THE POLITICS OF PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA:

A CASE STUDY OF


BY

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts in International Studies at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS), University of Nairobi.

October 2007
DECLARATION

This dissertation is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

Charles Tai Gituai Signature  date Nov 2007

This dissertation has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor.

Prof Makumi Mwaguru signature
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the politics of peacekeeping in Africa, by evaluating and highlighting the challenges, problems, prospects and ramifications of the peacekeeping missions in Africa. In the process the study examines the structures of UN peacekeeping in Africa, concepts, capacities, operations and empirical challenges of peacekeeping missions in Africa. The study uses the African regional peacekeeping missions, the OAU in Chad and the sub regional peacekeeping mission, the ECOMOG in Liberia, to underpin and evaluate those political challenges experienced by these two missions and how they affected their overall achievement of their missions. The study establishes that regional peacekeeping missions in Africa are still in their infancy and require support from the international community, in order to fully achieve their objectives in peacekeeping and peace building in Africa.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AAFC</td>
<td>Allied Armed Forces of the Community</td>
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<td>ACOTA</td>
<td>African Contingency Operations Training Assistance</td>
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<td>AFL</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Liberia</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Central Revolution Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDRR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West Africa Monitoring Ceasefire Group</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIPC</td>
<td>Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities Programs</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAN</td>
<td>Forces Armies du Nord</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPOI</td>
<td>Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative</td>
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<td>GUNT</td>
<td>Transitional National Union Government</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Red Cross</td>
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<td>IGNU</td>
<td>Interim Government of National Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>INPFL</td>
<td>Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDF</td>
<td>Lofa Defence Forces</td>
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<td>LPC</td>
<td>Liberian Peace Council</td>
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<td>MOJA</td>
<td>Movement for Justice in Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Military Operations In Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPFL</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
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OAU  Organization of African Unity
PKO  Peacekeeping Operations
QIP  Quick Impact Projects
SECON  Senegalese Contingent
SMG  Standing Mediation Committee
ULIMO  United Movement for Democracy and Liberation in Liberia
UN  United Nations
UNAMSIL - United Nations Assistance Mission to Sierra Leone
UNEF  United Nations Emergency Force
UNOMIL  United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNUC  United Nations Operations in Congo
ZACON  Zairean Contingent
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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction to the Study

Introduction

During the Cold War, peacekeeping took shape and was moulded by the political realities of the period.\(^1\) Traditional peacekeeping was the approach used by the military at that time. This involved military components being deployed between belligerents to monitor cease-fires, assist in troop withdrawal and create opportunity and space for negotiations of the underlying dispute through diplomatic initiatives conducted separately. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) in the Suez crisis,\(^2\) was the first UN peacekeeping operation to have troops deployed. The principles of traditional peacekeeping evolved in this operation. These principles are, consent of the parties to the conflict, the impartiality of the peacekeeping force, and the prohibition of the use of force except in self-defence.\(^3\)

The role of the United Nations has been the maintenance of international peace and security as stipulated in Article 24 (1) of the United Nations Charter.\(^4\) Peacekeeping has evolved through practice and it is not mentioned in the United Nations Charter.

The first peacekeeping mission in Africa was the Operations in Congo (ONUC) from 1960 to 1964, which prefigured the alarming future for missions to states involved civil war. In the Congo, the UN found itself using military force against Katanga rebels to preserve the unity of the state of Congo. The effect of post-Cold War was that there was no longer competition between super powers and many countries in Africa who relied heavily on their relations to either of the powers.

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found themselves vulnerable to internal challenges as they were expected to embrace democracy, human rights and transparency. As African countries readjusted to the new situation, the effects took new dimensions as intra and interstate conflicts proliferated and continued to ravage Africa. These conflicts affected regional security in the areas that they occurred in and as a result became the concern of other states within their region.\(^5\) In many of these conflicts, serious peacekeeping challenges were evident especially in Somalia in 1993-1995. In some of the conflicts, peacekeeping missions were unable to create an environment for negotiations for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The UN moved away from the traditional peacekeeping role, which largely addresses inter-state conflicts, to multifunctional peacekeeping, which targets internal conflicts. This has increased the politics and challenges of peacekeeping missions and has further complicated UN peacekeeping forces management.\(^6\) These intra state conflicts were a new post-Cold War phenomenon and western countries especially the US started pushing for the African continent to establish their own peacekeeping organizations and take responsibility over their regions. As Africa undertakes peacekeeping on its own, whether it will manage this arduous task without the international community and how regional and sub regional organizations have undertaken these tasks, the political challenges involved and the level of success attained, is part of this study. The study also critically analysis the performance of the OAU peacekeeping mission in Chad from 1981-19\(^*\) and ECOMOG in Liberia from 1990-1997, as regional and sub regional peacekeeping forces respectively.


Statement of the Research Problem

The tasks that peacekeepers perform in African missions are diverse and complex. They include negotiations, overseeing elections, preventive deployment to zones of conflict, verification of cease-fire agreements, safe areas and troop withdrawal, disarmament and demobilization of combatants, mine clearance, training, and awareness programmes, providing secure conditions for humanitarian aid and peace building functions. In other cases they may be involved in the protection of refugees, disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR) being some of the tasks that peacekeepers undertake. These tasks require special skill to handle. Some may demand special equipment to access difficult terrain, either in mobility or in communication. Examples of many other challenges and politics of peacekeeping in Africa include cases where the belligerent groups have delayed or denied The UN access resulting in continued fighting and increased human suffering. Rwanda, Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and Darfur in Sudan are some of the examples where UN was either denied access or delayed. In other cases like Somalia, the belligerents were hostile to the peacekeepers while in Rwanda the situation turned genocidal while UN troops watched. In Sierra Leone, rebel groups fighting for the control of government and state resources resisted peacekeepers, killing and capturing some of them with total disregard for international norms on peacekeeping. In view of this, questioned have been asked about what ails peacekeeping missions in Africa. The international community wants African states to resolve their security and conflicts without any expectation for assistance from the west. This was mainly emphasized after US suffered serious casualties in Somalia in 1993-1995. The reasons behind the shift by the international community from supporting African peacekeeping missions, the effects of this lack of support and trends related to making regional and sub regional peacekeeping missions responsible for African peacekeeping mission to resolve their own problems, are some of the issues that this study will address. The study will also establish the ability of African regional and sub regional peacekeeping forces capacity to carry out peacekeeping missions in Africa.
Objectives of the Study
The overall objective of the study is to identify how the political challenges in peacekeeping affect the success or failure of peacekeeping in Africa. The component objectives are:

(ii) To evaluate whether the success or failure of regional and sub-regional peacekeeping operations in Africa is determined by the international community support.

(ii) To establish how the politics of peacekeeping and the rational actor's interests, affected the logistical support of peacekeeping missions in OAU in Chad in 1981-1982 and ECOMOG in Liberia in 1990-1997.

Justification of the Study
After the end of Cold War, the western world focused its attention to those countries that are of strategic, political and economic importance to them. Most of these countries are the former Eastern European countries that have better infrastructure for investment than Africa. As a result the material and financial support that Africa used to receive from the west has diminished. Africa was therefore left with no alternative but to take care of its affairs as the attention of its former allies diverted elsewhere. As conflicts increased in Africa, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) now African Unity (AU) and the sub regional organizations started looking into how to manage their security affairs. African states started to reinforce and improve their regional peacekeeping organizations in order to undertake peacekeeping missions in their respective regions. This study focuses on analyzing the politics and challenges of peacekeeping in Africa and it is therefore justified because peacekeeping will continue to be used as a means of establishing an enabling environment for mediation and negotiations in between belligerents. The UN is currently involved in many peacekeeping missions in Africa and both UN and US, would like Africa to take responsibility over peacekeeping in their region. Therefore it is necessary that more research is done on African peacekeeping missions in order to add more information that can be used to improve on the performance of these
missions. The study will also be important for troops contributing countries especially in Africa, as the findings will provide them with an insight into the hazards and risks which their men and women are subjected to while on peacekeeping duties in Africa. The study will also be beneficial to the regional organizations such as the African Union (AU), and the sub regional organizations like the (ECOMOG). These institutions are increasingly finding themselves involved in peacekeeping missions in Africa.

**Literature Review**

This section will review the literature on the politics and challenges of peacekeeping in Africa. It begins by giving different arguments by scholars on the subjects of the relationships between peacekeeping and conflicts. It examines literature which is focused on the politics and challenges of peacekeeping at regional and sub regional level. It concludes by examining an outline of peacekeeping in OAU in Chad in 1981-1982 and ECOMOG in Liberia in 1990-1997.

**Peacekeeping and Conflicts**

Africa has continued to experience civil conflicts since independence. Garuba correctly asserts that, conflict is conceived as the incompatibility of goals, interests and objectives and is endemic in human relations.\(^7\) Mwagiru argues that conflicts within sub regions should not be seen as individual conflicts concerning only the state within the sub region.\(^8\) These conflicts are precipitated by many factors like sharing of resources, ethnicity, cultural, economic, political and other social reasons. Once these conflicts threaten international peace and security, or violate human rights, the UN may be compelled to deploy peacekeepers.

In Africa, the post-Cold War period proved to be an era of much distress, fear and deadly conflicts. According to the Secretary General's report, in 1996 alone, 14 of the 53 countries of Africa were afflicted by armed conflicts and needed

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peacekeeping operations. These conflicts accounted for more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide and resulted in over eight million refugees, returnees and displaced persons. The increased internal wars in Africa and the incidences of state failures have challenged the United Nations in the involvement of conflict management. It is against this background that many peacekeeping missions have been deployed in Africa and many writers have evaluated the challenges of peacekeeping operations in Africa.

Henry Wiseman gives an encapsulating assessment of the conflict conundrum in Africa when he stated that 'just wars' of national liberation, which have all run their course, have been followed by internal conflicts, secessionism and interstate wars and with some notable exceptions, the states of Africa are beset by internal economic and political turmoil. In many states, national cohesion and stability are either pretentious or non-existent. Mwagiru argues that conflict is an inalienable part of life and one has to learn how to manage it properly and that conflicts can also be useful as a warning on the wrongs of the society.

Challenges of peacekeeping in Africa were also evaluated by the Brahimi report. The substance and focus of the report contributed significantly to the challenges that are facing peacekeeping missions in the world and Africa in particular. The United Nations Secretary General Koffi Annan, has on many occasions spoken about peacekeeping challenges in different fora. He is quoted as having said that the first UN peacekeeping operation was an attempt to confront and defeat the worst in man with the best in man, to counter violence with tolerance, might with moderation, war with peace. Since then, day after day, year after year,

UN peacekeepers have been meeting the threat and reality of conflicts, without losing faith, giving in, and giving out. Annan’s statement is attributed to the suffering of humanity mainly in Africa which is caused by fellow human beings and the peacekeepers represent those who put their in lives in danger, to help fellow human beings. This is also attributed to the sheer complexities of violent conflicts in Africa and the consequent challenges that have compelled the United Nations to undertake measures of ensuring international peace and security. However some scholars feel that, though the solutions offered by the peacekeeping operations may not be complete in many situations, they are the best that can be hoped for.

Challenges of Peacekeeping

Boutros Boutros Ghali, expressed his gratitude and admiration for the courage and sacrifice of United Nations personnel, military and civil, in the new era of challenges to peace and security. He noted that peacekeepers serve under very extreme harsh conditions and many have died. Others have persevered despite the loss of family members and friends. Many other authors have written on peacekeeping operations like Howard on Nambia, Murphy on Somalia and May on the OAU in Chad among others. These authors have done case studies of recent missions that pose special challenges or introduce new elements into peacekeeping operations. Their articles tend to be of the 'lessons learned' variety, designed to draw lessons with the benefit of some historical perspective. In most of these studies a number of policy recommendations follow, the most notable of which is the success of peace implementations in a country or region.

Adebayo\textsuperscript{18} discusses 'hegemonic peacekeeping' by narrating the US in Somalia and Nigeria in Liberia, where they both conducted what he calls hegemonic peacekeeping. His argument is that the two interventions were quite similar, yet they have been portrayed very differently in the media. The lead interventionists were both regional and global powers. In both cases policy eventually changed from attacking to appeasing. The US was more sensitive to domestic public opinion and with its immediate national interests in Somalia. It felt compelled to withdraw from Somalia after one year, when things turned sour. Nigeria on the other hand, stayed for eight years in Liberia.

The literature on peace operations doctrine has benefited from book by Findlay. He has meticulously traced the history of the use of force in UN peace operations, from United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) through to the United Nations Assistance Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). He discusses the evolution of thinking in UN circles in the post-Cold War period, as reflected in the Boutros Ghali’s book, Agenda For Peace and the Brahimi report. His core assessment is that generally the use of force by UN peacekeepers especially in Africa has been marked by political controversy, poor doctrines, conceptual confusion and failure in the field. He concludes that all mandates should be under chapter VII of the UN charter and there should be standard operating procedures for different circumstances and capacities. He contends that sometimes pre-emptive force must be used in a crushing military engagement.\textsuperscript{19}

Routledge and lichenberg\textsuperscript{20} argues that Africa needs a new ‘development peacekeeping doctrine’ because the main drivers of conflict in Africa are resource based and that an overly military approach to peacekeeping ought to be replaced by a more multidimensional developmental approach. Looking into African conflicts, they argue that many societies have become ‘war economics’ where the expulsion


of populations, killings and large-scale human rights violations are a means of accumulating resources and that UN peacekeeping in Africa has largely ignored this dynamic. They offer 'development' peacekeeping as an African alternative, defined as 'post-conflict reconstruction intervention' which aims to achieve sustainable levels of human security through a combination of interventions aimed at accelerating capacity building and socio-economic development. Practically the argument is that the African peacekeeping missions need to be multi-disciplinary with a mandate to develop an integrated post conflict reconstruction programmes.

Berdal relates the US peacekeeping policy problems in Africa as the central dilemma of US foreign policy after the Cold War, and how to articulate interests and maintain a moral foundation for policy in the absence of direct threats to US strategic interests. The basic element of the US policy on UN operations will almost certainly continue to reflect this dilemma. In various addresses, the element of US peacekeeping policy have been spelled out where the objectives of an operation must be clearly defined in the US national interests and assured of continuing public and congressional support. Secondly, the commitment of US troops cannot be open-ended and an exit strategy must consequently be in place before the troops are deployed. Thirdly operations involving US force must have effective command and control arrangements. The third element in effect means no US forces under UN command. The western influence in African peacekeeping missions is further exemplified by the way they react towards these missions in Africa. For example United Nations Military Operation in Congo (MONUC), was to be expanded from a mission of 10,800 troops to 23,900 troops on the UN Secretariat's recommendation. This was mainly for the purpose of having a force that would cover vast areas of Congo. However the US voted in favor of an expansion of 16,700 an increase of only 6,100 troops. The US was of the view that, it bears the major burden of

22 Ibid p 41
23 The statement by the chairman the joint chief of staff in September 1993, before the Senate of the Armed Forces Sub Committee, stressed that troops participating in international peacekeeping will still report ultimately through their US chain of command, even though they may be deployed under the "operational control" of a foreign commander leading a UN or NATO coalition.
payment where 27.1 per cent of UN budget is met by the US.\textsuperscript{24} This expansion was far below the expectations of the UN. As a result, there are many provinces in Congo where the UN has not yet been deployed resulting in unsuccessful endeavors by the UN in Congo.

In missions like Angola and Somalia, there was no lasting conflict resolution and UN operations were formed, deployed and withdrawn. In the case of Somalia, in September 1994, UN Secretary General Koffi Annan, then as Under Secretary General for peacekeeping, warned the incipient Somali nation clan welfare and anarchy that unless the Somali leaders showed an immediate commitment to forming a government, the Security Council would have no alternative but to end the operation.\textsuperscript{25} Annan's position was forced on him and the UN, by pressures from UN members, particularly those footing the financial and military manpower bill. These members saw noticeable lack of success by the UN deployments, whether it was frustration by snipers, mines, workers and guns that continued to kill peacekeepers, there was no way any other force would have managed after the powerful US troops left.

The US government is in the forefront of reviewing African missions with a view to reducing them. It is concerned with the explosion of peacekeeping in Africa and has focused its attention on regional organizations. US has increased its efforts to work with African countries towards developing their armed forces for peacekeeping capabilities. There are a number of US programmes in Africa on peacekeeping development. They include, the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities Programs, (EIPCP) and the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI). However, this concerted effort by the west to ensure that Africa takes care of its conflicts would appear like Africa is being marginalized to deal with its conflicts yet

\textsuperscript{24} A statement on the subject of 'challenges of peacekeeping in Africa', before the Africa Sub-Committee of the House International Relations Committee, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Washington DC, October 2004.

\textsuperscript{25} The Economist . September 1994, in early November 1994, the Security Council announced that the somali operations would be ended in march 1995 and under US protection,UN forces withdrew, leaving the clans in charge.
African states are members of the UN whose main role is international peace and security.

