

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

**Foreign Policy Leadership and War: Case Study of
Anglo-Zulu War of 1879**

BY

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**Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of Requirements of the Masters of Arts in
International Studies at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS),
University of Nairobi**

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DECLARATION

This dissertation is my own original work and has not been presented for a decree in any other university)

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Signature

Date

**This dissertation has been submitted for examination with my approval as University
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Date

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Abstract

The British imperial policy of colonising smaller, weaker and less developed nations was the underlying cause of the Anglo-Zulu War. The imperial policy allowed British agents, including the military, to use unrestricted amount of violence to deal with nations resisting colonial authority. Leaders who used violence against natives without express British government authority with success were rewarded with decorations and career advancement. Those who failed or caused loss of British lives were lightly reprimanded and/or redeployed. The declaration and the waging of the Anglo-Zulu War was in line with the British policy of using violence against native states perceived as a threat to imperial interests.

Leadership was pivotal in the occurrence of the Anglo-Zulu War. It was power relations and interactions between various British and Zulu leaders that resulted in Britons and Zulus going to war. The manner in which Carnarvon was advised to bring about the confederation of Southern African states caused the Anglo-War. Actions and decisions taken by various leaders led to a violent confrontation between the two nations.

Decision-making processes within the imperial system facilitated the waging of the war without the express British government authority. The colonial office under Carnarvon's leadership was able to conceive the confederation concept and allocated resources for its implementation without any political oversight. Colonial officials were allowed to make and implement decisions in the colonies without London's approval. A hurried attempt to implement the confederation was the direct cause of the Anglo-Zulu War. Bartle Frere and Chelmsford were appointed for the sole purpose of dealing with the Zulus. Decisions taken by the Zulu kings, particularly Mpande and Cetshwayo facilitated an easy British victory.

Glossary of Terms

<i>udibi</i>	Young boys used as mat carriers and general logistics functions for the Zulu army commanders. They were normally between the age of 14 and 16 years.
Hottentots	Natives of South Africa who were living around the area of Cape Town when Jan van Riebeeck and his Dutch settlers arrived in the Cape.
Bushmen	Aborigines of Southern Africa who were inhabited the Drakensberg area during the 1800's. They used poisoned arrows to hunt their prey.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

In the 19th Century. Britain had the largest empire which was achieved by invading and annexing territories belonging to other people. Among the conquered areas was South Africa. In 1805 the British Navy defeated the French Navy and took the CapeColony from the Dutch as a strategic post. It needed the Cape for the establishment of a refreshment station and to protect its increasing fleet travelling to and from India. After the colony was awarded to Britain at the European Peace Conference, it started settling its citizens in the area¹.

The colonialisation process was led by soldiers. After conquering, the soldiers gave way to administrators and the two, soldiers and administrators; worked together to address different issues and their relationship was complimentary. The administrators represented the legal authority and the military beat those who resisted'.

Among those to be conquered militarily were the Zulus. The Anglo-Zulu relations started in 1824 with a group of Britons who left the Cape to explore the Natal area for trading opportunities on behalf of the merchants. Under the leadership of Lt Francis Farewell the group was warmly received by King Shaka kaSenzangakhona. This group stayed for many years outside the influence of the British and colonial government. The Boers under the leadership of Piet Retief and Gert Maritz settled in Natal, including the Port of Natal between

¹ Kevin Shillington. History of Southern Africa. (Essex: Longman Group. 1987.) p 53.

Rod Thornton. Historical Origins of the British Army's Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist Techniques.

Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). Geneva. Switzerland: 2005. p 39.

1837 and 1838. It was after the Boer settlement that Britain developed interests in the Port of Natal, attacked the Boers in 1842 and declared it a British territory.³

The official arrival of the British colonial administrators and the existence of a colony adjacent to the Zulu kingdom changed the strategic outlook of the area drastically. As from 1842 Zululand was bordered by the British colony on the South and a Boer republic on the North West. These groups were interested in the affairs of the Zulu kingdom because of its strategic significance. The Anglo-Zulu relations went sour in late 1870's and culminated in a war of 1879. The British won but did not declare Zululand part of Natal until 1887⁴.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The Zulus initially received the British well and in a friendly manner. Yet, the visitors attacked the hosts and no good reason was advanced or has been advanced to explain Britain's action. Was it naivety on the part of the Zulus to assume the British were friendly or was it due to poor coordination on the part of the British officials? The Anglo-Zulu War is not adequately explained.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the study are:

- To analyse factors in Anglo-Zulu relations that caused the outbreak of the War.
- To examine the role played by all leaders before, during and after the War.
- To investigate the effect of the military and the new technology on the causes of the War.

1.4 Hypothesis

The ideal for a South African confederation was the cause of the Anglo-Zulu War.

Poor coordination on the part of the British caused the War.

³ Ibid, pp 59-64.

⁴ Ibid. pp. 58-68.

Naivety on the part of the Zulus in their relations with the British Empire encouraged British aggression.

1.5 Literature Review

Norman Etherington in "Anglo-Zulu Relations 1856-1878" presents the relations between the Zulus and colonial Natal as friendly, especially from the side of Zulu king. During the coronation of King Cetshwayo, Theophilus Shepstone was invited as a guest of honour. The visit was not taken serious by the colonial officials, but it was used later against the Zulus in justifying the invasion of Zululand. Personality clashes between Cetshwayo and Shepstone were present during this period. Shepstone was trying hard to exercise supremacy over the Zulu king who did not take kindly to such an act. Furthermore there was lack of communication in general. This allowed the rumour mongering to thrive in the Anglo-Zulu relations. The rumours peddled were always on security and kept the colonial society suspicious of their native neighbours' intentions. There was also a serious shortage of labour in the colony and the Zulus were not helping in addressing this requirement. Measures were taken to attract black labourers beyond the borders of the colony and the Zulu kingdom, especially Eastern Transvaal and north of Delagoa Bay. This process was complicated and did not solve the labour shortage in Natal.

Serious security concerns of the colonial white population were identified by Bill Guest as the source of the confederation ideal. In "The War, Natal and Confederation" he argues that the white population of the Natal colony felt overwhelmed by the presence of the black population. The colony was surrounded by native societies from all directions, Zulu kingdom in the East, Sotho in the North and Xhosa in the South. The number of black people within the colony exceeded that of the white population by 1:18 in 1871. Rumours were always circulated about an impending Zulu invasion of Natal; even conflicts with other native populations were always perceived by the white population as Zulu-inspired. The conflict

with the Xhosa's in the Eastern Cape. Pedi-Boer conflict in the Transvaal and the skirmish with Langalibalele in the Drakensberg were all perceived as motivated and supported by Cetshwayo. These concerns were further compounded by an increasing need for land and labour which could not be satisfied from the Zulu kingdom. The lack of responsible government in Natal made it easy for the personality of Sir Bartle Frere to manipulate the situation towards the invasion of Zululand.

According to Donald Morris in The Washing of the Spears: The Rise and Fall of the Zulu Nation Under Shaka and its Fall in the Zulu War of 1879 a party of British citizens lead by Francis George Farewell in 1824 were the first to interact with the Zulus. These members were part of the Cape Colony Britons who out on expedition. They were given a warm reception and remained in Zululand interacting with the Zulu king until his death in 1828. On 17 August 1824 Farewell got Shaka to sign a deed entitling him to 3 500 m² of land around Port Natal. During the reign of Dingane, who took over after Shaka. there were only sporadic interactions with the British colonialists. It is the Boers that kept Dingane busy on all fronts. One notable battle between the Zulus and the Boers was fought in 1838 on the banks of Income River, later known as Blood River because of that event. The Boers formed an alliance with Mpande and overthrew Dingane in 1840. The British colonised Natal in 1842 after defeating and displacing the Boers from the Port of Natal. In 1843 the area south of Tugela River was declared a British colony and British citizens started settling in the area. The settlement and expansion of colonial activity occurred during the reign of Mpande who was seen to be friendly towards both British and Boer settlers. Cetshwayo took over, after the death of Mpande in 1872, and found a kingdom that was already earmarked by the colonial fraternity for invasion.

Kevin Shillington, in History of Southern Africa, states that Trek Boer groups under the leadership of Gert Maritz and Piet Retief settled in Natal during the period 1837-1838.

They established their parliament in Pietermaritzburg and used Port Natal for trading. This is the group that interacted with Dingane for about three years. During his flight from Dingane in 1839, Mpande was sheltered by this group of settlers. In 1840 Mpande invaded Zululand, with the assistance of the Boers and defeated Dingane to claim the Zulu kingship. The Boers, for their trouble, forced Mpande to pay tribute to them in the form of cattle and land. In 1842 the Cape Colony decided to send a force to invade Natal and expel the Boers from the Port of Natal. Dutch and US ships were calling at the port raising fears of competition from other great powers and coastal security concerns from Britain. Furthermore, the Boer settlers were accused of practising slavery and pushing surplus Africans in southern direction. The Boers displaced from Natal moved northwards to settle in the Transvaal and Anglo-Zulu relations remained normal until the death of Mpande in 1872.

Phillip Kennedy in "Mpande and the Zulu Kingship" follows Mpande's life from the time of King Shaka until the end of his own reign. During Shaka's reign he survived by being a favourite of his half-brother. Their closeness resulted in Shaka presenting Mpande with two wives who bore him Cetshwayo and Mbuyazwe amongst others. Growing away from Dingane allowed him to gather some followership to an extent that by 1832 Henry Fynn was certain of his (Mpande) future kingship. During the late 1830's Mpande's relations with Dingane soured to an extent that Mpande survived two assassination plots perpetrated by his brother between 1837 and 1839. He had to defect to the Boers in Natal to save himself and his followers. The Boers accepted him and used him to defeat Dingane. He was installed as a king of the Zulus and he soon changed his allegiance to the British who fought the Boers in 1842 and colonised Natal in 1843. During his term of office Mpande did not name his heir apparent causing Cetshwayo to purge a large number of his half-brothers to earn the right to become an heir apparent. The power during Mpande's time slowly devolved to the local chiefs to an extent that at his death there were chiefs who were more powerful than

Cetshwayo. Due to this state of affairs Cetshwayo had to resort to whites from Natal to secure his kingship.

In "An Imperial High Commissioner and the Making of the War", Peter Colenbrander argues that Sir Bartle Frere was appointed as High Commissioner to South Africa for the main purpose of waging war with the Zulu to advance Lord Carnarvon's dream of Southern Africa confederation. Frere strongly believed that Britain had a responsibility to civilise the native states by peace and war where necessary. This view was shaped by events in India where he witnessed princely states being assimilated and subordinated by the British Empire. As High Commissioner in South Africa he assumed office in March 1877 and started the preparations for the Zulu war without a delay. The Zulu kingdom was the only African state that exhibited signs of cohesiveness and military prowess to an extent that it was deemed a threat by the colonial officials. In order to establish grounds for war Frere employed various tactics against Cetshwayo. The negative information was supplied by the missionaries and colonial officials. The establishing of the grounds for war culminated into an ultimatum that was given to the Zulus where they were required to comply with its near impossible terms in 30 days or face war. In this way Frere succeeded in tricking the Zulus into a war that was not necessary.

In "The Man Who Would be Inkosi: Civilising Missions in Shepstone Early Career", Thomas McClendon states that Theophilus Shepstone life and character was shaped by the family's religious background and the Frontier Wars of the Eastern Cape. In 1854 he made a proposal where the African population between Tugela River and Pondoland would be moved into reserved locations where he would be their "king". The plan was built on the findings of a Locations Commission which investigated the problem of Africans who were flowing into the British territory in increasing numbers. The budget of the Natal government was not funded by the British Empire and there was a shortage of labour. Bishop Colenso

and the Commissioner supported the plan. Bishop Colenso saw an opportunity where converts could be easily accessible while the Commissioner assumed this would reduce the security threat posed by Africans to the colonial population. Shepstone on his side saw this as an opportunity for him to raise his status by controlling a large pool of human resources which could give him access to greater things. Africans were moved to the locations and placed under the control of magistrates and Theophilus Shepstone never became the "king". McClendon portrays Shepstone as a person who is calculating and would not hesitate to utilise an opportunity to use the African population for his own ends.

In his book entitled The Road to iSandlwana Philip Gon argues that the annexation of the diamonds fields of Griqualand West opened the horizons for the British Empire. Lord Carnarvon, on the advice of Theophilus Shepstone wanted to create a confederation that would include the Boer republics, the Cape colony and Natal. The independent African kingdoms were a source of fear for the colonial officials, who saw them as a perpetual threat. In order to prepare ground for his project Lord Carnarvon sent James Anthony Froude to investigate and market the idea of the confederation. Froude's visit was met with resistance from some colonialists, especially Sir Barkly (the High Commissioner in South Africa). Sir Barkly was replaced as high commissioner by Sir Bartle Frere on Froude's recommendation. Transvaal, a northern Boer republic, was annexed by Theophilus Shepstone in 1877, three weeks after Sir Bartle Frere's assuming of office. This was followed by the conquering and reorganisation of the Eastern Cape after the last frontier war in 1878. Some 2500 German settlers were also brought in to Eastern Cape to assist with farming after a great famine in 1877 had devastated the area. The Zulu kingdom had a reputation of being the best native army in Southern Africa and colonial Natal viewed this force as a perennial threat. Once the other areas were pacified, it was time to deal with the Zulus. At the beginning of October

1878, more than 60 days before the presentation of the ultimatum to the Zulus. British forces were already occupying three places along Natal/Zululand border.

As an "Introduction" of The Anglo-Zulu War: New Perspectives Duminy & Ballard argue that it was the need for livestock, confederation and the new technology that fuelled the Anglo-Zulu War. The armed conflict in the Eastern frontier was always characterised by the British forces seizing cattle from the Xhosa natives. The ultimatum handed to the Zulus included herds of cattle as fine for certain violations. The growing industrialisation rivalry amongst the European powers made it imperative on colonial empires to consolidate and protect their investments abroad. Labour markets in the colonies had to be created to ensure that there is uninterrupted labour supply for the imperialists. The introduction of breech loading Martini-Hendry rifles and the Gatling machine gun gave the British forces a sense of superiority. During the Frontier Wars these weapons proved to be very effective even when faced with massed attacks. The personality of Sir Bartle Frere is cited as one important factor that made the war a possibility. The High Commissioner was handpicked by Lord Carnarvon for the purpose of establishing the confederation of Southern Africa and he was prepared to achieve it at any cost.

Colin Webb in "The Origins of the Anglo-Zulu War: Problems of Interpretation" criticises the earlier British orthodox writers who depicted the Anglo-Zulu War as inevitable. It is argued that Zulus were far less of a threat to the British Natal and even in the face of war they were still suing for peace. The reasons for the war had their source in capitalist interests. Lord Carnarvon and Sir Bartle Frere wanted to create a South African dominion that was supported by a strong economy. Most accusations against Cetshwayo were followed up by Bishop Colenso and most of them were found to be untrue. The writers of the time were reporting from the British perspective and preferred to overlook certain information. The notion of the war being inevitable is based on the general feeling of the

colonial administrators who were using the theory as an explanation to their higher authorities in order to escape punishment.

Peter Colenbrander in "The Zulu Political Economy on the Eve of the War" states that Cetshwayo was leading a less cohesive Zulu nation compared to that of the Shakan era. The shortage of cattle, which were central to the life of a Zulu, had impacted negatively on the economy of the kingdom and caused it a serious strain on the Zulu economic life. Trading activities were partly responsible for the shortage of cattle. Trading for firearms and implements were also responsible for depleting herds of cattle in Zululand. Between 80(H) and 20 000 firearms are estimated to have entered Zululand during 1870's. The Boers also traded implements with Zulus at unfavourable terms. Population growth dynamics and migration impacted negatively on the Zulu force levels. Polygamy was practiced mainly by rich people who were a minority in the Zulu kingdom; the majority of the people were monogamous. During the 1870's Natal experience an increased inflow of people from Zululand. This further deprived the Zulu Army of additional young men for military mobilisation.

Jeff Guy, in "The Role of Colonial Officials in the Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom" states that after the defeat of the Zulus, British Government issued an instruction forbidding the annexation of Zululand as a colony. The instruction did not give guidelines regarding the management of the defeated and destructed Zulu kingdom. Sir Garnet Wolseley, who replaced Bartle Frere, decided to divide Zululand into 13 chiefdoms and appointed new chiefs accordingly. The new chiefs developed rivalry amongst themselves which metamorphosed into a civil war. As the king was imprisoned, Zibhebhu kaMaphitha started attacking the chiefs who were aligned to the exiled king. Shepstone was amongst many people who criticised this division of Zululand in favour of a system where the chiefs would be reporting to a white magistrate. Wolseley rejected this idea citing the instruction not to annex

Zululand as the reason for his action. The absence of clear guidelines on the terms of settlement allowed the colonial officials, particularly Wolseley, a free hand in reorganising Zululand after the war. Reorganising the Zululand into thirteen chiefdoms resulted in civil war that claimed many lives of the inhabitants of the territory.

Charles Ballard in "Sir Garnet Wolseley and John Dunn: The Architects and Agents of the Ulundi Settlements" argues that it was Wolseley and Dunn who were responsible for the terms of settlement in Zululand. Wolseley did not trust the colonial officials and the missionaries and did everything in his power to exclude their participation and inputs. He only accepted Theophilus Shepstone's advice on the number of chiefdoms where he was advised to consider thirteen instead of his considered six chiefdoms. As Frere was still in South Africa, Wolseley was supposed to keep him informed on the progress of pacification. Wolseley believed that Frere's confederation policy was a total failure and he preferred to exclude Frere as much as possible. John Dunn had extensive interests in Zululand and stood to lose all of it in case the Zululand was in Cetshwayo's hands or those aligned towards the king. Wolseley realised that Dunn was cooperating fully and used him to create a buffer zone between Natal and Zululand. After allocating the largest territory to Dunn, his services were further useful in the selection of the twelve chieftains for the remainder of the chiefdoms. The Ulundi settlement was therefore an expression of Dunn's aspirations and Wolseley's whims.

In his article "Written in Characters of Blood? The Reign of King Cetshwayo kaMpande 1872-9" Richard Cope argues that an attack on Cetshwayo's character by Frere, Shepstone and Robertson was designed to incite the colonial officials into viewing the war against the Zulus as a just cause. Frere did not have knowledge of Zulu affairs but relied on a missionary called Robertson for information demonising the Zulu king. Robertson had an axe to grind with Cetshwayo for refusing missionaries permission to operate freely in

Zululand. The truth was that missionaries left Zululand in 1877 due to a rumour pertaining to an imminent British invasion of Zululand. The anonymous author of the negative publications was widely believed to be Robertson. Events that occurred in the past were recycled as proof that the King was a "*blood thirsty barbarian*" whose reign was "*written in characters of blood*". Shepstone as the former Secretary of Native Affairs he was viewed as an authority on the Zulu affairs and he used this influence to spread incorrect information about the Zulu Kingdom. The absence of wide media coverage resulted in rumours thriving to extent that rumours were generating new stories. These conditions made the rumours more effective in fuelling fears of an imminent Zulu invasion amongst the colonial settlers.

Richard Cope in "Local Imperatives and Imperial Policy: The Source of Lord Carnarvon's South African Confederation Policy" discusses factors that were fuelling the confederation ideal. The native societies and the Boers were viewed by the Colonial Office as an obstacle to the creation of the confederation. The violent encounter between the British forces and Chief Langalibalele confirmed this fear which was unfounded. The press was also responsible for encouraging the annexation of native territories. Local and British interests as represented by JH Froude and John Paterson of Standard Bank were instrumental in advocating the confederation ideal. JH Froude was sent by Lord Carnarvon to investigate and promote the confederation in South Africa. It was Froude who recommended the replacement of Sir Barkly and he was further instrumental in Frere's appointment. Paterson was a merchant in Port Elizabeth and a founder of Standard Bank. He was very vocal on the benefits the confederation could bring for South Africa and his views were in line with those of Lord Carnarvon. The economic situation was such that the depression in Europe during 1873-1896 was contrasted by a boom in South Africa over the same period.

In his book Zulu Rising: Epic Story of Isandlwana and Rorke's Drift Ian Knight states that the commander on the spot sent a request to London for officers to volunteer for a special

service in South Africa due to an imminent war with the Zulus. The special service allowed soldiers of the British Army to detach themselves temporarily for field appointments. These appointments aroused interest from young officers who were on garrison duties. Field service was viewed as an opportunity to break away from the routine peacetime duties for active service in the field. The active service was adventurous and provided an opportunity for medals and possibly accelerated promotion. It was due to these reasons that young officers did not hesitate to enlist for a special service.

In the article "British Imperial Opposition to Natal Expansion 1865-1873" Benjamin Kline exposes Natal's expansionist tendencies from 1865. Between 1865 and 1868 the Natal colonists, led by Keane and Shepstone attempted to annex Basutholand without success. The annexation was motivated by a request for protection from Moshoeshoe who was under attack from Free State Boers. The first request was rejected by Cape Town and this caused Moshoeshoe to send the second request to Natal. In 1867 the Colonial Office in London directed Wodehouse, the Cape Governor, to allow Natal to annex Basutholand. Wodehouse was reluctant to allow Natal officials to annex the Basotho kingdom he therefore found an opportunity in 1868 to defy London and annexed it as a British protectorate. The continued harassment of the Basotho by the Boers gave Wodehouse the excuse he needed to justify his annexation of Basutholand and deny the Natal colonists the opportunity to expand their territory.

In the article entitled "A Note on Firearms in the Zulu Kingdom with Special Reference to the Anglo-Zulu War, 1879" Jeff Guy estimates that about 30 000 firearms were imported into Zululand during the period 1872-1877. Guy further estimated that there were not less than 8 000 firearms in the Zulu Army at the start of the Anglo-Zulu War. John Dunn is identified as the main actor in the Zululand arms trade. Most of the firearms were the obsolete stocks disposed by the European armies after the introduction of breech loading

rifles. The firearms would be imported from Europe to Durban harbour from where they were re-exported to Delagoa Bay. John Dunn would collect the firearms from Delagoa Bay and bring them to Zululand where they would be exchanged for cattle. During the period 1872-8 a double muzzle loader's price increased from 1 cattle to 4 cattle. The cattle would then be driven across Tugela into Natal where they would be exchanged for cash. Cetshwayo enlisted the services of Basotho gunsmiths to maintain the firearms and give musketry training to the Zulus. In the war the firearms were not effective due to serviceability and tactical application. Most of firearms were obsolete and Zulus were still combining the use of firearms with the spear. In some cases Zulus were still having two additional throwing spears which were decommissioned by Shaka more than 50 years earlier.

Rod Thornton in "Historical Origins of the British Army's Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist Techniques" argues that during the colonial period a heritage was created whereby British Army officers could conduct operations in their regions without too much interference from the homeland. This was partly due to amicable relations that existed between the colonial administrators and the army officers. Administrators were representing the legal authority of the British Empire and were allowed to take the lead in dealing with the political side while the army would join later to address the military side of the problem. The homeland also believed in allowing the man on the spot to address the situation as he deemed fit. This approach was based on the reality in terms of distance and the old British Army tradition of mission command. The concept of mission command gave the commander on the spot the benefit to make decisions and report later, take accolades if he did well or take punishment if he failed.

In the article "The Cohesion of the Zulu Polity under the Impact Anglo-Zulu War: A Reassessment" Laband argues that there was a difference of opinion amongst the king and the council. He observed that the council was not in favour of the war against the British but the

wider population felt that the terms of the ultimatum were a provocation and insult to the Zulu nation. The central issue was the surrender of Sihayo's sons on which the king and the populace were unanimous in their refusal comply with such a requirement. Sihayo was one of the few chiefs Cetshwayo could trust and betraying him was unthinkable. In the end it was John Dunn who was left exposed. The councillors felt that as the ambassador he misled king regarding the true intentions of the British Empire. This division threatened Dunn and his interests in Zululand and there were even suggestions to put him to death. In order to protect his interests on 31 December 1878 he defected to the British forces and collaborated with them. His defection gained him the trust of Garnet Wolseley, who was later charged with the post war settlement in Zululand. Due to his contributions during the war. Dunn was the first to become chief and got most land closer to the Natal amongst the thirteen chiefs and was instrumental in the appointment of the other twelve chiefs.

