APPLICATION OF MULTIPLE DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS IN PREDICTING FINANCIAL DISTRESS OF COMMERCIAL AND MANUFACTURING STATE CORPORATIONS IN KENYA

TUDA REBECCA AWINO

A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN FINANCE, SCHOOL OF BUSINESS UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

2016

DECLARATION

I hereby affirm that this research project is the product of my own work and it has not been accepted for the award of degree or professional qualification in any institution of higher learning.

Signature.....

Date.....

TUDA REBECCA AWINO

D63/79271/2015

This Research project has been presented for examination with my approval as University Supervisor.

Signature.....

Date

DR. WINNIE NYAMUTE

LECTURER,

DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING

SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I start by appreciating the Almighty for giving me an opportunity to chase my dreams of accomplishing my post graduate degree in MSc Finance. He has given me strength to soldier on despite many challenges that came my way.

My greatest appreciation goes to Dr. Winnie Nyamute, whose able supervision, guidance and patience has significantly contributed to the eventual completion of my research project.

Special thanks are addressed to the companies which granted me access to their documents and information for purposes of the project.

Lastly, I cannot forget to thank my mother Rachael and brothers Godfrey, Arthur and Paul for their tremendous support, encouragement and their constant prayers.

DEDICATION

This project is dedicated to my mother Rachael who has guided and shaped my academic progress since childhood. To my brothers Godfrey, Arthur and Paul for providing moral support which has seen me through the challenges I encountered while undertaking my MSc Finance degree course.

Table of Contents

| DECLARATION | I |
|-----------------------|------|
| ACKNOWLEDGEMENT | ii |
| DEDICATION | iii |
| LIST OF TABLES | viii |
| LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS | ix |
| ABSTRACT | x |

| CHAPTER ONE |
|---|
| INTRODUCTION1 |
| 1.1 Background of the study1 |
| 1.1.1 Multiple Discriminant Analysis |
| 1.1.2 Financial Distress |
| 1.1.3 Multiple Discriminant Analysis and Financial Distress |
| 1.1.4 State Corporations in Kenya7 |
| 1.2 Research Problem |
| 1.3 Research Objectives11 |
| 1.4 Value of the Study11 |

| CHAPTER TWO | 13 |
|---|----|
| LITERATURE REVIEW | 13 |
| 2.1 Introduction1 | 13 |
| 2.2 Theoretical Review | 13 |
| 2.2.1 Gambler's Ruin Theory1 | 13 |
| 2.2.2 Cash Management Theory1 | 14 |
| 2.2.3 Entropy Theory | 14 |
| 2.3 Determinants of Financial Distress | 15 |
| 2.3.1 Liquidity1 | 15 |
| 2.3.2 Leverage1 | 15 |
| 2.3.3 Profitability1 | 16 |
| 2.3.4 Firms Growth | 16 |
| 2.3.5 Management Inefficiency1 | 16 |
| 2.4 Empirical Studies1 | 16 |
| 2.5 Summary of Literature Review and research gaps1 | 17 |
| 2.6 Conceptual Model1 | 18 |

| CHAPTER THREE | 20 |
|----------------------|----|
| RESEARCH METHODOLOGY | 20 |
| 3.1 Introduction | 20 |

| 3.2 Research Design | 20 |
|-----------------------------|----|
| 3.3 Population | 20 |
| 3.4 Sample | 20 |
| 3.5 Data Collection | 21 |
| 3.6 Data Analysis | 21 |
| 3.6.1 Analytical Model | 22 |
| 3.6.2 Tests of Significance | 24 |

| CHAPTER FOUR | 25 |
|---|----|
| DATA ANALYSIS, FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS2 | 25 |
| 4.1. Introduction | 25 |
| 4.2 Descriptive Analysis | 25 |
| 4.2.1 Non-distressed State Corporations | 25 |
| 4.2.2 Analysis of Non-distressed State Corporations | 26 |
| 4.2.4 Distressed State Corporations | 30 |
| 4.2.5 Analysis of distressed State Corporations | 31 |
| 4.3 Regression analysis | 33 |
| 4.4 Correlation Analysis | 35 |
| 4.5 Interpretation of Findings and Discussions | 35 |

| CHAPTER FIVE | 38 |
|--|----|
| SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS | 38 |
| 5.1 Introduction | 38 |
| 5.2 Summary of Findings and Discussions | 38 |
| 5.3 Conclusions | 39 |
| 5.4 Limitations of the Study | 40 |
| 5.5 Recommendations | 41 |
| 5.5.1 Policy Recommendations | 41 |
| 5.5.2 Suggestions for Further Research | 41 |
| REFERENCES | 43 |
| APPENDICES | 53 |
| Appendix I: Commercial and Manufacturing State Corporations | 53 |
| Appendix II: Non- Financially Distressed State Corporations | 54 |
| Appendix III: Financially Distressed State Corporations | 58 |
| Appendix IV: Pearson's correlation coefficient interpretations | 60 |

LIST OF TABLES

| Table 2.6: Conceptual Model. | 17 |
|---|-----|
| Table 4.2.1: Non-distressed State Corporations | .23 |
| Table 4.2.2: Altman (1993) Z" score for Non-distressed State Corporations | .24 |
| Table 4.2.3: Accuracy of Altman (1993) model on non-distressed State Corporations | .27 |
| Table 4.2.4: Distressed State Corporations | 27 |
| Table 4.2.5: Altman Z'' (1993) Score for Distressed State Corporations | 28 |
| Table 4.2.6: Accuracy of Altman (1993) model on Distressed State Corporations | .29 |
| Table 4.3.1: Regression Analysis Statistics | 30 |
| Table 4.3.2: ANOVA Analysis | 30 |
| Table 4.3.3: Summary of coefficients | 31 |
| Table 4.4: Correlation Analysis | .31 |

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| ANN | Artificial Neural Network |
|--------|---|
| BVE | Book Value of Equity |
| CF | Cash Flow |
| EBIT | Earnings before Interest and Tax |
| EBITDA | Earnings before Interest, Depreciation and Amortization |
| FMCG | Fast Moving Consumer Goods |
| KBC | Kenya Broadcasting Corporation |
| KES | Kenyan Shillings |
| MDA | Multiple Discriminant Analysis |
| RE | Retained Earnings |
| ТА | Total assets |
| TARDA | Tana River Development Authority |
| TD | Total debt |
| TL | Total Liabilities |
| WC | Working Capital |
| | |

ABSTRACT

Commercial and Manufacturing state owned corporations are heavily financed by the National Treasury and they perform important functions that ensure smooth running of the nation. Instances of financial distress or failure of State Corporations normally lead to great financial implications in the economy especially in terms of job losses. This raises valid concerns to investors and all other stakeholders. Therefore, the core objective of the study is to find out whether Altman (1993) model is applicable in predicting financial distress of Commercial and Manufacturing State Corporations in Kenya. This will assist various stakeholders in the Kenyan financial industry to react to distress signals in State Corporations early enough to avoid corporate failure. Exploratory research design was adopted in this study where a census was carried out on the 27 Commercial and Manufacturing State Corporations. The period of study was five (5) years ranging from the financial year 2010-2011 to 2014-2015. The audited financial accounts of State Corporations provided secondary financial data. This data was used to extract liquidity, profitability and leverage ratios which were then summed up to arrive at the Z-Score. Data analysis was conducted through the use of MS Excel where correlation and regression tests were tabulated. The research findings indicate that Altman (1993) model is reliable in predicting financial distress of Commercial and Manufacturing State Corporations in Kenya since it predicted accurately 66.32% of non-distressed corporations and 75% of distressed firms. Further, the findings provide evidence that liquidity (WC/TA), profitability (RE/TA) and leverage (BVE/TL) ratios had a major influence on financial distress prediction. Short-term profitability ratio (EBIT/TA) did not have much influence. The outcome of this study suggests that stakeholders in a firm can predict failure before it occurs by paying close attention to liquidity, long-term profitability and leverage ratios. This will enable them avoid the losses associated with failures by taking appropriate actions in advance.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the study

Financial distress is a situation whereby a company is faced with a temporary lack of liquidity and has difficulties in fulfilling financial obligations on schedule and to the full extent (Gordon, 1971). Financial distress has been one of the most recurrent symptom of mismanagement and waste in State Corporations. Despite the fact that they are heavily financed and subsidized by the government, they have continued to record poor performance. A worryingly large number of State Corporations whose accounts have been examined by Public Investment Committee have been described as being technically insolvent.

State corporations have been such a drain on the public purse since the 1980s. Further, they have continued to report numerous financial distress cases thus raising the need for prediction of their financial soundness and the likely occurrence of financial distress.

Financial distress and failure of State Corporations such as Pan Paper Mills and Kisumu Cotton Mill has motivated the need to determine whether Multiple Discriminant Analysis is reliable in predicting financial distress in Commercial and Manufacturing State Corporations. Predicting financial distress as early as possible with sound accuracy will enable State Corporations take corrective measures to mitigate costs associated with bankruptcy and failure thus improving financial stability of the economy.

1.1.1 Multiple Discriminant Analysis

MDA is a statistical model which is used to classify an observation into one of several a priori groupings dependent upon the observation's individual characteristics. In the analysis, explicit groupings are first established, next data is collected for the various objects and then a linear combination of these characteristics is computed. MDA is able to determine a set of discriminant coefficients from a set of quantifiable characteristics from a company. The following is the model;

$$Z = C_1 X_1 + C_2 X_2 + C_3 X_3 + \dots Cn Xn$$

Where $C_1, C_2, C_3...Cn$ are discriminant coefficients while $X_1, X_2, X_3...Xn$ are independent variables. The MDA computes the discriminant coefficients, W_1 -Wn while the independent variables X_1 -Xn are the actual values. The results of the analysis are usually used to confirm the correctness of grouping technique. In 1968 Altman came up with a five-variable Z-Score;

 $Z{=}\ 0.012 X_1 + 0.014 X_2 + 0.033 X_3 + 0.006 X_4 + 0.999 X_5$

 X_1 = working capital /total assets

- X_2 = retained earnings /total assets
- X_3 = earnings before interest and tax / total assets
- X_4 = market value equity/ book value of debt
- $X_5 =$ sales /total assets
- Z= overall index

This model was based on ratios from listed manufacturing companies. The zones of discrimination were: Z > 2.99 – "Non-bankrupt", 1.81 < Z < 2.99 – "Grey" and Z < 1.81 - "Bankrupt"

This model was later modified to suit privately owned companies. The resultant model was:

$$Z = 0.717X_1 + 0.847X_2 + 3.107X_3 + 0.420X_4 + 0.998X_5$$

Firms were found to be in the non-bankrupt sector if they had a Z score which was greater than 2.90. Bankrupt firms recorded a score of 1.23 and below. Grey area ranged from 1.23 to 2.90; a firm falling in this area was difficult to classify. Altman (1993) model was a modified model which was meant to apply to privately held firms and non-manufacturing firms. Sales to total assets ratio (X_5) was eliminated because it varied significantly from one industry to the other; it was higher in trading and service firms because their assets were not much, and lower in manufacturing firms which are capital intensive in terms of assets. To correct this anomaly, Altman eliminated X_5 ratio and the resultant model was as follows:

 $Z = 6.56X_1 + 3.26X_2 + 6.72X_3 + 1.05X_4$

Where: $X_1 = (Current Assets - Current Liabilities)/Total Assets$ $X_2 = Retained Earnings/Total Assets$

 $X_3 = Earnings$ before Interest and Taxes/Total Assets

 $X_4 = Book Value of Equity/Total Liabilities$

Z'' > 2.60 - "Safe" Zone 1.1 < Z'' < 2.60 - "Grey" Zone Z'' < 1.1 - "Distress" Zone

In 1984 Fulmer et al. came up with "nine variable" MDA model:

 $H = 5.528 (X_1) + 0.212 (X_2) + 0.073 (X_3) + 1.270 (X_4) - 0.120 (X_5) + 2.335 (X_6) + 0.575 (X_7) + 1.083 (X_8) + 0.894 (X_9) - 6.075$

Where;

 $X_1 = Retained Earning/Total Assets$

 $X_2 = Sales/Total Assets$

 $X_3 = EBT/Equity$

 $X_4 = Cash Flow/Total Debt$

 $X_5 = \text{Debt/Total Assets}$

X₆ = Current Liabilities/Total Assets

 $X_7 = Log Tangible Total Assets$

 $X_8 = Working Capital/Total Debt$

 $X_9 = Log EBIT/Interest$

If H < 0; then the firm is classified as "failed"

The model classified correctly the companies one year prior to failure at an accuracy rate

of 98% and 81% accurate in classifying them more than one year prior to bankruptcy.

A step-wise MDA was used by Gordon Springate in 1978. From 19 financial ratios, 4 ratios

that best discriminated successful from non-successful firms were selected.

Springate model:

Z=1.03W + 3.07X + 0.66Y + 0.4Z

Where; W = Working Capital / Total Assets

X = Net Profit before Interest and Tax / Total Assets

Y = Net Profit before Tax / Current Liabilities

Z = Sales / Total Assets

If Z score < 0.862 then; "failed company", accuracy level being 92.5%.

1.1.2 Financial Distress

Various researchers and stakeholders define financial distress in numerous ways. Baldwin and Mason (1983) and Andrade and Kaplan (1998), defined financial distress as a situation whose incidence differentiates between the period a firm is financially robust and the time it is financially weak and it demands coming up with measures to mitigate costs associated with this troubled state.

Gordon (1971) defines financial distress in terms of a process. The process starts from financial distress, then failure and is lastly followed by financial restructuring and security valuation. According to Turetsky and MacEwen (2001), financial distress is a multi-stage process, each stage having a distress point.

