Comparative Mediation and its Outcome in African Wars of Insurgency: Angola and Mozambique

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DECLARATION

This dissertation is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.

Brian John Chikonzo

This dissertation has been submitted for examination with my approval as a university supervisor.

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DEDICATION

This study is dedicated to the millions who needlessly lost their lives and those who were displaced from their homes and separated from their families in the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique; to the many child soldiers who are still struggling to reintegrate into society, having lost their childhood to these senseless wars and to the gallant men and women who are involved in peace support operations across Africa. The African continent has suffered enough violence and plunder. It is time for Africans to take charge of their own destiny and for peace and prosperity to visit Africa, the cradle of mankind.

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ABSTRACT

This study has sought to establish why similar conflicts respond to mediation differently by examining the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique. Both conflicts attracted international mediation efforts and whereas the mediation in Mozambique yielded peace within two years of the start of mediation, the conflict in Angola persisted for fourteen years after the first attempt at mediation. The similarities between the two countries including a shared history of domination by the Portuguese, the attainment of independence the same year and the eruption of civil war characterized by external interference should have resulted in a similar response to mediation. That was not the case, as the Angolan war lasted fourteen years after the initiation of negotiations while in Mozambique it was two. The study has proceeded along the hypothesis that it was the idiosyncrasies of the leaders in both conflicts that caused the divergence in outcomes of the mediation.

The results of the study revealed that mediation in the two cases was affected by four factors, namely; the ripe moment; choice of mediator; impartiality and neutrality of the mediator; the ownership of the mediation process and the implementation of the agreement. The differences in response to mediation of the two conflicts led to the

conclusion that the idiosyncrasies of the individual leaders in the conflicts ultimately decided whether mediation succeeded or not.

The study made three inferences regarding mediation: mediation efforts require an understanding of the psyche of the leaders involved in order to avert unnecessary prolongation of conflict; consultation with the constituents for the agreement is to be respected and that inclusive governance obviates the winner-take-all approach to elections which spawns conflict.

ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress
CCPM	*Commissao Conjuta Politico-Militar* (Joint Political-Military Commission)
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CIO	Central Intelligence Organization
CMVF	*Commissao Mista de Verifficao* (Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission)
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Rehabilitation
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FADM	*Forcas Armadas da Defesa de Mozambique* (Armed Forces for the Defence of Mozambique)
FNLA	*Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola* (National Front for the Liberation of Angola)
FRELIMO	*Frente de Liberação de Moçambique* (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique)
GNU	Government of National Unity
GNUR	Government of National Unity and Reconciliation
IDP(s)	Internally Displaced Person(s)
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JVC	Joint Verification Commission
MNR	Mozambique National Resistance
MONUA	*Mission d'Observation des Nations Unies a l'Angola* (United Nations Observer Mission in Angola)
MPLA	*Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola* (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ONUMOZ	*Operacao das Nacoes Unidas em Mozambique* (United Nations Operation in Mozambique)
PIDE Police)	*Polizia International de Defesa de Estado* (Portuguese Secret
RENAMO	*Resitência Nacional Moçamicana*
SWAPO	South West African People's Organization
UN	United Nations
UNAVEM	United Nations Angolan Verification Mission
UNITA	*Uniao Nacional pela Independencia Total de Angola* (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
USA	United States of America

USIU	United States International University
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union)
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union

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Chapter 1

Introduction to the Study of Mediation in Angola and Mozambique

"All wars are civil wars, because all men are brothers". ***Francois Fenelon***

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to give the background to the Civil Wars that form the subject of this study. The chapter contains the rationale of undertaking the study as the statement of the research problem; objectives for carrying out the study; a theoretical model on which the study is based as well as an explanation of the terms and concepts used. There is also a review of the literature that exists on the mediation of the two civil wars. The final part of the chapter contains the hypothesis, methodology employed in conducting the study and an outline of the each chapter of the dissertation.

The Research Problem

Independence came to most of Africa between 1956 and 1980—during the height of the Cold War. The immediate post-independence era in most of these countries witnessed protracted intrastate conflicts that threatened the very existence of these young states. The conflicts were mostly between or among former liberation movements and newly installed governments. In some instances, erstwhile colonial masters actively supported opponents to the new governments, especially where ideological differences surfaced as a result of the Cold War. Some of these conflicts took on international

dimensions when other actors outside the countries involved influenced the outbreak or prosecution of the conflicts. In southern Africa, the apartheid government of South Africa provided a destabilising factor in the region, in addition to the interests of the Cold War protagonists, the Soviet Union (USSR) and United States of America (USA), which had interests in acquiring or maintaining ideological influence in the region.

The western region of Africa was occupied by the Portuguese when the first caravel arrived in the Congo around 1482. The Portuguese colony of Angola was founded in 1575 and Luanda (now the capital city of Angola) was granted city status in 1605. The Dutch briefly took the territory over around 1641 but by 1648 Angola had reverted to Portuguese control.[1] The trade in slaves was the main activity on the colony until slavery was abolished in 1836 and agriculture based trade became the mainstay of the economy. The colony was incorporated as an overseas province of Portugal in 1951 and it attained independence in November 1975 after a liberation war fought by three liberation movements.[2]

Similarly, the Portuguese occupied Mozambique in 1498 and from about 1500, Portuguese trading posts and forts became regular ports of call on the new route to the east.[3] In 1891 the Portuguese shifted the administration of much of the country to a large private company, under a charter granting sovereign rights for 50 years to the Mozambique Company (Companhia de Mocambique) which, though it had its headquarters at Beira, was controlled and financed mostly by the British.[4] After the

[1] Humbarci, A, Muchnik, N, *Portugal's African Wars: Angola, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique,* Macmillan London Limited, 1974, p 77
[2] Ibid, p 85
[3] Gelb, J; Palley, M, L, *Women and Politics Around the World,* ABC-CLIO, p 459
[4] Isaacman, A; Isaacman, B, *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900-1982,* Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1983, p 36

Second World War, Portugal included Mozambique as one of its provinces abroad. The country attained independence in June 1975 following a guerilla war.

Angola and Mozambique witnessed bloody intrastate conflicts that lasted several years soon after achieving independence. Like most civil wars in Africa, the two conflicts attracted several attempts at mediation. However, the two wars resisted such attempts for relatively long periods. Reasons for failure of the conflict mediation efforts ranged from, among a host of others, refusal of one or more of the protagonists to negotiate a settlement, a breakdown of negotiation to failure to observe settlement terms during the implementation phase of negotiations.   Factors influencing such failure might have ranged from idiosyncrasies of the leaders, external actors to the style of mediation among others.   One major aspect of the wars in Angola and Mozambique was the similarity of their genesis. Both countries attained independence from Portugal around the same time and both had liberation movements claiming to be waging liberation wars on behalf of the respective populations of the countries. The civil wars in both instances started at the height of the Cold War. It is this shared history that forms the basis of this study, which seeks to identify the reasons that led to the differences in response to mediation between the two conflicts that otherwise had so many similarities.

As a colonial master, Portugal adopted identical policies in the administration of both Angola and Mozambique.   These were policies of extreme brutality, racial discrimination and repression including partial slavery; and they provoked similar patterns of resentment in both colonies. The black majority populations were subjected to so much oppression that they inevitably revolted, not only in Angola and Mozambique, but in all the other Portuguese colonies as well, such as Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.

Events in these colonies, coupled with a military coup in Portugal in 1974, finally saw an end to colonialism in Angola and Mozambique. However, civil wars broke out in both countries soon after independence. Efforts by the international community to mediate in the conflicts met with mixed results. In Mozambique the civil war finally ended in 1992 while the one in Angolan ended in 2002.

There are many similarities between the civil wars in Mozambique and Angola. Both conflicts emerged soon after the attainment of independence from Portugal and both were extensively influenced by the politics of the Cold War and apartheid. All the parties involved in both conflicts claimed to be representing the populations of the respective countries and one would have expected that the international mediation efforts would bring lasting solutions to the conflicts, acceptable to the actors and their constituents. In both wars, government forces won many battles but the insurgents managed to obtain control of vast amounts of territory, pointing to significant support of the insurgencies from the local populations. These apparent similarities and inexplicable differences in outcomes of mediation beg the question of whether conflict mediation in Africa fits into the mould of the existing theories on conflict and its management. Prevailing theories and prescriptions, coming mostly from Western scholars, tend to reflect their assumptions about human nature, the nature of society and polity, and the inherent possibility and desirability of constructing and testing valid general theories of social phenomena.[5] Virtually none are taken from the African experience.

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[5] Deng F, M, Zartman, I, W, *Conflict Resolution in Africa*, Brookings Institution, 1991, p 154

In Mozambique, the Resistencia Nacional Mocamicana (RENAMO) or Mozambique National Resistance (MNR), a brainchild of the then Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), had no political agenda when it started fighting the government of the Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique (FRELIMO) or Front for the Liberation of Mozambique. However, the rebel movement was aided in this insurgency by the hard-handedness of the FRELIMO government, which in its post-revolutionary enthusiasm sought to create a scientific socialist state by nationalising the land, industry and transport, and creating collective farms and communal villages.[6] It was only as the war raged that RENAMO began to make political demands and the government initiated mediation that the insurgency ended.

In Angola, it would have been expected that insurgent movements that had been collectively waging a liberation war would work together once the objective of independence from Portugal had been achieved. Such a scenario would have been understood from the premise that once the conflict causing element is removed, then the conflict must cease. Instead, the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) or Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola; the Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA) or National Front for the Liberation of Angola and the Uniao Nacional pela Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) or National Union for the Total Independence of Angola engaged in civil war right from the start of the Angolan independence. Why did two, apparently similar conflicts, respond to mediation so differently?

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[6] Copson R,W; Sharpe, M E, *Africa's Wars and Prospects for Peace,* 1994, p 40

Objectives of the Study

The primary objective of this study is to explain the divergence in the outcome of mediation processes in Angola and Mozambique despite the similarities in the conflicts and therefore determine the validity of expecting similar conflicts everywhere to respond to mediation in a similar manner. The study also seeks to find out when the resolution of a conflict by negotiation should be declared successful: Is it when the parties successfully implement the agreement or when the underlying and proximate causes of the conflict are addressed? An acceptable settlement must satisfy the combatants' expectations regarding the resolution of the causes of the conflict. This study also seeks to examine the negotiation processes in political settlements in Angola and Mozambique that terminated armed hostilities, overcame the conflict, and opened the door to multiparty politics in Mozambique, while in Angola, the process broke down before or during implementation. The research will also attempt to answer the question of whether the killing of Jonas Savimbi in itself ended the conflict in Angola and whether or not the peace in Angola signifies that the structural conflict is indeed over. In Mozambique, successive presidents Samora Machel and Joaquim Chissano prosecuted the war differently, with the latter being considered more liberal. The question of the idiosyncrasy of leaders therefore comes into play. In analysing conflict, not only in Africa but in the global sense, the role of individuals must not be overlooked.

Theories abound as to what the causes of conflict and conflict sustaining elements are, but very little is published on the role of individuals in determining the outcomes of conflict. In examining the history of wars, it can be seen that some individuals are, by virtue of their character of genetic make-up, predisposed towards violence. This goes a

long way in explaining the Stalins, Hitlers and Mussolinis of the 20th century. In Africa too, there emerged personalities that appeared to revel in wars. It has been argued that the civil war in Angola, that lasted more than twenty seven years, took so long mainly because of the personality of UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi. Thus, it can become difficult to distinguish between just wars and those for personal aggrandizement.

In Africa, conflicts are rarely resolved to the satisfaction of constituents because the majority of the population is hardly consulted. Many of the structures that cause or perpetuate the conflicts remain dormant only to resurface at a later stage. The study will therefore also contrast the two conflicts regarding the implementation process of mediation, which is what the civilian constituents usually only get to see, besides being the ones who bear the brunt of the war.

Theoretical Model

The study will use the model developed by Kumar Rupesinghe on conflict transformation.[7] This model is appropriate for the conflicts because it addresses all the ingredients that existed in both civil wars. The most important of these is that the model specifically focuses on internal conflicts rather than conflict in general. The author advocates for a multi-dimensional approach to conflict resolution rather than a linear analysis which tends to ignore the many complexities like the ones that characterized the two wars. Further, the model takes into account the role of non-state actors in the mediation of conflict.[8] Individuals and church organizations in the context of this study fall into this category. The Sant Egidio Catholic community played a vital role in the mediation of the war in Mozambique, whereas the war in Angola, which continued even

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[7] Rupesinghe K, (ed), *Conflict Transformation,* St Martin's Press, 1995, p 65
[8] Ibid, p 66

after mediated agreements, did not have much of non-state actor participation except the various individuals concerned. Lastly, the model argues for the total inclusion of all issues leading to conflict, rather than on outstanding issues of the mediated agreement.[9]

In terms of mediation, Laurie Nathan refers to six principles of international mediation which this study will adopt[10] as a basis for analysis and discussion.   One principle posits that for successful mediation, the parties must agree to the mediation and choice of mediator. Although this may sound obvious, the intensity of some conflicts can lead state or non-state actors to offer themselves as facilitators on humanitarian grounds before the parties involved call for mediation.   Agreement to mediation does not guarantee success of mediation as was demonstrated in the Angolan conflict at Bicesse in 1992 and in countless other conflicts around the world. The belligerents are likely to be holding unshakable positions and view the conflict in zero-sum terms. From their perspective, mediation is a capitulation to "the enemy" with the prospect of compromising core values in order to reach a settlement. They could have genuine fears of losing credibility in the eyes of their supporters, being outmanoeuvred by their opponent's negotiating tactics, and being pressurized by the mediator to change their goals.[11]   The choice of mediator plays a central role because belligerents can retain confidence in the mediator of their choice. In Mozambique, RENAMO wanted Kenya to mediate because of the ties that existed between the two parties.   When Mozambique insisted on having Zimbabwe as co-mediator, RENAMO resisted and the two protagonists reached a deadlock because of the closeness between FRELIMO and

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[9] Ibid, p 76

[10] Laurie Nathan, *'When Push Comes to Shove'* The Failure of International Mediation in African Civil Wars, *Track Two* Vol.8 No.2 November 1999 (CCR, Cape Town)

[11] Ibid

Zimbabwe. In the end, none of the two would-be mediators played a further role in the conflict mediation. Instead the Sant'Egidio community finally mediated the conflict.[12]

Other principles of mediation on which scholars are yet to agree are the questions of neutrality and impartiality. The idea that mediators need to be impartial in the conflicts they face is widespread. Young says that, "the existence of a meaningful role for a third party will depend on the party's being perceived as an impartial participant (in the sense of having nothing to gain from aiding either protagonist and in the sense of being able to control any feelings of favouritism) in the eyes of the principal protagonists".[13] Stulberg goes even further to suggest that the mediator must also be neutral besides being impartial.[14] This means that a mediator must have no personal preference that the dispute be resolved in one way rather than another. In terms of impartiality, these scholars posit that the mediator must not be biased towards or against any of the protagonists.

