

**PERSISTENT CONFLICT BETWEEN THE  
POKOT AND THE TURKANA:  
CAUSES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS**

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## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this thesis to the Shalom Center for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation (SCCRR) and all peace practitioners who are engaged in researching the underlying causes of conflict in Africa in order to achieve a society where peace, justice and reconciliation can flourish.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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## **DECLARATION**

This thesis is my original work and has not been submitted for the award of a degree in any other university.

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## ABSTRACT

The study is about the conflict between the Pokot and the Turkana communities in the North Rift of Kenya. This conflict has persisted since precolonial times. Apart from the conflict management interventions of the State, the other main actor trying to manage the conflict is the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church's activities of conflict management complement those of the State. Thus, the problem that this study sought to address is why the Pokot-Turkana conflict persists despite the interventions by the State and the Catholic Church. This study is guided by three hypotheses which were derived from the study's objectives. The first hypothesis is about underlying causes of the conflict, the second is about State approaches to managing the conflict and the third is about the Catholic Church's activities of managing the conflict. The hypotheses as well as the objectives with which they resonate were informed by wide ranging pertinent social sciences and humanities literature within the purview of conflict and peace. The study was guided by structural violence theory. The research design employed was cross-sectional sample survey wherein 381 cases comprising Pokots and Turkanas were selected through cluster sampling. Quantitative data was collected from these cases through structured questionnaire, supplemented by focus group discussions and interview data. The hypotheses were tested using factor analysis, Pearson correlation, analysis of covariance and multiple regression/correlation. Factor analysis was applied to the first hypothesis. Pearson correlation and analysis of covariance were applied to the second hypothesis and multiple regression/correlation and skewness were applied to the third hypothesis. Statistical test results were as specified below. Three underlying causes of the conflict, namely, core resources, political economy and infrastructure insecurity were identified and explained. In the second hypothesis it was found that State approaches to managing the conflict are not effective. With regard to the third hypothesis it was demonstrated that some activities of the Catholic Church significantly contribute to management of the conflict while other activities do not make a significant contribution. Thus the results are inconclusive. This suggests that further research needs to be done in order to clarify the nature and dynamics of the Catholic Church's activities of contributing to management of the conflict. This research is significant because it points to a need to carry out comprehensive quantitative research into why the conflict continues to persist in post-colonial Kenya. For both the State and Church the crucial objects of management approaches/activities, with achieving long lasting Pokot-Turkana peaceful coexistence as the end in view, is human security; economic political, environmental and cultural. In terms of statistical inference, the results of hypotheses testing warrant stating that the peaceful coexistence is far from being in sight.

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

AMECEA	Association of Member Episcopal Conferences in Eastern Africa
AU	African Union
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning Network
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CJPC	Catholic Justice and Peace Commission
CKRC	Constitution of Kenya Review Commission
DPDC	District Peace and Development Committees
EAPCCO	Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Co-operation Organization
IGAD	Inter-governmental Authority on Development
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KAR	King's African Rifles
KIPPRA	Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis
KNBS	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
KPR	Kenya Police Reservists
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NSC	National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCJP	Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace
SCCRR	Shalom Centre for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation
SID	Society for International Development
SRIC	Security Research and Information Centre
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program

WB

World Bank

## **CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION**

### **1.1 Introduction**

This Chapter presents background information about the problem that this study set out to investigate. Specifically the chapter comprises statement of the problem, study objectives, justification of the study, operational definition of concepts, theoretical framework, hypotheses and methodology.

### **1.2. Background**

Sub-Saharan Africa has been characterized by numerous conflicts. These conflicts have taken different forms. Many of these conflicts have received national and international conflict management attention that resulted in peace agreements that appear durable. These include: conflicts associated with independence movements against colonialism in Africa in the Twentieth Century, the Biafra War in Nigeria in the 1960s, the Tanzania-Uganda war of 1978-79, the genocide in Rwanda of 1994, among other well-known examples. However, there are other violent intercommunal conflicts, particularly at the intra-state level, which do not receive similar attention at the national and international level. Many of these conflicts have persisted without much intervention.

Four major identifiable conflicts that have taken place in Kenya since the Nineteenth Century. These conflicts are those between the colonial government and the indigenous people of Kenya (1895-1963), the Somali secession conflict (locally known as the Shifta war) 1963-1967, the post-2007 election violence, and the conflict between pastoral communities in the northern region of Kenya, including the one between the Pokot and Turkana communities in the North Rift. The first three conflicts were successfully managed. However, the conflict between Pokot and the Turkana which is traced to the 19<sup>th</sup> Century persists to date.

This conflict, which is the focus of this study, is the most complex of the four conflicts mentioned above. This is not only because it is the oldest of the four conflicts but also because it seems intractable. The exact date when this conflict started is not known. It is also not known when the Turkana and the Pokot evolved into distinct ethnic communities. What is known however is that unlike the other three conflicts the Pokot-Turkana conflict has persisted in space and time. The conflict continues despite the employment of a variety of interventions by the Kenya government, non-governmental and faith based organizations, such as the Catholic Church. The reason for this persistence remains unclear.

### **1.3 Problem Statement**

The problem that this study seeks to address is why the Pokot-Turkana conflict persists despite the interventions made by the State and the Catholic Church to transform it from conflict to peaceful co-existence? In addressing this problem, it is necessary to find out whether the persistence of the conflict has anything to do with the effectiveness of the conflict management approaches used by the State and the activities of the Catholic Church. For a conflict to be effectively managed, it is imperative to identify its underlying causes in order to have a basis for policy recommendations to transform the conflict to a situation of peaceful co-existence between the two communities.

### **1.4 Objectives**

#### **1.4.1 General Objective**

To explain the persistence of the violent conflict between the Pokots and the Turkanas.

#### **1.4.2 Specific Objectives**

1. To examine the underlying causes of the conflict.

2. To find out why the conflict has not been resolved despite the intervention by the State.
3. To find out why the conflict has not been resolved despite the intervention by the Catholic Church.

## **1.5 Justification of the study**

This study is justified from both academic and policy perspectives.

### **1.5.1 Academic Perspective**

There is no evidence of specific research as to why the conflict between Pokot and Turkana communities continues to persist. Up to now, the academic literature on the causes of the conflict has been dominated by cultural, environmental and ethnic explanations (Bollig, 1994; Kratli and Swift; 1999; Eaton, 2008). A structural violence perspective has not been applied to explain the underlying causes of the conflict and why it persists. According to structural violence theory the underlying causes of conflicts are structural because conflict is embedded in the social structures of relationships and interactions. Deficient structures manifest themselves in variables that are latent or observed (i.e. measured). The persistence of this conflict, despite the interventions, calls for a research beyond the immediate manifestations of behavioural violence. It is essential to consider the structures that underpin the social relationships and interactions between the parties to the conflict. If the structural causes underlying the persistence of the conflict are not effectively addressed, the conflict cannot be transformed into a situation of peaceful co-existence between the Pokot and Turkana communities.

While various studies and research have been undertaken on aspects of the conflict, there is a need for more in-depth research of other manifest and potential forces (causative variables) of the conflict. A structural violence perspective is essential in order to understand the underlying causes and persistence of the conflict. Accordingly, this study makes robust the

empirical linkage between structural violence and behavioural violence between the ethnic communities. This will involve critically focusing on underlying causes that underpin the conflict. Moreover, in addressing the linkages of structural violence to the causes and persistence of the conflict, this study scrutinizes the conflict management approaches applied by the State the Catholic Church aimed at ending the conflict. A major output from such a study is a systematic assessment of the legitimacy and effectiveness of the strategies employed by these two actors to realise peace and social progress between the two communities. Furthermore, the existing literature on conflict between pastoralists in the is largely descriptive in nature. Thus, there is a need for explanatory research. The case for such explanatory research is that its findings typically provide a better basis for decision making and appropriate policy choices.

Overall, this study does two unique things: first, it provides a valuable paradigmatic perspective on the underlying causes of the conflict, exposing the implications for conflict management with respect to structures, approaches, activities and their effectiveness, needed to end the persistence of the conflict. Secondly, the study enlarges the discourse of structural violence theory to understanding inter-ethnic conflict, particularly between pastoralist communities.

### **1.5.2 Policy Perspective**

Without knowing the specific causes of the persistence of the conflict, it is neither possible nor practical to develop appropriate policy responses to the conflict and appreciate the necessary implications. An appreciation of the nature of the conflict and its causes is a prerequisite for developing policy choices that have a potential to transform the conflict to a situation of peaceful co-existence. The State has the primary responsibility to provide institutional structures and tools for regulating social control and other infrastructural power that can facilitate the

achievement of peace and development for its citizens. Accordingly, the study also seeks to ascertain whether or not State approaches to managing the conflict are also causally linked to persistence of the conflict. This study identifies the variables and factors that have led to persistence of the conflict and thereby providing a foundation for conflict transformation road maps towards settlement and resolution. In this vein, the findings from this research will inform the design and implementation of future conflict management interventions.

In researching the conflict management activities of the Catholic Church, this study provides policy implications for its conflict management structures and their effectiveness aimed at realizing enduring peaceful coexistence between the two communities. This research also presents an opportunity to critique explanations of the conflict emerging from the cultural, environmental and ethnic schools of thought vis-à-vis their contribution to policy formulation and conflict management practices. Overall, this research provides a foundation contributing substantially to the transformation of this violent conflict towards enduring peace that will, in turn, lead to greater national cohesion.

### **1.6 Operational Definition of Concepts**

Some concepts are variables while others are not variables. In this study, the operational definition of concepts pertains to variables. A variable is a concept, which when operationally defined, may be assigned different case values along any number of dimensions. An operational definition is the specification of one or more measuring operations used to assign case values to the variable. The concepts that are operationally defined below are those that are variables in the posited hypotheses in section 1.7 below. The variables are: conflict persists, and underlying causes in the first hypotheses; ineffective approaches in the second hypothesis; and ineffective

activities in the third hypothesis. Conflict persistence is the dependent variable in all the hypotheses. The rest of the variables are independent.

### **Persistence of conflict**

Persistence of conflict refers to members of Pokot/Turkana communities who engage in recurrent acts of violent aggressive behaviour against each other which inflict physical harm, kill and/or displace members of both communities, and damage property by physical force, using weapons such as rungas, spears, bows and arrows, machetes, firearms, in one form or another.

### **Underlying causes**

Basic conflict behaviour dispositions stemming from latent variables in the domain of Pokot-Turkana relations which are not directly observed, but each of which is manifested in several related ways as intentional aggression that results into bodily harm, loss of life, damage to property, displacement, and forceful taking of property with Pokots/Turkanas as the objects of the dynamics of the basic conflict behaviour dispositions.

### **Ineffective approaches**

Policies and practices of State institutions or agents geared towards managing the Pokot-Turkana conflict produce below minimum expected positive effects because: first, peace actors use repressive reactive, as opposed to proactive, strategies and tactics in a bid to stop or prevent violent conflict behaviour. Secondly, security personnel engage in corrupt acts. Thirdly, formally constituted authority charged with the duty and responsibility of ensuring Pokots/Turkanas are provided with political goods and services often perform overlapping functions. Fourthly, some of the conflict prevention initiatives tend to lead to reproduction of misplaced goals in terms of pacifying Pokot-Turkana relations. Lastly, State personnel tend to handle matters of Pokot-

Turkana violent conflict behaviour with limited understanding of ethnic differences, environmental resources, conflict management theory and culture.

### **Ineffective activities**

Efforts towards reducing or containing or probably preventing recurrence of violent conflict between Pokots and Turkanas are in practice rendered ineffective by a number of factors. These include: conflation of evangelization with peace promotion activities or initiatives, and a lack of systematic order and organisation of the efforts. Others include incompetence of actors on the ground due to poor training and grasp of the theory and practical skills of conflict management. There is also a critical absence of methods and approaches that can bring key Pokot and Turkana actors together to mutually discuss ways and means of peaceful co-existence, and methods that can reduce deeply ingrained misperceptions and misjudgements between the communities. However, some of the activities of the Church intended to generate trust, across space and time between the communities are undermined by the lack of trust between Pokots and Turkanas. Church activities are ineffective through being driven more by the goal to increase quantitative institutional membership of Pokot/Turkana within the Catholic Church at the expense of the qualitative imperative to ensure that the communities internalize the virtues that can assure peaceful co-existence between them.

### **1.7 Theoretical Framework**

For conflicts to be explained adequately, the trigger, proximate and underlying (structural) causes need to be studied (UNDP, 2004; Crispin, 2006). The foremost theoretical frameworks applied in attempts to explain the causes of the conflict under study are from the ethnicity, cultural and environmental resource schools of thought (Kratli & Swift, 1999; Eaton, 2008). The literature review in this study exposes and offers a critique of the inadequacies of these

frameworks in the identification and management of the underlying causes of this persistent conflict. In failing to investigate the underlying structural causes, the scholars have merely focused on the trigger and proximate causes of conflicts. The scholars, thus, fail to appreciate the underlying structural causes that fuel the persistence of the conflict. In order to achieve enduring positive peace, one has to go beyond identification and transformation of trigger and proximate causes. Trigger and proximate causes of conflict are confined to the realm of behavioural events/incidents and intermediary variables provoking conflict, respectively. Attending to the trigger and proximate causes of conflict will only achieve negative peace, which is constantly in danger of regressing back to violent behavioural conflict. In order to fill this gap and its inherent inadequacies, this study adopts structural violence theory as the theory of choice. The choice of structural violence theory is based on the rationale that this study wishes to examine the persistent violent conflict between the two ethnic communities. All societies have structures operationalized in institutions, systems, and infrastructures of social organization pertaining to cultural, social, political, economic and environmental domains. Structures are the bedrock of patterned social behaviour, without which it is not possible to predict and/or manage the behaviour of people. The Pokot and Turkana communities are no exception. State structures are fundamental in determining how a State functions and realises its objectives. The nature and effectiveness of these structures are essential to the measurement of State strength or weakness in the provision of its political goods and services to its citizens.

In international relations, there is overwhelming consensus that the State has the primary responsibility of ensuring peace, security and social progress for all its citizens (United Nations [UN], 2000), irrespective of their ethnicity. The accomplishment of this responsibility depends inherently on structures. However, there is a real danger that this responsibility may be

compromised in multi-ethnic and divided societies like Kenya where the ruling elite tend to favour their own ethnic groups in the distribution of political goods and services. In such cases, ethnocentric tendencies find expression in governance and policy processes and this ultimately results in ineffective attention to structural issues. The inevitable result is that ethnic groups at the periphery of power end up experiencing marginalization because of anomalous structures. Structural violence finds expression in marginalization, stratified dimensions of rank-disequilibrium, differential treatment and relative deprivation. According to Kelman (1999), the prevention and resolution of conflict between ethnic groups demands a transformation of ethnic relationships through ridding the state of structures and inherent institutions that underlie marginalization and conflict. Peace goes hand in hand with development and effective institutions are central to the process (World Bank [WB], 2000, 2011; Eliason, 2015). A review of relevant literature and the synoptic overview of the spatio-temporal context of the Pokot-Turkana conflict (see chapters 2 and 3) reveals that the causes and persistence of the violent conflict seems to have features of being impacted by State neglect, associated intra-ethnic legitimization of violence and ethnic geography among other issues. Structural conflict, and its inherent violence, seems to be implicated in the causes and persistence of the violent conflict behaviour between the Pokots and Turkanas. Accordingly, the structural violence theory becomes an important basis to assess and explain the underlying causes and the persistence of the conflict as well as recommend future policy approaches.

Conflict is a general feature of social life that can be understood with reference to the needs, wants, and obligations of the parties involved (Nicholson, 1992). The essence of conflict centres on the incompatibility of goals between parties or when they wish to carry out acts that are mutually inconsistent (De Reuck, 1984; Mitchell, 1981). Conflict permeates all dimensions

of social behaviour: between individuals, in families, at work places, and in domestic and international politics. Consequently, conflict is an intrinsic aspect of social change (Ramsbottom et al., 2005). New constructs are being continually generated which clash with previous held positions and thus impact on social change. Therefore, in any analysis of conflict it is essential to take the social context into consideration. Social change is structural, reflecting the heterogeneity of values and interests that arise and these may, in turn, introduce new incompatibilities of goals (Galtung, 1964). In this regard, “if the incompatible values and positions are perceived as fundamental, the parties’ behaviour, witnessed by hostile, distrustful and suspicious attitudes may well be violent” (Holsti, 1983, p.433).

Structural violence theory finds its basis in the Peace Research school of thought (Galtung, 1969; Groom, 1990). It is a sub-set of conflict analysis as its focus is primarily on structural violence as distinct from manifest physical violence. According to Galtung (1969), who is considered the lead proponent of the theory, structural violence is the condition where, “violence is present when human beings are influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations” (p. 168). It exists when an actor or group are unable to fulfil their potential either because of the way a society is structured or due to the way the structures of a given society are operationalized. The distinction between structural violence and overt physical violence is based on whether the incompatibility of goals is articulated in the structures of society or by the manifest use of force. Whereas physical violence is always intentional, structural violence may or may not be intentional. However, structural violence can, and frequently does, negatively evolve into physical violence if not addressed. Degeneration into physical violence is hastened where the structures becomes unbearable, for example due to inequity in access to political goods and social services that make it impossible for people to

meet their basic human needs and are thus unable to actualize their potential. This situation causes relative deprivation evident in the widening of gaps between different sectors of society.

In distinguishing peace research from other paradigms of conflict, Groom (1990) points out that the:

Conceptual world is very different, since it is not the subjective element in the nature of relations that is fundamental, but the deep rooted structures which give rise to them...the structuralists argue that conflict is an objective phenomenon. It emerges from a real clash of interests rather than a perceived clash of interests, although the actors may not perceive who their real enemies are (pp. 96-97).

The underlying structures of society, as opposed to individual human motivations, are the main impacting mechanism that explains violent conflict behaviour. Structural violence theory, thus, considers individual motivations and intentions as insufficient to explain human behaviour because, when aggregated, human behaviour precipitates structures whose existence individuals may not be conscious of when they express themselves (Galtung, 1969; Groom, 1990; Earl, 2005).

Structures have a life of their own that determines human and group behaviour. It is the structure as a whole that has greater impact than the sum of all the individual parts. It is possible to be in circumstances of conflict without realizing it (Groom, 1990). Society is understood as a stratified social system that consists of units in interaction according to rank dimensions. This theoretical analysis is based on the relative deprivation and differential treatment emerging from rank-disequilibrium. As such, inequality is built into the system whether it is at the inter-state or intra-state dimension. Galtung (1969) maintains that structural violence affects people indirectly, be it in the form of relationships in the structure being unjust and inequitable and/or because

repression is deliberately built into the structure. Curle (1971), another prominent proponent of structural violence theory, characterises such situations as ‘unpeaceful’, similar to what Galtung (1990) and Webb (1986) call negative peace. Regardless of how well the proximate and trigger causes of conflict are managed, the result will at best only yield conflict settlement epitomized by negative peace. While such an outcome has a value in itself, it will not facilitate the achievement of positive peace associated with conflict resolution and reconciliation. Resolution of a conflict depends on whether the underlying causes have been identified and attended to by effective conflict management interventions. Achieving conflict resolution will bring about positive peace that is enduring and mutually supported by all parties previously in conflict with each other. A society oriented to positive peace is operationally centred on the mutual security, development and wellbeing of all the citizens (Galtung, 1990; Webb, 1986). According to Mudida (2007, 2009), in societies prone to structural violence, an actor or group is prevented by structural constraints, from developing their talents or interests in a normal manner. They can even be thwarted from realizing that such developments are possible. Mudida (2009) sees such constraints manifested in class, race, ethnic or religious discrimination in the contemporary world. Violence is built into the structure and often manifests as inequality in power and opportunities in life. It can be both difficult to evade structural constraints and/or to generate new structures to suit an individual or a groups own preference (Mudida, 2009).

Structural violence theory is primarily concerned with the underlying causes or factors that underpin proximate and trigger causes of conflict. In so doing, it goes much deeper than explanations of the Pokot-Turkana conflict submitted by cultural, ethnic and environmental schools of thought. Ultimately, the explanations emerging from these schools of thought have failed to take cognizance of the structures underpinning culture, ethnic and environmental

causes. Explanatory perspectives about the causes of the conflict, focussing on the proliferation of small arms, cattle rustling and revenge issues related to human life/ death/injury/displacement during the raiding can only be categorised as proximate or trigger causes for the persistence of the conflict. Thus, structural violence theory provides a unifying and holistic framework for a discussion on how some of the perspectives and variables mentioned above are linked to the underlying causes of conflict and its persistence. The relationship of behavioural violence to its underlying conditions of structural violence is considered as a useful framework in respect to inter-ethnic conflict from which to design appropriate conflict management approaches, (Mwagiru, 2007). Hence, when physical violence occurs and persists between ethnic groups or by an ethnic group resisting State control, and portraying ethnic, cultural and environmental traits, questions should automatically arise about the anomalies of structures applicable to the management of these conflicts.

It is in the context of such questions that there are some assumptions pertinent to structural violence theory, which need to be kept in focus when elucidating its essence and logic, and how it is relevant to explanations about the causes and persistence of the Pokot-Turkana conflict. The theory would assume that: first, structures are an imperative that underpins the quest of people to actualize their potential. Human behaviour cannot be adequately understood by examining individual motivations and intentions. Social order and the prevention of anarchy is greatly influenced and determined by structures. Secondly, State provision of human security is not adequately provided to all citizens. Human security is understood as safety from chronic threats, such as, hunger, disease, repression, and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life (United Nations Development Program [UNDP], 1994). Gleditsch (2007) identifies four critical aspects of human security, namely: political security, defined as the

freedom from dictatorship and other arbitrary government, tracking political security would involve looking at patterns of democratic governance and respect for human rights. The second aspect is economic and social security defined as the freedom from poverty and want. The third aspect is cultural security, defined as freedom from ethnic and religious dominance, and environmental security, defined as the freedom from environmental destruction and resource scarcity.

Thirdly, equality is a universal paramount value; equality of opportunity should be an imperative (UN, 2000). However, all persons, regardless of social or ascriptively defined characteristics are not treated equally, demonstrated initially in unequal power and life chances that may lead to overt violence (Galtung, 1969). Fourthly, the theory assumes that it is the State's role to promote equity, and that public resources are to be directed to those with greater need. In this regard, material resources affect people's life chances when there is general inequity in the distribution of political goods and services. The relationship between actualizing one's potential and meeting basic human needs can never be severed (Mudida, 2009). Any comprehensive analysis of violence embedded in society should begin from a broad conceptualization that takes into consideration the individual and groups situated in broader social structures. The application of structural violence theory examines plausible structural sources underpinning the persistence of conflict. The inappropriateness and ineffectiveness of social structures, systems and institutions undermines peace and development by preventing people and communities from actualizing their potential. To name a few sectors, it is possible to point to the minimal or non existence of social welfare systems, the politicization of institutions of law and order, and the absence of State monopoly in the use of force (Earl, 2005). Until the conflict under study is transformed to a situation of endurable peace, its persistence is an affront to the ideals outlined in

the Constitution of Kenya and its implementation process. Furthermore, it undermines the State's monopoly in the use of force. As such, there are structural dimensions linked to the causes and persistence of violent conflict. In this regard and in line with Galtung's definition of structural violence, the question whether or not structural violence linked to the State is having an influence on the Pokot and Turkana so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realisations is valid. The answer to this question underpins to some extent the explanation for the persistence of the conflict.

In Kenya, peace and social progress depends on how the State organizes and delivers political goods, among the 42 different ethnic groups (KNBS,2009). The history of Kenya, characterised by its multi-ethnic composition, illustrates that a few ethnic communities have benefited socio-economically more than others, particularly those associated with the power elite (Wanyande, 2009). According to Wanyande, the immediate three Presidents of Kenya after independence up to 2008 relied on the support of their own ethnic communities and favoured their own communities at the expense of other communities. Structural violence in the form of differential access to social goods became the order of the day. Differential access to political goods and services is core evidence of the existence of structural violence; structural violence cannot exist without differential access to opportunities (Webb, 1986). It is this mode of analysis that underpins the views of Rupensinghe (1989) and Wanyande (1997) that consider the underlying cause of inter-ethnic conflicts as issues of structures transcending immediate grievances. For Wanyande (1997), inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya have to do with the nature of governance. The State establishes the rules of governance and is responsible for their enforcement. He maintains that, "the extent that the State fails to enact legitimate structures that ensure good governance then the State will have created conditions for potential and eventually

actual conflict and violence” (Wanyande, 1997, p.6). The historical marginalization of certain ethnic groups in Kenya was a pertinent issue during the constitutional debates in Kenya that led to the new constitution in 2010 (Mudida, 2008). However, the devolved system of government, a key component of the Constitution, established in the 2010 Kenya Constitution promises more equity in the delivery of social goods. Provisions in Articles 27, 174 and 260, among other provisions envisage the new devolved structure to address discrimination and marginalization in the delivery of social and political goods (Bosire, 2013). Is it possible that the persistence of the Pokot-Turkana conflict is linked to how structures of the State in the form of institutional arrangement have negatively impacted on the two communities independently and on their inter-relationship? It is widely accepted that there is a strong causal correlation between the stagnation of economic and social development and the danger of physical or behavioural violence evolving (Garfield, 2001). The stagnation of economic and social development is manifested in the lack of provision and/or the deterioration of infrastructural amenities critical to human development that can facilitate a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living (Mudida, 2009). Considering the persistence of the conflict from this perspective, perhaps the strongest predictor of physical violence occurring between the two communities is based on structural violence that is evidenced by the limited provision of human security and socio-economic development infrastructure in the area inhabited by the two communities (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics [KNBS], 2015).

Additionally, apart from the possible relationship between the nature of State structures and the persistence of the conflict, further questions arise about the possibility of physical violence being generated from the structural issues underpinning the Pokot and Turkana’s own ethno-cultural social formation and conflict management mechanisms. Are there intra-ethnic

structural issues interwoven in culture that may be contributing to the underlying causes of their persistent violent conflict? The fact that both groups are able to utilise their own culturally legitimized expressions of violence persistently (which are illegal by State law) again portrays an environment lacking in effective State control through appropriate institutions vital to the maintenance of peace, security and social progress. At an intra-ethnic level, the persistence of the conflict demonstrates that manifest violence may be a legitimate practice that is culturally accepted by both communities.

According to Galtung (1969), cultural violence is any aspect of a culture that can be used to legitimize violence in its physical or structural form. Such aspects of culture can be exemplified by acts of religion, ideology and traditions endorsing direct or structural violence acceptable in society. Structural violence is sometimes interpreted as cultural violence because of its deep-rooted underpinnings of cultural expression. Culture does not exist in a vacuum; it is operationalized on its structural foundations. Structures are the bedrock of patterned social behaviour. The circumstances analysed above justify the use of structural violence theory to explain the causes and persistence of the conflict. Up to the 1970's, explanations of the conflict have predominantly focused on cultural issues such as beliefs, customs and practices (Kratli & Swift, 1999). However, these scholars failed to interrogate the structures and their intrinsic institutions underpinning culture, which can legitimize or delegitimize violence. Structures, cultural or otherwise, when negatively manipulated to cause structural violence to a group or towards another community, life within those structures can become unbearable and physical violence often becomes the only alternative (Mwagiru, 2000). These expressions may be directed at women, race, ethnic groups or religions. If this form of violent culture, either in its physical or structural form, is not positively transformed, it becomes more entrenched and

institutionalized. There is, thus, a need to research on the link between the persistent physical violence between Pokot and Turkana and the social structures underpinning two communities.

Galtung's idea of structural violence and its detrimental impact on 'fulfilling potential' is nuanced further by Burton (1991). Burton (1997) recognizes that people are compulsively struggling in their respective institutional environments at all social levels to actualize their potential. This struggle necessitates that their basic human needs, and ontological needs such as security, identity, development and participation, are met or satisfied. According to Burton (1997, p.35), "needs theory became a short-hand way of describing the problems created by structural violence and pointed more directly to the ways in which they could be tackled." Both Burton (1997) and Christie (1997) argue that structural violence arises from deprivations built into the structure of social systems. Structural violence is, thus, closely linked to the inadequate satisfaction of basic human needs because people are not able to fulfil their potential, (Iadicola & Shupe, 2003). Certain material resources, such as food and water, are indispensable for human life and certain structures are imperative to the sustained availability and management of these resources. Accordingly, for the Pokot-Turkana conflict to be transformed to a situation of durable and positive peace, the underlying structural violence, manifesting in deprivation of these basic human and ontological needs should not be ignored. Burton (1997) does recognise that there are some negotiable interests that can be dealt with through legal and bargaining processes but emphasises that there are other non-negotiable needs which at times require structural changes. Rupenstein (1990), Pilisuk (1998), and Gill (1999) further endorse this perspective and advocate for fundamental alterations in the political and social systems and institutions in order to prevent vicious circles of violence from evolving. Moreover, Pilisuk (1998) emphasizes the view that structural violence is associated with the perpetuation of social

arrangements connected to elite domination of resources, inequality, and poverty. According to Pilisuk, behavioural violence is a surface manifestation of the need to identify and change the invisible structures that promote it. Mankind is not a slave to the structure. Indeed, structures can be changed to become normative and sanctioned in cultural expression. In this regard, Pilisuk (1998), considers structural, cultural and behavioural violence to be interrelated. The relevance of this connectedness should not be underestimated in research of the underlying causes for the the persistence of the Pokot-Turkana conflict.

The operational dynamics of structural violence evolving into behavioural violence is best understood in the context of conflict being cyclical (Mwagiru, 2003). The dynamism of the conflict cycle maintains that structural violence left unattended to can or will evolve into direct violent conflict. The dynamics of violence in the conflict cycle is portrayed by scholars as emerging and escalating from stable peace management, characterized by the absence of structural violence across the social spectrum of relationships, to a situation of tension, to crisis, onto direct violent behaviour and returning to peace through effective conflict management (Niklaus, Swanstrom & Weissman, 2005). If the tensions and crises are not managed or contained by addressing the structural violence factors, the conflict escalates into physical violence. This situation in turn needs to be managed and deescalated back to a state of negative peace. At this stage there is need to attend to the structural violence issues that generate tension. If these underlying causes of the conflict are adequately addressed in a peace-building process, then positive peace, understood as the mutual interest of conflicting parties to reinforce the wellbeing of each other, can be achieved (Webb, 1986). In fact, the central elements of post conflict peacebuilding revolve around structures or relationships in society and their relevant institutions, systems, and mechanisms (Spence, 2001).

The conflict-cycle demonstrates the dynamism of conflict and that conflict is an intrinsic aspect of social change that ultimately is structural. The persistence and operational dynamics of conflict between the Pokot and Turkana communities bears all the features of the conflict cycle streamlined through various stages. This is evidenced by brief interludes between raiding/counter-raiding, tension, crises, overt violence, and back to only intermittent short periods of negative peace. Issues of structural violence in conflict environments by their very nature tend to persist because of strategic vested interests, particularly in the sphere of political economy, whether it is at a local or State level. Concerning intra-state conflicts, Brown (2007) asserts that “when State structures are weak or non-existent, groups fight between and among themselves in a Hobbesian universe of their own”(p. 39). Such a ‘universe’, as is the case with the Pokot-Turkana conflict and its interrelationship with the Kenyan state, can only be transformed by addressing the underlying structures of relationships in the given social context. The reality of life for the two communities and their general conflict environment reveals that the two communities are far behind other Kenyan communities with regard to state-facilitated peace and social progress (Mkutu, 2008; Wanyande, 2009; KNBS, 2015). This state of affairs cannot avoid speculation that the issue of structural violence is the cause of persistent conflict between them. This assertion begs the question whether State weakness and/or neglect contributes to the persistence of the conflict? Structural violence theory would maintain that the Pokot and Turkana will continue to engage in behavioural violence, possibly experience intermittent negative peace, but definitely fail to attain conflict resolution epitomised by positive peace between them, until the underlying structural causes are examined and attended to.

The theoretical framework of structural violence, however, does not disregard the variables in the domains of ethnicity, culture, and environment that are linked to the conflict.

Rather, it builds on their strengths while overcoming their weaknesses, by providing a more profound and holistic framework within which the persistence of the conflict can be understood. Structural violence theory maintains that these explanations are not the underlying causes of the conflict because, underpinning all these domains are structures that determine whether or not overt violence can or will result from the above domains. It is the first and foremost responsibility of the State to ensure that adequate structures of good governance, relevant to these domains, are in place in order to ensure peace and social progress. The monopoly of State structures over any other structures legitimizing violence, such as those with ethno-cultural connectedness, is strategically important in this regard. However, the reality is that the persistence of the Pokot-Turkana conflict remains unaltered by either the approaches of the State and/or by the activities of other conflict management actors such as the Catholic Church. While the conflict may have its underlying causes in the inability of both communities to realize their potential, it is certainly true that both communities cannot actualize their potential through fulfilling their somatic and mental realizations, while engaging in persistent violent behavioural conflict with each other. These potentials and realizations can only be wholly fulfilled when the persistent violent conflict is transformed into a situation of endurable peace. In turn, this cannot happen until the underlying structural causes are identified, overhauled and/or replaced by more appropriate structures of managing relationship patterns. The overall security, development and cohesion of the State itself will also determine whether lasting peace can be achieved. Focusing on the symptoms of conflict or addressing the trigger and proximate causes, without looking at the underlying structural factors, may only succeed in bringing about a temporary settlement, or negative peace that is usually understood as the absence of violence (Webb, 1986). It will not lead to positive peace where both communities and the State are actively involved in the

safeguarding of mutual security and interdependent wellbeing of each other. The probability of violent behavioural conflict recurring is elevated, if not inevitable, when the underlying structural causes are not attended to. Where conflict management approaches and activities ignore structural violence and are limited to behavioural violence only, the result would be application of repressive State apparatus (Althusser, 1971) that usually manifests as punishment and imprisonment. Doing so would at best just settle the physical conflict, achieving mere negative peace. On the other hand, paying attention to structural violence in society would address the underlying causes of the behavioural violence. This would go beyond the achievement of negative peace enabling conflict resolution and positive peace to develop between the communities, thereby terminating the persistence of the conflict. Therefore, it is imperative that the underlying causes be identified, and attended to, through appropriate and effective conflict management policies and interventions. The current conflict management approaches and activities intended to resolve the Pokot-Turkana conflict, and their apparent ineffectiveness, makes the application of the structural violence theoretical framework to the persistence of the conflict indispensable.

### **1.8 Hypotheses**

1. The conflict persists because the underlying causes have not been addressed.
2. The conflict persists because of ineffective approaches by the State in managing the conflict.
3. The conflict persists because of ineffective activities by the Catholic Church in managing the conflict

## **1.9 Methodology**

### **1.9.1 Introduction**

This section on methodology has eight subsections: description of the research area, specification and characterization of the design, definition and description of the population, sampling, data collection instruments, and data collection and analysis, reporting of findings and limitations. It is important, by way of introduction, to specify what methodology refers to in this study. However, before doing so, its definition needs to be given. Briefly, it is the abstract and logical basis of “finding out” and “knowing” itself. It includes theoretical rules, guidelines and principles and in terms of the philosophy of research a distinction is usually made between positivism and phenomenology (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2014). Positivism pertains to quantitative methodology whereas phenomenology pertains to qualitative methodology. The primary task of phenomenology is to achieve essential understanding of the social and personal world. Its focus is the study of life as it is experienced by the self and others. Positivism in contrast to phenomenology, hold that there is a single true world “out there”, independent of the observer, and that, through detached observations, science can identify causes and laws regarding the world. Positivism proceeds on an assumption that any unverifiable, (or unfalsifiable) statements are meaningless. Procedurally it is characterized by measurement of variables, randomization and control. The methodology in this study is positivistic.

### **1.9.2 Study Area**

The Pokot and Turkana ethnic communities live in the in the North Rift. This study was carried out in the region, which is geographically vast. The two communities interface with each other along a boundary that is approximately 250 kilometres. The specific area that constituted the research area is the stretch of terrain thirty-to-fifty kilometres at either side of the entire length of

the boundary that runs south-eastern to northwestern. The rationale for choosing this terrain as the research site is that in general terms, distance in kilometres from the boundary has a bearing on the occurrence of incidents of the violent conflict. The incidents typically, not exclusively, occur within this terrain. The probability of occurrence of raiding/counterraidering or attacking/stealing, outside the specific research terrain, is quite low or virtually zero. Turkanas who live in the interior of Turkana-land, outside the specified area of research, are highly unlikely to be attacked or get their livestock stolen, because the risk of Pokot attackers/rustlers getting killed by Turkanas is very high. Similarly, Turkanas avoid raiding/counterraidering or attacking/stealing in the interior of Pokot-land because the risk of getting killed by Pokots is also very high. Thus, it makes sense to state that occurrences of incidents of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict vary with the distance from the boundary – the relationship between violent incidents and distance is inverse. As distance from the boundary, which is unmarked and an object of contestation decreases, occurrences of incidents of violent conflict increase.

### **1.9.3 Design**

The terms, design, method and methodology tend to feature more in literature on quantitative research than in the one on qualitative research; the nature of this study is quantitative. Quantitative research is associated with survey designs. The particular design used in this research is cross-sectional survey. Thus, time was not a variable; something whose effect had to be controlled or something that was part of a dynamic as opposed to a static analysis of relationships among variables. This is because cross-sectional research is designed to understand relationships among variables that have to do with the conflict, by observing their values during a particular period in time. All measurements and observations were made on a single occasion over a time period of three months with no follow up period. Hulley et al. (2007) point out that

cross sectional designs are very well suited for the goal of describing variables and the distribution patterns. Besides, cross sectional designs provide estimates of effect variables, among other things. Here the choice of which variables to label as predictors and which variables to label as outcomes depended relatively easily on the cause-effect hypotheses of research rather than on the design. Cross-sectional sample survey, which was applied to this research, has explanation as one of its aims. This design was underpinned by explanation: to find out how or why the phenomena, varied and wide ranging, of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict operate or function by looking for evidence of cause-and-effect relationships in the data.

#### **1.9.4 Population**

In research, population is a complete set of people with a specified set of characteristics that are of interest to the research in question. At the time when primary data was collected in this study (2013), the population of Turkana-land was about 857,000 and that of Pokot-land was about 526,000. The sum of these constituted the target population to which the results of the research are generalized. The vast majority of the population are pastoralists – even as there are significant differences between Turkanas and Pokots, and particularly the highland Pokots. The latter are agro-pastoralists and the level of poverty among them slightly lower relative to that of Turkanas. There is no significant difference between lowland Pokots and Turkanas in terms of poverty. Turkanas and Pokots, regardless of whether they are lowland or highland Pokots, are classified as pastoralists by the government. It was pointed out earlier that the distance in kilometres from the Pokot-Turkana boundary does have effect on occurrence of incidents of the conflict. However, it does not affect the image and perception, rooted in history and culture, that Pokots have of Turkanas, and vice-versa. In general terms, Pokots’ social perception of Turkanas can be described as more negative than it is positive. Turkanas’ social perception of

Pokots is similarly more negative than positive. Both lowland and highland Pokots have much the same perception of Turkanas. Likewise, the image that Turkanas who live farthest from the boundary have of Pokots is by and large not different from the image held by the Turkanas who live along the boundary areas. It is thus clear that social perception and distance from the boundary are independent. This statistical independence is the grounds for: the sampling method that was used during the research, and the generalizations of sample findings to the population as was done in hypothesis testing.

### **1.9.5 Sampling**

In social science, empirical research discourse about sampling is predicated on the principle that a researcher(s) usually cannot collect/get/gather data from everyone (potential respondents or research subject or source of data) one is interested in. This sub-section describes and explains the strategy and techniques that were employed in the selection of the sample. Two considerations determined sampling: first, was that the population was geographically dispersed, secondly, there was a need or requirement to achieve randomization and representativeness of sample elements as a whole since this was a sample survey. The terrain that constituted the research site has been described above. Since the population was dispersed across widely scattered villages (*manyattas*), cluster sampling was used. Cluster sampling is probability sampling of natural groupings (clusters) of individuals in the population. The villages (clusters) were the natural groupings, namely: Amakuriat, Seker, Naipokure, Kositei, Nasorot and Napukut on the Pokot side interfaced with the Naipa, Kataruk, Kainuk, Katilu, Lopur and Lokori on the Turkana side. Cluster sampling is very useful when the population is widely dispersed and it is impractical to list and sample all its elements (Vaus, 2002; Creswell, 2009). It involves surveying whole clusters of the population selected through a defined random sampling strategy.

The *manyattas* were sampled so that individuals in their upper teens or above could be surveyed. The thinking was that since Pokots and Turkanas are pastoralists, the best way to locate them was through the *manyattas*. On the Pokot side of the Pokot-Turkana boundary, there were about forty clusters of villages (*manyattas*) and on the Turkana side there about thirty of them. However, in terms of numbers of people who lived in each *manyatta*, there was, by and largeno difference between Pokots and Turkanas. On either side of the boundary, the number of residents per *manyatta* ranged from three hundred to five hundred. Six *manyattas* (clusters) were randomly selected on the Turkana side of the boundary and six on the Pokot side, in the same way, which gave a total of twelve clusters. A sample of 381 cases, comprising of 190 Pokots and 191 Turkana consisting of men and women was selected from the twelve clusters. The selection was stratified by gender and age. The strata were: women in which age is a fixed variable (40 percent% of the sample), men who are 31 years old and above in which age is a fixed variable (30% of the sample), and young men aged 17 through 30 years – the ‘morán’ or warrior age group (30% of the sample). Besides cluster sampling, focus group discussion – supplemental to cluster sampling – was employed. The researcher requested assistance from the representatives of the local government administration, and the local Churches in the selection of appropriate individuals for the focus group discussion. Focus group discussions were conducted on the Pokots and Turkanas separately. The criteria of knowledge of the local milieu, high regard, and significant level of respect among the local population guided the researcher in the selection of participants for the focus group discussion. The individuals were recruited from the local administration (chiefs and assistant chiefs), local Church (pastors and catechists) local Non-Government Organizations (peace and development workers) and other respected opinion

shaping groups in the society, such as teachers. Focus group discussions provide deep, comprehensive qualitative information about the topic under research.

Four criteria informed the decision to have a sample size of 381 respondents: first, the type of data that was to be collected, secondly, the interest in detecting significant relationships among variables and this depends on how large a sample size is. Thirdly, the fact that cluster sampling requires a large sample size to achieve precision because cases within clusters tend to be similar. Fourth, the need to use factor analysis that requires a large sample size, in order to identify or uncover underlying dimensions (causes) of the research object, which is the Pokot-Turkana violent conflict.

There are mathematical formulas that help one to calculate the size a researcher's sample should be, and this is based on the desirable level of precision. Researchers usually choose a confidence level of 95% or 99%. Since the target population was known, the sample size required to be representative of it was calculated with the following formula.

Where:

$$s = X^2 NP (1-P) \div d^2 (N-1) + X^2 P (1-P).$$

S = required sample size

$X^2$  = the table value of chi-square for 1 degree of freedom at the desired confidence level (3.841).

N = the population size

P = the population proportion (assumed to be .50 since this would provide the maximum sample size).

$d^2$  = the degree of accuracy expressed as a proportion (.05).

The formula above was originally published by the research division of the National Education Association (1960) in the USA in The National Education Association Research Bulletin. For more on this, see Krejcie, & Morgan (1970) Determining Sample size for Research Activities, Educational and Psychological Measurement.

### **1.9.6 Data Collection Instruments**

The main instrument was a questionnaire in Pokot, Turkana, and English languages. It was supplemented by an unstructured interviews and a focus group discussion. The instruments were designed to tap data on five distinct types of question content: behaviour (what people do), beliefs (what people think is true), knowledge (establishing the accuracy of beliefs – i.e. facts), attitudes (establishing what they think is desirable), and attribute (obtaining information about the respondents' characteristics).

### **1.9.7 Data collection and analysis**

Before data collection, the instruments were pilot-tested at the research site. Thereafter, the data were collected through face to face interaction with respondents by the researcher and two male and two female research assistants. One of the males was Turkana and the other was Pokot; also one of the females was Pokot and the other was Turkana. All of them were fluent in Kiswahili, English and their mother-tongue. The data of this study took three months to collect during the months of December, 2012, January, February 2013. The unit of analysis was the individual from whom the data was obtained. However, in focus group discussion, the unit of analysis was the group, not the individuals who comprised the group. Data analysis means taking things apart and putting them together again, to work out the links between respondents' inputs and original questions/hypotheses. Multivariate analysis (factor analysis, correlation, regression, skewness) was applied to the data (this is covered in chapters four, five and six). Data tapped on most of

the variables of this research were quantitative. Variables at nominal and ordinal scales of measurement were quantified through dummy variable coding, thereby rendering them amenable to statistical analysis, as is done with variables at interval and ratio scales of measurement.

The usual practice, when it comes to the data analysis sub-section of methodology, is to name, but not explain, the data-analytic statistical technique or method employed to analyse the data. This assumes that people reading the work are familiar with the techniques used and that there will be no difficulty in making sense of the work. However, this assumption may, at times, turn out to be false. In order to forestall the consequences of the assumption not being true, the data-analytic techniques used in this research are identified. They are: factor analysis, Pearson correlation, skewness, multiple regression, and multiple correlation. The selected techniques are the most suitable in terms of rigor that the testing of the research hypotheses requires. Of these techniques, only factor analysis is explained below. The rest could not be explained in this section because doing so would distance them from the data, thereby disconnecting them from what the data means, implies and entails. Factor analysis was applied to testing the first hypotheses. It was applied because it has, firstly, to do with underlying or latent variables and, secondly, because in this study's first hypothesis the thrust of analysis testing is identification of underlying causes of recurring incidents of violent conflict between members of Pokot and Turkana ethnic communities. What factor analysis does is explained in the next paragraph.

Factor analysis is a multivariate technique. It is most familiar to researchers as a tool for unearthing or discovering basic empirical concepts reflecting unsuspected influences at work in a domain of phenomena under study. Specifically, it is used to identify whether or not the correlations between a set of observed variables stem from their relationship to one or more latent variables in the data, each of which takes the form of a linear model (Tabachnick & Fidell,

2014; Field, 2013). The variables that are correlated with one another but largely independent of those of other sub-sets of the set of variables in question are combined into a factor. The correlation of a variable with a factor is called the factor loading of the variable on the factor. Each factor is a combination of original variables. Factors are thought to “cause” variables. “In general, the factor is causal to the variables that load on it” (Catell, 1966, p. 62). The basic objective of factor analysis is to substitute a few concepts in the place of many as an explanation of behaviour. Its mathematics is complex but it makes complex phenomena simpler and by doing so, increases understanding of them. Steps in factor analysis (see for example, Pallant (2006) include: selection and measurement of a set of variables while ensuring that the data on the variables are suitable for the factor analysis to be applied, preparing the correlation matrix to perform factor analysis, extracting a set of factors from the correlation matrix, determination of the number of factors, probably rotating the factors to increase interpretability, and finally, naming the factors and interpreting the factors by the variables’ factor loadings’ that correlate with them. Factors are computed in descending order of magnitude. Accordingly, the factor that accounts for the largest variance in the matrix is extracted first, followed by the factor that accounts for the next largest residual variance and so on.

### **1.9.8 Findings Report**


The findings of the analysis of data that were generated using the methodology are discussed under their respective hypothesis in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, and also in the concluding chapter.

### **1.9.9 Limitations**

There were no problems in the data collection process of this research because prior to going to the field adequate ground work and preparation were done to reduce to the very minimum, if not

eliminate, the possibility of problems arising. However, there was one limitation which is common to cross-sectional sample survey. It is the limitation of disturbing variables. These are extraneous variables which may be confounded with the explanatory variables. One of the ways to address this issue is to use partial correlation to control for them after the data have been collected. In this research confounding variables were controlled through partial correlation and analysis of covariance.

Figure 1.1 Turkana – Pokot Conflict Zone (in Kenya)



Source: Schilling, Opiyo & Scheffran (2012)

## **CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter critically reviews literature that addresses salient issues relevant to understanding the persistence and management of the conflict between the Pokot and Turkana. The core purpose for this critique is to identify limitations and knowledge gaps in the existing perspectives which need to be addressed if the violent conflict is to be transformed to peaceful coexistence. For this reason the review is thematically divided in the following subsections; Conflict and its Management, Conflict and Ethnicity, State Capacity and Interethnic Conflict, The Kenya State and Conflict Management, Involvement of Regional Actors, Culture and Conflict, Environmental Resources and Conflict, The Catholic Church and Conflict Management. Throughout this literature review, there is analytical deliberation on the interactive dimensions of these themes as they impact on the persistence of the conflict.

### **2.2 Conflict and its Management**

Conflict is a multi-dimensional social phenomenon. The essence of conflict is to be found in the incompatibility of goals (Mitchell, 1981; Reuck, 1984). However, contrary to general perception, not all conflicts are harmful, especially some non-violent ones. In fact, many can be beneficial, such as those which help opposing parties understand themselves better, correct a perceived or actual injustice and contribute to positive social change (Wright, as cited in Burton & Dukes 1990; Mulu, 2008). Even then, Holsti (1983) notes that if the incompatible values and positions are perceived as fundamental, the parties' behaviour may be violent. From a conflict theory perspective, conflict is conceptually typified within two main categories (Mwagiru, 2006). One type is the manifest conflict exhibited in behavioural direct physical and visible violent actions. The second type is structural violence that is a latent invisible form of violence embedded in society's structure of relationships and interactions. At the outset of any discussion

on conflict, a clear understanding of both types of conflict is vital. Clarity about these typologies and how they interrelate is essential for the provision of an accurate analysis of the conflict being researched.

The distinction between structural violence and overt physical violence is based on whether the incompatibility of goals is articulated in the structures of society or by the manifest use of force. Whereas physical violence is always intentional, structural violence may or may not be intentional. The overt physical violent behaviour is visible while structural violence is not and thus requires acute conceptual explanation in order to be recognised and understood. Adam Curle (1971) characterises such situations as unpeaceful, thus creating a situation and category distinct from the traditional categorisation of situations to be either in peace or in war. In such a situation, the society may not be experiencing overt behavioural violence but is in a condition of negative peace. On the other hand, a society experiencing positive peace is operationally centred on the mutual security, development and interdependent wellbeing of all the citizens (Galtung, 1969; Webb, 1986). Situations of negative peace epitomised by structural violence can evolve into physical violence if not attended to. The risk of transition into violent conflict is increased when conditions of living, referred to earlier, are unbearable. Examples of structural violence in the majority of African countries since independence are particularly evident in the struggle for democracy by citizens against tyranny and dictatorial regimes (Meredith, 2006).

The intellectual discourse on the tenets of structural violence has provided many worthwhile contributions on its essence and its application to the study of peace and conflict. Structural violence focuses on the objective role of structures, as a fundamental aspect, in explaining the underlying cause of conflict and this can be criticized as overlooking the subjective roles of individuals or groups to engage in violent conflict independent of the

structures (Boulding, 1977). Similarly, while emphasizing the objectivity of conflict in the society's structural formation, structural violence theorists leave themselves open to the criticism that they are ultimately applying their own subjective value criteria when evaluating structures and their inherent violence (Derriennic, 1972). For example, it is possible to evaluate distributive grievances arising from social structures in different ways. However, structural violence theory maintains that acts by individuals and groups should not be explained in isolation from the structures pervading the culture and/or the State where they live. Structural violence does not dismiss subjective explanations of conflict but considers such explanations to be relevant at the level of trigger or proximate causes. However, these causes ultimately do have structural underlying causes. In the Kenyan context, the proponents of structural violence theory can legitimately claim that the Constitution of Kenya, enshrined with articulated values in its preamble and Article 10, and delineated structures of governance for all its citizens without discrimination, is an objective benchmark for subjectively evaluating the existence/operationalization of structural violence or not. However, Boulding (1977) cautions structural violence theorists of the dangers of evaluating structures at a given point in time. He cautions against underestimation of the random elements in social systems and that the emphasis on equality can be a threat to the value of liberty and quality progression in a society. In addition, Gronow and Hilppo (1970) critique Galtung's concept of structural violence arguing that social injustice does not necessarily equate to unequal distribution of power. Galtung (1985, 87), however, maintains that the fundamental role that structure induced inequality plays in human affairs is underestimated by Boulding and others. For Galtung, what is needed is the revolutionary removal of gross structural violence evidenced in exploitation and repression.

The Kenyan context, and specifically the Pokot-Turkana ethnic communities, demonstrates that it may be easier to transform State structures but it is more difficult to transform or replace traditional ethnic-cultural structures in a short span of time. The obvious reason is that traditional ethnic-cultural structures have ingrained and deep rooted constructs of governance, conflict management institutions, values, and roles dating back to time immemorial. Esman (1994), however, reminds us that ethnic identities are also contextual, adaptable to unexpected threats and new opportunities and are thus capable of developing new goals infused with new content. As such, he claims that every collective ethnic identity and solidarity can be located on a spectrum between primordialist historical continuities and instrumental opportunistic adaptations. Webb (1986), while agreeing that the concept of structural violence has an intuitive appeal for many, urges caution concerning the concept and its empirical demonstrations. Establishing the basis of structural violence depends on comparison between different units in a society; the extent of structural violence depends on the comparative units used both internally in a State and between nations. Webb (1986) maintains that it is not necessarily the case that all inequality, and hence structural violence, is due to the nature of relationships between groups. Inequality can result from differences in natural resources or through a population's technological failure to develop resources at its disposal. Burton (1990) maintains that ultimately conflict behaviour is learnt behaviour nurtured in persons as individuals who through their own volition either decide to engage or not to engage in conflict. While he recognizes the role of structures in impacting on the causes and persistence of conflict, he still gives priority to the individual ability to subjectively transform conflict through negotiation and accommodation. Structural violence theorists claim that this argument does not diminish the need to transform or create better structures to address the underlying causes of conflict.

Ultimately, they maintain that structures are what underlie and influence subjective decision making processes.

From another perspective, structural violence theory appears to underestimate the impact of how power is subjectively exercised by individuals and groups in and through the structures. Strategists or Realists, in appraising dynamics of conflict management and peace building, consider power and its use to be fundamental to understanding the underlying causes of conflict (Groom, 1990). Strategists maintain that power is operationalized in the quest to attain security and interests and thus takes pre-eminence over structural violence theory explanations. They maintain that structures are secondary and susceptible to the manipulation of power. Structural violence theorists counter this viewpoint by maintaining that it is the structures that define the types and parameters of power used. In addition, structural violence theorists maintain that that if structures were strengthened in the political-economic domain of human relationships, the dangers of power being misused to cause conflict could be prevented. The theory is also subject to criticism about who decides how it is to be done in interventions meant to transform issues of structural violence. The ripe or the right moment to intervene in a conflict is not always clear. However, when life in the structure becomes unbearable, leading to behavioural violence, whether in the short term or long term, or persistent, as is the case with the Pokot-Turkana conflict, it is an indication that intervention to transform structures is necessary.

With regard to managing the Pokot-Turkana manifest violent relationship, practitioners need to comprehend applicable concepts, such as, conflict and its management, mediation, Track 1 and Track 2 diplomacy, negative and positive peace, and settlement-resolution orientations. This understanding is first of all vital in order to carry out a competent analysis of the causes, issues, interests and roles of various actors involved. Understanding the concepts above is also

essential to envisioning and realising an end to the persistence of the violent conflict. In terms of conflict management, some authors (Groom, 1990; Mwangi, 2006) have pointed out that structural violence takes the focus away from the individual to the objective structures underpinning individual and group behaviour. Mwangi (2000) argues:

The subjective/objective debate has far reaching implications for conflict and its management. For the subjectivists, because the parties to a conflict must experience it, conflict management must centre on the efforts and inputs of the parties themselves. For the objectivists, since people may be in conflict without realising it, third parties can enter into the conflict, and be instrumental in its management. Subjectivists approach the conflict from the perspective of negotiation and analysis, while the objectivists approach it from the perspective of action to change the structure (p.16).

Many definitions of conflict management appear to benefit from Zartman (1989, 1997 & 2007) who considers conflict management as interventionist efforts meant to prevent the escalation of negative effects of violence. In a similar vein, conflict management deals with the processes by which conflict is managed by the concerned parties until peace is restored (Aseka, 2008). As such, it entails “efforts towards preventing the escalation and negative effects, especially violent ones, of on-going conflicts, and, when actively conducted, is an ongoing process” (Miller, 2005, p.23). Seen from this transformative perspective, it is submitted that the term conflict management refers to processes through which parties in conflict are encouraged to engage jointly in doing something about the conflict (Mwangi, 2006). While any definition of conflict management must perforce be broad ranging, Quinney’s (2011) definition of conflict management as “any and all approaches, mechanisms, and other measures intended to prevent, manage, or resolve violent inter-state and intra-state conflict” is comprehensive in this regard.

All the above perspectives are relevant to managing the Pokot-Turkana conflict but the degree to which they have been tried, tested and found productive is not evident, based on the fact that the conflict still persists. Categorizations of peaceful conflict management methods are numerous but probably the most preferred choice is that of coercive or non-coercive approaches (Mwagiru, 2006; Mulu, 2008). Coercive approaches are those that are enforceable legally, such as, arbitration and litigation while non-coercive types include: negotiation, mediation, enquiry, conciliation, and the use of good offices such as the office of the United Nations Secretary General. Mediation is one of the most used and popular methods; a mediator may be a conflict management actor, such as, a government, an organization, a group or individual with a keen interest in resolving the conflict (Mohamed, 1994).

