ASSESSMENT OF EFFECTIVE FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGIES IN KENYA, A CASE STUDY OF MANDERA COUNTY

BY

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DECLARATION

I declare that this research project is my original work and it has not been presented for assessment or the award of any degree in any University or other institution whatsoever.

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This project has been written under my supervision and submitted for examination with my approval as the University supervisor.

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DEDICATION

This research project is dedicated to the people of Kenya for their dedication, cooperation, unity and oneness in the fight against all forms of terror and insurgent activities that threaten our country.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AP   Administration Police

COA   Courses of Action

COIN   Counterinsurgency

CPAs   County Policing Authorities

DDR   Disarming, Demobilization and Reintegration

GOK   Government of Kenya

ICG   International Crisis Group

KIIs   Key Informant Interviews

KIRA   Kenya Inter-Agency Rapid Assessment

KNHCR   Kenya National Commission on Human Rights

KP   Kenya Police

NIS   National Intelligence Service

OSCE   Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

RAT   Routine Activities Theory

SCP   Situational Crime Prevention

ABSTRACT

Mandera County has suffered several cases of insurgent attacks. The prevalent insecurity threatens the achievement of the Kenya's Vision 2030 (KNCHR, 2014). In addition, terror attacks approximately account for 8% of deaths resulting from insecurity incidences in Kenya related to but much worse in Mandera County as it has resulted in displacement of 16% of the locals within the county (KIRA, 2014; KNCHR, 2014). It is claimed that deep-rooted discriminations and perceived or real marginalisation in Northern Kenya have provided breeding ground for support of insurgent activities by Al-Shabaab with the claim of pursing its extreme 'Jihad' in the region and enhance their cause (Rohwerder, 2015). In addition, North Eastern Kenya bordering conflicted Somalia has spill-over effects coupled with perceived mistreatment of ethnic Somalis and local Muslims. Furthermore the response by security agents to quell the violence has largely played State security responses that are seen to target Somalis and Muslims more widely play straight into Al-Shabaab's strategic method to provoke a vehement insurgency in Kenya in its quest to pressure the Kenyan government to withdraw the Kenya Defence Forces from Somalia (Lind, Mutahi, & Oosterom, 2015). Although the security agencies have tried to adopt new approaches to counter the Al-Shabaab, it has been observed that the Kenyan security system has significant weaknesses (Gibbons, 2014). The security situation in the County will only be strengthened by the pursuit of interrelated political, governance and security reforms addressing violence happening at the country's margins and that have the greatest impacts for its marginalised populations. This study therefore sought to evaluate the effectiveness of informational, security, political and economic counter-insurgency measures deployed in Mandera County. The study employed a case study design which targeted heads of security agencies. Data was gathered through Key Informant Interviews administered to purposively sampled head of security agencies. Qualitative data collected was analysed via content where emerging themes were coded and results presented as verbatim. The results showed that there was no consolidated counterinsurgency strategy but counterinsurgents were independently implementing measures with semblance to counterinsurgency strategy. There was minimal use of propaganda among security agencies as compared to the insurgents' use hence reduced public image of security agencies. On the other hand security agencies were effectively providing security for locals and were able to gather intelligence as a result of collaborative community policing. Security agencies were however not involved in execution of developmental programs hence denying them an opportunity to interact with the locals. There was need to develop a single comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy to be implemented by the existing agencies to enable them better coordinate implementation. Security agencies should also enhance intelligence gathering mechanisms so as to avoid extrajudicial killings associated with leader decapitation. The study recommended that there is need for counterinsurgents to consolidate their counterinsurgency measures into one executable strategic plan. This will enable the agencies better coordinate activities as well as better information sharing hence fostering their chances of success in countering insurgency within the county

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1   Background of the Study

Terrorism is now deliberated as the paramount danger to peace globally. And as such government agencies and international bodies have responsibility to undertake all essential actions to safeguard human rights within and without the country's jurisdiction from extremism (OSCE, 2014). These rights include protection of the right to life, the right to be treated with integrity and protection of all vital freedoms as well as other human rights.   With this actuality, various governments are confronted with persistent want to legislate counter-insurgency strategies to safeguard their internal security (Njogu, 2015). The absence of a cohesive and multi-pronged strategy to threat of insurgency frequently lead to misunderstanding among government agencies and disorganized responses to insurgent incidences as there will be no agreement with what exactly needs to be done and which agency will be responsible (Moore, 2007). This results in blame among agencies when failures occur and task-shifting when an urgent response is needed. Therefore to successfully counter insurgent activities, there is need for wide-ranging strategic approach that captures variety of measures and policies (OSCE, 2014).

According Routine Activity Theory, there are three fundamental locational essentials necessary for a crime to happen: existence of prospective criminal, existence of appropriate targets and lack of proficient and willing caretakers (Cohen & Felson, 2013). This offers a justification why each probable criminal prospect is not taken advantage of, and why insurgent activities are not carried out in each prospective terror target. Thus planning suitable counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy is determined by the prevailing state of affairs hence COIN can be seen as a Situational Crime

Prevention (SCP) approach to insurgency. For effective strategic implementation to occur all efforts should be made to involve all the stakeholders not only at executional stage but right from strategy formulation stage. According to Interactional View Theory, the collaboration among key stakeholders is key to minimizing the gaps in strategic management since the stakeholders will be able to synchronize their activities in their attempt to accomplish goals set for the respective agencies (Savaneviciene & Stankeviciute, 2011).

Mandera County has been importunately inflicted with insecurity incidences and episodes of severe communal violence right from the time of Kenya independence as a result of underlying irredentism, side-lining, widespread poverty, declining sources of livelihoods, environmental deterioration, resource rivalry, closeness to Somalia, widespread availability of small arms, and Islamic extremism (Bradbury & Kleinman, 2010). Although initially the attacks were carried out by clan militias, they have recently aligned around two local insurgents, namely, Al Hijra and Al-Shabaab. Al Hijra is a home-grown terror group responsible for providing Al Shabaab, a terror network originating from Somalia, with suitable targets and providing an avenue to recruit the local youths to fight in Somalia beside Al-Shabaab.

1.1.1 Concept of Strategy

A strategy is defining a definite direction to which the organization is taking over long-term. Strategy empowers the firm earn a competitive advantage in the dynamic internal and external environment by redesigning and realigning its available resources to best meet the needs and anticipation of its stockholders. This entails undertaking reasonable changes with the definitive aim of achieving organizational growth and efficacious out competing rivals while attaining the organizational fixed

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targets (Hough, 2010). For organizations to realize their objectives, it is essential for them to change in response to environmental changes through adoption of a strategy. It is vital to be cognizant that even the well-designed strategies are of no use if they not implementable; therefore there is need for organization to design a fitting strategy (Prasad, 2015).

Strategy sets to enhance the fit among the external environment and internal competences of an organization (Kraus & Kauranen, 2009). The external environment is composed of pressures and openings outside the control of the organization and composes influences from economic, social, political and technological surroundings. While internal environment is composed of internal competences including organizational strengths and weaknesses, organisational policies and systems, resource capability and culture of the organization (Huiru, 2011).

1.1.2 Strategy Formulation

All firms are dependent on their surrounding environment and therefore how the organization adopts to this dependence is determined by the strategy it embraces. This is especially necessitated when the organization is in an ever-changing, multifarious and volatile environment which hinges the survival of the organization to remain competitive in the environment. Based on open systems theory, organizations continuously change as they constant interaction with the immediate environment which constantly shapes the organization. Organizations therefore utilize strategy to define goals and objectives for them to ascertain the appropriate courses of action and distribute of its available resources effectively to realize the agreed goals. According to Pearce & Robinson, (2000), organizations can effectively realize their objectives and adjust to its environment appropriately through formulating a strategy.

Designing a strategy involves establishing the vision, mission, objectives and goals of the organization and determining how to achieve these items by adopting a suitable strategy (Alkhafaji & Nelson, 2013). To formulate a strategy much research needs to be carried out since it is the primary determinant of establishing ways in which the organization can achieve its target goals. Strategy formulation serves to determine the organizational direction hence organizational growth, enhancing organizational competence, adoption of innovation, determining product and service focus and ways of differentiating them, effective meeting customer needs and stakeholders' expectations (Grattan, 2016).

1.1.3   Strategy Implementation

Strategy implementation is an action constituting setting the selected strategy into a run through, availing resources to the chosen strategy, shaping the structure and culture of the organization to align with the strategy and handling the resultant change (Schermerhorn, 2010). Effective strategy implementation happens when organizational resources and activities are connected to the strategic priorities, when the goals set are realized and when performance measures are aligned to identified success main factors (Sorooshian, Norzima, Yusuf, & Rosnah, 2010).

