YOUTH AND VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN NAIROBI'S KIBERA SLUM
1992-2008

BY
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2012
Declaration

This Project is my original work and to the best of my knowledge has not been submitted in any other University.

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This Project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the University Supervisor:

Signature......................................... Date 29/11/2012

PROF. VINCENT SIMIYU

Signature. ........................................ Date 29/11/2012

DR. H. MISIGO AMATSIMBI
Dedication

This work is dedicated to my loving husband Daniel and my children, Deborah, Christopher and Natalie.
Acknowledgments

It has taken a long period to develop and prepare this project work. Its development would have not been possible without the hand of God through His answered prayers. I also acknowledge Prof. Vincent Simiyu, Dr. H. Amatsimbi Misigo and Ms Hellen Amunga, among others, who read the work and gave their contributions. You graciously gave your time and knowledge throughout the period as I developed this work.

It was my privilege to interact with youth groups and individual within Kibera’s Laini Saba, Gatwekera, Silanga villages during my data collection period. They helped me identify various factors that have led the young people to participate in violent conflict within Kibera Slum. This work has captured their grievances and thoughts that will be used to prevent future conflict outbreaks. I am grateful to each and every one of you.

It is my wish to further acknowledge the assistance by staff of; Kenya National Library Services, University of Nairobi’s Jomo Kenyatta Library, Kenya National Archives for providing resource materials, without which this work would not have been authentic.

It is also wish to appreciate the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports, especially the late Permanent Secretary, Mr. Kinuthia Murugu who, through his office, granted me the course approval to undertake my studies at the University. Not forgetting Mr. Julius Kubai, the Director Youth Development who granted me the requisite time to attend classes and even allowed me to be away during the examinations. May I extend this acknowledgment also to the entire Youth Development Staff at the headquarters for the moral support they gave me.

Last but not least, I wish to acknowledge the wonderful support that my family has continued to give me. I owe my family more than words can express especially my husband who has continued to encourage me to finish up the work. You are God’s precious gift to me. Thank you my family.
Abstract
This study examines youth involvement in conflict in Nairobi’s Kibera Slum from 1992 to 2008. The themes within the study includes; how the historical settlement within Kibera has a contribution to youth participation in conflict in the area, factors that have contributed to youth participation in conflict in Kenya since 1992, factors for youth involvement in conflict in Kibera since 1992 and the impact of conflict in Kibera since 1992. The study design is mainly descriptive based on in-depth oral interviews and historical method.

The aim of this research was to discuss various factors that drive the youth to participate in conflict specifically in Kibera and its impact. The project is based on two theoretically derived assumptions: first, greed or opportunity perspective which indicates that the youth participate in violent conflict for potential gain on material incentives. Secondly, youth violence is due to frustration that has left them unable to attain their social status. At this stage, youth view violence as a means of survival and belonging. The study tested the magnitude of these two theories concerning youth participation in violent conflict within Kibera and brought out other factors to compliment the two.

In the recent past, Kenya has been riddled with conflict and violence where the youth have been fully involved, the trend is worrying as studies feature them as targets and perpetrators and also as direct victims. The project locates the triggers for the subsequent violence which has rocked Kenya since 1992 with the worst in 2007 which saw more than a thousand Kenyans killed and between 300,000 and 500,000 internally displaced. Among the areas most heavily hit was the capital city of Nairobi. Within Kenya’s political heart, the bulk of the violence took place in the slums with Kibera bearing the worst brunt due to massive confrontations between supporters of ODM and those of PNU.

The findings of the study indicates that the youth in Kibera engaged in violent conflict due to a number of reasons ranging from; social, political and economic factors. On the social findings, poor living conditions, exclusion and inequality, ethnic stereotype comes
out clearly to replicate why the youth engage in violent conflict. Economic factors include among other, unemployment while the political factor blamed for conflict incudes inflammatory statements from our politicians and role of the security organs among others. Although have been participating in conflict in Kibera since 1992, the study has indicated that Kibera experienced perhaps the darkest chapter in its 100 year during the 2007/08 post-election violence. During this period, unknown property worth millions of shillings and homes were looted and burnt down, many people lost their lives especially the youth, a number were injured and with thousands displaced. What comes out clear in this study is that in Kibera, the primarily political driven violence quickly evolves into an all consuming amalgam of ethnic, political and instrumentally motivated acts of individual or group violence.

It is important to not that the research only took place in the five villages within Kibera namely; Silanga, Gatwekera, Kisumu Ndogo, Laini Saba and Soweto. These villages' lies south of the railway track that seperates the poor south of the track with the relatively rich North of the track. This therefore indicates that still there is room for study on youth and conflict within Kibera.
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADEA</td>
<td>Association for Development of Education in Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CIPEV</td>
<td>Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence</td>
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<td>ECK</td>
<td>Electoral Commission of Kenya</td>
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<tr>
<td>FORD-K</td>
<td>Forum for Restoration of Democracy, Kenya</td>
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<td>GEMA</td>
<td>Gikuyu, Embu and Meru Association</td>
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<td>GSU</td>
<td>General Service Unit</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<td>IPPG</td>
<td>Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAR</td>
<td>Kings African Rifle</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAMATUSA</td>
<td>Kalenjin Maasai Turkana and Samburu</td>
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<td>KANU</td>
<td>Kenya African National Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>KNCHR</td>
<td>Kenya National Commission of Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<td>MOYAS</td>
<td>Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRC</td>
<td>Mombasa Republican Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NARC</td>
<td>National Rainbow Coalition</td>
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<td>NCCK</td>
<td>National Council of Churches of Kenya</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<td>ODM</td>
<td>Orange Democratic Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Provincial Commissioner</td>
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<td>PNU</td>
<td>Party of National Unity</td>
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<td>PTSD</td>
<td>Post Traumatic Stress Disorder</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLDF</td>
<td>Sabaot Land Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>STD</td>
<td>Sexually Transmitted Diseases</td>
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TJRC Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF United Nation International Children Education Fund
WHO World Health Organization
### Operational definition of terms

**Conflict**

In this study, conflict has been defined as “a Social relationship that is determined by a perceived and articulated contradiction about perception, judgment and expectations.”

**Violence**

Violence is the use of physical force or power against oneself or another person or a group that either results in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development or deprivation.

**Election violence**

Election violence is any acts of omission that is likely to cause harm to an individual or group of people, damage to property as a result of electoral choice or outcome.

**Slum**

A slum is a region in an urban setting which is characterized by overcrowding, poor sanitation, low quality or deteriorating housing, high morbidity and mortality rates, high crime rate and prostitution.

**Youth**

The youth or young people refer to every person between the ages of 15 and 35 years. The Kenya National Youth Policy defines a Kenyan Youth as one aged between 15 – 30 years.

**Child Soldiers**

Illegally recruited children under the age of 18 years fighting as soldiers during war.

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CHAPTER ONE
Background to the Study

1.0 Introduction
Young people today encounter greater and more unique challenges than ever before. During a crucial phase of their development, not only are they confronted with the biological and psychological growth process as that characterize youth and adolescence, but they must also grapple with formidable external pressures such as poverty, disease and violence. For instance in the Middle East, youth unemployment rate is among the highest compared to other developing regions. This is because waiting for a job is measured in years rather than months leaving them to live with their parents while in their twenties and so delay in marriage.6 This problem is an outcome of interconnected processes or influences such as education, labor, credit, housing and marriage that mediate transition from school to work and family formation. The difficulty in these transitions is a consequence of distortions and rigidity in the institutions and rules governing individuals' behaviors.7 The eruption of war further compounds the adversities many face. Young people have much at stake, yet have little say in the policies and activities that pertain to their lives.

More than 35 African Countries in the recent years between 1980 and 1990s, have been at war or engaged in conflict that have directly affected over 550 million people with the youth featuring centrally as targets and perpetrators of violence.8 The number of youth who have been directly affected by violent conflict is enormous and unprecedented. During these conflicts, the young people have been maimed, killed and even uprooted from their homes and communities. They have been made orphans, and subjected to abuse and exploitation. Young people are abducted and even sexually abused.9 Researchers in Africa have shown that, although the level of involvement of young people in armed violence has varied from conflict to conflict, they have

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7 Ibid.
8 Social Development Paper, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction,' Young men and the Construction of Masculinity in Sub-Saharan Africa,' Paper N0. 26, June 2005.
been involved in all conflicts and have been responsible for some of the worst atrocities ever committed on the continent.\textsuperscript{10}

In addition, war indirectly affects an increasing number of youth by destroying social networks and infrastructures. For example, malnutrition increases due to low food production and displacement; resources for social services are diverted into the war; as health services deteriorate, death rates rise dramatically among the young people; the destruction of schools and the displacement of teachers reduces access to schooling leaving the youth at risk of recruitment and feelings of helplessness; displacement separates families and deprives the youth of a secure environment. For example, young people in Uganda have been facing acute problems given that over 50 percent of the population is under 18 years. For instance in Northern Uganda, the situation has been even more severe since the region is relatively under-served by health and education facilities. There has been little investment in roads, markets and other infrastructure due to the chronic insecurity that has affected the region particularly since 1986.\textsuperscript{11}

The young people in Northern Uganda face severe limitation on their chances of education and employment; they are vulnerable to economic and sexual exploitation from adults including parents, teachers and employers. The depredations of the Lord's Resistance Army have generated violence and insecurity which the young people have suffered from. For example to obtain food supplies, wives and soldiers, the LRA rebel looted villages and abducted the young people to serve as porters, combatants, spies and wives. At least 20,000 children and youth had been abducted and some two thousand were still under LRA as at December 2006.\textsuperscript{12}

Most of those who had been abducted spent several years in the bush and as a result, lost their chances of education. Although primary education is free in Uganda, many schools in the North have remained closed due to insecurity in the area.\textsuperscript{13} All these elements illustrate the horrendous impact of violent conflict on the youth. These have become common features of today's

\textsuperscript{10} Donald McIntyre, "Rights, root causes and recruitment, the youth factor in Africa's armed conflict," Vol. 12, No. 2, 2003, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{11} ACORD, A lost Generation, Young People and Conflict in Africa; Nairobi; Ramco Printing Press, July 2007, p.46.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
conflicts; they deserve special attention and action in order to ensure the well-being of the youth in the twenty-first century.

In developing countries, young people are coming of age in societies that lack stable government, steady economic growth, or basic material and physical security. In such circumstances, youth often turn away from the authority and ideology of older generations, and seek to mobilize their own generation in search of solutions. Furthermore, lack of gainful employment and land ‘to dig’ is a link to young men’s participation in armed conflict. Clearly, lack of vocational and educational opportunities is related to young men becoming part of armed, or rebel groups. In Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire for instance, lack of a clear ideology has led to recruitment of young men into violence, seeking to acquire power at all cost. In these countries, they have been a powerful force for constructive change.

The above developments were also witnessed during the recent revolutions in North Africa. However, this same power can also serve destructive purposes if, for example, the youth are exploited by proponents of violent ideologies or seek to improve their situation by dominating others. Although a large pool of young people is not inherently destabilizing, there is a strong correlation between large youth cohorts and political violence. When young people, particularly young men are uprooted, jobless and alienated, they remain with few opportunities for positive engagement and instead represent a ready pool of recruits for groups seeking to mobilize violence.

Urban youth gangs have a long history in Brazil. The 19th century Maltas in Rio de Janeiro are among the earliest recorded examples. Ranging from the relatively tame galeras cariocas to the more violent drug trafficking quadrilhas, the Brazilian youth gangs are among the most diverse and violent in Latin America. Violent has been increasing in Brazil since the early 1980s, particularly in urban areas.

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15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid.  
In 1992, Rio de Janeiro and New York shared the same homicide rate of 23 per 100,000 populations. By 1989, New York had declined to 17 per 100,000 while Rio’s had exploded to 57 per 100,000 and has continued to increase. Among the main contributors to these trend is poverty, drug trafficking, migration and deportation of illegal immigrants from United States. The young men are attracted to the gangs to secure status and also for materialistic benefits, to enrich themselves. These gangs are territorial as they physically stake out their drug markets and defend them violently against other drug traffickers and criminals. Their wars are said to be murderous and it is rare for a gang member to live beyond age 25 years. For instance in 1994, the low-income neighborhood of Bairro in Rio de Janeiro, recorded the deaths of 722 youths between 13 and 25 years old and unspecified number of casualties from the local population caught in the cross fire.18

Whether or not they participated directly in armed combat, youth are victimized by widespread violence. The attention of the international community has tended to focus on child soldiers. However, adolescents are far more likely than young children to be forcibly recruited into militias and they suffer problems of trauma, sexual abuse, and loss of educational and economic opportunities. In Mozambique, young men involved with RENAMO were either co-opted, coerced and psychologically brutalized to become crazed killers.19

As the situation has been in Kenya in the recent past, once violence breaks out, a conflict develops its own dynamics, reducing substantially the chances for successful diplomatic engagement, largely leaving the government with a costly option and the uncertain outcomes of coercive forms of intervention. In Kenya, violent conflict has been witnessed since independence and the youth have been always involved both in the urban and rural areas. An example of such areas is Kibera in Nairobi which is the main area of focus for this study.

Today Kibera is known widely as the largest informal settlement in Sub-Saharan Africa. With an approximate population of between 800,000 and 1,000,000 people living in makeshift structure under deplorable conditions of poverty, and daily struggle, Kibera is regarded as one of the most violent and conflict prone areas in Kenya. Of this population, approximately 65 percent are youth between ages 13 and 26. This age group have little education opportunities and almost no access to capital to start small businesses. Hardest hit by the existing challenges in the slum, the youth have little options and are pushed to choose dangerous lifestyle either ending up as street thugs, prostitutes, drug addicts or lose their lives being used as pawns by politicians to die of police bullets as seen during the 2007/2008 post-election violence in Kenya.

1.1 Statement of the Problem
Since the introduction of multi-party politics in Kenya in 1992 following the amendment of section 2 (A) of the constitution, cross-ethnic violence has riddled every national electoral exercise with the youth at the forefront. Although Kenya held presidential elections from 1963 to 1992, the incumbent always ran unopposed, underming the intentions of effective leadership transformation. During the election violence witnessed in 1992 and 1997, the conflict's epicenters were mainly Nairobi, Rift Valley and Coast provinces. In Rift Valley and Coast, youth from indigenous communities targeted the "migrant" ethnic communities to drive them back to their original homelands in order to reduce the chances of the presidential candidate supported by the migrant communities from garnering the minimum of 25% of the vote from at least five (5) out of the eight (8) provinces as required by law.

In Nairobi, the multi-party elections of 1992 and 1997, was the bastion of the opposition politics and voted opposition leaning members of parliament and councillors. Electoral contests were characterised by violence managed around organised youth gangs such as the notorious Jeshi la Mzee which caused mayhem during the 1992 and 1997 elections. Other gangs included; Siafu, Mungiki, Bukhungu, Jeshi la Darajani, mainly originating from Kibera Slum.

The 2007/08 post-election violence in Kenya, however, was of a different magnitude. During this period that lasted approximately six weeks, the youth from the two political divides ODM and PNU engaged each other in protest riots, repression by security forces and revenge killings. This resulted to approximately 1,133 killed, over 600,000 displaced from their homes, 3,000 innocent women raped, and the loss Ksh 100 billion to the economy. Nairobi’s informal settlements where thousands thrive on micro and small enterprise bore the brunt of the violence. In Kibera, properties and homes were razed and looted, 2km railway line was uprooted and wheat enroute to western Kenya looted, thousands of people were displaced and unlike in previous electoral related violence, places of worship were targeted such as the Kibera Catholic Church and a Presbyterian Church of East Africa church.

This intermittent election violence especially in Kibera and the involvement of the youth has raised serious concerns about the future of the area. This situation therefore calls for interrogation as to why the youth in the area engage in violent conflict specifically during certain periods. Although different scholars have studied and offered solutions to cross-ethnic violence during electioneering years, youth engagement in violent conflict in Kibera has escaped their attention. Interestingly, apart from inquiry reports and a few articles, very little scholarly documentation has been developed concerning the violence in Kibera. This therefore calls for a further interrogation to understand why the youth in the area participate in violent conflict and its impact.

1.2 Objectives of the Study

1. To analyze the historical settlement within Kibera as a contribution to youth participation in conflict in the area since 1992.
2. To examine the factors that contribute to youth participation in conflict within Kibera since 1992.

1.3 Justification of the Study

Kibera slum provides opportunities to address conflict amongst the youth. During the post-election violence of 2007/08, the brunt of the suffering in Nairobi was borne by the poor people living in low income areas especially Kibera. The citizens found themselves in a quandary as
marauding youth caused violence. Unlike other informal settlements within the city, it was in Kibera where the railway line was uprooted disrupting transportation of goods to Uganda and other countries. Currently, a number of landlords are yet to access their houses in Kibera.

The high population of the youth within Kibera alone does not lead to their participation in violent conflict in the area. The study will therefore unveil the current status of the youth in the area by investigating activities they involve in as regards to poverty, survival, historical settlement, security and safety. The study is expected to unfold various factors and reasons that pushes the youth particularly those in Kibera into violent conflict.

Policies to prevent youth participation in violent conflict within Kibera have been formulated without consideration of the historical background of the area. This study therefore tends to furnish policy makers with the idea that the historical settlement in the area has played a key role in ethnic balkanization where specific ethnic groups lives in specific village within Kibera settlement. This has cultivated tribalism, enmity, criminology among the youth leading to violent conflict in the area.

