THE ROLE PLAYED BY AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO CONFLICT IN THE COLD WAR ERA

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YEAR: 2006
DECLARATION

This dissertation is my original work and has not been presented for award of a degree in any other University.

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Date

This dissertation has been submitted with my approval as a University supervisor.

Signed: L.S. Chesoni

Date
DEDICATION

I dedicate this work firstly to the Almighty God for giving me the grace to finish this project. Secondly to my beloved husband Jonathan Ciano who stayed late nights reading through my work despite his heavy work schedule. Thirdly our three lovely children, Timothy, Christopher and Brenda who supported me in very challenging times of my life. I did this project when I was very ill and could have easily given it up were it not for them. Because of their prayers and support I was able to finally complete this dissertation.

May the Lord Almighty continually bless their efforts in all that they do. Amen
ABSTRACT

This project has attempted to argue that the US foreign policy greatly contributed to the crisis in the DRC in the Cold War era. The argument is based on the fact that the Congress formulated the US foreign policy to benefit the Americans and not the Africans. Based on the realist theory the foreign policy was geared towards achieving the goals of the Congress at any given time.

The US foreign policy kept on shifting according to the government agenda and the doctrine of the time. The underlying principle was to protect American interests abroad at any cost. As long as no one interfered with their interests in the DRC, the US took a low position. When there was a threat the foreign policy changed. They resorted to any means necessary to save their interests. It is this continuity and change of American foreign policy that is the concern of this project.

The fact that America supported an oppressive regime for over three decades raises an ethical question. If the US foreign policy was to protect democracy globally, then the case of DRC was a mere contradiction. Democracy became compromised to protect the interests of state. A whole chapter deals with continuity and change of American foreign policy. It is by analysing the process by which the Congress formulates the foreign policy that we can begin to comprehend the case of DRC. By so doing we are able to understand why America supported the Mobutu regime while claiming that he was America's best friend and the most valued friend in the continent of Africa.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Lastly but not least thanks to my parents for their support.
Mobutu Sese Seko worked with six American Presidents. With each change of leadership, the US foreign policy took either a shift or continued to match the doctrine of that presidency. Each change affected DRC therefore greatly influencing the internal politics of the nation. Before the Cold War era the US policy makers consistently ignored the continent of Africa. It was not until 1957 when Richard Nixon and Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts recognised the importance of Africa. The changes that were occurring in Africa were important to the East-West relations. They warned that the new independent states would either turn to Moscow or to Washington. President Eisenhower then created a separate Bureau of African affairs within the state department to deal with Africa issues.

Fear of the Soviet Union caused the US to change her attitude towards Africa in the Cold War era. It is such circumstances that led to some of the unfortunate decisions made over the DRC. Africa entered into a phase of neo-colonialism. It is within this framework that the DRC politics can be analysed.
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CHAPTER ONE

1.1 Background of the Study

Introduction

The international system in the Cold War era divided the world into two power zones. These were the Western block composed of the United States of America and her allies, and the Eastern block comprising the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic. This bipolar world system with the United States and the Soviets as the main hegemonies rose as a result of military strength. The ideological differences between capitalism and communism dominated the scene and led to power struggle between the two super powers. Each side believed that there would be no lasting world peace as long as the other side was dominant. Communist Russia under Stalin warned the world in 1946 that capitalism was a threat to world peace. To overcome capitalism it was prudent to not only improve but also increase their weapons and technology. No sooner had Stalin made this pronouncement than George F. Kennan, the American ambassador to Moscow sent a telegram to his country warning about the Soviet expansion. He asserted that it was of no use to negotiate with Moscow and advised that the best way forward was for the U. S to pursue a long term vigilant containment of Russia.
The idea of ‘iron curtain’ being drawn across Europe became a popular cliché after Winston Churchill’s memorable speech at Westminster College in Missouri in which he warned of the Russian threat to democracies. This speech is seen to have prompted the US to depart from her isolationist foreign policy and led to the subsequent struggle to stop communism that resulted in the massive arms' race known as the Cold War. US foreign policy was geared towards protecting the US interests abroad and influencing the world with her ideology. US foreign policy towards Africa and the DRC must be understood in that context.

The involvement of both superpowers in Africa was intended to further their national interests. As a result of this policy the newly independent African states resorted to a non-alignment policy in order to accrue benefits from the superpowers. The competition between the superpowers resulted in multiple conflicts, poverty and military insurgencies in major parts of Africa thus destroying economies and reducing populations. The non-alignment policy was an attempt by African states to protect themselves against the effects of the Cold War.
The East-West conflict was manifested in the US foreign policy towards the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Other countries affected by that policy in Africa were Ethiopia, Somalia and South Africa where dictatorial and racial regimes were supported by the Western countries. Consequently the relations with African regimes which evolved were influenced by the rivalry between the two super powers. Any perceived or actual Soviet involvement in a particular region was enough to prompt White House intervention and would usually provoke escalation of conflict.

The D.R.C and Angola are good examples of this policy. In both cases the US used covert military assistance to stop Soviet expansion in Africa. Sometimes the conflict had nothing to do with ideological concerns of capitalism or communism as was the case of Somalia and Ethiopia during President Reagan’s tenure.

After the end of Cold War US attention shifted elsewhere following the collapse of the Soviet Union. This time the focus was on the political changes happening in Europe. The policy towards Africa shifted to that of disengagement. African issues were no longer to be allowed to bother America which increasingly became reluctant to take positions that might bring political
controversies internationally. It is this selfish attitude on the side of US that led the writer to investigate its role in the DRC conflict.

The D.R.C. was regarded as the Pearl of Central Africa and still is because of its unique minerals and resources like cobalt, which was important to the West for their industrial and military uses. In line with the US foreign policy towards Africa in the Cold War era, Mobutu Sese Seko, a despot was allowed to stay in power because he kept unity among the country's 200 ethnic groups. This worked well for the US because it minimised the possibility of Soviet intervention. The US maintained Mobutu in power until end of the Cold War, when relations between the two countries began to change. As a result the D.R.C was left at the mercy of a tyrannical ruler who did not have interests of the nation in mind.

The post-independent D.R.C. was faced with crisis after crisis. The US did not seek long-term solutions to these crises. The US Congress responded to the crises as and when the need arose to protect their interests. A long lasting solution was not sought.
According to the Convention of Democratic and Social Institutions (CIDES) of 2001\(^1\), the Democratic Republic of Congo is now reliving the turmoil experienced during the transitions of the first five years after its independence (1960 to 1965) and during the National Sovereign Conference period (1990 to 1997). Many attempts have been made to bring peace to this region but none has worked so far. These include the 1999 Lusaka peace agreement.

The study will among other things seek to answer the question of why it has taken so long to achieve peace in the DRC since independence.

**Problem Statement**

The DRC has not experienced consistent peace since the time of her independence in 1960. Political disorder characterised the first five years of independence between 1960 and 1965 when Mobutu Sese Seko took over as a dictator. Even after President Mobutu took over there continued to be crisis after crisis. Independence from the cruel rule of Belgium did not end the conflicts within this region.

Attempts made by scholars to explain the crisis have focused mainly on the ethnic and personality factors. Much has not been done to explain the

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\(^1\) Http://www.cides-congo.org
international dimension of the crisis.\textsuperscript{2} As a result there is inadequate understanding of the crisis as well as to its solution. The DRC crisis can best be understood by researching on the various variables of the conflict. International dimension is one of them. The US involvement in the DRC affairs in the Cold War era is critical because she was the superpower at the time.

This paper seeks to establish the extent to which the US was linked to the DRC crisis if at all.

**Research Problem**

To what extent did the US foreign policy affect the crisis in DRC in the Cold War era?

**Objectives**

To: Examine, assess, and find out the extent to which US foreign policy contributed, affected and influenced the crisis in the DRC in the Cold War Era.

\textsuperscript{2} Nzongola-Ntalaja (ed), The Crisis in Zaire: Myths and Realities (Trenton, NJ: African World Press, 1986), pg
Hypothesis

1. The US foreign policy towards DRC contributed to the crisis in this region in the Cold War era.
2. The US foreign policy towards DRC had nothing to do with the crisis in the region in the Cold War era.
3. The US foreign policy towards DRC only acted as a catalyst to the already existing crisis in the DRC in the Cold War era.

Justification

Most scholarly works written on the DRC conflict have tended to focus on the ethnic and personality factors of the problem except scholars like Schraeder. These two variables have yet to explain satisfactorily the nature and causes as well as the consequences of the crisis. The Congo region is one of the wealthiest in mineral resources in Africa. It has however not been able to sustain itself economically. There is no satisfactory explanation for this chronic setback. Scholars like Nzongola-Ntalaja argue that other variables that are critical in understanding this state of affairs have been either minimised or neglected. Nzongola-Ntalaga suggests two such variables as: the international

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3 Schraeder, P.J., United States Foreign Policy Towards Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and change, Cambridge University Press, 1994
dimension of the crisis; and the survival strategies of ordinary people. These people developed survival techniques despite the declining capacity of the state for development. Schraeder’s work has attempted to tackle the international dimension of the crisis by exposing the operations of the American decision making process for Africa. He contends that there is very little scholarly research done on U.S relations with Africa and that this area has been of low academic priority. This had led to ignorance on the part of African diplomats who are charged with the responsibility of their states. The Somali Charge d’Affairs Abdi Awaleh Jama, in 1989, remarked at a meeting of the North African Studies Association, “The primary dilemma facing African diplomats assigned to Washington is that the U.S government speaks with many voices, which often times are contradictory. In order to survive, we African diplomats must learn to walk a precarious diplomatic tightrope, all the time concentrating on which voice, if any, predominates and thus serves as the proper guidepost for our initiatives.”

Schraeder has gone to great lengths to explain the way continuity and change in U.S policy towards Africa has affected the conflicts in the continent. He demonstrates that it is the nature of events on the continent that determine the operation of the US policy making process and decisions for Africa. He is quick

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1 Schraeder, P.J., United States Foreign Policy Towards Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and change. Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. xiii
to point that US / African relations have evolved as a result of the different parts of the foreign policy establishments. They all assert their influence within the policy making process at different points in time. It is the interplay between the events and the operations of policy making process that has influenced the behaviour of US towards Africa.

This study will attempt to analyse the international dimension of the crisis namely the U.S. foreign policy towards DRC. By analysing the American Foreign Policy towards DRC, it is hoped that this study will offer additional explanations to the already existing literature. It is hoped that the findings of this study will have an impact on African policy makers, and empower them in future negotiations with the more powerful states. To understand the current political, economical and social crises in DRC, it is important for the policy makers to have a thorough analysis of the issues that influence the direction of the conflict. This will help them avoid the past mistakes. It is possible to achieve this by looking at both internal and external components of the conflict. However this paper will attempt to analyse the external component of this conflict namely the US foreign policy in the Cold war era.
1.2 Literature Review

Background of the Conflict - The colonial connection

Belgium was the colonial power in Zaire until 1960. The two countries still have ties as a result of the colonial relationship. The two helped to shape each other. On one hand Belgium prospered from the African connection while on the other hand Zaire was exploited to a point of being ruined. The interesting story is that even after independence DRC did not recover, instead it seemed to produce leaders who took her on the same road that Belgium paved.

According to an article published by Colin Blane in Brussels soon after the death of President Laurent Kabila, the Belgian capital thrived from the wealth extracted from the Zaire. Belgian government confirmed this fact. To quote, "Two of Brussels' most elegant thoroughfares, Avenue Louise and Avenue Terveuren were laid out with money raised from Belgium's adventures in Congo basin, and many of the city's most grandiose buildings were funded from the proceeds of rubber, timber and ivory". Colin Blane continues to say that the Arc de Triompe in Brussels, which was built with money squeezed

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7 Ibid
from Congo, rivals the one in France. This symbol of grandeur is a proof of extravagance of wealth.

Unfortunately, that price was paid by Congo in a negative way. Leopold II saw the Congo as a prize to be consumed. To use his words, “I do not want to miss the chance of getting us a slice of this magnificent African cake”\(^8\). Leopold ruled Belgium for about 20 years, and within these years he was, more than any other European power, the most ruthless and exploitative. Congo was 80 times bigger than Belgium. Leopold used African forced labour to harvest rubber and those who resisted were punished. He never visited Congo at any given time. He used his ministers to run the empire. He was so ruthless that he had his enforcers cut off the hands of villagers and take them to him as a proof that the locals worked for him. Leopold’s personal gain was enormous; he destroyed thousands of villages and left about 3,000,000 people dead.

Congo was shared between Belgium and France on each side of the river. Leopold II was responsible for the breakdown of traditional communities and for the plunder of wealth that left the country impoverished for years. Congo’s wealth continued to be plundered after Mobutu came to power as the world watched history repeat itself. This time round it was a son of the Congo who

\(^8\) Ibid
exploited the nation for his personal benefit. Mobutu used the same road as his master to siphon the wealth to Europe. Under these two rulers, theft became part of the mainstream economy thus a very hard vice to eradicate.

**Post-Independent era**

At independence on 30th June 1960, Congo had already gone through a turbulent history as the background suggests that was characterised by exploitation and plunder. Independence brought a lot of hope to the people of Congo, hope for a prosperous democratic future. Unfortunately these expectations were overshadowed by the outbreak of ethnic conflicts, breakdown of law and order, widespread rioting, looting and atrocities. These were further followed by the attempted secession of the mineral-rich provinces of Katanga and South Kasai. It was not until November 1965 that Mobutu restored some degree of political stability after his take over. He used military coup d’etat to become the head of state.

**Social Economic causes of conflict**

Guy Lamb attributes the DRC crisis to Mobutu’s dictatorial reign. “By 1967 the new government had assumed control of most of the country, and embarked on a programme known as ‘authenticity’ - later renamed Mobutuism - which aimed to develop a sense of nationalism
among the country's many desperate ethnic groups. Despite its initial achievements, the dictatorial Mobutu regime has proved disastrous for Zaire over three decades. It has led the country to economic ruin; non-religious institutions barely function; and ethnic tensions, fostered by the government, continuously flare up. Rebellion in the east has the potential to topple President Mobutu, and return Zaire to post-independence chaos."

The post-independent chaos

To understand the post-independence chaos it is necessary to go back to the colonial set-up of the politics of Congo. The first liberation party, Mouvement National Congolais- MNC, was established in August 1956. Its objective was to: pursue the political emancipation of the Congo; and foster among its members a consciousness of their national unity and responsibilities. When Patrice Lumumba joined the party in 1958 the party became established. His personality gave him both a leverage and weakness over his political career. He had charisma and ability to pull crowds. He was a good orator, a political organiser and an activist and had a passionate commitment to the idea of a united Congo. However, he was known to be arrogant and controlling which led to friction within his own party. In 1956 there was a split in the party

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leadership with Joseph Ileo, Cyrille Adoula, and Albert Kalonji forming the MNC - Kalonji’s party. The Lumumba MNC was left with only the support of Kasai and Katanga communities. However in spite of these handicaps, Lumumba claimed the largest number of votes. In May 1960 Lumumba became President of DRC. Joseph Kasa-vubu became Prime Minister in June 1960.

A latent conflict between these two existed due to the radically different nationalisms. There also followed a constitutional crisis of legitimacy. Five days after independence the army mutinied and the already fragile structure of the state collapsed. Belgium flew in troops to rescue her nationals and protect her interests. The crisis became worse in July when Moise Tshombe declared Katanga independent. Katanga was the richest province in the region. At this point the Congolese government led by Lumumba appealed to the United Nations for help. The UN sent a peace-keeping force mainly composed of African troops to replace the withdrawn Belgian troops and to try and keep order. When the UN force failed to deliver from the point of view of Lumumba, he went on and called in Soviet aid. The West and some of the Congolese leaders were alarmed leading to Lumumba’s overthrow on the basis that he was communist. On 14 September 1960 Lumumba was ousted by the army and Joseph Mobutu his army general took over as leader to neutralise the conflict between Kasavubu and Lumumba. This came to be known as the First
Republic. However the situation did not improve Congo deteriorated even more. Katanga was still an independent state. Lumumba’s supporters became more established in the city of Stanleyville this time under the leadership of Antoine Gizenga. A situation of near anarchy spread through much of the country. The collapse of the security force and the intervention of the Belgian paratroopers, the constitutional controversy due to the fundamental opposition between president and prime minister all brought down the government machinery.

In January, 1961 Lumumba who was under house arrest was assassinated in Katanga after he had gone to join Gizenga’s party of African Solidarity Party. His death that was not announced until 13 February, led to a state of anarchy in many areas. Gizenga consolidated his regime and was recognised officially. On the other hand the Tsombe government in Katanga remained isolated. This situation led UN to take a stronger action than before. By August the Congo had returned to representative government through UN good offices. Cyrille Adoula became the prime minister while Gizenga became his deputy. Katanga was subdued at the end of 1962 and made part of the central government. Tsombe went back to exile.
However the government did not last long and by 1963 Gizenga was arrested and his supporters were changed around. Repressive measures were used and parliament was closed down in October 1963. The closure of parliament plus the deteriorating economical and social conditions especially in rural areas led to violent rebellion.

Breakdown of Social Political and Economic Structures

According to Cathreen Hoskyns, the causes of this rebellion were as a result of a breakdown in political, social and economic structures. To quote her words, "By the end of 1963, three years of administrative breakdown, political corruption and scattered civil war had caused acute social and economic deprivation in many areas. It was on this that the rebellion based its strength".10

On the other hand according to Herman Kinder, it was the ethnic conflict created by Adoula government that caused the crisis. Government mechanism was destroyed in the first Republic when Adoula replaced the six provinces with twenty-one provincettes. The idea was to allow each region to administer itself according to its interests. This change of constitution proved unworkable. It turned out that by reducing the size of the province Adoula shifted the focus

10 Cathrine Hoskyns, The Organisation of African Unity and the Congo crisis, 1964-65; Oxford University; Dar es Salaam, p 1
of ethnic conflict to a smaller arena. The already controversial boundaries led to bitter conflicts in certain contested areas.

Despite the ethnic conflicts this arrangement was formalised in June 1964 in a new constitution. Also arrangements were made to change the country’s name to Democratic Republic of Congo by August 1964. By this time there was a state of semi-anarchy and at least three provincettes had fallen into the hands of rebel forces. The stage was set for a possible crisis. “From January to August 1964, rural insurgency engulfed five provincettes out of twenty-one and made substantial inroads into another five, raising the possibility of a total collapse of the central government”. Guerrilla warfare led by Mulele in Kwilu began in January 1964, which attacked government outposts, missions, and company installations. The Kwilu rebellion did not end until December 1965. Other rebellions were carried on including the eastern rebellion led by Gaston Soumialot trained in Burundi. Rebel movements spread all over the DRC and discipline became more difficult to maintain as acts of violence and terror increased. These rebellions were as a result of the failure of the provincette experiment. By September 5 Stanleyville was under the rebels, the eastern rebellion had taken almost half of DRC and seven out of twenty-one capitals were in rebel hands.

