TANZANIA'S NATIONAL INTEREST AND THE COLLAPSE OF
EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY

BY

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DECLARATION

This thesis is my own original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

Signed: .................................
Jonathan Ltipalei Lodompui

This thesis has been submitted for examination with my knowledge as a University supervisor.

Signed: ................................. Date: .................................
Joshua M. Kivuva, Ph.D.
DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my late beloved father Mr. Lerrapae Lodompui who, though illiterate, used every available resources and his time in determination to see my school life being promising.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Chama Cha Mapinduzi</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAA</td>
<td>East Africa Authority.</td>
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<tr>
<td>EADB</td>
<td>East African Development Bank.</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community.</td>
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<td>EACB</td>
<td>East African Currency Board.</td>
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<td>EACSO</td>
<td>East African Common Services Org.</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAHC</td>
<td>East African High Comm.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Organization of West Af.</td>
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<td>EEU</td>
<td>European Economic Union.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLS</td>
<td>Front Line States.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Front for Liberation of Mozambique.</td>
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<td>KADU</td>
<td>Kenya African Democratic Union.</td>
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<td>KANU</td>
<td>Kenya African National Union.</td>
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<td>KPU</td>
<td>Kenya Peoples Union.</td>
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<tr>
<td>KY</td>
<td>Kabaka Yekka.</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Union.</td>
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<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organization.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADCC</td>
<td>South African Development and Co.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South-West African People’s Org.</td>
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<tr>
<td>TANU</td>
<td>Tanganyika African National Union.</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAZARA</td>
<td>Tanzania Zambia Railway.</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPC</td>
<td>Uganda Peoples Congress.</td>
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<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Africa National Union.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Africa People’s Union.</td>
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The problem facing most of the developing countries today is that of the establishment of appropriate regional organizations that will optimally implement development policies within a given region. A number of regional organizations have often been inadequately operating, and whenever they operate, they end up with negative consequences. The study analyses the collapse of one of the regional co-operations, which was established to help create common market and services. The East Africa Community (EAC) was formed in 1967 by the three East African states of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The EAC was formed because the three partner states felt that the East African High Commission (EAHC) 1948-1967, was not able to facilitate the national development of each of the three states.

Other causes for the collapse of EAC as mentioned by other scholars include: ideological differences, developments in Uganda, East Africa authority, the uneven level of development, external influence and the internal conflicts within the state and the literature review though gives more value to the above factors I have selected Tanzania’s national interest to explain the collapse of EAC because the national interest of a country cannot avoid being responsive to relations among other states.

The figure therefore illustrates the regional cooperative mechanisms in East and Southern Africa. It explains the cooperation within East African states and how Tanzania’s national interest facilitated the formation of EAC. In particular a common colonial bond and a similar capitalist form of economy amongst the East African partner states of Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda made the formation of EAC possible to attain.

Though the EAC has been extensively studied, especially on the factors that led to its collapse, no study has linked its collapse to Tanzania’s pursuit of its national interest. Tanzania pursued two national interest objectives or goals in the African region. The first goal was expansion of trade links within the East African regions. Tanzania’s aim was to use trade to maximize the gains from the region while developing close relations with the two partner states of Uganda and Kenya.

The second goal that Tanzania pursued was the campaign against colonialism in Southern Africa region. The simultaneous pursuit of the two policies was based on Nyerere’s belief that increased trade would facilitate Tanzania’s pursuit of her anti-colonial policies in Southern Africa. Amin’s coup in Uganda in 1971 severed Tanzania – Uganda relations which negatively affected Tanzania’s national interest by ending trade and other bilateral relations between the two friendly states. When the trade was severed between Uganda and Tanzania, Tanzania reacted by shifting southwards for better trade relations. When Tanzania’s trade became costly and unworthy in East Africa then the collapse of EAC became inevitable in 1977.
This study relied on secondary sources of information. Therefore to enable the research constituted the dominant source of investigation. The study again identified the research gaps within the contributions made by other scholars particularly on the collapse of EAC. Primary data was also used for through an informed interaction with persons who are knowledgeable about the collapse of EAC. Their contribution made this study more enriched. This study findings and recommendations will generally enrich the existing knowledge on regional integration and the collapse of regional arrangements.

The collapse of EAC was as a result of Tanzania’s pursuit of its national interest both in East African and South African regions. Though economic and political ties have oriented Tanzania’s effort to the south, economic and geographical realities will continue to draw it back to east Africa. Tanzania’s national interest is likely to continue to determine the regional arrangements in the East African region. I therefore recommend that Tanzania’s national interest be well understood by all partner states to avoid the collapse of the new EAC given that Tanzania has already threatened to pull out of the new scheme on issues of land, rights of establishment and travel documents.
CHAPTER ONE
BACKGROUND

1.1.0 Introduction

Regional integration is redrawing the economic map of the world (Baldwin, 1993:1). Among the developed countries Europe leads the way, though the importance of this trend for Africa cannot be understated. Numerous efforts have been made in Africa towards regional integration; however such efforts have not brought about any tangible results. This notwithstanding, regionalism still retains a strong symbolic appeal for African leaders (Ravenhill, 1985). Most African countries came to independence at a time when enthusiasm for regional integration reached its peak, where integration was viewed as a collective good, a goal to be pursued for its own sake. Regionalism was often treated as if it would be a dues ex machina, bringing immediate solutions to Africa’s many development needs (Ravenhill, 1985:206).

In Africa, the low levels of development and the small domestic markets have been the impetus of regional integration, yet the limited possibilities for profitable intra-regional trade simply do not provide a good basis for integration at the moment. At the moment, there exist a disturbing gap between aspirations and achievements within the efforts of integration while at the same time African countries have not been able to achieve much of the aspirations in forming these organizations.

Regional cooperation must start from the premise that the requisites for integration do not exist but must be created. This is in contrast to the dominant approach of the first two decades after independence where there appeared to be a belief that integration could be legislated from above. There is little purpose in liberalizing trade when the parties have nothing to exchange. Regional cooperation inter alia must create the basis for trade (Senghor, 1990).

If integration is not to be guided by market forces, considerable effort will have to be devoted to identifying possible areas for profitable mutual cooperation. Accordingly, unlike
many of the previous integrative efforts, the foundation on which cooperation stands must be planning, rather than laissez faire (Nyong’o, 1990). Prospects for success will be achieved if efforts are concentrated on projects where cooperation is perceived as being essential to the realization of gains and the actual benefits from the projects must reasonably be realized in the short term.

A rigid framework, as was the case with the treaty for the defunct East African community, makes it impossible for countries to participate selectively in those activities which are of paramount interest to them. The efforts put to regional integration in Africa is a subject which has continued to be characterized by a disturbing gap between aspirations and achievements (Ndiaye, 1990).

The East African Region has not been different since regional integration efforts collapsed due to unclear objectives and conflicts over issues of national interest and national sovereignty. The East African Countries have not fared any differently despite the existence of most of the factors associated with successful integrative mechanisms. (Hazlewood, 1985)

By 1963 all the three East African countries had attained independence. The three countries of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania pursued a common ideology of capitalism. This created political harmony in the East African Region. This political harmony made it possible for the three East African partner states to establish the East African Community (EAC) in 1967. The EAC was meant to create an economic integration by harmonizing trade while establishing certain common services within the region.

In 1967, the same year when the EAC was established, Tanzania adopted a socialist ideology. In Arusha Declaration, Tanzania made a dramatic departure from the policies it had pursued during its first years of independence. This departure was meant to protect the national interest of Tanzania within the region and particularly against a developed Kenyan capitalism advanced by Multinational Corporations (MNCs). This drastic and radical departure created disharmony in the region as Tanzania also tried to recruit Uganda to
isolate Kenya. In 1971, Amin came to power and the military regime was not recognized by Tanzania. Amin therefore threatened Tanzania's national interest within the region, because besides severing trade links between Tanzania and Uganda, the situation degenerated into a war between the two former friendly nations. Tanzania shifted to the south when it became dissatisfied with both Uganda and Kenya economic and political systems. The pursuit of Tanzania's national interest therefore led to the collapse of EAC in 1977.

1.2.0 Statement of the Problem
The accident of history and nature gave Nairobi and its hinterland the basis for an early start in commercial, industrial and even agricultural transformation and development. This happened during the colonial period when there grew a dis-proportionately large concentration of European and Asian communities in Nairobi. This seemed to reduce Tanzania and Uganda to the position of Kenya's market. At the same time, Kenya's developed capitalist system became a threat to Tanzania's weak economy. Despite the above scenario, 1961 Tanzania attempted to delay her independence in order to wait for the independence of the other two neighboring states of Kenya and Uganda, with a hope to form a federal government within East African regions. After independence of Uganda and Kenya, in 1962 and 1963 respectively, the two states preferred an economic cooperation instead, and the EAC was established in 1967.

To protect her national interest Tanzania was quick to take certain drastic measures against the Kenyan advanced capitalist system which was becoming a major threat to her weaker economy. In 1967 Tanzania took an about turn from a capitalist orientation to socialist ideology. To Tanzania this was the only way to protect her land from the private investors supported by expansionist capitalists.

Tanzania's foreign policy was radicalized by the Arusha Declaration of 1967 although the declaration was aimed at promoting and protecting Tanzania's national interest, the declaration became a major challenge to the survival of EAC, when the Arusha Declaration set Tanzania's a radical path to development which went counter to Kenya's capitalism. The radicalization of Tanzania's foreign policy in the region put her on a totally different
ideological point from her principle neighbour Kenya, which strained relations between the two countries. Ideological differences coupled with the pursuit of conflicting national interest objectives hindered the two countries willingness to cooperate. As Kenya and Tanzania pursued conflicting national interests, each tried to recruit Uganda to isolate the other.

After Arusha Declaration in 1967, Tanzania’s relations with Kenya and Uganda saw twists and turns. Tanzania’s relations with Uganda were cordial until 1971, and of the two East African neighbours of Kenya and Uganda, Uganda seemed to offer promising grounds for better relations with Tanzania. This was manifested in the Common-Man’s Charter, or the Move to the Left, a policy change initiated by the Obote regime in 1969. This policy initiative which claimed to give priority to the interests of the poor masses, workers and peasants was similar to the Tanzania’s Arusha Declaration of 1967. The Common-Man’s Charter made Obote to be regarded as a disciple of Julius Nyerere the then president of Tanzania. Tanzania’s relations towards Uganda that time were warm or cordial and the two countries appeared like they were cut from the same piece of cloth (A.S Kiondo 1992).

Tanzania’s relations with Uganda were negatively impacted by the coup d’etat led by Amin in 1971, which overthrew Obote. Immediately after the coup, Tanzania denounced the new regime and refused to recognize it. To make things worse for the EAC, Obote and most of his supporters were granted political asylum in Tanzania from where they attempted unsuccessful incursion into Uganda towards the end of 1972. From then onwards, Tanzania – Uganda relations became so hostile to the extent that in 1974, Tanzania boycotted the Organization of African Unity (OAU) conference which was held in Kampala on the grounds that, to hold the conference there amounted to blessing the killer regime of Amin.

This research therefore intends to examine the extent to which the pursuit of Tanzania’s national interest led to the collapse of the East African Community in 1977. The research seeks to answer the questions, to what extent did the pursuit of Tanzania’s national interest responsible for the collapse of EAC?, What role did the emergence of a military regime in Uganda impacted on Tanzania’s pursuit of her national interest?
1.3.0 Objective of study
This research aims to interrogate Tanzania’s role in the collapse of the East African Community.

The objective of the research can be summarized as:-
1. To examine the extent to which the pursuit of Tanzania’s national interest led to the collapse of East African Community in 1977.
2. To examine the role Amin’s coup played in it.
3. To examine how the three states responded to the new development on the post Amin coup.

1.4.0 Significance and justification of study
There is perhaps no word that is more frequently used in African political discourse than unity (Nyongo, 1990). Within nation states the frequent call for national unity as a prerequisite for development is heard at every national day and on the platforms of political rallies. Nations divided into ethnic groups whose interests are posed as antagonistic by political entrepreneurs must be held together if socio-economic progress is to be held ascertained (Nyongo, 1990).

The East African leaders formed the E.A.C. in 1967, but only collapsed after 10 yeas of its operation. The basic question among policy makers and the public alike on the performance of regional organizations particularly the East African region, is why the three East African states failed to justify the existence of the community? It is for this reason that the efforts to integrate the East African region could not escape criticism from both the public and the policy makers.

The findings of this study will help provide some policy insights for regional policy makers on the stages of integration. In heuristic terms; this study also intends to examine the role of Tanzania’s national interest in the collapse of EAC. The findings will inform the policy makers, the public and the scholars with a few to create new knowledge and debate.
1.5.0 Scope and limitation of study

This research is mainly confined to the members of the defunct East African Community namely Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. This study covers the period between the establishment of the East African Community in 1967 and its collapse in 1977.

1.6.0 Literature Review

Efforts at regional cooperation in East Africa started in 1917 when Kenya and Uganda established a free trade area between them. Later in 1922 it was transformed into a union after the defeat of Germany in the First World War when Tanganyika also joined the union. Most scholars, who have written on this topic acknowledge this fact, but many of them failed to give a historical analysis of the regional cooperation development (Kinyanjui, 1983).

In East Africa, regional cooperation was a valuable asset to the colonial government. The system of regional development was to stimulate industrial change and other forms of economic development. There were necessary prerequisites for the free movement of capital and labour during the colonial era. Between 1961 and 1963, the East African countries achieved independence, and the concern of the leaders of the independent governments was national development (Ngunyi and Adar, 1992). This indicated that cooperation could function so long as it operated and served the aims of the national economic development of each of the three countries. Each country would only participate, if it was assured of receiving a fair share of the benefits derived from the cooperation.

The signing of the treaty for East African Community in June 1967 was more important as a turning point because the idea of political federation was largely ignored within the provision of this treaty (Ngunyi and Adar, 1992). The streamlining of the activities of the E.A.C were done with the aim of strengthening the cooperation and make it more responsive in carrying out the tasks of development for the three states (Wambulwa, 1983). Then the most puzzling thing is why after such arrangements and signing of a treaty that seemed binding and reasonably welcome to all parties concerned, went soar and brought down the dream for cooperation in 1977. The collapse of EAC is a widely researched area. There are about 20 scholars who have contributed to the regional integration in East Africa. Some of these scholars have mentioned different factors as responsible for the collapse of EAC. Some factors
mentioned as responsible for the collapse of EAC are socio-cultural, economic and political. For the purposes of this study, I have put these scholars into categories according to their different thematic contributions, because some of them mentioned economic factors as responsible for the collapse of EAC, but failed to mention political factors. I have picked the key scholars to illustrate their contributions to the collapse of the EAC. These scholars are (Ngunyi and Adar, 1992; Wambulwa, 1983; Mugomba, 1975; Senghor, 1990: Hazlewood, 1985; Kinyanjui, 1983; Ravenhill, 1985; Onwuka, 1985 & Gordon, 1984)

Specific thematic factors were put forward by scholars as responsible for the collapse of EAC, but none of the scholars has linked the Tanzania’s national interest with the collapse of EAC. This is the gap this study intends to fill. The following literature illustrates the above scholars in different thematic areas according to their contributions on the collapse of the EAC.

Different ideological orientations pursued by the three East African States, caused the collapse of the E.A.C. Right from its inception, the community lacked harmony in its development policies because the three partner states pursued different paths in terms of development strategies and for an integration to succeed, the units or nation states concerned ought to pursue similar economic policies (Ngunyi and Adar, 1992).

This was complicated by the fact that Tanzania was committed to an economic ideology that involved nationalisation of certain private concerns as a means of affecting public ownership of the means of production and distribution. It is difficult to imagine how under such circumstances, monetary and fiscal policies of the partner states could be harmonised without actually diluting the ideologies purity of the ruling regimes of the three countries.

From the start, certain aspects of the new policy of socialism, Tanzania was to adopt would hinder and stand in the way of community activities. If the treaty was to live to its expectations then Tanzania would first have to relax its domestic policies. But was she willing to sacrifice her national commitments to territorial ones? The same dilemma applied to Kenya and Uganda as national considerations came before those of the EAC. Changes in Tanzania were not in favour of the community harmony and, if they contributed anything, then it was to drive
further the wedge that was making things fall apart. Tanzania’s decision ‘to move to the left’ in 1967 resulted in its economy being increasingly under government surveillance thus consequently placing both internal and external trade under the monopoly of state corporations (Kinyanjui, 1983).

At the same time, Kenya pursued an open market economy. The divergent ideological leanings between Kenya and Tanzania had an adverse effect on the East African Community. The common market was greatly affected by Tanzania’s decision to nationalise its state corporations. The treaty for East African community created a laissez faire common market whose advantage hinged on free trade. The economic activities would be undertaken by private enterprise with little government interference. This would in essence lead to financial fluidity necessary to cater for the transfer of goods between the partner states. Tanzania’s introduction of socialism and nationalization therefore went against these assumptions making the operation of the community hard. On the other hand, Kenya contributed a lot in causing disharmony in community activities by operating capitalist ideology (Mugomba, 1975)

In Uganda, the case was however, different given that the leaders pursued different economic policies at different times within a single frame work of the community. For instance, at the time of Obote I, the emphasis was on socialist orientation, particularly after 1969 when Uganda adopted a Common-Man’s Charter, or the Move to the Left. A move that saw Obote becoming a ‘discipline’ of Nyerere. What followed this was a Praetorian system under Idi Amin 1971 - 79. Uganda witnessed an economic somersault, which then lacked consistency with respect to a meaningful economic policy. Due to divergent economic policies, the maintenance of the community as a framework designed to promote and harmonise the particular economic policy positions was therefore bound to fail (Ngunyi and Adar, 1992).

The East African leaders – presidents or the East African Authority (EAA) were not ready to share their political power, not only at regional level but even at national. Difficulties involved in achieving political independence were still fresh in their minds. In Kenyan side for example, Kenyatta wanted to use the national power he had obtained in the hard way to promote his own
interests and that of his political base. In so doing he aimed at creating a kind of monarchical rule in Kenya - which gave no room for the surrender of that power.

Lack of interests within the EAA to try to promote areas of cooperation, created disharmony within EAC. Tanzania under Nyerere in particular was mainly concerned with the issues of the liberation of Southern African countries, especially by offering FRELIMO and ANC training facilities and bases. Tanzania also turned her economic interests southwards by constructing the TAZARA - railway line. Tanzania justified this act because benefits from EAC common market began to disappear with the duplication of industries. More so, the development of Kenyan roads for private business was still a view held in Tanzania and this was a sign of less than whole hearted commitment in Tanzania. The shift of Tanzania interests southwards made it difficult for the East African leaders to try to harmonise the important disintegrating issues which emerged in the early 1970's (Gordon 1984).