Strategy implementation is a non-linear progression because it comprises persistently casting an eye over changes in the environment during the implementation process and altering the strategy to reflect environmental changes to avoid the strategy being implemented being invalid during the implementation process (Campbell, Stonehouse, & Houston, 2002). Strategy implementation involves promoting employee performance and when challenges are stumbled upon, the management should find ways of addressing these challenges in a timely manner. However it has

been recognized that strategy implementation is the most difficult stage of strategic management and as a result it has been noted that majority of strategies drawn fail during strategy implementation process (Blahová & Knápková, 2011).

1.1.4   Counterinsurgency Approaches

The conflict system is a complex ecosystem comprised of numerous interlined players in search of ways to maximize their survivability and enhance its advantage in an unruly and confrontational environment (Kilcullen, 2006). Therefore in a multi-pronged method, counter-insurgency is constantly applied concurrently to overthrow and comprehend insurgency and solve its foundational causes. Counter-insurgency is therefore an all-incorporating modus operandi that involves security, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions (Dixit, 2010). It comprises endowing local communities with opportunities, attaining their trust, attracting legitimacy, and integrating them into counterinsurgency efforts. This may entail denying recruitment of locals into terrorist groups, the support of local communities while at the same time attacking them with brute police and military force. Other components of counter-insurgency include de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation.

COIN strategies can be categorized as either "enemy-centric" or "population-centric" approach (Springer, 2011). The enemy-centric method tries to defeat the insurgents by killing the members of the insurgents groups and punishing civilian population who support the insurgents while population-centric methods entails convincing the local population that the counterinsurgents can better protect them from adversity as compared to the insurgents while starving insurgents of accommodation, food and medical supplies with the aim of defeating them (Khalili, 2010). Typically an inter-agency counter-insurgency framework consists of a base (Information), three pillars

(Security, Political and Economic) and a roof (Control) (Kilcullen, 2006). The information strategy enables the counterinsurgents to convey unifying themes to the civilians while at the same time castigating actions by the insurgents. Fundamental security, political and economic measures aims at ensuring safety, fairness in representation and providing livelihood opportunities respectively. However these later initiatives rely on communication, hence informational strategy is incorporated in to them. Once a concrete informational base has been achieved, the other three pillars have to be harmonized and synchronized as they are all equally important (Verret, 2013). Furthermore, effective COIN strategy must conglomerate pre-emptive measures with attempts to address grievances either real or percieved (Rosand, Millar, & Ipe, 2008).

1.1.5   The Government of Kenya

The security sector is an explicit function of the national government. The key players in the security Sector include the provincial administration, Kenya Defence Forces, the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS), the Kenya police and the Administration Police. The Kenya Police Service is responsible for internal security of the country and is headed by the Inspector General of Police in the national level and County Commanders in the county level. County governments' role as security players is embodied in the County Policing Authorities (CPAs), headed by governors is responsible for monitoring trends and patterns of crime, developing proposals on priorities, objectives and targets for police performance, monitoring progress and achievements, overseeing and promoting community policing initiatives, facilitating public participation and providing financial oversight for the budget for policing (Mkutu, Marani, & Ruteere, 2014).

1.1.6   Mandera County

Mandera County is located in North Eastern Kenya and borders Ethiopia towards North, Somalia on the East and Wajir County on the Southern side. The county has just over a million persons and covers a total area of about 25,991.5 km^2. Administratively the county is segmented into six Sub-counties including Mandera West, Banisa, Lafey, Mandera South, Mandera North and Mandera East and additionally up to 30 administrative wards. Mandera County has been known as the topmost terror hot spot in the country due to their closeness to the border between Kenya and Somalia. The government in its efforts to quell these attacks has deployed both the Police and Kenya Armed Forces to guard the border points as well as provide security within the county. In addition community policing has been established within the county.

1.2   Research Problem

Terrorism is a global issue that requires crafting global strategies. In a global survey of COIN strategies by Paul, Clarke and Grill (2010), it was observed that winning a COIN campaign doesn't revolve around a single factor but involves all-encompassing measures. COIN strategies have information strategy at the base and pillars including security provision, political legitimacy and economic empowerment (Sisco, 2015). The security agencies that are successful in COIN operations usually implement recognized effective COIN practices while circumventing measures that have been recognized as ineffective. Furthermore it has been recognized that to counterinsurgent activities it is imperative to address its root causes including reducing economic deficiency, promoting social and political rights, promoting rule of law, avoiding unnecessary military occupations, and providing sufficient education and discouraging extremism by public education (Campbell & Weitz, 2006). COIN

strategies promote population-centric measures and are against kill-capture strategy which forms the core of enemy-centric measures (Sitaraman, 2009).

Mandera County which has a close proximity to the Somali border has been persistently affected by Terrorism. Thousands have died from attacks perpetrated by the Al-Shabaab and their sympathizers in vicious attacks. Of note are the terrorist attacks on the bus travelling from Nairobi to Northern Kenya of which 64 teachers were killed and another attack which massacred 36 quarry workers near Mandera town. Mandera County has been frequently affected by insecurity and periods of acute communal violence since independence brought about by underlying irredentism, side-lining, widespread poverty, declining sources of livelihoods, environmental deterioration, resource rivalry, closeness to Somalia, widespread availability of small arms, and Islamic extremism (Bradbury & Kleinman, 2010). This calls for an effective formulation and implementation of counter-insurgency strategies within Mandera County which remains the primary objective of this research.

Internationaly studies have focussed on counterinsurgency strategies applied in Middle East. Doohovskoy (2009) and Dorronsoro (2009) evaluated the effective aspects of counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan while Rosand, Millar, and Ipe (2008) assesed how the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was being implemented in East Africa. In Kenya, Bradbury and Kleinman (2010) assessed the influence of aid and security provision in Kenya as a counterinsurgency strategy but did left out political and economic aspects of COIN. Bundotich (2013) explored the challenges in counter terrorism in Kenya. Nyongesa (2013), Manana, et al (2014), Chtalu (2014) and Kipkurui (2014) studied strategy implementation at the Kenya Police Service (KPS). Since there has been no local study carried out to evaluate

effective formulation and implementation of counterinsurgency strategies, this study sought to answer the following research questions:

What counter-insurgency strategies have been deployed as a measure in Mandera County? How effective are the counter-insurgency measures deployed in Mandera County?

1.3   Research Objectives

The study was guided by the following research objectives:

  i.   To establish the formulated counterinsurgency strategies in Mandera county.

  ii. To evaluate the effectiveness of counter-insurgency strategies in Mandera County.

1.4   Value of the Study

The findings of this study sought to fill the existing information gap on the issues impeding the implementation of the counterinsurgency strategies by Kenyan authorities as an instrument pacifying the region which has been shown to be making slow progress on attainment of peace. As such the administrators in the Kenyan government can use the information generated in the formulation and implementation process while effectively addressing any foreseen challenges during implementation in good time to allow smooth strategy implementation.

Secondly, this study is of paramount importance to the academicians in the fields of non-profit and strategic management who may see this as a good basis for further research, especially in Kenya and Africa as the results might be useful in the preparation of bills, proposals and sessional papers to guide on policy formulation.

Finally, this study is of prime value to donors, governments, partners and other stakeholders in seeking accountability and efficiency including professionalism in counterinsurgency programs in Kenya. The study forms a base for future scholars and researchers who may want to study in the area of strategy formulation and implementation. It is a source of reference as it provides information on challenges of strategy formulation and implementation.

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1   Introduction

This chapter lays down the theoretical underpinnings of the study as well as empirical review of other studies exploring the formulation and implementation of counterinsurgency strategies. The first section addresses the theories explaining counterinsurgency strategies, the second section lays how counterinsurgency strategies have been formulated and implemented and the third section explores related literatures explaining the study variables.

2.2   Theoretical Framework

This study was based on Routines Activities Theory which explores the necessary condition for a crime or an attack to occur and Interactional View Theory which potent the necessary communication processes during counterinsurgency strategy implementation.

2.2.1   Routine Activities Theory

Routine Activities Theory (RAT) was developed by Cohen & Felson (2013). They argue that the core of RAT is the contention that there are three fundamental locational essentials necessary for a crime to happen: existence of prospective criminal, existence of appropriate targets and lack of proficient and willing caretakers. Therefore because crime needs the coming together of these three components, it means that crime can be avoided by preventing striving offenders from the appropriate targets at the opportune time or by providing an adept guardians (Branic, 2015; Kleemans, Soudijn, & Weenink, 2012).