However, Don MacNamara, President of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies argues that peacekeeping has turned into what used to be called 'just wars'. It is however essential to distinguish between the diplomatic activity of peace making which is usually done by diplomats and the operational activity of peacekeeping by the troops. Alan James however argues that the structural change in the approach of peacekeeping, where the emphasis now is in peace enforcement may be traced to non-state actors' interference. He sees a growth of industry ahead where arms and technology producers would be interested in engaging UN troops into war for the sale of their equipment.

**Regional Peace Challenges**

Post-Cold War UN peacekeeping missions operated under strict parameters set forth by the Security Council. This gives the UN missions strictly defined functions, which Alan James refers to as 'conflict diffusion', stabilization and resolution assistance. The period also introduced a number of factors to which the African continent is still responding. For example, the strategic value of the continent diminished for the major powers. Conflicts and state collapse in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia continued with little response from the international community. Consequently, regional and sub-regional organizations saw the nged to respond to some of those conflicts. Malaquias raises the issue of national and regional perspectives. He agrees that new peacekeeping challenges have prompted African states and institutions to move away from traditional, non-interventionists approaches to conflict management. His argument

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is that more confidence in the potential of sub-regional organizations to help in regional peacekeeping should be encouraged; and military interventions are legitimate when mass killings and atrocities, ethnic cleansing or genocide are occurring or threatened. Military intervention is also legitimate when an internal war breaks out, or sub-region intervention may be considered when other means have failed to restore a democratic government overthrown by force.\(^{30}\)

**OAU in Chad and ECOMOG in Liberia**

In 1977, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) initiated the search for a peaceful resolution of Chad's conflict. The OAU's intervention in Chad from 1981-1982 was unique because it was, at the time, the only internal conflict in Africa in which substantial intervention by a regional organization was permitted by the state in crisis, contrary to systemic norms and organizational principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of member-states.\(^{31}\)

On the other hand, the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) was established in May 1975. The aim of this organization was to promote trade, cooperation and self reliance in West Africa.\(^{32}\) The regional organization comprises sixteen members namely Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Guinea, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Gambia and Nigeria. By the late 1970s the West African leaders realized that there cannot be economic development without security. They therefore established a regional security organ that would deal with inter and intra state conflicts that affect the regional countries. This organ is the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which was deployed in Liberia, in 1990 following escalation of fighting.

This mission represented the first full scale attempt by a sub-regional organization in Africa to stem a conflict largely through the efforts of sub regional troops, logistics and funding. The Liberia mission is also the first time that the UN

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\(^{31}\) Charter of the OAU, Article 3(2)

has sent peacekeeping to an already established sub regional peacekeeping effort. This effort crystallized the growing indifference of external actors to resolve African problem and the growing interests of African actors in resolving their own conflicts amid difficult challenges.\(^3\)

**Conceptual Framework**

The success of peacekeeping operations depends on two key issues. First, the peace agreement and/or ceasefire that the peacekeeping operations is based on must be tenable for both sides. If one or both sides wants to continue the fighting, a peacekeeping operation will be very unlikely to maintain the peace.\(^4\) Second, success is contingent on clear strategies for implementing nation-building and institutional development, such as democratization. Third, peacekeepers should be adequately equipped to be able to perform in accordance to the mandate and tasks. Peacekeeping that does not set out basic goals for building and maintaining trustworthy social institutions are not likely to experience high levels of success. Only in this context can peacekeeping forces prove to be effective solutions to intractable conflicts. Depending on one’s criteria for the success of a peacekeeping, the number of U.N. missions that have been successful ranges from none to almost all of them.

However, a standard evaluation of success is based not on a mission’s peacekeeping ability alone, but also its peace building ability. For example, Downs and Stedman use two criteria for evaluating a peacekeeping, one of which has an implicit peace building element to it like, "whether large-scale violence is brought to an end while the implementers are present, and "whether the war is terminated on a self-enforcing basis so that implementers can go home without fear of the war.


Peace according to these criteria is the short-term absence of violence with the promise that this absence of violence might be lasting.

Therefore maintenance of peace in any form is preferable to continued violence and peacekeeping can offer a valuable solution to violent intractable conflicts. Downs and Stedman focus this willingness on the political and economic will of outside powers to get involved in the peacemaking process. That is, for any regional or sub regional powers to risk casualties, commit resources or use leverage, they must see their own interests as being affected by the continuation of the conflict. Therefore in order to foster peace, combatants must be willing to consider peace as an option, and external powers to consider peace as valuable and worthwhile. The goal of any peacekeeping should not be to establish a marginally stable peace that lasts a few years, but to establish a lasting peace in which liberal institutions can be built, gain legitimacy, and guarantee peace. This study therefore evaluates the politics and challenges of peacekeeping in Africa and how they contribute to the failures or successes of African peacekeeping, based on this conceptual framework.

**Hypotheses**

Three hypotheses will be investigated in this study:

(i) The success of regional and sub regional peacekeeping missions in Africa is achievable when the international community provides adequate support.

(ii) Regional and sub regional peacekeeping missions in Africa are capable of undertaking peacekeeping missions without logistics support from the western powers.

(iii) The state and rational actor's interests determine the success or failure of peacekeeping in Africa.

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36 Ibid p43
METHODOLOGY AND SOURCE OF DATA

The study relied on secondary data mainly from text books, journals, magazines, documents, reports, periodicals, internet and other relevant materials. The study uses two case studies. The first case study is on the OAU peacekeeping in Chad, in 1981-1982 and the second is the ECOMOG peacekeeping in Liberia in 1990-1997. The use of the case studies allowed for the data to be analyzed qualitatively with the aim of examining the politics, prospects and ramification of peace keeping operations in Africa in general and also evaluating the regional and sub regional peace keeping missions. The data enabled the scrutiny of the two case studies in order to critically analyze and compare how each case was affected by the political challenges. This analysis of the data generated interesting insights in the politics and challenges of peacekeeping in Africa and how international support or lack of it affected the overall peace process in both missions.

Structure of the Study

Chapter one introduces the study in the detailed literature review. It also outlines the background of the study. Chapter two examines the meaning, concepts, characteristic, and principles of peacekeeping within the framework of the United Nations, regional and sub organizations. Chapter three consists of the analysis of the performance of OAU in Chad in 1981-1982, focusing mainly on the peacekeeping operation. Chapter four consists of the analysis of ECOMOG performance in Liberia in 1991-1997. Chapter five mainly deals with the critical analysis issues raised in the study. Chapter six contains the conclusions.
CHAPTER TWO

THE MEANING AND CONCEPT OF PEACEKEEPING

Introduction

This chapter explains the meaning and concept of peacekeeping. It begins by giving the definitions of peacekeeping, its requirements and norms. It shows how these norms are essential for a successful peacekeeping in a regional and sub regional peacekeeping mission. The chapter further explores the concept of peacekeeping with details of the types of peacekeeping such as traditional and multifunctional peacekeeping and their characteristics and application. The chapter further explores different tasks of peacekeeping, characteristics of peacekeeping and finally the universal principles of peacekeeping.

Defining Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is not specifically defined in the UN Charter. However it has evolved as a pragmatic response over time and has come to be accepted as one of the methods of implementing the UN role of maintaining peace and security, which is a major principle agenda of the United Nations. The UN has defined peacekeeping as an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace-end security in areas of conflict. These operations are voluntary and are based on consent and cooperation. While they involve the use of military personnel, they achieve their objectives not by force of arms, thus contrasting them with the 'enforcement actions' of the United Nations under Article 42.¹

In the context of U.N. application, peacekeeping has been defined as the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of peaceful third-party intervention organized

and directed internationally, using multinational military, police and civilian personnel to restore and maintain peace.\textsuperscript{2} The distinctive aspect of peacekeeping is the absence of coercive force. It is a concept of peaceful action, not of persuasion by force. Peacekeeping has appropriately been identified by Forsythe as one of three interrelated functional elements the international organization may undertake to intervene in a conflict situation.\textsuperscript{3} The objective of the first functional element, peacekeeping, is to limit and, if possible, curtail violence of a conflict already initiated. The second functional element is peacemaking, the objective being to help resolve the substantive issues of the dispute. The third distinctive element is peace building which is targeted to avoid or reduce conflict through socioeconomic programmes such as technical assistance and quasi-governmental programmes. Peace building incorporates the rebuilding of institutions and infrastructures of countries torn by conflict in order to strengthen and solidify peace and, thereby, avoid relapse into conflict.\textsuperscript{4}

A peacekeeping venture, by itself, does not resolve a dispute; it is a stop-gap measure or a holding action.\textsuperscript{5} The primary purpose and function of peacekeeping is to contain and constrain violence to provide an atmosphere of calm and stability in which peacemaking and peace-building efforts would be better able to resolve the roots of the conflict. Thus, peacekeeping is essentially a third-party supervised truce that enables a peaceful settlement to be negotiated. Used in isolation, or where other modes of conflict management are ineffective peacekeeping does not resolve the dispute.\textsuperscript{6} The Security Council mandates all peacekeeping missions and it is essential that all missions comprehend and comply with the United Nations peacekeeping principles which are the guides and common frames of reference, in peacekeeping operations. The Security Council mandates are usually as a result of political agreements and

\textsuperscript{3}Forsythe D P \textit{United Nations Peacemaking}, Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972, pp 1-3.
\textsuperscript{5}-\textit{The Blue Helmets, A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping}, United Nations Department of Public Information, New York, 1985, p. 3
\textsuperscript{6}Rikhye, Harbottle, and Egge, \textit{The Thin Blue Line}, op cit p. 16
compromises among members of the Security Council. The Security Council then passes resolutions, which enables the UN peacekeepers to formulate their campaign plans in order to deploy in the consenting state. The Security Council operates under article 24 (1) of the Charter which confers on the members of the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of the international peace and security, and agrees that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility, the Security Council acts on the behalf of the members, in order to establish peacekeeping forces. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the purpose and principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII of UN charter. These chapters are effective action references where the Security Council is conferred primarily, the responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security.\(^7\)

**Traditional peacekeeping**

Traditional peacekeeping is conducted in several ways which may include the traditional or military interposition of peacekeeping troops, peace observation, humanitarian assistance, electoral assistance and disarmament\(^8\) and peace enforcement.\(^9\) Fabian\(^10\) and William Durch\(^11\), argue that the traditional peacekeeping rests on the use of military force as a third party, usually an international organization, to intervene in a conflict that is either on the verge of breaking out into a war or is already in a state of war. Traditional peacekeeping had its limitations, principally caused by the politics of the Cold War. The early peacekeeping missions were carried out without the assistance of military personnel and equipment from the permanent members of the Security Council.


\(^9\) Ibid pp3


Hence some of the early problems were logistic in nature as the peacekeeping missions drew the bulk of their personnel from the third world countries military contingents. Not all peacekeeping operations that were carried out by the UN during the Cold War can be classified as traditional peacekeeping. The OAU deployment in Chad (1981-1982) and the ECOMOG deployment in Liberia (1990-1997) can be classified as multifunctional peacekeeping. Multifunctional peacekeeping involves missions that are mandated to execute more than the traditional peacekeeping function of the observation of peace agreements and positioning military forces between the parties in conflict. According to White, multifunctional peacekeeping integrates traditional peacekeeping functions when assisting in post conflict transition. These post-conflict activities include the provision of security, overseeing of disarmament and demobilisation, facilitation of reconstruction and provision of humanitarian aid.

Peacekeeping forces should intervene in the conflict with the agreement of the parties involved in the conflict. It is essential that one or more of the parties in conflict should accept the intervention of the peacekeeping force. This is essentially because the peacekeepers will need to establish a base in the country, therefore they have to seek assistance of one or more of the parties, in order to be able to establish its foothold and subsequently traverse the country. Another major element of this characteristic is that the peacekeepers must be neutral and impartial. However, impartiality has been one of the challenges that peacekeepers have experienced. On several cases it has proved difficult to sustain for a long time under stressful conditions. Fabian argues that it is important to make peacekeeping a distinctive kind of conflict management activity, whatever the authority or the effectiveness and the leverage the

Peacekeepers may be having.\textsuperscript{15} Peacekeepers may be armed and even in tense situations where the belligerents are likely to break the cease fire rules, violence is inevitable and peace enforcement may be deployed with appropriate self-defense. However peacekeepers by definition are almost outgunned by the disputants, they are sent to monitor. Any recourse to force must be calibrated to localize and defuse rather than escalate violence.\textsuperscript{16}

More importantly a traditional peacekeeping force should endeavor to keep the belligerents separate in order to facilitate a peace agreement. This would avoid a situation where the peacekeepers would appear to be imposing a different type of conflict and violence, while essentially they are expected to be establishing an enabling environment for peace. If peacekeeping forces do not facilitate an environment for a peace agreement, then the post-conflict management may be very difficult, and the situation may erupt when the peacekeeping force is withdrawn. In other words, the main determinant of success is the ability and capacity of the peacekeeping force to establish an atmosphere that is conducive to peacemaking.\textsuperscript{17}

**Multifunctional Peacekeeping**

Multifunctional peacekeeping is the contemporary peacekeeping concept, which is usually mandated from the onset to undertake various functions, which include economic reconstruction as post conflict requirement. Traditional peacekeeping, addresses mainly the maintenance of cease-fires between belligerents. Post-Cold War peacekeeping has however moved from the traditional peacekeeping to multifunctional peacekeeping, when the Security Council felt the desire to address the complex problems that were posed by internal conflicts and regional disputes. Basic to traditional and multifunctional peacekeeping is the requirement for consent, non-use of force except in self-defense and impartiality. Both types of missions may have similar tasks of monitoring cease-fires, troop withdrawals, prisoner exchange, and disarming and demobilization. However the differences

\textsuperscript{15} Fabian L. *Soldiers Without Enemies* op cit p 21.

\textsuperscript{16} Durch W. *Introduction in the Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, op cit pp 4 -8.

in the two types of missions are reflected mainly in their mandates. Multifunctional peacekeeping mandates are wide-ranging and more political in the tasks to be carried out. There are more non-military components which involve more extensive conflict resolution measures. One of the areas of commonality between the two is that for both types of missions, the UN needs to get consent from the parties involved in the conflict.\footnote{Malone D.M and K. Wermestes,' Boom and Bust:The Changing Nature of UN Peacekeeping', \textit{International Peacekeeping}, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2000 pp 38-56.} The consent is sought from any existing legitimate authority and local factions with a stake in the conflict. The other common feature of the two types of missions is that in both, the use of force is restricted to self-defense only, which leaves both types of missions with no enforcement or coercive capacity.\footnote{Ibid p 59}

The key difference between traditional and multifunctional peacekeeping is that in traditional peacekeeping, the UN enters as soon as a cease-fire has been negotiated and the mission has limited political goals thereafter other than maintaining the status quo. The UN undertakes multifunctional peacekeeping after a comprehensive peace agreement has been concluded through negotiations between the UN and all stakeholders, and addresses exhaustively the conditions that would bring about a more permanent resolution to the conflicts hence, multifunctional peacekeeping is a post-conflict undertaking. The challenge of multifunctional peacekeeping is brought about by the character of the internal conflict, mostly ethnic based. This is well captured by Otis who describes peacekeeping in ethnic conflict areas as operating in a conflict arena to which armed forces are sent without a clear idea of who the protagonists are, why they are fighting and what the involved forces are really supposed to accomplish.\footnote{Otis P," Ethnic Conflict: What kind of War is this?" \textit{Naval War College Review}, Autumn 1999 Vol. LII, No 4 pp 9-24.}
The Concept of Peacekeeping

The idea of peacekeeping was not initially in the minds of those who established the UN. Therefore, peacekeeping has developed overtime and the UN has used it as a means of ensuring peace settlements as a result of threats to international peace and security. The UN's ability to employ peacekeeping is therefore under Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in which the UN is mandated to seek settlement and resolution of international peace and security. Peacekeeping may be used as means of facilitating or creating environment for settlement of disputes. It is stipulated under article 37(2) of the charter, that if the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, the Council shall decide whether to take action under article 36 or, to recommend terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate. These terms may encourage settlement of disputes, negotiations, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or other 'peaceful means' as the first step in the management of the conflict. These 'peaceful means' may include traditional peacekeeping deployment as part of the UN endeavor to settle disputes.

Traditional peacekeeping is sent to a region once the conflict has broken out and multifunctional peacekeeping is sent following the conclusions of a peace agreement. Their forces are provided by the member states of the United Nations and all the UN peacekeeping operations must be approved by the Security Council. Following the end of the Cold War, there were renewed calls for the UN to become an agency for achieving world peace and co-operation, as several intra state conflicts that were internationalized continued to increase around the world. Chapter VII of the UN Charter mandates the Security Council to enforce the restoration of international peace and security wherever the members of the Council so decide. The actions with respect to threats of peace, breaches of peace and actions of aggression may include sanctions as stipulated in article 41, that 'the Security Council may decide to take measures not involving the use

of armed forces but to completely or partially interrupt the economic relations such as rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication and the severance of the diplomatic relations.’ The Security Council may also use enforcement under article 42, that 'should the measures in article 41 prove inadequate it may take such action as the use of air, sea, or land force as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.'