John Laband in The Illustrated Guide to the Anglo-Zulu War divided the war into four phases, namely: the first invasion, regrouping, second invasion, and pacification and withdrawal. The first invasion took place during the period 6-31 January 1879. After suffering losses at iSandlwana the British forces withdrew and waited for reinforcements from the homeland. Regrouping and receiving of the reinforcements was carried out between 1 February and 18 March 1879. Once Lord Chelmsford was happy with his forces he launched a second invasion which lasted from 6 April until 8 July 1879. This invasion culminated with the Battle of Ulundi where the Zulus were defeated. After the victory at Ulundi the British forces started with the exercise of pacifying the area which lasted until 22 September 1879 and was followed by a withdrawal. The strategy of the British Army was to advance on three fronts and converge at Ulundi where they would finish the Zulu Army and capture the King. The British Army had about 18 000 men for deployment while the Zulus were ready to field about 30 000 men.

In his article entitled "Political Power within the Zulu Kingdom and the Coronation Laws" Richard Cope argues that at the death of his father Cetshwayo did not have enough power to claim legitimacy in the Zulu polity. Mpande had allowed for the diffusion of power to local chiefs and izikhulu. In an attempt to anchor and legitimatise himself Cetshwayo had to invite Shepstone to the coronation. Shepstone welcomed the opportunity as he was seeking to have an influence in politics of Zululand. At the coronation Shepstone read some rules which were to be followed in Zululand. These laws were perceived by Cetshwayo to be directed to the chiefs and izikhulu. but Cetshwayo was later accused by Frere of violating the same rules and consequently, his kingdom invaded. Mpande left Cetshwayo as an heir apparent but lacking in relative power and legitimacy. This led him to seek legitimacy using Shepstone who abused the opportunity for his own ends.

Donald Morris in The Washing of the Spears argues that after the defeat of the Zulus Wolseley deliberately appointed those chiefs who either had subservient attitude towards British or showed hostility to the Zulu royal house. Some of the appointees, like Hlubi kaMotha and John Dunn, were compensated for their services during the war. The combination of these appointments laid a foundation for future disturbances and further destruction of the Zulu kingdom. Cetshwayo was arrested late in 1879 and incarcerated in Cape Town before until 1882. In July 1882 the Zulu king arrived in England for a meeting with Queen Victoria who allowed for him to return to his throne at once. The ship carrying the Zulu king and his entourage docked at Port Dunford, in Zululand. and there were no Zulus to meet him. He was taken by Shepstone and the Dragoon guards to his new place at Mthonjaneni. Later he built his new kraal at Ulundi and settled in his devastated kingdom. A civil war ensued after his settlement and culminated in his death on the 8th of February 1884. Even after the death of Cetshwayo Zululand remained in turmoil and more Zulus continued to die while Britain refused to take any responsibility for the territory beyond Tugela River.

David Chunter argues in 'The Making of Defence Policy' (hat von Clausewitz's statement that "*war is merely the continuation of policy by other means*" is often misunderstood. Firstly, the English language interprets policy as deciding and implementing. Policy in von Clausewitz should be understood as the intentions of the state. Secondly, von Clausewitz's Art of War was written at the time when states were still in the habit of waging wars to further their foreign policy goals. The correct interpretation should be the use of military force is always applied with a wider political object in view. The achievement of the political object requires coordination between the grand strategy and operational level. The politicians are in control of the grand strategy level while the military commanders are charged with the application of military force on the ground. The main contention is measures that need to be applied in pursuit of political objects and the nature of political objects.

1.6 Theoretical Framework

Theory is a set of fundamental truths that assist the researcher in investigating a phenomenon. This study is about imperialism and war between a European power and a native kingdom. Pollins and Murrin, on the other hand strongly argued for a combined use of the Long Waves Cycles and the Leadership Cycles in order to explain imperialism and war amongst nations. Johan Galtung developed a structural theory of imperialism to expound centre-periphery relationships in an imperial setting.

1.6.1 Long Waves and Leadership Cycle Theories

In "Where Hobbes Meets Hobson: Core Conflict and Colonialism. 1495-1985" Pollins and Murrin argue for the combined use of Goldstein's Long Waves and Models & Thompson's Leadership Cycles analysis as a single theoretical framework to explain imperial wars. They further argued that patterns in wars involving super powers are best analysed over long periods and the dynamics of colonial activity is also better understood when viewed over a

longer period of time. The Long Wave and Leadership Cycle theories are used to analyse these phenomena and are the best tools for long term activities and they both apply the Kondratieffs wave\

Long Waves Cycle is about connecting long term global patterns of growth and decline in production, consumption and distribution⁶. The long wave theory postulates that it is the economic fluctuations in the global economy that influence nations in a manner that cause conflict, imperialist expansion, alliance formations and rivalry. The economic expansion is generated by commerce and production of new technology based products and services that appear in the global market every fifty years. The new technologies cause the innovating country to be a leader in the production of goods and services based on such technologies. Goldstein argues that it is the global economic growth, in the form of production and prices, that fuels the need for the nations look outside their own confines for new markets for raw materials and finished goods⁷.

Leadership Cycle includes "*processes connected to recurring concentration and deconcentration of power in the hands of a single dominant state*"*. Modelski and Thompson state that it takes a century for a hegemon to rise and fall. This century is made up of two equal periods of innovation driven growth. The first fifty years consist of a period preceding a systemic war fuelled by innovation driven K-waves, from which one winner emerge as a hegemon. The second fifty years is a peaceful period, where innovation driven K-waves energises the hegemon into consolidating and shaping the new world order'. After hundred years other players catch up with the hegemon and the process of reshaping the

⁵ Brian Pollins. & Kevin Murrin. Where Hobbes Meets Hobson. "Core Conflict and Colonialism". 1495 - 1985. International Studies Quarterly. 43. 1999. pp. 427-429.

⁶Ibid, p 429.

⁷Ibid. p. 431.

"Ibid. p. 429.

"Ibid. p. 432.

world order takes place. At the end of this process a new world order with a new hegemon or hegemonic alliance would emerge.

1.6.2 Structural Theory of Imperialism

According to Johan Galtung the world consist of centre and periphery nations due to difference in living conditions. The inequalities exist within each nation causing a centre and a periphery. Imperialism as a foreign policy seeks to exploit the existence of the centres and peripheries amongst nations. A centre nation has some form of an advantage over the periphery nation and uses this advantage to dominate relations with periphery nations. A bridgehead is established by the centre nation in the centre of the periphery nation. There is a disharmony of interests between the centre and the periphery in the periphery nation which facilitate the functioning of the bridgehead. The centre of the centre nation is able to extract resources from the periphery nation for their own benefit^{1"}.

Imperialism mainly benefits the centre in the centre nation. There is a need to maintain the status quo in the relations in order to continue with the exploitation of the resources in the periphery nation. The principles of vertical and feudal interactions are used in maintaining the dominance in the relations. Vertical interaction ensures that resources are extracted on terms favourable to the centre nation and create a gap in living conditions between the two nations. Feudal interactions ensure that relations between the countries are dominated by the centre nation to maintain the inequality that is caused by vertical interactions. According to this theory imperialism can be defined as a dominant type of relationship between a centre and a periphery nation dominated by the centre nation for the purpose of exploiting benefits for the centre using vertical and feudal interactions".

Accordingly, the study was used to test the compatibility of the two theories using data of major wars over the period 1495-1992. The findings confirmed that wars were more

¹"Johan Gallung."A Structural Theory of Imperialism". Journal of Peace Research. Vol 8. No 2. 1971. p 81.

²Ibid, pp 81-83.

prevalent during the time economic growth that during stagnation. Colonial expansion was also found to correlate with the phases of the two theories independently of each other¹².

The combination of Long Wave and Leadership Cycles is useful in explaining the conflict in the imperial setting. Galtung's theory is about subordinating a periphery nation under a centre nation's economic and political interests. Britain colonial office was of the view that a cohesive Zulu state was threatening the realisation of a confederation of Southern Africa states. The war was therefore a British attempt to make the Zulu state more useful to the realisation of the ideal. The structural theory of imperialism would more useful in the analysis of the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 and study will rely more on it than the combination of the Long Waves and Leadership Cycles theories.

1.7 Justification

As from mid-1870's Britain was experiencing economic depression while South Africa was booming due to the discovery of diamonds. Emerging European powers like Germany were looking for colonial assets in Africa. These developments partly inspired the ideal of a capitalist South African dominion in a form of a confederation. Lord Carnarvon was the lead instigator of this ideal but resigned the post of Secretary of State for Colonies in 1878. Hicks-Beach, who replaced Carnarvon, relied heavily on Sir Bartle for further direction on the realisation of the confederation. The existence of native kingdoms, especially the Zulu, and the Boers were viewed by the proponents of the confederation ideal as a perennial impediment. Britons and Zulus interacted peacefully with minimal confrontation during the period 1824-1878. The ideal of a confederation does not sufficiently explain the sudden deterioration of Anglo-Zulu relations. Available literature identifies the ideal for a confederation and the personality of Bartle Frere as the main cause of the Anglo-Zulu War. These factors are enough in the explanation of deteriorating relations between the two parties.

¹² Ibid, pp 446-448.

There is a need to investigate factors that caused the British Army to attack a native army that had lived peacefully for half a decade. There is a further need to investigate reasons that led Britain to refuse the annexation of Zululand after gaining a clear victory. There is a need to understand why after the victory Britain refused to claim the prize which was supposed to be the main purpose for the invasion.

1.8 Methodology

Foreign policy and history fall within social sciences. Traditionally, in social sciences secondary data is acceptable as a source for scholarly works. This thesis is based on published works available at various resource facilities. Journals kept by soldiers and officials at the time will be used as primary sources for the study.

Sources including books, journals, articles and internet publications were critically analysed. The materials were collected from NDC Library, University of Nairobi Library, SA Parliamentary Library and Internet. The data used to test the hypothesis was based on qualitative and comparative case studies, historical data, and scholarly arguments. The period in which the events occurred made it difficult to do sampling and administration of a questionnaire. The study is based exclusively on secondary data.

1.9 Outline of Chapters

The thesis will be presented in four chapters. Chapter 2 will discuss the dynamics of the Anglo-Zulu relations over the period 1824-1840 when Shaka and Dingane were the kings of the Zulus respectively. In Chapter 3 the relations during the reign of Mpande over the period 1840-1872 will be discussed. The relations and the war during the reign of Cetshwayo 1873-1884 will be covered in Chapter 4. Conclusion on leadership and war will be discussed in the last chapter.

CHAPTER TWO

ANGLO-ZULU RELATIONS OVER THE PERIOD 1824-1840

2.1 Introduction

The area of Natal generally stretched from Pongola in the north to Mzimvubu River. The Indian Ocean was the natural eastern boundary while the Drakensberg formed a western boundary. In 1820's Shaka was the absolute ruler of the entire area with his headquarters at kwaBulawayo about 190 km north of Port Natal. Shaka as an active warrior king was able to cover the whole area, but in his last days he was not able to dominate the entire area. He gave the southernmost part of the area to Francis Farewell and his group. Later Zulu kings, particularly Dingane and Mpande used the Tugela and Buffalo Rivers as the boundary between Natal and Zululand. This was contained in the agreement between Dingane and Piet Relief in 1838 as well as the one signed in 1845 between Mpande and Cloete.¹¹

The British Empire took over Cape Town from the Batavian Empire in 1806 after defeating the French Navy. The main purpose for the settlement of the British was to ensure a safe passage of the British fleet to and from India. The Cape was also useful as a refreshment station for the British fleet, as it was established for the same purpose by the Dutch. There was no immediate intention to expand further into South Africa for the fear of escalating costs for the Empire. As a matter of principle any further expansion into South Africa was authorised on condition it was not going to add costs to the British treasury.¹⁴

Portuguese explorer Vasco Da Gama arrived in the area on 25 December 1497, and gave the name of Natal. The Zulus were not a maritime society and relied on stock farming. They did not see any importance in Port Natal, therefore was easier for the settlers to occupy the port without disturbance.

2.2 Anglo-Zulu Relations during the Period 1824-1828

Francis Farewell and his team were the first Europeans who came to the port with an intention to settle for a long period. Shaka, the Zulu Monarch at the time, was a dominant personality who effectively controlled the territory between Pongola and Mzimvubu Rivers.

¹¹ Kevin Shillington. History of Southern Africa. (Essex: Longman Group. 1987). pp. 63-65.

¹⁴ Ibid. pp. 64-65.

As a result he was able to dominate the relations between the Zulus and the white settlers. The Anglo-Zulu relations during this period were largely mutually beneficial for both parties.

2.2.1 The Cape Colony and the Zulu Kingdom

King Shaka kaSenzangakhona is credited with the rise of the Zulus nation. He took over the Zulu chieftaincy after the death of his father in 1816 when he was about 29 years old. On this occasion Dingiswayo, a chief of the Mthethwa tribe, sponsored him with part of the iziChwe regiment. This regiment was used as a foundation for the Zulu army. The new army was equipped with short stabbing spears and large shields while most armies were still using throwing spears and small shields. The Zulu warriors possessed increased mobility because they were not using the ox-hide sandals used by most warriors in the region. Shaka enlarged his kingdom by conquering and annexing other clans. Furthermore, after Dingiswayo's death he also incorporated the Mthethwa clan into his new kingdom and became the most powerful king in the Southern Africa region. By 1817 the Zulu nation had expanded to an extent that there were about 2000 combat ready warriors and the area had increased four-fold¹⁵.

Britain occupied the Cape colony in 1806 without intention to expand further into Africa. This was due to the fact that costs of running a colony were perceived as very high. The Dutch had run the colony for more than 150 years with a close knit group of Dutch speaking settlers known as the burghers. The remaining settlers, who referred to themselves as Boers (*farmer*), had less regard for the British colonial administrators. They were not getting along with the new British settlers due to divergent culture, language and values. The Boers were already venturing into the eastern frontier for more fertile lands¹⁶.

In 1689 the Dutch colonialists attempted to buy territory in the vicinity of Port Natal without success. Simon van der Stel who was the Governor of the Cape at the time, heard about the port from the survivors of a ship who had explored the surroundings of littoral and collected some ivory before they were rescued. On arrival in Cape Town they spoke of the potential of the area and the governor wanted to acquire the place for the Dutch Empire.

Donald Morris.. The Washing of the Spears: The Rise and Fall of the Zulu Nation Under Shaka and its Fall in the Zulu War of 1879 (New York: Simon and Schuster. 1965). pp. 49-54.

¹⁶"Knight. I. Zulu Rising: The Epic Story of Isandlwana and Rorke's Drift. (London: Pan McMillan. 2010). p. 47.

Captain Timmerman was sent to purchase the area from those who owned it. In October 1689 Captain Timmerman arrived at Port Natal found chief Inyangesa whom he gave trade-goods worth one thousand guilder in exchange for the territory around Port Natal. The chief was made to sign a deed for the transaction. The proof of purchase did not make it to the Cape because Captain Timmerman was shipwrecked before arriving at his destination. Only four of his eighteen member crew made it to the Cape. The governor was more infuriated by the loss of the document than the loss of 14 crew members' .

The end of the Napoleonic Wars resulted in the Royal Navy scaling down and laying off a number of young officers. Many of these officers found employment in the shipping industry due to their maritime exposure. Francis Farewell was one of the officers who were laid off in 1815. He was thereafter employed as a commander of merchant ships travelling between India and South America until 1822. Thereafter he decided to seek better opportunities in Cape Town. He heard stories of a kingdom ruled by a powerful king in the vicinity of Port Natal and with a potential for trading activities. In 1823 Farewell chartered a brig named Salisbury, with James King as the commander for the purpose of surveying the south-eastern coast of South Africa to Delagoa Bay for trading opportunities. On their way from Delagoa Bay bad weather forced them to dock at the port of Natal. This gave Farewell and King an opportunity to survey the port. The area in the vicinity of the port was named Salisbury Island during this occasion. After the weather had cleared, the expedition set sail for Cape Town where they arrived safely in December 1823. In Cape Town Farewell started preparations for a bigger expedition to make contact with the ruler of the Port Natal and establish trading links. During the trip Jakot Msimbithi, a Xhosa ex-convict employed as an interpreter, escaped and disappeared into the hinterland while the crew was exploring the area of St Lucia¹⁸.

Lord Charles Somerset, governor of the Cape, was opposed to the idea of exploring further than the Cape territory because the Empire did not have enough financial resources to manage additional territories¹⁹. On 1 May 1824 Francis Farewell approached the governor for the permission to explore Port Natal mindful of the current colonial policy. Somerset took five days to grant him permission on condition that the new territory would not be financed from the colonial coffers. In other words. Farewell's exploration and settlement at

¹⁸ ibid, p. 69.

¹⁹Ibid. p. 71.

"Knight. Zulu Rising, p. 47.

Port Natal was an enterprise approved by the British Empire but carried out at own risk and expense²⁰.

2.2.2 The First Settlers and their Relations with Shaka

In preparing for the Natal expedition Farewell bought himself a sloop named Julia and chartered a brig named Antelope. He was also able to convince a group of thirty-three people to join him on the expedition. The group included twenty Boer farmers looking for new land, ten Englishmen out for adventure and trade, and three Hottentot servants named Michael, John and Rachel. The Julia, under the leadership of Henry Fynn was the first to leave Cape Town in April 1824 and arrived in Port Natal at end of the month. The expedition was not approved by Somerset and Farewell remained behind with the Antelope to finalise the authority to settle in the new territory, which was granted in May. The Antelope arrived in Port Natal in July about six weeks after the Julia, with the Farewell and the rest of the group and the chartered brig returned to Cape Town soon after completing its business. The Julia stayed at the port until it was required to ferry nine Boers back to Cape Town in September. On 11 December more Boers wanted to return to Cape Town because they had concluded that the area was not suitable for farming. The Julia was once again used to transport this group of people but sank before reaching Cape Town and lost all on board. The settlers in Port Natal were left without any form of sea transport and Farewell, who owned the Julia, went bankrupt²¹.

Before the arrival of Farewell, Fynn had already made contact with a small clan of amaThuli in the vicinity of the port and his attempted to meet Shaka were unsuccessfully. On Fynn's attempt to meet the Zulu king he was given ivory and forty heads of cattle and sent back to the port. After the arrival of Farewell the settlers were able to make contact with the king of the Zulus. The new settlers were invited to kwaBulawayo, Shaka's headquarters, for a July meeting. KwaBulawayo was about 200 km away from Port Natal. The delegation was led by Farewell and Fynn and included Captain Davis, Peterson, Henry Ogle, Joseph Powell, Zinke and two male Hottentots. The group used horses for transport and Shaka provided an escort of about one hundred men.²²

²⁰ Moms-The Washing of the Spears, p. 69.

²¹ Ibid. pp. 75-77.

²² Ibid. pp. 76-77.

Henry Fynn was appointed co-leader of the party because of his education, youth and a sketchy understanding of the local dialect. He was twenty-one years old, worked as a medical assistant in England and could muster some Xhosa dialect. He was used to take notes during meetings with Shaka because he was also a good listener. The group collectively encouraged Fynn to embellish the reports such that Shaka was viewed as a cruci savage. This would arouse some sympathy from the colonial government and support for their cause. The support of the colonial government would give the group access to government resources, including military and finances²³.

On arrival at kwaBulawayo the chief escort made the settlers to wait under a tree while he reported their arrival to the king. Before being lead into the cattle pen they were required to gallop around the kraal several times. When they finally met Shaka they discovered that he had an interpreter named Jakot Msimbithi, who was the same Farewell's interpreter who escaped the previous year at St Lucia. Inside the cattle pen the visitors were entertained for the entire day. Before retiring to sleep on their first day they fired a gun salute as part of their tradition and this unsettled the Zulus and their king for a moment⁴.

During the remainder of the two weeks stay Farewell's group interacted and discussed general matters with the Zulu king. During the discussions the settlers were not content with Jakot's English and Fynn was asked to take over the interpreting. The group had a lot to gain by marginalising Jakot due to their past confrontation with the man. He was an ex-Robben Island convict, escaped from them in St Lucia the previous year and was able to meet Shaka before them. They were further not sure what he had told Shaka before their arrival and wanted to impress the king on their own. It is therefore possible that Jakot was purposefully marginalised by Fynn for other motives than language incompetence. ^

Upon hearing that the visitors had their own king named George; Shaka developed a sudden brotherly interest. He was of the opinion that King George was the king of all white people while he was the king of all black people. He was further impressed by the firearms display but still believed that his warriors would defeat the British because they took too long to reload the muskets²⁶. At the end of the settlers' stay gifts were exchanged. On the first visit Farewell wanted to impress Shaka in order to achieve his ultimate objective of

²³'Knight. Zulu Rising, p. 49.

²⁴Morris. The Washing of the Spears, p. 79.

²⁵Ibid. pp. 80-81.

²⁶Ibid. pp. 80-84.

establishing a viable hading post. While in Cape Town he took time to select gifts that could meet the King's approval. The gifts included, woollen blankets, a quantity of brass and copper, pigeons, dogs, a pig and a full-dress military coat decorated with a gold lace. Shaka was satisfied with the gifts and in return he gave Farewell some ivory and allowed him to return to Port Natal. Shaka was impressed by Fynn's language ability and demanded that he stay behind for a few days while the rest departed².

On the second visit Farewell was assured of the king's character and he set out to exploit it. This visit occurred on the first week of August because Fynn, who remained at kwaBulawayo, requested Farewell to bring him some medication. Farewell used this opportunity to get Shaka to cede a portion of land to him. To this end he had prepared a deed grant which gave about 5 600 km² of land to him on behalf of the British Empire without any obligation to pay for it. On 7 August 1824 Farewell presented the deed grant to Shaka for signature. Shaka had no problem appending his signature on the document he could not read. A few of indunas signed the document as witnesses as well. Farewell allocated himself land that he did not know and Shaka had no intention of parting with his land. The transaction indicated the level of greed on Farewell's part and ignorance on the part of the Zulu King³.

Armed with the title deed from the Zulu king Farewell declared the Port Natal area a British territory by flying the Union Jack on 27 August 1824. The document was sent to the Cape Governor in September but the governor did not view the document as important and he consequently did nothing about it. The settlement was established by building a fort and some mud and daub houses. Farewell and Cane ventured into the interior while Fynn and some retainers took a trip to the south to meet amaMpondo. While Farewell and Fynn were away, Lord Somerset sent a party aboard the York to find out what Farewell and his party were doing in Natal. They found amaThuli retainers and assumed that the group needed to be rescued. The party returned to Cape Town and reported that the settlers were in distress and needed rescue. However, the colonial government did not send any rescue mission. Later, James King arrived to join his old friend Farewell²⁹.

The settlement at the port began to gain some significance and the settlers increased. The natives who were found in the vicinity of the port, amaThuli, were supplying the most needed menial labour. There were also nearly a hundred of the natives travelling with

²⁷ R.J. Gardsen. "Biography of Francis Farewell". Natalia. 4. 1974. p. II.

²⁸ Morris..The Washing of the Spears, pp. 81-82.

²⁹ Ibid. pp. 82-83.

Farewell and Fynn on their expeditions inland and southwards. On 1 October James King arrived with Nathaniel Isaacs, Hatton and seven sailors aboard the brig named the Mary. On landing at the port, the brig suffered serious damage that rendered it unseaworthy. Farewell and Fynn were still away on their expeditions when James King arrived at the port^W.

The new arrivals had to be introduced to Shaka as a matter of protocol. Farewell returned a week after the arrival of King and a week later they set out on a trip to kwaBulawayo. They were accompanied by two sailors and forty natives. Shaka asked Farewell and his group to accompany him on an elephant hunt. During the hunt one of the sailors shot down an elephant to Shaka's amazement. This feat earned the settlers 107 head of cattle. The group returned to Port Natal on 11 November 1825 content with their visit as a great success¹¹.

Towards the end of 1825 the relations and interaction between Shaka and the settlers became more regular. By 1826 the settlers were able to visit Shaka often and in different groupings. The settlers had also developed a habit of visiting Shaka whenever they were out of provisions and traded anything with him for cattle and ivory. Farewell had established a cache along uMngeni River where he stored his stocks of ivory. Shaka was also able to summon them to the headquarters whenever a need arose. On one occasion Fynn accompanied Shaka to a battle against Sikhunyana, a Ndwandwe chief, north of Pongola River. During this battle Fynn participated actively and the Zulus were able to defeat the Ndwandwes and returned with 60 000 head of cattle. It is clear that the relationship between Shaka and the settlers had matured¹².

2.2.3 The Last Days of Shaka's Rule

Towards the end of 1826 Shaka took more interest on the southern part of his kingdom. This was shown by the moving of his homestead to kwaDukuza in November 1826. The new headquarters was about 24 km south of Tugela River and 80 km north of Port Natal. The reason for this move was never given but it is clear that it was informed by the victory over the Ndwandwes in the north. Shaka had posted an informer closer to Port Natal in 1825 to keep an eye on the settlers' activities. He wanted to get closer to the settlers and expand his

^WIbid. p. 83.

