing international engagement in post-conflict countries is the spill-over

effects of insecurity and instability in war-torn countries.⁶⁵ In the following chapter we examine the nature of post conflict societies with a view to identify common pillars used for their reconstruction.

⁶⁵ For example, Chauvet and Collier (2004) *argue that the cost of doing nothing exceeds the cost of aid intervention intended to turn around fragile states.*

CHAPTER TWO

THE NATURE OF POST CONFLICT SOCIETIES

2.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the nature of post conflict societies with a view to identify common pillars that can be used for their reconstruction. In this chapter we propose that interventions in post conflict societies must address the key pillars of the post conflict reconstruction framework, namely: Legitimacy, trust and authority of the state, political will for transparency and accountability, rule of law, social capital and social cohesion, economic reconstruction and service delivery and finally, security and cross border movement.

This is because violent conflicts permeate all levels of society, disrupting social bonds, communal links and mutual trust, which are crucial for social stability.⁶⁶ Previous wars fought, previous aggressions committed, or previous actions that led to the loss of trust are not easily forgotten. The conflict helix is a process of conflict which originates in the socio-cultural space of meanings, values, norms, status, and class. It is at one time a structure, the opposition of attitudes, at another a situation, the opposition and awareness of different interests. It may be latent until one actor initiates action, or resolved through resignation of interests. Or it may be manifest as opposing interests strive to overcome and balance each other.

66 Stover, E & Weinstein, H. (2004). *Introduction: conflict, justice and reconciliation*. In E.Stover, H.M Weinstein (Eds.).*My neighbour, my enemy: justice and community in the aftermath of mass atrocity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-26

2.2 Post Conflict Societies

Countries that are emerging out of conflict face multiple challenges – ranging from transitional justice issues, building civil society, writing new constitutions, creating new rule of law systems and security forces as well as rebuilding the domestic economy. Although this is the result largely of the internal efforts of individual countries, it is also due to the dramatic increase in support from the international community.⁶⁷ “Post-conflict” scenarios are often characterized by “multiple transition processes,” including the transition from war to peace, but also often accompanied by democratization, decentralization, and market liberalization. Hence, the transformation of war-torn societies into peaceful, stable and more prosperous ones is an immensely complex task, often susceptible to contradictory pressures and concomitant risks of a relapse into violence.

The experience of recent years has also led the United Nations to focus as never before on peace building – efforts to reduce a country's risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Building lasting peace in war-torn societies is among the most daunting of challenges for global peace and security. Peace building requires sustained international support for national efforts across the broadest range of activities – monitoring ceasefires; demobilizing and reintegrating combatants; assisting the return of refugees and displaced persons; helping organize and monitor elections of a

⁶⁷ John, E & Stewart, F. (2008). *Enabling Local Ingenuity: Crisis Prevention and Recovery Report 2008*, United Nations Development Programme Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UN Publications, New York.

new government; supporting justice and security sector reform; enhancing human rights protections and fostering reconciliation after past atrocities⁶⁸.

2.3 The Post-War Era Situation

Experience has shown that in the early phases of transition (from conflict to peace), peace processes remain fragile and the risk of resumption of violence high⁶⁹. This is because countries emerging from conflict are characterized by weakened or non-existent capacity at all levels, destroyed institutions, and the absence of a democratic culture, good governance, rule of law and respect for human rights, as well as underlying poverty. The challenge of violent conflicts and its impact on socio-economic development in developing countries has remained a daunting task. War has caused untold economic and social damage to these countries. Food production is impossible in conflict areas, and famine often results. Widespread conflict has condemned many of these countries' children to lives of misery and, in certain cases, has threatened the existence of traditional cultures.

In Africa, the African Union (AU) and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have put enormous efforts in the facilitation of negotiations for peaceful resolution of

⁶⁸ Maluki, P. (2014). *Peace building strategies and sustainable peace in Rwanda and Burundi*. Heinrich-Böcking: Scholars press

⁶⁹ African Union Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development (AU PCRDR) policy framework <http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/70-post-conflict-reconstruction-and-development-pcrd#sthash.ssw2kco1.dpuf>

existing conflicts and the effective implementation of peace agreements, as witnessed in, among others, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Sudan and Somalia.

It was in this context that the AU saw the necessity to ensure that peace agreements are effectively complemented by sustained post-conflict reconstruction and peace building efforts, with a view to addressing the root causes underlying their outbreak. Africa has been undertaking post-conflict reconstruction activities since the time of the OAU, long before the Post conflict Reconstruction and Development, (PCRD) Policy was adopted in Banjul in 2006. The AU policy is intended to serve as a guide for the development of comprehensive policies and strategies that elaborate measures that seek to consolidate peace and prevent relapse to violence, promote sustainable development and pave the way for growth and regeneration in countries and regions emerging from conflict.⁷⁰

2.4 Nation Building in Post Conflict Societies

A key feature of post conflict societies is the breakdown of the nation state. Long drawn conflict usually wears out contenting parties leading to erosion of basic affinities that nit society together; consequently nation building pre-occupies these societies. Nation building refers to the process of expanding and establishing state authority over an entire national territory, whose inhabitants are increasingly being integrated into an identity

⁷⁰Ibid.

higher than those of their respective ethnic and regional identities. This constitutes a national space and is brought about purely as an empirical matter due to the accidents of history⁷¹. Thus nation building is an endogenous process that enhances capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state propelled by state-society relations. In a nutshell, nation building has to be an agenda that fundamentally provides policies and a framework that affirm the peace, reconciliation and the rule of law among citizens.

Thomas Risse argue that if statehood is defined by the monopoly over the means of violence or the ability to make and enforce central political decisions, then limited statehood reflects a situation where the domestic sovereignty of a state is severely circumscribed. Areas of limited statehood concern those parts of a country in which central authorities (governments) lack the ability to implement and enforce rules and decisions or in which the legitimate monopoly over the means of violence is lacking, at least temporarily. The ability to enforce rules or to control the means of violence can be restricted along various dimensions: (1) territorial, that is, parts of a country's territorial spaces; (2) sectoral, that is, with regard to specific policy areas; (3) social, that is, with regard to specific parts of the population; and (4) temporal⁷².

Positive nation building processes usually constitute symbiotic relations between a state that delivers services for its people, social and political groups who constructively engage

⁷¹ Bendix, R. (1964). *Nation-Building and Citizenship*. New York: Wiley and Sons, p. 18.

⁷² Risse, T. (2010). *Governance without a State - Can It Work? Regulation and Governance*.

with their state⁷³. These processes involve multiple national stakeholders who continually negotiate and transform the political process by empowering citizens to ask themselves what they can do for their country to boost this worthy cause. Thus with these methods of capacity building among all the stakeholders the dimension of nation building will be realized. These dimensions include: Political settlements and processes that facilitate constructive state-society relations, the capacity of the state to provide security and rule through law; Containment, channeling and resolving conflict in society; Raising revenue and managing it to meet people's expectations (service delivery, employment); Facilitating economic development; Legitimizing the state in the eyes of the population (based on quality of political processes, performance and moral authority); Government seeking progress through Peace-building initiatives and implementation of the same. Successful nation-building requires close attention and responsiveness to local conditions calling for a reorientation on how state failure or success is perceived⁷⁴.

2.5 The Reconstruction Framework in Post Conflict Societies

While it is generally understood that reconstruction often takes place at various times during and after conflict, the framework places tasks between the cessation of violent conflict and the return to normalization. Normalization is reached when: extraordinary outside intervention is no longer needed; the processes of governance and economic

⁷³Tanja,B & Risse, T. (2005). *Public Private Partnerships: Effective and Legitimate Tools of International Governance? In Complex Sovereignty. Reconstituting Political Authority in the Twenty-First Century, edited by Edgar Grande and Louis W. Pauly.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press,pp 195-216.

⁷⁴ Bandyopadhyay, S. & Green, E. (2008). *Nation-Building and Conflict in Modern Africa.* London: Department of Economics and STICERD, LSE and Department of International Development, LSE.

activity largely function on a self-determined and self-sustaining basis; and Internal and external relations are conducted according to generally accepted norms of behaviour⁷⁵.

While primary responsibility for reconstruction must lie with indigenous actors, international intervention is often critical during the early stages of post-conflict transition. The framework is organized into three conceptual phases, defined as initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability. Transformation also focuses on developing legitimate and sustainable indigenous capacity, often with special attention to restarting the economy, establishing mechanisms for governance and participation, and securing a foundation of justice and reconciliation. Fostering sustainability consolidates long-term recovery efforts, often leading to the withdrawal of all or most of the international military involvement. It is this stage that also lays the foundation for the prevention of conflict and the re-emergence of violence. Likewise, fostering sustainability, the path toward normalization, may also emerge during the transformation time frame⁷⁶.

2.6 The Pillars of Reconstruction

The framework tasks are organized around four distinct issue areas, or “pillars”: security; social/economic well-being; justice/reconciliation; and governance/participation.

⁷⁵ Brown, A & Stewart, F. (2011). *A Typology of Post-Conflict Environments*, Centre for Research on Peace and Development (CRPD) University of Leuven, Working Paper No. 1

⁷⁶ Brown, A. & Stewart, F. (2011), *A Typology of Post-Conflict Environments*, Centre for Research on Peace and Development (CRPD) University of Leuven, Working Paper No. 1

2.6.1 Security and Demilitarization

In big international wars, a formal surrender, a negotiated cessation of hostilities, and/or peace talks followed by a peace treaty mark possible “ends” to conflicts.⁷⁷ The post-conflict period starts when the main hostilities have ceased to the point that international aid can begin. There is a reasonable degree of security but the situation is not necessarily safe. Security addresses all aspects of public safety, in particular establishment of a safe and secure environment and development of legitimate and stable security institutions. After war, the recovery and rehabilitation of the state itself is a priority, particularly because a functioning state is essential for peace consolidation.

Security encompasses the provision of collective and individual security, and is the precondition for achieving successful outcomes in the other pillars. In the most pressing sense, it concerns securing the lives of civilians from immediate and large-scale violence and the restoration of territorial integrity. Maintaining cessation of all violent conflict is the foundation for a peaceful transition to the creation of a new government, economic development and social reconstruction. As a critical early step, security should be consolidated with confidence building and other measures to control violence. Reducing tension and suspicion is a precondition for complete demobilization and disarmament, but at the same time the latter’s success reinforces mutual commitment to peace. Steps towards demilitarization are composed of force reduction, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants back into society.

⁷⁷ Brown, A. & Stewart, F. (2011), *A Typology of Post-Conflict Environments*, Centre for Research on Peace and Development (CRPD) University of Leuven, Working Paper No. 1

In the post conflict setting public security is considered in the context of the protection of group and individual well-being and to human rights violations by the state. Capacity of any government is to ensure civilian security through establishment of professional police and judicial systems. Institutional reforms in the security sector coupled with the protection of the citizens are essential in creating an environment conducive to sustain the process of democratization and development. In the traditional notion of confidence building i.e. the reductions of military forces and armament among state actors has been applied to mitigate volatile relations between former foes coming out of intrastate conflict. Demilitarization and peaceful transition cannot be successfully carried out in the midst of suspicions. Where there are risks of renewed clashes, protagonists continue to keep stock piles of arms for future use. Transparent commitments rely on mutually accepted framework of rules and institutions such as national peace committee, secretariat, or commissions adopted jointly by the parties.

Political matters are more important than logistical and technical concerns in determining the outcome of a demilitarization process. Since returning to war is the outcome of a political decision, weapons are not the cause of war, but just instruments. The international community can provide the needed guarantee of compliance of each party. Such measures as the withdrawal of armed forces and the surrender or reduction of arms are made easier with third-party supervision. In the process of administering demobilization, compensation is needed for former combatants and their immediate dependants. Ex-soldiers may receive aid for transportation, food assistance and stipends in order to return to their place of origin. Reinsertion support serves as safety nets for

veterans. Support for settlement may extend to retraining for new skills, microcredit facilities and counseling for reintegration. Although short-term efforts such as supervising the demobilization of combatants and guaranteeing their security as well as monitoring ceasefire can be more easily achieved, long-term demilitarization has to be supported by sufficient and available financial and human resources.⁷⁸

2.6.2 Socio-Economic Wellbeing in Post-conflict Societies

Economic stagnation, inequality, scarcity and environmental degradation have been some of the outcomes of conflict. The purpose of economic growth programming in post-conflict countries is both to reduce the risk of a return to conflict and to accelerate the improvement of well-being for everyone, particularly the conflict affected population.⁷⁹

When war ends, countries face serious macroeconomic problems including massive unemployment, moderate to high inflation, chronic fiscal deficits, high levels of external and domestic debt and low domestic revenue.⁸⁰ Successful economic recovery subsequently involves the challenging tasks of steering a course that manages inflation whilst attaining respectable growth, makes the best use of aid, builds an environment conducive for private investment and attains reasonable fiscal autonomy. Fortunately,

⁷⁸ Mark, K & Ozerdem, M. (2004). *Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace*. Journal of Peace Research 41, No 4 July.

⁷⁹Guide to Economic Growth in Post-Conflict Countries. Guide is based on staff research and workshops organized by the Economic Growth Office of USAID's Economic Growth, Agriculture, and Trade (EGAT) Bureau during 2007-2008.

⁸⁰ Ohiorhenuan, J & Stewart, F. (2008). *Enabling Local Ingenuity: Crisis Prevention and Recovery Report 2008* United Nations Development Programme Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UN Publications, New York.

there is extensive experience to draw on from many countries that have negotiated post-conflict recovery.

Economic interventions need to be an integral part of a comprehensive restructuring and stabilization program. While economic growth is not the sole solution to resolving post-conflict issues, it can clearly be a significant part of the solution. Evidence shows that early attention to the fundamentals of economic growth increases the likelihood of successfully preventing a return to conflict and moving forward with renewed growth. Economic growth programming should focus on the basics of a functioning economy, with early emphasis on short-term effectiveness in stimulating economic activity and creating jobs, rather than on longer-term economic efficiency. In general, short-term results should trump longer-term issues in terms of programming choices. There are, however, no hard-and-fast rules about these trade-offs. Judgment must be applied on a case by case basis.

Economies of war underpinned by greed and opportunities have been posited to underlie causality, dynamics and the sustenance of conflicts and particularly resource wars.⁸¹ For example, the economy of resource conflict in Nigeria's oil belt, the Niger Delta region as profound by Ikelegbe was that a conflict economy comprising an intensive and violent struggle for resource opportunities, inter and intra communal/ethnic conflicts over resources and the theft and trading in refined and crude oil had blossomed since the

⁸¹Ikelegbe, A. (2005). *The Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta Region of Nigeria*, University of Benin, Benin City, *Nordic Journal of African Studies* 14(2): 208–234.

1990s. Though the economy did not cause the conflict, it has become a part of the resistance and a resource for sustaining it. The economy underpins an extensive proliferation of arms and the institutions of violence and the pervasiveness of crime, violence and communal/ethnic conflicts.

How best can the capacities and institutions that have survived a conflict be nurtured and reinforced? How can the efforts and initiatives of households, communities and enterprises be strengthened as they strive to rebuild their lives at the end of a conflict? Indigenous drivers provide the most viable platform on which to base post-war recovery efforts and international support. Policies that harness and build on social processes and interactions on the ground, and on local capacities, are more likely to be successful and self-sustaining. During the immediate post-conflict period, there may be a narrow window of opportunity to introduce difficult economic reforms. There also may be extreme limits on the government's capacity to implement change. Often, so many changes are needed that donors, working with the host country government, have to set immediate priorities on the basis of what will most quickly and most effectively generate employment and stimulate the economy.

2.6.3 Non-Reconciled Communities and the Problem of Social Dilemmas

Reconciliation or the process of forgiving past wrongs and putting away grievances on an individual, community, and national level is an important feature of post-conflict societies' reconstruction. Psychosocial healing is crucial process following the trauma of war and the breakdown of social institutions. While those affected by war are ultimately

responsible for the healing process, international organizations can assist in the process. Justice and reconciliation addresses the need for an impartial and accountable legal system and for dealing with past abuses; in particular, creation of effective law enforcement, an open judicial system, fair laws, humane corrections systems, and formal and informal mechanisms for resolving grievances arising from conflict.

Judicial reconciliation can create a more substantial sense of justice for citizens who have been the victims of war crimes and human rights abuses. This requires individual accountability for war criminals and via criminal prosecutions or mechanisms of accountability in the form of an international tribunal, a commission of inquiry, or a “Truth and Reconciliation commission”. Mechanism are needed to ensure quick response to both immediate and longer-term rehabilitation needs of the justice system.

Truth and Reconciliation Commission, South Africa (TRC), a court-like body was established by the new South African government in 1995 to help heal the country and bring about a reconciliation of its people by uncovering the truth about human rights violations that had occurred during the period of apartheid. The primary focus of the commission was on victims. It received more than 22,000 statements from victims and held public hearings. The commission received more than 7,000 amnesty applications, held more than 2,500 amnesty hearings, and granted 1,500 amnesties for thousands of crimes committed during the apartheid years. The South African TRC represented a major departure from the approach taken at the Nüremberg trials. It was hailed as an innovative model for building peace and justice and for holding accountable those guilty

of human rights violations. At the same time, it laid the foundation for building reconciliation among all South Africans. Many other countries dealing with post-conflict issues have instituted similar methodologies for such commissions, although not always with the same mandate.

The absence of reconciled communities in post conflict societies attest to the challenge of social dilemmas that characterize these communities. According to Bo Rothstein social dilemma indicates a situation where everybody wins if everybody cooperates.⁸² By implication, if you do not trust that everybody else will cooperate it is meaningless to act cooperatively yourself, since benefits from cooperation needs everybody or almost everybody to cooperate. Thus it can be rational not to cooperate if you do not think others will. This means that functioning cooperation for a common purpose can only exist if you trust that other will also act cooperatively. This social dilemma can help explain the absence of reconciled communities in most post conflict societies. Like in the famous prisoners dilemma the *worst-of* scenario will arise if both or several parties chose not to cooperate especially on an issue that is core to the conflict. In such scenario, each party tries to maximize its interests at the expense of the common good that would accrue through cooperation⁸³.

82 Cooperation in social dilemmas can signify both to restrain oneself from doing something (like taking bribes or misuse the water supplies or killing people for being from another ethnical group), and to be capable of doing or achieving something (like doing the maintenance of a pond or maintain security for a group of people).

⁸³ Persson, E & Maluki, P. (forthcoming) *Building Trust in Post-Conflict Societies: the human rights and peace building lessons learned in Mt. Elgon region in Kenya*. Nairobi: University of Nairobi

2.6.4 Weak Governance Institutions and Democratic Norms

Generally most of the post conflict societies suffer from weak governance institutions. The UNDP describes governance as “the exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels.”⁸⁴ It comprises mechanisms, processes, and institutions, through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations, and mediate their differences.

Governance is now understood to include the wide range of ways in which the political, social, and administrative structure of a society affects the access of its members to basic opportunities and capabilities. It is a paradigm denoting something more than government. In fact, governance has become a fashionable way of talking about reform in government and its relations with the society. The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project reports composite indicators of six dimensions of governance. Key features and aggregate indicators that define governance in this case are listed as: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PV), Government Effectiveness (GE), Regulatory Quality (RQ), Rule of Law (RL), Control of Corruption (CC), Voice and Accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. Political Stability and Absence of

⁸⁴ UNDP. (2000). *Human Development Report*. hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2000

Violence is concerned with perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism.

While legitimate governments are increasingly challenged to meet the requirements of democracy, manipulation of mass-based democracies can lead to conflict. Critical factors for the establishment of a modern government comprise those that causally contribute to the process of building a national government capable of executing public policies under the guidance of good governance. The most important aspects of good governance traverse the economic, political, and the administrative environments of society and government.

A state public record falls within the administrative aspect of good governance. With open state records, the public is able to express its opinions on any matter independently. It also provides for a transparent government model, which is a fundamental characteristic of modern administration. Societal and governmental processes and institutions cannot be sustained with a closed bureaucratic system that is accountable to the few. A secretive public matter either gets spoiled or is lost and, in the process therefore, creates mistrust and suspicion among stakeholders. No government will be able to make the laws of the land and enforce them if it ignores openness. Somalia has been without effective government for 24 years. It has survived, but it has not prospered. Various forms of governance have filled the vacuum left by the collapse of the state in 1991, including informal systems driven by the resurgence of the role of clans and by the

evolving roles of business, religious, and civic groups.⁸⁵ In South Central Somalia, these groups provide an array of services in most communities, and various levels of security, justice, and predictability in a context of continuing conflict and insecurity. In the absence of a functioning central government, Somaliland and Puntland restored peace and security in their states, but both are still too weak to efficiently deliver services.

The overall objective of the Governance, Security, and Rule of Law cluster is to support the post conflict societies to develop administrations that, through its credibility, legitimacy, and reconciliation, can: create institutions to ensure security and establish the rule of law; regulate commerce and enable private sector growth with international investment and trade; enable investment in infrastructure to support growth and recovery from war; enable the recovery of livelihoods; and deliver social services to all, through local governance, with community-led initiatives and partnerships.⁸⁶

2.6.4.1 Legitimacy, Trust and Authority of the State

When the authority of the state has collapsed, and the remaining structures of government often lose their legitimacy in post-conflict settings, thus leading to political, societal and economic disintegration on a national and even regional level, the main task of governments in post-conflict situations is to rebuild economic and political governance

⁸⁵Fletcher, S. et al. (2006). *Governance, Security, and Rule of Law*, Somali Joint Needs Assessment, Cluster Report UNDP Somalia.

⁸⁶ Maluki, P.(2014). *Peace building strategies and sustainable peace in Rwanda and Burundi*, Heinrich-Bocking: Scholars press

and regain legitimacy and the trust of their populace. It is generally acknowledged that the critical determinant of sustainable recovery, peace and development is a committed leadership aimed at: protecting human rights; ensuring rule of law and security; re-establishing and strengthening credible, transparent and accountable public administration institutions; reconstructing an efficient, representative public service that achieves equitable service delivery and re-generates an equitable post-conflict economy.

These key areas of concern constitute the basic prerequisites of peace-sensitive reconstruction and reconciliation. Demonstrated action toward accomplishing them can transform the mind-set of people to trust in their government's ability to deliver lasting peace and progress and to be patient through the hardships that will prevail. At their inception, post-conflict governments, especially transitional authorities, often lack legitimacy and have not yet earned trust, as they were formed as a result of negotiations between warring parties without the involvement of the majority of the population or they include former combatants perceived by the population to be responsible for crimes. They also exercise limited control over the country's assets.

A major process of democratization is the concept of power-sharing among foes, as exhibited in the Rwandan case. The Arusha Accord like all power sharing arrangements, sought to end the conflict in Rwanda by proportionately distributing legislative and governing authority equally among the parties involved. Ideally this created a political structure which relies upon the free election of public officials to fill the role of government with an effective democratic society disputes and conflicts would be settled

on campaign trail and not on battlefield. The development of public policy often has to be negotiated with other actors -sectarian groups or former parties to the armed conflict- who may control parts of the territory and/or national resources.

2.6.4.2 Potential for Social Capital Approaches

Social capital refers to the institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society's social interactions.⁸⁷ Social capital may be defined as those resources inherent in social relations, which facilitate collective action. Social capital resources include trust, norms, and networks of association representing any group which gathers consistently for a common purpose⁸⁸. Social capital is regarded as a set of horizontal associations between people, consisting of social networks and associated norms that have an effect on community productivity and well-being. Social capital facilitates coordination and cooperation. The social capital is particularly useful conceptual tool for the assessment and construction, as it emphasizes the importance of cross-cutting bonds, focusing on what can bring people back together and foster constructive interaction which can become self-sustaining in divided communities. Thus, this approach builds on one of the aspects of divided and war-town societies that possess great potential for change- the human drive for repair.

⁸⁷ World Bank .(2011). *what is Social Capital*.<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/EXTT SOCIALCAPITAL/0,,print:Y~isCURL:Y~contentMDK:20185164~menuPK:418217~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:401015,00.html>

⁸⁸ *ibid*

The broadest and most encompassing view of social capital includes the social and political environment that shapes social structure and enables norms to develop. Led by a growing body of evidence which shows social capital as a potential contributor to poverty reduction and sustainable development, increasing efforts are being made to identify methods and tools relevant to social capital. Elaborating upon the social capital model of Grootaert and van Bastelaer, it establishes that ethnic conflict destroys the balance of the social capital components eradicating the level overarching divides.⁸⁹ Internally displaced people (IDPs), returning refugees, and unsupported youth and (former) child soldiers/ex-combatants and others are particularly vulnerable to being co-opted into unproductive or illicit activities that are counterproductive to the effective functioning of the state. The State must organize specific, demonstrable initiatives to regenerate social cohesion through policies and programmes that promote participation, equity and inclusion.

The World Bank's Rwanda Community Reintegration and Development Project were among few initiatives fostering inclusive social capital in Rwanda after the 1994 ethnic war. It was run from 1999 to 2003, targeting twelve vulnerable communities and pursuing 'community-based reintegration'. The heavily top-down initiatives aimed at proscribing Rwanda ethnic groups whose relations became antagonized in the course of conflict have equated ethnic identities with conflict and largely failed in terms of transforming societal relations. It may seem therefore that promoting the non-exclusivity

⁸⁹Grootaert, C & Van, T. (2002). *The Role of Social Capital in Development*. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, pp. 341 – 350.

of ethnic identities, encouraging community engagement and inter-ethnic dialogue at the local level has more potential to foster reconciliation. Ethnic reconciliation was not among the stated goals of the project as it was focused on rebuilding social capital and diminishing cleavages among groups.⁹⁰ Post-conflict reconstruction after an ethnic conflict should address as a matter of priority the problems related to the recovery or construction of societal micro-frameworks with respect to the macro-unit in focus.

The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina provides good examples for the negative impact of ethnic conflict on macro and micro socio-political levels and for the discrepancies between expected and achieved results. The reconstruction practice in Bosnia and Herzegovina is considered in the context of policies and programmes designed and implemented by representatives of the international and local community, with a focus on the efforts directed towards social capital rebuilding. The special needs of societies emerging from the traumas of conflict have shortened the development planning cycle in such a way as to demand more flexibility of programs and resources and greater responsiveness to emergencies that have up to now been handled only through humanitarian and relief assistance.⁹¹ Ideally, every post-conflict reconstruction effort seeks to respond to the urgent needs of societies emerging from armed conflicts and works to improve the efforts of key actors in rehabilitation and reconstruction operations by identifying and filling gaps within the current capacities of local and international actors.

⁹⁰World Bank. (2001). *Building Cooperation in Post-Conflict Areas: Rwanda Community Reintegration*, Social Development Notes. No. 59. Washington, DC: World Bank

⁹¹ The African Capacity Building Foundation, Occasional Paper No.3, 2004.

In post-conflict reconstruction, peace and security are essential for sustainable development. Broad-based development, important in its own right, also contributes to sustainable peace. The centrality of the peace objective implies one important corollary: the importance of appreciating the political environment and sensitivities of capacity building interventions. Capacity building, being a means to an end in a long development process, should be integrated as fully as possible in national development policies, plans and strategies. In this regard, the development objective in post-conflict reconstruction process must be clearly defined, institutional and human resource development needs mapped out, and the capacity building strategy clearly articulated.

2.6.5 Democratic Norms and Beneficiary Participation

Promoting democracy in post-conflict states begins with the problem of order. By definition, where there has been violent conflict, a peace agreement may restore the authority of the state over its territory and implement peaceful means for sharing power or regulating the competition for power. In the absence of an effective state, there are basically three possibilities. If there has been a civil war and a rebel force has ultimately triumphed, then the vacuum may be filled by the rebellious army and political movement as it establishes control over the state.⁹²

⁹²Diamond, L. (2014), *Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States: Lessons and Challenges* Prepared for the National Policy Forum on Terrorism, Security, and America's Purpose. Washington, DC

Tension pits the imperatives of post-conflict democracy building against post-conflict administration and stabilization. The goal may be to establish democracy, but in a post-conflict setting it may be some time before free, fair, and meaningful elections can be organized. Thus, for some interim period, an unelected authority has to administer the country. The best solution is a transitional government in which the former combatants share power by some agreed-upon formula until democratic elections can be organized (the South African model). However, it is difficult to broker such agreements in the midst of violent conflict or state collapse. A frequent model has been international intervention of both a military and political nature, with the international authority providing both a stabilization force to secure the country and a transitional authority to rule the country, or at least help referee the political situation, until a new constitution can be written and elections can be held for a new permanent government. Whatever the specific form of the post-conflict effort to build democracy, one thing must be stressed above all others: no order, no democracy. Democracy cannot be viable (and neither can it really be meaningful) in a context where violence or the threat of violence is pervasive and suffuses the political calculations and fears of groups and individuals. Thus, the promotion of democracy in post-conflict situations cannot succeed without the rebuilding of order and therefore the tasks of democracy building and of peace implementation are inseparable.

It is possible to implement peace without democracy, but it is not possible to build democracy without peace. More generally, there are six distinct challenges of political reconstruction in a post-conflict setting: rebuilding the capacity of the shattered state,

including its means of providing order and security (the army, police, and intelligence); controlling and demobilizing alternative sources of violence in the hands of non-state actors, such as religious and party militias, warlords, and other private armies; reducing the structural incentives to violence, through the design of political institutions that give a real stake in the system to each group that is willing to play by the rules of the democratic game; developing the political and social institutions of democracy, in the state and civil society; administering the post-conflict nation; and the design and implementation of a plan for transition to a self-sustaining and democratic new political order⁹³.

First is the tension between order and freedom. The post-conflict state needs an authoritative and capable public security establishment. But building up the police is in tension with the goal of empowering and privileging civilian political actors. The new state must have an internal monopoly on the means of violence, but this must be constructed carefully, with mechanisms and norms of civilian supremacy, so as not to create a new, anti-democratic military Frankenstein.

The dilemma may be reduced when the international transitional authority “has been empowered primarily to hold an election and then withdraw” according to a defined and fairly imminent timetable --as with the eighteen-month UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).⁹⁴ It becomes more serious when the international authority is

⁹³ Knaus , G and Cox, M. (2005). *Building Democracy after Conflict: The ‘Helsinki Moment’ in Southeastern Europe*. Journal of Democracy 16, No 1

⁹⁴ Chesterman, S. (2004). *You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building* . Oxford: Oxford University Press

tasked with both administering the country and preparing it for sovereign democracy, with no specific end date, as was initially the case in Iraq and has been the case for quite some years now in Bosnia and Kosovo. The scale of operation and formal scope of authority also matter a great deal. In East Timor, the authority and resources of the UN gave it effective governing authority over the territory for more than two years, while the UN mission in Afghanistan operated with a much lighter footprint, involving only “a fraction of UN Transitional Administration in East Timor --UNTAET’s staff and budget ... in a country perhaps forty times the size and thirty times the population of East Timor.”⁹⁵ The heavy footprint worked in East Timor, but those conditions seen as a situation of decolonization; support and acceptance from the local population; international consensuses; and therefore broad domestic and international legitimacy, are likely to prove rather unique in the contemporary era.

Gerald Knaus and Marcus Cox argue that the European Union’s mission in Bosnia and the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) failed to build democracy in these two territories because they have ruled them as protectorates through a model of “authoritarian state-building.”⁹⁶ While this has achieved some degree of stabilization, it has not cultivated the tools, incentives, and culture of democratic self-governance but instead has run roughshod over local resistance.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Knaus, G and Cox, M. (2005). *Building Democracy after Conflict: The ‘Helsinki Moment’ in Southeastern Europe*. *Journal of Democracy* 16, No 1

The electoral system has a considerable impact on the post-conflict democratization process and the political party system.⁹⁷ The choice of the type of electoral system will depend on the specific situation of the country in question, encompassing its political culture, its track record on representative democracy, the size of parliament, the electorate's knowledge and the quality of its political organizations and leadership, and not on a 'one-size-fits-all' approach generally proven to be the best remedy for all post-conflict settings.

This need for a country-specific approach also holds true for the less dramatic but also highly influential choice between a unicameral or bicameral parliamentary structure within a federated or confederated state structure, since this choice is clearly relevant for the emergence or consolidation of regional and local parties. All these institutional choices directly influence the levels of representation or inclusion, fragmentation and polarization in the party system. There is no perfect electoral system for countries with significant ethnic, social, religious or regional differences, nor for those which have recently experienced violent conflict, but experience suggests that some systems are more suitable than others.

The devastation of human, social and physical capital often found at the beginning of the post-conflict period, as well as the particular provisions of the peace agreement, require a

⁹⁷Hoove, L and Scholtbach, A. (2007) *Democracy and Political Party Assistance in Post-Conflict Societies*. Hague: The Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD)

paradigm shift when diagnosing and prescribing policy interventions. These should be essentially conflict-mitigating. Moreover, a post-conflict reconstruction process typically requires at least two decades of sustained effort, with the risk of war a recurrent threat.⁹⁸ Beneficiary participation in decisions concerning capacity development would be critical in every capacity building initiative. Post-war reconstruction must be geared towards modifying social structures and processes associated with the causal power imbalances. Participation is a process by which individuals, organizations and communities assume responsibility for their own welfare and that of the community, and to develop the capacity in order to contribute to their own and their community's development.

