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**The Military and Democratization in Africa: A Case Study of Burundi**

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## **Declaration**

This project is my own original work and to the best of my knowledge has not been presented for examination in any other university or any other award.

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## **Dedication**

This project is dedicated to my family whose patience, support and encouragement have been my motivation. Special thanks to my lovely wife Marie Therese Barankenguje, my children Alain Jodel Mugisha, Christa Liesse Iradukunda, Aurore Arielle Ndayikengurukiye, and Jean Arlin Dushime. For their prayers, love and encouragement, I say thank you.

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## **Abstract**

The role of the military in democratization process in Africa depicts a stark image on the extent to which the military has been effectively utilized in the past as well as during the current period. In some cases, the military has been used to propagate fear and to commit atrocities in Africa. However, over the last two decades, the military in Africa has been involved in efforts to quell civil strife and to promote peace, stability and democracy. In this regard, this paper focuses on the concept of post-colonial democratic experience in Africa, and how the military has been involved in this process. The study will specifically seek to identify the involvement of the military as an institution that has promoted democracy in Africa, with specific reference to Burundi. In Burundi, democracy was ruthlessly suppressed in 1993, when army extremists assassinated the first freely elected president, sparking waves of retaliatory ethnic violence that later subsided, but not yet ended, despite positive developments in the political transition process.

On revisiting this case and the available literature on the continent's democratic process, the study intends to draw conclusions on how the military has helped to promote democracy in Africa, the challenges encountered, and the way forward in future. It is the view of this study that the military has positively contributed to the promotion of democracy in Africa, despite the myriad of challenges encountered in the process. This is appreciating the fact the liberal democracy as interpreted in the dominant western models may not be applicable in the continent as understood from such a perspective. As such, the adopted perspective of democracy in Africa will be interpreted from varied interpretations depending on the manner in which it has been implemented.

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## **Abbreviations and Accronyms**

AMIB:	African Union Mission in Burundi
AU:	African Union
CNDD:	National Council for the Defence of Democracy
DDR:	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
ECOWAS:	Economic Community of West African States
FDD:	Forces of Defence of Democracy
FNL:	National Forces of Liberation
FRODEBU:	Front for Democracy in Burundi
FROLINA:	National Liberation Front
IGAD:	Intergovernmental Agency for Development
NEPAD:	New Partnership for Africa's Development
OAU:	Organization of African Unity
PALIPEHUTU:	Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People
SADC:	Southern Africa Development Community
UN:	United Nations
UPRONA:	Union for National Progress



# CHAPTER ONE

## Introduction

### 1.0. Background of the Study

It is indeed agreeable that the concept of democracy in post-colonial Africa elicits mixed reactions given the varied experiences witnessed in different countries that claim to adhere to this principle. As a result, Africa is arguably dominated by unique interpretations of the principles of democracy, thereby creating several democratic regimes. The complex nature of democracy in Africa has resulted in a high number of violent civil conflicts in most Sub-Saharan countries since their independence half a century ago<sup>1</sup>.

The role of the military to promote democracy is, therefore, investigated in this study as an intervention measure to regulate, manage, and resolve conflicts in Africa. While military interventions have been used in Africa to achieve this goal, it is worth noting that such deployments have achieved more success after the creation of the African Union in 2002.

As such, the study will explore the role of the military in this context, with specific reference to the case of Burundi. In this regard, the study will seek to identify the role of both internal and external military interventions to promote democracy, the context of conflict, the success of such missions, as well as the problems encountered. The role of the African Union (AU) in promoting democracy, whilst addressing social, political, and economic challenges in Africa, must therefore be understood in order to objectively assess the role of the military in such interventions. This

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<sup>1</sup>Gerhart, Gail M, “*Democratic Experiments in Africa:*” Foreign Affairs, 1998, vol. pp.

study proposes that the military plays a positive role in promoting democracy in Africa, particularly in view of the success achieved in resolving the decade long conflict in Burundi.

### **1.1. Problem Statement of the Study**

Given the delicate nature of ethnic-related conflicts witnessed in most African countries, there is no doubt that the main goal of the African Union was to promote peace, security and stability. The new organization was created to address the challenges that were crippling most African democracies, by providing solutions that suited specific African contexts. To this end, the Union has undertaken several military interventions in Africa, including Burundi, Sudan, Comoros and Somali. In addition, the union also suspended the membership of several countries including Madagascar, Ivory Coast, and Niger, over irregularities during political transitions. All these efforts are ultimately intended to promote democracy in African states.

However, despite these strides towards achieving democracy, the overall role of the military in achieving this goal is often overlooked. As a result, some missions by the military have been unsuccessful due to the apparent mismatch of the role of the intervening force and the context of the conflict being resolved. Such a setback can be traced to the lack of elaborate research that reflects how African problems can be resolved by African solutions. This study therefore intends to assess the success of military interventions to promote democracy, how they can be implemented, as well the challenges that jeopardize the achievement of intended goals. This will bridge the gap in the existing body of research, by providing insight on how the military aids in promoting democracy. The study will also seek to highlight the underlying structural and institutional limitations that hinder successful military missions to promote democracy.

## **1.2. Objectives of the Study**

The primary objective of the study is to investigate the overall contribution of the military in the democratization process in Africa. This study will achieve this by focusing on a specific case of Burundi as the point of reference. In general, the study will investigate why the military intervenes in democracy.

In addition, the study also seeks to achieve the following specific objectives:

1. To investigate the rise of African Military and democracy, and their relationship;
2. To evaluate military intervention in democracy in Africa;
3. To determine the impact of that intervention;
4. To conduct an analysis of current policies taken to contain that intervention.

## **1.3. Research Question or Hypothesis of the Study**

This study endeavours to investigate why the military intervene in democracy. The following research questions will guide the process of research;

1. What is the relationship between the rise of African Military and democracy?
2. How does military intervention in democracy occur in Africa?
3. What is the impact of military intervention in democracy?
4. What are the current policies taken to contain military intervention in Africa?

## **1.4. Literature Review**

This study will largely rely on the available literature to clearly link the military's role to the progressive realization of democratic states in Africa. This review will help the study in exploring the intricate aspects related to the role of the military in promoting democracy. The

literature review will first outline the historical context of democracy in both pre and post-colonial

To begin with, the concept of democracy from an African context needs to be assessed from a realist point of view as opposed to an idealist perspective. This is because its implementation has resulted to varied experiences across the continent, thereby creating complex democratic systems that cannot be evaluated wholesomely to bring out an identifiable form that defines African democracy. Arguably, democracy in this study is viewed as a political process that is guided by objective laws that are inherently human in nature<sup>2</sup>. By and large, the political sphere in Africa defines interests primarily in terms of power, and moral qualities, motives and overall wellbeing. As a result, while these interests as defined in view of democratic power are universally acceptable and valid, it is evident from an African context that the meaning prescribed for such definitions often changes.

For this reason, this study adopts the political realism view, which argues that the universally accepted laws of morality are characteristically distinct from one nation to another<sup>3</sup>. This is why the democratic process has resulted into diverse interpretations across one continent. As such, this study seeks to assess the contribution of the military in influencing the democratization process in Africa, in consideration of the specific time, place, and the unique circumstances that prevailed during this process.

Secondly, the literature explains that the military is in fact an establishment of administration with a perspective of persuading the peruser of its proceeded with institutional need<sup>4</sup>. In this regard, the paper will also revisit the involvement of the African Union in promoting military

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<sup>2</sup>Hans Morgenthau, "*Politics Among Nations.*" The Struggle for Power and Peace, 2005

<sup>3</sup>Hans Morgenthau, "*Politics Among Nations*", 2005.

<sup>4</sup>George K. Kieh, and O. Agbese, Pita, "*The Military and Politics in Africa: From Engagement to Democratic and Constitutional Control.*" Wear, 2004.

involvement to maintain and sustain peace, stability and democracy in Africa. In this case, the role of the African Union is rather limited to military intervention cases in a number of countries to promote peace and democracy. One such case involves Burundi, which will be the focus of the case that the study intends to refer to enhance its findings.

Moreover, the paper propels the idea of common military relations inside the talk of security division change to advocate common control of a state's military backings great and law based administration by giving the obliged establishments to the responsibility of the military<sup>5</sup>. In this regard, the paper will also revisit the involvement of the African Union in promoting military involvement to maintain and sustain peace, stability and democracy in Africa. In this case, the role of the African Union is rather limited to military intervention cases in a number of countries to promote peace and democracy. One such case involves Burundi, which will be the focus of the case that the study intends to refer to enhance its findings.

In this section, the study will explore the historical facts that contribute to the positive and/or negative impacts of the role of the military on the democratic space in different contexts in Africa. In addition, the role of the military will also be reviewed in order to link the achievements and challenges with realizing democratic states in Africa. In this way, the study will objectively identify the success factors attributable to military intervention, as well as the past and emerging challenges that undermine their success. From the conceptual view of the literature review, it emerges that to a large extent, the army plays a positive role in promoting democracy in Africa.

The literature review will largely rely on past studies on how the military has promoted democracy in Africa. The study will also rely on the Conflict Transformation Theory to review

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<sup>5</sup>Kieh and Pita, "*The Military and Politics in Africa*", 2004.

the complexity of democracy from an African perspective. As a result, the review largely relies on the concept of democracy from an African perspective, rather than the extensively explored western interpretation of democracy. This is based on the understanding that the concept of democracy in Africa is arguably elusive, given the inconsistent nature of the implementation process and how it is practice<sup>6</sup>. For this reason, it is worth highlighting from the onset that the concept of democratization in Africa is largely viewed from the western perspective, hence the misconceptions that characterize its implementation. This is largely attributed to the ethnic disparities that are apparent in the post-colonial African countries.

In addition, the role of the African Union, which was established in 2002, is also indispensable in this study. This is because the organization has been actively involved in safeguarding peace and security in Africa, which has in turn resulted in efforts to institutionalize democracy in African states. In the present case of Burundi, the organization launched military intervention in 2004 to quell the civil conflict that had threatened to plunge the country back into chaos. As such, the intertwined role of external military intervention with the internal state military is unavoidably relevant in drawing conclusions based on the case of Burundi.

#### ***1.4.1. The case of Burundi***

The case of Burundi is preferred in this study due to the unique circumstances that have resulted in recurrent waves of civil violence in the country. Burundi has encountered rehashed conflicts amongst Hutu and Tutsi bunches. The unequal power distribution in governance, which was often exploited by the Tutsi leadership at the expense of the majority Hutus, has over the years contributed to a series of perennial Hutu rebellions since Burundi gained independence from Belgium. In 1972 extremists crossed into southern Burundi from the neighboring Tanzania and

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<sup>6</sup>Kieh and Pita, *"The Military and Politics in Africa"*, 2004.

methodically aggrieved people, which brought about numerous passings and annihilation of property. The reaction was a merciless and unpredictable countering from the Burundian armed force, which brought about the passings of both agitators and regular folks. An expected 150,000 individuals fled the nation to the neighboring Rwanda and Tanzania<sup>7</sup>.

A moment wave of common savagery happened in the North of the nation taking after President Buyoya's catch of force in 1987 and the tenacious concealment of the Hutu populace through unequal government structures. Once more, this brought on Hutu counters in which various individuals were slaughtered. Inside Burundi, revolt bunches conformed to two distinct gatherings, to be specific, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD) and the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU), each of which have part facilitate as of late<sup>8</sup>.

The most recent rough considerate clash in Burundi happened not long after the presentation of a multi-party framework in 1992. The new framework presented the nation's first equitably chosen Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye and a Parliament ruled by the Hutu Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU)<sup>9</sup>. In late 1993, the chose President Melchior Ndadaye was killed. Before long, the nation dove into another contention after the prompt successor Hutu President Cyprien Ntaryamira and Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana kicked the bucket on air conflict after their plane was shot down over Kigali, in baffling conditions<sup>10</sup>. Understandably, another Hutu, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, was selected by the Assembly to lead the country as a President of Burundi in late 1994.

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<sup>7</sup>Kieh and Pita, *"The Military and Politics in Africa"*, 2004.

<sup>8</sup>Patricia Daley, *"Ethnicity and Political Violence in Africa: The Challenge to the Burundi State."* Political Geography 2006, 25 (6): 657–79.

<sup>9</sup>Patricia Daley, *"Ethnicity and Political Violence in Africa"*, 2006.

<sup>10</sup>Patricia Daley, *"Ethnicity and Political Violence in Africa"*, 2006.

## **1.5. Justification**

Given the sensitive nature of the concept of democracy in Africa, the use of military to address emerging political concerns the continent has become a common phenomenon since the formation of the African Union in 2002. While the military has achieved commendable results towards promoting democracy on the continent, it is undeniable that there exists a myriad of challenges that are based on the different contexts upon which democracy has been adopted by African states. Consequently, it is often difficult to predict the outcome of military intervention in different contexts, hence the success of such missions is never certain. This can be attributed to the apparent information gap on how the military can be used to address the emerging challenges in different contexts. The short period since the creation African Union is partly responsible for the apparent shortage in the number of studies that shed light on the role of the military in promoting democracy in Africa.

As such, this study will go a long way in deepening our understanding of the role of the military in promoting democracies across different contexts in Africa. The study will highlight the pertinent issues that need to be considered and addressed in order to promote democratic states in Africa. In this regard, the study is primarily intended to offer feasible recommendations to policy makers in addressing the apparent challenges that undermine the gains realized towards democratizing African states. The study proposes recommendations that reflect the unique underlying features of governance and leadership in an African context. Such a localized perspective will offer objective insights on how the role of the military can be enhanced in future to promote democracy. Finally, the study seeks to link the role of the military with promoting democracy in Africa. As such, the study will certainly expand on the current research by assessing the success and challenges that undermine such efforts. This is particularly important



to continental policy makers since the identified pitfalls will be avoided in future military commitments.

## **1.6. Conceptual Framework**

In the present case, the study will largely entail a conceptual framework that seeks to address the research questions and to achieve the outlined objectives. In this framework, the role of the military entails intervention, inclusivity, training, and the context of conflict resolution. The study is of the view that in promoting democracy, the military may intervene to quell civil strife that occasionally threatens democratic institutions in Africa. The intervention by the soldiers is hereby interpreted in view of the military as an independent institution in the democratic process of a state. The idea of inclusivity relates to the composition of the military based on the demographic distributions in a country<sup>11</sup>. This is based on the understanding that democracy in Africa is often scuttled in many independent countries due to unequal composition of different ethnic communities in governance and in the military itself. The case of Burundi provides an excellent example of how power imbalance in governance leads to civil tensions that finally culminate in armed conflicts requiring military intervention. In addition, the context of the conflicts that the military has been used to promote democracy is of paramount importance in this study. This is because the challenges experienced in institutionalizing democratic principles in Africa are unique and involve different factors.

On the other hand, the interpretation of democracy in Africa is largely varied and has resulted in different experiences in diverse contexts. Consequently, this study invokes the ideas proposed in the Conflict Transformation Theory to elucidate how democracy has been realized in Africa since independence. The theory of protracted social conflict is another theory that has been used

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<sup>11</sup>Zoltan Barany, "The Role of the Military." *Journal of Democracy*, 2011.

in this study in the explanation of conflict resolution. Protracted social conflict takes place when sections of a populace are denied their rights to pursue their basic needs on the basis of their identity. To this end, the term struggle change has been utilized as a part of this study to show a thorough and long haul way to deal with social and political change in circumstances of rough, regularly obstinate clash. While this term is adequately expansive to mirror the law based plan in this study, its reference is along these lines made to derive advancement and help, security and administration as being applicable to strife change forms. In this study, the concept of democracy is interpreted as the process that entails promoting peace, stability, representativeness, civil liberties and growth of civil societies<sup>12</sup>. This study explores these factors in assessing how the military has contributed to promoting them. For this reason, the study has chosen the case of Burundi to illustrate how democracy has improved in the country after a series of conflicts, some of which have been resolved through military intervention. In this way, the study will fully address the questions of the study as well as the objectives outlined.

Military theory<sup>13</sup> is the evaluation of normative behaviour in addition to trends in military affairs as well as military history, beyond the mere description of events in war. In essence, military theories, particularly since the influence of Clausewitz during the nineteenth century, endeavour to encapsulate the multifaceted cultural, economic and political relationships between societies and the conflicts they create. Theories and formations of warfare have diverged in different places through human history. Through the description of trend and behaviour of military affairs, it is possible to understand military intervention, its rationale and practical underpinnings. Therefore, military theory plays an important role in offering a comprehensive understanding of military intervention and its role in democracy. In a democratic society, the military is placed

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<sup>12</sup>Zoltan. Barany, *"The Role of the Military."* 2011.