1.4 Scope and Limitation of the Study
The study was carried out in selected villages of Gatwekera, Laini Saba, Silanga, Mashimoni, and Soweto within Kibera slum, Langata Division, Nairobi West District, Nairobi County. This study focused on economic, political and social factors that led to the youth involvement in violent conflict in Kibera. The study covers the period between 1992-2008 and not earlier since it was in 1992 when Kenya first experienced violence and conflict during the election period. Conflict erupted again in 1997 with the worst taking place in 2007.

On limitations, some materials that were targeted for the study were too recent and so could not be accessed. Also the interviewing the youth was quite a challenge given that they expect some handouts after the interviews. Kibera is also so large that getting information from every village remains quite a challenge.
1.5 Literature Review

The literature review highlights and indicates that youth involvement in violent conflict in Kibera is a myriad factor whose significance has not been objectively analyzed. It points out the glaring mismatch between their participation and other related variables within this context. A number of scholars have provided different understandings and explanations as regards the youth participation in violent conflicts. The literature has stressed on particular factors with key areas being economic deprivation, ethnicity and poverty as some of the key issues.

Diana Freeman in her paper ‘An Explanation of Conflict: Ethnicity, Deprivation, and Rationalization’ as one of the reasons for youth involvement in violent conflict. According to her explanation, this phenomenon can occur in the economic or the political spheres and between groups or for a particular group of people across time. Nafziger and Auvinen define deprivation as when “people feel deprived of something they had, but subsequently lost, or when others have gained relative to them.” Their definition is useful because it addresses the many dimensions of deprivation: political, economic, horizontal, and longitudinal. In their study, “Economic Causes of Humanitarian Emergencies,” they correctly emphasize the distinction between absolute and relative deprivation. Extended periods of deprivation are less influential for humans because they become accustomed to their situation, whereas experiences of relative deprivation are more accessible for the individual: a man can look to his rich neighbor and realize his own poverty or remember days when he himself was wealthy. He is more likely to resort to aggression based on these observations than if there was blanket poverty across the nation as explains Nafziger.

Although deprivation as a cause of conflict is desirable because it has both economic and political implications, very rarely is deprivation unrelated to economic factors. Political deprivation occurs when a group or individual is excluded from the political process or disadvantaged in some manner, as he/she/they are being deprived of their political rights. However, political elites use this type of deprivation in order to maintain their power to control and administrate economic resources. This blurring of economic and political resources is

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especially prevalent in the third world, where weak political institutions perpetuate clientelism and corruption. Moreover, public sector employment is extremely vital in developing economies where the private sector is weak and ineffective. This study on deprivation as an explanation for youth participation in violent conflict in relations to Kibera falls short to explain as to the reasons why youth in Kibera participate in conflict only at particular time and not throughout their lives even though they live in poverty. Deprivation, especially the economic factor is a continuous process and in most cases the poor especially those in the slum are forced to live with. Kibera remains calm most of the time and violence only occurs when it is triggered by certain issues which the study is to find out.

Deprivation can manifest itself in a variety of forms as illustrated in Sri Lanka. The case of Sri Lanka is very interesting because it was an exemplar for post-colonial development and then was seemingly suddenly plagued by civil war. Sirimal Abeyratne implicates the overwhelming post-colonial prosperity and success with the ultimate deterioration of conditions throughout the last three decades. The legacy of colonialism in Sri Lanka was a strong and effective welfare system that continued to improve human development. The irony of the system is that it improved overall health, facilitating population growth that the economy was unable to support.\textsuperscript{25}

As Abeyrantne notes, "the main development challenge at the time was not of raising people’s living standards, but of maintaining them in the face of a rapidly growing population." A further problem created by the welfare estate was a generation of "people who were brought up within the welfare system and had improved human capabilities to be utilized productively and higher social expectations to be satisfied." This generation could not be absorbed into the economy and was faced with increasing unemployment. The outbreak of violence by both Sinhalese and Tamil youth demonstrates the potency of the deprivation throughout the country. However, the Tamils were also experiencing deprivation relative to the Sinhala majority such as discriminatory employment in the public sector and imposition of a Sinhala official language. These factors of exclusion and economic decline are instrumental in the progression towards war in Sri Lanka. The youth violence in Sri Lanka explains how economic deprivation resulted outbreak of violence

countrywide. This factor falls short on the Kenyan case where conflict erupts only at particular period. Unlike Sri Lanka Kenya like other third world countries experience the problem of youth unemployment, yet the have always remained peaceful and only erupts when instigated. The study therefore seeks to find out the pattern of violence conflict among the youth, specifically those in Kibera.

According to Gethui and Theuri, Structural Adjustment Programme designed by the World Bank and IMF implemented in the early 1990s in Kenya led to freezing of new employments and retrenchment of workers in all government ministries attributes to youth involvement in violent conflict. Before the implementation of SAP, the young people were sure of employment after completion of their studies in collages and university; this abruptly came to an end in the early 1990s when the government only hired a few people to fill up vacant posts. This program locked out the youth from direct employment after school since education no longer became a ticket to a job even among university graduates. The country’s youth have therefore been thrown into predicaments because organizations nolonger hiring new college graduates. To make the matters worse, corruption and tribalism have locked deserving youth out of genuine opportunities to secure jobs or advance themselves. These, among other issues, are blamed for the involvement of the youth in violent conflict before, during and after the general election since 1992. This point brings out clearly the uncertainty the youth find themselves into especially after school buts falls to explain why particulary, Kibera youth have been participating in violence in the area in 1992, 1994, 1998, 2002 with the worst being the post-election violence of 2007/08. It is not only the youth in Kibera who were affected by the program but the whole country. The study therefore will bring out factors that instigate violence in Kibera and also find the literacy level of the youth in conflict in Kibera.

In Rwanda, the Hutu turned to violence when they feared a loss of economic security with the onset of the International Monetary Fund’s SAP. Andy Storey’s in his analysis of the economic factors that led to Rwandan genocide explains how structural adjustment conditionalities

changed the nature of political power. He notes how the prospect of democratization posed a real threat to the interests of the political and economic elites, who were no longer free to use their power to perpetuate Hutu preferential treatment. The Hutu deprivation of political power and potential loss of jobs contributed to the perception of elites that their future was bleak.

The youth involvement in violent conflict has been blamed on their large population. According to Urdal Henrick, large numbers of male youth inevitably sets the stage for violence. He claims that youth bulges increase the risk of outbreak of low-intensity political violence, namely internal armed conflict, terrorism and rioting. The statistical relationship remains strong, even when controlling for other contextual factors, for example level of development, democracy and conflict history. He argues that youth bulges can become particularly volatile under different conditions. For instance, the risk of terrorism and riots are higher when youth bulges coincide with periods of long-term economic decline and an expansion of tertiary education. He concludes that countries with large youth cohorts do have higher rates of conflict than countries with smaller cohorts but he contends that there is no clear threshold as to how many young men make countries more prone to conflict. Furthermore, he adds that youth bulges are more likely to cause armed conflict when combined with economic stresses. However, this literature has its clear limitation, the youth bulge presents a demographic window of opportunity if coupled with economic and so a large youth cohort need not be a problem if there are sufficient opportunities for young people and they can be engaged in meaningful, democratic national projects. In Kibera, youth engage actively on matters of economic development and only engage in conflict when incited.

According to Peter Uvin, extreme poverty can easily drive the youth into violent conflict as he tries to illustrate on the Rwandan situation. The pre-war and pre-genocide history in Rwanda was characterized by grinding poverty, intense population pressure on land, pronounced lack of education, social and geographical immobility, and a dominant controlling authoritarian government with an excessive record of human right abuse, a small and intimidated civil society

among other social inequalities, these atrocities affected the young people directly. Prior to the genocide, Rwanda was the poorest country in the world with 86 percent of total population living below poverty line and half of its people characterized as ‘extremely poor.’ About 26 percent of its rural population lived on less than half a hectare of land, without schooling or non farm income. Expanding landlessness, dramatic reduction in life opportunities for most poor Rwandese, corruption and clientelism among the elite all helped to create a rural life that Uvin characterized as a “prison without escape in which poverty, infantilization, social inferiority, and powerlessness combined to create a sense of personal failure. According to Uvin, the conditions on the eve of the genocide made it ‘almost impossible for the youth of the country, most of them unemployed not to get involved.’ Coercion mixed with promises of material gain. Kibera being a slum with many people living in very pathetic and inhumane conditions, Uvin’s work is very critical for the study since it will bring out the relationship between poverty and conflict within the slum.

Amy Chua explains that existence of free markets and democracy operating along each other can easily manipulate the youth into in violent conflicts. Free markets facilitate the accumulation of wealth by a few while democracy on the other hand seeks to empower the deprived majority. In the west, this tension is reconciled through redistributive mechanisms that respond to the needs of the lower classes through welfare based services. Contrary to this, not only are these redistributive institutions non-existent in developing countries like Kenya but also the percentage of the poor is much higher as compared to the west. Chua translates this into a poor majority who can hardly meet their basic needs but are politically empowered through the ideal democracy; one-man one-vote. In Kenya, the market dominance by the Kikuyu ethnic group has gradually generated resentment from other tribes. The violent ethnic conflicts that occurred in 1992, 1997 and 2007 which the youth fully participated illuminate the dynamics of the interplay between free market and democracy. While free market benefited a minority who dominate the market, democracy on the other hand seeks to empower the majority but who are the market minority groups. This came out clearly in 2007 when the anti-Kikuyu campaign became the focus of the general elections because they had dominated the market for several years. Following Chua’s

argument, is therefore important to find out if the anti-Kikuyu campaign in Kibera was triggered by the poor against the wealth landlords and shop owners.

Exclusion and inequality can lead to a crisis of gender identity among the youth as illustrated by Paul Francis on his research on, ‘Masculinity and increasing male violence in rural Kenya.’ He explains that when the traditional routes to becoming a man are blocked, young men may see violence as the most readily available way of proving their manhood. Francis has outlined how the erosion of livelihoods and assets in rural Kenya has implications for gender relations as traditional male livelihoods (export crops, livestock/pastoralism, labour migration) have declined. Meanwhile there are new opportunities for female roles (food crop production, petty trade, informal services, beer brewing etc). Young males have found it increasingly difficult to fulfil traditional male roles and this has led to a sense of failure. Feelings of disempowerment are undermining the social value, identity and self-esteem of men. Francis notes manifestations of growing violence and insecurity amongst young males in rural Kenya: domestic violence; intergenerational disagreements; political violence; land clashes; vigilantism; increasing criminality and armed gangs spreading to rural areas. Although Francis’s work demonstrate clearly a feeling of disempowerment undermains male self esteem in the rural, it falls short of explaining the situation in the urban areas specifically Kibera slum. It therefor leaves a gap further research in the area.

Protracted armed conflict can lead to a vicious cycle in which violence becomes the norm. According to Paul Collier and others, the post-conflict period is very fragile and an estimated 40% of conflicts which have ended restart again within 10 years. If the underlying causes are not tackled, conflict will persist and potentially turn violent again. Violence has a lasting impact on perpetrators, survivors and witnesses and prolonged exposure to violence can contribute to a general culture of terror of normalisation of violence. As discussed above, at an individual level there is also evidence that children who grow up with violence whether in domestic violence in

the home or violence in their school, workplace, neighbourhood or community may be more likely to re-enact violence as young adults. Over the longer term, witnessing violence or being a victim of violence can condition children or young people to regard violence as an acceptable means of resolving problems. Prolonged exposure to armed conflicts may also contribute to a general culture of terror that increases the incidence of youth violence. This research of Collier and his colleagues is important to this study because it will discover the reasons for repeated violence within Kibera since 1992. It will assist to find out whether the recent violence that occurred in the area has anything to do with those of the past.

A Political Ideology also plays a crucial role in youth involvement in conflict. Ibrahim Abdullah in his journal, ‘Bush Path to Destruction: The Origin and Character of the Revolutionary United Front,’ argued, that those movements without a clear political ideology for instance, RUF in Sierra Leone and LRA in Uganda are the most prone to using violence as an end in itself, providing young men with power, income and women and using extreme violence. In many cases these movements have alienated the rural populations they were supposed to liberate and therefore have turned to forced recruitment. It is also true that some movements with clear political ideologies like Tanzania People’s Defence Force and the African National Congress in South Africa do promote some constraint in the use of physical violence. However, the same insurgency may have different meanings for different youth. For the educated, the rebellion may have political undertones; for the less educated it may be about following a big man who distributes weapons and booty and offers status by participating in violence. For example, Weinstein argues, that organisations that use identity as a basis for recruitment systematically recruit more educated individuals than those financing recruitment from resource rents. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the scholars have failed to recognise that once violence starts, it can to some extent take on its own logic and the original motivations for the violence, including political demands can be lost. In Kibera, the outbreak of violence in 2008 was dissatisfaction of the election results yet as it continued it took a different angle. It is therefore important to investigate these other factors not necessarily the political ideology.

The literature has clearly pointed out a number of factors that lead the youth into violent conflict. So far there a number of gaps that the literature has left out and the study intended to fill in relationship to Kibera. For instance, the literature has not pointed the existing social conditions within Kibera as a factor to the youth involvement in violent conflict. Significantly, also not mentioned include; exclusion and inequality among the youth, peer pressure, bad leadership, low level of education, election irregularities, existence of youth gangs as major players in the youth participation. The study therefore targeted these factors to fill in the gaps that have been left out in the literature review.

1.6 Theoretical Framework
There are a number of overreaching theories that tend to explain youth engagement into violent conflict. These theories are based on economic, biological, social and political analysis and can be grouped under the following headings; Greed or (economic) opportunity perspectives; and the Blocked transition to adulthood.

“Greed” or “opportunity” perspectives
According to the greed or opportunity perspective advanced by Urdal, an individual recruitment into a rebellion is feasible only when the potential gain from joining violent conflict is so high and the expected costs so low that rebel recruits will favour joining over alternative income-earning opportunities.35 Weinstein has argued that in resource rich environment, rebellions may soon become flooded with opportunistic joiners who exhibit little commitment to the long term goals of the organization and are instead primarily motivated by looting.36 This argument therefore focuses primarily on the material incentive for engagement in violence for example access to money, luxury items, minerals, drugs.

This argument therefore focuses primarily on the material incentives for youth engagement in violence in Kibera slum to access money, drugs, and luxury items. Some research has also focused on the importance of non-material rewards for example, physical and psychological protection and status, for example, the motivation for the young people to join RUF in Sierra

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Leone included money, diamond and protection. There are young people in Kibera slum who join illegal violent groups because of selective incentives including protection and reward for their patronage which may be significant predictors of joining illegal armed groups.

Inequality in terms of the distribution of scarce resources can also bring negative competition between those who control power and those who perceive themselves to have been marginalized. Youth in Kibera would rally their support behind the ‘have’ and ‘have not’ elites which is a threat to peace as violent conflict becomes eminent, yet at no time in any growing economy will there be equal distribution of resources.

The “Blocked transition to adulthood”
There is now substantial literature arguing that there is a youth crisis in many parts of the developing world as a result of high levels of youth discontent and grievances. The transition to adulthood is largely culturally defined and can vary greatly between contexts and between men and women. Full adulthood is increasingly difficult to achieve due to social and economic constraints. Millions of African youth living in deplorable conditions are without access to predictable route to jobs, marriage and the setting up of household, are caught “in limbo” as described below;

“For many young Africans, “youth” is not serving as a transitional phase to a more established social status, but is an enduring limbo. This is a source of tremendous frustration. Instead of living the youth behind and entering adulthood by marrying and establishing an independent household, an increasing proportion of this ‘lost generation’...are unable to attain any social status.”

In such situations, being a ‘gangster’ or ‘militia’ confers on a young person a status of some sort. However, once war or conflict is over, these same youth are no longer given the recognition they had, and this marginalization can further exacerbate their involvement in violent behavior and crime.

40 Ibid.
In Africa, the common requirements for achieving socially respected manhood are: (a) achieving a level of financial independence, employment or income (and being able to become a provider); and (b) starting a family or being sexually active (because a bride price is common in most parts of Africa, marriage and family formation are directly tied to having income or property).41

Failure to achieve the above requirements may lead to frustration and as a result the youth may join illegal armed groups. This may be the case amongst youth in Kibera slum where the majority of them have been reported to be blocked in transition to adulthood. Literature reveals that the majority of youths in Kibera slum stop studying to help their parents at home since they cannot afford tuition fees especially before the introduction of the free primary and subsidized secondary education. It is evident and common that some of the youth in Kibera slum, who come from poor homes join armed gangs or groups as a means of survival and belongingness.

In summary, the current study has both independent and dependent variables. The independent variables for this study are factors that are assumed to have contributed to armed and violent conflict amongst youth in Nairobi’s Kibera slum from 1992 to the present. The dependent variable in this study is violent conflict amongst youth. Consequently, it is expected that: level of education, unemployment, urbanization and migration, and participation in decision making will have a significant impact on armed and violent conflict among youth in Kibera slum.