The destruction of the governing system was not replaced by an alternative one. As a result, corruption, administrative inefficiency, and ethnic favouritism became the order of the day. The provincettes administration had led to ethnic consciousness. The reliance by rebels on specific ethnic groups to man administration and military further complicated the tensions between the leaderships. Tshombe was recalled from exile by the European mercenaries. He replaced Adoula as prime minister and helped the central government regain control over the rebel-held areas. The UN assisted Tshombe to take up leadership but only for a while. He made enemies with Kasavubu and Mobutu. A struggle for power developed between Kasavubu and Tsombe both of who were to take presidency and prime minister positions. The friction between the two led to political instability. This became worse as elections came near which led to Mobutu's second military take-over. Parliament announced a state of emergency for five years under which Mobutu was to rule until the country became stable. Mobutu began his second republic that was characterised by harsh rule of Bula Mutari. From 1965 until the 1990s, Mobutu Sese Seko dominated the political life of Zaire. He restructured the state several times and earned himself the self-appointed title of "Father of the Nation". This began the long history of dictatorship in Zaire.
Role of US Foreign Policy

According to Schraeder, US was indirectly involved in the politics of DRC. Her foreign policy greatly shaped the events in the land. He says that US supported Belgium in their oppressive policy by keeping a low position. The following quotation shows the US attitude towards DRC;

"Zaire is among America's oldest friends and its President - President Mobutu - one of our most valued friends on the entire continent of Africa....One of Africa's most experienced statesmen. President Mobutu has worked with six US Presidents. And together, they and we have sought to bring to Zaire, and to all of Africa, real economic and social prowess, and to pursue Africa's true independence, security, stability as the bases for that development."1

The fact that Mobutu Sese Seko worked with six American Presidents gives us a hint as to the extent the US foreign policy has shaped the events in the DRC today. The US Zaire relationship was made special in the Cold War era. This was in the time of president Eisenhower's administration in 1960s. The US foreign policy towards Zaire was to remain in consultation with other European powers. They were particularly sensitive to Belgium to a point that African Americans were not allowed to serve in Zaire to avoid upsetting Belgian racial
concerns. Besides they would have stirred up the Zairian spirit of independence. The Belgians demanded that the Western powers keep a distance from Zairian affairs. The US foreign policy towards Zaire was low key; the Consular in Leopoldville or Kinshasa relied on Belgian intelligence sources and limited their activities. In terms of technical aid, US only supplemented that of Belgium. To make matters worse, the State department allowed the Belgian officials to compile the names of the Zairian leaders travelling to US. The relationship between US and Zaire was friendly until the Force Publique mutiny against the Belgian commanders. This was followed by the Shaba (Katanga) cessation. Belgian intervention was interpreted as a colonial reoccupation of Zaire and led to an appeal for UN help by the Lumumba Kasavubu government to protect their territorial integrity. America kept a distance and instead used UN military force that included the US, the Soviet Union, and the major Eastern and Western bloc powers. US interests in Zaire were not explicit at this time. It became evident when Lumumba and Kasavubu broke diplomatic ties with Belgium. They also threatened to invite Soviet intervention if the UN forces were not able to force Belgians out of Zaire. The US saw a possibility of a major crisis especially now that the Belgians refused to leave. Belgium got an ultimatum to leave or have Soviet intervention. This

transformed the conflict into a crisis. It is at this point that US began a more serious debate on how to manage the issue.

The main research concern is to establish why American foreign policy shifted from being indirectly involved to direct concern after Belgium fell out with Zaire. Why did congress change its viewpoint? Could it be that the U.S interests were threatened by this change of events or were it because of humanitarian concerns over Zaire? The answers to these questions will enlighten us on the reasons why the DRC is of importance to US.

Consistency in Foreign Policy

According to Daniel Pipes the US foreign policy towards DRC was consistent since the early 1960s. To quote him: “The US policy towards Zaire has evolved since the Congo crisis of the early 1960s but, as two US government documents demonstrate, its broad outlines have remained remarkably consistent.” There were two objectives the first one was to establish a unified and independent state and the development of institutions capable of maintaining political stability and initiating a program of economical and social development. The second objective was prevention of the Soviets penetration and extension of the cold war.
The second objective ceased to be important after the collapse of Soviet Union as a major world power in 1979. With the end of bipolar system, the US, as the world hegemony, was left to stabilise the politics of the DRC and initiate a program of economical and social development. DRC had always been of strategic interest to America in the sub-Saharan Africa. The US policy towards DRC kept shifting from time to time according to their interests. For example it is said that the US was involved in the death of Patrice Lumumba, and also in the coup d'état of 1965 that brought Mobutu to power. Mobutu was well aware of the American attitude towards DRC. He knew that they needed a stable country to serve their interests so to survive; he developed an economical strategy until he was stable enough to take over the government. In 1969 Mobutu used American influence to get aid and to lure foreign investments by providing a generous investment code. He also took a moderate political stand. However, the warm relationship was broken when Mobutu introduced the ‘Zairianisation’ decree of 30 November 1973. By Zairianization Mobutu transferred foreign businesses to Zaire people that affected the foreign investment in Zaire including those by U.S nationals. By so doing he lost US support.

In 1975, the US promoted her relations with Zaire during the Angolan civil war when the two found themselves supporting the same faction. It became apparent to the US that a stable Zaire was necessary if they were to succeed in their missions south of Sahara. This shift of attitude in case of the US was based on the theory of realism that promotes state interests. It also reflected the theory that says Americans have no permanent friends, but they have permanent interests. Mobutu was an asset to the American interests in Africa and though he was a tyrant, they could make him a friend as long as it served their goals. It was against this theoretical background that the US relationship with DRC was based.

Consistencies and Contradictions

by Michael G. Schatzberg has described the US foreign policy as having “consistencies and contradictions”. DRC’s importance to US in the 80’s can be seen in their commitment in terms of regional security. For example in Reagan’s administration they had proposed eleven million dollars to fund a security program for Zaire in 1988. In 1987 the US foreign policy aim was to: “Promote regional stability supporting a key ally in Central Africa; Support Zaire’s resistance to Libyan aggression; Encourage continued economic reform.

14 http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/two/2/p8.html
16 Ibid p.422

24
growth; and Promote democratic institutions and respect for human rights.\textsuperscript{17}

This attention was given to DRC because of its importance to US in terms of: a) its vast mineral wealth; b) its location; c) and its contribution to African peacekeeping efforts. It was therefore important for US to fund the DRC in its economical and military endeavours. The DRC armed forces were useful in Central Africa and US undertook to improve their programs to enable their mobility.

The American policy towards DRC was influenced by the prevailing foreign policy of the time. In the bipolar international system, the US foreign policy was influenced by the doctrine of containment aimed at stopping the Soviet penetration and influence in the world. After the collapse of communism, the doctrine of expansionism dominated the foreign policy. The idea of expanding was justified by the need to spread democracy in the zeal to liberate the world from communism. This was to be achieved through social economical development aid to shield against the hostile powers, and through military assistance. It is within this theoretical framework that the US intervention in the 1961 rebellion in DRC can be explained. US was more concerned of the Soviet expansion than the security in the region. However, and most importantly, the US interest in the mineral resources was a key motivating factor in the whole operation.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid p.422
In the post-Cold War era, Russia was no longer a threat to the US but there were other enemies that included all radical elements in terms of Soviet ideology. America was fighting a shadow of communism even after its fall. It was the fear of communism that led to Lumumba's death as he was seen to be a threat to the security of DRC when he sought Soviet aid to stop the rebellion. US used the UN umbrella to protect their interests in DRC while Washington provided financial support and logistics. Both UN and US pursued similar goals at the time.

US Interests
Crawford Young's view is that the US interests have greatly influenced their policy towards the DRC as is demonstrated in the 1961 crisis. During this time President Eisenhower ignored Lumumba's strength as the best candidate for DRC. He was popular and his Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) was the closest to being a genuine national movement compared to other parties. However his connection with the Soviet Union presented a threat to the US interests. At this point in time the US interests came first and that of DRC second. The US used UN to stop Soviet influence and to destabilize Lumumba. The US played a very major role in directing the politics in DRC at
the inception of the republic. At independence of DRC the US made the choice of leadership as the documents reveal, "the evidence leaves little doubt that US officials encouraged Lumumba's Congolese opponents to eliminate him...." President Eisenhower is said to have issued the instructions to the CIA to eliminate Lumumba and all this was done in fear of communism.

After Lumumba's death, the U.S became the patrons of the government under Cyrille Adoula and after he resigned in 1964 Tshombe was invited from exile to be Prime minister in his place. The reasons for this choice were because DRC then needed a military expertise and Tshombe had the control of the Katanga gendarmes now in Angola after secession. He also had influence on the white mercenaries that the government needed badly. The US was looking for a friendly leader to work with as it was demonstrated in the Kisangani drop. This is the time when the insurgents captured Kisangani where about 1,500 foreigners lived. In a bid to protect them, Tshombe tried to retake Kisangani. He used the Belgian and US help. On the other hand, the rebels used the whites as hostages in an attempt to pressure US to stop the advance. Tshombe authorised the US to airlift the Belgian units on Kisangani to save the hostages on humanitarian ground. This action was also used to break the rebellion. Henceforth, it became a precedent for the US to intervene in terms of material

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support. They did not invest in American troops. DRC was not worth the American blood. This was repeated in the 1970s during the Shaba I and II. America did everything else to assist the pro-western governments of DRC. The 1964 drop on Kisangani established the policy: “never let a friendly, anti-Soviet, Zairian government be consumed in the flames of its own domestic unpopularity.”

The US policy towards Africa can be said to be generally that of compromise between idealism and realpolitik. Idealism would have had US sever relations with DRC in the times of Mobutu because he was a dictator. As a democracy the association with such regimes would be a violation of the US standards of political behaviour, yet they continued to support the tyrannical regime. The rule would have been to punish Mobutu for human rights abuses rather than support him. The realists on the other hand argue that America should only interfere with dictatorships when it affects their interests and as long as Mobutu was co-operating with them they could remain friends.

**Issue of Morality and Compromise**

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19 Kalb, The Congo Cables, p. 189
20 Michael G. Schatzberg, Zaire under Mobutu: Consistencies and Contradictions of U.S. Policy, p. 434
Howard Wiarda states that: "If a regime opposes the Soviet Union, Washington should not undermine it, no matter how unpleasant its actions."21 The argument continues to justify that cutting such regimes off from the United States may be moral but it would cost the opportunity to influence the regime towards democracy after the authoritarian government is gone. This established the American double standards in their policy towards African politically moral. This compromise between the morality and interests is the basis of contradiction in the American behaviour in the DRC. From Kennedy all through to Ford’s administration Mobutu’s regime was justified in Washington by rationalising his poor records on human rights and democracy. Mobutu was anti-Soviet. He had helped eliminate Lumumba and expel the Soviets in DRC. He had also fought the MPLA and their Cuban allies, had assisted the CIA’s covert aid to FNLA pass through Zaire. All these acts made Mobutu a front liner in the global struggle against Soviet expansionism. He was forgiven for not having time for democracy.

Howard continues to say that the reality of the matter as seen from the American perspective is: “Were the United States to sever relations with the world’s authoritarian regimes, it would cut itself from fully two-thirds of the

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countries on the globe." \(^{22}\) The author continues to say that America cannot abandon authoritarian regimes despite their non-democratic character and the human right abuses because there are too many vital interests that are involved.

**Realism**

Power is another tenet on which the US foreign policy was based. From the realist point of view, the US cannot afford to have a foreign policy that focuses only on human rights and democracy and expect to remain a great power. At the same time they cannot afford to be indifferent to the issues of human rights. Issue of human rights falls under idealism. According to realism, state interests come first. It was therefore prudent for the US to maintain a tyrannical regime, which was able to stabilise the peace of that region, than to impose a democratic regime whose centre would not hold. To keep the balance between the two contradicting theories, the United States found compromise a good tool for maintaining power. In making the choice between realism and idealism the US created one of the most repressive, corrupt, and brutal regimes in the world. As Mobutu became more brutal and greedy he became more resisted by the population in DRC. However to the US Mobutu was maintaining a unified state that was conducive to their operations. DRC acted as a base for the American military activities in Southern African region.
The stability of the government in DRC was very important to United States. All policies were made with this in mind. The Kennedy administration was impatient with Adoula’s inability to end the war soon. This led them to enthrone Mobutu as the alternate head of state. From then on, Mobutu was to get political, economical and military support from United States, in return for unswerving loyalty to America by maintaining an anti-Soviet stand. At the same time he was to create a liberal investment climate. Mobutu was used to assassinate Patrice Lumumba by the US government. He had seen the US government assist in the overthrow of Adouls’s government. So he knew that his relationship with the US was on condition that he could deliver to their satisfaction. Mobutu developed survival methods to outsmart the Americans. This made it hard for Americans to get rid of him later. Mobutu became an opportunistic head who would use every opportunity to cover his weaknesses. A good example is during Nixon-Ford time when he engaged in the process of indigenisation of Zairian economy. The US ambassador challenged him to put the economy back to order and exposed the corruption in the country. This hurt Mobutu’s pride and he expelled the US Ambassador Deane Hinton in 1975 and accused CIA of planning a coup. To divert US attention, Mobutu freed his officer corps from Angola where they aided US in the war. Mobutu knew his importance to US in facilitating the covert aid to the (FNLA). It turned out to

22 ibid, p. 5
be a relationship of playing games at each other. Later that year Mobutu sent the Zairian troops to fight the MPLA. At this time the US administration sent a new ambassador and a special envoy, as the saying goes "to smooth Mobutu's ruffled feathers."\(^{23}\)

The President's beliefs influenced the foreign policy towards DRC. The Carter administration for example did not approve Mobutu's regime. Carter reluctantly supplied non-lethal aid. In Shaba I and in Shaba II the United States only provided logical support in transporting Belgian and French troops to Kamina air base. Mobutu welcomed communist help that shocked the United States. After this threat of a possible communist comeback Carter pushed for reform. Although Mobutu complied for a while, the reforms threatened his power base. The reforms allowed other competing parties to seek votes freely from the people. It also meant that ministries would be able to ask for explanations from the government. He however allowed these reforms to take place. The IMF personnel were let into Zaire's central bank, and he also normalised his relations with Angola. Mobutu used the easy access to foreign capital to sustain his luxurious lifestyle and when the IMF made it hard to access currency he made it so hard that Mr. Erwin resigned as a result. In his secret report Erwin warned that IMF would not recover their money because Mobutu would only

\(^{23}\) ibid, p.435
repay the loans with new ones. The Carter administration did not succeed in the reform mission. By 1980 Mobutu had regained his position in political arena. He made a comeback after ‘feeding’ from the reform money.

President Reagan restored US relations with Mobutu when he took over the government. He continued what other US presidents had done. He praised Mobutu for his stand against the Soviet expansionism. In the Reagan/Mobutu alliance US benefited from DRC when they participated in the Chadian peacekeeping operations against Libya. On the US side Reagan invited Mobutu to the White House and honoured him as a faithful friend. America sacrificed democracy at the expense of globalism. Mobutu was a useful ally in Angola when he allowed covert support to Jonas Savimbi’s party to pass through DRC. Mobutu continued to enjoy the US support when George Bush took over the presidency.

American interest in a stable DRC greatly influenced their attitude towards DRC. The region was important in the Cold-War era to act as a shield against communism. This was based on the theory that a weak Zaire would cause internal chaos and this would attract international crisis as both the Soviets and Americans had an eye on her. US theorised that: “only a strong ‘man’ can hold

\[^{24}\text{Erwin Blumenthal, “Zaire: Report on her Financial Credibility,” typescript, April 7, 1982. in Friendly Tyrants, p. 436}\]
This was the justification for tolerating Mobutu's tyrannical regime and as the argument went it, was either Mobutu or chaos. The other reason that led the US to compromise was economical. US imports 90% of cobalt and half of the mineral comes from the DRC's. Cobalt is a mineral used to create the heat resistant super alloy used in jet engines and is also used in petroleum industry. DRC depended on US to buy most of its cobalt and US depended on DRC to produce it. This led to a relationship of inter-dependency between the two states. US was willing to do anything to keep the relationship even to a point of covering for DRC. The authors of Friendly Tyrants have the following to. "The United States has even agreed to time its purchases of cobalt to coincide with meetings of the Paris Club to aid Mobutu in presenting a better picture of Zaire's balance of payments."

The other interest that determined the US policy towards DRC was the military. The first attempt was the Public Safety Program initiated since independence. It was designed to maintain internal securities by reorganising police force, training them and providing the logistic support. Unfortunately the United States could not control the corruption within the police. However in 1967 when the mercenaries rebelled Mobutu had only the police radio as a means of communication to rely on. Kamina was of military importance to the US as an

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25 Adam Garfinkle, Friendly Tyrants: An American Dilemma, p. 437
26 ibid p. 438
aircraft base. US needed the two airstrips in Kamina which were conveniently placed to allow landing, unloading of cargo, and then take off without having to turn. From Kamina the US can reach any place in Africa and return without refuelling. This military base was important in the minds of the policy makers because it would make America a power to contend with in Africa.

According to the views held by the policy makers, US helped not only create but also to sustain the Mobutu regime for their political and military interests. In view of this it can be said that United States played a major role in encouraging the conflict in DRC by maintaining the Mobutu regime even after the Cold War.

1.3 Theoretical Framework

To understand international relations it is essential to analyse the various theories and international systems that are used by scholars of international studies. The most commonly used international systems are; 1) Unipolar systems, 2) Bipolar systems, 3) Multipolar systems and 4) Isolationism. Several theories are used by scholars to support these international systems at any given time. Some of these theories are; 1) Idealism, 2) Pragmatism, 3) Realism and Neo-Realism and 4) Rational Actor Model.
Unipolar systems stand for ultimate concentration of power. There is one primary unit at the centre with secondary powers at the periphery. Examples can be found in ancient Rome, Mongol, Chinese, and Greek empires. These were regional systems. Today the United States may be said to represent this type of system because it is the only super power. There is however a likely shift of hegemony from the US to the regional coalition of the European Union. The other organ likely to be hegemony is the supranational global organisation - the United Nations.

Bipolar system involves two superpowers. The Cold War era was characterised by this where the US competed with the USSR. This system is governed by two principles, the conflictual bipolar systems and the co-operative bipolar systems. Conflictual bipolar system is based on containment. The pre-détente Cold War system is an example of this. Both the US and USSR tried to expand their spheres of influence at the expense of the other. In cooperative bipolar system the main powers are content with their spheres of influence. The two powers co-operate to preserve order in the periphery. It is a fairly stable arrangement the type sought by Nixon and Kissinger during the détente in the Cold War era. The Cold war era was characterised by both conflictual and cooperative bipolar systems.
Multipolar systems have more than three or more elements. They are more flexible than tight bipolar systems. Power is diffused. The fluid coalitions preserve the system and prevent any one power from dominating it. Even though they have their share of problems, multipolar systems do better in preventing wars than bipolar ones. In co-operative multipolar system relations within the block are solved through diplomacy, international law, mediation or the use of international institutions. This system is more superior than either unipolar or bipolar systems.

Isolationism is lack of involvement in international affairs. The US has a tradition of withdrawing from the rest of the world when it suits them. Internal problems lead the US to retreat from the responsibilities of world leadership. The Cold War era was characterised by the Bipolar system.

The above mentioned world systems are based on several theories one of which is realism. Realism assumes that all nation states are motivated by national interests. At times these national interests are disguised as moral concerns. Nation states seek to preserve their political autonomy and their territorial integrity at most. Once this is achieved, some states may want to expand their political or economical systems while others may want to be left alone.
America wanted to be left alone after she secured her new found land. She went into isolationism. Realists talk of relative power of states. All states have to depend on their own resources and secure their interests, enforce whatever agreements they have entered into with other states and try and maintain a desirable domestic and international order. Realists do not recognise greater authority over nation-states. They fear centralised authority unless it is derived from the power of his or her own state. A decentralised system is the focus of realism and must be purchased at any cost. This explains why the US tried to contain the USSR in the Cold War era. To preserve the decentralised system war is inevitable. The balance of power requires that the major powers agree on the preservation of state autonomy. If they do not agree, wars occur and can affect the entire international system. However if they do agree, wars will still occur but will be limited within nation states. In the Cold War era, the US used the containment method to keep USSR from expansionism. On the other hand the US did not stop her own expansionism. Realism is about survival of a nation state.

Neo-realists assume that a nation-state must conduct a rational, self-interested foreign policy or face extinction. According to John K. Setear, "Nations must focus on survival in the international systems ...or perish. Those nations that remain will then be those, and only those, that can conduct a self-interested,
security-oriented foreign policy”. This theory has been proved wrong by the fact that in the past century many more nation-states have been created than have perished. Neo-realism assumes the Rational Actor Model in any decision making.