Critical to the process of conflict management is the need for clarity on the type of peace sought, or the end result, in terms of settlement or resolution between the belligerents (Groom, 1990). According to Webb (1986), positive peace is understood as harmonious relationships among or between various parties or actors contributing to mutual reinforced development, growth and attainment of goals. Positive peace is attained when the conflict is resolved. Conflict resolution is directed towards the underlying causes focusing on the non-negotiable values and primordial human needs, which need to be resolved through the mechanism of problem solving workshops (Burton, 1990). Such workshops are designed to bring representatives of the different parties in conflict together in locations where they can engage in face to face communication independent of diplomatic protocol and the scrutiny of publicity. These workshops are aided by the guiding presence of qualified experts knowledgeable about conflict theory and group process orientations (Kelman, 1999 & Kelman, 1990). Negative peace is distinguished from positive peace in that while both have no physical violence there is no

harmony and reconciliation in the former due to structural violence. From a conflict management perspective, negative peace is achieved when conflict settlement is attained. Conflict settlement, whether legal or coercively enforced, is an outcome that emerges from bargaining over interests and “based on the existing power relations between the parties” (Burton 1997, p. 431). Settlement merely “re-adjusts and regulates the conflict relationships” whereas resolution is oriented to the mutual legitimization of relationship (Burton, 1997, p.431). In real terms, resolution involves attitudinal change and is about self-sustaining relationships without the imposition of behavioural patterns (Groom, 1990). Conflict resolution, thus, aims to fulfil or to meet the fundamental needs of both parties as opposed to being centred on mere secondary interests. Hence, conflict resolution is about win-win permanent solution to a problem as opposed to the zero-sum dynamic of settlement. It does not necessarily mean that all the demands of the parties in the conflict have been fully met but that the fundamental needs to ensure resolution have been attained.

Effective conflict management of the persistent Pokot-Turkana conflict by the relevant actors primarily depends on identification of the underlying causes through rigorous research. No conflict or its management process just drops out of the sky! Conflict management strategies that fail to comprehend and analyse the underlying, proximate and trigger causes, do so at great peril. How can one solve anything without knowledge of the causes? Furthermore, there is need to have clarity about the desired end goal of the conflict management process and the appropriate methodology that can lead to the desired end (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2008). Should the goal be focused on short term settlement or long term resolution perspectives? Will the approach involve only State and ethnic actors or include other third party actors, such as the Catholic Church? Will the methodology be centred on negotiation

or mediation processes? According to Mwangi (2006), negotiation is a process by which the parties in conflict sit by themselves and talk it out voluntarily and map out the future of their relationship. It could be a dyadic process where in the case of the Pokot and Turkana, the two communities negotiate the settlement or resolution, or a triadic process that involves a third party such as the State or some other body in the negotiation (Bercovitch, 1984). The fact that a conflict continues to persist may mean that this process has not been tried or was tried and failed due to a variety of reasons. Some of the reasons may centre on the structure of the process itself, the levels of analysis applied to the conflict issues, the involvement of all the relevant actors in the process and whether it was the ripe moment to engage in the process (Zartman, 1988; Mwangi, 2006).

Normally when parties have attempted dyadic negotiation and failed they may wish to involve a third party to help break the deadlock as a mediator. For Doob (1993), mediation involves the efforts of one or more persons to affect one or more other persons when the former, the latter or both perceive a problem requiring a resolution. Mediation involves the “voluntary, informal, non-binding process, undertaken with an external party that fosters the settlement of differences or demand between directly invested parties” (Millar, 1971, p. 49). The effectiveness of mediation and its results are largely contingent on political context, the mediator’s conflict management competency, prestige, access to resources and ability to act unobtrusively (Bercovitch & Houston, 1996). According to Mulu (2008) “Mediation is an act of intervention in a conflict by a third party or an outside power to improve the chances of resolving the conflict. Mediation usually entails engaging the adversaries in constructive dialogue, initiating negotiations between antagonists, or breaking a deadlock in negotiations” (p. 14). As part of a conflict management process, the best way to understand efforts of mediators is to analyse the

common dimensions of any interaction, namely: actors, issues, interests, resources, and behaviours. In conflict management, the difference between Track I and II mediation is based on the distinction dividing official/formal and unofficial/informal management of conflict. At the international level, it is official conflict management diplomacy between States. At the intra-state level, Track I is operated by the agents of a State or official representatives of political parties, without excluding international official actors (Becovitch & Houston, 1996). Track I mediation conflict management is based on formalized rules and procedures being agreed upon and adhered to. Ethnic leaders of the Pokot and Turkana communities can be categorized as legitimate Track I conflict management actors within the context of their inter-ethnic conflict. Conflict management processes involving negotiations between ethnic leaders such as community elders and other indigenous significant opinion shapers is generally classified as traditional conflict management. Montville (1991), distinguished Track II from traditional diplomatic Track I activities:

Track II diplomacy is an unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversarial groups or nations that aims to develop strategies influence public opinion, and organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict. It must be understood that Track II diplomacy is in no way a substitute for official, formal, 'Track I' government to government or leader to leader relationship (p. 162).

Dual diplomacy is where Track 1 and II collaborate, co-operate, and complement each other in efforts to manage, settle and/or resolve conflicts. This dualism is often referred to as Track 1 and half. Therefore, while Track I diplomacy is much more in line with the concept of settlement as associated with realism and structuralism, Track II is essential for the goals of the world society conflict research school of thought so that conflict can be transformed beyond settlement to

attain conflict resolution and aspire to practical reconciliation (Banks, 1984; Mwangi, 2006). Even then, it is important to realise that both Track I and Track II deal with the same subject matter and indeed complement each other. They differ in terms of procedures adopted, the philosophies underlying these procedures and the processes used in the interventions (Mwangi, 2006).

The Catholic Church has its headquarters in the Vatican City where the Pope is head of the Vatican State and the Catholic Church. Due to its recognition as a State at the international level, it is apportioned in international relations a Track I conflict manager status. However its involvement in the intra-state affairs of another country is in the realm of Track II. In its efforts to resolve the Pokot-Turkana conflict so far, the Catholic Church approach seems to be that of mediation in conjunction with implementing social progress projects particularly in the educational and medical spheres (Dolan, 2006; Good, 2007; CJPC, 2013; Mwaniki, 2015). The Church's conflict management rationale strongly supports a philosophy based on a development-security nexus (Mudida, 2007) and, as such, complements the State. The primary goal of the Church's conflict management policy is reconciliation between people (Benedict XVI, 2011). The extent to which the Church has the conflict management theoretical basis and technical mastery in Africa to deal with issues of behavioural and structural violence has been subjected to negative critique (Mwangi, 2006). The gist of Mwangi's critique is explored later in this chapter. In the context of the Pokot-Turkana conflict, the methodological approach and competency of the Catholic Church as a conflict management actor in the context of the Pokot-Turkana conflict is not clear and requires additional research. Persistence of the Pokot-Turkana conflict, despite the Church's long standing activities geared at reconciliation, raises questions about the effectiveness of its conflict management expertise and activities.

The historical literature on the Pokot-Turkana conflict to date focuses predominantly on incidents of direct violent conflict involving cattle raiding, killing, maiming, destruction of property and displacement (Kratli & Swift 1999). The State and Church are well aware of this overt type of violence between the Pokot and the Turkana. In a quest by the two communities to survive and meet their 'basic human needs' (Maslow, 1970), they rely almost completely on pastoralism in a semi-arid environment with limited water and pasture (Mkutu, 2008). Both groups place immense importance on cattle and when the herds are reduced through famine, drought or disease, they raid to replenish them to the point that they will fight and even die in the process (Mkutu, 2008). These realities concerning the Pokot and Turkana way of life should be viewed from the context of their ethnic and cultural identity as well as their environmental milieu. However it is also essential to state that the actions of the two groups are subject to ethno-cultural underlying structures that may sanction or legitimize both behavioural and structural violence. Analysis on the extent to which these structures require state-facilitated intervention and transformation, as part of the state's primary responsibility for the peace and social progress of all its citizens, without discrimination, is still lacking. Likewise, the Pokot and Turkana circumstances of social exclusion, economic underdevelopment and political marginalization, as suggested by Mkutu (2008) can be considered indicative of structural violence stemming from the State's conflict management approaches. However, the verification of this observation through in-depth research is yet to be done. The degree to which the persistence of the conflict can be linked to the state policies is unclear and such verification is an important part of this study.

All social, cultural, political, economic structures are operationalized through institutions, systems and norms of administration at the community and State levels of governance.

Institutions aspire to foster patterns of social behaviour and relationships. This is true of the apparatus that the State uses to assert control and ensure its hegemony and social order. These apparatuses can be divided into what Althusser (1971) described as the repressive apparatus (army and police) and ideological State apparatus (religious organizations, schools, and media). He maintains that the repressive State apparatus functions by violence whereas the ideological State apparatuses functions by ideology. For the State ideology to ensure hegemony throughout all its territory, both aspects of apparatus have to be structurally dominant and unyielding. Ultimately, the State has the primary responsibility to ensure that the operations of all structures, - State and ethnic - within its territory contribute to peace and social progress for its citizens (UN Charter). Issues of structural violence that emanate from State governance were not a factor until Pokot and Turkana came under colonial jurisdiction. However, such violence can also be generated from the structures of the ethnic group itself. While conflict has linkages with the domains of ethnicity, culture, environment, the State and the Church, structures underpin all of them as well as the processes of conflict management. As such, research on the structural causes of conflict provides a unifying framework of analysis.

### **2.3 Conflict and Ethnicity**

The behavioural dynamics of the conflict under study are confined to the location where the pastoralist segments of both communities directly interface and encounter with each other. It is on this basis that this inter-ethnic conflict is often defined as an ethnic conflict or pastoralist conflict between ethnic communities (Kratli & Swift, 1999). While the gist of the conflict entails pastoralism, it seems erroneous for someone to characterise the Pokot-Turkana conflict, as a pastoralist conflict. While it is true the conflict is between two pastoralist communities, this single aspect does not necessarily validate it as a pastoralist conflict as there are many other

issues besides those associated with pastoralism that may be linked to the persistence of the conflict. The immediate parties to this conflict are differentiated along ethnic lines. However, since this study is concerned with conflict between two different ethnic communities, what Gurr (2007) would call different ethno-cultural identities, there is a need for clarity about the concepts of 'conflict' and 'ethnicity' within the context of the Kenyan State and the State's claim to hegemonic control. A crucial issue to be addressed is whether or not the manifest violence of this inter-ethnic conflict is caused by ethnic difference or whether the conflict has deeper underlying causes that happen to manifest along the lines of ethnic identity. Rothchild (1997), while making reference to the African context, defines ethnic identity or ethnic group as a people who have a link or bond by consciousness to a special identity and who jointly endeavour to maximize their political, economic and social interests. The root meaning of 'ethnic' is found in the Greek concept *ethnos*, meaning group of people, or race with common features and cultural peculiarities (Nyasani, 2009). Smith (1993) classifies an ethnic community as a: "named human population, with a myth of common ancestry, shared memories and cultural elements; a link with a historic territory or homeland and a measure of solidarity" (p. 28-29). The power of identity is often activated when members of an identity community care for the interests of others in the community enough to sacrifice their own interests (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2007). According to Gurr (2007), there is no warrant for assuming any one basis for ethnic identity, such as language or common homeland, is more likely to cause conflict than others. Gurr (2007) further maintains that what is primarily important is shared identity about what is good for the group, not just greed or desire for power.

When ethnic identity is operationalized in the domain of inter-ethnic relationships, it is referred to as ethnicity. Ethnicity manifests itself in different ways and at different levels that

include official and institutional arenas as well as at the informal and personal levels (Wanyande, 2009). When ethnicity takes on negative ethnic centred features it is characterised as ethnocentrism. Some scholars, like Yuwa (1989) believe identity and ethnocentrism has its basis in the controversial idea of the biological propensity to safeguard one's own close relations. However, most scholars, when evaluating ethnocentrism with its inherent "in group-out group" biases, favour social psychological explanations (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2007). According to Goldstein and Pevehouse, ethnic conflict stems from a systemic dislike or hatred by one ethnic group towards another and as such it is based on intangible causes about whom one is, rather than on tangible causes concerning what one does. Yet, while it is true that issues of ethnic cultural difference or identity may impact on the causes of the conflict, it is claimed that there are normally other factors, such as State capacity, environment resources, religious issues, conflict memory and so on which interplay with ethnocentrism to cause conflict (Getui, 2009; Mwangiru, 2007). Ethnocentrism is an indicator of the existence of some form of conflict among ethnic groups even in the absence of physical violence. Ethnocentrism is a key concept and factor that explains why conflicts such as the Pokot-Turkana are often described as 'ethnic conflicts'. When ethnicity takes on negative characteristics, what becomes apparent is that the 'ethnic identity factor' is not the underlying cause of conflict but rather an instrument and tactic used to achieve objectives that are not ethnic *per se*. In this perspective, any explanation of the Pokot-Turkana conflict as a mere 'ethnic conflict' or a conflict caused by ethnic difference should be spurned and the underlying causes sought and identified through further research. This is not to deny that ethnic issues are involved.

From a broader perspective, it is however important to pay attention to how ethnic considerations have contributed to the historical marginalization of both groups. This is

evidenced by the distribution of political goods and services among various ethnic groups as well as the ethnicization of institutions in Kenya (Wanyande, 2009). Therefore, while ethnicity manifests itself in different forms, an understanding of the term and its associated connotations needs careful analysis. Nthamburi (2009) offers a valuable perspective on the relational dynamism between ethnic identity, ethnicity and ethnocentrism:

While the term “ethnicity” is neutral sociologically, “ethnocentrism” is a pathological, destructive state of cultural and ethnic absolutism. It is often used when an ethnic identity is vested with power to subdue and surmount other identities. Ethnicity becomes destructive when it is used to seize control of resources. When a group that has power is identified with ethnocentrism it means that others who belong to other forms of identity than the dominant group are deprived of resources or their human rights are denied (p.70).

As the conflict quotient rises in space and time between ethnic groups such as the Pokot and Turkana, so does the quantity of conflict memory increase (Mwagiru, 2006). The role of conflict memory, especially in historical long term persistent conflicts like the one under study, reinforces group identity and hostility and in so doing reflects the negative impact of ethnocentrism (Glad, 1990). Conflict between ethnic communities is considered peculiarly potent when it contains historical enmities (Rotberg, 1967). Those who take part and experience the violent effects of a conflict do not easily forget the memory of that conflict. In fact, memory is resilient and those affected pass on the anger and impact to subsequent generations. Indeed, it is contended that one of the reasons why ethnic conflicts continue to fester is the resilience of this sort of memory (Mwagiru, 2006). Horowitz (1985) has suggested that the strength of ethnic conflict is proportional to the depths of its traditional origins. However, conflict is not just the

persistence or recrudescence of earlier antagonism. In an inter-ethnic conflict, such as conflict under study that dates back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century, it would be indeed difficult to dismiss the role of conflict memory as an issue influencing the persistence of conflict.

From an interactive framework concerning State-ethnic relations, the issue of ethnicity instigating rebellions and demands for secession due to eco-political grievances is very prevalent in the literature of Rothchild (1991). Collier (2007), also with a general eco-political focus on ethnic conflict posits a different perspective, maintaining that the causes of conflict in multi-ethnic societies go beyond the grievance explanation. He argues that issues of greed or lust for power can predominately be the motivating factor. Similarly, Gurr (2007), Kimenyi & Tarimo (as cited in Tarimo and Manwelo 2007, p.77) while recognizing the identity dimension of conflict maintain that ethnic groups should also be appraised as interest groups which share some common political-economy agenda. They argue that when it comes to issues of governance and provision of public goods, the overall common good is sacrificed for the sake of ethnic wellbeing. This viewpoint is closely linked to Chukwu's (2000) arguments concerning the role of marginalisation in ethnic conflicts. While referring to Nigeria's multi-ethnic society since independence, his position is that ethnic animosity has been the main catalyst for political instability due to gross marginalization. In a study of ethnic minorities in Kenya and Tanzania, (Mawhood & Wallis, 1993) maintain that ethnicity and ethnic alliances will continue to be a major factor in Kenyan politics revolving around issues such as power, electoral manipulation, and patronage. They consider the use of violence to achieve ethnic goals to be an ongoing real possibility.

A review of literature titled 'ethnic conflict' reveals that a variety of issues from social, political, economic and culture disciplines are utilized to explain conflicts labelled as ethnic

conflicts. Ethnicity is used as a means and tactic to achieve the desired social, political, economic and cultural objectives rather than the determining factor of conflict between ethnic groups. It would appear that these other objectives are more crucial areas to be researched upon to explain the causes of interethnic conflict than the ethnic factor *per se*. Defining conflicts between ethnic communities as ‘ethnic conflicts’ *per se* and explaining their causes and/or persistence through the lens of ethnic identity seem to be minimalistic and does an injustice to the wider interplay of underlying structural factors. In this regard, one has to question whether the substantive underlying issue causing conflict between the Pokot and Turkana is ethnic at all. Are the causes of the conflict and/or its persistence not ultimately problematic issues of structures in the social, political, economic, cultural and environmental domains of governance by the State?

Scholars like Mudida (2009), in line with Galtung’s understanding of structural conflict, claim that despite many conflicts in Africa having ethnic dimensions, they have deeper structural sources arising from anomalous economic, political, and social structures. He maintains that when the structural deficiencies - intrinsic causes and effects of poor governance - are not rectified, they often manifest themselves in violence with an ethnic dimension. If one accepts this viewpoint, then the ethnic dimension cannot be considered to be the underlying cause of the violent conflict between the Pokot and Turkana. However, one should not lose sight of the fact that broader issues of ethnocentrism at State-governance level could explain how some issues of structural violence in the form of marginalization impact on both Pokot and Turkana communities to the extent of influencing persistence of the conflict. In the same vein, while this structural violence perspective does not dismiss the cultural and environmental contributions to interethnic conflict in the area, it does challenge conflict management actors to examine the


structural deficiencies that allow cultural and environment factors to become variables of conflict between ethnic communities. This reiterates the need to go beyond the visible manifestations of conflicts by identifying underlying factors in order to achieve a deeper understanding of the causes of the Pokot-Turkana conflict and its persistence. In multi-ethnic states, similar to Kenya, the issue of structural violence frequently becomes apparent in the marginalisation of certain ethnic groups. This becomes obvious in the distribution of political goods and services. The persistence of physical violence between the Pokot and Turkana and the disparity of development initiatives in their respective counties compared to other areas of Kenya makes credible the allegation that ethnic marginalisation is a ground for conflict. According to Wanyande (2009), much of the ethnic tension in Kenya is generated by the perception that public resources are not distributed equitably (see the poverty indices on Figure 2.1). He observes that regions that fall within the former Central Province and parts of the former Rift Valley Province benefited more from State investment than any other province since independence. The Pokot and Turkana pastoralist communities, despite two, among numerous, ethnic groups who live in the Rift Valley region being part of the Rift Valley Province, benefited practically nothing from the investments; their socio-economic marginalisation during post-colonial times remains largely unchanged (Mkutu, 2008). Their situation has all the features of structural violence evidenced partly in the unequal distribution of public resources. According to Wanyande (2007), the solution to ethnic issues of structural violence, marginalization and ethnocentrism lies in improved governance:

This must entail restructuring the State and its institutions, respect for human rights, development of a strong sense of nationhood, and appreciation of the cultural and ethnic

diversity and equal treatment of all citizens irrespective of their religious and ethnic identity. This requires leadership by statesmen (p. 68).

In Kenya, the magnitude of poverty incidence varies from one county to another. The Counties of Turkana, West Pokot and the northern sector of Baringo County (inhabited by Pokots) are semi-arid land areas with low population density and are characterized by harsh weather conditions and poor infrastructure. These areas have poverty levels far above the national average and little has changed over the last ten years.

**Figure 2.1 National Poverty Profile by County, 2005/2006**



Source: Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis [KIPPRA], 2013.

The comparative disadvantage of these two counties compared to other counties, coupled with the effects of the vicious and persistent conflicts justify a special consideration when sharing national resources among the counties (KIPPRA, 2013). The disparities existing between counties are evidence of structural violence in the governance of the Kenya State. In the 2015 Kenya National Bureau of Statistics Report on spatial dimensions of well-being in Kenya, Turkana County was nationally ranked last out of 47 counties with a poverty incidence of 87.5

percent, which is 42.3 percentage points above the national average. West Pokot, on the other hand, was ranked 40<sup>th</sup> with a poverty incidence of 66.3 percent, which 21.1 percentage point above the national average, and the Eastern Pokot area in the north of Baringo County is even higher (KNBS, 2015). The continued unequal access for the citizens in these areas to public resources and infrastructure in the domains of security, health, and education among other political goods raises many questions about equity in the structures and administrative systems of the State governance apparatus. It is not the case that the government has been unaware of the possible inter-relationship between poverty, conflict, security and development planning (Office of the President, 1999); this document provided a framework for mainstreaming conflict management within development planning for communities such as the Pokot and Turkana for the period 1999 to 2015. Indeed, this type of governance-conflict management-development nexus analytical questioning is not just unique to Kenya. It is gaining increased emphasis in research and policy formulation across Africa (Booth and Gammack, 2013) and in major development institutions working on the continent such as the World Bank (WB, 2015).

Vanhanen (1999), when studying the issue of inter-ethnic conflict, focusses on the role of the evolved predisposition towards ethnic nepotism in Africa. He considered the tendency to favour members of one's own ethnic group to be a major factor in explaining ethnic conflict. In Kenya, the three former Presidents, since independence, originated from the former Central Province, and the mid-section of the former Rift Valley Province. Both home regions of the former presidents have experienced comparatively much higher rates of development than the minuscule social progress among the Pokots and Turkanas. This reality impacts on the relations between the ethnic groups in the area as the struggle for scarce resources vis-à-vis the rest of the State in general, and with their immediate ethnic neighbours in particular. The extent to which

issues of ethnic nepotism in social, economic and political spheres of governance and the resulting marginalization have contributed to the persistence of the conflict has yet to be empirically researched. It is this perception that underpins Wanyande's (2004) observation that many of the conflicts in Africa emanate from "rigged" development. Development that is ethnic leaning serves the interests of the dominant class, yielding to a distorted development process marred with massive ethno-regional and gender inequalities in the society. In the world today, most countries formulate a constitution that is sanctioned by the people and geared towards common good, and equity devoid of ethnic exclusion. The post-election violence in Kenya during 2007/8 had ethnic dimensions that were deeply rooted in defective Kenyan constitutional and political structures (Mudida, 2009). The need for a new constitution was a key component of the peace settlement in the aftermath of the violence. The new constitution, voted in by an overwhelming majority in 2010, including the Pokot and Turkana ethnic communities, arguably reflected the desire for reform in order that issues of structural violence are transformed. This type of structural change is essential if basic human and ontological needs (Burton, 1990; Burton, 1997) are to be satisfied. Constitutional reform that is grounded in the principle of the common good and guided by enlightened leadership that transcends narrow ethnic interests is seen as vital in the prevention of outbreaks of inter-ethnic conflict arising from marginalization (Mudida, 2009). It is therefore critical to go beyond the issue of ethnicity and ethnocentrism when researching on the causes and persistence of inter-ethnic conflict. From this perspective, the persistence of the conflict under research seems considerably connected to issues of defective State structures and approaches impacting negatively on social behaviour patterns.

Brown (2007) argues that scholars have identified four main clusters of factors that underlie inter-ethnic conflict: structural factors, political factors, economic/social factors, and

cultural/perceptual factors, which make some places more predisposed to violence than others. The relationship of these four factors to the persistence of conflict is fundamentally about the effectiveness of State structures – structural factors - in weak States, particularly regarding how governance is applied equitably to all ethnic groups. Arguably, Kenya is a weak State because of the persistence the conflict under study as well as other ongoing intra-state inter-ethnic conflicts since independence in 1963. Regarding the other clusters, Brown highlights the importance of policy makers and established political, economic and social mechanisms to maintain peace. In other words, issues of structures concerned with peace and social progress need to be continually assessed overhauled and/or created in order to prevent and/or manage inter-ethnic conflict. Policy making and social mechanisms are inherent components of structures and their manifestations. He maintains that, “in most internal conflicts the key actors are governments and rebel groups but when State structures are weak or non-existent, groups fight between and among themselves in a Hobbesian universe of their own” (Brown, 2007, p. 39). There is a need to determine if State structures and their approaches to conflict management and interaction with communities are contributing to the persistence of the Pokot-Turkana conflict. There is a dearth of literature investigating the relationship between State conflict management structures and persistence of the conflict.

#### **2.4 State Capacity and Interethnic Conflict**

Practically all African States, according to Ayangafac & Cilliers (2011), have major issues of State weakness and Kenya is not an exception. They argue that the principal reason for the structural weakness of African States, dating back to colonial times, is a developmental and governance crisis. This weakness is evidenced recently by the Kenya post-election violence of 2007/8. The subsequent ratification and promulgation of a new State constitution in 2010 was

identified as one of the means of strengthening state structures. Few would argue that the people of Kenya, in general, and the ethnic groups of Kenya in particular, anticipate that the ongoing implementation of the new constitution will help transform the underlying causes of their persistent interethnic conflicts. However, the effectiveness and relevance of the constitution in providing peace and development among the ethnic communities largely depends on the capacity of the State to deliver its political goods and services to all groups without discrimination. If State capacity in the delivery of political goods and services, especially services, is found wanting, there is a real danger that conflicts between ethnic communities, such as the Pokot-Turkana, will remain unaltered. The State has the primary responsibility of ensuring peace and social progress for all its citizens (United Nations [UN], 2008). There is also a consensus among peace and development policy makers and practitioners that there can be no long term peace or security without development and vice versa (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 1994; Eliasson, 2015). This primary responsibility of the State is a duty ultimately underpinned by structures; the State has a duty to resolve the Pokot-Turkana conflict. In order to understand this duty and its relationship to the conflict, there is need for clarity on what a State is *per se* and its role in the wellbeing of its citizens, regardless of whether they are homogenous or heterogeneously composed from numerous ethnic groups.

The institution of the State is a widely studied subject (Weber, 1964; Althusser, 1971, Badie & Birnbaum, 1983; Jackson & Rosberg, 1986; Migdal, 1988; Rotberg, 2007). Migdal (1988) following Max Weber, offers the following definition of a State:

It is an organization, composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the State's leadership (executive authority) that has the ability or authority to make and implement

the binding rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rulemaking for other social organizations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its ways ( p.19).

He maintains that a strong State must ensure its own survival strategies while persisting on its own, mobilise the society, regulate social relationship and extract and use resources appropriately. The stronger the capabilities to achieve these goals the stronger the State; the opposite applies to the weak States (Lambrecht, 2010). In weak States, some ethnic communities can attempt to impose their own set of survival strategies and thus actually subvert the survival strategies and instruments of the State (Toit, 1995). These capabilities can be measured with reference to participation by the citizens in the governance of the State, the legitimacy of the State and willing compliance by the populace to the edicts of the State. According to Rotberg (2007), States are “categorized in descending order as strong, weak, failing or collapsed depending on their ability to deliver high qualities and quantities of essential political goods” (p.83). In other words, the quality and quantity of delivery of essential political goods is related to whether State institutions, systems, and mechanics of governance are effective, non-existent and/or anomalous in character. Migdal (1988) evaluates the strength of a State on the basis of how it realises social control within its territory. This view is supported by Krasner (as cited in Migdal 1988, p.21) when considering weak and strong States from both a domestic and international perspective. According to Krasner, the measuring rod is the ability of the State to mobilize its population to accept its statutes. It is difficult to consider the State anything but weak in the context of the Pokot-Turkana conflict. However, in line with the theoretical reflections of Haskel (1980) and Migdal (1988) on weak and strong States, the persistence of their conflict may be also related to the ability of outsiders to access the conflict environment and circumvent the State and State policies. Either way, it is clear that an

evaluation of issues of strong and weak States is essentially an appraisal of the presence and impact of State structures. State social control involves the subordination of behaviour sought by other social organizations that is contrary to the policies of the State. Ultimately, State social control is the expression of power by the State through structures, so aptly described by Mann (as cited in Migdal 1988, p. 22) in line with Migdal's position as infrastructural power. For example, in Kenya, the locus of the Pokot-Turkana conflict, the widespread illegal possession of weapons can be indicative of State weakness of infrastructural power and/or neglect in terms of security (Singo, Wairagu & Kamenju, 2004). However, the mere fact that there may be weakness exhibited through the defects of infrastructural power in the Pokot-Turkana conflict environment does not automatically mean that the State is weak. Perhaps, the infrastructural power of the State is not being applied adeptly to the conflict. The application can be evaluated through what Althusser (1971) termed the ideological State apparatus and/or the repressive State apparatus, as explained below. If this is the case, then the question that follows is, why is the infrastructural power of the State not being operationalised appropriately in the conflict environment.

The phrases 'repressive State apparatus' and 'ideological State apparatus' have been given much emphasis by Althusser (1971) in his reflection on what the State is and how its institutions impact on its desired ideology of social order. Althusser used the expression 'ideological State apparatus' to describe the ways the State used institutions like the religious institutions, schools and the media function to support its ideology. He further maintained that the vision and mission of the State were pursued, not only by ideological State apparatus, but also through the repressive State apparatus (army and police) that ultimately functions by the use of or threat of violence. For the State to ensure hegemony, and thus avoid State weakness

throughout all its territory, both aspects of apparatus have to be dominant and unyielding. In the Kenyan case, the recurrent incidents of violent conflict between the Pokot and Turkana do not necessarily imply that Kenya has insufficient repressive and ideological State apparatuses to end the persistence of the conflict. It is also important to clarify that it has never been claimed, nor does it appear the case, that the Pokot and Turkana ethnic groups are trying to secede from the Kenyan State. Yet, it may be the case that State weakness is providing the political space for the intensification of conflict among the ethnic groups albeit with no secessionist agenda. No doubt, such political space can in the long run erode the capacity of any State to maintain order and provide security for its citizens (Ayoob, 2007; Hampson & Aall, 2007). In this context, the question of whether or not the Kenyan State is strong or weak is problematic to answer. The persistence of the conflict raises a number of questions with regard to the Kenyan state and particularly its claim to hegemony within its territory: does the State possess adequate capacity or apparatus to stop the direct violence and resolve the underlying causes for the persistence to the conflict? Are the State and its security functionaries applying the appropriate conflict management methodologies to transform the conflict to a situation of enduring peace? Finally, is the Pokot-Turkana conflict a situation whereby the State apparatus is not interested or willing to resolve the conflict? Of course the absence of political will to end conflict is, in itself, a negation of the aspiration of any State to label itself strong! Authors such as Ross (1993) hold the view that the underlying causes of conflicts, like the Pokot-Turkana conflict, with States are best explained through the lens of culture. Others like Gleditsch (2007) maintain that the causes are fundamentally about environmental resource issues. Undoubtedly, these explanations from cultural-ethnographers and environmentalists contribute to understanding the causes of conflict. However, ethnographers and environmental theorists ignore the fact that it is first and foremost

the responsibility of the State to have appropriate instrumentalities to research, counteract and manage conflicts that have cultural and environmental dimensions.

#### **2.4.1 The Kenya State and Conflict Management**

The development of formal State structures in Kenya began when the British colonial government took responsibility for the direct administration of the territory in 1885. Ghai & McAuslan (1970) maintain that the army and police forces (repressive State apparatus) were critical in enshrining the colonial authority; the human security and development of the colonized population was a distant objective. Kenya's ethnic groups were forcefully subordinated under the strong hand of the colonial State. As the administration became more structured, the legal foundations of the colony necessitated the development of a constitution. A constitution is a set of values and institutions, which form the fundamental framework for the operation of governance in a State (Ghai, 2011). As such, it is a benchmark document for the development of conflict management policy for the people within a State, including relationships between different ethnic communities. The essence of the colonial constitutions centred on how British objectives could be achieved (Ghai & McAuslan, 1970). Structural violence pervaded the British colonial system of governance in Kenya.

With the attainment of independence for the Kenya State in 1963, a new constitution emerged. The era of behavioural and structural violence inflicted on the indigenous people of Kenya by the colonialists was over. Naturally, peace and social progress for all the people of Kenya, after independence, was envisaged. Ghai (2011) maintains that the new constitution provided the blueprint for a State reflecting greater democratic rule, devolved administration respecting ethnicity, ensuring human rights, and justice for all. Its general ethos aimed at ensuring equal power sharing between the major and smaller ethnic groups and fair distribution

of national resources between the regions. Kenya has over 40 different ethnic communities (KNBS, 2009). The last thing that was envisioned was any form of violence, where the people of Kenya would be affected so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations. However, as Munene (2003) observes, in May 1963, Jomo Kenyatta made it clear that he considered the Majimbo (federalist) constitution worked out at Lancaster House an imposition that Kenyans would have to reject. Soon after independence, the process of dismantling the 1963 Constitution began (Muigai, 2001; Ogendo, 1972). Devolved regional governments were replaced by a centralised administration, opposition to the government was practically eliminated, and the parliament, judiciary, and civil service lost their independence and autonomy (Muigai, 2001). As a result, destructive ethnic politics took hold, evidenced by greater discrimination and conflict, acute poverty for many, and obscene affluence for a few (Ghai, 2011). What emerged was an autocratic State where personal rule and coercion to maintain the status quo prevailed at the expense of participation and a well-articulated constructive democratic ideology (Mbai, 2003). Remote areas where pastoralist groups subsisted with meagre political influence, like the Pokot and Turkana, attained practically no improvement in the realms of peace and development from the time of Kenya's independence to date.

Successive Kenyan presidents Jomo Kenyatta (1963-78), Daniel Moi (1978-2002) and Mwai Kibaki (2002-2013) – respectively, continued the British policy of appointing local chiefs throughout Kenya. This approach amounted to interference with community leadership structures and further diluted the effectiveness and power of ethnic Track I traditional conflict management systems. Moreover, the negative socio-economic standing of pastoralist communities compared to other ethnic groups and locations in Kenya widened. For example, while Nairobi Province population had access to electricity at the rate of 71%, only 4.6% of rural

populations, including the Pokot and Turkana, have access to electricity (Society for International Development [SID], 2004). The hallmarks and negative effects of inequity in the provision of social goods is still blatantly evident, not only between regions of the country, but also between different ethnic groups (KNBS, 2015). Pressure for constitutional review grew in the 1990's, mainly as a result of the structural violence embedded in the State structures and consequently throughout the Kenyan society (Mudida, 2008). The 1963 constitution had, by 2005, been amended thirty eight times, with most of the amendments geared towards undermining its values. The Constitution became a major source of structural violence as the changes impeded the State from fulfilment of the aspirations of the Kenyan Society (Constitution of Kenya Review Commission [CKRC], 2005; Mwangi, 2000). A state of negative peace prevailed throughout the country with persistent violent conflict being a major feature between pastoralist communities. Many citizens were not able to actualize their potential and attain fundamental rights to peace, security and development. Eventually, after difficult political struggles and activism, the people of Kenya voted for a new constitution in 2010. According to Ghai (2011), the new constitution incorporates

A number of important values which seek to eliminate corruption, favouritism, negative ethnic politics and policies, promotes rights and justice, and emphasises our diversity and unity...it disperses State power so that we will not have the concentration of power that enabled massive breaches of the law with total impunity (p.13).

The Pokot-Turkana conflict persisted throughout the post-independence period. It is not clear whether the political and governance challenges during this period contributed to the persistence of the conflict. Wanyande (1997) argues that inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya have to do with the nature of governance. The State establishes the rules of governance and is

responsible for their enforcement. Wanyande (1997) maintains that, “the extent that the State fails to enact legitimate structures that ensure good governance then the State will have created conditions for potential and eventually actual conflict and violence” (p.6). In 2001, the State set up the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC) in an effort to strengthen, coordinate, and integrate various conflict management policy initiatives, (National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management, 2012). After 11 years of developing a policy document, it was adopted in 2012. The document begins by outlining the problem, as it sees it:

The Problem: Whether responding to humanitarian needs or root causes of conflict, a fundamental problem in Kenya has been lack of policy guidelines for the co-ordinated approach to peace building and conflict management. As a result, most actors engage on ad hoc basis and with interventions that are reactionary in nature. Lack of norms, values and principles to guide interventions, has in certain situations exacerbated conflicts. In addition, sufficient resources have not been mobilised to prevent latent conflicts and enable rapid response when conflict occurs (p. 5).

This understanding of the problem regarding the causes and management of conflict is implicitly critical of the State’s own policy and approaches since independence. When discussing the nature of conflict in pastoral areas such as the Pokot-Turkana conflict, the policy document highlights the unpredictable climatic conditions and suggests that the conflicts are aggravated by social and political alienation, economic marginalisation and the proliferation of small arms. While focussing on issues of prevention and response to conflict, the document fails to stress the consistent negligence of the State to apply its repressive and ideological apparatuses to end the persistent interethnic conflicts within its borders. Moreover, the document does not define the

appropriate methodology to be applied to uncover the latent underlying causes of conflicts that are persisting. This would have ensured that future policy and decision making are based on objective facts, qualitatively and quantitatively researched, instead of speculation and conjecture. Neither does it address considerations about the how recommendations from a research depends on the model of policy-making and implementation adopted, such as “the knowledge utilization school” (Sunquist, 1978; Weiss, 1978, 1991; Restivo & Julia, 1987; Singer, 1990), Herbert Simon’s classic “administration behaviour model” (1997), and the “rationalist, or engineering model” (Robbins & Judge, 2007). Overall, while the policy oriented document lacks empirical researched primary data to back its provisions, the development of the document is to some degree a positive step forward offering an assessment of structural and associated institutional conflict management requirements in Kenya. Even so, to date, there is still no evidence of a State initiated analysis, based on a rigorous research, of the conflict under study.

The proliferation of sophisticated small arms such as AK 47s, G3s and their associated ammunition and explosives in the Pokot-Turkana conflict environment is widespread (Mkutu, 2004, 2008). Undoubtedly, fully armed and roaming warriors are an affront and threat to the State itself (Tibaldo, 2006). Measures to implement the policy will have to address the reality of armed pastoralists. According to the United Nations, small arms are those weapons that are manufactured to military specifications and designed for use by one person (Grimmet, 2006). Throughout the Twentieth Century to date, the proliferation of arms has impacted on conflict processes in terms of methodology, speed, and the violence inflicted during incidences of conflict between pastoralist communities (Hendrickson, 1998). In 2003, Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC) observed that the Turkana possessed 66, 239 illegal weapons and the Pokot were holding 36, 937 (Security Research and Information Centre, Terrorized Citizens,

[SRIC], 2003; Dolan, 2006). In Eaton's (2008) article, 'The business of Peace: Raiding and Peace Work along the Kenya-Uganda Border', he claims that the general conflict environment is characterized by an unforgiving heavily armed people, often better equipped than Kenya security personnel, engaged in incessant cattle raids and counter attacks. Gifford (2009) informs us that the Moi and Kibaki regimes "made over twenty attempts to disarm the Pokot in North Rift valley in as many years but attempts to bring these areas into modern Kenya have been slight" (p. 29). These attempts at disarmament failed. Based on the current scale and persistence of the violence, it is argued that conventional State security interventions such as disarmament, which are largely coercive, have not deescalated the intensity of the Pokot-Turkana conflict (Mkutu, 2008). Disarmament policies often seem to focus more on State security than on transforming the marginalized livelihood conditions of the Pokot and Turkana communities. Most of the modern State and regional policies appear symptom/effect focused rather than addressing the underlying causes (Grahn, 2005; Bevan, 2007). Bevan asserts that policy responses that only prioritize disarmament and focus on replacement of pastoralism with sedentary modes of production do not address the deeper structural factors underpinning social, political and economic issues that influence the armed violence dynamics. Such policy responses were evident in the statement by the Minister for Internal Security and Provincial Administration, John Michuki, in 2005. Michuki (2005) said that, "the Police with the full backing of the armed forces would start to disarm the Home Guard and others among the Pokot, Turkana,...that criminals in possession of illegal firearms must surrender them or the government will use all its machinery with equal and ruthless force as far as permitted by the law to restore law and order" (Mkutu 2008, p.123). Undoubtedly, disarming the Pokots and Turkanas of firearms could limit the quantity and expressions of violence between the communities *per se*. However, in terms of

explaining the reasons for why the conflict persists, it seems very myopic and superficial to conclude that the conflict exists and persists because of the prevalence of firearms. Furthermore, to disarm these two communities without also recognising and disarming the numerous other armed enemy neighbouring ethnic communities internally in Kenya, and across international borders, would leave them defensively weak, vulnerable and exposed to attacks. With respect to vulnerability, security has to be considered within a pastoralist interethnic conflict systems perspective (Grahn, 2005; Bevan, 2007).

The Michuki conflict management initiative of forcefully disarming the Pokot and Turkana communities, no matter how well intentioned, lacked comprehensiveness in terms of the research, policy and practical approaches needed to end the persistence of the conflict. This claim can be substantiated largely by the fact that his authoritative statements and initiatives never succeeded. Any policy of disarmament of pastoralist communities engaged in violent conflict needs to be analysed and formulated, not only in a conflict systems perspective, but also within a national, regional and international framework. Overall, the Kenya State's policy towards ending this conflict, after 50 years of independence, raises a lot of questions concerning firstly, research into what are the underlying causes for the persistence of the conflict, and secondly, the effectiveness of the State's approaches to managing the conflict.

#### **2.4.2 Involvement of Regional Actors**

The conflict management role of the Kenyan State to its citizens should not be analysed in isolation from the international community. Kenya is a member of the United Nations (UN) and two regional organizations within Africa: the African Union (AU), and the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). These organizations have explicit policy orientations for peace, security, development and human rights, just to name a few crucial areas of interest

relevant to this study. Conflict is no longer accepted as a domestic issue of a sovereign State alone; rather, it is seen to have regional and international dimensions. Brown has written extensively on the causes, implications and potency of intra-state inter-ethnic conflict to internationalise conflict (Brown, 2001). According to him, African history, as elsewhere, has shown that the potential for inter-ethnic conflict to spread and become internationalized has drastic results (Brown, 2001). Often, what appears to be a local ethnic problem, if unresolved, can engage other parties and escalate into a wider multi-ethnic conflict and/or inter-state conflict. Mwangiri (2006), on the same theme of internationalisation of ethnic conflict, explores the impact of colonial established international borders dividing the same ethnic groups. Mwangiri maintains that an inter-ethnic conflict in one country can spread across the border by contagion to a segment of the same ethnic group who live in a neighbouring country. Asiwaju (1985), in his book, 'Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations across Africa's International Boundaries, 1884-1984', provides a very informative exposition on some of the practical issues involved. An analysis of inter-ethnic conflict between pastoralist communities in Northern Kenya should have a regional perspective since most of the areas that these communities inhabit straddle international borders of countries in the region, such as Uganda, Somalia, South Sudan and Ethiopia. One of the strategic reasons for the development of IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) consisting of 8 countries in 1996 was to assist member States with peace and security issues bearing in mind their regional conflict management implications. The vision and mission of IGAD emphasises the promotion of peace and stability in the region and the creation of mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of inter-state and intra-state conflicts through dialogue (IGAD, 2010). One of IGAD's major organs with a mandate to address these issues is the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism

(CEWARN). CEWARN operates in Kenya and assists the State through its programs targeted at mitigating and preventing violent conflicts in the sub-region. Since its establishment in 2002, CEWARN has been functioning with a particular focus on cross-border pastoralist and related conflicts. Unlike the Turkana who generally are domiciled within the Kenyan borders, a small section of the Pokot people straddle the border of Uganda and are domiciled there. Any incursion of the Turkana people into Uganda is largely due to the demands associated with their pastoralism lifestyle. Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda have all experienced internal conflict in the last 30 years and are frequently linked to being the source for arms proliferation within the Pokot and Turkana communities (Mkutu, 2008). However, to date the Pokot-Turkana conflict has not been linked to causes of inter-state conflict as the various countries try to come up with co-ordinated regional and national conflict management policies. Concerns about this regional dimension and the persistent conflicts between pastoralists in Northern Kenya underpins the 'Protocol for the Prevention, Combating and Eradication of Cattle Rustling in Eastern Africa' (2008), According to the Protocol "cattle rustling means the stealing or planning, organizing, attempting, aiding or abetting, the stealing of livestock by any person from one country or community to another, where the theft is accompanied by dangerous weapons and violence" (p.3).

When trying to manage conflict and transform it towards positive or negative peace, it is important to give adequate attention to potential regional and international dimensions (Stavenghagen, 1991; Mwangi, 2007). Thus, it is important to acknowledge that rarely, if ever, is an inter-ethnic conflict, including the conflict under study, purely insular to the two ethnic parties involved and unaffected by other parties or issues external to them. It seems logical that the persistent Pokot-Turkana conflict, taking place with the Kenyan State, would need further

appraisal in a conflict systems perspective since the parties have ethnic relations across international and ethnic borders and further have external sources for the accrument of weapons (Mkutu, 2008; Eaton 2008). Conflict systems approach can be traced back to systems theory postulated by Kaplan (1957). As Mwagiru (2007) states, ‘approaching conflict from a systemic perspective essentially means examining it in the conflict system to which it belongs’ (p. 72). The conflict system framework is increasing evident in the policy analysis of the World Bank. According to Kim (2016) President of World Bank, manifest violent conflict, where civilians are more and more the victims, is on the rise in the Horn of Africa since 2012, spilling over borders and morphing into conflict systems. When applied to conflict analysis, it calls for consideration of the diversity of actors, issues and transactions impacting internally and externally to the conflict environment. With this in mind, the persistence of the Pokot-Turkana conflict raises questions about the conflict management policies, structures and approaches being applied from a conflict system perspective.

## **2.5 Culture and Conflict**

The Pokot and Turkana are two culturally distinct communities (University of Pennsylvania, n.d; Ochieng, 1975). Up to the 1970s, the explanations for the causes of conflict in Kenya where the Pokot and Turkana communities are located predominantly focussed on cultural issues such as beliefs, customs and practices (Kratli & Swift, 1999). Culture affects conflict behaviour when it sanctions specific ways to pursue individual or group interests and disapproves of others (Omoka, 1979; Ross, 1993). According to Geertz (1993), the culture of people is an ensemble of texts, which the anthropologist strains to read over the shoulders of those to whom they properly belong. As such, culture can be an elusive concept to pin down but a crucial term to define. One of the more recent definitions (Cohen, 1997), suggest culture to be “human software” - that is,

the beliefs, traditions, values, norms, and shared by a specific group. Culture, thus, entails underlying structures, conventions, and assumptions shared by individual communities; it acts as a grammar for imparting meaning to the reality. Culture and the structures underpinning it form the basis for conflict management decision making processes (Quinney, 2011). Lederach (1995) observes that social conflict emerges on the basis of the meaning and interpretation that those involved attach to actions and events. Conflict is, thus, connected to meaning, meaning to knowledge, and knowledge is rooted in culture (Lederach 1995; Ruto, Adan & Masinde, 2004). Ross (1993) succinctly outlines this connectivity when he states that culture shapes what people consider valuable and worth fighting over, investing particular goods, status, positions or actions with meaning. For example, the issue of circumcision being practiced in one culture and not in another is considered by some authors to have a key bearing on conflict between some ethnic communities (Ruto, Adan & Masinde, 2004). Cultural violence exists when any structural elements of culture, such as cultural rituals and religion, are used to legitimize violence (Lim, Metzler & Yaneer, 2007; Galtung, 1990; Galtung, 1971); structures underpin rituals and religion in culture.

Cultural anthropologists have traditionally focussed on internal factors emanating from culture as the basis for explaining physical violence between ethnic groups (Bollig, 2003; Muhreza, 2005). The early ethnographers did not consider activities entailing violence, such as cattle raiding, to be determined by issues of personal gain or conquest; pre-colonial African society was deemed to be socialist by nature (Eaton, 2008). Scholars such as Gluckman (1963) Dyson-Hudson (1966) Lamphear (1976) and Turton (1979) argue that cattle-raiding was primarily about the preservation of the internal identity of each ethnic group; violence was seen as characteristic of culture. In the past, communities determined the level of cattle raiding and

violence to be metted on the target community (Bollig, 2003; Markakis, 1993; Ruto, Aden & Masinde, 2004). These scholars (including Simonse and Kurimoto, 1998) argue that the underlying cause of persistent conflict between the Pokot and Turkana is primarily located in the cultural domain of each group. Simonse and Kurimoto (1998) consider the view that warfare or violent relations resulting from antagonism in some cultures is an abnormal and vicious situation that needs to be extinguished. They appraise the constructive dimensions of violence, which entail replenishment of the basic human needs of the ethnic group but also consider the cultural constraints to be strong enough to avert a free for all escalation of warfare. Lamphear (1994) explains certain forms of direct violence between ethnic groups as a ‘chivalrous tournament’ rather than as a mode of warfare. However, as suggested by Eaton (2008), there is a need for these qualitative assertions to be researched and quantified. Furthermore, this analysis ascribes external factors, such as the commercialization of cattle raiding and changes in the types and proliferation of arms, meagre significance in causing the conflict. However, Baxter (1979) and Sato (1998), operating within parameters of cultural legitimization of violence against the ethnic ‘other’, ascribe much more weight to commercialization of cattle raiding and proliferation of arms causing conflict. Other related explanations, drawing on understandings of political-economy (Giblin, 1987) identify government legislation, corrupt State security functionaries, and well-armed mercenary ethnic warriors to be significant contributing causes of interethnic conflict between pastoralist communities, including that of the Pokot and Turkana (Anderson, 1986; Bollig, 1994; Goldsmith, 1997; Kratli & Swift, 1999). In this regard, the approaches of the anthropologist and ethnographers are open to accusations of being too synchronic and static in their analysis. They underestimate evolving transformations within cultures as a result of cross cultural interaction – either by choice or inevitability – facilitated by the impacts of modernity

and globalisation. External factors impacting on cultural behaviour and conflict dynamics have begun to receive much more attention. More liberal-capitalistic explanations of present day inter-ethnic violence between the Pokot and Turkana communities are being suggested.

Writing on the impact of neo liberal market economics on conflict among East African agro-pastoral people, Fleisher (2000) aptly addresses this transformation by arguing that cattle raiding between pastoralist communities has changed from its pre-colonial roles of demonstrating the mettle of new warriors and enlarging the community cattle herd. He argues that conflict has transformed into illicit, often-times quite violent, cash market-oriented enterprises reacting to pressures emerging from capitalist penetration and the policies of post-colonial States (Fleisher, 2000). He also raises the alarm bells about the negative effects of commercialization of cattle. It would be difficult to refute the claim that the impacts of ethnic exposure to globalisation and associated capitalistic ideology are not only transforming the cultures of the Pokot and the Turkana but also the dynamics of the conflict. As far back as 1910, the British Colonial Administration were being confronted with arms smuggling, banditry by criminal gangs and illicit trading, including ivory, in Kenya (Public Record Office, 1911). Mirzeler & Young (2000) have studied the issue of transformation of cultural institutions and customs among communities engaged in inter-ethnic conflict. They maintain that the proliferation of small arms has caused profound changes to the traditional customary normative order, the traditional intra-ethnic authority, and the level of violent behaviour previously allowed between ethnic groups. Sandra Gray points out an additional external factor by claiming that Karamojong warriors (ethnic group in Uganda bordering the Pokot and Turkana) were being manipulated to get involved in civil wars within Uganda and Sudan (Gray, Sundal, Wiebush, Little, Leslie & Ivy, 2003). These developments also, according to her, are impinging negatively

on the bio-behavioural adaptability of other adjacent ethnic groups. Thus, while acknowledging that these ongoing transformations do impact on cultures one can hardly ascribe to them the significance of being underlying causes of conflict. Moreover, regardless of one's theoretical standpoint, for or against internal and external cultural factors explaining conflict, there still remains the need to empirically test and quantify the validity of such qualitative assertions. The trap of falling into an 'either-or syndrome' should be avoided. Neither should one be lured into an idealized view of a traditional African ethnic socialist society totally controlled by cultural structures of authority and norms. Hence, even from a cultural perspective, the issues causing conflict appear to be multi-causal and enmeshed over a long period of time (Barber, 1968). It is not a case of 'either-or', or that it was totally one set of reasons then, and another now. It is undeniable that instruments of violence and the components of social-political-economy are continually changing.

Overall, the existing literature on the Pokot and Turkana interethnic conflict, from a cultural perspective, does not address the issue of State responsibility to identify and transform underlying structures of culture that generate and legitimise violent conflict. The State has the responsibility to address and counter any form of violence emanating from culture that is contrary to the constitutional requirements for the provision of peace and human security. For violence to be culturally legitimized, there is the need to examine the structures underpinning culture. Cultural expressions, whether in the form of beliefs, customs and physical violence, do not exist in a vacuum independent of structures that legitimise their execution. Neither should such cultures - which exist within the State - and their violent expressions, have monopoly over the State constitution and its structural manifestations. If they do, then there are issues of structural violence to be addressed internally within the culture and secondly, the relationship

between the culture and State structures. All ethnic groups and their cultural expressions have an environmental context. The linkage between peaceful co-existence of ethnic groups and environmental sustainability in causing or preventing conflict is receiving ever greater attention. According to Gleditsch (2007) where ethnic groups cooperate, the prospects of negotiated and cooperative solutions to environmental problems are good. Where they do not, environmental factors will add to the problems created by the cultural factors. With this perspective in mind, this chapter pays particular attention to literature dealing with environmental resources and conflict as it pertains to the conflict under study.

## **2.6 Environmental Resources and Conflict**

The environmental resource connectivity to conflict and peace is widely accepted to be of key relevance in the field of conflict theory and management today. This connection was evident in the awarding of the 2004 Nobel Peace Prize to Wangari Maathai. It was the first time that an environmentalist received the award and is widely seen in the context of how environmental disruption and resource scarcity are linked to armed conflict (Gleditsch, 2007; Urdal, 2004). Environmental resource scarcity is a constant challenge to people endeavouring to satisfy basic human needs, whether they be material and/or ontological as exhorted by Abraham Maslow, John Burton and others (Rothman, 1997). Certain core resources are essential for the entity of life to survive in human beings. Conflict in the Pokot-Turkana context, cannot be divorced from issues of people struggling to meet their basic needs and actualize their potential. The Pokot-Turkana conflict behavioural dynamics play out in a general environment that has been described by Charles Millar (1971) as one of the harshest on earth. He depicts it as:

A horizon less frying pan of desolation; a sun-dried moonscape of cracked earth harder than iron, grotesque lava heaps rising to the height of ten story buildings, vast plains of

dehydrated thorn scrub, sightless deserts and scorched black mountains. Temperatures often climb to 120 degrees in the shade; the country may have been best described by the late journalist Negley Farson when he called it, ‘as close as you can get to hell on earth’ (p .471).

There is an inseparable link between environmental resources and human security. In peace and development initiatives today, the issue of security is focusing much more on the individual and human rights within the State rather than on the State security *per se*. According to Gleditsch (2007), environmental security is the freedom from environmental destruction and resource scarcity. Human security was broadly defined by the (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression” and also protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life (UNDP, 1994). Gleditsch (2007) considers human security to have four critical aspects: political security, defined as the freedom from dictatorship and other arbitrary governments; tracking political security would involve looking at patterns of democratic governance and respect for human rights. The second aspect is economic and social security, defined as the freedom from poverty and want. The third aspect is cultural security, defined as freedom from ethnic and religious dominance. The fourth aspect is environmental security, defined as the freedom from environmental destruction and resource scarcity. However, the State has prime responsibility for the formulation of policy and structured conflict management strategies to ensure human security for all its citizens equally.

Homer-Dixon and the Toronto Group have been spearheading the connection between environmental insecurity and armed conflict under various banners, such as, the “green war” or “environmental scarcity” arguments (Homer-Dixon, 1991; Homer-Dixon, 1994; Percival &

Homer-Dixon, 1998). The core of this theoretical perspective is that declining environmental resources and growth in population size leading to unmet human needs is a fundamental cause of conflict around the world. They further emphasize resource scarcity in conjunction with environmental degradation as key conflict causal issues in developing countries. They argue that under certain conditions, the scarcity of renewable resources, such as, cropland, forests and water, generate consequential social effects, such as, poverty, migration and weak institutions. These social effects, in turn, produce tensions and conflicts. The Toronto school as presented in (Gleditsch, 2007) highlights that:

Environmental factors play an important role in generating and exacerbating armed conflicts (and) distinguishes among three forms of resource scarcity as follows; demand induced scarcity, which results from population growth, supply induced scarcity, which results from depletion or degradation of a resource and structural scarcity, which refers to the distribution of the resource (p.179).

In the same vein, Kaplan (1994) gives pertinent significance to the issue of environmental degradation as a future cause of anarchy characterised by lawlessness and violent conflict. The recent attention to the effects of global warming and climate change tend to support this perception of conflict analysis (Gleditsch, 2007). However, different schools of thought give varying emphasis to either the environmental resources perspective or the population viewpoint or the interaction of both perspectives in a conflict. There is vast array of scholars who have proffered environmental explanations for the existence of conflict between pastoralist ethnic groups in Kenya (Kratli & Swift, 1999; Eaton, 2008). The literature of NGOs is heavily laden with environmental perspectives of the Pokot and Turkana, even to an ad nauseum extent (Eaton, 2008). Since pre-colonial times, the issue of scarce resources in Kenya is claimed by many

writers to be a constant threat to human security (Broch-Due, 1990) even though the population of the ethnic groups residing there is less, compared to other areas of Kenya.

The relationship between population growth and resources has its own theoretical conflict polemic history dating back to the time of Malthus at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Malthus believed that while the environmental factor of population growth expands exponentially, the environment resource production can only grow in a linear dimension (Kaplan, 1994). More recently Tobias (1994) has given new impetus to this line of argument but from a broader framework of analysis. He argues:

The current size of the human population has wreaked unprecedented damage on the biosphere, and is going to accelerate that damage. Millions of plant and animal species have been driven to extinction. A billion people are hungry, morning, noon and night. The ozone layer is thinning, with consequences that are lethal for every living organism. The air, water, and soil across the planet have been fouled. The forests in many countries are gone or nearly gone. And the mammary glands of every mother on Earth are now infiltrated with DDT and other harmful chemicals (p. 426).

However, the Cornucopian school of thought and the evidence of history have challenged neo-Malthusians; the former believe in the ingenuity of mankind to manipulate the environment to meet the demands of population increase and to counter environmental degradation factors before violent conflict emerges (Gleditsch, 2007). This school of thought should attain greater importance if global warming can be curbed, restoring stability thereby counter-acting the unfolding climatic environmental turbulence. Scholars, such as Urdal (1998), Tir and Diehl (1998), reject the link between population growth and conflict. The pressure of population growth on resources leading to conflict has also been questioned and subjected to research in

Northern Kenya close to the conflict environment. Dietz, Adano & Witsenburg (2005) conducted research on violent deaths in the Marsabit region (another inter-ethnic conflict environment area bordering the Pokot-Turkana conflict to the north east) from the 1930s onwards. They found that even though the population had increased 18 fold between 1959 and 1999, cattle raiding and associated violence had showed no appreciable increase. Even with the advent of commercialized cattle rustling and the use of more sophisticated modern weaponry, there are diverse claims about the levels of raiding and its associated violence in the North Rift. The findings of Gufa Oba (1992) suggest that Turkana casualties during raiding have shown no major change in terms of mortality between 1929 and 1989. His research data also indicates similar results regarding the scale of theft during raiding. These findings certainly challenge the perspective of Mkutu (2007) and others who maintain that violent conflict has escalated and is connected to modern arms proliferation.

