

**UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

**EXAMINING MECHANISMS FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF BURUNDI AND CENTRAL AFRICA REPUBLIC**

BY

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Declaration

I, JEAN JACQUES MUPENZI, do hereby declare that this Project is my original work and has not been submitted in part or in whole for any degree at any other University.

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This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the appointed University supervisor.

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Dedication

This work is dedicated to all members of the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF) who have exemplified exceptional discipline and selflessness in preserving peace and stability in our motherland, Rwanda. This motivates my self-esteem to be a member of the RDF.

Acknowledgement

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My special thanks go to the Commandant, National Defence College, Lieutenant General J N Waweru, the Senior Directing Staff and the entire National Defence College fraternity for their unsurpassed support and encouragement.


I would like particularly to thank my dear wife Songa Claudine Mupenzi for her utmost understanding and encouragement. She was so determined to care for the family while I was a way.

Many thanks to my children Elvis, Elisha, Erison, Grace, Shaloom and Nissi for their endurance while I was away and would not spend valuable time with them during the course duration and writing of this work.

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MAPS OF STUDY AREAS

Map of Central Africa Republic



Source: infoplease.com (2015)

List of Abbreviations

AACC	All Africa Conferences of Churches
AFISM	African-Led International Support Mission in the Central Africa Republic
APF	African Peace Facility
APRD	Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy
APRD	Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy
ASF	Africa Standby Force
AU	African Union
AU-RTF	African Union Regional Task Force
BINUCA	National Peace-Building Office in the Central Africa Republic
BINUCA	United National Peace-Building Office in the Central Africa Republic
CAR	Central Africa Republic
CEMAC	Economic and Monetary Community of Central African Republic
CEN-SAD	Community of the Sahel-Saharan States
CNDD	National Council for the Defence of Democracy
CNDD-FDD	Forces for Defence of the Democracy
CNDRR	National Commission for Demobilization, Reintegration
CPJR	Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace
CSADN	Comité de Suivi des Actes du Dialogue National
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
DDR	Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
EU	European Union
FAB	Burundi Armed Forces
FACA	Armed Forces of Central Africa
FDLR	Rwandan Rebel Group
FDN	National Armed Forces
FDPC	Central African Democratic Front
FDPC	Democratic Front of the Central Africa People
FDPC	Central African Democratic Front

FNL	Forces Nationales de Liberation
FOMUC	Multinational Force of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
FRODEBU	Democratic Front of Burundi
GLR	Great Lakes Region
GOS	Government of Sudan
GP	Presidential Guard
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDP	Internal Displaced Persons
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
LRA	Lord’s Resistance Army
MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme
MICOPAX	Mission for the consolidation of peace in Central African Republic
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR
MIPROBU	Observation mission for the restoration of confidence in Burundi
MISAB	Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreement
MLC	Movement for the Liberation of Congo
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OAU	Organization of African Unity
ONUB	Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi
PALIPEHUTU	Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People
PALIPEHUTU-FNL	National Forces for Liberation of the Hutu
PBC	UN Peace-building Commission
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSO	Peace Support Operations
RCSSP	Reintegration and Community Support Special Program
REC	Regional Economic Communities

RPF	Rwanda Patriotic Front
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SLA/M	Sudan Liberation Movement
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UFDR	Union of Democratic Forces for Unity
UFDR	Union of Democratic Forces for Unity
UFR	Union for Republic Forces
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNITA	National Union for Total Independence of Angola
UPRONA	Union for National Progress
WWC	World Council of Churches

Abstract

Africa has remained the center of protracted violent conflicts and underdevelopment. Most of these conflicts have been intra-state in nature. Such devastating conflicts have claimed millions of lives and property destroyed. Countries like; Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, Central Africa Republic (CAR), South Sudan and Burundi, are the most affected. In 2002, the African Union (AU) was established (replacing the Organisation of African Unity, OAU) with an impetus to deal with the persistent conflicts in the continent. Several initiatives, frameworks and mechanisms have been employed in the management of the conflicts, though with limited successes. This study examined the factors responsible for the persistent political instability in Africa and in Burundi and CAR in particular. These include: problem of identity, lack of participation, discontent, and poverty to mention but a few. However, the main focus of the study was to examine factors militating against conflict management mechanisms in both Burundi and CAR. Ineffective negotiation skills, inability to identify root-causes of the conflicts and lack of necessary logistics and financial constraint among others, have hindered the regional efforts in establishing sustainable peace and stability in Burundi and CAR. However, sustainable peace and political stability could be achieved in the continent through respect for human right and rule of law. Further enhance administrative capacity and strengthening the regional mechanism for conflict management and democratic governance among many others.

Table of Contents

Declaration	i
Dedication	ii
Acknowledgement	iii
List of Abbreviations	vi
Abstract	ix
Table of Contents	x
CHAPTER ONE	1
Introduction to the Study	1
1.0 Introduction.....	1
1.1 Statement of the Research Problem	3
1.2 Objectives of the Study:.....	3
1.3 Literature Review.....	4
1.3.1 Conflict in Africa	4
1.3.2 Conflict and Conflict Management in Burundi	6
1.3.3 Conflict and Conflict management In Central Africa Republic	11
1.4 Justification	13
1.4.1 Academia	13
1.4.2 Policy Level	13
1.5 Theoretical Framework.....	13
1.6 Hypothesis.....	14
1.7 Methodology	14
1.8 Chapter Outline.....	15
CHAPTER TWO	16
Conflict and Conflict Management in the Central Africa Republic	16
2.0 Introduction.....	16
2.1 Causes of Conflict in Central Africa Republic	18
2.1.1 Trigger Causes: the 2002-2003 Coup	19
2.1.2 Rebel Groups	19
2.2 Conflict Dynamics	20
2.2.1 The Historic Realities	20

2.2.2	Weak State	21
2.2.3	The Construct of the Rebel Groups	21
2.2.4	Tormented Triangle	22
2.3	Actors	23
2.3.1	Chad	23
2.3.2	France.....	24
2.3.3	South Africa	24
2.3.4	Regional Actors	24
2.3.5	Others Actors	25
2.4	Conflict Management in Central Africa Republic	25
2.4.1	National Dialogue Process, 2003	25
2.4.2	Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement- 2008	27
2.4.3	The Inclusive Political Dialogue, 2008.....	28
2.4.4	Libreville Peace Agreement, and Coup 2013	30
2.5	Security Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration	32
2.5.1	Background.....	32
2.5.2	Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme	32
	CHAPTER THREE	36
	Conflict and Conflict Management in Burundi	36
3.0	Introduction.....	36
3.1	Causes of the Conflict in Burundi.....	37
3.1.1	Structural Factors	38
3.1.2	Triggering Factors.....	39
3.2	Conflict Management in Burundi	40
3.2.1	The UN Efforts from 1993 to 95.....	40
3.2.2	Mwalimu Nyerere as a Mediator(1996–99).....	41
3.2.3	Sant’ Egidio	43
3.2.4	Other Actors.....	45
3.2.5	Regional Leaders Impose Economic Sanctions	46
3.2.6	Mediation Led by Nelson Mandela.....	47
3.2.7	Mediation Led by Jacob Zuma	49

3.3	Regional Peacekeepers.....	50
3.4	Analyzing Mediation Efforts	51
3.5	Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)	53
3.6	Current Issues.....	54
CHAPTER FOUR.....		57
A Comparative Analysis of Conflict Management Efforts in the Burundi and Central Africa Republic		57
4.0	Introduction.....	57
4.1	Approaches to the Conflict Management	57
4.1.1	Pre-Negotiation Stage	58
4.1.2	Understanding Root Causes	61
4.1.3	Ownership of the Peace Process	62
4.1.4	Identifying all the Actors	63
4.1.5	Identifying Facilitators.....	65
4.1.6	Setting a Realistic Timetable	67
4.1.7	Evaluating Success and Failure	68
4.1.8	Strategic Constituencies.....	70
4.1.9	The role of Regional Peacekeepers.....	71
4.1.10	Sustaining the Effort	73
CHAPTER FIVE		75
Critical Analysis.....		75
5.0	Introduction.....	75
5.1	Factors Responsible for the Persistent Conflicts in Africa	75
5.2.	Figure: 1 Showing the Respondents Opinion on the Factors Responsible for Protracted Civil Conflicts in Africa.....	76
5.2.1	Analysis.....	76
5.2.2	Issue of Participation.....	76
5.2.3	Problem of Identity	77
5.2.4	Discontent	78
5.2.5	Political Transition.....	79
5.2.6	Poor Economy.....	79

5.2.7	Poverty	80
5.2.8	Proliferation of Small Arms.....	80
5.2.9	Other Factors.....	81
5.3	Problems Militating against the Mechanisms for Conflict Management in CAR and Burundi	82
5.3.1	Figure: 2 showing the Respondents Opinion on the Problems Militating against the Mechanisms for Conflict Management in CAR and Burundi	83
5.3.2	Analysis.....	83
5.3.3	Negotiation Techniques	83
5.3.4	Understanding Root-Causes to the Conflict	84
5.3.5	Weak Regional Institutions.....	85
5.3.6	Ownership of the Peace Process	86
5.3.7	Lack of Resources.....	86
5.3.8	Disarmament and Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR).....	87
5.4	Strategies for Attainment of Sustainable Peace and Stability in Africa	88
5.4.1	Figure: 3 Showing the Respondents Opinion on the Strategies for Attainment of Sustainable Peace and Stability in Africa	89
5.4.2	Analysis.....	89
5.4.3	Findings.....	89
5.4.4	Respect for Human Rights and the Rule of Law	90
5.4.5	Enhancing Administrative Capacity and Promoting the Culture of Transparency and Accountability.....	90
5.4.6	Strengthening Conflict Management Mechanism and Democratic Governance.....	91
5.4.7	Emphasizing Social Development	91
5.4.8	Support for Regional Cooperation and Integration.....	92
5.5	Objectives, Hypotheses and Theoretical Framework of the Study.....	93
	CHAPTER SIX	95
	Conclusions and Recommendations.....	95
6.0	Summary	95
6.1	Conclusions.....	98
6.2	Recommendations.....	100
	Bibliography	102

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction to the Study

1.0 Introduction

Peace, security and political stability are the bedrocks of growth and development.¹ Global, regional and sub-regional organisations and governments at all levels therefore design laws, legislation and constitution that would ensure the sustainability of these elements. However, throughout human history there has rarely been a period of total peace. Man has been engaged in one form conflict or the other.

According to Lewis Coser, conflict 'is a struggle over values, and claims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals'.² Conflict therefore is characterized by antagonistic encounter or collision of interests. The pursuit of these interests could however be without the use of arms. Conflict therefore does not connote war but is a social phenomenon in which there exists a point of sharp difference in positions or ideas between individuals, states and organisations or even within a state or an individual.

Conflict however, can be classified according to level of escalation (violent and non-violent), and on the basis of territorial spread (local, regional and global). Conflict could therefore be in forms of family feuds, ethnic crisis, interstate crisis and civil war to general war. Violent conflicts irrespective of the parties involved and their territorial spread constitute threat to sustainable peace and political stability. It destroys the state structure, levels entire development process and unleashes destruction on lives and property.³

Africa has been in the centre of violent and devastating conflicts which have been intra-state in nature. In nearly every country in Africa, long repressed ethnic animosities, religious intolerance and resource control has continued to erupt conflicts. The consequences are lack of sustainable peace and political stability. Others include colossal loss of lives and property and underdevelopment with its attendant effects of hunger, diseases, refugee problem and backwardness in technological development. By 1996, almost half of deaths caused by armed conflicts the world over occurred in Africa and about 8 million out of the 22 million refugees in

¹Venessa, K. and Mark, M., The African Standby Force: Progress and prospect (Quarterly Report 2003) <http://www.co.za/pubs/asr> (accessed on 01 may 2015).

² Lewis Coser, Cited in Otite O, and Albert, 10, (eds) Community Conflicts in Nigeria, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd, 1999), p.1

³Imobighe, T., Civil Society and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria, (Ibadan, Spectrum Books Ltd 2002), p.81.

world were Africans. In 2004 for instance out of the 17 violent conflict that attracted the attention of the United Nations (UN), 7 were in Africa.⁴

Responding to the persistent conflicts in Africa and the world at large, the UN encouraged the creation and identification of peace-keeping forces through regional partnership arrangements. The purpose is to facilitate quick response to crisis before it escalates into violent and to minimize the effects of violent conflicts when they occur.⁵

In line within the UN directive, African leaders under the umbrella of the African Union (AU) began a pragmatic approach towards achieving sustainable peace in the region in 2002.⁶ At a meeting in the African Union (AU) Headquarters Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the AU Assembly of Heads of State or Government adopted the draft frame work for a common African Defence and Security Policy. Also adopted at the meeting was protocol relating to the establishment of the peace and Security Council (PSC). The PSC by July 2002 established a military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Peace Support Operations (PSO) on all questions relating to military and security requirements. The protocol provides for the establishment of the PSC to deploy peacekeeping missions and intervene in crisis pursuant to the AU Constitutive Act. The Africa Standby Force (ASF) would be the mechanism for implementing the decisions of the PSC.

Despite the efforts of the sub-regional, regional and other international organisations to ensure sustainable peace in Africa, violent conflict has continued to persist in the continent. Conflicts in the Darfur Region of Sudan, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi and Central Africa Republic (CAR) are pointer to that fact. The need to examine mechanisms for managing conflicts in Africa, therefore become necessary and motivated this study. However, emphasis will be on a comparative study of the conflicts in Burundi and CAR. The 2 conflicts have convergences and divergences, and apparently no study has ever been comparably conducted.

⁴Okwudia, N., *Ethnic Conflicts in Africa*, (Dakar CODESRIA 1998).

⁵ The United National Charter, Chapter vii (5).

⁶Neethling, T., *Shaping the African Standby Force: Development, Challenges and Prospects*.<http://usa.cac.army.mil/cac/mil/review> (accessed on 01 may 2015).

1.1 Statement of the Research Problem

For the last two decades, political institutions and systems in both Central Africa Republic and Burundi have collapsed due to recurring coups, ethno-politics and civil wars among others. Protracted civil conflicts have led to loss of innocent lives including women and children. Traditional peace-making and peace-building mechanisms by regional and international actors have to some extent yielded relatively good results. In Burundi there is a remarkable progression in peace-building despite the current fears on the likelihood of re-emergence of conflict due to the fact that the present Hutu government is threatening to change the constitution and extend the third term for the incumbent president. In 2014 the UN representative in Burundi reported that there was an on-going arming and training of militia groups by both sides, hence warned of imminent re-escalation of conflict between the two ethnic groups.⁷

In Central Africa Republic recent crisis came after several peace agreements were signed between belligerent parties, notably 2008 Comprehensive Peace Agreement brokered by Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). Two consecutive election processes in 2006 and 2012 had given a perception that conflict management mechanisms employed were successful. The survival of the current government under President Catherine Samba-Panza is dependent on the presence of the regional and international forces in CAR. This study therefore will investigate reasons why CAR and Burundi civil conflicts continue to endure despite regional and international conflict management efforts employed to mitigate or prevent conflict recurrences.

1.2 Objectives of the Study:

- 1) To identify the causes of civil conflict and political instability in Africa.
- 2) To examine factors militating against the conflict management mechanism for achieving sustainable peace and political stability in CAR and Burundi.
- 3) To examine strategies African leaders would adopt to enhance peace and stability in the continent.

⁷ Burundi political infighting could derail country's peacebuilding efforts – UN official The Security Council meets on the situation in Burundi. <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47789#.VDDp92eSzpg> (accessed on 22 August 2014).

1.3 Literature Review

This study's literature review will be divided into four sections. The first section will review literature on conflict in Africa, the second on conflict and its management in Central Africa Republic (CAR); the third on conflict in Burundi and its management; and fourth section on theoretical framework.

1.3.1 Conflict in Africa

Dennis and Sandole opine that, conflict arises in contexts, and occurs at the intrapersonal, interpersonal, inter-group, organizational, and international levels. They further stress that, conflict exists when incompatible goals develop between persons, groups, or nations.⁸ Coser on the hand defines conflict as a “struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rival.”⁹ Conflict therefore has a useful social function as an indicator of scarcity in the society. With scarcity, such sharing changes to competition that takes different forms. Conflict is one of the features of competition and claim of ownership and right of possession to scares resources. Mwangiru concurs with both Denis and Coser with definition of conflict, however, he goes further to explain that , when one is analyzing conflict, it should be born in mind that there are no mono causes of any single conflict, because conflict is endemic, organic, dynamic and therefore complex.¹⁰ This precludes the complexity and multifaceted nature of conflict and its inherent causes.

Also Burton and Drake assert that, there are four types of conflict namely; physical conflict (where two or more entities try to occupy the same space at the same time), political conflict (by which a group tries to impose its policies on others), ideological conflict (systems of thought or of value struggle with each other), and legal conflicts (which controversies over claims or demands are adjusted by mutually recognized procedures).¹¹ Such structural causes of conflicts are as a result of breach of social contract in any governance setup. According to Azar and Burton, structural factors include political, economic and social patterns such as state repression, lack of political participation, poor governance performance, the distribution of

⁸Dennis J. Sandole, et al, Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution. (New York: Routledge, 2009). p.3.

⁹Coser L. Function of Social Conflict. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe Library of Congress Card No. 56-68 74. 1956), p. 8.

¹⁰Mwangiru, M. Conflict in Africa. Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management.(Nairobi; Centre for Conflict Research, 2006),p.6.

¹¹ Burton, J. and Dukes, F. Conflict: Readings in Management & Resolution. (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1990), p.22.

wealth, the ethnic make-up of a society, and the history of inter-group relations.¹² In most cases, this result into social inequalities and power asymmetries among others. Political, ideological and legal frameworks are designed and adopted in exclusive manner. This acts as a leeway to sideline other group(s) in order for the ‘in house group’ to attain their personal greed. Consequently, the power asymmetry will emerge. According to Coleman and Deutsch; when there is power asymmetry in a relationship, conflict may escalate as the disempowered party seeks to redress grievances against the more powerful party¹³. Thus, most conflicts escalate or de-escalation due to various factors.

As stressed by Mwagiru, people are not inherently violent but are forced to by circumstances they find themselves in; conflict may be avoided by better information, less misperception, and more rational behavior.¹⁴ Here, those in power would try to avoid disruptions in society by trying to meet the demands of the people through negotiation/accommodation. However, other schools of thought contradict this by forwarding the psychological and biological causes of conflict. For example, Scott asserts that, a human being is inherently a source of aggressive behavior which allows for the interaction between the organism ‘nature’ and its environs ‘nurture’.¹⁵ Francies challenges this perspective of the aggressive theory; by questioning the threshold of frustrations which would force people to be aggressive or violent.¹⁶ Thus, if causes of conflicts are inherently in human being, then managing conflict would only take reactive path, because with or without, violent conflict would automatically erupt.

Several scholars have endeavored to trace causes of the endemic and chronic conflict in Africa. The imperialist theorists (like McPhee and Gann) always explain ethnic, cultural and historical issues on the basis of historical and contemporary inadequacies in the African system. They emphasis on factors like lack of democracy, replay of ancestral ethnic hostilities, and the inability of Africans to cope with the fast changing world order.¹⁷ However, the leftist theorists (like Curlis and Luckham) take a contrary view. They base their position overwhelmingly on external factors. They argue that slavery, imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism among others are the major causes of conflicts in Africa. According to Luckham, most African nations

¹² Azar, E and J. Burton. *International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1986).

¹³ Burton, J and F. Dukes, *op cit*.

¹⁴ Mwagiru, M. *op cit*. p.18.

¹⁵ Scott, W. *Organizations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems*. (NJ: Prentice Hall Inc, 1981).

¹⁶ David J. *Peace Conflict in Africa*. (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2008), p.7.

¹⁷ Agyemang, P. *African Ethnicity: History, Conflict Management, Resolution and Prevention*. (Boston: University Press of America, 1998), p.55.

are recently independent and the heritage of colonialism lingers. Directly addressing the civil conflicts in Africa, he said ‘the exploiters unceremoniously drew boundaries uncaringly across tribal lines.’¹⁸ The liberal scholars like Oluwatony put equal weight on external and internal forces to explain civil conflicts in Africa. He blames the contemporary Africa chronic conflicts on political, economic and social systems developed by colonialists.¹⁹ He concurs with Oucho, who asserts that there are three exogenous variables which influence civil conflicts in Africa; first, there are factors that have origins in the colonial background. These include the country’s administrative structure left to the independent government; and a host of other colonial legacies. Second, in the independence era, governance has exploited legacies of the administrative structure that is coterminous with the ethnic structures of the country and perpetuated conflicts. The third factor is the world economy/political order which has brought the influence on international agencies to bear on the country’s political and economic development.²⁰ Within the African region, political instability in contiguous countries in different sub-regions has not only influenced the national governments, rather it has affected other countries due to the spillover effects. For instance; conflicts in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa where the epicenters have been shifting with time, currently in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Somalia respectively, have spillover effects to the entire region. The Al-Shabaab terrorist group in Somalia and Rwandan Armed Group (FDLR) in DRC has affected the internal and external security milieu of the entire region.

The common denominator here is that causes of conflicts in Africa are multiple and endemic. Being endemic, Mwagiru stipulates that such conflict is an inalienable part of life.²¹ It is therefore important to learn how to manage it properly.

1.3.2 Conflict and Conflict Management in Burundi

Zartman, defines conflict as underlying issues in dispute between parties.²² As the case in Burundi, underlying issues may be structural issues emanating from chronic exclusive politics which have been practiced by the political elites since independence in 1960s. Such exclusion

¹⁸Luckham, R. (eds), *Can Democracy Be Designed? The Politics of Institutional Choice in Conflict-torn Societies.* (Zed Books, London, 2003), p. 27-50.

¹⁹Oluwatonyin, O. Oluwaniyi, *Conflict in Africa: Exploring the Trends and Causes of Wars in Post-Independence Africa.* (Ogun State: Covenant University, 2008).p.60.

²⁰Oucho, J. *undercurrents of ethnic conflict in Kenya.*(Boston, African social studies, 2002).p.34.

²¹Mwagiru, op cit p.6.

²²Zartman, W. *Ripe for Resolution Conflict and Intervention in Africa,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989),p.8.

politics has been by and large based on social identity, where Tutsi ethnic group marginalized the majority Hutus. Tejfer defined social identity as that aspect of one's sense of self-concept that comes from membership in groups. Individuals need/desire a positive sense of self and thus want their group to compare favorably with other groups.²³ Social Identity Theory explores specific behaviors in conflict, including intragroup solidarity, intergroup hostility, ethnocentrism, out-group bias, why and when intergroup relations lead to conflict and when they do not, how and when weak or latent identities become the motivator of ethnic cleansing, and when and how social identities affect group members' willingness to engage in collective action.²⁴ From 1945 to 1999 the world witnessed over 129 civil conflicts based on social identity.²⁵

Identity here represents ethnic categorization of social entities. As Sandole explains the instrumentalist approach, he postulates social identities as strong feelings of membership in a specific group (ethnic, national, religion, regional), and have existed for centuries; yet have from time to time resulted into conflicts. Social identities never cause or initiate conflict and should be understood neither as sources nor as consequences of conflict. But once social identity becomes involved in interest-based conflict, it then changes the nature of political or economic conflict in particular ways, making conflict protracted and deep-rooted.²⁶

The colonial anthropology not only falsified the history of Burundi, it also forged the image of a pyramidal Burundi society. At the heart of these assertions, there were also the physical characteristics and the reasons for moral, cultural and social differences. This pseudo-scientific perspective based on morphology as a scientific distinction between Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi, has created a big gap in their relationships. Such prejudices had political motives which were aimed at dividing the Burundians so as to control them with great ease. Unfortunately these racial 'clichés' could not only be accepted by Burundi elites, but would contribute to freeze the country's history. Needless to say, the Hutus and the Tutsis were neither two different races, nor two different tribes; the Hutus and the Tutsi speak the same language, share the same culture and have always lived together.

During colonial period, Belgians favoured the Tutsis and considered them as brilliant collaborators to the prejudice of Hutus. In 1929, the Hutus and the Tutsis formed 43 percent of

²³Dennis, J. op cit. p.24.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Holmes, W. Lecture: Building Peace. Global Governance. Volume: 13. Issue: 1 January-March 2007. Gale Group.

²⁶Sandole & Dennis J. et al, Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution. (New York: Routledge, 2009), p.21.

all chiefs, the other 57 percent were Ganwa(Tutsi ruling clan). By 1945, there was no Hutu chief and only a few Tutsi(minus Ganwa Clan) chiefs were left. This administration would destroy the whole political, social and traditional stratum. Following administrative reform, the colonial regime organized an educational system open only to Tutsi children and those of chiefs. After, leaning on a few Tutsi to control the country, the Belgians changed alliances and leaned on Hutu elites in the 1950s.²⁷ The reasons for this change can be explained by the Tutsi elite's aspiration to national independence.

Similarly, critical theory views ethnicity as mainly an instrument used by dishonest leaders for their own ends. According to this theory, the colonialists caused the problem in Africa in particular in Burundi, by applying 'divided-and-rule' style of leadership.²⁸ Greedy politicians in Burundi and CAR perpetuated this division after independence. However, this theory seems to err in the opposite direction of excessive optimism, as it seems to imply that if only the people realize the machinations of their leaders and elect better ones, ethnic divisions will vanish and all will live in harmony ever after. The theory further amplifies the role of colonial legacy to ethno-political conflicts in Africa. Conversely, the class theory identifies inequities among economic groups as the bases for conflicts.²⁹ The marginalization of the Hutu ethnic group of Burundi can explain this better. However, this theory is limited for explanations since the marginalization would be zeroed only on economic sense.

The protracted nature of the conflict in Burundi is stemmed on the following variable; the colonialist actions, state actions, and conflict dynamics. Colonialist action refers to the formation and mobilization of identity groups. State actions include government actions ranging from domination and subjection strategies to accommodation and adjustment. Conflict dynamics include escalatory conflict spirals triggered by tit-for-tat responses, attribution error, intergroup development of enemy images, dehumanization and polarization.³⁰

Considering colonial legacy as one of the causes of conflict in Burundi, one would presuppose that, after almost a half century, ramification of the colonial actions would not still be very significant. However, the relevance is at the state actions after independence, where the authoritarian Tutsi regime which was characterized by successive coups resulting to series of

²⁷Gakunzi, D. *Building Peace in Burundi. Mission: Possible.* (Paris, L'Harmattan Inc, 1998), p. 48.

²⁸Horkheimer, M. *Traditional and Critical Theory*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976).

²⁹Parkin, F. *Marx's Theory of History. A Bourgeois Critique.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979).

³⁰Gakunzi, D. Op cit. p.23.