The United Nations policy responsibility rests with the member states and in particular those states which are members of the Security Council. Article 24 of the Charter, stipulates that members of the United Nations have conferred on the Security Council 'primary responsibility' for the maintenance of international peace and have agreed that the Security Council acts on their behalf in carrying out these duties. The UN has authorized many peacekeeping missions under Chapter VI of the Charter and others under Chapter VII. These authorized peacekeeping missions have allowed measures to be undertaken to safeguard international peace and security through the application of military force, or the threat of use of force to compel compliance with the resolution reached at during negotiations. Peacekeeping is hence normally deployed as a consequence of a Security Council decision. However, on occasion, the initiative has been taken by the General Assembly but the operational control of peacekeeping belongs to the Security Council and the Secretariat.

The Security Council invites states to contribute troops and constitute a multinational force for peacekeeping. Regional organizations are authorized under article VIII of the Charter. They are established on matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Regional military forces have also been used for such operations like ECOMOG, which has participated in various missions in Sierra Leone and Liberia in peace enforcement. The OAU peacekeeping mission under the regional arrangement was also deployed in Chad in 1981-1982.
**Tasks in Peacekeeping**

Multifunctional peacekeeping embraces tasks that comprise traditional peacekeeping and others needed to achieve a more permanent state of security. In many instances, tasks performed by the peacekeepers are aimed at supporting or assisting civilian agencies and the local authorities to create a favorable environment in which they can address the causes of the conflict. Multifunctional peacekeeping tasks include controlling and verification of compliance with peace agreements, monitoring of cease-fire agreements, guaranteeing, or denying freedom of movement which may be done to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid or movement of other peacekeeping components such as election monitoring teams. Peacekeepers are also required to conduct or support mine clearing and explosive ordinance disposal. This involves clearing areas that will facilitate subsequent operations.

Where the mandate allows, peacekeepers carry out demilitarization and demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration, (DDRR) which mainly involves disarmament of various groups, control of weapons, and ultimately may involve the training of indigenous forces and reintegrating them into society. Peacekeepers provide assistance to humanitarian relief agencies or will themselves conduct humanitarian operations if there are no civilian agencies to carry out the tasks or if the employment of civilian agencies is impractical due to insecurity or lack of infrastructure. They will also provide support to human rights agencies and other organizations in eliminating human rights abuses and in supporting the restoration of human rights.\(^{22}\) The peacekeepers may be required to assist in planning and monitoring elections, in restoration of civil orders and the rule of law, including the apprehension of war criminals and their production before international tribunals. The peacekeeping missions may also be mandated with the co-ordination of activities supporting economic rehabilitation and reconstruction. This is normally carried out as 'quick impact projects' (QIPs) together with community and indigenous people so as to foster

good community relations and co-ordinate activities better. A peacekeeping mission is considered successful if it achieves all the tasks stated or any other depending on its mandate. It may be partially successful if it meets some of the tasks within the mandate and in accordance to the principles of peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{23}

**Characteristics of Peacekeeping**

Alan James argues that Boutros-Ghali expanded the traditional peacekeeping well outside its former bonds of traditional peacekeeping to multifunctional peacekeeping, which has contributed to most of the current UN peacekeeping deployment system and experience by peacekeepers.\textsuperscript{24} Ghali envisaged more use of UN peacekeeping forces in situations where consent of the parties might not prevent or might have disappeared and he saw more use of traditional war fighting weaponry than in the past when the UN forces were unarmed or lightly armed. This is of more concern now as Boutros Ghali's peacekeeping proposal indicates that there is a great risk of the peacekeepers becoming part of the conflict itself.

A high level threat to peacekeepers as seen in Sierra Leone recently will make it difficult to keep the use of force to a minimum, as the lines between peacekeeping and enforcement become more and more blurred. Many peacekeeping operations have been conducted under the authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The Security Council has authorized peacekeeping under this Chapter, which has allowed it to take appropriate measures to protect and safeguard international peace and security through the application of military force. This force is usually provided by member states that are protective of their powers as sovereign states. The UN does not have an institutionalized military force to undertake any enforcement. However, enforcement is primarily

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a legal, not a military term, and refers to actions authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In peace enforcement, an aggressor is identified and forced to reverse his action of aggression by the United Nations involving collective security measures. The UN has been emphasizing the establishment of regional peacekeeping organizations under article VIII for the purpose of dealing with the regional collective security especially in Africa.

**Universal Principles of Peacekeeping**

There is no formal protocol to regulate peacekeeping operations. The U.N. system, through its peacekeeping experience and practices, has over time developed some norms, principles and requirements for an effective peacekeeping operation. These forms the backdrop to the analysis of any peacekeeping undertaking.\(^25\)

**Consent**

Peacekeeping operations are non-mandatory. They require the consent of the parties to the conflict and the countries contributing troops to the multinational peacekeeping force. If any of these consents is absent, it is almost impossible to launch a peacekeeping operation, and if launched, it will be ineffective. Consent is a pre-requisite for the deployment of peacekeepers and it marks the basis for the success of any mission. For belligerents to accept to have peacekeeping forces is a sign of acceptance and a first step towards compromising for peace. Consent is sought through negotiations, and when accepted the parties agree on ceasefire or withdrawal, in order to allow peacekeeping deployment. However, in some situations, the principle of consent may not be applicable depending on the situation. The earliest mission in Africa to have been conducted against the consent principle was the 1960 deployment of the United Nations operation in Congo. This mission was necessitated to save the country from breaking into a civil war and was meant to oversee the withdrawal of Belgium forces from Congo. In this case, the UN

did not specify in the mandate as to whether the mission was being conducted under Chapter VII or VI of the Charter.

There have been debates on whether consent is always necessary for the success of multifunctional peacekeeping or whether limited consent may be applicable where full consent is untenable. One opinion is that the United Nations has not performed well in internal conflicts whenever there has been an inflexible stand on the issue of consent. The effect has been that whenever consent was strongly emphasized, the UN has left the initiative to the conflicting parties and by so doing the parties have been able to prevent the peacekeepers from stopping attacks on civilians. This has also exposed the peacekeepers to more aggressive action by factions. Jacobsen argues that in internal conflicts, where consent is usually low, basing the peacekeeping doctrine on consent is unwise and contrary to experience so far gained from the past missions.  

**Impartiality**

The principle of impartiality is vital for any successful peacekeeping mission. This is the only way the mission can preserve its legitimacy. The peacekeepers cannot take sides as this would make them part of the conflict, which they are mandated to control and manage. Impartiality is based mainly on the objectivity of ensuring that focus is maintained in pursuing the mandate regardless of provocations or challenge. Without impartiality, there cannot be any prospect for success in accordance to the principles of peacekeeping, as the discriminated parties would lose confidence and become uncooperative with the peacekeepers. This would have serious implications on the part of UN peacekeepers, as credibility and respect would be lost. All efforts must be put in place to ensure that impartiality is maintained. This should however not condone inaction and a non-committal attitude. Peacekeepers must be effective, despite this principle. Groom argues that if a peacekeeping operation takes sides, then it becomes part of the conflict, which it had been set out to control or resolve. Therefore

Impartiality means that all parties must be given equal opportunities and treatment. This is very fundamental if successful outcome is to be achieved in traditional peacekeeping. However this has become one of the challenges of post Cold War peacekeeping as the principle of impartiality is to be based on the concept of peacekeepers being impartial only to the support of the mandate, which also need to be impartial. What impartiality means then is that actions of force will whenever necessary, be taken against or in support of any party, depending on its compliance or non compliance with the mandate and not because of whom it represents.

The Brahimi report acknowledges that in internal conflicts it is particularly challenging to maintain impartiality if it means giving equal treatment to all belligerents; this would indeed amount to appeasement of some groups that are the aggressors. The Brahimi report recommended that there are occasions when impartiality may have to be done away with for the sake of the overall mission objective. Brahimi further recommended that impartiality needed to be adhered to only so far as it is in relation to working within the mandate of the mission.

### Cooperation

Peacekeeping is essentially a non-coercive military mission; cooperation is therefore the crux of the operation. Active and consistent cooperation of the former belligerents or parties to the dispute is essential to effective peacekeeping. In any case, peacekeeping operations invariably have a very limited capacity for enforcement and are limited in their use of force to self-defense in the last resort. A peacekeeping force can therefore be effectively defied if any party decides not to cooperate. Under circumstances where cooperation is lacking or withdrawn, the peacekeeping mission is frustrated in implementing its mandate. The cooperation of the constituent units of the authorizing body is also essential. The absence of cooperation from this quarter can undermine the capability, credibility,

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and the impartiality of the peacekeeping force. With unity comes the leverage and persuasive power to lead hostile parties toward negotiation.

**Non-Use of Force**

The principle of non-use of force is basic to the concept of peacekeeping. Experience, however, would seem to indicate that the emphasis on the concept of peaceful action may be too restrictive and subject to misrepresentation. A peacekeeping force may serve as a deterrent, a stabilizing presence, and occupy a buffer zone position. However in some cases the confrontational if not coercive aspect of force may be essential. Thus, peacekeeping force may use the minimum force necessary to back up the mandated task in its policing function in this buffer position. The key is to use force in a certain way, as a deterrent force in the buffer zone position. The operative distinction is not between the use or non-use of force, but its use to police a situation as mandated, and as an enforcement action that falls outside the concept of peacekeeping. This requires that peacekeepers use force in self-defense.

This is a major departure from the traditional peacekeeping to the second-generation multifunctional peacekeeping. Many troops contributing countries accept this principle including acceptability by the parties in conflict. This implies that peacekeepers should be ready for peace enforcement and that they have a right for self-defense in proportion to the threat that is envisaged. The peacekeepers are to be aware of the rules governing self-defense in peacekeeping especially the international law on war and the stipulated rules of engagement. The principle of minimum force is also essential when acting on self-defense and peacekeepers are therefore to react in self-defense if all other means have been fully exhausted. The view by the traditional peacekeeping is that the use of force can only be undertaken in self defence and may not be necessary where there is consent between the two parties. However, where consent is restricted or limited, there is a likely wood of use of force beyond self defence. The French adopted this doctrine of peace restoration as discussed by

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Arguments against the use of force are also advanced on the bases that there can be a military retaliation over political disputes of which may influence the political dynamics of the conflict. This may cause the UN to be unable to be impartial particularly on the disadvantaged group.

Clear Mandate

The nature and scope of the mandate of the peacekeeping mission is a key determinant to its success or failure. A successful peacekeeping operation requires an unambiguous mandate, restricted in scope and application and not liable to varying interpretations. The terms and interpretation of the mandate must have the prior and specific agreement of the parties to the conflict. Specific tasks and duties of the force must be defined and agreed on. A mandate cast in broad and ambiguous terms, with unrealistic objectives and without prior agreement by the parties to the details, is often bound to give rise to difficulties later with regard to interpretation and application. It is the authority of UN Security Council that gives peacekeeping missions the mandate to function and it is done through political and diplomatic compromises among members of the Security Council. The peacekeeping forces formulate their plans for deployment and operations based on these mandates. Therefore decision on these mandates determines the nature and bases of peacekeeping deployment. During the Cold War period, political interests of the superpowers on conflict areas determined the approach and the mandate that were to be agreed upon. In Africa the superpower interests were the driving force in influencing the peacekeeping mandates. For example in some cases mandates were reached to prevent escalation of conflict to the neighbouring country that would affect the other super power. Based on this consideration, the peacekeepers had limited political goals and tasks and were only focused on the traditional peacekeeping under the military command. In post Cold War period the political and economic interests continue to influence the Security Council in determining the African peacekeeping mandates.

Jacobsen P V, op cit pp 89
White N D, op cit pp260
The main argument therefore is that the meaning and concept of peacekeeping has evolved as one of the UN tools in the management of disputes. The traditional and multifunctional peacekeeping do require all the principles of peacekeeping including institutional capacity such as materials, operational and political resources. Material and operational resources include funds, logistics, training and disciplined infantry and adequate personnel with high-level expertise in complex fields. Such high-level personnel will include brilliant military commanders, smart logisticians, military intelligence officers, professional soldiers, civilian political officers, human rights monitors, electoral officials, refugee, and humanitarian aid specialists. The timing of peacekeeping intervention is often critical to the success of a peacekeeping mission. The timing is in turn often immensely influenced by the availability of materials and operational resources. Political resources in the context of institutional capacity comprise moral authority, leverage, and the political strength to gain adherence to agreements.
CHAPTER THREE

OAU PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CHAD NOVEMBER 1981- JUNE 1982

Introduction

The OAU's intervention in Chad from 1981 to 1982 was unique because it was, at the time, the only internal conflict in Africa in which a regional organization was permitted by the state in crisis, contrary to the OAU principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member-states.¹ The chapter examines events and political challenges that took place in order to deploy the OAU force in Chad. It describes how different approaches and arrangements were conducted to ensure that the OAU peacekeeping force was deployed and the various impediments that arose. The seven-month period between November 1981 and June 1982 witnessed the fielding, maintenance, and withdrawal of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) peacekeeping mission in Chad and the case study will discuss these issues during that period.

Background of the OAU Peacekeeping Mission in Chad

Since independence the Chad underwent serious internal conflicts precipitated by ethnic differences.² Those conflicts led to various peacekeeping initiatives by Nigeria, Libya and the involvement of France in trying to resolve them. Libyan troops were streaming steadily out of Chad in November 1981, to pave way for the deployment of the OAU peacekeeping force. France which had interests in Chad as the former colonial master, the OAU, and Goukouni Weddeye, the then president, originally envisioned the multifunctional peacekeeping force as an immediate replacement for the departing Libyan soldiers. However, as more Libyans withdrew from Chad, a military vacuum developed due to the absence

¹ Charter of the OAU, Article 3(2)
of the peacekeeping force to replace Libyan troops. The removal of its troops was not being accomplished with the cooperation of Chadian authorities. Goukouni's government did not have contact with the Libyan authorities who were upset about the request for a withdrawal by the government to allow a multifunctional OAU force to deploy. Hissen Habre was the leader of the Forces Armees du Nord (FAN) the northern faction, and backers of the OAU peacekeeping mission realized the urgency of the situation as Habre's forces intensified their probes and sat poised to move from Sudan into areas of eastern Chad being vacated by the Libyan forces as Egypt and Sudan were his main supporters. Goukouni expressed his concerns to President Shagari of Nigeria who, in turn, informed OAU Chairman President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya urging him to expedite the fielding of the peacekeeping force.

On November 3 1981, Habre received information on the departure of the Libyan military from Chad and ordered his Forces Armees du Nord (FAN) faction to unilaterally discontinue combat operations in eastern Chad. A FAN spokesman informed the Sudanese media that Habre would participate in a conference to discuss a peaceful solution to the civil war. However, Goukouni responded by announcing that Habre was a "criminal who has been condemned to death by the Chadian people." On November 3 1981, FAN violated its pledge and emerged from Sudan, occupied eastern Chad as Libyan soldiers departed the area. This action verified Goukouni's concerns about a military vacuum if the Libyans left Chad without immediate replacement by OAU peacekeeping force.

President Goukouni reacted by signing an agreement on November 14, known as the Paris Accord, which officially outlined the legal status of the OAU

5 'Shagari Sends Message to OAU Chairman Moi' Daily Times, November 9, 1981 p. 10.
7 'Goukouni Accuses Sudan of Aiding Habre Forces.' p. S1.
peacekeepers earmarked for Chad. On the same day, Libya completed the withdrawal of its soldiers stationed in N'Djamena. Many African leaders denounced the role and influence of France in drafting the document and staging its signing in Paris. Nigerian Vice-President Alex Ekwueme remarked, "The OAU has sold itself cheaply to France and degraded the meaning of African unity."\(^9\) Guinean government officials commented that the Paris Accord represented the "worst form of neo-colonialism."\(^10\) Benin also objected to the Paris Accord, and some scholars attribute that country's later refusal to send a military contingent to Chad as a direct result of the Paris meeting. In response, the OAU agreed to hold a second meeting in Nairobi two weeks later.

