

**CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH TERRORIST RISK
REDUCTION STRATEGIES IN KENYA: A CASE STUDY OF
NAIROBI'S CENTRAL BUSINESS DISTRICT**

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DECLARATION

This research project is my original work and has not been presented for any award in any other university.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this project to my family especially my loving husband Mr. Maitai for his unfailing encouragement and love. To my dear mother who kept on praying and was a constant source of encouragement for me to strive on to the completion of this project.

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I am very grateful to God for the gift of life, strength, patience and health to do this work. To Him I give all the glory forever.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AMISOM	African Mission in Somalia
AQAP	Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
AU	African union
CBD	Central Business District
CCTV	Closed circuit Television
FTO	Foreign Terrorist Organization
GoK	Government of Kenya
GTI	Global Terrorism Index
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USA	United States of America

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to determine the challenges associated with terrorist risk reduction strategies in Nairobi. The study was guided by 3 specific objectives: to establish the vulnerability factors that make Nairobi's CBD attractive to terrorist threats; to identify risk reduction strategies employed to counter terrorist attacks in Nairobi's Central Business District; and to determine challenges of implementing risk reduction strategies in Nairobi's Central Business District.

The study adopted the descriptive research design. The study targeted Nairobi City Inspectorate Staff with the following cadre of staff; Constables, Sergeants, Senior Sergeants, Inspectors and Chief Inspectors in the Nairobi City Inspectorate who are 1,125 in number. The sample size for the study was 111 respondents and stratified random sampling procedure was used to select respondents included in the sample. The questionnaire was adopted for collecting data for the study as it gathered information from a large population of respondents. The researcher adopted key informant interviews to complement data gathered through the questionnaires. Descriptive statistics were used in analyzing data which present the information in summary form in order to be able to show trends in the data through means, frequencies and percentages. The qualitative data was presented in verbatim to complement the quantitative data.

The major findings and recommendations were as follows: There exist some vulnerability factors that make Nairobi Central Business District (NCBD), but the most highly rated was corruption in different departments especially government agencies which affect the implementation of risk reduction strategies. There is also urgent need for the government to budget and provide resources to deal with the terrorist, more personnel and provision of more specialized and modern equipment to handle the counter terrorism. The legislative and legal framework needs also to be improved and updated to the current trend of terrorism. The public ignorance of county laws and lack of cooperation thus public awareness and education is mandatory. A large population of the youth is unemployed thus attractive to terror attacks especially in the county, study reviewed. More energetic youth should be recruited to reduce this gap. Traffic congestion and hawking in the city is a major problem and thus the government should decongest the CBD off public vehicles and hawker's in order to reduce overcrowding which is a target for terrorist attacks. The security from county inspectorate department is not adequate and therefore metropolitan policing program should be included. The Kenyan government should adopt and introduce a tested model of UK of (4 Ps); Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare to protect the Kenyan citizens against the increasing terrorist attacks.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

Nairobi, Kenya's capital city has been subjected to numerous terrorist attacks. Al Qaeda documented the first attack by terrorists against the interests of the Americans in 1998. Killings of 224 people including twelve Americans and over four thousand were recorded following the bombing of Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (Ploch, 2010). This leads to losses that contributed to psycho-social and social-economic torture.

The socio-economic losses and psycho-socio challenges caused by this act on the country were phenomenal with tourism sector losing 25% of business (Kenya Economic Survey, 2002). In July 2010, 76 individuals were murdered in similar attacks in Uganda. Later the Al Shabaab claimed responsibility for these killings; this was the first group that made a successful attack outside the territory of Somali. One of the suicide bombers was identified as a Kenyan. This incident of terror attack in Kampala indicated that Kenyans of non-Somali and Arab ethnic origin had been recruited to the Al Shabaab terror group (Blanchard, 2013).

From 2011, Kenya has experienced an increase in terrorist attacks that is believed to be executed by Al-Shabaab. A retaliatory operation 'Operation Linda Nchi' coordinated a military mission between the Military of Somali government and four hundred Defense Forces which commenced in 2011 (*Reuters*, 2012). Threats were posed by Al Shabaab to attack Uganda and Burundi that deployed eighteen thousand troops to African Union (AU) following the establishment of the peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM), this exposed countries such as the West and East Africa to attacks (Blanchard, 2013).

In 2012, at least 10% of Al-shabaab's forces were estimated to constitute local Kenyan fighters, these includes the converts, who are known as the "Kenyan Mujahideen" by Al-Shabaab's that constitute youthful members who are hopeless and unemployed. They serve as soft targets for recruitment to join the terrorist gang. USAID estimates unemployment of out of school youth in Kenya to stand at 75%, and is reported to be even higher among Muslim youth. Al-Shabaab offers youth approximately 40,000 shillings per month, four times the average national pay, to join their organization and train in Somalia (USAID, 2013). These Kenyan insurgents are highly valued by the terrorist organization as they possess different ethnic profiling this easily gives them access

to interact with the general population in Kenya without arousing interest from the public or security personal and make them harder to track (Blanchard, 2013).

The first attack by al-Shabaab in Nairobi in 2011 was a synchronized twin attack during lunchtime, one on a bar in Mfangano Street in Nairobi's Central Business District by hurling a Russian-made grenade that led to a loss of life and more than twenty people wounded. In the other attack, a grenade was hurled at passengers boarding buses at a bus terminus in the eastern side of the CBD killing one person and injuring 13 (Kenya Police reports, 2011 Page 7). In the same year, police documented two bomb attacks at Garissa and one in Mandera all targeting Kenya armed forces ((Kenya Police Reports, 2011 Page,7). These attacks prompted the government to reorganize security services within the city and business premises owners were prompted to invest heavily in security guard services, counter terrorist technologies and staff training in security management. Many countries issued travel advisories to their citizens and warned them not to visit the country. This resulted in a significant heavy loss in the economy especially the tourism industry (Kenya Economic Survey, 2012).

In the year 2012, the Kenya Police Reports, (2012), indicated that Al Shabaab militants stepped up their onslaught on Nairobi residents and were responsible for many attacks. In March 2012, 6 people were murdered and over sixty hurt after 4 attacks at Machakos bus station in the Nairobi town. In April of the same year an attack was executed at God's Ngara when a Chinese made grenade was hurled at worshipers, killing one and injuring 11. In the month of May, a bomb was blasted inside a fashion house along Moi Avenue that injured 27 people

In August, a person was murdered and 6 others injured at an Eastleigh close to the headquarters of the Kenya Air Force. This attack occurred when Hillary Clinton (the former United States secretary of state) has visited Kenya. In September, a boy was killed when a grenade was thrown to Sunday school children at St Polycarp Anglican Church along Juja road in Nairobi's East Leigh estate. In November the Al Shabaab executed a twin attack, a policeman was slayed and 10 people hurt in a grenade attack in church within Nairobi. At the other attack 10 civilians and twenty five hurt when an explosive exploded inside a mini-bus in Eastleigh. In December, 5 individuals were hurt and 8 others wounded in an exploration that occurred near mosque around Eastleigh, two people got injured after two explosions outside Al Amin mosque in Eastleigh area (Kenya Police Reports, 2012).