The political trends in Uganda had a significant contribution to the collapse of the EAC. Uganda constitution accepted a federal government, where such a federal government allowed the existence of Kingdoms. Embracing of other East African countries would obviously jeopardise the autonomy and operational capacity of the Kingdoms. Between 1962 and 1966, Obote and Kabaka Mutesa formed a coalition government, which did not give room for a federal government in East Africa. The Buganda's being a very influential group, especially in Amin's Uganda, played a great role in pulling Uganda away from the union.

The Amin's coup detat of 1971, was also a great blow to the EAC, the emergence of Amin brought a 'wolf' into the scene particularly on the view of the E.A Authority. Apart from Amin's behaviour, Nyerere in particular hated him for not only overthrowing his fellow president but his intimate friend and a disciple who was ready to adapt the socialist orientation - particularly after 1969. The founders of the community were expected to legislate against the appearance of Idi Amin. Amin's seizure of power was not acceptable in Nyerere's view and this simply meant that the East African president's never met since Amin came to power in Uganda.
The atmosphere was then never conducive for the smooth operation of the community, let alone to that progressive extension of co-operation. Uganda then ceased to be an effective participant in community discussions and the balance of the community's tripartite structure disappeared (Hazlewood 1985:183).

This deteriorating political climate made it practically difficult not only to solve the problems which existed in the community, but also prevented the leaders to meet and review the functioning of the community. As Tanzania closed her borders with Kenya, the whole idea of cooperation was duly shelved and forgotten. Hazlewood (1985) and Gordon (1984), argue that, the collapse of the EAC was mainly as a result of centralization of power within the East African Authority. The Treaty of 1967 provided that, the three East African head of states were to form the East African Authority. In Article 48 of the Treaty for East African Community, the authority was charged with the responsibility of promoting the effective corporation of the community. In this regard, the East African presidents had a greater say over the functions of the community. Tanzania utilized this clause to prevent further meetings of the presidents.

Hazlewood (1985) argued that the power given to the Authority by the treaty resulted to the personalization of the functions of the community based on the rotational basis where every head of state chaired a meeting ones after two years. The East Africa legislative council was therefore hampered particularly as body charged with responsibility of carrying out activities of the community. The Authority had its internal problems and these were more pronounced especially after 1971 when Amin toppled the Obote I government. Nyerere was the most hurt because he supported Obote’s government. To Nyerere, the Amin’s coming to power was an act of treason to the whole cause of African progress, African freedom and the spirit of EAC.

The decision making within the East African authority became almost impossible as Nyerere and Amin could not see eye to eye. The secretariat could only take decisions with the consent of the members of the Authority sought individually as they could not meet. Consensus on many issues could not be reached and many vital decisions were assumed to be of no harm
whenever they were postponed. The community collapsed in mid 1977 after the 1977 - 78 budget was not approved by the member states.

The uneven level of development among the partner states was responsible for the collapse of the community. This means the three countries differed in their economic levels especially as seen in their Gross National Product (GNP). The uneven level of development dates back to colonial period, and the 1967 treaty was to resolve it, but in fact the reverse happened. This was because Kenya continued to control to half of the total intra E.A.C trade scheme, where gains from cooperation are concentrated in only one member state, instead of the spread effects (Gordon 1984).

The most important matter with which the treaty attempted to deal with was the distribution of the benefits of cooperation. The integration of states which are at different levels of development tends to concentrate further development in those already most developed, and to result in an unequal distribution of the benefits of cooperation. For an integration scheme to be born and to survive, every member must be satisfied and must remain satisfied with the distribution of the benefits. Measures to achieve an acceptable distribution which would not be achieved in an unregulated common market are therefore an essential feature of an integration scheme. It is evident that the mechanisms of the treaty were inadequate, given the context within which they operated, to persuade the partner states that continued cooperation was worthwhile. But it is not self-evident that the mechanisms of the treaty were inherently inadequate, let alone inappropriate, for their purpose.

The transfer tax is sometimes seen as a device for encouraging the duplication of industries within East Africa, whereas the rationale of the common market was to avoid such duplication and to enable industries to enjoy economies of scale resulting from access to the whole East African market. But this criticism seems to derive from a mis-understanding, even though in practice it may be true that uneconomic duplication took place.

The rationale of the transfer tax system was that it would allow Tanzania and Uganda temporarily to protect from Kenyan competing industries which could operate efficiently on a
scale provided by their national markets. For these industries the encouragement of duplication was the whole purpose of the transfer tax, not an unwelcome and unintended side-effect. There were other large scale industries the location of which could not according to this rationalization of the system, be affected by transfer taxes, because only a single plant would be economic for the whole of East Africa. Herein, however, lies the weakness of the rationalization; the distinction between the two types of industry is nothing like so clear-cut as the rationalization presumes, and if sufficient incentives are provided, industries with important economies of scale could be duplicated to serve national markets at high cost. Such inefficient duplication cannot be blamed on the transfer tax. As formal fiscal incentives differed little between the partner states it is probable that practices incompatible with the treaty, including discriminatory purchasing by state trading corporations and quantitative restrictions on imports were the major causes of inefficient duplication of industries (Hazlewood, 1985).

The effectiveness of the East African Development Bank as an equalizing device may be questioned because of the limited scale of its activities. By the end of 1975, its investments in total were little more that twice the original contributions of the partner states. On average the annual commitment of funds by the Bank accounted for no more than 4 per cent of industrial investment in the partner states. It may be that a much larger scale of operations was expected by the less developed partner states when they agreed to the constitution of the Bank. But the Bank did rapidly achieve the prescribed distribution of its investments between the partner states, until its activities in Uganda were disrupted by political developments and it is possible that if the community as a whole had proved a success, outside finance would have become available to enable the scale of Bank operations to increase substantially.

However, the most important role of the Bank could be seen as to act as a catalyst for complementary industrial development rather than to undertake a major part of industrial investment itself. In that respect, there is certainly a reason to question its effectiveness. The projects in which the Bank invested (textiles, sugar, paper, tyres, cement for example) do not appear particularly relevant to the aim of making the economics of the partner states
more complementary. It would have been difficult for the Bank alone to pursue this aim. It could have done so if agreements had existed between the partner states on a pattern of industrial specialization into which the Bank's investments would fit.

A number of issues concerning transport and the related issue of tourism, caused tensions between the partner states. The Kenya tourist industry benefited from access to the game parks of northern Tanzania. They were generally included in a circuit for Nairobi based tourists, using Kenya vehicles. Although payments were made for the use of Tanzania's hotels and game parks and for other goods nonetheless it was strongly contended by Tanzania that she received only minor benefits from the tourism. Geographical convenience made northern Tanzania a natural part of a Nairobi based tour, and at the time it would have been implausible to expect a cross border tour to be based anywhere else. Arusha could have been an alternative base, but not until there had been a very substantial expansion in the infrastructure for tourism, and a change in Tanzania's somewhat ambivalent attitude towards the industry. Tourism is an industry where a redistribution of the benefits rather than a relocation of activities were the way to maximize total benefits and improve their distribution. A greater share for Tanzania would have required an agreement permitting discriminator charges and other measures, and such arrangements could have been brought under the treaty. The closure of the border and the disappearance of cross border tourism with the collapse of the community must have reduced the total benefits of tourism.

External influence was also responsible for the collapse of the East African community. The British Government was not happy with the whole idea of a federation in East Africa. In fact this threatened their economic interests especially when communism was engulfing the region with Tanzania's support. Though co-operation was their brain child, but cooperation was only important and valid when it served their interests at that particular time. With the same view, the Multinational Corporations (MNCs) also rejected the union and instead - financed more projects within the three partner states with a single reason of diverging these countries' attention away from the Union (Ravenhill, 1985).
The East African partner states intended to develop their weak and unstable economies through self-reliance, they will inevitably need capital and technology which are not easily available within the periphery. When the host countries decide to welcome the MNCs which most do, then the profit motivated interests of their foreign investors are likely to run into conflict with the development-orientated motives of their hosts (Onwuka, 1985).

The colonial policies of divide and rule had to be replaced after independence by the more positive but more difficult task of building new nations out of ethnically and culturally diverse communities. Several new African states have had to face the most serious challenges to national unity especially civil unrest waged out of regional ethnic rivalry within the state (Mazrui 1984:194).

These external rivalries made regional cohesion difficult if not impossible to achieve. In Uganda for instance, the battle of the palace on 24th May 1966 tells it all. That is after the pre-independence elections of 1962, Uganda came to be governed by Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) and the regionalist and sub-nationalist Kabaka Yekka Party (KY) of Kabaka of Buganda – Sir Edward Mutesa. Obotc became the Prime Minister and Mutesa President.

This coalition was undermined in the early years of independence as Obote skilfully used parliamentary manoeuvres to strengthen his party’s position and undermine the Kabaka’s parliamentary support. Finally in 1966, Obote’s tactics shifted to the use of military force to destroy Kabakaship, the political base Baganda regionalism and separatism. The Obote – Mutesa relations became sour and after some cabinet ministers who were behind Mutesa protested of Obote’s corrupt practices, coupled with an ultimatum from the Buganda kingdom for the central government to leave Kampala, the central government treated this ultimatum as an act of rebellion.

From then on events gathered momentum culminating in the battle of the palace on 24th May 1966 when the national army on Obote’s order and led by Idi Amin attacked the Kabaka’s residence and after a sustained exchange with its defenders, captured it. The Kabaka himself escaped and found his way to Britain where he was to remain in exile.
The events of 1966 seemed to shake Obote’s faith in the viability of institutionalised pluralism in his country. To Obote, Buganda as an autonomous entity seemed at last to have come to an end but he miscalculated the Buganda potential in the future political unrest. He went further even to assume the Baganda bad feelings towards the East African Federation. The above example illustrates how the formation of EAC in 1967 overlooked certain problems of disunity. It was meaningless to talk of unity when internal dynamics of each of the partner states were polar opposites especially along ethnic lines.

Tanzania on its part also had almost the same problems as above. The delicate Zanzibar – Tanganyika union did not mean much on regards to Tanzania’s unity. In fact since the Zanzibar Revolution of 1964, the legacy of the barrel of the gun as a source of the revolution was not forgotten in Zanzibar. Sheikh Abeid Karume the leader of the Afro-Shirazi party and the first vice president of the union between Zanzibar and Tanganyika often emphasised that:–

It was through a violent confrontation that the people of Zanzibar and Pemba had won back their rights as human beings and it’s through the barrel of the gun that those rights will be upheld (Mazrui 1984: 224).

The above union was so fragile that Tanzania was busy trying to re-organise herself than concentrating on the East African Co-operation. On the other side many viewed this union as a first step towards the East African Federation. However, rather than promote unity, the Tanzania became an obstacle to the development of East African Federation. This was the case because the Zanzibar – Tanganyika union had its own point of reference and it was defined between the previously independent states. In fact, the newly created Tanzania could not join any federation without resorting to consultation with both Zanzibar and Tanzania main land. The formation of EAC in 1967 somehow tended to divert attention from the uncertainties at home. This way, the EAC served as a means to broaden the base to deal with potential conflict, while little importance seems to have been attached to economic cooperation.
In Kenya, the situation was the same. Shilla war in 1967 is a point in mind. The Northern Frontier Districts (NFD) in fact wanted to secede to Somalia. For Kenya to ignore such a fact and attempt to forge for regional unity was unrealistic. On the other hand, Kenya became independent as a multi-party state. The two major parties were Kenya African National Union (KANU) and Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). KANU and KADU differed on the basis of their support in their policies and in their organisation. In other respects the two were similar. Both parties reflected ethnicism where both were supported by one party tribes that is ethnic communities which were split between KANU and KADU. A striking of this ethnic partisanship is provided by the case of the Kamba. Leaders from the two Kamba districts of Machakos and Kitui met on the Yatta Plateau and after discussing which party the Kamba as a whole should support decided on KANU (Mazrui 1984:108).

The KANU and KADU were multi-ethnic parties in terms of support. In 1961, KANU defeated KADU but interesting here is the fact that the problem of regionalism (majimboism) persisted. In 1964, KADU members were seen crossing the floor to join KANU an act which down graded regions. Thus Kenya then had at last a unitary constitution containing few obstacles to the exercise of strong and effective presidential rule. Regionalism had been defeated but ethnicism remained strong within the monolithic ruling party KANU and the ethnic consciousness presented independent Kenya with a number of crisis and difficulties. Within the major party KANU new tensions began to rise and a faction to the left of the top leadership gradually began to be discernible as a source of challenge. By 1966, the leftist faction broke from the ruling party and formed the Kenya People's Union (KPU) whereas the original opposition had been from the right. The new opposition was from the left (Mazrui 1984).

This deteriorating political climate made it practically impossible not only to solve the problems which existed in the community but also prevented the leaders from meeting and review the functioning of the community. The EAC did not stand the test of time and it collapsed in June 1977. In the literature review we have dealt with factors which other
researchers have considered as responsible for the collapse of EAC. The scholars above have failed to link the Tanzania’s national interest with the collapse of EAC.

This research therefore intended to examine the extent to which the pursuit of national interest of Tanzania led to the collapse of the East African Community in 1977 and how the Amin’s coup of 1971 threatened Tanzania’s national interest in the region. No single scholar has ever linked the Amin’s coup of 1971 in Uganda and the national interest of Tanzania which led to the collapse of EAC, and this study therefore intends to fill this gap.

Other factors contributed by other scholars to the collapse of EAC are very important to this study. I have selected the pursuit of Tanzania’s personal interest as a viable to explain the collapse of EAC, because all nation states pursue their goals and objectives through their national interest. Nation states also interact within the international sphere as they pursue their national interests. Statesmen also advance their own positions through the interests of their own states. It is for this reason that national interests of all states become important for their survival hence the selection of Tanzania’s national interest to explain the collapse of EAC.

This study examined the pursuit of Tanzania’s national interest as the main cause for the collapse of the E.A.C. Though Ngunyi and Adar (1992) claim that the collapse of E.A.C had been attributed to political factors thus did not clearly show the extent to which the pursuit of Tanzania’s national interest contributed to this. They failed to link Amin’s coup of 1971 with the national interest of Tanzania which led to the collapse of EAC. Hence the gap this study intends to fill in this regard is to examine the roles of Tanzania’s national interest and Amin’s coup of 1971 in the collapse of EAC.

1.7.0 Theoretical framework

The principle purpose of a theory is to describe, explain and predict relationships between variables. While most theoretical approaches to integration have these qualities, this study adapts the Power Theory as its theoretical framework. This is because of its usefulness in analysing the political will of the concerned states towards integration. Power theory also
explains the conflicts of interests among partner states. The pursuit of national interest is a struggle for positions in trade and power. Power theory explains that politics is the manipulation of power. Before discussing the Power Theory in detail, I will examine a number of other theories that I considered for the study.

1.7.1 Theories of integration

Integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new and a larger centre, whose institutions demand a jurisdiction over pre-existing national states (Haas, 1958).

The main underlying assumption in integration is that, It is the best interest of nation states, not only to exist individually, but also collectively whereby the interests of individual states can be harmonized in the process to create acceptable whole within the diversified interests of the same nation-states (Nye, 1971). A theory is a general explanation of certain selected phenomena set forth in a manner satisfactory to someone acquainted with the characteristics of the reality being studied. It need not be acceptable to all experts; indeed it may satisfy the expounder and horrify all others.

Powerful theories are those that exercise great influence upon the thinking of large numbers, perhaps the overwhelming majority of knowledgeable persons for a long time before being replaced by new theories (Kaplan, 1948). A scientific theory might therefore be linked to a complex spatial network. Its terms are represented by the knots, while the threats connecting the latter correspond, in the part to the definitions and in part to the fundamental and derivative hypotheses contained in the theory.

The whole system floats as it were above the plane of observation and is anchored to it by rules of interpretation. This might be viewed as strings which are not part of the network but link certain parts of the latter with specific laces in the plane of observation. By virtue of those interpretive connectors, the network can function as a scientific theory. From certain observational data, we may ascend, via an interpretive string to some point in the theoretical
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network; hence proceed via definitions an hypothesis to other points from which another interpretive string permits a descent to the place of observation (Kaplan, 1948).

Some of the theories of integration are as follows:

1.7.2 Federalist theory/approach:

Federalism is a process of direct union of nation states into one specific unity, the supranational institution. The concept is concerned with cooperating people in the form of their needs, into one entity, which acquires significance in inter-state relations (Galtung, 1968).

The idea of federalism is based on the need to centralise the activities of nation-states into one larger entity, which is assumed, to have the power to enact and enforce laws designed to regulate the activities of the union. Political actors should be persuaded to shift their expectations, loyalties and political activities to a single centre of decision making. It should be a process in which, two or more actors form a new actor (Galtung, 1968).

The theory assumes that, two or more units shift their loyalties to the whole - or a large centre, this new centre demands jurisdiction upon the pre-existing units. The approach therefore seeks to reduce the sovereign power of the nation state through the creation of federal institutions, such as the military, police, a common legal system, adoption of a common constitution, and finally by ensuring a division of power at the federal and the national levels.

EAC is an economic cooperation arrangement without a supreme political authority makes the federalists approach irrelevant for this study. Political unification in the East African region is not in the least a priority to the East African partner states. The treaty for East African community does not call for it, and this theory can’t be of relevance to our study, which is to examine the economic cooperation and the collapse of East African Community.

1.7.3 Functionalist approach:

Unlike the federalist approach, the functionalist theoretical approach emphasises a gradual predominance of economics over politics in promoting integration. It is by examining the
problem tasks, and issues which become a base for identifying the specific institutions, which
would harness the activities of the partner states. These institutions are headed by technicians
or experts who operate within the same institutions. These experts are non-political (Mitrany,
1975).

The doctrine of ramification assumes that co-operation in one sector would lead to co-
operation in yet another sector and through a gradual process, this would move from an easier
to a more complex aspect of co-operation. Once the tasks have been identified and the
institutions formed, the idea of nationalism will be removed, since the loyalty of a nation will
be transferred to institutions created, where nationalism changes to inter-nationalism. At this
point the politicians will have no option but to collaborate with the experts, to transfer
sovereignty of the nation-states to the institutions formed. The theory also assumes that
functional activities could re-orient international activity and contribute to world peace.

Like federalist approach, the functionalist approach is also not useful to our study because
political integration, as it was in the EAC, rests on the will of the three partner state
governments, and not through the technicians who will collaborate to solve some non political
tasks.