1.7 Hypothesis
The study sought to test the following research hypotheses:

1. Historical settlements within Kibera have not contributed to youth participation to violent conflict in the area since 1992.
2. Youth in Kibera have actively participated in violent conflict in the area since 1992
3. Youth in Kibera have been negatively affected by conflict in the area since 1992

1.8 Methodology
Both secondary and primary, sources of data, have been used. Secondary sources included books, articles, scholarly journals, National Policies and Legislations, News paper as well as website articles have also been used. For the materials from the website, dates of retrieval have

been indicated. The libraries used included; University of Nairobi, Jomo Kenyatta Memorial Library and the Kenya National Library Services. The unprocessed written material for example, reports from the Kenya National Commission of Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group, Waki Report, Akiwumi Report, Kiliku Report, Ndung'u Report and those of the United Nations Organizations, World Bank working with the Youth have been used to fill the gaps in the books and journals. Archival materials and oral interview were also used.

Primary data were collected through field survey. Researcher obtained a permit from the National Council for Science and Technology worked closely with the Ministry of Youth officers stationed in Kibera, the Provincial administration particularly the area Chief, youth leaders and parents. Researcher sampled and studied 100 youth (10 per day for 10 days) between the age of 14 – 24, both male and female from Gatwekera, Laini Saba, Silanga, Kisumu Ndogo and Lindi villages in Kibera slum. With the help of the District Youth Officers, researcher interviewed 10 parents. A combination of scheduled interviews, focus group discussion and interviewer observation were used to collect qualitative data on the causes and impact of youth involvement in conflict.

During the survey, researcher managed to sample on the following within Kibera; gender, age, youth in and out of school, marital status, residence within Kibera, level of engagement into violence, role of education on youth and violence, unemployment among the youth and violence, rural urban migration and its role in violence, lack of political engagement and youth violence and other general factors. The research design was mainly descriptive survey and historical method. After the data collection, the raw data from the questionnaire, interview guides and document analysis guide were sorted out according to their homogeneity. It was then edited to identify those that were not filled for questionnaires and then coding was done to make it easy for entry into the computer. The method of research analysis used was quantitative.
CHAPTER TWO
Settlement of Kibera area to 1992

2.0 Introduction
Nairobi City which currently covers 684 square kilometers is divided into eight districts with
eight main administrative divisions being Starehe, Dagoretti, Embakasi, Kasarani, Langata,
Makadara, Kumkunji and Westlands. The 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census put
Nairobi’s population at 3,138,269.42 Out of this, it is estimated that nearly 2 million of Nairobi’s
residents live in low income residential neighborhood and informal settlements like Kibera,
Mathare, Kariobangi, Kagemi, Korogocho and Mukuru where crime and daily violence including
extortion, murder, illegal taxation and rape has become a reality that ordinary citizens living
there have had to live with.43

43 Alfred Omenya and Grace Lubaale, Understanding the Tipping Point of Urban Conflict; the Case of Nairobi,
According to the Human Rights Watch Report "Ballots to Bullets" March 2008; Kibera and Mathare slums are some of the most densely populated areas in the world and as a result faces many problems related to urbanization. Located roughly 5 kilometers (3 miles) southwest of the city centre of Nairobi, Kibera encompasses an area of 2.5 square kilometers (0.965 square miles), accounting for less than 1% of Nairobi's total area while holding more than 25% of its population, at an estimated population density of 2000 persons per hectare (1250 / acre). Conditions in Kibera are extremely poor, and most of its residents lack access to basic services such as electricity and running water. A railroad track runs through the center of Kibera, which is commonly considered a boundary separating the poorest and most dangerous parts of Kibera.

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South of the tracks, from the relatively “better off” parts of Kibera North of the tracks. Kibera is home to multiple ethnic groups, who tend to dominate specific villages (Daily Nation, 2008).

2.1 Kibera Settlement from 1900 to 1945
The Nubians who are the earliest inhabitants of Kibera descended from Nuba mountain in what is now Central Sudan. They were forcefully conscripted into the colonial British army in early 1900s when Sudan was under British rule. As part of the Kings African Rifle also known as “Askaris” by British Colonial regiment, they were deployed throughout various parts of then British East Africa, including the Kenya colony to assist the British in their military expeditions and later in the First and the Second World Wars.46 In 1904, KAR officials set up army barracks a few kilometers southwest of the city along Ngong Road.47 The military was also allocated a large forested area next to the barracks, which the Sudanese soldiers called “Kibra” or forest. This location was chosen so that soldiers would be available anytime required by the central government and could reach the city centre at short notice.48

As these soldiers grew older and became unable to continue their military service, they began to set up more permanent residences on the land. Because these Sudanese soldiers were not native Kenyans, they had no pre-existing local “native reserve” where they could retire to, and most did not wish to return to their homeland. So in 1902, the KAR permitted nearly 300 Sudanese soldiers to settle in the area rent-free, as an “unofficial pension” for 12 years of military service.49 Kibera quickly became a thorn on the side of government officials as they grew weary of increasing crime and declining living conditions on land they “deemed too valuable and too near European settlement to be left to African.”50

The colonial authorities did not grant British citizenship to the Sudanese as they did to the Indian railway workers they had brought from India to Kenya for labor in the late 19th century. As such,

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the Sudanese remained simply as British subjects under colonial rule and were not granted British citizenship. As subjects they were considered British protectorate persons.\(^{51}\)

In 1904, the British colonial authorities assigned Kibera to the Sudanese to serve as their home. Kibera was surveyed as a military reserve and gazetted as such in 1917, which clarified that the area allocated was 4,197 acres. Permits to reside in Kibera were given to the Sudanese as individuals. The text of the permit gave the Sudanese permission to live in the area and to build a house but no title was conferred. A “location survey of buildings and shambas at Kibera” prepared by the District surveyor in 1934 indicated that Kibera was divided into 397 plots, each of which was individually allocated to named Kenyan Nubian, together with an indication of the acreage allocated. At the centre of the map there is also a clear indication of the location of a cemetery.\(^{52}\)

This allocation was supported by the 1933 report of the Kenya Land Commission, otherwise known as the Carter Land Commission Report which held that:

> "While we are fully satisfied of the necessity for moving the unauthorized residents of Kibera, we are not convinced with the necessity of moving the Sudanese. Their past service to the government entitled them to sympathetic consideration, and it is certain that they would prefer to stay where they are. We shall presently show grounds for thinking that it would be to the advantage both of themselves and of government that they should be allowed to do so."\(^{53}\)

The Carter Commission further stated;

> "The legal position of the occupants of Kibera appears to be that they are tenants at the will of the crown and the tenancy is liable to termination by the Commissioner of Lands. On the other hand we cannot agree that they have no rights in equity. We consider that government had a clear duty to these ex-soldiers either to repatriate them or find accommodation for them.... In our judgment they ought not to be moved without receiving suitable land elsewhere, and compensation for disturbance, we consider that a similar obligation exists in respect of their widows, sons who are already householders at Kibera."\(^{54}\)

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\(^{52}\) Ibid.


\(^{54}\) Ibid.
On the basis of the above, the Carter Commission recommended that Kibera should be reserved for the Nubians. It recognized that “Kibera was clearly designated to provide a home to the Sudanese ex-soldiers” and “government has a clear moral obligation to settle the Soldiers.” Many Nubians have therefore lived in Kibera from the turn of the last century to the present time.

In 1928, the administration of Kibera was handed over to the municipal council and one had to be a descendant of the soldiers who first settled there to be allowed to build a house. As the Sudanese community began to expand through new comers from other Sudanese settlements in East Africa as well as through natural growth, so the building of houses also expanded. The Municipality was not happy about the growth of the settlement and the existence of the Sudanese in the area, but the colonial officials argued that the Sudanese were merely tenants at the will of the Crown. The Carter Commission recommended that the Sudanese be given special consideration and should not be moved immediately out of the area, but gradually, and they should be compensated in the process. The Carter Commission is therefore very important in the study of Kibera since it allowed for the continuity of the Sudanese settlement in the area. At this time a few outsiders, not more than one hundred people mainly from Meru and Kikuyu had come to work as herders or shamba boys on the plots of the Sudanese settlers.

While Kibera residents largely won the right to remain on the land during colonial rule, their victory was partial. The colonial administration reluctantly agreed to abide by its obligation to tolerate Kibera but did nothing to develop it. From the perspective of the government, two possible endgames for Kibera remained. The first was that the conditions on the ground would become so unpleasant that residents would voluntarily choose to settle elsewhere, in what Parson terms “malicious neglect,” the government attempted “to force the Sudanese out by rendering Kibera unlivable.” They refused to provide services believing that doing so would only encourage others to settle on the land.

56 Ibid.
The second possibility was that the permitted KAR soldiers would eventually die at which time the colonial administration would reclaim the land. But the government did not anticipate the complexity and diversity of living arrangements that came about through years of informal settlement. A 1945 survey of Kibera’s nearly 3,000 residents found that only ten households belonged to those who were officially permitted residence, while others included offspring, KAR veterans without passes, and others who had purchased or married into housing permits.58

2.2 Kibera after 1945

While the colonial administration never accepted the legality of Kibera, by the 1950s, plans for reorganizing or demolishing it had largely disappeared as the British became pre-occupied with the Mau Mau Emergency and looming Kenyan Independence.59 The drastic change on the situation in Kibera came about during the Mau Mau emergency in 1950s. During this period, many Kikuyus left the city by choice and by force, but they were replaced by a steady stream of new migrants, including many western Kenyans who settled in Kibera60

The Sudanese anticipating independence saw this as their last opportunity to take advantage of their favored status with the British Administration and again requested permanent land rights. But Nubians had slipped from their privileged position with the British, partially because Nubians were less interested in institutional education than other ethnic such as the Kikuyu.61 Ultimately, the Nubians were unsuccessful in gaining permanent land rights as “the British Government lacked the influence or the desire to convince African politicians to up hold colonial obligations to the Sudanese. 62

The influx of migrants from western Kenya affected the housing demand in Kibera as the municipality was not in a position to provide housing for all the workers in municipal estates. The migrants found Kibera more congenial compared to other low income areas such as Dagorretti, Mathare valley, Kariobangi which were predominantly occupied by the Kikuyu and so not very safe to stay during the State of Emergency. The lifting of the State of Emergency in

59 Ibid.
60 Davis Clark, Op.cit.
62 Timothy Parsons, Op.cit. p.120.
1959 provided an impetus to the building of housing in the area as those people who had been forced out of Nairobi were now streaming back to compete over few housing and jobs in the City. Although most of the tenants who arrived were still non-Kikuyu, a new phenomena arose, namely the building of housing and cultivation of plots by Kikuyus on the outlying fringes of settled area of Kibera. The incoming Kikuyu were mainly displaced persons who had lost all they had during the Emergency and so tried to eke out an existence in the no man’s land in the Kibera fringes, still conveniently near enough to town either for casual employment or for catering of needs of townsmen.63

2.3 Kibera Since 1963

Following Kenya’s independence in 1963, waves of landless people migrated to urban areas in search of employment. The new Kenyan government retained the land policies of the colonial regime and inhabitants of Kibera did not receive property rights to the land they occupied. The Crowns Land Ordinance was renamed the Government Lands Act and the president was given authority to allocate unalienated government land, including Kibera.64 In line with its policy of ‘slum-clearance’, the Government of Kenya declared Kibera to be government land and officially terminated Nubian claims to the land in 1969. Between 1960s and 1970s, the state began to reclaim the land that had been allocated to the Nubians in order to construct middle-class housing estates. Even after the Nubian Member of Parliament at that time, Yanus Ali, presented a motion that passed unanimously requesting that Nubians receive title deeds for the land they occupied, it was never implemented as the government continued to claim the land.65

In spite of the government control of the land, settlement continued as rural Kenyans were motivated to move into the City and Kibera’s numbers increased by thousands. For instance, Kibera’s population grew from 3000 in 1960 to 8,000 in 1968 and to between 15,000 and 17,000 by 1972.66 The 1960s and 70s brought an influx of Luo tenants fleeing violence in rural areas following the assassination of a cabinet minister and KANU secretary general, Tom Mboya. As Luos settled in Kibera, the ethnic diversity of the settlement increased dramatically.

64 Davis Clark, Op.cit.
In the late 1960s, the Ministry of Lands and Settlements approached landlords in Kibera about demolishing the slum and offering them compensation and relocation assistance in response. The landlords refused this offer, likely questioning the government’s ability to forcibly evict them from Kibera and feeling a sense of ownership of land. A 1972 housing survey of Kibera found that 95 percent of landlords had lived in Kibera for 9 years or longer and 51 percent had lived there for over 27 years. The same survey found that 71 percent of owners were Nubians and 23 percent Kikuyus, while only 4 percent of renters were Nubians and 16 percent were Kikuyu. By late 1970s, this ratio of Nubians - to - Kikuyu owners was about to change as was the government policies towards Kibera.

When the government realized that they could not clear Nairobi slums, they changed their approach from hostile to tactic acceptance. In fact, as Hake notes, resident’s of Nairobi’s slum could no longer be considered squatters – most were paying rent for their accommodation – and they were not living in shanty towns – most of the residences were comparable to homes in up country Kenya and far more permanent than their ‘temporary’ label implied. So the administration asserted their authority in this otherwise unauthorized housing sector by offering government permits to build in Kibera and threatening to demolish any new, non-permitted constructions.

But critics’ points out that most of these permits went to members of the same ethnic group as President Jomo Kenyatta, the Kikuyu. Amis argues that land allocation permits were granted as political patronage, “paying back favours, consolidating potential clients, rewarding friends or fellow tribesmen by informally giving out free land for urban development.” While the Kikuyu were the most aggressive in acquiring land permits and building houses at this time, the Nubians

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67 Etherton, D., Mathare Valley; A case Study of Uncontrolled Settlement in Nairobi; Nairobi; Housing Research Development Unit, University of Nairobi, 1971.
69 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
also participated in the rental economy. As a result, ‘Kibera filled up very fast.’ But the Nubians’ initial hesitancy to build and rent homes in Kibera lost them their dominant position in Kibera; by 1984, 66 percent of Kibera landlords were Kikuyu while only 22 percent were Nubians while the growing tenant population came from Luo and Luhya ethnic groups.

Between 1980s and 1990s, Kibera continued to grow in population as more rural Kenyans and immigrants from nearby countries migrated to Nairobi in search of work. As the commercial housing sector become more institutionalized in Kibera, conflicts between the government and slum residents became less important and the problem in the area turned to be the growing tension between tenants and landlords. Tenants have become less concerned with the possibility of slum clearance and more worried about eviction from failure to pay their rent. The housing conditions which were largely made of wood, metal sheeting, mud and semi-permanent materials have continued to deteriorate as the tenants blame landlords for failing to maintain proper housing and services, and the landlords blame the tenants for the poor conditions of their rental properties.

In the past two decades, Kibera has experienced two notable clashes between tenants and landlords involving the youth. In 1992, Raila Odinga ran for a parliamentary seat to represent Langata constituency that includes Kibera. Prior to elections, several members of the Luo ethnic group moved from Nyanza province to Kibera to help ensure his victory. At this time and likely as a result of the growing number of Luo migrants in Kibera, a few major conflicts arose between the Luo tenants and Nubian landlords over rental charges. Even though the Kikuyu landlords were not directly involved in the fighting some had their properties destroyed while others were chased entirely from Kibera.

Ten years later in October 2001, violence again broke out between Luo tenants and Nubian landlords. President Daniel Moi while attending a fundraising directed that rents in Kibera be

76 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
lowered by half. The following week, a number of Kibera tenants took Moi by his word and refused to pay their rents until the government brokered a deal for decreased rents. In the following two months, tension increased which ensued into fighting that led to the death of at least 25 people, destruction of a number of homes and displacement of thousands of Kibera residents.79 After the violence ended, some landlords agreed to lower their rents, although rent disputes have continued to be the source of great tension between tenants and landlords in the area.

2.4 Kibera Since 2008

Today, Kibera sits approximately four miles west of Nairobi’s city center, surrounded by the Royal Nairobi Golf Club to the northwest, the Nairobi dam to the southeast, and the Ngong Forest to the southwest. Kibera is divided into a number of villages namely; Kianda, Soweto, Gatwekera, Kisumu Ndogo, Lindi, Laini Saba, Silanga/Undugu, Makina, Raila, and Mashimoni whose borders are not clear but mainly consists of natural boundary makers such as walking paths, railroad track and streams. The villages are Balkanized along ethnic lines with specific ethnic groups dominating specific areas within the slum; the Luo predominantly occupy Kianda, Raila village, Gatwekera and Kisumu Ndogo areas; Makina is mainly populated by Nubians while Laini Saba and Soweto near Nairobi Dam and the area bordering Langata are dominated by Kikuyu. The Luhya are dominantly in Mashimoni and Lindi areas.80 Homes in these villages are largely made of wood, metal sheets, mud and semi-permanent materials and rents range between Ksh.400 – 1,200 per month.81 This multi-ethnic nature coupled with the clanism of Kenyan politics has made Kibera to be the site of potential ethnic conflicts throughout its near 100 years of Kenya’s history.

One of Kibera’s most distinctive features is the Kenya-Uganda Railway that winds through the middle of the slum. While Kibera has a railway station, few residents use the train to commute to work, although some hang on the outside to avoid paying the fare. Most residents walk to their places of employment or use matatus or buses that service the slum via Kibera Drive and Mbagathi road.