Hutu repressions especially in 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, that claimed hundreds of thousands lives of the innocent Hutus and several others forced to flee the country to the neighbouring countries. Escalatory conflict spirals for instance; the assassination of the first democratically elected Hutu president Ndadaye in 1993, triggered violence in Burundi. Several rebel groups were formed including; the National Council for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD) of the Current President Nkurunziza, and Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU) under GatoRwasa; rebel group which is still fighting against Burundi government from DRC. This alone can better refute the claim that, conflict in Burundi is ethnic based, since this is a Hutu movement against Hutu government.

The violence in Burundi was overshadowed by the civil war in the neighboring Rwanda which has the same ethnic composition and context. It was only after the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda in 1994 that the international community started to take the violence in Burundi seriously and actively sought to avoid ‘another Rwanda’. Between 1993 and 1996, no other country in Africa received a comparable amount of attention from many conflict management and mediation experts. The actors ranged from the United Nations, the then Organization of African Unity (OAU) and later the African Union (AU), non-government organization and academics.

According to Mwangiri, there should be a clear aim on what conflict management should achieve. The issue is whether the final aim and end of conflict management should be to resolve conflict, or merely to settle it. It is evident that many of the conflict management entities regionally and internationally aim not at a resolution but at settlement³¹. Conflicts can be prevented and, where they occur, they can either be kept under control or resolved amicably. This is typically what United Nations applied, by appointing AhmedouOuld-Abdallah as the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s Special Representative for Burundi.³²

In 1996, the UN Department of Political Affairs conducted an inquiry into the mass violence in Burundi and reported to the Security Council that acts of genocide had been perpetrated by certain Burundian parties. This initiative by UN, rather scared warring parties since both the government and rebel movements were culprits.³³ According to Evan and

³¹Mwangiri M. op cit. p. 37.

³²Security Council resolution S/RES/1049 (1996), 5 March 1996, para 13.

³³ Ambassador AdoniaAyebare. Peacemaking In Burundi – A Case Study Of Regional Diplomacy Backed by International Peacekeeping And Peace-Building Director of the Africa Program, International Peace Institute.

Newham, conflict management would, in particular, seek to avoid or terminate violence between parties'³⁴. UN rather employed only investigative roles (though equally important) with less efforts in stopping hostilities.

As a result of conflict escalation, former President Buyoya staged a coup in 1996, thereby suspending the constitution and effectively ending democracy. The coup led to an international boycott that further crippled Burundi's economy. Regional leaders imposed economic sanctions and arms embargo against the regimes spearheaded by former president of Tanzania Mwalimu Nyerere. Surprisingly, this move was not well conceived by some great nations like US and Belgium. International community wanted a relaxed conflict management efforts whereas regional leaders believed that, without applying tight conflict management efforts, conflict in Burundi would later on result into genocide. According to Zartman, conflict management involves such measures as denying both sides the means of combat, constituting conferences to talk for fighting and so on.³⁵ Regional mediation efforts informally leveraged power to make the parties decide for negotiations. Western Actors applied similar approach as Thibaut and Walker, who believe that; mediators employ a variety of strategies and tactics to initiate and facilitate interaction between disputants, but leave the final resolution or terms of settlement in the hands of the disputants.³⁶ Thus mediation primarily relies on facilitating negotiations among disputants. Contrary, regional leaders never gave parties to the conflict a leeway to decide on themselves. For instance, the president of Uganda Museveni threatened Burundi government then that, if they are not willing to negotiate, regional forces would be employed to topple the government. Equally, rebel groups felt that if regional forces intervened, their political terms and conditions would be subverted. It is assumed that, coercion is vital where parties to the conflict are stubborn. What effects could this have on the conflict management process?

Ironically, the 2000 Arusha Peace Agreement created expectations that conflict in Burundi would come to an end. The biggest dilemma was having the Peace Accord without ceasefire. After the death of the former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, in 2001 Nelson Mandela managed to negotiate a transitional government, in which Hutu and Tutsi leaders would share power. Minister posts in this period were divided equally among the two ethnicities. Since

³⁴Evan and Newham. Op cit. p.5.

³⁵Zartman p. op cit. p.9.

³⁶Thibaut, J. Walker, L. Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis. (N.J: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1975), p.150.

there was no peace to keep, AU deployed a peace keeping force which later was relieved by the UN peace Keeping Force in 2004. Elections followed in 2005 were the incumbent president Nkurunziza won elections. However, the current political wrangle where the Hutu ruling party is bargaining to change the constitution for the third term is a crucial concern.

1.3.3 Conflict and Conflict management In Central Africa Republic

Mwagiru believes that, in order to understand and manage conflict properly and effectively, it must first be identified. According to him, identifying conflict means being able to understand the type of conflict and the role it can play in society, or in relationships.³⁷ Underlying causes of civil conflict in CAR could be; structural, political, economic, social or cultural factors. According to Lind, where state structures are unable to provide for the satisfaction of basic needs (physical security, access to political, economic and social institutions, acceptance of communal identity), individuals tend to revert to alternative means in the fulfillment of their needs³⁸. Therefore, it is important to recognise the legacy of coups and past conflict in CAR as a key root cause of conflict in the country today. Since gaining independence from France in 1960, CAR has only had one peaceful transfer of power, in 1993. Arms have remained the key to political success. Linked to this history of coups is the weakness of state capacity and authority in many core state functions. The CAR state frequently fails to ensure the security of the state from rebellions and coups. It also fails to protect the security and welfare of civilians from violence and poverty.

Furthermore, according to Tilly, in his theory namely ‘collective action theory’, conflict springs from the continuous power struggle between those who have decision-making power, and those who have not, that is at the base of political action. Tilly considers that, ‘the passage from individual interests to collective decisions’ involve a confluence of shared interests that must be organized and mobilized, hence, collective political action, including collective violence, will occur if there is a sufficient opportunities for it; yet not solely economic opportunity.³⁹ Linked to this is the weakness of state capacity and authority in many core state functions. The CAR state is weakly institutionalized with poor security and high vulnerability to rebellions. The more recent emergence of ‘rebel groups’ in 2005, clearly underpins Tilly’s

³⁷Mwagiru.Op cit. p.7.

³⁸Lind, J. & Kathryn, Scarcity and Surfeit.The Ecology of Africa’s Conflicts.(Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies, 2002), p.24.

³⁹Tilly, c. From mobilization to Revolution, Reading Mass, (Addison, Wesley, 1978),p.3.

argument. After sidelining number of political elites from the National Dialogue of 2005 by former president Buzizi, several rebel movements were created, such as: the Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy (APRD), the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR), and the Central African Democratic Front (FDPC). Such could be understood as both a proximate cause and a consequence of recent insecurity. Also failure by the government then to implement the Libreville Peace Agreement of 2008 resulted into 2013 coup by Seleka rebel movement.

Additionally, civil conflicts in CAR have been compounded by the destabilising effects of regional politics in particular the complex relations with Chad and regional 'men in arms'. Given its history and geography (a landlocked country surrounded by several conflict-affected countries), CAR is particularly vulnerable to fluctuating regional developments. This resulted into what Mwangiru considers as a conflict system,⁴⁰ where the epicenter has been shifting back and forth from Chad, CAR and DRC. Managing such complex civil conflicts require extraordinary mean and ways to settle disputes.

Mwangiru contends that the internationalization of conflict has effects on conflict management, since it significantly changes the structure of conflict management and poses challenges for the conflict managers. The introduction of new actors, such as external actors to the internal conflict further internationalizes internal conflict. Since, most of these actors are a part to the conflict in one way or another, the mechanism at time losses credibility. The intervention of Chad in CAR has created a lot of contention and opposition by some ethnic groups in the south.

In addition to that, the Libreville Peace Agreement and the second National Dialogue of 2008, between the Buzizi regime and rebel movements under the auspices of Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) spearheaded by the former president Bongo of Gabon never saw the light of the day due to several reasons. First some member countries of ECCAS and European Union (EU) including Chad and France respectively were either directly or indirectly involved the civil conflict in CAR. Second, since the most of the rebel movements were newly formed, the Buzizi government disregarded them since both France and Chad had their troops in Bangui to protect his him and his government, thus, the stalemate was not hurting

⁴⁰Mwangiru, op cit. p.73.

the parties enough to force serious negotiations as stipulated by Zartman.⁴¹ The escalation of conflict in 2013 could be attributed to the failure of the conflict managers to identify what the Zartman considers as the ‘ripe moment’ among others.

1.4 Justification

The justification of this study is elucidated by few critical factors:

1.4.1 Academia

There has been no comparative study done on the conflict and conflict management in Burundi and CAR. Some comparative studies have been conducted between Burundi and Mozambique, Burundi and Ivory Coast, Burundi and Somalia, Burundi and South Africa, and Burundi and Rwanda. Therefore conducting a comparative study of Burundi and Central Africa Republic (CAR) would contribute to the body of knowledge. The higher learning institutions would benefit on it especially those in the field of social sciences and conflict management.

1.4.2 Policy Level

This study would be of an important value to the peace keeping missions on the continent particularly to them who are serving in the UN Mission in CAR. As a member of the Rwanda Defence Forces (Rwanda), which is the fifth largest troop contributing country globally and the second biggest in Africa; this study would serve as an additional term of reference to the military Rwanda’s strategic decision makers. Moreover, this study will benefit the national, sub-regional and regional conflict management mechanisms and frameworks in Africa. These include: troop contributing countries (TCC), and African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), particularly the panel of wise, early warning mechanisms and so on.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

For the purpose of this study, the human needs theory of Burton will be employed. Several reasons may be advanced to justify the utility of such a theory in the conflict and conflict management mechanisms in Burundi and CAR. First, unless people’s needs are gratified there is human suffering and perhaps death. This is the case because of the psychological nature of the organism, hence human needs are analogues of primary emotions and since the primary human emotions are innate, so are human needs. However, the constructivist view of emotions takes the position that all human emotions are constructed within the framework of social life, usually

⁴¹Zartam, op cit. p.112.

during socialization.⁴² Contrary to constructivist view, Kemper indicates his view on emotions more correct. He posits only four primary emotions; fear, anger, depression and satisfaction (happiness and joy). In terms of human needs a need for security becomes the correspondent of the fear emotion; a need for meaning the correspondent of anger emotion; a need for self-esteem the correspondent of depression; and the what Burton called a need for relaxation, which can come only if the other needs are sufficiently gratified, the analogue of satisfaction emotion.⁴³ The position here is that the human needs posited provide reason a basis for judgment in terms of the legitimacy of an order.

Therefore, civil conflicts erupt due to the denial not only biological needs but also psychological ones which are related to growth and development. These include peoples' need for identity, security, recognition, participation, and autonomy. This theory elucidates the main reasons of civil conflicts in Africa, where such needs are not easily met by authoritarian regimes.⁴⁴ This study focuses on John Burton's theory to explain civil conflict in Africa, in particular Burundi and CAR, because it offers definite reasons for the civil conflicts particularly in the Sub-Sahara Africa.

1.6 Hypothesis

The following are this study's hypotheses:

- a. Conflict is likely to occur or endure in societies where human needs are not easily availed by the institutions and organs of the governments.
- b. Solid foundation for effective organisation and enabling institutions is a necessary pre-condition for sustainable and enduring peace and political stability.
- c. Sustainable conflict management could be achieved in Africa through collective commitment of African leaders.

1.7 Methodology

During the research, the study used both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources includes: formal and informal and unstructured interviews, and independent consultation. Through the internet and telephone, the researcher interviewed various categories of people in the area under this study. The population for the study includes selected number of military

⁴²Harre, R. (ed), *The Social Construction of Emotions*, (New York: Blackwell, 1990).

⁴³ Kemper, T. *A Social Interaction Theory of Emotion* (New York: John Wiley, 1978), p.93.

⁴⁴ Burton, J. *Deviance, Terrorism and War: The Process of Solving Unsolved Social and Political Problems*, (New York: St. martin's Press, 1979).

officers, senior members of civil societies, diplomats, academics and politicians. To obtain precise data, the simple random sampling technique was adopted in the selection of 200 respondents from the population to represent the sample. To ensure a realistic research outcome, the researcher adopted random sampling technique. The entire research population was grouped into military officers, diplomats, senior members of civil societies, academics and politicians. Sixty military officers, out of which 50 had peace support operation experiences, were selected. 40 senior members of civil societies mostly from Rwanda, Burundi and CAR, 20 diplomats, 40 academics, and 40 politicians were also selected. The data collected for the study was then presented using charts and graphs. The data was subsequently analyzed on the trend and frequency of the variables. Different variables obtained from the returned questionnaires critically analyzed using content analysis. The unstructured interviews were analyzed qualitatively. Deductions were therefore drawn using qualitative and quantitative methods. Hence, this led to the research finding from which recommendations were made.

1.8 Chapter Outline

Chapter one of this study, introduced the topic of the research project by first setting broad context of the study, the statement of the problem, objective of the research, hypothesis, justifications, literature review, theoretical framework, methodology, and limitations. Chapter two gave background to the conflict and conflict management in CAR. Chapter Three covered background to the conflict as well as conflict management in Burundi. Chapter Four provided comparative perspective of both cases with a view to evaluate the conflict management mechanisms applied to resolve both conflicts. Chapter Five critically analysed the collected data on the study. And, Chapter Six gave summary, conclusions and recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

Conflict and Conflict Management in the Central Africa Republic

2.0 Introduction

In 1958 the French administered territory of Oubangui-Chari was granted internal self-governance and become the Central Africa Republic (CAR). The leader of the independence movement, Barthélemy Boganda died in an unexpected plane crash in march 1959, and David Dacko become the republic's first president at independence on 13 august 1960.¹ Following independence, CAR endured multiple coups until 1965, when former colonial soldier Jean-Bédél Bokassa overthrew President David Dacko. Bokassa initially enjoyed support from France but the increasing brutality of his regime led France to abandon him. Bokassa sought Libyan backing, but in 1979 he was forcibly removed by the French military. Dacko was restored to power until the state military, led by General André Kolingba, took over power in 1981. Kolingba, a member of the Yakoma tribe that inhabits parts of southern CAR, ruled as a corrupt military dictator and catered mainly to the Yakoma-populated southern belt of CAR while enjoying French support. The ethnic favouritism resulted in internal dissent amongst the non-Yakoma groups and an unsuccessful coup attempt in 1983.²

According to Berg, Kolingba's rule brought in a period 'establishing for the first time ethnic identity as the crucial factor in the political culture of the Central African Republic'.³ In the early 1990s external pressure to democratization, led to CAR's first elections in 1993 in which Kolingba lost to Ange-Félix Patasse; a politician who came from both the Gbaya and Kare tribes, yet grew up in Paoua in the north, which is home to the Kaba tribe. Rather than addressing economic and political problems, Patasse launched a broad effort to weaken the Yakoma-dominated military and stacked the French-backed Presidential Guard with members from the Kaba thus perpetuating the political exploitation of ethnicity.⁴

These divisions fuelled violence in 1996 when the military launched three mutinies. As a result, the African peacekeeping force known as *Mission interafricaine de surveillance des accords de Bangui* (MISAB) literally meaning Inter-African Mission to Monitor the

¹ Europa Regional Surveys of the World: Africa South of the Sahara 2012(41st Edition), (London: Routledge, 2012), p.256-262.

² Marc, A. Understanding access to justice and conflict resolution at the local level in the Central African Republic (CAR), World Bank (Washington D.C: 24 February 2012), p. 49.

³ Berg, P. Country Conflict Analysis Studies, (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2008),p.19.

⁴ Ibid.

Implementation of the Bangui Agreement, was created to monitor and quell hostilities. This development provided France with an exit strategy out of CAR's deteriorating political and social situation. Deprived of French patronage, Patasse similar to Bokassa, lobbied for Libyan support. Thus the Gaddafi created a community of the Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). He further provided a peacekeeping force for Patasse and his presidential guard. Additional backing came from the Congolese rebel group *Mouvement pour la libération du Congo(MLC)* led by Jean-Pierre Bemba.⁵

In 2001, François Bozize (the Army Chief of Staff then) was accused of involvement in a coup attempt against Patasse and sought refuge in Chad, where he enjoyed the hospitality of Deby (the Chadian President) as well as backing from France, Congo-Brazzaville and Gabon. With assistance from Deby, Bozize amassed a group of fighters that consisted of impoverished young men and ex-combatants from Chad and CAR. Bozize returned to CAR from Chad for another coup attempt, which met with success in March 2003, ousting Patasse. In 2004, former supporters of Bozize, many of whom were Chadians and upset by broken promises of compensation for their efforts in assisting the coup, began to attack government targets. In response, Deby sought to act as a mediator and to counsel the Chadian rebels. These efforts met with some success, but many remained frustrated and eager to take up arms. Eventually, many of these disaffected individuals joined the rebellion in north-eastern CAR, the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR); which serves as an umbrella organisation for other armed groups. Interestingly, in an indication of how volatile alliances can be, the UFDR attracted former enemies who joined forces in order to oust Bozize, whom they accused of neglecting the Vakaga Region in terms of development and political representation.⁶

In 2012, several primarily Muslim-led rebel groups formed a coalition called "Seleka" ("alliance" in the local lingua franca Sango). In March 2013, Seleka swept into the capital Bangui, and seized control of the government, overthrowing President François Bozize. Once in power, Seleka leaders presided over the collapse of an already fragile state, and they oversaw brutal attacks on rural Christian communities in the northwest, Bozize's home region. Seleka fighters also targeted perceived Bozize supporters in Bangui, including members of the national

⁵Arieff, A. Crisis in the Central African Republic, Congressional Research Service (Washington D.C., 14 May 2014), p.5

⁶Jennifer Giroux, Et Al, The Tormented Triangle : The Regionalisation Of Conflict In Sudan, Chad And The Central African Republic. Crisis States Working Papers Series No.2 April 2009. Center for Security Studies, Eth, And Swiss peace.

security forces, which was largely disbanded. Mostly Christian-led militias known as “anti-balakas” (anti-machetes) then mobilized against the Muslim communities. Civilians have also taken up arms against each other. A transitional government appointed in January 2014 has been unable to stop the violence. Separate in origin from the current crisis, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a militia of Ugandan origin, continues to attack civilians in southeast CAR, creating additional humanitarian needs.⁷

2.1 Causes of Conflict in Central Africa Republic

Mwagiru opines that conflict occurs whenever two or more parties or communities have incompatible goals or values. He states further that when analyzing conflict, it should be born in mind that there are no mono causes of any single conflict. This is because conflict is endemic, organic, dynamic and therefore complex.⁸ Conflict in the CAR is quite complex and has multiple manifestations in different parts of the country. Central Africa Republic borders Chad, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, all of which suffer from endemic conflicts internally with dysfunctional states’ structures and chronic instabilities. Therefore due to its proximity to these conflict zones, the cause of violence there is often attributed to spillover effect especially from Chad, Darfur or DR Congo.⁹ Additionally, a history of instability and lack of state infrastructure, are major structural causes of the conflict among several others.

One major contributing factor to the seemingly endless cycle of violence in the CAR is that of poverty. Most Central Africans depend on subsistence farming for their livelihoods, and the continuing atmosphere of violence and instability has disrupted this way of life. Criminal gangs have emerged as another menace to civilian security, kidnapping and terrorizing the population in order to levy fines and ransoms. But their presence is resultant of the lack of opportunity to earn a living as well as the absence of government accountability in many rural areas.

⁷Arieff, A. Crisis in the Central African Republic, op cit.

⁸Makumi M., Conflict in Africa. Theory, processes and Institutions of Management, (Nairobi; Centre for Conflict Research, 2006),p.6.

⁹Berg, P. “A Crisis-Complex, not Complex Crises: Conflict Dynamics in the Sudan, Chad and Central African Republic Tri-Border Area.” InternationalePolitik und Gesellschaft.2008, No. 4, p. 72-86.

2.1.1 Trigger Causes: the 2002-2003 Coup

According to Nyamboga, trigger causes of any conflict are many including; single key acts, events, or their anticipation that will set off or escalate violent conflict. For instance, elections (as was the case in Kenya 2007).¹⁰ The political tension between Patasse and Bozize is the source of major divisions within the Armed Forces of Central Africa (FACA) as well as among rebel groups in the north (some of whom remain loyal to Patasse). The bloody coup also involved the support of several outside military and paramilitary forces which committed violent acts of destruction and human rights abuses across the country. With a only a weakened military to defend him, Patasse enlisted the support of the Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC) led by Jean-Pierre Bemba in the south as well as a Chadian mercenary force led by AbdoulayeMiskine in the north. Both parties committed massacres and rapes to the civilian population during the conflict.¹¹ Most of these scenarios escalated the conflict and ravaged the country.

2.1.2 Rebel Groups

The most pressing issue is that of the rebel activity in the northwest and northeast that has displaced hundreds of thousands since the bloody coup of 2002 and 2003. The Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy (APRD) is the main rebel group in the northwest, the home area of the former president Patasse. His tribe, the Gbaya, is one of the largest ethnic groups in the country, making up 34 percent of the population. Notably, ethnic ties are often used as political tools in the CAR, and most people vote along ethnic lines.¹²

The APRD was formed following the coup and is made up mostly of Patasse's old Presidential Guard (GP). Another group, the Central African Democratic Front (FDPC), is also operating in the northwest. They are led by AbdoulayeMiskine, a Chadian national with close ties to the Libyan government and who supported Patasse during the coup. The Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) is the main rebel group in the northeast. They are comprised mostly of soldiers who fought for Bozize during the coup but have since turned against him because of their lack of compensation for that support.¹³

Since 2008 the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has been carrying out attacks on remote populations in southeastern CAR. The LRA has already caused massive displacements

¹⁰Nyamboga, M. &Kiplang'at, N. Conflict Resolution: the Role of Information and Knowledge Management, the Kenyan Experience. (Nairobi, Kenya library association,2008), p.13.

¹¹Ibid

¹²Gouby, M. "Patasse Reveals Presidency Bid." (London: Institute for War and Peace Reporting. June 15, 2009).

¹³Improving Civilian Protection in Northwest Central African Republic." Human Rights Watch, December 2008.

throughout the Great Lakes Region of central Africa, more notably in northern Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Human Rights Watch indicates that recent attacks in CAR have not been well-reported and have received little attention or follow-up by the government or the United Nations.¹⁴ Though, the Uganda and the US forces have been conducting joint military operations against the LRA for over 2 years in the CAR.

2.2 Conflict Dynamics

Conflict dynamics act as both structural and proximate causes of conflict in CAR. According to Nyamboga, structural and proximate causes of conflict are distinct in that; structural causes are pervasive factors that have become built into the policies, structures and fabric of a society and may create the pre-conditions for violent conflict. Proximate causes are those factors contributing to a climate conducive to violent conflict or its further escalation.¹⁵ While this study focuses on the period 1993 to 2014, it is important to understand the historic legacy of coups and conflict in CAR. Linked to this is the weakness of state capacity and authority in many core state functions. The CAR successive governments have been weak, institutionalized with poor security and high vulnerability to rebellions and coups. In this way, the state had not been able to protect the security and welfare of civilians from violence and poverty. The more recent emergence of ‘rebel groups’ can be understood as both a proximate cause and a consequence of recent conflict.

2.2.1 The Historic Realities

Since gaining independence from France in 1960, CAR has only had one peaceful transfer of power, in 1993. Since 1960, eight presidents have led CAR, four of whom have stayed in power for ten or more years. Arms have remained the key to political success. In 2007, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that the previous decade had seen at least ten coup attempts.¹⁶ Coups have typically been supported by external powers, with Chad and France key countries playing active roles in supporting military coups in CAR.¹⁷

¹⁴Trail of Death: LRA Atrocities in Northeastern Congo.” Human Rights Watch, March 2010.

¹⁵Nyamboga, M. & Kiplang’at, N. Conflict Resolution: the Role of Information and Knowledge Management, the Kenyan Experience. (Nairobi, Kenya library association, 2008), p.13.

¹⁶Human Rights Watch 2007. Central African Republic-State Of Anarchy-Rebellion And Abuses Against Civilians volume 19, No. 14(A). http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/car0907webwcover_0.pdf Accessed On 09/11/2014.

¹⁷Somerville K., Foreign Military Intervention in Africa, (London: Pimnter, 1990). Chapters two and three.

2.2.2 Weak State

Post-independence CAR has been characterized by weak state authority in many parts of CAR, especially in the northern regions, and outside the capital Bangui. Central Africa Republic is one of the poorest countries in the world. Civilians are often victims of violence from the government's own security service, from rebel groups, and from armed bandits. Bandits roam freely and come from within CAR, but also from Chad, Sudan, and Uganda.¹⁸ The CAR state frequently fails to ensure security of the state from rebellions and coups. It also fails to protect the security and welfare of civilians. For example, Bozize had been accused of fostering a system of impunity in CAR. While he may have officially agreed to make an inclusive government, to reform the security sector institutions, and to protect human rights, his actions suggested that he did not ever intend to carry out these reforms. Bozize's actions perpetuated and worsened; low standards of democracy, human rights, and institutions in the security sector.¹⁹

Bozize came to power via a violent coup in 2003, and he only supported a few judicial reforms that were in his interest, such as an amnesty law to protect his troops against human rights prosecutions. His regime was also characterised by widespread clientelism. Since the beginning of his second mandate, Bozize's relatives were appointed to crucial positions within the state apparatus. State fragility in CAR has incentivised a 'winner-takes-all' political culture.²⁰ Exclusionary politics has heightened group divisions, which correlate with regional and ethnic divisions.

2.2.3 The Construct of the Rebel Groups

The emergence of rebel groups in CAR is a more recent phenomenon, including those indicated above. Most of CAR's rebel groups announced their status officially from 2005 onwards.²¹ There have been three distinct phases of recruitment to the rebel groups: first, the formation of official groups like UFDR, in response to regional insecurity between 2005-2007;

¹⁸ Giroux, J. et al. Regional And Global Axes Of Conflict -The Tormented Triangle : The Regionalisation of Conflict In Sudan, Chad And The Central African Republic. Center for Security Studies, and Swiss peace. Working Paper No. 47.

¹⁹ Human Rights Watch 2007. Central African Republic-State Of Anarchy-Rebellion And Abuses Against Civilians volume 19, No. 14(A). [Http://Www.Hrw.Org/Sites/Default/Files/Reports/Car0907webwcover_0.Pdf](http://www.Hrw.Org/Sites/Default/Files/Reports/Car0907webwcover_0.Pdf) Accessed On 09/11/2014.

²⁰ Central African Republic: Priorities of the Transition Africa Report N°203 11 June 2013 Translation from French <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/203-central-african-republic-priorities-of-the-transition.pdf> accessed on 17 Nov 14. Central African Republic: Priorities of the Transition Africa Report N°203.