According to Asquith et al. (1994), if a firm's EBITDA in two consecutive years is below 80% of the firm's interest expense, then it is financially distressed. In this situation a firm usually has lower profitability levels, is heavily leveraged and has difficulty in meeting current obligations with the available cash. Financial distress is a circumstance in which a company cannot meet its current obligations using operating cash flows and it is therefore faced with the need to employ corrective measures (Wruck 1990). According to Hendel (1996), chances of a company going into bankruptcy is high if its levels of liquid assets are low and it cannot access credit. According to Outecheva (2007), a firm faces two possible conflicts when it is experiencing financial distress; either limited cash balances or high leverage levels resulting into inadequate cash flow to cover immediate obligations. Therefore, a company is forced to take corrective action such as restructuring (Outecheva, 2007).

Empirical evidences have shown that financial distress is caused by factors such as high debt levels and poor management practices. Financial distress costs can be divided into two; direct costs and indirect costs (O'Neill, 1986). Direct costs may include management fees, legal fees and auditors' fees while indirect costs may come in the form of conservative managers cutting down on investments to spare cash, lack of access to new sources of capital, poor reputation, and loss of customer base.

A Company faced with financial distress can take measures such as merging with other companies, disposing major assets, reducing capital spending, negotiating with banks and other creditors, issuing new securities, and undertaking debt restructuring (Ross et al., 2002).

1.1.3 Multiple Discriminant Analysis and Financial Distress

In 1968, Altman developed the Z-score which was based on multiple discriminant analysis. Altman used this original model to predict bankruptcy in US manufacturing firms. He used a sample of 66 companies from USA with an asset range of \$0.7-\$25.9 million (for thirty three bankrupt corporations) and \$1-\$25 million (for thirty three successful corporations) over the period 1946 to 1964. The model achieved 95% accuracy in classifying firms correctly for data one year to bankruptcy, for data two years to bankruptcy the model achieved 72% accuracy in classification. Using secondary samples, the model achieved accuracy levels of 96% categorizing bankrupt firms and classified correctly 79% of non-bankrupt firms. When testing was done for more than two years the model proved unreliable.

In 1980 Dambolena and Khoury used a ratio stability measure and stepwise discriminant analysis to sample 46 US firms which were grouped into failed and non-failed categories. Their period of study was eight (8) years ranging from 1969 to 1975. From the extracted data, four (4) major ratios were derived; turnover, profitability, indebtedness and activity ratios. They tested predictive correctness of the model with stability measures and one without stability measures. They concluded that the model with stability measures was better in predictive accuracy. In 2010, Hayes S., Hodge K. and Hughes L. applied Altman's Z-score model on US based public retail firms to determine whether the model could predict financial distress. They used the Altman's re-estimated model for non-manufacturing firms on a sample of companies in the years 2007 and 2008. They concluded that the Z" Score was 90% accurate in predicting financial distress.

Onyeiwu, C., & Aliemeke, G. (2009) investigated the applicability of Altman's model in discriminating between financially robust and weak companies in Nigeria in the year 2009. From the results they concluded that that Altman's model could accurately predict financial failure of banks in Nigeria. In 2011, Johansson & Kumbaro used the Z score and Z'' score models to predict bankruptcy of 45 firms in America in the years 2007 to 2010. The models predicted accurately bankruptcy two years prior to failure. However, in 2001, studies by Grice and Ingram concluded that the Z-score gave negative results in recent periods and to manufacturing firms.

1.1.4 State Corporations in Kenya

The core roles of State Corporations are promoting or accelerating economic growth, delivery of public services, creation of employment opportunities and building of international partnerships. While State Corporations play a crucial economic role, evidence from the 1970s and 1980s from a number of countries shows that, on average, state owned corporations have performed poorly relative to private firms (Manduku, 2008). According

to Manduku (2008), State Corporations have often incurred substantial financial losses and became an unsustainable burden on the national budget and banking system.

In 2008 the global financial crisis was characterized by numerous business failures and bailouts. Locally, State Corporations such as Pan Paper Mills and Kisumu Cotton Mills have collapsed not forgetting Uchumi, Kenya Airways and Mumias Sugar Company which are financially distressed. The failure of companies normally lead to huge financially losses to the various stakeholders hence creating a need for a prediction mechanism. According to Economictimes.Indiatimes.com (2010), simultaneous financial failure of companies may adversely affect the economy of a country and those of her neighbors. According to Macharia (2012), parastatals are deeply implicated in most fiscal problems of African governments because of their inefficiency, losses, budgetary burdens, and provision of poor products and services. Occasionally, they achieve some non-commercial objectives, which are used to justify their poor economic performance.

The 20th Annual Report of the Public Investments Committee, (December 2015), concluded that many state owned corporations operate under financial difficulties occasioned by imprudent commercial practices and/or mismanagement, they over rely on exchequer for continued financial support and they spend beyond approved budget. In 2005, Centre for Governance and Development reviewed Kenyan State Corporations' financial reports for the period 1993 to 2002 and observed that there was a lot of waste in resources. The report concluded that apart from losses, most corporations were also unable to service loans and were working with negative capital. From these reports it is clear that state corporations need proper financial management practices so as to avoid financial distress and huge losses that comes with it. In 1999 McCrindell stated that financial

management and control is the bedrock of government management. Proper financial management leads to efficient, effective and proper use of public resources and improvement of national economy.

1.2 Research Problem

Various stakeholders such as citizens of a country, investors, auditors, bankers, governmental and regulatory bodies value financial strength of a company. In addition, based on the going concern principle, a company is assumed to continue to operate in the foreseeable future. Commercial and Manufacturing state owned corporations are heavily financed by the National Treasury and they perform important functions that ensure smooth running of the nation. In the event of financial distress or failure of State Corporations, the financial implications are normally felt by the greater economy especially in terms of job losses. Instances of State Corporations financial distress and failure thus raise valid concerns to all stakeholders. The expectation of this research project is to contribute to the body of knowledge in the prediction of financial distress and failure so as to assist the various stakeholders in Kenya to react to distress signals in State Corporations, early enough to avoid corporate failure.

State Corporations in Kenya provide crucial services to the public and foster wider development goals. Despite these roles, they continue to face financial difficulties. In the recent past, the government has been forced to bailout several state owned enterprises facing financial problems using taxpayers money. Among them are Mumias Sugar Company, Kenya Airways and TARDA which received KES 1 billion, KES 4.2 billion and KES 2.4 billion respectively. The state has also been servicing Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) loan of KES 32.3 billion and so far it has paid KES 7.1 billion. Financing such corporations has put a strain on the state's resources hence, creating a need for prediction of the financial soundness and the likely occurrence of financial distress in State Corporations. Early prediction would enable various stakeholders take corrective action and mitigate costs associated with failure.

Numerous studies on prediction of financial distress and failure have relied on financial ratios. Beaver (1966) used the univariate model to predict corporate failure and he found that non-liquid asset ratios were better predictors of failure. In 1968 Altman utilized financial ratios in predicting bankruptcy and he showed significant useful results in predicting bankruptcy of manufacturing firms. Altman and Mcough (1974) carried out an analysis of the relationship between bankrupt companies and auditors reports prior to bankruptcy. They observed that Altman's model could give an early signal of going-concern problems. However, Lussier (1995) questioned the effectiveness of ratio-based corporate failure prediction models. In 1990 Gilbert et al. showed financial distress is not only affected by financial factors but also non-financial factors. Therefore, non-financial variables including firm size have been incorporated in prediction models in various studies. In 2001, Westgaard and Van der Wijst applied age and firm size with financial factors into their prediction model based on logistic regression analysis.

There has been progress in Kenya when it comes to studies in prediction of financial distress, bankruptcy and failure. In 1990, Peter Keige conducted a failure prediction study on 20 companies in Kenya with a capital base of Ksh.5 million, which had failed between 1980 and 1990. The model was 90% accurate in forecasting failure two years prior to failure. Kathanje (2000) formulated a multivariate performance predictive model for the banking sector using financial ratios. In his study, liquidity, gearing and earnings had a

significant impact on financial performance of banks. It is evident that most financial distress and failure prediction studies have focused on publicly quoted companies and not state owned corporations. Commercial and Manufacturing State Corporations are unique firms in that they heavily rely on the national treasury and they perform critical roles which ensure the smooth running of the economy. Therefore, their failure could bring negative financial implications to the nation. It is for this reason that it was important to focus on financial distress and failure prediction in Commercial and Manufacturing State Corporations. Therefore, the study sought to answer the question, can Altman (1993) model be used to predict financial distress in Commercial and Manufacturing State Corporations in Kenya?

1.3 Research Objectives

The objective of this study was to establish the applicability of Altman (1993) model in predicting financial distress in Commercial and Manufacturing State Corporations in Kenya.

1.4 Value of the Study

The following stakeholders are expected to get value from the findings of this study as follows:

Investors: This study would assist investors when assessing the ability of a company to make principal and interest payments. Investors adopting an active investment approach may develop strategies based on the assumption that distress prediction models can provide earlier warnings of financial problems than is implicit in the existing security price.

Regulatory authorities: Among the regulatory bodies' responsibilities is the function of monitoring the solvency and stability of companies. State Corporations are also monitored by regulatory bodies such as the National Treasury. From the study, these regulatory bodies will be able to monitor and formulate policies that will facilitate social and economic development and prevent financial distress.

Government: Most State Corporations usually rely heavily on government financing through treasury budgets. Also, during financial distress, governments may be forced to bailout such State Corporations and it is usually costly to the economy. This study will be useful to the government in giving timely signals associated with financial distress in State Corporations so that it can take corrective measures.

Auditors: One opinion that auditors make is whether a firm is a going concern. This judgement affects the asset and liability valuation methods that are deemed appropriate for financial reporting. Therefore, this study will assist the auditors in giving their opinion on the financial viability of a business.

Management: Bankruptcy can mean that a firm incurs both direct and indirect costs. If early warning signals of bankruptcy were observed, these costs could be reduced by management through the arrangement of a merger with another firm or adopting a corporate reorganization plan at a more propitious time.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the previous research work done by various scholars. The first part dwells on the theoretical review, the second part looks at determinants of financial distress and the third section focuses on empirical studies. Finally the chapter ends with the summary of the literature review.

2.2 Theoretical Review

The theories we shall concentrate on are the ones that describe financial distress by focusing on the conditions that are present in the firms. These theories include;

2.2.1 Gambler's Ruin Theory

This theory is based on the concept of profitability. According to Feller (1968), a gambler or speculator has a likelihood of gaining or losing when he is betting. The gambler bets an arbitrary amount of money where he has a chance of either winning or losing in each bet. Similarly, a company can be viewed as a bettor in its daily operations where it has a probability of making gains or losing until it goes bankrupt. Liquidity level of a company is very important as it needs cash for its normal operations. In its daily activities, a company would experience either positive or negative cash flows. Cash inflows may be inform of inventory sales, sale of property and equipment, loans and legal settlements while cash outflows may be inform of purchase of inventory and capital assets, settlement of debts and payment of cash dividends. When a company experiences prolonged periods of negative cash flows, it may get into financial distress and eventually bankruptcy. According to this theory, the solvency of a company is guaranteed when its value exceeds zero. The major limitation of this theory is that it makes an assumption that a company normally has a certain amount of money which it can use to gamble.

2.2.2 Cash Management Theory

Cash management is concerned with cash forecasting, collecting, disbursing, investing and planning for the smooth running of a firm (Zimmerer et al, 2008). According to Watson and Head (2007), cash management is a theory which entails the optimization of available cash, maximizing interest on investments and reducing losses occasioned by delays in transmission of monies. Cash management is concerned with three issues; amount of liquid resources to hold, determination of how much liquid resources should be held as cash and marketable securities and finally maturity of marketable securities portfolio.

The main worry of every business, especially small businesses is the short-term management of cash flows. Forecasting cash flows perfectly is a challenging task, especially cash inflows (Aziz & Dar, 2006). In the normal business operations cash inflows sometimes are surpassed by cash outflows due to increased expenses such as payment of dividends, salaries, taxes and restocking of the business. If the function of cash management collapses, this may lead to financial distress and eventual bankruptcy of the firm (Aziz & Dar, 2006).

2.2.3 Entropy Theory

Financial distress of a firm can be predicted by carefully looking at the changes occurring in the statement of financial position (Aziz and Dar, (2004). It would be difficult for a firm to maintain an equilibrium state if the structure of assets and liabilities in the statement of financial position significantly change over a prolonged time period. If these changes become uncontrollable in future, financial distress can be predicted (Aziz & Dar, 2006). The major assumption of this theory is that failing companies have volatile financial performance. This volatility leads to greater degrees of change in the books of accounts. Successful firms tend to have stable performance, hence stable books of accounts.

2.3 Determinants of Financial Distress

2.3.1 Liquidity

According to Keynes (1936), the motives for holding cash are for transaction, precaution and speculation purposes. These motives can be extended to companies as they require liquid assets for daily operations, to pay unexpected debt, for acquisitions and expansions and other profitable investment opportunities. Lack of liquidity may reflect a fall in asset prices, deterioration in external sources of finance and reduction in market base. Keige (1991) and Kiragu (1993) demonstrated that liquidity, leverage, and debt service ratios were crucial in predicting financial distress and bankruptcy.

2.3.2 Leverage

Leverage, refers to the amount of debt or borrowing of a company to finance operations. In 1994, Titman and Opler observed the significant positive relationship between leverage and financial distress. Other studies which have similar conclusions are Keige (1991), Theodossiou et al. (1996) and Tan (2012) among others.

2.3.3 Profitability

Altman (1968) concluded that profitability is one of the significant ratios in predicting failure. According to Wang and Li (2007), profitability has a positive and significant influence on corporate financial distress. Their study on prediction of financial distress employed the rough set model and they focused on a sample of 424 Chinese listed companies, 212 were financially distressed while 212 were non-distressed. Their period of study was from the years 1998 to 2005. Geng, Bose and Chen (2015) concluded that financial distress can be predicted by looking at the effect of a firm's profitability.