A different view articulated by Zartman, Touval[15], Bercovitch[16] and others, regards mediation as an extension of negotiation, where the mediator becomes a party to the conflict because even if he comes in with his own interests, the conflicting parties are more interested in the resources that he brings than whether or not he is inclined to support one party over the other. Bias can play an important role in mediation when the

[12] Daniel Levine, Graduate Research Fellow, Organizational Disruption and Change in Mozambique's Peace Process, University of Maryland, September 2006

[13] Young, 0. R. ,*The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967, p 81

[14] Stulberg, J. B., *Taking Charge: Managing Conflict.* Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath*.*, 1987, p 37

[15] Touval, S., and Zartman, I. W, (eds)*. International Mediation in Theory and Practice.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview. 1985.

[16] Bercovitch, *Social Conflict and Third Parties: Strategies of Conflict Resolution,* Boulder CO, Westview Press, 1984

bias adds to the mediator's capacity and desire to influence. A mediator may also possess the leverage to influence one side to behave in a certain way. Zartman[17], Bercovitch[18] and Smith[19] agree that it is next to impossible for mediators to remain impartial and neither is it necessary. Whereas the impartiality of mediators in domestic settings may be derived from the fact that they have no extended relationship with the parties and therefore no interest in the conflict beyond its peaceful resolution, states and other international actors have little motivation to mediate in international conflicts except that they have a relationship with one or both adversaries and an interest in the details of a settlement. This can usually apply in the case of religious organizations or former colonial masters.

The last principle of mediation is that the belligerents must own the settlement. The mediator must never underestimate the degree of aggrievement felt by belligerents to a conflict. There are no "senseless" demands and there is no obvious solution. From the vantage point of a mediator, such views are misleading and unhelpful. Parties to high-intensity conflict are almost always driven by an acute sense of injustice, marginalization or by real or imagined threats to their security. They might feel deprived of what they feel is rightfully theirs or may be collectively having unmet needs which they consider fundamental. A mediator who does not take seriously these concerns will not be taken

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[17] Zartman, W. I., and Touval, S. *"International Mediation: Conflict Resolution and Power Politics."* Journal of Social Issues, 1985, 41: 27-45.

[18] Bercovitch, J. "International Mediation and Dispute Settlement: Evaluating the Conditions for Successful Mediation." Negotiation Journal 7:17- 30. 1991

[19] Smith, W. P. "*Effectiveness* of the Biased Mediator*",* Negotiation Journal 1, 1985, pp 363-372*.*

seriously by the conflicting parties. If the mediator therefore tries to prescribe a solution that is inimical to their interests, they are likely to conclude that the mediator has sided with their opponent.

Besides these principles of mediation, the study will address the issues of understanding of root causes of conflict, setting realistic timetables for implementation of an agreement, strategic constituencies and evaluation of mediation. These are linked to the model postulated by Rupesinghe.[20] The complexities of the two wars demand that they be examined in a holistic manner that looks at each and every facet that could have had a bearing on the outcomes of the mediation, particularly the impact of individual actors such as Savimbi and Dhlakama.

Concepts

This study has applied several concepts whose meanings require clarification at the outset. These concepts include war, civil war, conflict, conflict management, idiosyncrasy of the individual, termination of war and mediation.

War

War is any large-scale violent conflict. War has been defined as a contest between nations or states (international war) or between parties in the same state (civil war), carried on by force of arms for various purposes, as to settle disputes about territorial possessions, to maintain rights that have been interfered with, to resist oppression, to avenge injuries, to conquer territory in order to extend dominion, and as a conflict of arms between hostile parties or nations.[21] There are many reasons why people engage in

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[20]Rupesinghe K, Op cit, p 76
[21] *Webster's Monarch Dictionary*, unabridged (Chicago, 1916)

war and these reasons are, in the eyes of the protagonists, real and rational. This study will be restricted to theories on civil war, but also take cognizance of the internationalization of civil conflict as was the case in both Mozambique and Angola.

War of Insurgency

According to Wikipedia, war of insurgency, a type of civil war, is a war between organized groups within the same nation-state, or between two countries created from a formerly united nation-state.[22] Civil wars are characterized by being large-scale, organized and sustained, resulting in a high number of casualties. Another scholar, James Fearon, defines civil war as a "violent conflict within a country fought by organized groups that aim to take power at the centre or within a region or to change government policies".[23] The Geneva Conventions give four conditions for a war to be classified as being a civil war: The party involved must be in possession of a significant part of the national territory; the civil authority must exercise de facto authority over the population; the insurgents must have some form of recognition as a belligerent and that the legal government is obliged to have recourse to regular military forces against insurgents organized as military.[24] Civil wars are usually caused by real or perceived marginalization of a section of a population, or the desire for self rule or self determination.

Conflict

Conflict is defined by the Office of Human Resource Development as a disagreement through which the parties involved perceive a threat to their needs, interests

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[22] Wikipedia, www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/civil_war accessed on 8 Sept 2009
[23] Fearon, J, *Iraq's Civil War* in *Foreign Affairs, March/ April 2007*
[24] Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Volume IIB, p 121

or concerns.[25] Conflict is defined by others as an inevitable result of the pursuit of power by individuals. This view holds that people in the world are naturally confrontational and adversarial. On the other hand, an idealist's view is that conflict is a learned response from society as a result of many contributing factors. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraft[26] define conflict as opposition between groups (ethnic, religious, cultural, political etc.) when goals are perceived to be incompatible. Other scholars view conflict theory in the light of race and ethnicity. In this view, groups are ranked by their prestige and power. This means that if a certain political entity, class, race or ethnicity has more education, prestige, and power then it is considered, or considers itself, the better, which creates conflict. Other basic categories in conflict theory are those of religion, region, gender, etc. All of these groups seek to gain power and use it to reshape society the way they see it best.[27] Ruganathan postulates that there are four primary assumptions of modern conflict theory: Competition over natural resources; structural inequality and inequalities in power and reward that are built into all social structures. Individuals and groups that benefit from any particular structure strive to see it maintained and those outside want a share and revolution occurs as a result of conflict between competing interests rather than through adaptation.[28]

Some scholars argue that conflict is inherent to human nature. They propound that there will always be disagreements or incompatibilities in society and conflict is seen

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[25] Office of Human Resource Development, www.ohrd.wisc.edu/onlinetraining/, accessed on 17 July 2010
[26] Dougherty J E & Phaltzgaf R L, *Contending Theories of International Relations,* Harper and Row, New York, 1990, p182
[27] Otomar J B, *Using Conflict Theory*, Cambridge University Press. 2002, p144
[28] Ruganathan V, *War is a Disease,* Oxford University Press, 2003, p 2

as being inevitable wherever two or more people share space. Mwagiru[29] notes that conflict is endemic to humans and will always be a part of human life. Conflict is therefore neither new, unique nor necessarily harmful. It is something which must just be managed in order to minimize its negative effects.

This study will also be informed by the psychologist theory espoused by scholars such as Evan Durbin and John Bowlby who argue that human beings are inherently violent and that wars provide an outlet for this violence.[30] The outbreak of violent conflict was not unique to the situations that obtained in these two countries but elsewhere across Africa and the rest of the world. Mwagiru argues also that there are other circumstances that drive people towards conflict. These could be values, interests or needs. Needs include human desire for identity, self worth, participation, recognition and security.[31] These are virtues that every human being is entitled to as a birthright. Taken in the context of the liberation wars fought against colonialists, the circumstances of being ruled by aliens could be said to have triggered those conflicts. Darwin, Freud and Lawrence agree that aggression in man is part of culture and social condition. Aggression arises out of underdevelopment, identities or distributive injustices, according to Azar.[32] It is something that human beings acquire through learning. This view supports what was seen in Africa as a wave of nationalism that swept across the continent in the middle of the 20th century when the populations realized that colonialism was at the

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[29] Mwagiru, M, *Conflicts in Africa: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management,* CCR Publications, Nairobi, 2006, pp 5-6

[30] Bowlby, J. and Durbin, E. F. M, *Personal Aggressiveness and War*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner. 1939

[31] Mwagiru, M, Op cit, p 5

[32] Azar, E E, "The Theory of Protracted Social Conflict and the Challenges of Transforming Conflict Situations" in Dina Zinnes (ed) *Conflict Processes and Breakdown of International Systems"*, University of Denver, 1993.

root of their suffering, deprivation and degradation. So, while some aspects of conflict or aggression can be explained by human nature, others are environmental.

Skirmishes among the three political parties, MPLA, UNITA and FNLA started during the war of liberation in Angola but exploded into a fully fledged civil war at Independence when the Portuguese government handed Angola over to a coalition of the three parties. This was done in accordance with the Alvor agreement,[33] which will be discussed in greater detail later in this paper. The three parties failed to agree on the composition of the post-colonial government and the MPLA unilaterally declared itself the legitimate government as it controlled the capital Luanda and most of the oil-rich coastal areas.[34] The FNLA and UNITA took control of most of the southern areas of the territory and they founded the "Democratic Republic of Angola" on 24 November 1975, with Holden Roberto of the FNLA and Jonas Savimbi of UNITA as co-presidents.[35] This government was dissolved hardly two months later in January 1976.   The FNLA gradually withered, leaving the MPLA and UNITA as the main adversaries in the civil war. It can therefore be argued that each of the parties in Angola perceived itself as the legitimate representative of the population. According to the social aggression model of relative deprivation, each side felt that if their adversaries were to achieve power, then they (losers) would suffer marginalization or deprivation in the distribution of national resources. The perception of such future deprivation became a reality that sustained the civil war.

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[33] Rothchild, D, S, *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation,* 1997, p 116
[34] Wright, G, *The Destruction of a Nation: United States Policy Towards Angola Since 1945,* 1997, p 57
[35] Crocker, C; et al, *Grasping The Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict,* 1997, p 213

In Mozambique, the birth of RENAMO came as a result of the disgruntlement of former Portuguese government fighters with the FRELIMO government and the Rhodesian government over the support FRELIMO was giving to the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) which had its bases in Mozambique.[36] Therefore when RENAMO was formed, its main function was to disrupt the activities of ZANLA and destabilize Mozambique through economic sabotage.[37] The hard-handedness of the FRELIMO government as it sought to create legitimacy and control spawned grievances among the population, especially in the rural areas where the people began to support RENAMO.[38] It was much later that RENAMO began to talk of a lack of representation in government of a section of the population it claimed to represent and also demanded a reformation of FRELIMO's Marxist ideology and the adoption of a multi party system of government. The civil war in Mozambique can therefore fit into the relative deprivation theory of conflict, although the greater drivers of the conflict were external. In both civil wars, a legitimate fight was hijacked by external actors who had their own agendas as shall be discussed later in the study.

Conflict Management

Conflict management is a multi-disciplinary field. It can be defined as the measures that are taken by actors (be it state or non-state, and be it party or non-party to the conflict) to mitigate the conflict while seeking a peaceful resolution to the same.[39] However, conflict management is usually more aptly defined by what it seeks to

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[36] Human Rights Watch, *Conspicuous Destruction: War, Famine and the Reform Process in Mozambique,* 1992, p 21
[37] Lulat, Y, G-M, *United States Relations with South Africa: A Critical Overview From the Colonial Period to the Present,* Peter Lang, 2008, p 272
[38] Ibid p 271
[39] Mwaura, C; Schmeidl, S, *Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa,* Red Sea Press, 2002, p 46

accomplish, rather than what it is. It involves a wide range of concepts depending on the stage of conflict. These are conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace building and state building. Burton argues that the process of conflict management should be inclusive of all actors and therefore research on the conflict is necessary.[40] Realists, who see states as the only actors, base conflict management on coercive politics, as postulated by Deustch.[41] Scholars generally seem to agree that conflict management theories cannot adequately apply to all conflicts because each conflict is unique. There can be no one-size-fits-all theory of conflict management. Zartmann[42] argues that internal conflicts are very difficult to negotiate partly because of the asymmetry of the actors and also because of the evolution of the actors as the conflict progresses. What makes internal conflict even harder to negotiate is the difficulty in obtaining a "mutually hurting stalemate"[43] which represents the ripe moment for resolution. This is when both parties reach the point at which escalating or sustaining the conflict is at a greater cost to them than they are willing to bear. The civil wars that form the basis of this study were complex affairs as a result of the many issues involved outside the core of the conflicts.

Idiosyncrasy

This part of the literature examines writings in the field of psychoanalysis of individuals. Most writings in this regard focus on what disposed some individuals like Stalin, Hitler and Mussolini towards violence. Some scholars like Cartwright[44] and

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[40] Burton, J, *Conflict: Resolution and Prevention,* MacMillan, London, 1990, pp188-198
[41] Deustch, M, *The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes,* Yale University Press, New Haven, 1973
[42] Zartman, I W, *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars,* Brookings Institution, 1995, p 3
[43] Ibid, p 8
[44] Cartwright, D, *Psychoanalysis, Violence, and Rage-Type Murder: Murdering Minds,* Psychology Press, 2002

Conteh-Morgan,[45] starting from a psychoanalytic standpoint, argue for a pluralistic approach to understanding aggression, and claim that the origins of aggression have no single source or cause. Conteh-Morgan posits that a theory of collective political violence is best explained by focusing on the nature of the human beings, specifically the leader who directs others. Kenneth Waltz has come up with what he calls the three images of international relations: man, the state and the state system. The First Image model points to human nature and behaviour as the locus of war.[46] He propounds that a person's beliefs condition his expectations, which in turn condition his actions. His argument is that it is the evil nature of man and the policies he pursues that cause war. Waltz argues that humans are selfish, evil, act upon aggressive impulses and are stupid.[47] The Second Image points to states as the focal point of war since states have the ability to change a person's behaviour and the third image points to the social activity among states that cause wars. His argument is plausible and applies to the civil wars that form the subject of this study. The individuals concerned in both wars, on both sides of the divide, played significant roles in the prosecution of the wars. Neighbouring states also had roles to play as did the Cold War protagonists and their sympathisers.

Termination of War

Termination of war is not the same as conflict resolution. Termination simply means the end of war. Termination of war can occur in one or more of several ways. These are cease-fire, armistice, capitulation and unconditional surrender.[48] A cease-fire or suspension of arms is an agreement by belligerents in a particular theatre to suspend

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[45] Conteh-Morgan, E, *Collective Political Violence: An Introduction to the Theories and Cases,* Routledge, 2004

[46] Waltz, Kenneth W, *Man, the State and War,* Columbia University Press, 1954, p160

[47] Ibid, p16

[48] Phillipson, C, *Termination of War and Treaties of Peace,* Lawbook Exchange Limited, 2008, p 3

hostilities for a short period. Armistice refers to the ending of hostilities over a larger area or the entire war for a longer period or indefinitely. Capitulation is a one-sided military agreement in which the loser gives up control over an area. Finally, unconditional surrender refers to the situation where one belligerent is completely defeated and the victor can dictate the peace terms.[49]

Because of the internationalization of both the Mozambican and Angolan civil wars, the theories thus examined must take into account the three levels of analysis present in international relations theories: the international system, domestic politics, and the role of individual leaders as postulated by Waltz.[50] Handel posits that, at the international level of analysis, there is dominance of rational choice models in theorists' efforts to explain belligerents' interactions and notes that those models are based on the assumptions that the actors make unitary rational decisions.[51] However, there are many levels of and competing interests in decision making where domestic politics and individual leaders naturally affect the termination process.

