RETHINKING DISARMAMENT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: A COMPARISON OF INITIATIVES IN KENYA AND UGANDA

BERITA MUTINDA MUSAU

R50/68381/2013

RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

NOVEMBER, 2016
DECLARATION

This research project report is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

Signature ____________________  Date ______________________

Berita Mutinda Musau

R50/68381/2013

This research project report has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor.

Signature ____________________  Date ______________________

Dr. Rosemary Anyona

Lecturer

Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies

University of Nairobi.
DEDICATION

I dedicate this research study first to my parents: my late father Peter and my mother Cecilia Domitilla for their loving sacrifice to see me through my life and academic journey. I also dedicate it to my husband Paul for his unwavering support and to our children; Rose, Peter, Patrice and Renita-Cecilia for their support, encouragement and prayers and for giving me a reason to relentlessly work hard.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to first thank God for His goodness, mercy, blessings and for granting me the strength, zeal and providence that enabled me to successfully pursue the M.A course and to undertake this project. His grace has indeed been sufficient.

My heartfelt gratitude also goes to my supervisor Dr. Rosemary Anyona for her support advice and motivation without which this study would have remained a far cry from what it is. Her constructive criticism, guidance and patience enabled me to successfully complete this research project. Her loving encouragement and commitment that enabled me to soldier on with the project even when it seemed too hard to continue cannot go unacknowledged.

I thank IDIS for granting me the opportunity to pursue this course, the IDIS faculty for the knowledge they imparted on us, the administrative staff for offering the much needed administrative support as well as the entire IDIS fraternity and all whom I interacted with in the course of my studies who made my experiences interesting and eventful.

In a special way I would like to thank my colleague Margaret Kariuki for linking me to contact persons from Turkana and West Pokot. On the same note, I wish to acknowledge Mr. Fred Iurien from Turkana and Mrs. Rachel Lagat from West Pokot for circulating my questionnaires to respondents in Turkana and West Pokot respectively, following up to ensure that they were filled in, and ensuring that I safely got them back on time. I owe them an enormous debt of gratitude. Special thanks too to the respondents who took their time to offer honest responses to my questionnaire.

My deepest gratitude and love also go to all my family members for their patience, moral support, prayers and encouragement that strengthened me throughout my studies.

Special thanks to my colleagues, classmates and friends who supported me in various ways and contributed to the success of my studies and this project. The list being endless, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to all persons who variously contributed to the success of my studies and to the successful completion of this research project.
ABSTRACT

Kenya and Uganda have had to grapple with insecurity challenges stemming from proliferation of illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). The situation is worse among pastoral communities who illegally possess illicit arms in large amounts. Consequently, the two countries have pursued various disarmament initiatives in order to curb the spread of illicit arms. Nevertheless illicit SALWs continue to proliferate and to be misused to launch violent attacks and commit various crimes. This study looked small arms proliferation and disarmament at the Horn of Africa in general and Kenya and Uganda in particular. It focused more on disarmament of pastoral communities at the Kenya Uganda boarder and compared two major disarmament initiatives by Kenya and Uganda namely: The Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP) in Uganda and Operation Dumisha Amani (ODA) in Kenya.

The persistence of the small arms challenge even after KIDDP and Operation Dumisha Amani puts to question the effectiveness of disarmament in the two countries. As a result the study maintained that for effectiveness disarmament required a rethink. The study proposed a human needs perspective and a human security approach to disarmament. The main area of focus was the Kenya Uganda boarder particularly the Karamoja region of Uganda and Turkana and West Pokot counties in Kenya. The target population comprised of the Karimojong in Karamoja, Uganda and the Pokot and Turkana in Kenya. It was a comparative study that relied on both primary and secondary data and applied qualitative data analysis methods. Based on the analysis of data collected from the study area, the study concluded that disarmament is urgent and indispensable in both Kenya and Uganda.

In rethinking disarmament, security ought to be provided as basic human need for disarmament to work. Security in this case should be considered in all its aspects from a human security perspective which considers the economic, personal, health, physical, cultural aspect of security as well as environmental security. Disarmament that adopts a human security approach would be effective in that it would enhance security in its entirety thus ensuring that communities attain freedom from fear and freedom from want, avert direct and structural violence. It is a long term process that would eventually curb the demand for and curtail the supply of small arms and light weapons.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION................................................................................................................................... ii
DEDICATION........................................................................................................................................ iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT........................................................................................................................ iv
ABSTRACT............................................................................................................................................ v
LIST OF TABLES.................................................................................................................................. ix
LIST OF FIGURES............................................................................................................................... x
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS................................................................................................. xi
CHAPTER ONE : INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY ............................................................................... 1

1.3 Objectives of the study.................................................................................................................. 6

1.4 Literature Review .......................................................................................................................... 6

1.4.1: Proliferation of Small Arms ................................................................................................. 7

1.4.2 Sources of arms at the Kenya-Uganda Border ....................................................................... 9

1.4.3 Small Arms and Conflicts ...................................................................................................... 10

1.4.3.1 Small Arms and Conflict/insecurity at the Kenya-Uganda border .................................. 11

1.4.4 Disarmament in conflict management, peace, security and stability ................................. 12

1.4.4.1 Disarmament of pastoralist communities at the Kenya-Uganda border ...................... 16

1.5 Justification of the Study ............................................................................................................. 19

1.5.1 Academic justification ........................................................................................................... 19

1.5.2 Policy Justification ................................................................................................................ 20

1.6 Theoretical Framework .............................................................................................................. 20

1.7 Hypotheses .................................................................................................................................. 23

1.8 Methodology ............................................................................................................................... 24

1.9 Chapter Outline .......................................................................................................................... 25
CHAPTER TWO: ARMS PROLIFERATION, CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AT THE HORN OF AFRICA.......................... 26

2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 26

2.2 Reasons for Arms acquisition among pastoral communities at the Horn of Africa........ 27

2.3 Factors enhancing proliferation of small arms in the Horn of Africa.......................... 29

2.4 Regimes and Approaches to small arms control and disarmament in the Horn of Africa.... 35

2.4.1 Regimes on small arms control and disarmament.............................................. 35

2.4.2 National and Regional Institutional Frameworks................................................. 38

2.4.3 The place of disarmament in the Horn of Africa.............................................. 40

CHAPTER THREE: DISARMAMENT INITIATIVES IN KENYA AND UGANDA....... 41

3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 41

3.2. Disarmament in colonial and post-colonial Kenya ............................................. 41

3.3 Disarmament in colonial and post-colonial Uganda ............................................. 43

3.4 Disarmament from 2000 to present: Embracing International and regional cooperation and Policy Frameworks............................................................... 45

3.4.1: International standards and new approaches to disarmament ......................... 45

3.4.2 Disarmament initiatives in post-2000 Kenya ................................................... 45

3.4.3. Disarmament Initiatives in post-2000 Uganda.............................................. 47

3.4.4. Kenya Uganda joint disarmament operation: KIDDP and Operation

   Dumisha Amani ........................................................................................................... 48

   3.4.4.1: Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP)... 49

   3.4.4.2. Operation Dumisha Amani (ODA) .......................................................... 52

CHAPTER FOUR: A CRITICAL COMPARISON OF THE KARAMOJA INTEGRATED DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME AND OPERATION DUMISHA AMANI................................................................. 58

4.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 58
4.2. KIDDP and ODA ................................................................. 58
4.3 Persistence of the Small Arms menace ................................................................. 61
  4.3.1 Impediments to the success of KIDDP and ODA ........................................ 61
4.4 Lessons for the future: Rethinking Disarmament ............................................ 64
  4.4.1 The human needs theory (HNT) and security/safety at the Kenya Uganda border .... 64
  4.4.2 Disarmament and the HNT at the Kenya Uganda border ............................... 65
  4.4.3 Human security, Human needs and Disarmament at the Kenya Uganda border .... 68

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS............................... 72
5.1 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 72
5.2 Recommendations ............................................................................................ 75

BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................. 77

APPENDIX 1: Questionnaire for Turkana ............................................................... 83
APPENDIX 2: Questionnaire for West Pokot........................................................... 88
LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1 Types of Human Security and Threats

................................................................. 68
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Sudan Karamoja route .................................................................................................................. 32

Figure 2: North Eastern route ................................................................................................................... 33

Figure 3: Sudan Lokichogio route ........................................................................................................... 34

Figure 4: Karega – Lopoch – Kotido route ............................................................................................... 34
# ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CEWARN</td>
<td>Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLR</td>
<td>Great Lakes Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHOA</td>
<td>Greater Horn of Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNT</td>
<td>Human Needs Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOA</td>
<td>Horn of Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSU</td>
<td>Human Security Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIDDP</td>
<td>Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOPEIN</td>
<td>Kotido Peace Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPR</td>
<td>Kenya Police Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDU</td>
<td>Local Defense Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Operation Dumisha Amani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECSA</td>
<td>Regional Center for Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPoA</td>
<td>United Nations Programme of Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPDF</td>
<td>Uganda People’s Defense Forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Background

For a long period, the states of Kenya and Uganda have faced enormous security challenges resulting from the spread, ownership and utilization of illicit small arms and light weapons (SALW) \(^1\) by civilians. This issue is, however not new since it existed in the two countries even in pre-colonial times. The communities living at the Kenya-Uganda border, which falls under the Karamoja cluster, have been known to possess small arms even before the two states were created. Consequently the area is known to be saturated with illicit arms.\(^2\) These illegal arms eventually circulate and find their way into urban and other parts of the countries. Moreover, the long shared border between Kenya and Uganda enhances easy circulation of arms across the two countries. In 2008, a survey done established a key supply route of arms from the Karamoja area of Uganda into Kenya which was facilitated by the Pokot living on both sides of the border.\(^3\) Consequently, the issue of small arms and the conflicts associated therewith become easily internationalized.

Non-state actors wielding small arms both in rural as well as urban centers have posed a great threat not only to state but also to human security. Large trails of destruction have been witnessed as a result of the use of such weapons. In urban centers, small arms are mainly used to commit crimes and cause injuries and deaths to victims. In rural areas, small arms are mainly found among pastoral communities who cling on to them on account of self-protection in an area that is devoid of adequate state security apparatus.

---

\(^1\) This study adopts the definition of SALWs presented by the Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSAs) Nairobi Protocol 2004. Small arms are defined as “weapons designed for personal use including light machine guns, sub-machine guns, machine pistols, fully automatic rifles, assault rifles and semi-automatic rifles”. It defines light weapons as “including the following portable weapons designed for use by several persons as a crew: heavy machine guns, automatic cannons, howitzers, mortars of less than 100 mm caliber, grenade launchers, anti-tank weapons and launchers, recoilless guns, shoulder-fired rockets, anti-aircraft weapons, and launchers, and air defense weapons”. Nairobi Protocol, 2004, p3. The study shall apply the term *small arms* to make reference to both small arms and light weapons.

\(^2\) Mburu, N. 2001:148

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) especially among pastoralists in the Horn of Africa and in the Karamoja cluster has exacerbated the amount of destruction and suffering that violent pastoral confrontations leave behind. The Karamoja cluster is a region that covers the borders between Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and South Sudan. The communities living in the Karamoja cluster include: the Karimojong of north-eastern Uganda, the Turkanas and Pokots of north-western Kenya, the Nyangatom and Meriles of southern Ethiopia and the Toposa and Dindinga of South Sudan. The peripheral geographical location of the Karamoja cluster makes it a vulnerable region. Historically the region has suffered marginalization and neglect during the colonial and the post-colonial period. It has for a long time been considered as an economically unproductive area situated far from the areas of influence of the central governments of the states concerned. Leff avers that insurgencies experienced in the region overshadowed pastoral conflicts entrenching a perception of the conflicts as mere primitive cultural practices.

This study focuses on the challenge of small arms at the Kenya-Uganda border which is part of the Karamoja cluster. The study takes cognizance of the fact that the whole Karamoja cluster faces the same problem but for the purpose of this study opts to concentrate on the Kenya-Uganda area as opposed to the whole Karamoja cluster. As such, although there may be a cursory mention of the South Sudan and Ethiopia, it should be noted that these are not the main focus of this study.

Kenya and Uganda share a long border in the Karamoja cluster. The Ugandan side of the border is popularly known as Karamoja. This should however not be confused with the term Karamoja cluster. While the term Karamoja cluster is an area which as described above covers the borders of four countries namely: Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan and Ethiopia, Karamoja on the other hand is used to refer to the Ugandan side of the Kenya-Uganda border.

The Kenya-Uganda border is mainly inhabited by pastoral communities. The Karimojong live in Karamoja while the Turkana and Pokot inhabit the Kenyan side of the border. These are the main communities that predominantly feature in this study. It should however be noted that these communities greatly share ethno linguistic characteristics. They also

---

4 Wepundi, Ndung’u, and Rynn. 2011:4
6 Leff, J. 2009:190
7 The term Karimojong and Karamojong are used interchangeably.
engage in violent confrontations within as well as across the borders. The confrontations are manifested in the form of cattle raids which are increasingly becoming deadly. The pastoral conflicts in this area have led to deaths, displacement of families, and gross violations of human rights.\(^8\) Commercialization of cattle raids, emergence of organized gangs, and deterioration of traditional structures are some of the recent worrying trends that not only threaten the security of the pastoralist communities but the security of the states concerned.\(^9\)

Pastoralist communities living at the Kenya-Uganda border claim to own illegal arms as a way of protecting themselves and their livestock and property owing to absence or minimal presence of government security apparatus.\(^{10}\) Competition for scarce pasture and water becomes an immediate trigger of violent intra-clan as well as inter-communal conflicts. The communities have also been on record for their violent engagements with state security forces. Bevan, for instance, notes that the Karamojong in Uganda are known for their notoriety in armed struggles with the Ugandan military.\(^{11}\) Similar cases have also transpired in Kenya. The attacks on the General Service Unit (GSU) officers in Kapedo Turkana, Kenya in October 2014, is a recent case in point.\(^{12}\) Less than a year after the Kapedo attacks, more than 46 people were killed when attackers believed to be Turkana attacked a village known as Nadome on the Turkana-East Pokot border.\(^{13}\) The worst of these attacks occurred in 2012, when close to 40 security officers who were in pursuit of some bandits in Suguta Valley, Baragoi–Samburu were brutally slain.\(^{14}\)

Faced with the above challenges of illegal arms, the governments of Kenya and Uganda have been on the forefront in carrying out various disarmament initiatives in order to reduce the amount of weapons held by civilians. Both forceful as well as voluntary disarmament interventions have been carried out by the two states, but limited success has been achieved since the communities still possess several weapons. Competition for pastureland and water has been severally cited as the main source of conflicts between and among the pastoralist communities. Climate change and the resultant persistent drought have widened the demand-supply gap of

\(^{8}\)Mkutu2003:5
\(^{9}\)Ibid.
\(^{11}\)Bevan 2008a:20
\(^{12}\)Kipsang 2014
\(^{13}\)Bii: 2015
\(^{14}\)Kiarie J.: 2012.
resources that are paramount for the survival of their livestock thus exacerbating the conflicts.\textsuperscript{15} Fischer observes that owing to the location of the Karamoja cluster at the boundaries of various countries, pastoral conflicts are not localized within one state in the region but on occasions are trans-boundary, thus making it challenging for one state to deal with such conflicts, hence calling for regional cooperation.\textsuperscript{16}

The study acknowledges and appreciates the efforts by the Kenya and Ugandan governments to disarm the pastoralist communities at their border in spite of the fact that disarmament in this area is a daunting task. The study looked at the various disarmament programmes pursued by the two states thus far taking special focus on the initiatives between the years 2000 and 2016. Particular emphasis was laid on two major disarmament programmes: The \textit{Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme} (KIDDP) in Uganda and \textit{Operation Dumisha Amani} in Kenya. It compared the two disarmament initiatives in the two countries with a view to establish the lessons the two countries can draw from one another and also lessons that can be drawn for effectiveness of future disarmament.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

From the time the Cold War ended, proliferation of SALWs has been on the rise. The Kenya-Uganda border region has been considered as a region that is saturated with illicit arms in the hands of insurgents, armed communities and criminals. Prevalence of small arms has increased the lethality of conflicts among pastoral communities and undermined peaceful coexistence of communities. Recent trends concerning arms in the hands of pastoralist communities are alarming. First, unlike in the past where the arms were a preserve of men, women are also carrying arms and even perfecting the art of operating them. A second worrying trend concerns attacks on state security officers by pastoralist communities. This implies that the challenge of small arms among pastoral communities is increasingly threatening both human and state security and cannot be wished away as a problem of regions in the periphery.

In an effort to solve the challenge of illegal arms and mitigate the suffering and destruction resulting thereof, numerous disarmament initiatives have been carried out in Kenya and Uganda in the colonial and post-colonial period. Most of them have been coercive and brutal.

\textsuperscript{15}Fisher, J: 2013.
\textsuperscript{16} ibid
and recently a few have incorporated initial phases calling for voluntary surrender arms before coercion is applied. Nevertheless, most of the disarmament initiatives met vehement resistance from the local communities even to the point of causing major casualties. For instance, a disarmament operation in Karamoja in May 2002 led to a violent confrontation between the Karamojong and Ugandan soldiers in which 19 soldiers and 13 Karamojong fighters were killed and several homesteads set on fire.\(^{17}\)

Most scholars such as Mkutu\(^ {18}\), Mburu\(^ {19}\) and Wepundi et al.,\(^ {20}\) among others who have done extensive research on disarmament of pastoral communities at the Kenya-Uganda border point to the failure of previous disarmaments as a result of the forceful nature that has characterized these exercises. They also propose regionally integrated efforts in carrying out disarmament since the problem goes beyond the borders of the states affected. Few of them lay emphasis on approaching disarmament from a human needs perspective.

This study appreciates the various disarmament initiatives that Kenya and Uganda have taken so far in addressing the challenge of illicit arms in the two countries, particularly among pastoralist communities at their shared border. It also commends two disarmament initiatives that stand out in the two countries’ efforts to pursue innovations in their disarmament: The Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP) in Uganda that kicked off in 2005 and targeted pastoralist communities at the Karamoja region and the Operation Dumisha Amani (I in 2005 and II in 2010) in Kenya that predominantly targeted the Turkana and the Pokot at the Kenya-Uganda border. These two initiatives were hailed for trying to incorporate human rights and development and also involve the local communities.