Compared to conflicts in other countries such as Sierra Leone and D.R Congo associated with mineral resources, (Collier, 2007) the Pokot-Turkana conflict has been linked to natural resources such as water and pasture. However, in 2010 oil was discovered near Lokichar in the heart of Turkana-land, north-east of the Pokot-Turkana conflict environment. The quantity and quality of oil discovered in the area is still unclear and it is uncertain if it will be a future factor in the persistence of the conflict. In this regard, one conversely needs to take into account the perspective that argues that greed for environmental resources is the cause of conflict rather than scarcity. The proponents of this viewpoint such, as (Fairhead, 2000; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Stewart & Brown, 2007) give ample valid examples, predominantly related to the abundance of mineral resources in many African countries. While they do not mention the case of North Rift, their works are still applicable to uncovering the conflict causal factors between the relevant

ethnic communities. Of course there is merit in the position that humankind has the capacity to have and activate characteristics of grievance and greed concurrently in the pursuit of resources.

Perhaps, a key issue in this debate on the relationship of environment to conflict is to clarify the distinction of a factor being an independent or an intermediary variable impacting on conflict. In many cases, the issue of environmental insecurity and degradation, can be seen as an intervening variable between poverty and poor governance on the one hand and armed conflict on the other (Gleditsch, 2007). As such, environmental conflicts, in relation to natural resources, frequently manifest themselves in the political, economic, ethnic, social and religious spheres. In his reflection on environmental conditions and conflicts, Schwartz argues that the nexus between the environment and conflict is not always straightforward. More often, environmental factors are enmeshed in a complex web of cultural, economic and political factors that function together to engender conflict (Schwartz, Daniel & Singh, 1999). This viewpoint is also validated by Levy (2007). Considering the harsh environmental context of the Pokot-Turkana conflict, it would be a grave mistake to disregard the relevance of environmental theories of conflict. Dyson-Hudson (1966) and Markakis (1995) strongly support this viewpoint with reference to other pastoral groups bordering the Pokot-Turkana conflict environment. They also highlight the role that local political decisions centred on coping with ecological pressures have on conflict activity. The discussion on whether environmental explanations of conflict can be considered as underlying causes to conflict is subject to much critique. The direct connection between the environmental resource variable as a cause of the conflict variable has been subject to increasing critique. McCabe (2004), an eminent advocate of environmental scarcity theory, is open to the fact that political events and decisions often play an important role in the connection between scarcity and violence. McCabe (2004) maintains that:

Some authors argue that conflict is an inevitable outcome of people living in non-equilibrium ecosystems. The argument is underpinned by the need to exploit resources outside the local ecosystem, and indeed conflict and violence characterize many of the relationships among pastoral groups in northern Kenya, north-eastern Uganda, southern Sudan and southern Ethiopia. However, access to external resources can be negotiated or fought over. Which path is chosen depends on far more than environmental conditions, and it can only be understood as part of broader political and economic relationships on the regional, State and international levels (p. 238).

McCabe emphasizes that the conflict management of usage and access to environmental resources are key components determining their impact on conflict causation. Thus, when analysing the relationship of resource scarcity to conflict in the environs of the Pokot and Turkana, broader political and economic structural factors influencing conflict management and relationships at the inter-ethnic and State levels have to be kept in focus.

Rotberg (2007) claims that the existence of physical and structural violence within a State or between ethnic communities always involves human agency. Few would disagree with this view, as indeed few would argue with the position that peace and development initiatives also depend on human agency. Eaton (2008) also engages this line of reasoning by introducing issues of human agency from the moral and ethical decision making perspective to explain causes of conflict between ethnic communities (Eaton, 2008). When writing about inter-ethnic conflict in the North Rift, particularly Turkana-land and its adjacent parts in the 1980s, when it experienced some of the worst famine conditions of the last century – drought and epizootics – he maintains that despite the stresses on the environment, the intervention with negotiation strategies on usage and access to water and pasture limited the escalation of violent conflict.

Eaton (2008) argues that instead of viewing conflict such as raids and counter raids as a sign of underlying problems alone:

It may be worthwhile to examine the issue of revenge itself. In the aftermath of any theft or raid, decisions must be made by the victims and their friends as to what course of action to take next. These rational decisions provide a more fruitful explanation for cattle raiding in the region, and may offer peace workers a useful new approach (p. 93).

One would be hard pressed to disregard the perspectives of Rotberg (2007) and Eaton (2008) about human agency and moral perspective as having some relevance in explaining incidents of conflict in general and between the Pokot-Turkana, in particular. However, Eaton's perspective seems to underestimate the fruitful role of substantive underlying factors explaining conflict, which also necessitate the involvement of rational human agency decision making. Few would argue against the position that virtuous management of environmental resources are vital for people's livelihoods and the realization of their potential. However, this does not necessarily mean that environmental resources *per se* are the underlying causes of conflict. The management of environmental resources by human agency depends on structures, including those underpinning the promotion of peace and the prevention of conflict. It is also important to reiterate the fact that it is the primary responsibility of the State to have appropriate policies and structural instrumentalities to manage the environmental resources within its territory. This entails having effective State repressive and ideological apparatuses to counter and transform the causes of conflict, which have causal linkages to the environment resources. The quality and operationalization of such structural instrumentalities largely determine the degree to which environmental resources can or will cause conflict. In light of the resource scarce terrain of the Pokot-Turkana conflict environment, it seems imperative that any meaningful research on the

persistence of the conflict between the two communities should not ignore the possible connectedness between environmental resource factors and the structures underpinning their utilization and management. The Catholic Church's focus on issues of the environment, human development and peace are an integral part of the Church's teaching on social justice (Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, 2005; Francis, 2015). The intervention by human agency in terms of activities, ethics, and morality in these spheres is constantly under scrutiny in the Church's teachings. The Church has been working among the Pokot and Turkana communities for over fifty years and continues to do so (Good, 2007; Mwaniki, 2015; Pierli, 2015). Apart from the State, it is generally regarded as the most pervasive humanitarian agent of peace and social development in their conflict environment (Good, 2007; Dolan, 2007; Mwangi & Vos, 1985; Mkutu, 2008; Paviit, 1997). Recognising this substantive presence, the rationale for the Catholic Church's role and conflict management activities in the Pokot-Turkana conflict environment needs to be appraised.

## **2.7 The Catholic Church and Conflict Management**

Religion is increasingly being considered an important dimension of conflict management, development processes, statecraft, the conduct of diplomacy and national security throughout the world (Johnson & Sampson, 1995; Devine, 2011; Tomalin, 2013; Mandaville & Silvestri, 2015). The overall aspiration is to better understand where religion is, or is not, relevant to various issues and topics in conflict management. The African continent has a complex mix of religious faiths and traditions dating back to time immemorial, and more recent additions such as Christianity, Hinduism and Islam, among others. About thirty years ago Lamb (1985) wrote, "Today...the Christian Church is probably the most powerful institution in sub-Saharan Africa" (p.141). In this vein, the Catholic Church is arguably the most pre-eminent among faith based

organizations in terms of engaging in activities that are correlates of peace, namely conflict management, social progress projects and reconciliation processes (Gifford, 2009; Schreiter et al., 2011). The headquarters of the Catholic Church worldwide is at the Vatican City. The Vatican City is also a sovereign State in its own right. The Pope, as leader of the Catholic Church, has overall responsibility for its structures of governance. Integral to the mission of the Church in Africa is the sacredness of human life, promotion of peace and justice, integrity of creation, human rights, development, and ethical character formation of human agency (Flannery, 2000; Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace [PCJP], 2005; Synod for Africa, 2009; Francis, 2015). It is on this basis that the Church is profoundly concerned with all forms of violence, including interethnic, and its negative repercussions. Peace making is integral to the Catholic Church's missionary existence in the world from its very beginning (Ford, 1984; Bosch, 2006).

It is reasonable to posit as an empirical generalization that conflict, be it short-lived or persistent, generates realities characterized by distrust, fear, misery and uncertainty for those who are directly or indirectly affected by it. In terms of historical function, there is no difference between the violent conflict behaviour of short lived conflict and the violent conflict behaviour of persistent and protracted conflict. Similarly, there is no difference between acts of violence by the strong party against the weak party and acts of violence by the weak party against the strong party in a conflict state of affairs. All forms of interethnic violence, regardless of whether it is short lived or persistent, or it is violence by the strong against the weak or vice-versa, it has one common denominator; it is inhuman in so far as it contravenes human rights prescriptions (Mercuse, 1976). The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church (2005) provides a very comprehensive compilation of the Catholic Church's teaching and aspirations concerning

conflict, peace, poverty, development, justice, minorities and environmental sustainability. It invites all people of goodwill to be effective agents of peace and development, seeing the reasons and value of dialogue and cooperation in serving the common good. While according priority to the goal of reconciliation in its conflict management initiatives, the Catholic Church proclaims an inseparability of peace, justice and reconciliation. These aspects are constitutive dimensions of the understanding and practice of the mission of the Catholic Church in Africa (Magesa, 2012). The ideals of Catholic Church social teaching are in accord with analytical aspects of conflict theory which address issues of structural violence, conflict management, conflict settlement, conflict resolution, conflict transformation and reconciliation (Lederach, 1995; Burton, 1997; Appleby, 2010).

In this teaching, there is a general consensus that if you want peace, prepare for development, echoing the phrase of Pope Paul VI in 1967 that development is the new name for peace (as cited in Orobator, 2008). In the same vein, Pope John Paul II (2000) asserted that, failure awaits every plan, which would separate two indivisible and interdependent rights: the right to peace and the right to an integral development born of solidarity. The Catechism of the Catholic Church (2001) declares that injustice, excessive economic or social inequalities, envy, distrust, and pride raging among people and nations constantly threaten peace and cause wars. Everything done to overcome these disorders contributes to building up peace and avoiding war.

The collaborative role of the Catholic Church in supporting States around the world with its social ministry is also addressed in numerous Church documents. Flannery (2000) affirms that as far back as 1971, the Catholic Church's proposition stated:

Let recognition be given to the fact that international order is rooted in the inalienable rights and dignity of the human being. Let the United Nations Declaration of Human

Rights be ratified by all Governments who have not adhered to it, and let it be fully observed by all. Let the United Nations – which because of its unique purpose should promote participation by all nations – and international organizations be supported insofar as they are the beginning of a system capable of restraining the armaments race, discouraging trade in weapons, securing disarmament and settling conflict by peaceful methods of legal action, arbitration and international police action. It is absolutely necessary that international conflict should not be settled by war, but that other methods better befitting human nature should be found. Let a strategy of non-violence be fostered also, and let conscientious objection be recognised and regulated by law in each nation (pp. 707-708).

While addressing the Diplomatic corps on the issue of conflict, Pope Benedict proclaimed that bloodshed does not cry out for revenge but begs for respect for life and peace (Benedict XVI, 2006). In light of the vision, mission and values of the Catholic Church, and the history of so much conflict at the inter-state and intra-state level in Africa, the 2009 Synod for Africa once again re-examined the Catholic Church's role as an agent of peace and a conflict management actor (Synod of Africa, 2009). While declaring "Peace is a universal good", the Synod proclaimed that we should dedicate all of our energies to its service. It called for the immediate setting up of 'An African Peace and Solidarity Initiative' to intervene in an act of solidarity and assist the local Catholic Church in conflict resolution and peace-building throughout the continent with its wise counsel on justice, peace and reconciliation. The Synod also proposed the setting up of Diocesan, National and Regional Peace-Building Councils, well-resourced with personnel and material to train the clergy and laity in the practice of peace-building, dialogue and mediation. In addition monitoring desks were to be established for the prevention and resolution

of conflicts. Programmes of formation and education including peace studies and conflict resolution were to be developed at primary, secondary, college, seminary and university levels to impart a real culture of peace. There were also proposals for a permanent organization for inter-ethnic dialogue to be established for the sake of a lasting peace, Prayers for peace and elections were to permeate all these activities. Pope Benedict XVI (2011), in his Post-Synodal Exhortation *Africae Munus*, makes clear the particular role of the Catholic Church in the service of Reconciliation, Justice and Peace throughout Africa.

The Catholic Church combines the role of a Track I and Track II conflict management actor depending on circumstances (Rocca, 2014). The peace and development roles of the Catholic Church in another country are commonly identified with Track II conflict management aiming to develop strategies that influence public opinion, and organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve conflict (Montville, 1991). The almost ubiquitous presence of the Catholic Church around the world, with its Track I and II characteristics is a reality. Referring to this Catholic Church's presence, potential, and activities, Appleby (2010) offers the following reflection:

One of the greatest advantages Catholics possess in thinking strategically about transforming conflict and building peace is the international and transnational character of the Church. If not a ubiquitous presence, exactly, Roman Catholicism as a worldwide institution and series of network has the capacity to bolster the peacebuilding presence and efficacy of the Church at the local, national, and regional levels, including in the contexts where the Church might otherwise be limited by population, resources, and negligible cultural, religious, or political influence (p. 7).

Such Track I and II approaches are understood to enhance the conflict management policies and activities of States where the Church ministers. While acknowledging the Catholic Church's conflict management roles and interventions, the Church is mindful of its own historical shortcomings, regarding its practice of justice. The Catholic Church, as an institution and participant, has become increasingly aware of the need for self-evaluation. Even as the Catholic Church is bound to give witness in word and deed, she recognizes that those who propagate the above values must also practice what they preach; the Church recognizes that anyone who ventures to speak to people about justice must first be just in the eyes of the people (Flannery, 2000). The Catholic Church is thus not averse to the danger of ineffectiveness emerging from a divergence between its ethical proclamations and its conflict management activities. The disagreements within the Church on how to manage issues of structural violence in society and the connectedness to protracted manifest conflict, is a continuous problem (Lederach, 2010). These divisions are frequently exposed in debates on the virtues of liberation theology (Berryman, 2009), a theology that critiques structural injustices and marginalization with particular concern for the poor and oppressed. The conflict management methodology of the Catholic Church in managing the Pokot and Turkana cannot claim success in so far as the conflict is persistent. This is not to say that it is ultimately responsible for managing it or that it has not contributed significantly to its management. The Church's role in Africa in, facilitation of dialogue, overcoming apartheid, supporting truth and reconciliation commissions, recognising the benefits of liberation theology, advocating democracy, supporting peace initiatives and empowering healing has been acknowledged far and wide (Carnegie Commission, 1997; Aall, 2007; Mburu, 2007; Appleby, 2010). Interventions by the Catholic Church to help prevent and manage conflicts, addressing situations of physical and structural violence, in most African

countries, are well documented (Aall, 2007; Comerford, 2005; Meredith, 2005). As Aall (2007) points out, the Catholic Church has taken on activities that range from preventing conflict to post conflict reconciliation and are active at all phases of the conflict cycle. This conflict management vision and role is evidenced in an abundance of Catholic Church teachings (Orobator, 2008) and as recent as 2009, in proposition 21 at the Synod of Africa, 2009. Critical to this vision and role is the task of building a society characterized by reconciliation justice and peace (Benedict XVI, 2011). The awakening of the individual and social conscience concerning the defence of human rights and good governance has been integral to this process (Mudida, 2009). A large part of the Catholic Church's teaching and activism is concerned with conflict mitigation, development, and human security (Korros, 2014).

In each African country, the Catholic Church, as a Track I and II conflict management actor, utilises its Catholic Justice and Peace Commissions as the main avenue to monitor and invigorate programs on conflict management, civic peace, justice, educational and medical development, and the integrity of creations (Dolan, 2006; CJPC, 2013). The Catholic Church's social teaching and activism in Kenya is oriented to the same vision and mission (Good, 2007; CJPC, 1988; CJPC, 2005; CJPC, 2013; Benedict XVI, 2011; Mwaniki, 2015; Francis, 2015). Through its development programs and justice and peace commissions in each diocese, the reach of the Catholic Church is continually present in the remotest places and engaging with ethnic communities experiencing issues of conflict (Dolan, 2006; CJPC, 2013). Issues of peace and development, in conjunction with concern for the integrity of creation, and the ethical and moral formation of human agency are fundamental to the Catholic Church's mission and service activity within the Pokot and Turkana communities (Good, 2007; Mwaniki, 2015; SCCRR, 2015). The Catholic Church is identified as a major institution providing a large number of the

social, medical and educational institutions oriented to the human security of the Pokot and Turkana communities, who remain traditional in religious affiliation, (Ministry of Planning and National Development, 1985; Pavit, 1997; Mkutu, 2008). With regards to ethnic religious affiliation, records from 1972 reveal the Turkana (96%), and the Pokot (90%) still practiced traditional African Religion (Kibichio, 1990).

The Catholic Church and affiliated NGOs began to domicile themselves, with the State's approval, in the dangerous Pokot-Turkana conflict environment from the 1960s onwards. While some christian missionary and development work had commenced among the Pokot from the 1930 onwards (Ndegwah, 2007), nothing substantial had been done among the Turkana until after Kenyan independence, especially with the arrival of the Catholic Church and African Inland Church (Daystar Communications, 1982). Good (2007) who has worked in the Pokot-Turkana conflict environment for almost 30 years provides a wide ranging and humane account of the various development and peace initiatives rendered in the region by the Catholic Church and associated NGOs. Ultimately all peace and development projects of the Catholic Church in any country are carried out in conjunction with State authorization and regulations. As such, collaboration and co-operation is critical in this process. Presently, the role of the Catholic Church among the Pokot and Turkana peoples, in general, entails the provision of medical and education services intermingled with some peace activities that are expansive in range and substance (Diocese of Lodwar Pastoral Plan 2007-2012, 2007; Mwaniki, 2015). The activities, according to Good (2007), Mwaniki (2015), Pierli (2015) and the Catholic Dioceses of Lodwar and Kitale (CJPC, 2015), include: preaching, facilitation of peace meetings, fostering tolerance, assisting the displaced, supporting schools and students, feeding programmes, assisting the injured, building educational and health facilities, among other activities. Understandably, the

provision of such services by the Church is severely hindered by the terrain of the violent conflict, especially at the front line. Due to its presence, the Catholic Church collaborates with traditional ethnic conflict management processes (Korros, 2014). Frequently, Catholic Church leadership is a key bridge between such processes and other approaches emerging from the State and NGOs, through the operations of its Justice and Peace Commissions, (Diocese of Lodwar Pastoral Plan 2007-2012, 2007). Mburu (2007) advocates that all the parties in conflict in the North Rift should reinforce the work of Christian missionaries in the area and learn workable strategies from them because, unlike the State, they often succeed to bring traditional pastoral enemies under one roof.

The Catholic Church recognises the indispensable need to address issues of behavioural and structural violence in the Pokot Turkana conflict environment. In doing so, it engages aspects of conflict management theory in its activities oriented to helping people actualize their potential. This entails attending to issues of basic human needs, conflict transformation at the individual, relational, institutional and cultural levels leading to reconciliation built around peace, truth, justice and mercy (Njue, 2010; Memorandum of Understanding, SCCRR & AMECEA, 2015). The extent of effectiveness of the Catholic Church's initiatives is yet to be conclusively ascertained through research. The persistence of the conflict under study also raises questions about the Catholic Church's capacity in terms of conflict management resources and technical capacity to effectively manage the conflict over the past 50 years.

The interventions of the Catholic Church to manage the persistent conflict are most evident in its justice and peace commissions, and social development activities regulated from respective headquarters in the two dioceses of Kitale and Lodwar (CJPC, 2013). In fact, both dimensions (justice and peace commissions and social development) are intricately

interconnected. Throughout the 1990s, the Catholic Church became more active through its own Justice and Peace Commission's, monitoring political, development and human rights issues affecting the two communities. They opened a Justice and Peace office in Lodwar among the Turkana in 1993, and in West Pokot in 1999 (Dolan, 2007) despite strong opposition from the local chief, a government appointee. The Catholic Church considers the conflict management policies/structures of the State to be too weak to deal with the conflict, or provide an alternative way of life to those involved (Diocese of Lodwar Pastoral Plan, 2007). According to Catholic Church personnel, an atmosphere of harassment, intimidation and denial of basic human rights still characterized pastoralist areas until the end of the KANU era in 2002 (Dolan, 2006). Furthermore, it is claimed that the government politicians considered their districts personal fiefdoms and obstructed development projects such as the construction of schools, harassing the young local educated elites, while all "the time they were aided by a repressive, corrupt provincial administration who were determined to keep these areas designated as Kanu Zones" (Dolan, 2006, p.47).

Despite the ideals and the interventions of the Catholic Church in the Pokot-Turkana conflict environment, the structures advocated by the Synod on Africa are yet to be realized. These structural deficiencies within the church identified above and others accentuated by other authors, (Assefa & Wachira 1996; Mwagiru, 2006; Parise, 2015), may be contributing to the persistence of the conflict. While reinforcing suitable and adequate structures, the Church is considered lacking of a rigorous conflict analysis theoretical basis to its conflict management activities (Mwagiru, 2006). In addition to the lack of theory Mwagiru emphasizes, there is a need for greater technical mastery of the science of conflict management. Conflict management cannot be reduced to an art or a hobby confined to the field of spirituality. The lack of technical

knowledge can be further compounded by a lack of appreciation for the history of a conflict, according to Mwangi (2006). The resilience of conflict memory is never to be underestimated. Ethnic conflicts continue to fester because of this type of memory. The Catholic Church needs to internally address all these criticisms and develop its own cohesive conflict management orientations, inclusive of a vision for a post conflict society, where enduring peace can prevail. These challenges seem particularly relevant to the Catholic Church working in the conflict environment of the Pokot and Turkana. According to Parise (2015) human advancement among pastoralist communities entails addressing issues of community organization and action for structural change. In order to do this Parise, maintains that there is a need for a multiplicity of competencies among church personnel working with pastoralists.

Indeed Catholic missionaries who have worked for many years in the conflict environment addressing issues of justice and peace have voiced similar caveats to the Catholic Church. In tackling issues of Justice and Peace, Dolan (2006) warns of the danger of the Church's Justice and Peace Commissions being fringe players with low calibre staff, lacking gravitas, offering no alternative ideological challenges or a critique to State strategies of conflict management. Overall, the fact that the conflict continues to persist between the Pokot and Turkana would seem, in itself, a challenge to the Catholic Church structure, particularly the Justice and Peace Commissions, to examine its conflict management capacity concerning theoretical competency, technical mastery, appreciation of history and greater rationalisation of its strategic activities. The efficacy of the peacebuilding structures and activities of the Catholic Church in the conflict under study has not been adequately researched. Exploring to what extent levels of ambivalence by the Pokot and Turkana towards Catholic Church ethical and development programs affects these initiatives may reveal important insights on why the conflict

persists and what strategic changes are needed in the Catholic Church's methodology. Perhaps, this study will expose whether, and how, ineffective Catholic Church ethical and development programs have inadvertently contributed to the protraction of the conflict.

## **2.8 Conclusion**

Beginning with conceptual understandings of conflict and its management, this chapter has focussed on the dominant schools of thought, namely ethnicity, the State, culture, environment resources, so far proffered to explain the persistence of the Pokot-Turkana conflict. The strengths and weaknesses of these perspectives have been emphasised and gaps in the literature pointed out. It is obvious from this review that there is a gaping absence of a structural violence perspective being applied to rigorously research the causes and reasons for the persistence of the conflict. Regardless of the issues connected to the causes of a conflict, including those with ethnic, cultural and environmental dimensions, the issue of structures ultimately needs to be addressed in both understanding the underlying causes and transformation of the situation to peace. This is one of the major knowledge gaps emerging from the literature review of the Pokot-Turkana conflict. Could this gap be indicating the need to apply a structural violence perspective as to why conflict management by the State has failed to transform, settle and resolve the conflict? Likewise, in respect to the Catholic Church's essence, mission mandate and activities questions arise about its effectiveness in managing the underlying structural causes of the conflict. The impact of the Catholic Church operating as a Track II conflict management actor among the Pokot and Turkana has received meagre research. This review reveals that there is a gap in analysing the effectiveness of the approaches and activities of two key conflict management actors in the conflict under study, namely the State as a Track I actor, and the Catholic Church as a Track II actor, evidenced in its activities. To what extent they may have

deliberately, inadvertently or not at all contributed to the persistence of the conflict needs to be researched.

The chapter has also brought forth the need to give attention to the focus, quality and type of research done in the conflict environment to date. Firstly, past analysis has predominantly emerged from the ethno-cultural and environmentalist schools of thought. The research inputs from political science or conflict management disciplines to the Pokot-Turkana conflict have been very sparse. Furthermore, it is critical for researchers from different disciplines to quantify their assertions. Secondly, there is a need for a more rigorous research among the populations of the conflict environment that entails a mutual reinforcing combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis. An applied rigorous systematic quantitative research methodology, as distinct from qualitative and episodic analysis, is practically absent in the literature on the Pokot-Turkana conflict. In order to effectively transform the Pokot-Turkana conflict towards lasting positive peace where all sides are mutually interested in reinforcing the development, wellbeing and harmony of each other, it is essential to pay attention to the possible underlying structural causes of manifest conflict. The intellectual tradition on the substance and appraisal of structural conflict provides useful observations to assist in researching the Pokot-Turkana conflict from a structural violence perspective. The Pokot and Turkana people have had minimal opportunities, if any, for peace and development to become entrenched in their lives and interrelationships. This reality stands in stark contrast with other Kenyan ethnic communities who continue to experience peace and sustained development. While acknowledging value in existing perspectives addressing the causes of the conflict, the literature review has also exposed that the structures necessary to tend to their explanations have been found wanting since pre-colonial times. Overall, the research literature available concerning issues of ethnicity and conflict,

culture and conflict, the environment and conflict, is overwhelmingly of a qualitative nature. While conflict management literature in general is laden with linkages of conflict to State structures, for example to issues of constitutions and governance, there remains an abysmal lack of research on this linkage being applied to explain the persistence of the conflict under study. This is not to say that authors have not suggested that there is a linkage between State ineffectiveness and the persistence of the conflict. More over the linkage is frequently proffered in media reports alleging that the conflict is associated with institutional corruption, porous borders, illegal weapons and policing/military escapades to manage the physical violence. However such assertions are not a substantive enough basis to inform policy making that can lead to effective conflict management approaches and activities. Therefore, a rigorous analysis of the structural underpinnings of the conflict is indispensable in order to end its persistence and generate an enduring peaceful relationship between the two communities.

## **CHAPTER THREE: SPATIO-TEMPORAL HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT**

### **3.1 Introduction**

This chapter is divided into four parts: the introduction, the interaction of Pokots and Turkanas in the late pre-colonial times, the Pokot-Turkana relations during the period of the colonial State, and the handling of Pokot-Turkana affairs by successive post-colonial regimes. The thread running through the sections is manifest violent conflict between the Pokot and the Turkana, in space and time. Every conflict has a history.

### **3.2 Historical Dimensions**

History forms a fundamental basis for understanding conflict because it narrates the conflict memory over time, relates the records of actors, issues, interests and describes the forms of violence among other things. As such, history gives an insight into the different parties to the conflict and their perceptions, information about the diverse and incompatible goals involved and the types of violence - manifest and structural – that were operationalized. In relative terms, Kenya's northern region, unlike other regions, is and has been prone to conflict between members of different ethnically defined social formations, including their intra ethnic clan conflicts. The problematic nature of development, or virtual lack thereof, in the region is habitually ascribed to the conflict. If, in simplified terms here, conflict is equated with lack of peace, then it follows that there is a positive relationship between peace and development. However, the relationship is neither simple nor direct; it is complex. A significant part of this complexity is residual obfuscation that derives, in part, from the synchronic image that many academics, such as anthropologists in particular, and policy makers/ peace practitioners have about the nature of the conflict. This synchronic image exists because fundamentally there is no systematic and well considered attempt in their academic discourses and policy lore to situate the

conflict in a diachronic purview. A diachronic purview is essential in order to not only know and understand the facts that make up the conflict's reality but also to know and understand the dynamics of historical forces that establish the facts. The Pokot and Turkana people, located in the North Rift, are the two primary actors throughout the history of this conflict under study since pre-colonial times. The British Colonial regime became involved in the conflict dynamic in the late Nineteenth Century after the Conference of Berlin in 1885 that subjected the Pokot and Turkana peoples to British colonization. Colonization, by its nature, is structural violence that is inflicted on the colonized. To begin with, it is a form of international systemic marginalisation. Unquestionably, Kenya has also become a strategic actor in the conflict since attaining independence in 1963. The other key actor operating in the Pokot-Turkana conflict environment, trying to bring peace and development, since the time of independence is the Catholic Church, (Mwangi, & Niels, 1985).

This chapter does not constitute an in-depth history of the conflict; rather, it is a spatio-temporal background to the research object of this study, namely, violent conflict behaviour between Pokots and Turkanas. The chapter, thus, gives what amounts to a synoptic image, or account, of the forces of the conflict. This is achieved through interplay of selected manifestations, namely economic, political, ethnic, cultural and ecological since the last quarter of the Nineteenth Century. The identification of these forces and their interplay in the conflict provides a significant historical overview and vision of the Pokot-Turkana's past relationship and this helps to understand the underlying causes of the conflict and its persistence. The forces are historical imperatives of the conflict, but they may also be constructed as parameters of the conflict in space and time. The rationale for this position is that violent conflict behaviour between the Pokots and the Turkanas can hardly be understood unless it is situated in the

interplay. The interplay, therefore, constitutes the context of the conflict. The interplay of these forces has, however, existed for more than one hundred years, but its statics and dynamics constitute neither a chronology nor an interpretation of the conflict, even as the interplay forms the context of the conflict. Furthermore, it is important to keep in focus, and to reasonably assert, that for humans to historically exist and develop, certain basic and ontological needs have to be satisfied (Maslow, 1970; Burton, 1991). These needs are, in turn, critically interwoven into peoples' actualization of potential (Galtung, 1969). These needs are inextricably intertwined with livelihood social, political and economic issues, and the structures underpinning their operationalization. What is assayed in this contextual chapter of the conflict under research presupposes that: first, politics and economics are embedded and secondly, that violence as politics is a means of economics. Lastly, economics as marginalization along ethnic lines generates counter-marginalization praxis in the form of identity politics, which finds expression in either violent conflict behaviour between "us" and neighbouring ethnic "other" and/or organized subversion of State legitimations, institutions and functionaries roles.. With respect to three subsequent divisions of this chapter, it is pertinent to emphasize, at this juncture, that the pre-colonial period of the conflict was not subject to State structures or institutions, or apparatuses. Instead, the conflict between the two communities was subject to their own ethnic structures of culture. It is these structures that define and legitimize the accepted manifest patterned behaviour by them towards each other. The reality of a Kenyan State only emerged with the incursion of British colonialism into Eastern Africa. This period was pre-statehood where ethnic systems of governance prevailed, untouched by modes of governance determined by the international system and the modern concept of state-hood. During this time, the conflict was not subject to forces of "repressive State apparatus" and "ideological State apparatus", terms

explicated by the Louis Althusser, the French Political philosopher (Althusser, 1971), and which became operational during the colonial and post-colonial periods of the conflict. Since this study is about the persistence of a conflict between two distinct ethnic groups within the Kenyan State it is useful to bear in mind the definition of an ethnic community: “named human population, with a myth of common ancestry, shared memories and cultural elements; a link with a historic territory or homeland, and a measure of solidarity” (Smith, 1993,; pp. 28-29).

### **3.3 Pre-Colonial Period**

The origins and migration of Pokots and Turkanas constitute in retrospect a correlate of not only their interaction but, also competition and conflict underpinned by an incompatibility of goals between them. The correlate undergirds what is said here concerning Pokots and Turkanas separately, as well as the conflict content before the era of British imperialism in the North Rift. Specifically, the correlate is taken as a point of departure in this attempt to depict a distant past, the time before the era of imperialism. The correlate is comprised of a complex of selected aspects of Pokot as well as Turkana life experiences and Pokot-Turkana relations, which is certainly important in terms of making sense of their violent conflict today. The depiction is informed by recognizing and taking into account at least two challenges of assaying the conflict during late pre-colonial period. First, the degree to which oral and recorded narrations of the conflict are problematic because of the lack of commonly agreed upon criteria of what counted or should count as the factual, not invented, Pokot-Turkana conflict history. Second, the subtlety of the task of determining whether or not a given source of information or data drawn on is a species of academic, popular or propaganda form of history. Implicit in these challenges is the observation that during the late pre-colonial years of the conflict, analysis is not untainted by bias stemming from particular dominant material interests and hegemonic value preferences. In

addition to ideological colouring, are the limitations of relatively scanty sources of the pre-colonial period specific to the Pokot-Turkana conflict, and the uncertainties and disputes of their interpretation. One version is that the Pokot originated from an area that is today southern Ethiopia and migrated southwards many centuries ago, into what is today the northern end of the western highlands of Kenya, living there since the Sixteenth Century (Curtin et al., 1995; Fedders & Salvador, 1979). Another version is that the Pokot originated from an amalgamation of refugees from wars between and among nearby ethnic communities (Peristany, 1951; Harold, 1953). Like the Turkana, the vast majority of the Pokot reside in the Rift Valley region of Kenya. A small area of customary Pokot-land straddles the Kenya-Uganda border. This situation resulted from the British Colonial policy of failure to respect the unity of an ethnic group in boundary demarcations of its administrative structures, such as Uganda and Kenya. The Pokot community is generally categorized into two distinct subdivisions: the pastoralist Pokots who, to this day, interface with the Turkana in violent behavioural conflict along an approximate 250 kilometre semi-arid desert frontline (Kratli et al., 1999, Mkutu, 2008, Eaton 2008, Ng'asike, 2013), and the arable farming agriculturalist Pokots residing south of the pastoralists (Grahn, 2005; Dolan, 2006) who do not have direct engagement with the Turkana as much as the pastoralist Pokots do.

According to the traditional migration accounts of Turkanas, they migrated before the Sixteenth Century from what is presently Southern Sudan into what is today Northern Uganda, and in the eighteenth century, into the present day Turkana-land in the North Rift (Gulliver, 1955; Thomas, 1966; Barrett, 1998). The reason for their migration from their original homeland is a matter of speculation. One view is that aggressiveness and militant territorial expansion tendencies that were characteristic of Turkanas are what caused them to migrate to

their present homeland in Kenya (Lamphear, 1992; Lonsdale, 1977). A different view is that the Turkanas came down the Dodoth escarpment into what is the North Rift because of decreasing environmental carrying capacity. Increasing human and animal population in northern Uganda, which is the area of dispersal of Karamojong ethnics of which the Turkana are a part, created problems of environmental sustainability (Mazrui, 1977; Berman and Lonsdale, 1992; Dietz, 1983). As the Turkana relocated, they found other ethnic communities including the Pokot in what is today Turkanaland, and through a series of wars in the nineteenth century drove the Pokot south into the Pokot hills (Gulliver, 1955; Lamphear, 1988). By 1900, the fault lines of Pokot-Turkana customary interfacing borders had by and large stabilized (Johnston, 1904, as cited in Lamphear, 1988). Today, the overwhelming majority of the Turkana people live in Kenya, with small segments of them straddling the borders of Uganda, the Republic of South Sudan, and the Ilemi Triangle to the north (Mburu, 2007).

### **3.3.1 Interaction in retrospect**

Pokot-Turkana interaction had multiple aspects including: peaceful coexistence, abandonment of occupied territorial area and moving to another area because of evidential threat, perceived insecurity, assimilation, and raiding (McCabe, 1990). The difference between evidential threat and perceived insecurity is that the former refers to objective phenomena of Pokot-Turkana interaction in the form of people and their herds moving away from one area to another area, external to the observer and directly measurable. On the other hand, the latter refers to mentalistic entities of thoughts, feelings, attitudes, perceptions, beliefs, which because they are subjective, are not amenable to direct observation or measurement, but influence or cause behaviour such as conflict between Pokots and Turkana. Evidential threats only existed generally in the form of being raided or counter-raided by either community. On the other hand,

perceived insecurity meant that Pokots and Turkanas were endangered and the danger stemmed from perceived insecurity that was common to all of them. It is most plausible that perceived insecurity facilitated self-control, the ability to inhibit impulses in everyone with a result that fighting between Pokots and Turkanas was averted sometimes. It stands to reason that this was one of the mechanisms as well as strategies and tactics by which the occurrence of incidents of conflict between Pokots and Turkanas was minimized or rendered insignificant in a statistical sense. However, it is important to point out the obverse of the foregoing, primarily because what is discussed here should be, and is, about the violent conflict behaviour dimension of Pokot-Turkana relations with matters of peace being treated as tangential to the discussion. The obverse, then, is that if impulses flared up in Pokot due to wrong doing or untoward activity by Turkanas, and vice versa, conflict would likely occur, depending on circumstances of the particular situation or moment. All of the above aspects were adaptive behaviour whose parameters were economic, socio-political, cultural and ecological. This needs some elaboration.

The aspects of Pokot-Turkana interaction specified above arose from the specific conditions, which had until then, prevailed in the evolution of Pokot culture and Turkana culture: the need to master nature's harsh physical environment in the struggle against scarcity. These aspects and their dynamics were culturally specific to the economy of scarcity then. This is partly why aspects of Pokot-Turkana conflict interaction today, particularly in terms of their dynamics, are considerably different from what obtained in the pre-colonial State era.

### **3.3.2 Historiographical Issues**

It is fitting at this juncture to bring in the historiographical speculations, of late nineteenth and early twentieth century anthropologists and historians. To begin with, one criticism of them from the standpoint of post-colonial theoretical perspective is that they were handmaidens of

imperialism. What is important here is not whether or not the criticism holds water but the making of history of which they were part. In a sense, history is not so much what actually happened as what writers of history say happened. In a similar vein, it is tenable that history is made and recorded by and for the victors. These perspectives on “what writers of history say” has to do with the dependence of history on secondary sources, while “made and recorded by and for the victors” bespeaks the extent to which history, construed as development, is the development of oppression and marginalization. The point being made is applicable to Pokot-Turkana relations as history before the second half of the last quarter of the Nineteenth Century. In the second half of the last quarter of the Century, and thereafter, the victors were British colonial imperialists and the vanquished were Pokots and the Turkanas.

Anthropologists and historians, including some missionaries, who acted as ideologues of colonial imperialism, not only speculated about pre-colonial Pokot and Turkana social formations, but also about Pokot–Turkana conflict interaction. The speculations were interspersed with judgments about Pokot and Turkana social formations and culture that stemmed from cultural value preferences and ideological inclinations of the speculators or writers. Specifically, the value preferences and ideological inclinations were couched in terms of what was negative or repulsive about the manner and customs of the Pokot and the Turkana. Besides, Pokot and Turkana cultures were, more or less, dubbed cultures of violence (Gluckman, 1963; Fry & Baszarkiewicz, 2008). Put differently, the perceptions postulated through the pre-colonial historiography of Pokot-Turkana interaction and inter-tribal wars painted a picture of communities stuck in a violent static culture since time immemorial, from which they could not transcend. Pokots and Turkana were portrayed as enemy neighbours and fights between them taken as the typical manifestation of the interaction (Rosberg and Nottingham, 1966; Alexander

et al., 2000; Berkeley, 2001). The above strand of thought has not waned, even though time has passed encompassing significant social transformation changes as well as changes in the nature of the dynamics of Pokot-Turkana conflict relations over the last one hundred years or so. This perception continues to exist today because of the pervasive notion that raids are integral to the social formations of Pokot and Turkana due to their pastoralist way of life (Bollig, 1990). According to Pratt, Gall, & Haan, (1997), the term pastoralism is “the finely-honed symbiotic relationship between local ecology, domesticated livestock and people in resource-scarce regions often at the threshold of human survival” (p. 169).

The notion that raids are integral to Pokot and Turkana societies can be faulted at least on two grounds. First, the notion is not an historical intellectual label of the changes Pokot-Turkana conflict interaction has undergone in retrospect but a populist, as specified earlier, conflation of occurrences or episodes of raiding and spans of time of relative peace between Pokots and Turkanas. Second, and more telling, particularly from a practical point of view, is that, it implies that pastoralism entails raiding. This is to say that, it is necessary for Pokots and Turkana to raid one another because they are pastoralists; if Pokots and Turkanas were not pastoralists they would not raid one another. The necessary implication of this argument is that, until pastoralism as Pokot and Turkana’s major means of livelihood atrophies through obsolescence dialectic, Pokots and Turkanas are likely to continue raiding one another. This critical evaluation is not intended to suggest that in the pre-colonial times Pokots and Turkanas did not raid one another. Granted, there was Pokot-Turkana raiding in pre-colonial times, but Pokot-Turkana relations were not systematically raid ridden (Ogot, 1972). Besides, it is untenable that occurrences of violent conflict behaviour between two communities were linked without exception to matters of

livestock. Some occurrences of the behaviour were independent of matters of livestock, for example, territorial expansion, particularly by the Turkana.

### **3.3.3 Motive forces of violent conflict behaviour**

This study is, as explicated in the first chapter, about the persistence of violent conflict behaviour between the Pokots and the Turkanas. The behaviour was, and is still invariably motivated and had multiple motivations or goals. The possibility of the existence of unconscious elements generating some of the motivations, specified below, is not ruled out. Before giving the motive forces of the conflict in the pre-colonial period, it is important to reiterate the differences between raids pertaining to livestock and violent conflict behaviour in the context of relations between Pokots and Turkanas. The difference is this: all occurrences of raiding between Pokots and Turkanas were violent conflict behaviour between them but not all occurrences of violent conflict behaviour between them were raids. Raids are, and were, a part of the conflict between them, even as they are and were the typical expression of conflict between them. It would be logically false, as well as empirically problematic, to reduce raids to violent conflict behaviour between Pokots and Turkanas. Besides, to conflate Pokot and Turkana cattle raiding and violent conflict behaviour between the two communities, as some writers on pastoralist conflicts have done, (Dyson-Hudson, 1976 & Dyson-Hudson, 1980) is tantamount to confounding the relationship between and among the motive forces of the conflict that pertain to cattle with those that do not pertain to cattle. The difference spelt out earlier is taken into account throughout this study for purposes of specificity and clarity concerning what the conflict encompasses, what it entails, and what it implies.

Occurrences of the conflict in the pre-colonial period were related to livestock but the occurrences were not invariably related to livestock. It cannot be denied that some occurrences

of the conflict were tangential to or had nothing to do with livestock matters. The raiding episodes stemmed from multiple motivations. The motive forces of pre-colonial occurrence of conflict behaviour between Pokot and Turkana were to: create a more beneficial economic base and enhance socio-economic status, control grazing areas, which subsequently led to an entrenched position of the stronger of the two groups, increase herd size as insurance against unexpected calamities such as long drought, famine, and livestock epidemic diseases. Other reasons included: restock after a calamity such as prolonged drought resulting in massive loss of herds due to lack of pasture, restock consequent upon massive loss of herds due to livestock epidemic diseases, and to meet the requirements of rite of passage into adulthood. Raids were also carried out to obtain livestock (typically cattle) for the bride price or dowry, to intimidate the other community to move to another territory, to recoup livestock losses suffered through enemy raids, and to revenge in the form of tit-for-tat for killings or deadly casualties or injuries stemming from any of the nine above (Ogot, 1972; Gulliver, 1951; Murdock, 1959; Eaton, 2008). By virtue of being inhabitants of a mostly harsh arid and semi-arid physical environment, the two communities had to rely on livestock and mobility for their livelihoods. Mobility was social structural, not ecological but both the social structural and the ecological were related to subsistence need, which in turn, was causally linked to competition and antagonism between them. They had to undertake seasonal migration in search of pasture and water to sustain their herds, which were the means of livelihood.

One would find it difficult to deny that the mobility in the form of nomadism and migration ever brought inter-communal contact and dispute over access to key resources, which sometimes eventuated into violent conflict behaviour between them. This is a probability statement about their interaction. What this means is that the interaction did not preclude

chances of physical violence occurring between the Pokots and the Turkanas; and that the violence was neither the sole characteristic of their interaction nor the dominant one. The fact of being enemy neighbours did not necessarily entail engaging in endless violent conflict behaviour. Violent conflict behaviour was not a routine aspect of the social history of the Pokot and the Turkana. A testimony to this is that for quite some time before the last quarter of the Nineteen Century, Turkanas and Pokots allied and pushed the Samburus further south-east of Lake Turkana (Mwanzi, 1985). Concerning the five aspects of interaction, specified earlier, during the pre-colonial period the one whose substance largely constitutes the object of this research is raiding. This aspect can be disaggregated into two sets of behaviour: unprovoked intentional group violent aggression manifested as raiding against the other, and provoked intentional group violent aggression which is a reaction to unprovoked intentional violent aggression manifested as raiding of one community by the other. Unprovoked violent aggression had negative effects on Pokots/Turkanas as well as provoked violent aggression in reaction to unprovoked violent aggression had negative effects on both of them. Each of the two sets of behaviour was, more or less, an expression of power. Granted that the antidote to power is power; it is persuasive to infer in line with realism that the antidote to raiding power was reactive raiding power. This inference is at once analytic and *ex post facto*, and makes it clear in no uncertain terms what is/was encompassed by the conflict as a label for a range of episodes of violent conflict behaviour wherein parties to the conflict are/were Pokots and Turkanas during the pre-colonial period, colonial period and post-colonial period.

### **3.3.4 Dynamics of conflict in pre-colonial period**

The Pokot-Turkana conflict has a lot to do with livestock. Any attempt to make sense of this conflict that does not take livestock into account is from the onset bound to be inadequate. However, it is not the case that each and every aspect of the conflict during pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial periods can be described, explained, and understood wholly in terms of direct and indirect dependence of the Pokot/Turkana on their livestock. This section of the chapter gives the dynamics of Pokot-Turkana conflict in pre-colonial times. However, this should not be construed as suggesting that in all processes as well as particular occurrences of the conflict, livestock matters were central. To do so would be an oversimplification of occurrences of incidents or episodes of violent conflict that were a feature of pre-colonial Pokot-Turkana interaction. Raiding was not a momentary episode. In terms of relations between the two communities, it was violent conflict behaviour whose context of meaning was constituted by history and culture of the Pokot and Turkana. This culture was pillared on structures that legitimised engagement in conflict. A behavioural definition of such conflict which neatly fits pre-colonial times is that it was, and still is to a large extent, a group incursion or forceful attack by an outside group whose main, if not sole objective, was to steal or take livestock (usually cattle) by force, rather than territorial expansion which arose as response to environmental stress that stemmed from localized famine, livestock epidemic diseases, and drought (Gray et al., 2003; Mulegeta, 2008).

There was no definitive permanent Pokot-Turkana territorial boundary. This situation was occasioned by mobility, in the form of transhumance or nomadism, as a characteristic of the way of life of the two communities. However, lack of such a boundary did not negate the operation of territorial imperative on the part of the Turkanas as well as the Pokots. The territorial imperative has to do with territorial behaviour as made popular in social science in the

second half of the Twentieth Century, particularly through the work of Ardrey (1961, 1966 1970). Specifically, it is the tendency of individuals or groups of individuals to protect their territory (Ardrey, 1966). Research, from which the concept of territorial imperative and territorial behaviour thereof derived, extrapolated to the study of human behaviour, was done in Kenya in the 1950s. Territorial imperative is a species of socio-biology theory and research that seeks to provide biological explanation for the evolution of structured social patterned behaviour and organization in humans. Territorial behaviour, a manifestation of territorial imperative, is invariably and exclusively defensive and is naturally resorted to if there is intrusion into individual or group territory. Raiding, as behaviourally defined above, and its immediate consequences, lent itself to explanation in terms of territorial imperative. What is on historical record about the pre-colonial past of Pokot-Turkana relations/interaction suggests that in most of the violent conflict occurrences Turkanas, more than Pokots, were the aggressors and intruders.

The warrior groups of the two communities did not engage in long distance raiding in faraway areas of the enemy's territory primarily due to lack of familiarity with the terrain and the high risk of getting harmed or killed in the course of the raiding activity. In light of this, the radius of the raiding action was short and, thus, localized (Dyson-Hudson and Dyson-Hudson, 1980; Leff, 2009). Hostilities were typically concentrated in periods of extreme environmental stress, brought about by abrupt and calamitous fluctuations in the livelihoods base. Raiding warrior groups and counter-raiding warrior groups used traditional weaponry, such as, spears, bows and arrows, machetes, *rungus*, and shields made from hides of certain animals. The conflict incidence was not long drawn out; it was characteristically constituted by brief surprise attacks that were small scale cattle raids whose number of deadly casualties was typically small. Raiding warriors and counter-raiding warriors did not deplete the entire stocks and thereby

render the raided destitute. Cattle obtained from the raids were not exchanged for other goods or items (Curtin et al., 1955; Murdock, 1959). There were some killings during some raiding incidents but, again, on quite a small scale; and the killing was not indiscriminate (Hendrickson et al., 1998; Schneider, 1957). This state of affairs was, by and large, a function of the fact that fighting was hand-to-hand between warrior groups using traditional weaponry. The people likely to be killed were Pokot warriors and Turkana warriors participating in the particular raiding acts either as raiders or as counter-raiders. Children and women, as well as old people, were, from the onset, not objects for killing because they were not warriors and did not participate in the particular acts. The structure of raiding activities, comprising of behaviour and norms, was under the stewardship of elders who were the custodians of traditional conflict management imperatives (Mazrui, 1977, Mamdani, 1996). Raiding was typically seasonal. Occurrence of particular raiding activity lent itself to being predicted reasonably well by virtue of seasonal occurrence of raiding and, consequently, being prevented through strategies such as moving to some different area of Pokot/Turkana territory because of insecurity. It is quite safe to state, as a generalization, that raiding was not a means of personal enrichment but patterned behaviour, constituted by strategies and tactics that were much more a means of survival through adaptation in calamitous or hardship situations, and much less a culturally charged response to calamitous or hardship situations.

### **3.4 Colonial Period**

This section looks at the second chronological part of conflict dynamics with Pokots, Turkanas, European settlers in Kenya's northwestern highlands, and colonial State functionaries as key stakeholders and actors during the colonial period. It is reasonable to argue that settlers, as a community and State functionaries, were a consequence of the dynamics of capitalism in its late

Nineteenth Century imperialist stage. In line with world system theory, (Wallestein, 1974) imperialism was a necessary product of capitalist industrialization whose political economy forces included a search for ways and means of capitalist accumulation, through markets, pre-capitalist societies to subjugate, low wages, and higher investment returns (Baran, 1957; Nkrumah, 1965; Rodney, 1973, Amin, 1974). Accumulation was mostly achieved by means of coercive power. This imperialist capitalism and its coercive application of power had its foundation in structural violence being justified morally and ethically as a strategy enabling imperialism achieve its goals. It would be difficult to dissociate the history and persistence of the conflict under research during the colonial period from this negatively laden philosophy and strategy. Bearing these points in mind, it is also valuable to take into consideration the fact that the rise of capitalism had a strong theoretical basis in religion, specifically ascetical Protestantism (Weber, 1930). The imperialism of British colonialism, which brought settlers and administrators who were mainly protestant by religion into contact with the Pokot-Turkana conflict, had its origins in the protestant ethic that gave rise to capitalistic modes of production. These were alien theoretical-based ideologies to the pre-colonial Pokot and Turkana community's modes of production, and to their cultural and religious theories. Pokot and Turkana social formations had to be, and were indeed subjugated by virtue of their being pre-capitalist, and subsequently absorbed into the capitalist system at its periphery. This meant that their dominant mode of production of pastoralism was, by and large, unaffected by the absorption; the Pokot and the Turkana, thus, remained largely social formations of peripheral capitalism. However, the subjugation through coercive appropriation of the northwestern highlands as part of British East Africa and later, Kenya, differentially affected Pokots and Turkanas with regards to their conflict over livestock, grazing land and water.

### **3.4.1 Entrenchment of Colonial Rule**

To establish hegemonic control over the Pokot and Turkana people, the British employed various strategies and tactics including the ones specified below. The first strategy was the criminalization of Pokot-Turkana cattle raiding. Before criminalization, Hobley, a one-time District Commissioner in western Kenya in the early part of the twentieth century, expressed a view about the same, subscribed to by other British officials thus: “It is necessary at all costs to repress the pernicious system of inter-tribal raiding, the curse of this district [Turkana] for so many centuries....Until inter-tribal fighting and raiding ceases, all real progress is impossible” (Matson, 1972, p.218; Mazrui, 1977, p. 252; Ellis, 1976, p. 557; Davidson,1968, p. 182). The second strategy was to get the Pokot to acquiesce to colonial rule. In most of pre-colonial period occurrence of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict, the Turkana were the aggressors (Gulliver, 1955). In light of this, some sections of the Pokot regarded the arrival of the Europeans as an undisguised piece of good fortune, so to speak, and sought actively to build an alliance with them; accommodation of the colonial forces was far more viable an option than resistance to them (Lonsdale, 1977). The third strategy was to essentialize the notion of tribe with particular reference to Pokot and Turkana: what Pokot were, Turkana were not. The Turkana were dreadful, recalcitrant, aggressive, expansive, belligerent, hostile, audacious, irreconcilable, truculent, and the like (Schneider, 1957; Leff, 2009; Gulliver, 1951; Lamphear, 1992; Thomas, 1966; Berman and Lonsdale 1992). Of course, none of these behavioural characteristics the British attributed to the Turkana obtained amongst the Pokot! This categorisation had to do with social perception. Perceptions have a major influence on behaviour: the perceivers form impressions of other people, and adopt hypotheses about the kind of people the others are. In this vein, the British knowledge and expectations about Turkana were much determined by impressions they formed of the Turkana. “The British [held] E Turkana and its people in low

esteem”, (Lamphear, 1992, p.88) which, in turn, determined how the British behaved towards them. Fourthly, the colonial State coercively appropriated highland areas of Pokot territory for European plantation cash farming and ranching. The farms were allocated to Boers and English speaking Europeans. This in effect decreased part of traditional Pokot grazing territory and forced domicile adaptations among the Pokots. In addition, it sandwiched the Pokots between the settlers and the Turkanas. Both effects, consequently, increased the probability of violent conflict over cattle and grazing land. The conflict usually elicited punitive reprisals by King’s African Rifles (KAR) and/or police garrisons against the Turkanas and not the Pokots. This is because Pokots were generally subservient to the colonial government and its forces - KAR, police, levies, and auxiliaries. The Pokot also acted as a buffer zone between the British settlers and the Turkanas.

Fifth, the colonial State facilitated movement of some of the Pokot into Uganda, to an area that was part of Karamojong territory in a bid to ease pressure caused by the alienation of their land. However, contrary to the expectation of government agents and settlers, it did not ease pressure on Pokots since the Pokots were sandwiched between the settlers and Turkanas. The movement simply increased the chances of occurrence of violent conflict between the Pokot and the Turkana, Pokot and Karamojong, and between the Turkana and Karamojong. Sixth, the colonial government garrisoned trouble areas of Turkana territory and subjected mobility of the people in the south to surveillance by garrisons of KAR and police, levies and auxiliaries included. Seventh, the military measures that were designed to exert absolute control over the entire Turkana territory rendered the Turkana incapable of raiding their enemies’ (the Pokots) herds with impunity. However, this was achieved only after decades during which the Turkana were subjected to punitive reprisals by State agents and forces, namely the KAR, police, levies,

and auxiliaries, for real and/or alleged raiding of Pokots. Instead of being cowed into submission, the Turkana determinately resisted British military measures to subjugate and rule them. Indeed, initial active resistance to British conquest and imposition of colonial rule in Kenya lasted longest in Turkana-land (Davidson, 1968; Curtin et al., 1955; Anderson, 2005).

### **3.4.2 Colonial Pacification of the Turkanas**

From the perspective of the British, Turkana resistance in the form of raids was dangerous on two grounds. First, the British saw Turkana raids against Pokot and other hostile neighbours as having a thwarting effect on British colonial ambitions throughout the North Rift (Featherston, 1973; Berman and Lonsdale, 1992). Second, the British feared that Turkana ‘expansion’, particularly southwards, would threaten the still fragile frontier between indigenous people and highland European settlers to the disadvantage of the latter (Gulliver, 1951). The foregoing were perceptions that resonated quite well with the negative British image of Turkana, which they began to build up from their earliest contact with the Turkana, as a ‘trumpet’ people or social formation with whom conflict would be likely (Mazrui, 1977; Dietz, 1983). The image propagated by the British of the Turkana actually became a self-fulfilling prophecy. This negative image of the Turkana precipitated aggressive violent behaviour towards the Turkana by the British that appeared to validate the colonial government’s image of the Turkana. The British, thus, engaged in self-initiated violent conflict behaviour with the Turkana. Subjection of Turkanas to relentless unpredictable raids became the mainstay of the British in their bid to get the Turkanas to submit to colonial rule. The British embarked on raiding or “pacification” as the British themselves called it, of the Turkana, with a view of impressing upon the Turkana that any raids by them on the Pokot and other ethnically defined groups whom the colonial government had undertaken to protect would be punished by immediate reprisals undertaken by KAR/Police,

garrisons Levies and/or auxiliaries included (Barber, 1965). Raiding between ethnically defined groups was something the KAR simply would not tolerate and those who did so were liable to severe punishment; the Turkana were prone to punishment more so than other such groups. The primary interest of the colonial forces was not to stop raiding and counter-raiding between the Pokot and Turkana nor fostering social progress in areas of the North Rift inhabited by these communities. The immediate concern was the progression and stability of their British settler program in Kenya. Effective colonial rule, of necessity, entailed subjecting the Pokot and Turkana to the violence of its fire-power in order to protect British settler community interests as well as bring about law and order. The British control of Turkana-land was also partially influenced by the need to thwart any Ethiopian incursions into northern Kenya, which if allowed to happen would negatively impact on its imperialist political economic policy in Eastern Africa (Barber, 1968; Mburu, 2007).

