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SECURING AFRICA: THE ROLE OF THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE

By

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SEPTEMBER 2015
DECLARATION

I, Mwanzia Richard Wambua hereby declares that this research project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.

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Signature                                                                                                      Date

MWANZIA RICHARD W

This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the appointed university supervisor.

......................................................... .........................................................
Signature                                                                                                      Date

AMB. PROF MARIA NZOMO
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this work to all my friends and colleagues, who have bravely and fearlessly continued to protect the territorial Integrity of our Nation and provide service to humanity at the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), and those who have had to pay the ultimate price with the lives.
### ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACDS:</td>
<td>African Chiefs of Defence and Security</td>
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<td>APSA:</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<td>ASF:</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<td>AU:</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>CPX:</td>
<td>Command Post Exercise</td>
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<td>EASBRIG:</td>
<td>East Africa Standby Brigade</td>
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<td>EDF:</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOMAC:</td>
<td>Force Multinationale de &quot;Afrique Centrale&quot;</td>
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<td>IDPs:</td>
<td>Internally Displaces Persons</td>
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<td>ISIL:</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIS:</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRA:</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<td>MSC:</td>
<td>Military Staff Committee</td>
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<td>NASBRIG:</td>
<td>North Africa Regional Standby Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU:</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC:</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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<td>RECs:</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities</td>
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<td>RTF:</td>
<td>Regional Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRCCs:</td>
<td>Special Representatives of the Chairperson of the Commission</td>
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<td>UN:</td>
<td>United Nations’</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL:</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>UNAVEM:</td>
<td>United Nations Angola Verification Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNEF</td>
<td>United Nations Emergency Force</td>
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<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Sudan</td>
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<td>UNOC</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Congo</td>
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<td>UNOMUR</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Uganda and Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>Nations Truce Supervision Organization</td>
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ABSTRACT

Peacekeeping and peace building (PK and PB) operations were ‘invented’ and ‘pioneered’ by the United Nations as early as 1948 and for a long period the UN has been the only organisation able and willing to deliver them. In the last decades, however, the quasi-monopolistic role of the universal organisation in this area has been seriously challenged by both regional organisations and by the so-called ‘ad hoc coalitions of the willing’. This new situation, with a good, sometimes excessive, presence of entities interested and available to deliver PK/PB operations, presents new challenges and new opportunities to the international community as a whole, and to the individual states requesting the deployment of a PK/PB operation. Against this background, the present article, after having defined its cope, presents few statistics confirming the existing trend towards ‘decentralizing’ the delivery of PK/PB operations, discusses why interest in playing a major role in PK has increased among states and regional international organisations, and outlines the consequences (both positive and negative) associated with such a trend. The question which the study sought to answer was: what is the role of standby force? The general objective of the study was to investigate the role of the African standby force in enhancing peace support operations in Africa. The following were the specific objectives that guided the study: To examine and analyze past efforts at securing Africa in the absence African standby force, To examine and analyze African standby force as a mechanism Africa Union peace and security council (PSC) and specific strategies used for enhancing peace support operations in Africa and to establish the prospects and challenges of African Standby Force and the key factors that influence its capacity for enhancing peace support operations in Africa. The study was guided by the following hypotheses: past efforts at securing Africa applied before African Standby Force were not effective in maintaining peace support operations in Africa; African Standby Force as a mechanism Africa Union peace and Security Council significantly influence peace support operations in Africa; Adopted strategies significantly influence African standby force in enhancing peace support operations in Africa. The study was based war theory which is is embedded in the principles of the concept of peacekeeping operations. The study found that ASF meant to have a multidimensional capacity with civilian, police and military components. AU and the regional economic communities have emerged as important actors in the deployment of peace support operations on the continent. To make better use of the capacity which has been developed, and to continue to strengthen this role, it was found appropriate to adjust the ASF concept, and to make investments along the lines of the nine lessons highlighted. The study recommended that the study suggested that the AU should employ a larger number of specialists and experts, along with more general staff, who will be able to provide better internal coordination and allow for a clearer division of responsibilities.
CHAPTER ONE

1.1 Background to the Study

The origin of peace keeping missions can be traced back in 1948 when the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorized the deployment of UN military observers in the Middle East to monitor Armistice agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbors under the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).\(^1\) Peacekeeping was started during the cold war, a period when intense rivalry and suspicion often paralyzed the decision making effort of the Security Council. During this period, peacekeeping was primarily limited to maintaining and monitoring ceasefires while stabilizing situations on the ground and providing the much needed support aimed at achieving political solutions. Such missions mainly consisted of unarmed military observers and lightly armed troops whose role was also to boost confidence within the conflict areas. The earliest armed peacekeeping mission which also involved an African state was the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 1). This force was deployed in 1956 to address the Suez Canal crises. The first large scale UN Peacekeeping mission was in the UN Operation in Congo (UNOC) in 1960 which had up to 20,000 military peacekeepers.\(^2\)

Since then almost 23 UN peacekeeping missions have been undertaken in the African continent alone from United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I) between 1988 to 1991, United Nations Observer Mission in Uganda and Rwanda

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(UNOMUR) from 1993 through to United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) between 1999 to 2005.\(^3\) Other notable ones include United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) to the recent one MINUSCA, which stands for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Central African Republic.\(^4\)

In the past year, international attention has concentrated on expanding capacity to conduct peace operations in Africa. To this end, African leaders have set upon improving the African Union (AU)’s ability to handle security and humanitarian problems on the continent.\(^5\) The AU has operationalized its Peace and Security Council and has elaborated its plans to develop regional standby forces in cooperation with the subregional organizations on the continent. At the Sea Island summit in June 2004, the G8 announced its Global Peace Operations Initiative, in which financial support was pledged to implement the AU’s proposals.\(^6\) The EU has also taken steps to enhance its supporting role through ad hoc efforts in the Sudan and through the establishment of an Africa Peace Support Operation Facility to finance missions. These initiatives also come amidst the United Nations’ (UN) own efforts to improve its headquarters capacity and to establish more effective mechanisms for conducting multinational operations.


Looking at the number of UN peacekeeping missions, it is evident that Africa as a continent has had a large share due to the continued conflicts caused mainly by political instability leading large scale insecurity. Africa is also a big contributor of troops to the UN.\(^7\) According to the UN Report of 2014, among the top 10 contributors, Africa has 5 countries namely Ethiopia, Rwanda, Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal.\(^8\) This includes top 15 countries with the list having an additional three countries namely; Egypt, Tanzania and South Africa. The report clearly highlights that Africa is a continent which is prone to conflicts and that African countries are ready to play a leading role in contributing towards the achievement of peace. Such numbers can be translated as a bold statement of the willingness by Africa to solve its security challenges through peacekeeping efforts. This can be achieved by the regionally constituted African Standby Force initiative.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The continent of Africa has experienced a lot of conflicts over time.\(^9\) The African Standby Force has played an important role in mediating peace agreements and assisting in their implementation, helping to reduce the level of conflict in several regions particularly in Africa.\(^10\) Nevertheless, some of those operations failed to take grip. This has resulted in unembellished internally displaces persons (IDPs) and refugee problems

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\(^8\) UN document A/3943, \textit{Summary study of the experience derived from the establishment and operation of the Force: report of the Secretary-General} (2014).


further complicating the security situation in and around such conflict areas. Statistics indicate that roughly half of all countries that emerge from war lapse back into violence within five years due to some challenges. Most of the conflicts in Africa have shown a contagious trend and thus have spill-over effects to other nations while new ones are also unfolding. The African Standby Force has not been effective in their roles and their level of reaction is questionable.\textsuperscript{11}

It is this delay and lack of rapid response capacity by the UN that has led to the African Union to seize the initiative of wanting to be an instrument of solving African problems through various approaches.\textsuperscript{12} The continent continues to be faced by new conflicts while the old ones persist. The situations in Central African Republic, Somalia, Nigeria, Libya, South Sudan and the fragile political situation in Burundi are a case in point while the problems in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Darfur continues.\textsuperscript{13} Due to the persistence of conflicts, and insecurity in Africa despite the past efforts this study is premised on the belief that the effective utilization of African Standby Force, peace and security can be enhanced. Therefore this study seeks to analyze the role of African Standby Force in securing Africa in particular enhancing peace support operations in Africa.

\textsuperscript{11} Hjalte T, \textit{The Spaces of Civil War : From a Global Typology of Civil War to a Topography of Violence in South Africa}, (University of Tromso, 2013), pp 23-40.


1.3 Objectives to the Study

The study’s general objective is to investigate the role of the African standby force in enhancing peace support operations in Africa.

The Specific objectives are as follows:

i. To examine and analyze past efforts at securing Africa in the absence African standby force

ii. To examine and analyze African standby force as a mechanism Africa Union peace and security council (PSC) and specific strategies used for enhancing peace support operations in Africa

iii. To establish the prospects and challenges of African Standby Force and the key factors that influence its capacity for enhancing peace support operations in Africa

1.4 Literature Review

According to Kindiki the relationship between the United Nations (UN) and Africa’s various regional and sub-regional organisations over the years has been the subject of a lot of debate and interest by scholars, politicians, diplomats and other important stakeholders within the continent and beyond.14 Little attention has however been paid in establishing how the relationships can be maintained and the way they collaborate in conflict prevention, thus impacting on the continent’s emerging security architecture. The

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dynamic nature of the problems facing the continent has in advertently resulted to the evolution of competing regionalisms in Africa leading to a major proliferation of intergovernmental organisations in all the regions in Africa. This has led to competition among sub-regional organisations, and in many cases there is duplication of efforts, deep divisions, sometimes uneasy coexistence, regional imbalances and nationalist tendencies defining such relationships.¹⁵

The International Peace Support Centre (Nairobi) occasional paper by Richard argues that it is important to note that the African Union (AU) has taken some important steps to harmonise the continent’s numerous security initiatives.¹⁶ One such step is the creation of regionally based multinational brigades as part of an African Standby Force, another is the decision to limit official co-operation to seven organisations an aspect aimed at preventing unnecessary duplication of efforts and to ensure that the continent’s resources and efforts are focused on priority areas.¹⁷ Through basing its security architecture on important regional pillars and incorporating existing initiatives as building blocks and implementing agencies into its continental policy, the AU has made decisive steps towards establishing a common approach towards dealing with peace and security problems in the region of Africa.


UN report points out that the continuation of conflicts in Africa which has continued over time, requires a new concept of intervention. One that is fast, reliable and effective. Wiseman suggests that since the UN and international community has failed to prevent conflicts in Africa, Africans and the African continent through African Union have started to take actions towards solving their conflicts. Many efforts have been made but the African Standby Force (ASF), if successful, might not only be the solution to African conflicts but a model to the UN system as a whole in dealing with maintaining peace in the world.

Vanessa and Malan posit that’s African states have demonstrated their willingness to mandate the deployment of peace support operations into all types of environment ranging from extremely complex and volatile conflict situations to mild and stabilizing situations. 2013 saw two new operations being mandated (to Mali and the CAR), and in addition, an existing operation was reinforced (Somalia) as part of international efforts in these countries. Multilateral planning including different actors like the AU, REC/RM, UN and EU and decision-making processes for multi-dimensional peace support operations have increasingly become very common and the way forward. Based on past experience, future deployments on the continent will most likely take place in the context of joint planning and decision-making processes. Although there are some challenges,

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numerous political hurdles, and much room for improvement, the AU and the RECs/RMs are slowly learning to work together in the formulation of joint responses to crisis situations, and to jointly plan and manage peace support operations drawn from the many years of active participation in such missions under the UN. More and more African countries are willing and indeed capable of deploying their personnel to both African-led peace support operations and UN peacekeeping operations.

In 2010, the AU was struggling to find Troop and Police Contributing Countries to join Burundi and Uganda in AMISOM. Just three years later, the Lord’s Resistance Army Regional Task Force (LRA RTF) had four, AMISOM five and AFISMA 13 troop contributing countries, and contributors were being lined up for the new mission in the CAR. Additionally, contributions to UN peacekeeping operations by African countries have steadily increased from little over 10,000 per annum in 2003 to approximately 35,000 per annum by 2013. In total, this has resulted to the highest number of African contributions to operations in Africa within a decade of the inception of the ASF.

The African continent has no shortage of examples when it comes to conflicts. Since time immemorial, the traditional African societies experienced wars of dominance and control of resources whose outcome resulted to death, destruction and disruption of the social status. Violent conflicts of different types have afflicted many African nations for a long period of time and exacted a heavy toll on the continent’s social, political and economical set ups, denying them of their developmental potential and democratic


possibilities. The causes of the conflicts in Africa are as complex as the challenges of resolving them, with many observers suggesting that only Africans themselves can come up with a lasting solution to their problems. However, their costs and effects cannot be in doubt, nor the need and the urgency to resolve them, if the continent is to navigate the 21st century with more success than it did in the previous century which was marked by the ravage effects of colonialism, its debilitating legacies and destructive postcolonial disruptions.25

The magnitude and impact of these conflicts are often viewed as depicting Africa as a continent mired in an endless spiral of self-destruction26. Africa has however not come out worse off than the other continents. From a historical and global perspective, the more than 180 million people who died from conflicts and atrocities during the twentieth century in the continent can be viewed as relatively modest compared to Europe’s First and Second World Wars, or even the civil wars and atrocities in revolutionary Russia and China. The worst bloodletting experienced in the twentieth-century in Africa occurred during the colonial period in King Leopold’s Congo Free State27. This should not be seen as watering down the immense impact of violent conflicts in Africa but rather to put African conflicts in both global and historical perspectives.28


African conflicts are inseparable from the conflicts of the twentieth century which was the most violent century in world history with many postcolonial conflicts rooted in colonial conflicts. According to John, the region from the southern Sudan through northern Uganda to Rwanda, Burundi, and Congo the scene of brutal civil wars and genocide has a long history of colonial violence in the form of slave trading, slave labor, plantation labor, plantation terror and a violent gun culture which all have to be taken into account when explaining the contemporary situation. The conflicts in Africa therefore have complex histories, multiple and multidimensional causes, courses and consequences.

Tiyambe Zelela posits that Africa’s wars since the late nineteenth century can be differentiated in terms of their causal factors and dynamics, spatial scales and locations, temporal scope and duration, composition of perpetrators and combatants, military equipment and engagements deployed, impacts on military and civilian populations, and consequences on politics, the economy, society, the environment, and even on cultural structures and mental states as mediated and filtered, as all social processes and practices are, through the enduring and hierarchical inscriptions of gender, class, age, ethnicity, and sometimes race and religion. This description places the conflicts in a complex multi dimensional web which has a diverse and far reaching effects on varies spheres of lives.

31 Tiyambe Zalela, The causes and costs of war in Africa, from liberation struggles to the war on terror, in The Roots of African Conflicts, (Ohio University press, 2004).
During the twentieth century Africa was ravaged by different types of wars with some of them, mainly the liberation wars aimed at regaining Africa’s historical legacy and freedom so cruelly seized by Europe through colonialism.\textsuperscript{32} In the twenty-first century, Africa is faced with a new form of war even as it desperately seeks to mitigate the effects of wars of the last century. This is the US-led global ‘war on terror’, a crusade that knows no spatial or temporal bounds, spares no expense, leaves a trail of wanton destruction, and wreaks havoc on the infrastructures of global order, development and democracy. In Africa alone, the effects of Al Shabaab, a terror outfit affiliated to Al Qaeda are being felt within the horn of Africa. The threat has had adverse effects on peace and stability of the region affecting the social, economic and political spheres an aspect which has led to the deployment of a military force under the auspice of the African Union. In West Africa, another group, the Boko Haram continues to cause havoc to the state of Nigeria and its neighbours especially Cameroun and Chad leading to a call for the deployment of a multinational force to deal with the threat.\textsuperscript{33}

In Libya, terror groups affiliated to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) also referred to as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is causing havoc within the region and creating global concern based on its activities, the operational environment in Libya which is characterized by political instability and segmentations affording conducive

\textsuperscript{32} Marten, K. \textit{Enforcing the Peace: Learning From the Imperial Past}. (New York: Columbia University Press 2011).

space for terror recruitment, training and radicalization.\textsuperscript{34} Further in the Northern Africa on the other hand, the effects of the Arab spring continue to be felt with the countries which were affected by the revolution still experiencing instability and uncertainty.\textsuperscript{35}

Since the commencement of any mission must be mandated and initiated by the UNSC before the process of funding followed by seeking for troop contribution by member states then deployment, the process takes a lot of precious time. While political efforts continue to take place in finding a lasting solution in many instances, past experience shows that innocent lives continue to be lost. In this regard, a military response could reduce the possibilities of unwanted deaths and destruction through quick response and intervention to contain the situation while a lasting political situation is sought through diplomatic effort. A framework of military response forces tailored along regional organizations under the ASF umbrella is seen by many as the answer to the current threat of peace in the continent. Currently, the AU is the major continental organization mandated with maintaining peace and security in Africa. One of the key principles in the AU’s Constitutive Act, enshrined in Article 4 (e), is the peaceful resolution of conflicts in Africa by African states themselves.

Arising from these threats it is evident that in the Post-Cold War era, the peace and security scene in Africa has changed fundamentally. This change relates not only to the changing nature of conflicts and the focus of the discourse on security, but also to various initiatives taken by Africa to institute an effective peace and security regime. Out of this,

\textsuperscript{34} Paul D. Williams, \textit{From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: The Origins and Development of the African Union’s Security Culture}, (African Affairs 106, no. 423, 2007).

\textsuperscript{35} Kofi Annan, \textit{Peace Operations and the UN’}, paper delivered at Conflict Resolution Monitor 1, Centre for Conflict Resolution, (Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, 2011), pp 25-32.
a remarkable development has been the establishment of an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) by the continental body, the African Union (AU). The idea of creating the AU came up in the mid-1990s through the leadership of Libyan head of state Col. Muammar al-Gaddafi whereby the heads of state and government of the OAU issued the Sirte Declaration (named after Sirte, in Libya) on September 9, 1999 calling for the establishment of an African Union.36

The Declaration was followed by summits at Lomé in 2000, when the Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted, and at Lusaka in 2001, when the plan for the implementation of the African Union was adopted.37 The African Union (AU) was established in 2002 with the aim of responding effectively to the problems of contemporary Africa, including armed conflict. The AU constitutive Act, Article 4[h] gave AU the right to intervene in member state in “pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect to grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.38

1.5 Significance of the Study

The study will be important to the peace policy makers in Africa. The study will point on areas that they need to play a leading role in trying to enhance peace and security in the continent under the umbrella of the UN has been for a very long time the best option.

