

**THE INFLUENCE OF MEDIA FRAMING ON POLICY ISSUE
SALIENCE: THE CASE OF SECURITY LAWS AMENDMENT
ACT, 2014.**

**A Project submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the Degree of Master of Arts in Political Science and Public
Administration of the University of Nairobi.**

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DECLARATION

This Research Project is my original work and has not been presented for an award of a degree in any other university.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this project to God who has seen me through my academic journey. I also dedicate this project to my daughter Marylyn Serena, whom I believe will follow in my scholarly footsteps and excel beyond what I have achieved.

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First and foremost, I would like to acknowledge my supervisor, Dr. Patrick Asingo, for his unparalleled support, without which I would not have successfully completed this work. I also register my appreciation for Dr. Peninah Ogada and Dr. Obuya Bagaka who offered critical mentorship during the early stages of my work. I am also indebted to my colleagues with whom we have walked together in this academic journey including but not limited to Frederick Ochieng, Laureen Wesonga, Kachuol Mabil, Jim Kaketch and the late Zadock Khamala. I also thank my family, and workmates for their understanding and prayers. I also acknowledge the role of all departmental staff at the Political Science and Public Administration department who supported me in the long journey.

ABSTRACT

This study examines the role of media framing in the enactment of the Security Laws Amendment Act, 2014. The question that the study asks and answers is how media framing of insecurity influenced the salience of insecurity as a policy issue. The study uses the Multiple Streams theory which makes three fundamental arguments: First, individuals tend to exhibit serial attention while systems exhibit parallel attention. Secondly, the theory argues that policy makers work under considerable time constraints. Three, the theory posits that the policy making process has three streams, namely, problems, policy and politics. Policy entrepreneurs couple together the three streams to successfully push issues to sufficient levels of salience. The study identifies all editorials published in the Daily Nation and The Standard during the period under study. The study then purposefully selected one editorial with the frames of interest and examined its effect by counting the number of articles on insecurity one month before, and one month after its publication. In its findings, the study finds that insecurity rose to a sufficient level of salience through the use of frames by the media. The study found that the media as a policy entrepreneur used issue definition, blame attribution and issue solution frames to guide the process of formulation of the SLAA, 2014. The study recommends that the government takes measures to entrench the role of the media in the policy making process henceforth to ensure enactment of quality public policies.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACF	-	Advocacy Coalition Framework
CAK	-	Communication Authority of Kenya
COTU	-	Central Organisation of Trade Unions
ICC	-	International Criminal Court
IEP	-	Institute of Economics and Peace
IPOA	-	Independent Police Oversight Authority
IPPG	-	Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group
ISS	-	Institute of Security Studies
KANU	-	Kenya African National Union
KDF	-	Kenya Defence Forces
KICA	-	Kenya Information Communication Act
KNBS	-	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
KTN	-	Kenya Television Network
MST	-	Multiple Streams Theory
NATO	-	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NIS	-	National Intelligence Service
NMG	-	Nation Media Group
NTV	-	Nation Media Group
PD	-	People Daily
PET	-	Punctuated Equilibrium, Theory
SLAA	-	Security Laws Amendment Act

DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS

Blame attribution: Blame attribution refers to the act of pointing out whom, or what is responsible for a problem. In this study, blame attribution is used to refer to how the media apportions blame for a particular problem. For instance, in the case of insecurity, who or what the media blames for the rise in insecurity.

Issue solution: This is a proposal on how to address a certain problem. For purposes of this study, issue solution is used to refer to the various proposals put forth by the media for adoption as solutions to the problem of insecurity.

Issue Salience: This is the visibility of an issue and its prominence in the policy discourse. In this study, issue salience is used to refer to the extent to which insecurity stood out as compared to other political issue.

Issue Definition: Issue definition here is used as defined by Anderson (2006), to refer to how the media characterises an issue, or the angle from which the media wants people to look at an issue. For example, the media can portray the issue of insecurity as being political, religious or normal crime.

Media Framing: This study has adopted the definition by Tankard et al. (1999) which views media framing as “the central organizing idea for news content that supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusions and elaboration.”(P.3). For purposes of this study, framing is used therefore to refer to how the media communicated information relating to insecurity, including issue definition and blame attribution and issue solutions.

Policy entrepreneurs: In this study, policy entrepreneurs is used as defined by Kingdom (1995) to refer to individuals or groups who have various policy proposals which they want to bring to the attention of policy makers.

Policy Windows: In this study, the phrase policy windows is used as defined by Kingdom (1995), to refer to opportunities that make it easier for advocates of policy proposals to push attention towards their issues.

Policy Agenda: This is a set of issues under debate by individuals or institution who aim at attracting positive government action on them. In this study, policy agenda has been used to refer to the issues that were competing for attention with the issue of insecurity in the period preceding the legislation of the Security Laws Amendment Act, 2014.

CHAPTER ONE

1.1 Study Background

Ideally, policy making is a formal process that proceeds through several stages. Indeed, according to (Downs, 1972), policy issues pass through five distinct stages, in what he refers to as the issue-attention cycle. The first is *the pre-problem stage*, whereby some adverse condition exists even though policy makers are not yet attentive to it. The second stage is that of *alarmed discovery punctuated with euphoric gusto*, where a spectacular event captures public attention, provoking some enthusiasm to unravel the problem. The third stage is recognizing *that change has a cost*, and during this stage, citizens increasingly become aware that implementation of concrete change is difficult. An issue then enters the fourth stage, characterized by a waning in public attention where people maybe bored or discouraged or their attention may be captured by the emergence of a new issue. Finally, there is the *post problem stage* where the issue gets dropped from public discourse even though it has not been resolved. Downs notes that, “usually, objective conditions regarding the problem are far worse during the pre-problem stage than they are by the time the public becomes interested in it” (Downs, 1972, p.39).

What happens in each of the stages varies from one context to the other, but generally depends on among other things, issue salience or the extent to which an issue stands out as compared to others in the same context (Fiske & Taylor, 2013). The second stage is thus very crucial because once an issue leaves the stage without a policy solution and regresses into the latter three stages then it has no potential of becoming a policy unless it is revived back into the issue-attention cycle through sustained pressure by advocates of policy change such as the media. Once an issue has left the second stage, policy entrepreneurs advocating for it are forced to wait until the next policy window to have their proposals adopted. Baumgartner and

Jones (1993) noted that sometimes the media redefines old issues that it turns into new alternatives by highlighting them. Sometimes issues remain unattended for a long time but later burst to the surface after the media picks them. This is because the media has the capacity to read the opinion climate and contextualize the agenda.

The foregoing shows why many policy issues, despite being very popular at some point in time, never quite get to become policies. For example, when the issue of the bloated wage bill in the government was raised in early 2014, it captured public attention to the extent that the president himself and his deputy not only offered to take pay cuts but also urged the rest of the public service to voluntarily do so (The Star, 2014). However, the issue soon withered away as more pressing issues emerged to capture the public attention. Similarly, the issue importation of sugar from Uganda, which came into the public limelight in August 2015, was a controversial one which dominated public debate for weeks. So heated was the debate that both the president and the opposition leader traded accusations over the matter at a public forum in Nairobi (Daily Nation, 2015). However, despite the fact that nothing was done to reverse the alleged agreement between Kenya and Uganda, the issue appeared to have slowly faded off the public agenda. While some issues are dropped from public debate for good, others like the two thirds gender debate in Kenya have been emerging and disappearing from the public debate in recent years.

Downs (1972) notes that a critical problem that which at one time gained national eminence but did not get a policy solution may sporadically recapture public interest later on. A problem re-emerges into the policy agenda if its advocates finally overcome the challenges that led to the decline on public interest to it. This includes finding ways of making the implementation of their policy proposals less costly for instance. Such is the treatment that

has been given to the gender debate in Kenya. The debate, which was kicked off after the promulgation of the new constitution in 2010 re-emerged after the March 2013 general elections when political parties were required to nominate women to ensure that the requirement is met. The debate again re-emerged more vigorously in 2015 and 2016 as policy makers sought ways to meet the two-thirds gender requirement before the 2017 general election (The Standard, 2016).

Of particular interest to this study however, is the issue of insecurity, particularly external attacks by terrorists, which have faced the country over the years. It has been noted for instance that:

Between March 2011 and March 2014, more than fifty attacks took place on the Kenyan soil, mostly in Nairobi's Eastleigh area, Mombasa and north-eastern towns of Garissa, Wajir and Mandera (Warah, 2014, p.38).

Despite these many attacks and the interest and the debates that they generated, it was not until the Westgate Gate Mall attack on September 21, 2013 that the government came up with drastic policy proposals to address the problem of insecurity in a more comprehensive way. Apart from the Westgate Gate Mall attack, most of the other attacks were small scale and were carried out using mostly grenades and home-made explosives (Warah, 2014).

The Westgate Gate Mall attack therefore, marked a turning point, not just because of the scale and magnitude of the attack, but also because of the manner in which attention to the issue of insecurity was sustained by the key actors. One of the most critical cogs in the entire policy wheel is the media which can influence policy makers to take action on an issue by magnifying it and attracting the attention around it (Fink, 2013). The media exposes issues to a larger audience, elicits debate on the issue, thus forcing formal decision makers to consider

the issue for a policy resolution. One way in which the media achieves this, is through framing (Cobb & Elder, 1972). When people talk about an issue and the media writes frequently and prominently about it, then the issue becomes more salient. By framing issues in a particular way, the media often highlight its fundamental causes and the likely ramifications, thereby establishing a criterion for evaluating remedies to the problem (Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997). In nutshell, the ability of an issue to rise to the policy level depends to a large extent on how the media frames the issue (Tankard et al, 1991).

Against this background, the study seeks to understand how the media through media framing helped to sustain attention on the issue of insecurity and raised its salience in the post-Westgate attacks, to the point that it became a policy agenda and eventually a policy (the Security Laws Amendment Act(SLAA), (2014), even though the courts annulled parts of the policy.

1.2 Statement of Problem and the Research Questions

Although insecurity and terror incidents have been a global problem for many years, studies have shown that the frequency of insecurity attacks has significantly increased in the recent times. In this regard, terrorist threats and attacks increased phenomenally in the recent past, with the total number of terrorist-induced deaths increasing from 11,133 in 2012 to 17,958 in 2013. During the same period of time, there was an increase in the number of countries that recorded more than 50 deaths annually, from 15 to 24 (IEP, 2014). In Kenya, general crime incidents have been on the rise with statistics standing at 71,832 (KNBS, 2014). Between October 2011 and August 2014, at least 370 people had been killed in Kenya and over 1,075 others injured in terrorist attacks (IEP, 2014).

The Westgate mall attack alone killed 67 people while another attack killed 28 people in Mandera (Daily Nation, 2014). Due to the high number of people affected and its proximity to the seat of government, the Westgate mall attack in particular led to an increased clamour for deliberate steps by the government to prevent such attacks and also stringent punishment for those responsible for them. Both the public and politicians were involved in a debate on the possible causes of the increased number of attacks and how to address them. The opposition politicians traced the causes of the problem to Kenya's foreign policy, particularly the presence of the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) in Somalia. The government on the other hand blamed the attacks on domestic politics, blaming it on rivals seeking to paint the government as a failure.