In early 2008, Kibera experienced perhaps the darkest chapter in its 100 year history. As indicated in the Waki commission of inquiry, Kibera was a major site of death, injury, destruction of property, displacement, and sexual violence. While violent conflicts largely fell along ethnic and political lines, hostilities between Odinga and Kibaki’s supporters in Kibera

Internet accessed on 18th June 2012

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were intensified by existing tension between Luo tenants and Kikuyu landlords. Many Kikuyu residents were chased out of Kibera, and a greater number of them have never returned.

2.5 Conclusion
The current challenges in Kibera have both the Government of Kenya and the colonial government to blame. While the colonial administration initially granted land to retiring Nubian soldiers, they eventually withheld municipal services and developments as Kibera’s population grew and diversified. The Government of Kenya after independence continued this policy of “malicious neglect” and also failed to provide low-income housing through private enterprise. This lack of low-income housing resulted into high population growth in the slums as more people migrated to the city in doves in search for employment. It was the real estate boom during the 1970s and 1980s that largely led to Kibera’s high population density and drop in housing quality. Since then, home conditions have deteriorated as tension between landlords and tenants grew. The profit motive has also encouraged the landlords to construct inexpensive rental rooms in greater numbers and diminishing size, while the fear of demolition discouraged them too from further investment in these properties. Therefore, colonialism, the prospect of urban migration, unemployment, corruption and unregulated capitalism are all key contributors to Kibera’s current living conditions and culture.
CHAPTER THREE
Youth and conflict in Kibera. 1992-2008

3.0 Introduction
According to the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census of August 2010, 3,138,369 people are living in the city of Nairobi. Out of this over two million live in informal settlements which are overcrowded and overstressed environments. For instance, one out of every five Nairobians lives in Kibera which is one of the most crowded places in Africa with a population density of between 100,000-3,000,000 in an area smaller than New York’s Central park. As noted by Mutsotso and Kinyanjui in their publication; A Ticking Time Bomb; Nairobi’s Informal Settlement, 2002, slums are by their nature prone to violence. Not only are the majority of the slum inhabitants unemployed, but the informal settlement provides an ideal retreat for criminals.

With time slum dwellers have developed survival tactics, key among them which is the tendency among people of the same community to live together in closely-knit ‘ethnic villages.’ The inhabitants are mainly poor people who do manual jobs or operate small businesses; social services including health amenities are scarce. For instance within Kibera villages such as Gatwekera, Laini Saba and Soweto, numerous shanties are made of mud; sanitation is an open sewer and bad drainage litter residential areas. Besides, immorality and insecurity is alarming and no day passes without one hearing of a rape or stab cases. Other settlements within Nairobi with large populations include Mathare and Korogocho in Kasarani, Dandora and Huruma in Embakasi, Kangemi in Westlands, and Mukuru.

Each of these areas has great significance to the politics of Nairobi area. The survival difficulties among the poor and the unemployed, compounded by multi-ethnic nature of Kibera’s populism, combined with tribalism that pervades Kenyan politics has led Kibera in hosting a number of small ethnic conflicts throughout its century-long history. Initially, the Kikuyu dominated Kibera slums population, however over the years; the Luo ethnic group has become dominant. Today, Kibera’s residents represent all the major Kenyan ethnic backgrounds with particular

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village specifically dominated and occupied by people from a particular ethno-linguistic group. The Luo are the majority in Kianda, Raila village, Gatwekera, and Kisumu Ndogo, Makina is mainly dominated by Nubians while Kikuyus have a dominant presence in Laini Saba and Soweto. Luhyas dominate Mashimoni and Lindi areas. This ethnic balkanization has been used for electoral and political mobilization.

The years between 1980s and 1990s witnessed high population growth in Kibera as many rural Kenyans and immigrants from nearby countries migrated to Nairobi in search of work. As commercial housing sector became more institutionalized in Kibera, conflicts between the government and slum dwellers became less important than the growing tension between tenants and landlords. Tenants became less concerned with the possibility of slum clearance by the government but more worried of eviction by landlords for failure to pay their rents. As a result, housing conditions continued to deteriorate as tenants blamed landlords for failing to maintain proper hosing and services while the landlords on the other hand blamed tenants for the poor conditions of their rental properties. The landlord/tenant blame game has made Kibera to experience two notable clashes in the past two decades, 1992 and 2001. This chapter therefore examined the violence pattern in Kibera between 1992 and 2008, the youth involvement and its impact.

3.1 Kibera Violence of 1992
The violence experienced in Kibera at this time was between tenants and landlords. In 1992, Raila Odinga was to run for a parliamentary seat to represent Langata constituency. Prior to the elections, several members of Odinga’s ethnic Luo community moved from Nyanza province to Kibera to help ensure his Victory. The Luos settled together in Gatwekera and Kisumu Ndogo

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87 Emmanuel Mutsy and Masaru Yarime, Understanding the Grassroots Dynamics of Slums in Nairobi; The Dilemma of Kibera Informal Settlements, 2011.
90 Ibid.
91 Kunguru, J. and Mwiraria, M., NGO Support to Informal Settlements; A Case Study of Kibera, Nairobi; UNDP-World Bank Water and Sanitation Program, Regional Water and Sanitation Group- Eastern and Southern Africa.

93 Ibid.
mainly as tenants and were interested in low rents. Before the elections, they demanded that Raila assures them of lower rents for him to secure their votes and his re-election. At this time and likely as a result of growing number of Luo migrants to Kibera, major clashes arose between the Luo tenants and Nubian landlords over refusal to pay rent which they claimed was too high. Though the Kikuyu stayed out of the fighting, they suffered most as they owned most of the houses in the affected areas.\(^94\) The rents were eventually reduced, although some tenants still refused to pay mainly to Kikuyu landlords and instead chased them away.

In 1994, violence again broke out in Kibera, this time round as a result of the succession dispute following the death of Jaramogi Oginga Odinga. Jaramogi was the national chairman of FORD-K while Raila and Michael Wamalwa were the deputy director of elections and vice chairman respectively in FORD-K. Jaramogi’s death caused a vicious contestation over the party leadership between Raila and Wamalwa as youths in Kibera allied to the two engaged in running battles armed with machetes, whips, axes to settle their political scores.\(^95\) A number of them were injured as properties worth thousands of shillings were either destroyed or looted.

### 3.2 Kibera Violence of 1997/98

In October 1997, a bloody violence broke out in Kibera that left four people dead and paralyzed operations at the Toi market as hawkers feared of their business being looted. It was observed by the District Officer at that time, Mr. Benjamin Lemlem that the perpetrators were youth living in Kibera. Several houses were raided and scores of wananchi injured and unknown number of women and girls were raped.\(^96\)

In 1998, there was a presidential decree urging tenants in Kibera not to pay any rent to owners of structures built out of carton boxes, an open license for free housing. The result was the tenant/landlord violence when landlords and structure owners forcibly and unjustifiably evicted tenants as they refused to pay the actual amount agreed upon.\(^97\) Since this time, landlords in Kibera are said to have increasingly adopted ruthless means to evict ‘troublesome’ tenants and defaulters. Some landlords even hire the chiefs and police who then hire gangs to burn and evict tenants;

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96 *Kenya Post-Election Violence, Article 19, December 1998.*  
these gangs take advantage of the situations by venturing into crime such as stealing, looting and sometimes even rape.

3.3 Kibera Violence of 2002
On 22nd October 2001, the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the Land Law Systems in Kenya, Njonjo Commission visited Kibera as part of its countrywide visits to collect and collate views of Kenyans on the land laws reform process. In the run up to the visit, tension had been brewing pitting Nubians against non-Nubians over land ownership. During its sitting, the Nubian community claimed ancestral, rightful and “constitutional” ownership of the land in Kibera arguing that they had lived there for over one hundred years. Moreover, they were reported to have made a submission to the effect that all non-Nubian residents were ‘squatters’ and therefore did not deserve to live in Kibera. They asserted that all land in the area be given to them as they were the original allottees. The Nubians further claimed hosting other communities that had instead turned to oppressing them and in a memorandum suggested that hundreds of squatters from their community be decently settled on the more than 400 acres of the land in Kibera.98

The corollary was that the non-Nubian particularly the Luo did not take kindly to the statements. The area MP Hon Raila Odinga was ambivalent in his comments on the controversial Kibera land ownership and so neither supported the Nubians nor the other communities’ claims. He simply stated that lack of land security had led to the mushrooming of slums, as owners of shanties feared demolition of decently built houses. The sitting ended acrimoniously in heckling, name-calling and near fights as pandemonium, confusion and commotion reigned. At this stage, conflict placed the Nubian community on a collision course with all the other tenant resident communities over land ownership.99

Exactly ten days later as tension began rising, president Moi visited Kibera on 31st October 2001, to preside over a funds drive in aid of Langata Bursary Fund.100 The area MP raised the controversial issue of landownership and asked the president to intervene so as to save the tenants from high rent the same way he had intervened on behalf of tenants within other Nairobi

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99 ibid.
slums like Korogocho. He decried the poor living conditions in which the tenants lived besides being terrorized by goons hired by landlords to deal with rent defaulters:

“There is a rent problem in Kibera. It is an issue to the tenants. There are landlords who have built on government land but have not provided their tenants with toilets and bathrooms. Gangs hired by landlords evict rent defaulters yet the land belongs to the government. Landlords do not pay any tax rate to the land yet they fleece tenants. It is unfair. Tenants are requesting you to reduce rent in the same way you did in Korogocho.”

In his address the president stated that the land in Kibera belonged to the Government and those levying rent on the temporary structures were breaching the law:

“I understand Kibera since I do not stay far from Kibera. People grabbed land, built mud houses and moved tenants in but the land is not theirs,...Those illegally occupying land in Kibera would have been prosecuted but have to reduce rent to the level...”

Moi then ordered the Nairobi Provincial Commissioner (PC) to arbitrate between the landlords and the tenants over the rent issue. The PC called for a consultative meeting between the two parties during which he seemed to contradict his senior by ordering tenants to continue paying rent as they awaited further negotiations. At this point violence erupted since the tenants took it that the provincial administrator had sided with the landlords.

At another meeting called by the PC which representatives of landlords and tenants attended, landlords dug in their heels and appeared as if they were determined to maintain their optimum income. They did concede to proposals for rent reductions as follows: rents of between Kshs 100 and 200 would be reduced by Kshs 50; those of Kshs. 300- 900 by Kshs. 100; Kshs 1 500-2 500 by Kshs 200 and Kshs. 3000-10 000 by Kshs 500. Tenants on their part maintained a half cut and even non-payment of rents for other structures. The message that the tenants got from Moi’s speech was that they could after all stay in houses without paying rent as doubt had been cast by none other than the President of the Republic as to the title of the land purportedly claimed by the landlords. The president in effect “settled the land ownership problem” once he said that land in Kibera belonged to

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101 Raila Videotape of speeches during the Langata Constituency Bursary Fund Rally on 31st October 2001.
102 Daily Nation 7th December 2001.
103 Moi videotape of speeches during the Langata Constituency Bursary Fund rally on 31st October 2001.
the government but not to the Nubians who ten days previously had claimed its ownership. The tenants were emboldened and felt that they had a stake in the whole issue. Most of them started holding meetings popularly known as ‘Kamukunjis’ in which they gradually moved towards a resolution against payment of rent.

On 3rd December 2001 the area Member of Parliament, attended a rally in Kibera and demanded that rent be reduced by 50%. Unlike the president, the MP was unequivocal and as such was seen to have sided with the tenants. It was a statement made more for its populist appeal as opposed to with an intention of looking for lasting solution to the perennial Kibera conflict over land. Indeed the MP’s pronouncement resulted in physical violence that very night. When a landlord went to ask for rent from his tenants, they refused to pay and no doubt relied on statements made by the two politicians. The landlord in turn mobilized youth who went to beat up the tenants. The tenants, with the help of the Taliban - a predominantly Luo militia armed with whips, stones, rungus (knobkerries) and machetes, fought back in defence and overpowered the landlord and his gang. Being a Muslim, the landlord sought refuge in a mosque from where he proceeded to raise alarm. The intention seemingly was to create the impression that a Muslim was being attacked by non-Muslims in a mosque.

However, tension began to build up in the slum and after two days, the violence had spread throughout Kibera. As it sucked in, more and more members of the public from either side joined in fight to protect their interests. Before the police moved in to restore order, 25 people had been killed, a number of houses destroyed and thousands displaced in Kibera. The displaced mainly women and children seeked refuge within church compounds, mosques and administration offices, while the youth engaged the police in running battles as the police used live ammunition against charging crowds. Many structures went up in flames as tear gas engulfed Kibera while some landlords removed the roofing of their houses to evict tenants who had defied rent payment. The results were; people were maimed, others were killed, houses were burnt and property destroyed. There were bodies lying in pools of blood with others mutilated using pangas (machetes) twitching from gutters and lying along the railway line as the orgy of

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109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
violence went on for two weeks. By the time the violence was contained, 25 people had lost their lives, a number of women raped and property destroyed.\textsuperscript{111}

The police deployed in Kibera during the clashes were accused of breaching the law which they were expected to maintain. Among the offences leveled against them was rampant looting, rape, breaking into houses, attacking anyone they found outside their homes and chasing away anyone looking for safety.\textsuperscript{112} A resident reportedly said that the police invaded her house, beat her up, stole from her and attempted to strip her naked with intentions of raping her before she was saved by some relatives who screamed an alarm. \textit{"I feel traumatized by the incident; the police should protect us and not harass us."}\textsuperscript{113} A butcher reportedly said officers in full uniform entered his premises and ordered him to roast meat for them, \textit{"They had carried bottles of beer stolen from other shops, which they drank as they ate meat behind the butchery."} Another resident said the officers broke into his shop and took away more than Ksh 3,000, a shopkeeper claimed he lost Ksh 6,000 and goods estimated at Ksh 10,000 including bottles of sodas, packets of milk and perfumes.\textsuperscript{114} Another resident claimed the officers broke into her house and ordered her to surrender all her money, \textit{"I gave them Ksh 11,000 belonging to our women group and now the owners are demanding the money or my property."} A kiosk owner reported that, \textit{"The police broke into my locked kiosk and took all the money and bread. They mixed sugar, water and paraffin..."}\textsuperscript{115}

3.4 Kibera Violence of 2007/08
In early 2008, Kibera experienced the darkest chapter in its 100 years history. Leading up to the December 2007 presidential elections, Raila Odinga hotly contested campaign against incumbent Mwai Kibaki. Speculations about PNU rigging plans provoked curiosity and protest among ODM supporters in Kibera; it also heightened ethnic tension between the Gikuyu, Embu and Meru (GEMA) community and the Rift Valley/Western groups which provided the bulk of ODM support. The initial poll results consistently revealed that ODM was ahead of PNU, the threat to ODM inter-party rivalry increased. Most of the poll experts also predicted that Odinga

\textsuperscript{111} The People 27\textsuperscript{th} November 2001.
\textsuperscript{113} Daily Nation, 6\textsuperscript{th} December 2001.
\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Ibid.}
would defeat Kibaki as the early election results indicated that Odinga was winning the presidency.

The announcement by the Electoral Commission that Kibaki won by 4.5 million votes against Odinga’s 4.3 million votes sparked off simultaneous violence across the country as ethnic communities perceived to have supported either side attacked each other brutally. Kibera was turned into a site of death, injury, destruction of property, displacement and sexual violence as ODM youth supporters took to the streets in large numbers in protest, some targeted the Kikuyu for vengeance, while others set out to loot, vandalize and burn their property. This violence fell along ethnic and political lines as hostility between Odinga and Kibaki’s supporters intensified following existing tensions between Luo tenants and Kikuyu landlords.116

The months before elections were marked by political tension and sporadic violence, while the political rallies of Raila’s opponents in Kibera were disrupted, sometimes allegedly after incitement by ODM politicians. As the National election votes were being counted, people in Kibera keenly watched the live broadcast of the election results expecting Raila to win. Ready to celebrate, the people were also tense, expecting that the results might be rigged. Immediately after Kibaki was declared the winner, violence erupted.117

As one interviewee described it, ‘people went on a rampage, destroying things. Kikuyu started moving out immediately. People took to the streets shouting “Kikuyu have to go.” People also started looting from the Kikuyu houses and businesses. At this time, violence had also erupted in other parts of the Country mainly in Rift Valley where the Kalenjin community went destroying Kikuyu property, killing people and chasing them away from where they had lived for generations. Shops and houses were looted all over Kibera, mainly those belonging to Kikuyus and known PNU supporters. Toi market, an informal market mainly controlled by Kikuyu traders went up in flames.118

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117 Oral Interview, Jackton Ombech, Gatwekera, 4th July 2011.
118 Ibid.
During the violence, people were beaten up and robbed, some killed, and women and girls were raped. Much of the violence was simply looting and the main actors were male youth although there were situations where adults, girls and children were involved. Looting was often done randomly as youths from all parts of Kibera, and even outside, took part. Looters were from all ethnic groups, including Kikuyus. According to most informers, the violence was instigated by Gatwekera youth, the Luo area. “Groups of youth from Gatwekera came looking for Kikuyu, other youths followed these groups for their own safety as those who didn’t join them, were perceived to be against them.”

These Gatwekera groups were said to have been organized by local (youth) leaders, often liked to ODM. They went all over Kibera; after the initial ‘shopping spree’ at Kikuyu shops and houses, they turned to the property belonging to people of other ethnic groups. Police intervention came too late after a lot of damage had been done. They were also accused to have encouraged the thugs to ‘loot peacefully’ on condition that they got a share. The areas most affected were Kianda and Olympic perceived as richer parts of Kibera. In other areas, looting was limited because they were protected by neighborhood vigilantes or most of the shops were owned by non-Kikuyu residents.