²¹ Spittaels, S. & Hilgert, F. Mapping Conflict Motives: Central African Republic. Antwerp 17 February 2009.

second, the increase in membership of groups, to benefit from Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) schemes between 2008 -2013; and lastly, the increase in people latching on to the rebel groups, in response to wider-scale rebellion between December 2012 - 2013. That is not to say rebel groups did not exist earlier. Chronic instability (especially outside of the capital and in the north) meant that some areas established self-defence groups. These groups gradually became aware, through better communication, and knowledge of conflicts in other areas of the benefits associated with the label 'rebel group' (in terms of money for initiatives such as DDR, and international status) and defined themselves as rebel groups. Mehler notes 'there have been few clear statements of what the various rebels stand for'.²² The recent rise of the groups has seen political parties lose out in the peace processes, as political parties are no longer seen to be the main actors by international mediators.²³ The impoverished, uneducated and unemployed youths in CAR have been the playground for political elites to attain their self-interests. The big size of ex-combatants who were formally serving in the successive regimes, and were forced out of service as a result of vicious cycle of coups continue to pose insecurity threat to the stability of CAR.

2.2.4 Tormented Triangle

A regional approach to the crisis in CAR is crucial considering that Seleka has recruited Chadian and Sudanese as well as Central Africans (mainly from the north). Many recruits from the tri-border zone have relatives in neighbouring states and are used to crossing borders. Thus, combatants who are considered 'Chadian' or 'Sudanese' have been living in CAR for years. The cross-border activities and fluid loyalties of combatants in this zone have been a structural pattern of conflicts in Darfur, Chad and the Central African Republic, which has major implications both at the local and transnational levels.²⁴ In addition to the involvement of Chadian and Sudanese men with arms, the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) is an important actor. LRA combatants have been present in the south east of the country since 2008.²⁵ Last but not least, transnational networks of road bandits, the infamous 'coupeurs de routes' or

²²Mehler A. Reshaping Political Space? The Impact of the Armed Insurgency in the Central African Republic on Political Parties and Representation,(Hamburg: GIGA Institute of Global and Area Studies, 2009), p.12.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Giroux Jennifer et al. Regional And Global Axes Of Conflict -The Tormented Triangle : The Regionalisation of Conflict In Sudan, Chad And The Central African Republic . Center for Security Studies, and Swiss peace.Working Paper No. 47. (opcit)

²⁵Spittaels Steven &FilipHilgert, Mapping Conflict Motives: Central African Republic. Antwerp 17 February 2009. (opcit)

‘zaraguinas’, have a long history in the sub-region.²⁶ Raiders, poachers, anti-poaching militiamen, road-blockers and pastoralists are particularly active in the north-eastern borderlands and partake in the governing of this area.²⁷ They have been one source of great concern for the past few years. Widespread road banditry has led to the displacement of population in Northern CAR and to refugee flows from Northern CAR to refugee camps in the south of Chad. Pastoralists coming from Chad, Niger and Nigeria cross CAR each year with thousands of cattle and carry weapons to protect their livestock; this provides a source of tension with armed groups, local communities, and farmers.²⁸ The spillover effect due to endemic conflict in Darfur and Chad will continue to have direct implication on the CAR national security.

2.3 Actors

While root causes of conflicts and political turmoil in CAR are to be found in internal problems specific to the country, these problems have been compounded by the destabilising effects of geopolitics. Given its history and geographical location, CAR is vulnerable to fluctuating regional developments, and a regional approach to the crisis has been wanting.

2.3.1 Chad

Chad has been a key actor in CAR for decades and unresolved crises in Chad and CAR have allowed armed movements to endure and reorganize on the fringes of the region. In March 2003, Bozize was supported by troops from Chad when he overthrew former CAR President Patasse. Following the coup, Chad maintained a contingent to provide security for President Bozize. In January 2013, Chad blocked the Seleka rebels at a town 70km from Bangui (considered the red line). However, a few months later, Chad supported the coalition which took over Bangui, despite Chadian President Idriss Deby’s claim that Chad did not interfere in CAR’s internal politics. It should be noted that Chad is now considered a regional power: its military intervention in Mali boosts Chadian President Deby’s own image as a defender of stability in the Sahel and Sahara region. ²⁹Chad’s ambiguous politics in CAR contradicts this new image of Chad as a stabilising effect in the region.

²⁶Roitman, J. *Fiscal Disobedience. An anthropology of economic regulation in Central Africa*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.,(2005).

²⁷Lombard, L. N. (2012). *Raiding Sovereignty in Central African Borderlands*. Phd dissertation. Durham: Duke University. http://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10161/5861/Lombard_duke_0066D_11603.pdf?sequence=1 accessed on 12 Nov 2014.

²⁸Spittaels, S. & Hilgert, F. (2009). *Mapping Conflict Motives: Central African Republic*. Antwerpen: IPIS. http://www.ipisresearch.be/maps/CAR/20090217_Mapping_CAR.pdf accessed on 12 Nov 2014.

²⁹Berg, P. *Country Conflict Analysis Studies*. (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2008), p.10.

2.3.2 France

Bozize was supported by France, the former colonial power, when he staged his successful coup in 2003. Until 2013, French support for Bozize was a major factor in his maintenance of power. France maintains some troops in Bangui as part of Operation Boali. While French forces on the ground do not officially engage the rebels, they did attack a CAR rebel coalition late 2006, allowing government forces to retake towns captured by rebels. In 2013, however, French troops did not intervene to stop Seleka, nor did they protect the French citizens inside the country.³⁰ France's actions indicated that it was distancing itself significantly from CAR, unlike the role it is playing in other regional conflicts, for example in Mali.

2.3.3 South Africa

South Africa is increasingly becoming involved in Francophone Africa. Its recent presence in CAR is quite evident. South Africa deployed a military contingent to CAR in 2007, when a bilateral agreement providing training and personal protection to Bozize was signed. South African National Defence Force (SANDF)'s presence in the country was seen by some analysts as a move to counter French military influence in the region. It is worth noting that South African mining companies were contracted under Bozize's rule.³¹ Besides South Africa's intention of supporting; 'African solutions to African problems', economic interests are at stake.

2.3.4 Regional Actors

A wide range of actors have been deployed in CAR, including the United National Peace-Building Office in the Central Africa Republic (BINUCA), and other UN agencies), the African Union, and the ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States). The regional peacekeeping mission (Mission for the consolidation of peace in Central African Republic, MICOPAX) is, since July 2008, under the responsibility of the ECCAS. It has succeeded the Multinational Force of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (FOMUC) operation established in October 2002, following a decision of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African Republic (CEMAC). It was a rather small operation (400

³⁰ International Crisis Group. Central African Republic: Priorities of the Transition Africa Report N°203 | 11 June 2013 brussels@crisisgroup.org

³¹ Bryans, M., Risk of Conflict? South Africa's Relations with the Central African Republic: Southern Africa-Issue in Focus, (SA ePublications, 2013), p.69-72.

soldiers) composed of contingents from the ECCAS with operational support from France, and financial support through the EU's African Peace Facility (APF).³²

2.3.5 Others Actors

Regional powers (Congo, Chad, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea) were involved in the brokering of the 2013 Libreville agreement, which was signed in January under the auspices of the ECCAS. However, ECCAS failed to monitor the implementation of the agreement and regional powers did not prevent the Seleka coalition from seizing power thereafter.³³ This is attributed to Bozize's reluctance to implement the agreement, and also to regional players losing confidence in Bozize. In addition to international and regional organisations, various regional armed factions have been involved in past conflicts as well as in the most recent political turmoil.

2.4 Conflict Management in Central Africa Republic

This section explores how conflict management efforts have been key drivers in shaping the changing political settlements in CAR over the past decade, for instance; the events of the national dialogue processes of 2003 and 2008, and the peace agreements of 2008 and 2013.

2.4.1 National Dialogue Process, 2003

Following years of rebellion and coup attempts, and under international pressure, the CAR President at the time, Patasse announced that he would hold a 'National Dialogue' event with the aim of fostering national peace and reconciliation. After taking power militarily, and in a climate of distrust, Bozize was under pressure to win legitimacy to rule the country, both internally and externally. The National Dialogue process presented such an opportunity. The National Dialogue was a six week conference held in September-October 2003, primarily financed by the President of Gabon. The content and logistics of the event was planned by a Preparatory Committee made up of 49 representatives from: the government; each political party; each security sector agency; civil society organizations (CSO); the regions of the country; and from the private sector (including sector representatives from agriculture, natural resources, financial).³⁴

³²International Crisis Group (2013) Op cit.

³³ International Crisis Group (2013) (Ibid.)

³⁴Mehler, A. Reshaping political space: the impact of armed insurgency in CAR. Working papers, No. 116. Hamburg: GIGA Institute of African Affairs, (2009).

The Preparatory Committee divided itself into six thematic commissions: truth and reconciliation; politics and diplomacy; defence and security; economic and financial; education, culture, youth and sport; organisation and logistics. Around 350 participants attended the National Dialogue. Like the Preparatory Committee, this included individuals from the political parties, government, security sector agencies, CSOs, the regions, the private sector, and also included regional and international institutions and donors. Notably, former president Patasse and his former defence minister were not invited. The CAR president prior to Patasse was invited (Kolingba). However, there were no representatives attending on behalf of armed rebel groups; this is probably because many of today's rebel groups had not officially formed at the time of the conference. This highlights the new status of the groups. Of course, members of the current day rebel groups may well have attended the National Dialogue independently, or as members of other organisations.³⁵

The outcome of the National Dialogue was a final report which made a long list of recommendations divided by the thematic commissions. Some of the key recommendations include: the establishment of a permanent truth and reconciliation commission; a new constitution; reform of the electoral code; restore security across the country; and create an autonomous committee to monitor the follow-up of their commendations (called the *Comité de Suivi des Actes du Dialogue National* – CSADN). These recommendations were divided into two categories, short and long term, but otherwise were not prioritised. Various rebel groups continued to criticise the government for not implementing the recommendations.³⁶

Reconciliation was a key discussion at the National Dialogue, and many prominent leaders made declarations of reconciliation and forgiveness for past violence³⁷. A report by the international NGO the (International Federation for Human Rights) argued that Bozize used the National Dialogue as a way to absolve his troops of human rights violations without using judicial mechanisms.³⁸ A permanent truth and reconciliation commission was never set up. In

³⁵Mehler, A. Reshaping political space: the impact of armed insurgency in CAR. Working papers, No. 116. Hamburg: GIGA Institute of African Affairs, (2009).

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷UN Security Council. (2003). Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic and the activities of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in the Central African Republic (S/2003/1209)http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2003/1209 accessed 17 Nov 14.

³⁸Legal and Judicial Cooperation Programme. Central Africa Republic: Rule of Law, Respect of Human Rights, Fight against Impunities. International Federation for Human Rights Report.www.fidr.org/img/pdf/rca399a.pdf accessed on 14 November 2014.

terms of impact, one of the main outcomes of the National Dialogue was the legitimising of Bozize, within the country and externally. A report from the UN Security Council (2003) published a few months after the event noted ‘the overall situation in the Central African Republic is changing slowly. It is less troubled than it was before the national dialogue, when the atmosphere was often charged with suspicion and rumours mostly unfounded of the destabilization of the regime’. One year later, a multi-donor \$13 million DDR project for CAR was approved.³⁹ Mehler notes that ‘2003 can still be termed fairly successful as it led to a set of consensus decisions regarding major fields of public life (particularly on the electoral process)’.⁴⁰

2.4.2 Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement- 2008

Systematic violence against civilians was perpetrated by the state security forces, and by rebels and road bandits, particularly in the north-east.⁴¹ In 2005, Bozize gave his candidacy for the presidential elections, but Patasse’s was annulled. This triggered widespread discontent and rebellion among Patasse’s followers. Some heavyweights of Patasse’s political class were included in Bozize’s government, but the general Patasse camp remained excluded. Following a period of sustained violence, the Bozize government decided to broker bilateral peace agreements with the different rebel groups. First was an agreement with the Central African Democratic Front (FDPC) (signed in Libya) in February 2007; second was with the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) (signed in CAR) in April 2007; and third with Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy (APRD) (signed in Gabon) in May 2008. However, following concerted pressure from the international community and Gabon, the government agreed to negotiate a single peace agreement involving all groups together. In June 2008, the Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed between the government and two of the rebel groups, APRD and UFDR, in Libreville Gabon.⁴²

The third most important group FDPC did not sign the agreement, and the agreement was rejected by parts of the exiled UFDR leadership. The President of Gabon acted as the mediator.

³⁹MDRP Secretariat (2004), Rapport de la Mission de Supervision Conjointe du MDRP (10-28 Octobre 2004)[online], Washington, MDRP, at <http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/jsm04-report_fr.pdf>.

⁴⁰Mehler, A. Reshaping political space: the impact of armed insurgency in CAR. Working papers, No. 116. Hamburg: GIGA Institute of African Affairs, (2009).p.16.

⁴¹ Human Rights Watch 2007, opcit.

⁴²CICS (2008): Emerging Human Security Issues in the Implementation of MDRP Fund in the Central African Republic (CAR), University of Bradford, at <<http://www.ddr-humansecurity.org.uk/images/DDR%20Mini%20Case%20Study%20CAR.pdf>>.

The atmosphere between the groups was one of distrust; the APRD warned that if the forthcoming Inclusive Political Dialogue did not lead to significant change, it would return to using violence⁴³. The agreement made nine commitments including: a complete ceasefire, a general amnesty, the release of prisoners, the integration of rebels into the national army, and commitment to a new DDR programme supported by the international community. The UN Secretary-General commented on the agreement saying it was ‘perhaps the most genuinely inclusive attempt to foster national reconciliation in CAR to date’. However, fighting erupted just two months later in August 2008 and ended the peace process. The International Crisis Group (ICG-2008) reports that the rebels broke the ceasefire due to the government’s draft of the new amnesty law; the rebels argued that various clauses disadvantaged the rebels, compared to people in the security forces, and would make it impossible for many of the rebels to benefit from the amnesty.⁴⁴

2.4.3 The Inclusive Political Dialogue, 2008

A key objective of the 2008 Inclusive Political Dialogue (herein referred to as ‘the Dialogue’) was to start a process and design a plan of action to implement the 2008 peace agreement. The day before the Dialogue started in December 2008, another rebel group, the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJR) also signed the peace agreement, thereby officially joining the peace process. A few days later, another group; the Union for Republic Forces (UFR), also signed up. Though, the UFR was not previously active in the conflict.⁴⁵ Negotiations were held between the government, the rebel groups and the mediator to decide on the composition of the Preparatory Committee, one year in advance. The conference was more inclusive with rebel group members taking part in the Preparatory Committee, and as final participants. However, Mehler notes that rebels held only three of 23 positions in the Preparatory Committee.⁴⁶ Patasse and his group, were also included, (unlike in 2003) and former president Kolimba attended. 200 participants attended the shorter two-week conference. During the Dialogue, Bozize agreed to form an inclusive consensus government, hold free and transparent

⁴³Spittaels, S. & Hilgert, F. Mapping Conflict Motives: Central African Republic. Antwerpen: IPIS, 2009. http://www.ipisresearch.be/maps/CAR/20090217_Mapping_CAR.pdf Accessed on 17 Nov 14.

⁴⁴ Central African Republic: Untangling the Political Dialogue Policy Briefing Africa Briefing N°55 Nairobi/Brussels, 9 December 2008. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/B055%20Central%20African%20Republic%20Untangling%20the%20Political%20Dialogue.pdf>

⁴⁵CICS (2008): Emerging Human Security Issues in the Implementation of MDRP Fund in the Central African Republic (CAR), op cit.

⁴⁶Mehler, A. Reshaping political space. Op cit.

elections, install a follow up committee, and create a truth and reconciliation commission. The follow up committee was to be composed of the former presidents (Patasse, Kolingba) and the then president Bozize.⁴⁷

Moreover, civilians and armed oppositions were not included in this committee. This meant that former presidents who presided over the country during serious and systematic human rights violations would be in charge of following up on the implementation of the peace process. The International Crisis Group (ICG) argued that Bozize's intention was to use the Dialogue and the amnesty agreed as part of the peace agreement to protect his allies, rather than to broker a peace deal for the country. By committing to these processes, and a wider democratic programme, Bozize maintained an image of legitimacy in the eyes of the international donors supporting the aid dependent country. Meanwhile, the main opposition was hoping that, through the Dialogue, the country would be able to remove Bozize as president.⁴⁸

The ICG also argue that the international community's support to the organisation of the *Etatsgénéraux des forces armées* (literally meaning 'general status of the armed forces) at the beginning of 2008 shifted the focus away from security, thus weakening the Dialogue, and shifted the focus to disarmament rather than reconciliation. In terms of impact, the Dialogue was considered a major achievement by the CAR authorities, stakeholders and the international community.⁴⁹ Consultations carried out by the International Dialogue for State building and Peace-building (2010) in CAR found that respondents consider the Peace Agreement and Dialogue cornerstones as a success story. However, N'Diaye argues that attempts to bring stability through a dialogue process with a divided armed and political opposition have been ineffective.⁵⁰

The International Dialogue for State-building and Peace-building consultations suggested the need for civil society participation to ensure the government understands and responds to people's expectations, to rebuild state-citizen trust. The report notes however, that 'meaningful participation is difficult in a context where a culture of participation has never developed and

⁴⁷Alusala, N. Armed Conflict and Disarmament. Selected Central African Case Studies. ISS Monograph Series No. 129. 2007.

⁴⁸ International Crisis Group (2008). <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic.aspx> accessed on 22 November 2014.

⁴⁹N'Diaye, B. (2009.) Security Sector Reform in the Central African Republic. In Born, H. and Schnabel, A. (eds) Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments: Insights from Comparative Analysis. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

where the presence of the state is still very weak. State-centric and capital-centric approaches to peace-building and state-building promoted by national and international partners do not help to create space for civil society actors'⁵¹

2.4.4 Libreville Peace Agreement, and Coup 2013

The period around the delayed 2011 elections saw more violence. The ICG claims that as much as two thirds of the country was beyond the control of the government, with thousands forced to flee due to armed attacks; Bozize became increasingly isolated and 'paranoid',⁵² losing support from his allies, the population at large, and, significantly, from his two prime sources of support; the Chadian President Deby, and the international community. Chadian President Deby removed the Chadian protectors, who were part of Central Africa Armed Forces-*Forces Armees Centrafricaines* (FACA), from protecting Bozize in September 2012. *Seleka* militarily took over twelve cities in the country, and then made formal demands to Bozize asking him to comply with his commitments made as part of the 2008 peace agreement. These demands increased, and *Seleka* entered the negotiations for the 2013 peace agreement demanding that Bozize step down as president. After just three days of negotiations with the majority party, *Seleka* coalition, opposition parties, non-active rebel groups and CSOs, the 2013 Libreville Peace Agreement was signed in January.⁵³ The negotiations were mediated by the ECCAS in Gabon. The United National Peace-Building Office in the Central Africa Republic (BINUCA) reported that the presidents of ECCAS (Chad, Republic of Congo, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea) were highly involved in the process. The speed with which the agreements were made indicated perhaps how unlikely the actors thought they would have to comply with the commitments.

The agreement included: a ceasefire, limiting Bozize's term as President until the end of his mandate in 2016 without a possibility to be re-elected; the formation of a government of national union within twelve months (to include the majority party, opposition parties, non-active rebel movements, the *Seleka* coalition, and civil society); elections; reforms to defence, security, territorial administration, and the judicial system; a continued Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) process with the support of the international community; and various economic and social. One month later in February 2013, Bozize officially proposed by decree a new national government; however the list of members

⁵¹Marlies G., "We Ourselves, We are Part of the Functioning," *African Affairs* 108, no. 430 (2009), p.52.

⁵² International Crisis Group (2013) opcit

⁵³Ibid.

was not welcomed by the opposition party or *Seleka*. In an interview, *Seleka* coalition spokesman Eric Massi said:

*'...the negotiations held in Libreville were very quick and left a bitter taste. The underlying problems have not been addressed... For more than a month after the signature of the Libreville agreement, Bozize hasn't met his commitments, except for the appointment of the Prime Minister. Prisoners, who were supposed to be released, have not been released. The South African troops are still in the country. In addition, it has deployed elements of the Central and South African army in the city of Bangassou when he shouldn't be involved in defence affairs'*⁵⁴.

In March 2013, *Seleka* presented the government with a list of eleven demands, and warned of military action were the government not to meet the demands within 72 hours. The list of demands included: the effective implementation of the 2013 peace agreement; the departure of the South African troops; review of the ministerial posts for *Seleka*; disarmament of the government's militias; and the integration of more than 2000 rebels into the FACA force.

Between 23 and 25 March 2013, *Seleka* entered Bangui, took the presidency and announced a new transition government with Djotodia as the President. The new transition government was to hold elections in three years, and would be composed of 34 members including: nine ministers from *Seleka*, eight opposition parties, one former member of Bozize's party, and 16 others from civil society or other political parties. Since the coup, *Seleka*'s factions were reported to be fragile and divided with disagreements, for example, over salaries for the troops that helped secure the coup. Meanwhile, a local CAR radio station reported that, in May ECCAS approved the 18 month national transition programme, indicating the process of external legitimisation of the new regime. The similarities of the 2003 and the 2013 coups are stark. Both involved violent coups, unleashing humanitarian and economic crises and a wave of human rights violations. *Seleka* combatants were also involved in massive looting in Bangui as well as in most CAR cities. Both coups were supported militarily by Chadian forces and politically by ECCAS Presidents.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ International Crisis Group (2013) <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic.aspx> accessed on 22 November 2014.

⁵⁵ Hovil, L., Why are African conflicts so often misunderstood?, African Arguments, 14 February 2014, <http://africanarguments.org/2014/02/10/why-do-we-continually-misunderstand-conflict-in-africa-by-lucy-hovil/> (accessed 23 November 2014).

2.5 Security Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

2.5.1 Background

Over the past two decades, security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) has moved from the periphery to the centre of policy discussions and programming in CAR. DDR processes were often established within the context of peace processes. CAR's history of instability means that multiple security, disarmament and demilitarisation interventions have been employed since independence –driven by both domestic and external actors.⁵⁶ However, the distinct language and conceptualisation of SSR and DDR were first articulated officially around the 2003 National Dialogue. It is evident that various SSR and DDR interventions have been employed by different actors.

2.5.2 Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme

Following the 2003 National Dialogue, the new 'transition government' led by Bozize wrote a 'DDR Policy Letter' requesting assistance from Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) and the World Bank. One year later, a three year DDR project was approved; the Ex-Combatant Reintegration and Community Support Special Program (RCSSP). The RCSSP was a Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) initiative, funded by the World Bank, UNDP and other donors, and implemented by the UNDP. It ran from 2004 to 2007, with a budget of USD \$13 million (MDRP 2004).⁵⁷

The next phase of DDR was initiated by three key events: first, the National Seminar on SSR (April 2008); second, the signing of the Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement (May 2008); and finally, the Inclusive Political Dialogue.⁵⁸ CAR became eligible for UN Peace-building Commission (PBC) funding in June 2008, which included SSR and DDR projects. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) led and implemented these interventions, with funds from UNDP, and ECCAS. The first tranche of funds ran from 2008 to 2010, with a budget allocation of USD \$10 million. The second tranche of funds was approved in 2010, with a budget of USD \$21 million. The 2008 draft 'Military Framework Law 2009-2013' This EU led initiative involved the drafting of the Military Framework Law 2009-2013 in 2009, which aimed to

⁵⁶Niagalé, B., Multilevel Governance and Security: Security Sector Reform in the Central African Republic. http://www.readcube.com/articles/10.1111%2Fj.1759-5436.2012.00332.x?r3_referer=wol&show_checkout=1 accessed on 10/11/2014.

⁵⁷Central African Republic: Lessons from a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program MDRP Dissemination Note 4, (2007) at <http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/MDRP_DissNote4_0908.pdf>

⁵⁸N'Diaye, B. (2009.) op cit.

provide a five-year plan for the security sector, with a detailed staffing, equipment and budget forecasts. The draft law was the result of two years of significant EU efforts, based on some years of work from France before that. The draft was presented to the National Assembly in August 2008, it would then be up to the CAR authorities to pass the law and implement it, with international assistance.⁵⁹

The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) reported that it met its targets by providing reintegration support to 7,565 ex-combatants, as well as providing ‘reintegration kits’ and training for all beneficiaries. Lombard strongly questions the achievements of DDR. She criticises the definition of ‘disarmament’ in the 2004-7 CAR DDR reform, noting that despite the 7,556 ex-combatants, the programme only collected about 400 guns, and only half were in working condition. Instead ‘disarmament’ has been redefined to mean people participating in the process; and according to this measure the MDRP did not meet its targets.⁶⁰ In a June 2013 policy briefing, the International Crisis Group recommended that the next phase of DDR in CAR should ‘develop a second generation DDR program emphasising community and economic reintegration of demobilized combatants’. Meanwhile, the EU-led draft Military Framework Law 2009-2013 was never approved by the CAR authorities. Despite not containing any particularly controversial or political clauses, Lombard argued that there was no political will to change things.⁶¹

According to N’Diaye, little effort was made on the part of the Bozize government to implement any SSR reforms.⁶² He further argued that ‘at the highest level of the executive branch, there was a continuous tendency to view SSR as insignificant programme’. As a consequence, at lower levels no efforts were made to implement even the most modest reforms.⁶³ Subsequently, the DDR process was a precursor to proliferation of the rebel groups and members increased over the period. Since the beginning of the RCSSP in 2004, various new active armed rebel groups have been established (APRD and UFDR), and other non-active

⁵⁹ICG-Policy Briefing. Africa Briefing N°55, Nairobi/Brussels, 9 December 2008. Central African Republic: Untangling the Political Dialogue. [http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/B055%20Central%20African%20Republic%20Untangling%20the%20Political%20Dialogue.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/B055%20Central%20African%20Republic%20Untangling%20the%20Political%20Dialogue.pdf)

⁶⁰ Lombard, L. N. (2012). *Raiding Sovereignty in Central African Borderlands*. Phd dissertation. Durham: Duke University. http://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10161/5861/Lombard_duke_0066D_11603.pdf?sequence=1 accessed on 17 Nov 14.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶²N’Diaye, B. (2009.) op cit.p. 61.

⁶³Ibid. p. 62.

groups have signed up to the 2008 agreement title to take advantage of the process. Meanwhile, Lombard asserted that the number of UFDR rebels increased from 600 (during the preceding conflict period) to about 1,240 (during the 2008 Libreville negotiations), and again during the following period of DDR programming.⁶⁴ In essence, resources allotted for DDR indirectly were used as war efforts.

According to Rupesinghe, a comprehensive approach to peace requires an adequate investment of financial resources, patience and a sustained commitment from sponsors.⁶⁵ The SSR and DDR reform processes had a significant financial support by external actors. This in one way or another, afforded International Community to exert pressure on the belligerent parties to negotiate. This led to the 2003 National Dialogue, the 2008 Peace Agreement and Inclusive Dialogue. However, limited availability of impact assessment and evaluation by donors on DDR and SSR processes in CAR can be attributed to its failures. Though, considering sensitive interventions which are highly political (for both the beneficiaries and donors) and operating in volatile environments, illustrate the varied perspectives on the impact of SSR and DDR in the CAR.