**OAU Peacekeeping Force Pre-Deployment Political Challenges**

The withdrawal of Libyan troops paved the way for finalizing the modalities and protocols for dispatch of the African peacekeeping mission. The Chadian leader Goukouni Weddeye envisioned that the OAU peacekeepers would be a total replacement for Libyan soldiers, and therefore he expected the OAU peacekeeping forces to fight Habre's forces as a peace enforcement mission and protect the Transitional National Union Government's (GUNT) hold on the country if FAN advanced toward the capital.\(^11\) Habre, in a press statement released in mid-November 1981, asserted that FAN would not be an 'obstacle'\(^*\) to the stationing of OAU peacekeeping force in Chad. However, he expressed concern that many promoters of the operation exerted a 'warlike stance'.\(^12\)

The secretary-general's special representative in Chad emphasized that the OAU force was a peacekeeping operation and could not take sides in the internal conflict. The special representative commented that if conflict emerged

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\(^10\) *Tbid*, p.11.


between any factions represented within the Chadian government, the OAU troops would serve as a buffer force between them until the acceptance of a political solution. However, he failed to define the exact role of the "buffer" force. Goukouni continued to interpret the role of the OAU force as a peace enforcement defense of his government, while the OAU saw the operation as neutral traditional peacekeeping. The special representative to the secretary general stated that there should be no repetition of the UN experience like in the former Belgian Congo, which had supported a government to repress a rebellion. Despite the reassurances by the chairman Moi, Goukouni expressed doubts that the entire OAU force would deploy in Chad. The Zairian contingent which had been provided with logistic support by the US to land troops, remained in N'Djamena without OAU reinforcements, while the eastern part of the country collapsed under FAN offensive. Tensions between Goukouni and the OAU continued to surge despite assurances from the OAU secretariat. On his way to Nairobi, and during a stopover at Kinshasha's on November 26, the Chadian president informed the assembled media:

"I am expecting nothing from Nairobi. I am going there to attend a summit which will be attended by all [sic] African countries. Since the summit will discuss an issue concerning my country above all, I am obliged to be present in order to not annoy my fellow heads of state.... As you are aware, the organization has been dodging the issue of sending troops to Chad since 1979 and though the Libyans completed their withdrawal from the country about or[wp month ago, we are left alone with the Zairian troops, just as we were with the Congolese troops, who were stationed here without support from other countries concerned."

Representatives from Benin, Chad, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo, and Zaire gathered in Nairobi on November 27 1981 for the Chadian peacekeeping summit also known as Nairobi II. The meeting examined the final coordination issues delaying the complete deployment of the OAU peacekeeping operation to Chad.

14 'Chad Peacekeeping Force Countries to Meet,' 27 November, ibid pp1-3.
15 "Goukouni Expects Nothing" Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS-MEA-81-228, November 26, 1981, p. S1.)
The Nairobi II summit also replaced the French-dominated Paris Accord and prepared a Status-of-Forces agreement for the OAU backed soldiers deployment in Chadian. The Status of Force Agreement covered the consent and the mandate of the peacekeeping mission. The mission’s mandate was supervision of the ceasefire; demilitarization of N'Djamena and the surrounding districts, financial and material assistance to train and establish an integrated Chadian armed force; and the defense and security of Chad while waiting for the integration of government forces.\(^{16}\)

The Libyan troops had withdrawn at the request of the President of Chad and therefore the situation called for immediate action to fill the vacuum. Any hesitation would have plunged Chad into a state of uncertainty and confusion. The Chairman urged for an immediate deployment of pan-African troops in Chad\(^ {17}\) hence the immediate commencement of the Nairobi II summit. The provisions of the Nairobi II summit document stated that peacekeepers will carry out the interests of the OAU and not their national states. Although the peacekeepers remain assigned to their national militaries, they were considered as OAU staff members. The peacekeepers were to fly the OAU flag at its headquarters and field positions as well as on vehicles. Each soldier assigned to the peacekeeping force was wear the uniform of his home country but would add any OAU identifying badges developed by the regional body and all vehicles would carry OAU identification marks and numbered plates. Peacekeepers were entitled to the status, privileges, and immunities as granted to any staff member of the OAU. Equipment and provisions for the operation may enter Chad free of duties and restrictions. The document further stated that the peacekeepers would respect the laws and regulations of Chad. Each soldier assigned to the operation should refrain from any political activities and display proper behavior while in Chad and were all entitled to OAU legal protection. The contingents were to receive orders only from the Force Commander. Each peacekeeper was subject


to the criminal jurisdiction of his home country and not that of Chad. Further, the contingent providing states were responsible for covering pay, entitlements, and compensation of peacekeepers in the case of death, injury, or sickness and the Force Commander would make the arrangements for repatriation of a deceased peacekeeper and his personal effects.\textsuperscript{18}

A final provision of the agreement outlined the duration and renewal of the document. The agreement was valid for six months, after which it was renewable by an exchange of letters between Chad and the OAU. Both parties could request the termination of the agreement by a three-month notice, and troop providing states could withdraw their contingents with three-month notice. After the summit, Goukouni hinted that if the OAU hesitated to deploy the peacekeeping force, the Chadian government had the right to appeal for military assistance from a "friendly" country in order to crush the FAN rebellion "Why should we not appeal to Libya? We are not enemies; we are friends\textsuperscript{19}

**Funding and Logistical Support**

Heads of State of the troop-contributing countries, Senegal, Zaire, and Nigeria,\textsuperscript{20} directed the general secretariat to work the budget and requested the OAU Chairman to raise funds from member states, the United Nations and other friendly countries.\textsuperscript{21} Finances remained a critical problem facing the peacekeeping mission. Pledges from OAU members still had not materialized into cash. Chairman Moi emphasized a renewed attempt by the OAU to secure external funding for the peacekeeping operations. Chairman Moi and President Goukouni requested for assistance from the secretary-general of the UN and the president of the UN’s Security Council for financial assistance as it became

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\textsuperscript{19} Reportage on OAU Mini Summit, November 1981. p 2

\textsuperscript{20} Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, and Zambia provided observers for the peacekeeping mission.

evident that the African countries were unable to sponsor their troops and OAU was financially incapable of funding the troops. What it meant for the OAU peacekeeping operation was that the peacekeepers in Chad and those preparing for deployment were now carrying out their missions under the official direction and mandate of the OAU. They therefore expected to be funded by the OAU. The chairman stated that he was mandated to contact the Security Council and the UN secretary general to obtain the necessary assistance for the establishment of the peacekeeping operations in Chad. This was an indication that OAU as an African regional peacekeeping force was unable to finance the peacekeeping force.22

The OAU contingents prepared to enter Chad without the organization having acquired the necessary financial backing for the peacekeepers. OAU Secretary-General Kodjo acknowledged the organization’s failure in 1981 and endorsed offers of support from non-African states. Rather than channel funds through the OAU, Kodjo noted, "Bilateral accords with the countries ready to send their troops were preferable."23 OAU Special Representative Dawit reiterated Kodjo’s comments and noted that the OAU had been mandated to seek funds from African countries each to contribute $500,000 but not "non-African" states. Therefore, any external funding and logistical assistance for contingents should be negotiated as bilateral agreements directly with the OAU members providing peacekeepers and not the OAU itself.24 The same arrangement applied for logistical assistance from non-African countries. The contingent providers could establish bilateral agreements with any state willing to provide equipment for the peacekeepers deploying to Chad. OAU Chairman Moi initiated personal appeals to France, Great Britain, and the United States for financial support for the OAU peacekeeping contingents and successfully secured pledges of assistance.25

22 Reportage on the OAU Mini Summit November 1981, p 1
24 Ibid p 21

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French incentives for Senegalese participation included financial and logistical support. The Senegalese peacekeepers flew to and from Chad on French-chartered Air Afrique aircraft.\textsuperscript{26} France provided military vehicles for Senegalese contingent (SECON) and financed their transportation by sea to Cameroon and then overland to Chad.\textsuperscript{27} Under a bilateral arrangement, Great Britain provided material assistance for the Nigerian contingent including new Land Rover vehicles and West Germany reportedly offered assistance to Nigeria.\textsuperscript{28} The OAU chairman continued to appeal for financial support from UN so as to obtain the necessary assistance for the establishment and operation of the force.\textsuperscript{29} The UN Security Council passed resolution 504 of April 30, 1982 asking UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar to establish a voluntary fund to benefit the OAU peacekeeping mission in Chad.\textsuperscript{30}

The UN planned to hold a fund-raising meeting in Nairobi during June 1982 but indefinitely postponed the conference after Habre's Northern Armed Forces (FAN) removed GUNT from N'Djamena.\textsuperscript{31} The United States quietly provided considerable logistical and monetary aid to the OAU peacekeepers,\textsuperscript{32} who were replacing Libyan soldiers in Chad. US had always been uncomfortable with the Libyan involvement and socialist influence. Nigeria and Kenya benefited and on December 14 and 15, 1981, C-141 aircraft carried Kenyan members of the observer group and their vehicles from Nairobi to N'Djamena.\textsuperscript{33} The US also pledged to provide $33ln4, in economic aid and up to $12M for peacekeeping operation, with half of the amount specifically earmarked for Zaire. The US provided Zaire with an ambulance, a pontoon bridge, rations, tents, and blankets.

\textsuperscript{27} West Africa. December 14, 1981, p. 2961
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid
\textsuperscript{32} West Africa June 14, 1982, pp. 1565-1566

It also agreed to maintain the single C-130 designated to shuttle between Zaire and Chad which was mainly used to transport and give all the logistic support to Zaire.\(^34\)

**The OAU Peacekeeping Deployment and Operations**

The peacekeeping troops under the command of a Nigerian General were deployed in their respective operational zones as follows: 2,000 Nigerians, 700 Zairians and 600 Senegalese troops by January 1982. There also fourteen military officers dispatched to Chad. The officers, representing Guinea, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo, and Zaire, were led by General Ejiga, and financed by the Nigerian government.\(^35\) The OAU planned to establish a neutral barrier to stop Habre from advancing towards the capital city and to halt his advance and not ignite a hostile situation with the contingent providing states.\(^36\)

The OAU still faced a shortage of personnel for the peacekeeping mission. The Chadian government vetoed the participation of Togo, while Benin and Guinea, and even Congo, appeared to have backed out of their pledges. Although soldiers from Nigeria, Senegal, and Zaire were on the ground in Chad, the OAU continued to stress that the contingents were performing a traditional peacekeeping mission and would not actively defend GUNT from Habre's FAN faction. In desperation, Goukouni sent an envoy to Addis Ababa and requested Ethiopia, a Marxist anti-western state during this period, to airlift troops to Chad. Although GUNT envisioned Ethiopian soldiers arriving under the umbrella of the OAU peacekeeping operation, Goukouni believed that the anti-western state would perform a peace enforcement mission and engage FAN alongside the

\(^{34}\) *Africa Now* April 1982, p. 57.


Chadian soldiers. However, General Mengistu of Ethiopia declined to contribute men to the OAU peacekeeping operation.\footnote{\textit{“NO Solution Yet in Chad,” Africa Now}, April 1982, pp 56-57}

OAU Secretary-General Kodjo explained on December 2 1981 that the inter-African force must ensure Chad’s defense and security in particular in the face of external aggression.\footnote{\textit{"OAU Secretary General on Chad, Fez Summit"}, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS-MEA-81-232, December 3, 1981, p. 1.}

Although the OAU clearly intended the peacekeepers to remain neutral in the conflict, Kodjo and Dawit confirmed that they did have the authorization to defend themselves if attacked. These statements by both OAU officials added fuel to the debate between the organization and GUNT, and Goukouni still claimed that the rules of engagement implied a peace enforcement mission in defense of GUNT and not just the self-defense of the contingents in a traditional peacekeeping operation. On December 12, 1981, Chadian foreign minister, called for a revision of the OAU peacekeeping operation’s mandate. He stated that the situation in Chad had changed and warranted a new role for the peacekeeping, which should fight alongside the Chadian army to regain control of eastern Chad from Habre.\footnote{\textit{Acyl, "Discusses Country’s 'Serious' Situation"}, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS-MEA-81-239, December 14, 1981, p. S2.}

Kodjo placed special emphasis on persuading those states that had pledged contingents to honor their commitments to the OAU. A Chadian source declared on December 3 that Togo would not be contributing a contingent as originally promised during the series of ad hoc committee meetings. The GUNT official also acknowledged that the Chadian government frowned on Togolese President Eyadema’s position in the civil war and accused the leader of being pro-FAN.\footnote{\textit{"Togo Will Not Participate in Chad Peace Force," Foreign Broadcast in formation Service (FBIS-MEA-81-234, December 7, 1981, p 1; "Chad: From Nairobi to N’Djamena," West Africa (December 7, 1981, p. 2946; Alex Rondos, "Slow March to Chad," \textit{West Africa} December 14, 1981, p. 2961.}} Such statements negated Togo’s pledge before any announcement by that country. The status-of-forces agreement granted GUNT the final approval on each contingent in the OAU peacekeeping operation. The government
spokesman added that GUNT's veto of a Togolese contingent in the OAU peacekeeping force was a result of Togo's stand on a political settlement rather than an unconditional backing of GUNT as the legitimate government in Chad.

Two other states that had pledged contingents, Benin and Guinea, appeared to have also backed out of their pledges by December 3. Nigerian Vice-President Ekwueme remarked that Benin complained of not having the resources to fund the deployment of a battalion to Chad. Guinea, according to Ekwueme, appeared capable of participating but refused to dispatch a contingent due to its impression that France had too much of a hand in the operation. Guinea also did not attend the Nairobi II summit in November 1981. The OAU and GUNT continued to squabble over its mission while Habre's FAN faction made steady progress against Chadian forces. By early January, France began to distance itself from peacekeeping operation which it had clearly helped to organize. French foreign minister Cheysson stated in Addis Ababa, that when France called for an urgent dispatch of an OAU force to Chad, it was only expressing its support for an OAU resolution. By January 1982, The OAU still had not secured external funding for the peacekeeping operation, leaving each contingent-providing state to foot the bill for its soldiers in Chad. The OAU Chairman President Moi convened a two-day summit of the Chad ad hoc committee on February 10 in Nairobi, to consider the proposals on funding for the OAU peacekeeping mission. The conference, known as Nairobi III, included representatives from Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Guinea, Kenya, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Togo, Zaire, and Zambia.

41 “Slow March to Chad, ”West Africa Newspaper, December 14, 1981, Ibid, p 2961
42 “Leader Sees Reluctance,” “Slow March to Chad,” Ibid pp. 296.

Nairobi III represented a change in policy for the OAU. Until February 1982 the OAU recognized Goukouni and GUNT as the legitimate authority and a temporary, government in Chad. The purpose of the OAU peacekeeping mission was to form a barrier within the state and help train a new integrated army from the many military factions in the country. The peacekeepers would withdraw at the conclusion of this mission. Now the OAU recognized Habre as a legitimate faction leader deserving participation in Chadian negotiations and inclusion in the election process. The summit attendees recognized that Habre could have seized N'Djamena but was restraining himself in order not to antagonize the OAU.\footnote{Habre Dominates the Scene,} The OAU had altered its policy toward Chad by first considering that the states, including France, aiding the peacekeeping operation, had grown impatient with Goukouni’s attitude toward the peace process. Goukouni continued to insist that the peacekeepers should fight as a peace enforcement mission to preserve GUNT’s power in Chad despite the OAU’s numerous declarations of neutrality. Second, the OAU underestimated the strength of Habre’s FAN faction. Once the Libyan military withdrew from Chad, Habre demonstrated that the other Chadian factions could not match FAN militarily. Habre probably would have seized N'Djamena if the OAU peacekeepers were not blocking the routes to the capital. Habre restrained his forces in order not to antagonize the contingent-providing states. Third, OAU members continued to renege on promises to contribute cash toward the peacekeeping operation and money had yet to be allocated by the UN. Contingent-providing -states were paying the costs of maintaining their forces, minus military assistance from western powers, out of their own pockets. These states found the international deployment of large numbers of soldiers to be expensive and did not want to remain in Chad for an indefinite period of time between two hostile parties.

Secretary-General Kodjo reported that the estimated cost of maintaining the OAU peacekeeping force for one year would total $163 million. However, few funds had trickled into the OAU from member states. Nigerian President Shagari
criticized Kodjo’s report as being "too theoretical" and stressed that the contingent providers had received nothing from the OAU to offset the costs of the operation. Shagari also stated that all OAU members should contribute toward the peacekeeping mission.\textsuperscript{46} Chairman Moi informed the attendees that he had sent appeals to all OAU member states and other "friendly countries" for financial assistance and reminded the latter through the press that the Chadian civil war affected the entire world and not just Africa.\textsuperscript{47} Moi said that the whole momentum demanded additional support and sacrifice from a "broader spectrum of countries"\textsuperscript{48} Moi thanked Nigeria, Senegal, and Zaire for dispatching and maintaining their contingents despite the "great financial and operational difficulties" of the operation\textsuperscript{49} He also appealed again to the UN to share the financial burden of the peacekeeping mission with the OAU.\textsuperscript{50} The committee members reaffirmed the neutrality of the OAU peacekeeping force in Chad blocking Goukouni’s attempts to have the mandate changed to one of peace enforcement on behalf of GUNT.