The upper part of Kikuyu dominated Laini Saba was guarded by Kikuyu vigilantes and so survived most of the looting. In revenge, Luos living there were beaten and ordered to leave as their houses were looted and occupied by Kikuyus, mainly those fleeing other parts of Kibera. Luos fleeing Laini Saba found refuge in the other villages and occupied rooms deserted by Kikuyus. Notably, there was no much killing in Kibera; this is because the Luos generally fear blood of a dead person and also their main aim was to chase away the Kikuyu and loot. Most Kikuyus left almost immediately violence started, certainly in areas with high Luo or Luhya population leaving all their belongings behind. Very few of them stayed behind, mainly young men who were born in Kibera.

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120 Ibid.
121 Oral Interview, Ezekiel Njuguna, Laini Saba, 27th July 2011.
122 Oral Interview, Joshua Mwangi, Laini Saba, 27th July 2011.
"I had no problem, the guys that came to the house, I know all of them, they are my friends, and we grew up together," declared Joshua Mwangi

Violence in Kibera was also escalated by the speculations of propaganda during the post election period. The propagandas informed that there was plot to assassinate Raila and the army was to take up power. These speculations spreaded faster and wider through modern technology such as text/SMS messages although the local radio stations broadcasting vernacular languages (mainly Kalenjin, Kikuyu and Luo) also played a key role in inciting people, fueling fear and panic, exacerbating violence, resulting to displacement of people and destruction of property. The propaganda that Raila had been arrested sent ODM supporters to the streets to vent their frustration resulting to conflict between youth and the police. Also there was speculation that the Mungiki, a violent, pseudo-religious, predominantly Kikuyu gang, was to invade Kibera to take revenge. In response, Kibera vigilante groups organized themselves and in many occasions, would stay in the streets at night in readiness for defence against Mungiki, as they also protected their ‘ethnic groups’ from more violence and looting.

For weeks, the vigilantes continued their nightly vigils, in area such as Laini Saba and Gatwekera; they checked people during the day, asking for the identification cards: if one was found to be from a rival ethnic group, he or she would be in serious trouble, at times people were seriously injured or even killed. Occasionally there were clashes between different vigilante groups, notably the groups from Gatwekera and the ‘defence force’ of Laini Saba fought and a number of people were reported dead. Youths who initially made money after looting, turned to be ‘vigilantes,’ and started levying taxes on the residents for ‘protection’ when out in the streets at night. Some even erected road blocks on Kibera Drive to collect money from incoming and outgoing traffic within Kibera. Others offered their services to Kikuyus who were transporting their belongings out of Kibera and occasionally to the newly arrived, mainly Luos and Luhyas, chased away from Kikuyu-dominated areas.

One of the most popular slogans during this period was ‘No Raila, no Peace,’ a slogan that resonated strongly in Kibera.\textsuperscript{126} It was mostly applied by the youth who demonstrated within Kibera and along Ngong road. In most cases, they were invariably stopped from entering the city center by security forces who dispersed them using water cannons and teargas, resulting to more confrontations. As the security forces blocked Kibera youth demonstrating; they would go on rampage, looting, destroying and even burning people’s properties along the way and fighting the police. During this period, building along Ngong road including supermarkets, offices, garages, shops, hardware’s and even markets remained closed while the main street, ‘Kibera drive’ was subsequently barricaded by the youth to prevent the police from entering the slum. As violence continued, life in Kibera became more difficult; in many areas shops were either empty after looting or remained closed for security measures and the available fresh foods remained expensive and only a few could afford.\textsuperscript{127}

The first wave of the post-election violence in Kibera lasted for a week, after which Kibera calmed down and shops re-opened again although the situation remained volatile pending negotiations between ODM and PNU. The arrival of the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on 22nd January to mediate, improved the situation and many vigilante groups stopped their nightly vigils. However, the assassination of the ODM Embakasi MP Melitus Mugabe Were which was seen to be politically motivated triggered renewed attacks on Kikuyus.\textsuperscript{128} The youth gangs from Gatwekera moved from door to door to flush out any Kikuyu who was still within the area. This time more Kikuyus were killed, causing revenge killing of Luos and Luhyas in Laini Saba and Soweto. Approximately, 60 people may have been killed in Kibera slum, nearly half of the total of those killed in Nairobi.\textsuperscript{129}

3.5 Factors for Youth Involvement in Violent Conflict in Kibera. 1992-2008

With the poor slum dwellers living on the hope that their ethnic political leaders will someday save them from hunger, ill-health, poor shelter and sanitation, and the general lack of opportunities for self-improvement that defines life as they know it, Kibera settlement has

\textsuperscript{126} Johan de Smedt, \textit{Op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{128} Waki, \textit{Op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{129} KNCHR, \textit{Op.cit.}
remained among the most inflammable in Kenya's cross-cultural political emotion. Based on the analysis of the field data, it is true that Kibera youth engage in conflict from time to time giving several reasons for their participation. As the saying goes 'there is no violent conflict without the youth participation,'\textsuperscript{130} Kibera bore the highest brunt of post election violence in 2007;\textsuperscript{131} and the role of the youth was evident. This information was reached at after interviewing a number of youth from Laini Saba, Gatwekera, Silanga and Soweto villages. The figure below indicates the response from the youth on engagement on violent conflict in Kibera. Although the majority thinks that the youth in Kibera do not engage in conflict, 39 percent agreed that youth have been at the fore front in conflict in the area.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{figure.png}
\caption{To find out whether youth in Kibera engage in violent conflict}
\end{figure}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{130} Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein, \textit{Op.cit.}
\item \textsuperscript{131} KNCHR, \textit{Op.cit.}
\end{itemize}
Figure ii indicate the youth responses to violent conflict in Kibera and the factors that make them to participate. The finding clearly shows that the youth in Kibera have been participating in violent conflict in Kibera since 1992 with 39 percent admitting the same. The youth engage into violent conflict for several reasons, namely; unemployment, presence of youth gangs, idleness, ethnicity, poverty, laziness and other factors as indicated in the findings. From the responses, unemployment and the presence of youth gangs overrides other factors with negative ethnicity and idleness playing a minor roles on reasons why the youth participate in violent conflict.

3.5.1 Poor Living Conditions
In conducting the research, the Kibera findings showed that the living conditions in the slum is one of the major reasons for the conflicts in the area. In Kibera, social amenities such as health,
clean water and sanitation facilities are scarce. In villages such as Gatwekera, Laini Saba, Soweto, numerous shanties are made of mud as proper sanitation is a mirage with open sewers and dab drainage. There are no proper toilets in these areas as residents uses plastic bags which they discard outside their houses.\textsuperscript{132} This has brought a lot of problems between the tenants and the landlords. The tenants claim that their landlords got the land free from the government, they do not pay land rates yet they have failed to maintain proper housing and services. The landlords on the other hand blame the tenants for the poor conditions of their rental properties.\textsuperscript{133} This issue has been the cause of conflict between the landlords and tenants since 1992. In addition to this, they face inadequate schooling facilities, lack of drainage system and even lack of security services. This has resulted to life threatening outcomes which leads to mass poverty, contagious diseases, conflicts and others social hazards.\textsuperscript{134}

Figure iii below shows the number of youth interviewed from the selected five villages; Gatwekera 23 percent, Soweto 15 percent, Laini Saba 26 percent, Silanga 19 percent and Mashimoni 17 percent.

\textsuperscript{132} Umande Trust, \textit{Op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{133} Kunguru and Mwiraria, \textit{Op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{134} Oral Interview, Benard Shitahi, Silanga, 14\textsuperscript{th} July 2011.
3.5.2 Unemployment among the youth

Unemployment problem has led to expansion of informal settlements in Nairobi to accommodate low-income populations. According to the 1989 population census, Kibera and Mathare alone had an average population of 122,647 with a density of 40,881 in square kilometers. This population was 60 percent higher than Nairobi’s city’s average. Two decades later, 60 percent of Nairobi’s population is living in the slums as the population of Kibera alone increasing from 122,643 in 1989 to 750,000 in 2002.\(^{135}\) Difficulties in securing a decent job is one of the major challenges Kibera youth face leaving them vulnerable to mobilization and manipulation to politicians and involvement into crime.\(^{136}\) The responses from the youth indicate that 69 percent of the youth believe that conflict in Kibera is mainly due to unemployment among the youth with 18 percent not supporting the fact as indicated in figure iv. During the 2007 post-election


violence, political parties took advantage of their vulnerability and incited them to participate in violence. Due to their massive numbers, they became a rich hunting ground for votes and were also employed to hunt for the opponents of their employers. A number of youth from Kibera were engaged in demonstrations and running battles with law enforcement agencies as the country slipped into violence.137

The situation of unemployment makes the youth be fodder for manipulation when enticed with money. Research found that majority of them have been forced to access self-employment in the informal sector (Jua Kali) where they are frequently victims of arbitrary licensing systems and confiscation of good on accounts of allegation of conducting illegal business. The changes introduced in public transport sector in 2004 (Michuki rules) that occurred almost simultaneously with the general freeze on licensing of hawkers especially in Nairobi rendered many youth

137 Oral Interview, John Nakoli, District Youth Officer Langata, 5th August 2011.
jobless and this had a repercussion in the level of violence crime involving the youth in 
Kibera. In explaining how unemployment contributed to violence more directly, the youth 
respondent mainly cited idleness that cause the youth to be paid to cause violence and lack of 
economic empowerment. The post-election violence therefore provided a camouflage for 
settling property and employment disputes by the youth.

On limited opportunities to earn a living, some youth agreed with the government’s explanation 
for the current unemployment crisis in Kenya. However, others were categorical that the greatest 
hurdles to employment were prospective employers’ requirements for ‘years of experience,’ 
compounded with nepotism and corruption. The culture of nepotism is not only practiced in the 
civil service, which remains highly politicized but is also experienced in the private sector. Lack of fairness in the country with regard to recruitment and reality that certain positions are 
held by members of particular ethnic groups has led to high unemployment among the youth 
leading to their participation in conflict.

3.5.3 Exclusion and Inequality
The perceived effectiveness of the right to voice political opinions, participation in decision 
making freely was assessed in Kibera for perceived political inequality. As much as 75 % of 
Kenya’s population is under 30 years of age, it is not reflected in their political representation 
since youth are marginalized and excluded from decision making. Young people’s understanding 
of political participation is directly related to the potentials of tangible influence on matters that 
affects their lives on public policy, instead of just being the subject to these. The youth feel that 
they have been left out of political engagement especially on matters and policies that affect 
them although they recognize that participation is an evolutionary process that takes time.

Youth from Kibera harbor a deep sense of exclusion and inequality originating from family 
background characterized by lack of sustainable sources of income. The youth do appreciate that 
good education paves way for better life opportunities and sustains their aspiration, but parents’

138 Oral Interview, Cecilia Amunga, Silanga, 14th July 2011.
139 Oral Interview, Samson Onyango, Gatweker, 15th July 2011.
poverty and educational backgrounds prevent them from furthering their studies. In the discussion on access to education, a majority mentioned the importance of money in schooling. While the highly deprived believed that the system has not provided equal opportunity, those who are better provided see education system as also limiting in terms of lack of applicable knowledge and skills to equip them for self reliance or self-employment, in the areas of business and entrepreneurial skills. The educational system has not prepared them for labor market opportunities leaving them to engage in conflicts. The study shows that 52 percent of the youth in Kibera believe that they participate in conflict due to inadequate education. Youths with basic education believe they could have done more if trained to be self sufficient instead on focusing on formal employment.

Figure 5: How inadequate education has contribute to youth participation in violence in Kibera

According to ‘Saroya Mbela’ not his real name, illiteracy among the youth also plays a great role in their involvement in violent conflict in Kibera. Due to poverty in the slum, majority of the

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young people do not go beyond primary, thank God to subsidized Secondary education introduced in 2008, this leave the youth with only primary education and some with no education at all forcing their parents to introduced them to income generating life earlier. The reality of many Kenyans is shaped by the hardship of inequality and poverty which often lead to frustrations and hopelessness. Even with the notable growth of economy of 6 – 7 percent in 2007, benefits do not translate into the livelihood and incomes especially of the urban poor who have continued to live in extreme poverty within the slums such as Kibera. This situation with other phenomena such as weak institutions, ethnic polarization has left the youth to be potential recruits for violence as witnessed in Kibera.

Figure vi: Does lack of Political engagement limit the youth to express their grievances?

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145 Oral Interview, Saroya Mbela, Soweto, 13th July 2011.
3.5.4 Existence of Organized Youth Gangs

In Kibera area, organized youth gangs are common and have operated there for a long time. The disintegration of security in the Nairobi slums since 1990s, following the violent introduction of multi-party politics and the consequent emergence of Mungiki, has led to simultaneous mushrooming of vigilantes in non-kikuyu dominated slums like Kibera. The mission of the vigilantes is to curtail increased incidences of crime in the slum and to safeguard the political community from potential attacks by opponent ethnic militias although beneath these functions, most of them have economic motives which relate to the survival needs of their members. They range from loose social or friendship groups – youth who hang out together to a more organized and structured gangs engaging in unlawful acts such as taxing, fighting rural group, drug dealing, violent crime and intimidation. Usually, they are hired by politicians and even other organizations who wish to hold events in the area and charge for use of grounds such as the open spaces. The gangs reported to have actively engaged in attacks during 2007/2008 post election violence in Kibera were Siafu, Bukhungu, Jeshi la Darajani, Ghetto, and Mungiki.

The ‘Siafu’ gang operates from Gatwekera/Olympic area and was suspected to have been the group that initiated violence and other forms of protests in Kibera during the 2007 post-election violence. Throughout the period that violence and protests occurred, witness accounts reported seeing the gang members armed with pangas and other crude weapons engaging the security forces, barricading roads, looting and burning. They are said to have coordinated their activities through mobile phones as reports also indicated that they received logistical support from some councilors.

The Bukhungu gangs operate in the areas of Lindi, Kichinjio where people from the Luhya community are the majority and were largely responsible for the mayhem within this part of Kibera. It consists mainly of Luhya youth and operates from an open area bearing the same name, which also serves as a venue for political rallies. It is reported to have engaged in various extortionist practices, for instance, one had to pay a fee to the group to be allowed to conduct

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150 Ibid.
business in the area and to use Bukhungu grounds. The group controlled and collected rent from the houses that were owned by evicted Kikuyu landlords.\footnote{KNCHR, Op.cit.}

Jeshi la Darajani gang allegedly operated in the Makina area and mainly composed of Nubians. This gang was responsible for much of the violence in areas such as Toi market which Nubians have over time claimed as part of their settlement and which they subsequently occupied after the violence.\footnote{ibid.}

Similarly, there were clashes pitting organized gangs from poor sections like Kisumu Ndogo, Gatwekera and Kianda against militias from estates such as Olympic, Ayany and Fort Jesus. The neighboring Karanja estate, which is inhabited by the small well-organized minority Nubians was not spared from chaos as the rest of the sprawling slum. These events of the second half of January 2008 showed the slide of political violence into social violence with criminal actors, gangs that were prompt in taking advantage of the slightest lapse in vigilance of the police to operate in broad daylight.\footnote{ibid.}

3.5.5 Perceived Mismanagement of the 2007 Elections
The youth claimed that the results which were announced by the ECK were not fair and therefore elections were mismanaged. In 2007, the opposition and other observers began questioning the independence of the Electoral Commission after President Kibaki ignored the Inter-Parties Parliamentary Groups (IPPG) agreement and named new commissioners without consulting the opposition parties. Some of the newly appointed commissioners were perceived to be friends of the government of President Kibaki.\footnote{ibid.} All this idea was widely documented in the media which the youth easily accessed. So when the ECK bungled the vote tallying exercise, it only confirmed the fears of the youth and the opposition that the electoral process and management was designed to ensure re-election of the incumbent president. The fact that most of the senior politicians (old guards) were voted out, they expected change of guard especially in the presidency. The youth thought that their engagement in violence and conflict would change the outcome of the National
They wanted justice which they thought they could only be achieved through mass action. To them injustice had been done and so “No Raila no peace,” shouted the youth along Kong Road.

5.6 Ethnic Stereotypes
Ethnic stereotypes also played a key role in Kibera chaos. Kenya has forty two ethnic communities with diverse cultures and traditions yet many communities have over the years retained stereotype against others. These stereotypes have been passed down through oral traditions from one generation to another. For instance, the Kikuyu community is known to be hard working and driven by pursuit for monetary gain making other communities perceive them as lovers of money and power. Within Kibera, different ethnic groups live in specific areas received as ‘ethnic villages,’ these communities owe their safety not on the national security, but entrust their protection in ethnic enclaves which act as barriers against opponent group. This actor highly explains why the youth from the Luo, Luhya and Nubian communities easily attacked the Kikuyu in Kibera during the 2007 post-election violence.