Recurrent violent attacks on both civilians and state security officers in both Kenya and Uganda epitomize the continued presence of illicit small arms in spite of the above major initiatives. The discovery of 100,000 rounds of ammunition in December 2009 and later 30,000 more in a private residence in Narok town in Kenya by the Kenya Police drew to attention the severity of the threat of small arms proliferation not only in the country but also to the wider

\(^{17}\)Mkutu, K. A. 2003

\(^{18}\)Ibid, see also: Mkutu 2006:47-70

\(^{19}\)Mburu 2002:1-4

Horn of Africa region.\textsuperscript{21} This means that the problem of illicit arms is still persistent and therefore warrants further research. Moreover, no study has been done that compares the two disarmament initiatives. This study argues that a comparison of the above disarmament efforts in Kenya and Uganda could unearth lessons that the two countries can learn from one another. Furthermore, the persistent challenge of small arms and the attacks resultant violent attacks for a rethinking of disarmament in order to try and offer lessons for the future. This study therefore endeavored to look at disarmament from human needs perspective.

1.3 Objectives of the study

The broad focus of the study was to examine the problem of illegal arms especially among pastoral communities at the Horn of Africa in general and in Kenya and Uganda in particular and to analyze disarmament as one of the methods used to address the problem.

The following were therefore the specific objectives of the study.

\textbf{a)} To explore the problem of arms proliferation as well as arms control and disarmament initiatives at the Horn of Africa region where the two countries (Kenya and Uganda) belong.

\textbf{b)} To take a comparative analysis of the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP) in Uganda and Operation Dumisha Amani in Kenya.

\textbf{c)} To identify lessons for the future and propose ways of rethinking disarmament for more effectiveness at the Kenya-Ugandan border.

1.4 Literature Review

The literature review for this study draws from various scholarly debates that revolve around the topics of small arms and disarmament. The literature review therefore looks into issues of arms and violent conflict in general and pastoral conflict in particular. It also focuses keenly on disarmament as a recognized method of conflict management and maintenance of peace and stability, delving into debates on disarmament in general and narrowing down to the Africa and the Kenya – Uganda border. The literature review is classified under the following subheadings: proliferation of small arms; sources of small arms at the Kenya-Uganda border; small arms and insecurity; small arms and insecurity at the Kenya-Uganda border; disarmament

\textsuperscript{21}Ibid.
in conflict management, peace, security and stability; and finally, disarmament if pastoralists at the Kenya-Uganda border.

1.4.1: Proliferation of Small Arms

Owing to insecurity resulting from prevalence of small arms in the society, the subject has attracted a lot of interest among scholars. Gillis asserts that most present-day conflicts involve the use of small arms.\textsuperscript{22} Although Gillis acknowledges the difficulty in assessing the number of arms in circulation, she points out that according to estimates there are about 875 million in circulation globally. The difficulty in getting an exact figure is caused by the fact that civilians possess majority of the weapons. She further alludes that as a result of lack of controls and regulation, small weapons easily find their way into illegal markets. In Africa, pastoralists are said to be among civilians who possess some of the largest numbers of illegal arms.

Scholars have over time engaged in debates in order to explain the reasons or origins of the proliferation of small arms. For some like Muggah, increase in the small arms in circulation is directly linked to the process of globalization. Muggah asserts that globalization has led to porosity of state boundaries, and numerous exchanges and interactions that go beyond state control. As a result, the state faces the challenge of effectively regulating flows of small arms hence is gradually losing the control and monopoly of arms which are the major instruments of violence.\textsuperscript{23}

On the same note, Dahinden, Dahrlitz and Fischer view the problem of spread of small arms especially in developing countries as a post-Cold-War problem.\textsuperscript{24} According to them, although weapons were disposed to developing countries during the Cold War, there was an upsurge of circulation of small arms after the war ended. They attribute this to two major processes: first to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the intra-state conflicts that ensued mainly in developing countries that created a demand for small arms as well as a force of supply. Secondly the process of globalization which they argue is a post-cold war phenomenon enhanced

\textsuperscript{22} Gillis 2012: 67
\textsuperscript{23} Muggah 2001
\textsuperscript{24} Dahinden, Dahrlitz & Fischer 2002:19
global interconnectedness which has been exploited by illicit arm dealers to circulate small arms to third world countries with permeable borders and weak state control systems.  

Atwood, Glatz and Muggah perceive proliferation of small arms from a motivations and means perspective which they maintain is indispensable in the comprehension and hence effective confrontation of the problem of arms proliferation.  

They assert that it is important to understand civilians’ motivation for acquisition of arms as well as the means that would come into play in enhancing the acquisition of such arms. They suggest that for disarmament to work, the factors enhancing demand ought to be identified and mitigated. In addition, the means through which the arms are acquired such as the arms trafficking channels should also be identified and blocked. In other words, they advocate addressing both demand and supply factors in curbing arms proliferation.

Mc Envoy and Murray’s study in the Eastern Equatorial region in South Sudan, and in Turkana north in Kenya in 2007 resonates with Atwood, Glatz and Muggah’s motivation theory. Mc Envoy and Murray established that more than two thirds of the population in these areas felt very insecure even during the day owing to lack of protection from state security forces. As a result of the high prevalence of insecurity majority of them acknowledged the importance they attach to small arms since they made them feel safer and indicated that disarmament would decrease security in their villages.

On the same note Mburu links proliferation of arms among the pastoralist communities to the dwindling of shared natural resources particularly pastures and water among the pastoral communities living in the Kenya Uganda border. He argues that as long as the communities have to scramble for the natural resources, then arms to them remain important tools of operation. According to Mburu, efforts to disarm the pastoral communities without proper management of the resources and legislation on how they can be shared, is bound to be an exercise in futility.
This study attributes the proliferation and circulation as well as misuse of illicit arms among pastoralist communities at the Kenya-Uganda border to the direct and structural violence that the people in the area have experienced for a long period. This has in turn created an unending need for human security which the concerned states have inadequately provided prompting the people to arm themselves in order to meet the unmet human needs.

1.4.2 Sources of arms at the Kenya-Uganda Border

A closer look into the prevalence of arms at the Kenya-Uganda border indicates that as early as the 1800 fire arms were in existence among pastoralist communities in this region, the source being gun markets in Maji, south-western Ethiopia.\(^{30}\) In Kenya, the communities living in the Karamoja cluster began massively arming themselves from as early as the 1960s. Mburu notes for example that the Pokot began arming themselves with guns which were somehow outdated.\(^{31}\) According to Mburu, the prices of such weapons have constantly been decreasing, making acquisition even easier. He also points out the participation of the Kenyan government during President Moi’s reign in covertly arming the Turkana allegedly for self-defense against the Karamoja in Uganda. Bevan also alludes to the role of the government of Kenya playing a role in arming pastoralist communities especially the Turkana.\(^{32}\) Both the Pokot and Turkana continue arming themselves illegally.

Mburu also faults the governments for the arming of the communities in Karamoja cluster. He highlights that the Karimojong in Uganda armed themselves massively in the 1970s when Moroto barracks was abandoned intact after the defeat of the Ugandan army by the Tanzanian army. The Karamoja people walked off with immense quantity of small arms and ammunition.\(^{33}\) He also faults Museveni’s government which on coming into power allowed the Karimojong to remain in possession of firearms for the purposes of self-defense against what he termed as Turkana and Pokot thieves from Kenya and the Toposa of South Sudan.\(^ {34}\) In addition, the Karamoja continued increasing their ammunition through illegal purchase of firearms.

\(^{30}\)Ibid.  
\(^{31}\)Ibid: 8  
\(^{32}\)Bevan 2008b  
\(^{33}\)Mburu 2002  
\(^{34}\)Ibid.
Mburu furthermore highlights regional conflicts and instability that have had spillover effects in the Karamoja cluster as far as acquisition and proliferation of illegal weapons is concerned. Rebel movements in northern Uganda, particularly the Lord’s Resistance Army, the civil war in Southern Sudan, the collapse of the Somaliland state in the early 1990s, conflicts in Ethiopia during the reign of Mengistu, as well as the perennial conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo have contributed to the spread of illegal weapons and insecurity in the Karamoja cluster. According to the Small Arms Survey global politics particularly the Cold War in the 1980s and also the post-Cold War period have seen an exponential increase in the use of modern weapons and violent attacks on pastoral communities.

**1.4.3 Small Arms and Conflicts**

There are various debates from scholars as well as policy makers concerning the relationship between arms and conflicts. Whether arms cause conflicts or not, is a question that remains prevalent in many discussions. Nevertheless, it can be contended that arms especially those illegally possessed by civilians are a threat to security.

Most studies view arms not as direct causes of conflict, but as tools that magnify the destructive impact whenever conflicts ensue. Although arms may not be a cause of conflicts per se, they exacerbate conflicts and the suffering resulting thereof. Talking of small arms, Gillis for instance argues that proliferation of small arms does not singly create conflict, but acknowledges the aggravation of tension and endemic violence that results from the excessive accumulation and widespread availability of the arms. This creates anxiety, an increased sense of insecurity and a greater demand for more weapons.

On the same note, Stohl compares small arms to weapons of mass destruction. She observes that these weapons have caused huge devastation in societies each year. According to Strohl, small arms have negative impacts in all societies: in post-conflict societies, small arms are likely to lead to resumption of violence while in countries that are at peace, small arms

---

35 Mburu 1999: 89-107  
37 Gillis 2012:67  
38 Strohl 2005: 71-77
become the weapons of choice for criminals and in addition may lead to dilution of rule of law and be an impediment to peace.\textsuperscript{39}

According to the United Nations, majority of conflict deaths arise from the use of small arms and in most cases, it is the civilians who bear the brunt of armed conflict at an alarming rate.\textsuperscript{40} Situating the problem of arms and conflict in a global context, the UN further notes the key role that the process of globalization has played in changing the nature of local conflicts mainly through enhancement of access to weapons that have made conflicts more deadly.\textsuperscript{41} The havoc wreaked by small arms cannot be underestimated. It takes numerous forms: gangs terrorizing a neighborhood, rebels attacking civilians and/or peacekeepers and humanitarian aid workers, bandits attacking people, robberies, criminals attacking law enforcers, communities raiding each other and so forth. Conflicts that were initially low scale due to limited access to weapons have now becoming full blown wars due to weapons being produced and marketed at a global scale. On the same note, Annault Phillip and Marc Finaud estimate the annual global death toll resulting directly or indirectly from SALWs to be 740,000.\textsuperscript{42}

This study argues that small arms are not a cause of conflicts but that whenever they are used during conflicts, they make the conflicts deadly. They offer those in possession thereof, the means to wage war or to fuel conflicts. As such, they pose great challenges to security. The best case scenario is when all arms are in the hands of the government/the state, which is charged with the responsibility to protect their citizens. When states endeavor to disarm civilians, they do so in their intention to maintain the monopoly of the instruments of violence.

1.4.3.1 Small Arms and Conflict/insecurity at the Kenya-Uganda border

Among the pastoralist communities the use of arms leaves large trails of destruction and deaths especially during cases of cattle rustling, robberies and other forms of aggression.\textsuperscript{43} The prevalence of arms at the Kenya-Uganda border is a constant threat to human security. Concerning arms and escalation of violent conflicts in the area, Mkutu refers to the commercialization of cattle rustling as having caused a major need arms and great resistance to

\textsuperscript{39}ibid
\textsuperscript{40}Ibid: 76.
\textsuperscript{41}World Bank 1999
\textsuperscript{42}Anawitt & Finaud 2011:10
disarmament efforts. Quite different from the past, when cattle raids were orchestrated only to replenish herds after a drought or an attack or for cultural practices like paying dowry, in commercialized cattle rustling cattle are stolen for the purpose of selling to already known or to prospective buyers most of whom are businessmen, political leaders and arms traffickers. Stolen cattle are therefore not taken to the villages where they can be pursued and traced.

Several scholars posit that, persistent violent conflicts involving arms among pastoralist communities leave pervasive indiscriminate fatalities, en masse displacement of families and depletion of livestock. They also leave an atmosphere of tension among those who witness such conflicts. In his study, Leff established that within a span of ten years (between 1994 and 2005), pastoralist communities in Kenya and Uganda lost approximately 460,000 (almost half a million) livestock which was worth over US$ 75 million while by 2003, about 164, 457 people had been displaced in northern Kenya. Leff also found out that similar patterns of insecurity were commonplace among pastoralist communities neighboring Kenya and Uganda. Leff’s discussions with local leaders in 2007 unearthed that attacks involving the Toposa of Southern Sudan and the Turkana of Northern Kenya were reported weekly. Attacks and retaliatory attacks result in numerous deaths. In all these, small arms were the weapons of choice.

Many studies point out to the fact that similar cross border violent confrontations also occur along the Uganda-Kenya border. In addition, to cross-border conflicts, inter and intra community as well as inter and intra clan confrontations among the pastoralist communities also occur within the borders of the countries, especially between and among ethnic rivals, for instance between the Turkana and Pokot in Kenya. The above cases are just but a few of the cases that point out to the devastating nature of arms among the pastoralist communities at the Kenya-Uganda border.

1.4.4 Disarmament in conflict management, peace, security and stability

Although widely applied, the term disarmament is a complex term with wide ranging definitions and application. Willet refers to disarmament as a complex process which takes multifaceted

\[44\text{Mkutu 2008}\]
\[45\text{Karamoja Cluster Project, Baseline Survey March, 2014}\]
\[46\text{Mkutu 2003, Mburu 1999: 89-107.}\]
\[47\text{Leff 2009: 191}\]
\[48\text{Ibid.}\]
\[49\text{Mkutu2003, Bevan 2008 a, Mburu 1999: 89-107.}\]
forms such as: “reduction in military spending, reduction or destruction of certain types of weapons, decrease in the size of the military, and limitation of arms transfers among others.” She further points out the predominant application of the term in southern Africa to refer to the collection and destruction of weapons after termination of conflict between warring parties. According to the United Nations (UN), disarmament is defined as a process that involves “collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population as well as the development of responsible arms management programmes.” For the purpose of this study, the UN definition is adopted.

Disarmament after the Second World War and during the Cold War period mainly focused on military disarmament in order to reduce military expenditure. States were encouraged to reduce their military expenditure with the assumption that such a reduction would enhance a diversion of expenditure to economic growth and other domestic uses such as education and technological innovations. Cooper also observes the same focus and argues that this was mainly to reinforce the military supremacy of the Super Powers during Cold War and after the Cold War, the supremacy of the United States and the West. Cooper further argues that with growing civil wars, then another concept was introduced to disarmament discourses: that of Post-Conflict Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). This was a process aimed at ending civil wars and enhancing peace and stability. Implementation of DDR programmes yielded some fruits leading to attainment of peace for instance in Mozambique and El Salvador while in other cases such as in Angola there was little success leading to a resumption of conflict.

Munive and Stepputat as well as Muggah take a keen look at DDR programmes and observe that the trend in the 1990s involved dealing with ex combatants and insurgent armies after signing of peace accords between warring parties. These actors, they argue, have changed

---

50 Willet 1998: 409-430
52 Vignard 2003
53 Knight, Loayza & Villanueva 1996
54 Cooper 2006: 353-376
55 Ibid
57 Muggah 2010: 1
and now include militias, and even other civilians in possession of illicit arms which pose great challenges to the stability of governments and security of civilians. Taking Africa as an example Munive and Stepputat aver that incessant conflicts such as pastoral conflicts, militias, contested elections as well as political violence epitomize the manifold actors that DDR programmes have to deal with. Muggah views DDR as an inherently political process that aims at aiding states to establish legitimacy and authority on their citizens as well as reaffirm their monopoly of violence. As such, DDR programmes have been reconceptualized to take care of armed groups in an ongoing conflict without necessarily being preceded by a peace accord and also to deal with several diverse actors.

Sabala's categorization, Muggah also highlights three types of disarmament operations: the first one is the one mandated by a peace agreement, the second one is that mandated by a United Nations security council and the third one is the one carried out unilaterally by a government.  

Disarmament of pastoralist communities at the Kenya-Uganda border should however be viewed differently from that carried out under DDR programmes. The pastoralist communities are not ex-combatants that need to be disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated in the society. Their possession or the need for acquisition of arms is mainly driven by a security void that exists: the human need for safety which calls for states to step in and satisfy and hence establish confidence and a feeling of safety among its citizens in order to make disarmament work. Unlike DDR, disarmament at the Kenya-Uganda border is pursued by the national governments and not under the auspices of an international body like the United Nations. As such, the disarmament initiatives at the Kenya-Uganda border fit in Sabala’s second and Muggah’s third types in their categorization. They are not preceded by negotiations of ceasefire.

---

58 Sabala 2007
59 Muggah 2010: 1
Disarmament, as well as any other initiatives tackling the small arms menace requires international cooperation considering the intricate channels and relationships that come into play in dealing with the arms among various actors. The United Nations has been a key organization in promoting cooperation in tackling small arms especially in the 21st century. A very key initiative was the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects. It took place in 2001 in New York and in the conference states committed themselves to addressing the proliferation of small arms and the devastation they cause.60 Later, another international instrument: The United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects was developed. This instrument, popularly known as UNPoA gave guidelines and recommendations to states on how to implement and strengthen regional and national controls over SALW.61 Another initiative was the United Nations Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition.

In the African Continent, the Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons was established prior to the United Nations Conference.62 The declaration recognized the proliferation of SALW as a common problem that hails the whole continent and that required the cooperation of all states in the continent. As a common position adopted by African states, the Bamako Declaration was presented to the 2001 United Nations Conference.

At the sub-regional level various measures have also been adopted. In West Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and other related Materials was developed in 2006.63 In the Southern African Sub region, The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials was adopted in 2001. In the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, The Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of the Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapon 2001 is an expression of the commitment of member states in addressing the common problem of illicit weapon. Pursuant to

60 Dye 2009:179
61 Ibid.
62 ibid
63 ibid
the Nairobi Declaration, The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa was developed in 2004. Unlike the Nairobi Declaration which is politically binding, the Nairobi Protocol is legally binding. Under the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol, member states are required to establish National Focal Points on small arms and light weapons which are tasked with the responsibility of handling small arms issues at the national level.

1.4.4.1 Disarmament of pastoralist communities at the Kenya-Uganda border

Kenya has since independence not experienced large scale intra-state conflicts involving widespread participation of non-state actors. As such, the country has not encountered a post-conflict situation that required demobilization and reintegration. Nevertheless, the country has carried out various disarmament initiatives to deal with the illicit arms menace. Uganda on the other hand has experienced major security challenges from insurgent groups particularly the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Acholi and the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) as well as the Former Ugandan Army (FUNA) in West Nile. Consequently, the country has carried out DDR initiatives in these two regions: Acholi and West Nile.