Active participation of people in defining their real needs tends to raise their esteem, mobilize their social energies and help them to shape their social and economic destiny. Studies demonstrated how institutionally-weakened post-conflict governments and societies failed to rise to the occasion and effectively participate in matters pertaining to the identification, design and implementation, monitoring and evaluation, reconstruction, and capacity building interventions. Post-conflict reconstruction, like any other development study undertaking, has unique concepts and methodologies that require explanation. The World Bank study, *a framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction*⁹⁹, identifies a "conflict country" as one that has recently experienced widespread violence, or where the preoccupation of the state is armed warfare, where the state has failed, or where a significant part of the population is

⁹⁸ Collier, et al. 2001; World Bank, 1997; Boyce, 1996

⁹⁹ World Bank. (1998). *The World Bank Experience with Post-conflict Reconstruction*, Vol 1, Synthesis Report, Washington, DC

engaged in armed struggle with the state. In each situation, external agencies need to understand the varying histories and nature of the “failure” process in order to calibrate informed intervention measures to facilitate the transition from war to sustainable peace, support the resumption of economic and social development, and determine at what point in the post- conflict process should a particular country be regarded as having achieved a relative state of normalcy. Participation encompasses the process for giving voice to the population through the development of civil society that includes the generation and exchange of ideas through advocacy groups, civic associations, and the media.

Post-conflict recovery and state reconstruction are complex challenges for the state and the society. They constitute, in fact, the major goals to be reached when a series of specific challenges have been met. Women’s political participation is a governance issues that is essential to ensure that women’s issues are addressed. However, women’s participation is still limited particularly in times of conflict.

2.6.6 Conflict Transformation and Peace Building

In a nutshell, post conflict societies are characterized by conflict transformation and peace building initiatives. Conflict transformation entails transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and if necessary the very constitution of society that support the continuation of violent conflict.¹⁰⁰ In International conflict, peace negotiations should go beyond achieving political agreement to transform the relationship of the parties to the

¹⁰⁰ Maluki. P. (2014).Peace building strategies and sustainable peace in Rwanda and Burundi. Heinrich-Bocking: Scholars press

conflict. Conflict change relationships in predictable ways, alters communication patterns and patterns of social organization. Conflict transformation is prescriptive in the sense that consequences of conflict can be modified or transformed so that relationships and social structures improve as a result of conflict instead of being harmed by it. Such transformation must take place at personal and systematic level. At personal level it would involve the pursuit of awareness, growth and commitment to change which may occur through the recognition of fear, anger, grief and bitterness. At systematic level the transformation must involve restructuring and reforming the institutions of governance in society in a way that respects and protects rights of citizens.¹⁰¹

Peace building approaches oriented toward helping to re-establish the former status quo in post-civil war situations are not likely to lead to longer-term social transformation.¹⁰² This is well exemplified by the return of authoritarian rule in Zimbabwe, political killings and intimidation by the dominant political party in Cambodia, and the continuing influence of former political and military elites accused of massacres in Guatemala and El Salvador.

The term peace building entered the international lexicon in 1992 when UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined it in *An Agenda for Peace* as post-conflict “action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a

¹⁰¹ *ibid*

¹⁰² Jeong , H. (2005). *Peace building in post conflict Societies: Strategy and Process*. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers

relapse into conflict.”¹⁰³ Since then, peace building has become a catchall concept, encompassing multiple (and at times contradictory) perspectives and agendas. It is indiscriminately used to refer to preventive diplomacy, preventive development, conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction.¹⁰⁴ The focus on mere restoration of order has serious limitations, for it ignores imbalances between groups in existing political and economic structures. Democratic processes and development are undermined by political and economic arrangements that allow the use of mineral or other resources to benefit former warlords, military generals or government officials as well as those interests are protected by them.

Peace building calls for strategic networking since different actors play specific roles during post conflict peace building depending on their capacities.¹⁰⁵ For instance in externally oriented peace building process, the United Nations plays a leadership role in three key areas: managing support for the political process, overseeing donor coordination efforts and managing humanitarian assistance programmes. Regional powers and neighboring states mostly offer diplomatic and financial assistance to states undergoing peace building process. Strategies for the effective mobilization of institutional and communal resources to overcome the legacy of violent conflict need to be investigated along with specific circumstances under which various peace building

¹⁰³ United Nations. *An Agenda for Development: Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Doc A/48/935, 6 May 1994.

¹⁰⁴ Call, C . (2004). *The Problem of Peacebuilding: How UN Thinking Has Evolved in Recent Years*, draft paper prepared for DPA.

¹⁰⁵ Maluki .p. (2014). *Peace Building Strategies and Sustainable Peace in Rwanda and Burundi*. Heinrich-bocking: Scolar Press.

approaches can be applied to be best adapted to existing realities, implementation programs have to be contextualized to the particular circumstances of a recipient society.

The needs of victims of violence (such as women, children, and the elderly) and their role in development and social rehabilitation must be taken into account in the construction of peace. The Question of gender perspective in peace processes at all levels has now entered the mainstream of peacemaking and peace building discourse and that the place of women in peace and security has formally been secured and is rooted in the UN Security Council Resolution 1325.¹⁰⁶ The Rwandan government as part of its commitment to advancing women's rights established a Ministry of Gender and the Advancement of Women to address the glaring gender disparities in the society.

Given that the process in peace building relies on improvements in inter-communal relationships, psychological transformation has to be supported by correcting the damage and loss inflicted upon victims of oppression and violence. Changes in perception promoted by education and reconciliation have to proceed alongside structural reform to prevent a return to dominant and facilitated dialogue sessions, designed for reconciliation activities, could break the cycle of violence. In addition, to prevent a recurrence of violence, root causes have to be tackled by structural transformation. Thus long-term strategy is aimed at addressing the principal political, economic, social and ethnic imbalances that led to conflict in the first place. Ultimately, peace building aims at

¹⁰⁶Portter, A. (2012). *Including women and Gender perspectives in Peacemaking in Managing Peace Processes*. A handbook for AU Practitioners Vol. 1, Addis Ababa African Union.

ensuring human security in a society, a concept that includes democratic governance, human rights, rule of law, sustainable development, equitable access to resources and environmental security.¹⁰⁷ Whereas dynamics of conflict resolution have to be extended to a comprehensive and durable peace process, implementation of peace agreements may not necessary be linear or orderly and may not even guarantee an expected outcome. In some post-conflict settlement processes (e.g., Liberia, Sudan, Burundi, and the DRC), continued hostilities and mistrust end with renewed clashes and efforts to reach another settlement need to be undertaken. Post-conflict situations not only provide opportunities but also pose substantial risk for former adversaries. As long as the residue of anger and hatred endures, the outcome of security and political arrangements such as disarmament and elections involve high stakes.

2.6.7 Chapter Summary

This chapter considered the nature of Post-conflict societies and how they are viewed by the international community. The extent and nature of international assistance in any post-conflict country varies according to factors such as humanitarian concerns, international media attention, and historical linkages. Often the most important considerations in this respect are the political- economic and national security interests of powerful states. The lack of in-depth knowledge of the historical, political, social and economic context of the conflict in these societies has undermined, in many important ways, the effectiveness of regional and international interventions. Recovery requires a

¹⁰⁷Ibid.

systematic framework of incremental planning, careful and realistic policy reforms as well as consideration of the post-war constraints and peace agreements. The root causes of conflicts are different from country to country, and that they require tailor-made approaches to bring countries back to a peace and development path. Thus understanding various histories and their root causes will help to inform reconstruction and capacity-building interventions that are likely to serve as credible and sustainable conflict mitigation measures for societal healing and capacity development. In the next chapter, we examine the critical policy factors that were necessary for establishing peace and stability in the post conflict Haiti.

CHAPTER THREE

POST CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION IN HAITI

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter we examine the critical policy factors that were necessary for establishing peace and stability in the post conflict Haiti. Specifically we want to examine the extent to which post conflict intervention in Haiti addresses the key pillars of the post conflict reconstruction framework, namely: Legitimacy, trust and authority of the state, political will for transparency and accountability, rule of law, social capital and social cohesion, economic reconstruction and service delivery and finally, security and cross border movement.



Figure 1 Map of Haiti

3.2 Violent Nature of the Haiti State

Haiti faces formidable challenges dating from long before the January 2010 earthquake.

The international donor community classifies Haiti as a fragile state—the Government cannot deliver core functions to the majority of its people, especially the poor. Haiti is also a post-conflict state—one emerging from a coup d'état and civil war. Others have variously characterized Haiti as a nightmare, predator, collapsed, failed, failing, parasitic, kleptocratic, phantom, and virtual or pariah state.¹⁰⁸

Since Independence, Haiti has suffered under a series of authoritarian and violent leaders that used state and paramilitary structures to terrorize and intimidate actual and perceived opponents. Particularly during the Cold War, during the Duvalier regimes of 'Papa Doc' and 'Baby Doc', leaders maintained their positions with the support of powerful international protectors such as the United States and France.¹⁰⁹ At times, the state has been the primary source of insecurity – as in the military junta period of the early 1990s, but criminal gangs and private militias have become increasingly powerful.¹¹⁰ Small arms have proliferated outside the state structures, with estimates of between 170,000 and 220,000 weapons in circulation. The violence has hit hardest those who suffer chronic under-protection by the state security apparatus. In particular, the Port-au-Prince slum of Cite Soleil, home to some 500,000 residents, is often considered a 'black-hole' of

¹⁰⁸ Buss, T., et al. (2006). *Why Foreign Aid to Haiti Failed: A Summary Report of the Academy International Affairs Working Paper Series, National Academy Of Public Administration*. Washington, DC

¹⁰⁹ Bolton, M. (2011). *Human Security after State Collapse: Global Governance in Post-Earthquake Haiti, LSE Global Governance*. New York: Praeger

¹¹⁰ Weinstein, B & Segal, A. (1992). *Haiti, The Failure of Politics*. New York: Praeger.

insecurity and few expatriates or Haitians without links to the neighborhood dare to enter it.¹¹¹ This has led to people being chronically underserved by public institutions.

Security in Haiti has also long had an international dimension, from the colonial genocide of the island's indigenous people to the transnational slavery system, from the Dominican dictator Trujillo's slaughter of some 20,000 Haitian migrants in the 1930s to the Dominican Republic's complicity with exiled right-wing militias that provoked subversion of the Aristide government.¹¹² Concerns about migration have led to greater international involvement in Haitian politics in an attempt to prevent a mass exodus. Indeed, US President Clinton's justification for the 1994 US military intervention in Haiti explicitly invoked the threat of migration to the United States.¹¹³ Haiti's crisis demonstrates a complexity of security landscapes that stretch the bounds of the realist preoccupation with threats to the state from either other states or rebel movements. For many Haitians, the state itself is a source of insecurity, along with a host of non-state actors and non-human elements like natural disasters and diseases. The 2010 earthquake, while certainly the worst natural disaster to hit Haiti in modern times, is by no means the

¹¹¹Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF). (March 2008). "*Violence, Mortality and Access to Health Care in Cité Soleil, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.*" Accessed 30 October 2010.
<<http://www.lakareutangranser.se/Global/documents/Rapporteur/Report%20Cite%20Soleil%20>

¹¹² Buss, T.F & Gardner, A. (2008). *Haiti in the Balance: Why Foreign Aid Has Failed and What We Can Do About It.* Washington DC: Brookings Institution, pp. 167-168.

¹¹³Frantzblau, K. J. (1997). "*Immigration's Impact on U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy.*"pp. 18-19 Accessed 30 October 2010 <<http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/uscir/respapers/ii-oct97.pdf>>..

first. Haiti has suffered over 20 internationally-recognized natural disasters in the last 15 years.¹¹⁴

3.3 Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Haiti: A Conceptual Framework

In each post conflict situation, external agencies need to understand the varying histories and nature of the “failure” process in order to calibrate informed intervention measures to facilitate the transition from war to sustainable peace, support the resumption of economic and social development, and determine at what point in the post-conflict process should a particular country be regarded as having achieved a relative state of normalcy.¹¹⁵

Like post-natural disaster reconstruction, post-conflict reconstruction typically involves the repair and reconstruction of physical and economic infrastructure; it also entails a number of external interventions aimed at rebuilding weakened institutions. While it is generally understood that reconstruction often takes place at various times during and after conflict, the framework places tasks between the cessation of violent conflict and the return to normalization. Normalization is reached when:

- 1) extraordinary outside intervention is no longer needed;
- 2) the processes of governance and economic activity largely function on a self-determined and self-sustaining basis; and

¹¹⁴Faubert, C. (2004). *Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict-Affected Countries: Case Study: Haiti*. New York: UNDP. Accessed 30 November 2014. <<http://www.undp.org/evaluation/documents/thematic/conflict/Haiti.pdf>>.

¹¹⁵The World Bank Experience with Post-conflict Reconstruction, Vol 1: Synthesis Report, Washington, DC, 1998.

- 3) Internal and external relations are conducted according to generally accepted norms of behavior.

The state institutions are usually so weakened that they exhibit little capacity to carry out their traditional functions. Those critical interventions include reviving the economy, reconstructing the framework for democratic governance, rebuilding and maintaining key social infrastructure, and planning for financial normalization. Countries undergoing reconstruction are often considered by the mainstream development establishment to be at risk of 'state failure'. Although repeated years of war, internal armed conflicts, and violent social and political upheavals do result in dysfunctional national structures and institutions, the imposition of a neo-liberal economic and political order in the guise of 'rebuilding lives' further debilitates national capacities and ensures that affected countries remain in a continuing condition of state failure.

The aspirations of local populations for peace, economic and social security, and political stability become secondary to the vision of reconstruction's architects. The project of 'nation building' becomes captive to the economic and geo-political interests of those who finance and direct reconstruction, especially wealthy donor countries and particularly the G-7. With regard to the reconstruction of Haiti in this case, as in others the world over, 'nation-building' took the form of following an economic and political blueprint largely designed by the multilateral financial institutions in Washington. What we witness therefore is the transformation of nation-states and nation-building into the creation of neo-liberal national states.

Analyses of 'state failure' by the development establishment consistently ignore the systemic causes of such failure. The draining of national wealth through colonial structures of production, debilitating debt repayment burdens, and structural adjustment programmes imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) rarely figure in analyses of negative economic growth, deepening poverty and poor governance in ostensibly 'failed states'. We are exhorted to believe that countries in Africa, Central America, and Asia have corrupt, unaccountable governments, lack the 'rule of law', do not provide for their citizens, and are susceptible to terrorist activities within their boundaries simply because they have not yet put in place the requisites of liberal democracies and market structures of the West.

3.4 The Politics of the Haiti's Reconstruction Process

A high-priority activity in reconstruction programmes is 'democracy promotion' and electoral democracy is considered essential to the smooth functioning of markets. In Haiti, much of US aid has been channeled through the International Republican Institute (IRI), which spent over US \$3 million to fund opponents of former president Aristide, and whose senior staff has had close ties with the Haitian military. The National Democratic Institute (NDI) on its part, received contributions from a number of sources to influence the Afghan elections. NDI contributors have included USAID, private corporations, labor unions, individuals, the World Bank and a number of Northern Governments.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁶ Max, B. (2004). *The Other Regime Change*. Salon.com. Accessed on 27th November 2014 <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/155/25980.html>

Christopher Coyne in his *After War* writes about what mechanisms facilitate or hinders a society from conflict to cooperation.¹¹⁷ In successful reconstruction, it is not just policy making but also sustaining liberal democracies through factors like perpetual rule of law, property rights and freedom of speech. Coyne argues that uncontrolled variables such as customs, norms, traditions and beliefs of people can seriously impede reconstruction efforts. The increasing involvement of NGOs in donor-driven democracy promotion indicates a cross-over from more conventional humanitarian and developmental activities into the open realm of politics.

Regardless of one's view of Aristide, he was democratic, warding off overwhelming reactionary forces, or he was just another in a long line of undemocratic, autocratic leaders, Haiti has been virtually ungovernable. There was no functioning Parliament or judiciary system, no political compromise or consensus, and extreme violence perpetrated by paramilitaries, gangs, and criminal organizations. Corruption and drug trafficking ran rampant. No government enjoyed much legitimacy. U.S. administrations suspended, reduced, or delayed foreign aid to pressure Aristide and the opposition to stop the conflict, contributing to extreme poverty and economic and political instability.

The World Bank points out that about 80 per cent of the world's poorest countries have experienced serious violent conflicts since the early 1990s, and its Crisis Prevention Unit monitored more than 40 countries considered "conflict affected" in the early 2000s.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷Coyne, C.J. (2008). *After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy*. Stanford: Stanford University

¹¹⁸ World Bank. (2000). *The Role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development: An Evolving agenda*. Washington: World Bank.

Between 1992 and 2002, 80 per cent of the countries that the World Bank categorized as “low income countries under stress” experienced serious civil conflict.

3.5 The State and Legitimacy in Haiti

In conceptualizing state legitimacy, one of the most frequently employed definitions of the state is that of Max Weber. He defines the state as a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a given territory.¹¹⁹ Therefore, the state exists and, in turn, perpetuates its existence because of its legitimate claim to the use of physical force. However, this conventional view of the state primarily focuses on elites, and how the state’s monopoly over the use of force serves elites’ interest in maintaining state domination in society and, in turn, perpetuating their political power. Weber’s work on the state and his heavy emphasis on force as a key criterion for statehood thus leaves many questions open, particularly at the individual level.

Legitimacy can refer to political leaders, the regime, the government or the state. It is the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society. Scholars who study the effects of legitimacy suggest that states that have high levels of it gain the voluntary compliance of their citizens are more stable and possess greater developmental capacities.¹²⁰ State legitimacy can be equated to as the effect of rights, governance and welfare gains, institutional trust and procedural fairness. Good governance, democratic rights, and

¹¹⁹ Weber, Max.(1984). "*Legitimacy, Politics and the State.*" In *Legitimacy and the State* ed. W. Connolly. New York: New York University Press, p. 33.

¹²⁰Hurrelmann, et al. (2007). *Legitimacy in an age of global politics*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan

welfare gains most strongly contribute to state legitimacy. Politics and politically mediated social and economic outcomes seem to matter most to legitimacy. Modern states largely gain legitimacy because of their role as provider and guarantor of sustainable peace, stability and development.

Legitimacy according to political scientist David Easton is a distinct form of political support that concerns evaluations of the state from a public or ‘common good’ perspective.¹²¹ What Easton highlights is a public good approach to understanding state legitimacy, meaning that citizens recognize their common interests; develop common standards for evaluating the performance of state leaders with regard to those interests and accord legitimacy to them based on how well they meet the public’s standards. States in which institutions and law and order have totally or partially collapsed under the pressure and amidst the confusion of erupting violence, yet which subsist as a ghostly presence on the world map, are commonly referred to as “failed States” or “*Etats sans gouvernement*”. This is the internal collapse of law and order, where there is total or near total breakdown of structures guaranteeing law and order. The collapse of the core of government, which Max Weber rightly described as “monopoly of power” sees the police, judiciary and other bodies serving to maintain law and order either ceasing to exist or are no longer able to operate. In many cases, they are used for purposes other than those for which they were intended.

¹²¹ David, E. (1965). *A systems analysis of political life*. New York: Wiley.

3.6 Elections in Post-Conflict Haiti State

Elections have three main functions in a democracy. First, they are means of choosing the people's representatives to a legislature, congress or other representative forum, or to a single office such as the presidency. Second, elections are not just a means of choosing representatives but also of choosing governments.¹²² Indeed, in many established democracies, elections are primarily a contest between competing political parties to see who will control the government. Also, elections are a means of conferring legitimacy on the political system.

Many of elections in post-conflict societies have been held with the assistance, supervision or sometimes direct control of the international community. In Haiti the Trust Fund established by the international community through UNDP to support the electoral process in Haiti had received contributions totaling US \$59,026,754 by the end of January 2006. These funds were made available by the Governments of Haiti (US \$2.9 million), Brazil (US \$1 million), Canada (US \$16.2 million), the European Union (US \$20.5 million), Japan (US \$0.9 million), the United States (US \$17.2 million) and by UNDP itself (US \$0.4 million)¹²³. The date of the first round had already been postponed three times, resulting in a total delay of three months. The registration of voters as well as the distribution of national identity cards²³ suffered delays.

¹²² Reilly, B. (2011). *Electoral Assistance and Post-Conflict Peace building -- What Lessons Have Been Learned?*. New York: Palgrave

¹²³ Carrol Faubert (2006). An evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict –Affected Countries, a case study of Haiti

Finally, the Presidential election in Haiti was held on 7 February 2006 and a total of 63 percent of the 3.5 million potential voters participated in this election. On 9 February 2006 the Chair of the International Mission for Monitoring Haitian Elections, announced that the elections had been ‘calm and orderly’ and that there was general absence of intimidations and violence at the polling centres. He however deplored the destruction of ballots¹²⁴.

Early announcement of the election results indicated that Presidential candidate René Préval was just short of victory in the first round. This information enraged his supporters who took to the streets and especially when it was rumored that 147,000 ballots had disappeared. After one week of turmoil and demonstrations, the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) adopted a compromise solution and declared the victory of René Préval, in order to calm the demonstrators and defuse the situation. The CEP decided to adopt an internationally-backed formula and distributed blank votes proportionally between candidates, as a result of which René Préval’s score jumped from 48.8 percent to 51.2 percent¹²⁵. This was an illegitimate victory which led to more violence in Haiti and the Director-General of the Provisional Electoral Council suffered arson and received threats to his life.

With a failed election, the Haiti reconstruction process failed the legitimacy test and the leaders put in power were not credible. This provides one of the justifications why in the long run the post conflict reconstruction in Haiti failed miserably.

¹²⁴ Ibid

¹²⁵ Ibid

3.7 Economic Distribution and Welfare in Haiti

Pervasive social exclusion and inequality are among the main sources of instability in Haiti, where less than 1 percent of the population owns 75 per cent of the wealth¹²⁶. A society with balanced distribution of social and economic resources is generally better able to manage the trade-offs and tensions that accompany economic development than a society characterized by extremes of wealth and poverty.¹²⁷ The local government is lacking both the capacity to provide the basic functions needed to safeguard the security and civic rights of the population and the legitimacy that only a broad social contract that different parts of Haitian society could confer.¹²⁸

The central most idea that emerges from successful efforts at state building and economic recovery in post-conflict situation is that of ‘adaptive efficiency’, the capacity to develop institutions that provide a stable framework for economic activity but at the same time are flexible enough to provide maximum leeway for policy choices at any given time and in any given situation in response to specific challenges. This idea rules out the privileging of a set of predetermined policy instruments (be they rapid trade liberalization and privatization, on the one hand, or high tariff protection and nationalization, on the other) to be employed regardless of actual circumstances.

When, as in Haiti, the institutional hiatus is wide, insistence on a correct ‘sequencing’ of reforms runs the risk of substituting political choices shaped by local values and

¹²⁶ Rodrik, D. (1999) .‘Where Did All the Growth Go? External Shocks, Social Conflict and Growth Collapses. Journal of Economic Growth, pp 471–472

¹²⁷ibid

¹²⁸ OECD. (2007) .*Enhancing the Delivery of Justice and Security in Fragile States*. Paris: OECD

conditions with general technocratic solutions. Researchers have suggested that conflict is often driven by polarization rather than inequality per se. Capital flight, both human and financial, and the shortening of investment horizons in the face of growing political insecurity are likely to intensify the struggle for economic and political resources, creating a vicious cycle of conflict in which countries can become trapped.

The lessons from post-disaster and post-conflict situations suggest that work-for-cash and work-for-food programs and other tools such as vouchers, direct food and housing support have an important role to play. There is growing evidence that, in the medium term, cash transfers to affected households may be local capacity for providing basic goods and services has been restored, because they allow households to determine their most urgent needs, can offer a faster, more transparent and less expensive way of delivering support and are better able to sustain recovery.

External assistance is crucial to trigger economic recovery. Still, such foreign aid will do little to build sustainable recovery without the presence of an institutional framework with the responsibility and capacity to reduce inequalities to the levels that are generally regarded as legitimate and fair. Attempts to transplant that framework from one environment to another are unlikely to be successful if they ignore local conditions and strangle the process of trial and error that is the hallmark of successful recovery episodes. The extent to which foreign aid can help Haiti to achieve the effectiveness of all forms of external assistance has to be judged by how far they contribute towards achieving those overriding objectives. The problem with bilateral assistance in post conflict reconstruction is the use of the bilateral assistance to support special interests in either

receiving or donor countries. Bilateral aid needs, therefore, to be monitored carefully by independent assessors.

In the case of Haiti, the US is by far the largest single donor, providing around 30 per cent of the total net Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the country. According to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) statistics, in 2008 the US government channeled \$259 million of aid to Haiti against \$9 million provided by the World Bank and \$11million from the Inter-American Development Bank. The advantage of multilateral aid, apart from avoiding multiplication of effort and the waste that it causes, is that it is better positioned to induce collective action among donors. Nevertheless, given that influence across the donor community is unevenly distributed, the effectiveness of multilateral aid still remains an issue.

Recognizing the need for a framework of organizing principles intended to ensure that aid is used more effectively and to encourage policy makers to forge a new kind of social contract, many observers continue to see the Marshall Plan as a model that can be employed by the international community.¹²⁹ The provision of financial assistance to deal with long-term imbalances is usually seen by international financial institutions as offering evidence of a weak commitment to reform and as encouraging a slackening of discipline by postponing necessary adjustment. There are several virtues of the Marshall Plan that remain particularly useful in ensuring that the aid flowing to Haiti, both for

¹²⁹Wright, R and Rayment, P. (1997). *The Institutional Hiatus in Economies in Transition and Its Policy Consequences*. Cambridge Journal of Economics, pp. 641–661.

immediate humanitarian relief and for economic reconstruction, supports a more ambitious long-run development plan.

First, Marshall made it clear that there was to be an end to piecemeal assistance which had suffered from a lack of coordination and had less impact than expected in stimulating economic recovery. A key requirement, therefore, was that each state recipient of aid had to produce a four-year outline plan for recovery, setting out targets for the main economic variables and providing an account of how the government intended to achieve its objectives. Secondly Marshall insisted that these plans, together with estimates of the need for assistance, had to be drawn up by the western Europeans themselves. Marshall acknowledged the existence of national sensibilities, admitted that the recipient countries were better informed about the facts of their situation than outsiders, and generally showed a deference towards European traditions and preferences that has subsequently been conspicuously absent from the attitudes of rich countries and international institutions towards the rest of the world.

However, the case for international support should be made along the lines outlined by Marshall. A starting point would be the cancellation of Haiti's crippling external debt.¹³⁰ Despite having benefited from debt relief of the HIPC Initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) at the time the earthquake struck, Haiti still owed foreigners a total of U S 1.25 Billion (around 15 per cent of its GDP) and was already classified as being at high risk of debt distress prior to the earthquake. Focusing on these principles

¹³⁰ UNCTAD. (2010). *'Haiti's Recovery Should Start with Cancelling Its Debt'*. UNCTAD Policy Brief No. 11 Geneva.

can help to provide a coherent framework for coordinating economic recovery and development plans with international assistance.

International sanctions in Haiti have been a failure and have further devastated the Haitian economy. The Organization of American States (OAS) and U.N. embargoes have accelerated environmental damage, contributing to near-famine conditions in some areas and contributing to the extreme hardship for ordinary Haitians while only belatedly touching the elite. Indeed, many of the latter have grown richer through smuggling and drug-running operations.

3.8 Constitutional Building in Haiti

Peace-building accomplished through international intervention has had little success in achieving sustainable peace. In February of 2004, Haiti slipped back into chaos and despair, turning ten years of international and Haitian state building efforts to dust. Theories abound for the lack of success in peace-building. Some focus on operational limitations and the unintended negative consequences of international aid, while others focus on institutional voids.¹³¹

Increasingly though, it is accepted that the most critical problems involve a lack of knowledge of how to rebuild states and an associated failure of state-building strategy. The design of a constitution and its constitution-making process can play an important role in the political and governance transition. Constitution making after conflict is an

¹³¹ United Nations. (2004). A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. UN Doc A/59/565 at 69, pp. 263–64.

opportunity to create a common vision of the future of a state and a road map on how to get there. The constitution can be partly a peace agreement and partly a framework setting up the rules by which the new democracy will operate.¹³² Initiating changes to the political culture of a society requires substantial changes to behavior as well as to expectations and norms. These sorts of societal changes require long-term strategies involving large segments of society. They require extensive education and sensitivity campaigns as well as dialogue and consensus building within society.

The 1987 Constitution is the fundamental law of the land, which is roughly modeled after those of France and the United States calls for election of a President and a bi-cameral Parliament. The president appoints a prime minister, subject to confirmation by parliament. Presidents are limited to one five year term. Presidents may not dissolve parliament and cannot call “snap” elections or referenda. The President controls the judiciary, with consent of Parliament, and is the titular—and often de facto—head of the military and police. The Constitution also devolved presidential power into provincial councils. One opportunity for societal dialogue that arises in most UN managed peace-building is the adoption of a participatory constitution-making process. It is increasingly recognized that *how* constitutions are made, particularly following civil conflict or authoritarian rule, impacts the resulting state and its transition to democracy.

¹³² Samuels, K. (2006). Post-Conflict Peace-Building and Constitution-Making ,International Peace Academy,. Chicago: Journal of International Law.

The process of constitution-building can provide a forum for the negotiation of solutions to the divisive or contested issues that led to violence. It can also lead to the democratic education of the population, begin a process of healing and reconciliation through societal dialogue, and forge a new consensus vision of the future of the state.¹³³ However, it is “transitional constitutionalism,” or “new constitutionalism,” that best recognizes the multifaceted role of new order. Constitution-making must be recognized as a process “or a forum for negotiation amid conflict and division.”¹³⁴ The design of the constitution seeks both to create new democratic institutions and to assure their protection in the longer term. Unless they are carefully designed and implemented, democratic institutions can ferment conflict in sharply divided societies. Poor governance framework will undermine the sustainability of the peace. It can exacerbate fault lines, divisions, and tensions in society; entrench conflict-generating electoral or governance models, or provide a basis for contesting the government.

One constitutional landmark was the accountability movement that emerged from the Haitian grassroots. CJA partner Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (BAI) pioneered an effort to bring the leaders of the military regime to justice. BAI's most prominent case was the prosecution of those responsible for the 1994 Raboteau Massacre, a vicious attack on an impoverished, pro-democracy neighborhood. In 2000, BAI successfully brought the perpetrators of the Raboteau Massacre to trial before the Criminal Tribunal of Gonaïves. The outcome of the trial marked one of the key human rights victories in the

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Vivien, H. (2001). *Constitution-Making and the Transformation of Conflict, Peace & Change*. pp 153-154.

Americas: 57 defendants were convicted, including the top military and paramilitary leaders of the 1991-1994 military dictatorship.¹³⁵

Haiti's 1987 Constitution continues to undermine sustainable peace. The majoritarian structure has encouraged tyranny of the majority, reinforcing the winner-takes-all political culture. Uncertainty in the constitutional provisions on elections has also provided a flash point for violence following the disputed 2000 elections. Furthermore, the dissolution of the army was unconstitutional and contributed to a new wave of instability that ensued thereafter, following the former army members' sense of frustrated entitlement.¹³⁶

3.9 Achieving Social and Economic Well-Being

Of the four pillars of post conflict reconstruction, addressing social and economic well-being is the most varied and therefore the most comprehensive. Ensuring that citizens in war-torn societies can resume a normal existence requires more than just the care and feeding of refugees and the internally displaced. It means providing food security, public health, shelter, educational systems, and a social safety net for all citizens. An economic strategy for assistance must be designed to ensure the reconstruction of physical infrastructure, to generate employment, to open markets, to create legal and regulatory reforms, to lay the foundation for international trade and investment, and to establish transparent banking and financial institutions.

¹³⁵ Bureau des avocats internationaux, Raboteau Massacre Trial. Available at: http://www.ijdh.org/articles/article_raboteau.htm

¹³⁶ Regan J. (2004) Haiti: Despised and Disbanded, a Blood- Stained Army Returns, IPS-Inter Press Service.

To achieve economic and social well-being, early assistance in these areas by the U.S. government in coordination with the international community and international financial institutions can help lay a solid foundation for good governance of the economy. Those in leadership positions in affected countries will also need to play an important role in advancing local interests. Bringing stakeholders into the process of economic and social reconstruction will create ownership of both policies and processes. Fragile political environments, the private sector's reluctance to invest in unstable states, the concentration of wealth and resources in the hands of a few powerful figures, the thinness of the financial sector and markets, and weak governance capacity will challenge both external actors and local stakeholders.

The single overarching constraint to satisfactory implementation, outcome and sustainability of development assistance to Haiti has been the continuous political turmoil and governance problems in the country. In project after project, the reason for delayed implementation or cancellation is a coup, civil unrest, or the inevitable results of these events, such as lack of ownership by a frequently changing government and aid staff turnover. Despite efforts on the part of the World Bank and other donors, it has been all but impossible to carry on a coherent lending program.¹³⁷

¹³⁷ Operations Evaluation Department (OED). (2002). *Haiti: Country Assistance Evaluation*. Washington: World Bank

Lack of capacity for financial management went considerably beyond poor aid administration. Haiti has dysfunctional budgetary, financial or procurement systems, making financial and aid management impossible. A budget reform law enacted in 1985 was never fully implemented. Offices were not created and personnel remained unassigned. Budget procedures and policies were not in place, budget data were unavailable. From 1997 through 2001, there was no approved national budget. From 1990 to 2003, Haiti received more than \$4 billion in aid—not including remittances from Haitian expatriates who contribute \$1 billion annually—from bilateral and multilateral sources.