1.7.4 Neo-functionalist approach:

Building upon the work of Haas (1958) and Mitrany (1966), Joseph Nye (1971) made an
effort to redefine neo-functionalist theory of integration. He developed a neo-functionalist
model based upon process mechanisms and integrative potential. This theoretical framework
to a greater extent is not Euro-centric.

Nye (1971) bases his conceptualization upon an analysis of the conditions for integration
drawn specifically from European and non western experiences and modifies greatly the
notions of automatic politicization and spill –over. Neo- functionalist theory unlike
federalist approach did not demand immediate commitment to federal union, but rather to
involvement leading towards some more highly institutional end. This is why neo-
functionalist is seen as a strategy for attacking the castle of national sovereignty by stealth
with interest groups as mercenaries and technocrats as agents within the walls to open the gates quietly (Nyc, 1971).

Neo - functionalist theory can be used to explain the collapse of EAC, but it's not effective in our case because Tanzania’s pursuit of its national interest led to the collapse of EAC. The pursuit of national interest is explained in terms of manipulation of power, hence the limitation of neo-functionalist theory.

1.7.5 The Power theory

In this study we have selected power theory as our theory to explain the collapse of EAC. This is because contrary to what people believe, the collapse of EAC was a pure power struggle. Morgenthau (1990), defines all politics as a struggle for power. Power is man’s control over the minds and actions of other men. Power is dynamic and changing rather than static in nature. Morgenthau argues that all nations are compelled to protect their physical, political and national interest against encroachment by other nations; hence national interest is identified with national survival. Interest is the essence of politics in pursuit of the national interest. Nation states are governed by a morality that differs from the morality of individuals in their personal relationships.

In our case Kenya and Tanzania pursued conflicting national interest, each of them tried to recruit Uganda to isolate the other. This is a struggle for power, since states men think and act in terms of their states national interests. We are going to use the power theory in this study, which is useful to describe, explain and predict relationship between two political actors in which actor A has the ability to control the mind and actions of actor B.

Schuman F.L (1933), held that in an international system lacking a common government, each nation state necessarily seeks safety by relying on its own power and viewing with alarm the power of its neighbours. All civilized life rests on the last instance of power (Spykman N.J, 1933). Power is the ability to move the individual or the human collectivity in some desired fashions, through persuasion, purchase, barter and coercion (Morgenthau, 1990). All politics is about struggle for power.
Burton.J. (1933), held that there is probably no common factor in all thinking on international relations than the assumption that, states depend for their existence upon power, and achieve their objectives by power. Power is usually exercised over people, territory and wealth (Deutsch, 1966).

Power is the difference between the highest reward and the worst punishment which a power holder can bestow upon some persons in his domain. Governments can exercise power through techniques of reward as well as punishment. Tyrants like Amin 1971 – 1979, prefer to rely on threats and punishments as a means of securing public order. Popularly elected governments, in contrast, prefer to rely on positive incentives and rewards.

Power is a set or collection of all the particular kinds of classes of behaviour, relations and affairs that are effectively subjected to governmental power. The external scope of power has increased overtime. Pure control relationships, in which strong nations states demonstrates their predominance over weak ones by collecting tribute, showing their naval flag, or exacting symbolic signs and submission, have given way to complex and multifunctional systems of dependency and interdependency. Robert Dahl (1957), asserts that actor A has power over B to the extent that, he can get B to do something B would not otherwise do.

There are also tangible elements (attributes) of power, for example, population, territory, natural resources and industrial capacity, military strength, leadership and foreign support and dependency. All these attributes explain that power remains at the heart of political process. Wars are fought for instance, Tanzania’s invasion of Uganda in 1979 was meant to preserve power, to defend power, to increase power and to balance power.

Nation states, through their diplomatic, military, and intelligence services, are constantly watching, charting, and analyzing one another’s power profiles. This makes politics a pure struggle for power (Morgenthau, 1990). This may comprise anything that establishes and maintains control of man over man and covers all social relationships which serve that end.
from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another.

To understand power theory we need also to understand the basic concepts of power. Influence is the use of instrument of persuasion – short of force by actor A in order to maintain or alter the behaviour of actor B in a fashion suitable to the preference of actor A. Power is authority can be defined as actors B's voluntary compliance with directives, (prescriptions, orders) issued by actor A, nurtured by B's perceptions regarding A, such as respect, solidarity, affection, affinity, leadership, knowledge and experience. Force can be defined as the explicit threat or the use of military, economic and other instruments of coercion by actor A against actor B, in pursuit of A's political objectives.

In our study, Tanzania found it important to recruit Uganda to isolate Kenya. In this case Tanzania aimed at recruiting Uganda in order to further isolate Kenya, but with a principal objective of achieving her nation interest within the EAC. In our case, Tanzania precisely understood that, politics is about manipulation of national interest in the quest for acquiring and balancing power, and it's for this reason that power has been selected to explain the collapse of EAC.

The above diagram is meant to serve the purpose of illustrating the theoretical framework and demonstrate that, pursuit of Tanzania's national interest led to the collapse of EAC. As indicated our intervening variable is the Amin's coup of 1971, which negatively impacted on Tanzania's national interest. The hypothesis is that, if Amin's coup did not take place in Uganda, then EAC could not have collapsed in 1977. The theoretical framework has three major variables: independent variable which is Tanzania's national interest, the intervening variable is the Amin's coup in Uganda in 1971 and the dependent variable is the collapse of EAC.
The Theoretical framework can be conceptualized as follows:

Tanzania's cooperation with
Southern African States

Liberation struggle

Tanzania's cooperation with
East African States

Trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Tanzania's Political Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Uganda's Common Man's Charter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Amin's coup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Liberation of Ugandans from Amin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Collapse of EAC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other factors for the collapse of EAC:
- Ideological differences
- Buganda Kingdom
- Uneven level of development
- External influence
- Internal conflicts
- East African Authority
As shown by the diagram 24a above, other causes for the collapse of EAC as mentioned by other scholars include: ideological differences, developments in Uganda, east Africa authority, the uneven level of development, external influence and the internal conflicts within the state and the literature review though gives more value to the above factors I have selected Tanzania’s national interest to explain the collapse of EAC because national interest of a country cannot avoid being responsive to relations among other states.

The figure therefore illustrates the regional cooperative mechanisms in East and Southern Africa. It explains the cooperation within East African states and how Tanzania’s national interest facilitated the formation of EAC. In particular a common colonial bond and a similar capitalist form of economy amongst the East African partner states of Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda made the formation of EAC possible to attain (Ngunyi and Adar, 1992).

Economic cooperation through trade and common services ensured the survival of EAC. The intra- EAC trade flourished and its volumes increased tremendously between 1967 and 1970. The trade became the major means of interaction within the region. Imports and exports increased uninterrupted until 1971. During this period, Tanzania’s aim was to unify the East African region as part of a piece meal effort to unite Africa.

Internal developments in Uganda influenced Tanzania’s national interest within East African region. Tanzania aimed at recruiting Uganda in order to isolate Kenya. In 1966, Obote toppled Mutesa and became the president of Uganda. Obote therefore had to deal with the Buganda, the enemy within. Obote realized that to defeat Buganda he had to re-distribute resources equitably within Uganda. To achieve this, Obote adopted the Arusha Declaration tenents, in 1969 through Common Man’s Charter. This provided Nyerere of Tanzania a perfect chance to partner with Obote as they strengthened the socialist orientation. Nyerere’s major purpose was to expand Tanzania’s trade and markets within East African region. The recruitment of Uganda was guided by the fact that, unstable
regimes in Uganda were likely to cooperate with either Kenya or Tanzania, and when Obote moved to the left, Tanzania was quick to cement her relations with Uganda.

Amin's coup of 1971 in Uganda negatively impacted on Tanzania's national interest within EAC. Amin's coup interrupted the Tanzania- Uganda cordial relations in terms of trade. Amin toppled Obote in 1971 and instituted a military regime in Uganda. This act was against the principles of Nyerere, who was hurt by the overthrow of his closest friend. Nyerere therefore refused to recognize the Amin's regime and went further to persuade other African leaders to do the same.

Nyerere gave a spirited fight against Amin through OAU, but without much success. Nyerere expected Kenya a partner in EAC to denounce the coup, but to contrary Kenya simply kept away from internal affairs of Uganda. To Kenya the coup was a blessing in disguise because the coup disrupted the Tanzania - Uganda growing socialist orientation. Nyerere went further to accept Obote's political asylum in Dar es Salaam and this made tension high between Tanzania and Amin's regime, particularly when the Obote's supporters tried unsuccessfully to topple Amin. Nyerere never met eye to eye with Amin since 1971 and this largely affected the smooth running of the EAC. Tanzania simply walked away from the regional arrangement. The trade between Tanzania and Uganda dropped drastically from US$5.8 Million in 1970 to US zero by 1975. Tanzania realizes that Amin had disrupted her trade relations with Uganda and her socialist system could not measure up to the competitive Kenya's capitalist system. Tanzania's national interest shifted southwards in order to trade with more friendly nations like Zambia.

Amin's coup influenced Tanzania's national interest shift to the South, hence the collapse of EAC. Tanzania's national interest shift to the south enhanced Nyerere's Pan- Africanism spirit and liberation struggle amongst the South African states. Tanzania's trade relations within EAC had disappeared by 1975 and it was prudent for Tanzania to shift southwards in order to trade with more friendly nations like Zambia. We also realized that Tanzania utilized trade in the south as an aspect of liberation struggle. This was clearly illustrated by the construction of TARAZA railway line and major road network connecting Dar es
Salaam and Lusaka. The TARAZA railway line in particular was aimed at helping the liberation struggle in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, by avoiding Apartheid South African route.

Tanzania’s trade links in the south and liberation struggle was rewarded immensely, because Mozambique through FRELIMO became independent in 1975 and Zimbabwe also became independent in 1980. The newly in dependent states provided Tanzania a perfect justification of remaining in the South because trade volumes increased between them, though at the expense of EAC. With independence of Angola, Namibia and South Africa in 1994. Tanzania’s national interest shift southwards was rewarded when Tanzania as the chairman of Front Line States (FLS), saw all South African states became independent. The FLS changed its mandate from pursuing political independence into working for economic independence. This economic independence culminated into the formation of SADCC.

Tanzania’s shift southward made the collapse of EAC inevitable, because the factors that led to the collapse of EAC also led to the conflicting national interests within East African states. Amin’s coup disrupted the harmonious relations within the region and dwelt a blow to EAC regional arrangements. When Nyerere toppled Amin in 1979 and Obote II government installed in Uganda, illustrates a consistent Tanzania’s national interest, with an aim of using trade as an aspect of liberation struggle. The Tanzania – Uganda war of 1979 was aimed at liberating Ugandans from Amin. Tanzania’s national interest therefore, has continued to determine regional cooperation in East and Southern Africa, because a pull out from COMESA and threats to do the same in the new EAC is a point in mind.

1.8.0 HYPOTHESES

Our hypothesis can be stated as follows

- That the pursuit of Tanzania’s national interests led to the collapse of East African communities in 1977.
- That the political developments in Uganda and Amin’s coup in 1971 negatively impacted on Tanzania’s national interest and EAC.
• How the three partner states responded to the new developments in the post-Amin coup.

1.9.0 Methodology

Library research constituted the dominant source of investigation, consequently this study is essentially documentary, hinging majorly on secondary sources of information.

It is important to note that in this study we have relied on documentary evidence. The secondary data were obtained from

1) Published books on EAC.
2) EAC summit papers, statistical abstracts.
3) Technical reports from related workshops.
4) EAC journals, magazines, periodicals, and newspapers on EAC.
5) EAC Annual trade year books and any other unpublished materials on EAC, and any other such literature that shall be deemed adequate in giving appropriate information.

It is also important to note that I acknowledged sources of data that I obtained through informal discussions with other informed persons. This informal discussion was to enrich the secondary data. To supplement the secondary data, I had reached out to obtain people’s perceptions, views and findings in relations to the collapse of EAC. To conduct the above interviews, one other vital aspect was time, where almost all meetings bookings were very essential. In this regard I would make a schedule of interviews according to the appointment arrangement of a specific institution or an individual. To avoid stretching my interview programme I had to deal with one group or category after another. This was to give sufficient time to each respondent or institutions personnel to respond to the questionnaires. Time frame was also important because some self administered questionnaires took most time than others even within the same institution.
I created a flexible programme to accommodate for appointments and promises that were not honoured by respondents. Some respondents may just deliberately fail to honour the time we had agreed and could keep on postponing our interviews several times, citing various reasons such as having other meetings to attend, given a new assignment that needed his/her attention, travelling abroad, travelling to the rural home or just attending various social functions.

Though prepared psychologically to face such challenges, some respondents and particularly the politicians were difficult to access. In some instances I would walk to an office in the morning where I had an appointment that morning, just to be informed later after waiting for one hour or two that my respondent was still away from his/her rural home. This trend could continue for a week or two and even a month. At some offices I became a common visitor, because of the need to access primary data which helped to supplement the secondary sources.

The secondary data was collected from the following institutions based in Kenya

1) Kenya Airways
2) Kenya Posts & Telecommunications.
3) Kenya Railways
4) Uganda Embassy in Kenya.
5) Tanzanian Embassy in Kenya.
6) Kenya Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This study aimed at obtaining first hand information on the cooperation within East African region with a view to understand the disintegration of EAC in 1977.

1.9.1 Method of data collection

I relied on documentary evidence on this study because, EAC is a widely researched area, and many scholars have contributed widely on the collapse of the EAC. The scholars' contributions provide a sufficient ground to identify the existing gaps on the collapse of
EAC. The rationale of relying on secondary data was mainly because, the EAC collapsed 33 years ago and much of what is existing now is documentary evidence. History has also failed to interpret the historical events to explain the past, present and the future implications this events have on the political arena. The regional integration in Africa and specifically in east Africa is a phenomenon which has been characterized by different aspirations and achievements. The study therefore intended to understand the documented experiences to avoid pitfalls of the previous integration schemes.

I managed the data collection process alone, as well as analyzing it and made report in form of a thesis. This research provides insights to other scholars to look at the available data and identify the gaps. Find solutions and new knowledge from filling the gaps in the existing literature. In this study, I had to move from one office to another, one library to the other in order to fill the gap existing in the collapse of the EAC. The collapse of EAC was mainly contributed by the pursuit of Tanzania’s national interest within the East African region. During the study I realized that the documentary evidence existed almost uniformly across the archives, libraries, workshop reports, journal and periodicals of all the three East African States. The ministry of foreign affairs, and Embassies of Uganda and Tanzania has documents that show that, EAC collapsed because of the conflicting national interests between Kenya and Tanzania which made their aspirations far apart. There is documentary evidence that largely blame Tanzania for closing its border with Kenya in 1977 and also a shift to the south after Amin toppled Obote in 1971, the reality was, if trade surpluses to one country are higher than those accruing to the other, then conflict is likely to occur. When the national interests of the partner states are conflicting, EAC was unlikely to survive.

1.9.2 Conclusion
The statement of the problem identifies Tanzania’s radicalization of her foreign policy after the Arusha Declaration as the main cause for the collapse of the EAC. This radicalization of Tanzania’s National interest in the region put her totally different ideological point with the
principle neighbor Kenya, which strained relations between the two countries. Ideological
differences coupled with the pursuit of conflicting national interest hindered the two
countries willingness to cooperate. Kenya and Tanzania each tried to recruit Uganda to
isolate the other.
Uganda from 1966 to 1969 seemed to offer promising grounds for better relations with
Tanzania. This was manifested in the Common-Man’s Charter, a policy change initiated by
Obote regime in 1969. This made Tanzania and Uganda appear as if they were cut from the
same piece of cloth.
Amin’s coup of 1971 in Uganda destroyed the cordial relations between Tanzania and
Uganda as Tanzania refused to recognize the killer military regime in Uganda. Tanzania’s
shift to the south created more problems in East Africa after closing its boarders with Kenya
and refusing to recognize Amin’s regime in Uganda.
TANZANIA’S COOPERATION WITH EAST AFRICAN STATES

2.1.0 Introduction

Tanzania became independent in 1961 with Mwalimu Nyerere as the president. Unlike Kenya and Uganda, there was no strong opposition in Tanzania at independence. Like Kenya and Uganda, Tanzania also attained independence as a capitalist economy. In 1961, Nyerere wanted to delay Tanzania’s independence to wait for both Kenya and Uganda, but realized that each country had its own unique ways of achieving independence. Furthermore independence was also designed by the colonial powers to come at different times. Nyerere’s objective then was to create a large East African state comprising of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. It was then as early as 1961 that the seeds for the East African Community were soared (Gordon, 1984).

Uganda and Kenya attained their independence in 1962 and 1963, respectively, outside the Nyerere’s federation plan. Kenya in particular preferred an economic form of co-operation which was later ratified through the East African community in 1967. The economic form of cooperation was not appealing to Uganda and Tanzania because even during the colonial period, Tanzanian and Ugandan governments distrusted settler dominated Kenya. At independence, both Uganda and, especially, Tanzania insisted that a new basis of cooperation could be found that would better serve the interests of all the newly independent East African states (Ngunyi and Adar, 1992).

More seriously, the accident of history and nature gave Nairobi and its hinterland the basis for an early start in commercial, industrial and even agricultural transformation and development. This happened during the colonial era when there grew a proportionally large concentration of European and Asian communities in Nairobi. This seemed to reduce Tanzania and Uganda to the position of Kenya's market, while Kenya’s strong capitalist systems was a threat to Tanzania’s weak economy.
In 1977, hopes for the formation of an East African Federation were shattered following the collapse of the East African Community. The collapse of the Community marked the end of one of the oldest attempts at international co-operation. EAC stood out as the most advanced customs union in less developed countries (Hazlewood, 1985). This chapter aims to investigate the degree and nature of interaction and co-operation among the East African states in political, economic and social sectors.

2.1.1 East African cooperation before treaty

To understand Tanzania’s cooperation with East African states, it is important to turn to the events that show the chronological sequence of the cooperation in the region before the treaty. Efforts at regional co-operation in East Africa begun in 1917, when a free trade area was established between Kenya and Uganda. Later in 1922, it was transformed into a union. After the defeat of Germany in the First World War, Tanganyika also joined the Union in 1923.

Regional co-operation was meant to be a valuable asset to the colonial government as it would reduce costs in administration and other related fields. The system of regional development would stimulate industrial change and other forms of economic development while at the same time avoiding duplication of such activities. The base of regional co-operation was the existence of a common market and services, which existed as early as 1920. The East African region had a common currency by 1905, and a harmonised income tax system, a postal union was created for the free movement of capital and labour during the colonial era.