The Pokot, for the most part, acquiesced to colonial rule, in the early stages of colonial rule, primarily as a self-preservation strategy against Turkana attacks. Their acquiescence to British rule also averted subjugation to the violence of colonial firepower. At the same time, the Pokots continued the raids on the Turkana since they knew that the colonial government was unlikely to subjugate them to the violence of its firepower. Unlike pre-colonial Pokot-Turkana conflict, in the form of raids, which was predictable, the conflict between the Turkana on the one hand and the colonial government, the Pokot, and the settlers on the other hand, did not lend itself to easy prediction. The conflict could be triggered off any time by any of five contingencies. First, actual Turkana intrusion into Pokot grazing territory/area as explained earlier in terms of territorial imperative. Second, Pokots exaggerating to government authorities the seriousness of damage inflicted on them by Turkana raiding, third, Pokot lying to

government authorities that Turkana were planning to attack, which prompted the sending of the KAR askari or police for a supposedly pre-emptive strike against the Turkana. Fourth, a rash speech (harangue) by a British official (commissioner or garrison commander); in some cases, the speech was the immediate prologue to quick and heavy-handed reprisal against the Turkana by KAR/Police garrison. Lastly, the violence on the Turkana could be used as a species or form of sport for the British. The fifth contingency was, in particular, unrelated to the possibility of the Turkana thwarting British colonial ambitions in the North Rift, raiding of the Pokot, and Turkana posing a threat to settler community interests. It was psychological, not environmental, and constituted a totally unprovoked violent aggression against the Turkana. That unprovoked violence was practiced against the Turkana as a sporting activity is borne out by the words of Eric von Otter, an administrator in Turkana District in the 1910s (Lamphear,1992):

The Turkana...considered the government as the biggest raiders of them all...I do not doubt that on very many occasions the innocent were punished...orders show that natives were fired on at sight and the Turkana referred to themselves on more than one occasion as wild animals hunted through the bush by the government ( p. 198).

By the end of the first quarter of the Twentieth Century, the Turkana were weakened to an extent that could not undertake significant raiding on the Pokot and, of course, they could not pose any major threat to British settlers and/or their interests. In the course of colonial rule, the previous occurrences of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict (with the Turkana typically as the aggressors) in the form of raids/counter-raids decreased. Colonial rule did not obviate the possibility of occurrences of Pokot-Turkana conflict; rather, colonial rule largely decreased the chances of raiding/counterraidering occurring especially during the last four or so decades of colonial rule. Thus, while violent conflict between the Pokot and the Turkana on account of

livestock, and access to grazing and water territory did not end totally during British Colonial rule, it was, in a sense, suspended. Up to the time of independence in 1963, the British policy in Turkana-land gradually developed into one of isolating the Turkana from practically all exterior influence through continued subjugation and a closed area policy to outsiders (Good, 2007; Pavitt, 1997). In terms of behavioural psychology, in the traditional political science sense of behaviouralism, which is concerned with political behaviour, participation, non-participation attitudes and public opinion, the suspension was not a manifestation of suppression of the urge to engage in raiding behaviour. Rather, it was a period during which Pokot and Turkana warriors sublimated raiding behaviour energy and directed the energy into activities that were conflict-free and socially beneficial to their respective communities. The reason for saying that occurrences of raiding/counter-raiding were largely suspended is that the occurrences resurged and escalated in the aftermath of the demise of the colonial State. Since then, it has become a challenge to the post-colonial State's successive regimes in terms of their capacity to end raiding and counter-raiding. The colonial State was able to reduce the frequency of occurrence of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict through four strategies: heavy handed political violence, socially systemic fear, rifle disarmament, and undermining of their economic base. As the colonial State evolved, the Turkana became the principal target of the strategies. In general, the British policy attitude towards Kenyan pastoralists was that pastoralism (with uncivilized nomadic habits) was a brake on the development of the country, which was critical to colonial interests and it should be curbed (Spencer, 1983).

The British exploited the Pokot-Turkana inter-ethnic conflict to achieve their own strategic political and economic interests of which security was fundamental. The economic resources of Kenya were valued by the domestic and imperial expansion policies of Britain.

Firstly, there was the need to provide long term security and development in the areas occupied by the ever increasing colonial white settlers in the fertile highlands of Kenya, located to the south and east of the Pokot homeland. The threat of Turkana expansion southwards displacing the Pokots was seen as a danger to this goal (Good, 2007). Secondly, there was a need to create a buffer zone against Ethiopian colonial incursions into Northern Kenya (Barber, 1968 in Kratli and Swift). The control of Turkana-land and the subjugation of its people were seen as critical to this end; between 1898 and 1903, two Ethiopian armed expeditions had infiltrated Turkana-land (Good, 2007). On a wider geo-political perspective, control of the Nile waters flowing from Uganda, “the pearl of Africa” to Egypt, another strategic British Colony, was an ever-present issue in British foreign policy. Any threats to British hegemony in these countries and/or issues affecting the Nile’s water from other countries or arising from issues of ethnic conflicts were to be curbed rapidly. It is clear from this overview of the interaction between the colonial government, the Pokots, and the Turkanas that issues of structural violence appear to have permeated their relationships. Structural violence seems to underlie the manifest violence behaviour between the Turkana and the government as well as contributing to the persistent conflict between the Pokot and the Turkana.

### **3.5 Post-colonial period**

After Kenya attained independence, governance, attitudes and approaches to issues of peace and social progress for the Pokots and the Turkanas changed little from the colonial policies (Nkinyangi 1983; Spencer, 1983; Dolan, 2006; Mkutu, 2008; Gifford, 2009). Structural violence, particularly in the form of marginalization, continued to be the order of the day. According to Nkinyangi (1983, p. 186), pastoralist peoples continued “to exist at the periphery of the Kenyan society, impoverished, dominated, and underprivileged in all spheres of life”. The

socio-political-economic under-development predicament of the Pokot and Turkana pastoralists and their persistent violent conflict dynamics persisted into the first decade of the Twenty-first Century, (Tibaldo, 2006). Undoubtedly, fully armed and roaming warriors were an affront and threat to the State itself, (Tibaldo, 2006). Writing about Pokot, Turkana and adjacent semi-arid districts Mkutu (2008:123) maintains that, “the marginalization, brutalization and dehumanization of the districts by the colonial State have been sustained by the post-colonial regimes to a greater extent than other areas of Kenya”. Peace, in the sense of an absence of incidents involving direct physical armed violence between the two communities, rarely lasts longer than a month (Mkutu, 2008, Eaton, 2009). In February 2012, the government administrator in charge of Turkana East District stated that he had put Kenyan security forces on high alert due to incidents of the Pokot both raiding the Turkana and attacks on the State security forces in the area (Ng’asike, 2013). Even the respect for cultural customary law and its associated traditional conflict management mechanisms by the state continued to diminish (Mkutu, 2004). Under three different leaders - Jomo Kenyatta (1963-78), Daniel Moi (1978-2002) and Mwai Kibaki (2002-12) – respectively, the State continued the British policy of appointing chiefs. These government-appointed and imposed chiefs were alien to the aspirations and community leadership structures of the Pokot and Turkana communities (Dolan, 2006). He maintains that these chiefs were aided and abetted by corrupt administrations primarily concerned with promoting interests of the government and those of the ruling party (KANU), which entailed terrifying the Pokot and Turkana into submission. According to Dolan, the main aim of the government and KANU, up to 2003, was to contain, ignore and use the pastoralists for political expediency. This policy continued to weaken local inter-ethnic Track I conflict management effectiveness in the conflict environment under study. The overall effect was that

the indigenous structural basis for deciding on what are the best conflict management tools to apply was undermined and eroding.

However, it is not factual to say that there was no substantive State policy shift, at least on paper, to addressing the difficulties of pastoralist communities. The emergence in 1980 of the Arid Lands Resource Management Project reflected a policy modification towards some concern about the pastoralist communities' situation and grievances (Grahn, 2005). A more in-depth analysis of the inter-relationship of poverty, conflict, security and development planning was evident in National Poverty Eradication Plan, 1999-2015 (Office of the President, 1999). While providing a framework for mainstreaming conflict management within development planning, there is no significant evidence of conflict transformation impacts in the Pokot-Turkana conflict environment to date. Even establishment of District Peace and Development Committees (DPDC) (Grahn, 2005) in the late 1990s has yielded nothing of consequence towards ending the persistence of conflict between the Pokot and Turkanas. DPDCs are made up of civil society actors such as elders, women's organizations, NGOs, who join with State officials in a conflict management body. The DPDCs, which were essentially State structures, somewhat recognized the value of traditional community based conflict management mechanisms by integrating elders into the committees. However, the legal status of the structure remains ambiguous, lacking a legal framework and judicial weight despite recognition from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development's (IGAD) department of Conflict Early Warning Network (CEWARN). CEWARN is operational within the Karamojong cluster, of which the Pokot and Turkana are constituent groups, collecting information, which is processed at its relevant State institutions within each IGAD country and regional offices. Conflict persists in spite of these initiatives. While taxes continued to be collected and borders patrolled to various degrees during the post-

colonial period, minimal development initiatives were undertaken for the Turkana people until the Church entities, particularly the Catholic Church arrived in the 1960s (Davis, 1978, Pavitt, 1997; Good, 2007).

The Catholic Church's entry into the Turkana and Pokot conflict environment provides close range and insightful recorded perspectives of the conflict and its dynamics. The Turkana were considered more aggressive than the Pokot, yet they were always easy targets for the Pokot raiders, who were and still are, based on the slopes of the Cherangani hills and adjacent parts (Good, 2007). Good observes that Pokot tactics involve brief and bloody attacks to strike terror in their victims followed by a quick gateway into the hills where the captured cattle disappear into the narrow enclaves and valleys of the 10,000 ft. mountains. Catholic Church records from the years 1966-71 outline the dangers that the Church and its personnel confronted whilst establishing medical clinics, building roads, initiating farm irrigation schemes in the conflict environment (Good, 2007). O'Callaghan, a catholic priest working in the area during this period, recorded in his diary that in one skirmish, 68 Pokot and Turkana were killed and many more wounded (as cited in Good, 2007). Subsequent raids became so frequent that development projects were provisionally abandoned; the ingenious Pokot removed all the bolts on clinic doors; "to [use them as] parts for home-made rifles for use in future raids" (O'Callaghan, as Cited in Good, 2007, p. 68). Good further reports that throughout the 1970s and 80s, Catholic Church initiated farm irrigation schemes were persistently disrupted by recurrent violent conflict between the two communities. The main objective of the manifest violent conflict was to raid and counter-raid livestock.

Similar incidents of conflict and dynamics continued in the 1990s along the approximately 250-kilometre fault line of the conflict. Kratli and Swift (1999) consider the

number of incidents reported to represent only a fragment of the number of ongoing raids that occurred across a broad spectrum of time. For instance, they provide details of Pokot-Turkana conflict in 1997/98 in areas near Kainuk and Katilu and further to the northwest in Lorengipi and Lokiriama areas, leaving numerous dead, and many more maimed and displaced. Tension and events deteriorated so badly in April 1998 that government-armed security personnel were despatched, followed by the army to the West Pokot-Turkana customary border areas to prevent further bloody violence. The Catholic Church considers the conflict management policies and interventions of the State to be both too weak to deal with the conflict and not able to provide an alternative way of life to those involved (Diocese of Lodwar Pastoral Plan 2007-2012, 2007). Conversely, the Catholic Church Justice and Peace Commission, despite their high ideals, have also been adjudged to be frequently lacking in the capacity and gravitas to be considered serious conflict management players due to 'low level staff' promoting the values of peace and justice (Dolan, 2007).

Grahn (2005) compares the dynamics of violent conflict, over time, between the two communities. He maintains that while traditional violent conflict before the colonial era involving groups of several hundred youths attacking homesteads and capturing herds of cattle using spears, bow and arrows, it gradually became more sophisticated and complex in terms of weaponry, decision making and strategies. The emergence of the colonial State in Kenya brought the conflict into a more globalized system of governance, economics and armament. Raiding and resource conflict management were considered no longer confined to the parameters of traditional ethnic and cultural imperatives. From the 1960's onwards the Pokots and Turkanas increasingly purchased guns and ammunition to defend themselves due to the State's inability to safeguard their livelihoods (Dolan, 2006). Dolan claims that the conflict environment was

dangerous for all except the brave and the Church missionaries. Due to the presence so many unlicensed guns, traditional cattle raiding was gradually supplemented with more sinister justifications for cattle raiding such as predation based on external commercial factors in the State's political economy (Eaton, 2008). According to Hendrickson (1998) and Eaton (2008) raids are now carried out by increasingly well-armed professional bandits. Unscrupulous businessmen, politicians and warlords who are connected to arms dealers and to abattoirs in major cities of Kenya aid these bandits. Increasingly, the arms merchant, the commercial cattle trader and the warlord are one and the same person, sometimes including State functionaries and traditional leaders (Mkutu, 2004). Osamba (2000) maintains that the warlord phenomenon first emerged in Pokot and Turkana areas of Kenya in the 1980s (as cited in Shikwati, 2004). A 2003 report highlighted increasing manifest violence between the Pokot and Turkana (Pkalya et al., 2003). The report emphasizes the increasing loss of human life, large scale displacement, disruption of socio-economic activities and livelihoods, environmental degradation, high levels of starvation, unprecedented dependence on food relief and increasing hatred between the communities. The report further notes that the conflict has not only occasioned the displacement of 30,361 people in West Pokot but is one of the conflicts with the highest frequencies of violence in Kenya. Eaton (2008) describes the situation in 2008 as characterized by an unforgiving heavily armed people (often better equipped than Kenya security personnel), incessant cattle raids and counter attacks. Such negative forces appear not interested in peace as their survival and prosperity depends on the persistence of the Pokot-Turkana conflict. These destructive forces trigger the exit of livestock from the local Pokot and Turkana communities causing rapid livestock depletion, shortage and an escalation of conflict in the effort to replenish or inflict revenge.

The proliferation and development of sophisticated small arms such as, AK 47s, G3s in the conflict environment spiralled throughout the Twentieth Century (Hendrickson, 1998). As mentioned in the previous chapter (see *The Kenya State and Conflict Management*, (2.4.1)), the Turkana possessed 66, 239 illegal weapons and the Pokot were holding 36, 937, as of 2003 (SRIC, 2003; Dolan, 2006). The Kenya State has threatened disarmament of the Pokot and Turkana numerous times. A joint Kenya-Uganda initiative in 1984 to collect guns from the two communities had no real impact and further alienated the pastoralists from the government. The Pokot and the Turkana have yet to be disarmed despite over twenty attempts (Gifford, 2009) and other threats (Mkutu, 2008) by the State to do so since 1978. This situation did not reflect a situation of State strength in terms of the State having a monopoly on violence in its territories (Tibaldo, 2006). These warnings and attempts at disarmament never attained the stated objective. Only a token number of firearms were surrendered and/or confiscated. These were easily replenished by the Pokots and Turkanas due to easy access to sources. Disarmament policies seemed focused much more on State security than transforming the underlying marginalized livelihood conditions of the two communities (Gifford, 2009). State and regional policies were symptom focused rather than addressing the underlying causes (Bevan, 2007). Despite commitments from the President Kibaki led government (2002-2007) to provide security for pastoralist communities in Kenya, cattle raids and violence escalated in the North Rift up until 2008 (Mkutu, 2008). The conflict continues to exist; the Pokot and the Turkana ethnic communities are still heavily armed and there has being minimal change in their social economic conditions (Eaton, 2009). It seems reasonable to argue that the underlying causes of the conflict were yet to be identified and their structural underpinnings addressed.

The National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management, discussed in the previous chapter (see The Kenya State and Conflict Management, (2.4.1)), was introduced to strengthen, coordinate, and integrate various conflict management initiatives in Kenya. While discussing conflict management perspectives in general the policy document highlights some poignant issues. The document recognised the State negligence in respect to policy guidelines for the co-ordination of approaches to peace building and conflict management. It maintains that most actors engaged on *ad hoc* basis and with interventions that were reactionary in nature, at times exacerbated conflicts. It recognized that sufficient resources have not been mobilised to avert latent conflict issues and enable rapid response when conflict occurs. To what extent the policy analysis is relevant to the Pokot-Turkana conflict situation is still speculative and needing rigorous research. Even so, the policy initiative is a positive historical conflict management development in Kenya. It offers some analysis and vision for the possible transformation of the persistent conflict. However, the ongoing persistence of the conflict raises questions about the State's commitment to the policy and its recommendations.

This historical perspective of the spatio-temporal context of the Pokot-Turkana conflict contributes to understanding the nature, dynamics and conflict management challenges of the conflict. The interests, as mentioned earlier, underpinning colonial policy are explained in the framework of imperialistic geo-political-economic factors, driven by Britain's domestic and foreign policies. Structural violence at the international level and within Kenya permeated the policy. During the post-colonial period the State's interest and approaches to address the underlying causes and end the persistence of the conflict have been found woefully wanting. In the colonial and post-colonial periods, academic explanations on the causes of the conflict have emerged from the cultural, ethnic and environmental resource schools of thought. The

underlying causes of the conflict have never been subjected to rigorous empirical research and analysis either by the colonial or post-colonial State administration. An application of rigorous research from a structural violence theoretical standpoint to explain the underlying causes for the persistence of the conflict is not evident from the history. Until this is done, other types of research, conjecture, and speculation seem to continue to inform State policy. There is no evidence of traditional conflict management structures ever being officially validated by the State. Instead, they were undermined by the State processes, exemplified particularly in the imposition of government appointed personnel to act as chiefs over the Pokot and Turkana communities. State conflict management strategies and actors are very limited in their theoretical basis on what was needed to research and manage the conflict. Disarmament on its own, as an approach and philosophy of conflict management reflects an extremely inadequate understanding of the causes, complexity and dynamics of the conflict. Disarmament was merely symptom oriented. Questions have also to be raised about the conflict management interventions and programs of the Catholic Church. Mwangi's (2007) critique of the conflict management activities of the Church in Africa, without dismissing altruistic intentions and projects, seem very appropriate. Its interventions are negatively criticised on grounds of: poor theoretical basis, lack of technical mastery, limited appreciation of history, and a lack of a systematic comprehensive policy that should include holistic transformation of the conflict to positive peace.

It is evident that the geo-political management of the conflict from the 19th century to date has evolved and transformed. There are numerous factors and variables which have impacted on the conflict, such as, cultural change, political governance, conflict dynamics, management approaches, social and economic changes, modernization, commercialization, development, and globalization (Graham, 2005). The conflict has evolved from conflict in an

inter-ethnic context up to 1895 where it was impacted by the imperialism of British colonialism, up until Kenya attained independence in 1963. The conflict between the two ethnic communities still persists. Even the conflict management interventions of other third parties, such as the Catholic Church, have not had any enduring success. Compared with the non-violent coexistence experienced between many ethnic communities in Kenya, the persistence of the conflict is ultimately a negative judgement on the part of the State in fulfilling its primary duty to provide peace and social progress to all its citizens, without discrimination. Overall, there seems to be a detrimental lack of any attempt to situate the conflict in a diachronic purview, that is vital in order to not only discern the facts which make up the conflicts reality but also to comprehend the dynamics of historical forces underpinning the facts. History is indeed a vision of the past. It provides a basis to critique the effectiveness of the conflict management approaches and activities applied by the ethnic communities, the State and the Catholic Church. The history of the conflict reveals incompatibilities concerning the political, economic and social goals of all the parties to the conflict. The reasons for the persistence of the conflict still remain unclear. This question requires the immediate subjection of the conflict to empirical rigorous research. By doing so, the underlying causes can be identified as a basis for the implementation of effective conflict management policies by those primarily responsible, and other parties interested in the peaceful coexistence of the Pokot and Turkana communities.

## **CHAPTER FOUR: UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT**

### **4.1 Introduction**

Chapter two is comprised of literature review and chapter three gives the history of the Pokot-Turkana conflict. This chapter is devoted to testing the first hypothesis which posits that the conflict persists because the underlying causes have not been addressed. In order to address the underlying causes it is first and foremost essential to identify them. Having identified the underlying causes it is then necessary to explain their relationship to the persistence of the conflict. What is said in this chapter is related to the two previous chapters. However, this chapter is not about the affirming or disaffirming what the literature review or history says. This chapter is specifically about the description, explanation and understanding of the relationship between the variables as posited in the hypothesis in question.

### **4.2 Results**

#### **4.2.1 Data**

This is cross section survey whose sample is large (381) and from which data were collected on a total of 74 variables that were contained in the research instrument. The chosen technique for testing the hypothesis is factor analysis which is a multivariate data-analytic technique. Agresti and Findlay (2009), note that multivariate data-analytic statistical methods were developed to handle many variables and large size sample, such as survey research. Multivariate means many variables and is usually used when there is more than one outcome (dependent) variable. The hypothesis in this research is about underlying causes and the only appropriate quantitative data-analytic technique to use is factor analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014)


Before presenting the results (factors) and interpreting the same, it is important to give the meanings of two closely related factor analysis terms, namely ‘rotation’ and ‘varimax’. Rotation is a process of improving the interpretability of factors. It entails transforming of the

initial factors in such a way as to maximize factor loadings that are already large, and to minimize factor loadings that are already small. Varimax, on the other hand, entails the loading of a smaller number of variables with high factor loadings on a factor. Differentiating the variables that load on a factor, as specified above, makes it easier not only to see which variables most clearly define that factor but also to interpret the meaning of the factor (Rummel, 1970; Palumbo, 1977, Hair et al., 1998, Stevens, 2002, Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014). This process is known as varimax rotation. Varimax rotation is extensively used and was used in this study. Thirty-seven of the 74 questions (variables/questionnaire items) that generated the data of this study focused directly or indirectly on recurrence of violent conflict between the two communities. Application of factor analysis to the 37 variables, as a set, resolved their measurements into distinct patterns of clusters of correlated variables of occurrence of the conflict behaviour. Factor analysis with varimax rotation identified three significant factors as determined from Cattell's (1966) scree plot (see Figure 1). The factors were labelled on the basis of the meaning of particular combination of observed variables that correlated highly with each of the factors.

The first factor was named "core resources", the second was named "political economy", and the third was named "infrastructure insecurity". These three factors, as classified in their respective clusters of variables, are the underlying causes of the conflict between Pokots and Turkanas. Each of these factor names is realistic on the basis that it makes empirical and logical sense by criteria of the variables clustering on it. Structural violence is operationalised through these identified latent variables. Deficient structures contribute to the existence and exacerbation of these latent variables in terms of impact on the manifest violent conflict under study. Twenty of the set of 37 variables factor analysed were retained for interpretation in terms of these

factors. As a rule of thumb, only variables with loadings of .32 and above were retained for interpretation. The greater the loading, the more the variable is a pure measure of the factor. Comrey and Lee (1992) suggest that loadings of .71 (50% overlapping variance) are considered 'excellent', .63 (40% overlapping variance) are considered 'very good', .55 (30% overlapping variance) are considered 'good', and .45 (20% overlapping variance) is considered 'fair' while .32 (10% overlapping variance) is considered 'poor'. In some cases, the cut-off is selected because one can interpret factors with that cut-off but not with a lower cut-off. The size of the loadings is influenced by the homogeneity of scores in the sample. Factors are extracted in the descending order of their magnitude. Thus, they are rank ordered in terms of relative causal importance. Typically, a good factor analysis identifies a few significant factors that account for a large proportion of the variance in the factor matrix. Factor, "core resources" explain 20% of the variance in the factor matrix i.e., the correlation between factors and variables. A 20% variance in the scree plot from which the factors in question were determined is quite reliable with large (200) sample size (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014, Field, 2013). This means, among other things, that the above factors are not a function of sampling error. In this study, the factors are few and the sample size is large (381). Therefore, they are not a function of sampling error meaning that they did not occur by chance and are, thus, replicable; they are realistic latent variables of violent conflict between the Pokots and the Turkanas. The factors are interpreted below in terms of their respective factor loadings (See Figure 4.1, Table 4.1 and Table 4.2).

**Figure 4.1 Scree plot**



Scree plot: a graph plotting each factor in a factor analysis (X-axis) against its associated eigenvalue (Y-axis). It shows the relative importance of each factor. This graph has a very characteristic shape (there is a sharp descent in the curve followed by a tailing off) and the point of inflexion of this curve is often used as a means of extraction. With a sample of more than 200 participants, this provides a fairly reliable criterion for extraction (Stevens, 2002).

**Table 4.1. Total Variance**

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings			Rotation sums of Squared Loadings
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total
1	7.378	19.940	19.940	7.378	19.940	19.940	5.804
2	3.407	9.207	29.147	3.407	9.207	29.147	2.543
3	2.006	5.422	34.569	2.006	5.422	34.569	2.412
4	1.850	4.999	39.567	1.850	4.999	39.567	1.980
5	1.748	4.724	44.292	1.748	4.724	44.292	1.779
6	1.611	4.355	48.647	1.611	4.355	48.647	1.731
7	1.438	3.886	52.533	1.438	3.886	52.533	1.699
8	1.335	3.607	56.140	1.335	3.607	56.140	1.659
9	1.193	3.225	59.366	1.193	3.225	59.366	1.544
10	1.088	2.942	62.307	1.008	2.942	62.307	1.511
11	1.035	2.799	65.106	1.035	2.799	65.106	1.429
12	.928	2.509	67.615				
13	.893	2.413	70.028				
14	.878	2.374	72.402				
15	.840	2.271	74.673				
16	.783	2.117	76.790				
17	.744	2.011	78.801				
18	.662	1.789	80.590				
19	.650	1.757	82.347				
20	.637	1.723	84.070				
21	.550	1.487	85.557				
22	.540	1.458	87.015				
23	.513	1.385	88.400				
24	.491	1.327	89.727				
25	.481	1.300	91.028				
26	.435	1.177	92.204				
27	.379	1.024	93.228				

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

**Table 4.2 Rotated Component Matrix**

Variables	Component		
	1	2	3
Death/loss of livestock	.820		
Poverty	.834		
Water	.737		
Pasture	.731		
Famine	.875		
Hunger	.819		
Politicization of Pokot-Turkana relations		.637	
Relief food		.571	
Wrangles		.659	
Revenge		.776	
Contested territory		.772	
Community influential/notables		.826	
Health care facilities			.790
Learning facilities			.724
Communications			.663
Security Personnel			.810
Elder's meetings			-.453
Firearms			.563
Distrust			.779
Greed			.519
Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization			
Factor Names: 1 = Core resources, 2 = Political Economy, 3 = Infrastructure Insecurity			

### 4.3 Core Resources

The literature on conflict in Africa is interspersed with the term resources (see literature review, subheading, “Environmental Resources and Conflict”, 2.6 above). Literature on intrastate conflicts in Africa, such as Sierra Leone in the 1980s, eastern area of the Democratic Republic of Congo since the 1990s, and the North Rift ascribe the conflicts to resources, among other things. However, there is a crucial difference between ascribing conflict in Sierra Leone and the eastern area of Democratic Republic of Congo to resources on the one hand, and ascribing conflict in the

North Rift to resources on the other hand. In order to make a distinction between these resource conflicts, it is helpful to provide an applicable understanding of the term ‘resources’ (Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004)). The term resource refers to a useful valuable thing/possession that contributes to economic activity and is also, either a basic necessity or indispensable for human/animal life. According to this definition, the conflict in Sierra Leone and the eastern part of Democratic Republic of Congo can be described as being over resources (diamonds and coltan) construed as a thing/possession that contributes to economic activity, whereas conflict in the North Rift can be described as being over resources (water, pasture and livestock) construed as a possession/thing that is either a basic necessity or indispensable for human/animal life. Neither diamond nor coltan is a basic necessity for human and animal life. Water is a basic necessity for human and animal life, and livestock is indispensable to some humans where because pastoralism is the dominant mode of production for survival, for instance, the Turkanas and most Picots. Pasture is a basic necessity for livestock life. That is why the first factor was labelled ‘core resources’. There were 6 variables that loaded on this factor: perennial shortage of water, perennial shortage of pasture, death/loss of livestock through prolonged drought, grinding poverty, famine and hunger. The above variables are correlated (clustered). Factors are interpreted by the variables that correlate with them. What follows below is interpretation of factor core resources in terms of these variables that loaded highest on it. The interpretation is causal meaning that each variable is interpreted as stemming from factor core resources; the how and why core resources, as an underlying process, generates the variables in question. Galtung’s (1969) assertion that structural violence is “existing in those conditions in which human beings are influenced so that their somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realization” (p.188), is very relevant to the variables above that loaded on factor core resources as an

underlying cause of the conflict and to the discussion on the variables below. Core resources, as an underlying cause of the conflict, is inextricably connected to human beings realizing their somatic and mental potentials. In this respect, the linkage of basic human needs explaining conflict (Maslow, 1970; Burton, 1997; Northrup, 1997) is also relevant, as the relationship between actualizing one's potential and meeting basic human needs is closely tied (Mudida, 2009).

Variable famine whose correlation with core resources is .875 is the most highly loaded on factor core resources. In a sense this is not surprising. Famine is more or less a characteristic of arid and semi-arid northern Kenya. Famine points to scarcity of core resources in the form of food and water. Occurrence of famine in Turkana-land, for example, is not a momentary state of affairs; it is recurrent (Good, 2007). One of the strategies of coping with famine, more or less, is raiding livestock from the ethnic other. In terms of descriptive statistics, 66 per cent of the sample (381) said that famine is a cause of the conflict between the two communities. The dynamics of this scenario are these: core resources, which is a latent variable, causes the conflict; however, the causation is not direct. It is indirect in that it is mediated by famine, which is the observable variable on which data were collected. Variables poverty, death of livestock through prolonged drought, and hunger, are also highly positively loaded on factor core resources. The difference between famine and hunger is that people can live with hunger without outside intervention to alleviate or mitigate it. People cannot, however, live with famine, let alone starvation. Hunger, as a distinct variable in its own right, does however contribute to violent conflict between members of the two ethnic communities. A simple frequency run of the variable hunger disaggregated into categories of its contribution to incidents of the conflict revealed this distribution: not much contribution (10.8%), much contribution (22.3%), very large

contribution (38.0%), and no contribution (28.9%). During the collection of primary data, Pokot and Turkana female interviewees stated that hunger forces men, depending on circumstances of the moment, to engage in acts of desperation against outsiders (Pokot/Turkana) with the objective of getting food and people get hurt or killed in the process. The simple correlation between variables hunger and famine based on the data of this research is .846, which in terms of prediction (regression of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict) means that the variables are collinear. When conditions of hunger and famine are allowed to perennially exist and cause conflict, questions arise about the structures of the society or State that tolerate such conditions. It is precisely this type of scenario that underpins Galtung's theory of structural violence.

Correlations of factor core resources with death/loss of livestock, water and pasture are quite high. These variables, as earlier explained, are basic necessities and in this respect lend support to structural violence enabling people to realise their somatic and mental realizations (Galtung, 1969; Burton, 1997; Iadicola & Shupe, 2003). The fact that they all highly loaded on factor core resources was expected; but the manner in which they cause violence between the members of the two ethnic communities varies. Death/loss of livestock through prolonged drought is the fourth highest loaded variable on factor core resources. Its factor loading value is .820. In terms of magnitude of loading on this factor, the difference between hunger and death of livestock through prolonged drought is negligible: .819 for hunger, and .820 for death of livestock through prolonged drought. However, the two variables are significantly different in nature and contrasting in terms of their separate, as opposed to joint bearing on the conflict. These variables, together with the others that are also loaded on factor core resources, were regressed on occurrences of the conflict. The regression showed that death of livestock due to prolonged drought predicts the conflict better than hunger does because the prediction error of

death of livestock due to prolonged drought was much smaller than the prediction error of hunger. Large-scale loss of livestock, through prolonged drought and animal disease related to the drought, tend to trigger violent conflict intended to replenish stock. The dynamics of hunger producing the conflict are different in the sense that the causal effect of hunger on conflict is significant when other correlates of the conflict, such as famine, are present. When there is famine, hunger is seen as a group problem, as opposed to an individual problem. Furthermore, other things being equal, this state of affairs leads to group, as opposed to individual, violent aggression against the ethnic other. In factor analysis, original measures (data) are changed into standard scores before various statistics are calculated. Standardization renders comparison of variables measured in different units meaningful. Thus, the variance of variable death of livestock through prolonged drought in this research is larger (4.179) than the variance of variable hunger (1.563). Since there were no outliers in the calculation of these statistics, what they mean in comparative terms is that death of livestock through prolonged drought as a cause of the conflict is more spread out from its central tendency than hunger as a cause of the conflict is similarly spread out.

Poverty is the second most highly loaded variable on factor core resources. Variables that are highly loaded on a factor can be treated as causes of those whose loadings on the same factor are lower (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014; Rummel, 1970; Kline, 1994, Agresti & Finlay, 2009). Barring variable famine with a factor loading of .875, a plausible argument in this regard is that variable poverty with a factor loading of .834 is causally linked to variables with lower loadings on factor core resources, namely, death/loss of livestock, water, pasture and hunger. Poverty is a controversial concept and social scientists (economists and sociologists) fail to agree on its definition or on how it should be measured (Sharp et al., 2002) but most discussion about

poverty by sociologists and economists distinguish between absolute and relative definitions of poverty. Relative definition refers to an individual or group's lack of resources when compared with that of other members of their society, in other words, their relative standard of living or deprivation. Furthermore, relative poverty is sometimes used in a more inclusive sense to encompass the cultural needs of individuals and families within the context of the rest of society. Poverty defined in absolute terms refers to a state in which the individual lacks resources necessary for subsistence. As such, it refers to the lack of basic requirements to sustain physical life. Poverty is widespread in the North Rift and has been causally linked to conflict (Buchanan-Smith & Lind, 2005). While Turkana-land is ranked highest in the country in terms of 'poverty incidence', Pokot-land in general is much better off. However, the area where the Pokots and the Turkanas interface with each other in conflict is practically equal in terms of 'poverty incidence' (KNBS, 2015). Of the two definitions of poverty, the one that is appropriate for the North Rift is the relative definition because it captures the empirical (facts, figures and history) reality of Turkana-land and most of Pokot-land. Before highlighting the causal link of poverty to recurring violent conflict between the two communities, it is important to note that poverty defined in relative terms is here to stay with us, barring utopianism, even as it is reduced in a variety of ways, both qualitatively and quantitatively. The probability of a perfect society, devoid of relative poverty, is highly unlikely as that is utopian. That variable poverty loaded second highest on the first factor to be extracted was not surprising; it is something that one would have predicted. Besides, it is not implausible that the very fact that variable poverty loaded on factor core resources constituted a form of validation of this study's primary data. Poverty is a pure measure of core resources because its factor loadings on the other factors identified in this research are below .32.

One generalization about conflict is that the probability of the poor fighting one another or amongst themselves is higher than the probability of the poor fighting the rich. This generalization is validated by ethnically charged conflict in the North Rift with particular reference to the Pokot and the Turkana. This is based on the fact that within the territorial confines of the State and by criterion of the relative poverty definition, members of the Pokot and the Turkana ethnic communities are poor. In qualitative research literature, conflict between members of these ethnic communities is often, if not commonly, ascribed to their marginalization, which is in turn equated with their poverty. Marginalization does not necessarily cause manifest violent conflict as evidenced in many places where marginalisation exists throughout the world. In this respect the analytic utility of the concept marginalization can be limited. However, some situations of violent conflict that are explained by other analysts in terms of poverty can be explained better by the concept of marginalization. Discussions of marginalization are frequently contextualised in the framework of the provision of goods and services connected to core resources. This entails reference to adequacy of institutions that can ensure that core resources are managed in a proper manner. Water and pasture, like herds discussed in terms of loss through raiding and drought as well as epidemic disease above, are core resources. The obvious difference between water and pasture is that the former is necessary for human existence as well as that of animals and the latter is indirectly essential for human life that is dependent on pastoralism. The pastoralist Pokots and the Turkanas are dependent on livestock for their livelihood and without pasture, animals will die and thereby depriving them of their means of livelihood. Nature, meaning the physical environment, is much more limiting in terms of developing alternatives to pastoralism in Turkana-land than Pokot-land. The first column of Table 4.2 has a high value .737 for water and a lower value of .731 for pasture. These

statistics mean that the contribution of water to factor core resources' explanation of variance in the data is more than that of pasture in the explanation of the same. Other things being equal, the amount of error made in predicting the occurrence of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict from perennial water scarcity is smaller than the amount of error made in predicting the occurrence of the Pokot-Turkana violence from perennial scarcity of pasture. Thus, in comparative terms, water is more of a cause of the conflict than pasture. This is because adaptive strategies and tactics with which to cope with perennial scarcity of water are more variable and typically productive in terms of expected results, for humans at least, than those of coping with scarcity of pasture. All this can be ascribed to the fact that water is necessary for human existence as well as animal existence, while pasture is necessary for animal existence only. Consequently, devising strategies and tactics for accessing water naturally takes precedence over devising strategies and tactics for accessing pasture. It is important to note that what this paragraph says resonates particularly with what is discussed in the chapter on literature review under the subheading "environmental resources and conflict" (2.6 above).

The fact that variables water and pasture load on the same factor means that their dynamics are not mutually exclusive and are, at times, inextricably intertwined. Violent conflict over pastures is a characteristic of the rainy season. During that season, there is plenty of pasture in Pokot-land and even in Turkana-land, and water is relatively easily available. Members of each ethnic community plan how to use the available pasture. This involves taking their respective herds to graze in areas distant from the environs of their dwellings, relatively permanent or temporary, so as to preserve the pasture closest to their homesteads. The preserved pasture will be used during the dry season or drought periods. While moving to distant pasture areas and grazing there, Pokot and Turkana herders encounter each other as their respective

herds move close and closer. This occasions grazing competition, free of violent conflict, as the two communities try to access the distant pasture. Usually, the non-violent competition does not last long; it transforms into conflict when the lush pasture becomes less and less or scarce. This transformation to conflict is as a result of either overgrazing or the movement of herds of one ethnic community deeper into the territory of the other ethnic community in search of pasture. This movement of herders and their flocks into distant pastures tends to result in fighting and raiding because of a variety of reasons. First, during the rainy season, warriors tend to be idle because they are free from their daily chores of watering animals and this gives them space to plan and execute raids. Second, warriors who provide security surveillance for their animals spy on the neighbouring ethnic community in order to know who is taking care of livestock, the kinds of weapons the other side possesses, and movements of likely opponents from among the Pokot or Turkana as the case may be. This knowledge is used for launching raids. Third, in the rainy season, there is a lot of merry-making that includes women singing traditional songs intended to entice warriors to carry out raids and counter-raids. Fourth, water is available in the corridors used for raiding purposes and this means that warriors will not experience problems of thirst. It is helpful, for the purpose of enhancing comprehension, to note that the validity of scarcity, alluded to above, as a cause of the violent conflict is rendered sound if the causation is contextualized within alternatives to pastoralism as the mainstay of subsistence for Turkanas and Pokots. This is much more so the case for herders (warriors) who are also typically involved in cattle rustling. It is a fact that areas inhabited by Pokots and Turkanas are deprived (KNBS, 2015), partly as a result of the natural environment, notwithstanding modification by human agency and State policy practices. Given the extreme poverty of the people in the Pokot-Turkana conflict environment, access to viable alternatives to pastoralism is very limited, especially

training and skills to engage in other alternatives to pastoralism. All this is exacerbated by their attachment to their animals (Osamba, 2000) that is better understood in terms of matters cultural than matters economic. Thus, when meteorologists forecast that there is going to be relatively long drought, politicians, among others, urge or advise locals to sell some, if not all, of their livestock while they are still healthy in order to avert losses if the drought persists. However, the locals tend not to respond accordingly due to cultural attachment to their herds. Hence, when drought lasts longer than expected, herds are lost through drought and those that are still alive deteriorate in terms of marketable economic value because of their emaciated condition. As a consequence, their owners experience severe hardship and are rendered poor and destitute. Hardship may be manifested in an extreme way in the form of death from starvation, particularly during times of perennial scarcity, as opposed to momentary episodes. In the circumstances, the aged, women, and children are likely to be rendered helpless while men are able to go out in search of food. If relief food agencies do not respond quickly, in the dispatching of food, the chances of the helpless surviving decrease. In addition, the men who went to search for food may get killed in the course of raiding livestock from other ethnic communities and this may also include fights and killings over wild fruit harvesting. To replenish the lost or depleted livestock, warrior groups from the Pokot and Turkana engage in violent conflict in the form of raiding and counter-raiding.

#### **4.4 Political Economy**

In international relations, political economy refers to parallel existence and mutual interaction of “state” and “market” in the modern world (Gilbin, 1987). However, in the context of conflict, political economy refers to the political and economic factors that are sources of conflict. Malone and Sherman (2007:647) claim that it is often difficult to separate these two factors:

“Both are sources of conflict, but the interplay and relative importance of these factors vary not only between conflicts but also among different actors within a specific conflict and over its duration.” Political economy is the second highest ranked statistically important factor in this study. Its importance is also based on the variables that loaded on it. Only factor core resources accounts for more variance in the variables loaded on it (core resources) than factor political economy accounts for variance in the variables loaded on it (political economy). In the Pokot-Turkana conflict, economic matters are politically charged; politics tends to be used as means of economics. This is the instrumentation of politics, the consequences of which may be positive or negative depending on the circumstances of the particular moment or situation. Political economy as the label for the second factor to be extracted from the data was based principally on the nature of the clustering or cramped variables on it. Labelling also took into account, in some measure, the application of the principles of neo-classical economic thought in certain aspects of political economy discourse by some social scientists (economists, sociologists, political scientists). Their treatment of political economy is different from the radical Marxist versions to which the label is most commonly applied. Their works apply neo-classical principles to areas outside the economy, such as public policy and its structural components, focusing on artificially induced scarcities (“rents”) that are produced by political pressure exerted by economic interest groups (Sharp et al., 2002). In a similar vein, Keen (1997) points out that a political economy perspective enables an understanding of conflict beyond the rigid opposition between winning and losing. It does this through throwing light on those increasing frequent situations where conflict appears to be a self-perpetuating process in which each party’s aim is to enjoy the contextual benefits, for example money, power, and impunity, rather than resolve or win over the other parties or party. With regard to the Pokot-Turkana conflict, the main contextual benefits

are raided/stolen animals, water, pasturage and other lesser important booties. The foregoing strand of political economy discourse informs, to an extent, the interpretation of variables with loadings of .32 and above on factor political economy. The variables are: contested control/occupation of territory (land), influential people (ethnic notables), firearms, relief food, politicization of Pokot-Turkana relations, political/economic wrangles, and revenge.

In retrospect, land is probably the most valuable commodity in Kenya (Ministry of Lands, 2009). Chapter three of this study that deals with the history of the conflict from a spatio-temporal perspective gives substantive attention to the role of territory and land in relation to the conflict and its persistence. During the pre-colonial period, much of the conflict under study had to do with control over territory for the purpose of not administering it but rather affording a means to access pasture and water. Preferential treatment accorded to the Pokot, as opposed to the Turkana, was largely based on considerations of land. At that time, Turkanas, more than Pokots, were invariably nomads, and this made the issue of territorial boundary between them complex and very difficult if not impossible to resolve. Successive post-colonial regimes did not do much in terms of addressing the land issue in the Pokot-Turkana relations. Indeed the issue of contested control of territory involving the Pokots and the Turkanas is more problematic now than it was in the pre-colonial and early post-colonial periods. This is due to the passage of time and the multiplication of interested parties in various forms and manifestations including political, economic, administrative, historical, ecological subsistence, mode of production contradiction tendencies, and cultural change. Once again chapter three of this study provides ample information on this matter. As a matter of fact, the so-called ethnic clashes in the Rift Valley in the post-colonial period may neither be justifiably construed as violent expression of identity politics nor as ethnic ‘othering’ as an aspect of dialectic of development praxis. Rather,

typical occurrences of violent conflict in the Rift Valley whose distinguishing line are ethnic differences stem from matters of land. This has especially been the case since the end of colonial rule. In this connection, and in light of all the ethnic displacement, it is plausible to assert that the resulting violence from the disputed 2007 presidential election results is partly explained, not by ethnic difference or differential political party affiliation, but by contested control of land, and territory in general. Variable contested territory is loaded at .772 on factor political economy. The magnitude of this factor loading is high such that it is warrantable to construe contested control of territory as a marker variable. Variable contested control/occupation of territory is third in contribution to variance (communality) accounted for by factor analysis. Lastly, concerning variable contested control/occupation of territory are the consequences, potential and/or manifest, resulting from natural environmental changes with particular reference to pasturage and water as explained below. Leaving land ungrazed causes pasture degradation in the long term as decreased pressures due to lack of grazing results in bushy and ungrazed vegetation. Water points are also degraded through disuse. This state of affairs is brought about by the fact that it is a highly risky place for herders to graze because of the danger of being subjected to large raids in the event of grazing in the area. Thus, Pokot and Turkana both eschew grazing in the area. The shrinkage of grazing and the water availability due to eschewal of disputed grazing areas by both communities leads to abnormal concentrations of herds in safe areas.

It is tenable that occurrences of violent conflict in the social formations of pastoralism, including agro-pastoralism, in Kenya are partly caused by what can be described as an entrepreneurial elite that mobilizes ethnic groups to further its own political interests. Variable ethnic notables, with a factor loading of .826, pertain to mobilization. In the analysis, preference

was given to the use of the variable name ethnic notables, or simply notables, rather than entrepreneurial elite because the former is more inclusive content-wise than the latter. The activities of the Pokot/Turkana notables in the form of social mobilization intensify Pokot/Turkana competition for limited resources and heighten ethnic self-consciousness. In so doing, they undermine manifest and potential efforts by actors, other than the particular notables, to improve the Pokot-Turkana relations oriented to contribute to development praxis in the two communities. It is highly unlikely that Turkana-land can develop at the expense of Pokot-land and vice-versa, notwithstanding the potential existence of potential commercially exploitable oil in Turkana-land. However, the economic objectives of particular Pokot notables' ethnically charged self-serving political manipulation can be achieved at the expense of those of their Turkana counterpart and vice-versa. The notables tend to conflate their pursuit of personal interests with speaking for, or representing collective community rights and other pertinent interests. However, it is quite plausible that oftentimes, the achievement of the objectives or interests of the notables do not entail or resonate with the achievement of Pokot/Turkana community rights and interests. This is due to contradictions between strategies and tactics of achieving of the personal interests of the notables, on the one hand, and strategies and tactics for achieving community rights and interests on the other hand. It is also a fact that social mobilization activities of Pokot and Turkana notables, within their respective ethnic communities, are not mutually exclusive. The ethnic other may be the reason for mobilization in the first place, or Pokot notables' and Turkana notables' mobilization activities have consequences that spill over into Pokot/Turkana community. Either the targeting of Pokot/Turkana as the reason for mobilization or the consequences of mobilization spill-over into Pokot/Turkana community becomes a most likely cause of violent conflict between Pokots and

Turkanas. This behaviour is, of course, politically charged and its motive is economic self-serving in multiple ways. For example, economic and political status benefits accruing from commercialized raiding that are linked to corrupt ethnic notables, cartels, corrupt security and other State functionaries. The foregoing are, then, the dynamics of the variance, excluding unique and error variance, in variable ethnic notables that is associated with factor political economy. Although the factor loading of this variable is high (.826), its practical importance by criterion of relative deprivation of earning livelihoods is more than its statistical significance here, in the purview of the political economy of Kenya, let alone Pokot-land and Turkana-land social formations. This is because Kenya's post-colonial State politics are structured partly by threat and violence explicable in terms of political choices made by a few powerful individuals that are functional to particular economic interests. This perspective is prevalent in chapter three on the history, and is particularly focussed on by Mazrui (1977) & Dolan (2006) among others. The whole operation of such political choices and its functional underpinnings are generally geared to maintaining institutionalized multiple disparities along ethnic and/or regional lines. In this context, disparity entails skewed distribution or sharing of public goods and/or provision of services and amenities. Disparity, thus, generates conflict at the more negative end of the skew, especially whenever the ethnic and the regional coincide, for example in the North Rift where the Pokots and the Turkanas live.

This form of social mobilization amounts to politicization of ethnicity in the context of Pokot-Turkana relations. The politicization of ethnicity is a regular issue of debate in Kenya's politics and governance (Wanyande, 2009). Variable politicization of Pokot-Turkana relations is loaded at .637 on factor political economy. Politicization means that the Pokot/Turkana are socially perceived or construed as a political community rather than as an ethnic community *per*

*se.* Given that politics is a means of economics (Malone and Sherman (2007), the Pokot/Turkana, by virtue of being a political community, have economic interests and strive in different ways to attain or accumulate such interests that flow by virtue of being a political community. Furthermore, the interests must be protected and promoted. In this scheme of things, history provides ancestry that legitimizes the present day loyalty to Pokot/Turkana as a political, as opposed to an ethnic identity *per se*. Community cohesiveness is politically constituted and dependent upon a sense of shared past experience. Accordingly, history becomes instrumentally important as the shared record of what binds fellow ethnics together and distinguishes them (Pokot/Turkana) from the ethnic other (Pokot/Turkana). While mobilization, in this context, does not convey primordial behavioural disposition, there is a sense in which it is arguable that mobilization smacks of a species of essentialism. In a discourse of identity politics and conflict Suny (2001:46) says that, “essentialism may be defined as the attribution of behaviour or thinking to the intrinsic, fundamental nature of a person, collectivity, or State.” Essentialism pertains to the cultural rather than the political and the economic. The cultural does not constitute lenses through which past and present relations between the Pokots and the Turkanas should be seen; rather, the lenses are constituted by the political and the economic. The point is that the political and the economic provide the historical lens or ancestry that legitimizes present day and past tendency on the part of the Pokot and Turkana individuals or groups to allow themselves to be manipulated by their respective ethnic notables. While all parties have interest in the political and economic benefits, the benefits mostly, if not exclusively, accrue to the notables rather than to the Pokots/Turkanas in general. The flip side of this point is that, in reality, ordinary Pokot and Turkana individuals and groups do not allow themselves to be used by the notables but rather economic insecurity forces the ordinary people

to turn to ethnic notables for support. Raiding does not benefit the ordinary people in general, be it the Turkana or Pokot. It benefits the raiders and dealers in commercialized rustling. Ethnic notables have what amounts to enormous, though far from absolute, multifaceted influence, through which they can either promote Pokot-Turkana cooperation in the interest of development praxis or instigate Pokot-Turkana violent conflict, thereby contributing to reproduction of political instability and economic backwardness in the Pokot-Turkana region. Political instability and economic backwardness are constantly reproduced when the notables, in their pursuit of self-serving ends, resort to identity because of identity's ubiquity and power of unifying Pokots against Turkanas, and Turkanas against Pokots. Raids and killings are a consequence of resorting to identity in the pursuit of self-serving ends. Thus, identity is not a category of Pokot/Turkana social history but one of practice exemplified by raiding for instance. Hence, identity is a category of everyday social experience developed and displayed by ordinary Pokot/Turkana social actors. It is not a category of analysis, as for example, in the seemingly apolitical narratives of colonial State social-cultural anthropologists and much of those of the post-colonial State on the same.

Wrangles are a regular and non-trivial aspect of ethnic and interethnic politics in Kenya (Nyawalo, 2011). They easily lend themselves to being understood in terms of particular individual/community interest or inter-community interests' incompatibilities. Community, as used here, refers to Pokot/Turkana. Within an ethnic community and between ethnic communities, wrangles are characteristic of social formations where pastoralism is the mainstay of livelihood. A comprehensive manner to make sense of these wrangles requires one to go beyond grazing and water, as well as livestock (cattle) rustling, which are frequently given as causes of conflict in the social formations of pastoralism. Specifically, there is need to look at

the interplay between the political and the economic in terms of their independent and unique contribution to violent conflict as a characteristic of these social formations. This is what is encapsulated by variable wrangles. Its factor loading of .659 is in the range of magnitudes that are moderate while its loading on factors core resources and infrastructure insecurity are quite low, which is in line with the purpose of varimax rotation. Thus, it is justified to describe variable wrangles as constituting a reasonable pure objectification of factor political economy that clearly defines the factor. Wrangles are fuelled by the self-interest of notables in the domain of politics and economics. In terms of spread or scale, the wrangles may be local on the basis that they are confined to a parliamentary constituency or a county. Of course wrangles that are national are aspects of the political and the economic in Kenya but this research focuses on how they attain locally within the group dynamics specified above. It is important to note that the distinction between local and national wrangles is analytic as opposed to concrete. Respondents averred (77%) that these wrangles are mainly due to lack of coherent leadership in their communities which facilitates disagreements in the form of wrangles between community notables and this becomes a basis for manifest violence between the Pokot and the Turkana. The wrangles contribute to the seemingly irretrievable diminution of the influence of elders on managing violent conflict between Pokots and Turkanas. A different perspective, but related to the above view of wrangles, is that they bespeak strains on the structure and process of the politics of patronage at local level.

Variable wrangles mediate the causal relationship between ethnically defined identity and membership of a political party to the Pokot-Turkana conflict. Thus, it is causally linked to the conflict as a non-exogenous variable. The dynamics of variable wrangle tend, to be verbal, more or less; but at times, they degenerate into physical violence that has destructive consequences for

peaceful coexistence between members of the Pokot and Turkana communities. When the wrangles degenerate into physical violence, their contribution to the conflict becomes direct rather than indirect. The contribution is thus not attributable to a cause that antecedes the wrangles. But it is also the case that sometimes the causal connection between wrangles and the conflict is indirect, as narrated by Pokot and Turkana research respondents. For instance, criminal elements of the local underlying population who are indifferent to the political intrigues of the notables behind the wrangles take advantage of the wrangles' rhetorical intimidation by instigating inter-communal, Pokot-Turkana, violent conflict. Besides, it is also the case that sometimes the wrangles do not stem from the political intrigues of the notables but are a function of ineptitude, incompetence and nepotism, or even avarice on the part of the State functionaries at the local level.

The introduction of guns into Turkana-land by traders from Ethiopia antedates the creation of the colonial State by the British in the geographical confines of what is Kenya today (Lamphear, 1992; Mburu, 2007). Since then, Turkana-land and elsewhere in the North Rift has all along felt the consequences of armed civilian populations. The tale of disarming the local civilian population of the North Rift by the colonial State as well as successive regimes of the post-colonial State is more a tale of failure and less of success. The failure is a constant (statistical sense, as in regression) in the colonial and successive regimes. Variable firearms has a factor loading of .531 that can be described as moderate. Besides, it is the only complex variable according to the data of this research. In factor analysis, a complex variable is one that loads on more than one factor. Variable firearms loaded on factors political economy and infrastructure insecurity. Variable firearms is interpreted here only in terms of political economy. The sources of firearms that obtain in the North Rift's social formations of pastoralism in recent

years are measurably different from those of the earlier post-colonial period. Furthermore, the translation of quality into quantity, meaning gun violence and the number of killings and injuries stemming from using guns in conflict between Pokots and Turkanas is larger in scale today compared to what it was in the relatively distant past. The above is a paraphrase of what respondents said, among other things, during collection of interview data – more Turkanas said so than Pokots. However, Pokots' image of Turkanas, as per the Pokots interviewees, is that Turkanas are more intrusive.

Significant reduction or obviation of the use of firearms in Pokot-Turkana conflict requires knowledge about the sources of firearms. Respondents tended to be somewhat reticent to talk about sources of firearms even as they admitted that there are many firearms in their community. They mentioned the various sources of firearms that are illicitly possessed by fellow ethnics and the ethnic other. First, they cited the involvement of Kenya security officers (typically men) in arms-trafficking cartels whose markets are neighbouring countries. Upon probing during a focus group discussion, they mentioned the discovery of the Narok arm cache in 2009 at a private home. Secondly, there are civilians who are arms trafficking operatives who get arms destined for other countries in Africa shipped to Mombasa legally but illegally divert the firearms into the Kenya market. Thirdly, there are three porous border points, particularly in northern Kenya, that afford gun smugglers a means to illicitly bring small arms into Kenya. This is primarily due to poor border patrol by Kenya security forces. Fourthly, communities acquire guns from the ethnic other during fights when the other is defeated, seriously injured or killed. Fifth is the ineffectiveness of State's negative reinforcement in the form of disarmament that amounts to the punishment of Pokots/Turkanas for illegally owning firearms. Disarmament is ineffective because it is episodic and its benefits are momentary. It is a state of affairs in which

Pokots and Turkanas are presented by the State with two alternative courses of behaviour to choose from; namely, handing over the firearms to the State security functionaries or refusing to do so. Those who surrender their firearms to the State voluntary or coercively, and most of them do not, soon re-arm themselves. The reason for this is because firearms are relatively cheap and easily available. This negates the purpose of disarmament. Moreover, the Pokots and the Turkanas who did not possess firearms hitherto the disarmament now proceed to acquire them because they believe that it is highly unlikely that they will be disarmed. However, in the event that they are disarmed, they will re-arm themselves. In dialectical logic, this scenario constitutes negation of negation. In their territories, the Pokots and the Turkanas choose to possess and own arms because it is the order of the day. It is normal to possess firearms for different reasons. One of the reasons as to why variable firearms pertains to factor political economy is that livestock rustling is commercialized and is on the increase in present times. In this evolving process, firearms have become centrally instrumental in transactions of the commercialization. Indeed, commercialization of cattle rustling adds credence to Bayart's (1991) notion of economy of dirty tricks whose dimensions are deception, threat, and violence. The identity of buyers of guns and the purpose they are purchased for are not issues in transactions of commercialized livestock rustling. It is just business as usual, though illegal. Consistent with Government of Kenya and IGAD reports, as well as media coverage, the Pokot and Turkana respondents conceded that there are a lot of firearms pervading Pokot-land and Turkana-land. All this is estimation based, in some cases, on information sources whose reliability one may call into question (Mirzeler & Young, 2000). In practice, it comes very close to being virtually impossible to determine what percentage of guns bought by individual Pokots and Turkanas that have been used by the individual buyers themselves in a given occurrence of the Pokot-Turkana

conflict. However, it is quite safe to state that it is not highly problematic to design a methodology to determine, in a given occurrence of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict, the percentage of firearms that have not been used by their respective owners because there has not/never arisen any need on the part of the owners to use them. But according to the data gathered from this research, it is well known within State security circles as well as civilian circles that the owners/possessors in question sometimes rent out the guns to people who need them for acts of physical violence such as livestock rustling or banditry and related activities. This is similar to a case where police officers give guns to criminal gangs to engage in acts of robbery with violence and who afterwards share the loot with the police who supplied them the guns. A pertinent question at this juncture is: are the firearms which are said to be easily available and proliferate inclusive of those rented out or given to criminal gangs as specified above? This is an empirical question that requires employing the scientific way of researching on social phenomena. However, it is highly unlikely that the government gatekeepers or the State security establishment can allow one to find out the different dimensions of which police firearms are used sometimes. For State reasons, it is reasonable to posit that only police themselves could investigate the phenomena of how and why some of the firearms under their custody get into the hands of civilians who use them in acts of criminal violence which are economically and/or politically motivated. Pokots and Turkanas fight neither to protect their respective cultures nor to achieve cultural hegemony on the ethnic 'other'. Thus, fights commonly in the form of raids, between them are not functional for both Pokot culture and Turkana culture. To argue otherwise is to fall into the trap of the descriptive accounts often propagated by the anthropologists of the colonial period. As pointed out earlier in Chapter Three, their fascination with the manners and customs of colonized peoples, and preoccupation with the

functionalist point of view, were wont to invent and propagate functions even where none existed. Furthermore, the functionalist standpoint did not atrophy following the end of colonialism and its associated political hegemony as well as economic privilege. It is still very prevalent as attested to by the writings of anthropologists about pastoralist communities. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the anthropological literature on the pastoralist communities in Kenya, raids are treated as cultural practice. This is a trivialization of the systematized killings, maiming violence, and displacement, which constitute a historical impediment to security and socio-economic development in the social formations of pastoralism.