This study as mentioned earlier maintains that the disarmament initiatives that Kenya and Uganda have carried out on pastoralist communities at the Karamoja region where the two countries share a long border could not fully be labeled as DDR programmes. They mainly involve the disarmament component of DDR programmes. Disarmament of pastoralist communities at the Kenya –Uganda border spans back a century ago to the colonial period. Wepundi et al posit that during the colonial period, the British in an effort to pacify the Karamoja region launched disarmament operations which were vehemently resisted by the local community and in response to the resistance the British applied a lot of brutality. The colonial government also disarmed the Turkana in Kenya and left them vulnerable to their hostile neighbors, prompting them to easily support the British in the Second World War with the

65 Finnegan & Flew 2008
66 Wepundi (et al) 2011:4
intention of acquiring weapons to increase their military capability and to punish their neighbors.\(^67\)

The various operations that the British conducted to disarm civilians in Kenya during the colonial period included *Operation Tennis* in the 1920s that targeted the Turkana, which yielded little success since the Turkana managed to evade the colonial officers’ patrols, thanks to the Turkana’s nomadic way of life.\(^68\) A second one was in 1941 targeting the Dassanetch near the Kenyan Ethiopian border, and the third one was in 1950 in Baringo while the last disarmament operation during the colonial period dubbed *Operation Jock Stock* was in 1952 and targeted the Mau Mau freedom fighters.\(^69\) All of them were characterized by use of extreme force and brutality on the civilians. In the post-colonial period, Kenya and Uganda also made efforts to disarm civilians especially pastoralist communities. Worth mentioning here is the infamous *Operation Nyundo* carried out in 1984, a joint Kenya-Uganda operation that targeted borderland communities, particularly the Karamojong and the Pokot.\(^70\) This operation was said to have been extremely brutal involving combined air and ground operations.

Recent disarms have been guided by international and regional instruments discussed above. Uganda for example carried out a disarmament operation between 2001-2002 in Karamoja which although offered an initial period of amnesty on voluntary disarmament eventually turned out to be very forceful and encountered resistance from the community.\(^71\) The other active disarmament of the Karamoja in Uganda began in April-May 2006 under a programme dubbed Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP). This programme was faulted for failing to initiate development before disarmament in order for development successes to serve as incentives for disarmament. Disarmament under the KIDDP eventually remained largely forceful including the controversial and dreaded cordon and search tactics.\(^72\)

Kenya on the other hand launched two coordinated disarmament operations dubbed *Operation Dumisha Amani I* (Operation maintain peace) in 2005 and five years later, in 2010

\(^{67}\) Ibid.
\(^{68}\) Ibid: 6. See also Mburu 2002
\(^{69}\) Wepundi 2011
\(^{70}\) Wepundi (et al.) 2011: 7.
\(^{71}\) Akabwai and Stites 2010: 27
\(^{72}\) Ibid: 29. See also Bevan 2008
Operation Dumisha Amani II followed. Unlike previous disarmaments which were largely forceful, this time the government sought to incorporate development initiatives and also to involve the community and pursue voluntary disarmament. Development initiatives involved efforts like building dams, schools, branding animals and offering health aid to local communities. These development efforts were carried out by the military. After the 2005 operation Dumisha Amani which advocated for peaceful disarmament involving amnesty for voluntary surrender or arms and ammunition, a second phase dubbed Operation Okota (Operation Collect) in 2006 which was coercive and aimed at collecting weapons forcefully from those who refused to disarm voluntarily.

Operation Dumisha Amani operations targeted a wide area of pastoralist communities namely Turkana, West Pokot, Marakwet, Samburu, East Baringo, Laikipia East and Trans Nzoia. Operation Dumisha Amani II is said to be still an ongoing operation. Under Operation Dumisha Amani operations, some success is said to have been realized as far as collection of arms is concerned. Nevertheless, the operations are said to have left some communities such as the Samburu vulnerable because they cooperated and disarmed. Consequently, communities have still been reluctant to fully cooperate owing to the feeling that the security provided by the state was still wanting and inadequate considering the gross security risks experienced in the areas in history. Moreover, the forceful phase watered down the good will that communities had initially demonstrated.

Despite these disarmament efforts, conflicts still persist in the Karamoja cluster and the region is still awash with small arms. Although disarmament has been recognized as a method of enhancing peace and conflict management, Bevan further argues that focus on disarmament as the main method of violence reduction may not work in establishing peace in the Karamoja region. Small Arms are not a root cause of violent conflict. They however as Bevan further correctly notes play a key role in intensifying the destruction that occurs during violent confrontations and crime.

---

73 Wepundi (et al.) 2011: 10
72 Ibid
75 Ibid
76 Wepundi 2011
77 Bevan, James 2008 a
78 Ibid
Concerning the strategies applied by the respective governments and decrying the high-handed nature that states sometimes apply in their disarmament initiatives, Wepundi et al. point out the necessity of states to win the confidence of communities and enhance the representation of the communities.\footnote{Wepundi (et al.) 2011: 10} According to them, peace building and development, coupled with dialogue and well organized voluntary disarmament efforts would enhance trust and confidence of states by communities which would be a good prerequisite for success in disarmament initiatives. They also highlight various goals that disarmament should pursue some of which include reduction of number of weapons in circulation, strengthening of security as well as enhancing of state confidence in its responsibility to protect and to have monopoly of the instruments of force.

1.5 Justification of the Study

1.5.1 Academic justification

This study appreciates the efforts that Kenya and Uganda have made so far to fight illicit arms along their border in spite of it being a daunting task. Nevertheless, more can still be done to that effect especially once the reality on the ground is taken into consideration. One of the realities on the ground at the Kenya-Uganda border is the fact that the human need for safety and security still persists. Insecurity affects all other human needs that the people living in this peripheral areas need for survival: For instance, during raids, livelihoods are destroyed, displacement denies people shelter, people lose their loved ones through death, opportunities for education are bottlenecked. Basically this renders numerous other human needs unsatisfied.

This study observes that most studies look at the disarmament programmes by both countries in isolation. Little has been done to compare the programmes in the two countries in order to establish the lessons that the two countries could draw from one another. This study fills that gap by comparing two major disarmament programmes in Kenya and Uganda: The KIDDP and Operation Dumisha Amani. In addition, little research has focused on the core relevance of addressing human needs for effectiveness of disarmament initiatives at the Kenya-Uganda border. This study endeavored to fill this existing analytical gap by applying the human needs
theory in the analysis of the disarmament programmes and establishing a nexus between: human
needs, structural and direct violence and the human security perspective to disarmament in order
to establish ways of rethinking disarmament for more effectiveness.

1.5.2 Policy Justification

One of the main tasks of the National Focal Points in the Great Lakes Region and the
Horn of Africa that were formed to implement the Nairobi Declaration and Nairobi Protocol is to
continuously gather and share information on small arms in an effort to combating proliferation
and trafficking of the arms. As such policy makers in these focal points as well as other
policymakers dealing with conflicts, small arms and disarmament, will find this research a
valuable contribution to the much needed research on issues pertaining SALWs in all its aspects.

A human needs approach to disarmament is useful because if well pursued, then it would
help reduce the demand for weapons and restore states monopoly of violence and hence state
legitimacy. It helps policy makers to address the challenge of small arms from a demand side.
Although the study focuses on Kenya and Uganda, policy makers from the other countries
especially the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa will find it useful.

1.6 Theoretical Framework

This study was based on the Human needs theory as proposed by John W. Burton. The
study argues that the demand for small arms among pastoralist communities at the Kenya-
Uganda borer is triggered by the ever existing need for security which has remained unmet for
several years.

Human needs theorists content that human needs play a powerful role in shaping human
behavior and social interaction. As such, satisfaction of human needs determines cooperation or
conflict in a society. Conflict arises from unsatisfied human needs. Abraham Maslow proposed
several things about human needs. One of them is that needs are hierarchical. In his pyramid, he
places physiological needs such as food, water and shelter at the bottom. The need for safety and
security come second, followed by love and belonging, then self-esteem and finally the need for
self-actualization.

80 Marker Sandra 2003.
According to Maslow, satisfaction of one need then offers the opportunity for one to pursue needs at a higher level in the hierarchy. The first four categories form the deficit needs while the fifth category comprises of the being needs. Lack of satisfaction of deficient needs causes a drive/urge to satisfy them. The fifth category, self-actualization is however not critically essential for one’s life and as such, one is pulled to satisfy it, rather than pushed. Below is a diagrammatic representation of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs indicating the deficit as well as the being needs.

![Maslow’s hierarchy of needs](image)

Source: author’s compilation with information from Griffin, E. 2011:125

John Burton adopts Maslow’s need theory in addressing conflicts but disagrees with Maslow’s hierarchical presentation of the needs. According to Burton, satisfaction of needs does not follow a hierarchy but are rather sought simultaneously. According to Burton, unsatisfied needs lead people to seek alternative behaviors including conflict in order to satisfy such needs. Burton identified four needs that are of primary importance if peace negotiations and settlements are to succeed: security or safety which he defines as freedom from fear; identity defined as a sense of self in relation to others; recognition and personal development.

---

82 Griffin 2011:125
84 Marker 2003
The above human needs, Burton further alludes, are nonnegotiable. They have to be satisfied for conflicts to be resolved and peace to be realized. Fulfillment of the above needs occurs through the community or through the various policies as well as public goods and services that the state provides or ought to provide. The state therefore bears the major responsibility of ensuring that the human needs of its citizens are met in order to resolve or even to prevent conflict. Burton further posits that the perception of the reasons for conflict behavior among human beings determines the means pursued to resolve the conflict: A perception of needs satisfaction as the cause of conflicts leads to a long term conflict resolution process that aims at addressing the needs hence offering a permanent solution. On the other hand if conflict is perceived to be as a result of a naturally human aggressive behavior, then coercive means are pursued to control the conflict.

Schnabel establishes an interesting nexus between Burton’s human needs theory and Johan Galtung’s concepts of structural and direct violence. Unsatisfied needs are to some extent a manifestation of structural violence in a society which could then result to direct violence when people engage in violent conflict as they strive to satisfy their needs. According to Galtung, direct violence involves an actor, who directly harms and inflicts pain on another whereas structural violence is inherent in the structure of the society and manifests itself in situations like marginalization, unequal access and distribution to resources as well various injustices among others.

Pastoralist communities at the Kenya-Uganda border have suffered years of marginalization in the colonial and post-colonial periods. The area is considered very insecure. As such, structural violence is inherent in the area. Inadequate state security provision has enhanced demand for arms. Direct violence manifests itself whenever there are violent attacks that lead to deaths, displacement and disruption of livelihoods. A vicious cycle of numerous unmet human needs ensues. This study adopts Burton’s conceptualization of human needs that puts emphasis on safety needs but still maintains that the needs are sought simultaneously, as opposed to Maslow’s hierarchy. In such an area like Karamoja (Uganda), Turkana and West

---

85 Burton 1986: 125-130
86 Doucey 2011
87 Ibid.
88 Schnabel 2007
89 Galtung 1969: 167-191
Pokot, Kenya for instance, security may take precedence and even determine the satisfaction of other needs like food and shelter.

This study argues that most of the disarmament efforts at the Kenya-Uganda border been pursued from a nature-nurture as well as biological perspective that perceive conflict as emanating from natural human aggressive behavior. As such, they have been based on the assumption that the pastoralist communities living there are inherently aggressive, like engaging in conflicts and holding on to small arms as the instruments of waging confrontations. Consequently coercive strategies have been applied with the aim of containing and controlling the pastoralist communities. This has led to failure owing to lack of a clear focus on the root causes of the problem: the unmet security and safety needs.

Hence, this study looked into the issue of disarmament from a human needs theory and notes that unmet security needs by the state have resulted in the communities resorting to arming themselves so as to protect themselves, their families, and predominantly their livestock which is the main source of livelihood and the channel to the satisfaction of basic needs such as food. The study then contends that looking at the issue of pastoralist conflicts and the need of disarmament from a human needs perspective will make all involved stakeholders particularly the state to take disarmament as a process that needs mechanisms to be put in place first to ensure that human needs are fulfilled first.

The human needs theory is useful in this study because it pays attention to addressing the root causes of conflicts. With regard to disarmament, the application of the theory is essential as it focuses on mitigating the factors that enhance the need for possession of arms. As such, it lays emphasis on addressing disarmament from the demand side perspective which this study highly appreciates. The study suggests that a human security approach to disarmament, which focuses on addressing human needs of individuals and communities, may render disarmament more effective.

1.7 Hypotheses

The following hypotheses guided this study:

a) Direct and structural violence enhances the need to acquire small arms among pastoral communities.
b) Coercive disarmament initiatives that have little consideration for the safety/security needs are likely to meet resistance from those targeted for disarmament.

c) Addressing disarmament from human security approach is likely to mitigate demand for small arms and enhance effectiveness in disarmament.

1.8 Methodology

The study is a comparative analysis involving an in-depth look into two major disarmament programmes Uganda (KIDDP) and Kenya (Operation Dumisha Amani). It draws from literature reviews to a great extend as well as from field interviews which are conducted through questionnaires as well as telephone interviews.

The study involved collection of primary data from selected communities at the Kenya-Uganda border. The Turkana and the Pokot on the Kenyan side as well as Karimojong who live in Karamoja on the Ugandan were the target population. Primary data was collected using questionnaires containing structured as well as semi structured questions to the Turkana residing in Turkana County and the Pokot in West Pokot County in Kenya. Turkana and West Pokot counties have been selected owing to their proximity to the Ugandan border and also to the fact that they have experienced most of the various disarmament initiatives discussed and the fact that it is the two ethnic groups that were the main initial targets of “Operation Dumisha Amani” in Kenya. Telephone interviews were also conducted to people who have knowledge on the above disarmament operations. Concerning the Karimojong people who reside in Karamoja on the Ugandan side secondary data was collected from various secondary sources including books, journals, articles and newspapers, reports, as well as policy documents.

The data was analyzed using qualitative analysis methods. The study focused more on interpretive qualitative analysis which involves trying to establish the inferences or implications of the information collected in relation to the focus of the study. Comparative analysis was also applied in comparing the two major disarmament programmes in Kenya and Uganda: Operation Dumisha Amani and KIDDP respectively.

One of the limitations of this study was the logistical difficulty in getting primary data from the Ugandan side of the border. Fortunately, there is plenty of available secondary data on the
government of Uganda’s disarmament initiatives in Karamoja including the KIDDP. The study therefore relied on secondary data from the many materials that have been written on the topic.

1.9 Chapter Outline

The study is organized in five chapters.

Chapter one is an introduction to the study. It presents the background and statement of the research problem as well as the objectives of the study. It further presents the literature review, justification of the study, the theoretical framework, and the methodology applied in the study.

Chapter two explores the problem of small arms proliferation as well as arms control and disarmament initiatives at the Horn of Africa.

Chapter examines the disarmament initiatives that the Kenya and Ugandan governments have pursued to address the challenge of arms proliferation among civilians, particularly pastoralist communities at the long porous border that the two countries share.

Chapter four critically compares the two major disarmament initiatives in Uganda and Kenya: The Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP) and the Operation Dumisha Amani. It also presents a rethink of disarmament initiatives.

Chapter five presents the conclusion and recommendations of the study.
CHAPTER TWO

ARMS PROLIFERATION, CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AT THE HORN OF AFRICA

2.1 Introduction

For the purpose of this study “Horn of Africa (HOA)” is used to refer to the following states that are members of the regional organization called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD): Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti. The Horn of Africa is known to be one of the most conflict-ridden and most insecure parts of the world. Civil wars that have caused massive loss of human life characterize this region. Somalia, Uganda, Ethiopia and Sudan for instance have suffered severe civil wars and resultant loss of life and destruction. Inter and intra-state conflicts continue threatening the security of the region. The prevalence of pastoral conflicts in the region still persists. Against this backdrop of endemic violence and insecurity, arms proliferation remains a major issue to reckon with.

This chapter examines the challenge of small arms proliferation in the Horn of Africa (HOA) taking more focus on small arms among pastoral communities in the region in general and the Kenya-Uganda border in particular. It also examines the initiatives that that the region has taken to address the arms proliferation challenge. It takes cognizance of the fact that each member country of the Horn has had its individual initiatives. The study however acknowledges that digging into the initiatives of each and every country would be too ambitious a goal to achieve in this chapter and therefore prefers to look at the initiatives that the HOA as a region has ventured into.

The Horn of Africa is home for an estimated 15-20 million pastoral communities. In spite of the contributions that the pastoralist mode of production makes to states at the horn of Africa, it is despised and considered backward and assumed to be incompatible with modern economy and modes of production. Conflicts over grazing fields and water characterize the live

91Healy 2009: 3
92Sabala, Kizito: 28
93Bevan 2007: 3
of pastoral communities in an effort to sustain a mode of production and a way of living that is increasingly under threat due to climate change and the resultant drought adverse climatic conditions. Most of these conflicts cut across international borders since most of the pastoral communities are found at the borderlands. With the ever increasing vulnerability resulting from endemic conflicts and insecurity, small arms are considered indispensable family as well as community assets. In addition small arms are durable, easily portable and easy to operate and even to conceal from security forces making it one of the reasons as to why they have easily spread all over the world and are the preferred weapon of choice especially among civilians.

2.2 Reasons for Arms acquisition among pastoral communities at the Horn of Africa

There are a several reasons which drive the pastoralist communities to acquire small arms. The following are some of the major reasons.

Insecurity

The areas of the HOA occupied by pastoralist communities most of which are at the peripheries are marred by intra as well as inter-clan or inter-ethnic conflicts. Some of them occur among communities living across borders and therefore become cross-border international conflicts. Moreover, the governments in the HOA have been incapable of providing adequate security to pastoralist communities and protecting them from bandits and cattle rustlers. It is against this backdrop that pastoralist communities resolve to acquire arms in order to meet their unmet security needs. The Turkana for instance maintain that they resolved to arm themselves in order to protect themselves from attacks by their Kenyan neighbors: the Pokot and Samburu, their Ugandan neighbors: the Karamojong as well as the Merille from Ethiopia and the Toposa from South Sudan.94 Similarly the Karimojong made efforts to acquire fire arms and abandon their traditional spears so as to protect themselves since the Ugandan government had failed to protect them from the Turkana who had been launching attacks on them using guns.95

94Sabala 2007: 30
95Mkutu 2003: 13
Modern cattle raiding

Cattle raiding, a once traditional activity has evolved and is now embraced in the modern capitalist mode of production. Raiding has become commercialized whereby raids are now funded by wealthy merchants and the raided stocks are purchased and transported to the urban centers far away from where they were raided. It therefore becomes very hard to trace stolen cattle. An instance in which livestock raided in Loima in Turkana, Kenya was found in a market in Kotido, Uganda is a good case in point. Eaton\textsuperscript{97} talks of what he calls *traiders*, a term he uses to refer to raiders who trade in cattle. They purchase and sell stolen livestock immediately after raids making it hard to trace them. Due to collective targeting of communities by governments in their disarmament operations, traiders are able to easily evade disarmament and the law. The raiders acquire small arms in order to maximize the stock looted for commercial gains while on the other hand, pastoralists arm themselves to protect themselves and their livestock against such raiders.