The rational Actor Model (RAM) assumes that decision makers are rational people. RAM assumes that the actor is a national government and that the action taken is as a result of a calculated solution to a problem. This has been challenged by terrorist groups and religious fundamentalists. RAM only recognises the leader and ignores the role of other organisations. The main concept of RAM is to determine the goals and objectives of the nation. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy’s goal was to prevent communism in the western hemisphere. He had many options but he had to weigh the consequences of each option and discuss the choice the nation was to take. He chose a blockade because it had several advantages. RAM helps an analyst to understand why decisions are made by political leaders and governments. This theory is very useful in analysing the US foreign policy decisions in this study. It helps the reader understand why the congress made certain decisions at different times of the Cold war international system.

27 Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law o Evolution and Neo-Realism
Idealism is based on moral standard or ground. It assumes the defence for freedom for nation-states. The US became a champion in this arena. The objective was to defend freedom in the world. The major enemy was the Soviet expansionism in the world. Idealism defines a class of things in terms of the principles they hold in common (morals) at a particular time. This argument is then used to justify a course of action over another. For example democracy is a reason for the US to go to war in order to defend nation-states from an imperial power.

Pragmatism deals with the practicalities of the defined ideas. It first evaluates a doctrine in terms of its consequences. A pragmatic will ask such questions as; “what is it good for?”, “what difference will it make to me and you?” or “what will it achieve?” and “Will it work?”. Idealism and Pragmatism are good tools if used together in formulating a policy. While the idealist concerns himself with enduring principles or defined ideas, the pragmatism concern is in the practicality of the principle.

In discussing the formulation of American foreign policy all the above theories are used at one time or the other. However the key theories used in analysing the foreign policy in the Cold War era are Realism and the RAM.
1.4 Methodology

Due to the unavailability of both time and resources available to me, this research employed secondary data method. The secondary data involved library research in terms of text books, journals, periodicals, newspapers, magazines, seminar papers, summit reports and political documents.

1.5 Definition of Basic Concepts

DRC

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) will be used to refer to Zaire except where there are direct quotations or where distinction is necessary to avoid confusion of the time period. On seizing power, Mobutu later changed names of several locations in his attempt to give Congo authenticity. In 1971, the DRC became Zaire. Leopoldville became Kinshasha, Elizabethville became Lubumbashi, Stanleyville became Kisangani and Katanga became Shaba. These names will be used in the same order.

Crisis:

A crisis is a level of conflict with tense confrontation between mobilised armed forces. These forces may engage in threats and occasional skirmishes but may not have exerted significant amounts of force. The probability of war is high. In
national contexts, this condition involves imminent civil war or a general breakdown of law and order. In case of DRC the question that comes up is defining the situation as a crisis; How can a crisis last for so long? (since 1973.) While some of the crisis scholars concur that it is inappropriate to apply the term to a condition that lasts so long, others feel that it is right to do so. In Gramsian terms a crisis is defined as a “fundamental breakdown in the equilibrium of social structure” whose peal is reached in an impasse. Since the group holding this structure together is falling apart, no other political force is viable enough to take it. The economical crisis has an impact in political and social spheres.

We can therefore say that the Congo crisis situation represents what J.D Hertzer calls “the breakdown of strategic institutions” in a society. He continues to say that it is a critical period whose outcome is decisive for all concerned. It is a period during which seemingly insoluble problems present themselves. They overtax the available resources or are beyond the conventional problem solving methods. They are perceived as a threat to the habits, customs, values and life goals of the people involved. This definition will be adopted in this study.

28 Http://www.caii.net/ghai/understanding.htm, Understanding Conflict and Peace.
Conflict:

A conflict is said to be there when two or more parties perceive that their interests are incompatible, express hostile attitudes, or take pursue their interests through actions that damage the other parties. These parties may be individuals, small or large groups, and countries.\(^{31}\) Interests can vary from resources in terms of money, energy sources, food and how they should be distributed; power in terms of how control and participation in political decisions making are allocated; identity concerning the social and political communities to which people feel tied; status whether people believe they are treated with respect and dignity. It also determines whether their traditions and social position are respected. It is of interest that values, particularly those embodied in systems of government, religion, or ideology be respected.\(^{32}\)

There are several levels of conflict, a) Latent conflict- seen by observer but the respective parties are not aware of the incompatibilities, b) Manifest conflict is when the unacknowledged contrary interests become conscious and voiced, c) Violent conflict-when conflicting interests are pursued with violence or coercion. This occurs when parties go beyond seeking to attain their goals peacefully, and try to dominate or destroy the opposing parties’ ability to pursue their own interests, d) Peaceful conflict when competing interests are

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\(^{30}\) Ibid pg 5  
\(^{31}\) http://www.caai.net/ghai/understanding.htm
handled according to regulated mechanisms. The failure of such mechanisms had led to frequent crisis situations. In view of this the term crisis and conflict will be used interchangeably to mean one and the same.

For violence to occur there is the presence or absence of certain conditions; main issues include natural resource competition, government control, territorial control, governing ideologies; the parties involved - ethnic, religious or regional communities, states, political factions; the types of force or coercion applied involve - nuclear war, conventional war, terrorism, coups, repression, genocide, gross human rights violations and ethnic cleansing; and geographic scope or arena for killing and destruction - e.g international conflicts, inter-communal conflicts, state-sponsored terrorism. However due to the complexity of conflicts, features may fluctuate in importance over the course of a conflict. We can not therefore label a conflict using one single dimension. In the DRC conflict all the above are evident at one time or another.

Peace:

Peace involves a high level of co-operation coupled with an awareness and pursuit of conflicting interests. In a peace situation the parties value their overall relationship more than specific self-interest. Separate interests are
pursued within peaceful, institutionalised dispute settlement mechanisms; there is no need for military force to safeguard security against others. There is accommodation of political institutions, outlets for political expression and access to decision-making. This definition will be used to evaluate the conditions of peace process.

1.6 Chapter Outline

Chapter one of this study includes the introduction, problem statement, research problem, justification, definition of basic concepts and literature review.

Chapter two discusses American foreign policy - its continuity and change and the process of formulation in details.

Chapter three discusses the US foreign policy towards Africa an overview

Chapter four discusses the DRC as a case study in the of the US foreign policy towards Africa in the Cold War era.

Chapter five is composed of summaries, conclusions and recommendations of both long term and short term solutions to the crisis.
CHAPTER TWO

2.1 American Foreign Policy-Continuity and Change

Introduction

The Cold War politics is best understood by analysing the foreign policy of that time. The bipolar world system influenced the direction the foreign policy was to take. According to the Americans, Communism was the main threat to Democracy. The US foreign policy decisions were heavily based on this threat. The world became a battlefield for these two powers and DRC was not an exception to this.

To understand the DRC case one needs to appreciate the way the US Congress formulates the foreign policy. It is also important to note that the US did not set out to save the world but to protect her own interests. This chapter will attempt to analyse the US foreign policy decision making process. By so doing it will help to establish the extent to which US was to blame for the crisis in DRC in the Cold War era. It will also help to better understand the US behaviour towards Africa in relation to her foreign policy. The dynamics of policy making includes the President’s powers and its limitations, State Department, Theories used, Media, Individual Level, Isolationism and Role Level – Presidential Doctrines.
Presidential powers

In the making of foreign policy, the U.S President is the most powerful political actor. The President has seven roles. They include: Commander in Chief, Chief Diplomat, Chief Administrator, Chief of State, Chief Legislator, Voice of the people and Chief Judicial Officer. There are however some limitations that constrain the President in exercising these powers. Some of them include time, information, bureaucracy, Congress, state and local government, Political parties, interest groups and social movements. There are several uncertain elements that the president cannot control. These are the courts, public opinion, the media and the environment. The President’s appointment of judges does not guarantee that the judges’ decisions will support presidential policies. Public opinion often demeans presidential manoeuvres; poor public opinion can discourage or limit presidential operations. The media on the other hand constrains or supports presidents and their actions. The global environment or events happening may act as a constraint or a catalyst to the president’s actions. Some of the examples given include the oil embargo of 1973 and the Iranian crisis.33

According to Rossati, there are two presidencies theses. He argues that a powerful president in foreign policy is weak in domestic policy while a powerful president in domestic policy is weak in foreign policy. He based these conclusions on the examination of the 1950’s and 1960’s presidencies. He found out that presidents were more successful in influencing foreign policy outcomes than they were in affecting domestic policy outcomes. During the Cold War era of American globalism, the presidents exercised extra powers in foreign policy affairs. They had the ability to formulate and implement policies in accordance to their Cold War beliefs. However after America got involved in the Vietnam war it became more difficult for the US presidents to preside over foreign affairs because the post Vietnam war era produced a reassertive Congress, new and varied interest groups, social movements, a more critical media and a moody public.

The contemporary presidential performance is reflective of the individual president and their beliefs/doctrines. According to Rossati, this paradox and life cycle of presidential power affected several presidents. Presidents Johnson, Ford, Carter and Reagan are given as examples. They suffered from a foreign policy crisis that gave rise to domestic and political crisis at home front. Reagan however was an exception to the case because he was able to prevent this paradox from destroying his ability to govern.
The Johnson presidency increased America's military presence in Vietnam from 18,000 troops committed by John F. Kennedy in 1963 to 50,000 troops by 1966. He told the American people it was just a matter of time before the war was over. Johnson's containment strategy was frustrated when the Soviets backed North Vietnam and Vietcong in 1968. Vietcong guerrillas launched major offensive seizing cities such as Saigon and the US Embassy there. The offensive shattered Johnson's belief in containment strategy and his public image. This led him to decline to seek presidential nomination for the 1968 elections.

Nixon is well remembered for the Watergate scandal. His major foreign policy initiative was détente with the Soviet Union. Richard Nixon sought to ease the East-West tension by initiating the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Nixon wanted to end Vietnam War. But when the US threatened his Vietnam policy Nixon ended up attacking domestic opinion through illegal and unconstitutional means. He abused his presidential power which culminated in the Watergate scandal and to his downfall. Ford followed Nixon's policies and was unpopular even in his own party.
Carter came to office installing a new spirit of honesty and idealism represented by his commitment to human rights and peace. He even brokered the Camp David Accord between Israel and Egypt. Carter appeared completely impotent in 1979 and could not prevent the fall of the Shah of Iran and the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini. 52 American diplomats were subsequently held hostage in Tehran for 444 days. This reflected badly on Carter. Later the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to support the Kabul government. The Soviet invasion coincided with the decline of the U.S domestic economy. President Carter was not able to recover politically, he was written off by the public as a failure and lost his bid for re-election.

Reagan entered office with clear intentions to strengthen American defence forces and strengthen America's efforts to combat terrorism abroad. He also sought to contain the communist threat especially in Central America. His policy was to defeat the Marxist-Leninst led guerrillas in Elsalvador, overthrow Sandinistas in Nicaragua, and communists in Honduras and Guatemala. The Congress declined to provide finances to support the contras of Nicaragua. This led to the Iran - Contra affair in which the Reagan administration secretly sold weapons to Iran's ayatollah in exchange for freedom of Americans held hostage by Iranian backed terrorist groups. The money earned from the sale of arms to Iran was used to support the contras of Nicaragua. Reagan survived the Iran-
Contra affair, but his powers and public prestige were diminished. He however remained popular and won another election thus overcoming the paradox and life cycle of presidential power.

It is evident that Reagan's personality helped him to survive the scandal unlike Nixon. This shows the extent to which the president's power can go in influencing the foreign policy. Reagan overcame the paradox and assumption that a powerful president in foreign policy is weak in domestic policy.

**The State Department at home and abroad**

The State Department is one of the most important organisations involved in the making of US foreign policy within the executive branch. It is one of the four cabinet departments created as part of the government of the US in 1789. However the supremacy of the department of state in presiding over foreign policy in the US was eroded by the rise of the Cold War, the containment strategy and the president’s efforts to manage foreign policy. Others include the four historical happenings which have acted as catalysts for the decline of the central importance of the state department in making US foreign policy. The containment strategy led to expansion of American capabilities and the development of nuclear weapons, a large convention military force, counter insurgency forces covert operations. This meant the growth of CIA as a major
player. Other establishments that impact foreign policy include the military intelligence community, foreign economic and cultural bureaucracy, the executive branch policy making, congress and legislative-executive relations and the judiciary. There is thus a dynamic process by which foreign policy makers and agencies interact to produce US foreign policy. Because of the complexity of the policy making process, scholars of U. S foreign policy have developed several models to explain how the policy making process operates within the executive branch.

Theories

According to Rossati, once an issue gets on the government agenda, the president determines the foreign policy goals that he wants to achieve. He does so by consulting the bureaucracy and his advisers. He then considers a wide assortment of policy options and selects the policy alternatives that will achieve his foreign goals. The model is a result of both centralised effort and rational judgement (RAM). The second classification is that of Groupthink. This is a centralised policy making structure like the RAM.

35 Ibid p. 76
The argument is that unlike the rational model, groupthink is anything but rational. That instead of searching for information, considering alternatives and selecting a policy option that maximises goals, groupthink is irrational. Its traits involve overestimation of competency and inherent morality of the group, stereotyping of the groups, pressure to have no divergent views within the groups and providing illusions of unanimity. The argument is that chances of success for this group are limited. Lyndon Johnson and a small group of applied this form of decision-making. The Reagan administration in the Iranian initiative led to the sell of arms to Iran in exchange for release of American hostages. George Bush used it to make the decision to adopt a military response after Iraq invaded Kuwait.35

**Government Politics**

This is the third concept of decision making. It is assumed that decision making is difficult because it involves many organs of the government. It also revolves around political competition and compromise among policy makers. An issue is likely to trigger the involvement of various individuals from various bureaucratic organisations each with differing goals and objectives. In this case different policy makers provide information and advocate different policy
alternatives and decisions, this leads to political bargaining, coalition building and compromise. A good example is seen in the emergence of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). President Johnson wanted to present the USSR with a policy that reflected bureaucratic concerns of the State Department, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Organisation Process

The fourth concept is the Organisation process. This model depicts a decentralised government where the chief advisors are bureaucratic organisations rather than the president or a group of policy makers. According to this model, the U. S foreign policy consists of a sum of the various foreign policies produced by the various organisations that make up foreign policy bureaucracy. The bureaucracy employs its own programs, routines and standard procedures for implementing presidential decisions. This causes a weakness in the policy. For example, during the Cuban crisis, President Kennedy ordered the U. S ships blockade to be moved closer to Cuba from its 500 mile distance but the Navy did not move the blockade. The other example is the Operation Desert Storm where the military bureaucracy was responsible for the enormous success once the president officially decided to go to war.
From the ongoing it is evident that in times of war, the President can make major decisions on his own. He therefore has greater power to influence the trend of foreign policy than the organised groups.

Pendulum or Cyclical Effect

The fifth view says that the legislative-executive relations in US foreign policy has been characterised by a kind of “pendulum or cyclical effect”. Throughout American history in times of national emergencies, particularly during times of war, power tends to flow towards the president and the executive branch. This was the case during the US invasion of Iraq. When conflict has subsided power tends to flow back to Congress. This happens because the decision making process takes time.

The Public and its Beliefs

The public and its beliefs has an impact on US foreign policy decision making. Public opinion however has been held as relatively unimportant by some political observers. Before the twentieth century, the American public was seen as uninterested, uninformed about foreign policy issues therefore their opinions didn’t matter. In the recent past, demonstrations all over the continent over the Iraq war have proven this to be wrong. The role of the public in US foreign policy making had mostly depended on the different types of public. These are
the elites comprising of opinion leaders, the attentive public and mass public who are known for the traditional wisdom, beliefs and their influence on national matters.

According to Rosati, public opinion affects the foreign policy process as it fluctuates within the confines of the American political culture and ideology. He claims that the rise of a strong sense of American optimism and nationalism, an ideological consensus, and a responsive public opinion led to an increase in presidential power in foreign policy during the Cold War era.

The Mass media

Mass media and the process of communication plays an important part in influencing foreign policy decisions. According to Rosati, the rapid growth of the media can be attributed to two factors namely the interdependence of the world and the rapid development of communication means. The world has become a global village hence the need for information and knowledge of both national and international affairs. The media decides what is news. Americans travel abroad for official visits to cover foreign events especially affecting the US. These include wars and inflation, governmental relations, changes in trends

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of states with special interest in European royalty, dramatic political conflicts and excesses of foreign dictators. Media coverage is therefore a great influence on both domestic and foreign policy in America.

Global Environment

The last influence to foreign policy in US is the global environment and the American power. Global environment has played a crucial role in affecting the complex politics of US foreign policy in the past and will continue to do so in the future. This affects foreign policy in two ways. Firstly, the global patterns set the underlying conditions or parameters of likely US foreign policy. Secondly, particular events and relationships occurring throughout the global environment often have an immediate impose in domestic policy making process.

The Cold War era was characterised by the East-West conflict and the rise of American power. After the World War II, USA pursued the policy of containment because of its military, economic and political power. The rise of global complexity highlighted the rise of global pluralism and independent economic recovery of Eastern Europe and Japan. Newly industrialised nations became multiple actors in the global arena. There was relative decline of American power due to the rise of other centers of power and influence such as
the Western European countries. This affected the US foreign policy. Soon after the collapse of communism other global factors arose such as the Persian Gulf conflicts and the African internal conflicts. The Zaire, Somali and the Sudan conflicts kept the US on her toes.

To appreciate the US foreign policy towards Africa one needs to understand the way the US foreign policy is made at home. Basically it involves change and continuity which springs from realism. Rosati maintains that US foreign policy is formulated from a strong realism point of view. He believes the national interests and coercive diplomacy are the basis of its formulation as at the present time.\(^{38}\)

The policy making process in U.S is a combined effort between the President, Congress, his close officers and the public. The President chooses his team way before he takes up the office. And although consultations are made within these various groups the Presidency has a greater input in the matters of foreign policy.

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At the individual level

"The president not only must decide who he will appoint to staff his administration, but how they will interact so that he is kept informed, able to arrive at decisions, and have decisions implemented in accordance with his wishes. The president cannot assume when he takes office that the policy making system in place will automatically allow him to manage bureaucracy. On the contrary, if a president wants to manage the bureaucracy, as opposed to responding to bureaucratic momentum, he must initiate a policy process that responds to his demands."

The choices made by the president elect determine how the foreign policy making process will operate. For instance the president decides if the process will be White House centred, State department centred, or mixed and even 'ad hoc'. Should the process be centralised or decentralised? Or should it be open or closed to staff and advisers?. The president can decide if he just wants a few individuals to act in his name and be responsible for the overall conduct of foreign policy or if he wants it to be more decentralised throughout the bureaucracy. And even then he must determine the level of access the different policy makers will have at the presidential level. This happens because as we shall notice most of the foreign policies are made in an 'ad hoc' manner as a

response to an international crisis. There is time constraint on the president. Besides he/she knows the operating styles, the views and judgements, trust and friendships of his advisers. He/she tends to be selective in whom to interact thus narrowing the process to his confidants to reduce opposition. In a nutshell the US president mainly relies on the National Security Adviser and the National Security Council. It is important to note that the presidential choices reflect the character of the president his beliefs and operating style.

American foreign policy can best be understood by looking at the various doctrines that were upheld at any particular time. However there is an exception for almost two centuries when Americans seemed to move away from any political movements, parties, and candidates advocating “doctrinal” or ideological solutions to national problems. The best example given is President Roosevelt’s administration and the New Deal. It was a time when America tried to use a combination of social and economic theories and government programs to solve the problems of the great depression.

American foreign policy can also be explained by using the international system level of analysis that dominated several time periods. These are characterised by the different doctrines that emerged after the second world war - from the Monroe’s doctrine to Carter doctrine. The main doctrines that dominated American foreign policy were the Monroe doctrine, the Open Door
Principle and the Stimson doctrine, Truman doctrine, the Eisenhower doctrine, the first and second Johnson doctrines, the Nixon doctrine and the Carter doctrine. The period before the 2nd World War was characterised by yet another principle known as isolationism. All these tenets formed the American foreign policy at different times. And as we shall see, the foreign policy principles were generally a response to international crises since America was interested in peace and prosperity. This meant avoiding unnecessary war and pursuing their economic goals.