<sup>13</sup>Sun Tzu, *"The Art of War"*. New York City: Barnes & Noble Books. 2003

under the authority of a civilian government. However, in instances where the government fails to maintain order, military intervention becomes necessary.

According to DeChurch & Marks<sup>14</sup>, conflict management denotes the process of limiting the negative components of conflict while increasing the positive components of conflict. In essence, the purpose of conflict management is to promote learning and group outcomes, in addition to effectiveness or performance in organizational setting. Correctly managed conflict can boost group outcomes. Conflict management theory affirms the importance of controlling conflicts in order to reduce the chances of proliferation. In a nation state, there are numerous conflicts mostly based on resources, social stratification and politics. If not managed well, such conflicts could result in the failure of democracy as different factions resort to violence and war as a way of resolving their differences. Such techniques of addressing conflicts will lead to the failure of civil democracy thus resulting in military intervention. Under normal circumstances, military intervention is necessitated by growing discontent among citizens and often results in military rule. Therefore, in as much as the military can uphold democracy through intervention, it could result into the overall destruction of democracy and evolution of autocracy. Conflict management theory offers a platform for the reduction of the negative elements of a conflict and increase of the positive element in order to ensure that the conflict does not explode into a bigger problem.

### **1.7. Methodology**

This is a qualitative research that will largely rely on historical inquiries related to the topic in order to achieve the aforementioned objectives. The dependent variable in this study revolves around the role of the military as an institution that is uniquely empowered to promote and

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<sup>14</sup>L. A. DeChurch; M. A. Marks. "Maximizing the benefits of task conflict: The role of conflict management". *The International Journal of Conflict Management*; 2001; 12: 4–22

protect democracy. Consequently, the interpretation and subsequent implementation of democracy forms the basis of the independent variable. In this case, the democratization process will be assessed in view of the changing roles of the military over the years. This is in recognition of the historical facts that have typified the democratization process across Africa, as well as the significant input of the military institutions in influencing the process. The other variables include the input of legislative institutions in regulating the military in order to ensure that its mandate promotes the realization of democracy in the long term. The role of regional organizations in promoting peace, stability and good governance is also reviewed in the study. This is intended to highlight how external measures, including military intervention, can be used to effectively transform national military institutions to advice the course of democracy.

The first section of the study will, therefore, review the available literature on the chosen topic. In the second section of the review, the conceptual context of the study will highlight how the role of the military has evolved over time, and its influence in promoting democracy in Africa today. This is intended to offer insights on how the military is becoming an integral element in promoting democracy across different contexts in Africa. The study will then consolidate these findings, with a view to relating them to the case of Burundi. The findings from the literature review and the case study will then be analyzed comparatively in order to form a reliable basis upon which conclusions will be drawn. The conclusions will then help in formulating feasible recommendations. However, the researcher acknowledges that the conclusions reached are primarily based on the generalizations that are identified in the literature review and one empirical case study of Burundi.

## **1.8 Chapter Outline**

As indicated above, this study is a qualitative study that seeks to establish the role of the military in promoting democracy in Africa. In the first chapter, the study highlights the underlying issues that the study seeks to achieve. The chapter highlights the objectives of the study, its significance, and the issues that motivated its inception. The chapter also justifies the choice of the research topic and the case study, which helps to draw meaningful conclusions on the topic.

In the second chapter, the study largely investigates the rise of African Military and democracy, and their relationship. The study will as well review the literature based on the past studies relating to the issues revolving around the chosen topic. The chapter is divided into two sections; the historical background of the study and the conceptual interpretations on the topic. The historical background covers the concept of democracy in post-colonial Africa, while the conceptual interpretation section covers the role of the military in Africa.

In the third chapter, the study extensively evaluates military intervention in democracy in Africa. This section will cover the case of Burundi as a point of reference to assess the role of the military in promoting democracy in Africa. In this section, the study largely covers the civil conflicts that have jeopardized democracy in Burundi in the past, as well as how the military has been involved in these incidents.

The fourth chapter determines the impact of that intervention and draws conclusions from the literature reviewed in the second chapter and the findings that relate to the case of Burundi as a point of reference. The conclusions drawn from the two previous chapters help the study in evaluating how the military has promoted democracy in Africa, to validate or disregard the proposed hypothesis.

The fifth chapter analyzes the current policies taken to contain military intervention. Current policies taken by governments in Africa to contain military intervention will be evaluated in terms of the suitability and efficacy.

Finally, the sixth chapter covers the recommendations of the study, based on the conclusions drawn. The recommendations are outlined in order to answer the research questions and to meet the objectives of the study.

## **CHAPTER TWO.**

# **The Military and Democratization Process in Africa**

## **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter explores the available literature from past studies on the role of the military on the democratic process in Africa. Consequently, the chapter is largely divided into two sections; historical background and conceptual view of democracy today. To begin with, the review discusses the different views that seek to define democracy, their interpretation, and the implementation process in varied contexts. The historical background advances the view of a militarized Africa, with specific reference to colonization as a major factor that influenced the concept of modern democracy. As such, the study will review the available literature on Africa during the period of colonization, as well as post independent African states. This will give insight on the role of the military in the newly independent states.

On the other hand, the conceptual view examines the literature on the African perspective in regard to the concept of democracy, and how an institutionalized military has promoted and shaped this ideology. In particular, the review will focus on elucidating how the military has been utilized to entrench the concept of democracy as it is interpreted from a modern African context. This review will provide insights on whether the militarized African states are cognizant of the supremacy of civilian authority as a fundamental aspect in promoting democracy, or there is a missing link in the transition process in cases where the military is involved. This is intended to assess the civil-military relations, legitimacy of the military institutions, and the role they have played as agents of democratic governance. Additionally, the role of the African Union and other regional institutions cannot be overlooked, given that these organizations have played major roles in enhancing democracy in Africa through both military and diplomatic interventions. In general, the literature review mainly points to the legitimacy of institutionalized military as a

necessary agent in the democratic process, while still maintaining that such institutions require civilian oversight for accountability purposes, and to promote good governance.

## **2.2. Historical Perspective**

Since the 1990's, the way of governing the African continent had changed. The former colonizers had given conditionalities to their colonies in order to continue to sustain their economies. Among those conditionalities, the democratization system had been the main politic which had been imposed on African countries.

### **2.2.1. Democracy in Africa**

The military theory<sup>15</sup> offers a credible platform upon which to base the understanding of democracy in Africa. The role of the military in supporting democracy is great in the sense that the democratic space must be protected through military defence. Therefore, the analysis of military affairs in Africa can point towards a better understanding of the prevalence of democracy in Africa. Democracy is fragile in Africa because it is an imported concept from western nations. Therefore, the military plays a great role in democracy that can be classified as positive or negative. Negative military intervention underscores the overthrow of civilian governments by military elements while positive intervention connotes the use of military power to support democratic governments. Democracy as it is understood today is akin to the Greek word, *demokratia*, which basically refers to 'rule of the people'. Democracy is loosely defined as a form of governance where power is vested in the people, who freely and actively participate in making the decisions about their state. Such decisions are made through voting in

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<sup>15</sup>Sun Tzu, "*The Art of War*", New York City: Barnes & Noble Books, 2003.



representatives, who then exercise power on behalf of the people who elect them<sup>16</sup>. In other words, democracy occurs in a regime where power is exercised by individuals or representatives chosen by distinct society in a region, which represents a societal state characterized by equal rights and privileges of citizens. In order to understand democracy and its constituents, it is imperative to highlight Plato's and Aristotle's views on democracy and politics. Both were not staunch supporters of democracy.

According to Plato, a democratic government, also known as an ideal regime was characterized by leaders or representatives who observed adherence of every member of the society's universally valid principles aimed at making better the lives of each and every member of the society, as opposed to increasing authority and power, material wealth and prestige to a few selected individuals. Hence, only a few individuals full of wisdom, charisma and virtue had the potential to run the ideal government. He also held that democracy would easily surrender to anarchy and rebellion, which would make all citizens to lose regard of law, and its enforcement, tyranny of power and would lead to moral deterioration. On the other hand, Aristotle argued that power comes from underneath and is exercised on behalf of all individuals irrespective of class, wealth, colour and other differences in walks of life. He had strong beliefs that were backed by lucid analysis of the workings of the government in his notion of ideal government. He also had a strong believe in the legitimacy of people in the middle class as being more superior compared to the lower and the upper classes. This is based on the idea that the middle class consists of a larger population than the rich and the poor. He also held that being born and brought up within affluent environments prevented one from learning to obey rules, thus making them to become overambitious and abusive of authorities, while the poor were likely to be used as slaves. A

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<sup>16</sup>Zoltan Barany, "The Role of the Military", *Journal of Democracy*, 2011.

correct regime that observes democracy, he maintains, should be able to enable rule for the common good in accordance with absolute justice, not private of individualized advantages. Thus, democracy is envisaged to constitute several aspects, which include the following key elements.

- A political framework that facilitates choosing and replacing elected representatives.
- Active participation of the citizens of the state in political and civic matters.
- Protecting and upholding basic human rights of all citizens.
- Rule of law, where the laws and procedures are equally applied to all citizens<sup>17</sup>.

Based on such a framework, it is plausible to assert that the pre-colonial African societies had a form of established democratic structures based on ethnic backgrounds. This is traceable from the fact that the ruling structures were characterized by varied degrees of accountability to the ruled, authoritarian military empires like the Zulu, as well as decentralized societies like the Twa. However these institutions were then disrupted by the introduction of colonial rule, which inevitably reduced vertical accountability and enhanced autocratic rule. The new rule was primarily an authoritarian bureaucratic apparatus of control and not intended to be a school of democracy for African societies<sup>18</sup>.

It was not until the end of World War II, that most colonial powers realized that they could no longer maintain their power in Africa as envisaged earlier. As a result, most colonized states established by colonial governments were granted representative governments over the next two decades, eventually leading to independence<sup>19</sup>. However it is worth noting that the independent

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<sup>17</sup>M. Bogaards, *“Measuring Democracy through Election Outcomes: A Critique with African Data.”* 2007

<sup>18</sup>M. Bogaards, *“Measuring Democracy through Election Outcomes”*, 2007.

<sup>19</sup>African Union, *“Protocol on the Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union”*, Maputo, 11 July 2003.

states were primarily based on the boundaries created by respective colonial powers, which completely disregarded the former ethnic compositions in these states<sup>20</sup>. Consequently, it is plausible to assert that the formal democratic institutions that were created at independence were largely part of the decolonization pacts that dominated the African societies during the colonial era.

Based on this understanding, it is evident that, while the newly established states acquired international legitimacy as democratic entities, the question of nationalism was clearly challenged in these states<sup>21</sup>. As a result, the newly independent nations faced a host of problems that slowed their progress toward democracy. While some of these challenges were economic in nature, others were largely attributed to the negative impact of colonial rule<sup>22</sup>.

### ***2.2.2. Role of Military Institutions in Africa.***

Conflict management<sup>23</sup> is an imperative concept in understanding the role of military institutions in Africa because most of the conflicts in Africa cannot be resolved but managed. Though quite a number of conflicts can be solved, others require management. Conflict management underscores the aspect of limiting the negative aspects of conflicts and encouraging the positive aspects of the same. The development of military institutions in Africa ought to be engineered towards inculcating conflict management deals to safeguard democracy and good governance.

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<sup>20</sup>Gail M. Gerhart, "Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective." *Foreign Affairs*, 1998.

<sup>21</sup>F. Fukuyama, "*State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*". New York, Cornell University Press, 2004.

<sup>22</sup>Patricia. Daley, "*Ethnicity and Political Violence in Africa: The Challenge to the Burundi State.*" *Political Geography* 2006. 25 (6): 657–79.

<sup>23</sup>DeChurch; Marks, "Maximizing the benefits of task conflict: The role of conflict Management". *The International Journal of Conflict Management*, 2001, 12: 4–22.

In the 1960s and early 1970s, armies in Africa were largely composed of guerrillas and their main goal was to liberate the African societies from colonial rule. However, in most post independent African countries, institutionalized military outfits became instruments of political interventions, thereby undermining the usurping civilian rule. As a result, military dictators emerged at an unprecedented rate as most of the dictators viewed civilian power as inadequate to govern the new states.

Additionally, the Cold War era aggravated this situation with the rationale that the imminent outbreak of a global war not only necessitated, but also justified the existence of such militaries for the purpose of preserving. As a result, the citizens accepted the disproportionate roles and capabilities assigned to military institutions, which subsequently squandered their intended legitimacy as promoters of democratic governance. This rationale promoted the notion that the military was the best institution to safeguard against external aggression and internal social unrest<sup>24</sup>.

Apparently such power is beyond the control of the citizenry once unleashed, and in most cases the military has been the very establishment of force and constrain that undermines democracy, abuses human rights of the citizens it is supposed to protect, and ultimately allows states to confiscate and embezzle public and private property<sup>25</sup>. While the military as an institution may be blamed for the apparent inability to promote democracy in Africa, it is also mentionable that such challenges are attributable to poor governance in these states<sup>26</sup>.

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<sup>24</sup>Biddle Stephen and Stephen Long “Democracy and Military Effectiveness: *A Deeper Look.*” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution.* 2004.

<sup>25</sup>UN Economic Commission for Africa, and African Union Commission. “African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.” *African Governance Newsletter.* 2011; 1 (1): 2.

<sup>26</sup>UN Economic Commission for Africa, and African Union Commission. “*African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.*” 2011.

From a historical perspective, the role of military institutions as intervening agents in the political process in Africa is as varied as the political institutions they represent. This can be traced from their roles and subsequently the power they impose on the citizens. For instance, there are those regimes that take over power unconstitutionally and without any popular basis. A good example is the current Mali regime. These are generally referred to as the ‘usurpers’, and they are typically unstable and susceptible to other coups in future<sup>27</sup>. Another form of military influence was characterized by anti-colonial guerrilla groups, which then take over power through civilian leaders and continue to rule with civilian constitutions. Such governments are referred to as ‘legitimates’, and they continue to rule in countries like Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe<sup>28</sup>. A third category is a form of governance that is constituted by supposedly ‘redeemed’ countries, but with a history of military rule. In this case, civilians influence is relatively higher and despite a long history under military rule, the chances of reverting to such a rule are very low. Such countries include Nigeria (which endured 33 years of uninterrupted military rule), Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso and Benin<sup>29</sup>.

However, there exists a distinct difference between leftist governments and pro-western ones, where in the former case, the military’s actions involves very few incidents affecting the general population. In the case of Benin, military intervention resulted in the overhaul of the colonial army and replacing it with one supported by the people. Similarly, in the case of Ghana in 1979 and Burkina Faso in 1983, the military leaders were seen as agents of redemption of their countries. In these cases, the military was used to promote social justices and to address

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<sup>27</sup>Pfaffenzeller, “*Conscription and Democracy: The Mythology of Civil- Military Relations.*” *Armed Forces & Society*, 2010; 36 (3): 481–504.

<sup>28</sup>Pfaffenzeller. “*Conscription and Democracy: The Mythology of Civil- Military Relations*”, 2010.

<sup>29</sup>Stephan. Pfaffenzeller “*Conscription and Democracy: The Mythology of Civil- Military Relations*”, 2010.

widespread corruption in the governments<sup>30</sup>. In this way, the role of the military in promoting stability, peace and democratic rights is apparent.

Based on these views, it is apparent that the underlying historic threat to democracy across the continent is as a result of unconstitutional changes of government, which are often promoted by the military in absence of stable institutions of governance<sup>31</sup>. While this section is primarily based on the period immediately after independence, it emerges that the military has also been in the forefront in promoting democracy in the continent. As such, it is agreeable that the military is an integral institution of governance, and an active promoter of democratic governance.

### **2.3. Conceptual Perspective**

Both military theory and conflict management offer a reliable conceptual basis for the evaluation of military intervention in democracy in Africa. Whereas military theory<sup>32</sup> stipulates the different ways in which the military supports democracy, conflict management affirms the role of the military in limiting the escalation of conflict. This section reviews how the role of the military in modern democratic states has changed in promoting democracy over the last two decades, and how it can be enhanced to promote good governance and political stability. This review seeks to explore the concept of democracy in modern context, in the understanding that its interpretation across Africa has evolved from the post-colonial view to a more cohesive perspective in modern times. This is based on the fact that by 2013, over 40 states in sub-Saharan Africa out of a possible 49 states practiced multiparty elections, while military rule and coups reduced dramatically since mid-1990s<sup>33</sup>. This trend indicates that civilian democracies have

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<sup>30</sup>McGowan Pat and Thomas H. Johnson. "African Military Coups d'État and Underdevelopment: A Quantitative Historical Analysis." *The Journal of Modern African Studies*. 1984.