Government conducted disarmament

Studies have indicated that while disarmament aims at reducing the number of weapons that are illegally held by civilians, it paradoxically triggers a need for the disarmed to rearm. This occurs due to the fact that disarmament initiatives focus more on collecting the arms and less on providing adequate state security. This leaves those disarmed vulnerable to attacks by other communities and thus triggers an immediate need for rearmament for deterrence as well as leverage purposes.

Marginalization

Most pastoralist communities at the HOA live in the peripheries and therefore have suffered social, political and economic marginalization both during and after the colonial period. Underdevelopment, coupled with their low enrollment in education diminishes their chances of gaining opportunities to participate in decision making forums. Little attention is paid to development initiatives by the governments in these areas. As such, pastoralist communities at the HOA have continuously suffered what Johan Galtung referred to as structural violence.\textsuperscript{98}

\textsuperscript{96}Ibid
\textsuperscript{97} Eaton 2010: 106-122
\textsuperscript{98} Galtung 1969: 167-191
This could be partly as a result of the misplaced assumption that pastoralism is an outdated mode of production that does not fit in the modern economic systems. This is in spite of the fact that pastoralism is very essential to the pastoral communities and also makes a large contribution to the livestock economy in their countries.

**Cultural practices**

Cultural practices among pastoralist communities encourage demand for small arms considering that traditional weapons such as the spear have been rendered obsolete by the presence of more effective small arms. One of the most common practices is that of paying bride price using cows. For instance among the Karamojong, as at 2012, a young man from a poor family was expected to pay 30 heads of cattle while one from a rich family had to part with 60 and among the Jie, the bride price could include way above 130 cows in addition to several goats.\(^9^9\) Owing to adverse climates and cattle raids that deplete stocks, small arms are considered important tools for restocking and deterrence of raids. Initiation of young men into adulthood which entails mounting successful raiding is also another cultural practice among pastoralist communities that encourages armament. The number of heads of cattle that one possesses determines ones social status in the community; the more cattle one has, the higher his status in the society. This also encourages raiding using modern weaponry in order to maintain a large heard and also to protect one’s heard from raiders thus maintain a high social status.

**2.3 Factors enhancing proliferation of small arms in the Horn of Africa**

In 2004, the Small Arms Survey estimated that there were 30 million SALWs in circulation in sub-Saharan Africa and that almost 81% of them were possessed by civilians, armed groups and insurgents.\(^10^0\) A good number of these could be found in the Horn of Africa. The following factors coalesce to enhance proliferation of arms in the Horn of Africa.

**A history of progressive militarization**

The strategic location of the Horn of Africa near the Arab world as well as the region’s contact with the Indian Ocean opened the region to external influence, one of the influences being the introduction of small arms. Consequently, the proliferation of small arms in the region

\(^9^9\)Mkutu 2003: 3  
\(^10^0\)Check 2011
pre-dates the colonial period. Ethiopians and Arabs who raided livestock, ivory and slaves for trade introduced and circulated weapons to communities living at the HOA especially pastoralists. The pastoralists offered ivory and protection to the raiders and were supplied with weapons in return. At that time, guns were already a commodity of trade in Ethiopia with ammunition being used as local currency.

Another wave of armament at the Horn of Africa can be traced to the Second World War when the British armed several Karimojong and Turkana to fight in the British East African Brigade. After the war, the weapons still remained in the hands of the communities and were used to launch raids. They also circulated to other communities.

The collapse of Iddi Amin regime in Uganda in 1979 led to massive armament when fleeing soldiers left an armory full of weapons in the military barracks in Moroto. The Karimojong helped themselves to large numbers of weapons which later circulated to the whole region. The overthrow of Megistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia in 1991 as well as the removal of Somaila’s Siad Barre from power by rebel groups contributed also to arms proliferation in the HOA.

The Cold-War legacy

The legacy of the Cold War in the circulation of weapons of small arms cannot be underestimated. From Asia to Latin America to Africa, the two superpowers: The United States and the Soviet Union as well as China played a key role in circulating weapons to various groups during the Cold War. The end of the Cold-War left a surplus of used but still modern weapons. The disposal of such weapons created a surplus on the supply side. Most of these weapons were dumped in the developing world such as those areas in Africa that were experiencing conflicts and instability. The upsurge of intra-state conflicts that ensued after the end of the Cold War created an increase on the demand side. One of the primary reasons why weapons including small arms keep on circulating at the Horn of Africa is that there is always a

\[\text{References}\]

102 Ibid. See also Mburu 2002: 8
103 Mburu, 2002, p8
104 Healy 2009: 3
105 Louise: 1995: 6
106 Thusi 2003: 17-26
demand for them.\textsuperscript{107} On the other hand there exist also suppliers who are keen to make profit from their supplies of weapons. There has therefore been a convergence of supply and demand for small arms in the post-Cold War period.\textsuperscript{108}

**Structural factors**

The demand for arms at the Horn of Africa both by civilians as well as by governments for their security personnel can be directly connected to various crises within the states.\textsuperscript{109} Various prevailing structural conditions that enhance proliferation of small arms include: socio-economic deprivation and unequal distribution of resources, exclusion and marginalization of both minority as well as majority communities based on their race, ethnicity or religious affiliations, authoritarian rule that disregards human rights and freedoms.\textsuperscript{110} Therefore proliferation and even use of arms in Africa is connected to social, political as well as economic situations inherent in the continent.

**Regional Instability**

Most of the states at the Horn of Africa have experienced chronic instability caused by civil wars, militia, criminal groups, and former soldiers among others. States at the Horn are therefore faced with major security challenges. The decades’ long civil war between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M),\textsuperscript{111} the collapse of the state of Somali in the early 1990s, the inter-state war and animosity between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Lords Resistance Army in Uganda, the increasingly threatening terrorist threats and attacks in Kenya and the ongoing civil war in South Sudan are just but a few cases in point that epitomize the endemic security challenges at the Horn of Africa. In addition to these are proxy wars that the countries in the Horn accuse each other of secretly supporting among their neighbors, some of the support being secret supply of arms to rebels and militias. Uganda for instance accused Sudan of supporting the Lords Resistance Army while Sudan on the other

\textsuperscript{107} Weiss 2003: 5-16
\textsuperscript{108} Louise, 1995
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid: 73
\textsuperscript{111} This civil war eventually ended with the secession of South Sudan to form the newest state in the world in 2011.
hand accused Uganda of supporting the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). These accusations have on and off severed their diplomatic ties.

Most of the HOA countries are also inhabited by pastoralist communities who live especially at their frontiers and are in constant conflict between and among themselves, within their states and across borders. All these conditions coalesce to create conditions for insecurity and consequently also enhance cross-border trafficking of small arms as well as continuous demand for the arms.

Porous borders

The countries in the Horn of Africa share boundaries that were abstractly drawn by colonial powers. These borders are largely porous, poorly policed and inefficiently controlled. Due to the porosity of the borders intertwining of the conflicts and stability among the countries of the Horn becomes inevitable. Trafficking of small arms ensues across the porous borders interlinking demand and supply. Mkutu identified four main routes through which small arms are trafficked in the inadequately policed porous borders at the Horn of Africa to the Kenya Uganda border area:

The Sudan-Karamoja route: This is one of the main routes of arms to the Kenya Uganda border area. The arms cross through the South Sudan border to Kotido district in Karamoja Uganda. From there they circulate to other areas of Karamoja particularly Moroto and Nakapiripirit and to Pokot and Samburu areas at the Kenyan side of the border.

![Figure 1 - Sudan Karamoja route](image)

**Source:** author’s compilation with information from Mkutu, K. A. 2003:23-26

---

112 Thusi 2003: 19
113 Wepundi (et al.) 2011: 1
114 Mkutu 2003: 23-26
North-Eastern route: This is the longest route involving movement of small arms from Somalia via the Merille area in Ethiopia into the Karamoja region of Uganda. From there they move to other parts of the Kenya Uganda border.

Figure 2 - North Easter route

Source: author’s compilation with information from Mkutu, K. A. 2003:23-26

Sudan- Lokichogio route: This route involves movement of small arms directly from South Sudan to Lokichogio in Kenya from which they move further to the Upe Pokot areas in Karamoja, Uganda and are even resold back to Kenya. Here ethnic alliances and rivalries manifest themselves. For instance owing to the rivalry between the Turkana and the Samburu and Pokot, the Turkana in Lokichogio do not sell the arms to the Pokot and Samburu. They rather trade with the Upe Pokot in Uganda who then bring the arms back to Kenya through their trade with the Pokot and Samburu in Kenya.

Figure 3 Sudan Lokichogio route

Source: author’s compilation with information from Mkutu, K. A. 2003:23-26
Karega – Lopoch – Kotido route: This is also another route through which small arms enter the Karamoja region from South Sudan and from there circulate to other areas. This route is mainly used by the Jie clan of the Karamojong. The Jie are believed to be the ones at the centre of the circulation of small arms to other clans of the Karamojong in Karamoja.

![Diagram showing the route from South Sudan to Karega, Lopoch, Kotido, and Turkana and other parts of Karamoja.]

**Figure 4 : - Karega – Lopoch – Kotido route**

*Source:* author’s compilation with information from Mkutu, K. A. 2003:23-26

**Africa’s problematic of pointing fingers at the West and East**

Most of the international instruments dealing with addressing the problem of arms in Africa target addressing the sources of small arms (the supply side). On this note, most African countries without excluding countries of the Horn of Africa are misled by the assumption that the arms that find their way in Africa mainly come from countries outside the continent.\(^\text{115}\) A closer look within the African continent reveals that there are also several countries that manufacture and supply such weapons. The 100,000 rounds of ammunition mentioned in chapter one that were found in a private residence in Narok town in Kenya were found to be locally manufactured by the Kenya Ordnance Factory Corporation based in Eldoret, Kenya.\(^\text{116}\) Most alarming is also the extant challenge of theft of arsenal from military and police departments in Africa which is mainly attributed to high level politicians and security officials who steal the arms in order to distribute to their ethnic affiliates.\(^\text{117}\)

Some small arms at the Horn of Africa have been supplied to pastoral communities by their governments. The main reasons for government armament of pastoralist communities have

---

\(^\text{115}\)Muggah 2013  
\(^\text{116}\)Wepundi (et al.) 2012: 22  
\(^\text{117}\)Muggah, 2013
been mainly to enhance the communities’ self-defense capability and prevention of foreign invasions since state security apparatus are conspicuously absent. Ethiopia for instance armed its Dassanech community in the 1990s to enable them to protect themselves from pastoralist communities from neighboring countries particularly Kenya and South Sudan. Kenya also armed the Turkana while Uganda armed the Karimojong in Karamoja ostensibly for the reasons of self-protection from cross-border attacks.

2.4 Regimes and Approaches to small arms control and disarmament in the Horn of Africa

2.4.1 Regimes on small arms control and disarmament

The Horn of Africa countries acknowledge the fact that the menace of small arms is not a one country problem but one that cuts across many countries regionally and internationally. As such they are parties to various international and legal agreements which offer guidelines on small arms legislation, policy and control initiatives.

The UNPoA

Most of the international and legal norms on small arms were established in the 21st century. The most notable international instrument on SALWs is the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate illicit Trade in Small arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects (UNPoA). It is a politically binding agreement which was established in the year 2000 and it formed a major advancement on international norms and standards that are necessary for preventing and stamping out illicit proliferation of small arms.

The Bamako Declaration

The Bamako Declaration on an African common position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons is another very important instrument on small arms and light weapons. It was also adopted in the year 2000 prior to the UNPoA when African countries met in Bamako in order to establish an African common position on small arms that they would present to the UN conference that established the UNPoA. The Bamako Declaration accentuates the need for member states to confiscate and destroy illegal weapons from civilians and to establish arms control measures including curbing

---

118 Bevan James. 2007: 5
119 Ibid.
trafficking and proliferation of small arms in an effort to establish a culture of peace. Just like the UNPoA, the Bamako declaration is a political instrument which provides for policy, institutional and operational measures to address the challenge of illicit small arms and light weapons in the continent. The fact that it is a political instrument means that its implementation is dependent upon the political good will of the member countries.

**The Nairobi Declaration/ Nairobi Protocol**

Regionally and closer home to the Horn of Africa countries is the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa. This declaration was signed in March 2000 by member states of the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa in recognition of the disastrous impact of SALWs in the regions. In addition to the states mentioned above that belong to the Horn of Africa, other states that are signatories to the Nairobi Declaration are Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Rwanda which belong to the Great Lakes Region (GLR). The Declaration advocated cooperation between governments, civil society and various agencies.

The aim of the Nairobi Declaration was to provide a wide-ranging and multifaceted strategy that entailed; an improved national legislation, and regulation on manufacture, trade, acquisition, possession, and use of arms; weapons collection and destruction initiatives, capacity building for various stakeholders charged with law enforcement such as security and border control officials; establishment of databases and communication systems that would aid in monitoring arms transfer; information exchanges as well as public awareness among all stakeholders. A three year implementation timeline (2000-2003) was set. The implementation plan advocated for a tripartite partnership between governments, civil society and inter-regional organizations. The Declaration also established the Nairobi Secretariat to oversee the implementation of the Declaration. The implementation Plan was anchored on the following seven Pillars:

Institutional Framework: The Declaration tasked each country to establish a National Focal Point (NFP) which would coordinate with the Nairobi Secretariat to implement the

---

120 Stott 2003
121 Thusi 2003: 2
122 ibid
Declaration. It called for interaction of the NFPs of the various countries as well as with the civil society in enhancing research and information exchange.

Regional cooperation and coordination: The Plan identified regional cooperation as key to success considering that the small arms problem cut across the whole region. To this end, the secretariat would play a key role in organizing annual ministerial review meetings as well as seminars for NFPs and consultative meetings among other initiatives. Another pillar concerned the legislative measures The Implementation Plan called for legal uniformity and an establishment of minimum standards in dealing with small arms. Operationally, there was need for operational capacity building. Success in the implementation of the Declaration required building and strengthening the operational capacity of the institutions and stakeholders involved through resources and proper skills and training.

Control, collection and destruction of weapons: Considering that most of the countries can hardly establish the exact quantities of arms in circulation, an increased capacity in controlling and accounting for the number of weapons in circulation both legal and illicit was considered necessary. Collection and destruction of illicit arms was deemed an important step in averting recirculation of collected arms. To this end, Kenya was applauded for her commitment when the country celebrated the third anniversary of the Nairobi Declaration on 15th March 2003 by publicly destroying arms that had been collected.

Information exchange and record keeping: Considering the complexity and intractability of illicit arm networks, the Implementation Plan emphasized the importance of information exchange as well as proper record keeping. Public awareness was also considered an important pillar. The Implementation Plan called for initiatives to create public awareness with regard to arms possession, storage and proper use. Most important and preferred would however be initiatives to avert the gun culture in the Horn and Great Lakes Regions.

The Nairobi Declaration formed an important basis for further legislation, initiatives and approaches to address the small arms challenge in the Horn of Africa region. It was however a political declaration which was legally non-binding meaning that its success would only be dependent upon the political good will of the countries involved. Four years later in April 2004, the Declaration was upgraded to a legally binding protocol: The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region.
In addition to the provisions and requirements of the Nairobi Declaration, the Nairobi Protocol encouraged countries to allow those illegally possessing arms opportunities for voluntary surrender of the arms in exchange for amnesty.

This study views the Nairobi Declaration’s and Protocol’s emphasis on prevention of arms trade and trafficking as well as collection and destruction of illicit arms as a focus on the supply side as well as on disarmament. There is however little provision for a focus on the demand side and consequently little emphasis on measures to reduce or avert demand for small weapons at the HOA and the GLR.

2.4.2 National and Regional Institutional Frameworks

In order to implement the various instruments on SAWLs, appropriate institutional frameworks have to be put in place both at the national and regional level. At the Horn of Africa, the National Focal Points (NFP) at the national level and the Regional Centre for Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA) at the regional level are key institutional frameworks. Worth highlighting here is also IGADs Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) which this study considers important although it is not directly concerned with arms control and disarmament.

The National Focal Points

The Nairobi Declaration and Protocol called upon member countries to institute national mechanisms to implement the declaration and to deal with the challenge of illicit small arms. This is provided for in article 4 (d) which states as follows: “states shall establish or enhance inter-agency groups, involving police, military, customs, home affairs and other relevant bodies, to improve policy co-ordination, information sharing and analysis at national level.”

To this end, the countries committed to establish National Focal Points on Small Arms and Light Weapons (NFPs). Some of the functions and responsibilities of the NFPs include: overseeing implementation of the various regional and international instruments on small arms, facilitating

---

123 Wepundi (et al.) 2011: 8
124 Nairobi Protocol 2004: 6
research as well as gathering and sharing of information and coordinating with NFPs and civil society in the various member countries.\textsuperscript{125}

**The Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA)**

One of the key institutions that deal with small arms at the Horn of Africa is the Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA). It is headquartered in Nairobi and was established by state parties to the Nairobi Protocol so as to aid states in the implementation of the Protocol. RECSA complements the National Focal Points at the regional level and helps to coordinate and harmonize actions by member states.\textsuperscript{126} RECSA established the Best Practice Guidelines on Practical Disarmament\textsuperscript{127} for the RECSA region. The guidelines, as practical disarmament requires, offer practical measures that address both demand and supply aspects of small arms; they call for proper planning of disarmament as opposed to ad hoc operations, clear allocation of responsibilities, clear benchmarks for success as well as prior intelligence so as to determine the appropriate extent of as well as provision of security so as to avert rearmament.\textsuperscript{128}

**IGAD CEWARN**

IGAD’s CEWARN, though not an institution per se is a network that aids IGAD member states in conflict prevention, management and resolution through information gathering and disseminating information on imminent attacks as well as offering information on situations on the ground. It was established in Khartoum, Sudan in January 2002 through the “Protocol on the Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN)” and signed by IGAD council of ministers.\textsuperscript{129} Although CEWARN does not deal directly with disarmament in the countries of the HOA, this study maintains that, if well utilized, CEWARN can indirectly enhance effectiveness in disarmament. For instance, if a government acts promptly to information provided by CEWARN on imminent attacks, protects their citizens, and deters attacks, voluntary disarmament could yield fruits.

\textsuperscript{125} Sabala 2007: 48.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid: 9.
\textsuperscript{127} This is a concept of disarmament that focuses on addressing the root causes of demand for arms. It aims at averting the need for weapons by addressing issues like insecurity and poverty so as to avoid rearmament after disarmament. It also advocates identifying and curbing the networks that enhance proliferation.
\textsuperscript{128} Wepundi(et al.)2011: 9
\textsuperscript{129} Sabala 2007: 48
2.4.3 The place of disarmament in the Horn of Africa

The prevalence of small arms in the Horn of Africa especially among pastoralist communities at the borderlands coupled with their devastation make disarmament an essential practice. The provision for weapon collection and destruction in the instruments for instance the Nairobi Protocol implies that there is provision for disarmament. As such disarmament is viewed as an important aspect of arms control. To this end and in line with the implementation of the protocol, governments of the Horn of Africa agreed on some guidelines that could enhance the efficacy of disarmament such as providing incentives and offering amnesty in order to encourage voluntary surrender of weapons, socioeconomic development initiatives as well as protection of informants.  