¹¹Ibid. pp. 83-86.

¹²Ibid. p. 91.

kingdom southwards. It is not clear whether he viewed the settlers as friends or enemies. By default or design the move brought Shaka and the settlers closer".

By 1827 the settlers were more familiar with the territory, fluent in local dialect and more confident about their relationship with the Zulu king. On one occasion Isaacs and Fynn are reported to have planted the Union Jack at the mouth of Mlalazi River, more than 150 km north of Port Natal. This was an act of declaring the area a British territory, although it was never pronounced as such. This was rather an indication of the extent of the settlers' familiarity with the territory. Shaka also wanted to benefit from the relationship and sometimes viewed the settlers as his subjects. The settlers, on their part, never objected to this arrangement as long as it was furthering their interests⁴.

In some cases Shaka used the settlers as his own soldiers and they gladly obliged. On one occasion Isaacs, Cane and some retainers were ordered by Shaka to join him on a campaign against Bheje of the Khumalo clan at eNgome. The presence of the settlers added firepower to augment the impi's spears. The campaign was in a rocky and mountainous terrain and the presence of firearms made it easier and quicker to defeat the Khumalos. On surrender the Khumalos gave ten young maidens as spoils of war amongst other things. The maidens were shared amongst the settlers who participated in the campaign. During this campaign Isaacs suffered serious injuries, including a back wound. He was carried to kwaDukuza where he remained for recuperation and returned to the port in mid-April 1827".

At the port the settlers were running short of various supplies, including medicines and parts to construct a vessel. Short of sea transport they were forced to send a fifteen year old boy, John Ross, on 970 km round trip to Delagoa Bay over land. Shaka provided an escort under the leadership of Langalibalele. The trip took about three weeks and the group returned with all that was required. John Ross spent only two dollars, because a slave trader at Delagoa Bay felt sorry for him and provided everything for free. It was when the slave trader developed some designs on John Ross's Zulu escorts, possibly for slave trade purposes, that he decided to return immediately. The supplies from Delagoa Bay helped stabilise life at the port and the work on the new craft continued expeditiously⁶.

⁴ibid. p. 92.

⁵Ibid. pp. 92-94.

⁶ibid. p. 93.

*Ibid. p. 95.

The moving of the Headquarters to kwaDukuza increased Shaka's opportunities to expand his territory southwards and developed stronger relations with King George of the British. On 24 July 1827 he summoned King to kwaDukuza and suggested to him that a diplomatic mission be sent to King George. He argued that this would formalise the relations between the Zulus and the Britons. Although the idea took James King by surprise he agreed and proceeded with the preparations. While the preparations for the mission were in progress Nandi, Shaka's mother, fell ill and died on 10 October 1827. A long time was needed for the mourning of this death and James King used this time to better prepare for the diplomatic mission, especially have the vessel ready⁷.

The mourning of Nandi's death took the rest of 1827 and the first months of 1828, thereby giving the settlers enough time to have the craft ready for sailing. In March 1828 the brig was ready and it was named the Elizabeth and Susan, after Farewell's wife and King's mother respectively. On 30 April the Elizabeth and Susan sailed for Algoa Bay with Shaka's diplomatic mission aboard, amongst other passengers. The delegation was led by Sotobe and Mbozamboza. James King carried a document that represented a treaty which he took liberty of drafting himself. It was signed Shaka, witnessed by Jakot Msimbithi and Nathaniel Isaacs. The document further gave King the same rights to the area that was previously given to Farewell and enjoined King to return to Shaka and give post trip feedback. As a surety to ensure the expedition would return. Shaka ordered Fynn to remain at kwaDukuza as a hostage until James King return from the diplomatic mission⁸.

The departure of the delegation gave Shaka an opportunity to explore the territory south of his kingdom and expand his territory south wards. Less than a month after the departure of the diplomatic mission Shaka ordered Fynn, Ogle and the natives from the port to join him and a force of 20 000 warriors for an expedition to the south. This force set out to attack amaMpondo and abaThembu tribes. The news of the Zulu army advance got to Grahams Town, where a British force was based, and caused the deployment of a British force under Major Dundas' command. By the time this force arrived at Mthatha the Zulu impi had already attacked and retreated back to Zululand. The British ended up attacking another force of Bantu's assuming it was the Zulus, which were in fact Matiwane's people

⁷Ibid. p. 97.

⁸Ibid. pp. 99-100.

who were on the run. Shaka and his army were already in kwaDukuza waiting for the diplomatic mission to return from King George³⁹.

On the diplomatic mission Sotobe and Mbozamboza were expecting to see King George in person. They could only go as far as Port Elizabeth where they remained until August. The delegation was kept in Algoa Bay for three months due to the Zulu attacks on amaMpondo and abaThembu. The commander of the British forces in Port Elizabeth, Major Cloete, was well aware of Shaka's expedition while the diplomatic mission had no clue of what transpired after their departure from Port Natal. On 2 August a ship from Cape Town, HMS Helicon, arrived carrying gifts for the Zulu king and the delegation were advised by Major Cloete to return to Zululand as the government did not wish to see them. The refusal to meet with the Zulus was due to the fact that the British were under impression that they were at war with the Zulus. They were not aware that the group of people they were attacking in the Eastern Cape were Maliwane's people⁴⁰.

The delegation had no option but to return to Zululand, give Shaka the report and face any consequences. The ship from Cape Town accompanied the Elizabeth and Mary back to Port Natal and the delegation arrived on 17 August 1828. On arrival at the port the British sailors were informed that the Zulu impi was away on an expedition to the Soshangane in the north. Upon receiving this information the sailors set sail for Cape Town promptly, possibly to report the status of the Zulu impi to the authorities who were under impression they were fighting it in the Eastern Cape. On 24 August Isaacs, Cane, Sotobe and Jakot set out to deliver the report of their journey to the Zulu king. On arrival Sotobe was first to give his report and Isaacs was the last to do so. Shaka was disappointed with the outcome of the mission, but he was more disappointed that Isaacs forgot to bring the Rowland's Macassar Oil he promised. It was for the latter reason that Shaka announced that a second mission under the leadership of John Cane would be sent. Cane protested that he had nothing to wear and Shaka gave him a Zulu cloak and sent him back to start preparations for the trip".

At the settlement James King died after a short illness on 9 September 1828. This placed Isaacs at the head of the settlement. Shaka also appointed him as the spokesperson for the colony and Farewell who saw himself as the founder of the port did not like this turn of events. Cane, Farewell and Isaacs visited kwaDukuza to finalise the details of the next

³⁹Ibid. pp. 101.

⁴⁰Ibid. p. 103.

⁴¹Ibid. p. 104.

diplomatic mission and Isaacs used the opportunity to get Shaka to sign a document ceding land that was previously signed over to James King. Farewell did not approve of this since the land was ceded to him first, but Shaka gladly signed the land deed since Isaacs was the representative of the colony. On 18 September 1828 the settlers returned to Port Natal and John Cane started the preparations for the second mission⁴².

Shaka's behaviour after the death of his mother was a cause for concern to the royal family and the Zulu population at large. Amongst the concerned royal family members was Mkabayi, kaJama, his paternal aunt, Dingane and Mhlangana (both half-brothers to Shaka). These royal family members were able to enlist Mbopha kaSithayi, Shaka's manservant, in a plot to kill the Zulu King. The two half-brothers feigned illness and stayed behind when a force went on Soshangane expedition near Delagoa Bay. This situation favoured the assassination plot because there was practically no troops or influential generals in the headquarters. It was planned that by the time the warriors return there should be a new king and the returning generals would have less to say because the new king would have consolidated his position. On 22 September 1828 Shaka was assassinated by his two half-brothers and his manservant while attending to emissaries from amaMpondo chief. The news of Shaka's death were received at Port Natal on 24 September 1828 and the by implication the impending diplomatic mission was grounded. Dingane was the eldest surviving male child of Senzangakhona and next on the throne, but could not rule comfortably while Mhlangana was still alive. He sent Mbopha to kill Mhlangana and thereafter became the undisputed king of the Zulus⁴³.

2.3 Anglo-Zulu Relations under Dingane 1828-1840

This period was marked by turbulent relations between Dingane and the combination of settlers and the Boers. The arrival of the Boers under the leadership of Piet Retief changed the political dynamics of the Natal/Zululand drastically. Dingane tried his best to prevent the Boers from settling in the area without success. The situation for Dingane was made worse by the defection of his half-brother, Mpande, to the Boers across Thukela River. This culminated in a battle where Dingane was defeated, dethroned and killed. At the end of the period the Boers were dominating the affairs south of Thukela River while the Zulus under Mpande were restricted to the north of the same river.

⁴²Ibid. p. 105.

⁴³Ibid. pp. 105-109.

2.3.1 Dingane Becomes the King of the Zulus

Once Dingane was on the throne he needed to consolidate his position before the warriors returned from the expedition and confirm his relations with the Port Natal settlers. The two months absence of the generals and soldiers made it easier to consolidate. The minor resistance that came from the pockets of Shaka's supporters was quelled with ease. A messenger was sent to Port Natal to explain the change of power and confirmed the new king's personal friendship with the settlers. The settlers were not convinced of Dingane's personal friendship and they feared civil war would break out and started preparing for departure. On 1 December 1828 a small group of settlers consisting of Farewell, Isaacs, Hatton and John Ross departed for Cape Town aboard the Elizabeth and Susan. However, Isaacs was unable to stay away from Port Natal permanently, on 30 March 1830 he was back in Natal⁴⁴.

The relations between settlers and Dingane were actually non-existent until the return of Isaacs. During Isaacs' absence, new members joined the settler community but their activities were concentrated in the south away from Dingane. Notable amongst the new arrivals at the port was the Fynn family, which included Henry Fynn's father and three brothers. Henry Fynn had founded a clan of his own and called it iziNkumbi and it consisted of members of Fynn family and some thousands of native retainers. Dingane kept himself busy with operations in the north and moved his headquarters, named uMgungundlovu, 240 km north of Port Natal to facilitate this purpose.⁴⁵

After two years of avoiding Dingane the settlers found the courage to visit the king at his new headquarters. The delegation consisted of Isaacs and some members of the Fynn family. The discussions were cordial and the prospects for trade were encouraging to the settlers. During the discussions Dingane argued that James King's cattle should have reverted back to the royal herd after his death because they were a gift from the late king. Henry Fynn was further offered the position of a king for the Natal upon which he promised to consider⁴⁶.

⁴⁴ Ibid. pp. 111-113.

⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 113.

⁴⁶ Ibid. p. 115.

The prospects of trade and the life of Port Natal are some of the factors that caused Isaacs to return to the port. He entered into a partnership with the Fynns and started the trading activities. On his return he had brought about twenty muskets from Cape Town. He gave some of these firearms to Dingane and used the remainder to arm a small group of retainers for the security of his trading activities. Together with Fynn they ventured into the interior in search of ivory. They came across the Bushmen using poisoned arrows to shoot elephants. The two traders established relations with the Bushmen and they promised never to deal with other traders except Isaacs and Fynn⁴⁷.

Dingane liked Shaka's idea of establishing diplomatic relations with the British king. He sent his own two-man delegation consisting of Cane, as an emissary and Jakot as an interpreter. Cane decided to go straight to Grahams Town instead of Cape Town, where he sold the elephant tusks and used some of the proceeds to buy gifts for Dingane. The delegation reported the request for diplomatic relations and submitted the document in that regard but returned before receiving a response. On 10 March 1831 the delegation arrived at Port Natal. Instead of reporting back to Dingane, Cane decided it was important to continue with repairs on his house. He tasked Jakot to go alone and submit the delegation's report at umGungundlovu. In his report to Dingane, Jakot blamed everything that went wrong on the trip to Cane. He reported that there was a force of white men on their way to invade Zululand and the British had no king named George⁴⁸.

Jakot's report was loaded against Cane in order to cause animosity between him and Dingane. As a result, Dingane sent an impi on 18 April to destroy Cane and his household. Cane's kraal was burned down but he was able to escape. Other settlers felt threatened and abandoned the settlement. Dingane had to send a messenger to explain that his anger was only directed at Cane and that the rest of them were safe. Fynn took it upon himself to save the situation and visited Dingane to clarify matters. On this visit Fynn carried the largest load of gifts ever carried to the Zulu king at the time. An entourage of 80 porters was used to carry the gifts. Eleven muskets were included in the gifts. During the discussions Fynn was able to refute Jakot's report about Cane and set the record straight as far as he could⁴⁹.

In 1831 the level of trust between Dingane and the settlers was at its lowest ebb. As Fynn and his party were returning to the port, a chieftain warned him that Dingane was about

⁴⁷ Ibid. pp. 117-118.

⁴⁸ibid. p. 119.

⁴⁹ Ibid

to send an impi to attack the settlers at the port. The settlers reacted to this warning by leaving the port to seek refuge elsewhere until they were certain of Dingane's intentions. Sotobe, who was placed by Shaka closer to the port to keep an eye on the settler's activities, saw these movements and concluded that the settlers were escaping with the royal herds and reported to Dingane. Accordingly, Dingane argued that all cattle given to the settlers by Shaka had to be returned, especially on death of the recipients. On receiving the report regarding the settler migration, the Dingane sent an impi to collect the cattle and the settlers barely escaped with their lives. Fynn lost his infant son in the process. After this attack, Nathaniel Isaacs felt he could no longer live at the port and he boarded the St Michael on 24 June 1831 never to return to Port Natal⁵⁰"

Jakot had told Dingane that a British force was on its way to invade Zululand, but months went past without the arrival of force. Dingane began to doubt Jakot's story and sent a messenger to tell the settlers to return to the port. Dingane must have missed something about the settlers; otherwise he had nothing to gain from the return of the settlers to the port. John Cane gathered enough courage and visited Dingane at the beginning of 1832 to clarify the situation. On hearing Cane's side of the story he tasked him to kill Jakot immediately. Cane tasked Ogle to execute the order and Jakot was tracked down and shot dead. The settlers returned to their port settlement but were hesitant to erect permanent structures due to safety considerations. It was not encouraging to improve the structures at the settlement because it was feared Dingane could attack at any time⁵¹.

2.3.2 The Arrival of Boers in Natal

James King, Francis Farewell, Nathaniel Isaacs and John Cane used to circulate stories about Natal where ever they travelled. This was to arouse interest from merchants, farmers and hunters to come and settle in the area. In 1832 a group of visitors including William Berg arrived in Natal to assess farming opportunities. William Berg, the first true Boer farmer to visit the area, was impressed about the potential of the area and reported positively on his return to Cape Town. He enticed many farmers, even at Grahams Town. Between 1833 and 1834 new settlers arrived at the port. The area also attracted Portuguese from Delagoa Bay and whalers from America. The new traders were more generous in their trading with locals and the settlers began to lose business. As a result some of the settlers left the port for

⁵⁰Ibid. p. 120.

⁵¹ ibid

government employment. Amongst those who took up government employment was Henry Fynn who was employed by the Cape government as an interpreter

Amongst the arrivals was Rev Allen Gardiner, a missionary who arrived on 29 December 1834. On 23 June 1835 he coordinated the establishment of the settlement in Port Natal into an organised township. The erection of kraals was banned and a proper street plan was implemented. The new township was christened Durban in the honour of Sir Benjamin D'Urban Smith who was the governor of the Cape".

Reverend Gardiner wanted to see peace prevailing between the Zulus and the British settlers. He signed a peace treaty with Dingane whereby no Zulus were supposed to cross into Natal and Gardiner was made a chieftain of the settlers. The treaty was taken to Cape-Town where it was submitted to the Governor who did not consider it important. On 20 February 1836, he decided to travel to England and present his case to the House of Commons, where he presented the conduct of the settlers towards natives in bad light. The presentation resulted in British settlers being subjected to the Cape of Good Hope Punishment Act which was passed in August the same year. This act was primarily aimed at regulating the Boers who were beginning to gain a reputation for ill-treating natives and practising slavery. Satisfied with his achievement, Gardiner spent the rest of 1836 in England and returned to Durban in May 1837. On his arrival he found that there was a new Reverend Francis Owen and some American missionaries who were reported to be in the vicinity. The township was still without a leader until the arrival of Piet Retief later in the year^J.

William Berg's report produced its first tangible result in 1834 when a group of 21 men and women arrived in Natal on a temporary visit in fourteen wagons. This group was part of various groups commissioned by the Cape Boers to explore farming possibilities north of Orange River. Johannes Lafras Uys was the leader of the party and they settled at uMvoti, an area not far from kwaDukuza. The land south of Tugela River stretching west to Buffalo River belonged to the Zulu kingdom but was lying unoccupied during Uys's visit. Dingane gave the Boer party permission to settle on the land south of Tugela River. A frontier war broke out in Grahams Town and Uys had to depart at a short notice. The visiting party was satisfied that Natal had a potential for farming. A positive report was submitted to the

^I-Ibid. p. 121.

⁵³ Ibid. pp. 132-134.

⁵⁴ Ibid. pp. 135-137.

relevant offices and the Boers started preparations to leave the Cape with Natal as one of their possible destinations".

The arrival of Britons in the Cape in 1806 was not welcomed by the Boers, but they had no say in the matter. A new way of life which included anti-slavery and liberal values, was introduced by the new settlers. The arrival of missionaries intensified the fight for workers' rights, which were barely observed by the Boers. In 1811 one missionary managed to have over twenty Boers arrested and charged with murder and maltreatment. Since the arrival of the Britons, Boers started moving out of Cape Town. By 1835 they were settled in faraway places like Graaff-Reinet and Grahams Town and still looking for more land. The trek was about the Boers getting more land and autonomy for themselves. The Britons were sympathetic to Boers, as fellow Europeans and Christians, but did not approve of their human rights practices which included slavery and ill-treatment of their workers. During this period there was general animosity between the colonial government and Boers, with Boers detesting the colonial laws they were subjected to by the British. Lafras Uys's report came at the right moment for the Boers who were yearning to break away from British rule and venture into the new territories⁵⁶.

The Boers had to choose amongst various areas for settlement. They were already divided into different groups and leadership for this purpose. Two groups under the leadership of Piet Retief and Gerrit Maritz chose to venture into Natal. Piet Reliefs group were travelling in fifty wagons. The group camped on the Drakensberg and Retief took with him a group of fifteen members to visit the port. He arrived at the port on 20 October 1837 and found less than fifty settlers with about 3 000 native retainers. The settlers made an undertaking that they were prepared to cooperate with Retief and his Boers. Since it was important to get Dingane's permission before entering the territory. Retief rushed to uMgungundlovu. As he was used to Cape Natives, he did not bother to find out more about Dingane from the settlers he only asked for an interpreter. He was not aware that the Boers defeat of Mzilikazi's Matebele at Vegkop had already reached Dingane. The Zulus had attacked Matebele unsuccessfully on various occasion since Dingane came to power therefore he was weary of the leader of the group that had succeeded where he failed. He also

⁵⁵ Ibid. pp. 122-123.

"•Ibid. pp. 126-128.

remembered Jakot's story about the invading force. Piet Relief arrived at umGungundlovu on 6 November 1837 and Dingane welcomed him as he did with other European visitors".

2.3.3 Natal-Zululand Relations under Dingane

Dingane was facing a problem of dealing with two groups of Europeans. The British settlers were not posing a serious threat compared to the newcomers. He set out to keep the Durban settlers happy while driving the Boers away. When Piet Relief asked for land he gave him permission to settle on condition he recovered Dingane's cattle that were stolen by the Tlokwa chieftain, Sikonyela. The Boers were able to recover this herd of cattle without a struggle. Piet lured Sikonyela to his camp asked him to try a pair of hand-cuffs and had him under arrest. He ransomed him for 700 cattle, drove 300 to Dingane and auctioned the remainder. This treacherous act (of tricking Sikonyela into custody) confirmed the Zulu king's suspicion that the newcomers cannot be trusted. The cattle were accepted and the Boers were invited to a ceremony at the beginning of 1838⁵⁷.

The next meeting was supposed to be an official hand over of the ceded land to the Piet Retief and his party, but Dingane had another trick planned for them. The Boers arrived at the beginning of February 1838 as arranged the previous year. The first day was spent on ceremonial display by the Boers to the appreciation of the Zulus. The Boer contingent included sixty-nine commandos, Thomas Holstead and some Hottentots. William Wood who was present at umGungundlovu counted forty Hottentots⁵⁹. On 6 February Dingane invited the Boers to the cattle pen for the Zulu entertainment. They were advised to come unarmed and Piet Retief agreed and convinced his party to comply. Inside the pen after a few Zulu displays Dingane stood up and shouted the famous "*bulalani abathakathC* (kill the wizards), upon which the whole contingent of Boers was captured and taken to a nearby hill. At the hill they were all clubbed to death with knobbed sticks⁶⁰.

While the Boers were being killed Dingane had Rev Owen, a thirteen year old William Wood and some native servants as visitors in nearby huts. They were watching the entire episode as the hill was visible from their huts and a messenger was sent to inform them that they would not be harmed. After the incident Owen's entourage was not allowed to

⁵⁷ [hid. pp. 131-138.

"ibid. p. 139.

⁵⁹ Robert Wood. (Ed) The Personal Diary of "William Wood, Interpreter to Dingaan". Cape Town: Collard & Co. 1840. pp.2-4.

⁶⁰Morris-The Washing of the Spears, p. 140.

travel to Durban for the next four days. This was done to ensure that the remainder of the Boers were not alerted until Dingane brought his plan to conclusion. After four days Owen was allowed to leave on condition he left his best wagon and servants behind. He did not have a choice he obliged and proceeded to Durban with William Wood, his interpreter⁶¹. In Durban he reported the death of the Boers and Holstead to the settlers. Dick King was sent on foot to report the incident to the families who were still camped below the Drakensberg waiting for the return of Piet Retief and his party⁶².

After the killing of Piet Retief's party Dingane was determined to exterminate the rest of the Boers. Hours after the massacre, he sent out three regiments to finish off the remainder of the Boers and their families. By the time Dick King arrived, the Zulu impi had accomplished their mission and returned to umGungundlovu. What remained was death and destruction that greeted Dick King. The dead included 41 men, 56 women, 185 children and 250 Hottentots. The manner of killing was also unusual and horrifying. About a thousand herds of cattle were driven to umGungundlovu as loot. A few days later a Boer force of 350 attempted to avenge the killings at the Battle of Thaleni. This force was routed without serious losses and thereafter they were known as the *Vlug Kommando* (Flight Commando). On 12 April 1838 the "Vlug Kommando" returned to the laagers⁶³.

The settlers in Durban felt that Holstead's death should be avenged as well. An expedition under the leadership of John Cane was organised. The force included a few settlers, 2 000 men from Henry Fynn's iziNkumbi clan. On their way to emGungundlovu they found Kranskop deserted and they seized 4 000 cattle and 500 women and thereafter returned to Durban without fighting. The desertion of Kranskop was due to the fact that all men were away on mobilisation with Dingane's forces. The second expedition had to be organised because some settlers felt that Dingane had to be punished. The second expedition which included seventeen settlers and over eight hundred natives left Durban on 17 April 1838 for umGungundlovu. This force was defeated by Zulu forces under Nongalaza and nominal leadership Mpande. About six hundred natives and thirteen settlers were killed in this battle. The survivors were pursued by the Zulus to Durban. Some settlers sought refuge aboard the brig Comet which was docked at the port. After the hostilities were concluded

⁶¹ibid, p. 141.

⁶²Wood, (Ed) The Personal Diary of "William Wood, nr>. 4-5.

⁶³Morris..The Washing of the Spears . pp. 141-142.

most of the settlers boarded the Comet and left Durban. Ogle. Biggar and few settlers were left at the port⁶⁴.

The second group of Boers under Gerrit Maritz had arrived in Natal before Piet Relief went to the Zulu King. Furthermore, the news of the killings attracted more Boers from other parts of South Africa to Natal. The Boers were in the process of organising themselves for a punitive attack against the Zulus. By June 1838 there were already 640 men, 3200 women and children, and over 1200 native servants organised in two laagers all under Gerrit Maritz leadership. The Zulus attacked and destroyed one of the laagers and everyone had to be accommodated under the remaining laager. The cramped conditions resulted in disease outbreak and Maritz was amongst those who died of illness. Andries Pretorius arrived with sixty men with a canon to lead the Boers in the place of Maritz. The British tried to stop the Boers from continuing with the attack by landing a force in Durban on 3 December and ordered the Boers to stop the advance. The order arrived after Pretorius had left for Blood River⁶⁵.