<sup>31</sup>Pfaffenzeller, "Conscription and Democracy: The Mythology of Civil - Military Relations." 2010.

outgrown military rules across the continent, unlike in the 1970s when over 30 military backed regimes changed the ruling regimes without the consent of the citizens<sup>34</sup>.

As such, this section acknowledges the dramatic changes witnessed in Africa in regard to how democracy has been exercised over the last two decades, subsequently spelling a new era of governance across the continent. Given the complexity of the democratic process in Africa, a review of the conflict transformation theory offers a basis for the study to assess the African democratic agenda. This has subsequently prompted the study to review these two eras separately, since it is also agreeable that the role of the military as an institution has also changed radically over the same period. Unlike the post-independence Africa when the military was actively involved in the political process in modern democracies, such unconstitutional interventions have subsided reverting to the promotion of good governance and democratic institutions<sup>35</sup>. Based on this rationale, this section of the review points to the reality that democracy, as an exercise of indirect representation by the majority, has generally improved in Africa, and so has the role of the military in promoting civilian rule.

### **2.3.1. Role of military in promoting democracy in Africa**

As highlighted earlier, the most evident indications of change towards democracy across Africa begun in 1989 and early 1990s, which marked the end of the Cold War era. This change was marked by a shift from military regimes and weak liberal democratic movements to civilian rule characterized by populist democracies. Liberal democracy in this context is viewed as the

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<sup>32</sup> Sun Tzu, *"The Art of War."* 2003.

<sup>33</sup> Pat and Johnson, *"African Military Coups d'État and Underdevelopment: A Quantitative Historical Analysis"*, 1984.

<sup>34</sup> Pat and Johnson, *"African Military Coups d'État and Underdevelopment"*, 1984.

<sup>35</sup> Pat and Johnson, *"African Military Coups d'État and Underdevelopment"*, 1984.

starting point to a rule of law that is drawn from constitutional supremacy, thereby ushering in regular, participatory, competitive, and legitimate elections<sup>36</sup>. For this reason, liberal democracy as emphasized by the international community has been critiqued in the African context as essentially frustrating the emergence of an inclusive democracy despite being more prominent across the continent. Ideally, the shift in democracy in the 1990s was largely advanced through external forces, as well as from within the African states. This democratization process involved privatization and liberalization of monetary policies, ushering in the neo-liberal era in the mid-1990s<sup>37</sup>. In particular, the neo-liberal era was characterized by a shift in the role of the military in African politics.

In this context, the paradigm shift from military authoritarianism to democracy is largely seen to have taken three major approaches. These are government top-down reforms, democratization process from below, and internal wars. Top-down reforms occurred in those cases where the ruling regime responded to imminent or actual crisis by initiating democratic reforms in their countries<sup>38</sup>. An excellent example is Nigeria, where the death of military dictator, Sani Abacha in 1998 led to the contested accession to power of Major General Abdulsalami Abubakar. The ensuing discontent led to the parliamentary election where Olusegun Obasanjo was elected. This shift was criticized by some scholars (since Obasanjo was also a high ranking military personnel) casting serious doubts on how citizens engage with power<sup>39</sup>.

However, cases of top-down reforms have taken place and have not ignored the justice element of democracy. In such cases, the reforms maintained semi-autonomous profile in the face of international community instead of sticking to a strict neo-liberal agenda, resulting to more

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<sup>36</sup>Lindy Heinecken, "Defence, Democracy and South Africa's Civil-Military Gap." *Scientia Militaria - South African Journal of Military Studies*. doi: 10.5787/33-1-6, 2011.

<sup>37</sup>Heinecken, "Defence, Democracy and South Africa's Civil-Military Gap", 2011.

<sup>38</sup>Claude Ake, "The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa." Codesria Book Series. 2000.

<sup>39</sup>Ake, "The Unique Case of African Democracy." *International Affairs* 1993; 69 (2): 239-44.



positive transition from military rule to civilian rule<sup>40</sup>. This promoted cohesive democracies like in the case of Ghana, resulting to stable institutions of governance.

On the other hand, the democratization process from below occurs at the point when there is mounting prominent weight from the general population bringing about national meetings, unrests, overthrows d'état, or social agreement arrangements, which are planned to move the state towards a more fair society. In the mid 1990s, the previously mentioned meetings, especially in Francophone nations, developed as vehicles for representation, responsibility, and accord arrangement<sup>41</sup>. Finally, in cases where these two approaches fail, war becomes inevitable. This was the case in DRC, Uganda and Rwanda. In these countries, military authoritarian regimes were overthrown through military efforts. The new leaders were mostly fighters or former fighters, who sought to change their respective regimes in preference for representative rule of law and subsequently called for free party elections<sup>42</sup>. However it is notable that all the mentioned democratic regimes are yet to prove their democratic credentials even in the presence of indirect forms of democracy and party elections.

Based on these insights, it is undeniable that the role of the military in modern democracies has become more complex given the geopolitical shifts witnessed in Africa over the last two decades. The role of the military in Africa today has shifted during this time, particularly after the creation of the African Union and other regional bodies like NEPAD, IGAD and SADC. These organizations have played a major role in redefining democracy and the role of the military in Africa, as well as shaping its mandate across the continent. In addition, the widespread advancement in technology has also played a significant role in shaping the role of

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<sup>40</sup>Robert Mattes and Michael Bratton. "Learning about Democracy in Africa: Awareness, Performance, and Experience." *American Journal of Political Science*. 2007; 51 (1): 192–217.

<sup>41</sup>Mattes and Bratton. "*Learning about Democracy in Africa*", 2007, p.

<sup>42</sup>Robert and Bratton, "*Learning about Democracy in Africa*", 2007, p.

modern military institutions by improving the relationship between the institution and the civilian population<sup>43</sup>. The simultaneous growth in terms of GDP in most sub-Saharan countries has also promoted the transition process that has created new roles for the military as an institution, as governments expand their structural, institutional and administrative capacities<sup>44</sup>.

While most of the African countries are characterized by young democracies, it is notable that the legal and institutional capacity to withstand historical challenges is still inadequate. This implies that most of the countries are still faced with historical inequalities that pose tangible risks that could throw them back to instability and civil conflicts. It is however arguable that the challenge in modern times is not attributable to the military, but rather to the civilian authority in place in the context of generalized inequalities and injustices<sup>45</sup>. Indeed, some of the military regimes have inadvertently promoted peace and stability in some countries. It is, therefore, the question of whether the military should contribute in creating, promoting, and sustaining democratic governance, or keep off completely. The typical political thinking perspective emphasizes that the army should stay away from politics, so as to promote the institutional and economic incentives that enhance participative democracy<sup>46</sup>.

A new taxonomy of power advanced by the proponents of neo-liberal democracy categorizes today's African military organizations on the premise of their capacities as empowering influences, suppliers and supporters of the neo-liberal vote based motivation<sup>47</sup>. The suspicion is that the military foundations in Africa are by and large under-supported to complete those parts

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<sup>43</sup>Larry Diamond and Marc F Plattner, "Civil-Military Relations and Democracy." *A Journal of Democracy Book*, 1996. <http://www.loc.gov/catdir/bios/jhu052/96023229.html>, retrieved on 14<sup>th</sup> January 2016.

<sup>44</sup>Larry and F Plattner "Civil-Military Relations and Democracy", 1996.

<sup>45</sup>Van Cranenburgh, Oda. "Democracy Promotion in Africa: The Institutional Context." Democratization. 2011.

<sup>46</sup>Oda "Democracy Promotion in Africa: The Institutional Context", 2011.

<sup>47</sup>Magid, "Democracy and Elections in Africa." History: Reviews of New Books. 2007.

in the neo-liberal state. To this end, subsidizing of military establishments in various vote based African nations has become exponentially throughout the most recent ten years. The official defense for this consumption is constantly in light of enhancing the abilities and hardware of the national armed forces. All things considered, it is getting to be distinctly clear that the military is progressively being utilized to police African social orders and less to take part in between State wars. In different nations like Rwanda, the military goes about as a corporate substance that participates in genuine business contracts like whatever other company. In Angola, a portion of the high positioning military officers sit in corporate executive gatherings as a major aspect of top official administration. These parts indicate military organizations that are occupied with regular citizen administration, in this way advancing great administration and authority. In different nations, nonetheless, the military organization still manages the political examples, yet through regular citizen authority<sup>48</sup>.

To this end, it is apparent that the concept of democracy in Africa is rather vague and the role of the military in Africa has, and remains, to influence leadership, which ever form it may take. A major problem faced by the new democratic states in Africa today identifies with the insufficiency of agent majority rules system to achieve the measurement of social equity in the built up vote based frameworks. Thusly, it is questionable that the contemporary history on move from military-impacted to regular citizen govern in Africa is not a urgent issue in many states, notwithstanding for vote based system<sup>49</sup>. Unexpectedly, there exists an issue of meaning of majority rules system as it is translated in various settings. The idea is excessively subtle and is

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<sup>48</sup>Gail M. Gerhart, *"Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism."* Foreign Affairs. 1997.

<sup>49</sup>Thad Dunning, "Conditioning the Effects of Aid: Cold War Politics, Donor Credibility, and Democracy in Africa." *International Organization*. 2004.

open, making it impossible to a wide arrangement of implications and understandings relying upon the particular setting it identifies with.

Preferably, the genuine contrast between a decent and an awful government generally relies on upon the definition that is given to the term popular government, and significantly less on the contribution or not of the military in the legislature. It is in reality conceivable to have non military personnel rulers who stifle law based administration, and military rulers who are in the constrained sense that they attempt to build the level of access to social insurance and instruction of their kin and to cultivate a more impartial dissemination of assets so that these people groups can make great utilization of their entitlement to express their political perspectives. In light of this contention, the issue of the military and tyranny, in Africa as somewhere else, is in actuality identified with the political ill/proficiency of the masses<sup>50</sup>. Thusly, this study looks to elucidate this contention by auditing the developing relations between military organizations and non military personnel authority. This will offer more clarity on whether the military without a doubt advances majority rule government in executing its part as an organization in African.

### **2.3.2. Civil-military relations in Africa**

In accordance to the conflict management theory<sup>51</sup>, the military and democracy ought to support each other in resolving, managing, and preventing conflict. As a result, there should be deliberate attempts to ensure that military and democracy work in harmony. It is indeed agreeable that the concept of democracy ought to acknowledge the fact that, as long as the military institutions in Africa continue to exercise the power they amassed during the post-colonial days, and as long as the institutions continues to enjoy excessive powers from the ruling regimes, then democracy as

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<sup>50</sup>Dunning, "*Conditioning the Effects of Aid*", 2004.

<sup>51</sup> L. A. DeChurch; M. A. Marks, "*Maximizing the benefits of task conflict*", 2001.

an ongoing process is unlikely to be realized<sup>52</sup>. This is in view of the fact alluded to in the previous sections where the military contribute to destabilizing democracy<sup>53</sup>.

The standard understanding of civil-military relations entails the balance of power between the civilian political authority and the military. Democratic civil-military relations demands that the military is subordinated to a democratically elected civilian government. Additionally, various constitutional and institutional procedures are put in place and civilian oversight becomes a key feature of the ensuing relationship. This may entail two approaches; objective or subjective civilian control of the military<sup>54</sup>. Objective civilian control exists where the civilian and military institutions are clearly distinct from each other. In this case, the institutional boundaries that isolate the civilian and military spheres of activities and functions are clearly delineated. To this end, the civilian authority makes policies that the military is supposed to implement, while on the other hand, the military's contribution to policy creation is restricted to security and defence matters through civilian and not military initiatives.

On the other hand, subjective civilian control exists where the institutional boundaries between the civilian governments are relatively vague and no clear distinction can be drawn. In this case the military functions are not clearly defined or they may be strictly limited to security and defence matters<sup>55</sup>.

### **2.3.3. The Role of the African Union**

Muammar Gaddafi first proposed the making of the African Union (AU) in 1999 at a meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Libya. In the consequent Sirte Declaration the

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<sup>52</sup>Diamond and Plattner, "Civil-Military Relations and Democracy." *A Journal of Democracy Book* 1996. <http://www.loc.gov/catdir/bios/jhu052/96023229.html>, retrieved on 26 February 2015.

<sup>53</sup>Dunning, "Conditioning the Effects of Aid", 2004.

<sup>54</sup>P. Chabal, "A Few Considerations on Democracy in Africa." *International Affairs*, 1998. 74 (2): 289.

<sup>55</sup>Chabal, "A Few Considerations on Democracy in Africa." 1998.

African Heads of State and Government upheld the foundation of an African Union<sup>56</sup>. The motivation behind the new association was to quicken the reconciliation of the mainland to enable it to assume an expanded part in universal issues while likewise tending to social, financial and political issues in Africa. The Constitutive Act of the African Union was received at the Lomé Summit in 2000, and the AU was authoritatively propelled at the first Assembly of its Heads of State and Government in Durban in 2002<sup>57</sup>.

This segment to a great extent tries to investigate the sacred arrangements and the related institutional structures that encourage the AU to conjure military intercession in common wars. This is expected to diagram how the military in Africa assumes a key part in balancing out clash inclined districts to encourage fair administration. This comprehension has guided the study in breaking down the contextual investigation of Burundi in the accompanying part. To this end, the extended part of the AU to incorporate military mediation will assess the essentialness of the mission vis - à - vis its commanded goals and the contention circumstance in which it locked in. Keeping in mind the end goal to survey the AU's capacity to reestablish peace, security and soundness on the African landmass, it is vital to highlight its arrangements for intercession in the inward undertakings of its part states.

#### **2.3.4. African Union's Constitutional and Institutional structures**

The conflict management thinking<sup>58</sup> affirms that the development of constitutional and institutional structures is the best way to manage, resolve, and avoid conflicts. The African Union stand for the unity of African states and intervenes when conflicts escalate between nation states. In the first place, the present part of the AU is drawn from the protected arrangements of

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<sup>56</sup>African Union, "Constitutive Act of the African Union." Lomé, 11 July 2000.

<sup>57</sup>African Union, "Constitutive Act of the African Union." 2000.

<sup>58</sup>DeChurch and Marks. "Maximizing the benefits of task conflict ", 2001.

its forerunner, the Organization of African Unity. These arrangements were embarked to free the African nations from imperialism, advance solidarity and solidarity among African states, encourage the serene settlement of question between its individuals and in addition to guarantee human rights and better living conditions for African individuals<sup>59</sup>. To this end, the OAU played a very limited role in restoring peace unless invited by the affected countries. Respect for sovereignty was the cover stove of the OAU system. Consequently, military interventions by the defunct organization were almost impossible given the institutional and legal impediments that existed.

Nonetheless, unlike the OAU, and many other regional organizations, the AU draws a self-imposed constitutional duty, and explicit right to intervene in certain matters involving its member, namely war crimes, genocides and crimes against humanity. Following an amendment three years later, the union was further mandated, upon the recommendation of the Peace and Security Council, to address serious threat to legitimate order in order to restore peace and stability to the member state. This marked a new legal and doctrinal dimension in restoring peace, stability, and good governance in the continent. This new approach imposes a legal provision for the Union to intervene if sovereignty is not being exercised responsibly among its member states<sup>60</sup>.

In order to realize the new mandate, the organization adopted a number of organs to restore peace, stability and good governance. Notably, the organization initially lacked a clearly established mechanism to fully exercise its mandate within the continent. The union's assembly, which consists of heads of states, acts as the supreme organ of the union. The assembly makes all

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<sup>59</sup>African Union, *“Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union”*, Maputo, 2002.

<sup>60</sup>African Union, *“Protocol on the Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union”*, 2003.

the strategic decisions of the union, as well as adopting budgetary provisions prepared by the executive council. The executive council is composed of ministers of member countries, and it implements the union's mandate on the continent. In addition, the pan African Parliament serves as the legislative body of the Union. With these organs, the union set out its mandate through constitutional provisions that are binding to all member states<sup>61</sup>.

In 2002, the increasing cases of armed conflict and subjugation of democratic governance were the most pressing concern for the union. Consequently, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) was created to act as a standing decision-making body to monitor conflicts and crises in Africa. With these key organs, the mandate of the African Union has become a significant force in regulating conflicts across the continent, and promoting democratic governance that is accountable to its citizens<sup>62</sup>. To this end, the input of the union in promoting democracy through military intervention will be revisited in the following chapter that covers the conflict in Burundi. In addition to the regional organization, there are other sub-regional organizations that have been created to address the stability, peace and security of member countries. Such organizations include Intergovernmental Agency for Development (IGAD), Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). One of the most instrumental among these organizations is ECOWAS, with its member states contributing to 45% of the unconstitutional changes of Government witnessed across the continent.