In 2013 terrorist activities in Nairobi continued to increase in frequency. Various grenade attacks on people were recorded by Kenya police. In the month of September the Al Shabaab changed tactics when they attacked Westgate shopping mall. During the attack militants engaged the Police and KDF for 4 days, at least 39 civilians died while 150 others injured.

In December 2013, a grenade exploded killing four people, wounding thirty six others. This was the fourth attack that occurred in the 50th anniversary in which thirteen civilians died in the first two weeks of December (Kenya Police Reports 2013).

In 2014 Nairobi has had its unfair share of terrorist attacks. In the month of March, twin explosions killed six people in Eastleigh estate (Limo, 2014). In April police stopped and boarded a car they suspected of ferrying terrorists who exploded the car bomb they had earlier rigged onto the vehicle, killing the four occupants who were 2 policemen (Nation Media, 2014).

Kenya is a soft target for terrorists due to its geographical, political, economic and social-cultural factors leading to its numerous attacks as reported by Otiso (2009) including its close links with Israel and countries in the West, in particular the US, the country has a lucrative tourism product that attracts foreigners across diverse parts of the world. The thought that Kenya is predominantly a Christian country makes it more exposed to terrorism attacks.

Terrorism in Nairobi has had many significant effects especially on the loss of lives of workers and family members; the flare-up of tensions between Christians and Muslims and has negatively impacted the country's economy especially tourism industry (Otiso, 2009). A number of arrests have been made but lack of legislation against terrorism or terrorist acts greatly has hampered security agents to pursue, prevent, protect and prepare residents against attacks.

1.2 Problem Statement

Kenya is one among the few Sub-Saharan African countries that is targeted by global terrorist. The Global Terrorism Index (GTI), a body that ranks the nations of the world according to terrorist activity, threat index, vulnerability and level of impact from previous episodes of attacks classifies Kenya at number 18 with an index of 5.266, which is among the most likely terrorist targets in Africa and the world (Global Terrorism Index, 2013).

Kenya's has a strategically located however; the stability within East Africa high depends on Nairobi, because of its centrality in the region. Embassies, Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the United Nations offices worldwide are headquartered in Nairobi (US State Department, 2012). Furthermore, Nairobi provides a suitable ground for campaigning against radicalism as it houses part of the 400,000 refugees from Somalia who opt to live away from refugee camps at Daadab but choose to live with Kenyans of Somali origin mainly at East Leigh estate where militants find safe haven amongst them (US State Department, 2012).

The numerous sustained terrorist attacks have had a serious impact on the people of Kenya. These include the issuance of travel advisories by American, British, Australian and other European governments that paint a very negative image of the country's security situation. By restraining their citizens from visiting Kenya, hotels and allied businesses like tours and travel were forced to lay off staff while others had shut down completely for lack of business (Macharia, 2014). The United States embassy evacuated all non-essential staff from Nairobi embassy while in June 2014, the United Kingdom shut down its Symbolic Consulate in Mombasa because of security matters (The Guardian. AFP. 17 May 2014).

A report by the USA State Department, Kenya has so far interrupted major terrorism activities reported in Kenya in 2012. These impending attacks included explosion by Al-Shabaab or its proponents targeting bars, restaurants, bus station, mosques and churches (US State Department, 2012).

The government have institutes a number of risk reduction strategies to reverse this threat. Refugees who had left their designated camps were rounded and repatriated from the capital. Massive but controversial screening exercises were conducted in areas with a high population of people of Somali ethnic origin. The screening exercise aimed at identifying non Kenyans who were being housed by Kenyans. The controversial exercise elicited more problems than were solved.

Another initiative that was instituted by the government is the "Nyumba Kumi Initiative", a form of community policing that groups 10 households together for security purposes. Reports of success have been reported in many areas even though it does not seem to work in some areas. The government has been investing in CCTV technology to monitor activities within the CBD. The installation seems to be effective even though a plan to

install high technology CCTV with face recognition software to cover the whole of Nairobi's CBD was frustrated by competing contractors.

Another risk reduction strategy has been the tightening of National boundaries which have long been identified as a weak point in the fight against terrorism due to the presence of corrupt immigration staff who let known terrorists in and out of the country. Corruption is still a big issue that compromises risk reduction strategies. Both government and civilian targets in Nairobi have faced immense challenges associated with terrorist risk reduction strategies. A concerted effort to enact a pursuant, prevent, protect and prepare strategy can go a long way in reduction and management of terrorist attacks in Nairobi. In view of above, the researcher intends to determine the challenges associated with terrorist risk reduction strategies in Nairobi's Central Business District.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

1.3.1 General Objective

The purpose of this study was to determine the challenges associated with terrorist risk reduction strategies in Nairobi.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

- i. To establish the vulnerability factors that make Nairobi's CBD attractive to terrorist threats.
- ii. To identify risk reduction strategies employed to counter terrorist attacks in Nairobi's Central Business District
- iii. To determine challenges of implementing risk reduction strategies in Nairobi's Central Business District

1.4 Research Questions

- i. What are the vulnerability factors that make Nairobi's Central Business District attractive to terrorist threats?
- ii. Which risk reduction strategies are employed to counter terrorist threats in Nairobi's Central Business District?
- iii. What are the challenges of implementing terrorist risk reduction strategies within the Central Business District?

1.5 Justification of the Study

The primary duty of the government is to protect its citizens and to provide a safe and secure place while protecting the freedom which they enjoy. Tackling the threat Kenya and especially Nairobi faces from international and home grown terrorism remains an important challenge.

This study will among other things contribute in determining the vulnerability factors that make Nairobi's Central Business District to be attractive to terrorist threats. These include the location of critical infrastructures like Universities, Banks, Central Bank, National Treasury, National Revenue Authority, County offices, International Hotels, Churches, Power, Water, telephone, Post-Office, shops and Government offices all situated within the Central Business District, and presenting an attractive target for terrorist activity. The Central Business District also serves as the national transport hub with the countries' main railway station and bus stations that lead to all parts of the capital and the country thus ensuring a large number of vehicles and pedestrians that cause serious overcrowding and an attractive target for terrorism activities.

The study will also determine the risk reduction strategies available or being employed with the aim of improving or redesigning the emergency management framework and policies. Many of the operators of critical infrastructures and business centers, the Nairobi County and National governments have reacted to the terror threats by enacting and employing various risk reduction strategies. This study will identify all the risk reduction strategies being used to counter terrorism and determine their effectiveness and appropriateness.

Since the onset of terrorism activity in Nairobi, significant changes in business have occurred especially within the central business district. This project will assess the risk reduction strategies and determine their effectiveness and effects they are having on the way business is conducted within the central business district of Nairobi. The researcher will also enumerate the challenges being encountered by stakeholders as they implement the risk reduction strategies and conduct business within Nairobi's Central Business District under the shadow of impending terrorist attacks. The outcomes of this study will contribute immensely to national and county government Policy makers will inform security providers and the public on the best practice approach to counter terrorism.