2.3.4 Firms Growth

The main factors which indicate a firm's growth are increase in earnings (profitability) and sales volume. A study by Altman in 1984 concluded that one of the major signals of financial trouble was a fall in sales volume. Whitaker (1999) observed that profitability of a firm drops below that of the industry as financial distress starts to occur.

2.3.5 Management Inefficiency

According to Ooghe & Prijcker (2008), business failures and bankruptcy occur because of management characteristics including deprived management qualities and skills, poor corporate policy and inadequate strategies. Jahur and Quadir (2012) carried out a study on the causes of financial distress in Bangladesh and they found poor management to be a major cause of financial distress.

2.4 Empirical Studies

Financial distress and bankruptcy prediction is an area that has elicited a lot of interest from academicians and researches since the late 1960s. In 1967 Beaver pioneered the building

of a corporate failure prediction model with financial ratios. In his study he noted that CF/ TD ratio had a great influence on corporate bankruptcy. In 1968 Altman used financial ratios and MDA to develop a model to predict corporate bankruptcy. He utilized 66 companies from USA with an asset range of \$0.7-\$25.9 million (for thirty three bankrupt corporations) and \$1-\$25 million (for thirty three successful corporations) over the period 1946 to 1964. Using the firm's balance sheet and income statement he calculated solvency, profitability, liquidity, leverage, and activity ratios. Using data from the initial sample, the model achieved 95% accuracy in classifying firms correctly for data one year to bankruptcy, for data two years to bankruptcy the model achieved 72% accuracy in classification.

Logit analysis was pioneered by Ohlson (1980). From his results, financial structure, firm size, short-term liquidity and performance were found to have a great influence on bankruptcy. In 2001, Shumway came up with a solution to logit analysis shortcomings by suggesting hazard model. He concluded that hazard model was better than MDA and logit model in predicting bankruptcy.

Kiege (1991), formulated a model to predict business failure among Kenyan companies. The model achieved a prediction accuracy of 90% two years prior to actual failure. Sitati and Odipo (2009) used MDA to predict business failure in Kenya. The target population of 20 firms was composed of the companies listed in the Nairobi Stock exchange in the years 1989 to 2008. This study revealed that the model was 80% successful in predicting failure and 90% accurate in predicting success.

2.5 Summary of Literature Review and research gaps

Financial distress prediction models are numerous and each model has its advantages and

disadvantages. Because of this, the level of accuracies among the models differ. The simplicity of the univariate model is appealing, however, one of its shortcomings is that only one variable can be tested at a time in the analysis.

Multiple Discriminant Analysis has its weaknesses, however, it still compares favorably to other various techniques. Therefore, this study aims at contributing to the body of knowledge by applying Altman (1993) to Commercial and Manufacturing State Corporations in Kenya.

2.6 Conceptual Model

The conceptual model outlines the independent and dependent variables of the study and how they interact. The independent variables are liquidity, profitability and leverage while the dependent variable is financial distress. According to Gilbert et al. (1990), financial distress is characterized by negative cumulative earnings over at least a few consecutive years, losses, and poor performance. Further, according to Outecheva (2007), financial distress is broken down into four sub-stages: performance decline, economic failure, technical insolvency, and default. Therefore, in this study we shall base financial distress on these definitions given above.

Independent Variables

Dependent Variable



CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the research design, target population of study, the basis of sampling, data collection as well as the data analysis techniques employed in the study.

3.2 Research Design

Exploratory design was employed in the study. This is because little is known about prediction of financial distress in State Corporations. Many financial distress prediction studies have dwelt on publicly listed companies, however, less focus has been given to state owned corporations. Therefore, the study was important for obtaining more information on applicability of the Altman's model on Kenyan State Corporations.

3.3 Population

The target population was 27 State Corporations categorized under Commercial and Manufacturing corporations.

3.4 Sample

Census study was applied on the target population where all corporations were considered for analysis (Appendix I). Five financial years were studied, these were 2010/2011 to 2014/2015. Census was preferred to sampling because the target population was small and at the same time a census solved the accuracy problems associated with sampling. Therefore, there was no sampling.

3.5 Data Collection

The study employed secondary source data. Financial data was collected from the annual financial statements and audit reports of the State Corporations. For liquidity, financial data on receivables, inventory, short-term investments, cash in hand and bank, short term debt and accounts payable was collected from the balance sheet. Financial data on profitability included EBIT, retained earnings, and operating revenue while financial data on leverage included book value of equity, current liability and long term liability. To get the total assets, data on non-current assets such as property, plant and equipment was combined with current assets. The financial data collected was then used to derive a Z-Score for estimating financial distress.

3.6 Data Analysis

Data analysis was done using multiple discriminant analysis. It is a model that seeks to determine whether a set of variables significantly differentiate among two or more sets of data, as well as determine specific combination variables that most efficiently differentiate among groups. Altman (1993) model was adopted in the study since it was modified to suit firms which are not publicly traded, manufacturing, non-manufacturing and firms which are in emerging markets.

In this study, financially distressed State Corporations were identified and they were matched with those that had not experienced financial distress, matching was done by the type of industry. The resultant ratios for each of the firms in the periods of interest were objectively weighted and summed up to arrive at an overall score that then became the basis for classification of firms into one of the prior groupings (distressed and nondistressed). The testing model discriminated eight (8) financially distressed Commercial and manufacturing State Corporations against nineteen (19) non-distressed corporations. For the purpose of the study, a financially distressed State Corporation was considered to be one that had been declared technically insolvent, had defaulted and one that had continued to experience performance decline and economic failure in the period of study.

3.6.1 Analytical Model

In this study, this MDA model will be applied:

$$Z^{\prime\prime} = 6.56X_1 + 3.26X_2 + 6.72X_3 + 1.05X_4$$

Where:

Z'' = Score of discrimination

X₁ = Current (Assets-Current Liabilities)/ Total Assets

The ratio measures financial strength of a company in the short-term. Working capital plays a significant role in a firm because it is used in the daily operations of the firm. A positive working capital is a good sign to the firm while a negative working capital shows that the firm will experience difficulties in meeting its obligations. Altman (1968) proved that this liquidity ratio was the most valuable in predicting financial distress.

X₂ = **Retained Earnings/ Total Assets**

Retained earnings refer to the profits which have been accumulated over time by a company. Young companies tend to have lower levels of retained earnings and sometimes they record nil or negative earnings. However, well established firms tend to record high levels of accumulated profits.

X₃ = Earnings before interest and tax/ Total assets

The ratio measures assets efficiency in generating profits. Low EBIT/TA ratio indicates that the firm is not using the assets efficiently in generating profits.

X₄ = Book Value of equity/Total liabilities

The ratio is appropriate where a company is not publicly traded. This private firm model may be appropriate in a smaller, less liquid and informational less efficient market.

Once these ratios had been derived, the Z" score was computed for each observation and the observations were assigned to one of the groups based on this score. The proximity of this score to the various group centroids predicted the degree of financial distress or non-distress of the State Corporation. This model had the following discrimination zones: Z" > 2.60 - "Safe" Zone, 1.10 < Z" < 2.60 - "Grey" Zone, Z" < 1.10 - "Distress" Zone.

A Z-Score of 2.60 and above indicates that a company is financially robust and it is less likely to enter bankruptcy. Z-Scores of between 1.10 and 2.60 are within the grey area. A Z-Score of 1.10 and below indicates that a company is financially distressed and it is likely to go bankrupt.

Therefore, in this study, for purposes of classification or prediction, if a State Corporation's Z-Score was 2.60 and above, it was categorized as financially healthy. However, if the score was 1.10 and below then the corporation was financially distressed. State Corporations with scores ranging between 2.60 and 1.10 fell in the grey area. These discriminating zones will be relevant in providing early warning signals of financial distress and for appropriate corrective measures to be taken especially for State Corporations that are categorized in the grey and distress zones.

Further analysis was done through MS Excel application and findings were presented as descriptive statistics and tables.

3.6.2 Tests of Significance

To determine the significance of the relationship, the following tests were done; the coefficient of determination (\mathbb{R}^2), ANOVA analysis and coefficient of correlation (r) analysis. \mathbb{R}^2 measured the proportion of deviation in the response variable (Z") with the deviations of the predictor variables (X_1 , X_2 and X_3). ANOVA analysis was conducted to test whether there were significant variances among the variables. Finally, correlation coefficients (r) was used to determine the strength and direction of the linear relationship between the dependent variable (Z") and independent variables (X_1 , X_2 and X_3).

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS, FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

4.1. Introduction

The chapter looks into data analysis and interpretation of the results. The objective of this study is to assess the applicability of Altman (1993) model in predicting financial distress in Commercial and Manufacturing State Corporations in Kenya. MS Excel application will be used to analyze quantitative data and the findings will be presented as descriptive statistics and tables.

4.2 Descriptive Analysis

4.2.1 Non-distressed State Corporations

| Table 4.2.1: Non-distressed State Corporations | |
|--|--|
| | |

| | X1 | X2 | X3 | X4 | Z'' |
|--------------------|-------|-------|---------|--------|-------|
| | WC/TA | RE/TA | EBIT/TA | BVE/TL | |
| Mean | 0.15 | 0.17 | 0.06 | 3.77 | 5.86 |
| Standard Deviation | 0.19 | 0.25 | 0.07 | 4.45 | 5.22 |
| Minimum | -0.97 | -0.46 | -0.04 | -0.16 | -7.91 |
| Maximum | 0.52 | 0.74 | 0.48 | 24.00 | 24.98 |
| Count | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Source: Research findings

Zones of discrimination:

Z > 2.60 - "Safe" Zone; 1.10 < Z < 2.60 - "Grey" Zone, and Z < 1.10 - "Distress" Zone

Table 4.2.1 above shows an average of 5.86 for the independent variable (Z) and 5.22 as the standard deviation from 95 observations made from 19 non-distressed State Corporations in the financial years 2010/11 to 2014/15. The average X_1 is 0.15 with a standard deviation of 0.19 varying from a minimum of -0.97 to a maximum 0.52; the average X_2 is 0.17 with a standard deviation of 0.25 varying from a minimum of -0.46 to a maximum 0.74; the average X_3 is 0.06 with a standard deviation of 0.07 varying from a minimum of -0.04 to a maximum of 0.48. X_4 had an average of 3.77, standard deviation was 4.45 was the standard deviation varying from -0.16 to 24.

4.2.2 Analysis of Non-distressed State Corporations

| Ν | Name | Year | X ₁ | X_2 | X ₃ | X4 | Z'' | Zone |
|---|--|---------|-----------------------|-------|-----------------------|-------|-------|----------|
| 1 | EA Portland Cement | 2010/11 | 0.08 | 0.25 | 0.05 | 0.73 | 2.42 | Grey |
| | | 2011/12 | 0.02 | 0.18 | -0.04 | 0.52 | 0.98 | Distress |
| | | 2012/13 | 0.02 | 0.25 | 0.02 | 0.79 | 1.92 | Grey |
| | | 2013/14 | -0.01 | 0.24 | 0 | 0.75 | 1.48 | Grey |
| | | 2014/15 | -0.01 | 0.48 | -0.02 | 1.51 | 2.95 | Safe |
| | Kenya Airports Authority | 2010/11 | 0.07 | 0.5 | 0.1 | 4.66 | 7.64 | Safe |
| 2 | | 2011/12 | 0.12 | 0.53 | 0.11 | 4.23 | 7.74 | Safe |
| | | 2012/13 | 0.12 | 0.53 | 0.14 | 3.19 | 6.84 | Safe |
| | | 2013/14 | 0.15 | 0.55 | 0.14 | 3.19 | 7.07 | Safe |
| | | 2014/15 | 0.21 | 0.5 | 0.07 | 2.67 | 6.29 | Safe |
| 3 | Kenya Ordinance Factories Corporation | 2010/11 | 0.24 | -0.12 | 0.01 | 12.86 | 14.79 | Safe |
| | | 2011/12 | 0.25 | -0.15 | 0.02 | 8.42 | 10.11 | Safe |
| | | 2012/13 | 0.26 | -0.16 | 0.02 | 8.52 | 10.21 | Safe |
| | | 2013/14 | 0.25 | -0.17 | -0.02 | 8.61 | 10.00 | Safe |
| | | 2014/15 | 0.28 | -0.14 | 0.03 | 8.47 | 10.49 | Safe |