Evaluating objectives from the perspective of an insurgents is extremely important since insurgents are only concerned with the targets they value (Gibbs, 2010). This offers a justification why each probable criminal prospect is not taken advantage of, and why insurgent activities are not carried out in each prospective terror target. Thus planning suitable counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy is determined by the prevailing state of affairs hence COIN can be seen as a Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) approach to insurgency. SCP involves measures designed to reduce opportunities required for a specific crime to occur. SCP is of the view that crime occurrence is dependent on specific environmental prospects, thus SCP comprises the designing and manipulating the close environment to prevent crime from occurring (Phillips, 2011).

2.2.2 Interactional View Theory

Communication is understood as interchange words of people who act with statements and take to mean their genuine situation and practice the state of affairs and the self with relations. The Interactional View is an interpretive theory developed by Paul Watzlawick (Savaneviciene & Stankeviciute, 2011). According to this theory interpersonal communication is centred on five axioms. First, every behaviour is a system of communication and since behaviour does not have a counterpart (there is no anti-behaviour), it is not possible not to communicate. Secondly, every communication not has content but also relationship component determined by how the speaker wishes to be understood and his view of the relationship of with the information receiver. Thirdly, the way in which the communicating parties punctuate their message determines the form of relationship among them and thus portray their behaviour in response to the other communicating party's behaviour. Fourthly, human beings communicate not only communicate digitally but also analogically and fifthly, communication is concurrently centred on equal power and variances in power.

The fruitful strategy formulation and the effective strategy implementation require the coordination of multiple actors and their activities. In strategic management process, the top management is in charge of strategic and organizational choices that affect the organization while line managers function as an in-between among strategic and operative organizational activities (McCarthy, Darcy, & Grady, 2010). The interaction between top management, line managers and other operational staff is fundamental in reducing the gap in strategies implementation and coordinating actions in order to effectively realize the organizational goals (Savaneviciene & Stankeviciute, 2011). In this case it is very important for people charged with policy formulation in the security sector in the County to spread the information, to ask for proposals from everybody.

2.3   Counterinsurgency Strategy Formulation and Implementation

A comprehensive strategy seeks noticeable objectives which solve immediate problems, but it also contributes to the resolution of long-term menaces (Millen, 2009). COIN can be designed as a SCP strategy (Gibbs, 2010). SCP are crime specific measures designed by influencing the environment in which crime is anticipated to occur with intent of heightening risk associated to commission of the crime by the offender as well as diminishing the rewards that the offender might assume if he or she succeeds in committing crime (Kleemans, Soudijn, & Weenink, 2012). Increase in risks associated with crime commission on the offender's side imply that the offender has to increase the efforts required to commit the crime which will be outweighed by the reduced resultant rewards hence reduced motivations to commit the crime (Gibbs, 2010). This approach is based on the fact that criminal always evaluates cost-benefit analysis before committing a crime according to Rational Choice Theory (Brym & Andersen, 2011). However, in designing the SCP strategy, a balance should be

stricken between heightening perceived costs and reduction benefits perceived (Beath, Christia, & Enikolopov, 2010). An inequality either results in an attack being conducted, or an over allocation of security resources.

When efforts to carry out an insurgency activity are made to be harder, insurgent operations turn out to be harder hence constraining the functionality of the insurgent system hence reduction operational tempo as well as increased expense of resources (Newman, 2009). With reduced tempo and increased expenses on operations, the insurgent activities will be less resourced and less attractive for potential recruits hence hampering recruitment of new members. Furthermore to prevent further progression of insurgent activities, leader decapitation can be seen as SCP since it reduces decision-making capability of the insurgents hence making harder efforts for the insurgents to function effectively (Staeheli, 2010; Gibbs, 2010). Reducing provocations and getting rid of excuses contributes in assuaging insurgent activities and making it to lack justification hence insurgent activities will not have a root cause (Sageman, 2011; Millson, 2011). Additionally, SCP must be sustained process since insurgents are rational makers who adopt effectively to take advantage of new opportunities when it arises (Clarke & Newman, 2006).

Strategy implementation is an action constituting setting the selected strategy into a run through, availing resources to the chosen strategy, shaping the structure and culture of the organization to align with the strategy and handling the resultant change (Schermerhorn, 2010). There are three different notions of strategy implementation: The first notion views strategy implementation as sequential process consisting of properly planned successive steps. The second notion views strategy implementation as chain of intensive (but regularly parallel) actions governed by implementers'

behaviour while the third method combines these former approaches to have a hybrid standpoint. Furthermore strategy implementation can be seen as a function of rational planning or logical incrementalism or complete lack of a particular implementation form (Andrews, Boyne, Law, & Walker, 2011).

Fruitful insurgency is a subject to four prerequisites (Vrooman, 2011). First is there should be attractive grounds to which the insurgents can attract and recruit members from the society as well as ensure community support. Secondly is the absence of strong COIN forces. Thirdly is the present of geographic environment that is not too hostile to the insurgents. Fourthly is the presence of outside backup in form of political, technical, financial and military support for the insurgent activities that justifies their cause of action. Based on these preconditions, a four pronged courses of action (COA) is necessary for an effective COIN strategy. These COA include direct strike on the leaders of insurgent, indirect exploitation of the conditions favouring growth of the insurgency, intruding into the insurgency activities and destroying it from inside, or strengthen the COIN political apparatus. Therefore security, cultural and social, economic, and political mobilization is necessary for successful COIN (Nyhamar, 2009).

2.3.1 Informational Counter-Insurgency Strategies

Every act in COIN camp portrays a message that will either foster or discourage community support of the COIN camp hence the counterinsurgents should the information campaign is to gain support from the community (Khan & Jamshed-ur-Rehman, 2014). On the other hand insurgents use informational strategies designed at reflecting the communal beliefs and ideologies but strategically conveying messages meant to undermine the government authority while also enhancing legitimacy of the

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insurgent activities (Rid & Keaney, 2010). Furthermore insurgents manipulate their informational dissemination to have maximum effect aimed at generating support from the community and strategically altering response by the government agencies (Desouza & Wang, 2007).

Insurgency information use is considered the life-blood since it serves as a basis to which it recruits its members, portray societal beliefs, gain communal support and beyond, as well as gain greater alliances in to the global extremism (Schmid, 2014). In most cases it is the insurgents who develop the narrative and the government agencies develop the counter-narrative (Onuoha, 2014). COIN informational strategies is not only about winning the hearts and minds of the locals but also provides de-radicalization avenues for insurgent recruits thus inhibiting radicalization. In addition, informational COIN enables the government agencies to enhance their legitimacy and foster collaboration with the locals hence enhanced intelligence gathering thus more effective COIN operations (Marine Corps, 2014).

To reduce discontent and enhance local's support, the COIN informational strategies should endeavour to generate and sustain a realistic local's expectations while also enhancing the population's acceptance for the unavoidable inconveniences caused by on-going COIN operations (Hunton, 2008). This conveying of messages should however be harmonised with actions consistent with the wider counter-narrative. The aim of informational COIN should be to manipulation the insurgent's ideological susceptibilities, plummeting prospective for ideological resonance, reducing the abilities of the insurgents to influence the locals, and cause discontent among the insurgents or between the locals and the insurgents thus reducing mobilization ideology (Forest, 2012). As a result a COIN informational strategy should seek to

foster damaging perceptions of the insurgents' authority, religious trustworthiness, operational capability, financial reliability, and much more.

Terrorism seeks to dishearten locals with the intent of causing dissatisfaction with the local government hence enhancing the insurgents' ability to manipulate the government agencies to commit themselves to a conflict (Khan & Jamshed-ur-Rehman, 2014). A terrorist ability to win is determined by its ability to create a view of violence within the population hence creating scepticism in regards to the government's ability to control monopoly of violence (Peskowitz, 2009). Insurgents' use of propaganda is designed to contain limited elements truth without presentation of opportunities for a counter-view thus enabling it to resonate well with the targeted audience who will continually view them as more legitimate as compared to the competing forces (Forest, 2012).

In this propaganda insurgents focus their decency, tactical achievements and resourcefulness while give a lower profile on its inhumaneness and obstacles (International Crisis Group, 2006). According to Bolt (2012) and Ucko (2013) insurgents perfectly design stories which can easily resonate with the communities filled with sensations, commemorations, and iconic references. As Al Shabaab is closely linked with other insurgent groups, this according to Exum (2008) ensures it taps from the knowledge base build overtime among insurgents; this includes how best to adopt propaganda machinery which it has been an effective strategy for the insurgents.