1.7 Scope and Limitations of the Study

Blanchard (2013) and Maina (2004) observed that Nairobi City is most targeted by the terrorism due to the close ties between Tel Aviv and many western countries especially the United States, Britain, Germany, Italy and France. This makes it very attractive to Middle East based terror groups like Al Qaeda and their affiliates like the Somalia based Al Shabaab. However, this study is limited to the central business district area which has had many terrorist attacks in the recent years it started with the 1980 Norfolk Hotel attack but the major attack was the 1998 bomb blast in the US Embassy and the 2 September 2014 attack on the Westlands Westgate shopping Mall, killing many and alot of injuries plus loss and damage of property.

Security solutions are largely covert and security personnel may be reluctant to share the kind of hardware, software or strategy they have installed or instituted so as to detect and or delay terrorist threats. The Nairobi's central business district is very divergent in terms of infrastructure development. For example a 20 storey sky scraper requiring elaborate security measures will be found next to a undeveloped property with a build- up shanty offering foods and drink to hundreds of peoples and no sense of security. This challenge in design and user profiles of properties in the central business district can offer serious limitations to the researcher.

Nairobi residents can be very suspicious of anyone trying to determine security issues of an installation especially government infrastructure where information sharing may contravene the official secrets act. With a history of terrorists carrying out security surveys before a strike, it will be challenging for the researcher to ask security related questions without raising suspicion from stakeholders. Since the researcher does not have a background of armed forces training, interacting with security personnel who provide security to most installations will not be easy as they may be unwilling to discuss security matters with someone they may consider and "outsider" in the profession.

Establishments which may have not invested considerably in terrorist risk reduction strategies may be reluctant to disclose their weaknesses to third party. These limitations may affect the quantity of data obtained but the researcher expects to obtain information from establishments which are open and willing to provide it.

1.8 Definition of Terms

Al Shabaab - Al Shabaab, more formally known as Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujahidin (“Mujahidin Youth Movement”), is a terrorist group that emerged about a decade ago in Somalia.

Risk - The chance or possibility of danger, loss, injury or other adverse consequences happening.

Risk reduction - Putting into action measures to eliminate or reduce considerably the possibility of danger, loss, injury or other adverse consequences

Risk reduction strategies - These are measures that have been repeatedly proven to be effective in eliminating or reducing the possibility of danger, loss, injury or other adverse consequences

Terrorism - The act of destroying or injuring civilian lives or the act of destroying or damaging civilian or government property without the expressly chartered permission of a specific government by individuals or groups acting independently or governments on their own accord and belief in the attempt to effect some political objectives

Threat - An action or potential action likely to cause damage, harm or loss

Vulnerability - A weakness that can be exploited to damage or harm an asset or to cause loss

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.0 Introduction

This chapter provides a review of literature on the following areas: definition of terrorism, risk, risk reduction strategies, vulnerability and threat, terrorist movements around the world with particular reference to Kenya, tactics and force multipliers of terrorists, risk factors from terrorism, disaster risk reduction strategies available to counter terrorist threats. The current terrorist preparedness situation in Nairobi's Central Business District (CBD), factors that make it an attractive target to terrorists and the psychological effects of terrorist actions is reviewed. Finally the researcher will also suggest emergency preparedness strategies that can be effected to enhance emergency preparedness in the event of terrorist threats.

2.1 Meaning and Origin of Terrorism

Defining terrorism is not easy like it has been demonstrated by various scholars. White (2003) suggests that before coming up with a definition, from a historical context White indicates that the concept was developed from French Revolution (1789-1795). By the end of 1800 and early 1900s, the term changed as it meant violent activities by several groups including labour organizations, revolutionaries and nationalist groups that revolt against foreign powers besides the governments.

Besides history, white has identified other contexts which are helpful to examine when defining terrorism (White, 2003). These include the type of conflict, political power possessed, religion and legislation all of which influence the way a country defines terrorism. Cooper, (1978), identifies several reasons for the confusion. First, the term is emotionally charged. A person or a group is socially and politically degraded when considered as a terrorist. Secondly the term morphs with history with many governments today existing courtesy of movements that fought for independence like in Kenya. The person who is perceived as a terrorist could be a freedom fighter to another individual, this is contradictory. In simple terms, terrorism means intimidation using violence means (Mathewson and Steinberg, 2003:59).

The United Nations refers to terrorism as an act that involves destruction or causing injury to public lives or government property on their accord and conviction seeking to achieve political objectives (United Nations, 2000). The United States Defense Department defines terrorism as an unlawful use of violence or force over people or property to coerce governments or societies which are mainly intended to realize ideological, religious or political goals (U.S. State Department, 2000). These acts cause loss of life and fear causing unnecessary fear to people or governments. However, this is the primary objective of terrorists, this form of violence targets civilians to gain publicity. In contrast with other criminals, terrorist often claim credit for their actions (White 2003).

Since terrorism is confined to social and political contexts no single meaning of terrorism is exhaustive. This is so because, terrorism is influenced by a myriad of factors to mention a few, political power and media. This fact alone facilitates terrorism to thrive in many counties including Kenya as law makers hardly ever agree on what should be labeled as terrorism in researchers view terrorism is the act of intimidation through violence to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm in order to achieve certain objectives (mostly political and maximum publicity) unlike other violent acts, they will always claim credit for their act and compliance to their demands.

The Mau Mau movement in Kenya was established to fight against British domination in Kenya in 1952 and was labeled a terrorist group by the British government. Due to definitional challenges of this term terrorism, this label persisted till the year 2006 when it was legally changed and members of the movement recognized as heroes by the Kenyan government. This also facilitated those Kenyans who lost the lives of loved ones and property to successfully sue the British government for compensation. In Kenya, terrorism is defined in the Prevention of Terrorism Act No. 30 of 2012. Legislating on terrorism in the Kenyan parliament was a long and a stormy process that took years to complete due to the diverse definitions of the concept and the different contexts that influence its definition.

2.2 Terrorist Movements

Otiso (2009) identifies 4 kind of terrorism these include: left-wing (leftist), right-wing (rightist), ethno-nationalist or separatist and, religious (Cronin, 2002). Apparently, region or sacred terrorism such as those executed by Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab and Boko Haram in West Africa are part of the aforementioned terrorism types that causes brutality. It is worthwhile to point out that religious terrorism is more dangerous since it is a constituent of struggle of good and evil which revolves around humanity (Cronin, 2002).

Major attacks in terrorism arise from ethno-nationalistic and regions. Ethno-nationalistic terrorism occurred locally during the colonial rule back in 1950s when freedom movement such as Mau Mau utilized terror to enhance the country's independence (Edgerton, 1989). While the British sought to suppress the Mau Mau terrorists", Kenyans oppressed by colonialism saw this ragtag army as freedom fighters and supported it, eventually culminating in the country's freedom from British colonial rule.