In 1924, when the Ormsby – Gore Commission was sent to East Africa to consider the viability of establishing a unified policy in the area, the East African Currency board and the postal union already existed. In that case, the commission recommended for an inter-alia, as there already existed pillars, which suggested a possibility of a strong Union in the region. These indicators would call for harmonization of the regional activities and services and more so create a foundation for expansion. The commission recommend that the governors of the
colonies were charged with the responsibility of designing the modalities of the union (Ngunyi and Adar 1992).

The issue of the federation of the colonies was not a point of focus though was an obvious thing in the remote future. To confirm the matter, the Kenya’s governor Sir Edward Grigg kept assuring his counterpart that Kenya being at the centre of the settlers, would appreciate the establishment of a federal capital in Nairobi. Anyway, the co-operation continued as informal because the interests of the settlers were identical and therefore easy to accommodate without set down rules and regulations. Then the settler’s interests and Governors’ conferences were enough to ensure the co-operation’s survival.

The federation idea did not go unchallenged but this did not divert the scheme from its original direction. For instance, the Kabaka of Buganda and his Lukiko (legislative) basing their argument on the 1900 agreement, rejected any move towards federation. Also the recommendation of Hilton – Young Commission of 1928 that it was not yet ripe for any change towards the establishment of a federation did not prevent the governors’ annual conference from taking place to discuss the framework of cooperation. Tanganyika unlike Uganda did not have strong autonomous African Kingdoms which opposed the co-operative mechanisms in East Africa.

In 1937, an income tax was introduced in Kenya, and was later extended to Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1940. In 1938, a joint East African Board was established to handle tax collection. This argument for co-operation was accelerated further by the creation of the East African High Commission in January 1948. The extension of the Income Tax to Tanganyika was because Tanganyika unlike Uganda did not have major divisions that opposed tax extensions within her African traditional societies. Tanganyika had never experienced divisive politics and this made Tanganyika a more united country in East Africa. This unity made Tanganyika pursue her national interests without major obstacles from within, which became a major motivator towards co-operation in the region.
Soon after the creation, the East African High Commission enacted laws putting into operation East African Railways and Harbours, the East African Posts and Telegraph, the mechanism for revenue allocation, the East African Income Tax management and the Makerere College. The E. A. H. C. was composed of the Governors who were supported by the legislative members and other inter-territorial boards. The governor of Kenya was the chairman and the chief executive of the body. As an executive body, the high commission was given the power to legislate upon the advice and consent of the assembly if this were expedient in the interest of the public order, public faith or good government (Ngunyi and Adar 1992).

The central legislative Assembly consisted of seven “ex-official” members, six officers in the High Commission, three European nominated members, one from each territory, one Indian and one African member appointed by the Governors of each territory and one Arab member appointed by the High Commission. In the above arrangement, the High Commission remained the supreme organ of the colonial scheme. The legislative assembly only became a supportive organ.

In 1960, another commission – the Raisman Commission was appointed for the purpose of studying the activities of the E. A.H. C. It recommended that the E. A. H. C. should have its own revenue independent of its territories. It also recommended equitable distribution of profits within East African colonies in a formula which favoured Tanganyika and Uganda. The E. A. H. C. operated until 1961 when it was replaced by East African Common Services Organisation (E. A. C. S. O). After Tanganyika became independent, EACSO was to be forerunner of a federation of E. Africa the view that was held mainly in Tanganyika. The EACSO comprised mainly of the East African Authority, the Central legislative Assembly, the Triumvirates and the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa.

The Triumvirates comprised of five ministerial committees which were to assist the Authority in various fields. More important among these is that the EACSO constitution gave more power to the three governments and not the British (Ngunyi and Adar 1992). With the
EACSO in place, the aim was to harmonise the economic services which existed mainly within the three East African territories. It was a supreme policy making body which consisted of principle ministers of the three territories who were responsible for direction of policies in specific areas e.g. railways, harbours, telegraphs and currency. It was a four member committee. With this, the Central Legislative Assembly of nine members elected by each territory government, made it possible for the activities and services of the organisation to be harmonised. The administration of EACSO was headed by the Secretary General who was based in Nairobi.

Between 1961 and 1963, the East African countries achieved independence and the concern of the independent governments was individual national development. The assumption was that co-operation could function as long as it facilitated the national economic development of each of the three countries. Each country was to participate only if it was assured of receiving a fair share of the benefits derived from the cooperation.

It is worthwhile to turn our attention to the colonial development policy and the type of economic structures the independent states inherited. This will enable us to see the extent to which this structures stimulated or stood in the way of the formation of a stronger co-operation in East Africa. The accident of history and nature gave Nairobi and its hinterland the basis for an early start in commercial, industrial and even agricultural transformation and development. This happened during the colonial era when there grew a proportionately large concentration of European and Asian communities in Nairobi.

The headquarters of the common services and market were located in Nairobi. It provided commercial and industrial infrastructure to maximise the cost of operating the regional undertaking. They seemed to reduce Tanganyika and Uganda to the position of Kenya’s market. Statistical evidence indicated that Kenya dominated intra – EAC trade. She controlled 48.7% of this trade between 1969 and 1978.

With such a background, one can understand clearly why after independence both Tanganyika and Uganda were eager to have a shift in the existing structure of EACSO and a creation of a
more favourable policy which would make them gain more from the union in terms of inter
EAC trade.

In 1964, a ministerial meeting was convened in Kampala. It was followed by another one in
Mbale by the heads of states of the three countries. The meeting came up with resolutions
which would ease the imbalance existing in the location of industries between Kenya and the
other two states. The basis of these resolutions was to harmonise relations in terms of intra-
East Africa trade and location of industries which seemed to be the areas of conflict among
the partner states. It was then decided that for the time being new industries would be mainly
established within Tanzania and Uganda. In addition the two countries were also allowed to
protect their budding industries by imposing temporary measures against imports from Kenya
through quota restrictions.

The East African High Commission (EAHC), operated until 1961, when it was replaced by
East African common services organization (EACSO). After Tanzania became independent
EACSO was to be a forerunner of a federation of east Africa, a view that was mainly held
by Nyerere (Ngunyi and Adar, 1992). By this time EAHC had enacted laws putting into
operation East African railways and harbors, the East African posts and telegraphs, the
mechanisms for tax collection, the East African income tax management and the Makerere
College. This arrangement recommended for equitable distribution of profits within East
African colonies, in a formula which favored Tanzania and Uganda.

The EACSO was also to harmonize the economic services which existed mainly within the
three East African territories. When the three partner states became independent, they
inherited colonial economic structures which favored Kenya. This was a time when there
grew a proportionately large concentration of European and Asian communities in Nairobi.
Furthermore the former Kenya’s Governor Sir Edward Greg, kept assuring his counterparts
in Tanzania and Uganda that Kenya being at the center of the settlers, and would appreciate
the establishment of a federal capital in Nairobi. The East African Cooperation continued as
informal because the interests of the settlers were identical and therefore easy to accommodate without set rules and regulations.

Though there were genuine complaints from Tanzania and Uganda over the imbalance of trade, continued accruing benefits of the cooperation to Kenya, and reducing Tanzania and Uganda to the position of Kenya's market, it is indeed important also to note that, there has been even closer integration of the economies of the three East African countries before any of them became independent. Integration arrangements, which had their origin in the colonial era, could not have been expected to continue unchanged from their colonial past into the era of independence, because most dissatisfaction was with the distribution of the benefits of integration. Between 1961 and 1963, the East African countries achieved independence and the major concern of the independent governments was individual national development.

Tanzania and Uganda complaints were that, the headquarters of the various common services and market were located in Nairobi. This provided commercial and industrial infrastructure to maximize the cost of operating the regional undertaking. Tanzania and Uganda were reduced to markets for Kenyan goods. Tanzania and Uganda believed that the cooperation worked overwhelmingly to benefit Kenya as the most industrially developed country of the three, because various common services were established in Kenya, employment and income creating benefits of the services to accrue mainly in Kenya. The redistribution of revenue in favour of Tanzania and Uganda was not adequate, because restriction began to be imposed on trade between the countries, which continued to benefit Kenya.

In 1964, a ministerial meeting was convened in Kampala and was followed by another one in Mbale by the heads of states of the three countries. The Kampala meeting tried to address the complaints from Tanzania and Uganda, which would ease the imbalance existing in the locations of industries between Kenya and the other two states. The basis of these resolutions was to harmonize relations in terms of intra-cast African trade and location of
industries which seemed to be the areas of conflict among the states. Tanzania and Uganda complained that Kenya continued to control about 50% of the intra-east African trade and its shares. It was then decided that, for the first time new industries would be rapidly established within Tanzania and Uganda. In addition Tanzania and Uganda were also allowed to protect their budding industries by imposing temporary measures against imports from Kenya through quota restrictions. These resolutions were therefore meant to address Tanzania and Uganda complaints, solved trade and imbalances, introduction of the quotas to the imports from Kenya, as a way of equalizing these trade imbalances.

Though the Kampala agreement was a step forward in solving complaints from Tanzania and Uganda, these arrangements were not pleasant to Kenya, and it was therefore, reluctant to ratify the Kampala agreement. Kenya did not adhere to Kampala resolutions and even proceeded to give concessions for the construction of the firestone tyre factory. When the Kampala agreement was not implemented, relations between the three countries in terms of trade were rapidly deteriorating. The treaty for the EAC was established in order to put cooperation between the partner states on a firm footing of mutual advantage and not simply to paper over the cracks in the old structure of colonial relationships. Cooperation was a formal structure for administering community institutions and provided measures to achieve acceptable distribution of the benefits of cooperation between the states.

In the Kampala agreement of 1964 the three partner states attempted to rectify the Complaints of Tanzania and Uganda. As early as 1964, this agreement provided for quotas on intra-East African trade to limit the imbalances for the deficit countries and sought to reallocate investments so as to enhance industrialization opportunities for Tanzania and Uganda. The arrangements were never effectively implemented because the changes involved were more difficult than had been foreseen and no formal mechanisms for implementing the plans were created (Gordon 1984).

Tanzania had a great challenge in the federation debate from Uganda, because the Uganda federal constitution recognized the autonomous kingdom of Buganda which opposed the
federation of the East African States. Tanzania was quick to ascertain that, Tanzania was ready to form a federation with Kenya, with Uganda possibly joining it later on (Ngunyi and Adar, 1992).

We have realized that, Uganda right from the time of a federation debate had been a reluctant partner in the issues of integration. This was because unlike Kenya and Tanzania, Uganda became independent in 1962 under a coalition government with Mutesa as the president and Obote as the prime minister. The fragile Uganda people’s Congress (UPC) and Kabaka Yekka continued to shape the political landscape of Uganda for the first ten years after independence (Sathyamurthy, 1992). In 1963 Uganda had supported the idea of federation as was pronounced in the Nairobi Declaration. But the kingdom of Buganda not only opposed the idea of Uganda’s independence as a unified state, but also the federation of East Africa. The autonomous position of the kingdoms in Uganda, were enshrined in Uganda’s Federal constitution. Because of the mounting internal opposition, the government of Uganda later clarified its policy that the Nairobi Declaration which required for these three states to work out a way to federate did not commit Uganda to federation and that, the questions of relationships and powers were still in the exploratory stage. At this point Buganda kingdom had threatened to secede from the Uganda coalition government (Ngunyi and Adar, 1992).

It can be argued that, Uganda’s policy position was against the immediate federation of East Africa, unlike Kenya and Tanzania which had committed themselves to the federation of East Africa, Uganda’s position of a reluctant partner led the two others to adapt to an economic kind of cooperation. It is therefore important to note that the Uganda’s internal dynamics and political developments continued to shape the cooperation’s efforts within East Africa.

In the years following the Kampala agreement, (1964-66), regional cooperation continued to falter while Kenya’s predominance in intra-regional trade increased. The three countries maintaining their commitment to cooperation, tried to overcome the difficulties by setting
up a new system of cooperation with the signing in June 1967 of the treaty for the East African community. The EAC sought to strengthen and evaluate industrial, commercial and other relations of the partner states in order to accelerate and sustain expansion of economic activities within East Africa. The benefits of the cooperation through EAC were to be equally distributed (Ngunyi and Adar 1992).

During the 1961-66 plan periods, Tanzania had not developed strong indigenous capital elements which could easily forge an alliance with finance capital. Tanzania also at the same period failed to bring about the desired development in the country, because external donors did not provide the 78% of the funds expected to finance its development budget. During the first half of the plan period, external sources contributed only 14% of such funds. To avoid a serious disaster, Tanzania had to mobilize more capital internally as a desperate measure (Hazlewood, 1985).

When the EAC was formed in 1967, Tanzania had already realized the danger of pursuing a capitalist policy of development and rather, took a drastic about turn from capitalism to socialism. The pursuit of Tanzania's socialist policies complicated the regional cooperation efforts, because Kenya and Tanzania became two countries that were poles apart, though trade links between Kenya and Tanzania was affected by their ideological difference.

It is indeed important to note that, there had been even closer integration of the economies of the three East African states before any of them became independent. This explains that Tanzania's initial national interest was in conformity with her neighbors- Kenya and Uganda. All the three countries were under capitalist economy and there were no major differences in their policies. The three East African states had cordial relations when the EAC was formed. The three countries major concern was individual national development. Their national interests were confined within their common capitalist form of economy. Tanzania’s national interest at that time was viewed as a pillar to facilitate cooperation in the region. Nyerere came out strongly to advocate East African regional cooperation. The turn of events came later in 1967 when Tanzania changed from capitalist form of economy
to socialism through Arusha Declaration of 1967. The radical ideology of socialism made Tanzania's national interests different from her principal neighbor Kenya. This radical national interest made Kenya-Tanzania relations poles apart, in terms of ideological orientation and this did not affect trade in EAC.

On the part of Tanganyika, its leaders emphasized need to accelerate the formation of the federation. When the parliamentary groups from Kenya and Tanganyika met in Nairobi on May 7, 1964 President Nyerere emphasized that: “The government of the Republic of Tanganyika and myself are fully committed to entering immediately into a federation with Kenya and Uganda or with Kenya or Uganda alone.” (Nguni and Adar 1992: 400). The conflicting policy position and internal divisions with the East African countries has slowed down the process of federation. The only option left was a search for a better framework based on decentralised economic activities to each of the East African countries.

Against the absence of consensus on the question of federation, the East African leaders went ahead and “signed a treaty in 1967, dealing mainly with the issues of economic co-operation in the region.” (Nguni and Adar 1992: 410). This was a treaty for East African co-operation. It was later ratified to create what became the East African Community (EAC) on 6th June 1967. The new approach simply meant that the original idea of a federation was shelved.

In 1967 the Treaty for EAC was ratified after the federation debate was shelved in favor of an economic cooperation. The treaty established the EAC, with an aim to strengthen and regulate the industrial, commercial and other relations of the partner states. It was designed to achieve an acceptable distribution of benefits of cooperation between the states. The establishment of EAC was to place within one framework both the common services and the common market.

### 2.1.2 The national interest of a country

These are goals a country aims to pursue and achieve for its survival and development. Coloumbis (1984) equated national interest with the pursuit of state power, where power stands for anything that establishes and maintains control by one state over the other. This
power control relationship can be achieved by coercive as well as cooperative techniques (Coloumbis, 1984).

A country’s national interest therefore cannot avoid being shaped by or being responsive to relations among other nations of the world as a whole. It is in this light therefore that we must view Tanzania’s national interest, as it can be understood after examining the nature of developments in international relations both before and at the formation of Tanzania as an independent state.

It is important also to mention that, the concept of national interest remains central in any attempt to describe, explain, predict or prescribe international behaviour, where the primary justification of state action is national interest. The concept of national interest can be explained when we know, who decides what the priorities of state action are going to be, and when and how they are to be implemented. According to Plato, the good of the polis— the public good—could best be arrived at by a philosopher—king aided by a few highly learned, detached, and fair minded advisors. These individuals could make wise and well informed decisions regarding the common good without accounting for the yearning of lesser minds or accommodating selfish and sectarian pressures.

This explanation of a national interest best describe the position of Tanzania because the historical background reveals a number of political nationalism that emerged in Tanganyika in the late colonial period. Tanzanian population has been spared the deeply divisive potentialities of ethnic cleavages partly because it did not have concentrated population in competition with one another nor were wealth and power concentrated in the hands of one group. It is significant that although the man who emerged as a leader—Julius Nyerere—came from a small community of the country, there was no strong resentment of his leadership in a society of this kind.

In 1956 Nyerere resigned as a teacher in order to work full time as a politician. TANU benefited from Nyerere’s leadership in a number of ways. First, Nyerere applied to Tanganyika some of the tactics of positive action that Nkrumah of Ghana had put in practice
where political independence and the African Unity was paramount. Unlike Nkurumah of Ghana, who advocated for immediate African Unity, Nyerere’s approached African unity with a gradual piece-meal view and EAC was part of such a scheme.

Nyerere also made adroit use of the country’s position as a UN trust territory and the 1954 UN mission to Tanganyika paid careful attention to TANU’s proposals and its report recommended a general time table for planned progress towards independence in Tanganyika as well as in other African countries. As early as 1960’s Tanzania as country had defined its position in the African politics. Nyerere made many visits to New York to seek further support for Tanzanians programme of early independence. Nyerere also had personal qualities like warmth and humility, a combination which captivated the public and helped to win widespread support for Tanganyika. In 1961, Tanganyika emerged into political freedom with single party which united all the African language groups. There was no African opposition party that emerged because there were no ethnic divisions to foster such an opposition.

The Tanzania’s position confirmed the Plato’s concept of national interest, where wise and well informed decision can be made by a few carefully selected individuals who have been expressively trained to think in terms of the collective good. These few individuals who posses awesome and unchecked power will not be corrupted by this power. Once socially optimal decisions have been made, they can be implemented effectively by loyal, well trained and obedient bureaucracies.

To understand Tanzania’s national interest, means that we shall identify and analyze the internal determinants of the country’s national interest. The aim here will be to expose their historical origins and the social-economic forces that give rise to them. Also to analyze here will be the material conditions within which the internal determinants operate. General developments in international relations in Tanzania’s case have been greatly influenced and mainly determined by two principle events. (1). The development of capitalism as a world system and the “Great October Revolution” which split the system into two opposed camps.
of Western and Eastern blocs. The struggle of Tanzanian trying to maintain the two opposing camps above have a strong bearing on Tanzania’s national interest.

During the cold-war period which gave rise to a bio-polar position, this position in particular guided Tanzania’s National interest. Tanzania became a staunch anti-colonialism proponent, and this principle informed Tanzania’s national interest towards liberation movements in Africa and else where in the world. Tanzania hosted the OAU liberation committee in Dar-es-salaam, apart from having been the home of many African Liberation movements during the period of liberation struggles. Tanzania also gave full support to other liberation movements such as POLISARIO and PLO and these two enjoyed full ambassadorial level in Dar-es-salaam.