President Shagari emphasized during the summit that the peacekeepers could not be expected to fight against any Chadian faction. Kodjo agreed with Shagari and remarked that there had been a "misunderstanding" between GUNT, the OAU and that the peacekeepers could not be requested to battle Chadian dissidents.\textsuperscript{51} The ad hoc committee’s final resolution included details for a cease-fire to be followed by elections. The resolution stated that the situation in Chad is a political one requiring a political arrangement and all factions should implement an immediate cease-fire as of midnight, February 28, 1982. The negotiations for national reconciliation should begin on March 15, 1982, under the auspices of the OAU's Chad Committee in an African country to be determined at a later date. All the factions should write a constitution and adopt it between April 1 and 30.

\textsuperscript{47} "Factions Told to Stop War" \textit{Daily Nation}, Kenya, February 12, 1982, p 1.
\textsuperscript{48} "Hands Off Chad " \textit{Daily Nation}, Kenya, February 11, 1982, p 1
\textsuperscript{49} Dairy Nation, Ibid p1
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid p10
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid p10
1982 and the legislative and presidential elections, followed by presidential inauguration should occur between May 1 and June 30, 1982 leading to the OAU withdrawal of peacekeeping force on June 30, 1982 52

The resolution provided GUNT with a final opportunity to secure the goodwill of the OAU and negotiate a cease-fire with Habre. The Special Representative Dawit spoke to the media and reviewed the OAU's interpretation of the peacekeeping mandate. He reminded journalists that the peacekeepers would not join Chadian forces in any attempt to "suppress internal dissidence." However, the peacekeepers would defend themselves and resist any attempt to wrest territory they control as a matter of self-defense.53 On March 24, OAU Special Representative Dawit offered GUNT another opportunity to accept negotiations with Habre. He expressed the notion that the OAU deadline of June 30 could be extended in return for GUNT cooperation.54 GUNT declined any opportunity to negotiate with FAN. Chadian foreign minister Acyl, speaking for GUNT with OAU Chairman Moi, requested an urgent meeting of the OAU heads of state in order to halt the "beating about the bush" over Chad and the peacekeepers. Acyl informed Moi on April 20, that OAU military support is necessary so that peace can return to Chad and Chad needs constant and indefectible support.55

Nigerian authorities warned Chad on April 22 that Lagos would begin unilaterally withdrawing its peacekeepers from Chad unless GUNT agreed to a cease-fire and initiated negotiations with FAN.56 Nigeria announced the unilateral withdrawal of one of its three battalions in Chad due to "economic reasons" in

52 "Final Resolution of the OAU Permanent Committee on Chad" OAU Document February 11, 1982.
55 Foreign Broadcast Information Service FBIS-MEA-82-064, April 2, 1982, p Q1.
April 1982.\textsuperscript{57} Goukouni reiterated that he would seek assistance from an "outside force" if the OAU withdrew its peacekeepers.\textsuperscript{58} Again, the GUNT leader hinted that he would turn to Libya. Disagreement between the OAU contingent providers surfaced when President Mobutu, during a visit to Chad on May 5 1982, announced that his country would not unilaterally remove its troops from the peacekeeping operation. Mobutu stressed that only the OAU could decide on the duration of the mission.\textsuperscript{59}

On May 6, 1982, Goukouni commented that the OAU had deceived him to allow the withdrawal of Libyan troops and after they had left, the organization imposed on him a negotiated settlement with Hissen Habre. He therefore protested everything in the Nairobi Resolution (Nairobi III). Representatives from Chad, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Zaire, and the OAU met in Kinshasa, Zaire, during May 21-22. President Mobutu hosted the meeting. The contingent providers expressed frustration with GUNT's continued stance of ignoring Nairobi III's call for negotiations with Habre, followed by elections. The resulting communiqué provided GUNT with a final ultimatum and requested GUNT to "display good will" and implement the provisions of Nairobi III. If GUNT did not adhere to Nairobi III's final resolution, Nigeria, Senegal, and Zaire declared they would proceed with the withdrawal of their peacekeeping contingents. The document set June 10 as the deadline for GUNT to take a "clear stand" and adhere to Nairobi III. After June 10, "the three countries participating in the peacekeeping force will feel compelled to put an end to the mission of their respective contingents in Chad."\textsuperscript{60} The contingent-providing states also reminded the OAU of its financial obligation to the peacekeeping operation. Although the UN had approved a resolution calling for voluntary contributions to assist the


\textsuperscript{58} "Goukouni to Seek 'Outside Force' If OAU Withdraws" Foreign Broadcast Information Service FBIS-MEA-82-088, May 6, 1982, p. S1.


OAU, the peacekeepers had yet to receive any funding. The May final communiqué reminded the OAU that:

"If the force is maintained in Chad beyond June 30, the OAU will have to take every measure to effectively cover the expenses incurred by the upkeep of the troops in Chad and also, the OAU will formally give guarantees that it will reimburse the expenses already incurred in Chad until 30 June 1982 by the three countries participating in the peacekeeping force."61

Goukouni traveled to Tripoli immediately after the conclusion of the Kinshasha summit to seek Libyan military assistance. However, Qaddafi proclaimed his state's neutrality in the civil war and refused to personally see the Chadian leader.62 By June 1982 GUNT was on the verge of military and political collapse and few friends willing to provide any assistance. Contingent providers openly displayed frustration with Goukouni for the Chadian refusal to abide by the Nairobi Accord and with the OAU for the lack of financial backing. Habre's desire to maintain cordial relations with the contingent providers still remained the only obstacle between FAN and the capture of the Chadian capital. Habre launched a lightning offensive from the north and entered N'Djamena at 5:00 A.M on June 7, 1982 and captured the Chadian capital in less than three hours of fighting and three days prior to the OAU deadline for GUNT agreement to the Nairobi Accord.63 FAN'S victory forced Goukouni to flee the country for temporary sanctuary in Cameroon, after Nigeria refused to allow him asylum, and left Habre as the de facto leader of national government in Chad. On June 11, OAU Chairman Moi officially ordered the withdrawal of the peacekeeping contingents from Chad by June 30. Moi issued a statement discussing the position of the OAU:

"The withdrawal, which will commence immediately, should be completed before the 30th of this month.... Following the latest development in Chad, it is now obvious that neither President Goukouni

61 Ibid.
Oueddei nor the GUNT government were able to meet the conditions set out at the Kinshasa meeting. There is therefore no legal basis for the continuation of the OAU peacekeeping force in Chad.... It is my earnest hope that Chad will from now be spared from external interference within or beyond OAU borders so that life in the country can soon return to normal.\(^{64}\)

Moi’s comments indicate that the OAU mandate officially ended on June 10 in accordance with the provisions of the Nairobi Accord and the Kinshasa mini-summit.

\(^{64}\) "OAU Troops Ordered to Quit Chad" The Standard June 12, 1982, p. 1.
CHAPTER FOUR

ECOMOG IN LIBERIA 1990-1997

Introduction
The previous chapter has examined the impediments that influenced the fielding, maintenance, logistics and the deployment followed by the subsequent withdrawal of the OAU regional peacekeeping force in Chad. This chapter examines a sub regional case study of a peacekeeping force in west Africa, the ECOMOG forces in Liberia. It will analyze the dynamics and the political challenges experienced during the period 1990-1997. The chapter will explore how those challenges relate with those identified in the previous chapters and will identify the significance of the intervention in Liberia, its legality, political, operational and regional political interests and how they influenced the logistical support of the peacekeeping mission, contributing towards its overall objective, prospects and ramifications of peacekeeping by regional and sub regional organizations in Africa.

Background to the Formation of ECOMOG
In May 1975, the west African states established a regional organization in order to address the economic and security challenges in the region. The Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) was formed with an objective of promoting trade, cooperation and self reliance in west Africa. The regional organization comprises sixteen members namely Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Guinea, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Gambia and Nigeria. By the late 1970s the west African leaders realized that there cannot be economic development without security they therefore saw the need to establish a regional security organ that would deal with inter state conflicts. Economic Community of West Africa Cease

Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was therefore established and the west African states signed a non-aggression Treaty in Lagos Nigeria in 1978. This Treaty however, only addressed the issues of open support that various ruling classes might give to the opponent of incumbent rulers. The treaty failed to address the issues of various insurgent movements that were threatening most of the regimes in the region internally. This led to member states agreeing to negotiate again and sign the protocol on Mutual Defense Assistance in Freetown, Sierra Leone in May 1981. This protocol was to provide a non-standing military force to be used to render mutual military aid to any member states that falls victim to external aggression. The nature of the composition of the military force as defined in the protocol was to have each member state earmark units that would be quickly deployed in any of the member states. This force was to be known as Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC). The force was to be placed under a force commander, appointed by the chairman of the community at the time, on recommendation of the defense council of the community. The protocol stated that the AAFC would be used as peacekeeping force.

**ECOMOG as a Regional Force**

The most significant sub-regional peacekeeping in Africa has been the Economic Community of West Africa Cease Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) mission in Liberia. This mission represented the first full scale attempt by a sub-regional organization in Africa to conduct peacekeeping efforts largely through sub-regional troops, logistics and funding. The Liberia mission is also the first time that the UN sent peacekeeping to an already established sub regional peacekeeping effort. This effort crystallized the growing indifference of external actors to resolve African problem and the growing interests of African actors in resolving their own conflicts amid difficult challenges.² The intervention in

Liberia was initiated by the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC), a specialized body formed by ECOWAS three months earlier with the limited and specific mandate of mediating disputes between two or more member states. The members of the SMC consisted of three Anglophone states (Nigeria, Ghana, and the Gambia) and two Francophone ones (Togo and Mali). However, once the decision had been taken to send in the monitoring force, the two Francophone members of the SMC, Mali and Togo, declined to contribute forces. Of the Francophone states, only Guinea (though not originally a member of the SMC) consented to contribute troops, partly because of its membership (together with Liberia and Sierra Leone) of the Mano River Union, and partly in reaction to the slaughter of Mandingo traders from Guinea by Taylor’s forces. This partnership was formalized when ECOWAS split the command between the three countries contributing the largest forces, with Ghana contributing the force commander, Guinea the deputy force commander, and Nigeria the chief of staff.

While well intentioned, the decisions by the members of the SMC, in effect, meant that a small group of member states lacking the required mandate committed the regional organisation to what turned out to be a protracted and expensive military enterprise. Some countries felt that adequate consultations had not been undertaken before the force was deployed. More fundamentally, they questioned what they saw as an illegal extension of the mandate of ECOWAS from economic issues, as enshrined in its Charter, to military concerns. However the heads of state summit made changes to the mandate in order to include peacekeeping and therefore legitimized the ECOMOG deployment in Liberia.

There were several responses to these objections to the ECOMOG as1981 protocol on mutual defence provided enough scope and authority for action. The conflict became internationalised when Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso allowed Taylor to launch his attack from within their borders and therefore it was considered an external aggression. Secondly, it was argued that the
deployment of ECOMOG was the only option left for these sub regional states in a situation of complete breakdown of sovereign authority. Third, to those who argued that the mandate of ECOWAS was limited to economic objectives, it was retorted that economic integration could not take place in a security vacuum.\(^3\)

To further complicate the picture, there was a similar lack of consensus among the rebels in relation to the ECOWAS intervention. While Samuel Doe the then Liberian president and other Liberian factions accepted the intervention by the ECOMOG, Charles Taylor, the leader of the largest faction, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) whose forces were at the gates of Monrovia, and who suspected that the intervention was designed to cheat him out of victory, rejected it. The subsequent landing by ECOMOG was welcomed and indeed assisted by Prince Johnson and his faction, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) a breakaway from the NPFL, but opposed by Taylor, whose faction declared ECOMOG an invading force and fired on it as it landed in Monrovia in 1991, causing several casualties. The NPFL under Taylor moved quickly and within a short period controlled most of the Liberian territory. Over seven years, four other warring factions emerged to contest power and territory in Liberia's civil war.\(^4\)

**ECOMOG Legality**

ECOWAS maintained that the intervention by the ECOMOG was a duty as prescribed by the 1981 ECOWAS Defence Protocol. According to Article 16 of the protocol, the Head of State of the member under attack may request action or assistance from the Community. Article 4 of the Protocol empowers ECOWAS to

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initiate collective intervention in any internal armed conflict, within any state, engineered and supported actively from outside and likely to endanger the security and peace of the entire community. Article 6(3) and Article 17 empower the Authority to decide on the expediency of military action, to impose a peacekeeping force between the warring factions or to engage in political mediation. Also Article 13(1 and 2) provides for creation of Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC) from earmarked units. As justifications for intervention, democracy and human rights proved to be equally problematic, humanitarian considerations provide no legal reason for intervention, nor could one ignore the irony of states such as Nigeria in 1990 tasking ECOMOG to 'create the necessary conditions for free and fair elections', when it was a military government.

The ECOMOG Deployment

A comprehensive examination of the origins of the Liberian conflict lies outside the scope of this chapter. It is sufficient to note that in December 1989, Liberian rebel forces of the National Patriotic front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor, crossed into Liberia from Cote d'Ivoire with the intention of overthrowing the regime of President Samuel Doe. As the fighting escalated, and the international community displayed marginal interest, ECOWAS initiated a regional response to the cisis, establishing a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) to try and encourage a diplomatic solution. On 7th August 1990, lack of progress on the diplomatic front prompted the SMC to begin the insertion into Liberia of a military monitoring group (ECOMOG). ECOMOG was deployed in

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order to restore order among the warring factions, and to oversee the implementation of a cease-fire, the disarmament of the warring factions, the cessation of arms imports and the release of prisoners. The ECOMOG operation began on 25 August 1990 with deployment of 3,000 West African troops into the Liberian capital Monrovia. The ECOMOG mandate in Liberia was to conduct military operations for the purpose of monitoring the ceasefire, to restore law and order and to create the necessary conditions for free and fair elections.7

The contributing countries and troop strengths varied, but included at one time or another Nigeria, which provided the bulk of the forces, Ghana, Guinea, Senegal, Gambia, Mali, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Uganda, Tanzania, Niger, Burkino Faso and Sierra Leone contributed troops. In February 1995, for example, the force consisted of 8,430 troops organized into ten battalions; of these troops 4,908 were Nigerian, 1,028 were from Ghana, 609 from Guinea, 747 from Tanzania, 760 from Uganda, 359 from Sierra Leone, and ten officers each were provided by Gambia and Mali.8 The force peaked at a strength of about 16,000 in 1993 and by early 1997 consisted of around 11,000 troops, after Nigeria had withdrawn one battalion and the Tanzania and Uganda troops withdrawal sighting lack of funds from the AU. The East African troops had been brought to beef up the force as an AU initiative to assist the West African nations.

Political Factions and ECOMOG's Operational Challenges
In its early incarnation the civil war pitted the troops of Doe's Liberian government, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), against the insurgents of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) under Charles Taylor, the former drawn predominantly from the Krahn ethnic group, the latter from the Gio and Mano tribes. As the war continued, the situation became increasingly confused as,

7 Ibid, p.197.

8 Figures from The UN and the Situation in Liberia, UN Reference Paper UN Department of Public Information April 1995, p. 18
often with outside support, new groups appeared and existing groups fragmented. The NPFL, for example, spawned the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), and the Central Revolutionary Council. A new group, ULIMO (the United Movement for Democracy and Liberation in Liberia), emerged in 1991 only to fragment into a Krahn faction (ULIMO-J under Roosevelt Johnston) and a Mandingo faction (ULIMO-K under Alhaji Kromah). By 1995 there were at least eight major factions and many more minor ones. These included the NPFL (led by Charles Taylor), ULIMO-K (led by Alhaji Kromah), ULIMO-J (Roosevelt Johnson), the AFL (Lt.General Joshua Bowen), the Liberia Peace Council (LPC, under George Boley), Lofa Defence Force (LDF) (Francois Massaquoi), Central Revolutionary Council (CRC, Tom Woewiyu) and the Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA) (Amos Sawyer).\(^9\)

The ECOMOG operations were never likely to be easy given the complexity of the situation in Liberia. Whilst ethnicity was much less of a factor early on in the struggle, the manipulation of ethnic differences by faction leaders for political purposes led to a conflict increasingly fought along ethnic lines. As well as embittering the fighting, this led to a rather "zero-sum" approach to negotiations.\(^{10}\) For example, cease-fires were often used in a calculated fashion to provide breathing spaces during which to consolidate and re-arm. This became an important matter as it financed the warlords and enabled them to continue with the war. This made the formulation of an over-arching political solution very difficult. Moreover, ethnic hatred and the progressive factionalisation of the militias made concrete advances on issues such as disarmament and demobilization very difficult. The progressive splintering of the


militias whose objective extended no further than persona gain such as economic gain created more problems.\textsuperscript{11} Since weapons and troops were the basis of faction power in Liberia, agreements regarding the handing over of weapons could only succeed if every faction, however small, was included. In reality, such difficulties meant that some factions excluded themselves from political agreements. For example the Lofa Defence Force (allied to Taylor), the Bong Defence Front (allied to Kromah) and the Liberian Peace Council, which operated in NPFL areas with clandestine support from the AFL, were not signatories to the Cotonou Agreement of 1993, which specifically called for deployment of peacekeeping mission.