In summary the causes of the conflict in CAR are several with conflict dynamics deeply-rooted in historic realities and weak governance structures as well as external forces. These have exacerbated the mushrooming of the rebel movements and competing elites for their self-interests. Most of the warring parties in CAR were born after the 2003 National Dialogue between the Buziziz Government and the political oppositions as well the CSOs. However, this could also be attributed to the external interferences in CAR domestic affairs. Some of the ECCAS political elites are said to have supported and aided rebel groups in CAR to oust the legitimate governments through coups. Former president Bozizi was supported by both France and Chad to topple Patassi in 2003 and Seleka rebels to oust Bozizi in 2013.

Both regional and international conflict managers including those in ECCAS/AU and EU/UN have deployed generous initiatives to ameliorate the security situation with limited successes. The Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2008, between the Bozizi regime and the warring parties was a hope for the restoration of peace in CAR. The failures by Bozizi to implement the peace accord resulted into the 2013 coup by the Seleka rebel group. The DDR and

⁶⁴Spittaels, S. & Hilgert, F. Mapping Conflict Motives op cit.

⁶⁵ Ibid

SSR programmes have been supported with enormous resources by the international community for a decade. The MDRP reported that it met its objectives by reintegrating over 7,500 ex-combatants. According to Lombard, very few projects impacted the beneficiaries with limited political will to avert things.

CHAPTER THREE

Conflict and Conflict Management in Burundi

3.0 Introduction

Burundi, like its neighbour Rwanda, is a country that has been at war with itself.¹ A sociopolitical climate marked by chronic tension, with coups, localized insurrections and military repression has dominated most of Burundian history since its independence from Belgium in 1962. Massacres in 1960s, 1970s, and 1990s led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Burundians, and hundreds of thousands more were internally displaced or fled to neighboring countries. In the literature, the main cause of the tension between the two major communities in Burundi, the Hutu and the Tutsi, is often described as ethnic. However, the conflict should more appropriately be understood as a political struggle over maintaining or capturing of power. Being the main avenue for accretion and reproduction of a dominant class, control of the state is of vital importance in a poor and deprived country like Burundi.²

Traditionally, the distinction between the Hutu and the Tutsi has its roots in a socio economic power-relationship starting more than 700 years ago when Tutsi herders subjugated Hutu cultivators. As a means to strengthen their control of the territory, German and later Belgian colonizers exploited this existing hierarchy. By offering privileges, like access to education and positions in the administration to the Tutsis, the colonial administration institutionalized the domination of the Tutsi over the Hutu, and thus played a fundamental role in fomenting ethnic polarization of politics in Burundi.³

Therefore, many Hutus were forced to flee to the neighbouring countries of Rwanda and Tanzania. In 1987 President Buyoya seized power through a bloody coup, which once again led to repression of the Hutus. The refugee camps become a breeding ground for Hutu radicalism and in the beginning of the 1990s several rebel attacks were launched into Burundi from Tanzania and former Zaire. The different rebel groups stemmed from two different groups; Party

¹Nyang'oro J. Greater Horn of Africa Peace Building Project. CASE STUDY THREE: A Middle-Level Dialogue in Burundi: An Assessment of Effective Practices. Washington; DC 20024 USA, March, 2001.

²Åshild F. Power-sharing and Peacebuilding in Burundi. Power-sharing Agreements, Negotiations and Peace Processes Center for the Study of Civil War International Peace Research Institute.(Oslo: University of California, 2008), p.8.

³ Ibid.

for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU) and National Council for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD), which over the years were split into new fractions on several occasions.⁴

When a multi-party system was introduced in 1992, some attempts were made to run the country democratically. However, the assassination of the first democratically elected president, the Hutu Melchior Ndadaye, led to renewed violence. In 1996 Buyoya retook the power and governed the country with the support of the Tutsi military but eventually he started to also include Hutus in the government. In 1996 the first peace negotiations also took place, but it was not until 28 August 2000 that the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement was signed. The agreement was, however, not completely comprehensive as some of the warring factions of the PALIPEHUTU and CNDD did not sign it. Instead, different ceasefire agreements were signed between the government and the remaining parties and it was not until 2006 that most of the rebel factions had signed except 'Forces *Nationales de Liberation*' (FNL) which is still destabilizing the country from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).⁵

The conflict in Burundi must also be understood in a regional context. The epicenter of the conflict in the Great Lakes Region (GLR) has been shifting from one country to another. For instance in 1994 the epicenter was in Rwanda, then in Burundi (1996) and in DRC (since 1997 till date). Also, there has been a form of alliances among the armed groups in the region. Regarding Rwanda, many of the Burundian refugees took part in the 1994 genocide of the Tutsis. When Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) seized the power in Rwanda in 1994, this on the other hand led fleeing Hutus to form alliances with Burundian Hutus.⁶ Moreover, later, the armed forces in Burundi and Rwanda have jointly fought the rebel forces. Thus, the conflicts in the GLR are intertwined with one another.

3.1 Causes of the Conflict in Burundi

The sources of Burundi's conflicts are complex and multifaceted, involving many actors and thus, making them impossible to reduce to a single cause or source: local, national, regional and international forces have combined to fuel this conflict. According to Azar and Burton the causes of any conflict are structural, accelerating and triggering factors. Structural factors include

⁴Ndikumana, L. "Institutional Failure and Ethnic Conflicts in Burundi."(African Studies Review 41(1): 29-47, 1998).

⁵ Daley, P.. "Ethnicity and Political Violence in Africa: The Challenge to the Burundi State." (Political Geography 25: 657-679, 2006).

⁶Svensson E. The African Mission in Burundi. Lessons Learned from the African Union's first Peace Operation. (Stockholm: Sweden Research Agency, 2008),p. 9-10.

political, economic and social patterns such as state repression, lack of political participation, poor governance performance, the distribution of wealth, the ethnic make-up of a society, and the history of inter-group relations.⁷ They increase a society's vulnerability to conflict. Accelerating or triggering factors often consist of political developments or events that bring underlying tensions to the forefront and cause the situation to escalate. They can include new radical ideologies, repression of political groups, sharp economic shocks, changes in or collapse of central authority, new discriminatory policies, external intervention, and weapon proliferation.⁸ In case of Burundi conflict, both structural and triggering factors are vivid as causes of the protracted conflict.

3.1.1 Structural Factors

Historical realities emanating from pre-colonial period where by the Tutsi ethnic group marginalized the Hutus and later aggravated by the colonial rulers' set-up, which aggravated the critical structural factors. The concept of the 'divide and rule' as was commonly applied by most colonial rulers exacerbated the social, economic and political inequalities between the two ethnic groups in Burundi then. The post-independence political instability as a result of chronic coups accompanied by repression against Hutu ethnic group forced many to fly to the neighboring countries like Tanzania, Rwanda and Democratic Republic of Congo-former Zaire to mention but a few. In response, Hutus organized themselves in their respective refugee camps in both DRC and Tanzania and mobilized for guerrilla war against the regime in Burundi then. This forced hundred thousand Burundians as Internal Displaced Persons (IDP).

Burundi has been ruled by a political-military oligarchy that tightly controls the state and appropriates all decision making without recourse to citizens' demands and desires. When the majority of the citizens' lives are intertwined with their land and resources, it need not be emphasized that their demands will invariably be ecologically linked. In this respect the successive Burundi governments have resorted to coercion, repression, and violence in addressing citizens' grievances.⁹

⁷Azar, E and J. Burton. International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1986).

⁸Davis, J. and R. Gurr. Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems. (Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997).

⁹Lind, J. & Kathryn, S., Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa's Conflicts. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2002, p.148.

3.1.2 Triggering Factors

Development theory has focused on the role that resources and societal development play on the onset of violence. In this respect, Gurr considers that, ‘for the last half century at least societies at low levels of development have suffered much more from societal warfare than prosperous societies’.¹⁰ According to ‘resource-war’ proposition, groups engaged in violent conflict are not primarily motivated by grievance resulting from ethnic discrimination, inequality, historical animosity, but essentially by economic agendas and their greed. Issues of identity and self-determination are dismissed in favour of a focus on the role that resources, by and of themselves, play as the main objectives of groups engaged in conflict. As stipulated by Reyntjens in the greed theory he said:

*“I have investigated statistically the global pattern of large-scale civil conflict ...expecting to find a close relationship between measures of these hatreds and grievances and the incidence of conflict...instead I found that economic agendas appear to be central to understanding why civil conflicts get going”.*¹¹

Also, Lemarchand uses a model based on expected-utility theory under the premise that ‘rebels will conduct a civil war if the perceived benefits outweigh the costs of rebellion.’¹² According to Hammouda, Burundi economic policy changed drastically from 1972 in terms of relative levels of investment in Agriculture compared to the industrial and service sectors. Until 1972, the agriculture sector, which employed more than 90 percent of Burundi’s work force dropped to between 20-30 percent in the period 1972-1992.¹³ The agriculture was disadvantaged compared to other sectors. Predation of the coffee industry, which is the main source of foreign exchanged income for the government, acts as a ‘cash cow’ uninhibited by external scrutiny’. As a result of state neglect of agriculture, especially coffee, combined with the high population density and growth with shrinking land allocation for individual farming families, triggered conflicts in Burundi. This policy affected the coffee growing areas of the northern provinces of Burundi. Palipehutu rebels which took arms as early as 1980, was originally based in the northern provinces of Ngozi and Kirundo bordering Rwanda.¹⁴

¹⁰Gurr, T. Why Men Rebel, Princeton: N.J.. Princeton University Press, 1970, p.5.

¹¹Reyntjens, Afrique des GrandsLacs en Crise: Rwanda, Burundi 1988-1994, Karthala, Paris, 1994, p.158.

¹²Lemarchand, R., Burundi: ethnic conflict and genocide, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, p.127.

¹³Hammouda,H. Burundi: Histoire Economic et Politique d’un conflit, paris: Editions L’Harmattan, 1995, p.107.

¹⁴ Ibid.

Additionally, exclusive politics practiced by the former Tutsi successive governments and the assassination of the first democratically elected Hutu President Ndadaye in 1993 are few among many cases that fuelled the escalation of the conflict in Burundi. The Hutu resentment resulted in stiff violent conflict whereby, towards 1999 there as hurting stalemate. In 2000, both parties signed the first peace agreement commonly referred to as, ‘2000 Arusha Peace Agreement’.

3.2 Conflict Management in Burundi

Conflict management efforts in Burundi showed seriousness since 1993 after the assassination of the president then, by some Tutsi military officers. Regional leaders and international actors as well as non-state actors indicated their passion to restore peace and security in country.

3.2.1 The UN Efforts from 1993 to 95

In the wake of the October 1993 Ndadaye assassination and the large-scale inter-communal violence that erupted afterward, the UN decided to intervene in Burundi, designating a distinguished diplomat, Amadou Ould-Abdullah, as the special representative of the secretary general to Bujumbura. For two years, Ould-Abdullah labored valiantly to calm the political turbulence and end violence. However, new power-sharing arrangements negotiated between the Tutsi-dominated ‘*L’Union pour le Progrès National*’ (UPRONA) literary meaning ‘Union for National Progress’; and Hutu-dominated ‘*Le Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi*’ (FRODEBU) meaning ‘Democratic Front of Burundi’ parties failed to satisfy either the extremist Tutsi elements or Hutu activists. An armed Hutu rebellion took root and began to operate in the countryside with increasing effectiveness. Within Bujumbura, extremist Tutsis launched a campaign of assassination and intimidation against all those associated with FRODEBU and even perceived UPRONA moderates. In his narrative account of his experience in Bujumbura, Ould-Abdullah captured the political mood:

“The country is plagued by a culture of fear: Burundians, like Rwandans, live in permanent fear of murder, displacement, and mass exodus. . . this atmosphere has not been generated by violence, alone, however. Rather, it is the product of violence and impunity. . . violence has become a catalyst for fear, which in turn aggravates violence. In

a similar vicious circle, the culture of impunity and the culture of fear justify and perpetuate each other."¹⁵

The 1994 Rwandan genocide sharply accelerated these negative trends, greatly deepening ethnic polarization and inter-communal fears and insecurities within Burundi. Growing anxiety within the UN that Burundi could go the way of Rwanda, led UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali, at the end of 1995, to call for the contingent creation of a UN peacekeeping force poised to move into Burundi as necessary to avert further mass violence or genocide. This initiative, however, was met with little enthusiasm by UN members: no major power was willing to assume the lead role for mounting such a force, potential troop contributors were scarce, and some feared that planning for such an intervention might trigger the very explosion the proposed intervention sought to avert. In the months and years that followed, when it came to Burundi, the UN was to give new meaning to the phrase "risk averse"¹⁶; with the Security Council and the UN Secretariat both reluctant to take the diplomatic lead, or to be proactive in developing peacekeeping modalities.

3.2.2 Mwalimu Nyerere as a Mediator(1996–99)

In 1995, sharing the concerns of the UN about the regional consequences of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the new chairman of the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU), Ethiopian Prime Minister MelesZenawi, and OAU Secretary-General SalimSalim began to encourage former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere to become involved in an effort to defuse the deepening Burundi crisis. Following two gatherings of regional leaders representing Zaire, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi, and consultations with UN officials, Nyerere agreed to help "assist the people of Burundi in finding means to achieve peace, stability, and reconciliation," including "the resolution of fundamental problems relating to the access, control, and management of power, so that either the ethnic or political minority is reassured."¹⁷

Initially, Nyerere was welcomed as a facilitator not only by the sub-region but also by the United States and the wider international community. First, no country outside Africa wanted to assume the lead role in efforts to resolve the Burundi conflict. Second, the willingness of

¹⁵AmadouOuld-Abdullah, *Burundi On The Brink 1993–95: A Un Special Envoy Reflects On Preventive Diplomacy* (Washington, Dc: U.S. Institute Of Peace, 2000), 25.

¹⁶Khadiagala, G. "Burundi," in *Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organizations*, ed. Jane Boulden (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 225.

¹⁷Weissman S. *Preventing Genocide In Burundi: Lessons From International Diplomacy* (Washington, Dc: U.S. Institute Of Peace, July 1998), p. 17.

regional leaders to step up and identify one of their own to guide the peace process was seen as a significant and positive development. Moreover, few African leaders enjoyed the iconic stature of the former Tanzanian president; a world statesman, a charismatic leader of Africa's anti-colonial struggle, and a pan-Africanist who played a key role in the liberation movements of southern Africa.¹⁸

From a process standpoint, however, the choices of Nyerere as facilitator and Arusha as the negotiating venue were problematic. Not only did much of Tanzanian society ideologically identify with the underdog Hutus but, since 1972, Tanzania had become home to hundreds of thousands of Burundian Hutu refugees. The refugee camps would shortly emerge as a principal recruiting ground for the armed rebellion, and, in the months ahead, Burundi-Tanzania relations, and the Arusha peace process itself; would be constantly strained by virtue of Tutsi complaints that Tanzanians were complicit in recruiting, training, and arming the rebellion.¹⁹

Significantly, the selection of the former Tanzanian president was fundamentally a decision not of Burundians (who were never formally invited to consider this question) but of the regional leaders. Burundian Hutus were generally quite supportive of the selection of Nyerere as facilitator and, later, of Arusha as the negotiating venue, but Tutsi reaction was ambivalent, at best. On the one hand, because of Nyerere's participation decades earlier in the establishment of UPRONA, the initially multiethnic nationalist Burundi political party, the former Tanzanian president enjoyed considerable respect among many key Tutsi figures. Moreover, Nyerere was the only regional leader to vigorously condemn the 1994 Rwandan genocide of Tutsis, in sharp contrast to other heads of state, who had effectively turned a blind eye.²⁰

Later, when the Tutsi-dominated army returned Pierre Buyoya to power in July 1996, he would be sharply criticized by many Tutsis for acceding to a Tanzania-dominated negotiating framework. In their view, the agenda of regional leaders was not a negotiated political settlement, but a Hutu government. From the standpoint of Tutsi hard-liners, Buyoya had fallen into a trap that would ultimately prove fatal to Tutsi interests and security. Toward the end of April 1996 and again early in June of that year, Nyerere brought FRODEBU and UPRONA representatives together in Mwanza, Tanzania, but made little progress in defusing political

¹⁸ International Crisis Group, 'Burundi under siege: lift the sanctions; re-launch the peace process', Burundi Report , 1, (28 April 1998).

¹⁹ Eck, V. 'Brokers in Burundi: broadening the Nyerere mediation initiative', TrackTwo, (1997), p. 6.

²⁰ Brown, S. and Schraub, M. (eds), Resolving Third World Conflict: Challenges for a New Era, (Washington DC: US Institute for Peace, 1992), p.241-261.

tensions. In particular, UPRONA, the party that despite its initially inclusive character had come to represent Tutsi hard-line interests, rejected Nyerere's suggestion that representatives of the armed rebels be invited to join the talks. The situation appeared increasingly desperate. Eighteen members of parliament had been assassinated. Tutsi youth militias were wreaking havoc within Bujumbura which was being ethnically cleansed of Hutus. Violence was mounting in the countryside. The capital was rife with rumors of a pending coup. Within the American government, National Security Advisor Tony Lake was talking directly with the prime minister and the minister of defense, urging that they join in condemning attacks on civilians, warning that the United States would work to isolate any regime that came to power by force or coup, and insisting that there was no military solution to Burundi's problem.²¹

3.2.3 Sant' Egidio

Rome-based Sant' Egidio, a Catholic lay order deeply involved in African conflict resolution for some years, was the second arena in which the Burundi peace process played itself out during the years of Nyerere's facilitation. Sant' Egidio's involvement began around the time that Nyerere was considering whether to take on the role of the regionally sanctioned facilitator. In 1995, Don Matteo Zuppi, (Sant' Egidio's Africa expert) met with Nyerere and offered to cooperate with Nyerere's efforts. Early in June 1996, with the encouragement of then private citizen Buyoya, with whom Sant' Egidio had established contact years earlier, Sant' Egidio facilitated a two-day meeting between a Burundian businessman who enjoyed the confidence of the then incumbent Tutsi prime minister and representatives of CNDD chairman Leonard Nyangoma. The meeting was reportedly seen by both parties as a constructive beginning of a discrete dialogue. Then, following his return to power in the July coup, Buyoya quietly reaffirmed to Sant' Egidio his interest in continuing contacts with the CNDD.²²

Zuppi recognized that the Burundian conflict involved more than two belligerent parties, but believed that the best point of entry was to begin a dialogue with what were then the two principal armed combatants; the government and the CNDD. There would subsequently be a need to bring in the other armed rebel organizations and the principal Hutu and Tutsi political parties. But it was first necessary to build a minimal degree of confidence between the primary

²¹Ndikumana, L.. "Institutional Failure and Ethnic Conflicts in Burundi." (African Studies Review 41(1): 29-47, 1998).

²² Madeira, R. and Domingos, M., Untitled paper presented at Learning from Conflict Resolution in Africa: Workshop on the Experience of Individual and Institutional Mediators, Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation and the Tanzanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation, (Arusha, 21-23 January 1998), p.5.

belligerents. Don Matteo Zuppi was exceptionally well-informed about Burundian political dynamics, having access both to the Hutu diaspora and to the very large number of Catholic clerics scattered throughout Burundi. And, as was demonstrated in its critical track II role in the Mozambican peace process, Sant' Egidio brought considerable political skill and finesse to the table.²³ Zuppi's modus operandi was to work slowly and methodically to build a relationship with key belligerent interlocutors so that they are at ease with Sant' Egidio's involvement. Sant' Egidio saw its mission not as imposing preconceived political solutions, but as simply facilitating the efforts of the belligerent parties to secure a negotiated political settlement of their conflict. Toward that end, Zuppi was in continuous contact with representatives of both the government and the CNDD, either in person or by telephone.²⁴

Both sides remained concerned that any direct contacts remain discrete and confidential. But they also both affirmed their willingness to continue to talk together, ultimately with the presence of some external observers. And they both agreed that they wanted to inquire deeply into Burundi's problems to arrive at a lasting peace. However, it was not until early in December, three months after the first bilateral contacts that the government and the CNDD returned to Rome. In the interval, Zuppi had struggled with several issues that flowed directly from the complexity not only of the core conflict, but also of the need to coordinate closely with the regionally sanctioned Arusha facilitator. First, Buyoya, already under attack from Tutsi hard-liners for his failure to get the sanctions lifted, remained exceedingly anxious about any public disclosure that his government was talking with the CNDD. He therefore resisted upgrading the level of his Rome delegation, fearing that this would connote the formalization of a process whose secrecy might be more difficult to preserve. In addition, he still preferred to use the nomenclature of *negotiations* or *pre-negotiations* rather than the more politically problematic *negotiations*. Zuppi and the special envoys explored with Nyerere the possibility of a temporary relaxation of the sanctions, so that Buyoya might have something with which to placate the hard-liners and make him more willing to assume some risks in Rome.²⁵

²³ Eck, V. 'Brokers in Burundi: broadening the Nyerere mediation initiative', Track Two , 6:1 (1997);

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Romano, A. 'Peace is possible: lessons from the Mozambique peace process', Paper presented at Learning from Conflict Resolution in Africa: Workshop on the Experience of Individual and Institutional Mediators. Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation and the Tanzanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation, (Arusha, 21-23 January 1998), p.7.

3.2.4 Other Actors

Then, at the June 1996 summit, with Kenya and Ethiopia joining the five states that participated in the original Cairo and Tunis summits of regional leaders, Ugandan president Museveni managed to secure from Burundi's Hutu president Ntibantunganya and Tutsi prime minister Ndiwayo a joint request that a regional peacekeeping force be established to help calm the situation in Burundi. This was wholly unanticipated, given the long-standing fear among Tutsis that an international military intervention might neutralize the Tutsi-controlled Burundian army; which Tutsis considered their last defense against the threat of Rwanda-style Tutsi annihilation. It is possible that elements of the Tutsi leadership may have seen a regional peacekeeping force as heading off the more feared alternative of a UN peace enforcement mission. Whatever the motivation, the request was welcomed by the United States and the international community. Washington recognized that the UN secretary-general's proposal for a standby UN force was going nowhere, and saw the regional initiative as the only viable alternative.²⁶

Unfortunately, this conception of a regional peacekeeping force was short-lived. Almost immediately, the prime minister and president began feuding over what they and the regional leaders had agreed on. The more extreme elements of the Tutsi community, who found the prospect of a regional force threatening, reacted sharply and violently. The prime minister had apparently not adequately prepared the UPRONA hard-liners for the intervention, and had begun to retreat from the agreement he and the president had reached with regional leaders. Moreover, although Hutu leaders inside Burundi strongly supported the intervention, CNDD leader Leonard Nyangoma also opposed it, fearing that it would pressure the rebellion to disarm before its political demands had been met. The political and security situation inside Burundi rapidly deteriorated. In gruesome act of violence, Hutu rebels slaughtered more than three hundred Tutsi civilians at Bungendanyana. At the funeral service that followed, President Sylvestre Ntibantunganya was forced to flee for his life. Then, on July 25, 1996, the Burundian army declared Pierre Buyoya—who, three years earlier, had guided Burundi into a democratic

²⁶ Evans, 'Responding to crises in the African Great Lakes', Adelphi Paper ,311, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies/Oxford University Press, 1997), p.33-39;

election he then lost to Melchior Ndadaye as Burundi's new president. The request for a regional peacekeeping force was immediately withdrawn.²⁷

3.2.5 Regional Leaders Impose Economic Sanctions

The decision to impose comprehensive economic sanctions against the government of Burundi was reportedly the most contentious issue discussed at the Arusha summit of July 1996. The regional leaders presented a united public face, but Nyerere later acknowledged their uncertainty about what they would do in practice. In the private deliberations that produced the final summit communiqué, Ugandan president Museveni had taken the hardest line. He wanted to demand that the Burundian army relinquish power immediately or face a regional military intervention. Museveni's position reflected his fundamental contempt for the principal actors on both sides of the conflict. In his view, there were no patriots in Burundi; no leaders motivated by the country's national interest rather than personal interests or those of a narrowly defined group. Moreover, in Museveni's view, the principal contestants for power were all killers, and a sustainable peace would never come from a negotiation among killers.²⁸

Nyerere saw the sanctions against Burundi much as he and a number of international actors had seen those against the apartheid South African regime. They were a way of making it clear to the Tutsi elite that attempts to retain their monopoly of power would, in the end, be far more costly than a negotiated political settlement with the majority Hutu. He argued, in addition, that the imposition of sanctions would be an important message to the Hutu rebels that the international community was not abandoning their cause and that means other than military force were available to bring the Tutsi-dominated regime to the negotiating table.²⁹

Because Burundi was effectively landlocked, Nyerere argued, Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya had it within their power to make sanctions work. "For once," he told the special envoys, "we can do without the rest of the world." Later, in an interview with *Le Monde*, Nyerere publicly affirmed his confidence that sanctions would be effective: "As to sanctions I would

²⁷Reyntjens, F. "Burundi: Breaking the Cycle of Violence." (Minority Rights Group International Report, 1995).

²⁸Mthembu-Salter, G., 'A policy passed its "sell-by" date: an assessment of sanctions against Burundi', Report prepared for Action Aid, December 1998.

²⁹ International Crisis Group, 'Burundi under siege: lift the sanctions; re-launch the peace process', Burundi Report, 1, (28 April 1998), p.36-50;

simply like to remind you that they succeeded in South Africa, which is a far stronger country than Burundi. They take effect more slowly than bullets but they work.”³⁰

The issue of sanctions was also to become a major irritant in the relationship between the facilitator and the donor countries supporting the Arusha process. Initially, although the United States and Belgium supported the Nyerere-led initiative; some officials in both countries had reservations about the region’s decision to impose sanctions against Burundi. Some of these reservations reflected an ideological opposition to sanctions generally; but others were based on a reading that Buyoya was the most moderate Tutsi alternative and therefore should not be the target of sanctions. Whatever the reasons for the resistance of some American and Belgian policymakers, their perception about the regional sanctions decision provoked a harsh reaction from Nyerere and OAU secretary-general SalimSalim, both of whom felt betrayed by the West. Nyerere subsequently pleaded that the international community do nothing to weaken the region’s resolve: “Don’t give us the blessed excuse to relax sanctions . . . you have already made your point. Let the region do the job for you. You couldn’t apply the pressures. We will apply the pressures.”³¹ However, when it became clear that American and Belgian opposition to sanctions would not only send mixed signals to the Burundi coup-makers, whom the United States had already condemned, but also risk a major North-South confrontation, the United States and Belgium reaffirmed their support for the regional leaders and the Arusha process.