The internal factors that go together with those principles to constitute the determinants of the country’s national interest are the policies of socialism and self reliance. During the colonial period Tanzania could not develop strong indigenous capitalist elements which could easily forge an alliance with finance capital. Tanzania also learnt that true independence has to include economic independence as well. Tanzania’s policy on how to achieve economic independence could be seen in its sustained demands for a new and just international economic order. The former president Julius Nyerere is well known for his untiring efforts in mobilizing for the creation of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), something which might have contributed to his appointment to the chair of the South – South Commission.

In order to enhance its position in the international scene, Tanzania radicalized its national interest culminating into the Arusha Declaration in 1967 and the further confrontation with international capital that followed after the declaration. By confronting the Western giants, Tanzania was preparing itself for further confrontation in the post- Arusha declaration period.

The confrontation between Tanzania and its greatest donor countries namely Britain, West-Germany and U.S.A, resulted in the cancellation of financial assistance promised by those
countries. But Tanzania determined to make the economy respond to the needs of the masses of Tanzania, the country embarked on the policy of socialization and self reliance. The policy involved nationalization of the commanding heights of the country's economy. However the nationalization themselves were effected with full compensation and instead of undertaking a complete break with the multinational corporation (MNCs) whose property were nationalized. The country simply entered into a sort of a partnership arrangement whereby the MNCs were granted management contracts over the nationalized corporations. Tanzania was careful about the MNCs contracts because the same MNCs activities motivated Tanzania to adopt a socialist orientation as a measure against capitalist's aggressive acquisition of wealth.

Socialism and self reliance are expressions of justifiable demands of the oppressed peoples in their struggles against imperialism. After independence Tanzania distinguished itself in the international forum as country determined to pursue a progressive foreign policy in an uncompromising manner. At different periods Tanzania troops were deployed in such countries as Mozambique, the Seychelles, Comoro and Uganda. It is therefore important to examine Tanzania's national interest in EAC, how it was pursued and with what results.

2.1.3 Tanzania's pursuit of its national interest

Tanzania's national interest can not avoid being shaped by or being responsive to relations among other states of the world as a whole. Tanzania's national interest can be understood when we look at the nature of developments in international relations both before and at the formation of Tanzania as an independent state. More than any country in Africa Tanzania's national interest has been consistent with its aspirations in the international sphere. Tanzania's national interest has always been and will still remain paramount compared to territorial ones. Tanzania's national interest therefore comes first before the territorial interest. It is for this reason that, we are paying more attention to Tanzania's national interest and how it led to the collapse of EAC. Tanzania therefore had three major goals to pursue and these were to:
1) Promote post independence rural development strategies in Tanzania and develop ideological orientation to counter capitalist system in Kenya.

2) Expand trade links in Africa and particularly within East Africa region.

3) Fight against neo-colonialism and demand for African liberation and unity, and advocate for the formation of regional blocs in Africa and particularly within East Africa.

The three Tanzania’s national interests were meant to achieve the following objectives:

1) Rural development strategies in Tanzania were aimed at solving the problems of ignorance, poverty and make the country a prosperous nation. Developed ideological orientation was aimed at countering the advanced capitalist systems of Kenya and other western powers enhanced by MNCs.

2) Expansion of trade was aimed at establishing trade links in Africa and particularly in East African region, to maximize gains from such trade links.

3) The fight against neo-colonialism and African liberation was aimed at achieving full independence for all African countries and other disadvantage groups in the world like PLO. The formation of regional blocs was aimed at promoting Pan-Africanism in the region with a view of creating an African unity government. The African unity was supposed to generate a spill over effects, where trading blocs in the south, east, west and North Africa eventually merge to form the African union or a united African government. Tanzania used trade as an aspect of liberation struggle.

Let’s now turn to Tanzania national interest, how it was pursued and with what results

2.1.4 Tanzania’s Rural Development Strategies

One of the most important Tanzania’s national interests was to promote post independence rural development strategies. From 1961-66, the rural developmental strategies in Tanzania were aimed at solving the problems of ignorance, poverty and make the country a prosperous nation. Like Kenya and Uganda, Tanzania also relied heavily on external aid to develop these rural structures. Tanzania like her two neighbor’s major concern was individual national development. Tanzania like Kenya
and Uganda became independent under capitalist economy and her major donors were Scandinavian countries, West Germany, USA and Canada (Ake, 1984).

Tanzania’s government expenditure between 1961 – 66 was US $285.7 million, and US $222.7 million or 78% was expected from external sources. To realize rural development strategies, Tanzania required heavy funding from external donors. Tanzania therefore had little option, but to continue partnering with the major donors for its domestic programs and government expenditure. Other than funding, Tanzania had also requested the same donors to provide expatriates to help facilitate the rural development strategies in the country. Both funding and skilled personnel were requested as a package for quick development and growth of the economy. Tanzania was the poorest country in the region compared with Kenya and Uganda. To develop Tanzania’s rural development it required more funding than the other two partners. Dar-es-salaam was the headquarters of the OAU liberation committee and Tanzania was respected within the non-alignment movement and in the social democratic states of Western Europe (Campell, H, 1992).

On the African continent Nyerere of Tanzania was articulate in his opposition to external manipulation and exploitation of Africa. Julius Nyerere the first president of Tanzania 1961-85 became one of the most respected leaders on the African continent. Like Kenya and Uganda, and many other African countries Tanzania also maintained cooperation with her former colonial states of Germany and Britain. By 1967, of 78% of all expected funds from external sources only 14.8% of this was received. This was a serious setback and Tanzania change from capitalism to socialism in 1967, was as a result of this frustrations from external donors and MNCs.

During the colonial period, British made even less effort of development in Tanzania than in Kenya, because unlike Kenya, Tanzania was not chosen as a settler colony, though there were settlers in Tanzania and Uganda but the Kenyan population of settlers was more than the two put together. The differences between Kenya and Tanzania are clear and interesting because, their ideological differences particularly after 1966 have
generated their own dialectical negation. For example, Kenya's relatively rapid economic expansion, largely financed by foreign investment in the industrial-service sector, was received by Tanzania to demonstrate the problem of growth without development. This growth without development was also viewed by Tanzania as a way of increasing inequality in the distribution of real income in Kenya, a situation not accepted in the Tanzania's development strategies. These two countries though joint EAC in 1967, Tanzania moved to the left and Kenya did not.

Tanzania's defensive radicalism generated powerful reactionary pressures from both at home and abroad, especially international monetary fund (IMF), have represented Tanzania's economic failures as the effects of its leftism. This radicalism in Tanzania's foreign policy culminated into a confrontation between Tanzania and her greater donor countries namely Britain, West Germany and USA, which resulted in the cancellation of financial assistance promised by those countries. But Tanzania determined to make the economy respond to the needs of the masses of Tanzania, the country embarked on the policy of socialism and self reliance. The policy involved nationalization of the commanding heights of the country's economy. However the nationalization was full of compensation and instead of understanding a complete break with the multinational corporations (MNCS) whose property were nationalized, the country simply entered into a sort of partnership arrangement whereby the MNCs were granted management contracts over the nationalized corporation's.

During the colonial period and the years after independence, Tanzania could not develop strong indigenous capitalist elements which could easily forge an alliance with finance capital. Tanzania realized that the first years of independence could not bring about the desired development in the country, because external sources did not provide the funds required to finance the development budget. Tanzania embarked on a policy of socialism and self reliance in attempt to mobilize more capital internally as a desperate measure to avoid an economic disaster. The disaster was as a result of external donors' failure to finance the country's development budget creating a huge deficit (Gordon, 1984).
Tanzania also learnt that true independence has to include economic independence as well. Tanzania's policy on how to achieve economic independence could be seen in its sustained demand for a new and just international economic order. The former president Julius Nyerere of Tanzania is well known for his untiring efforts in mobilizing for the creation of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). Something which might have contributed to his appointment to the chair of the South – South Commission (Ngunyi and Adar, 1992).

Tanzania's economic independence was to be attained through a socialist orientation which was adopted in 1967. With the promulgation of the Arusha Declaration in January 1967, Tanzania made a dramatic departure from the policies it had pursed during its first years of independence. This was a clear indication that the EAC was a far fetched reality. Hence EAC's collapse in 1977 did not come as a major surprise. Tanzania's pursuit of its national interest under socialist orientation made Tanzania – Kenya relations difficult in regard to regional cooperation.

2.1.5 Tanzania's socialist orientation

Another important aspect in rural development strategy was Tanzania's change from capitalism to socialism. Tanzania in 1967 developed an ideological orientation which was aimed at countering the advanced capitalism systems of Kenya and other western powers enhanced by MNCs. Tanzania's main reason that made her shift from capitalism to socialism was because the external donors mainly her former colonial powers of Germany and Britain failure to finance the much needed government expenditure between 1961 to 1966. Tanzania's Socialist orientation was a strategy to achieve her national interest.

One of the main causes of Arusha Declaration in 1967 was the failure of the first five year plan to attract investment capital from abroad. Thus, Tanzania perhaps more than any African country at that time, learnt the emptiness of the prevailing doctrine of partnership in development. By 1966, Tanzania had learnt the lesson to the abandonment
of the expensive World Bank transformation approach to rural development (Migot-A S., 1984).

Arusha Declaration in which president Nyerere articulated Tanzania's shift to a strategy of socialism and self reliance, aimed at developing and implementing a policy of Ujamaa through voluntary participation of the rural masses and largely by their own resources (Nyerere, 1972).

Popularity in the wake of the Arusha declaration in 1967 heightened the comparison especially made between Tanzania and her northern neighbor Kenya. Whereas before Arusha Declaration, Tanzania and Kenya were perceived as two neighbors cut from the same cloth. After Arusha Declaration, they were viewed as having chosen mutually exclusive conceptions of development and incompatible strategies for achieving development. What was defined as development in Kenya was viewed as under development in Tanzania and vice versa. This difference in ideological orientations made the national interests of these countries wide apart. Tanzania's choice of ideology made regional cooperation in East Africa difficult (Ngunyi and Adar, 1992).

Prior to 1967, Tanzania like Kenya and Uganda pursued a capitalist form of economy. Tanzania prior to 1967 was viewed to be the country to lead East African region into a firm cooperation. This was because Tanzania more than Kenya and Uganda aimed at a federal government of East African state. After 1967, Tanzania’s dramatic change to socialism reversed the entire situation in the region, which meant that instead of Tanzania leading the way towards integration, she turned to be a major obstacle, to the extent that EAC could have been much better without Tanzania.

Tanzania had only embarked on a course of socialist construction and continued to prefer to have more in common with Kenya and Uganda than with other socialist countries that had undergone a socialist transformation. The socialist transformation in Tanzania made its national interest more aggressive and incompatible with Kenya’s open economy. To Nyerere the socialist transformation did not matter even when the two
countries were increasingly regarded as polar opposites in so far as their development strategies were concerned (Barkan, 1984). Capitalism and socialism are two different and incompatible systems of development, and Nyerere’s assumption that socialist transformation in Tanzania did not affect regional cooperation was an argument which went against the rational and conventional wisdom (Ngunyi and Adar, 1992).

Arusha Declaration was mainly meant to promote and to protect Tanzania’s weaker economy as well as becoming an aspect of trade within East and Southern African states. Arusha declaration in Nyerere’s view was a shield against advanced capitalist system of Kenya, rather than creating a rift within EAC. Nyerere assumed that trade would still flourish within EAC because of various common regional bonds that dates back to colonial period.

Tanzania’s weaker economy, coupled with little internal capital forced Tanzania to adapt to socialist orientation. Ideological polarization did not prevent trade from taking place within EAC. We can therefore argue that Tanzania’s socialist administration did not destroy the spirit of regional co-operation in EAC. Ngunyi and Adar (1992) argued that ideological differences were to blame for the collapse of the EAC. But it is important to note that, Sudan, Somali and Obote’s Uganda in 1969 were all socialist states who continued to trade with Kenya and other capitalist countries. Socialism like capitalism are only but two different ideological orientations that allow for interaction among states. Radicalization of Tanzania’s policies after the Arusha Declaration, only defined the economic policy framework than anti-thesis of regional co-operation.

It is therefore safe to argue that, with the promulgation of the Arusha Declaration in 1967, Tanzania made a dramatic departure from the policies it had pursued during its first years of independence. The impact of Arusha declaration was particularly great because of its comprehensiveness of the document (TANU’s policy on socialism and self-reliance) and the follow up generated in terms of substantive policies in a variety of fields. Included within the Arusha Declaration itself was the nationalization of banks and
other major enterprises in the private sector, most of which were foreign owned (Ngunyi and Adar, 1992).

It is difficult to imagine how under such circumstances, monetary and fiscal policies of the partner states could be harmonized when Kenya and Tanzania pursued two different and incompatible economic systems. Certain aspect of the new policy of socialism, Tanzania was to adopt would hinder and stand in the way of EAC activities. If the treaty for EAC was to live to its expectations, then Tanzania would first have to relax its domestic policies? But Tanzania was not willing to sacrifice her national commitments to territorial ones. The most important point to note here is that, though Arusha Declaration created a different path from Kenya’s capitalist system, it did not in any way affect trade within EAC as shown by the table below.

Table 2.1: Tanzania’s trade with Kenya in EAC 1969 – 1980, (Valued in US $ million).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As shown by the table above, the trade trends indicate that Tanzania’s trade with Kenya continued to increase in volume and value despite the ideological differences. In 1976, for instance, just one year before the collapse of EAC, Tanzania’s trade with Kenya had reached its peak. Tanzania’s exports to Kenya increased in 1969 from US $ 11 million to 30 million in 1976. The imports increased in 1969 from US $ 36 million to US$79
million in 1976. This explains that Tanzania had been Kenya’s important trade partner in 
EAC despite ideological differences. After the collapse of EAC in 1977, the closure of 
Tanzania’s border with Kenya and the shift of Tanzania’s national interest southwards 
due to Amin’s coup in Uganda, the Kenya – Tanzania trade also decreased. It’s important 
to note that Arusha Declaration was not against Tanzania’s national interest because the 
socialist orientation became the vehicle which was used to facilitate the Tanzania’s 
national interest.

As the ideological rift between Kenya and Tanzania widened in the mid 1960s and early 
1970s, an increasingly alarming leftist development in Uganda, Somalia and Sudan also 
ensued. This apparently made Kenya apprehensive. Kenya feared a complete socialist 
circuit in East Africa would possibly encircle her. Kenya’s only hope in such 
encirclement was that her economic axis with Uganda would keep the growing 
Tanzania-Uganda socialist ideological axis in check. This would ensure that her trade 
domination in the region was not interfered with (Tirimba, 1991). To the contrary, 
Tanzania’s Arusha Declaration of 1967, explicitly de emphasized the role of foreign 
capital in her economy’s development, which saw intra-EAC trade basically as a flow of 
foreign goods. In the ultimate end, Tanzania began to have misgiving about the raison 
d’être of intra-regional trade in EAC. Tanzania saw it as basically benefiting the foreign 
investors operating from Kenya and which converted her economy and that of Uganda 
into captive markets (Ngunyi and Adar, 1992).

In 1971, Idi Amin took over power in Uganda and the growing Tanzania- Uganda 
socialist ideological axis was grossly upset. This political change inevitably broke the 
Tanzania- Uganda ideological axis, by Amin delinking Uganda’s socialist orientation 
which was adapted by Obote from Tanzania’s socialism. Tanzania reacted by refusing to 
recognize the Amin’s regime. Amin’s coup of 1971 was a great blow to EAC, because 
apart from Amin’s behavior, Nyerere in particular hated him for not only overthrowing 
his fellow president, but his intimate friend and a disciple who had already adopted 
socialist orientation in 1969.
The founders of EAC were expected to legislate against the appearance of Amin, but Amin’s seizure of power was not acceptable in Nyerere’s view, and this simply meant that the East African presidents never met since Amin came into power in Uganda in 1971. Tanzania’s National interests were again threatened by Amin in Uganda. The atmosphere was never conducive for the smooth operation of the EAC, particularly because Uganda like Kenya then ceased to be an active participant in the EAC discussions (Ngunyi and Adar, 1992).

This deteriorating political climate made it practically difficult not only to solve the problems which existed in EAC, but also prevented the leaders from meeting and reviewing the functioning of the EAC. As Tanzania closed her borders with Kenya and Nyerere refusing to recognize the Amin’s regime, then the whole idea of EAC was duly shelved and forgotten (Hazelwood, 1985).

2.1.6 Conclusion

One of the main causes of Arusha Declaration in 1967 was the failure of the first five year plan to attract investment capital from abroad. Thus, Tanzania perhaps more than any African country at that time, learnt the emptiness of the prevailing doctrine of partnership in development. By 1966, Tanzania had learnt the lesson to the abandonment of the expensive World Bank transformation approach to rural development (Migot, 1984).

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exclusive conceptions of development and incompatible strategies for achieving
development. What was defined as development in Kenya was viewed as under
development in Tanzania and vice versa. This difference in ideological orientations
made the national interests of these countries wide apart. Tanzania's choice of ideology
made regional cooperation in East Africa difficult (Ngunyi and Adar, 1992).
CHAPTER THREE

TANZANIA'S NATIONAL INTEREST IN EAST AFRICA: TRADE

3.1.0 Introduction

Tanzania pursued two national interests, and objectives or goal, in the African region. The first goal was expansion of trade links within the East African region. Tanzania’s aim was to use trade to maximize the gains from the region while developing close relations with the two partner states of Uganda and Kenya. Trade gains were essential because Tanzania in the first two years after independence needed to create internal capital to address the problem of poverty amongst its peasants in the rural areas. Trade gains were also important because Tanzania’s infrastructure was not well developed during the colonial period. Therefore improved trade would not only have created the need for a better infrastructure but would also provide funds for such an improvement (Barkan, 1994).