2.3.2   Security Counter-Insurgency Strategies

The security pillar includes military security (providing the locals with security against attacks by the insurgents) and police security (community policing,

intelligence gathering and paramilitary police activities) (Khan & Jamshed-ur-Rehman, 2014). It also integrates human security which relies on promotion of human rights, protecting civil institutions and civilians and provision of public safety services (fire, ambulance, sanitation, & civil defence). The security pillar in the COIN strategy most involves security agencies attention with some elements of civilian activity. For this strategy to be effective there should be collaboration not only among various security agencies but also between the security agencies and the public.

Collaboration enhances transparency and accountability among security agencies while also ensuring increased performance of the security agencies resulting to not only decline of crime but also increased legitimacy of these agencies among the citizens. For this to occur there should be a public trust and confidence in the police as well as good working relationship among these parties (Verkoren, Willems, Kleingeld, & Rouw, 2010). But due to rampant cases of corruption among security agencies, there is a constrained working relationship between the security agencies and the general public (Pyman, Bock, Blache, Mustafa, & Zaum, 2014). This suspicion also affects police view of the civilian population as the security agencies might think that the civilians attach no value to the security services provided and singly targeted in the war against corruption (Chtalu, 2014). The incapability of governments to monopolize the use of violence as well as guarantee security or affirm its territorial authority tends to breed insurgency (Muggah & Sang, 2013).

Security COIN also incorporates elements of leader decapitation. This discourages participation in insurgent activities hence producing burnout among members which decimates the members' obligation to the group vision and mission (Weinberg, 2013). Numerous studies have castigated doubt in using punishment to counter insurgency

activities as it perpetuates violence cycles thus failing to prevent insurgents but serves to further propagate acts of terrorism (Darnell, 2010; Kumar, 2016). The sustained punishment security strategies has been also associated with not only sustained violence in areas the insurgents are currently occupying but also has spill-over effects to other uncontested as the insurgents move away from the contested in search of more suitable location (Toft & Zhukov, 2012).

2.3.3 Political and Economic Counter-Insurgency Strategies

Political transformation and development signify the principal COIN strategy, and offers a base for other initiatives and programs (Davidson, 2009). Political COIN involves providing legitimate political representation in the eyes of the civilian. Political legitimacy of state governs the amount to which civilians willingly or submissively act in accordance with resolutions give out by the local governing authority (Marine Corps, 2014). The political pillar of COIN strategy emphasises on marshalling community support for the government initiatives while side-lining insurgents but promoting good governance and enhancement of the rule of law (Kilcullen, 2006). Furthermore the political pillar seeks to reduce resistance to state and enabling the local authority to be assertive in monopoly of violence and provision of adequate security. An approach based on functional authority having sufficient administrative capacity and political acceptability should be embraced as this is the only way a state can exercise its authority (Teskey, Schnell, & Poole, 2012). However when the state is challenged in monopolizing violence or providing security, the citizens will drift allegiance to the insurgents group hence propagating further insurgency (McFate & Jackson, 2006).

This means for political COIN to function effectively, there is need to enhance institutional capacity of the government entities and foster social re-integration efforts including disarming ex-combatants and incorporating them back to the society with view of controlling arms flow (Al-Bayaa, 2010). This includes enabling the combatants have voice in the societal issues so as to address the root of feeling unfair representation. However, the success of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes have registered limited in many counterinsurgency operations as especially in Africa since not all combatants surrender for fear reprisal by other insurgent groups or rogue security agencies (Schroeder & Lamb, 2006).

The incapability of the governing authority to meet the needs of the locals including provision of adequate education, creating employment opportunities for the youth casts a wide opportunity for the insurgents to take advantage of the vast desperation and side-lining to recruit and undertake insurgent activities while gaining support from the community (Shetret, Schwartz, & Cotter, 2013). Although with contemporary insurgent attacks indicate that the insurgents are not from deprived background, support for insurgent activities are likely to be of much importance in communities with widespread poverty and political misrepresentation (Taspınar, 2009). Therefore for development COIN strategy to effectively tackle insurgency activities, it should be mirrored by locals perceptions' of their standard of living and social well-being associated with better access to social and economic services in conjunction with better societal view of the local government agencies (Beath, Christia, & Enikolopov, 2010).

2.4   Challenges of Counterinsurgency Strategy Implementation

In several instances of insurgent attacks in Kenya, the insurgents have alluded to Muslims and ethnic Somalis oppression, the fight by Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) in Somalia, and assassination of Muslim clerics as the motives for their attacks (Adair, 2014; Human Rights Watch, 2015). Furthermore it has been cited that most Muslim youth are radicalized into joining Al Shabaab in response to the alleged government-sponsored 'collective punishment' motivated by the imprudent opinion that all Somalis and Kenyan-ethnic Somali are probable terrorists (Botha, 2014). However, the main aim of Al Shabaab is to coerce the Kenya governments into accepting its demands of withdrawing KDF from Somalia while causing disgruntlement among Kenyan citizens due to numerous insecurity incidences (Bundotich, 2013).

Through effective use of mass media available nowadays, Al Shabaab regularly pin-point their successes and highlight shortcomings of the COIN agencies. Therefore with increased coverage, these insurgents gain not only coverage but also support from those their ideologies resonate with. Al Shabaab has demonstrated their capability in the use the emergent social media platform to assert its win over the global media. In addition these insurgents have mastered the art of social media including YouTube, launch of pro-insurgent websites and Internet chat rooms which has enable them gain financial and moral supporters and increase number of recruits backed by back-end tech gurus (Menkhaus, 2014). Furthermore Al Shabaab have been able to strategically exploit local political squabbles to promote its cause (Anderson & McKnight, 2014).

Locally, it has been noted that there is no consolidated COIN strategy while the existing approaches date back pre-independent Kenya (Whittaker, 2014; Ang, 2015)

and therefore according to Aronson (2013) the COIN strategy in the region is defective. Despite this recognition, it has been recognized that the local COIN measures have faced significant increment in funding as well as increment of counterinsurgency programs hence one questions the justification for this increment (Lum, Kennedy, & Sherley, 2009). Further it has been argued that the sustained implementation of COIN initiatives in the region has been propelled by substantial supply of resources to the regional governments.

2.5   Empirical Review

In a study of COIN strategies in Philippines, Fowler (2011) found that to counter the home-grown insurgents, the Philippines tried to deny the insurgents local support by availing sufficient security while other civil affairs groups improved infrastructure and constructed social amenities. These developmental programs provided much looked-for basic services thus providing an avenue to win local support while improving the local infrastructure necessary economic development and enhance movement for the COIN agencies. These projects enabled the COIN agencies to develop good rapport with the civilians during implementation of the development projects thus enhancing the ability of the COIN security agencies to gather intelligence about the insurgent activities. Despite this, there was no integration of the military strategy into these developmental programs.

In a study of COIN strategy implementation in Pashtun belt in Afghanistan, Dorronsoro, (2009) observed that the COIN strategy was designed to eliminate insurgents from the target area and stay while executing development projects aimed at winning the locals' support. Numerous challenges were encountered while implementing the strategy as it was not visible to separate the locals from the

insurgents in the villages but also there was absence of state structure to substitute the COIN forces after the removal of Taliban. In addition majority of the insurgents came from the local area and hence the locals tended to be in solidarity with the insurgents.

In his study of COIN strategies deployed by Soviet forces, Doohovskoy (2009) observed that the COIN security agencies limited the contact between the population and the insurgents by applying monitoring and controlling strategies. This inhibited the support network for the insurgents. This strategy involved conserving strict curfews, allotting census cards and carrying out thorough searches and questionings to regulate the locals and separate them from the insurgency. In the economic front, the COIN strategy involved infrastructural development, natural resources exploitation, and development of local skills to increase their ability to take advantage of available economic capabilities. In the informational front, the strategy involved information distribution local dailies and radio stations comprehending messages that buoyed the government agenda and condemned insurgents' activities as they portrayed the as undertaking external forces' interest at the expense of the civilian population. This strategy also enabled the counterinsurgents to win over the populace thus enabling them gather intelligence about the insurgents and enabled them to understand the population mood.

Pampinella, (2016) compared counterinsurgency effectiveness of winning hearts and minds against the use of brute force against ordinary civilians. The results demonstrated that a combination of intimidating, convincing, and diversified COIN practices results to victory. However, more use of persuasive methods reliably lead to success as compared to the others, despite the fact that coercion practices was constantly used in all cases. These findings were similar to a study by Johnston,

(2009) which revealed that COIN strategy comprising leadership decapitation might be effective by itself or when used concurrently with population-centric measures. This is because the leadership of the insurgency is fundamental to enhancement of insurgency effectiveness hence their elimination deteriorates and disrupts insurgent functionality hence a better chance of success by the COIN agencies. Additionally Butler (2015) argued that leadership elimination are likely to be successful COIN strategies as in the long-run it will lead to decline of the group as the group will face leadership challenges hence disruption of its activities. On the contrary Butler (2015) on his study of Al Shabaab found that that leadership decapitation registered limited success in distracting and preventing future insurgent activities committed by Al Shabaab.