In Haiti, the international community was dealing mainly with thugs rather than military officers. And what thugs understand is power.¹³⁸ One has to use it in a way that will be credible, keeping in mind that a failure to apply leverage will be interpreted as weakness and will encourage further recalcitrant behaviour. Moreover, beyond the problems of "restoring" democracy, were the tasks of economic and social "reconstruction." In his joint press conference with Aristide in March, then President Bill Clinton had pledged the United States to participate in a 5-year multilateral, \$1 billion development program to "rebuild the Haitian economy" and "restore conditions of prosperity."¹³⁹

Beneficiary participation in decisions concerning capacity development would be critical in every capacity building initiative. Post-war reconstruction must be geared towards

¹³⁸ Schulz, D. E., & Marcella, G. (1994). *Reconciling the Irreconcilable*: Washington D.C: The Troubled Outlook For U.S. Policy Toward Haiti Strategic Studies Institute

¹³⁹ Ibid.

modifying social structures and processes associated with the causal power imbalances. Participation is a process by which individuals, organizations and communities assume responsibility for their own welfare and that of the community, and to develop the capacity in order to contribute to their own and their community's development. Active participation of people in defining their real needs tends to raise their esteem, mobilize their social energies and help them to shape their social and economic destiny. Studies demonstrated how institutionally-weakened post-conflict governments and societies failed to rise to the occasion and effectively participate in matters pertaining to the identification, design and implementation, monitoring and evaluation, reconstruction, and capacity building interventions.

The Haitian civil service has been perpetually a problem to its post-conflict development. Assessments revealed that about 30% of the civil service were "phantom" employees, compensated about half of the public wage bill. One ministry had 10,000 employees, only about half of whom were ever at work. A 2004 International Monetary Fund (IMF) assessment, looking back at Haiti's civil service in 1998, found that the:

- (1) civil service has played a very limited role in providing social services;
- (2) small size and very limited capacity of the government contrast with the massive development challenge facing the country;
- (3) public sector is far smaller than in other developing countries;
- (4) public sector wage bill in Haiti is very low;

- (5) public wage bill takes up a significant portion of the government budget in Haiti;
and
- (6) Public sector wages are not comparable to private sector. The IMF doubted Haiti's ability to deliver services, attract quality civil servants, and avoid corruption.

3.10 Reconciling the Un-reconcilable in Haiti

The idea for a truth commission in Haiti began with efforts by the Haitian Diaspora community living around North America and the Caribbean in 1993. The concept was based largely on the articulation of a popular tribunal "The International Tribunal on Rights in Haiti" that took place in Montreal in October 1994. The Haitian National Truth and Justice Commission's mandate was to investigate human rights abuses that took place over a three-year period beginning with the September 30, 1991 coup that overthrew elected President Aristide until his restoration to power in September 1994.

The charter creating the commission was through an executive order issued by President Jean Bertrand Aristide officially created the Commission on December 17, 1994. A second order proclaimed the commission's mandate on March 28, 1995. The commission was chaired by Françoise Boucard a Haitian sociologist, and also composed of seven members: five men and two women, including four Haitians and three internationals. The commission took over 5,500 testimonies, identified 8,667 victims who had suffered 18,629 human rights violations. The Commission made special

investigations into cases of sexual violence against women, abuse of journalists and the media and the April 1994 massacre in Raboteau.

The Commission presented its final report to President Jean Bertrand Aristide and the judiciary on February 5, 1996, with only seventy-five copies made. A second edition was published in 1998 in French, which most Haitians could not read or write. The report recommended that the government continue investigations and prosecute those found responsible through establishment of an international tribunal. The commission also recommended that a reparations commission should be established, the judiciary should be reformed, and laws against sexual violence and rape should be enacted.

In the end, a few key trials were held, in particular those concerning the Raboteau and Carrefour-Feuilles killings. The Raboteau case was concluded in November 2000 and more than fifty defendants were convicted, including the entire military high command and the heads of the paramilitary FRAPH (Front Révolutionnaire pour l'Avancement et le Progrès Haïtiens). However, on May 3, 2005, the Supreme Court of Haiti reversed the sentences of fifteen former military and FRAPH members. None of the fifteen men were in prison at that time. Intolerant nature of the Haitian society is appalling. Political and class conflicts are so bitter that, no matter who is on top at any particular moment, violence and terror are never far from the surface. One recalls the fate of President Vilbrun-Guillaume Sam, who in 1915 was hacked to death by his enemies, then ripped apart by an enraged mob.

The contending social forces are divided by wealth, race, and language: the upper-class, mulatto socioeconomic elite speaks French and the lower-class black masses, Creole; they only partially share the same culture and history. This is class conflict in its most unadulterated form: a zero-sum game, in which one side loses when the other wins. In Haiti, the state was developed as a fundamentally predatory organism. It is not an accident that the Creole word *leta* means both "state" and "bully. The Haitian political equation can be made, compatible with the other parts--in particular, the military, the oligarchs, and the attaches. Haiti has long been ruled by a shifting coalition of groups whose record of rapaciousness and brutality is as sordid as that of any ruling class in the world.

The Haitian political class often seems perpetually frozen in irreconcilable schisms. The military is riven with factional strife. Officers struggle over power and spoils. Loyalties are based on opportunism rather than ideology; they can shift quickly, depending on who is on top or moving up and who is losing in the game of musical chairs that has been Haitian politics since the fall of the Duvalier dynasty.

3.11 Governance Failure in Haiti

In addition to development problems precipitated by the embargo and military intervention, at least four drivers—lack of government capacity generally and in administration of aid specifically; lack of government support for or ownership of programs funded by foreign assistance; excessive aid dependency; and widespread dissention between president and parliament—contributed to aid ineffectiveness on the

Haitian side. According to the World Bank, after 1995, there was a “total mismatch between levels of foreign aid and government capacity to absorb it.

The UN Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti concluded, in 1999, during the ongoing electoral crises that: “Unfortunately, capacity building within those national institutions that have a mandate for aid coordination is being hampered by the political stalemate which has made it difficult to approve new technical cooperation projects, some of which would have strengthened managerial and coordination capacity.¹⁴⁰

The advisory group recommended that long-term development program of support for Haiti address the issues of capacity-building of governmental institutions, especially in areas such as governance, the promotion of human rights, the administration of justice, the electoral system, law enforcement, police training, and other areas of social and economic development, which are critical for enabling the Haitian Government to adequately and effectively coordinate, manage, absorb and utilize international assistance and development aid.

Program design is critical in delivering aid, but often poorly done. In 1994, USAID funded the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to demobilize the Army and reintegrate soldiers into civilian society. The IOM program may have succeeded in attaining short-term stabilization, but it failed miserably in reintegrating ex-soldiers into

¹⁴⁰Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). (1999). *Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti*. New York: UN, ECOSOC.

society. The program offered reintegration as an amorphous, ill-defined goal—almost a wish, according to those who evaluated it. But the program design failed to take into account reintegration problems. Businesses were loath to hire ex-soldiers many of whom had human rights abuse records and were known to have terrorized the population. Even those businesses that might have hired ex-soldiers did so out of fear of retaliation from Aristide paramilitary supporters.

Aristide's reinstatement in 1994 seemed to augur a new era where aid could really help. Then, after spending months putting together the Emergency Economic Recovery Plan, the 1997 election debacle dampened donor enthusiasm. In 1998 the World Bank stated that lack of progress in reforms could discourage further investment, reduce donor support, and jeopardize both political and economic recovery.¹⁴¹ They did as it turned out and Haiti became an aid orphan years that followed receiving increasingly lower amounts of aid, in part because the costs of state failure was not of sufficient consequence to bilateral or multilateral donors to justify more.

3.12 Security Reforms in Haiti

The post-conflict period starts when the main hostilities have ceased to the point that international aid can begin. There is a reasonable degree of security but the situation is not necessarily safe.¹⁴² Security addresses all aspects of public safety, in particular

¹⁴¹Operations Evaluation Department (OED). (1998). *The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction*. Washington: OED, World Bank

¹⁴²Brown, A. & Stewart, F. (2011). *A Typology of Post-Conflict Environments*, Centre for Research on Peace and Development (CRPD) University of Leuven, Working Paper No. 1.

establishment of a safe and secure environment and development of legitimate and stable security institutions. After war, the recovery and rehabilitation of the state itself is a priority, particularly because a functioning state is essential for peace consolidation. Security encompasses the provision of collective and individual security, and is the precondition for achieving successful outcomes in the other pillars. In the most pressing sense, it concerns securing the lives of civilians from immediate and large-scale violence and the restoration of territorial integrity.

Security sector reform in the early phase of reconstruction, focus was too much on demolishing the army, creating a new police force and providing training to it. Although the judicial sector in Haiti was inefficient, corrupt and distrusted and served the interest of the wealthiest segments of the population, reform in the judicial sector was slow and was only carried out in the later stages of reconstruction. The Government and parliament adopted a law on May 8, 1998 on the reform of the justice system. Moreover, although the U.S. government, the UN, and the French and Canadian Governments provided assistance to reform Haiti's justice system, the assistance failed to produce tangible results because donor efforts were not well-coordinated and the reform strategy was not comprehensive enough.

The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program was largely successful in meeting its three goals: To neutralize the short-term threat of the former FAD'H, to provide a longer-term breathing space from possible FAD'H disruption to

help allow other transition activities to occur, and to lay the foundation for the eventual reintegration of the former FAD'H into Haitian society.

3.14 Chapter Summary

In this chapter, it has been established that in post-conflict reconstruction, peace and security are essential for sustainable development.¹⁴³ Ideally, every post-conflict reconstruction effort seeks to respond to the urgent needs of societies emerging from armed conflicts and works to improve the efforts of key actors in rehabilitation and reconstruction operations by identifying and filling gaps within the current capacities of local and international actors.

Haiti's efforts to sustainable peace building collapsed in February of 2004, and the state slipped back into chaos and despair, turning ten years of international and Haitian state building efforts to dust. Many factors have been advanced to explain the reason as why the country slipped backwards. Like any other country emerging from conflict and a destructive one for that matter, Haiti was characterized by weakened or non-existent capacity at all levels, destroyed institutions, and the absence of a democratic culture, lack of good governance, absence of rule of law and disrespect for human rights, as well as underlying poverty are the common and the contributing situations that led to collapse of the peace-building efforts. Class conflict among the citizens in the country contributed

¹⁴³ The African Capacity Building Foundation. (2004). *Reconstruction and Capacity Building in Post-Conflict Countries in Africa: A Summary of Lessons of Experience from Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone & Uganda*. Harare: ACBF.

significantly to failure of post conflict reconstruction. The criminal justice system is flawed as it serves the interest of the wealth class despite the sector reforms in the judiciary. Lack of state capacity to handle and manage foreign aid hindered the efforts geared towards post conflict reconstruction in Haiti. Inability to manage foreign aid and overdependence on it groomed a state which could not sustain its peace building efforts a move that was cultivated in midst of run-away corruption.

Reconstruction work Haiti is financed largely through multilateral and bilateral loans and grants which come tied to policy conditionalities. Governments of affected countries have little say in these policy prescriptions, although many national officials are quite willing to collaborate in setting up systems that help them to corner power, influence, and wealth. Reconstruction also provides a quasi-legitimate avenue for wealthy and powerful donor countries to consolidate their claims on the natural resources and economic opportunities of entire regions.

The US which is very active in the post-conflict reconstruction in Haiti has created an office for the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (CRS). The post-conflict work CRS focuses on creating laws and institutions of a 'market democracy', and planning which include forming a 'reserve corps' of specialist civilian teams able to respond rapidly to reconstruction needs, and devising reconstruction contracts well in advance with private companies and NGOs¹⁴⁴.

¹⁴⁴ Guttal, S. (2005). *The Politics of Post-war/post-Conflict Reconstruction*. New York: Palgrave.

CHAPTER FOUR

POST CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION IN CAMBODIA

4.1 Introduction

The last five decades, Cambodia has suffered extensive military and ideological wars, undergoing changing political regimes that were neither stable nor legitimately recognized. These passed from absolute monarchy, to communism attached to Maoism, to socialism after Marx and Lenin, to capitalism, and finally to constitutional monarchy based on parliamentary system, which have influenced significantly all state institutions from complete destruction to reconstruction based on ideological, geo-strategic interest or political cupidity.

It is against this background that this chapter evaluates the sequencing order of the post-conflict reconstruction policies used in Cambodia with a view to identify factors which impeded the reconstruction process. Specifically we want to examine the extent to which post conflict intervention in Cambodia addresses the key pillars of the post conflict reconstruction framework, namely: Legitimacy, trust and authority of the state, political will for transparency and accountability, rule of law, social capital and social cohesion, economic reconstruction and service delivery and finally, security and cross border movement.



Figure 2: Map of Cambodia

4.2 An Overview of the Cambodia Conflict

In 1953 Cambodia gained its independence from France under the reign of King Norodom Sihanouk, after nearly 100 years of colonialist rule. Cambodia is governed by a constitutional monarchy. In the 1960s, the USA, as part of its strategy to contain the ‘communist threat’ of northern Vietnam, orchestrated a power grab by its democratic puppet General Lon Nol in order to suppress a communist-sympathiser government that was gaining strength just across the border. Lon Nol lasted in power from 1970 to 1975,

when the Marxist-Leninist.¹⁴⁵ Khmer Rouge army overthrew the government and began its reign of terror. In the years preceding the genocide, the population of Cambodia was just over 7 million, almost all of whom were Buddhists.¹⁴⁶

In 1976, the country was re-named Democratic Kampuchea. Sihanouk resigns; Khieu Samphan becomes head of state, with Pol Pot as the prime minister. The so-called ‘liberation’ in 1979 by communist Vietnam and its decade-long occupation of ‘the Democratic Republic of Kampuchea’ prolonged severe civil strife and allowed for continued existence of Khmer Rouge guerrilla factions.

The peace process began in October 1991 with the internationally mediated Paris Peace Accord, which brought together four factions; Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK), People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), Royalist Party (FUNCINPEC), and Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) to form the Supreme National Council (SNC).¹⁴⁷ The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was established to oversee implementation of the agreements and elections.

The Khmer Rouge soon withdrew from the agreement to continue waging guerrilla war in the northwestern mountains. The conflict did not truly end until 1998 when Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge leader, died.

¹⁴⁵ The Khmer Rouge also described as Stalinist-Maoist in Chanda, Nayan(2003) ‘Cambodia: unable to confront the past’, in Y. Funabashi (ed.) Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

¹⁴⁶ World without Genocide. (2012). William Mitchell College of Law. <http://worldwithoutgenocide.org/protection-from-domestic-violence> accessed on 19th December 2014.

¹⁴⁷ In a cruel twist of fate, the Khmer Rouge had represented Cambodia at the United Nations during the 1980s.

In 1992 and 1993, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) repatriated 360,000 Cambodians from refugee camps on the Thai-Cambodian border; most had been there for more than 10 years. Although the quadripartite government lasted from 1991 to 1993, the Khmer Rouge (PDK) dropped out of the peace agreement and retreated to their well-established jungle hideouts, where they continued the war against the PRK through the mid-1990s. Nonetheless, national elections, boycotted by the Khmer Rouge, were held under United Nations auspices in 1993.

4.3 Cambodia Under the Khmer Rouge

The Khmer Rouge rule from 1975 to 1979 was intended to cleanse society of bourgeois elements and religion. Furthermore, the Khmer Rouge soldiers systematically destroyed temples and other cultural sites that connected ancient Khmer culture to the present. Peasants, merchants, children, and many former Khmer Rouge comrades suspected of harbouring elitist tendencies were murdered under the leadership of ‘Brother Number One’, Pol Pot.

All city dwellers were forcibly moved to the countryside to become agricultural workers. Money becomes worthless, basic freedoms were curtailed and religion were banned. The Khmer Rouge coined the phrase "Year Zero".¹⁴⁸ Civil servants, teachers, and doctors—in effect, all educated people—were classified as enemies of the Khmer Rouge, and members of the former regime were marked for execution.

¹⁴⁸ BBC, Cambodia Profile: A Chronology of Key Events. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13006541> Accessed on 16 December 2014

They wanted to transform Cambodia into a rural, classless society in which there were no rich people, no poor people, and no exploitation. To accomplish this, they abolished money, free markets, normal schooling, private property, foreign clothing styles, religious practices, and traditional Khmer culture.

Family relationships were also heavily criticized. People were forbidden to show even the slightest affection, humor or pity. The Khmer Rouge asked all Cambodians to believe, obey and respect only Angkar Padevat, which was to be everyone's "mother and father."

The Khmer Rouge claimed that only pure people were qualified to build the revolution. Soon after seizing power, they arrested and killed thousands of soldiers, military officers and civil servants from the Khmer Republic regime led by Marshal Lon Nol, whom they did not regard as "pure." Over the next three years, they executed hundreds of thousands of intellectuals; city residents; minority people such as the Cham, Vietnamese and Chinese; and many of their own soldiers and party members, who were accused of being traitors. Many were held in prisons, where they were detained, interrogated, tortured and executed. The most important prison in Cambodia, known as S-21, held approximately 14,000 prisoners while in operation. Only about 12 survived.¹⁴⁹

Under the terms of the CPK's 1976 "Four-Year Plan," Cambodians were expected to produce three tons of rice per hectare throughout the country. This meant that people had

¹⁴⁹ In a cruel twist of fate, the Khmer Rouge had represented Cambodia at the United Nations during the 1980s.

to grow and harvest rice all 12 months of the year. In most regions, the Khmer Rouge forced people to work more than 12 hours a day without rest or adequate food.

The fall of the Khmer Rouge came when clashes broke out between Cambodia and Vietnam in 1977. By the end of 1978 the Vietnamese troops had marched into Cambodia, capturing the capital Phnom Penh in their wake. Khmer Rouge leaders then fled to the west and re-established their forces in Thai territory, aided by China and Thailand. The United Nations voted to give the resistance movement against communists, which included the Khmer Rouge, a seat in its General Assembly. From 1979 to 1990, it recognized them as the only legitimate representative of Cambodia.

In 1982, the Khmer Rouge formed a coalition with Prince Sihanouk, who was exiled in China after the Cambodian Civil War, and the non-communist leader Son Sann to create the Tri-party Coalition Government. In Phnom Penh, on the other hand, Vietnam helped to create a new government – the People’s Republic of Kampuchea – led by Heng Samrin.

The Khmer Rouge continued to exist until 1999 when all of its leaders had either defected to the Royal Government of Cambodia, arrested, or had died. But their legacy remains.

4.4 Rebuilding the State in Cambodia

Democratic Kampuchea was one of the worst human tragedies of the 20th century. Nearly two million Cambodians died from diseases due to a lack of medicines and medical services, starvation, execution, or exhaustion from overwork. Tens of thousands were made widows and orphans, and those who lived through the regime were severely

traumatized by their experiences. Several hundred thousand Cambodians fled their country and became refugees. Millions of mines were laid by the Khmer Rouge and government forces, which led to thousands of deaths and disabilities since the 1980s.¹⁵⁰ A large proportion of the Cambodian people had mental problems deriving from loss of family and trauma from horrors of the conflict.¹⁵¹ In the aftermath of genocide, the peace building process faced even greater challenges in dealing with the total devastation of societies and individuals physically, psychologically, structurally, politically, economically, socially and spiritually.

4.5 Land Mine Problem in Cambodian Post Conflict Reconstruction

Landmines are one of the most significant obstacles to post-conflict peace building and development.¹⁵² Long after a battle has ended and peace agreements are signed, landmines remain underground, where they explode to kill and maim people above. Mines delay the return and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) and block access to vital resources and social services, including farmland, water, roads, schools, and health clinics. Furthermore the costs of mine removal and victim assistance weigh heavily on countries struggling to recover from conflict and rebuild their

¹⁵⁰ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross)(1996). *Anti-personnel landmines: Friend or foe?; A study of the military use and effectiveness of anti-personnel mines*. Geneva, Switzerland. www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0654.pdf.

¹⁵¹Khmer Rouge History, Cambodia Tribunal Monitor, contributed by DC-Cam from KhambolyDy's "A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)." <http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/history/cambodian-history/khmer-rouge-history/>. Accessed on 21 December 2014.

¹⁵²Shimoyachi, N. (2012). *Linking demining to post--conflict peacebuilding: A case study of Cambodia*. In *AssessingandRestoringNaturalResourcesinPost--ConflictPeacebuilding*, ed. D. Jensen and S. Lonergan. London: Earthscan

societies. Landmines must be removed to protect populations and put mine-affected countries on the path to recovery and development with post-clearance land use plans.

The Mine Ban Treaty, signed in 1997 and entered into force in 1999 obliges states' parties to clear all antipersonnel mines in their territories within ten years of becoming party to the treaty and to prohibit the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of antipersonnel mines. The Cambodian government signed the treaty in December 1997 and to which it became a state party in January 2000, requiring the country to clear all antipersonnel mines no later than January 1, 2010. Approximately two-thirds of the sixteen states failed to meet their 2009 deadlines and requested extensions.

Cambodia is one of the most heavily mine-affected countries in the world. Its landmine problem resulted from a nearly three-decade-long civil war that started in 1970 during the Cold War. Landmines were used as a key weapon in the 1980s in the battle between the socialist government, which was supported by Vietnam and the Soviet Union, and the communist, China-backed Khmer Rouge.¹⁵³

According to Cambodia Mine Victim Information System, there were 7,300 reported casualties from landmines and unexploded ordnance, approximately 92 percent of them civilian between the end of hostilities in 1998 and May 2009.¹⁵⁴ The first national survey

¹⁵³Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ICBL (International Campaign to Ban Landmines)(2009).*Landmine monitor report 2009: Toward a mine-free world.* Ottawa: Mines Action Canada. www.the-monitor.org/lm/2009/res/Landmines_Report_2009.pdf.

of minefields in Cambodia (the Level 1 Survey), completed in 2002 with the support of the Canadian government, ascertained that the number of villages affected by mines was 6,422, or 46 percent of the total number of villages, and stated that the contamination put more than 5 million people, or about 45 percent of the population, at risk.¹⁵⁵ Recognizing the extent of the problem, Cambodia listed mine clearance in its 2006–2010 National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) as one of the key strategies for enhancing the agricultural sector. According to the NSDP, “de-mining operations are not only humanitarian and security related but have significant social and economic implications, particularly on land distribution and the security of poor farming households in remote areas.

Cambodia’s primary demining agencies are the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC), the national operator, and the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), the national regulatory body. CMAC was originally established in June 1992 as part of the UNTAC. The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), international mine-action policy took demining in Cambodia indirectly through training, but the organization and its member states were reluctant to allow their mine specialists stationed at UNTAC’s Mine Clearance Training Unit to work in dangerous minefields and, instead, decided to train Cambodian de-miners.

¹⁵⁵CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency) and CMAC (Cambodia Mine Action Centre), 2002. Cambodia National Level 1 Survey: Executive summary. www.sac-na.org/pdf_text/cambodia/executive%20summary.htm.

Mine clearance is conducted according to an institutional process -- community-based, bottom-up mechanism-- that prioritizes minefields and guarantee effective use of mine-cleared land. The reclaimed land is then distributed to local people, following the procedure set out by the pilot project for managing mine-affected land. By giving local people priority-setting and decision-making authority, the community-based approach enhanced their sense of ownership in the rehabilitation and development of the community.

Planning for mine clearance is scheduled on an annual cycle that begins in January or February with a commune meeting where village chiefs and commune council members discuss and propose priority areas for demining, based on information ascertained through the Level 1 Survey that included village sketches, aerial photos, and village and minefield profile data. Of the land cleared in 2006 (35.4 km²), roughly 60 percent was allocated for agriculture and resettlement (including dual-purpose land) reserved for roads and other infrastructure. Overall the result was consistent with the priorities set nationally¹⁵⁶.

4.6 Security Sector Reforms

In post-conflict societies, the remnants of wartime military and security apparatuses pose great risks to internal security: inflated armies with little or no civilian control; irregular and paramilitary forces; an overabundance of arms and ammunition in private and government hands; weak internal security forces; and a lack of trust in and legitimacy of

¹⁵⁶MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan). (2008). Project assessment report of grand aid project in Cambodia [MushoshikinKyoryokuniOkeru Project Level JigoHyokaChosa Cambodia].

the government's control over police and military forces.¹⁵⁷ Without a secure environment and a security system that ensures security even after the departure of international peace operations, political, economic, and cultural rebuilding are impossible. Effective peace building therefore requires a thorough reform of a society's security sector – a process that requires active involvement of military, economic, and political actors.¹⁵⁸

The roles of security forces – external and internal – and the process of security sector reform are key ingredients of the post-conflict peace building agenda. Among the primary conditions for starting a process of conflict transformation and the rebuilding of political institutions, security, and economic structures is a secure environment.

That is the point where external military forces must be at hand to cope with such diverse tasks as the reinstallation of order, support for local security forces, disarmament of combatants, facilitation of security sector reform, protection of elections, demining, and securing the repatriation of refugees and protection of human rights. This is only possible if the activities of external military forces are integral parts of the overall transformation process of the post-conflict society concerned.

¹⁵⁷Edward, N and Schnabel, A. (2002). “Introduction: Recovering from civil conflict”, in Edward Newman and Albrecht Schnabel (eds) *Recovering from Civil Conflict: Reconciliation, Peace and Development*. London: Frank Cass, pp. 1–6.

¹⁵⁸Baden, W et al. (2004). *Security Sector Reform: Potentials and Challenges for Conflict Transformation*. *Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series No. 2*. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.

The UN's report on reforming UN peace operations offered a wide range of proposals to plan, implement, and train for future peace missions. In general, the United Nations and regional groupings are beginning to show serious concern as to how to prepare for improved and more effective operations that support both negative peace (i.e. the absence of direct violence) and positive peace (i.e. the creation of political, economic, and social conditions to support sustainable justice and security).¹⁵⁹

In most post-conflict societies, political institutions are absent or greatly weakened, there is an overabundance of war ordnance and weaponry, there is little or no civilian control over military and police, and mistrust and economic scarcity determine political and social relations. Both external and domestic actors are expected to cooperate in an effort to transform this delicate and fragile environment into sustainable peace. Military, paramilitary, and police forces in war-torn societies must be transformed and integrated into acceptable, legitimate, and democratic security structures and actors.

The “security sector” includes “all those organizations that have the authority to use, or order the use of, force or threat of force, to protect the state and its citizens, as well as those civil structures that are responsible for their management and oversight”. It includes military and paramilitary forces; intelligence services; police forces, border guards, and custom services; judicial and penal systems; and respective civil structures

¹⁵⁹Jean-Marie,G. (2002). “*On the challenges and achievements of reforming UN peace operations*”, *International Peacekeeping*. Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 69–80.

that are responsible for their management and oversight.¹⁶⁰ External actors are tasked with two important issues. First, putting security sector reform on the right path during the period of external presence; and second, ensuring that local actors are efficiently trained and resourced to continue that work.

It is necessary in such situations of reconstruction that security sector reform (SSR) programs address the initial monopoly, and that legitimate use of force is returned to the state very early in the peace process. Legitimate use of force by the state in this case will imply the existence of a recognized government and even fledgling institutions such as the courts to provide checks and balances.¹⁶¹ SSR in post-conflict situations is different from other situations because it has to deal with the legacy of past conflict and the re-establishment of the state-citizen social contract. Thus in post-conflict periods, it is inevitable to call for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, an important component of Peace-building that helps prevent the reoccurrence of conflict.

DDR programs are one of the early attempts to initiate recovery services and contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments so that development can start. These programs aim to deal with the post-conflict security problem which arises as a result of ex-combatants having no livelihood or support network, other than the one they

¹⁶⁰ Malcolm, C. (2000). *Security Sector Reform in Developing Countries: An EU Perspective*. London/Ebenhausen: Saferworld and Conflict Prevention Network, January, p. 6, available at www.saferworld.co.uk/publications/Secform.html.

¹⁶¹ African Development Bank. (2011). *The Role of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programs in Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Some Lessons Learnt*, Fragile States Unit (OFSU)

have been accustomed to during the period they served as soldiers. Current realities suggest that the re-establishment of security is one of the greatest challenges Cambodia faces and this will require more effective security forces, not simply less soldiers or less security spending. The long-term objectives of demobilization can be fully achieved if Cambodia's government can be more effectively supported as it conducts this complex exercise.¹⁶²

There are three longer-term challenges associated with demobilization exercises, each of which is closely linked to the more traditional development concerns of donors. The first has to do with discharging soldiers and ensuring that they are effectively reintegrated back into society. Secondly is to redefine the role of the military in society alongside, although constitutionally and functionally separate from, the forces responsible for civil law and order. The third concerns the question of how to channel the resources generated by a reduction in the size of the security sector - the so-called "peace dividend" – into more productive uses.

Laying the groundwork for successful reintegration is one of the foreseen long-term tasks that will necessarily merge with the socio-economic recovery of Cambodia's rural areas.¹⁶³ While this is still far off, there is much that can be done in the short term though, to give soldiers the best chance possible of finding productive employment. This will not

162 Hendrickson, D. (1999). Why security sector reform is a key priority, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London. <http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/why-security-sector-reform-key-priority#>. Accessed on 21 December 2014.

¹⁶³Ibid.

only stimulate the rural economy but, more importantly, will help to address the rural security problem by enabling work and movement without fear of intimidation or unofficial "taxes" being levied on their production.

Disarmament has not been included in the overall project design. It should be possible to require that every soldier being demobilized turn over at least one serviceable weapon as a condition of receiving demobilization benefits. This was written into the demobilization plan in Sierra Leone which was prepared with the technical assistance of the World Bank. There is currently no guarantee that Cambodia's soldiers will be disarmed before being demobilized or that weapon stockpiles will be appropriately dealt with. The danger is that ex-combatants will return to rural areas still armed or that military officials will be tempted to re-export weapons or place them on local markets as has happened in the past.

World Bank's current strategy is to combine a financial pay-off for ex-combatants with a wide range of other support services to ease their transition into peace-time society. The challenge is how to accurately assess what the exact needs of soldiers are and how these can best be met in the context of existing government services or donor programmes.

4.7 Economic Recovery in Cambodia

Cambodia's economy has been based traditionally on agriculture. About 85% of the cultivated area is devoted to the production of rice, while rubber trees account for a major part of the remainder. Prior to the war years, Cambodia's rice crop was usually ample

enough to permit exports.¹⁶⁴ The international donor community annually provides roughly half of the national budget in aid, but they do not use the leverage that this aid gives them effectively.

When the Pol Pot regime, came to power in April 1975, it was determined to emphasize the growth of agriculture and restore national self-sufficiency. The entire population was mobilized in a mass labour campaign to improve agricultural production through massive irrigation projects in the countryside. The cities were virtually emptied, and industrial production drastically declined. Private ownership of land was disallowed, and landholdings were transferred to the state or to state-organized cooperatives. All industrial enterprises were similarly transferred to state ownership. Sparse food supplies were distributed through a system of government food rationing and other forms of allotment.

Rule by the Khmer Rouge, 20 years of civil war, economic isolation, and a centrally planned economy imposed heavy burdens on Cambodia. Serious damage to basic infrastructure, industrial and agricultural production, and human resources required massive rehabilitation and reconstruction. Market-oriented reforms have been introduced which dismantle the centrally planned economy. In the 1990s Cambodia remained predominantly agricultural with more than 80% of workers employed in

¹⁶⁴ Nations Encyclopedia, Cambodia. <http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Asia-and-Oceania/Cambodia-ECONOMY.html>. Accessed on 21 December 2014.

agriculture. Inflation rose steadily, the price of domestic commodities increased at least 140% in 1990, but by only 15% in 1998.

Economic reform policies in 1989 transformed the Cambodian economic system from a Command economy to an open market one. In line with the economic reformation, private property rights were introduced and state-owned enterprises were privatized. Cambodia also focused on integrating itself into regional and international economic blocs, such as the Association of South East Asian Nations and the World Trade Organization respectively.¹⁶⁵ These policies triggered a growth in the economy, with its national GDP growing at an average of 6.1% before a period of domestic unrest and regional economic instability in 1997. However, conditions improved and since 1999, the Cambodian economy has continued to grow at an average pace of approximately 6-8% per annum.

Since Cambodia's economic freedom was first assessed in the 1997 Index, its progress in adopting policies that enhance economic freedom has been uneven and modest. The country's overall economic freedom score has improved by only 4.5 points, with advancements in trade freedom, monetary freedom, and investment freedom largely offset by significant declines in business freedom and freedom from corruption.

¹⁶⁵ Vannarith, C. (September 2008). "The Political Economy of Tourism in Cambodia". *Asia Pacific Journal of Tourism Research* 13 (3): 282.[doi:10.1080/10941660802280414](https://doi.org/10.1080/10941660802280414)

Cambodia had advanced into the ranks of the “moderately free” during the early 2000s but has fallen back to the status of economically “mostly unfree” since 2006. Substantial challenges remain, particularly in implementing deeper institutional and systemic reforms that are critical to strengthening the foundations of economic freedom. Government interference continues to undermine dynamic flows of investment and overall economic efficiency.

4.8 Land and Human Development in Cambodian Reconstruction

Cambodia has enjoyed economic growth and a reduction of poverty in the past decade, but the benefits of this growth have not been shared equitably among the citizens. With a population that has grown from around 8 million in the late 1980s to 14 million today, it is obvious that land has become an increasingly scarce resource.¹⁶⁶ The recovery of a fractured community increases its ability to change the dynamics of the cycle of conflict. Peace building ultimately has to focus on problems attributed to original and new sources of serious conflict. The reconstruction of a broken social and human fabric in a war shattered region has to be geared toward promoting human well-being and social justice, which constitute positive peace. Social empowerment and trust building improve the chances of successful reconstruction.

Disparities in income and access to opportunities have increased, particularly in rural communities. Rural communities are heavily dependent on land and forest resources, and

¹⁶⁶United Nations. (2007). *The Report of Land and Human Development in Cambodia Supreme National Economic Council*. New York: United Nations.

landlessness is a main cause of widespread poverty in rural Cambodia.¹⁶⁷ In 2004 91% of the poor who formed 35% of the total population lived in rural areas depend on land and agriculture for survival. 20-30% of land owners hold 70% of the land.¹⁶⁸ During the Khmer Rouge regime from 1975 – 1979, all land was collectivized and the land administration, including cadastral maps and titles, were destroyed. The regime brought about one of the greatest population displacements in human history, forcing millions to move from cities and towns to the countryside and from one part of the country to the other.