Table 4.2.2: Altman (1993) Z" Score for Non-distressed State Corporations

| | Kenya Ports Authority | 2010/11 | 0.14 | 0.11 | 0.09 | 4.79 | 6.95 | Safe |
|---------|---|---|--|---|---|---|--|--|
| | | 2011/12 | 0.02 | 0.18 | 0.15 | 3.38 | 5.22 | Safe |
| 4 | | 2012/13 | 0.03 | 0.23 | 0.08 | 2.62 | 4.24 | Safe |
| | j. | 2013/14 | 0.09 | 0.28 | 0.04 | 3.3 | 5.25 | Safe |
| | | 2014/15 | 0.09 | 0.38 | 0.06 | 3.56 | 5.96 | Safe |
| | | 2010/11 | 0.43 | 0.23 | 0.06 | 10.44 | 14.97 | Safe |
| | Kenva | 2011/12 | 0.48 | 0.28 | 0.06 | 10.63 | 15.65 | Safe |
| 5 | Literature | 2012/13 | 0.49 | 0.15 | 0.06 | 8.93 | 13.48 | Safe |
| | Bureau | 2013/14 | 0.5 | 0.18 | 0.08 | 6.8 | 11.58 | Safe |
| | | 2014/15 | 0.42 | 0.29 | 0.05 | 7.96 | 12.43 | Safe |
| | | 2010/11 | 0.26 | 0.19 | 0.48 | 3.84 | 9.60 | Safe |
| | Iomo | 2011/12 | 0.12 | 0.03 | 0.38 | 1.59 | 5.10 | Safe |
| 6 | Jomo Kenyatta Foundation | 2012/13 | 0.07 | 0.03 | 0.25 | 2.2 | 4.57 | Safe |
| | | 2013/14 | 0.06 | 0.02 | 0.05 | 4.86 | 5.91 | Safe |
| | | 2014/15 | 0 | 0.06 | 0.07 | 8.9 | 10.03 | Safe |
| | | | - | | | | | |
| | | 2010/11 | -0.97 | -0.46 | 0.02 | -0.16 | -7.91 | Distress |
| | Kanya | 2010/11 2011/12 | -0.97 0.05 | -0.46 -0.37 | 0.02 | -0.16 6.47 | -7.91 6.08 | Distress Safe |
| 7 | Kenya Railways | 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 | -0.97 0.05 0.13 | -0.46 -0.37 -0.35 | 0.02 0.03 0.01 | -0.16 6.47 24 | -7.91 6.08 24.98 | Distress Safe Safe |
| 7 | Kenya Railways Corporation | 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 | -0.97 0.05 0.13 0.11 | -0.46 -0.37 -0.35 -0.31 | 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 | -0.16 6.47 24 23.49 | -7.91 6.08 24.98 24.49 | Distress Safe Safe Safe |
| 7 | Kenya Railways Corporation | 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 | -0.97 0.05 0.13 0.11 0.07 | -0.46 -0.37 -0.35 -0.31 -0.08 | 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0 | -0.16 6.47 24 23.49 0.29 | -7.91 6.08 24.98 24.49 0.54 | Distress Safe Safe Safe Distress |
| 7 | Kenya Railways Corporation | 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2010/11 | -0.97 0.05 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.05 | -0.46 -0.37 -0.35 -0.31 -0.08 0.19 | 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0 0 0.04 | -0.16 6.47 24 23.49 0.29 0.76 | -7.91 6.08 24.98 24.49 0.54 1.99 | Distress Safe Safe Safe Distress Grey |
| 7 | Kenya Railways Corporation Kenya | 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2010/11 2011/12 | -0.97 0.05 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.04 | -0.46 -0.37 -0.35 -0.31 -0.08 0.19 0.2 | 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0 0 0.04 0.04 | -0.16 6.47 24 23.49 0.29 0.76 0.75 | -7.91 6.08 24.98 24.49 0.54 1.99 2.04 | Distress Safe Safe Safe Distress Grey Grey |
| 7 | Kenya Railways Corporation Kenya Electricity Generating | 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 | -0.97 0.05 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.04 | -0.46 -0.37 -0.35 -0.31 -0.08 0.19 0.2 0.2 | 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0 0.04 0.04 0.04 | -0.16 6.47 24 23.49 0.29 0.76 0.75 0.64 | -7.91 6.08 24.98 24.49 0.54 1.99 2.04 1.84 | Distress Safe Safe Distress Grey Grey Grey |
| 7 | Kenya Railways Corporation Kenya Electricity Generating Company | 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 | -0.97 0.05 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.01 | -0.46 -0.37 -0.35 -0.31 -0.08 0.19 0.2 0.2 0.16 | 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 | -0.16 6.47 24 23.49 0.29 0.76 0.75 0.64 0.44 | -7.91 6.08 24.98 24.49 0.54 1.99 2.04 1.84 1.24 | Distress Safe Safe Distress Grey Grey Grey Grey |
| 7 | Kenya Railways Corporation Kenya Electricity Generating Company | 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 | -0.97 0.05 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 0 | -0.46 -0.37 -0.35 -0.31 -0.08 0.19 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.16 0.15 | 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 | -0.16 6.47 24 23.49 0.29 0.76 0.75 0.64 0.44 0.7 | -7.91 6.08 24.98 24.49 0.54 1.99 2.04 1.84 1.24 1.45 | Distress Safe Safe Distress Grey Grey Grey Grey Grey |
| 7 | Kenya Railways Corporation Kenya Electricity Generating Company | 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2010/11 | -0.97 0.05 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 0 0 0.06 | -0.46 -0.37 -0.35 -0.31 -0.08 0.19 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.16 0.15 0.11 | 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.06 | -0.16 6.47 24 23.49 0.29 0.76 0.75 0.64 0.44 0.7 0.53 | $\begin{array}{r} -7.91 \\ \hline 6.08 \\ 24.98 \\ 24.49 \\ \hline 0.54 \\ \hline 1.99 \\ 2.04 \\ \hline 1.84 \\ \hline 1.24 \\ \hline 1.45 \\ \hline 1.69 \end{array}$ | Distress Safe Safe Distress Grey Grey Grey Grey Grey Grey |
| 7 | Kenya Railways Corporation Kenya Electricity Generating Company | 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2010/11 2012/13 2011/12 2013/14 2011/12 2013/14 2013/14 2013/14 2013/14 2013/14 2011/12 2010/11 2011/12 | -0.97 0.05 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 0 0.06 -0.02 | -0.46 -0.37 -0.35 -0.31 -0.08 0.19 0.2 0.2 0.16 0.15 0.11 0.12 | 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.06 | -0.16 6.47 24 23.49 0.29 0.76 0.75 0.64 0.44 0.7 0.53 0.56 | $\begin{array}{r} -7.91 \\ \hline 6.08 \\ 24.98 \\ 24.49 \\ 0.54 \\ \hline 1.99 \\ 2.04 \\ \hline 1.84 \\ \hline 1.24 \\ 1.45 \\ \hline 1.69 \\ \hline 1.22 \end{array}$ | Distress Safe Safe Distress Grey Grey Grey Grey Grey Grey Grey |
| 7 8 8 9 | Kenya Railways Corporation Kenya Electricity Generating Company Kenya Power and Lighting | 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2010/11 2012/13 2011/12 2013/14 2011/12 2013/14 2011/12 2011/11 2011/12 2011/12 2011/12 2012/13 | -0.97 0.05 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 0 0.06 -0.02 -0.01 | -0.46 -0.37 -0.35 -0.31 -0.08 0.19 0.2 0.2 0.16 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.11 | 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0. | -0.16 6.47 24 23.49 0.29 0.76 0.75 0.64 0.44 0.7 0.53 0.56 0.39 | -7.91 6.08 24.98 24.49 0.54 1.99 2.04 1.84 1.24 1.45 1.69 1.22 1.05 | Distress Safe Safe Distress Grey Grey Grey Grey Grey Grey Distress |
| 7 8 9 | Kenya Railways Corporation Kenya Electricity Generating Company Kenya Power and Lighting Company | 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2010/11 2012/13 2011/12 2013/14 2011/12 2013/14 2011/12 2011/11 2011/12 2011/12 2011/12 2012/13 2012/13 2012/13 2012/13 2013/14 | -0.97 0.05 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 0 0.06 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 | -0.46 -0.37 -0.35 -0.31 -0.08 0.19 0.2 0.2 0.16 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.12 | 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0. | -0.16 6.47 24 23.49 0.29 0.76 0.75 0.64 0.44 0.7 0.53 0.56 0.39 0.37 | $\begin{array}{r} -7.91 \\ \hline 6.08 \\ 24.98 \\ 24.49 \\ 0.54 \\ \hline 1.99 \\ 2.04 \\ \hline 1.84 \\ 1.24 \\ \hline 1.45 \\ 1.69 \\ \hline 1.22 \\ 1.05 \\ \hline 1.30 \end{array}$ | Distress Safe Safe Safe Distress Grey Grey Grey Grey Grey Distress Grey |

| | | 2010/11 | 0.26 | 0.66 | 0.15 | 2.17 | 7.16 | Safe |
|----|-----------------------------|---------|-------|------|------|-------|-------|----------|
| 10 | Kenya Pipeline | 2011/12 | 0.24 | 0.73 | 0.16 | 2.94 | 8.06 | Safe |
| | | 2012/13 | 0.19 | 0.66 | 0.13 | 6.3 | 10.89 | Safe |
| | Company | 2013/14 | 0.26 | 0.68 | 0.14 | 6.08 | 11.23 | Safe |
| | | 2014/15 | 0.29 | 0.74 | 0.12 | 7.98 | 13.53 | Safe |
| | | 2010/11 | 0.23 | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.05 | 1.90 | Grey |
| | Kenya | 2011/12 | 0.09 | 0.03 | 0 | 0.03 | 0.73 | Distress |
| 11 | Electricity Transmission | 2012/13 | 0.08 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.72 | Distress |
| | Company | 2013/14 | -0.02 | 0.02 | 0 | 0.02 | -0.04 | Distress |
| | | 2014/15 | -0.08 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.02 | -0.40 | Distress |
| | | 2010/11 | 0.38 | 0.29 | 0.05 | 2.94 | 6.85 | Safe |
| | | 2011/12 | 0.37 | 0.31 | 0.09 | 2.74 | 6.91 | Safe |
| 12 | Kenya Wine Agencies | 2012/13 | 0.39 | 0.2 | 0.08 | 3.9 | 7.83 | Safe |
| | | 2013/14 | 0.29 | 0.2 | 0.07 | 1.88 | 4.99 | Safe |
| | | 2014/15 | 0.25 | 0.19 | 0.07 | 1.97 | 4.83 | Safe |
| | | 2010/11 | 0.52 | 0.64 | 0 | 6.47 | 12.29 | Safe |
| | Kanya Saad | 2011/12 | 0.5 | 0.62 | 0.04 | 4.21 | 9.98 | Safe |
| 13 | Company | 2012/13 | 0.51 | 0.63 | 0.06 | 3.55 | 9.51 | Safe |
| | Limited | 2013/14 | 0.52 | 0.62 | 0.07 | 2.97 | 9.01 | Safe |
| | | 2014/15 | 0.56 | 0.64 | 0.07 | 3.31 | 9.72 | Safe |
| | | 2010/11 | 0.13 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 10.82 | 12.44 | Safe |
| | Kenyatta | 2011/12 | 0.12 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 11.82 | 13.47 | Safe |
| 14 | International Convention | 2012/13 | 0.15 | 0.05 | 0.03 | 8.85 | 10.63 | Safe |
| | Centre | 2013/14 | 0.12 | 0.07 | 0.03 | 9.45 | 11.13 | Safe |
| | | 2014/15 | 0.14 | 0.09 | 0.03 | 7.57 | 9.33 | Safe |
| | | 2010/11 | 0.13 | 0.02 | 0 | 5.82 | 7.06 | Safe |
| | National Water | 2011/12 | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0 | 9.98 | 11.04 | Safe |
| 15 | Conservation | 2012/13 | 0.11 | 0.01 | 0 | 0.1 | 0.86 | Distress |
| | and Pipeline Corporation | 2013/14 | 0.11 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.08 | 0.88 | Distress |
| | | 2014/15 | 0.15 | 0 | 0.01 | 0.06 | 1.16 | Grey |
| | | | | | | | | |

| Pos | | 2010/11 | 0.05 | 0.06 | -0.01 | 0.57 | 1.07 | Distress |
|-----|----------------|---------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|----------|
| | Postal | 2011/12 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.54 | 1.25 | Grey |
| 16 | Corporation of | 2012/13 | 0.06 | 0.12 | 0.04 | 0.65 | 1.70 | Grey |
| | Kenya | 2013/14 | -0.01 | 0.06 | -0.04 | 0.45 | 0.35 | Distress |
| | | 2014/15 | -0.06 | 0.06 | -0.02 | 0.58 | 0.29 | Distress |
| | | 2010/11 | 0.14 | 0.24 | 0.07 | 1.94 | 4.18 | Safe |
| | | 2011/12 | 0.1 | 0.32 | 0.08 | 2.36 | 4.68 | Safe |
| 17 | New KCC | 2012/13 | 0.17 | 0.25 | -0.03 | 2.16 | 4.04 | Safe |
| | | 2013/14 | 0.19 | 0.27 | 0.03 | 2.22 | 4.64 | Safe |
| | | 2014/15 | 0.23 | 0.27 | -0.01 | 2.41 | 4.84 | Safe |
| | | 2010/11 | 0.24 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 1.33 | 3.34 | Safe |
| | Pyrethrum | 2011/12 | 0.21 | 0 | 0.02 | 1.18 | 2.74 | Safe |
| 18 | Board of | 2012/13 | 0.12 | 0 | 0 | 1.97 | 2.85 | Safe |
| | Kenya | 2013/14 | 0.1 | -0.06 | -0.01 | 1.73 | 2.80 | Safe |
| | | 2014/15 | 0.1 | -0.08 | -0.01 | 1.63 | 2.60 | Safe |
| | | 2010/11 | 0.26 | 0.18 | 0.14 | 0.28 | 3.54 | Safe |
| | | 2011/12 | 0.24 | 0.17 | 0.1 | 0.26 | 3.10 | Safe |
| 19 | UNES | 2012/13 | 0.13 | 0.1 | 0.05 | 0.14 | 1.68 | Grey |
| | | 2013/14 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.05 | 0.11 | 1.39 | Grey |
| | | 2014/15 | 0.12 | 0.1 | 0.01 | 0.12 | 1.29 | Grey |

Source: Research findings

Table 4.2.2 above shows the different values of X_1 , X_2 , X_3 , X_4 and Z'' scores as well as the discriminating zones of the nineteen (19) non-distressed State corporations.

 Table 4.2.3: Accuracy of Altman (1993) model on Non-distressed State Corporations.

| Classification | Frequency | % Frequency |
|----------------|-----------|-------------|
| Safe Zone | 63 | 66.32% |
| Grey Zone | 19 | 20.00% |
| Distress Zone | 13 | 13.68% |
| Total | 95 | 100.00% |

Source: Research findings

Zones of discrimination:

Z > 2.60 -"Safe" Zone; 1.10 < Z < 2.60 -"Grey" Zone, and Z < 1.10 -"Distress" Zone It can be noted in table 4.2.3 above that the model correctly categorized 66.32% of the observed State Corporations, 13.68% were classified in the distress zone while 20% were classified in the grey zone.