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<sup>61</sup>African Union, "*Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union*", 2002.

<sup>62</sup>Tim. Murithi, "*The African Union's Evolving Role in Peace Operations: The African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia.*" *African Security Review* 17, 1: 70-82, March. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. 2008.



### **2.3.5. Conflict Transformation Theory and Protracted Social Conflict theory**

Given the complexity of the democratic process, the study now seeks to integrate the ideas highlighted above in the context of conflict resolution. Notably, it is necessary to highlight the Complexity Theory in the context of ethnicity and military theories and thinking. From a military context, complexity theory suggests that organizations undergo a continuous cycle of interaction with their environment. This view describes a cycle of repetitive, interrelated and overlapping process. These include observation, orientation, decision, and action<sup>63</sup>. From a military perspective, orientation is of most importance since it not only influences the decisions and actions, but also shapes observation. Consequently, it is understandable that the orientation of the military institutions is largely responsible for the resultant decisions and actions undertaken by the military as a complex organization.

As earlier noted, protracted social conflict theory happens in situations where communities are denied their satisfaction of their primary or basic prerequisites on the grounds of collective distinctiveness. However, this deprivation of basic needs is consequential to multifaceted and complex causal succession that entails the role of the nation and the patterns of internal linkages. Other factors that play a role are the multi-communal environments of the society, the colonial legacy and the domestic historical setting as will be discussed further in this study. This diagram will help in explaining the numbers of main characteristics that define them incorporating three essential stages including the genesis, process/procedure dynamics and outcome analysis.

According to this theory, the possible causes of conflicts in Burundi are, but not limited to the decline of physical security, governmental institutions deformities, mental ossification and elevated reliance or dependency and cliency.

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<sup>63</sup>Diane. Hendrick, “*Complexity Theory and Conflict Transformation*”, 2009.

Consequently, conflict transformation theory is largely concerned with change, where if change not limited to a certain form or determined direction, then it entails certain values, and in the present case, justice, non-violence, participation. Ideally, complex systems are unpredictable due to their non-linear dynamics; hence the direction of change within complex systems may be sudden and radical<sup>64</sup>.

During the transformation process, sometimes change happens too dramatically or too quickly to allow adaptation to take place. It is, therefore, necessary to keenly observe the critical point at which a system changes state, particularly when resolving long term conflicts<sup>65</sup>. Such a system facilitates creativity and change to come about, and intervention measures implemented are more effective. However, it is also noteworthy that, given the nature of complex systems, there is no foolproof way to know if intervention mechanisms will bring about inconsequential or catastrophic repercussions in the long term.

### **2.3.6. Conclusion**

Arguably, most of the European powers had done little to prepare their African colonies for independence, hence a sense of national identity was difficult to establish due to the ensuing ethnic and cultural conflicts that characterized the new states.

Consequently, democracy was short-lived in most states, as strong militaries became tools for ambitious leaders to seize and/or maintain power. In many other cases, military dictatorship replaced established democracies, and ethnic imbalances soon emerged plunging the countries into endless wars and conflicts. It is, therefore, understandable that the concept of democracy in post-colonial Africa was characterized by the absence of inclusive and democratic governance,

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<sup>64</sup>Diane. Hendrick, "*Complexity Theory and Conflict Transformation*", 2009.

<sup>65</sup>Diane. Hendrick, "*Complexity Theory and Conflict Transformation*", 2009.

with the counter-productive involvement of the military in institutions of governance taking its fair share of blame in the ensuing chaos<sup>66</sup>. Despite the fact that most countries in post-colonial Africa were granted independence under multiparty systems, it did not take long for military rule and one party system to take over in most of the regimes. As such, democratic experiences in post-colonial Africa cannot be generalized since they vary so widely that one can only speak of democracies in plural and in reference to specific contexts<sup>67</sup>.

Nonetheless, the stark image of democracy in Africa was greatly reshaped after 1989 and in the early 1990s. During this period, a majority of African countries reverted to multiparty systems, indicating a resurgence of democracy<sup>68</sup>. Most of these countries conducted elections, albeit with diverse difficulties that compromised their quality and representativeness. It was during this wave that most dictators ceded power to allow for elections, while in other regimes, the ruling parties manipulated the election process to ensure they held on to power<sup>69</sup>. The wave of change in the 1990s also saw a reduction of military coups, with others reverting power to the people. The creation of the African Union a decade later has also enhanced the democratic process in the continent, especially in cases where military and diplomatic interventions have been launched to restore peace and stability. In the following Chapter, we will see if this assessment has helped to resolve the conflict in Burundi.

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<sup>66</sup>George K.Kieh and O. Agbese Pita “*The Military and Politics in Africa*”, 2004.

<sup>67</sup>Patricia Daley, “*Ethnicity and Political Violence in Africa*”, 2006

<sup>68</sup>Daley, “*Ethnicity and Political Violence in Africa*”, 2006

<sup>69</sup>R Luckham, “The Military, Militarization and Democracy in Africa: A Survey of Literature and Issues.” in E. Hutchful and A. Bathily (ed.), *The Military and Militarism in Africa*, Senegal, CODESRIA. 1998.

## CHAPTER THREE

### **Military Intervention in Democracy in Burundi**

Over the past five decades, Burundi has experienced various periods of some of the most intense forms of violence, protracted armed conflicts and political strife as well as displacement of citizens, which are factors that have caused serious humanitarian outcomes. The precise triggers of conflict in Burundi have proven to be complex and multifaceted. While the causes of these conflicts largely revolve around struggles by political elites to gain power, recent studies on the root cause of these conflicts have shown that the causes can be categorized into three including the colonial experience, racial or ethnic rivalry and quest for political power. Indeed, the rivalry between the Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi was present way before the colonial era, though it was heightened by the Belgium colonial experience. The Belgians as well as the Catholic missionaries played a significant role in augmenting or enhancing racial cleavages among the two tribes. Through using the '*divide and rule*' policy, they purposely exacerbated ethnic gaps through replacing Hutu leaders with Tutsi and ensuring that more Tutsi than Hutu attended schools, which was the door to leadership and other opportunities. Not only has this been one of the triggers of the violent incidences in Burundi, but it has also elevated inter-ethnic tensions and warfare.

According to the military theory, theory has played an imperative role in Burundi's democracy in the sense that the conflicts pitting the country have necessitated military action. The country's political history has to great extent been influenced by military action, where the army has played an active role in restoring order after armed conflicts. Under normal circumstances, the military operates parallel to government in a civil democracy where power is vested in elected leaders. The military operates under the authority of civil government. However, in the case of

Burundi, there have been instances where the military has had to intervene in the country's political affairs to restore calm and sanity. This assertion is relevant when the theory of conflict management has to be used.

Conflict management is a brainchild of DeChurch & Marks<sup>70</sup> who affirmed that the negative aspects of a conflict should be minimized while the positive aspects should be maximized. This philosophy creates a viable atmosphere for the cultivation of peace, harmony, and honest. For the case of Burundi, there ought to be efforts to create a common bond among the diverse population that will overcome the existing differences which creates disharmony. This does not imply that the causes of conflicts be ignored rather it denotes emphasis on the constructive components that can boost success.

### **3.1. The Burundi Civil war**

Burundi has experienced many phases of war since the time it got its independence up to now. Many factors that undermine peace were and is still are both internal and external. Some of the leaders have been trying to deal with the situation until it split to conflict. This section will show those different steps.

#### ***3. 1.1. From independence to La Baule convention.***

After the autonomy of the Belgian Congo and settlements crosswise over Africa from 1960, Belgian directors in Ruanda-Urundi started to set up the region for freedom. Taking after freedom in 1962, an organization with Burundi and Rwanda was rejected, and every one got autonomy independently. Not at all like Rwanda, Burundi held its government.

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<sup>70</sup>DeChurch and Marks, "*Maximizing the benefits of task conflict*", 2001,

Burundi's second multi-party races were hung on 27 June 1993. These races were quickly gone before by 27 years of Tutsi military administrations, starting with Michel Micombero, who had driven a fruitful overthrow in 1966 and supplanted the government with a presidential republic. Under the Micombero administration, the minority Tutsi for the most part overwhelmed administration. In 1972, an all-Hutu association known as Umugambwe w'Abakozi b'Uburundi or Burundi Workers' Party (UBU) composed and completed orderly assaults on ethnic Tutsi, with the proclaimed goal of destroying the entire gathering. The military administration reacted with substantial scale backlashes focusing on Hutus. The aggregate number of setbacks was never settled, however appraises for the Tutsi genocide and the responses on the Hutus together are said to surpass 100,000. Numerous displaced people and haven seekers left the nation for the Democratic Republic of Congo (Ex Zaire), Tanzania and Rwanda.

The accompanying rebellion was in 1987 and introduced Major Pierre Buyoya. Buyoya endeavored to organize various changes to simplicity state control over media and endeavored to encourage a national discourse. Rather than helping the issue, these changes rather served to arouse ethnic pressures as trust developed among the Hutu populace that the Tutsi restraining infrastructure was at an end. In 1988, nearby revolts thusly occurred by Hutu workers against Tutsi (Peasants and pioneers) in northern Burundi; these Hutu state armies slaughtered several Tutsi families all the while. The intercession of the armed force to suppress the uprising swung to executing of a huge number of Hutu.

### ***3. 1.2. Political Evolution of Burundi***

On October 21, 1993, Burundi's first fairly chose Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, was killed by Tutsi radicals. As an aftereffect of the murder, brutality broke out between the two gatherings,

and an expected 50,000 to 100,000 individuals kicked the bucket inside a year. A 1996 UN report into Ndadaye's death and its result presumed that "demonstrations of genocide against the Tutsi minority were conferred in Burundi in October 1993". The report additionally involved senior figures in Burundi's Tutsi-commanded armed force in the death of the pioneers. In Burundi, Tutsi regular folks have been focuses of mass killings and demonstrations of genocide sorted out by the state and by outfitted civilian army bunches (see Burundi genocide (1993). They were trailed by a long considerate war that murdered both Hutu and Tutsi.

In 1994, Ndadaye's successor Cyprien Ntaryamira was killed in a similar plane crash with Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana. This demonstration denoted the start of the Rwandan Genocide, while in Burundi, the passing of Ntaryamira exacerbated the savagery and agitation, in spite of the fact that there was no broad slaughter. Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, another Hutu, was introduced to a four years administration on April 8, 1994, yet the security circumstance additionally declined. The deluge of a huge number of Rwandan displaced people and the exercises of outfitted Hutu and Tutsi bunches has additionally destabilized the administration. After the death of Ntaryamira the Hutu administration and Tutsi military worked under a power-sharing political framework until 1996. On July 20, 1996, Hutu rebels slaughtered a great deal of inner dislodged (Tutsi) in a camp, and afterward the Tutsi Pierre Buyoya accepted the open door to make an overthrow to President Sylvestre Ntibantunganya. In 1998, Buyoya and the resistance drove Hutu parliament achieved a consent to sign a transitional constitution, and Buyoya was confirmed as President. The Arusha peace talks started on fifteenth June 1998, and 28th October 2000, Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation had been agreed upon. The common war,

be that as it may, proceeded, in spite of the endeavors of the worldwide group to make a peace procedure.

In 2005, many developments were made in that way. The President signed a law in January 2005 to initiate a new National Defence Force, consisting of merging ex Government Military Forces and all Hutu Rebels Groups, but one of those Rebel Groups has refused to ceasefire.

In July of the same year, parliamentary elections have been held, postponed from November 2004, in which "the Government of Burundi and the Independent National Electoral Commission conducted a technically-sound election, carried out in an atmosphere of peace and security." The CNDD-FDD party ended up winning the parliamentary and senate elections. Several months later, Pierre Nkurunziza, Hutu from the winning party, CNDD-FDD, was elected as President by the two Hutu-dominated houses of parliament.

Matters continued to look promising after Burundi's last rebel group, the National Forces of Liberation (FNL), signed a ceasefire deal in Tanzania, "solidifying the end of twelve years of civil war." As part of the agreement, members of the FNL were to be assembled, demobilized, and integrated into the national army. However, in mid-April 2008, the other group of FNL rebels which has rejected the ceasefire continued to shell the capital, Bujumbura before finally accepting to be integrated in Army. In 2010, other elections took place, and the same party, CNDD-FDD leaded by President Pierre Nkurunziza, worn again for a five year term.

In 2015, the crisis in Burundi erupted after president Pierre Nkurunziza sought a constitutional change to allow him to run for a third term, which he eventually secured. Recently, fears have grown that the situation could descend into civil war. Already, rebel groups opposed to President Pierre Nkurunziza have announced the formation of a military outfit to fight government forces for power in the country. The African Union (AU) and International Community have advised



the Burundians to privilege the talks and not the use of force in order to find constructive solutions for all the Burundian political challengers, and talks are evolving.

### **3. 2. The Role of the Military**

The 1993 war had enormous detrimental impacts not only on the economic and political arena, but also the settlements in the capital city of Burundi as well as its outskirts. It brought about radicalization, polarization and balkanization of quarters in Bujumbura as well as in other parts of the nation between the two opposing tribes: Hutu and Tutsi. As a result, these three detrimental impacts gave rise to the emergence of militia whereby the two tribes tried to form small groups with the intention of getting security from them if need be. Examples of these groups include the “Jeunesse Démocratique du Burundi” [(JEDEBU) (Democratic Youth of Burundi)] formed by the Hutu population to restore democracy, and the “Parti d’Auto defense Amasekanya” [(PA-Amasekenya) (Self Defence Party)] created by the Tutsi population to defend them from being massacred by Hutu rebel. “Sans échecs” and “Sans défaite” were other militia organizations.

Just as other militaries in the world facing of chaos and warfare from their people, the Burundian military had elevated roles in protecting the Burundi people while ensuring that they fight and abolish the militia who threatened to jeopardize the safety and welfare of the citizens as well as that of the nation at large. However, they were faced with a wide range of dilemmas in their attempt to bring security and safeguard their people. To begin with, having been accused to have been involved in the assassinations of the President as well as other Government officials greatly impacted their intervention attempts. In addition, the complexity of the combat whereby the military had to fight against three targets at the same time was also a form of dilemma to the military. Indeed, three fights were happening at the same time characterized by the government

military towards Hutu rebels and militia, government military towards Tutsi militia, and government military towards both the two militia. Numbers of human lives were lost as well as infrastructures worth millions destroyed. People who sought solace at churches were not spared either. Owing to the fact that the President in office at this time was alleged to have encouraged the killings, the military saw a need for another coup that took place in 1996. Although the challenges for the military were huge, they had various commendable achievements. Firstly, the military played a significant role in moralization and securing the population, the internally displaced persons, and the humanitarian organizations which were operating in Burundi. They also managed to combat the rebels and negative forces in DRC. To crown it all, they emerged victorious in their attempts to ensure a secure nation.

### **3. 3. Role of Other Stakeholders**

In their conflict management theory, DeChurch & Marks<sup>71</sup> affirms that the peace and security of Burundi cannot be acquired without the involvement of other stakeholders not only from the local groups, but regional and international organizations. Among the key players were the non-governmental organizations (NGO's) including the Red Cross, which helped in ensuring that the war casualties from both sides were taken care of by offering first aid and extending their help in healthcare settings. In addition, the NGO's collaborated with the military in offering food aids, clothing and shelter as well as medicine and other basic needs to those involved in the conflict as well as the internally displaced persons. The military here played a critical role in ensuring the safety of the NGO's officials both in and out of Burundi. Another stakeholder that played part was the judiciary. They worked hand in hand with the military jurisdiction and civil jurisdiction in efforts to maintain law and order. They also helped in ensuring that the alleged criminals and

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<sup>71</sup>DeChurch and Marks, *"Maximizing the benefits of task conflict"*, 2001.

perpetuators of the violence were captured by the military among other responsibilities that are defined by their organizations. Another key player was the administration. The main role of the administration was to ensure that various posts of government officials who had joined the rebels were replaced with immediate effect. Their other critical role was to ensure security in all places in the country. Media and newsletters also played a critical role in informing the members of the general public on the situation. Other stakeholders worth mentioning were religious leaders. They helped by taking in the internally displaced persons and giving them the basic commodities they would afford. The military helped in safeguarding these places to avoid attacks.

From the onset, the objective of the peace process as well as both military and stakeholders aimed at achieving two goals. On the one hand, it was targeted at finding a lasting solution to the persistence conflict, while on the other hand it sought to lay the establishment for a transitional government that would integrate the representative of all the principal parties concerned. To this end, the collaborator efforts between the regional leadership, the Carter Foundation, African Union and international community played a key role in fostering the negotiation process.