In his study on the COIN strategies applied by British COIN agencies in during the Mau-Mau upsurge, Ang (2015) observed that the initial stages of COIN involved thorough sweeps of insurgent hide-outs designed to make the insurgents to be on constant run hence distabilizing their ability to make concrete strategic plans. This security strategy depended on the collaborative ability among security agencies and between civilians and the security agencies. The COIN strategy on the socio-economic front employed authoritarianism, relocation of displaced civilians and attempts to address complaints designed at gaining local support, however it produced the opposite results by advancing the insurgency. In the political strategy, the British took advantage of the tribal divisions among the commmunities and this registered significant success to the counterinsurgents.

In their study of use of propaganda, Odhiambo, et al (2013) found that Al Shabaab attached the COIN agencies with the intention of creating a response that is likely to

increase the insurgent's support. On the other hand the COIN agencies portrayed the insurgents' activities as unjustified vicious discourse. This counter-narrative was disseminated using available mass media which effectively covered large areas of Somalia and was effective in questioning insurgents' propaganda as well as castigating those who supported or spread the insurgent's propaganda. This informational strategy according to Odhiambo, et al (2013) registered significant success in countering the insurgent propaganda and hence reduced support for their activities. However fostering collaboration among security and other government agencies is an uphill task because it has been observed that there is a extensive cynicism of government agencies among Muslims. This implies that the Muslim believers and the government cannot exclusively enhance consensus on issues aimed countering radicalization and insurgency (Anderson & McKnight, 2014).

CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1   Introduction

This chapter explores the research design to be used, a brief description of the study target population and the study sample and also the selection methods of data collection, the data collection process and techniques of data analysis that will be adopted by the study.

3.2   Research Design

Research design is the scheme, outline or plan that is used to generate answers to research problems. This study adopted a case study design. Case study is as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. Case studies is an in depth inquiry employing several sources meant to describe a situation comprehensively with specific focus is one situation and not generalizability of the context (George & Bennett, 2005). Being an explorative research, the case study approach provides formation of causativeness relationship in the particular context and offers an all-inclusive viewpoint on the relationship since it treats the specific context as a whole (Zainal, 2007). Case study also allows gathering data in both retrospective and prospective perspective hence a more holistic view. This choice of design was based on the fact that the study sought to obtain information that describes existing counterinsurgency strategies together with their perceived impact.

3.3   Data Collection

This study relied on primary data collected from the study respondents. For the purpose of this study, the qualitative data was collected through the use of Key

Informant Interviews. The respondents to this study were County administrators including the Governor, County Commissioner and County Minister in charge of security and heads of security agencies in the county including Kenya Police, Administration Police, National Intelligence Service and Kenya Defence Forces. Because of the sensitivity of terrorism issues, this study only targeted a maximum of 7 respondents. These respondents were purposively sampled.

3.4   Data Analysis

Content analysis was used to analyse the transcripts developed. Content analysis allows the researcher to develop codes in textual responses by systematically examining the contents of the text. These codes allow the researcher to develop a comprehensive picture of the perspective of the stakeholders and organizational behaviour (Duriau, Reger, & Pfarrer, 2007). This involved reading through the data and developing codes that draw similar connections between categories and themes using Atlas.ti software. Further analysis of the data categories was anticipated to yield themes and sub-themes that captured the central phenomenon which serves the core of this study. Analysed data and themes were presented in form of text and figures.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS, RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1   Introduction

This chapter presents the results of the data collected. The study sought to determine the counter-insurgency strategies that have been deployed in Mandera County and to assess the effectiveness of these deployed strategies in Mandera County. The researcher conducted key informant interviews County administrators including the Governor, County Commissioner and County Minister in charge of security and heads of security agencies in the county including Kenya Police, Administration Police, National Intelligence Service and Kenya Defence Forces.

4.2   Demographic Profile

The study sought to establish the demographic profiles of the respondents. The demographic characteristics of interest in this study included the respondents' current position, education level and length of being in public service.

4.2.1   Response Rate

Out of the targeted 7 respondents in this study, the researcher managed to interview 6 respondents which were considered sufficient to answer the study objectives. This was specifically so due to the sensitive nature of security matters in the County.

Table 4. 1: Response rate

	Frequency	Percent
Response	6	85.7%
Non-response	1	14.3%
Total	**7**	**100%**

4.2.2 Respondents' Position

The respondents were drawn from the head of security agencies and county administration as shown in the following table.

Table 4. 2: Respondents' Position

Department	Respondents	Percent
Kenya Police	1	16.7%
Administration Police	1	16.7%
National Intelligence Service	1	16.7%
Anti-terrorism Police Unit	1	16.7%
County Commander	1	16.7%
In-charge Security at the Mandera County Government	1	16.7%
Total	**6**	**100%**

4.2.3 Education Level of Respondents

Majority (66.7%) of the respondents had attained bachelor's degree while 2(33.3%) had Master's degree. This showed that the respondents were well educated and therefore could effectively formulate and manage the implementation of counterinsurgency strategies within the county.

Table 4. 3: Education Level of Respondents

Education level	Frequency	Percent
Bachelor's Degree	4	66.7%
Master's Degree	2	33.3%
Total	**6**	**100%**

4.2.4 Length of Service in Public Sector

The study found that 66.7% of the respondents had served in the public sector for between 10 and 15 years while 33.3% had served for more than 15 years.

Table 4. 4: Length of Service in Public Sector

Length of Service in Public Sector	Frequency	Percent
10 – 15 years	4	66.7%
> 15 years	2	33.3%
Total	**6**	**100%**

4.3 Insurgency in Mandera County

Incidences of terrorism in Northern Kenya dates back to Shifta war. However terrorist attacks begun to spiral with the invasion by the KDF into Somalia in 2011. This heightened in 2014 as Kenyan terror incidences appeared consistently on international media. Notable among these insecurity incidences included grenade attacks in Nairobi and Mombasa, attacks of farming communities and businesses in Mpeketoni and Witu town respectively in Lamu County, heightened clan-based violence in Northern Kenya. In towns these attacks were carried out in churches, shopping malls, bus stations, bars and a college targeting civilians. In Northern Kenya the terror attacks were majorly carried out in border areas of Mandera, Garissa and Wajir (Onuoha, 2013).

Although initially the attacks were carried out by clan militias, they have recently aligned around two local insurgents, namely, Al Hijra and Al-Shabaab. Al Hijra is a home-grown terror group responsible for providing Al Shabaab, a terror network originating from Somalia, with suitable targets and providing an avenue to recruit the local youths to fight in Somalia beside Al-Shabaab (Onuoha, 2013). It has been noted that Kenya nationals who have joined Al Shabaab management have also recruited fellow Kenyans in their quest to fighting coalition forces in Somalia (Hassan, 2015). Despite these motivation of fighting 'Christian intruders' in Somalia, it has been

continually noted that local recruits have been used to conduct terrorist attacks in the Kenyan soil (Botha, 2014)

In several instances of insurgent attacks in Kenya, the insurgents have allude to Muslims and ethnic Somalis oppression, the fight by Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) in Somalia, and assassination of Muslim clerics as the motives for their attacks (Adair, 2014; Human Rights Watch, 2015). Furthermore it has been cited that most Muslim youth are radicalized into joining Al Shabaab in response to the alleged government-sponsored 'collective punishment' motivated by the imprudent opinion that all Somalis and Kenyan-ethnic Somali are probable terrorists (Botha, 2014). However, the main aim of Al Shabaab is to coerce the Kenya governments into accepting its demands of withdrawing KDF from Somalia while causing disgruntlement among Kenyan citizens due to numerous insecurity incidences (Bundotich, 2013).

According to the respondents the insurgent activities in the County have been declining for the past one year occasioned by high alertness of security agents, sustained crackdown on the insurgents by government security, close collaboration between the locals and security agents, sustained community sensitization campaigns against insurgency and community embrace of the Nyumba Kumi initiative. This showed that there has been close working relationship between security agents and community which enabled the community to share intelligence information with the security agents without fear of victimization.

Figure 4.1: Causes of decline in insurgency

Source: Researcher (2016)

Majority (83.3%) of the respondents were of the opinion the relationship between the insurgents and the local community members has deteriorated as locals have lost more than what they gained due to the insurgent activities. However there are some cases in which the locals support insurgent activities for payments, for religious reasons or in sympathy with their kins that have been arrested or killed by law enforcers. Despite the low support for insurgent activities, the supporters do not openly confess due to fear of consequences. This indicated that there was still room to effectively counter the remaining support for the insurgent activities by winning the hearts and minds of locals from support of insurgent activities.