3.2.6 Mediation Led by Nelson Mandela

The sudden death of Nyerere provided an opportunity for Nelson Mandela, who had just completed his sole term as president of South Africa, to take over as the leader of the mediation efforts. The first thing Mandela did was to try to draw the militias back into the negotiations. When there was no progress, Mandela concentrated instead on bringing the remaining participants in the negotiations to a final agreement. He built on the foundations laid down by Nyerere, who had established committees to explore five key areas of focus in the negotiations: first, the nature of the conflict; second, democracy and good governance; third peace and

³⁰ International Crisis Group (ICG), *Burundi Under Siege*, 28 April 1998, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6d30.html> [accessed 25 January 2015]

³¹ A Report of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997.

security; fourth, reconstruction and development, and last, guarantees to support the accord's implementation.³²

One of the main unresolved issues was the future composition of the armed forces, which was at that point still predominantly Tutsi and was viewed as a threat to Hutu communities. Mandela's simple solution was to make it 50 percent Tutsi and 50 percent Hutu. This was widely criticized by some Burundian parties who argued that it was too simplistic or that it gave more military power to Tutsis than their proportion of the population warranted.³³ Yet the proposal addressed core issues on both sides of the ethnic divide. Tutsis were concerned that they would be the victims of genocide if Hutus controlled the government and military, while Hutus feared that Hutu politicians would be killed if the armed forces were not reformed.

In late August 2000, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement was signed. The agreement established a transitional government and included Mandela's suggested 50/50 reform of the military. It also contained, in Article 6, principles and measures relating to the prevention, suppression, and eradication of genocide, war crimes, and other crimes against humanity; three of the four crimes that states committed to protect populations from in endorsing R2P at the 2005 World Summit. The provisions called for: legislation to counter these crimes; the creation of a UN commission of inquiry; measures for combating impunity; educational programs; regional cooperation; the promotion of national inter-ethnic cooperation; a monument to remember victims of the crimes; and a day of remembrance.³⁴

The signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement was a major achievement, setting Burundi on a long road toward constitutional democracy and human rights protection, and ideally, away from a bloody past and present. Yet the civil war and related atrocities were not over. Absent from the negotiations were representatives of the two armed militias still at war with the military; *Conceil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces Pour la Défence de la Démocratie* (CNDD-FDD) meaning 'Forces for Defence of the Democracy' and '*Le Parti pour la Liberation du Peuple Hutu - Forces Nationales de Libération*' (PALIPEHUTU-FNL) literary meaning 'National Forces for Liberation of the Hutu'. Their refusal to sign the agreement left them as a significant threat as they remained beyond the reach

³²International Crisis Group, "Burundi Peace Process: Tough Challenges Ahead," Central Africa Briefing, Arusha/Brussels, 27 August 2000.

³³Mthembu-Salter, "Burundi's Peace Agreement Without Peace, op cit.p.33.

³⁴Arusha Peace And Reconciliation Agreement For Burundi, Chapter II, Article 6.

of the ceasefire and cessation of hostilities provision included in it. The two militias actually intensified their attacks on government forces after the signing of the Arusha Agreement, and they, along with the military, killed hundreds of civilians. The full implications of this became tragically clear in the early months of 1999 as FNL fighters created road blocks on the road to Bujumbura, the country's capital, ambushing buses filled with passengers. Later that year, FDD forces killed dozens of civilians and burned over 600 homes in the eastern provinces of Burundi to discourage those who had fled to Tanzania from returning. FNL and FDD frequently ambushed regroupment camps, attacking soldiers and stealing food from civilians.³⁵ Additionally, human rights defenders and humanitarian workers were abducted, attacked, and killed by the militias and threatened by government forces. Hampered by the violence and lack of support, even among some of its signatories, implementation of the agreement stalled.

To prevent the agreement from falling apart, Mandela convened a regional summit in Arusha in July 2001. He managed to secure an agreement on a transitional government, which entailed a Tutsi leadership for 18 months, after which a representative of a predominantly Hutu party would take over. Mandela then convened another summit in October 2001 in Pretoria where it was agreed that troops from the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) would deploy to Burundi to protect Hutu politicians returning from exile to serve in the transitional government.³⁶

3.2.7 Mediation Led by Jacob Zuma

The thrust of the mediation efforts by the end of 2001 was thus almost entirely focused on negotiating with the CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL to reach a ceasefire with the government. South African deputy president Jacob Zuma had been delegated by his government to take over this task from Mandela. In early December 2002, Zuma successfully negotiated a ceasefire agreement between the government and CNDD-FDD. The implementation of this agreement was to be monitored by an African Union (AU) Force to be called the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB). By mid-2003, over 3,000 troops had been deployed to Burundi. Despite AMIB's presence, both the CNDD-FDD and the military repeatedly violated the

³⁵Gregory Mthembu-Salter, "Burundi Recent History," In *Africa South Of the Sahara 2008*, Ed. I. Frame (London: Routledge, 2008), 157.

³⁶Amnesty International, "Burundi: Preparing For Peace – One Year On: A Public Appeal By Amnesty International," August 2001, 1, Available At: [Http://Www.Amnesty.Org/En/Library/Asset/Afr16/037/2001/En/A86c1f14-D8f8-11dd-Ad8c-F3d4445c118e/Afr160372001en.Pdf](http://www.Amnesty.Org/En/Library/Asset/Afr16/037/2001/En/A86c1f14-D8f8-11dd-Ad8c-F3d4445c118e/Afr160372001en.Pdf).

ceasefire agreement and the fighting intensified. Throughout 2003, atrocities continued unabatedly, as rebel groups indiscriminately attacked civilian villages and the armed forces carried out extrajudicial killings.³⁷

Seven months later, the government and the CNDD-FDD finally signed a comprehensive peace agreement that arranged for the group's integration into the military as well as the political arena. With the CNDD-FDD's entry into government, clashes between its forces and the Burundi Armed Forces (FAB) largely subsided and the population finally saw a reduction in atrocities. Meanwhile, Zuma continued to seek to persuade the leaders of the PALIPEHUTU-FNL, the one militia continuing hostilities against the government (hostilities that included a massacre of 150 civilians in August 2004), to agree to a ceasefire. The armed group ultimately agreed to a ceasefire in late 2006 and demobilized and joined the political process in 2009, though this agreement broke and the rebel movement is still operating from the Eastern DRC.

3.3 Regional Peacekeepers

The 2000 Arusha Agreement "called for a UN peacekeeping operation to assist with the implementation of the peace agreement."³⁸ However, the UN refused to authorize the force because both the CNDD-FDD and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL failed to sign the agreement and continued their fight against the military, which meant that there was no comprehensive ceasefire in place. In October 2001, then mediator Nelson Mandela agreed to deploy a 700-member South African force to Burundi. In a context of continued armed confrontation, its mission was to protect returning politicians in order to enable the power-sharing transitional government to take shape.³⁹

In January 2003, South Africa, Ethiopia, and Mozambique agreed to contribute troops for AMIB, and by mid-year over 3,000 had deployed in Burundi.⁴⁰ Their main objective was "to create conditions sufficiently stable for the UN Security Council to authorise a UN intervention,"⁴¹ a near impossible task given that AMIB lacked a mandate to protect civilians. As a result, "after several months on the ground, senior AMIB officials drafted rules of engagement (ROEs) to allow their troops to use force to protect civilians in 'imminent danger of serious

³⁷Mthembu-Salter, "Burundi—Recent History," op cit.p.159.

³⁸Kristiana, P. The African Union's Emerging Peace and Security Regime, Opportunities And Challenges For Delivering on the Responsibility To Protect, ISS Monograph No. 119 (Ottawa: The North-South Institute, May 2005), p.34, Available At: [Http://Www.Iss.Co.Za/Pubs/Monographs/No119/Mono119.Pdf](http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No119/Mono119.Pdf).

³⁹Mthembu-Salter, "Burundi—Recent History," op cit.p.158.

⁴⁰Ibid.p. 159.

⁴¹Powell, The African Union's Emerging Peace And Security Regime, op cit. p.34.

injury or death,' including in cases of genocide and mass killings, although such engagement required prior authorization from military and civilian officers."⁴²

Although AMIB had deployed, the mission made little progress in establishing camps for demobilized fighters and both sides repeatedly violated the ceasefire agreement, with the fighting in fact getting worse. AMIB itself became the target of militia attacks. As AMIB soldiers were establishing a camp for Palipehutu-FNL near the Kibira forest, CNDD-FDD forces fired upon them. Reporting to the UN Security Council in late 2003, Zuma formally asked that AMIB be replaced by a UN force. In May 2004, in response to Zuma's request and because of the progress in establishing a comprehensive ceasefire agreement with the CNDD-FDD, the council passed resolution 1545 establishing the Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi (ONUB), which formally commenced operations in June 2004, for an initial six-month period.⁴³ With a Chapter VII mandate, ONUB was authorized to protect civilians. It enforced the ceasefires, administered the camps for CNDD-FDD fighters, and later facilitated either their demobilization or integration into the new national armed forces—Forces de Défense Nationales (FDN), which formally replaced the FAB in early 2004.⁴⁴

3.4 Analyzing Mediation Efforts

Mediation efforts were ultimately successful in ending Burundi's civil war and halting atrocities against civilians. As a protection tool, however, the process suffered from several weaknesses. The efforts were premised on the belief that a negotiated political solution would automatically lead to a cessation in violence and atrocities. Accepting the need for a political solution as the starting point, "the international community only faintly recognized that continuing violence posed the greatest threat, in that it continually renewed and strengthened mutual fear and distrust that undermined efforts at peace-building. The violence was seen as a result of the parties' dispute rather than as a cause."⁴⁵ This, along with other factors, meant that at times "the solutions issuing from the negotiations; addressed the wrong problems. The continuing fighting between Hutu insurgents and the Hutu government after 2003 serves as

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Mthembu-Salter, "Burundi—Recent History," op cit. p.159.

⁴⁴ Economist Intelligence Unit, "Burundi Country Report," February 2004, 13. http://www.eurac-network.org/web/uploads/documents/20100504_12779.pdf accessed on 25 Jan 2015.

⁴⁵ Lund, M. et al, "Learning from Burundi's Failed Democratic Transition, 1993-96: Did International Initiatives Match the Problem?" In Barnett Rubin, ed., *Cases and Strategies for Preventative Action*. (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 1998), p.72.

evidence for this.”⁴⁶ Furthermore, while the ultimate goal of the negotiations was to develop a power-sharing and army integration agreement, the frequent exclusion of key perpetrators of atrocities from the process made it difficult to bring an end to the fighting. Thus those committing the worst of the atrocities found themselves outside of the negotiations and thus lacked incentives to cease their hostilities, including their attacks on civilians.

Another weakness in the early stages of the process was the fact that the military did not perceive Nyerere as a neutral third party. In fact, the FAB leadership believed that he and the Tanzanian government (which they conflated) were implacably biased against it. They thought that Nyerere was too pro-Hutu and thus that he regarded the armed forces as an enemy to be defeated. Moreover, as other experiences have made clear the success of mediation efforts are largely determined by their reliance on robust supportive measures, such as the presence of peacekeeping forces and human rights monitoring.⁴⁷ These measures must be chosen in a sensitive manner that takes into account the interests of the various parties and the pressure points likely to motivate them toward compromise rather than to harden positions. Such measures were not always successfully employed during Burundi’s mediation process.

Finally, the contradictions and biases among the facilitators almost jeopardized mediation process for Burundi conflict. Burundi western allies like Belgium and US, strongly opposed economic sanctions on Burundi government contrary to the regional mediators especially Nyerere. Still, Museveni course of action was different to Nyerere’s, since he advocated for immediate deployment of the regional forces to oust the Buyoya regime. According to Smock, any mediator should be familiar with ‘techniques to pressure parties to negotiate using either sanctions or threats of force. He continues to stress that, mediators can succeed when their credibility and authority emanate from moral stature rather than formal power⁴⁸ . Regional leaders explicitly applied this approach, which relatively yielded some positive results.

⁴⁶Nijimbere, “Insider Mediators.”p.12, http://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Other_Resources/MED_Insider_Mediators.pdf accessed on 25 Jan 2015.

⁴⁷Mthembu-Salter, “Burundi’s Peace Agreement Without Peace,” p.28. See Also Lund, Rubin, And Hara, “Learning From Burundi’s Failed Democratic Transition,” p.80.

⁴⁸Smock, D. (ed), *Making War and Waging Peace: Foreign Intervention in Africa* , (Washington DC: US Institute for Peace, 1993), p.243.

3.5 Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)

The relationships between the actors involved in DDR are crucial for consideration. International community has been the custodian; all assistance has been channeled through the government. In a country that has just emerged from civil war and with a government that is considered to be incapable and corrupt, this dependence on the national government creates problems. On the ground there is little trust in the government and the National Commission for Demobilization, Reintegration ‘*Commission Nationale de Démobilisation, Réinsertion et Réintégration/ CNDRR*) and corruption is seen to be rampant. The replacement of the previous *Sécretaire Exécutif* of the CNDRR in 2008 due to a corruption scandal has not improved the perception of the CNDRR of being corrupt. As a result of this not all payments to ex-combatants have been made in full, and what was paid endured many delays. “If you give support to the government the money doesn’t end up here and only the people up there are profiting.” The delayed payments of benefits to ex-combatants by the CNDRR have caused several manifestations by protesting ex-combatants in front of the CNDRR office. Apart from corruption, payments have been delayed to the government by the World Bank when the programme proposals for DDR handed in by the CNDRR were not yet considered to be in order.⁴⁹

On the other hand, not all problems can be blamed on corruption and incapacity on the side of the Burundian government. Complaints were made that the procedures are excessive and time consuming, and that “donors are demanding things to go as they propose them while their ideas do not always match the realities and needs on the ground.” Another problem is that while there are many international donors (both multilateral and bilateral) active in reintegration, according to a UN official there is no mapping of who does what where.⁵⁰ In this respect, the situation in Burundi is not atypical. Many DDR programmes are frustrated by the weaknesses of post-civil war governments. Yet, the fact that the DDR programme from the start prioritized working with the national government has important consequences for the extent to which the programme was also rooted and embedded at the local, sub-national level. Indeed, in the case of Burundi, people experienced a lot of frustration about the lack of involvement by some local

⁴⁹Willems, at al, *Connecting Community Security: Experiences From Working Group Community Security and Community-Based In Fragile States* November 2010 Centre For Conflict Studies, Utrecht University http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/4BBDB2E419277B7D852577D5005A8A9A-Full_Report.pdf accessed on 12 Nov 14.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

actors. Ex-combatants aired their grievances of not being sufficiently implicated in the execution of the programme and the way decisions on the programme were made. Despite the system of focal points; ex-combatants who represented the ex-combatants in a commune at provincial and national levels; and the free choice the programme intended to give ex-combatants on their reintegration kit, many felt that the programme was forced upon them. “Demobilized are not being implicated in the programme and we can’t make any choices. They should allow us to choose ourselves, but now it is like a dictatorship. We are treated as children, and they are like a father who buys pants for his son, but doesn’t care whether it is red or blue. But it matters for the child. We should be more involved in the decision making”.⁵¹

In general, many ex-combatants feel they can play a more active role in the DDR process and support the development of the country, but like other community members they generally find they need to be given material support to enable them to do so. Similar complaints about being neglected in the programme have been made by community members. The focus of the DDR programme was primarily on individual combatants, and the communities in which these ex-combatants were to be reintegrated were not involved in the decision of what benefits were to be granted. As a representative of an NGO explained, this lack of involvement resulted in projects that did not match the context in which it had to be implemented: “Car mechanics was given to someone in a region where only the bishop and the governor had a car.” Communities were also hardly prepared for the arrival of ex-combatants and not supported in receiving them. Yet it was observed that “an approach that includes the community is needed because reintegration is much easier when the ex-combatants are understood.”⁵²

3.6 Current Issues

The peace-making process ended in 2009 and peacekeeping troops withdrew soon afterwards. As the war-torn country moved ahead in restoring peace and security, it adopted a number of strategies to address its political, social and economic challenges. Among these was the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy that was placed on the agenda of the UN Peacebuilding Council, which focused on issues such as governance and corruption, the promotion of human rights and action to combat impunity. A land commission was established to address land claims arising from the reintegration of returnees, disputes arising from the scarcity of land and

⁵¹Willems at al, *Connecting Community Security*, op cit.

⁵²Ibid.

poor security of land rights. There was also a push to tackle women's rights in land and inheritance laws.⁵³

Elections were held in 2010 and considered inclusive by the UN and international observers, but opposition parties disputed the results and boycotted the rest of the electoral process, leaving the party in power, the CNDD-FDD, as the sole candidate. The UN Peacebuilding Commission noted that during this period there was an increase in human rights violations, including summary executions and torture, as well as political assassinations. Main opposition leaders went into exile and there was a narrowing of freedom of expression, movement and assembly. The international community subsequently pushed for the prosecution of extrajudicial killings and the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms.⁵⁴

Progress has been made in a number of areas and the UN has provided support for the reform of the electoral code and promoting dialogue through consultations with political parties in order to draw up a road map for the 2015 elections. Reforms have been made to combat corruption and measures have been taken to improve the business climate. Nevertheless, despite the establishment of a National Human Rights Commission and promises by the government to prosecute perpetrators, human rights violations still occur with impunity. While the Gatumba attack in 2011, when over 30 people were shot in a bar just outside Bujumbura, led to prosecution, Human Rights Watch noted that the trial was seriously flawed and that the report of the commission of inquiry was not published. In addition, there has been a delay in the implementation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, with the UN arguing that blanket amnesties cannot be given for grave crimes and critics claiming the current framework lend itself to political influence. The Land Commission has been accused of favouring returnees and generally ruling in favour of ethnic Hutus. Tensions are compounded by limited economic growth, the country's energy deficit and limited infrastructure.⁵⁵

Most recently, the adoption of the media law presents a serious concern regarding the freedom of the press and democratic governance in general, and there have been discussions in Parliament over the possible banning of political demonstrations. Human Rights Watch has also

⁵³ Daley, P.. *Gender & Genocide in Burundi: the search for spaces of peace in the Great Lakes region.* (Oxford: James Currey ,2008).

⁵⁴ Daley, P. *Gender & Genocide in Burundi: the search for spaces of peace in the Great Lakes region.* (Oxford: James Currey, 2008).

⁵⁵ *Burundi: Escalation of Political Violence in 2011, Human Rights Report:* <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/02/burundi-escalation-political-violence-2011> accessed on 25 Jan 2015.

raised concerns over impunity for crimes committed by the ruling party's growing youth league. In addition, there are allegations that the president is planning to amend the Constitution in order to allow him to extend his rule past two terms. The UN and International Crisis Group reports have also noted that Burundian rebel groups are active in the Kivus in the Democratic Republic of Congo, with links to the political opposition. These developments represent a worrying trend: the shrinking of political space in the country and the possibility of a resumption of violence.⁵⁶

In summary, the causes of Burundi civil conflict are multi-faceted; though they are not ethnic based *per se* but economic or power based. In Burundi civil conflict, several actors sufficed in the process to end the conflict. State and non-state actors got involved, though with different approaches altogether. The famous Vatican-based Sant' Egidio, as well some Western power like; US and Belgium advocated for a relaxed mediation approach whereas regional leaders took coercive approach. The signing of the 2000 Arusha peace agreement was a cornerstone to the transition to the peace-building phase. However, failure to put FNL Hutu rebel groups on board is still a security dilemma to the Burundi peace-building process. Also, the current political climate, where the incumbent Hutu president and his political party are attempting to change constitution in order to go for third term, may trigger re-escalation of the conflict.

⁵⁶ Burundi: From Electoral Boycott To Political Impasse Africa Report N°169 – 7 February 2011. International Crisis Group Working To Prevent Conflict Worldwide. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~Media/Files/Africa/Central-Africa/Burundi/169%20burundi%20from%20electoral%20boycott%20to%20political%20impasse%20english.pdf> Accessed On 13/11/2014.

CHAPTER FOUR

A Comparative Analysis of Conflict Management Efforts in the Burundi and Central Africa Republic

4.0 Introduction

This chapter explores a comparative perspective of the conflict management mechanisms of CAR and Burundi. After a comprehensive description of the outlines of conflict and conflict management in both Burundi and CAR in chapter two and three, chapter four then compares conflict management mechanisms so as to analytically decipher the similarities and differences inherent in the above named conflict areas. The comparative analysis will focus mainly on the approaches applied in the management of Burundi and CAR conflicts.

The Republic of Burundi and Central Africa Republic have several commonalities, including historical realities, similar official language (French), endemic civil conflicts as well as methods applied in trying to end conflicts among others. Burundi and CAR have been colonized by Belgium and France respective, though the post-independence Burundi has been characterized by French defence and security cooperation. Such cooperation arrangements have increased French roles and influence in the Burundi internal affairs. Therefore French culture and language are significant to Burundi as it is in the CAR. Additionally, both countries have been experiencing chronic coups since independence till early twentieth first century. These countries have undergone severe political instabilities due to social exclusion and discriminations.

For over three decades now, Burundi and CAR have been experiencing protracted civil conflicts which have claimed and still claiming thousands of innocent lives. Regional and International communities have intervened to their outmost. Regional actors have been very instrumental in efforts to restore peace and stability in both countries. International divergent interests as well as manipulation forces have been overt in either trying to maintain status quo or to showcase that, the absence of great powers in the conflict management efforts cannot yield anything tangible.

4.1 Approaches to the Conflict Management

Approaches to conflict management will be examined under the following headings: First, before any negotiation takes place, pre-negotiation procedures should be adhered to.¹ The intention is to create a rapport between the facilitators and warring parties or among the warring

¹Rupesinghe, Kumar (ed). Conflict Transformation. (London: Macmillan, 1995),p.80.

parties themselves. Second, facilitators can hardly mediate prudently without the knowledge of the conflict dynamics as well as having clear understanding of the key actors in that particular conflict. Lack of ownership of the process by some actors and failure to set genuine timelines for negotiations create big challenges to conflict management process. Inefficiencies by some of the facilitators to timely evaluate successes and failures as well as properly identifying the strategic constituencies during negotiation processes affect peace process. Lastly, for any peace process to be successful, involvement of local or regional peacekeepers and feasible sustainability statement for the peace efforts are crucial.

4.1.1 Pre-Negotiation Stage

It has been argued that the pre-negotiation is the most important phase of a negotiation because during it, significant discussions take place, hence significant agreement might arise.² An important point to assess the success of the pre-negotiation stage (and, indeed, the entire negotiation process) is why conflicting parties come to the negotiation table. Do they really want to peacefully resolve their conflict (reduce intractability) or is it just a tactical manoeuvre to buy time to pursue the military option allowing one's forces to be regrouped and resupplied? In the cases of Burundi and CAR, the loss of their colonisers' support; Belgium and France respectively as well as the increased efficiency of the regional bodies in conflict management and intervention resulted in a mutually hurting military stalemate. From the perspective of the CAR, the withdrawal of both French and Chadian troops in 2012,³ weakened Bangui's capacity to sustain its war effort. The result of the operation was the government coming to the realisation that a military solution was beyond its capacity. However, since the Chadian military support shifted to the rebel movement (Seleka); what was perceived as a hurting stalemate reversed to power asymmetry and the Seleka rebels toppled Bozizi's regime in 2013.

On the part of Burundi, the leading rebel groups: National Council for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD) could not face another offensive in 2000s like it had before against government forces without major losses on its side. Clearly, then the warring parties came to the negotiating table not as a result of any moral drive for peace, but simply because the military option at that stage was no longer viable, and because of the pressure to negotiate by regional states such as the Tanzania, South Africa and Uganda. But, it is also clear that both sides viewed

²Mwagiru, M. Conflict in Africa. Theory, processes, Institutions of Management, (Nairobi: Centre for Conflict management Research, 2006), p.114

³Berg, P. Country Conflict Analysis Studies. (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2008),p.10.

the military option as a viable alternative should they not have their desires satisfied through negotiations.⁴ The Arusha Peace Agreement was signed in 2000, but intensive negotiations had started as early as 1993. According to Zartman, the mediator needs to find a formula that meets the parties' demands and also to act in accordance with the dynamics of the parties.⁵ The proposal by Mandela on the agreement to establish a transitional government on equal power sharing (According to the Article 14 of the Arusha Peace Agreement,⁶ both parties had equal share 50/50 including defence and security sectors) yielded positive results. However, in this perception, such traditional methodology of conflict management addressing only negotiable interests of the parties and overlook the those non-negotiable ones like; recognition, identity, and rights to participation and development affects the resilience of the peace process.⁷

The CAR case is different to Burundi because, the conflicting parties came to the negotiating table for the wrong reasons hoping to continue to play the zero-sum games they played out on the battlefield violating ceasefire agreements. This is typically similar to the Kenya's mediation of the Uganda conflict in 1985. Where 2 parties signed the peace agreement and immediately resumed fighting which ended by ousting the Tito Okello regime by the National Resistance Movement under the leadership of Museveni.⁸ The Libreville Peace Agreement of the January 2013, failed after 3 months, the Seleka rebel group took-over power from Buzizi regime.⁹ The speed with which the agreements were made indicated perhaps how unlikely the actors thought they would have to comply with the commitments. The catalyst to this could be attributed to number of factors including inconsistencies in National Dialogues of 2003 and 2008, where a part of the parties to the conflict would be sidelined. For instance, during the 2003 National Dialogue, where some members of the opposition were excluded including the former president Patasse and his former defence minister.¹⁰ Also, there were no representatives attending on behalf of armed rebel groups; this is probably because many of today's rebel groups

⁴Daley, P.. "Ethnicity and Political Violence in Africa: The Challenge to the Burundi State." (*Political Geography* 25: 657-679, 2006).

⁵Zartman, W. Conflict Resolution. Conflict and Intervention in Africa, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p.255-256.

⁶Arusha Peace And Reconciliation Agreement For Burundi, Chapter II, Article 14.

⁷Mwagiru, M. opcit, p.104.

⁸Ibid. p. 105.

⁹ International Crisis Group. Central African Republic: Priorities of the Transition Africa Report N°203 | 11 June 2013 brussels@crisisgroup.org

¹⁰Mehler, A. Reshaping political space: the impact of armed insurgency in CAR. Working papers, No. 116. Hamburg: GIGA Institute of African Affairs, (2009).

had not officially formed at the time of the conference. This highlights the new status of the groups. Of course, members of the current day rebel groups may well have attended the National Dialogue independently, or as members of other organisations. In such circumstances where power asymmetry exists between warring parties, Moore contends that the mediator has to work with both weaker and stronger parties to minimize the negative effects of unequal power.¹¹ Throughout this process the facilitator ignored this idea. Stringent measures against the Buzizi regime were put towards his fall in 2013. The presence of the foreign troops in Bangui particularly from France, Chad and South Africa offered him confidence to overlook the implementation process of the peace agreements and results of the National Dialogues. Towards 2013, when France and Chad shifted their support to the Seleka coalition rebel movements,¹² still there was power asymmetry in favour of the rebels, who immediately took that advantage and ousted Buzizi government in March 2013. The role of the intruders in the CAR civil conflict has continued to jeopardize the realization of the hurting stalemate to the parties.