Raids lend themselves to categorization into two labels, namely, revenge and non-revenge raids. The discussion here is on revenge. In terms of quality, there is no difference between them precisely because both of them entail violence. However, with respect to quantity, there is a crucial difference that is delineated below. The factor loading of variable revenge on factor political economy is .776. According to the criteria proffered by Comrey and Lee (1992), the description of this factor loading is that it is good; its overlapping variance with all the variables that loaded on factor political economy is 60% ( $.776^2$ ). The remaining residual comprises unique and error variance. In the media and government circles, revenge is usually given as the reason for livestock rustling and fighting between pastoralist communities. They assert that revenge is the cause of the conflict but do not demonstrate that it is the cause. Be that as it may, the above factor loading does not validate the assertion; rather it is an empirical demonstration of the bearing of political economy on violent conflict behaviour between the Pokots and Turkanas as mediated by revenge. The concept of revenge is central to the problem of violence in the social formations of pastoralism. In this regard, the linkage between revenge and the concept of conflict memory should be valued, a perspective proffered by Eaton (2008).

Resilience of conflict memory, in this context of revenge, could be a reason for persistence of interethnic conflicts (Mwagiru, 2006). Revenge is a function of Pokot/Turkana in the counting of gains and losses. Revenge is a politically fuelled and economically motivated and a necessary effect of Pokots/Turkanas counting their gains and losses in dialectic of raiding. However, not all occurrences of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict are revenge; rather, they constitute or comprise of the so-called traditional raiding that is not based on revenge. Most respondents (65%) responded that the amount of destruction, such as killings, maiming, displacement, loss of animals to raiders and thieves in revenge raiding can be quite large whereas in traditional raiding it is much smaller. Seemingly, there is a strain of vengeance seeking group grievance in revenge raiding. This is unlike traditional raiding in that it is apparently unencumbered by such a strain. During focus group discussion sessions, Pokot and Turkana elders pointed out that since the mid-postcolonial period, raiding has exhibited a trend that is drifting from traditional raiding towards revenge raiding. Revenge is a retaliatory or retributive social act. In theorizing about revenge, Girard (1999) focuses on the idea of blood feud, and shows how the mechanics of vengeance are contained within the effects of mimetic (body language) desire. In terms of violent conflict, it means that after interethnic raids, the mimetic or derivative desire ensures that one community's response in raiding reflects the severity of the antecedent raid on them, and vice versa. As such, violent conflict between Pokots and Turkanas becomes a self-sustaining effect, a vicious circle of 'tit for tat'. A vicious circle is any situation in which an action (for example, an attempt by the State functionaries to resolve specific aspect the Pokot-Turkana conflict) tends to bring about a further reaction that offsets any gain brought about by the initial action. Perhaps, as a result, this tends to bring a return to the state of affairs that led to the initial action (i.e., Pokot-Turkana raiding each other) and even exacerbating the initial problem.

With respect to Pokot-Turkana conflict, the expectation is that the role of the State in resolving the conflict should be impartial. However, contrary to expectations, when the State is not seen by Pokots/Turkanas as a neutral arbiter, under certain circumstances, its intervention geared to resolving a territorial dispute, such as county boundary for example, is from the onset perceived by Pokots and Turkanas as partial rather than impartial. This makes it much less likely that violent conflict behaviour between Pokots and Turkanas will not recur. Now this point is a probability statement of certainty, that is, one whose chances of recurring are 100% (=1) precisely because Pokot-Turkana conflict is a recurrent phenomenon and not a momentary episode. The perception in question is underpinned by political disorder as an aspect of Pokot-Turkana relations in space and time, which, in turn, is a correlate of relative social exclusion in Kenya. What amounts to a more telling correlate of the social exclusion is economic deprivation. The disorder and deprivation in question constitute the context of revenge wherein revenge lends itself to explanation in terms of retrodution, which is a form of reasoning that entails making an inference about the causal mechanism that lies behind and is responsible for regularities in the social world (Lakatos & Musgrave, 1972). In this context, it refers to regularities of political disorder and economic deprivation as correlates of Pokots' and Turkanas' relative social exclusion. In matters epistemological, critical realism that is associated with retrodution is a persuasive approach of getting to know the facts of political disorder and economic deprivation. The epistemological standpoint of critical realism is the assertion that the study of the social world should be concerned with the identification of the structures that generate that world, which in this instance refers to the world of occurrences of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict as revenge. Although retrodution and critical realism are associated, as alluded to earlier, they are nevertheless concerned with different aspects of the scientific enterprise.

Retroduction has to do with matters of theory (explanation), whereas critical realism has to do with matters of method (how to know). As can be seen from the foregoing, the relevance of retroduction and critical realism to the concern of this study, with particular reference to the hypothesis in question, is explicitly obvious. Not all participants in revenge raiding are necessarily Pokot and Turkana. In certain revenge raids, some of the raiders are non-Pokot/Turkana with experience in livestock rustling and/or banditry. It is worth pointing out that the inclusion of non-Pokots/Turkanas in revenge raids does not diminish the salience of Pokot/Turkana historical memory formation, specifically conflict memory and their respective ethnic identity construction tales couched in prejudice and aggression on the part of the ethnic other. During unstructured interviews, interviewees averred that in some raids, State security personnel are among the raiders, but when killed during the raiding process, the official government explanation is that they were killed by warriors and the like while they were carrying out their official responsibilities as security personnel.

Among the many variables on which data were collected in this research was the response by security officials to the raids, mainly through the pursuit of raiders and recovery of the livestock taken during raids. It was treated as scale with regard to measurement and constructed in the form of a matrix question: quite quick reaction, quite slow reaction, and no reaction. Data on the last response were deemed not usable because cases were too few. Simple one way analysis of variance (anova) was applied to data on quite quick reaction and on quite slow reaction. Results of anova showed that the means of the two responses differ significantly. The direction of the difference was determined by dividing the significance of the F ratio, anova statistic, by 2 (quite quick reaction and quite slow reaction) (Cramer & Howitt, 2004; Yates, Moore and McCabe, 2000; Hinkle, Wiersma, & Jurs, 1998). The direction, turned out to be

towards the mean of quite slow reaction (7.1), which was bigger than that of the quite quick reaction (5.6). This anova finding constitutes an empirical affirmation of the most common complaint by respondents against State security establishment, namely very slow reaction or lack thereof to raiding acts, as specified above in this paragraph. However, it is erroneous to argue, based on the foregoing, that because certain elements of the State repressive apparatus do not respond quickly enough to raids, it constitutes a case against the government of underperformance by criteria of protecting lives and property nationwide. On the contrary and most plausibly, the observed slow reaction on the part of agents of law and order to occurrences of revenge raiding is neither a manifestation of ineptitude and incompetence on the part of the agents nor of their potential to act productively as they should and could. Rather, it is a well-intentioned and rational refusal in an economic sense. In this connection, respondents said that sometimes the government trucks (GOK) are used to transport raided and/or stolen livestock to places where they are sold. A Turkana male respondent asserted that it is a belief among the Turkanas that violent conflict between them and the Pokots will end when they (Turkanas) no longer have livestock. The violence of revenge raiding is underpinned by vengeance-seeking group grievances coupled with the absence of trust or any sense of obligation towards mutual benefit. Revenge raiding violence, capitalizes on vengeance-seeking group grievances and the absence of trust or any sense of obligation towards mutual benefit and, in effect, promotes Pokot/Turkana internal individual solidarity and cohesiveness. This takes the form of Pokots/Turkanas relying on each other in the generating of an “us” syndrome, in a sense in their violent conflict against the other “them”.

A perennial and predictable problem in the North Rift, as discussed earlier, is hunger and/or famine/starvation, as discussed earlier. Whether or not hunger will degenerate into

famine/starvation depends on the ready availability of food for an extended period of time. Lack of readily available food means that there is famine/starvation. People can live with hunger in the short-term but not in the long term, as it the case or tends to be the case in the arid and semi-arid areas of Kenya, but they cannot live with famine/starvation particularly if it is long-term rather than transitory. Starvation that extends over a relatively long period of time results in deaths. Starving people are those who cannot feed themselves and have to be given food in order to save their lives. Starvation or the threat thereof, is something that is part and parcel of the collective life experience of the people who live in the North Rift. Of course, the typical response to starvation is to provide relief food, a role that is usually carried out by the government and/or food aid organizations such as the World Food Program and voluntary/emergency agencies including the Catholic Church.

Variable relief food loaded on factor political economy at .571. In a sense, this is what one would expect meaning that it did not happen by chance. It is a realistic factor loading, and not a statistical artefact that can be linked to the contentious interplay between power and utilization of natural resources in the North Rift. Often times, hunger is an object of political debates, among other things. However, when hunger, as a quality that is a physiological state of a person, becomes a quantity in the form of number of people who are emaciated/dead because of lack of food, it gets elevated to political debate to become uncontested in terms of taking measures to stop or alleviate it. Hence, it becomes imperative to give food aid before quality, which refers to starvation, gets transformed to into quantity meaning number of people who are dead because of starvation.

The people of Turkana-land as well as those of Pokot-land, specifically the low land Pokots, in general face a common and desperate problem of inability to adequately feed

themselves without aid/relief. All too often, bringing food to them has challenges that pertain to or are expressions of factor political economy. This explanation of the loading of variable food relief on factor political economy is given against a background of the dynamics, in the form of stress and strains of the challenges. Efforts to alleviate hunger and starvation among the two communities are made by the government, United Nation and voluntary aid agencies. Their goal, in this connection, is to alleviate or combat hunger and starvation; it is not to bring economic aid in the sense of development to Pokot-land and Turkana-land. In reality, they are addressing symptoms rather than underlying causes. Foreigners, mainly extra-continental, and locals from Kenya carry out food aid activities. The former play a crucial role and bear tremendous responsibility. Press and television tend to play up the work of agencies pertaining to relief food. However, locals on the ground in Turkana-land and Pokot-land express ungracious doubts about employees of food aid agencies, mostly foreigners, who come to help them. The doubts have to do with matters of qualification. The argument is that some of the relief food experts and consultants are globe-trotters whose only qualification is their curiosity about pastoralists. They lack relevant technical experience; some of them may have studied philosophy or other subject in the domain of humanities at university but not in the domain of social sciences and this is compounded by a sublime ignorance of the conditions of the pastoralists, specific to the North Rift. Consignments of relief food, sometimes from the world beyond Africa, are found to be past expiry date and contain a lot of broken grains, impurities and molds that make the food unfit for human consumption. The foregoing points on the qualifications of experts and consultants in the relief food industry, and relief food which is unfit for human consumption, are part of the context of variable relief food's loading on factor political economy. There are also a number of challenges with local relief efforts: some of the

food meant for the hungry/starving is stolen in transit by State functionaries and sold within Kenya. This point is common knowledge. Furthermore, the distribution of relief food tends to be politicized with a result that this or that ethnic group is favoured, or certain areas within the territory of one and the same ethnic community is favoured. All this ends up becoming fodder for persistent violent conflict with particular reference to factor political economy.

#### **4.5 Infrastructure-Insecurity**

The preceding parts of this chapter have dealt with the complex and violent conflict between the Pokot and Turkana by explaining factors core resources and political economy through their respective loading variables. In this factor analysis solution, dealing with the first hypotheses, the third and last factor is infrastructure-insecurity. The label infrastructure-insecurity is based on the attributes of variables that clustered as function of varimax rotation. They are: elders meetings, State security personnel (protection of life and property), firearms, greed, distrust, educational facilities, road-communication, and health care facilities.

Before interpreting factor infrastructure-insecurity in terms of the Pokot-Turkana violent conflict, it is pertinent, for purposes of clarity, to ascribe specificity to the terms infrastructure-insecurity. Specificity is a requirement of the scientific way of knowing about the external world. This being the case, the link between insecurity and infrastructure in the context of Pokot-Turkana relations is an object of obvious concern, particularly for the stakeholders in the conflict. Security is the opposite of insecurity. Insecurity, like security, is a subjective state in which an individual or a collective group does not feel free of threats, anxiety and/or danger. Such insecurities have typically been defined in relation to nation-states, for example regarding Kenya's border or institutions responsible for governance. Insecurity, like security, stands on a long continuum and therefore cannot be understood in absolute terms. A government must trust

its ability to deter attacks or defend against them in order to counter insecurity at the national level and thus assure security, including human security (Gleditsch, 2007). The origins of threats, whether military, political or economic, may arise internally or externally to a country. Geographically, the origins and dynamics of the Pokot-Turkana conflict are unquestionably internal to Kenya. However, external influences on the dynamics in the form of political power intrigues and commercial interests cannot be ruled out today. Issues, such as the commercialization of livestock, extractive mining industries and arms trade dynamics in the Pokot-Turkana conflict environment are becoming complex and increasingly regionalised, hence the involvement of bodies such as IGAD in managing the conflict. Thus, the responsibility for the formulation and implementation of policy and strategy designed to counter insecurity threats is invariably not exclusive to government organs of the State. The onus increasingly includes proponents of security who are peripheral to government organs and bodies. Hence, the nation-state is not the sole entity to be protected against insecurity threats. In a multi-ethnic nation-state like Kenya with ethnically defined groups such as the Pokot and the Turkana, the people have to be protected against insecurity threats, not only from the ethnic other but also from the State itself in the form of criminal acts against its citizens (Bayart et al., 1999).

Anxiety alluded to earlier, is an aspect of insecurity. An excellent definition of anxiety proffered by Kandel (1983:1277) is particularly apt in the context of this research. Kandel defines anxiety as “a normal inborn response either to threat – to one’s person, attitudes, or self-esteem – or the absence of peoples or objects that assure and signify safety”. Anxiety is an emotion and state of mind characterized by aversive, cognitive and behavioural components. These components take the form of apprehensive expectations of negative experience or consequences and of hyper vigilance, avoidance and paralysis of action (Craig et al., 1995).

Anxiety, as a phenomenon, is undoubtedly psychological but its data sources are not. In this respect, anxiety is not psychological because its data sources, as for example in Gurr's (1970, 1973, 1980) work on political violence, are predominantly social and economic. The infrastructure component of factor infrastructure-insecurity is about socio-economic causes and consequences of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict, in the form of institutionally constituted and politically charged multi-dimensional peripheralization of pastoralists in Kenya's development praxis. Much of the manifest violence between the Pokots and the Turkanas is political; 49.5% of the sampled Pokots and Turkanas affirmed that the Pokot-Turkana violent conflict is political rather than ethnic. Differentials in political power, as demonstrated later in this chapter, not only structure the provision of order and organization of the Pokot-Turkana recurrent violent conflict, but also considerably influence outcomes in space and time.

Analytically, the concept of infrastructure is not immune from being an object of confusion relating to specifics and precision in discussions about socio-economic issues and/or socio-political issues. The reason for this is that it is prone to overlap subtly but empirically with the concepts of capital production resources (such as educational systems), substructure (underlying economy) and superstructure (all other socio-political infrastructure such as hospitals, roads and so on) (Marger, 1999). Social scientists are cognizant of the overlap and its subtlety depending on their area of specialization. Cognisance of the overlap and taking it into account when employing infrastructure, socio-economic or socio-political discussion of the issues, enables one to eschew distorted errors that stem from personal opinionated speculation and/or ideological value preference. Failure to recognize this overlap tends to diminish the practical use of the evidence and conclusions from the analysis. In this research, the confusion and danger of losing track, as explained above, are obviated by specifying the referents of

infrastructure that seem unique. The infrastructure component of factor infrastructure-insecurity refers to the capital equipment used to produce publicly available services that include: transport, telecommunications, gas, electricity, water supplies, schools, hospitals, prison and criminal correction related institutions. These are basic physical structures of a society and or country. They provide an essential background for economic activities in a nation-state, among other enabling conditions. If they are not available or not reliable, as demonstrated below, in the case of the North Rift, development is handicapped. Such circumstances impact negatively on communities who are in a quest to actualize their potential (Galtung, 1969). This situation, in turn, affects the realisation of peace as its negative and/or positive form, is substantially impeded. The rest of this chapter interprets factor infrastructure-insecurity in terms of the Pokot-Turkana violent conflict. Eight variables loaded on the factor by criterion of .32 cut-off. Discussion of the variables as mediators of the influence of factor infrastructure-insecurity on the conflict is not ordered by the magnitude of the factor loading, just as variables' factor loading in a factor matrix (rotated) are not ordered by magnitude.

Existing literature on conflict and peace in the social formations of pastoralism in the IGAD region is wide ranging and of extremely uneven quality. It is interspersed with discussions of meetings of inter-ethnic elders as a historical and contemporary strategy of handling violent conflict between members of neighbouring ethnic communities or clans. This strategy of handling violent conflict generally lacks clarity. Sometimes, it can refer to an issue of managing, transforming, preventing, stopping, or ending, without specifying the distinctiveness of each concept. In other instances, it seems to be a conglomeration of concepts if not a hodgepodge. The factor loading of variable elders meetings is low and negative (-.453). The negative direction of this loading is consistent with the direction, negative, of the elders'

meetings loading on factors core resources (-.299) and political economy (-.256). Since activities of elders are part of the lore of peace and conflict with particular reference to the North Rift, it was expected on the basis of intuition, that variable elders meetings would load .32 or higher on one of the factors extracted. What was expected materialized. However, what was intriguing in this research is the negative factor loading of variable elders meetings on factor infrastructure-insecurity.

Given that the relationship of a factor to variables loaded on it is causal, it follows with respect to variable elders' meetings negative loading on factor infrastructure-insecurity that the causal effect of infrastructure insecurity on elders' meetings is negative. Since it was elders' meetings that is observed, it follows that the influence of elders meetings on the Pokot-Turkana conflict is negative, that is the influence of elders' meetings decreases as Pokot-Turkana violent conflict increases. This inverse causal relationship between infrastructure-insecurity and elders' meetings is an empirical case of this study that refutes the qualitative accounts by Ruto et al., (2004) among others. These non-empirical claims are mainly based on judgement in terms of what makes personal sense and/or ideas held about the way things ought to be in certain academic circles, non-governmental organizations in relief assistance and peace/conflict business, faith based organizations and of course State functionaries. The non-empirical knowledge claim is that in conflict prone areas, inter-ethnic peace meetings of elders of influence are an important strategy for managing violent conflict between members of neighbouring ethnic communities. Contrary to the knowledge claim, a plausible interpretation of this statistical finding is that the inverse relationship between infrastructure-insecurity and elders' meetings points to a trend of dynamics where elders' meetings are increasingly becoming insignificant to decreasing the probability of occurrence of violent conflict between Pokots and instead serving

to increase the probability of recurrence. According to the data obtained in this research, this is how factor infrastructure-insecurity, as mediated by variable elder's meetings, causes violent conflict between the two communities. This happens in a number of different ways that are highlighted below. Before highlighting them, it is important, as discussed in the chapter on the history of conflict, to note that Pokot-Turkana relations were different in the period of colonialism compared to what they are today; occurrences of violent conflict were lesser than is the case currently. For a long time in Pokot and Turkana communities, the institution of elders meetings was key to peaceful coexistence between the two communities, even as there was no oath of peace between them, because of the hegemonic authority they had over warrior groups. The elders, for example, invariably sanctioned raiding. Their authority remained largely intact before the introduction of the market economy, new forms governance, advanced automation and information technology, new sources of wealth and influence through banditry, criminality, commercialization of raiding, labour migration among other issues (see Kratli and Swift, 1999; Duffield 1997; Dolan, 2007). However, in the late post-colonial period, the contribution of Pokot/Turkana elders meetings, either as a routine practice to deliberate about peaceful coexistence between the two communities or elders from both sides coming together as a reaction to a raiding occurrence that just happened, are practically inconsequential and bordering on the symbolic in terms of contribution to reduction of the violence in the form of raiding/counter-raiding. The structural pillars and parameters of customary conflict management have been altered and are rendering elders' meetings more and more irrelevant to the management of the conflict.

On the basis of the data of this research, the above inverse relationship between the elders' meetings and the violent conflict is most plausibly explicated by saying that elders'

meetings are being rendered obsolescent. Elders' meetings are no longer an autonomous conflict management institution intra-ethnically or as a Pokot-Turkana conflict management body. Moreover, the people who decide who the elders should be and impose them on the constituents or the underlying population have clear political objectives. In contrast, elders have in general, fragmented understanding of political opportunities in the context of an evolving national level Kenyan political-economic formation and therefore easily amenable to political manipulation. The elders tend to be perplexed by and lost in a discussion of political-economic issues due to inability to distinguish between fact and opinion or between evidence based on data and evidence based on values. This is, therefore, indicative of the waning influence of the ethno-cultural institution of elders in the conflict. Manipulation by the notables and their agents takes several forms. One form is co-optation through elders being given material incentives and promises. This co-optation makes elders' opposition to existing State institutional arrangements counter-productive to their personal interests. Co-optation becomes the option in instances where elders cannot be ignored without adverse political and/or economic consequences to the notables pertaining to privileged access to resources, legal protection, and public positions among other areas. In situations of co-optation, the elders' influence, comprehensive stock of knowledge of chronic conflict between Pokot and Turkana and/or potential or manifest ability to threaten and destabilize political order are sublimated in the interests of the ruling elite and thus legitimizing activities of the regime. This state of affairs tends not to bode well for desirable harmony within and between ethnic communities living in the the North Rift of region of Kenya. Co-optation is a political process of managing elders insofar as their role activities are perceived as constituting a potential or real disturbance of local political formation. It is inherently convoluted and tortuous, and it is this twisted craftiness in the form of role stress and strain on the part of elders'

meetings that renders them more a contributor to the violent conflict and less as a contributor to reduction of frequency of occurrence of the conflict. A simple frequency run of variable elders' meetings categorized below, by criterion of effectiveness in terms of contribution to reduction of the rate of occurrence of violent incidents of the conflict produced this distribution: 41% negative contribution, 33% positive contribution, and 26% no contribution. Clearly, variable elders' meetings pertain to the security component of factor infrastructure-insecurity.

Another variable in the security component of the factor is the State security personnel's ability to protect human lives and property. This variable's loading on factor infrastructure-insecurity is .810. This is a good factor loading (Comrey & Lee, 1992) as it is in the range of .55 (30% of overlapping variance). Since a factor loading is a regression coefficient of a variable for the linear model that describes a latent variable in factor analysis, .810 is a pure description of factor infrastructure-insecurity because the correlations of variable security personnel with factors core resources and political economy are extremely low; .020 and .009 respectively. As such, security personnel is a marker variable. Its loading on factor infrastructure-insecurity is an ideal example of varimax rotation results; it makes it easier to see which variables loaded on a factor, clearly define the factor, and to interpret the meaning of that factor. Variable security personnel is about governance; governance is the effective provision of political goods and services by the State (Rotberg, 2004). It is the responsibility of the State to create and supply these goods, the most important of them being security – the projection of State power, the State monopoly of violence, and human security (Migdal, 1988; Gleditsch, 2007). Of course, the primary function of Kenya as a nation-state is to reduce or obviate domestic threats or attacks on the national order. Performing the function encompasses different but interrelated roles and activities including enabling groups of citizens not to have recourse to violent conflict behaviour

when one group has issues with another. However, violent conflict is an aspect of Pokot-Turkana relations. This reality raises questions about the functionality, competence and effectiveness of the State in the delivery of political goods. To argue that Pokots-Turkana relations are fraught and laden with violence, simply because it is the intent of the ruling political elite to see that the violence exists, is to overstate the case. Similarly, to say that the Kenya State does not have the ability to pacify the Pokot/Turkana relationship is an overstatement of the case. However, there is no risk of error in maintaining that variability of contingencies that trigger occurrences of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict also includes some aspects of inability of the Kenyan State to end the recurrences of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict.

Contrary to Weber's (1947) prescriptive treatment of violence and legitimacy in relation to the State, it is simply not the case that in the North Rift the State has a monopoly on violence and that it exercises the security function in the best interests of Pokots/Turkanas. The proliferation of sophisticated small arms such as, AK 47s, G3s in the Pokot-Turkana conflict environment spiralled throughout the 20th century (Hendrickson, 1998). In 2003, Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC) maintained that the Turkana possessed 66, 239 illegal weapons and the Pokot were holding 36, 937 (SRIC, 2003; Dolan, 2006) and both groups are yet to be disarmed. The fact that the conflict continues to persist further supports the claim that the State has not monopoly over violence. During sessions of structured interviews and focus group research, participants adamantly affirmed that in many contexts, government security forces do not serve the whole Pokot-Turkana population effectively or efficiently, a view supported by Gray, et al., (2003) and Eaton (2009) among others. The image of the State portrayed by the Pokots and Turkanas who participated in the research is that the use of violence by the State creates a climate of insecurity stemming, not from the ethnic other but from the State itself.

Insecurity in the North Rift is more than a function of incompatibilities of material interests and values of Pokots vis-à-vis those of the Turkanas as the State is a contributor to it just as pointed out above. While the Pokot-Turkana violence is motivated by the need to achieve some socioeconomic ends for the two communities, the State, on the other hand, is more concerned, through its use of violence, with serving institutional arrangements that are not attending to the basic interests of the two communities. Effective and efficient are descriptive words that have to do with the type or nature of effect of something and in terms of security personnel, it refers to the type or nature of effect that State security personnel have on insecurity in the North Rift. Effectiveness is concerned with the extent of achieving a goal whereas efficiency has to do with the means to achieve a goal. In this regard, effective policing, for example, would be constituted by largely, if not absolutely, stopping or ending or preventing the occurrences of incidents of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict. On the other hand, efficient policing would comprise deploying or mobilizing counter-conflict resources (human, funds and equipment) in such manner that the resources not only enable quick cessation or end or prevention of the conflict but are also used in a prudent way. Effectiveness and efficiency in terms of cattle rustling, for example, would mean employing a strategy which is appropriate in the sense that in effect it balances the interests of Pokots and Turkanas in the scenario of managing the conflict. Since there are conflicting notions of efficiency with regard to activities or acts pertaining to the function of security personnel, discussed below, efficiency is contextualized in the concept effectiveness without jettisoning the analytic utility of the concept of efficiency in the discussion.

The Kenyan State is amenable to evaluation in terms of the activities of its security personnel. The verdict of respondents was largely negative on that score. They expressed mistrust and appeared to despair on the ability of the police to protect them against livestock

raids, theft, and unprovoked killings. These negative perceptions and experiences concerning the provision of human security do not augur well for Kenya, as a strong State (Migdal, 1988; UNDP; 1994; Gleditsch, 2007). They categorically affirmed that State security functionaries, particularly the police, are not effective. The observation that security functionaries are not effective, according to the respondents and the literature review on the subject, is manifested or expressed in different forms that include: low motivation or lack thereof, limited experience, poor or negligible knowledge of the terrain of the North Rift, lack of security functionaries, and intrusion or interference in the role activities of security personnel by outsiders or insiders in the higher echelons of the security system, with the intention of influencing the outcomes of activities or the end results. Other manifestations identified by respondents and literature include the involvement of some security officials such as those of the Kenya Police Reserve (KPR) hiring out guns for carrying out criminal activities such as cattle rustling, livestock theft, banditry, slow response to reports of raid occurrences or deadly attacks or killings, and frequent incidents of cross-border crime.

Information given by victims of raids and livestock theft to security officers and other State functionaries about the activities of the raiders and their escape routes may or may not get a positive response from the security personnel. A positive response, in this regard, is one that is in accord with the legitimate and expected role activities of the security personnel. This was a view expressed by a majority of respondents. A plausible explanation for this is that the decision to respond and how to respond may be influenced less by the victims' losses and more by considerations that are intended to serve the interests of cartels of cattle rustling and guns. For instance, security officers may negotiate deals, if not already pre-arranged, with the raiders to have a part of the booty. Fear of insecurity is not a two party, Pokot and Turkana, cognitive-

emotional state. There is a third party in the conflict (the police) that generally seems to be unencumbered by fear due to the fact that they hire out guns to be used in criminal activities (livestock raiding and related activities). In this context, it is tenable that concerning security matters, Pokots and Turkana distrust the police just as they distrust each other. Police presence is largely not protective and is, at best, almost virtually symbolic. At worst it is in itself insecurity, in the sense that the police sometimes supply firearms that are used in the violent conflict. The conflict is a source of accumulation on the part of the police as some of the raided booty is shared out to the police in economic exchange for the hired guns that are used during raids. Variable firearms factor loading is .563

The question of how many security personnel would be needed to ensure effective policing is beyond the scope of this research. Behavioural specifics of this lack of effectiveness are analysed below. What follows below is a summary of what the vast majority of respondents said concerning the dynamics of insecurity, all within the purview of ineffectiveness. In fact, no respondent held the view that policing was effective. Politicians frequently cross legitimate and ethical boundaries and get corruptly involved in the activities of the security personnel as a way of staying in office or getting elected. This politicizes the activities and compromises the impartiality and integrity of the security personnel in the discharge of their duties. This type of interference is not just unique to the Pokot-Turkana conflict dynamics but is a phenomenon that is widely reported throughout Kenya in the media, and human rights proponents. As earlier explained, partiality is inimical to efficiency and effectiveness. The government typically deploys security personnel to safe locations for the security of the functionaries themselves. The State is evidently not inclined to deploy the personnel to conflict prone areas where security services are needed but the risk to the functionaries is high. The North Rift is understaffed in

terms of security personnel. To combat violence in highly dangerous conflict environments such as that of the Pokot and Turkana conflict, sufficient personnel and resources are required. Police tend to equate their presence with provision of security. Police presence in the conflict environment under study is nominal. This state of affairs contributes significantly to explaining the persistence of the violent conflict. Arrests of criminals, who include those who raid and steal livestock, are atypical in police activities in the conflict area. Both Pokot and Turkana respondents indicated that many of those arrested are usually released back into their community after a short time because of corruption, favouritism, and selective application of the law. Besides police presence, the relevant law courts applying the law of the land and ensuring effective legal redress are extremely lacking in Pokot-land and Turkana-Land.

Police are trained but lack knowledge of and work experience in the terrain of the North Rift. Raiders outsmart them because the raiders are very conversant with their local terrain. At times, police and army personnel suffer heavy casualties. In 2012, for instance, 42 State security personnel were killed, and many injured, in an ambush by Turkana warriors in the Suguta valley, a location where the Pokot, Turkana, and Samburu ethnic communities interface with each other (Kenya Forum, 2012). In 2014, at least 19 more were killed near Kapedo during a feud between the Pokots and the Turkanas. Many security functionaries posted to police stations in the territory of Pokots and Turkanas are novices. They are posted there soon after graduation from police training colleges. Using the criterion of efficiency, they are patently not suited to work in the manifest violent conflict prone environs of the North Rift. As mentioned earlier, the variable firearm's is complex because it loaded on more than one factor. It is loaded on both political economy and infrastructure-insecurity. The magnitude of its factor loading on infrastructure-insecurity (.563) is higher than that on political economy (.531). What is most important about

the factor loading is not the differential magnitude-wise of firearms on political economy and infrastructure-insecurity. Rather, what is important is the reason why variable firearms loaded on factors political economy and infrastructure-insecurity. The variable ‘firearms’ loading on political economy has been explained already. What follows now is an interpretation of the bearing of factor infrastructure-insecurity on Pokot-Turkana violent conflict in terms of variable firearms. The context of the earlier discussion concerning the loading of variable firearms on factor political economy is constituted by commercialization of Pokot-Turkana raiding (cattle rustling). However, the discussion on the loading of the same variable on factor infrastructure-insecurity below is different. The context of this loading is constituted by the militarization of Pokot-Turkana relations. There are two parts to the discussion: the reasons for possession of firearms by the Pokots and Turkanas, and the dynamics of the use of the firearms. Possession or ownership of small firearms in the North Rift is inextricably linked to the livelihoods of the Pokot and Turkana communities. Considering that Pokots and Turkanas have a long history of rivalry, firearms are essential weapons for fighting off inter-groups attacks between each other. A suggested key indicator, according to Mburu, 2007; Mkutu, 2008; Eaton, 2009, of insecurity in the North Rift is the incidence of cross-border crimes by criminal-warrior elements from Ethiopia or South Sudan or Uganda. The proliferation of illicit firearms in the land of the Pokots and Turkana and adjacent parts is largely attributed to porous borders between Kenya and its neighbours. The small arms find their way into Kenya and are used, with sophistication, for cattle rustling because of inadequate security in the area occupied by the Pokot and Turkana communities. The Administration Police may be more visible than the regular police but they are few and hence insufficient to guarantee security.

The motivation for possession of firearms is predominantly defensive. In the questionnaire responses, 89% of Pokot and Turkana respondents indicated that the predominant reason for owning firearms is for protection from the various perceived dangers. The need to safeguard property, especially livestock, was the top ranking reason for ownership of firearms. However, by criterion of time order of events, the relationship between guarding property and ownership of firearms was confounded with personal protection from the ethnic other. This was demonstrated through the application of partial correlation. Partialling out personal protection from both guarding property and ethnic other, though significant, did not change the rank of guarding property. The data from field research demonstrate that the Pokot-Turkana communities' marginal existence in Kenya as social formations creates a demand for small arms as they compete for scarce resources and protect their livelihoods. Respondents also identified fear of the future as motivation for ownership of firearms. They explained that the ethnic other are wont to turn to physical violence for flimsy reasons and this makes it necessary for them to be prepared all the time to defend themselves. They stated that guns give them a sense of security hence they buy guns and keep them and use them in the event of aggression by the ethnic other. In addition, respondents indicated that firearms are owned either as part of a tradition or prestige, or with the intention of engaging in criminal activities. Both communities cited discrimination in the allocation of State resources and victimization of pastoralist communities as another reason for possession of firearms. This is often talked about as marginalization or political reproduction of regional economic disparity that coincides with ethnic difference. The Kenya National Bureau of Statistics Report on Spatial Dimension of Well-Being in Kenya (2015) validates the argument that the Turkana and Pokot communities

have been discriminated against within the State. It confirms the skewed distribution of State resources to favour some communities, a characteristic of all the post-colonial governments.

Small arms play a significant role in determining the winners and losers of conflicts and the perpetration of crimes. Illicitly transferred small arms have negative effects on innocent people because they contribute to the prolongation of the conflict. The arms not only have unique influence on Pokot-Turkana violent conflict behaviour but they also lead to displacement of people and thereby disrupt routine economic activities. Disarmament of the Pokots and Turkanas is of no consequence on at least two grounds. First, disarmament usually happens *ex post facto* and it can, thus, not undo the damage that stems from the use of illicit firearms. Secondly, disarmament is ill-conceived precisely because even if all Pokots and Turkanas who own or possess firearms are disarmed in total, by any means possible, the exercise would not prevent them from re-arming themselves because disarmament and re-armament are independent phenomena, in a statistical sense.

Every society has some people who have a strong desire or drive to have a particular thing regardless of the objective benefits that accrue to them individually out of that thing. It is this desire that underpins variable greed. This variable pertains to the insecurity component of factor infrastructure-insecurity as an underlying cause of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict behaviour. Its factor loading of .519 is moderate. Greed is a motive force of raiding behaviour dynamics, particularly on the part of relatively economically entrenched livestock cartel actors. The greed of cartel actors means that they can never be fully satisfied with the economic benefit from the raids, regardless of the number of raids they carry out. This is not because they have too little or have less than what they desire. It is this reality, which, in terms of wealth or opulence, makes it hard for other people to understand and/or not wonder why they should keep on

demanding or wanting more in the process of amassing wealth. Greed has psychological and economic aspects but its dynamics defy principles of behavioural psychology and laws of elementary economics. The very fact that greed defies certain principles and laws provides a basis to understand why greed is insatiable. Greed is associated with the notion of war economy in the history of warfare. War economy refers to the idea that warring parties use violence primarily to further economic agendas. In this respect the economic and the political have a 'hand in glove' relationship. Collier & Hoeffler (2001) & Collier (2004) are foremost proponents of greed in the context of resource (natural) abundance as the motive of civil war or rebellion. They argue that explanations of violent conflict in the form of rebellion or war cannot be reduced to a paradigm of grievance. Essentially, their argument maintains that in situations where the State is weak, violence, such as rebellion or civil war becomes an opportune way to capture resource rents and exert control over them. In most cases, community notables are the masterminds. In this regard, rebel opportunities to loot natural resources, motivated by greed, represents the main reason for civil war and rebellion, a rational political-economic choice, particularly when the State is weak. Appropriate examples in this regard include the Democratic Republic of Congo and Central Africa Republic today.

In some pertinent literature (Fairhead, 2000; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Collier, 2007; Gleditsch, 2005) the phrase 'lootable resources' isolates and apporitions more economic value to minerals and oil on the ground that they are immediately lootable and profitable compared to livestock. In this study, livestock are a resource to which conflict is normally ascribed. In the literature, livestock does not figure very highly in the list of lootable resources. This is because livestock are not as profitable as commodities such as oil and minerals. Furthermore, livestock are "dispersed" and they require major overheads and transaction costs to control in contrast to

“point” resources (oil and minerals) that are concentrated in localised areas. However, there is no denial that resources are a cause of conflict between pastoralist communities and the livestock are a major conflict resource in arid and semi-arid lands that are inhabited by ethnic communities whose economic mainstay is pastoralism. Furthermore, there is no denial that livestock are an object of greed in conflict raiding between ethnically defined communities such as the Pokots and the Turkanas. Greed leads to predation raiding. Grievance leads to revenge raiding or vengeance. While the former seeks wealth accumulation, the latter seeks socio-political justice. The former, in a pure form, generates unprovoked violence while the latter generates reactive violence. A community engages in predatory raiding behaviour when it is feasible to do so. Feasibility of undertaking a raid has to do with capability. Capability is determined by availability of the means or resources such as men, weaponry, tactical skills, knowledge about the terrain, information about the location of herds and types of livestock, and how the herds are marshalled and protected (Lamphear, 1992; Mkutu, 2008). The best possible raid occurs where the raiders incur no physical harm to themselves from the raided. They maximize the looting utilizing violence in order to make away with hundreds or even thousands of livestock from their legitimate owners. Not everyone who is involved directly or indirectly in livestock rustling cartels has the resources to ensure that predation is fully executed. Typically, only those livestock traders and businessmen who engage in commercialised rustling are able to make predatory behaviour a feasible engagement or undertaking. This involves informal and secretive interaction and transactions with criminal networks involving elders, warriors, councillors, police, parliamentarians, chiefs and their assistants, meat-outlet operators and local community opinion leaders. Taking all these dynamics into account, there is generally no risk of making a significant error if one claims that raiding is not a reminder to the government by Pokots and

Turkanas that they are marginalised. Rather, it is a manifestation of integration of the business activities of a few relatively rich Pokots and Turkanas into Kenya's commercial capitalism. This form of commercial capitalism, in turn, affords livestock rustling cartel members a means to feed their greed through guaranteeing a market for the looted livestock. This reality exists because the order of the political environment of the particular commercial capitalism has, in recent years, become disordered such that, its dynamics overlap with the dynamics of illegitimate or illegal transactions in the sphere of economy. Thus, there is a marked symbiotic relationship between the two. This state of affairs constitutes a quite hospitable arena for people, including some Pokots and Turkanas whose political economy transactions are activated and driven by insatiable financial accumulation and/or veritable lust for power.

Interpretation of factor infrastructure-insecurity as an underlying cause of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict behaviour, focusing on variable greed, makes much more sense if greed is contextualised in commercial livestock rustling. The rustling requires resources, as pointed out earlier. Predation is a commercial variant of raiding that is only executed by the relatively rich who have powerful connections, and do so if and when it is feasible. One can, thus, conclude that the main motivating factor for raids is neither lust for power, nor grievance but greed. Power and grievance cannot be said to affect greed insofar as it is a function of neuro-biological functioning or process. Besides, the nature of the object of greed, whether it is natural resources, such as oil, minerals or livestock, has no effect on greed as an insatiable desire. Greed leads to predation violence and grievance leads to reactive violence. There is no relationship between greed and grievance *per se*; they are independent. However, oftentimes, greed is deceptively or unconsciously and erroneously portrayed as grievance that is a motive of revenge for the purpose of getting support and sympathy from the public. Such support ultimately benefits predatory

behaviour that is motivated by greedy behaviour and not revenge behaviour motivated by grievance. This can happen and does happen, as indicated below, under circumstances of greed motivated raiding behaviour. In such circumstances, grievance is a necessary momentary camouflage for greed in the greed to predation causal linkage.

The introduction of county governments in the current State administration and the discovery of commercially exploitable oil in the North Rift have made the problematic and disputed boundaries between the Pokots and Turkanas even more complex and more problematic (Mutsotso, 2015). In the early postcolonial period of Pokot-Turkana conflict, greed was tangential to boundary, as greed and boundary did not co-vary. This is because nomadism, at that time, made nonsense of any talk about the existence of static Pokot-Turkana territorial boundary. Today, there exists a sense in which it is plausible to evidentiary maintain that greed and territorial boundary do co-vary and are no longer tangential. As exemplified by Pokot-Turkana territorial boundary dispute, greed is not tangential to grievance, whether real or imagined. This is because, in some cases, as observed by respondents, Pokots raid Turkanas' livestock on grounds that the cattle are, sometimes, grazed on the Pokot side of the boundary. Boundary disputes are historically problematic to fix and the raids are not about preventing future intrusion by Turkana livestock into Pokot territory since such intrusion cannot be practically prevented. In reality, raiding merely serves to feed the greed of some Pokots and Turkanas. In order to ascertain that the relationship between contested/disputed boundary and raids includes greed and that greed confounds the relationship, variable greed was partialled out of variable contested/disputed boundary and variable raiding with the result that the correlation of .376 between contested/disputed boundary and raiding decreased to .201. This decrease affirmed what respondents stated: a higher percentage of Turkanas (83%) than Pokots (57%) averred that

greed on the part of the ethnic other is a contributor to Pokot-Turkana violent conflict in the form of raiding. Respondents were asked to select only two of the following motives of raiding and rank them: enlarging herd size (accumulation of wealth), payment of dowry, drought, and poverty. Most Turkana respondents ranked drought first and poverty second whereas most Pokots respondents ranked accumulation of wealth first and payment of dowry second. These differences do not, by any stretch, mean or imply that there are no Turkanas who have greed and that there are no Pokots who experience drought. The most plausible explanation or interpretation of the differences in the choosing and ranking is that they indicate the feasibility and capability conditions to carry out large scale raiding where hundreds or thousands of animals are looted in a single raiding act.

In pastoralist social formations, wealth is possessed in the form of livestock and possession of large herds means being wealthy. In their responses, Pokot respondents ranked accumulation of wealth as the first motive for raiding. However, this does not mean that they alone are greedy in comparison to the Turkanas just because Turkanas did not rank accumulation of wealth as the first or second motive of raiding. Greed is a desire that is found in all societies, but there is variation in its manifestation as behaviour, depending on the particular object or thing that is desired. The difference between the choices and ranking made by the Pokot and Turkana on the motives of raiding above can be explained by fundamental differences in culture, social organization, natural environment and adaptation as modified by human agency. The totality of these factors, when applied to the Pokot, makes it more feasible and easier for the Pokot to engage in large-scale commercial livestock rustling more than the Turkana. It is a fact that livestock raided by the Pokots for commercial interests from the Turkana can be moved expeditiously to large trading centres and abattoirs in Kitale, Eldoret, Nakuru, Nairobi, and other

less prominent places. On the other hand, Turkana raiders of Pokot livestock would find it very difficult to do the same because of their more inaccessible ethnic-geographical location. However, both communities have a similar potential of moving the raided livestock across borders into neighbouring countries. Intermarriage between ethnic communities in Kenya is harped on in some circles as one way of achieving harmonious relations between people who are ethnically different (Ndanyi, 2014). However, intermarriage cannot cure greed and its inevitable behaviours. In this context, consider the following: Pokot men do marry Turkana women but Pokot women getting married to Turkana men is so much rare that it can be considered largely non-existent. After marriage between a Pokot man and Turkana woman, which entail paying high dowry in the form of livestock for the Turkana woman, Pokot men usually raid Turkana and take back or repossess the animals paid as dowry. It is not necessary that the animals should be the same ones that were given to the Turkana as dowry. During raids to repossess animals paid as dowry, typically more animals than those given as dowry are ‘repossessed’. Turkana male respondents cited this as an indication of greed on the part of Pokots. With greed as the motive force of raiding, a premium is put on ensuring that the raid is successful and this means that the raiders are capable of executing raids with practically no risk of failure. Raiders are usually well equipped, organized and highly effective in order to ensure success. According to data collected during this research, the composition of raiders may be mono-ethnic warriors or may include men who are from outside the pastoralists’ economy. The men usually have experience in raiding and/or criminal activity acquired in or outside Kenya. Experience in Kenya typically means participation in similar raids in the past, whether in Pokot-Turkana raids or other inter-ethnic raids elsewhere in the country. On the other hand, experience acquired outside Kenya refers to processes where men from Kenya enrol as fighters in conflicts across the border in

neighbouring States and receive military training and weapons that they usually keep upon their return. The men could also be deserters and ex-combatants who have drifted into Kenya from areas of fighting in neighbouring countries, swelling the ranks of bandits, or making a living as mercenaries or cheap fighters in commercial raids. Furthermore, they could be either members of a particular militia group created by political elites for a specific purpose or during a specific time period. Such militia groups may contain pastoralist economy youth who drifted to urban areas where they are marginalised, alienated and jobless. Overall, the foregoing groups constitute an increasing pool of potential and cheap fighting manpower that can be recruited and used to serve the interests of livestock traders and self-interests that end up feeding the greed of livestock rustling cartel members.

The variables discussed, thus far, pertain to the security component of factor infrastructure-insecurity. The variables discussed below pertain to the infrastructure component of the factor. They are: distrust, learning facilities, communications (ways of moving between one place and another, particularly road networks) and health care facilities. Apart from distrust, the other three variables are visible physical structures that are particularly about the provision of social welfare by the Kenya state and non-state actors. However the discussion of their factor loading will begin with variable distrust.

Many groups that assign increased salience to their ethnic identity merely focus on improving the well-being of group members as individuals (Smith, 1981). However, this may go further and become a demand to have control over a piece of territory or to protect culture, all targeted at outsiders who may be the ethnic other or the State and distrust may be employed in the process. Variable distrust loaded at .799 on factor infrastructure-insecurity. It pertains to the infrastructure component of this factor because it stems, to a very large extent, from historical

and contemporary resentment against the State irrespective of the regime in power (See subheading ‘post-colonial period’ 3.4 above). There exists distrust, on the part of many communities, including the Pokot and the Turkana ethnic communities, towards the government (Watkins & Fleisher, 2002; Witsenburg & Roba; 2002; Tibaldo, 2006). Since the colonial period, the Pokot and Turkana communities have distrusted the government and this stems from systematic marginalization and mistreatment that has relegated them to a peripheral constituency of the nation State in Kenya. Even today, it is still contestable that the State has legitimately established itself in Pokot-land and Turkana-land. This is so because it can be validly argued that members of Pokot and Turkana communities significantly operate outside of state sovereignty and outside state laws. Different regimes, in retrospect, adopted different anti-pastoralist policies targeting these communities that invariably led them to distrust the state, regardless of regime in power. This is evident, for instance, in the failed attempts to disarm them. The problematic nature or way in which operations by state institutions and structures such as the police, the judiciary and prisons are carried out also contribute to distrust by the communities. The government rarely keeps its development promises to improve the well-being of the people of Pokot-land and Turkana-land. Since the introduction of multi-party politics, the government has tended to use heavy-handed violence against the Pokot and the Turkana as a way of managing the conflict. The heavy-handedness, by its very nature, reflects an ethnic bias on the part of the government explicable in terms of the historically strained relations between these communities and the State (Mkutu, 2008; Eaton, 2009) (see chapter three, subheading “post-colonial period” (3.4)). While the conflict was politicised during the single party era, the machinations of multiparty politics have made the conflict management even more convoluted (Dolan, 2006). This development involves the manipulation of conflict variables to serve

political ends. In this context, political machinations are geared towards weakening the support base of the opposing political party in the area. The ruling parties are as much a part of this problem as the opposition parties in the competition to gain political control. Thus, the political engagements of the State in the North Rift where the Pokots and Turkanas are domiciled constitute an object of distrust. The distrust is two-way: Pokots/Turkanas harbour distrust for government officials, particularly the security personnel, and officials, in turn, distrust the Pokots/Turkanas, particularly with regard to matters of livestock raiding. This state of affairs strains relations and interaction between the State and the two communities. Since the officials have leverage in the interaction, the implication is that the interaction constitutes social exchange in the domains of administration, polity, and economy where Pokots/Turkanas benefits tend to be typically below expectation and this leads to distrust of the officials. Ideally, Pokots and Turkanas should not withhold information from officials that could be used to improve security and enhance peaceful coexistence between Pokot and Turkana. Yet, sharing information is not typical of relationships and interaction between the officials and the ethnic communities and this can be traced to the existing distrust between state officials and the communities.

Access to education and health care are particularly important for people endeavouring to actualize their potential so that their somatic and mental realisations are not below their potential. This view is in line with Galtung (1969)'s argument about structural violence. The focus here is on how the state performs in terms of provision of these essential services. The people of Pokot-land and Turkana-land are economically marginalized, meaning they are generally poor and they exist in context of manifold poverty. This is very evident in the comparative statistics of the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics - Spatial Dimensions of Well-being in Kenya: Where are the poor? (KNBS, 2015)(See also chapter two that deals with literature review). The term poverty,

in both its absolute and relative senses, was explained earlier in the interpretation of factor core resources. For marginalised communities such as the Pokot and Turkana, poverty is not simply about having a low income: it is about multidimensional deprivation – hunger, under-nutrition, dirty water, illiteracy, minimal access to healthcare services, and insecurity, among other factors. As argued by Gleditsch (2007), the opposite of poverty is not necessarily wealth but security in its widest human-security sense. In the context of the Pokot-Turkana conflict, the connection between basic human needs theory (Burton, 1997) and structural violence theory is also evident in this perspective. Insecurity, for instance, affects formal education both directly and indirectly.

Formal education is variable learning facilities whose factor loading is .724. Education and training arguably constitute the best strategy through which Pokots and Turkanas can be enabled to develop or find viable alternatives to pastoralism. This is because a large proportion of the variance in their marginalization (relative poverty) is accounted for by their predominant dependence on pastoralism as their means of livelihood. This is a perspective long held by the Justice and Peace Commission of the Catholic Church working among the Pokot and Turkana (Diocese of Lodwar Pastoral Plan 2007-2012, 2007). Since Pokot-Turkana conflict stems, in part, from pastoralism this would entail an inverse relationship between the conflict and alternatives. In effect, this means that conflict decreases as alternative modes of earning livelihood to pastoralism increase. However, this has largely not happened, not because of the harsh physical environment in which Pokots and Turkanas live, but because of problematic relationships between the State, regardless of regime in power, on the one hand, and the people who live in semi-arid and arid lands of the North Rift on the other. Various dimensions of the issues involved are evident in the National Poverty Eradication Plan, 1999-2015 (Office of the President, 1999). The relationships have been all along ones where Pokots and Turkanas are

peripheralized as discussed in the preceding chapter (see subheading “post-colonial period (3.4)) with no adverse consequences for the regime that is in control of State power. The relations in the form of the government ruling practices are highlighted in the next chapter.

Education is a socially stratifying variable. Highly educated people, on average, tend to do better socio-economically than those with less or no education. Literacy levels in Turkana-land and Pokot-land are low compared to those of non-pastoralist rural communities in the country. The observed minimal diversification of livelihoods in Pokot-land and Turkana-land is causally linked to low literacy, fewer and sparse schools, student drop out that is above the national average, deficiencies in learning equipment; mismanagement and understaffing of schools, etc. One counterproductive consequence of this state of affairs is that the youth are denied the skills and knowledge required to access gainful employment and professional development. This is one of the biggest problems in parts of northern Kenya that are rooted in the lack of effective government presence as a result of historical neglect. This view of State neglect resonates with the Catholic Church’s perception and experience of the State’s contribution to education in the Pokot-Turkana conflict environment. The Diocese of Lodwar Pastoral Plan 2007-2012 (2007) claimed that 70% of the Turkana people could not read or write when it was developing a five-year plan for interventions by the Catholic Church in education. The church maintains that the educational system has continually deteriorated since 1980 because of the apparent abandonment of the area by the central government. According to the Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey (KIHBS) 2005/06 Basic Report, the literacy rate in Turkana County is only 19% compared to a national average of 79% and there has been little improvement to date. Statistics from the Kenya National Bureaus of Statistics KNBS (2013) maintain that only 3% of Turkana County residents have a secondary education while 82% have

no formal education. In West Pokot County, in areas where the Pokots interface with the Turkanas such as Alale ward and Kacheliba constituency, 92% and 84% of residents, respectively, have no formal education and only 6% of the whole West Pokot County residents have a secondary level of education. The actors in the Pokot-Turkana recurrent incidents of violent conflict are mainly the youth. Therefore, greater government involvement in the provision of educational facilities would considerably reduce the frequency of conflict incidents and thus contributing to the effective management of the conflict. Structural violence theory is about inequities contained in the institutions of a society that prevent people from realizing their somatic and mental requirements. It explains conflicts in terms of these inequities. Factor infrastructure-insecurity, which is an underlying cause of the conflict under study, cannot be observed directly, but variable learning facilities, which loaded on it, was observed directly. The connection between structural violence theory and factor infrastructure-insecurity and Pokot-Turkana manifest violent conflict can be explained. The logic of the theory in this connection is that: infrastructure-insecurity, mediated by learning facilities, causes the manifest Pokot-Turkana conflict because of deficit, deficiencies, and disparities in the way education institutions are structured systemically in Kenya. Thus, this is the relationship between structural violence theory and infrastructure-insecurity as an underlying cause of recurrent incidents of the conflict under study.

The World Bank (2015c) asserts that road construction would contribute significantly to the improvement of the livelihood of the population living in Turkana and West Pokot counties of Kenya. It maintains that the populations are currently living under extreme poverty, where development indicators, such as education, life expectancy, and sanitation, are far below the national average. Development of the North Rift, as a means of addressing the Pokot-Turkana

conflict, is significantly impeded by transport problems. Variable communication (roads) loaded at .663 on the factor under discussion. Road networks in the North Rift, where the Pokot and Turkana ethnic communities are domiciled, are patently insufficient. Gaye (2015), the World Bank Country Director for Kenya observes that “Enhancing connectivity to this region will improve the livelihoods of the pastoral communities in the region, enabling their people to share in the prospects for growth, poverty reduction and prosperity”. Remote areas of Pokot-land and Turkana-land have serious deficits in fixed capital in the form of roads. This is exacerbated by sparse population densities, which increase the cost of providing them. The lack of a road network hugely undermines the promotion of human capital on the part of the Pokots and Turkanas. Human capital refers to knowledge, skills and health, which are meant to increase the productivity of the individual. Distance and time increase the opportunity cost of education and healthcare. Remote rural areas of Pokot-land and Turkana-land tend to be bypassed by the flow of people, ideas, services and goods. This increases the isolation of certain areas and people in these lands which, in turn, tends to obviate their potential to move to other areas such as urban and market places in order to enhance their levels of development and productivity. Such locations could offer improved connectivity and services that would be beneficial in terms of betterment of livelihood chances. In turn, this can provide people a chance to diversify themselves and thus move from total dependence on pastoralism. The communities are largely excluded from opportunities to migrate, partly due to transportation constraints and this indirectly contributes to the social reproduction of environmental contingencies of raiding and counter-raiding. It is not surprising, therefore that they are wont to compete for water and pasture, with a high chance of degenerating into gun violence due to proliferation of firearms in pastoralist communities throughout the North Rift. According to this line of empirical-based

reasoning, the fighting is significantly partly a function of the State's disregard, in space and time, of building a network of usable road communications. Doing so would not only enable full integration of Pokots and Turkanas into Kenya's economy on a national scale but would also render their recurrent violent conflict incidents immediately counterproductive and obsolescent. A network of roads would bring about many peace and development benefits that include: many economic development activities as a result of the opening up of Pokot-Turkana territorial area through the network, effective and efficient law and order administration in the territory as a result of easy movement, and enhanced efficiency in terms of tracking raided/stolen livestock.

Roads constitute fixed capital that is undoubtedly central to the opening up of the North Rift to development. One would be hard put to deny that there is a causal relationship between the lack of a road network and Pokot-Turkana conflict. The connection between structural violence theory and factor infrastructure-insecurity with particular reference to variable communications, understood as road network, as an underlying cause of the conflict, is addressed below. Pokots and their Turkana counterparts do not need roads in order to raid one another's livestock. However, the State needs roads, first and foremost, to facilitate movement of security personnel for purposes of tracking and recovery of raided/stolen livestock, and general conflict management. The lack of roads in the region can be attributed to selective allocation of fixed capital development funds that results in discrimination against Pokot-land and Turkana-land. The selective allocation is not random; it is systematized as an aspect of how the government allocates public funds for development. The allocation is structured to reproduce regional socioeconomic disparity. One observed indicator of this disparity is the lack of communications in the Pokot-Turkana region. Factor infrastructure-insecurity, mediated by variable communications, which was observed, causes the conflict because of the institutionalized

selective allocation of fixed capital development funds by the State. This in effect denies the region, and its people, communication infrastructure that is essential to the management of the conflict.