Figure 4.2: Relationship between the insurgents and the local community members

[1:2] To some extent the locals supp..

To some extent the locals support the insurgents either for payments, support their religious organizations or sympathize with their kins who have been arrested or killed by law enforcers

[2:14] The relationship varies as mos..

The relationship varies as most share same culture and language thus some support the insurgents while others do not thus the variance.

Victimization

is cause of

Reduced support

Hidden support

[4:14] The relationship between the l..

The relationship between the locals and the insurgents is bad since the locals of Mandera County have suffered many consequences economically, lack of expertise, socially and educationally and they believe they have lost more than what they gained due to the insurgent activities.

[3:2] Due to fear it may not be poss..

Due to fear it may not be possible for local supporters of insurgency to come out openly in support of the insurgents.

Source: Researcher (2016)

According to the respondents, in addition to the dwindling community support for insurgent activities and ideologies, there has been declining trends in radicalization. However, the KIIs observed that the rate of which insurgents were denouncing the group was rather low. Despite this low deradicalization, the respondents observed that the security situation has improved with few cases of insecurity. Reduced cases of insecurity implied that the locals are driven to negatively perceive the insurgents as the locals get to peace semblance; this denies the insurgents opportunities to get community support hence reducing its ability to undertake insurgent activities.

Figure 4.3: Radicalization trends

Source: Researcher (2016)

4.4 Effectiveness of Counter Insurgency Strategies

Half (50%) of the respondents thought that there was cordial working relationship among security agencies. The other half thought that the locals had negative attitude towards the security agencies as they blamed the security agencies of corruption, incompetence, harassment and extra judicial killings. However despite this widespread distrust with the security agencies, some locals cooperate with security personnel by providing vital information that help in curbing insurgency. This shows that Al Shabaab narrative against the security agencies largely resonates with the local views or could be an indication that the counter-narrative by the Kenyan government is yet to resonate among locals. This local perception of the security agencies could be real or a mere perception.

Figure 4.4: Relationship between security agencies and locals

Source: Researcher (2016)

The respondents were in agreement that radicalization has been suppressed but not yet eradicated. The existing level of radicalization according to the respondents is fanned by persistent marginalization of Northern Kenya, poverty and unemployment, religious and political intolerance and victimization of locals by security agencies. However radicalization is on the decline according to the respondents due to efforts made by the county and national governments to educate the youths and create employment.

Figure 4.5: Causes of radicalization

Source: Researcher (2016)

The study indicated that in most cases of attacks by these insurgents, the attackers always cite the mistreatment of ethnic Somalis within Kenya by the government and avenging the killing of other Muslims by security agencies. These assertions were similar to findings by Adair (2014) and Human Rights Watch (2015) who claimed mistreamement of ethnic Somalis has fueled insurgency in Northern Kenya. Furthermore this mistrust and mistreatment has been viewed as government-imposed 'collective punishment' motivated by perception of collective view that all Somali

and Kenyan-Somali nationals are probable terrorists (Botha, 2014). In Kenya haphazard arrests are common in the informal settlements in urban centres as well as in Northern Kenya (Amnesty International, 2013). In general the prevalence of bribery among the police has had significant increase to reach 72% in 2014 (Transparency International Kenya, 2015). According to Amnesty International (2013), corruption in the security agencies is an inculcated enterprise-wide culture that the current government regime has not been able to tackle it effectively. Furthermore corruption along Kenyan borders, especially in the North East region imply that the security agencies facilitate movement of the insurgents as they easily bribe their way in and out of the country (Hassan, 2015).

The study found that there was relative collaboration between the members of the local community and security agencies in addressing cases of insecurity. For collaboration between the security agencies and the local community to occur there should be a public trust and confidence in the police as well as good working relationship among these parties (Liberman, Fontaine, Ross, Roman, & Roman, 2010). But the mere perception that security agencies are corrupt and ineffective in securing builds up a barrier between the citizens and the police thus threatening the chances of a working relationship between the public and law enforcers. This might lead community resorting to formation of and support of insurgents hence reduced probability of winning the hearts and minds from these insurgents (Kivoi & Mbae, 2013; KNCHR, 2014; Rohwerder, 2015). It has also been found that 58% of Kenyans reporting to the police since they torture, this fear therefore much worse in Northern and Coastal regions of Kenya (Independent Medico-Legal Unit, 2011; KNCHR, 2014).

All the respondents agree that all the security agencies, local administration and non-governmental organizations cumulatively were involved in counterinsurgency strategy formulation process. There was extensive awareness of existence of strategic plans to counter insurgency within the county. Furthermore each of the agencies had formulated counterinsurgency strategic plans. According to the KIIs these strategic plans were being harmoniously being implemented by the respective agencies and there was great level of collaboration and cooperation among these agencies. However cases of mistrust or ingenuity among agencies occasionally occurred. The study concurs with a study in Afghanistan among Canadian agencies which found that despite relative collaboration between the COIN agencies and the locals there were some teething problems in the collaborative approach occasioned by agencies capacity, bureaucracy, political interference, and organizational culture (Alexander, 2014). Similar findings have been documented in other Kenyan studies which indicate that there has been some mistrust among various security organs (Mkutu, Marani, & Ruteere, 2014; Wanga & Hajir, 2015).

Figure 4.6: Collaboration among agencies in counterinsurgency strategy formulation

The respondents were of the opinion that locals were adequately involved during the formulation of the counterinsurgent strategy and their views were adequately captured in the drawn up strategy. This local involvement ensured that the local are in agreement with strategies being implemented hence reducing resistance as well as tapping in local knowledge essential for the success of counterinsurgency strategy and forming strategic alliance with locals. This study showed that the security agencies in the county had adopted 'mediated state arrangement' whereby the state co-opts local security arrangements to promote security by relinquishing part of its monopoly of violence. However, this formulation strategy depended on the legitimacy and inclusivity of local governance but at risk of manipulation from powerful individuals within the society. This concurs with a study in Philippines where it was found that

civilian authorities were limited to implementation of counterinsurgencies developed by the military and the locals did not think availing intelligence information being a form of participation (Hall, 2006). This study showed that in countering insurgency, the security agencies had applied principles of strategic management in reducing resistance to strategic initiatives by involving locals in decision making.

Figure 4.7: Involvement of locals in counterinsurgency strategy formulation

Source: Researcher (2016)

4.5   Informational counter-insurgency strategies

According to the respondents the insurgents propagate a message of castigating the generalization of Muslims as terrorists but the propaganda from the insurgents lately has not succeeded in winning large portion of the population and only resonates with the believes of select few. This could be an indication for ineffective propaganda use

by the insurgents or an effective counter narrative developed and deployed by the counter insurgents. Further with the dwindling support for the insurgents among locals, the insurgents are forced to propagate more propaganda in attempt of winning back the locals. The propaganda was mainly propagated in Mosques and in entire community which tries to depict Muslims as being generalized targets of victimization. This victimization tended to drive negative attitude towards counterinsurgents while the negative attitude resulted from the propaganda. This concurs with a study by Odhiambo, et al (2013) found that Al-Shabaab were fighting with counterinsurgents hoping to provoke counterterrorist narrative which in turn radicalize the entire population hence providing the insurgents with much needed community support while on the other hand the government countered this by disputing insurgent rumour mongering and depicting them as wrongful users of mass media. The study observed similar trends as indicated by Some (2011) who observed that Al Shabaab steps up its propaganda machinery in attempts to curtail efforts by counterinsurgents to free the region of militants by portraying the counterinsurgency efforts as a war among Muslims and non-Muslims. The study observed similar trends as indicated by Anderson & McKnight (2014) who observed that Al-Shabaab has been able to competently manipulate local political squabbles to enhance their own cause and gain support from community which is key to its survival.

The study revealed that the insurgents perfectly designed stories to easily resonate with the communities filled with sensations, commemorations, and iconic references. This message is selectively, quickly and carefully disseminated in repetition in such a manner that the community might agree with the message. Similar findings were made in Iraq and Afghanistan which found that insurgent had mastered the art of propaganda, manipulating mass media which in turn shaped the perceived manner in

which counterinsurgency operation was being carried out not only among the insurgents but also among allies and the general population (Exum, 2008).

The study found that the insurgents at times used permanent graffiti which serves as continuous souvenir of their existence. This concurs with a study by Garfield (2007) who found that insurgents tend to employ low technology strategies to enable their message to trickle down to grassroots and use mosques to deliver their viewpoints among attendants and seek religious legitimacy for their activities. The study also concurs with a study by Taarnby and Hallundbaek (2010) who found that propaganda messages delivered by Al Shabaab was clear in portraying its views and vision and had repeated valuable references to other Jihadi groups including Al Qaeda.