Conflict over land is one of the most disturbing trends to emerge in recent years with far-reaching consequences for the people's basic human rights and livelihoods. By one calculation, about 4 % of Cambodian households have been or are involved in land-based conflicts.¹⁶⁹ Violence against land activists take many forms, from verbal threats, intimidation to serious assaults and killings, in particular during the course of violent evictions. Representatives of affected communities are targeted for arrest and imprisonment on fraudulent criminal cases. Most of the instigators were rich people and companies, soldiers, police or government officials. In 1989, the Cambodian government introduced laws that allowed farmers to pass land titles to their children and permitted householders to buy and sell real estate. Nevertheless vast tracts remain classified as state

¹⁶⁷ STAR Kampuchea Organization, Landlessness and land conflicts in Cambodia, Phnom Penh, Cambodia http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/files/legacy/legacypdf/07_r%5Bt_land_cambodia.pdf?q=pdf/07_r%5Bt_land_cambodia.pdf. Accessed on 21 December 2014.

¹⁶⁸ The World Bank. Cambodia. Halving poverty by 2015? Poverty Assessment 2006. Phnom Penh 2006, p.17; A Fair Share for Women. Cambodia. Gender Assessment, Phnom, April 2004, p. 60.

¹⁶⁹ Sithan Phann, P. (2006). *Land Conflict and Conflict Resolution through Cadastral Commission*. Singapore: Royal University of Agriculture

land. All provinces have conducted land registration activities, but only some have carried out systematic registration. Most landowners still do not hold legal title to their property.¹⁷⁰

Women make up more than half of the agricultural workforce and they have a potentially more important role in reducing food insecurity and poverty. Landlessness is significantly higher for women and female-headed households. This group is most vulnerable to having their land rights ignored, partly due to a lack of knowledge of land rights and land title procedures. Women have less access to infrastructure, common property, social, health, legal, and financial services. They have less access to male dominated networks at community and provincial level.

The social, cultural and political value of land gets lost within the process of privatization and market based formalization of property rights. Women and other marginalized groups and indigenous people lose out when land becomes scarce and is turned into an economic asset.¹⁷¹ Weak legal protection for land ownership is another cause of landlessness. Few poor rural households have completed the registration procedures that are necessary to prove their property rights, and they are therefore vulnerable to land grabbing and forced evictions. To meet the reform needs of the current rural landless poor, gains will be realized when increased access to land is combined with strengthened ownership rights,

¹⁷⁰Vanna, M. (2007). *Detail presentation on risk management/land release*. GICHD, Geneva, Switzerland. www.gichd.org/fileadmin/pdf/risk_management/workshop-june2007/DetailPresentation-LR-RM-Workshop-June2007.pdf. Accessed on 21 December 2014.

¹⁷¹ Enge, E.(2006). *Will Formalizing Property Rights Empower the Poor? Or is this just another Blueprint?*. New York: Phnom Penh

investments in land improvement and irrigation, as well as complementary reforms in infrastructure.

There are a number of challenges that have to be met in order to realize these benefits.

One challenge is to obtain sufficient land and financial resources for the reforms. An overview of current land use in Cambodia indicates that at least 15% of the land area, or more than 2.1 million hectares, are underutilized could be targeted for land reform.

Cambodia's experience indicates that land management is key to linking mine clearance to peace building. Land is closely associated with rebuilding life after conflict, which includes the return and resettlement of refugees and IDPs and access to vital resources and social services, such as farmland, water, health care, and education. Yet if mismanaged, mine-cleared land can be grabbed by the elite and become a source of tension and grievance, thereby undermining peace at the local level. Therefore mine clearance must go hand in hand with land registration and titling.

Coordination between mine clearance and land registration is indispensable to ensure fair distribution of land. In Cambodia, where large-scale land acquisitions (often referred to as land grabbing) by people with power and authority is rampant, there are reports of poor people who laid mines to protect their land or built their houses deliberately on

minefields to prevent arbitrary confiscation.¹⁷² The problem is exacerbated by the fact that Cambodia's land tenure remains unclear largely because private ownership of all property, including land, was abolished during the Khmer Rouge regime.

Another major challenge is to ensure implementation of reforms. Support and cooperation from all levels of government are necessary to implement land reforms. Previous reform initiatives have been stalled by insufficient support from either the local, provincial, or national levels. In this context, it should be noted that land reforms can be an important component for ensuring political and social stability. Support and cooperation from all levels of government are crucial for effective implementation. It is also suggested that future redistribution of land should be based on a dual-income approach, acknowledging the importance of supplementary, non-agricultural sources of income.

By encouraging beneficiaries to continue supplementary income opportunities while increasing agricultural incomes, a maximum effect of land reforms may be derived. An additional benefit of this reform approach is that it enables households to diversify and reduce the vulnerability to shocks. When sequencing reforms, increasing tenure security through a strengthening of legal institutions should be at the top of the agenda. Furthermore, reforms should be targeted to vulnerable groups, whose capabilities to take advantage of the new opportunities should simultaneously be strengthened.

¹⁷²JCBL (Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines). (2003). *Landmines and human beings [Jirai to Ningen]*. Tokyo: Iwanami

The capacity of indigenous organizations to mobilize resources in a local setting is the key to a grassroots development approach. Uprooted populations need to be integrated into development programs with assistance in promotion of self-sufficiency and sustainability. The participation of local populations in rebuilding their communities reassures regained control over their own lives. Various projects organized at a community level such as production cooperatives, savings and loan associations, job training and literary programs operate in an informal economy.¹⁷³

4.9 Truth and Reconciliation

There can never be lasting peace and stable democracy in war-torn societies without truth, justice, and reconciliation. Mass killing, ethnic cleansing, rape, and other brutal forms of conducting war in ethnic, religious, and similar types of conflict render reconciliation extremely difficult. Although it is a long-term process, it has to be started as soon as the peace operation and peace building are initiated.¹⁷⁴ Almost three decades after the mass killings, Cambodia established the Extraordinary Chambers (“CEC”) to prosecute those most responsible for the terror. Neither an international nor a domestic

¹⁷³James, K. and Pastor, M. (1997). *Macroeconomic Policy and Peacebuilding in El Salvador*, Kumar, Krishna, *Rebuilding Societies After Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, pp. 287-314.

¹⁷⁴Winrich Kühne, P. (2001). “From Peacekeeping to Postconflict Peacebuilding” in Luc Reyhler & Thania Paffenholz (eds), *Peacebuilding: A Field Guide*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 386

court, Cambodia's CEC belongs to a new category of tribunals referred to as "hybrid courts"¹⁷⁵.

The network of social interaction, torn down by the deep and widespread effects of violent conflict, cannot be healed without reconciliation. Envisioning a new future would not be possible without acknowledging past abusive relationships. Personal fear has to be overcome for community building since the loss of familiarity in the routine and mistrust in others generates dysfunctional relations.¹⁷⁶ Reconciliation may start with healing psychological trauma caused by indiscriminate killing and torture and other types of abuses. Trauma stemming from the experience of abusive violence includes mental deprivation and loss of meaning and control of one's own life.¹⁷⁷ The idea of creating a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) has been considered as a possible substitute for the ongoing legal proceedings at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC).

A TRC can be an important process for investigating widespread and systematic human rights abuses committed by a former regime. Its work is believed to contribute to national

¹⁷⁵ *ibid*

¹⁷⁶ Kimberly, M. (1997). *Rebuilding Community: Psychological Healing, Reintegration, and Reconciliation at the Grassroots Level*, in Kumar, Krishna (ed.), *Rebuilding Societies after Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher

¹⁷⁷ Joseph, M. (1993). *The Healing Function in Political Conflict Resolution*, in Dennis J.D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe, eds., *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 112-28.

reconciliation and unity, and to help victims achieve some but not complete, degree of closure. The "truth" produced by a TRC helped to foster reconciliation.

It was common for people to be shot for speaking a foreign language, wearing glasses, smiling, or crying. One Khmer slogan best illuminates Pol Pot's ideology: "To spare you is no profit, to destroy you is no loss."

On July 25, 1983, the "Research Committee on Pol Pot's Genocidal Regime" issued its final report, including detailed province-by-province data. Among other things, their data showed that 3,314,768 people lost their lives in the "Pol Pot time." Beginning in 1995, mass graves were uncovered throughout Cambodia. Bringing the perpetrators to justice, however, has proved to be a difficult task.

Two former Khmer Rouge leaders — Nuon Chea, known as Brother No. 2, and Khieu Samphan, former head of state of the regime — were sentenced and convicted on August 7 2009 to life in prison by the trial chamber of the U.N.-supported tribunal. Both of them have appealed the verdict.¹⁷⁸ They are the first members of the notorious regime leadership to face justice. Pol Pot died in 1998, long before the ECCC was established. In 2010, the trial chamber sentenced Khmer Rouge prison chief Duch to life in prison.

Notably, before the establishment of the ECCC, Cambodians and their government carried out many social, political, religious, traditional and cultural activities to address

¹⁷⁸ Sok-Kheang, Ly .(2009). *What need for a truth commission?*
<http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/what-need-truth-commission> Accessed on 22 December 2014.

the legacy of the Khmer Rouge. Although not called a "TRC", these efforts were designed to help people overcome trauma, loss, hopelessness and the tremendous suffering Cambodians experienced during the KR regime. For example, thousands of survivor accounts (known as the *Renakse* petitions) were collected in the early 1980s. Both individual and collective petitions describe the sufferings of that era: the loss of family members and community members; the destruction of property; and the prohibition of culture, religion and tradition. The process was undertaken to publicly reveal the truth about the KR crimes and to seek acknowledgment from the international community.

Also, on the annual celebration called the "Day of Anger/Remembrance", people gather together to speak out about their losses and sufferings and to condemn the Khmer Rouge crimes publicly. The local government officials acknowledge their hardship and sufferings. During the gatherings, the Buddhist ceremony *baingskol* has also helped the victims mentally.¹⁷⁹

In the international community's past peace building practice, the focus on the political rather than the personal has tended to mask the underlying psychosocial processes that contribute to the willingness and readiness of people to choose a path of peace and reconciliation rather than engaging in further mass violence and/or abuse of human

¹⁷⁹Ibid.

rights. The concern with “hard-nosed” *geopolitics* needs to expand to include the realm of *geo social politics* in which relationship-building and reconciliation take centre stage.¹⁸⁰

We need to reorient our peace building framework toward the development of support infrastructures that enhance our capacity to adapt and respond to relational needs rather than being defined and driven by events and agreements. In other words, rather than focusing on the political and legal aspects of peace agreements, truth commissions and criminal tribunals, we need to focus on the task of relationship-building and how that may be enhanced through these various processes.

Since there is obviously an important psychological component of protracted conflicts, there is surely likely to be an equally important psychological or emotional component to their resolution. Consistent with conflict resolution theory’s emphasis on the need to address underlying human needs, international interveners need to address the underlying causes, as well as the effects, of the broken relationships manifested in violent conflicts.

The argument is that psychological, relationship based aspects of peace building have not been considered sufficiently in the implementation of post-conflict peace building: there needs to be a questioning of *real politik* assumptions and a redress in the balance of priorities and understanding. Focusing on responding to people’s expressed needs in

¹⁸⁰ Rasmussen,L.(2001).“*Negotiating a Revolution: Toward Integrating Relationship Building and Reconciliation into Official Peace Negotiations*” in Mohammed Abu-Nimer (ed.), *Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence: Theory and Practice*. Lanham, Maryland Lexington Books, , pp. 101-127

relation to justice and reconciliation is one step in this direction which can contribute to the long-term success of peace building.¹⁸¹

These two instances can be understood as aspects of an informal truth commission that Cambodian people have participated in since the end of the regime. Up to now, what Cambodians most lack is a sense of justice. Therefore, punitive justice at ECCC should be complementary to the many local efforts made since the fall of the KR regime in 1979. In this respect, all stakeholders should keep offering constructive comments for the sake of an internationally and nationally accepted justice. Afterward, symbolic collective reparations supplementing the ECCC verdicts should also be a means of assisting victims in gaining a sense of closure.

A national-level TRC appears unrealistic considering Cambodia's culture, religion and political climate. Therefore, continued commemorations, ongoing work at the grassroots to collect and share accounts from the period, and assistance to the ECCC process are more constructive efforts than pressing for the creation of a national-level TRC. Policies for reconciliation take such forms as compensation, and restitution in addition to psychological rehabilitation.¹⁸² Material losses of victims have to be compensated. An important goal of restitution is deterrence against future abuses. Lost honour and respect can be regained by an official acknowledgement of the pain of victims.

¹⁸¹Ibid.

¹⁸² Merwe, V. Johnson, T. & Thomas, J. (2000). *Restitution in South Africa*. International Journal of Peace Studies, vol. 2, No.2, pp. 37-48.

4.10 Democratic Governance and Post Conflict Reconstruction in Cambodia

Where civil strife disrupts the pre-existing government, former enemies may agree on a ceasefire or peace, but not on who should govern the peace. The end of an armed struggle is symbolized by the participation of belligerents in a political process through the formation of political parties and peaceful mobilization of their supporters. While elections are an essential part of many peace agreements, ill-timed, badly-designed or poorly-run elections have often served to undermine peace processes in fragile post-conflict environments.

In Cambodia warring parties had fought each other since 1970: first, the regime of General Lon Nol versus the communist Khmer Rouge guerillas (1970-75), followed by a four year reign of Khmer Rouge terror under the leadership of Pol Pot (1975-79), during which approximately one fifth of the population was murdered or died as a result of the misrule of the Khmer Rouge.¹⁸³

A new order needed to be negotiated among former adversaries in creating a new system. Constitution making has to be complementary to building a new political relationship. Given the impact of formal institutional structures on political games, adopting an appropriate political system is important. However, it is not always easy to find a

¹⁸³ Croissant, A. (2006). *International Interim Governments, Democratization, and Post-Conflict Peace-building: Lessons from Cambodia and East Timor Strategic Insights, Volume V, Issue 1, Center for Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School*. California: Department of Defense, Monterey

satisfactory political framework following many years of struggle for autonomy, independence, and social justice.

Democratization is a long-term process of social and political development, not a short-term event run by or for the international community. The impact that external interventions can have on democratization – particularly in post-conflict situations -- is largely limited to the design and construction of hardy institutions. Democratic development has to be based on social consensus regarding the system of rules that govern the expression of political differences and competition.

In Cambodia peaceful transition required the establishment of a functioning government acceptable to different parties along with the formation of mutually agreeable expectations and rules in inter-group dynamics. The new government ought to have a legal basis for its rule as legitimized by elections. Suffrage is applied to everyone regardless of his or her minority status, gender or racial differences. The contentious issue of political legitimacy of the government both inside and outside of the country is supposed to be solved by holding free and fair elections.

Comparative studies show that the reconstruction of civil strife-torn economies like that of Cambodia requires an extensive amount of time. In the past, most countries rarely recovered within the first decade following a civil war.¹⁸⁴ Before elections are held, a

¹⁸⁴Haughton, J. (2001). "Reconstruction of War-torn Economies: Lessons for East Timor," in H. Hall and

transitional authority is required to be in place to fill up the power vacuum. Many of elections in post-conflict societies have been held with the assistance, supervision or sometimes direct control of the international community. The basic principle that governments should be chosen by the ballot, not the bullet, has become enshrined as an emerging right in international law.¹⁸⁵ The model of international interim governments are those “in which the international community, through the aegis of the United Nations, directs and monitors the process of democratic change.

The United Nations and some Western countries had key roles in the process which eventually led to the installation of interim governments in Cambodia. The United Nations provided the framework for peace negotiations between the warring parties, while external patrons supplied pressure and incentives to induce their domestic clients to cooperate. However, the main actors in Cambodia still were the four hostile factions.

UN transitional authority in Cambodia was restricted to administrative authority, while the Supreme National Council, the local power-sharing government of all four warring parties with Prince Sihanouk as its head, had full legislative authority. UNTAC and its special representative, Yasushi Akashi, were given only the authority to decide when the factions within the council were deadlocked and Prince Sihanouk did not act. UNTAC’s primary responsibility was to control the administration in five areas of sovereign

J. M. Saldanha, eds., East Timor: Development Challenges for the World’s Newest Nation. Singapore and Canberra: ISEAS

¹⁸⁵ Franck, M & Thomas, M. (1992). "The *Emerging Right to Democratic Governance*" *American Journal of International Law*, pp. 46-91.

activity—defense, finance, foreign affairs, information and public security. UNTAC thus exercised executive power only indirectly. The previously established bureaucratic structures, however, remained intact, and the old bureaucracy, which was riddled with cadres of the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), was responsible for the execution of UNTAC’s directives. In addition, UNTAC had no mandate to develop a long-term plan for economic reconstruction. In July 2003, Cambodia held parliamentary elections for the third time since the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement of 1991. The elections appeared commendable, with a campaign period not overshadowed by overt violence, 94 percent voter registration, independent observers, and trained polling staff. But the smooth exterior belied a more complex reality.¹⁸⁶

The existing political structure, while liberal in its constitution and technically a multi-party system, is in practice a state ruled by a single party. Heavily steeped in its communist heritage, the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) is firmly entrenched at all levels of society and largely intolerant of political opposition.

State capacity building in Cambodia was retarded by the politicization and underpayment of the bureaucracy and an army that was bloated far beyond national security needs. The warring parties in Cambodia had to be disarmed, and their troops demobilized, while antidemocratic ideologies remained prevalent among the domestic actors and some of the

¹⁸⁶McGrew, L. Frieson, K, & Chan , S. (2004). *Good Governance from the Ground Up: Women’s Roles in Post-Conflict Cambodia, Women Waging Peace Policy Commission*. Ed.Anderlini S.N. Hunt Alternatives Fund.

factions were fundamentally unwilling or unable to abide by their commitment to the peace agreement.

The design of a constitution and its constitution-making process can play an important role in the political and governance transition. Constitution making after conflict is an opportunity to create a common vision of the future of a state and a road map on how to get there. The constitution can be partly a peace agreement and partly a framework setting up the rules by which the new democracy will operate.¹⁸⁷

External experts brought in by UNTAC assisted Cambodians in drafting a new constitution prior to elections, but civil society played a key role in making the process inclusive. Through an ad hoc network, they held public consultations in towns, cities, and provinces; raised awareness with peaceful demonstrations; created alliances with National Assembly members; and regularly offered proposals and draft language. The effect is evident today: Cambodia has a strong liberal, democratic constitution, with provisions for the protection of human rights and freedom from all forms of discrimination.

The design of the constitution seeks both to create new democratic institutions and to assure their protection in the longer term. Unless they are carefully designed and

¹⁸⁷ Samuels, K. (2006). *Post-Conflict Peace-Building and Constitution-Making*. International Peace Academy, Chicago Journal of International Law

implemented, democratic institutions can ferment conflict in sharply divided societies. Poor governance framework will undermine the sustainability of the peace. It can exacerbate fault lines, divisions, and tensions in society; entrench conflict-generating electoral or governance models, or provide a basis for contesting the government. Governance in Cambodia is still characterized by political patronage, violence, intimidation, and an absence of cross-party cooperation. Entrenchment of these qualities impacts citizens and hinders efforts by those seeking to promote accountable, inclusive, and democratic governance structures.

4.11 Chapter Summary

In this chapter we attempted an evaluation of the sequencing order of the post–conflict reconstruction policies used in Cambodia with a view to identify factors which impeded the reconstruction process. We have established that every peace process is not the same, especially in considering divergence in inherent conflict situations (e.g., the impact of intensity and level of violence in inter-group relations on transformative dynamics). However, drawing from the Cambodian experience, an overall conceptual and analytical approach can be proposed to identify steps and actions for bringing about harmonious relations between former adversaries and reconstructing post-conflict societies. Understanding the effectiveness of different elements of peace building is enhanced by examining how security, political, social and economic components support each other in rebuilding the fabric of divided societies.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁸ Howon,J. (2000). *Peace Building in Post-Conflict Societies: Processes and Strategies*. Ashgate: Aldershot.

If we take peace-building to mean action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict, then only sustained, cooperative work on the underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation. Unless there is reconstruction and development in the aftermath of conflict, there can be little expectation that peace will endure.¹⁸⁹ This was one of the problems that faced post conflict reconstruction in Cambodia. The diversity of tasks, challenges, and lessons of experience needed to help post-conflict countries address the urgent needs for establishing safety and security; strengthening constitutional government; reconstructing infrastructure and restoring services; stabilizing and equitably growing the economy; and strengthening justice and reconciliation organizations were inadequate in the Cambodian peace process.

In the next chapter we examine the extent to which participatory governance system, institution building and security reforms contributed to successful post conflict reconstruction in Mozambique.

¹⁸⁹United Nations. (1992). *Agreements on a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodia conflict*. DPI/1180-92077. This documents is referred to as the "Paris Agreement.

CHAPTER FIVE

POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION IN MOZAMBIQUE

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter we examine the post conflict reconstruction in Mozambique with a view to determine the extent to which participatory governance system, institution building and security reforms contributed to successful post conflict reconstruction in Mozambique. More specifically we discuss how post conflict intervention in Mozambique addressed the key pillars of the post conflict reconstruction framework, namely: Legitimacy, trust and authority of the state, political will for transparency and accountability, rule of law, social capital and social cohesion, economic reconstruction and service delivery and finally, security and cross border movement.



Figure 3: Map of Mozambique

5.2 Background to the Mozambique Conflict

The war in Mozambique pitted two main groups: the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) and the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) and it culminated in a peace agreement in 1992 when the two groups signed a peace treaty in Rome, Italy¹⁹⁰. During the conflict, approximately one million people lost their lives and an additional six million people were displaced across the country. Frelimo, a Mozambican resistance organization was formed in 1962 to resist colonialism by Portugal. The resistance was sustained until in 1974 when an armed coup took power in Portugal and the new government decided to free the colonies and grant them independence. Consequently, Portugal handed over the reigns of government in Mozambique to Frelimo in 1975.

The run up to 1975 was quite bloody and the stakes were high because it pitted a long standing battle between the capitalist West and Soviet Communists on the international stage. Portugal had considerable support from its western allies who were afraid of a communist take-over in South Africa. On the other hand, Frelimo was supplied with increasingly sophisticated weapons from China and the Soviet Union to fight against the Portuguese colonial rulers. The Frelimo Guerillas could raid settler plantations and block railways in their resistance, since their offensive capability had greatly been bolstered. The guerilla resistance considerably escalated until Marcello Caetano was overthrown back in Portugal and freedom of Mozambique quickly negotiated. All was not well after the independence negotiations which handed over freedom to Mozambicans from

¹⁹⁰ Frelimo. (1989). .Relatório do Comité Central ao V Congresso. Maputo: Partido FRELIMO.

Portugal. The vast numbers of settlers in Mozambique went further to attempt a coup and forestall the transition to civilian rule, but the Frelimo and Portuguese regular army crushed the resistance.

From that point, Frelimo was granted the right to run the country since the Portuguese had no legitimacy and the power for a neo-colonial rule in Mozambique. Frelimo nationalized businesses, banned other political parties, undermined religious and traditional authorities, and actively supported the liberation struggle in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa. The move did not augur well with the authorities in Zimbabwe and South Africa and in response; Zimbabwe organized Mozambicans into resistance to counter the Frelimo move¹⁹¹. The Mozambican national Resistance or Renamo as it came to be known was created and financed by Zimbabwe over the period until Zimbabwe attained independence in 1980 after which the Apartheid South African regime took over the role of financing and arming the rebels in Mozambique.

In 1984, Frelimo and South Africa signed the Nkomati Accords, in which each government agreed to halt support to armed insurgents fighting the other. Although Renamo still benefited from South African backing, it moved its bases inside Mozambique and adopted new tactics aimed at undermining government authority in the

¹⁹¹ UN. (1995). *The United Nations: Mozambique 1992 - 1995*. New York: United Nations.

eyes of the population¹⁹². These tactics included targeting civilians for massacres, and destroying social services, transportation, and crops. At this time, South Africa was in the middle of the Mozambican conflict and was squarely responsible for many of the atrocities committed inside Mozambique. The situation took a nosedive in the mid eighties as the rebels gained ground and by the end of 1987, the Mozambican territory was effectively divided between the government and the rebels and then the war reached a stalemate. Joaquim Chissano the predecessor to Samora Machel took over after the death of the latter in a plane crash and immediately started exploring ways of a negotiated solution to the conflict. In 1990, dialogue was established based in Rome, Italy and after two years and 12 rounds of negotiations, an agreement was reached between the two warring sides and an accord was signed which was fully supported by the UN and the international community.

The United Nations created a monitoring force, the United Nations Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), to oversee the disarmament and demobilization of 110,000 troops and the resettlement of 5-6 million refugees, and to organize elections for 1993. Despite delays, the peace process was relatively smooth. Elections in 1994 gave Frelimo the presidency and a small majority in the parliament, while Renamo¹⁹³ won 45% of the parliamentary seats. The ONUMOZ was withdrawn from Mozambique and the country began the other journey for rebuilding and progress.

¹⁹² FRELIMO 1989: 25

¹⁹³ Renamo .(1989).“*Sixteen Points Paper*” Mimeo: Nairobi.

The newly found peace in South Africa and the neighboring countries has helped to keep the country together, although deep divisions still exist within the ranks of Mozambican people and to many, the memories of the two decade conflict are still alive.

5.3 The Mozambique Peace Process

The Mozambique peace negotiations which continued in 1991 were greatly slowed by the Renamo who vehemently refused to accept the legitimacy of the sitting government. An agenda was developed to solve the impasse and on May 1991, an agreement consisting of six areas was reached. These areas included: The law of political parties, the electoral system, military issues, guarantees, a cease fire, and a donor conference.

The General Peace Accord dealt with the military issues, political and humanitarian issues.¹⁹⁴ It consisted of seven protocols upon the negotiation process. These protocols included: Protocol 1 which dealt with the legitimacy of the sitting government. Renamo agreed to respect the sitting government and avoid use of military force for political gains in the country. In return, the government agreed to suspend any form of legislation until a multi-party election was done in the country. To oversee the success of the agreement, the government, Renamo and the UN agreed to form a commission tasked with that specific matter. Protocol 2 predominantly dealt with political issues. The need for the implementation of multi-party democracy was expressed in this protocol. It reinforces the Law of political Parties which had previously been adopted by Freelimmo earlier in the same year. Under the protocol, Renamo was recognized as a legitimate political party

¹⁹⁴ Wallensteen, P. (1998). *Preventive Violent Conflicts: Past record and future challenges*. Report No. 48. Uppsala. Department of Peace and Conflict Research. Uppsala University: Uppsala.

operating within Mozambique. Protocol 3: provided the platform for conducting the electoral process. The protocol includes the guiding principles for the elections and the participation of the international observers during the electoral process. The government was also tasked with drawing an electoral law in consultation with Renamo and other players. Protocol 4: dealt with the military doctrine whereby, new structures for the Mozambique Armed forces were to be determined. In addition, it provided a framework of depoliticization of the military. Demobilization of the troops was taken care of by this protocol. Protocol 5: established the timetable for the electoral process. It also said that the general elections under the multiparty system would be held a year after the signing of the peace accord. A commission to oversee the implementation of the cease fire was established under the same protocol. Protocol 6: established the timetable for the cease-fire and its implementation in four steps: (i) cease-fire, (ii) separation of forces, (iii) concentration of the separated forces and (iv) demobilization. Prisoners, except those being held for ordinary crimes, were supposed to be released. Protocol 7: this protocol agreed by both parties that there was a need to request for international financial support to help implement the provisions of the peace accord. It is through this protocol that a donor conference was held in Rome to help Mozambique begin its baby steps towards achievement of long lasting peace.

With reference to the contents of the agreement, both parties clearly expressed their need to proceed with peace process by undertaking hard and complex activities towards the

successful implementation of the accord¹⁹⁵. However, war in Mozambique was profitable to some members of the local and international community who attempted time and again to drag the peaceful implementation of the agreement. Fortunately, the forces were not strong enough to beat the will of the people of Mozambique and were ultimately defeated militarily and ideologically.

5.4 Implementation of the General Peace Agreement (GPA)

The GPA provided a comprehensive framework of transforming from war to peace through the following processes: The assembly and demobilization of troops, the formation of new armed forces, and the reintegration of demobilized military personnel into civil life, the resettlement of refugees and displaced persons and the process of holding the first democratic multiparty elections. The United Nations through the UNOMOZ (United Nations Operations in Mozambique) supervised the implementation of the GPA in the country. Thanks to the exceptional efforts of Italian diplomat Aldo Ajelo, most of the suggested agreements were managed and implemented. However, some aspects of the GPA were not totally implemented. For instance, the integration of Renamo controlled regions into one state remained a difficult task for the implementers.

¹⁹⁶ In addition, disarmament of the armed groups was not completely achieved due to the basic nature of people involved in conflicts. It is believed that the same arms are in use today and responsible for the wave of crimes affecting the country long after the peace agreement. In addition, the implementation of the accord ran into the obstacle of finances

¹⁹⁵ ibid

¹⁹⁶ Ajelo, A. (1996) . *The Role of UNOMOZ in the Pacification Process*. A. Mazula (ed.). *Mozambique: Elections, democracy and development*. Maputo: Inter-Africa, pp 119-123.

as some of the activities proved very expensive for the United Nations. The best part of the deal was that, the cease fire agreed upon was sustained though the implementation of the agreement was delayed for about a year. The delay was attributed to the complexity of the process of implementation on both ends. Nevertheless, the elections were held in October 1994 where FRELIMO won a majority in the 250 members' Assembly, and Joaquim Chissano was elected president. A coalition of three small parties won nine seats, contributing to ease the polarization in the parliament between the ex-belligerents. The second national election was held in 1999, also with the victory of FRELIMO, and RENAMO appearing again as the second force, building a coalition with 10 parties.

However, despite the strides the nation has taken in its rehabilitation and nation building, it is confronted by a considerable number of challenges which hinder nation growth and development. Post-conflict situations inherit a legacy of very poor economic policies and governance institutions. In many post-conflict situations the government is required by donors to hold elections, so that citizens may have more influence than usual in aspects of governance and self-rule which assumes democratic principles, so that the extent of their understanding of policy and governance may be typically important.

Most countries in early stages of post conflict reconstruction, and even those in the transition from reconstruction to more stable government, rank relatively low on indicators of governance. In Mozambique the Government is weak in its capacity to coordinate, supervise and regulate the activities of external agencies. Frelimo being the ruling party in the country remains fundamentally unchanged in terms of how it rules the

country.¹⁹⁷ On matters of governance, the ruling party, Frelimo faces significant challenges, including the country's dangerous dependence on external commodities such as oil and cereals, increased heavy dependence on external donors; Mozambique is highly dependent on international development aid. Donor development partners fund about 51% of the country's national budget. This compromises the sovereignty of the country in terms of its ability to plan its own budget. Rampant corruption in the government is undermining development in the country as resources are diverted from state coffers to private enterprises a move that has threatened all the sectors of the state.

The political environment in Mozambique is characterized by ineffective opposition political parties that lack a solid ideological base around which support for them is eroded. Opposition parties face enormous challenges and are dominated by individual and ethnic interests. This has resulted in the ruling party effectively monopolizing all attempts to find solutions to the country's problems and designing paths to prosperity without any substantial contributions from other political perspectives.¹⁹⁸ Economically, the nation faces many challenges, including continuous price increases for basic commodities and services such as public and private transport most notably after the war. Following the introduction of structural adjustment in 1987, which entailed some liberalization of prices and increased credits to rehabilitate the manufacturing sector, there was modest growth in 1987-9 but this was not sustained due to continued war, drought and the negative effects of adjustment policies themselves. This led to the

¹⁹⁷ Shikhani, P. (2012). *Mozambique, Post-war socio-economic and political challenges*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies

¹⁹⁸ Ibid

occurrence of unpredictable events, including food riots and other forms of social unrest, causing disorder in the system.¹⁹⁹ A simple price increase generated a domino effect that developed rapidly from social unrest into political crisis. Both subjective and objective factors are linked to Mozambique's economic profile, while problems include the country's lack of sovereignty because of over-dependence on donor aid and economic giants in the region such as South Africa.²⁰⁰

Politically, Mozambique faces legitimacy challenges among its political actors. In 1990 Mozambique adopted a new constitution that provided for a multiparty political system and exchanged its centrally controlled political economy for a market-oriented one. The Frelimo regime that came to power decided to replace its communist political, social and economic system with a Western-oriented system. The strategic shift was also aimed at undermining internal and external support for the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (Renamo), which was Frelimo's opponent in the civil war.²⁰¹ Although a peace deal was signed between the two warring parties they still continued to trade accusations that each was undermining peace. For instance, Frelimo accused Renamo, the main opposition party, of maintaining a non-specified number of armed men in its former military bases while Renamo, for its part, charged that Frelimo was persecuting its

¹⁹⁹ Adam, C., P. Collier and V. Davies. (2006) ..*Post-Conflict Monetary Reconstruction*. Mimeo: CSAE.

²⁰⁰ *ibid*

²⁰¹ *ibid*

members, and monopolizing and abusing state resources to the disadvantage of the rebel-movement-turned-opposition-party.²⁰²

5.5 Security Challenges in Post Conflict Reconstruction in Mozambique

The process of reforms in the security sector was not consistently addressed from the immediate post-war transitional phase. The fact that Renamo troops did not integrate the new police force always constituted a problem. Renamo did not have a police component within its own guerrilla movement and thus suffered dramatically as was the case with the new armed forces where semi-professional men were merged with the non-professionals.²⁰³ The Police still have major operational and attitudinal shortcomings. Mozambican Government adopted a militarized model of Police and availed itself of the transfer of ex-military into the Rapid Intervention Police Unit, which has had questionable and aggressive behavior towards the population.