The period before the First World War was known as the time of isolationism. Isolationism did not mean that America was indifferent to the actions of the other nations, nor did it mean that America pursued a passive foreign policy. Rather it meant that for over 150 years America refused to commit itself to a defensive pact with another power. It was to remain no-entangled with other great powers. However from 1800 to 1949 the U.S entered into treaties and understandings with other nations but none of them involved binding commitments for military assistance of any kind.

Political and Economic Experiences

As a result of the American experience in the early years of setting foot in the "New Land" and the twenty five years that followed they adopted the doctrine
of isolationism. Several factors influenced this foreign policy in America. Firstly the lessons learned by the founding fathers during the colonial stage, secondly the events that followed reinforced the need to be isolated. The third was the geographical factor. America was separated from the world by oceans on all sides. It was therefore easy for her to keep away from the rest of the world. America suffered each time the European powers fought among themselves as the war spread to the "New World". Due to the mercantilist theory of trade the New World was seen as source of national wealth thus the wars spread over to the colonies. The post colonial experiences were also threatened by the French wars 1796-1800 and 1812-1815 when England invaded America to protect her trade. Both the colonial and post colonial experiences led to the famous 1796 farewell speech made to Congress by President Washington, and the Monroe's doctrine of 1823.

2.2 Presidential Doctrines

Doctrine of Isolationism

President Washington told Americans to avoid any entanglement with Europe because their interests had little or no relationship. America wanted peace and prosperity that could not be maintained by getting involved with Europe's rivalries, ambitions, interests and so on. This precept was followed religiously.
by America but only as far as European matters were concerned. At this time the only other 'nations' in the world were China and Japan by modern definition. (war in Europe seen as a threat to national security and prosperity to America-state interests-realism led to isolationism. Also there was no other external threat geographical distance was an advantage to this policy)\textsuperscript{40}

Washington was not against the general principle of alliances but was against those alliances of permanent nature. For example in 1778 U.S entered into an alliance with France to aid the colonial revolt against England. The French colonies gained independence as a result. This treaty was to last forever but U.S dishonoured it when France went to war with England in 1793 and in 1800. U.S completely cut off from France to avoid involvement in the revolutionary Napoleonic wars in Europe. This would be entangling and Washington worried that the trio relationships-Franco-American and Anglo-American alliances would have put U.S in a difficult position. He saw this as leading to ideological polarisation in the U.S. Temporary alliances that were based in expediential needs of the moment were more favoured. This reflects the theory of realism for self preservation of a state.

President James Monroe's message to congress in 1823 formed the first set of foreign policy principles that were later referred to as the Monroe Doctrine.

\textsuperscript{40} Cecil V. Crabb, J.R. The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy pg 105
Monroe believed in America being isolated from the rest of the world. It was the major influencing factor of U.S foreign policy and it lasted for a long time. Even today it remains the foundation stone for U.S foreign and defence policy. For the first time in history, all alliances both permanent and temporary were ruled out. The Monroe doctrine was a departure point for both Europe and America. It was a realisation that Europe’s squabbles were beyond the power of the United States to affect and not therefore objectives worthy of U.S energy. The Monroe doctrine also stated that the “New World” was off limits for further colonisation by Europe. These two formed what came to be known as the Two Spheres” Principle of Monroe Doctrine. The two continents were separate both geographically and politically with separate concerns. Both Washington and Monroe influenced the doctrine of Isolationism as a foreign policy in America. The official formulation of Isolationism was therefore a European oriented policy designed to keep America out of Europe’s squabbles by keeping her isolated from them. In 1923 Isolationism was proclaimed the natural and permanent state for America. This policy became so powerful that it lasted until the 1940s.
Open Door Principle

The US appeared keener to engage Asia and pursued a totally different policy based on the open door principle. It came to be known as the "Open Door Principle"41. This policy, first proclaimed in 1899 by President William McKinley, sought to promote commercial and economic relations in China. Later this doctrine was amplified several times and especially during the Japanese expansionism in 1930s. In 1899 September, America sent diplomatic notes to Britain Germany and Russia urging them to exercise a 'perfect equality of treatment in their commercial and economic relations with China. To avoid future wars, the US sought universal acceptance of the open door policy. We can conclude from this approach that America used the realist theory that exalts the interests of the states above all others.

Expansionism Policy: By 1900 America had expanded to the Pacific and by 1910 her economy had surpassed that of Europe. By 1905 she acquired Cuba, the Caribbean and Latin America. The policy of isolationism kept America out of war in Europe and led to her expansionism to the West. Isolationism was

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41 Cecil V. Crabb, JR. The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy pg. 106
thus a deliberate attempt for U.S to keep away Europe from her internal affairs. America wanted to go it alone in making and implementing foreign policy.

American foreign policy can best described in terms of continuity of certain doctrines to changes in others. The shift was based on the theory of realism that places the interests of the state before that of the individual relations. She moved from Isolationism to Expansionism, Containment and interventionism. These doctrines formed the basis of the foreign policy in the Cold war era.

**Containment Policy**

Isolationism continued until America entered World War I as a latecomer. By this time US influence had expanded to the Latin America and Eastern Asia and was the strongest economic power in the world. She had already entangled herself with several other countries of the world with whom she had economic interests. US foreign policy changed from isolationism to containment to prevent the Soviet spread of communism.

Containment was simply a reactive policy to counter Russian initiatives, and to keep the status quo so as to maintain US credibility in her spheres of influence. The shift from isolationism to containment was based on the belief that if the
US did not honour her commitment in any one of her areas of influence, she would lose credibility. Containment as a doctrine was carried out in three distinct phases:

a) The period after the 2nd World War (1945 –1950), the primary threat being that economic integration could lead nations into the hands of communism.

b) External threat phase, characterised by the fear of direct attack by Russia on Western Europe as a consequence of the Korean war. Castro’s rise to power through guerrilla war was seen as a communist strategy and a threat to US interests. In the 60s there was the threat of internal subversion in the third World.

c) Public Opinion - thirdly there was the fear that American public would force the US to withdraw its containment to communism and return to isolationism.  

Democracy as a Policy

The fear that the American public might compel the government to withdrew the containment policy led yet to another policy, defence of democracy abroad as a cover up for anti-communism. In the years to follow America’s foreign policy was dominated by this policy. Democracy was defended by using several emerging doctrines. The term doctrine is used because the policies were

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42 Cecil V. Crabb, JR. The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy pg 107
formulated as a result of a set of beliefs that emanated from the Presidency of the time. These principles came to be upheld as religion in the minds of Americans. People were willing to die for these doctrines.

Military Industrial Complex: This refers to the combination of the US armed forces, arms industry and associated political and commercial interests which grew rapidly in scale and influence in the wake of World War II. The term was first used publicly by President Dwight Eisenhover in his farewell address to the nation on January 17, 1961. It is sometimes used to refer to the iron triangle that is argued to exist between weapons makers, military contractors, the Pentagon and the US Congress. The interplay between these groups played a major role not only in providing the necessary military power to achieve the US political goals but to boost domestic economy. The production of weapons also boosted the domestic economy therefore strengthening the domestic policy. Through the military might, America was able to maintain dictators in friendly states, like Mobutu Sese Seko of DRC, as long as they were not pro-Russia. The US government was not willing to risk dictators turning to communists Russia for aid. Another example is seen in case of the Dominican Republic. After Trujillo was assassinated J.F. Kennedy decided to accept a continuation of dictatorship rather than have a failed
democracy. It was safer to maintain a pro-Western dictator than keep a pro-Russian democratically elected leader.

This was the dichotomy that characterised the US foreign policy in the Cold War era.

America faced a dilemma after the 2nd World War in that the world had changed. Europe was no longer the threat and many more actors came to play. Truman's policy was to preserve anti-communist governments but not to impose democracy in Europe – a purely realist view. Even after the Yalta declaration, in February 1945, promised that East Europe would hold free elections. Truman did not enforce it. The Truman Doctrine officially reversed America's long-standing "isolationist" stance toward European affairs. It committed America to a variety of interventionist policies and programs from Western Europe to East Asia.

Due to the interventionist doctrine, Truman was forced to work closely with the military triangle. At this point it can be concluded that US foreign policy was greatly influenced by the military industrial complex.
Expansionism/Globalism Policy

Truman is reported to have said, "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures". Truman's and Monroe's were the two most influential doctrines in U.S foreign policy for years to come. Truman's doctrine expressed and epitomised America's "Internationalist" or "globalism" approach to foreign relations since the 2nd World War. America's main pre-occupation was the threat posed by the Soviet Union. This policy continued well into the 80s during the Reagan presidency. The Truman doctrine was a response to developments in Eastern Europe. Many actors were coming into this region including the Soviets. The US needed to move in quickly to prevent a Soviets take over. The immediate challenge came in the Middle East when Greece and Turkey were invaded by Soviets with the aim of expanding in the Middle East. Britain sought America's assistance. On learning of the impending withdrawal by Britain from the region, Truman sought Congress approval for economic assistance. This Greek/Turkish problem led Truman and Congress to believe that they should handle the Russian threat globally and with a global strategy.

Truman's doctrine attempted to address the Balance of Power in the globe. The defeat of Germany and Japan, the decline of British power after World War II
created a serious imbalance of power and a new American diplomatic strategy was necessary. George F. Kennan was quoted as saying that, “Soviet power was like a fluid stream that threatened to fill up every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of power”.44 The other implicit goal in Truman doctrine was that unlike in the World War I, America was prepared to accept a leadership position. Capitalism was also ripe and the American dream of ‘one world’ was at its height. The Soviets had to be contained. This doctrine ended the historic era of isolationism in America.

**Economic and Military Tools:** America used economic and military aid as tools to deal with the situation in Europe-Greece and Turkey. The Marshall Plan was an economic blue print to bring about economic recovery in Western Europe so as to stop Soviet expansionism. Aid would also influence political development. Economic recovery was the most important thing and America put pressure on Britain and France to give up zones of West Germany so as to create a West Germany state. Truman felt that for Europe to recover, Germany had to be revived, otherwise the Soviets would never leave Europe.

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43 Ibid p. 108
44 Ibid . p.111
The Far East policy: As far as the foreign policy of Far East was concerned there was no clear policy. Several policies were made one for Japan, one for China and one for Korea but there was no link between them. After France lost her zone in West Germany, she was given Indochina to colonise as compensation. Truman also miscalculated the Russian domination in Vietnam and Asia. He saw China’s communist ideology as of no consequence due to the existing hostility between her and Russia. They were both very nationalistic and he saw no danger of Soviet influence. He was wrong. By 1950 the threat of Russian expansion became a reality. Truman’s administration did not think of Japan until the Korean war broke out. U.S sent troops to force Japan to surrender. The US realised that if the war continued there was a likelihood of Russia taking the whole peninsula. As a result Korea was divided between Russian to the North and America to the South. It was another way of containment.

However America withdrew from the region and used economic aid and defence arms which, in their view, were cheaper than their presence. America did not want to spend where there was no gain. Once again America failed to see the connection between Korea and Japan. The US stand was to make South Korea independent and saw no need to protect her until the war broke out. The Truman doctrine of neutrality was however challenged by Mao Tse-ung’s
foreign policy which rejected the idea of a third road maintaining that one was either for imperialism or for socialism. This led to a Sino-Soviet treaty and Truman realised that China and Russia were closer in ideology than he assumed, hence the formulation of containment policy in the Far East. But it was only tentative since the US did not want to commit finances.

**Re-armament policy:** The National Security Council Study No 68 (NSC-68) reviewed the existing policy in 1949 after Russia made an atomic bomb and came up with recommendations which included: the need for the US to improve her capability of massive destruction; increase conventional weapons; rearmament as a major project for global containment; and a major containment for Russia globally. This began the foreign policy of global watchman or world police by America. The policy dominates the world even today.

**A shift of foreign policy:** The NSC marked a period of change of foreign policy from restricted economic containment policy to an open-ended military one. The Korean war helped justify this policy even further because it occurred before the implementation stage.
The post-1945 American foreign policy was highly influenced by the Korean war. If the US did not get involved, NATO would have lost faith in Truman's policy. Japan was in the process of joining NATO and would have lost confidence in the alliance. Intervention in the Korean war was for credibility of US commitment to her allies not for gain. The US began the policy of supporting nations that were resisting armed forces and outside pressure as part of its foreign policy. This shift from realism to idealism was meant to give the US credibility abroad.

After Eisenhower became President he was faced with the Middle East problem. After ten years of Truman's containment policy, Eisenhower called for a fundamental reorientation in American policy towards Middle East through a congressional joint resolution that came to be known as Eisenhower Doctrine. He turned to the Middle East because he realised that this area was the most volatile and especially after the 1956 Suez Canal crisis.

**Continuity and change of policy:** Eisenhower continued with the Truman doctrine of containment but asked for three things: a new bilateral and multilateral foreign aid program to bolster independence in the region, an extension of military aid and co-operation to Mid Eastern nations that requested it and an authorisation of employment of US armed forces to secure and protect
the territorial integrity against any armed aggression from international communism. In 1956 Hungary had been attacked by the Soviet Union and the idea was to stop such a thing from ever happening again. Aggression was seen not only as direct attack but also as indirect attack such as revolutionary activities, economic and military arms-aid programs, terrorism, and propaganda campaigns.

Eisenhower continued the policy of diplomatic engagement abroad. His proposals were designed to act as an emergency stop-gap measure to prevent the conditions in Middle East from deteriorating. The problems of the Middle East were attributed to the decline of Western power and influence in this region. Eisenhower saw it as a gap in leadership which the US needed to fill before Russia did. Russian influence had began to grow rapidly after the Aswan High Dam issue when Washington refused to finance Cairo for the project. It is at this time that Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal leading to war with Israel. The events before this showed that Eisenhower was inclined to isolationism. US refused to intervene in the Middle East war in 1956 between Egypt and Israel. Eisenhower displeased all sides by his behaviour. When President Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal in July 1956 Israel invaded Egypt in October as a result.
The French and British entered Egypt to topple the Nasser regime but the US did not offer help. As a result Israel not only got defeated but had also to return the Sinai to Egypt. Israel blamed the US for not joining forces with the French and the British to fight Egypt. Britain and US soured and Egypt became more hostile to Israel. Britain and France lost influence over this region leaving Russia to meddle in Middle East affairs. It was not until Russia took a prominent role that Eisenhower convinced Congress to get involved.

According Dulles the Secretary of State, the Eisenhower doctrine was a mixture of both Monroe's and Truman's doctrines. Like Monroe's policy of 1823, it was a psychological one and was designed to keep Russia from Middle East. The doctrine was also meant to extend to Africa. It was also an application of Truman's containment doctrine in the Middle East. Eisenhower was defending free people of Middle East. Truman defended Greece and Turkey a decade before him. Eisenhower also continued the “Tripartite Declaration” of May 25, 1950 where U.S, Britain and France had guaranteed security of the Middle East.

After Eisenhower, Kennedy was more concerned with the Cuban situation. The US had interests in Cuba because of American Multinationals. Vietnam was thought to be of little economic value but this proved to be a miscalculation.
The Kennedy-MacNamara team focused on producing arms to fight communism. Kennedy's policy emphasised strengthening the arms race for containing Soviet influence. During his administration the US had the highest increase of arms in the history of mankind\textsuperscript{45}. Kennedy and Whitehouse increased American conventional capability to the benefit of the next Presidencies in the fight of communism.

President Johnson came in at a time of massive conventional arms. However he followed the typical U.S trend of responding to crises rather than planning a foreign policy strategy. In 1964 he was faced by the crisis in S.E. Asia known as the Tonkin Gulf crisis. America’s destroyer Maddox was attacked by North Vietnam torpedo boats. Two days later, despite the warning by Washington they did the same thing. This brought a new stage in American foreign policy. America took a stand to protect their interests and forces in S.E. Asia. Johnson’s first doctrine had to deal with this issue. It was seen as an emergency response to a crisis. It was not a long-lasting constitutional procedure as is typical of US foreign policy after the Second World War.

This policy was criticised as not being adequate to procure a lasting national consensus on foreign policy goals.

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid p. 230
The second Johnson doctrine was in response to the communist threat in the Americas. The Dominican Republic was threatened by the Soviets in the 60s. For thirty years the Dominicans were under the ruthless and exploitative dictatorship of Rafael Trujillo. After his assassination Juan Bosch was elected and brought hope for democracy. However he was weak and later linked up with Marxist elements. According to America he became a threat to democracy. After the 1963 coup Kennedy had severed ties with the Dominican Republic. The Johnson administration changed all of that. For 30 years the US policy was that of "good neighbour". But as Johnson stated in 1965 the US policy was "That American nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the establishment of another communist government in the Western Hemisphere". This was yet another case of an attempt to contain communism. This second doctrine sprang from the Monroe policy in the Western Hemisphere which declared that special relations linked the American Republics in that region. But lack of proper implementation of this policy paved the way for communism. The containment principle however led to intervention in the Caribbean islands. Johnson's second doctrine was yet a continuation of the long-standing U.S policy designed to contain communism globally.

46 Ibid p. 234
Retrenchment policy

The post-Vietnam or retrenchment policy came to be known as the Nixon doctrine. It was the most elusive policy in American history. It emerged as a result of several policy declarations by president Nixon and his advisers. The so-called "Emerging Structure of Peace" was an attempt by Nixon to come up with a new foreign policy doctrine. He was influenced by Henry Kissinger, a student of Realpolitik, who was secretary of state. Power was the crucial element in this doctrine. The argument was that balance of power was for maintaining global stability while national interests were for determining foreign policy. Historians have termed this doctrine a 'diplomatic' package rather than a foreign policy. The doctrine was unclear to most Americans including Nixon's officers. It covered such areas as détente with Soviet Union, normalisation of relations between US and communist China, stronger partnership between the US and its NATO allies and several other major and minor elements. The main criticism of this policy was that it kept on changing from time to time and was uncertain. It has been argued that probably only the President knew what he wanted to achieve.

The above characteristics of the Nixon-Kissinger doctrine brought confusion in American foreign policy and as the Vietnam war came to an end there was
great public doubt about the future direction of American policy. The Nixon Doctrine marked the beginning of a probably lengthy, and difficult process of defining new patterns of America’s relationship to the new world and of a similarly lengthy process of building up a new domestic basis for that relationship. But in Nixon’s mind he had not departed from the American dream of national interest. As he stated in his report to Congress in 1971, “We are not involved in the world because we have commitments; we have commitments because we are involved. Our interests must shape our commitments rather than the other way round.” America suffered humiliation when she lost the Vietnam war. Nixon tried to refute the idea that the U.S. no longer had global commitments. America was relapsing to what he called ‘new isolationism’. The retrenchment doctrine was an attempt to correct the image that American power will not fail in future.

Nixon sought to retrench America’s overseas commitments and to enable the US to fulfil those that were left more effectively and at a lower cost. Nixon shifted from the Eisenhower doctrine of containment especially when he declared that America was not to take up any new security commitments abroad. However the US was to honour the existing alliances’ obligations. As a

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47 Ibid p. 280
48 Zbigniew B. “Half Past Nixon,” Foreign Policy, III (Summer, 1971), 21
49 Ibid pg 21
result there was a reduction of military forces in South Korea and an increase of assistance. Defence was a key principle of this policy. The US was to provide nuclear cover if a nuclear power threatened the freedom of a nation allied with them or of a nation whose survival depended on US. This contradicted the overall principle of the Nixonian doctrine. Critics called it elusive and confusing. In reality it expanded America's overseas commitments.

The Détente

The last doctrine that had influence on American foreign policy was that of President Carter. As it was the pattern, American expansionism was as a result of international crises that threatened either its national interest or the balance of power on the globe. The Carter doctrine was a response to the Persian Gulf crisis.

Carter's policy dictum was based on the policy statement that, "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." President Carter made the volatile Middle East the focal point of his message to Congress in

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50 Cecil V. Crabb, JR. The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy pg 329
1980. In this message Carter talked of a ‘new Persian Gulf strategy’, later
known as Carter doctrine. The Carter administration was faced with many
challenges including the presence of the Russians in Cuba, the overthrow of the
Iranians wanted the return of the Shah and Iranian wealth to Iran. Carter
however refused to yield to these demands. Later Washington used the good
offices of Algeria to have the hostages released. Then came the 1980 Iran-Iraq
war followed by an oil crisis, the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 that
imposed communism and the subsequent internal resistance that followed. The
US continued to send troops to Afghanistan even after the defeat of the Soviet
backed regime in Kabul.