Kenya and Uganda have been at the fore front in the fight against small arms. The two countries were among first ones to establish their NFPs and have maintained them active in addressing small arms challenge as required by the various instruments. Based on the number of reports submitted by various NFPs in Africa under the UNPoA, a study carried out by the Small Arms Survey in August 2003 found out that the Kenya and Uganda NFPs have been the most active among all the other countries of the Horn of Africa. These initiatives have targeted pastoral communities who make the majority of armed rural populations in the two countries.

The presence of illicit arms, the proliferation thereof and their devastating impacts in the HOA cannot be overemphasized. The efforts that the region has made to embrace the legal, policy and institutional measures to address the small arms menace is commendable. However, the success of the above measures is dependent on the efforts that the countries put and also the cooperation between and among them. The following chapters discuss disarmament initiatives in Kenya and Uganda.

---

130 Eavis 2002: 251-260
CHAPTER THREE

DISARMAMENT INITIATIVES IN KENYA AND UGANDA

3.1 Introduction

Kenya and Uganda have been on the forefront in undertaking various initiatives to deal with the challenge of small arms increase and abuse. One of the main initiatives has been undertaking civilian disarmament. Most of the civilian disarmament initiatives by the two countries have been directed towards the pastoral communities especially in the countries’ borderlands.

The efforts by the Kenya and Ugandan governments to disarm pastoral communities at their long porous border have generally been motivated by the following objectives as highlighted by Sabala: “Aversion of the destruction that occurs on property and loss of human life; to curb infiltration of small arms into urban areas; to discourage violent resolution of conflicts in favor of peaceful methods; to enhance development in areas inhabited by the pastoralists, and to establish law and order considering that such areas are marred by lawlessness.”

This chapter examines the disarmament operations that Kenya and Uganda have initiated on the pastoralist communities over the years. It takes more focus on the disarmament initiatives at their shared border and narrows down to their joint disarmament operations namely the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme and the Operation Dumisha Amani.

3.2. Disarmament in colonial and post-colonial Kenya

Initiatives by the colonial government

Although deficient of a systematic record, an estimated 50 disarmament operations are said to have been undertaken in Kenya since the beginning of the colonial period in the early 1900. Disarmament initiatives in the country can be traced back to the colonial period. The 1920s marked the first initiative by the colonial government. The operation was dubbed

---

132 Sabala 2007: 28
133 Wepundi (et al.) 2012: 21
“Operation Tennis” in which the British set out to collect weapons from the Turkana. The Turkana, in resistance to the operation, and being well versed with the terrain relocated to the areas that were beyond the reach of the colonial officers. The operation was eventually futile.

In 1941, the British launched another plan aimed at disarming the Dassanech. This initiative entailed denying the Dassanech access to grazing areas unless they gave back a specified number of weapons. Nine years later, the colonial government commenced the third disarmament operation in Baringo, Kenya. It was a very brutal operation which involved cordon and search strategies which led to numerous deaths and displacement of many people. Majority fled to Uganda.

In the wake of struggles for decolonization, in 1952, the British launched the “Operation Jock Stock”, a counter-insurgency which targeted the Mau Mau freedom fighters who had played a key role in bringing arms to the urban centers. Political elites were also targeted in this operation. In spite of the brutal operation, the Mau Mau rearmed and the insurgency continued eventually leading to the county’s independence.

**Initiatives by the post-colonial government**

Several of Kenya’s post-independence disarmament initiatives targeted communities living at the peripheries, most of whom were pastoralists. The first such initiatives came in the wake of a major threat to the national security of the newly independent Kenyan state by Somali irredentists living at the border of Kenya and Somalia in the then Kenya’s North Eastern Province (NEP). What ensued was the five year (1963-1968) Shifta War, in which the Kenyan government launched a brutal counter-insurgency in order to crash the secessionists and disarm the communities in a bid to enhance security and entrench its legitimacy in the region. The province was declared a no go zone and security officers were given shoot to kill orders on suspected insurgents. In addition, the officers had orders to confiscate not only weapons but also livestock belonging to the insurgents.

Apart from the counter-insurgency, coercive disarmament operations continued in the 1980s, most of which occasioned severe human rights abuses. The 1980 Bulla Karatasi massacre

\[134\] Wepundi (et al.) 2011: 23
\[135\] Ibid.
in Garissa, the 1981 Malka Mari Massacre in Mandera and the infamous 1984 Wagalla Massacre are just but a few epitomes of such brutal disarmament initiatives.\footnote{Ibid.} Other pastoral communities did not go unscathed by the post-colonial disarmament operations. Indeed, during president Moi’s regime (1978-2002), he is estimated to have ordered not less than 20 disarmament operations solely directed at the Pokot.\footnote{Ibid.}

In an effort to join hands to fight illicit arms proliferation that were a shared predicament along their porous expansive border, the government of Kenya and Uganda orchestrated a joint disarmament operation dubbed “\textit{Operation Nyundo}”. The main targets for the operation were communities residing at the Kenya Uganda border predominantly the Karimojong and the Pokot. The operation involved both ground and air operations and was extremely brutal.

\section*{3.3 Disarmament in colonial and post-colonial Uganda}

\textbf{Initiatives by the colonial government}

The insecurity as well as illicit arms in Karamoja were a force to reckon with even during the colonial period. Consequently, the colonial administration sought to pacify the area. The first initiative by the British colonial government to tackle insecurity in Karamoja entailed the establishment of a permanent garrison in 1912. This however did not provide a panacea to insecurity threats that reigned in the region.

Immediately before Uganda attained independence, the British launched a very brutal disarmament operation in Karamoja. The operation targeted not only small arms but also aimed at reaping all the instruments that the Karamoja could use to wage attacks. As such, it also targeted removal of crude weapons especially spears which were the Karimojong’s traditional weapons. The operation extended up to Turkana in Kenya. Resistance and refusal to disarm was met with a lot of brutality.

\textbf{Initiatives by the post-colonial government}

Immediately after Uganda gained independence, the first president of the country, Milton Obote declared civilian possession of arms illegal. Since then, the post-independence
government of Uganda has had successive initiatives to disarm civilians predominantly the Karimojong in Karamoja.

Uganda’s second president Idi Amin, who came to power after overthrowing Obote in 1971 prioritized disarmament of the Karimojong and sought to reap them not only of small arms but also any other instruments that they could use to wage attacks including spears. Coercive disarmament yielded relative success in disarming Karamoja leaving the Karimojong vulnerable to cross border attacks from the Turkana from Kenya and the Toposa from Sudan. The relative success was later watered down at the end of the decade when in 1979, Iddi Amin’s regime collapsed leaving an unguarded military arsenal in Moroto to which the Karimojong helped themselves.138

The massive rearmament by the Karimojong in 1979 aggravated the need for further disarmament. This was pursued by president Obote in 1980 after recapturing the presidency from Iddi Amin. In a bid to try a different tactic, the Karimojong were first offered one month to disarm voluntarily in exchange for amnesty. The expiry of the amnesty period paved way for forceful disarmament campaigns which resulted in killings, displacements and livestock apprehensions. The 1984 *Operation Nyundo*, the joint operation with the Kenyan government discussed above took place during president Obote’s period.

In 1986, President Yoweri Museveni took over power after successfully leading his rebel movement (The National Resistance Movement – NRM) to overthrow Obote’s regime. He too made disarmament of Karamoja a priority. In an attempt to provide alternative and local security in an area that was beyond the adequate reach of government security forces Museveni introduced what came to be known as Local Defense Units (LDUs) in 1996. LDUs were composed of men and women drawn from the civilians and were provided with arms by the government in order to provide security to the people in Karamoja. The women were however not armed and were tasked with provision of information and intelligence. These efforts were later undermined when the LDUs took advantage of their government provided arms to conduct cattle raids, banditry, robberies and other crimes.

138 Mirzeler& Young 2000. 418
The post-independence Uganda, regime changes entailed violent overthrows. Nevertheless, all the presidents perceived Karamoja’s insecurity and arms prevalence as a force that could not be wished away. As a result, most of the government disarmament initiatives were concentrated in Karamoja. Just like the colonial government, force and brutality took the best part of the initiatives. Nevertheless, some new aspects were attempted in an effort to improve effectiveness. For instance during Obote’s second reign, he introduced amnesty for voluntary disarmament while Museveni sought to provide alternative local security to Karamoja through the LDUs. Nonetheless, Karamoja still remained militarized.

3.4 Disarmament from 2000 to present: Embracing International and regional cooperation and Policy Frameworks.

3.4.1: International standards and new approaches to disarmament

The year 2000 was a hallmark in the practice of arms control and disarmament. The world had realized that small arms had caused a lot of devastation in the world. Efforts were made to cooperate internationally, regionally and bilaterally address the menace. In civilian disarmament, initiatives were encouraged that would offer people amnesty to endear them to voluntarily surrender their weapons.

3.4.2 Disarmament initiatives in post-2000 Kenya

At the turn of the century in 2000, the Kenyan government was still battling illicit arms especially among pastoral communities. In 2001-2002, president Moi enticed pastoral communities from West-Pokot, Marakwet and Baringo with amnesty in order for them to surrender their small arms.\textsuperscript{139} This yielded no fruits since the communities declined to disarm citing fears that this would render them vulnerable to attacks from neighboring communities particularly the Karimojong of the Ugandan side of the border. The amnesty expired without any surrender of weapons leading to the extension of the amnesty in January 2002 coupled with a consequent threat of a military crackdown which still yielded little fruit. Before the military crackdown could commence, the government diverted its attention from disarmament and focused on campaigns for the December 2002 general elections.\textsuperscript{140}

\textsuperscript{139} Mkutu 2003: 28
\textsuperscript{140} ibid
Guided by the new set of international standards and the intention to correct past unfruitful approaches of coercive disarmament and a focus on disarmament as an end, the government of Kenya sought to alter the its approach and incorporate development in disarmament. This led to the conception of “Operation Dumisha Amani”. This will be discussed later in this chapter.

Shifting from the supposedly internationally guided Operation Dumisha Amani, the Kenyan government executed two coercive disarmament operations in 2008: Operation Okoa Maisha (save lives) in Mt. Elgon and Operation Chunga Mpaka (guard the border) in Mandera. Operation OkoaMaisha (save lives) was carried out to crash a militia group: The Sabaot Land Defense Force (SDLF) that had been formed to forcefully seek address to prevailing land grievances in the area. The group had posed grave security threats that paralyzed resident’s daily lives including closure of businesses and several schools. The operation led to collection of 103 fire arms and 1,155 rounds of ammunition and was hailed as being successful in crashing the militia group and restoring order.\(^{141}\) Moreover, some positive change was effected: Free medical care was offered to the residents by the military medical team which had been deployed there, new roads were constructed and old ones repaired, businesses and schools that had been closed reopened and in a bid to enhance security, a permanent military base was established in the area. Nevertheless the security forces were accused of severe brutality and gross human rights violations.

Operation Chunga Mpaka was carried out in Mandera to address gross security concerns that were occasioned by violent inter-clan conflicts over competition for water and pastures. The operation was extremely forceful with accusations of torture on the residents. The operation netted 48 weapons and 1200 rounds of ammunition in Mandera and in addition, 600 detonators were captured on transit to Mandera.\(^{142}\)

In November 2009, violent inter-communal clashes in Isiolo prompted the government of Kenya to launch another disarmament operation. This involved calls for voluntary disarmament in return for amnesty and local chiefs were tasked with the responsibility of facilitating the collection of weapons from their areas. The initiative led to the collection of 700 weapons and

\(^{141}\) Wepundi (et al.) 2012: 30
\(^{142}\) Wepundi (et al.) 2011: 11
4,000 rounds of ammunition which were voluntarily surrendered by communities in Isiolo.\textsuperscript{143} The Samburu however declined to relinquish their arms owing to their negative experience with the 2005 \textit{Operation Dumisha Amani I} when they heeded the government’s amnesty, and voluntarily disarmed only to be left vulnerable to attacks from other communities that did not disarm. In 2010, the government launched \textit{Operation Dumisha Amani II}. This will be discussed later in this chapter.

\subsection*{3.4.3. Disarmament Initiatives in post-2000 Uganda}

After several forceful disarmament operations proved to be exercises in futility, pursuing a different approach became indispensable. Trying policy guided disarmament and motivating the pastoralists in Karamoja to voluntarily surrender their weapons was the first option. In 2000, the Ugandan parliament passed a resolution that emphasized that it was the ripe time to completely disarm Karamoja. Consequently, the government of Uganda launched a disarmament operation in Karamoja from December 2001. This was initially preceded by calls for voluntary disarmament and as such earned the support of some Karimojong particularly the Bokora, the Jie and the Dodoth.\textsuperscript{144} Those who voluntarily surrendered their guns were compensated and granted amnesty, an ox-plough and a bag of wheat flour as rewards. The disarmament initiative was accompanied by peace initiatives from the Kotido Peace Initiative (KOPEIN) a non-governmental organization which was working closely with local communities in advocating voluntary disarmament. By the time the voluntary disarmament period ended, 6,046 guns had been collected.\textsuperscript{145} The end of the voluntary disarmament paved way for forceful disarmament.

The forceful disarmament entailed violent rounding up of people especially men and taking them to the barracks for interrogation. They would only be released if it was established that they had relinquished their arms. Owing to the force and torture that the UPDF applied, this operation did not enjoy the support of the local community and NGOs. In fact, violent confrontations between the UPDF and armed raiders who were in resistance of disarmament were a frequent phenomenon. A clash between the raiders and the UPDF in May 2002 in which the raiders killed 19 UPDF soldiers is a case in point.\textsuperscript{146} In retaliation, the soldiers torched

\textsuperscript{143} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{144} Bevan 2008 c: 72.
\textsuperscript{145} Sabala 2007: 36.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid: 36
homesteads belonging to the Karimojong, killed 113 warriors and in the process recovered some weapons. This disarmament operation was interrupted by a resurgence of attacks by the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) resulting in a sudden exit of UPDF from Karamoja in order to respond to the attacks from the LRA. This created a security vacuum and those who had voluntarily disarmed became targets for those who had not disarmed. Rearmament began immediately and the security situation deteriorated.

The operation netted approximately 10,000 firearms against the estimated 30,000-40,000 firearms in circulation in Karamoja. Gauging from the number of arms collected, it can then be argued that the success of the operation was quite minimal. Based on the peace and security expected to result from reduced weapons among civilians, the disarmament initiative achieved very little considering the imbalance of power that ensued from disarming some communities and leaving them with inadequate protection from those who still retained the instruments of waging attacks. Inadequate planning, poor coordination, insufficient government funding as well as lack of proper mobilization and involvement of local communities to a great extend contributed to the little success realized.\textsuperscript{147}

3.4.4. Kenya Uganda joint disarmament operation: KIDDP and Operation Dumisha Amani

In addition to regional cooperation and individual national initiatives to address small arms, Kenya and Uganda sought to cooperate bilaterally to disarm communities at their shared border. In 2003, Kenya and Uganda launched the Kenya Uganda Disarmament Action Plan aimed at enhancing cooperation between the two countries in various areas including the following: to simultaneously carry out a coordinated disarmament operation, establishing law and order in the targeted areas, branding of livestock, provision and reconstruction of social and physical infrastructure, support for development of alternative livelihoods, to mobilize and sensitise the target communities prior to the operation.\textsuperscript{148} In addition, the joint disarmament was to be guided by RECSA’s guidelines on practical disarmament and as such link disarmament with development in a bid to avert further demand for arms among the disarmed communities. In Uganda, the joint disarmament programme would be implemented through the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP), while in Kenya it would be

\textsuperscript{147} Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP) 2007

\textsuperscript{148} Wepundi (etal.) 2011: 9
through *Operation Dumisha Amani (Operation sustain peace)*. The two disarmament interventions are discussed below.

**3.4.4.1: Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP)**

Following the failure of the disarmament operation in 2001, the government of Uganda sought to come up with a way of incorporating development in its disarmament initiatives in Karamoja.\(^1\) This gave rise to the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP). KIDDP was anchored in two initiatives in Uganda: The 2004 Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) that anchors all development projects in Uganda and the Peace and Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) for Northern Uganda.

**Aim of the KIDDP:** The KIDDP aimed at having a participatory process engaging wide-ranging stakeholders as well as the local community in Karamoja in order to attain effective and sustainable disarmament in Karamoja.\(^2\) This was in acknowledgement of the fact that the single and highhanded involvement of the government through the UPDF in disarmament interventions had done more harm than good in Karamoja. Furthermore voluntary disarmament was preferred to forced disarmament that had dominated previous disarmaments. According to KIDDP force was to be resorted to as a last option. As such, KIDDP hinged upon development that would also encourage alternative livelihoods, provision of adequate security and involvement of the community and other stakeholders in disarmament. These were viewed as necessary prerequisites for the communities in Karamoja to voluntarily relinquish their weapons and for sustainable peace to be achieved.

**KIDDP initial draft**

The initial KIDDP document was drafted from January to June 2005 and its implementation was scheduled to be between 2005 and 2008. The KIDDP envisaged an implementation approach entailing development-oriented interventions as well as military provision of security. All the stakeholders including development partners and local community members would be actively involved in order to realize development and security and hence

---

\(^1\)Kräśli Saverio 2010:3-23. Kräśliargues that owing to the perception of Karamoja as a backward region that is isolated from the rest of Uganda by conflict and underdevelopment, the KIDDP programme aimed at enabling Karamoja to join the rest of the country.

\(^2\)KIDDP 2007: 8
voluntary disarmament. The human security orientation of the programme attracted the support of several international organizations and donors such as the UNDP, the Danish International Development Agency (Danida), embassies of various countries, Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and civil society organizations and was highly welcomed by the local community in Karamoja.

The initial draft of the KIDDP recommended the following among other things: stakeholder mobilization and sensitization to KIDDP and the disarmament it advocated, establishment of community-based security system to enhance security of people and livestock, voluntary disarmament which would be preceded by provision of adequate security, support for development of alternative development to reduce overreliance on cattle which were the main targets for raids, coordination and monitoring of the progress of peace-building and the effectiveness of KIDDP.\textsuperscript{151}

Before the first KIDDP draft was launched, the UPDF launched coercive disarmament which undermined the development-oriented disarmament envisaged in KIDDP. The government claimed that the military interventions aimed at seeking a speedy solution to the small arms menace in Karamoja in order to provide a secure and conducive environment for development. After the February 2006 presidential elections, military interventions became even more severe involving cordon, search and disarm.\textsuperscript{152} This led to donors, civil society and NGOs and the local community to withdraw their support from KIDDP citing brutality and gross human rights violations.\textsuperscript{153} The initial draft of KIDDP was therefore ultimately never formally launched.