Expansion of trade was also important to Tanzania because it would create closer relations with its two neighbor’s partners of Kenya and Uganda. Improved relations with the two countries would no doubt increase trade links within the region. Tanzania maintained good relations with her neighbors as a way of creating a large market for her exports mainly from cotton and sisal. Though Tanzania strove at making trade links in East Africa one of her major goals, the volumes of its trade in the region at independence were low compared to her two neighbours and hence her gains from her regional trade were also low. Post independence period Tanzania, for example, had low trade volumes compared to Kenya. It was in response to this need that Tanzania put a large portion of her land under cash crop production, mainly in sisal, cashew nuts and cotton. Tanzania aimed at increasing her exports in the region in order to generate more revenue and increase her share of East Africa trade.
The second goal that Tanzania pursued was the campaign against colonialism in Africa through an aggressive liberation struggle for political independence. The liberation struggle was aimed at achieving political independence which would enhance Pan-Africanism in the continent. This national interest objective was motivated by Tanzania's desire and determination to end colonialism in the continent. Tanzania was concerned that intra-African trade and pan-Africanism could not be achieved unless the majority of African states were freed from the colonial yoke. The majority of African countries still under colonialism were found in the Southern Africa region. Thus, while the desire to enhance trade was oriented towards the Eastern Africa region, particularly within the East African Community, Tanzania's anti-colonial policy was aimed at the Southern Africa region particularly within the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) countries.

These two national interests' goals or objectives were not incompatible and hence Tanzania pursued them simultaneously. Tanzania and especially its leader Nyerere, pursued a policy that encouraged more trade links with her East African neighbours while at the same time pursued an anti-colonial policy aimed at freeing the majority of Southern Africa states from the colonial yoke.

The simultaneous pursuit of the two policies was based on Nyerere's belief that increased trade would facilitate Tanzania's pursuit of its anti-colonial policies in Southern Africa. Nyerere also understood the importance of ending colonialism in Southern Africa. The elimination of colonialism in the region and the subsequent unity of these Southern Africa States were sure to provide not just an opportunity for an increased cooperation but also provide a larger market for Tanzanian goods in the Southern Africa region. At the same time Nyerere believed that once independence was won for the Southern African states, this would also enhance increased trading relations within the region.

3.1.1 Tanzania's trade in East Africa
One of the Tanzania's national interest objectives was to expand trade links in Africa and particularly within the East African region. Tanzania wanted to maximize gains from such
trade links and generate revenue from it as well. At independence Tanzania’s trade in the region was low, a factor that could have been attributed to the general absence of any significant number of European settlers. Tanzania, unlike Kenya, was not a White settler colony. This meant that Tanzania was not as developed by the colonial government as Kenya, which had been developed by the colonial government to serve colonial and settler interests at the same time. Trade with Kenya was also enhanced by the colonial government as a mechanism for generating revenue to run the colonies. Tanzania’s trade therefore was generally low during the colonial period and in the first years of independence.

Table 3.1 below illustrates Tanzania’s trade within the East African region, which shows how low the volume of trade was at independence. This table also shows a gradual increase in Tanzanian trade after the formation of EAC. The table also illustrates Tanzania’s trade within the region.
Table 3.1: Tanzania’s trade in EAC, 1967 - 1980 (combined trade) (valued in US $ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>68</th>
<th>69</th>
<th>70</th>
<th>71</th>
<th>72</th>
<th>73</th>
<th>74</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>76</th>
<th>77</th>
<th>78</th>
<th>79</th>
<th>80</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tanzania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>226</th>
<th>248</th>
<th>286</th>
<th>318</th>
<th>283</th>
<th>265</th>
<th>308</th>
<th>307</th>
<th>314</th>
<th>480</th>
<th>93</th>
<th>202</th>
<th>241</th>
<th>420</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>as % of EAC</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 1967 Tanzania’s imports from EAC were US $ 38million while exports to EAC in the same years were US $ 16million. Tanzania’s imports from EAC in 1967 were more than two times the Tanzania’s export to EAC in the same year. In the same year Tanzania’s trade total was US $ 54 million while EAC trade total was US $ 226million. Tanzania’s trade volume and value was low in the region, because her trade was only 24% of the total EAC trade in 1967.

Table 3.1 shows that from 1967 to 1976 Tanzania’s trade in EAC increased gradually. In 1976, both her imports and exports almost doubled. Tanzania’s imports in 1967 were US $ 38 million and by 1976 imports increased to US $ 79 million; this was an increase of 106% in imports. During the same period Tanzania’s exports increased from US $16 million to US $ 30 million in 1976. This was an increase of 84% in exports. It was a remarkable increase in imports but Tanzania continued to import more goods from EAC than she exported to the
region throughout the period under study. Table 3.1 shows that Tanzania has been a net importer in the region.

Tanzania’s trade total shows significant increase in the region particularly after 1968. This significant increase in the volumes of trade indicates that Tanzania became a very important trading partner in the region. Tanzania’s trade in the region therefore explains the vital role Tanzania’s national interest played in the region particularly in regard to trade. In 1970, Tanzania’s trade reached 27% of the total EAC trade.

In 1977, EAC collapsed and Tanzania’s trade in the region was the most affected its imports declined from US $ 79 million in 1976 to US $ 2 million in 1977, a drastic decline indeed. Tanzania’s exports also decreased from US $ 30 million to US $ 3 million during the same period. Tanzania’s trade volume decreased from US $ 109 million in 1976 to US $ 5 million in 1977. By all standards this was a drastic decline in Tanzania’s trade in the region, because her total trade volumes decreased from 22% in 1976 to a mere 5% in 1977. The year 1978 also shows Tanzania’s continued low trade volumes in the region, but a gradual increase in trade is noted after the collapse of EAC and fall of Amin’s regime in Uganda in 1979.
The graph above shows that Tanzania's Trade was low in the region because the trade total average was 18.6% of the total EAC trade.

Table 3.2: Tanzania’s Trade with Uganda 1957 – 1967 (Valued in US $Million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>58</th>
<th>59</th>
<th>60</th>
<th>61</th>
<th>62</th>
<th>63</th>
<th>64</th>
<th>65</th>
<th>66</th>
<th>67</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.3: Tanzania’s trade with Uganda 1968 – 1980 (Valued in US$ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>68</th>
<th>69</th>
<th>70</th>
<th>71</th>
<th>72</th>
<th>73</th>
<th>74</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>76</th>
<th>77</th>
<th>78</th>
<th>79</th>
<th>80</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>12.1</td>
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<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3.2 shows Tanzania’s trade with Uganda from 1957 – 67. The table covers the period before independence and at the formation of East African Community in 1967. Tanzania’s trade with Uganda in Table 3a shows a gradual increase both in imports and exports for the entire period. In 1957, Tanzania’s imports from Uganda were US $ 4.2 million, but it continued to increase to US $ 12.2 million by 1967. This was an increase of 190.4%. Tanzania’s exports also increased from US $ 2.4 million in 1957 to US $5.6 million by 1967 during the same period, this was 133% increase in Tanzania’s exports to Uganda.

Table 3.2, also shows that Trade between Tanzania and Uganda started to increase gradually soon after independence. The period after 1961 had shown an increase both in terms of imports and exports between the two countries. Table 3.3 – shows Tanzania’s trade with Uganda between 1968 – 1980. This table shows that Tanzania’s trade with Uganda continued to increase particularly after the formation of the EAC in 1967. After the formation of the EAC. Tanzania’s imports from Uganda were US$ 14.8 million in 1970 and her exports to Uganda were US $ 7.8 million. This was the period when the trade between the two countries was at its peak. Tanzania’s trade increase with Uganda particularly after 1969, was significantly influenced by the fact that Uganda was moving towards socialism. The increase in trade between Tanzania and Uganda was also influenced by the improving relations between Nyerere and Obote.
Tanzania’s trade increased from US $ 12.5 million in 1968 to US $ 14.8 million in 1970, but drastically decreased to US $ 3.8 million in 1971. This sudden decrease in trade between Tanzania and Uganda was as a result of Amin’s coup in Uganda in 1971, which disrupted trade between the two friendly countries and severed bilateral relations.

### Table 3.4: Tanzania’s trade with Kenya 1957–1967 (Valued in US $ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>57</th>
<th>58</th>
<th>59</th>
<th>60</th>
<th>61</th>
<th>62</th>
<th>63</th>
<th>64</th>
<th>65</th>
<th>66</th>
<th>67</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>35</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.5: Tanzania’s trade with Kenya 1968 – 1980 (Valued in US $ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>69</th>
<th>70</th>
<th>71</th>
<th>72</th>
<th>73</th>
<th>74</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>76</th>
<th>77</th>
<th>78</th>
<th>79</th>
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<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>53</td>
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<td>79</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>5.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3.4, shows Tanzania’s trade with Kenya between 1957 and 1967, the table also shows the period before independence and soon after independence. The table also shows that Tanzania’s trade with Kenya was quite skewed in Kenya’s favour. The table shows that while Tanzania exported goods to Kenya worth US $ 4 million in 1957, her imports from Kenya were worth US $ 28 million. Tables 3.2 and 3.4 above show that Tanzania’s trade in the region particularly before independence was extremely low compared to Kenya or Uganda. Table 3.2 also shows that, although there was an increase in Tanzania’s exports to Kenya between 1957 and 1967, this increase was minimal compared to the value of goods imported by Tanzania from Kenya during the same period. Tanzania and Uganda were mainly net importers of Kenya’s goods.

Tanzania’s trade with Kenya gradually increased both in value and volume particularly after the formation of EAC. Though Tanzania continued being a net importer of Kenya’s goods, her exports to Kenya also increased tremendously after the formation of EAC. It is also important to note that Amin’s coup in Uganda did not have a negative effect on the trade between Tanzania and Kenya. Though Tanzania thought that Kenya would support her to overthrow the Amin’s regime, Kenya did not give any such support to Tanzania because Kenya did not want to interfere with the internal affairs of Uganda. Tanzania therefore continued to trade with Kenya because she was gaining in terms of trade. Political and

As shown by the graph 3c above, the trade trends indicate that Tanzania’s trade with Kenya continued to increase in volume and value overtime. Table 3.4 shows that there was some trade links between Tanzania and Kenya before independence, the increase was mainly evident after the two countries attained political independence in 1961 and 1963 respectively, where both imports and exports increased. The 1965 – 1969 period shows a remarkable increase in trade between Tanzania and Kenya, where Tanzania’s imports from Kenya increased from US $ 8 million in 1965 to US $ 36 million in 1969. This was a remarkable increase in imports, when considering the ideological differences
remarkable increase in imports, when considering the ideological differences between the two countries. The graph also indicates that, Tanzania’s export to Kenya continued to increase both in volume and value over the same period.

Table 3.4 indicates that in 1965 Tanzania’s exports to Kenya increased from US $ 8 million to US $ 22 million in 1971. This increase in Tanzania’s exports to Kenya suggests that the two countries continued to be important trade partners in EAC. Tanzania continued to trade with Kenya despite the fact that Tanzania adopted the Arusha Declaration in 1967, which was a policy shift from capitalism to socialism. The ideological differences between Kenya and Tanzania did not affect trade between the two countries. Tanzania acknowledged that trade was the only way to access the East African markets. It was also through trade that Tanzania generated revenue to undertake development strategies in the country. Tanzania increase in trade in the region also made it able to import goods to satisfy the domestic needs of her people. Tanzania also increased trade with Kenya because of Tanzania’s initiative to develop her Northern corridor tourist circuit around Mount Kilimanjaro and Serengeti areas Ngunyi and Adar (1992). Tourists who visited Kenya also used Tanzania’s northern corridor to access Tanzania’s National Parks. The Kenya –Tanzania tourism joint ventures also benefited Tanzania abundantly in terms of revenue generation from Tourism. Tanzania’s trade with Kenya did not immediately decline after Amin’s coup in Uganda in 1971, but the trade between the two countries declined sharply at the collapse of EAC in 1977. Tanzania’s exports to Kenya reached its lowest level after the collapse of EAC and the closure of Tanzania- Kenya border in 1977.
Table 3.6: Kenya’s trade with Uganda 1957 – 1967 (valued in US $ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>58</th>
<th>59</th>
<th>60</th>
<th>61</th>
<th>62</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
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<td>17.8</td>
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<td>19.6</td>
<td>20.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>41.1</td>
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<td>48.4</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>53.2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.7: Kenya’s trade with Uganda 1968 – 1980 (valued in US$ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
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<th>69</th>
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<td>46.</td>
<td>53.</td>
<td>52.</td>
<td>58.</td>
<td>77.</td>
<td>75.</td>
<td>79.</td>
<td>126.</td>
<td>41.</td>
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<td>102</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>28.</td>
<td>21.</td>
<td>19.</td>
<td>10.</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>75.</td>
<td>75.</td>
<td>71.</td>
<td>68.</td>
<td>84.</td>
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<td>80.</td>
<td>130.</td>
<td>41.</td>
<td>98.</td>
<td>104.</td>
<td>182.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3.6 shows Kenya’s trade with Uganda between 1957 and 1967. The table shows that Kenya’s trade with Uganda increased steadily before and after independence. In 1957 Kenya’s exports to Uganda increased from US $ 22.6 million in 1957 to US $ 33.1 million by 1967, an increase of about 33.3%. Kenya’s imports from Uganda also increased from US $ 15.8 million to US $ 20.1 million during the same period. Kenya and Uganda have been great trading partners in the region. Uganda being a land-locked country had been using the port of Mombasa for her trade. Kenya provided an entry and exit route for most of
Uganda’s trade. Kenya’s railway line and road network has provided an opportunity for these two countries to increase their trade in EAC. Table 3.7 – shows that Kenya’s exports to Uganda increased tremendously even after Amin’s coup in Uganda. Kenya did not interfere with Uganda’s internal affairs during the coup, and when Tanzania – Uganda relations were severed, Kenya remained neutral. Kenya’s trade with Uganda therefore increased because the Amin’s coup also interrupted the socialist orientation between Kampala and Dar es Salaam. Amin’s coup was a blessing in disguise for Kenya.

Table 3.7 also shows that Kenya’s imports from Uganda increased though there was a slight decrease in trade in 1972 between the two countries. But due to Amin’s action which chased away the Asians from Uganda. After the Asians left, most factories were closed and this affected the import trade between the two countries. Kenya – Uganda trade increased in volume and value despite the challenges brought about by Amins regime.

Amin’s claims of Western Kenya as part of Uganda did not affect the import trade between the two countries either. Though Amin had turned to the Arab World and imported goods that were available in Kenya did not affect the trade between the two countries. The tables above show that Kenya’s export to Uganda continues to increase even after the collapse of EAC in 1977. General trade trends show that Kenya and Uganda have been great trade partners of all the times.

Graph 3d shows Kenya’s Total trade with Uganda from 1968 – 1980 (valued in US $ million) The graph shows that Kenya and Uganda have been good trade partners. According to Tirimba (1991) Kenya and Uganda have always been good trade partners regardless of conflict and cooperation situations between the two countries.


3.1.2 The Amin’s Coup in 1971

Uganda as a state made little impact on international relations outside the confines of East Africa and its influence on the African international scene has been negligible. It was mainly because of internal dynamics and political developments that made the country to approach the issues within EAC in a tactical manner. It was also because of these developments in Uganda that provided Tanzania with an opportunity to pursue her national interests further. Obote’s change from capitalism to socialism was aimed at attacking the Buganda and to effectively defeat the enemy and distribute resources equitable to the people of Uganda. Nyerere was therefore encouraged by the turn of events in Uganda as the country under Obote was gradually changing to a socialist state (Tirimba, 1991). Tanzania on her part was also trying to influence Uganda’s behaviour.
on her part was also trying to influence Uganda’s behaviour particularly after the Arusha Declaration of 1967, but more than anything else, Uganda’s internal dynamics made the country move towards socialist orientation more than the Tanzania influence towards the same. The Arusha Declaration of 1967 only provided the route and doctrines of socialism for Uganda. The turn of events in Uganda therefore improved Tanzania-Uganda trading relations. Tanzania’s imports from Uganda increased from US $ 3.3 million to US $5.6 million between 1969 and 1970. This was a 58.9% increase in imports from Uganda. Uganda’s exports to Tanzania under the same period also increased from US $ 4.8 million to US $ 5.6 million (Ngunyi and Adar, 1992). The trade links between Uganda and Tanzania enhanced Tanzania’s pursuit of her national interest within EAC because Tanzania’s trade shares in EAC increased and so was the revenue.

Nyerere -Obote attempts to isolate Kenya within the EAC framework led to Obote’s adoption of the Common-Man’s-Charter in December 1969. The policy change outlined the ideological framework of President Obote’s ‘Move to the left’. While the Charter accorded a place to private firms and foreign investment in the economy, the Charter also suggested that certain private firms should be nationalized in order to place control of the means of production in the hands of the people of Uganda. The Charter also called for income re-distribution to close the income gap between the rich and the poor and widen the market for consumer goods. It was during this period that the political alliance between Uganda and Tanzania to counter Kenya’s economic preponderance in the EAC was very much in evidence (Tirimba, 1991).

It is important to note that the political serenity at home gave Uganda the chance to initiate the Common-Man’s- Charter that was directly antithetical to Kenya’s state – assisted capitalism. Uganda’s brand of socialism was formulated along Tanzania’s scientific socialism. The Charter was to inaugurate a new political culture in Uganda and a new way of life where the people of Uganda as a whole were paramount. It was this move to the left which saw Uganda’s brand of socialism formulated along Tanzania’s scientific socialism that made Obote be regarded as Nyerere’s disciple (Hazlewood, 1985).
As was noted earlier, the internal situation in Uganda afforded her the chance to pursue policies that in Kenya's view undermined her ideological stand. The same policies enhanced Tanzania's national interest towards Uganda in terms of cordial relations and trade. It was such a state of affairs that introduced tension between Kenya and Uganda after 1969 (Tirimba, 1991). Uganda's friendly relations with Tanzania were for instance demonstrated in the repatriation of non-Ugandan unskilled workers in 1970. Uganda was targeting Kenyans who were working as unskilled workers in Uganda. "This concretized the growing fears amongst Kenya’s foreign policy makers that connivance was in the making between Kampala and Dar es Salaam to isolate Kenya in East Africa" (Tirimba, 1991:102).

After President Obote was overthrown by Amin in 1971, Amin became the President of Uganda and relations between Uganda and Tanzania altered significantly. This change did not only affect inter-country trade but the entire configuration in EAC. This is because the success of the scheme was pegged on the stability of the relationships of the cooperating states (Ngunyi and Adar, 1992). A slight change in these relationships was reflected in the configuration of the entire scheme (Mamdani, 1983). The Nyerere–Amin fallout resulted in the slow disintegration not only of the relationship between their countries per se, but a disintegration of that relationship within the framework of the EAC. Given that the EAC membership was small, the disintegration of two of the three 'relationships' meant a disintegration of almost the entire EAC.