First, is the winner/loser perspective of termination which, as the name suggests, posits that the war ends with one side achieving military victory over the other. This viewpint is supported by scholars such as Lewis A. Coser and Frank L. Klingberg.[52] The perspective cannot adequately explain all termination because of the many examples of wars that have not been fought until the total extermination of one of the belligerents. Stedman argues that bargaining and negotiation are part of conflict termination process

[49] Edlin T, *The Korean War Explained with the Termination of War Theories,* Journal of Singapore Armed Forces, www.mindef.gov.sg accessed on 24 August 2008
[50] Waltz, Kenneth,W, Op cit, p 225
[51] Handel, M,I, *War Termination - a Critical Survey*. Jerusalem: Alpha Press, 1978.
[52] Klingberg, Frank L. *Predicting the Termination of War: Battle Casualties and Population Losses.* The Journal of Conflict Resolution 10.2 (1966): 129-171.

especially in civil wars where stakes are divisible into several issues like participation, legitimacy and distribution.[53] This argument certainly does not explain the civil wars that this study is concerned with. The terminations of both civil wars were negotiated settlements, although in Angola it can be argued that it was the killing of Savimbi that ushered in the final Peace Process.[54]

The second is the cost/benefit perspective which is also known in other scholarly circles as the bargaining approach. Paul R Pillar points out that negotiations may sometimes occur while the war continues, but that negotiations may be delayed until the military outcomes of battles have made the likely outcome of the war more predictable. Each side to the conflict weighs the costs of continuing with hostilities against the benefits of termination. However, Pillar notes that offers to negotiate and offers of concessions may be construed by the opposition as a sign of weakness.[55] This argument does somehow explain the processes that led to cessation of hostilities in the two wars that this study is concerned with. However, the issues at play were myriad because of the many actors involved.

The third paradigm in termination theories is Joseph Engelbrecht's Second Order Change model which argues that leaders are sometimes forced to reconsider continuing with hostilities when the war threatens higher or second-order values. The war itself becomes a problem because of its potential to adversely affect more important issues.[56] The issue is that when leaders are focused on executing war, they may tend to block out

[53] Stedman S. *Peace in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980,* Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1991, pp. viii, 2.

[54] Rupiya, M & Njeri J, *An Evaluation Of The Post-Savimbi Peace Process In Angola Since February 2002: The Victor's Peace Treaty.*

[55] Pillar, Paul R. Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process, Princeton: Princeton UP, 1983, p 27

[56] Engelbrecht J Jr, *War Termination: Why does a State Decide to stop Fighting,* Ph D Dissertation, Columbia University 1992

all other information. Unfortunately this paradigm is almost impossible to employ in the present case study because none of the leaders involved in Mozambique and Angola were subjected to a psychological evaluation to determine whether they were aware of second order issues at play.

The fourth perspective of war termination is the Hawk and Dove paradigm espoused by scholars such as Fred Ikle. He proposes that those leaders who lead their countries or groups into war can become so engrossed in the war that they fail to rationalize or change their minds about the war. It is when new leaders who are less committed to the war come in and seek peace that the war can be terminated.[57] This argument goes a long way in possibly explaining the events that led to mediation in Angola and Mozambique. The multiplicity of actors and issues clouded the resolution processes of both wars. Events such as the end of white rule in Namibia and Zimbabwe, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of apartheid in South Africa and the deaths of Samora Machel and Savimbi all ushered in new leaders and that contributed in some ways to the termination of the civil wars.

Mediation

Bercovitch[58] defines mediation as "a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties' own negotiations, where those in conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an outsider (whether an individual, an organization, a group, or a state) to change their perceptions or behaviour, and do so without resorting to

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[57] Ikle F C, *Every War Must End*, New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1971, pp. 6-7

[58] Bercovitch, J "Mediation in International Conflict: An Overview of Theory, A Review of Practice" *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques*, eds. I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997, p 130

physical force or invoking the authority of law." Elsewhere, Bercovitch postulates that the practice of using intermediaries to help settle disputes is age-old. Even though there are different approaches to mediation, there is value to be realised in seeking pacific settlement or management of disputes.[59] Mwagiru defines mediation as the continuation of negotiation by other means; in other words, there have to be failed or stalled negotiations for mediation to take place.[60] However, events in both Mozambique and Angola, as shall be revealed in later discussions, challenge this line of argument, as there were no negotiations prior to mediation.

There are certain principles that apply to mediation. A prominent factor is the ripeness of the conflict for mediation. Bercovitch asserts that the conflict circumstances must be ripe for intervention, in other words there must exist a mutually hurting stalemate (e.g. a military setback, a change in power relations, or a failure to impose a unilateral outcome).[61] The parties to the conflict themselves must be ready for mediation. Mwagiru[62] points out that the parties reach a "precipice" and perceive that there is no benefit to be gained from continuing with hostilities and the prospects of a cessation of war are bleak. Zartmann points out that the concept of "ripe moment" is consistent with the human trait of aversion to loss. Humans are more averse to losing a certain amount than they are to gaining the same amount. The idea of "ripe moment" is one which has been identified in mediation in other conflicts around the world. Mwagiru gives several examples of conflicts that were not resolved because the moment was not ripe. One such

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[59] Bercovitch J, *Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation,* **Lynne** Rienner 1996, p 12

[60] Mwagiru, M, *Conflict in Africa: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management,* Centre for Conflict Research, Nairobi, 2006, p 115

[61] Bercovitch J, "Mediation in International Conflict", op cit, p 145

[62] Mwagiru M, Op cit, p 117

conflict was the Ethiopian conflict of 1991 when Jimmy Carter's efforts at mediation failed because one of the parties was making military progress and had not reached a precipice.[63] Other conflicts that were mediated successfully because of heeding the ripe moment were in the Sinai (1974), Southwest Africa (1988), El Salvador (1988), Mozambique (1992), among many others.[64]

If this is explained in terms of "game theory", a conflict becomes ripe for resolution when the parties realize that the status quo is a negative sum or lose-lose and not a zero-sum or win-lose situation. Therefore in order to avoid the mutual loss, they must consider mediation in an attempt to reach a positive sum or win-win outcome.[65] The mutually hurting stalemate does not necessarily have to exist. Zartmann argues that it is the "perception" of the condition in the minds of the mediators and belligerents that achieves the stalemate. The mediator cannot therefore convince one or more of the parties that the condition exists. Conversely, if the parties believe that the condition exits, no matter how little evidence there is, then the stalemate does indeed exist.[66] In mediation theory, therefore, what matters more is not the actual situation, but how the various actors perceive the situation.

There are other factors that affect mediation. Brian S. Mandell identifies contextual and procedural factors that have impact on the success of international mediation. Contextual factors relate to the nature of the conflict; the characteristics of,

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[63] Ibid, p 117

[64] Zartman, I. William, "Ripeness" *Beyond Intractability*, Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess (eds) Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: August 2003 http://crinfo.beyondintractability.org/essay/ripeness/ , accessed on 12 November 2008

[65] Zartman, I W, and Berman M, *The Practical Negotiator* , New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982, pp 66-78

[66] Ibid

and relations between the parties to the conflict; the characteristics of the third party; and the relations among the third party and each of the respective parties involved in the conflict.   Procedural factors are to do with the various strategies applied by the mediator.[67]

Hypothesis

The idiosyncrasies of the leaders in the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique were responsible for the differences on mediation outcomes of the wars.

Literature Review

This section of literature looks at the history of Mozambique and Angola including the pre-colonial period. It also addresses what has been written concerning the probable causes of the divergence in outcomes of the two mediation processes. Most scholars are in agreement that the first people to inhabit Mozambique were Bantu peoples migrating from the north. Newitt[68] and Manning[69] review the colonisation process up to the post-independence era in Mozambique. The history of Mozambique is closely associated with Cold War politics and South Africa's domination and destabilisation. Literature supporting this view includes writings by Finnegan[70], Young and Hall[71].

Literature on Angola also examines the origins of that particular nation-state. It appears that little is known about who the original inhabitants were, but scholars like

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[67] Brian S. Mandell and Brian W. Tomlin, 'Mediation in the Development of Norms to Manage Conflict: Kissinger in the Middle East', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (1991), p. 43

[68] Newitt, M D D, *A History of Mozambique,* C Hurst & Co, 1995
[69] Manning, C L, *The Politics of Peace in Mozambique: Post Conflict Democratization, 1992-2000,* Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002
[70] Finnegan W, *A Complicated War: The Harrowing of Mozambique,* University of California Press, 1992
[71] Young, T and Hall M, *Confronting Leviathan: Mozambique Since Independence,* C Hurst & Co Publishers, 1997

Birmingham[72] and Siler[73] agree that the fundamental composition of the peoples of this nation-state prior to colonization were mostly Bantu with a sprinkling of the Khoisan people. Portugal colonized Angola with very clear intentions to plunder its resources without much thought to the development of the population. This conviction is shared by scholars like Boahen[74], Bender[75] and Birmingham[76]. Independent Angola's history, like Mozambique's, is a story of civil war of great devastation. Many scholars tend to agree that Angola's woes were internationalized by the Cold War and apartheid. Those who support this notion are Hodges[77], Pearce[78] and Malaquias[79].

Much has been written on the probable causes of the differences in outcome of the two mediation processes. Scholars seem to agree that there were several reasons for the divergence in outcomes. One of the reasons cited was the availability of diamond and oil wealth in Angola to prosecute the war while there was no funding to sustain RENAMO activities in Mozambique after South Africa decided to abandon the insurgent movement.[80] This scenario gave rise to a situation where both protagonists in the Angolan war pursued military victory as the only means to end the war. On the other hand, events in Mozambique clearly showed that both sides had reached the point where they had no means to carry on fighting.

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[72] Birmingham, D, *Trade and Conquest in Angola,* Oxford University Press, 1966

[73] Siler, M J, *Strategic Security Issues in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Comprehensive Bibliography,* Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004

[74] Boahen, A A, *African Perspectives on Colonialism,* John Hokins University Press, Baltimore, 1994

[75] Bender, G J, *Angola Under the Portuguese:The Myth and the Reality,* Africa World Press, USA, 2004

[76] Birmingham, D, *Empire in Africa: Angola and its Neighbors,* Ohio, USA, 2006

[77] Hodges, T, *Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State,* James Currey Publishers, UK, 2003

[78] Pearce, J, *An Outbreak of Peace: Angola's Situation of Confusion,* David Philip, South Africa, 2005

[79] Malaquias, A, *Rebels and Robbers: Violence in Post-Colonial Angola,* Nordic Africa Institute, Sweden, 2007

[80] Ibid

The escalation of the conflict in Angola after the Bicesse Accord was described by Roberto Sallazzo[81] as being fuelled by the pursuit of territory by both the MPLA and UNITA from which they could extract oil and diamonds respectively to continue the war. The subsequent sanctions placed on UNITA prohibiting arms sales and the purchase of diamonds gradually bankrupted UNITA so much so that by 2002 it was unable to continue the purchase of arms due to the severe restrictive measures imposed by the international community on the smuggling of diamonds.[82] Rupiya and Njeri argue that the economy of Angola ended up exclusively fuelling the war on both sides.[83] This view puts the resources surrounding the protagonists at the centre of the decision to continue fighting but lacks empirical evidence. While the diamonds that financed UNITA are still available in Angola, the fighting has stopped, thereby refuting the claim that it was the access to diamond and oil money that led to prolongation of war.

Another reason advanced by scholars for the difference in outcomes is the question of whose interests the mediation processes were serving. In critically analyzing why the Bicesse and Lusaka Accords failed in Angola, Christine Messiant argues that the role of the international community and its interests took centre stage in the mediation, disregarding the interests of the protagonists and, more importantly, of the civil population.[84] She also places the blame for the failure of the 1988 Gbadolite Accord on the doorstep of the international community, the UN included, arguing that the overarching interests of the Cold War protagonists overrode any considerations that might have been given to the real issues that the Angolan people desired to be addressed.

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[81] Interview with Dr Roberto Sallazzo on *International Business Careers News* on www.devex.com accessed on 28Aug 2010
[82] Ibid
[83] Rupiya M, Njeri, J, Op cit
[84] Messiant, C, Op cit

Events in Mozambique were crucially different in that the role of the international community was not so prominent during the Rome peace talks. It is argued that the civil constituency, through its chosen representatives at the talks, played a significant role in ensuring that the real issues at stake in Mozambique wee addressed by the peace agreement. While this argument might hold water, it does not explain the success of the Luena Agreement, signed after the death of Savimbi, which still had the interests of the international community and which did not specifically include civil society. What transpired after this event has even led some scholars such as Ana Leao to conclude that the civil war in Angola ended with victory for the government, without any external influence.[85] That view is debatable, since all the attempts at mediation built upon previous ones, and in all of them, the international community was represented to an extent. Therefore, there still exists a gap in what is known regarding the special roles that the individuals prosecuting these civil wars personally played in ensuring success or failure of the mediation processes. It is the answer to this question that this study undertakes to provide.

Methodology

This is a library-based research. Data was obtained from published books, journals, periodicals, Government documents and UN reports among other documents. The research employed physical visits and on-line examination of sources. The institutions of reference included libraries such as the National Defence College, Nairobi, Questia (online library) and the United States International University (USIU).

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[85] Leao, A, *Different Opportunities, Different Outcomes—Civil War and Rebel Groups in Angola and Mozambique,* Bonn, German Development Institute, 2007 (Discussion Paper)

Internet sources were also used to obtain data on the two wars and mediation processes. Websites such as Wikipedia and Conciliation Resources are renowned authorities in terms of research and analysis of contemporary and historical international issues. There was also substantive information collected from UN sites on Peace Keeping and Humanitarian reports.

Chapter Outline

The first chapter gives a background to the study of the gap that exists in the body of knowledge on the civil wars in Mozambique and Angola in trying to understand the divergence of outcomes of the mediation processes. The chapter contains concepts that inform the study, hypothesis, a literature review, the research methodology and the chapter outline. Chapter Two contains the characterization of the two civil wars. Chapter Three has the mediation processes in detail. Chapter Four explains the divergence in the outcomes of the mediation process of both wars. Chapter Five concludes the study by revisiting the hypotheses and making recommendations.

Chapter 2

Characterization of the Two Civil Wars

Introduction

This chapter briefly traces the history of the two countries that form this case study. The chapter also gives a brief account of the events and process and prosecution of the civil wars and a short introduction to the leaders of the guerilla movements. This is meant to place the civil wars into context for analysis of the mediation processes.