President Carter declared Soviet presence in Afghanistan a threat to the global
peace. The Carter administration used several economic sanctions to force the
Soviet Union out of Afghanistan including: denial of Soviet ships to fish in
American coastal waters, curtailing export of high technology and agricultural
products to Soviet, persuading the European allies to restrict their trade with
communist countries, withdrawal from the Olympic Games in Moscow,
increased military spending and creation of a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF)
so as to protect the Gulf and other endangered regions. Carter also improved
NATO defences. At the same time the US renewed its defence security agreement with Pakistan. Most importantly the US withdrew the Soviet-US Strategic Arms-Control agreement (SALT II) from being considered by the Senate.

The Carter doctrine reaffirmed the continuity of US post-war foreign policy and the concern for Middle East that was formulated by Truman in 1947. It was formulated to contain Soviet expansionism. The US interest in the Middle East region was strategic. The US became highly dependent on the oil from this region from 1967. The countries around the Middle East accounted for three quarters of the world’s oil reserves. Besides the US, Japan and Europe depended on oil from this region. Soviet control of Middle East had to be prevented because it threatened the US interests. But the fact that Carter was in favour of détente and peaceful co-existence with Russia, made him unable to act even though the idea gained public support.

President Reagan replaced Carter and continued with his foreign policy for a while. Reagan’s first priority was to safeguard the West’s life line- the oil in the Persian Gulf. The Arab-Israeli disputes were subordinate to oil. However although Soviet influence was a threat to this interest, Reagan could not gain

31 President Carter’s message. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, XVI (Jan 28, 1980), 194-200
the co-operation and contribution of the Western allies including Japan in order to use American power in the Middle East.

**Change of doctrine**

The 1980s witnessed a new era of foreign policy making. The US reversed the policy of détente and retrenchment that it had pursued in the seventies and reverted to containment, which it had never abandoned fully. As long as Russia kept expanding her global influence the US kept the containment principle. The SALT II Accord on arms reduction was shelved as the US sought to increase its defence budget and expand its world-wide commitments with the formation of a global interventionist military force, Rapid Deployment Force)". America turned to the patterns of the fifties and sixties which escalated hostilities between them and Soviet Union and greater use of military arms. The policies of the Reagan administration differed in degree but not in basic direction from those of Carter in his last year in office. The four major policies were: the expansion of America’s military power; the pursuit of a tough arms control policy; holding of the Soviets accountable worldwide; and the strain of unilateralism inherent in America’s political and military resurgence.

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52 Roy C. M. Foreign Policy in World Politics. New Jersey, 1985, p.159
Reagan pursued a more aggressive policy towards the Soviet Union than his predecessor. Where Carter shied away from focusing on the Soviets, Reagan intensified the hostilities. Reagan blamed the Soviets for any conflict and sought to deter her from influencing the globe. In his attempt to stop Soviet expansion, Reagan overlooked the local problems of the regions at stake. A good example is that of Central America. He backed the government of El Salvador militarily and ignored the land reform policy issues that led to guerrilla warfare just to stop the Soviets from gaining influence. This showed the strain in unilateralism that was to follow. Unfortunately the US unilateralism in Latin America strained relations with her Western allies. As America was pursuing the Soviet Union in Central America, European countries continued to pursue the policies that were beneficial to them. In doing so they strained their relations with the US. In retaliation the US imposed sanctions against European based American firms that did so. Later the sanctions were lifted but it left a dent of mistrust. Europe was distancing herself from the US because of her unilateral and a seemingly unpredictable character.
The US needed Europe and Japan for her global commitments but after the withdrawal from Vietnam her allies began to question her credibility. “Carter’s vacillations and then Reagan’s ‘foreign policy by ideology’ made a bad problem worse”53.
The New World Order

George Bush (Snr) inherited an office heavy with debts in 1988. As a result of Reagan’s policy of containment the US economy suffered turning the country into the world’s leading debtor. The world was changing in several regions: the events in China, Eastern Europe, Soviet Union, South Africa, and Central America. All that needed attention. But Bush chose not to respond to the world revolution of 1989. Bush could not help the emerging democracies because the treasury was empty despite the fact that the US was the most powerful nation in the world. In 1989 the world saw the breaking of the Berlin Wall and collapse of the communist system that the Soviet Union had built for over seventy years. This was the end of Cold War that saw an emergence of many small states struggling to find their identity. In 1991 Iraq invaded Kuwait leading to the Gulf War. The defeat of Iraq by the 26 country US-led coalition saw the Bush Administration proclaim the emergence of a ‘new world order’.

Africa’s Case Scenario

In all these time periods and presidential doctrines no other continent was as ignored as Africa. In spite of Africa being connected to America through

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53 ibid p. 161
slave trade and therefore through the African American population, it seemed to be of no importance in terms of US foreign affairs. America was sensitive to European colonists in Africa and therefore kept a low profile in matters concerning the Africans. The US avoided direct responsibility in Africa. Africa was never at the centre of US foreign policy. America supported colonial interests by avoiding intervention where such would be seen to undermine the interests of her western friends which had colonised Africa.

However the US directly intervened in Africa when their national interests were threatened. They responded in the heat of the moment therefore formulating short term policies that left no lasting solutions to African problems.

The next chapter will attempt to relate the US foreign policy with the political instability in Africa in the Cold War era.
CHAPTER THREE

3.1 US Foreign Policy towards Africa—Cold-War era

General Overview.

According to Henry F. Jackson "No other continent has been so consistently ignored by our policy-makers, and yet none but Europe has been so continually connected to important developments in America, from the founding of the Republic in the era of the Atlantic slave trade to the inauguration of training exercises for the new Rapid Deployment Forces." 54

Us interest in Africa is relatively recent and can be traced to 1957 when Nixon and J.F. Kennedy warned that the new nations could either turn to Washington or Moscow for guidance. In 1957 Richard Nixon and Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts recognised the importance of Africa and the changes that were occurring in relation to American politics especially regarding the East-West relations. Nixon recommended to President Dwight D. Eisenhower the creation of a separate Bureau of African Affairs within the State Department. Kennedy on the other hand warned that the new nations achieving their

independence from colonial masters could either turn to Moscow or to Washington for help or sympathy/guidance. These two people influenced the trend of US foreign policy towards the new emerging states in the Cold War era especially in Africa.

**US Interests in Africa**

The official recognition of Africa by the US foreign policy establishment came in 1958 with the creation of the State Department’s Africa Bureau. US interests in Africa were economic, political and strategic. Economically, Africa was a potential market for US goods and source of vital raw materials. Politically, the US needed Africa’s support in the UN and other international forum. Strategically, US needed to ensure access to Middle East oil and therefore the need to control the Horn of Africa and the Cape of Good hope in South Africa.

The US attitude towards Africa could however be said to have been that of indifference or/and neglect in comparison to other regions perceived to be of greater importance. This shows the inherent character of US foreign policy in general. It is based on the state’s interests.
The US foreign policy towards Africa was more often than not marked by continuity rather than change in the Cold War era. However there were some noteworthy changes depending on which party was in power. However this was reflected only in change of style rather than substance of policy.

The US foreign policy towards Africa seems to shift from time to time and from president to president. As noted in chapter two, the foreign policy is greatly influenced by the president and his advisers. The Kennedy administration, for example, is said to have greatly departed from the anti-nationalist tendency of US foreign policy towards the third world. According to Schraeder, Jimmy Carter’s policy of promoting majority rule, for example, meant in actual fact supporting the Marxist Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe led by Robert Mugabe. This doctrine broke away from the belief that radical elements in Africa should not be included in playing any major role in both political and economic arenas.

The Reagan administration’s policy of ‘constructive engagement’ sought to upgrade US ties with South Africa. This was yet another departure from the past US foreign policy. But as Crawford Young argues, the Kennedy, Carter and Reagan administrations had the African in mind as they entered office. The interest was however more rhetorical than practical. In case of the Kennedy

administration, despite of his strong rhetoric and denunciation of Portuguese colonialism in Africa and his support for black majority rule, the US was unable to move beyond this rhetoric.

The Carter administration, despite the stated commitment to human rights and the need to reduce ties with authoritarian dictatorships, was unable to do anything in the case of Zairean Mobutu Sese Seko. He gave in to the influence of national security bureaucrats who believed that Zaire would plunge in chaos and instability if Mobutu fell. This appears to confirm the view that Americans have no permanent friends but they have permanent interests. US foreign policy was consistent in substance in that it sought to protect her national interests. Her behaviour in the case of Somalia is yet another example. In 1980 Somalia, an anti-communist client was threatened by former Marxist Ethiopia. According to Schreader, President Reagan did not act and like Kennedy before him he chose to restrain. 56 Reagan did not act and like Kennedy chose to restrain because it was not in the interests of the US. This type of behaviour is not uniquely US. All states are motivated by interests.

56 Ibid p. 7
3.2 Us Foreign Policy and Instability in African Politics

The Doctrine of Intervention

US intervention in Africa was motivated by the desire to prevent the spread of communism. It was a way of ensuring the balance of power in the international arena. The major focus was to protect American national interests abroad as opposed to the welfare of the Africans. This doctrine was based on the realist theory. This method was not unique to Africa but indicative of US foreign policy in general.

As stated by Donald J. Punchala the story of the blind men and the elephant in terms of international integration, each blind man touched a part of the elephant therefore coming to a different conclusion of the nature of the beast. This analogy has been applied to the U.S relationship with Africa. The Scholars of U.S foreign policy towards Africa focuses on relations with Washington to explain the nature of the beast - in this case continuity and change in U.S intervention. And as mentioned earlier in chapter two, the decision making process in U.S foreign policy is a very complex issue. It involves many departments for example the Bureaucrats, the Congress, the Presidency, the

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Pressure Groups, the Media, the Global Environmental Atmosphere, the Public, the Military, the CIA to mention a few. In 1986 the anti-apartheid pressure groups won over the Congress by using economic sanctions against South Africa. In 1960 a commitment was made by the Congress in the case of Ethiopia and Somalia to maintain forces in this region, thus touching the military part of the beast. In discussing the continuity and change on U.S intervention in Africa one has to look at the government of the time. Schraeder concludes that the nature of events on the continent historically has affected the operations of the U.S policy-making process that in return affects the US Africa policies. This trend is not unique to Africa alone but to most Third World countries as discussed in chapter two. A change of presidency was enough to shift policy as it changed from doctrine to doctrine. Presidential beliefs or doctrines caused discontinuity in the foreign policy in general not just for Africa.

America did not seek to understand the problems of the African continent. As a result the US foreign policy was not formulated to solve the African problem. The policies were more reactive rather than proactive to African issues making Africa to be a foreign policy backwater. There was general ignorance about the African continent by US policy makers. Some did not know what was going on

58 Peter J. Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change, Loyola University of Chicago p. 11
while others did not know the geography of the continent. The following is a conversation in a debate concerning an amendment concerning the Soviets' advances in Africa by Mr. Helms.

In the words of Henry F. Jackson \(^{59}\) "But, Mr. Moynihan said, what of Chad, which is 'fending off the Red armed hordes' with the help of the French? And what of Djibouti which is doing the same? Mr. Helms was puzzled. Djibouti? Where is this Djibouti? Mr. Moynihan sprang to his feet, strode to the wall of the hearing room, clambered atop a chair and referred to a big map. He pointed to the Horn of Africa. 'Communists to the left, he said, gesturing broadly. Another gesture: 'Communists to the right.' A stab of the finger on the map: 'Djibouti - right in the middle.' Mr. Helms appeared enlightened, even chastened. ...".

The debate was about an amendment forwarded by Helms on his concern about the Soviet advances in Africa. The point here is to demonstrate the role played by ignorance on the part of American officials. This combined with the complexity of the American decision making process makes it harder to explain in totality the US - African relations in terms of continuity and change. The interplay between the US foreign policy making process and the events taking

\(^{59}\) Henry F. Kackson. From the Congo to Soweto: US foreign policy Toward Africa since 19960 (New York: Quill, 1984), p. 18
place in Africa better explain this relationship. The US interventionist practices in Ethiopia and Somalia as noted by Schraeder,\(^{60}\) best explains the importance of the relationship between the two.

The term ‘intervention’ as explained by Schraeder\(^{61}\) in the broad sense is used to mean “the calculated use of political, economic and military instruments by one country to influence the domestic or the foreign policies of another country”. According to him, intervention has four definitions that stand out: “First intervention is seen as purposeful, underscoring the intentional nature of the act. Second, intervention entails a wide choice of instruments ranging from the extension of economic and military aid to economic sanctions, covert action, paramilitary interference, and finally, direct application of military force. Third, attempts to influence a country’s policies need not be restricted to efforts to change those policies but may also support a given regime in order to insulate it from change. Finally, intervention is not limited to affecting the domestic politics of a given country, but can be undertaken to affect that country’s foreign policies, as well.”

The above definition fits the entire range of US foreign policy towards Africa and is responsible for the continuity and change. The underlying factor was

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\(^{60}\) Peter J. Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change. Loyola University of Chicago p. 180
security. The US wanted security in the world to protect their interests abroad and Africa was no exception. Africa and the world in general was under the threat of Soviet Union. This led to the policy of intervention and containment.

For US to safeguard their interests in Africa they sought to ensure security with the African regimes. This meant supporting them in political, economic and military ventures. It was for this reason that Lyndon Johnson, provided transport, in 1964, to Belgian troops in order to rescue and evacuate hostages and to fight the guerrilla insurgency in north eastern Zaire; in 1960s State Department kept on pressuring increase of economic aid to Ethiopia so that Haile Selassie could in exchange give continued access to strategically important facilities; US put an economic sanction against South Africa, in 1986, to try and force changes in the country's system of apartheid; Again we see the US defence department airlifting military supplies to assist General Said Barre of Somalia against an internal insurgency in 1988.

The following statement explains the general policy towards the Horn of Africa (Somalia and Ethiopia).

"Our objective should be to exclude military bases or related facilities for foreign powers from the Horn of Africa. The military forces of both Somalia

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61 Ibid p. 8
and Ethiopia are all out of proportion to their true national security requirements and should be scaled down\textsuperscript{62}.

\textquotedblleft The Horn of Africa...has considerable strategic importance for the United States as it is relevant to both the security of the Middle East and to Africa.... We seek access to airfields and harbours for our military forces should they, in times of crisis, be required to defend against Soviet expansionism in the Persian Gulf or the Indian Ocean.\textsuperscript{63}\textquotedblright

The US foreign policy was formulated according to their needs. This led to either continuity or discontinuity of the foreign policies. This behaviour was determined by threats and crises in the areas of interest. In Ethiopia, US established and increased their security relations with the regime at the expense of their ties with Somalia. They used one of the interventionist methods. Economic assistance was used to keep unhampered access to Kagnew that was one of the most important US bases on the continent of Africa. But in 1974, although the US involvement was high, they took a low profile on the territorial disputes of the region. The implication was not highly welcome by Somali government.

\textsuperscript{62} Quoted in Raymond L. Thurston, “The United States, Somalia and the Crisis in the Horn,” Horn of Africa (April-June 1978): 20
\textsuperscript{63} Chester Croker, “US Interests in regional Conflicts in the Horn of Africa,” address before the Washington World Affairs Council, Washington, DC. November 13, 1985, p.3
US policymakers were only interested with their national interests and not those of the locals. This was a selfish policy. As long as the bigger picture of world 'peace' worked, it was justifiable. They failed to recognise the importance of regional harmony as an important aspect of maintaining world peace. Kagnew was very important to US during the Cold-War era because of the telecommunications and eavesdropping network directed against the Soviet Union.

The importance of Kagnew led the US to support Haile Sellasie's claim of Eritrea. They also supported the Ethiopians in their old age conflict with Somalia. It is this kind of behavioural attitude that led the U.S to support dictatorial regimes in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World countries. The horn of Africa suffered because of such behaviour on the part of US towards Somalia. The bureaucrats could be blamed for putting pressure on the defence department of African bureau to support the increase of military aid to Haile Selassie's regime. It is this support that made the national security bureaucracies to determine that the pan-Somali idea was not illegitimate. The whole idea was to maintain the Ethiopian territorial integrity. Despite Haile Selassie's supporters within the national security bureaucracies, the State
Department of Africa Bureau was able to expand the economic relationship with Somalia after 1964.

However, it was only after the 1974 Ethiopian revolution that US policy in the horn of Africa changed significantly. The White House got involved when the Soviets threatened Ethiopia and Mengistu turned pro-Soviet. The Kissinger - Ford government continued military aid. This was based on the theory of realism. Carter and Vance held an idealist world view on the other hand. They insisted on upgrading of human rights. However they did not depart from the foreign policy ideals. Both administrations wanted to prevent any regional crisis that would affect the state interests. This was consistent with foreign policy theory of realism despite the fact that they had differing world-views.

The shift was evident when there was a change in relationships that led to a break from US-Ethiopian security relations to US- Somalia military ties. This came during Carter’s administration which embraced globalism as a worldview. The US had just gone through the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The 1974-77 Ogaden crises helped in strengthening Carter’s global world-view as opposed to regional one favoured by Vance. The US continued to use the interventionist theory in both Somalia and Ethiopia in the 1980s and 1990s. This demonstrates the importance of the
relationship between US policy-making process and the events taking place in African continent. As long as there was no crisis especially after the Ogaden war, the US policy in the horn of Africa remained in the hands of the African specialists within the national security bureaucracies. The State Department’s Africa Bureau had to seek renewal of US ties with Africa. Once again what was once the White House most important client on the African continent was of no much use.

It is evident US – African relationship revolved around the realpolitik theory which forms the backbone of US foreign policy decisions. It also reveals the complexity of the process of decision making which would shift from time to time according to the type of issues at hand. This behaviour is well summarised by the story of the blind men and the elephant. Each man was convinced of what he touched as the true definition of the beast. The beast has many parts and is complex to see unless you have eyesight. The parts have different functions and interests. This is the case with decision-making, each department will respond to what it thinks is important, so when an issue does not seem so it is left out. Africa has suffered as a result of these inconsistencies during and after the Cold War.
In case of South Africa, the following statements tell the story. President Dwight D. Eisenhower in a statement to the South African Ambassador, November 15, 1954 said, “The good relations which so happily exist between our two countries are a source of the greatest satisfaction and encouragement to me, and I assure you that the traditional ties of friendship and understanding between us shall be strengthened to our mutual benefit.” It looks as if the relationship between the two nations was based on mutual benefits. It also seems as if the US foreign policy decision makers were willing to compromise the welfare of the blacks in South Africa for their economic and security benefits.

“I knew that I could never again raise my voice against the violence of the oppressed in the ghettos without having first spoken clearly to the greatest purveyor of vice in the world today - my own government.... Five years ago [the late John F. Kennedy] said, ‘Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable.’ Increasingly this is the role our country has taken. Martin Luther King, April 1967”.

Martin Luther King was convinced that US foreign policy decision-making body made it impossible for the President to make decision in South Africa.

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President Kennedy could see the future yet he could only prophesy about the future outcome because his hands were tied by Congress.

America supported the white tyrannical regime in the Cold-War era to keep status-quo. They feared that if the apartheid was dismantled it would cause a state of anarchy and Soviet Union would penetrate therefore affecting the balance of power.

Nelson Mandela had was quoted as saying: "The struggle is my life. I will continue fighting for freedom until the end of my days." Nelson Mandela, June 26, 1967. This expresses the desperate but determined state of most South Africans. The struggle for freedom was not important as long as the white government was in mutual agreement with that of America for mutual benefits. Once again the underlying theory was realpolitik. American national interests came before the freedom of the people. US domestic politics played a very important role in the formulation and implementation of US/Africa foreign policies.

South Africa was politically stable from 1948 to 1974. For US policymakers the stability was more important than the fight for freedom since the latter would

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destabilise this part of the continent. Both the White House and the Congress ignored the South African issues. During the Cold War, US foreign policy was directed by the state department, the Pentagon, and the CIA. They chose the US-South African cooperation. The shift in the Kennedy administration to voluntary arms embargo did not change much.