On their advance, the Boers crossed Ncome River on 15 December and laagered for the night. The following morning about 12 000 Zulus attacked the camp. Fighting from their laagers, Pretorius' men defeated the Zulus without a single casualty. About 3 000 Zulus lost their lives during the battle, it was later named the Battle of Blood River. The Boers advanced to umGungundlovu and found that Dingane had already fled northwards. The bodies of Piet Reliefs and his party were found, collected and given burial. The document ceding land to the Boers was also found intact inside Reliefs pouch. The Boer forces began the exercise of collecting all cattle they could find in Zululand. The remainder of the Boers started moving to various parts of Natal and Zululand. The majority of the Boers assembled on a plateau about 85 km north-west of Durban and decided to build their capital. This capital was christened Pietermaritzburg, in honour of Piet Retief and Gerrit Maritz. The parliament was also built in the same vicinity⁶⁶.

When the Boers were satisfied that Dingane has been punished they returned to Natal to rebuild their lives. The Zulus were defeated but they were still a physical threat to the Boers. They assembled after the Boers had departed and rebuilt umGungundlovu. The British forces were of no help at all even their attempts to broker peace between the warring

⁶⁴ Ibid. pp. 142-144.

⁶⁵ Ibid. pp. 147-148.

⁶⁶ Ibid. pp. 148-149.

parties did not succeed because the Boers were still bent on punishing Dingane. The British forces departed and left a Captain Jervis who tried to facilitate peace to no avail and he also left for Cape Town soon after the forces. The Boers wanted more cattle from Dingane and he refused to give them what they demanded. Dingane suffered a further blow when his half-brother Mpande defected to the Boers. In an attempt to salvage his dented image Dingane ordered an expedition against the Swazi's. Mpande was also summoned to join the expedition, but he suspected that his senior half-brother wanted to kill him. He faked illness and remained at home, at the right moment he collected his followers and headed for Natal and asked for protection from the Boers who gladly accepted him"⁷.

2.3.4 Mpande Defect to the Boers

The news of a Zulu prince and a group of armed men entering Natal sent the Boers into a panic mode. One hunter was brave enough to approach the entourage and enquired the nature of their business in the Boer territory. Mpande explained that he was getting out of his half-brother's reach and meant no harm. He was asked to appear before the Boer parliament and plead his case. The parliament was pleased with his presentation and they offered him protection and allowed him to settle in the Boer territory on condition he pledged never to wage war on them. He was thereafter installed as the "reigning Prince of the Emigrant Zulus" in charge of all Zulus in Natal. Mpande further pledged to present to the Boers his successor for their approval⁶⁸.

Mpande's defection gave the Boers more energy and leverage in dealing with Dingane. To the Boers Mpande was a perfect replacement for Dingane and they believed time was ripe for the regime change in Zululand. After hoisting their flag in Durban they turned their attention to Dingane. The Boers had taken a lot of cattle from Zululand but they still believed that Dingane was hiding more in his territory. Dingane believed that the Boers were being unfair and he sent only 200 oxen with his two indunas, Dambuza and Khambazana to negotiate. The two indunas were arrested, charged for complicity in the killing of Piet Retief and his party and taken to Blood River for a trial⁶⁹.

On 21 January 1840 Pretorius, the new Boer leader in Natal, mobilised his forces in two columns marching parallel to each other from Pietermaritzburg to Blood River. Mpande

⁶⁷ Ibid. pp. 150-151.

⁶⁸•ibid. p. 151.

⁶⁹Ibid. p. 152.

was taken along as a hostage, with Dambuza and Khambazanachained as prisoners. Mpande's forces were placed under Nongalaza. Mpande's induna, and dispatched to attack Dingane. On 29 January the Boers reached Blood River and began with the two indunas trial. Mpande was used as the witness for the prosecution and Dambuza confessed to the crime of killing Piet Retief and his men . They were offered amnesty in case they defected but they both rejected the offer and consequently they were found guilty and sentenced to death by shooting. The following day Nongalaza reported that he had defeated Dingane who was already in a northward flight. The Boers felt that Zululand was then open for looting and the time had arrived for them install their own stooge as the king of the Zulus⁷⁰.

The Boers knew that they had to be laagered to defeat Dingane and they could not face his forces in an open warfare and they sent Nongalaza to face him. On hearing the news of his defeat they started pursuing the Zulu force with the understanding that they were already in flight. Dingane could not be found because he was already closer to Swaziland in the Nyawo territory. The Boers, assisted by Nongalaza's forces, started looting Zululand of cattle. The Boers alone brought more than 36 000 cattle with Nongalaza bringing an unknown quantity. About a thousand youngsters were brought from Zululand as "orphans" for domestic service. On 10 February 1840, on the banks of Black Umfolozi River the Boers proclaimed Mpande as the new Zulu king. A coronation was held and Mpande was handed a bill of 8 000 cattle at the end⁷¹.

The end of Dingane's reign was a tragedy for the Zulu nation. The Zulus were scattered all over Zululand in confusion and the new king was a puppet of the Boers. Dingane could not rally his subjects and return to power because the Boers were using Zulu forces under the command of Nongalaza against him. He killed his indunas before crossing Pongola River into the Nyawo territory. The few followers he had gradually dissented and returned to join Mpande who had promised a peaceful Zululand. The Nyawo people consulted the Swazis on further action regarding the uninvited guest in their land and they were duly advised to kill Dingane. A small group of Nyawo warriors killed him and buried him in an unmarked grave which was discovered in 1947 and marked as a monument. The situation meant abundant land and cattle for the Boers. The disintegrating of the Zulu state also meant cheap labour in addition to the "orphans" who were already enslaved. The influx of people and cattle in Natal put a lot of strain on land availability. The Boers were not

⁷⁰ ibid

⁷¹ Ibid. pp. 152-153.

complaining about the turn of events but the British in the Cape colony were watching their actions with concern⁷².

2.4 Conclusion

During this period two Zulu kings interacted with the British settlers and achieved contrasting results. Shaka interacted with the settlers for a period of four years. He was focussed and consistent in his dealings such that the settlers knew what to expect from him at any time. Shaka was of the opinion that the Anglo-Zulu relations were supposed to be internationalised but the colonialists were not keen on these relations. The settlers were treated as subjects of the Zulu kingdom and sometimes used as Zulu warriors. He proved a visionary leader when he tried to establish diplomatic relations with King George of the British Empire. Dingane on the other hand did not have good relations with the settlers. He was inconsistent in his dealings and was open to manipulation by those who wanted to achieve certain outcomes. His inconsistency was more visible after the arrival of the Boers in 1837. He wanted to keep the settlers happy while exterminating the Boers. He did not confirm the number of Boers before trying to kill all of them. The attempt to kill Mpande resulted in Boers getting an instrument they used effectively against him. It was the defection of Mpande that gave the Boers a force capable of fighting Zulus in the open. Dingane succeeded in making Boers stronger and victorious in Natal.

The Port of Natal was First visited by Europeans in 1497 and for more than 300 years there was no interest in settling or using the port as a trading post. The arrival of the first settlers had its roots in the scaling down of the Royal Navy after the Napoleonic Wars. It was the flooding of the civilian maritime sector with jobless sailors that led to the idea of settling and trading in Port Natal. The civilian settlers were content with their business conducted from Cape Town. The British Empire had an expressed policy against founding of new colonies based on financial consideration. Being a sailor, Francis Farewell was able to convince some civilians to settle at the port. The British government was reluctant on extending its tentacles to Natal. On various occasions the settlers tried to get the government to participate in the affairs of Natal without success. After Shaka had ceded a piece of land. Farewell sent the document to Lord Charles Somerset in attempt to woo him into colonising Natal. On another occasion the settlers manipulated the record of Fynn's diary to portray Shaka as a savage. This was done to attract the British Empire to colonise Natal and destroy

⁷²Ibid, p. 153.

Shaka's kingdom. The British Empire was not moved by these antics and remained firm on its decision not to expand beyond the Cape.

The trading with the Zulus was exploitative in nature. The British settlers did not treat the native leaders with the respect they deserved. They determined the terms of trade and impose them on the natives. Captain Timmerman used goods to the value of 1 000 guilder to purchase the entire Natal for the Dutch Empire. The natives were operating a tenure system that did not require documentation but the settlers always made the kings to sign a deed for the land. After signing the deed the land belonged to the settlers, the settlers were prepared to even evict the natives they found on that land.

Shaka showed clarity of purpose in his dealings with the settlers. He wanted to establish permanent diplomatic relations with the British and he viewed the settlers as his subjects on most occasions. He dominated the relations by exerting himself over the settlers. Dingane was naive in his dealings with the settlers and the Boers alike. His actions led to his own demise and the rise of the Boers as a pre-eminent force in Natal. The defection of Mpande was a key factor in the fall of Dingane's regime and future Natal/Zululand relations.

CHAPTER THREE

ANGLO-ZULU RELATIONS DURING THE REIGN OF MPANDE 1840-1872

3.1 Introduction

The 1840 regime change in Zululand came at a high cost in terms of lives and property. The war between Dingane and Mpande resulted in a loss of many lives, displacement of persons and destruction and/or loss of property and livestock. After proclaiming Mpande as the king of Zulus the Boers claimed some cattle for their troubles and also engaged in deliberate livestock looting. The population was divided between the new king and the deceased monarch. Mpande had to declare a general amnesty, pardoning those who were fighting on Dingane's side, for some communities to return to their homesteads. As one of the two surviving sons of Senzangakhona, Mpande did not have a lot of competition for the kingship. The other surviving son of Senzangakhona was Gqugqu, who was younger than Mpande. There was no competition from within and Mpande had a perfect environment to rebuild the kingdom.

In Natal the British settlers had already thrown their lot with the Boers. There was enough problems in Natal to keep the Boers away from the Zulus. Mpande and the Boers had a form of a non-aggression pact signed when Mpande defected to Natal. The peaceful relations with the Boers gave the new Zulu king enough space for the rebuilding of his devastated kingdom. One of the challenges was to bring together warriors who previously faced each other on the battlefield.

By 1840 the Boers in Natal and Mpande in Zululand were not aware that Britain was following the actions of the Boers with keen interest. Although the British colonial policy in South Africa discouraged expanding the colonies, they were already planning an intervention in Port Natal. The intervention and subsequent colonialisation of Natal by the British changed the dynamics of the Natal-Zululand relations.

3.2 The Boer Domination of Natal

The Natal settlement gave the Boers an opportunity to governing themselves outside the British control and discovered that it was not easy. Pretorius was the Boers' undisputed leader, but it was difficult to appoint him president although the post remained vacant. Due to lack of political leadership and effective bureaucratic structures taxes were voted but

never collected. Despite all these difficulties the Boers were happy and everything they could hope for was available in adequate quantities⁷³.

3.2.1 The Native Problem for the Boers

The new government of the Boers was soon confronted with the native problem. Firstly, the farms were looted by Zulus whose cattle were looted by the Boers during the war. The Bushmen also participated in the raiding of the farms. The Boers decided to punish the looters and raiders. The trail of the culprits was followed to Ncaphayi's amaBhaca clan. Ncaphayi was a chief that left Zululand to get away from Shaka. The entire amaBhaca clan was wiped out, including women and children. Secondly, the Boers found themselves competing with an increasing number of natives. The news of Dingane's death caused the natives who ran away from Natal during Shaka's reign to return to their lands and established their kraals. The returning refugees were from the south and along the Drakensberg. On August 1841 the Boers' parliament voted for the eviction of the returnees. They were going to be dumped on a territory south of Natal. The news of the impending eviction infuriated Faku to an extent that he petitioned the colonial office at once. The arrangement was that each farm would be left with five families as a source of labour and rest was going to be evicted en masse⁷⁴.

Reports of Boers' conduct towards the natives found its way to Sir George Napier who was the governor of the Cape colony. He was sympathetic to the Boers and hoped that after leaving the Cape they would be able to find their own place and establish a stable government and live in peace with whomever they share the space. Until they established their own government, Napier felt that he was responsible for their actions. It soon appeared to him that the Boers were actually not capable of living in peace with the natives and establishing a stable government was an equal challenge. The disturbing reports included the looting of the Zulu cattle, the killing of Ncaphayi clan and the abduction of a thousand Zulu youths for slavery⁷⁵.

In June 1841 Sir George Napier received instructions from London to occupy the Port of Natal. The docking of non-British ships in Port Natal brought British interests and those of other imperial nations in direct competition and Britain felt threatened. These

⁷³Donald Moms.. The Washing of the Spears, p. 153.

⁷⁴Ibid, pp. 153-154.

⁷⁵Ibid, p. 153.

events led the British to conclude that the Boers were not capable of protecting British interests. In December 1841 Napier informed the Boer parliament that the British were going to oppose any ill-treatment of natives, including their eviction to Faku's lands. The souring of the relations between the Boers and the Britons exposed the British settlers at the port; they were marginalised in the allocation of land. It was clear that the Boers were preparing for war with the British⁷⁶.

3.2.2 The Battle of Congella and Collapse of the Boer Republic

The last British forces were withdrawn from Durban in 1838 and there were no forces in reserve to execute the order from London because of general manpower shortages. By 1841 the Boers were armed, skilled fighters and excellent horsemen. Captain Smith, a veteran of Waterloo, was ordered to march from a small fort in Pondoland to Durban with two companies. The force included 263 men, 250 servants and dependants, and sixty supplies wagons each drawn by ten oxen. On 1 March 1842 Smith and his force left Pondoland and on 4 May 1842 arrived in Durban⁷⁷.

On landing in Durban the troops rested for fifteen days before engaging the Boers. The Boers were still regarded as the Queen's subjects and treated with some kindness, even when they were posing danger to Britons. Supplies for Smith's troops were landed in two ships soon after his arrival. Pretorius, the Boer commandant, decided to engage the British before the next load of supplies was delivered. Smith decided to attack the Boers on the evening of 23/24 May 1842 in order to prevent the reinforcements from the Highveld reaching them⁷⁸. During the attack the British suffered sixteen deaths and thirty-one injured. This crippled the force's fighting capability and Captain Smith decided to adopt a defensive posture⁷⁹.

Captain Smith decided that reinforcements were needed and the closest source was 965 km away in Grahams Town. Dick King volunteered to take the trip to requisition reinforcement, and he was accompanied by a Zulu retainer named Ndongeni. Smith's forces remained besieged until they were relieved on 26 June. The first batch of reinforcements arrived aboard the Conch on 24 June and the second batch followed the next day. The entire

⁷⁶Donald Morris.. The Washing of the Spears, p. 155.

⁷⁷Ibid. pp. 154-156.

⁷⁸* Lonsdale, F.M. "The Battle of Congella". Military History Journal. Vol. 5. No. 3. June 1981. pp. 1-6.

⁷⁹Donald..The Washing of the Spears, p. 156.

force was under the command of Colonel Cloete. It disembarked on 26 June, engaged the Boers and relieved Captain Smith. The relieving force overwhelmed the Boers who dispersed into the bushes without giving credible resistance. The British presented the terms of surrender in Pietermaritzburg and the Boers accepted grudgingly⁸⁰.

The Boers remained a credible force even after the defeat because they did not suffer losses during the battle. The British could not leave the Boers with the natives because they had proved that they could not live in peace with other groups. Disappointed Boers started leaving Pietermaritzburg for the Highveld and the capital city was chaotic. Colonel Cloete had to depart for Afghanistan and Smith, who was then a major, took over the command of the occupying force. The remaining population in Natal, black and white, started competing for land. Cloete had advised Smith not allocate any land until Cape Town had made a decision on the matter. Everyone remained on the land he/she was physically occupying^{*1}.

3.2.3 British Preparations for Natal Colonialisation

Correspondence between Cape Town and London was slow. A letter had a turnaround time of six months between the two locations if it was replied and returned on arrival. Major Smith had to remain in Natal until it was promulgated and declared a colony. On 12 May 1843 Sir George Napier announced the adoption of Natal as a British colony. Henry Cloete, a barrister and brother to Colonel Cloete, was appointed a High Commissioner for Natal. He was charged with the task of preparing the new colony for colonialisation. On 5 June Cloete arrived in Durban and rode to Pietermaritzburg alone after Major Smith had refused him an escort due to procedural misunderstandings. The Boers who remained in Pietermaritzburg were less cooperative to the High Commissioner. It took over two months to sort out matters at the Natal capital. On 31 August the High Commissioner was able to fly the union jack in Pietermaritzburg for the first time. The boundaries of the new colony were set according to agreement between Piet Retief and Dingane. Late in September Cloete consulted Mpande and concluded a treaty on 5 October 1843. According to the treaty Mpande and his people would remain north of Tugela River and east of Buffalo River. This implied that the British would also remain south of Tugela River and west of Buffalo River⁸².

⁸⁰ ibid

^{**}Ibid. p. 159.

Ibid. pp. 160-162.

After confirming the north and west boundaries of the colony Cloete went on to address the issue of land redistribution. There were about 365 Boer families living in Natal but 760 claims were lodged. Claims exceeded the land available and in some cases there were more than one claim for the same piece of land. Cloete decided to allocate farm land to those who could prove they had occupied the land for more than a year. Smaller claims were allocated to those who could prove that they have occupied the land for less than a year. Those claimants who could not prove anything were dismissed without an allocation. Towards the end of April 1844 Cloete felt that he had completed his task and therefore decided to return to Cape Town. Major Smith took over as the Commandant of Natal until a governor was appointed. On arrival in Cape Town Cloete prepared and submitted his report whereby he recommended that the new colony be allowed a certain level of autonomy.⁸¹

In February 1845 the final decision arrived from London directing that Natal be annexed into the Cape Colony as a district. The legislature and the judiciary for Natal would be located in Cape Town. The administration would be executed by a lieutenant governor assisted by an executive committee of five members. Municipalities would be allowed to levy and collect own taxes. Martin West, a magistrate from Grahams Town was appointed as the first Lt Governor of Natal and Theophilus Shepstone was appointed to the executive committee as the diplomatic agent for African Affairs. The Lt Governor arrived in Durban on 5 December and proceeded to Pietermaritzburg on 12 December 1845 and resumed his duties⁸⁴.

3.3. The British Colonisation of Natal

The colonisation of Natal by Britain was not a deliberate and planned exercise. It was a reaction on the events that were unfolding in the new Boer Republic of Natalia. London was reluctant to increase the number of colonies in South Africa due to financial considerations. Natal was declared a British colony in 1843 as part of the Cape to avoid the establishment a fully-fledged colonial government in the new colony. By 1848, five years after the declaration, there still less than 3 000 Europeans in the territory and sixty-seven registered farms the majority of which were cattle farms. The lack of interest to settle in Natal prompted a British sponsored drive to attract new settlers. In 1854 White settlers in Natal

⁸¹ibid, p. 162.

⁸⁴Ibid, pp. 162-163.

were estimated at about 6 000 (1 000 being Boers) and Africans were already numbering about 100 (XX).⁸⁵

After examining the potential of the new territory Cloete recommended an independent Natal colony, but London decided to annex Natal to the Cape colony. It was difficult to find volunteers for the new civil service. Martin West, the new Lt-Governor, was described as a 41 year old Anglo-Indian serving as a Resident Magistrate from Grahams Town. Theophilus Shepstone, the Diplomatic Agent with the Africans, was serving as a government agent at Fort Peddie. Members from Cape Town did not make themselves available for the civil service vacancies at the new colony.⁸⁶

Natal was different from the Cape in terms of the native population. The number of Africans in Natal far exceeded that of the white settlers. In the north, beyond the Thukela River, there was a strong independent native kingdom neighbouring the colony. Failure to attract more settlers made the existing settlers feel overwhelmed by the native population in and around the colony.⁸⁷ The colonial administrators were faced with a task of attracting settlers to a colony that was not appealing to the settler society while coping with insecure settlers.

3.3.1 Theophilus Shepstone and the Problem of Native Settlement

The impeding deportation of the returning refugees near Faku's territory in 1841 was cited by Britain as one of the reasons for the attack on the Boers settlement at Congella. Soon after colonising Natal, the British were faced with the problem of how to deal with the Africans in Natal. The native population was a potential source of labour and potential tax revenue base. They outnumbered the settler population and thereby made land availability to settlers a problem. London preferred a non-interference approach and had directed that natives should be ruled according to their own systems of government and customs.⁸⁸

⁸⁵Emery, F. "Early Colonists' Perceptions of Nata'l. Journal of Natal and Zulu History. VIII. 1985. p2.

⁸⁶Donald Morris., The Washing of the Spears. pp. 162-63.

⁸⁷ibid, p. 165.

⁸⁸McClendon, T. "The Man who Would be Inkosi: Civilising Missions in Shepstone's Early Career". In Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol 30, No 2. 2004. pp. 347-348.

After assuming his post in 1846, Shepstone set out to organise the African population in Natal. He was able to influence the Locations Commission of 1846-47 to recommend the development of locations in Natal where the natives would be settled. The plan called for a resident agent for each location backed by a police force. Training schools and agricultural training colleges were to be established for each of the locations. The resident agent was supposed to govern these locations with a mix of African and European laws and chiefs and councillors were going to function as assessors. The plan went against London's policy of a non-expansionist and/or self-financing expansion. Shepstone went ahead and implemented the recommendations of the Commission without the adequate funding. Governor Smith arrived in Natal in 1848 to stop the plan but found the project half way in implementation. The process was halted but those locations already established were allowed to continue existing. This meant that the locations plan did not address all requirements for the resettlement of African population in Natal.

By 1850 Shepstone realised that he was running a location system that was lacking funds and Africans were continuously pouring into Natal. He consequently lost confidence on his own plan and went back to the drawing board for a better plan. In 1851 Shepstone came up with another plan of solving the problem of natives in Natal. This plan was a carbon copy of the Boers'1841 plan which called for the eviction of the natives and their resettling between Natal and Pondoland. The plan was calling for the disbanding of the locations in Natal and all Africans with their chiefs to be moved to the area south of uMkhomazi. This area was supposed to be between Pondoland and uMkhomazi River and was going to be ruled by superintendent magistrates. The plan was not approved but in 1852 a Native Affairs Commission was appointed to investigate the possibility of a partial removal of Africans and other administrative reforms.⁹⁰

The Native affairs Commission of 1852 was dominated by white settlers and lacked natives' representation. The Commission did not agree with the manner Shepstone was administering native affairs and used the opportunity to discredit his work. The Commission's report issued in 1853 called for the removal of 30 000 to 40 000 Africans (*30-40% of the native population*) to area between Natal and Pondoland. In January 1854 Shepstone wrote to the colonial office supporting and giving reasons for the plan proposed by the Commission. Bishop Colenso, the head of the Anglican Church in Natal, was also

^{KV} Ibid. pp. 350-351.

^w Ibid. pp. 352-353.

convinced that the plan would create a pool of potential converts at his disposal. The Cape and Natal governments approved the plan in principle and authorised Shepstone to enter into negotiations with Faku over the cession of land. On his trip to Pondoland, Shepstone took his wife and seven children and was accompanied by an escort of two hundred Africans. The number of escorts accompanying Shepstone were perceived by the people of the Pondoland chief as a sign of invasion. Shepstone had to use Jenkins, a Wesleyan missionary, to inform Faku that he was coming in peace.⁹¹

On his return Shepstone reported that Faku agreed to cede the land between him and Natal including St John River mouth. It was further reported that nearly all chiefs and councillors residing in the ceded area had agreed and signed an instrument electing him as their supreme chief. As Shepstone put it:

".../ explained to them most particularly, that they placed themselves their wives and children, their property and their country in my hands....! accepted this only on condition that my Queen consented to my doing so...

The report further recommended that Shepstone as the supreme chief of the new territory would have added responsibilities and hardships which necessitates an increase in his salary. This implied additional costs, against the colonial policy discouraging additional costs for the British Treasury.⁹³

The newly appointed Cape Governor, Sir George Grey, noted that Shepstone's report was calling for him to be crowned a king of the Africans in the new settlement. There were no doubts that Shepstone saw in the removal plan an opportunity for enhancing his own status and prestige. Before departing to Faku's territory he wrote a series of letters to George Cato, his friend and a Durban banker, inviting him on further trips to the territory and fantasising about the possibilities of copper mining in the proposed territory. The plan was not approved due to its complications and possible financial implications.⁹⁴

3.3.2 Theophilus Shepstone and the Taxation of Africans in Natal

The potential of the African population in Natal as a source of revenue for the colony was exploited in 1849. The debate over the taxation of the natives had been raging since 1846.

⁹¹Ibid. pp. 353-354.

⁹²Ibid. p. 354.

⁹³Ibid.

⁹⁴Ibid. p. 355.