36 *International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa: IDRC, 2010).


Bearing in mind that Africans are best placed in understanding, mitigating and even preventing such conflicts, the AU has taken a bold step of establishing regionally based African Standby Force (ASF) which can be rapidly deployed to any of its regions in reaction to possible threat to security, to prevent loss of life and property which can lead to humanitarian catastrophe. The study will recommend on areas of improvement and if implemented it is hoped that the African Standby Force will be effective in enhancing peace support operations in Africa.\(^{39}\)

The study will provide opportunity for future scholars of International study and International Conflict Management to research more on the area of study. The study will contribute knowledge in the area of the role of the African Standby Force in enhancing peace support operations in Africa which can be adopted by other continents. The analysis and the understanding of the emergence of the ASF is important as it is the only such kind of a standby force in world under collective security arrangement. Since history has proven that African conflicts are mainly caused by Africans themselves, ASF brings to form a new perspective to conflict prevention and resolution in the Continent. It will also provide information and highlight gaps to future scholars and researchers who might need to research further on this area.

**1.6 Study Hypothesis**

H1\(_1\): past efforts at securing Africa applied before African Standby Force were not effective in maintaining peace support operations in Africa

\(^{39}\)Ibid
H1₂: African Standby Force as a mechanism Africa Union peace and Security Council significantly influence peace support operations in Africa

H1₃: Adopted strategies significantly influence African standby force in enhancing peace support operations in Africa

1.7 Theoretical Framework

The study will be anchored on war theory. The theory is embedded in the principles of the concept of peacekeeping operations. The protection of non-combatants has been addressed in connection to both *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*.⁴⁰ In the theory lies the endorsement of the protection of the innocent. Later, the protection of the innocent was explicitly formulated as a *jus ad bellum* criterion and more specifically as one of the just causes for resorting to lethal force. The commitment to the protection of non-combatants can also be detected in the *jus in bello* criteria and thus the criteria addressing how soldiers should conduct themselves in war.⁴¹

Principles of civilian protection in the just in war theory are that: First, the *jus in bello* criterion of discrimination says that parties to an armed conflict distinguish at all times between combatants and non-combatants, and it prohibits soldiers to apply direct,

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intended armed force against non-combatants. Those who plan and decide upon an attack have the responsibility to consider potential side effect harm that may follow from their decisions. Moral responsibility for unintended effects of attack also fall on those who carry out the attack: they have a responsibility to abort the attack if it becomes clear to them that disproportionate harm to civilians will follow.

Second, protection may also be seen as the long-term indirect outcome of traditional war fighting through the defeat of an enemy. Formulated as a negative duty, and in the indirect sense just sketched, protection is not really a new task for the soldier. MacQueen suggests that, while protection is a part of soldiering, the reason for soldiering is victory, and the reason for victory is the protection of one’s own people, not of other people. Since Mike conceives of the responsibility to civilians mainly as a kind of agency responsibility, he seems to restrict responsibility and blameworthiness to cases where soldiers directly or indirectly inflict harm through their actions.

1.8 Research Methodology

The study will be conducted by the use of cross-sectional design. Survey studies are normally intended to describe and report the way things are. They are characterized by systematic collection of data from members of a given population through interview

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guide. Thus this design is deemed appropriate in this study since it involves analyzing the role of the African standby force in enhancing peace support operations in Africa.

This study will relay on both primary and secondary sources for the purpose of gathering information. Purposive sampling technique will be used to select respondents and collect data in the form of administered questionnaires to personnel who have been involved in the Somalia mission (AMISOM) and also EASTBRIG personnel based in Karen, Nairobi. Secondary sources will include Therefore, key UN, OAU and AU documents as well as other official sources will be consulted where appropriate. Other sources will include; academic journal articles, publications and books containing commentaries on and analyses of those topics introduced above, produced by respected authors in their respective fields.46

The unit of analysis is therefore the African Standby Force peacekeeping capability in terms of the time dimension. While the period of analysis stretches back to the formation of the OAU in 1963 and further looks ahead to what the future may hold for the AU’s peacekeeping capability, the findings will be written from the perspective of the present using both descriptive and content analysis.

1.9 Chapter Outline

Chapter one examined the various conflict situations in Africa over a period of time with a view of understanding the origin of peace supports operations initially by UN and at a later stage those that are AU driven. It has also looked at the immense contribution that

46 UN document A/3943 Summary study of the experience derived from the establishment and operation of the Force: report of the Secretary-General (2014).
African countries have made towards peace keeping missions throughout the world from First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 1) which was deployed in 1956 to address the Suez Canal crises. The chapter has also looked into the problem, the role of the African standby force in enhancing peace support operations bearing in mind the leading role that African states have played in contributing troops towards various missions all over the world and the need to have an African solution to African problems.

Chapter two analyzes the historical background of African standby force and operations in Africa. It is organized in the following sub-topics: Past efforts at securing Africa in the absence African standby force, African Standby Force as a Mechanism of AU Peace and Security Council in Enhancing Peace Support Operations in Africa, African standby force concept and plan, the role and purpose of African standby force, the African standby force in the African security architecture, strengthening African peace support operations; future of the African standby force, operationalizing the African standby force: progress and problems and finally the conclusion.

Chapter three provides an overview of the influence of Africa policies in enhancing peace support operations in Africa. It is organized in the following sub-topics: patterns of peace operations in Africa, policies influencing enhancement of peace support operations in Africa, challenges facing peace operations in Africa and peace support operations in Africa; role of G8 Action Plan

Chapter four give the findings on the topic securing Africa; the role of the African standby force.
Chapter five presents summary of the findings, conclusions based on the findings and recommendations there-to securing Africa; role of the African standby force. The chapter also presents recommendations for further studies.
CHAPTER TWO

AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE AND ITS OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

2.0 Introduction

This chapter analyzes the historical background of African standby force and operations in Africa. It is organized in the following sub-topics: Past efforts at securing Africa in the absence African standby force, African Standby Force as a Mechanism of AU Peace and Security Council in Enhancing Peace Support Operations in Africa, African standby force concept and plan, the role and purpose of African standby force, the African standby force in the African security architecture, strengthening African peace support operations; future of the African standby force, operationalizing the African standby force: progress and problems and finally the conclusion.

2.1 Past efforts at securing Africa in the absence African standby force

According to Francis (2006), the African Union came to life in July 2002. With 53 founding members (all African countries joined except Morocco) and a wide-ranging agenda, the AU replaced the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and reflects a fundamental shift in thinking for African leadership. Based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the current AU is structured and better designed to respond to conflicts on the continent than its predecessor. The OAU, which emphasized the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference, lacked both the statutory authority and capacity to intervene in matters related to peace and security.

The AU, which embraces international cooperation and recognizes the primacy of the UN Charter in peace and security, has also adopted a wider field of engagement options, from mediation to using force to intervene in specific circumstances. Article 4 of the Constitutive Act specifies: The right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect to grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity… the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security.  

African governments have tried to create peace and security in Africa through different mechanisms. However many peace and security bodies have been in place over many years. African Heads of States and Governments, in an effort to enhance their capacity to address the scourge of conflicts on the Continent and to ensure that Africa, through the African Union, plays a central role in bringing about peace, security and stability on the Continent, acknowledged the contribution of African regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution in the maintenance and promotion of peace, security and stability on the Continent and the need to develop formal coordination and cooperation arrangements between these regional mechanisms and the African Union.  

Furthermore, the impact of the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons threatens peace and security in Africa and undermines efforts to improve the living standards of African peoples.

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49 Ben, K. The right of intervention under the African Union’s Constitutive Act: from non-interference to nonintervention, (International Review of the Red Cross 85, 2010), 807

50 Ibid
Also, the AU in reaffirming their commitments during the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) noted that armed conflicts in Africa have forced millions of people, including women and children, into a drifting life as refugees and internally displaced persons, deprived of their means of livelihood and human dignity. 51 This informed the establishment of an operational structure for the effective implementation of the decisions taken in the areas of conflict prevention, peace-making, peace support operations and intervention, as well as peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. This is in accordance with the authority conferred to that regard by Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. Thus, the Peace and Security Council was established to monitor and intervene in conflicts with an African force, conducted in a manner consistent with both the UN and the OAU Charters and the Cairo Declaration of 1993. 52

2.1.1 Main Bodies: The Peace and Security Council and the AU Commission

Two bodies have been primarily responsible for the AU peace and security agenda, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the AU Commission. The PSC is designed as the main decision-making body, much like the UN Security Council. The day-to-day work on peace and security issues is conducted by the AU Commission, a role that parallels that of the UN Secretariat. In July 2002, the AU adopted the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, which details the PSC mission and operational structure. The AU Constitutive Act was signed in July 2000, but the PSC framework took several years of consultation among member states. The Peace and Security Council was established by AU member states in late 2003 as the

51 Ibid
52 Makonnen Ketema Creation of the OAU (1965) p2.
standing decision-making organ “for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts,” with a goal of “timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa.” The Protocol sets the role of the PSC within the context of the primary role of the United Nations and the UN’s own recognition of regional arrangements in this arena: Mindful of the provision of the Charter of the United Nations, conferring on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as the provision of the Charter on the role of regional arrangements or agencies in the maintenance of international peace and security, and the need to forge closer cooperation and partnership between the UN, other international organizations and the African Union, in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa…

2.1.2 Composition of the Peace and Security Council

The Peace and Security Council is composed of fifteen Members elected on the basis of equitable regional representation and rotation, with a commitment to uphold the principles of the Union, contribution to the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa in this respect, experience in peace support operations would be an added advantage. In addition, is the capacity and commitment to shoulder the responsibilities entailed in membership, participation in conflict resolution, peace-making and peace building at regional and continental levels and willingness and

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ability to take up responsibility for regional and continental conflict resolution initiatives among others.\textsuperscript{55}

\textbf{2.1.3 Objectives of the Peace and Security Council}

Osman\textsuperscript{56} states that the objectives for which the Peace and Security Council was established were to promote peace, security and stability in Africa. This is in order to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property, the well-being of the African people and their environment, as well as the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development. Additionally, it is to anticipate and prevent conflicts. In circumstances where conflicts have occurred, the Peace and Security Council shall have the responsibility to undertake peace-making and peace-building functions for the resolution of these conflicts.

\textbf{2.1.4 Peace and Security Council Guiding Principles}

The Peace and Security Council has been guided by the principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act, the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It was meant to be guided by principles of peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts, early responses to contain crisis situations so as to prevent them from developing into full-blown conflicts and respect for the rule of law, fundamental human rights and freedoms, the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law.

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid
The PSC in an effort to pursuing peace, security and stability on the continent, prior to the full establishment of the Peace and Security Architecture has attempted to manage conflicts to a certain extent. Some examples are sighted in Darfur, Sudan with the establishment of the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) since 2004. Another attempt was the support of elections in the Comoros deployed to the islands in 2006 which successfully provided security and other forms of support for the Comorian elections. Additionally is the latest deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) since March 2007.57

2.1.5 The Peace and Security Council and the AU Commission today

Several entities are designated to support the PSC: the Commission; an African Standby Force (including a Military Staff Committee); a Panel of the Wise; a Continental Early Warning System; and a Special Fund. The PSC Protocol identified the components for developing an AU capacity for peace support operations, mostly within the context of the African Standby Force, as well as signals an ambition to conduct peace building efforts.

2.2 African Standby Force as a Mechanism of AU Peace and Security Council in Enhancing Peace Support Operations in Africa

In accordance to the Protocol relating to the establishment of the PSC and in order to enable the Peace and Security Council perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and intervention pursuant to article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act, an African Standby Force was established.58 The Force is composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components in their

57 African Union,. The ASF is outlined in Article 13 of the PSC Protocol, June 2004.
58 Ibid
countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice. For that purpose, the Member States under the provisions has to take steps to establish standby contingents for participation in peace support missions decided on by the Peace and Security Council or intervention authorized by the General Assembly. The strength and types of such contingents, their degree of readiness and general location is determined in accordance with established African Union Peace Support Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), which are to be subject to periodic reviews depending on prevailing crisis and conflict situations.

According to Paul the detailed tasks of the African Standby Force and its modus operandi for each authorized mission is considered and approved by the Peace and Security Council upon recommendation of the Commission. As an approach, the development of the concept of the ASF must be informed by the dynamics of relevant conflict and mission scenarios, the instructive experiences of the existing Mechanism, as well as by the experience of the UN System in peace operations, and by other models evolved outside of Africa. As far as possible, the ASF use UN doctrine, guidelines, training and standards. The concept will also need to be validated against pragmatic conflict scenarios.

The need and utility of the mechanism that is the African Standby Force (ASF) is best appreciated when considered against the political and contextual dynamics surrounding the move to transform the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU). The main priority of the almost four-decade-old OAU was to secure independence

\[59\] ibid
for all African states, as well as to defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity. The sanctity afforded these norms effectively meant that the OAU was not carved out to manage the complex security threats and the international concern for human rights and good governance that faced the continent after the Cold War.

According to Charles tragic scenes of conflict on the continent in the 1990s resulted in the deaths of millions of African men, women and children, and led to mounting criticism and internal reflection on the OAU’s inability to intervene adequately in the series of unfolding crises. The genocide of Rwanda, and the conflicts in Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), served to motivate African leaders towards the revitalization of the OAU into a body that was more progressive in promoting and achieving democracy, development and the human rights and basic security of African citizens. The restructuring of the continental body would provide an opportunity for African member states to seek ways of addressing the number of perennial challenges facing the continent collectively whilst, at the same time, promoting the unity of Africa and strengthening its ability to play a more dynamic role in both the regional and global arenas. During the Extraordinary Summit of the OAU in Sirte, Libya, on 9 September 1999, calls were made for the establishment of the AU. This was followed by the adoption of the Constitutive Act during the OAU Lomé Summit on 11 July 2000. The Act came into force on 26 May 2001 and the inaugural meeting of the AU was held in 2002 in Durban, South Africa, with the convening of the 1st Assembly of Heads of States

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61 Charles, D. Developments and challenges in the operationalization of the ASF, Powerpoint presentation at the APSTA Seminar held at Hilton Hotel, in Addis Ababa of 8 April 2009, slides 33–34.
of the Union. At the core of the new continental body was an aspiration towards the achievement of peace and security in Africa.\(^2\) This was underscored by the AU Constitutive Act, which recognized that “the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent and of the need to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of our development and integration agenda.

In January 2004 it was announced that African Ministers of Defense and Security, meeting at the headquarters of the African Union (AU) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, adopted a Draft Framework for a Common African Defense and Security Policy. The relevant functionaries also reviewed progress on the development of an African standby (peacekeeping) force, and of an early warning system to detect and prevent potential conflict situations and to ensure speedy humanitarian relief in the event of disasters.\(^3\) In July 2004, the AU Assembly (of heads of state or government), meeting in Addis Ababa, subsequently formally adopted the said Framework for a Common African Defense and Security Policy (hereafter common defense and security policy) as Africa's 'blueprint' or conceptual framework in the search for peace, security and stability on the African continent.

The common defense and security policy is based on an understanding among African leaders and functionaries of what is required to be done collectively by African states to ensure that Africa's common defense and security interests and goals, as set out in


Articles 3 and 4 of the AU’s Constitutive Act, are safeguarded in the face of common threats to the continent as a whole. These developments should be viewed against the background of various calls over a number of years for a macro-policy framework on conflict resolution and peacekeeping, specifically with regard to the role that the AU and sub-regional organizations should play on the continent.

2.3 African Standby Force Concept and Plan

According to Article 13(1) of the Peace and Security Council Protocol the ASF ‘shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice’. The ASF is not the equivalent of a national army for, unlike a national army, it is not a standing force. The standby arrangement is to be achieved on the basis of pledges from member states and preparations by regional economic communities /regional mechanisms. To this end member states identify and earmark military, police and civilian personnel and forward their names and details to the regional economic communities. On the basis of these pledges each regional economic communities raises and prepares the regional brigade and develops the standby roster. The regional economic communities then forwards all the data on the capabilities they raised and the standby roster they developed to the AU.

While part of the ASF standby arrangement, the identified personnel (contingents) remain in their countries of origin. This means that it is only when a decision is made to deploy

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an ASF mission will they be called up, assembled at a certain point and jointly deployed to the mission area. However, while on standby they do participate in various pre-deployment activities, including training and joint exercises, which are organised on a regular basis by each regional economic communities to keep them prepared for deployment\textsuperscript{66}.

The ASF is a multidimensional force. Since most conflicts on the continent are complex and of long duration, they call for a multifaceted approach and require capabilities to address not only security and military aspects, but also the political, humanitarian, developmental and legal/institutional dimensions of the conflicts. There is therefore a need for not only military but also police and especially civilian components. Accordingly, in terms of the policy framework, as well as the Roadmap for the Operationalization of the ASF the ASF is to be composed of three components, namely a military, a police and a civilian component\textsuperscript{67}.

The ASF is organised into five regional brigades:

i. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) brigade (SADCBRIG)

ii. The East African Peace and Security Mechanism (EAPSM) 23 brigade, which is known as the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG)

iii. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) brigade (ECOBRIG)

\textsuperscript{66} Holt, V. & Shanahan, M. \textit{African capacity building for peace operation: UN collaboration with the African Union and ECOWAS}, (Washington, DC: Henry L Stimson Centre, 2005), p 68.

\textsuperscript{67} Bwakira, P. \textit{Statement before the House Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health}, (Washington, DC, 25 June 2009), p. 3.
iv. The North African Regional Capability (NARC) brigade, which is known as the North African Standby Brigade (NASBRIG)

v. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) brigade (ECCASBRIG), or Multinational Force of Central Africa (FOMAC)

2.4 The role and purpose of African standby force

According to Jakkie in May 2003 the African Chiefs of Defence and Security (ACDS) adopted a document entitled: “The policy framework document on the establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) and of the Military Staff Committee (MSC)”. Shortly after, African ministers of foreign affairs recommended regular consultations to consolidate the proposals contained in the framework document. Their recommendation was endorsed by AU heads of state and government two months later. The result of the ACDS meetings in May 2003 and January 2004 was the adoption of an amended framework document in July 2004.

The protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the associated ASF entered into force in December 2003, only 17 months after being signed. This was a clear demonstration of a seriousness of commitment on behalf of African politicians to the conflict prevention and management initiatives of the AU. The final concept for the ASF adopted by heads of state provided for five standby brigade level forces, one in each of Africa’s five regions: North Africa Regional Standby Brigade (NASBRIG); East Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG); Force Multinationale de l’Afrique Centrale (FOMAC);

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Southern Africa Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG); ECOWAS Standby Brigade (ECOBRIG) supported by civilian police (CivPol) and other capacities⁶⁹.

On its full establishment, the ASF will consist of standby Multi-disciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components based in their respective countries of and ready for fast deployment in conflict zones anywhere in Africa, and possibly even outside the continent. However, effective command and control of the ASF require the installation of an appropriate Africa-wide, integrated and interoperable command, control, communication and information system (CIS) infrastructure, that would link deployed units with mission headquarters, as well as the AU, planning elements and regions⁷⁰. Much of this was set out in the March 2005 document entitled Roadmap for the Operationalization of the African Standby Force that was adopted at an AU experts meeting in Addis Ababa.

The Peace Support Operations Division developed an internal follow-on roadmap document in November 2006, although this document has no formal status. One of the significant developments has been the conceptualization of an ASF rapid deployment capability. The ASF peace support missions within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations are mandated by the Peace and Security Council which is the strategic level decision-making body. Once the missions have been given a mandate, they are placed under the command and control of a Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (SRCC), who is responsible for appointing a force

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⁷⁰ Ben, K. *The right of intervention under the African Union’s Constitutive Act: from non-interference to nonintervention*, (International Review of the Red Cross 85 , 2003), 807
commander, commissioner of police and head of the civilian components. The Peace and Security Council is the mandates approving body\textsuperscript{71}. Once deployed, ASF forces are placed under AU command and control.

According to Richard\textsuperscript{72} the primary role of the five regional brigades is to generate and prepare forces, the provision of planning, logistic and other support during ASF deployment. The military brigade is the largest component and requires most resources of each of the five regional standby forces. The following illustration demonstrates the composition of key resources within one of the regional brigades showing the ASF structure and its associated deployment timelines as informed by six missions and scenarios: regional observer mission co-deployed with UN mission. Deployment required within 30 days of an AU mandate provided by the Peace and Security Council, regional military advisor to a political mission. Deployment required within 30 days of an AU mandate provided by the Peace and Security Council, AU regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions. Deployment required within 30 days of an AU mandate provided by the Peace and Security Council, AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping mission – low-level spoilers. Deployment required within 30 days of an AU mandate provided by the Peace and Security Council and AU intervention in cases of grave circumstances. Deployment required within 30 days of an AU mandate provided by the Peace and Security Council.


2.5 The African standby force in the African Security Architecture

The ASF constitutes one of the most important and ambitious elements of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Upon the creation of the African Union (AU), the African peace and security protocol was adopted at the 2002 summit in Durban. As part of the continent’s new peace and security architecture, it established the au peace and Security Council as its centerpiece, the continental early warning system, the panel of the wise, the peace fund and the African standby force. A major impetus for the creation of the ASF was the international community’s failure during the Rwandan genocide of 1994.

The ASF is by far the most robust component of the APSA. With its military staff committee, the ASF was conceived to conduct, observe, and monitor peacekeeping missions and support operations. Its tasks include operations across the entire spectrum of missions, ranging from peacekeeping to peace enforcement, as summarised in the six mission scenarios. The ASF will be able to draw on both military and civilian contingents.

The ASF does not entail the establishment of a standing multinational force, but is built around a standby arrangement where states earmark and train specific units for joint operations and then keep these units ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice. The ASF comprises stand-by brigades in each of the five regions (south, east, north, west, and central Africa): the Southern African Development Community Brigade (SADCBRIG), the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), the North African Standby Brigade (NASBRIG), the Economic Community of West African States Brigade

73 United Nations Security Council, Support to AU peacekeeping operations.
(ECOBRIG), and the Economic Community of Central African States Brigade (ECCASBRIG). Each of these brigades is to have around 5,000 members, for an overall strength of 25,000 to 30,000 personnel in the ASF. The five Regional Economic Communities (RECs) serve as regional pillars of the ASF.

Many attempts at establishing some sort of Pan-African military force preceded the creation of the ASF. Most of these attempts failed because states felt threatened by the inevitable surrender of some aspects of their sovereignty and control over national capabilities. Through its unique reliance on regional frameworks, the ASF represents a major improvement in this respect. Its decentralized character ties states and RECs into a common framework coordinated by the AU and give them greater ownership in building a continental security architecture. This increases the stakes of all actors involved in the process and creates constructive peer group pressure among them.

2.6 Strengthening African Peace Support Operations; Future of the African Standby Force

Over the last decade, African countries, with the support of international partners, have engaged in a collective effort to develop regional capacities for peace support operations. Under the umbrella of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the African Union (AU), three Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and two Regional Mechanisms (RMs) have worked to develop the African Standby Force (ASF). Major

74 Charles, D. Developments and challenges in the operationalization of the ASF, Powerpoint presentation at the APSTA Seminar held at Hilton Hotel, in Addis Ababa on 8 April 2009, slides 33–34.

75 Asanda, S. To Stay or to Leave, South African Foreign Policy Monitor 12/3, (2004), pp. 2-3

lessons of the past decade that can inform the future development of the African Standby Force:

### 2.6.1 Recognizing deployment politics

The ASF concept has contributed to the development of African capabilities for peace support operations, but it has been less useful in terms of deploying these capabilities. The strength of the ASF concept lies in setting common standards for the identification, training and retention of capabilities at the national level which can be deployed when required. The ASF concept has also led to the development of multidimensional planning capabilities at the level of the AU Commission and the regional economic communities planning elements. However, actual deployments have relied on lead states and coalitions of the willing. The mission in Burundi (2003 – 2004) was mostly undertaken by a single lead state, all subsequent missions by coalitions of willing member states, often also involving lead states at critical times. As in other multilateral deployment contexts, the willingness of member states to contribute to a particular operation will always be based on considerations of national interest and the prevailing political climate. The AU and the regional economic communities will therefore have to deploy missions using what resources are available at the time, and probably not on the basis of a readily-deployable force from a particular region that can be deployed as a coherent entity.

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2.6.2 Strengthening AU-Regional Economic Communities Relations

According to Patrick\textsuperscript{78} the relationship between the AU and the regional economic communities needs to be strengthened. It is likely that the future deployment of peace support operations will see the AU and the regions having to work more closely together, both when developing political and operational responses to crisis situations. Under the ASF concept, peace support operation capabilities reside with the regional economic communities, and are made available to the AU when a deployment need arises. The reality is that capabilities firmly reside with member states, and regional economic communities and the AU will have to find better ways of working together to access them when required.

The aim of the Abuja Treaty is to establish an African Economic Community to promote economic, social and cultural development, as well as African economic integration, in order to increase self-sufficiency and indigenous development and to create a framework for development, mobilization of human resources and material. The AEC further aims to promote cooperation and development in all aspects of human activity, with a view to raising the standard of life of Africa's people, maintaining economic stability and establishing close and peaceful relationships between member states. By breaking with the market approach to integration in Africa, the Abuja Treaty marked a watershed in the history of African experience with integration. With its emphasis on the development of the continent's productive capacity as a pre-requisite for increased intra-African trade, the

Treaty shifted Africa's priorities and objectives\textsuperscript{79}. The Treaty aimed to develop and diversify Africa's productive base by focusing on agriculture, mining and industry so as to increase locally-produced goods and services which will later give rise to more intra-African trade flows. To facilitate both the expansion of the productive base and increased intra-African trade, another key objective of the Treaty is the integration, rehabilitation and modernization of the continent's infrastructural network so as to build a more efficient and operational intra-African transportation and communications system.

\textbf{2.6.3 Adjusting the planning scenarios use of ASF}

The deployment scenarios for the ASF need to be re-examined. In 2003, six scenarios were envisaged, based on the conflict dynamics on the continent in the 1990s. These ranged from observer missions through to the rapid deployment of an intervention force in response to grave circumstances. However, at present the continent finds itself grappling with international terror networks, organised criminal networks that subvert state authority, piracy, coups, state repression, or humanitarian disasters\textsuperscript{80}. Finding the appropriate operational responses to complex situations, such as in Somalia or Mali, proved extremely challenging. More attention will need to be paid to the types of capabilities needed in relation to the threat agendas being faced.

When political or social tensions result in violent conflict, the solution that is usually most prominently on the table is the rapid deployment of a peace support operation, as in


\textsuperscript{80} Ben, K. The right of intervention under the African Union’s Constitutive Act: from non-interference to nonintervention, \textit{International Review of the Red Cross} 85 (2003), 807
the recent cases of the Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan. This is why the 2002 Protocol establishing the African Union’s (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) provided for the establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF). The ASF is composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian, police and military components in their countries of origin. In the context of the Mali experience and the decision to establish the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), the January 2013 AU General Assembly asked for an assessment of the progress made to date with the establishment of the ASF. To meet this request, the chairperson of the Commission appointed an independent panel of experts in July 2013 to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the ASF. The panel submitted its report in December 2013, and in January 2014 the report and the recommendations of the panel were endorsed by both the ministers of Defence and Security and the AU Summit.

2.6.4 Institutionalizing flexibility

A more structured concept of burden-sharing needs to be elaborated between African states, the regions, the AU, and partners such as the EU and the UN. While the response to a particular conflict will always be shaped by the political realities, more attention can be given to establishing frameworks that provide a sense of predictability to all actors involved. The AU and the regional economic communities often have political legitimacy, the advantages of proximity and access to African capabilities. Partners bring funding, experience and logistical capabilities, as well as political leverage in specific cases. All of these comparative advantages have come to play in various forms in support

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for African peace support operations to date, but largely on an ad hoc basis\textsuperscript{82}. Greater attention should be given to understanding how effective collaboration could be attained, and to developing mechanisms of coordination that can be activated if need be.

Over the past fifteen years, two principal factors have stimulated the search for more flexible and differentiated models of European integration than that envisaged in the Treaty of Rome of 1957 and the Single European Act of 1986. They are the realization in the early 1990s that the member states of the European Union were no longer able to achieve a consensus on the goals, scope and pace of their integration; and more recently the expansion of the Union’s membership to countries with widely differing levels of social and political development, differences so great as to form a substantial practical barrier to monolithic integration, even where all the possible participants might desire it.

The element of flexibility relates only to the period of time in which all member states achieve commonly agreed goals\textsuperscript{83}. The multi-speed approach generally contends that European integration should be driven forward by sub-groups of member states, allowing those who are initially unable or unwilling to participate to remain outside the adoption of a new policy area or the development of an existing field of integration for the time being. Such deeper integration could well occur simultaneously in more than one policy area, with varying membership of the different sub-groups.


\textsuperscript{83} Ben, K. The right of intervention under the African Union’s Constitutive Act: from non-interference to nonintervention, (International Review of the Red Cross 85 , 2003), 807
2.6.5 Strengthening multi-dimensionality

Multi-dimensionality is key to success. Early missions tended to be comprised mostly of military personnel while political processes were largely managed by separate special envoys or representatives. In recent times, the AU has appointed Special Representatives of the Chairperson of the Commission (SRCCs) to head multidimensional operations comprising civilian, police and military personnel, tasked simultaneously with leading the political engagement in-country\textsuperscript{84}. This alignment of political and security processes has yielded greater results and is now being imitated at the regional levels.

A Command Post Exercise (CPX) in Addis Ababa in October 2010 was the culminating point of the cycle and allowed the AU to draw numerous lessons that were compiled during the Amani Africa Implementation meeting in Dakar in February 2011. The ASF processes were validated within the larger framework of the AU’s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). At the same time, the need to improve procedures, organization and multidimensional capacities of the ASF was raised, as well as the need to reinforce the communications system between the continental level and the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs). It is in light of these lessons that the AU and the EU decided to pursue their common goal, capitalizing on capacity already built, for the ASF to reach full operational capability by 2015. This commitment was confirmed in the new joint Plan of Action for 2011-2013 within the Africa-EU Partnership for Peace and Security, agreed in Tripoli in November 2010. A new three-year cycle named Amani Africa II, covering the period 2011-2015, has been

The overall objective of this cycle is to "validate the capacity of the African Union to mandate and employ a Rapid Deployment Capability of the African Standby Force as a start-up operation, and to run a multi-dimensional peace support operation". According to the ASF doctrine, scenario consists of an AU intervention, in situations such as genocide, where the international community does not act promptly.

2.6.6 Improving joint planning

Proper planning has been a key challenge. On numerous occasions the UN Security Council rejected AU plans to deploy a mission, due to gaps in planning and insufficient information. And indeed, the planning processes for African peace support operations have often been undertaken ad hoc, at times in an uncoordinated fashion. Yet on those occasions where planning processes brought together the various Departments and Divisions within the Commission, the AU and the regional economic communities, or where they have been undertaken jointly with the UN, some of the best results have been attained. The most recent planning initiatives between the AU and the UN on Somalia or the joint planning between ECOWAS and the AU on Mali bear testament to this, and serve as models for the future. If better results are to be achieved, the planning capacities which are available at the AU and the regional economic communities will have to be reinforced, and member states and partners will have to invest more in strengthening the role of the strategic headquarters in Addis Ababa and the planning elements in the regions.


Since the establishment of the ASF, the AU has deployed missions of its own to Burundi, Darfur, Somalia, Mali and the CAR. Each of these missions involved political decision-making processes, planning, deployment, strategic and operational management and mission support. Several of these missions were also handed over and liquidated. Together, they represent a significant demonstration of capacity and experience. All these missions have been undertaken with support from the UN, European Union (EU) and bilateral partners, and they thus also reflect a growing body of experience with various forms of partnerships and collaborative action\(^87\). In most of these missions, the ASF planning elements at the continental and regional levels have been involved in the planning and management of the missions, and the ASF regional centres of excellence have been involved in the training, preparation and evaluation of these missions.

### 2.6.7 Securing predictable funding

Funding constraints have impacted on every African operation to date. The most significant funding mechanisms remain the AU Africa Peace Facility, designed to mobilize contributions from AU member states, and the EU Africa Peace Facility, which has channeled over a billion Euro in support of African peace support operations to date. While these have been vital, it is broadly agreed that the results have been less than satisfactory. The AU APF remains devoid of the kind of funding required for peace missions, and member states remain unwilling to fund the operations they mandate\(^88\). The EU APF has performed well, however, funding volumes consistently had to be increased,


\(^{88}\) Ibid.
and funding peace and security initiatives through the European Development Fund (EDF) appears to be increasingly untenable in the European context. New modes of cooperation, and financial mechanisms that provide the required levels of financial predictability, will need to be established.

AU operations rely upon external (non-African) assistance. Between mid-2008 and mid-2012, for example, African Union Mission to Somalia will have received nearly $800 million from the UN—in addition to the nearly $40 million pledged to the UN’s African Union Mission to Somalia Trust Fund between 2009 and 2011. This dependence undermines a core rhetorical tenet of the AU’s approach to conflict management, namely African solutions first. Despite significant activity, the AU still lacks sufficient funds, troops, police, materiel, strategic airlift capabilities (for both personnel and equipment), training facilities, management structures, and qualified staff to sustain even relatively small-scale peace operations. One of the AU’s internal assessments referred to this as the “mandate-resource gap” i.e., the disjuncture between “the PSC’s willingness to authorize such missions and the AU’s ability to implement them”89. The so called Prodi Report on AU peacekeeping operations also recently emphasized this point: the AU will only be able to respond to crises effectively if there is sufficient political and financial commitment of its own member states and, more generally, of the international community. In the absence of the necessary capabilities, such an approach brings a high level of risk, not only of failure but also of raising expectations of the people that cannot be fulfilled. Worse still, it undermines the credibility of peacekeeping and weakens the organisation that is responsible.

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2.7 Operationalizing the African standby force: Progress and problems

While the initiative was initially slow to take off, considerable progress has by now been achieved towards the goal of making the ASF fully operational by the end of 2010. The ASF doctrine, a training policy, an ASF logistics concept, a command and control plan and the standard operating procedures have been finalized and approved in March 2008. These documents provide the tools for operationalizing the ASF. However, some problems with the operationalization of the ASF remain as a result of regional differences, questions about the mandating procedure and the political process. The readiness of the five brigades varies considerably and the persistence of conflicts in several regions makes progress difficult. While EASBRIG, EASBRIG, and SADCBRIG are making good progress, both the northern and central brigades (NASBRIG, ECCASBRIG) are still lagging behind.

Moreover, a sound burden-sharing arrangement between the AU and the regional organisations will have to be found with regard to the use of ASF capabilities and of the regional brigades. According to Thorne the provision of both adequate personnel and sufficient financial resources, as well as the improvement of logistical capabilities to conduct ASF missions are also vital challenges. The evaluation of “Exercise Carana”, which was held by the AU at the end of October 2010, is expected to yield further insight into the current strengths and weaknesses of the ASF.


There also remain some unresolved questions about the mandating procedure. Although it is not established as a legal requirement for the AU, at the policy level the Policy for the Establishment of the ASF provides that ‘the AU will seek UN Security Council authorization for its enforcement actions.’ So far, the AU has sought the support of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for all its missions, not only in cases of enforcement action. This gives AU missions a greater sense of international legitimacy. The practice has also been established to enable the AU to access the financial resources of the African Peace Facility, which are provided by the European Union and are conditional upon UNSC authorization. However, since decisions of the UN Security Council can take a long time to be implemented, some have argued in favour of AU mandates taking precedence where urgent action is required.

But the vital factor will be the political process. There is a need to ensure political consensus among nations before an operation can be approved and deployed. The AU’s Peace and Security Council is a political body composed of member states that pursue their respective national interests. Its decisions regarding the deployment of an ASF Mission will therefore depend, among other things, on the interests and political dynamics of members of the Peace and Security Council and the strength and diplomatic skills of the Chairperson of the Peace and Security Council in any given crisis situation. The Peace and Security Council’s ability to forge a consensus will be critical to the speediness and legitimacy of its decisions and, therefore, also of the deployments themselves.