The Historical Context

The history of Mozambique dates back to centuries before the arrival of the Portuguese in 1498.[86] During this time the communities in Mozambique were Bantu tribes governed by powerful chieftains who were also spiritual leaders. Most of Mozambique was part of the powerful Monomotapa Kingdom or the Malawi Confederation which were considered to be the most powerful state systems in South and Central Africa at the time.[87] The Arabs had arrived in the area by the mid-fifteenth century and the Portuguese arrived in 1498. The latter quickly established new frontiers based on trade and then began the process of colonization and repression. Although the locals resisted this occupation for centuries, Mozambique was to become and remain a Portuguese colony for over 480 years. In contrast, from the earliest recorded history, the first inhabitants of present day Angola were Khoikhoi speaking San and Khoi who are said to have inhabited most of southern Africa for as long as 25 000 years.[88] There were

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[86]Isaacman,A, Isaacman B; *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900-1982* Westview Press, 1983, p 11

[87] Ibid, p 12

[88] Ibid, p 9

also Pygmies along the Cuando Cubango River. Small Bantu populations migrated from West Africa and settled in northern and north-eastern Angola by 800 AD, whereas other Bantus who settled in central and southern Angola came in through eastern Africa.[89] The Portuguese arrived in Angola in 1483 and their initial interest in the area was to procure slaves. By 1576 Angola was a Portuguese colony and through systematic penetration of the interior, Portugal was able to keep Angola under colonial control until 1975. Throughout Portuguese occupation, the indigenous Angolan communities experienced severe brutality that included forced labour. It is recorded that around 1645, Queen Nzinga Mbadi of the Ndongo Kingdom contributed to increased resistance to Portuguese subjugation.[90] Although cases such as these are few, they demonstrate that the African inhabitants did not passively accept European domination, but challenged it even as it started. The slave trade played no small part in decimating the population of Angola, as it is estimated that more than 4 million people were lost to slavery from Angola by the end of the eighteenth century.[91] The slave trade spawned the divisions that emerged among the population of Angola during the liberation struggle by creating elites within the population.[92]

Portugal officially abolished slavery in **1869** but the cruel trade in humans went on in Mozambique and Angola until around 1900. The local populations in both countries were forced to work on agricultural plantations which were owned by the colonialists. Conditions on these plantations were so bad that many indigenous people chose to cross the borders into neighbouring Rhodesia, South Africa, Malawi and Zambia as migrant

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[89] Collelo T, (ed) *Angola: A Country Study,* Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1990, p 5
[90] Tvedten, Op cit, p 9
[91] Collelo, Op cit, , p 15
[92] Leao, A, Op cit, p 6

labourers on farms and in mines.[93] In **1926 a** fascist coup turned Portugal into a military dictatorship. António Oliveira Salazar ascended to power, and that meant a tighter grip on the African population and greater use of forced labour.[94] The Portuguese government ruled the colonies through a racist system similar to the South African apartheid. Schools were only for the Portuguese population and it was unlawful for the Africans to own any kind of business.

End of Colonialism

African resistance to Portuguese rule in its colonies emerged as the British and French colonies in Africa began to gain their independence. In Mozambique, various liberation movements were formed and on 25 June 1962, these groups united to form the current ruling party, FRELIMO with Dr Eduardo Mondlane as its first leader.[95] The armed struggle began on 25 September 1964, when FRELIMO guerrillas trained in Algeria went into action for the first time in Cabo Delgado. By 1965, fighting had spread to Nyasa, and by 1968, FRELIMO was able to open fronts in the Tete region.[96] By that time, it claimed to control one-fifth of the country. In response, the Portuguese committed more and more troops, military supplies, and military aid funds to the territory. On 3 February 1969, Mondlane was assassinated in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania by the Portuguese secret police PIDE and was succeeded by Samora Moises Machel after a brief power struggle within the leadership.[97] The guerrilla movement fought a war of attrition against the Portuguese and the 1974 coup in Lisbon led to the cessation of hostilities, not only in

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[93] Newitt, M, *A History of Mozambique,* C Hurst & Co. Publishers, 1995, p 240
[94] St Louis, R, *Portugal,* Lonely Planet, 2009, p 39
[95] Wikipedia
[96] Humbarci, A, Muchnik, N, Op cit, p 149
[97] Mwakikagile, G, *Nyerere and Africa: End of an Era,* Biography and Autobiography, 2009, p 218

Mozambique, but also in Angola, and the handing over of power to FRELIMO.   Samora Machel became the first President of independent Mozambique.

Similarly, in Angola, from the end of the nineteenth century, armed resistance to Portuguese rule began to surface as a result of increasingly repressive tendencies by Portugal. The MPLA was formed in 1954; FNLA in 1962 and UNITA in 1966.[98] The three nationalist groups were formed along ethnic and regional lines yet each claimed to represent the entire population of Angola. In the years prior to independence, the groups became bitter rivals over ethnicity, foreign aid, ideology and personal leadership ambitions.[99]   The liberation movements waged parallel guerrilla wars against the Portuguese colonial power until 1974 when the coup in Lisbon led to ceasefire. In 1975, the three leaders, Agostinho Neto, Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi of the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA respectively, agreed to form a unity government in Angola[100] in line with the provisions of the Alvor Agreement signed in Portugal. The agreement was signed by the three in Alvor after meeting from 10 to 15 January 1975. They agreed that a transitional government led by the Portuguese High Commissioner and a Prime Ministerial Council would rule until October 1975 when the first assembly elections would be held.[101] The Portuguese preserved three ministerial positions for itself with the remaining nine being shared among the three Angolan parties, revealing the former coloniser's desire to continue influencing Angolan politics. The agreement also provided for the integration of the militant wings of the three Angolan parties with the Portuguese having 24 000 active personnel while the other three parties would provide 8 000 each.

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[98] Tvedten, Op cit, p 10
[99] Collelo, Op cit, p 24
[100] Ibid, p 36
[101] Rothchild, D S, Op cit, p 116

As there was no mechanism to verify the number of troops, the Portuguese troops were soon outnumbered by the Angolan troops as factional fighting resumed.[102]

Leaders of the Organization for African Unity tried to salvage the Alvor agreement in Nakuru, Kenya in June 1975. There, the three parties agreed to abide by the provisions of the Alvor Agreement but cited that lack of trust amongst them was likely to lead to more violence.[103] In July 1975 the MPLA took control of the capital Luanda and drove the FNLA out. Savimbi retreated to Huambo in southern Angola where he teamed up with the FNLA to fight against the MPLA. On 10 November 1975, the Portuguese left Angola and the following day Neto declared the independence of Peoples' Republic of Angola, and the MPLA government was recognized a year later by both the OAU and UN as the legitimate government of Angola.[104] Savimbi and Roberto also declared the Republic of Angola on 25 November 1975 and started advancing north to Luanda. When the FNLA fizzled out due to lack of funding, the civil war between the MPLA and UNITA began.[105]

Rise of Civil War

Within two years of independence, civil war broke out in Mozambique while in Angola the war broke out immediately after independence. The independence of the two countries produced a shockwave in Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa as it represented the opening of more fronts for the wars of liberation of the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa; Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the

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[102] Wikipedia
[103] McDannald, A H, *The American Annual: An Encyclopedia of Current Events, 1877-1976,* 1976, p 86
[104] Ibid p 86
[105] Croker C A, et al, Op cit, p 213

armed wing of the nationalistic movement Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) of Zimbabwe (Rhodesia then) and South West African Peoples' Organization (SWAPO) of Namibia. With the US containment policy of Soviet Marxist expansion factored in, the stage was set for an international conflict of classic proportions[106] as other actors sought to safeguard individual interests in the two countries.

The Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) created an insurgency movement in Mozambique called RENAMO in 1976 to and monitor as well as disrupt ZANLA activities in Mozambique.[107] To buttress the assertion that it had Rhodesian roots, the movement was better known by the English acronym, MNR (Mozambique National Resistance) than RENAMO during the period leading to the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980. The first leader was Andre Matsangaissa, a former Mozambican army officer who had been incarcerated in a re-education camp for alleged vehicle theft.[108] After his escape to Rhodesia, he won the sympathy of the regime of Ian Smith who helped him to go back to Mozambique and free 500 other inmates from the same re-education camp to form the first group of RENAMO fighters.[109] Other recruits were taken from the ranks of former Portuguese armed forces personnel who had fought in Mozambique. Many of these were indigenous Mozambicans but others were expatriate Portuguese while others were former FRELIMO fighters who had deserted or had been dismissed from the FRELIMO forces.[110] This movement did not have a political agenda, having been set up to spy on and disrupt ZANLA operations in Mozambique. However,

[106] Somerville, K, *Foreign Military Intervention in Africa,* Printers Publishers London, 87 Martins Press, New York, 1990, p86
[107] Human Rights Watch, Op cit p 20
[108] Lulat, Y, G-M, Op cit, p 272
[109] Leao, A, Op cit, p 9
[110] Ibid, p91

they began to carry out destabilisation activities of sabotage, terror attacks and banditry in Mozambique, ultimately becoming an externally backed agency to destroy the Mozambican economy. South Africa took over the sponsorship and direction of the MNR (which began to be more commonly known by the acronym RENAMO) after Zimbabwe became independent[111] with a former Portuguese settler, Orlando Cristina headquartered in Pretoria being the political and military leader. Cristina was assassinated in Pretoria in 1983 after which Afonso Dhlakama emerged as the leader of RENAMO.[112]

The rebel organization was notorious for shooting executions, knife/axe/bayonet killings, mutilations (especially hacking off of the ears, lips or arms), burning alive, beating to death, forced asphyxiation, forced starvation, and random shooting at civilians in villages during attacks. Mozambican civilians were RENAMO's principal targets in the war, although they also attacked government installations and the economic infrastructure. RENAMO also abducted children for use as child soldiers.[113] Despite all these atrocities, RENAMO managed to attract some sort of support from the civilian population, by playing up the excesses of the FRELIMO government.

Towards the end of apartheid in South Africa, support for RENAMO began to decline. Efforts to bring a negotiated settlement to Mozambique began to gain prominence and in late 1989 the parties started mediated negotiations. On the 4th of October 1992, the Rome General Peace Accords, negotiated by the Community of Sant'Egidio with the support of the UN, were signed in Rome between President

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[111] Flower, K, *Serving Secretly*, London: John Murray, 1987, p 262
[112] Radu, M; Arnold, A, *The New Insurgencies: Anticommunist Guerrillas in the Third World,* Transaction Publishers, 1990, p 173
[113] Wikipedia

Chissano and Renamo leader <u>Afonso Dhlakama</u>, and formally took effect on the 15th of <u>October 1992</u>. A United Nations peacekeeping force (ONUMOZ) of 7,500 arrived in Mozambique and oversaw a two year transition to democracy. More than 2 000 international observers also entered the country to supervise the elections. The elections were held from 27 to 28 October 1994 and FRELIMO won. Mozambique transitioned into a democracy with RENAMO as the official opposition. The last ONUMOZ contingents departed in early 1995.[114]

In a more complex manner, the delicate relationship among the three liberation movements in Angola lasted a very short time. Armed conflict flared within a matter of days after the swearing in of the transitional government. The MPLA found itself on the seat of government in Luanda, but facing military action from both the FNLA and UNITA.[115] External actors, driven mostly by Cold War interests, entered the conflict. South Africa, Cuba and Zaire all had troops in Angola at some time during the conflict. The Chinese and Zaireans were backing the FNLA in the civil war, while the Soviet Union, the states of Eastern Europe and Cuba were supporting the MPLA, and South Africa supported UNITA.[116] The US entered the fray on the side of UNITA and became the greatest backer of the movement. The FNLA fizzled out of existence before very long, leaving UNITA and the MPLA as the main protagonists of the civil war.[117]

South African and Cuban troops began withdrawing from Angola in 1988 under a United Nations resolution but the USA continued its overt support for UNITA. In 1989, mediation efforts between the MPLA and UNITA brokered by Mobutu and other African

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[114] Wikipedia
[115] Library of Congress Country Studies
[116] Lockyer, A, *Foreign Intervention and Warfare in Civil Wars: The Effect of Exogenous Resources on the Course and Nature of the Angolan and Afghan Conflicts,* Sydney, 2008, p 155
[117] Collelo, op cit, p 39

leaders failed to stop the war.[118] Civil war between UNITA and the MPLA continued until an American and Portuguese-brokered agreement resulted in the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and of South African soldiers from Namibia in 1989. That led to the Bicesse Accord in 1991, which spelled out an electoral process for a democratic Angola under the supervision of the UN, which the MPLA won.[119] Savimbi refused to accept the results and returned to the bush. By this time, US support for UNITA had all but ceased. A second peace accord, the Lusaka Protocol, was brokered in Lusaka, Zambia and signed in November 1994.[120]

The Lusaka agreement between the MPLA government and UNITA provided for the integration of former UNITA insurgents into the government and armed forces. A national unity government was installed in April 1997, but serious fighting resumed in late 1998 when Savimbi again returned to war, claiming that the MPLA was not fulfilling its obligations.[121] The government renewed its offensive against UNITA, which by now was relying mostly on diamond smuggling to fund the insurgency. The civil war created a humanitarian crisis of incredible proportions in Angola, with up to 4.28 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), a third of Angola's population. These same people made up 75% of all landmine victims in the country. It is estimated that approximately 15 million landmines were laid by both sides to the conflict by 2002[122].

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[118] Somerville, K, *Foreign Military Intervention in Africa,* Printers Publishers London, 87 Martins Press, New York, 1990, p 156
[119] Ana Leao, Op cit, p 22
[120] Ibid, p 26
[121] Ibid, p 26

[122] Furley, Oliver and Roy May, *Ending Africa's Wars: Progressing to Peace*, 2006, p 147.

Government troops gunned Savimbi down on 22 February 2002 in Moxico province, his birthplace.[123] After that, commanders from UNITA and the MPLA agreed to a cease-fire. The military commanders signed a Memorandum of Understanding, the Luena Agreement, as an addendum to the Lusaka Protocol paving the way for UNITA to declare itself as a political party and to officially demobilize its armed forces.

The Insurgency Leadership

The chapter will conclude by examining the main rebel protagonists in the two civil wars: Afonso Dhlakama of RENAMO and Jonas Savimbi of UNITA. Very little is known about Dhlakama except that he was the son of a Chief Manguande and was born in the Sofala Province of Mozambique on 1st January 1953.[124] He joined FRELIMO in 1972 after deserting from the Portuguese army. He was trained in Nachingweya in southern Tanzania and after independence he became head of logistics for FRELIMO in Sofala[125] during which time he became disgruntled with FRELIMO and joined forces with other former FRELIMO cadres against their former master. Dhlakama became leader of RENAMO after its first leader, Andre Matsangaisssa, was killed by Mozambican government forces in on 17 October 1979.[126] Dhlakama has remained the leader of the opposition, contesting all three presidential elections since 1994, losing all albeit by respectable margins.[127]

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[123] Wikipedia
[124] Radu, M; Arnold, A, Op cit p 166
[125] Ibid
[126] Lulat, Y, G-M, Op cit, p 273
[127] Wikipedia

On the other hand, the leader of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi, who was born on 3rd August 1934, at Munhango, in the Moxico province of central Angola, is now deceased. He won a scholarship in 1958 from the United Church of Christ to study in Lisbon. In 1960 he moved to Fribourg University and then studied political science at the University of Lausanne in Switzerland. He was appointed secretary general of a liberation movement called the Popular Union of Angola and later as foreign minister of the government in exile. When he became dissatisfied with the leadership of this group, he broke away and started to lay the groundwork for a new liberation front which was to draw most of its support from the people of his own tribe in central Angola, the Ovimbundu;. Thus UNITA was founded in 1966.[128]

Savimbi is said to have been a natural politician, dynamic, charismatic, and a first-rate orator. Apart from a doctorate that he obtained in Portugal, Savimbi also received military training from China, from where he became a Maoist.[129] It is said that he spoke several languages fluently, including Chinese, Portuguese, English and Swahili. He spent most of his time in the bush country of eastern and southern-eastern Angola, at his headquarters at Jamba, or travelling about in order to rally villagers to his party and to his guerrilla army. Savimbi fought against the Portuguese for 10 years, then against the MPLA government of independent Angola for 27 years. He was gunned down by Angolan government troops in Moxico province in 2002.