Figure 4. 8: Insurgents' use of propaganda

Source: Researcher (2016)

According to the respondents there was minimal use of propaganda to counterinsurgencies efforts and enable the security agencies win the support of locals. This minimal use of propaganda was found to be effective as it had contributed to efforts by locals to shield Christians from attacks from the insurgents. In addition the security agencies propaganda had translated to better perception of security agencies who were previously castigated as targeting Muslims and Somalis in their counterinsurgency efforts. However, much ground has not been covered in convincing locals from this line of thought has the view 'collective punishment' still largely resonates with locals.

Similar cases of mistrust of security agencies have been documented in Kenya with locals perceiving security as unfairly targeting Somali and Muslims in counterinsurgency operations (Adair, 2014; Human Rights Watch, 2015). Botha (2014) also similarly observed that there is general view of locals that security agencies are executing 'collective punishment' of people perceived to be probable terrorists (Botha, 2014). Furthermore security agencies have not succeeded in pacifying the perception that they are corrupt in its entirety hence cannot be trusted by locals who fear being sold out to insurgents if they provide intelligence information to the security agencies (Amnesty International, 2013). This inability to counter this narrative hinders the collaboration among security agencies and locals hence driving locals to the side of insurgents (Liberman, Fontaine, Ross, Roman, & Roman, 2010).

4.6   Security Counterinsurgency Strategies

According to Routine Activities Theory, presence of potential offenders, presence of suitable targets and an absence of capable and willing guardians precludes occurrence of an insecurity incident. The security agencies in Mandera County were applying this

theory in situational crime prevention. The strategies included hardening the target by ensuring that the vulnerable members of the community are protected enhance ensuring community activities continue peacefully. Other strategies employed included using intelligence information to disrupt insurgent activities, decapitation of heads of insurgents as well as investigating and prosecuting alleged members of Al Shabaab. However, the later strategy was at risk of generating mistrust among the locals as they might perceive the security agents as collectively profiling them as security agents.

Figure 4. 9: Security counterinsurgency strategies

Source: Researcher (2016)

The study observed that the deployment of all security organs to the region not only ensured there was an increase in perceived costs of undertaking insurgents activities but also provided an alternative to insecurity which the community tended to value as compared to insecurity fashioned by Al Shabaab. Furthermore presence of numerous security officers in the region ensured that the risks of committing insurgent activities are minimized. The study also observed that there were cases of decapitation of insurgent leaders which served to instil fear among members and potential recruits. This discouraged participation in insurgent activities hence producing burnout among members which decimates the members' obligation to the group vision and mission. The results relates well with other studies that have castigated doubt in using punishment to counter insurgency activities as it perpetuates violence cycles thus failing to prevent insurgents but serves to further propagate acts of terrorism (Darnell, 2010; Kumar, 2016).

4.7   Political and Economic Counterinsurgency Strategies

According to the respondents, the security agencies were minimally involved in political and economic counterinsurgency strategies. Although the counterinsurgency strategies might have included elements of political and economic counter insurgencies, the security agencies played an advisory role to other government agencies implementing these strategies instead of direct participation in implementing these strategies. As a result the respondents recommended the need for creation of employment opportunities for the youth, with these employment, the youths will have access to sustainable livelihoods hence they will not be attracted to insurgent activities. However the youths could not effectively utilise the available employment opportunities since they have limited capacities, hence there was need to enhance their capacities by providing them with training opportunities.

The security agencies therefore lacked crucial link in working with the locals in developmental programs. Working in developmental programs with locals could have enabled the security agencies interact with locals thus creating a good rapport with them hence better collaboration and efficient intelligence gathering. This shows that developmental programs although a crucial link to winning the hearts and minds of locals was missing, hence a defective strategy. Similar findings were made in Philippines which found security agencies purely concentrated in security provision while civilian teams of counterinsurgents provided executed infrastructural development programs by rebuilding schools, providing water and other civic works (Fowler, 2011). Contrary findings were made in a study of counterinsurgency strategies employed by Soviet forces which found that the counterinsurgents incorporated infrastructure development and development of local skills to empower locals (Doohovskoy, 2009). This strategy enabled the Soviets to not only win over the population and gather intelligence but also enabled them to understand the mood of the locals.

Figure 4.10: Developmental Counterinsurgency strategies

Source: Researcher (2016)

On the political front, the counterinsurgents in Mandera, as in other Northern Kenya and Coastal regions had championed leader decapitation. Respondents indicated that the killing of leaders means that the insurgents losses strategic leadership which disorients activities within the insurgents. The results showed that leadership decapitation also caused wrangles with the insurgent's organizational structure due to the fact that the remaining leaders might think of their fellow leaders as the ones who might have leaked out information counterinsurgents causing their colleagues to be killed.

The study also noted that the greed of having a say in the community was a major drive determinant in joining insurgents' ranks. This concurs with a study by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) who found that insurgency was mostly motivated by greed to take over control of the population by controlling monopoly of violence, therefore grievances within the insurgents group might erupt with various sides wanting to take over leadership of the group from the decapitated leader. The work of Butler (2015) argued that leadership targeting principles that are likely to be effective counterterrorism strategies and lead to the long-term decline of the group.

These findings were similar to a study by Johnston, (2009) which revealed that counterinsurgency strategy involving leadership decapitation may be effective alone or when used in tandem with population-centric principles this was because insurgency's leaders are crucial to the effectiveness of insurgent organizations thus their removal weakens and disrupts insurgent movements hence a better chance of success in the counterinsurgency. On the contrary Butler (2015) on his study of Al Shabaab found that that leadership decapitation operation has limited effect in disrupting and preventing future acts of terrorism by Al Shabaab.

The study found that there have been attempts to balance in representation in the region with respect to clan dynamics. These attempts ensure fair representation thus boosting the legitimacy of administration hence reduction in the feeling of marginalization resulting in decline in support of insurgent activities. This concurs with studies by Lindley (2014) and Albrecht and Lambo (2015) who claimed that complex clan system in Northern Kenya shapes nearly every aspect of the society and as a result legitimacy of the local administration was shaped by its representation of clan system hence a source of conflict and a driver of insurgent support with clans

trying to outdo each other. In such case Gonnelli (2013) observed that the political elites are a kin to manipulating this phenomenon to suit their interests which keep on shifting whenever it does not favour them. This concurs with a report by International Crisis Group (2013) which found that deep divisions within and between clans was as a result of government manipulation and essential representation disagreements between the clans in local administration.

CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1   Introduction

This chapter presents the summary of the research approach adopted by the study and the findings derived from the study. The conclusions derived from the study findings are presented here in as well as conclusions resultant from the study findings. Recommendations made from the study conclusions are also presented in this chapter.

5.2   Summary

The study sought to establish the counterinsurgency strategies deployed in Mandera County as well as an assessment of effectiveness of these deployed strategies. The counterinsurgency strategies explored by the study included informational, security, political and economic counterinsurgency strategies. The study adopted a case study approach which included Key Informant Interviews conducted among heads of various security agencies within the County. The qualitative data collected from the interviews was analysed using content analysis where common themes were developed using Atlas.ti. The results were presented in verbatim form.

There was no comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy developed as a single document, however, the various agencies in the county deployed measures similar to a counterinsurgency strategy. These measures were averagely considered to have succeeded in curbing insurgent activities as indicated by reduction in insecurity incidences in the county and seemingly better support for implementing agencies by the locals as compared to the support of insurgents. This showed that the measures in place were relatively successful in winning the hearts and minds of the locals which is the fundamental element in counterinsurgency strategy.

On the informational front, the agencies minimally relied on propaganda in trying to win over the locals from support of the insurgents. The messages security agencies tried to create a better perception of security agencies among the locals. This perception creation had been successful since the locals were increasingly found to work more closely with the security agencies. However, the use of propaganda was more on the side of the insurgents who tried to propagate a message of collective punishment of Muslims and ethnic Somalis as well as continued marginalization of the locals by government agencies. This insurgent propaganda, although resonated with the feelings of the general population in the county, it had support of a few locals. As the population support for insurgent activities was dwindling with time, the insurgents stepped up its use of propaganda mainly delivered in Mosques and other social gatherings.