During the Cold War-era the bureaucratic missions did not make it easy for the political activist appointees to alter much in this relationship. The US interventionist method was used in times of crisis in most parts of Africa. One such time was in 1974 when the Portuguese attempted a coup d'etat. According to Sherida this threatened stability and caught the attention of the White House. Nixon and Ford administration then saw a colonial power opening the doorway for the Soviets' - Cuban intervention in Southern African region. The Ford administration increased their cooperation in terms of military and diplomatic aid in Angola and South Rhodesia. Once again we see the US interventionist practice rather than a long term solution which was typical of the realpolitik world view. After the crisis was over the White House left it to the routine missions -security bureaucracies that were independent from the president and the White House.

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67 Ibid p. 105
This shows that African issues were of no importance until they threatened the US interests at home or abroad. There only existed rhetoric of senior policymakers but a lot was left to be desired. US policy was more reactive or crisis oriented than pro-active seeking long term solutions to African issues. The 1976 Soweto revolt only increased politicisation of the issue of apartheid in the 70s and 80s. Occasionary there would be a shift in policy by individuals who would be hardly supported by the majority. One such attempt was when Crocker and Nixon quietly pursued a constructive engagement in communication. US policy never went beyond cooperation until the mid-80s when they passed the Comprehensive Anti-apartheid Act of 1986.

The unique thing about US-South African relationship is that the congress was not united about the extended crisis of South Africa. It was the public gradual realisation of the ills of apartheid that put pressure on their members of Congress to act. Congress imposed sanctions. However, once the situation calmed down, they went back to their tradition of doing nothing. This shows the policy of continuity and change in Cold War era. However after the Cold-War period the entire world put pressure on US to act because she was the supper power. There was a shift in policy but not in paradigm. Democracy became the policy but realism remained as the paradigm.

*Ibid p. 107*
US-Africa relationship was based on the US policy-makers' fear of the spread of communism and the idea that they should contain the perceived Soviet expansionism. This fear highly influenced the US interventionist practices on the African continent. The Truman administration had outlined two strategies of containment that were also applied to Africa, although in different forms.

Firstly, Africa was a solution to non-African problems. Africa was not important in her own right but was used to maintain the balance of power between the two super-powers namely America and the Soviet Union. African regimes were considered in terms of how important they were to the East-West framework. Ethiopia, Somalia and South Africa were dictatorial regimes, so was Zaire under Mobutu Sese Seko, but were of strategic importance to the US security within the East-West relations. It was therefore prudent to retain and maintain them for political gain. Somalia and Ethiopia acted as military points to solve Middles - East problems, while Zaire and South Africa served as bulwarks against communism. US became so pre-occupied with the East-West watch until they sacrificed the Africans by failing to check on these regimes. They created tyrants in most of these cases by allowing the leaders' to have excess power as long as they kept 'peace' which was a necessary ingredient for Americans to function in these regions. The US foreign policy makers were not
interested with internal issues in general. Africa suffered under these tyrants during the Cold - War because of suppression and lack of freedom to express the ills of the systems. The leaders exploited the opportunities and reaped the wealth off the nations while the citizens became impoverished.

The second strategy was to use Africa as a proxy battlefield in East-West conflict. When the super-powers got involved in regional conflicts, for example where the Soviet Union was involved, the US reaction would be to make it worse by supporting the offended side. During the Congolese crisis that followed its independence, the Soviet Union came to the aid of Lumumba after the US refusal. This caused US to authorise covert assassination of Lumumba because he turned to the Soviets for help. In other parts of Africa, US/ Africa cooperation was encouraged to contain Soviet influence on the continent. These reactions were responsible for direct involvement of troops from one country to the other therefore encouraging internal wars. The idea was to stand by the anti-communist regimes. In the Angolan civil war of 1975-76, the Soviet Cuban coalition got involved causing America to ally with South Africa and Zaire. What began as an internal conflict turned out to be a super-power war. Africa found itself apart of an international power political game even where it was not necessary.
US-Africa relations assumed two distinctive phases: Phase one, runs from the beginning of the 1960s when most of the west European colonies in black Africa were granted independence, to mid-1970s which marks the end of direct US bilateral interests in Africa. Phase Two, begins with US retreat from Africa in the mid-1970s to the Cold War by the end of the 1980s.69

Olewe Nyunya calls phase one the ‘misguided optimism’ where both US and Africa hoped for a peaceful transition from colonialism. America was ignorant of the colonial wiles and blindly hoped that independence would lead the post-colonial Africa to a path of democracy in terms of the western world. Africa was optimistic too and had great expectations after a long time of oppression. But as it turned out to be the Cold War drew more from them than was expected. The international relations of the European nations affected the US-Africa relations both positively and negatively. For example, US negotiated the issue of African independence with her European allies and African nationalists with minimal intervention, if at all. In short though America was anti-colonial and pro-democracy, she did not intervene where other international players were involved to keep international peace. America did not seek to understand Africa’s internal politics and dynamics. The lack of involvement in internal politics of African states shows that America was not really interested in Africa. She only got involved where her interests were affected.

69 J. D. Olewe Nyunya, ‘Towards Understanding US-Africa Relations During the Cold War Era’ in ————, pg 180
An example given by Dr. Nyunya is seen in Ethiopia where the Soviets were kept out for strategic military reasons. Likewise they kept the Soviets out of the Congo for strategic raw materials (notably cobalt and copper). In Ethiopia, America maintained the dictatorial Emperor Haile Selassie due to strategic military motives. America had a military base at Kagnew with an Air Force Base and American employees, a NASA observation centre, and a marine research centre. Ethiopia also received military support of 60% from America. By doing so they assisted the emperor to suppress the majority of the Ethiopians all in the name of American interests.

In case of the Congo the situation was more complex because there were different political leaders who did not agree. The US policy was to maintaining 'peace' so as to contain the Soviet Union. To achieve this goal, the CIA organised the assassination of Patrice Lumumba because he was seen as a trouble maker. Since this time the DRC politics have remained unstable and up until today there has been bloodshed upon bloodshed. The superpowers contained the situation by a peaceful coexistence.

In the mid-1960s to mid-1970s the US policy was known as a policy of 'neglect'. The US depended on the NATO allies to keep the affairs of Africa.
She had no diplomatic strategies and this led to crisis in several regions in Africa. Two such major crises were the Rhodesian crisis that led to unilateral declaration of independence, and the Nigerian or Biafran war. The US neglect in the African affairs was hypocritical in nature because she hid behind Britain. She did more harm by doing so than by getting involved. As a matter of fact US still controlled Britain. This showed the nature of US policy in Africa as that of total neglect.

The second phase according to Dr. Nyunya, was between 1975-1990 when America decided to retreat from the affairs of Africa. This began in the 60s as a gradual and consistent process. It involved the economic and military aid. It can be safely concluded that the US-Africa relations was never a permanent one rather it was a relationship based on convenience. To summarise it in the words of Dr. Nyunya,

"The experience of the last thirty years [referring period from 1960 to 1990] with regard to US-Africa relations has many revealing lessons, especially for the minor actor in the game. It has been demonstrated that United States was not interested in black Africa for any moral, humanistic or economic reasons during the Cold War era, but was basically concerned with her own geographical (economic, political and military) global hegemonic designs." He
continues to say, “US global strategy, dictated by the logic of the Cold War, was to counter the Soviets anywhere in Africa, especially by eliminating targets of opportunity that could give Soviet Union leverage.”

From the above summary it can be construed that US-Africa relations were based on selfish motives. It was to use Africa for the good of America, but not to burden American tax payers with any extra baggage. Dr. Nyunya concludes that Africa became the victim of US Cold War activities aimed at Soviet Union rather than Africa itself. Just like two parents fighting, it is the children who get to suffer as a result of that hostility. Africa suffered because she was a minor actor in the international politics.

US-Africa relations can not therefore be explained in one paradigm. There are several competing theories some of which overlap while others alternate. The realist-mercantilist theory, and the dependency theory compete when it comes to US-Africa relations. The first theory dictates that United States concentrate in areas that are of strategic interests to the States. In case of the DRC the mineral resources were of major economic interest. In the second theory US-Africa relations is one of dominance-dependence relations where Africa’s raw material is exploited for the benefit of United States. The third theory,

71 Ibid 188
according to Dr. Nyunya, is the Marxist theory that offers an alternative explanation.

4.1 Introduction

Location

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), formerly called Zaire, is located in the Central Africa, southeast of Angola. Its geographic coordinates are 0 00 4.25.00 E. It has an area of 2,345,410 km² in total, which comprises of a land area of 2,267,760 km² and 77,650.44 km² of water. DRC is slightly less than one-fourth the size of the United States of America. It has a coastline of 3.7 km.

The land boundaries total 10,764 km, to the south is Angola 2,511 km, Zambia 1,860 km, to the east is Tanzania 473 km, Burundi 231 km, Rwanda 217 km, and Uganda 383 km. To the north, east is Sudan 628 km. To the south is Central African Republic 1,577 km, and to the east is Republic of the Congo 2,840 km.

Climate

DRC has a tropical climate. It is hot and humid in equatorial river basins, cooler and drier in uplands, highlands, and cooler and wetter in eastern highlands.
CHAPTER FOUR

U.S. Foreign Policy towards DRC

4.1 Introduction

Location

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC; formerly called Zaire) is located in the Central Africa, northeast of Angola. Its Geographic coordinates are 0 00 N, 25 00 E. It has an area of 2,345.410 sq km in total which comprises of a land mass of 2,267.600 sq km and 77.810 sq km of water. DRC is slightly less than one-fourth the size of the United States of America. It has a coastline of 37 km. The land boundaries total 10,744 km. to the south is Angola 2,511 km. Zambia 1,930 km. To the east is Tanzania 473 km. Burundi 233 km. Rwanda 217 km and Uganda 765 km. To the north east is Sudan 628 km. To the north is Central African Republic 1,577 km and to the east is Republic of the Congo 2,410 km\(^2\).

Climate

DRC has a tropical climate. It is hot and humid in equatorial river basin. cooler and drier in southern highlands and cooler and wetter in eastern highlands.

\(^{72}\) cia.gov/cia/publications/factobook/geos/cg.html pg 1
North of Equator the wet season is between April to October, the dry season between December to February. South of equator the wet season is between November and March while the wet season falls between April and October.\(^{73}\)

**Resources**

DRC is a vast central basin in form of a low-lying plateau with mountains to the east. Its lowest point is the Atlantic Ocean with 0 metres. The highest point is Pic Marguerite on Mont Ngaliema (Mount Stanley) 5,110m. The country is known for its rich mineral resources which include cobalt, copper, cadmium, petroleum, industrial and gem diamonds, gold, silver, zinc, manganese, tin, germanium, uranium, radium, bauxite, iron ore, coal, hydropower and timber. According to 1993\(^{74}\) estimates the arable land is 3% while 77% is forests and woodland. There are no permanent crops but there are permanent pastures of 7%. The remaining 13% is for other activities. There are periodic draughts in the south and volcanic activities. This coupled with the fact that only 100 sq km of land is irrigated threatens the very livelihood of the people in the DRC.

\(^{73}\) Ibid pg 2
\(^{74}\) Ibid pg 2
Population

The population of the DRC was 53,624,718 by July 2001\(^7\). The estimates took into account the effects of excess mortality due to AIDS. Population growth rate as per 2001 was 3.1% with a birth rate of 46.02 births/1,000 populations and a death rate of 15.15 deaths/1,000 population. The net migration rate was reported to be 0.14 migrants/1,000 population in the same year. Life mortality at birth was reported to be 99.88 deaths/1,000 live births.

Ethnic Groups

There are over 200 African ethnic groups of which the majority are Bantu. The four largest tribes are the Mongo, Luba, Kongo (all Bantu), and the Mangbetu-Azande (Hanitic) make up about 45% of the population. The major religion is Christianity composed of 50% Roman Catholics and 20% Protestants. Islam takes 10% of the population while Kimbanguist takes 10%. The other 10% is taken up by syncretic sects and indigenous beliefs. French is the official language Other languages are Lingala (a lingua franca trade language), Kingwana (a dialect of Kswahili), Kikongo and Tshiluba.

\(^7\) Ibid pg 3
4.2 Colonial History

Belgium colonised the Congo basin by 1885 under Leopold II and continued to rule over her until 1960 when she got her independence. Belgium was a newly-formed European country at a time when European colonial powers were scrambling for Africa. According to Colin Blane, Leopold II outfoxed his European competitors, pretending to set up an international society to supervise the Congo basin, before taking it over as his own private holding. Colin continues to say that Leopold wanted the Congo as a source of both raw materials and labour to develop his country. Leopold is said to have been both ruthless and exploitative to the Congo people. He ruled over Congo for twenty years. During these years Leopold's agents are said to have used forced labour to harvest rubber. Rubber was grown in Congo and was a highly sought after commodity at the time. Besides forced labour the people of Congo were forced to pay rubber-tax failure to which they were punished. The worst of the atrocities was the severing of hands from labourers. These hands were taken to Belgium to prove to Leopold that the labourers did their work.

According to Colin, Belgium prospered from its connection with Congo on one hand while on the other Congo suffered economic and social exploitation. He attributes the development of the city of Brussels to the wealth got from the
proceeds of rubber, timber and ivory. Leopold is also said to have accumulated enormous personal wealth from Congo. He never once visited Congo but his rule destroyed the country and left an estimated three million dead. His reign of terror broke down traditional communities and created a long-lasting pattern of plunder. On the contrary, in Brussels, Leopold left monuments and buildings. Nearly a century later, President Mobutu inherited Leopold's methods of rule and continued to plunder Congo.

Nationalist Awakening

From as early as 1895 the Congolese began to resist the Belgian rule through countless uprisings. Some of them were instigated by local chiefs such as the Babua uprising in 1903, 1904, and 1910. The Budja uprising in 1903 and 1905, the mutinies of the Force Publique in 1895 and 1897. Besides these resistance movements there were various independent African religious movements that flourished in 1920s and 1930s. Simon Kmbangu founded a church in 1921. He upheld a vision of spiritual salvation that attracted many people in among the Bakongo. The Kitawala religious movement conveyed the same message in Katanga in 1920s. The Belgians perceived these movements as threats. They repressed the activities of the groups and exiled the members. These early uprising spearheaded the ethnic nationalism in the 1950s.

78 Colin Blanc, Brussels.
The Rise of Political Ethnic Parties

Joseph Kasavubu led a cultural association known as Abako in 1956 which issued a manifesto calling for immediate independence. This movement was based on the lower Congo region, the homeland of the Kongo tribe. Abako became a major vehicle of anti-colonial protest. In 1957 elections, the party won 133 seats out of 170 in the city. Its sections proliferated in the countryside beyond government control. In January 4, 1959, there was a confrontation between the government and Abako supporters which left the government with no choice but to formally recognize independence as the ultimate goal of its policies. Kasavumbu had inspired other tribal groups to demand ultimate independence. As a result, Kongo people faced conflict in Leopoldville with Lingala-speaking group. This ethno-regionalism became a major trial of strength between these forces setting a base for future conflicts. The European settlers in Katanga region presented another challenge to the struggle for independence. They had formed a settler organisation in 1944 known as Union pour la Colonisation du Katanga (Ucol-Katanga) for the purpose of protecting their interests. However when they realised they could not stop the move for

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77 Ibid pg 3
78 pg 4
independence they chose to collaborate with Africans who opposed centralised government\textsuperscript{79}.

**Katanga Settlers**

Moise Tsombe led the Confederation des Associations du Katanga (Conakat). This group felt they were the authentic Katangalese and because they resented non-Katangalese presence in this region, they worked in collaboration with the settlers. Their supporters came from the Lunda and Yeke people from southern Katanga. They resented the Luba immigrants from Kasai and from northern Katanga who had come to work in the mining centres. The situation became more complex because the Luba people were not united. Those from the north had their own political organisation the Association des Baluba du Katanga (Balubakat) led by Jason Sendwe. The Luba from Kasai joined the Federation Kasaienne (Fedeka). This division came as a result of the MNC activities in Kasian region. MNC had split into two one led by Lumumba and the other one by Kalonji. The Lumumba group identified itself with Lulua people while the Kalonji one was for the Luba people. When Balubakat joined the Lumumba branch, it made it hard for Fedeka to join Balubakat. This weakened the Luba as a tribe giving Conakat a political advantage led by Tshombe.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid pg. 6
Patrice Lumumba's MNC won the national legislative elections in May 1960. The result of this victory was an increasingly close partnership between the European settlers and Conakat on one hand. On the other hand the relationship between Conakat and Balubakat became protracted. The provincial elections gave Conakat twenty five seats while Balubakat got twenty two seats. Balubakat appealed the results but the Belgian magistrates rejected the appeal. Despite all these conflicts Conakat won and Tshombe formally declared Katanga an independent state to the advantage of the settlers. The conflict did not end here. Several conferences were held to have a united Congo but Tshombe opposed the plan.

**ADoula Government 1961-1964**

However when Adoula was unanimously elected prime minister, on August 2 by deputies from all provinces including Katanga and south Kasai, it brought an end to constitutional crisis about Katanga. Resistance however continued until January 1961 after a violent showdown with UN forces who remained on the ground until 1964 when they were withdrawn. Adoula split the six provinces into twenty one administrative provincettes. This move merely shifted the focus of ethnic conflict to a smaller arena. In 1964 the country was changed to Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). By this time the provincettes were in a state of semi-anarchy and three had fallen to the hands of
rebel forces\textsuperscript{80}. This had set the stage for yet another conflict between the central government and dissident forces.

**Rise of Rural Insurgencies**

According to Hermann Kinder\textsuperscript{81} insurgency spread to all the provincettes from January to August 1964. Some of the reasons he gives are, neglect of rural sectors, disparities of wealth and privilege between elites and peasant masses, inefficient and corrupt government. The government had failed to deliver their promises but when parliament was dissolved in September 1963 it took away the only tool of political participation. The withdrawal of the UN forces by June 30, 1964 left the government helpless. As a result some deputies joined Lumumba and moved to Brazzaville the former French Congo where they formed a liberation party known as Conseil National de liberation (CNL). This became the major party in the eastern rebellion. Pierre Mulele joined Antoine Gizenga in Kwilu area in July 1963. A key revolutionary Mulele went to Eastern Europe where he received guerrilla warfare. Upon his return he recruited a force among his tribe the Mbunda as well as among Gizenga’s kinsmen the Pende.

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid pg 8
In January 1964 this group attacked the government outposts, mission stations, and company installations. The Kwilu rebellion had begun and although the troops were sent to stop it, the rebellion did not end until December 1965. The leader of this eastern rebellion was Gaston Soumialot, who in January 1964, was sent to Burundi by CNL. He recruited a force in Burundi of Tutsi exiles in exile from Rwanda. This he did with the full support of the Burundi government. This rebel movement swept and terrorised Congo from eastern region killing thousands of Congolese. These included government officials, political leaders in opposition parties and local police, school teachers, and all believed to be westernised. The rebels took over but they lacked adequate leadership. They were unable to establish an alternative system of government to the one they had destroyed. They too failed. The European mercenaries also contributed to this fall by trying to re-establish central government.

In July 1964 Tshombe was recalled from exile and replaced Adoula as prime minister. He got help from Katangan gendarmes who were recalled from Angola and from white mercenaries to fight the rebel forces. Supported by air strikes Tshombe was able to recapture rebel strongholds. The rebels retaliated by holding hostage some local European residents as hostage. At this point the Belgians and Americans came together in a joint parachute rescue operation in Stanleyville. The Belgo-American operation defeated the rebels but it also
damaged Tshombe’s popularity within the Congo. He antagonized his President (Kasavumbu) and army general (Mobutu).