### **3.4. Mediation Efforts**

After a period of many combat which were opposing Government forces and rebels, international community has approached the protagonists to help them to find solutions which have to lead them towards peace and security. It is in that case that many facilitators have tried to convince the former government leaded by the President Pierre Buyoya, and the various Political parties and movement armed. The process was not very easy, it is for that reason it has taken a long time.

### ***3.4.1. Rome talks***

During the civil combat that followed the military coup in October 1993 in an attempt to oppose Ndadaye Melchior, the first Hutu president who was also the first to be democratically elected, Burundi went into to disorder for more than ten years. It is approximated that more than 800, 000 people were displaced and more than 300,000 lost their lives. In an attempt to help the nation return to enduring peace, initiatives, both at international and regional levels took place. Immediately after the coup, some peace initiatives were initiated in Burundi headed by the United Nations envoy, Ould Abdallah, in 1994, at the regional level, Uganda and Tanzania also attempted to help the nation to return to peace. In addition, there were rounds of peaceful talks that took more than two years in Rome, at an international level, under the delegation of San Egidio community. The Rome talks were held between the CNDD rebel faction headed by Nyangoma and the administration under the leadership of President Buyoya. During these talks, it was noted that they were the conflict was triggered not only by the current factors, but also by other factors dating back to 1965. No changes were shown to be easy given the structural administrations, institutions and commitments of third parties as well as the emotional milieu the conflicts created.

### ***3.4.2. Julius Nyerere's facilitation***

In response to the turmoil in Burundi and in parallel of Rome talks, leaders in the Great lakes region, led by Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, sought to restore peace through diplomatic meetings held in 1996 between the Hutu's Front for Democracy in Burundi, and Tutsi's Union for National Progress. This in turn provoked Burundi to seek a withdrawal from the Arusha

peace talks, and subsequently convinced many Tutsi that Nyerere, who led the process, was inclined to the Hutu cause<sup>72</sup>.

Attempts by the new President to quell the internal civil conflicts in Burundi failed, prompting him to re-join the second peace process in Arusha. This time however, the presidents of Kenya and Rwanda joined in the talks in 1998. However, the demise of President Nyerere in 1999, who was the chief negotiator in the talks, marked the entry of South Africa's involvement in the process.

### **3.4.3. Role of Nelson Mandela**

President Nelson Mandela was delegated to assume control over the discussions as the main mediator. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi was at long last marked in August 2000, which was expected to combine the peace procedure in the nation. In any case, the outfitted groups of CNDD and PALIPEHUTU, to be specific; the Forces Defense of Democracy (FDD) and National Front of Liberation (FNL) separately, had officially split far from the arrangements, taking after dismissal of their requests of representation in their own particular right . To break the halt, the summit chose to proceed with the dialogs with the delegate political authority, forgetting the military groups. Subsequently, the outfitted groups were excluded as signatories to the peace assention, in spite of the fact that the truce was effectively consulted in 2002, and marked by both the political gatherings spoke to and the transitional legislature of Burundi.

### **3.4.4. The Mediation of Jacob Zuma**

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<sup>72</sup>Emma, Svensson, *"The African Mission in Burundi: lessons Learned from the African Union's first Peace Operation."* Stockholm: FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency. 2008.

Jacob Zuma, the then deputy president of South Africa, replaced President Mandela. Zuma was given an additional role aimed at brokering a final ceasefire agreement amid the armed rebel groups and the transitional administration who by then were still involved in fighting. The strategy Zuma used differed that which was applied by President Nelson Mandela and Mwalimu Julius Nyerere. Not only did he involve the United Nations and African Union envoys to the talks, but he was also more discrete in his mediation efforts. His main achievement was in involving the council for the defense of democracy, which was the largest armed faction, into the talks. Indeed, this inclusion altered the dynamics of the Burundi peace talks and created a potential way of ending the civil war. In December 2002, a cease-fire deal was signed. The next challenge was to organize an electoral process and to bring the Palipehutu-FNL into the peace talks. With the help of the United Nations, they managed to form a new constitution and to set a date for elections. On June 2005, a free and fair election was carried out. The former rebel group, the CNDD-FDD won the elections and their leader, Pierre Nkuruzinza, became the new President of the Republic of Burundi.

Owing to the fact that most of the armed movements did not agree to the cease fire, they were joined in the peace talks, such as the case for the PALIPEHUTU which had joined the talks at the end of 2006. This process was initiated in 2006 when the Tanzanian administration told the regional initiative that the PALIPEHUTU movement was ready to willing to join the peace talks without any preconditions. Charles NQAKULA who by then was the Minister for Public Peace and Safety in South Africa was appointed as the new mediator. Upon pointing out by the PALIPEHUTU-FNL that the negotiations were not basically about cease-fire, the international community and other involved parties sought to put into place measures that would pressurize PALIPEHUTU. A meeting chaired by Yoweri Museveni and which also included other

dignitaries from the European Union, the African Nation and the United Nations, called for Burundians to set free all political prisoners that were in jail and make 33 positions available for the PALIPEHUTU in the government. They were called upon to change their name through dropping their ethnic designations and settle their combatants to demobilization locations.

Burundi became the first nation on the agenda of Peace boosting commission in 2006. During their conversations with the fighting groups, the mediator would cite peace building commission engagement in order to convince the group that the conclusion of the talks would generate peace for the nation. Engagement in peace building commission and the peace boosting endowments have nurtured the nation's recovery from violence and hence strengthened the nation's aptitude to prevent conflict relapse at least for some time. In other words, involvement of the United Nation peace building in Burundi has been of great effect in the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide. It has enabled the country to protect its population from crimes against humanity and other forms of conflicts.

#### ***3.4.5. African Mission in Burundi (AMIB).***

Following the conclusion of the Arusha peace process, one of the key agreements in the talks provided for a universal peacekeeping power in Burundi. the truce assention between the Transitional Government of Burundi (TGoB) and the Armed Political Parties and Movements (APPMs) focused on that the relief ought to be confirmed and directed by a peacekeeping mission, either commanded by the UN or exclusively be attempted by the AU. The truce understanding that was accordingly marked in December 2002 affirmed that the confirmation and control of this assention ought to be attempted exclusively by the African Union<sup>73</sup>. For the first time since its creation, the African Union was mandated to intervene in an internal conflict

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<sup>73</sup>Emma, Svensson, "*The African Mission in Burundi*" 2008.

through a military peacekeeping mission. The mission was affirmed by the Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in February 2003. The African Union's central goal in Burundi was commanded for one year and was at first sent last between April 2003 and May 2004<sup>74</sup>.

The essential command of AMIB in Burundi was to administer, watch, screen and guarantee the full usage of the Arusha Agreement, the truce conventions and the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program in the nation. Specifically, the Arusha Agreement gave how political and military forces would be partaken in post-war Burundi. Then again, the truce agreements diagrammed an arrangement on the most proficient method to reincorporate the previous agitators into the general public<sup>75</sup>. Outstandingly, the command unmistakably explained the expected end-condition of the mission on satisfying its order of encouraging the usage of the truce assentions, and additionally balancing out the protection and security circumstance in Burundi through all around oversaw national barrier and security contraption. This mandate translated to very specific objectives for the mission.

#### **3.4.6. United Nations.**

In the wake of the chaos that plunged Burundi into a decade long conflict, there were some peace initiatives started in 1994 shortly after the coup d'état by the UN envoy, Ould Abdallah, within the country. For instance Uganda and Tanzania took the lead with fewer successes to stop violence during the delicate rule of President Sylvester Ntibantunganya between 1995 and 1996. The first rounds of negotiations lasted more than two years, between 1997 and 1998 when the first unofficial meeting was held in Rome, Italy under the auspices of the San Egidio

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<sup>74</sup>Tim, Murithi, *"The African Union's Evolving Role in Peace Operations"* 2008

<sup>75</sup>Emma, Svensson, *"The African Mission in Burundi"* 2008.



Community<sup>76</sup>. This meeting was held between the government under the then President Buyoya, and the CNDD rebel group when it was still headed by Léonard Nyangoma, the former Home Affairs Minister in the previous Ndadaye's government.

While the road to peace through negotiations has been long, it is understandable that many challenges delayed the signing of the peace agreement. This was related in part to a high number of actors involved in the negotiation process. Among the actors were those struggling for power in Burundi, like Front pour la Democratie au Burundi (FRODEBU) and Union pour le Progrès National (UPRONA), the Burundi Armed Forces (Forces Armées Burundaises - FAB) and the armed groups, mainly Conseil National pour la Defense de la Democratie-Forces pour la Defense de la Democratie (CNDD-FDD), Forces Nationales pour la Liberation-Parti pour la Liberation du Peuple Hutu (FNL-PALIPEHUTU)<sup>77</sup>, and others (17 parties in total but all of them were political without armed militia). Most actors agreed that the conflict in Burundi was a political one with critical ethnic dimensions. The peace procedure took into account both the political and military aspects. According to Ambassador Ayebare, the political process largely dealt with political players and was aimed at influencing the political environment in a way that facilitated collaboration with the various political actors. On the other hand, the military track was directed at establishing protection for political institutions, as well as all political leaders who would return to Burundi after the negotiation process.

Consequently, in 1994, the UN was instrumental in trying to resolve the Burundi conflict in a power sharing process. This process was mainly led by the UN Special Envoy to Burundi, Ahmedou Ould Abdallah. In this case, the agreement on power sharing involved, to a large

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<sup>76</sup>G. P. Mpangala, "Leadership, Nationalism and Forty Years of Ethnic Conflicts in Africa." In Othman, (ed), Reflection on Leadership in Africa: Forty Years After Independence VUB University Press and IDS, Brussels, Dar es Salaam, 2000.

<sup>77</sup>G. P. Mpangala "Leadership, Nationalism and Forty Years of Ethnic Conflicts in Africa." 2000.

extent, members of the FRODEBU party and those of UPRONA<sup>78</sup>. The power sharing agreement was eventually signed in September 1994. However, the agreement was not an effective solution to the crisis in the long run, the agreement managed to temporarily restore calm in the country.

### **3.5. Conclusion**

Both military theory and conflict management are applicable theoretical concepts in analyzing the situation in Burundi. Whereas military theory evaluates the course of military intervention in the country, conflict management evaluates the way to peace and harmony in the country. The civil conflict and turmoil witnessed in Burundi lasted for over a decade before it was resolved by the AU mission between 2004 and 2005. In assessing the mission's success in achieving the set objectives, it is worth highlighting that this particular mission marked one of the most successful missions initiated by the African Union. Faced with a host of critical objectives and a myriad of challenges, the mission managed to bring to an end the conflict that had torn the country apart. In recognition of these efforts to promote peace, stability, rule of law, and democratic governance, a full assessment of the mission's achievements will be highlighted in the analysis chapter<sup>79</sup>. This is particularly relevant in articulating the positive role of an accountable military institution to promote democracy.

In summary, the AU intervention mission in Burundi successfully managed the violent conflict to the end. More importantly, the mission secured a conducive environment to facilitate the immediate impact of this move was a drastic improvement in the security situation in the country. In addition, the FNL, which was the only operational rebel group, was considerably weakened by a series of joint operations undertaken under a new integrated high command of the

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<sup>78</sup>G. P. Mpangala *“Leadership, Nationalism and Forty Years of Ethnic Conflicts in Africa.”* 2000.

<sup>79</sup>Samuel, M. Makinda, and F. Wafula, Okumu, *“The African Union: Challenges of Globalization, Security and Governance.”* London: Routledge, 2008.

Burundi army and the FDD. On 21<sup>st</sup> April 2004 the FNL was forced to declare a unilateral truce, marking a new era of peace and stability for the country<sup>80</sup>.

The new wave of redemption from perennial conflicts was greatly welcomed by the civilian population, and for once in more than a decade, the country was finally headed towards a genuine end to civil conflicts that had completely hampered development, stability and good governance. However, the long-awaited hopes will not last long because we are currently witnessing the downside.

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<sup>80</sup>Murithi, *“The African Union’s Evolving Role in Peace Operations”* 2008.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **The Impacts of Military Interventionism in Africa.**

This chapter provides an overview of the impact of military interventionism in managing the country's affairs in Burundi. This is long-standing situation that is why we want to assess the current situation of the country, to see how to propose recommendations that can help change the situation. At the political level, we try to claim that the current situation the country is in, is caused by the excesses of some sections of the military and political class. They do not seem to care about the future of the nation, which seems to be at a crossroads. These military leaders should heed the words of Sun Tzu when he says that: "the General is the prop of the country is on him rests the life or death of the nation." That said, the observer notify raises the question of where does the Burundi and where he embarked.

Referring to the history of Burundi, there was a period during which the country was living under a monarchy. The mode of access and succession to power was known. This period ended in 1966. This was followed by the republic regime, where access and succession to power was

replaced by coups-d'état and the suspension of the Constitution<sup>81</sup>. During this period, the single-party rule was imposed.

This period ended in 1993 and gave way to a democratic regime based on several parties. The acceptance of this scheme was laborious. But, aided by the international community, the people could restore the democratic system. The recovery of this system borrowed two ways to always remember: the way of dialogue, negotiation and the path of rebellion. However, in the end, it was the dialogue and negotiation that allowed the country to alter the crisis; with the 2000 Arusha Agreement between politicians in conflicts and other agreements which were signed later between those in power and leaders of rebellions.

Thus, the country had spent ten years in this restored democracy in this way, but the base was the Arusha Agreement. This plan of a consensus democracy, based on a multiparty system allowed good competitive elections, giving the people the opportunity to choose from several parties: the party with the best social project. Currently, some parties have been destroyed and are insolvent, others are within the scope of prohibition of operation, the organization of elections has become problematic, which is what the political system that the country wants to start. Some questions have risen in the attempt to promote democracy and good governance: what is the new way to access and succession in power? Do we want the mode where people are going to vote in protest or under the intimidation of a single party that will choose its satellites to accompany it? Would it be proved that Burundians have the option to return the system to a single party, whereby the single party will be in control of everything including the power of life and death? These are the questions that everyone should keep in mind at a time when the country is in a crossroads wondering the best political system to implement.

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<sup>81</sup>MJ. Voors, EE. Nillesen, P. Verwimp, EH Bulte, R. Lensink, Van Soest DP. *“Violent conflict and behaviour: a field experiment in Burundi.”* Am Econ Rev. 2012; 102 (2): 941–64.

#### **4.1. The Impacts of Military Interventionism on Politics**

The good and efficient answer to these questions can be found only through dialogue of political class and the neutrality of the military and the police force who have a vision for Burundian. It is the politicians who are good scouts of the people in politics and represents them in the national assembly<sup>82</sup>. However, even if those in power are struggling to convince the national and international community that everything is well, it is apparent that the political class is divided badly. On the one side, there are politicians in power who have assimilated with the party in power and follow blindly all the views, perspectives and policies that have been enacted. On the other hand, there are politicians who oppose what they feel is not right for the Burundian citizens. Most of them are currently in exile due to the authoritarian order. Their views can only be expressed through foreign media. This fact is probably among the reasons why they do not support the return of refugees to the country. What is even worrying is that lack of dialogue between the protagonists in the conflict is now covering the killings that have been occurring in the country. People who disappear from their families are killed and their bodies are buried in mass graves, just to be discovered later by their loved ones. The fact that the leading party covers the exact situation happening in the country not only generates difficulties with some of our neighboring countries and the international community, but it also aggravates the poverty situation in Burundi. It also deprives the country of some of its financial aid. How to solve the dire poverty rates in Burundi and ways of acquiring financial aid will be discussed later in this chapter when analyzing the impact of military interventions on the economy.

Another very relevant example in the impact of military interventionism in Burundi is the emergence of groups which argued for respect for human rights. These groups were born at the

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<sup>82</sup> Fortes Meyer and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, (editors) (1940) 1958. *"African Political Systems."* Oxford Univ. Press.

same time as the private media during the beginning of democracy. They have been strengthened during the conflict in Burundi. Their role is quite relevant. In addition to the training and information that these bodies provide to the population, they have also denounced the abuses carried out by some public and private groups. They should follow the wise words of this time of the crisis, the Burundian military should heed the following words of Sun Tzu: "the strategist as understood by Sun Tzu is the opposite of a specialist. Its lights are not confined to the conduct of military operations themselves, but extend to politics, diplomacy, economics and philosophy as well as all other disciplines that help to understand and control his environment". Sun Tzu, in this respect, would certainly have ratified the famous formula of General de Gaulle: "The general culture is the real school of command". It is appropriate to say that such practices lead to the failure of the military to emphasize a neutral position is common in Africa.

#### **4.2. Impact on the Media and freedom of expression**

Military intervention is not limited to the above mentioned single component; it reaches all spheres of national life. As examples, the private media did not exist before the advent of democracy. The population was unhappy to only read, listen and watch the only public media available. The informations were selected and tailored to boost the Government.

Often, these actions were filtered to avoid debates, which forced people to remain in silence and inaction. This was not the result of the fact that there was no writing or speaking, it was the opposite because the country was ruled by an authoritarian system and militarized. The politicization of the intelligence system, which often was part of the military, forced Burundian to speak any what would please the government authorities. Those who criticized the regime found themselves imprisoned or exiled. During the democratic times, in Burundi, just as other states in Africa, there existed a wide range of media stations, owned by both private people and

the government. This greatly promoted the freedom of expression whereby individuals would air their views and perspectives without hindrances. The impact of military interventionism has however altered this scenario. Currently, the totalitarianism regime has banned all private media corporates owing to the fact that they used to communicate to the Burundian citizens on the wrongs of the government. Following the ban and destruction of independent media stations, they were forced to go to exile where they communicate to either the refugees or the members of the host country of the ills of the government, this is a factor that has greatly altered the freedom of expression.

### **4.3.Economic Impact**

Military intervention in democracy in Africa results in conflicts that negatively affect economic development. This section indicates how the conflict in Burundi has negatively affected economic development.

#### ***4.3.1 Poverty and Despondency***

Conflict and warfare in most African nations has had detrimental impacts to the nations and their distinct citizens. People from a conflicting nation are usually faced by various hardships ranging from lack of the basic necessities to illnesses. A superb example of such a scenario is Kenya during the 2007-2008 disputed elections, which saw the nation experience armed conflict resulting in the death of more than 2000 people, destruction of property and high numbers of internally displaced persons. The aftermath of the conflict was a period of various hardships. Being a country that is highly dependent on farming activities, Kenya was threatened to hunger as most people did not engage in farming activities during the conflicting times, which resulted to low production of farm produce. Somali and Southern Sudan are other African nations that



have been greatly affected by prolonged warfare and conflicts in the poverty and despondency milieu.

In Burundi, the increased use of the military in handling political issues during the civil war also led to poverty and despondency. The destruction of property and instability in the country disrupted economic activities led to job losses and other resource based problems. People were not free to engage in economic activities because of the high-handedness in the country. The civilian populations are casualties of both the rebels and the military. Increased tension and fear in the country has made economic activities impossible. People were suffering because of lack of money and basic necessities<sup>83</sup>. The Burundi civilian population was swallowing in poverty and despondency. Youths are also worth mentioning. The healthy and economically productive Youths have been displaced while others have been forced by the situation to join the rebels and military. Most of them are primary and secondary school dropouts, which is a factor that has hindered their economic growth and potential. Instead of youths farming in their rural lands, most of them have relocated to the urban centres in search of jobs. The impact of rural-urban migration has had a wide range of destructive effects such as traffic jams, increase in theft and perform criminal activities of various degrees. Prostitution is also rampant in the nation causing various health issues. Poverty rates in Burundi have escalated, which a fact attributable to the prolonged warfare and conflict. This has caused various organizations to chip in the attempt to eradicate poverty and enhance the living standards of Burundians; an example of these organizations is PNUD and UNDP, which has been faced with various obstacles due to the situation of the government and high rates of corruption.

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<sup>83</sup>H. Alderman, J. Hoddinott, and B. Kinsey, *“Long Term Consequences of Early Childhood Malnutrition”*, Oxford Economic Papers, 2006. 58 (3): 450-474.

### ***4.3.2 Imminent Collapse of the Economy***

The collapse of the Burundi economy during the civil war era emanated from complex of happenings in the war-torn country. The destruction of economic hubs and disruption of economic activities are the greatest factors that could lead to an economic crisis in the country<sup>84</sup>. The war targeted economic powerhouses capable of employing majority of the population. This resulted in mass job losses that directly result in poverty. The rate of conflict-based unemployment in the country is high and the country is on the brink of economic collapse. The disruption of economic activities has halted economic generating activities because of increasing tension in the country. Therefore, Burundi is headed for economic collapse if things do not change in the near future. Military intervention has diminished democratic space and killed entrepreneurship and private businesses. Even people employed have escaped to safety because of the prevailing political instability. The country's economy is in shambles owing to the ongoing crisis. On the state level, Burundi is in the verge experiencing a decline on its capacity to handle macro-level impact of the prolonged conflict. Indeed, the revenue collection of the nation is imminently decreasing due to high government expenditures in the attempt to contain the situation. As a result, the nation experiences a drop in exports, depreciation of exchange rates, capital flight and hyper-inflation. In addition, there are heightened costs that relates to refugee keep-up as well as the loss of lowered regional trade.

### **4.4. Environmental Impact**

The environment is usually affected by military conflicts because crucial points of the environments are used as battle grounds for war. This section indicates how the environment was affected by the war in Burundi.

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<sup>84</sup> Becker, G. S. "Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis." *Journal of Political Economy*, 70 (5) Part 2: *Investment in Human Beings*, 1962. 9-49.

#### ***4.4.1 Destruction of Environment***

Military interventionism in Africa has had a wide range of both long term and short term impacts to growth, development, and to the environment. The affects of armed conflict are felt on various levels including the international levels, regional, as well as the local environments. In the regional perspective, neighbouring countries experience the impact through destruction of natural resources such as forests, rivers, and the topography. In various parts of African continent, cutting down trees is illegal. However, during conflict situations, people take advantage of the weak government state to exploit trees for wood production. Liberia is one of the African nations that has experienced destruction of vegetation, especially the forests in wood production. During the civil war, some of the Liberia elites took control of the wood industries. People who paid grants to these elites were given permission to explore the wood industry. Any person who opposed this move was tortured, detained, and in worst situations, killed. It is estimated that the illegal trade of wood during the civil war should have given the Liberian government more than 106 million dollars in form of government tax, was arguing a survivor on France 24 television.

Military intervention in Burundi led to the destruction of environment because of the political instability and chaos. The government has been focusing too much on quelling rising protests that it has ignored the role of conserving the environment. The civil war led to the use of environmental hubs like forests as training ground for militias. Therefore, the current situation has seen the destruction of forest cover in the country. The absence of order in the country has contributed to the ongoing destruction of environments and other ecological sites. Political instability has encouraged rogue elements in the government and civilian population to engage in illegal trade of animal organs. This has directly affected the environment of the country.

Charcoal is one of the mainly used fuels for domestic purposes. During the military interventionism epoch, many youths cut down trees for burning charcoal. This greatly tampered with the vegetation cover, leading to deforestation and degradation of the top fertile soils suitable for farming. As a result, there has been soil erosion, which has led to drought. In addition, the cutting down of trees has had impacts on the Ozone layer. Trees take in carbon dioxide that is emitted by factories and households. This has been one of the concerns of the global unions that have the intentions of lowering the production of greenhouse gases that threaten to jeopardize the wellbeing of not only the environment, but that of human beings.

#### **4.5. Impact of military interventionism on social institutions**

Social institutions are perceived as of a fundamental focus of a society: it is common to all societies and with some of the basic worldwide issues of ordered social life. The major institutional spheres are wide and diverse, just as culture and societies. The first social institution is the family or kinship setting, which is an institution that focuses on the rules and regulations of biological and procreative correlations. The other sphere is the educational institutions. Political and economic spheres also form other institutions that transmit heritage and socialization as well as control and regulation from generation to generation. Cultural institutions are those that facilitate conservation of culture and ways of people such as religious and artistic institutions. Other institutions are hospitals that deal with the wellbeing of the people. During the times of warfare and conflict, all these social institutions are affected in one way or another. For instance, families split up following conflict as was in the case of Kenya during the post election violence. Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Somalia and Central Africa are some of the African nations that have experienced disorganization of social institutions following conflicting occurrences. Violent conflict has been one of the dominant developmental challenges facing Burundi today. Despite

the fact that conflict in Burundi has heightened in the recent past, conflict occurring during the democratic era has had enormous destructive impact on social institutions. Not only has the health facilities been destroyed, but educative institutions and political settings has not been spared. Families have been displaced both internally and externally<sup>85</sup>. Wars have even disrupted schooling and have endangered civil liberties. Most people have become dropouts due to this menace.

#### **4.6. Impact of Military Interventionism on Gender and Health**

Sexual and gender based violence are common in many wars and post-war context, which is a factor that impacts the health and wellbeing of individuals, with female's being the most affected gender. Women and girls are usually violated by not only the rebels, but also by military personnel during conflicts. Indeed, armed conflict has been rated as one of the most severe health problem because of its heightened detrimental impact on community health and the health system. Not only do women lack access to basic health services that entails maternal and reproductive health, but they are also prone to sexually transmitted diseases and infections including HIV/AIDS<sup>86</sup>. In Burundi for example, women and girls have been greatly affected by conflict. While some have been raped and killed by both military and rebels, others have been chased from their matrimonial homes due to the fact that they have contracted HIV/AIDS. Family structure in the Burundian context can be taken as the basis under which gender inequality is established, which has patrilineal and patrilocal structure in nature. Burundian

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<sup>85</sup>H. Seckinelgin, "What is the Evidence that there is no evidence? The Link between Conflict, Displacement and HIV infections." *European Journal of Development Research*, 2010, 22. 363–381.

<sup>86</sup>DJ. Jamieson, SF. Meikle, SD. Hillis, D. Mtsuko, S. Mawji, Duerr A. Denise J. Jamieson.. "An Evaluation of Poor Pregnancy Outcomes among Burundian Refugees in Tanzania." *JAMA*, 2000, 283(3):397-402. doi:10.1001/jama.283.3.397,

women, just as those of many countries in Africa, have an ambiguous position in their family structures. They function either as through their relationships with males as husbands or through families as sisters and daughters. Therefore, the status of females is considered to be unstable because they do not continue to live where they were born after marriage. The fact that men have power and authority over their women has caused to them a wide of problems, especially during and after the conflicts. During the conflict times, men moved from their homes to either join the military or the rebels, leaving their women and girls prone to sexual abuse while others turned to transactional sex, which is a factor that increased their likelihood to contract HIV/AIDS. Women who were raped during the warfare times were reportedly chased from their matrimonial homes after men discovered their positive HIV statuses.

After all, impacts of military intervention are observed in many areas, and had weakened the development of African states. In Burundi, renewed hope had been held with the cessation of hostilities since 2009, but the situation has further deteriorated since March 2015. The same human rights violations are recorded in different areas of the city of Bujumbura. The overall analysis of this phenomenon will lead us to take our recommendations.

#### **4.7.Conclusion**

Military intervention in democracy in Africa has proven be counterproductive in many areas that comprise of economic development, environmental conservation, gender and health, politics, media and the viability of social institutions. Therefore, military intervention in democracy has been inherently destructive on a number of spheres. This implies that for a country to thrive and grow economically, socially and politically, the military should be separated from democratic or civil rule.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **Analysis of Current Policies**

Subsequent to the analysis of the impact of military intervention in Africa with special reference to Burundi accomplished in chapter four, this chapter evaluates the findings of this study in terms of how military intervention has changed fortunes in democracy. Therefore, the analysis seeks to provide a coherent line of thought that will inform the conclusions of the study. Consequently, this chapter will relate the contents of the cited in chapter four to the facts alluded to in the case study. Ideally, the analysis is intended to offer clarity on the objectives outlined from the onset of the paper, and their relevance to the chosen topic based on all the reviewed materials. For this reason, the analysis will largely invoke the basic ideas that have been presented in the previous sections, with a view of answering the research questions initially contemplated. From the following analysis, the study will draw its conclusions and offer feasible recommendations about the role of the military in promoting democracy in Africa.

To this end, this section highlights the input of the military institution as a tool that promotes democracy, the scope of such input, as well as the impact of the institution from an African

context. In addition, the role of civilian population in this context, as well as the presence of supportive legal and institutional structures will be reviewed. This is in recognition of the fact that the military as an institution cannot operate in isolation, and in absence of these elements. In addition, democracy in Africa can only be contemplated in specific contexts and as such, its functionality or lack thereof cannot be blamed solely on the military, rather it is a combination of inputs by the military and civilian rule, as well as the institutional capacity to incorporate dimensions of social justice into the system<sup>87</sup>. As such, the following analysis is divided into subtopics that highlight the interrelated frameworks that have enhanced and/or inhibited the military's role in promoting democracy.

### **5.1. Military in the Democratization Process in Africa**

The role of military intervention in Burundi is diverse in the sense that although the role of military was necessitated by circumstances, the effects have been both positive and negative. Therefore, military intervention has undermined democracy in Burundi. To begin with, it is apparent that the role of the military in promoting democracy from an African context is typically diverse and as such, it elicits mixed reactions given the different experiences witnessed across the continent. This is based on appreciating the diverse ways in which they have taken and legitimized their power, or the role they played and/or they are playing in the transition from military authoritarianism leadership to indirect democracy<sup>88</sup>. While the very concept of democracy has produced different frameworks from which it can be traced in Africa, it is

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<sup>87</sup>Randal, Vicky and Lars Svasand. *“Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Africa.”* Democratization 2002. 9(3):30–52.

<sup>88</sup>Mbaku, John M. and Suresh C. Saxena (eds). *“Africa at the Crossroads: Between Regionalism and Globalisation.”* London: Praeger. 2004.



undeniable that the military as an institution has played a significant role in influencing the varied interpretations that have characterized its implementation in the continent.

From a historical perspective, it is apparent that Africa has endured its fair share of strained relations between the military and civilian population since the post-independence era. The strained relations extend to those countries that maintain to have a legitimate civilian rule. In post-independence years of 1970s, Africa saw an unprecedented rise in military involvement in the political matters and governance, leading to over thirty unconstitutional changes of government in a period of one decade<sup>89</sup>. These incidents greatly obscured the continent's conception of democracy as initially envisaged by the departing colonial rule.

Arguably, the subsequent failure of democracy in post-independence Africa is partly attributable to the colonial administrative structures that were entrusted to a fragmented and inexperienced continent. As suggested in the Conflict Transformation theory, the inherent long term impacts of colonialism are partially linked to the leadership challenges that typified post-independence Africa since the continent was left to chart its own destiny after innumerable and irrecoverable distortions of the geographical, socio-economic, and political structures that existed before colonization. As a result, the incoming leadership had a painstakingly uphill task of cultivating a cohesive sense of national identity in states that hosted diverse cultural and political backgrounds<sup>90</sup>.

Furthermore, from a political perspective, these challenges were complicated by the fact that the struggle to independence provided a platform to forge collective military factions to fight for colonial power. After independence, most states had very weak structures to incorporate the

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<sup>89</sup>McGowan, Patrick. "African Military Coups d'état, 1956-2001: Frequency, Trends and Distribution." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 2003. 41(3):339-70.

<sup>90</sup>McGowan, Patrick. "African Military Coups d'état, 1956-2001: Frequency, Trends and Distribution." 2003.

guerrillas whose role in the new states remained uncertain. As a result, it was often the case that, some of factions that fought for independence felt side-lined and betrayed by their fellow countrymen, thereby breeding views of resistance against the new African regimes. On their part, the states created powerful military institutions, most of which dominated a considerable share of power in the ruling regimes<sup>91</sup>. To this end, it is plausible to assert that sometimes change happens too dramatically or too quickly to allow adaptation to take place, whether in conflict situations or developmental and ecological crises. Consequently, these resulting systems are intermeshed but the complexity of the interconnections and nonlinear nature of influence makes it difficult to untangle what happened and why. This is clearly the case with African democracies, which, as argued earlier, experienced radical and unplanned change after independence.

Most of the resulting systems were unable to adapt to the democratic standards that would have propelled them to achieve good governance. This view support earlier arguments on the role of the military institutions in Africa immediately after independence, and their emerging roles today. The case of Burundi for instance is cited as a surprisingly awkward power structure, where the Tutsi minority is accused to have ruled the majority Hutu for decades by using the military to crush any form of rebellion from the Hutu. However, this is a constructivist theory developed by Hutu elites in order to gain posts in politics. The inequalities that followed the post independent events led to unending power struggles between competing factions, some of which led to bloody ethnic conflicts as was the case of Burundi. Consequently, based on the conflict transformation theory it is apparent that uncertainty forms part of intervention measures in complex systems. This is argument forms the underlying foundation upon which most of the military leaders has exercised their rule, leading to some of the worst conflicts in the continent.

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<sup>91</sup>McGowan, Patrick. *"African Military Coups d'état, 1956-2001: Frequency, Trends and Distribution."* 2003.

Additionally, the constructivism theory can be a superb model of analysing the Burundi case study. Unlike other countries in Africa that practice democracy in their systems of governance, Burundi is characterized by a system of governance that lacks law to govern not only the populace, but other sectors including the military. Indeed, the centre of Burundi's gravity has been the military and as opposed to other African nations and the world at large, even the military structures in this nation do not have law to govern them.

Decision-making is therefore left to the military personnel to act as they wish. This has caused devastating impacts bearing in mind that there has been militarization of politics in Burundi whereby the military has actively been involved in political affairs and some of them are from rebel groups, which is very wrong, especially because there is no barrier law to regulate that behaviour. Largely, the apparent weakness of the legal and institutional structures in the new states is partly to blame for the unprecedented failure of democracy in Africa during the post-independence era. On the other hand, while this view is seemingly plausible, the long term impacts of colonization remain subject to debate and more research is suggested in future. In the meantime, this study emphasizes that the African leadership that assumed power after independence had sufficient means to overcome the apparent challenges that faced the new states, without necessarily having to entertain the bloodshed witnessed to date.

It is arguable that the new leadership had the capacity to avert the recurrent turmoil that has typified Africa as the dark continent indeed. Instead, most of these leaders sought to consolidate power using any means possible, leading to a total collapse of democratic movements before they even took off<sup>92</sup>. During this period, the concept of democracy was completely scuttled in most countries, leaving most of the countries at the mercy of military dictators. While this

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<sup>92</sup>McGowan, Patrick. "Coups and Conflict in West Africa, 1955-2004: Part II, Empirical Findings." *Armed Forces and Society*. 2006. 32(1):5-23.

persisted, the international community failed to instil sanity into the continent's leadership and it ignored the plight of the suppressed civilian population. Explicably, this period was characterized by global tensions during the heightened Cold War. As a result, military rule amassed immense power over the civilian populations in Africa, and growth of democratic governance was practically untenable. In the wake of liberal democratization, most military regimes have seen a drastic reduction across the continent as the countries turn to democratic and constitutional institutions. However, it is still arguable that the resultant institutions have only fitted into the military regimes without any significant impact on the powerful military personnel. We agree with Adebayo, Paul and Shola when they assert that this understanding is based on the understanding that across Africa, military elites continue to assert their power in post military regimes, and in most cases, they have remained in power or have amassed considerable economic power to influence civilian rule indirectly<sup>93</sup>.

To a large extent, it is also plausible that some African countries have also benefited from military intervention in politics, as is the case of Benin and Ghana. In this case, the military was instrumental in promoting social liberties that were initially neglected by the ruling regimes, and the resultant military intervention granted the civilian population a lifeline to better governance and democratic rule<sup>94</sup>.

In summary, it is apparent that the euphoria of independence across the continent had hardly subsided when the promises of newly independent states started to fade away. As it has transpired, in the 50 years of independence such expectations remain unfulfilled in some countries. As a matter of fact, the number of unconstitutional power changes, most of which

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<sup>93</sup>Adebayo, Paul F. and J. Shola Omotola. "Public Perceptions of the 2007 Nigerian General Elections." *Journal of African Elections*. 2007. 6(2):201-16.

<sup>94</sup>Adejumobi, Said. "Citizenship, Rights and the Problem of Conflicts and Civil Wars in Africa." *Human Rights Quarterly*. 2001. 23(1):148-70.

were led by the military, that have taken place in Africa between 1958 and 2008. It is evident that more than half (28 countries) of the countries in Africa have witnessed unconstitutional changes in power since independence. This indeed poses a stark image of the democratization process in Africa, particularly in the period after independence. While the state military is largely to blame for these events, it is also plausible to assert that this phenomenon has been escalated by the apparent lack of strong institutions of governance to fully realize fluid democratization process. Consequently, it is worth noting that the greater sources of democratic threat are inherent in the contradictions within the democratization process itself<sup>95</sup>. This is on the grounds that the democratization move was not adequately done as most administrations embraced their govern from the pilgrim legacy. These incorporate issues identified with its proprietorship, social imbalances, equity and representation, and its effect on the political, financial and sociocultural privileges of the general population. Notwithstanding the nations highlighted in the table over, a large group of different nations have survived unsuccessful upsets and fatal common wars, demonstrating the high rate of insecurity over the landmass since freedom.

However, the drastic reduction in frequency and space in the number of coups and civil wars in Africa is a welcome development, as is the recourse to institutional channels, especially the constitution, in seeking to circumvent restrictions on executive terms<sup>96</sup>. In addition, provisions regarding the establishment, purpose and control of the armed forces are of paramount importance in realizing smooth democratic governance in the continent. Some of the issues that emerge towards realizing this are that one, the military institution is largely prevented from civil-

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<sup>95</sup>Adejumobi, Said. *"Citizenship, Rights and the Problem of Conflicts and Civil Wars in Africa."* 2001.

<sup>96</sup>Adekanye, Bayo J. *"Military Occupation and Social Stratification, an Inaugural Lecture."* University of Ibadan. 1993.

related duties, and it only specializes on purely military duties. These duties are primarily defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country against aggression.

Secondly, military institutions are emphasized to be constitutionally subject to civil authorities. In this case, the president of the country acts as both the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, with power to appoint all service chiefs, as well as power to appoint, promote and discipline all members of the armed forces. Indeed, the operational use of the military has been transformed to be the sole prerogative of the president. These constitutional measures were instituted to subject the military to civilian control, and are discussed in the following section; legal and institutional structures to promote democracy.

For instance, regional and sub-regional frameworks by organizations like the African Union (AU), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Southern African Development Community, New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and ECOWAS, only assume the force of law within a national jurisdiction when ratified by the affected country<sup>97</sup>. However, the level of institutionalization of these regulatory norms and principles is yet to be fully implemented in most jurisdictions<sup>98</sup>. As such, this study evaluates the institutional structures that enhance accountable military institutions at both regional and national level. These analysis focuses on the national and regional structures that have helped enhance accountability of military institutions across the continent.

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<sup>97</sup>ECOWAS. *Protocol 1/12/01* on "Democracy and Good Governance Supplementary to the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security". 2001.

<sup>98</sup>Edi, Eric. "Pan West Africanism and Political Instability in West Africa: Perspectives and Reflections." *Journal of Pan African Studies*. 2006. 1(3):7-37.

## **5.2. Role of Legal and Institutional Structures**

The role of legal and institutional structures in nurturing and protecting democracy is well exemplified in chapter four where it has been largely been described as an antidote to chaos and instability. Therefore, the following subsection discusses the historical perspectives of the role of legal and institutional structures in democracy in Africa.

### ***5.2.1 Regional level***

Most African nations that gained independence after the republic of Ghana followed its footsteps by establishing a one-party dictatorship system of governance, which was described by many a different observers as ‘one-man, one-vote, one-time’ practice of democracy. In most African nations including the sub-Saharan countries and the Great lakes Region were characterised by the political party that won the elections after independence made use of their majority in parliament to pass bills and legislatures, outlawing the views and opinions of the opposition parties, which is a factor that left the party in power with a monopoly of authority and leadership. The monopoly trend of governance threatened to jeopardize the idea that pure democracy leads to greater freedom and liberty. Indeed, various nations in Africa enjoyed greater personal freedom during the colonial governance as compared to their governance under independent rule. An example of such nations was Uganda during the leadership of Iddi Amin. Another example was Kenya during the leadership of President Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi when he denounced multiparty leadership and increasingly criticized people who endorsed this kind of leadership, arguing that it would not cause political liberalization. Zimbabwe’s president Robert Mugabe

was also another leader in African who supported one-party state. Individuals justified this form of governance as a form of national unifier that would help in uniting individuals of diverse ethnicities, religion and linguistics.

In nations such as Ghana, Niger, Gabon, Benin and Congo, one party democracy was created coercively and was less stable as compared to those that did it willingly or as a result of de facto dominance such as Mali, Ivory Coast, Guinea and Rwanda to name but a few countries. Burundi was also another nation where one party democracy was formed coercively. We agree with Makinda *et al*, 2008 observation that even hard-line dictators made efforts to use the nation's constitution to legitimize their power and authority takeover. As well, the land laws were not treated as irrelevant, though Burundi as a nation ended up with a constitution without constitutionalism.

To Burundi, the constitution was viewed as an instrument that did not require the commitment of the nation in following it. As a result, various military led coups took place, with the military becoming the centre of gravity as opposed to the constitution and law. The nation, along with other states in Africa, remained undemocratic until the early 1990s when the first democratic elections were held.

This definition was further extended in January 2007 through the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) to include manipulation of constitutions and legal instruments for prolongation of tenure of office by incumbent regime. The addition of tenure prolongation, popularly referred to as the third term agenda, was reasonable, given that between 1990 and 2005, eighteen African presidents had completed two terms and were constitutionally barred from seeking a third term<sup>99</sup>.

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<sup>99</sup>Adebayo, Paul F. and J. Shola Omotola. "Public Perceptions of the 2007 Nigerian General Elections." *Journal of African Elections*. 2007. 6(2):201–16.



As highlighted in the case of Burundi above, the AU recognized this reality by declares in the preamble of the Lomé Declaration that the phenomenon of coup d'état has resulted in flagrant violations of the basic principles of the larger Continental Organization and the United Nations. Consequently, the organization called for strict adherence to principles of good governance, transparency and human rights and the strengthening of democratic institutions<sup>100</sup>. In summary, these organizations have effectively mitigated serious cases of civil-military conflicts that have resulted to bloody civil wars. The case of Burundi is a success story by the AU, having resolved the conflict that had plunged the country into a decade of civil war.

### **5.2.2 National Level**

Arguably, most of the challenges to deter unconstitutional changes of government in Africa are inherent in the enactment of these norms and principles at a regional or national level. Furthermore, a greater challenge lies in the degree of respect for, and adherence to such norms and principles in practice. Ideally, it is arguable that democracies that high ranking democracies in terms of their legitimacy rating stand better prospects of avoiding interventions from military institutions. At a national level, most of the coups enumerated above are largely as a result of insufficient legitimacy, either as traceable in its mode of ascension to power, the creation of an apparent power vacuum, unpopular policies or bad performance while in power<sup>101</sup>.

Consequently, the military is readily provided with a pretext for intervening in politics. In an effort to overcome these challenges, it is undeniable that most liberal democracies have sought to

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<sup>100</sup>Tavares, Rodrigo, *Regional Security: the Capacity of International Organizations.* London: Routledge. 2010.

<sup>101</sup>Edi, Eric. "Pan West Africanism and Political Instability in West Africa: Perspectives and Reflections." *Journal of Pan African Studies.* 2006. 1(3):7-37.

institutionalize the power structures in order to abate unconstitutional take overs<sup>102</sup>. As observed in the last chapter, the military regimes govern without respect for the rule of law, principles of accountability and the fundamental human rights of the people. However this reality obscures the broader picture of the role of the military in promoting democracy.

From a national point of view, most overthrow pioneers advocated their intercession on the grounds of horrifying neediness, in spite of bounteous assets, occasioned by enormous debasement at all levels of government and the need to cure the circumstance. Prominently, a great part of the awful administration implied is without a doubt an outcome of the military's improper inclusion in structures of administration. As history affirms, Burundi is defaced by governmental issues of rivalry for the control of the state, especially between the military and non military personnel classes, coming about to fizzled majority rules systems and awful cycles of upsets. In settling this at a national level, common control of the military gives a plausible approach to address the issues of Burundian advancement and administration, the vast majority of which are military instigated<sup>103</sup>. In the meantime, parliamentary oversight is another measure to adequately reduce the impact of the military in the political procedure in Burundi, as well as crosswise over Africa. This involves components to represent the resistance part, which for this situation, to a great extent relies on upon the kind of political framework that exists.

Parliamentary oversight of the guard part gives an essential angle in guaranteeing that military establishments are overseen as adequately as some other open organization. Thusly, it is irreplaceable to bear the cost of adequate consideration regarding the lawful and formal systems

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<sup>102</sup>Heinlein, Peter. *“Unconstitutional Power Grabs Threaten African Democracy.”* Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 2009, 14 September.

<sup>103</sup>Ikome, Francis. “Good Coups and Bad Coups: The Limits of the AU’s Injunction on Unconstitutional Changes of Government.” *Occasional Paper No 55*, Institute of Global Dialogue, Johannesburg, South Africa. 2007.

of the parliamentary power that gives the basic oversight of the barrier area. Proficient oversight part involves the appropriation and support of best practices of administration that reverberate with the regular citizen run the show<sup>104</sup>. Accordingly, building institutional limit is fundamental if parliaments are to successfully practice long haul oversight part over the military. Hypothetically, parliament can accomplish these objectives by practicing its official part in the budgetary procedure of the nation<sup>105</sup>.

Be that as it may, this requires clear methods for use, which should then be set and comprehended by both the military and the individuals who practice control over the military. Subsequently, established and legitimate forces can get to be distinctly jumbled and useless if the official is politically solid and rebellious, consequently constrained control of the military foundation in support of the non military personnel run the show. At last, this oversight part requires straightforwardness in all levels of administration. Eminently, straightforwardness is a loaded issue in view of the requirement for classification and mystery, which in swings should be adjusted with the equitable right of the non-military personnel populace<sup>106</sup>.

### **5.3. Conclusion**

In summary, this chapter has offered an analytical perspective of the findings of this case study as examined in chapter four. This chapter has discussed the use of military intervention in democracy across African nations its successes and failures; civil and legal structures; along with systems at national and regional levels as concerns nurturing democracy. Therefore, African nations use a diversity of approaches in nurturing and protecting democracy.

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<sup>104</sup>Ikome, Francis. “*Good Coups and Bad Coups: The Limits of the AU’s Injunction on Unconstitutional Changes of Government.*” 2007.

<sup>105</sup>Lindberg, Staffan. “*The Democratic Qualities of Competitive Elections: Participation, Competition and legitimacy in Africa.*” Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 2004. 42(1):61–105.

<sup>106</sup>Lindberg, Staffan. 2004. “*The Democratic Qualities of Competitive Elections: Participation, Competition and legitimacy in Africa.*”

## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

In view of the findings of the case study on military intervention in democracy in Burundi, this section offers a summary of outcomes and offers recommendations regarding the proper approach towards safeguarding democracy in Africa.

#### **6.1. Conclusion**

In summary, the case of Burundi offers viable lessons on the role of the military in democracy. It is evident that when conflicts escalate the military takes the role of safeguarding democracy.

However, the negative effects of military interventions in Burundi, which include poverty and despondency, destruction of environment, imminent collapse of the economy, the reduction of the democratic space and restriction of media freedom, offer the necessary benchmarks for the development of democracy without the active role of the military.

In essence, from the review and analysis in the previous chapters, it is apparent that the reincarnation of military coups in post-independence Africa has raised fundamental questions about the feasibility of democratic consolidation on the continent in the last 50 years. While some of the military interventions and coups have played a positive role in removing an oppressive, dictatorial government when all other avenues have failed, it is also the case that some of these regimes perpetrated heinous crimes against the same population that they are supposed to protect. Consequently, some of the military coups like in Ghana and Nigeria have gained popularity among civil society groups, trade unions and opposition parties, as a means to prepare the country for expanded democratic governance and to address social inequalities promoted by ruling regimes<sup>107</sup>. On the other hand, some of the military interventions in the political process have resulted in untold horror, including the near genocide case of Burundi. Based on the diverse issues arising in the previous chapters of the study, the conclusion is subsequently premised on four constructs, which seek to expound on the different perspectives regarding how the military has, and continues to promote democracy from an African context<sup>108</sup>. First, the conclusion provides a rationale in light of both perspectives (the military institution as both a promoter and a hindrance to democracy in Africa), with a view of persuading the reader

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<sup>107</sup>Ikome, Francis. "Good Coups and Bad Coups: The Limits of the AU's Injunction on Unconstitutional Changes of Government." *Occasional Paper No 55*, Institute of Global Dialogue, Johannesburg, South Africa. 2007.

<sup>108</sup>Ikome, Francis. "Good Coups and Bad Coups: The Limits of the AU's Injunction on Unconstitutional Changes of Government." 2007.

that despite the myriad of challenges experienced through the democratization process in Africa, the institutionalization of sound common military relations offers the focal reason for the legitimization of the military as a crucial player and promoter of equitable administration. Also, the study battles that the military is without a doubt an essential establishment of administration, which in nearness of solid legitimate and institutional limit, assumes a huge part in advancing popular government in both territorial and national levels. Thirdly, the study progresses the idea of common military relations, inside the talk of security area change to advocate common control of a state's military backings great and law based administration by giving the obliged establishments to the responsibility of the military. At long last, the expanding part of sub-local and local associations will be returned to, in light of their accomplishments in hindering military instigated administration to the detriment of law based regular citizen run the show.