Security is a public good that every citizen requires. Human security and development are linked by the health of a country's security sector. If human security is the aim for the citizens of Mozambique, then security-sector reform (SSR) is one means to achieve that aim. Violence is a feature of Mozambican society although the country does not suffer from any ongoing conflict. In the urban and peri-urban areas, the main instances of

²⁰² Doyle, M. and Sambanis, N. (2006). *Making War and Building Peace*. New York: Princeton University Press.

²⁰³ Lalá Anícia, A.(2006). *Democratic Governance and Security Sector Reform: Realities from post-war Mozambique*. VOL.3.Number 144,pp 35-39

violence are linked to criminal activity which involve Petty crime involving gangs, informal criminals and ‘opportunists as well as Organized crime involving criminal syndicates that often include personnel from the police and other law-enforcement agencies.²⁰⁴

To analyze the interlinkages between the security challenges and the democratic peace theory in the context of Mozambique, it is important to acknowledge the fact that democratic system of governance, by its very nature, implies a fairer allocation of government resources and policies than any other system.²⁰⁵ This is primarily because the leadership relies on the electorate to remain in power. In order to remain in power the government has to earn legitimacy in the eyes of the voter through, for example, provision of security. Many of Mozambique’s democratic institutions are weak, embryonic or absent.²⁰⁶ These weaknesses are compounded by an electorate that has low levels of literacy and is broadly unaware of its entitlements and rights. Therefore, Mozambique’s democratic deficits represent the main challenge to peace and security in the country because they reduce government’s ability to promote the human security of people through the development and implementation of appropriate people-centric policies, investments, measures and interventions.

²⁰⁴ Astill-Brown, J et al. (2010). *Mozambique: Balancing Development, Politics and Security*. London: Chatham house

²⁰⁵ *ibid*

²⁰⁶ *ibid*

5.6 Mistrust and Social Disunity among the Communities

The discordant relations between the two former enemies of the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO) and the ruling Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) have continued to characterize Mozambique's internal politics which exhibit mistrust and a political environment that could be best described as one of 'armed peace'. In post-election periods RENAMO customarily adopts an aggressive posture, using accusations of electoral fraud to hinder FRELIMO's governance.²⁰⁷ This causes mistrust and lack of confidence in the established institutions hence undermining governance. Most of civil or "intrastate" wars are fuelled as much by racial, ethnic, or religious animosities as by ideological fervour and disunity among the communities. Social and economic divisiveness of inequality places a significant strain on social cohesion and high poverty and unemployment rates are attributed with the conflict in Mozambique. Mistrust between community members also relates back to individuals' alignment with either one of the two warring parties.

5.7 Nation Building in Post Conflict Mozambique

Nation-building is the construction of a shared sense of identity and common destiny, to overcome ethnic, sectarian or religious differences and counter alternative allegiances. Nation-building efforts can help develop greater social cohesion.²⁰⁸ State-building is concerned with the state's capacity, institutions and legitimacy, and with the political and

²⁰⁷ *ibid*

²⁰⁸ Bendix, R. (1964). *Nation-Building and Citizenship*. New York: Wiley and Sons

economic processes that underpin state-society relations. The effectiveness of the state and the quality of its linkages to society largely determine a country's prospects for peace and development. State-building is a long-term, historically rooted and internal process driven by a wide range of local and national actors.²⁰⁹ In a post conflict setting, fragile countries like Mozambique which have experienced a twenty-year conflict, state-building and peace-building objectives are the necessary building blocks towards achieving poverty reduction and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Nation-building has historically been a violent process, and movements to challenge an exclusionary political settlement have often led to short-term instability or conflict, while laying the foundations for a more sustainable, inclusive settlement.²¹⁰

In Mozambique, nation-building process strengthened the propensity of the central state to relegate other forms of sociality to the domain of repression through repressive state apparatus soon after independence. The transition to multi-party democracy in 1994 made the political parties especially those in opposition legitimate with their projects and at the same time the ruling party ushered in pluralism.²¹¹ Nation building in post conflict Mozambique was the primary goal of all stakeholders after the signing of the peace accord. It is an aspect that involved reconciling the people, eradicating ethnic animosity, improving the socio economic well being of Mozambique and restoration of the damaged infrastructure in the country. The role of nation building in Mozambique involved a lot of

²⁰⁹ World Bank. (1997). *World Development Report: The State in a Changing World*. World Bank: Washington DC

²¹⁰ Bendix, R. (1964). *Nation-Building and Citizenship*. New York: Wiley and Sons

²¹¹ Virtanen, P. (2005). *The politics of natural resource management in post-colonial Mozambique*: university of Tampere. Acta

forces working together where each dwelled with a different part of the process. Beginning with the guarantee that the peace agreement would be respected by both warring parties, other development aspects could as well be initiated and implemented.²¹²

In economic terms, comparison between post war Mozambique and with the situation during the conflict, it is evidently clear that Mozambican economy improved by a very large margin in all aspects.²¹³ The war to peace process of democratization was carried out in parallel with economic structural reforms leading to a liberal market system; this had a mixed impact on the country's economic recovery. The transition rejuvenated and boosted the economy toward becoming a popular destination for foreign direct investment and infrastructural developmental projects.²¹⁴ This has generated high economic growth rates and enabled the country to qualify for debt relief and also translated into substantial increases in the standard of living in the rural areas. Political stability was also evidenced by the signing of the peace accord and the subsequent general election which did not plunge the country into another war of attrition. In view of democratic peace theory, holding of the general elections marked a landmark milestone in advancing of democracy through people's representation and accommodation of divergent views. General elections in that sense symbolized a move towards

²¹² Manning, C. (2002). *The Politics of Peace in Mozambique: Post-Conflict Democratization*. Connecticut: Praeger

²¹³ Brahimi, Lakhdar, "Statement by Lakhdar Brahimi, Special Advisor to the Secretary-General of the United States" in *Beyond Cold Peace: Strategies for Economic Reconstruction and Post-Conflict Management Conference Report*, Berlin Federal Foreign Office, October 27-28, 2004

²¹⁴ Rugumamu, S. (2003). *Studies in Reconstruction and Capacity Building in Post-Conflict Countries in Africa*. Addis Ababa: The African Capacity Building Foundation

democratization.²¹⁵ There was an improvement in individual freedoms, and access to product and communication networks, and progress in improving human development. According to the World Bank, the percentage of the population living in absolute poverty declined from 69 percent in 1996-1997 to 54.5 percent in 2002.²¹⁶

In terms of education, nation building achieved a lot. Adult literacy rose from 35.5 percent in 1992 to 46.5 percent in 2002. Education is believed to be a key contributor to the ability of people to eliminate some of the challenges they face in life and is seen as a powerful tool in nations building. In addition, per capita GDP of post conflict Mozambique increased from an average of \$122 in 1985 at the height of the war to \$220 in 2002. Annual inflation decreased from 63.2 percent in 1995 to 2.86 percent in 1999. During the post war reconstruction, Mozambique still faced a large number of social and economical problems: poverty, unemployment, migrants, low agricultural production, and low access to social and economic services and facilities.²¹⁷ According to the UNDP Human Development Index 2004, Mozambique was ranked 171st of 177 countries, and is well below the average of sub-Saharan Africa and the Least Development Countries (LDC). More than two-thirds of its population was below the poverty line in the same year. There has been no improvement in life expectancy at birth although the infant mortality rate has been reduced in recent years; it is still one of the highest in the world.²¹⁸

²¹⁵ *ibid*

²¹⁶ World Bank, Report 2002

²¹⁷ IMF, 2005

²¹⁸ The UNDP Human Development Index 2004

5.8 The Reconstruction Framework in Mozambique

The period 1992-1994 can be best described as a period for relief, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. The period from 1994 to 1999 can be characterized as the period of development and more rapid change. During this period, multiparty elections took place, privatization was carried out rapidly, and reconstruction and development activities were continued.²¹⁹ Most stakeholders played an integral part in the reconstruction of Mozambique including foreign development partners. The United Nations was the major contributor in creating an enabling environment in Mozambique for donor countries and institutions to establish development framework in the country. The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) and several UN agencies, the multilateral donors such the World Bank, IMF, EU, and African Development Bank (ADB), bilateral donors, the international non-governmental and non-profit organizations contributed to the peace building in Mozambique.²²⁰ As the United Nations was overseeing the implementation of the peace agreement and ensuring the demilitarization of the conflict, the development agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF were actively involved in the reconstruction process.²²¹

The UN was instrumental in brokering the peace as well as laying the foundation for the peaceful reconstruction and rebuilding of the country. ONUMOZ was established by the Security Council arm of the United Nations, to oversee the implementation of the General

²¹⁹ Diamond, L. (2014). *Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States: Lessons and Challenges*, Prepared for the National Policy Forum on Terrorism, Security, and America's Purpose, Washington, DC

²²⁰ ibid

²²¹ ibid

Peace Agreement signed in 1992 between the warring parties.²²² Under the agreement, the ONUMOZ was tasked with monitoring that the ceasefire agreed upon was followed to the latter in addition to separating and concentrating of armed forces within selected areas in Mozambique. Demobilization and collection of weapons in the hands of the fighters was also the role of United Nations force in Mozambique and which was also tasked with destroying the weapons.

The government demobilized 71,281 combatants and integrated 8,533 into the post-conflict national Army, while the rebels demobilized 20,537 (including 2000 children) and integrated 3662 into the post-conflict national Army. The demobilized soldiers were given their salary for two years, the first six months paid by the government and the next eighteen months paid by donors through a US\$ 35.5 UN administered trust fund.²²³ This was a commitment by both the government and the bilateral development partners to ensure that the fighters did not feel shortchanged after giving up arms. It also ensured that the fighters did not engage in illegal activities to cover up for the lost income which they were enjoying under RENAMO.²²⁴ There also existed the possibility that another financially capable power would exploit the opportunity and finance another armed rebellion using the disposable fighters angry at the move. The money was paid through the BPD, the People's Development Bank, which has branches in most district capitals.

²²² Nuvunga, A. (2007). *Post-war Reconstruction in Mozambique: The United Nations' Trust Fund to assist the former rebel movement RENAMO*. London: Tiri

²²³ Ibid

²²⁴ Juergensen, O. (2000). *UN Repatriation as peace building and reconstruction: the case of Mozambique, 1992–1995*. Johannesburg: International Development Research Centre.

Money would be paid to all demobilized soldiers, even if they had obtained employment within the two year period.

ONUMOZ's mandate also extended to monitoring and overseeing the withdrawal of foreign forces operating within Mozambique and to provide adequate security in the transport corridors which also served as the economic backbone of Mozambique at the time. Other functions of ONUMOZ in Mozambique included; monitoring and verifying the disbanding of private and irregular armed groups; authorization of security arrangements for vital infrastructures and to providing security for UN and other international activities in support of the peace process; providing technical assistance and monitoring the entire electoral process and coordinating and monitoring the humanitarian assistance operations, in particular those relating to refugees, IDPs, demobilized military personnel and the affected local population.²²⁵

The UN Secretary General's visit to Mozambique on October 20, 1993, made a breakthrough in the peace process by having both parties agree on the revised timetable for the implementation of the Agreement with other plans such as the demobilization of government and RENAMO forces, composition of National Elections Commission, and the creation of National Police Affairs Commission subcommittees to monitor the activities of the Mozambique Police. In early 1993, some 6,500 troops and military

²²⁵ Nuvunga, A. (2007). *Post-war Reconstruction in Mozambique: The United Nations' Trust Fund to assist the former rebel movement RENAMO*. London: Tiri

observers, led by the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Mr. Aldo Ajello, were deployed. The ceasefire took place and held with very few incidents.

After its mission was achieved in 1994, ONUMOZ was liquidated in early 1995 marking the end of that phase of reconstruction and peace building.²²⁶

5.9 International Financial Institutions and the Reconstruction of Mozambique

The two Breton Woods institutions prioritized the transformation of Mozambique from a socialist economy to a market economy. Both of these institutions focused on macroeconomic stability (e.g., control of inflation, tax reform, fiscal administrative reforms, and exchange rate liberalization) and privatization. The institutions also encouraged the country to embrace inclusiveness and open up the economy to foreign direct investment.²²⁷

In 1984, Mozambique joined the Lome Convention and became a member of the IMF and the World Bank. Mozambique launched a structural adjustment program in 1987 which was supported by a Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) arrangement until 1990, by an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) until 1995, and a second ESAF-supported arrangement until-1999. The World Bank approved six adjustment-lending operations that helped to establish one of the world's largest relief operations in

²²⁶ Ibid

²²⁷ Ross, C. (2014). *Mozambique rising building a new tomorrow*. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, Publication Services

Mozambique. During the 1985-1992 periods, net disbursement of the Bank to Mozambique averaged about \$46 million per year and net disbursements rose sharply to \$133 million per year in the post-war period (1993-2001). The IMF conditions in the structural adjustment program focused on structural reforms including privatization, public sector reform and fiscal reform, and increasing the quantity and quality of social spending.²²⁸ Besides the support for the structural reforms, the scope of the World Bank lending included economic adjustments (liberalization and privatization), basic education, primary health care, agriculture, and transportation. The World Bank also developed the Provincial Reintegration Support Program (PRSP) to facilitate the economic and social reintegration of ex-combatants.

5.10 Post Conflict Reconstruction Framework Pillars in Mozambique

Post conflict reconstruction often takes place at various times during and after conflict, the framework places tasks between the cessation of violent conflict and the return to normalization. Ideally normalization is reached when extraordinary outside intervention is no longer needed in a country and the processes of governance and economic activity largely function on a self-determined and self-sustaining basis. In Mozambique the post-conflict reconstruction framework tasks are organized around four distinct issue areas: Socio-Economic Wellbeing; governance/participation; Legitimacy, Trust and Authority of the State; Social Capital Approaches in Reconstruction and Non-Reconciled Communities and the problem of Social dilemmas.

²²⁸ Ibid

5.10.1 Socio-Economic Wellbeing in Mozambique

At the end of the war, GDP per capita was below its pre-independence level a factor that had profound impact on social lives of many Mozambique citizens. Poverty remained high, particularly in rural areas, and inequality across households was increasing between 1995 and 2005. Trust, relations between community members, and access to income opportunities are used as indicators of social capital and social transformation.

In the aftermath of war, households vary in the extent to which they were able to take advantage of new opportunities beyond farming and improve their standard of living. A small number of households became contract farmers, raising chickens for a local poultry company, considered to be a highly desirable source of cash income. More than a decade after the end of the war, agricultural techniques practiced in rural Mozambique are still very basic.²²⁹ The education and the health sectors were severely hit by the 16-year war that ravaged schools and health centres. 60 per cent of the rural network and much of the rural health system was destroyed. The 1992 peace accord laid the basis for the reconstruction of both health and education systems. Successful reform programs have been introduced in both sectors to ensure both short term and long-term reconstruction and development is achieved.²³⁰ Mozambique has been classified by the international community as a success story of social economic reform which has been portrayed as one

²²⁹ Bozzoli, C. and Brück, T. (2009) *Agriculture, Poverty, and Postwar Reconstruction: Micro-Level Evidence from Northern Mozambique*, *Journal of Peace Research*, 46(3), pp. 377-397.

²³⁰ Sousa, C. (1999). *Rebuilding rural livelihoods and social capital. The Mozambique jexperience*. Working paper No . 171. UNU World institute for development economic research

of the fastest in Africa.²³¹ Since the end of the 16-year conflict in 1992, the education system, and in particular Primary education has been expanding rapidly. In 1992 the net enrolment rates for primary school in girls was 34.2 per cent and 43.8 per cent for boys. In 2006, the net enrolment rates for girls and boys rose to 67 per cent and 71 per cent respectively. Official statistics from the household survey 2003 show that the incidence of absolute poverty is 69.4 per cent, indicating that more than two-thirds of the Mozambican population is living below the poverty line.

In addition, between 2003 and 2004, Mozambique experienced a 16 per cent reduction in poverty in rural areas (from 71 per cent to 55 per cent) and a 10 per cent reduction for urban areas (from 62 per cent to 52 per cent).²³² The reduction in poverty levels is a social reconstruction that improves people lives and accords development and growth. Market reforms have increased access to basic food supplies, increasing household consumption and disposable incomes. The market economy brought more food security but at the cost of price hikes, unemployment, inflation and uncertainty about household livelihoods. The transformation from a command to a market economy has had a tremendous impact on the lives of ordinary people, who previously could access cash money, free education and health care, stabilized prices and jobs although the country experienced food shortages.²³³

²³¹ Fox, L. and Van den, K. (2005). *Poverty in Mozambique: unraveling changes and determinants. Poverty background paper to the Country Economic Memorandum*, Washington, D.C.: World Bank

²³² *ibid*

²³³ UNDP.(2007). *Mozambique: National Human Development report-Challenges and opportunities the response to HIV/AIDS*. Maputo: UNDP.

In 1992, Mozambique emerged from the civil war with a seriously weakened health infrastructure, low level of financing and limited technical capacity. Since then, the health sector has greatly developed with the reconstruction of infrastructures and the redistribution of qualified health staff all over the country.²³⁴ Despite the positive developments that the sector has registered, Mozambican health indicators are among the most alarming in Africa, with an infant mortality rate of 124 per 1000 live births and a child mortality rate of 178 per 1000 live births. The maternal mortality rate is considered one of the highest in the region (408 per 100 000 live births). The situation has worsened with the spread of HIV/AIDS, as 16 per cent of the population is infected with the virus.²³⁵ Therefore in the social-economic pillar framework in the reconstruction of Mozambique, it is evident that in the past 15 years the Mozambican government has made significant investments in terms of social development, including the basic service delivery areas of education, health, water and sanitation. As result, the Mozambican government has a reputation of being a success in terms of expanding the education and health systems of the country.

5.10.2 Governance Institutions and Democratic Norms in Reconstruction Process

Mozambique was formally a ‘socialist’, one-party state ruled by FRELIMO until 1990. As early as 1983, the government began to introduce various economic and political reforms aimed at transforming Mozambique into a more pluralistic society, and the pace

²³⁴ Chao, S. and Kostermans, K (2002). *Improving health for the poor in Mozambique: the fight continues*. HNP Discussion paper. Washington: World Bank.

²³⁵ UNDP .(2007). *Mozambique: National Human Development report-Challenges and opportunities the response to HIV/AIDS*. Maputo: UNDP

of reform accelerated after 1987. The reforms resulted into a new constitution which was enacted in November 1990 which ushered a multiparty political system, a market-based economy and free elections. After the enactment of constitutional guarantees for a multiparty political system and the peace agreement, political activity and political parties in the country increased.

From 1990 to the third general elections held in December 2004, many opposition parties were created.²³⁶ The first national elections were held in 1994. The turnout was 87.9% of all registered voters and the international observers declared the elections to be free and fair. The democratic process was also consolidated by two subsequently held national elections and a local election. With a turnout of nearly 75%, the second national election in 1999 again elected Mr. Chissano as the president of Mozambique.²³⁷ In February 2004, Mr. Chissano handed over power to Armando Guebuza, the victor of the 2004 presidential elections. During the first democratic elections Joaquim Chissano was elected president, with 53 per cent of the vote, and a 250-member National Assembly was voted in with 129 FRELIMO deputies, 112 RENAMO deputies, and nine representatives of three smaller parties that formed the Democratic Union (UD). Since its formation, the National Assembly has made some progress in becoming a body increasingly more independent of the executive.²³⁸ Active participation of citizens in the determination of policies and priorities can improve the commitment of government to reduce poverty and

²³⁶ Pereira,C.(2009). *The Impact of democracy in Mozambique: Assessing political, social and economic developments since the dawn of democracy*: Johannesburg. Centre for Policy Studies

²³⁷ *ibid*

²³⁸ *ibid*

enhance the quality of life of its citizens and enhance democratization in Mozambique. It is increasingly recognized that government accountability, and the ability of citizens, civil society and the private sector to scrutinize public institutions and hold them to account is an important facet of good governance. This means that the agenda is not just about democracy, it is about deep democracy or representative democracy with a strong participatory element. Political accountability is enforced through formal processes like elections, and through institutions for community participation and consultation which improved good governance and democratic norms.²³⁹ Strengthening communication and information processes is central to deepening voice and accountability which the representative government should accord to its subjects. The power of communication and information is a vital element in advancement of democratic space and free media is an integral part of democratization process. If media is not free it can not raise the issues of accountability and corruption which are social evils and detrimental to development.²⁴⁰

5.10.3 Legitimacy, Trust and Authority of the State

The most important tasks facing countries in crisis or recovering from recent hostilities are restoring effective governance and building public trust in government. Without effective governance institutions, an effective government, a strong private sector, and a vibrant civil society, little can be done to bring about peace, reconstruct war-torn

²³⁹ DFID. (2007). *Mozambique Country Governance Analysis*. Maputo: DFID.

²⁴⁰ Pereira,C.(2009). *The Impact of democracy in Mozambique: Assessing political, social and economic developments since the dawn of democracy*: Johannesburg. Centre for Policy Studies

countries, and stabilize political, economic, and social conditions.²⁴¹ Those groups dissatisfied with governance or lacking trust in government are unlikely to end on-going hostilities or to join together in a united effort to rebuild peaceful societies. Restoring effective governance and rebuilding trust in government are necessary but not sufficient conditions for both peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction.²⁴² FRELIMO has been the ruling political party in Mozambique since independence from Portugal in 1975. The principal challenges to its primacy and legitimacy in Mozambican politics came from RENAMO. A new political party, the Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM), a breakaway group of former RENAMO members was established in Mozambique in 2009 as a matter of mistrust in the former party. MDM was prevented from participating fully in the 2009 National Assembly elections, owing to an alleged failure to comply with regulations a move that was seen by political analyst as politically motivated.²⁴³ Mozambican donors interpreted the exclusion of MDM as violation of democratic norms and a repressive motive to curtail democratic space and discourage pluralism.

People's perception on political parties brought a mixed reaction with perceptions that FRELIMO is weak, divided, and incompetent and with no political future. While MDM, is perceived as potentially strong, held back from success by legal (and technical) obstacles and capable of forging a bright future. This perceptions on Frelimo as the ruling

²⁴¹ Fetherston, A. B. (eds.). (2005). *Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding: a reconsideration of theoretical framework*. Abingdon: Frank Cass.

²⁴² UNDP. (2007). *The Challenges of Restoring Governance in Crisis and Post-Conflict Countries*. Vienna: United Nations publication.

²⁴³ Astill-Brown, J et al.(2010). *Mozambique: Balancing Development, Politics and Security*. London. Chatham house.

party raises questions of its legitimacy and the level of peoples trust in it.²⁴⁴ FRELIMO's leaders inherited a country characterized by inequality, poverty and little experience of other systems than authoritarian rule. The political class had an obligation to institute a solid state authority which could guide the state in nation building. Frelimo sought to create a nationwide political and administrative presence, and to transform social and economic relations along Marxist lines. FRELIMO leaders envisioned a united and modern nation state in which there was no place for social and cultural differences.²⁴⁵ This was aimed at consolidating state authority and maintaining a tight grip on state's apparatus. Frelimo inherited a military ethos from the war for independence and military considerations dominated its priorities. With such military mind set the ruling regime embraced an authoritarian rule which discouraged divergence views and the opposition was relegated to the periphery.

5.10.4 Potentials of Social Capital in Reconstruction of Post-Conflict Mozambique

Social capital is defined as networks together with shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate co-operation within or among groups.²⁴⁶ Mozambique presents an ideal case study where social capital approaches were utilized by communities to produce desired outcomes and achieve their common interests. To achieve their objective, social capital networks in Mozambique embraced trust, quality of

²⁴⁴ ibid

²⁴⁵ Alexander, J. (1997). *The Local State In Post-War Mozambique: Political Practice And Ideas About Authority*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. *Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 67, No. 1 (1997), pp. 1-26

²⁴⁶ Woolcock, M and Narayan, D. (2000). *Social Capital: Implications for Development Theory, Research, and Policy*. Washington DC: World Bank's Development Research Group.

relationships between community members and access to opportunities in post- conflict reconstruction of Mozambique, more specifically in the North.²⁴⁷

In Northern Mozambique support for either the FRELIMO government or the RENAMO guerrilla was mainly defined along ethnic lines. The largest ethnic group in the region, the Makua people, suffered more from oppression by the colonial state than other local groups, which continued after independence with FRELIMO. Mistrust among the Makua people towards the government ruled by FRELIMO made them to support the opposition RENAMO. To them, opposing FRELIMO was a way to preserve their autonomy from the state. As a result of Makua's support the opposition was able to channel the frustrations of impoverished youth without prospects, farmers who were forcibly moved into communal villages by the FRELIMO government and people who found themselves at the lower end of the new power hierarchy within Makua society.²⁴⁸ In order to prevent grievances and mitigate the consequences of unequal development and rising inequality, people's trust and confidence in the state, governmental institutions and the rule of law were enhanced in this region as a measure to increase social capital which is essential for post conflict reconstruction.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁷ Schindler, K. (2011). *Social capital and post-war reconstruction: Evidence from northern Mozambique*. Berlin: OECD

²⁴⁸ Grootaert, C. and Bastelaer, T. (Eds). (2002). *The Role of Social Capital in Development: An Empirical Assessment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

²⁴⁹ Schindler, K. (2011). *Social capital and post-war reconstruction: Evidence from northern Mozambique*. Berlin: OECD

5.10.5 Non-Reconciled Communities and the Problem of Social Dilemmas

There are 43 languages spoken in Mozambique among a total population of approximately 22 million people. The country has been in peace since 1992 after 16 years of armed conflict that has contributed to destroy infrastructures, productive units, and above all, lives, undermining in the process the very social fabric of the society.²⁵⁰ Despite the prevailing peace the country continues to face social cohesion problems and social dilemma among its communities. Many communities remain unreconciled since the pre conflict period and the reconciliation efforts that were guaranteed by the general peace accord did not bear full fruits. The failure to reconcile the warring communities was occasioned by the Mozambique's choice not to create a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.²⁵¹ The major argument was that the African culture functions under a principle of forgiveness not confrontation, and such a commission would open wounds of war already in the process of healing.

Refugees and internally displaced people produced by the protracted conflict constitute a social dilemma and exacerbate disillusionment among the affected communities. According to the UNHCR, some 1.7 million refugees returned to their homeland between 1992-1994, from six neighboring countries - Malawi, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. And, at least twice as many internally displaced Mozambicans are believed to have returned home during the same period. The return of the refugees and the problem of the IDPs, have created a complex social dilemma which could not be

²⁵⁰ Lundin, I. (2004). *The Peace Process and the Construction of Reconciliation post Conflict – The Experience Of Mozambique*. Maputo: Centre for Strategic and International Studies

²⁵¹ *ibid*

handled internally and necessitated assistance of donors and development partners, in the country's post-conflict resettlement efforts.²⁵² In fact, for a country such as Mozambique with a plurality of groups of different social ethnic religious background and various interests including party preferences, there is a need to raise a common voice for consensus based on a cultural understanding of reconciliation shared by all communities to build a platform for peace as a common good.

5.11 Chapter Summary

The conflict in Mozambique greatly diminished the government ability to deal with important aspects of the economy such as the general development of the people. Despite the challenge, the government engaged in serious reforms which were to set the ground for general inclusiveness of the entire Mozambican population as opposed to the hard-line stance it had taken. The government of Mozambique started the process of economic reforms in 1987 which was followed by a constitutional change in 1990. The main part of the new constitution was the replacement of the one party system to a multiparty system followed by a transformation from Marxist philosophy which the Frelimo government had employed. The political paradigm shift allowed the government to win political and economic support from the western development partners, in addition to allowing Renamo to be accommodated in the new dispensation in the country.

²⁵² Wilson, K.B and Shurnba, F. (1989). *Food provision amongst Mozambican refugees in malawi*, report on Refugees study program, July.

The success of Mozambique's reconstruction provides many important lessons. First, basic security is a prerequisite for all other components of post-conflict reconstruction including return of refugees, rehabilitation, reintegration, elections and political and economic reforms. A rapid rebound from war requires strong and sustained private and foreign investment that creates markets and employment. However, private sector efforts will be hindered unless legal framework reforms protect property rights and keep macroeconomic stability (e.g., low inflation and budget deficit) in the economy. These reforms send a good signal to investors. In Mozambique, the new government brought new laws to secure the property rights (especially the right to own the land) and was also able to maintain macroeconomic stability.

CHAPTER SIX

TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FRAMEWORK FOR POST CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION: DATA FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

6.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the findings of the study. The purpose of the study was to examine how the inter - linkages and phasing of various priorities in the areas of security, humanitarian and relief efforts, economic recovery, democratization and governance, and longer-term development, could be used to formulate a framework for post-conflict reconstruction using the key pillars of legitimacy, trust and authority of the state, political will for transparency and accountability, rule of law, social capital and social cohesion, economic reconstruction and service delivery and finally, security and cross border movement. Data composed was collated and reports were produced. Findings from open-ended questions were also presented in prose. The researcher made use of frequency tables, figures and qualitative analysis to present data.

6.2 General Lessons on Post Conflict Reconstruction

The study sought to determine the factors that in the respondents' opinion are most important for post-conflict reconstruction. The respondents were therefore asked to list the factors that they think are most important for post-conflict reconstruction and the findings are as discussed below.

Establishment of participatory and inclusive governance systems and structures was the most common reconstruction factor mentioned by the respondents. This implies that there is need for legitimate, effective political and administrative institutions and participatory processes and political goodwill by the leaders. This can be achieved through setting up a representative constitutional structure, strengthening public sector management and administration, and ensuring active and open participation of civil society in the formulation of government and its policies. Governance involves setting rules and procedures for political decision-making, and delivering public services in an efficient and transparent manner. Participation encompasses the process for giving voice to the population through the development of civil society that includes the generation and exchange of ideas through advocacy groups, civic associations, and the media.

One of the respondents in Mozambique stated that “*distribution of power among various Communities in the Country should be encouraged to foster the spirit of people being in touch with the government*”.

Security was vastly mentioned as a factor or condition important for post-conflict reconstruction. This encompasses all areas relating to the safety of the general public through ensuring they live in safe and secure settings, establishing proactive and accountable security institutions that the citizens and residents of a country have faith in to protect them from violence.

One of the respondent asserted that “*security in a country is key for other areas of the development of the country as people can go about their activities without fear and*

disruption. It ensures securing the lives of residents of a country from unprecedented and extensive violence and the restitution of a region's integrity".

Another factor was existence of a strong and impartial judicial system that can address past injustices and deter future ones. This would require the formulation and implementation of effective laws, reforming of the relevant institutions, for instance the courts, to ensure just and fair rulings, prosecution of perpetrators of conflict, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants, rehabilitation, creating other avenues (formal or informal) for effectively dealing with injustices and instituting and enforcing the rule of law.

Reconciliation was also emphasized by the respondents. This was particularly in relation to efforts to resettle internally displaced persons or refugees, identifying the causes of conflict, identifying the actors of conflict, mediation and signing of peace agreements by the warring factions, national dialogue, inclusion of women and minority groups in decision making processes, media freedom and communication in people processes, proper planning and coordination of programs or strategies, determine appropriate divisions of labor, mobilize the necessary resources and manage competing demands of multiple actors working together.

According to one of the respondents *"there is need for civic education and training on conflict, injustices and their repercussions to the people both for the development and maintenance of sustainable efforts.*

The respondents further asserted that an effort to meet the social and economic welfare of the populace is an important factor for post-conflict reconstruction. This essentially addresses essential social and economic needs of the people; widely mentioned was provision of emergency relief, restitution of necessary services, establishing the basis for a viable economy, and introduction of a comprehensive, protractible development program. In order to meet these demands there is therefore need for appropriate funding mechanisms and levels are integral to short-term and long-term reconstruction.

According to the respondents *“in addition to maintaining physical security of the people there is also need to ensure there is food security and disease prevention and control. Therefore, socio-economic reconstruction is a process that begins with humanitarian relief in the short term and progresses to long-term social and economic development programs.*

Similarly, Colin and Roelfsema (2008) riding on notions of democratic peace theory find that democratization and post-conflict elections are associated with higher, not lower, risks while higher post-conflict income and faster growth significantly reduce the risk of civil war relapse. Walter (1999) and Fortna (2003) assert that effectiveness and durability of post-conflict peace is to be found within mechanisms and content of the agreements. Fortna argues that mechanisms should be able to help change incentives, reduce uncertainty, and prevent accidental violations by concerned parties. Dobbins et al. (2005) observes that peace-making and peace-keeping operations, to be truly successful, must include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures that will tend to

consolidate peace. These may include disarming the previously warring parties and restoring order, destroying weapons, repatriating refugees, providing advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming and/or strengthening governmental institutions, and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.²⁵³

Finally Collier (2008) asserts that successful efforts to peaceful coexistence after a civil war requires open and democratic institutions to ensure law, order, and the repression of resurgent violence as well as the establishment of legitimate institutions of decision-making and the foundations for economic recovery in the form of revenue generation, the creation of stable environments for investment, or the capacity to deliver core services to a vulnerable population.