5.7 Inflammatory Statements
Other triggers that contributed to violence were hate speech by politicians and Media houses specially vernacular stations serving the big ethnic groups. Careless pronouncement by the vice president for his support to Kibaki instigated conflict between the Luos and Kambas in Satwekera area. They gave the Kambas twenty four hours to vacate the place. Ugandans were never spared either due congratulatory remark made by President Museveni to Mr. Kibaki and his presence during the inauguration at state house. This occasioned the Luo and Luhya to turn their anger at the Uganda village adjacent to Laini Saba where they were given an ultimatum to leave, a number of them were injured and their houses torched. Careless pronouncements of politicians and incitement of the public to hate the antagonist parties and communities, coupled with hate propaganda given expression over especially vernacular radio served to fuel the violence. The content of the statements by politicians during the run up to the 2007 elections was
both condescending as it was coded in negative ethnic stereotypes involving various communities.\textsuperscript{162}

3.5.8 Harassment by Security Organs
The regular security raids carried out by the police and other security agencies is perceived as contributing factor to the conflict. The persistent police operation in low-income areas such as Kibera slums was interpreted as intimidation and provocative. The presence of the police in the area during the post election violence exacerbated the situation and led to the many deaths of civilians who were felled by security organs. Additionally the indiscriminate use of police and other security agencies in interfering with the activities of the locals in the pretext of providing security provokes violence.\textsuperscript{163}

Police used excessive force in attempts to contain the demonstrators. They used tear gas and live ammunition on unarmed protesters. In one incident at Ligi Ndogo where prayers were being held for deceased protesters mainly from Kibera, police used live ammunition to disperse protesters blocking the nearby Ngong Road.\textsuperscript{164}

3.5.9 The Abortive NARC Dream and the New Constitution
A better understanding of the frustrations Kenyans had with the Kibaki government is best captured by the NARC dream symbolized in the swearing-in of Mwai Kibaki as head of state in 2002. The display of popular support during the swearing in of president Kibaki at Uhuru Park in 2002 was a symbolic revolution in the making. The revolution revolved around a new constitution, fight against corruption and creation of 500,000 jobs yearly. Hence to the youth, the coming into power of NARC in the year 2002 was a guarantee that the leadership was going to address the socio-economic problems facing them and the country in general. Contrary to their expectation, the NARC dream collapsed as the coalition parties fell apart.\textsuperscript{165} The regime became more ethnicized that coalition partners representing certain communities were dropped from government following the defeat of government in the 2005 referendum. The government failed to address ethnicity, corruption and unemployment leaving the youth with nothing but to engage

\textsuperscript{162} KNCHR, \textit{Op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid.
in violence. The youth actually lost faith and were really looking forward towards change of leadership in 2007. So when their dream failed to come true, violence erupted immediately election results were announced.166

3.5.10 Role of Parents
There were situations where parents forcefully recruited their sons to defend them against the attackers. According to Samora from western province, his father forced him to sleep in the course of the day so that at night he keeps vigil, guarding their properties and their community.167 During the day within the slum, a few youth could be met roaming as they slept to guard over the night. The parents also provided them with the weapons such as pangas, rungus and even arrows for their use. According to another respondent within Kibera, the police in some instances failed to protect members of particular communities since they were overstretched.168 So failure by the police to act on time encouraged the youth and vigilantes from those communities to take the law into their hands in order to protect their people.

3.5.11 Need to Sustain Livelihood
Following the outbreak of violence, many people were unable to access to normal supplies especially food and other basic needs. The most affected were casual laborers residing in the slums depending on daily wages from their employers since they were unable to go to work due to insecurity. In the absence of normal supplies, many of them organized themselves into small gangs to break and loot shops within Kibera. Looting presented an opportunity to acquire assets that one would not obtain legally through hard work as the gangs bragged that they were going shopping while some even illegally occupied residential houses belonging to the enemy communities. They also erected illegal road blocks on roads leading to the slum where they imposed illegal levies on motorists and other road users.169

3.5.12 Breakdown of Social Norms
The transmission of social values and norms which should take place through the family and the local community is missing within Kibera as indicated in the figure with 52 percent responding to yes. This breakdown has been reinforced by the poor physical environment, inadequate or

poor distributed economic and recreation opportunities within the informal settlement and the lack of social support. The breakdown of traditional sanctions to combat the culture of violence enables the cycle of violence among the youth to continue. The family and the school have ceased to operate as primary socializing agents and so many youth within Kibera have opted for a life in the streets as street gangs or in social groups which are similar to the gangs.\textsuperscript{170}

Education is the crucial link for the development of responsibility and citizenship among the young people yet it has particularly been affected by the growing urbanization. Traditionally, education has been the major form of social capital investment but today its value has been minimized due to the overwhelming number of the youth. In Kenya even with the introduction of the free primary education in 2003, it has been found that the youth living within the informal settlements especially Kibera do not even enter primary education because their families cannot afford it or absence of schools in the area.\textsuperscript{171} Others never progress beyond primary level again for reasons of cost as well as the unavailability of secondary education. Others leave school early under pressure from families to earn money in order to provide family care.\textsuperscript{172} This increases their vulnerability to crime and victimization and further reduces their opportunity to find productive work and involvement in their society.

\textsuperscript{170} Okoth Okombo and Olang' Sana, \textit{Op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{171} Saroya Mbele, \textit{Op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{172} Samora Mulunda, \textit{Op.cit.}
During the recent conflicts, the social decay, characterized by evident loss of social and moral values within Kibera was exposed. The rape cases within the area committed against both female and male victims, forced male circumcision against the Luo community by the Mungiki sect and killing of people in discriminatively actually was a sign of social decay within Kibera. As a result, many people lost their lives; some lost their dignity leading to hopelessness and to some extent suicide, while other contracted HIV Aids and other related diseases. These atrocities left the children tortured especially in areas they witnessed these acts against their relatives or parents. A young girl committed suicide after being gang raped by the same gang that raped her mother.

174 Oral Interview, Christine Ochieng, Gatwekera, 15th July 2011.
3.5.13 Rural Urban Migration

There is also the perception by some communities and groups that they have been marginalized, especially the youth. Waki report clearly states that certain communities in Kenya today have done better than others who are poorer, less well developed, and more marginalized from the mainstream.\(^{175}\) Feelings of resentment and powerlessness that the affected communities and youth leave them with high potentials of being mobilized violently. In Kibera, the fast growing groups of the urban poor from rural areas “who are not land owners and are unlikely ever to be landowners” already displays a grave security problem in the setting.\(^{176}\)

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Although Kibera youth may have been seen as an easy target for violence and crime, they can also be mobilized to undertake a worthy cause. A large number of them registered and voted during the 2007 general elections through a voter education campaign dubbed ‘vijana tugutuke’. Apart from voting, they have also managed to mobilize themselves to demonstrate their qualities of leadership and capacity to respond to the national democratic demands. Some of the current political leaders for instance, have ascended to their present status through the public universities student’s politics and activism.177

3.5.14 Conclusion
Failure by successive governments to comprehensively address the issues facing the youth has rendered them frustrated and therefore vulnerable. They are particularly exposed to crime and violence both as victims and perpetrators. In a bid to survive in such a harsh environment many youth have found themselves recruited into violent gangs such as; Mungiki, Bukhunger which are easily manipulated, particularly by politicians.

A number of factors have been mentioned grossly as the reasons why the youth in Kibera participated in violent conflict between 1992 and 2008. Most of the conflicts experienced in Kibera in 1992, 1997/97 and 2003 were mainly between the tenants and landlords. The tenants believed that Kibera land belongs to the Government and therefore the landlords, specifically the Nubians who even have no citizenship have no authority to increase rent at their will. The Nubian landlords on the other side claim the area was given to them by the colonial Government and so it is their rightful land. This has lead to a number of clashes in the area living scores of people dead and injured. Properties and businesses have also not been spared during these clashes as shops, kiosks and even houses have been looted, torched and burned down.

Further, unemployed youth in Kibera have not only been mobilized, incited and paid by leaders to commit anarchy and create chaos, but they also exploit their own, especially the poor by forcing them to join gangs. The Kriegler Report notes that they are also heavily underrepresented in the voter register – a basis drawn from the ECK reports’ findings. This could be attributed to the fact that their right to participate in governance is not only inhibited by difficulties in

obtaining a national identity card, but also that political processes and institutions in Kenya have systemically failed to engage the youth in any meaningful manner.

Apart from the perceived rigged elections, youth unemployment and the landlord/tenants tensions in Kibera, the study has also brought up other factors for youth involvement in violent conflict in the area. Some of the mentioned factors include limited opportunities to earn a living, existence of organized gangs within Kibera, idleness and peer pressure, ethnic balkanization within the slum, inadequate education, rural urban migration among others. These factors have increased stress and a feeling of hopelessness among the youth in the area who already are in the heart of poverty, and so left with nothing but a fighting process as a means of venting their anger and frustrations.

Kibera youth were not only among those that were exploited but were exploiters as well. For instance, the Mungiki gang who created chaos during the skirmishes took advantage of the situation, consolidated and strengthened their own power which to date they are using as a tool of trade for causing insecurity that ensured their survival. Militia gangs such the Siafu, Bukhungu have capitalized on the disorder and political uncertainty to expand their economic interest and their area of influence by demanding money from members of public perceived to be economically well to do.

However, while the youth in Kibera have been condemned for committing most of the atrocities during PEV, what is less acknowledged is that they were also the biggest victims and casualties. Most of those who lost their lives were youth. Law enforcement agencies also focus their attention on the youth while protecting the principal perpetrators of violence.
CHAPTER FOUR
Impact of the Youth Involvement in Conflict on Kibera

4.0 Introduction
Nairobi has always been the hotbed of political activity in Kenya. In the multi-party elections of 1992 and 1997, for instance, it was the bastion of the opposition politics and voted opposition leaning members of parliament and councilors. Electoral contests in Nairobi have always been characterized by violence leaving behind destructions and loss of lives. In December 2007, systematic violations started after the polling day. Tension gripped the city as the first results started trickling in on that same night. Indications were that a number of violent acts were being experienced during the counting and tallying of the votes in most Nairobi constituencies’ tallying centers within the slums.\(^{178}\)

It was not however until the announcement of presidential results that widespread and more severe and methodical violence occurred. On the night of the 30 December 2007 violence broke out in Kibera. Following the announcement of presidential results, ODM called for protests and a rally at Uhuru Park. The rally was planned for the swearing in ceremony of ODM presidential candidate Raila Odinga as the Peoples President.\(^{179}\)

During the month of January 2008 and early part of February 2008, the entire city experienced incidents of violence including in the Kibera mostly spearheaded by illegal gangs that preexisted before the 2007 election violence. These gangs include Siafu, Mungiki, and Bukhungu, Jeshi la Darajani and Siafu associated with the leading political parties, ODM and PNU.\(^{180}\)

The violence saw a great deal of death and bloodshed in the informal settlements of Kibera when the illegal and organized groups armed with, clubs, machetes, stones and other crude weapons barricaded roads, looted properties and violently attacked those they perceived to have voted for rival candidates. Between 27 December 2007 and 30 January 2008, close to 50 people were estimated to have been killed in Kibera alone. These negative atrocities were blamed on the youth.\(^{181}\)

\(^{179}\) Ibid.
\(^{180}\) Ibid.
4.1 Impact of Conflict on Kibera

The youth in Kibera have been associated with negative actions anytime there is conflict in the area with the worst being the 2007/08 post election violence. These included looting and theft, violent attacks and killings, protests and blocking of roads, displacement of people and general destruction of physical infrastructure. The youth were also associated with atrocities such as gang rape.

4.1.1 Displacement of People

In December 2001, Kibera was faced with one of the most violent periods following fight between landlords and tenants after president Moi, on the request of Raila Odinga directed that rents be reduced. The tenants turned against their landlords and landladies with the former refusing to pay rent and demanding that the latter lower their rates. They refused to pay on the strength of president Moi’s call for lower rates in the area.182 The result was violence in Kibera which lasted for four days and left fifteen people dead, scores injured with deep cuts, house and other properties either looted or burnt down and a number people displaced from their homes seeking refuge in churches, mosques and DOs office.183

To date, an estimated seven hundred thousand people from the villages of Soweto, Mashimoni, Silanga, Makina, Lindi and Gatwekera are still leaving in fear and suspicion of one another even though some landlords lowered their rents.184 During this time, Brother Rubi and Charles of the Missionaries of Charity (brothers) who had established an informal school and feeding program for six hundred children within Kibera were also forced to close down prematurely as most parents re-located due to the skirmishes. The only health facility in Kibera was also partly burnt as pews and other property at St Thomas Catholic Church (A mass centre of Guadalupe Parish) were also burnt down.

The 2007/2008 violence was also characterized by widespread forced evictions and displacement of people. By 10th January 2008, there were about seventy five thousand internally displaced people in Nairobi and in Kibera alone, an estimate of five thousand people were displaced. In Silanga Village, there was extensive displacement of all landlords, mainly from the

183 Ibid.
Kikuyu community and invasion of houses by new and illegal tenants.\textsuperscript{185} Many victims fled their houses on their own volition to escape violence and threats while some fled to IDP camps that had been established at the High rise Catholic Church, St. Jude’s Anglican Church, Christ the King Church in Laini Saba, Administration police Camp adjacent to Nyayo high rise, Jamuhuri Show ground and Undugu Society. Others shifted to more friendly neighborhoods in other parts of the city and in some cases, to rural areas.\textsuperscript{186}

The camps were established haphazardly and so had poor ventilation, grossly inadequate water supply and sanitation facilities coupled with overcrowding, making them ideal conditions for major outbreak of communicable diseases such as meningitis, typhoid, cholera and chest related diseases from the cold. Mbagathi District Hospital which is a few meters away was overwhelmed by the number of patients and so turned away huge numbers. The displaced also suffered malnutrition due to inadequate food supply from the Red Cross which they mainly depended on. The displaced were mainly women and children as men remained guarding their properties at home.\textsuperscript{187}

Within the camps, women and children bore the brunt of suffering as families were forced to share congested sleeping places in close proximity with one another with little or no privacy. Nature being what it is, uncontrolled and indiscriminative sexual behaviour was reported not only between the adult men and women but also sexual abuse against the young children particularly girls, the result was the sexual transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS passed from one individual to another with women and children being the most affected.\textsuperscript{188}

4.1.2 Loss of Lives and Physical Injuries

In 2007, the people of Kibera slum predominantly an ODM stronghold experienced loss of life and physical injuries when illegal organized youth gangs armed with machetes, clubs, stones and other crude weapons barricaded roads and violently attacked those they perceived to have voted for rival candidates. Close to fifty people are estimated to have been killed the night presidential

\textsuperscript{185} KNCHR, \textit{Op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{186} Kibera Inter-Faith, Kenya Thabiti Task Force; Root Causes and Implication of Post-Election Violence of 2007, 2008.
\textsuperscript{187} Oral Interview, Steve Ochieng, Laini Saba, 27\textsuperscript{th} July 2011.
\textsuperscript{188} \textit{Ibid.}
results were announced in Kibera alone. On 29th December 2008, police collected 10 bodies from the slum.

A resident of Kibera stated that she was in her house in Kibera Laini Saba on Monday 31st of December 2007 when she felt something hit her on the left breast and she fell down bleeding. It was only then that she realized she had been shot. Good Samaritans were unable to take her to hospital immediately since there were gunshots everywhere but she was eventually taken to Mbagathi Hospital and later referred to Kenyatta National Hospital to undergo an operation to remove a bullet lodged in her breast. Upon discharge from hospital, she found her house had been looted. Young people mainly the youth were seriously injured during the skirmishes, in Laini Saba and Gatwekera, three interviewees' Samora, Alex and Samson had visible scars from injuries due to violence. They claimed that they were attacked by arrows and bow, panga and even knives, fortunately none had a bullet wound.

Majority of the youth who lost their lives as they were killed by the police. Slum dwelling made mainly of wood, sacking, and tin sheets were easily pierced by bullets. A young woman was hit in the chest at 8.00am in the morning on December 31st 2007 as bullets came through the wall of her home. Another man was shot and killed the same day when he opened the door of his house to see what was going on in Kibera, as a worker at the local mosque told human rights watch;

"On December 31st 2007 at 9.00am; along Karanja road, I was carrying wounded people who had been shot by police. A young man opened the door of his house to see what was going on. Police aimed at him and shot at him three times. The first two missed, but the third bullet got him."

Similar or worse violence escalated following the announcement of a partial cabinet by President Kibaki when he appointment ODM-Kenya presidential candidate Hon. Kalonzo Musyoka as Vice President on 9th January 2008 and the killing of the late Embakasi MP Hon Melitus

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193 Ibid.
Mugabe Were on 29th January 2008 in Nairobi’s Woodley Estate in Kibera. The residents found themselves in a quandary since those they thought were entrusted to protect them mainly the police and provincial administration were either not present nor did not seem to care. In places where they were present, they remained as brutal as the marauding youth gangs terrorized people and caused violence. Citizens going about their business suffered just as much at the hands of police. As indicated in the Report on the Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence (CIPEV) dated October 2008, Nairobi recorded a total of one hundred and twenty five deaths. These deaths were as a result of multiple factors as shown in the figure below.

![Figure ix: Causes of deaths in Nairobi during the 2007-2008 post-election violence](image)

As the security agencies cordoned off Kibera to ensure that the protesters did not go beyond their residences, ordinary citizens who were not necessarily protesters and who had no intention to participate in demonstrations and riots were either killed as the police used live ammunitions on the demonstrators or barred people from any movement within the area since a curfew was enforced. According to the Human Rights Watch Report 2008, nine people were shot dead and

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nineteen others seriously injured in Kibera between 27th December 2007 and 10th January 2008.