Conclusion

The policy of Portugal in its colonies was one of extreme brutality, repression and racial discrimination. The oppressed indigenous populations rose against the colonial

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[128] Collelo, Op cit, p 32
[129] Ibid

power in wars of independence. However, it is clear from the events that unfolded soon after the granting of independence to both countries that neither the colonizer nor the freedom fighters were ready for the transition. This view is vindicated by the influence of Portugal on the insurgencies against the newly independent states. Unfortunately, the Cold War with its attendant ideological wars plus the presence of white supremacist governments in South Africa and Rhodesia conspired to scuttle the independence of the fledgling states. Civil wars internationalized, as the Soviet Union, USA, South Africa, Cuba, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Zaire, Zimbabwe and Malawi got involved in some stage of at least one of the conflicts.

The chapter has set the context for the study by briefly outlining the rise of the civil wars and the mediation processes that led to their resolution, namely, the Gbadolite Agreement, Bicesse, Lusaka and Luena accords in Angola and the Rome Agreement in Mozambique. The chapter also briefly looked at the personalities of Jonas Savimbi and Afonso Dhlakama, the insurgent leaders in the two civil wars. The next chapter will take it a step further by recounting the mediation processes that led to the termination of the wars and the transition to peace.

Chapter 3

The Mediation Processes

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to examine the mediation processes in Mozambique and Angola taking into account the principles of mediation spelt out in Chapter 1. The chapter reviews the mediation processes to find out whether Savimbi and Dhlakama shaped the outcome of the processes and if they did so, how. The chapter also examines the details of each agreement from initiation of mediation to implementation (of those that managed to reach that phase) of the agreed terms. The chapter seeks to interrogate each of the processes with a view to identifying whether the behaviour of the individuals involved in the civil wars during the mediation can validate the hypothesis.

Pre-negotiation Phase in Mozambique

In Mozambique, RENAMO was being overtly supported in its insurgency by the South African apartheid government. However, in 1984, the governments of Mozambique and South Africa signed what came to be known as the Nkomati Accord.[130] In the accord, both sides agreed that their territories would not be used by armed groups to launch attacks against their neighbours and that South Africa would stop its support of RENAMO. South Africa was at this time trying to contain incursions by Umkhonto weSizwe, the armed wing of the ANC which was waging a war of liberation against the apartheid government and launching its attacks from Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Angola. The agreement failed to stop the civil war as RENAMO actually intensified its campaign, which included the forced recruitment of child soldiers, abductions, torture

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[130] Conciliation Resources. Accessed at www.c-r.org on 28 August 2010

and mutilation.[131] The rebel movement also regularly captured arms and other supplies from the FRELIMO government forces. Under the sponsorship of South Africa, it is estimated that by the late 1980s, RENAMO had caused the deaths of up to 100 000 people and the creation of more than a million refugees.[132] The activities of RENAMO brought the Mozambican economy to a virtual standstill before Zimbabwe, Zambia and Tanzania intervened to help protect some of the infrastructure, mainly the railway network.[133]

After the mysterious death in a plane crash of the Mozambican President Samora Machel in 1986, his successor, former Foreign Affairs Minister Joachim Chissano, tried to explore avenues of dialogue with RENAMO.[134] This was always going to be difficult since the FRELIMO government had taken the stance that RENAMO was nothing more than a bandit organization that the Mozambican government would crush militarily. This relentless demonization of RENAMO made it difficult for the initial contact between the belligerents as political parties with equal standing to be made, according to Helmick and Petersen.[135] However, with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of apartheid, support for RENAMO all but vanished. The Mozambican government began to lose its faith in Marxism and approached the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as the country sank into poverty due to limited investment and the government's

[131] Lundin, B I, *The Peace Process and the Construction of Reconciliation Post-Conflict—The Experience of Mozambique,* Paper presented in Barcelona, 27-28 February 2004

[132] *On War,* (2000), Renamo Insurgency in Mozambique 1976-1992, www.onwar.co./aced/data/romeo/renamo1976.htm accessed 28 August 2010

[133] Leao, A, op cit, p 16

[134] Andrea Bartoli, "Forgiveness and Reconciliation in the Mozambique Peace Process", in Helmick R G & Petersen, R L, (eds) *Forgiveness and Reconciliation: Religion, Public Policy, and Conflict Transformation,* Templeton Foundation Press, 2002, p 366

[134] Ibid, p 366

inability to control much of the country.[136] The government embarked on Structural Adjustment Programs prescribed by the West and this went a long way to isolating RENAMO politically because previously anti-Marxist rhetoric had helped to secure funding for RENAMO.

As the war dragged on with no end in sight, Chissano initiated dialogue between the warring parties by inviting Catholic leaders in Mozambique to facilitate in opening lines of communication between the government and RENAMO. Catholic and Protestant leaders in Maputo therefore established informal ties with RENAMO leaders in Mozambique and Kenya. They (Christian leaders) were the ones who indicated to Chissano after a trip to Nairobi in February 1989 that RENAMO was also war weary and would welcome negotiations.[137] The church had been active in negotiations with RENAMO to free religious hostages before. But more importantly, the Archbishop of Beira had ethnic ties with some of the RENAMO leaders.[138] At the same time, Chissano approached local Moslem leaders and Eastern religious leaders schooled in meditation and non-violent means to try and talk to RENAMO in order to bring peace to Mozambique.[139] However, it was the Catholic Community of Sant' Egidio that got the breakthrough. The same community had, in 1982, managed to facilitate negotiations between the Vatican and FRELIMO to restore religious freedom in Mozambique. Besides that, it had played a major role in negotiating with RENAMO for the release of nuns and priests that had been captured by RENAMO.[140] The community finally got

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[136] Salamons, *The United Nations in Mozambique,* www.intlmgt.com/publicmanagement/mozambique accessed on 20August 2010
[137] Lundin, I, B, *The Peace Process and the Construction of Reconciliation Post Conflict—The Experience of Mozambique,* Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Maputo, 2004
[138] Salamons, Op cit
[139] Andrea Bartoli, op cit, p 368
[140] Salamons, op cit

Dhlakama to agree to a mediated negotiation with Chissano. Kenya and Malawi were touted as possible venues but the two warring sides failed to agree with FRELIMO suspicious of Kenya, which for some time had been considered sympathetic to RENAMO.[141] On the other hand, Malawi was considered unsafe by RENAMO leaders, who, throughout the process of mediation, displayed a fear of assassination or abduction.[142] In the end, with the concurrence of the Italian government, and as suggested by the Community of Sant' Egidio, Rome was agreed upon as a venue for the mediation.[143] Initially, Presidents Mugabe and Moi had been tipped to be mediators, but once the venue for the mediation was established, the erstwhile observers, Mario Raffaelli, a representative of the Italian government; Jaime Goncalves, Archbishop of Beira; Andrea Riccardi and Matteo Zuppi of the Community of Sant'Egidio were agreed upon by the two warring parties to mediate.[144] Mario Raffaelli would be the coordinator of the mediators.

Apart from these efforts, Tiny Rowland, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Lonrho, a multinational corporation, emerged as a strong go-between in the civil war using his seemingly endless resources to try and bridge the gap between Chissano and Dhlakama. Having significant investments in Mozambique, Rowland had been paying protection money to RENAMO since 1982 to have his investments spared from sabotage.[145] Rowland, at the behest of Presidents Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, played a significant role in

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[141] Hanlon, J, *Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots?* James Currey Publishers, 1991, p 34
[142] Lundin, I, B, Op cit, p 10
[143] Ibid, p 10
[144] Joint Communiqué on Mozambique, www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agree,ments/pdf/moz5.pdf accessed on 20 August 2010

[145] Vines, A, *The Business of Peace: Tiny Rowland, Financial Incentives and the Mozambican Settlement,* Conciliation Resources, www.c-r.org accessed on 20 August 2010

financing Dhlakama's trips around east and central Africa and to Europe as regional leaders tried to bring the two leaders together for negotiations.[146] However, Dhlakama distrusted many of the regional leaders, especially Mugabe, whom he viewed as too close an ally of the Mozambican government, given the history between Mozambique and ZANU. It was not until July 1990 that the first meeting took place at the headquarters of the Community of Sant'Egidio in Rome between the protagonists to agree on mediators, observers, advisors and verification committees.[147]

Throughout the run-up to the peace talks, Rowland would use his financial leverage to persuade Dhlakama to play ball, suggesting that Dhlakama was also looking to ways in which he could personally benefit from the whole mediation process. It can be deduced that the RENAMO leader was more concerned with personal issues than issues of political grievances but he was showing a commitment to the mediation, unlike the situation in Angola where Savimbi was convinced that he could defeat the MPLA militarily.

Mozambique Negotiations

That first meeting, held from 8 to 10 July 1990 culminated in a joint communiqué issued by the two parties, represented by Armando Emilio Guebuza, who was Minister of Transport and Communications in the Mozambican government and Raul Manuel Domingos, Chief of RENAMO's External Department and head of the RENAMO delegation.[148] Also present at this historic occasion were Presidents Mugabe and Masire lending to the ceremony international respectability. George Saitoti, the Vice President of Kenya, the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pik Botha, the Malawian Minister

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[146] Ibid
[147] Leao, A, Op Cit
[148] Conciliation Resources, accessed at www.c-r.org/ourwork/accord/mozambique/ on 20 August 2009

in the Office of the President, John Tembo and Ahmed Haggag, the Assistant Secretary General of the UN were also witnesses to the declaration.[149]   Representing the observers were Dr James O C Jonah, Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs at the UN; Ambassador Herman J Cohen, United States Assistant Secretary of State; Ambassador Philippe Cuvillier, for the government of France; Dr Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, for the government of Portugal and Sir Patrick Fairweather for the government of the United Kingdom.[150]   In essence, the two parties agreed to put their differences aside and search for ways to end the war and build a lasting peace in Mozambique and agreed that the Rome Agreement, once signed by the negotiating teams, would be binding on all the parties concerned.

On 16 July 1992, the delegations and mediators issued a declaration that provided for urgent facilitation by both sides of the war all the humanitarian food relief effort in Mozambique. This was in response to the devastating drought that had afflicted the country that year. The parties considered that "...for the population (of Mozambique), the consequences of the armed conflict have been seriously aggravated by the worst drought in 50 years in the country and region".[151] In December of the same year, the group met again and agreed on a partial ceasefire and the terms under which Zimbabwean troops engaged in guarding the Beira and Limpopo rail corridors should operate.[152]   They also agreed to set up a Joint Verification Commission (JVC) made up of representatives from

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[149] Lundin, I, B, Op cit, p 11
[150] Ibid
[151] Declaration on the Guiding Principles for Humanitarian Assistance, www.santegidio.org/archivio/pace/mozamb_19920716_EN.htm accessed on 22 August 2010
[152] Agreement on Partial Ceasefire, www.santegidio.org/archivio/pace/mozamb_19901201_EN.htm, accessed on 22 August 2010

RENAMO, FRELIMO, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Congo, USA, UK, France and Portugal to invigilate the implementation of the agreement.[153]

The peace negotiations continued in Rome without much progress because the two leaders were failing to agree on issues of how to structure a new military force and how to administer RENAMO controlled zones during the ceasefire period.[154] Back in Mozambique the fighting continued although Dhlakama was coming under pressure from regional leaders to be more committed to the peace process. Up to this point he had not spelt out any clear political ideology except vague calls for the government to stop referring to RENAMO as "bandits", an end of Marxism, the withdrawal of foreign troops from Mozambique, freedom of speech and an adoption of a Western type of economy.[155] This apparent lack of political maturity goes a long way towards proving the assertion that RENAMO was only trying to legitimize what had started as and remained a bandit movement without a political agenda and even without the desire or aptitude for political office. Instead, in the period leading to the Rome Agreement of 1992, Dhlakama appeared to be more concerned about his personal safety than achieving political goals. Presidents Mugabe, Kaunda, Masire and Moi conducted shuttle diplomacy between their capitals as they strove to bring Chissano and Dhlakama face to face.

Presidents Ketumile Masire of Botswana and Robert Mugabe met Dhlakama in Botswana to pave the way for a meeting between Chissano and Dhlakama which finally took place in Rome well into the mediation process, on 4 August 1992[156] under the chairmanship of President Mugabe. The meeting ended on 5 August with a historic first

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[153] Ibid

[154] Vines, A, Op cit

[155] Mozambique: RENAMO at a Crossroads, CIA Documents, www.faqs.org/cia/docs/ accessed on 22 August 2010

[156] Vines, A, Op cit

handshake[157] between Chissano and Dhlakama and the issuance of a Joint Declaration. The two leaders agreed to speed up the mediation process and on 7 August a declaration to accept the peace agreement by October 1992 was signed. The delay was to allow the Mozambican parliament to ratify the commitments made by the FRELIMO representatives as part of the peace process.[158] The Joint Declaration also saw Chissano conceding that he would make arrangements to ensure the personal safety of Dhlakama and members of RENAMO, while Dhlakama agreed to a ceasefire. Present at the signing of the Joint Declaration were President Mugabe; Emilio Colombo, Italy's Minister of Foreign Affairs; Gaositwe Keagakwa Tibe Chiepe, representative of President Masire and the mediators, Mario Raffaelli; Jaime Goncalves; Anrea Riccardi and Matteo Zuppi.[159]

The negotiations that began at Sant' Egidio in 1990 and ended with the signing of the Rome Peace Agreement on 14 October 1992 addressed the following agenda issues: Firstly, the criteria and agreements for the formation and recognition of political parties in Mozambique with special emphasis on the requirement that political parties should only aspire to office through democratic means.[160] Secondly, the negotiators agreed on the principles of the electoral act, which included the setting up of an Electoral Commission and specifying that the next elections would take place within one year of the General Peace Agreement. The government undertook to assist RENAMO in obtaining accommodation, transport and communication facilities in order to campaign

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[157] Ibid
[158] Conciliation Resources, Op cit
[159] Ibid
[160] Ibid

around the country.[161]   Thirdly, the negotiators agreed on the structure of the Armed Forces of Mozambique, (FADM). They agreed that the forces would be drawn in equal proportions from both sides and its formation would coincide with the concentration, disarmament and integration into civilian life of the demobilized personnel. The third item also gave a timetable for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Mozambique.[162] Fourthly, the parties agreed on a full ceasefire to come into effect upon signature of the Agreement. A Ceasefire Commission would be established to oversee the whole process from separation of forces, their concentration and demobilization. Fifthly, the parties agreed that they would request the Italian government to convene a donors' conference to finance the electoral process, emergency programs and programs for the reintegration of displaced persons, refugees and demobilized soldiers.   They also agreed that an appropriate portion of the funds so raised would go to each political party to finance its activities.[163]