To underscore the government's resolve to address insecurity after the Westgate mall attack, President Uhuru Kenyatta noted the following:

I have directed security agencies to be decisive in their response to this or any other threat. They must and will do this to demonstrate our constitution's categorical guarantee of Kenyans' indefeasible rights to life and property. My Government stands ready to defend the nation from internal as well as external aggression. (The presidency website, September 21st, 2013).

At the same time, during parliamentary debate on the Westgate mall attack, the Majority Leader in Parliament, Aden Duale, also emphasized the change of strategy in security matters:

This is the time to evaluate the security of our country. This is the time to assess whether the men and women that we have in charge of our security are working. Our security is paramount. I am sure the President and the government will have something to do about it (National Assembly official Hansard September 24th, 2013)

On the surface of it, it would appear that the government acted on its own motion to enact the SLAA, (2014) in the post-Westgate period. But if this was the case then the government could have enacted the law immediately after the Westgate mall attack. The fact that it took over a year after the attack for the government to make good its promise of a new policy suggests that it may have taken more than just the government's resolve to have the policy enacted. What remains unclear therefore is how the issue of insecurity rose to a sufficient level of policy agenda and was eventually enacted as a policy. A clue to this issue is found in the literature, which suggests that, how the media frames an issue determines whether it will rise to a sufficient level of salience that will make it rise to the level of policy agenda. The research question for this study that arises from the foregoing discussion therefore is: ***How did media framing of insecurity influence the salience of insecurity as a policy issue?***

However, this is a complex question that needs to be broken down into a simpler form. It is complex because media framing has several components. This study focuses on three components of media framing which it considers to be the most important, namely: Issue definition of insecurity, media blame attribution on insecurity and issue solutions on insecurity. With regard to blame attribution for instance, Maher (1955) notes that: "A key component of framing is often the assignment of the causes of social problems" (Reese et al, 2008, p.102).

In light of these components, the study is guided by three more specific research questions, each corresponding to the components:

- i. How did issue definition of insecurity by the media influence the salience of insecurity as a policy issue?
- ii. How did blame attribution by the media on insecurity influence the salience of

insecurity as a policy issue?

- iii. How did issue solutions to insecurity by media influence the salience of insecurity as a policy issue?

1.3 Study Objectives

1.3.1 Main Objective

To examine how media framing of insecurity influenced the salience of insecurity as a policy issue.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

- i. To examine how issue definition of insecurity by the media influenced the salience of insecurity a policy issue.
- ii. To examine how blame attribution by the media on insecurity influenced salience of insecurity as a policy issue.
- iii. To explore how issue solutions by media to insecurity influenced insecurity as a policy issue.

1.4 Justification of the Study

This study broadly focuses on one of the most critical stages of the public policy processes, namely, how problems in society attain the status of public issues and capture the attention of policy makers so as to become a policy agenda. That is, how media elevates issue salience. More specifically, it focuses on three aspects of salience, which have not been properly addressed by most literature especially in the Third World countries like Kenya. For instance, while the literature shows that scholars in the developed world have studied some aspects of framing such as issue definition and tone, the role of blame attribution and issue solution in

policy making have not been fully examined. For instance, Anderson (2006) and Birkland (2007) have widely studied the role of focusing events in influencing policy in the United States. Lee and Chan (2011) also studied the role of negative media coverage in influencing the massive Hong Kong protests in 2003. However all these major studies were conducted on the First World. In Third World countries like Kenya, not much attention seems to have been given to studies on how media framing has affected policy making in recent years. One can barely find studies that have been conducted to examine how the media in Kenya has utilized issue definition, blame attribution and media solutions to influence policy decisions locally. Yet, framing is an important stage in policy formulation that determines whether an issue is salient enough to qualify as a policy or not. As noted by Maher (1994), a key component of media framing is often the assignment of causes of social problems.

The purpose of this study therefore is to come up with findings on the role these important components (Issue Definition, Blame Attribution and Issue Solution), played in the framing of the issue of insecurity and eventual enactment of the SLAA, (2014). It is hoped that the findings will widen academic discourse on the role of media on framing issues of public policy, and add to the existing literature. It is also hoped that findings from this study will assist the media to strengthen its role in shaping public discourse on issues of policy. This will lead to quality debates and enactment of watertight policies by the government. Findings from this study can also be useful to the government and the public by enhancing the understanding of how media works. By understanding media better, the government will be expected to take the media seriously as a key actor in the policy process.

1.5 Scope and Limitations of the Study

The study focuses only on two major newspapers, that is, Daily Nation and the Standard. The two are the mainstream newspapers in Kenya circulating an estimated 180,000 and 54,000 copies respectively on a daily basis (Synovate, 2011). The study has selected print media because records of published material are available in most public libraries as opposed to broadcast media. Further, newspapers contain more details than television or radio, which carry shorter items in terms of duration, thus providing less material. The study has covered the period between September 2013 and December 2014, during which debate on insecurity dominated public debate in Kenya. The Westgate attack, which prompted the government to seek new strategies towards security, occurred in September 2013. From that time onwards, vibrant debate on the problem of insecurity and how to address it continued, resulting in the formulation of the Security Laws Amendment Bill, 2014. SLAA was enacted in December. The study is interested in examining how the media influenced the of insecurity during the 16-month period between The Westgate mall attack and the enactment of SLAA.

This study is likely to be affected by the challenge of external validity whereby its findings may not be generalized to the entire media given that it focuses only on two newspapers. This leaves out the electronic media and other form so of media, like the internet. As a solution to this challenge, it is hoped that the study will act as inspiration to other scholars to conduct similar studies in other forms of media. The study also grappled with the challenge of processing large amounts of information in the newspapers published within the same period, to obtain relevant data on the stories published on the issue under study. Sometimes it was difficult to access private libraries which required long processes and protocol to obtain approval from relevant authorities. Other libraries were poorly stocked, as some of the information was missing. A number of staff were non-cooperative. Therefore the researcher

had to visit multiple libraries to obtain complete information. This was costly and time consuming. However, to counter these challenges, the study used research assistants, as well as websites of the two newspapers to save on time and cost.

1.6 Literature Review

1.6.1 Overview

This section contains reviewed works organised around the three objectives of the study. The first part contains reviewed works on issue definition and policy salience, the second part contains reviewed literature on blame attribution and policy salience while the third and final part contains reviewed works on issue solution and policy salience.

1.6.2 Issue Definition (ID) and Policy Salience

A study conducted by Kendall (2011) on how the media presented poverty and wealth in America focused on how the media agreed or disagreed existing narratives on social classes. The study found that how American media defined concepts like elitism and social classes shaped the opinions of lower classes about the upper classes and vice versa. However, the study did not venture into how the media influences government policy on poverty and wealth which is the basis of social classes. In any case, the study focused on how the media influence perceptions while this study is about how the media, through framing triggers real policy action. Indeed, this study seeks to examine how the media influenced the process of the formulating one of the major security laws in Kenya.

According to Anderson (2006), the persistence of the media in reporting an issue can help define it as a problem, forcing the government to act on a condition that has been in existence for years. The media does this by using focusing events. For instance, health hazards faced by

coal miners were ignored in the US since the 1930s. Despite annual deaths as a result of collapsing mines, averaging at 1000, the government did little to address the problem. In 1968, there was an explosion at one of the mines owned by the Consolidation Coal Company in West Virginia, killing 79 people. The incident was reported widely by the media, which focused on the conditions affecting miners, including explosions, accidents and lung disease as a result of breathing in coal dust. The media definition of the issue as medical issue rather than an industrial one helped to raise its salience leading to a strike by miners, demonstrations and other forms of agitation for their rights. As a result, the West Virginia legislature enacted legislation in 1969 to provide for compensation of miners followed by the forwarding of a draft bill by President Nixon to the Congress on coal mine safety. This significantly reduced the number of injuries and fatalities at the mines (Anderson, 2006).

The foregoing arguments explain how the media can use focusing events to elevate an issue on the policy agenda. The question is whether the Kenyan media is sufficiently robust as the American media, and whether Kenyan policy makers take the media seriously to the point of embracing media definition of issues. Besides the media, the coal mine example affected a specific group in the society namely, coal workers. This group was able to mobilize and put pressure on policy makers through demonstrations and strikes. In contrast, the question of insecurity has no specific target group since terrorists can attack any segment of the society. This study is therefore vital as it serves to establish whether the media in the absence of a specific, organized pressure group can increase policy salience through issue definition.

Luckmann and Berger (1992) observe that issue definition is more than merely attributing blame on someone for a particular problem and stating how high the stakes are. Issue definition helps throw an issue into a visible position in the policy making process. For example in political conflict, issue definition can be used by opposing sides in a debate to

push their respective positions. Definitions are formulated to help people understand the things they go through and how they choose to respond. The Luckmann and Berger (1992) study shows how protagonists use issue definition to gain advantage over each other in a conflict situation. However this study is about how the media, not protagonists, use issue definition to raise the salience of a policy issue. This study examines how the media constructed the issue of insecurity to create the reality that insecurity was a major policy problem that required the attention of the government. In a sense, their study was not applied on media and public policy.

According to Anderson (2006), issue definition determines how situations become problems. People must understand how an issue of concern makes them uncomfortable and must believe that there is need for government action. For conditions evolve into problems, they have to be defined as such, articulated as well as brought to the attention of government. Although many conditions may exist at the same time, how they are defined changes how they are perceived. The media does this by pointing out the causes. This explains why only a few problems get the attention of government. The limitation in this argument is that sometimes government officials have their own policy proposals that they want implemented. In such a case the media's role in highlighting the issue is only seen as that of a conveyor belt and not the creator of issues.

According to Birkland (1997), limited time and resources available to institutions or society ensures only a few issues attain agenda status. Therefore, policy entrepreneurs make efforts such that problems compete in a manner that makes them rise or fall in the policy agenda. Problems are therefore constructed using symbols, beliefs and facts (e.g, Constitution) to explain how or why a problem is one. The defect in this argument is that some problems do not need to be constructed. The media sometimes is forced to prominently publish issues

because of the consequences they have and the high number of people affected. This study for instance seeks to come up with findings on how the media influenced the salience of insecurity in public discourse after the Westgate attack.

According to Stone (2002), problems attracted the government depending on how they were brought to the knowledge of policy makers and how they are defined as problems. To make the issues popular, the media uses symbols to construct messages. Problem definition is not only about defining goals but also articulating how this can be attained. To define problems, groups, actors strive to portray them in a manner that favours their preferred course of action. Representation of these problems is therefore meant to win majority of people to one side thereby disadvantaging opponents. After citing issues that require action, media uses various symbols to create messages with an aim to attract the attention of both the public and policy makers.

Stone (2002) fails to appreciate that some events become salient because of the high number of people they affect and the dire consequences of not solving them immediately. In such cases media does not create the issues but is merely compelled to highlight them. Moreover, this study is not about whether the issues were defined in a way that promotes media interest but simply whether by defining the issue of insecurity in a particular way, the media provoked more interest and debate around issue definition.

Kingdon (1995) argues that there are three ways in which actors in the policy debate define conditions as problems; first, issues that go against important societal values are portrayed as problems. Second, conditions mature into problems by comparing how they are viewed in other jurisdictions. Therefore, if the media defines an issue as pressing, it is given priority over others. Policy entrepreneurs, the media included use significant resources to convince policy

makers to see problems in a particular way. Third, issue definition can be achieved by classifying conditions thereby presenting them as one kind of problem or another. Kingdon (1995) in this case merely highlights the kind of conditions under which an issue may become a problem. This study on the other hand looks at how problems already identified attain sufficiently high level of salience to be considered by policy makers.

1.6.3 Blame Attribution (BA) and Policy Salience

According to Stone (2002), the media uses narrative stories to frame issues in a way that assigns blame on a certain actor thereby causing anger and sharp reactions. By reading and listening to the narrative stories, the public gets to know who is to blame for the success or failure of a certain policy decision. The media achieves this by telling stories of helplessness and control, which show that a certain problem was as a result of human action. Such stories serve to demonstrate that someone has been benefiting by taking advantage of the ignorance of citizenry on a certain issue. Another way in which media achieves attribution is by using blame-the-victim stories which show that the capacity provide solutions is in the hands of the victims. For instance, a story in the media can claim that the Third World countries are unable to develop because they waste foreign aid on extravagant lives. What Stone (2002) fails to appreciate is that since the main reason for framing a story is to inspire change of attitudes and subsequent policy change; Blame attribution may stagnate policy change if it blames the victim that is set to benefit from policy change. This is because policy makers may develop apathy towards the issue after the media exposure.

According to London (1993), electoral accountability forms the bedrock of representative democracy. Therefore, the citizens should be at a position to identify who is responsible for social problems. The media then frames the news using contextual stories to show where the

blame is. For example, a story can highlight how a certain issue is creating fear, anger, and sorrow due to violence. The story can go further to explain how this would have been avoided in the first place by putting in place relevant policies. Just like the argument by Stone (2002), there is a risk of stagnating policy change if the victim who is also a minority is blamed for their own predicament. Furthermore, the debate that ensued after the Westgate mall attack assumed political dimension whereby the government and the opposition appeared to attribute blames differently. In this case, the media risked being viewed as partisan if it adopted a definition similar to either group. It therefore becomes interesting to find out how the media navigated this political terrain in terms of blame attribution.

According to Birkland (1997), the main purpose of reporting on focusing events is to assign responsibility for accidents. Any debate on policy where someone or something is blamed for a policy breakdown is likely to be acrimonious thus making them more salient. If a story in the media points out convincingly that someone intentionally caused a problem, then their proposed solutions are more likely to rise on the agenda. However, some focusing events like earth quakes are as result of natural disasters, which are unpredictable and therefore the issue of blame as far as cause is concerned does not arise. In this case of security in Kenya, the focusing event, which is the Westgate mall attack, was surprisingly a unifying one. It was the first, and the only time the president and the opposition leader stood together in solidarity pledging to work together in the fight against terrorism. It would therefore be very interesting to know what happened beyond this show of solidarity, particularly how the media attributed blame for insecurity. This is what this study seeks to do.

According to a study conducted by Lee and Chan (2011), the public can blame certain actors for problems depending on how the media frames it. Lee and Chan (2011) conducted a study examining the role of media framing and public reactions in the July 1, 2013 Hong Kong

protests against the Hong Kong Basic Law Article 23. The study found that though some protesters were already disgruntled with the government over the negative impact of the law, an even large number of protestors turned up for the protest march after following the debate in the media. The study also found that four out of five newspapers dedicated a significant percentage of space to negative articles about the legislation, and wrote negative commentaries and editorials depicting the government negatively. The study concentrated on the societal and foundations of social movements, how the public and media discussions affected mobilization for protests and the manner in which the protesters understood whatever they were doing and the political environment in which they were operating. As such, the study did not examine the impact of media coverage on the government's reaction to the issue, or how the media reshaped public discourse on the law especially after the protest. This study seeks to examine how the media influenced public discourse on insecurity in the post Westgate mall attack which triggered change of strategy on the manner in which government dealt with security issues.

In his works on the role that focusing events play in the public policy process, Birkland (1997) found that focusing events could also be used by the media to apportion blame for an issue. Mass media collapse focusing events to things like images of collapsed industries as a result of corruption for instance, thus portraying them as a result bad polices. This way, the media succeeds in taking a negative tone on an issue of policy by taking a position, which portrays the government's performance as dismal. For example, in the United States, during the Exxon Valdez super tanker oil spill, media stories led to new legislation on oil pollution. The media showed pictures of dying birds and polluted waters due to spilt crude oil in Alaska. The March 27th, 1989 incident angered the public, prompting reactions by elected leaders and environmentalists. Elected leaders argued that the spill resulted from Amercia's

dependence on fossil fuels, as well as the decisions by the state and federal government decisions. This led to the legislation of the Federal Oil Pollution Act of 1990. The author appears to over-emphasize on the use of focusing events to elevate the salience of policy issues. The case study does not acknowledge the ability of the media to act out of its own volition without being prompted by trigger events (Birkland, 1997).

As observed by Brunken (2006), the media can influence the salience of an issue by portraying government as inefficient or efficient, passive or proactive in terms of responding to an issue, reliable or unreliable in handling disaster. A content analysis of how the media framed Hurricane Katrina focused on how media described government response to the matter. The study examined how four newspapers attributed blame on the kind or response accorded to the matter. The findings showed that positive media coverage for the local government as opposed to federal government led the public to accuse the latter of failing to act. The study was not however directly related to policy formulation but just the manner in which the media portrayed government response to the disaster. This study seeks to establish how the Kenyan media influenced the formulation of the security Laws Amendment Act, 2014.

1.6.4 Media Solutions (MS) and Policy Salience

As stated by Birkland (1997) the media highlights focusing events so as to expose weaknesses in existing policies with a view of inspiring change. Events like disasters become focusing events because they have significant negative effects. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) agreed with this argument, adding that by broadening the scope of conflict, the media creates more attention around the problem leading to negative assessment of the current policy. This eventually leads to the opening up of the policy making stage to accommodate change. As a

policy entrepreneur, the media picks problems, highlights its undesirable effects and proposes solutions that can be adopted to correct the situations.

Baumgartner and Jones (1993) have cited the 1979 nuclear power accident at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 in Harrisburg Pennsylvania to explain how the media can use focusing events to inspire policy change. After being highlighted in the media, the accident raised questions on the safety and cost effectiveness of nuclear power generation. This led to the formation of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to address the concerns raised. They added that persistence of media attention on an issue pushes them to the front burner of the policy agenda. The attention also creates a sense of urgency causing policy makers to come up with solutions. A similar argument is advanced by Cobb and Elder (1972) who argue that advocates of policy change have pet solutions to issues and therefore capitalize on the presence of the problem to introduce their proposals as solutions. When the chance to bring in a policy comes up, policy entrepreneurs take advantage of it to have their solutions upheld.

The arguments advanced by the three sets of scholars above, are significant in showing the critical role the media plays in inspiring change in society. In fact they demonstrate that without deliberate framing by the media to show the benefits of policy change, it would be difficult to convince policy makers to initiate such changes. However, there is a loophole, which lies in the assumption that media as a policy entrepreneur and advocate for change has the best possible solutions to every problem. This argument is lopsided because media just like any societal group is sometimes influenced by interests that are economic, political or ownership related which may affect its objectivity in coming up with solutions for problems. It should therefore not be assumed that the media will act in everyone's best interest at all times.

In his critique of the media's framing of the effects of broken families on the behaviour of children in California, Cicourel (1968) accused the media for blaming the high prevalence of single parent families as being responsible for child delinquents. This affected attitudes and actions by policy makers in providing solutions to existing problems. He attributed the frequent arrests of minors to framing by media, which portrayed children from single parent families as being most predisposed to become delinquents. This significantly influenced the attitudes of police and probation officers who were quick to arrest children from broken families. Cicourel's critique was however not based empirical evidence. It is therefore important to undertake an empirical study on how the media attributes blame and whether that attribution raises the salience of the issue in question. Moreover, Cicourel (1968) focused on a social problem but this study is about security which is more sensitive.

In her arguments on media framing, Berns (2009) noted that how a problem is framed puts forward solutions to it. By identifying a problem, its causes are, a frame implies what can be done to solve it. She further argued that social problems are characterized through frames that point out its cause and propose a solution. Each frame gives factors that cause problems and suggests how they can be dealt with. The author however failed to point out how specific frames can be used to propose solutions, something that this study seeks to do. Indeed, this study seeks to find out for example whether the solution offered by the media led to more intense debates on solutions to the problem of insecurity.

According to Dye (2004), the most critical stage in policy making is when the media frames problems by suggesting alternative solutions. The media must find a way to formulate messages in a manner that will elicit reactions from policy makers. More often than not, the reactions are a policy solution. The problem in this argument is that policy change sometimes

policy makers act on their own initiative to address problems which serve their own interest. In such cases, the only role of the media is to inform the public of the developments.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

1.7.1 Overview

This study is guided by the Multiple Stream Theory (MST), which explains the public policy formulation process. However, the study acknowledges that there are other theories that could potentially be used to explain this study but are not used due to weaknesses inherent in them. These include the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) and Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). Therefore, before expounding on MST, it is important to begin by highlighting these alternative theories and why they are not being used in this study.

The ACF is used to explain beliefs and policy changes in instances where there are goal disagreements and technical disputes among several actors from different governmental levels as well as interest groups, the media and research institutions (Weible & Sabatier, 1988). The framework emphasizes on the centrality of coalitions in policy formulation in complex environments, characterized by different visions of problems and disagreements. The coalitions act as negotiators and consensus builders around issues they feel strongly about on the agenda. It posits that the best way to track policy change over a period of time is to look at policy subsystems especially how those who seek to influence policy outcome, interact. The framework also assumes that these subsystems have shared core beliefs, which enhance their lobbying activities (Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009). The framework's strength lies in its ability to explain policy making in complex environments through coalitions. However, this strength is also its biggest limitation as far as explaining this study in concerned. Due to its over reliance on coalitions' role in the policy making process, it cannot effectively be used to explain systems that have no clear coalitions. The focus of this

study is the Kenya print media and the role of coalitions in the debate on insecurity is not central to the study and therefore ACF cannot effectively explain this study.

PET on the other hand, begins from the assumption that political activities operate on the basis of stability and incrementalism, resulting in changes in public policy (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). Baumgartner and Jones (1993) examined several policy making cases in the United States and found that on many different issues and over a fairly long period of time over time, policymaking goes through periods of both stability and change. This inclination towards a punctuated equilibrium was aggravated by the nature of American political institutions. The analysis also concluded that that policy images considerably expand issues beyond the policy monopolies. Taking the case of nuclear policy, they demonstrated how actors consciously altered policy images depicting it positively or negatively (Baumgartner & Jones, 2014). The theory has been used in explaining the process of policy making in an environment of fully developed democracy such as the US. However, PET does not expound on the role of individual actors such as the media in necessitating change. The theory cannot therefore sufficiently explain this study whose focus is on the role of media framing in raising the salience of issues, attracting responses from policy makers thereby causing change.

1.7.2 The Major Assumptions of the Multiple Streams Theory (MST)

The Multiple Streams Theory (MST) was originally developed by Cohen et al (2001) (Kingdon, 1995). It is used to explain decision making in organizations. Cohen et al (2001) called the organizations affected by the decision making as organized anarchies. John Kingdon developed the theory and used it in explaining decision making in government. He however viewed government as an organized institution rather than an organized anarchy that the originators of the model had sought to explain.

MST has three fundamental assumptions: To begin with, the study assumes that individuals process issues serially while systems process them in parallel way that is they pay attention to a single issues at any given time. As a result policy makers usually have a very limited number of issues that they consider at a time. Similarly, entrepreneurs can only attend to are relatively small number of critical projects. However, at the organizational level, there is division of labour which makes focus of many issues simultaneously a possibility. The second assumption of MST is that policy makers work under considerable time limits. There is always a sense of urgency and the constraints imposed by time imply that only a few alternatives can be considered (Kingdon, 1995).

The last and final assumption of MST is that that there are three streams in the policy making process. To further understand MST's third assumption, it is noteworthy that these streams are independent, with each element having a life of its own. First, there is the *problems stream*, which comprises different problems that citizens and policy makers seek to resolve. These include things like disasters and issues like inflation. Policy makers learn of these conditions through indicators, focusing events or feedback. The second stream is the *policy stream*, which is basically a pool of ideas, seeking to capture the attention of policy makers. This combination of competing ideas is generated by actors, such as bureaucrats and specialists who have an interest in a certain policy area (Kingdon, 1995).

The final stream is the *politics stream*, comprising of the national mood on a particular issue, as well as campaigns by interest groups and administrative and legislative campaigns. In this regard, national mood is a situation where many people think along the same lines on an issue of policy, thereby forcing the government to act after sensing the mood through things like opinion polls and public demonstrations. MST argues that advocates of policy proposals that are referred to as policy entrepreneurs take advantage of policy windows, to have their

proposals adopted. Policy windows can be in the form of a change in the political stream, like a change in government which favours the implementation of some policy proposal (Zahariadis, 2003).

1.7.3 Application of MST to the Study


In relation to its three assumptions, MST is applicable to this study in a number of ways: First, in line with the first assumption above, this study has been conducted at the organizational level where the government of Kenya was giving attention to many issues alongside insecurity. These included the issue of International Criminal Court (ICC) cases and other development projects like the Standard Gauge Railway and digitization of government systems.

Secondly, the second assumption is relevant in this study in the sense that during the period under study, there was urgent need to address the issue of insecurity and that time was of essence due to frequent attacks which reached climax during the Westgate Mall siege. Due to the numerous instances of security attacks, the government was under pressure to prove that it was providing solutions to the problems. At the same time, the media had to utilize the prevailing situation to push for solutions to insecurity. On the third assumption, MST's applicability in this study emerges in the role of the media in coupling the three streams flowing through the system. The media is one of the policy entrepreneurs that identifies conditions and defines them as problems. MST is also relevant to the effect that the media picks issues randomly from a collection of several ideas and decides to highlight what it considers important them.

Thirdly, policy proposals go through political and administrative debates including parliament, in the media and also in other public forums. Finally, MST's relevance in this study is reflected in the ability of the media to utilise policy windows to agitate for timely policy proposals for adoption by government. In nutshell the study is testing the ability of the media as a policy entrepreneur to couple the three streams, that is problems, politics and policy which it feeds into the policy window have its various proposal adopted. MST is fairly complex.

To help explain the application of the theory better, the study has adopted and modified an MST conceptual framework developed by Zahariadis (2003), as shown in figure 1.

Fig 1: Study Conceptual Framework



Source: Adopted and modified from Zahariadis (2003)

The framework illustrates how policy change occurs when the three streams of Problem, Politics and Policy are coupled together by a policy entrepreneur. In the context of this study, the media was the policy entrepreneur, who helped to bring together the three streams by highlighting the events in each; The media highlighted the Westgate mall attack which acted as a focusing event due to its magnitude and the number of people affected. As a result the

government vowed to take a different approach in ensuring that such regular attacks on Kenyan soil were stopped. The firm commitment by policy entrepreneurs then kicked off a rigorous debate on the solutions that should be adopted. The media managed to couple these streams through framing (issue definition, blame attribution and issue solution). The policy window in this case came up in the form of jubilee majority in the House, which enabled the provisions of SLAA to sail through the House despite the opposition's spirited fight to have them shelved.

1.8 Study Hypothesis

1.8.1 Main Hypothesis

Media framing of insecurity raised the salience of insecurity as a policy issue.

1.8.2 Specific Hypothesis

- i. Media definition of insecurity raised the salience of insecurity as a policy issue.
- ii. Blame attribution by the media on insecurity raised the salience of insecurity as a policy issue.
- iii. Media proposals on solutions to insecurity raised the salience of insecurity as a policy issue.

1.8.3 Operationalization of the Dependent and Independent Variables

The study's major dependent variable is *issue salience* while the independent variable is *media framing*. Issue salience (in this case, the prominence of insecurity as a policy issue), is measured by the number of newspaper articles on insecurity during the period of study. Meier (1994) also used the approach to measure salience of alcohol policy. This is the same approach used by Eisner, Worsham & Ringquist (1999), who concluded that: "our

methodology for measuring policy salience is the current disciplinary standard (Eisner Et al, 1999: p.30)”

The table below provides details on measurement; particularly how the key variables have been operationalized.

Table 1: Variable operationalization

Variable type	Variable name	Specific variables	Variable indicators
Independent Variable	Media framing	Issue definition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Media editorial that portrays insecurity as a policy problem.
		Blame attribution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Media editorial that apportions blame over the issue of insecurity.
		Issue solution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Media editorial that offers solutions on the issue of insecurity.
Dependent Variable	Issue Saliency	Issue saliency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The number of newspaper articles that address a specific aspect of framing i.e issue definition, blame attribution or issue solution

The table is suggesting for instance that when media editorial address the question of issue definition, the number of newspaper stories addressing the same issue will also increase. That way, it is easy to see the effect of a particular frame on saliency.

1.9 Methodology

1.9.1 Research Design

The research uses the longitudinal research design. The study is longitudinal in the sense that it covers a long period of time as opposed to a cross-sectional design which examines an event at a specific point in time. Indeed, a longitudinal design requires a researcher to repeatedly observe the same variable for a long time. The study covers a period of 16 months, from the Westgate Mall attack to the enactment of SLAA (2014), to establish the relationship between media framing and issue salience. It involves selecting newspaper editorials on insecurity over the 16-month period. The editorials selected contain frames of interest. A longitudinal analysis has been undertaken on each editorial covering the period before and after each editorial to determine whether the number of newspaper articles on each frame of interest increased after the editorial.

1.9.2 Data Collection and Sampling Techniques

The study relied entirely on secondary data derived from Kenya's two main newspapers namely the Daily Nation and The Standard. The reasons for picking the two publications have been given under the Scope and Limitations section. More specifically, collection of data followed several steps. First, the study purposefully selected editorials on the subject of insecurity in the two newspapers during the period under review. The editorials were selected purposefully because they contained the particular framing aspects that the researcher was interested in examining. The study then established whether the editorials have the framing aspects the researcher was interested in (definition, attribution, and solutions). After this, the actual editorials to be studied were purposively selected as shown in the table below:

Table 2: Editorial Selection

Newspapers	Number of editorials		
	Editorial with issue definition	Editorials with blame attribution	Editorials with issue solution
Daily Nation	1	1	1
The Standard	1	1	1

The total number of editorials analyzed in the two newspapers was six, one for each frame. The study chose an analysis time frame of one month before the editorial and after the editorials. Since the study was comparing the effect of frames before and after publication of the editorials, it was the opinion of the researcher that a one month time-frame was sufficient to assess the effect of one editorial. It is neither too short nor too long. The researcher then counted the number of newspaper articles addressing each frame before and after the editorial piece. The frame itself was the stimulus that the editorials with frames were subjected to. The goal was to compare salience of insecurity in the period before and after the editorials.

1.9.3 Data analysis

The study used descriptive statistics after observing change in frequencies on newspaper coverage on the issues of interest. For instance, it focused on whether or not the number of newspaper articles on insecurity increased after the editorial. There was also a content analysis of newspaper articles on insecurity in order to obtain thematic narratives. Whereas descriptive statistics tell the number of articles with the issue definition frame for instance, content analysis enables the researcher to get details of the frames as reported in the newspaper stories.

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL AND CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND ON MEDIA AND INSECURITY IN KENYA

2.1 Introduction

This chapter contains the historical and contextual background of the study. It provides a cursory retrospection of the media in Kenya, starting with the early stages of the industry, its growth and expansion. The chapter also contains details on the various forms of media in Kenya and the advent of liberalization of frequencies and public licenses. The institutional and legal framework governing the media in Kenya is also highlighted in this chapter, starting with the colonial period to current media environment. Besides providing understanding into how the media is established in Kenya, the section also highlights the security challenges in Kenya, the legislative framework and major events leading to the enactment of the SLAA, 2014.

2.2 The Media in Kenya: A Historical Perspective

2. 2.1 Newspapers

The first newspaper in Kenya was published by A.M Jee Vanjee in 1901 and was known as the African Standard. Two years later, it was bought by a European owner who called it East African Standard in 1905. The East African Standard also established Baraza in 1939, which was the first weekly newspaper that was published in Swahili. In the years preceding independence, there was agitation for a publication to serve the interests of Africans. In 1959, East African Newspapers Group was established by the Agha Khan. The group also owned Taifa Kenya (1959), Daily Nation (1960), Taifa Leo (1960), and the weekly Sunday Nation (1960). By 1964, more publications were published in English, Swahili, Asian and vernacular languages emerged. Some of them were weekly papers like Wiyathi (Kikuyu 1960), Ramogi

(Dholuo 1962), Jicho (Swahili 1962) and colonial Times (Asian 1962). Apart from the Daily Nation, Sunday Nation, Taifa Leo and The Standard, the weekly papers folded up after independence (Ochieng & Maxon, 1992).

However, there were new players that emerged in the 1980s. These included the Kenya Times, which was started in 1983 by Kenya African National Union (KANU) which was the ruling party. Later in 2010, Kenya Times was closed after experiencing financial problems. In 1992, Kenneth Matiba, one of the opposition kingpins introduced The People Newspaper which published weekly. It later became a daily newspaper in 1998. In 2010, it changed ownership to the Mediamax Network Limited and has since rebranded into People Daily (PD). In 2014, it became the first free Daily in Kenya.

The latest entrant into the mainstream newspaper industry was the Star newspaper, which began as the Nairobi Star in 2007 before rebranding in 2009. It is owned by the Radio Africa Group. When it started, it only carried news on Nairobi but later expanded its coverage nationally. However, despite covering news from all over the country, its readership is relatively small standing at one percent (Steadman 2008).

The end of the cold war 1989 led to change across the world, including in Kenya, where the push for political pluralism accelerated. In 1991, the constitution was amended making way for multiparty democracy in Kenya. The liberalization of the political environment also reflected in the media where government was forced to liberalize the broadcasting sector and issuance of publication licenses (Iraki 2010). Thus individuals and entities could own multiple media outlets.

In the newspaper category for instance, the Nation Media Group (NMG) owns several publications in Kenya including Daily Nation, Taifa Leo (Swahili) and Sunday Nation. The Standard Group has one daily newspaper, the Standard, and one weekly publication, The Nairobiian. In terms of circulation, the Daily Nation sells the biggest number of copies per day standing at 23 percent, followed by the Standard (10 percent). This translates to an average readership of approximately 4,379,400, and 2,223,500 per day respectively. Taifa Leo has 6 percent while Business Daily has 1 percent (Steadman, 2008).

2.2.2 Television and Radio

The first radio broadcast in Kenya was done in 1929 by the British East African Corporation, and mainly served the European community. Later in 1959, African Broadcasting Service was started and the two were combined to become Kenya Broadcasting Service. In 1962, the Kenya Broadcasting Service became Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) becoming the first television East Africa. In 1964, when Kenya became independent, KBC's name was changed to Voice of Kenya (VOK) before again reverting to KBC in 1989. By the time of independence, KBC transmitted through three centers that is, Nairobi, Mombasa, and Kisumu. By 1963, there were thousands of television licenses in various languages. Radio was powerful for creating political awareness, national unity as well advertising (Ochieng & Maxon, 1992).

The advent of digital broadcasting in Kenya, saw the proliferation of several television stations in addition to the most popular stations in terms of viewership, that is NTV, Citizen, KTN and K24. Since 2009 when the digital roll out kicked off, over 100 television and radio stations operating on digital frequencies have been set up. The companies licensed to distribute digital signals in Kenya by the Communication Authority of Kenya include Signet,

Gotv, Bamba, DSTV and Startimes (Synnovate, 2013).

In the television and radio category, the era of liberalization also saw the sprout of several media companies, which have established multiple outlets. These include NMG which owns two television channels and two radio stations, Nation Television and QTV. NTV started in 1990 with initial coverage in Nairobi, which later spread to other major towns in Kenya. The station broadcasts, informative educational and entertainment programs, which it broadcasts in both Swahili and English. QTV is a Swahili television station. The group's two radio stations Nation Fm and Q fm broadcast in English and Swahili respectively. The major shareholder in NMG is His Highness the Agha Khan, the Ismailia spiritual leader (Iraki 2010). Another TV station, the Kenya Television Network (KTN) is owned by Standard Group (SG). The group also owns radio Maisha that broadcasts in Swahili. In terms of ownership, SG has been linked to former president Moi's family and his close associate Joshua Kulei (Iraki, 2010).

Royal Media Services owned by entrepreneur Samuel K. Macharia also benefited from the liberalisation of airwaves. Its major outlets are Citizen Television and radio Citizen. However the company has several radio stations broadcasting in different languages. These include Hot 96 (English), Ramogi (Dholuo), Inooro (Kikuyu), Musyi (Kamba), Mulembe (Luhya), Egesa (Kisii) Changei (Kalenjin), Wimwaro (Embu), Muuga (Meru), (Iraki 2010). The Radio Africa owns Kiss Television and several radio stations. The Fm stations include Kiss Fm, Classic Fm, Radio Jambo and West FM. Its ownership is associated with Kiprono Kittony, Patrick Quarcoo and William pike (Media Council Website, 2015).

The Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC), a state entity, also owns different outlets. Its television and radio stations KBC Channel one and KBC radio enjoy national coverage. The KBC also owns vernacular Fm stations Including Coro (Kikuyu) and Kitwek (Kalenjin). Mediamax Network Limited came into the media market in 2011 through most of its subsidiaries had been in existence before they were amalgamated into one entity. The Network owns K24 television and five radio stations which are; Kameme Fm (Kikuyu), Milele Fm (Swahili), Pilipili Fm (Swahili, Meru Fm (Meru) and Mayian Fm (Maasai). The company's ownership has been linked to President Uhuru Kenyatta (Media Council website, 2015).

2.3 Legal and Institutional Framework Governing the Media in Kenya.

2.3.1 The Colonial Era (1895-1962)

The press was a mere conveyor belt giving out government information to the public. The colonial government used the Newspapers' Ordinance of 1906, to punish opposition towards its policies (Mbeke, 2008). The Penal Code enacted in 1930, as well as the 1939 Emergency Order in Council formed part of the laws introduced by the colonial government. In 1950, the colonial government amended the Newspaper Ordinance Act of 1906 to control alleged seditious publications. The publications targeted included Inooro ria Agikuyu, Sauti ya Mwafrika, African Leader and Uhuru wa Mwafrika. Most of these newspapers were owned by movements that opposed discriminative colonial policies on land, labor, unfair taxation, and racism. The government was afraid of the freedom of press (Iraki, 2010).

However, the colonial government toned down its dictatorship against media after the reality of independence became definite, lifting the emergency ban. This saw the government allow publication of some political newspapers and even sponsor others. The gains were however reversed by the enactment of the Books and Newspapers Act in 1960, which was aimed at

gagging publications agitating for nationalism. Through the Act, the colonialists censored radio programs as well as licensing of publications (Mbeke, 2008).

2.3.2 The Independence Era

Kenya's founding President Jomo Kenyatta was conscious of the influence of media and therefore put in place measures to manipulate and control it to help them spread propaganda. Media law was characterized by concerns for national cohesion, dealing with political rivals and issues of ideology. Kenyatta's government wanted a media that could play ball in terms of nation building. The government did not want independent media, which was potentially harmful, as the Kenyatta government feared this could cause rebellion. The government thus became intolerant towards the press as demonstrated by the enactment the Official Secrets' Act, 1968. The Act proscribed publication of leaked government information. The government feared being exposed to criticisms occasioned by the publication of such information by the media. Using the same law, the government later banned the Pan African Magazine (Mbeke, 2008).

During the Moi Era (1978-2002), more publications including Beyond magazine, Financial Review, Financial Review, Development Agenda and Nairobi Law Monthly were banned in 1989, adding to the media tribulations. Between 1988 -1990 some 20 newspapers were proscribed. News by foreign news agencies was also prohibited as the government saw them as threat to its policies. The Voice of Kenya (VOK) was given a new name, Kenya Broadcasting Corporation, to be a government mouthpiece. While Moi's pronouncements were not backed by law, it is believed his hostile attitude towards the media was influenced by several factors which included the political competition pitting Kenyatta and Odinga and the military coup attempt in 1982. Other factors were economic recession that led to demands

to implement structural adjustment programs by International Monetary Fund, as well as the clamour for economic and political liberalization (Mbeke, 2008).

In 1991, the constitutional repeal of part 2A among other things saw the liberalization of media and communication sector. The relatively widened democratic space for the media, donor pressure leading to change in laws on the media. The year 1991 ushered in the liberalization of the airwaves with the Attorney General setting up a task force to change the law and make recommendations on media law. The task force led by Hillary Ng'weno proposed the enactment of the Press Council of Kenya Bill (1995) and the Kenya Mass Media Commission Bill (1995) (Iraki, 2010).

The Kenya Mass Media Commission Bill of 1995 was supposed to govern mass media activities. For instance the Bill provided for the criteria for licensing of radio frequencies, ethics as well as media ownership. On the other hand, the Kenya Mass Media Commission Bill (1995) proposed provisions to regulate professional conduct of media practitioners. But non-governmental organisations and politicians in the opposition parties rejected the bills as they considered the draconian (Iraki, 2010).

The Media Council of Kenya was created during the Kibaki era (2003-2008) to regulate the conduct of media regulation as well as encourage self-censorship. It is also the same time that the ICT Act, (2007) was enacted to enhance growth and expansion of the sector. However the Act has been criticised for being ineffective as the government has not been able to support community media since the proposals was adopted. The Kibaki administration formulated the Freedom of Information Bill, 2007 to repeal Official Secrets Act and improve access to official information and governance (Mbeke, 2008).

The Constitution promulgated in August 2010 expressly provides for freedom of expression, media freedom and the right to obtain government information. Article 34 of the Kenyan constitution guarantees freedom of the media and guards against state control of the media. Article 35 also grants the right to access to information both to the media and general public. The provision of the constitution did away with most of the laws governing media, which were earlier considered draconian and restrictive (Media Council of Kenya, 2015). The promulgation of the new constitution therefore set for major changes in both the legal and institutional framework that govern the media industry in Kenya currently (Mbeke, 2008).

Since 2013, the government has enacted two major Acts of Parliament aimed at operationalizing the provisions of Article 34 and 35 of the 2010 constitution. These include the KICA (Amendment) Act, 2013 as well as the Media Act 2013 (Media Council of Kenya, 2015). The former Act provides for the setting up of Communications Authority of Kenya (CAK), to regulate the sector. CAK was set up in 1999 following the enactment KICA in 1998. The authority facilitates the growth and expansion of various aspects of the sector including telecommunications, broadcasting, electronic commerce, multimedia, postal and courier services (KICA, 1998). On the other hand, the Media Council of Kenya professional conduct for media practitioners.

2.4 Recent External Security challenges in Kenya

2.4 .1 Security Challenges Before the Westgate Mall Attack

One of Kenya's biggest security challenges of recent times has been the problem of terror attacks. The country's dilemma in addressing this challenge has been complicated by its proximity to Somalia, which has been the breeding ground for terror groups, and its pro western policies which have made it a target of terror. Kenya has also been hosting Somalia

refuges a situation that terror elements have been using as a loophole to access Kenya. As a result, Al Qaeda terror cells have been entering Kenya and increasing their activities over time.

As a result, Kenya suffered the first devastating terror attack in August 07, 1998 during which Al Qaeda agents bombed the American Embassy in Kenya killing 214 people and injured 5,000 others. There was a simultaneous explosion of bombs in Dar es Salaam Tanzania and Nairobi Kenya, which led to 224 fatalities and 5,000 injuries. Out of the fatalities 12 of them were U.S citizens. The attacks were later blamed on Osama bin Laden who was the Al-Qaeda leader then. After those attacks, the Kenyan and USA government agreed to work together in anti-terror efforts. However the anti-terror efforts were seen to be enhanced only by the USA government, affecting it facilities and citizens globally. The Kenyan government did not seem to act with the same seriousness (Carson, 2005).

Another attack for which Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility took place at the Paradise hotel in Mombasa on November 22, 2002. The attack claimed 16 people were killed after the hotel located in Kikambala, in the outskirts Mombasa was blown off by suicide bombers, also destroying the establishment. Out of the 15 fatalities, there were 12 Kenyans and were tourists from Israel. Paradise Hotel in Kikambala, is located 15 miles North of Mombasa (Daily Nation, 2014). According to analysts, the attack was aimed at harming Israel interests in Kenya as the owner of the hotel and most of the guests were from Israel. Israel is one of the closest allies of the United States of America (USA) whose interests Al Qaida has sworn to harm anywhere in the world (Carson, 2005).

Apart from terror attacks, Kenya has in the past also suffered from the instability in Somalia in the form of piracy attacks in the Indian Ocean. By 2007, 188 Kenyans had been kidnapped for ransom by Somali pirates, seven Kenyan cargo ships seized while several fishing boats captured. Kenya was also at the centre of this piracy probe in the sense that up to \$ 100 million of the proceeds from the illegal trade was being laundered in Kenya (Daniels, 2012). The problem of piracy saw Kenya send its troops to Somalia to fight the Alshabab terror group, which was the mastermind of the piracy activities. Kenya's penal code has also been used to try piracy suspects (Lehr, 2007).

Two such incidents happened in 2008: The first pirate attack occurred in May 2008 when pirates from Somali took control of a Ukrainian ship, christened MV Faina, which was carrying weapons destined for Kenya. They demanded \$35 as ransom but after negotiations facilitated by various international agencies including NATO, the pirates were paid \$3.5 million, ending the siege. The second attack was reported in November 2008 when Somali pirates took control of a super tanker, which was ferrying crude oil worth \$100 million. The pirates demanded a payment of \$25 million but were later paid between \$3 million and \$8 million, bringing an end to the hostage situation (Platt, 2015).

2.4.2 The Westgate Mall Attack

Another major attack occurred in September 21, 2013 when Al Shabaab, an Al Qaeda allied group killed 68 people after taking control of Westgate mall in Nairobi. The attack also injured 175 people. The choice of the location of the attack and the success with which the attack was executed portrayed the Kenyan government as weak and raised questions on its ability to prevent or even repulse such attacks. The attackers appeared to have collected intelligence, conducted surveillance, moved operatives and equipment into place before conducting the attack at the heart of Nairobi next to the seat of government. The attack drew

global attention with observers both local and international asking critical questions about the attack (Jones, 2014).

Due to the high number of people affected and its proximity to the seat of government, THE Westgate Mall attack in particular led to an increased clamour for deliberate steps by the government to prevent such attacks and also stringent punishment for those responsible for them. Both the public and politicians were involved in a debate on the possible causes of the increased number of attacks and how to address them. While the opposition politicians argued that the reason for the attacks was the presence of the Kenya Defense Forces in Somalia, the government argued that some of the attacks were carried out by its political rivals to paint the government as a failure (Masslen, 2014).

2.4.3 Security Challenges in the Post-Westgate Mall Attack

One of the major attacks during this period was the Mpeketoni attack for which Somali based militants Al Shabaab claimed responsibly. However, before the group issued a statement to claim responsibility, there was confusion on who was responsible for the two attacks that took place on 15th and 17th June 2014. The government led by President Uhuru Kenyatta denied the involvement of islamists and instead blamed local political networks working with criminal gangs to achieve an ethnic agenda. However a few days later, Alshabaab claimed responsibility for the attacks saying it was a response to the brutal repression of Muslims by Kenyan government (The Daily Nation, 2014).

On November 22nd, 2014, 28 people died after Al-Shabaab ambushed a bus heading to Nairobi from Mandera. The attack took place near Kenya's border with Somali. Al-Shabaab militants later came out to says they were responsible for the ambush, and claimed the were

revenge a raid by Kenya security forces on various mosques in Mombasa. Several teachers of Non Somali origin were killed in the attack. The attack heightened religious tensions in the country even as fellow teachers working in Mandera boycotted work and demanded to be transferred to more secure areas (Gibson & Lando, 2015).

Also worth noting was another attack on 2nd December 2014, where 36 quarry workers were killed in attacks sponsored by the Alshabaab in Mandera. Once again the attacks on non-indigenous Somali led to a heated debate with leaders from the affected areas calling on the government to provide adequate security in Mandera. The opposition said the government had failed to protect its people along the Somali Border (Burbidge, 2015). Following the attack, a judge in Mandera issued a controversial ruling against 20 quarry workers whom he sentenced for five months or a fine of Sh60, 000 each for disobeying police orders. The workers faced charges of defying orders by police authorities in Mandera to leave the quarries due to security concerns. However, the ruling was overturned after an appeal by the Director of Public Prosecutions, following public uproar (Daily Nation, 2014).

The most recent attack that killed 147 people occurred at the Garissa University College in the Northern town of Garissa. Heavily armed attackers stormed the college, surrounded and fired indiscriminately at students singling out non-Muslims. Over 500 university students survived, even as 79 of them sustained injuries. A fifth gunman has reportedly been arrested. The Ashabaab later claimed responsibility of the attack as debate raged on the attack, critics censured the Kenyan security forces' policing strategy, which they said was high handed in nature and which involved unwarranted arrest of members of the Somali community. Politicians from the Muslim community and human rights organizations warned that indiscriminate arrest would create resentment among the Muslim community (Daily Nation, 2014).

2.5 The Security Laws Amendment Act, 2014 (SLAA).

The process of formulating and enacting the SLAA, 2014 followed several attacks on Kenya citizens, which exerted pressure on authorities to stop the bloodshed. It amended 21 pieces of legislation touching on insecurity and terrorism. It was signed into law on December 19, 2014 by President Uhuru Kenyatta. Some of its key provisions include heavy prison sentences for terror suspects including government officers found to have abetted terror activities. The law in section 69 for instance emended the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), 2012 by introducing a new section, 36 A, which accorded various security institutions significant powers to detect crime and related activities. The act for instance gives powers to the national security organs to determine circumstances under which communication can be interrupted to necessitate prevention to terror. The Act also amended the Penal code by adding a new section 128A, which provides for a 15-year jail term for public officers convicted of abetting terrorism activities (SLAA, 2014).

SLAA also amended the criminal procedure code by providing that suspects of terror, drug traffic, money laundering and human trafficking be denied disclosure of evidence in advance. The amendments were contained in a new section 42 A. The criminal procedure code was also amended allowing police to monitor criminal who have previously been imprisoned for more than three year. Section 343 was introduced in the code, to allow police to put former convicts under surveillance for five years after they have been released. Section 25 of the Act also amended the Registration of Persons Act, which gave the director of immigration powers to cancel any identification document obtained through forgery or other illegal means. Section 36 of Act amended section 4 of the Firearms Act to provide that individuals caught with a gun or any other weapon including an improvised explosive device is subjected to a jail term of at least 25 years. Section 61 of the Act amended the PTA by providing that those

caught training persons or radicalizing youth for the purpose to participating in terror activities will spend 30 years (SLAA, 2014).

However, in February 2015 the court nullified eight sections of the Act which it declared unconstitutional. This is after the opposition coalition CORD went to court to contest the law arguing some of its section infringed on Kenyan's rights and liberties. The five-judge Bench on February 23, 2015, declared Section 12 of SLAA which sought to regulate how media published images of victims of terrorism whether dead or alive. The judges ruled that amendments would impact on the freedom of the media. The judges also held that section 42A which allowed the State to produce evidence in camera was against an accused person's right noting that in such instances, the accused could not have an opportunity to interrogate the same and prepare for defence. They were of the view that introduction of section 42 A in the criminal law would lead to trials through ambush (The Standard, 2014).

Equally thrown out by the court was Section 20, which introduced Section 36A, making it optional for the court to grant an accused person a bail was declared unconstitutional. The judges ruled that the section was introduced without justification. The court also quashed Section 48 of the Amended Act that had in turn introduced Section 18A in the Refugees Act. They noted that the State had not indicated how it was to deal with the remaining 300,000 who are to be affected by the new legislation. They also noted that other countries had not set a limit on the refugees that were to enter into their territories (The Standard, 2014).

2.6 Conclusion

In dealing with security challenges, policy weakness has been cited as one of the major problems that have seen Kenya continue to be a victim of insecurity over time. The problem of tribal clashes and election violence has been attributed to lack of policy action. This is because the government which has the capacity to demobilised the highly potent and dangerous militia and bring to book their paymasters, but has failed to do so. One such case is the 2007/08 post election violence during which 1,000 killed even as another 600,000 were displaced (Mentan, 2014). Collusion between corrupt police officers and terror suspects has also been blamed for failure to apprehend perpetrators of terror attacks. For instance, the key suspect in the 1998 American embassy attack and Paradise hotel terror attack, Fazul Abdullah, had been arrested by Kenya authorities and managed to escape after bribing police. He was however killed in Somalia in June 2011 through anti-terror efforts (Carson, 2005).The formulation and subsequent enactment of SLAA followed the Westgate attack after a 16-month long period of debate on the problem of insecurity in Kenya.

CHAPTER THREE

STUDY FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

3.1 Introduction

This chapter addresses the findings of the study based on data collected. The first section contains findings on the influence of media framing on insecurity in the Daily Nation newspaper. Each of the three frames has been addressed in separate sub-sections. The second section gives the findings of media framing on the issue of insecurity in The Standard newspaper. The study then gives a summary of the findings in both newspapers before comparing the results.

An editorial is said to have influenced salience if the issues it raised inform the subsequent articles, either agreeing with them or challenging them. Salience can also be assessed in various ways: First, an issue is salient when many different groups of people are talking about it. Secondly, an issue is salient when it is being discussed at multiple venues, be it rallies, press conference, parliament, cabinet or in churches. Finally, an issue is salient if it attracts the attention of people who can do something about it by acting on it directly or by influencing those who can act on it.

For instance, in the case of issue definition, when the editorial defines insecurity in a particular way, the number of articles reporting concurrence or disagreement with that definition is expected to increase. Similarly, when the editorial makes a blame attribution, the number of articles reporting concurrence, disagreement or merely discussing the editorial's claim should increase. Likewise, when the editorial offers a solution, the number of articles reporting support or disagreement with that solution is expected to increase.

3.2 Media Framing and the Salience of Insecurity: The Daily Nation

3.2.1 Issue Definition (ID)

To examine the effect of issue definition on the salience of insecurity in the Daily Nation newspaper, the study selected an editorial published on 5th May 2014. The editorial was purposefully selected because it contained the frame of interest, namely ID. The editorial contained four key arguments that were important to the study. First, the editorial argued that the government and the opposition as well as individual Kenyans had a role to play in ensuring Kenya is secure. Secondly, the editorial dismissed the notion that frequent attacks in Kenya were as a result of religious wars among Kenyans. Thirdly, the editorial suggested that the claims by the government that the opposition was inciting communities against the government were inaccurate. Finally, it dismissed the opposition's claims that the presence of KDF in Somalia was the cause of insecurity in Kenya.

The editorial concluded that both the government and the opposition were playing politics with insecurity, rather than genuinely seeking to address insecurity. The editorial concluded that frequent attacks in Kenya were a result of lack of security measures and not politics or religion. Moreover, the wave of terror was not related to the presence of KDF in Somalia.

The table below shows the frequency of the newspaper articles addressing ID, one month before the publication of the selected editorial and one month after the publication of the editorial:

Table 3: Issue Definition in the Daily Nation newspaper

Number of articles and publication dates	
Before the Editorial (5 th April, 2014-5 th May 2014)	After the Editorial (6 th May 2014-6 th June, 2014)
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Nil	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 15th May, 2014• 29th May, 2014• 4th June, 2014• 5th June, 2014

From the table above, the study found that there were no articles on insecurity, in the course of the one month prior to the publication of the editorial with ID. However, within one month after the publication of the editorial, the number of articles on insecurity rose to four. The mere increase in articles after the editorial is the first indication that the salience of insecurity as a policy issue had increased. The second indication that salience increased is the fact that in the articles, debate was rife on the perceived causes of attacks on the Kenyan soil.

The President himself commented on the matter. On 5th June, 2014, President Uhuru Kenyatta asked Kenyans to resist attempts by criminal groups keen to divide them along religious lines. The president stated that the government would catch up with criminals who were out to break the law while hiding behind what he termed as strange religious ideologies.

He noted:

I would like to urge all law abiding citizens, not to be deceived by the narrative that the problems we are facing are religious in nature. There is no true religion that advocates for loss of innocent lives, (Daily Nation 2014, p.4).

The president's remarks were related to the editorial in the sense that the editorial had refuted the notion that the frequent attacks in Kenya were as a result of religious wars. Uhuru's comments indicated that the issue was being discussed at the highest level of government.

The third indication that the editorial raised salience is that there were three more articles reporting on the definition of security at various venues. The article published on 29th May 2014 reported that Jubilee MPs at a rally in Kiambu were calling for unity among religious leaders to help dispel the notion that the attacks in Kenya were as a result of religious differences. On 4th June 2014, Daily Nation Newspaper reported that Muslim MPs had held a press conference in parliament to deny claims that Muslims were supporting terrorism. Furthermore, on 5th June 2014, another article in the same newspaper reported that Mombasa county commissioner, Nelson Marwa, had warned youth against being deceived to join crime, disguised as religion. All these articles suggest that the publication of the editorial raised the salience of insecurity in the Daily Nation newspaper.

3.2.2 Blame Attribution (BA)

The study analyzed an editorial dated 22nd July 2014 to determine the influence of blame attribution on the salience of insecurity in the Daily Nation. The particular editorial was selected purposively because its arguments manifested the frame of interest. First, the editorial argued that criminal elements behind the terror attacks in Kenya were being encouraged by the evident ineffectiveness of the Police. Secondly, the editorial urged the government to stop finger-pointing and apportioning blame and instead engage in serious security actions that will reprimand the culprits. In essence, the editorial attributed blame for insecurity on the failure of the police service to do its work.

The following table shows the results of the study's analysis of how the publication of the editorial with BA affected the frequency of articles on insecurity. As was the case with ID, the observations were done for a period of one month before the publication of the editorial and one month after the publication of the editorial:

Table 4: Blame Attribution in the Daily Nation newspaper

Number of articles and publication dates	
Before the Editorial (22 nd June, 2014-6 th July, 2014)	After the Editorial (23 rd July, 2014-23 rd August 2014).
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 24th June, 2014	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 27th July, 2014• 31st July, 2014• 10th August, 2014• 17th August, 2014

As shown in the table above, there was only one article on insecurity during the one-month period before the editorial. The article published on 24th June, 2014 reported that a blogger had been arrested for claiming that Muslims were terrorists on his social media account. In other words, the article blamed religion as the source of insecurity. More specifically, Muslims were accused of promoting terrorism activities either directly or indirectly.

The study however observed that during the one month after the publication of the editorial, the number of newspaper articles addressing the same frame increased to four, up from one. This was the first indicator that there was an increase in salience. Moreover, in one of the articles that appeared in the Daily Nation on 10th August 2014, religious leaders under the aegis of the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK) said the gaps in the security system were to blame for runaway insecurity. NCCCK also claimed that the government was politicizing matters of insecurity by accusing the opposition of being responsible for attacks, thus aggravating the situation.

Notably, the editorial claimed that weaknesses in the security system were encouraging criminals to continue carrying out attacks. The editorial also told the government to stop finger pointing and instead work towards a solution to insecurity. This is a second indicator that the editorial influenced the remarks by NCCCK, hence increasing the salience of the issue.

Thirdly, the involvement of NCCCK, which is an umbrella body for all evangelical churches in Kenya shows that the issue had sparked the interest of a wide audience. The findings are therefore evidence that the publication of this editorial with BA increased the salience of the issue of insecurity in the Daily Nation newspaper.

3.2.3 Issue Solution (IS)

To examine the influence of IS on the salience of insecurity in the Daily Nation, the study purposefully selected an editorial published on the 16th June, 2014. The editorial was selected because the frame of interest was reflected in its arguments. First, in the editorial, the Daily Nation newspaper urged the government and the opposition to work together and avoid reckless statements about the issue of insecurity. Secondly, the editorial said President Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto must make the country's security a priority, not politics, nor the economy. Thirdly, the editorial said the solution to insecurity lay in tough discussion with the national security team, to obtain assurances that the lapses in the system will not continue. In a nutshell, the solution offered was proper coordination of the security activities.

The following table contains findings of study on the influence of IS on the salience of insecurity in the Daily Nation newspaper, one month before and one month after the publication of the editorial with the frame.

Table 5: Issue Solution in the Daily Nation newspaper

Number of articles and publication dates	
Before the editorial (16th May 2014-16th June, 2014)	After the editorial (17th June,2014-17th July, 2014)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 16th May, 2014 • 5th June, 2014 • 11th June, 2014 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 21st June, 2014 • 22nd June, 2014 • 22nd June, 2014 • 24th June, 2014 • 30th June, 2014 • 3rd July, 2014 • 15th July 2014

The table above shows that there were three articles on the issue of insecurity during the one month period before the publication of the editorial with IS. In one of the articles published on 16th May, 2014, political leaders from the North Eastern region were calling on the government to come up with a law on radicalization to curb the vice. In this case, the leaders were calling for a legal solution. The second article published on 5th June 2014 talked about a demonstration in Baringo County where locals were calling on the government to deploy more security personnel to help fight insecurity. The third article appearing on the Daily Nation Newspaper on 11th June 2014 was about a civil society group, the Independent Medical Legal Unit (IMLU), which was protesting against the shoot to kill order by the government against suspected criminals in Mombasa.

The study however observed that one month after the publication of the editorial with IS, the number of articles on insecurity increased to eight. On 21st June, 2014, for instance, there were two articles addressing issue solution. The first article was about the British ambassador to Kenya Christian Turner who said Britain would work with Kenya in fighting terrorism. He said: “Britain is willing to work with the Kenyan government by providing qualified

personnel and partnering to set a system that is watertight in fighting terror,” (Daily Nation 2014, p. 5).

In the second article, published on the same date, the Daily Nation Newspaper reported that the government had released funds for the roll out of a new security surveillance system. The article titled: “Government sets aside Shs 13 billion for new security system” stated that a private telecommunication company, Safaricom was going to set up the new installation on behalf of the government. The then Interior and Coordination Cabinet Secretary Joseph Ole Lenku said the following during the signing of the agreement with Safaricom:

The current system has largely contributed to the security challenges facing the country. Safaricom will build the network to be used in the proposed system and then hand it over to the National Police Service (Daily Nation, 2014 p.6)

The findings indicate that the publication of the editorial increased the salience of insecurity in the following ways: Firstly, the first article had attracted the attention of the international community and one of Kenya’s key development partners. The remarks by the UK envoy indicated that the issue had received attention at the highest level of UK government. In fact, he was already providing a solution to the issue of insecurity in Kenya. Secondly, the editorial was categorical that the government needed to prioritize matters of security. This corresponds with the second article where the government had allocated funds for setting up of a security surveillance system. It is therefore evident that the editorial had influenced the salience of insecurity. And thirdly to sum it up, the significant increase in the number of articles published after the editorial is an indicator that the editorial raised the salience of insecurity.

3.3 Media Framing and the Saliency of Insecurity: The Standard Newspaper

3.3.1 Issue Definition (ID)

To determine the effect of issue definition on the saliency of insecurity in The Standard newspaper, the study purposefully selected an editorial published on 7th May, 2014. The editorial argued first, that the ongoing attacks in Kenya were not a good reason to withdraw KDF from Somalia. Secondly, The Standard newspaper noted that the attacks in Kenya were as a result of general insecurity, which the government could contain whether KDF were in Somalia or not. Thus the editorial concluded that the argument that the presence of KDF in Somalia was the cause of attacks in Kenya was not an accurate reflection of the reality. It therefore defined the issue of insecurity as a reflection of general insecurity and had no link with the presence of KDF in Somalia.

The findings in this section are summarized in the table below:

Table 6: Issue Definition in The Standard newspaper

Number of articles and publication dates	
Before the Editorial 7th October 2014-7th November, 2014	After the Editorial 8th November, 2014-8th December 2014
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Nil	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 11th October, 2014• 20th October, 2014• 6th December, 2014

During the one-month period before the publication of the editorial with ID, the study observed that there was no article addressing the issue of insecurity in The Standard newspaper. However, as a first indicator of saliency, the number of articles on insecurity rose to three, within one month after the publication of the editorial addressing the frame of interest. For instance on 11th October 2014, Deputy President William Ruto said KDF troops

would remain in Somalia until peace returns to that country. He added that the government was committed to deal with extremists at whatever cost:

Those who think that they can intimidate us through cowardly attacks should be warned that the Kenya government will soon catch up with them, our troops will remain in Somali for as long as our efforts to keep peace in that country are needed. Nobody should be cheated that we will remove KDF from Somalia, the attacks will stop (The Standard 2014, p. 6).

The Deputy President's remarks are an indicator that the issue's salience had been enhanced since he is one of the top decision makers in government. The fact that he was discussing it meant that his attention had been captured and he was capable of doing something about it. This is the second indicator of salience. The third indicator that the editorial had raised the salience of the issue is that the Deputy President's remarks agreed with the editorial's argument. The editorial had dismissed the notion that the insecurity problems were directly linked with government's strategy of keeping KDF in Somalia, which was not in the interest of Kenya. In summary, the findings appear to offer evidence that the frame (ID) reflected in the editorial had enhanced the salience of insecurity in The Standard newspaper.

3.3.2 Blame Attribution (BA)

One of the tasks that the study undertook to accomplish is to examine the influence of blame attribution on the salience of insecurity in The Standard newspaper. To achieve this, the study purposefully selected an editorial dated 4th October 2014. First, the editorial blamed the immigration department, for failing to control the type and number of foreigners entering Kenya. Secondly, it argued that the high number terrorists entering Kenya undetected was largely because of corruption at the Kenyan borders and lack of screening capacity. The Standard newspaper therefore blamed the immigration department for the loopholes in the movement of people in and out of Kenya, thus contributing to the high rate of insecurity.

The table below contains the findings in this section:

Table 7: Blame Attribution in The Standard newspaper

Number of articles and publication dates	
Before the editorial (4th September, 2014-4th November, 2014)	After the editorial (5th October 2014-5th November, 2014)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 21stSeptember, 2014 • 29th September, 2014 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 7th October, 2014 • 7th October, 2014 • 11th October, 2014 • 29th October, 2014 • 29th October, 2014 • 1st November, 2014 • 3rd November, 2014

It is evident from table 8 that during the one-month period before the publication of the editorial on insecurity containing the BA frame, the number of articles on insecurity was two. One of the two articles published on the 21st September 2014, was quoting a survey conducted by The Standard newspaper, which had concluded that most Kenyans believed insecurity was the biggest challenge facing the country at that time. The second article published on 29th September 2014 quoted a government report released by the ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government showing that crime rates had reduced in 2014, compared to previous years. It is notable that the number of articles rose to seven, during the period of one month after the publication of the editorial.