The debate was mostly driven by lack of funds and persistent complaints by settlers. Firstly, the Imperial government approved the colonisation of Natal on condition it was not going to be funded from London. The colonial administration had to find ways to source revenue in order to finance the colony's day to day activities. Theophilus Shepstone proved to be useful in inventing new ideas using his portfolio. Secondly, the white settlers were of the view that the colonisation of Natal was for the protection of natives against the Boers. It was therefore argued that it was only fair for the natives to contribute towards the running of the colony. The settlers were not content with the tax regime that targeted the white community alone. It was against this background that on 12 September 1849 Sir Martin West proclaimed a seven shillings Hut Tax to be imposed on all natives resident in Natal. Theophilus Shepstone was then authorised to collect the proclaimed taxation in his capacity as the Diplomatic Agent in charge of African Affairs.⁹⁵

The Hut Tax was Theophilus Shepstone's invention. He was of the opinion that this taxation was viable, difficult to evade and likely to reduce polygamy in the African society. Firstly, the huts were not easy to conceal and each hut was going to cost seven shilling per year. The huts erected in that tax year were exempt from tax. Secondly, every wife had her own hut and additional wives implied additional huts-hence more taxation. Shepstone argued that the additional tax burden would discourage polygamy amongst the native population.⁹⁶

The proclamation of the Hut Tax was accepted by the African population without protestation. The first collection started in September 1850 with Theophilus Shepstone as the main actor in the collection as authorised by the proclamation. During the 1850 collection he succeeded in collecting £8,734 4s 9d and earned himself £698 as 8% commission of the sum collected. From 1852 the collection duties were transferred to the Resident Magistrates and the collection period was duly changed to April and May. The Africans, for two reasons agreed to be taxed an equivalent of six weeks earnings by 5 000 white settlers. Firstly, the natives did not want to lose access to their land and might have been of the opinion that this was a once-off arrangement. Secondly, the Africans needed protection from the Zulu kingdom and for such protection they were prepared to accept any condition."

"Ramdhani. N. "Taxation without Representation: The Hut Tax System in Colonial Natal 1849-1898". Journal of Natal and Zulu History. XI. 1986. pp. 14-15.

⁹⁵ibid, p. 15.

⁹⁶ibid. p. 16.

3.3.3 Natal Attempts to Annex Basutholand

The policy towards natives was determined by the London office and colonial officials did not agree with the notion of non-interference in native affairs. The location system created in the late 1940's denied the colonialists labour but it did bring about peace between the settlers and natives. The settlers needed more land and native labour and between 1865 and 1869 an attempt was made to annex the neighbouring native states in order to gain more land. The Boer-Sotho war of 1865 was seen as an opportunity to colonise Basutholand. This war ended in April 1866 with Moshoeshoe and Johannes Brand signing the Thaba Bosiu Treaty. Wodehouse, the Governor of the Cape Colony, was opposed to the annexation of the Basotho territory in line with the imperial policy and he was supported by Edward Cardwell, the Secretary of State in London.⁹⁸

Theophilus Shepstone saw an opportunity to extend and expand his rule over the Africans in the annexation of Basutholand. He was very vocal in urging Britain to annex the territory and Wodehouse was firmly against the idea. The Natal colonialists, led by Keate and Shepstone tried to use an incident where Lesaoane, an independent Sotho chief, pursued the Boers into Natal and seized their cattle including those belonging to Natal settlers. Settlers demanded compensation from Moshoeshoe and threatened him with violence in case he was not willing to comply. Moshoeshoe started negotiating and paying the compensation to the Cape Colony. The bid to annex Basutholand by force was stopped when Wodehouse declared that the Basotho matter would be solved through diplomacy."

Despite the Treaty of Thaba Bosiu, the Free State Boers did not cease their harassment of Moshoeshoe and his people. This prompted the Sotho king to seek protection from the Natal colonialists because his past request was rejected by the Cape Colony. London informed Wodehouse that it agreed with the Natal annexation of Basutholand and he should give them the permission to do so expeditiously. Wodehouse was in a dilemma because he did not agree with the arrangement and he had to do something to check Natal's ambitions. During the first months of 1868 he learned that the Free State Boers were continuing to harass Moshoeshoe and refused to call off their activities. On 12 March 1868,

⁹⁸Kline, B., "British Imperial Opposition to Natal Expansion 1865-73". *Journal of Natal and Zulu History* XIV. 1992. pp. 21-22.

⁹⁹Ibid. p. 22.

Wodehouse declared Basutholand a British protectorate citing the continued harassment of Moshoeshoe by the Boers as the main reason.¹⁰⁰

The Governor of the Cape had defied a direct order from Britain and he had to move cautiously and expeditiously in order to ensure that he justified his actions convincingly. In April he met Moshoeshoe at Thaba Bosiu and obtained evidence that the Boers were plundering Basutholand and Moshoeshoe actually wanted protection, not necessarily that of Natal. Moshoeshoe confessed that after the Lesaoane incident he just wanted to show his friendship to the British Empire. Wodehouse reported to the London office his actions and recommended that Basutholand becomes a British territory falling directly under him. He further warned that the land hungry Natal colonialists could not be trusted with the territory. Lt-Governor Keate and Theophilus Shepstone protested to no avail and ended complying with London's decision. Keate and Shepstone were interested in expanding the territory for their own prestige in South Africa while the settlers were genuinely interested in getting more land.¹⁰¹ The bid for the annexation of Basutholand failed but the quest for more land and labour remained a problem for the Natal settlers.

3.3.4 The Introduction of Indian Indentured Labour in Natal

The introduction of sugar cane farming in Natal in 1852 generated need for labour. As George Robinson, editor of the Natal Mercury, put it: "...*The great desideratum of our industry - an adequate supply of reliable and effective labour*". Sugar required labour for planting and harvesting as well as factory workers for crushing into final product. Shepstone's idea of moving natives to locations reduced the number of labourers available for colonial industry. Shepstone was of the opinion that Zulus as a nation of warriors and hunters could not be relied upon as a source of steady supply of labour. The most probable reason for the Natal Africans' reluctance to a wage labour was based on independence created by the location systems. The systems gave the natives sufficient land and were able to maintain some economic independence through subsistence farming. The idea of a wage labour arrangement was not appealing to the Natal natives.¹⁰²

The sugar planters were in a difficult position; they had sufficient land and capital with markets hungry for their sugar but could not make any advances due to shortage of

¹⁰⁰"ibid, p. 24.

¹⁰¹"ibid, 25.

¹⁰² Du Bois. "Towards a New Labour Dispensation: Background to the Arrival of Indians in Natal in 1860". Natalia. 40. 2010, pp. 12-13.

labour. Amongst the Natal newspaper, the Natal Mercury advocated for the importation of foreign labour. George Robinson argued that the employment of imported labour would set an example for the African population to follow. If the natives saw the imported workers going to work every day and earning wages they would also do likewise. Saunders, who migrated from Mauritius in 1854, made the Natal farmers aware of the advantages of the indentured labour as it was used in Mauritius. Saunders also made the famiers aware of the Indian Emigration Act of 1842 and the procedure to be followed in the procurement of indentured labour. The Indians were already engaged in indentured labour in other colonies like the West Indies. The idea of Indian indentured labour gained a lot of support from the settler population and the procurement processes were set in motion."¹⁰⁴

In Durban, for instance, farmers met to discuss labour. A report in a 17 October 1851 Durban Observer issue recorded reference to Natal farmers' demands for Indian labour in a meeting of leading citizens at a Durban Government School Hall. The meeting debated the problem of labour shortage and the possibility of indentured labour importation."¹⁰⁵

Sir George Grey visited Natal and its sugar cane plantations and he expressed his support for the Indian indentured labour. He further warned that it should be expected that the families of the labourers would remain as settlers after the expiry of their service term. The Cape government issued an ordinance in January 1856 empowering the Lt Governor of Natal to make rules and regulations for the employment of Indians in Natal. The process of indentured labour procurement was mired in bureaucratic red tape until 1859.¹⁰⁵

In May 1859 sugar industry stakeholders took their petition for indentured labour to the Legislative Council. The main reason for the delay in the procurement process was Natal's failure to comply with India's policies regulating the emigration of indentured labour. By the end of May the Council had promulgated three pieces of legislation that complied with the importation of indentured labour. The wage for the labourers was set at ten shillings for the first year and increase to twelve shillings for the second year. The ratio of male to female was set at 65:35. The shortage of women caused the agent to reduce the ratio of

¹⁰⁴Ibid. pp. 13-14.

¹⁰⁵ Govender, L. "The Indian Immigrant". An Unpublished Research Project for histon III Course at University of Durban Wesiville. 1983. p.1.

¹⁰⁵ Du Bois. "Towards a New Labour Dispensation", p. 15.

women to 25%. In order to make the 25% of women, prostitutes were also included in the first batches as no proof of marriage was required."*

By 1891 the number of Indians in Natal was estimated at 41 142 while that of the Whites was at 46 788."¹⁰⁷ The low cost of the Indian labour caused the farmers to continue the importation and neglected the Africans who were also not very keen on engaging in a wage labour relations with them. The idea of getting the imported labour to set an example to the natives was largely ignored by the farmers.

3.4 The Zulu Kingdom under Mpande's Leadership

The borders of Zululand as far the south was concerned were made clear by the treaty Mpande signed with Cloete in 1845. The new king of the Zulus respected the terms of the treaty and Tugela and Buffalo Rivers were easy to identify as borders between Natal and Zululand. The Boers and later British left the Zulus to their own devices. This gave Mpande enough space to rebuild the Zulu Kingdom's capacity as a nation. After killing Gqugqu, who was the youngest of all brothers. Mpande became the only surviving son of Senzangakhona. Thereafter he did not have members of the family staking claims to the throne. The Boers and British were also attending to their own problems in Port Natal "¹⁸.

3.4.1 Mpande Rebuilds the Kingdom

Mpande was born around 1796 and was an *udibi* at the beginning of Shaka's reign and supported his half-brother. In 1819 he was recruited into uMgumanqa regiment and lived his life as a warrior prince. He was the closest to Shaka compared to other brothers. Shaka presented him with at least two brides, Ngqumbazi and Monase, who bore him Cetshwayo and Mbuyazwe amongst other children respectively. Mpande survived the *Mfecane* and the terror unleashed by Dingane on his brothers and lived on to become a king. He also survived two assassination attempts by Dingane.¹⁰⁹

Mpande took over a country that was devastated. He had to rebuild the kingdom from the ruins caused by him and his allies. Between 1838 and 1840 the Zulus were involved in wars with both settlers and Boers. On coming to power Mpande retained the military system he inherited from his predecessor brothers. But unlike his brothers, he married many wives

** Ibid. pp. 16-18.

¹⁰⁷Ibid. p. 3.

¹⁰⁸Morris. The Washing of the Spears, p. 192.

"Kennedy. P.A. "Mpande and the Zulu Kingship". Journal of Natal and Zulu History IV. 1981. p. 24-27.

and fathered 23 sons and many daughters. He did not involve himself in major conflicts with the settlers and Boers, but he kept his native neighbours in the north busy. The period 1842-1851 Mpande launched serious attacks on small chiefdoms of Swazis and Pedis in the north. He was also responsible for displacing Langalibalele's chiefdom which ended up settling in the Drakensberg¹⁰. Langalibalele was the chief, during Shaka's reign, who led the escort of John Ross to Delagoa Bay and back.

Shaka had enlarged the Zulu kingdom from a small enclave to a vast land that could not be traversed in one day on foot. He was a warrior king and could easily move around the country. Mpande enjoyed the life of the palace and could not move an inch outside it. During his reign he relied more on runners and outlying chieftains and indunas. He had little direct influence on internal affairs of the kingdom. In this process the power of the king was diluted. He had to be pulled around the palace by two retainers in a small cart. Chieftains began to exercise powers and independence they would not enjoy during the Shakan era. Notable amongst those who increased their power and influence were Hhamu, Maphitha and Mnyamana.¹¹

Mpande used his own forces to fight Dingane for the Zulu throne and thereby made it easy for the Boers to loot and destroy Zululand. On his arrival in Natal Mpande had sufficient manpower, including Nongalaza as a commander, to face his brother. Mpande and Dingane's forces met at Maqonqo and Dingane was defeated and later killed near the Swaziland border by Nyawo people. Accordingly, the Boers waited in reserve while Nongalaza dealt with Dingane's forces. After the confirmation of the defeat the Boers rode into Zululand and proclaimed Mpande the king of the Zulus and looted the territory. *

In return for the asylum, Mpande had promised the Boers that he would submit the heir apparent to them for approval. He further promised to submit Cetshwayo to mission education. Mpande had no intention of keeping any of these promises once he was in power. After the British had defeated the Boers at the Battle of Congella. Mpande sent eighty oxen to Captain Smith in Port Natal. The same year Mpande came to power, he expelled two Voortrekkers ambassadors for their complicity in illegal cattle appropriation. The relationship with Boers was a means for survival and Mpande was quick to realise that their

¹⁰Shillington. History of Southern Africa, n. 73.

"Donald Morris., The Washing of the Spears, p. 194.

¹¹Kennedy, "Mpande and the Zulu Kingship", pp. 28-31.

reign was not going to last very long and therefore switched his allegiance to the British colonialists. Mpande's pledge of military support to the British helped the British conquer the Boers and this caused Henry Cloete to reinstate Thukela River as the boundary with Natal instead of the Black uMfolozi.¹¹³

The period 1845-1872 was characterised by the presence of an organised colony of Natal as a neighbour to the Zulu kingdom. This worked against the maintenance of a central Zulu authority. Zulu people were free to move across Thukela River in case they so pleased. The Natal authorities allowed the natives to settle in either domain although they did not like it. During Mpande's reign manpower in Zululand decreased or remained constant while the African population in Natal increased substantially. The Nguni speaking African residents between Thukela and Mzimkhulu were estimated between 60 000 and 100 (XX) in 1861 and increased to 140 000 by 1872. The manpower available for mobilisation was reduced by the exodus and the growing powers of the chiefs. During Mpande's kingship chiefs' powers increased due to his lack of mobility and they could withhold manpower from the king's service.¹¹⁴

3.4.2 Cetshwayo Fight to Become Heir Apparent

Mpande married his first wife in 1825 when he was still a prince under Shaka's reign. He did not take the great wife when he became king and that caused confusion that he lived to regret. There was lack of clarity regarding the heir to the throne. His first wife Ngqumbazi, a daughter of a Zungu chieftain, bore him a son named Cetshwayo about 1827. The second wife, Monase, bore him a son soon after Cetshwayo. The second son was named Mbuyazwe in honour of Henry Fynn who was a close friend of Mpande. In total Ngqumbazi bore three sons and Monase bore four sons and three daughters. More wives were taken later but the great wife was never declared. As the two sons grew older the rivalry started and it intensified with time. Later, Mpande realised that the two sons could not remain peaceful within the same locality any longer. Monase was moved with her brood forty miles north of Black uMfolozi River and Ngqumbazi moved with her brood forty miles south and settled on the banks of Mhlathuze River. These moves eased the tensions temporarily but as the boys

¹¹³ibid, p. 31.

¹¹⁴ Ibid, pp. 33-35

grew older they began coalescing some following around them and the stage was set for a confrontation."⁶

Cetshwayo and Mbuyazwe were incorporated into their respective age groups. Cetshwayo became part of uThulwana regiment and Mbuyazwe formed part of amaShishi regiment. As the two boys grew into adulthood their factions gained permanent identities. Cetshwayo's group was known as uSuthu while Mbuyazwe's followers were iziGqoza. The failure of Mpande to take the Great Wife and nominate the heir apparent frustrated Cetshwayo who felt that he was old enough to charge of state affairs given his father's lack of mobility. The choice for the heir apparent was understood to be between Cetshwayo and Mbuyazwe. By 1856 the two sons were already approaching their thirties and their rivalry came to a head that year at the Battle of Ndondakusuka. USuthu attacked iziGqoza on 2 December 1856 in the general area of Mandeni"⁶.

As uSuthu attacked. Mbuyazwe and his followers fled towards the Tugela River. Mbuyazwe was convinced that the fight could not be avoided and since he lacked numbers to match uSuthu. he hoped that by going south the British would be at hand to support his outnumbered forces. A variety of factors prevented Mbuyazwe from crossing into Natal and obtaining support from the British colony. In the process of crossing the Tugela River into Natal, Mbuyazwe was persuaded by his younger brother Mantantashiya to return and face Cetshwayo. This decision was doomed but Mbuyazwe chose to follow his ego and paid the ultimate price." Besides, the Tugela River was rising and swelling fast and uSuthu did not give iziGqoza a chance to find a suitable area to cross the river"⁷. The settlers on the border were mainly traders and hunters and could not match uSuthu. Amongst the traders who tried to assist Mbuyazwe was John Dunn who went on to become Cetshwayo's advisor soon after the battle. As the conditions were heavily loaded against iziGqoza, defeat was an inevitable outcome and six of Mpande's sons, including Mbuyazwe. perished in the Battle of Ndondakusuka"⁹.

The traders of Natal were unhappy with the behaviour of uSuthu during and after the battle. Cattle belonging to the traders were looted in the process of battle and the traders

⁶- Morris. The Washing of the Spears, p. 193.

⁷"Ibid. pp. 194-5.

⁸Shanise. The Reign of King Mpande and his Relations with the Republic of Natalia and its Successor the British Colony of Natal, pp. 224-225.

¹⁸Morris. The Washing of the Spears, pp. 195-1%.

⁹Shamase. The Reinn of King Mpande. pp. 235-236.

threatened that this was disturbing peace between the British and the Zulus. Mpande dealt with the situation by sending a letter to Lt Governor Scott confirming that Cetshwayo was willing to compensate the traders for losses suffered during the battle. In 1857 John Dunn, a British hunter and trader, withdrew his claim for losses and became advisor to Cetshwayo on matters regarding the British Colony and the Boers. This implies that Cetshwayo was certain of becoming the next king and was already building his capacity for foreign policy¹¹⁰.

After the Battle of Ndondakusuka. Cetshwayo's primacy started to gain national support due to the fact that there were no contenders who were bold enough to stake their claims. In 1857 the Zulu nation called for the royal presence on matters of the nation. It was argued that Mpande as the reigning king was regarded as the "head" but he needed the feet that could solve problems on the ground. The nation recommended that Cetshwayo becomes the "feet" for the king. Mpande agreed that Cetshwayo be partnered with Masiphula kaMamba, Mpande's principal advisor, to attend to matters on the ground, make decisions and refer them to Mpande for final approval. The colonial office as represented by Theophilus Shepstone confirmed this decision in 1861 by installing Cetshwayo as successor to Mpande. Four years after eliminating his main rival to the throne Cetshwayo was a virtual king¹²¹.

The conflict between his two sons exposed the characteristics of Mpande's leadership as a king. In the matter of choosing an heir he was indecisive and manipulative if not calculating. Mpande presented Cetshwayo to the Boers as his heir apparent, but regarded Mbuyazwe as the future king because his mother was given to him by Shaka. He was further heard, according to the folklore, whispering the name of Mthonga as his chosen king of the future¹²². Mpande's failure to take a Great Wife and choose of an heir made both sons to legitimately believe that they had a valid claim to the throne. The separation of Cetshwayo and Mbuyazwe resulted in their developing separate followings. Before the start of the Battle of Ndondakusuka Cetshwayo commanded about 20 000 uSuthu warriors against Mbuyazwe's meagre 7 000 iziGqoza¹²³.

Although Cetshwayo was now in a commanding position regarding the succession, he was still keeping an eye on possible competition and, he was prepared to wait for his father's

¹¹⁰Ibid, pp. 234-235.

¹²¹Ibid, pp. 235-236.

¹²²Shamase. M.Z. The Reign of Kinn Mpande. pp. 220-224.

¹²³Morris. The Washing of the Spears, p. 195.

natural death. The strongest of the competitors were Hhamu, Mnyamana and Maphitha. all who fought on Cetshwayo's side at Ndondakusuka. There were also other half-brothers who were exiled in Natal and Transvaal. Sikhatha and Mkhungo were in Natal while Mthonga and Mgidlana were harboured in the Transvaal. Cetshwayo was more concerned about Mthonga and Mgidlana, sons of Mpande's latest favourite wife. Nomantshali. After observing the affection his father's was giving Nomantshali, Cetshwayo concluded that Mthonga, the elder of the two, was about to be favoured for the throne. According to the folklore Mpande was actually heard whispering the name of Mthonga as the heir apparent. Cetshwayo was infuriated and sent a party to wipe out the entire family of Nomantshali. The two sons were able to escape with their lives to the Transvaal. The other competitors were ignored and more energy was spent pursuing Mthonga in the Transvaal.¹²⁴

Since Mthonga was Mpande's favourite son and he was mature and agile. Cetshwayo considered him more of a danger than all other competitors. He entered into negotiations with the Boers for the repatriation of Mthonga and his younger brother back to Zululand. The Boers were able to detect and exploit Cetshwayo's desperation. They demanded a large strip of land in the Utrecht District and an undertaking from Cetshwayo that the two brothers would not be harmed. At the end of March 1861 the Treaty of Waaihoek was signed between Cetshwayo and the Transvaal Boers. The treaty amended the border between Transvaal and Zululand. Cetshwayo agreed never to harm Mthonga and Mgidlana and he also undertook to leave his father in peace and would cause no bloodshed in and outside the Zulu kingdom. Mpande appreciated this deal and confirmed it by issuing 25 cows, a bull and a saddled horse. Cetshwayo was so obsessed with Mthonga that he could not realise that the deal he concluded with Pretorius was of no value to him. Other conditions aside, he secured Mthonga's repatriation but he was expected to ensure that he remains alive. Cetshwayo wanted to eliminate the subject but entered into a deal where he was supposed to keep the subject alive and he was content with the deal.¹²⁵

On receiving the news of the Waaihoek Treaty, Theophilus Shepstone became a worried man. It finally dawned to him that power in Zululand had shifted to Cetshwayo. In order to remain relevant to the politics of the Zulu kingdom he had to win Cetshwayo's amity. He regarded his project of the Natal Africans as complete and there was a need to focus on natives outside the colony to enhance his power and prestige. Shepstone decided to

¹²⁴Morris, The Washing of the Spears, pp. 198-199.

¹²⁵Ibid, p. 199-202.

travel to Mpande's headquarters, kwaNodwengu. and carry out a ceremony of inaugurating Cetshwayo as the heir apparent. Cetshwayo bought the idea wholeheartedly since he thought this would elevate his position in Natal as well as in Zululand. For the trip to Zululand, Shepstone took along his son, Henrique and a few retainers. Cetshwayo was accompanied by John Dunn, his new ambassador to Natal and Transvaal. Shepstone proclaimed Cetshwayo "*heir apparent in the name of the Queen*". Cetshwayo's *indunas* viewed the ceremony as an intrusion into the Zulu traditions. They argued that Shepstone was a commoner who had no right to make any royal proclamation, but Cetshwayo chose to go ahead with it.^{1:6}

Before leaving kwaNodwengu. Shepstone decided to raise the issue of the Natal-Zululand relations. He delivered a speech where he alluded to the superiority of Natal over the Zulu kingdom and went ahead to caution Cetshwayo to mind his conduct during his future rule. Shepstone felt bold enough to tell Cetshwayo that he would not tolerate any injustice from his part since it implied that Shepstone was Cetshwayo's supreme chief and the future king was not as independent as he thought.²

The period between 1861 and 1864 passed peacefully in Zululand, only the outbreak of a smallpox epidemic was recorded as an event. Mthonga could not be happy around Cetshwayo who wanted him dead; therefore in 1864 he was able to escape into Natal. Shepstone received Mthonga happily and hoped to use him as pawn to check Cetshwayo in future dealings. Cetshwayo tried in vain to secure the return of Mthonga. Shepstone refused to release him. On hearing the news of Mthonga's escape, the Transvaal Boers fearing that Cetshwayo might annul the treaty beaconed off the border containing the area affected by the Waaihoek Treaty.¹²⁸

3.4.3 The End of Mpande's Long Reign

Mpande died of natural causes in October 1872 after ruling the Zulu kingdom for 32 years. He was the only son of Senzangakhona who reigned the longest and died of natural causes. His reign was largely peaceful with the Battle of Ndondakusuka as the only large scale armed conflict. The damage caused by the Boers to the Zulu kingdom was substantially repaired.

^{1:6}Ibid. pp. 202-203.

^{1:7}Ibid, p. 203.

