${\bf METAREPRESENTATION\ IN\ KIMERU}$

NARRATIVES

BY:

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DECLARATION

I declare that this is my original work and it	t has never been submitted in any other institution of
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This research project has been submitted supervisors:	for examination with our approval as university
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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my family, both nuclear and extended.

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CHAPTER ONE

1.0. Introduction

Here, an introduction of the project is done by indicating major research assumptions and procedures on which it is based.

1.1. Background to the Study

Demonstratives play important roles in Eastern Bantu folk tales. Studies have revealed that demonstratives in Bantu narratives differ in terms of number, morphology (i.e. mode of formation), distribution and functions accordingly, with reference to specific languages. That is to say that those aspects are language specific.

1.1.1 Studies in Bantu narratives texts

There is evidence of studies that have been carried out on narratives. For example Steve Nicolle (2014) has described the functions of demonstratives in some Eastern Bantu cultural languages depending on the analysis of narrative texts in their original states. They include some languages in Tanzania, Kenya, Mozambique and Congo (DRC). These includes; Fuliiru, (Democratic Republic of Congo), Chidigo, (Kenya), Kwaya, Suba-simbiti, Kabwa, and Malila, (Tanzania) and last but not the least, Makonde, a Bantu language spoken in Mozambique.

According to him, demonstratives act as referential elements in narratives in these languages. Additionally apart from the identification of specific players in the story, these units can also feature throughout the entire text playing discourse level functions namely; activation status, agency function, text structuring function and thematic development function.

Heimelmann also classified four (non-spatial deictic uses of demonstratives which he termed as; situational, discourse deictic, recognitional and tracking functions respectively. According to him, situational function as the name suggests relates the character to the situation in which the narrative is being related. A Makonde text which situates the story during the "ing'ondo-alilaitandi (that First World War) illustrates this. Here, the distal demonstrative "alila" situates the war (ing'ondo) in relation to the time of the story.

He also explains the discourse-deictic function to refer to the use of demonstratives to refer to propositions and events. Nicolle (2012) argues that the Digo class 8 referential demonstrative "hivyo" has that function.

The recognitional use of demonstratives identifies a particular referent using knowledge shared and is not derived from situational clues or the proceeding discourse. This function is played by the Digo distal demonstrative, according to Nicolle (in press, 92). And lastly, in the tracking use, the demonstratives enables the narrator to track what is happening to (usually major) participants in a narrative. Diessel (1999) records that this is a special situation in the narrative which is anaphoric in nature in which demonstratives refer to entities which has been previously mentioned in the same discourse. Many of the eastern Bantu narrative texts are of this form.

1.1.2 Morphological analysis

On the other hand, a morphological analysis of the demonstratives in Eastern Bantu narrative texts have been carried out in those languages. For example, there are those that comprise a dual nature such as the the proximal demonstrative. Its morphological structure is a combination of a vowel prefix and the root. In a language like Bena of Tanzania, the class two demonstrative 'uyu' has the prefix 'u' and the root 'yu'. Its class two has the vowel 'a' and the root 'va', Just to mention but few.

In view of the evidence above, this study was therefore based on the premises that demonstratives feature variously in different narratives and that these differences are language specific.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The researcher aimed at investigating the nature and metarepresentational functions of demonstratives in Kimeru narrative texts. The investigation applied the relevance theoretic concepts of interpretive use, metarepresentation and procedural-encoding.

According to the relevance theory, when utterances are used interpretively it said to be a meta-representational function. Wilson (2000:414) argue that this interpretation involves two levels, that is, a higher level representation with a lower level representation. The higher level is

embedded inside the lower level. Dan Sperber (1985) also records that, systems in the human mind have the ability to manufacture and process representations in the mind. Brain systems also produce and interpret public representations. These representations, mental or public are themselves individual entities in the universe which are found inside the brain and are visible by the communicators and that, they are objects of second-level representations or 'metarepresentation.'

On procedural-encoding, Relevance theory proposes that some words act as concepts and others as procedures. Concepts are seen as those linguistic elements that carry meaning or carry concepts such as John, book, tree (nouns) go talk eat (verbs) beautiful, small, blue (adjectives) beautifully, and, slowly, quickly (adverbs). They also map up into propositional representational constituents which can be computed. Procedures on the other hand, are those elements of the language that map-up into the computations themselves directly, that is, into mental processes (Blackemore 1987; 1444).

The study therefore attempted to provide various examples of metarepresentational uses of demonstratives in Kimeru narrative texts, argue on their interpretation and concluded by proposing a justificatory explanation for their metarepresentational use. In addition the study sought to find out the nature of information encoded by metarepresentational demonstratives in Kimeru narratives, that is, whether they encode conceptual or procedural information.

1.3. Research Questions

- 1. How are demonstrative pronouns in Kimeru language formed?
- 2. Which are the metarepresentational functions of demonstratives in Kimeru narratives?
- 3. Which semantic features account for the metarepresentational functions of demonstratives in Kimeru narrative texts?

1.4. Objectives of the Study

This study was guided by the following objectives;

- 1. To establish the morphological structures of demonstratives in Kimeru language.
- 2. To investigate the metarepresentation of demonstratives in Kimeru narrative texts.

3. To establish the semantic characteristics of demonstratives which account for their metarepresentational use in Kimeru narrative texts.

1.5 Rationale of the Study

It is hoped that the findings of this study will enhance scholarly understanding of the internal structures of demonstratives in Kimeru language and therefore help in writing and teaching of Kimeru language.

The findings can also be used by comparative linguists as a source of synchronic data on morphology of Gîtigania dialect of Kimeru for comparison with data from the same language at other stages of development or even for comparison with other languages. Scholars doing dialectal studies will also benefit from the research as they can use the data on Kimeru demonstratives to make comparison with other dialects of Kimeru language not covered by this study.

Moreover, the findings of this study will hopefully make a contribution to the scholarly debate on the cognitive approach to communication. It will help to test, at least in a small way, the adequacy of relevance theory as a model of communication. For example it will help prove or disapprove, albeit only in relation to Kimeru demonstratives the theories claim that procedural expressions trigger cognitive instructions which are exploited in inferential communication (Wilson, 2011:2).

It will also act as a stimulant to further research in the language either in the same area or in other aspects of Kimeru Morphology and semantics.

1.6. Scope and Limitations of the Study

This research only covered the formation and metarepresentational functions of demonstratives in Kimeru narrative texts and sought to account for the research data using three concepts of the relevance theory which includes; the concept of interpretive use, metarepresentation and procedural encoding. Moreover, the data will be collected from the Gitigania dialect of Kimeru. Due to the limitations of time, space and other resources, the data collected was only as much as it was sufficient to the objectives of this research.

1.7 Definition of Concepts

Metarepresentation: It is a representation whose context harbour another representation. (Wilson 414) calls it the potentiality of the mind to represent a higher - level-representation with a lower-level representation with the higher level embedded inside the lower level. (Wilson: 414)

Distal demonstrative: A demonstrative which in spatial-dectic use refer to an entity that is far from the speaker.

Proximal demonstrative: A demonstrative which when usey in physical distance conditions refer to an entity that is nearer to the speaker.

Non-proximal demonstrative: A demonstrative which in spatial- deictic use refer to an entity that has been mentioned again in the discourse.

Participants: Characters who play some kind of active role in the story.

Addressee/ speaker: A character in the story who is passing information or addressing the other.

Major participants: Characters who play major roles in a story.

Minor participants: Characters who play minor roles in a story.

Higher order thoughts hypothesis: It is the assumption describing the manner in which one is aware of his own conscious states in the mind. which records that a person is aware of his conscious states because every situation of such type is accompanied by a thought of higher level so that the person is in that state.

Context: According to the relevance theory of communication, context refers to the hypotheses which are mentally represented and are actually used in interpreting an utterance. These assumptions can be gotten from; cultural background, knowledge of science, assumptions of common sense and in general, any item of shared idiosyncratic information that the hearer can access at that time.

Informative intention: Its a term used in overt information transmission denoting the speakers intention to give information to somebody.

Communication intention: Its used in overt information transmission method denoting a higher – level intention that requires the addressee to recognize the original intention.

Concepts: Are the linguistic elements mapping into propositional representational constituents which are computable (Blackemore 1987:144).

Procedures: Are those linguistic elements assumed to map up straight onto the process operating in the mind of the individual (Blackemore 1987:44).

Conceptual information: Is information which enhance the accessibility of mental representations pragmatically, in the individual.

Procedural information: Is the information harbouring instructions related to how representations in the mind must be processed.

Explicatures: Explicatures may be defined as propositional forms of which utterances communicates. Pragmatically, they are built on the propositional scheme that the utterance encodes; its content combines materials encoded by the language itself and material that is pragmatically inferred (sperber and Wilson 1986:182).

Explicature denotes assumptions ostensively communicated and developed inferentially from the conceptual representation which is incomplete The representation is encoded by an utterance as (Carston Glossary 2002:377) recorded.

Higher order thoughts hypothesis: it is the model explaining how we are aware of the states of our own minds.

Noun class: A system through which nouns are classified. A noun may be said to fall in a certain class because it possesses qualities owned by its referent, such as animacy, sex, shape, similarities in meaning, which group them with other nouns that have a form and meaning similar to them, or through arbitrary convention.

Prefixes: These are morphemes preceding the root as in "re" in re-fill, "in" as in, in-complete.

A manifest assumption: This refers to an assumption of which an individual can represent in the mind at the time provided.

Mutually manifest assumption: an assumption that all the interlocutors have the capability of forming representations in their own minds.

A strongly manifest entity: an entity which is highly visible in an individuals mind.

Weakly manifest entity: an entity which is not strong in a persons mind.

Suffixes: These are morphemes that are placed after the roots in words for example "s" in cat-s, "ed" as in paint – ed, "ly" in quick-ly.

Cognitive effects: made up of new information and background information or context. It is realized when a new information falls in the same environment with the background information. Thy can either;

Add strength to a background assumption,

Cause contradiction which would eliminate an assumption,

Join with context to yield contextual implication,

Relevance is determined by the level of communicative effects and the processing power.

Processing effort; it is the effort exerted by the mind or the psychological engagements the hearer assigns to processing an utterance. If the cognitive effects are great the processing effort becomes less and vice versa.

Processing ability is determined by the following factors;

How rececenly the information is used so that recently used information will need less processing effort and the information that was used a long time ago will utilize more energy comparatively.