The current incidence of religious terrorism in Kenya and Nairobi is fateful because perpetrators lack qualms about civilians in the process of achieving political goals. The infrastructural damage was so massive the whole building including the adjoining Ufundi Cooperative Sacco buildings were completely damaged and never rebuild. In 2013 another major attack in Nairobi took place at Westgate Mall, 67 people were killed and hundreds injured. The infrastructural damage cost Kshs 190 Million and 2 years to rebuild. Between 2011 and 2013, the Al Shabab claimed responsibility over a number of grenade attacks on churches, crusades, public transport vehicles, hotels and bars in Nairobi with increasing frequency.

2.3 Tactics and Force Multipliers of Terrorists

Jenkins (1985) explains that the six terrorism tactics that entails hijacking, bombing among others. As religious fanatics, the strategies of terrorism have changed to posing threats and mass obliteration. The emergence of information age has led to a paradigm shift in the manner in which terrorist attack, the way they spy and how they multiply.

Ketcham (1986) observes that use of technology has accelerated terrorism practices. Implementation of technological weapon and attacks has provided an impression of a high degree of activity.

The bomb that destroyed the American embassy was constructed using 400 cylinders of TNT explosives, supplemented with Ammonium Nitrate fertilizer, and Aluminum powder products easily available in shops in Nairobi. The use technology to convert common products to make bombs is one tactic adopted by al Shabaab in Nairobi.

James (1986), illustrates that the second force multiplier as transnational support. A group possessing the capability to cross national borders can perform highly. The Al Shabaab is headquartered in neighboring Somalia but take advantage of the large population of Kenyan Somalis with whom they share a common religion, language and heritage to cross into Nairobi, strike targets and get back into Somalia undetected. The 2013 Westgate attacks in Nairobi was broadcasted live by most local and international news networks, and is thought to have given the attackers an upper hand as they were also watching the event broadcast live inside the mall. Kipsang (2014), in a research paper titled reporting terrorism among Kenyan media highlights cases where media uses old footage to force multiply a minor incident involving terrorists.

According to Hoffman (2005), notes that terror groups claim support to a certain religious inclination to gain support. Al Shabaab has always claimed to be Muslim even though many of their victims are Muslims too. Irrespective of the source, force multipliers give a platform for individuals to operate like a large group. Though the notion is diminishing, Al Shabaab, have always dragged the religion of Islam to seem to be the motivator of their criminal acts.

2.4 Risk Factors from Terrorism

When Al Qaeda bombed the American embassy in Nairobi, Osama bin Laden was questioned on why he targeted innocent Kenyans, a majority who turned out to be Muslims while his “jihad” was against the Americans he answered that in his war “there were no innocent bystanders”. The risks from terrorist attacks are many but Murty (2006), has classified the attacks into five categories.

2.4.1 Explosions

Explosion is regarded as an air-borne detonation of an explosive device which can be held using hand, carried by vehicles or located near a supplier to the building and mail. These explosives cause serious damages to buildings, businesses including loss of life. They also cause pollution to the environment. In cases where these explosives are aligned in a chain, their duration to explode might take time however, the damage is bigger. There are

factors that determine this, these include the type, quality and the quantity of explosion utilized (Murty, 2006).

Majority of terrorist attacks in Nairobi have been executed through the use of explosives. An example include the bombing that happened in 1980 in Israel at Norfolk Hotel that left fifteen people killed and at least eighty civilians got wounded (Harman, 2002). In 1998, 500 kilograms of explosives were used in the American embassy bombing where to buildings were completely destroyed while others within 500 meters had their roofs, windows, doors and other fittings blown off. Hundreds of vehicles were damaged alongside the 224 dead and 5,600 injured. In other attacks grenades have been used to cause explosions that have killed and injured people and destroy property.

2.4.2 Arson

Arson implies initiating fire. Fire can be started through direct contact; this threat can take minutes then hours. This form of damage is affected by the type and quantity of device utilized in executing arson and the kind of materials used. Damage varies depending on the entire spectrum right from structural elements to non-structural elements. This can form part of the building or the entire building (Murty, 2006). There have been no reported cases of use of arson by terrorist in Nairobi so far but the threat still exists.

2.4.3 Armed Attack

Armed attack can be described as an assault from distant location. This attack might involve use of small arms or stand-off weapons that involve use of rocket propelled mortars. Armed attack might take minutes to days depending on how efficient the counter attack might be. The magnitude of loss is depends on the intention and attacker's ability (Murty, 2006). All terrorist attacks on Nairobi involved some form of an attack with a light weapon or the use of grenades. The 2013 West gate attack is one example where the terrorists used automatic weapons and grenades to kill and injure shoppers at the mall.

2.4.4 Biological, Chemical and Nuclear Attack

This involves pollution of natural environment that impacts negatively on human beings and the environment. Contaminants can be solid, liquid or gases that are produced at the site where attacks takes place including nuclear reactions. These reactions affect the body parts once an attack happens leading to diseases such as reactions that enter the body, food and water. Biological effects are short-term in nature; quantitatively they can last from hours to weeks. In cases where an attack is impactful it depends on the existing

conditions. This form of contamination might spread by water or wind while biological infections spread through animal and human vectors. Chemical contamination is however different because it spreads through people, vehicle, water and wind while it has long-term effects. Contamination as a result of radiological agents can last long. Electronic items might be exposed to nuclear radiation if proper care is not made. The use of Biological, Chemical or Nuclear means has not been reported in Nairobi so far. The potential risk of this threat is however high, owing to overcrowding hazard and ineffective physical security accorded to critical infrastructures in Nairobi (Murty, 2006).

2.4.5 Other Attacks

Several covert acts of terror that affect lives of people and activities include cyber-terrorism, Agri-terrorism and unauthorized surveillance among others (Murty, 2006). Cyber terrorism has become a reality in many countries and Nairobi has not been spared. Banks have reported heavy losses from cyber-attacks since 2012. In 2014, 77 Chinese nationals were deported for having powerful cyber attacking equipment in their possession. The Daily Nation, in an online article reported that the Presidents, Vice Presidents, Kenya Defense forces, Immigration and Registration of Persons Ministry, Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS) which contains sensitive financial data at the treasury and 10 other government websites all reported incidents of cyber-attack in 2015 (nation.co.ke). Even though no terrorist group claimed responsibility, a terror group may have been responsible. In 2012 an Indonesian cyber attacker called *dirixer* took down 103 sites belonging to state agencies in one day, downing service delivery in Nairobi for one day. In November 2010, *ReisBEY*, a Muslim Turkish cyber attacker managed to shut down the treasury website for a day.

2.5 Disaster Risk Reduction Strategies Available to Counter Terrorist Threats in Nairobi

Disaster risk reduction (DRR) is a process that involves identifying, assessing and mitigation of risks of a calamity. It aims at minimizing socio-economic exposures and approach to deal with environmental among other hazards. This is influenced by mass research on vulnerability that started back in mid-1970s. It is an integrated responsibility of development partners and relief agencies. DRR is wide-ranging; its scope is broad and deeper as compared to managing conventional emergency (UNISDR, 2004).