**Revised KIDDP**

The speedy establishment of peace and security that the government of Uganda claimed to pursue through the military operations remained only a wish. In deed the reality on the ground proved to be a contradiction. Rearmament, armed conflict and raids coupled with violent confrontations between the UPDF and raiders continued relentlessly. This prompted the government through the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) to commission a revision of KIDDP so as to align it with the realities on the ground. The revised KIDDP’s goal was to “contribute to

\textsuperscript{151} Bevan 2008 c: 73
\textsuperscript{152} KIDDP 2007: 8
\textsuperscript{153} Bevan 2008 c: 72
human security and promote conditions for recovery and development in Karamoja.” ¹⁵⁴ This would be achieved through a comprehensive and coordinated disarmament that would factor in peace building initiatives and development. The revised KIDDP perceived collection of weapons not as the paramount end of disarmament, but as just a means of enhancing sustainable peace. Disarmament was also to be perceived as a component in a systematic execution of a development programme. Disarmament and development are as such mutually reinforcing processes that need to be well executed for them to succeed in Karamoja.

The revised KIDDP was premised on the following principles: community ownership; mutli-sectoral, multi-stakeholder and multi-level approach, rights-based approach, voluntary and peaceful disarmament, labour-based approaches to development, long-term development strategies and finally transparency and accountability. The revised document was published in January 2007 and was approved by the cabinet in September 2007.¹⁵⁵ As the revision of the document was ongoing, forceful disarmament continued as well. There was therefore complete disparity between what KIDDP contained and the reality on the ground. While the revised KIDDP viewed disarmament as a means to resolve the problems that had prevailed in Karamoja, the military–led forced disarmament on the ground appeared to take disarmament as an end in itself.¹⁵⁶

**Implementation:** The KIDDP advocated a development-led disarmament which integrated multifaceted stakeholders ranging from government, development partners, and civil society to the local community in Karamoja. These would work together to realize development, peace and security and thus endear the community to voluntary disarmament. The implementation of the programme was however predominantly implemented by the UPDF who were involved in military led forceful disarmament. In order to provide security, the UPDF introduced a process they termed as “protected Kraal” in 2007. Under the protected Kraal, livestock would be concentrated in Kraals as opposed to people’s homesteads. These kraals would then be placed under the protection of the UPDF. Owners would go in the morning and get the livestock from the Kraals and take them for grazing then return them in the evening.

¹⁵⁴ KIDDP 2007: 9
¹⁵⁵ Bevan 2008 c: 77
¹⁵⁶ Ibid.
The aim of the protected kraal was to protect livestock from raiders and to track stolen livestock through regular inspection of the livestock in the Kraals which would lead to identification of stolen cattle.\textsuperscript{157} The households that did not belong to the system of protected Kraals were suspected by the UPDF of having weapons and were targeted for forceful disarmament.\textsuperscript{158} The practice of protected *kraals* was adopted without consultation of the locals and did therefore not enjoy support on the ground. Moreover, the protected kraals became easy targets for large-scale raids and livestock in the kraals kept diminishing. Inadequate protection of the *kraals*, led to more raids and the resultant loss of lives and livestock and increased making the system of protected kraals a failure. Another recourse to insecurity that the government resorted to was the use of local defense units (LDUs). These were civilians who were recruited by the government, armed and tasked with provision of security to the local community.

**Successes:** Gauging success of KIDDP is not an easy task. One would ask what the benchmarks for success are. If maintenance of peace is a benchmark, then the success has been on and off. For instance in 2006 a major operation in Karamoja involving deployment of forty-two thousand soldiers is said to have enhanced relative calm in Karamoja by bringing down the number of raids conducted and diminishing the culture of carrying guns in public.\textsuperscript{159} This can be considered as success. Nevertheless, the success was short lived as raids and thefts resurfaced in 2008 increasing insecurity in spite of UPDF presence prompting one of the elders to make the following comment "*UPDF operations in the name of cordon and search are ongoing and cattle theft and killings still continue*".\textsuperscript{160}

**Failure:** Collective targeting of communities instead of singling out criminals makes the whole exercise bear little fruit. This study argues that commercialized cattle raiding is carried out by individuals who belong to gangs and not by entire communities. However, disarmament under KDDP still targets entire communities, therefore failing to collect the arms and in turn torturing innocent civilians. An incident Kaabong in Karamoja where the UPDF killed twenty eight people claiming that they were all armed but recovered only two guns from them is one of the many failures of collective targeting of civilians/communities in disarmament operations.\textsuperscript{161}

\begin{footnotesize}
\bibitem{Mkutu2010}
Mkutu 2010: 97  
\bibitem{Wepundi2011}
Wepundi (et al.) 2011: 10  
\bibitem{Ibid97}
Ibid: 97  
\bibitem{Ibid}
Ibid.  
\bibitem{Ibid98}
Ibid: 98
\end{footnotesize}
The UPDF have been accused of stealing cattle from locals and selling them. This greatly undermines the integrity of these security officers.

**Challenges**: Bad blood between the communities in Karamoja and the UPDF leading to confrontations was a major drawback for KIDDP. Another challenge was the stance taken by various stakeholders with regard to disarmament; the donors, civil society organizations as well as the local community advocated peaceful voluntary disarmament while the government gave live service to it but launched military led coercive disarmament. Another challenge is that of cross-border ethnic ties and alliances. For instance the Pokot in Uganda cross over to their fellow Pokot in Kenya to evade disarmament only to return thereafter and launch attacks on those who have been disarmed. Ethnic ties are also notorious in facilitating cross-border trafficking of weapons.

### 3.4.4.2. Operation Dumisha Amani (ODA)

The previous forceful disarmament operations having proved futile, Kenya decided to try a different approach which would incorporate development. The new approach was dubbed *Operation Dumisha Amani*, a Kiswahili expression for sustain or maintain peace. It was also carried out in line with the agreed upon joint disarmament operation with Uganda’s KIDDP discussed above.

ODA was a government development and disarmament program for civilians which targeted communities at the North Rift region of Kenya majority of whom are pastoralists. The operation initially targeted Turkana and West Pokot districts at the Kenya-Uganda border but due to increased raids and violent conflicts, the area of operation was expanded to also include Marakwet, Samburu, East Baringo, Laikipia East and Trans Nzoia. ODA was in two stages: ODA I (2005) and ODA II (2010)

**Operation Dumisha Amani I 2005 (ODA I)**

ODA I had short term, medium term and long term objectives. In the short term, based on the security situation that triggered it, the operation had the following aims: i) to enhance stability in the region and entrench law and order hence assisting the communities to resume to

---

162Ibid.
their settlements and their normal lives, (ii) To collect illegal arms and ammunition in the North Rift region of Kenya (iii) To establish the presence of government and enhance security, (vi) To develop infrastructure through construction of roads and (v) to brand livestock to enhance tracing. In the medium term and long term, ODA purposed to provide alternative means of livelihood for the pastoralist communities, to change their values and attitudes, and assimilate the region to the rest of the country through development.\footnote{Wepundi 2011: 27.}

Operation Dumisha Amani I was premised on development, voluntary surrender of arms and coercive disarmament (for those who would refuse to disarm voluntarily). It integrated development initiatives such as reconstruction of infrastructure and construction of dams to provide the much needed water to pastoralist communities in order to avert conflicts over competition for water points.\footnote{Ibid.: 35} Incorporating development and provision of security purposed to endear communities to voluntary surrender of arms and eradicate motivations for demand for arms and rearmament.

Operation Dumisha Amani was implemented predominantly by the military and other security forces in Kenya in three phases; the first which took place from May 2005 to February 2006 hailed as \textit{Operation Dumisha Amani} was a voluntary phase where campaigns were made to mobilize people to voluntarily relinquish their arms in return for amnesty and more security provision.\footnote{Leff 2009: 196.} The second phase dubbed \textit{Operation Okota (operation collect)} commenced in April-May 2006 and was a coercive phase that sought to forcefully take the weapons from those who refused to voluntarily surrender their weapons but also permitted voluntary surrender of weapons. In some instances, weapon holders would be given the option of being recruited to the Kenya Police Reserve (KPR)\footnote{Kenya Police Reserve: These are civilians who volunteer to offer security to their communities. They are then provided with weapons and are attached to the police and are called upon when need arises to respond to security crises. They are considered necessary in their communities although their recruitment and management is considered wanting just as the incidences during ODA illustrate.} in which case they would return their weapons in return for government registered ones. They would then be tasked with providing local security to the community. Nevertheless the coercion that reigned in this phase entailing the use of tanks, trucks
and helicopters by security officers prompted some communities to cross over to Uganda with their livestock as well as their guns.\textsuperscript{168}

Based on government sources ODA I is said to have achieved the following: collection 2298 firearms and 4418 rounds of ammunition while development wise, free treatment of 28,719 patients, branding of 170,000 livestock, re-opening of 66 schools that had been closed due to insecurity and construction of feeder/security roads totaling to 167 km.\textsuperscript{169} Conversely, the promised security was not guaranteed and those who cooperated and surrendered their weapons voluntarily such as the Samburu were left vulnerable to attacks from those who had not disarmed. In addition, the government was accused of high handedness, excessive use of force during the coercive okota phase, a top down approach and little involvement of the local community. Consequently, the government failed to win the hearts and confidence of the local community leading to little cooperation and hence little success.\textsuperscript{170}

**Operation Dumisha Amani (ODA) II**

Having gained little success in ODA I and against the backdrop of persistent insecurity, the government of Kenya launched ODA II five years later. ODA II was also prompted by the government’s realization that the country’s pastoralists had spent huge sums of money over the years to arm themselves and as such, the operation targeted to collect 50,000 illegal weapons.\textsuperscript{171} This time the operation covered not only North Rift but also the Eastern region of the country. It also sought to expand the scope of stakeholders and involve Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), local political leaders, private actor, the media, and local community leaders so as to enhance community ownership of the program. The operation was further in line with Kenya’s Vision 2030, an economic blueprint whose aim is to provide an enabling environment for development.

The operation began with a voluntary disarmament phase which began in February 2010. Two months later, in April, the coercive phase began. Just like ODA I the government’s upper hand reined as the operation was mainly implemented by government through the provincial administration and security forces including the following: The administration Police, The Kenya

\textsuperscript{168} Kopel, Gallant & Eise 2008: 19
\textsuperscript{169} Wepundi (et al.) 2011: 11
\textsuperscript{170} Wepundi 2011: 27.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid. For instance the Kenyan government estimated the amount spent by the country’s pastoralists to purchase arms over the years to be 1.1 billion Kenya Shillings ( $ 13,750,000)
Police, The General Service Unit, The military. Civil disarmament facilitators such as chiefs and elders were also involved especially at the voluntary phase to convince community members to cooperate. However the involvement the local community was regarded as minimal. The operation recovered 1,201 firearms and 1,665 rounds of ammunition and in addition retrieved 201 livestock that had been stolen.\textsuperscript{172}

**Successes of ODA:** Just like the KIDDP, gauging the success of ODA requires looking at it in different angles. Based on the number of weapons collected against the targeted number, the interventions then registered little success. The operations have however been acknowledged for reducing attacks and revenge attacks to some extend as well as reducing the confidence with which weapons were publicly displayed. People carrying weapons do not carry them publicly with pride as they used to do before; Even if they carry them, they conceal.\textsuperscript{173} The essential services that the military provided such as water, infrastructure, medical care, branding of livestock, as well as construction of markets remain to be success stories that locals tell about operation Dumisha Amani.\textsuperscript{174} This went a long way to change the pastoral communities’ negative perception of the military. It assured to the local community that the military can still attain a human face in its operations and dealing with civilians. Indeed, majority of the respondents were of the opinion that the government should carry out more disarmament operations but with a human face.\textsuperscript{175}

**Failures of ODA:** First, the government failed to hit the target number of weapons that it had set out to collect. The amount collected was way below the targeted amount. Although the operation purposed to present a different approach from the previous coercive ones, the resort to force and brutality and the human rights violations that accompanied it failed the test of success. Moreover, the promises of improved security that would be provided to the target communities to encourage them to voluntarily disarm eventually turned out to be lip service. The Samburu for instance declined to disarm in ODA II owing to their negative experience with ODA I when their cooperation and voluntary disarmament only worked against them as they were left susceptible

\textsuperscript{172}Wepundi (et al.) 2011: 11
\textsuperscript{173}Interview with Fred Iurien, resident of Kapedo, Turkana; 14\textsuperscript{th} June 2016 and written response from respondents in West Pokot.
\textsuperscript{174}Written interview responses from respondents in West Pokot and Turkana.
\textsuperscript{175}Written interview responses from respondents in West Pokot and Turkana.
to attacks by the communities that did not disarm. Consequently, although ODA II targeted them, this proved to be futile.

**Challenges of ODA:** Like many other disarmament initiatives, ODA faced manifold challenges ranging from operational to administrative. The main challenge faced was lack of full cooperation from the local communities that have a history of resisting disarmament. This can be attributed to the coercive nature of the operation and lack of proper involvement of the communities on the ground. Administratively the lack of coordination among the implementers particularly the security forces that maintained the independent chains of command amounted to confusion on the ground hindering success. This was occasioned by poor planning prior to the operation. In spite of the comprehensive programme envisaged, ODA was *ad hoc* just like the previous disarmament operations. There was no basis of a clearly written document guiding the operation like the KIDDP. Another challenge is that posed by cross-border ethnic relations also discussed under KIDDP above, which facilitate evasion of disarmament and subsequent rearmament.

Kenya and Uganda have had to grapple with the challenge of small arms especially among its pastoral communities at the peripheries. Efforts to disarm and pacify such communities began way during the colonial period and continued to the post-colonial period. Before the year 2000, most of the disarmament initiatives were predominantly forceful and brutal and yielded little success in addition to causing resentment of the governments by the communities. Since the year 2000, disarmament interventions were characterized by initial calls for voluntary surrender of weapons before force had been resorted to. There had also been more cooperation internationally and regionally. Bilateral cooperation had also proved indispensable especially for countries that share borders like Kenya and Uganda. Another recent development has been the endeavor to link disarmament to development in an effort to curb inspirations for arms possession. The KIDDP and Operation Dumisha Amani were efforts by Uganda and Kenyan governments to cooperate to address the small arms menace at their shared borders. The next chapter critically compares the two disarmament interventions.
CHAPTER FOUR
A CRITICAL COMPARISON OF THE KARAMOJA INTEGRATED DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME AND OPERATION DUMISHA AMANI

4.1. Introduction

This chapter compares KIDDP and Operation Dumisha Amani (ODA) looking at similarities and differences of both. The chapter also looks at various challenges that hinder effectiveness of the above two initiatives. It further presents and suggests a human needs perspective to disarmament pursued through the human security approach to disarmament.

4.2. KIDDP and ODA

Similarities

Rationale behind disarmament: The rationale behind both KIDDP and Operation Dumisha Amani was to get rid of arms from communities living at their common border and to avert demand for arms by providing security and long-term development. The two disarmament initiatives purposed to initiate development projects and provide adequate security so as to motivate the pastoral communities to voluntarily disarm. In both, voluntary disarmament was proposed as having preference to forceful disarmament. Both also aimed at integrating several stakeholders and involve the local communities in disarmament. Development was also aimed at linking the target regions with the rest of their countries due to a realization that marginalization had isolated them.

Perception of pastoralism as antidevelopment: In both initiatives, there was concerted effort to convince the pastoralist communities in the study area to relinquish pastoralism and adopt other modern means of production. They highlighted the need to convince the communities to adopt alternative livelihoods. While this was important to reduce overreliance on pastoralism, it plays down the importance of the pastoralist way of life to them. This is based on the assumption that equates pastoralism to underdevelopment. This study maintains that such an assumption is wrong. Instead, the governments should try and promote the pastoralists in their way of life and protect their livestock which not only benefits them but also contributes a lot to the cattle production in both countries.
Implementation: Although both KIDD and Operation Dumisha Amani purposed to integrate multifaceted stakeholders ranging from government, to international development and aid agencies as well as civil society organizations and local communities on board, the implementation took a different turn. The governments’ high handedness featured predominantly since security forces took a center stage in implementing disarmament. In the KIDD, the UPDF launched coercive disarmament while in Kenya various security forces including the military, the General Service Unit (GSU), Kenya Police and Administration Police dominated operation Dumisha Amani. In both cases, brutality, human rights violations, coupled with little involvement of the other stakeholders led to withdrawal of their support and the initiatives then yielded little success owing to failure of the security forces to win the hearts, trust and confidence of the local communities.

Timing: In terms of the timing, both disarmament initiatives began more or less around the same time (2005-2006). They aimed at disarming pastoral communities at the common border of the two countries. They were also carried out at a time of heightened violent conflicts among communities. Indeed, the UPDF in Uganda launched coercive disarmament way before the KIDD programme was launched citing increased insecurity and the urgent need to calm the region to pave way for development. Similarly Operation Dumisha Amani was launched in the wake of increased violent attacks in the North Rift region particularly Turkana and West Pokot which lie at the Kenya Uganda border. This reactive disarmament is likely to yield little success since the perpetrators of the attacks would be anticipating such a reaction from the government and are likely to be ready to react as well or might already have hidden their weapons. In addition, the victims of the attacks would also be feeling most vulnerable and reluctant to disarm.

Provision of alternative security: Both Uganda and Kenya sought to engage locals in provision of security to complement state security forces. In Uganda, the local security providers are known as Local defense units (LDUs) while Kenya has the Kenya Police Reserve (KPR). While it is important for the locals to assist in providing security, there are concerns about allowing untrained locals to possess guns. Moreover, some of the LUs and KPRs have been accused of using the same government provided guns to perpetrate crime. Arming civilians to provide security challenges state legitimacy and the state also relinquishes its privilege of being the sole owner of the instruments of violence.
Gauging success: Both KIDDP and ODA mainly used the number of weapons collected as the main parameter of gauging success. According to the figures presented in chapter three, going by the number of weapons collected, then the success of these disarmament initiatives was quite minimal.

**Differences**

Level of acceptance of the disarmament initiative by the local community: This was highly dependent upon the approach used during disarmament particularly during the forceful phase. The amount of force that was applied by the security forces from the two countries differed sharply. The UPDF of Uganda used excessive force while implementing KIDDP as compared to the Kenyan security forces launching Operation Okota, the coercive phase of ODA. Consequently, Operation Dumisha Amani received some slight welcome from locals especially because of the essential services such as water, health and infrastructural developments, provided by the Kenyan military. On the other hand KIDDP was rejected at the local level because of UPDFs prioritization of coercive disarmament with little regard to the proposed voluntary disarmament and development. As a result, disarmament in Uganda faced extreme resistance from the local communities including attacks and retaliatory attacks between groups of Karimojong warriors and the UPDF leading to loss of lives and property and gross human rights violations that eventually led to the UNDP withdrawing its support for the KIDDP.