4.2.4 Distressed State Corporations

Table 4.2.4: Distressed State Corporations

| | X 1 | X 2 | X3 | X4 | Z" |
|--------------------|------------|------------|---------|--------|--------|
| | WC/TA | RE/TA | EBIT/TA | BVE/TL | |
| Mean | -0.89 | -1.46 | -0.003 | 0.89 | -9.68 |
| Standard Deviation | 1.64 | 1.46 | 0.20 | 1.95 | 15.25 |
| Minimum | -5.79 | -5.37 | -0.48 | -0.83 | -50.95 |
| Maximum | 0.56 | 0.04 | 0.80 | 6.87 | 3.61 |
| Count (N) | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 |

Source: Research findings

Zones of discrimination:

Z > 2.60 - "Safe" Zone; 1.10 < Z < 2.60 - "Grey" Zone, and Z < 1.10 - "Distress" Zone

Table 4.2.4 above shows that the dependent variable (Z") has a mean of -9.68 and standard deviation of 15.25 from 40 observations made from 8 non-distressed State Corporations in the financial years 2010/11 to 2014/15. The average X₁ is -0.89 with a standard deviation of 1.64 varying from a minimum of -5.79 to a maximum 0.56; the average X₂ is -1.46 with a standard deviation of 1.46 varying from a minimum of -5.37 to a maximum 0.04; the average X₃ is -0.003 with a standard deviation of 0.20 varying from a minimum of -0.48 to a maximum of 0.80 and finally 0.89 was the average of X₄ 1.95 was the standard deviation varying from a minimum of -0.83 to a maximum X₄ of 6.87.

4.2.5 Analysis of distressed State Corporations

| Ν | Name | Year | X ₁ | X_2 | X ₃ | X4 | Z " | Zone |
|---|--------------------|---------|----------------|-------|-----------------------|-------|------------|----------|
| | | 2010/11 | -3.66 | -3.93 | 0.02 | -0.78 | -37.53 | Distress |
| | Kenva | 2011/12 | -4.28 | -4.17 | -0.01 | -0.79 | -42.51 | Distress |
| 1 | Broadcasting | 2012/13 | -4.59 | -4.12 | 0.05 | -0.77 | -44.06 | Distress |
| | Corporation | 2013/14 | -5.79 | -5.37 | 0.8 | -0.83 | -50.95 | Distress |
| | | 2014/15 | -2.64 | -2.41 | 0.31 | -0.63 | -23.79 | Distress |
| | | 2010/11 | 0.28 | -2.28 | -0.11 | -0.63 | -6.99 | Distress |
| | Agro- | 2011/12 | 0.27 | -2.2 | 0.21 | -0.62 | -4.61 | Distress |
| 2 | Chemicals and Food | 2012/13 | 0.29 | -2.06 | 0.1 | -0.6 | -4.76 | Distress |
| | Company | 2013/14 | -2.03 | -1.88 | 0.1 | -0.58 | -19.42 | Distress |
| | | 2014/15 | -1.99 | -1.84 | 0.07 | -0.58 | -19.21 | Distress |
| | | 2010/11 | -0.25 | -0.28 | 0 | 0.12 | -2.47 | Distress |
| | Chemelil | 2011/12 | -0.34 | -0.53 | -0.22 | -0.11 | -5.54 | Distress |
| 3 | Sugar Company | 2012/13 | -0.24 | -0.5 | -0.16 | 0.16 | -4.11 | Distress |
| | | 2013/14 | -0.24 | -0.59 | -0.05 | 0.08 | -3.76 | Distress |
| | | 2014/15 | -0.28 | -0.69 | -0.1 | -0.05 | -4.76 | Distress |

| | Kenya Safari Lodges and | 2010/11 | -0.14 | 0.03 | 0.11 | 0.88 | 3.61 | Safe |
|---|---|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|----------|
| 4 | | 2011/12 | -0.05 | 0.04 | 0.03 | 2.87 | 3.04 | Safe |
| | | 2012/13 | -0.1 | 0.01 | -0.03 | 2.13 | 1.35 | Grey |
| | noters | 2013/14 | -0.14 | -0.12 | -0.13 | 2.07 | -0.02 | Distress |
| | | 2014/15 | -0.31 | -0.29 | 0.36 | 0.96 | 0.45 | Distress |
| | | 2010/11 | 0.06 | -0.47 | -0.04 | 2.83 | 1.55 | Grey |
| | National | 2011/12 | 0.06 | -0.51 | -0.01 | 2.51 | 1.25 | Grey |
| 5 | Cereals and | 2012/13 | 0.02 | -0.6 | -0.06 | 1.97 | -0.19 | Distress |
| | Produce Board | 2013/14 | 0.02 | -0.5 | -0.01 | 1.08 | -0.4 | Distress |
| | | 2014/15 | 0.03 | -0.43 | 0 | 0.76 | -0.4 | Distress |
| | | 2010/11 | 0.14 | -0.02 | 0.08 | 0.61 | 2.05 | Grey |
| | | 2011/12 | 0.15 | 0.01 | 0.1 | 0.63 | 2.37 | Grey |
| 6 | National Oil Corporation | 2012/13 | 0.17 | 0.03 | 0.08 | 0.58 | 2.33 | Grey |
| | Corporation | 2013/14 | -0.03 | -0.04 | -0.05 | 0.36 | -0.29 | Distress |
| | | 2014/15 | -0.03 | -0.03 | 0.04 | 0.48 | 0.48 | Distress |
| | | 2010/11 | 0.14 | -3.37 | -0.01 | 1.79 | -8.2 | Distress |
| | Numerical | 2011/12 | 0.19 | -3.02 | -0.01 | 1.51 | -7.14 | Distress |
| 7 | Machining | 2012/13 | 0.53 | -1.98 | -0.48 | 5.12 | -0.83 | Distress |
| | Complex | 2013/14 | 0.56 | -1.57 | -0.35 | 6.87 | 3.44 | Safe |
| | | 2014/15 | 0.42 | -1.4 | -0.25 | 5.12 | 3.06 | Safe |
| | | 2010/11 | -1.49 | -1.6 | 0.05 | -0.48 | -15.15 | Distress |
| | | 2011/12 | -1.41 | -1.46 | 0.05 | -0.45 | -14.16 | Distress |
| 8 | Nzoia Sugar Company | 2012/13 | -3.26 | -3.07 | -0.09 | -0.73 | -32.76 | Distress |
| | - • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • | 2013/14 | -3.7 | -3.48 | -0.19 | -0.76 | -37.7 | Distress |
| | | 2014/15 | -2.38 | -2.25 | -0.05 | -0.64 | -23.99 | Distress |

Source: Research findings

Table 4.2.5 above shows the different values of X_1 , X_2 , X_3 , X_4 and Z" scores as well as the discrimination zones of the eight (8) distressed State Corporations.

Table 4.2.6: Accuracy of Altman (1993) model on Distressed State Corporations.

| Classification | Frequency | % Frequency |
|----------------|-----------|-------------|
| Safe Zone | 4 | 10.00% |
| Grey Zone | 6 | 15.00% |
| Distress Zone | 30 | 75.00% |
| Total | 40 | 100.00% |

Source: Research findings

Zones of discrimination:

Z > 2.60 -"Safe" Zone; 1.10 < Z < 2.60 -"Grey" Zone, and Z < 1.10 -"Distress" Zone It can be noted in table 4.2.6 above that 75% of the observed State Corporations were accurately classified while 10% were classified as non-distressed.15% was difficult to classify.

4.3 Regression analysis

| Table 4.3.1 | : Regression | Analysis | Statistics |
|--------------------|--------------|----------|-------------------|
| | | | |

| Regression Statistics | | | | | | |
|-----------------------|-------------|--|--|--|--|--|
| Multiple R | 0.997623732 | | | | | |
| R Square | 0.995253111 | | | | | |
| Adjusted R Square | 0.995144403 | | | | | |
| Standard Error | 0.816967366 | | | | | |
| Observations | 135 | | | | | |

Source: Research Findings

Table 4.3.1 presents the summary of regression statistics for the State Corporations. It can be noted that R squared is 0.9952. The result demonstrates that the variation of X_1 , X_2 and X_4 explains the 99% variation in Altman's Z" score while the Adjusted R Square score of 0.9951 indicates that adjustment in the number of predictor variables explains 99% of the variations in Altman's Z" score.

Table 4.3.2: ANOVA Analysis

| ANOVA | | | | | | |
|------------|-----|---|-------------|---------|---------|--------------|
| | | | Sum of | Mean | | Significance |
| | df | | Squares | Square | F | F |
| Regression | 3 | 1 | 8331.80213 | 6110.6 | 9155.34 | 0.00000 |
| Residual | 131 | 8 | 37.43407377 | 0.66744 | | |
| Total | 134 | 1 | 8419.2362 | | | |

Source: Research Findings

A variable is statistically significant if its significance level is 0.05 and below while it is less significant if the significance levels are 0.05 and above.

Table 4.3.2 presents the ANOVA test. The findings show that the F test value is 9155.34 and the P value (0.000) is less than 0.05 (P<0.05) which means the variables are significantly related and the model is acceptable.

| | | Standard | | |
|-----------|--------------|----------|----------|---------|
| | Coefficients | Error | t Stat | P-value |
| Intercept | 0.28116 | 0.09261 | 3.03603 | 0.00289 |
| X1 | 6.02769 | 0.11821 | 50.99163 | 0.00000 |
| X2 | 3.65549 | 0.10608 | 34.45921 | 0.00000 |
| X4 | 1.05463 | 0.01816 | 58.07799 | 0.00000 |

 Table 4.3.3: Summary of coefficients

Source: Research Findings

In the output above, we can see that an increase in liquidity ratio (X_1) by a unit leads to an increase in Z" by 6.03, increase in profitability ratio (X_2) by a unit results into an increase in Z" by 3.66 while an increase in leverage ratio (X_4) by a unit leads to an increase in Z" by 1.05, holding other variables constant. It can also be observed that the predictor

variables of X_1 , X_2 and X_3 are significant because their p-values are 0.000. A true relationship therefore exists between the (Z" Score) and the variables X_1 , X_2 and X_3 .

4.4 Correlation Analysis

| | X1 | X2 | X3 | X4 | Z" score |
|----------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| X 1 | 1 | | | | |
| X2 | 0.798963 | 1 | | | |
| X 3 | -0.21218 | 0.0123 | 1 | | |
| X ₄ | 0.312602 | 0.241069 | -0.05105 | 1 | |
| Z" score | 0.912233 | 0.850401 | -0.0612 | 0.614293 | 1 |

Table 4.4: Correlation Analysis

Source: Research Findings

Table 4.4 summarizes the correlation analysis.

From the findings it can be noted that X_1 (WC/TA), X_2 (RE/TA) and X_4 (BVE/TL) had a great effect on the Z" score. However, X_3 (EBIT/Total assets) was found to have very little effect on the Z" score (Appendix IV)

4.5 Interpretation of Findings and Discussions

For the non-distressed Commercial and Manufacturing State Corporations, the Z-Score had an average of 5.86 and a standard deviation of 5.22. Liquidity ratio of WC/TA had an average of 0.15 with a standard deviation of 0.19. Long term profitability ratio of retained earnings to total assets had a mean of 0.17 and a standard deviation of 0.25. Short term profitability ratio of EBIT/TA had a mean of 0.06 and a standard deviation of 0.07. Finally the leverage ratio of BVE/TL had a mean of 3.77 and a standard deviation of 4.45. Similarly, for the distressed Commercial and Manufacturing State Corporations, the Z-Score had a mean of -9.68 and a standard deviation of 15.25. The liquidity ratio of WC/TA had an average of -0.89 and 1.64 was the standard deviation. The long term profitability ratio of retained earnings to total assets had a mean of -1.46 and a standard deviation of 1.46. Short term profitability ratio of EBIT/TA had a mean of -0.003 and a standard deviation of 0.2 while the leverage ratio of BVE/TL recorded an average of 0.89 while 1.95 was the recorded standard deviation.

Based on the correlation analysis, the findings show that X_1 (WC/TA), X_2 (RE/TA) and X_4 (BVE/TL) had a positive relationship and great effect on the Z" score. However, X_3 (EBIT/Total assets) was found to have a negative relationship and very little effect on the Z" score. This observation supports the fact that state owned corporation's main goal is sustainability in the long-run. Their main aim is promoting economic growth and delivery of public services in the foreseeable future. Retained earnings normally strengthen financial stability of a firm and ensures growth when earnings are reinvested in profitable ventures. Therefore, this explains why retained earnings had more effect on financial distress than EBIT.

The regression analysis statistics produced R squared of 0.9952. The result demonstrates that the variation of X_1 , X_2 and X_4 explains the 99% variation in Altman's Z'' score while the Adjusted R Square score of 0.9951 indicates that adjustment in the number of predictor variables explains 99% of the variations in Altman's Z'' score.

Further, the ANOVA test showed that the F test value was 9155.34 and the P value (0.000) was less than 0.05 (P<0.05) which means the variables are significantly related and the model is acceptable. Finally, the predictor variables of X_1 , X_2 and X_3 were found to be significant because their p-values are 0.000. A true association therefore exists between the (*Z*["] Score) and predictor variables X_1 , X_2 and X_3 .

In general the model correctly classified 66.32% of non-distressed State Corporations, 13.68% were categorized as distressed and 20% were difficult to classify. Similarly, for distressed corporations, Altman's (1993) Z" score model correctly classified 75% of them, 10% were classified in the safe zone and 15% were classified in the grey zone. It can therefore be concluded that Altman (1993) prediction model was 66.32% accurate in classifying non-distressed corporations and 75% accurate in classifying distressed firms. This model has been found reliable in predicting financial distress of Commercial and Manufacturing State Corporations in Kenya.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

The chapter gives a summary of the study findings, conclusions and concludes with the study recommendations.