One of the challenges of enacting a national DDR strategy is expenditure (UN, 2012). It has been established that on average, 4% of the estimated Kshs1, 000 billion annual spent on humanitarian aid worldwide is committed to prevention strategies, hence shilling spent on risk minimization saves between Kshs 500 and 1000 in economic loss from calamities (Schwartz, 2006).

2.6 Current Risk Reduction Situation in Kenya

The government accepts the presence of a synchronized policy framework for managing disaster (GoK, 2009). The existence of an impulsive system that aid the government and its development partners (the United Nations system and other relief agencies) to counter disaster in this country, such as the 1999-2001 drought that affected more than 4.5 million Kenyans. Stakeholders' participation in managing disaster is a sign of good will in addressing disaster management in this country. Other participants that take part in managing disaster include National Disaster Operation Centre (NDOC), National Police Service, Department of Defence and the National Youth Service (NYS) among others. These stakeholders take pro-active measures to counter disasters (GoK, 2009).

2.7 Existing Gaps and Challenges in Risk Reduction in Nairobi

In Nairobi, a number of gaps and challenges present a hindrance to implementation and execution of risk reduction strategies in the event of a terrorist threat. These include:-

2.7.1 Inadequate Policy, Legal and Institutional Frameworks

Over time, handling of disasters is done without coordination, legal and institutional outline. Similarly, response to disasters is poorly coordinated as a result of lack of standardized operational procedures and emergency operational plans. Such a situation is challenging since it might lead to replication of efforts and resources wastage. This exposes disaster victims to risks and slow recovery. Conversely, failure to plan and prepare might lead to exposure to calamities and pose huge risks (GoK, 2009).

2.7.2 Weak Disaster Management Capabilities within Communities and Institutions

It is worthwhile to note that management of disaster depends on the extent of preparation made by communities. Communities and institutions that put proper measures to disaster are less affected by disasters because the magnitude is minimized. Most communities in Kenya are not fully sensitized about managing disasters in particular making preparations, setting up mechanisms to minimize disasters and they impact that these disasters might

have on the victims. Recently, there are evolving challenges faced when managing disaster cycles in matters that pertain resettlement, rehabilitation and recovery of Internally Displaced Persons (GoK, 2009).

2.7.3 Inadequate Integration and Co-ordination between Agencies

Government Ministries, NGOs and Civil Society Organisations run a range of multiple programmes that are aimed at preventing and responding to disasters. These initiatives are executed in a less planned manner with consistency in policy regulation. Thus, the current policy initiatives reflect the commitment of the government in formulating a consistent strategy to address disaster in a responsive way. This is meant to strengthen their abilities in preparing and overcoming adverse effect on disasters (GoK, 2009).

2.7.4 Inadequate Regional and International Linkages

Disaster might go past national borders. However, governments in most African countries including Kenya fail to factor disaster planning and response mechanisms. This leads to intervention across the borders where there are high risks of exposure to calamities. The importance of national systems in linking with regional and global firms has not attained the recognition that it deserves. Considering these weaknesses and challenges, the government finds the worth to set policies and establish legislative frameworks that can address these inadequacies and enhance efficiency in disaster management systems (GoK, 2009).

2.8 Vulnerability Factors that Make Nairobi Attractive to Terrorist Threats

Nairobi, Kenya's capital city and the largest city and leading business center in East and Central Africa targets a global terrorism which is a blend of geographic, regional, historical and social cultural factors. Kenyan military is useful in facilitating regional operations against Al Shabaab in Somalia and America sees Kenya instrumental in countering terrorism in the region. Kenya and AMISON forces have made relevant moves in the fight against Al Shabaab over the last 2 years. Locally, the operations commenced in October 2011 which led to loss of Al Shabaab's strategic seaport in Kismayo where it received revenues from global charcoal trade.

Direct motives of terrorist include Kenya's close of ties with Israel and Western countries in particular the US having Nairobi as its nerve center, a vibrant coastal beach tourism industry controlled or owned by people in Nairobi.

Blanchard, (2013) and Maina, (2004) observe that close ties between Nairobi and Tel Aviv, western countries especially the United States, Britain, Germany, Italy, France makes the capital city very attractive to Middle East based terror groups like Al Qaeda and their affiliates like the Somalia based Al Shabaab. Another factor that contributes to Nairobi, Kenya being attractive to terrorists has close relations to Israel as reported by Maina (2004) and Harman (2002). Israel is a country disliked by many Muslims around the world. This connection is a major impediment to native and foreign Muslims that have repeatedly but unsuccessfully been calling for the severance of the relationship (Ali 2003). A key indication of the strength of this link signed in 1963 (Oluoch, 2009) is Kenya's 1976 decision to provide Israel logistics support in raiding Entebbe Airport to free Israel hostages held by the Palestine hijackers linked to the former Ugandan dictator Idi Amin (Kyemba 1977, Harman 2002).

Another contributing factor is Nairobi's proximity to unstable countries with highly porous borders like Somalia and Sudan. Nairobi city being the business center for Eastern African countries is an attractive investment center by residents from these unstable countries who also include terrorist groups who prefer to establish sleeper cells in the capital. Otiso, (2009) argues that the relatively open and multicultural society of Nairobi, the good transport and communications infrastructure and advanced regional economy contribute to the attractiveness. After the Garissa University Al Shabaab terrorists attacked and killed 147 Christian students and injured 79, 13 money transfer companies, transport companies and banks were shut down in Nairobi after being suspected of being used by terrorist financiers.

2.9 Effects of Global Terrorism in Nairobi

Kenya's terror attack experienced in 1998 had a dramatic effect on social, political and economic activities of this country. Otiso (2009), notably harmful effects include rising tension and insecurity, disruption of economic activities, punitive measures to counter terrorism, civil and political rights, protection of the country's sovereignty and panic between Kenya and the West.

2.9.1 Economic Effects

The Kenya economic survey 2015 reported tourism industry is facing a decline owing to numerous factors; the major one being travel advisories and Ebola spread in West Africa (GoK, 2015). This has led to a decline of tourism revenue with a margin of seven percent

in 2014. Terror attacks are mainly accomplished with explosives which cause heavy structural damages to buildings, infrastructure and other properties. In the case of 2013 Westgate attack, the owners of the building spent Kshs 190 million and 2 years to rebuild. The American embassy was destroyed in the 1998 terror attack to such an extent that it was never rebuilt, with an adjoining building collapsing and hundreds of others requiring extensive repair work. Even when the rest of the country is attacked ripple effects are felt greatly in Nairobi.

2.9.2 Socio-political Effects

Kenya had a reported national unemployment rate of 40% in 2011 (UNISDR, 2004) and a staggering unemployment of out of school youth estimated at 75% especially among Muslim youth. A lot of terror activities have been concentrated in the estates where they live. Al-Shabaab is reported to offer approximately 40,000 Kenyan shillings per month or four times the average national pay to each youth who join their organization and trains in Somalia (UNISDR, 2004). This promise of an income is one of the identified motivators of radicalization of Kenyan youth to join terror groups. Further, the attack that occurred in Nairobi led to sociopolitical effects that resulted into loss of life and disruption, growing tension between Christians and Muslims (Otiso, 2009).