4.1.3 Forced Circumcision

Forcible circumcision was one particular form of violence that targeted the male members of the Luo community mainly by alleged members of the Mungiki sect in Laini Saba and Lindi villages in Kibera.197

As one witness recounted to the Waki commission: “One night soon after the announcement of the presidential results, members of the Mungiki cell moved around the houses in the area calling on all male from the Kikuyu community to come out and defend their people. They claimed “our women and children were being raped and killed while we slept.” I was forced out of the house to join them ....That night I personally witnessed the members of this group led by their commander forcefully and crudely cut the foreskins of eight male adults, mainly from the Luo community. They would stop matatus at stages within Gumo Estate and force them to alight; some of the matatu drivers helped them identify the Luo passengers. The Mungiki then ripped the trousers and underwear of the person using sharp pangas, exposing the person’s private parts. If the person was found to be uncircumcised, they crudely pulled out and cut the foreskin.” The forced circumcision was atrocious and many victims bled to death.198

4.1.4 Rape

Rape took an ethnic angle in Nairobi’s Kibera settlement where sexual violence was meted against members of ‘enemy communities.’199 Sexual violence was used mainly to force people out of their homes; retaliate against them as a punishment for having voted for the wrong tribe or party; and to humiliate individuals and their communities into a pit of powerlessness. Women, men, boys and girls were sexually assaulted as part of the unrest. Kikuyu women were targeted by Luo and Luhya men while the Luo women were raped by Kikuyu men.200 The effect of this was the widespread of infections such as HIV/AIDS and sexual transmitted infections (STI); physical injury and psychological trauma; desertion by spouses and unwanted pregnancies especially among women and girls. Speaking at Gender and Violence Recovery Centre, Dr. Sam Nthenya, the Head of Nairobi Women’s Hospital appealed to the two senior women in the country Mrs. Lucy Kibaki and Mrs. Ida Odinga to intervene.201

200 Oral Interview, Ezekiel Njunguna, Laini Saba, 27th July 2011.
Women in Kibera experienced horrific experiences. Most victims of rape were poor women who were gang raped in their own homes by youth, gangs of up to 20 men, GSU personnel, and in some cases police officers. The victims ranged between 25 - 68 years with some being married, widowed or divorced or single. Sexual violence was a direct consequence of existing inequalities between men and women in Kenya, and something that affected the way in which husbands responded to the rape of their wives and daughters. Most of the women were raped at home in the presence of their spouses and children, causing a great deal of stress that resulted to them being abandoned by their husbands.

As one explained, “the man came, the father of the house and when he found that his wife had been raped and the same men raped his daughter and daughter-in law, he said I am finished with ‘this’; I cannot deal with this. I am going to find myself another woman, because this is the biggest taboo in my home and I cannot even be cleansed and who are the perpetrators.”

A 50 year old woman and a resident of Kibera testified in camera to the Commission recounting what had happened to her in the following statement:

“.....At around 6:30 pm two (2) motor vehicles came with GSU policemen in uniform, green (with patches) and they had a cap of the same colour. Thinking that they were coming to assist us, we were very happy but that was not the case. They hit a jiko that had fire and it fell on my daughter Juliana and she got burnt on her feet......one policeman hit my eyes. I fell down and my blood pressure rose. He tore my clothes. He raped me I got unconscious as the other ransacked the house. The same man raped my daughter J. She became pregnant though on 5/7/08, she had a miscarriage.”

4.1.5 Destruction of Properties and Homes
In early 2008, residents of Kibera woke up to a bloody morning to find their residential and commercial houses/properties broken into, looted, before being razed. According to an interviewees in Kibera, gangs of youth bragged that they were going “shopping.” In areas where residential houses were not looted or razed, they were taken over by illegal occupants, for instance off Karanja road, residential houses were invaded and occupied by illegal tenants. In Mashimoni, 32 houses and business properties were looted, broken into and burnt to ashes. In Makina area, largely inhabited by Nubians, more than three thousand stalls in Toi market were destroyed and property worth millions of shillings lost. Before being razed to the ground, Toi

market housed over three thousand traders. A similar or bigger number of people were employed by the traders, and many others depended on the market as suppliers or customers.²⁰⁵

The chairman of Toi Market Traders Association, Ezekiel Rema, estimated that besides property worth millions of shillings being destroyed, the destruction of the market affected over two hundred thousand people mainly suppliers and customers.²⁰⁶ Still within Makina village, an estimate of around one hundred food kiosks, hardware shops, wood workshops business along the main road to Toi market were torched, and two supermarkets razed down. Along the Mugo Kibiru Road near Ayany Estate, approximately ninety kiosks selling groceries were destroyed as permanent structures were broken into and property looted.²⁰⁷ In Soweto village a shopping complex housing a supermarket, butcheries and food restaurants, bars, saloons and small retail shops were burned down. Along Karanja Road towards Olympics, all semi permanent kiosks were looted, vandalized and burnt down. The nearby Patrick Njiru Petrol Station was torched. At Ayany shopping centre, twenty business premises with 200m stretch of kiosks were razed down.²⁰⁸ Although the market has been reconstructed, there are reports that members of the Kikuyu community who previously had stalls within the market have, unlike other communities, been excluded from re-establishing their businesses by the Nubian community who claims the market is part of their historical land.²⁰⁹

Other forms of destruction involved the destruction of the Kenya – Uganda railway line. On 18 January, 2008, protesters in Kibera uprooted 2km of the railway line which passes through the slum to Uganda through Western Kenya and looted wheat containers.²¹⁰ This was a deliberate message to President Kibaki’s associates who partly own the Rift Valley Railway (RVR).

²⁰⁶ Ibid.
²⁰⁷ Ibid.
²⁰⁸ Ibid.
²⁰⁹ Ibid.
combined with a desire to loot wheat containers on the track. The destruction of the rail line disrupted supplies to parts of Kenya and Uganda forcing re-routing to insecure roads. This was followed by the destruction of the Kisumu-Butere railway line on 28th January 2008. The repair of the lines alone was expected to cost the company Ksh. 12.5 million ($183,000) in addition to the estimated Ksh. 400 million ($27 million) lost earning from service disruption.\footnote{International Crisis Group, \textit{Op.cit.} p.21.} Unshipped cargo containers destined for Uganda piled at the port of Mombasa leading to shortage of fuel and other goods in Uganda and other East African Countries.\footnote{Kuria, M., ‘The Kibera mob got it all wrong,’ Daily Nation, 3\textsuperscript{rd} March 2011.} Unlike in previous electoral related violence, places of worship such as the Kibera Catholic Church, African Inland Church (A.I.C) and a Presbyterian Church of East Africa church were targeted. The major reason for the destruction of the A. I.C church was because the gangs associated it with the former President, Moi.\footnote{International Crisis Group, \textit{Op.cit.} \footnote{Samora, \textit{Op.cit.} \footnote{Oral Interview, Alex Risindi, Gatwekera, 16\textsuperscript{th} July 2011.}}

\subsection*{4.1.6 High cost of living}
Increase of food prices and those of other commodities also affected the residents of Kibera due to the inadequate supplies and drop in production in other parts of the country due to widespread violence. This increased the cost of living was exacerbated by the increase on prices of basic commodities such as maize flour, milk, bread and vegetables. For instance, maize flour prior to the 2007 elections retailed at Ksh. 45 for 2kg packet yet currently is retailing between Ksh. 100 – 130. Paraffin and cooking oil were never spared; according to Samson, one litre paraffin traded at Ksh.100 and it was scarce considering that a number of petrol stations were destroyed.\footnote{Samora, \textit{Op.cit.} \footnote{Oral Interview, Alex Risindi, Gatwekera, 16\textsuperscript{th} July 2011.}} Air time also retailed at doubled prices, the card for one hundred and fifty retailed at two hundred and one hundred respectively. This led to starvation, malnutrition and suffering of people within the slum.\footnote{Oral Interview, Alex Risindi, Gatwekera, 16\textsuperscript{th} July 2011.}

\subsection*{4.1.7 Displacement of Landlords}
Residential settlements were not spared in Kibera. The landlords lost control over their houses as tenants from rival communities took control and charged reduced rents. In Gatwekera, Mashimoni and Raila villages, Kikuyu landlords were pushed out of their houses by the Luo
From research undertaken from the villages, it is clear that to-date there are a number of landlords unable to access their houses and those occupying them are not paying any rent. In Silanga, there was an extensive displacement of landlords mainly from Kikuyu ethnic group and houses invaded by illegal tenants. “A witness told the Waki commissions how he could not access his eighty rental houses which had been illegally taken over. He told the commission that even after reporting the matter to the provincial administration, nothing was done since him and fellow landlords continued to receive threats from the tenants who even threatened to burn down the houses. He reiterated that the situation precipitated another round of violence as the landlords hired youth gangs to reclaim their property.”

Speaking at a fundraising at PCEA Gatunanabu Church recently, the Prime Minister appealed to the tenants to pay rent to the landlords in Kibera.

He said “we resolve to start a new chapter in our country after post-election violence. If you are occupying a house that does not belong to you, kindly pay rent to the owner.”

With the mounting uncertainty about the future, a number of structure owners in Kibera have sold out their parcels and shifted to areas considered less risky. Consequently, the demand for housing has surged in the slum against a sharp drop in supply, thereby increasing rental costs. There are also indications that landlords who chose to stay put employ the subtle use of militias to enforce compliance from errant tenants.

4.1.8 Interference of Learning in Schools

A study commissioned by the Association of Education in Africa (ADEA) found out that out of 650,000 plus displaced people during the post-election violence, more than 100,000 were learners. Also affected, were 765 teachers who were forced to relocate from schools and communities they had worked in for years. A total of 40 schools were burnt and additional 65 were vandalized. In Kibera, schools remained closed even after the government ordered the reopening countrywide. The schools that most affected included Ayany primary which had its wooden fence pulled down to serve as the weapon, Olympic and Old Kibera primary.

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218 The Daily Nation, “Raila asked Kibera residents to give landlords their dues;” 8th August 2011.
221 Oral interview, Collins Ojwang’, Silanga, 22nd July 2011.
opening, teachers and children failed to turn up because the majority had been displaced and were living in the camps where learning was not guaranteed. Loss of close family members due to chaos and dispossession took toll on many learners and teachers as children dropped out of school due to the financial and socio-economic constraints. School children also lost their books, uniform from the chaos. Majority of the parents could not even raise term one school fees and so children remained at home for the better part of January and February 2008.222

4.1.9 Destruction of Infrastructure
Other forms of infrastructure also suffered the brunt of the conflict. Water pipes and electricity wires were vandalized in Gatwekera, Laini Saba, Soweto, Silanga villages causing shortage of water and blackouts.223 Roaming gangs comprising mainly of the youth took advantage of the situation to terrorize the residents and also took control of matatu and bus terminus in which every vehicle was forced to pay Ksh. 100 to operate. The Citi Hoppa Bus Company cancelled its operations in Kibera at the height of violence after its buses were targeted for attack due to alleged connection with some political Kikuyu elites. There are allegations that the company was allowed to return only after paying protection fee to the groups controlling the termini, and none of its buses has been attacked since then.224

4.1.10 Breakdown of Families
According to the field information from a number of villages within Kibera, there were cases of broken marriages and family life resulting from chaos due to ethnic boundaries within the slum. The inter-ethnic marriage between the Luo and Kikuyu, Luhya and Kikuyu that had existed peacefully was viewed with fear and suspicion.225 Many such marriages disintegrated in the wake of ethnic violence as some couples voluntarily separated for safety reasons.

At the height of the violence, a Kikuyu man who had hosted a Luo, Luhya or Kalenjin wife was considered a betrayer who deserved punishment. A similar verdict was made on a Luo or Luhya who hosted a Kikuyu man or wife. In some extreme situations where divorce was inevitable, children were divided between the parents. The children with Luo/ Luhya names such as

223 Oral Interview, Elector Opar, District Youth Office Langata, 22nd August 2011.
225 Oral Interview, Damaris Kamau, Soweto, 11th July 2011.
Onyango, Atieno, Nekesa, Wafula, went to the Luo/ Luhya parent while those with Kikuyu names like, Njoroge, Kamau, Njeri went with the Kikuyu parent. The couples who were determined to stay together were forced to relocate to areas where residents were less sensitive to issues of mixed marriages.226

This created mistrust, prejudice and psychological trauma characterized by mental anguish and general apathy between the ethnic groups within Kibera yet they had co-existed for several decades, said Eunice Waithera whose Kalenjin husband, James was murdered by Mungiki in Laini Saba. Even with the positive strides towards the restoration of normalcy in Kibera, the situation has not improved much. The violence seems to have affected the future marriages as Eunice reports “most young Luo men now prefer marriage partner from any tribe except the Kikuyu. Likewise a Kikuyu slum resident actively avoided the prospect of marrying a Luo or a Luhya partner.”227

4.1.11 Loss of Jobs and Businesses

During the chaos in Kibera, the youth were never spared as a number of them lost their jobs and businesses which were destroyed through looting, vandalism and arson.228 Most of them who walk all the way to industrial area to seek employment everyday were unable to do so for fear of being attacked and also, nearly all factories were closed down after the Asian community who owned them flew back to India. As a result, the youth lost their jobs and were left to languish in poverty. Self employed youth suffered a great loss as their projects such as vegetable gardens; tree nurseries were looted and destroyed. Their working tools like jembes, gumboots, and wheelbarrows and clean up items; aprons and gloves were also looted from their homes.229 Those in businesses were never spared, some had started video shows and studios which were looted and burnt down. The destruction affected them negatively because majority had received loans from the Youth Enterprise Development Fund to set up the businesses and projects and were expected to pay back at an interest rate of 8 percent. Unemployment became an immediate problem in Kibera because small-scale business youth lost their uninsured sources of income.

227 Oral Interview, Eunice Waithera, Laini Saba, 27th July 2011.
Investors' confidence also fell sharply owing to widespread insecurity and uncertainty occasioned by power struggle between PNU and ODM.230

4.1.12 Proliferation of Arms
Some of the youth had an opportunity to see certain weapons which they had never seen in their lives. They actually associated them with some of the weapons used in the Second World War. According to Samora, the guns he saw some people carrying were so big and can only be equated by those used by the Portuguese found at Fort Jesus in Mombasa. This really shocked him and he could not imagine that people keep such things inside their houses.231

4.1.13 Rise of Illegal Gangs/ Vigilante Groups
Violence also led to the rise of organized ethnic driven illegal gangs among the youth. Certain gangs in Nairobi that existed long before the election violence erupted and were well known to control crucial services such as security in some neighborhood re-emerged. During the post-election violence, the existing and other emerging gangs took the law into their hands as a means of gaining further control of their neighborhood. In Kibera, gangs such as Siafu and Bukhungu which are predominantly Luhyas were supported by local politicians in the area. Nubian community on its part had Jeshi la Darajani while the Mungiki operated in Laini Saba and Soweto. These gangs today control playing grounds and open fields; matatu terminus; public infrastructure and utilities in the slum.232 Beneath their social and political functions, most of the gangs have an economic motive which relates to the survival needs of their members.

The landlord-vs-tenant conflict that erupted after the December 2007 polls have particularly popularized neighborhood vigilantism in Kibera. In the wake of the post-election violence, most landlords in Kibera particularly from Kikuyu and Nubian communities hired vigilantes to secure their structures from destructions and to forcefully evict tenants who illegally took occupation of their houses. Business people also relied upon the services of the gangs to protect their shops from looting or burning. Equally, illegal tenants constituted vigilante gangs to keep away the landlords and their agents and to do 'intelligence' work.233

233 Ibid.

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Furthermore, the power of these gangs cannot be underrated, including their ability to force other poor unwilling youth to join them as they remain unchecked, grow, and along with other forces threatening the integrity of state and nation. In this sense, youth are both being exploited and have become exploiters themselves. The claims that organized youth groups have to deal or dealt with the state and its security apparatus, whether true or false, have nevertheless left gross consequence in its trails. Not only have they greatly compromised the perception of the state’s capacity to control violence, but more important, the claim has increasingly threatened the integrity of the state and nation as a whole. This underlying endemic situation is increasingly seen as a justifiable resort in conflict situations, more so as the perception that its use is unlikely to be checked, has increasingly continued to gain ground.234

4.1.14 Balkanization of Ethnic Groups
The study found that ‘psychological wall’ today exists among communities living in Kibera. In the entire area, people from different ethnic groups who once lived together peacefully before the advent of December 2007 post election violence now harbor deep seated resentment and suspicion of one another, making it difficult to renew social relationships or form new ones. Many Kikuyus and Kambas spoke bitter about their former Luo and Luhya neighbors whom they accuse for ensuing attacks against them and even destroying their properties. Such feeling and claims have led to mistrust, hatred and fear amongst Kibera communities.235

It is a fact that many survivors of the post-election violence in Kibera owned their safety not to the police but protection in their enclaves which acted as barrier against opponent groups. The tribe therefore provided protection to its members at a time when the state intervention failed. Even with easing of tension and hostilities, ethnic - village arrangements are still vital to Kibera resident’s life in terms of their role as safety providers of the last resort.236

4.1.15 Persistent Culture of Impunity among the Youth
The post election violence has instilled tendencies, defiance and impunity among a large section of Kibera youth population which the state security apparatus is finding as a challenge. During

the three months period of lawlessness (January – March 2008) a significant number of youths took advantage of the situation by venturing into crime and profiting from looting and ‘free housing’ from the displaced. Not only have these youth become an obstacle to recovery efforts, but are willing to create another scenario of lawlessness from which they can benefit materially. For instance, in April 2009, a section of the youth in Kibera uprooted a section of the railway line in protest over the alleged annexation of Migingo Island on Lake Victoria by Ugandan soldiers.237 During the same period, they violently attacked Kenya Power and Lighting Company (KPLC) technicians who had come to disconnect illegal power connections in the section of the slum.238

4.1.16 Mistrust between Landlords and Tenants
The violence entrenched a culture of mistrust between landlords and tenants in Kibera to the extent that most owners of residential and commercial structures today use agents to collect rents on their behalf. Many tenants are generally uncomfortable with agents due to their uncompromising attitude hence many have since relocated. Very few people are ready to invest in Kibera rental structures because of the risk involved.239 Already, a number of structure owners have sold out their parcels and shifted to areas considered less risk. Consequently, the demand for housing has surged in Kibera against a sharp drop in supply, thereby increasing rental costs. There also indications that some investors who chose to stay put employ the subtle use of militia to enforce compliance from errant tenants.240

4.1.17 Conclusion
The devastating effects of the post-2007 election violence were more severe in the informal settlement in Nairobi as most of the upper market neighborhood was hardly touched. Youth participation in violent conflict in Kibera introduced new challenges and strains on the slum community and the nation at large as Kibera bore the brunt of massive destruction. During this period, properties worth millions of shillings were destroyed; these included shops, markets, petrol stations and several kiosks. Two kilometer Kenya – Uganda railway was uprooted

blocking transition of goods from Mombasa to Western Kenya and other Countries in East Africa. This had a very negative impact on the country’s economy.