Implementation of the Rome Agreement

The Rome Agreement was signed at Sant' Egidio by Guebuza and Raul Domingos on 4 October 1992, signaling the end of the mediation and the beginning of the implementation process.[164]   This implementation period lasted from 1992 to the General Elections which were held in October 1994.   It is important to examine the implementation because a successful mediation can only be judged by whether it is implemented fully, thereby ending the conflict.   It is also during the implementation process that the particular behaviours of the personalities made or broke the mediation

[161] Ibid
[162] Ibid
[163] Ibid
[164] Lundin, I,B, Op cit, p 14

processes. The first issue was the deployment of a peacekeeping UN Mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), a 7 500 strong force led by UN Special Representative to Mozambique, Aldo Ajello of Italy.[165] The mandate of ONUMOZ was to oversee the withdrawal of foreign troops from Mozambique, mostly Zimbabwean and Malawian, disarm the combatants and oversee elections.[166] It was also to demine the country and oversee humanitarian aid. A sticking point during this process was RENAMO's refusal to accept the government's claim to sovereignty while the government wanted RENAMO to recognize it as having sovereign power over all of Mozambique including RENAMO controlled areas. In addition, ONUMOZ failed to demine the countryside, completely disarm the combatants and keep the forces from sporadically attacking each other over the slightest misunderstanding. Although these incidents could have scuttled the implementation of the agreement, Dhlakama, to his credit, played them down and refused to reconsider the military option. The funds sourced from donors, which found their way into RENAMO coffers, went a long way in pacifying RENAMO leaders.[167] Dhlakama used the money to try and build up a political image from the rebel tag that RENAMO had carried throughout the civil war.[168] Elections were scheduled for 27 October 1994, and on the eve, Dhlakama threatened a boycott, citing gross violations of the Rome Peace Agreement and other electoral fraud on the part of FRELIMO. However, from sustained Western and Zimbabwean pressure, he relented and announced that he would accept to participate in the polls.[169] The elections were held on schedule and FRELIMO won 129

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[165] Africa Research Group, *Mozambique, The Achievement of Peace,* London, May 1999, p 4
[166] Levine, D, Op cit, p 10
[167] Venancio, M, *Did Peace-Keeping Work in Mozambique*? in Chan & Venancio, eds, "War & Peace in Mozambique", Basingstoke & London, 1998: pp 98-116

[168] Ibid
[169] Africa Research Group, Op cit, p 6

to 112 seats for RENAMO. Dhlakama and RENAMO accepted the results and peace has prevailed in the country since then, marking the end of the civil war. Dhlakama has remained the leader of the opposition in the Mozambican parliament, and has participated in and lost the national and presidential elections in 1999, 2004 and 2009 to FRELIMO. The mediation of the conflict in Mozambique went the way it did because Dhlakama was amenable to the mediation. He could have easily rejected the results of the elections as is commonplace in Africa, that election results are challenged if they do not go the expected way.

Mediation in Angola

The mediation in Angola resulted in four agreements: the Gbadolite Agreement, the Bicesse Accords, the Lusaka Accords and finally the Luena Memorandum. The last two brought no new issues to contend with except to call upon the protagonists to respect the provisions of the Bicesse Accords.

The Gbadolite Agreement

The civil war and mediation processes in Angola were more complex affairs because of the multiplicity of actors and interests involved in the civil war. Neither Savimbi nor the Angolan President dos Santos ever made overtures to the other as was the case in Mozambique. However, the Angolan leader had offered amnesty to and invited UNITA to reintegrate its forces with his, which Savimbi rejected.[170] This was soon after the historical signing of the UN treaty that allowed for the cessation of hostilities between Angola and South Africa, the independence of Namibia, and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola in late 1988.[171] The independence of Namibia

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[170] Leao, A Op cit p 11
[171] Collelo Op cit, p 51

was linked to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola through the involvement of both Cuba and South Africa on the side of the MPLA and UNITA respectively in the Angolan Civil War.

A fierce battle, dubbed the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale pitted Angolan government troops with the aid of SWAPO and ANC forces against South Africa in a conventional battle in southern Angola, which many saw as a turning point in the Angolan war and Namibian occupation by South Africa.[172] The Angolan and Cuban troops were able to halt the advance of the South African forces, leading to the latter agreeing to withdraw from Angola and relinquish Namibia as well. Quadripartite talks in New York in 1988 among South Africa, Cuba, Angola and USA resulted in the New York Accords in which South Africa and Angola agreed that their territories would not be used for any attack against another sovereign country, meaning that South Africa would stop supporting UNITA while Angola would expel ANC fighters from its territory.[173] Under the agreement, Cuba would withdraw its forces from Angola and Namibia would be granted its independence.[174] A UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) oversaw the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, which was completed on 25 May 1991.[175]

The first time that Savimbi and dos Santos met was in Gbadolite, Zaire (now DRC) on 22 June 1989 at the invitation of then Zairean President, Mobutu Sese Seko.[176] The meeting in Gbadolite was attended by nineteen African Heads of State from Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau,

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[172] Wikipedia
[173] Encyclopedia of the Nations, accessed at www.nationsencyclopedia.com on 20 August 2010
[174] Ibid
[175] UN Report, *Completed Peacekeeping Operations: Angola,* at www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unaven1, accessed on 13 August 2010
[176] Bruce W Nelan, *Angola "We Have taken the First Step"* , TIME Magazine Article at www.time.com, accessed 27 August 2008

Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome e Principe, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.[177] The purpose of the meeting was purely to register intent on the part of both sides to ending the civil war. The Gbadolite Agreement was the first mediation effort by regional states and it opened the door for further negotiations. As in the situation of Mozambique, the case of Angola disproves assertions by some scholars that mediation must necessarily follow failed or stalled negotiations.

A peace deal was announced, in which Savimbi would leave the country for two years—in a form of self exile-- and return for the award of an honorary title and position within government.[178] The rest of the agreement had to do with the cessation of South African and US aid to UNITA and the retention of the Angolan constitution. Within two months of the agreement, UNITA had launched more than 600 attacks across the country and more than 700 people had been killed.[179] Gbadolite had been nothing but a propaganda stunt for Savimbi. He was deceiving the world into thinking that he was ready for negotiations, though in reality, he never had any intention of keeping his side of the bargain.[180] The events after Gbadolite go a long way in showing what sort of schemer Savimbi was. He had his eyes firmly on the biggest prize and no negotiated settlement would force him to give up his quest for total power in Angola. This demonstrates how Savimbi, as an individual, was willing to scuttle any mediation if it did not bring him into power. The Gbadolite agreement was also always going to fail because the mediator, Mobutu of Zaire, deceived both sides that the other side had

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[177] Fischer, H, MacDonald A, *Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Vol 5*, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p 13
[178] Ibid
[179] Ibid
[180] Brittain, V, *Death of Dignity: Angola's Civil War,* Pluto Press, 1998, p

accepted its demands. Savimbi was quoted as saying. "Why are we going to surrender? When we are strong, why should we say I am going into exile?"[181]

The Bicesse Accords

The next meeting was convened in Bicesse, Portugal by the troika of Portugal, USA and USSR and its objective was to create conducive conditions in Angola for the holding of credible elections under international supervision.[182] The USA, in its role as kingmaker, thought that it could bulldoze the MPLA into accepting a new mediated agreement, and the Angolan government, keen to regain its place among legitimate states agreed, in the hope that it would garner enough support in a "winner-take-all" election. The meeting agreed that the MPLA would recognize UNITA as being equal in status to the MPLA during a transition period to elections. Savimbi had the confidence that he could beat his adversary dos Santos in a free and fair election in Angola on the advice of his American backers who told him that it the Marxist MPLA government would lose and that it was a "foregone conclusion that UNITA would win the elections the following year."[183] In fact, throughout the world, socialist governments were being rejected by their people in favour of more democratic capitalistic parties. Even the MPLA itself had begun to reshape itself into a social-democratic party in order to avoid being dumped by the population. The grievances of UNITA, personified by Savimbi, could be summed up as the desire to govern Angola, as it claimed to be the legitimate representative of the people and that the Marxist regime of the MPLA was not democratic.

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[181] McCormick, S, *Angola: The Road to Peace,* CSIS Notes, No.125, June1991, p 3
[182] Bradshaw, Y, W; Ndegwa, S, N, *The Uncertain Promises of Southern Africa,(*eds) Indiana University Press, 2000, p 169
[183] McCormick, S, Op cit, p 46

The negotiations, mediated by the Troika of Portugal, the USSR and the USA opened in the Portuguese city of Bicesse and were held from April 1990 to May 1991. The negotiators agreed that the MPLA would abandon its Marxist-Leninist ideology and adopt a multi-party democratic system. The agreement also forced the MPLA government to recognize UNITA as a political party on the same footing as itself. Also included in the agreement was the condition that elections would be held after a transition period during which the demilitarization of the two forces and the formation of a single army should take place, as a way of ensuring that the vote would be respected.[184] The Accords were initialed on 1 May 1991 at Estoril, Portugal and signed by the President of Angola, Jose Eduardo dos Santos and President of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi in Lisbon on 31 May 1991.[185]

The agreement addressed ceasefire as the first item of the agenda. To this end, a Joint Political-Military Commission or CCPM (Commissao Conjuta Politico-Militar) was set up to supervise the ceasefire in conjunction with elements from both parties. Provision was also made for the formation of a Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission or CMVF (Commissao Mista de Verifficao) composed of MPLA and UNITA representatives and the troika of USA, Portugal and USSR as observers to monitor the ceasefire throughout the territory of Angola.[186] The agreement also mandated that assembly areas would be created where combatants from both sides would be quartered prior to the creation of a unified army. Arms and ammunition would also be collected and stored in various locations where they would be accounted for by the

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[184] Christine Messiant, Op cit
[185] UN Report, *UNAVEM II,* www.angel-invest.us/en/peacekeeping accessed on 22 August 2010
[186] Ibid

CMVF. The cessation of hostilities would be at 12 midnight on 15 May 1991.[187] Forces would start moving to assembly areas from 1 July to 1 August 1991. In addition, UNITA agreed to recognize dos Santos as the president of Angola until the holding of elections while the Angolan government would allow UNITA to freely participate in political activities commensurate with those of a political party in a multiparty state system. A UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) was established on 20 May 1991 to verify the ceasefire arrangement, monitor the neutrality of the Angolan police and oversee the election process.[188]

According to reports by UNAVEM II, most of the political aspects of the Bicesse Accord were adhered to except the issue of demobilization which both UNITA and the MPLA government, in a clear sign of a lack of mutual trust, failed to observe.[189] The electoral process involved voter registration from 20 May to 10 August 1992; electoral campaigning from 29 August to 28 September; presidential and legislative elections on 29 and 30 September and vote counting, investigation of complaints and announcement of final results on 17 October 1992.[190] Voting was largely peaceful, but even before the final results were announced, Savimbi had recalled 11 of his Generals who had joined the new Armed Forces of Angola, citing fraud and cheating in the elections. At the end of the polling period, Savimbi had garnered 40,07% of the votes cast, less than the 49,57% won by dos Santos, necessitating a run-off since none of the candidates had achieved an

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[187] Ibid
[188] Ibid
[189] Ibid
[190] Ibid

outright majority. In the parliamentary vote, UNITA won 34,1% against 53,74% for the MPLA.[191]

Savimbi immediately rejected the results, citing extensive government rigging, and resumed fighting although the voting had been hailed by UNAVEM II and other international observers as having been free and fair. Savimbi was not even prepared to allow an investigation into any alleged rigging of the vote. He had wanted nothing short of victory and the military solution for him, unlike for Dhlakama in Mozambique, was still very much alive. A week before the polls he had told a British news crew that he would not accept defeat.[192] However, a few of his winning parliamentary candidates took up their posts in Luanda and formed the New UNITA or UNITA Renovada when Savimbi returned to the bush.[193] Savimbi himself, and many of his loyalists, could not accept the prospect of coming out of the whole civil war with nothing to show for it. For him, if power could not be achieved through the ballot, then it would have to come through the bullet. Had there been a clause about power sharing after elections, perhaps the situation could have been different.

The civil war actually intensified to heights not reached before the Bicesse Accords after the collapse of this initiative with the UN strongly condemning UNITA's actions.[194] More than 120 000 people died in the aftermath of the Bicesse Accords,

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[191] Meldrum, A, *Hungry to Vote, Africa Report (November –December),* 1992, pp 26-30

[192] Knudsen, C, Mundt, A, Zartman, I, W, *Peace Agreements: The Case of Angola,* African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, October 2000

[193] Rupiya M and Njeri J, Op cit

[194] UN Chronicle. UNAVEM II Mandate Extended; UNITA Condemned for Endangering Peace Process. : Volume: 30. Issue: 3, September 1993. p 27

compared to 300 000 that had died during the years of civil war prior to Bicesse.[195] As the fighting raged, the international community tried to intervene with offers of concessions from the MPLA in exchange for military concessions from UNITA.[196] The UN, through the Secretary General and Miss Margaret Joan Anstee, his Special Representative and Chief of Mission (UNAVEM II) appointed on 6 February 1992, tried to mediate by extending the mandate of the mission to include mediation, albeit the original mandate had since lost relevance. As the civil war intensified, the Secretary-General and his Special Representative initiated talks in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, which were held from 27 to 30 January 1993 to discuss the modalities of resuming a ceasefire in Angola. The first round of the talks left some important issues unresolved and the second round did not materialise after UNITA failed to send a delegation. Peace talks resumed in April 1993 in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, but broke down again in May without progress after signature.[197]

The Security Council condemned UNITA for its continuing military actions, invoked Chapter VII of the Charter, imposing an embargo on the supply of arms and petroleum products to UNITA.[198] The Council insisted that UNITA respect the 1991 Peace Accords, and that the parties make every effort to restart negotiations. Under pressure from the international community, UNITA was soon forced back to the negotiating table, this time in Lusaka, Zambia to revive the Bicesse Accords.