In the Burundi case, while political parties came to the negotiating table with fixed position; they maintained a flexible posture to ensure that negotiations did not stalemate, although all parties played brinkmanship to the extreme. Besides the willingness to compromise, the other distinctive character about the Burundi case is that the willingness to talk peace came from regional actors themselves with limited finger prints by international brokers. However, it must be noted that this willingness to compromise also related in large measure to the prudent mediation as well as various parties having a true appreciation of their relative strengths and weaknesses. Both the Tutsi led government forces and Hutu rebel groups, inherently possessed grave weaknesses due to their ethnic-based construction.¹³ This issue provided the countervailing balance that provided one of the necessary incentives for compromise. On the other hand, CAR had been similarly segmented on ethnic grounds, though Bozizi regime could not compromise accordingly.

¹¹ Moore, C. *The Mediation Process. Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict*, (San Francisco: Jossey – Bass, 2003), p.391.

¹² Hovil, L., *Why are African conflicts so often misunderstood?*, African Arguments, 14 February 2014, <http://africanarguments.org/2014/02/10/why-do-we-continually-misunderstand-conflict-in-africa-by-lucy-hovil/> (accessed 23 November 2014).

¹³ Åshild F. *Power-sharing and Peacebuilding in Burundi. Power-sharing Agreements, Negotiations and Peace Processes* Center for the Study of Civil War International Peace Research Institute. (Oslo: University of California, 2008).

Despite the ripeness and mutually hurting stalemate in the Burundi conflict, the conflict in Burundi was equally intractable like the one in CAR. It must then be asked why there has been only one major agreement signed in Burundi, and the country has been able to hold its first and second elections with an all-inclusive government and is currently preparing to hold its third one in 2015. In CAR however, numerous agreements and ceasefires have been signed while elections have been conducted twice in 2005 and 2010 respectively, despite subsequent coup of 2013 that disrupted peace process and re-escalation of the civil war. The international and regional economic communities (RECs) are concerned with the current political climate in Burundi where the Hutu ruling political elites are threatening to change the country's constitution in favour of the incumbent president. This alone if happened would take same direction as CAR case, hence likely to re-ignite violence.

4.1.2 Understanding Root Causes

It is clear from recent experiences in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia that there is need for a thorough understanding of the root causes of a given conflict. It stands to reason that any successful intervention is premised on knowledge of how and why the conflict started in the first place. Addressing the sources which generated the conflict would then form a basis of the management to the conflict¹⁴. In the case of Burundi, it is difficult not to escape the stark fact that the root causes of the conflict had less to do with ethnic (Tutsi vs Hutu) considerations. Rather, this has been used as vehicles for their own political ambitions.

Conversely, both intra-state conflicts in CAR and Burundi were influenced by grievances, ethnicity and identity issues and the exclusion of ethnic groups. In Burundi, the majority Hutu were dominated and discriminated by the minority Tutsi throughout the country, while in CAR those living in the south benefitted more from the country's economic prosperity than those in the north. The people from arid and semi-arid north has been marginalized by different successive regimes, and often conceived as foreigners (Chadians).¹⁵

A comparison of the criteria determining the intractability of a conflict reveals that both case studies were protracted with the existence of identity denigration. Resource extraction based on greed did not play a role in these conflicts although parties benefited from the crises to the extent that the maintenance of the conflict maintained desirable power structures and other forms

¹⁴Rupesinghe, Kumar (ed). Op cit, p.81.

¹⁵Berg, P. "A Crisis-Complex, not Complex Crises: Conflict Dynamics in the Sudan, Chad and Central African Republic Tri-Border Area." *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft*. 2008, No. 4, p. 72-86.

of emotional and psychological gain. Although scholars consider the conflict in Burundi to be primarily an ethnic one and that in CAR an economic one, it would seem that in both case studies, the conflicts were motivated primarily by the sense of exclusion experienced by some members of the society in declining socio-economic conditions. Ethnicity and economic opportunities were used as tools to create divisions in the respective societies. According to Burton, it is the denial of human needs, of which ethnic identity is merely one, that finally emerges as the source of conflict, be it domestic, communal, international or inter-state.¹⁶

Consider in this regard that in the 2000 Arusha Peace Agreement between Tutsi government led, and Hutu rebel movements, yet, the main Hutu rebel groups; National Council for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD) and Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People – National Forces for Liberation (PALIPEHUTU-FNL) refused to sign the ceasefire and fighting continued, including a major rebel assault on Bujumbura in July 2003, and an attack on Gatumba transit camp, in which 150 Banyamulenge from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) were killed and for which FNL claimed responsibility. Only towards the end of 2003, an agreement was reached between the government and the CNDD-FDD, though one Hutu rebel group (FNL) boycotted the ceasefire agreement and resumed violence till date.¹⁷ In CAR, the emergence of rebel groups in CAR is a more recent phenomenon. Most of CAR's rebel groups announced their status officially from 2005 onwards. Though, that does not imply that rebel groups never existed before. There has been an increased membership of rebel groups in order to gain from Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) schemes.¹⁸

Until the communities in each country are fully integrated with equal access to resources and services, both countries are at risk of a continuous to armed conflict. The lesson to be learnt from this is that it is always easier to resolve a conflict where issues of divergence are clearly put on the agenda and where such issues go beyond the mere hunger for power among political elites.

4.1.3 Ownership of the Peace Process

The sustainability of the peace process is dependent upon the empowerment of local actors so that they become the primary architects, owners and long-term stakeholders in the

¹⁶ Burton, J. & Dukes, F. *Conflict: Reading in Management & Resolution*, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd), 1990, p.146.

¹⁷Mthembu-Salter, G. "Burundi Recent History," In *Africa South Of the Sahara 2008*, Ed. I. Frame (London: Routledge, 2008), 159.

¹⁸Spittaels, S. & Hilgert, F. *Mapping Conflict Motives: Central African Republic*. Antwerp 17 February 2009.

peace process. The axiom of this statement is clearly borne out in the Burundi situation where the Peace Agreements were, in large measures, imposed upon the parties. In this sense, for instance, the former Presidents of Tanzania and South Africa: Nyerere and Mandela respectively, were the real architects of the 2000 Arusha Peace Agreement. However, the same formula did not work well with CAR where Gabon president Bongo, as talks leading to the Libreville Peace Accords, fighting continued and eventually Seleka rebel movement took over power in 2013. In 2013, Margaret Vogt (the head of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central Africa Republic -BINUCA) argued for a more strategic, concerted regional approach to the CAR crisis. She claimed that, leaders and combatants of many of the rebel groups had connections to Chad and were of Chadian Origin, which challenged the sense of ownership and their commitment to the peace process.¹⁹This is an indicative of the fact that the CAR themselves did not own the peace process and therefore did not feel obliged to obey its terms. In the Burundi case, the situation was the reverse. The role of outside mediators such as Nyerere or later Mandela was taken by belligerents as a golden opportunity. Additionally, there were no internal facilitators whom the parties could agree upon in both conflict areas. This once again underlined the fact that the Libreville Accords was not owned by CAR themselves. In this way, the peace process in Burundi was truly owned by all parties and more importantly, by Burundians in general, and as such they had a vested interest in its maintenance.

4.1.4 Identifying all the Actors

It is vital to identify all actors (big and small) and bringing them to the negotiating table. Failure to do this could result in the alienation of key stakeholders and role-players from the peace process. In Burundi the former Tutsi government and rebel Hutu groups could be considered the main actors in the conflict, while a similar situation existed in CAR where the government was at war with an amalgamation of the rebel parties in the country. Political entrepreneurs, who sought to benefit from the instability, existed in both case studies. In CAR, regional actors, namely Chad and Sudan, played significant roles in supporting and indeed fuelling the conflict in the country by, amongst others, hosting and supporting the rebels.²⁰

¹⁹ United Nations: Meetings Coverage and Press Release, SC/10879, 11 January 2013. <http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc10879.doc.htm> accessed on 19 January 2015.

²⁰Giroux Jennifer et al. Regional And Global Axes Of Conflict -The Tormented Triangle : The Regionalisation of Conflict In Sudan, Chad And The Central African Republic . Center for Security Studies, and Swiss peace.Working Paper No. 47.

In Burundi, regional actors, namely Tanzania, complicated the process to the extent that achieving a solution under their leadership would contribute to their status within the region and indeed the continent. Tanzania did not support the appointment of Mandela as a mediator preferring a Tanzanian successor who would bring continuity to the process that had already begun under Nyerere.²¹ However, Tanzania became pivotal in supporting the mediator's endeavours to bring the Paliphehutu-FNL to the negotiating table because it was the only country able to apply pressure on the rebels by threatening to expel the thousands of refugees it hosted on its soil should they not accede to the peace process.

Moreover, the international actors in each of the respective conflicts were largely the same, CAR's troubles were further complicated by the ever present spectra of the former colonial power, France which interacted with the conflict in Africa through other Francophonie countries in the region and on a larger multilateral stage, including through the United Nations Security Council of which it is a permanent member. Burundi's former colonial power Belgium, did not however interact much with the situation in Burundi outside of contributing financial support through the European Union, to the peace process. Burundi also never found itself a champion amongst the permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council.²²

Additionally, non-official actors were less used in both conflict management systems. Mwangiri exposes the necessity of utilizing both official and non-official mediators and negotiators in conflict management processes.²³ In several instances, governments have also worked alongside or supported the efforts of private mediators as peacekeepers in African conflicts; for example the World Council of Churches (WCC) and All Africa Conferences of Churches (AACC) in the Sudanese negotiations of 1971-72, and the Roman Catholic lay organization Sant'Egidio and the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Beira in the Mozambique negotiations in 1989.²⁴ However, during the initial stages of Burundi negotiations, Sant'Egidio played a big role in mediation between former president Buyoya of Burundi and the Leader of the

²¹Khadiagala, G. "Burundi," in *Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organizations*, ed. Jane Boulden (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003).

²² Bryans, M., *Risk of Conflict? South Africa's Relations with the Central African Republic: Southern Africa-Issue in Focus*, (SA ePublications, 2013), p.69-72.

²³Mwangiri, op cit, p.109.

²⁴Nhema, G. *Quest for Peace in Africa. Transformations Democracy and Public Policy*, (Addis Ababa: OSSREA, 2004),p.76.

one rebel groups in Burundi MrGatoRwasa.²⁵ When MwalimuNyerere and other regional leaders took-over the responsibility of facilitating the negotiations between the warring parties in Burundi, little is heard about the Catholic lay. Basically, all conflicts ran short of involving non-official actors. This is emphasized by Mwangiri who opines that, though track two conflict management has been known for some time, it has been a less visible form of conflict management in Africa.²⁶

4.1.5 Identifying Facilitators

Mwangiri suggested some tips in identifying a qualified facilitator with two hats: One whodirectly outside the conflict system (exogenous) but has concrete knowledge of the conflict dynamics (endogenous); referred to as heterogeneous facilitator.²⁷ The question to posse here is; was Nyerere and Bongo qualifying as heterogeneous facilitators? By nature of the African conflict system, it is difficult to find regional facilitator who is not implicated in other state's conflict in one way or another. Though, in the case of Burundi, Manderu could fit the taste of Mwangiri. Nonetheless, whether exogenous / endogenous or heterogeneous, any facilitator ought to have background knowledge, analytic and mediation skills to make a positive contribution to the design process.²⁸

In the case of Burundi, because the peace was imposed and the architects were regional hegemonies, Nyerere as facilitator was perceived as partial since Tanzania was believed to be supporting the rebel movements against Burundi Tutsi led government. However, Nyerere's inherent integrity outweighed the perception, consequently yielding a success story. This is a different from CAR case where Bozizi lost trust in all regional leaders (Bongo, Deby and SassouNguesso) and resorted to seeking for help from South Africa.²⁹

In both case studies, the mediators insisted that the process be inclusive and all parties be involved. Even where parties were unwilling to engage in negotiations, mediators pursued them tirelessly, bilaterally or sometimes using third parties. The mediators also believed in assessing the realities on the ground and visited each of the countries where they held discussions with the

²⁵ Madeira, R. and Domingos, M., Untitled paper presented at Learning from Conflict Resolution in Africa: Workshop on the Experience of Individual and Institutional Mediators, MwalimuNyerere Foundation and the Tanzanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation, (Arusha, 21-23 January 1998), p.5.

²⁶Mwangiri, opcit, p. 128.

²⁷Ibid. p. 52.

²⁸Ibid.p.81.

²⁹ Bryans, M., Risk of Conflict? South Africa's Relations with the Central African Republic: Southern Africa-Issue in Focus, (SA ePublications, 2013), p.69-72.

relevant parties. In the case of CAR, Bongo has been commended for being the only mediator who investigated conditions in both the strongholds of the government and the rebels as a means of assessing objective conditions on the ground.³⁰

Again, while there are various similarities in the mediation processes for instance: both conflicts are classified as intra-state, and entry of the South African as a mediator; it would seem that a significant difference between the two case studies is the involvement and presence of the international community, particularly the former coloniser and the United Nations, in the mediation processes in CAR. In contrast to this, the peace process in Burundi was firmly guided by the regional leadership together with the mediator and governed by African principles. While the mediators' position with regard to conflict management initiatives remained that the parties to the conflict themselves could be the only parties to agree to and implement durable and sustainable solutions. The mediator was very restricted in its use of creativity and innovation in facilitating such an agreement with such indirect involvement from the international community in CAR. In addition, the mediator was not able to conclude its work in the country or oversee the implementation of the Libreville Agreement.

The peace agreement is usually preceded by a ceasefire which contributes to the cessation of hostilities, thereby creating an enabling environment in which negotiations can begin. In Burundi, the Arusha Agreement was signed in the absence of a ceasefire agreement. Essentially, there is no peace without ceasefire. But, it was clearly more necessary to sign the Arusha Agreement and work towards a ceasefire rather than waiting for all the sufficient conditions to be in place before signing the agreement. This is again evidence of the mediator exercising initiative and prudence in order to create momentum in a process that may otherwise have remained deadlocked. In June 2008, the Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed between the CAR and two of the rebel groups, Assembly for the Union of the Democratic Forces (APRD) and Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR), in Libreville Gabon. The third most important group Democratic Front of the Central Africa People (FDPC) did not sign the agreement, and the agreement was rejected by parts of the exiled UFDR leadership. The President of Gabon acted as the mediator, which eventually collapsed in 2013.³¹

³⁰Mehler, A. *Reshaping political space: the impact of armed insurgency in CAR*. Working papers, No. 116. Hamburg: GIGA Institute of African Affairs, (2009).

³¹Spittaels, S. & Hilgert, F. *Mapping Conflict Motives: Central African Republic*. Antwerpen: IPIS, 2009. http://www.ipisresearch.be/maps/CAR/20090217_Mapping_CAR.pdf Accessed on 17 Nov 14.

The mediator has had to be very creative, innovative and patient in ensuring the implementation of this Agreement. It has taken unwavering commitment and unceasing efforts by the mediator to maintain the momentum, sometimes in the face of stubbornness from the parties themselves, to bring the peace agreement to fulfillment. To this end, Africa in general and South Africa in particular supported African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) with a view to creating stability in the country to enable further international support for and confidence in the peace process.³²

While the will of the mediator when dealing with CAR may have been no less determined, the involvement of some regional actors severely restricted the mediator's creativity and innovation. The similarities of the 2003 and the 2013 coups are stark. Both coups were supported militarily by Chadian forces and politically by some ECCAS Presidents.³³ The main provisions of all of the agreements in CAR, DDR as well as the holding of free and fair, all inclusive elections have never been implemented as agreed.

4.1.6 Setting a Realistic Timetable

Setting a realistic timetable is vital for the success of any peace process. It should include: identification of root causes and significant actors, through such phrases as cease-fires, to the peacebuilding. A timetable which attempts to do too much over a short period of time may result in most cases not being done or being done very badly (such as demobilization of former combatants). This could then serve to undermine the credibility of the entire peace process. On the other hand, a timetable which results in protracted peace negotiations over a considerable period of time may result in the momentum for peace being lost. Both options are equally dangerous.³⁴

The protracted duration of these conflicts made it more difficult to conceptualise solutions acceptable to all parties, because factors and the emotions of actors mutate in intensity when prolonged. This may explain why in CAR parties are still unable to move decisively towards democratization and conflict resolution despite the factors contributing to that conflict being more negotiable. It would, for instance, have been relatively easy for the government to agree on the inclusion of all parties by implementing the 2008 Libreville Peace Agreement.

³²Mthembu-Salter, "Burundi—Recent History," op cit. p.159.

³³ International Crisis Group. Central African Republic: Priorities of the Transition Africa Report N°203 | 11 June 2013 brussels@crisisgroup.org

³⁴Movius, H. and Susskind, L.E., *Built to Win: Creating a World Class Negotiating Organization*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Press, 2009).

Protraction may also be the reason, despite the generations of minority rule and discrimination of Hutus, Burundi has now been able to enter into pilot and operationalize the power-sharing initiative as earlier agreed in the 2000 Arusha Peace Agreement.³⁵

Additionally, the length of the conflict resulted in a stalemate where the costs of the conflict outweighed the benefits to be derived from its conclusion encouraging parties to comply with mediation initiatives, except FNL (*Forces Nationales de Liberation*). A war weary population could also have encouraged this. Prolonged duration, when dealing with intractable conflicts could therefore contribute positively or negatively when attempting conflict management.

Despite this, both conflicts still continued intermittently because the main rebel movements remained outside the formal framework of the reconciliation and nation-building processes. The world believed that, the cessation of hostilities of all armed parties could be dated at 26 May 2008 when the Paliphehutu- FNL signed an unconditional ceasefire, but the renewal of violence by FNL in 2010 was and still is a great security concern. The conflict management efforts between 2003 to 2008 when the government, and several rebel movements signed peace agreements including conducting national dialogues was a hope for sustainable peace in CAR. The renewal of violence in CAR in 2013 by Seleka rebel movement and subsequent coup which ousted Bozizi, and Djotodia became the president then, greatly dented the 2008 Libreville Peace Agreement.³⁶

4.1.7 Evaluating Success and Failure

The crucial element of any peacekeeping design is to have a process evaluation mechanism, which indicates whether the main interests of the parties are being addressed: the precedents and principles used in searching for a solution and whether they were useful.³⁷

In the CAR case, such a built-in system evaluating success and failure was not designed into the process. If it was, perhaps the parties and international sponsors would have asked why throughout the negotiations leading up to the 2008 Libreville Accords, fighting on the ground continued. Part of the problem could also have been an unrealistic timetable (as explained above) which made no provision to evaluate why peace accord was not being implemented. Another

³⁵Mthembu-Salter, "Burundi's Peace Agreement Without Peace, op cit.p.33.

³⁶Daley, P.. Gender & Genocide in Burundi: the search for spaces of peace in the Great Lakes region. (Oxford: James Currey ,2008).

³⁷Mthembu-Salter, op cit, p.82.

problem which may have hindered an evaluation of success and failure is that the root causes were not properly spelled out. As such, it would be difficult to assess whether issues of divergence were being addressed or not.³⁸

In the Burundi case, this was not the case, as problem issues were clearly put on the agenda thus progress towards peace process could be assessed in terms of whether these root causes were being addressed or not. Knowing what the points of divergence that forms the basis for the successful management of the conflict and, hence this is the first step in the evaluation of success or failure of the peace process.

The 2000 Arusha Peace Agreement was signed by only 14 of the 19 political parties and did not include the provisions for a ceasefire. Tireless efforts and negotiations however led to two separate ceasefires with the two largest Hutu parties, the CNDD-FDD in October 2003 and the Paliphehutu-FNL in September 2006 respectively. With the inclusion of the Paliphehutu-FNL, now named the FNL, into the peace processes of the country, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi has been partly concluded.

It has been suggested that the Burundian parties have not once signed any agreement voluntarily (Arusha or any of the ceasefires) but were pressurized to do so by the regional community. Regional mediation efforts informally leveraged power to make the parties decide for negotiations.³⁹ Thibaut and Walker, concur with this concept though leave a leeway for the disputants to decide on their solutions.⁴⁰ The take here is that the mixture of both stick and carrot is crucial for any successful mediation processes. When considering the many agreements signed in CAR one has to wonder if this view is also relevant to CAR. It has also been suggested that Bozizi had over the years manipulated the regional and international community, including Bongo, by signing agreements, while using his family members in the government and National Assembly to scupper any potential gains along the way.

Meanwhile, when considering military support for the peace processes in each of the case studies, the 2000 Brahimi Report recommended that UN peacekeepers not be deployed until a comprehensive ceasefire was being implemented and there was peace to keep. In this context,

³⁸ Author, Interview with the Chief of Staff of the UN Multi-dimensional Integration Stabilization Mission in CAR in February 2015.

³⁹Zartman p. op cit. p.9.

⁴⁰Thibaut, J. Walker, L. Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis. (N.J: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1975), p.150.

only towards the end of 2003 was an agreement reached between the government and the CNDD-FDD in Burundi. In 2004, a UN peacekeeping force took over from African Union troops because there was peace to keep. On the other hand, in CAR, the presence of Libreville Peace Agreement of 2008, afforded regional force; Mission for the consolidation of peace in Central African Republic (MICOPAX) to deploy, and later on 19 July 2013, African-Led International Support Mission in the Central Africa Republic (AFISM-CAR or MISCA acronym in French) took over the mission. Consequently, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central Africa Republic (MINUSCA) under the UNSCR 2149(2014) took over the mission from the Africa Led Mission on 15 September 2014. The BINUCA (the United Nations Peace-Building Office in Central Africa Republic), which deployed in 2010, was subsumed in the new mission with effect from 15 September 2014.⁴¹

From 2010 to 2013, CAR was clouded by multiple forces with different missions. The MICOPAX was to keep and monitor the implementation of the 2008 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, though, due to its limited capacity; it could not endure the test of the time. The BINUCA was a peace-building office with limited efforts, apart from ensuring the Security Sector Reform (SSR) and DDR processes. The African Union Regional Task Force (AU-RTF), which has a specific mission to uproot Lord Resistance Army (LRA) in CAR. Then the South Africa Defense Forces, under bilateral arrangement; deployed to secure Bozizi regime with some concessions.⁴² The cocktail of forces in CAR could be attributed to the failures of CAR peace accord. The absence of the unified leadership or command for that matter, and divergence interests, rendered conflict management architectures in CAR useless. This underpins the earlier assumption that CAR could be an economic-based conflict unlike Burundi which is ethno-centric. Ethno-politics in CAR are proximate causes other than the root cause in its self.

4.1.8 Strategic Constituencies

Identifying strategic constituencies directly or indirectly attached to the conflict system is a panacea for sustainable peace. These include; relevant non-governmental organisations, the media, human rights and humanitarian institutions, peace institutions, religious institutions, independent scholars, former members of the military, members of the business community,

⁴¹International Crisis Group. Central African Republic: Priorities of the Transition Africa Report N°203 | 11 June 2013 brussels@crisisgroup.org

⁴²Bryans, M., Risk of Conflict? South Africa's Relations with the Central African Republic: Southern Africa-Issue in Focus, (SA ePublications, 2013), p.69-72.

intergovernmental and government officials and donors to mention but a few. To maximize their impact, various constituencies would form strategic alliances focused on particular conflicts, aspects of violent conflict or the overall goal of prevention.⁴³ In both cases, no such peace constituency existed, with civil society being relatively underdeveloped. Consequently, there was not a sufficient domestic pro-peace lobby to sustain the process before and after the signing of the Peace Accords. In the Burundi situation, things were dramatically simple to define, there are weak civil society nurtured by their ethnic differences, and same as in the CAR.

4.1.9 The role of Regional Peacekeepers

It is implied that, the role of the regional peacemakers would have significant implications to the members of local communities. Their first-hand knowledge on the conflict, actors, the political and economic situation and the cultural background will have a distinct 'comparative advantage' over other potential peacemakers wishing to act as third-party mediators".⁴⁴ The role of these regional peacekeepers take on added importance if one considers the erratic and ambivalent role played by outside peacekeepers, as was displayed in the Burundi case. More disconcerting though is the fact that in the Burundi case there were no regional peacekeepers which meant that parties were increasingly dependent on the attention of outside sponsors. However, later, South Africa which had extended its logistic muscles could not sustain it.

Following the assassination of President Ndadaye in October 1993, Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire decided to deploy the Mission of Protection and Restoration of Trust in Burundi (the Observation Mission to Re-establish Confidence in Burundi-*Mission de protection et d'observation pour le rétablissement de la confiance au Burundi* (MIPROBU) which would comprise 180 soldiers and 20 civilian observers, which was fiercely resisted by the Burundi government then, who accused the region of compromising its sovereignty and interfering in its internal affairs. In February 1994 only 18 men were deployed.⁴⁵ Belgium, the former colonial power only offered to provide logistical support to this mission. Many internal developments followed including the death of President Ndadaye's successor while external support from the region was hindered being viewed by the government as interference. In this climate the regional

⁴³Thibaut, J. Walker, op cit, p.150.

⁴⁴ Ibid.p.85

⁴⁵AmadouOuld-Abdullah, Burundi On The Brink 1993–95: A Un Special Envoy Reflects On Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, Dc: U.S. Institute Of Peace, 2000).

leadership including Museveni, Mobutu and Mwinyi invited former United States President Jimmy Carter to assist when it became apparent the situation in Burundi was not improving.⁴⁶

However, the United Nations stepped in only in July 1995 when the Secretary General announced the organisation would establish an enquiry into the 1993 massacres and assassination of President Ndadeye as well as to recommend measures to eradicate impunity and promote national reconciliation in Burundi". In the meantime, the Carter initiative resulted in Nyerere emerging as the most suitable candidate to lead the peace mission in Burundi. This set the stage for the Arusha negotiations to be led by him. The OAU had deployed a small peacekeeping force to Burundi from 1993-1996. However, besides this, no international or regional peacekeeping support was rendered to the country until April 2003 when the African Union established and deployed the first continental peacekeeping force AMIB, which aimed to create the conditions for the UN to deploy a peacekeeping force. The 2000 Arusha Agreement was not accompanied by a ceasefire. Although one was signed in October 2002 between the government of Burundi and the CNDD-FDD and the Paliphehutu-FNL, though did not hold. A unilateral ceasefire agreement was signed in Pretoria between the government of Burundi and the CNDD-FDD in October 2003.⁴⁷

Together with the efforts of AMIB to create the conditions of peace and security in the country and the unceasing work of the regional leadership to implement a political solution, the United Nations in May 2004 adopted Security Council Resolution 1545 establishing the UN Mission in Burundi with a chapter VII mandate. In June 2004 AMIB was transferred to ONUB, which was still largely staffed by African troops, mainly South Africa. The leadership of the African Union and the mediator had convincingly demonstrated to the United Nations that there was peace to keep in Burundi.