Healthcare facilities are among the essential social services that the government has a responsibility to provide. Variable healthcare facilities loaded at .790 on factor infrastructure-insecurity making it the second highest factor loading. The government does not have a monopoly on the provision of these services. There are private sector organizations as well as individuals providing the same services. However, this chapter only focussed on government healthcare facilities. The questionnaire items were designed to uncover the adequacy and availability of health facilities, as opposed to the quality of the services. Most of the respondents averred that availability is inadequate. During focus group discussions, the appraisal of facilities was more negative than positive, an observation supported by one of the largest suppliers of health care in the conflict environment under study (the Catholic Church). The Church decries the decline of government health care to its citizenry. In response to the decline, the Catholic Diocese of Lodwar was, by 2007, providing 60% of the health care in all Turkana districts including provision of 100 outreach clinics to remote and isolated areas that are particularly inhabited by pastoralists (Diocese of Lodwar Pastoral Plan 2007-2012, 2007). According to the Catholic Church, other NGO's also contribute healthcare services and this further indicates that the percentage of health care provided by the State is way below what would be expected. Poverty and transport deficiencies considerably prevent access to the facilities and services are quite poor. A common view was that the government should build more treatment centres and staff them so as to improve the situation. Preventable death becomes more likely. Human capital is depleted by ill-health and impairment because health care facilities are few, far apart

and thus unable to cope with demand from a population that mainly depends on them. In general, the people cannot afford treatment in non-governmental healthcare facilities apart from those sponsored charity health care facilities provided to the poor by organisations such as the Catholic Church. Practically all the pastoralists have no health insurance and they tend to shun government healthcare facilities when treatments do not alleviate their ill-health. Instead, they resort to using alternative traditional modes of treatment whose medical efficacy is usually problematic.

The Kenyan media, actors in politics, as well as human rights elements of civil society frequently observe that most of the country's citizens are poor and wealth is concentrated in the hands of a small proportion of the citizenry. It is a country characterized by, among other things, extreme inequality between the poor and the rich (KNBS, 2015). One indicator of this inequality is provided by utilization of healthcare facilities contextualised in the country's social stratification order as measured by low income, middle income, and upper income strata. This is where structural violence theory enters the equation. Healthcare facilities are service-giving entities. They are not production organizations. It is common knowledge that the rich tend not to use local government-run healthcare facilities because they do not have appropriate and ample medical equipment and medication. The rich also have reservations about the technical qualifications and capability of the medical personnel who provide healthcare service. Government hospitals and health clinics are under-funded; the under-funding is a systemic characteristic of all government hospital and health clinics. Healthcare service at government facilities is mostly for the underlying population comprising people who belong to low-income and middle income socioeconomic strata. As pointed out earlier, this is institutionalized through underfunding of the health sector.

This under-funding by virtue of being structural is the focus of structural violence theory's explanation, in part, of Pokot-Turkana conflict in terms of factor infrastructure insecurity, as mediated by variable healthcare facilities. Specifically, in terms of human capital, people need to be in good health in order to work and improve their lives or they are likely to be poor. When people are mostly poor, they are likely to fight amongst themselves, as is the case with the Pokots and the Turkanas whose vast majority are poor and belong to the low-income stratum of Kenya's social formation.

With regard to the variables which loaded on factor infrastructure-insecurity, the majority of them, such as learning facilities, roads, medical facilities and security personnel are easy to identify and observe in terms of their visibility or their absence, and to a lesser degree, their effectiveness. As stated earlier, these are basic physical structures of a society and or country. Based on the data from this research, it is a finding that in the social context where the Pokot-Turkana live and interface with each other, there is a situation of State neglect. It is a situation where the two parties to the conflict are largely left to fend for themselves with regard to issues of livelihood needs, security, and largely make decisions about when and how to engage in manifest conflict with each other.

This discussion of underlying causes of the conflict ends with showing their overall link to the theory used in this study. As pointed out early in the first chapter, this study relies on structural violence theory. This chapter has discussed persistent Pokot-Turkana violent conflict, in terms of underlying causes (factors) that are in themselves unobservable. The purpose of theory is to explain phenomena and particularly the phenomena of persistent violent conflict between the two communities. The link between these phenomena and structural violence is that while the theory's logic of explanation involves identifying causal mechanisms and processes

that cannot be observed directly, they can be identified in their effects, for instance through institutionalized neglect, minimal social amenities and physical violence. It is also important to point out that respondents were not expected to understand the concept of structural violence. However, there is little doubt that if they were informed that their life experiences of the underlying causes of the conflict identified in this research were caused by structural violence, they would be able to comprehend the connection. For instance, factor core resources is unobserved but it explains Pokot-Turkana physical violence phenomena stemming from water, which is an observable variable. Thus, core resources cause the physical violence through fluctuations in the levels of water and decreasing availability of water. It is evident that the structures in the form of institutional arrangements to counteract the underlying causes of the manifest violent conflict are inappropriate and deficient in the area where conflict is an aspect of Pokot-Turkana interaction. The fact that these underlying causes actually exist is a testimony to the presence of structural violence. The deficiencies of structures in the form of flawed institutional arrangements underpin the socially patterned conflict behaviour between the two communities. The underlying causes of the conflict are inseparable from the structures that underpin these phenomena since structures ultimately determine behaviour. In reality, the underlying causes of the conflict identified in this study will remain until appropriate structures are constituted to counteract them. The foregoing, then, is the link or connection between structural violence theory and underlying causes of the persistent violent conflict. It is clear that in the context of the conflict under study, the theory fits the facts.

## **CHAPTER FIVE: STATE APPROACHES TO MANAGEMENT OF THE CONFLICT**

### **5.1 Introduction**

The Kenya State approaches to conflict were reviewed in chapter two while chapter three analysed state approaches to conflict in the context of the historical development of the State. The fourth chapter identified and explained the underlying causes of the conflict in question through the application of factor analysis to the primary data. This chapter is about the relationship between the persistence of the conflict and ineffective approaches by the State in managing the dynamics of the conflict under study. In regard to this relationship the second hypothesis is about the management of the conflict by the State. This hypothesis, as demonstrated below, has turned out to be plausible because the data on the variables give credence to the ineffectiveness of State approaches to managing the Pokot-Turkana conflict. The term approaches refers to government policy practices of providing goods and services as a way of managing the persistent conflict. The discussion of the data in this chapter pertaining to the second hypothesis is constituted by the interplay between the State's ineffective approaches to managing the conflict and the persistence of the conflict. Before addressing the specifics of the hypothesis-testing exercise, the chapter highlights the parameters, conceptualization and measurement of variables that pertain specifically to ineffective State approaches to the persistent conflict.

### **5.2 The Hypothesis and its Variables**

The purpose of testing the second hypothesis was not to show the relationship between test results of the first hypothesis, pertaining to the underlying causes of the conflict, and the test results of the second hypothesis, pertaining to the State approaches of managing the conflict. Instead, what was tested was the plausibility of the hypothesis in its own right as separate and distinct. This is what hypothesis-testing means to researchers and statisticians. The meaning of

the phrase ‘ineffective approaches’ is discussed under subheading “operational definition of concepts” (1.5 above). The approaches do not pertain to the underlying causes of the conflict; they are about managing recurrent incidents of the violent conflict under study. Throughout the discussion on ineffectiveness and approaches to managing the conflict, it is important to bear in mind that effective conflict management would ideally transform the manifest conflict, through processes of conflict settlement and conflict resolution, to a situation of negative peace and positive peace respectively, as discussed in the literature review (see subheading “conflict and its management” (2.2)).

The discussion that follows below is not in terms of the underlying causes of the persistent conflict identified in the previous chapter because that would amount to another research that has a different design and different data. This chapter certainly recognizes and takes into account the underlying causes of the conflict addressed in chapter four. However, this chapter does not make explicit reference to the causes of the conflict in the discussion on state approaches to management of the conflict. This is necessary in order to avoid conflation of underlying causes of the conflict with State approaches to management of the persistent conflict since such conflation would make chapters four and five redundant. In this regard, it is important to take into account that the underlying causes were not identified when the second hypothesis was being tested. This study has addressed both hypotheses concurrently with the specific aim of explaining the persistence of the conflict. The question whether the State is using effective approaches to manage the underlying causes of the persistent conflict cannot be answered by the data collected from this research. The underlying causes are a function of application of factor analysis. Thus, answering the question requires constructing a research instrument that is based on the identified underlying causes, collecting data with the instrument

and relating those data to the set of data on State approaches to the conflict so as to find out whether or not the approaches are effective. This chapter analyses the hypothesis that posits: the conflict persists because of ineffective approaches by the State in managing the conflict. There is no evidence in the literature to suggest that the State engaged in quantitative empirical research aimed at identifying the underlying causes of the conflict under study. The failure of the State to carry out empirical research in order to identify the underlying causes of persistence of the conflict contributes indirectly substantively to ineffectiveness of the approaches the State.

It is an accepted practice in empirical research, where measurement of variables is crucial, to explain why some variables were selected and constituted as measures of this or that aspect of the research object and/or as having a bearing on the research object. The research object in this study is persistent violent conflict between Pokot-Turkana and what bears on it, as the hypothesis posits, is approaches. Explanation in the above sense has to do with matters that the researcher seeks to uncover in the research questions or hypotheses. This hypothesis presupposes that there is a wide range of different but functionally interrelated approaches that the government can use in its efforts to manage the persistent violence. The hypothesis predicts that ineffective approaches have no effect on the persistence of the violent conflict. This does not imply that the government does not have or cannot come up with approaches that are effective for management of the conflict. The logic of the hypothesis is that the conflict persists, not because the approaches are inherently ineffective, but because the approaches are ineffective in managing the conflict. However, it cannot be denied that state approaches have an impact on the conflict. What is at issue is not the application of the approaches but the ineffectiveness of the approaches. By virtue of being alternative, the hypothesis assumes a real relationship between approaches and the conflict in the population from which the sample was drawn. In the

testing of the hypothesis, the description of approaches as ineffective is warranted only on grounds that the testing result affirmed the hypothesis as stated, which entailed rejection of the null form. Determination through Pearson correlation coefficients that the approaches are ineffective/effective was a function of level of statistical significance (i.e  $p > .05/p < .05$ ). The rationale for this is part of what is said below in connection with measurement of variable approaches contextualised in the ineffectiveness, that if and when ineffectiveness is counteracted it would obviate the need on the part of the government in power to regard the North Rift as prone to occurrence of disorder in the form of recurrent instances of Pokot-Turkana conflict.

Approaches by the State is clearly not a simple concept (see “Kenya National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management, 2012” quote in subheading “Kenya State and conflict management”; (2.4.1)); it is complex in terms of measurement. To get at the complexity of approaches by the Kenyan State, contextualised in their description as ineffective, multiple indicators and measures of what the approaches are, constituted as a variable were used. In concrete operational terms, approaches designate role performance activities of State functionaries, according to state policy in so far as they wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, pertain to recurrent incidents of violent conflict between the two communities. The functionaries are: chiefs, assistant chiefs, district commissioners, district officers, provincial commissioners, police, parliamentarians, councillors, magistrates and judges. The role activities of these State functionaries directed at managing the conflict constitute approaches as a variable. Data were collected on various role activities of these functionaries individually and collectively. This research was done just before devolution was implemented. Nevertheless, devolution has had minimal positive effect, yet, on the order and organization of security in terms of surveillance in the North Rift where this research was done. Approaches, as a variable, of the State to managing

the conflict was measured by multiple State functionaries on a five-point Likert scale matrix question with designations of State functionaries, specified above, as response categories to be scaled. Designation Provincial commissioner was not scaled because most of the respondents were either barely informed or ignorant about specifics of the role of provincial commissioner in relation to livestock raiding and counter raiding in their conflict zone. Designations judge and magistrate were treated as one item. Thus, the items scaled were 8. Each response by the respondents to each item was scored. The scores for each item were then added together to provide each respondent with an overall score for the designations. The minimum possible score and the maximum possible score was 5 and 40 respectively. The overall score was taken to indicate a respondent's "position" on or "experience" with approaches that the individual response categories were intended to tap. Obviously, the total number of overall scores was the same as the number of respondents in the sample size. The overall scores were used in the computation of correlation coefficients of variable approaches with the rest of the variables, through which the second hypothesis is tested.

The grounds for measuring State approaches to managing the persistence of the conflict as explicated above are as follows. First, the role activities of the functionaries of the different designations taken together provide a better measurement of the approaches than the activities of an occupant of a single designation. The measurement of the approaches is inclusive as it covers all designations whose occupants' respective role activities pertain to law and order that amounts to managing of the conflict. Second, since an indicator is a specific measure of a more complex concept that is labelled 'approaches' in this study, the use of aggregated measures of approaches certainly enabled avoidance of some distortions and misclassifications that could have arisen had a single-item measure of approaches been used. Thus, convergent validity, which is a variant of

criterion-related validity, to which approaches as measured herein pertain, was greatly increased (Babbie, 2002). Third, the answers by the respondents to a question can largely be a function of the wording of the question. To guard against this anomaly, multiple indicators were used to measure approaches so as to avoid the way in which the question was worded, (contextualized in the role prescriptions and activities of one designation) and this substantially affected the way a respondent answered the question. This increased reliability in the sense of common variance of measurement of approaches because it minimized respondents' answers to questions being a function of the wording of the questionnaire items, thereby, reducing response error variance contextualised in the role prescriptions and activities of one or more designations. Fourth, data on variable approaches generated by asking respondents about role prescriptions and activities of a single designation would have amounted to a crude and partial measurement of approaches. Using multiple indicators enabled greater precision thereby achieving a high degree of exactness in the measurement of variable approaches. Fifth, simplicity is valued as an aspect of the scientific way of knowing about the external world. By summarizing the information conveyed by multiple measuring of State approaches to managing persistent Pokot-Turkana conflict into one variable, the analysis of the interplay between the conflict and State provision of Pokots and Turkanas with political goods and services, with particular reference to security, was considerably made simple.

Conflict within the Pokot and within the Turkana communities and non-violent conflict were excluded from the analysis of conflict for purposes of this study. Only manifest violent conflict between Pokot and Turkana ethnic communities was of research interest. As a variable, it is multi-faceted. Thus, to tap exhaustive data on it, direct and indirect measures were employed. It was treated as a discrete variable. A variety of publications on conflict between

these pastoralist communities were utilized (See Chapter 3 on literature review; Kratli and Swift 1999; Good, 2007; Mkutu, 2008; Eaton, 2009 among others) in the formulation of items in a matrix question. Thus, data on the conflict variables was generated through the following items in the matrix question: raids witnessed by respondent; raids respondent was told occurred; respondent saw a person or persons under security personnel arrest because of raiding; respondent was told that a person or persons was/were seen under arrest by security personnel because of raiding; respondent saw security personnel in pursuit of raiders with raided/stolen livestock; respondent was told that security personnel were seen in pursuit of raiders with raided/stolen livestock, respondent was told security personnel returned livestock to their respective rightful owners, respondent saw security personnel returning recovered livestock to their respective rightful owners, respondent witnessed Pokot/Turkana killing/fatally injuring/injuring Turkana/Pokot going away without taking anything belonging to the other party, respondent was told that Pokot/Turkana were seen killing/fatally injuring/injuring Turkana/Pokot, then going away without taking anything belonging to the other party, and occurrences of violent conflict between Pokots and Turkanas in the last two years or recent times. In accordance with variable approaches explicated earlier, the scores for each of these measures of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict were added together to provide each respondent with an overall score on variable Pokot-Turkana conflict. The overall score was taken to be respondent's datum on variable conflict. The overall scores were then used in the computation of correlation coefficients of variable violent conflict with each of the rest of the variables through which the hypothesis in question was tested. However, unlike variable approaches, each of the items (indicators of conflict) was retained as a single variable and correlated with every other variable excepting the indicators that were combined to constitute the overall measurement

of conflict as explained above. If the correlation coefficients across all the other variables were not statistically significant (i.e.,  $P > .05$ ), they were dropped from the analysis as a variable but not necessarily excluded from partly informing interpretation of some of the statistically significant correlation coefficients where appropriate.

Since association between two variables can be in other forms, other than linear, computing a correlation (Pearson) coefficient between variables whose distributions in the sampled population are not amenable to representation by straight line will yield a coefficient which is not significant, meaning it is very low, negligible or zero (Agresti and Finlay, 2009; Coolidge, 2013). This can happen because either the rates of change between the two variables vary, or data on one of the two variables are only measuring a small part of the possible range of the variable (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The former applies to instances where a relationship is higher at the two extremes than in the middle; and the latter applies where one variable is truncated, meaning only a small part of its range was measured. The former relationship is curvilinear and the latter is truncated. Scatter plot was done to ascertain that the non-significant correlation coefficients, which were not interpreted, were neither a function of curvilinearity nor truncation. The hypothesis associates persistence, meaning recurrence of the violent conflict, with ineffective approaches by the State in managing the recurrent incidents of the conflict. The hypothesis predicts successive occurrences of the conflict as opposed to a single occurrence of conflict. What is predicted is the association between the approaches and the persistence of the conflict within the purview of approaches ineffective. A statistically significant correlation between a particular measure of approaches and a particular measure of the conflict does not indicate the degree to which the two are correlated. It merely affirms that at that level of statistical significance there is an ineffective component, on the part of the particular approach,

in the observed correlation coefficient of the interplay between the approaches and persistence of the conflict. The question of whether or not a certain manifestation of State approach to managing the conflict, that is, delivering adequate political goods and services with particular reference to security to Pokots and Turkana is ineffective, is methodological and not epistemological.

The correlation between approaches of the State to managing occurrences of the conflict on the one hand, and conflict, in the form of raids and other incidents, on the other hand was determined by Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient since it is the single most common type correlation coefficient which measures the degree of relationship between two quantitative (interval and ratio) variables. All the variables comprising the correlation matrix upon which testing of the hypothesis in question was based are quantitative. Although Pearson correlation is widely used in social science research, the difference between one correlation coefficient and another is not easy for one to understand without a fair grounding in statistics. For purposes of illustration, a correlation coefficient of .35 and one of .70 can be compared as below. For this reason, discussion of the interplay between State approaches on the one hand and persistence of the conflict, on the other hand, employs zero-order Pearson correlation and coefficient of determination. The coefficient of determination is a very convenient and useful way of interpreting the value of a correlation of two variables. It is a clearer indication of the relationship between two variables than the zero-order correlation coefficient. The coefficient of determination is the square of the correlation coefficient between the two variables. In terms of the above example, 0.35 squared is .1225 and 0.70 squared is .49. Each of the coefficients of determination (.1225 and .49) represents the proportion of shared variance between two variables. Since a proportion can be converted into a percentage by multiplying it by 100, .1225

becomes 12% and .49 becomes 49%. In zero-order correlation 0.70 is two times 0.35. However, in terms of coefficient of determination 0.35 is 12% of variance in one variable, say y, explained by one with which it is correlated, say x, and vice versa. The percentage of variance explained by a correlation of 0.70 is more than four times the percentage of variance explained by correlation of 0.35, yet, mathematically, 0.70 is twice as high as 0.35. Based on the above illustration it can be seen that, interpretation of amount of variation that two variables have in common in terms of coefficient of determination is clearer than interpretation of the same in terms of zero-order correlation coefficient. Although the statistical data-analytic method employed in testing the hypothesis in question is correlation, “the correlation coefficient may also be used as an indicator of prediction” (Coolidge, 2013, p.184); conventionally, prediction is a concern of regression analysis. If, for example, a strong negative correlation is obtained between State security surveillance in the North Rift and Pokot-Turkana cattle rustling, it could be said that security surveillance predicts cattle rustling and vice-versa. The rest of the chapter discusses the bearing of State approaches on managing the violent conflict, within the purview of the approaches being ineffective. The discussion is about dynamics of the conflict, as opposed to underlying causes. The dynamics are in the form of interplay between approaches and conflict. The link between the interplay and structural violence theory is that, the interplay comprises observed causal mechanisms in the form of correlation coefficients between measured (observed) variables. As stated earlier, causal mechanisms, attributes of observed variables, are encompassed by the logic of explanation proffered by structural violence theory. It is important to note that the discussion of relationships between approaches phenomena and conflict phenomena is at once underpinned and guided by structural violence theory.

Table 5.1 Correlation Matrix of Conflict Variables and Approach Variables

	V009	V013	V014	V015	V021	V027	V028	V029	V32a	V32b	V32c	V32f	V32j	V34e	V36e	V36f	V38a	V38b	V38c	V47b	V47c	V47d	V47e	V47f	V47g	V47h	V051	V055	V061
V009	1	.249	-.206	.659**	*.183	-.104	-.189	-.105	-.059	.080	.341**	.049	.473**	-.149	.408**	-.074	.091	-.123*	-.167	-.168	-.015	.081	.064	-.043	-.122*	-.110	-.114	-.066	-.100
V013	.249	1	-.151*	.460	.170	-.157*	.011	-.139*	-.155*	.181	.031	-.096	.199	-.132*	-.059	-.004	.046	-.137*	-.115	-.175	-.301	-.069	-.042	-.011	-.177	-.086	-.198	-.113	-.282
V014	-.206	-.151*	1	-.322	-.138*	.400	.125*	.212	-.209	-.050	-.313	-.219	-.231	.007	-.017	.002	.078	.260	.255	.063	-.062	.096	.132*	.122*	.049	-.025	-.017	.045	.144*
V015	.659**	.460	-.322	1	.351	-.083	-.024	-.097	-.096	.297	-.047	.005	.041	-.502	-.479**	-.079	.014	.216**	** .204	-.396	-.214	-.435**	-.085	-.428**	-.371	-.319	-.211	-.160*	-.368
V021	.183*	.170	-.138*	.351	1	-.098	-.147*	.004	-.107	.145*	-.038	.008	.152	-.274	-.064	-.056	.050	-.195	-.153	-.084	-.170	.072	.005	-.200	-.165	-.103	-.021	.000	-.055
V027	-.104	-.157*	.400	-.083	-.098	1	-.002	.211	-.250	-.102	-.153	-.213	-.063	.043	-.062	-.010	-.052	.185	.155	.058	.023	.149	.174	.222	.067	-.078	.135*	-.015	.070
V028	-.189	.011	.125*	-.024	-.147*	-.002	1	.133*	.190	.010	-.003	.029	-.023	.002	.009	.000	.092	.199	.213	-.056	-.115*	-.142*	-.200	-.135*	-.186	-.203	-.022	-.053	-.153
V029	-.105	-.139*	.212	-.097	.004	.211	.133*	1	-.177	.316**	-.233	-.195	.136*	-.055	.142*	.106	.090	.144*	.177	.103	-.024	.099	.080	-.002	-.140*	-.180	.065	-.069	-.023
V32a	-.059	-.155*	-.209	-.096	-.107	-.250	.190	-.177	1	.062	.348	.471	.011	.118*	-.035	-.117	-.148*	-.210	-.086	.037	-.031	-.312	-.428	-.328	-.151	-.024	.028	-.009	-.089
V32b	.080	.181	-.050	.297	.145*	-.102	.010	.316**	.062	1	.325	.180	.315	-.128*	.003	-.103	.045	.014	.062	-.210	-.139*	.017	.007	-.073	-.120*	-.130*	-.153	-.237	-.256
V32c	.341	.031	-.313	-.047	-.038	-.153	-.003	-.233	.348	.325	1	.504	.099	.049	-.085	-.091	-.042	-.099	-.106	-.022	.111	-.121*	-.076	-.038	.156	.091	-.039	-.048	.008
V32f	.049	-.096	-.219	.005	.008	-.213	.029	-.195	.471	.180	.504	1	.198	-.014	-.044	-.095	-.025	-.042	-.094	-.072	.039	-.156	-.203	-.214	.034	.058	.008	.047	-.057
V32j	.473**	.199	-.231	.041	.152	-.063	-.023	.136*	.011	.315	.099	.198	1	-.230	.012	-.048	.062	.001	.050	-.174	-.028	.015	.068	-.062	-.153	-.268	-.071	-.166	-.201
V34e	-.149	-.132*	.007	-.502	-.274	.043	.002	-.055	.118*	-.128*	.049	-.014	-.230	1	-.005	-.019	-.230	-.074	-.006	.110	.147*	-.024	.044	.221	.165	.304	.133*	-.001	.045
V36e	.408**	-.059	-.017	-.479**	-.064	-.062	.009	.142*	-.035	.003	-.085	-.044	.012	-.005	1	.309	.038	.063	.066	-.079	.034	.054	.102	.153*	-.009	.011	-.005	-.051	.016
V36f	-.074	-.004	.002	-.079	-.056	-.010	.000	.106	-.117	-.103	-.091	-.095	-.048	-.019	.309	1	.118	.052	-.013	.061	.058	.267	.253	.357	.231	.224	-.020	-.027	-.082
V38a	.091	.046	.078	-.014	.050	-.052	.092	.090	-.148*	.045	-.042	-.025	.062	-.230	.038	.118	1	.274	.118*	-.130*	.015	.087	.222	.109	.095	.000	-.231	.033	-.016
V38b	-.123*	-.137*	.260	-.216**	-.195	.185	.199	.144*	-.210	.014	-.099	-.042	.001	-.074	.063	.052	.274	1	.778	-.008	.203	.214	.195	.219	.065	-.101	-.064	.003	.004
V38c	-.167	-.115	.255	-.204**	-.153	.155	.213	.177	-.086	.062	-.106	-.094	.050	-.006	.066	-.013	.118*	.778	1	-.049	.137*	.217	.150*	.187	-.021	-.120*	-.042	-.060	-.009
V47b	-.168	-.175	.063	-.396	-.084	.058	-.056	.103	.037	-.210	-.022	-.072	-.174	.110	-.079	.061	-.130*	-.008	-.049	1	.307	.246	.119*	.039	.189	.171	.307	.180	.263
V47c	-.015	-.301	-.062	-.214	-.170	.023	-.115*	-.024	-.031	-.139*	.111	.039	-.028	.147*	.034	.058	.015	.203	.137*	.307	1	.395	.349	.282	.323	.129*	.095	.126*	.203
V47d	.081	-.069	.096	-.435**	.072	.149	-.142*	.099	-.312	.017	-.121*	-.156	.015	-.024	.054	.267	.087	.214	.217	.246	.395	1	.641	.510	.336	.214	.084	-.042	.149*
V47e	.064	-.042	.132*	-.085	.005	.174	-.200	.080	-.428	.007	-.076	-.203	.068	.044	.102	.253	.222	.195	.150*	.119*	.349	.641	1	.673	.482	.309	.094	.018	.136*
V47f	-.043	-.011	.122*	-.428**	-.200	.222	-.135*	-.002	-.328	-.073	-.038	-.214	-.062	.221	.153*	.357	.109	.219	.187	.039	.282	.510	.673	1	.551	.517	.063	-.013	.146*
V47g	-.122*	-.177	.049	-.371	-.165	.067	-.186	-.140*	-.151	-.120*	.156	.034	-.153	.165	-.009	.231	.095	.065	-.021	.189	.323	.336	.482	.551	1	.549	.141*	.161	.317
V47h	-.110	-.086	-.025	-.319	-.103	-.078	-.203	-.180	-.024	-.130*	.091	.058	-.268	.304	.011	.224	.000	-.101	-.120*	.171	.129*	.214	.309	.517	.549	1	.203	.133*	.216
V051	-.114	-.198	-.017	-.211	-.021	.135*	-.022	.065	.028	-.153	-.039	.008	-.071	.133*	-.005	-.020	-.231	-.064	-.042	.307	.095	.084	.094	.063	.141*	.203	1	.580	.345
V055	-.066	-.113	.045	-.160*	.000	-.015	-.053	-.069	-.009	-.237	-.048	.047	-.166	-.001	-.051	-.027	.033	.003	-.060	.180	.126*	-.042	.018	-.013	.161	.133*	.580	1	.307
V061	-.100	-.282	.144*	-.368	-.055	.070	-.153	-.023	-.089	-.256	.008	-.057	-.201	.045	.016	-.082	-.016	.004	-.009	.263	.203	.149*	.136*	.146*	.317	.216	.345	.307	1

\*. \* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

V32 j - distrust, V36e - lack of viable alternative to pastoralism, V027 - Violence political rather than ethnic, V32a - marginalization causing inter-ethnic conflict, V32b - self-serving behavior, V32c - borders, V47b - coercion-based reaction to conflict, V47c - killing because of resistance to attack, V47d - cattle raiding and killing, V47f - dramatic (atypical) conflict occurrence, V38a - Kenya-Uganda border patrol, V38b - Kenya-South-Sudan border patrol, V38c - Kenya-Ethiopia border patrol, V028 - discussion based reaction to conflict, V029 - duties and responsibilities, V34e - scarcity of effective security personnel, V015 - security approaches, V021 - increasing police/military personnel, V009 - conflicts, V013 - influential people (community notables), V014 - business interests in pastoralism, V32f - revenge killing, V47g - attacking/injuring as part of cultural rite, V47d - non-dramatic (typical) conflict occurrence, V47e - livestock accumulation need, V47h - long standing hatred, V051 - vengeance, V055 - community securing own livestock, V061 - greed causing conflicts

### **5.3 Discussion of Correlation Results**

In a sense, it is not implausible to argue that what has been discussed in the last chapter constitutes more of an exploration of the latent dimensions of Pokot-Turkana recurrent violent conflict, and less of a determination of their bearing on recurrent Pokot-Turkana violent conflict. This is because data were not collected on the dimensions, but on the variables; some of which were clustered as a function of rotation to constitute particular latent dimensions of the conflict. This chapter, unlike the last, discusses the management of the conflict by the government. The discussion is couched in terms of variables as opposed to factors. The approaches are in the form of role performance by different State functionaries in accordance with their respective designations. Ineffectiveness has to do with the difference or discrepancy between what a functionary, such as the police officer, is designated to do, or what ought to be done, and what the functionary actually does or tends to do in practice. The discrepancy is neither an inherent aspect of the approaches of the State to managing the conflict nor an aberrant behaviour on the part of the State functionaries whose duties and responsibilities have to do with matters of law and order, peace and/or security of the State and its citizens. What is tested in the second hypothesis of this study is the relationship between variable approaches as an aggregation of the role performance of different State functionaries on the one hand, and Pokot-Turkana violent conflict decomposed into its correlates in the form of different structured manifestation(s) in space and time on the other.

In the correlation matrix, the coefficients vary in terms of magnitude and direction. Magnitude has to do with degree or strength of the relationship between variables in question while direction has to do with the relationship between variables being either positive or negative. The matrix has twenty-nine variables of which sixteen are significantly correlated (.01

or .05 level of significance) with variable State approaches to ending the persistent violent conflict, or their correlation with approaches as mediated by other variables. Efforts to manage the conflict comprise of a variety of strategies and tactics, both non-coercive and coercive, by State agents in the form of activities of State functionaries, as well as processes of institutional arrangements in the domain of security together with law and order. The interrelationships of these sixteen variables, indicated by the zero-order and/or partial correlation coefficients that are discussed singly to enable arrival at an overall conclusion, in the form of statistical decision that either, the approaches and persistent conflict are related, or they are not related. The purpose of the logic of discussion (hypothesis testing) is not to demonstrate that the approaches and persistent conflict are related; rather, the logic is geared towards falsification (disconfirmation) of the null hypothesis, which posits that there is no causal relationship between ineffective approaches and persistence of the conflict (Popper, 1972). In turn, the falsification confirms that ineffective approaches constitute a valid explanatory or predictor variable of persistence of the conflict. Falsification pertains to the null hypothesis. Confirmation pertains to the alternative hypothesis that is posited here: ineffective approaches are related to persistence of the Pokot-Turkana conflict. The zero-order (simple) correlation of each of the rest of the variables is taken to be a specific test of the hypothesis in question as posited. Hence, hypothesis testing here, and in this connection, does not pertain to one relationship (coefficient) but a set of coefficients which in effect maximizes reliability of the testing outcome of the bearing of ineffective approaches on the different correlates (measures) of persistent Pokot-Turkana violent conflict in total. The discussion of variables interrelationships below hinges upon the postulation of verifiable existence of causality between variable approaches on one hand, and the rest of the variables on the other, as well as within the rest of the variables.

#### **5.4 Distrust, Conflict and Approaches**

Variable distrust is a constituent of the domain of deep-seated animosities and rivalries rooted in the history, myth and memory that Pokot and Turkana have of each other. It is, therefore, an immediate potential and manifest force of occurrences of acts of violent conflict between the two communities. Distrust and trust are usually considered opposite poles on one continuum, even though they may be qualitatively different (Lewicki et al., 1998). When contextualized in behaviour, distrust is the expectancy of negative outcomes that one can receive based on the expected action of another party in the interaction characterized by uncertainty (see for example Bhattacharya et al., 1998). This is in line with Giddens (1990) who views distrust as a lack of confidence in the reliability of the person or system, and points out that some properties of distrust apply regardless of society under discussion. Distrust is both a disposition personality variable and a temporary state; disposition has to do with long-term disposition to behaviour whereas state has to do with a temporary condition, such as mood (Sundberg, 2004). Those who are distrusting, Pokot/Turkana in this case, tend not to give others the benefit of the doubt unless they have clear evidence that some are trustworthy (Komorita and Parks, 1994; Rotter, 1980; Gurtman, 1992). During the primary data collection process, it was observed that in terms of relations and interaction between Pokots and Turkanas, the tendency to distrust is seemingly more characteristic of the Pokot than it is of the Turkana. Distrust is causally related to conflict; the coefficient of correlation between conflict and distrust is .473. Approaches do not cause conflict; rather, they are a reaction to conflict. However, it is important to point out that approaches can contribute to the persistence of a conflict if that they are ineffective. Thus, the relationship between persistence of the conflict and approaches is not one way but two way. This is in line with the relationship posited in the hypothesis. In terms of time order of events,

occurrence of a specific set of acts of conflict between the Pokot and the Turkana antecedes in time approaches. The correlation between approaches and conflict is .659; the correlation between approaches and distrust is .041. Since “approaches” is a reaction to conflict, and conflict is an effect of distrust it follows, by implication, that approaches is an indirect reaction to distrust. The foregoing suggests that either conflict mediates the relationship between distrust and approaches or distrust confounds the relationship between conflict and approaches. The nature of the interrelationship between variable approaches and distrust is, thus, not clear at this juncture. To clarify the interrelationships, statistical control of variance through partial correlation was applied to the variables’ correlation coefficients. Specifically, distrust was partialled out of conflict but not out of approaches, for the simple reason that the covariation of distrust with approaches is insignificant; their correlation coefficient of .041 is not significant at .05 level of probability. After distrust was partialled out of conflict, as specified above, the correlation between approaches and conflict (originally .659) decreased to .200. Clearly .200 is the partial correlation between approaches and conflict. The stronger correlation of .659 between approaches and conflict is due to the fact that conflict is linearly dependent on distrust. Therefore, when distrust was partialled out of conflict, the correlation between approaches and conflict decreased considerably. Of course, these statistics support the hypothesis in question. Statistically, the low or decreased correlation of .200 between approaches and conflict after partialing out distrust from conflict is explained by the fact that conflict is partly a function of distrust, and when distrust is held constant or controlled for, the correlation between approaches and conflict decreases very considerably to .200.

The usual approach of the government to the conflict, in the form of mobilization of security personnel in response to acts of manifest violence between Pokot and Turkana, indicated

by killings, maiming, raided livestock, burning of houses, displacement, is ineffective precisely because the acts are effects of distrust in part. In this regard, they will certainly recur unless handling them by the government takes into account distrust from which they partly stem. Approaches are ineffective on two grounds. First, they are reactive rather than preventive, an observation noted in the National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management, (2012). Second, they tend to be coercive, that is, they employ repressive State apparatus, as opposed to ideological State apparatus, that use methods of conflict management, even as the government has leverage to do so. In line with structural violence theory, the approaches are likely to make a long term qualitatively and quantitatively better difference to the living standards of Pokots and Turkana in the purview of their inter-ethnic interaction dynamics in space and time if the approaches target distrust, among other causes of the conflict, rather than conflict *per se*, which is in itself a product of distrust. Variable approaches is not inherently ineffective in terms of contributing to managing the persistent conflict. The word ineffective is a valid descriptive label of approaches in so far as government efforts to manage the conflict are reactive to the conflict as opposed to the causes. This reactive approach contributes to the reinforcement of recurrence of acts of violent conflict between the two communities. On the other hand, if the approaches by the State were to target distrust, it would be erroneous, in such a context, to describe approaches as ineffective. However, targeting distrust alone does not amount to effective management of the conflict because the conflict has multiple causes of which distrust is just one of them. To recap, the ways and means that the State employs in its efforts to manage the persistent conflict are ineffective because they react to and target acts of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict instead of targeting distrust, which is partly responsible for the persistence of the conflict. This rationale is in line with Grahn, (2005), and Bevan, (2007), who also criticise government coercive conflict

management approaches that do not identify and address the underlying causes of a conflict. The persistence of the conflict is not a function of how the approaches are structurally constituted as tools of law and order within Kenya (Ghai, 2011); rather, it is contingent on how the approaches are operationalised.

It is tenable to argue that persistent violent conflict between the Pokot and Turkana is considered somewhat tolerable, regardless of its scale and damage in terms of who got killed, maimed, size of livestock raided, dwellings burned down, displacement of people among other effects, as long as it does not spread to regions inhabited by communities whose economic mainstay is different from pastoralism. Thus, what is tolerated in pastoralist communities may not be tolerated or allowed to become the order of the day in non-pastoralist communities by the regime in power. This would be inconsistent with the State's practice of selective repression that is manifested in ethnic/regional economic disparity or structural violence. If what is tolerated as normal or expected in pastoralist communities were to happen or spread to non-pastoralist communities, government response is quick, by either controlling through threat or use of force or handling it through non-violent restoration of law and order, depending on circumstances of the moment and the place. However, the speed with which the government responds tends to be influenced more or less by the answer to the question: are victims of the attack ethnically homogeneous or heterogeneous? If, for example, most or all of the victims are from the same ethnic group as the tenant of the State House, or are of the same ethnic group as a powerful individual who is a critical political ally of the tenant, one can predict, with an insignificant risk of error, that the government will be fast to respond to the attack or violent conflict and the effects of the response will be productive in both the short term and the long term. Contrasting cases to illustrate this point are the State's instant reaction to Mkepetoni Lamu County, 2014

(Kipchumba, 2014) killings, and its perfunctory (dilly-dally) reaction to killings in the north Baringo County area and beyond it, whose inhabitants are multi-ethnic and without a State House tenant (see Daily Nation, 16/10/15). This area is part of the North Rift's conflict environment inhabited by Pokots and Turkanas among others that has all the features of wider indicators of structural violence. The 2015 Kenya National Bureau of Statistics Report on spatial dimensions of well-being in Kenya ranked Turkana county the last out of 47 counties nationally with a poverty incidence of 87.5 percent, which is 42.3 percentage points above the national average. West Pokot was ranked 40<sup>th</sup> with a poverty incidence of 66.3 percent which is 21.1 percentage point above the national average. Eastern Pokot area, which is in the north of Baringo County, is even higher (KNBS, 2015). It is clear that this is an area that has and continues to experience issues of marginalisation and this raises questions of state neglect on many fronts, even beyond matters of law and order. As history has demonstrated, government responses are at times, or even commonly, selective. In relation to the government, this state of affairs or scenario is, in a large measure, a function of visibility of what Althusser (1971) calls repressive State apparatus and ideological State apparatus. Certain sections of civil society organizations whose value preferences, biases, slants or inclinations resonate with those of the ideological State apparatus acquiesce to the State's selective responses. For the purpose of deepening understanding of the inverse relationship between variables raiding and approaches, it is helpful to make reference to the works of Gramsci (Gramsci, 1971), a political theorist whose concept of hegemony has been influential in the domain of social sciences from the 1970s. In his systematic refutation of State ruling ideas, whose beneficiaries are the ruling class, he compared civil society to a powerful system of "fortresses of earthworks" (Gramsci, 1971) standing behind the State. Since a strong State (Rotberg, 2007) controls the means of violence, a Weberian

notion, and the various groups within civil society are dependent on the State for achieving any policy goals they may espouse, the relationship between the State and civil society is asymmetrical in favour of the State. On this basis, State personnel can and actually do, to various extents, impose their own preferences on citizenry. Of all IGAD member countries, Kenya is arguably the one with the most active, vibrant and developed civil society. While the State has power to exercise legitimate violence within its territory, it also applies its power through other means by negotiating administrative relationships with different groups in its territory in order to develop its capabilities for intervening in violent conflict between different ethnically defined groups, among others. Both the argument and what it implies are generally true, while accepting that in some situations this approach is not used. It cannot be denied that force is not the only means of State power and, therefore, State actors cannot be oblivious of the social power and influence of civil society. The actors have to make concessions that depend on the circumstances of the moment and what the social power and influence of the civil society entails. However, concessions, in the form of state actors recognising and taking into account the concerns and standpoints of civil society when dealing with conflict matters whose fault line is ethnic difference, are applied, even as such a difference may sometimes be a spurious cause of the conflict. At that point, the apparent tension between State and civil society, in the context of conflict between differently defined ethnic groups, is largely rendered impotent, thereby giving credence to Gramsci's notion that civil society is a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks standing behind the State. In this context, the State and civil society objectives appear similar and geared to production of a different and qualitatively better approach to handling Pokot-Turkana violent conflict. Typically the government tolerates civil society elements or organizations provided they do not cross the line and appear to undermine state authority.

It is, thus, hardly surprising that when the State employs coercive and repressive approaches to handle Pokot-Turkana violent conflict, there is generally reticence on the part of the civil society to criticise the strategies. The coercive and repressive approaches are seemingly underpinned by an unproven assumption that such strategies are ultimately productive in terms of ending the conflict, and that such approaches are primarily in the interests of the Pokots and Turkanas and secondarily in the interest of State law and order. In terms of genealogy of ideas, the assumption has roots in John Stuart Mill's (1962) argument that despotic ruling is legitimate provided its objective or goal is to improve the ruled, and the means of the despotic ruling is justified by the objective. The practice of despotism involves using coercive and repressive means. It is pertinent to recall that variable approaches has multiple indicators. The indicators are covariates. Violence is a covariate and comprises of coercion and repression. Violence is part of the State's arsenal of approaches to persistent conflict. The correlation of violence in the form of coercion or repression by the government with conflict is  $-.168$  which is significant at  $.01$  level of probability. The meaning of this inverse relationship between approaches (violence) and conflict is that, as the State's employment of violence in the form of coercion and repression, as a means of ending the persistent conflict decreases, occurrences of violent conflict between the ethnic groups increases. This inverse correlation of  $-.168$  between approaches meaning violence by government security personnel, and conflict referring to violent acts of Pokots against Turkanas and vice-versa, supports the hypothesis in question. Dynamics of the support are as explicated below.

To begin with, a nation-wide cross section image that the people of Kenya have particularly of the police force is negative. This generalization about public perception of the police is neither an invention of academics nor propaganda by journalists. The police are

generally perceived as corrupt, measurably incompetent, and tend to use excessive force in the form of unnecessary and unjustified brutality. Indeed, complaints or criticisms or commentaries by certain civil society organizations, contrary to Gramsci's view, or elements of aggrieved citizens and detached onlookers on how and why the Kenyan State delivers goods and services to the citizenry, usually directed at the police, are typically about these perceptions. The complaints or criticisms or commentaries, insofar as they are considered by the police in the course of discharging their duties and responsibilities, are adduced for the negative correlation of -.083 between variables violence being political rather than ethnic and security approaches. It is important to reiterate that what increases is not the size of security personnel numbers but the frequency of occurrence of incidents of Pokot-Turkana conflict.

An obvious challenge to successive post-colonial State regimes is the issue of the practical utility of the functions of punishment, retribution, and deterrence in terms of counteracting Pokot-Turkana violent conflict as a means of addressing the much needed socioeconomic development in the North Rift. Does punishment work and has it ever worked in bringing about what can be described as a lasting end of the conflict? The answer to this fundamentally important question in terms of the governments' policy formation and practice is simple. The State's use of violence to end, once and for all, the persistent conflict between Pokots and Turkanas has not worked. It has not produced the expected long term positive results; rather, what has been witnessed can be described as short and sporadic periods of negative peace. In this regard, it is also beneficial to contextualise these functions (punishment, retribution, and deterrence) in a wider framework which claims that since attaining independence, the State's attitudes and approaches to issues of peace and social progress for the Pokots and the Turkanas are insignificantly different from colonial policies and practices (Nkinyangi 1983; Spencer,

1983; Dolan, 2007; Tiabaldo, 2007; Mkutu, 2008; Gifford, 2009). The failure of punishment to produce expected enduring positive results is precisely because punishment requires that the State functionaries be permanently present, particularly at the geo-ethnic fault-line of violent conflict between the antagonists. It is for this reason that punishment, as a means of ending the persistent conflict, is by and large not effective. Any expected positive effects of punishment, as a bundle of internally differentiated strategies of counteracting the persistent conflict are, thus, inherently bound to be transient and patently ineffective. In retrospect, this state of affairs obtains as a reinforcing aspect of the conflict because its atrophying or ending have been and are systematically blocked by structural incompatibilities and contradictory tendencies in the interplay between matters economic and matters political in the regimes of the post-colonial State.

### **5.5 Borders and Security Personnel**

The correlation of border (Uganda, South Sudan, and Ethiopia) with approaches is positive for South Sudan (.216) and Ethiopia (.204), but for Uganda, the correlation coefficient (.014) is not significant. Thus, only Ethiopia and South Sudan coefficients are discussed, but without totally dispensing with Uganda. Security personnel get to the area where the raiding or attack has occurred. If prior to the attack they were thin on the ground, meaning that their number was small, it will increase as a way of enhancing security. However, in the cases of Ethiopia and South Sudan it is the increase in number, as opposed to increase in security personnel, that is positively correlated with the conflict (raiding/rustling of cattle and the like). Turkanas border the Dassenech ethnic group that is on the Ethiopian side of the border. The Dassenech are armed and there is no apparent effort or clear policy by the Ethiopian State to disarm them (Mburu, 2007). Furthermore, the Ethiopian security personnel actively patrols the Kenya-Ethiopian

border. It is, thus, quite easy for Dassenechs to cross the border into Kenya and raid Turkana than for Turkanas to cross over to Ethiopia and do the same. The Kenya-South Sudan border is porous on both sides due to minimal presence of both Kenyan and South Sudan personnel along the border. There are practically no border security personnel to deter the Toposas of South Sudan from raiding the Turkanas. This is exacerbated by the fact that the Kenya-South Sudan border is problematic from a variety of dimensions, as discussed by Mburu (2007), particularly due to uncertainty about ownership of the Ilemi Triangle. Increasing the number of security personnel in the area of attack is predictably what happens after an attack is reported. As noted above, it is not the increase of security (counter-raiding) activities on the part of the police that is involved in the positive correlation coefficient. A general view of the respondents was that the increase is driven more by the desire on the part of security functionaries, particularly police, to benefit personally from the loot, for example raided livestock, than by the need to provide security. In addition to questionnaire data, focus group discussions averred that when the police recover stolen livestock, they frequently do not seek out the rightful owners and they dispose of the livestock themselves. Furthermore, the presence of a relatively large number of security personnel in the area of the attack is typically for a short time. Respondents were asked to answer either “yes” or “no” to the question: Does the number of police officials increase when incidences of insecurity heighten? The answers were coded as dummy variables, with “no” as the comparison basis. “Yes” was coded one and “no” was code zero and then correlated with conflict, yielding a negative correlation coefficient of  $-.183$  (significant at .05 level of probability). As the size in terms of numbers of police decreases, the frequency of occurrence of conflict incidents in the form of raids, attacks, and theft of animals increases. Deploying an increased number of police in response to violent conflict phenomena between Pokots and

Turkanas and withdrawing most, if not all of them, when the conflict subsides or momentarily ceases, which is what the negative correlation coefficient of  $-0.183$  between variables approaches and conflict means in this particular case, is a variant of ineffective State approach to ending persistent occurrence of incidents of violent conflict between Pokots and Turkanas.

Turkanas, as a whole, have more goats than cattle or sheep or camels or donkeys. Goats are the most numerous, followed by cattle. During unstructured interviews and focus group discussion, Turkana respondents stated that when the Pokots raid or steal their goats, the security functionaries have a tendency to pursue the Pokot raiders with the aim of demanding a share of the booty as opposed to recovery of the stolen animals. Security functionaries normally allow Pokots to get away with the rest of the animals after they give a share of the raided loot to the police. This is self-serving behaviour on the part of the security personnel. It can, thus, be argued that the increase of the number of State security functionaries as raiding occurrences heighten, is seemingly not for the purpose of pacifying Kenya's North Rift region or ending persistent Pokot-Turkana violent conflict, rather the purpose can be plausibly construed in terms of serving non-State interests. The increase of security functionaries, if and when it happens, is arguably a function of raiding (livestock rustling) insofar as it constitutes offering an opportunity for security functionaries to personally benefit from the raided loot. Similarly, Pokot respondents said that security functionaries do demand and receive a share of some of the raided animals. It is important to bear in mind that variable approaches are comprehensive and inclusive. It encompasses behaviour on the part of security functionaries in total, while they are on duty, regardless of whether it is legitimate or not legitimate. The approaches in the form of a range of strategies and tactics geared towards ending persistent Pokot-Turkana violent behavioural conflict is analytically amenable to disaggregation into two aspects: the first is about self-serving

interests for individual security functionaries, and the second comprises performing of legally prescribed duties and responsibilities. The latter aspect is for ensuring public maintenance of law and order, and securing lives and property of people inside Kenya. Self-serving behaviour is informally institutionalized as an aspect of how the order and organization of State establishment operates. As such, self-serving behaviour is inextricably intertwined with other legally prescribed forms of behaviour that are required under the purview of state security dynamics. This makes self-serving behaviour part and parcel of what, in practice, constitutes Kenyan State approaches to ending the persistent conflict. In the correlation matrix, variable self-serving behaviour correlates at .316 with the variable prescribed duties and responsibilities of state security functionaries, irrespective of their designation duties or being located in proximity to the Uganda, Ethiopia or South Sudan border. A correlation coefficient whose magnitude is this high means that the inter-correlated variables are measuring the same thing, which is, State approaches to ending Pokot-Turkana violent behavioural conflict. Obviously, the correlation coefficients above and their interpretation lend support to the hypothesis in question; that the conflict persists because Kenyan State uses ineffective approaches in efforts to end the conflict.

Ideally, there should invariably be no difference between State on the one hand and Pokots as well as Turkanas on the other, concerning what should be done to end Pokot-Turkana violent conflict once and for all, other things being equal. However, this is difficult, if not impossible, because of not only the complicated nature of Pokot-Turkana relations in historical and contemporary perspectives, but also because of internal institutional weaknesses and generally problematic relations between different institutions of Kenya's post-colonial State. The problematic relationships, highlighted below, did not obtain in Kenya's colonial State. In the academic literature on intrastate conflict, of which recurrent fighting between the Pokots and

Turkanas in the North Rift is a part, there is much discussion of State strength in terms of notions of a State being collapsed, failed, failing, weak, or strong. Admittedly, these notions are not without flaws analytically and concretely. As evaluative criteria of judging State performance of constitutionally prescribed obligations, duties and responsibilities, they are crude and relative. The criteria pertain to a State's ability to provide its citizens with what is referred to as political goods (Bayart, 1993). In Kenya, politicians and policy makers, as well as journalists reporting on incidents of the Pokot-Turkana conflict and other conflict issues, such as Kenya's present conflict involvement in Somalia, do not tire of naming porous borders as a contributing cause. In a sense, this is tantamount to species of conspiracy theory. It would, however, be simplistic to argue that porosity of borders is an indication of weakness, on the part of the Kenya's post-colonial State regardless of change of regime. The notions of State strength specified above considerably resonate, in terms of the substance that they describe, with Weber's frequently cited definition of State (Weber, 1947). According to Weber, the State is a distinct set of institutions that have authority in the form of legitimate power to make rules that govern a society; and which claims a monopoly of legitimate violence within a specific territory. The context of Weber's image of a State, as above, is provided by explication of the ideal types of authority he constructed, namely: traditional, charismatic and legal-rational (bureaucracy). The type of authority that is particularly relevant and important to this hypothesis testing exercise at this juncture is legal-rational authority because none of the different tenants of State House in post-colonial State Kenya has ruled or rules through traditional authority or charismatic authority. All of them have ruled through bureaucracy, whose effectiveness and efficiency are encumbered with an operation complex of strains and stresses, contradictions, systemic political intrusion, mono-ethnic hegemony tendency intrigues, and patently unequal allocation of political goods

and development resources, thereby reproducing regional economic disparity. All of these governance challenges are evident, to an extent, in the haphazard provision of political goods and services operationalized in institutional arrangements in Kenya, in particular security. What the hypothesis posits resonates with this historical state of affairs and validates the assertion in the hypothesis.

## **5.6 Approaches, Dramatic and Non-Dramatic Violence**

One useful way to describe acts of violent conflict between the Pokots and the Turkanas is by distinguishing those that are dramatic from those that are non-dramatic. The former are unusual while the latter are usual. Data on these descriptions as variables were generated through a seven-point Likert scale questionnaire item. The item is number 51 in appendix 1. How it was utilized to measure dramatic conflict incidents and non-dramatic conflict incidents, after completion of data collection, is described first. This is followed by explanation of the meaning of variables dramatic and non-dramatic conflict. Kenyan State approaches to management of the conflict are then discussed in terms of differential reaction to recurrence of dramatic and non-dramatic conflict incidents. The item was coded into dummy variables. Dummy coding is a way of creating multiple variables out of the original variable all of which are dichotomous and take values of only 0 or 1 (Tabernick & Fidell, 2014; Field, 2013; Agresti & Finlay, 2009), 1's are assigned to subjects of a group one wishes to identify and 0's to all other subjects. "Dummy variables can be very useful in the analysis of research data" (Black, 2003, p.117) and, indeed, some of the variables to which factor analysis was applied in the fourth chapter are dummy variables. Response categories "agree very strongly", "agree strongly", and "agree" were combined to constitute one dummy variable that was labelled dramatic conflict. Each and every sample element that chose any of these three was assigned 1. Response categories "disagree",

“disagree strongly” and “disagree very strongly” were combined to constitute another dummy variable which was labelled non-dramatic conflict. Each and every sample element that chose any of these categories was assigned 1’s. Response categories that neither agree nor disagree were treated as the baseline and therefore those who chose it were not assigned 1’s. Each and every same element that chose it was assigned 0. Thus, three groups were created out of the sample, two of them being dummy variables, that is, dramatic conflict and non-dramatic conflict. This is summarised in the table 5.2.

**Table 5. 2 Two Dummy Variables for the Three Groups**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Dramatic (1)</b>	<b>Nondramatic (2)</b>
<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

As indicated in chapter four, revenge is a major contributing variable to Pokot-Turkana violent conflict. In chapter four, the dynamics of revenge behaviour were explicated, demonstrating in effect that violent conflict incidents, which can be described as unusually destructive, stem from vengeance. Item 51 in the research instrument was selected as one of the key measures of dramatic conflict incidents and non-dramatic conflict incidents because it is contingent upon three successive preceding items which are all about vengeance.

Non-dramatic acts constitute what is typical or characteristic of violent conflict as an aspect of Pokot-Turkana relations in space and time. These acts frequently recur and the general perception of them is that they are part and parcel of normal relationship conflict interaction between the two communities. The adjective “persistent” in the phrase “persistent Pokot-

Turkana conflict” pertains mainly to non-dramatic acts of the violent conflict. There are not and cannot be acts of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict that are inherently non-dramatic or inherently dramatic. Dramatic and non-dramatic are descriptive labels of observed acts of violent conflict whose causes are external to individual Pokots and Turkanas. Variables dramatic and non-dramatics were correlated with variable State approaches and resulted into correlation coefficients of -.428 and -.435 respectively at a .01 level of significance, both highly significant. Before explaining and describing what these correlation coefficients mean, it is important to further differentiate between dramatic and non-dramatic acts of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict. Non-dramatic acts are characteristically small scale in terms of amount of damage caused to their target victims. They involve a small number, less than ten, of aggressors who can be categorized as raiders, attackers, bandits, or thieves. Respondents (39%) indicated that often the offending criminal aggressors have a high probability of getting shielded from facing the justice system, or evading identification as performers of the raid, or getting arrested, or not getting reported to State security functionaries, let alone the media. The respondents ascribed this, in part, to political protection. Non-dramatic acts of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict are the predominant focus of security provision activities by relevant State functionaries in the purview of Pokot-Turkana conflict relations in space and time. The acts are patterned and, therefore, lend themselves to correct prediction. On the other hand, the amount of damage caused by acts of a dramatic violent conflict is considerably far greater than that caused by a non-dramatic incidence of violent conflict. The dramatic act is given much publicity in the media where it is purveyed as truth or matters of fact about it. In general, what is purveyed tends to be largely a function of the particular media houses and newspapers ideological slant and business interests. Dramatic conflict acts elicit reactive verbal behaviour on the part of the core ruling elite, not from the

relatively peripheral politicians who tend to pander to the core elite, the sentiments of which are at one and the same time ethnically charged and politically defensive. Moreover, there is a seemingly virtual refusal on the part of this core elite to recognize truth as a value system that should undergird their ruling and policy making. Frequently, there is also much rhetoric on the part of some sections of ‘politicos’ about the State capacity not only to pacify the North Rift but to maintain peace in the whole country.