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[195] Knudsen, C et al, Op cit
[196] Lewis, J, *Angola 1995: The Road to Peace,* XIII International Relations, 1996, p 3
[197] UN Report, *UNAVEM II,* Op cit
[198] Schweigman, D, *The Authority of the Security Council Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: Legal Limits and the Role of the International Court of Justice,* Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001, p 116

The Lusaka Accord

Mediation was conducted by the United Nations Special Representative, Mr Alioune Blondin Beye, who by this time had replaced Joan Anstee. Representatives of the warring parties were Fernando Faustino Muteka and Eugenio Ngola Manuvakola of the MPLA and UNITA respectively.[199] The parties agreed on the following: a reaffirmation of both parties' acceptance of the Bicesse Accords and relevant Security Council resolutions; the re-establishment of a ceasefire, the withdrawal, quartering and demobilization of UNITA troops; completion of the formation of the FAA under the verification and monitoring of the UN; the roles of the National Police and the integration of UNITA members into the police force; reconciliation and national healing including the granting of special status to Savimbi plus the inclusion of 70 deputies from UNITA into the national assembly; completion of the electoral process, ie the presidential run-off; the mandate of the UN and the functions of a Joint Commission and a timetable for the execution of the agreement.[200] It is pertinent to note that by the time of the Lusaka Accord, Savimbi was being considered by the international community as a pariah who had rejected the results of a free and fair election in favour of a military option to take over power in Angola. Based on that perception, he was at pains to portray the image of a statesman who accepted that negotiation was the way to resolve conflict, although in essence he was the leader of a party now in rebellion against a legitimate government. The accord was initialled on 31 October and signed on 20 November 1994 in Lusaka by the Minister for External Relations of Angola, Mr. Venâncio de Moura, and by the Secretary-General of UNITA and its chief negotiator at Lusaka, Mr. Eugénio

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[199] Chabal, P; Vidal, N, (eds) *Angola: The Weight of History,* Columbia University Press, 2008, p 102
[200] Ibid

Manuvakola, in the presence of President dos Santos and representatives of the observer states, Portugal, USA and Russia.[201] The ceremony was witnessed by several heads of State, a number of foreign ministers and other dignitaries. Savimbi did not travel to the Zambian capital, citing security concerns. On 1 February 1995, UNAVEM III was established to assist in the implementation of the Lusaka Accord.[202]

The Lusaka Accord provided the platform for the formation of a Government of National Unity and Reconciliation (GNUR) in Angola in 1997.[203] However, with the GNUR in place, both sides violated the Lusaka Accord so much so that the country returned once more to war. The renewed fighting spawned one of the worst humanitarian disasters ever seen in the world. It is estimated that in the years following the signing of the Lusaka Accord, close to a thousand people died in Angola everyday as a direct result of the civil war.[204] Savimbi ignored the requirements to demobilize and kept a sizeable number of his fighters with him in his base in Huambo. A few of his officials were sworn into the GNUR but the relative calm lasted only a year after the signing of the Lusaka Accord. Savimbi dragged his feet on all of the Protocol issues and, drawing on massive diamond revenues, went on an arms buying spree, despite the UN embargo. In June 1998, the mediator, Alioune Blondin Beye was killed in a plane crash.[205] The Angolan government then launched a massive offensive against UNITA and Savimbi at great cost to the country and its population.[206] It seemed obvious that the MPLA government of dos Santos was pursuing a policy of committing all available resources in

[201] Ibid
[202] Yusuf, A, A, *African Yearbook of International Law, Vol 3,* 1995
[203] Christine Messiant, Op cit
[204] UN Report, *UNAVEM II,* Op cit
[205] Bradshaw, Y, W; Ndegwa, S, N, *The Uncertain Promise of Southern Africa,* Indiana University Press, 2000, p 171
[206] Messiant, C, Op cit

a final effort to flush out and exterminate Savimbi. Regional leaders, themselves engaged in the DRC war, issued a statement during a SADC summit in Mauritius in September 1998, declaring Savimbi a "war criminal to be hunted down."[207] In December 2001, the Angolan government suggested three scenarios for Savimbi: Capture and justice as a war criminal, surrender and pardon or death in combat. He chose the 3rd scenario. Savimbi was gunned down by government forces in Moxico Province on 22 February 2002. His death was decisive in the Angolan civil war as it signified the renewal of negotiations and the acceptance by UNITA of the subsequent Luena Memorandum in April 2002 that would finally end civil war in Angola.[208]

The Luena Memorandum

After the death of Savimbi, his Secretary General, Paulo Lukamba, took over leadership of UNITA after the second in command to Savimbi, Antonio Dembo, died of natural causes on 3 March 2002, just twelve days after the death of Savimbi.[209] The Angolan government declared a unilateral ceasefire and offered UNITA a Peace Plan, outlining a return to the resolutions of the Bicesse and Lusaka Accords; UNITA's demilitarization; an amnesty for all war crimes and the integration of UNITA into the political life of Angola.[210] By 18 March 2002, UNITA generals had agreed to the plan and endorsed the ceasefire. Talks began in Luena on 20 March, centred on the modalities of a ceasefire; formation of a Joint Military Commission; quartering and demobilization

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[207] Knudsen, C et al, Op cit

[208] **Aaron Griffiths,** *The end of the War: The Luena Memorandum of Understanding*, **2004,** Conciliation Resources website at www.c-r.org, accessed on 27 August 2008

[209] Rupiya, M and Njeru, J, Op cit p 101

[210] Griffiths, A, *Conciliation Resources, at* www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/angola/luena_memorandum.php accessed on 20 August 2010

of UNITA troops. The Luena Memorandum was signed on 4 April 2002 by the two Commanders-in-Chief of the MPLA and UNITA respectively, Generals Armando da Cruz Neto and Abreu Karmorteiro, in the presence of the Troika ambassadors.[211] Witnessing the signing were Angolan President dos Santos and interim UNITA leader, General Lukumba. The Luena Memorandum opened the avenue for further talks leading to the end of civil war in Angola. The absence of any meaningful UNITA impediment to the implementation of Bicesse after the death of Savimbi clearly demonstrates that it was Savimbi himself who had become the obstacle to peace in Angola.

Conclusion

The mediation processes in both Mozambique and Angola were clearly different both in their conduct and outcomes. In Mozambique, peace was achieved within six years of the start of negotiations, whereas in Angola, the same was attained after thirteen years.   While many similarities existed in the two wars, the way they responded to mediation was clearly different. There were no material differences in the processes from other mediation processes that have taken place in other conflicts around the world, leading one to conclude that it was the personalities of the actors involved that shaped the outcome of the mediation. One aspect of the mediation process in Angola was the absence of civil sector representation in any of the phases of the negotiation. This supports the argument that in Angola the fight was just about who occupied the seat of government, rather than addressing real grievances within the population.   The next chapter will analyze the two mediation processes with a view of explaining the different outcomes of the mediations and draw some conclusions.

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[211] Fischer, H et al, Op cit p 6

Chapter 4

Explaining the Outcomes

Introduction

The chapter seeks to explain what caused the differences in outcomes of the two processes in light of the key aspects of mediation, namely the ripe moment; choice of mediator; the questions of impartiality and neutrality; ownership of the settlement and the implementation process. The chapter is a comparative analysis of the above aspects to determine possible reasons for similarities and differences between the two wars that form this study. Key in this analysis is the role played by the individual insurgent leaders.

The Ripe Moment

In both civil wars, the incumbent governments did not want to request for mediation as doing so would have expressed recognition of the armed groups opposing it as political equals. Mediation therefore required a transformation of the incumbent government's view of armed resistance or rebellion as banditry or criminal acts to one where they are legitimate political parties. While RENAMO did start as banditry, it transformed itself with time to become a political party with considerable following, albeit forced, countrywide. Savimbi's UNITA was known to be one of the political parties fighting for the independence of Angola, but after the MPLA declared the Peoples' Republic of Angola, the effect was to criminalize the activities of UNITA. It also required the transformation of these armed groups into political parties that are capable of participation. Mediation of both civil wars was therefore not necessarily

undertaken voluntarily as incumbent governments initially pursued the military option as the only plausible way to address the insurgency. A lot of effort went into persuading parties to the conflict to negotiate, and the two wars are similar in this regard. Southern African governments, particularly the frontline states, played a significant part in bringing the warring parties to the negotiating table. Churches, particularly in Mozambique, were instrumental in bringing the protagonists together to negotiate.

Dialogue between the Mozambican government and RENAMO was initiated in 1989 in Kenya through efforts by Presidents Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. The two presidents gave up after failing to persuade the FRELIMO Government to talk to RENAMO directly because Chissano had not yet gotten over his disdain for RENAMO. Additionally, RENAMO understandably did not trust Zimbabwe (given the closeness of ZANU and FRELIMO) as mediator and Mozambique did not trust Kenya.[212] However, the ripe moment was very close by this time because external support for perpetuating the war had been withdrawn from both parties as a result of the demise of the Cold War. Russia had stopped supplying Mozambique with diesel and other materiel and there was a devastating drought in 1990-91 in Mozambique which threatened almost the entire population, RENAMO included. There was war exhaustion on both sides as well as a lack of resources to prosecute the war profitably.[213] So in August 1990, President Chissano announced that FRELIMO had agreed to allow opposition parties to operate openly and legally in Mozambique. That declaration in itself was a major victory for RENAMO because it signalled an acceptance from the government that RENAMO was a credible political party. In November,

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[212] African Research Group, *Mozambique: The Achievement of Peace,* London, May 1999, p 4
[213] Ibid

government and RENAMO agreed to allow the Italian government and the Catholic Church Community of Sant'Egidio as mediators in peace talks. A peace treaty ending the war was signed in October 1992 and elections followed two years later.

In contrast, the situation concerning the ripeness of the conflict for mediation in Angola was quite different. Both the belligerents in the civil war in Angola were convinced of military victory fully supported by their respective benefactors. The two had all the resources at their disposal—the government had unfettered access to oil revenues and both the government and UNITA enjoyed overt military, political and financial support from the USSR and the USA respectively.[214] Therefore, when the Bicesse process was initiated in Portugal, the belligerents had not reached a mutually hurting stalemate. Both of them actually only agreed to negotiate because each believed it would emerge the winner. Both belligerents had the means and willingness to dominate society and did not need to care much for the population. They both depended on raw military power and both pursued undemocratic methods and had no inclination towards mutual accommodation. Savimbi was convinced that he had the upper hand because he had "forced" the MPLA to the negotiating table. Savimbi also believed that he could use force as the ultimate means of gaining power. The MPLA, on the other hand, had run the country as a militarized one party-state based on arbitrariness, privilege and massive corruption by the ruling clique. The government had long abandoned economic reforms and appeared obsessed with defeating Savimbi as an end in itself.[215] This represents the first point of divergence between the two mediation processes. While there were many

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[214] Christine Messiant, op cit
[215] Ibid

factors pushing the belligerents in Mozambique towards the negotiating table, the protagonists in Angola were still bent on a military solution.

The mediation in Angola was based on false premises on the part of both belligerents and therefore never stood a chance of working. The MPLA only wanted to avoid defeat and UNITA was somehow convinced that it would win elections. When that victory did not materialize, it did not take long for Savimbi to return to the bush and for the MPLA to respond with all its military might. Following closely to the Bicesse Accord was the Lusaka Agreement which was almost imposed on UNITA by the international community. Again, as in Portugal earlier, none of the sides perceived a hurting stalemate and both felt that military victory was a clear possibility. Therefore fighting went on while the war was being mediated by new UN Special Representative Beye and representatives of the Troika: USA, Russia and Portugal.[216] The Lusaka Protocol was signed by the government and UNITA in 1994 and it included a cease-fire, demobilization and disarmament of UNITA forces, the integration of UNITA senior military officers into the government army, and the extension of government administration into all UNITA territory. UNITA only signed the agreement when the MPLA was on the offensive and winning territory, and used the protocol to forestall even greater losses and buy time to rearm. Fighting therefore raged on with both sides pursuing a scorched earth policy that cost the civilian population heavily in terms of displacements and deaths.[217]

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[216] Ibid

[217] John Prendergast , *Angola's Deadly War: Dealing with Savimbi's Hell on Earth,* 12 October 1999 Special Report No. 55 *United States Institute of Peace on* www.usip.com*, accessed on 1st September 2008*

The last chance for peace came after the gunning down of Savimbi in combat in 2002. Having been personally credited with perpetuating the war for his own selfish ambitions for power, Savimbi's death created a ripe moment for the mediation of the conflict this time. There was war weariness on the part of both belligerent sides and unlike in previous mediations, external support for UNITA had all but vanished. With the absence of a hardliner in the mould of Savimbi in the ranks of UNITA, the Luena Memorandum was signed and implemented and that signaled the end of the civil war in Angola.[218] This clearly demonstrated the dominant role that Savimbi, as an individual, played in the prosecution of the civil war in Angola. It is apparent that Savimbi's warriors ended up fighting for Savimbi rather than for the Angolan people.

Choice of Mediator

In terms of the choice of mediator, the case of Mozambique was quite straightforward. From the very outset, RENAMO and FRELIMO had both refused to accept the presence of Zimbabwe and Kenya respectively, for reasons of perceived bias. Kenya had been suspected of harbouring the leadership of and being sympathetic to RENAMO, while the close relationship between ZANU of Zimbabwe and the FRELIMO government was well documented. The principal negotiators in the Mozambique peace negotiations were Armando Guebuza, Minister of Communications, (who later became Mozambican president after Chissano) for FRELIMO, and Raúl Domingos, for RENAMO - both senior figures. The official mediating team included Archbishop Jaime Gonçalves of Beira who spoke Dhlakama's Ndau language and who was known to be not too friendly towards FRELIMO. The inclusion of the Archbishop went a long way in

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[218] **Aaron Griffiths, O**p cit

clearing suspicion from RENAMO while it also was a semblance of civic society representation in the mediation, in contrast to the Angolan mediation where there was no representation at all from the unarmed actors of the war, i.e. civil society, political and religious leaders. Besides the Archbishop, there was Mario Rafaelli, a socialist parliamentarian representing the Italian Government, and two senior members of the Sant'Egidio community, Andreas Riccardi and Matteo Zuppi.[219] The two parties agreed to the make up of the team and also agreed to abide by the decisions reached at the negotiating table.

While the choice of mediator seemed to pose no problems in the Mozambique mediation process, the opposite was true for Angola. In Bicesse, the troika of Portugal, Russia and USA was imposed on the belligerents by the international community without due regard to the wishes of the protagonists. Besides the issue of the ripe moment, the choice of mediator was bound to scuttle the negotiations. As Messiant notes, "the MPLA wanted to avoid defeat, and it had only accepted certain conditions reluctantly and under pressure".[220] The Troika placed itself into the driving seat of negotiations in pursuit of its own agenda, especially the balance of power.[221] Clearly the mediators had no influence over either of the belligerents, except the US which was still covertly supporting UNITA. This brought up the question of whether supporters of belligerents should mediate in conflicts. The US bulldozed the process to elections because it was so sure of a UNITA victory. The choice of mediator is clearly a crucial ingredient of mediation. Although it may not be possible to entirely rule out self interest on the part of the mediator, that

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[219] Africa Research Group, "Mozambique: The Achievement of Peace" 1991
[220] Christine Messiant, op cit

[221] Ibid

interest must not be so overwhelming as to overshadow the whole process. The US as one of the main mediators of the Angolan conflict clearly wanted Savimbi to win, and had no interest in solving the underlying causes of the conflict.