2.9.3 Psychological Effects

Terrorism in Nairobi has cost the county the death of workers and family members, loss of occupations and property and hence induced serious psychological effects on the citizens. The loss of a sense of security due to fear of other attacks has perhaps led to the greatest of all psychological losses (Brewin, 2003). The significant others of victims and survivors of attacks usually go through long and painful and traumatizing recovery efforts. Still others manifest post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms (Otiso, 2009). Attacks by terrorist possess psychological effects on communities and direct culprits, insecurity, stress and increased threat perception that results into behavioural change that might lead to trauma (Shuster et al., 2001; Huddy et al., (2004)

2.10 Challenges of Implementing Risk Reduction Strategies in Nairobi

Lack of a disaster management framework policy and a crisis centre to organize and assess the magnitude of the disasters

Lack of dedicated funding and resources not budgeted in the national and county government. The cost of gathering intelligence is not catered for and they have to rely on information gathered by other intelligence agents.

Complex religious ethno-political situation in Nairobi like all other metropolitan cities in the world due to existence of many denominations.

Lack of a coordination centre and thus a haphazard and uncoordinated response provided by the concerned government agencies example experience in Westgate attack in September 2013.

Lack of a risk assessment audit in Nairobi city on disaster management. No available audit reports to give the actual details and recommendations on how to handle the disasters.

Many unresolved regional disputes and conflicts in Kenya's bordering regions like Somalia, Southern Sudan and others states like DRC which have eyes on Nairobi as their business and communication hub.

Lack of metropolitan police force for the city of Nairobi. The city has to rely on other police forces like the army, GSU which are located in the outskirts of the city.

Lack of communication and cohesiveness between government agents and private service providers. eg Safaricom and Airtel.

High level of unemployment among the youth, leading to them being forced by circumstances to join terrorist groups who are able to pay them well making it a fertile recruitment ground in Nairobi.

Lack of legal framework and thus terror groups will continue to exploit the lack of law and order to recruit, operate and threaten targets in Nairobi.

Radicalization of youth by extremist groups like Al Shabab and recruitment of youths from Muslim, other religions and communities.

Violent extremist ideologies associated with Al Shabab. This group regards most government in Muslim countries as 'unislamic' and thus fights against them i.e. they fight against other religions.

Presently, these threats from terrorist vary from threats faced in Kenya. These terror goons claim credit for their actions having a wide-range of religious and political ambitions. Majority of them seek public casualties such as West Gate massacre, they executed attacks without warning while they target recruits from non-Muslim communities across the world.

2.10.1 Introducing a Tested Model UK of Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare in Nairobi

As a result of the above, Nairobi as the seat of Kenya government and the leading business center in Eastern Africa should develop effective risk reduction strategies to focus on the threat and impact of terror attacks. The United Kingdom which have also experienced and still faces considerable risk from terrorist attacks have developed a four point national strategy that can be adapted by Kenya (HMS, 2009).

2.10.2 The UK Pursue Strategy

This is the most immediate priority for the UK Government. Since terrorists operate secretly, intelligence is key in detecting impending attacks. Counter-terrorism techniques include advice on legal matters and training on human rights and building capacity to boost efficiency and enhance coordination between stakeholders and security agencies (HMS, 2009).

In the improved UK legislation against terrorism, crime that relate to acts of terrorism, training, terrorism training and terrorism publication has been given more concentration as a reliable approach to counter terror. Although the government has put in place a range of alternatives to protect the public these however, is not satisfactory and sustainable with constant review since these attacks are dynamic. The government has invested immensely to counter terrorism by laying legal structures and human rights training. These has been done in partnership with more than 20 countries around the world, Kenya is one the beneficiaries of these programmes.

Other pursue objectives include development of efficient non-prosecution acts to disrupt activities of terror overseas through counter-terrorism and the UK's counter-insurgency and building capacity in Afghanistan, Pakistan and coordinating partnership between shareholders. Protecting human rights is an essential principle that gives the UK the reason to fight against terrorism and guarantee the right to life. Kenya is also expected some of these practices to succeeding in fighting terror.

Some of the challenges will include the legislation passed to fight terror in Kenya which was watered down and weakened by parliamentarians pursuing their different agendas in the process of passing the law. The Prevention of Terrorism Act No. 30 of 2012 is quite vague in many aspects unlike the UK legislation. Legislating on terrorism in the Kenyan

parliament was a long and a stormy process that took years to complete due to the definitional challenges of the concept, the different contexts that influence its definition and competing interests along political party lines and individual interests.

In the Act that was finally passed, "terrorist act" was described as an action that threatens an individual's life, this exposes people to health and safety risks as a consequence, it cause damage to property that entails use of explosives that involves release of toxics and radioactive waste. This brings about interference with electronic systems causing disruption in communication system and national security. This is intended to impose fear to the public or to induce the government to refrain from certain acts (National Council for Law Reporting, 2012). To counter these acts, the government has empowered law enforcement agencies to decisively probe into terror matters without violating human rights.

2.10.3 The UK Prevent Strategy

The strategy involves preventing people from joining terrorist or supporting their activities, it is based on understanding the basis of radicalization and how the youth is lured in joining such activities. This strategy had 5 sought to accomplish five objectives: challenging the idea of violence and extremists and finding ways to avert violence (Her Majesty's Service, 2009). To achieve this strategy, the UK government purposed terrorism risk reduction to stop attacks and disorganize terrorist activities. This followed the prevention strategy set out in 2007. This was aimed at minimizing radicalization including challenging the ideas and the agenda to promote violent activities in areas where the propagated terrorism. Communities were made aware of the ills of terrorism through campaigns and dialogue, this was realized through investing in intelligence systems and monitoring communications and activities that were meant to support terrorism, to support these programmes a budget of KES 21 billion was allocated.

One of the challenges of implementing a similar strategy for Nairobi is the prohibitive cost of gathering and analyzing intelligence. Nairobi therefore relies heavily on intelligence gathered by U.K, U.S. and other friendly nations. Unemployment levels continued on a high especially among the most vulnerable demographic group, the youth, with only 80,000 jobs created in 2014 (GoK, 2015) thus providing extremists with fertile recruiting grounds in Nairobi.

2.10.4 Protect Strategy

To achieve the aim of their strategy the UK have realized the need to reduce exposing the nation and its interests to attacks by terrorist. This strategy protects the Critical National Infrastructure (CNI), crowded areas, the transportation system and national borders from misuse of risky materials (HMS, 2009). To accomplish the set strategy, there is a need to mitigate exposing the country to any form of threat that may arise from terror. However, progressive efforts have been made; the strategy seeks to protect areas that can be used as platforms to facilitate terrorist activities. Reports indicate that terrorist targets the UK. Government has set out an inclusive programme to safeguard the state infrastructure from being inhabited by terrorist; this programme gets support from Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI). The state has developed a transport infrastructure integrated with biometric systems to track visitors in and out of the country to boost security at the borders and give support to counterterrorist investigations

In the local setting, implementing the protect strategy would be prohibitive due to the immense resources required. Investing in technology and human capital would dent the national budget which always has to be supplemented with donor funding. Political will to recruit personnel or buy the required technology may not exist (Davis, 2010).

2.10.5 The UK Prepare Strategy

This strategy seeks to mitigate the impact of attacks from terrorist. It involves managing a continuing attack and recovery (HMS, 2009). In UK, the government has plans in place of dealing with emergencies cases such as terrorism. Organisations have are empowered to execute their work accordingly by equipping them with organisational resources. Approaches to counter attacks from terrorist have been improved by Police Counter-Terrorism Network through integrated programmes. These are meant to build capacity and enhance effectiveness to counter-terrorism attack. Attacks from terrorist from other nations have been applied to develop the response model.

A challenge of implementing this strategy is that Nairobi has borne the brunt of terrorist attacks in Kenya. One overriding observation is the haphazard, uncoordinated response provided by concerned government agencies when an attack is carried out. They are uncoordinated and in one extreme case, competing agencies at the Westgate mall exchanged live fire resulting in the death and injury of members of the General Service unit and delayed the response period to four days. Private organizations and well-wishers

exploit this vacuum and end up coordinating and providing more support to survivors than from government agencies. The national government and county government of Nairobi even officially delegate their responsibilities of responding to some of these private organizations which results in survivors being abandoned with no means of support soon after an incident. The National Disaster Operations Center whose work is to coordinate such response seem overshadowed by Non- profit organizations who specialize in disaster response.

2.10.6 Other Challenges to Implementation of UK Model in Nairobi

Some other challenges that may complicate implementation of the U.K. model above include first and foremost the many unresolved regional disputes and conflicts in the region with focus on Somalia and South Sudan and other state fragile states like D.R.C. Congo, Central African Republic all of which have eyes on Nairobi as their business and communication hub (Davis, 2010) as long as the countries do not have strong stable central governments, terror groups will continue to exploit the lack of law and order to recruit, train, operate and threaten targets in Nairobi.

The violent extremist ideology linked to Al Shabaab is an implementation challenge. This group regard look at governments in Muslim nations as ‘un-Islamic’ or apostate; meaning that such government are maintain by Western states that are engaged in international attack on Islam while considering violent action as a religious duty of all Muslims which might culminate the creation of worldwide caliphate (Davis, 2010).

Modern technologies have facilitated terrorist force multiplication through media propaganda, communications, banking and general terrorist operations (Davis, 2010). Nairobi has to invest heavily in technology that betters these used by terror groups. Border crossings, airports and other critical areas need to well protect.

The fourth challenge is the radicalization of youth by extremist groups like Al Shabaab. The process in which people especially, youth supports violence extremism and terror groups (Ploch, 2010). Nairobi terror attackers in the early years used to be foreign nationals. Today terror groups prefer to recruit youth from non-Muslim communities who may raise little or no suspicion to poorly trained security staff (Ploch, 2010).

2.11 Theoretical Framework

Social learning theorists note that crime is as a result of understanding values and behaviours related to criminal actions. Differential association theory is social learning

theory by Edwin Sutherland that holds that the primary principles of differential association involve criminal behaviour. Criminal behaviour is learnt and applied over time. An example in this case is terrorism behaviour which is grouped the same way as any other behaviour like writing. Two criminal approaches are learnt. Learning criminal behaviour entails acquiring techniques to commit crime which are complex and simple. This requires understanding the motive and attitudes of the criminal behaviour. Children might meet and relate with criminal “mentors” who impart and develop skills of bombing and use of explosives. Thirdly, perceptions of legal code influence motives and drives. The intent and set goal learnt from the various aspects of legal code has either a positive or negative impact on the moral behaviours of individuals. People go through cultural conflict when faced with diverse and contrasting attitudes towards right and wrong, moral and immoral. Associating with deviant peers sustains deviant attitudes that anchor terrorism and crime in groups and individuals.

2.12 Conceptual Framework

This includes vulnerability to terrorism, risks / effects of terrorism, challenges in implementation, current risk reduction strategies and counter terrorism. Challenges do exist but the government has also employed some risk reduction strategies which are not adequate to handle the terrorist attacks and thus the Kenyan government should employ more risk reduction strategies and improve on the already existing ones in order to reduce the risk of terrorism attacks.




Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter outlines the research methods that were adopted to meet the study objectives. These include: research design, target population, sampling technique, data collection methods, data collection procedures, instruments validity and reliability and data analysis methods

3.1 Research Design

The study adopted the descriptive research design. Burns and Grove (2003), descriptive research aims to give a description of the present situation. It can be applied to determine a hypothetical nexus between variables. It may be used to justify current practice and make a judgment and also to develop theories by allowing respondents to answer questions from a tool which for this study is a questionnaire. The descriptive design was appropriate for the study as it sought to collect information from a target population on the terrorist attacks reduction strategies in Nairobi County and challenges associated with implementation. The descriptive design was also appropriate for the study as it undertook a cross-sectional research design which involves collection of data for a specified period of time.

3.2 Target Population

The study targeted Nairobi city inspectorate staff. They are charged with the primary role of maintaining order and security in the city and are on the front line of defense in protecting Nairobi against terror. Most are stationed within Nairobi's Central Business District and are familiar with the subject of security. The target population included Constables, Sergeants, senior sergeants, Inspectors and Chief Inspectors in the Nairobi city inspectorate who are 1,125 in number.

3.3 Sampling Size and Sampling Technique

A sample is a representation of a population (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2007). Mugenda and Mugenda (2003), a sample size of 10 % - 30 % of the target population adequate for research. The researcher sampled 10 % of the target population. The sample size for the study was therefore 111 respondents. Target population was 1125 but the ample size was 111 respondents.

The study adopted the stratified random sampling procedure. Stratified random sampling involves distinguishing the population into mutually exclusive groups from which random samples are then collected for inclusion in the sample size. The sample was collected from the city county inspectorate team which involved the chief inspector, inspectors, senior sergeants and constables in various capacities.

Table 3.1: Sample Distribution of Employees

Categories	Population	Percent (%)	Sample
Constables	366	10	36
Sergeants	289	10	29
Senior sergeants	199	10	19
Inspectors	150	10	15
Chief inspectors	121	10	12
Total	1,125		111

Source: Nairobi County Government Records (2015)

3.4 Data Collection Methods

The researcher adopted both quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection. These consist of questionnaires and key informant interviews.