KIDDP was based on a well-defined programme that was incorporated in the country’s poverty eradication programme. As such, it was visualized to be a long term process that would entail both development and disarmament. On the other hand, for ODA, there was no comprehensive programme laid out. Indeed, the operation was just carried out like the previous short term operations that the country had engaged in.

Different terminologies used for the initiatives: The use of the terms *programme* for KIDDP makes it appear to be a well thought and planned for programme. On the other hand the term *operation* in ODA gives it a negative connotation from the onset that links it to violence unleashed by security forces during previous disarmsments.

Provision of essential services and amnesty: While Kenya had offered a period of amnesty between April 2005 and April 2005, the UPDF in Uganda were launching coercive disarmament.
This undermined the practicality of the operations as joint operations between the two countries. On the other hand the military in Uganda was not involved in providing essential services such as infrastructure, water and health that the Kenyan military provided during ODA.

4.3 Persistence of the Small Arms menace

Data collected in 2007-2008 on cattle raiding in Karamoja indicated that incidences of cattle raiding had risen in spite of the implementation of the KIDDP in 2006.176 The Kenyan side of the border also continued experiencing insecurity as a result of conflicts involving small arms. The following are the factors that impede the success of the disarmament initiatives.

4.3.1 Impediments to the success of KIDDP and ODA

Uneven disarmament: This leads to some communities disarming while others still retain their weapons thus creating military imbalances among the communities. This is exacerbated by cross border identity based alliances or even presence of similar ethnic groups on both sides of the border (for example Pokot in Kenya and Uganda). Those who cooperate and disarm become vulnerable to attacks from those who have not disarmed. Cooperation of the Samburu in Kenya during ODA I undermined their military capability leaving them vulnerable from attacks by neighboring communities. Consequently, they refused to disarm during ODA II. Similarly, the Bokora clan of the Karimojong disarmed with the promise of security provision by the government which did not honor its promise. They then became prone to attacks from their neighbors.

Use of force during disarmament: This further threatens the peace and security of the target groups making the need for security unending. Confrontations between warriors resisting disarmament exacerbate insecurity.

Other political and security priorities: Disarmament efforts in both countries had to be curtailed at some point. KIDDP was interrupted by elections in January 2006. Resurgence of the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) also interrupted disarmament in Uganda since the UPDF had to be redeployed to deal with the LRA. Operation Dumisha Amani I on the other hand was punctuated by preparations for the 2007 general elections.

176 KrätriSaverio 2010: 3-23.
Collective targeting of communities disarmament: While carrying out disarmament, the governments have most of the time targeted entire communities instead of singling out the real criminals. A keen actor analysis revealed that the raiders who engage in commercialized cattle raiding are individuals who belong to gangs that operate not only within but also across the borders of the two countries. Indeed such cattle raiders also pose major security threats to the pastoralist communities themselves. Collective targeting of the communities leads to innocent civilians being brutalized while the real culprits (the raiders) hide and are therefore left at large.

Inherently coercive voluntary disarmament: Both KIDDP and Operation Dumisha Amani had a preference of voluntary disarmament over coerced one. There were calls for voluntary disarmament and threats of consequent forced disarmament if the voluntary phase failed. During the voluntary phase of Operation Dumisha Amani I, armored military trucks were stationed in designated locations, an implication of a looming coercive disarmament in case of inadequacy of the voluntary phase. The military presence scared some people so much that they fled with their livestock based on previous experiences of military brutality. Moreover, the voluntary phase was accompanied with threats for imminent forceful disarmament if people were adamant to voluntarily surrender their small arms. People were therefore called upon to make a choice between the less painful voluntary disarmament and the more painful forceful disarmament. This study considers such conditional voluntary disarmament inherently coercive.

Two kinds of force emerge according to this study: soft force in form of threats and hard force in form of brutality. Voluntary disarmament, this study maintains, can only be achieved once conditions are made so conducive through development, provision of security and building of confidence to the level that possession of weapons is rendered unnecessary at which point the weapons would now be freely surrendered without any threat of coercion. Achievement of this may seem farfetched but with political will and planning it is can work. It has worked in Trans Nzoia in Kenya where administration police officers began a programme that aimed at enhancing their interaction and cooperation of locals. They carried out development programmes such as drilling bore holes and electrification. Through the program, they won the confidence of the locals such that those who had their arms surrendered them freely. The community also freely

177 Wepundi 2011.
178 Citizen Television seven o’clock news on Saturday 29th October 2016.
provides intelligence to the police concerning criminals. As a result, security in the area has been enhanced.

Stakeholders/actor disparity: Forceful government disarmament operations have in most cases been complimented with calls for peace from civil society. It is also the civil society and the local leaders that have in most cases carried out the campaigns for voluntary surrender of arms. This proves hard since it is hard to get assurance of security from civil society groups who don’t possess the instruments of violence and are also equally vulnerable to attacks. The governments still maintained an upper hand in the operations. The civil society thus acquires the face of peace while the government acquires that of coercion and brutality. In addition, the level of involvement of the local communities in disarmament initiatives still remains wanting. This leads to lack of ownership of the process by the local communities leading to minimal support from them, which is always a recipe for failure.

Perception disparity: Concerning small arms: Most of the pastoralists targeted for disarmament perceives the arms as part of their lives and livelihoods while the governments perceive them as threats to state security. While the local people perceive the government to be an enemy, the government perceives them as people who are naturally violent, backward and resistant to modernity and development. This is mainly so in Karamoja where people felt that disarmament had made them more insecure and that the government was doing little in helping them as one community member said “people think that the government only wants to control them but does not offer them services”.

Ally turns enemy: Research has unearthed facts that both the government of Kenya and that of Uganda were on some occasions involved in the armament of the pastoral communities for the various reasons mentioned in chapter two, particularly the need for self-defense against neighboring communities. The same threats to security still persist. The same governments that armed the pastoralist communities are the same ones disarming them without averting the same threats that existed then.

179 Telephone Interview with a community member in Kotido, 15th September 2010. Interview carried out by Centre for Conflict Resolution.
4.4 Lessons for the future: Rethinking Disarmament

The presence of small arms among pastoralists and the persistent violent conflicts and crimes committed using these arms is an indication that the struggle to rid civilians of illicit arms is far from over. Disarmament therefore still remains essential in pacifying the pastoralist communities. However, the process ought to be rethought in order to improve effectiveness.

4.4.1 The human needs theory (HNT) and security/safety at the Kenya Uganda border

According to John Burton’s Human Needs Theory, conflicts resulting from frustrated or unmet basic human needs are non-negotiable since the satisfaction of the human needs cannot be compromised. Burton’s basic human needs of safety, identity and recognition are or essence if conflicts are to be resolved.

Security/safety as a human need among the Karamoja, Turkana and Pokot

Turkana, West Pokot and Karamoja regions at the Kenya Uganda border have had to content with insecurity for decades. Just like the omnipresent insecurity in Karamoja, the Turkana and Pokot who were interviewed cited insecurity as a problem that they have had to content with for decades. Commenting about security in their area, most of the respondents recounted that security was a major concern and that they lived in fear. They dread bandits and cattle rustlers who launch attacks leaving trails of destruction. The presence of the police, KPR and the military according to them eased their fear to some extend especially when they were not on disarmament missions. The Karimojong in Uganda however dread the state security forces particularly due to their negative encounters with them.

Safety has therefore remained an endemic need in this region. Even when the situation is slightly calm, residents still live in fear of attacks. Insecurity affects all aspects of life among the pastoralists of Karamoja in Uganda and West Pokot and Turkana in Kenya. Ethnic animosities further exacerbate the security situation. According to the respondents in the study area, attacks from neighboring communities are always imminent. It emerged that the Pokot and the Turkana harbor sentiments of hatred against each other and are constantly scared of each other.

\[180\] Avruch & Mitchel 2013: 8
The Karamoja, Turkana and the Pokot have an innate feeling that because they are pastoral communities, living in their countries’ periphery, they are less considered by their governments and as a result continue suffering marginalization, political, economic and social exclusion. Indeed a resident of Karamoja categorically stated that the Ugandan state is only interested in controlling them and not providing services to them. These pastoralist communities at the Kenya Uganda border continue experiencing violence both structurally and directly as explained in John Galtung’s conceptualization. Their classification of needs in order of priority featured security/safety and protection predominantly at the lowest level of the pyramid alongside the physiological needs. This corresponds very well with John Burton’s Human Needs Theory’s (HNT) emphasis on safety as a very essential need which if suppressed could lead to protracted conflict.

Demand for arms among these communities is occasioned by the principal need for safety in an area where citizens have had to fend for their security in the absence of adequate protection from the government. According to majority of the respondents, poverty, marginalization and the need to safeguard their indispensable livestock economy which is currently under threat from environmental insecurities and a modern economy characterized by commercialized raiding underpins their drive to arm themselves. Others particularly on the Kenyan side of the border recounted that their possession of small arms was necessary so that they could be in a position to assist the KPR and the other security officers whom they felt were not conversant with the terrain and therefore required the assistance of armed locals in their provision of security. This exposes the mistrust that the locals have on their governments’ ability to safeguard their safety and further questions the governments’ privilege to have monopoly over the instruments of violence and its responsibility to protect. The communities therefore experienced structural violence in form of insecurity and marginalization and thus felt the need to possess some level of military capability by possessing small arms in order to be able to deter direct violence.

4.4.2 Disarmament and the HNT at the Kenya Uganda border

Disarmament of the above pastoral communities that reside at the Kenya Uganda border has been carried out both during colonial and postcolonial periods. Paradoxically armament and rearmament among the communities has also taken place alongside disarmament. The question
would be then whether disarmament is ever going to rid these communities of the arms. This calls for a change of focus of disarmament initiatives so that disarmament becomes the preferred process by the communities.

Colonial and post-colonial disarmament initiatives which have been mainly coercive focused on a reduction of the small arms from the communities without reducing or even mitigating the root causes of armament. Moreover, the government parameters used to gauge the success of disarmament operations have been a target number of weapons with little focus on a reduction of insecurity, the prime drive for armament. The result has been that as the communities arm to fend for their security, the proliferation of arms in turn has been a cause of insecurity among the communities and a threat to both human and state security. Rule of law and order among the pastoral communities remains greatly undermined.

By planning KIDDP and Dumisha Amani Uganda and Kenya envisaged an improvement in disarmament by integrating development in order to avert demand for arms after disarmament. Nevertheless, disarmament took precedence over economic and infrastructural development. Political and state security concerns became the main driving motives. As a result disarmament presented a major conflict between the states and the communities that resist the process. The situation was worse in Karamoja where the Karimojong teamed up to confront the UPDF which they perceived as the “raider” since they treated them with a lot of brutality and even sold their livestock for their own economic benefits. This was a major threat to the legitimacy of the Ugandan state in Karamoja considering that the legitimacy of the state is not only on the monopoly of violence but also the provision of basic human needs to its citizenry. Through the emphasis of the disarmament component of KIDDP and forceful disarmament, the UPDF is said to have reduced the gun culture in Karamoja to some extent. Nevertheless, the bad blood that exists between the Karimojong (especially the warriors) and the UPDF, is an implication of a suppression of the problem and not the resolution thereof hence structural violence still exists and so does arms proliferation even if concealed.

On the other hand, on the Kenyan side, a few respondents hailed Operation Dumisha Amani to some extend particularly the use of local leaders to reach out to the people in the voluntary phase. Consequently, it is said to have changed attitudes of a few Pokot and Turkana

---

181 Wepundi Manasseh (et al.) 2012
warriors who relinquished their weapons and reformed. Some respondents however recounted with disappointment the brutality unleashed by the security forces especially during the coercive phase. In spite of operation Dumisha Amani 2005 and 2010, attacks still persist. According to respondents, the real threats to security: the cattle rustlers and bandits who possess most of the small arms and launch most of the deadly attacks retreat and hide the forests. Since the government security officers are not conversant with the terrain, they collectively target those in the villages while the raiders and bandits still remain at large.

Disarmament therefore ought to be rethought. A human needs theory (HNT) based disarmament approach according to this study would be an important approach to consider. Disarmament based on HNT is premised upon the fact that success is dependent upon ensuring that basic human needs of safety/security, identity and recognition are met for it to work. This study focused more on safety as a basic human need. For the purpose of this study, safety and security have been used interchangeably. The HNT based disarmament also entails digging deeper and establishing the root causes of insecurity that motivates armament or even rearmament after a disarmament exercise. John Burton in his HNT argued that if conflict is perceived as a result of unmet human needs, then the resolution of the conflict follows a long term process aimed at meeting the human needs and thus resolving the conflict. On the other hand, if a human aggressive nature perspective is taken, then force is applied to suppress the conflict without resolving it, hence risking chances of a flare up of violent conflict. Thus the study established that although KIDDP and Operation Dumisha Amani had envisaged development in their planning, the human aggressive nature perception reigned in the implementation and eventually force was applied to collect weapons from the pastoral communities in the area of study: Karamoja, Turkana and West Pokot. The pastoral communities were perceived as militant in nature whose determination to own the gun was relentless.

The respondents expressed their preference for a situation in which their communities were free of arms but only if the government provided adequate security and protection to make sure that they lived without fear of attacks from raiders, bandits and other communities. They also expressed that peace and harmonious coexistence with their neighbors was indispensable for peace to reign. Security and protection without harmonious relations among neighbors would

---

182 Written response by respondents of Kapeto in Turkana and Kapenguria in West Pokot.
183 Telephone interview with Fred Iurien from Turkana and Rachelle Lagat from West Pkot

67
not be practical. Protection of livelihoods as well as economic development among others also featured as a prerequisite to effective disarmament. It was therefore apparent that the communities were not only concerned about personal safety but also other aspects of security. This implies that the concept of human security in its entirety is of essence for effective disarmament. The study therefore based on the respondents, deciphered that disarmament based on security as a basic human need approaching security from a human security perspective would go a long way to improve effectiveness of disarmament at the Kenya Uganda border.

4.4.3 Human security, Human needs and Disarmament at the Kenya Uganda border

According to the UNDP’s Human Development Report, human security is defined based on two very important aspects: *freedom from fear* and *freedom from want*.\(^{184}\) As opposed to the traditional focus on security whose emphasis was state security, human security focuses on individual security. The table below presents the various forms of security as envisaged by the United Nation’s human security approach to security.

**Table 4.1 Types of Human Security and Threats**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Security</th>
<th>Examples of main Threats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal security</td>
<td>Physical violence, crime, terrorism, domestic violence, child labor etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political security</td>
<td>Political repression, human rights abuses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food security</td>
<td>Hunger, famine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental security</td>
<td>Environmental degradation, resource depletion, natural disasters, pollution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community security</td>
<td>Inter-ethnic, religious and other identity based tensions and confrontations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic security</td>
<td>Persistent poverty, unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health security</td>
<td>Deadly infectious diseases, lack of access to basic health, malnutrition, unsafe food etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above types of human security are clearly applicable to the pastoral communities living at the Kenya Uganda border. The different types of human security as well as their threats are interconnected and have a domino effect. For instance an attack on a certain village by cattle rustlers can lead to injuries (personal insecurity) depletion of livestock as and loss of livelihoods (economic insecurity), ethnic tensions (community insecurity), hunger (food security) and so forth. On the same note, environmental insecurity could trigger drought, leading to death of livestock triggering economic insecurity, famine (food insecurity), malnutrition (health insecurity) and so on.

The strategies required to address human security entail protection and empowerment so as to enhance protection from fear and want. Most respondents indicated that in order for them to voluntarily relinquish their weapons then the state ought to completely come in and provide adequate security to the level that the communities feel so safe that their weapons are rendered unnecessary at which point they would then surrender them voluntarily without threats of imminent coercion. The need for harmonious coexistence with other communities also featured prominently among the major priorities in the needs of those interviewed. This reinforces the reality that, provision of security without good relations among neighbors would not quell dreaded inter communal attacks and revenge attacks that are perpetrated using small arms. Ethnic animosities are also forces to reckon with if adequate provision of security and hence disarmament are to be realized. Respondents also indicated the need for the government to facilitate economic development through creation of jobs and education opportunities especially for the youth to prevent them from being lured to arm themselves and join cattle rustlers. This would ultimately enhance economic security hence fostering freedom from want.

Provision of human security in the various aspects highlighted above is multi-sectoral since it entails the incorporation of various sectors such as economic, health, and environmental sectors among others.\textsuperscript{185} The KIDDP manifested that clearly by the various sectors involved in the programme in order to realize development. It brought together the water sector, education sector, road sector, and agricultural sector among many others which were supposed to work together to enhance development so as to enhance or complement disarmament.\textsuperscript{186} However,
when coercive disarmament became too brutal and grossly violated human rights, the working of the various sectors was undermined and so did development. Even donors such as the UNDP withdrew support by mid-2006 due to UPDFs brutality which instead of enhancing human security became an agent of human insecurity. According to this study, if KIDDP would carefully be implemented without prioritizing forceful disarmament while giving lip service to development, then human security would be enhanced and disarmament would ensue effectively without the unrelenting resistance manifested so far.

This study however avers that the human needs through- human security approach to disarmament does not preclude the continuation of disarmament. Indeed it is important to note that successful disarmament is essential for development but on the other hand, development is indispensable for successful disarmament. They are two mutually reinforcing processes. However, disarmament should not be conducted in such a way that it hinders development the way the UPDF did leading to withdrawal of development agencies from the programme. Indeed, it should be conducted based on intelligence in order to identify the criminals such as the raiders and bandits who destabilize communities. Research findings indicated that this is possible with proper cooperation from locals. In fact some respondents suggested that the government could even hire youths who would secretly and constantly gather information about arms and raiders in the villages and provide intelligence security agencies without the knowledge of the community members.

The KIDDP and Operation Dumisha Amani were improvements in the initiatives of Uganda and Kenya to disarm pastoral communities. The major challenge both faced was the prioritization of disarmament over development and worse still the two governments approached disarmament from a political and state security perspective and applied force which undermined participation of other stakeholders. As such, proliferation of small arms still persists and holders of illicit small arms still remain at large.