Impartiality and Neutrality

The next issue stems from the debate of whether or not the mediator must be impartial. While both sides of the argument have their merits, neither side offers enough empirical evidence for its argument. There are examples of mediations that have succeeded where mediators were known to be biased toward one side. An example of this was the 1966 mediation of the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir at Tashkent, where Aleksei Kosygin, premier of the Soviet Union, had no problems asserting his authority, despite stronger ties to India. Evidence of this included his efforts to maintain "balanced press coverage of both sides, balanced references to each side in Soviet speeches, and even ritualistic alternation of whose name was mentioned first."[222] On the other hand, some mediators have been rejected by protagonists for perceived bias. In the mediation process for the Mozambican conflict, the refusal by RENAMO to accept Zimbabwe, and that of FRELIMO to accept Kenya was based on perceptions of bias. Using the reverse argument, the Community of Sant'Egidio could be said to have succeeded in mediating the same conflict because it was believed to be impartial. The importance of the impartiality of this particular mediator was actually said to have played a pivotal role in the success of the process. If one of the belligerents does raise an issue

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[222] Thornton, T. P., *" The Indo-Pakistani Conflict: Soviet Mediation, Tashkent, 1966."* In Touval and Zartman, International Mediation, 1985

of perceived bias, the benefit of doubt should be given to the complainant and the mediator should make way for somebody else. Although the issues of impartiality and neutrality of the mediators in both cases was not raised, it was generally believed that the Angolan mediators had preconceived ideas about who should win any subsequent elections achieving success by those who were party to the mediation.[223]

In Angola, the issue of partiality was not raised at any point by the belligerents probably because neither side really cared who was mediating. Savimbi certainly had his mind made up about what he wanted out of any settlement. However, during the Bicesse talks, the US consistently turned a blind eye to the retention by UNITA of a large part of its war-making machinery in the countryside in the run up to the elections.[224] This capability allowed UNITA to quickly return to the bush after losing the election though the MPLA as well had kept aside a considerable number of troops for such an eventuality. During the Lusaka Accord and Luena Agreement phases of mediation the question of impartiality did not feature. However, it can be deduced that the vested interests of the US in the outcome of the mediation in Bicesse did adversely affect the outcome. Although the issue of impartiality certainly was not pivotal in shaping the outcome of either mediation, it nevertheless contributed to the mistrust among the parties to the Angolan conflict. Both RENAMO and FRELIMO were sensitive to the identity of the mediator because both were committed and they did not want to agree to a settlement biased towards their opponent.

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[223] Laurie Nathan, op cit
[224] Christine Messiant, op cit

Ownership of the Settlement

The ownership of the settlement by the belligerents rather than by the mediator is also an important tool of assessment. In the case of Mozambique, there was the commitment on both sides to go through the process and pursue it to its conclusion. Additionally, the mediators were careful not to allow external pressures to force a settlement. Mediators can have very compelling reasons to try and resolve a conflict quickly and in their haste they may want to impose solutions. Romano recalls that Sant' Egidio was put under strong pressure to end the Mozambican peace talks quickly since "every additional day more of war meant more killings."[225] The mediators resisted this pressure on two grounds: nothing could be achieved by trying to gloss over the issues and there was no use in forcing people to agree on anything. The only way the process could have been successful and the reason that made it successful was that all the actors involved gained ownership. In his study of the Mozambican talks, Cameron Hume concludes similarly that "in any negotiations the parties (must) have the final word on how they negotiate and on what terms they settle."[226] The case of Angola was different and, as has been argued earlier, the belligerents there were merely paying lip service to the negotiation process which was clearly owned by the troika of Portugal, USA and the Soviet Union. The result was that the settlement was not recognized as binding hence the

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[225] Romano, A, *Peace is Possible: Lessons from the Mozambique Peace Process*, presented at Learning from Conflict Resolution in Africa: Workshop on the Experience of Individual and Institutional Mediators. Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation and the Tanzanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation, Arusha, 21 - 23 January 1998

[226] Hume C, *Ending Mozambique's War*, 1994. Washington DC: US Institute for Peace.

quick resumption of hostilities after the elections. In all the attempts at mediation in Angola, the belligerents were not completely sold out as the military option always remained open. The mediation in Angola was therefore not owned by the protagonists but by the troika of Portugal, USSR and USA. In Mozambique the two sides had initial problems agreeing on a mediator, but when they finally did agree, they allowed the mediator to do his job and both sides assumed full ownership of the mediation process. .

The Implementation Process

The implementation processes of the mediations of the two wars provide the major points of divergence. In Mozambique, the signing of the accord brought into motion the deployment of UN forces, the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) to oversee the disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation (DDR) and election process, while in Angola, the UN was also present to conduct a similar mandate. The presence of the UN in Angola had started earlier (December 1988 - May 1991) with the United Nations Angolan Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) which was established to verify the phased and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of Angola. Subsequent to the Bicesse Accords, UN Security Council Resolution 696 established a second Angola mission, UNAVEM II. It was mandated to observe and verify the disarmament process and support the creation of a new single national army in Angola. It was also to oversee de-mining, provide humanitarian aid and facilitate the expansion of state authority to those spaces within Angolan territory where the government had no presence, mostly in UNITA areas. UNAVEM II was very thinly staffed with only 350 unarmed military observers, 90 unarmed police observers and 100 electoral observers. The initial budget was a paltry US$132.3 million, although it was later increased by

$18.8 million in recognition of its election duties.[227] The UN operation in Angola was set up merely to observe and verify elections. This mandate demonstrated a serious lack of appreciation of the issues on the part of the UN planners. The situation in Angola demanded a deeper involvement because the country was emerging from 16 years of bloody conflict and the belligerents still showed signs of preferring the option of military victory over negotiation. In addition, the UN, not having been a part of the negotiation process, was not fully conversant with the dynamics of the conflict and the protagonists. UN Special Representative Margaret Anstee concluded that the UN should never again accept a role in the implementation of a peace accord unless it had been involved in the negotiations of its terms and mandate.[228]

The UN mission declared the September 1992 elections generally 'free and fair', a verdict with which the US, European Union (EU), South Africa and other international observers concurred. As alluded to earlier, UNITA vehemently disputed the results and immediately resumed fighting. Anstee's attempts to negotiate a ceasefire failed and the Security Council responded by reducing and then fully withdrawing all UNAVEM military personnel. Many Angolans, including UNITA and the MPLA, blamed the UN for the failure of this transition period, believing that it had been in UNAVEM's power to intervene.

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[227] Paulo, M J, *The role of the United Nations in the Angolan Peace Process,* 2004

[228] Ibid

In February 1995 UNAVEM III was authorized by the Security Council to assist in the restoration of peace and the process of national reconciliation.[229] It was replaced by the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) on 30 June 1997, which was closed down in July 1999 after being forced to pull out as the fighting intensified in Angola and hopes for peace faded.

One way of minimizing the possibility of demobilized combatants regrouping quickly is to ensure that they are scattered all over the country and not in a small geographical area within which they can easily reform fighting units. Being out of government, UNITA had no negotiating power other than its military force; while all the reins of transitory power and resources of the party-state remained in the hands of the MPLA. Savimbi therefore made sure that his fighters remained within easy reach of each other just in case the elections did not go his way, which indeed they did not. The nature of the peace and ceasefire agreement allowed the different parties to preserve their current status. Neither the Troika nor the international community made any effort to dismantle the structures of the protagonists. UNITA maintained control over some of its areas and its supporters and had no intention of losing its only asset by disarming. Meanwhile, noting the international community's lack of interest in its democratic obligations, the MPLA quickly mobilized its forces to avoid losing everything by losing the vote. It therefore went to great lengths to ensure that it would win the elections by any means: foul or fair. The ruling party used its access to public funds, its total control of the administrative apparatus and the state-owned media to marshal vast resources for the campaign. In the process, it created a paramilitary force under the very nose of the UN

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[229] United Nations Report 2000

mission, which force was used extensively to further the interests of the MPLA government.

A major difference in the way the two UN missions handled the Disarmament, Demobilization and Rehabilitation (DDR) processes was in the way RENAMO rebels were scattered throughout the country in order to prevent them from regrouping in the event of an electoral defeat. This was referred to as ONUMOZ's "pay and scatter" concept.[230] According to the United Nations, in Mozambique, the combatants received a payment equivalent to six months of salary when they were demobilized, and they were encouraged to engage in activities that were in no way connected to life as combatants. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants and the destruction of their weapons are important steps in the implementation of mediation processes. If it had been done properly in Angola, it could have prevented the proliferation of light weapons and an increase in the crime rate in the post-conflict period. When combatants become ex-combatants and are no longer security risks they can be trained in agricultural or other income generating projects. In Mozambique, internal political problems impeded the collection and destruction of arms but many former combatants out of a total of close to 500 000 were successfully assisted back into productive participation in community life.[231]

The role of the UN in the implementation process came under the spotlight in both conflicts. It appeared that the UN mission in Angola was ill prepared to monitor the implementation of the DDR process. The funds allocated for the task were not enough and the lack of prior knowledge of the protagonists made it very difficult, if not

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[230] Levine D, *Organizational Disruption and Change in Mozambique's Peace Process,* Centre for International and Security Studies at Maryland, 2006, p 11,
[231] International Crisis Group 2003, p207

dangerous, for the UN to police the whole country. In Mozambique the UN came fully prepared and willing to make the implementation process workable. While it may be conceded that the desire of FRELIMO and RENAMO to abide by the agreement was instrumental in making the implementation a success, the UN's role was more pronounced and its mandate clearer in Mozambique than in Angola.

Conclusion

This chapter examined the reasons for the divergence in outcomes in the mediation processes in Angola and Mozambique. While the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War provided an opportunity for peace, it only seemed to work in Mozambique. The withdrawal of external support for the war in Angola did not have much of an impact because of the easy access to the vast riches of the country and the pursuance of a scorched earth policy by both sides to the conflict. The MPLA government had no inclination to relent in its pursuit of a military solution to the threat posed by Savimbi's UNITA. On the other hand Savimbi and most of his followers had long abandoned any tangible ideology except the desire to ascend to power. By contrast, in Mozambique both sides appeared to have reached the point where further bloodshed was no longer necessary as the possibility of a military victory was looking more and more remote for either side. With FRELIMO having abandoned its hardliner Marxist stance in favour of a market driven economic policy, the ideological differences between the protagonists had all but vanished.   In Angola, none of the warring parties was really ready for a negotiated settlement as both sides paid lip service to the mediation process while they each pursued military victory on the battlefield.

The next chapter will reconsider the hypotheses and draw conclusions about the outcomes of the two mediation processes. The chapter will conclude with recommendations regarding mediation in seemingly similar conflicts.

Chapter 5

Inferences in Mediation and Outcomes: A Conclusion

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to revisit the objectives of the study in order to ascertain whether they have been achieved. The chapter also contains concluding remarks about the role of individuals in conflict situations and how such roles need to be recognized and taken into consideration in mediation.

Findings

This study began with the question of what caused the divergence in the outcomes of the mediation of two seemingly similar conflicts. Both Angola and Mozambique were colonized by Portugal around the same time and the two countries' black populations were subjected to extremely degrading racist abuse and servitude by the colonizing power. However, following years of armed insurrection in the colonies, Portugal agreed to grant independence to both countries. The advent of independence ushered in a new era of internal strife as the indigenous populations rose against each other in bloody civil wars which were to last for years. The two civil wars were prosecuted by people who claimed to be representing the majority of the respective populations of the two countries. Yet, when the chance for peace presented itself, Mozambique responded positively while the war in Angola continued unabated.

The study sought to address the issue of whether the individual insurgent leaders, Savimbi and Dhlakama, had a decisive role to play in the outcome of the mediation processes. For the case of Angola, the fact that UNITA leaders agreed to a ceasefire shortly after the death of Savimbi suggests that it was Savimbi himself who had become

the stumbling block to the success of the mediation of that particular conflict. In Mozambique, Dhlakama readily agreed to the outcome of the mediation process, participating in democratic elections and accepting the results.

The stubbornness of Savimbi coupled with the belief by dos Santos that he could crush Savimbi militarily proves the hypothesis that the individual leaders had important roles to play in the outcome of conflict mediation. Both men pursued the policy of a scorched earth which largely ignored the wishes of the people of Angola. There were both aided by the vast riches they commanded in their respective positions coupled with external backing by the Cold War protagonists. Savimbi had access to illegally mined diamonds and dos Santos had unrestrained access to oil revenues. The sad statistics of casualties in the civil war in Angola goes to prove that neither the insurgent UNITA nor the MPLA government had any sympathy for the civilian population that each claimed to be representing. There was no material difference in the efforts exerted by the mediators to both conflicts but each conflict responded differently.

Dhlakama and Chissano were instrumental in ensuring that the mediation ushered in a new era of peace for Mozambique because they accommodated each other and essentially they were both weary of the civil war. Both sides widely consulted with the local communities especially towards the final years of the war and this transferred the ownership of the peace process to the population.[232] Although RENAMO started without any tangible ideology, it was able to command a sizeable following over the years and it transformed itself into a political party that has managed to offer a formidable challenge to the ruling party FRELIMO.

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[232] African Research Group, *Mozambique: The Achievement of Peace,* London, May 1999, p 6

The study has also shown that there is no basis for assuming that similar conflicts will respond to mediation in the same manner. Whilst such a scenario could prove an invaluable tool for mediation the world over, the complexities of each particular conflict, ranging from the motives of the actors, the personalities of the mediator and protagonists as well as the resources available in the conflict system obviate such an assumption. In addition to this, the idiosyncrasies of the leaders of the conflicting parties can make or break mediation efforts. There could not have been a way of predicting that the one bullet solution would work in Angola and the MPLA was well prepared to continue its war against UNITA even after Savimbi died. It therefore came as a surprise to them that the remaining leaders of the rebel movement agreed to the terms of the Luena agreement and to a ceasefire.

The outcomes of the mediation processes in Angola and Mozambique were largely shaped by the idiosyncrasies of the various leaders in the civil wars. While both conflicts finally yielded peace, the heavier toll of human suffering including deaths and displacements was witnessed in Angola precisely because both the rebel leader and the incumbent president, dos Santos, were bent on pursuing a military solution. While other factors such as the easy access to funds by both sides contributed to the prolongation of the war, ultimately it can be argued that it was the nature of the leadership that led to the divergence in outcomes of the two wars. The hypothesis that the idiosyncrasies of the leaders caused the divergence in outcome of mediation in the Angolan and Mozambican conflicts has therefore been proved. Therefore, regarding conflict mediation, there should be a clear understanding and deliberate targeting of the psyche of the leaders in a conflict situation in order to determine the best way to approach the mediation. The

international community failed to recognize that Savimbi was the main stumbling block to peace in Angola until his death. His persistent rejection of the election results only served to prove that he was only going to accept an election result in which he would emerge the winner.

The Last Word

One of the objectives of the study was to determine when mediation should be said to have succeeded. This study has shown that conflict resolution cannot be said to have succeeded until the agreement has been implemented in full to the satisfaction of the respective constituents. This was in evidence in Angola where several agreements were signed, only for the process to stall at implementation. Savimbi was instrumental in scuttling the implementation of all the agreements that he signed.

Conflict can be confined to the level of leadership while the rest of the population provides most of the casualties. Both conflicts had very little, if any, civic society participation in terms of consultation. While the economy of Angola could have benefited tremendously from oil revenues, diamonds and agriculture, the channelling of funds to the war effort left the people entrenched in abject poverty. The protagonists in the civil war plundered the nation's resources as each side pursued its own agenda. In Mozambique, the economy was literally run down by the war and the population sank to extreme levels of poverty. Even today, Mozambique is ranked among the poorest nations in the world. Mediators must therefore make efforts to include, within the mediation framework; provisions that seek to protect the civilian population or otherwise cater for their needs.

The "winner-take-all" approach to elections must now give way to a new paradigm where contesting parties that have the support of a sizeable chunk of the population are allowed to participate in government. It does not make sense to ignore the wishes of 49% of the population in a situation where the winner of presidential elections garners 51% of the vote and is allowed to form a government without the meaningful participation of his opponents and their constituents. This is a clear recipe for conflict because of the attendant perceived or real deprivation by the dominant party over the other. Inclusive governance allows for a proportionate sharing of power which can avert future conflict.

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