The situation was further complicated by strife in Sierra Leone, one consequence of which was that Sierra Leonean resistance groups based themselves in Liberian territory; these competed with ULIMO for control of territory and resources.\textsuperscript{12} The overall situation was also exacerbated by the composition of the militias. At least a quarter of the soldiers were children.\textsuperscript{13} At face value, the question of whether ECOMOG has been a success would seem to be redundant. Given the termination of conflict, despite the considerable difficulties posed by the complex nature of war outlined above, the case for "The ECOMOG Miracle"\textsuperscript{14} might appear to be self evident. Skeptics who characterize the operation as "unwarranted aggression and illegality camouflaged as a

\textsuperscript{12} Liberia: "Problematic Peacekeeping", \textit{Africa Confidential.} 4 March 1994, pp.2-3.
\textsuperscript{13} "Beware the Children", \textit{Time Magazine.} 4 December 1995.
\textsuperscript{14} Asante, \textit{New African,} March, 1995 pp4-5.
peacekeeping operation\textsuperscript{15} may not have understood the complexity of the Liberian situation.

**ECOMOG and the Regional Political Interests**

Divisions at the regional political level had a significant impact on the peacekeeping operation. Whilst, in theory, a multi-national operation is a method of reducing tensions by preventing unilateral advantage, it can, in practice, simply act as a catalyst for conflict. This was indeed the case with ECOWAS, which was the mandating body for ECOMOG and which was supposed to exercise political control over it. ECOWAS was divided by conflicting ideas over how the ECOMOG force should operate a situation attributable to the diverging geopolitical interests of its member states and to emerging problems over contributions to the operation. The clearest problem resulted from the clash between the interests of Nigeria and those of other west African states, notably Cote d'Ivoire.\textsuperscript{16} Nigeria, which provided the bulk of the ECOMOG troops and financial contributions opposed Charles Taylor's NPFL. It provided Samuel Doe with assistance; despite denials by the then President Ibrahim Babangida, the Nigerians supplied weapons and ammunition to Monrovia during the AFL campaign in Nimba county.\textsuperscript{17} Taylor received support from Cote d'Ivoire and Burkino Faso and from further abroad, for example, France and Libya.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{15} Ankomah, B* The UN: "Taking Sides in Liberia", *New African*, November 1993.pp7-9


\textsuperscript{17} Adibe, C E, "Coercive Diplomacy and the Third World: Africa after the Cold War." Paper presented to the Workshop on Coercive Diplomacy, King's College London, 7-9 June 1995, p.14.

maneuverings of the rival Anglophone group, dominated by Nigeria, and the Francophone, dominated by Cote d'Ivoire, had profound implications for the ECOMOG operation. There existed considerable resentment of Nigeria's rather heavy-handed use of its influence; for example the dispute with Ghana and Benin regarding Nigeria's unilateral replacement of the ECOMOG Force Commander Arnold Quainoo (a Ghanaian) with the Nigerian Joshua Dogonyaro. One member of the SMC stated that "ECOMOG ... is nothing but a convenient camouflage for an effective Nigerian war machine." Moreover as Nigerian influence within the operation grew; it became increasingly difficult to isolate ECOMOG from Nigerian domestic politics. Thus Dogonyaro's eventual removal as commander was attributed to Babangida's fears about his successes and the possible emergence of a future rival in the Nigerian domestic politics. The economic and political costs to those involved also contributed to divisions. As the operation became progressively more dangerous, costly and protracted, the willingness of ECOWAS states to support potentially dangerous options often reduced correspondingly. The Senegalese contingent, for example, was withdrawn after initial casualties caused the government to forbid its contingent to engage in combat operations without significant Nigerian support. Divisions at the strategic political level eroded the decision-making capability of ECOWAS and led to an inability to decide which objectives to pursue at any given time


ECOMOG Mandate

Related difficulty was the lack of clarity in the mandates given to ECOMOG. Initially, the ECOMOG force commander was tasked with the "conduct of military operations for the purpose of monitoring the cease-fire" and "restoring law and order to create the necessary conditions for free and fair elections to be held in Liberia."\(^{23}\) However, as the situation evolved, the operation found itself tasked with various functions in which the mandates were often very vague, particularly over the situations in which force would be used.\(^{24}\) Agreements at Bamako in November 1990 and Lome on 19\(^{th}\) February 1991 tasked ECOMOG with "monitoring" cease-fires, drawing up buffer zones, the establishment of check points, and the disarmament of militias without any clear guidelines about how this would be achieved in a violent environment. At Lome for example the ECOMOG cease-fire was to be "supervised and maintained" by ECOMOG through the take-over of airports and ports, the establishment of roadblocks at strategic locations, patrols into the countryside, escorts/transports to repatriate displaced persons and so forth.\(^{25}\) How they were to be maintained, given the paucity in the numbers of troops, and what would happen if ECOMOG were resisted, was not stated.

Relationship between UNOMIL and ECOMOG

The UN established the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) in 1994 following an agreement reached by the protagonists at Cotonou in the previous year, and UNOMIL and ECOMOG worked in tandem to implement the

\(^{23}\) Ecowas Standing Mediation Committee, Decision A/DEC.1/8/90. Article 2(2) from Weller, op.cit. p.67.


peace accord. The relationship between UNOMIL and ECOMOG was often less than harmonious. The difficulties were partly practical, such as who should be in control of joint operations, and partly psychological, not least a certain degree of resentment of the UN on the part of ECOMOG and thus an unwillingness to relinquish control. This naturally made it more difficult to accept co-operation with a UN agency. Some ECOMOG soldiers also viewed the whole idea of being "monitored" by the UN as being at best irrelevant and at worst an act which undermined them; according to the Gambian contingent commander in July 1994 "...it is like an inconvenience. Monitoring ECOMOG symbolizes distrust." 26 It is, therefore, no surprise to find a certain tension in the UNOMIL/ECOMOG relationship at the lower level as well. 27 These problems caused enormous practical difficulties. The coordination between the deployment of the UNOMIL and ECOMOG forces was often very poor. 28 Even where UNOMIL and ECOMOG were deployed together, UNOMIL was sometimes subject to so many ECOMOG restrictions that the credibility of the UNOMIL operation was undermined. 29

Operations and Logistics

The situation in Liberia continued with sporadic violence. Despite the continued violence, ECOWAS was able to establish an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) in November 1990. Through ECOMOG enforcement, a measure of stability was then established which lasted until October 1992, with ECOMOG in

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26 Liberia: Problematic Peacekeeping*, op .cit. p 4


28 Ibid, p.41.

control of Monrovia, and the NPFL controlling most of the rest of Liberia. However, attempts by ECOMOG to establish buffer zones and police the UN arms blockade were complicated by continued conflict between the militias. Indeed the early cease-fire did not represent any significant change in the NPFL's opposition to ECOMOG and was instead a tactical decision designed to consolidate the NPFL's position before returning to the offensive.30

On 15 October 1992 the NPFL launched Operation Octopus, a surprise attack against Monrovia and the predominantly ECOMOG forces defending the town. One of the ECOMOG's problems was that effective peace enforcement was difficult because right from the onset, Nigeria's objectives were against Taylor NPFL. One effect of the progressive "Nigerianisation" of the command structure, where Nigerian Gen Dogonyaro replaced Ghanaian Gen Quinoo in a position that was initially agreed to belong to Ghana, the subsequent replacement of Dogonyaro by another Nigerian Gen Olurin and the way in which ECOWAS operations were directed specifically against the NPFL, increased the risk and intensity of operations and further eroded consensus within ECOWAS. The friction generated by this, contributed to a lack of strategic direction as to where force ought to be applied and the outcomes that ECOMOG wanted to achieve.31 This problem was exacerbated by several other factors. One was the NPFL's move towards a guerrilla strategy which meant that, despite holding Monrovia and extending the area controlled by the IGNU, ECOMOG found it difficult to exploit their success. Another was that, despite being a west African force, ECOMOG displayed a remarkable ignorance of the geography, people and politics of Liberia even to the extent that the initial planning for the operation was


carried out on the basis of a tourist map.\textsuperscript{32} Often lacking an understanding of the context in which it operated, it is not so surprising that ECOMOG found that its military strategy did not always produce the desired results. Moreover, ironically, the early territorial gains made through peace enforcement tended to encourage the view within ECOMOG that a military solution could be found which served to undermine the attempts to find a political solution, particularly early on.\textsuperscript{33}

The peace enforcement also undermined the already partial consent for the ECOMOG deployment. The loss of consent in itself may not have been a critical weakness if ECOMOG had retained its impartiality, but this too was further compromised through its attempts at peace enforcement. Nigeria's determination to get rid of Charles Taylor reinforced the perception that ECOMOG was not neutral.\textsuperscript{34} On finding it difficult to score a decisive success against the NPFL, ECOMOG tried to exploit the civil war situation by allying itself with some of the warring factions; for example the AFL, ULIMO, and forces controlled by IGNO co-operated with ECOMOG in the attacks on Taylor's head quarter at Gbarnga in 1993. During the outbreak of violence in April 1996 ECOMOG forces were alleged to have helped clear a way for the forces of Kromah and Taylor in their assaults on Prince Johnson's positions in Monrovia.\textsuperscript{35}

The impartiality issue was significant since, after the signing of the Cotonou Agreement in 1993, ECOMOG attempted to shift into a new peacemaking phase in co-operation with the WN and OAU. Even without the preceding difficulties, ECOMOG's task would have been a challenge, simply because of lack impartiality and resources.


\textsuperscript{33} "Liberia: The Battle For Gbarnga", \textit{Africa Confidential}, Vol.34, No.11, 28 May 1993, pp.1-2.

\textsuperscript{34} Kodjoe O, 'Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict' op. cit, p.293.

\textsuperscript{35} "Liberia: Out of Control", \textit{Africa Confidential}, 10 May, 1996, pp.1-4.
Financial and material constraints left ECOMOG consistently short of the means necessary either to inflict a "defeat" decisive enough to deliver lasting political gains or to implement the ambitious peace-making programmes. This in part explains the initial force of only 3000 which was inadequate for anything except a holding operation. Indeed, without heavy investment from Nigeria, the operation could never have been mounted, a fact which made it easier for it to adopt a leadership role.\(^{36}\)

The lack of resources also had important implications for the effectiveness and morale of the troops; according to Jean-Daniel Tauxe of the ICRC, ECOMOG forces were mostly unpaid or underpaid, and in such conditions they were peacekeepers by name only\(^{37}\). This created friction with the UNOMIL personnel whose operation was much better funded but who depended on ECOMOG to function\(^{38}\). It also led to numerous alleged incidents of corruption\(^{39}\), including the sale of fuel purchased by the US and intended for ECOMOG vehicles; hence the local joke that ECOMOG was an acronym for "Every Car or Moving Object Gone"\(^{40}\). The issue of low and irregular pay was worsened by the lack of an organized system of rotational changeover to relieve troops deployed in Liberia. As one UN officer commented "They're not motivated, not rotated, often not paid"\(^{41}\). The poverty of the ECOMOG contributors highlighted the

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\(^{36}\) Kodjoe, op.cit.p.291.


\(^{40}\) "Witness to Insanity", *Newsweek*, 29 April 1996.

\(^{41}\) Ibid.
significance of external sources of aid; this was, however, a double-edged sword. The degree of dependency on outside sources gave leverage to aid donors and led to considerable discontent in ECOMOG, discontent which was unlikely to foster faith in their mission. The US, as the largest contributor to the UN Trust Fund for Liberia, held what amounted to a veto over expenditure, even to the extent of canceling some fuel purchases. The US also created resentment through its tardy provision of promised logistics, transport and communications equipment for ECOMOG forces.

**The ECOMOG Withdrawal**

Ultimately, ECOMOG's success was less in peacekeeping, since the fighting may well have been more prolonged and heavier, if it had not intervened. The ECOMOG operation was, in reality, an ambiguous exercise in attrition, sustained by Nigeria's willingness to accept heavy material costs, which succeeded largely because of eventual compromises made bilaterally between the then Nigerian President, Sani Abacha, and Charles Taylor which gave Taylor much of what he sought. Prolongation of the war was the key reason for its eventual termination, but this prolongation was made possible by the fact that the Liberian crisis was viewed by Nigeria as an issue of national interest, it did not stem from a new approach to conflict resolution. However, possibly the most notable aspect of the ECOWAS initiative was less the military than the diplomatic dimension.

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44 According to Nigeria $8bn and 500 dead, although Nigeria may well have an interest in talking up its efforts. "Liberia Peace Cost Nigeria 8 Billion Dollars," BBC Online Network, 25th October 1999.
CHAPTER FIVE

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICS OF PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA

Introduction

This chapter analyses critically the two case studies of the regional and sub regional peacekeeping missions, the OAU in Chad and ECOMOG in Liberia. Emphasis has been given to establishing whether the missions carried out were in conformity to the requirement of peacekeeping and whether the regional and sub regional peacekeeping missions are capable of conducting peacekeeping missions in Africa without external support and the effects of the geostrategic influences on the missions. The findings of the study have also been analyzed with a view to bringing out the key issues that may be useful to policy makers. Particular emphasis has been given to findings relating to the politics and challenges of peacekeeping in Africa. Finally the study brings out key issues that are worthy of further research and whose findings will contribute greatly towards the success of peacekeeping missions in Africa.

Analysis of the case studies

The case studies covered in Chapter three and Chapter four were missions that were conducted eight months and seven years respectively, both with a ten year difference between them. The OAU in Chad was conducted during the Cold War period and the ECOMOG in Liberia was a post Cold War peacekeeping mission. The OAU peacekeeping mission in Chad can be categorized as a traditional peacekeeping mission because of its mandate that was focused on monitoring the cease fire and was deployed to act as buffer zone between two opposing belligerents. The ECOMOG in Liberia could be categorized as a multifunctional peacekeeping, in that it was mandated to undertake various tasks including facilitation of elections. The ECOMOG mission in Liberia was also later mandated to not only monitor the cease fires
but even intervene, when the situation became worse. Despite both missions having been conducted at different historical periods, their logistical problems were similar.

In the case of the OAU in Chad, there were difficulties of implementation of the mandates because President Goukouni Wedeyye wanted the peacekeepers to defend his government rather than remain neutral. In Liberia the political factions had different reasons for their existence and nearly all of them were mainly interested in extracting resources from the regions that they controlled. The ECOMOG was initially a peacekeeping under chapter VI which was forced by circumstances to convert to chapter VII. Both cases studies had defective mandates and while the intentions were noble, the implementation was poor. As for ECOMOG the peacekeepers had to contend with dealing with many splinter factions that were coming up depending on the individual interests and ethnic backing. Some groups were also remnants of the national army while others were mainly civilian groups organized mainly on ethnic lines to defend their areas and mainly for the purpose of exploiting resources from their areas. In the case of OAU in Chad, the OAU had a vague mandate and it lacked finance and logistics support and initially it was trying to conduct the mission without involving the UN at least to prove that Africa could be able to resolve its problems. The traditional nature of the mission meant that peacekeeping forces taking part were exposed to the principles of neutrality and impartiality discussed in Chapter Two. This was what President Goukouni seemed to disagree with as he all along thought that the peacekeepers were to protect his Transitional National Union Government (GUNT) against Hissen Habre's FAN. One of the

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1 ‘Chad Peacekeeping Force Countries to Meet,’ 27 November, ibid pp1-3.


· Reportage on the OAU Mini Summit November 1981, pi
roles that the Chairman of the OAU, President Moi had to play was to ensure that adequate peacekeepers are deployed but many countries particularly in west Africa were unable to send their troops due reasons ranging from lack of finances to regional politics and conflicting interests. The clearest problem resulted from the clash between the interests of Nigeria and those of other west African states, notably Cote d'Ivoire. Nigeria, which provided the bulk of the ECOMOG troops and financial contributions opposed Charles Taylor's NPFL. It provided Samuel Doe with assistance; despite denials by the then President Ibrahim Babangida, the Nigerians supplied weapons and ammunition to Monrovia during the AFL campaign in Nimba county. What has come out of this study is that the main challenges that both missions faced were mainly lack of adequate resources and the complexity of the African conflicts and the political challenges which invited a lot of diverse interests both internally and externally. The regional and sub-regional interests affected the performance of the two peacekeeping missions. Both missions were unable to perform their mission successfully because they could not manage without the support of the international community. The lack of support from the international community at the right time and the differences that regional leaders as 'rational actors' developed, contributed the way both these missions were conducted. This analysis will examine the political challenges of peacekeeping in Africa and how they effect the international support of African peacekeeping missions.