6.2.1. The Most Important Lessons Learned

The study requested the respondents to state the most important lessons learned. According to most of the respondents conflict/war does not have any benefits to both the society/ communities and therefore it is best to prevent conflict at all costs. They also added that in the event that conflict occurs, the best ways to deal with the situation is to; assess the root causes of the conflict as it is very likely to reoccur if the factors that caused it are not solved, establish the actors of the conflict, be neutral towards the warring parties to avoid any one of them feeling like their adversary is being favoured, establish mechanisms for ending the conflict (mediation, reconciliation, Implement land

²⁵³ Boutros-Ghali 1992; Dobbins et al. 2005

reforms, power sharing deals, good governance, mobilize revenue, reforming of institutions of justice) depending on the causes of conflict, disarm, demobilize and reintegrate combatants. In light of the above, the respondents said that they also learnt in conflict situations, time is of essence, restoration of peace should be the main focus of all efforts of ending conflicts and that the stakeholders should avoid holding abrupt elections until the situation has been managed.

One of the respondents from Haiti was of the opinion that “*governments cannot be allowed to keep themselves in check where the judicial system is weak*”.

Collier and Hoeffler (1998) propose ethno linguistic fractionalization and non inclusive societies as another determinant of civil war onset. This is a measure of ethnic diversity in a country, a variable used to proxy for coordination cost when mobilizing for the formation of a rebellion. Collier and Hoeffler also find that past civil wars tend to increase the probability of future civil wars. In Africa, Ngaruko and Nkurunziza (2000), Azam (2001), Addison (2005) and Ndikumana (2005) argue that political violence is often the consequence of selfish behavior of those undemocratically controlling political power and their associates. They accumulate the country's wealth for personal gain at the expense of other groups holding a similar claim to political power and its spoils since their government systems are not inclusive.

6.2.2 The Most Important “Do’s and Don’ts” in Post-Conflict Reconstruction

The study went on to probe the respondents on the most important “do’s and don’ts” in post-conflict reconstruction. To begin with, most of the respondents stated that; various

stakeholders should have a deeper understanding of what conflict is and how it works; treat each conflict with its uniqueness; prioritize efforts to restore security, keep peace, make necessary reforms for instance land reforms, strong independent judiciary, establish participatory & inclusive governance systems and structures; disarm, demobilize and reintegrate combatants; restore people's faith in the governing institutions, encourage community especially women and minority groups participation in resolution process; political goodwill of leaders; socio-economic problems addressed, transitional justice and dealing with the past injustices. On the other hand they advised against; calling for abrupt elections or discrimination of individuals or a community. These arguments are in line with the tenets of the democratic peace theory which call for a more open and representative society that caters for the social economic welfare of its people.

The same argument concurs with Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) who go beyond the simplistic clichés attributing Africa's civil wars to social divisions measured in terms of ethno-linguistic fractionalization. Using an econometric model, they test for the validity in Africa of civil war determinants proposed by Collier and Hoeffler (1998). They find that the high incidence of civil war in Africa is due to three main factors, two of which are the same as those identified in Collier and Hoeffler (1998). First is Africa's high dependence on natural resource exports which are relatively easy to loot to finance rebellions. Sierra Leone and Angola are cases in point. Second, low per capita income and low levels of education imply that the youth can be easily enlisted in rebellions given that they have little to lose; in other words, their opportunity cost of joining rebellions is very low. Elbadawi and Sambanis add poor governance as a third factor which is not

discussed by Collier and Hoeffler. They argue that Africa's propensity to political violence may be due to weak democratic institutions which have limited capacity for peaceful conflict resolution.

6.2.3 The Pre-Requisites for a Successful Post-Conflict Reconstruction

The respondents were asked to describe the pre-requisites for a successful post-conflict reconstruction. The study findings were that there is need for; institution building, security reforms, peace and treaties between warring parties, development programs, participatory and inclusive governance systems and structures, addressing of the root causes of conflict, rule of law, land reform, dialogue/communication to resolve conflicts, commitment of all involved stakeholders, funds availability, donors ready to support reconstruction, consider processes that are relevant to the local context, community involvement and trust as well as human resource.

Likewise Griffin and Jones (2000) argue that the challenge lies in how to account for successful post-conflict reconstruction and that the most ambitious measures are those that expect to redress the root causes of conflict. The UN Security Council views successful post-conflict reconstruction as requiring short and long-term actions tailored to address the particular needs of societies sliding into conflict or emerging from it. These actions should focus on fostering sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law, and the promotion of a culture of peace and nonviolence²⁵⁴.

²⁵⁴ UN Security Council, 2001

6.2.4 Realistic Duration of Time for the International Community to Actively Engage in Rebuilding Post-Conflict Countries

The respondents were asked for their opinion on the realistic duration of time that the international community should actively engage in rebuilding post-conflict countries so that the international engagement has a real impact on sustaining peace. Majority of the respondents said the most realistic duration of time is immediately, this was followed by one to two years, five to ten years with very few proposing ten to fifteen years.

The reasons for the immediate timelines are that; the international community is a non partisan party; to allow for adequate engagement and provide moral support; can assist in forming a transitional government that eventually leads to formation of a strong government; to provide their input on the implementation of peace agreements. On the other hand longer timelines allow for in-depth review and sets pace for issues to be thoroughly resolved; enables people to see the advantages of the change and for a slow withdrawal process.

One of the respondents from Cambodia argued that *“reconstruction is a long-term engagement that must first focus on peacebuilding which could take years, secondly state building activities to develop institutions might also take years. Moreover each conflict has its own characteristics and therefore no realistic duration e.g. former Yugoslavia took about a decade, DRC is taking a number of decades”*.

Another one was of the opinion that *“it would be unwise to contemplate the number of years this would take as situations will be dependent on local situations. For instance the situation in Somalia is different from that in Sierra Leone”*.

In reality, however, it is impossible to say exactly when a country returns to normalcy from its post-conflict state. Hence, the post-conflict period is arbitrarily defined as the 10-year period following the end of a conflict (see, for example, Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). As Collier and Hoeffler, (2004) indicate, initial response comes immediately after the end of widespread violence and is characterized by the provision of emergency humanitarian services, stability and military interventions to provide basic security. Internationally such responses also include the deployment of peacekeepers

6.2.5 Spending More Resources in a Post-Conflict Country

The respondents were asked to state when they prefer spending more resources in a post-conflict country. The findings are as presented and discussed in table 6.5.

Table 6.1: Spending more resources in a post-conflict country

	Frequency	Percent (%)
Early phase of reconstruction (1-2 years after the end of conflict)	22	62.9
Middle phase of reconstruction (3-5 years after the end of conflict)	8	22.9
Later Phase of the reconstruction (6-10 years after the end of conflict)	5	14.2
Total	35	100.0

Majority (22) of the respondents were of the opinion that spending more resources in a post-conflict country should be in the early phase of reconstruction (1-2 years after the end of conflict), 8 of the respondents were of the opinion that it should be in the middle phase of reconstruction (3-5 years after the end of conflict) and 5 of the respondents were of the opinion that it should be in the later Phase of the reconstruction (6-10 years after the end of conflict).

Societies emerging from conflict have become a growing concern for the international community. There is awareness that while war has ended, peace, especially sustainable peace, is not so easily forthcoming. Dire poverty, ongoing ethnic, political or religious rivalry, the proliferation of arms, nonexistent governments and infrastructure all pose tremendous threats that can easily lead a country back into war. Simultaneously and despite the overwhelming challenges, the post conflict period is also a period of hope and opportunity. Coming after years or even decades of fighting, it is a time when financial and technical resources are available to help address the root causes of war and shape the

future of a nation. The solution is lay a strong democratic foundation for affected society early enough to nurture inclusive and participatory democratic norms and institutions.

6.2.6 Importance of Reducing Military Expenditure

The study sought to determine how important respondents think reducing military expenditure is in post-conflict countries. Accordingly, most (48.6%) of the respondents said that it was very important, 31.4% said it is somewhat important, 14.3% said it is not very important while 2.9% said it is either unimportant or don't know. The findings are further depicted in the figure 6.3.




Figure 6.1: Importance of Reducing Military Expenditure

Addressing post-conflict societies' multiple needs poses a challenging problem. Depending on the duration of the period of instability, countries inherit ravaged economies with depleted physical and human capital; disruptions due to these destructions; curtailed civil liberties; diversion of resources to non-productive activities; and very limited financial resources to fund their development efforts, due to dis-saving

and portfolio substitution²⁵⁵. According to a recent study by IANSA et al. (2007), the average financial opportunity cost of armed conflict in Africa over the period 1990-2005, in addition to the human tragedy of the conflicts, was estimated at \$18 billion or 15 percent of GDP per year. The cumulated opportunity cost over the 15-year period is estimated at \$ 300 billion.

6.2.7 Time Frame for Downsizing Military in Post-Conflict Countries

The study went on to investigate the preferred timeframe for downsizing military in post-conflict countries and a summary of the findings discussed.

Table 6.2: Time frame for downsizing military in post-conflict countries

	Frequency	Percent (%)
Early phase of reconstruction (1-2 years after the end of conflict)	9	25.7
Middle phase of reconstruction (3-5 years after the end of conflict)	13	37.1
Later Phase of the reconstruction (6-10 years after the end of conflict)	11	31.4
Never	1	2.9
Don't know	1	2.9
Total	35	100.0

²⁵⁵ Collier, 1999

The findings as presented in the table 6.6 were that, the preferred timeframe for downsizing military in post-conflict countries according to most (37.1%) of the respondents is the middle phase of reconstruction (3-5 years after the end of conflict), 31.4% said it is in the later Phase of the reconstruction (6-10 years after the end of conflict), 25.7% said it is in the early phase of reconstruction (1-2 years after the end of conflict), 2.9% either don't know the preferred timeframe for downsizing military in post-conflict countries or think it should never happen. As indicated in previous chapters of this study interventions in post conflict societies must address the key pillars of legitimacy, trust and authority of the state, political will for transparency and accountability, rule of law, social capital and social cohesion, economic reconstruction and service delivery and finally, security and cross border movement.

6.2.8 Importance of land reform in the post-conflict countries

The respondents were also asked to state how important they think land reform is in the post-conflict countries. The findings are as illustrated in figure below.




Figure 6.2: Importance of land reform in the post-conflict countries

As per the findings in figure above majority (80%) of the respondents stated that land reform in the post-conflict countries is very important, 17% said it was somewhat important and 3% did not know how important it was.

In light of the above, the respondents were probed further on their opinion on when land reform should be implemented. The findings are described in table 6.7.

Table 6.3: Period land reform should be implemented

	Frequency	Percent (%)
Early phase of reconstruction (1-2 years after the end of conflict)	11	31.4
Middle phase of reconstruction (3-5 years after the end of conflict)	17	48.6
Later Phase of the reconstruction (6-10 years after the end of conflict)	5	14.3
Never	1	2.9
Don't know	1	2.9
Total	35	100.0

From the findings tabulated above, most (17) of the respondents were of the opinion that land reform should be implemented at the middle phase of reconstruction (3-5 years after the end of conflict), 11 of the respondents were of the opinion that land reform should be implemented at the early phase of reconstruction (1-2 years after the end of conflict), 5 of the respondents were of the opinion that land reform should be implemented at the later Phase of the reconstruction (6-10 years after the end of conflict), 1 of the respondent was of the opinion that land reform should never be implemented whereas another 1 of the respondent did not know when land reform be implemented.

The respondents were then asked to give their reasons for importance and basis of land reform in the post-conflict countries. They revealed that; premature interventions might cause further escalation and delay might cause impatience. Internally displaced persons and refugees should be included in the process to facilitate an effective resettlement process, landless people might spark further conflict when they infringe on other areas, the military plays an important role in stabilizing a country through peace keeping, conflict might be caused by various things other than the land issue, reassuring people of government commitment to end their suffering, most conflicts are land and resources based and early intervention is critical to reaching solutions.

One of the respondents asserted that *“land is a key component for economic empowerment in most countries, coming out of conflict and failure to address land disputes could lead to relapse of the conflict.”*

Although a number of conflicts occur due to grievances emanating from land use and its distribution, it is not easy to start land reforms before addressing other issues of concern. As indicated by the respondents, it is important for first reconcile the worrying factions, then address democratic governance issues before dealing with land matters which comes in the third phase of the reconstruction period.

6.2.9 Timing and Pace of Civil Service Reform in Post-Conflict Countries

There seems to be no agreement among policy makers regarding the timing and pace of civil service reform in post-conflict countries. The study therefore requested the

respondents to state how much important civil service reform is. Figure 6.5 illustrates the findings of the study.




Figure 6.3: Timing and pace of civil service reform in post-conflict countries

The findings in figure above indicate that majority (91%) of the respondents stated that civil service reform is very important, 6% said it was somewhat important and 3% did not know how important it was.

The respondents were also asked to describe when civil service reform should be implemented. Accordingly the study findings are discussed below.

Table 6.4: Period civil service reform should be implemented

	Frequency	Percent (%)
Early phase of reconstruction (1-2 years after the end of conflict)	20	57.1
Middle phase of reconstruction (3-5 years after the end of conflict)	12	34.3
Later Phase of the reconstruction (6-10 years after the end of conflict)	2	5.7
Don't know	1	2.9
Total	35	100.0

As per the findings tabulated above, most (20) of the respondents were of the opinion that civil service reform should be implemented at the early phase of reconstruction (1-2 years

after the end of conflict), 12 the respondents were of the opinion that civil service reform should be implemented at the middle phase of reconstruction (3-5 years after the end of conflict), 2 of the respondents were of the opinion that civil service reform should be implemented at the later Phase of the reconstruction (6-10 years after the end of conflict) while one of the respondent did not know when civil service reform should be implemented.

6.2.10 Immediate Macroeconomic Priorities for Post-Conflict Countries

In regard to the immediate macroeconomic priorities for post-conflict countries, the respondents were asked which activities should be given priority. Table 6.9 presents a summary of the findings.

Table 6.5: Immediate macroeconomic priorities for post-conflict countries

	Frequency	Percent (%)
Privatization programs	1	2.9
don't know	2	5.7
Controlling budget deficit	3	8.6
Mobilization of revenue through tax and administrative reform	13	37.1
Controlling hyperinflation	16	45.7
Total	35	100.0

The most common macroeconomic priorities for post-conflict countries according to the respondents is Controlling hyperinflation (frequency level of 16), this was followed by

Mobilization of revenue through tax and administrative reform (frequency level of 13), Controlling budget deficit (frequency level of 3), don't know (frequency level of 2) Privatization programs (frequency level of 1). Others were; Restraining and combating war economies and parallel economies, control price fixing, reasonable salaries, combating corruption, productivity, accountability, transparency, revise monetary reforms/policies, establish oversight bodies for checks, balances and accountability.

The social and economic dimensions of reconstruction include re-establishing the functional components of society, including: restoring internal security, including the reintegration of uprooted populations, and disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating former combatants; building administrative and governance capacities; repairing physical infrastructure, including building homes, roads and bridges; restoring water, electricity and fuel supplies; repairing schools, markets and hospitals; recruiting personnel; and providing the training necessary for operations and maintenance; establishing functioning financial infrastructures and economic restructuring. This includes creating a credible banking and financial system; fiscal planning and budgets; restoring an economic base drawing on traditional agricultural or pastoral production and existing industries; and creating an environment conducive to generating new sources of income and economic growth. It also includes the provision of loans and grants to businesses or new ventures, skills training, development of new industries and commerce and eliminating criminality and the control of armed actors over important sectors of the economy; establishing a credible and functioning judicial system, including processes for drafting legislation, reforming courts and judicial processes, recruiting personnel, providing training and initiating a national legal literacy program; and ensuring social well-being, including the

health care needs of the population, (e.g. food security, providing basic social services and rebuilding education systems).

These issues are not unique to post conflict settings, but the phase of conflict can determine the primary actors, the type of assistance most needed and what can be provided.

6.2.11 Pace and Process of Civil Service Reform

The respondents were asked to comment on the pace and process of civil service reform. They revealed that civil service reform should be well planned, gradual and target the long-term, issues of ethnicity need to be addressed with urgency to depoliticize the civil service, commitment of civil service stakeholders, civil service reform which should take up reasonable time, participation by all stakeholders, the civil service should be tactfully engaged, the civil service should be in tandem with process of conflict resolution and involvement of the grassroots.

The study also asked the respondents to comment on the implementation of these priorities and any conditions which must be considered to implement these programs in post-conflict countries. Majority of the respondents stated that give priority to the civilians, commitment of all parties, priority should be based on the social amenities needed by the affected people, foster trust among conflicting individuals and the process needs to be transparent. Increasingly, international actors are reaching out to local organisations in partnership for reconstruction efforts. Yet, often women and grassroots groups at the front lines of recovery are marginalized and excluded.

One of the respondents stated that *“Post conflict societies require a combination of strategies for them to create the desired impact. You need strong democratic leadership coupled with policies to guide the process, you also need external support.”*

6.2.12 Elections’ Importance in the Post-Conflict Countries

This sought to investigate whether; elections should be important and top most priorities in the post-conflict countries. The findings are as portrayed and discussed in figure 6.6.




Figure 6.4: Elections importance in the post-conflict countries

According to the findings, majority (68.6%) of the respondents agreed that elections is very important and top most priorities in the post-conflict countries, 14.3% said it was somewhat important, 11.4% said it was somewhat important and 2.9% said it was unimportant or did not know how important it was each. Free, democratic and fair elections lead to politically legitimate government. Political legitimacy is virtue of

democratic political institutions and of the decision making necessary for creation of political authority²⁵⁶.

The respondents were also asked when elections should be conducted.

Table 6.6 Period when elections should be conducted

	Frequency	Percent (%)
Don't know	1	2.9
Later Phase of the reconstruction (6-10 years after the end of conflict)	4	11.4
Early phase of reconstruction (1-2 years after the end of conflict)	14	40.0
Middle phase of reconstruction (3-5 years after the end of conflict)	16	45.7
Total	35	100.0

From the findings presented in table 6.10, most (16) of the respondents were of the opinion that elections should be conducted at the middle phase of reconstruction (3-5 years after the end of conflict), 14 the respondents were of the opinion that elections should be conducted at early phase of reconstruction (1-2 years after the end of conflict), 4 of the respondents were of the opinion that elections should be conducted at the later Phase of the reconstruction (6-10 years after the end of conflict) while 1 respondent did not know when elections should be conducted. This makes sense as it allows different stakeholders to take charge and guide the reconstruction process.

²⁵⁶ Maluki P (2014) Peacebuilding strategies and sustainable peace in Rwanda and Burundi

6.2.13 Priority of Longer-Term Development

The study investigated whether longer-term development including new and big projects such as electricity, roads, and railways; normally have a lower or higher priority in post-conflict reconstruction. The findings are as illustrated in figure 6.7.




Figure 6.5: Priority of longer-term development

The findings depict that, majority (63.0%) of the respondents agreed that longer-term development have a higher priority in post-conflict reconstruction, 28.0% said it was moderate while 9.0% said it was lower.

The main reasons given were that, they have higher priority because they help to foster economic development whereas those who thought it had a lower priority said that peace must prevail first before serious development takes place.

The respondents were also asked to indicate how important these projects are. Figure 6.8 presents a summary of the findings.




Figure 6.6: Importance of Projects

The findings presented above indicate that majority (66%) of the respondents stated that these projects are very important, 28% said they were somewhat important, 3% said they were not very important and the remaining 3% did not know how important they were.

The respondents were also asked to describe when the projects should start. Accordingly the study findings are discussed below.

Table 6.7: Period when the projects should start

	Frequency	Percent (%)
Don't know	1	2.9
Later Phase of the reconstruction (6-10 years after the end of conflict)	6	17.1
Early phase of reconstruction (1-2 years after the end of conflict)	14	40.0
Middle phase of reconstruction (3-5 years after the end of conflict)	14	40.0
Total	35	100.0

The findings reveal that, most (14) of the respondents were of the opinion that the projects should start at the early phase of reconstruction (1-2 years after the end of

conflict) and the middle phase of reconstruction (3-5 years after the end of conflict) each, 6 of the respondents were of the opinion that the projects should start at the later Phase of the reconstruction (6-10 years after the end of conflict) while 1 of the respondent did not know when the projects should start.

6.2.14 Sequencing of Programs (Activities)

The study sought to determine which activity the respondents think should be initiated first after post-conflict period and in which phase. The respondents said that the challenges that countries in crises and post-conflict situations face are complex, multifaceted and vary due to the variety of different historical root causes of conflict and the different political, social and geographical contexts. The strategies to address these challenges and effectively support a country on a path of recovery, development and durable peace are therefore diverse. What works in one country does not necessarily work in another. However, there are some universally shared values, principles and key elements that have been found to be sine qua non for sustainable peace. These comprise: focused and committed leadership, security, solid government structures providing basic services, building people's trust and legitimacy, information dissemination, sound civic dialogue, mediation and community participation.

Experience from different countries emerging from conflict has demonstrated that when a leadership sets up appropriate, transparent and accountable management systems and tools, and then applies them properly and equitably, the key components of sustainable peace and development become more achievable. Government legitimacy and trust in

national institutions are created. Economic activities can flourish and generate growth and prosperity. Difficult reconciliation can be achieved.

Moreover, the respondents were asked to state which phase programs should be initiated.

The findings are discussed below.

Table 6.8: Phase programs should be initiated

	Frequency	Percent (%)
don't know	2	5.7
Transition (3-5 years after the end of conflict)	6	17.1
Emergency (1-2 years after the end of conflict)	27	77.1
Total	35	100.0

Majority (77.1%) of the respondents were of the opinion that the projects should be initiated at the Emergency (1-2 years after the end of conflict), 17.1% said that the projects should be initiated at the Transition (3-5 years after the end of conflict) and 5.7% did not know when the projects should be initiated.

The reasons behind the respondents' propositions were that a sound mix of policies based on universally shared values and the proper use of management systems and tools are critical for every country emerging from conflict. And, that bringing them to the fore are key to the aims that governments profess they are striving for in terms of sustainable peace and development benefiting to all. They further added that this would encourage; registration of voters, organize polling station, civil education, identify parties to

participate in elections, total disarmament, reconciliation, secure and stable environment and transitional governments ensure inclusivity.

According to one of the respondent *“transition government will formulate laws to support/facilitate coming elections. An independent organ will be in charge of the elections process, this is the first step in the transition from war to peace, providing social rights before political rights”*.

The reasons for these suggestions were that societies emerging from conflict have become a growing concern for many international donors. There is awareness that while war has ended, peace, especially sustainable peace, is not so easily forthcoming. Dire poverty, ongoing ethnic, political or religious rivalry, the proliferation of arms, nonexistent governments and infrastructure all pose tremendous threats that can easily lead a country back into war. Simultaneously and despite the overwhelming challenges, the post conflict period is also a period of hope and opportunity. Coming after years or even decades of fighting, it is a time—albeit brief—when financial and technical resources are available to help address the root causes of war and shape the future of a nation. This would go a long way in ensuring faster reconciliation, reduce the impact of the conflict, help the electorate understand leadership, ensure free and fair elections as well as provide a secure and stable environment to build trust among the people.

Some of the respondents reiterated that *“the cycle of violence can only be broken through trust and this calls for warring parties to disarm leading to a safe environment as well. Political elites tend to exploit common man in such situation.”*

6.2.15 Priorities (policies) that Matter most for a Successful Peace-Building

The study sought to determine the respondents’ opinion on what the most important priorities (policies) that matter most for a successful peace-building should be. The most important policy should be on security, politics & governance, reconciliation and rehabilitation, access to justice, legal reforms and economic development.

A respondent stated that *“the main important policies should be those addressed to socio economic problems of the common people for example roads, schools, hospitals, agriculture. The people should feel secure to go about their duties, and instigators of conflict should be prosecuted accordingly. The leaders also need to unite the people through inclusive politics.”*

6.2.16 Prioritization of Activities Across Policy Categories

The study sought to determine how available resources (in terms of total budget of 100%) should be distributed among the policy categories in the first phase of reconstruction (emergency phase: 1-2years after the end of conflict). The respondents were asked to indicate in percentage so that the total of five categories adds up to 100%.

Table 6.9: Policy Categories the first phase of reconstruction

	Percentage (%)	Std. Deviation
Economic Stabilization & Reforms	18	6.335
Governance/Democratization	19	14.975
Infrastructure/Development	19	9.040
Security	22	11.462
Humanitarian/Social	23	10.775
Total	100	

According to the findings, most of the respondents were of the view that available resources (in terms of total budget of 100%) should be distributed among the Humanitarian/Social policy categories in the first phase of reconstruction by 23%, this was followed by security (22%), Infrastructure/Development and Governance/Democratization by (19% each) and finally Economic Stabilization & Reforms by 18%.

The study also sought to determine how available resources (in terms of total budget of 100%) should be distributed among the policy categories in the second phase of reconstruction (transition phase: 2-5 years after the end of conflict). The respondents were asked to indicate in percentage so that the total of five categories adds up to 100%.

Table 6.10: Policy Categories the second phase of reconstruction

	Percentage (%)	Std. Deviation
Economic Stabilization & Reforms	18	6.783
Humanitarian/Social	19	9.712
Governance/Democratization	20	15.547
Security	21	16.402
Infrastructure/Development	22	10.612
Total	100	

The findings presented in table 6.14 above depict that, most of the respondents were of the opinion that available resources (in terms of total budget of 100%) should be distributed among the Infrastructure/Development policy categories in the second phase of reconstruction (transition phase: 2-5 years after the end of conflict) by 22%, this was followed by security (21%), Governance/Democratization by (20% each), Humanitarian/Social by 19% and finally Economic Stabilization & Reforms by 18%.

The study sought to determine how available resources (in terms of total budget of 100%) should be distributed among the policy categories in third phase of reconstruction (development phase: 6-10 years after the end of conflict). The respondents were asked to indicate in percentage so that the total of five categories adds up to 100%.

Table 6.21: Policy Categories the third phase of reconstruction

	Percentage (%)	Std. Deviation
Economic Stabilization & Reforms	16	6.394
Humanitarian/Social	17	10.025
Governance/Democratization	18	8.186
Security	23	20.392
Infrastructure/Development	26	10.987
Total	100	

As per the findings presented in table 6.15, most of the respondents were of the opinion that available resources (in terms of total budget of 100%) should be distributed among the Infrastructure/Development policy categories in the third phase of reconstruction (development phase: 6-10 years after the end of conflict) by 26%, this was followed by security (23%), Governance/Democratization by (18%), Humanitarian/Social by 17% and finally Economic Stabilization & Reforms by 16%.

This implies that while conflict is ongoing, the provision of humanitarian assistance; basic food, shelter and medical services, is a priority for both national and international actors. Large bilateral or multilateral agencies arrive to work with national governments, and to manage and disburse most funds for social and economic reconstruction. This transition from war to peace is not smooth. When peace agreements hold and violence

subsidies, the focus of aid shifts from emergency relief to long-term social and economic development.

Asked to comments on the distribution of efforts mentioned in the previous sections, the respondents stated that; the initial response comes immediately after the end of widespread violence and is characterized by the provision of emergency humanitarian services, stability and military interventions to provide basic security. The second phase is a period in which legitimate local capacities emerge and should be supported, with particular attention needed for restarting the economy, including physical reconstruction, ensuring functional structures for governance and judicial processes and laying the foundations for the provision of basic social welfare such as education and health care. The final phase or the period for fostering sustainability is a time when recovery efforts should be consolidated to help prevent the resurgence of conflict and propel economic development.

The respondents emphasized that *“security is important to create conditions for reconstruction and humanitarian efforts is also important to alleviate suffering thereafter allocation to other categories can be increased gradually.”*

6.2.17 Realistic Time Horizon to Complete Programs

The study investigated the realistic time horizon to complete a series of activities. The respondents were therefore asked to provide the average duration of a program from the prospective of having a real impact on sustaining peace in post-conflict countries.

Table 6.12 Realistic Time Horizon to Complete Programs

	Mean	Std. Deviation
Provide agricultural assistance	3	3.17236
Implement corruption control measures	3	2.62758
Electoral support	3	2.52217
Restore basic services such as education, health, water, and electricity	3	2.40203
Disarm, demobilize and reintegrate combatants	4	3.781
Clear landmines	4	2.462
Implement human rights monitoring and advocacy mechanism	4	3.0301
Return and resettle refugees and displaced persons	4	4.08687
Respond to the rising incidence of disease and acute health concerns	4	4.12881
Implement education and health care reforms	4	2.90985
Establish interim governance institutions	4	3.7051
Secure property rights	4	3.7636
Cut hyperinflation	4	2.5873
Provide regulatory framework for financial sector	4	2.71782
Implement liberalization programs (liberalize trade and capital flows)	4	3.15483
Restore productive (existing or known) capacity of the economy	4	3.25215
Implement a comprehensive security sector reform (i.e., military, police)	5	3.97408
Reduce military expenditures (downsize military)	5	4.33318
Implement land reform	5	3.82231
Strengthen local and national institutions (build capacity of line ministries)	5	3.49357
Build political parties, civil society, free press	5	3.40711

Implement privatization programs	5	3.43316
Professionalize army and police	6	4.837
Ensure food security (supply of food)	6	5.84678
Mobilize revenue (tax reform; custom reform; introduction of cash budgeting system)	6	16.31414
Build infrastructure (large-scale reconstruction of roads, ports, and airport)	6	3.58381
Liberate the exchange rate	7	16.31914
Provide budgetary support and control Budget deficit	7	16.30111
Implement a comprehensive (full-scale) civil service reform	8	16.17213

From the findings, the programs with the prospective of having a real impact on sustaining peace in post-conflict countries in the shortest period were: Provide agricultural assistance, Implement corruption control measures, Electoral support and Restore basic services such as education, health, water, and electricity each with an average period of 3 years. This was followed by: Disarm, demobilize and reintegrate combatants, Clear landmines, Implement human rights monitoring and advocacy mechanism, Return and resettle refugees and displaced persons, Respond to the rising incidence of disease and acute health concerns, Implement education and health care reforms, Establish interim governance institutions, Secure property rights, Cut hyperinflation, Implement liberalization programs (liberalize trade and capital flows) and Restore productive (existing or known) capacity of the economy with an average period of 4 years each, Implement a comprehensive security sector reform (i.e., military, police), Reduce military expenditures (downsize military), Implement land reform, Strengthen local and national institutions (build capacity of line ministries, Build political parties,

civil society, free press and Implement privatization programs with an average period of 5 years each, Professionalize army and police, Ensure food security (supply of food), Mobilize revenue (tax reform; custom reform; introduction of cash) and Build infrastructure (large-scale reconstruction of roads, ports, and airport) with an average period of 6 years each, Liberate the exchange rate and Provide budgetary support and control Budget deficit with an average period of 7 years each and finally Implement a comprehensive (full-scale) civil service reform with an average period of 8 years.

When asked for any comments on the duration of programs mentioned, the respondents stated that post conflict stability determines the programs to be implemented. Additionally, the programs are dependent on the political system in place, however people related policies should be given priority even though there is no one size fits all post conflict reconstruction strategy.

6.2.18. Effectiveness of Policies

The study sought to determine the impact of each program on the specific outcome variables. The respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with statements in relation to what will be the impact of each program on the following outcome variables. The responses were placed on a three point likert scale with; 3 = high impact, 2 = medium impact, 1 = low impact and 0= no impact.

Table 6.13 Effectiveness of Policies

	Mean	Std. Dev.
Liberalize interest rates	1.457	0.852
Implement privatization programs	1.514	0.781
Liberate the exchange rate	1.600	0.736
Reduce the military expenditure (downsize military)	1.686	0.963
Provide budgetary support and control budget deficit	1.714	0.987
Cut hyperinflation	1.800	0.901
Secure property rights	1.943	0.838
Provide regulatory framework for financial sector	1.943	0.873
Build political parties, civil society, free press	1.971	0.747
Implement human rights monitoring and advocacy mechanism	2.000	0.767
Implement a comprehensive (full-scale) civil service reform	2.057	0.802
Mobilize revenue (tax reform; custom reform; introduction of cash budgeting system)	2.057	0.873
Return and resettle refugees and displaced persons	2.171	1.043
Conduct elections	2.200	0.833
Restore existing or known capacity of the economy	2.229	0.808
Provide agricultural assistance	2.257	0.780
Implement land reform	2.257	0.919
Implement corruption control measures	2.314	0.867
Respond to the rising incidence of disease and acute health concerns	2.343	1.056
Build infrastructure (large-scale reconstruction of roads, ports, and airport)	2.371	0.808
Clear landmines	2.400	0.881
Deploy peacekeepers to restore and maintain security	2.457	0.852
Implement a comprehensive security sector reform (military, police, judicial and penal system reforms)	2.457	0.741

Implement education and health care reforms	2.457	0.817
Strengthen local and national institutions (build capacity of line ministries and local administration)	2.486	0.742
Professionalize army and police	2.514	0.702
Establish interim governance institutions	2.543	0.701
Restore essential infrastructure (roads, ports; airports)	2.543	0.780
Disarm, demobilize and reintegrate combatants	2.657	0.684
Ensure food security (supply of food)	2.657	0.684
Restore basic services such as education, health, water, and electricity	2.714	0.710

The findings in table 4.4 indicates that most respondents were of the opinion that the impact of each program would be highest on; Restore basic services such as education, health, water, and electricity as depicted by the highest mean score, of (M = 2.714), followed by Ensure food security (supply of food) and Disarm, demobilize and reintegrate combatants (M = 2.657 each), Restore essential infrastructure (roads, ports; airports) and Establish interim governance institutions (M = 2.543 each), Professionalize army and police (M = 2.514), Strengthen local and national institutions (build capacity of line ministries and local administration) (M = 2.486), Implement education and health care reforms, Implement a comprehensive security sector reform (military, police, judicial and penal system reforms) and Deploy peacekeepers to restore and maintain security (M = 2.457 each) and Clear landmines (M = 2.400).