International support to Burundi was significantly different when compared to that in CAR. Firstly, there was very little contribution from the United Nations mainly because of the reluctance of the United States to intervene following its experience in Somalia and the former colonizer did not actively participate in this conflict resolution initiatives. Secondly, the conflict in Burundi occurred in close proximity to that in Rwanda where it is largely accepted that the international community failed in preventing the catastrophe of such gigantic proportions as

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Mthembu-Salter, "Burundi—Recent History," op cit.p.158.

Rwanda has come to be known. Perhaps the international community felt it best to leave the Africans to deal with Africa's problems.

It was therefore left to the Africans to create the political and security conditions that would encourage international support of the conflict management initiatives hence the deployment of AMIB in 2003. South Africa had also been actively involved and ever present in its mediation efforts since 1999. While the mediator has changed in the last decade, the country's commitment to the peace process had been constant and unwavering with South Africa even employed members of the South African National Defence Force as peacekeepers, supporting its political mandate. This did not occur in CAR. Until 2004, South African troops monitored the DDR process in Burundi, albeit under the AMIB and ONUB mandates.⁴⁸

Regional Powers including: Congo, Chad, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea were involved in the brokering of the CAR peace processes right from 2003 to 2013 under the auspices of the ECCAS. However, it failed to monitor the implementation of the agreement and regional powers did not prevent the Seleka coalition from seizing power thereafter. This is attributed to weak regional mediation innovations and initiatives, accompanied by the weak peace keeping forces. Lack of ownership by the local actors, affected the regional efforts unlike Burundi case, where both local and regional actors observed their commitments.

A wide range of actors have been deployed in CAR, including the UN (BINUCA, and other UN agencies), the African Union, and the ECCAS. The regional peacekeeping mission MICOPAX was, since July 2008, under the responsibility of the ECCAS. It had succeeded the FOMUC operation established in October 2002, following a decision of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African Republic (CEMAC). It was rather small operation (400 soldiers) composed of contingents coming from the ECCAS with operational support from France, and financial support through the EU's African Peace Facility (APF).⁴⁹

4.1.10 Sustaining the Effort

A comprehensive approach to peace requires an adequate investment of financial resources, patience and a sustained commitment from sponsors".⁵⁰ In the Burundi case, clearly this commitment on the part of the sponsors was lacking. For example, South Africa took the

⁴⁸Kristiana, P. The African Union's Emerging Peace and Security Regime, Opportunities And Challenges For Delivering on the Responsibility To Protect, ISS Monograph No. 119 (Ottawa: The North-South Institute, May 2005).

⁴⁹International Crisis Group (2013) Op cit.

⁵⁰Mthembu-Salter, op cit, p.158.

challenge alone with insignificant international support. The 2000 Arusha Agreement requested for a UN peacekeeping operation to assist with the implantation of the peace agreement, though, the UN refused the force because both the CNDD-FDD and the Palipehutu-FNL had failed to sign the ceasefire agreement. In October 2001, then mediator Nelson Mandela agreed to deploy a 700-member South African force to Burundi.⁵¹ In a context of continued armed confrontation, its mission was to protect returning politicians in order to enable the power-sharing transitional government to take shape.

Similarly, the National Dialogue (2003), event that fostered national unity and reconciliation in the CAR was primarily financed by the President of Gabon. This was a high powered six-week conference hosting over 350 participants.⁵² Both CAR and Burundi cases later became eligible for UN Peace-Building programmes to support SSR and DDR. These programmes have been funded by World Bank, UNDP and other donors. In CAR, these programmes (SSR/DDR) were implemented by the NGOs through UNDP, unlike Burundi, where the government collaborated with the donors.

⁵¹Amnesty International, “Burundi: Preparing For Peace – One Year On: A Public Appeal By Amnesty International,” August 2001, 1, Available At: [Http://Www.Amnesty.Org/En/Library/Asset/Afr16/037/2001/En/A86c1f14-D8f8-11dd-Ad8c-F3d4445c118e/Afr160372001en.Pdf](http://www.Amnesty.Org/En/Library/Asset/Afr16/037/2001/En/A86c1f14-D8f8-11dd-Ad8c-F3d4445c118e/Afr160372001en.Pdf).

⁵²Mehler, A. *Reshaping political space: the impact of armed insurgency in CAR*. Working papers, No. 116. Hamburg: GIGA Institute of African Affairs, (2009).

CHAPTER FIVE

Critical Analysis

5.0 Introduction

This chapter is the flagship of the study since it examines and tests the core objective and hypothesis of the study. It explores the conflict management mechanisms of CAR and Burundi. After a comprehensive description of the outlines of conflict and conflict management in both Burundi and CAR in chapter two and three, and comparative perspective in chapter four; chapter five then juxtaposes conflict management mechanism so as to analytically decipher the thematic areas inherent in the above named conflict areas. The chapter also includes information garnered from interviews of several respondents who are either practitioners or policymakers in the field of conflict management.


The following yardsticks are used for the critical analysis: factors responsible for the persistent conflicts in Africa; further examining the approaches to conflict management (earlier analysed in chapter four); and proffer strategies which African leaders would adopt to enhance peace and stability in the continent. Then this study will discuss the following issues: whether the objectives of the study have been met; whether the hypotheses have been tested and also link the suitability of the theoretical framework to the outcome of the study.

5.1 Factors Responsible for the Persistent Conflicts in Africa

The figure 1 below indicates the opinions by various respondents on the factors responsible for protracted civil conflicts in Africa. The common denominator here is that, the causal-effects factors appear to be structural in nature. According to Burton's theory of human needs, the inability to meet peoples' psychological and biological needs result into violent conflict. These include peoples' need for identity, security (from fear and want), recognition, participation, and autonomy.¹ These need cross-cuts to all other sectors, such as economic security, health security, political security, environmental security to mention but a few. However, the respondents validated thematic areas such as: Problem of identity, Discontent, Issue of participation, Political transition, Poor economy, Poverty and Proliferation of small and light weapons among others.

¹ Burton, J. Deviance, Terrorism and War: The Process of Solving Unsolved Social and Political Problems, (New York: St. martin's Press, 1979).

5.2. Figure: 1 Showing the Respondents Opinion on the Factors Responsible for Protracted Civil Conflicts in Africa



Source: Data collected by the researcher.

5.2.1 Analysis

Sixty Four respondents representing 32.6 per cent opined that the problem of lack of peace and political instability in Africa is as a result of lack of participation. 41,25,16 and 20 respondents representing 20.9, 12.7, 8.2 and 10.2 percent respectively opined that the problem are as a result of discontent, problem of identity, political transition and poor economy respectively. 50, 20, 17, 7 and 6 respondents representing 10.2, 8.7, 3.6 and 3.1 percent respectively posited that the problem are that of poor economy, poverty, proliferation of Small Arms and other factors respectively.

5.2.2 Issue of Participation

Top on the list of the major reasons for the occurrence of conflict and political instability in Africa is the issue of political exclusion. This involves the exclusive politics and absence of the democratic principles and values accompanied by poor governance. This is normally projected in the image of social identity. Corruption, nepotism, favouritism, tribalism and ethnicity have become the games of day. The issue of lack of participation is directly corrected with both issue of identity and poor economy. The exclusive political tendencies increase the

inequality in any society. The excuse for this has been through discrimination and demonization of those excluded mostly basing on the ethnic, religion and territory orientations.²

In essence, lack of participation refers to voluntary actions and choices that are open to individuals and groups in making demands on government and expressing support, or lack of support of government policies reaching their areas. In Burundi, the successive oppressive regimes forced Hutu ethnic group to form ethnic militias and rebel movements including CNDD and Palitihutu-FLN against the Tutsi dominated regime. After the 2003 coup in CAR, and exclusive politics played by Buzizi regime resulted in multiple formation of rebel movements since 2005. This was after the Buzizi regime failed to involve some of his opposition elements in the National Dialogue of 2005.³

5.2.3 Problem of Identity

Second top on the list of the major reasons for the occurrence of conflict and political instability in Africa is the issue of identity. This involves the self-definition of an individual with respect to his membership in a particular community that may be defined in social, political, economic or territorial terms. The issue of identity determines the extent to which an individual sees himself as being an integral member of the community. The perception of identity also sets parameters to the extent of the sort of sacrifice that individuals and group will make for the benefit of the community. Kofi Annan, explained the problem of identity and its implication on African states, when he stated that:

*“The widespread rise of what is called identity politics, coupled with the fact that fewer than 20 percent of all states are ethnically homogenous, means that political demagogues have little difficulty finding targets of opportunity and mobilizing support for chauvinist causes. The upsurge of “ethnic cleansing” in the 1990s provides stark evidence of the appalling human costs that this vicious exploitation of identity politics can generate”.*⁴

Ethnic groups are basically social formations that are distinguished by the communal character of their boundaries with language and culture being their most important attributes. By extension, ethnicity connotes the subjective perceptions of common origins, historical ties and

²Isaksson, A., (ed) Political Participation in Africa: Participatory Inequalities and the Role of Resources, Afrobarometer, www.afrobarometer.org/
<http://www.eldis.org/go/home&id=57078&type=Document#.VUUzMfAXXnE> (accessed on 20 February 2015).

³³ Central African Republic. International Religious Freedom Report 2006". U.S. Department of State <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2006/71292.htm> (accessed on 15 February 2015).

⁴Kofi A. Annan Preventing War and Disaster: A Growing Global Challenges (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1999).

memories. Most conflicts that have occurred in Africa have been attributed to differences that exist between 2 or more ethnic groups or the politicization of ethnicity as recourse to the acquisition of power. The Hutu/ Tutsi conflict in Burundi is an example of an ethnic conflict that has been aggravated by contention over power.⁵

In Western Sahara, Senegal (in Casamance), Angola (in Cabinda), Ethiopia (in Oromoland, Ogaden and Haud), Comoros (in Abjouan), Niger (in Agadez) and Mali (in Alawak), disaffected ethnic nationalities have been waging armed separatist struggles for autonomy or outright independence. In 2000s, Cameroun has increasingly become volatile since the beginning of the agitation for national self-determination by the San people of the Caprivi Strip and English-Speaking Cameroonians respectively.⁶

The second dimension of identity is that of religion. This is a very difficult issue to tackle because religion deals with the relationship between man and the supernatural. Religion can be understood in 2 related distinct forms. First, in a material realm, it refers to religious establishments as well as to social groups and movements whose primary interests relate to religious concerns.⁷ There is also the spiritual sense in which religion is seen as supernatural and beyond the material realm. In Nigeria for instance, the problem with religion today derives from its politicization. The presence of Boko Haram and its activities in the entire region is a crucial concern.

The third dimension of identity has to do with territory.⁸ Basically, this involves claims made by ethnic groups over land by virtue of their historical occupation. An example of such violent conflict is the Banyamurenge conflict in DRC. African states could establish a standing specialized commission on land and boundary issues. Aggrieved person or groups could forward their complaint to such commission. Boundary adjustment as a result of state or local government creation could be handled by such commission.

5.2.4 Discontent

Another major cause of conflicts in Africa relates to the issue of relative deprivation otherwise referred to as discontent. It is a perception of discrepancy between value expectations

⁵ Weinstein, W. & Schreier, R., *Political Conflict and Ethnic Strategies: A Case Study of Burundi*, (Syracuse University: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, 1976), p. 5.

⁶Okechukwu Emeh 'Africa and the Crisis of Instability' (Vanguard Newspaper March 30, 2004) http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/sovereign/failed/2004/0330_crisis.htm extracted 2/20/2015. P. 3 of 5.

⁷Bassey, C., & Oshita, O., *Conflict Resolution, Identity Crisis, and Development in Africa*, (Abuja: Malthouse Press, 2007).

⁸ Ibid.

and value capabilities. Value expectations denote the belief, held by people, that they are rightfully entitled to certain goods and conditions of life. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions that they think they are capable of getting and keeping.⁹

The fact that the values provided do not meet up with the expectations of the people is a powerful stimulus to rebellion and conflict. The theory of relative deprivation or discontent provides a framework for analyzing and understanding the state of violence and agitation in the oil-rich Niger-Delta region of Nigeria. Here, despite the fact that Nigeria's oil wealth is derived from that region, what they possess falls far below their value expectations. Another example is the Sudan Crisis where two local rebel groups namely; the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLA/M) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) demanded more equitable share of resources from the Government of Sudan (GOS).¹⁰

5.2.5 Political Transition

The process of political transition has been identified as providing a conducive environment for conflict and political instability in Africa. Politicians, ethnic, religious and regional groups use the process of democratization and the political space that it opens up, to justify protests and rebellions as forms of struggle for individual and group rights.¹¹

The political transitions from single party system to democratic governance in Burundi in 1993, caused the assassination of the first Hutu elected president. This triggered the civil conflict in the country which still lingers. On the other hand, CAR had its first multi-party elections in 1993, where Patasse won elections. He was later ousted by General Buzizi (his former chief staff) in the year 2003 through coup.¹²

5.2.6 Poor Economy

Economically, the outlook for some of the African countries is bleak, as some of them are being relegated in international finance and trade of the Post-Cold War era. Except to some extent, South Africa, Egypt, Tunisia, Botswana, Rwanda, Mauritania, Senegal and Kenya, the economy of many political configurations on the continent are not dynamic and booming. There

⁹Gurr, T. *Why Men Rebel?* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 24.

¹⁰Flint, J. and De Waal, A., *Darfur: A New History of a Long War.* (London: Zed Books, 2008), p. 90

¹¹Bratton, M. and Nicolas, V., *Neo-Patrimonial Regimes and Political Transition in Africa*, <http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2950715?uid=3738336&uid=2&uid=4&sid=21106242881501> (accessed on 03 March 2015).

¹² International Crisis Group. "Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State" (PDF). CrisisGroup.org. International Crisis Group. (accessed on 13 March 2015).

is therefore a problem of sluggish economy, debt overhang, human suffering, social unrest and political quagmire in some of the states.¹³

The African depressed economy also creates socio-economic problems such as massive unemployment and social insecurity. Indeed, most of the violent conflicts in Africa tend to be fuelled by the unemployed youths who are willing participants of such violence. African leaders could diversify the economy of their states rather than depending solely on a single source of income such as agriculture as is the case of most African states. That would create employment opportunities for the youths.¹⁴

5.2.7 Poverty

Poverty has become a part of the normal life of an average African. Grinding poverty creates alienation and social economic insecurity. These impel people to seek solace in primary group identity as under ethnic or religion identities. Poverty and low level of literacy prevent the people from fully understanding the intricacies of modern government and real issues involved in it. Consequently self-seeking ethnic demagogues who present ethnicity as a panacea for their economic woes can carry them away easily. Poverty generates divisive socio-economic competition.¹⁵

The effect of such competition is insecurity associated with limited job opportunities and social services. Frustrated and unsuccessful competitors find it easy and convenient to blame their plight on some assured advantages possessed by the opponents. This often results to conflict. Governments at various levels of the African states could embark on a serious fight against poverty. This could be done through provision of jobs for the citizens and improved standard of living.¹⁶

5.2.8 Proliferation of Small Arms

The readily availability of small arms in the African region is a major factor for sustaining and fuelling conflicts. Considerable quantity of small arms is in circulation from previous wars. For instance, between 1972 and 1990, Ethiopia and Somalia imported 8 billion US \$ worth of small arms and light weapons. In 1992, the Angolan Government distributed an

¹³ Christian, K. and Kingombe, M., Mapping the new infrastructure financing landscape, (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2011).

¹⁴Magdoff, F., Twenty-First-Century Land Grabs: Accumulation by Agricultural Dispossession, Monthly Review, 2013, Volume 65, Issue 06 (November).

¹⁵Sarl, E., ed. (2013). "2013 Guide économique du continent Bourses Africaines". AFRICA 24 Magazine (AFRICA 24 Magazine) (8): p. 12–3.

¹⁶Moyo, D., (21 March 2009). "Why Foreign Aid Is Hurting Africa". The Wall Street Journal.

estimated 700,000 rifles to the population for their defence against National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).¹⁷

These small arms have found their ways into all corners of Africa and these have continued to be used to sustain conflicts. According to Mutsindashyaka, failure by the international community to disarm the Libyans' militia groups after the death of Gadhafi has been a great insecurity concern, bearing in mind that the arms were air-dropped by North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in support of ant-Gadhafi movement in 2011. These fire arms have ended up in so many illegal possessions including BokoHaram, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in Libya (ISIL) and rebels in Mali. He further decried the current situation in Burundi where the government is allegedly arming a government created militia group (Imbonerakure) with the same fire arms which were earlier collected through disarmament process.¹⁸

African leaders could take pragmatic effort to demobilize their people. This could be achieved through gun-buy-back strategy. Security at the African borders could be beefed up to check illegal importation of illicit arms. The Disarmament and Demobilization and Integration (DDR) processes on the continent especially in CAR and Burundi should be revised accordingly. Regional regimes against proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) need to be re-engineered. However, the success of this is dependent on the politic will.¹⁹

5.2.9 Other Factors

In addition to the broader sources of conflict in Africa, a number of factors are especially important in particular situations and sub-regions. In central Africa, they include the competition for scarce land and water resources in densely populated areas. In Rwanda, for example, multiple waves of displacement have resulted in situation where several families often claim rights of the same piece of land. This is a replica to Burundi. In African communities where oil is extracted, conflicts have often arisen over environmental degradation and local complaints that the community does not adequately reap benefit of such resources. The clamour for resource control in the Niger Delta area of Nigeria is a typical example. Also, there is a perception that the

¹⁷Oke-ChukwuEmeh "Africa and the Crisis of Instability Op Cit P. 4 of 5.

¹⁸ Author, Interview with Mutsindashyaka, T., Executive Secretary, Regional Center on Small Arms , Nairobi, March 2015.

¹⁹ Ibid.


recent discovery of oil deposits in Kenya's Turkana County could increase insecurity in the region.

The location of mineral deposits has sometimes caused serious conflicts among African states. Either as a result of greed or to divert attention from the bad leadership, African Governments are known to have encroached on another country's territory for the control of mineral deposits. This was in fact, the situation when Idi Amin of Uganda seized the Kagerasalient which is located well inside Tanzania. It led to the overthrow of Uganda's Idi Amin by the combined efforts of the Tanzania Army and their Ugandan supporters. Inter-state conflicts have added to the sources of violence and instability in Africa. Such conflicts include the long-time standoff between Nigeria and Cameroun over the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula which was later resolved at the International Court of Justice.

5.3 Problems Militating against the Mechanisms for Conflict Management in CAR and Burundi

Chapter Four examined the approaches to conflict management in both Burundi and CAR in a comparative perspective. The thematic areas examined in Chapter Four are: pre-negotiation procedures; the understanding of the key actors in both conflicts by mediators; ownership of the peace process by some actors; capacity of the facilitators to timely evaluate successes and failures; and involvement of local or regional peacekeepers as well as feasible sustainability statement for the peace efforts. These factors will be further examined in figure 2 below to amplify the problems militating against the mechanisms for the conflict management in both CAR and Burundi.

5.3.1 Figure: 2 showing the Respondents Opinion on the Problems Militating against the Mechanisms for Conflict Management in CAR and Burundi



Source: Data collected by the researcher.

5.3.2 Analysis

The chart indicates that; 61, 42, and 34 respondents representing 31.1, 21.5 and 17.3 per cent respectively are of the views that lack of negotiation techniques, inability to identify the root-causes to conflicts, weak regional institutions respectively are the problems militating against the mechanisms for conflict management in Burundi and CAR. Out of the remaining 59 respondents 26, 9 and 24 representing 13.3, 4.6 and 12.2 per cent respectively posited that the problems are in the areas of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), inadequate resources and lack of ownership of the peace process.

5.3.3 Negotiation Techniques

There are several techniques applied before, during or after negotiation processes. However, the most sensitive stage is pre-negotiation, hence significant agreement may arise.²⁰ According to Zartman, the mediator needs to find a formula that meets the parties’ demands and also to act in accordance with the dynamics of the parties.²¹ The proposal by Mandela on the agreement to establish a transitional government on equal power sharing (According to the Article 14 of the Arusha Peace Agreement)²² is a case in point. The CAR case is different to

²⁰Mwagiru, M. Conflict in Africa. Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management, (Nairobi: Centre for Conflict Research, 2006), p.114

²¹Zartman, W. Ripe for Resolution. Conflict and Intervention in Africa, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p.255-256.

²²Arusha Peace And Reconciliation Agreement For Burundi, Chapter II, Article 14.

Burundi because, the facilitators were not able to discover that conflicting parties came to the negotiating table for the wrong reasons hoping to continue to play the zero-sum games they played out on the battlefield or deliberately defying terms and conditions of ceasefire and peace agreements they are signatory to.

Additionally, failure to identify vital actors and their respective constituencies (both strategic and tactical) can affect the smooth running of the negotiations. Emphasized by Mwangi that, it is necessary to identify and involve both official and non-official facilitators during conflict management processes.²³ In both Burundi and CAR, only warring parties were engaged, with less attention to other actors especially civil societies as well as other strategic constituencies (external actors). These political entrepreneurs, who sought to benefit from the instability, existed in both case studies. In CAR, regional actors, namely France, Chad and Sudan, played significant roles in supporting and indeed fuelling the conflict in the country by hosting and supporting the rebels.

The most difficult part for any peace process is having a rightful facilitator who would be trusted by all parties to the conflict. According to Mwangi a heterogeneous facilitator could be preferably identified (the one who understands the dynamics of conflict but not associated with it-an outsider).²⁴ Both Nyerere and Bongo could not meet this criterion, though the entry of Mandela in Burundi in mediating Burundi peace process accounted credibly.

5.3.4 Understanding Root-Causes to the Conflict

It is abundantly clear from recent experiences in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia that there is need for a thorough understanding of the root causes of a given conflict. It stands to reason that any successful intervention is premised on knowledge of how and why the conflict started in the first place. Addressing the sources which generated the conflict would then form the basis of the management to the conflict²⁵. In the case of Burundi, literature has been highlighting the social identity as the core root cause of the conflict. Though, the conflict had less to do with ethnic (Tutsi vs Hutu) considerations and more to do with desire for complete

²³Mwangi, op cit, p.109.

²⁴Ibid, p. 52.

²⁵Rupesinghe, K. (ed). Conflict Transformation, (London: Macmillan, 1995), p.81.

control on the part of leaders who utilised such considerations as vehicles for their own political ambitions.²⁶

Equally, in CAR those living in the south benefitted more from the country's economic prosperity than those in the north. The people from arid and semi-arid north has been marginalized by different successive regimes, and often conceived as foreigners (Chadians). Ethnicity and economic opportunities were used as tools to create divisions in the respective societies. In essence, it is the denial of human needs, of which ethnic identity is merely one, that finally emerges as the source of conflict, be it domestic, communal, international or inter-state.²⁷

5.3.5 Weak Regional Institutions

The roles of regional institutions especially in peacemaking/peacekeeping that have the local knowledge on the conflict dynamics tend to have significant influence over the local communities. This affords them comparative advantage over traditional exogenous peacekeepers/ peacemakers.²⁸ More disturbing though is the fact that in the Burundi case there were no regional peacekeepers which meant that parties were increasingly dependent on the attention of outside sponsors. However, later, South Africa which had extended its logistic muscles could not sustain it.

Regional Powers including: Congo, Chad, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea were involved in the brokering of the CAR peace processes right from 2003 to 2013 under the auspices of the ECCAS. However, it failed to monitor the implementation of the agreement and regional powers did not prevent the Seleka coalition from seizing power thereafter. This is attributed to weak regional meditation innovations and initiatives, accompanied by the weak peace keeping forces.

Lack of ownership by the local actors, affected the regional efforts unlike Burundi case, where both local and regional actors observed their commitments. A wide range of regional missions have been deployed in CAR, including the regional peacekeeping mission for the consolidation of peace in Central African Republic(MICOPAX); since July 2008 under the responsibility of the ECCAS. It had succeeded the Multinational Force of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (FOMUC) operation established in October 2002, following a decision of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African Republic

²⁶ Author, Interview with Prof Rutayisire, T., Director, Center for Conflict Management and Research for Peace, Kigali, March 2015.

²⁷ Burton, J. & Dukes, F. Conflict: Reading in Management & Resolution, London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1990, p.146.

²⁸ Ibid.p.85

(CEMAC). It was rather small operation (400 soldiers) composed of contingents coming from the ECCAS with operational support from France, and financial support through the EU's African Peace Facility (APF).²⁹ In essence, regional forces could not deter, or prevent warring factions from breaking ceasefire agreements.

5.3.6 Ownership of the Peace Process

The thresholds for any successful peace process are measured on the level of involvement and empowerment of the local actors. In essence, they become the primary architects, owners and long-term stakeholders in the peace process. The former Presidents of Tanzania and South Africa: Nyerere and Mandela respectively, were the real architects of the 2000 Arusha Peace Agreement. The actors in CAR showed less commitment despite Gabon President Bongo's efforts leading to the Libreville Peace Accords. Fighting continued and eventually Seleka rebel movement took over power in 2013. Vogt, the head of United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central Africa Republic (BINUCA) then, expressed her concerns that, 'leaders and combatants of many of the rebel groups had connections to Chad and were of Chadian origin, which challenged the sense of ownership and their commitment to the peace process'.³⁰ This suggests the fact that the CAR themselves did not own the peace process and therefore did not feel obliged to obey its terms.

5.3.7 Lack of Resources

A comprehensive approach to peace requires an adequate investment of financial resources, patience and a sustained commitment from sponsors".³¹ According to David Zounmenou, senior researcher for the institute of security studies Pretoria, asserted that, 'there is no shortage of African troops to join the AU brigades, the challenge is providing troops with vehicles, aircrafts weaponry, communication equipment and other items that cost money'.³² African peacekeeping is therefore not limited by political will alone or the availability of troops but, rather, by insufficient funding. Even relatively small and less logistically demanding unarmed military observer mission are costly. The AU and its predecessor the OAU were unable to provide finances from their own budgets. The budget for the OAU liaison mission in Ethiopia

²⁹ International Crisis Group. Central African Republic: Priorities of the Transition Africa Report N°203 | 11 June 2013 brussels@crisisgroup.org

³⁰ United Nations: Meetings Coverage and Press Release, SC/10879, 11 January 2013. <http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc10879.doc.htm> accessed on 19 January 2015.