Chad Peacekeeping Contingents

The Organization of African Unity OAU experienced considerable difficulty securing member states willing to contribute men and equipment for the organization's second attempt at multinational peacekeeping in Chad. The first peacekeeping mission dispatched to Chad demonstrated the challenges the continental body could face in the area of contingent deployment. Although Benin, Congo, and Guinea pledged soldiers, only Congo actually fielded a contingent initially. Benin and Guinea officially cited logistical and transportation difficulties for the non-appearance of their soldiers. By November 1981, it was clear to all parties that what they were developing was on a much larger scale peacekeeping operation where contingent selection can be a challenging process for an international organization fielding a multinational peacekeeping operation. First, member states must volunteer to provide contingents for a peacekeeping mission, since international organizations, lack the authority to compel a member to contribute soldiers.

Most OAU members, for various reasons, preferred to not participate in the peacekeeping operation, while others professed an initial willingness but failed to fulfill their commitments. Others like Togo had different political interests and openly supported Habre's faction. The status-of-forces agreement granted GUNT the final approval on each contingent in the OAU peacekeeping operation. Therefore GUNT's veto oTa Togolese contingent in the OAU peacekeeping force was as a result of Togo's stand on a political settlement rather than an unconditional backing of GUNT as the legitimate government in Chad. The GUNT official also acknowledged that the Chadian government frowned on Togolese President Eyadema's position in the civil war and accused the leader of being pro-FAN. This was part of the political challenges that this mission faced.

8 "Leader Sees Reluctance," "Slow March to Chad," Ibid pp. 296.
as the regional actors had their own interest in Chad which affected the support required for the mission. With a poorly resourced OAU facing difficulties in securing external funding for the mission, contingent-contributing states were forced to absorb the costs associated with the operation or find their own external resources allowing France to have greater influence particularly on Senegalese participation including financial and logistical support. The Senegalese peacekeepers flew to and from Chad on French-chartered Air Afrique Aircraft.\textsuperscript{11} Similarly the United States funded Zaire and Nigeria while Kenya\textsuperscript{12} benefited in the process\textsuperscript{13}. It is evidence that only Nigeria, Senegal and Zaire were able to deploy large troops and only after they were supported by France and United States\textsuperscript{14}.

\textbf{Financial Challenges}

Immediately after becoming operational, the peacekeeping mission encountered immense logistic and financial difficulties. The enormity of these problems compelled the Chairman of the OAU that time, Kenya's Arap Moi, in accordance with the recommendation of African heads of state,\textsuperscript{15} to ask the U.N. Security Council for financial, material, and technical assistance for the OAU's peacekeeping effort in Chad.\textsuperscript{16} The Security Council, however, would not commit itself to any extensive financial or operational contribution to a peacekeeping operation that would not be under its own political authority and military direction. Such an action would be unprecedented. The farthest the U.N. Security Council would go was to adopt a consensus resolution calling on the U.N. Secretary-General to establish a fund for assistance to the

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\textsuperscript{12} Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, and Zambia Provided Observers for the Peacekeeping Mission.
\textsuperscript{14} Africa Now April 1982, p. 57.
\textsuperscript{15} Security Council Resolution 504, April 30, 1982.
peacekeeping force of the Organization of African Unity in Chad, to be supplied by voluntary contributions.\textsuperscript{17}

On the question of finance, the heads of state of the troop-contributing countries, Senegal, Zaire, and Nigeria, at a meeting in Nairobi in November 1981, directed the general secretariat to work out details of the budget and requested the OAU Chairman to raise such a fund from the Member States, the United Nations and other friendly countries.\textsuperscript{18} As a result of these requests, the assistance that was given to the troops seemed to have been based on the supporting state interests. For example the transportation and the provision of general logistics for the Senegalese troops were borne by France. The United States committed $12 million for logistical help to Zaire and Nigeria.\textsuperscript{19} The OAU peacekeeping mission was constrained by inadequate logistics and finances for any effective operations, and its peacekeeping efforts were frustrated by the absence of political will on the part of the Chadian factions to pursue a political settlement of the conflict. This was a contributing factor to the deterioration of the politico-military situation in Chad and Hissene Habre's took advantage of it with his forces making tremendous advances, virtually unimpeded, toward N'Djamena.

It was this situation that may have prompted President Arap Moi of Kenya, the chairman of the OAU to realize that the sad politico-military situation in Chad made nonsense of the peacekeeping mission's purpose and mandate. Consequently, he convened a meeting of the OAU Standing Committee on Chad in Nairobi in 1982, to review the Chad situation and OAU involvement. The Nairobi meeting issued another peace plan reiterating the neutral character of the OAU peacekeeping force as far as internal conflicts were concerned, demanded that a ceasefire be established by February 1982, and decided to

\textsuperscript{17} Security Council Resolution 504, April 30, 1982, op. cit.
withdraw the OAU peacekeeping force by June 30, 1982. President Goukouni, on the other hand, insisted that the OAU force in Chad should participate actively on the side of his Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) at suppressing the rebellion. He rejected the ceasefire call, charged that the OAU Standing Committee had no legal basis, claimed a betrayal by the OAU, and walked out of the meeting with his delegation. Hissen Habre may have wanted the OAU troops to support his government but this could not happen because he was not the signatory to the Status of Force Agreement. His forces captured N'Djamena on June 7, 1982, while Goukouni fled the capital for Cameroon. As the government signatory to the Status of Force Agreement was no more in power, the existence of the OAU Peacekeeping Force in Chad was no longer legal after June 7, 1982.

**OAU Credibility**

Hissen Habre's capture of the capital city while the OAU troops were unable to act on their mandate has an effect in the overall conduct of the regional rational actors and the ability of the OAU institution which may have been frustrated by the lack coordinated effort and support. Amadu Sesay asserts that the OAU suffered a crushing blow to its prestige, credibility, and confidence as a result of its inability to achieve its objective in its first peacekeeping undertaking.

The absence of cooperation among the states that were expected to contribute troops and the inability of the OAU Chairman and the secretariat to convince them in any way compounded the problems of the peacekeeping mission of the OAU. OAU member-states appeared to have differing motivations for involvement in the process. The differing motivations of member states tended to sap the political strength of the OAU by undermining its unity of purpose, credibility and ultimately, capability. For example, Hissene Habre may have had no reason to seek a negotiated settlement since some member states

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of the OAU, particularly Egypt and the Sudan, were more than willing support him. The limited institutional and structural capacity for the peacekeeping mission may have been the major operational constraint. The Chad operations were simply beyond the financial capability of the OAU. Troop contributing countries with the assistance of their foreign patrons had to bear the brunt of the cost of operations and logistics for their respective troops. The uncertain funding impaired command and control and this kind of situation usually undermines the morale of the troops and adversely affects the efficiency and effectiveness of the peacekeeping mission. With mounting bills and increasing logistical problems, there was no way the OAU could have sustained a drawn-out peacekeeping mission even if the belligerent parties had cooperated.

**Neutrality of Peacekeepers in Chad**

The peacekeepers remained neutral in the crisis because it was not in the interests of the contingent providers to become actively involved in the conflict. Foreign policy objectives were served by persuading GUNT to remove the Libyan troops from Chad and overseeing a cease-fire between the belligerents while the international community, mainly France and US provided the logistic support for this purpose. The financial costs and casualties associated by becoming involved in the fighting could have led to internal problems within the contingent-providing states as Nigeria faced later during the ECOMOG operation in Liberia.

Zaire represents one possible exception to the discussion on peacekeeper neutrality. The United States and France persuaded Zaire to provide a contingent to the OAU peacekeeping operation as evidenced by the logistic support that it was offered. Zaire, following the Western lead, appeared to prefer Habre over Goukouni due to the Habre's anti-Libyan stance. After Habre's ouster of Goukouni, the OAU ordered its peacekeepers to depart Chad. However, Zaire responded to a request from Habre and remained in Chad to help protect N'Djamena as FAN consolidated its positions and formed a new government. An

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American transport plane re-supplied the soldiers from Zaire in N’Djamena after the departure of the last Nigerian and Senegalese peacekeepers. This was an indication that US continued to influence the events in Chad for its own interests therefore determining the success of the regional peacekeeping to its favour.

ECOMOG and the Regional Political Interests

ECOMOG operations and its challenges can be analyzed against the background of the regional political interests. Five of these were particularly important. The first was the Anglophone/Francophone cleavage in the region, a cleavage as linguistic as it was cultural and political. Of the sixteen members of ECOWAS, nine are French-speaking, five are English-speaking, while two-Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde are Spanish-speaking. Previous attempts at regional co-operation in west Africa have reflected, these colonial linguistic and political affinities, particularly among the Francophone states. ECOWAS itself was the first attempt to overcome these historical alignments and to initiate some form of overarching regional integration; its limited success was an indication of the durability of some of these colonial relationships. A second factor was the dominance of Nigeria within the region, in terms of population and economic resources, a dominance which was greatly augmented by the oil boom in the 1970s. However, Nigeria's pre-eminence was contested especially by the arch rival, Ivory Coast.

Thirdly, ECOMOG operations occurred at a difficult moment for the states in the region. The members of the regional organisation were themselves involved in complex political transitions, with most of their regimes under considerable challenge from their own civil societies. Fourthly, seven years of ECOMOG stay in Liberia is likely to have generated huge resource demands, economic, military, political and diplomatic, that these states were ill-equipped to fulfill and which the international community was unwilling to deliver. Fifthly, the structural and political crises that sustained this conflict in Liberia, economic stress, state decay, illegitimacy and the dislocation of the youth, were eminent difficulties in the peacekeeping process. There was thus a real danger that the
conflict would spread beyond the borders of Liberia and call for support from the international community. The major dilemma of weak states is that they are vulnerable to such regional disturbances, but have limited power to stop or suppress them. Ironically, it was arguably this very sense of their vulnerability and of the possibility of a 'domino effect' within the region that furnished ECOMOG with the political will to remain engaged in the Liberian issue for the seven years.

**ECOMOG mandate**

ECOMOG, however, soon found its mandate complicated by the violent and brutal capacity of the warring factions. Not long after its deployment, ECOMOG shifted from being a peacekeeper to perform peace enforcement tasks. ECOMOG found itself embroiled in a war with the NPFL, inevitably compromising any supposed neutrality that a peacekeeping force might have. In the process of attempting to interpose itself between various warring factions to keep the peace, ECOMOG supported and armed other rivals of Charles Taylor. Of the troops that intervened under the auspices of ECOMOG, Nigerian troops were seen as notorious for their aggressive military campaign against Taylor. In fact, the whole story of ECOMOG in Liberia is bound by the open desire of Nigeria to challenge, dominate and dictate the outcome of the conflict, but more importantly, to prevent Taylor from seizing power in Liberia.25

It may be generally thought that a regional peacekeeping operation would stand a much better chance of avoiding common peacekeeping problems, if only by virtue of a greater interest in, and understanding of, local conditions. In dealing with a complex dispute, however, the ECOMOG force faced many of the same


problems of UN operations. Indeed, in key areas, such as strategic direction, the formulation of mandates, the use of force, co-operation with other organizations, and the question of resources, the ECOMOG peacekeeping operation proved to be more ineffective than the UN, further confirming that the regional peacekeeping forces are unable to succeed in peacekeeping without international support.

Closely linked to the difficulties caused by strategic level political differences and the issue of mandates were the problems associated with ECOMOG's military strategy, which oscillated between peacekeeping and peace enforcement without decisive breakthroughs in either. Peacekeeping in Liberia was always likely to be difficult because of this situation. This illustrated the problems associated with trying to apply the Cold War concept of peacekeeping in post Cold War conflict environments. In Liberia, the traditional essentials for a peacekeeping operation, the consent of the protagonists and a working ceasefire, did not really exist. Indeed the ECOMOG force was fired upon even as they landed by Taylor's NPFL, indicating that he had not consented on the deployment of ECOMOG, as an interested party.

The Outcome of ECOMOG Deployment

The issue of whether or not the ECOMOG deployment prolonged the war is a controversial one.\textsuperscript{26} Seven years on, Taylor occupied the position that he might have occupied in 1989; asjie himself commented, "If we had been allowed to win on the battlefield, we would have finished the war in six months in 1990.\textsuperscript{1,27} Taylor's assessment is perhaps overly optimistic, given that Liberia had antagonistic neighbours who may well have been willing to provide support to


anti-Taylor factions in continuing the struggle. Nevertheless, even a prolongation of the conflict might have been acceptable if it had resulted in a better quality of outcome which would have been a long term solution for Liberia's instability and the promotion of regional stability.

A military victory by Taylor in 1990 might simply have pushed opposition factions across the border, leading to continuous low-level conflict in Liberia. Another crucial difference between the situation in 1997 and that which might have occurred in 1990 is that it has been brought about with the active support of Nigeria and at least the acquiescence of other major protagonists, such as Cote d'Ivoire. Yet there remain several areas of concern. Taylor's electoral victory was the result of a number of factors including having more resources, better organisation, and better media coverage, but it is also apparent that the strength of his support was related to a fear on the part of the electorate that if he were not elected, violence would return.28

A comparative Analysis of both Case Studies

In both case studies deployment of the peacekeeping forces was either delayed or faced with scarcity of resources leading to logistical problems or lack of the clarity of the peacekeeping mandate. OAU in Chad was marred by pre-deployment and post-deployment difficulties. OAU in Chad and ECOMOG in Liberia deployment were delayed. For example financial difficulties in OAU lead the contingent provider to establish bilateral agreement with states willing to provide equipment for peacekeeper deploying to Chad. OAU Chairman Moi initiated personal appeals to France, Great Britain, and the United States for financial support for the OAU peacekeeping contingents and successfully secured pledges of assistance.29


29 Daily Nation, Nairobi, November 24, 1981, pp. 1
This poses the main challenge as to whether regional and sub-regional peacekeeping mission can succeed without logistical support from western powers. The Chad case has revealed the difficulties the OAU chairman faced in trying to get troops to deploy in this mission. There was also evidence of competing regional and external powers exemplified by Zaire, Nigeria and France. Zaire was backed by the US to protect its interests in Chad. Nigeria was exercising its hegemonic influence in trying to protect its national interests in Chad against the background of French influence in the region, as evidenced by their competing interests with Ivory Coast, where each supported opposing factions. The US and French financial and logistics support was necessary because there was no way OAU would have been able to support the mission in any way as evidenced by the calls from Chairman Moi when he reminded the world through the press that the Chadian civil war affected the entire world and not just Africa, for the international community to support the mission. Both missions were supported despite their inability to fully perform to the expectations of a peacekeeping mission. Another aspect is the relationship between the rebels and the peacekeeping forces. To a large extent, this may determine the progress of the peacekeeping process. Hissen Habre's delay in moving to the capital Njamena would have positively contributed toward gaining more time to allow more troops to be deployed and hence be able to implement the mandate. In Liberia it was evident that right from the onset, Nigeria had broken the cardinal rule by accepting to enter the host state without the consent of Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). Therefore the relationship between Nigerian contingents which were the largest, with some of the factions, was already biased. This led to Nigeria being unable to deploy in areas that they were considered hostile and the mission was unable to take off smoothly right from the start.

After many delays, the OAU contingents prepared to enter Chad without the organization having acquired the necessary financial backing for the peacekeepers. The OAU Secretary-General Kodjo acknowledged the

organization's inability to support its deployment in Chad in 1981 and endorsed offers for support from non-African states. Rather than channel funds through the OAU, Kodjo stated that bilateral accords with the countries ready to send their troops would be preferable. This may be traced to the lack of concerted effort by the OAU members. The Anglophone/Francophone cleavages and influences by the colonial masters, where their interests were of much importance in Chad could have contributed towards decision by Kodjo. For example it was easier for France to fund Senegal and US to fund Zaire and Nigeria, in order to sustain their political interests rather than fund through the OAU secretariat which would otherwise finance other African countries that do not support the donors like Libya.

The open bilateral support meant that member states were free to negotiate for assistance from their allies outside the framework of the OAU. Therefore any assistance given was likely influence the peacekeeping mission based on the interests of the donor. This was further evidenced when President Mobutu agreed to remain behind and support Hissen Habre even after the OAU chairman had directed the withdrawal of troop. The US which had offered logistical support to Zaire may have influenced on Zaire to stay on. In any case Zaire would not have been able to stay without that support. OAU Special Representative Dawit reiterated Kodjo's comments the next month and noted that the OAU had been mandated to seek funds from African countries (the $500,000 assessments) but not "non-African" states. Therefore, any external funding and logistical assistance for contingents should be negotiated as bilateral agreements directly with the OAU members providing peacekeepers and not the OAU itself. The same arrangement applied for logistical assistance from non-African countries. The contingent providers could establish bilateral agreements with any state willing to provide equipment for the peacekeepers deploying to Chad.