On the other hand the programs with the least impact would be; Liberalize interest rates (M = 1.457), Implement privatization programs (M =1.514), Liberate the exchange rate (M = 1.600), Reduce the military expenditure (downsize military) (M = 1.686), Provide

budgetary support and control budget deficit (M =1.714), Cut hyperinflation (M = 1.800), Strengthen local and national institutions (build capacity of line ministries and local Secure property rights and Provide regulatory framework for financial sector (M = 1.943 each) and Build political parties, civil society, free press (M =1.971). The other programs that would have moderate impact include; Implement human rights monitoring and advocacy mechanism (M =2.000), Implement a comprehensive (full-scale) civil service reform and Mobilize revenue (tax reform; custom reform; introduction of cash budgeting system) (M = 2.057 each), Return and resettle refugees and displaced persons (M = 2.171), Conduct elections (M = 2.200), Restore existing or known capacity of the economy (M =2.229), Provide agricultural assistance and Implement land reform (M =2.257), Implement corruption control measures (M =2.314), Respond to the rising incidence of disease and acute health concerns (M = 2.343) and Build infrastructure (large-scale reconstruction of roads, ports, and airport) (M =2.371).

6.2.19 Prioritization of Activities Within Policy Categories

The study sought to determine the priorities that would be given to activities within policy categories. The respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with statements in relation to how they would prioritize these programs if they were in charge of post-conflict reconstruction. The responses were placed on a five point likert scale with 5= the top priority to 1 = least priority.

Table 6.14 Prioritization of Activities Within Policy Categories

	Mean	Std. Dev.
Liberate the exchange rate	2.029	1.200
Liberalize interest rates	2.400	1.397
Reduce the military expenditure (downsize military)	2.429	1.481
Implement privatization programs	2.543	1.462
Build political parties, civil society, free press	2.571	1.501
Cut hyperinflation	2.571	1.650
Implement human rights monitoring and advocacy mechanism	2.829	1.445
Mobilize revenue (tax reform; custom reform; introduction of cash budgeting system)	2.829	1.618
Provide regulatory framework for financial sector	3.029	1.543
Implement land reform	3.057	1.679
Secure property rights	3.114	1.451
Conduct elections	3.200	1.549
Provide budgetary support and control budget deficit	3.229	1.555
Build infrastructure (large-scale reconstruction of roads, ports, and airport)	3.286	1.673
Restore existing or known capacity of the economy	3.371	1.573
Implement a comprehensive (full-scale) civil service reform	3.400	1.459
Clear landmines	3.771	1.437
Professionalize army and police	3.829	1.445
Provide agricultural assistance	3.829	1.272
Strengthen local and national institutions (build capacity of line ministries and local administration)	3.829	1.424
Respond to the rising incidence of disease and acute health concerns	3.857	1.332
Restore basic services such as education, health, water, and electricity	3.886	1.530
Return and resettle refugees and displaced persons	3.914	1.337
Establish interim governance institutions	3.971	1.272
Implement education and health care reforms	4.057	1.136
Implement corruption control measures	4.057	1.282
Deploy peacekeepers to restore and maintain security	4.143	1.167
Deploy peacekeepers to restore and maintain security	4.229	1.285
Implement a comprehensive security sector reform (military, police, judicial and penal system reforms)	4.229	0.973
Ensure food security (supply of food)	4.343	0.968
Disarm, demobilize and reintegrate combatants	4.457	0.950

The findings in table 4.4 indicates that most respondents would; disarm, demobilize and reintegrate combatants as depicted by the highest mean score, of (M = 4.457), followed by Ensure food security (supply of food) (M = 4.343), Implement a comprehensive security sector reform (military, police, judicial and penal system reforms) and Deploy peacekeepers to restore and maintain security (M = 4.229 each), Implement corruption control measures and Implement education and health care reforms (M = 4.057 each), Ensure food security (supply of food) (M = 4.343), Implement a comprehensive security sector reform (military, police, judicial and penal system reforms) and Deploy peacekeepers to restore and maintain security (M = 4.229 each), Deploy peacekeepers to restore and maintain security (M = 4.143), Implement corruption control measures and Implement education and health care reforms (M = 4.057 each), Establish interim governance institutions (M = 3.971), Return and resettle refugees and displaced persons (M = 3.914), Restore basic services such as education, health, water, and electricity (M = 3.886), Respond to the rising incidence of disease and acute health concerns (M = 3.857), Strengthen local and national institutions (build capacity of line ministries and local administration), Provide agricultural assistance and Professionalize army and police (M = 3.829 each) and Clear landmines (M = 3.771), Implement a comprehensive (full-scale) civil service reform (M = 3.400), Restore existing or known capacity of the economy (M = 3.371), Build infrastructure (large-scale reconstruction of roads, ports, and airport) (M = 3.286), Provide budgetary support and control budget deficit (M = 3.229), Conduct elections (M = 3.200), Secure property rights (M = 3.114), Implement land reform (M = 3.057) and Provide regulatory framework for financial sector (M = 3.029).

On the other hand, the respondents stated that they would give the least priority to; Implement human rights monitoring and advocacy mechanism and Mobilize revenue (tax reform; custom reform; introduction of cash budgeting system) (M = 2.829 each), Build political parties, civil society, free press and Cut hyperinflation (M = 2.571), Implement privatization programs (M = 2.543), Reduce the military expenditure (downsize military) (M = 2.429), Liberalize interest rates (M = 2.400) and Liberate the exchange rate (M = 2.029).

6.2.20 Trade-Offs Between Policies

The research finally concluded by determining whether the trade-offs between policies (e.g., security vs. infrastructure) depends on how the conflict was ended and how the reconstruction was started. The respondents were therefore asked to state their opinion on whether the effort levels in the previous sections depend on the nature of conflict (e.g. a negotiated settlement of conflict like in the case of Mozambique and Cambodia vs. forced settlement of conflict like in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq). All the respondents agreed to this.

6.2.21 Critical Analysis of Research Findings

Research findings from this study indicate that the development of a reconstruction framework in societies emerging from conflict certain key elements need to be considered. These include: leadership and governance, public administration, legislative power and rule of law, participatory development and social cohesion, economic

reconstruction and development and the security sector of the state under reconstruction. Thus in line with our objective one it is clear that there certain critical policy factors that are necessary for establishing peace and stability in societies emerging from conflict and the necessary conditions needed to implement them.

From the data presented it can be deduced that the success or failure of post-conflict reconstruction efforts is closely linked to the existence of a coherent and legitimate government. In line with the democratic peace theory a solid governance infrastructure, based on well-articulated horizontal and vertical divisions of power, is crucial to delivering political promises along with the needed public goods such as security, health care, education and infrastructure. State building ought to be the central objective of every peace building process and is dependent upon the reconstitution of sustainable governance structures. This study has established that post-conflict nation-building comprises, at minimum: the rule of law, judicial, constitutional and security sector reform, the establishment of mechanisms of political participation and inclusive policies, the effective provision of basic services and goods, fighting corruption, fostering a democratic culture, free and transparent elections, and the promotion of local governance.

The study further found that one key contributor to good governance is integration of institution building with skill and capability building of civic and political leadership including those of constructive negotiation and consensus formation. Arguably, it is not possible to transform government institutions without a transformation of mindsets of people and the ways in which they relate to each other and their capacities for positive

engagement. Comprehensive human rights-related learning, socialization and education, consensus-seeking skills at all levels, and consciously inclusive policies, that are formulated and implemented with full participation, are all vital and indispensable to creating new norms for collaborative engagement among former antagonists.

Further, this study argues that in a post-conflict setting, the public administration must be capable of the management and implementation of the whole set of government activities dealing with the implementation of law, regulations and decisions of the government and the management related to the provision of public services. At the center of credible governance and public administration is an effective public service, whether understood as an institution, a structure of organization, a cadre of public officials, or simply as the service provided by a public authority. Therefore, a capable public service, based on a merit and incentive based system, has a greater bearing on recovery both in terms of delivering aid and basic services and in rebuilding national cohesion and the credibility, legitimacy, and trust in government. As a central actor in the reconstruction process, therefore, the public service is called upon to be an agent of change and to ensure that it undergoes self-transformation to adapt to and manage the changed and changing overall socio-politico-economic governance terrain.

Governments need the capacity to undertake in-depth conflict analysis and situation analysis through inclusive, participatory processes in order to fully understand both the issues that may cause conflict and those are most important to the people. Conflict triggers, as well as peace building factors, need to be thoroughly examined, their

interactions and potential impacts understood. ‘Process’ skills, which are key ingredients for an inclusive public policy development process, need to be built or rebuilt. This confirms our first hypotheses, which states that a thorough knowledge of the origins, rationale, complexities and dynamics of each conflict situation is a prerequisite for designing appropriate post reconstruction responses.

Another important finding that emerged from the study concerns legislative power and rule of law. This study argues that sustainable peace requires legal and constitutional frameworks for governance that must be constructed through a process of inclusive participation, especially if they are expected to be visionary and accomplish more than an end to fighting, but also lay the foundation for democratic development. While short-term needs may have to be met through an interim constitution or an agreement on contentious issues, the rewards of a carefully constructed process of participation will be worth the time once conditions are mature for a full freedom of expression. National and international actors should jointly invest in these processes. They secure legitimacy and increase credibility. They build commitment to democracy. Although such participation may be conducted in different ways, it should allow the creation of a constitution drawing from the history, the suffering, and the aspirations of the people and truly reflecting their needs and vision. It is important to mention that an accurate revision and enactment of laws and regulations, supported by appropriate funding provisions, may be needed to promote women and vulnerable groups’ participation in leadership and decision making positions. Social inclusion, political participation and social cohesion are crucial to post-conflict reconstruction, but also represent complex processes of political and social

consultations. Several post-conflict transitional governments have sought to achieve this goal by sharing power among groups with different ethnic or religious identities.

It is the opinion of this study that any post-conflict development initiative must be implemented with the participation of the affected populations. Dialogue mechanisms, systems, and processes for the resolution of day-to-day disputes within society need to be established to build up and reinforce an infrastructure for peace. Religious, civic and community leaders can play constructive roles in fostering an environment for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Our second objective aimed at identifying the ideal sequencing/phasing of post-conflict reconstruction policies with a view to enhancing sustainable peace and stability. On those bases we argue that, in the immediate period after the end of violence, the creation of jobs through public works programs and the stimulation of micro and small enterprises are crucial. International actors should encourage governments to promote private sector development, creation of economic opportunities for business operation and development as well as entrepreneurship training and policy frameworks for small and medium enterprise development. They should also assist governments to establish sustainable partnerships with the private sector, where the latter exists (public private partnerships), and carefully balance its interactions in this area in order to prevent polarization of interests that might undermine the benefits of the general population, hence generating renewed or even new conflict. This study argues that economic policies need to be closely aligned with peace-building components. Governments must balance carefully the

trade-off between tight fiscal management and the need to show quick success in stimulating the economy and providing basic services. This is what will help people differentiate between the results of war and the benefits of peace and encourages their participation in the reconstruction process. We therefore disapprove our third hypothesis which suggests that socioeconomic rehabilitation and reconstruction only lay a strong foundation for lasting peace and sustainable development, but do not restore the economy to its pre-conflict state. Contrary to this view effective socioeconomic rehabilitation and reconstruction can restore the economy to its original state as happened in Mozambique.

This study found that a well-governed security sector is a prerequisite for stability, recovery and development. The security sector has the potential to generate tremendous political good will and protect economic growth within a post-conflict country. This confirms our second hypothesis which proposes that when security and political stability precedes socio-economic development in post-conflict reconstruction it leads to better strategies to prevent re-emergence of conflict.

In our view the goal of the security sector reform (SSR) program should be the establishment of a security sector that ensures adequate capacity to respond to the threats facing the nation while at the same time facilitating the establishment of an enabling environment for socio-economic development and poverty reduction. Thus SSR provides opportunities to link post-conflict recovery strategies with other targeted programmes supporting economic recovery, legislative and public sector capacity building and civil society empowerment. It is essential that the reforms introduce transparent management

mechanisms as well as accountability of the security sector to the government. This can be ensured through a “democratically accountable civilian oversight” ensuring a balanced allocation of state resources to this sector in line with those of the other strategic institutions. This suggestion is in line with tenets of the democratic peace theory.

Further to our argument, in this study we point out that SSR must pay attention to institutional capacity building. This is equally as important as effecting a reduction of budgetary allocations or changing the “size and shape” of the armed forces. In effect, institution capacity building ensures the creation of “force multipliers” necessary for a robust response to threats in society. In post conflict situations SSR can also take different forms such as re-orienting soldier’s tasks, creating reintegration programs and retraining ex-combatants to increase chance of sustainable livelihood.

6.3 Chapter Summary

This chapter has analysed the data collected and provided a detailed discussions on the factors that need to be considered in the formulation of a framework for post-conflict reconstruction. In the first phase (emergency phase: 1-2years after the end of conflict) of reconstruction available resources (in terms of total budget of 100%) should be distributed among the Humanitarian/Social policy categories by 23%, followed by security (22%), Infrastructure/Development and Governance/Democratization (19% each) and finally Economic Stabilization & Reforms 18%.

In the second phase (transition phase: 2-5 years after the end of conflict) available resources (in terms of total budget of 100%) should be distributed among the Infrastructure/Development policy by 22%, followed by security (21%), Governance/Democratization (20% each), Humanitarian/Social by 19% and finally Economic Stabilization & Reforms by 18%.

In the third phase (development phase: 6-10 years after the end of conflict) available resources (in terms of total budget of 100%) should be distributed among the Infrastructure/Development policy by 26%, followed by security (23%), Governance/Democratization by (18%), Humanitarian/Social by 17% and finally Economic Stabilization & Reforms by 16%.

Civil service reform is very important in the reconstruction process and this should be initiated at the early phase of the reconstruction process (between 1-2 years). The civil service reform should be well planned, gradual and target the long-term, issues of ethnicity need to be addressed with urgency to depoliticize the civil service, commitment of civil service stakeholders, civil service reform which should take up reasonable time, participation by all stakeholders, the civil service should be tactfully engaged, the civil service should be in tandem with process of conflict resolution and involvement of the grassroots.

In order of priority, post conflict reconstruction should begin with the disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating combatants, followed by ensuring food security,

implementing comprehensive security sector reform (military, police, judicial and penal system reforms) and Deploying peacekeepers to restore and maintain security. This should be followed by implementation of corruption control measures and implementation of education and health care reforms.

Other important tasks include responding to the rising incidence of disease and acute health concerns, strengthen local and national institutions (build capacity of line ministries and local administration), providing agricultural assistance and professionalizing the army and police. Clearing landmines, implementing a comprehensive (full-scale) civil service reform, restoring existing or known capacity of the economy, building infrastructure (large-scale reconstruction of roads, ports, and airport), and providing budgetary support and controlling budget deficit. This should be followed by conducting elections, secure property rights, implementing land reforms and providing regulatory framework for the financial sector. In conclusion, the data presented and analysed in this chapter clearly confirms that the key pillars of the post conflict reconstruction framework include; legitimacy, trust and authority of the state, political will for transparency and accountability, rule of law, social capital and social cohesion, economic reconstruction and service delivery and finally, security and cross border movement. These are the indicators which can explain the failure of reconstruction work in Haiti, the partial success of post conflict reconstruction in Cambodia and the success of post conflict reconstruction in Mozambique.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Introduction

This chapter presents summary of findings, conclusions based on the findings and recommendations there-to. The general objective of this study was to examine how the various peace building strategies that could be used to formulate a framework for post-conflict reconstruction using the case studies of Haiti, Cambodia and Mozambique.

The study considered the various peace building strategies applied for the reconstruction of each of the three case studies and established varying degree of effectiveness of the reconstruction processes despite the use of similar strategies.

In Haiti, reconstruction strategies were less effective as compared to Cambodia and Mozambique. One of the short comings in Haiti's post conflict peace building was absence of a legitimate government. The study argued that legitimacy confers to the political leadership of a state credibility and acceptance of the political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society. Good governance, democratic rights, and welfare gains most strongly contribute to state legitimacy. Elections are one of the ways of conferring legitimacy to political authority but in Haiti, the Presidential elections held on 7 February 2006 was a total failure in addition pervasive social exclusion and inequality are among the main sources of instability in Haiti. A society with balanced distribution of social and

economic resources like Mozambique is generally better able to manage the trade-offs and tensions that accompany economic development than a society characterized by extremes of wealth and poverty. Haiti's 1987 Constitution continues to undermine sustainable peace while the National Truth and Justice Commission did not do much in transitional justice. Although mandated to investigate human rights abuses that took place over a three-year period beginning with the September 30, 1991 coup that overthrew elected President Aristide until his restoration to power in September 1994. The commission took over 5,500 testimonies, identified 8,667 victims who had suffered 18,629 human rights violations but more came out of it.

In Cambodia, the situation was not good either but it was relatively better than Haiti. The weakest point was in the area security sector reforms. Cambodia is one of the most heavily mine-affected countries in the world. Landmines were used as a key weapon in the 1980s in the battle between the socialist government, which was supported by Vietnam and the Soviet Union, and the communist, China-backed Khmer Rouge.

In post-conflict periods, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, is an important component of Peace-building that helps prevent the reoccurrence of conflict as DDR programs are one of the early attempts to initiate recovery services and contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments so that development can start. Unfortunately, this has been poorly done in Cambodia.

Almost three decades after the mass killings, Cambodia established the Extraordinary Chambers ("CEC") to prosecute those most responsible for the terror. Neither an

international nor a domestic court, Cambodia's CEC belongs to a new category of tribunals referred to as "hybrid courts"²⁵⁷.

The network of social interaction, torn down by the deep and widespread effects of violent conflict, cannot be healed without reconciliation. Envisioning a new future would not be possible without acknowledging past abusive relationships. Personal fear has to be overcome for community building since the loss of familiarity in the routine and mistrust in others generates dysfunctional relations. In Cambodia the idea of creating a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) has been considered as a possible substitute for the ongoing legal proceedings at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). For example, thousands of survivor accounts (known as the *Renakse* petitions) were collected in the early 1980s. Also, on the annual celebration called the "Day of Anger/Remembrance", people gather together to speak out about their losses and sufferings and to condemn the Khmer Rouge crimes publicly.

In Cambodia peaceful transition required the establishment of a functioning government acceptable to different parties along with the formation of mutually agreeable expectations and rules in inter-group dynamics. The new government had a legal basis for its rule as legitimized by elections. Suffrage is applied to everyone regardless of his or her minority status, gender or racial differences. In July 2003, Cambodia held

²⁵⁷ *ibid*

parliamentary elections for the third time since the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement of 1991.

On the economic side State capacity building in Cambodia was retarded by the politicization and underpayment of the bureaucracy and an army that was bloated far beyond national security needs. The warring parties in Cambodia had to be disarmed, and their troops demobilized, while antidemocratic ideologies remained prevalent among the domestic actors and some of the factions were fundamentally unwilling or unable to abide by their commitment to the peace agreement.

In comparison to both Haiti and Cambodia, Mozambique was the most successful case study in post conflict reconstruction. The General Peace Accord dealt with the military issues, political and humanitarian issues. It consisted of seven protocols upon the negotiation process. These protocols included: Protocol 1 which dealt with the legitimacy of the sitting government. Protocol 2 predominantly dealt with political issues. The need for the implementation of multi-party democracy was expressed in this protocol. It reinforces the Law of political Parties which had previously been adopted by Frelimo earlier in the same year. Protocol 3: provided the platform for conducting the electoral process. The protocol includes the guiding principles for the elections and the participation of the international observers during the electoral process. Protocol 4: dealt with the military doctrine whereby, new structures for the Mozambique Armed forces were to be determined. In addition, it provided a framework of depoliticization of the military. Demobilization of the troops was taken care of by this protocol. Protocol 5:

established the timetable for the electoral process. It also said that the general elections under the multiparty system would be held a year after the signing of the peace accord. A commission to oversee the implementation of the cease fire was established under the same protocol. Protocol 6: established the timetable for the cease-fire and its implementation in four steps: (i) cease-fire, (ii) separation of forces, (iii) concentration of the separated forces and (iv) demobilization. Prisoners, except those being held for ordinary crimes, were supposed to be released. Protocol 7: this protocol agreed by both parties that there was a need to request for international financial support to help implement the provisions of the peace accord. It is through this protocol that a donor conference was held in Rome to help Mozambique begin its baby steps towards achievement of long lasting peace.

Nation-building and the construction of a shared sense of identity and common destiny, to overcome ethnic, sectarian or religious differences and counter alternative allegiances was successful leading to greater social cohesion. State-building is concerned with the state's capacity, institutions and legitimacy, and with the political and economic processes that underpin state-society relations. The effectiveness of the state and the quality of its linkages to society largely determine a country's prospects for peace and development.

Thus in Mozambique the period 1992-1994 can be best described as a period for relief, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. The period from 1994 to 1999 can be characterized as the period of development and more rapid change. During this period,

multiparty elections took place, privatization was carried out rapidly, and reconstruction and development activities were continued. Most stakeholders played an integral part in the reconstruction of Mozambique including foreign development partners. The United Nations was the major contributor in creating an enabling environment in Mozambique for donor countries and institutions to establish development framework in the country. The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) and several UN agencies, the multilateral donors such the World Bank, IMF, EU, and African Development Bank (ADB), bilateral donors, the international non-governmental and non-profit organizations contributed to the peace building in Mozambique.

Largely, the Post Conflict Reconstruction Framework Pillars in Mozambique included: Socio-Economic Wellbeing in Mozambique; Governance Institutions and Democratic Norms in Reconstruction Process; Legitimacy, Trust and Authority of the State; Social Capital in Reconstruction of Post-Conflict Mozambique; the Problem of Social Dilemmas.

7.2 Sequencing of Post–Conflict Reconstruction Policies for Sustainable Peace and Stability

Post-conflict recovery and state reconstruction are complex challenges for the state and the society. This study has shown that interventions in post conflict societies must address the key pillars of the post conflict reconstruction framework, namely: Legitimacy, trust and authority of the state, political will for transparency and

accountability, rule of law, social capital and social cohesion, economic reconstruction and service delivery and finally, security and cross border movement. The most critical challenges in post-conflict realities which help in constructing a post conflict reconstruction framework are as follows:

7.2.1 Legitimacy, Trust and Authority of the State

When the authority of the state has collapsed, and the remaining structures of government often lose their legitimacy in post-conflict settings, thus leading to political, societal and economic disintegration on a national and even regional level, the main task of governments in post-conflict situations is to rebuild economic and political governance and regain legitimacy and the trust of their populace. It is generally acknowledged that the critical determinant of sustainable recovery, peace and development is a committed leadership aimed at: protecting human rights; ensuring rule of law and security; reestablishing and strengthening credible, transparent and accountable public administration institutions; reconstructing an efficient, representative public service that achieves equitable service delivery and re-generates an equitable post-conflict economy.

These key areas of concern constitute the basic prerequisites of peace-sensitive reconstruction and reconciliation. Demonstrated action toward accomplishing them can transform the mindset of people to trust in their government's ability to deliver lasting peace and progress and to be patient through the hardships that will prevail. At their inception, post-conflict governments, especially transitional authorities, often lack legitimacy and have not yet earned trust, as they were formed as a result of negotiations between warring parties without the involvement of the majority of the population or they

include former combatants perceived by the population to be responsible for crimes. They also exercise limited control over the country's assets. The development of public policy often has to be negotiated with other actors (sectarian groups or former parties to the armed conflict) who may control parts of the territory and/or national resources.

7.2.2 Political Will for Transparency and Accountability

The fragility of post-conflict situations creates multiple openings for corruption and the lack of a common ethos of governance undermines the political will for transparency and accountability, thus impeding the creation of robust mechanisms to deal with it. The absence of a shared vision and ethos of governance within the new, constituted governing group, especially when its members are drawn from former warring parties, often induces factionalism that makes different groups in government work at cross-purposes rather than for the national good.

7.2.3 Rule of Law

Absence of rule of law, accompanied by a culture of impunity, especially affects many post-conflict situations and severely undermines the legitimacy of the State. It is likely that weak rule of law existed prior to violent conflict and was characterized by ineffective or corrupt institutions. The fallout from this circumstance is especially evident in the judiciary and police, where dysfunctional institutions have over time eroded confidence in the formal mechanisms for dispute resolution and grievance management and induces citizens to resort to illicit means. There is a need to re-build the judicial infrastructure from the highest to the lowest levels, with the most severe challenges being to rebuild the

physical infrastructure and capacities of the staff, and to establish and promulgate an enforceable legal and regulatory framework that will be accepted by the populace.

7.2.4 Social Capital and Social Cohesion

Post-conflict public policies are particularly vulnerable to distortion by sectarian behavior towards particular groups, sectors or communities overriding national interests. The loss of human and social capital, a dearth of social cohesion, continued exclusion of targeted groups in society, and absent participatory mechanisms in public policy formulation, all perpetuates a lack of trust in government and challenge the revival of legitimate local and national governance structures. Internally displaced people (IDPs), returning refugees, and unsupported youth and (former) child soldiers/ex-combatants and others are particularly vulnerable to being co-opted into unproductive or illicit activities that are counterproductive to the effective functioning of the state. The State must organize specific, demonstrable initiatives to regenerate social cohesion through policies and programmes that promote participation, equity and inclusion.

7.2.5 Economic Reconstruction and Service Delivery Structures

Another major challenge is the need to simultaneously sustain ongoing governance reform and economic restructuring programmes at the same time securing visible achievements in poverty alleviation efforts as dividends of peace and stability. With regards to economic reconstruction, the short-term economic orientation of local actors which is focused mostly on private immediate gain often prevails in post-conflict

settings. This situation, exacerbates a credibility and legitimacy deficit for the new political actors, and limits the citizens' compliance with their obligations.

War economies and parallel economies continue to thrive particularly during situations of ceasefire. Unless concerted action to retake regulatory control of the State accompanies the cessation of violence, these parallel economies deny the state access to substantial revenues and the beneficiaries undermine and destabilize attempts to rectify the situation. Within this arena, the exploitation and abuse of mineral and natural resources by illicit national and/or foreign actors, coupled with worsening terms of economic exchange, are other crucial challenges that need to be addressed to ensure a sustainable economic reconstruction.

7.2.6 Security and Cross-border Movements

Continuing insecurity and violence affect the provision of basic services, and reestablishment of government authority and administration at local levels. A lack of institutional authorities and failure in the security sector, in particular the police forces, lead to continuing mistrust of the population in public authorities and, at best, a State lacking legitimacy, and at worst, a breeding ground for the re-eruption of unresolved conflicts and violence. Conflicts spilling across borders represent an additional source of continued post conflict disintegration, on both a national and regional level. Such cross-border conflict issues include the illegal traffic of small arms, light weapons and anti-personnel mines. The fundamental question here is how to regulate movements across

borders in order to discourage illicit traffic while promoting legal and safe movements and advancing more cohesion and integration among countries.

7.3 Reconstruction Framework in Societies Emerging from Conflict

This relates to key elements to be considered in designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating any strategy leading to post-conflict recovery, sustainable peace and development for a country or region emerging from crisis. There is need for a thorough in-house situation analysis in conjunction with an analysis of external (regional and global) factors in order to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the root causes of conflict in the context of the country before working on a post-conflict reconstruction strategy.

7.3.1 Leadership and Governance

The success or failure of post-conflict reconstruction efforts is closely linked to the existence of a coherent and legitimate government. Rebuilding the capacities of the state and the (re-)establishment of credible, transparent, participatory and efficient governance and public administration institutions in fragile post-conflict settings is the key ingredient to achieving peace, stability and sustainable development. A solid governance infrastructure, based on well-articulated horizontal and vertical divisions of power, is crucial to delivering political promises along with the needed public goods such as security, health care, education and infrastructure. State- or nation-building is the central objective of every peace building operation and is dependent upon the reconstitution of sustainable governance structures. Post-conflict nation-building comprises, at minimum: the rule of law, judicial, constitutional and security sector reform, the establishment of

mechanisms of political participation and inclusive policies, the effective provision of basic services and goods, fighting corruption, fostering a democratic culture, free and transparent elections, and the promotion of local governance.

Merely establishing formal institutions and processes does not guarantee that policies will be developed and implemented by all relevant actors. What is required is to integrate institution building with building skills and capabilities of civic and political leadership including those of constructive negotiation and consensus formation. Arguably, it is not possible to transform government institutions without a transformation of mindsets of people and the ways in which they relate to each other and their capacities for positive engagement. Comprehensive human rights-related learning, socialization and education, consensus-seeking skills at all levels, and consciously inclusive policies, that re formulated and implemented with full participation, are all vital and indispensable to creating new norms for collaborative engagement among former antagonists. Even if new institutions are established, they will deadlock as their members fail to reach consensus or compromise. Thus, leadership is crucial and needs to model the behavior of inclusiveness.

Most fundamentally, sustained peace requires a visionary leadership in a trustful, transparent and participatory partnership with civil society. The central question of successful state-building often comes down to whether newly re-established and reformed states can manage diversity and competition among different groups without

resorting to violence and authoritarianism, and in a manner that delivers access to political and economic opportunities to all citizens equitably and irrespective of identity. Any post-conflict leadership needs to place the larger national interest over that of the group, presupposing the ability to successfully manage and resolve conflicts in a participatory manner. Leaders need to be able to put aside self-interest in the name of the larger national interest, such that there are not victors, nor vanquished, but only partners. Leadership to establish priorities and implement strategies in crisis and post-conflict countries unquestionably rests with national stakeholders. But, solid partnerships with international interlocutors are also necessary to create and solidify viable governance structures that are re-constituted through inclusive processes and begin to re-establish credibility and trust in the state. Any visionary post-conflict leadership needs to consider the particular importance of the contributions of all genders and vulnerable and marginalized groups in post-conflict reconstruction.

Decentralization is a key policy area in post-conflict settings. The dispersal of key government functions to the provincial or local levels promotes inclusion and participation, and reduces the stakes for a contest over centralized power. However, experience shows that decentralization cannot by itself resolve the intractable problems that led to violence or the post-war challenges. This is because a successful decentralization process - since it entails a transfer of power, authority, responsibilities and resources from the centre to local governments - requires consultations and participatory actions. These processes are unlikely to develop in the immediate aftermath of war or conflict without concerted actions.

If control over territory is what is contested, then territorial decentralization may contribute to peace (bearing in mind specific territorial areas of a country that are put under governance of one warring faction). However this would not be decentralization in the real sense because it actually represents a loss on the part of the central government and a victory of the warring faction. All the same, there is a case for designing decentralized governance systems in order to promote peace. Decentralization in fact provides a structural arrangement for orderly negotiation and shared exercise of power and facilitates the involvement of the local people in policy decisions on their own development. Moreover, it offers effective resource allocation, improved service delivery and better prospects for peace. Thus the design and development of local representative structures is a key element of peace-building efforts in conflict and post-conflict situations. However, when decentralized governance is not well managed, it can lead to instability and conflict rather than peace. Therefore, supporting capacity building for decentralization, especially the delivery of basic services in an inclusive and participatory manner, is a critical element of peace and development strategies.

7.3.2 Public Administration

In any development context, and particularly in a post-conflict setting, the public administration must be capable of the management and implementation of the whole set of government activities dealing with the implementation of law, regulations and decisions of the government and the management related to the provision of public services.

At the center of credible governance and public administration is an effective public service, whether understood as an institution, a structure of organization, a cadre of public officials, or simply as the service provided by a public authority. Therefore, a capable public service, based on a merit and incentive based system, has a greater bearing on recovery than is generally recognized, both in terms of delivering aid and basic services and in rebuilding national cohesion and the credibility, legitimacy, and trust in government. However, it needs to be recalled that the public service is of external to a conflict or crisis situation. It is part of the socio-politico-economic and cultural conditions that interplayed in the first place to fuel the conflict and often it is itself a causality of the destruction engendered by the conflict. As a central actor in the reconstruction process, therefore, the public service is called upon to be an agent of change and to ensure that it undergoes self-transformation to adapt to and manage the changed and changing overall socio-politico-economic governance terrain.

Governments need the capacity to undertake in-depth conflict analysis and situation analysis through inclusive, participatory processes in order to fully understand both the issues that may cause conflict and those are most important to the people. Conflict triggers, as well as peace building factors, need to be thoroughly examined, their interactions and potential impacts understood. 'Process' skills, which are key ingredients for an inclusive public policy development process, need to be built or rebuilt. Credible governance will require the political actors learning and employing new sets of process skills, such as collaborative negotiation, mediation, and consensus building. The vision

and mission of post-conflict governments should be based on a process of national dialogue that will produce a demand-driven delineation of short- and long-term priorities. It needs to be accompanied by the establishment of a public service that is viewed by the public as representative, united and technically competent, and distinct from the pre-conflict system. Such a public service is key to delivering on those commonly established priorities.

The laws and administrative procedures regulating public sector institutions should be peace sensitive, inclusive and development oriented. Their establishment should be designed in accordance with the challenges to be overcome and the priority needs or issues to be addressed. They should be made functional according to the real existing capacity in terms of financial and human resources as well as technology and equipment. Their administrative structures should be compatible with the staff profiles required for their optimal functioning. The availability of skilled staff should be assessed in order to plan training activities needed. Moreover, the equipment required for the running of these structures should be adequate to the available technology and capacity of staff, as well as to their mission for responsive service delivery. The work itself should be performed based on sound management practices guided by clear systems and tools known as standards or norms.

In sum, there is need for public service transformation which addresses the weaknesses and major challenges the public sector is facing considering the unique context of each country. Even though the public sector reform is guided by its own specificity, it is

essential to establish a proper congruence between policies, strategies, public programmes/projects, norms and standards to be implemented at national and local levels whatever the socioeconomic sector. This implies the key role the citizens and public servants will play under a political and managerial leadership focusing on transparency accountability, equity and professional ethics for working methodologies, approaches and practices. In this perspective, the budgeting process - including the salary policy for the public servants - and the fiscal system will be the prominent factors with regard to the reconstruction of public service.