How frequently it is used so that the softenness a word, a concept, a syntactic construction, or a contextual assumption is used, reduces the effort required to process it.

Level of linguistic complexity so that the more complex an item - syntactic or phonological construction is, the more the effort it requires to process (other things being equal).

Logical complexity; some items such as negative expressions require more processing difficulties when compared to their corresponding positive expressions such as possible, believe.

Speaker's meaning; the meaning a person intends to convey.

Sentence meaning; Grammatical meaning of a word or meaning outside context.

1.8 Literature Review

1.8.1 What are Metarepresentations

Metarepresentation is a combination of two words; a Greek preposition and prefix `meta' and the word 'representation.' The preposition meta means 'beyond and the word 'representation,' means to stand for. Deirdre wilson puts it to imply a state where the mind is able to represent a `higher level with the `lower- level representation intertwined. In this case a representation is represented by another. If you draw a picture it represents a thing or person which someone may interpreted to belong to the referent at a glance.

Narrowly speaking a metarepresentation involves a context where two representations are embedded. Examples are Quotations, codings or higher order believes. Also representations involving the cognitive faculties in people may broadly be considered as metarepresentational in nature.

According to Dan Sperber (1985), cognitive systems can build and process mental representations. These systems in the mind of a person if capable of communicating may also be able to produce as well as interpret public representations. The representations in question whether existing in the mind or public are considered as separate entities in the universe. They potentially feature as objects of second-level representation. Dan proposes four examples of metarepresentations in form of which mental representations represents other representations in the same mind as in the situation where one has the thought "Kamau believes there will be rains rain the following afternoon," a representation in ones mind bearing a public representation as in the situation where one bears the thought "Kamau said that it is likely to rain this afternoon", a third case where a mental representation is represented with a public representation. As in the utterance "Kamau strongly believes that it will not rain in the evening" and last but not least, is the case where a public representation is represented with another public representation. This

characteristic of the mind to be able to form a metarepresention of an individual's own experience in his own mind is said to play an important role in the consciousness of the individual and there is a believe that it even defines it.

For David Rosenthal (1986, 1997), in particular, a situation in a persons mind is said to be in a conscious state in the case where its representation exists in a higher- order thought. Other situations exist where thoughts themselves are said to be conscious. In such cases, the higher-order thoughts or thought that are said to bear their

representation are metarepresentations straight away. The levels of representation may be many since the higher order thoughts in this case may also constitute the object of thoughts of another level higher than it. This is why consciousness is said to be flexible in nature or otherwise known as the reflexive character of consciousness. A case of the type where one is conscious of being conscious implies a hierarchy or several levels of metarepresentations. Cognitive approaches have emphasized that human communication is a complex process. The urguement has been that the very act of communicating bears, on the part of the speaker and the listeners a mutual representation, of each other's situation in the mind. ordinarily, the addressee of a speech acts' interest is the linguistic meaning of the utterance as a vehicle to lead him to the discovery of the intended meaning or the meaning he intends to pass. Paul Grice (1989) analysed speakers meaning as having several layers of metarepresentational intention. These intentions cause in the addressee's mind a certain state mentally and the higher order Metarepresentational intention where that basic intention is to be recognized by the addressee himself. In `Metarepresentations in an evolutionary perspective, 'Sperber talks of the possibility that human beings have not only one, but several inborn metarepresentational abilities. He observes that, save for the standard meta-mind-reading ability of human brain, there is the possibility of the existence of a certain comprehension module in human beings whose aim is to interpret utterances online and a logico-argumentative module, whose aim is to persuade other people so that to avoiding deceiving them.

The information in this section is important to this study because it gives an insight of what metarepresentations are. It will therefore aid in the understanding of metarepresentational functions of demonstratives in Kimeru narrative texts.

1.8.2. Demonstratives in Narrative Texts

Some studies have been carried out concerning demonstratives in narrative texts and utterances. For examples; Nicolle (in press) has carried out a study on demonstratives in Chidigo and classified them in four categories in reference to physical distance between the interlocutors involved in the conversation. He talks of those that address entities near to the speaker, those that are far away from the addresser or the addressee and others that are either very close to the listener or the speaker, and metarepresentational Whose functions are independent of the conditions to do with physical distance.

Mugane (1997:27) categorizes kikuyu demonstratives into three kinds with singular and plural forms. These includes those that refer to things in proximity to the speaker, those that refer to things in proximity to the listener and things previously mentioned in a conversation and those that are non- proximal to both the speaker and the addressee respectively. The three classes constitute the total number of demonstratives available in all the dialects of Kikuyu language.

He argues that demonstratives assign reference to nouns that have already been made prevalent in discourse. They therefore guide the reader to find the appropriate referents.

Nicolle (2012: 197-8) observes that demonstratives operate at a number of different levels. A distinction is made between uses that are exophoric where demonstratives refer to entities in the physical environment, and endophoric uses of demonstratives in which entities- including non-concrete entities such as propositions and events that have already been mentioned are assigned reference. He further proposes various sub-categories of endophoric use, as well as additional uses associated with the deixis of emotion.

1.8.3 Morphology of Demonstratives in Eastern Bantu Language.

Nicolle (2012) has presented an analysis of how demonstratives are formed in some languages as follows;

The demonstrative referring to entities proximal to the addresser may constitute either of these forms: In Rangi and Makonde languages, Its morphological form constitute a vowel prefix and the root. The Bena 'uyu', and 'ava'; demonstratives have the prefix 'u' and the root 'yu'

In another example, the Kabwa language proximal demonstrative is realized by prefixing the roots 'nu' or 'no' with either a vowel or a consonant as illustrated by the suba-simbiti 'ono', or Jita `bhanu' demonstratives. Their roots are 'o' and 'bha' respectively.

The referential demonstrative in all languages prefixes the root with the noun class prefix as in `uyo,' in Rangi, and "ava" in Malila respectively.

The distal prefixes the root with the noun class prefix. The roots 'rya' 'ra' or 'la' when combined with the affixes produces the demonstratives in 'urya,' and 'vara,' in Kwaya and Rangi respectively.

Digo comprise variants in all forms and the classes which refer to humans both as single entities or many entities respectively, are irregular. The class 1 and 2 forms in Digo are; hiyu/hinya (proximal), hiye/ hinyo (referential) and yuya/hara (distal).

The information in this section is relevant to this study because it will help the researcher to establish the internal structures of demonstratives in Kimeru which is also one of the Eastern Bantu languages.

1.9 Theoretical Framework

In order to understand how demonstratives function in Kimeru narratives, this study will employ the relevance theoretic approach. This choice is motivated by its ability to account for the manner in which the addressee interprets the meaning intended.

1.9.1 Relevance Theory

Relevance theory traces its origin from Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson. Its pragmatic task is to explain how human communication and cognition takes place. As an inferential theory of communication, it scientifically accounts for the online information transmission as proposed by its choreographers. The explanation involves a speaker intending to pass some information producing a stimulus. The stimulus serves to guide the listener to identify the information the addresser aims to communicate to his audience. It attempts to explain how the addressees infer the meaning intended by the addresser.

This study will be based on three concepts of relevance theory, i.e. the concept of interpretive use, metarepresentation and procedural - encoding.

1.9.2 Theoretical Assumption of Relevance Theory

The basic assumption in which Relevance theory operates is that: Every utterance bears interpretations which are linguistically possible and that have compatibility with the information that is decoded. The interpretations are not equally accessible to the hearer as wholes. A single general procedure is thought to exist that helps them evaluate interpretations depending on their occurrence and either accepts or rejects them as assumptions about intended meaning. Wilson (2007) as quoted in (Schroeder 2007) claims that the criterion is so strong that it can single out the interpretation that best satisfies the first hypothesis in his consideration.

1.9.3 Relevance and Cognition

Sperber and Wilson (1986:251) defines relevance as an ideal property of an input. In the eye lens of the relevance theory, an input such as a sound, a gesture or of any other form is said to raise the expectation of relevance relying on the assumption that the search for relevance is a primary need in human cognition which is at the disposal of communicators exploitation. The theory still records that external stimuli may be relevant to an individual at one time. The same case applies to internal representations. Relevance can be gauged on the basis of effects in the mind as well as the processing energy. This means relevance of an input to an individual will be great to the same level with the processing power, cognitive effects and vice versa. On the same breath if the processing effort is greater than the output, the relevance of the input to an individual will be lower.

At every moment, the inputs in the mind of the individual are greater than it can possibly attend to. In such cases, one only selects information that deem relevant to him at the moment if only it yields positive effects and uses less effort to process the information. Sperber and Wilson (1995) say that online communication uses a general principle: that the information attended by ones mind at a time is one which is relevant technically to that person.

Another definition of relevance is the power to raise the level of the persons overall representation of the world. Human brain systems generally aims to improve individual

knowledge of the world as effectively as possible. Any information therefore that is thought to contribute to this goal either by: broadening or building on the knowledge at hand, providing corrections to mistaken beliefs or providing confirmation of existing knowledge is attended to. According to Sperber and Wilson's (1995: 95), such Information is said to produce mental effects that are positive.

According to Schroeder (2007:6), cognitive effects are of three types. One deals with strengthening of the context. Here information is said to be relevant to a person on condition that it combines in a certain way with his present assumptions about the world. New information is said to gain relevance on the event that it makes the existing hypothesis stronger or even confirms it. The rule works on the grounds that relevance depends on the number of assumptions it strengthens so that the more they are, the more relevant it will be. In the event that there is a contradiction between present and old assumptions the weaker of the two is abandoned. New information is relevant in any context in which it leads to elimination of the existing assumption - the more assumptions of the living assumptions there is and the more it eliminates and the stronger they were, the more relevant it will be. Lastly, the cognitive effect of the contextual effects operate in that relevance will be great to the same level with the contextual effects.

Pragmatic theory of communication proposes that communication operate in this manner: First the process begins with an addressee who must be willing to communicate some message. The person first produces a gesture which signals to the listener to take note of the message by making him recognize the addressers intention to communicate it. This is a case of ostensive inferential communication where the communicator intentionally first provides evidence concerning the conclusion he intends the audience to arrive at. He not only intends to affect the thoughts of an audience but also wants this intention recognized. It then involves an extra layer of intention, apart from the informative one. This is communicative intention.

Verbal communication involves a code which conceptualizes the grammar of the language. What people utter is the evidence that the hearer should use to decode what is intended by the speaker. However this utterance cannot be solely used to interpret the speaker's meaning. Knowing the meaning of the utterance so communicated is not enough requirements for total utterance comprehension. Coding and inference are also mandatory. Relevance theory draws the connection between the two by equating a verbal utterance to a stimulus which the speaker can

use as a guide for retrieval of the meaning intended by the addresser. The information enshrined in the stimulus is considered as part of the evidence. A combination of the stimulus and appropriate contextual information, Warrants the inference of what the speaker wanted to communicate. If every bit of the evidence gained from a stimulus can be given potential interpretation vis-a-vi a huge rage of contextual assumption warranting a variety of inferences, including those that are mutually exclusive, then how does the inferential theory explain how communicators succeed in understanding each other? The cognitive and the communicative principles of relevance theory of relevance shed light on this issue.

1.9.4 The Cognitive Principle of Relevance

The urguement in the cognitive principle of relevance is that human cognition aims at the highest level of relevance. Inferential communication is built on these premises. As earlier explained the speaker starts by demonstrating her intention to communicate some meaning. The audience makes inference about it depending on the evidence provided. An utterance which can be said to be in such state can be understood through decoding.

A part from the linguistic meaning recovered by decoding these can be implied meaning whose inference must be made from the evidence at his disposal. Apart from the ability of human cognition to maximize relevance, humans are born with the power to metarepresent other people's thoughts and intention which allows them to accurately predict particular interpretations assumed to be relevant to others and use the predication for various purposes.

The communicative principle of relevance was invented on consideration that human beings are equipped with the formula of attending to the interpretation of a stimulus that is most relevant to them.

1.9.5. The Communicative Principle of Relevance

(Ulger 2001:5) talks of the possibility of all acts of ostensive communication to communicate a presumption of relevance. This is based on the observation that an ostensive stimulus is at the optimum level of relevance to an audience if:

 Its relevance is enough to Warrant the audiences' processing energy. 2. Its relevance supersedes the rest and is in line with the speaker's ability and preference.

The communicative principle of relevance and the definition of optimal relevance proposeempirical criteria for performing all the sub-tasks which the hearer must apply in order to make accurate guesses about the intended meaning. These sub-tasks are constructed in the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedures, which say: The addressee should take the meaning linguistically carried by the sentence, follow the route bearing the least effort in computing contextual effects and consider interpretations (contextual assumption, relevance assignment, implication etc) depending on the criteria by which they are arrived at, and stop when he feels the levels of relevance expected by him are satisfied (Wilson and Sperber, 2004:260).

A person interested in simplifying his utterance to be easier to comprehended by his audience should construct it in such a way that the interpretation that becomes the first to satisfy the hearer's expectation of relevance is the one he intends to communicate. An utterance bearing two interpretations that are both satisfactory and conflicting would bear on the side of the listener the unnecessary extra burden to process and making a choice between them and the interpretation that comes out would fail to meet requirement 'b' of the definition of optimal relevance.

The addressee therefore, taking a route of least effort and results to an interpretation that fully meets his relevance expectations where contrary evidence is lacking, is taken as the most plausible guess about the intended meaning.

1.9.6.Metarepresentation in Relevance Theory

Relevance theory, classify thoughts and utterance as representations. It defines a thought as an abstract representation in the mind of an individual representing an actual or predictive state of things. It further defines utterances as overt representation of peoples mental states. In the event that one may represent personal thoughts with utterances, provided that he believes the utterance to be true, it is interpreted as a descriptive use of the utterance in question. On the other hand an utterance that represents another utterance or thought is understood in Sperber and Wilson's (1986:224-254) view as being in an interpretive use.

When utterances are used interpretively they are said to be 'metarepresentationaly used.' Wilson (2000:414) records that such interpretative uses embeds two orders, a higher level

representation and the other, a lower level representation. A question for instance may be said to bear two representations, one public and the other one mental.

Metarepresentation can be single dimensional in that they can be only thoughts or utterances, as in the example of the indirect speech which uses one utterance (the report) to represent another utterance (the original utterance).

The two concepts, that is, interpretive use and metarepresentation which are among the tenets of relevance theory, can be used to analyze many linguistic constructions to express the notion that the utterances in which they apply or contribute to is either in metarepresentational or interpretive use.

In this study, the concepts of interpretive use, metarepresentation and procedural encoding were used to work out the functions of demonstratives in Kimeru narrative texts. The concepts of metarepresentation and interpretive use were used to show how the narrator is able to metarepresent and interpret utterance or thoughts of a participant in the story and the concept of procedural- encoding was used to account for metarepresentational functions of demonstratives in narrative text. It was used to analyse the semantic features of metarepresentational demonstratives that account for these functions.

1.9.7 Procedural Encoding

Blakemore (1987:144) in his attempt to distinguish between conceptual procedural items observed that the largest number of lexical items constitute representations of concepts. They therefore have influence on the truth conditional aspects of utterances in which they are part.

He also reasons that there are other expressions that have no truth value in utterances, and cannot therefore be conceptual. They however carry some linguistic meaning which fall on semantic side of the semantic – pragmatic divide. He proposes that they could be guidelines to the inferential comprehension process through imposition or constraining the procedures guiding the construction of background information and / or effects of communication. Simply put, procedural elements are just guidelines or vehicles which guide the comprehension processes. They activate assumptions in the mind which are in line with certain aspect of linguistic use

leaving the individual to make inference based on other factors such as sentence type and intonation. Their contribution therefore is on the implicatures.

In this study therefore, the concept of procedural encoding was used to establish the kind of information encoded by metarepresentational demonstratives, that is, whether they encoded conceptual or procedural information. The researcher will also use the concept to unify the semantic features of demonstratives that make them function metarepresentationally both in narratives and in conversation.

1.10 Methodology

1.10.1 Research approach

The research took a qualitative approach since the data that was collected required a non-empirical explanation.

1.10.2 Sampling techniques

The sample size was determined using a non- probability technique because this approach provides the researcher with the opportunity to deal with cases that have the necessary information with regard to the required features. The cases that were selected for this study were therefore those that contained metarepresentational demonstratives. As a result, specific phrases, clauses, sentences and paragraphs were hand-picked depending on the availability of the required information.

1.10.3 Sample selection and area of research

Before the data was collected, purposive method guided the selection of a representative sample of interviewees. Preference was given to informants with at least basic education and deemed as knowledgeable proficient Kimeru speakers so as to ensure correct and precise data. The sample was taken from six different villages in Tigania East District with each of the six villages providing two of the twelve informants to enhance representativeness of the sample.

1.10.4 Data collection techniques

The sampled informants were used to generate data and also to cross-check the data given by each of them in a bid to ensure authenticity and correctness through participants observation sessions. This was in order to balance out the effects of personal native-speaker intuitions when making generalizations (see Kaviti 2004:97). The rest of the data was generated through the introspection method. This method involves relying on personal intuitions about the structure of the language under study. Though this method may lack in scientific objectivity, if constantly checked through use of corroborative evidence from the intuitions of other native speakers, the potential subjectivity can be completely ruled out, as Kaviti (2004) observes. To ensure accurate translation of the data, the informants were asked to pronounce the words and the syllables of the affixes in the data while they were being tape recorded. Parts of the data were obtained from secondary sources by reading the relevant literature.

1.10.5 Nature and data collected.

The data collected involved original non-translated texts both oral and written. It included a wide range of Kimeru words under the class of demonstratives and the type of the affixes used in forming them, together with the range of possible meanings they are associated with. Also collected are Kimeru narratives. Majority of the texts studied were mainly stories with people, animals or supernatural beings. Twelve narrative texts were selected from which eight were fictional and four non-fictional.

1.10.6 Data Analysis

Once collected, the data was written down, translated from Gîtigania to English, described, classified, tabulated and analyzed morphologically and semantically. Intuitions were made about the structure of demonstratives in Gîtigania and the correctness of the formation method. The data was explained using the three concepts of the theory which namely; the concept of metarepresentation, interpretive use and procedural-encoding.

1.10.7 Conclusion

This exploration was motivated by the realisation with evidence from other languages that demonstratives play different functions in different narratives and that, these differences are

language specific. For example, the way they are structured, distributed or function in Chindigo narratives is not the same way they do in Kikuyu narratives and so on. As such, the questions of this study were a sufficient guide to the achievement of the objectives since they sought answers as to the nature, functions and semantic characteristics of demonstratives in Kimeru narratives. Lastly, the Relevance Theory was used to account for the research data due to its appropriateness in answering the research questions

CHAPTER TWO

FORMATION OF THE DEMONSTRATIVES IN KIMERU LANGUAGE

2.0. Introduction

This chapter provides a morphological analysis of demonstratives in Gîtigania dialect of Kimeru language. The first section, "The Gitigania dialect," is meant to introduce the main source of data through isolating the dialect of study from the other Kimeru dialects.

A brief syntactic analysis of the dialect is also provided to introduce the idea of noun class system and how it works or rather the relationship between nouns and their dependents.

The section on the noun classes is important in the future engagement in the research paper since it provides the formula used in the formation of Kimeru demonstratives. The idea here is that an, observation of our research data will reveal that the kind of derivational affixes that will go into forming the Gîtigania demonstratives will be determined by the form of the prefix of the relevant noun classes. It will also reveal that the number of Kimeru (Gîtigania) demonstratives is reflected in the number of the respective noun classes.

The last section, that is, an inventory of the Gîtigania demonstratives is one of the raw materials of this study. Apart from revealing the internal constituents of Gîtigania demonstratives (or their morphological structure) as well as their number, these demonstratives will be used in phrases, clauses and sentences to illustrate metarepresentation in Kimeru narratives. It will also enhance quick identification of these demonstratives as well as their referents through summarizing this information in tables. For example, when the researcher in his argument refers to the demonstrative in class number one, the information is that the referent is a human being and the number is either singular or plural. If it was demonstrative in class number three the referents are names of trees and plants in general. The conclusion will give us the summary of the information addressed in the whole chapter.

2.1. Agreement

According to Kroeger (2006) agreement is considered as the modification of the form of one element to match the properties of another element. Their rule makes a constituent "X" to agree with another constituent "Y" with respect to such categories as number and person. It concerns the marking of various morph syntactic properties of a head such as person and number features on the head. For instance, within a noun phrase determiners and attributive adjectives often share the number and person features of the head noun thus agreement is achieved.

Kroeger (2006) says that agreement generally describes a situation where the grammatical characteristics of a noun or a noun phrase are used to decide the morphological structure of a linguistic unit that has syntactic similarities with the noun or noun phrase in one way or another. The word that determines the features of the whole phrase is called the head. The other non-head elements of the phrase that carry the properties of the head are the dependents of that head.

This therefore means that agreement involves feature sharing where a non-dependent (the head) shares a feature with the dependents. Just like any other language, heads in Gitigania phrases share features with their dependents.

2.2. Gitigania Dialect

Gîtigania is one of the dialects of Kimeru language spoken in Meru County. It is the language spoken in the current Tigania East and Tigania West sub-counties. As a dialect of the wider Kimeru language, Gîtigania therefore belongs to the Bantu language. Scholars argue that despite the wide use of this language by a good number of speakers, few scholars have taken interest in this language.

2.3. A Syntactic Analysis of Agreement in Kimeru

Basically the language has a rich noun class system. Noun class membership marks the agreement. Words in some parts of speech such as verbs and adjectives undergo changes to achieve agreement with the respective nouns which they are used with. This is mostly in regard to number and class. Nouns in particular are organized into classes which trigger agreement as in the Kimeru phrase below:

Ntomwenda na-itire

Ntomwenda (name of a person) na- (agr PAST)

Ntomwenda went

As shown above, a noun from class one requires that the subsequent verb carries an agreement marker (na-) for the noun class for the sentence to be grammatical. The prefix that appears on a noun determines its particular class.

This analysis is targeted to expound more on the issue of agreement which is the principle behind the morphemic combinations in the formation of the demonstratives in Gîtigania language. It will also be useful in chapter three to illustrate the relationship between metarepresentational demonstratives and the nouns found in metarepresentational contexts.

In Gîtigania all modifiers follow and agree with the head noun. The modifier carries the features of the NP it modifies. Modifiers can either be pre-nominal or post-nominal. In Gîtigania demonstrative modifiers are post nominal as in the example below;

Mûûrû yû-û

Hole D 3 this)

An agreement morpheme of noun class three which is the class of the noun being modified is attached to the demonstrative and it C-Commands the NP. Therefore their is agreement between the demonstrative and the noun being modified.

2.4. Gitigania Noun Classes

Most languages are known for their rich noun classes which are numbered systematically. The classification of Gitigania (or generally Kimeru) noun classes is, just like the other languages, mainly based on morphological gender, though there is a partial semantic correlation between some of the classes. Prefixes (see marete), and the observed semantic correlation between the classes indicate the basis of the original noun-class system in the proto-languages. The naming of the classes follows the singular-plural pairs formed by the singular/plural prefixes of the

members of the corresponding nominal groups. Generally singular noun classes are odd numbered while their plural counterparts are even numbered. This system however does not apply to Gitigania noun classes that are above class eight because some nouns above this level have both singulars and plurals alike. In any language a very large number of nouns can be analyzed as comprising a noun prefix of a stem on the basis of the prefixes. A complete list of all the Gitigania noun-classes is given below in table 1. The writing style is borrowed from Marete (1981:10) with the necessary adjustments made to them to suit the language of this study. The prefixes used with the nouns in respective classes are shown.

NOUN	PREFIX	NAMES	GLOSS
CLASS NUMBER	EXAMPLES	EXAMPLES	
1	MU/MW	Muntu/Mwana	Person, child
2	A-	Antu, Ana	Many people, children
3	MÛ -	Mûti	Tree
4	Mî-	Mîtî	trees
5	î/Rî-	Iiga, Riitwa	Stone, name
6	Ma-	Maiga, Marîîtwa	Stones, names
7	Kî/Gî-	Kîoro, Gîtai	Toilet, serving spoons
8	Cî-	Cîoro, îtai	Tolets, serving spoons
9	M-M	Mburi	Goat
10		Mburi	Goats
11	RÛ	Rûtandi	Thigh
10	N-	Ntandi	Thighs
12	Ka	Kanyoni	Bird
13	TÛ	Tûnyoni	Birds
14	Û	Ûthaka	'act of respect'
6	Ma	Maûthaka	'acts of respect'
15	KÛ	Kûthamba	Times one bathes
6	Ma	Mathamba	
16	A	Aa, Au	Place
17	K	Kwao	

Table 1: A list of Gitigania noun classes.

Noun classes 1/2 carry the general meaning of [+HUMAN].

Noun classes 3/4 stands for the names of trees and plants in general and seasons.

Noun class 5/6 addresses names of fruits.

Noun class 7/8 is for the inanimate objects.

The noun in class 9/10 carries the general meaning of [+ ANIMAL]

Class 11/10 means long, thin or slender.

Noun class 12/13 addresses smallness or dimitiveness.

Noun class 14/6 is for the abstract things.

Noun class 15/6 stands for names of actions or activities and last but not the least.

Class 16/17 which indicates places.

2.5. An Inventory of the Gitigania Demonstratives

Majority of the languages spoken have a total of three types of demonstratives although some have four. In spatial-deictic (exophoric) uses, these demonstratives are named in relation to the physical distance between the interlocutors. For example in other classifications, a demonstrative that refers to objects that are near to the speaker are called proximal demonstratives. Those that refer to objects that tare far from the speaker are called distal demonstratives and the referential demonstratives which refer to objects which refer to objects that had been previously mentioned or to a referent compared to another by use of another demonstrative.

In endophoric uses however, these demonstratives may be classified otherwise.

Steve Nicolle (2012) observes that; when the demonstratives are characterized using physical space between them and the referents, as in conversation in which the referents are all present, the use is arbitrary to their meaning. Nevertheless, in stories, where the space is not a

compulsory requirement, they might have other uses. These differences share similarities to the distinction between functions where physical distance is necessary on one hand and anaphoric and other related functions on the other.

Demonstrative in Gitigania language can also be classified in the same style. In this study am going to identify four types of demonstratives in the language which appear in both endophoric and exophoric conditions. I am also going to urgue that these four demonstratives vary in terms of their morphological structures and distribution. A complete list of demonstratives in Gîtigania language is given in the table below.

Noun				
CLASS	1	2	3	4
1	ûû	ûûra	ûu	ûra
2	baa	baara	bau	bara
3	yûû	yûûraa	yûu	yûra
4	îî	îîra	îu	îra
5	rîî	rîîra	rîu	rîra
6	yaa	yaara	yau	yara
7	kîî	kîîra	kîu	kîra
8	bii	biira	biu	bira
9	îî	îîra	îu	Îra
10	ii	iira	iu	ira
11	rûû	rûûra	rûu	rûra
10	ii	iira	iu	ira
12	kaa	Kaara	kau	kara
13	tûû	tûûra	tûu	tûra
14	bûû	bûûra	bûu	bûra
6	Yaa	yaara	yau	yara
15	kûû	kûûra	kûu	kûra
6	yaa	y aara	yau	yara
16	Aa	Aara	au,	ara

17	kûû	kûûra	Kûu	kûra	

Table 2: A list of demonstratives in

Gitigania.

In spatial-deictic or exophoric use,

The demonstratives in the category marked, 1 are used to refer to entities within the proximity of the speaker.

The demonstratives in the category marked 2 are used when referring to entities that are not close to the addresser and the listener.

The demonstratives in the category marked 3 are used to refer to entities which are near to the addressee (actually very close or touching him) but very far from the speaker.

Last but not the least, the demonstratives in the category marked, 4 are used when referring to entities that had been previously mentioned.

The analysis above proposes that the demonstratives in Gitigania may be similarly defined using the terms proposed by Nicolle (2000) in another classification. But since this study deals with endorphoric use of demonstratives in narratives where their use cannot be defined in reference to the physical distance between the interlocutors and their referents, we shall retain the labels 1, 2, 3 and 4 in the preceding discussion. Again for the sake of convenience am going to use the term "metarepresentational demonstratives" when discussing their functions in Kimeru narrative texts.

2.6 Morphology of Kimeru Demonstratives

In this section am going to provide the Morphology or the internal structures of demonstratives in Gîtigania language or rather, how morphemes combine to form the demonstratives.

The formation of demonstratives in Gitigania language is highly dependent on the respective nouns with which they belong in the same class. That is, the noun being the head determines the morphological shape of the demonstrative (dependent) for them to agree in terms of number - singular or plural.

In this respect, the demonstratives in the category 1 are formed by either doubling the vowel of the noun-class prefix or by prefixing it with the root consonant after doubling it as in;

Noun class prefix.	1	
mu-	ûû	
A-	ba - a	class 1/2
Mû	y ûû	
M î	îî	class 3/4

The demonstratives in the category, labelled 2 are formed by suffixing the roots derived from 1 with the invariable ending "ra" as in;

1	2	
ûû	ûû-ra	class 1/2
baa	baa-ra	
îî	î î-ra	
rîî	rîî-ra	class 4/5

The demonstratives in category D3 are formed by prefixing the invariable ending "u" with the first syllable of D 1 as in;

Kaa.ka-u

tû-û tû-u class 12/13

And last but not the least, the demonstratives in the category labeled D,4 are formed by prefixing the invariable ending "ra" with the first syllable of D1 as in;

1

rûû rû -ra

ii i-ra 11/10

kîî Kî-ra

bii bi-ra 7/8

2.7. Summary and Conclusion

This chapter sought to establish the morphological structures of demonstratives in Gitigania dialect of Kimeru language. The study has established that Kimeru language has seventeen demonstratives.

It has further established that the Kimeru noun class system is the backbone of the formation of these demonstratives because they provide the structural formula for morphemic combinations in these demonstratives. A physical count of the two items also indicates that they both tally in terms of number.

In addition to that, we have also discovered based on evidence from other languages that Kimeru demonstratives can be classified or categorized based on parameters of use, as to whether they are in spatial-deictic use or in endophoric use.

In spatial-deictic use the demonstratives are defined according to the physical distance between the interlocutors i.e. that is whether the referent is near the speakers, near the addressee, far from the speaker or the addressee, or both. In endophoric use where physical distance between the interlocutors is not important, these demonstratives serve other functions.

In the next chapter we shall discuss an endophoric use of demonstratives in Kimeru texts.

CHAPTER THREE

FUNCTIONS OF METAREPRESENTATIONAL DEMONSTRATIVES

3.0. Introduction

This chapter provides a descriptive account of the functions of Kimeru demonstratives in Kimeru narrative texts. The functions are classified according to the clause/sentence type and various examples are provided to illustrate how these are metarepresentational functions. The sample texts have been extracted from conversation and narratives. To start with, I shall have a brief discussion on the conversational use and then link it with the narrative use.

3.1. Kimeru Demonstratives in Conversation

A conversation is a talk between two or more people. On any inferential approach to communication, the hearers' task in interpreting an utterance is linking the bridge existing between the meaning provided by the sentence and the intended meaning. This implies that for effective communication to take place, the speaker must make sure his meaning has been understood by the hearer. On the relevance theoretic approach, identifying the speakers meaning involves the simultaneous construction of a package consisting of an appropriate context, an explicit content and a set of cognitive effects.

When a speaker uses a Kimeru demonstrative in a conversation endorphorically, the demonstratives function to alert the listeners to focus on a certain object place or a thing. The speaker must however be certain that the hearer has the capability to form a mental representation of the object, with less regard to the current presence or absence of a representation of that kind in his mind. Such an assumption of which and individual can form a mental representation of at that moment is described as being "manifest "to the person in question, in relevance theoretic terms (Sperber and Wilson 1995:39)

There are other situations where both the addresser and the addressee are capable of mentally representing an assumption at the same time. (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 39) refers to such a phenomenon as "mutual manifestation."

A referent or entity or a representation of that entity can be made visible or easier to see by both the speaker and listener in a similar way as an assumption under conditions that within a specified time frame that person is capable of forming its mental representation. It is not mandatory for an assumption or an entity to be mentally represented for it to be manifest. We know from experience that human mind is not static in terms of exploration, creativity and storage of information. It is capable of processing new information every other minute. This means, its only the capability of the mind to represent the assumption or entity that matters for it to be manifest. Relevance theory suggests two levels of manifestness in the sense that, one is weak, the other strong. Accordingly, strongly manifest assumption is the one that is easily accessible or strongly represented in the individual cognitive environment.

An object, person or thing that is said to be manifest is the one that is not or fewer salients in the individuals mind.

In the discussion that follows, I want to show how Kimeru demonstratives function to raise the level of manifestness of entity in the minds of speakers in cases where the referents are weakly manifest.

At times you have heard people talk of experiences in life where they see without seeing, talk without talking, listen without listening and so forth (in lay mans language). For example you can be near to an object for a long time without noticing it. There are other incidences in which you have passed by person or a thing and when someone asked you whether you saw it, you have doubts if you saw it. At the same time, your mind is somehow conscious of the object in question. On the other hand if your interrogators describes or demonstrates the kind of person he is referring to, you were able to clearly figure out the person and remember having met him.

In the first case in which you have a slight impression of the referent, it is because when you met it, it was weakly manifest in your mind probably because your mind was pre-occupied with many other important things to take note of the less relevant thing the person is asking about. When you remember having seen the person after the speaker specifies the referent, it is because

it becomes strongly manifest. Remember the speaker used a demonstrative to point out at the referent in question; it is the demonstrative which made the weakly manifest object more manifest in the hearer's Consciousness.

The following two examples illustrate the phenomenon.

In example one, John and his friend were washing clothes at home near a tap busy chatting from one topic to another. All of a sudden, there was a cut off in the flow of water. Then John asked him;

(1) "Nimbi yatûma rûûî rureka kwîya?"

"What has caused the Cut off in the water flow?"

His friend answered,

"Ûtîkwona arûme baara

bathatû bakwînja mûtaro aara?"

"Don't you see those three men digging a trench there?"

John answered using the demonstrative aara and pointing at the three men a few metres away, whom until then he had not identified. Until then the manifestation of the two men was weak in his mind and by using the Kimeru demonstrative the speaker made it stronger or easier two see.

On the other hand, the referent of a Kimeru demonstrative mustn't be physically present for it to be metarepresented. In another case, Peter's cousin said to him;

(2) "Nûkûriikana mpenethi îra wanenkere? noo ntûîre nio."

Do you remember sword that you me give still me have it."

"Do you remember **that** sword you gave me? I still have it."

It was now about seven months after they had a get together party which his father had hosted at their home. The celebrations went late at night and before his cousin left, he had given him a sword for security purposes. In the conversation therefore it was this sword he was telling him about. At the time of the conversation the sword along with everything associated with the get together party, was faintly manifest to him and the speaker (his cousin) improved its manifestness by using the demonstrative îra.

Another day, Jose woke up quite early in the morning. He had to prepare early since they had exams in the college. Meanwhile he also intended to collect his personal identification number (P.I.N) at the Kenya revenue authority at the Times Towers building. Immediately after getting out of the room, he got into the company of a colleague who was a classmate in the same university and also a tribe mate. As they walked together, Jose told him of his plan to collect his P.I.N. Soon they tuned on to a discussion about the exams, the lecturers....., and now they were about twenty metres past the Times Towers building. Then Jose heard his colleague utter with suddenness;

(3) "Loama! îîranio times towers ûûkuwaîra

"Halt! **that**is the times towers you were talking about."

Jose knew pretty well the locus of the Times Towers building, but, even as they by passed it, the building was weakly manifest to him at the moment (probably because of the preoccupation with the examination stuff) so that, even as they by passed the foot of this building, Jose failed to notice it. By use of the metarepresentational demonstrative $\hat{\imath}$ ra, his colleague made the building more manifest.

In the first and third examples the referents of the demonstratives were present or at the vicinity of both the addresser and addressee.

In the second example, the entity being referred to is absent. We can therefore conclude that, Kimeru demonstratives can refer to objects that are either present or absent in conversation, so long as there is a possibility of indentifying them by the interlocutors. the physical distance however may not be necessary. This, however, applies to cases where demonstratives functions

endophorically as oppose to the exorphoric use where spatial deixis is a compulsory requirement. In using demonstrative then, it is necessary for the speaker to gauge the level at which the object is represented in the mind of the listener with the aim of strengthening this representation. In other words the speakers' aim is to make it more manifest. The situation discussed above is not a preserve of conversation alone it can be realized in narratives as discussed further below.

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3.2. Kimeru Demonstratives in Narrative Texts

kimeru demonstratives when used metarepresentationally can be used to address entities whose manifestation is mutual to both players in kimeru narrative texts as well as in conversation. In narratives, this is possible in a situation in which the speakers are characters in the story. The speakers and the cave are both physically present, but their identity is not yet known to the addressee. The use of the demonstratives when referring to the speakers and the house makes them properly visible in their minds.

A self-conceited girl called Gacûria possessed by her vain desire to remain the most beautiful girl in the village was deceived by an ogre who lived in the nearby forest after he came to know of her vain desire and craftily planned her destruction. The Ogre impersonated a stunningly beautiful necklace that landed her deep inside the forest as she struggled to collect it. The ogre ordered her to follow him. Shaking like a frightened chameleon on a feeble twig, she followed him. Now they are outside a dimly lit cave deep inside the forest and the Ogre is giving her instructions.

(4) "Rîu ndirîenda ûthikîre na matû yayaîlî.

Now me want you listen with ears them two.

kuuma ruarîî îkurungu rîî nireo muciî yokuu. Ûkorogeria kuuma

From today cave **D** 1 is home yours. You never try to get out

Kûû nontû ûkailila

D 1 because you will regret.

"Batwi nkoma cia ûtukû

We spirits of night

tûrî nyumba ingî cia mûthenya

we have houses others of day

Îndiu tî **îî.îî**ni ya ûtukû

But not **D** 1. **D** 1 is of night.

Ngatia metho yakwa kathatine

I shall leave eyes mine basket in

Kaara yakualilakie.

That to be you looking.

"Now I want you listen with two years. From today **this** cave will be your home. Never try to escape from here because you will regret it. We spirits of the night have other houses for the day but not **this one**, **this one** is of the night.

In the above example, the Kimeru demonstratives have been shown. The sentences containing the demonstratives are in direct speech. In Kimeru narratives this can be interpreted as a story teller representing an utterance or thought of one of the characters in the story. It is a public representation of a mental representation which is a metarepresentational function.

Kimeru demonstratives can also be used to express questions and surprise. The examples below illustrate how questions and surprise are expressed simultaneously in direct speech in constructions containing Kimeru demonstratives.

In the following example the interrogative clause has two Kimeru demonstrativesûra, referring to thebe (a very poor person in noun class 1) and ira referring to ng'ombe (cows) in noun class

10. The speaker wonders how man who previously had been very poor now has enough wealth to fund for the initiation into the council of elders. The council (Njuri Nceke) was a preserve for the rich only. This man Nkûbîria was in fact a pauper but when the day came, he gave the whole council and the community at large the surprise of the year. He payed the total cost for the initiation into the council at once, a thing that rarely happened in the history of this councl. Now, a member of the community who knew Nkûbîria for what he was, amazed by the whole episode, commented thus;

5) "Yaa ni mantû yakûrigarania ya

These are things of wonders like

Kîongo kiriti meetho. Thebe ûra

Head it removed eye Poor man **D4**

inaa araumîre na into bira

Where him get with things **D** 4

bionthe araûmîre nabio Njûri?"

all he initiated with into Njûri?

"These are wonders like a head without eyes"where did That poor man (of all the other people) get all those materials he paid for the initiation into the council of elders from?"

A similar case is example six where the speaker doesn't believe that the subject referred by the demonstrative ûra, a person cursed by the clan, was to offer the sacrifice for cleansing the initiates before circumcision. It was culturally unacceptable in Meru community for anybody who was under any form of community curse to preside over sacrifices for himself was considered unclean.

Circumcision was (and even today) a very important rite of passage among the Meru people. At certain age, both boys and girls are circumcised in order to prepare them for adult life and responsibilities. A few days before the operation, they would undergo certain cleansing rituals

which were meant to keep off any evil spirits, witches or anything likely to cause bad omen to the initiates during the whole process of healing. The ceremony was simple. A ram of purely one colour was killed, slaughtered and a strip of its skin cut off and placed at a road junction where all the candidates would step over it. This was accompanied by a number of cultural prayers related to the same and pouring of 'nainchû' (a traditional beer made from bees honey). This special ceremony was not carried out by just any other person. A special team of elders were charged with this responsibility. The one presiding was supposed to be a ritual expert properly versed with the details of the ceremony. In addition to that, he was supposed to be one hundred per cent pure (or so it was assumed) by among other things having abstained from sex for at least seven days before the ceremony and above all, free from any form of community curse.

A man called Kamwikûa was for long time known to carry out this task. Even this time round as it seemed that the obvious was the case, to one old man Ntomûchiri, it was not business as usual. The community elders seemed to have forgotten that Kamwikûa had recently beaten his pregnant wife until she aborted. That was a serious abomination and all women in the whole clan of his wife's age had come out in public to ridicule and codemn this animosity. Ntomûchiri therefore wonders how this very man was to cleanse the initiates when himself was unclean and questions thus;

6) "**Ûûra** ndume ya mwîrîga

D1 Cursed of clan

nitea aûmbîkîa kûrita

how he is able to offer

kîgongwana?"

Sacrifice"

"That one cursed by the clan

how comes he is the one to offer the sacrifice?"

The following clause in example seven has the kimeru demonstrative **ûra** tagged in a clause bearing the source of the question in the last clause.

Kînankira (name of a boy) goes to visit his uncle a few days before his circumcision to inform him about it with very high expectations that his uncle would shower him with presents as it was their culture. Kînankira (the speaker) is shocked that what his wealthy uncle gives him is just a small chicken. When he went, home he reported to his mother thus;

(7) "ûra! ûtîgîntû ampere,

D1 no thing him me gave

ni gaûkû akî ampere

Its chicken (small) only him me gave.

Ka mwana wa mwarî wenu eeyawa

Is child of sister yours given

ngûkû ni bamutûoo etite gûtanwa kana ni

chicken by his uncles him going circumcised or it's

mbûri abuîrîte kûewa?

goat he supposed to be given?'

"Aa!that one gave me nothing, he gave me only a small chicken. Is a nephew given a chicken by his uncles when he is going to be circumcised or it's a goat he is supposed to be given?"

Traditionally in the Meru community during such accessions, uncles were expected to reward their nephews with a goat and most preferably, a she goat or something bigger. This she goat was considered as a blessing from the uncles to the nephew. It symbolized wealth and was expected to produce many offsprings without limit.

In this other example, the mother cannot believe that their daughter, Ciacûi, the most beautiful girl in the village, had just fallen for an old man even after turning down proposals from many wealthy, handsome, young suitors including the son of the famous chief, Kibore. Perhaps, more surprising was the fact that the old man was of her father's age. In the Meru community, it was unethical for a man to marry a girl whose father and him are of the same age group and that was a fact every girl of marrying age was expected to be aware of.

When Ciacûi finally reported to the mother she was to introduce her lover to the parents and the family, the mother was beyond herself with joy. However, her joy went sour when the bride turned out to be Karaibang'i, the blacksmith, a man almost three times older than her daughter. Actually, her father's age mate. The mother now filled with shame and humiliation called her daughter and reprimanded thus;

(8)"ûkoethia mûcii **yûû**yoa kûthekeloa

you've made family **D** 1 to be laughed

ni antû bonthe ntûrene îî

by people all village **D** 1

Yonthe. Mûkûrû ûra nue

Whole. Old man **D** 1 is one

ûracalîlearîmûrûme okuu?"

You choose as husband yours.

"You have made this family the laughing stock of everybody in the whole village. Is that old man the one you have chosen for a husband?"

In (9), the mother even doubts the sanity of the old man and comments thus;

"Inkûrigara kethîra

I wonder if

antû ka bakuuma

people are growing

nthû." (9) ka mûkûrû ûra

Mad. Is old man D4

Wee atîkwona ûrî oûmwena

Himself doen't see you are the same as

Mwarî wawe?"

Daughter his

"I wonder whether people are getting mad."(9)

"Doesn't that old man see you are just like his daughter?"

The last example in this category is example (10) which contains ûra (which act as a modifier to "My friend in Kimeru noun class 1). The clause is interrogative in form. The clause traces its background in the surprising discovery that all the cows he had left grazing in the forest, its only tails that he has.

Hare decided to teach Hyena a lesson after discovering that he was eating the fatest bulls of the stock they owned together every time it was his turn to look after them graze in the forest. One day he hid somewhere and saw Hyena kill a big bull during lunch time and eat it. Delighted at this discovery he waits until Hyena drops down into a deep slumber as it was his normal habit after a heavy meal, chopped off the tails of all the remaining cows, dug holes in the field and buried them halfway onto the ground, each at its place, until they filled the whole compound. He then escorted the animals to a safe hideout in the forest. When Hyena resurrected from his death like sleep, he is shocked to the bottom of his existence. The whole situation is so surprising that the Hyena doesn't know how to explain it to his friend Hare and wife. The narrator gives a description of the situation this using the first person singular pronoun (ûni) and the class 10 Kimeru metarepresentational demonstrative ira. The class 16 demonstrative aa is only used as a time adverbial.

Mbîtî îramaka mono.

Hyena was amazed so much

Nîtea nkaîra mûcore wokoa

What can I say to that friend of mine

ambîtîkîe. Rîu ûni mbîyîre

him me believe. Now me came

kûrîthia ngombe ciongwa rîu

to graze cows real but

aa ni mînyiritha

Now here its tails

Yonka mpanite nio!'

Only me go home with

The Hyena was amazed.

"How am I going to put it to that friend

of mine so he believes me?

I came to graze real cows.

but now here its only tails I am.

taking home !"

More examples of met a representational contexts with Kimeru demonstratives in Kimeru narratives in this study are to be found in commands and exhortations. The two are also taken as met representational cases. A command or an exhortation can be thought of as a representation of

a proposition that is desirable, that is, a proposition which the speaker would wish to have the truth value.

Kamankura was the first man to make the Chief's daughter laugh when he staggered past the chief's house with a donkey on his back. The chief had promised to get the girl married to anyone who would ever make her laugh. Kendi was very beautiful but always gloomy. Witnessing the funniest scene in her life, she first smiled, then giggled and finally laughed and laughed and laughed. The chief came running in to see what was happening, saw her laughing and was delighted. He rushed out of the house and stopped kamankûra and told him;

"Mûthaka, iûwe watûmîre mwari

Young man its you who made daughter

Wokoa atheka. (12) inkwenda

Mine to laugh. I want

Ûgûra mwari ûra"

You marry girl **D4"**

"Young man, youmade my daughter laughs. I want you to marry that girl?"

In this other example number (12), the presence of the first person plural pronoun is evident even though it is not part of the command. The Kimeru pronoun is however part of a clause which offer the basis for the command since there was an agreement that whoever killed 'Nkûnga' (the Ogre) would get half of his wealth as a reward.

A large serpent which was believed to cause havoc to the inhabitants of the region whenever it was offended, swallowed a lot of people including the chief's wife. The chief had promised to give half of his wealth to whoever would save his wife, Ciabaimpwî. On hearing this, three brave worriors Rambati, M'birithi and M'uchiri trailed the monster, killed it with their machetes and saved the lifes of all the people including the chief's wife. A few days later, the three men went to the chief and told him:

(12) "Itûraonokerie mûka okuu.

We saved wife yours.

Tûnenkere ûtonga

us give wealth

bûra waûwîîre

D4 you talked about

"we saved your wife

give us that wealth you promised."

Other instances of Kimeru demonstratives occurring in direct speech, and the few that do not occur in this situation have mostly been cited as expressing emphasis or indicating the conclusion of a story.

In example (13) below, a woman is challenging her husband who went out to look for food when there was famine promising to come back soon. Now its four years gone and all the man brings home is a walking stick and a kilo of maize meal. By using the class four demonstrative iu, she effectively expresses her surprise disapproval of the husbands behavior. Note also the irony of good father and husband who runs away from his responsibilities during times of need.

(13) "Ruarii jumaa îî nireo

Today Friday **D1** is when

watûrikana na wîyîte njara

You remember us and you've come hands

intheri. Rîu ndîrîenda ûmbîîre

empty. Now I want you tell me

nimbi ana bakarea

what children will eat.

"Today this Friday is when you remember us and you've come empty handed. Now tell me, what are the children are going to eat?"

The closing example I would wish to highlight which featured in this study deals with Kimeru songs. Some Kimeru demonstratives were evident in speech orienteers. Their function was to introduce songs in the narratives. Songs play many roles in Kimeru folk narratives such as general entertainment, marking transition from one part to another, passing a literal message, just to mention but few. The example below is an introductory function. The song is a dirge and the Kimeru demonstrative $\mathbf{r}\hat{\mathbf{u}}$, modifies, rwimbo rûra ainaga' as shown below;

(14) Rwimbo ruongwa **rûra** ainire rwari

Song real that he sang was

rûû rwa kuithikîra.

D1of mourning

The real song that she sang

wasthat one of mourning.

3.3 Conclusion

In this chapter I have discussed practical examples of metarepresentational functions of kimeru demonstratives. We started by discussing their uses in conversation and then the narrative use. In conversation, we have established that they basically play the role of making the objects they refer more visible in the mind of the listener and, that the presence of the referents is optional, that is may be present or absent. We further established that the character of manifestness can also be extended to the narrative use. Here, the referents of Kimeru demonstratives are mutual to the interlocutors Further we established that and that in narratives they are found in contexts that have indirect speech clauses and thoughts, question seeking information, clauses that express surprise, and commands and exhortations, and in emphatic utterances. Most importantly, we have discovered that the metarepresentational use of Kimeru demonstratives both in conversation and narratives is not dependent on physical space between the characters in the story.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0. SEMANTIC FEATURES OF KIMERU DEMONSTRATIVES

4.0.1 Introduction

The previous chapter provided a thorough discussion on the metarepresentational functions of demonstratives in Kimeru narrative texts and utterances. The idea of manifestness was featured as the guiding principle in the interpretation of utterances and partially in narratives.

Further analysis of Kimeru narratives (both fiction and real) has revealed that Kimeru demonstratives functioning metarepresentationally occur in sentences/ clauses that show expressions of surprise, information seeking interrogative constructions, exhortations and commands, emphatic clauses and indirect (reported) speech and thoughts.

Suggestively, this distribution of Kimeru demonstratives must have some linguistic implications or consequences. It is therefore the search for these consequences that provides the basis for the arguments in this chapter. To quench for this thirst, the researcher will first consider the semantic features of Kimeru demonstratives and then attempt to draw the intercourse between the demonstratives' functions and metarepresentation as a concept of relevance theory. Later at the end of this engagement, the semantic features of Kimeru demonstratives shall be unified for both the narratives and conversation using yet another relevance theoretic concept; procedural encoding, as proposed in the methodology.

4.1. Discussion on metarepresentational use

Deirdre Wilson defines metarepresentation as the capacity of the human mind to represent two representations one embedded in the other. In another language, it is the ability to representation of representation. Narrowly speaking, it is a situation in which the context of one representation contains another representation. Coding's, Quotations, believes of higher level are just few examples of what we mean. Also representations involving the faculties in the people's minds are classified as in this category by extension.

Wilson illustrates the idea of metarepresentation using a drawing or a picture. He argues that a picture is a representative of somebody or something and a person who sees the picture is able to metarepresent the picture in his mind. The outcome of this representation is an interpretation of the picture as belonging to so and so; say a boy, a girl, a man, or a woman. Also a thing, such as; a tree, a book, or, further interpretation as in; a tall man, a black girl, a mango tree or a white car, just to mention but few.

According to Dan Sperber (1985), brain systems have the ability to manufacture and process representations in the human mind. These Cognitive systems can also manufacture and interpret public representations. Whether mental or public these representations pose as potential objects in the second order of representation or metarepresentation.

In experiential metarepresentation, people are represented as sensors and what they sense is the reality around them. (Cultural reality or cognitive reality).

As argued in the previous chapter, when Kimeru demonstratives appear in an engagement in which the two players involved in the exchange are physically present, they improve the level of comprehension of the entity in question in the mind of the listener. Putting it in the appropriate theoretical terms we say the referent is "manifest" in the mind of the hearer. To make something manifest is to show it clearly, especially of a feeling, an attitude or a quality, ie, to demonstrate. The referents may not necessarily be present physically because it is of no consequences in this case. That is to say, whether present or absent the condition remains the constant.

The connection between manifestness and the idea of metarepresentation is that, manifestness has more to do with the processes in the mind as opposed to the physical characteristics. In this sense, Kimeru demonstratives may be said to be functioning metarepresentationally in any conversation, if it's presence in the same conversation, serves to point out a referent whose manifestation is mutual to both the speaker and the listener, and, raises the possibility of its representation in the mind of the hearer leading to better comprehension of the object by the same addressee.

Just for the sake of information. I would like to note that representations are of four types These are: Representations in the mind bearing another representation in the same or another mind. As in the idea "Kamau believes that it will rain in the evening", representations in the mind concerning a public representations as in the thought ("Kamau said it will rain today") public representations of another representation in the mind (e.g. The utterance "Kamau believes that it will rain in the afternoon") and public representation bearing another public representation.

Kimeru demonstratives feature differently in Kimeru narratives when compared to their use in utterances in two important aspects. One, in narratives, the interlocutors are completely absent whereas in conversation they may be either present or absent. Secondly, physical distance is significant in conversation whereas it is insignificant in narratives. It should however be noted that these conditions are only valid when referring to the metarepresentation functions of demonstratives in these texts. The opposite may also be true. Agood example to illustrate this is when the demonstratives are used exhorphorically. A proximal demonstrative 'Ura' (in spatial deictic use) can be used as a discourse connector. Its contribution is making the content of the whole text solid or compact in case of gaps within the structure or just in case there is a short fall in the progress of a text as in change of a place, or, when there is a time gap between two adjacent clauses.

In narratives a non proximal demonstrative can be found in a construction involving a tail head linkage. Here the flow of the two contexts of two neighbouring clauses exists and the final information is reviewed using a construction that is different at the second clause. When an entity that was featured in the first construction is featured again in the preceding clause, its

modifier may be a proximal demonstrative. This phenomenon serves to indicate the boundary's concept between the two constructions marking a fresh progress in the story as in the example below.

kaiyi ka-ra ka-ri-kwo-na mbi-ti

Boy that when he saw hyena

Ka- ra-gwa- twa ni u - gwaa

He be held by fear

Mono.karamatuka mwanka

Much, he run up to

Mucii ka-ri gu-ka-ra-nga

Home he then stayed

Kuo ka-gi -ta ga-kai,

There period short,

Ka – ra – co- ka mwi- thu – ne ka- i-ri

Him returned forest in again

Ka-ra-i- ti-a $\,$ mu- ti - ne $\,$ I - gu-ru

Him climbed tree at top

Ku-a-li-I-li-a O! na-ra mbi-ti

To look that same place hyena

Ya – u mi-i-rii-te

had emerged

When that boy saw the hyena, he got afraid and ran home. He stayed there for a while and returned to the forest again. When he arrived, he climbed at the top of a tree to look at the very direction the hyena had come from.

Looking at the above example the use of class three demonstrative "nao" is used unmetarepresentively to join two ideas as a referential demonstrative.

Apart from Kimeru demonstratives functioning differently in different classifications and contexts, other example exists where expressions which have specific primary meaning behave in related ways. Direct speech markers and interrogative use are used as surprise indicators in some languages. For example, Blass investigating the use of sissalla *re* and Turkish mis as markers of reported speech observe that;

'The interconnection between a report and surprise has its end in the expectation of keeping distance between the distance being described by the speaker and the actual distance on the ground. Just as the markers of indirect speech show lack of commitment by the addressee, in the same breath, the addressee does not commit himself to the facts provided in the surprise.

Other examples are in the Swahili question marker **Je** which may act to show the verbal mood or surprise (Nicolle 2000) and the Amharic particle **Ete** which occurs both in interrogative clauses and as an exclamative marker. The three items discussed in the literature have primary functions. They are either markers of direct speech or interrogative markers and only known to mark surprise conditionally.

Comparatively, Kimeru demonstratives are neither restricted to a specific function nor clause or sentence type. Remember we have already discussed a number of metarepresentational contexts in which they occur such as reported speech, expression of surprise, connecting discourse, the emphatic clauses and commands. we have also argued that they too feature in conversation and unreported speech. I have however noted some tendency of Kimeru demonstratives throwing

their bulk in reported speech, practically in interrogative clauses which might probably be subject to other investigations in other studies, beyond the scope of this study. However, in my own view the reason has to do with the rhetoric features of Kimeru narratives to highlight major or important events by having one of the participants expressing them verbally.

4.2. Restriction on Metalinguistic use

If Kimeru demonstratives mark metarepresentation unconditionally as urgued above, is there a need for any restriction (whether linguistic, metalinguistic) on this distribution. If the answer is 'Yes' why should there be such a restriction? On the other hand, if the answer is 'no' why shouldn't there be such a restriction?

When Kimeru demonstratives occurs to places with numbers of metarepresentational backgrounds, they specifically show the representation of the content of an utterance by another, save for the form. The fact that demonstratives have restricted surface- syntactic scope validates such a restriction. Remember demonstratives do not select a referent from the universe of discourse as it is the case with the nominal expressions. For example in the interpretation of 'he' or 'him' in the sentence:

John saw him.

All we know is that 'him'refers to an entity that is characterized by its nominal features. (+ singular) and (+ male). The features of gender and number restrict the entities picked out by a pronoun, but they do not allow us to identify a uniquely specific referent from the universe of discourse. The pronoun him will merely select a sub-group from the wider domain of entities which we might want to talk about.

On the other hand, we cannot freely chose any entity which is male as a referent for him in the sentence above. Him cannot be used to refer to John

At this point we are talking about the interpretation of a pronoun without a context. Once it is contextualized we have a clearer idea of the referent of the pronoun him as for instance, in the context below, the most natural interpretation will be for 'him' to refer to the same entity as that referred by Karimi;

(A): And what about Karimi?

(B): Karimi admires him.

The example above seeks to account for the need for a metalinguistic restriction on demonstrative pronouns on the basis of their restricted surface- syntactic scope in that they are only tied with a noun in a noun phrase. This means the demonstratives cannot be interpreted independently of the noun with which together they co-occur in the same noun phrase.

Considering other linguistic elements for comparison as in the example of particles, Frantheim (2000:54) talks of the existence of two types of scopes in particles. These includes: the logical semantic scope and the surface – syntactic scope. He further said, particles which constitute a proposition as part of their logical – syntactic scope, in their surface syntactic scope, there must be an expression which harbour a logical form with the potentiality of being pragmatically modified to produce a propositional form.

The difference between Kimeru demonstratives and the particles discussed above is that despite the fact that their logical – semantic scope is propositional as that of the particles, their logical – semantic scope is the noun phrase in which they occur. That means, the derivation of their logical – semantic scope has nothing to do with their surface – syntactic scope. Kimeru demonstratives therefore are not metalinguistic markers since they represent the content as opposed to particles which represents the form of an expression. When they appear in metarepresentational contexts they pose as met representational markers, hence ruling out any possibility of deriving a formula of judging the expression bearing the form an utterance with the Kimeru demonstrative is supposed to represent. What matters is the function, whether endorphoric or exhorphoric, and, the scope of their reference

4.3. What kind of information is encoded by Kimeru Demonstratives

The idea that pronouns and other referential expressions might encode procedures is borrowed from scholars older than Wilson and Sperber. For example, Howkins on his investigation on the pragmatic functioning of the definite article 'the' on inferential process of communication proposed that the use of the article 'the' which is a definite article do serve to instruct the addressee enabling him fix whatever is being referred to by the definite noun phrase by looking for it in the correct environment that is identified pragmantically." This means that definite article reduces the mental effort needed in the processing of the information pertaining the identification of the referent of the noun.

Ariel (1988:68) contrasted the manner in which an utterance is processed and the processing procedure and recorded this;

"Instead of making claims that an expression is processed in a particular way we view the processing procedure associated with each form as its inherent definition."

Ariel's view therefore tends to argument referring expressions above the singular role of providing the route map to the retrieval of the required information, ie' they map up into the procedures themselves. To cut the long story short, Kimeru demonstratives are classified as referring expressions, and just like other demonstratives, they encode procedural constrains of factual propositional content, in specific terms, those that indentify or retrieve the targeted referent. Remember we argued that the limited syntactic scope of Kimeru demonstratives ties them only to the noun phrase with which they co- occur in the same construction. In another example, in chapter two, I demonstrated how Kimeru demonstratives are formed by featuring the noun class of certain items as the source of the raw materials used in the formation of the demonstratives. This connection implies that the demonstratives harbour information concerning the noun class of the referent in question. If for example we cite the case of demonstratives in the noun class number ½, - Mu – A, the interpretation is that the referent is a human being [+ HUMAN], and the number is either singular of plural respectively as in;

Noun Demonstrative No

Muntu ûû singular

Antu.baa plural

Similarly of we take demonstrative in class ³/₄ the message is that the referent is a tree, plant or a season as in:

Mu – embe Mi-embe singular

Mango tree mango trees plural

This however applies to Kimeru demonstratives in spatial deictic (exhorphoric) use. In endophoric use (as in metarepresentational use) they exhibit a unique quality in that the linguistic content in which they occur must be metarepresentational. It is also worth noting that it is not the demonstrative that is metarepresentational but their role in utterance interpretation in cases where spatial deixis doesn't make sense.

If Kimeru demonstratives under this condition of use purely harbour only the information guiding one to identify the targeted referents and that they only feature in metarepresentational environments, then the interlocutors have no choice but must be ware of the utterance type, to be able to distinguish between the endorphoric and exorphoric use of demonstratives in narrative texts.

The assumption that Kimeru demonstratives encode conceptual information is ruled out. Since a deduction or a deduction in that direction would render all what we have achieved so far fruitless. A back up to this based on our linguistic knowledge informs us that there is no specific concept in the name of "Surprise" or "Command" that can be brought to ones consciousness, and which is consciously available in Kimeru native speakers.

On the other hand, if we direct our inquiry on the route that they encode procedural information, in my own view, this seems to offer a sensible judgment. Firstly because procedural elements in utterances do constrain the identification of truth-conditional content. Secondly as metarepresentation designers, they constrain the indicators of the addressees attitude in relation to the proposition expressed.

4.4 Conclusion

The topic on metarepresentation, and specifically, elements that mark metarepresentation is not new in the world of semantics and pragmantics as evidenced by the studies in the previous discussions. Blass for example studied 're' in Sissalla and 'mis 'in Turkish. Nicolle (2000) worked on the Swahili interrogative marker 'je 'and the Amharic particle 'Ete 'as interrogative markers of metarepresentation use. In Conversation, they function to make a representation easy to see in the mind of the listener. That is, they reduce the processing effort that a heaver needs to process or interpret an utterance with ease. In narratives, the ability to metarepresent is dependent on the linguistic context in which they find themselves as in indirect speech, information questions, and commands, items that express surprise, emphatic clauses and exhortations. These are classified as metarepresentational contexts according to the relevance theory. I further argued that their role as indicators of metarepresentation is indefinite.

My discussion furthermore has portrayed Kimeru demonstratives as having a dual nature, that is, as demonstratives and metarepresentational markers.

last but not the least, I pointed out that Kimeru demonstratives have other functions either inside or outside of spatial deixis and that this other additional function adds an extra load to the processing effort demanded in the interpretation of utterances in which Kimeru demonstratives occur according to clause 1(b) of the presumption of optimal relevance. The justification of the extra effort however depends on whether extra or different effort will be achieved. This is therefore what determines the choice of one demonstrative or another in the context of use.

In chapter three, metarepresentational uses of Kimeru demonstratives in Kimeru narratives were discussed, the conversational use initiated the negotiation with an aim of introducing the concept of manifestness and later to link it with the narrative use. Consequently, a thorough investigation of the demonstratives lend to the revelation that, when they are used in conversation, they magnify the mental lens of the addressee's mental eyes, hence making their focal point clearer and easily comprehensible. In execution of this cardinal role, the demonstratives do not put into consideration the physical distance between the interlocutors and their referents. Instead, the speakers own imaginations of the level of manifestness of the entity in question in the mind of the listener is the pivotal principle that guide him to make judgment on

what more cognitive effort is required to make it more manifest. Thus implies that, metarepresentationally speaking, two representations are involved here. That is, the first one in which the speaker has to realize that an entity is weakly manifested in the mind of the listener, and second one, in which he has to realize of the need to increase the level of manifestness of that entity in the speakers mind. In relevance theoretical terms, one is a lower level representation and the other a higher level representation. (Ie the state of being conscious of one's own consciousness). on the other hand, the listeners mind has two representations. The first one being that he has to realize that an entity is weakly represented in his mind and the second in which he realizes that It has become strongly represented in his own mind. These four instances are the essence of the idea of the hierarchy of metarepresentation.

The concept of manifestness was further expounded to illustrate metarepresentation of Kimeru demonstratives in Kimeru narrative texts; I argued that this can be evident in a situation where the narrator represents thoughts or utterances of the characters in the story first' in his own thoughts and secondly, in his own utterances through, verbal narration. When one downloads what is in his mind and expresses it verbally, in relevance theoretic terms, it is called a "public representation of a mental representation," which according to sperber and Wilson (1985) is a metarepresentational function. It was further exposed that Kimeru demonstratives are said to function metarepresentationally when they occur in metarepresentational contexts.

In chapter four, a semantic characterization of Kimeru demonstratives which account for their metarepresentation use in Kimeru narratives was discussed. First, spatial – deixis was disqualified as a partnering in this game. Context was however featured as the only mandatory or key decision maker as to whether a demonstrative — was acting metarepresentationally or unmetarepresentationally it was therefore decided that for the demonstrative to play the role, they must occur in a metarepresentational context since a demonstrative cannot be interpreted outside a certain context. Reported speech an example of such a context and every other unit in the segment (Noun phrase) plays the role.

Lastly I suggest that Kimeru demonstratives in these contexts both mark metarepresentation and remain as demonstratives. Procedurally, as demonstratives, they guide the interpreter to indentify the intended referents

As metarepresentational markers, they reduce the processing effort that a hearer needs to process a certain piece of information, by activating several possible hypothesis related to markers of metarepresentation use which in turn makes interpretation more comprehensible. I also adviced that since this is one type of endophoric use of Kimeru demonstratives that I have featured in this paper, prospective scholars may take exploits on either case if it seems important to them in any way.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.0 Introduction

This study was built on the premises that demonstratives feature variously in different narratives and that these differences are language specific. Evidence from other languages revealed that demonstratives differ in terms of morphology, distribution as well as functions, across languages. The objectives of this study were to establish the morphological structure of demonstratives in Gitigania dialect of Kimeru language, to investigate the metarepresentational fuctions of procedural element in Kimeru narrative texts and to establish the semantic characterization of demonstratives which account for their metarepresentational use in narrative texts. The problem of the study was to find out whether the metarepresentational demonstratives are metalinguistic or metarepresentational markers or both, and whether they carry procedural or conceptual information in relation to the proposition so expressed. The data was extracted from the Gîtigania dialect of Kimeru language and was accounted for using three concepts or the relevance theory of communication which includes; the concepts of interpretive use, metarepresentation and procedural encoding. The researcher hoped that the findings of the study would benefit the writers and teachers of Kimeru language through enhancing the scholarly understanding of internal structures of Gîtigania demonstratives. Also act as a source of synchronic data on the Morphology of Gîtigania dialect which he would use to compare with data from the same language at other stages of development, comparison with other dialects of Kimeru or with other languages and also to provide the grounds for criticism on the reliability

of the relevance theory to account for the inferencial process of communication (the cognitive approach model).

In chapter two, the morphological structure of demonstratives in Gîtigania language was established. The study revealed that, Gîtigania has seventeen demonstratives which are numbered on singular – plural arrangement. This arrangement however is not applicable for the demonstrative above class eight since some classes have both singulars and plurals alike. Also that the language has a rich noun class system, comprising of seventeen classes, a number which should tally with that of the demonstratives since the demonstratives rely on the noun classes for their existence. That is, a noun in a particular noun class share certain features such as number, gender and tense with the respective demonstrative in the same class , thus, the noun classes provides the formula for the morphemic combinations in the respective demonstrative.

In chapter three, metarepresentational uses of demonstratives in Kimeru narrative texts were discussed. First, the conversational use was discussed to introduce the concept of manifestness and later to link this concept with the narrative use. The study revealed that the basic function of metarepresentational demonstratives is to make the referents more manifest to the addressee and that the decision whether to use a metarepresentational demonstrative in a conversation is not dertemined by the physical proximity of an entity being referred to relative to the speaker or the addressee, but, depends on the speakers assessment of how manifest a mental representation of that entity is, with the aim of making it more manifest. This therefore implies that metarepresentational demonstrative modify representation of representations.

It was further concluded that, the difference between metarepresentaional demonstratives and the other types of demonstratives lies in the fact that, their use in conversation is not dependent on spatial deixis, that is, on the physical location of an entity relative to the interlocutors, but on the psychological salience of a mental representation of that entity.

The character of manifestness was further discussed with the narratives. It was established that metarepresentational demonstratives can refer to mutually manifest entities in narrative texts as well as in conversation. In narratives, this is possible in a situation where the "speakers" are characters in a story and, them and the referents are physically present though their identity is not

known to the addressee. The speech is direct, where the narrator represents the utterance or thoughts of one of the participants. In a nutshell, it was found out that, in narratives, metarpresentational demonstratives occur in reported speech and thoughts, expression of surprise, information questions, exhortations and commands and for emphasis.

In chapter four, the semantic characterization of demonstratives which account for their narrative use was discussed. The study revealed that, just as in conversation, the use of metarpresentational demonstratives is not dependent on spatial deixis. However, the context in which metarpresentational demonstratives occur (reported speech and thoughts, information questions, expressions of surprise, exhortations and commands, and for emphasis) are all examples of meterepresantational use, although their use in Kimeru narratives is neither limited to a single function nor restricted to a specific clause type. Meterepresentational demonstratives are therefore non – specific meterepresentational markers which do not indicate that an utterance is a representation of the form of another utterance rather than its content, that is, they are not used to mark the meta-linguistic use of an expression. This is because demonstratives have restricted surface-syntactic scope. The logical-semantic scope of meterepresentational demonstratives is a proposition, and their surface-syntactic scope is the noun phrase which they determine. This therefore means that their logical semantic scope is not derived from their surface – syntactic scope, which is irrelevant as far as their use as meterepresentational markers is concerned. There is therefore no definite formula of indentifying the linguistic expression whose form an utterance containing a metarepresentational demonstrative is meant to represent. The referential scope of metarepresentional demonstratives is however dependant on their surface - syntactic scope (i.e the noun phrase which they determine) but their metarepresentational functions are independent of this surface – syntactic scope and express a higher-level-explicature which is logically independent of the propositional content expressed by the clause.

Lastly, I pointed out that the very term "metarepresentational demonstrative " suggests that meterepresentational demonstratives are both metarepresentational markers and demonstratives. My argument was therefore that they encode two distinct kinds of procedural constraints. The first has to do with their nature as demonstratives where they encode procedural information constraining the identification of the intended referent, thereby guiding the addressee to the

intended propositional content of the utterances of which they are part. The second has to do with their nature as metarepresentational markers in which they encode procedural information which activities the range of possible hypothesis compatible with metarepresentitional use, thereby making such interpretations more salient.

5.1. Recommendation

As I pointed out, the demonstrative system of Gîtigania remains undescribed area. I have described just one endorphoric function of these demonstratives. I tend to believe there are other uses associated with endorphoric as well as exorphoric conditions which may attract the attention of prospective scholars.

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