In the case of ECOMOG, the member states were mainly supporting their troops with Nigeria as the main sponsor. The peacekeepers were deployed in

32 Ibid p 21
Liberia before detailed logistics and financial arrangements were made. The peacekeepers were ill equipped and ill prepared and not all members were fully informed before the full scale deployment occurred. Some countries complained that the decisions by the SMC were 'unilateral' and the ECOWAS was out of its mandate to involve itself in a security undertaking of such magnitude. The other concern was domination of the ECOMOG Nigeria. This resulted in the lack of sub regional unity and deprivation of important legitimacy in fulfilling the tasks. The ECOMOG forces in Liberia were under the operational control of the commander in the field rather than the ECOWAS secretariat. After the Nigerian removed the Ghanaian commander, and the Nigerian contingent being the largest, it was left to the Nigerian to run the show and most of the information may have been shared only between the Nigerians, without reaching other members of ECOWAS.

Based on the analysis of the OAU peacekeeping mission in Chad, it may be viewed to have failed because it did manage to gain enough support to deploy the troops as per the mandate. The belligerents refused to cooperate and honor an OAU negotiated cease-fire. Rather than lay down their arms and form a temporary coalition government under the oversight of the OAU peacekeepers, GUNT and FAN continued the conflict until N'Djamena fell to Habre's forces. The belligerents also did not acknowledge the mission of the peacekeepers. Habre simply drove through the peacekeepers' neutral barriers during his final offensive, and GUNT utilized the neifiral OAU positions as sanctuaries for its troops after assaulting FAN units. A strong OAU force with strong support would have therefore been able to achieve success, particularly if the international community provided that support.

However, from a western political view point, the OAU peacekeeping mission was actually a 'success', based on their interests. The contingent providers and their western backers persuaded Goukouni to request the withdrawal of Libyan troops from Chad. This action satisfied the most important foreign policy goals of the contingent-providing states and their western supporters who did not want a pro soviet Libya in Chad. Although the Chadian
factions refused to enact a cease-fire and negotiate national elections, Habre's victory served also to fulfill foreign policy objectives of the force participants and their backers. Habre, already seen as pro-western compared to Goukouni and receiving clandestine western military aid through Sudan, stood staunchly against the reintroduction of Libyan soldiers in Chad. The viewpoint would be that any 'success' of peacekeeping in Chad was therefore determined by the international community support, but for their own interests and those of other regional rational actors who were pro-west.

On the other hand, the ECOMOG force faced many of the same problems of UN operations. Indeed, in key areas, such as strategic direction, the formulation of mandates, the use of force, co-operation with other organizations, and the question of resources, the ECOMOG peacekeeping operation proved to be more ineffective than the UN. Closely linked to the difficulties caused by strategic level political differences and the issue of mandates were the problems associated with ECOMOG's military strategy, which oscillated between peacekeeping and peace enforcement without decisive breakthroughs in either. Peacekeeping in Liberia was always likely to be difficult because of this situation. These unclear mandates had serious impact on prospects and ramifications of peace in relation to this study objective. ECOMOG, however, soon found its mandate complicated by the violent and brutal capacity of the warring factions. Not long after its deployment, ECOMOG shifted from being a peacekeeper to perform peace enforcement tasks. ECOMOG found itself embroiled in a war with the NPFL, inevitably compromising any supposed neutrality that a peacekeeping force might have. In the process of attempting to interpose itself between various warring factions to keep the peace, ECOMOG supported and armed other rivals of Charles Taylor. Of the troops that intervened under the auspices of ECOMOG, Nigerian troops were seen as notorious for their aggressive military campaign against Taylor. The political challenges of this mission can be understood from the context in which it operated, it is not so surprising that ECOMOG found that its military strategy did not always produce the desired results. Moreover,
ironically, the early territorial gains made through peace enforcement tended to encourage the view within ECOMOG that a military solution could be found which served to undermine the attempts to find a political solution, particularly early on.\textsuperscript{33} Financial and material constraints left ECOMOG consistently short of the means necessary either to inflict a "defeat" decisive enough to deliver lasting political gains or to implement the ambitious peace-making programmes. Indeed, without heavy investment from Nigeria, the operation could never have been mounted, a fact which made it easier for it to adopt a leadership role.\textsuperscript{34} Ultimately, ECOMOG's success was less in peacekeeping, since the fighting may well have been more prolonged and heavier, if it had not intervened. The ECOMOG operation was, in reality, an ambiguous exercise in attrition, sustained by Nigeria's willingness to accept heavy material costs,\textsuperscript{35} ECOMOG as a peacekeeping mission did not satisfy the principles of neutrality and impartiality. Nigeria having been the most financially capable manipulated the mission to their advantage including the unilateral change of the Ghanaian commander. Hand the mission been fully supported by the international community, Nigeria would not have manipulated it to its advantage. However Nigeria managed to lead the mission up to the time that the UN took over amid serious losses.

\textsuperscript{33} "Liberia: The Battle For Gbarnga", \textit{Africa Confidential}, Vol. 34, No. 11, 28 May 1993, pp.1-2.

\textsuperscript{34} Kodjoe, op.cit.p.291.

\textsuperscript{35} According to Nigeria $8bn and 500 dead, although Nigeria may well have an interest in talking up its efforts. "Liberia Peace Cost Nigeria 8 Billion Dollars," BBC Online Network, 25\textsuperscript{th} October 1999.
CHAPTER SIX

Conclusions
This study has highlighted on the politics and challenges of peacekeeping in Africa and has examined two case studies that represented the challenges that peacekeeping missions in Africa experience. The study notes that the Peacekeeping force will continue to be the main UN instruments for maintenance of international peace and security. The introduction of the peacekeeping force will continue to presume definable, achievable and realizable political ends which are reasonable within a specified amount of time. However political mandates in any given peace keeping situation without the commitment of troops and resources are more of expressions of moral outrage than of any political will. That was exemplified in the analyzed regional missions conducted by OAU in Chad and ECOMOG in Liberia.

The study has established that in any peacekeeping mission in Africa, early interventions would require sophisticated transportation, logistics capabilities maintained by countries that have the capability. The UN and Western powers need therefore to fully support regional peacekeeping missions so that they are able to handle their regional security problems effectively. On the other hand, the problem faced by current UN policy makers is how to bridge the gap between chapter VI missions which is classical peacekeeping and chapter VII missions, which is peacemaking or enforcement. Questions are asked as to what should be the response when a chapter VI mission, with the situation in Liberia in mind, where things got out of hand and all went wrong, and where the mandate for the troops on the ground was purely based on Chapter VI. Then the ECOMOG reaction towards transforming itself to enforcement under chapter VII was commendable despite other shortcomings.

The study has further established that the regional peacekeeping organizations are better placed to undertake prompt interventions in peace enforcement despite their shortcomings, mainly in logistics aspects. Their inherent knowledge of regional problems, linguistic compatibility, acclimatization,
the general interest on the regional participants and the synergy that comes from working with close neighbours bound by shared economic culture and interests. There are however obstacles particularly in African regional organizations. The different states, individual and group interests that regional participants might have in the outcome of a regional conflict, may lead either to misuse of the force, like the case of ECOMOG mission in Liberia where the country's and individual agendas in the mission derailed the focus of the mission.

In both cases studies, they have shown that there was lack of expertise in the conduct of both missions. Both cases have however proved that as much as there may be advantages of regional and sub regional forces deployment in their region, there are other factors particularly national, individual and unilateral interests that may be detrimental to the overall objective of the mission. Peacekeeping is an extension of national foreign policy and states contribute manpower to a peacekeeping operation if it is within their interests. Secondly, the states volunteering to provide soldiers must have a military force capable of projecting and sustaining itself outside of its borders unless the international organization provides the required financial and logistical assets. Funding is mainly the main problem from beginning to end of mission. Regional forces cannot sustain themselves without logistic support as evidenced by the OAU in Chad in 1981-1982 and ten years later the ECOMOG forces in Liberia in 1990-1997, had similar problems. These are some of the critical problems by the regional and sub regional peacekeeping missions that the western world is reluctant to support.

The weaker states in the West African region had difficulties in mobilizing the resources required to deal decisively with the Liberian crisis, becoming overwhelmingly dependent on one regional power to sustain the operation. The ECOMOG operation occurred at a difficult time for the states in the region, when they were involved in painful economic reforms and their own legitimacy, in most cases, was subject to internal criticism and pressures. The intervention was also complicated by linguistic and geopolitical rivalries and by cleavages within ECOWAS itself, and undermined by debilitating arguments about its legitimacy.
and organization. These difficulties were partially due to the fact that ECOWAS and the regional organization, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), had been very slow in taking issues of regional security seriously. Regionalism also proved as much a source of weakness as of strength in the operation. Its advantages were both genuine interests mainly on the aspect of sub regional security and 'avoidance of spread of instability' and self-interests in the mission and intimate knowledge of the local political terrain, both necessary for sustained and meaningful engagement. Its disadvantages were the danger of partisanship and the lack of neutrality and, in the ECOMOG case, the militarization of existing regional conflicts and cleavages. In other words, regional or sub regional actors are liable to be both too close to the issues and too interested in the outcomes. Therefore international intervention was ultimately required to break the deadlock.

Yet despite the severity of the conflict, 1997 saw an agreement to end hostilities, the disarmament of warring factions, the establishment of political parties and elections in July 1997 which returned Charles Ghankay Taylor as President of the Republic of Liberia. A key component of the process by which conflict termination was achieved was the deployment of ECOMOG. Understandably, therefore, there is a growing interest in the idea of a more developed African peacekeeping capability building in part based on this perceived success. There are, of course, good reasons why specifically regional responses make sense, not least the manifest unwillingness of the international community to countenance significant engagement. Nevertheless, the problems concomitant with an African regional initiative are many. In reality, however, ECOMOG provides a poor peacekeeping role model. In terms of intent, method, and outcomes, the ECOMOG operation embodied serious flaws which make it an imperfect model upon which to build future African intervention capabilities.

However, this option of regional forces is viewed by African countries as a way for the developed world to shift the risk of casualties onto to poor countries or to maintain a de-facto veto over the use of regional forces through the
retention of certain key capabilities. Ultimately the force that was required in Liberia and Chad, right from the onset should have been a UN force, or UN force or a leading country should have followed immediately, with a clear mandate based on the situation on ground. For example United Kingdom responded in Sierra Leone as a former colonialist. If questions of operational goals, force generation, deployment, employment and engagement require a major military actor to answer them in sufficient time to make a different, then United States and European Union countries must recognize that their services will be demanded in the spirit of UN principle of maintenance of international peace and security in the world. This is however not to say that only the western powers can, or should, but they may willingly perform the bulk of future operations like the one of the UK in Sierra Leone, evidently they are the only once that have the capabilities and are indispensable on these tasks as powerful members of the Security Council.

The study further establishes that international politics will remain a balancing act between cooperation and conflict among competing nation-states in an arena of power. In such a world, the imperfect UN will be able to perform modest peacekeeping services of largely the classic type, with some minor additions in election monitoring and relief operations. Warlike peace enforcement operations should not be the task of the UN but of great power led coalitions or of regional defense and security groupings such as NATO, ECOMOG, or any upcoming regional peacekeeping organizations, with lip service being paid to the UN as in the American-led Gulf War. Peace will be preserved in the world only if nation-states first look to their own defenses and internal well-being. Outside the primary arena of traditional interstate interactions, international peacekeeping can play a limited but useful role in making a safer world. How useful that role will be will depend on effective and energetic pursuit of reforms in peacekeeping by the UN and its member states.
An interesting African perspective is offered by Madlala Routledge and Liebenbeg who assert that Africa needs a new 'development peacekeeping doctrine', they argue that the main drivers of conflict in Africa are resource based and that an overly military approach to peacekeeping ought to be replaced by a more multidimensional developmental approach. Extrapolating on African conflicts, they stress that many societies have become 'war economics', where the expulsion of populations, killings and large-scale human rights violations are a means of accumulating resources. This was very evident in west Africa where ECOMOG was deployed. The authors argue that UN peacekeeping in Africa has largely ignored this dynamic. They offer 'development' peacekeeping as an African alternative, defined as 'post-conflict reconstruction intervention' which aims to achieve sustainable levels of human security through a combinations of interventions aimed at accelerating capacity building and socio-economic development. The argument is that the African peacekeeping missions need to be multi-disciplinary with a mandate to develop an integrated post conflict reconstruction program.

Boulend's arguments on the principle of impartiality, contends that an impartial mandate is 'without prejudice' the position of the parties. This principle is underscored in Article 40 of the UN Charter. She argues that monitoring a ceasefire or peace agreement is almost by definition, an impartial mandate. She contends that impartial mandates will not necessary be implemented impartially, she gives an example of actions by the peacemakers which have an impact on the positions of one of the parties, like in Liberia case with ECOMOG showing favor to Prince Johnson's Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), impartiality cannot be achieved particularly on such an operation. However she does not reject the value of impartiality as a guiding principle, but calls for a deeper understanding of what it means and greater care in its use. In the case of ECOMOG, Nigeria had to face this challenge when they openly showed

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1 Boulden J, Dealing with Conflicts in Africa.:The UN and Regional Organizational (eds) Malgrave Macmillan Press, 2003
impartiality against Taylor's NPFL, in order to enter Liberia. This is a post Cold War peacekeeping challenge in intra state conflicts.

The former Algerian, Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi chaired a commission sanctioned by the United Nations on its reforms. The report now known as Brahimi report launched a new vision for the future of United Nations peacekeeping. It covered a substantial amount of information on peacekeeping challenges and the reforms needed in the UN as an organization. Among other things the report calls for deployment of better equipped and well supported peacekeepers. It also emphasizes on the need for regional and sub regional peacekeeping organizations especially in Africa. The report also calls for end to half measures where wishful thinking substitutes for a clear and well supported plan of action.\(^3\) However, despite recommendations, there has been slow progress in creating more regional brigade size forces and more need to be done to support regional organizations in developing countries to meet this goal.

While UN peacekeeping missions cannot be risk free, there is the need to have the report implemented so that the UN is well equipped to undertake more complex missions. However Mwagiru argues that debates about peacekeeping in Africa particularly in the African Union meetings have generally been colored by conceptual confusion about the essential nature of peacekeeping.\(^4\) The ongoing peacekeeping missions are extremely fragile and the security environment can be better managed if missions match the need on the ground, if resources can be better managed and missions match those mandates and if peace operations are deployed in a more judicious and deliberate manner.

This further exemplifies the reasons as to the need for UN and western support in the regional organizations to create interest and focus on the maintenance of the aim. Building and training a military meaningful regional force is a costly undertaking. Building the confidence and interoperability takes significant effort to achieve. Few regions have the military capability to deploy

\(^3\) Brahimi Report op. cit p\(1\)

and sustain a peacekeeping or peace enforcement force for the significant time it takes to generate stability on the ground, such an effort may be viewed by some as an excuse by the developed world to wash its hands off the problems in the developing world and mainly in Africa. Africa has some of the poorest countries in the world, yet it is a paradox that the very region that has serious conflicts, comprises countries in dire financial, social and political strains which would be hard pressed to participate without outside assistance. ECOMOG, for example is composed of countries that, apart of Nigeria, the rest are relatively poor and were unable to provide or sustain their own troops in Liberia.

Many arguments have been raised on the need to strengthen regional security institutions in Africa, as part of the continuing evolution of post Cold War global security architecture. Mwagiru argues that the OAU engagement in Chad in1981 underlined the fact that the OAU was keen to move beyond mere speeches and engage practically in conflict management. Despite the reluctance of the OAU to go ahead and establish its own peacekeeping force, the regional organizations have taken up the challenge like the ECOWAS and its force ECOMOG.5 Since the 1990s the multinational Forces of the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) and later the African Union have repeatedly stepped in, with little support from the international community, to take on peace keeping duties where the need was most urgent. ECOMOG did so in Liberian 1990-1997. General arguments over the strength, weaknesses and success of regional and sjjb regional peacekeeping missions, which now appear to be the way the western world intends, was part of the main discussion in Vienna Seminar in August 2003.6 The argument in the seminar was over the strength, weaknesses and the success of regional security arrangements, versus the UN centered regime, in the context of peace operations in Africa. The issue

takes a different dimension, when looked through African perspective, especially looking at situations in Chad and Liberia. These missions experienced serious weaknesses and could not fully succeed without support from the powerful nations and the UN. Therefore the Chad and the Liberia case studies confirms that the success of regional peacekeeping is only possible when the approach to peacekeeping in Africa is multidimensional and should include regional actors, the UN, external powers, NGOs and private contractors. During peace building, priority should be given to security sector reform, and the establishment of effective rule of law institutions and better management of the relationship between the military and humanitarian actors in these operations.

The study has demonstrated that regional and sub regional peacekeeping missions require logistic support that may not be available from their states. The regional political and economic interests have an effect on the achievements of the regional and sub regional peacekeeping objectives and the international community interests can manipulate peacekeeping missions in Africa for their own national interests. France and U S exemplified this through Senegal and Zaire respectively, in the Chad case study. Nigeria and Ivory Coast exemplified in Liberia case study. The study has further shown how political challenges, lack of clear mandates, and adequate logistic support has failed African peacekeeping missions.
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