In the security front, the counterinsurgents mainly deployed situational crime prevention strategies which designed on the Routine Activities Theory. This included manipulation of the immediate environment through sustained intelligence gathering and provision of adequate security by coordinating the various security agencies. Furthermore the security agencies advised other agencies in implementation of situational crime prevention measures which included street lighting by the County Government. In addition to this security agencies conducted public awareness campaigns which enabled them build better rapport with the public hence better intelligence gathering. The sustained security efforts and vigilance meant that the risks of committing insurgent activities without being known were too high, hence reduced motivation of insurgents activities thus reduced relevance of insurgent ideologies. The reduced relevance meant that the insurgents were effectively denied opportunities to recruit members of the society to their camps. Furthermore with

increased security, the members of the society did not see the need to resort to local arrangements for their safety which formed the basis of them backing away from supporting clan-based militias.

Although the security agencies were not involved in political and economic counterinsurgency strategy implementation, it played an advisory role but civilian affairs department provided these programs. The developmental programs being implemented included infrastructural development and construction of social amenities. With better infrastructure, the local economy blossoms which creates better employment for the otherwise idle youths thus denying the insurgents a recruitment pool. Reduced unemployment also results in reduced income disparities and better living standards which thus reduce the feeling of marginalization of the locals hence denying the insurgents a reason to foster their ideology based on the concept of marginalization.

In the political front, with the advent of devolved governance, the society progressively feels adequately represented. However, this might have not been effective as it might not reflect clan-based dynamics within the county, furthermore these clan-based dynamics are at times manipulated by political elites to suit their interests hence an ineffective counterinsurgency strategy. Since the elites command loyalty from the society, it effectively determined whether the community support the insurgents or counterinsurgents at their whims thus a 'shifting goal' strategy.

5.3   Conclusions

Based on the study findings the following conclusions were drawn:

There was no single comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy implemented by counterinsurgencies in Mandera County. Despite this each counterinsurgency agency including security agencies, civilian affairs agencies and political agencies were implementing measures with semblance to counterinsurgency strategy. In their implementation of these measures, however, there was good coordination among the counterinsurgents with minimal cases of mistrust among agencies.

The counterinsurgents measures deployed were averagely effective in winning the hearts and minds of the locals. This was due to the fact that locals have progressively shifted from supporting insurgent activities in favour of counterinsurgents.

The use of propaganda among counterinsurgents within Mandera County was relatively low among the counterinsurgents, however, the insurgents ranked highly in the use of propaganda. The low use of propaganda and other informational counterinsurgent measures meant that the security agents had not succeeded in creating better perception of security agencies among the locals instead there was continued negative attitude among locals. The locals still perceived the security agencies as propagating collective punishment among locals which was concurrent with the insurgent propaganda. Despite this concurrency, the insurgent propaganda did not translate to better support from locals.

There were enhanced security counterinsurgency efforts within the County which included provision of better security among vulnerable members of the society and sustained intelligence gathering aimed at disrupting insurgent activities. This was made possible by better coordination among security agencies and local community

members who happened to have embraced community policing. This was an indication that security agencies were progressively developing good rapport with the locals. The security apparatus also carried out targeted killings of insurgency heads but these efforts constantly run into headwinds as the society viewed some of the decapitation as extra-judicial killings of innocent civilians. The leader decapitation strategy thus registered mixed results hence not effective counterinsurgency strategy.

Although there were developmental programs designed and implemented to counter insurgent activities in the county including infrastructural development and establishment of social amenities, the security agencies were not involved in implementing these measures. This effectively denied the security agencies an opportunity to interact with locals hence reduced chances of building better rapport and lost intelligence gathering opportunities.

5.4   Recommendations

Based on the study conclusions the researcher recommends the following:

1. There is need for counterinsurgents to consolidate their counterinsurgency measures into one executable strategic plan. This will enable the agencies better coordinate activities as well as better information sharing hence fostering their chances of success in countering insurgency within the county.

2. Although security agencies had earned significant support from locals there is need for these agencies to enhance their information dissemination strategies not only to counter the insurgents propaganda but also enable them build a better public image among locals. This is necessary because their image is highly dented by insurgent propaganda and general population feelings.

3. The security agencies should also design and implement better intelligence gathering machinery especially when gathering information about alleged

insurgent leadership. This will enable the leader's decapitation strategy to be properly executed without accusation of extrajudicial killing of innocent civilians.

4. Civilian agencies should involve security agencies in executing developmental programs aimed at countering insurgent activities. This will provide opportunities for the security agencies to interact with locals and develop good rapport hence learning more insights about the community and effectively gather intelligence information.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: LETTER OF INTRODUCTION

Dear Participant,

I am **Abass Sheikh Barre**, a Master's student of Business Administration at UoN. I am carrying out a study on counterinsurgency strategy formulation and implementation in Mandera County. This study is part of the requirements for the conferment of the above mentioned degree and informative in the agenda to improve the security in the county. As an individual the benefit is minimal but the study will enable better understanding of implementation of strategies drawn. Your voluntary participation in this study is greatly appreciated. As a participant, you are kindly requested to participate by completing the study tools under the guidance of researcher/ research assistant. Your identity will be concealed, privacy will be respected and any information you provide will be confidential and for purposes of research only. You shall not be exposed to any harm by participating in the study. Your participation is purely voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any point without any penalty. Kindly read and understand the written consent form before signing. You are welcome to ask any questions or to seek any necessary clarifications before you sign the document using the contacts below.

I voluntarily agree to participate in the research.

Signature ………………………………. Date………………………………

Principal researcher: **Abass Sheikh Barre (0722 242 528)**

Email: abassysheikh@gmail.com

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF COUNTIES

1. Baringo County	2. Meru County
3. Bomet County	4. Migori County
5. Bungoma County	6. Marsabit County
7. Busia County	8. Mombasa County
9. Elgeyo Marakwet County	10. Muranga County
11. Embu County	12. Nairobi County
13. Garissa County	14. Nakuru County
15. Homa Bay County	16. Nandi County
17. Isiolo County	18. Narok County
19. Kajiado County	20. Nyamira County
21. Kakamega County	22. Nyandarua County
23. Kericho County	24. Nyeri County
25. Kiambu County	26. Samburu County
27. Kilifi County	28. Siaya County
29. Kirinyaga County	30. Taita Taveta County
31. Kisii County	32. Tana River County
33. Kisumu County	34. Tharaka Nithi County
35. Kitui County	36. Trans Nzoia County
37. Kwale County	38. Turkana County
39. Laikipia County	40. Uasin Gishu County
41. Lamu County	42. Vihiga County
43. Machakos County	44. Wajir County
45. Makueni County	46. West Pokot County
47. Mandera County	

APPENDIX 3: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE

Topic: Assessment of Effective Formulation and Implementation of Counterinsurgency Strategies in Kenya, a Case Study of Mandera County

Section A: Demographic Profile

1. What is your position in this organization
2. What is your highest education level
3. How long have your been in the public service

Section B: Counterinsurgency strategies

4. How would you describe the trends of insurgent activities in the county within the last one year? Is it decreasing, stagnating or increasing? What could be driving this trend?

5. How is the relationship between the locals and the insurgent groups? Do they support the insurgent views? If they do why do you think they are in support?

6. How is the relationship between the locals and the security personnel in the county? Do they support the activities of the security personnel? If they do why do you think they are in support?

7. In this county, what do you think is the driver of the local's support of insurgent activities? How would you describe the trends of radicalization within the county? Do you think the local perception of the security personnel/operation could be driving the radicalization?

8. As head of security, have your agency sat with other government agency to formulate counterinsurgent strategy for the county? Which are these agencies? How would you describe your working relationship with them?

9. Does everyone involved knowledgeable of the government's strategic plan to defeat insurgency? Do you know of any participating agencies in counterinsurgency that have their own implementing plans in support of the government's plan?

10. If there exists a drawn up strategy, how are these agencies collaborating in its execution? Is there mistrust or view of ingenuity among these agencies?

11. During the formulation of the counterinsurgent strategy, how were the locals in the county involved? Were their views adequately captured in the drawn up strategy? If no, what do you think was left out?

12. The insurgents in the county are known to use propaganda to attain support from the locals, what are some of these messages emanating from the insurgents? Does it resonate with the views of the society? Is the society in support of these messages?

13. In the counterinsurgency strategy drawn does it contain elements of fighting this propaganda? If yes how do you think this has been successful? What do you think needs to be done to boost the informational counterinsurgency?

14. Are there members of the insurgent groups who have denounced the group? What is the trend of this denunciation in the last one year? In the drawn up plan how are those who quit the insurgents supposed to be re-integrated? What role does the security personnel play in their re-integration to the society?

15. Apart from securing the county, are the developmental programs implemented by your agency aimed at countering insurgency? If yes what are these programs? Do you think these programs have had an impact on insurgent activities? If yes how has it impacted?

16. Are these developmental programs implemented by your agency in collaboration with other agencies? If yes what do you recommend to improve interagency coordination in general and the implementation of the development programs?