Ibid. pp. 203-204.

particularly the loss of cattle. The kingdom was peaceful and more powerful than when Mpande took over.^{1,4}

The time of the transfer of power from the dead monarch to the heir apparent was a critical moment because of possible competitors. Cetshwayo did not make any immediate move to mount the throne. The situation was however tense due to events that preceded the death of Mpande. Mthonga was able to sneak into the kingdom shortly before his father's death and he also managed to leave the territory with Cetshwayo's spies in hot pursuit. It was also rumour that Mbuzwe was alive and on his way to take over the vacant throne. In order to strengthen his position, Cetshwayo procured 150 firearms and decided to seek the support of at least one of his European neighbours. In February 1873 he sent John Dunn and his messengers to invite Shepstone for the coronation ceremony.⁵⁰ The last time the two men met they did not part on good terms and Cetshwayo was inviting the same person who proclaimed the British as superior to the Zulu kingdom. During the last meeting, Shepstone had dictated to Cetshwayo regarding good behaviour. The invitation of Shepstone to the coronation could only serve to confirm the Zulu position towards the British colony as Shepstone had pronounced during the proclamation ceremony in the early 1860's..

3.5 Diamonds Discovery in South Africa

In 1867 diamonds were discovered in South Africa and started the process of industrialisation and foreign trade. Prior to this discovery, in 1862 alone about 25 million pounds of wool were exported from South Africa. The economy was dominated by wool as an important export commodity. The problem with wool was that Canada, Australia and New Zealand were producing more and better product compared to South Africa. Diamond mining placed the economy of South Africa on equal footing with Canada, Australia and New Zealand in all British Colonies³¹.

Kimberly the town of diamond mining became the second most populous town after Cape Town. During the diamond rush the town was boasting two churches, one hospital, a theatre and as many liquor facilities as the rest of South Africa. By 1871 it was estimated that about 50 000 people of various races were inhabitants of Kimberly. These inhabitants

⁴⁹"ibid, p. 204.

⁵⁰Ibid, pp. 204-206.

⁵¹ De Kiewiet. C.W. A History of South Africa: Social & Economic. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1941). pp. 88-89.

were falling outside the realm of the British Empire as Kimberly was lying between Orange and Vaal River.¹³²

The effects of diamonds discovery and subsequent exploitation were far reaching. Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Durban experienced an increase in imports and exports. The struggle for the control of Griqualand West, as the general area of diamond mining was known, broke out between the Boers and the British Colonial government. The industrial activity was so intensive that a need for native labour could not be ignored. The various tribes of South Africa. Basotho, Batswana, Xhosa, Zulus, found themselves working together in a strange place. The industry was characterised by anarchy and lack of economic policy to ensure that the benefits of diamond mining could be harnessed into economic power¹³³.

The area of diamond fields was occupied by Griquas. Tswanas. Koranas. Boers and Bushmen without properly defined boundaries. The existing borders were mostly disputed by the parties involved. The conditions allowed the stronger parties to prevail and the weaker find other means to survive. Parties who could not protect their claims like Tswana chiefs and Griqua captains looked up to the colonial office for protection. Sir Henry Barkly assumed his duties as the Governor of the Cape towards the end of 1870. On his arrival he was overwhelmed by the amount of complaints from Tswana chiefs and Griqua captains regarding their land claims in the diamond mines. Britain had given Barkly the task of preparing the Cape for the establishment of responsible government as a priority. The enormity of the diamond fields forced the new Governor to divert his attention¹³⁴.

Before the end of 1870 Waterboer, a Griqua captain, was smart enough to pledge his allegiance to the British colony. This act earned him recognition from Barkly such that his land was declared crown land and his people became British citizens. This decision angered a lot of people in London, Cape Town and Kimberly. The situation in the diamond fields worsened when the Orange Free State Boers rejected the annexation and kept their magistrate in Kimberly. The untimeliness of the annexation was evident in the appointment of the Lt Governor for Griqualand West. It took Barkly about 24 months to appoint Richard Southey as the Lt Governor who reported for his duties in Kimberly in December 1872¹³⁵.

¹³²"ibid

¹³³Ibid, p. 91.

¹³⁴ Phillip Gon. The Road to Isandlwana (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers. 1979). p. 32.

¹³⁵ Ibid. pp. 32-33.

As Lt Governor, Southey passed several ordinances in an attempt to ensure that the interests of the small claim holder are protected. Financial support was not forthcoming from the colonial government. Southey administration was saved from bankruptcy by the big business and he had to reciprocate in kind. Big business and wealthy diggers were able to control the mining activities to the detriment of the small claim holders.⁶

3.6 Conclusion

The settlement of Boers in Natal aroused the British interest towards the colonisation of the territory. The trading partners the Boers attracted to the port of Durban and the Boer treatment of the natives in and outside their Natal territory motivated the British to authorise the occupation of Natal. The occupation resulted in the Battle of Congella where the Boers were defeated. Subsequently, the British authorised the colonisation of Natal as part of the Cape colony. London's reluctance to expand colonies in South Africa due to lack of funds was the main reason for annexing Natal to the Cape.

Dingane attempted to prevent the Boers from settling in Natal but his efforts ended with his defeat by Mpande in 1840. Mpande became the king of the Zulu nation and cooperated with the Boers in accordance with the agreement he concluded when he was admitted as a refugee. However, he was quick to switch his allegiance to the British during the occupation and Battle of Congella and the subsequent colonialisation of Natal. Mpande was able to restore the kingdom to a stronger position than at his takeover. His reluctance to take or appoint a Great Wife caused confusion regarding the heir apparent. As a result Cetshwayo had to use excessive violence and purged most of his half-brothers to establish himself as an heir apparent.

In the colony of Natal, the Africans refused to work on farms for wages or engage in economic activities on commercial scale. Shepstone's Locations system gave the Africans access to land that was enough for them to sustain themselves through subsistence farming. The Zulus could only make their services available to the king as warriors and could not engage in wage labour. This shortage of menial labour caused the colonial farmers to agitate for the importation of indentured labour from India. The indentured labour started arriving in Natal from 1860 and continued until it was discontinued in 1911. Due to lack of funding and inadequate autonomy Natal remained a periphery of the Cape. It was unable to dominate the

Ibid. pp. 91-93.

native population in numbers and could not, as a colony, entirely control their activities. Africans, in Natal and Zululand, remained a core in the periphery and successfully resisted any form of dominance by the Natal colonialists. Natal was not effectively colonised and natives were not being exploited or producing for the imperial overlord but were cohabiting with the white settlers. Zululand had entered into a treaty with the British and existed as a sovereign state alongside the Natal colony. Britain was not reaping any form of benefits from colonising this territory except checking the Boers and protecting the British-India sea route.

The dominance of Cetshwayo and Theophilus Shepstone and the clash of their personalities came to the fore during this period. Cetshwayo used all means necessary to secure his claim to the future Zulu kingship. Besides purging his half-brothers, he employed the services of John Dunn as his ambassador and entered into the Treaty of Waaihoek with the Transvaal Boers. After realising that Cetshwayo was the main actor in the Zulu polity, Shepstone moved to impose British superiority over the Zulus and win amity of the future king by proclaiming him the heir apparent. More than ten years before ascending to the throne, Cetshwayo was busy mortgaging his kingship. These dealings were bound to have an effect on his future kingship in one way or another. His proclamation as heir apparent by Shepstone, John Dunn appointment and the Waaihoek Treaty were not beneficial to the kingship he was ten years away from ascending.

The British policy of non-expansion in South Africa was put to test during this period and it did not pass. Between 1843 and 1871 Britain annexed three territories, namely: Natal, Griqualand West and Basutholand, under the principle of self-financing. The British footprint in South Africa had increased drastically while the politicians in Britain were made to believe that the only British colony in South Africa was the Cape. This policy was a political gimmick that was broken at every opportunity but funds could not be procured directly into the new territories. Funds had to be procured through the Cape colony for political reasons.

CHAPTER FOUR

ANGLO-ZULU RELATIONS DURING THE REIGN OF CETSHWAYO 1873-18X4

4.1 Introduction

After Mpande's death Cetshwayo took over a kingdom that was largely peaceful. By 1873 Natal had an emerging economy led by the sugar industry. The emerging economy created a need for labour which could be addressed by engaging native populations inside and outside the Natal colony. Africans were reluctant to engage in wage employment under the white colonialists. The locations system gave natives in Natal some form of autonomy and economic self-sufficiency and they saw no need for working in the sugar industry. Due to farmers' agitation, the importation of indentured labour from India which started in November 1860 was continuing.

Cetshwayo ascended the throne in under unfavourable conditions. The non-interference approach that the British adopted towards Mpande was not guaranteed for him. Theophilus Shepstone already indicated during the proclamation ceremony that he viewed the Zulu kingdom as a dominion of the British Empire and expected Cetshwayo to rule according to the British regulations.

The problem of the half-brothers who were exiled in Natal and Transvaal was a matter of concern to Cetshwayo. In 1861 he had ceded some land to the Boers in the north in terms of the Waaihoek agreement in order to secure the person of Mthonga. Generally Cetshwayo did not trust many of his indunas and that might be one of the reasons he decided to appoint John Dunn as his ambassador in order to check the power of his own indunas.

4.2 Cetshwayo Becomes the King of the Zulus at Last

The passing of Mpande brought Cetshwayo's insecurities to the surface. There existed competition for the throne and power within Zululand. Hhamu was a potential competitor to

Cetshwayo although he fought on his side at Ndondakusuka. He was Mpande's son and had a substantial following and manpower on his side. Zibhebhu had ascended the powerful Mandlakazi throne and his allegiance was not certain. There were other notable chiefs whose power was a concern for Cetshwayo and this informed his decision to invite Shepstone for the coronation. Masiphula did not support the idea of Cetshwayo being proclaimed king by a white settler.⁷

Cetshwayo faced three problems after the death of his father. Firstly, some of his half-brothers who were competitors to the throne were exiled in Natal and Transvaal. They were all of the right age for the throne and there were rumours that they would come and take over. There was even a rumour that Mbuyazwe was not dead but resident in Natal. According to the rumour he was busy preparing to return to take over. Secondly, Mthonga was exiled in the Transvaal and the Boers were busy encroaching into the Zululand territory. Cetshwayo feared that the Boers can do what they did to Dingane using Mpande and this made him a worried man. Lastly, the missionaries were spreading the news of an impending civil war in Zululand. According to these news the Zulus were excited at the death of Mpande because there was now going be some fighting which they had not seen for a long time. The delay in the coronation and the invitation of Shepstone was an attempt by Cetshwayo to deal with the insecurities of the Zululand politics.¹³⁸

Mpande died in October 1872 and the ceremony could only take place between August and September 1873, almost a year later. The various chiefs had increased their power including manpower to an extent that it was widely anticipated that their meeting at the coronation was likely to result in violence erupting. The thought of Hhamu, Mnyamana, Zibhebhu and uSuthu sharing a stage peacefully was unimaginable to most observers at the

⁷Knight,Zulu Rising, p. 99.

¹³⁸Etherington, N. Anglo-Zulu Relations 1856-1878, in Ballard, C & Duminy, A (ed). The Anglo-Zulu War: New perspectives. (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1981). pp. 26-28.

time. Even Shepstone was accompanied by a credible force which brought an artillery piece to Zululand for any eventuality. The coronation managed to galvanise the Zulu nation behind Cetshwayo as their new king. Hhamu was made to declare his allegiance to Cetshwayo before the proceedings in order to clear the air. According to Zulu customs the Chief Induna of the dead monarch proclaims the new king and Masiphula proclaimed Cetshwayo king of the Zulus before Shepstone's arrival. Masiphula died a few days after the proclamation having completed his duty in line with the Zulu customs.³⁹

4.2.1 Shepstone Involvement in Cetshwayo's Coronation and the Coronation Laws

Cetshwayo invited Shepstone to the coronation in order to show his friendliness towards the British colony and to legitimatise his position amongst the Zulus. He was further weary of possible pretenders to the throne and Shepstone's presence was supposed to help discourage anyone who was still harbouring designs to the Zulu kingship. This partly explains the reason why it took nearly a year to hold the coronation. Shepstone on the other hand wanted to use the opportunity to strengthen his influence over Zululand and beyond. This was going to boost his prestige as the Diplomatic Agent for Africans and pave way towards more subordination of the Zulus and other natives outside Natal. Being the strongest and most cohesive native kingdom in southern Africa, having an influence over the Zulus would have made it easier for Shepstone to subordinate other small chiefdoms⁴⁰.

In addition, in inviting Shepstone Cetshwayo hoped that his presence at the coronation would bring his own (Cetshwayo's) power on par, if not higher, than that of the great territorial chiefs. The coronation laws were therefore going to be a useful tool in regulating chiefs' behaviour during Cetshwayo's kingship. The wording of the coronation laws are broad and difficult to identify to whom they were targeted. The laws as proclaimed read as follows:

³⁹ Morris, *The Washing of the Spears*, pp. 206-207.

⁴⁰ Cope, R.L. "Political Power within the Zulu Kingdom and the "Coronation Laws" of 1873". *Journal of Natal and Zulu History*. VIII, 1985. p. 12.

^{47^w} - That the indiscriminate shedding of blood shall cease in the land.

^{2nd} - That no Zulu shall be condemned without open trial and public examination for and against, and that he shall have a right of appeal to the King.

^{3rd} - That no Zulu's life shall be taken without the previous knowledge and consent of the King, after such a trial has taken place, and the right of appeal has been allowed to be exercised.

^{4th} - That for minor crimes the loss of property, all or portion, shall be substituted for the punishment of death ".¹⁴¹

The coronation laws are mostly believed to have been directed to Cetshwayo's person. The wording of the second and the third laws points to the chiefs and not Cetshwayo. After the formalities were completed Shepstone went on and addressed the royal family members and councillors regarding their responsibilities vis-a-vis the coronation laws and their relationship to the new king. Shepstone did his best to ensure that Cetshwayo was elevated to the right level as the king of the Zulus. The danger is that Shepstone might have wanted Cetshwayo to be dominant as a king so that he could be effectively used to further British interests. A king that was not effective would have been of no use to the British interests.¹⁴²

Parson Robertson, who was present at the coronation ceremony, called it a "farce", in his attempt to get some labour resources flowing from Zululand to Natal Cetshwayo allowed John Dunn to supply labourers from Delagoa Bay. Cetshwayo saw himself as an independent king of the Zulus. In 1876 he denied ever agreeing to the coronation laws. He was quoted as saying: "Did / ever tell Mr Shepstone I would not kill? "¹⁴³

4.2.2 Anglo-Zulu Relations under Cetshwayo

The intercourse between the Zulu kings and the Natal settlers decreased drastically during Mpande's reign. The Anglo-Zulu Treaty signed in 1843 clearly defined the boundaries between the two territories. During the reigns of Shaka and Dingane, the Natal territory was part of the Zulu kingdom and the settlers were technically part of their subjects. From 1845

¹⁴¹ Ibid. pp. 12-18.

¹⁴² Ibid. p. 18.

¹⁴³ Etherington. Anglo-Zulu Relations 1856-1878. p. 33.

Zulus were to remain north of Thukela River and the British on the south of the river. The only intercourse he could have with the British was through Theophilus Shepstone, John Dunn, missionaries, and hunters and traders. All these parties did not have the Zulu interests at heart but used Cetshwayo's influence for their own ends.¹⁴⁴

Theophilus Shepstone came to Zululand in 1861 to proclaim Cetshwayo the heir apparent and returned again in 1873 to crown him king of the Zulus. Cetshwayo was hoping that his involvement would enhance his position in the eyes of the British authorities, but Shepstone was actually enhancing his own status and prestige by associating himself with the king. After the Battle of Ndondakusuka, Mpande's sons who were not aligned to Cetshwayo were exiled to Natal and Transvaal. Mkhungo was one such son who went to Natal and Shepstone took him to Bishop Colenso so that he could be groomed for future use. Colenso was heard on various occasions boasting of having a Zulu king under his roof. Colenso and Shepstone were plotting against Cetshwayo and pretended to be his friends.¹⁴⁵ As a diplomatic agent Shepstone was supposed to be promoting good relations between the Africans and Europeans. On the contrary he created policies that kept the two groups apart and he used the Africans to enhance his reputation with the Europeans.

After crowning Cetshwayo, Shepstone opined that Zululand was not a place favourable to missionary operations. Cetshwayo and the Zulu kings before him held a view that religion was competing with their authority over their Zulu subjects. Missionaries were facing a dilemma. They persuaded Zulu converts to remain loyal to the kings without success. The converts argued that one person cannot be a subject of two kings therefore on becoming a convert the Zulus denounced their king immediately. Mpande expelled some of the missionaries, some left Zululand on their own accord and a few remained in the territory.

¹⁴⁴Ibid. p. 15.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid. pp. 15-17.

The news of Shepstone going to Zululand to crown a king brought some hope that conditions might improve for missionary work to resume. Shepstone returned to Natal with the bad news that religious conversion was still forbidden in Zululand.¹⁴⁶

Missionaries became advocates of invasion of Zululand. As a result they were ready to cooperate with Bartle Frere, even the Norwegian missionaries who detested British imperialism began to see invasion as a solution. When Frere was looking for information to justify the war against the Zulus he found the missionaries ready to cooperate. It was against this background that Robertson, one of the Missionaries in Zululand. actively participated in spreading of propaganda against Cetshwayo in the process of justifying the

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invasion.

In 1857 John Dunn changed his allegiance and became Cetshwayo's advisor on colonial matters, and a trader. He was accepted in Zululand given several wives and land in Ongoye district. Cetshwayo was of the view that his claim to the throne was less contested than before 1856 and he needed to make connections with the British and the Boers and John Dunn was the best person for that job. Therefore Dunn became the Cetshwayo's ambassador to Natal and Transvaal. Maphalala observed that Cetshwayo was already gravitating towards the British and the Boers to an extent that he did not kill any of them during the battle in 1856, although they were assisting iziGqoza. He was even prepared to compensate them for the loss of their cattle and other property suffered during the battle. It was this opportunity that John Dunn saw and exploited. He was not interested in promoting the interests of the Zulu heir apparent in Natal and Transvaal.¹⁴⁸

The relationship between Cetshwayo and John Dunn was exposed on the eve of the invasion of Zululand. The councillors felt that Dunn did not do his job well regarding the

¹⁴⁶Cope. R.L. "Written in Characters of Blood? The Reign of King Cetshwayo kaMpande 1872-79". The Journal of African History Vol 36. No 2. 1995. pp 250-51.

¹⁴⁷Ibid. p. 251.

¹⁴⁸Ibid. pp. 234-235.

intentions of British Empire in Zululand and therefore he should be put to death. This threatened his life and his interests in Zululand and he decided that it was better to defect to Natal. Laband argues that initially Dunn tried to be neutral but the British successfully lure him to their side and his knowledge of the Zulu territory and people was invaluable. On 31 December 1878 he decided to defect with two thousand followers and three thousand heads of cattle.¹⁴⁹

Cetshwayo's ill-advised appointment of Dunn backfired at the time he needed him the most. His lack of relative power and legitimacy caused him to seek support from dubious sources and thereby opening himself up for opportunists like John Dunn and Theophilus Shepstone. Dunn used his relationship with Cetshwayo to enrich himself and enhance his prestige in Natal and Zululand. In his twenty-one years of service as the king's ambassador there is lack of evidence to prove his promotion of Zulu interests amongst the British and the Boers. There is sufficient evidence that he was successful in accumulating wealth and prestige such that by time he defected he was the richest man in Zululand.¹⁵⁰

Dunn advised Cetshwayo to acquire firearms in order to bolster his power that was checked by that of the chiefs. This advice amounted to self-enrichment because Dunn was the supplier of the firearms since he was a known gun runner amongst other businesses in Zululand. His modus operandi included exporting firearms from Durban to Delagoa Bay from where Dunn personally transported them to Zululand for sale. In Zululand the firearms were exchanged at a rate of one firearm for one beast in 1870 which increased to four beasts for the same amount of firearms by 1879 translating to a 400% rate increase in nine years. Disregarding the causes of the price increase the seller of the firearms hugely benefited from this increase. The cattle were driven to Durban where they were sold for cash to the white

¹⁴⁹Laband, J.P.C. "The Cohesion of the Zulu Polity under the Impact of the Anglo-Zulu War: A Reassessment" *Journal of Natal and Zulu History*, Vol. VIII, 1985, p. 59.

¹⁵⁰Ibid, pp. 59-60.

settlers. This was one of the ways John Dunn was able to amass wealth and status using his relations with Cetshwayo.¹⁵¹

43 The Ideal for the Confederation of Southern Africa as a Cause of War

By 1870, officials in Britain were concerned with the British Empire and its pre-eminence. These concerns are best explained by views expressed by James Froude. Carnarvon and Macfie during the period 1870-72. In 1870 Froude observed that Britain was enjoying an increase in its rate of trade but was worried about its sustainability and justifiability. Carnarvon noted that the Empire was facing stiff international competition and could not afford to do away with colonies because they would be useful in dealing with this competition. In May 1872 RA Macfie, then Director of Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, was of the opinion that there were forces causing Britain to lose its edge as a leader in manufacturing and therefore warned that preparations were required to ensure that colonies can be used as a safety valve to counter the possibility of unemployment.^{1^H} These were concerns that required action and the officials uttering them were well positioned to influence policy formulation and implementation.

4.3.1 The Origins of the Confederation Ideal

Conditions of an economic stagnation were experienced in Europe and USA over the period 1873 to 1896. This period is known as the period of "Great Depression". The concerns that were raised by the British officials were precursors to the depression. British overseas investments fell from £73 million over the period 1870-74 to £28 million over the period 1875-1879; export of domestically produced goods fell from the normal 15% annual growth

¹⁵¹Guy, J.J. "A Note on Firearms in the Zulu Kingdom with Special Reference to the Anglo-Zulu War. 1879". The Journal of African History, Vol. 12, No. 4. 1971. pp. 559-560.

^{1,2}Cope, R.L. "Local Imperatives and Imperial Policy: The Source of Lord Carnarvon's South African Confederation Policy", The International Journal of African Historical Studies. Vol. 20, No. 4. 1987, pp 601-626. p- 7.

rate to 3% over the same period; Bankruptcies became the order of the day. Robert Giffen who was head of Statistics Department in 1877 opined that trade stagnation over the period was unprecedented and was further concerned that it was likely to be permanent. The conditions did not become permanent but the period is known as the longest economic cycle. These conditions caused liberals in Britain to view colonies as a burden worth abandoning as they were draining resources from the homeland.¹⁵³

Carnarvon viewed colonies as a source of national power that required harnessing and disagreed with the liberal view of the colonies. Benjamin Disraeli believed that colonies should be given self-governing status as a form of a greater scheme of Imperial consolidation. Carnarvon disagreed with Disraeli but could not argue with his master. He thought the view should be adopted and managed towards a greater scheme:

"...which may yet in the fullness of time be realised, of a great English-speaking community united together in a peaceful confederation, too powerful to be molested by any nation, and too powerful and too generous, I hope, to molest any weaker State".¹⁵⁴

Lord Carnarvon, as Secretary of State for Colonies, embarked on a policy of quietly annexing unindustrialised territories occupied by natives. The idea was to preserve the advantage of links and influence with the native rulers as an informal hegemon so that other great powers could not lay claim over the same territory. This amounted to colonising the territories without the burden of occupation and administration. There were concerns that overt expansionism would inspire other great powers like Germany to emulate the act. In a letter to Derby Carnarvon enquired if it was possible to assert British supremacy along the

¹⁵³ Ibid. pp. 5-6.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid. p. 6.

South African coast and exclude any intrusion. Derby emphatically stated that it was difficult to lay claim to an unoccupied territory.¹⁵⁵

The main role players in confederation of South African states were Lord Carnarvon, Sir Garnet Wolseley and Theophilus Shepstone. Lord Carnarvon used Langalibalele incident as a vehicle to capitalise on Natal colonialists' insecurities to realise his confederation project. On hearing the incident he concluded that a confederation was the panacea of all ills in Southern Africa. Accordingly, in August 1874 he despatched James Fraude to South Africa to investigate the feasibility of the confederation. The Langalibalele incident affected security perceptions of Natal colonialists and it was the Natal colonialists who initiated the attack on the Hlubi people. Langalibalele and his people used their resources to defend themselves. The main issue was that the Natal settlers wanted to dictate to Africans on how to behave in their own land and any resistance was punishable by violence.¹⁵⁶

In 1875 Carnarvon asked Barkly to organise a conference of delegates from all states to discuss the different systems of native treatment and the issue of Griqualand West. The request was motivated by reports from Froude and an embellished briefing from Shepstone. It is clear that the matter of natives could not have been included without Shepstone's input and the Griqualand West was influenced by Froude's opinion on the annexation of the territory. The items Carnarvon wanted on the agenda of the conference were remotely related to the core issues of the confederation. As the Secretary of State for Colonies, Carnarvon was in an authoritative position to push the plan unopposed by personalities in South Africa. The assistance of Shepstone and Wolseley could be useful in giving the implementation feet on the ground.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁵Ibid. p. 9.

¹⁵⁶Gon. The Road to ISandlwana. p. 55.

¹⁵⁷Ibid. p. 56

Lord Carnarvon used his influence in the British politics effectively. At the beginning of 1877 London introduced a Draft South African Bill allowing states in favour of the confederation to unite under the government of the Cape Colony. The confederation was to be modelled on the British North America Act of 1867. The act was also known as the Permissive Act and it was supposed to serve as a guide towards incorporation. This act was seeking to incorporate the white settlers under one flag and leave the natives in the hands of the British Government. The Act contained a clause stipulating that all laws passed by the federal parliament would be subject to approval by Her Majesty's Government. The Bill was not taken serious by the Cape parliamentarians who viewed the preparations for the South African International Exhibition as more important. Consequently it was shelved until the arrival of Bartle Frere two months later.¹⁸

4.3.2 Lord Carnarvon's Influence in Anglo-Zulu Relations

Carnarvon's was described as ambitious, obstinate and sensitive to criticism. At the age of thirty-five, he was credited with introducing a bill that led to the confederation of British North American Provinces that endeared him to the government and the wider political circles. The ideal of the Southern Africa confederation originated from his office and he campaigned vigorously for its acceptance by the colonists. He needed disciples in form of

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Wolseley, Shepstone and Froude to realise acceptance and successful implementation.

The Langalibalele Rebellion gave Carnarvon an opportunity to put his confederation plan in motion. He wanted to do something that would change Southern Africa permanently and therefore looked at unification exercises carried out in Canada, Australia and Leeward Islands. He concluded that South Africa was more than ready for a similar unification

¹⁸⁸Ibid. p. 80.

¹"Mortis.The Washing of the Spears, pp. 226-227.

exercise. He further reasoned that it was a confederation that would give Southern Africa a unified native policy which would permit further political development.¹⁶⁰

The confederation plan was set in motion by sending James Fraude to South Africa to promote its viability and an instruction was sent to Barkly directing him to convene a conference of all South African states. Two issues were to be included on the agenda, namely: the native affairs and the Griqualand West question. Fraude failed to get the support of colonists for the confederation ideal. He returned to Britain with a report identifying Barkly and Molteno as obstacles to the ideal. This turn of events infuriated Carnarvon and he went out to take punitive measures and ensure the plan to get compliance in future. He applied to the war office to be loaned the services of Major General Garnet Wolseley in order to replace Benjamin Pine as a Lt Governor of Natal. Before his departure to South Africa, Wolseley was carefully briefed by Carnarvon and later by Shepstone. The elevation of Shepstone to the advisor of Carnarvon and briefing of Wolseley derived from his acceptance and support of the confederation plan.¹⁶¹

The failure of the Cape administration to convene a confederation conference did not discourage Carnarvon. In August 1876 he convened and chaired another conference in London. The attendants of the conference were Garnet Wolseley, Theophilus Shepstone, President Brand and James Froude. Molteno refused to attend the conference and Brand walked out as soon as the confederation came up for discussion. Molteno's refusal to attend the conference resulted in the conference reaching an impasse. After the impasse it appeared as if the confederation ideal had reached a dead end until Froude suggested the roping in of Sir Bartle Frere to replace Barkly as high Commissioner to South Africa so that the confederation ideal could move forward.¹⁶²

¹⁶⁰"ibid. p. 228.

¹⁶¹Ibid. pp. 234-235.

¹⁶²"ibid. p. 245.

Bartle Frere's history in India suggested that he was the type of an administrator who believed that the man on the spot had the prerogative to decide and act according to his understanding of the situation. He had proved himself during the Punjab mutiny in 1862 where acted on his own initiative and succeeded to bring the mutiny under control. This single act won him a KCB. In 1872, acting without London's approval, he blockaded the island of Zanzibar to force the sultan to abandon the slave trade and succeeded. This earned him accolades from prestigious British institutions. Judging by these few incidents it is clear that Frere was a man who had acted outside authority and succeeded. His appointment was based on the fact that he does not wait for official direction to take a specific course of action. On his arrival in Cape Town on 31 March 1877 he was aware that according to his contract he was supposed to realise the confederation in two years. Twelve days after his arrival Shepstone annexed the Transvaal."¹⁶³

Frere's past successes were partly a result of the support he obtained from those he had worked with. Accordingly, he had never been exposed to the conditions he was about to face in South Africa. Carnarvon reasoned that the post of the Cape governor was unthankful undertaking unable to attract a high calibre diplomats in mould of Bartle Frere. He used this line of reasoning to sweeten the deal to entice Frere to accept the job in South Africa.

Frere's terms of employment were thus as follows:

- > *A high commissioner for two years with salary of £5,000 and a representation allowance of £2,000.*
- > *Frere was also given the post of a High Commissioner for Native Affairs for South Africa. This gave him a bigger voice than Shepstone in all affairs pertaining to the Africans in South Africa.*
- > *He was going to remain as the first Governor General of the unified South Africa with a salary of £10,000."*

¹⁶³ Ibid. pp. 80-81.

"Ibid, p. 247.

Theophilus Shepstone was knighted in August 1876 but had lost his supremacy over native affairs to Bartle Frere. He had been very active in supporting the confederation ideal for Carnarvon and deserved to be recognised for his efforts. He was therefore compensated with the annexation of the Transvaal. Shepstone was given a Royal Commission authorising him to annex the Transvaal if and when the circumstances in his opinion allowed for such action. On his part Shepstone reasoned that the annexation of the Transvaal needed crises to exist. He was thus disappointed when Sekhukhune, the Pedi chief, did press his advantage on after routing the Boers in the Transvaal. The Zulus were also not likely to attack the Boers any time sooner although there was an issue of a disputed territory between them. In terms of his old portfolio as the diplomatic Agent for Africans Shepstone started stepping away from it as soon as he returned from London with the Royal Commission.¹⁶⁵

In 1878 Carnarvon abandoned the confederation ideal and resigned due to his frustration with the progress of his confederation ideal. Sir Bartle Frere had taken up his two year contract in 1877 and a year later South Africa was nowhere near the confederation ideal. The remaining period was not enough to realise the confederation of Southern Africa and it is possible that Carnarvon decided to cut his losses, saved himself embarrassment and resigned with his dignity intact. Frere, Wolseley and Shepstone were left with the confederation plan without a powerful supporter in the colonial office.¹⁶⁶

4.3.3 James Froude's Role in Advancing the Confederation Ideal

James Froude was a noted historian and student of imperial affairs. Carnarvon sent him to South Africa to investigate for him the feasibility of a confederation. Instead of investigating feasibility, Froude went ahead and started marketing the confederation ideal to the colonists who saw it as a threat to their established interests. On his arrival he was

¹⁶⁵Ibid. p. 249.

¹⁶⁴Ibid. p. 256.

readily sympathetic to the Boers and admired their way of life amongst other things. He shared the Boers' opinion that the Africans could only be civilised through discipline and labour.¹⁶⁷

He visited Cape Town, Griqualand West, Natal and Port Elizabeth organising a conference to discuss the confederation ideal. In Cape Town the administration was divided and could not even start discussing the confederation as one administration. This angered Froude to an extent that he recommended to Carnarvon that Barkly, the Governor of Cape Town should be replaced if the confederation ideal was to be realised. In Griqualand West he criticised the annexation of the diamond fields as the obstacle to confederation. He was of the opinion that the diamond fields should be returned to the Boers who would integrate with it into the confederation. In Port Elizabeth, Froude opined it feasible for Eastern Cape to enter into the confederation as an independent state. In Natal he offered Wolseley the position of a president of the conference. Wolseley thought he was being used for other purposes and refused the post. In the end, the confederation conference did not take place until Froude was recalled by Carnarvon to Britain."^H

The ideal of a confederation originated from Carnarvon's office and other personalities were manipulated to ensure its realisation. Carnarvon's had succeeded with the British North American Confederation of 1867 which elevated his status as a colonial administrator but South Africa was different. James Froude was sent to investigate feasibility of the confederation but decided the best thing he could do was marketing and testing the acceptability of the ideal.¹⁶⁹

^{"^Gon.}The Road to ISandlwana. p. 55.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, pp. 55-62.

¹⁶⁹ibid. p. 56.

4.3.4 Theophilus Shepstone's Role in Advancing the Confederation Ideal

Shepstone was appointed as the first Secretary of Native Affairs in the Natal Government. He did not see his jurisdiction as restricted to matters pertaining to Natal Africans, but he extended it to include neighbouring native territories. His attitude and approach towards blacks was informed by background as a child and young man in South Africa. He arrived in South Africa as a three year old with his parents. His father, William Shepstone left his work as stonemason and became a Wesleyan lay preacher. The family settled in Eastern Cape and a young Theophilus grew up with Xhosas and learned their language and way of life. As an adult the natives referred to him as "Somtsewu" which meant the "white patriarch". Theophilus Shepstone witnessed most of the frontier wars as a boy and a young man. At the outbreak of another frontier war in 1834 he was employed as an interpreter attached to Colonel Harry Smith. The Cape Government found him to be suitable candidate to head the Native Affairs for the new colony of Natal in 1845.¹⁷⁰

In his capacity as Secretary of Native Affairs he introduced the locations system and the Hut Tax. The location system separated the Natal Africans from the white settlers and thereby contributed to peaceful coexistence between the two societies. During the 1840's Shepstone proposed the movement of all Africans to another area where he would be their king or chief. He was hard working, manipulative, power hungry and ambitious. He used his portfolio to improve the government and also to enhance his status and prestige. Since Natal was not receiving funding from London, his Hut Tax gave the Natal government much needed revenue. Shepstone saw himself as supreme chief of all Africans in South Africa. This he showed by attacking Langalibalele, attempting to annex Basutholand into Natal, and dictating to Cetshwayo. He was influential in provoking Langalibalele into a rebellion and

¹⁷⁰McClendon, T. "The Man who Would be Inkosi: Civilising Missions in Shepstone's Early Career". The Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol 30, No 2, 2004, pp. 340-350.

thereafter ensured that his chiefdom was destroyed. He further imposed himself over Cetshwayo as a superior authority over the Zulu kingdom.¹⁷¹

After the Langalibalele Rebellion Shepstone became more obsessed with power and felt that he was more powerful than Lt Governor Benjamin Pine. When Pine sent him to London to explain the incident to Lord Carnarvon, the Secretary of State for colonies in London, he used the opportunity to criticise Pine. He gave advice to Carnarvon on how to deal with the problem of natives in South Africa. Carnarvon liked Shepstone's ideas to an extent that he adopted and implementing them. After a few consultations with Shepstone. Carnarvon announced to his staff that he had found the solution for the problem of South African native policy.¹⁷²

His potential power in Natal and the knowledge of native affairs was seen by Carnarvon as useful in advancing the confederation ideal. Carnarvon was on a crusade to enhance his reputation with the British politicians while Shepstone thought he could play a major role in a unified South Africa as a guru of native affairs. The two were mutually complementary in the advancement of the confederation ideal since they both stood to benefit from its realisation. Shepstone had an opportunity to exert his influence on Carnarvon during the meetings they had between 1874 and 1876.¹⁷³

The appointment of Bartle Frere and the transfer of the native affairs portfolio to the new governor was a surprise and left Shepstone exposed. James Froude recommended the appointment and probably the inclusion of the native affairs in the High Commissioner's portfolio with the aim of checking Shepstone's power and influence. For his efforts Shepstone was knighted in August 1876 and given a Royal Commission to annex Transvaal at his own will, which he implemented on 12 April 1877. The annexation occurred a few

¹⁷¹ Ibid. pp. 348-354.

¹⁷² Etherington. Anglo-Zulu Relations 1856-1878. p. 34.

¹⁷³ Ibid. p. 245.

days before the arrival of Bartle Frere. It is likely that Shepstone did not trust the new governor and decided to make his move before him in case he disapproved of his plan or outmanoeuvred him.¹⁷⁴

After receiving his Royal Commission, Shepstone could not wait to become the leader of the Transvaal Boers. He believed that he needed a crisis to befall the territory to justify his annexation. On 27 December 1876 he carried out a tour of the Transvaal and found the administration and finances to be in such shamble that he could use it to justify the annexation. On 12 April 1877 he rode into the Transvaal and hoisted the British flag as a sign of the territory being part of the British Empire. There was no resistance because he had used his December trip to familiarise himself with the Boers and he was familiar with most of those who were influential. Furthermore he was a good speaker of their Dutch language.¹⁷⁵

4.3.5 Langalibalele Rebellion and Its Contribution to the Confederation Ideal

Langalibalele was a Hlubi chieftain who was displaced by Mpande in the early 1840's. He fled with his people from Zululand, crossed the Buffalo River and settled in the foothills of E>rakensberg. He technically became a Natal native and thus fell under Theophilus Shepstone's jurisdiction. His people had the opportunity of working in the diamond fields and obtained firearms as remuneration. The Hlubi community became a gun owning native society. Native gun ownership was not illegal in Zululand but the white settlers felt insecure in midst of armed natives and something had to be done. Langalibalele and his people were ordered to register their firearms with the Natal authorities.¹⁷⁶

Although Natal laws required firearms to be registered. Africans who tried to do so in the past were denied registration and their firearms were confiscated. Natives believed that

¹⁷⁴ Morris. The Washing of the Spears, p. 249.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid. pp. 251-252.

¹⁷⁶ Cion. The Road to ISandlwana. p. 50.

the order to have their firearms registered was equivalent to a request to surrender those firearms without any prospect of compensation. Langalibalele and his people must have understood and defied the registration order because they understood it as a call to surrender their prized weapons.¹⁷

When Shepstone ordered Langalibalele and his people to register their firearms with the Natal authorities, the Hlubis ignored the order and abused the messengers who delivered the message. Shepstone felt undermined and took the incident personal and viewed Langalibalele's insubordination as an insult and a threat to his native reserves system. On 2 November 1873 a small force of whites and native levies under Major Dunford was mobilised to punish the Hlubis. The force was hastily assembled because Langalibalele was more famous as a rainmaker than as a warrior.¹⁸

The main aim of the expedition was to stop Langalibalele from fleeing Natal. Shepstone argued that the defiance would set a bad example to other native chiefs and undermine his authority and the credibility of the native reserve system. Accordingly, Langalibalele had to be prevented from fleeing and taught a lesson as a warning to other native chiefs.¹⁷⁹ While on the march in the Drakensberg the Natal force came across a detached Hlubi rear guard and a fire fight ensued. The Natal force was routed and three soldiers died including the son of the Natal colonial secretary. Major Dunford also sustained serious injuries but succeeded in withdrawing his force and minimised the losses.¹⁸⁰

After the incident Natal settlers feared spontaneous native uprising against the colonial administration. Langalibalele had to be punished in order to discourage anyone who thought of following his act and lay his hands on the white settlers' and their allies. Later in November the Natal force returned to Drakensberg and randomly killed more than two

¹⁷Mon-is. The Washing of the Spears, p. 216.

¹⁸Gon. The Road to ISandlwana. pp. 50-51.

¹⁹Morris. The Washing of the Spears, p. 217.

²⁰Gon. The Road to ISandlwana. p. 51.

hundred Hlubis including women and children. Langalibalele was later arrested and faced a makeshift court which found him guilty of treason. He was therefore sentenced to life imprisonment.¹⁰¹

Natal lacked facilities to detain long-term political prisoners and Langalibalele was transferred to Robben Island in Cape Town. Cape Town was directed by the London office to pass Act No 3 of 1874 to cater for the incarceration of Langalibalele in Robben Island. Bishop Colenso protested this incarceration to the London authorities. He took the matter up with the newly appointed Secretary of State for Colonies, Lord Carnarvon. Firstly, Carnarvon directed that Langalibalele be brought back to the mainland. Secondly, special agent, in the person of James Anthony Fraude, was sent to South Africa to investigate the feasibility of a confederation.^{1x}:

The Langalibalele Affair affected the relationship between natives and white settlers in Natal. The white settlers were then beginning to exert their authority over the native societies outside the Natal location system, and these populations were resisting. There were always fear that the native populations outside Natal, especially the Zulus, posed a perpetual security threat to the Natal colony.

Froude's reports to Carnarvon painted a picture of an imminent native uprising in Natal, led by the Zulus. In reaction to the Langalibalele incident Carnarvon replaced Lt Governor of Natal, Sir Benjamin Pine with Sir Garnet Wolseley for a period of six months (April-September 1875). Wolseley was a respected militarist who distinguished himself in the Ashanti expedition. Carnarvon's appointment of Wolseley was the first step of British preparations for war with the Zulus. Wolseley accepted the post to please the Tory government since he was made to believe that there was an imminent war with the Zulus. The type of staff and powers Wolseley demanded from Carnarvon indicates that he was

¹⁰¹"Morris, The Washing of the Spears, p. 222.

^{1x}Gon, The Road to Isandlwana, pp.51-52.

coming for war with the natives outside Natal. For example, one of his demands was the authority to raise troops in South Africa and Mauritius as the circumstances demanded."¹⁸³

The Langalibalele Rebellion was used by Carnarvon and Shepstone to further their ideal for a confederation. The incident generated fear amongst the white natal residents who were outnumbered by the Africans inside Natal. They feared that the Natal Africans and the Zulus in Zululand might be inspired by the Langalibalele incident and stage an uprising or invasion. This turn of events served the confederation ideal well. This became an excuse for mounting a war with the Zulus.

4.4 The Anglo-Zulu War of 1879

Preparations for the Anglo-Zulu War started in 1875 with the appointment of Garnet Wolseley as an administrator of Natal.¹⁸⁴ This appointment was informed by the sentiments of James Froude and the Natal whites after the Langalibalele Rebellion. James Froude reports to London suggested that Natal was about to be invaded by the Zulus who were many times more than Langalibalele's Hlubis. The appointment of Wolseley was aimed at achieving two objectives. Firstly, he had to carry out a topographical study of the Natal area for future colonial policy. Wolseley came to Natal with an idea of waging war. On his landing in Cape Town newspapers observed that this was the first time that such eminent officers were appointed to a South African territory. He further requested for wide authority to raise forces as further afield as Mauritius. Secondly, he was to prepare Natal for incorporation in the federation by shaping the politics and government of Natal. His efforts did not succeed due to the reluctance of the Cape Government to move towards the confederation.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸³ Ibid. pp. 52-53.

¹⁸⁴ De Kiewiet. A History of South Africa: Social & Economic, p. 279.

¹⁸⁵ Gon, The Road to ISandlwana. pp.52-53

Wolseley's work was made difficult by the presence of James Froude in South Africa. The Cape Governor, Henry Barkly refused to cooperate with Froude who was sent to promote the ideal of a confederation by Carnarvon. Wolseley was offered the post of presiding over the confederation of states after its failure to take place in Cape Town, but he turned it down because he believed Froude was using him for his own selfish ends. After falling out of favour with Carnarvon's agent Wolseley returned to London but remained on the team working on confederation. He was of the opinion that Shepstone was the most competent of the Natal administrators and his command of native languages, including Dutch, gave an added advantage.

Carnarvon was not discouraged by the failure of Garnet Wolseley to achieve the objectives but learned from the experience. In 1876 he decided to appoint Sir Bartle Frere in the place of Henry Barkly for the Cape Governor. He felt that someone willing to advance the confederation was needed in Cape Town and his choice of a candidate was met with wide approval in London. Froude thought Frere was the best alternative to Wolseley while Lord Salisbury believed that he was the man to quickly bring the blacks and the Boers under control. Frere was actually over-qualified for the job and had to be persuaded with a specially packaged remuneration deal to accept the post. He was further promised the

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position of governor general of the confederation of Southern Africa states.

4.4.1 The Ultimatum

On 11 December 1878 an ultimatum was sent out to Cetshwayo to comply with in order to avoid invasion of Zululand. The terms and the timing, including the time allowed for compliance were all done in bad faith, and meant to be impossible to comply with.

Ibid. pp. 61-63.

^{1r7} Ibid. pp. 79-80.

Preparations for the invasion were completed and British forces were already positioned on the Natal-Zululand border.¹⁸⁸

Cetshwayo was required to comply within 30 days, by 11 January 1879 with the following:

- ' *Surrender three sons of Sihayo and his brother for trial in Natal. The surrender was related to the incident that occurred on 28 July 1878 where the sons of Sihayo entered Natal and forcibly removed two women and killed them in Zululand. The women were wives of Sihayo and he ran into Natal with other men.*
- > *Payment of 500 herds of cattle for failure by Cetshwayo to comply with an earlier order issued by Lt Governor of Natal regarding the surrender of Sihayo's sons.*
- > *Payment of 100 herds of cattle as a redress for the harassment of British agents who on a surveying mission by the Zulus in September 1878. The incident was treated as a minor one at its occurrence but blown out of proportion for the ultimatum purposes.*
- > *The surrender of Prince Mbilini waMswati for trial in Natal for his incursion and killing of fifty Africans in Transvaal in October 1878. Mbilini was an exiled Swad prince living in Zululand and Cetshwayo had given the Boers permission to deal with him as they pleased.*

Complying with the terms of the ultimatum was a difficult task for Cetshwayo due to the fact that power in his kingdom was more diffused than during Shaka's era. He could not afford to surrender Sihayo's family to the British. His offer of a thousand heads of cattle was rejected. Fearing the implications on his power vis-i-vis Sihayo's influence in Zululand and the time allowed for compliance Cetshwayo found himself having to defy the ultimatum and face the might of the British arms.¹⁹⁰

Other demands included:

"Colenbrander, P. "An Imperial High Commissioner and the Making of War". Reality, January, 1979, p. 15.
""ibid. pp. 15-16.
""ibid

Th^e Army had to be disbanded and warriors demobilised with immediate effect;

* *A British Resident had to accepted in Zululand to look after the interests of the whites and the converts.*

> *Missionaries were to be allowed to operate freely in Zululand.¹⁹¹*

Incidents used as basis for the ultimatum framework actually occurred when preparations for the invasion were already underway. The forcible removal of Sihayo's wives from Natal which is the earliest incident on the list occurred on 28 July 1878. The decision to invade Zululand was taken long before July 1878. In April 1878 the Commander of HMS Active, a Royal Navy ship that was deployed along the Natal-Zululand coast, remarked that he was told by Bartle Frere earlier that complications necessitating operations in Zululand were to arise shortly. Lord Chelmsford wrote on 1 June 1878 that it was more than probable that active steps were to be taken to check the arrogance of Cetshwayo.¹⁹²

The colonial officials did not believe they could have peace and prosperity in South Africa as long as a cohesive native kingdom of the Zulus continued to exist. The ideal of a Southern Africa confederation depended on a unified policy on native settlements and control which had proved impossible for the Africans in Zululand. Zululand had to be attacked and destroyed at all costs and the presentation of an ultimatum was just a facade to please the British authorities and justify the invasion. The act of rejecting the offer of a thousand herds of cattle and the invading on 11 January 1879 without even allowing for a grace period shows that Britain wanted nothing short of war with the Zulus. Anticipating victory Bartle Frere knew that the British Army stood to get more cattle than a mere thousand.¹⁹³

["] Gon, The Road to Isandlwana, p. 199.

Ibid

^wIbid, p. 15.

4.4.2 The Invasion and Destruction of Zululand

Lord Chelmsford the Commander of British forces in South Africa since 4 March 1878 had the duty of planning and leading the war against the Zulus. He had limited experience he obtained during the last frontier war in the Eastern Cape, and was of the opinion that the Zulus had to be thoroughly defeated in a manner to remove any doubts about British superiority. The British Army had three main objectives: namely, the destruction of the Zulu Army, the destruction of the Zulu seat of power at Ulundi, and the capture of King Cetshwayo. The achievement of the military objectives was supposed to facilitate the realisation of the Confederation of Southern Africa.¹⁹⁴

The original plan was to advance with five columns which would converge on Ulundi. Logistical constraints caused Chelmsford to settle for three advancing and two defensive columns. The advancing columns crossed into Zululand using natural crossings and were supposed to converge at Ulundi. They consisted of the left, right and the centre columns. Chelmsford anticipated that the centre column would attract the attention of the main Zulu Army. He therefore decided that this was his main force and remained it. The defensive columns were deployed within Natal to counter against possible raids by Zulu Army into Natal. After the battle of iSandlwana the plans were changed and two columns were later used to attack and destroy Ulundi.¹⁹⁵

Cetshwayo, on the other hand, decided to adopt a defensive strategy against the invading British Army. He was of the view that by playing a victim of an unwarranted British invasion he was placing the Zulu kingdom in a better position to bargain for a favourable post war settlement. The essence of this strategy involved restricting his forces'

¹⁹⁴Maplesden. M., "A Consideration of the Adequacy of British Military Tactics during the Battles of the Anglo-Zulu War", www.Angloziiluvvar.com. 2011, pp. 1-2.