Many people especially the youth lost their lives through brutal killings and gun shots from the security forces as others were left nursing serious injuries. The youth also lost their businesses and to date many are unable to pay back the loans borrowed from the Youth Enterprise Development Fund and other banks as Kibera residents are yet to come to terms with the post election violence. In particular, the violence occasioned social, economic, political and even psychological disruption that the Kenyan Government and other actors have had to respond to in the aftermath of the violence to speed up recovery.
In conclusion, this study has actually analyzed the objectives of the study that included; historical settlement in Kibera as a contributor to violent conflict in the area, factors that have made the youth to be participating in violent conflict in Kenya since 1992, factors for youth involvement in conflict in Kibera since 1992 and the impact of Kibera conflict since 1992. Theoretically, the conflict that the youth participate into revolves around two theories, namely; greed or opportunity perspective and blocked transition. On greed or opportunity theory, the youth become easy target for recruitment so as to get alternative income earning opportunity they cannot acquire from hard work. In such circumstances, they form rings of gangs and involve themselves in looting of properties and extortion which they easily walk away with.

This situation has been evident in Kibera where the youth form gangs to protect their communities from attacks by rival gangs. During the recent post-election violence within Kibera, the Siafu gang mainly consisting of Luo youth formed a ring around the Luo villages of Gatwekera, Kisumu Ndogo and Raila to protect their community as they harassed Kikuyus living within the villages, on the other hand, Mungiki also formed a protection ring surrounding Kikuyu villages of Laini Saba and Soweto to protect their interests. During this period, the gang members took opportunity to loot properties and even to harm and even killed their perceived enemies.

On the blocked transition theory, youth today face great obstacles in transition to adulthood and instead remain trapped somewhere in the middle. Education is no longer a transition to employment and so majority of youth who have finished school have been left unemployed or under-employed. The result is that the unemployed youth are forced to continue staying with their parents as dependants delaying in marriage which is a cultural norm and a rite of passage to adulthood. Failure in this transition has led to youth exclusion leaving vulnerable and easy recruits into violence and crime. This situation is seen in Kibera where the youth not only fail to get better jobs after school but instead drop out due financial constrains and later in life finds themselves trapped and cannot marry and raise families due to economic constrains. Some of
them therefore join gangs and other criminal activities to ensure means of survival and belongingness.

In situations of violence, the youth have always been at the forefront not only due to ‘greed or blocked transition’ but also as a result of a number of factors that the study has brought forward. Youth definition itself has remained problematic making them vulnerable in nearly all circumstances since there is no direct law, internationally or locally that specifically protects their rights as children, instead they are grouped together with adults. United Nation Conventions on the Right of the Child protects the rights of children and not the youth. The use of children in armed conflicts is restricted in the Article 4 (3) of Additional Protocol 11 which provides that “children who have not attained the age of 15 years shall neither be recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in any hostilities.” This article has actually protected the rights of children and that is why recently the International Criminal Court (ICC) convicted Thomas Lubanga to 14 years jail for having conscripted children to participate in wars in Democratic Republic of Congo. The International Law restricts the recruitment of children into armed conflict and therefore guarantees children’s protection. Such Laws are missing on the youth since different bodies, organizations and even countries have different definitions of a youth. This has left them as the greatest casualties especially in occasions where conflicts erupt.

During the recently Arab Springs in the North African Countries of Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, the youth were at the forefront and at the end managed to topple Libyan and Egyptian presidents. Their grievances rotated around unemployment, dictatorial governments and high cost of living. The youth participation in violent conflict has also been blamed on their numbers ‘youth bulge theory’ which argues that high concentration of youth in a particular area is inherently dangerous. The Rwandan case dismissed this theory as it was found that despite their high concentration in rural areas, there was no evidence that the youth in any way participated in violence. The young men who participated in the 1994 genocide were certainly desperate and vulnerable. Their involvement emerged when their vulnerability and desperation was exploited by those who were on power at the time.
Conflict in Kibera can be traced far back to its historical background which stretches back to colonial days with the arrival of the Imperial British East Africa Company in the late 19th century. During this period, most Africans were banned from the residential areas of Nairobi which were reserved for Europeans and Asians. Kibera originated as a settlement for the former Nubian soldiers from Sudan who had been conscripted by the British as part of the King’s African Rifle, a regiment of soldiers drawn from British Eastern Africa who fought notably in the World War 1. The Nubians had been allowed by the colonial government to settle on the land as squatters and were never given title deeds as they built their homes and businesses in the place. In the initial years, Kibera was excluded from city planning; in 1963 all forms of housing in the area were rendered unauthorized and effectively illegal to reduce the population in the city.

It was not until 1974 when the restrictions were removed allowing more people to settle in Kibera. Subsequently, Kenyans from different ethnic backgrounds moved to Kibera with the Kikuyu ethnic group being in power dominating the place. Today, it is estimated that more than 1 million people are staying in the area resulting to high population density and making the place more insecure and volatile. Due to its proximity to the city center and relatively cheap rent, Kibera is often the first stop for rural Kenyans seeking employment in Nairobi. In the recent years, unemployment in Kenya has been rampant and this is reflected in Kibera especially among the youth where every four out of five youth are unemployed. The persuasive poverty, insecurity and tribal backgrounds have left members of specific ethnic groups congregated in the 13 specific villages of Makina, Gatwekera, Lindi, Mashimoni, Kianda, Silanga, Soweto East and West, Ria, Kambi Muru, Laini Saba and Kichinjio and Kisumu Ndogo.

Land within Kibera has been highly contested between the residents resulting to violent clashes. To the tenants, the land belongs to the government since the government does not recognize Kibera and landlords pay no tax on the rental income. According to the landlords especially the Nubians community, Kibera belongs to them and they support their claim of ownership with documentations from the colonial government leaving the issue very contentious. Today, three main groups claim Kibera; the Nubians who have always asserted ownership based on an eighty year old letter of allocation from the colonial authority, Kikuyu landlords who mainly control
vast estates, businesses and other basic services to their tenants and largest the group mainly

tenants who rent residential units.

As a result of this complex mix of interested parties, lack of control over property is considered
to be one of the most difficult conditions within Kibera leaving facilities in deplorable
conditions. This lack of secure tenure means that tenants can be evicted at anytime, without
cause, without notice and without any legal recourse for action. The result has been bloody
violence experienced in 1997, 1998, with the worst being in 2001 when Nubian landlords
violently attacked tenants who had not paid rent. In revenge, tenants also attacked the landlords
leaving a number of people dead and some injured. The post election violence 2007/ 2008
witnessed tenants evicting landlords from their premises and started collecting rent. To date a
number of tenants within Kibera stays free after the landlords fled and failed to return after the
2007 clashes.

Due to Kibera’s lack of official recognition in the eyes of either the British or Kenyan
governments, government officials especially the chiefs have continued to grant permission for
the construction of houses in return for payment. Chiefs being members of the Provisional
Administration have the right to grant temporary occupation licenses on government land.
However, housing in Kibera is far from temporary and those receiving permission from the
chiefs to build are acting as landlords. This practice, along with a lack of political will to enforce
the formal rules and the absence of an official housing policy in Kenya has allowed people to
continue to construct dwellings without any clear lease or title to land.

Conflict among the youth is also blamed on poverty leading to rural urban migration. This
concept is common in the Sub-Saharan Africa where a number of young people stream urban
center to escape poverty in the rural areas. Most of these young people are ill equipped and so
fail to access employment leaving them vulnerable for easy recruitment into criminal acts. This
has actually been the case with Kibera where young people from the rural areas flock with hopes
of securing employment in the city. Due to its proximity to the town center and industrial area
and cheap housing, many youth from the rural areas prefer to stay Kibera.
The youth were the greatest casualty of economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s and the consequent adoption of SAP. These reforms drastically reduced public expenditure leaving many countries unable to fulfill their promises made to the youth such as good education, immediate employment after school. This situation has left the young people in a state of hopelessness resorting into criminal acts. For instance in Kenya in 1980s, the Government froze employment leaving all graduates from colleges and universities with no hope. Every year, the universities in Kenya produce about 40,000 graduates, yet only 150,000 informal jobs have been created since 2003.

This illustrates the presence of high rate of youth unemployment, thus making transition to adulthood inherently difficult. Education is expected to ease the transition to good employment but in such cases it fails to do so. Massive youth unemployment and idleness constitute a real security concern and the problem is likely to increase if action is not taken ‘without regular and stable jobs.’ More youth in Kibera especially the younger generation could be tempted by easy money associated with illegal economic activities or potentiality by those wanting to recruit them for subversive activities once again.

Failure by the successive governments to comprehensively address these issues has rendered the youth frustrated and therefore vulnerable. This has left them exposed to crime and violence both as victims and perpetrators especially within Kibera. In bid to survive in such hash environment, many of them have found themselves recruited into violent gangs which are easily manipulated, particularly by politicians as mentioned earlier. The study established that the youth gangs within Kibera were mobilized into ethnic outfits and were hired to execute killings, destruction and looting of property and eviction of communities perceived to be ‘foreign’ during the 2007/2008 post election violence.

A number of factors have been mentioned as the reasons for the youth involvement in violent conflict within Kibera slum. Ideally, all these factors are just tools of violence and the most effective of them is ethnicity/ ethnic balkanization which hold together all other tools, especially negative ethnicity which has to be put squarely on top of the intervention agenda. Even with the enactment and implementation of the new constitution, there is no guarantee that Kenya will
move ahead when still under the deliliting grip of ethnicity. History can bear us out of this. In as early as 1786, the USA had produced the American constitution which is one of the highest quality documents in its category. Yet it took them close to two hundred year before they could actually begin to put into practice the principles of the wonderful document for the benefit of everyone. To achieve this they had first to undertake a systematic attack on forms of symbolic violence and this came in the form of the civil rights movements championed by charismatic leaders like Martin Luther King and Malcom X; it is from then on that social justice was put at the center stage of the national discourse.

This work demonstrates that the youth involvement in violent conflict within Kibera slum has been due to a culmination and convergence of many issues that have remained unresolved for decades. Among the long standing issues is that related to land and property in the area. During the recent post-election violence2007/2008, it came out clearly when the youth evicted landlords from their homes and occupied the houses using force and even went to an extent of collecting rent from other tenants.

Violence within Kibera also demonstrated that the youth were in the forefront as agents of change or protectors of the status quo. On several occasions, the youth from the various political parties faced off, sometimes becoming violent. Orange Democratic Party supporters saw themselves as representing marginalized, under-developed people within Kibera seeking political pluralism and a resolve to address historical injustices and unfair wealth distribution.

However, while Kibera youth can be condemned for committing most of the atrocities during the PEV and other conflicts that took place earlier within the slum and its environs, what is less to acknowledge is that they were also the biggest victims and casualties. The law enforcement agencies especially the police focused their attention on them, killing them in discriminatively while protecting the principle perpetrators of violence resulting into many deaths. They lost a lot of property as their businesses were either looted or burnt down. They were also victims of broken homes as some saw their parents separate due to inter-ethnic marriages while others had their spouses walk out of marriage. The youth lost their jobs especially those who were working
at the industrial area as the Asian community fled Kenya during the violence. Those who were self employed suffered a setback as their businesses were destroyed.

The challenges for many governments in Africa should be to nurture and harness the youth potential so as to transform into dynamic force for positive socio-economic development. Putting the youth at the centre of development process rather than at the centre of social unrest, can be achieved through understanding of youth's problems and aspiration from their own perspective. Investment in education and training of the Kenyan youth is essential in integrating them into the development process. Young people need to access both formal education and opportunities to acquire a range of vocational life skills to actively participate in all spheres of an increasingly knowledge intensive society.

The causes of youth conflict in Kibera are largely exogenous to the youth. They have much to do with the shrinking of economic, social and political prospects that the young people are confronted with. In Kibera, the young people lack quality education and employment opportunities thus decreasing their chances of establishing themselves as adults in an increasingly competitive world. Excluded from decision-making, they may see the mainstream political channel also as irrelevant. The solution therefore is to increase both the concrete opportunities available to the young people and their sense of inclusion in the society. The following recommendations therefore take a comprehensive approach dealing with economic, social and political challenges rather than working from the assumption that the young people are inherently a problem.

On the reasons for their involvement in violent conflicts, the question of youth unemployment and the related problem of social inequality and exclusion need to be addressed urgently. The government needs to invest in welfare systems that cushion the very poor and engage Kenyan youth creatively. When the young people work, they not only generate income but also develop their skills, increase their knowledge, build self-esteem and confidence and glean a positive view of what their future might hold. The education system needs a thorough review to place greater emphasis on the acquisition of skills that can enable youth earn a living as opposed to the current emphasis that profiles the prestige of certain professions and white-collar jobs. There has to be
an emphasis on technical training and cultivation of a culture that values hard work "the dirty-your-hands" variety amongst the youth.

The Government needs to consciously give incentives that are geared towards expanding the private sector, especially infrastructure expansion. Such developments will remove the state from the core of the country's economic activity. A growing private sector will diminish the importance attached to access to political office and its relationship with people's economic well being and survival. Such a strategy should be accompanied by an aggressive campaign against grand corruption so that access to public office is not tied to quick riches. To this end, business activity for the top echelons of the civil service, public and political service and their families should be restricted and become part of the public accountability procedures that public officials must be subject to as a matter of course. This will eliminate conflict of interest and the undue advantage that is associated with access to the public service or high political office. This should include a deliberate effort to expand opportunities, embrace meritocracy and get rid of patronage. As such, the premium placed on politics and access to political office will be diminished to a certain extent. This will reduce the high stakes of youth involvement in Kenyan politics and elections in particular that predispose the country to electoral violence.

The land question in Kibera needs to be addressed most urgently. The land controversy in Kibera was one that post colonial governments inherited but lacked the political will to rectify. There is need for land tenure reform and redistribution urgently that would include a comprehensive review of the existing land laws and how they hinder access to land by the majority poor. In addition, the government needs to diversify economic production to move the people away from land-based means of production that make land ownership a matter of life and death.

There is need to mainstream political reform, coupled with the constitutional reforms that will eradicate factors that make it possible for political leaders to mobilize the youth in Kibera along ethnic lines and practice the politics of ethnic exclusion. Violence in Kibera is seen within a pattern of politically motivated clashes that has rocked Kenya since the advent of the multiparty system. It is highly unlikely that violence erupts in Kibera if politicians don't go to the area and utter statements that make tempers to flare. There must also be a deliberate effort to address the
balkanization of ethnic groups, real or perceived, especially in distributing economic resources and opportunities. There is need to enhance the youth participation to give them the capacity and confidence to protect and support themselves in order to deal with challenges of life that faces them.

The youth need to be included in program development by government and private sectors. Since the youth in Kibera find themselves prematurely into adult roles and responsibility through cultural poverty, conflicts, social upheaval and increasingly HIV/AIDS crisis, maximum effective youth programming can only be achieved if they are empowered as program decision makers. A Swahili proverb “a son will be what he was taught” illustrate just how much young people learn from examples set by those around them. Many risks the youth take are not so much a reflection of their own attitudes and wishes but rather are the consequences of pressure exerted on them by adults, policies and laws created. Without adult guidance and support, and without the knowledge and skills to protect themselves, the youth remains vulnerable. “A society that cuts itself from its youth severs its lifeline; it is condemned to bleed to death” said Kofi Annan, former UN secretary during the World Conference of Ministers Responsible for Youth.

National and local laws must also promote and support the youth rights, and young people should participate in the development and making of these policies. The youth who are denied opportunity for growth and feel trapped by circumstances may come into conflict with the law. The manner in which the society responds to a young law breaker can make or break a young person’s future. “Punishment does not purify, if anything it only hardens children” said Mahatma Gandhi.
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