**Mobutu Take Over**

Tshombe and Kasavumbu’s friction became worse during the legislative elections in the spring of 1965. Tshombe was determined to seize the presidency from Kasavumbu and to do so he organised a new party Confederation Nationale des Associations Congolaises (Conaco). Although Conaco won Kasavumbu appointed Evariste Kimba, a leading figure in the anti-Tshombe forces, as a prime minister-designate. This act threatened the government machinery paving the way for military take over. On November 25, 1965 Mobutu Sese Seko took over the government as chief of state and Colonel Leonard Mulamba became the prime minister. Mobutu dominated the political life of Zaire for three decades as dictator.

**4.3 The US Foreign Policy**

The US foreign policy towards Africa was based on realpolitik. They used Africa for their own security and material gains. According to Marc Mealy,\(^2\)

the history of the US - African relations has not always been beneficial to
African societies due to asymmetries of power and subjective applications of
principles and values. He says that principles were relegated to the back burner
when U.S interests were conceptualised in ways that placed those interests
above or at the expense of the political, social, and economic security interests
of African societies. USSR was the major threat to the U.S interests in Africa in
the Cold War era. To restrain the USSR, the U.S sacrificed democracy, peace
and development at the expense of keeping dictators in power in Africa in the
Cold War era. Violence was applied where it was necessary, to keep USSR
away like in the case of Belgo-American parachute rescue. The Americans went
to help the Belgians settle the crisis by suppressing the eastern rebellion. This
was not at the interests of Africans. If America didn’t step in the USSR could
have. Marc Mealy points out that relationships should be based on the
underlying principles and values in the relationship building between U.S and
Africa because they are the key determinants of how relations impact the
societies concerned.

The principle underlying the US/ Africa relations was based on pursuing U
national security and global strategic interests in every bilateral and multilateral
relationship. Mealy says that US could utilise any instrument of foreign policy
to pursue this including supporting a dictator like Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire. It is therefore difficult to assess the relations without the underlying principle.\textsuperscript{83}

The Euro-Centric Approach

In the 1960s the US./ Zairean relationship was based on appeasing Belgium. This is evidenced by the decision not to post African-Americans to the country out of fear. According to Schraeder, \textsuperscript{84} firstly, African Americans were not allowed to work in Zaire so as not to upset the Belgian racial concerns. They were a threat to ‘peace’ because they could influence the Zaireans to demand for their independence. The second principle was based on keeping a distance from Zairians by the Western consulates. The US consulates relied on Belgian intelligence sources. The US gave limited technical aid just to supplement Belgian priorities. Lastly it was the duty of Belgians to make the list of guests from Zaire who would visit Washington. The relationship was based on Euro-centric approach. Washington wanted a smooth transition to independence that would be pro-western. This would pave the way to a good relationship when time came for US to enter in. This is summarised by the following quote: “The independence of the Republic of the Congo is a source of deep satisfaction to the United States, especially since this freedom was achieved in friendly

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid
cooperation with Belgium. The Government and the people of the United States look forward to close and friendly relations with the Government and people of the Republic of the Congo.”

The above world-view was to shape US/Zairean relations for some time. In attempting to keep off from Zairian internal affairs the US ended up supporting Mobutu, a dictator who ruined the country. There followed crisis after crisis and arguments arose in White House as to how to alter the US/Africa policies. There arose a conflict between domestic and foreign policy. The question was should US intervene in Zairian domestic policy or maintain its stand on foreign policy even in times of crisis? To maintain a diplomatic approach it was necessary to address both the foreign and domestic affairs of a country.

The US Attitude towards DRC

The US depended on Belgium’s historic colonial role and apparent willingness to maintain order. The White House remained inattentive to the disturbances in Zaire and that postponed the fashioning of a proper US policy response to the

85 Ibid, pg 53.
ensuing crisis. United States was therefore shocked when the Force Publique mutinied against Belgian solders in 1960 five days after independence. Belgian intervention made a bad situation worse. Katanga region declared independence and the diamond rich province of South Kasai followed suit. The worst blow for the US is when Lumumba and Kasavubu made direct appeals to the UN for troops to protect them against Belgium. The State Department responded by creating a multilateral UN military force. This force precluded the involvement of contingents of either the US, the Soviet Union, and the major Eastern and western bloc powers. This was meant not only to control the Soviets but also to defuse the growing conflict between Belgium and Zaire. In the words of Clare T. Timberlake, the US Ambassador to Zaire;

“This would keep bears out of the Congo caviar. I assume most Americans have not yet developed a taste for it either.”

The US Foreign Policy Design

The US foreign policy towards DRC was based on continuity and change. Lack of commitment on the part of the US to this region partly led to the state of affairs where DRC became vulnerable to many foes. By not setting long term goals in their foreign stand in this region the US exposed DRC to political foes.

86 Ibid pg 54
In the end the DRC was not only faced by foreign foes but by African bears that smelled the ‘Congo caviar’ as Clare Timberlake put it above. The first bear was given the key to devour the caviar by the American government in the name of Mobutu Sese Seko. By supporting a dictator, the American foreign policy induced economic deprivation, poverty and corruption that made the looming crises worse. Even after the dictator was ousted the Americans did not take up the responsibility of reading into the Zairian political situation. The battle continues to range in the waters of this central African region.

Post-Independence Crisis

At independence US foreign policy was to keep off Belgium domain but to use their good offices to control Zaire. But Patrice Lumumba threatened to seek Soviet help if the UN contingent did not force Belgium to withdraw from Zaire. By doing so he threatened to break diplomatic relations with Belgium and that would threaten 'peace'. Lumumba could not be trusted by the State Department to rule Zaire. This would negatively affect the interests of Americans. Suggestions were made to remove Lumumba by the State Department's European Bureau and the US Embassy in Brussels to appease Belgium. Lumumba was seen as another Castro to be and his removal was discussed to

87 Ibid pg 54
keep diplomacy with Belgium. It is evident that all the US foreign policy decisions were focused on European diplomacy not for the good of Zaire. Lumumba lost favour from the US because he was seen to be a radical and impossible to deal with. The worst came when the young Prime Minister broke up with the UN Secretary- General Dag Hammarskjold on August 14 over the Shaba issue. By calling for the withdrawal of all white UN troops from Zaire, Lumumba proved a threat rather than a help to the whole European community. He had to go. US had to look for someone who could help them serve their interests without upsetting the balance of power. Lumumba’s reason to withdraw the white troops was justified in that the UN secretary had refused to use the military to help him defeat the Shaba secession. However to the US this was not beneficial enough for them to take a commitment like that. This is yet another prove that the relationship between the Americans and Zaire was based on the principle of realism which placed America’s interests before those of the Zairians. Lumumba actually threatened these interests when the Soviets sent help in terms of technicians, material and transport planes. This caused Eisenhower government to fear a more direct Soviet intervention and it called for action. The solution was to remove the Prime Minister. Eisenhower could no longer hold on to his neutral ideological beliefs. The act of removing Lumumba re-activated the crisis that had hardly settled after independence.
Diplomacy Compromised

After the removal of Lumumba and his eventual assassination a military rule was preferred to a civilian one. The CIA argued that it was not possible to attain stability through a civilian government. Instead it was best to use a wholehearted military rule led by Mobutu. It was either complete loyalty to US government or none. However this did not stabilise the government in Zaire. The pro-Lumumba elements, led by the deputy Prime minister Antoine Gizenga, threatened the Mobutu government by establishing an alternative government in Stanleyville (the present Kisangani). This was the stronghold for Lumumbaists. The crisis continued. There was a shift in the US foreign policy from a diplomatic approach of a civilian government to a military government led by and controlled by a ‘traitor’ of the state. This caused even a worse crisis.

The Kennedy administration did not change much in terms of radical nationalists who were linked to the Soviets or seemed to have strong relationship with them. The CIA was still involved in “king Making” process in Zaire even after independence. US dollars were used to buy the Zairian votes to support Mobutu against Gizengists. This knowledge reveals that the US foreign policy was manipulative to an extent of using corruption to keep their interests intact. This behaviour shows the extent to which the US was willing to go in interfering with domestic policy in order to sustain the state interests. The
justification was based on counterinsurgency. The US was willing to compromise the Shaba issue of secession to please the Belgians and this stirred up conflict among the African radicals who were unwilling to co-operate with Europeans.

The coalition government was established to keep check on the radicals. Gizenga was threatened by the Shaba issue and feared that if Belgium succeeded to support Tshombe in Shaba other provinces would also follow suite and break away. The US policy was to please all parties for the sake of stability and especially the Belgians. In the words of Schraeder:

"As long as there was a chance that the dispute between the Adoula-Kasavubu government and Tshombe could be resolved peacefully, the White House would not implement a controversial new initiative that clearly went against Belgian wishes and, most important, ran the risk of alienating a conservative coalition in Congress whose support was crucial to other presidential initiatives".

The above statement shows the attitude of US foreign policy decision makers. There was no hurry for changing policies where there was no conflict. It is this kind of thinking which made it impossible to come up with long lasting solutions in the relationship between US and Zaire. This attitude has not proved
useful in terms of alleviating the crisis in the DRC. It is a sign of short-term response to a crisis that did not attempt to resolve the age-old conflict. The US policy changed as need arose to keep their interests protected even to the detriment of compromising the African interests in the DRC. This explains why the US supported dictator Mobutu survived for three decades.

The coalition government broke up when Adoula-Kasavumbu attacked Tshombe in Shaba region when pressured by radicals to end the secession and Gizenga returned to Kisangani. This led to a threat of war and a Soviet takeover.

**From Diplomacy to Force**

The Kennedy administration was convinced of a need to use more military force as opposed to diplomacy and we again see a shift in policy. The US took up an activist policy and the UN went to war with Tshome's forces. However this stand did not last long as Kennedy yielded to pressure at home and in Europe. Once again to please the public he did not stand for African interests. It is not difficult to see the pattern of the foreign policy in the DRC. In times when there was no crisis, the US used diplomacy while in times of crisis the policy would change to even using force. It can therefore be said to be inconsistent. It was however consistent on one thing, it was counterinsurgent in
nature. As long as there was a sign of rebellion the policy would be geared to stopping it. The methods differed but the focus remained the same.

The US foreign policy in Zaire was prompted by the events that occurred from time to time. This for sure did not bring out the best of the policies because the State Department for African Affairs did not succeed in analysing the real issues that needed to be addressed. A policy born out of a crisis does not provide a good foundation upon which to fall when the 'chips' go down as the saying goes. Built on shaky ground, the policy was not able to sustain the coalition government when the wind blew from the east in this case Kisangani.

It can be deduced that the nature of the American foreign policy in Zaire contributed to the ensuing crisis in the DRC because it evolved as the events unfolded. There is therefore a relationship between the nature of events and the operation of the policy making process. For example during the Tshombe issue, the US showed clearly that they were not ready to make a controversial policy which would displease the Belgian government as long as Aduola-Kasavumbu government were willing to make peace with Tshombe. The focus was always stability not a long term solution. Even in such a volatile situation the US government was willing to wait and see how far that could hold. This kind of mentality would later lead the country to yet another crisis that would
be sorted out as events unfolded. As long as the events did not threaten the Soviet invasion of Zaire the status quo would be a good option. But as it proved in this case the UN was employed to expel mercenaries in Shamba (Kishngani) and war was used as a foreign policy measure out of necessity. The effect of this move was opposition by the European allies and domestic critics that led to change in policy.

From Force to Diplomacy

A shift of gear from use of force to use of diplomacy was prudent. The cost of losing her allies in Europe and at home was not worth the sacrifice of resolving the Shamba crisis. Once again we see the US interests taking an upper hand in the making of their foreign policy. Such erratic move was not useful to a country whose independence and peace was at stake. Zaire needed a committed policy that would protect her domestic interests for growth purposes. The events turned when it was realised that Aduola was about to fall. This threatened the Soviet re-entry in Zairian affairs. The result of this would be to lose the region. Once more the policy changed to that of coercive measures in order to avoid a major disaster in Zaire. Again the events dictated the shift of policy from diplomacy to harsher method of coercion. The Belgian Foreign Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, supported this policy when he offered to support the UN in Shaba. UN Secretary General U-Thant was prepared for a military
showdown with Tshombe. At this point Tshombe was no longer useful to the maintenance of stability and had to go. Pressure was applied on Tshombe and he finally let go of Shamba.

**Diplomacy to Armed Forces**

The next policy that was made was to maintain peace internally by training the Zairian Armed Forces by the Western nations. Six of them took lead in what they called the "Green Pla". This plan was to win the UN cooperation and to exclude the Soviet bloc in any future involvement with this region. They wanted to keep a pro-Western regime in power. This was an attempt to contain Soviet Union. This was the first time that Washington showed they were in control of the Zairian affairs by assuming a responsibility for continue stability of Zaire by training Zairian soldiers.

**Dictatorship**

Another unique element in this policy was that the US Defence Department became closely involved in keeping the integrity of future Zairian regimes. This paved way for dictatorship policy in Zaire. Diplomacy and military methods had failed and it was time to tighten the bolts in this Central African region that meant so much to the white race. America could no longer become indifferent to what was happening to Zaire. She took a direct stand and
involvement applying diplomacy, military force, coercion and dictatorship through the personality of Mobutu Sese Seko. By using a local dictator who was pro-Western the US government would pass on the responsibility to the Zairian people and at the same time benefit from this partnership. The US government would help Mobutu sustain power as long as he delivered the goods. It was this indirect engagement in a cruel and inhuman rule that the US government led Zaire to the present state of affairs. Corruption, poverty, crime, deprivation, economic depravity and human rights violations are some of the many conditions that ail the Republic even today. The CIA favoured a military strongman who was able to hold the 'pieces' together to an African coalition government whose chances of collapse were obvious.

In May 1963 Mobutu's visit to Washington made it known that he was US's choice to carry this role because he was treated as a head of state as is indicated in an internal memorandum from the Pentagon to the White house. "Although it appears General Mobutu would like to remain apart from politics, his stature and position as commander-in-chief of the army are not likely to allow him to do so. Mobutu's army either as a whole or in part would of necessity be involved in any violent changes in the composition of the Zairian government."

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In a private conversation with President Kennedy on May 31, 1963 Kennedy had the following to say to Mobutu: "General, if it hadn't been for you, the whole thing would have collapsed and the communists would have taken over."89

The above conversations reveal that Mobutu was working for Washington behind the scenes and that he had impressed the president. It also tells us that Mobutu had actually not been able to keep off from the super-power politics as it looks from the first memorandum. By inference it could be said to be a betrayal to his people whom he was going to be in charge of. Was Mobutu going to work for Zairians or for Washington? Or was he going to be a compromise? According to the above conversations, Mobutu had secret arrangements with Washington. He went to Washington four months after Tshombe's forces were defeated which meant he was being groomed as an alternative to the coalition government.

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Military Rule

The choice of a military general could only have meant that the preferred foreign policy was military rule for containment of the Soviet Union. Once again the turn of events on the Zairian soil dictated the foreign policy making process. A threat of a possible fall of the coalition government and a Soviet intervention led both Belgian and US national security bureaucracies favour a military option as a solution to Zairian problem. However as history has it, this did not bring stability in the country, the search for stability continued. The period between 1960 and 1967 was one of turbulence with recurring crisis. The American presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson were busy in the policy making and policy after policy evolved according to the nature of events.

Lack of Involvement

However, after 1967 there were no crisis and the presidency of United States withdrew from the policymaking process and drifted to other areas of concern. This pattern of US foreign policy making left a vacuum that was soon filled by Mobutu Sese Seko as the White House's attention was diverted elsewhere. It was this lack of attention that built Mobutu as he understood the White House behaviour and capitalised in it. He made sure that he suppressed any possible crisis before it blew up to keep the Americans out of the way. He used the rule of terror and kept the country out of "control" as he knew that was the desire of
the Americans. In this way the US foreign policy of military force assisted in
the creation of the deteriorating condition that was to follow for the next three
decades as Mobutu reigned in Zaire.

4.4 Mobutu’s era

After 1965 Mobutu dominated the political life of Zaire. He earned himself the
title of “Father of the Nation.” He also gave the nation the name Zaire and
made many changes from time to time in terms of political structures and
processes. Besides being a military general, Mobutu was a charismatic leader
who had a vision for himself. Mobutu came from a humble background and
from a small ethnic group in the north known as the Ngbandi. It borders the
Central African Republic. His father was a cook for a colonial magistrate. He
had an uncle who was a worrier as well as a diviner from the village of
Gbadolite.90 His name was Sese Seko Nkuku wa za Banga, meaning “all
conquering warrior, who goes from triumph to triumph.” Mobutu’s official
names were Joseph-Desire Mobutu but culturally he was named after his uncle.
In one of those episodes of change that Mobutu made he forced all Zairians to
adopt their authentic names and he too changed his to adopt his uncle’s names.
This was known as the era of ‘authenticity’. He dropped his official name to

Mobutu Sese seko Nkuku wa za Banga. Names have a great deal of influence especially in Africa where they are attached to a certain meaning.

Mobutu began his worrier like behaviour while in school. He attended a catholic mission school where he frequently argued with them and at age nineteen he was expelled. He later entered a seven-year disciplinary conscription into the Force Publique. These seven years prepared him for the take over of a nation that had no law and order. The military shaped his career. He did so well that he earned himself a white colour job. In 1950 he was sent to the school of the non commissioned officers where he met many military men who were to take control of the army after the flight of the Belgians in 1960. Mobutu had the advantage of another language - French - and by the time he left in 1956 he had risen to the rank of sergeant-major which was the highest a Congolese could rise to.

**Rise to power**

Mobutu rose to power first as Lumumba's choice of chief of staff in May 1960 after the military mutinied against its Belgian officers. He began to amass power around himself by building his national army at this vulnerable time. He made forces to be loyal to him by channelling foreign aid to units loyal to him
and by exiling those unreliable units to remote areas. He also absorbed or dispersed rival armies. He controlled individual officers by giving promotions and by the amounts of moneys that they were paid. Mobutu took control even over the older army men and nobody could stop him. Mobutu was also an opportunist. When Kasavumbu and Lumumba were in a conflict, Mobutu staged his first coup on September 14. He established an interim government on his own but behind the scene was the United States. The government was composed of university students and graduates (from the college of Commissioners) who replaced parliament for six months in 1960-61.

In 1965 Mobutu seized power for the second time when the division of power became an issue between the prime minister and the president. He had seized power in 1960 under similar conditions. In each of these times the country’s stability was threatened. Once again he seized power with the help of the United States who operated in the background. However this time Mobutu assumed the presidency rather than use the College of Commissioners. Another curious aspect of Mobutu is the ‘Binza Group’ who held the real power for four years between 1960 and 1965. These were Mobutu’s supporters from the rich suburbs. They maintained the weak civilian governments as they rose and fell.
It is clear that the US foreign policy since independence was shaped with Mobutu in mind. He was a capable army general whom the US presidents turned to wherever there was a crisis. Mobutu was a true friend of America as the saying goes, for a long time. He remained in the background but he had his invisible hand in the governments of Congo. He was waiting for the opportune time to take over and his master, the United States, blew the whistle for entry. The time was 1965. From that day on the history of Congo was shaped by Mobutu at the forefront and United States at the background. Stability was the key issue in US foreign policy towards Congo. Mobutu kept that stability. The method of keeping this stability was not addressed and hence Congo became a good soil for dictatorship and chaos.

**Mobutuism**

Mobutu set up a culture that came to be known as Mubutuism. Between 1965 and 1967 Mobutuists set out to establish its authority by gradually dismantling the institutions of the First republic and at the same time bringing about a substantial measure of centralisation around the president. Parliament was reduced to a mere ritual because decisions were taken through executive decrees known as ‘ordinances-loi.’ Political parties were dissolved and political activities banned. By 1966 Mobutu had centralised power. He dismantled the powers of ‘provincettes’ first by keeping the numbers low from
twenty-one to twelve and later to eight. They directly reported to the central
government and their assemblies were only to be consultative rather than
legislative bodies. 91 Lastly Mobutuism eliminated the office of the prime
minister in October 1966. He suppressed the opposition from Tshombe by
absorbing them into the state through several patronage operations. By using
his craftiness and subtle methods Mobutu was able to silence the beast that
once had been aroused to terrorise the world. But how far did he maintain the
silence? This remains the interesting question as we watch the unfolding events
of the Congo basin. Pockets of threats remained that challenged the regime but
were confronted with harsh treatment. Some of the conspirators were hanged
publicly to warn any further insurgents to the regime.