¹⁹⁵Ibid. pp. 2-4.

activities within the Zulu territory. The Zulu King further advised his commanders against pursuing the British Army into Natal. Defending on three fronts stretched the Zulu Army resources, made it weaker and facilitated its defeat.¹⁹⁶

The war was executed in four distinct phases, namely: the first invasion, regrouping, second invasion, and pacification and withdrawal. The first invasion took place during the period 6-31 January 1879. Regrouping and receiving of the reinforcements was carried out between 1 February and 18 March 1879. Once Lord Chelmsford was happy with his force levels a second invasion was launched between 6 April and 8 July 1879. This invasion culminated with the Battle of Ulundi where the Zulus were defeated. After the victory at Ulundi the British forces started withdrawing from the area until 22 September 1879.¹⁹⁷

The Battle of iSandlwana was the main event of the first invasion phase and influenced the conduct of war thereafter. During this battle the British suffered a crushing defeat on the African soil from a native army. After this defeat Lord Chelmsford withdrew his forces, particularly the central column, back to Natal in panic and requested reinforcements from Britain. Although the war against the Zulus was not authorised, the defeat was too embarrassing for the British to ignore Chelmsford's request. In Natal Chelmsford took over a month reorganising his forces and planning for the second invasion. During this period the weaknesses of the Zulu strategy were exposed. Instead of following up the victory into the British territory, the Zulus retreated back to Ulundi and gave Chelmsford more time and space to reorganise.¹⁹⁸

The British government dispatched reinforcements to Zululand promptly. These forces were largely drawn from Britain, Ceylon and St Helena. The rapid arrival of

¹⁹⁶Yahand, J & Thompson, P. The Illustrated Guide to the Anglo-Zulu War. (Pietermaritzburg: Natal University Press, 2000). pp. 45-47.

¹⁹⁷Ibid. pp. 49-65.

¹⁹⁸Ibid. pp. 49-51.

reinforcements enabled the British Army to be ready for the second invasion towards the end of March and launched the invasion as from 6 April. During the second invasion, Chelmsford based his plan on two main columns which converged just before Ulundi and attacked from there as one force. On 8 July 1879 the British Army overran Ulundi and defeated the Zulus. Thereafter the process of burning Ulundi and other homestead and the looting of livestock by the British Army started. Cetshwayo and a small entourage of servants escaped the attack on Ulundi and went into hiding.^{1W}

After iSandlwana the British government lost confidence on Lord Chelmsford abilities as a commander. On 26 May 1879 the British Cabinet decided to replace Chelmsford with Sir Garnet Wolseley. Chelmsford learnt of this decision by 26 June 1879 but was not informed of it until 9 July 1879. Chelmsford then tried to bring the war to a quick conclusion. On 7 July 1879 Wolseley landed in Durban and took over the command of British forces in South Africa on 9 July 1879. He thereafter started the process of pacifying Zululand and withdrawing the British forces from the area. This process was concluded in September 1879 when Wolseley was satisfied that the Zulus were no threat to British interests in South Africa. As from September 1879 Wolseley led the post war settlement in Zululand with strict orders from Gladstone's government not to annex the territory.²⁰⁰

4.4.3 The Aftermath and Settlement of the War

The Anglo-Zulu had a profound effect on the lives of the Africans north of Thukela River and British politics. The Zulu kingdom was destroyed beyond recognition. In Britain Disraeli was ousted as the prime minister by Gladstone. In South Africa Sir Garnet Wolseley replaced Sir Bartle Frere as the High Commissioner. Before his deployment as the administrator of Natal in 1875 Wolseley received a thorough briefing from Theophilus

["]Ibid. pp. 51-62.

[^]Ibid. p. 62.

Shepstone regarding politics in Zululand. Shepstone believed that the Zulu kingdom had to be reduced to its smallest unit measurement before it could be dominated by the British Empire.²⁰¹

Between 1875 and 1876 Wolseley was an active role player in the advancement of Carnarvon's confederation ideal and his appointment could not benefit the Zulus. In 1875 he was the administrator of Natal for six month. During this period he did not receive adequate cooperation and support from the Natal colonialists. This motivated Wolseley to exclude the Natal colonialists in arrangement of post war settlement in Zululand. In this process the resulting settlement was crafted exclusively by Wolseley and John Dunn, to the disdain of the Natal settlers and the majority of the Zulus. Natal settlers were of the opinion that the settlement was perverse and ignorant because of its adverse impact on their own lives. After the settlement the Natal community could not do business in Zululand.²⁰²

The territory was divided into thirteen chiefdoms in accordance with the Ulundi Treaty. The treaty contained eleven clauses that the chiefs had to observe. Observance of the eleven clauses amounted to recognition of the British Empire as the higher authority in South Africa and Zululand. John Dunn and Zibhebhu kaMaphitha were two of the thirteen chiefs who had larger territories. Dunn was influential in the selection of the twelve chiefs who were largely conformists or against Cetshwayo. The establishment of the chiefdoms created deep divisions amongst the Zulu society. Four years after the settlement Zululand erupted into a deadly civil war in which more people were killed than during the Anglo-Zulu War. Cetshwayo was captured on August 1879 and exiled in Cape Town until 1882. He was

²⁰¹ Knight. I. Zulu Rising, pp. 681-692.

²⁰² Ballard. C. "Sir Garnet Wolseley and John Dunn: The Architects and Agents of the Ulundi Settlement", in Ballard. C & Duminy. A (ed). The Anglo-Zulu War: New Perspectives. Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press. 1981. pp. 120-121.

returned to Zululand in 1883, and a civil war erupted that led to his death on 8 February 1884.

The Zulu King left a kingdom that was characterised civil war and destruction.²⁰¹

4.5. Conclusion

During the period 1873-1884 the number of European settlers in South Africa and Natal increased drastically. British interests in the territory changed and clashed with those of the native societies in the region. Britain anticipated an economic slowdown that would be accompanied by a decline in British pre-eminence on the World politics. Lord Carnarvon, in his capacity as the Secretary of Colonial Affairs, conceived the idea of a Southern Africa confederation that would be a panacea for Britain's political and economic ills. The confederation was an idea to coalesce all British territories in Southern Africa and form an English speaking confederation that would be economically independent of Britain. It was envisaged that the confederation would provide an economic relief to the Empire as well.

Lord Carnarvon was still mulling over the confederation ideal in 1873 when the Langalibalele Rebellion broke out. The incident changed the security perceptions of the Natal colonialists for the worst and brought Carnarvon into contact with Theophilus Shepstone. The colonialists feared that an attack on them by the Zulus would have more devastating effects compared to the one by Langalibalele. Shepstone was on a crusade to extend his influence beyond the Natal Africans and used the opportunity to convince Carnarvon that Zulus were a greater threat to the confederation ideal. In the aftermath of the Langalibalele Rebellion Carnarvon saw a window of opportunity for his confederation project. In 1874 he sent James Froude to prepare ground for the implementation of the project. In 1875 he followed up by sending Sir Garnet Wolseley as an administrator of Natal for six months. Froude and Wolseley did not succeed in achieving Carnarvon's objectives.

²⁰³ Ibid. pp. 138-140.

The implementation of the confederation was fast tracked by the appointment of Sir Bartle Frere as High Commissioner in South Africa for a two year contract. He assumed his duties early in 1877 and in terms of the contract he had to complete his assignment in March 1879. On his arrival he concluded that the colonialists in South Africa and the Zulus were the main obstacles to the implementation of the confederation. He effectively isolated the colonialists in his activities and resolved to destroy the Zulu Kingdom at all costs. Lord Chelmsford was appointed early in 1878 on Frere's recommendation for the sole purpose of waging war against the Zulu King. The war was not approved by the British cabinet and parliament. The defeat of the British at iSandlwana and the embarrassment that followed caused the British government to approve reinforcements. The war against the Zulus and the destruction of Zululand was therefore approved at the highest level of the British government.

The war resulted in the destruction of the Zulu Kingdom and everything it represented. Cetshwayo's strategy of playing victim and defending from within his own territory did not yield the expected results. After the defeat on 8 July 1879 the British Army soldiers burnt homesteads, including Ulundi, and looted all livestock they could find. After his capture, Cetshwayo was treated like a common criminal and incarcerated for more than three years before being sent back to his devastated kingdom. The final blow in the destruction of Zululand was delivered by Wolseley who was assisted by John Dunn using Shepstone's advice obtained in 1875 briefing. Cetshwayo contributed to the defeat and destruction of Zululand through his diplomatic and military strategy choices. The Zulu King's choice of Shepstone and Dunn in diplomatic relations with the British and his defensive strategy during the war were his undoing.

Mpande's thirty-two year reign without taking a great-wife or nominating an heir apparent was a source of instability for the Zulu Kingdom, especially after his death. Cetshwayo had to fight for the right to ascend to the throne. In the process he sent most of

his half-brothers into exile in Natal and Transvaal. During Mpande's long reign local chiefs **became** more powerful and influential in their areas. On ascending the throne Cetshwayo **was** less powerful than the combined power of the chiefs. Consequently, he resorted to his diplomatic relationship with Shepstone and Dunn in order to check the chiefs' relative power. Unfortunately, Shepstone and Dunn used their relationship with the king for their own **benefits**. His association with the two gentlemen sowed the seeds for the destruction of his **kingdom**.

CHAPTER FIVE

LEADERSHIP AND WAR

5.1 Summary

The period between 1828 and 1840 can be viewed as the initial Zulu contact with the British and Boer settlers. Shaka dominated his relations with the first British settlers and occasionally used them to augment his troops during raids. He unsuccessfully tried to establish formal diplomatic relations with the British Empire. Dingane opposed British and Boer settlement and his objective was to clear Natal and Zululand of all European settlement. His failed attempts on Mpande's life drove Mpande into the arms of the Boers and resulted in Dingane's downfall. Mpande embraced the Boers' non-aggression pact. He was quick to embrace the British in 1842 after the routing of the Boers. The British busy establishing themselves in Natal, allowed Mpande to rebuild the Zulu kingdom.

The foundations of the destruction of Zululand were laid during the thirty-year rule of Mpande, between 1840 and 1872. Mpande's reign stabilised Zulu politics but changed power configuration. His lack of mobility within the length and breadth of his territory resulted in local chiefs increasing their powers and human resources in relation to Mpande. Personalities like Mnyamana, Maphitha and Hhamu became powerful during this period. Mpande's failure to take a great-wife and nominate the heir apparent caused Cetshwayo to fight for the right to become the king. In the process of fighting for the throne, Cetshwayo made ill-advised diplomatic choices that were instrumental in the destruction of his kingdom.

British settlers used the period 1843 to 1872 to lay foundations for the future dominance of Natal and later Zululand. After the Boer settlement in Natal during the late 1830's Britain felt that its interests were threatened and decided to attack the Boers in 1842. In 1843 Britain declared Natal a British colony but to be administered as a district of the

Cape Colony. This decision made the government of the new Natal colony to be weak and open to manipulation. The state of Natal government made it easy for Bartle Frere to organise and execute the war against the Zulus. British concerns about its pre-eminence and economic future started in 1870-1872 and led to the conception of the confederation project.

After the declaration of Natal as colony, the settlement of British citizens in Natal gained momentum and led to political and economic complications for the Zulu Kingdom. During Shaka's reign Natal and Zululand were part of his kingdom. Shepstone, in his capacity as the Secretary of Native Affairs in Natal, desired to extend his influence into Zululand and this led to a clash with Cetshwayo on various occasions with regard to supremacy of Britain over the Zulu Kingdom. For Britain interests to prevail, Shepstone concluded that the Zulu kingdom had to be reduced to its smallest unit. Economically, the settlers needed a viable economic activity to sustain their livelihoods in the new colony. Labour to support the economic activity was scarce. This led to the importation of slaves from Delagoa Bay and indentured labour from India. The settlers also felt that the transformation of the Zulu military system could release a lot of labour for the Natal economy.

The period 1873-1884 was the most turbulent period in the history of the Anglo-Zulu relations. Cetshwayo became the king of the Zulus and his actions as heir apparent and king led to the destruction of the Zulu kingdom. The Langalibalele Rebellion increased the fears of the settlers for a Zulu attack. Carnarvon used the opportunity to harness the fears of Natal colonists to implement his confederation project. The attempt to implement the confederation led to the war and the destruction of Zululand.

Cetshwayo ascended a throne with less power relative to the local chiefs like Mnyamana, Zibhebhu and Hhamu. It took eleven months for Cetshwayo to be inaugurated

after the death of his father. He had to make irresponsible diplomatic choices to balance the power before he could feel secure to ascend the throne. Cetshwayo developed a sense of unfounded trust towards the Europeans due to his lack of power and legitimacy in Zululand. This misplaced trust in Europeans was visible in the appointment of John Dunn as his advisor. The invitation of Shepstone for the coronation was viewed as ill-advised by the Zulu elders. The adoption of a defensive strategy in the face of an invading imperial force backfired badly, especially after the defeat of the Zulus.

5.2 Causes of Anglo-Zulu War

The ideal for the confederation of Southern Africa was the only cause of the Anglo-Zulu War. Other factors were instrumental in facilitating the occurrence of the war. Carnarvon's career was helped by his implementation of the confederation concept in Canada. He believed that a successful implementation of the concept in South Africa could have advanced Carnarvon's career even further. He worked hard to achieve this ideal and when he realised that it was going to fail he avoided embarrassment by resigning abruptly.

Carnarvon had conceived the idea of a confederation using his experience in Canada. Although he desired to implement it in the South African environment, he did not have a plan until the occurrence of the Langalibalele Rebellion in 1873. The Rebellion came as a blessing in disguise for the implementation of Carnarvon's confederation ideal. The event increased the insecurity of the Natal colonialists and brought Carnarvon into contact with Shepstone. These conditions provided fertile ground and a willing agent for the implementation of the confederation.

The appointment of Bartle Frere on a two-year contract was supposed to fast track the implementation of the project. The abrupt resignation of Carnarvon in 1878 further complicated matters. Frere was promised the post of a Governor-General in the new

confederation which placed pressure on Frere to deliver on time. The pressure led Frere into waging a war for which Britain was ill-prepared. The irrationality of the war against the Zulus was more visible after the British victory when Gladstone's government advised against the annexation of Zululand into the British Empire. At the end of the Zulu war the confederation was nowhere near implementation and Frere's career took a nose dive. The Anglo-Zulu war was where all participants lost. The Zulu Kingdom was destroyed but Britain did not annex the territory.

Mpande and Cetshwayo were naive in their relations with the officials of the British Empire. Mpande's legacy impacted negatively on Cetshwayo's kingship decisions were largely informed by his insecurity within the Zulu political environment. Insecurity within the Zulu Kingdom caused Cetshwayo to have misplaced trust in the Europeans. John Dunn fought against him at Ndondakusuka in 1856. but Cetshwayo appointed him in 1857 as his advisor on Boer and British Affairs. His association with Shepstone led to personality clashes over British supremacy in Zululand. The Zulu elders warned against Shepstone's influence in Zululand but Cetshwayo did not heed their advice.

During the war the Zulu King could have influenced the war differently if he allowed his forces to exploit into Natal after the victory at Isandlwana. He had an option of waging guerrilla warfare against the British and force them into the negotiating table for a favourable settlement. These activities were likely to produce better results than his defensive strategy. Due to Cetshwayo's unfounded trust in Europeans he adopted diplomatic policies that led to his downfall and the destruction of his kingdom. Naivety of the Zulu leadership did not cause the war, but facilitated an easier British victory.

Britain's imperial policy of invading smaller and weaker nations for the purpose of exploiting their resources was always accompanied by military action. In cases where native states

were too weak to resist the invasion British interests prevailed without exercising any military option. The Zulu Kingdom was perceived as cohesive and militarily dangerous to colonise with peaceful means. British officials, in a hurry to realise the confederation, used military means to destroy and restructure the Zulu society to conform to its imperialist designs. The main purpose of the destruction was to ensure that resources, including labour, from Zululand become available to the British economy. The imperial policy of colonising native states using violence where necessary was the underlying cause of the Anglo-Zulu. The policy further allowed colonial officials decision-making powers that were not subjected to political oversight. These powers were open to abuse as it was demonstrated in the making of the Anglo-Zulu War. In cases where these powers were abused with good results the officials were decorated. The Anglo-Zulu War resulted in death of British soldiers and Frere had to be punished. The policy did consider the interests and lives of native societies as important.

The implementation of the confederation ideal caused the Anglo-Zulu War. Bartle Frere and other proponents of the ideal were of the view that the destruction of the Zulu Kingdom was a precondition for the realisation of the confederation. The proponents of the confederation made an appreciation that was more informed by Shepstone's advice and post rebellion fears. The ideal was conceived by Carnarvon as a tool to enhance his career prospects. Other role-players, like Shepstone joined the confederation project with the objective of furthering their own interests. Shepstone desired to control the affairs of all natives in South Africa. Frere was bound to become the Commissioner-General in the confederation. The proponents of the ideal were in a rush to achieve their objectives using the confederation ideal and made wrong appreciations and conclusions. Consequently the war against the Zulus appeared unavoidable because using dialogue would have taken them longer than they were prepared to endure.

5.3 Leadership and War

The political and military processes in management of colonies created bureaucratic confusion. Leaders in colonies were allowed to make decisions beyond the authority of their positions. In cases where decisions yielded positive outcomes for the Empire, leaders were praised, and where the outcomes impacted negatively on Britain, members were reprimanded lightly and/or redeployed. Additionally, the military was also allowed to deploy to a colony before the war was declared. Frere was aware of these anomalies in the colonial system and exploited them. He ensured that reinforcements reported and the forces deployed before issuing the ultimatum to Cetshwayo. The invasion of Zululand was rushed with the object of achieving victory before Britain expected an answer on relations with the Zulus. After iSandlwana disaster he was replaced with Wolseley, but remained in South Africa for a long time.

Carnarvon enhanced British national pride by successfully implementing a confederation of British states in Canada. The realisation of the confederation ideal in Southern Africa had a potential of boosting the economy of the Empire, improve Carnarvon's career prospects and enhance his prestige. On realisation that the confederation was about to fail, he saved himself embarrassment by resigning. The appointments of Frere and Chelmsford made it impossible to reverse or abandon the implementation of the project. Future career prospects of Frere and Chelmsford depended on successful completion of the confederation project. The act of reversing or abandoning the project would have reflected negatively of British national pride.

The defeat of the British Army by a native force reflected negatively on British national pride. The invasion of Zululand was not authorised by the British parliament, but reinforcements were approved by the parliament after iSandlwana incident. Britain was

prepared to punish the Zulus for defending themselves against an unauthorised invasion in order to restore their prestige and national pride.

By accepting the post of High Commissioner in South Africa, Frere exposed himself to manipulation. He was generally over qualified for the job, but was appointed for his reputation of achieving results while operating outside authority. Despite his diplomatic qualifications, Frere was not a rich man. He accepted the job in South Africa with the object of improving his economic status before retirement. If Frere was planning on following due process in implementing the confederation, the period of two years was not sufficient. Motivated by greed, Frere accepted a difficult project to the detriment of his career and prestige.

Shepstone was appointed Secretary of Native Affairs in Natal due to his familiarity with the African way of life. He was supposed to use the position to promote good relations between Africans and Europeans. Instead, he aspired to have a confederation of all Africans where he would become their king. He tried to convince Cetshwayo that the Zulu kingdom was a dominion of the British Empire. When Cetshwayo objected to this arrangement, Shepstone concluded that the Zulu kingdom had to be reduced to its smallest unit of measure for imperial interests to prevail. Carnarvon and Frere decided to give Shepstone a Royal Commission to annex Transvaal before they could proceed with their confederation project. Shepstone considered himself superior to Cetshwayo and believed that the confederation would make him king of all Africans. After the Anglo-Zulu War Shepstone was marginalised and denied any further role in the colonial affairs.

Chelmsford and Wolseley were ignorant in their dealings with the Zulus. In his preparations for war, Chelmsford believed that Zulus would not offer resistance. He was of the opinion that as soon as he enters Zululand, all Zulus would turn against Cetshwayo and he

would claim an easy victory. His ignorance resulted in the war dragging on for more than six months and claiming many British and Zulu lives. Sir Garnet Wolseley, in his settlement arrangement, ignored the inputs of the Zulus and Natal colonists. He chose to rely on his 1875 notes, Shepstone's advice and inputs from John Dunn. The resulting settlement gave John Dunn the biggest portion of land and status to the detriment of legitimate Zulu chiefs. The settlement favoured neither British nor Zulus and was condemned by both.

The foundations for the destruction of Zululand were laid during Mpande's long reign. Mpande embraced imperialism by collaborating with the Boers to defeat Dingane and entered into a non-aggression pact with them in 1839. In 1845 Mpande signed a treaty with Britain, represented by Barrister Cloete. According to this treaty the boundaries between Natal and Zululand were demarcated as Thukela and Buffalo Rivers. Mpande's legacy resulted in Cetshwayo becoming a less powerful and legitimate king in the eyes of the chiefs. In order to balance the power and create legitimacy for his throne, Cetshwayo had to make to make diplomatic choices that led to the destruction of the Zulu kingdom. The decisions Cetshwayo took before and during his kingship led to the destruction of his kingdom.

5.4 The Effects of Anglo-Zulu War

The Anglo-Zulu War shows the importance of leadership in foreign policy. It shows confusion on the part of the actors on both the English and the Zulu side. There were miscalculations and wrong assumptions that led to wrong decisions. The core in the new colony was strengthened by encouraging and supporting British citizens to settle in the territory. Creating a core in the Zulu state was difficult because of its cohesiveness. Zulu young men were not prepared to work for a wages in Natal because they were the Zulu King's subject. The core and the periphery of the Zulu state were in harmony. Furthering British interests in Zululand was impossible while the Zulu military and political systems

remained intact. It was the cohesiveness of the Zulu Kingdom that led Shepstone to conclude that for the British interests to prevail in Zululand the kingdom had to be reduced to its smallest unit of measure.

The defeat of the Zulu Army and the destruction of the Zululand succeeded in creating the core and periphery amongst the Zulus. Zululand was divided into thirteen chiefdoms with John Dunn and Zibhebhu kaMaphitha having the largest portion of land and resources. This created conditions for the colonialists and Britain to manipulate the affairs in Zululand. Although Britain did not annex the Zulu territory soon after the victory. Dunn and Zibhebhu ensured that there was no peace in Zululand until it was officially annexed in 1887. Garnet Wolseley was certain about Dunn's loyalty to the British interests when he allocated him large portion of land adjacent to Natal. After Wolseley's settlement the imperial chain of control spanned from the colonial office down to those chiefs in Zululand who open for British manipulation. The type of oath all chiefs took amounted to the acknowledgement of the Queen as the supreme authority in Zululand. The acceptance of chiefs office opened them for British manipulation as subject of the Queen.

Fears of an impending unemployment decline in British pre-eminence resulted in the conception of the confederation ideal. Britain needed raw materials to keep its industrial machinery dominating the World economy. British officials, like Carnarvon, argued that Britain needed an avenue to cushion the economy against unemployment in the homeland. The establishment of the confederation in South Africa was supposed to make more resources, including labour, available for the British economy. The Zulu state was viewed by the colonial officials as an obstacle and a threat to British interests. The implementation of the confederation, according to Shepstone's advice, required the dismantling of the Zulu war machinery and way of life.

Poor coordination on the part of the British officials facilitated the execution of the war. The imperial decision-making system was based on the principle of trusting the officials on the ground to make better decisions. This principle was informed by the fact that correspondence at the time was extremely slow. The abrupt resignation of Lord Carnarvon in 1878 resulted in the appointment of Michael Hicks-Beach as the Secretary of colonial Affairs. Hicks-Beach was less informed on the confederation ideal and Frere as the man on the ground had the privilege of making decisions as he pleased. For example, the letter advising Frere against the invasion of Zululand was received on 13 December 1878, two after the presentation of the ultimatum to the Zulus. Frere was of the opinion that the war against Zulus was going to swift and could deliver the news of victory to Britain before the end of his contract.

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