Disarmament still remains a relevant process since ignoring it would exacerbate the small arms menace and undermine security and development. But the process needs a rethink. This study established that the application of the human needs theory (HNT) proposed by John Burton

---

which emphasizes the importance of meeting security/safety needs could ultimately enhance voluntary surrender of arms among pastoral communities. This calls for a human security approach to disarmament. It is a long term comprehensive approach which is people-centered and multi-sectoral whose ultimate goal to ensure that people attain freedom from fear and freedom from want. By so doing, structural and direct violence would be averted and the security need met, and ultimately effective disarmament realized.
CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusion

The Kenya-Uganda border area is considered one of the most insecure areas in the insecure Horn of Africa. Years of marginalization and isolation, coupled with the ubiquitous insecurity and inadequate provision of security by the state have led to a high proliferation of illicit small arms as communities strive to arm themselves for self-protection and protection of livestock which is their main means of livelihood. Although the small arms are not direct causes of conflicts, they have been instrumental in increasing the lethality of the conflicts in the region. Consequently human security as well as state security has been greatly threatened in this area. This has necessitated the governments in the two countries to initiate disarmament as one of the methods of riding the area of illicit arms.

The study looked at the challenge of arms at the Horn of Africa in general and at the Kenya Uganda in particular. The aim was to compare disarmament initiatives in Kenya and Uganda particularly the KIDDP in Uganda and Operation Dumisha Amani (ODA) in Kenya. The target areas at the border were Karamoja in Uganda and Turkana and West Pokot in Kenya. The target population was the Karimojong of Uganda and the Turkana and Pokot of Kenya.

The persistent presence of small arms and their resultant destructive effects even after KIDDP and ODA is an indication of ineffectiveness of disarmament in the two countries. In an effort to establish the reasons behind the demands for arms possession among the pastoral communities at the Kenya Uganda border, their resistance of disarmament which challenges disarmament efforts and with the need to propose a way forward the research was guided by three hypotheses: First, that structural and direct violence enhance demand for small arms among pastoral communities. The second hypothesis was that coercive disarmament initiatives pursued without attention to safety/security needs are likely to encounter resistance from the people targeted for disarmament. The third hypothesis was that addressing disarmament from a human security approach was likely to reduce demand for small arms hence enhance effectiveness of disarmament. The study then applied John Burtons Human Needs Theory (HNT).
Taking a closer look at the Horn of Africa (HOA) where Kenya and Uganda as well as the study area: the Kenya-Uganda border are situated, the study established that there exists both demand and supply factors that complement each other to reinforce the proliferation of illicit arms in the region and at the area of study. Considering that the challenge of small arms proliferation affects all countries of the HOA the countries have become parties to various international regimes for instance the UNPoA, the Bamako Declaration and the Nairobi Declaration and Protocol that focus international cooperation in tackling the small arms proliferation of menace. The countries have also established their own instruments, policies and institutions such as the Nairobi Protocol, as well as the National Focal Points (NFPs) to address the small arms menace.

An analysis of the various disarmament initiatives by Kenya and Uganda identified that coercion featured predominantly. However, the year 2000 was a turning point when most of disarmament initiatives were guided by international standards and regimes as well as well-established national policies. It was against this backdrop that the KIDDP and ODA were planned. The study compared the two and identified that they have similarities and differences and that the two countries can still learn from one another. The fact that even after KIDDP and ODA, the small arms menace still persists called for a rethink of disarmament initiatives. The study established that pastoral communities in the study area suffer both structural and direct violence and are therefore motivated to arm themselves for self-defense. Kenya and Uganda’s disarmament initiatives in the pastoral communities have mainly been marred coercion and brutality and inconsideration of the unmet security needs and have as such prompted resistance from the local communities.

Disarmament still remains an urgent priority at the Kenya Uganda border where small arms among the pastoral communities still wreak havoc. At the time of writing this project for instance, major clashes ensued between the Pokot and the Marakwet (both are pastoral communities) which prompted top government security officials and the deputy president to visit the area. Again, calls for disarmament of pastoral communities were reiterated and even shoot to kill orders given for those perpetrating clashes. This sporadic and reactive disarmament may however yield little fruits as the study has established. This study advocates for an approach to

188 Television news 26th and 27th October 2016.
disarmament which takes the human needs perspective and pursues disarmament from a human security approach. Unlike the previous sporadic disarmament initiatives, disarmament from a human needs perspective and pursued from a human security approach puts the needs of the people at the core and incorporates development so as to eventually render the people free from fear and free from want.

Uganda’s KIDDIP presents a very important vision that links development and disarmament. The only challenge is the disparity between what is on the paper and the reality on the ground. While KIDDIP advocates for voluntary disarmament, the UPDF carry out forceful disarmament on the ground leading to violent confrontations which undermines development and security. If KIDDIP could be well implemented, then it would go a long way to enhance development, build trust between the government and the local community which is indispensable for success and enhance government legitimacy in Karamoja. This would eventually realize the much desired voluntary disarmament. Kenya’s Operation Dumisha Amani seemed to have envisaged a long term process that also integrated development and disarmament. However, it was implemented just like the previous sporadic and reactive disarmament operations. Kenya could borrow from Uganda and come up with a similar programme to be implemented on the long term.

However the study identified that there are also criminals that hide under the banner of ethnicity and take advantage of the fact that government disarmament initiatives have mainly targeted entire communities. Raiders and bandits as well as the various criminals carry out various heinous activities and hide in the community. During disarmament operations, they retreat into the forests taking advantage of the fact that the security officers are not conversant with the terrain in the regions. Indeed the study unearthed that many locals are most scared of these groups of criminals and would want the government to disarm them. This study suggests that the governments should gather more information and use more intelligence on the ground as well as device more creative approaches to identify criminals especially those involved in cattle rustling. Forceful disarmament of criminals such as cattle rustlers/raiders and bandits, this study maintains may be indispensable. It is also necessary for the governments to establish the channels and cartels that are involved in commercialized cattle rustling: the rustlers, politicians
as well as the businesspeople that provide ready markets for stolen livestock or even facilitate cattle rustling.

5.2 Recommendations

Considering the persistent nature of the small arms challenge at the Kenya Uganda Border, this study recommends that Kenya and Uganda should not relent in their efforts to rid the area of illicit arms. Nevertheless, caution should be taken so as to avoid brutal since this has proven to worsen the situation and in turn trigger more demand for weapons.

Different approaches should be embraced when targeting different people. For the common citizens who claim to own small arms for self-protection and protection of livestock which is their livelihood, coercive disarmament might trigger more human insecurity. In that case, the long term human needs/human security approach proposed in this study could prove more effective. The governments should establish its presence and legitimacy among the people, beef up security and initiate development to avert demand for weapons. For the cattle rustlers and bandits however, the sporadic coercive disarmament may be inevitable in the short run since their attacks are also sporadic. However a long term process that entails the human needs/human security approach should be the goal.

Proper timing is very important. Many are the times when the governments launch disarmament immediately after an attack. This reactionary approach has proven quite unsuccessful. Immediately after an attack the culprits would anticipate government reaction and therefore would have made prior plans on how to escape. The communities also feel most vulnerable at that time and might not be ready to surrender their arms. The governments should be keen to use intelligence and early warning systems to deter attacks instead of reacting to them. That way they would win the confidence of the people.

For the Ugandan government, the KIDDP presents a very good blue print for disarmament and development. The government should implement it properly without giving precedence to coercive disarmament. The Kenyan government could borrow a lot from the KIDDP and come up with a similar programme.

Although this study focused on the Karimojong, Pokot and Turkana, it is also applicable to other pastoral communities at the entire Karamoja Cluster, and in the Horn of
Africa at large. To this end the governments of Kenya and Uganda could lobby for a better coordinated joint disarmament that ropes in South Sudan and Ethiopia. It could even be conducted by a joint security force drawn from all the countries. Cross border attacks as well as cross border ethnic alliances take advantage of state sovereignty since security officers pursuing attackers and/or livestock are mandated to advance only up to their country’s border. A joint security force drawn from the entire region and not restricted by state sovereignty could go a long way in addressing the cross-border conflicts and arms trafficking.

In both countries, ethnicity needs to be properly managed both within the countries and at the common border. Ethnic alliances undermine disarmament when people cross the border to the neighboring country together with their livestock and small arms to evade disarmament. Moreover, ethnic animosities particularly between the Pokot and Turkana in Kenya should be dealt with. It emerged from the study that a border dispute between Turkana and West Pokot counties could be the force behind animosities and attacks between the two communities which have been on the rise. It was established that some of the large scale attack targeting whole villages are aimed at displacing people so as to pass some political message particularly concerning the disputed border. This could of course be fuelled by politicians. In Uganda, the Karimojong at some point believed that the UPDF who were unleashing brutality on them were drawn from the Acholi community and were on a revenge mission due to previous attacks that Karimojong launched on the Acholi people.

Finally Kenya and Uganda should actively engage various stakeholders: Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), civil society, the youth, international organizations, media, and the private sector among others in the fight against the small arms menace.

It emerged from the study that emphasis on the need for peaceful and harmonious coexistence with other communities was mainly from female respondents while male respondents stressed on the need for government security provision and protection as prerequisites for voluntary disarmament. Further research could be carried out on gender roles and disarmament so as to establish whether there could be any correlation.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Karamoja Cluster Project, Baseline Survey March, 2014


Mapping of the Disarmament Effort in Karamojong Triangle. *Institute of Security Studies*
_Nairobi, Kenya. November 2009._


Mkutu, K. A. (2008 a). Disarmament in Karamoja, Northern Uganda: Is This a Solution for Localised Violent Inter and Intra-Communal Conflict? The Round Table, 97:394, 99-120 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00358530701844718](http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00358530701844718) (accessed: 29-02-2016)


Preventing Conflict in Karamoja: Early Warning, Security and Development. Centre for Conflict Resolution (June 2011)


World Bank. (1999). The Transition from War to Peace: An Overview
APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR TURKANA
GOVERNMENT DISARMAMENT INITIATIVES AT THE KENYA-UGANDA
BORDER

Dear Respondent,

This is an academic research study. Please answer the following questions as diligently as possible. The information provided in this questionnaire is considered private and confidential and under no circumstances will the information be used apart from academic purpose. Your participation and contribution will be highly appreciated.

SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

Please respond to the questions below by ticking in the boxes provided or filling in the blank spaces provided.

Personal Details

1. Gender of respondent Male ( ) Female ( )

2. Age: □ 0-20 □ 20-30 □ 31-40 □ 41-50 □ 51 & Over

3. Which part of Turkana do you come from?

4. Level of education. Which is your level of education according to the Kenyan (8.4.4) system? Please tick. Primary ( ), Secondary ( ), Graduate ( ), post graduate ( ), Never gone to school ( )

5. Do you hold any position in the community? Yes ( ), No ( )
   If yes, which one? (Please tick)
   Village elder ( ), council of elders ( ), chief ( ) assistant chief ( ), Moran ( ), warrior ( )
   Any other ________________________________

6. What do you do to earn a living? (Tick please)
   Pastoralism ( ), agriculture ( ), business ( ), employed ( ) cattle raiding ( )
   Any other ________________________________
SECTION TWO: SECURITY, DISARMAMENT, AND HUMAN NEEDS

Provision of security

1. Comment briefly about security in your area.

2. Who provides security in your area?

3. What are the threats to security in your area?
   ___________________________________
   ___________________________________
   ___________________________________
   ___________________________________
   ___________________________________
   ___________________________________

4. Whom among the following are you scared of? (please tick)
   Other armed communities ( ), cattle rustlers/raiders ( ), the police ( ), the military ( ),
   KPR ( ), bandits ( ), None ( )

   Why? _____________________________________________

5. Whom would you propose to provide security in your? Please tick.
   The military ( ), the police ( ), the Kenya Police Reserve (KPR) ( ), community Morans ( ),
   yourself ( )
   Any other (s) ___________________________________________________

6. Do you consider it necessary for people (civilians) in your area to possess small arms?
   Yes ( ), No ( )

   Why?
Disarmament by the Kenyan government

Operation Dumisha Amani (I – 2005), II (2010)

1. What do you know about “Operation Dumisha Amani” which was conducted in 2005 and 2010 by the government of Kenya?

2. Please tick appropriately
   - I gave my small arm voluntarily ( )
   - My small arm was forcefully taken from me by security officers ( )
   - I did not give up my small arm ( )
   - I did not have any small arm ( )

3. What did the government offer those who voluntarily disarmed?
   ________________________, ________________________, ________________________, ________________________, ________________________, ________________________, ________________________, ________________________

4. What development initiatives did the government of Kenya carry out in your area prior to during and after operation Dumisha Amani?

5. What alternative livelihoods did the government of Kenya offer you or propose to you?

6. What changes in terms of small arms reduction and reduction of insecurity in your community since operation Dumisha Amani was conducted?

   Are there people who still carry guns in your community? Yes ( ), no ( )

7. A) How did the operation affect your means of livelihood?

8. Have you witnessed any attacks involving small arms or heard of any since operation Dumisha Amani II (since 2010)? Yes ( ) No ( )

   If yes, How many? (tick please) 0-10 ( ), 11-20 ( ), 21-30 ( ), 30 – 40 ( ), 41 - 50 ( ), 50 and above ( )
9. Would you like the government to conduct more similar disarmament operations like operation *Dumisha Amani* in your area? Yes ( ), No ( )

10. What other disarmament initiatives has the government of Kenya carried out in your area?

11. Whom would you want the government to disarm?

   ___________________________  ___________________________  ___________________________
   ___________________________  ___________________________  ___________________________
   ___________________________  ___________________________  ___________________________

12. Where do people in your area/community get their small arms from?

13. What do you think is the greatest problem affecting people in your area?

14. What would you advise the government of Kenya concerning disarmament in your area?

**Human needs and disarmament**

1. How important are the following needs to you? Write the needs below in the categories that you would put them in the pyramid below.

   Health care, Food, shelter, security/protection/safety, education, car, recognition/high status in the society, peace among neighbors, roads/infrastructure, political and economic inclusion

   *You are also free to add any other needs you may have in the pyramid.*
2. Which of the above services has the Kenyan government provided in your area?

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

3. What in your opinion what should the Kenyan government do to people in your area/community in order for people to voluntarily surrender their arms?

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

4. Are you able to provide food, shelter and clothing for your family? (for those with families)
   Yes ( ), No ( )
   If no, what would you say is the problem? ____________________________

5. Do you feel that your government recognizes and takes care of you as a citizen of Kenya?
   Yes ( ), No ( )
   Please comment. _____________________________________

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION
APPENDIX 2: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR WEST POKOT

GOVERNMENT DISARMAMENT INITIATIVES AT THE KENYA-UGANDA BORDER

Dear Respondent,

This is an academic research study. Please answer the following questions as diligently as possible. The information provided in this questionnaire is considered private and confidential and under no circumstances will the information be used apart from academic purpose. Your participation and contribution will be highly appreciated.

SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

Please respond to the questions below by ticking in the boxes provided or filling in the blank spaces provided.

Personal Details

7. Gender of respondent  Male ( )  Female ( )

8. Age:  ☐ 0-20  20-30 ☐  31-40 ☐  41-50 ☐  51 & Over ☐

9. Which part of West Pokot do you come from?

10. Level of education: Kindly indicate your level of education according to the Kenyan (8.4.4) system? *Tick please.*
    Primary ( ), Secondary ( ), Graduate ( ), post graduate ( ), Never gone to school ( )

11. Do you hold any position in the community? Yes ( ), No ( )
    If yes, which one? *(Tick please)*
    Village elder ( ), council of elders ( ), chief ( ) assistant chief ( ), Moran ( ), warrior ( )
    Any other ________________________________

12. What do you do to earn a living? *(Tick please)*
    Pastoralism ( ), agriculture ( ), business ( ), employed ( ) cattle raiding ( )
    Any other ________________________________
SECTION TWO: SECURITY, DISARMAMENT, AND HUMAN NEEDS

Provision of security

7. Comment briefly about security in your area.

8. Who provides security in your area?

9. What are the threats to security in your area?

10. Whom among the following are you scared of? (please tick)
    Other armed communities ( ), cattle rustlers/raiders ( ), the police ( ), the military ( ),
    KPR ( ), bandits ( ), None ( )

    Why? ____________________________

11. Whom would you propose to provide security in your? Please tick.

    The military ( ), the police ( ), the Kenya Police Reserve (KPR) ( ), community Morans ( ),
    yourself ( )

    Any other (s) ____________________________

12. Do you consider it necessary for people (civilians) in your area to possess small arms?

    Yes ( ), No ( )

    Why?

Disarmament by the Kenyan government

Operation Dumisha Amani (I – 2005), II (2010)

15. What do you know about “Operation Dumisha Amani” which was conducted in 2005 and 2010 by the government of Kenya?

16. Please tick appropriately

    I gave my small arm voluntarily ( )
    My small arm was forcefully taken from me by security officers ( )
    I did not give up my small arm ( )
    I did not have any small arm ( )
17. What did the government offer those who voluntarily disarmed?

_________________, ____________________, ____________________, ____________________
_________________, ____________________, ____________________

18. What development initiatives did the government of Kenya carry out in your area prior to
during and after operation *Dumisha Amani*?

19. What alternative livelihoods did the government of Kenya offer you or propose to you?

20. What changes in terms of small arms reduction and reduction of insecurity in your
community since operation *Dumisha Amani* was conducted?

Are there people who still carry guns in your community? Yes ( ), no ( )

21. A) How did the operation affect your means of livelihood?

22. Have you witnessed any attacks involving small arms or heard of any since operation
*Dumisha Amani II (since 2010)*? Yes ( ) No ( )

If yes, How many? (tick please) 0-10 ( ), 11-20 ( ), 21-30 ( ), 30 – 40 ( ),
41 - 50 ( ), 50 and above ( )

23. Would you like the government to conduct more similar disarmament operations like
operation *Dumisha Amani* in your area? Yes ( ), No ( )

24. What other disarmament initiatives has the government of Kenya carried out in your
area?

25. Whom would you want the government to disarm?

________________________      ___________________   ___________________
____________   _________________   ______________

26. Where do people in your area/community get their small arms from?

27. What do you think is the greatest problem affecting people in your area?

28. What would you advise the government of Kenya concerning disarmament in your area?

**Human needs and disarmament**

6. How important are the following needs to you? Write the needs below in the categories
that you would put them in the pyramid below.
Health care, Food, shelter, security/protection/safety, education, car, recognition/high status in the society, peace among neighbors, roads/infrastructure, political and economic inclusion

You are also free to add any other needs you may have in the pyramid.

7. Which of the above services has the Kenyan government provided in your area?

8. What in your opinion what should the Kenyan government do to people in your area/community in order for people to voluntarily surrender their arms?

9. Are you able to provide food, shelter and clothing for your family? (for those with families)
   Yes ( ), No ( )
   If no, what would you say is the problem? ____________________________

10. Do you feel that your government recognizes and takes care of you as a citizen of Kenya?
    Yes ( ), No ( )

    Please comment. ____________________________________________

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION