

**UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**

**DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL WORK**

**THE IMPACTS OF DOWNWARD ACCOUNTABILITY ON THE APPROPRIATENESS  
OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE- A CASE STUDY OF ANGLICAN  
DEVELOPMENT SERVICES (ADS) HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN BORI AND  
ADADI SUB LOCATIONS IN MARSABIT COUNTY.**

**BY**

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**C50/79727/2012**

**A Research project submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of  
the degree of Master of Arts in Sociology( Advanced disaster management)**

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### **Declaration**

I declare that this research project is my original work and has not been submitted to any other university for academic credit.

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### **Dedication**

I dedicate this research project to my wife Risper Chebet, my children Dennis, Edgar, Joy, Ian and parents Andrew Onyango and Mary Akelo Onyango who despite never having acquired higher education, believed in education and took me to school at an early age. May God bless them.

## **List of Abbreviations and Acronyms**

<b>ADS MKE</b> .....	Anglican Development Services of Mount Kenya East
<b>ALNAP</b> .....	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
<b>BOND</b> .....	British Overseas NGOs for Development
<b>CRS</b> .....	Catholic Relief Services
<b>DEC</b> .....	Disaster Emergency Committee
<b>ECB</b> .....	Emergency Capacity Building
<b>HAP</b> .....	Humanitarian Accountability Partnership
<b>ID</b> .....	Identity card
<b>IEBC</b> - .....	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
<b>IDPs</b> .....	Internally Displaced persons
<b>JEEAR</b> .....	Joint Evaluation on Emergency Assistance in Rwanda
<b>MOU</b> .....	Memorandum of Understanding
<b>OECD DAC</b> .....	Organisation for Economic Corporation and Development, Development Assistance Committee
<b>TEC</b> .....	Tsunami Evaluation Coalition

**UCCS**.....Ukamba Christian Community Services

**UNICEF**.....United Nations Children’s Fund

## Table of Contents

<b>Acknowledgements .....</b>	<b>ii</b>
<b>Dedication .....</b>	<b>iii</b>
<b>Abstract.....</b>	<b>xii</b>
<b>CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Background to the study .....	1
1.2. Problem Statement .....	3
1.3 Objectives of the Study .....	6
1.3.1 Main objective: .....	6
1.3.2 Specific objectives .....	6
1.4 Scope and limitations .....	6
1.4.1. Scope.....	6
1.4.2 Limitations .....	7
<b>CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK.....</b>	<b>8</b>
2.1 Review of empirical literature.....	8
2.2. Theoretical Literature.....	16
2.2.1. Voice Exit, Loyalty Theory .....	20
2.2.2. Resource dependence theories .....	22
2.2.3. Principal Agent Theory .....	24
<b>CHAPTER 3- METHODS .....</b>	<b>29</b>
3.1- Site description and selection criteria .....	29
3.1.1. Site selection .....	29
3.1.2. Site selection criteria.....	30
3.2. Sampling .....	32

3.2.1. Target population .....	32
3.2.2. Unit of analysis and unit of observation. ....	33
3.2.3. Procedure for respondent Selection .....	33
3.3. Techniques of data collection. ....	35
3.4. Techniques of Data Analysis .....	38
3.4.1. Techniques for answering the research questions.....	38
<b>CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS .....</b>	<b>45</b>
4.1 Introduction.....	45
4.2 Demographic characteristics of the respondents.....	46
4.2.1 Distribution of respondents by age .....	47
4.2.2. Distribution of respondents by level of education .....	49
4.2.3. Respondents main sources of income .....	50
4.3. Answer to research question 1. ....	52
4.3.1. Impacts of downward accountability mechanisms on aid appropriateness.....	52
4.3.1.1. Information sharing with relief assistance beneficiaries .....	55
4.3.1.2. Impacts of information sharing on aid appropriateness and effectiveness.....	58
4.3.1.3. Participation of targeted households in delivery of relief assistance .....	60
4.3.1.4. Complaints and response mechanisms established during relief assistance. ....	67
4.4. Answer to research question 2. ....	75
4.4.1. Socio-cultural barriers in the implementation of downward accountability .....	75
4.4.2. Addressing the socio-cultural barriers. ....	79
4.4.3. Downward accountability mechanisms and decision making ability .....	83
4.5. Answer to research question 3. ....	86
4.5.1. Successes and failures of downward accountability mechanisms. ....	86
<b>CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS ...</b>	<b>95</b>
5.1. Summary of research findings .....	95



5.2. Conclusions.....	102
5.3. Recommendations.....	104
5.4. Areas of further research.....	106
References.....	107
Internet sources .....	114
6.1. Annexes .....	116
Annex 1: Interview schedule for household heads .....	116
Annex 2: Key informants interview guide.....	123
Annex 3: Focus group discussion guide .....	130
Annex 4: Data Analysis matrixes .....	133
Annex 5: Project budget information.....	136
Annex 6: Water distribution list.....	137
Annex 7: Memorandum of understanding -MOU.....	138
Annex 8: Complaints and feedback form .....	139
Annex 9: Committee meeting minutes.....	140
Annex 10: Community fuel register .....	142
Annex 11: water provision worksheet .....	143
Annex 12: Water tanks provided during relief.....	144
Annex 13: Evidence of information about donors that supported ADS MKE.....	145

<b>List of tables</b>	<b>Page</b>
<b>Table 1- Distribution of respondents by sex .....</b>	<b>46</b>
<b>Table 2-Information sharing with respondents- Adadi and Bori combined.....</b>	<b>54</b>
<b>Table 3- Impacts of information sharing on aid appropriateness .....</b>	<b>57</b>
<b>Table 4- Level of participation by household heads in delivery of relief assistance.....</b>	<b>60</b>
<b>Table 5- Level of participation by household heads in relief assistance and its impacts .....</b>	<b>64</b>
<b>Table 6- Level of knowledge and usage of Complaints and response mechanism–Adadi- Bori.....</b>	<b>67</b>
<b>Table 7- Complaints and response mechanisms and their impacts on aid appropriateness .....</b>	<b>70</b>
<b>Table 8-Summary of impacts of downward accountability mechanisms on appropriateness .....</b>	<b>73</b>
<b>Table 9: Socio-cultural barriers that impede the implementation of downward accountability.....</b>	<b>76</b>
<b>Table 10- Proposed ways of addressing socio-cultural barriers to downward accountability.....</b>	<b>79</b>
<b>Table 11- People who held decision making power-Adadi and Bori .....</b>	<b>83</b>
<b>Table 12 - Indicators of the successes of downward accountability mechanisms .....</b>	<b>87</b>
<b>Table 13. Indicators of the failures of downward accountability mechanisms.....</b>	<b>93</b>

<b>List of figures</b>	<b>Page</b>
<b>Figure 1-Conceptual Framework .....</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>Figure 2- Map of Kenya .....</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>Figure 3- IEBC revised Moyale constituency county assembly wards .....</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>Figure 4- Distribution of Respondents by sex .....</b>	<b>46</b>
<b>Figure 5– Distribution of respondents by age .....</b>	<b>47</b>
<b>Figure 6 – Distribution of respondents by age .....</b>	<b>47</b>
<b>Figure 7-Respondents number of children .....</b>	<b>48</b>
<b>Figure 8- Respondents number of children .....</b>	<b>48</b>
<b>Figure 9- Distribution of respondents by level of education .....</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>Figure 10- Distribution of respondents by level of education .....</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>Figure 11- Respondents main sources of income.....</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>Figure 12- Respondents main sources of income .....</b>	<b>51</b>
<b>Figure 13-Information sharing with respondents – Adadi .....</b>	<b>54</b>
<b>Figure 14- Information sharing with respondents – Bori.....</b>	<b>55</b>
<b>Figure 15- Impacts of information sharing on aid appropriateness and effectiveness .....</b>	<b>58</b>
<b>Figure 16- Level of participation by relief beneficiaries in delivery of relief assistance –Adadi .....</b>	<b>61</b>
<b>Figure 17- Level of participation by relief beneficiaries in delivery of relief assistance –Bori.....</b>	<b>61</b>
<b>Figure 18- Level of participation by household heads in relief assistance and its impacts .....</b>	<b>64</b>
<b>Figure 19- Level of knowledge and usage of Complaints and response mechanism –Adadi .....</b>	<b>68</b>
<b>Figure 20- Level of knowledge and usage of Complaints and response mechanisms –Bori .....</b>	<b>68</b>
<b>Figure 21- Complaints and response mechanisms and their impacts on aid appropriateness.....</b>	<b>71</b>
<b>Figure 22-Summary of impacts of downward accountability mechanisms on appropriateness .....</b>	<b>74</b>
<b>Figure 23: Socio-cultural barriers that impede the implementation of downward accountability...77</b>	
<b>Figure 24- Proposed ways of addressing socio-cultural barriers to downward accountability-.....</b>	<b>81</b>
<b>Figure 25-People who held decision making power on relief assistance-Adadi .....</b>	<b>84</b>

**Figure 26-People who held decision making power on receive relief assistance –Bori..... 84**  
**Figure 27- Indicators of the successes of downward accountability mechanisms .....88**  
**Figure 28 Indicators of the failures of downward accountability mechanisms .....94**

## **Abstract**

The term downward accountability is used to describe the extent to which an NGO is accountable to the intended beneficiaries. Recent studies (Featherstone, 2013: 27) have shown that downward accountability is important in delivery of humanitarian assistance. However, other scholars like Riddel (1999: 223) have questioned whether Humanitarian Assistance Agencies are responsible for exaggerating the importance of downward accountability in delivery of humanitarian assistance. This is interesting because on one hand, there is recognition that downward accountability is important while on the other there are questions around the essence of the mechanisms. The purpose of this study was therefore to assess the use of these mechanisms and their impacts on the appropriateness of humanitarian assistance. The study focused on Anglican Development Services humanitarian assistance programs in 2011. Two locations were compared, one where the mechanisms were applied in Adadi with another where the mechanisms were not applied in Bori. It was guided by the following objectives: To describe the successes and failures of downward accountability mechanisms on the appropriateness and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance; to assess the socio-cultural barriers to the establishment and implementation of downward accountability mechanisms and identify the measures that can be put in place by stakeholders to improve the voice and bargaining power of disaster affected communities. It adopted a case study approach and was based on three theories: Voice, exit and loyalty theory; Resource dependency theory and principal agent theory. Primary data were collected from 94 households out of the sampled 98 households using interview schedules. The 94 households represented a response rate of 95%. The study also utilised key informant interviews, direct observation and group interviews as methods of data collection.

The research findings suggest that where the three pillars of downward accountability mechanisms- information sharing, complaints and response and participation were applied in Adadi, they were effective in enhancing appropriateness of humanitarian assistance through improved targeting and meeting the needs of the target group at 74%, 85% and 77% respectively. The mechanisms also improved beneficiaries' ownership of the relief process at 64%, 74% and 72% respectively. However, only participation was seen to enhance sustainability of programs at 85%. These results were not evident in Bori where the mechanisms were not applied showing that the existence of the mechanisms helped in enhancing appropriateness of assistance. On the other hand, the mechanisms were not effective in helping beneficiaries to make demands on Humanitarian Assistance Agencies or address fraud and mismanagement of aid both of which scored 32% and below. On the second research question, the study revealed that the top three socio-cultural barriers to the implementation of downward accountability mechanisms were language barrier at 89%, trusting the committee for representation (87%) and culture of being grateful/not questioning those who assist (81%). Under the third research question, the study found that the three key indicators of success of the mechanisms included availability of signed distribution lists (98%), community knowledge and participation in developing the targeting criteria (89%) and evidence of complaints made and response to the complaints (77). These were not evident in Bori where the mechanisms were not applied indicating that the downward accountability mechanisms deliver results in enhancement of aid appropriateness and effectiveness. The key recommendations from the study are; Future humanitarian responses should use a combination of accountability mechanisms to ensure maximum success; Informal complaints and feedback processes should be adopted in highly illiterate communities; Pictorial information should be used to depict key program details like relief entitlements.

## **CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION**

### **1.1 Background to the study**

The discourse on downward accountability in humanitarian assistance is based on participation literature on participation. It is also about voice and power of disaster-affected people in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The term downward accountability is used to describe the level to which an NGO is accountable to those at the lower end of humanitarian assistance mainly to the targeted beneficiaries. According to British Overseas NGOs for Development (BOND, 2006: V), 'it is often used loosely, to describe the extent to which the NGO is transparent about its actions, and listens and responds to those lower down the aid chain, involving them in decision-making'.

Downward accountability is related to the concept of self-reliance and empowerment. Quoting early philosophers Dewey and Tufts (1908:302), Ellerman (2001: 12) emphasized that a self-directed accountable interaction would work to establish the conditions which permit others freely to exercise their own powers from their initiative, reflection, and choice. It is about the transfer of power from those with more power to those with less power. It is also about the ability of people with less power to increase their influence on decisions that affect them.

The purpose of downward accountability is to release power to those further down the aid delivery system for example from an NGO to its intended beneficiaries (BOND, 2006: V). It involves influencing humanitarian assistance agencies by participating in decisions about project activities including decisions around design, targeting and appropriateness of aid, information sharing, giving feedback and generally making their voice heard. According to Najam (1996:

345), downward accountability' refers primarily to relationships with groups to whom NGOs provide services. Ellerman (2001:37) makes the case that development is only effective when its activities are owned by local people themselves; people need not only to "participate" but to be in the driver's seat in order to make their actions their own and to make their learning their own. Schumacher (1973:168-9) emphasises the point of evolution and moving with the doer's and says that 'the primary causes of extreme poverty are immaterial; they lie in certain deficiencies in education, organization, and discipline.... here lies the reason why development cannot be an act of creation, why it cannot be ordered, bought, comprehensively planned: why it requires a process of evolution'.

The World Bank (1996: 5) says 'development experience has shown that when external experts alone acquire, analyse, and process information and then present this information in reports, social change usually does not take place; whereas the kind of "social learning" that stakeholders generate and internalize during the participatory planning and/or implementation of a development activity does enable social change'. All these views make a case for the importance of development and humanitarian actors involving and being accountable to people in the decisions that affect their lives.



## **1.2. Problem Statement**

Humanitarian assistance Agencies have increasingly tried to be more accountable to the beneficiaries that they seek to serve with varied successes and failures. Recent studies have shown an increase in rhetoric and several downward accountability initiatives and codes of conduct, however, as Keystone (2006: 3) notes, the issue of accountability to the beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance remains highly elusive, and are addressed systematically by only a handful of agencies. In some cases, according to Riddell (1999: 223), NGOs are themselves responsible for exaggerating their claims to legitimacy and impact without actual monitoring and assessment of their accomplishments. Second, according to Ebrahim (2002: 85), ‘many donors admit that they generally do not know how accountable their grantees are to beneficiaries and that they use the proxy that if they perceive an NGO to be a ‘good organization’, then it must surely be accountable to its beneficiaries’.

Most studies on downward accountability have focused on assessing the existence of these mechanisms and their intended benefits. However there is limited research on the contribution that downward accountability makes in aid effectiveness, appropriateness and efficiency. For example, the downward accountability component of the joint evaluation on the international response to the Tsunami mainly focused on assessing the existence or otherwise of these mechanisms and found that the public accountability of the international efforts toward intended beneficiaries appeared virtually non-existent (Tsunami Evaluation coalition, 2006: 93). Oxfam’s evaluation of the emergency food security and urban livelihoods program in Kenya, Haiti and Gaza showed that these downward accountability mechanisms had mixed results. For example regarding participation, it says: in the development of the initial proposal for crisis response, the

views of people living in urban informal settlements were taken into account in as much as their experiences of crisis were presented as a case for funding (Macauslan and Phelps, 2012:70). In Haiti, Save the children and CARE international evaluation showed that disaster-affected populations felt a lack of clear information about what agencies were planning and doing (Emergency capacity building project, 2010:32). In all these cases, the focus has been on assessing the existence and benefits of downward accountability within agency projects without a critical look into the impacts of downward accountability mechanism on aid effectiveness, appropriateness and efficiency.

The main questions in the downward accountability debate have always been ‘why does downward accountability matter? How do you ensure that the beneficiaries can hold the donors and NGOs accountable, track progress and ensure that they are not just passive recipients of aid? According to Featherstone (2013: 27) most of us would respond that downward accountability matters because it is both moral and ethical to use the resources held in trust for other people according to the wishes and best interest of those people. However, NGO practitioners and stakeholders have made compelling moral and practical arguments for having downward accountability in humanitarian assistance. For example, Egeland (2005:2) suggested that downward accountability improves effectiveness of humanitarian programs by ensuring that goods and services are relevant to the people’s needs and that this helps ensure sustainability.

Other scholars like Kilby (2006: 952), have taken a cynical view that the extent of downward accountability is discretionary and relies on the ‘grace and favour’ of practitioners. Edwards and Hulme (1996: 25), casts doubt on the impacts of downward accountability stressing that service

organizations offer much less powerful forms of voice and exit to their clients, except in highly competitive contexts where clients have multiple service providers from which to choose. They go further to say that beneficiaries of an NGO, cannot hold it accountable in the same way that members can in membership organisations. According to Edwards and Hulme (1996: 25), clients and beneficiaries of NGOs are in a ‘take it or leave it’ relationship, quite similar to that of customers and employees of private firms.

All these arguments about the benefits or otherwise of downward accountability make good sense and sound credible. However, the inherent contradictions in view points and limited evidence on how downward accountability impacts on the appropriateness of humanitarian aid should be studied further. Most of the moral, personal and ethical arguments in favour of the benefits of downward accountability have been made mainly by humanitarian assistance agencies, humanitarian practitioners, donors and other key staff members of the humanitarian aid system with little research and/or empirical evidence linking downward accountability to aid effectiveness and appropriateness. The only attempt so far, at a systematic investigation of the link between accountability, impact and aid appropriateness has been by Andy Featherstone in June 2013 in Makueni Kenya titled ‘*improving impact – do accountability mechanisms deliver results?*’ However in his recommendations, he emphasized the need for further studies saying that ‘*at best the lack of evidence on the link between downward accountability, aid effectiveness and impact ... represents a missed opportunity, at worst it highlights a failure to understand and communicate the impact that assistance is having on communities*’(Featherstone, 2013: 27).

## **1.3 Objectives of the Study**

### **1.3.1 Main objective:**

To assess the impacts of downward accountability on the appropriateness of humanitarian assistance

### **1.3.2 Specific objectives**

- 1) To describe the impacts of downward accountability mechanisms on the appropriateness of humanitarian assistance.
- 2) To assess the socio-cultural barriers to the establishment and implementation of downward accountability mechanisms and identify the measures that can be put in place by stakeholders to improve the voice and bargaining power of disaster affected communities.
- 3) To assess and evaluate the main successes and failures of downward accountability mechanisms in the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

## **1.4 Scope and limitations**

### **1.4.1. Scope**

The research broadly assessed the impacts of downward accountability on humanitarian assistance in Bori and Adadi sub-locations in Butiye and Obbu wards in Moyale, Marsabit County. One part of the study focused on Adadi sub-locations where Anglican Development services of Mount Kenya East (ADS MKE) applied the mechanisms and compared these with those in Bori sub-location where ADS MKE provided humanitarian assistance without these mechanisms being put in place. The main informants were those who received humanitarian assistance and the key stakeholders including government officials.

In seeking to assess the impacts of downward accountability mechanisms on aid appropriateness, the study focused on three benchmarks of the accountability and quality management from the humanitarian accountability partnership (HAP) standard 2010: **information sharing, participation and complaints and response**. In this research, these three are considered to form the basis of downward accountability mechanisms in humanitarian assistance.

#### **1.4.2 Limitations**

Due to the small size of the area of study, the fact that due to funding constraints the Anglican Development Services applied these mechanisms in some locations and not in others and the limited time to cover a wider geographical area, the results cannot be used to generalize on the overall impacts of downward accountability mechanisms in the whole of the humanitarian sector or in Kenya. At best, the findings will increase the evidence-base of the impacts of downward accountability on aid appropriateness and contribute to the understanding of the key benefits, impacts or otherwise of establishing downward accountability mechanisms during emergency response.

## **CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK**

### **2.1 Review of empirical literature**

Concerns about downward accountability in humanitarian assistance agencies have increased over the past two decades, mainly due to recent scandals that reduced public confidence in non-profit organizations. According to Dabelstein (1996:1), ‘the shortcomings exposed in the Joint Evaluation on Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (JEEAR) of 1996 – including poor coordination, limited accountability to genocide survivors and aid being directed to perpetrators of violence – provided a strong impetus for the humanitarian community to professionalise its work, recognise the potential for abuse and adverse effects, promote accountability to those affected and create mechanisms to promote and monitor positive outcomes’. Although downward accountability is emphasized in humanitarian assistance, critical evidence based data is still lacking on how it contributes to aid appropriateness and efficiency. This gap in evidence is shown in the research by Featherstone (2013: 27) in Makueni Kenya, which stressed that the *lack of evidence on the link between downward accountability, aid effectiveness and impact ... represents a missed opportunity*. In addition, in Moyale during the evaluation of the ADS humanitarian response in 2014, Abena (2015:17) mentioned that ADS had good practices of downward accountability; however the impacts of these mechanisms on the appropriateness of the assistance given were not assessed.

#### **2.1.1. Field experiences on downward accountability**

Empirical literature on downward accountability is mainly found in evaluation findings of humanitarian responses such as the Tsunami joint evaluation findings of 2006, Save the children and Care international joint evaluation of Haiti response in 2010 and the Disaster Emergency

Committee(DEC) evaluation for the East and horn of Africa crisis in 2012 amongst others. Even in these cases, authors like Macauslan and Phelps (2012:71) stress that the views of people in crisis are taken into account in as much as their experiences of crisis are presented as a case for funding. Truelove and Duncalf (2012:9) also stress that feedback mechanisms are mainly effective in capturing simple operational issues for example corrections to beneficiary ID cards, replacing lost ID cards but not larger operational issues like aid effectiveness and impact. Due to the project specific nature of these evaluations for example the Tsunami evaluation in 2006 and the Haiti earthquake response in 2010, focus is usually on whether the downward accountability mechanisms were applied or not without an in-depth comparative study of their impacts in areas where they have been applied and where they were not applied.

A review of findings from NGOs in diverse fields such as Oxfam's evaluation of the emergency food security and urban livelihoods program in Kenya, Haiti and Gaza in 2012, Catholic Relief services (CRS) evaluation of transitional Shelter response in west Sumatra in 2012 or Concern Worldwide evaluation in Ethiopia in 2012, indicate that most agencies focus on participation, information sharing, complaints and response as the main means to achieve downward accountability to disaster affected people. However, the effectiveness of some of these approaches is also contested due to power dynamics between the providers and recipients of humanitarian assistance. For example, regarding participation in Oxfam projects, Macauslan and Phelps (2012:71) point that there was no detailed participation in the overall design of the program itself and in cases where consultation happened, those consulted and those in charge of the final selection were representatives rather than 'ordinary' community members. This point to the fact that even where participation mechanism is applied, the degree of participation differs

and the voice of the beneficiary population may be compromised by a focus on representative as opposed to the wider beneficiary population.

Although some of the literature such as Featherstone (2013: 27) suggests that downward accountability is critical in aid effectiveness and appropriateness, others like Macauslan and Phelps (2012:70) show that in some cases, these processes are established mainly as tick boxes to fulfil external requirement for funding.

From the above findings, it is clear that most humanitarian evaluation studies have neither addressed the broader challenges of downward accountability nor the barriers that hinder the effective use of the accountability mechanisms. In addition, apart from Featherstone (2013: 27), the studies above have not assessed the impacts of these mechanisms on effectiveness and quality of aid including how participation informed targeting, how beneficiary voice informed program quality and whether complaints/ feedback changed the design and implementation of the program. None of the above studies have shown how the information shared with beneficiaries influenced the appropriateness, speed, effectiveness and delivery of the assistance. In other words, they focused mainly on assessing whether the mechanism were established and how they were used, as opposed to a comprehensive analysis of the links between the accountability processes and the appropriateness and effectiveness of the assistance provided.

These findings go further to support the cynical views that have been expressed about the benefits of downward accountability by scholars like Kilby (2006: 952) who have emphasized the voluntary nature of downward accountability processes. They also support scholars like



Edwards and Hulme (1996: 25) who have cast doubt on the impacts of complaints and response in aid settings. These findings lend credence to the importance of further investigation of the links between downward accountability mechanisms and the appropriateness and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance.

In Haiti, the emergency capacity building (ECB) (2010:32) evaluation of Save the children and CARE international programs highlighted similar concerns. The findings showed that disaster-affected populations felt a lack of clear information about what agencies were planning and doing; agencies did not successfully communicate about their work with these populations, for many of the participants in the focus group discussions (FGDs), it was their first contact with NGO staff. In the case of the Tsunami response (TEC Capacities Report, 2006: 75), the downward accountability mechanisms put in place by NGOs were largely ineffective and did not cover the whole population. The report says, 'despite these mechanisms, accountability and complaints mechanisms overall were not commensurate with the scale of the funding. They were largely ineffective in addressing the worst cases of inappropriate aid, wastefulness and negligence among internationally, nationally and locally managed recovery programmes' (TEC Capacities Report, 2006: 75). However the report does not give any reasons why the mechanism were ineffective nor does it provide any solutions as to what should have been done to improve their efficiency to address the inappropriate aid, wastefulness and negligence.

The above evidence points to the fact that even in large scale responses, humanitarian agencies still struggle to get the best out of their accountability mechanisms and in most cases, these mechanisms do not deliver on their promise and are largely ineffective. The first question

therefore to explore is to identify and describe the mechanism employed to ensure accountability in humanitarian assistance. Secondly, address the barriers and challenges experienced in delivering humanitarian assistance in an-accountable manner. Thirdly, address the means of overcoming these challenges to downward accountability in the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

In Somalia, which is an arid and pastoralist country similar to Marsabit where the study was conducted, beneficiary feedback systems tended to work, but the benefits were not very clearly articulated in the evaluation of the program. The feedback mechanism was effective in capturing simple operational issues for example corrections to beneficiary ID cards, replacing lost ID cards and also in highlighting cases of taxation (Truelove and Duncalf, 2012:9). However, on other broader operational issues like fraud, targeting, aid appropriateness and participation there were no cases highlighted; this shows a general weakness of downward accountability processes to handle sensitive issues. In Marsabit, Abena (2015:16), the gap was also noted indicating that complaints and response mechanism did not capture sensitive issues even when the people were aware of the availability of the mechanism. Secondly, the study in both Marsabit and Somalia did not analyze the links between the accountability processes and the appropriateness, and effectiveness of the assistance. They did not highlight how the feedback was used to change the design of the program and whether the feedback enhanced the voice of the disaster affected people or not. The fact that the accountability processes also largely failed to deliver on their promise in a large scale response like the East Africa crisis response, clearly shows that there are underlying barriers both internal and external to the organizations that need to be investigated so

that appropriate measures can be put in place to enhance the results of downward accountability in future.

In the case of Concern Worldwide, Valster and Shegute (2012: 18) found that the response in Ethiopia focused on whether downward accountability mechanisms were put in place or not. However, the evaluators did not delve into whether these mechanisms improved the quality, appropriateness and effectiveness of assistance.

Kraft, et al (2010:14), in their evaluation of Catholic Relief Services transitional Shelter response in West Sumatra, noted that accountability mechanisms did not seem to enhance targeting and quality of assistance. The report says that community members were generally not aware of the targeting criteria defined by CRS, many beneficiaries, especially vulnerable ones, did not know why they received the assistance, even though they appreciated it and used the cash grant to build a 'pondok'<sup>1</sup>. According to Kraft, et al (2010:14), the complaints and response system also had their misgivings, for example, a 24-hour hotline was established with a phone number, posted in a central location in each community by the beneficiary list, which community members could call to provide feedback or submit complaints. This phone line received some feedback, but most community members did not know about this option.

### **2.1.2. Limitations of empirical literature on downward accountability**

The above findings show that most empirical data on downward accountability have focused on evidencing the existence and usage of accountability mechanisms as opposed to an analysis of the links between these mechanisms and the appropriateness and effectiveness of humanitarian

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<sup>1</sup> A 'pondok' is a local name in Indonesia for a small house or cottage

assistance. Although the general consensus is that downward accountability is a good thing and can benefit humanitarian work, studies on their overall effectiveness in influencing aid delivery are still scanty. The closest study that tried to answer the question about the link with aid effectiveness, appropriateness and impact is the one by Featherstone in Makueni, Kenya. In the study, the researcher highlighted that there was an explicit link on the contribution of downward accountability on the relevance of the assistance provided. It shows that ‘an explicit link was made between participation of the affected community and the successful targeting of the most vulnerable participants’ (Featherstone, 2013: 19). Regarding effectiveness, the study observed that the use of mass meetings to inform communities about the project ensured that knowledge was widespread and the NGO UCCS, had a good understanding of what they had achieved (Featherstone, 2013: 19).

All these findings by Featherstone (2013: 27) seem to be positive, however in his conclusions and recommendations, Featherstone was baffled that although there seems to be evidence of the importance of downward accountability most agencies are not using them across the board in their work. Although he saw some evidence of the links between downward accountability and aid effectiveness and relevance, he bemoaned the limited evidence on the same saying that ‘*at best the lack of evidence on the link between downward accountability, aid effectiveness and impact ... represents a missed opportunity, at worst it highlights a failure to understand and communicate the impact that assistance is having on communities*’ (Featherstone, 2013: 27). He recommended further research to build the evidence base.

In addition, Featherstone (2013: 27) did not explore the issue of power, voice and exit options for the beneficiaries in his analysis. He assumed that the communities had access to these and that the organisations had a goodwill attitude to offer the best in service. Without analysing the underlying power dynamics in the communities and in the organisations, Featherstone missed out on a comprehensive assessment of the role that agencies, individuals and communal power can play in the success or otherwise of the accountability mechanisms. It is also possible to question his assertions of the direct link that he noted between downward accountability processes and aid effectiveness since without an analysis of power (both of the NGOs and community members), voice and exit options, it cannot be possible to get a comprehensive picture of the factors at play in NGO accountability processes. His evidence should therefore be put to further scrutiny. Secondly, in Kenya, the case studies focused on a few locations mainly in sedentary agricultural communities settings where longer term humanitarian assistance was being offered. There is limited evidence as to whether the findings will hold true on transitory pastoralist communities.

From the above findings, the key gaps and questions that need further inquiry include: What socio-cultural barriers impede the implementation of downward accountability amongst disaster affected people and how can these be addressed to enhance the voice and power of disaster affected people in the delivery of humanitarian assistance? What are the underlying power dynamics that impact on the successes and failures of downward accountability mechanisms in the delivery of humanitarian assistance?

## 2.2. Theoretical Literature

Accountability as a term is broad, complex and difficult to define. On one hand, Ebrahim and Weisband (2007:2) say that ‘its implementation is regarded as a kind of panacea to punish unethical, illegal, or inappropriate behaviour by public officials, corporate executives and non-profit leaders’. On the other, scholars like Edwards and Hulme (1996: 25) stress that ‘lack of power and choice can make it difficult to enforce accountability measures’.

The challenge in defining accountability is shown in the attempt in 1995 by the *Non-profit Management and Leadership institute* that produced a special issue on the theme of accountability. However, as Cnaan (1996: 221) noted in a subsequent letter to the editor, ‘none of the five contributing authors adequately defined accountability, either on the assumption that we knew what the term meant or for lack of a clear definition’. The problem of defining accountability arises from both its socially derived nature and also from the fact that organizations are often faced with multiple accountabilities that shift with time. As a composite concept, the term offers several possible meanings. For example, Edwards and Hulme (1996: 967) define it as ‘the means by which individuals and organizations report to a recognized authority (or authorities) and are held responsible for their actions’. According to this view, accountability is about relationships between at least two actors.

In their study of accountability in the World Bank and NGOs, Fox and Brown (1998:12), describe accountability as ‘the process of holding actors responsible for actions’. Learner and Tetlock (1999:255) describe accountability as ‘the implicit and explicit expectations that anyone may be called upon to justify one’s belief, feelings and actions to others’. Accountability to them

is about both reporting and performance. Cornwall, Lucas, and Pasteur (2000: 3) suggests that accountability is about both being “held responsible” by others and “taking responsibility” for oneself. This view combines the dimensions of a reactive response to those entrusted to oversee work and a proactive one tied to ensuring that public trust is addressed. According to Kogan (1986: 67), accountability refers to a condition under which a role holder renders account to another so that judgment may be made about the adequacy of performance. Kearns (1996: 43), proposes that accountability should be viewed as containing as many as three dimensions: ‘the higher authority to whom organizations and individuals are accountable, the standards of performance for which organizations are held accountable, and the responses to the accountability environment from inside the organization’.

On further analysis, it is clear that even these multiple dimensions of accountability are socially constructed and change with time. This makes the definition of accountability challenging as it can shift based on situation, time and circumstances. For example, Weber (1999:453) in his historical analysis of accountability in American democracy, observes that ‘the conceptualization of democratic accountability, rather than being a sacrosanct concept that all can agree on, varies dramatically over time’.

Accountability can therefore be seen as a means to ensuring that individuals and organizations are held responsible for their actions and performance. Ross (1993: 139), ‘states that the issue of accountability arises as part of the process of delegation. There is a need for accountability when a principal seeks to get an agent to do something for him or her. The principal gives the agent resources or delegates power for a purpose and wish to constrain or provide incentives to the

agent to provide value for money in the use of the resources'. This view would fit well in the downward accountability discourse; however, the recipients of humanitarian assistance are in most cases powerless and dependent on the aid givers thereby lacking power. Edwards (2002: 24), refers to accountability as the obligation to report on one's activities to a set of legitimate authorities.

Terry (2002:51) on the other hand introduces the issue of voice in the accountability dialogue; saying that 'the Humanitarian Accountability project (HAP) aims to be a voice of clients, beneficiaries and claimants of humanitarian assistance'. The Humanitarian Accountability partnership (HAP) (2010:1) on the other hand defines accountability as the means through which power is used responsibly. According to HAP (2010:1), 'it is a process of taking into account the views of, and being held accountable by different stakeholders, and primarily the people affected by authority or power'. This view puts power at the centre of the accountability debate and believes that accountability is particularly necessary for organisations that assist or act on behalf of people affected by or prone to disasters, conflict, poverty or other crises.

The missing point in the debate on accountability is a comprehensive look at how organizations deal with competing accountability demands. According to Najam (1996: 342), 'NGOs can face the competing demands of multiple stakeholders more acutely and regularly than do private firms'. Edwards and Hulme (1996: 967) advances this view, emphasizing that NGOs are accountable to multiple actors including to patrons, to clients, and to themselves. Edwards and Hulme (1996: 967) say that 'NGO-patron accountability or "upward" accountability usually



refers to relationships with donors, foundations, and governments and is often focused on the spending of designated moneys for designated purposes’.

NGO accountability to clients refers primarily to relationships with groups to whom NGOs provide services although it may also include communities or regions indirectly impacted by NGO programs (Najam, 1996: 345). This view is also referred to as “downward” accountability (Edwards and Hulme, 1996: 967). The third category of accountability articulated by Najam concerns NGOs themselves. This internal accountability includes NGOs responsibility to its mission and staff, which includes decision-makers as well as field-level implementers (Najam, 1996: 345). These multiple and competing accountabilities can become even more complicated in cases where NGOs enter into contractual relationships with foreign donors, local governments, and multinational corporations (Meyer, 1999:110–115).

It is apparent from this brief review that accountability is a dynamic concept that changes with time and application. It is both a means through which individuals and organizations are held responsible for their actions and also a way in which organizations and individuals take internal responsibility for their actions, allow external scrutiny and assess performance towards meeting objectives and goals.

Downward accountability can be explained by various theories, which include Hirschmans’ (1970:3) voice, loyalty and exit, resource dependence. It can also be explained by the principal agency theories of Jensen (1963:324), Perrow (1986:235) and Ross (1973:134). Other Scholars

like Cooke and Kothari's (2001: 7) have also delved deeper into the role of participation in downward accountability

### **2.2.1. Voice Exit, Loyalty Theory**

Albert O. Hirschman theory of exit, voice and loyalty can be used to analyse the concept of downward accountability and accountability in organisations. The central tenet of his theory was based on economics where firms produce saleable outputs to customers, Hirschman emphasised that the theory could be applicable to organisations such as voluntary organisations, associations, trade unions or political parties (Hirschman, 1970:3). According to Hirschman, 'members of an organization, whether a business, a nation or any other form of human grouping, have essentially two possible responses when they perceive that the organization is demonstrating a decrease in quality or benefit to the member. They can *exit* (withdraw from the relationship), or they can *voice* (attempt to repair or improve the relationship through communication of the complaint, grievance or proposal for change)' (Hirschman, 1970:4). Following the same argument, downward accountability processes like complaints and response, feedback, participation and information sharing established by Non- Governmental organisations can be used by beneficiaries as key methods of ensuring voice and in its extreme –exit, during humanitarian assistances. However, although this may be true in most organisational settings, the exercise of voice and exit are difficult to effect in disaster settings through downward accountability mechanism due to power imbalances. For example, Butler (2005: 11) says that the key barrier in this accountability debate whether downwards or upwards is based on the fact that we give an account only when it is requested, and only when that request is backed up by power.

The above views show that although it is possible to explain downward accountability through the lenses of exit, voice and loyalty theory, it cannot fully explain the dynamics of the NGO downward accountability systems due to power imbalances between NGOs and beneficiaries, between beneficiaries themselves and also between NGOs and their donors. It is also clear that the limited choice that beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance have can make it difficult for them to exercise exit in situations where the NGO is incompetent in service delivery. The poor may not often demand accountability from NGO officials, as they do not have enough voice. Besides, they cannot easily exit from services because of their economic constraints. In the NGO setting, exit can even be harmful since the agency may be the only organisation operating in the area and therefore providing essential services. By exiting, the beneficiaries will be forced to forgo essential benefits. Secondly, it can be argued that the downward accountability processes by NGOs may not be driven by a desire to really serve their beneficiaries better but rather to satisfy the donor demands for continued funding. An investigation of power, exit and voice and their influence on the effectiveness of downward accountability processes is therefore necessary.

In order to delve deeper into the issues of power, voice, feedback and complaints and to get an in-depth view of the impacts or otherwise of downward accountability, a case study approach was used in the study. The focus was on the perspectives from the beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance where the accountability mechanisms were established and comparing these with areas where they were not established. The study also delved into community power processes, exit/voice/feedback options and the role these played in the arena of humanitarian assistance and how they can be strengthened to ensure that they inform aid appropriateness.

### **2.2.2. Resource dependence theories**

Resource dependence theory was introduced by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). Their theory is built around the central hypothesis that organizations are constrained by external pressures and demands. Consequently, the key to organizational survival is the ability to acquire and maintain resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978:2). According to them, organizations survive to the extent that they are effective, that is, to the extent that they produce acceptable outcomes and actions (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 11). There are three core ideas of the theory: (1) social context matters; (2) organizations have strategies to enhance their autonomy and pursue interests; and (3) power is important for understanding internal and external actions of organizations. The basic tenet of exchange-based power in the theory was derived from Emerson's (1962:32) parsimonious account: that the power of A over B comes from control of resources that B values and that are not available elsewhere. B is dependent on A to the degree that A has power over B. The theory suggests that the activities of individuals and resource interdependence influence an organization's strategic decisions.

On the issue of power, DiMaggio and Powell (1983:149) came up with the concept of isomorphism, 'a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions. They acknowledge the existence of two types of isomorphism, competitive and institutional. Competitive isomorphism emphasizes market competition (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983:150). In the NGO accountability process, this is applicable in cases where there are several NGOs offering the same service thereby giving beneficiaries the option of choice. Institutional isomorphism supplements these views and explains the politics of organizational structuring and bureaucratization as a result of a search for

legitimacy. Three forms of institutional isomorphism are identified: coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism. Coercive isomorphism stems from pressures on the organization by other organizations on which the former depends. For example, NGO donors can exert pressure by pushing certain standards and requirements on NGOs before funding is provided. Mimetic isomorphism is the process in which organizations deal with uncertainty or ambiguity by 'copying' other organizations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983:150). Normative isomorphism stems from professionalization of services by NGOs for example focusing on water and sanitation services as opposed to food aid.

The idea of coercive isomorphism can be linked with resource dependence theory in the NGO sector. As NGOs increasingly seek donor funds, they face the constraints of being dependent on the donor. Their services and contract become heavily reliant on their donors and supporters. The focus on donors can therefore compromise the need for downward focus on beneficiaries. According to Ebrahim (2003:816), the dependence on donors by NGO's for external funds promotes external approaches to accountability. This can be enforced through threats such as the denial of funds. An organization's ability to control a resource is a form of power, with power being defined as the ability to influence outcomes, changing what might have been in the absence of the use of power (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974:148). The suggestion that resources come with power and dependency, which can compromise the delivery of downward accountability, therefore needs to be investigated for a clearer understanding on how these impacts on the voice of beneficiaries of assistance. An in-depth inquiry through a case study approach can reveal the level of this influence and therefore answer the question about the

underlying power dynamics both communal and organisational that impact on the successes and failures of downward accountability mechanisms in the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

### **2.2.3. Principal Agent Theory**


The principal-agent theory can also be used in explaining accountability. The theory has been articulated both economists and political scientists such as Jensen (1983), Perrow (1986) and Ross (1973). According to Perrow (1986:235) agency theory reminds us that organisations life is based on self-interest. Eisenhardt (1989:57) says that the theory is premised on the observation that some individuals (principals) attempt to have their agendas carried out by other individuals (agents). A principal-agent problem arises in contexts where principals and agents have conflicting goals or the principals are uncertain as to whether their agents adequately represent or implement their interest (Eisenhardt (1989:57). In cases where humanitarian assistance organisations are funded by donors they can be described as being agents of the donors. From this perspective, accountability may be defined as the principal's "right to require an account" from the agent and also "the right to impose sanctions if the account or the actions accounted for are inadequate" (Leat et al, 1990:144).

The key point here is that principals influence the performance of their agents. While business organizations are accountable primarily to shareholders, non-profits are expected to respond to the interests of their donors, boards, clients, contracting agencies, and to multiple actors like patrons, and themselves. In analysing accountability, it is therefore important to assess the level of dependency and how this impacts on the voice of beneficiaries. An in depth case study approach can help delve into the following questions: how far can beneficiaries challenge the

service delivery through NGO based complaints and response processes? Are the complaints and response processes effective in highlighting the voice of beneficiaries and are the complaints acted upon and lessons incorporated into the program in a way that influences the delivery of assistance?

The three theories present several issues that are critical in analysing downward accountability. These include power, influence of donors, dependency issues, voice and exit options for the beneficiaries of assistance. These can be seen as both facilitating and inhibiting factors in the effectiveness of downward accountability mechanisms. The conceptual framework below tries to show the potential linkages.

### 2.3. Figure 1-Conceptual Framework



The conceptual framework above explains the relationships between downward accountability mechanisms and aid appropriateness in the context of humanitarian agencies operations. In summary, the model identifies both constraining and facilitating factors as influencing the relationship between downward accountability and aid appropriateness. The constraining factors include choices available to beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance, dependency on aid, government assistance, literacy, cultural factors, donor regulations, community power dynamics and support from other sources. It is important to investigate how the mechanism delivered on



the various variables of aid appropriateness including proper targeting, ownership of relief process, abuse of aid/ fraud, power to make demands on the NGOs and sustainability of programs. For example, the availability of alternative service providers can help enhance voice but in the absence of the same, the accountability mechanisms can help by providing an avenue for voicing dissatisfaction, airing views without fear and influencing direction of activities through participation. In addition, cultural factors, government regulation, community power dynamics and support from other sources can also impede the implementation of the downward accountability mechanisms. However, if the mechanisms are strong and functional, they should be able to help in reducing the impacts of these factors and ensure that proper targeting, ownership of relief process, issues of aid/ fraud, power to make demand on the NGOs and sustainability of programs are ensured. It is through a field comparative study that it is possible to establish the significance of the downward accountability mechanisms in ensuring aid appropriateness.

The facilitating factors on the other hand include Government regulations, NGO internal regulation, code of conduct, staff capacity, rights awareness by beneficiaries, access to NGO and government services and donor influence. For example, funders provide money to NGOs with clear expectation which sometimes include the obligation to establish accountability mechanisms in the communities. The fact that NGOs are dependent on the donors for funds can force them to implement these mechanisms mainly to abide by the donors requirement. The donor in this case becomes a facilitating factor. However the question remains whether the mechanism established under such conditions can be successful in ensuring aid appropriateness or they are meant to meet donor compliance.

In summary, although the framework shows linkages between accountability mechanisms and aid appropriateness, it requires further empirical study to establish how the various mechanisms performed during the delivery of humanitarian assistance. An in-depth assessment can help in building further evidence on the impacts of downward accountability on aid appropriateness. This will plug the gaps identified by scholars like Featherstone (2013: 27) in this area.

### **Research questions**

The key questions that the research aimed to answer were as follows:

- 1) How do downward accountability mechanisms applied by aid organisations to disaster affected people contribute to the appropriateness of humanitarian assistance?**
- 2) What socio-cultural barriers impede the implementation of downward accountability amongst disaster affected people and how can these be addressed to enhance the voice and power of disaster affected people in the delivery of humanitarian assistance?**
- 3) What are the successes and failures of downward accountability mechanisms in the delivery of humanitarian assistance?**

These questions required beneficiaries to tell their own narratives about their voice and whether it was heard and acted upon, their power and choice in the aid process, their participation, and information availed to them, feedback processes and whether these were used to enhance appropriateness of aid. Answers to the three research questions are given on the following pages: Research question 1 on pages 52-77, research question 2 on pages 78-85, research question 3 on pages 86-92.

## CHAPTER 3- METHODS

### 3.1- Site description and selection criteria

#### 3.1.1. Site selection

This study was conducted in Bori and Adadi (also known as Garba) sub-locations in Butiye and Obbu Wards in Moyale, Marsabit County. The larger Marsabit County is 560 km north of Nairobi and is to the south of Ethiopia. It borders Wajir County to the East, Isiolo County to the South East, Samburu County to the South and South West and Lake Turkana to the West and North West in the former Eastern Province. It is vast, with an area spanning 70,961.3Km<sup>2</sup>. According to the 2009 Census, it has a population of 291,166 (52% Male and 48% Female). The county comprises four constituencies (Saku, North Horr, Laisamis and Moyale). Administratively, it has seven districts. There are four ethnic groups living in larger Marsabit County: the Rendille, the Burji, the Borana and the Gabbra. There are also some Garre people in Moyale, one of the Somali clans. According to Marsabit County government Integrated Development Plan 2013-2017(2013:10), the county has poverty level of 76 %.


The Kenya population census (2010:79-80), shows that Bori sub-location is located in Bori Location in Butiye Ward, and has a population of 4,895(2194 female) in 753 households. Other sub-locations in the Ward include Butiye, Somare, Goromuda, and Kate. On the other hand, Adadi is in Dambala Fachana location in Obbu ward and has a population of 416(198 female) in 70 households. Other sub-locations in the ward are, Bodhoda, Humballo, Sololo Makutano. Both sub-locations are in Moyale district. The main livelihoods of the people is pastoralism, with a vast majority of them being nomadic herders, keeping camels, goats, sheep, cattle and donkeys. Crop cultivation is mostly practiced on the hills around Sololo and Moyale towns. According to the report 'Exploring Kenya's Inequality-Pulling Apart or Pooling Together' (2013:11), the two

wards Butiye and Obbu are sparsely populated with livestock accounting for 70% of household income and 72-85 % of the population live below the poverty line. The main factors causing poverty in the area include: poor livestock marketing; inappropriate land tenure and pasture management leading to conflicts, lack of access to job opportunities, un-attractive credit services, frequent droughts, underdeveloped infrastructure, and illiteracy.

### **3.1.2. Site selection criteria**


The researcher selected Bori and Adadi sub-locations because of several reasons. First, in the recent past (2008-13), the areas have experienced cyclical drought emergencies where humanitarian aid was provided. Secondly, in Adadi, Anglican Development Services of Mount Kenya East (ADS MKE) provided humanitarian assistance using different methods of ensuring downward accountability and therefore provided an ideal opportunity to analyse the impacts of these mechanisms. Secondly, ADS MKE had two different donors, one prioritised downward accountability and therefore provided funding for the mechanisms. The other donor did not fund the mechanisms and therefore ADS did not establish the mechanisms in the donors' target area. This provided a good basis to compare adjacent sites where the mechanisms were applied with those where they were not applied. Thirdly, these are pastoralist communities and will help in comparing the results with the study that was conducted in Makueni an agro- pastoralist area, to establish whether the findings can hold true in pastoralist settings. Last but not least, the locations are not close to Makueni and the evidence gathered can stand alone without claims of spill over effects from the impacts noted in the earlier study conducted in Makueni.

Figure 2- Map of Kenya



The arrow shows Marsabit County which includes Moyale constituency where the research was conducted

**Figure 3- IEBC revised Moyale constituency county assembly wards**



The map above shows Moyale constituency in Marsabit and the two arrows show the two locations where the study was conducted.

### 3.2. Sampling

#### 3.2.1. Target population

The sample population was drawn from Bori and Adadi sub-locations. The sample was taken from households that received relief assistance in both sub-locations. The sampling frames were

the beneficiary distribution lists for the two sub locations. The views of the beneficiaries in Bori where relief was provided but downward accountability mechanisms were not established were compared with those in Adadi where the mechanisms were applied. In addition, the study involved key informants drawn from the community leaders and government officials mainly the chiefs who interacted with the relief process.

### **3.2.2. Unit of analysis and unit of observation.**

The unit of analysis was the Anglican Development Services relief program. The views of the relief beneficiaries in Adadi where downward accountability mechanisms were established during the assistance were collected and compared with those in Bori (the comparison group) sub-location who received assistance but where no downward accountability mechanisms were established. The units of observation were the individual household heads, program activities, community leaders, chiefs and meetings.

### **3.2.3. Procedure for respondent Selection**

Purposive and systematic random sampling was used to select households within the two sub-locations. First, purposive sampling was used to identify household heads that benefited from relief assistance in the two areas. This is because the subject of study is best analysed by comparing areas where downward accountability mechanism were established with those where they were not established during relief assistance. This type of comparison does not require pure probabilistic sampling as the whole population was not targeted with relief and therefore not all the population experienced relief assistance or the usage of downward accountability methods during relief. The view about the impacts of these mechanisms could therefore not be reflected in the whole populations because only those who received assistance can have an opinion on how

the assistance was provided. The target had therefore to be only those who received some form of relief assistance and not the entire population.

Secondly, systematic random sampling was used to identify specific household heads to interview. The relief assistance list in the two sub-locations acted as the sampling frame. According to the local assistant chief for Bori sub location, 80 vulnerable households were targeted in 2012-13 with humanitarian assistance. In Adadi the number targeted was 50 households according to the assistant chief and verified from the relief register. The final sample size was calculated using the formula by Yamane (1967:886)

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

Where n is the desired sample size, N is the population size (in this case the population targeted with humanitarian assistance), and e is the level of precision (0.05)

The desired sample was then selected from a total of 130 households that were targeted by Relief agencies in the two sub- locations. In Bori, 80 households were targeted during the 2012/13 response while in Adadi, 50 household were targeted. These households formed the sampling frame. Using the formula above, the desired sample size was calculated as follows:

$$n=N/1+N(e)^2$$

$$n=130/1+130(0.05)^2$$



n= 98

From the calculation above, the desired sample size was 98. In order to ensure equity in representation and balance the weight of views in the two sub-locations, the desired sample size was divided equally between the two locations. This was to ensure that the views of the households' heads that received assistance but where downward accountability was applied are equally represented with the views of those where assistance was provided but downward accountability was not applied. Subsequently in each sub-location, the study targeted 49 households. In Adadi, due to the small number of the households targeted with relief assistance, the first 49 households were selected for interviews. In Bori, a random process was used (kth number, where k is equal to 1). In this approach, the first household was selected and then the second skipped and the third selected, the fourth skipped, the fifth selected until the first 40 households were identified. Afterwards, the remaining 9 households were selected from the 40 that were skipped in the first selection using the formula of every 4<sup>th</sup> household until the 9<sup>th</sup> household is attained to add to a total of 49. However due to the unavailability of some of the sampled respondents, the researcher only managed to interview 94 households (47 in each of the two areas).

### **3.3. Techniques of data collection.**

The key methods of data collection included, direct observation and in-depth interviews with relief beneficiary household-heads. Other methods used were key informant interviews, focus group discussions and document review. The study used mainly primary data collected from 94 households. However, other data was also collected from key informants to get the views of key stakeholders. Primary data was collected using interview schedules, direct observation and focus group discussions. The interview schedules were structured to handle the respondents with low

educational levels and interpreters used to address language barrier. The interview schedules were designed with both open and closed ended questions. The open ended questions enable respondents to respond freely while closed ended ones allowed for a specific list of alternative answers. Direct observation was employed to clarify meaning of respondent's answers to check accuracy. The researchers also used transect walk to identify physical changes in the community to confirm impacts of accountability in the community. Community dialogue sessions were also observed during focused group discussions to identify any unique behaviours out of the norm and peculiar responses that needed further probing.

The respondents were interviewed individually and asked to give oral testimonies about their experiences with the relief distribution and their view on the accountability mechanisms and how they related with these mechanisms during the assistance. Key informant interviews were conducted with local chiefs and community leaders and relief committee leaders. The study used an interview schedule to collect data from these respondents. The first set of key informants came from village committees, elders and community leaders. The second set was government officials mainly the chiefs who handled relief assistance and who were part of the relief assistance. The key informants were targeted because they understood how the accountability processes were implemented and gave additional information on the successes and failures of these mechanism and recommendations on how to improve them in the future. The key informants were also used to triangulate the information from the community and focus group discussions to check consistency.

Due to limited time and logistical constraints, two focus group discussions were conducted in each sub-location. The focus group discussions were conducted with groups of 6-12 twelve men and women separately. They were selected from the records of the village relief committees and

beneficiaries lists. The men were separated from the women in order to ensure openness and for women to speak freely without being intimidated by the men. The results from the focus group discussions were used to triangulate with the information received from individual household interviews. The discussions were organized around the key issues on the subject of study which included the community understanding of downward accountability, its dimensions and forms. The focus group discussion also delved into how the downward accountability mechanisms were implemented during the delivery of assistance, their relevance and effectiveness. Discussions also focused on community and individual voice and power during assistance and assessed how the leaders and those targeted influenced the delivery of assistance. The discussions further explored whether individual beneficiary voices were heard. Community power structures and how these affected the implementation of downward accountability during the delivery of assistance were also assessed.

Document reviews were conducted to identify policies and procedures on downward accountability. Evaluation reports and impact assessments reports were also used to add details and meaning to the findings. Other documents checked included Anglican Development services field reports on accountability processes, Christian Aid evaluation report on the drought assistance in 2011 and documentation on processes followed to establish and implement the mechanisms. The research also used photographic evidence to enrich data.

### **3.3.1. Ethical considerations**

The researcher conducted two meetings in the tow areas to get buy-in and ensure that respondents agree to give information freely. The meetings were also used to introduce and familiarise the researcher and the research assistants with the community and the setting. The

two assistant chiefs and religious leaders accompanied the team to help build rapport with the community.

The collection of sensitive information like those for income, age and marital status was conducted with a lot of care. The respondents were told in advance the type of sensitive information they were going to be asked and they were given adequate time to decide whether they want to respond or not. Before starting any interview, the researcher and the assistants ensured that each household-head was asked to give consent and decide to proceed with the interview without any form of inducement.

To avoid bias, proper recording of findings was done on note books for each interview, focus group discussion and observations.

The researcher made it clear to all respondents that the project work is completely done for academic purposes only and not for commercial use hence no payment of any kind or compensation would be made upon participation. The researcher and the assistants therefore asked the respondents to give information voluntarily

### **3.4. Techniques of Data Analysis**

#### **3.4.1. Techniques for answering the research questions**

The researcher used several approaches to answer the research question. The first approach was the voice-centred relationship model by Doucet and Mauthner (1998:114-9). This approach analysed interview data by re-reading through the interview scripts, looking for meanings and patterns. This approach was used to describe individual participant's voices in the downward accountability experience and hearing the impacts, successes, failures, barriers, recommendations from the participants. The emerging patterns and stories were used to enrich

the analysis by situating them into the various research questions to form a coherent whole that answered the various research questions.

Other methods that were used for drawing conclusions included noting patterns and themes, making contrasts, comparisons, clustering, and counting responses. The researcher identified patterns and themes from the field notes, observations and interviews to check frequency of recurrence and analyzed whether they really made conceptual sense. The other method that was used was clustering of emerging issues into classes and categories. The interviews, transcripts and field notes were condensed using the matrix in annex 4. This helped to understand the results by grouping and then conceptualizing those that had similar patterns or characteristics.

The fourth approach was counting of the frequency of occurrence of themes and phrases. When a theme was identified, it was isolated to check how many times it is appearing in field notes and interviews and how recurrent it was. The researcher then made comparisons between the results from the areas where accountability were applied and those from areas where the accountability mechanism were not applied to draw conclusion on how the process changed the delivery of assistance.

The other method that was used in analysis and answering the research question was noting the relations between variables. Using the matrix in annex 4, the researcher analysed responses for each variable and checked whether there was evidence that they related and informed the other variables. Under the first research question, the variable of downward accountability was broken down into sub-variables of information sharing (relevance and clarity of information), complaints and response(effectiveness, safety of the process to raise , receive complaints and

timeliness in response) and participation (beneficiaries taking lead in design and implementation of the projects, level of ownership of process of provision of assistance, how participation helped in prioritisation of the poorest including women and men, how the beneficiary views were listened to, heard and used to influence programs). These were then checked against appropriateness of assistance provided to see how the accountability processes influenced the way aid was delivered. Data from the areas where the accountability mechanism were applied was checked with those from areas where the mechanism were not applied to ascertain any differences, similarities and linkages.

The study also employed the narrative method and used interviews, documents and observations to follow and record respondent's views. These approaches were used for each research question to get answers from the data.

Specifically in answering the first research question on how downward accountability mechanisms applied by aid organisations to disaster affected people contribute to the relevance and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance, the researcher focused on three pillars of downward *accountability mechanisms* and 5 indicators of *effectiveness and appropriateness of relief assistance*. The three pillars of downward accountability used in this study were: information sharing processes, complaints and response handling processes and participation of disaster affected people during the delivery of humanitarian assistance. According to OECD DAC criteria for evaluating development assistance (2002:1), **appropriateness** is the tailoring of humanitarian activities to local needs and increasing ownership and accountability (ALNAP, 2006:20-21). Accountability here refers to the ability and power to question, make decisions and demands to service providers, capacity to address fraud and mis-management of aid and cost-

effectiveness. However, the researcher focused on only the indicators of increasing ownership, power to make decisions and demands, ability to address fraud and mismanagement by relief staff and whether the relief provided met local needs. The indicator on whether relief met the needs of the target group was assessed by checking how targeting was done to reach the most vulnerable and whether their needs were met.

**Effectiveness** on the other hand measures the extent to which an aid activity achieves its purpose, or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of the outputs, (ALNAP, 2006:49). Effectiveness is assessed in the contributions of outputs to achieving outcomes. Evaluation of effectiveness is therefore linked to evaluation of impact and longer-term effects of the intervention, (ALNAP, 2006:50). For this research, the main indicator assessed under effectiveness was longer term effects summarised as sustainability of the relief action beyond the one year of the relief phase. Any action that went beyond this period was seen as sustainable.

The study explored how timely, relevant and clear, the information about the Anglican Development Service of Mount Kenya East (ADSMKE) and its activities were shared and used to influence the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Narratives on how the information processes were established, their timeliness, clarity, effectiveness, relevance and how they were used to influence programs were collected from beneficiaries. The frequencies of these occurrences were checked to identify patterns that show linkages that the existence or otherwise of accountability mechanisms influenced the targeting, empowerment of beneficiaries, addressed mismanagement of aid and fraud. The researcher also counted the number of response that showed whether downward accountability mechanism helped beneficiaries in demanding of accountability from the NGO providing assistance and promoted ownership and sustainability of

programs. The views of the beneficiaries in Bori where the information sharing processes were not established but assistance was provided were then analysed and compared with Adadi where the information sharing processes were established and assistance provided.

In exploring the use of complaints and response mechanisms, the study delved into whether there was an effective and safe process to raise and receive complaints. It also assessed whether complaints were responded to and used to inform program implementation. It assessed how the beneficiaries interacted with this mechanism and how their complaints were addressed. It also checked how the views and feedback were used to change the design of the projects and whether the beneficiaries felt that they were heard. As in the case of information sharing, views on how complaints and response processes were established, their safety, security, effectiveness and how they were used to influence programs were collected from beneficiaries. The frequencies of occurrences were used to show linkages that the existence or otherwise of complaints and response mechanisms influenced program design, targeting and empowerment of beneficiaries. The results were also used to assess whether the mechanism contributed in addressing mismanagement of aid and fraud and promoted ownership and sustainability of programs. The views of the beneficiaries in Bori where the complaints and response processes were not established but assistance was provided were analysed and compared with Adadi where the information sharing processes were established and assistance provided.

The participation of beneficiaries was assessed at design and implementation levels with interview questions exploring how beneficiaries took lead in the design and implementation of the aid. The questions also explored whether by participating beneficiaries felt that they owned



the process of provision of assistance. The researcher also checked how participation helped in prioritisation of the poorest including women and men, whether the beneficiary views were listened to and views used to influence programs. The individual views from Bori where participation processes were not fully practiced were compared with those from Adadi where participation mechanisms were functional to assess how participation influenced the way humanitarian assistance was delivered. This helped in generating adequate data to answer the first research question on how downward accountability mechanisms applied by ADS MKE to disaster affected people in Adadi and Bori contributed to the relevance and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance.

The second research question was '*what socio-cultural barriers impede the implementation of downward accountability amongst disaster affected people and how these can be addressed to enhance the voice and power of disaster affected people in the delivery of humanitarian assistance*'. This was answered by exploring the indicators on level of choice by beneficiaries and how this impacted on voice, dependency on aid, availability/lack of government assistance, literacy and livelihoods options. Beneficiary positions/hierarchy in the community, power of community leaders and their impacts on delivery of assistance were also assessed. Community decision making processes and influence on targeting and ADS MKE power as provider of assistance were also explored. Cultural considerations, and challenges experienced in implementation of the mechanisms were studied. Questions were developed around these indicators to get beneficiary narratives on how these impacted on the implementation of downward accountability mechanisms. The views from Adadi where accountability mechanisms were implemented were compared with the views of beneficiaries from Bori where the mechanisms were not applied to ascertain whether these barriers impacted on the success or

failures of downward accountability during the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The focus was on individual views, emerging themes from interviews to establish linkages between the socio-cultural barriers and the success or failures of downward accountability.

To answer the third research question, the researcher focused on the community indicators of the successes and failures of downward accountability mechanisms in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The researcher explored what success and failure looked like for the community in the implementation of accountability mechanisms. Evidence or otherwise of successes and failures of these mechanisms were documented.

## **CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS**

### **4.1 Introduction**

This chapter deals with the analysis, presentation and interpretation of data collected on the impacts of Downward Accountability on the effectiveness and appropriateness of humanitarian assistance in Adadi and Bori sub-locations. The two locations were targeted by NGO, Anglican Development Services of Mount Kenya East (ADS MKE). The researcher used thematic, quantitative and descriptive information drawn from the research findings to analyse the impacts of Downward Accountability on the effectiveness and appropriateness of humanitarian assistance.


Information and data collected were drawn from key informant interviews with 12 community leaders (6 from each area) comprising religious leaders, chiefs, women leaders and relief committee members. 4 focus group discussions, 2 in each location (12 participants each from Adadi and Bori) and a total of 94(47 in each area) interviews were conducted with household heads. The interviews represented 95% of the projected 98 interviews with household heads who were recipients of humanitarian assistance in the two areas. The interview schedule, focus group guide and the checklists for key informants were pre-tested with 10 respondents who advised that due to their length, adequate time should be allowed for field administration. Desk review was conducted of key documents including evaluation reports; project reposts and project proposals for ADS MKE. All information was triangulated to test evidence and avoid as much as possible any assumptions.

## 4.2 Demographic characteristics of the respondents

**Table 1- Distribution of respondents by sex**

respondents Sex	frequency		total	%
	Adadi	Bori		
Male	13	16	29	<b>31</b>
Female	34	31	65	<b>69</b>
Total	47	47	94	<b>100</b>


**Figure 4- Distribution of Respondents by sex**




A total of 94 respondents were interviewed comprising 69% female and 31% male. This corroborates the results from the focus group discussion and the key informants that confirmed that the criteria for targeting focused on women headed households, the aged, those considered very poor majority of whom were women. It also aligns with figure 12 below which shows that women were involved mainly in charcoal and milk selling which is not the mainstay of the local economy. The main source of income in the area is pastoralism which according to the report ‘Exploring Kenya’s Inequality-Pulling Apart or Pooling Together’ (2013:11), accounts for 70% of household income and this according to the findings is dominated by men as indicated in figure 12. This explains the relatively lower numbers of men targeted for assistance at 31%.

#### 4.2.1 Distribution of respondents by age


**Figure 5– Distribution of respondents by age**




**Figure 6 – Distribution of respondents by age**



**Figure 7- Respondents number of children**




**Figure 8- Respondents number of children**



The majority of the respondents were 41-50 years (44%) followed by those between 51-60 years (24 %). In other words, 86% of the respondents were 41 years and above. This is a reflection of the fact that the target group were generally older and had more family responsibilities compared to the younger segments of the community. This is shown in the number of children in the figure 7 above in which 31% had 8 children and above and 65% had 4-7 children.

#### 4.2.2. Distribution of respondents by level of education

**Figure 9- Distribution of respondents by level of education**



**Figure 10- Distribution of respondents by level of education**




Figure 9 shows that most of the respondents had never been to school (94%), 5 % had been to primary school and only 1% had reached secondary level of education. This reflects the overall

picture of the county that shows that literacy levels are generally low at 27.7% according to the Marsabit country government (2013:43).

#### 4.2.3. Respondents main sources of income

Figure 11- Respondents main sources of income







Figure 12- Respondents main sources of income



The main source of income for the respondents was charcoal selling (46%), livestock keeping/pastoralism (20%) and selling milk (18%). A more in depth analysis indicates that all the livestock keepers /pastoralists were men and all those selling milk were women at 18%. This shows that pastoralism which is the main source of livelihoods in the area is dominated by men while women dominated the other small scale income generating sectors including milk selling, charcoal selling and casual labour. The findings explain the relative vulnerability of women as the sectors in which they are active in are not the ones that are the economic mainstay of the area.

### **4.3. Answer to research question 1.**

#### **4.3.1. Impacts of downward accountability mechanisms on aid appropriateness and effectiveness**

##### **Introduction**

This section answers the first research question stated in chapter 2 on page 28. The question focused on how downward accountability mechanisms applied by aid organisations to disaster affected people contributed to the appropriateness and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance.

In order to answer this research question, the researcher analysed the three main variables of downward accountability as per the HAP standard 2010. These are; information sharing, complaints and response and participation. The three mechanisms were assessed against 5 indicators of appropriateness and effectiveness to check their impacts.

##### **Definition of terms**

According to OECD DAC criteria for evaluating development assistance (2002:1), **appropriateness** is the tailoring of humanitarian activities to local needs and increasing ownership and accountability (ALNAP, 2006:20-21). Accountability here refers to the ability and power to question, make decisions and demands to service providers, capacity to address fraud and mismanagement of aid and cost-effectiveness. However, the researcher focused on only the indicators of increasing ownership, power to make decisions and demands, ability to address fraud and mismanagement by relief beneficiaries and whether the relief provided met local needs. The indicator on whether relief met the needs of the target group was assessed by checking how targeting was done to reach the most vulnerable and whether their needs were met.


**Effectiveness** on the other hand measures the extent to which an aid activity achieves its purpose, or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of the outputs, (ALNAP, 2006:49). Effectiveness is assessed in the contributions of outputs to achieving outcomes. Evaluation of effectiveness is therefore linked to evaluation of impact and longer-term effects of the intervention, (ALNAP, 2006:50). For this research, the main indicator assessed under effectiveness was longer term effects summarised as sustainability of the relief action beyond the one year of the relief phase. Any action that went beyond this period was seen as sustainable.

Using the above definitions, the researcher analysed each of the three downward accountability mechanisms against the 5 selected indicators of appropriateness and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance (targeting and meeting needs of the target group, Ownership of relief projects, Beneficiary demands on NGOs and Governments, Addressing issues of fraud and mismanagement of aid and Sustainability of programs). Improved targeting and meeting the needs of beneficiaries was assessed based on whether the aid met the needs of the vulnerable, whether the right people received assistance and whether the selection process was clear, understood and developed jointly by the community. Promoting ownership of relief process was assessed by checking beneficiary views on how they felt about ownership of the relief process. The ability of beneficiaries to address mismanagement of aid and fraud and make demands on service providers was assessed by checking the beneficiaries' level of power to make decisions, challenge processes, and raise questions. Sustainability of project outputs was assessed by checking whether the relief activities and outputs existed beyond the relief phase of one year.


**Table 2-Information sharing with respondents- Adadi and Bori combined**

In your overall opinion how much information did you know about the organisations, project , activities and their budget					
	1.I knew nothing about the agency or about the project activities	2. I knew a little about the agency or about the project activities	3. I knew a lot about the agency and had a good knowledge about the project activities	4.I knew a lot about the agency, the project activities and the budget	Totals
<b>Adadi- Number of responses out of 47</b>	0	2	31	14	<b>47</b>
<b>%</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Bori- Number of responses out of 47</b>	0	44	3	0	<b>47</b>
<b>%</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>100</b>

**Figure 13-Information sharing with respondents – Adadi**



**Figure 14- Information sharing with respondents – Bori**



#### **4.3.1.1. Information sharing with relief assistance beneficiaries**

In Adadi where the information sharing mechanisms were applied, 66% of the respondents mentioned that they knew a lot about the agency and had a good knowledge about the project activities. Another 30% said that they knew a lot about the agency, the project activities and the budget and only 4% mentioned that they knew a little about the agency or about the project activities. In contrast, in Bori where the downward accountability mechanisms were not applied, 94% of the respondents mentioned that they knew little about the agency or about the project activities, 6 % knew a lot about the agency and had a good knowledge about the project activities and none of the respondents knew a lot about the agency, the project activities and the budget.

This shows that where information sharing was applied, the communities felt confident about their knowledge of the activities including the budgets compared to where information sharing processes was not applied. These findings were corroborated by those from the focus group discussions and key informant interviews. In the focus group discussion in Adadi, participants mentioned that Anglican Development services –Mount Kenyan east(ADSMKE) displayed the total project cost on project sign boards and on banners during community events. This was confirmed through observation (see annex 5).

During focus group discussions, participants could remember off-head the figure which was displayed in the billboard. They were happy with this level of transparency and mentioned that due to the information they had, they were confident to challenge the contractor for water supply who was delivering poor quality water and fewer amounts of litres compared to what was in the contract between the contractor and ADS MKE. This complaint led to the increase in the amount and quality (clean) of water (see annex 8, complaint form). The communities confirmed that this was possible mainly due to the information that they had received about their entitlements, the knowledge of the contract with the water supplier and the knowledge about the budgets for the activities.


In Adadi, participants' in the focus group discussions mentioned the various ways that they could get information including through the committee, community meetings, billboards, their leaders, their elders, the chief and the ADS MKE project staff. They also confirmed that they took part in the development of the targeting criteria and relief entitlement was shared with them. This was corroborated from the information obtained from file kept by the relief committee in which records of assistance given and recipients targeted were documented and each beneficiary had signed after receiving supplies (see annex 10 and 11). Focus group discussions also confirmed

that project information such as objectives, expected outcomes; milestones and their roles were provided by ADS MKE during community meetings. These were further drawn into memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the community in Adadi and the NGO (see annex 7). Participants in the focus group discussion mentioned that the support that was provided was appropriate and effectively addressed the needs of those affected by the drought. Participants mentioned how much money had been spent on certain initiatives and how much each beneficiary was entitled to and the community contribution (sand ballast, and free labour). They affirmed that sharing project financial information improved the mutual trust between them and ADSMKE.

**Table 3- Impacts of information sharing on aid appropriateness**

<b>Impacts of downward accountability on the appropriateness and Effectiveness of humanitarian assistance</b>						
	<b>Evidence of Presence of accountability mechanism /rating</b>	<b>Targeting and meeting needs of the target group</b>	<b>Ownership of projects</b>	<b>Beneficiary demands from NGOs Governments</b>	<b>Addressing Issues of fraud and mismanagement of aid</b>	<b>Sustainability of programs</b>
<b>Information sharing (timeliness, relevance and clarity)</b>						
Adadi -number of responses for each category(cell)	Mechanism was established	35	30	7	4	10
percentage %		74	64	15	9	21
Bori- number of responses for each category(cell)	Mechanism was not established	0	0	0	0	0
%		0	0	0	0	0

**Figure 15- Impacts of information sharing on aid appropriateness and effectiveness**



**4.3.1.2. Impacts of information sharing on aid appropriateness and effectiveness**

In Adadi, 74% of the responses confirmed that the information that was shared helped in improving targeting and meeting needs of the target group. On the question of ownership of projects, 64% of the responses indicated that they felt a sense of ownership as a result of the information that they received. However, only 15% felt that they could make demands on NGOs and Governments regarding assistance, 9% said that information sharing could help in addressing issues of fraud and mismanagement of aid and 21% thought that information sharing could help in sustainability of programs. Further discussions in focus groups showed that participants felt that they could not raise serious demands on NGOs as they were seen as good and helping the community. The general goodwill and appreciation of philanthropy by the community made it difficult to fully scrutinise NGOs operations in the area. This shows that even though information sharing is important in enhancing ownership and targeting the needy, it



is not a strong mechanism in making demands on the relief providers. The evidence also suggests that information sharing may not offer much assistance in addressing issues of fraud within NGOs. This also confirms that even with information sharing mechanisms, communities still believe that power resides amongst the relief providers as opposed to beneficiaries.

The above was well illustrated by one participant in the focus group discussion who said that *'so long as there is still hunger and drought and NGOs like ADS MKE are the ones providing assistance, how can we question them?'* The findings points to the feeling of powerlessness amongst relief beneficiaries in the process of delivering humanitarian assistance. In other words, even though information sharing as an accountability mechanism can help in aspects of aid effectiveness and appropriateness including targeting, ownership and sustainability, it is not a strong mechanism for breaking some of the power barriers between NGOs and relief beneficiaries. This means that a lot still need to be done by NGOs to transfer real power to the beneficiaries of relief assistance.

In Bori on the other hand, there were no visible signboards displaying the total project cost and respondents could not remember clearly what and why they received the items. Most of them said *'although I got assistance, I knew little about the NGO and the activities'* (94%). The limited knowledge on what they received and the feeling that they knew little of the activities shows that lack of information on relief distribution and activities contributed to poor targeting of beneficiaries as most of them could not articulate why they were selected for the assistance apart from the fact that they were poor. From observation, the relief committee had no filed records of assistance given, this was in contrast to Adadi that had details of assistance recorded and filed. Apart from confirming that they received relief assistance, none of the focus group


members could remember details of the project information such as objectives, expected outcomes and milestones as in Adadi. Focus group participants also did not know how much money had been spent on key initiatives and their contribution. The contrast in Bori compared to Adadi shows that information sharing has significant benefits in enhancing aid effectiveness and appropriateness especially targeting and building a sense of ownership of relief projects.

#### 4.3.1.3. Participation of targeted households in delivery of relief assistance


**Table 4- Level of participation by household heads in delivery of relief assistance (Bori and Adadi)**

Which of the four options below describes the ways in which you were involved in the various stages of the relief distribution project					
Participation of targeted households in delivery of relief assistance	1. Informed but not involved –I was told how the project will affect me	2. Consulted – the organisation /partner discussed decisions with me	3. Collaborative /joint decisions making –the organisation /partner sat with us and we made decisions together	4. community-led/managed –we made decisions and the organisation/partners helped us to implement them	Totals
Adadi	0	5	28	14	47
%	<b>0</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>100</b>
Bori	30	17	-	-	47
%	<b>64</b>	<b>36</b>	-	-	<b>100</b>

**Figure 16- Level of participation by relief beneficiaries in delivery of relief assistance – Adadi**



**Figure 17- Level of participation by relief beneficiaries in delivery of relief assistance –Bori**



#### **4.3.1.3.1 Level of participation of targeted households in delivery of relief assistance**

In Adadi, according to figure 16, 59% of the respondents mentioned that they felt that there was a collaborative and joint decision making. According to them, ADS MKE sat with them and they made decisions together. On the other hand, 30% felt that the projects were community-led and managed and that they made decisions and ADS MKE helped them to implement the decisions and a further 11% reported that they were consulted and ADS MKE discussed decisions with them. None of the respondents mentioned that they were informed but not involved. This shows that there was a general feeling amongst respondents that they participated adequately in the program at all the stages.

These findings were corroborated in the focus group discussions, for example, participants indicated that they provided sand and labour for construction of shallow wells, water tanks and rocks catchments. They were able to articulate the selection criteria which included female headed households, the poor, widows, elderly persons, people living with disability and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Although a document review showed that ADSMKE had no specific documentation on beneficiary selection and participation, the respondents were aware of the selection process and had participated in developing the informal selection criteria which was accepted by the community. Focus group participants confirmed that they participated in all aspects of the project including assessments, decisions on the needs of beneficiaries, beneficiary selection, project implementation and evaluation. They confirmed that relief implementation committees were formed at the community level through an open participation process and those selected represented diverse groups within the community including men, women and youth. These committees eventually led the beneficiary selection processes which they described as


transparent. They also confirmed that they were asked what their needs are before they relief items were brought to the areas.

The key informants confirmed that targeting followed the right criteria developed jointly with community. The presence of strong project implementation committees was confirmed with clear record keeping (see annex 6, 9 and 10). When asked the question ‘how successful was the project in meeting the most important needs of the vulnerable community members?’ the males and females in Adadi scored ‘very good’ while the males and females in Bori scored ‘okay’. This shows that the respondents in Adadi felt that the assistance provided was appropriate and effective in meeting the needs of the people while those in Bori felt that their needs were not fully or adequately met meaning that the assistance was not appropriate or effective in meeting the needs of the vulnerable. Since the assistance provided in both locations were the same, the NGO was also the same and the drought impacts were similar in both locations, the differences in perception can be attributed to the accountability process established in Adadi and not in Bori. This validates the fact that where accountability processes were strong, aid was seen as appropriate and effective in meeting the needs of the most vulnerable members of the community.

**Table 5- Level of participation by household heads in relief assistance and its impacts on aid appropriateness**

Level of participation by household heads in relief assistance and its impacts on aid appropriateness and effectiveness						
Participation in delivery of humanitarian assistance	Evidence of Presence of accountability mechanism /rating	Targeting and meeting needs of the target group	Ownership of projects	Beneficiary demands from NGOs Governments	Addressing Issues of fraud and mismanagement of aid	Sustainability of programs
Adadi -number of responses for each category(cell)	yes	36	34	4	3	40
percentage %		77	72	9	6	85
Bori - number of responses for each category(cell)	No	0	0	0	0	0
percentage %		0	0	0	0	0

**Figure 18- Level of participation by household heads in relief assistance and its impacts on aid appropriateness**



#### **4.3.1.3.2. Impacts of participation on aid appropriateness and effectiveness**

On the question on how their participation helped in improving targeting, ownership, addressing fraud and mismanagement, making demands on NGOs and governments and sustainability, 77% of the respondents in Adadi were in agreement that their participation helped in better targeting and meeting needs of the target group. Another 72% said that they felt a sense of ownership as a result of their participation. However, only 9% felt that due to their participation, they could make demands from NGOs and Governments regarding assistance, 6% felt that participation helped in addressing issues of fraud and mismanagement of aid. On sustainability of programs, 85% felt that participation improved sustainability of programs (programme activities existing beyond the relief phase). According to the focus group participants, their participation in the project ensured that the items that were donated are still safe and being used in the community four years after the relief project had ended showing that their participation enhanced sustainability beyond the relief phase. This was confirmed through observation (see annex 12 and 13) in Adadi which showed that the water tanks were well protected in a fenced area and were still functional and being used by the community four years after the relief assistance. However the findings shows that even though participation is viewed favourably as helping in aid effectiveness and appropriateness indicators of targeting , ownership and sustainability of the programs, there is little evidence that it has significant impacts in addressing issues of fraud and mismanagement or making demands on relief providers. This is an area in which NGOs should invest in when establishing downward accountability measures during relief provision. It is also an area that needs further research to establish why the mechanisms don't seem to deliver on these key areas of voice.

In Bori on the other hand according to figure 17, 64% felt that they were informed but not involved and that they were told how the project would affect them but they did not feel that they were adequately involved, 36% felt that they were consulted and that ADS MKE discussed decisions with them. None of the respondents felt that there was collaborative /joint decisions making or that the projects were community led and managed. The respondents were also not able to relate any of the mechanism to improved targeting, ownership, sustainability of projects or in making demands on NGOs as they had not experienced these mechanisms. During the focus group discussions, some participants confirmed having participated in providing ballast sand and labour for the construction shallow wells, however respondents were not able to clearly articulate the selection criteria used to identify beneficiaries and most of them simply mentioned that they were selected because they were 'poor'. The key informants for Bori said the relief assistance met the needs and reached the right relief beneficiaries but they could not articulate the criteria used to identify them apart from being poor. Presence of project implementation committees was evident but from observation, members did not have records of their deliberations as shown in Adadi. This shows that where the participation mechanisms were put in place in Adadi, communities felt a sense of ownership, selection processes were clear, targeting process were enhanced and there was a general feeling that the process was transparent compared to Bori where the participation mechanism were not put in place.




#### 4.3.1.4. Complaints and response mechanisms established during relief assistance.

**Table 6- Level of knowledge and usage of Complaints and response mechanism–Adadi and**


**Bori**

Which of the four options best describe the way in which you could complain or provide feedback to the agency about the relief project					
Which of the four options best describe the way in which you could complain or provide feedback to the agency about the relief project	1. I didn't know how to give feedback to the organisation/partner about the project	2. I was able to give feedback but I didn't understand how the mechanism worked.	3. There was a mechanism to give feedback. I understood how it worked and I was able to give feedback and my feedback was used to make the changes to the project	4. There was a feedback mechanism, I understand how it worked and regularly provided feedback about issues and feedback was used to make changes to the project	Totals
Adadi	2	1	39	5	47
%	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>100</b>
Bori	44	3	-	-	47
%	<b>94</b>	<b>6</b>	--	-	<b>100</b>

**Figure 19- Level of knowledge and usage of Complaints and response mechanism –Adadi**



**Figure 20- Level of knowledge and usage of Complaints and response mechanisms –Bori**



#### **4.3.1.4.1. Level of knowledge and usage of Complaints and response mechanisms**


In Adadi, 83% mentioned that there was a mechanism to give feedback, they understood how it worked and were able to give feedback and their feedback was used to make the changes to the project. A further 11% confirmed that there was a feedback mechanism, they understand how it worked and regularly provided feedback about issues and the feedback was used to make changes to the project. However, only 2% were able to give feedback but didn't understand how the mechanism worked and 4% didn't know how to give feedback to the organisation/partner about the project. The focus group discussions confirmed most of the findings for example , participants mentioned that the complaint they made regarding the contractor for water supply to increase the amount and quality (dirty)of water was documented and acted upon and subsequently changes were made to the quality and amount of water they were receiving (observation see annex 8). This demonstrated that a functional complaints and response system can help address issues of mismanagement of relief supplies by contractors.

The focus group discussion also confirmed that the participants knew how to handle complaints at the community level. Even though the procedure was not documented, they orally explained the process emphasising that they could use the relief committee, the elders, the religious leaders, the ADS MKE management and the chief to report complaints. Complaints against ADS MKE staff could be made to the managers at ADSMKE and the committee members had telephone numbers for the managers at ADS MKE.

**Table 7- Complaints and response mechanisms and their impacts on aid appropriateness and effectiveness**

Complaints and response (effectiveness, safety of the process to raise and receive complaints , and provide feedback	Evidence of Presence of accountability mechanism /rating	Targeting and meeting needs of the target group	Ownership of projects,	Beneficiary demands from NGOs Governments	Addressing Issues of fraud and mismanagement of aid	Sustainability of programs
Adadi - number of responses for each category(cell)	yes	40	35	15	13	4
percentage %		85	74	32	28	9
Bori	No	No responses , since accountability mechanisms were not applied in Bori	No responses , since accountability mechanisms were not applied in Bori	No responses , since accountability mechanisms were not applied Bori	No responses , since accountability mechanisms were not applied Bori	No responses , since accountability mechanisms were not applied Bori
%		-	-	-	-	-

**Figure 21- Complaints and response mechanisms and their impacts on aid appropriateness and effectiveness**



**4.3.1.4.2 Impacts of complaints and response on aid appropriateness and effectiveness**

On the question of how the complaints and response mechanism was effective in enhancing targeting and meeting needs of the target group, 85% of the responses in Adadi felt that the presence of a mechanism helped in enhancing targeting, 74% felt that the complaints process enhanced ownership of projects, 32% mentioned that it helped them to make demands on NGOs, Governments on their entitlements and 28% agreed that the complaints processes could help in addressing issues of fraud and mismanagement of aid citing the case of the water quality and quantity that was enhanced by a direct complaint. However, only 9% thought that a complaints and response mechanism could enhance sustainability of programs, this show that beneficiaries believe that complaints and response is not the best mechanism in enhancing sustainability and that participation and information sharing mechanism perform better on sustainability compared to complaints and response. This goes to prove that for maximum successes on all the accountability indicators, all the three mechanisms should be implemented

simultaneously. From these findings, it is clear that there is strong evidence that complaints and response procedures can enhance targeting, ownership and to a lesser extent address issues of fraud and mismanagement of aid, however on sustainability of programs; NGOs should strengthen other accountability mechanisms like participation which at 85% showed better results in enhancing sustainability of the programs. According to the findings from the focus group participants and the key informants, the presence of the complaints system also acted as deterrent since the selection committee members knew that if they were not transparent, then they could be reported through the system. Most participants in the focus group discussion said that having a complaints system made them 'feel in charge'.


In Bori on the other hand according to figure 20, the results were different with 94% saying that they didn't know how to give feedback to ADS MKE, 6% confirmed that they could give feedback but didn't understand how the complaints and response mechanism worked. None of the respondents reported that there was a mechanism to give feedback, understood how it worked, were able to give feedback and their feedback was used to make the changes to the project like in Adadi. Also none reported that there was a feedback mechanism; understand how it worked and regularly provided feedback about issues and feedback was used to make changes to the project. These results were confirmed in the focus group discussions in which most participants mentioned that they did not know how to complain or provide feedback. There was no evidence of any feedback or complaint made including verbal ones with chiefs or leaders. From observation, the relief committee had no documentation or files with complaints. The different results for Bori and Adadi shows that functional complaints and response processes can help in improving targeting, ownership of projects, making demands on NGOs and to a lesser extent, address issues of fraud and mismanagement of aid.

**Table 8-Summary of impacts of downward accountability mechanisms on effectiveness and appropriateness of relief assistance**

<b>Impacts of downward accountability on the appropriateness and Effectiveness of humanitarian assistance</b>						
	<b>Evidence of Presence of accountability mechanism /rating</b>	<b>Targeting and meeting needs of the target group</b>	<b>Ownership of projects</b>	<b>Beneficiary demands from NGOs Governments</b>	<b>Addressing Issues of fraud and mismanagement of aid</b>	<b>Sustainability of programs</b>
<b>Information sharing (timeliness, relevance and clarity)</b>						
Adadi -number of responses for each category(cell)	Yes	35	30	7	4	10
percentage %		74	64	15	9	21
Bori	No	0	0	0	0	0
%		0	0	0	0	0
<b>Complaints and response (effectiveness, safety of the process to raise and receive complaints , and provide feedback</b>						
Adadi -number of responses for each category(cell)	Yes	40	35	15	13	4
percentage %		85	74	32	28	9
Bori		0	0	0	0	0
%		0	0	0	0	0
<b>Participation by household heads in delivery of relief assistance</b>						
Adadi -number of responses for each category(cell)		36	34	4	3	40
percentage %		77	72	9	6	85
Bori		0	0	0	0	0
%		0	0	0	0	0

There were no responses from Bori as they didn't experience the downward accountability mechanisms and therefore could not assess their impacts

**Figure 22-Summary of impacts of downward accountability mechanisms on effectiveness and appropriateness of relief assistance**





#### **4.3.1.5. Summary of impacts of downward accountability mechanisms on effectiveness and appropriateness of relief assistance**

In summary, according to figure 22, the results answers the first research question by showing that downward accountability mechanisms have strong impacts on the three indicators of aid appropriateness and effectiveness (targeting and meeting the needs of the target group, ownership of relief process, and sustainability of the relief activities beyond the relief phase). However, the three mechanisms score poorly in two other indicators related to power which include being able to make demands on NGOs and Governments regarding assistance and helping in addressing issues of fraud and mismanagement of aid. For example on the indicator of relief beneficiaries making demands on NGOs and Governments, the downward accountability mechanisms of information sharing, complaints and response and participation contributed only 15%, 32% and 9% respectively. This shows that even though these mechanisms are stronger in enhancing ownership, sustainability and targeting the needy, they don't deliver much value in making demands on the relief providers and addressing issues of fraud and mismanagement during relief assistance.

#### **4.4. Answer to research question 2.**

##### **4.4.1. Socio-cultural barriers in the implementation of downward accountability**

###### **Introduction**

This section answers the second research question stated in chapter 2 on page 28 and covers key sociocultural barriers in the implementation of downward accountability in humanitarian assistance. Secondly, it also highlights the ways in which NGOs and other stakeholders can address the barriers to ensure successful implementation of the downward accountability mechanisms. The section also deals with the issues of power and voice of disaster affected

people by assessing whether the mechanisms can be used to enhance their voice and power in decision making during disaster response.


The research question could only be answered by views from those who experienced the downward accountability mechanism in Adadi as opposed to Bori. This is because in Bori, there was no benchmark to assess the barriers as the mechanisms were not applied there. However on the question of who wielded power during the relief distribution, the researcher assessed both areas to know the perceptions on respondents in both location and use this to compare the difference and make linkages. The type and number of responses to the question on barriers were varied. Some respondents mentioned more barriers than the others. The researcher grouped these into similar categories and counted the number of occurrences for each to get the frequency for specific categories

**Table 9: Socio-cultural barriers that impede the implementation of downward accountability mechanisms during relief assistance-Adadi**

	<b>frequency(each cell count out of 47)</b>	<b>%</b>
Language	42	89
Trusting the committee to represent me	41	87
Being grateful, not questioning those who help, ADS seen as good	38	81
Limited choice of NGO in the area	28	60
Fear of NGO exit from the area , relief seen as a favour not a right	23	49
Culture /fear of speaking in public by women	22	47
Respect for community/religious leaders	21	45
women participation in family chores, busy , lack of time	20	43
sending relatives to get information on my behalf	15	32

The table above does not have responses from Bori since they didn't experience the downward accountability mechanisms and therefore could not provide the barriers to their implementation.

**Figure 23: Socio-cultural barriers that impede the implementation of downward accountability mechanisms during relief assistance-Adadi**



The most frequently mentioned barriers were: language at 89%, trusting the committee for representation (87%), culture of being grateful/not questioning those who assist/ADS being seen

as good (81%) and limited choice of NGOs (60%). The researcher put a cap that only responses that were mentioned by over 30% of the respondents would be highlighted.

It was not surprising that language was the most frequently mentioned barrier at 89% since the level of literacy in the areas is very low at 27.7% according to the Marsabit county government (2013:43). Language barrier was also responsible for failure in documentation of oral complaints which were said to be the majority compared to the formal ones. The respondents mentioned that they were more confident in raising issues with leaders, elders, committee members, however, these people were also illiterate and although they handled the complaints, they could not document these for future reference. The other barriers most mentioned were trust for the committee (87). This means that investments in informal complaints and response process can deliver more results as communities are more confident to participate and raise complaints with the leaders and committees as opposed to directly with NGOs. The culture of not questioning those who provide help was also cited as major barrier at (81%). In other words even though over 94% knew how they could complain and provide feedback in Adadi as shown in figure 18, 81% felt that it is not good to question someone who helps them. The limited choice of NGOs and fear of exit by the existing ones was cited by 60% and 49% of the respondents respectively. This shows that most respondents still believe that relief assistance is a favour not a right and therefore questioning NGOs will impact negatively on them leading to limited assistance in the future. This requires education and awareness on the beneficiaries so that they know that they have a right to assistance by all stakeholders including the government.

These findings were confirmed in focus group discussions, for example the women mentioned that in order to be seen to 'be obedient and respectful, they did not speak in meetings where men were present. The women proposed that NGOs should separate women and men during

community consultations to enhance their voice. Further discussion in the focus groups showed that ADSMKE was generally viewed as ‘being good’ to the community as they have been in the area for over 15 years and have assisted during emergency situations. Participants felt that it is not good manners to question or make a lot of demands on such a ‘committed’ agency. They also confirmed the findings from the respondents that when they have informed the committee or religious leaders or elders on any problematic issues, they would generally get help. This strengthens the case for informal complaints and responses processes as opposed to formal ones. The participants also stressed that most community members were illiterate yet project documents were in English and were rarely translated into local languages. Further discussions in focus groups indicated that translation of documents into local languages would not be of great help as the literacy level is very low at 27.7% according to the Marsabit country government (2013:43). However, participants confirmed that oral translation during community meetings was effective. They also suggested the use of pictures to highlight the key messages especially on relief entitlements.

#### 4.4.2. Addressing the socio-cultural barriers.


**Table 10- Proposed ways of addressing socio-cultural barriers to downward accountability- Adadi.**

<b>How to address socio cultural barriers</b>	<b>frequency(each cell count out of 47)</b>	<b>%</b>
Local staff/ understanding of local language	44	94
Government to provide essential services	40	85
Better timing of Community meetings	38	81
using pictorial messages	36	77
Awareness on importance of participation	35	74

working closely with community leaders , elders	34	72
Awareness on relief supplies as a right	31	66
Separate sessions for women and men	28	60

The table above does not have responses from Bori since they didn't experience the downward accountability mechanisms and therefore could not provide solution to address the barriers to their implementation.

**Figure 24- Proposed ways of addressing socio-cultural barriers to downward accountability-Adadi**



The respondents mentioned several suggestions on how to address these barriers. On information sharing, the use of local staff who understands the local languages was cited as one of the main ways to address language barrier by 94% of the respondents. According to them, using local staff who can speak directly to the people without translation can make interactions more free, enhance trust and clarity. The respondents also recommended that government should provide

essential services to the people during period of disasters to avoid desperation and fear of NGO exit; this was mentioned by 85% of the respondents. Appropriate timing of community meetings to get maximum participation was cited by 81% of the respondents, women particularly were more concerned with this than men saying that the meetings should be scheduled to take into account their traditional chores which can block them from participating in the relief process. The use of pictorial messages and illustrations to convey key messages to the communities was highlighted by 77% of the respondents to address the language barrier. They also recommended that community leaders, elders and local opinion leaders should be included in the relief distribution process (77%). Separate sessions for women and men should be conducted to enhance the voices of women and women should be prompted to speak in every session (60%). Awareness campaigns on the importance of participation in relief assistance should be conducted (74%) and awareness on relief as a right and not a favour by NGOs was also cited by 66% of the respondents so that communities can complain and challenge NGOs on poor service without feeling constrained.

According to the focus group participants, complaints and response processes should be made transparent, easy and safe to use. NGOs should recognise that their staffs wield power and devise ways to reduce the possible abuse of power in the community. Measures should also be put in place to ensure that the communities know that they can get assistance without relying on their leader's goodwill.




**4.4.3. Downward accountability mechanisms and decision making ability of relief beneficiaries.**


**Table 11- People who held decision making power on who could/could not receive relief assistance-Adadi and Bori**

Who in your opinion held power regarding the decision on who should or should not be included in the relief distribution list?-	<b>Adadi</b>		<b>Bori</b>	
	frequency(each cell count out of 47)	%	frequency(each cell count out of 47)	%
Relief Committee	39	<b>83</b>	9	<b>19</b>
Community and religious leaders	4	<b>9</b>	12	<b>26</b>
Elders	-	-	2	<b>4</b>
Don't know	-	-	3	<b>6</b>
Staff who came here	1	<b>2</b>	2	<b>4</b>
Assistant Chief	3	<b>6</b>	19	<b>40</b>

**Figure 25- People who held decision making power on who could/could not receive relief assistance-Adadi**



**Figure 26- People who held decision making power on who could/could not receive relief assistance –Bori**



In Adadi, 83% felt that the relief committee had power on who would be selected to benefit from the relief assistance, 9% felt power rested with the community and religious leaders, 6% felt the assistant chief had the power and 2% thought the elders had the power on who would be in the distribution list. This corresponds with figure 18 in which the same percentage 83% felt that they knew how they could complain and provide feedback on the project. In Adadi where downward accountability mechanisms were applied, there was a feeling that those that the community entrusted with managing the relief assistance (relief committee) held the power over the process. It means that with strong accountability mechanisms some level of power can be transferred and exercised at the community level. However 27% felt that power rested elsewhere with the NGO staff, elders , community and religious leaders signifying that even though downward accountability can help in empowering communities , there is still a view that that significant amount of power resides elsewhere and not with the communities. This calls for increased awareness of the communities on their entitlements and strengthening the accountability systems to enhance voice and power of communities during relief distribution.

In Bori where the downward mechanism were not applied, the results were different and most of the respondents felt that the power to decide who would be selected rested with the assistant chief (41%) followed by elders (26%). The relief committee was third at 19%. The other 12% felt that the religious and community leaders and ADS MKE staff had the power to decide on who would get or not get assistance. 6% said they did not know who wielded this power. This shows that in general, respondents in Bori felt that most power on who would or would not be selected rested elsewhere out of their control. Even though there was a selection committee, the respondents did not think that they had much power compared to the chief, the elders and community leaders. This corroborates the earlier results on participation in which the focused

group discussion participants in Bori were not able to clearly articulate the selection criteria used with most of them simply mentioning that they were selected because they were ‘poor’.

The differences in Adadi compared to Bori show that where downward accountability mechanisms were applied, there was a feeling that those that the community entrusted with managing the relief assistance (relief committee) held the power over the process. This means that with strong accountability mechanisms some level of power can be transferred and exercised at the community level during emergencies.

#### **4.5. Answer to research question 3.**

##### **4.5.1. Successes and failures of downward accountability mechanisms.**

###### **Introduction**


This section deals with the research question 3 as stated in chapter 2 on page 28. The question focused on what the community indicators were for the successes and failures of downward accountability mechanisms in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. This question was explored by listening to the relief beneficiaries’ narratives of what they felt were the signs that the downward accountability mechanisms either failed or succeeded in delivering on their promise. These were then categorised and the responses for each category counted to get their frequency.

**Table 12 - Indicators of the successes of downward accountability mechanisms**

<b>Indicators of success of downward accountability mechanisms</b>	<b>frequency(each cell count out of 47)</b>	<b>%</b>
Available signed list of relief beneficiaries	46	98
knowledge on project budgets	43	91
knowledge /participation in developing selection/targeting criteria	42	89
Knowledge on relief entitlements	40	85
Evidence of complaints made and response given	36	77
Knowledge / Existence of MOU between the community and ADS	30	64
Availability of community /committee meeting minutes	29	62

NB: There were no responses from Bori as they didn't experience the downward accountability mechanisms and therefore could not assess their successes and failures

**Figure 27- Indicators of the successes of downward accountability mechanisms**



**4.5.1.1. Indicators of the successes of downward accountability mechanisms**

Results on the indicators of successes were varied but were mainly articulated in Adadi where the mechanisms were applied as they were the ones that experienced the mechanisms and therefore could assess their success or failure.

Respondents' highlighted key factors that they thought pointed to the successes of the downward accountability mechanisms. They used phrases that described their satisfaction and impressions on the benefits of these mechanisms. The indicator mentioned by most respondents as a sign of success was the fact that they all signed (thumbprints) distribution lists and records were available to prove this (98%). The fact that the project budgets were shared on billboards was also shown as a sign that the downward accountability mechanism was successful in information disclosure (91%). Knowledge of and participation in the development of the targeting criteria was also cited by 89% of the respondents as indicator of the success of the downward accountability mechanisms. Respondents in Adadi where the downward accountability mechanism were applied were able to articulate the selection criteria used during relief assistance proving that they were part of its development.

Clarity and knowledge of relief entitlements was also mentioned by 85% of respondents as a sign that the participation and information sharing processes delivered results. Evidence of complaints made and action taken to respond to the complaints was also mentioned by 77% of the respondents as a sign that the complaints and response processes were effective and addressing concerns by the relief recipients. Knowledge of a memorandum of understanding signed between ADS and the community during the relief assistance was also mentioned by 64% of the respondents as a sign that the downward accountability measures delivered benefits. Availability of community and committee meeting minutes which were filed and kept in safe custody four years after the relief assistance project had ended was also mentioned by 62% of the respondents as an indicator of successful implementation of downward accountability mechanisms

These results were confirmed during focus group discussions in which participants mentioned that the display of the total project costs on project sign boards and banners during events was an indicator that ADS MKE valued beneficiaries' information. They gave examples of other NGOs that have worked in the area before and have never shared project budgets with the communities. Respondents highlighted that by knowing project budgets, they felt 'valued' and 'respected'. Focus group participants mentioned that knowledge of project budgets can help in ensuring bigger impacts as communities can contribute during disasters to expand the benefits of programs. They highlighted that with devolved country governments, open sharing of information on budget can help them to advocate for more resources from the country government. Respondents affirmed that sharing project financial information has improved the mutual trust between them and ADSMKE. However, they mentioned that they did not get full details on salaries for staff and other administration costs. Although salary information is confidential, NGOs can share aggregate data on total project administration costs so that communities can feel that there is full disclosure and transparency on project budgets.

The other indicator of success mentioned by focus group participants the fact that the community could still remember and articulate the details of targeting and the relief assistance that they were given four years after the assistance was provided. In Adadi, participants were consistent in describing their entitlements and the process that was used by the community in identifying those that benefited. They described the selection criteria in detail, highlighting the key vulnerabilities that were considered for one to be selected which included disability, widows, families with sick members, the aged , those considered poor (less than 4 goats). They emphasized that all this was provided during information sharing sessions. The selection process helped to ensure that the



neediest people were targeted. The fact that most of the targets were older people corresponds with figure 5 that shows that 81% of the respondents (beneficiaries) were aged 45 years and above thereby meeting the old age criteria of selection.

Focus group participants also confirmed that complaints were made and subsequent action taken by ADS MKE to address these complaints. The participants mentioned that the information they provided to ADSMKE about the contractor for water supply led to the increase in the amount and quality (clean) of water. However, during focused group discussion it was noted that oral complaints that were the majority could not be accounted for apart from verbal confirmations that these were made by the communities. NGOs should devise ways in which these oral complaints and feedback are captured and stored for future reference. For example, literate committee members can be encouraged to document oral complaints and file these records.

Evidence from observation also revealed that there was detailed documentation of the beneficiaries and confirmations that those targeted received supplies (see annex 10 and 11). This showed that the processes were transparent and accountability was ensured in the distribution process. The filing of the details and safekeeping by the relief committees in Adadi is also evidence that the committee was empowered and knew their role in relief distribution.

The evidence of the existence of a memorandum of Understanding (MOU) (see annex 7) between the community and ADS MKE ensured that the commitments by both parties were agreed on and shared openly to ensure compliance and accountability. Discussions with community members in focus groups showed how the MOU made them feel as important part of the relief distribution. They confirmed having drafted the MOU together with ADSMKE and

agreed on the contents and implementation arrangements. The participants mentioned that they knew what was expected of them and what they expected of ADS MKE. This was not the case in Bori where there were no accountability mechanisms.


The success of the downward accountability mechanisms was also shown in the way committee members held their meetings. Observations of the minutes showed that the meetings were autonomous and did not involve ADSMKE. Minutes were written, documented and filed for future reference (see annex 9). This shows that the committees which were established as a result of the accountability mechanisms to enhance community participation and engagement were largely functional and successful. The downside of these is that the minutes were in English and written, yet the community is largely illiterate making them only accessible to the elites and those with literacy skills. However, it was noted that during focus group discussions, participants referred to these committee meetings and could remember what were agreed upon and how they took forward the recommendations including contributions they made.

#### 4.5.1.2. Indicators of the failures of downward accountability mechanisms

**Table 13. Indicators of the failures of downward accountability mechanisms**

<b>Impacts of downward accountability on the appropriateness and Effectiveness of humanitarian assistance</b>						
	<b>Evidence of Presence of accountability mechanism /rating</b>	<b>Targeting and meeting needs of the target group</b>	<b>Ownership of projects</b>	<b>Beneficiary demands from NGOs Governments</b>	<b>Addressing Issues of fraud and mismanagement of aid</b>	<b>Sustainability of programs</b>
<b>Information sharing (timeliness, relevance and clarity)</b>						
Adadi -number of responses for each category(cell)	Yes	35	30	7	4	10
percentage %		74	64	15	9	21
Bori	No	0	0	0	0	0
%		0	0	0	0	0
<b>Complaints and response (effectiveness, safety of the process to raise and receive complaints , and provide feedback</b>						
Adadi -number of responses for each category(cell)	Yes	40	35	15	13	4
percentage %		85	74	32	28	9
Bori		0	0	0	0	0
%		0	0	0	0	0
<b>Participation by household heads in delivery of relief assistance</b>						
Adadi -number of responses for each category(cell)		36	34	4	3	40
percentage %		77	72	9	6	85
Bori		0	0	0	0	0

**Figure 28 Indicators of the failures of downward accountability mechanisms**



The main failures of the accountability mechanisms were around issues of fraud and mismanagement of aid and making demands on NGOs by beneficiaries of assistance. These were scored poorly by respondents across all the accountability mechanisms as shown in figure 28 above. It was only under complaints and response that communities felt that these issues could be marginally addressed with 32% of the respondents mentioning that they could make demands from NGOs and Governments on their entitlements and 28% saying that with complaints and response processes, they could address issues of fraud and mismanagement. This shows that even though downward accountability mechanisms are successful in enhancing targeting, project ownership and sustainability, they largely fail on issues of full transfer of power to beneficiaries, addressing fraud and mismanagement of aid and making demands on NGOs.

## **CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS**

### **5.1. Summary of research findings**

The study shows the three pillars of downward accountability: information sharing, complaints and response and participation contributed in diverse ways in enhancing effectiveness and appropriateness of humanitarian assistance. For example according to figure 22, on the indicator of targeting and meeting the needs of the target group, the downward accountability mechanisms of information sharing, complaints and response and participation were found to be effective at 74%, 85% and 77% respectively showing that by establishing and strengthening these mechanisms, relief assistance can be better targeted and meet the needs of those affected by disasters. The results also show that the downward accountability mechanisms of information sharing, complaints and response and participation also contributed to the ownership of the relief process at 64%, 74% and 72% respectively.

The third indicator of effectiveness and appropriateness that the downward accountability mechanisms had strong impact on was sustainability of relief programs beyond the relief phase. However the main downward accountability mechanism that had greatest impact on this was participation at 85%. The results show that with strong participation mechanism, relief assistance can be sustainable beyond the relief phase as evident in the manner in which the research respondents have taken care of the relief inputs and assets for over 4 years since the last drought.

The above results show that downward accountability mechanisms have strong impacts on these three indicators of aid appropriateness and effectiveness (targeting and meeting the needs of the target group, ownership of relief process, and sustainability of the relief activities beyond the relief phase). However, the three mechanism score poorly in two other indicators related to power which include being able to make demands on NGOs and Governments regarding assistance and helping in addressing issues of fraud and mismanagement of aid. For example on the indicator of relief beneficiaries making demands on NGOs and Governments, Information sharing, complaints and response and participation processes of downward accountability contributed only 15%, 32% and 9% respectively. This shows that even though these mechanisms are stronger in enhancing ownership, sustainability and targeting the needy, they don't deliver much value in making demands on the relief providers and addressing issues of fraud during relief assistance. It is therefore possible to conclude that the mechanisms alone cannot help in breaking some of the power barriers between NGOs, vendors and relief beneficiaries, a lot of work still need to be done by NGOs to transfer real power to the beneficiaries of relief assistance.

In conclusion, the evidence suggests that downward accountability mechanisms contributes to the effectiveness and appropriateness of humanitarian assistance especially the three key indicators of targeting and meeting the needs of the relief beneficiaries, ownership of relief projects by relief and sustainability of relief activities beyond the relief phase. The evidence also lends credence to the study by Featherstone (2013: 27) that suggested that downward accountability is critical in aid effectiveness and appropriateness.

The results for the second research question showed that the main socio-cultural barriers to the implementation of downward accountability mechanisms were language at 89%, trusting the

committee for representation (87%), culture of being grateful/not questioning those who assist/ADS being seen as good (81%) and limited choice of NGOs (60%). It was not surprising that language was the most frequently mentioned barrier at 89% since the level of literacy in the areas is very low at 27.7% according to the Marsabit country government (2013:43). Language barrier was seen as the main reason for the failure in documentation of oral complaints which were said to be the majority compared to the formal ones. The respondents were more confident in raising issues with leaders, elders and committee members, however, these people were also illiterate and although they handled the complaints, they could not document these for future reference.

The second most mentioned barrier was trust in the relief committee for representation (87%). According to the respondents, the relief committee was seen as a good avenue for representation and raising issues. This means that individual complaints and voice was compromised as people felt that by virtue of the existence of the committee the issues around participation and complaints would be addressed thereby not seeing the importance of making individual demands. Although this is a good thing pointing to the fact that the committee was strong and had the trust of the community, it has the effect of compromising individual voice at the expense of broader communal narratives. Secondly this shows that investments in informal communal complaints and response processes can deliver more results as communities are more confident to participate and raise complaints with their representatives and leaders as opposed to directly through formal processes with NGOs.

The culture of not questioning those who provide help was also cited as major barrier at (81%). Making demands on people who provide assistance was viewed as 'bad manners' making complaints to be seen as negative. This is also tied to the belief that relief assistance is a favour

and not a right and therefore those who provide it should be respected and not admonished for bad service. This culture has the potential of negating the impacts of complaints and response processes because relief target group can adopt a culture of silence even if things go wrong because of the feeling of good-will toward NGOs that provide assistance.

The limited choice of NGOs and fear of exit by the existing ones was cited by 60% and 49% of the respondents respectively. In the two areas, it was only ADS MKE that was providing assistance during the period, the government had provided some assistance but this was seen as inadequate and unreliable. The respondents felt that their area was *favoured since other locations were not getting assistance*. They did not want to *'rock the boat'* as mentioned by one key informant. They believed that by making demands on the NGO, they would be seen as being *'difficult to work with'* thereby possibly making the NGO to leave the area leading to limited relief assistance in the future. This also reflects the fact that the government which should be the main service provider is not providing services making the communities to rely on the few NGOs during times of distress. This leads to desperation, fear and the feeling that relief assistance is a favour and not a right. This requires education and awareness on the beneficiaries so that they know that they have a right to assistance by all stakeholders including the government.

The main suggestions mentioned in addressing socio-cultural barriers according to figure 24 included the use of local staff who understands the local languages (94%). Using local staff who can speak directly to the people without translation was seen as more free and can enhance trust and clarity. It was also recommended that government should provide essential services to the people during period of disasters to avoid desperation (85%). Timing of community meeting to get maximum participation was cited by 81% of the respondents. Women particularly were more



concerned with this than men saying that the meetings should be scheduled to take into account their traditional chores which can block them from participating in the relief process. The use of pictorial messages and illustrations to convey key messages to the communities was highlighted by 77% of the respondents to address the language barrier. Community leaders, elders and local opinion leaders should be included in the relief distribution process (77%). Separate session for women and men should be conducted to enhance the voices of women (60%) and awareness campaigns on the important of participation in relief assistance should be conducted (74%). the other 66% mentioned that awareness should be conducted emphasising that relief is a right and not a favour by NGOs so that communities can complain and challenge NGOs on poor service without feeling constrained.

The results on the impacts of downward accountability mechanisms on the ability of relief beneficiaries to make demands and have power over the distribution process were not strong. In most cases, power to make decision rested out of the control of the individual relief beneficiary with the committees, leaders amongst others. However a deeper look at the results from Adadi and Bori showed a different pattern as evident in figures 25 and 26. In Adadi where the downward accountability mechanisms were applied, the results indicate that most decision making power rested with elected relief committee members (83%) and only 9% felt power rested with the community and religious leaders, 6% felt the assistant chief had the power and 2% thought the elders had the power on who would be in the distribution list. This was in contrast to Bori where the downward accountability mechanisms were not applied. The respondents in Bori felt that power to decide on who could or could not get assistance rested not with the elected community relief committees and mainly with government official and other non-elected leaders. Most respondents felt that the power to decide who would be selected

rested with the assistant chief (41%) followed by elders (26%). The relief committee was 3<sup>rd</sup> at 19%. The other 8 % felt that the religious and community leaders and NGO staff had the power to decide on who would get or not get assistance and 6% said they did not know who wielded this power. This shows that in Adadi where downward accountability mechanisms were applied; there was a feeling that those that the community entrusted with managing the relief assistance (relief committee) held the power over the process as opposed to non-elected members as was the case in Bori. The different perceptions between Bori and Adadi where the same agency was working and providing similar assistance points to the fact that where downward accountability mechanisms are established, some level of power can be transferred and exercised at the community level. However, the fact that over 27% felt that power rested elsewhere even in Adadi where the downward accountability mechanism were applied means that even though downward accountability can help in enhancing relief beneficiary voice, it is still not effective in overall transfer of power during relief process. This calls for increased awareness of the communities on their entitlements and strengthening the accountability systems to enhance voice and power of communities during relief distribution.

Under the third research question, respondents' highlighted key factors that they thought pointed to the successes of the downward accountability mechanisms. They used phrases that described their satisfaction and impressions on the benefits of these mechanisms. According to figure 27, the indicator mentioned by most respondents as a sign of success of downward accountability was the fact that they all signed (thumbprints) distribution lists and records were available to prove this (98%). The fact that the project budgets were shared on billboards was also shown as a sign that the downward accountability was successful. Knowledge of and participation in the development of the targeting criteria was also cited by 89% of the respondents as an indicator of

the success of the downward accountability mechanisms. Clarity and knowledge of relief entitlements was also mentioned as a sign that the participation, information sharing processes delivered results. Evidence of complaints made and action taken to respond to the complaints was also mentioned by 77% of the respondents as a sign that the complaints and response processes were effective and addressing several concerns. Mechanisms were successful in giving information to the communities. Knowledge of a memorandum of understanding signed between ADS and the community during the relief assistance was also mentioned by 64% of the respondents as a clear sign that the downward accountability processes were successful. Availability of community and committee meeting minutes which were filed and kept in safe custody four years after the relief assistance project had ended was also mentioned by 62% of the respondents as an indicator of successful implementation of downward accountability mechanisms.

The main failures of the accountability mechanisms were around issues of fraud and mismanagement of aid and making demands on NGOs by beneficiaries of assistance. These were scored poorly by respondents across all the accountability mechanisms. It was only under complaints and response that communities felt that these issues could be marginally addressed with 32% of the respondents mentioning that they could make demands from NGOs and Governments on their entitlements and 28% saying that with complaints and response processes, they could address issues of fraud and mismanagement. This corresponds with the Tsunami evaluation findings, that found that *'accountability and complaints mechanisms overall were not commensurate with the scale of the funding. They were largely ineffective in addressing the worst cases of inappropriate aid, wastefulness and negligence among internationally, nationally and locally managed recovery programmes'* (TEC Capacities Report, 2006: 75). This shows that

even though downward accountability mechanism are successful in enhancing targeting, project ownership and sustainability, they largely fail in addressing fraud , mismanagement of aid and full transfer of power to beneficiaries. This is an area to explore in future research in order to get reasons why these mechanisms are not delivering on these issues.

## **5.2. Conclusions**

The study shows that downward accountability mechanism applied by NGOs during humanitarian assistance help in enhancing appropriateness and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance. These mechanisms deliver varied benefits on the key indicators of appropriateness and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance including better targeting, ownership of humanitarian programs and sustainability. However, to ensure maximum benefits, the findings demonstrate that the mechanisms should be applied in an integrated manner as each of them contributes in different ways in enhancing these indicators.

The findings also support scholars like Egeland (2005:2), Featherstone (2013: 27) that suggested that downward accountability improves effectiveness of humanitarian programs. However, the research goes further by showing the critical impacts in enhancing specific indicators of effectiveness and appropriateness of humanitarian assistance including better targeting, ownership of humanitarian programs and sustainability issues that the above scholars did not adequately address. In addition, earlier studies did not comprehensively cover whether the mechanisms can help address issues of power of beneficiaries in making demands on NGOs and fraud and mismanagement of aid. The study has addressed these and found that the mechanisms largely fail in these critical areas of accountability.

Secondly, the findings challenge the negative assertions by scholars like Kilby (2006: 952) and Edwards and Hulme (1996: 25) that doubt the impacts of downward accountability in humanitarian assistance. These scholars emphasised that accountability mechanism do not deliver because their application is discretionary and relies on the ‘grace and favour’ of practitioners. However, the study shows that this is not the case as evident from the results that identify positive impacts of downward accountability mechanism on targeting and meeting needs of beneficiaries, ownership and sustainability of programs. However, the failures of the mechanisms to deliver on power, voice, fraud and mismanagement of aid, support the claim of Edwards and Hulme (1996: 25) that service organizations offer much less powerful forms of voice and exit to their clients. The main question that still remains is why these mechanisms do not deliver major benefits on issues of beneficiary power, fraud and making demands on NGOs during relief assistance. These are areas to explore in further research.

The findings also add new strands in empirical knowledge on the impacts of downward accountability during humanitarian assistance and challenge some past studies. For example Kraft, et al (2010:14), noted that accountability mechanisms did not seem to enhance targeting and quality of assistance. Other scholars like *Truelove* and Duncalf (2012:9) emphasised that feedback mechanisms are mainly effective in capturing simple operational issues for example corrections to beneficiary ID cards, but not larger operational issues like aid effectiveness and impact. Others like Macauslan and Phelps (2012:70) mentioned that in some cases, the downward accountability processes are established mainly as tick boxes to fulfil external requirement for funding. However, the research findings challenge these assumptions by clearly demonstrating the successes of these mechanisms in improving targeting and meeting the needs

of the target group, enhancement of ownership and sustainability of programs. On the other hand, the research shows that the findings by the Tsunami evaluation coalition (TEC Capacities Report, 2006: 75) that the complaints and response processes were ineffective in addressing the worst cases of wastefulness and negligence is largely true since the findings demonstrated that these mechanisms failed to deliver impacts on these issues.

The findings also challenge some of the theoretical assertions. For example, Albert O. Hirschman (1970:3) premise that clients of voluntary organisations can *exit* (withdraw from the relationship); or they can *voice* (attempt to repair or improve the relationship through communication of the complaint, grievance or proposal for change) may not be fully applicable as the findings demonstrate that accountability mechanisms do not offer adequate levels of voice and power for clients to make demands and are largely ineffective in addressing issues of fraud, and mismanagement of aid. It is also clear from the research that the option of exit is not fully available to the beneficiaries of assistance because of limited choice of relief providers.

In summary, the research clearly expands knowledge on downward accountability, shows ways in which the theoretical literature can be expanded and adds empirical knowledge on the key impacts of and barriers to downward accountability in humanitarian assistance.

### **5.3. Recommendations**

Based on the study, the researcher proposes the following recommendations:

- 1) Future humanitarian responses should use a combination of accountability mechanisms since the evidence suggests each of the various mechanisms is effective in achieving

different results. Implementing them together will ensure maximum benefits for beneficiaries as opposed to a focus on one or two mechanisms.

- 2) Alternative informal complaints and feedback processes should be adopted in highly illiterate communities to capture and respond to oral complaints.
- 3) Awareness sessions at the beginning of and during the course of relief assistance should be enhanced to empower communities to challenges relief providers and reduce the perception that power still resides outside of the community during relief operations. NGOs should be deliberate and committed to real transfer of power to the beneficiaries so that relief assistance can be fully managed and seen to be controlled from the community. The communities should be made aware of their relief entitlements from the beginning emphasising that relief assistance is a right and not a favour. Such awareness and strong accountability systems throughout the relief distribution process can enhance voice and power of communities during relief distribution.
- 4) Relief providers should strive to hire local staff who understand both English and local language. In largely illiterate communities, pictorial information should be used to depict key program details like entitlements so that those who are illiterate can easily see these on community billboards.
- 5) Community meetings should be scheduled to take into account women traditional roles so that they don't miss out on key meetings and deliberations. Separate sessions for women and men should be conducted to enhance the voices of women. Awareness campaigns on the important role of women in relief assistance should be conducted and women encouraged to participate in the committees and special seats with responsibilities allocated for them in the said committees.

- 6) Government agencies and donors should be lobbied to provide essential services so that people are not desperate or tied to one agency during emergency periods. Prior consultation on the needs before assistance is brought should be conducted as a way of addressing participation barriers. This will ensure that relief matches the needs of the beneficiaries.

#### **5.4. Areas of further research**

The main failures of the accountability mechanisms were around issues of power, voice, addressing fraud and mismanagement of aid and making demands on NGOs by beneficiaries of assistance. These were scored poorly by respondents across all the accountability mechanisms. It was only under complaints and response that communities felt that these issues could be marginally addressed with 32% of the respondents mentioning that they could make demands from NGOs and Governments on their entitlements and 28% saying that with complaints and response processes, they could address issues of fraud and mismanagement. This shows that even though downward accountability mechanisms are successful in enhancing targeting, project ownership and sustainability, they largely fail on issues of full transfer of power to beneficiaries, addressing fraud and mismanagement of aid and making demands on NGOs. This is an area to explore in future research in order to get reasons why these mechanisms are not delivering on power, fraud and mismanagement of aid.



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## 6.1. Annexes

### Annex 1: Interview schedule for household heads

#### UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

#### DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL WORK

This interview Schedule is intended to facilitate the study on **the impacts of Downward Accountability on the appropriateness and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance in Butiye and Obbu wards in Moyale, Marsabit County**. The study is for academic purposes only and is carried out as partial requirement of the award of Master of Arts degree in disaster management International for Mr Maurice Ouma Onyango. As a key beneficiary of the recent humanitarian assistance, you have been selected to provide vital information that will facilitate the study. Your response will be treated with utmost confidentiality.

Can I proceed?

Thank you very much for your valuable time.

#### Part A- Respondent's background

Residence of respondent\_\_\_\_\_

Age\_\_\_\_\_

Sex\_\_\_\_\_

Highest Level of education completed\_\_\_\_\_

Occupations\_\_\_\_\_

Family size\_\_\_\_\_

Type and number of livestock owned\_\_\_\_\_

What is the main source of your income? \_\_\_\_\_

What are your other sources of income? \_\_\_\_\_

#### Observations made

Village	Things to observe	observation	Significance	Follow-up
	House type Water facilities Livestock numbers Number of children Any other things of significance			

#### Part B-Relief assistance and Information Sharing

- 1) During the last drought 2011-13, what form of assistance did you receive from Non-governmental organisations?

---

2) How were you selected to benefit from this assistance?

---

3) Which organisations provided this assistance?

---

4) What do you know about the organisation that provided assistance?

---

5) What are the aims of the relief project of this organisation?

---

6) What are the benefits of these relief projects?

---

7) How did you get the information about the organisation and its relief distribution projects?

---

8) Who in the community didn't have this information and why?

---

9) How did this information help you to get involved in the relief distribution project? Can you give a specific example?

---

10) How did the information that you received and provided help in the following:  
-improved targeting,

---

-empowerment of relief beneficiaries,

---

Addressing mismanagement of aid and fraud,

---

Demanding of accountability from the NGO, government, local representatives

---

Promoting ownership and sustainability of programs

---

How was the project delivered?

---

---

---

11) How did the information you received about the relief assistance affect your expectation of how NGOs should share information with the communities during relief assistance

---

12) How timely was the information provided? Please explain and give examples

---

---

13) How relevant was the information provided in view of the relief distribution? Please explain and give examples

---

---

14) How clear was the information you were given? Please explain and give examples

---

---

15) What suggestions do you have on how NGOs should provide information to the beneficiaries of assistance

---

---

16)

In your overall opinion how much information did you know about the organisation , project , its activities and budget	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
--	-------------------------------	-------------------------------	-------------------------------	-------------------------------

1 – I knew nothing about the agency or about the project activities

2 – I knew little about the agency and about the project activities

3 – I knew a lot about the agency and had a good knowledge about the project activities

4 –I knew a lot about the agency, the project activities and the budget

### Section C- power and barriers to information sharing

17) How were you selected to benefit?

---

18) Who in your opinion held power regarding the decision on who should or should not be included in the relief distribution list?

---

In the community?

---

In the NGO?

---

In the government?

19) How did these people use their power to influence relief distribution? Please give examples

---

20) What do you think should be done to ensure beneficiaries have voice, power and decision making during relief destitution?

---

21) In your opinion what were the key social and cultural barriers that hindered successful information sharing during the relief distribution?

---

22) How can these barriers be addressed improve the voice of disaster affected people during future relief food distributions?

---

**Section D- Participation, complaints and response**

**23)**

Which of the four options below best describes the ways in which you were involved in the various stages of the relief distribution project?	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
--	-------------------------------	-------------------------------	-------------------------------	-------------------------------

1 – Informed but not involved –I was told how the project will affect me

2 – Consulted –the organisation /partner discussed decisions with me

- 3 – Collaborative /joint decisions making –the organisation /partner sat with me and made decisions together
- 4 –community-led/managed –we made decisions and the organisation/partners helped us to implement them.

24) How did your participation in the project help in the following:  
 -improved targeting?

---

-empowerment of relief beneficiaries?

---

Addressing mismanagement of aid and fraud?

---

Demanding of accountability from the NGO, government, local representatives?

---

Promoting ownership and sustainability of programs?

---

25) In what ways did your participation differ at various stages of the project? (Assessment, implementation and monitoring)

---

26) Can you give an example of the difference that your participation in the project made and any ways in which your involvement in the project selection, targeting and implementation made the project more successful-

---



---

27) How did your lack of participation hinder the project success?

---

28)

Which of the four options best describe the way in which you could complain or provide feedback to the agency about the relief project?	1	2	3	4
	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

- 1- I didn't know how to give feedback to the organisation/partner about the project
- 2 – I was able to give feedback but I didn't understand how the mechanism worked and didn't use it.

3 – There was a mechanism to give feedback. I understood how it worked and I was able to give feedback and my feedback was used to make the changes to the project.

4 – There was a feedback mechanism, I understand how it worked and regularly provided feedback about issues and feedback was used to make changes to the project.

29) Can you describe how the complaints and feedback mechanism worked?

---

30) Which members of the community used this complaints and feedback mechanism? How safe and confidential was this mechanism?

---

---

31) How did the NGO give responses to complaints and feedback and how fast was the response given?

---

32) In what ways did the lack of feedback hinder the success or failure of the project (explain the importance of confidentiality and suggest against using examples that may be sensitive)

---

33) Some complaints are usually very personal did you feel comfortable sharing these with the organisation? If so, how did you do it?

---

34) In what ways did the complaints that you made about the project help in the following:  
-improved targeting?

---

-empowerment of relief beneficiaries?

---

Addressing mismanagement of aid and fraud?

---

Demanding of accountability from the NGO, government, local representatives?

---

Promoting ownership and sustainability of programs?

---

35) What were the key indicators/evidence of the successes and failures of information sharing, complaints and response and participation mechanisms in the delivery of humanitarian assistance?

**Information sharing**

Success indicators

---

---

failure indicators

---

---

**Complaints and response**

Success indicators

---

---

failure indicators

---

---

**Participation**

Success indicators

---

---

failure indicators

---

---

- 36) In your overall opinion, what do you think were the overall impacts of the information sharing, participation and complaints and response in the delivery of humanitarian assistance?



**Annex 2: Key informants interview guide**

**UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**

**DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL WORK**

This interview Schedule is intended to facilitate the study on **the impacts of Downward Accountability on the appropriateness and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance in Butiye and Obbu wards in Moyale, Marsabit County**. The study is for academic purposes and is carried out as partial requirement of the award of Master of Arts degree in disaster management International for Mr Maurice Ouma Onyango. As a key beneficiary of the recent humanitarian assistance, you have been selected to provide vital information that will facilitate the study. Your response will be treated with utmost confidentiality.

Can I proceed?

Thank you very much for your valuable time.

**Part A- Respondent's background**

Respondent's occupation \_\_\_\_\_  
Agency/government \_\_\_\_\_  
ministry \_\_\_\_\_  
Length of service \_\_\_\_\_  
Level of education \_\_\_\_\_  
Age \_\_\_\_\_  
Sex \_\_\_\_\_

**Part B-Relief assistance and Information Sharing**

- 1) During the last drought 2012-13, what form of assistance did the community receive from Non-governmental organisations?

\_\_\_\_\_

- 2) How were the beneficiaries selected to benefit from this assistance?

\_\_\_\_\_

- 3) Which organisation/s provided this assistance?

\_\_\_\_\_

- 4) What do you know about these organisations? How did you know about these details?

\_\_\_\_\_

5) What were the aims of the relief projects of the organisations?

---

6) What were the benefits of these organisations projects in this area?

---

7) How did you get the information about the organisation and its relief distribution projects?

---

8) Who in the community do you think didn't have this information and why?

---

9) How did this information help beneficiaries to get involved in the relief distribution project? Can you give a specific example?

---

10) How did the information given to the beneficiaries help in any changes in the way the project was delivered? Please give examples?

---

11) How timely was the information provided?

---

---

12) How relevant was the information provided in view of the relief distribution?

---

13) How clear was the information you were given?

---

14) What suggestions do you have on how NGOs should provide information to the beneficiaries of assistance?

---

15)

In your overall opinion how much information do you know about the organisations, project , activities and their budget	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
---	-------------------------------	-------------------------------	-------------------------------	-------------------------------

1 – I knew nothing about the agency or about the project activities

- 2 – I knew little about the agency and about the project activities
- 3 – I knew a lot about the agency and have a good knowledge about the project activities
- 4 –I knew a lot about the agency, the project activities and the budget

16) How did the information provided to beneficiaries help in the following:

-targeting,

---

-empowerment of beneficiaries,

---

Addressing mismanagement of aid and fraud,

---

Demanding of accountability from the NGO, government, local representatives

---

Promoting ownership and sustainability of programs

---

### **Section C- power and barriers to information sharing**

17) How were people selected to benefit from assistance?

---

---

18) Who in your opinion held power regarding the decision on who should or should not be included in the relief distribution list?

---

---

In the community

---

In the NGO

---

In the government

---

19) How did these people use their power to influence relief distribution? Please give examples

---

20) What do you think should be done to change the power balance and put beneficiaries at the centre of relief destitution?

---

21) In your opinion what were the key social and cultural barriers to successful information sharing during the relief distribution?

---

22) How can these barriers be addressed during future relief food distributions?

---

### Section D- Participation, complaints and response

23)

Which of the four options below describes the ways in which you were involved in the various stages of the relief distribution project	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
--	-------------------------------	-------------------------------	-------------------------------	-------------------------------

1 – Informed but not involved –I was told how the project will affect me

2 – Consulted –the organisation /partner discussed decisions with me

3 – Collaborative /joint decisions making –the organisation /partner sat with us and we made decisions together

4 –community-led/managed –we made decisions and the organisation/partners helped us to implement them

24) In what ways did community participation differ at various stages of the project?  
(Assessment, implementation and monitoring)

---

25) Can you give an example of how community participation in the project selection, targeting and implementation made the project more successful and or how their lack of participation hindered the project success?

---

26) How did the participation of relief beneficiaries in the project help in the following:

-improved targeting,

---

-empowerment of relief beneficiaries,

---

---

---

Addressing mismanagement of aid and fraud,

---

---

---

Demanding of accountability from the duty bearers (NGO, government, local representatives),

---

---

---

Promoting ownership and sustainability of programs

---

27) What suggestions would you offer to improve the participation of beneficiaries in relief assistance in the future?

---

28)

Which of the four options best describe the way in which communities could provide feedback to the agency about the project	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
---	-------------------------------	-------------------------------	-------------------------------	-------------------------------

1-I didn't know how to give feedback to the organisation/partner about the project

2 – I was able to give feedback but I didn't understand how the mechanism worked and had didn't use it

3 – There was a mechanism to give feedback. In understood how it works and I was able to give feedback and my feedback was used to make the changes to the project

4 – There is a feedback mechanism to give feedback, in understand how it works and regularly received feedback about issues raised and how they have influenced the changes to the project

29) Can you describe how the feedback mechanism worked?

---

---

---

30) Which members of the community used this mechanism?

---

31) How was feedback/ response given by the organisation and how soon was the response given?

---

32) In what ways did the lack of feedback/response hinder the success of the project?  
(explain the importance of confidentiality and suggest against using examples that may be sensitive)

---

37) How did community feedback and complaints help in the following:  
-targeting?

---

-empowerment of relief beneficiaries?

---

Addressing mismanagement of aid and fraud?

---

Demanding of accountability from the NGO, government, local representatives?

---

Promoting ownership and sustainability of programs?

---

33) What suggestions would you offer to improve the voice and feedback of beneficiaries of relief assistance in the future?

---

34) What were the key indicators/evidence of the successes and failures of information sharing, complaints and response and participation mechanisms in the delivery of humanitarian assistance?

Success indicators

---

failure indicators

---

35) What downward accountability indicators do you want to see in future humanitarian assistance?

**Information sharing**

---

**Complaints and response**

---

**Participation**

---

36) In your overall opinion, what do you think were the overall impacts of the information sharing, participation and complaints and response in the delivery of humanitarian assistance?

---

---

**Annex 3: Focus group discussion guide**

**UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**

**DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL WORK**

This group discussion guide is intended to facilitate the study on **the impacts of Downward Accountability on the appropriateness and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance in Butiye and Obbu wards in Moyale, Marsabit County**. The study is for academic purposes and is carried out as partial requirement of the award of Master of Arts degree in disaster management International for Mr Maurice Ouma Onyango. As a key beneficiary of the recent humanitarian assistance, you have been selected to provide vital information that will facilitate the study. Your response will be treated with utmost confidentiality.

Can I proceed?

Thank you very much for your valuable time.

**Community score card**

**The group should discuss each question in turns and assign a single tick , a sticker or place a stone on the score card to indicate the performance of the project choosing from the five options 1-very bad, 2 –bad , 3-ok, 4 good and 5- very good (separate scores for men and women**

1.

a)

Men

How successful was the project in targeting those in the community most in need of assistance	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
---	-------------------------------	-------------------------------	-------------------------------	-------------------------------	-------------------------------

Women

How successful was the project in targeting those in the community most in need of assistance	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
---	-------------------------------	-------------------------------	-------------------------------	-------------------------------	-------------------------------

b) How did the information, participation and complaints and feedback mechanisms contribute to the project targeting those in most need?

---

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c) In your overall opinion, what do you think were the overall impacts of the information sharing, participation and complaints and response in the delivery of humanitarian assistance?

---

---



a) Men

How successful was the project in meeting the most important needs of the vulnerable community members?	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
---	-------------------------------	-------------------------------	-------------------------------	-------------------------------	-------------------------------

Women

How successful was the project in meeting the most important needs of the vulnerable community members?	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
---	-------------------------------	-------------------------------	-------------------------------	-------------------------------	-------------------------------

b) How did the information, participation and complaints and feedback mechanisms contribute to the project meeting the most important needs of the community members?

---

---

3.

a) Men

What level of trust was there between the community and the implementing agency?	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
--	-------------------------------	-------------------------------	-------------------------------	-------------------------------	-------------------------------

Women

What level of trust was there between the community and the implementing agency?	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
--	-------------------------------	-------------------------------	-------------------------------	-------------------------------	-------------------------------

b) How did the information shared, participation processes and complaints and feedback mechanisms contribute to building trust between the NGO and the community during the delivery of the assistance?

---

---

4. What suggestions would you offer to improve the voice, participation and feedback for beneficiaries of relief assistance in the future?

---

---

How much power did you have to influence the way assistance was provided? Give examples

---

---

Do you feel that your voice was heard during the delivery of assistance? Please give examples

---

---

**Observations made**

<b>Village</b>	<b>Things to observe</b>	<b>observation</b>	<b>Significance</b>	<b>Follow-up</b>
	<p>How are the community leaders participating and their power over the group?            How are the speakers articulating the issues?            How is the group engaged?            Power relations within the community.            Who is dominating and why?            Who wields power in the group?            How are women and the poor participating?</p> <p>Water facilities            Observe for evidence of targeting criteria            Observe for evidence of accountability mechanisms            Any other things of significance</p>			

#### Annex 4: Data Analysis matrixes

Research question 1: How do downward accountability mechanisms applied by aid organisations to disaster affected people contribute to the appropriateness and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance?

		Impacts of downward accountability on the appropriateness and Effectiveness of humanitarian assistance					Conclusion and recommendations
Key variables on Downward accountability	Evidence of Presence of accountability mechanism /rating	Targeting and meeting needs of the target group	Ownership of projects,	Beneficiary demands from NGOs Governments	Addressing Issues of fraud and mismanagement of aid	Sustainability of programs	
Information sharing (timeliness, relevance and clarity)							
Complaints and response (effectiveness, safety of the process to raise and receive complaints , and provide feedback							
Participation (beneficiaries taking lead in design and implementation of the projects, ownership of projects , targeting of the poorest including women and men, listening to the beneficiary views ,using views to influence how assistance is provided							

Research question 2: What socio-cultural barriers impede the implementation of downward accountability amongst disaster affected people and how can these be addressed to enhance the voice and power of disaster affected people in the delivery of humanitarian assistance?

		Socio-cultural barriers that impede the implementation of downward accountability amongst disaster affected people and how these can be addressed to enhance the voice and power of disaster affected people in the delivery of humanitarian assistance?		Conclusion and recommendations
Key variables on Downward accountability	Evidence of Presence of accountability mechanism /rating		How to address them	
Information sharing (timeliness, relevance and clarity)	Yes /no			
Complaints and response (effectiveness, safety of the process, to raise and receive complaints ,				
Participation (beneficiaries taking lead in design and implementation of the projects, ownership of projects , targeting of the poorest including women and men, how the beneficiary views were listened to, heard and used to influence programs				

Research question 3: What are the community indicators of the successes and failures of downward accountability mechanisms in the delivery of humanitarian assistance?

		Community indicators of the successes and failures of downward accountability mechanisms in the delivery of humanitarian assistance?	Conclusion and recommendations
Key variables on Downward accountability	Evidence of Presence of accountability mechanism /rating	Indicator /Evidence of success of downward accountability mechanism	
Information sharing (timeliness, relevance and clarity)			
Complaints and response (effectiveness, safety of the process, to raise and receive complaints ,			
Participation (beneficiaries taking lead in design and implementation of the projects, ownership of projects , targeting of the poorest including women and men, how the beneficiary views were listened to, heard and used to influence programs			

**Annex 5: Project budget information**



**Annex 6: Water distribution list (personal details e.g. IDs and names have been removed)**

August

**HOUSE HOLD WATER BENEFICIARIES ADAP COMMUNITY**

0	NAME	HEAD	ID NO	WEEK	SIGN
1				1	
2					
3					
4					
5					
6					
7					

Date

DF

certified (G)

**Annex 7: Memorandum of understanding –MOU** (personal details e.g. IDs and names have been removed)

---

**MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING.**

1. **Through water trucking .**

2. **Fuel subsidy.**

3. **P.V.C Tank.**

crisis.

**EXPECTED OUT COMES**

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.

Community this day



**Annex 8: Complaints and feedback form** (personal details e.g. IDs and names have been removed)

**Feedback Form | 2011**

Date	Name of Community member	Position in Community	Contact details	Community
Complaint / Feedback Issue:				
Action taken during meeting:				
Action to be taken:				
Final action taken?			Date action completed?	

*[Handwritten notes and signatures are present in the bottom section of the form, including a signature that appears to read "John ..."]*

**Annex 9: Committee meeting minutes** (personal details e.g. IDs and names have been removed)

MINUTES OF ALADS COMMUNITY HELD AT ALADS  
PARK ON OR/SAMPLE Rd1 AT 10.00 A.M.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
- 11.
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.
- 16.
- 17.
- 18.
- 19.
- 20.
- 21.
- 22.
- 23.
- 24.
- 25.
- 26.
- 27.
- 28.
- 00

AGENDAS

- \* CCS PROJECT
- \* SELECTION OF COMMITTEE
- \* Identification of water beneficiaries, Fuel Subsidy.
- \* Matters arising
- \* A.D.B.

Min. 02/04/11 Determination

Min. 02/04/11 SELECTION OF COMMITTEE

Min. 03/09/11 Identification of Water beneficiaries  
& Fuel Subsidy.

**Annex 10: Community fuel register** (personal details e.g. IDs and names have been removed)

**COMMUNITY FUEL REGISTER**  
 ADDD) COMMUNITY

DATE	S/LNO	DONOR	QTY RECEIVED	QTY ISSUED	BALANCE	SIGNATURE
14/09/11						
15/09/11						
16/09/11						
17/09/11						
18/09/11						
19/09/11						
20/09/11						
21/09/11						

Verified by

Certified by

Annex 11: water provision worksheet

Form - 2 (Scheme) Rev 1/11

Verified for correctness: member Name: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Sl. No.	NAME	PHOTO	ID CARD	PHONE NO.	ADDRESS	STATUS
1						
2						
3						
4						
5						
6						
7						
8						
9						
10						
11						
12						
13						
14						
15						
16						
17						

HOUSE NO. & WATER CONNECTION NO. \_\_\_\_\_ ADDRESS \_\_\_\_\_ COMMUNITY \_\_\_\_\_

August 2011

## Annex 12: Water tanks provided during relief



Water tanks protected four years after the emergency

**Annex 13: Evidence of information about donors that supported ADS MKE**