As a first indicator of salience, the study noted that in addition to the increase in articles, the publication of the editorial containing the blame attribution frame had shaped debate on insecurity. This is because while articles before the publication of the editorial were not specific on who to blame for insecurity, the articles that followed the publication of the editorial attempted to make specific blame attributions. The second

indicator of salience is that the editorial had blamed corruption and collusion between authorities and criminals for the high number of terrorists entering the country. In one of the articles published on 11th October 2014, for instance, the Independent Police Oversight Authority (IPOA) said it was investigating one of the police officers deployed in Lamu over the clashes that had been reported in the area. Thirdly, IPOA is one of the major decision making organs in the security system and therefore their involvement was an indicator that the editorial had attracted their attention to act. It can therefore be concluded that that the editorial raised salience of insecurity in the The Standard newspaper.

3.3.3 Issue Solution (IS)

To effectively examine the influence of issue solution on the issue of insecurity in The Standard newspaper, the study purposefully selected an editorial published on 14th October 2014. The editorial argued that insecurity was a complex issue, which required a multipronged approach to solve. The editorial further proposed *Nyumba Kumi* (community policing) as one of the most effective ways of dealing with rampant insecurity in Kenya.

The next table summarizes the findings in this section:

Table 8: Issue Solution in The Standard newspaper

Number of articles and publication dates	
Before the editorial 4 th September, 2014- 4 th October, 2014	After the editorial 5 th October 2014-5 th November, 2014)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 13thSeptember, 2014 • 17thSeptember, 2014 • 21stSeptember, 2014 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 7th October, 2014 • 11th October, 2014 • 29th October, 2014 • 2nd November, 2014 • 20thNovember, 2014

The table above shows that during the period of one month before the publication of the editorial with IS, there were three articles published in The Standard newspaper on insecurity. On 13th September, The Standard newspaper reported that the government had announced plans to come up with a comprehensive anti-radicalization policy to be implemented by security agents, community leader and religious leaders. The second article published on 17th September, 2014, reported that the government was targeting *madrassas* in its efforts to fight radicalization. The third article published on 21st September 2014 reported that there was a demonstration in Nairobi calling on the government to put an end to the numerous attacks in Kenya.

Firstly, the study noted that though the articles published in the one month period before the editorial were about issue solution the number increased to five after the publication of the editor. This shows that the editorial influenced the salience of insecurity through blame attribution. Secondly, in one of the articles published after the publication of the editorial with BA, the Central Organization of Trade Unions Secretary (COTU) general Francis Atwoli, asked the government to work with all stakeholders in addressing the issue of insecurity. The article was published on 20th November 2014. Atwoli said this could be achieved through dialogue involving security agencies, religious organizations, and community leaders, among other groups. His sentiments agreed with one of the editorial's arguments that a multi-pronged approach was required in addressing insecurity. One of the proposals made by the editorial was involvement of communities through *Nyumba Kumi*. The observations show that the publication of the editorial with IS therefore raised the salience of insecurity in The Standard newspaper, albeit marginally.

3.4 Comparison of findings from the two newspapers

The table below summarizes the findings of the study in both newspapers:

Table 9: Summary of Findings

Newspapers	Number of articles		
	Before editorial	After editorial	Difference
Daily Nation	3	16	13
The standard	5	15	10

As the table suggests, the publication of editorials containing the various frames of interest (Issue Definition, Blame Attribution and Issue Solution) resulted in a substantial increases in the number of articles highlighting similar frames. The findings show that in both newspapers the number of articles increased significantly in the period after the publication of editorials addressing the frames of interest. However the increase was much higher in the Daily Nation. On a general scale, the number of articles one month before publication of editorials with frames rose from 3 to 16 in the Daily Nation while those in The Standard rose from 5 to 15. This means that the influence of the frames on the salience of insecurity in the Daily Nation newspapers was slightly higher than it was, in The Standard newspaper.

The findings agree with the MST, which is the study's theoretical framework. First, the findings appear to demonstrate that indeed, the media is one of the policy entrepreneurs that identifies conditions and defines them as problems. Second, for the media to have highlighted the issue of insecurity persistently and constitutively, it shows the importance that the two newspapers attached to the issue of insecurity as compared to other issues. Thirdly, the study observed that SLAA was enacted through the emergence of a key policy window; the government's majority in the national Assembly. It turns out then that media did not only

highlight the events, but it defined them as connected to insecurity, pointing out who should shoulder responsibility for the situation and proposed solutions to the challenges.

In essence, the media as a policy entrepreneur seems to have succeeded in bringing together the three streams of MST; Problem, Policy and Politics. Through framing the Media therefore raised the salience of insecurity as a policy issue. The findings appear to agree with the main hypothesis of the study, which is that media framing of insecurity raised the salience of insecurity as a policy issue.

CHAPTER FOUR

STUDY SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECCOMENDATIONS

4.1 Study Summary

The core objective of this study was to examine how media framing of insecurity influenced salience of insecurity as a policy issue. This core objective was further broken into three specific objectives: to examine how media definition of insecurity influenced the salience of insecurity a policy issue; and to examine how blame attribution by the media on insecurity influenced salience of insecurity as a policy issue; to explore how media proposals on solutions to insecurity influenced insecurity as a policy issue. This chapter therefore gives a summary of how the study was conducted and the key findings.

The study majorly relied on secondary data obtained from Kenya's two main newspapers, namely the Daily Nation and The Standard. The data was collected both quantitatively and qualitatively. As a first step, the study selected editorials on the subject of insecurity in the two newspapers during the period after Westgate Mall attack. The period of focus was between the date of the Westgate attack and the enactment of the Security Laws Amendment Act, 2014. To come up with findings, the study counted the number of newspaper articles published one month before and one month after the editorials with frames. The aim was to observe whether there was any change in the frequency of article published on the three frames addressed by the editorials. The findings of the study indicated that the publication of editorials with the three frames raised the salience of insecurity in both the Daily Nation and The Standard newspapers. This is because there was a rise in the frequency of newspaper articles after the publication of the editorials addressing each frame.

4.2 Conclusions

The study undertook to examine how media framing influenced the salience of insecurity as policy issue. In line with this objective, the study established that at a general level, the use of frames, by both the Daily Nation and the Standard newspapers significantly influenced the salience of the issue of insecurity as a policy agenda. This is evidenced by the increase in the frequency of the number of articles on security, one month after the publication of editorials containing the frame as compared to the same period of time before the editorials' publication.

Moving on to specifics, the study first undertook to examine the influence of issue definition on the salience of insecurity as a policy issue. From the findings, this study therefore argues that when media defines an issue, policy makers are likely to adopt their proposals. This is evidenced by the fact that the government finally made efforts to come up with an omnibus Bill that contained amendments to various security laws to deal with insecurity. As proposed by the Daily Nation and the The Standard newspapers, the formulators of the law for instance came up with harsh sentences for terror suspects as well as provisions to seal loopholes in the law that enabled perpetrators to evade punishment. This action by government is proof that the media's proposals in defining the attacks as a problem of insecurity ended up influencing the manner in which policy makers reacted to the issue in the end. This means that policy makers ignored other definitions including that of politics or the presence of KDF in Somalia, in favour of the insecurity angle offered by the media.

A similar conclusion can be reached with regard to the use of blame attribution in the sense that when media assigns blame and points out those in its opinion are responsible for a particular policy problem, policy makers are likely to react to correct the situation. In the

context of this study, the media blamed various institutions and individuals from the escalating security problem in Kenya. Those blamed included the presidency, the National police service, the immigration department, and individual politicians. In response, parliament enacted SLAA, which addressed the failures pointed out by the media. For instance, in response to what the media perceived to be weaknesses in the national police service, SLAA introduced section 42 A, that gave the Director General of police unlimited powers to sanction secret security operations. These powers are to be exercised when the police believe the operation will yield information that is necessary to prevent an insecurity attack.

The media also argued that corruption that corrupt police and immigration officers were to blame for the high rate of insecurity. The Act in section 128 A provides that A public officer who aides the illegal entry of criminals to Kenya or conceals the whereabouts of criminal can be imprisoned for at least 15 years. The media law blamed weakness in the National Intelligence Service (NIS). In response the Acts introduced section 6A, which gave NIS officer powers to arrest suspected criminals subject to a court order.

On issue solution, this study argues that media proposals on solutions to policy problems often find their way into policies responding to such problems. In the context of this study, the media proposed various solutions to the problems of insecurity and the incessant security attacks. The Daily Nation newspaper on its side proposed that the government takes urgent steps, including legislations, to address insecurity as a matter of priority. The Standard newspaper on the other hand argued that insecurity was complex a problem which required a multi-sector approach. The speed with which SLAA was drafted and enacted by parliament was a pointer to the urgency that policy makers attached to the law. SLAA was passed in

chaotic environment in parliament where the government was keen to have it adopted by all means despite stiff defiance from the opposition. After leaving parliament the president appended his signature almost immediately.

The central argument of this study therefore is that the media's persistent reporting of the issue of insecurity using the three frames influenced to large extent the process of enactment of the SLAA. A close scrutiny of article published after the editorial by this study showed that policy makers including Members of Parliament, the President and cabinet secretaries were actively involved in the debate on insecurity. This is evidence that they were reading the editorials published by the media. In the end SLAA was a response to general insecurity, just like the media had defined it. In addition, SLAA addressed loopholes in agencies and institutions that the media had assigned blamed for insecurity in Kenya. Further, SLAA adopted most, if not all proposals made by the media on how to curb insecurity in Kenya.

4.3 Study Recommendations

This study has established that indeed media framing influences the salience of issues and thus policy formulation, as demonstrated in the enactment of the SLAA 2014. The study therefore, makes a number of recommendations which will not only broaden the academic discourse on this subject but will also assist policy makers to incorporate the media in legislation processes going forward. First, the study recommends that wider studies be conducted on media's influence in policy formulation. In the course of conducting this study, it was realized that not many scholars have studied the media's role in policy formulation in Kenya. Therefore there is a significant gap in knowledge in this area. Besides, this study only concentrated on the print media specifically the Daily Nation and The Standard newspapers. There is need to conduct similar studies in regard to other forms of media. Specifically the

study recommends studies on other aspects of framing which have not been addressed by this study. This will provide a holistic understanding of the media's role as well as add to the depository of knowledge within local academic institutions.

Secondly, this study recommends that the policy makers in Kenya should recognize the media as one of major stakeholders in policy formulation. The study notes that even when the media played a key role in improving the salience of insecurity, which led to the eventual enactment of SLAA, 2014, most of its work was out of own initiative. Due to a lack of recognition the media was accused of meddling or even reporting falsehoods, yet in the end the media contributed significantly to the outcome of legislative process.

Finally, the study recommends to the media in Kenya to use this study to assess its performance. In Chapter One, this study has highlighted works by scholars from other parts of the world on what the media has achieved in influencing policy decision in other jurisdictions. The media in Kenya and specifically the Daily Nation and The Standard newspapers would therefore benefit from this study by using it to compare its performance with the media in other parts of the world.

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