Constitution

By 1967 Mobutu had consolidated his rule and given his country a new
constitution and a single party. The majority of Congolese approved it. The
following was provided in the constitution,

"—the executive powers be centralised in the president, who was head of
state, head of government, commander in chief of the armed forces and the

91 Ibid
police, and in charge of foreign policy. The president was to appoint and
dismiss cabinet members and determine their areas of responsibility. The
ministers, as heads of their respective departments, were to execute the
programs and decisions of the president. The president was also to have the
power to appoint and dismiss the governors of the provinces and the judges of
all courts, including those of the Supreme Court of Justice.

N'Sele Manifesto

Mobutuism had succeeded in building a dictatorship that was in contradiction
with the democracy in America. The two contradicting views reflected the
extent to which US foreign policy would allow to maintain 'stability' but was
this real stability? With Mobutuism came the founding doctrines of Congo that
were to have a long lasting effect. This was done in form of a manifesto that
was issued from the president's rural home and named after it, the N'Sele. The
major themes were nationalism, revolution, and authenticity. Nationalism
implied economic independence, revolution described the repudiation of both
capitalism and communism. Congo was not to look either right or left.
Authenticity was here used to mean being conscious of one's own personality
and one's own values and feeling good in one's culture. These last two became
pronounced slogans in the Congo. In line with authenticity, Congo changed its
name to Zaire in October 1971. Many other names changed after this to reflect
the doctrine of a new foundation. These are the foundation stones that Mobutu built upon for three decades in the Cold War era.

While Mobutu was busy establishing his domain, the white house’s attention was slowly drifting away from the US-Zairian special relationship. This moving away to other more pressing areas helped Mobutu to entrench himself. But why did America leave the politics of Congo at such a vulnerable moment without much guidance? The only possibility could be because there was no crisis because Mobutu had silenced the people with his iron rod.

A Shift in US Foreign Policy

The presidential involvement, which was part of policy-making process in times of crisis, was withdrawn. The White House went back to the traditional way of deferring African issues to the Africa specialists within the state department, the pentagon and the CIA. There was an increase in bureaucracy and a consensus was arrived that the alternative to dictatorship was chaos and communist expansion. Mobutu was a good compromise and was to be given the necessary support as long as he was able to hold the country together. Mobutu was given the largest US Military Assistance Advisory Mission in Africa and two military attaches. By doing this US acknowledged the harsh rule by extension therefore being responsible for the ills it caused in Zaire. This US-
Zaire arrangement did not last long without creating tension in the land. For instance there was growing tension when the State Department pointed a finger at the economy as a result of Zairianisation campaign. This effort to make businesses local led to decline in prices of copper—the primary source of foreign currency. Prices of oil went up and corruption was on the increase.

**Economic Chaos**

The country was on the verge of decline so Mobutu turned to Washington for help. US turned Mobutu away and blamed him for bad economic policies and demanded reform rather than the US dollar. This let down frustrated Mobutu. He had been faithful to the point of cooperating with the CIA’s idea of the Angolan issue. The CIA wanted to stop any Soviet advances in Africa and Mobutu had agreed to be part of it yet the US was unwilling to help in times of need. In retaliation, Mobutu declared the US Ambassador Hinton persona non-grata, and also arrested most of the CIA agents in Zaire. As an opportunist Mobutu did well. The US needed him on Angolan issue and president Ford and secretary Kissinger quickly sought to repair the breach with Mobutu. US assured Mobutu that the US-Zaire relationship was strong and that they were not planning his overthrow as Mobutu had said. All this was done because the White house needed Mobutu’s help in the Angolan situation. In the words of Walter Cutler, the new designate Ambassador.
“It wouldn’t have been such a critical situation had the Angolan situation not been evolving so quickly.”

Mobutu had manipulated the White House by giving a bait, no matter how successful it was to US, to get his desired results. In 1975 Henry Kissinger became active in the affairs of Zaire by putting pressure on bureaucracies to take more seriously the affairs of Zaire. The country was to be taken as a strategic point in Africa. US began to release aid including military weapons of sophisticated nature to counter a possible threat from Angola. Mobutu had won the battle. However these are the same weapons that he was to use to keep his nation ‘stable’ especially when resurgence occurred.

The above information supports the view that America did not take the issues of Africa seriously. If Zaire was of such importance to America as has been stated above, then it should have been reflected in their foreign policy. As it shows in this case, it was not until the Angolan issue came up that Kissinger saw the need to spend American resource on a mere corrupt country. He had not seen its importance in the balance of power of that region. Once again the events in Central Africa determined the behaviour of US towards Zaire. The US interests were threatened. If Kissinger did not act quickly the Soviet Union

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would have come in. The US policy was to contain the advent of Soviet Union so it was only logical for US to spend tax-payer's money and step in. The East-West relations became the dictating principle in this case. The conflict between US and Mobutu was ignored and the State Department was ordered to support Zaire.

The US foreign policy was designed to strengthen Mobutu's role as a regional bulwark for US policies in Central Africa. Zaire was sacrificed for American interests and Mobutu was established as a useful dictator. He took advantage of the situation because he knew the US needed him. There followed crisis after crisis. Resurgence and counter-resurgence, re-assessment of the special relationship, conflicts within the bureaucracy and the congress were all part of the phenomenon of this foreign policy. However these elements acted as a source of strength to Mobutu who had learned to manipulate the Americans.

The nature of US policy towards Zaire greatly contributed to the ensuing crisis in this country because it was interventionist. It evolved out of a crisis and continued to be nurtured by crisis. This behaviour came out of the philosophy of the time that characterised the Cold War. This was in three circles; 1945-55, 1955-73 and 1973-89. According to Dr. Nyunya, the last two circles had

93 J.D.Olwe Nyunya. "Towards Understanding US-Africa Relations During the Cold war Era" in———pg 177

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direct impact on superpower relations in Africa. This was the time of great rivalry between Soviet Union and America. According to Dr. Nyunya

United States had clear designs for global economic, political and military hegemony. To achieve this she established geographical global military command system of which Africa was part of. He continues to say that both US-Soviet conflict and US designs for global hegemony provided the background for US-Africa relations. These two paradigms also constitute the US relations with other actors in the international system. Congo was a victim of this Cold War rivalry in the international system. When relations shifted between the international powers it affected the US foreign policy in Congo. America’s aim was to control the world. She depended on her allies to do so including the local leaders who were willing to be her friend. Mobutu fell into this category of a ‘friend’ of America. He played his game well and gained the favour of American presidents for three decades.

However America made a big mistake by entrusting Congo to him. This was made worse by the US policy of neglecting Africa from mid 60s to mid 1970s. Another factor that made the situation worse was the economic and military retreat from sub-Saharan Africa. The DRC crisis cannot be explained by one particular paradigm but several. It can however be attributed to one fact, the international politics of the Cold War of which America was the champion.
This paper seeks to explain the DRC crisis in the Cold War era by focusing on the US-African relations during those three decades that Mobutu was in reign. To understand the relationship, Dr. Nyunya sums it in the following words.

Thus in the context of the cold war politics, the realist-mercantilist school of political economy, the dependency model of core-periphery relations, and the economic model of modes of production are all relevant in understanding U-S African relations during the period; each theoretical paradigm throws some light in understanding US experience in Africa during the cold war. 94

**Other Explanatory Theories**

The realist-mercantilist paradigm talks about the subordination of economic forces to political and military interests and the reality and primacy of interests. 95 This study encourages United States to use her political, economic and military power to suppress communism so that she can dominate and also be secure from communist threats in Africa.

The dependency model of co-periphery is based on the North - South relations of world politics. It sees the world in terms of the developed and the undeveloped worlds. Africa falls in the category of undeveloped or third world. Africa - US relations is based on the dominance-dependence relations.

94 Ibid pg 190
where Africa’s raw materials are exploited for the benefit of the developed world in this case America and Europe. The developed world is termed as the core while the undeveloped world is viewed as periphery. The economic model focuses on the Marxist theory and it has an alternate explanation for a policy change. It contradicts the co-periphery model which sees the world commerce as a tool of underdevelopment. It views economic activities as producing an elite class in Africa and elsewhere who would be responsible for African capitalist development like the case of Kenya.

However there is also a possibility of producing an elite who would collaborate with foreigners and continue the process of underdevelopment like the case of Mobutu of DRC. All these are very important in understanding the US-Congo relations in the Cold War. These paradigms were the major contributing factors of the Cold War conflicts and recurrent crisis in the DRC besides the local events that took place in Africa. The responses to the events were determined by the paradigms that ruled the minds of the American congress of the time thus the shifting of policies from time to time.

From what Dr. Nyunya says, the above theories were the cause of African conflicts in the Congo. As America pursued her interests in getting raw...
materials for her use, they impoverished the continent. By trying to maintain
the geographical military interests they created an army that later was used to
fight internal battles by Africans themselves in their own internal conflicts. To
quote Dr. Nyunya; "US militarization of some groups and regimes in pursuit of
strategic raw materials and strategic military interests exacerbated African
internal conflicts". 96

In the DRC Mobutu took advantage of militarization as a dictator and
suppressed the Congo people for many years. He established a behemoth
(system) that was so entrenched that even today the new rulers have not been
able to completely break apart and every time they attempt to do so there is a
new crisis. America supported Mobutu for the economic and military gain in
the cold war era. After the collapse of communism they shifted their interest to
maintaining democracy in the region in pursuit for globalism and human rights.
Once again the dominating factor was the international policy of the time.

It can be said that US foreign policy in the Congo as well as in Africa is
characterised by shifting of policy according to the international politics.
America did not at any particular time develop a long-term foreign policy for
the DRC as well as for Africa as a whole. This can be said to be the reason for
unstable politics in this region. During the cold war era, America did not

96 ibid pg 190
support Africa’s economic development. Her policy was lukewarm. There was little or none bilateral economic and investment activities, which led to underdevelopment of the continent as a whole, and DRC was not an exception.

Summary

The US foreign policy in the Cold War era was designed to contain the expansion of communism as a system. It was not meant to save the world. On the other hand, the Africans may have seen the US as a saviour to their economic, political and social conditions. The two conflicting perceptions have led many African scholars to put blame on the American foreign policy. After analysing the policy it is clear that there was no commitment made to save Africa. In the case of the DRC, it is obvious that the political machineries were weakened if not totally broken by the Belgian government during their colonial reign. By the time the DRC got her independence the country was in chaos. The US government was interested in stability in this region because it was important for them strategically. Mobutu was capable of maintaining that stability. The method of doing so was not in question.

It can safely be said that the American foreign policy acted as a catalyst to an already existing problem. By sustaining a dictatorial regime they made a bad situation worse. The policy fulfilled its objective by changing when it was
necessary and by continuing when it worked. It served the US government's objectives of keeping communism out of zones where they had interests. The DRC was a beneficially to that. However her problems were not solved by the presence of America.

The objective of writing this paper was to assess and find out the extent to which the US foreign policy contributed, affected and influenced the crisis in the DRC in the Cold War era. The conclusions arrived at in this study supports the third hypothesis. The policy only acted as a catalyst to the already existing crisis in the region. It made a bad situation worse.
5.1 Summary and Conclusions

To sum up it can be said that the DRC politics were greatly affected by the US foreign policy towards Africa in the Cold War era. The events that took place in this Central African state were greatly affected by the US policy at the time. Even when they were not directly connected, the crisis were accelerated by the foreign policy of the time. The other factor to consider is the international system of the Cold War era. The Cold War era was dominated by the bipolar international order with the United States and Soviet Union competing for the world dominion. The US foreign policy was controlled by the real politic philosophy where their state interests came first. By not having the DRC interests at heart, the policy accelerated the individual crises into conflicts. The third point to note is the lack of appreciation of the Congolese politics by the American government. It was easier to have the status quo than begin to change a behemoth that was deeply established by the Belgians. Fourthly, the US foreign policy supported the dictatorial rule by Mobutu Sese Seko for the sake of 'stability'. The CIA assassinated Patrice Lumumba who had the country's interests at heart by branding him a communist. Lumumba understood the politics in the DRC and had the interests of his state at heart. But the goal of the U.S was not sort out the Congolese conflicts it was to contain the expansion of
the Soviet Union in DRC. The US policy was to maintain 'stability' at any cost even to a point of supporting and sustaining a dictator whose interests were personal gratification. The international policy was containment of the Soviet Union and this did not favour the politics of the DRC because democracy was compromised with tyranny.

American foreign policy towards DRC evolved out of crises and lasted as long as the crisis was on. When things calmed down the policy took a shift and focused elsewhere. The general policy was to contain Soviet Union from taking over the DRC. The theory of realism dictated that those on US side be supported even if they were anti-democracy. Thus the idea of friendly tyrants like Mobutu was welcome. The act of supporting Mobutu in itself supports the first and the third hypothesis. The US foreign policy contributed to the crisis in the DRC in the cold war era. It also shows that the US foreign policy also acted as a catalyst to the already existing conflicts in the region. The Africans may have seen Mobutu as a traitor but he could not have survived without the support of the American government. Congo had for a long time been held together by the harsh rule of Belgium. That rule destroyed the indigenous systems of law.
Leopold II didn’t establish an alternative apparatus of administration that Congolese could use after independence. They were therefore left like children without a father and Mobutu filled that gap. Mobutu didn’t come up with an alternative structure and when he tried the indigenisation method, it didn’t work. Temporary measures were taken as usual but such measures further destroyed Zaire as Mobutu took advantage of the World Bank loans. Zaire was dilapidated and impoverished even more as the behemoth re-established itself.

The international politics of non-interference did not help the DRC situation. At the time when America was most needed they hid under the isolationist policy. As Congo lapsed to the old cruel system, economic deprivation led to rebellions, political corruption and civil wars that escalated the crisis. The Adoula government led to civil strife as the administrative machinery failed. When America used Tshombe for his leadership quality it did not help the situation. It contravened the principle of independence and democracy. The use of European allies didn’t work for long either. Mobutu, like the US foreign policy in the Congo, rose out of necessity and thrived in crises. After Tshombe failed Mobutu re-established himself by proving to US that he can hold Congo together. The United Nations was composed of all European nations but the United States controlled it. The extent to which US influenced UN was the extent to which she was responsible of the crisis in the Congo. US worked with
Mobutu for more than three decades. It can therefore be construed that US foreign policy greatly influenced the events that occurred in that region that time. Even the low-key policy that the congress took had an impact on what was happening or not happening in DRC at the time.

American government did not depart from their objectives in Africa which were: unified, independent, and stable institutions for political stability and economic development; and Soviet containment from penetration and extension to Africa. To succeed in Africa south of the Sahara, US needed Mobutu as a unifying factor. For this they ignored the harsh measures used to achieve Zairinisation in 1973 even to a point of sacrificing the Zairian economy. Realism ignored the Zairian interests at the expense of American ones. This was the theoretical framework upon which the US/DRC relation was built. DRC had the mineral wealth which American needed so badly, geographical advantage for military manoeuvre, was a peace keeper for African region and had a good military programme which could be used when need arose.

However there was a contradiction when it came to the theory of expansionism for the sake of democracy. America showed her weakness by retaining Mobutu as a compromise. Other areas of compromise were seen between realism and idealism. Mobutu scored poorly when it came to human rights yet his immoral
behaviour was acceptable to Washington because he was pro-west and anti-communist.

Power was another influencing factor to the American behaviour towards the DRC. A tyrannical rule that holds at the centre was better than a democracy that could not. This was a reasonable justification to the act of keeping a power base. US/Zairian relation was based on deals and Mobutu knew it. Stability led to economic benefits for Mobutu and he played a good game of it. Idealism did not work with Mobutu as in the case of President Carter and economic reforms. Reagan succeeded by praising Mobutu, he gained his favour and the services he needed from Mobutu.

Lastly the inter-dependence theory also greatly influenced the attitude of US/Zairian relations. 59% of US cobalt comes from the DRC. US needed the Kamina airstrips for flying all over Africa. There was a need to encourage Mobutu so that they can stabilise their power in Africa. As a result of this US overlooked all the evil that was being done by the dictator. US created, maintained and encouraged the dictatorial rule in the DRC to further their interests. To this extent US foreign policy towards the DRC influenced the internal politics of the state and the conflicts thereon.
5.2 Recommendations

It is the view of the writer that the DRC needs a transformation of the mind, a healing of the soul and a new heart rather than a change of a system. A system works on the external qualities of a people and they do not last long. The external values last as long as a leader lasts. In case of the DRC, Leopold II created a system that enslaved the people for a long time. If it were to be dismantled it would take as long as it took to establish it. But the key lies in the people themselves, what they perpetuate to the generation ahead of them. If the ideas generated today are that of revenge, there will never be a breakthrough. But if the focus is directed to forgetting the past and rebuilding a new nation with human rights as the focus, then there is a hope for tomorrow.

The Cold War exacerbated already existing crisis in the DRC. In that era, the Europeans, Americans and the Soviets were the external enemies. In the post-Cold War era DRC the conflict is with her neighbouring countries. To the south Angola attempted to close off southern Congo due to the attacks by the UNITA rebels who used this area as a base. They also wanted to stop the guns-for-diamonds smuggling route for UNITA. To the south Zimbabwe had also interest in diamond mining in southern Congo. Rwanda and Uganda to the east support the Congolese Tutsi and Rwandans to claim positions in the post-war Congo. They both want the diamond-rich Kisangani area. DRC has timber, tea,
coffee, gold and diamond production in the northeast. The conflict in the DRC is a complex one to sort out but it all boils down to the mineral wealth and other wealth of this region. Having the complex nature of the crisis in the DRC, it is important to pay special attention to each dimension of the conflict. Many attempts have been made to make peace in this region but it does not last for long.

**Peacemaking**

The international community need to take heed to the early warnings of the conflict. These should be followed by an early action. Most times the reports given by media are ignored as rumours until there is evidence through deaths of several people. This can be done in several ways, a) through negotiations, mediation, fact finding missions, efforts to promote national reconciliation, human rights programmes, and making peace institutionalised. The United Nations can work alongside the Organisation of African Unity for effectiveness.

**Peacekeeping**

The past record may not be encouraging where UN intervened in DRC. To avoid suspicion that UN has other motives other than keeping peace.
deployment of African troops can be reinforced. Funds should be set apart for this purpose and OAU should work along side the UN.

**Humanitarian Assistance**

There should be an international mechanism not only to help in aid, but to also assist governments to host large populations of refugees and to maintain them in humane environments. Most of the refugee camps are pathetic to live in. Besides the lack of basics, there is no security and rapes have become a major concern. In the DRC camps, near the Rwandese border, combatants hide within the refugees and they should be separated to avoid unsuspected wars.

**Post-Conflict Peace Building**

After the conflict is ended the most important step is to prevent any recurrence of armed conflict. Diplomacy alone is not enough nor is military action or presence. It is necessary to deal with the issues that caused the war in the first place. This is best done in times of peace. In the DRC this would mean strengthening the weak national institutions, promoting human rights, monitoring elections, providing rehabilitation programmes, and creating the conditions for resumed development. There is also need to protect the ordinary citizens, give them access to basic facilities like water and electricity. This will avoid social discontentment.
Sustainable Development

Development is essential in order to reduce tension and conflicts in a society. Reduction of poverty as part of human rights, education, health, and justice are essential ingredients of sustaining peace. Corruption is another cause of conflict when laws apply to certain individuals and not others.

U.S Foreign Policy

The US foreign policy towards Africa and the DRC should change to suit the interests of the locals rather than the internationals. The congress should have a more permanent policy that is long-term than the reactive short-term one. The ever-shifting foreign policy has caused instability in this African region over a long period of time.

Democracy

America should not support any leader who is a dictator rather they should encourage democratic elections and ensure they are fairly done to avoid conflict.
Domestic policy

America should take more interest in domestic politics within the DRC so as to come up with a realistic long lasting solution.


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