Experience has shown that post-conflict recovery will not be sustainable unless governments, civil society, and other stakeholders enhance the meditative capacities of a range of actors in society. This requires that a range of stakeholders acquire the specific capacities and skills to manage and resolve, through compromise and consensus, recurring conflicts and competition over scarce resources, the allocation of mineral wealth, land and between different identities. While many recovery efforts focus on there building of physical infrastructure, equal emphasis must be placed on building “infrastructure for peace,” that is, the institutions and processes through which a society mediates its own conflicts.

In this perspective, public sector reconstruction will be conducted based on the logical links between the three columns (structural elements, human resources and available systems), comprising the public sector’s fundamental constituents and following the institution development methodological approach.

Most crucially, there is a need to broaden emerging consensus on reconciliation as a means toward conflict prevention and to develop a culture of prevention. A broad range of actors must be involved in the elaboration and implementation of practical prevention policies and mechanisms which should address the root causes of conflict in particular situations. This calls for a new spirit of collaboration among national and international actors and involves the development of common tools and institutional mechanisms for addressing potential crisis which take account of the perspectives of the parties to the conflict.

Consensus-based decision-making needs to be fostered as preferred state practice related to state design and policy. For example, peace agreements and new constitutions may need to be designed and, above all, implemented. The process of drafting a new constitution needs to engage the participation of the majority of the population instilling a sense of ownership among/across different ethnic and religious groups. The need for consensus building processes that reinforces trust between government and people cannot be compromised even by the need for political institutions to act as quickly as possible.

Sometimes constitutional re-design can be misused as a stalling maneuver between antagonists that don't trust each other. Dialogue and confidence-building, however, may temporarily obviate the need for constitutional change by bringing consensus on contentious issues. Embarking on a constitutional process in the aftermath of conflict may take time, energy and funding away from more urgent needs. Raising trust between antagonists and imparting collaborative negotiation skills can help facilitate and expedite contentious negotiations where constitutional change is needed. However a thorough

constitutional review process needs to be undertaken when conditions are conducive to full freedom of expression engaging all different strata of the society.

7.3.3 Legislative Power and Rule of Law

The guidepost involving legislative power and rule of law is derived from the interlinkages of the legislative and judiciary pillars. Parliaments have a fundamental role to play in peace building processes, including oversight of reconstruction, legislating on human right issues and addressing post-conflict security concerns. Parliamentary strengthening is critical to allow a parliament to fulfill its constitutionally mandated role of holding the executive branch accountable for its actions and performance. It also contributes to peace building while restoring legitimacy and trust in the legislative power. Therefore in post-conflict realities, the legal framework, judicial institutions and the penal system need to be re-established to sustainably ensure the rule of law. The establishment of truth and equitable access to justice, often absent in many pre-conflict and in-conflict situations, is key to lasting reconciliation and hence sustainable peace. However, the imperatives of justice can often clash with those of reconciliation.

Fragile post-conflict situations may not be able to stand the stress of putting leaders on trial. The balance may lie in ensuring that justice and human rights protection is equitably and fairly available to communities and individuals in the short-term through an interim system of rule of law, while wider justice is achieved at the national level, through mechanisms ranging from truth commissions to special courts, once the process of recovery is stabilized. Sustainable peace requires legal and constitutional frameworks for

governance that must be constructed through a process of inclusive participation, especially if they are expected to be visionary and accomplish more than an end to fighting, but also lay the foundation for democratic development. While short-term needs may have to be met through an interim constitution or an agreement on contentious issues, the rewards of a carefully constructed process of participation will be worth the time once conditions are mature for a full freedom of expression.

National and international actors should jointly invest in these processes. They secure legitimacy and increase credibility. They build commitment to democracy. Although such participation may be conducted in different ways, it should allow the creation of a constitution drawing from the history, the suffering, and the aspirations of the people and truly reflecting their needs and vision. It is important to mention that an accurate revision and enactment of laws and regulations, supported by appropriate funding provisions, may be needed to promote women and vulnerable groups' participation in leadership and decision making positions.

7.3.4 Participatory Development and Social Cohesion

A decisive factor in the success and effectiveness of post-conflict reconstruction is the prior experience of a country and society in democratic processes. Where governance measures can rely on such traditions and previous experiences, the transition from violence to a peaceful and democratic political culture is greatly facilitated. Social inclusion, political participation and social cohesion are crucial to post-conflict reconstruction, but also represent complex processes of political and social consultations.

Several post-conflict transitional governments have sought to achieve this goal by sharing power among groups with different ethnic or religious identities.

However, constituting a government along these lines, especially in societies where such identities have previously not been sharply drawn, or where different groups have suffered from relatively unequal access to opportunity, may heighten division among groups, and lay the basis for tensions in socio-political interactions and ultimately lead to future conflict. Non-governmental actors and civil society movements can make major contributions and play important roles in identifying, analyzing and addressing root causes of conflict.

Enabling societies to dialogue with itself and to encourage dialogue between governments and the civil society needs to be amongst the key goals of post-conflict reconstruction in order to find solutions that consolidate peace in the long run. Support to the establishment of civil society umbrella bodies helps to create a structure through which civil society organizations can collectively engage in lobbying, advocacy and monitor in programmes that help enhance the development of pro-poor development policies.

Therefore, any post-conflict development initiative must be implemented with the participation of the affected populations. This is to ensure correct understanding of their actual needs, including society transformation after conflict, local participation and ownership as well as responsibility for sustaining achieved results. Intervention must be

conflict sensitive and “de-ethnicized,” especially if ethnic tension was at the root of conflict. Interventions must actually go beyond simply ‘doing no harm,’ but must proactively address the root causes of conflict and diminish tension and destructive competition among interest groups. Dialogue mechanisms, systems, and processes for the resolution of day-to-day disputes within society need to be established to build up and reinforce an infrastructure for peace. Religious, civic and community leaders can play constructive roles in fostering an environment for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

7.3.5 Economic Reconstruction and Development

In the area of socio-economic governance, the promotion of macroeconomic reconstruction and stabilization is one key determining factor for sustainable long-term reconstruction. Regulating ownership in a post-conflict society and combating and constraining the basis of so-called ‘war economies’ and parallel economies are priorities. In the immediate period after the end of violence, the creation of jobs through public works programmes and the stimulation of micro and small enterprises are crucial. Threatened livelihoods can easily lead to a new break-out of conflicts.

Reintegrating ex-combatants, refugees and internally displaced people into the economy represent further financial challenges on fragile post-conflict states suffering from sharply reduced revenues. Inflation might be additionally increased by further credits; declining confidence in the domestic currency leads to brain drain and dwindling capital, thus to a spiral of continued economic failures. New macroeconomic policies and institutions, as well as capacity-building for people working in these areas, are required to encourage the

development of market mechanisms that can efficiently and effectively allocate scarce economic resources.

International actors should encourage governments to promote private sector development, creation of economic opportunities for business operation and development as well as entrepreneurship training and policy frameworks for small and medium enterprise development. They should also assist governments to establish sustainable partnerships with the private sector, where the latter exists (public private partnerships), and carefully balance its interactions in this area in order to prevent polarization of interests that might undermine the benefits of the general population, hence generating renewed or even new conflict.

Economic policies need to be closely aligned with peace-building components. Governments must balance carefully the trade-off between tight fiscal management and the need to show quick success in stimulating the economy and providing basic services. This helps people differentiate between the results of war and the benefits of peace and encourages their participation in the reconstruction process. Some emerging best practices are worth considering. One of them is to establish robust systems of public control and oversight to minimize imprudence or corruption. Another may be to negotiate the distribution of income from the exploitation of natural resources, such as gold and oil, across geographical, ethnic and sectarian lines. Also, the government should strive to engage its armed forces in the delivery of public goods to justify public expenditure on them.

7.3.6 Security Sector

Governance of the security sector is a precondition for stability since it provides safety and security for the populace, assure the return of IDPs/refugees and resettlement, and ensure good management of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes. A well-governed security sector is a key public service and a prerequisite for stability, recovery and development. Thus, security sector reforms need to be initiated and implemented within a wider and long-term peace-building perspective.

Downsizing or reforming the security sector on the basis of international standards is not a sufficient starting point. The primary emphasis should be on determining, on the basis of dialogue among relevant stakeholders, the genuine internal and external overall security needs of a post-conflict society, and then ensuring the allocation of resources to meet these needs. For demobilized security personnel, these resources should include the provision of secure economic alternatives. Reconstituted thus, the security sector should be subject to democratic, civilian oversight as well be neutral vis-à-vis any political party order or belligerent faction.

The security sector has the potential to generate tremendous political good will and protect economic growth within a post-conflict country. Thus, governing authorities need to ensure security as a precondition for any further post-conflict development. Although security sector concerns may vary among post-conflict countries because of unique political and historical legacies, often there are four common characteristics of the post conflict security sector: a) bloated military apparatuses that drain economic resources,

military and b) police forces that frequently play major role in politics and the economy, and which may be incompetent, abusive and corrupt, c) armed groups/militias posing significant threats to individual/community security and d) dysfunctional civil - military relations.

The trust domestic citizens and international investors have in the security sector can either enhance or hinder the amount of investment, aid, and development opportunities a country will receive. Thus, the trust in this sector is not only essential for the creation of a sustainable peace and public administration and judicial system but also for the future economic and political development of a country. The sector has the responsibility of protecting an environment of trust by the citizenry, the private sector and the international community which is a sine-qua-non condition for launching a process of growth and investment creation. It is clear that the need to restore people's confidence and reestablish trust in government cannot be fulfilled without an effective and democratically accountable security sector. Consequently, reform of this sector needs to be initiated to avoid a situation of fragility in the gained peace and to avoid relapse into conflict.

The goal of the security sector reform (SSR) program should be the establishment of a security sector that ensures adequate capacity to respond to the threats facing the nation whilst facilitating the provision of an enabling environment for socio-economic development and poverty reduction. It is essential that the reforms introduce transparent management mechanisms as well as accountability of the security sector to the government. This can preferably be ensured through a "democratically accountable

civilian oversight” ensuring a balanced allocation of state resources to this sector in line with those of the other strategic institutions. External funding may be required to assist post conflict countries to face their challenges of financing this sector.

The SSR also requires a delicate attention to institutional capacity building. This is more important than effecting a drastic reduction of budgetary allocations or of the “size and shape” of the armed forces. It is also important to pay adequate attention to the creation of “force multipliers” ensuring robust response to threats in society. However, many governments avoid SSR and necessary downsizing of the military because of the benefits it provides to their stability, to its soldiers and the deterrent to criminal behavior it provides. Thus, governments often seek alternatives to downsizing and complete the following tasks: Reorient soldier tasks: external security and providing support during complex humanitarian emergencies; Engage soldiers in peacekeeping (this requires training efforts); Hire/consider private military/security firms (this poses issues of standards and accountability); Create/utilize labor intensive works (this may crowd out private sector and not be appreciated by the military); Create reintegration programmes retrain ex-combatants to increase chance of sustainable livelihood.

Ethnic tensions need to be particularly taken into account with actors in the security sector in order to avoid the issues being carried out at the expense of vulnerable groups in post-conflict societies and people who are only starting to rebuild their trust in government. Moreover, although there has been increased attention regarding the connection between livelihoods and trust during the last ten years, there are still many

unanswered questions. Some of these concern the actions to be taken against former combatants as well as the concerns over human rights abuses, which persist with impunity long after the conclusion of many conflicts.

SSR provides opportunities to link post-conflict recovery strategies with other targeted programmes supporting economic recovery, legislative and public sector capacity building and civil society empowerment. During the SSR process many levels of mistrust must be overcome and trust between individuals and security must be established or reestablished if collapsed or previously non-existent. However, to create the dimension of trust between individuals and the security forces, citizens must believe that the management and the oversight of the security sector is not only inclusive, but also accountable to them in a transparent manner. Additionally, actors of all levels must be empowered to ensure the stability of trust in the security sector. Specifically the executive and legislative actors must be empowered to create more effective direction and management and civilians must be empowered to participate in oversight.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that trust in the security sector does not ensure trust in other areas of the government: the legislative, executive, or judicial authorities and it does not prevent/reduce problems that may result from the lack of proper institutions. Therefore trust in this sector, although essential, does not singularly enhance the livelihoods or human security of individuals in a society. In sum, SSR is a necessary, but not sufficient component of post-conflict reconstruction.

7.3.7 Information and Communication Technologies and Knowledge Management

Access to reliable and objective information is a vital element of democratic process and settings. Countries' experience shows that the manipulation of information can be a trigger of rising misunderstanding and tensions that can lead to devastating conflicts. Therefore, the promotion of exchange and dissemination of information is an important element of re-construction efforts. It is therefore in the interest of governments to set up mechanisms allowing them to manage information and knowledge assets. In particular powerful tool for both economic and social development, allowing governments to improve efficiency and to deliver more transparent, high-quality services to citizens.

Many post-conflict governments implement decentralization strategies to improve service delivery and foster inclusion, participation and peace. Experience in countries including Rwanda, has demonstrated that these strategies greatly benefit from the effective application of information sharing and dissemination through ICT. This facilitates communications between decentralized authorities and increases information sharing and coordination. It also promotes better accountability and streamlines capacity building. ICT is also highly effective in collecting information on a wide range of vulnerability factors for preventing the relapse of conflict and supporting sustainable peace processes.

However, it must be noted that the implementation of ICT strategies in post-conflict contexts requires a careful interposition of technologies, starting with simple projects such as Internet kiosks and scaling up to more complex integrated budget systems that allow for improved financial management and increased transparency and accountability.

The use of ICT can assist post conflict governments to implement processes aimed at fighting corruption and restoring people's trust in the country's institutions. Due to the fact that ICT is expensive and usually beyond the financial capacity of governments in post conflict societies, assistance from external actors may be required, combined with internal knowledge of how to strategically address needs and constraints.

7.3.8 Environment and Natural Resources Management

The consequences of violent conflicts on the physical environment and irreplaceable natural resources are obvious. In the aftermath of violence, leaders and decision makers must pay careful attention to environmental stewardship toward the ultimate goal of peace and sustainable development. This requires balance between reconstituting the ecosystem, the optimal management of natural resources and equitable resource distribution to benefit all citizens. The main strategic areas to be developed further in both a conflict situation analysis and for policy development include the protection of biodiversity for the maintenance of a better environmental balance.

Governments need to implement specific policies and actions for preventing natural disasters and planning for problems such as climate change, desertification, etc. This is aimed at enhancing socio-economic activities that reduce poverty, generate growth, and manage natural resources sustainably without further damaging the environment. In addition, participation and commitment of local communities in the management of natural resources and fostering an optimal resources management process based on transparency and accountability within three focal points: mapping of natural resource

areas for instance “Tele-detection”; exploitation norms including performance requirements and obligations; control, monitoring and evaluation, are all essential components in the management of the environment and natural resources in a post conflict setting.

7.4 Critical Policy Factors Necessary for Establishing Peace and Stability in Post Conflict Societies

7.4.1 Reconstructing Governance Structures in Post-conflict Societies

The international community as well as regional actors play a crucial role in the immediate aftermath of a conflict but are often challenged by a lack of coordination and unclear leadership role. External funding and technical assistance must be sequenced and provided on a long term basis. It should also focus on developing national capacity from the outset so that governments are prompted to mobilize resources domestically. Paradoxically, the most aid is available early on when crisis or post-conflict governments’ absorptive capacity is weakest. When governments actually develop capacity, aid often dries up. External donors also need to strike a balance between the need for ensuring accountability and the necessity of collaborating effectively with national actors.

International actors may be needed to deliver emergency and relief aid in humanitarian operations during and in the immediate aftermath of conflict and to provide the foundation for long-term development. To prevent a further destabilization of post-conflict societies, rapid responses and a quick transition from planning to implementation

are needed. However, the international presence often overwhelms vulnerable countries emerging from conflict with imposed priorities or inadequate responses. Hence, it is important to ensure that first phase support measures are also a product of joint consultation and are as flexible and un-bureaucratic as possible. One big challenge for the international community is the initial dilemma to cooperate with government institutions that are not fully democratically legitimized and at the same time help them strengthen and transform and become accountable and legitimate.

It is indisputable that continuing significant external technical and financial assistance is critical to sustainable post-conflict recovery. International support can play a particularly valuable role in creating national capacity for the implementation of post-conflict strategies and programmes. In addition to short-term relief and recovery needs, post-conflict assistance should also target the large-scale development of leadership skills and capabilities within the civil service to work inclusively in making and implementing policies and decisions. Additionally, the sequencing of reconstruction measures at all levels and across all sectors (security, political-administrative, socio-economic) in post-conflict settings is decisive for a sustainable long-term development.

7.4.2 International Actors

The international community needs local knowledge, networks, and support which are ultimately the only sustainable foundation for reconstruction. It is crucial for the international community to identify, cooperate, and support from the very beginning with main drivers of change, individuals and key institutional partners, for post-conflict

reconstruction. However, relying too strongly on civil society actors creates the potential danger of substituting and delegitimizing state organizations and thus potentially undermining long-term efforts to strengthen them.

7.4.3 Local, National and Regional Actors

Local, national and regional institutions, structures and processes are the key dynamic and sustainable factors that can provide internal, culturally-appropriate guidance and eventually take over and implement emergency as well as longer-term reconstruction activities within all sectors of society. Relying on local knowledge and networks, and then building the capacities of public officials in policy design and implementation are crucial steps in the aftermath of a conflict. This cannot be compensated by handing over decision-making on domestic economic issues to international organizations. Adequate training measures, establishing appropriate incentives and reviewing all external strategies with national/regional/local necessities are key elements to make external interventions a success and support for long-term development.

Regional organizations can have an important role to play in post-conflict environments and can be a useful adjunct to the work of inter-governmental or bi-lateral partners. Regional counterparts can provide more acceptable support that is seen as neutral (in everything from brokers of peace agreements to peacekeeping troops to election monitors.) Their in-depth knowledge of the sub-region and political influence on governments and their opposition can often produce agreements or effect difficult decisions that other external actors have difficulty achieving.

7.4.4 Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Infrastructure

Both international and regional actors play a crucial role in peace-building as part of post conflict reconstruction efforts. However, it is essential that they also support actions aimed at strengthening national capacities for conflict prevention. As part of these efforts, it is important to build skills and capabilities of civic and political leadership for understanding the nexus between peace and development and for enacting mechanisms for in-depth conflict analysis and prevention.

Within this context, public sector managers need to be aware of the existence of mechanisms which can be accessed to support post-conflict peace building activities as well as for conflict prevention. Among the former mechanisms it is worth mentioning the Peace building Commission, an intergovernmental advisory body established to enact a recommendation made by world leaders at the 2005 World Summit. The need for consolidating peace building and development efforts has been institutionalized with the establishment of this body. The role of the Commission is to marshal resources at the disposal of the international community to advise and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict recovery, focusing attention on reconstruction, institution building and sustainable development, in countries emerging from conflict.

7.5 Recommendations

The study recommends the following key elements to be considered in the design and implementation of post conflict and peace sensitive strategies. These elements are to be

taken into account within the perspective of governance and public administration while the post conflict societies are developing their individual strategies. As argued above, strategies must reflect specific country circumstances and there are no generic prescriptions on an optimal strategy. The critical elements that public sector managers need to focus on in order to create and implement successful post conflict reconstruction strategies are;

7.5.1 Successful Policy Mixing

For any post-conflict reconstruction strategy to be successful, it should start from the beginning by determining the right entry point(s). The assessment of the context will then point out the key pillars around which the reconstruction strategies should be built. Based on the sectors or pillars identified as crucial, sectoral policies and appropriate management arrangements will be made with a main purpose: create coherence among different policies and make them converge towards the common goal of sustained development, prosperity and peace. The difficulty resides in harmonizing policies and management mechanisms and avoiding exacerbating any unresolved conflict causes or other overlapping matters. In so doing, the people and national development actors can understand easily if the measures taken and decisions made are set for their benefit. They will then stand ready for greater participation through partnerships, networks and various genuine forms of inputs.

7.5.2 Sequencing

There are four phases for reconfiguring a country's governance system. In most cases, they are: (i) the emergency phase, (ii) the rehabilitation phase, (iii) the reconfiguration phase and (iv) the development phase. These phases strongly depending on the specific idiosyncrasies of each country, the nature of the conflict that has affected the public administration, the extent to which this has been destroyed and what aspects of it have been destroyed can be executed either in a chronological/sequential manner or in a comprehensive and simultaneous way.

The key question is: how to implement activities in order to generate an impact on reconstruction, peace and development? Against this backdrop, it is important to underline that in order for governments to identify an appropriate mix of policies, they need to know where and when to start, and what follows what? This implies that, for the political and managerial leadership, great capacities are required with regard to empathy and timeliness for action.

Having said that, the common breakdown of the sequencing process can be structured as follows: Situation analysis, National dialogue and agreement on national priorities, Building trust among people and restoring government legitimacy including the authority of state for the public good and interest for all and Progressive stages towards development and well-being.

7.5.3 Forging Effective Partnerships

The political and managerial leadership must recognize no program will be implemented in isolation due to the amount of challenges to overcome. Some effective partnerships will be strongly tied between national institutions and international community agencies, for example, the public donor agencies and NGOs, or between institutions of public and private sectors including the civil society and the common citizen at national and local level. External assistance helps restoring governance functions when governments emerge out of hostility without legitimacy and capacity to meet the daunting reconstruction challenges. However, in light of the importance of a country's ownership of the post-conflict reconstruction process, it is critical for governments to acquire the capacity of managing external relations and forging alliances with a vast range of stakeholders.

It is important to note that the alliances between the domestic and external actors need to operate within a coordinated, peace-sensitive approach. Each actor cannot work in isolation from the other, but rather in a collaborative effort that utilizes each stakeholder's comparative advantage in order to achieve the endogenous goals of the post conflict society.

7.6 Suggestion for Further Research

This study has interrogated the concept of responsibility to rebuild with a view to construction a framework for post conflict reconstruction. The results of this study indicate that fragile post conflict societies require multiple interventions in their

reconstruction process. These interventions must address the key pillars of the post conflict reconstruction framework, namely: Legitimacy, trust and authority of the state, political will for transparency and accountability, rule of law, social capital and social cohesion, economic reconstruction and service delivery and finally, security and cross border movement. There is however need to do further research on relations of these post conflict reconstruction framework pillars and regime types with a view to establish under which regime types this framework works better.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Interview Questionnaire

Dear Respondent,

My name is Mohamed Seif a PhD candidate at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi. My study topic is The Responsibility to Rebuild: A Framework for Reconstruction of Post Conflict Societies.

I kindly request you to participate in my research study. The information you will provide to me will be treated with extreme confidentiality and it will be strictly utilized only for academic purposes. Your answers can be hand-written or typed. Once you have completed this questionnaire, please e-mail this file to: seifmohamed@yahoo.com

Your participation is highly valued.

PART I: Bio data. Please tick the most suitable response.

1. Sex: Male Female
2. Age: 25-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50
 51-55 60 and above
3. Highest level of education attained:
 Primary education Secondary education College education
 University education Other _____
4. Please indicate your professional affiliation.
5. Government official Military officer Diplomat
6. Media professional UN official Academic
7. Nationality: -----

PART I: Questions on Generic Lessons from Post-Conflict Reconstruction

Q1: a) Drawing on your own experience, please list the factors or conditions that you think are most important for post-conflict reconstruction.

b. What are the most important lessons learned?

.....

C. What are the most important “do’s and don’ts” in post-conflict reconstruction?

.....

D. What are the pre-requisites for a successful post-conflict reconstruction?

.....

Q2: What do you think is a realistic duration of time that the international community should actively engage in rebuilding post-conflict countries so that the international engagement has a real impact on sustaining peace?

.....

b. How many years and why?

.....

Q3: When do you prefer spending more resources in a post-conflict country? (Tick one)

Early phase of reconstruction (1-2 years after the end of conflict)	
Middle phase of reconstruction (3-5 years after the end of conflict)	
Later Phase of the reconstruction (6-10 years after the end of conflict)	
Never	

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Q4: In post-conflict countries how important do you think reducing military expenditure is? (**Tick one**)

Very important	
Somewhat important	
Not very important	
Unimportant	

b. When do you prefer downsizing military in post-conflict countries? (**Tick one**)

Early phase of reconstruction (1-2 years after the end of conflict)	
Middle phase of reconstruction (3-5 years after the end of conflict)	
Later Phase of the reconstruction (6-10 years after the end of conflict)	
Never	

Q5: How important do you think land reform is in the post-conflict countries? (**Tick one**)

Very important	
Somewhat important	

Not very important	
Unimportant	

b. When should land reform be implemented?

Early phase of reconstruction (1-2 years after the end of conflict)	
Middle phase of reconstruction (3-5 years after the end of conflict)	
Later Phase of the reconstruction (6-10 years after the end of conflict)	
Never	

c. What are your reasons behind the answers provided above?

Q6: There seems to be no agreement among policy makers regarding the timing and pace of civil service reform in post-conflict countries. How much important is civil service reform? (**Tick one**)

Very important	
Somewhat important	
Not very important	
Unimportant	

b. When should civil service reform be implemented? (Tick one).

Early phase of reconstruction (1-2 years after the end of conflict)	
Middle phase of reconstruction (3-5 years after the end of conflict)	
Later Phase of the reconstruction (6-10 years after the end of conflict)	
Never	

Q7: What do you think should be the immediate macroeconomic priorities for post-conflict countries? (Tick one)

Controlling hyperinflation	
Controlling budget deficit	
Solving exchange rate crisis	
Mobilization of revenue through tax and administrative reform	
Privatization programs	
Liberalization of trade	
Liberalization of financial market (e.g., liberalization of interest rate)	

Other please list:

.....

Q8. Please comment on the pace and process of civil service reform.

.....

b. Please provide your comments on the implementation of these priorities and any conditions which must be considered to implement these programs in post-conflict countries?

.....

Q9: Should elections be important and top most priorities in the post-conflict countries?

(Tick one)

Very important	
Somewhat important	
Not very important	
Unimportant	

b. When should elections be conducted?

Early phase of reconstruction (1-2 years after the end of conflict)	
Middle phase of reconstruction (3-5 years after the end of conflict)	
Later Phase of the reconstruction (6-10 years after the end of conflict)	

Never	

Q9: Do you think longer-term development including new and big projects such as electricity, roads, and railways; normally have a lower or higher priority in post-conflict

.....

b. How important are these projects? (Tick one)

Very important	
Somewhat important	
Not very important	
Unimportant	

c. When should they start?

Early phase of reconstruction (1-2 years after the end of conflict)	
Middle phase of reconstruction (3-5 years after the end of conflict)	Elections should take place immediately the country has an effective military
Later Phase of the reconstruction (6-10 years after the end of conflict)	
Never	

Q10: Which activity do you think should be initiated first after post –conflict period in which phase?

.....

b. Which phase should it be initiated? (Tick one)

Emergency (1-2 years after the end of conflict);	
Transition (3-5 years after the end of conflict)	
Development (6-10 years of reconstruction)	

c. What are your reasons behind the answers provided above? Please also list the most important pre-electoral conditions if any.

.....

d. What are your reasons behind the answers provided above?

.....

Q11: In your opinion, what should be the most important priorities (policies) that matter most for a successful peace-building? Please list them with your comments.

.....

Q12: In general, how should available resources (in terms of total budget of 100%) distributed among the below policy categories in the first phase of reconstruction (emergency phase: 1-2years after the end of conflict)? Please provide your answer in percentage so that the total of five categories adds up to 100%. If you have any comments, please provide them in the Q15.

Distribution of efforts in the first or the emergency Phase: 1-2 years after the end of conflict?

Policy Categories

Security	
Humanitarian/Social	
Governance/Democratization	
Economic Stabilization & Reforms	
Infrastructure/Development	

Q13: How should available resources (in terms of total budget) be distributed among the below policy categories in the second phase of reconstruction (transition phase: 2-5 years after the end of conflict)? Please note that the total of five categories should add up to 100%.

Policy Categories

Security	
Humanitarian/Social	
Governance/Democratization	
Economic Stabilization & Reforms	
Infrastructure/Development	

Q14: How should available resources (in terms of total budget) be distributed among the below policy categories in the third phase of reconstruction (development phase: 6-10 years after the end of conflict)? Please note that that the total of five categories should add up to 100%.

Policy Categories

Security	
Humanitarian/Social	
Governance/Democratization	
Economic Stabilization & Reforms	
Infrastructure/Development	

Q15: Any comments on the distribution of efforts mentioned in question 12, 13 and 14?

.....

Q16: What do you think is a realistic time horizon to complete each of following activities? Please provide your tentative answer in years in column 3.

Note: Although the duration may depend on the circumstances, please provide the average duration of a program from the prospective of having a real impact on sustaining peace in post-conflict countries.

Column 3

Activities	Years
Disarm, demobilize and reintegrate combatants	
Clear landmines	
Professionalize army and police	
Implement human rights monitoring and advocacy mechanism	
Implement a comprehensive security sector reform (i.e., military, police, judicial and penal system reforms)	
Reduce military expenditures (downsize military)	
Return and resettle refugees and displaced persons	
Ensure food security (supply of food)	
Respond to the rising incidence of disease and acute health concerns	
Provide agricultural assistance	

Implement land reform	
Implement education and health care reforms	
Establish interim governance institutions	
Strengthen local and national institutions (build capacity of line ministries and local administration)	
Secure property rights	
Build political parties, civil society, free press	
Implement corruption control measures	
Electoral support	
Cut hyperinflation	
Implement a comprehensive (full-scale) civil service reform	
Liberate the exchange rate	
Provide budgetary support and control Budget deficit	

Mobilize revenue (tax reform; custom reform; introduction of cash budgeting system)	
Provide regulatory framework for financial sector	
Implement privatization programs	
Implement liberalization programs (liberalize trade and capital flows)	
Restore basic services such as education, health, water, and electricity Restore essential infrastructure (roads, ports; airports)	
Restore productive (existing or known) capacity of the economy	
Build infrastructure (large-scale reconstruction of roads, ports, and airport)	

Q17: Any comments on the duration of programs mentioned in question 16?

.....

Q18: What will be the impact of each program on the following outcome variables?

For each activity, please enter one of the following values:

3 = high impact,

2 = medium impact,

1 = low impact,

0= no impact

Note: High, medium and low scales measure the positive impact. While answering question 18, please think about a scenario where if each activity were implemented for a reasonable amount of time, what would be its impact on each of the following outcome

ACTIVITIES	VALUES
Deploy peacekeepers to restore and maintain security	
Disarm, demobilize and reintegrate combatants	
Clear landmines	
Professionalize army and police	
Implement human rights monitoring and advocacy mechanism	
Implement a comprehensive security sector reform (military, police, judicial and penal system reforms)	
Reduce the military expenditure (downsize military)	
Return and resettle refugees and displaced	

persons	
Ensure food security (supply of food)	
Respond to the rising incidence of disease and acute health concerns	
Provide agricultural assistance	
Implement land reform	
Implement education and health care reforms	
Establish interim governance institutions	
Strengthen local and national institutions (build capacity of line ministries and local administration)	
Secure property rights	
Build political parties, civil society, free press	
Implement corruption control measures	
Conduct elections	

Implement a comprehensive (full-scale) civil service reform	
Cut hyperinflation	
Liberate the exchange rate	
Provide budgetary support and control budget deficit	
Mobilize revenue (tax reform; custom reform; introduction of cash budgeting system)	
Provide regulatory framework for financial sector	
Implement privatization programs	
Liberalize interest rates	
Restore basic services such as education, health, water, and electricity	
Restore essential infrastructure (roads, ports; airports)	
Restore existing or known capacity of the economy	

Build infrastructure (large-scale reconstruction of roads, ports, and airport)	
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Q19: If you were in charge of post-conflict reconstruction, how would you prioritize these programs on a scale of 1 to 5 within each policy category?

5= the top priority

1 = least priority.

Note. Please note that you cannot have more than 2 top priorities in each policy category.

ACTIVITIES	VALUES
Deploy peacekeepers to restore and maintain security	
Disarm, demobilize and reintegrate combatants	
Clear landmines	
Professionalize army and police	
Implement human rights monitoring and advocacy mechanism	
Implement a comprehensive security sector reform (military, police, judicial and penal system reforms)	
Reduce the military expenditure (downsize military)	

Return and resettle refugees and displaced persons	
Ensure food security (supply of food)	
Respond to the rising incidence of disease and acute health concerns	
Provide agricultural assistance	
Implement land reform	
Implement education and health care reforms	
Establish interim governance institutions	
Strengthen local and national institutions (build capacity of line ministries and local administration)	
Secure property rights	
Build political parties, civil society, free press	
Implement corruption control measures	

Conduct elections	
Implement a comprehensive (full-scale) civil service reform	
Cut hyperinflation	
Liberate the exchange rate	
Provide budgetary support and control budget deficit	
Mobilize revenue (tax reform; custom reform; introduction of cash budgeting system)	
Provide regulatory framework for financial sector	
Implement privatization programs	
Liberalize interest rates	
Restore basic services such as education, health, water, and electricity	
Restore essential infrastructure (roads, ports; airports)	
Restore existing or known capacity of the	

economy	
Build infrastructure (large-scale reconstruction of roads, ports, and airport)	

Q20: Do you think that the effort levels you provided in questions 16, 17 and 18 depend on the nature of conflict (e.g. a negotiated settlement of conflict like in the case of Mozambique and Cambodia vs. forced settlement of conflict like in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq)? In other words, do you think the trade-offs between policies (e.g., security vs. infrastructure) depend on how the conflict was ended and how the reconstruction was started?

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 ...1.....
 ...