Any two incidents of dramatic violent conflict are far apart time-wise in contrast to non-dramatic violent conflict incidents as specified earlier. Any one incident of dramatic violent conflict has very significantly low probability of occurring. This means, in terms of prediction, dramatic conflict comes quite close to being improbable, but not impossible. At this juncture, it is important to observe that the putative so-called early conflict warning signs smack of being tantamount to what may justifiably be described as nonsensical diatribe in terms of affording a means to predict dramatic conflict. Early warning signs are partly the stock in trade or preoccupation of peace narratives or lores of non-science minded sections of academia, sections of the State security establishment, and certain non-governmental organizations, each with an axe to grind. The observed negative correlation between dramatic violent conflict incidents and State approaches is what one would expect and an affirmation of reality on the ground in the North Rift. This inverse relationship between variables State approaches and dramatic conflict incidences means that security decreases while the amount of damage during the attack, in the aftermath of the attack, increases. Thus 18% (the square of  $-0.428$ , the correlation coefficient of dramatic conflict and State approaches) is the proportion of variation in dramatic conflict explained with State approaches. This pertains to approaches in terms of being ineffective. A telling occurrence of dramatic violent conflict incidence specific to Pokot-Turkana hostile

relations is what happened at Kapedo in December 2014. The Kapedo ‘affair’ is the latest case in point of dramatic violent conflict in this seemingly interminable cycle of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict.

To argue that the State security functionaries were caught unaware is not only simplistic but also borders on political naivety. Furthermore, to blame the incident on some key officials in the State security establishment who ‘slept’ on the job is to be evasive of the multi-dimensional nature of the incident. To label the incident as another manifestation of State security establishment’s ineptitude in the context of the current regime to pacify the North Rift is tantamount to a perception of the Kapedo affair that is coloured by one’s own particularistic socio-historical experience (Manheim, 1957). To say that the Kapedo affair constituted a species of delegitimation and invalidation of an organized operation of the State security establishment, as a life and property protection violence-based system, is to advance a directional hypothesis which can either be confirmed or disconfirmed with empirical data. The Kapedo affair is not an isolated incident; the Westgate command structure fiasco of 2014 can, for instance, be evaluated in similar light. What does the foregoing about the Kapedo affair have to do with dramatic conflict incidence occurrence as an object of State approaches? First, the Kapedo affair is itself a telling dramatic conflict incidence. Second, it points to a need to look at the ways in which specific structurally constituted components or elements of the security establishment, as an entity, operate in the social reproduction of haphazardness as well as problematic security intelligence competence. Doing so enables understanding the ‘within-security-establishment’ sources or forces of the seemingly interminable occurrence of non-dramatic incidences of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict.

To determine whether approaches are flawed in thought and/or practice in relation to violence between Pokots and Turkanas, analysis of covariance was carried out involving three variables: violence measured as a discrete quantitative variable, approaches, and livestock accumulation need. The covariance of approaches was presumed to be causal, that is, the dynamics of approaches being such that they contribute to prolonging the “life” of violence. Covariance is given by the formula;

$$\text{Cov}(X, Y) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n (X_i - \bar{X})(Y_i - \bar{Y})}{n - 1}$$

$x$  = the independent variable

$y$  = the dependent variable

$n$  = number of data points in the sample

$\bar{x}$  = the mean of the independent variable  $x$

$\bar{y}$  = the mean of the dependent variable  $y$

As can be seen from the formula above, covariance is a measure of the variance that two different variables share. Analysis of covariance (Ancova) is a form of analysis of variance (Anova). In the simplest case, as applied here, it is used to determine whether the means of the dependent variable for two or more groups of an independent variable differ significantly when the influence of another variable that is correlated with the dependent variable is controlled. The dependent variable is violence and the independent variable, as specified above, is approaches, and the control variable (covariate in the terminology of Ancova) is livestock accumulation need whose correlation with violence is .312. The relationship between variable livestock accumulation need and variable violence is causal: livestock rustling or raiding or stealing stems

in part from a need to increase livestock possession and herd size. The next paragraph gives specifics of the analysis of covariance with the variables named above and also the meaning of its result in terms of State approach efforts to end the persistent conflict.

The independent variable was approaches, categorized into State repressive and ideological apparatus (Althusser 1971). The dependent variable consisted of occurrences of incidents of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict. Livestock accumulation need, as measured on a seven point Likert scale, was the covariate control variable. It correlates at .312 with Pokot-Turkana violent conflict; but it did not correlate with variable approaches categorized into repressive State apparatus and ideological State apparatus thereby constituting two groups on which ANCOVA was carried out. Each of the two groups comprised randomly assigned Pokot respondents and Turkana respondents. After adjusting for, or controlling for livestock accumulation need, there was no significant difference between the mean of repressive State apparatus group and the mean of ideological State apparatus group on the criterion variable, that is the dependent variable, which is occurrence of incidences of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict ( $F(1,126) = .71, p = .28$ ). Note that: F stands for F ratio (the ANOVA/ANCOVA statistic); (1,126) stands for the smaller and the larger degrees of freedom respectively; .71 stands for the F ratio; .28 stands for the statistical significance value of the F ratio, .71. In the context of the hypothesis in question, this finding of no significant difference between the mean of Kenyan repressive State apparatus and the mean of the Kenyan ideological State apparatus is interpreted as meaning that, in terms of the State's efforts to end the persistent Pokot-Turkana violent conflict, there is no difference between using repressive apparatus and using ideological apparatus. Both repressive State apparatus approaches and ideological State apparatus approaches (Althusser, 1971) are ineffective, but not inherently so, with respect to the issues or

matters of why and how these apparatuses are employed as ways and means of ending the Pokot-Turkana violent conflict. This application of analysis of covariance to the variables in question supports the hypothesis. Obviously, this finding does not mean that the persistence of the conflict under research is entirely explained by ineffective approaches. 10% (the square of .312 which is correlation between Pokot-Turkana violent conflict and livestock accumulation need) of the variance in Pokot-Turkana violent conflict is accounted for by livestock accumulation need and this is evidence that ineffective approaches are not the only significant cause of the persistence of the conflict. Certainly, it would be patently simplistic to argue that persistent Pokot-Turkana violent conflict is entirely a function of ineffective approaches by the State. That would amount to mono-causal explanation, which is untenable as far as explanation of human social behaviour is concerned.

In line with the expectation that hypotheses are to be adequately tested, a t-test of the significance of the difference between the mean of non-dramatic violence and the mean of dramatic violence was done. The result of the t-test showed a significant difference between the two mean (4.1 and 6.4, respectively). This statistical difference signifies that practices of non-dramatic violent conflict occurrences constitute an infinite population of dynamics and strategies, and dramatic violent conflict occurrences constitute a different infinite population of dynamics and strategies. The phenomena of non-dramatic violent Pokot-Turkana conflict and the phenomena of dramatic violent Pokot-Turkana conflict are not one population; rather, they are two different populations. The form and expression of non-dramatic violent conflict are significantly different from the form and expression of dramatic violent conflict. Obviously, this implies, as a matter of course, that approaches by State security functionaries to handling of non-dramatic and dramatic Pokot-Turkana violent conflict occurrences should not be uniform.

However, typically, and as respondents confirmed, that is not what happens. It is quite tenable evidentially, in practice that in terms of security intelligence, the purpose of which is to veer off the possibility of violence, there is no difference in large measure between that of dramatic conflict and that of non-dramatic conflict. This line of reasoning, grounded in the primary data, gives credence to what the hypothesis states. What follows in the next paragraph is a discussion of the relationships between variables livestock accumulation need, violence political than ethnic, and security approaches.

The discussion begins with correlation coefficient specifics. The correlation between violence and approaches is  $-.83$ ; violence's correlation with livestock accumulation need is  $.174$ ; the correlation between approaches and livestock accumulation is  $-.085$ . Variables violence and livestock accumulation need pertain to Pokots and Turkanas. This is because they engage in violent conflict against each other, and the violence is or may be partly motivated by a need to accumulate livestock or increase herd size. Possession or ownership of large herd size is an indicator of high status in Pokot and Turkana cultures. Variable approaches pertain to the State. It is composite in that it is expressed in different but functionally inter-related ways, depending on whether the conflict violence is dramatic or non-dramatic, among other things. The expression comprises various strategies and tactics, some being repressive and others being non-repressive. The repressive and non-repressive are functionally interdependent because the State cannot depend for a long time exclusively on just one of them without undermining its legitimacy. The question, what does the negative correlation of  $-.083$  between approaches and violent conflict mean is now addressed. This question is deceptively simple. However, the negative correlation coefficient plausibly means that as approaches increase violence decreases but the decrease is not significant. This statistic gives credence to the hypothesised relationship

between persistence of the violent conflict and State approaches to management of the conflict. The statistics testifies to the existence of ineffectiveness on the part of the State with respect to managing the conflict. Since in Pearson correlation statistical significance depends on sample size, there is no doubt that if this research's sample size were larger the coefficient would be significant at .05 level, at least, but its direction would not change. What is important in this regard is to bear in mind, with particular reference to the hypothesis in question, is the direction of the coefficient as it affirms what the hypothesis posits, and not its (coefficient's) magnitude. As pointed out earlier in this paragraph, a need to increase herd size cause violent conflict. Variable livestock accumulation need is negatively correlated at  $-.085$ . This correlation coefficient is not statistically significant. However, what is particularly important is the fact that it is negative. Livestock accumulation need is a continuous attitude variable. This means that there can be more of it or less of it on a continuum. It cannot have a value of zero in real terms and any such value would be arbitrary not pragmatic. The meaning of  $-.085$  is that, as approaches increases, livestock accumulation need decreases. It would not be plausible to interpret this coefficient to mean that approaches decrease with increase in livestock accumulation need. The expectation, or what tends to happen, is that, the increasing and continuing presence of security personnel in Pokot-Turkana conflict zone decreases the likelihood of occurrences of livestock rustling, that is, it attenuates the need to acquire or have large size herd through raiding. It is clear from the foregoing that the observed relationship between approaches and livestock accumulation need as indicated by a negative correlation coefficient of  $-.085$  tend to support what the hypothesis in question posits.

## **5.7 Approaches and Alternatives to Pastoralism**

Alternatives to pastoralism do not mean abandoning pastoralism and adopting other ways or modes of earning a living. Parenthetically, it is instructive to note that Kalenjin communities, high land Pokot arguably included, were originally pastoralist but in the course of time adopted agrarian practices of tilling the land without abandoning pastoralism entirely. Indeed, high land Pokot people combine pastoralism and arable farming practices. These people can be described as sedentary pastoralists who combine food crop growing with livestock keeping, even as Pokots in general remain largely pastoralist. Accordingly, ascribing Pokot-Turkana violent conflict to lack or scarcity of viable alternatives does not mean or imply abandoning pastoralism absolutely. Rather, it means economic diversification wherein pastoralism and alternative means of livelihood other than pastoralism are complementary. Today, to the degree to which transhumance, in the form of seasonal movement of human groups in search of pastures is practiced in the North Rift, there is relatively no difference between Pokot and Turkana social formations in regard to their dependence on pastoralist subsistence. Comparatively speaking, according to the data from this research, it is valid to state that subsistence in Turkana social formation is characterised by tending flocks and herds of domesticated animals combined, and at times supplemented by some hunting and gathering. This supplementation occurs particularly during hard times of transhumance; Turkanas engage in very insignificant and irregular arable agriculture. Pokot social formation is characterised by tending flocks and herds of domesticated animals combined with significant arable agriculture, particularly in high land areas, even as pastoralism is still the main mode of subsistence in Pokot social formation, like it is in Turkana social formation. The fact that the two communities live side by side in this unchanged harsh environment, characterized by perennial scarcity of means of livelihood, continues to impact on

the persistence of the conflict and its management, (Ruto, Adan, & Masinde, 2004; Eaton, 2009).

It is clear that the history of the State's variety of strategies to end the conflict is one of failure. Much of the variance in the failure is plausibly accounted for by what reasonably amounts to neglect by successive post-colonial regimes' to address the issue of alternatives, let alone viable alternatives, to pastoralism. This has continued as social reproduction of essentially non-adaptive pastoralist mode of subsistence became increasingly problematic as an aspect of development of praxis of Kenya's post-colonial State, irrespective of change of regime and/or State house tenant. The issue of viable alternatives to pastoralism is critical with regard to matters of socio-economic development praxis not only in the pastoralist North Rift but also elsewhere within the territorial boundaries of Kenya as a State wherein pastoralism is an economic mainstay of a certain section of the citizenry. The concept of political goods was drawn on earlier in this chapter. It is helpful at this juncture to draw on this concept again to underpin looking at the dynamics of interrelationships of variables approaches to persistent Pokot-Turkana violent conflict, lack/scarcity of viable alternatives to pastoralism, and ongoing occurrences of incidences of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict. Variable approaches correlates negatively at  $-0.479$  with variable lack/scarcity of viable alternatives to pastoralism. The interrelationship of lack/scarcity of viable alternatives with occurrences of incidences of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict is two-way. As such, lack/scarcity of viable alternatives to pastoralism influences occurrences of incidences of violent conflict, and occurrences of incidences of violent conflict also influences lack/scarcity of viable alternatives to pastoralism; the correlation coefficients are  $0.408$  and  $-0.383$  respectively, but only, and only if approaches is partialled out of occurrences of violent conflict.

State approaches to the conflict correlates at  $-.659$  with occurrences of incidents of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict. A closer look at the four correlation coefficients in the context of the two-way flow of causal influence between lack/scarcity of viable alternatives to pastoralism and occurrences of incidences of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict suggested the likelihood of one of the two independent variables: approaches, and the lack/scarcity of viable alternatives, being a suppressor variable (Agresti & Finlay, 2009). Of particular interest is the effect of lack/scarcity of viable alternatives on occurrences of incidents of violent conflict. The term suppressor variable has to do with prediction, that is, multiple regression. It is an independent predictor variable that is useful in predicting the dependent variable and in increasing the value of the squared multiple correlation coefficient. In this context, dependent predicted variable is occurrence of incidences of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict while the independent predictor variable(s) are Kenyan State approaches to ending Pokot-Turkana violent conflict and lack/scarcity of viable alternatives to pastoralism. A suppressor variable produces suppressor effects, and suppressor effects are, in turn, specifically generated when a predictor variable has a significant effect on the predicted variable but only when another variable (which is also a predictor) is held constant. Prediction of occurrences of incidences of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict with lack/scarcity of viable alternatives to pastoralism, when State approaches to ending Pokot-Turkana violence conflict is held constant, demonstrated that lack/scarcity of viable alternatives to pastoralism is the suppressor variable. This finding has important policy implications in terms of the bearing of State approaches and lack/scarcity of viable alternatives on occurrences of incidences of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict. Indeed, it is important to note that the correlation between lack/scarcity of viable alternatives to pastoralism and occurrences of incidences of violent conflict when approaches was held constant, as specified above, was  $.383$ ,

which can be described as very high. And so, what flows from the foregoing? It is the finding that approaches by the Kenyan State to manage Pokot Turkana violent conflict are ineffective. They are significantly flawed in terms of why and how they are constituted and executed. The hypothesis being tested is supported and strongly so.

This paragraph highlights distinctive findings in the form of interrelationships of variables. Variables distrust, conflict and approaches were discussed together. What emerged from the discussion was that the State's approaches to management of the conflict are ineffective, in part, because the target conflict behaviour, which is an effect rather than distrust that is, a cause, in part of the conflict. The ideal end, in view of the approaches, should be to end the conflict. Management of a conflict is a species of ending it. According to data from this research, the approaches are typified more by utilization of coercion in the form of restitution, retribution, deterrence and prevention; and less by non-coercion in the form of researching and attending to the underlying causes, dialogue, and reward of mutual beneficial peace between the two communities. This has rendered the approaches ineffective because the positive effects of coercive or punitive approaches to manage the conflict are characteristically short lived rather than enduring over time. For collective approaches to be effective, the punishing agent has to be ever present in the location of the conflict. In the current context, the punishing agent is the State. Its presence in Pokot-land and Turkana-land can be described as insignificant in quantitative terms and generally not positively felt by the people of the two communities. The discussion of variable borders and security personnel included other variables. What emerged from discussion is that self-serving behaviour on the part of the security personnel compromises patrolling Kenya-Ethiopia, Kenya-South Sudan and Kenya-Uganda border, thus contributing to ineffectiveness of the approaches. Approaches dramatic and non-dramatic occurrences of the

conflict were discussed together with other variables, giving recent examples of dramatic conflict occurrences and contrasting them with routine conflict occurrences in terms of the State's reaction to them. What was demonstrated in this connection was that the conflict persists, in part, because State approaches differ depending on whether or not the conflict is routine or dramatic. Typically, the latter is given the attention it warrants whereas the former rarely, if at all, gets the attention it warrants. The decision to treat a conflict occurrence as either routine or dramatic and react to it accordingly tends to be determined by political considerations. It is not untenable to state, in this regard, that occurrences of the conflict are generally, not invariably, regarded by the State as routine, and thus, not constituting a serious threat to the internal security of the State. This may explain the State's ineffective approaches to management, as posited by the hypothesis in question. Ineffective approaches do not reflect political and economic inability, on the part of the State to manage, let alone end, recurrent incidents of Pokot-Turkana conflict once and for all. Rather the conflict incidents, involving the killing, maiming, displacement, livestock raiding, destruction of property etc, persist because they are tolerable. Clearly, the approaches of the state in terms of policy and practice, in this regard, are flawed and, thus, ineffective.

It is helpful to recap what has been discussed in this chapter as a way of indicating, among other things, the linkage between this chapter and the next chapter, which focuses on the activities of the Catholic Church pertaining to management of the conflict. It is usual for a multivariate analysis exercise, like the one carried out in this chapter, to have one or more key variables. To begin with, approaches and persistent conflict that are singularly key variables in this chapter were explicated. This was followed by discussion based on observed correlation coefficients of the relationships between State approaches to management of the persistent

Pokot-Turkana conflict on the one hand, and the persistent conflict on the other. Selection of the coefficients was determined by their significance level ( $P < .05$  or  $P > .01$ ) meaning that the observed relationships between an approach variable and a conflict variable did not occur by chance sampling.

In line with the null hypothesis, which any hypothesis testing exercise attempts to reject, the purview of the discussion was ineffectiveness on the part of the State in managing the conflict. Significant correlation coefficients discussed in the chapter are empirical evidence of ineffectiveness of State approaches in managing the conflict. They warranted acceptance of the hypothesis as posited. The data from this research in the form of the statistically significant correlation coefficients constituted empirical grounds for rejecting the null hypothesis of no relationship between State ineffective approaches management of the conflict on the one hand and the persistence of the conflict on the other. The data affirmed the hypothesis in question. This is the finding of this quantitative research with particular reference to the State approaches to management of the conflict in question. In the next chapter, the third and last hypothesis, pertaining to the activities of the Catholic Church is tested, specifically in terms of their contribution to management of the conflict in question. The linkage between this chapter on state approaches and the next chapter is not in their findings. Rather, it is simply logically and empirically the fact, that the range of phenomena in terms of which to appraise Kenyan state's approaches as well as Catholic Church's activities is constituted by one and the same thing, namely management of the conflict in question.

## **CHAPTER SIX: THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND ITS MANAGEMENT OF THE CONFLICT**

### **6.1 Introduction**

Chapter five analysed the Pokot-Turkana conflict from the perspective of state approaches to managing of the conflict. This chapter focusses on the activities of the Catholic Church in the management of the conflict. The chapter tests the third hypothesis, which states that the conflict persists because of ineffective conflict management activities by the Catholic Church. The object of the hypothesis encompasses a variety of activities of the Church in Kenya that have a bearing on the conflict. There are three aspects in the testing of the third hypothesis under this chapter. The first highlights parameters, in the form of terms/ideas and substantive aspects of the hypothesis object, that is, what is included in the hypothesis' testing exercise, as a way of distancing matters social scientific from matters religious. The second contextualizes conflict management as practice, as opposed to a narrative, in the Pokot-Turkana conflict, and then indicates data-analytic strategies used in the attempt to reject the null hypothesis. The third describes and explains observed activities of the Catholic Church in terms of their effects on the conflict.

### **6.2 Data and discussion**

The underlying causes discussed in Chapter four were not identified when the third hypothesis was being tested. This study has addressed both hypotheses concurrently with the specific aim of explaining the persistence of the conflict. Furthermore, while this chapter takes into account the chapters on literature review and history, the aim is not to affirm or to disaffirm what the literature review or history says; rather, it is specifically about describing, explaining and understanding the relationship between variables as posited in the hypothesis in question. What is discussed in connection with activities of the Catholic Church pertaining specifically to the

conflict is underpinned by taking into account the fact that the thrust of the activities of the Catholic Church as a non-state institution in Kenya is not control *per se*. The mission of the Church in Africa is underpinned by the promotion of peace and justice, sacredness of human life, human rights, integrity of creation, development, and ethical character formation of human agency (Flannery, 2000; Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace [PCJP], 2005; Synod for Africa, 2009; Francis, 2015). The activities are essentially not about securing obedience, law and order of people in the North Rift. Matters of law and order are social-political and are thus the responsibility of the Kenyan State. They are part and parcel of the obligation on the part of the State to provide political goods and services for the purpose of rendering its rule legitimate in the eyes of the public or the ruled. Ultimately, all peace and development activities of the Catholic Church in Kenya are subject to State regulations. However, it would be misleading to say that contradictions of social-political trends in the form of what amounts to patterned multi-faceted disparity in Kenya as a social formation are none of the Catholic Church's concern. The hypothesis in question is not about the role of catholic evangelization in the efforts of the Catholic Church to manage the conflict. Involvement of the Catholic Church in matters of the conflict is expected, as opposed to required, by State legal prescriptions.

Peace is a universal good (African Synod Proposition, 2009) and peace making is integral to the Catholic Church's missionary existence in the world from its very beginning (Ford, 1984; Bosch, 2006). The Church is not required by the laws or constitution of Kenya to be involved in any affairs of violent conflict management internal to Kenya. However, it is involved precisely because not being involved would not only diminish justification of the essence of its presence in Pokot-land as well as Turkana-land but also peripheralize or render irrelevant matters of catholic socio-spirituality to the Pokots and the Turkanas. This is because the progress of not only socio-

political matters, but also religious, faith, evangelization and salvation on the part of Pokots and Turkanas are significantly, if not necessarily, contingent upon security assurance by the State. Transforming manifest conflict, whether it is a short lived or persistent one, to negative and positive peace, as explicated by Galtung (1969) and Webb (1986) is vital for such progress. The Catholic Church can and does indeed contribute to the security assurance or maintenance effort, but it is not required by law to do so; it would be naïve for one to say that the State expects the Church to do so. Thus, it would be unrealistic and simplistic to say that if the Catholic Church maximized the effectiveness of its conflict management activities, the obverse of what the hypothesis in question posits would be the case or would obtain. This is not to deny the Church's constant concern for peace and social progress for the people in the areas where it carries out its activities. The Catholic Church's effectiveness, or lack thereof, with regard to contribution to efforts to end recurrent incidents of violent conflict between the Pokot and the Turkana, is not a simple function of the Church's pursuit of spiritual matters. Neither is it a simple function of the need to ameliorate the negative effects of violent conflict and/or the effects of chronic drought that is characteristic of the North Rift where Pokots and Turkanas live. The dynamics of spiritual matters co-vary with dynamics of motive force. Catholic Church theological concepts and/or religious faith-based ideals that presumably lead Catholic Church's actors to engage in activities that manage recurring incidents of the conflict are excluded from the discussion on the testing of the hypothesis. This is because there is a very high likelihood that they will compromise the analytical rigor by introducing obfuscation and confusion as well as extra-empirical speculation in the hypothesis testing exercise. Specifically, this means avoiding mixing up matters that pertain to political science and those that pertain to religion.

Conflict management is the key term in the hypothesis in question. Before highlighting the modes of data-analytic strategy used below to describe and explain the meaningful patterns identified in the data, it is important to indicate what conflict management means in terms of scope and mechanisms, as an aspect of Pokot-Turkana relations in space and time. A definition of conflict management, given by (Zartman, 1989) is in order: “Conflict management refers to the elimination, neutralization or control of the means of pursuing either the conflict or the crisis” (p.8). This resonates with that of Quinney (2011) who considers, the substance of the process to mean any and all approaches, mechanisms, and other measures intended to prevent or resolve violent intrastate conflict. It can be termed as interventionist efforts towards preventing the escalation of negative effects of the violence, which in this study refers to the Pokot-Turkana conflict behaviour. Realistically speaking, the Catholic Church in Kenya is, by virtue of its influence in terms of social issues, well placed and able to significantly contribute to Pokot-Turkana conflict management as social action and also as an aspect of the ongoing endeavour of stakeholders to end the conflict. This is because much of what conflict management as practice calls for or needs to target is in the purview of the Catholic Church. Besides the influence of the Catholic Church, alluded to earlier, it has all along been involved in activities that are either a species of managing the conflict or have affinity with State conflict management approaches. In light of the manner in which the hypothesis in question is phrased, the foregoing means that Catholic Church’s activities, whose purpose is to contribute to managing the conflict, overlap with State administrative/policy practices that operate for the same purpose. The interest here is in the Catholic Church’s activities in terms of their unique contribution to management of the conflict. These activities are all aspects of the Catholic Church as a Track II conflict management actor as discussed in chapter two on literature review, (see subheadings “conflict

and its management” (2.2) and “Catholic Church and conflict management” (2.7)). The phrase “unique contribution to management of the conflict” refers to the proportion of variation in management of the conflict that is specific to Catholic Church’s activities. In this vein, State administrative/policy practices whose purpose is management of the conflict are extraneous to Catholic Church’s activities specified above. In theory, it is not problematic to differentiate between what ought to be done and what can practically be done to end the conflict. However, in practice, differentiating between what should be done and is being done is not easy. This is because activities of ending the conflict and activities of managing the conflict are not mutually exclusive strategies of pacifying the North Rift. Rather, they constitute a continuum of counter-violence activities with conflict managing at one end and conflict ending at the other end. The testing of this hypothesis involves assaying the activities of the Catholic Church in insofar as they pertain to the conflict, with particular reference to their effectiveness in terms of contribution to management of the conflict, while the State’s administrative/policy practices geared to or whose purpose is managing/ending recurrent violent conflict incidents are excluded. Determination of whether or not the Catholic Church’s conflict management activities are effective, through statistical testing, is dependent upon the chosen level of significance of the particular quantitative data-analytic technique applied. Furthermore, in some cases, interpretation of a relationship between variables in question, in the context of effectiveness, or lack thereof, takes the form of a trade-off between statistical significance and practical importance of the relationship.

Having delineated the parameters and scope of what to reasonably expect the Catholic Church to do in matters of management of the conflict, it is helpful to end this section on testing the third hypothesis by specifying what the terms effective and ineffective as descriptions of

activities of the Catholic Church's conflict management, in this study, not only mean but also imply. The hypothesis posits that the Catholic Church's conflict management activities are ineffective. Since conflict management is a process, not an event, effective refers to the degree of success of the Catholic Church, as a social organization, in achieving the goals of the sets of its various structurally constituted or institutionalized activities of conflict management pertaining to recurrent incidents of violent conflict between the two communities. A set of such activities is effective or ineffective relative to the material and non-material resources available or at its disposal, but the manner in which it operates has to be done within the framework of the State's ruling policy-practices, which validate Kenya's self-image as a secure State. Some sets of activities are more effective in terms of contribution to conflict management while others are less effective in doing so. No activities are one hundred percent ineffective and, by the same token, no activities are one hundred percent effective. The terms 'ineffective' and 'effective' as applied to the hypothesis in question are at the polar ends of a continuum state of affairs. Accordingly, whether a test statistic indicates effectiveness or ineffectiveness of a relationship is determined by the level of significance ( $p < .05$  or  $p < 0.01$ ) reached. Similarly, deciding whether a simple frequency statistic means that the set of activities in question is effective or ineffective in terms of conflict management depends on whether the statistic (skew) is negative (i.e., below the expected value), or positive (i.e., above the expected value). Positive and negative refers specifically to the direction of a variables' frequency and expected value refers to the variables mean. What follows in the rest of this chapter is presentation and discussion of data-pattern linkage (non-causal and causal) of the conflict management activities of the Catholic Church, and recurrent incidents of the conflict, which constitutes the hypothesis testing exercise.

Before doing so, however, it is important to indicate the link with structural violence theory (Galtung, 1969), as expounded upon in the “theoretical framework”, in chapter 1 (see subheading 1.6 above) and in the literature review (see subheading “conflict and its management” (2.2)), and what is discussed in the rest of this chapter. A theory, structural violence included, is an account of phenomena that goes beyond what can be seen and measured (Kerlinger & Lee, 2002). This chapter establishes statistical relationships in terms of prediction as a way of determining the contribution of the Catholic Church to management of the conflict. Structural violence theory addresses structural constraints that keep sections of the population or a community or society or country in marginalization, indicative of differential treatment, relative deprivation, stratified rank-disequilibrium among other dimensions. The Catholic Church’s conflict management activities discussed below are a response to the structural constraints that keep the people of Pokot-land and Turkana-land marginalized. These activities, which are most evident in social development initiatives interlinked with the mediating role of the Justice and Peace Commission, are regulated principally from two Catholic Church diocesan headquarters, located at Lodwar and Kitale (CJPC, 2013). Note that as in the preceding chapter what is discussed is not underlying causes of the marginalization; rather, it is dynamics of marginalization in the form of relationships between observed variables pertaining to the Catholic Church and variables that pertain indirectly to the conflict.

### **6.3 Univariate Analysis**

Testing of the hypothesis begins with single–variable based statistical description of phenomena of the violent conflict contextualized in management of the conflict in the form of skewness. Although descriptive statistics seem to be much simpler than inferential statistics, depended upon in the first and second hypotheses, they are essential to quantitative data analysis. Univariate and

bivariate examination of data is an initial key step in analysing quantitative data as it enables one not to overlook trends in the data but also greatly facilitates understanding of the trends besides serving as a means of identifying the important variables in the structure of the data (Agresti and Finlay, 2009). Table 6.1 below shows skewness and its associated standard error for each of the variables that pertain to Catholic Church's management of the violent conflict. The variables in question, being sets of activities of the Catholic Church that pertain directly or indirectly to management of the conflict are: preaching (persuading) peace, facilitating peace meetings, promoting harmonious relations, fostering tolerance of ethnic difference, assisting the displaced due to interethnic violent conflict, assisting the injured in interethnic conflict, giving food to the starving, promoting entrepreneurship, sponsoring students, sponsoring children's homes, advocating for citizens' rights or civil liberties, drilling water boreholes, building/sponsoring schools, building/sponsoring hospital health clinics, effectiveness of Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (CJPC), Church paying attention to causes of conflict, Church's structures and process in relation to interethnic interaction. In fact, such activities are not just unique to Kenya (Comerford, 2005; Meredith, 2005; Dolan, 2007; Aall, 2007; Gifford, 2009; Schreiter et al., 2011).

**Table 6.1 Skew-Wise Description of Contribution to Pokot-Turkana Violent Conflict**

Variables	Skewness	Standard Error of skewness	Z-score	Sig* .05
Preaching (persuading) peace	-1.591	.187	8.524	*
Facilitating peace meetings	-1.065	.187	5.695	*
Promoting harmonious relations	-1.347	.191	7.052	*
Fostering tolerance of ethnic difference	-1.333	.188	7.090	*
Assisting the displaced due to interethnic conflict	-.136	.190	0.716	
Sponsoring students	-1.095	.191	5.733	*
Sponsoring children's homes	-.429	.191	2.246	*
Advocating citizen rights	-.958	.189	5.069	*
Effectiveness of JPC	-.973	.190	5.121	*
Assisting the injured in violent conflict	-.721	.189	3.815	*
Giving food to the starving	-.903	.189	4.778	*
Promoting entrepreneurship	-.388	.189	2.053	*
Drilling water boreholes	-.677	.191	3.545	*
Building/sponsoring schools	-1.038	.188	5.521	*
Building/sponsoring hospital and health clinics	-.599	.88	0.681	

\* means  $\rho < .05$

Skewness is the lack of symmetry in a distribution. Skew is a measure of the shape of a distribution. A skewed distribution can be positively skewed, meaning the frequent scores are clustered at the lower end and the tail points towards the higher of more positive scores. Positive

values of skewness indicate a pile-up of scores on the left of the distribution. A skewed distribution can also be negatively skewed, meaning the frequent scores are clustered at the higher end and the tail points towards the lower or more negative scores. Negative values of skewness indicate a pile-up of scores on the right of the distribution. The value of skewness should be zero in a normal distribution. The typical pattern is a cluster of frequent scores at the other end of the scale and the frequency of scores tailing off towards the other end of the scale. Although the values of skewness in Table 6.1 are quite informative in terms of description of the variables in the context of Pokot-Turkana conflict, the skewness values were converted to standard scores (z-scores) for purposes of comparing the values, thereby enhancing knowledge of their relative importance and gaining a better understanding of their collective effects to management of the conflict. This was done simply by subtracting the mean of the distribution, in this case zero, from the skewness value and then dividing it by the standard deviation (in this case the standard error of skewness used) in line with the established z-transformation procedure, in this way:

$$Z_{skewness} = \frac{S-O}{SE_{skewness}}$$

Where:  $Z$  = Standard score

$S$  = Skewness

$O$  = Mean of the distribution

$SE$  = Standard error of skewness

If the resulting score (when the minus sign is ignored) is greater than 1.96 then the score is significant ( $p < .05$ ) (Yates, Moore & McCabe, 2000; Lucey, 2002; Agresti & Finlay, 2009) – meaning that the variable’s skewness did not occur by chance sampling or chance variations. The Z-transformation values are given in the third column of Table 6.1. With 1.96 as a baseline,

it is clear from Table 6.1 that only the fifth variable (assisting the displaced due to interethnic conflict) and last variable (building/sponsoring hospitals and health clinics) are not skewed significantly at .05 level of significance. The overwhelming majority of the variables (thirteen out of seventeen) are skewed significantly at .05 level of significance. The skew of every variable is, as indicated in Table 6.1, negatively skewed. For each and everyone of the seventeen variables pertaining to with management of the conflict there is a pile-up of research subjects' scores on the right hand side of the distribution, that is, the frequent scores are clustered at the higher end of the questionnaire item measuring the variable and the tail of the variable's distribution points towards the lower or more negative scores which are below the mean of the variable.

Taking the mean as the expected value of activities of the Catholic Church in terms of contribution to management of the conflict, the foregoing skewness values by virtue of all of them being negative, and the majority of them being significant at .05 level indicate that the activities of the Catholic Church have no statistically significant influence in managing the conflict, in terms of recurrence of incidents of violence whose parties are Pokot and Turkana. This statistical finding, however, does not entail the ruling out of the practical importance of some of the variables in matters of management of the conflict. The practical importance of such activities is that they are integral to the Social Doctrine of the Church (2005). In this vein, for example, temporary sheltering or assisting some victims of the conflict at a Catholic Church facility, though patently practically important, may not be statistically significant on the ground that it is a momentary amelioration in the dialectic of Pokot-Turkana conflict in space and time. The quantitative values of the table constitute a species of affirmation of the third hypothesis as posited.

#### **6.4 Justice and Peace Commission's Contribution to the Management of the Conflict**

Long before the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (CJPC), hereafter referred to as Commission, was established in Kenya, the Catholic Church was long involved in activities that served and still serve the cause of conflict management in the North Rift region of the country (Good, 1988). The activities are presented in this section of the chapter in the form of variables in Table 6.1, hereafter referred to as conflict managing variables. Multivariate analysis was applied to the conflict managing variables. The existence of the activities do not necessarily depend on the commission, even as there is a relationship between commission as a variable and each one of the conflict managing variables and their respective conflict management activities. In the scheme of operational linkage between and among dynamics of conflict managing variables and those dynamics of commission as well as those dynamic of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict, it is quite reasonable to describe or characterize the role of the commission as one of mediating the link or relationship between conflict managing variables and Pokot-Turkana violent conflict behaviour. The dynamics of this operational linkage vary, depending on the circumstances in each diocese (Good, 2007; CJPC, 1988; CJPC, 2005; CJPC, 2013; Dolan 2007). This means or implies that the role activity of the Commission, as an instrument of conflict management, is amenable to being appraised in terms of the conflict managing variables. The role of the commission involves, among other things, contribution to overseeing the activities for the purpose of ensuring that they make a difference in terms of management of the conflict. Although the ongoing activities, as pointed out earlier, antedate commission the existence of the commission depends to a large extent on the activities encompassed by the conflict managing variables in total.

The Catholic Church leadership is without doubt concerned with the violence and repercussion of the Pokot-Turkana conflict, (CJPC, 2013; Good, 1988; Dolan, 2007; SCCRR, 2015). Its involvement in conflict management is not about playing politics for some other ulterior motive. One would be hard put indeed to deny, for example, that the Commission's press releases sanctioned, by a Catholic bishop, or a pastoral letter *per se* from the bishop in connection with ongoing or escalating interethnic conflict in the North Rift, no matter how momentary or short lived the fighting might be, is unrelated to the fact of the Catholic Church giving material and non-material spiritual assistance to victims of the conflict in question. It matters not whether or not one is on the side of the State, irrespective of how and when it acts on the conflict situation, or on the side of the Catholic Church in the context of Pokot-Turkana recurrent incidents of conflict, or on the side of one of the two ethnic communities in the conflict. In this vein, anyone who is knowledgeable about violent conflict in the North Rift but disavows the relationship between the Commissions' press release and/or bishops pastoral letters, as well as the material assistance given by the Catholic Church to the management of the violent conflict should not be taken seriously. Otherwise the disavowing should be construed as a manifestation of being on the side of the complex of politics and economics as well as ethnicity and culture that fuels and triggers the social reproduction of recurrent incidents of violent conflict between Pokot and Turkana.

The activities of the Commission are, by their nature, reactive and this is because the Commission cannot be proactive in matters of State leadership and security (Migdal, 1988), apart from advocating for policy change and cooperating with the State. The Commission's activities stem from or are consequent upon what actors in Catholic Church conflict management at the diocesan level engage in. The activities are typically about contribution to prevention of increase

in the rate of occurrence of incidents of conflict between the Pokot and the Turkana, or increasing the span of time between the occurrence of one violent conflict incident and the next such incident, or rendering the occurrence of incidents of violent conflict behaviour relatively less frequent today than in the recent past. What the actors do is, in turn, determined in the main by: social-historical learning, circumstances of the particular conflict situation or the moment insofar as they render relevant conflict management activities feasible, and bearing of past experience on the circumstances as specified above. The Commission, which was established among the Pokot and the Turkana in 1999 and 1993 (Dolan, 2007) respectively, is tasked with contributing to justice and peace, bearing in mind that both are elusive concepts. Its effectiveness, or relative lack thereof, as a counter violent conflict strategy is a function of the degree of success of the activities of Catholic Church peace actors and initiatives at the local diocesan level in management of the conflict. The activities are the only measurable strategies through which an appraisal of the role of the Commission with particular reference to the conflict, and, consequently, either retaining the null hypothesis or rejecting it in favour of the alternative as posited here. The relationship between the conflict managing variables and measures of Pokot-Turkana conflict is causal in the sense that the variables' dynamics as conflict management strategies have preventive or deterring or containment or counteracting effects on recurrence of conflict incidents. However, the same cannot be said about the link between the conflict managing variables and activities of commission as a variable without making simplifying assumptions including reciprocal causation between conflict managing variables on the one hand and the commission's activities on the other hand.

In causal analysis, and the hypothesis under discussion is a causal one, the usual criteria by which to establish the existence of causality between variables are three: association between

variables, appropriate time order of variables, and elimination of ineffective (meaning spurious etc.) explanation of the criterion variable (Anderson et al., 2007; Kerlinger & Pedhazur, 1993; Palumbo, 1997; Williams, 1996). On the basis of these criteria, reciprocal causation between conflict managing variables and the commission's activities (variables) was ruled out. This means that the flow of causal influence is unidirectional, meaning that the conflict managing variables influence commission's activities. It is a state of affairs where the criteria of causality specified above obtain. Accordingly, the conflict managing variables are predictor variables while the role activities of commission constitute the predicted variable. In this regard, multiple regression was applied to the data of the variables. Multiple regression analysis is a statistical procedure that measures the strength of a relationship between multiple independent variables and a single dependent variable. Here, the conflict managing variables are the multiple independent variables while activities of the commission constitute the single dependent variable. Results of the multiple regression are given in Table 6.2

It is important to reiterate, in line with the hypothesis in question, that the activities that the Church engages in to contribute to management of the conflict, and not necessarily ending the conflict even though managing the conflict implies ending the conflict. Determination of whether or not the contribution to management is not effective is statistical (see last column of the regression table, 6.2). However, the fact that the conflict persists is not only explained by this ineffectiveness but also by other variables, for instance those identified in chapters four and five. Some of the activities the church engages in, such as, giving food to the starving and building schools, may be carried out by the Church even if there exists no conflict between the Pokot and Turkana since such activities are attributes or defining characteristics of the Church. Other activities of the Church, for instance, facilitation of peace meetings and assisting the

displaced, are a response to the conflict's persistence as they are contingent upon the conflict's persistence. When the conflict ends, these activities will be rendered needless. The activities that are attributes of the Catholic Church and those which are contingent upon persistence of the conflict serve the same purpose, namely, contribution directly and/or indirectly, to management of the conflict. The activities supplement those of the State by virtue of the fact that the State is the central actor with the primary responsibility of managing and ending the conflict. The activities do not stem from failure of the State for the very simple reason that Kenya is not a failed State. This does not rule out the possibility that the activities may stem from negligence by the state to fulfil its primary responsibilities. The activities are part of the collective effort of the State as well as the Catholic Church and other stakeholders to bring about peace in the conflict environs of the two communities under study. In doing so, they not only facilitate socio-economic development praxis by the State but also enable the Catholic Church to achieve its temporal and spiritual mission. Thus, in respect to the objectives of the activities of the Church it is important to recall that a substantive degree of the 'raison d'etre' for the Church's existence and mission is to achieve peace and reconciliation. As Appleby (2010) and Philpott (2010) have pointed out, the Catholic Church, as a Track I and II conflict management actor, is persistent in the pursuit of these ends. Realization of these objectives entails transformation of conflict situations, initially to negative peace and ultimately to positive peace that is understood as resolution or reconciliation (Lederach, 2010). This transformational role is imperative to the mission of the Church. In the absence of peace, reconciliation is illusive. Whether manifest violent conflict is unfolding or not, the Church proactively engages in multiple peace and development activities in the process of striving for its end goal of reconciliation. As such, it complements the State responsibility to achieve peace and social progress for its citizens.

Ultimately, the Church does not bear the ultimate responsibility to end the conflict, nor does it have sufficient resources to do so. However, by engaging in managing the conflict, the Church augments the interventions that the State ought to do or is doing in order to end the conflict. Ineffective approaches of the State in managing the conflict do not devalue the mission impetus of the Church but do negatively impact on the Church's achievement of its goals of peace and reconciliation exemplified by positive peace. The ineffective approaches of the State and the State's neglect of its responsibilities and duties in the conflict environment have induced a greater proactive response from the Church to intervene and manage the conflict because of its 'raison d'être'.

**Table 6.2 Multiple Regression Outcomes**

Variable	b	Std error	Beta	Simple r	Partial r	t	Sig.05
X <sub>1</sub> Preaching peace	.083	.073	.080	.637	.077	1.147	.253
X <sub>2</sub> Facilitating peace meetings	.121	.070	.114	.596	.116	1.736	.084
X <sub>3</sub> Promoting harmonious relations	-.102	.073	-.094	.566	-.093	-1.396	.164
X <sub>4</sub> Tolerance of ethnic difference	-.004	.042	-.004	.407	-.007	-.999	.921
X <sub>5</sub> Assisting the conflict displaced	-.002	.047	-.002	.547	-.003	-.041	.967
X <sub>6</sub> Assisting the injured	-.115	.061	-.118	.640	-.125	-1.874	.062
X <sub>7</sub> Giving food to the starving	.246	.068	.251	.772	.235	3.004	.000
X <sub>8</sub> Promoting entrepreneurship	.082	.048	.084	.643	.114	1.716	.088
X <sub>9</sub> Sponsoring students	-.091	.076	-.091	.719	-.080	-1.200	.232
X <sub>10</sub> Sponsoring children's homes	-.095	.062	-.097	.650	-.103	-1.543	.124
X <sub>11</sub> Advocating for citizen's rights	.481	.068	.459	.820	.428	7.026	.000
X <sub>12</sub> Drilling water boreholes	.017	.057	.017	.631	.020	.296	.768
X <sub>13</sub> Building/Sponsoring schools	.251	.037	.253	.732	.224	3.427	.001
X <sub>14</sub> Building hospitals and clinics	.116	.065	.116	.725	.118	.775	.077
X <sub>15</sub> Interaction X <sub>13</sub> X <sub>14</sub>	.137	.058	.139	.681	.152	2.423	.046
X <sub>16</sub> Interaction X <sub>4</sub> X <sub>8</sub>	.128	.063	.131	.643	.117	2.118	.049
<i>Notes:</i> Dependent variable: Justice and Peace Commission							

Interpretation of the coefficients and significance values focuses on the commission, but only on matters of relationships of conflict and peace, manifest and/or potential, between Pokot and Turkana to the degree to which the matters are within the purview of the Catholic Church to contribute to management of the conflict. The hypothesis being tested in this chapter is concerned with the Catholic Church as a social organization, not its religious belief content, with particular reference to the contribution of the Justice and Peace Commission activities to managing the conflict. It is not concerned with social teaching principles and doctrines of belief held by the Church. The reason for this is that the teachings have to do with matters of social ethics and gospel, which situate conflict management as social action in the domain of religion as opposed to empirical science. Critical to this role in Africa is the task of building a society characterised by peace, justice and reconciliation (Benedict XVI, 2011). The context of interpretation of the quantitative values in Table 6.2 is other than social ethics and gospel. The focus is exclusively on the Commission in terms of its role activities pertaining to managing the conflict. The intent is not to subjectively judge the adequacy of effectiveness of the activities. The nature of scientific and intellectual endeavour is that ideas (hypotheses in this study) and findings are objectively scrutinized and checked. Accordingly, in terms of the hypothesis in question, the endeavour is to decide, on the basis of practiced conventional mathematical criteria, whether it is more plausible that the relationship between each of the conflict managing variables and activities of the Commission, as a variable, is not the result of chance than it is the result of chance.

#### **6.4.1 Explanation of Table 6.2**

Before doing what is stated above, it is important to explain Table 6.2. The explanation has three parts. First, what the statistical values column-wise mean, from left to right. Second is the

specification of the sense in which the term trend is used with particular reference to the  $\rho$ -values in the seventh column. Third, highlighting the meaning of the term effect size to enable appreciation of the size of individual (unique) and combined effects of conflict managing variables, mediated by the commission, on management of the conflict.

#### **6.4.2 Column values**

To begin with, in multiple regression the research concern is often twofold: firstly, to what extent can the independent variables, meaning conflict managing variables in this case, predict the dependent variable, which is the commission activities as a variable; secondly, what is the strength of each independent variable in the prediction of the dependent variable? Prediction of relationship is a function of high correlation. Low correlation means poor prediction while high correlation means good prediction. In the Tables' first column each statistical value (regression coefficient,  $b$ ) is the effect of the respective conflict managing variable on commission as a variable when the effects of the rest of conflict managing variables on Commission are held constant. Coefficient  $b$  is based on the original scores of Commission as a variable and on the original scores of respective conflict managing variable. Each of the statistics in the second column (standard error) is the difference between the predicted effect of the respective conflict managing variable on commission as a variable and the actual empirically observed effect of the respective conflict managing variable on commission as a variable. It is the amount of error of prediction made when the particular conflict managing variable was used to predict commission in terms of its activities contextualized in conflict management. The smaller the standard error, the better the prediction, and the larger the standard error, the poorer the prediction. The third column contains standardized regression (beta) coefficients. To obtain beta, each and every original score on predictor variables was transformed into a standard deviation and variance

equal to 1. The same was done to original scores (primary data) on commission as a variable. Then the beta was computed with z-scores; z-score transformation makes it possible to compare beta coefficients of variables measured in different units, as done below, as part interpretation of regression coefficients. Each of the coefficients in the fourth column (simple-order  $r$ ) is a correlation between Commission as a variable and respective conflict managing variable in which one or more variables have not been partialled out. Thus, it is more than an indication of the relationship between commission and respective conflict managing variables. Each of the coefficients in the fifth column (partial  $r$ ) is the correlation between commission as a variable and respective conflict managing variables adjusted for a third (control) variable. Put differently, partial correlation is a measure of the relationship between commission as a variable and respective conflict managing variable while controlling the effects of one or more additional conflict managing variables on both. The values in the sixth column ( $t$ ) are test statistics. The exact nature of the  $t$  test depends on the use to which it is put. In this analysis, the  $t$  test is used to ascertain the statistical significance of the unstandardized regression coefficients in the first column of the Table. Specifically, any of the  $t$  values tests whether the regression (prediction) of a conflict managing variable on Commission as a variable, given in the first column, is significantly different from zero. The values of the seventh column (sig) are levels of significance reached by respective unstandardized regression coefficients in the first column. The values in the sixth column (sig.) determine the values in the seventh column. The minimum conventional level of significance is a probability of  $p < .05$  (Coolidge, 2013). In terms of the hypothesis under testing here, if a value in the seventh column is or smaller than .05, then it constitutes a piece of evidence which is contrary to what the alternative hypothesis posits in this

study concerning the relationship between Catholic Church conflict management activities and persistence of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict.

### **6.4.3 Trend**

It is important for purposes of clarity and specificity to indicate the sense in which the term trend is employed in statistical analysis in general, and in this research, in particular. The term trend refers to time-series data showing change or long-term growth path of a variable, around which there may be short-term fluctuations (Sharp et al., 2002; Shoesmith et al., 2007; Lucey, 2007). Trends may be calculated by various methods. One of them is ordinary least squares method. It minimizes the sum of squared residuals, the deviations between the observed values of the dependent variable and the estimated values of the dependent variables (Shoesmith et al., 2007). The regression coefficients in the first column of the Table above were computed through this method. Large differences in residuals imply that the predictions are less accurate. The advantage of residuals is that they make it easy to distinguish between a good predictor and a poor predictor. In this analysis, the predictors are the conflict managing variables and their residuals are construed, as it is done here, in terms of a continuum of more accurate prediction and less accurate prediction. This is in line with, for example, Rosnow and Rosenthal who point out that “the strength of evidence for or against the null hypothesis is a fairly continuous function of the magnitude of  $\rho$ ” (Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1989, p.1281).

In light of the foregoing, it is quite reasonable to state that most, if not all, of the questions a researcher can ask or may ask about the relationship between activities of the commission as a variable and conflict managing variables are largely not dichotomous in nature and can hardly be adequately answered in terms of “yes” or “no” responses. This is partly the reason why the term trend is of much analytic utility in making sense of the relationship in

question. It is a common practice for researchers to report trends in their data and this usually means that they did not reject the null hypothesis but that they came quite close to doing so. In such cases, trend does not mean the same thing as explained earlier. Rather, in this context, a trend in the data may mean that the test statistic did not exceed the critical value at the .05 level, but the findings may or can be associated with a range of probability levels -.06 through .10 (Weisberg, 2005; Agresti, 2007). This state of affairs obtains in the above table by criteria of significance level values in the seventh column. Each value (a function of its respective t test value in the sixth column) in the seventh column indicates whether or not the conflict managing variable has significant effect on Commission as a variable. The use of t test includes ascertaining the statistical significance of regression coefficients. More specifically, the t test in the context of regression is used to test whether a regression coefficient,  $b$ , is significantly different from zero.

#### **6.4.4 Effect size**

Effect size is part of the terminology of multivariate analysis. It is used in multiple regression/correlation in connection with size or magnitude of phenomena under study. Cohen writes that “one of the attractive features of multiple regression and correlation is its automatic provision of variance and correlation measures of various kinds. These are measures of ‘effect size’ of the magnitude of the phenomena being studied” (Cohen, 1995, p.9). Effect size is “an objective and (usually) standardized measure of the magnitude of an observed effect. Measures include Cohen’s  $d$  and Pearson correlation,  $r$ ” (Field, 2011, p.785). Elsewhere, Cohen defines effect size as the “degree to which phenomena exist” (Cohen, 1987, p.9). Like Cohen, Abelson (1995) & Kline (2004) couch their discussion of correlation and regression in terms of effect size. Effect size is the size of the effect that is found in a quantitative study. This is a

quantitative study, and the effect in question is simply the effect of activities of the Catholic Church, meaning the Commission, pertaining to management of the conflict. There is association, which implies prediction, between the activities on the one hand and the conflict on the other hand. The existence of effect pertains to the size of the correlation coefficients of commission with conflict managing variables, and also its prediction from these variables, which, in turn, lends itself to interpretation in terms of the proportion of the variance of Pokot-Turkana conflict management accounted for by the conflict managing variables. Thus, effect size is not about statistical significance (that is,  $\rho < .05$ ) which may be a function of size of sample; rather, it is about magnitude which in this case is magnitude of activities (i.e., conflict managing variables) of the Catholic Church's contribution to management of recurrent incidents of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict.

## **6.5 Results**

The concern of this section is to gauge, in statistically precise terms, the effect of the Catholic Church, comprising its diocesan peace actors and the Justice and Peace Commission on the persistence of incidents of conflict between the Pokot and the Turkana. This is done below in two separate but related ways. The first has to do with trends in the data, as indicated by test statistic values, in terms of their significance, while the other has to do with effect size of individual conflict managing variables' regression coefficients. In the trends and test statistic discussion, the objective is to arrive, through significance test values, at stating whether or not particular conflict managing variables in terms of their respective and combined regression coefficients constitute evidence for or against the hypothesis in question. Since the hypothesis in question posits that the Catholic Church's conflict management activities have no significant effect on recurrent incidents of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict, the meaning with particular

reference to any one of the conflict managing variables is that, if the variable's regression coefficient has a level of significance, which is or less than a probability of  $\rho < .05$ , then this statistical finding constitutes a piece of evidence, not evidence in total, on the side of retaining the hypothesis.

### **6.5.1 Multiple Regression**

Each of the significance level values in the seventh column is either less than .05 or more than .05. Only four of the conflict managing variables, namely: assisting the injured, giving food to the starving, and advocating for citizen's rights and building/sponsoring schools, are significant predictors of activities of the Commission contextualized in management of Pokot-Turkana conflict. Ten conflict managing variables are not significant predictors (at .05 levels) of activities of the commission as a variable. This does not mean that none of these ten conflict managing variables shares common variance with commission as a variable. On the contrary, each the ten variables overlap with commission as a variable. The phenomena or dynamics of each variable is not statistically independent of those of commission. This is indicated by partial Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients in the fifth column of the Table. It can be seen in the Table's fifth column that none of the conflict managing variables has a zero correlation with commission as a variable. However, the ten predictor variables have very low or trivial partial correlations with commission as a variable by virtue of which they are *apriori* rendered poor predictors of commission's effectiveness in managing the conflict. The value of high correlations is the ability to predict relationships more accurately. In this analysis, the relationships of each of the conflict managing variables with commission as a variable. The regression effect of each conflict managing variable on commission as a variable, in the first column of the table, is a function of the magnitude of its respective partial correlation coefficient

in the fifth column. Since what is being discussed is a multiple regression model, the unstandardized regression coefficients, are partial regression coefficients. The unstandardized regression coefficient of a predictor describes the change in the mean of commission for a one-unit change in the predictor, controlling for the other thirteen conflict managing variables in the model. In the case of preaching peace, the effect (change) is  $b = .083$ . This is not significant at .05 level. Similarly, the  $b$  values of variables facilitating peace meetings, promoting harmonious relations, fostering tolerance of ethnic difference, assisting the (Pokot/Turkana) displaced due to Pokot-Turkana violent conflict occurrences, promoting entrepreneurship, sponsoring students, sponsoring children's homes, drilling water boreholes and building/sponsoring hospitals, are all non-significant as indicated by the respective probability levels in the seventh column of the Table. Multiple regression is a statistical procedure (Field, 2013). Its use here, as it is the case in most other statistical procedures, concerning evaluating a model's solution, needs establishing in general the collective significance, or lack thereof, of the bearing of conflict managing variables on Justice and Peace Commission's contribution. This is salient in terms of understanding and gaining insight into the complexity of the forces that tend to counteract effective management of Pokot-Turkana conflict, the objective of which is to significantly attenuate the conflict, thereby contributing to managing it. In line with the foregoing, the general statement encompassing all the entire ten conflict managing variables is that the probability that each of the non-significant unstandardized regression coefficients would have occurred by chance if the hypothesis in question were not true, is more than .05. This leads to the conclusion that none of these ten conflict managing variables is a significant contributor to the regression when used in combination with the other thirteen conflict managing variables, but that variables giving food to the starving, stemming from Pokot-Turkana conflict occurrences or prolonged

drought, advocating for citizen's rights, and building/sponsoring schools have respective significant unstandardized regression coefficients when used in combination with the other conflict managing variables. It is quite reasonable, in accordance with the term trend, as explained earlier, to include variable assisting the injured in the list of conflict managing variables with statistically significant unstandardized regression coefficients. In quantitative analysis, the concern or task of the researcher or analyst is to identify meaningful patterns in the data. The mode of regression analysis used here was forced entry. It produced regression coefficients that indicate a trend away from effective activities of managing Pokot-Turkana conflict and towards ineffective activities of managing the conflict by the Catholic Church. The trend is in the form of a continuum, or range of significant-non-significant probabilities of conflict managing variables. The trend is consistent with the hypothesis in question as posited. In other words, the data from this research, as indicated by the quantitative values of multiple regressions lend support to the hypothesis. What follows below is an explanation of the activities of the Catholic Church insofar as they constitute a contribution to management of Pokot-Turkana conflict.

It was stated earlier that this section has two parts concerning gauging the effect of Catholic Church activities, insofar as the activities have to do with conflict management, on the persistence of the conflict. The first part concerns trend and the other has to do with relative or differential effect of conflict managing variables, in standardized form, on Justice and Peace Commission. Trend has been discussed above. What follows now is a discussion of differential effect, followed by identification of plausible reasons for the observed patterns, as well as difference between predictor variables in terms of standardized regression coefficients. This involves comparison in order to enhance understanding why some conflict managing variables

are relatively robust in terms of contributing to management of Pokot-Turkana conflict while others are attenuated in the same respect. Comparison of standardized regression coefficients of conflict managing variables, in terms of their respective unique effect on commission and, by extension, contribution to management of recurrent incidents of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict, is guided by the term effect size as earlier explained. It is important to point out that the extension is not determined by the data-analytic technique, in the form of forced entry regression used here; rather, the extension is a function of the logical status of prediction involving commission and recurrent incidents of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict as well as how the data were produced.