Kenya’s reaction to the January 1971 coup in Uganda was cold and its treatment of President Obote thereafter, seems to confirm Kenya’s dislike for the policy of the UPC government. Just a few days before the coup in 1971, 700 British troops arrived in Kenya. There were also reports that two Israeli generals were sent to Nairobi to help organize the coup (Tirimba, 1991:103). Israeli soldiers were also reportedly seen in the streets of Kampala after the coup besides flying planes in Amin’s victory parade. Furthermore, British intelligence officers acquired from the contingent in Nairobi as well as Colonel Bolk Barlev, the head of the Israeli military mission in Uganda were Amin’s chief advisors in the days after the coup (Tirimba, 1991). Kenya’s uneasiness about Uganda’s alliance with
After the coup, Amin announced that he intended to reverse the deteriorating relations between Kenya and Uganda. Commensurately too President Kenyatta dispatched a senior government minister to Kampala immediately after the coup and in April the same year sent Vice President Daniel Moi to the state funeral of the Kabaka. These gestures of friendliness were apparently geared towards enhancing the national interests of both countries. Kenya had seen a chance to win over Uganda from the emerging socialist-circuit in the region.

Uganda – Tanzania relations were shattered by the Amin’s coup of 1971. Obote had not only been close to Nyerere of Tanzania but had also received political asylum in Tanzania after the coup. This made Amin not only defensive but also bellicose towards Tanzania. During Amin’s reign of terror a stream of Uganda refugees fleeing to Tanzania and Kenya were evident (Mamdani, 1983). Tanzania refused to recognize Amin’s regime in Uganda, and Amin took any slight opposition at home to blame Tanzania, terming it as revolts by soldiers loyal to Obote. These conflicts shaped Tanzania’s foreign policy towards Uganda throughout the entire period of Amin’s military rule (1971-1979). Amin’s major contention was that as long as Obote and his followers continued to live in Tanzania, Uganda’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence was in jeopardy.

At this point Nyerere-Amin relations made Tanzania and Uganda enemies within the EAC framework. Two friendly partners had turned to be enemies. In this regard, Amin’s regime was one of the factors that drew Tanzanian national interests away from EAC. Nyerere had a keen distaste for Amin. Tanzania continued to support abortive invasions of Uganda by followers of the President Obote. At the same time Amin often verbally threatened Tanzania and there were several incursions by Uganda troops into Tanzanian territory (Gordon, 1984).

Nyerere continued to speak out against Amin, refused to meet with him, and chided other African leaders on their silence towards Amin. In October 1978, Uganda forces invaded and
occupied the Kagera salient in Tanzania, with Amin declaring it part of Uganda. Infuriated Nyerere vowed to drive the Uganda troops out of Tanzania, get the OAU to condemn the aggression, obtain compensation for damages from Uganda and ensure that Uganda renounces any claims to Tanzania and that there would be no further attacks on Tanzanian territory.

While the Tanzanian army mobilized for the first task, Nyerere had a series of meetings with other African leaders after the OAU took up the dispute. The OAU attempted to mediate the dispute between Uganda and Tanzania. This further infuriated Nyerere who asked “how do you mediate between someone who breaks into your house and the victim of the assault?” (Gordon, 1984:325). Other than Tanzania’s partners in the front line states, only Ethiopia among OAU states was willing to condemn Amin. Nyerere’s failure to gain OAU support for a condemnation of Amin convinced him that unilateral Tanzanian action to remove Amin was justified even though it was in violation of one of the central principles of the OAU – non intervention in the affairs of other states. Nyerere still felt that the main burden of the task should be given to anti Amin groups but was willing to provide them with military and financial assistance.

After the collapse of EAC in 1977, Tanzania-Uganda relations degenerated into a war situation because Amin’s soldiers had crossed the Uganda –Tanzania border and occupied 710 square miles of Tanzania territory by October 1978. The Kagera salient was claimed by Amin as the main staging ground for Uganda guerrillas. In January 1979, Tanzania troops entered Uganda in a continued pursuit of the Ugandan battalions that had been driven out of Kagera Salient. At the same time, several anti-Amin Ugandan exile groups put together a force to match on the Uganda capital of Kampala. Tanzania’s hope that it would play only a limited role in the overthrow of Amin proved false. When Amin lost soviet military support and advisors, Libya stepped in to provide large scale military assistance to maintain Amin’s rule. After the Libyan intervention, Tanzania decided to throw all its military weight into the struggle to overthrow Amin. Tanzania reacted by mobilizing 40,000 troops who matched to Kampala and toppled Amin on 11th April 1979. By this time the Uganda’s economy was in
disarray due to mismanagement and overspending by the military, hence would not put up a great resistance to the Tanzanian troops.

Just as it had been impossible to remain minimally involved in the effort to topple Amin once the decision to do so had been made, so it was very difficult to Tanzania to extricate itself from Uganda after the fall of Amin. Given the intense political conflicts among the anti-Amin forces and also in a way to maintain its national interest of liberating Ugandans in the spirit of Pan-Africanism, Tanzania could not help but become the de facto authority in Uganda (Ngunyi and Adar 1992). A year after Amin’s fall, over 15,000 Tanzanian troops remained in Uganda. On the other hand, Kenya feared that Tanzania wished to set up a puppet government in Uganda. The Tanzania’s troops stayed on after the fall of Amin confirms that Tanzania national interests were threatened by Amin’s military regime in the East African region. The post-Amin period saw Tanzania reclaiming her lost glory in the region, this was evident when Obote II became the President of Uganda. Tanzania–Kenya relations also improved after the re-opening of their borders (Gordon, 1984).

The EAC collapsed in 1977 mainly because Tanzania–Uganda severed relations. Tanzania’s interests were threatened by Amin’s military regime both in terms of trade and several incursions by Uganda troops into Tanzanian territory. The EAC had also made heavy losses that required the partner states to contribute more money to put EAC institutions back on sound footing. The Tanzania–Uganda quarrel could not allow funds to be contributed, because each partner state desired to run her own services. While the EAC institutions and concepts of East African cooperation began to disintegrate one after the other. Bilateral relations within the East African states and particularly between Tanzania and Uganda had sharply deteriorated removing any basis for continuity in the EAC. When the trade gains in EAC reached its lowest level and Tanzania–Uganda relations severed, Tanzania’s national interest broadened southwards, providing Tanzania with an opportunity to trade with friendly South African nations like Zambia and Mozambique.
These friendly nations in essence replaced the East African states whose trade links had disappeared. Tanzania’s national interest shift to the South due to Amin’s coup in Uganda also provided Tanzania with an opportunity to use the trade links in the south as an aspect of liberation struggle. This means that trade was used to support the liberation groups both in Zimbabwe and Mozambique; Dar es Salaam rail and road network supplied the required equipments, food and ammunitions to the fighters. If Amin’s coup had not taken place in Uganda in 1971, then Tanzania’s national interest could not have shifted southwards, and it was more probable that EAC could not have collapsed in 1977. In June 1977 the EAC officially collapsed, when the budget for 1977/78 was not approved, commitment to the EAC was literally eroded and political capital necessary to keep the scheme afloat exhausted and the collapse of EAC became inevitable.

Graph 3c below shows the impact of Amin’s coup on the EAC trade and particularly the negative effect among the partner states. Amin’s coup had a direct negative impact on the Tanzania’s intra – EAC trade. This was because Tanzania – Uganda cordial relations were disrupted by the coup. This also negatively affected the trade between the two former friendly partners’ states. Amin’s coup disrupted the East African regional trade because it also affected the bilateral relations of two out of three member states.

Graph 3c below shows how Amin’s coup in 1971 in Uganda negatively affected Tanzania’s trade in EAC. When Amin took over as the president of Uganda in 1971, Tanzania – Uganda relations were severed. The two former friendly nations turned to be great enemies in the region. Nyerere refused to recognize the Amin’s military regime in Uganda. This made Tanzania – Uganda trade collapse immediately Amin took over power in Uganda. Graph 5 illustrates how sudden the decline in trade was between Tanzania and Uganda after the coup. The decline in trade between Tanzania and Uganda made Tanzania to shift her interest southwards for friendly relations.
Graph 3C: Tanzania’s trade with Uganda from 1967 - 80 valued in US $ (Millions)

3.1.3 Conclusion

As was noted earlier, the internal situation in Uganda afforded her the chance to pursue policies that in Kenya’s view undermined her ideological stand. The same policies enhanced Tanzania’s national interest towards Uganda in terms of cordial relations and trade. It was such a state of affairs that introduced tension between Kenya and Uganda after 1969 (Tirimba, 1991). “This concretized the growing fears amongst Kenya’s foreign policy makers that connivance was in the making between Kampala and Dar es Salaam to isolate Kenya in East Africa” (Tirimba, 1991; 102). Tanzania – Uganda relations were cut short by the Amin’s coup of 1971 in Uganda. As explained above, internal developments in Uganda after January 25th 1971, negatively affected Tanzania-Uganda cordial relations.

The EAC collapsed in 1977 mainly because Tanzania –Uganda severed relations. Tanzania’s interests were threatened by Amin’s military regime both in terms of trade and several incursions by Uganda troops into Tanzanian territory. While the EAC institutions and concepts of East African cooperation began to disintegrate one after the other. Bilateral relations within the East African states and particularly between Tanzania and Uganda had sharply deteriorated removing any basis for continuity in the EAC. Hence by 1977 when the Knell declaring the demise of the EAC was sounded, inter-state relations between member’s states of the scheme were virtually sour. Commitment to the EAC was literally eroded and political capital necessary to keep the scheme aloft exhausted and the collapse of EAC became inevitable.
CHAPTER FOUR

TANZANIA’S ANTI-COLONIAL CAMPAIGN IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

4.1.0 Introduction

The second national interest goal pursued by Tanzania was liberating Southern Africa countries from colonialism. Tanzania and especially Nyerere, was convinced that Pan-Africanism could not be achieved unless all African states were liberated from colonialism. Nyerere wanted to liberate the countries of Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and South African Republic, in southern Africa and Uganda from Amin in East Africa.

Nyerere helped these countries in various ways. He granted political asylum to freedom fighters from these countries in Tanzania, provided them with training bases, food and allowed other supplies through the port of Dar es Salaam. The TAZARA railway line and road network connecting Dar es Salaam and Lusaka became a major route to supply food, arms and ammunition to the fighters through Zambia. The TAZARA railway and road network was aimed at avoiding the South African route. Nyerere even went further to open diplomatic offices in Dar es Salaam for the liberation groups, fully recognizing the liberators as the bona fide leaders of their respective countries. Refugees from these countries were also given social services like education for their children and Medicare (Kiondo, 1992).

Liberating these Southern Africa countries was a major concern for Nyerere as early as 1961. About two weeks after Tanzania attained independence, Julius Nyerere, when addressing the UN Security council, pledged to support liberation efforts particularly in Africa, in order for all nations to attain political independence. Tanzania pursued the principle of African unity or pan-Africanism which explains the country’s strong interest for African unity. For Tanzania, African unity stood for peace and complete freedom from colonialism. Tanzania also believed that political and economic independence could not be
achieved when a country is surrounded by hostile or countries under colonial yoke (Kiondo, 1984). Tanzania also saw African unity as a strategy for forming a common front against poverty and external dependence. To Nyerere, African unity was to come gradually in a peace - meal approach through regional blocs, and East African Community and South African Development and Coordination Conference were such schemes.

Tanzania is a founder member of the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U), and Nyerere was a strong believer in a United Africa. The union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar which gave birth to Tanzania in 1964 is a living testimony to the country’s efforts towards African unity. Indeed Tanzania wanted to delay her independence to wait for Kenya’s and Uganda’s independence with a view of forming a united East African state (Ngunyi and Adar, 1992). The delay of Tanzania's freedom was a clear demonstration that Tanzania was willing to sacrifice her own independence for the sake of other states.

The fight against colonialism and African Liberation was aimed at achieving full independence for all African countries and other disadvantage groups in the world like Palestine Liberation Organization. The principle of anti-colonialism informs Tanzania’s polices towards liberation movements in Africa and elsewhere in the world. In his speech in 1961 Nyerere pointed out that Tanzania's basic goal is a continued opposition to colonialism anywhere in our continent or any other part of the world. It is no coincidence; therefore that Tanzania hosted the Organization of the African Unity (OAU) Liberation Committee in Dar es Salaam, apart from having been the home of many African Liberation Movements during the period of liberation struggles (Kiondo, 1984:337).

4.1.1 Tanzania’s role in Liberation struggle in Southern Africa

According to Mazrui (1984) African Liberation struggles against colonization rule did not begin with modern political parties and Western Intellectuals, but originated in the armed resistance by Africans against Western intrusion. The true heirs of these primary resisters are not however the Nkrumahs and Nyereres of modern Africa, but the
liberation fighters against colonial rule in Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, a tradition which had declined sharply in the colonial period.

Nkrumah and Nyerere came out strongly against colonial rule in Africa. Nkrumah advocated for immediate unification of Africa but Nyerere realized that immediate unity remained farfetched given the fragile political situation in the continent. Nyerere advocated for a gradual and piecemeal approach to African Unity. Nyerere’s gradual approach was based on the fact that some African countries were still under colonial rule and could take time to liberate them. In this view, Nyerere took that great challenge to liberate southern Africa states that were under colonial yoke. Portugal the earliest European colonial power in Africa was the last. Portuguese colonized Angola and Mozambique.

Zimbabwe was colonized by the illegal Smiths regime of 1965 – 1980. Namibia and South Africa were under the Dutch – Afrikaners. Nyerere took personal initiative to support the freedom fighters from the above countries. He mentioned that freedom could only be achieved when all African leaders and fighters joined hands to break the colonial yoke in the continent. Nyerere made Tanzania a home for freedom fighters and Refugees from the same countries. To ensure success in the war of liberation, Nyerere gave FRELIMO (Front for the liberation of Mozambique) guerrillas a training camp in Dar es Salaam and Bagamoyo. He also helped set up training institutions, primary and secondary schools for the freedom fighters and their families.

FRELIMO organized guerrilla attacks in Mozambique and by 1972, there were notable military success against the Portuguese. There were successful attacks on Portuguese airfields, planes were destroyed, roads and transmission lines, dams and Portuguese military bases. When the war of liberation intensified in Mozambique, FRELIMO also used TAZARA railway line and road network between Tanzania and Zambia to supply food to the guerrillas. FRELIMO fighters used the Tanzania – Zambia cordial relations to access Portuguese military bases in Mozambique through bases in Zambia. The Lisbon coup in Portugal in February 1974 saved Maputo from FRELIMO, when the new government
held talks with FRELIMO and declared political independence on 25th June 1975 under Samora Machael as the president.

In Angola the story was the same, because the armed struggle in Angola was as a result of the failure of peaceful protest in 1960. Portuguese in Angola used the same tactics to deny Africans freedom. Nyerere also helped the UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), FNLA (National Front for Liberation of Angola) and MPLA, fighters against the Portuguese in Angola. Nyerere tried to bring together the above rival groups, because unity of purpose was important against the Portuguese in Angola. Though he succeeded persuading Kaunda of Zambia to allow freedom fighters establish bases in Zambia, but the rival groups fought Portuguese – mostly separately until after the Lisbon coup in 1974. Soon after the coup, freedom fighters from Zambia and Tanzania training camps were mobilized to wage peoples war against the Portuguese. On 11th November 1975, Angola attained independence, when a transnational government was formed of the three rival factions and the stage was set for the Angolan civil war under Dos Santos.

The war of independence in Zimbabwe took the same arrangement as in Angola and Mozambique. In the early 1960’s successive white-settlers regimes blocked proposals by British government for majority rule in Southern Rhodesia by the illegal Smith regime 1965-1980. In 1962 Joshua Nkomo formed ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Peoples Union) and set up new ZAPU headquarters in Dar es Salaam. Nkomo went against the wishes of Nyerere by setting up a government in exile in Dar es Salaam. Nyerere felt that Nkomo should concentrate on political action in Zimbabwe. Nyerere shared the views of a growing number of ZAPU supports, who broke away and formed ZANU (Zimbabwe Africa National Union) in 1963. Tanzania provided the bases for ZANU querrilla fighters while FRELIMO fighters also joined their brothers in fighting Smith’s minority rule in Zimbabwe. ZANU fighters had a wider support from Zambia, Mozambique and Tanzania. On 20th April 1980, Zimbabwe became independent under Robert Mugabe.

Namibia and South Africa were under the Afrikaners. The armed struggle by SWAPO (South West Africa people’s organization) and ANC (Africa National Congress) was an
attempt to end Apartheid and racial discrimination. When the pressure for Afrikaners to give room for majority rule became unbearable SWAPO led Namibia to attain political independence in 1989, under Sam Nuyoma. After the release of Mandela, ANC led South Africa to a majority rule and attained political independence in 1994, under Nelson Mandela as the president.

Trade and liberation struggle were pursued by Tanzania simultaneously. The capability of Trade and liberation struggle for Tanzania was because they both supplemented the other. Trade gains were used to support the liberation fighters and at the same time when countries attain political independence after the successful liberation struggle as in the case of FRELIMO in Mozambique, more trade and markets were opened for Tanzania’s goods. This shift southwards also enhanced liberation struggle amongst the Southern Africa states. This meant that as Tanzania’s trade interest declined in East Africa after Amin’s coup, Tanzania’s interest in the liberation struggle amongst the South African states increased. It is therefore safe to argue that Amin’s coup in Uganda in 1971 had bearing in both Tanzania’s trade interest in EAC and liberation struggle amongst the Southern Africa states.

4.1.2 Tanzania’s trade in Southern Africa before liberation

Tanzania’s trade with Southern Africa states before liberation was very low. Tanzania’s major concern then was establishment of trade links in East African region. After Amin’s coup in 1971, Tanzania’s trade in East Africa became costly and unworthy pursuing. The Amin coup made Tanzania turn to Southern Africa trade and bilateral relations. Tanzania’s trade in the early 1970s began in small volumes in Southern Africa region but gradually grew in volume and value immediately after the liberation struggle. The newly independence state of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe provided a good market for Tanzania’s goods. The formation of SADCC provided the perfect opportunity for Tanzania’s trade rapid increase in the Southern Africa region. Graph 6 below illustrates the gradual Tanzania’s trade increase in Southern Africa region immediately after the liberation struggle. The newly independence states provided Tanzania’s Trade expansion in the
Southern Africa region, where Tanzania was not regarded as a competitor but a big brother who was there during the time of need.