5.2 Summary of Findings and Discussions

The objective of this study was to determine the applicability of Altman (1993) model in predicting financial distress of Commercial and Manufacturing State Corporations in Kenya. Quantitative secondary data was collected from the financial statements and audit reports of the State Corporations. The Altman's (1993) *Z*" score model was used in the study due to its popularity and due to the fact that it has been modified to suit firms which are not publicly traded, manufacturing, non-manufacturing and firms which are in emerging markets. The model was also applied in the study due to its simplicity. Census study was applied on the target population where all 27 Commercial and Manufacturing State Corporations were analyzed using MS Excel for the financial period 2010/11 to 2014/15. The State Corporations were grouped into 19 non-distressed corporations and 8 distressed corporations.

The study findings show that Altman's (1993) Z" score model correctly classified 66.32% of the non-distressed State Corporations, 13.68% were classified in the distress zone while 20% were classified in the grey zone. Similarly, for distressed State Corporations, Altman's (1993) Z" score model correctly classified 75% of them, 10% were classified in the safe zone and 15% were classified in the grey zone. The findings also show that X₁ (Working

Capital/Total assets), X_2 (Retained earnings/Total assets) and X_4 (Book Value of Equity/ Total Liability) had a great influence on financial distress prediction. However, X_3 (EBIT/Total assets) was found to have very little influence.

5.3 Conclusions

Timely forecast of financial distress is important to stakeholders in that corrective actions can be taken before corporate bankruptcy and failure. In general financial ratios can be used to predict bankruptcy. However the type of ratio that will best discriminate between non-distressed and distressed firms appears to differ from place to place. From the analysis presented, it was observed that the factors which differentiate between a non-distressed firm and a distressed firm are liquidity, profitability and leverage levels. Liquidity (Working capital/Total Assets) was observed to have the greatest influence on financial distress prediction. State Corporations with low levels of liquidity faced difficulties in their operations as they were not able to meet their immediate obligations. These conclusions are similar to observations made by Deakin (1972). He concluded that the best predictor of potential distress is liquidity (Working Capital/Total assets). However, these conclusions differ from those made by Altman (1968). Altman found this liquidity ratio to be the least predictive of the variables under his study.

In this study, profitability (RE/TA) was found to be another good predictor of financial distress in State Corporations. In 2000, Charitou et al. made the same conclusions. The third best predictor of financial distress in this study is leverage ratio of BE/TL.

However, it was noted that the short-term profitability ratio of (EBIT/Total Assets) was the least predictor of financial distress. This conclusion differs from Altman (1968) research findings which concluded that EBIT/Total Assets was

significant in predicting financial failure. He argued that the probability of a profitable firm going bankrupt is almost nil. The validity of his conclusions have been challenged especially with the collapse of once profitable companies such as Enron and WorldCom. It is possible for a profitable company to be broke and it may lack cash to meet immediate obligations. This supports the findings of this study which concludes that liquidity is the best predictor of financial distress.

In conclusion, liquidity, profitability and leverage ratios are significant in predicting financial distress in Commercial and Manufacturing State Corporations in Kenya and stakeholders should pay close attention to them.

5.4 Limitations of the Study

Only one category of State Corporations has been studied. If the other categories of State Corporations could have been included, the study could have been more conclusive.

This study relied majorly on quantitative data. In reality other non-quantifiable circumstances could lead to financial distress and failure such as court cases, poor management and high competition in the market for a corporation's products.

Another limitation encountered in the study was that the period of study was limited to only five years. The study could have been more conclusive if the period of study was increased.

Access to information was also hampered by delayed audit process. Financial statements of State Corporations are only made public after they have been audited and tabled in parliament. In few instances, there were some delayed audit reports and this slowed down the data collection process.

Another limitation of this study is that it only focused on one statistical model (MDA) for

predicting financial distress. However, comparative analysis can be done using other statistical models such as logit, probit and hazard models to determine the best predictor models for financial distress and bankruptcy.

5.5 Recommendations

5.5.1 Policy Recommendations

Financial audit of State Corporations normally takes three months from October 1st to December 31st. There should be strict adherence to these timelines so that timely audit reports can be relayed to various stakeholders for their consumption. Causes of any delays such as financial resources and limited access to information for audit purposes should be dealt with to ensure smooth audit process.

State Corporations heavily rely on the government for funding. The government can use the findings of this study to determine the best candidates for financial bailouts in case they suffer financial distress.

Finally, the outcome of this study suggests that stakeholders in a business firm can predict failure before it occurs by paying close attention to liquidity, profitability and leverage ratios. This will enable stakeholders in a firm avoid the losses associated with failures by taking appropriate actions in advance.

5.5.2 Suggestions for Further Research

From the insights gained in this research, the following are suggestions for future research: more studies on financial distress should be conducted on state owned companies. It has been noted that most studies have majorly focused on publicly listed companies and State Corporations have been least researched on. Therefore, my suggestion is that financial distress research studies should be done on other categories of State Corporations which include Financial, Public Universities, Training and Research, Service corporations, Regional Development, Tertiary Education and regulatory State Corporations.

Most financial distress prediction studies have focused on quantitative financial data. A major drawback of financial data is its susceptibility to manipulation by management. Therefore, one of the solutions is to base studies on qualitative factors such as firm size, age of the company, management characteristics and government's influence on the operations of State Corporations.

It has been noted that most studies range from two to five years due to lack of time, financial resources and lack of data. However, studies on financial distress would be more credible, and conclusive if the period of study was increased.

Research studies can be conducted to determine the influence of delayed information on investor decision making process especially for listed State Corporations. It has been noted that audit process of some State Corporations are normally delayed especially where they are audited by private audit firms on behalf of the government.

Further research can be done to investigate the applicability of other statistical models such as logit, probit and hazard analysis in forecasting financial distress in State Corporations. Non-statistical financial distress prediction models such as chaos theory can also be used to determine the best predictor model of financial distress.

REFERENCES

Altman, E. I. (1968). Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate Bankruptcy: *Journal of Finance*, *23(4)*, 589-609.

Altman, E. I. (1993). Corporate Financial Distress and Bankruptcy – A complete guide to predicting & avoiding distress and profiting from bankruptcy. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Altman, E. I. (2000, July). Predicting Financial Distress of Companies: Revisiting the Z-Score and ZETA Models. Retrieved from <u>https://www.iiiglobal.org/sites/default/files/3</u> predictingfinancialdistress.pdf.

Altman. E. I., Haldeman. R. G. & Narayanan, P. (1977). ZETA analysis: A new model to identify bankruptcy risk of corporations, *Journal of Banking and Finance*, 1, 29-54.

Altman, E. I., & Hotchkiss, E. (2006). *Corporate Financial Distress and Bankruptcy*. Retrieved from http://books.google.com/book/about/

Andrade G. and Kaplan S., 1998, How Costly is Financial (not Economic) Distress? Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions that Become Distressed, *Journal* of Finance 53, 1443-1493. Asquith, Paul, Robert Gertner, and David Scharfstein, (1994). Anatomy of financial distress: An examination of junk-bond issuers, *Quarterly Journal of Economics 109*, 625-658.

- Aziz. M.A. and Dar. H.A. (2004). *Predicting corporate financial distress: whither do we stand* (Working Paper). Loughborough University, UK.
- Aziz, M. & Dar, H. (2006). Predicting Corporate Financial Distress: Whither Do We Stand? *Corporate governance*, 6(1), 18-33.
- Bal, G. R. (2015). Prediction of Financial Distress using Altman Z-Score: A study of Select FMCG Companies: Indian Journal of Applied Research, 5(9), 129-131.
- Baldwin, C. L. & Mason, S. P. (1983). The Resolution of Claims in Financial Distress: The Case of Massey Ferguson, *The Journal of Finance*, *38*(2), 505-516
- Beaver, W. (1966). Financial ratios as predictors of failure: *Journal of Accounting Research*, *5*, 71-111.
- Brown, D. T., C. M. James, and R. M. Mooradian. (1992). The Information Content of Distressed Restructurings Involving Public and Private Debt Claims, *Journal of Financial Economics 33*, 92–118.

Campbell, J.Y., Hilscher, J. D & Szilagyi, J. (2011). Predicting financial distress and the performance of distressed stocks, Journal of Investment Management 9(2), 14-34.

Centre for Governance and Development. (2005). A Decade of Parastatal Waste. Kenya.

Charitou, J.K.W, Tam. C.M and Cheung, R. K. C (2000). Construction firms at the crossroads in Hong Kong, *Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management*, *12*(2), 111-124.

Dambolena I. G. and Khoury S. J. (1980). Ratio Stability and Corporate Failure, Journal of Finance, 35(4), 1017-1027.

Deakin, E. (1972). A Discriminant Analysis of Predictors of Business Failure, *Journal of* Accounting Research, 10, 167-179.

- Feller, W. (1968). *Introduction to probability theory and its applications*. Wiley, New York, 3rd edition.
- Fulmer, J. G. Jr., Moon, J. E., Gavin, T. A., & Erwin, M. J. (1984). A bankruptcy Classification Model for Small Firms: *Journal of Commercial Bank Lending*, 25-37.

Geng, R., Bose, I. & Chen, X. (2015). Prediction of financial distress: An empirical study of listed Chinese companies using data mining, *European Journal of Operation Research*, *241* (1), 236–247.

- Gilbert, L. R., Menon, K. & Schwartz, K. B. (1990). Predicting bankruptcy for firms in financial distress, *Journal of Business Finance and Accounting* 17 (1), 161-171.
- Glautier, M.W.E. and Underdown, B. (2001). *Accounting theory and practice*. Harlow: Financial Times Prentice Hall, seventh edition
- Gordon M. J. (1971). "Towards a Theory of Financial Distress", *The Journal of Finance*, *Vol.26* (2), 347-356.
- Grice J.S., Ingram R.W. (2001): Tests of the generalizability of Altman's bankruptcy prediction model, *Journal of Business Research*, *54*, 53–61
- Hayes, S. K., A.Hodge, K., & W.Hughes, L. (2010). A study of the efficacy of Altman'sZ to predict Bankruptcy of Speciality retail firms doing business in contemporary times,*Economics and business journal: enquiries & perspective*, 122-134.
- Hendel, I. (1996). Competition under Financial Distress, *The Journal of Industrial Economics*, 54(3), 309-324.
- Hillegeist, S.A., Keating, E.K., & Lundstedt, K.G. (2004). Assessing the probability of Bankruptcy: *Review of Accounting Studies*, 9(3) 5-34.

Jahur, S.M. & Quardir, N.M. (2012). Financial Distress in Small and Medium Enterprises of Bangladesh: Determinants and Remedial Measure. *Economia management*, 15(1), 46-61

- Johansson, T., & Kumbaro, J. (2011). Predicting corporate default-An assessment of the Z-Score model on the U.S. Market 2007-2010 (Dissertation). Lund University, Sweden.
- Kathanje, M.N. (1999). An Evaluation of Financial Performance of the Kenyan Banking Sector for period 1987 to 1999 (Thesis). University of Nairobi, Kenya.
- Kerlinger, F. N. (1973). Foundation of behavioral science. New York: Published by Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., American Problem Series.
- Keige, P. (1991). Business Failure Prediction Using Discriminate Analysis (Unpublished Thesis), University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya.
- Kiragu, M. (1993). The Prediction of Corporate Failure Using Price Adjusted Accounting Data (Unpublished thesis), University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya.
- Laitinen, E. K., & Laitinen, T. (1998). Cash Management Behavior and Failure Prediction, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 25(7&8), 893-919

- Lev, B. (1973). Decomposition measures for financial analysis, Financial Management, 2(1), 56–63.
- Lussier, R. N. (1995). A nonfinancial business success versus failure prediction model for young firms, *Journal of Small Business Management*, *33*(1), 8-20.

Macharia, N. W (2012). Factors Affecting Management of Finances in Kenya's Public Sector: A Survey of Parastatals in Nakuru Town, *International Journal of Science and Research (IJSR)*, *3*(10), 626-633.

Manduku, S. K. (2008). *Hybrid governance of commercial State Corporations in Kenya:* A balancing act between enterprise and government (Unpublished Thesis). University of Nairobi, Kenya.

Mantziaris, S. Z. (2015). Bankruptcy Prediction Models: An Empirical Analysis of Altman's Z-Score Model in Forty Greek Companies in the Period of Economic Recession (Masters Dissertation). Retrieved from <u>https://dspace.lib.uom.gr</u>

Mc.Crindell, J. (1999). Costing Government Services for improved Performance Measurement and Accountability. Toronto: Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants. Nam, C. W., Kim, T. S., Park, N. J. & Lee, H. K. (2008). Bankruptcy prediction using a discrete-time duration model incorporating temporal macroeconomic dependencies,

Journal of Forecasting, 27, 493-506.

- Ohlson, J. (1980). Financial ratios and the probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy. *Journal* of Accounting Research, 18(1), 109-131.
- Ooghe, H., and De Prijcker, S. (2008). Failure Processes and Causes of Company Bankruptcy: A Typology, *Journal of Management Decision*, *46*, (2), 223-242.
- O'Neill, H. (1986). "An Analysis of the Turnaround Strategy in Commercial Banking," Journal of Management Studies, 165-188.
- Onyeiwu, C., & Aliemeke, G. (2009). Financial Ratios and the State of Health of Nigerian Banks,
- Opler, T. C., and Titman, S. (1994). Financial Distress and Corporate Performance, *The Journal of Finance*, *49*(*3*), 1015-1040
- Outecheva, N. (2007). Corporate Financial Distress: *An Empirical Analysis of Distress Risk* (Doctoral dissertation). University of St. Gallen, Zurich, Swizerland.
- Quarcoo, N. L., & Smedberg, P. (2014). The Road to Bankruptcy: A study on Predicting Financial Distress in Sweden (Masters Thesis). Retrieved from https:// www.diva-

portal.se

- Republic of Kenya. National Assembly. (2015). *Twentieth Report of the Public Investment Committee on the Audited Financial Statements of state corporations* (vol 1). Kenya.
- Republic of Kenya. (2013). Report of the Presidential Taskforce on Parastatal Reforms. Kenya.
- Ross, Westerfield & Jaffe. (2003). *Corporate Finance*. Retrieved from http://www.mhhe.com/primis/online/
- Shisia, A., Sang, W., Waitindi, S., & Okibo, B. W. (2014). An indepth Analysis of
 Altman's Failure Prediction Model on Corporate Financial Distress in Uchumi
 Supermarket in Kenya: *European Journal of Business Management*, 6(23), 27-41.
- Shumway, T. (2001), "Forecasting Bankruptcy More Accurately: A Simple Hazard Model," *Journal of Business*, *74(1)*, 101-124.