### ***6.1.1. Construct 1: Civil-military relations as a basis for promoting democracy***

Since a strong military presence undermines the democratic space, it is necessary to reduce the role of military in democracy. Given its unique institutional dynamics, responsibilities, and standard procedures, the military is undoubtedly constrained in its interactions with parliament, civil society organizations, or other civilian entities. Likewise, most African civilian officials lack a deep understanding of security issues and institutions. As a result, productive engagement, cooperation, and mutual respect are elusive and frustration is common<sup>109</sup>. As a result, the contribution by African militaries to the 'bad governance' on the continent became a concern, prompting a series of interventions by the international community. An example of such a program is the Structural Adjustment Programs initiated by the World Bank to drastically reduce

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<sup>109</sup>Bratton, Michael and Nicholas van de Walle. "Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transition in Comparative Perspective." Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1997.

military budgets in Africa. One focus of the SAPs was to promote regulation of the military institutions by fostering the creation of security sector reforms aimed at promoting democratic, civil control of the military. In this way, efforts were made by African countries to pursue a harmonious and non-conflicting civil-military relation, aimed at limiting military intervention in the political process of the countries<sup>110</sup>.

In light of these initiatives, it became apparent that the necessary reforms in governing the security sectors are highly political. As such, these reforms entail altering the power balance between civilian and security personnel of the country in one end, as well as between the executive and legislative arms of government, within the executive itself, and between the government and the civil society<sup>111</sup>. In this context therefore, it is plausible to assert that the major challenge towards a harmonized system lies in developing both effective civil oversight mechanisms and affordable security institutions that are fully capable of providing security for the state and its citizens within a structure of democratic governance<sup>112</sup>. To this end, effective civilian control of the military requires a professional military institution, which is strong enough to avoid being embroiled in the political process of the country.

A typical assessment of civil-military relations revolves around the balance of power between the civilian political authority and the military institution. In this case, democratic civil-military relations demands that the military is subordinated to a democratically elected civilian government. This is based on the understanding that the various legal and state institutional structures have a major role in operationalizing effective civil control over the military

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<sup>110</sup>Heinlein, Peter. *Unconstitutional Power Grabs Threaten African Democracy*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 2009.

<sup>111</sup>Ngoma, Naison. *Coups and Coup Attempts in Africa: Is there a Missing Link?* African Security Review. 2004.

<sup>112</sup>Edi, Eric. "Pan West Africanism and Political Instability in West Africa: Perspectives and Reflections." *Journal of Pan African Studies*. 2006. 1(3):7-37.

institution. Ideally, military institutions and their actions are considered as legitimate, indirectly, through their recognition of the legitimate civilian institutions and civilian governing structures<sup>113</sup>.

In this way, civilian control is exercised through a number of constitutional and institutional measures that have to be put in place, and civilian oversight is recognized as a key aspect of the ensuing relationship. This may entail two methodologies; objective or subjective civil control of the military. Objective civilian control exists where the civilian and military institutions are clearly distinct from each other. In this case, the institutional boundaries that isolate the civilian and military spheres of activities and functions are clearly delineated, and the civilian authority makes policy that the military is supposed to implement. On the other hand, the military's contribution in policy creation is restricted to security and defence matters through civilian and not military initiatives<sup>114</sup>.

Conversely, subjective civilian control exists where the institutional boundaries between the civilian governments are relatively blurred and there is no clear distinction. As a result, the military functions are not clearly defined or they may be strictly limited to security and defence matters<sup>115</sup>. Such a scenario is only possible where there are no definite institutional structures and as such, the distinction between the government and the army is subsequently lost. Ideally, good governance of the security forces, particularly the military, requires that they be controlled by democratic civilian institutions. In this case, such civilian control is shaped by many factors, most important among them being the institutional capacity of the civilian governance structures.

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<sup>113</sup>Omotola, J. Shola. "Beyond Transition: The Challenges of Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction in Liberia." *Journal of Security Sector Management*. 2006.

<sup>114</sup>Ong'ayo, Antony O. "*Political Instability in Africa: Where the Problems lies and Alternative Perspective.*" Afrikaner continent op drift, organized by Sticing National Enfgoed Hotel De Wereld Wageningen. 2008.

<sup>115</sup>Chabal, P. "*A Few Considerations on Democracy in Africa.*" *International Affairs*. 1998. 74 (2): 289 – +. doi:10.1111/1468-2346.00017.



The representative institutions of governance, like parliament, are therefore viewed as the most efficient means to limit the power of the military, thereby promoting democratic governance in all aspects of leadership<sup>116</sup>. In this understanding, civilian control recognizes that the role of the military institution as a specialized government agency that has defined roles and responsibilities, which is primarily mandated to implement rather than formulate security policies of its own.

### ***6.1.2. Construct 2: legal and institutional capacity to promote democracy***

Democracy should be anchored in law and protected by strong legal structures. A basic understanding of the civil-military relations emphasizes on the need for constitutional, legal and institutional structures of governance, which have the capacity to effectively manage military institutions in a democratic system<sup>117</sup>. The importance of these institutions is emphasized by the fact that, democratic systems are typified by distinct institutions to provide checks and balances, with a view of deterring autocratic rule and excessive power by any arm of governance. Most of the institutions that can effectively offer the checks and balances need to be entrenched in the constitutional dispensations in the systems they operate<sup>118</sup>. To this end, equally important is the necessity to effectively counterbalance the executive's power to determine and govern the national security of a country in isolation. In this case, parliamentary oversight becomes a necessary check against monopolization of the national security and defence policies, together with the extended roles of the military<sup>119</sup>.

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<sup>116</sup>Onimode Bade. *"Africa in the World of the 21st Century."* Ibadan: University of Ibadan Press. 2000.

<sup>117</sup>Heinlein, Peter. *"Unconstitutional Power Grabs Threaten African Democracy."* Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 2009.

<sup>118</sup>Osaghae, E. Eghosa. *"Amoral Politics and Democratic Instability in Africa: A Theoretical Statement."* Nordic Journal of African Studies. 1995. 4(1):62–78.

<sup>119</sup>Posner, N. Daniel and Daniel Young. "The Institutionalization of Political Power in Africa." *Journal of Democracy*. 2007. 18(3):126–40.

This argument is supported by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, which expressly states that “whilst legislatures may range from ornamental to significant governing partners, they also have some common characteristics, which include the basic functions they perform: representing the public, making or shaping laws, and exercising oversight. It is an undisputed tenet of democracy that the parliament, being the representative body of the policy, must exert oversight over every element of public policy, including the military or the security sector in general”<sup>120</sup>. Consequently, it is plausible to assert that in a democratic system, state institutions are accountable to parliament, as the elected representative body of the public. More importantly, the resilience of these institutions is emphasized in order to ensure that decision-making is collective, conflicts are resolved by consensus, and strategic alliances involving excluded groups can be built up on the basis of mutual benefit. Additionally, confidence building, inclusivity, seeking out common ground and joint problem-solving, reflect the standards of conflict resolution.

This implies that the institution needs to ensure that the military institution operates within democratic and constitutional parameters provided for in law, and that it does not abuse its powers in executing its mandate. This parliamentary role is exercised through oversight duties drawn from the constitutional provisions that govern the operations of the various institutions of governance<sup>121</sup>. Consequently, the prevailing constitutional provisions, institutional capacity, and democratic governance are essentially bestowed on the representative bodies, which are then mandated to exercise oversight role on behalf of the citizens. Based on this understanding, it becomes apparent that importance of constitutionally institutionalizing parliament’s powers is

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<sup>120</sup>Posner, N. Daniel and Daniel Young. “*The Institutionalization of Political Power in Africa.*” 2007.

<sup>121</sup>Posner, N. Daniel and Daniel Young. “*The Institutionalization of Political Power in Africa.*” 2007.

primarily derived from recognition and acknowledgement that constitutions are not easy to change over time, and in any case, voting on constitutional reforms ordinarily requires a qualified majority in the parliament or a popular referendum.

Accordingly, the constitution represents an effective way of protecting the oversight authority and power of the parliament, which in turn checks the powers exercised by other institutions, including the military. To this end, since the state has the exclusive monopoly of force, this is effectively delegated to the military, which is in turn accountable to the democratic and legitimate authority. Based on this fundamental principle of democratic rule, it is apparent that, in the presence of effective checks and balances through democratic and constitutional frameworks, the military is expected to be accountable to these mechanisms, hence acting as an instrument of promoting democracy in the country.

### ***6.1.3. Construct 3: Reforming security sector to promote equality and democracy***

The security sector should be placed under civil authority as a way of safe guarding welfare and protecting the democratic space. It is indeed agreeable that excessive interference that is free from oversight checks and balances tends to erode the capacity and professionalism in the security sector, as well as the caliber of its leadership. For instance, the case of Burundi clearly illustrated that the apparent lack of legitimacy often compels authoritarians to rely on ethnically biased recruitment to maintain allegiance in governance. In this case, the minority Tutsi population held on to power, which is a factor viewed by the Hutu as illegitimate, hence sparking a vicious cycle of deadly civil conflicts between the civilian population and the military institution. In this case the ruling regime used the military to cling on the power, and democratic rule was viewed as impractical given that the Tutsis comprised a minor percent of the population.

With such points of reference, it is arguable that most of the military institutions in Africa were largely based on ethnicity, hence representing social imbalances and inequalities. The need for reforms in such cases was inevitable, so as to reflect the demographic patterns in the affected countries. One such country was Benin, where in concerted efforts to address the social inequalities in governance, a successful coup resulted to disbanding the entire army and subsequently recruiting afresh military institution that reflected the ethnic patterns in the country. Consequently, in the wake of liberal democracy, most leaders faced the daunting task of reforming and realigning security services that were once a highly respected force in Africa. In this way, these military institutions have a sense of continuity, thereby expanding their ability to modernize, make strategic arms procurements, and effectively plan for the future.

More importantly then, civilian authority ought to be exercise objective checks and balances, with the legislative branch having a critical role in approving military budgets and security policies. Without accountability, military resolutions are more liable to be based on political, institutional, or personal interest as opposed to the real needs of the security services to protect the citizens. Additionally, objective oversight role promotes better civil-military relations, while on the other hand, a legitimate and trusted military institution is able to cooperate, inform and easily interact with civilians<sup>122</sup>. While such collective reforms and objective oversight roles of the security services are difficult to achieve, the long term benefits to regional, national, and human security that accrue from it are substantial.

Furthermore, based on the conflict transformation theory, it becomes apparent that a feasible strategy should make use of the valuable insights developed over years of practice and research on third party intervention. Inclusivity is therefore viewed as an important aspect of the peace

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<sup>122</sup>Saul, J.S. 1997. "Liberal Democracy vs. Popular Democracy in Southern Africa". *Review of African Political Economy* 72:219–36.

processes wherever negotiation and mediation are prominent. Sustainable solutions require, at a minimum, a basis of all interests having been heard and acknowledged, if not directly then indirectly, e.g. parallel talks via representatives, or sequential inclusion in the implementation phase. This was the case in Burundi, which eventually resolved the decade long conflict.

Finally, initiatives that seek to redress the inequalities that exist in the security sector will also go a long way in balancing the typical neo-patrimonial rule that characterize the ruling elite in most African countries. Indeed, most African countries are perennial victims of longstanding economic predicaments, extreme poverty, little experience with liberal democratic governance, and pervasive societal alienation based on ethnic inclinations. As such, a more representative military institution and security sector is likely to promote easier cooperation between the civilian population and the military, as well as between the democratic civilian rule and the military in place<sup>123</sup>. This would greatly diffuse tensions that often culminate to mutiny and consequently to military induced coups. To this end, it is understood that reforms to address social inequalities are likely enhance grassroots participation and the connection between communities and the state. Eventually, this would promote civil-military relations, and accountability in the institutions of governance would in turn promote democracy and good governance.

#### ***6.1.4 Construct 4: Role of sub-regional and regional organizations in promoting democracy***

Regional organizations offer great impetus in building and safe guarding the democracy of a country. It is evident from the case of Burundi discussed earlier that the increasing role of the AU and other regional economic communities also play vital roles in improving democracy be

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<sup>123</sup>Saul, J.S. “*Liberal Democracy vs. Popular Democracy in Southern Africa.*” Review of African Political Economy. 1997. 72:219–36.

playing an external oversight role of internal military institutions of member states. Based on the impact of military interventions carried this far, the effectiveness and success of these organizations is largely based their capability to act, fund, as well as efficiently cooperate and coordinate their efforts in different contexts. Practically, the capabilities of the intervening organization and the specific context of the conflict play a fundamental role in the success of the military intervention in both the short term and in the long term<sup>124</sup>. How these two aspects relate to each other also matters.

In the Burundi for instance, the AU mission successfully monitored the implementation of the peace and ceasefire agreements and facilitated the activities of the Joint Ceasefire Commission and the technical committees for the establishment of national security forces. It started to secure the identified assembly and disengagement areas and provided safe passage for the relevant parties to these areas and provided VIP protection for designated leaders returning to Burundi. It also helped with the delivery of humanitarian assistance and coordinated its activities with those of the UN and other international actors involved in the peace process<sup>125</sup>. Despite the fact that the mission was underfunded and its capabilities highly compromised, it still managed to quell the conflict in Burundi within the stipulated timeframe, and with minimum resources. This indicates the effectiveness of international missions in enhancing security, stability, peace and ultimately better governance among its member states.

The use of an external and impartial military force can effectively promote accountability in the internal activities of a country experiencing civil conflicts, given that the country is a signatory to the respective body that intervenes. In the case of AU, the organization draws a self-imposed

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<sup>124</sup>Heinlein, Peter. *“Unconstitutional Power Grabs Threaten African Democracy.”* Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 2009.

<sup>125</sup>UN Economic Commission for Africa, and African Union Commission. “African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.” *African Governance Newsletter* 1 (1): 2. 2011. doi:10.1163/9789004227729.

constitutional duty, and explicit right to intervene in certain matters involving its member, namely war crimes, genocides and crimes against humanity, whilst it still acknowledges and respects the national sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its member states<sup>126</sup>. Such a self-imposed mandate promotes accountability of the internal military institutions in their activities during conflicts, and when the situation demands, the organization uses military intervention to promote the values of its member states. The organization's Peace and Security Council makes the recommendations to intervene in case it deems that the legitimate order of a country is highly compromised. In fulfilling this mandate, the organization essentially promotes democracy and good governance in disregard of the internal military factions as was the case in Burundi<sup>127</sup>.

Finally, it is also worth pointing out that, it is evident that a local view is important, and that local strategy development for a particular context has the best chance of working. It is therefore stressed local stakeholders play a vital role in conflict resolution matters, not just in analysis spheres, but also in a dynamic response to the situation in terms of self-organization. This helps in mobilization of the system's own resources, thereby contributing positively to the transition process. In the long term, this should not only reduce violence, but also make changes at a systemic level by establishing or reinforcing support systems that will produce the political and social change required for a just and peaceful society

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<sup>126</sup>African Union, *“Protocol on the Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union.”* Maputo. 2003.

<sup>127</sup>UN Economic Commission for Africa, and African Union Commission. “African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.” *African Governance Newsletter 1 (1): 2*. 2011. doi: 10.1163/9789004227729.

## **6.2. RECOMMENDATIONS**

Owing to the fact that military intervention in democracy in Burundi has had numerous ramifications on the country's democracy, media, social institutions, economy and the environment the following recommendations are thus made.

1. Structures must be put in place to guard the fragile democracy in the recovering nation because failure to strengthen the practice of democracy will result into future conflicts. There must be efforts to ensure that adequate attention is given on the process of nurturing the countries democracy.
2. Reconciliation and cohesion ought to be given great priority in the developing country to ensure that issues are tackled through dialogue and diplomacy. This will ensure that the role of military in handling conflicts is reduced because of its negative effects. Burundians must learn to coexist in the nation through which chances of conflict will drastically reduce. This will result in better democratic ideals in the former war-torn nation.
3. Politics of self-expression ought to be encouraged in Burundi as an antidote to military role in political affairs. Politicians of diverse ideology should be allowed to participate in national discourse without threats and intimidation. This will result in the full recovery and growth of the political space.
4. The freedom of the media as an imperative pillar of the democratic space must be consolidated in Burundi as the way forward after a lengthy period of conflicts. The media should be allowed to play its role in nurturing democratic space.



5. Economic recovery measures should be launched in the country as an antidote to poverty and despondency. This will be crucial in averting resource-based conflicts that could harm the nation's social and political fabric.

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