Table 4.1: Tanzania’s trade with Southern Africa States from 1967 - 1980 (valued in US $ in million).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>69</th>
<th>70</th>
<th>71</th>
<th>72</th>
<th>73</th>
<th>74</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>76</th>
<th>77</th>
<th>78</th>
<th>79</th>
<th>80</th>
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<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
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<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
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<td>13.6</td>
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<td>16.9</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance</td>
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<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Graph 4a: Tanzania's Trade with Southern Africa states from 1967 - 1980 (valued in US $ million)


Tanzania's trade in the early 1970s began in small volumes in Southern Africa region but gradually grew in volume and value immediately after the liberation struggle. The newly independence state of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe provided a good market for Tanzania's goods. The formation of SADCC provided the perfect opportunity for Tanzania's trade rapid increase in the Southern Africa region.
Graph 4b - Tanzania's trade in South African Region between 1967 - 1980 (valued in US $ Millions)

Graph 4b shows Tanzania’s trade in South African region from 1967-1980 valued in US $ Millions. The graph shows Tanzania’s trade increase after the liberation of Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Angola and later Namibia. The trade increase was because Tanzania began trading with newly independent states from South African region. The newly independent states provided a larger market for Tanzania’s goods which enhanced her interest in the South. Due to increased trade, Tanzania was able to generate revenue which also enhanced her good relations among the South African states.

Tanzania’s position as the chair of the Front Line States (FLS) made it impossible to delink her national interest with the newly independent states, which was happening at the expense of her East African partners. Tanzania’s persistent support to the struggle for independence amongst the countries in the south made her a closer trading partner with countries in Southern Africa.

In its regional diplomacy, Tanzania had sought to generate and act upon a set of Pan African principles that could serve as a model for other African states. It is the seriousness of Tanzania’s purpose and the consistency that President Nyerere in the mid 1970’s brought to this task that gave Tanzania an international significance far beyond what its size, resources and location would warrant. The top propriety in Tanzania’s foreign relations then had been the struggle against the remaining colonial regimes in southern Africa and against Apartheid in South Africa.

Dar es Salaam had been the headquarters for the liberation committee of the OAU and had provided temporary or permanent bases for many liberation groups including FRELIMO of Mozambique, MPLA of Angola, SWAPO of Namibia and the South Africa’s ANC. Tanzania played a particularly significant role in the struggles leading to independence of Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and president Nyerere is credited as being the force behind Black Africa’s multi-faceted strategy in support of liberation in Southern Africa.

In the struggle for Mozambique, Tanzania provided training facilities and military bases for FRELIMO, as well as schools and social services for Mozambique refugees. Without this
support, FRELIMO’s capacity to maintain a guerilla force against Portuguese forces would have been substantially reduced. Since Mozambique became independent in 1975, trade between the two countries expanded and a very close bilateral political relationship has emerged (Gordon, 1984).

As the trade expanded between Tanzania and Mozambique, intra-EAC trade suffered reaching its lowest levels in 1975 when Mozambique gained independence. Amin’s regime in Uganda encouraged Tanzania to further move southwards for bilateral political relations. Tanzania’s relation with Southern African states arose from her central role in the regions Liberation struggle. Although Tanzania is essentially part of East Africa, it is difficult to imagine Tanzania outside the history of southern Africa. In terms of trade, Tanzania’s shift to the south saw trade expanded between Tanzania and her two principal partners, Zambia and Mozambique. In 1977, when Tanzania’s trade gains were the lowest within EAC, Tanzania’s trade with Zambia and Mozambique had increased tremendously, as explained in graph 4b above.
Graph 4c: Tanzania's trade volumes in EAC and South African States (SADCC) from 1961-1980 (Valued in US $ Millions)

Graph 4c shows Tanzania's trade in EAC and SADCC between 1961 and 1980. While Tanzania's trade increased in East African region steadily between 1961 and 1970, her trade in SADCC was minimal. This steady increase in trade volumes made Tanzania's national interest dominant in the region. Tanzania had cut an edge for herself in the region particularly in terms of trade. The steady increase in trade volumes were disrupted in 1971, by Amin's coup in Uganda.

Amin's coup in Uganda in 1971 is our intervening variable. Amin's coup influenced Tanzania's national interest in East and South African regional cooperation. Amin's coup in this case facilitated Tanzania's national interests further south and it is important to note that, liberation struggle as one of Tanzania's national interests became more dominant after the Amin's coup in 1971. Though Mugomba (1984), Hazlewood (1985) and Ngunyi and Adar (1992) agree that one of the Tanzania's goals was a liberation struggle against colonialism in Africa, the scholars did not mention that Amin's coup in 1971 in Uganda facilitated, Tanzania's liberation struggle in the southern Africa states. They also failed to mention that Tanzania used trade in the southern Africa as an aspect of liberation struggle.

The Amin's coup in 1971 disrupted the Tanzania – Uganda trade relations when their bilateral relations deteriorated. The trade declined in 1971 from US $ 42million to US $12million in 1972. In 1977, when the EAC collapsed and Tanzania’s trade volumes had decreased to zero, Tanzania then had to shift her national interest southwards to friendly nations like Zambia. Though Ngunyi and Adar (1992), maintained that Tanzania’s shift to the south was due to her frustrations in the EAC, the scholars failed to specifically connect the Tanzania’s shift to the south to Amin’s coup in Uganda in 1971. It was the Amin’s coup in Uganda that curtailed Tanzania’s trade in EAC and disrupted Tanzania- Uganda socialist orientation which had enabled the two countries to develop trade links and enjoyed the benefits from EAC trade.

After Amin’s coups in 1971, Tanzania’s trade gradually picked up in the south and by 1977 after the collapse of EAC, Tanzania has already found new friendly nations of Mozambique.
and Zambia as illustrated by graph 6 and 7 above. Tanzania’s trade increased in the south particularly after the independence of Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia and later South Africa. Trade volumes and value continues to increase in the south after 1971 and particularly after 1977 because unlike in East Africa where Tanzania was treated as an equal partner in trade. Tanzania’s position in Southern Africa states and SADCC was treated with lots of respect. This was because Tanzania stood beside them during the hour of need and Tanzania’s trade links in the south is that of a big brother and not a competitor.

Tanzania’s trade also gradually picked up in East African, particularly in the post Amin period (1979 – 80), when Obote II government was installed in Uganda, Tanzania trade with Uganda increased in the Post Kenyatta period in Kenya and subsequent opening of Kenya-Tanzania border, Tanzania’s trade with Kenya also gradually picked up (1978- 81). It is also important to note, when Tanzania pulled out of COMESA, Tanzania’s trade with SADCC is likely to continue to increase both in volume and value, mainly because Tanzania is likely to continue enjoy the benefits of trade in SADCC, than in any other regional bloc, for instance PTA, COMESA and the new EAC.

This indicated that Tanzania’s national interest shift southwards had serious implications for the East African regional arrangements. SADCC became a new baby and replaced the defunct EAC which was shelved and forgotten. Tanzania was given the responsibility within SADCC for regional industrial development, a task in which she was not prepared. The potential for effective Tanzanian leadership in SADCC is poor. While ideological sympathies and political tics have reoriented Tanzania’s effort to the south, economic and geographical realities will continue to draw it back to East Africa.

4.1.3 Attempt to Revive EAC

The three East African states of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania sign a treaty to re-establish the regional trading block on 30th November 1999 into force on 7th July 2000, and it became a customs union in 2005. Yet in July 2007 two new members of Rwanda and Burundi joined the community. The region has a population of 126 million people, a GDP
of US dollars 73 billion and a surface area of 1.82 million sq miles. On 1st July 2010 the community took a giant leap when the five states simultaneously launched the common market protocol. The common market protocol is a legal process which will require all state to harmonise their laws to conform to the new scheme. We anticipate this process to take about 2 years before all laws are harmonized. The new EAC intends to attain common currency level soon and a political union after 2013 referendum where the masses or the public will be subjected to approval or rejection of the scheme.

To understand more about Tanzania’s national interest, it’s important to look at the current state of affairs in East African regional integration efforts in order to understand the historical pursuits of Tanzania’s national interest that led to the collapse of EAC. Tanzania’s interest in terms of trade in EAC was negatively affected by Amin’s coup in 1971 in Uganda. The Amin’s coup made the Tanzania’s trade decline drastically in EAC. Tanzania shifted to the Southern Africa region for trade as well as pursues the objective of liberation struggle. Amin’s coup therefore disrupted the Tanzania’s interest in the East African region which made the collapse of EAC inevitable.

With the formation of the new EAC, Tanzania’s national interests could still bring threats to the existence of this regional cooperation, because the issues of land, private investment and travel documents are major concerns to Tanzania. Without resolving these issues Tanzania again has threatened to pull out of EAC, just as it did to COMESA. Tanzania’s national interest led to the collapse of the defunct EAC, and may still be a major threat to the new EAC. Signing of the East Africa Community Common Market Protocol Agreement, which was supposed to have been concluded on December 2008, has been delayed. The set back comes after Tanzania continued to object to certain provisions of the treaty. The issues of land ownership, right of establishment and use of identity cards as travel documents, which Tanzania has all along been opposed to, remain a sticky issue with no solution found to date. These issues affect the national interest of Tanzania in the region because Tanzania has a large unoccupied land that Kenyans and Ugandans are likely to find an alternative land to settle. These issues if not resolved, Tanzania has threatened to pull out of the new EAC if
these issues are not resolved. East African leaders failed to sign the proposed Common Market Protocol on 29/4/2009 because of Tanzania's stance on land and rights of residence. The EAC leaders deferred the matter to November 2009 to allow for more consultations. Tanzania's argument is that the EAC provisions should not seek to give authority to override national interests, policies and laws. Tanzania had indicated that Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi which are not opposed to the land pact can proceed. Tanzania continues to oppose access to its land by non-citizens. Tanzania is the largest country by size in the region and sparsely populated. Tanzania's opposition to the use of national identity cards as travel documents and access to its land by non-citizens might not change soon and this position has threatened the new EAC.

4.1.4 Conclusion

Tanzania has already indicated or threatened to pullout of the protocol if the proposed land pact is not amended. We can safely argue therefore that Tanzania's national interest comes first before the territorial ones, and the confined conflict within the new EAC may lead to a more complex situation and may even lead to the collapse of EAC (Daily Nation, 30th April, 2009). The relevance of this situation to our study is the fact that, history may repeat itself. Because Tanzania's pursuit of its national interest led to the collapse of the EAC in 1977, she is more probable and likely to do the same within the new EAC. Tanzania's national interest therefore is likely to continue to determine the regional integration efforts in East Africa.
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

5.1.0 Summary and Conclusion

Regional Integration in Africa is a subject which continued to be characterised by a disturbing gap between aspirations and achievements (Ndiaye 1990:35).

It was this editorial statement by an African scholar that inspired this study. It apparently attacked the ineptitude of the East African Community, while raising the disturbing gap between aspirations and achievements. The study seeks to establish the validity or otherwise of the editorial statement that is whether there was really a disturbing gap between the statement of intentions and the results of the EAC. The study goes further not only seeking to know whether there is really a gap, but why there was that gap. The study is presented in five chapters. Chapter one introduces the study and focuses on routine matters such as statement of the problem, literature review and the theoretical framework adopted in the study.

It was very clear right from the beginning that political independence in Africa in 1960’s was immediately followed by a great debate on the strategy for African unity. But despite the fact, this became major preoccupations subject to controversy and conflict.

The literature review reveals that many of these co-operations and other forms of regional integration in Africa and especially the East African case may have collapsed due to unclear objectives and conflicts over issues of national interest and national sovereignty.

In chapter two, the Tanzania’s national interest within the East African region is focused. The historical experience tells us that much effort has been put toward regional integration in the case of East Africa during the colonial period. Since 1917 when these efforts were put in place, there seems to be consistent progress until 1960s when the three East African states became independent and in turn the African leaders took charge. Although the East
African Community stood out as the most advanced customs union in less developed countries but its hopes were shattered in 1977 when the community collapsed. The collapse of the EAC was due to Tanzania's pursuit of its national interest, and EAC treaty did not address pertinent issues of the cooperation. The treaty failed to adjust on areas of conflicting national interest amongst the partner states.

Chapter three reflects Tanzania's Trade in East African region. The Amin's coup of 1971 in Uganda threatened Tanzania's national interest and led to the collapse of EAC in 1977, by Tanzania's shift to the south.

Chapter four explains Tanzania's anti-colonial struggle in Southern Africa. Tanzania's national interest shift to the south was due to Amin's coup in Uganda. The Amin's coup negatively impacted on Tanzania's national interest in EAC, particularly in terms of trade. Tanzania's shift to the south was to establish trade links with friendly nations like Zambia and Mozambique.

Chapter five is a summary and conclusions, which focuses on recommendation to various groups

5.1.1 Recommendations

In the light of the findings and conclusions of this study as detailed explained in the chapter above, the following recommendations are made:-

5.1.2 Recommendations to the East African Public

In order to make the East African Cooperation a viable venture it is instrumental for the East African public to be involved in all stages of the cooperation. These includes:-

Planning stage, Implementation, Monitoring and evaluation of the system, the people of the three or more partner states had to be given time to vote in a referendum in order to reject or accept the East African Community. The nature of involvement ranges from getting their views at their own local setting to elections. This kind of concern will make every
individual to be committed to the cooperation hence minimize chances of collapse. This is because a collective effort is much greater than a three man team who are like minded. On the other hand, masses need to feel the urge to cooperate among themselves, without being forced, told or advised to do so. Cooperation should be a free will, which is necessitated by the needs and demands of the situations of integration.

The masses also should stop thinking that whatever the president or other leaders say is a God’s blessed message and therefore, no one can oppose. We need to acknowledge that in the modern world, a society without leaders is not a society but at the same time, those leaders must know that they were not born into those positions but were elected by the public, for a specific period of time. The public then need to refuse being pulled like a cart by few individuals and urge for harmonised understanding between themselves and the leaders. So that all can join hands for a common purpose of the East African Cooperation. This is in reference to Article 48 (1), of EAC Treaty which gave the East African Authority the ability to control the defunct EAC.

5.1.3 Recommendations to the East African partner states (Government – policy makers).

The study has also found that some of the problems affecting the performance of the EAC are related to overall government policy particular with regard to pursuit of Tanzania’s personal interest. This study therefore, has the following recommendation to make to the policy makers if East African cooperation or future regional arrangements are to be made instrumental to development.

For a common understanding and cooperation the three East African states and policy makers, should be able to operate common or similar economic policies or ideological orientation because it is the only way to create a common market and services within the region. Any thing short of this makes the regional cooperation venture a fruitless effort.

The socialization process needs also to be similar to lure, inter-tribes and inter-regional
movement and information. We urge the policy-makers to try to put in place almost a similar education system — this will set the East African standards. The systems will gradually breakdown any barriers of integration. To assume that people will naturally socialise is a fallacy of generalisation. A situation where information reception is distorted not uniformly flowing brings misunderstanding and isolation hence breaks the cooperation eventually.

The three states need also to formulate domestic policies which will be able to conform to the regional policy and state regional relations. The wider the gap created by different domestic policies also undermines the policy of good neighbourliness. This kind of affairs curtails for any workable regional relations and no cooperation may be possible. The East African states have been pursuing different domestic policies as regard development and these domestic informs foreign policy and the results has been that the three states kept looking on different directions but assumed to work on a common course. This is still the case between Kenya and Tanzania. Tanzania still fears that its land will be occupied by Kenyan capitalists.

These states need to work along a historical closeness especially the colonial history. This and other advantages which can make relations viable can be explored. In particular, the broader tribes of Kuria, Masai, Luhyia, Karamojong, Teso, and Luo can be a spring board towards identity and actualization among the East African people. The policy-makers need to understand that the decision concerning national interest should always be made on the basis of concrete and demonstrable national advantage — within the limits of prudence rather than on the basis of abstract and impersonal criteria of morality, law and ideology. In this regard, prudence is taken to mean the ability to assess one’s needs and aspirations while carefully balancing them against the needs and aspirations of others. Tanzania invasion of Uganda in 1979 was a retrogressive action against the sovereign state and the people of Uganda.

It is expected that the above six recommendations would help the policy-makers in the East African region in ensuring that the East African Community could have delivered the goods.
They should also guide the policy-makers when new East African regional cooperation is to be established. For instance, as the three states think of starting the East African Cooperation, such an establishment should not repeat the mistakes of the former East African Community.

5.1.4 Recommendations to scholars

To scholars who may be interested in pursuing further research on the same topic, it is recommended that more emphasis be laid on the role of national interests. This is vital because the national interests have always assumed the critical role in their respective states. What we mean here is that the national interests should not be used by political leaders as one to guide the foreign policies of their states. These leaders are regarded as charismatic, great farmer, teacher number one, and best sports man, the father of the nation, the God fearing, the wise elder and many other nicknames, and have taken their respective states as their own household properties. Amin in Uganda acted on his own state of mind without any consultation while at the same time oppress any descending view.

In this scenario, the leaders tend to assume all responsibilities ranging from cultural to political. Hence under such circumstances a vital undertaking like states’ cooperation is likely to be interfered by the leaders. It is against this background that we recommend for further study in regional cooperation such as the EAC, in relation to the political setting and states’ power relations because this is likely to be determined by individual leaders instead of situational needs and demands.

5.1.5 Recommendations to the East African Authority (Presidents)

To the past, present and the future presidents of the East African countries, we recommend the following:-

It was and still is important that when the cooperation within the region is considered, the masses ought to be contacted in order to get their views on the same. Anything short of this means the mass support is lacking and is bound to fail, reference is made to the fourth coming referendum to approve or reject the new EAC in 2013.
It was unfair for the East African leaders to have initiated the former East African High Commission (EAHC) strategies towards East African Integration because this was not an African arrangement but colonial and unfortunately though EAHC was turned to cooperation within the region, but it had its own different purpose from the EAC. EAHC being not an indigenous idea had latter implications on the African style of politics.

The president ought to avoid being in the centre of power all the time. Power requires to be decentralised instead of centralised within a small group of individuals. Centralisation of power creates greed among leaders and suspicion among the masses. It is important to avoid patron – client cleavages because cooperation instead will be geared towards those who are loyal to the president. The rest who may be in the opposition are regarded not active members of the cooperation and therefore, can choose to undermine the good will of the scheme.

Pluralism should be seen to bear fruits in East Africa else the diversified views of different party members may take a different approach on regional cooperation. Some parties may like the cooperation, others may not and since chances are equal for all parties to win the elections and forming the government it is then vital that regional cooperation is driven by situational needs and not individual desires. The case of KPU versus KANU in Kenya, UPC and KY in Uganda and the delicate Zanzibar-Tanganyika Union in 1964.

Particular pertinent issues like land ownership, private investment, travel documents within the region and boundaries, for example the Migingo Island dispute between Kenya and Uganda should be resolved amicably to avoid these same issues re-emerging time and again. Tanzania’s national interest has continued to determine regional cooperation both in East and Central Africa. Tanzania has dropped its COMESA membership and threatened to pull out from the new EAC this is a lesson we need to learn. Tanzania’s national interest comes first before the territorial ones. It is imperative to note that, EAC has been and will still be far much better without Tanzania.
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