As statistical significance (that is,  $P < .05$ ) is not a measure of the magnitude of a result (effect), the comparison below of standardized regression coefficients (in the third column of the above table) is not a comparison of statistical significance. It is a comparison in terms of magnitude that has to do with or pertains to contribution to management of persistent conflict between the two communities. Standardized regression coefficients are employed in the comparison because their respective conflict managing variables have a mean of zero and standard deviation of 1 due to z-transformation. Thus, for example,  $B = .080$  is the partial regression coefficient of preaching peace on activities of Justice and Peace Commission as a variable when all variables in the model are standardized, and its square ( $=.0064$ ) is the proportion shared with commission as a variable of that part of preaching peace's variance that is independent of the remaining thirteen conflict managing variables. Making comparisons is in order. It can be seen in the Table's standardized regression coefficients in the third column that six of the conflict managing variables: promoting harmonious relations, tolerance of ethnic difference, assisting the displaced due to ethnic conflict, assisting the injured because of the

conflict, sponsoring students, and sponsoring children's homes, all have negative regression coefficients. This means that there is a negative or inverse association between commission as a variable and each one of these conflict managing variables. In other words, higher scores on the conflict managing variables go with lower scores on commission as a variable. The rest of the conflict managing variables: preaching peace, facilitating peace meetings, giving food to the starving, promoting entrepreneurship, advocating for citizens' rights, drilling water boreholes, building/sponsoring schools, and building/sponsoring hospitals, all have a positive (+) sign. The association between commission as a variable and each one of these eight conflict managing variables is positive. That is, higher scores on conflict managing variables go with higher scores on commission as a variable. At this juncture, a plausible conclusion can be drawn from the fact that just about half of the conflict managing variables have negative regression coefficients with commission, and half of them, excluding interaction terms, have positive regression coefficients with the same. This is because some of the conflict managing variables are salient or more critical with regard to contributing to management of Pokot-Turkana conflict than are others. Besides, those that are putatively salient or more critical in the same respect, according to Catholic Church peace workers' lore or narrative, have quite small effect size in terms of managing Pokot-Turkana conflict. Obvious examples according to the models solution are: preaching peace, promoting harmonious relations, and fostering tolerance of ethnic difference. It is at once instructive and telling in this connection to quote the words of one ethnic Pokot uttered during data collection: "The Church is foreign, and for the Pokot anything foreign is not welcome. Whatever does not come from within is challenged, and they believe in what is done by one of their own."

Variable advocating for citizens' rights contrasts with the preceding three and its contribution to effect size is the largest. Indeed, in terms of predicting activities of the commission from the fourteen conflict managing variables using forced entry multiple regression method, variable advocating for citizens' rights is the strongest predictor in the entire set of conflict managing variables in the regression model. This state of affairs is partly a function of this variable being more encompassing in scope and inclusive in content than the other three variables. Furthermore, it is the most distanced from the activities of the Catholic Church as a faith-based organization by criterion of common variance. It fits in well with treating the Catholic Church as a social organization, just like any other secular organisation, concerned with social issues such as human rights, and conflict and peace. It is justified to venture an explanation of why preaching peace, promoting harmonious relations, and fostering tolerance of ethnic difference have trivial effect size in terms of contribution to management of the conflict using Justice and Peace press releases, pastoral letters issued by bishops, giving talks in public fora, individually and collectively. It is neither erroneous nor an exaggeration to opine that the media releases are part of the stock in trade of what the three variables are about. The contribution of such press releases, public talks and pastoral letters, if they are anything more than expression of a religio-political stand on this or that dramatic social issue of the moment, is that they believably serve to boost trust between Pokot and Turkana. At a minimum such press releases, public talks, and pastoral letters are an expression of religio-political stand on this or that dramatic social issue of the moment. However, they also believably serve to increase trust between the Pokot and Turkana making them to value cooperation in matters that have to do with water, pasture, and territorial boundary, thereby reducing the probability of violent attacks and counter-attacks. However, it is simply impossible to gauge or determine the effect of the media

releases, if any, on conflict management because they are a species of political-moral sentiment occasioned by State's ineffectiveness in handling dramatic conflict matters. The media releases do not get translated into discernible measurable contributions to management of Pokot-Turkana conflict. These releases constitute, at their very best, an assertion of the existence of commissions and bishops as a religio-political collective and who are genuinely concerned about justice and peace issues. Hence, they are ineffective and this supports the hypothesis as posited. This ineffectiveness is somewhat in line with Dolan's (2006) concerns about the impact of the Justice and Peace Commission when he warns of them becoming fringe players with low level staff, lacking gravitas, offering no threat or ideological challenges to State strategies of conflict management. Variables: facilitating peace meetings, assisting the displaced due to ethnic conflict, and assisting the injured in the conflict, entail Catholic peace workers interacting with victims directly. It is not in doubt that the interaction is materially beneficial to the victims, and even to the participants in peace meetings facilitated by the peace workers. However, how this interaction translates into contribution to management of the conflict is problematic. This observation is based on a close examination of the standardized regression coefficients of these variables contextualized, in the knowledge, expertise (practice informed by theory) and ability of the peace workers to make non-trivial contributions to management of the conflict. On the basis of the coefficients of these three variables, it is quite reasonable to infer that knowledge and expertise on the part of the peace workers at local diocesan level, which non-trivial contribution to management of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict calls for, is below what is expected and needed in terms of conflict management. One can argue that assisting the injured, for example, is not a core defining aspect of practicing conflict management. While it is quite safe to assert that anybody can materially assist victims of the conflict, it is erroneous, on that basis, to equate this

to knowledge and expertise proficiency (meaning trained analytical competency, peacebuilding techniques, experience and skills) to contribute to management of the conflict. The peace workers have experience of dealing with violent conflict, giving assistance in various ways to victims of the conflict. However, this kind of experience alone is inadequate in terms of making a discernible contribution to managing the conflict. The regression coefficients of the three variables in question give credence to the point that part of the problem of ineffectiveness in regard to managing the conflict is the fact that peace workers, as specified above, are relatively ill equipped in terms of managing the dynamics of the conflict. Of course there are historical and contemporary reasons for this seemingly systemic inadequacy of knowledge competence. However, history is not the issue or problem. History does not make institutions or give order and organization to relations between and among people. Rather, it is the other way round: institutions largely determine the course of history and social history. In this regard, the problem of incapacity on the part of peace workers at diocesan level is rooted in the institutional deficiency of the Catholic Church in Kenya with regard to its knowledge competency and technical mastery concerning conflict management. This is not an overstatement as some scholars have observed with reference to the church and conflict management in Africa (Mwagiru, 2007). However, it would be a gross overstatement to say that, currently and throughout the post-colonial State regimes, there is no iota of observed evidence of the positive effect (effect in terms of size, not effect in terms of statistical significance) of the Catholic Church's activities on the management of the conflict. Excluding the rest of the fourteen conflict managing variables, the effect size of variables facilitating peace meetings, assisting the displaced, and assisting the injured is .027 (= the sum of these variables' respective standardized regression coefficients squared). It is not much. However, it is in the direction (positive) of the

hypothesised relationship between Catholic Church conflict management activities and persistent incidents of the conflict. The contribution of variable assisting the displaced due to conflict to the above sum is zero (=the square of  $-.002$ ) because, as indicated by the partial Pearson correlation coefficient of  $-.003$  in the fifth column of Table 6.2, this variable and variable commission are statistically independent phenomena, thus ruling out a prediction of one from the other. This is not a statistical artefact. It is consistent with the raid and counter-raid nature of the conflict. Permanent displacement of the Turkana and the Pokot, as a result of raids is a very rare, and indeed an unlikely phenomenon in the conflict but it cannot be ruled out as a chance occurrence. As can be seen from the third column of the above table, the fourteen conflict managing variables are not of equal strength with regard to their prediction of activities of commission as a variable. Besides, explaining activities of the commission in terms of some variables gets encumbered with logical and theoretical difficulties or limitations while other variables have no such encumbrances. Thus, for example, the link between variables giving food to the starving and sponsoring children's homes on the one hand and commission as a variable on the other hand is fairly problematic to explain on the basis of only theory and logic whereas it is fairly easy to demonstrate the connection between variable drilling water boreholes and commission as a variable. The link being that in both cases, the variables are being treated as evidence for either retaining or rejecting the hypothesis in question.

The discussion now turns to looking closely at variables giving food to the starving, and sponsoring children's homes. The effect of the former on commission is quite large compared to the effect of the latter on the same. On the basis of literature relevant to this observation (see, McClave & Sincich, 2000, Black, 2003; Laws et al., 2013) this large effect size was suspected to be spurious and, consequently, drought, which is a cause of giving food to the starving, was

partialled out of the giving food to the starving. Partialling is statistical control of unwanted variance. A spurious relationship is an apparent relationship between two variables (in this context, variables commission and giving food to the starving) that disappears when the effects of a third variable (variable drought in this case) are taken out. Accordingly, variable commission was regressed on variable giving food to the starving. This gave a regression coefficient that was significantly different from zero. However, when variable drought is added, the regression equation (model) yields a Pearson correlation that is significantly different from zero but a change in commission as a variable, for one-unit change in variable giving food to the starving which was not significantly different from zero. The apparent relationship between commission as a variable and variable giving food to the starving was, thus, spurious. The rationale was that since drought and raiding can and do lead to giving food to the starving, a realistic (non-spurious) prediction of commission as a variable from giving food to the starving should be done after partialling out drought from giving food to the starving. This reduced the magnitude of the correlation between giving food to the starving and commission as a variable. However, the partial correlation ( $r = .235$ ) in the fifth column of Table 6.2 does not exclude the common variance between drought and giving food to the starving because drought was not included in the regression model. It is important to note, in this connection that in chapter four, the explanation of variables water and pasture factor loadings on factor core resources hinges on the perennial occurrence of drought. What the foregoing implies is that, variable giving food to the starving, like variable sponsoring children's homes, has small effect size, meaning that it contributes very small effect to the model's effect size, given the effect size of the fourteen conflict managing variables pertaining to, in turn, the contribution of the commission to management of the conflict. The question of the relationship between these two variables, giving

food to the starving and sponsoring children's homes, on the one hand and commission on the other hand, in the context of Catholic Church's contribution to management of Pokot-Turkana conflict, is an empirical question, not a theoretical question. Theoretically, anything is possible. Here the concern is with matters empirical as opposed to matters theoretical. What flows from this line of reasoning is that, the unique effect size of these two variables when used in combination with the rest of the conflict managing variables is quite small.

It is undoubtedly the case that recurrent incidents of conflict are partly casually linked to lack of alternative(s) to pastoralism as an economic mainstay in the arid and semi-arid North Rift. What follows in this paragraph is a consideration of conflict managing variables drilling water boreholes, building/sponsoring schools, sponsoring hospitals, promoting entrepreneurship, and sponsoring students. These variables are associated in different ways, directly or indirectly, with the notion of alternative(s) to pastoralism in the short term or long term, depending on the nature and/or dynamics of the particular variable. This state of affairs is indicated in the correlation matrix. In this study, alternative(s) to pastoralism is construed less as what is sustainable and more as what is functional for either decrease of the probability of occurrence of incidents of Pokot against Turkana conflict or maintenance of the current probability of occurrence of the conflict incidents. Variables drilling water boreholes and promoting entrepreneurship are peripheral, not in relation to contribution to management of the conflict, but in the sense of not being considered here as part of core activities of the Catholic Church as a social organization operational in the North Rift. Accordingly, it is reasonable to interpret the respective standardized regression coefficients of these variables (.017 and .084 respectively) as being a function of chance sampling since the drilling of water boreholes is predominantly, not exclusively, an activity of the State. The effect of water boreholes, in terms of contributing to

management of the Pokot-Turkana conflict, can hardly be legitimately be ascribed to the core activities of the Catholic Church. But this does not imply or entail denying that there exists any covariation between activities of the Catholic Church in the form of drilling water boreholes and management of recurrent incidents of the conflict under study. It follows, from what has just been said above in connection with water boreholes and entrepreneurship, that it would be misleading to use the individual unique effect size of these variables as a piece of evidence for not retaining the hypothesis in question

The relationship between water boreholes and entrepreneurship, and management of Pokot-Turkana conflict has already been highlighted. The three conflict managing variables (sponsoring students, building/sponsoring schools, and building/sponsoring hospitals), discussed below, are deeds in the form of non-verbal behaviour. The relationship between hospitals or medical care facilities and management of the conflict can be better seen when the meaning of management of the conflict is extended to incorporate any activity or set of activities by Catholic Church actors that ameliorates the effects of violent conflict between the two communities. Giving medical care or facilitating doing so to victims of the conflict thereby saving their lives, among other things, is a form of conflict management. During interviews, respondents averred that other things being equal people prefer Catholic Church to State medical facilities because of better and efficient service. Note that in the last column of Table 6.2 this variable reaches a p-value of .077 which is non-significant.

Regression is the data-analytical method which was applied to the field data about activities of the Catholic Church and the conflict. Results of its application are given in Table 6.2. Regression coefficients unstandardized and standardized serve a number of purposes depending on what the researcher is interested in. The unstandardized coefficients are for

interpreting prediction and serving theory development, while standardized coefficients are used for comparing variable measure in different units. According to Table 6.2 the correlation of Justice and Peace Commission with sponsoring students is negative (-.80), whereas its correlation with building/sponsoring schools is positive (.224). The former coefficient means that one of the two variables, Justice and Peace Commission or sponsoring students, is decreasing while the other is increasing. This negative coefficient makes sense in terms of historical perspective. Activities of sponsoring students have been in existence for a much longer time than Justice and Peace Commission has existed. As discussed elsewhere in this chapter, there is no risk of error to state that activities of the Justice and Peace Commission have tended to increase with the passage of time. Sponsoring students is a form of expenditure, in one way or another, on the part of the Catholic Church. As the Church established itself in the conflict environment under study from the 1960' onwards, the number of sponsored students was small but gradually increasing. However, as more schools were opened in the course of time the student population went up correspondingly. This led to the rate of sponsoring students decreasing as the the church increasingly became more active in building/sponsoring schools for the population in general. This is why there is a negative correlation between sponsoring students and Justice and Peace Commission. Education is a means of bringing about peace to the conflict prone North Rift. Barring the domain of the spiritual, the Catholic Church in the North Rift is most visible in terms of activities pertaining to education. The Church was a pioneer in building sponsoring schools in the region. Unlike sponsoring students, building sponsoring/schools is not a cost; rather it is an investment. The Catholic Church's peace activities, through the Justice and Peace Commission, increases in scale with increase of building/sponsoring school. This is the reason why variable building/sponsoring schools and variable Justice and Peace Commission correlated at .224. In

terms of prediction, variable building sponsoring schools is a better predictor of variable Justice and Peace Commission than sponsoring students. Sponsoring students has a standardised regression coefficient of  $-.091$ , while building sponsoring schools has a standardized regression coefficients of  $.253$ .

It may not be so easy for one to get to know individual students and how many of them in the North Rift are sponsored by the Catholic Church in the course of a given period of time, for example; but it is quite easy for one to get to know which schools and how many of them in the North Rift were built and/or sponsored by the Catholic Church. What is distinctive about variable building/sponsoring schools in the entire set of conflict managing variables in the model is that it is relatively the most stable. From a long-term perspective the other variables are characterized variously by instability, some more so and others less so, compared to variable building/sponsoring schools. How respondents answered the questionnaire item that generated the data on variable building/sponsoring schools was by and large a function of experience-based knowledge, meaning what they have known in the past and what they know today, of the Catholic Church in connection with building/sponsoring schools. If the model's predictor variables were ranked, on the basis of their being known to the Pokots and the Turkanas as activities of the Catholic Church, building/sponsoring schools would likely rank first. The input of the Catholic Church to education development is expansive (Good, 1988; Good, 2007; Diocese of Lodwar Pastoral Plan 2007-2012, 2007; SCCRR, 2015). Ending Pokot-Turkana violent conflict, of which managing it is an aspect, is about getting them to behave toward each other differently from how they behaved in the past. Bringing about change of behaviour is a long-term process of social learning to which schools can make an important contribution. Among other things, schools afford ethnic Pokots/Turkanas a means to mutually understand each

other and foster enlightenment about other alternatives to pastoralism. This facilitates overcoming of misperceptions about the ethnic other, which in turn, benefits communication between them, thereby contributing to lowering the probability of occurrence of conflict. Behaviour may be changed through voluntary means or involuntary means. The former is non-coercive and those whose behaviour is the object of change may not immediately know that their behaviour is subjected to change. The latter is coercive and those whose behaviour is the object of change immediately get to know that their behaviour is being subjected to change. The expected or desirable effects of voluntary change tend to be gradual and cumulative whereas the expected effects of involuntary change tend to be instant and short-lived. It is interesting to bear in mind the fact that State approaches tend to elicit involuntary behaviour on the part of the citizenry compared to the voluntary mind-set of the Catholic Church in dealing with behavioural change. This is evident in the Catholic Church's intervention to address issues of both structural and manifest violence (Comerford, 2005; Meredith 2005; Gifford, 2009). The State typically employs coercive means in its efforts to pacify the North Rift. It cannot be denied that coercion, manifest or potential, as a means of managing the conflict, has had desirable results for the State. However, in terms of ending the conflict, it is arguable that coercion has failed. The State's dependence on coercive means does not imply disavowing of non-coercive means. Of course, the State employs both non-coercive and coercive means to achieve its objectives. But there are no meaningful results to show for combining coercive and non-coercive means to end the conflict, even as it is the case that these coercive and non-coercive means have had some effect in terms of managing the conflict.

The effect of building/sponsoring schools on management of the conflict comprises a series of actions, not an event. Researching it is *ex post facto* because it is practically not

possible to do experimental research on the contribution of building/sponsoring schools to management of Pokot-Turkana conflict. But it is quite possible to determine the contribution through correlation/regression and partialling (statistical control of variance) using data on already occurred incidents of Pokot-Turkana violent conflict as was done in this study. Table 6.2 shows that variable building/sponsoring schools when used in combination with the rest of the predictor variables is relatively more accurate in predicting commission's activities than any of the predictor variables. Its standard error of .037 is the smallest, and the proportion of the model's effect size that is associated with it is the second largest. However, the accuracy of the model in predicting the commission cannot only be based on the variable that has the largest effect size on the commission. Rather, all variables in the model have to be taken into account as pointed out earlier. Obviously, matters of conflict and peace in the North Rift are simply not accessible to classic experiments. They can only be addressed by non-experimental observation studies as they occur in their natural flux. Multiple regression and correlation is particularly practically suited to such studies because of its capability for assessing unique variance, and the closely related measures of partial correlation and regression as in Table 6.2. Like other data-analytic statistical methods, multiple regression makes assumptions about the phenomena to which it is applied. Among the assumptions is one that has to do with the equation of multiple regression itself. The multiple regression equation

$$E(y) = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \dots + \beta_k X_k$$

assumes that the partial relationship between y (commission) and each X (each of the conflict managing variables) is linear and that the slope  $\beta$  (partial standardized regression coefficient) of that relationship is identical for all values of the other explanatory variables. This implies a parallelism of the lines relating the two variables, at various values of the other variables.

However, the assumption does not entail denial that the model (multiple regressions) is sometimes too simple to be adequate (Agresti & Finlay, 2009). A case in point, in this regard is that when there exists interaction between predictor variables (that is, no parallelism) interaction terms are created from primary predictor variables and added to the model, depending on whether or not they significantly add to the power of the model to predict the outcome variable as determined by t test of their regression coefficients as in Table 6.2. For quantitative variables, as it is the case here, interaction exists between two conflict managing variables in their effects on commission when the effect of one variable changes as the level of the other variable changes. Interaction effects constitute the effect that both interacting variables have on commission. It was important to determine whether interaction effects exist, because where they exist they add to the power of the model to predict the outcome variable. Interaction effects, in this context, is the effect which both the conflict managing variables that interact have on commission over and above the effect that each one of the two singly has on commission. In multiple regressions, it is usual to allow for interaction of predictors variables for the purpose of increasing the magnitude of a model's prediction (that is, effect size). The variables that were subjected to determination of whether or not interaction exists are: giving food to the starving, advocating for citizens' rights, building/sponsoring schools, facilitating peace meeting, assisting the injured, sponsoring student, fostering tolerance of ethnic difference, building/sponsoring hospitals or health clinics, and promoting entrepreneurship. The selection of these variables was based either on logically and empirically grounded considerations of structural violence theory or p-value with .0 as the first digit.

Interaction terms were created as it is commonly done, that is, cross-multiplication of predictor variables in question. For these eight conflict managing variables creating interaction terms of two predictors per term resulted into twenty eight terms, thus:

$$N(N-1)/2 = 8(8-1)/2 = 56/2 = 28$$

Of these twenty-eight, only two had regression coefficients significantly different from zero by criterion of t test, as in the last column of Table 6.2. One of these two interaction terms was the result of cross-multiplication of scores on variable building/sponsoring schools ( $X_{13}$ ) by scores on variable building/sponsoring hospitals or health clinics ( $X_{14}$ ) that gave interaction term  $X_{13}X_{14}$ . The explanation for this significant interaction is that in recent years, or for quite some time now, hospitals or health care facilities have become increasingly more demanding financially than the Catholic Church can handle. Consequently, the Catholic Church has scaled down its activities pertaining to provision/operation of medical care infrastructure and has shifted to promotion or facilitation of self-help engagements involving the locals. The engagements as interventions are not specifically aimed at provision of alternatives to pastoralism. However, they supplement dependence on pastoralism thereby having a diminishing effect on pastoralism as a cause of Pokot-Turkana conflict. This state of affairs constitutes a contribution to management of Pokot-Turkana conflict. The second significant interaction resulted from cross-multiplication of scores on variable fostering tolerance of ethnic (Pokot-Turkana) difference ( $X_4$ ) by scores on variable promotion of entrepreneurship ( $X_8$ ), which gave interaction term  $X_4X_8$ . Tolerance of ethnic difference implies peaceful inter-communal coexistence while promotion of entrepreneurship implies decreasing dependence on pastoralist mode of production, which, in turn, has negative or deterring effect on the conflict-causing potential of pastoralism. These two interaction terms, ( $X_{13}X_{14}$  and  $X_4X_8$ ), were added to the multiple regression model's fourteen

primary predictors, which increased its predictors to sixteen as can be seen in Table 6.2. As can be seen in the last column of the Table,  $X_{13}X_{14}$  and  $X_4X_8$  added predictive power to the multiple regression model.

### **6.5.2 Multiple Correlation**

This exercise of explicating the link between Justice and Peace Commission on the one hand and management of Pokot-Turkana conflict on the other hand in terms of predictors, which are themselves measures of Catholic Church's contribution to management of the conflict, ends with examining the overall effect of the sixteen conflict managing variables on commission as a variable. It was stated earlier in this chapter that multiple regression has two research concerns, namely: the extent to which predictor variables predict the criterion variable, and the strength of each predictor variable in the prediction of the criterion variable. Discussion of the conflict in terms of Catholic Church's contribution to its management thus far has focused on the latter. The discussion in the rest of this section pertains to the former concern that addresses the combined effect of the predictors. Unlike the latter concern, the discussion of which involves long and relatively complex explication through standardized regression coefficients, managing the former concern is brief, and justifiably so, because the variable are aggregated as one and correlated with Justice and Peace Commission. This does not mean that the multiple correlation exercise is less essential to this (third) hypothesis's testing than the latter concern. This is done through multiple correlation which is a term used in multiple regression. Multiple correlation is the correlation between the observed values of an outcome (or criterion) variable and the values of the outcome variable predicted by a multiple regression model. Quite simply, here it is the correlation of respondents values (scores) on variable justice and peace commission and the

values (scores) predicted for the respondents by applying the multiple regression equation to the sixteen predictors.

The symbol for multiple correlation is  $R$  and its square measures the proportion of total variation in the criterion variable that is explained by the predictive power of all the explanatory variables through the multiple regression model. Here, the multiple correlation between commission as a variable and the sixteen explanatory variables in Table 6.2 was  $R=.557$ , the square of which is .310. This .310 (read percent) is the proportion of total variation in commission that is explained by the predictive power of all the conflict managing variables (16), through the multiple regression model (Table 6.2). Since, as explained earlier, commission is a mediating variable in relation to the conflict managing variables, it follows therefore that commission accounts for 31% of the variance in the management activities of the conflict in this study; given that the sixteen predictor variables operate to reduce the frequency of occurrence of incidents of the conflict. It is evident that there are specific areas of competency and of activities of the Catholic Church where it could be more effective in managing the conflict. These include: dealing with tolerance of ethnic difference, promoting entrepreneurship, facilitating peace meetings and having qualified personnel engaging in conflict management. In fact, during the interviews, Catholic Church conflict management personnel acknowledged limitations in terms of their conflict management capacity and activities, and this corroborates the findings above. The responses to the interview questions with these conflict management personnel considerably informed interpretation of capacity and activities of the Catholic Church in managing the conflict. It is pertinent to point out that these issues of competency, mentioned above, are in line with some negatives critiques of the church's conflict management capacity mentioned in the literature review (Chapter Two).

## **6.6 Conclusion**

Testing through skewness resulted into statistical values that were quite unproblematic to interpret in terms of Catholic Church's contribution to management of the Pokot-Turkana conflict. All the statistically significant values were negatively skewed meaning that the contribution is below expectation (below the mean) and this constituted support of the hypothesis. However, results of multiple regression were different. Coefficients of ten of the conflict managing variables supported the hypothesis. Six of the sixteen predictors (including the two cross-product terms) had coefficients that did not justify retaining the hypothesis (see Table 6.2). Results of correlation, about effect size of activities of the Catholic Church in terms of contribution to managing the conflict - were significant. As mentioned earlier, under the subsection multiple correlation 31% (see Multiple Regression/Correlations in Table 6.2) of the variance in managing the conflict is accounted for by the activities of the Catholic Church mediated by the Justice and Peace Commission. The remaining 69% of the variance is attributable to other variables that contribute to the management of the conflict. Variables pertaining to the state, and other actors such as IGAD, religious organization and NGOs etc., contribute to the unaccounted for 69% of the variance. In addition, sampling fluctuation and measurement error also contribute to the 69%. The overall inference about testing this hypothesis is that the results are inconclusive in the sense that they are mixed. This suggests that further research should be done to clarify the relationship of the nature of the conflict on the one hand, and strategies used by the Catholic Church to manage it, on the other. Such a research would necessarily have to take into account the underlying causes revealed in this study and the conflict management capacity of the Catholic Church, in order to understand the dynamics of these latent causes (variables) and their connection with structural violence.

## **CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **7.1 Introduction**

This study is about violent conflict between the ethnic Pokot and ethnic Turkana, focussing exclusively on the conflict's persistence in the form of recurrent incidents of attacks or raids and counter-raids. The persistence is made sense of by analysis and interpretation of outcomes of statistical tests of three hypotheses, each meeting empirical criterion, posited about the persistence. This chapter provides a summary of findings, conclusion and recommendations. The recommendations pertain to findings that will inform policy-making. The implications of the findings in the fourth to the sixth chapter pertain to the conflict management approaches of the State and to the conflict management activities of the Catholic Church respectively.

### **7.2 Summary of Findings**

This methodology of the study was quantitative, being characterized by measurement of variables, representation, randomization, control and hypothesis testing culminating in retaining or rejecting the null hypothesis. The reviewed literature is wide ranging in that it transverses disciplines in the domains of social sciences and humanities but it is thematized to facilitate easy making sense of it. The conflict's long history was periodized in per-colonial, colonial and post-colonial. In colonial times Pokots had power leverage over the Turkanas because the former were allied with the neighbouring colonial settler community against the Turkanas. This state of affairs changed after the demise of the colonial rule, in that the dynamics of the conflict in terms of who had leverage came to depend on the post-colonials State's government in power.

The underlying causes (factors) of the conflict are realistic and the dynamics of the variable loaded on them are invariably an aspect of Pokot-Turkana interaction in space and time. In terms of actors and stakeholders the conflict is no longer exclusively an affair of Pokots and

Turkanas. Today they are less able to determine the occurrence, trend and consequences of conflict incidents between them because the number of stakeholders in the North Rift has increased and is very unlikely to decrease. This is validated by the many statistically significant coefficients in the correlation matrix that depicts the interplay between conflict variables and State conflict management variables. The correlation coefficients give credence to the point that the conflict is unlikely to be attenuated by hitherto existing State conflict management approaches in the foreseeable future, because the increase of stakeholders in the conflict has in effect made it more complex and, therefore, quite problematic to manage it in the interest of ending it.

The Catholic Church is undoubtedly the prominent non-State actor in the dialectic of peace-conflict matters and development praxi in the North Rift. Thousands and thousands of indigenous Pokot and Turkana people know more about what the Catholic Church does there than what the State does there, but for different reasons. Be that as it may, by critical of frequency distribution and of conflict management activities as variables, the management is below average and measured by skewness. The activities were independent variables, that is, the sought causes of the relationship between the Church's conflict management and occurrences of violent conflict incidents between members of the Pokot and Turkana communities. Similar to skewness, multiple regression/correlation outcomes evidenced that more than half of the predictor variables had trivial or chance effects on the conflict. This low prediction, that is, lack of robust regression coefficients was ascribed to institutional arrangements internal to the Catholic Church itself. However, interaction terms with significant regression coefficients implied that the positive impact of the Catholic Church on Pokot-Turkana violent conflict will likely increase, not decrease. Objectives of a study are meant to be achieved. A field research's

data collection is not based on objectives. It is based on hypothesis if they are used in the study, as is the case in this study. In this research the objectives were achieved through the outcomes of the hypothesis testing.

### **7.3 Conclusion**

This is a quantitative study of recurrent incidents of violent conflict. Through factor analysis realistic underlying causes of the conflict were identified and explained. By virtue of their extraction in descending order the factors are clearly practically valuable because they specify where to begin in terms of initiating policy action to counter the violence. With regard to State approaches to the conflict most of the correlation coefficients (significant at .05 and .01) lent support to the hypothesis. There are considerable differences among the coefficients in terms of magnitude. A most plausible conclusion that flows from this is that the conflict is complex. Concerning the Catholic Church's activities of contributing to management of the conflict, most multiple regression/correlation values were not impressive in the sense that they were either chance occurrences or trivial. This was similar to skewness values. The empirical findings legitimates concluding that team work and capacity proficiency under the umbrella of Catholic Church Justice and Peace Commission (CJPC) at its best results in a synergy that is below being considerable productive in regard to contributing to management of the conflict.

### **7.4 Recommendations**

The recommendations made here stem from the hypothesis testing discussions. They do not pertain directly to the objectives of this study for the very simple reason that the data were primarily collected not to achieve the objectives but to test the hypothesis. In light of the identification and explanation of the underlying causes of the conflict in question, the State, regardless of regime in power, should manage the conflict using pro-active strategies rather than

being reactive for the same end. The rationale for this is that the former strategies target causes of the conflict whereas the latter strategies target effects of the conflict. This is so for the obvious reason that the conflict persists not because of its effects with which the regime tends to be preoccupied in terms of management approaches, but because of its causes. These causes exist because the approaches to the causes are marred by inappropriate institutional arrangement and misperceptions leading to general ineffectiveness. The perceptions are routinely distorted through partisan accounts of social-historical experiences of dominant actors inside and outside the government as a function of the interplay between matters economic and matters political structured by matters ethnic.

Since most predictor variables of Catholic Church Justice and Peace Commission did not reach significance (i.e.,  $<.05$ ), and the effectiveness of Catholic Church's contribution to management of the conflict is very much a function of knowledge pertaining to Pokot-Turkana violent conflict in theory and practices on the part of its actors, the implication is that the actors are less than adequately equipped to by criteria of knowledge competence and technical mastery to effectively contribute to management of the conflict. In general terms this means that the actors are significantly deficient in terms of conflict management expertise that effective contribution to management of the conflict calls for. The recommendation warranted by the quantitative values of Table 6.2 is that the Catholic Church's actors in the conflict management should be given more foundational training in terms of theory-based knowledge, analytical skills, peacebuilding techniques and other appropriate specializations. Besides, the Church needs to engage in positive self-criticism. This should take the form of rethinking its activities and reevaluating its structures vis-à-vis the persistent conflict in question.

Whether or not research-based knowledge relevant to policy will come to bear on approaches to management of the conflict in question is a function of social and political contingencies. This, in turn, depends on whether the decision-makers in government are willing to use authoritative knowledge in policy-making/decision-making or are indifferent, if not averse, to it. The recommendation that flows from the foregoing is that the producers of authoritative knowledge pertaining to the conflict – who are mostly outsiders to the State security establishment – should be involved in its application to management of the conflict, thereby attenuating the degree to which the application gets distorted and marred by the particular interests of the powerful in or outside government.

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## APPENDICES: RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS

### Appendix 1 Questionnaire

I am Fr. Patrick Devine, based in Nairobi. I do missionary work in arid and semi-arid areas of Kenya and Tanzania. Besides, I am a post graduate student at the University of Nairobi, in the department of Political Science and Public Administration doing a Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.d) degree. Carrying out research is a requirement for the awarding of the degree. My research is about communal conflict and development in this area (North-western) of Kenya. Knowing and deepening understanding of the causes and consequences of the conflict will greatly enhance the effectiveness of my missionary work in this area. Therefore, I request you to give information I need for the purpose of getting the degree by responding to the questions and statements in this questionnaire. Your response to my question or statement is neither wrong nor right. The information you give will be kept strictly confidential and, similarly, your identity will not be revealed to anybody – it will be kept anonymous. Thank you very much, in advance, for your kindness in participating in my research.

#### Appendix 1: Questionnaires

##### 1.1.English Questionnaire (To be translated in to Pokot and Turkana languages)

Province

District

Location

Sub-location

Place of interview

Gender of respondent: Male  or Female

Respondent's ethnic identity

Respondent's Languages

	<b>Pokot</b>	<b>Turkana</b>	<b>Other</b>	<b>Other</b>
<b>Speak</b>				

Respondent's age

Respondent's Education

Years of schooling -

Or: level primary  Secondary  University

Respondent's Occupation

1. Are all your neighbouring ethnic communities' pastoralist?

Yes

No

2. What is the name of one (or more) of your neighbouring ethnic communities?

3. How much do you (or members of your ethnic community) trust individuals or groups of people who belong to a neighbouring ethnic community?

Do not trust at all	Trust very little	Trust little	Trust
1	2	3	4

4. Which of the following do you consider to be the greatest cause of violent conflict between members of your ethnic community and members of neighbouring ethnic communities?

Unemployment

Massive death of livestock through prolonged drought

Distrust between your ethnic community and neighbouring ethnic communities

Environmental scarcity (= water, pasture, land for growing food crops)

Long standing hatred between ethnic communities

Proliferation of guns

5. If "Longstanding hatreds between ethnic communities" above, to what extent would you say that this is the case?

Very very small extent	Very small extent	Small extent	Large extent	Very large extent	Very very large extent
1	2	3	4	5	6

6. Do contested rights to ownership or use of natural resources (pasture, water, fish) by neighbouring ethnic communities in this area sometimes result in violent conflict between communities?

Yes  No

7. Does violent conflict sometimes occur in this area because the rights of one ethnic community are abused by a different ethnic community with impunity (i.e., the abusers are not arrested and charged in a court of law?)

Yes  No

8. Have you ever seen a person or people under police arrest because the person or people participated in acts of inter-ethnic violence?

Yes  No

9. About how many incidents of violent conflict between members of your ethnic community and members of another ethnic community or communities would you say have occurred in this area in recent years?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	Over 12
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----	----	----	---------

10. Which difference is the predominant cause of violence between members of your ethnic community and members of neighbouring ethnic community/ies?

Ethnic difference  Religious difference  Political difference  
 Cultural difference  Economic difference

11. To what extent would you say that elders' negotiations reduce hostility and prevent future incidents of inter-ethnic violence?

Very very small extent	Very small extent	Small extent	Large extent	Very large extent	Very very large extent
1	2	3	4	5	6

12. Are there influential people who contribute to violence by interfering with ethnic communities elders' efforts to end or prevent acts of inter-ethnic violence?

- Yes  No

13. If "yes" above, to what extent would you say this is the case?

Very very small extent	Very small extent	Small extent	Large extent	Very large extent	Very very large extent
1	2	3	4	5	6

14. Do some individuals who have business interests in pastoralism engage in acts which encourage inter-ethnic violence?

- Yes  No

15. If "Yes" above, to what extent would you say that this is the case?

Very very small extent	Very small extent	Small extent	Large extent	Very large extent	Very very large extent
1	2	3	4	5	6

16. Do people who illegally carry guns tend to use them against other people who do not belong to their ethnic community?

- Yes  No

17. Where do members of your ethnic community get guns?

- Countries that border Kenya (Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia)
- Security personnel
- Middlemen
- People from neighbouring ethnic community/communities who are killed or captured during their livestock raiding in our ethnic community
- Other members of our ethnic community
- People who have no use for guns because all their livestock died through drought

18. Is there a neighbouring ethnic community whose members consider themselves to be ethnically and culturally superior to members of another ethnic community/ies

- Yes  No  Uncertain  Don't know  Other (please specify)

19. Describe their behavioural disposition towards members of your ethnic community when there is a situation of conflict/misunderstanding that should be resolved through collaborative action by people from your ethnic community and the neighbouring ethnic community.

- Uncompromising  Hostile  Rigid
- Intolerant  Authoritarian  Anti-democratic

20. If 'yes' to question above, to what extent would you say that their attitudes towards your ethnic community are antagonistic?

Very very small extent	Very small extent	Small extent	Large extent	Very large extent	Very very large extent
1	2	3	4	5	6

21. As far as you can recall in recent years, how many times would you say that you saw, were told about, or heard that some people were violently attacked and/or murdered because they did not belong to the ethnic community of their attackers/murderers/

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	Over 12
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----	----	---------

22. Which of the following for you are the sources of information about inter-ethnic violence?

- Relatives
- Friends
- Members of the Church/mosque where you worship
- Newspaper
- Chief/Assistant chief
- Non-governmental organizations
- Neighbours
- Members of your ethnic community
- Television
- Radio
- Officemates/workmates
- Human Rights groups
- Government security officials

23. Do people from a neighbouring ethnic community get livestock from your ethnic community?  Yes  No

24. If "Yes", how do they get livestock from your ethnic community?

- Violent attack (Livestock raiding)
- Bartering
- Performance of religious-medical function/ritual
- Stealing
- Bride price
- Other (Please specify)
- Buying
- Compensation for murder
- None

25. When people from a neighbouring ethnic community take through a raid or steal animals owned by member(s) of your ethnic community and the owner(s) report the raid or stealing to the security personnel, pointing in the direction in which the raiders or thieves escaped with the animals, what do the security personnel sometimes do?

- Sometimes the security personnel pursue the raiders/thieves in the direction in which they escaped with the animals
- Sometimes the security personnel do not go in the direction the owners of the animals told them the raiders/thieves escaped with the animals – the security personnel go in the opposite direction sometimes
- Sometimes the Security Personnel are slow to take action
- Sometimes the security personnel hardly take interest in the report or do not take care
- Sometimes the security personnel evidently do not take any action

26. If the security personnel manage to recover the raided/stolen animals, what do they do with the animals?



Violation of taboos				
Political/economic wrangles				
Witchcraft				
Competition/rivalry between clans				

32. Indicate how much each factor below causes strained relations and violent conflict between your ethnic community and a different neighbouring ethnic community/ies.

	Does not cause	Hardly causes	Sometime causes	Largely causes
Injustice (marginalization) against your ethnic community				
Extreme poverty				
Loss of livestock through theft/ raiding by members of neighbouring communities				
Competition for water holes				
Competition for pasture				
Killing of members of your ethnic community by people who belong to a neighbouring ethnic community/ies				
Dispute over ownership of land/territory occupied by a neighbouring ethnic community				
Some NGO activities				
Differences in religious ideas, beliefs & practices				
Your ethnic community's deep distrust of a neighbouring ethnic community/ies				
Revenge for murdered fellow ethnics and/or raided livestock				

33. When do most incidents of violent conflict between members of your ethnic community and members of a neighbouring or neighbouring ethnic community/communities occur?

Season	Time period of the day
During the dry season	During day time
During the rain season	During night time
Any season	Any time

34. Below are 5 kinds of scarcity that may cause violent conflict. To what extent does each cause conflict between your ethnic community and neighbouring ethnic community or communities?

	Large cause of conflict	Moderate cause of conflict	Small cause of conflict	Least cause of conflict
Pasture scarcity				
Water scarcity				
Food scarcity				
Livestock scarcity brought by long drought which killed most or all livestock				
Scarcity of effective security personnel				

35. Describe your ethnic community's access of the following?

	Hardly accessible	Fairly accessible	Quite accessible
Employment (formal)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Employment (informal)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Pasture	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Credit	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Education	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Water	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Health Care	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Security personnel	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Recognition	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Dignity	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

36. Indicate by ticking (√) the effect of each scarcity specified below on your ethnic community.

	Migra tion	Unemploy ment	Povert y	Criminal Violence	Hunge r	Famin e	Sick -ness	Death
Water Scarcity								
Pasture Scarcity								
Food Scarcity								
Livestock scarcity after long drought which killed most or nearly all livestock								
Scarcity of alternative(s) to pastoralism								
Scarcity of security personnel/ infrastructural facilities								

37. Please rate the availability of the following infrastructural services in this area inhabited by your ethnic community.

	Adequate	Inadequate	Very inadequate
Basic health care (hospitals, health clinics)			
Schools, training institutions			
Veterinary services			
Public service mode of transportation			
Market (place) where members of different ethnic communities gather together to sell and buy livestock			
Roads			
Security (Police/Army)			

38. Are the following international borders adequately patrolled by security forces (police, army and the like) to prevent cross-border acts of aggression and violent attacks by people who belong to a neighbouring ethnic community or communities?

	Adequately patrolled	Inadequately patrolled	Patrol is lacking	Don't know
Kenya-Uganda border				
Kenya-Sudan border				
Kenya-Ethiopia border				

39. According to the cultural practices and beliefs of your ethnic community, what should be the response/reaction to people from different ethnic community who have...

	Killed a person or people who belongs to your ethnic community?	Used violence to take livestock belonging to members of your ethnic community?	Stolen livestock belonging to members of your ethnic community?
Forget			
Forgive them			
Negotiate with them			
Revenge			
Kill			
Other (Please specify)			

40. Does your ethnic community have a particular social behaviour according to which only members of your ethnic community engage in culturally sanctioned aggressive physical (hurting) violence amongst themselves as:

A sporting game or activity?

Yes

No

A rite of passage?

Yes

No

41. Do members of your ethnic community sometimes perform, in line with your culture, an unprovoked violent aggression act against a person or some people belonging to a different (=neighbouring) ethnic community as an end in itself?

Yes

No

42. To what extent can each of the following inter-ethnic phenomena contribute to reduction of cultural difference and animosity rooted in history between your ethnic community and neighbouring ethnic community/communities?

	No reduction	Small extent reduction	Large extent reduction
Inter-marriage between neighbouring ethnic communities			
Inter-ethnic women self-help groups			
Inter-ethnic sporting events			
Inter-ethnic performing arts events (e.g. singing, acting, dancing)			

43. Does your ethnic community have indigenous methods of peace making with neighbouring ethnic community/communities?

Yes

No

44. If “Yes”, what are the methods?

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45. Please rate the effectiveness of the capacity of indigenous peacemaking methods to stop or prevent conflict and maintain peaceful co-existence between your ethnic community and neighbouring ethnic community/communities?

	Effective	Not effective	Don't know
In the distant past indigenous peacekeeping methods were:			
At present, indigenous peacekeeping methods are:-			

46. If “At present indigenous peacekeeping methods are not effective” above, why are indigenous peacekeeping not effective at present?

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47. Rate the performance of the following acts of aggression against members of your ethnic community by people from a neighbouring ethnic community/ies.

	Very commonly performed	Commonly performed	Rarely performed	Not performed
Hurling abuse/insults as a prologue to assault				
Stealing animals only and doing/taking nothing else				
Raiding a homestead/ village/ manyatta or herdsmen grazing animals and taking the animals without injuring/ killing the owner(s) if they don't resist the raid.				
Raiding a homestead/ village/ manyatta and killing people, taking their animals and other belongings, setting fire to their dwellings regardless of whether they resist or don't resist the raid.				
Raiding a homestead/ village/ manyatta or herdsmen grazing animals and killing and/or seriously injuring people, running away without taking anything that belongs to them.				
Attacking and injuring just because of not belonging to the ethnic community of the attacker(s).				
Attacking and injuring/killing as part of a rite of passage which the attacker(s) is undergoing.				
Assault and seriously injuring or killing because of long-standing hatred between the ethnic communities.				

48. Would you say that some people from your ethnic community ever took animals by a person or people belonging to a neighbouring ethnic community without knowledge of the owner(s) as an act of vengeance

Yes

No

49. Would you say that some people from your ethnic community ever took animals by force (= raiding) owned by members as an act of vengeance?

Yes

No

50. Would you say that people from your ethnic community ever attacked people (= village/manyatta) who are members of a neighbouring ethnic community and injured/killed some of them as an act of vengeance?

- Yes  No

51. If 'yes' to any of the questions 48, 49, 50 above, please react to the following statement by choosing one description of it that best represents your belief or what you think.

If members of your ethnic community had not performed the act of vengeance against members of the neighbouring community, relations between members of your ethnic community and those of a neighbouring ethnic community would be less strained than they are now.

Agree very strongly	Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	Disagree very strongly

52. Would you say that people from a neighbouring ethnic community ever took animals owned by members of your ethnic community without knowledge of the owners?

- Yes  No

53. Would you say that members of a neighbouring ethnic community ever took animals by force (= raiding) owned by members of your ethnic community?

- Yes  No

54. Would you say that people from a neighbouring ethnic community ever attacked people (= village/manyatta) who are members of your ethnic community and killed/injured them?

- Yes  No

55. If 'yes' to any of the question 52, 53, 54 above, please react to the following statement by choosing one description of it that best represents your belief or what you think.

If only members of your ethnic community had taken measures to secure their animals and their own lives, neither the animals would have been raided/taken, nor the people killed/injured.

Agree very strongly	Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	Disagree very strongly

56. X and Y are members of your ethnic community. Some time ago X and Y left pastoral life and went to Lodwar/Kapenguria to work for non-governmental organisations. X murdered y. As far as your culture is concerned, what would you or your ethnic community say caused X to murder Y? Please tick appropriate boxes.

- X has a hot temper  X is psychologically disturbed (mentally ill)  
 X is cursed/bewitched  X was isolated from his/her family/friends

- X was drunk
- X did not get along with his/her boss
- X was always frustrated by his/her boss

57. How is taking away animals that are owned by another person who is not a member of your ethnic community, without knowledge of their owner(s) or through raiding, regarded in your ethnic community?

- a cultural practice
- an act of survival in a physically harsh/hostile environment
- an act of lawlessness

58. Rank the following correlates of ethnic identity according to their relative importance in serving to unify members of your ethnic community against violent aggression by members of neighbouring communities.

	Extremely important	Very important	Quite important	Somewhat important
Your common history				
Your language				
Your culture				
Your religion				

59. If a member of your ethnic community took animals owned by a member of a neighbouring ethnic community without the owners knowledge, or used force to take the animals (=raiding) owned by a neighbouring ethnic group, or killed a person belonging to a neighbouring ethnic group, how likely is it that the member of your ethnic community will regret having done so?

Extremely unlikely to regret	Very unlikely to regret	Quite unlikely to regret	Somewhat unlikely to regret	Will regret

60. P, Q and R are female members of your ethnic community and each has one daughter. Their husbands were killed during a livestock raid by people from a neighbouring ethnic community when the daughters were less than five years old. Each mother holds a set of values/beliefs that has guided her efforts in raising her daughter. Now the daughters have grown up and each is rejecting many of her mother's beliefs. Who is responsible (= to blame) for the daughter's rejection of her mother's beliefs?

- daughter
- mother
- daughter and mother
- other (please specify)

61. Neither grievance/vengeance, nor long standing hatreds, nor environmental scarcity, nor marginalization is the cause of prolonged incidents of violent conflict between members of your ethnic community and members of a neighbouring community /ies. The ultimate cause of the prolonged incidents of violent conflict is individual greed because some individuals within the different ethnic communities, provincial administration, security force, companies engaged in livestock related business, non-religions related non-governmental organisations, and political class use prolonged incidents of violent conflict between the different ethnic communities to advance their own economic positions.

Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly

62. What is the respondents' marital status?

- married
- widowed through violent aggression by non-fellow ethnic
- widowed through natural death of spouse
- divorced/separated
- single

63. Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statement about the work of the Church in your ethnic community.

	Strongly Disagree <b>1</b>	Disagree <b>2</b>	No opinion (Neither Disagree or agree) <b>3</b>	Agree <b>4</b>	Strongly Agree <b>5</b>
Preaching Peace					
Facilitating Peace Meetings					
Promoting harmonious relations					
Fostering tolerance of gender difference					
Fostering tolerance of Age Differences					
Fostering tolerance of Ethnic differences					
Fostering tolerance of Religious differences					

Assisting the displaced due to conflict(e.g. livestock raiding) between your ethnic community and a neighbouring ethnic community					
Assisting the injured due to conflict between your ethnic community and a neighbouring ethnic community					
Giving food to the starving					
Donating clothes and/or footwear					
Initiating/promoting entrepreneurial activities					
Sponsoring pupils/students					
Sponsoring children's homes					
Advocacy of citizen rights					
Evangelizing					
Drilling water boreholes					
Donating books and equipment to schools					
Building sponsoring schools					
Building/sponsoring hospitals/health clinics					
Activities being performed by the Justice and Peace Commission are productive					

64. Different government officials and elected representatives of people in this area perform duties that are related to security and peace between ethnic communities in the area. Designations of the officials and representatives are given below. Rate the extent to which the official or representative performs his or her duties of security and peace by ticking the number which you think indicates his or her performance of the duties.

	<b>Performance of security/peace duties</b>				
	Very small extent			Very large extent	
<b>Designations</b>	1	2	3	4	5
Assistant chief					
Chief					
District Officer					
District commissioner					
Provincial commissioner					
Police					
Councilor					
Parliamentarian					
Magistrate					
Judge					

## **Appendix 2 Focus Group Questionnaires**

Q.1. According to the history of your ethnic community as told by members themselves, have they always lived in this area or did they migrate from some other place and settle here?

Q.2. Why did they migrate?

Q.3 What are the causes of inter-ethnic violence?

Q.4 Do contested rights to crop/ pasture land sometimes result into violence between ethnic communities in this area?

Q.5. Does ethnic violence sometimes occurs in this area because the rights of one ethnic community are abused by a different ethnic community with impunity (i.e. the abusers are not arrested and charged in a court of law?).

Q.6. Does your community feel marginalized compared to other communities/districts in Kenya?

If so, why?

Q.7. Is violence between members of your ethnic community and members of a different (neighbouring) ethnic community/ is justified?

Q.8. Does a group of elders from one ethnic community ever negotiate with a group of elders from a different ethnic community for the purpose of pacifying the ethnic communities?

Q.9. Is violence between ethnic communities (interviewer should specify names of the ethnic communities) due to environmental scarcity (pasture, water, land for growing food crops) or is it due to longstanding hatred between the ethnic communities? Discuss?

Q.10. Provide only one word that best characterizes it (ethnic community).

Turkana	Pokot

Q.11. How can religion be used to contribute to prevention of inter-ethnic violent conflict?

Q.12. How is governance in this area?

Q.13. Suppose you were charged with the task of ending mistrust, disharmony and violent conflict between members of your ethnic community or neighbouring ethnic communities, what would you do?

Q.14. What do you like about Church activities in the area?

Q.15. What do you not like about Church activities in the area?

Q.16. What do you think the Church should do in addition to its present activities in this area?

### **Appendix 3 Interview Questions:**

Catholic Church Bishops, Parish Priests, Rev. Sister Superiors, Catechists, Parish Chairpersons, Justice and Peace Commission Officers responsible for Church activities in the Pokot-Turkana conflict environment.

1. Among activities performed by the Catholic Church in the Pokot-Turkana area are those whose intent is to manage conflict between Pokot and Turkana ethnic communities.

In this connection, would you say that the Catholic Church is largely free from Kenya Government control to choose strategies and tactics it employs in its conflict management and/or peacebuilding activities or it is considerably constrained by the control?

2. In the dry lands of northern Kenya distrust between the ethnic communities is often implicated in disputes between the communities and tends to be a source of inter-ethnic conflict behaviour that stems from misperception and misjudgement.

That being the case, is reducing the distrust between the Pokots and Turkanas a main concern of the Catholic Church? Does the Church's repertoire of conflict management and/or peacebuilding strategies and tactics include ways and means whose specific purpose is to reduce distrust while at the same time increasingly generating trust between Pokots and Turkanas?

3. It is now generally recognized that all conflict – regardless of what motivates it and the form of behaviour it takes – cannot be exclusively explained in terms of ethnic difference. This recognition does not, of course, deny that ethnic difference is a major contributory cause of occurrence of conflict incidents between pastoral ethnic communities.

In this vein, what evidence is there that the Catholic Church in its conflict management and/or peacebuilding activities pays considerable attention to causes of Pokot-Turkana conflict that are independent (i.e. unrelated to) of Pokot-Turkana ethnic difference.

4. The Catholic Church is not the only non-state actor in conflict management and/or peacebuilding. There are other non-state actors including non-religious aid agencies and business organizations or people. Relations between non-state actors tend to get politicized among themselves.

Granted the politicization, does the Catholic Church shield its activities from the politics? Another way of putting the question is this: Are the conflict management and/or peace-building activities of the Church immune from the politics of non-state aid organizations operating in Pokot-Turkana territory? (i.e, Kitale and Lodwar Dioceses).

5. Culture defines what people value and what they are likely to enter into dispute over, and suggests appropriate ways to behave in particular kinds of disputes. Thus, culture affects conflict behaviour when it sanctions specific ways to pursue individual or group interest and disapproves others. Ethnographers and missionaries/local Church leaders, among others, have observed the existence of culturally sanctioned aggression in the cultures of pastoral ethnic communities. This aggression in the form of violent conflict behaviour is usually directed to members of a neighbouring ethnic community. The violence is unprovoked and is perceived by its perpetrator(s) as normal and justified as a cultural practice of the perpetrators(s).

Granting this psycho-cultural state of affairs, what specific structures and processes of inter-ethnic interaction and social exchange does the Catholic Church have and use to stop

sanctioned aggression and its resulting violent conflict between Pokot and Turkana ethnic communities.

6. The array of activities subsumed under the comprehensive terms of conflict management and/or peacebuilding have as their end in view or purpose to bring about holistic development by ending conflict or reducing their destructiveness. The extent to which this can be achieved largely depends on the activities being theory informed and theory guided. The activities are practice, after all. Now practice without theory is blind and theory without practice is empty. Theory explains and predicts behaviour – specifically conflict behaviour; thereby making it possible to predict and control (prevent) future conflict behaviour. Practice (i.e., peace-building, conflict management activities) need theory and vice versa.

In the light of the foregoing, would you say that the conflict management and/or peacebuilding activities by the Catholic Church, in Kitale and Lodwar Dioceses are guided by a theory, or are they haphazard (not grounded in a theory)

7. Peace-building and conflict management activities where they exist are socially organized, and one would be hard put to deny that they constitute a social organization. An organization has structure and process. Its purpose is to achieve the goals for which it was established. In Kitale and Lodwar Catholic Dioceses one of the goals of peace-building and conflict management activities if formally constituted would be to prevent or end Pokot-Turkana conflict. Attaining this goal would depend on the organizational structure of the activities. Here structure means the order of authority positions, the knowledge, competence (theoretical and practical) and expertise (technical mastery) of personnel who occupy those positions. Structure has to do also with policy and coordination. Policy and coordination should be part of and also transcend Kitale,

and Lodwar Dioceses and, as such, could be referred to as the Catholic Church's "Structured conflict management and/or Peacebuilding Policy", (a type of Church 'foreign policy' entailing a clear vision and sense of direction of inter-ethnic conflict management ).

Now, against the background of the foregoing, would you say that the people who perform activities to bring peace between the Pokot and Turkana ethnic communities are able to: apply logic and reason to the activities, bring conflict theory to bear on the activities, appreciate the factual history of the Pokot-Turkana conflict, imbue the activities with dynamism and vision, capitalize on their knowledge competence and expertise (if any) pertaining to inter-ethnic conflict in pastoral areas and, finally, contextualize peace-building and conflict management activities in what could be referred to as Catholic Church 'conflict management 'Foreign Policy'?

8. Peace is a common (Universal) good. The expectation is that it should exist between all nations and within all nations, between all ethnic communities and within all ethnic communities, and in all continents. Unfortunately none of the above is the case. Conflict is the negation of peace. Conflict as direct violence and/or structural violence exists in all continents. However, a look at conflict in comparative perspective during the last thirty or so years across ethnic communities and nations as well as continents in terms of the number of people who have died because of violent conflict or causes related to violent conflict shows that Africa ranks first. The central question for people (i.e., individuals and organizations) participating in peace-building and conflict management activities is: What new or additional institutional structures can be set up by the Catholic Church for the purpose of markedly reducing, if not ending, violent conflict in which ethnic difference is implicated?

Granted that attaining peace has been elusive inspite of efforts of Catholic Church Diocesan Structures - Departments/Offices - (e.g. Justice and Peace Office), it is imperative to set up institutional structures in the form of Peace Building Councils within the parameters and purview of the Diocesan Structures/ Justice and Peace Office, which will be at one and the same time more effective and efficient than has hitherto been the case in mitigating Pokot-Turkana conflict. The proposed institutional arrangement emerging as per propositions, especially proposition 21, of the II Special Assembly for Africa of the Synod of Bishops on the theme, The Church in Africa at the Service of Reconciliation, Justice and Peace, 2009, are at three levels, namely, Diocesan, National and Regional.

Please provide your input on the idea of Peace Building Councils formation, structure and role.