Sitati, A., & Odipo, M. K. (2009). Evaluation of applicability of Altman's revised model in prediction of Financial Distress: A case of companies quoted in the Nairobi Stock Exchange. University of Nairobi, Kenya.

Slotmaker, R. (2008). *Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy of Private Firms in the Netherlands* (Masters Thesis). Retrieved from <u>https://www.faillissementen.com/uploads</u>.

- Taliani, I. J. (2010). Predicting financial distress in commercial banks in Kenya.(Unpublished MBA project). University of Nairobi, Kenya.
- Tan, T. K. (2012). Financial Distress and Firm Performance: Evidence from the Asian Financial Crisis. *Journal of Finance & Accountancy*, 11(10), 36-45.

Theodossiou, P., Kahya, E., Saidi, R. & Philippatos, G. (1996). Financial distress and corporate acquisitions: Further empirical evidence, *Journal of Business Finance & Accounting*, 23 (5), 699-719.

Turetsky, H. & McEwn, R. A. (2001) "An Empirical Investigation of Firm Longevity: A
Model of the Ex Ante Predictors of Financial Distress", *Review of Quantitative Finance* and Accounting, vol. 16: 323-343

- Wang, Z., & Li, H. (2007). "Financial Distress Prediction of Chinese listed Companies: A Roughset Methodology", Chinese Management Studies, Vol 1, 93-110
- Watson D. & Head A. (2010), Corporate Finance: Principles and Practice, England: Prentice Hall Inc.
- Westgaard, S. & Wijst, D. (2001). Default Probabilities in a corporate bank portfolio: A Logistic model approach, *European Journal of Operational Research. vol. 135*.

- Whitaker, R. B. (1999), "The Early Stages of Financial Distress." Journal of Economics and Finance, 23 (2), 123-133.
- Wruck, K. H. (1990). Financial distress, reorganization, and organizational efficiency, Journal of Financial Economics, 27(2), 419-444
- Yadav, R. A. (1986). *Financial ratios and the Prediction of Corporate Failure*. New Delhi, India: Naurang Rai Concept Publishing Co.
- Zimmerer, T.W., Scarborough, N.M., & Wilson, D. (2008). Essentials of entrepreneurship And small business management. 5th ed. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson/Prentice Hall.

APPENDICES

Appendix I: Commercial and Manufacturing State Corporations

| 1. | Agro-Chemicals and Food Company |
|-----|--|
| 2. | Chemelil Sugar Company |
| 3. | East African Portland Cement Company |
| 4. | Jomo Kenyatta Foundation |
| 5. | Kenya Airports Authority |
| 6. | Kenya Broadcasting Corporation |
| 7. | Kenya Electricity Generating Company |
| 8. | Kenya Literature Bureau |
| 9. | Kenya Ordinance Factories Corporation |
| 10. | Kenya Pipeline Company |
| 11. | Kenya Ports Authority |
| 12. | Kenya Power and Lighting Company |
| 13. | Kenya Railways Corporation |
| 14. | Kenya Safari Lodges and Hotels |
| 15. | Kenya Seed Company Limited |
| 16. | Kenya Wine Agencies |
| 17. | Kenyatta International Convention Center |
| 18. | National Cereals and Produce Board |
| 19. | National Oil Corporation of Kenya |
| 20. | National Water Conservation and Pipeline Corporation |
| 21. | Numerical Machining Complex |
| 22. | Nzoia Sugar Company |
| 23. | Postal Corporation of Kenya |
| 24. | Pyrethrum Board of Kenya |
| 25. | University of Nairobi Enterprises and Services Limited |
| 26. | New Kenya Co-operative Creameries Ltd |
| 27. | Kenya Electricity Transmission Company |

| Ref | Name | Year | Total Assets | Current | Current | Total | Retained | EBIT | Book Value of |
|-----|-----------------------|---------|--------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------|------------|----------------------|
| | | | | Assets | Liabilities | Liabilities | Earnings | | Equity |
| | | | KES 000' | KES 000' | KES 000' | KES 000' | KES 000' | KES 000' | KES 000' |
| 1. | EA Portland Cement | 2010/11 | 13,530,871 | 3,172,070 | 2,100,179 | 7,827,953 | 3,362,871 | 653,640 | 5,702,918 |
| | | 2011/12 | 14,091,006 | 2,570,423 | 2,275,422 | 9,241,968 | 2,528,148 | (610,479) | 4,839,390 |
| | | 2012/13 | 16,160,364 | 3,626,405 | 3,302,093 | 9,026,061 | 4,086,892 | 314,546 | 7,134,303 |
| | | 2013/14 | 15,790,733 | 3,395,142 | 3,509,386 | 9,009,679 | 3,716,438 | (59,909) | 6,781,054 |
| | | 2014/15 | 23,112,582 | 3,157,336 | 3,351,461 | 9,302,989 | 11,024,102 | (451,532) | 14,001,007 |
| 2. | Kenya Airports | 2010/11 | 28,193,720 | 4,464,556 | 2,458,062 | 4,980,110 | 14,064,691 | 2,737,437 | 23,213,610 |
| | Authority | 2011/12 | 30,938,104 | 5,790,612 | 1,992,929 | 5,918,981 | 16,529,856 | 3,489,300 | 25,019,124 |
| | | 2012/13 | 37,298,049 | 7,598,621 | 3,004,948 | 8,897,235 | 19,587,984 | 5,398,607 | 28,400,810 |
| | | 2013/14 | 47,644,336 | 11,197,782 | 4,105,163 | 11,364,277 | 26,201,868 | 6,736,407 | 36,280,060 |
| | | 2014/15 | 60,986,078 | 16,847,561 | 4,054,994 | 16,601,751 | 30,529,505 | 4,333,067 | 44,384,324 |
| 3. | Kenya Ordinance | 2010/11 | 4,676,825 | 1,470,264 | 337,340 | 337,340 | (550,716) | 52,940 | 4,339,485 |
| | Factories Corporation | 2011/12 | 4,930,203 | 1,775,024 | 523,528 | 523,528 | (753,526) | 77,196 | 4,406,675 |
| | | 2012/13 | 4,850,432 | 1,756,265 | 512,440 | 512,440 | -787,943 | 80,930 | 4,367,992 |
| | | 2013/14 | 5,008,391 | 1,736,265 | 502,440 | 502,440 | -832,209 | -87,930 | 4,327,992 |
| | | 2014/15 | 4,830,432 | 1,900,172 | 529,141 | 529,141 | -680,950 | 139,664 | 4,479,250 |
| 4. | Kenya Ports Authority | 2010/11 | 58,175,388 | 12,742,812 | 4,555,173 | 10,052,815 | 6,595,013 | 5,463,463 | 48,122,573 |
| | | 2011/12 | 69,264,537 | 7,200,159 | 5,991,715 | 15,829,372 | 12,514,705 | 10,065,872 | 53,435,165 |
| | | 2012/13 | 80,327,539 | 8,247,217 | 6,076,828 | 22,186,110 | 18,727,740 | 6,594,000 | 58,141,429 |
| | | 2013/14 | 121,731,005 | 16,378,871 | 5,567,531 | 28,285,512 | 34,253,139 | 5,168,000 | 93,445,493 |
| | | 2014/15 | 130,662,090 | 16,712,160 | 4,637,648 | 28,661,624 | 49,353,730 | 7,404,000 | 102,000,466 |
| 5. | Kenya Literature | 2010/11 | 1,618,766 | 842,249 | 141,501 | 141,501 | 370,377 | 102,704 | 1,477,265 |
| | Bureau | 2011/12 | 1,739,284 | 987,636 | 149,507 | 149,507 | 482,889 | 109,152 | 1,589,777 |
| | | 2012/13 | 1,871,482 | 1,101,323 | 188,472 | 188,472 | 276,122 | 117,988 | 1,683,010 |
| | | 2013/14 | 2,045,007 | 1,291,593 | 262,292 | 262,292 | 375,827 | 164,685 | 1,782,715 |
| | | 2014/15 | 2,640,595 | 1,405,741 | 294,679 | 294,679 | 765,795 | 143,531 | 2,345,916 |

Appendix II: Non- Financially Distressed State Corporations

| 6. | Jomo Kenyatta | 2010/11 | 544,911 | 253,877 | 112,524 | 112,524 | 103,837 | 262,702 | 432,387 |
|-----|--------------------|---------|-------------|------------|------------|-------------|--------------|------------|-------------|
| | Foundation | 2011/12 | 580,061 | 291,335 | 223,652 | 223,652 | 19,577 | 220,427 | 356,409 |
| | | 2012/13 | 783,274 | 301,973 | 245,219 | 245,219 | 22,765 | 197,457 | 539,005 |
| | | 2013/14 | 1,198,670 | 275,450 | 204,388 | 204,388 | 25,708 | 62,060 | 994,282 |
| | | 2014/15 | 1,171,953 | 118,335 | 118,335 | 118,335 | 67,671 | 86,190 | 1,053,618 |
| 7. | Kenya Railways | 2010/11 | 51,870,661 | 9,333,343 | 59,447,694 | 61,421,405 | (24,078,183) | 804,381 | (9,550,744) |
| | Corporation | 2011/12 | 53,570,083 | 9,358,048 | 6,934,180 | 7,169,970 | (19,828,747) | 1,578,844 | 46,400,113 |
| | | 2012/13 | 54,068,523 | 8,920,580 | 1,929,568 | 2,162,565 | (19,148,124) | 680,623 | 51,905,958 |
| | | 2013/14 | 61,601,660 | 9,199,553 | 2,136,079 | 2.515,485 | (19,032,278) | 710,770 | 59,086,176 |
| | | 2014/15 | 232,868,761 | 72,761,588 | 55,878,169 | 180,129,085 | (18,091,623) | 429,333 | 52,739,676 |
| 8. | Kenya Electricity | 2010/11 | 160,993,290 | 19,539,034 | 11,256,593 | 91,574,703 | 30,513,173 | 5,648,258 | 69,418,587 |
| | Generating Company | 2011/12 | 163,144,873 | 22,288,066 | 15,000,957 | 92,965,319 | 33,319,646 | 7,017,498 | 70,179,554 |
| | | 2012/13 | 188,673,282 | 25,127,810 | 17,672,629 | 114,714,766 | 37,728,726 | 7,027,726 | 73,958,516 |
| | | 2013/14 | 250,205,524 | 27,630,643 | 25,196,229 | 173,495,851 | 41,071,239 | 6,745,467 | 76,709,673 |
| | | 2014/15 | 342,519,995 | 21,368,973 | 22,479,973 | 200,925,904 | 52,482,236 | 11,700,671 | 141,594,091 |
| 9. | Kenya Power and | 2010/11 | 121,171,515 | 35,150,676 | 28,130,511 | 74,092,227 | 13,227,779 | 7,082,447 | 39,606,376 |
| | Lighting Company | 2011/12 | 134,131,983 | 28,159,384 | 31,383,138 | 78,258,103 | 16,739,064 | 7,808,520 | 43,511,553 |
| | | 2012/13 | 184,212,535 | 37,727,982 | 38,875,140 | 120,974,981 | 20,249,921 | 8,939,610 | 47,149,807 |
| | | 2013/14 | 220,109,352 | 50,411,859 | 48,847,728 | 147,223,069 | 27,305,683 | 14,987,067 | 54,205,569 |
| | | 2014/15 | 275,493,150 | 66,062,475 | 40,197,934 | 192,030,542 | 34,549,142 | 15,837,548 | 61,449,028 |
| 10. | Kenya Pipeline | 2010/11 | 42,074,260 | 14,727,996 | 3,794,648 | 13,264,404 | 27,634,101 | 6,463,320 | 28,809,856 |
| | Company | 2011/12 | 45,731,978 | 15,342,584 | 4,525,850 | 11,608,675 | 33,247,548 | 7,163,737 | 34,123,303 |
| | | 2012/13 | 61,490,995 | 14,362,998 | 2,545,997 | 8,428,034 | 40,327,952 | 8,049,605 | 53,062,961 |
| | | 2013/14 | 70,059,342 | 22,071,604 | 3,987,896 | 9,901,106 | 47,394,969 | 9,964,529 | 60,158,236 |
| | | 2014/15 | 73,875,571 | 24,266,630 | 2,606,541 | 8,230,063 | 54,787,041 | 8,909,069 | 65,685,508 |
| 11. | Kenya Electricity | 2010/11 | 18,992,244 | 6,659,826 | 2,225,308 | 18,139,186 | 851,058 | 495,563 | 853,058 |
| | Transmission | 2011/12 | 28,743,231 | 7,145,895 | 4,607,143 | 27,855,871 | 885,360 | 57,910 | 887,360 |
| | Company | 2012/13 | 43,687,743 | 8,223,271 | 4,728,572 | 42,509,089 | 1,176,654 | 491,356 | 1,178,654 |
| | | 2013/14 | 50,127,707 | 4,535,983 | 5,693,882 | 48,944,181 | 1,181,526 | 63,508 | 1,183,526 |
| | | 2014/15 | 71,260,895 | 2,589,938 | 8,206,011 | 69,838,467 | 1,420,428 | 370,571 | 1,422,428 |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |

| 12. | Kenya Wine Agencies | 2010/11 | 1,998,101 | 1,144,174 | 386,434 | 507,440 | 574,791 | 99,723 | 1,490,661 |
|-----|------------------------|---------|------------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|-----------|------------|
| | | 2011/12 | 2,282,396 | 1,298,493 | 456,662 | 609,480 | 717,147 | 197,864 | 1,672,916 |
| | | 2012/13 | 2,010,201 | 1,160,694 | 373,041 | 373,041 | 401,252 | 153,907 | 1,455,268 |
| | | 2013/14 | 2,566,912 | 1,569,304 | 833,701 | 833,701 | 514,236 | 185,060 | 1,564,641 |
| | | 2014/15 | 2,934,709 | 1,621,346 | 876,987 | 876,987 | 568,543 | 201,765 | 1,727,654 |
| 13. | Kenya Seed Company | 2010/11 | 6,487,366 | 3,639,220 | 290,746 | 868,092 | 4,164,535 | 18,191 | 5,619,274 |
| | Limited | 2011/12 | 7,086,384 | 4,383,669 | 837,391 | 1,359,861 | 4,412,046 | 258,420 | 5,726,523 |
| | | 2012/13 | 7,648,188 | 5,102,008 | 1,185,574 | 1,679,548 | 4,789,421 | 429,260 | 5,968,640 |
| | | 2013/14 | 8,029,088 | 5,704,257 | 1,566,691 | 2,021,660 | 4,956,274 | 591,431 | 6,007,428 |
| | | 2014/15 | 8,245,712 | 6,058,196 | 1,459,354 | 1,913,198 | 5,281,361 | 612,265 | 6,332,514 |
| 14. | Kenyatta International | 2010/11 | 2,919,036 | 626,816 | 246,994 | 246,994 | 66,245 | 67,235 | 2,672,043 |
| | Convention Centre | 2011/12 | 3,168,223 | 630,207 | 247,168 | 247,168 | 115,256 | 70,506 | 2,921,054 |
| | | 2012/13 | 3,439,339 | 848,372 | 349,059 | 349,059 | 187,934 | 104,326 | 3,090,280 |
| | | 2013/14 | 3,498,961 | 692,373 | 271,999 | 334,807 | 261,808 | 93,488 | 3,164,154 |
| | | 2014/15 | 3,852,492 | 914,419 | 389,919 | 449,644 | 349,401 | 112,223 | 3,402,847 |
| 15. | National Water | 2010/11 | 8,286,526 | 2,330,224 | 1,214,305 | 1,214,305 | 149,676 | (1,065) | 7,072,221 |
| | Conservation and | 2011/12 | 11,683,317 | 1,936,692 | 1,063,617 | 1,063,617 | 156,352 | 31,739 | 10,619,700 |
| | Pipeline Corporation | 2012/13 | 13,743,321 | 2,390,283 | 936,378 | 10,372,754 | 167,736 | 52,723 | 1,023,021 |
| | | 2013/14 | 14,176,503 | 2,168,267 | 639,512 | 13,177,557 | 150,333 | 128,219 | 998,946 |
| | | 2014/15 | 16,237,555 | 2,892,243 | 414,917 | 15,316,085 | 72,857 | 202,561 | 921,469 |
| 16. | Postal Corporation of | 2010/11 | 7,531,182 | 4,441,484 | 4,072,973 | 4,788,139 | 463,805 | (56,358) | 2,743,043 |
| | Kenya | 2011/12 | 7,738,083 | 4,749,833 | 4,372,241 | 5,022,807 | 436,038 | 205,652 | 2,715,276 |
| | | 2012/13 | 8,450,442 | 5,527,846 | 5,047,877 | 5,127,044 | 1,026,813 | 315,277 | 3,323,398 |
| | | 2013/14 | 9,172,014 | 6,197,048 | 6,291,938 | 6,321,105 | 571,672 | (360,086) | 2,850,910 |
| | | 2014/15 | 7,410,896 | 4,236,260 | 4,685,867 | 4,685,867 | 470,831 | (138,560) | 2,725,029 |
| 17. | New Kenya | 2010/11 | 7,323,997 | 2,789,583 | 1,758,337 | 2,490,534 | 1,732,814 | 486,281 | 4,833,462 |
| | Cooperative | 2011/12 | 6,244,256 | 2,050,073 | 1,413,676 | 1,859,960 | 1,981,590 | 468,361 | 4,384,298 |
| | Creameries Ltd | 2012/13 | 6,866,048 | 3,094,303 | 1,896,775 | 2,173,304 | 1,747,735 | -205,502 | 4,692,743 |
| | | 2013/14 | 6,779,682 | 3,143,386 | 1,833,998 | 2,105,722 | 1,806,773 | 173,636 | 4,673,960 |
| | | 2014/15 | 6,407,121 | 3,136,499 | 1,692,386 | 1,877,839 | 1,739,914 | (49,150) | 4,529,282 |

| 18. | University of Nairobi | 2010/11 | 667,384 | 648,642 | 473,727 | 521,544 | 123,281 | 91,452 | 145,840 |
|-----|-----------------------|---------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------|--------|---------|
| | Enterprises Ltd | 2011/12 | 863,166 | 843,918 | 635,392 | 683,210 | 145,133 | 88,669 | 179,957 |
| | | 2012/13 | 1,242,022 | 1,219,603 | 1,059,832 | 1,092,999 | 122,323 | 68,301 | 149,023 |
| | | 2013/14 | 1,392,817 | 1,360,374 | 1,228,785 | 1,251,285 | 128,953 | 73,087 | 141,532 |
| | | 2014/15 | 851,238 | 820,878 | 718,189 | 756,839 | 83,192 | 6,493 | 94,399 |

| Арр | Appendix III: Financially Distressed State Corporations | | | | | | | | |
|-----|---|---------|--------------|------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|-----------|---------------|
| Ref | Name | Year | Total Assets | Current | Current | Total | Retained | EBIT | Book Value of |
| | | | | Assets | Liabilities | Liabilities | Earnings | | Equity |
| | | | KES 000' | KES 000' | KES 000' | KES 000' | KES 000' | KES 000' | KES 000' |
| 1. | Kenya Broadcasting | 2010/11 | 6,009,774 | 1,318,860 | 23,342,759 | 26,977,916 | (23,626,321) | 128,876 | (20,968,142) |
| | Corporation | 2011/12 | 6,486,595 | 1,120,313 | 28,861,655 | 30,871,771 | (27,043,356) | (32,780) | (24,385,176) |
| | | 2012/13 | 7,584,981 | 1,329,633 | 36,180,568 | 37,328,514 | (31,253,766) | 360,227 | (28,595,587) |
| | | 2013/14 | 6,843,981 | 903,003 | 40,527,853 | 40,940,373 | (36,754,572) | 5,507,420 | (34,096,392) |
| | | 2014/15 | 17,294,330 | 1,000,162 | 46,735,779 | 46,484,782 | (41,735,114) | 5,353,553 | (29,190,452) |
| 2. | Agro-Chemicals and | 2010/11 | 3,182,045 | 1,175,200 | 276,774 | 8,645,200 | (7,241,544) | (357,367) | (5,463,154) |
| | Food Company | 2011/12 | 3,143,828 | 1,047,867 | 197,049 | 8,280,512 | (6,915,073) | 670,875 | (5,136,683) |
| | | 2012/13 | 3,351,469 | 1,192,422 | 216,099 | 8,473,806 | (6,900,726) | 338,802 | (5,122,336) |
| | | 2013/14 | 3,609,071 | 1,291,841 | 8,632,740 | 8,632,740 | (6,802,059) | 366,313 | (5,023,669) |
| | | 2014/15 | 3,704,979 | 1,344,856 | 8,728,849 | 8,728,849 | -6,802,260 | 249,504 | (5,023,870) |
| 3. | Chemelil Sugar | 2010/11 | 3,466,202 | 730,651 | 1,613,492 | 3,083,733 | (955,989) | (13,188) | 382,469 |
| | Company | 2011/12 | 3,226,666 | 671,428 | 1,782,932 | 3,643,669 | (1,695,701) | (694,205) | (417,002) |
| | | 2012/13 | 5,239,115 | 681,654 | 1,994,876 | 4,501,328 | (2,614,543) | (840,625) | 737,787 |
| | | 2013/14 | 5,078,177 | 753,252 | 1,996,426 | 4,856,658 | (2,974,015) | (244,177) | 378,315 |
| | | 2014/15 | 5,234,973 | 608,053 | 2,054,579 | 5,339,898 | -3,614,050 | -504,235 | -261,720 |
| 4. | Kenya Safari Lodges | 2010/11 | 506,995 | 133,382 | 203,711 | 269,515 | 16,708 | 57,737 | 237,480 |
| | and Hotels | 2011/12 | 978,986 | 131,254 | 177,504 | 253,058 | 40,170 | 29,061 | 725,928 |
| | | 2012/13 | 981,282 | 131,912 | 233,948 | 313,883 | 6,331 | (32,282) | 667,399 |
| | | 2013/14 | 970,948 | 155,138 | 291,607 | 291,607 | (119,943) | (125,126) | 602,781 |
| | | 2014/15 | 898,270 | 124,431 | 399,827 | 459,173 | (257,187) | 319,691 | 439,097 |
| 5. | National Cereals and | 2010/11 | 13,124,951 | 4,191,087 | 3,425,547 | 3,425,547 | (6,194,161) | (518,127) | 9,699,404 |
| | Produce Board | 2011/12 | 12,952,328 | 4,430,038 | 3,689,081 | 3,689,081 | (6,630,318) | (187,717) | 9,263,247 |
| | | 2012/13 | 12,558,348 | 4,456,490 | 4,231,766 | 4,231,766 | (7,566,982) | (770,023) | 8,326,583 |
| | | 2013/14 | 15,604,198 | 7,864,952 | 7,493,935 | 7,493,935 | (7,783,302) | (155,338) | 8,110,263 |
| | | 2014/15 | 18,434,482 | 11,025,248 | 10,497,648 | 10,497,648 | (7,956,731) | 67,995 | 7,936,834 |
| | | | | | | | | | |

| | National Oil | 2010/11 | 7,489,202 | 4,382,273 | 3,308,281 | 4,658,452 | (135,191) | 595,118 | 2,830,750 |
|----|---------------------|---------|------------|-----------|------------|------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|
| 6. | Corporation | 2011/12 | 8,101,412 | 4,954,231 | 3,741,104 | 4,962,914 | 103,524 | 823,653 | 3,138,498 |
| | | 2012/13 | 8,893,270 | 5,122,786 | 3,612,282 | 5,612,776 | 269,871 | 667,668 | 3,280,494 |
| | | 2013/14 | 9,689,956 | 4,369,875 | 4,627,562 | 7,121,700 | (387,125) | (531,410) | 2,568,256 |
| | | 2014/15 | 12,469,801 | 4,936,823 | 5,289,534 | 8,420,298 | (429,674) | 500,022 | 4,049,503 |
| 7. | Numerical Machining | 2010/11 | 312,307 | 135,069 | 89,890 | 89,890 | (1,052,844) | (2,106) | 161,181 |
| | Complex | 2011/12 | 349,737 | 168,720 | 103,583 | 103,583 | (1,057,650) | (4,806) | 156,374 |
| | | 2012/13 | 573,144 | 394,962 | 93,629 | 93,629 | (1,132,219) | (274,464) | 479,515 |
| | | 2013/14 | 828,402 | 572,277 | 105,317 | 105,317 | (1,303,768) | (287,579) | 723,085 |
| | | 2014/15 | 930,639 | 538,117 | 147,716 | 147,716 | (1,298,925) | (229,785) | 756,658 |
| 8. | Pyrethrum Board of | 2010/11 | 3,911,520 | 1,590,158 | 665,968 | 1,679,336 | 150,621 | 159,168 | 2,232,184 |
| | Kenya | 2011/12 | 3,771,024 | 1,509,067 | 719,112 | 1,732,480 | 18,386 | 64,703 | 2,038,544 |
| | | 2012/13 | 5,435,098 | 1,459,799 | 815,089 | 1,828,457 | 18,386 | (6,159) | 3,606,641 |
| | | 2013/14 | 5,359,671 | 1,490,487 | 946,700 | 1,960,068 | -339,494 | -39,422 | 3,399,603 |
| | | 2014/15 | 5,314,144 | 1,526,898 | 1,006,056 | 2,019,424 | -440,946 | -39,522 | 3,294,720 |
| 9. | Nzoia Sugar Company | 2010/11 | 10,762,415 | 4,550,142 | 20,553,278 | 20,553,278 | (17,212,633) | 517,753 | (9,790,864) |
| | | 2011/12 | 11,531,129 | 4,851,661 | 21,095,692 | 21,095,692 | (16,885,154) | 573,530 | (9,564,564) |
| | | 2012/13 | 10,333,273 | 2,578,722 | 36,213,713 | 38,220,593 | (31,718,565) | (978,560) | (27,887,320) |
| | | 2013/14 | 9,663,905 | 2,092,304 | 37,856,348 | 39,783,251 | (33,665,543) | (1,833,784) | (30,119,346) |
| | | 2014/15 | 15,859,469 | 1,624,669 | 39,412,512 | 43,476,333 | (35,731,379) | (831,809) | (27,616,864) |

Appendix IV: Pearson's correlation coefficient interpretations

Effect size of predictor variables on the response variable can be measured by the following scale:

| | Pearson Coefficient (r) | | | | | |
|-------------|-------------------------|--------------|--|--|--|--|
| Effect size | +ve | -ve | | | | |
| Small | 0.1 to 0.3 | -0.1 to -0.3 | | | | |
| Medium | 0.3 to 0.5 | -0.3 to -0.5 | | | | |
| Large | 0.5 t0 1.0 | -0.5 to -1.0 | | | | |

Source: Laerd Statistics