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2.8 Conclusion

AU and the regional economic communities have emerged as important actors in the deployment of peace support operations on the continent. To make better use of the capacity which has been developed, and to continue to strengthen this role, it would be appropriate to adjust the ASF concept, and to make investments along the lines of the nine lessons highlighted. The ASF is not the solution to African conflicts but it is a fundamental element towards finding a solution. Its success is challenged by, among others, the fact that capability of the regional economic communities is very uneven and there is no clarity about mandating authority. Furthermore, given that the ASF is organized along the lines of five regional brigades, its capabilities are raised and developed by the regional economic communities that form part of the building block of the APSA. This gives rise to political and organizational challenges. Notwithstanding the memorandum of understanding signed between AU and regional economic communities on their general relationship, there is nothing that specifically regulates their respective roles and powers with respect to the use and authorization of ASF capabilities. As a result, there is lack of clarity about whether the AU needs to negotiate with regional economic communities on the use of the brigades that they have raise and maintain. If that is going to be the case, there is no doubt that it will complicate matters. Finally, some of the regional economic communities have a rich experience and an advanced level of capability but others do not, and it is not clear whether the AU is able to provide the necessary guidance to bring all brigades up to standard.
2.9 chapter summary

Chapter two investigated the historical background of African standby force and operations in Africa. It evaluated the past efforts at securing Africa in the absence African standby force. It analysed African Standby Force as a Mechanism of AU Peace and Security Council in Enhancing Peace Support Operations in Africa, it also investigated the African standby force concept and plan, the chapter also evaluated the role and purpose of African standby force, the African standby force in the African security architecture, strengthening African peace support operations; future of the African standby force, operationalizing the African standby force: progress and problems.

The analysed objectives in this chapter were; to examine and analyze past efforts at securing Africa in the absence African standby force and to examine African Standby Force as a Mechanism of AU Peace and Security Council in Enhancing Peace Support Operations in Africa. However the literature obtain justify the two stated hypothesis that past efforts at securing Africa applied before African Standby Force were not effective in maintaining peace support operations in Africa and also African Standby Force as a mechanism Africa Union peace and Security Council significantly influence peace support operations in Africa.

This chapter applied war theory this is because the underlying issues that ethical analysis must deal with involve the logical nature of an individual's complicity and the aiding and abetting the war machine, with greater weight being imposed on those logically closer than those logically further from the war machine in their work. At a deeper level, one can consider the role that civilians play in supporting an unjust war: to what extent are they morally culpable, and if they are culpable in giving moral, financial, or economic
support to some extent, does that mean they may become legitimate targets? This invokes
the issue of collective versus individual responsibility that is in itself a complex topic but
one that the principle of discrimination tries to circumvent by presenting guidelines for
soldiers that keep their activity within the realms of war and its effects rather than
murder.
CHAPTER THREE

PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES OF AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE AND THE KEY FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE ITS CAPACITY FOR ENHANCING PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

3.0 Introduction

This chapter analyzes prospects and challenges of African Standby Force and the key factors that influence its capacity for enhancing peace support operations in Africa: it has the following subtopics: patterns of peace operations in Africa, Challenges Facing ASF as AU Mechanism for Peace Operations in Africa, policies influencing enhancement of peace support operations in Africa, challenges facing peace operations in Africa and peace support operations in Africa; role of G8 Action Plan.

3.1 Patterns of Peace Operations in Africa

According to Lund\textsuperscript{94} fifty new peace operations have been deployed across Africa since 2000. Several patterns have emerged: the number of peacekeepers, missions, and budgets is constantly on the rise; “partnership peacekeeping” has become the norm on the continent; and African states and the AU play increasingly important roles. First, the number, size, and cost of peace operations in Africa are growing. By December 2014, approximately 113,000 uniformed peacekeepers were deployed across the continent, more than 11,000 of whom were police officers. The United Nations remains, by far, the single most significant actor, accounting for nearly 82,000 of these personnel. African

\textsuperscript{94} Lund, M. S. “Not Only When to Act, But How: From Early Warning to Rolling Prevention” in Wallensteen, Peter, Preventing Violent Conflicts: Past Record and Futures Challenges, Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, (Uppsala University:1998) pp. 155-166
issues also remain the most frequent subject of UN Security Council discussions, and Africa hosts nearly 80 percent of all UN peacekeepers. These figures do not include approximately 15,000 additional civilian personnel in UN peacekeeping operations and more than 600 staff in six UN special political missions currently deployed across Africa. The rising number of personnel involved and the often difficult terrain into which peacekeepers deploy have also significantly increased the cost of these operations.

Second, “partnership peacekeeping” has become the norm. This entails collaboration on active military operations between two or more multilateral institutions or various bilateral actors. Several factors have driven this trend, including widespread recognition that no single actor can cope with Africa’s security challenges and that different actors bring comparative advantages. Most peace operations are authorized or supported by the UN Security Council, demonstrating the enduring significance of the UN brand and legitimacy. In Africa, the central partnerships involve relations among the UN, the AU, the regional economic communities (RECs), the EU, and important bilateral actors—principally France, the United States, and Britain.

In Africa, partnership peacekeeping has taken several forms. One is sequenced operations, as in Mali, Burundi, and the Central African Republic (CAR), in which responsibility transitions from one set of actors to another, usually from African organizations to the United Nations. In parallel operations, multiple missions coexist simultaneously within the same theater, as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ivory Coast, and the CAR. The United Nations has also provided a variety of

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support packages to regional missions, only one of which, in Somalia, was funded from the United Nations’ assessed peacekeeping budget\textsuperscript{96}. One joint hybrid mission has also been undertaken, between the United Nations and the AU in Darfur, Sudan (UNAMID), though there is little appetite among Western countries to repeat this experiment.

A third pattern has been the consistent increase in African contributions to these peace operations. Moreover, since 2004, the AU has played the central role, authorizing the deployment of more than forty thousand troops, nearly four thousand police, and more than four hundred civilian experts in its four major peace support operations in Darfur, Somalia, Mali, and the CAR. However, this trend has three important caveats. First, these deployments have required significant external assistance. Second, the AU has been unable to deploy adequate numbers of police and other civilian experts on its missions\textsuperscript{97}. Third, since 2003, the majority of African peacekeepers have come from roughly one-fifth of the AU’s members, particularly Burundi, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda.

\textbf{3.2 Challenges Facing ASF as AU Mechanism for Peace Operations in Africa}

Peace operations in Africa face a range of strategic and operational challenges that have left many of them struggling to achieve their mandates. These perennial problems highlight the persistent absence of sustained political support as well as the tendency to


misapply the peacekeeping tool. Most important, peace operations are instruments, not strategies. To succeed, they need strong political support and a viable strategy for conflict resolution and reconciliation. Without a viable strategy, peacekeepers may stem some of the worst symptoms of a particular crisis, but they will not resolve the fundamental drivers of violence and instability. This has been a problem for many years in Darfur and the DRC, and more recently in South Sudan, Mali, and the CAR, where peacemakers have failed to resolve conflict and left peacekeepers to pick up the pieces.

To be effective, peace operations need to be part of a broader toolbox of conflict-management instruments for the United Nations, the AU, and other actors to use. For example, peace operations are not always appropriate tools to deliver successful high-level peace negotiations. The United Nations, the AU, and other actors should hence not focus solely on training, equipping, and deploying peacekeepers, but instead develop broader capabilities to track and assess trends in organized violence, carry out preventive diplomacy and mediation through envoys and special political missions, impose targeted sanctions, and promote peace building and reconciliation initiatives.

A second challenge is maintaining good relations with the host state a crucial factor in the success (or failure) of most peace operations. In Eritrea, Chad, Burundi, and Sudan, the host government has ejected peace operations; in the DRC and South Sudan, the governments have complained bitterly about the peacekeepers but allowed them to stay. This has generated debate over whether peacekeepers should cross the “Darfur line,” that

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is, deploy into theaters where the host regime officially consents to a mission but erects numerous obstacles to hamper its activities\textsuperscript{100}. The other challenge related to consent arises when international actors play a role in deciding who counts as the local de jure authorities, as occurred in Ivory Coast after the contested 2010 elections. It is thus crucial that peace operations receive strong and united political support from the UN Security Council or other mandating authority.

Peace operations in Africa also face a range of financial challenges. The United Nations maintains a workable system to pay for its operations, though powerful member states generally try to keep missions as small as possible. In contrast, the AU has a system on paper that has never worked effectively in practice, leaving the AU in a constant search for predictable, sustainable, and flexible funding. The fundamental problem is the lack of major indigenous sources of funding, which has left the AU unable to deploy and sustain peace operations in the field. As a result, African calls for local ownership and leadership are dramatically undermined. This financial reality is reflected in the AU’s 2015 budget, in which only $8.7 million (2.3 percent) of its programmatic budget of $379 million is paid for by AU member states: external partners, including the United States, are expected to pay the rest. Despite the strategic and financial problems, peacekeepers in Africa are routinely mandated to carry out complex, multifaceted, and difficult tasks in highly volatile environments. For example, the most recent UN operation, the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), was mandated to implement twenty-seven priority tasks and fourteen additional tasks ranging from protecting civilians “from threat of physical violence” to

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid
seizing illicit weapons and promoting “the rapid extension of state authority.” Most peacekeepers in Africa work in active war zones where there is no peace to keep a trend reflected in the now-regular deployment of Special Forces in several theaters, notably Mali, the DRC, and Somalia. Unsurprisingly, more peacekeepers are dying as a result.

According to Hamburg the multifaceted mandates assigned to peace operations have also blurred the lines between activities traditionally kept distinct. Numerous contemporary “peacekeeping” operations in Africa have involved war fighting, stabilization, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, atrocity prevention, state-building, and regime-consolidation tasks particularly in the CAR, Mali, the DRC, and Somalia, where the United Nations and the AU have explicitly designated enemy groups. Most of these tasks far outstrip the current principles and guidelines on which UN peacekeeping is based. Consequently, the need to clarify the limits of peace operations and distinguish them from war fighting, counterterrorism, or counterinsurgency is urgent. Finally, almost every mission in Africa suffers from a variety of operational capability gaps. The standard problems include difficulties with rapid deployment and mission start-up capabilities; logistics supply, which is intensified by operating in environments with little infrastructure, placing a premium on air transport; transportation, including availability of armored vehicles and aviation units; medical and engineering units; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; and communications. In addition, suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) pose a range of relatively novel


challenges to peacekeepers, especially in Somalia and Mali. Future operations are likely to encounter these threats more frequently.

3.2.1 Policy challenges

Since the establishment of the ASF in 2003, the AU has made a lot of with regard to the elaboration of various documents and concepts. During Phase I of the operationalization of the ASF (Roadmap I for the operationalization of the ASF) five major policy documents were drawn up. These cover doctrine, training and evaluation, logistics, command, control, communications and information systems and standard operating procedures. These policy documents were adopted by the African Chiefs of Defence and Security (ACDS) and the African Ministers of Defence and Security (AMDS) at their meeting in March 2008. These documents define the policy frameworks that provide the technical and conceptual basis and the regulatory setup for the operation of the ASF.103

In terms of the structure and systems for the ASF the elaboration of an effective command and control system is an essential requirement. The AU did elaborate an ASF command and control system as part of Phase I priorities in the operationalization of the ASF.104 Clearly, however, the institution of an effective command and control system requires more than mere development of the document or the concept. The AU should recruit people with the necessary expertise and experience as part of the continental headquarters capability in Addis Ababa. It is not clear if the existing recruitment measures are suitable for attracting and retaining such people.

3.2.2 Political Challenge

One of the requirements for successful peace support operations is the degree of political support and commitment that it receives or commands from the mandating authority, AU member states and the broader international community. In elaborating the norms and establishing the institutions for effectively responding to conflicts on the continent and more particularly in deciding to establish the ASF, African states have expressed their shared political and legal commitment to take the lead in responding to conflicts, among others by deployment of the ASF. Over and above this general commitment, however, the AU will have to mobilize and continuously sustain the commitment of member states to ensure that a credible ASF mission is deployed timeously whenever a situation that warrants the deployment of peace support missions arises. This commitment has to be obtained in terms of not only political support for ASF deployment (legitimacy) but also of funding and logistics support (material support). Without this, the ASF will have to contend with serious difficulties when it is deployed even if the ASF were equipped with the necessary technical and infrastructural capabilities. Judged in terms of the track record of the PSC on its bold engagement with many situations on the continent, there is reason to believe that the AU is committed to addressing conflicts on the continent. However, this does not necessarily translate into actual commitment by member states of the AU with regard to personnel, material and financial support to enable the PSC to deploy an ASF mission, as the experience of the missions that AU has deployed so far attests. In none of its larger missions have authorized or required troop levels been reached. (E. Svensson 2008).

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105 ibid
Given the economic situation of many African countries as well as their military and personnel capabilities, it would seem likely that the ASF concept will be unable to overcome many of these problems. Although the ASF has the potential to contribute substantially to addressing problems of force generation (ASF forces are pledged before the decision for deployment), it cannot entirely overcome the issue of capability given that the overall force strength of the ASF is itself limited.

### 3.2.3 Training challenge

Additionally, Adequate training is an important technical requirement and a prerequisite for the operational readiness of the ASF capabilities. Given that ASF brigades are constituted of multidimensional contingents based in their countries of origin, there is a need for continuous training at different levels. Personnel that states contribute towards an ASF capability should acquire the necessary foundation training if they are to be able to contribute to ASF peace support operations. They should also receive joint training by means of exercises at both REC/RM and continental level.\(^{107}\)

This is not an easy thing to accomplish. It requires a number of well-equipped, well-resourced and well-staffed training centres that can provide regional and continental support. Although there are training centres in the different parts of the continent, not all of them have the necessary capacity to meet the ASF training needs. All of them also need to improve their existing infrastructure and personnel capabilities. Their training curricula must also be revised in line with ASF requirements. The availability of such

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training institutions differs from region to region and regions lacking the necessary centres should be identified so that such institutions can be established where required.  

3.2.4 Infrastructural challenge

The deployment and maintenance of an effective peace support operation also depends on availability of the necessary infrastructure both for its deployment and for an effective and successful execution of its mandate. It is also of great importance that the ASF has at its disposal all the necessary equipment as well as air and sea lift capabilities, ground transportation, information systems, etc. The lack of such infrastructure not only prevent a mission from effectively implementing its mandate but will also undermine its ability to respond to crisis situations. This was aptly illustrated in the experience of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur, as detailed by former force commander, General Martin Luther Agwai, during an interview: The minimum, not the ideal but the minimum … is 18 utility helicopters, and about 12 to 18 combat helicopters that can go to do reconnaissance and other things. As of today, there is no country in the world that has volunteered to give us that capability zero. You must have heard about the attack we had on our camp in Haskanita when we lost 10 of our peacekeepers. After the attack we wanted to go to the area to move the injured. It took us about eight hours because the civil pilots could not take the risks if we had military helicopters, we would have been able to arrive very much, much earlier, and we may have been able to save may be one or two lives.109

108 Ben, K. *The right of intervention under the African Union’s Constitutive Act: from non-interference to nonintervention*, International Review of the Red Cross 85 (2003), 807

109 Ibid
These have been common problems in all peacekeeping operations undertaken by the AU and sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS. To date, the AU and its RECs have mounted peacekeeping operations in Burundi, the Comoros, and Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Somalia. While these missions have shown the value of a quick response for containing violence and contributing to the resolution of conflicts, „the ability to implement their respective mandates has often been constrained by a lack of military capabilities, insufficient resources and inadequate institutional capacity to plan, manage, deploy and liquidate operations“.

3.2.5 Operational challenges

The absence of predictable and sustainable funding has been linked to a number of critical operational limitations, including: The inability to reach mandated troop levels; Limited operational effectiveness owing to a short term focus on the availability of funding, as opposed to a longer term strategic focus on achieving the mandate; In the case of the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), a difficult transition from an under resourced African Union operation to a hybrid peacekeeping operation (the African Union -United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)); An unsustainable administrative, coordination and financial management burden placed on a limited African Union capacity by multiple donors" reporting and oversight mechanisms.

110 Peter, K. *The right of intervention under the African Union’s Constitutive Act: from non-interference to nonintervention, International Review of the Red Cross* 85 (2003), 807
3.2.5 Administrative challenges

The challenge for the AU is not just one of mobilizing the required funding for its future ASF missions but also of developing the necessary financial administrative and regulatory framework to ensure the efficient and transparent management of funds. Much work needs to be done on the modalities of channeling and administering funding for ASF missions to ensure reliable and timely funding for operations and to ensure that funds are channeled and administered effectively. This should be achieved without encumbering the AU with demanding financial administration responsibilities. The best approach would be that the AU develops an effective but simple model for channeling and administering funds which is acceptable to its partners. Other issues that affect effective administrative capacity include the overall organizational infrastructure of the AU, its internal working methods, rules and procedures, and decision-making mechanisms. As very little progress has been made to improve these aspects, which are known to be inefficient, it is to be expected that ASF missions will in the short to the medium term be affected by these administrative woes of the AU Commission. 111

3.3 Policies Influencing Enhancement of Peace Support Operations in Africa

When political or social tensions result in violent conflict, the solution that is usually most prominently on the table is the rapid deployment of a peace support operation, as in the recent cases of the Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan. This is why the 2002 Protocol establishing the African Union’s (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) provided for the establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF). The ASF is composed

111 Ibid
of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian, police and military components in their countries of origin\textsuperscript{112}. African countries have employed various strategies in enhancing peace support operations

3.3.1 Just-in-time Rapid Response

The logic behind the standby concept is that the ability to deploy a peace operation rapidly will be greatly enhanced if countries preselect soldiers, police officers and civilian experts; prepare and train them; make sure they have the necessary equipment and support systems in place; and then place them on a standing readiness mode, waiting for a decision to deploy them. The standby model assumes that such a standing readiness capacity is a necessary precondition for rapid deployment, but acknowledges that it is not sufficient to ensure that a peace operation can be rapidly deployed when faced with a dire crisis. Two additional factors highlighted in the 2013 ASF assessment – the political decision-making process and the financing of peace operations – have already been mentioned. The ASF and all other such standby arrangements suffer from two further interrelated vulnerabilities\textsuperscript{113}. The first is the political will of the contributing countries to participate in any given operation. Agreeing to participate in a standby arrangement is one thing, but agreeing to participate in a specific peace operation is a separate decision altogether. The second is the match between the context-specific needs of a specific mission at hand and the off-the-shelf generic design of the standby force.


It is a combination of these two vulnerabilities that has undermined all international efforts to date to establish standby arrangements that can generate predictable rapid response mechanisms. The UN Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) initiative, the EU Battle Group concept and the ASF share these same vulnerabilities. The SHIRBRIG initiative has already been abandoned, and it is unlikely that the EU Battle Group and the ASF’s standing readiness capacity will be used as envisaged. This is because each crisis is unique, and it is doubtful that a generic standby capacity can sufficiently match the needs – both in terms of the political coalition and the operational capabilities – posed by the specific challenge. Each crisis requires a context-specific solution, including the coming together of a unique set of countries that have a political interest in the resolution of the conflict, or have an interest in being part of that particular mission\textsuperscript{114}. Each crisis also requires a slightly different set of capacities, and the off-the-shelf generic standby brigade model does not meet such needs. This explains why the AU, EU and UN have not found a direct use for its standing readiness arrangements to date.

According to Hjelm-Wallen\textsuperscript{115} rapid deployment can, of course, only happen if there are capabilities at national level that can be deployed. The basic assumption or logic of the standby model thus holds true at national level, but falls apart when it is applied at the multinational level. This is because at this level the decisive factor is not capabilities and readiness, but how those capabilities are coalesced in a political coalition that forges

\textsuperscript{114} Hough, M. Warning Intelligence and Early Warning with Specific Reference to the African Context, (Strategic Review for Southern Africa 26 (2), 2004): 23-38

\textsuperscript{115} Hjelm-Wallen, L. Promoting the Prevention of Violent Conflict and Building by Interaction between State Actors and Voluntary Organizations: On Interaction between State Actors and Voluntary Organizations, (Stockholm: XBS Grafisk Service, 2002) pp. 69-72
together political will, financial means, the capacity to plan, deploy and manage an operation and the national capabilities that can be deployed. National interest is a subtle and often indirect driver in the consensual type of peace operations the UN and EU typically undertake, but it is still vitally important. In the AU context, where the operations undertaken to date have almost all been peace enforcement operations, with a stabilization mandate that requires a higher degree of intensity, robustness and risk, the national interest of the major troop-contributing countries, in particular, has been of decisive importance. Both the missions in Somalia and the CAR have sustained heavy losses. A country with no interest in a given crisis is unlikely to agree to its capabilities being deployed in a high-intensity and high-risk operation, just because they agreed to be part of a regional standby arrangement. What can be concluded from the ASF experience to date is that the general effort to establish the ASF has contributed significantly to the capacity of the AU, the regions and AU member states to plan, prepare, train and deploy military, police and civilian capacities to actual missions. However, the standing readiness dimension of the ASF concept – that is, the idea of specific pre-identified military and police units being prepared, verified and then placed on standing readiness, so that they can be deployed rapidly when called upon to do so – has not, and is unlikely to be used as assumed in the design of the ASF.

3.3.2 Establishment of early warning system

Early warning developed during the Cold War in the field of national military intelligence to enhance capacities to predict potential (ballistic) attacks. In contrast, the

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latter believe that early warning has evolved as a system of predicting environmental hazard, mainly to detect natural disasters like floods, hurricanes, volcanic eruptions and earthquakes. In the early 80s, it was also used for predicting the economic condition of the stock market. Nevertheless, the effect of these occurrences in terms of human casualties makes it obvious that these events have a direct effect on individuals and communities as a whole\textsuperscript{117}. For this reason, early warning started focusing on humanitarian issues and also included famine and refugee migration in the late 1980s. This activity was led by relief organisations that are mostly non-governmental, making them the first actors to use early warning as a system of humanitarian assistance.

According to Hough\textsuperscript{118} in 1992, early warning as a system of conflict prevention was established in the UN Secretariat after the Secretary-General Boutros Ghali’s report, ‘An Agenda for Peace’, highlighted the link between humanitarian action and the peace process. In the report he mentioned the ‘valuable work’ of the early warning system on environmental threats, the risk of nuclear accidents, natural disasters, mass movements of populations, the threat of famine and the spread of disease. Boutros stressed that ‘there is a need to strengthen arrangements in such a manner that information from these sources can be synthesized with political indicators to assess whether a threat to peace exists and to analyze what action might be taken by the UN to alleviate it. Subsequently, the nature of conflict in Africa, the high death toll of civilians and the gravity of human rights abuses (including sexual exploitation), added to the high cost of peacekeeping and other


\textsuperscript{118}Hough, M. “Warning Intelligence and Early Warning with Specific Reference to the African Context”, Strategic Review for Southern Africa 26 (2): 23-38
post-conflict interventions, led the international community and African leaders to focus on conflict prevention. This shifted the focus onto the development of knowledge-based models that enhance the decision maker’s ability to identify critical policy developments in a timely manner. In July 1990, the OAU decided ‘to work towards the peaceful and speedy resolution of all types of conflicts on the Continent’\textsuperscript{119}. This was followed by the establishment of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in 1992.

This decision was put into effect in June 1993 with the adoption of the Cairo Declaration which established the Central Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. The Mechanism provided for the anticipation and prevention of situations of armed conflict as well as peacemaking and peace-building efforts during conflict and post-conflict situations. Nevertheless, while the Cairo Declaration created most of the AU institutions (such as the Peace Fund) and practices (such as the use of eminent persons) that were subsequently included in the PSC Protocol, it did not explicitly provide for the establishment of a unit for early warning\textsuperscript{120}.

The African Union approach to peace and security focuses more on conflict management, especially in peacekeeping operations. This reactive approach has proven to be costly both financially and in terms of the loss of human life. The cost of demobilization, disintegration and reintegration and other post-conflict activities like Security Sector

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{119} Greene, O. “Conflict Prevention, Management and Reduction in Africa: Issues and Priorities” in Owen Greene; Buxton, Julia & Salonius-Pasternak, Charly Conflict Prevention, Management and Reduction in Africa, (2006).}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{120} Francis, D. Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006).}
Reform are far more expensive than prevention\textsuperscript{121}. Members of the African Union have suffered from genocide and civil wars which the AU was unable to address because of a lack of capacity; the Rwandan genocide and the ongoing civil wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia are cases in point. According to the UN, the costs of peacekeeping missions and long-term capacity building of post conflict areas have increased from $1.5 billion in 1999-2000 to $7.1 billion for 2008-2009. This shows the high cost incurred for post-conflict interventions. The costs in terms of the loss of human life and livelihoods are even higher. For example, Liberia lost 250,000 out of a total population of 3.5 million; the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo has claimed more than 4 million lives while Angola’s civil war killed more than 500,000 people. During the war in Sierra Leone tens of thousands of people died and more than 2 million people (one third of the total population) were displaced. It is therefore better to be proactive through conflict prevention than to be reactive\textsuperscript{122}. The latter approach is less expensive in terms of saving financial resources, cutting down on the loss of human lives and protecting the sources of livelihood of those involved in conflict.

According to Dwan\textsuperscript{123} to achieve peacekeeping missions the conflict prevention requires vigilance, constant monitoring and, above all, in-depth understanding of the dynamics of all levels of conflict, including identifying potential conflict spots and mitigating the

\textsuperscript{121} Evans, G."Conflict Prevention and NGOs" in Mellbourn, Anders, Development, Security and Conflict Prevention, (Hedemora, Sweden: Gidlunds, 2005) pp. 121-136


possibility of relapse into conflict after an initial settlement. This is where early warning can play a major role. Likewise, early warning is included as a conflict prevention strategy in the PSC protocol as a responsible body for pre-empting conflicts before eruption. Early warning serves as capacity building for conflict prevention and can be used to strengthen the capacity of potential parties to violent conflict for resolving and progressively reducing the underlying problems that produce disputes. Early warning raises several questions when it comes to the use of the system in conflict prevention.

3.3.3 Panel of the Wise

The Panel of the Wise is a consultative body of the African Union, composed of five appointed members who each serve three year terms. Its mandate is to provide opinions to the Peace and Security Council on issues relevant to conflict prevention, management, and resolution. Representatives are chosen for the North, East, South, West, and Central regions of the continent. The first Panel of the Wise was established in December 2007, with a mandate which expired in 2010. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government, meeting in Kampala in 2010, decided to expand the Panel's composition, by appointing a Group of "Friends of the Panel of the Wise" appointed on the same basis as the Panel (one representative for each African sub-region).\(^\text{124}\)

The emergence of independent African states, while ushering in prospects for majority rule and socio-economic development, has also been accompanied by various challenges, among them, the problem of fledgling democracies. In the post-Cold War era, there has been an upsurge of intra-state conflict in the form of civil wars, as well as post-election

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violence. This has made it necessary for RECs and the AU to establish Afro-centric institutions for peacemaking\textsuperscript{125}. These institutions adopted and reengineered the concept of ‘wisdom’ as one which should play a more prominent role in the peace and security realm. The AU and regional panels and councils of the wise, among them ECOWAS’ Council of the Wise, COMESA’s Committee of Elders, SADC’s Panel of Elders and the IGAD Mediation Contact Group all agree on the importance of strengthening and deepening cross-regional relations and enhancing their capacity to collectively address the scourges of conflict and ensure the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability on the continent. Identified avenues through which this can be achieved include regular information exchange about activities pertaining to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability; enhanced coordination of activities; joint implementation of programmes; and initiatives aimed at strengthening the continent’s capacity in relevant areas\textsuperscript{126}.

3.3.4 Involving African women in mediating peace in Africa

In Africa, many communities, southern Africa included, in women have demonstrated that they can be adept at mobilizing diverse groups for a common purpose, working across ethnic, religious, political and cultural divides to promote peace. While acknowledging progress made towards ensuring the participation of women in mediation, it is also important to note the persisting gap in achieving the aspirations of the provisions of UNSCR 1325. The challenge of building sustainable peace and security in Africa,


\textsuperscript{126} Ibid
particularly in southern Africa, has yet to fully embrace the skills and capacities of women to inform such processes at formal levels. UNSCR 1325 calls on governments to increase the representation of women in conflict resolution initiatives. Furthermore, UN General Assembly Resolution 65/283 on strengthening the role of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflict prevention and resolution, passed in June 2011, recognizes the importance of ensuring the ‘full and effective participation of women at all levels, at all stages and in all aspects of the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflict prevention and resolution’. With the adoption of these resolutions, the need to promote women’s representation in peacemaking increasingly became an expectation rather than an ideal. Yet, according to a study by UN Women, no woman has been appointed as a lead mediator in any UN-sponsored peace talks in Africa since 1992. Women’s participation has mainly been as part of a team of mediators in some talks sponsored by the African Union (AU) and other institutions.

Women’s equal participation in formal peace processes increases the inclusiveness of negotiations, therefore enhancing the probability of responding to gender concerns and perspectives in society. It can also be observed that the engagement of women in peacemaking can only aide their participation during the implementation of agreements and peacebuilding processes. The sustainability of peace agreements therefore relies heavily on the participation of women to support their implementation in post conflict reconstruction. In southern Africa, efforts to build sustainable peace have not always

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taken into consideration the inclusiveness of the peace processes. Organisations entrusted with ensuring the stability of the region, especially Regional Economic Communities (RECs), have not adequately supported the participation of women in mediation. In an attempt to respond to these issues, ACCORD and UN Women convened the SAWMS.

The increasing need for mediation in southern Africa and beyond, backed up by associated regional and continental commitments to ensure the involvement of more women in peace processes, has resulted in the acknowledgement of the need for inclusivity in mediation teams. Efforts aimed at including women in conflict resolution and governance has been facilitated through the formulation of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Gender and Development (2008). Furthermore, the SADC Protocol promotes the mainstreaming of gender considerations within policymaking and outlines an implementation framework for mainstreaming gender equality and equity. The Protocol as such provides for the empowerment of women by encouraging and harmonizing the development and implementation of gender responsive legislation, policies, programmes and projects.

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3.4 Peace Support Operations in Africa; role of G8 Action Plan

The G8 commitment to the prevention and resolution of violent conflict in Africa was founded in the Africa Action Plan created at the 2002 Kananaskis summit, and was built upon at the 2003 Evian Summit with the Joint Africa. G8 Action Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to undertake Peace Support Operations. The G8 has committed to work with African counterparts to develop local capacities to undertake peace support operations, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, in an attempt to prevent outbreaks of violence, and to ensure that any violent conflict is quickly diffused. The G8 Action Plan: Expanding Peace Support Operations in Africa builds upon past effort undertaken by the G8 and its African partners. The G8 recognizes the financial and logistical difficulties faced by many African nations when deploying troops equipment internationally throughout the continent, therefore focus was placed upon building established frameworks for transportation and logistical support to ensure that the troops ready to prevent and diffuse conflict in Africa can promptly arrive where they are needed, and are properly equipped to undertake peace support operations. The G8 is composed of eight countries which include: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom and United States, these countries have demonstrated an adequate level of compliance.

Hjelm-Wallen\(^{133}\) noted that Canada has demonstrated an adequate level of compliance to its peacekeeping commitments in Africa, concentrating investments in African Union missions with particular emphasis on the Sudanese conflict. At the United Nations (UN) General Assembly on September 22, Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin professed the country’s interest in enhancing African Union capabilities in Sudan, offering a contribution of $20 million (CAD) to African Union peacekeeping operations. Earlier in September, the Canadian Minister of National Defence Bill Graham announced a donation of $250,000 (CAD) to the AU in basic army supplies, consisting in body armor, helmets, flashlights, protective insect nets, cots, and pocket knives. A similar contribution totaling $1.165 million (CAD) in basic army supplies to the AU forces were made by the Department of National Defense later in the year. Canada continues to assist the African Union mission in Sudan by providing helicopter support as well as expertise in military planning. This has included close to $2 million to charter 5 helicopters in Darfur as announced on 21 October 2004.854 As of November, the helicopters, currently based in Al Fasher, Kabkabiya and Al Geneina, have transported supplies and over 330 UN officials, humanitarian workers and new AU observers from Nigeria, Rwanda, Egypt, Gambia and Ghana. These helicopters have been used in transportation of supplies and personnel across the region. In addition to the previous contribution, Canada announced the availability of 15 more helicopters for January and another 3 helicopter for March of this year, representing an extra investment of $13.4 million (CAD) to the African Union. It should be noted that this is an ad hoc arrangement and a more institutionalized arrangement would be desirable by the time of the 2005 G8 Gleneagles Summit.

On June 16, 2004, shortly after the conclusion of the Sea Island Summit, Hervé Ladsous, a spokesman for the French Foreign Ministry, reaffirmed France’s commitment to supporting peace operations in Africa.\textsuperscript{134} Despite this stated commitment to the issue, France has done little to improve the means of transportation and logistics for peacekeeping troops in Africa. France’s primary contribution to the commitment has been its continued support for the existing ReCAMP (Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities) programme, initially established in 1997. Created in 1997, ReCAMP trains African military personnel in French military academies in both France and Africa\textsuperscript{135}. ReCAMP is currently in its fourth cycle (ReCAMP) which involved a politico-military seminar held in Accra from May 24 to 28 (prior to the G8 Summit), operational conference in Abuja from June 7 to 11, and a field exercise in Benin in December 2004. Nevertheless, the commitment’s references to logistics and transport are understood to mean the procurement, distribution, maintenance, and replacement of materiel and personnel, while ReCAMP seems focused on training. In addition, ReCAMP has established equipment storage depots on three African bases (Dakar in February 1998, Libreville in January 2000, and Djibouti in June 2001). Although each of these depots house 9 armoured vehicles, 67 trucks (35 two-axle and 32 three-axle), 3 ambulances, and 3 repair vehicles which may be used by African troops for operations approved by the UN or the AU, these depots were created long before the Sea Island Summit. As a result, while France continues to provide annual support to ReCAMP this cannot be construed as new initiatives that would be evidence of full compliance.

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid

Germany is on its way to achieving full compliance based upon its actions since the Sea Island summit. Currently the bulk of Germany’s activities are focused on the situation in the Sudan. Germany has supported the African Union’s peace support mission in Sudan through the provision of communication equipment. Germany has financed satellite telephones, radios and other pieces of communication equipment at a cost of roughly €100,000 to facilitate the supervision of the cease-fire agreement. The German government has also supplied a further €1 million to the AU bilaterally for mission headquarters, outposts, and for the transport of observers and materials. In December 2004, Germany began providing transport for AU ceasefire observers consisting of roughly 200 Gambian soldiers, 60-70 German soldiers, and 12 tonnes of equipment from the Gambian capital Banjul to Darfur, with a stopover in Chad. This commitment is an aspect of the decision taken by the German Parliament on December 3 to provide upwards of 200 troops to assist in the transport of AU forces.

Italy has demonstrated an interest in complying with the commitment it made concerning peace support operations, however, this commitment has not yet been realized. Italy has continued to contribute to improving logistical support arrangements through funding and operating a workshop at the UN Logistical Support Base in Brindisi November 8-26. A group of mid to high ranking African officers were educated about various aspects of peace support operations at this event. Specifically, a module was presented by the Scuola di Applicazione and the Brigata Alpina Taurinense of the Italian Armed Forces to these field grade officers in an effort to introduce them to the military planning exercise (MAPEX) This training educated the officers in operational planning procedures and

136 Ibid
provided valuable training in the utilization of logistical equipment used in UN peace support operations\textsuperscript{137}. Italy has also provided a facility in Vicenza for the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units, which is shared with the newly established European Gendarme Force headquarters. The Center of Excellence is on track to begin offering classes in 2005 in an effort to realize the goal to train 3000 officers and non-commissioned officers in a period of five or six years.

Japan has thus far failed to comply with the commitment set out at the 2004 Sea Island Summit. Although a joint survey mission in eastern Chad conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japanese Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Japanese NGOs to assess the humanitarian situation of Sudanese refugees has recommended an increase of transport capacity on both land and air routes for more efficient procurement of aid, no action has been taken by the Japanese government\textsuperscript{138}. Although Japan has reiterated the need to improve transport and logistics capacities in the African region and, at times, expressed their willingness to take on enhanced responsibilities, no action has been taken.

Russia has presented an unsatisfactory level of compliance to its commitments due to lack of investments in logistics and transportation support to peacekeeping missions in Africa. Furthermore, Russia receives a negative score as result of its involvement in a controversial sale of MiG-29 aircrafts to the Sudanese government, which has been accused of arming local militias involved in ethnic cleansing/genocide in the western

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\textsuperscript{137} Leatherman, J. *Breaking the Cycles of Violence: Conflict Prevention in Intrastate Crises*, (West Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 1999).

\textsuperscript{138} Hough, M. *Warning Intelligence and Early Warning with Specific Reference to the African Context*, (Strategic Review for Southern Africa 26 (2) (2004) 23-38
province of Darfur. The Russian government denies any association between the delivery of the planes and the conflict in Sudan. Most of Russia’s minimal involvement in African conflicts is largely the result of its permanent seat in the UN Security Council. In addition, foreign-aid and client-state relationships that date back to the USSR has allowed Russia to maintain connections and exude influence over organizations such as ECOWAS and countries like Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Burundi, and Ghana. There has been no overt Russian assistance to these countries to improve their transportation or logistics capabilities related to peace support operations.

The United Kingdom (UK) has demonstrated a desire to improve the standing of transportation and logistics concerning peace support operations in Africa. Specifically, the UK has provided a variety of direct transportation and logistical support to assist the African Union in alleviating the crisis in Sudan. In August 2004, the UK financed the airlift of 140 Nigerian troops, including ration packs into the Darfur region. The UK also airlifted 131 Toyota 4x4 Land Cruisers and 12 three tonne trucks to support the African Union’s (AU) peace support mission in Darfur; this action was completed in December, 2004. The UK has also allocated £60 million for its cross government African Conflict Prevention Pool, established in 2001. In 2004, £700 000 from the Conflict Prevention Pool was pledged to the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping and Training Centre in Ghana. Actions taken thus far by the UK indicate that it is on its way to achieving full

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compliance to its commitment concerning peace support operations before the 2005 summit\textsuperscript{140}.

The United States has taken action in providing transport and logistics support to peace support activities in Africa. During his speech to the United Nations General Assembly on September 21, 2004, President Bush reiterated his country’s dedication towards creating permanent capabilities to respond to future crises” in the African region. An example of this dedication is the legislation passed in October 2004 by the US Senate. The FY 2005 Foreign Appropriations Bill (S. 2812), as dictated in the accompanying Senate Appropriations Committee report (S.Rept. 108-346), allows for the transfer of funds from the US Department of Defense to the State Department for the Global Peace Operations Initiative, in the amount of (up to) $80 million. On November 20, 2004, the House-Senate Conference Committee approved the FY 2005 Foreign Appropriations Conference Report as part of the FY 2005 Omnibus Appropriations Conference Report, including the $80 million provision for the GPOI if the Department of Defense so chooses. It only remains for the Department of Defense, “which supports the provision, to transfer the funds to State”\textsuperscript{141}. The US has also taken action in the field; in late October, the US cleared a battlefield area for an airstrip at Rumbek in Southern Sudan, “an important transit point for food, medicine and other critical items en route to needy populations in southern Sudan” to accommodate larger transport aircraft.


3.5 Chapter summary

This chapter investigated prospects and challenges of African Standby Force and the key factors that influence its capacity for enhancing peace support operations in Africa: it investigated patterns of peace operations in Africa, Challenges Facing ASF as AU Mechanism for Peace Operations in Africa. Policies influencing enhancement of peace support operations in Africa were also analysed in this chapter. The chapter also investigated challenges facing peace operations in Africa and peace support operations in Africa; role of G8 Action Plan.

The chapter aimed at investigating the objective of establishing the prospects and challenges of African Standby Force and the key factors that influence its capacity for enhancing peace support operations in Africa. This objective is made to test the hypothesis whether adopted strategies by AU significantly influence African standby force in enhancing peace support operations in Africa.

This chapter shows the importance of application of war theory. Only duly constituted public authorities may wage war. “A just war must be initiated by a political authority within a political system that allows distinctions of justice. Dictatorships or deceptive military actions are typically considered as violations of this criterion. The importance of this condition is key. Plainly, an individual cannot have a genuine process of judging a just war within a system that represses the process of genuine justice. A just war must be initiated by a political authority within a political system that allows distinctions of justice”.
CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATIONS OF THE SECURING AFRICA: THE ROLE OF THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE

4.0 introduction

This chapter gives the findings on the topic securing Africa; the role of the African standby force. It is classified in the following subtopics: Driving factors for the OAU/AU to Create African Standby Force (ASF), Role and Purpose of African Standby Force in Peace Operations, Africa policies in enhancing peace support operations in Africa, U.S. Policy and Recommendations in enhancing peace support operations in Africa, External Actors on Effectiveness of African Standby Force in Enhancing Peace Support Operations in Africa, Challenges faced by ASF in conflict resolution and finally the respondents concluding remarks.

4.1 Driving factors for the OAU/AU to Create African Standby Force (ASF)

From the findings it was noted that the African Union (AU) mandating process for peace support operations is hinged on the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) which is the AU mechanism for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts as outlined in the Constitutive Act of the AU of 2000 and the PSC Protocol of July 2002. This is re-affirmed in the signing, in Addis Ababa in January 2008, of the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation on Peace and Security between the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs)/ Regional Mechanisms (RMs) for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. This MOU, inter alia, commits the parties to work together to make the ASF fully operational and outlines the modalities
of interaction between the AU and the RECs/RMs, with respect to the African Standby Force (ASF).

According to the study finding, the African Standby Force (ASF) was established to enable the PSC to perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of PSO missions and intervention pursuant to Articles (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act. The ASF is composed of standby, multidisciplinary contingents comprising civilian, police and military components from the RECs/RMs (ECOWAS, SADC, EASBRICOM, ECCAS and NARC). In undertaking its functions, the ASF, where appropriate, cooperate with the United Nations, its agencies, other relevant international organizations, as well as with national authorities and NGOs.

Cedric states that the conflict that engulfed Mali in 2012, prompting the intervention of the African Union (AU), was brought about by a complex, multidimensional mixture of long-term, fundamental grievances by diverse groups within the Malian state. Three distinct but related factors coalesced to produce this crisis: The secessionist tendencies of the Tuaregs in northern Mali for an independent state of Azawad, the political crisis, aggravated by the military coup d’état of 2012, that further weakened the Malian state and heightened Tuareg rebel hopes and activities toward secession, and The hijacking of the Tuareg nationalist uprising by Islamist jihadists who attempted to overrun Mali and establish a state based on Sharia law. The jihadists’ actions prompted international

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142 Jackie Cilliers and Mark Mallan A Paper on Progress with the African Standby Force.
143 An interview with EASTBRIG personnel based in Karen and personnel who have been involved in the Somalia mission (AMISOM) (2005)
intervention in the Malian crisis, with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU), France, the United States, and the European Union (EU) playing pivotal roles to stem the country’s slide into civil war and anarchy. The AU began playing an active role in June 2012, later upgrading the mission from a regional to a continental one and leading to the creation by the United Nations of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). AFISMA was originally supposed to be drawn from the Western African Standby Brigade (WASB), which is the African Standby Force (ASF) brigade in West Africa.\textsuperscript{146}

The study findings revealed that the ASF, established in 2002, is meant to comprise a 25,000-man contingency force, organized in 5,000-men contingents roughly aligned to each of Africa’s five regions north, south, central, east, and west. Its purpose is to facilitate the rapid deployment of troops to conflict areas on the continent, avoiding the delays often experienced when waiting for countries to volunteer troops and deploy them.\textsuperscript{147} The AU has spent the past thirteen years trying to get the ASF up and running. Yet it exists more as a concept a “paper tiger” than a fully operational facility. Had it been operational during the crisis in Mali, it would have been deployed there. Currently, however, there is little hope that the third revised date of 2015 for its takeoff will be met.

The concept behind the ASF is laudable, the inability to deploy it in Mali prompted the AU to tinker with a new concept: an interim, smaller, more manageable, more affordable, and more flexible force to fill the operational gap. In May 2013, the AU established the African Capacity for Immediate Response Crises (ACIRC), designed for faster

\textsuperscript{146}\textit{ibid}

\textsuperscript{147} Theo Neethings \textit{Shaping the African Standby Force: Developments, Challenges and Prospects},(2005)
mobilization in conflict zones before ASF contingents are ready to deploy. The formation of the ACIRC means the AU now has two continent-wide peacekeeping forces, and herein lies a problem. Some experts have noted that “plans for the two forces have caused some delays and confusion...and ‘that the ACIRC may draw attention away from, and undermine the investment put into the ASF so far.’ ” Also called into question is the ability of the AU to finance both forces, in view of its heavy dependence on external funding. The argument here is that, rather than create another force and new bureaucracy, the establishment of the ASF should have been accelerated.  

According to the finding in the AU’s most recent conflict intervention in support of Nigeria and its neighboring countries in their battle against the Islamist terrorist group Boko Haram, neither the ACIRC nor the ASF is being put into operation. The AU’s authorization for the operation is directed instead at reinforcing the ad hoc regional force put together by the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LBC) countries (Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria) and joined by Benin Republic. The drive toward actualizing the ACIRC despite criticism that amounts to charges of reinventing the wheel exposes two flaws in AU policymaking. From a critical perspective, the ASF brings out in bold relief the tendency of the AU to make grand plans that are seldom feasible vis-à-vis its capacity and resources, the condition of its member states, and the complex relationships among them. The second issue is that of sustainability. Activated to address the situation of rapid deployment in Mali, the ACIRC machinery already seems moribund, as the force could...

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not be mobilized to intervene in the CAR and is not being called upon to serve the mission the AU is about to undertake in Northern East Nigeria.

4.2 Role and Purpose of African Standby Force in Peace Operations

The findings revealed that the ASF was meant to have a multidimensional capacity with civilian, police and military components. For instance, Article 13 of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) Protocol provides for an ASF that shall be composed of multidisciplinary civilian and military components. The Protocol goes on to state that the AU should establish and centrally manage a roster of “mission administration” and “civilian experts” to handle human rights, humanitarian, governance, reconstruction and DDR functions in future missions. The framework document that has served to inform the establishment of the ASF further elaborates on the provisions of the PSC Protocol, and serves as the common African position on the establishment of the ASF. The ASF Policy Framework document states, in paragraph that the generic components of a valid multidimensional peace support operations capability comprise the following: a legitimate political capacity to mandate a mission under the UN Charter; a multidimensional strategic-level management capability; a mission headquarters-level multidimensional management capability; and mission components for multidimensional peace operations. The ASF Policy Framework also provides for a “roster of civilian experts” to fulfil human rights, humanitarian, governance, demobilization, disarmament, repatriation and reconstruction tasks.\textsuperscript{150}

\[\textsuperscript{150} \text{Agence France-Presse (AFP), “Mbeki Wants Standby Force Prioritised,” Business Day, 23 May 2003}\]
Mike\textsuperscript{151} states that according to initial planning, the ASF would be established in two phases. The first phase (up to 30 June 2005) had, as the AU’s objective, to establish a Planning Element (PLANELM) for the management of military advisory and observation missions, while the five regions would establish regional standby forces up to brigade size to achieve capabilities for more complex missions. For the second phase (1 July 2005 to 30 June 2010), it was originally envisaged that, by 2010, the AU would have developed the capacity to manage complex peacekeeping operations, while the five regions will continue to develop the capacity to deploy a mission headquarters for such missions, involving AU/regional peacekeeping forces.

However, it was decided that the civilian dimension and roster of experts was not a phase 1 priority “because UN humanitarian, development and human rights elements, which do not require a UN Security Council mandate, could deploy in tandem with an ASF mission”. In fact, the draft AU Vision 2010 document states that “… although police and other civilian capabilities will form important components of the ASF, owing to the absence of a detailed related police/civilian policy, the focus at this stage had to be mainly on the military aspects…”\textsuperscript{152}

4.2.1 ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) and Peacekeeping Operations

When working outside the UN framework, the ECOWAS approach to peacekeeping operations has been essentially military, and few civilians have been involved in mission planning and implementation. In Article 28 of the Protocol on the Mechanism, ECOWAS member states agreed to make available to ECOWAS all

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid
Military, Police and civilian resources for the accomplishment of multifunctional peace missions. The protocol also clearly defines the role of the Special Representative of the Executive Secretary (SRES) as head of all ECOWAS missions. Despite this acknowledgement of the primacy of civilian political leadership, the post protocol missions in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire were essentially military operations. By April 2004, both ECOWAS Missions in Liberia (ECOMIL) and Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI) had transitioned to UN operations and ECOWAS military planners were able to concentrate on developing a standby capability for peacekeeping operations. Guidance was provided by the Defence Staff Commission in the form of an ECOWAS military strategy, which states that The ECOWAS military component (ESF) will comprise pre-determined regional standby formations that are highly trained, equipped and prepared to deploy as directed in response to a crisis or threat to peace and security, the ECOWAS Task Force will comprise 1,500 soldiers within pre-determined units and upon order be prepared to deploy within 30 days and be self-sustaining for 90 days and the ECOWAS Main Brigade will comprise 5,000 soldiers within pre-determined units and upon order be prepared to deploy within 90 days and be fully self-sustaining for 90 days.

According to the findings in total, the ESF is to consist of 6,500 troops, pledged by contributing nations, and coordinated through the Mission Planning and Management Cell (MPMC). The idea is for the Task Force to have the capacity to deploy rapidly to meet initial contingency requirements. If the military effort requires an expanded force,

the main brigade will be deployed.\textsuperscript{154} It is expected that all forces committed to the ESF will meet the criteria and standards set out in an ECOWAS memorandum of understanding. A further planning assumption is that the ESF Task Force will have the capability to deploy for up to 90 days; after which one of the following options will be implemented: The Task Force elements will return to the TCCs, The Task Force will remain deployed as an element of the ESF Main Brigade, The Task Force will become an element of an AU or UN mission, The Task Force will hand over to a UN or AU Force An operational framework for the ESF was developed by the ECOWAS Secretariat (specifically the Mission Planning and Management Cell, in conjunction with military advisors from donor nations, in late January/early February 2005.

Paul a respondent involved in Somali mission states that the operational framework aims to specify all the activity strands and benchmarks for the establishment of the ESF. The purpose of the document is to assist ECOWAS in the sequencing and coordination of activities, while providing a coordination tool for donors to identify and target assistance to support the early and efficient establishment of the ESF. The operational framework document focuses almost exclusively on the military component of the ESF but, according to the drafters, this “should not detract from the multi-functional nature of any PSO”. Moreover, the document “is designed to evolve and be updated, so that its usefulness is sustained”. In terms of force generation, it is envisaged that ECOWAS will define and certify the entry level of capability for nations who

\textsuperscript{154} Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union

87
pledge forces. The training, equipping and provision of logistic support up to the entry level of baseline capability will be a national responsibility. 155

Designated forces will receive an additional level of training, equipment and logistic support to enter a higher readiness pool. This pool will need to be broad enough to have flexibility in terms of nation, language and capability. The resources for training, equipping and sustaining will be provided by a mix of member nation and ECOWAS support, the nature of which will depend on the level of donor contributions. Member states have so far pledged 6,200 troops for the ESF. These will be organized by ECOWAS planners to form a battle group or battalion group and a logistics Unit for the Task Force. While member states have pledged certain capabilities (such as an Infantry Company and/or an Engineering Squadron), specific Units have not been named, so the pool of potential units that may one day deploy as part of the ESF is large. To focus limited resources for training, equipping and sustaining the ESF, the next step is for nations and the Secretariat to identify and name specific units to be placed ‘in role’ and raised to high readiness. After an expected visit by the secretariat to nations to identify these units, the respective Chiefs of Defence Staff will need to have an assessment made of their pledged units’ operational readiness, their training and resource requirements. These units will then be allocated roles and must be able to meet the operational tasks within their given notice to move.156


156 An interview with Karen respondents
4.2.2 SADC Standby Force Brigade (SADCBRIG)

Southern Africa has prioritized the establishment of a regional early warning system, the SADC Standby Force Brigade (SADCBRIG) and support to the peace process in the DRC for 2004/5. Following the various decisions by the AU on the establishment of the ASF, the SADC Inter State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) met in Maseru, Lesotho, in 2004 to consider the establishment of SADCBRIG. Consequently, a Ministerial Defence Sub Committee was mandated by the ISDSC to set up a technical team to plan the establishment. Recent meetings of the technical team, composed of military planners, took place in April and May 2005, including the establishment of an interim PLANELM at the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone. Although the outcomes of these and subsequent meetings are being treated with a high degree of confidentiality, the region is known to be finalizing the memorandum of understanding between member states that will regulate the establishment and maintenance of SADCBRIG. Member state troop contributions have been pledged, and a proposed management and PLANELM structure completed, as well as a structure for SADCBRIG. Preparations for the establishment of a peacekeeping brigade in SADC predate the current initiative towards the ASF by several years, as does the development of a regional peacekeeping training centre of excellence. 157

The original momentum for a regional peacekeeping Brigade came after the Second Meeting of African Chiefs of Defence Staff that was held in Harare in October 1997. That meeting built on a similar meeting in Addis Ababa the previous year, and in 2004 the Third Meeting of African Chiefs of Defence and Security took

place, which kick started current developments around the ASF. The Harare meeting made a host of substantive recommendations towards the establishment of an African peacekeeping capacity. Shortly afterwards, in May 1998, a SADC military delegation visited Denmark (the Danish Military and SHIRBRIG Headquarters) and Bosnia. Eventually, on 15 March 1999 the ISDSC, consisting of Ministers of Defence and Security, approved a proposal on the way ahead for the establishment of a multinational SADC standby peacekeeping brigade. 158

Oriented towards Chapter VI missions, the then SADC Brigade was conceived as consisting of a mobile Headquarters, three Infantry Battalions, one Reconnaissance Company, an Engineer Squadron, a logistical support Company, a Military Police Company, a civilian police component, and an air and naval component. The Brigade was to have been established over a period of five years. Unlike current thinking, which envisages a multinational standby brigade headquarters, the earlier concept called for a standing Multinational Brigade Headquarters that could be established on a non-rotational or rotational basis. SADCBRIG will be a true multinational standby force, with contingents assigned for up to six months for any in-country assignment. Even the standby Brigade Headquarters will have a multinational structure and the Commander and Deputy/Chief of Staff may not necessarily be from the same country. The downside of such an arrangement is that the region will not be able to base the brigade on a reserve or active brigade structure in countries such as South Africa, Angola or Zimbabwe.

158 Osunu EASTBRIG personnel based in Karen
According to the findings SADCBRIG guidelines stipulate that the force or member states should support/sustain the force for the first three to six months and that the force should be able to negotiate and conclude host nation support agreements and contracts with civilian authorities and commercial companies for its initial requirements. The region has apparently not yet concluded its discussions on the location and composition of a Military logistic depot. Earmarked units will remain in their countries of origin on an on call system and the region has adopted the response times defined by the AU, although smaller contingents of multinational rapid reaction/early entry forces should be available on a much higher 14 days state of readiness. The SADC standby system is based on the concept of a pool arrangement whereby total troops earmarked in the various potential TCCs for peacekeeping will provide sufficient capacity to ensure the full availability of a brigade at any time. The SADCBRIG commander will then compose his/her force during mission planning from the standby pool. In this manner a deployment will not be held hostage by the decision by one or more TCCs not to contribute to a particular mission or inability to do so. All SADC member states have pledged contributions to the SADCBRIG standby pool, with Angola also earmarking contributions to the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) standby brigade, given its dual membership of SADC and ECCAS.

4.2.3 East Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG)

The findings reveal that although the AU defines East Africa as a region composed of some 13 countries, it does not have an overarching and integrated conflict prevention, management and mitigation framework similar to West or Southern Africa. As a result, the AU mandated the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), on an interim basis, to coordinate the efforts of the region towards the establishment of an East African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG). In the absence of a legal framework for conflict management, EASBRIG is to operate on the basis of a memorandum of understanding that provides for an Assembly of Heads of State and Government for EASBRIG, a Council of Ministers of Defence and Security, a Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff, a standby brigade headquarters, a planning element and logistic base. The assembly serves as the ‘supreme authority’ for EASBRIG and authorizes deployment for missions mandated by the PSC. Unlike the ECOWAS military component (ESF), EASBRIG, in terms of its memorandum of understanding, can only deploy with a mandate from the AU. On deployment, the brigade will come under the operational control of the AU or the UN, as applicable. The Council of Ministers of Defence and Security is to manage all aspects relating to EASBRIG, and only appoint the commander of EASBRIG upon recommendation of the Committee of East African Chiefs of Defence Staff (EACDS) for standalone missions within the East Africa region.

Where the AU mandates a deployment, the PSC will appoint the brigade commander. EASBRIG has decided to separate the locations of the PLANELM and the

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160 An interview with EASTBRIG personnel based in Karen
161 Ibid
Brigade Headquarters, with the latter in Addis Ababa and the former in Nairobi. The decision to locate the logistic base in Ethiopia has the benefit of potentially co-locating with the AU logistic depot, but is possibly not an optimal choice in terms of the regional transport infrastructure or of benefiting from the region’s extended coastline.

The EASBRIG HQ in Addis Ababa serve as a command HQ for force preparation and operational command. It is also responsible for the provision of secretarial services to the Committee of EACDS and is to be composed of seconded officers from all EASBRIG member states. In terms of capabilities, EASBRIG aims to optimize its structure towards participation in traditional peacekeeping tasks (that is, in accordance with Scenario 4 of the AU documents and Chapter VI of the UN Charter), although the planning framework provides for sealift capabilities and additional fire support capacity in Scenarios 5 and 6. The head of the PLANELM also serves as the Chief of Staff of EASBRIG and is located in Kenya. The PLANELM will be composed of a regional military and civilian staff on secondment from all EASBRIG member states, and is being equipped at its location at Karen, outside Nairobi, close to the existing Kenyan Peace Support Training Centre (KPSTC). The function of the PLANELM is to serve as multinational full time planning headquarters for EASBRIG and it is empowered to enter into agreements with national and other training institutions. On the other hand, the function of the logistics base, which is located in Ethiopia (with proposed outposts in member states as and when required), is to serve as the central regional base for maintenance, storage and management of the logistical infrastructure of EASBRIG. It also coordinates all activities involving logistics,
including but not limited to performing functions mandated by the African Union and/or the United Nations managing external assistance.

Through the EASBRIG fund, IGAD\textsuperscript{162} is able to collect contributions from all member states assessed in accordance with the AU mode of contributions, and grants, donations and contributions from member states and other sources. Funds may also be used for general conflict prevention and conflict management apart from their use for peacekeeping.

4.3 Africa policies in enhancing peace support operations in Africa

According to the findings\textsuperscript{163} UN has been the more visible actor in international peacekeeping, African contributions to UN peacekeeping have been significant over the past 20 years. For example, Rwanda, Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, Gambia and Tanzania are among the top ten female police contributors. Overall, the top 10 troop and police contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs) for UN PKOs include Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Ghana and Egypt. Included among the top ten PCCs are Senegal, Nigeria, Rwanda, Egypt and Togo.\textsuperscript{164}

Moreover, the uptick in African-led PSOs over the last 10 years is noteworthy. Following the end of the Cold War, regional and sub-regional organisations increased their involvement in peacekeeping operations on the African continent. The identification of peacekeeping failures in the mid-1990s, particularly in Rwanda, resulted in the recognition by African countries of a need to respond to challenges on the continent in a

\textsuperscript{162} Ibid
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid
\textsuperscript{164} An interview with respondents involved with Somali mission
more robust manner, to ensure the ability to take ownership and to respond to conflicts when the international community was either unwilling or unable to do so. The reasons for the subsequent increased engagement vary widely, but include a need for faster deployment; overall knowledge of the history and the geographic and sociological realities of the area; as well as generally being more linguistically prepared. Parties to conflicts and populations affected by the conflict often presented the AU as an actor with greater political legitimacy and credibility. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the continental responses to armed conflict were initially led by the RECs/RMs. For instance, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) all initiated responses to security and conflict challenges in their regions. Between 1989 and 2005, 31 PSOs were initiated by regional or sub-regional actors, reflecting the belief that regional organisations were better suited to respond to crises in their own regions since they were closer to the situation, were more aware of the issues on the ground and were more likely to have a long-term commitment. They provided ‘local solutions to local problems’ that were perceived by the affected populations as being more legitimate.¹⁶⁵

4.4 U.S. Policy and Recommendations in Enhancing Peace Support Operations in Africa

According to the findings¹⁶⁶ successive U.S. governments have built a solid relationship with the AU. Two major developments shape the geostrategic context for this relationship. First, the establishment of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) provided

¹⁶⁵ Ibid
a new focal point for engagement with the continent. AFRICOM now has the potential to significantly enhance the operational and tactical dimensions of AU peacekeeping missions by supporting current and prospective troop-contributing countries. Second, non-western powers principally China, India, Brazil, and Turkey are gaining influence in Africa. At times, the United States is left to play catch-up as other powers solidify bilateral relationships with some of Africa’s most powerful states. Although it plays third fiddle to the UN and EU on the extent of its engagement in Addis Ababa, the United States generally enjoys a good relationship with the AU leadership. As the first non-African country to establish a separate diplomatic mission to the AU (in August 2006), it now enjoys a U.S.-AU annual summit and strongly supported the AU’s decision to take a tougher stance toward military juntas and other unconstitutional regimes. The United States has also provided significant materiel support to various AU peacekeeping operations. Naturally, there have been major differences of opinion on some issues: the AU did not agree with Washington’s imposition of economic sanctions on Mugabe’s regime in Zimbabwe; in Darfur the AU dismissed the possibility of a no-fly zone and criticized the U.S. government’s use of the term genocide; and the AU was against all forms of foreign military intervention in Libya. At times, inconsistent funding of U.S. programs to the AU has caused problems; the first long-term assistance agreement between the U.S. Agency for International Development and the AU, signed in August 2010 and extending through 2013, is thus a welcome step in the right direction.167

Arguably the most visible U.S. peace and security activities in Africa are its counterterrorism initiatives in the Sahel and the Horn, counter piracy and maritime

167 A journal by Baderin, M. “Towards effective collective security and human rights protection in Africa”
security operations, and various anti-trafficking programs. The United States has also contributed over $250 million to AMISOM since 2007, and it has provided important communications equipment to bolster the CEWS and communication between the AU and regional ASF brigades. More generally, the United States has provided aged to strengthen its mission in Addis Ababa and intensify its interaction with AU officials and member states. The secondment of U.S. government personnel to the AU Peace and Security Department and to AMISOM provides a useful opportunity to learn lessons about the benefits of such an approach as well as the potential tensions provoked by such appointments within the AU. 168

To implement this agenda, the U.S. government should pursue the following steps: Forge political agreement on the core values driving the APSA. The AU has grown in significance as a political actor and this trajectory is likely to continue. But it still suffers from major conflict management capability gaps, the sources of which are both technical and political. Politically, the United States should work hard with external partners and bilaterally with important African partners to forge agreement within the PSC on the political values which lie at the heart of the APSA. This must be based upon a realistic appraisal of the AU’s conflict management capabilities whereby expectations (of insiders and outsiders) are brought in line with continental realities. Without widespread agreement among PSC members on how to respond to critical issues such as unconstitutional changes of government, armed conflicts, or mass atrocities, no amount of technical reforms will deliver effective conflict resolution. Increase diplomatic and economic support for the UN Office to the African Union. Although the U.S. government

168 Ibid
has provided substantial assistance to the AU’s peace and security architecture, the United States is not the only, or even the biggest, player in Addis Ababa. Washington should therefore ensure there is clear strategic coordination between its own assistance programs and those of the UN and the EU. While the United States, UN, and EU will naturally retain distinct programs and policies, their representatives should work hard to devise a coordinated delivery system for assistance to the AU that reflects the comparative advantages of each actor while remaining sensitive to the AU’s limited capacity to absorb funds. In the short term, the United States, EU, and UN should support the newly established UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) because the UN has done much to bridge the AU’s bureaucratic and infrastructural capability gaps in conflict management issues, most recently in support of the AMISOM mission. Increase civilian capabilities for the AU’s conflict management activities.

According to the findings civilian expertise is crucial across every dimension of conflict management: prevention and early-warning, mediation, and peacekeeping, as well as peace building programs. Yet most efforts to develop the new APSA focus on military capabilities. As a consequence, the AU is unable to recruit and deploy sufficient numbers of civilian personnel, especially on short notice. The AU already recognizes its lack of capabilities in this area and the commission has started to develop a peace and security standby roster that should serve the needs of all future peace and security civilian deployments, including mediation. The United States should devise mechanisms to
support these ongoing efforts as well as share the lessons of its own not entirely successful experiences developing an effective Civilian Response Corps.\textsuperscript{169}

The findings reveal that\textsuperscript{170} the AU’s current approach to mediation has been ad hoc, ill-prepared, and based on little more than the hope of forging elite, top down bargains, usually under arbitrary deadlines. To ameliorate this problem, the AU is considering establishing a mediation unit within the commission. Such a unit could coordinate mediation support to AU officials and envoys as well as mediation capacity-building activities. To fulfil these functions, it should include a coordinator, two mediation experts, a senior administrator at headquarters, and an administrative officer who can be deployed in the logistical support, staff training, and exercises for battalion, brigade, and multinational force headquarters personnel, as well as equipment for trainers and peacekeepers, primarily through the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) program. By June 2011, ACOTA had provided training and non-lethal equipment to just over 176,000 peacekeepers from its twenty-five African partner states.

Indeed, the rising numbers of African peacekeepers deployed to UN missions (depicted in Figure 2) would not have been possible without the ACOTA program. There is widespread agreement on both sides of the relationship that the U.S. government should help strengthen Africa’s emerging peace and security architecture. U.S. officials also believe that over the long term, the U.S.-AU relationship should come to resemble the U.S.-EU relationship (i.e., one built on strong diplomatic and official relationships between personnel within the U.S. government and the AU across a wide range of

\textsuperscript{169} Ibid
\textsuperscript{170} An interview with EASTBRIG personnel based in Karen
sectors). In the short term, the U.S. government should be encouraged to strengthen its mission in Addis Ababa and intensify its interaction with AU officials and member states. The secondment of U.S. government personnel to the AU Peace and Security Department and to AMISOM provides a useful opportunity to learn lessons about the benefits of such an approach as well as the potential tensions provoked by such appointments within the AU. 171

4.4 The police and the African Peace and Security Architecture

As per the findings172 the police and the African Peace and Security Architecture International conflict management and peace building approaches recognise the centrality of the rule of law as critical to security, social and economic development. However, at the 2014 PSSG meeting it was noted that the first ‘ASF Road map’ exclusively reflected military input. The police was not involved in the initial design of the ASF, with the effect that the military representatives of member states, as well as international military partners, were the dominant voice in the creation of the APSA and the ASF subsequently. The police was not integrated into the APSA until 2008. Even the Continental Planning Element (commonly called the Peace Support Operations Division or PSOD) within the AU Commission, is also military heavy, complete with a military chief of staff. A central question is how the AU expects to promote multidimensionality as envisaged in the Protocol while creating a military heavy structure that does not provide for equal development of the police and civilian components. There is no dispute that the roles and

171 Ibid
responsibilities of the police in PSOs and the range of their tasks have increased in complexity since their first deployment in the UN Operation to the Congo (ONUC) in 1960. Not only have the numbers of police peacekeepers increased, but mandated tasks have evolved from simple monitoring operations to the reform, restructuring and rebuilding of national police organisations, community confidence-building and direct law enforcement, promoting human rights, providing operational support to the host nation or law enforcement agencies.\footnote{Ibid}

As a result, there is a valid argument that ‘getting policing right’ is at the heart of a successful PSO. The need for an expanded range of technical skills, and for intercultural communication expertise and sensitivities to local cultural practices on the rule of law, concepts of justice and traditional mechanisms used to resolve disputes, requires a sophisticated response to police functions, including command frameworks that support the objectives of the host state in restoring the rule of law. From an African perspective, the PSSG was established to bring strategic police representation to the same level as that of the Military Staff Council under the Protocol and Military Operations Coordinating Committee specifically created for AMISOM military operations, to ensure that the police equally participate and are heard in all aspects of PSO decisions, planning, execution, and monitoring and evaluation. The inaugural PSSG conference provided a platform for a select group of police experts in PSOs to focus on the structure and organisation of the AU police or the ASF Police Component in APSA, the relationship with the regional planning elements (PLANELMS), and the regional police capacities and capabilities.
Developing a clear corporate identity and role definition for the police component is a high priority. As was noted in an address to the PSSG, the police component must establish its identity by being clear about its mission, vision, core values, and code of ethics, core functions and structure in order to advocate for itself in APSA. It is noteworthy that the word ‘police’ does not even appear in the entire PSC Protocol.\textsuperscript{174}

This point featured in many discussions at the PSSG and it was recognised that if the police leadership, the PCCs and policing roles do not feature in the legal documents of AU and APSA, it confirms that the police does not have a platform as ‘no one is listening’. However, the identity and command and control system of the military are fully articulated in the same Protocol, with clear duties and responsibilities of the Chiefs of Defence Staff, Military Staff Committee and a Force Commander being expressly provided in it.

\textbf{4.5 External Actors on Effectiveness of African Standby Force in Enhancing Peace Support Operations in Africa}

As per the study findings for the countries of Africa, the regional security context is marked by, inter alia, numerous fragmented civil wars, persisting colonial legacies, lower levels of US strategic interest, and inadequate resources for a self-sufficient security system to quell regionalized civil conflicts. Thus, the key security tasks that have demanded attention have been those of multidimensional peace operations. These operations have included an eclectic “cocktail” of regional actors, the UN, external powers, NGOs, and private contractors.\textsuperscript{175}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid
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The UN as an external actor currently has seven operations on the African continent, and a number are taking place in countries that neighbor each other, including the operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Coted’Ivoire, and the operations in the DRC and Burundi. Based on this operational reality and also based on the regional nature of the conflicts across the continent, broad consensus has emerged on the need for “regional approaches”. Such an approach would seek both to address regional conflict linkages and to develop within-region capacity to end civil wars, prevent them from spreading across boundaries, and promote regional economic development. The UN has tried to implement a regional approach model, with mixed results. The UN office for West Africa (UNOWA) was established to help ECOWAS develop its headquarters capabilities and to facilitate coordination between the UN operations in the sub region. But these objectives have been inhibited by two key problems. First, UNOWA’s office is located in Dakar and not Abuja (ECOWAS’s headquarters city). The benefits of this arrangement would seem to come from the distribution of points of influence within the sub region; to have all sub regional centers of influence in Nigeria may be exacerbate the Francophonie Anglophones tensions within the subregion. Nonetheless, these benefits need to be weighed against the major logistical constraints imposed by this arrangement. Conference participants generally agreed that these logistical constraints made UNOWA’s role vis-à-vis ECOWAS quite ineffectual.¹⁷⁶

Second, the UN operations are mandated to specific countries, and the military and civilian leaderships answer directly to UN headquarters in New York. Participation in UNOWA’s efforts has tended to be at the convenience of operational leaders, reflecting

¹⁷⁶ Ibid
their reluctance to subordinate their command to another bureaucratic layer.\footnote{177 UN document A/3943 Summary study of the experience derived from the establishment and operation of the Force: report of the Secretary-General (2014),} Participants at the Vienna seminar noted that a product of this situation was a lack of coordination between the neighboring disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs in West Africa. A lack of data sharing, differing compensation schemes, and different timing of program activities has created a perverse DDR “market” in the sub region. Combatants have sometimes participated in multiple programs to collect compensation more than once (“DDR shopping”), resulting in wasted resources and destabilizing flows of combatants across the sub region. These undesirable results suggest the need for a re-think on how a “regional approach” model might be implemented, especially when trying to link existing operations.

4.6 Africa's New Approach to Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution

4.6.1 Improving Operations

According to the findings\footnote{178 Ibid} Peace operations in Africa bring together a broad array of actors and approaches, raising issues of prioritization and integration. Most current peace operations in Africa are marked by a number of traits. The sense in the mid-1990s was that the UN would no longer engage in large-scale peace enforcement, but this sense proved wrong. Troop levels have risen to well above the previous peak in 1993 to help the continent cope with a profusion of conflicts affecting hundreds of millions of lives. Second, the main troop contributing countries have almost no power in the Security Council mandating process. In addition, external powers have proved unwilling to
operate within the UN framework. Thus, the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council mandate risky operations that they would prefer to pass on to the poorer troop-contributing countries. The UN, essentially acting at the service of the Security Council, can hardly say no. This condition, sometimes referred to as “peacekeeping apartheid”, has potentially negative consequences for the coherence the relationship between mandates and actual operations. Finally, these operations are multidimensional missions, emphasizing DDR and linked to institution-building and social recovery programs.

Based on these operational realities in Africa, discussions at the Vienna seminar\textsuperscript{179} focused on two key areas of improvement. The first area concerned how force ought to be used and institutionalized in a complex mission. The discussion touched on issues relating to rules of engagement and limits to the utility of force. The second area concerned the management of security, development, and humanitarian priorities in multi-dimensional operations. In such operations, urgent needs are multiple and simultaneous, but resources are limited. Success requires that mission leaderships master the art of trading off between security, development, and humanitarian needs to ensure long-term progress in all three areas. Experience in recent operations shows that these tradeoffs are particularly sensitive with respect to DDR, transitional justice, and child protection. At the same time, these are crucial elements of peace operations in Africa, either because they are taken as essential to progress in peace processes (DDR and

\textsuperscript{179} IPA Vienna Seminar on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (2004)
transitional justice) or because they are simply too ubiquitous to ignore (child protection issues).

4.7 Challenges faced by ASF in conflict resolution

In the midst of contentious domestic politics in many African countries, African States have been organizing to strengthen their collective Military capacity to respond to insurgencies threatening political stability within or between countries. This initiative followed the formation of the AU and amongst other mechanisms the ASF which centred on strengthening African collective international capacity to guarantee democracy. Building an effective and credible peace operations capacity building is not cheap and requires serious investment at all levels, including political commitment, and none of the envisaged capabilities are really affordable for Africa. Therefore the single biggest impediment to peacekeeping in Africa by Africans is funding. African peacekeeping is not limited by political will or the availability of troops but, rather, by insufficient funding. Even relatively small and less logistically demanding unarmed military observer missions are costly.

According to the findings the AU and its predecessor, the OAU, were unable to provide finances from their own budgets. The AU must be able to address and meet the financial realities of the high cost of peacekeeping operations. Clearly, the cost of deploying large, and perhaps simultaneous, missions will require additional funding. Currently, the ASF is funded primarily by the AU Peace Fund, which is underfunded with barely enough capital to sustain current AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). ASF funding

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180 Ibid
181 participants involved with MONUC
has been a longstanding issue, given the lack of financial support from AU Member States.\textsuperscript{182}

As per the findings a further complicating issue is that the ASF architecture dictates that it will be entirely dependent on the regions for force generation and operational capability. The member states of these regions are already committed to providing troops and police to AMIS, as well as ongoing UN operations, and may also be contributing to their own regional operations when called upon to mobilise for future ASF operations. Moreover the regions are developing their standby capacities at different rates and with different levels of linkage to the continental framework and standards. Furthermore, a delay by the need for emergency responses to ongoing armed conflicts has delayed implementation of various projects as was seen where the Government of the Sudan refused the deployment of non-African troops in Darfur. Another example is the implementation of the ECOWAS Mechanism which has been hampered by deployment in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire. Extant West African capacities to mount and sustain peace operations pale in comparison to this scale of deployment, and the capacities of some Member States to provide more troops and police are severely stretched. Ghana alone (with armed forces totaling under 10,000) needs to rotate around 7,000 troops annually for its existing commitments to UN operations.\textsuperscript{183}

Another aspect where the ASF faces challenges is that of logistics.\textsuperscript{184} Whereas SHIRBRIG provides a good example of the Standby structure; is in its system, contingents deploy fully self-sustained for 60 days. This might not be the case with

\textsuperscript{182} Ibid
\textsuperscript{183} An interview with EASTBRIG personnel based in Karen
\textsuperscript{184} Ibid
African contingents where the preference is for ASF owned logistics bases in view of the lack of national capacities. To be able to deploy within the timelines for the various conflict scenarios, the ASF will need mission ready units and headquarters, with equipment, including vehicles and communications, ideally held in centralised regional logistical bases or provided by donors under clear terms of commitment. To launch the ASF elements into mission areas, these pre deployment arrangements would have to be backed up by standing arrangements for strategic sea and airlift. The Report of the Panel on UN Operations (the Brahimi Report) highlights that “The first six to 12 weeks following a ceasefire or peace accord is often the most critical period for establishing both a stable peace and the credibility of the peacekeepers. Credibility and political momentum lost during this period can often be difficult to regain.” Using this as a point of reference for deployment timelines, it is clear that the current operational capabilities of the AU are not suitable for situations that require a rapid and credible force on the ground. The ability to plan, command, direct and support a multidimensional and national peacekeeping force has been identified by the Defence Chiefs as a key element of rapid deployment. However, in order to meet these timeframes, the AU must also have the capacity to react quickly on three interdependent aspects of rapid deployment: personnel, materiel readiness and funding.

4.6 Conclusion

Majority of the respondents\textsuperscript{185} concluded by saying that the ASF is a major step toward forming a multinational military force for intervening militarily in serious conflicts

\textsuperscript{185} An interview with EASTBRIG personnel based in Karen and personnel who have been involved in the Somalia mission (AMISOM)
around the troubled continent of Africa. Taking into account that the ASF is likely to operate as a bridging force for UN deployments rather than a replacement, universal standards therefore need to be developed as a matter of urgency. In other words, the exit strategy for the AU remains a UN operation since only the UN can provide a response to the types of complex emergency that characterise conflict in Africa. This was true of Burundi and ECOWAS experiences where the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was taken over by the United Nations Mission in Burundi (ONUB) and ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) transited to the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). While the somewhat ambitious target dates for operationalization of the ASF are still dwindling policy formulation at the AU strategic level has progressed remarkably. This has been undertaken in close collaboration with regional economic communities and has thus produced a unique African doctrine, established a set of SOPs, created a logistical procedure, training and evaluation procedures and command, control, communication and information systems (CIS). Further policy development was pursued in formulating the ASF concept for rapid deployment, a continental ASF training plan to be completed in 2010. Development of ASF continental and regional logistics depots, which will support ASF future deployments. Verification of the operational readiness of pledged troops from the various sub regions have commenced but at a slow pace relative to the 2010 deadline. Finally efforts to establish an initial planning capacity for the ASF at the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa has registered modest progress as several staff officers have so far been recruited with support from and working in tandem with
AU partners. If plans come to fruition, by the end of this decade Africa should have a six Brigade, UN style force ready to contain conflicts.

According to the findings the ASF’s formation, which is of great significance, embodies Africa’s long desired dream of policing its own trouble spots. Political support is not lacking for the ASF, but valid concerns persist about the financial implications of developing it. Significant costs related to its establishment have led African leaders have continued to seek support from the international community. Realising that financial and technical assistance will be pivotal to successful ASF development, a joint Africa/G8 Action Plan aims to enhance African capabilities to undertake peace support operations so that by 2010, Africa and its partners will be able to prevent and resolve violent conflict on the continent. On the primary basis of financial constraints, the institutional and operational limitations of regional organisations to undertake complex peace-building operations and the emerging division of labour between the UN and regional organisations, it is unlikely that the AU or regional organisations will often undertake a long term peace operations in the foreseeable future. Instead, more often than not, the AU is likely to undertake military observer type operations like it did with AMIB, AMIS and AMISOM and regional organisations like ECOWAS are likely to undertake short term stabilisation missions as was the case with ECOMILY.

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186 Ibid
187 An interview with EASTBRIG personnel based in Karen and personnel who have been involved in the Somalia mission (AMISOM)
4.7 Chapter summary

This chapter presented the findings on the topic securing Africa; the role of the African standby force. It was analysed under the following subtopics: Driving factors for the OAU/AU to Create African Standby Force (ASF), Role and Purpose of African Standby Force in Peace Operations, Africa policies in enhancing peace support operations in Africa, U.S. Policy and Recommendations in enhancing peace support operations in Africa, External Actors on Effectiveness of African Standby Force in Enhancing Peace Support Operations in Africa, Challenges faced by ASF in conflict resolution and finally the respondents concluding remarks.

The findings concur with the theory of war which is is embedded in the principles of the concept of peacekeeping operations. The protection of non-combatants has been addressed in connection to both jus ad bellum and jus in bello. In the theory lies the endorsement of the protection of the innocent. Later, the protection of the innocent was explicitly formulated as a jus ad bellum criterion and more specifically as one of the just causes for resorting to lethal force. The commitment to the protection of non-combatants can also be detected in the jus in bello criteria and thus the criteria addressing how soldiers should conduct themselves in war.
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents summary of the findings, conclusions based on the findings and recommendations there-to securing Africa; role of the African standby force. The chapter also presents recommendations for further studies.

5.2 Summary of Findings

The study aimed to assess securing Africa; role of the African standby force. The study established that ASF was meant to have a multidimensional capacity with civilian, police and military components. For instance, it was discovered that Article 13 of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) Protocol provides for an ASF that shall be composed of multidisciplinary civilian and military components. The findings also noted that the Protocol goes on to state that the AU should establish and centrally manage a roster of “mission administration” and “civilian experts” to handle human rights, humanitarian, governance, reconstruction and DDR functions in future missions.\(^{188}\)

According to the finding\(^\text{189}\) the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) developed an internal follow-on roadmap document in November 2006, although this document has no formal status. One of the significant developments has been the conceptualization of an ASF rapid deployment capability. The ASF peace support

\(^{188}\) Ibid
\(^{189}\) International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2010), The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: IDRC).
missions within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations are mandated by the PSC which is the strategic level decision-making body. The findings also revealed that once the missions have been given a mandate, they are placed under the command and control of a Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC), who is responsible for appointing a force commander, commissioner of police and head of the civilian components. The PSC is the mandates approving body. Once deployed, ASF forces are placed under AU command and control.

5.3 Discussion of the findings

5.3.1 Past efforts at securing Africa in the absence African standby force

According to the findings African Union before emergence of ASF established Peace and Security Council (PSC) to promote peace, security and stability in Africa. This is in order to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property, the well-being of the African people and their environment, as well as the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development. Additionally, the findings reveal that PSC’s great objective was made to anticipate and prevent conflicts. In circumstances where conflicts have occurred, the Peace and Security Council have the responsibility to undertake peace-making and peace-building functions for the resolution of these conflicts. From the study findings it was discovered that before the establishment of

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African Standby Force (ASF) PSC always made effort to pursuing peace, security and stability on the continent.

5.3.1 African standby force as a mechanism Africa Union for enhancing peace support operations in Africa

According to the study findings at the center of the African Union’s collective security apparatus is the African Standby Force. The ASF is designed as a continental peacekeeping system of both civilian and military components. Unlike a standing army, the ASF consist of a quick response unit able to effectively and rapidly move in to prevent the emergence, or scale, of African conflicts that have historically engulfed the continent and prevented the conditions necessary for foreign investment and stable economic growth. From the findings it is noted that this ‘African solution to African problems’ is made to remove the over reliance the continent has long had on UN and Western powers to intervene in African conflicts.

The study further found out that the ASF is one of the pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), alongside the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, the Military Staff Committee, the Peace Fund and the AU’s PSC. The ASF is thus part of a holistic African approach to engaging in conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building.

191 Ibid
It was also noticed that the ASF is a continental standby capacity with a brigade-sized multidimensional (military, police and civilian) standby arrangement in each of the AU’s five regions: North, South, East, West and Central Africa. The ASF Policy Framework was approved in 2003, and has been implemented in several phases or ‘roadmaps’. The initial target was set for 2010, but when that target was only partially met, a new target for full operational capability was set for 2015. According to the study findings it was noted that detailed tasks of the African Standby Force and its modus operandi for each authorized mission is considered and approved by the Peace and Security Council upon recommendation of the Commission. As an approach, the development of the concept of the ASF must be informed by the dynamics of relevant conflict and mission scenarios, the instructive experiences of the existing Mechanism, as well as by the experience of the UN System in peace operations, and by other models evolved outside of Africa. As far as possible, the ASF use UN doctrine, guidelines, training and standards.

5.3.3 Prospects and challenges of African Standby Force

On challenges of African Standby Force the study findings revealed that given the economic situation of many African countries as well as their military and personnel capabilities, it would seem likely that the ASF concept is unable to overcome many of these problems. Although the ASF has the potential to contribute substantially to addressing problems of force generation (ASF forces are pledged
before the decision for deployment), it cannot entirely overcome the issue of capability given that the overall force strength of the ASF is itself limited.  

The study further found out that adequate training is an important technical requirement and a prerequisite for the operational readiness of the ASF capabilities. Given that ASF brigades are constituted of multidimensional contingents based in their countries of origin, there is a need for continuous training at different levels which is not an easy thing to accomplish. It requires a number of well-equipped, well-resourced and well-staffed training centres that can provide regional and continental support. However, the findings also revealed that there has been common problems in all peacekeeping operations undertaken by the AU and sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS. To date, the AU and its RECs have mounted peacekeeping operations in Burundi, the Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Somalia. The study too found that while these missions have shown the value of a quick response for containing violence and contributing to the resolution of conflicts, „the ability to implement their respective mandates has often been constrained by a lack of military capabilities, insufficient resources and inadequate institutional capacity to plan, manage, deploy and liquidate operations“ .

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According to the findings the absence of predictable and sustainable funding has been linked to a number of critical operational limitations, including: The inability to reach mandated troop levels; Limited operational effectiveness owing to a short term focus on the availability of funding, as opposed to a longer term strategic focus on achieving the mandate; In the case of the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), a difficult transition from an under resourced African Union operation to a hybrid peacekeeping operation (the African Union -United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)); An unsustainable administrative, coordination and financial management burden placed on a limited African Union capacity by multiple donors’ reporting and oversight mechanisms.\footnote{ibid}

It was also noted that the challenge for the AU is not just one of mobilizing the required funding for its future ASF missions but also of developing the necessary financial administrative and regulatory framework to ensure the efficient and transparent management of funds. Much work needs to be done on the modalities of channeling and administering funding for ASF missions to ensure reliable and timely funding for operations and to ensure that funds are channeled and administered effectively.

5.4 Conclusion

The study noted that the ASF is not the solution to African conflicts but it is a fundamental element towards finding a solution. Its success is challenged by, among others, the fact that capability of the regional economic communities is very uneven and there is no clarity about mandating authority. Furthermore, given that the ASF is
organized along the lines of five regional brigades, its capabilities are raised and
developed by the regional economic communities that form part of the building block of
the APSA. This gives rise to political and organizational challenges. Notwithstanding
the memorandum of understanding signed between AU and RECs on their general
relationship, there is nothing that specifically regulates their respective roles and
powers with respect to the use and authorization of ASF capabilities. As a result, there is
lack of clarity about whether the AU needs to negotiate with RECs/RMs on the use of the
brigades that they have raise and maintain.\textsuperscript{196}

On African standby force as a mechanism Africa Union PSC for enhancing peace support
operations in Africa the study concludes that the African Standby Force concept,
approved in 2003, is a priority for the PSC as the primary means of future AU peace
operations. Based on standby multidisciplinary contingents, the ASF is envisioned with
civilian and military components stationed in their home countries and ready for call-up
and deployment. The ASF peace and security responsibilities are broad, with the force
expected to serve multiple, diverse purposes, including monitoring and observation
missions, preventive deployments, peace building efforts and post-conflict missions, and
peace support operations and interventions.\textsuperscript{197} The ASF concept outlines the need for
training guidelines for both civilian and military personnel contingents at the operational
and tactical levels, and envisions training to be in accordance with UN practices and
standards. Non-military aspects of the ASF include a standby capacity for civilian police,

\textsuperscript{196}Ibid

\textsuperscript{197}Karuru, N. “Conflict Prevention: Responses by Subregional Organizations and Civil Society
pp. 263-288
as well as civilian experts in areas such as human rights, governance, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.\textsuperscript{198}

On challenges of African Standby Force the study noted that The AU’s peacekeeping management capability is still being developed, and in the short term its existing structure will allow it to control and command only small missions. It may need to resort to ad hoc strategic management capability, as it has done for AMIS and currently for the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), for big missions. The number of staff of the AU PSOD is very small if one considers the tasks they are expected to undertake for the operationalization of the ASF and the planning, management and support of existing and new missions.\textsuperscript{199} The study therefore conclude that there is need for AU employs a larger number of specialists and experts, along with more general staff, who will be able to provide better internal coordination and allow for a clearer division of responsibilities.

5.5 Recommendations

The study suggested that the AU should employ a larger number of specialists and experts, along with more general staff, who will be able to provide better internal coordination and allow for a clearer division of responsibilities. The study also recommends that there is also a need for a clear definition of the different levels

\textsuperscript{198} Paul D. Williams, \textit{From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: The Origins and Development of the African Union’s Security Culture}, African Affairs 106, no. 423 (2007).

of command and control at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The AU and RECs/RMs also need to put in place the infrastructure that will enable the different actors to exercise and enforce command and control on deployed ASF missions. Furthermore, a decision should be taken on the official language for missions at the regional and continental levels as this will go a long way towards facilitating effective command and control of missions at all levels. The study recommends that if the ASF is to serve as an effective means for the management and resolution of conflicts, the AU needs to put in place a more efficient decision-making process for the deployment of the ASF. This must of course be reconciled with the need for the timely deployment of an ASF mission to ensure that such a mission is effective in responding to conflicts in Africa.

Further, consistent with the types of conflict experienced in Africa, the PSC protocol provides for a timely and prompt response to conflicts and crisis situations.\textsuperscript{200} If the ASF is to meet this requirement, there is a need for not merely a decision-making process, but one which is efficient. Furthermore, the study recommends that there is also a need for a mechanism for developing lessons learned and ensuring that such lessons are integrated into the planning of future missions and management of existing ones. No provision has been made in existing AU ASF documents for such a mechanism. This should be rectified during Exercise AMANI, if not earlier. At both AU and REC/RM levels, the proposed rostering system for maintaining a database on available civilian and police capability from which the AU could recruit individual civilians and police officers

for various ASF missions needs to be instituted and start functioning.\footnote{Marten, K. Enforcing the Peace: Learning From the Imperial Past. New York: (Columbia University Press. 2011).} The contribution and role of existing nongovernmental rostering systems should also be used and their modalities properly defined. The study too recommends that the AU should provide more guidance to RECs/RMs to ensure that the different brigades adhere to the same standards and achieve the same level of readiness.
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APPENDIX: INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. What were the driving factors for the OAU/AU to create ASF?

2. In your own opinion what is the role and purpose of ASF?

3. Do you think relationship between the AU and the regional economic community’s needs to be strengthened?

4. In your own view what is the influence of Africa policies in enhancing peace support operations in Africa?

5. What’s the role of external actors on effectiveness of African Standby Force in enhancing peace support operations in Africa?

6. In your own view what’s the role played by the RECs under ASF in enhancing peace support operations in Africa?

7. What are the new approach to African conflict resolution?

8. What are the challenges faced by ASF in conflict resolution?

9. What are your final comments on the topic role of the African standby force in enhancing peace support operations in Africa?