³¹ Ibid

³² Clare Short, Jack Straw et al, "The causes of Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa" cited in Hassan, AA W, "African Union and Challenges of Conflict Resolution: The need for a Standby Force" (2006), p. 45.

and Eritrea amounted to \$1.8 million per year in 2000.³³The original planned strength for the mission was 43 civilian and military personnel, but because of financial constraints, in 2000 the actual strength was 27.³⁴

In the Burundi case, clearly this commitment on the part of the sponsors was lacking. South Africa took the challenge alone with insignificant international support. In October 2001, mediator then, Nelson Mandela agreed to deploy a 700-member South African force to Burundi. In a context of continued armed confrontation, its mission was to protect returning politicians in order to enable the power-sharing transitional government to take shape. This partly, limited violations to the 2000 Arusha Peace Agreements.³⁵

Similarly, the National Dialogue (2003) event in CAR that fostered national unity and reconciliation was primarily financed by the President of Gabon. This was a six-week conference hosting over 350 participants. However, both CAR and Burundi cases later became eligible for UN Peace-Building programmes to support SSR and DDR. These programmes have been funded by World Bank, UNDP and other donors. In CAR, the programmes (SSR/DDR) were implemented by the NGOs through UNDP, unlike Burundi, where the government collaborated with the donors to manage resources. However, general perception is that, such funds have had limited impact on the beneficiaries.³⁶

5.3.8 Disarmament and Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)

Well-managed disarmament and demobilization are necessary elements of successful peace-building. The total number of soldiers worldwide declined from 29 million in 1987 to 24 million in 1994.³⁷ Reintegration of combatants and their families into society is the critical next step following demobilization. If it does not succeed, demobilized former combatants can entail in internal security risks as well as a burden for society. Demobilized combatants are often in need of support, for instance , in the job training, health services, education, housing and credit, to mention but a few. Though, proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Africa has exacerbated the civil conflicts on the continent for past 3 decades.

³³Africom to help build African Standby Force <http://www.Stripes.com/article.asp> accessed on 20/02/2015

³⁴Neethling T. 'Shapping the African Standby Force: Development, Challenges and Prospect <http://usacac.army.Mil/cac/mil> review. p. 70

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Author, Interview with Col Nkuriye, L., Director, Peace Support Operations(PSO), Kigali, February 2015.

³⁷Bonn, International Center for Conversion. Global Disarmament, Demilitarization Demobilization. Conversion Survey, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.37

In Burundi, more than 78,000 combatants were demobilized for a period of over 5 years from 2004 to 2009. On disarmament, it is important to say that the number of surrendered arms is unknown due to an absence of a disarmament phase within the programmes of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP). Another controversial aspect of the programme in Burundi was the design of payments for the demobilisation and reintegration phases, above all because ex-combatants had high expectations for these payments. There were also clear signs of payment inequality. Whilst National Council for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD) combatants received \$600, *Gardiens de la Paix* (Guides of Peace) received \$100, and minors an average \$330. Lastly, with regard to financing, payments by the European Union and the World Bank to rural development programmes were remarkable for their delays.³⁸ This increased the feeling of inequality between communities and ex-combatants. Consequently, many ex-combatants have resorted to acts of banditry.³⁹

On the hand CAR benefited from the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) and the World Bank. The first project ran from 2004 to 2007, with a budget of USD \$13 million.⁴⁰ The MDRP reported that it met its targets by providing reintegration support to 7,565 ex-combatants, as well as providing ‘reintegration kits’ and training for all beneficiaries. However some scholars and technical observers strongly questioned the achievements of DDR. According to Lombard, despite the 7,556 ex-combatants demobilised, the programme only collected about 400 guns, and only half were in working condition. Instead ‘disarmament’ has been redefined to mean people participating in the process; and according to this measure the MDRP did not meet its targets.⁴¹ In essence, what was issued as a reintegration package was a mere war effort.

5.4 Strategies for Attainment of Sustainable Peace and Stability in Africa

Respondents have endeavored to provide their opinions on the strategies for attainment of sustainable peace and stability in Africa as indicated in figure 3 below. Some scholarly works

³⁸Boshoff, H. & W. Vrey A Technical Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration. A Case Study from Burundi . ISS Monograph No. 125. (Pretoria: ISS. 2006). <<http://www.issafrica.org>>.


³⁹ Author, Interview with the Regional Commander, Southern Regional, Bujumbura, January 2015.

⁴⁰ Central African Republic: Lessons from a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program MDRP Dissemination Note 4, (2007) at <http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/MDRP_DissNote4_0908.pdf>

⁴¹ Lombard, L. N., (2012). Raiding Sovereignty in Central African Borderlands. Phd dissertation. Durham: Duke University. http://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10161/5861/Lombard_duke_0066D_11603.pdf?sequence=1 accessed on 17 Nov 2014.

have been consulted to examine strategies for the attainment of sustainable stability on the continent. These strategies include: Respect for human and rule of law; enhancing administrative capacity and promoting transparency; strengthening the regional conflict management mechanisms and democratic governance; emphasizing social development; restructuring international aid; reduce debt burden; and support for regional cooperation and integration.

5.4.1 Figure: 3 Showing the Respondents Opinion on the Strategies for Attainment of Sustainable Peace and Stability in Africa



Source: Data collected by the researcher.

5.4.2 Analysis

Out of the 196 respondents, 68, 48 and 32 of them representing 34.7, 24.5, 16.3 percent respectively opined that attainment of sustainable peace and stability in Africa could be through respect for human rights and rule of law, enhancing administrative capacity and promoting transparency and, strengthening the regional conflict management mechanism and democratic governance. While 28 and 20 representing 14.3 and 10.2 respectively posited that, peace and stability can be achieved in Africa through emphasizing social development and support for regional corporation and integration respectively.

5.4.3 Findings

The difficult relations between the state and the society in Africa owe much to the authoritarian legacy of colonialism which saw no need to seek political upheavals, and a weak and dependent civil society. A number of African states have continued to rely on centralized

and highly personalized forms of government. Some have fallen into a pattern of corruption, ethnically based decisions and human rights abuses. Notwithstanding the conduct of multiparty elections in a majority of African countries, much more needs to be done to provide good governance. This will create an environment in which individuals feel protected, civil society is able to flourish, and government carries out its responsibility effectively and transparently.⁴² This cannot explain more to what has been happening in both CAR and Burundi since independence.

5.4.4 Respect for Human Rights and the Rule of Law

Respect for human rights and the rule of law are necessary components of any efforts to make peace durable.⁴³ They are cornerstones of good governance. There is need for African governments to demonstrate their commitment to building a society in which all can live freely by showing their commitment to respecting human rights. This could be achieved by the development of a national plan of action for human rights.

The establishment of credible, independent and impartial national human rights institutions could be a significant confidence building measure. Strengthening judicial institutions would also encourage other stakeholders to cooperate with African countries in promoting good governance.

5.4.5 Enhancing Administrative Capacity and Promoting the Culture of Transparency and Accountability

According to Kofi Annan, former Secretary General of the United Nations, ‘Good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development’.⁴⁴ Good governance requires the effective management of resources. Improved public sector management in Africa deserves priority attention by African governments. A strong central bank capacity, an efficient customs unit and well managed government regulatory institutions are vital pre-requisites for stable macroeconomic performance and the building of investor confidence.

Corruption as a serious phenomenon has critically crippled and stunted Africa’s development. There is therefore the need for African governments to get tough on this issue, and make the fight against corruption a genuine priority. There is also the need for African countries

⁴²Jallow, A., *The Challenges of Globalization to Democratic Governance in Africa*, (Addis Ababa, Development Policy Management Forum, 2003), p.204

⁴³ Forsythe, D., *Human Rights in International Relations*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.57

⁴⁴Jallow, A., *The Challenges of Globalization to Democratic Governance in Africa*, op cit, p.225

to devise uniform African convention on the conduct of public officials and the transparency of public administration.

5.4.6 Strengthening Conflict Management Mechanism and Democratic Governance

Conflict management and the promotion of peace in Africa have several implications for African sustainable development. It will create an enabling environment for investment and economic growth. However, economic growth prosperity does not only depend on direct foreign investment, but on the ability to induce its domestic equivalent.⁴⁵ This is because when a country is at peace with itself and its neighbours, it can plan its future and mobilize resources for its development. It would also enable emphasis to be placed on social capital. This could be achieved as the funds that would have otherwise been used on arms could now be used for social development. Furthermore, it would enhance the restructuring of international aid as donor countries would now be able to focus their aid into areas that would have direct impact on the lives of the people. Though, African leaders should understand that foreign aid is rather a political endeavor than an economic investment venture. Therefore, need to perceive it as a short-term utility.

Democratic governance helps to guarantee political rights, protect economic freedom and foster an environment where peace and development can flourish.⁴⁶ There is need for African governments to establish pluralistic systems of government in which political leaders should observe constitutionalism.⁴⁷ This is because without genuinely democratic institutions, contending interests are likely to settle their differences through conflict rather than through dialogue.

5.4.7 Emphasizing Social Development

Investment in human resources is a driving force for development. Education not only increases employment options and capacities but also enables individuals to make a broader, better and more informed choices in all aspects of life. Technical and professional training lays

⁴⁵Tulchin, J., *Democratic Governance & Social Inequality*, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p.20

⁴⁶Pippa, N., *Making Democratic Governance. How Regimes Shapes Prosperity, Welfare, and Peace*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p.5.

⁴⁷Pollis, A. & Schwab, P., *Human Rights: New Perspectives, New Realities*, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), p.147

an essential foundation for acquisition of skills, and for renewing, adapting or changing those skills to better suit the evolving needs of individual and societies.⁴⁸

The eradication of poverty requires development in which access to the benefits of economic progress is widely accessible to all. Africa needs to pay special attention to social justice if development and economic growth are to produce positive result and for the society to develop in a balanced way. Development and spending priorities need to be broad-based, equitable and inclusive.⁴⁹

Investing in women capabilities and empowering them to exercise their choices is a vital and certain way to advance economic and social development.⁵⁰ Quality of rights opportunities and access to resources between men and women are fundamental requirements. Measures need to be taken by African leaders to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women and girls. Institutional barriers that prevent the exercise of equal rights need to be identified and removed through comprehensive policy reforms.

5.4.8 Support for Regional Cooperation and Integration

Strong support for regional cooperation and regional integration would enable African countries to achieve collectively what each would be unable to achieve on its own. Furthermore, the closer the economic ties among member states of sub-regional or regional groupings, the greater the effort likely to be devoted to preventing disputes and tensions from turning into conflicts.⁵¹

There is need for African countries to give priority attention to establishing uniform standards for equipment and facilities relevant to sub-regional interactions. There is also need for African countries to examine ways in which regional and sub-regional integration can be used to promote economic discipline and some microeconomic policy. Furthermore, there is need to adopt measures that would facilitate the establishment of solid institutional and confidence building links between neighbouring states.⁵²

⁴⁸ Adebayo, A. African Development and Governance Strategies in the 21st Century, (London: Zeb Books, 2003), p.57

⁴⁹ Author, Interview with Prof Shyaka, A., CEO, Rwanda Governance Board, Kigali, April 2015.

⁵⁰ Moghadam, V., Modernizing Women. Gender and Social Change in the Middle East, (London: Lynne Rienner, 2003), p.33

⁵¹ Author, Interview with, Chief of Staff, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Mission in the Central African Republic, Bangui, March 2015.

⁵² Mungachi, W. Regional Integration in Africa, East African Experience, (Ibadan: Safari Books Ltd, 2011), p.6

5.5 Objectives, Hypotheses and Theoretical Framework of the Study

All projects have specific goals and objectives. A successful project achieves the target goals and purposes within a designed time period. Likewise, the objectives of a good research are achieved by the end of the study. The general objective of this study was to explore factors responsible for the protracted conflicts in Africa. That was done in Chapter One, where an overview on causes of conflicts in Africa was examined particularly under literature review part. However, Chapter Two and Three further broadened the discussion on the factors responsible for the persistent conflicts in Africa particularly in the Central Africa Republic and Burundi respectively. Most of the causes of conflicts in Africa are structural factors. These include: problem of identity, lack of participation, Absence of freedom from fear and want, and proliferation of small and light weapons among many others.

The second objective of the study was to specifically identify factors militating against the conflict management mechanism for achieving sustainable peace and political stability in CAR and Burundi. This was achieved in Chapter Four where the researcher comparatively analyzed mechanisms applied by both countries in conflict management processes. Approaches to the conflict management including; style and understanding of mediators/facilitators on the root causes of conflict, the role of the local/regional and international intervention forces, and so on were examined.

The third objective of the study was to examine strategies African leaders should adopt to enhance peace and stability in the continent. This was achieved after critical analysis in Chapter Five where most thematic areas earlier discussed in chapters (Two, Three and Four) were brought onboard for analysis and scrutiny. Hence, the research objective was achieved.

From the three objectives of the study, the author derived three hypotheses which the study sought to affirm or negate. The first hypothesis states that conflict is likely to occur or endure in societies where human needs are not easily availed by the institutions and organs of the governments. Peoples' needs of identity, participation, recognition, security and autonomy, are crucial to sustainable peace and stability. Failure by various African governments to meet peoples' needs have caused persistent conflicts in the continent.

The second hypothesis asserts that, solid foundation for effective organisations and enabling institutions is a necessary pre-condition for sustainable and enduring peace and political stability. This was tested against conflict management mechanisms applied in Burundi and CAR.

Indeed weak sub-regional and regional structures have militated against the peace processes. The presence of weak states and ineffective regional security arrangements has yielded ineffective mechanisms for conflict management in Burundi and CAR.

The third hypothesis of the study which states that, sustainable conflict management could be achieved in Africa through collective commitment of African leaders. The proffered strategies in Chapter Five could only be realized if there is collective commitment of African leaders. The implementation and actualization of these strategies depend greatly on the political will.

Thus, the hypotheses were tested and also appropriately linked to the theoretical framework for the outcome of the study. Failure by the governments and organisations to meet peoples' needs results into violent conflicts. Therefore any conflict management mechanism which does not address peoples' needs is doomed to fail in long run. Deliberate efforts and strategies designed for the attainment of sustainable peace and stability in Africa, should be human needs-focused.

CHAPTER SIX

Conclusions and Recommendations

6.0 Summary

The post-independence Africa has been experiencing a state of political instability due to protracted violent conflicts. The sub-Sahara Africa is at the fore-front of such conflicts where many countries have become conflict prone zones. Such countries include; the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Central Africa Republic, Liberia and Burundi among many others. Millions of innocent lives have been killed and several others fled their countries to the neighbouring states as refugees. Women and children have been the main victims of these violent conflicts, where rape has been applied as a weapon of war (as it happened during Rwanda Tutsi genocide of 1994 or currently in Darfur).

The study on the causes of perennial civil conflicts in Africa has attracted several students and scholars of the social sciences in the region and the global. Biological, psychological and physical causes have been suggested. The Burton's theory of human needs has enriched this study, since it outwardly postulates that if biological, psychological and physical needs are not availed, people will act otherwise. Such needs include; dire desire for security, identity, participation, and autonomy among many others. The denial of these needs directly affect growth and development of any state.

Lack of processes, structures, and institutions in most African states is a major reason for their failures. The status of most Sub-Sahara Africa can be categorized as failed states. Burundi and CAR cases set basis for this study, where authoritarian leadership accompanied by endemic violence has been taking placing since independence. Military leaders have been coming to power through coups where repression has been the main method of governance. Regional and International actors have intervened in both conflict zones to settle the underlying political disputes but all in vain.

The centerpiece of this study has been to thoroughly examine the militating factors against the approaches for the conflict management in both countries. The chapter Four comparatively analysis these approaches including; pre-negotiation skills by the facilitators in both Burundi and CAR conflicts, the level of knowledge on the conflict dynamics, the thresholds of the inclusiveness in the mediation processes, and resources factor as well as the role of the regional peacemaker/peacekeeper in both conflicts. There were both convergences and

divergences in the analysis: Firstly, at the level of negotiations, facilitators were predominantly official mediators. Non-official facilitators were ignored to some extent. In 1990s, the famous Catholic layman Egidio had shown interests to take part in the Burundi peace process, though regional leaders ignored it. Secondly, at the level of personalities; mediators in Burundi and CAR were respected leaders in their respective capacities. However, both Bongo (former president of Gabon) and Nyerere (former president of Tanzania) were directly or indirectly implicated in the conflicts they were required to manage. Tanzania government then was perceived by the Tutsi regime as the one arming and supporting the Hutu rebel movements, since rebels were using their refugee camps in Tanzania as mobilization and training centers as well as a spring board to invade Burundi. Despite this, Nyerere as an icon for Pan-African philosophy, both sides acknowledged his facilitation. However, his successor Mandela qualified the taste of Mwagiru to what he refers to as heterogeneous mediator. The 2000 Arusha Peace Agreement was expedited and the power-sharing arrangement met the timelines. Bongo on the other hand was able facilitator and his government supported financially the peace process especially during the CAR National Dialogue of 2005. However, due to spatial proximity of both Gabon and CAR, warring parties could perceive him as an endogenous mediator like Nyerere was perceived by the warring parties.

Thirdly, the level of understanding of the root-causes to the 2 conflicts, one would resonate the fact that, all actors had gaps. The Burundi conflict was considered as an ethnic-based conflict as a result the '2000 Arusha Peace Accord', where power sharing was based on the 2 ethnic groups (Hutus/Tutsis), each taking an equal share of 50 percent. One Hutu rebel group FLN has boycotted the ceasefire agreement and is currently destabilizing the country from Eastern DRC. In CAR however, it was different matter altogether, during the 2008 Libreville Peace Agreement, the government signed it with only 3 rebel movements, then other rebel movements were born later. This called for other Peace Agreement in Libreville in 2010 and 2013 respectively. In essence, any politician who would desire to join the political race would mobilize men with arms. This undermined the peace process and resulted into a coup of 2013, which ousted Buzizi government.

Fourthly, the ability to identify actors to the conflicts was wanting in both conflicts. In CAR for instance, the presence of the regional and international actors like France, Sudan, Chad and South Africa contributed to the failure of the peace process. Most of these countries had their

troops in Bangui (capital city of CAR) purposely to protect Buzizi regime. This created power asymmetry between the warring parties, hence the conflict could hardly reach the hurting stalemate. When, these countries especially Chad and France shifted their support to the Seleke (a coalition of rebel movements in CAR), Buzizi government was ousted in March 2013. In the case of Burundi, regional and international actors had a common position, though with different courses of actions. When Buyoya came to power through coup, the president of Uganda Museveni insisted on the use of force to topple the regime, Nyerere on the other hand sought sanctions, while the international actors including USA and Belgium opposed both options. However, ably exercising his influence, Nyerere imposed economic sanctions on Burundi at the regional level.

Fifthly, at the level of resources; both Burundi and CAR regional peacemaking and peacekeeping missions were ill-financed and ill-equipped. The 2000 Arusha Peace Agreement of Burundi was signed before the ceasefire agreement. According to the UN concept, peacekeepers cannot deploy in the absence of peace to keep. The South African mediator-Mandela improvised and mobilized a 700 size force from South Africa and deployed in Burundi to secure the CNDD politicians in Bujumbura (Burundi Capital City). UN deployed in 2004 after the ceasefire agreement had been signed. The same fate applied in CAR where regional forces would be deployed with limited capabilities compared to the warring parties.

Finally, the disarmament demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes in Burundi and CAR had short falls. In Burundi, there were no records for ex-combatants. These affected planning and implementation processes of the project. Other anomalies were in the inequalities of the packages to ex-combatants. The CNDD combatants were issued bigger envelope than other ex-combatants. Element of corruption was reported to some extent. However, the donor's delays in the payments to the combatants had impact to the reintegration process. In CAR, the DDR process was slightly different. First, fund for ex-combatants were managed by the Non-Government Organisations (NGOs). This in essence, created mistrust among the warring parties. Second, many rebel movements were created in order to benefit on the project, and resources acquired ended up being used as war efforts.

Additionally, this study also, endeavored to proffer strategies for the attainment of sustainable peace and stability in Africa. The realization of this could base on the following factors (but not limited to): First, solid foundation for effective institutions and sustainable

conflict management mechanisms are pre-requisites for sustainable stability on the continent. Vibrant and efficient early warning mechanism and response are crucial for any sustainable conflict management mechanism. Second, for successful strategy, fundamental standards and procedures based on the human need principles are core. Citizenry participation in all aspect of governance at all levels including; societal, state and international perspectives. Lastly, the political will or commitment by the regional political leaders, would act as a major driver of issues and solutions on the continent. Collective efforts would enhance regional synergy, hence the attainment of sustainable political stability.

6.1 Conclusions

Africa has been experiencing devastating conflicts for decades now. These conflicts have been intra-state in nature, mostly triggered by long repressed ethnic animosities, religious intolerances and resource control. This has resulted into colossal loss of lives and property and underdevelopment. National, regional and international mechanisms have been employed to manage the conflicts in the continent. In 2002, the AU Assembly of Heads of States and governments adopted the framework for a common African Defence and security policy, as well a protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC). This protocol was to provide the PSC with a mandate to deploy peacekeeping missions and intervene in crisis pursuant to the AU Constitutive Act. The Africa Standby Force (ASF) was to act as a mechanism for implementing decisions of the council. Nonetheless, violent conflicts have persisted in the continent. Most recent examples are conflicts in the Darfur, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC), Burundi and Central Africa Republic(CAR) to mention but a few. This study has endeavored to examine the mechanisms employed in managing conflicts in Africa with particular emphasis on conflicts in Burundi and CAR in a comparative perspective.

The study has explored factors responsible for the protracted conflicts in Africa. The human needs theory by Burton has been applied as the theoretical framework of the study. According to Burton's theory of human needs; the inability to meet peoples' physical, psychological and biological needs result into violent conflict. Such needs include: peoples' need for identity, security, recognition, participation, and autonomy to mention but a few. Failure by most African states to address these needs has been the major reason for the persistent violent conflicts in the continent. Problem of identity, discontent, lack of participation, social injustice,

proliferation of small and light weapons and many others have been identified to be core factors responsible for the persistent conflicts in Africa, particularly in CAR and Burundi.

The Study has also examined the mechanisms for the conflict management in both Burundi and CAR. A comparative analysis has been conducted in Chapter Four. The approaches to conflict management in both conflicts had convergences and divergences. These mechanisms range from the sub-national, national, regional and international levels. The study has focused on the style of the mediation, understanding of the conflict dynamics by the facilitators, the level of ownership of the peace process by the warring parties and capacity of the facilitators to evaluate the criteria for success and assessment of failures. The role of the local/regional peacekeepers and ability of the regional intervention forces to sustain their forces in the mission areas have been examined too. The mediation processes in Burundi and CAR has been merely conducted through Track One. According to Mwagiru, a mix of the Track One, Track Two and Track One and a Half(or Track Three) could yield better results in any mediation process. Involvement of the non-state actors and other useful stakeholders in the peace processes in Burundi and CAR has been limited. Also, in many instances, the facilitators were not knowledgeable of the root causes of the conflicts they were supposed to manage. For instance, facilitators in Burundi conflict believed that, the root causes of the conflict were ethnic. After the 2000 Arusha Peace Agreement, another Hutu rebel movement (FNL) emerged against the fellow Hutu regime and is still destabilizing the country from the DRC. Finally, weak regional conflict management mechanisms have contributed to the perennial conflicts in Burundi and CAR.

Comparably, the CAR case (mechanism for managing conflicts) is weaker due the effects of the intruders such as Chad and France. External interferences to peace process in CAR have prevented the realization of the hurting stalemate. According Zartman, when opposing forces reach hurting stalemate, they succumb to negotiation process. In CAR, when this state of condition sufficed, Chad, South Africa or France would intervene militarily in support of either the government or the rebel movements. In 2008 when rebel movement and Buzizi regime has reached the hurting stalemate and the 2008 Libreville Peace Agreement signed, France intervened and rooted out the rebel group. Also, after the 2013 Peace Agreement, Chad supported the rebel group to oust the Buzizi regime. This is an indication that the absence of the collective regional commitment in the management of the conflict in Africa has been the main factor responsible for the perennial conflicts.

In view of the above, the study proffered some strategies which the managers of the conflicts would adopt so as to achieve order and stability in the continent and Burundi and CAR in particular. Respect for human and rule of law, enhancing administrative capacity and promoting transparency; strengthening the regional conflict management mechanisms and democratic governance; emphasizing social development, enhancing regional cooperation and integration among many others has been analysed in the chapter five. However, these strategies could only be effective if there is political will. Without collective regional commitment by the African leaders, these strategies would have limited impact.

6.2 Recommendations

The study has identified the causes and effects of protracted civil conflicts in Africa with specific attention to Burundi and CAR civil conflicts in a comparative perspective. It also went further to examine the conflict management efforts employed and reasons for their failures. Several strategies for the attainment of sustainable peace and stability have been proffered accordingly.

In the recent past most countries in Africa have experienced the rise of ethnic militia groups. Most conflicts that have occurred were attributed to the actions of such groups. Governments of African countries should therefore ensure equitable distribution of state resources. This would reduce incidence of ethnic base conflicts. Additionally, fire arms collected through DDR process should be well recorded and publically destroyed. Second, the depressed economies of the African states cause social insecurity. Indeed most violent conflicts in Africa tend to be fuelled by the unemployed youths who are willing participants in violence. African leaders should diversity their states' economies rather than depending solely on a single source of income such as agriculture. This would create employment opportunities for the youths. Lastly, small arms have found their ways into all the corners of Africa and these have continued to be used to sustain conflicts. African leaders should take pragmatic effort to demobilize those with the arms. This could be achieved through gun-buy-back strategy, accompanied by an effective reintegration process.

As part of conflict management strategy in the continent, the regional institutions should establish a regional court at the AU headquarters to try perpetrators of violent conflicts even after an end of a conflict. Those found guilty could be punished with long jail term. That would serve as deterrent to potential perpetrators of conflicts. Second, lack of necessary logistics and

financial constraint are key issues that have hampered regional crisis management mechanism in the past. Most African states have weak economies that depend highly on foreign aid and loans from the western donor countries. This affects the regional organisations' ability to set up and sustain a force with requisite capability to deal with issue of crisis in the continent. The African governments (in regional security arrangements) should therefore address the high cost of missions if its mechanism for conflict management is to play significant peacekeeping role in Africa. Third, establishment of credible, independent and impartial national human rights institution could be a significant confidence building measure. Strengthening judicial institutions would also encourage the international community to assist African countries in promoting good governance. Lastly, democratic governance helps to guarantee political rights, protect economic freedom and foster an environment where peace and development could flourish. African governments therefore should establish pluralistic systems of government in which political leaders are elected by the will of the majority to a fixed term of office.

To eradicate poverty from the continent, African leaders should pay special attention to social justice if development and economic growth are to produce positive result and for the society to develop in a balance way. Development and spending priorities need to be broad-based, equitable and inclusive. Second, equality of rights, opportunities and access to resources between men and women are fundamental requirements. Measures needed to be taken to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women and girls. Institutional barriers that prevent the exercise of equal rights should to be identified and removed through comprehensive policy reforms. Lastly, there is need for African countries to give priority attention to establishing uniform standards for equipment and facilities relevant to sub-regional interactions. African countries also need to examine ways in which regional and sub-regional integration can be used to promote economic discipline and some macro-economic policies. There is also need to adopt measures that would facilitate the establishment of solid institutional and confidence building links between neighbouring states.

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