3.4.1 Questionnaires

The questionnaire is an ideal instrument to gather descriptive information from a large sample in a fairly short time (Kothari, 2004). The questionnaire was the most appropriate tool for the study as it sought to gather information from a relatively large population of respondents. The tool was ideal for the study as it seeks to measure different aspects of the terrorist reduction strategies in Nairobi County. The questionnaire consisted of five sections. These included: background information of respondents (social demographic statistics), vulnerability factors that make Nairobi's CBD attractive to terrorist threats, risk reduction strategies employed to counter terrorist attacks in Nairobi's Central Business District, and challenges associated with implementing risk reduction strategies in Nairobi's Central Business District.

3.4.2 Key Informant Interviews

The researcher adopted key informant interviews to complement data gathered through the questionnaires. The researcher conducted a key informant interview with the Director of the City Inspectorate Department. The researcher developed a key informant interview guide which was used to conduct a semi-structured interview with the Director, his

deputy and four assistant directors in the office setting. The choice for using the semi-structured interview was to allow the researcher to probe for more information from the respondent during the course of the interview not sticking to a strict guideline but rather an informal discussion on the topic.

The advantage of using this technique is that the interviewer can engage in a discussion with the interviewee on the subject under study. The discussions allowed the researcher to gather information that may not have been anticipated during the development of the proposal but may be significant to the study.

3.5 Data Collection Procedures

The researcher developed an introduction letter to the respondents on the objectives and purposes of the study and also guaranteeing the respondents of the anonymous, confidential and the voluntary participation of the research. The researcher sought a letter of data collection authorization from the University of Nairobi. The data collection process began with administration of the questionnaires to the sampled respondents. The questionnaires were administered through the drop and pick approach in order to motivate the respondents to participate in the data collection activities. The questionnaires were administered for one month (September 2015). The researcher administered questionnaires through head of department at the city inspectorate. The researcher then collected the questionnaires at the end of each day for those that have been duly filled.

The researcher conducted the key informant interview with the Directorate after the analysis of the questionnaires. The advantage of this approach is that the researcher was able to follow-up on the observed trends from the questionnaires. The key informant interview was conducted in the respondents' office which enhanced the comfort of the respondents and therefore motivated their participation in the interview.

3.6 Instruments Validity and Reliability

The researcher conducted a pilot test to establish the validity and reliability of the instrument. The pretest involved administration of the questionnaire to a representative sample through a pilot study. The researcher used the test-retest approach to establish the validity and reliability of the instrument. The researcher administered the questionnaire to 10 % of the sample in the first test and to the same group in the second test after a duration of one week as recommended by Simon (2011) and were not included in the final sample size of the study. The researcher calculated the correlation coefficient

between the two tests. A higher correlation coefficient of the score from the two sets of questionnaires signifies a higher reliability. According to Bryman (2006) suggests a correlation co-efficient of $\alpha > 0.7$, the research instrument was termed reliable. The correlation coefficient of the instrument was found to be 0.8 which means it was reliable.

3.7 Data Analysis Methods

The data analysis process aims at making sense of raw data collected from the field into information which can be understood and comprehended by the researcher and their audience (Cohen et al., 2007). There are several steps involved in undertaking research data analysis. First, data gathered from the questionnaires were coded and this process was completed with the researcher having a code sheet for the questionnaire. Secondly, data was entered into the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). Third, the researcher identified the statistical procedures to be used to analyze the data. Descriptive statistics is the first step of analyzing data which present the information in summary to be able to show trends in the data through means, frequencies and percentages. in the study, qualitative data has been analyzed and presented in verbatim to complement the quantitative data.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the data analysis and presentation which comprises gathering information from social and demographic statistics. Factors Influencing Vulnerability to Terrorism Attacks, Risk Reduction Strategies and challenges of implementing risk reduction strategies in Nairobi City

4.1 Social Demographic Statistics

4.1.1 Gender

Table 4.1 shows that 67.4 % were male respondents and 32.6 % were female respondents. These findings are attributed to the nature of work, security involves more male than female as it's a risky job. The findings explain that male are more involved in the security and keeping order in the city due to the safety of work. More females should be recruited to balance the gender.

Table 4.1: Gender of Respondents

Gender	Frequency	Percent
Male	62	67.4
Female	30	32.6
Total	92	100.0

4.1.2 Age

In terms of their age, Table 4.2 shows 35.9 % were 41-50, 26% were 31-40, 19.6 % were over 50, 17.4 % were 25-30 and 1.1 % were under 25 years. This shows majority are in the age group 41-50, thus county required to recruit young people to replace those in the next few years, and should also have a program for exit.

Table 4.2: Age of Respondents

Age	Frequency	Percent
Under 25	1	1.1
25-30	16	17.4
31-40	24	26
41-50	33	35.9
Over 50	18	19.6
Total	92	100.0

4.1.3 Education

With regard to their education, 39.1 % were diploma, 23.9 % were certificate, 20.7 % were bachelor degree and 16.3 % were postgraduate degree as shown in Table 4.3. These findings are attributed to the heterogeneous nature of the respondents who had different academic qualifications and also different occupations and professions and were literate.

Table 4.3: Education of Respondents

Education	Frequency	Percent
Certificate	22	23.9
Diploma	36	39.1
Bachelor Degree	19	20.7
Postgraduate Degree	15	16.3
Total	92	100.0

4.1.4 Job Experience

Table 4.4 shows that 63.0 % of the respondents involved in the projects for more than 11 years, 27.2 % were 6-10 years and 9.8 % had less than 5 years. These results validate the finding of the study as the majority of the respondents had experience with the security jobs for more than 11 years.

Table 4.4: Experience of Respondents

Experience	Frequency	Percent
Less than 5 years	9	9.8
6-10 years	25	27.2
More than 11 years	58	63.0
Total	92	100.0

4.1.5 Religion

Table 4.5 shows the religion of respondents where 70.6 % were Christian, 25.0 % were Muslim and 4.4 % of the respondents other religious affiliations. This difference is due to the fact that Kenya is a multi-religious state where there is freedom of religion. This shows that the fear of God does not stop people from committing crime.

Table 4.5: Religion of Respondents

Religion	Frequency	Percent
Christian	65	70.6
Muslim	23	25.0
Others	4	4.4
Total	92	100.0

4.1.6 Rank of Respondents

The results show that 44.5 % were constable ranks, 26.0 % were sergeant, 15.2 % were senior sergeant, 11.0 % were inspector and 3.3 % were chief inspector rank as shown in Table 4.6.

Table 4.6: Rank of Respondents

Rank	Frequency	Percent
Constables	41	44.5
Sergeants	24	26.0
Senior sergeants	14	15.2
Inspector s	10	11.0
Chief inspectors	3	3.3
Total	92	100.0

4.2 Factors Influencing Vulnerability to Terrorism Attacks

There are several vulnerability factors that make cities and major urban centers vulnerable to terrorist attacks. The study sought to identify the factors that make Nairobi city a target for terrorism attacks. As observed in Table 4.7, the highest mean score was observed for corruption (M=4.34), Inadequate technological tools (M=4.24), Poor counter-terrorism strategies (M=3.95), Weak legal framework (M=3.93) and Weak border controls (M=3.92).

A weak legal framework has been found to be a determinant of terror attacks. Oino and Sorre (2013) abide that the existing law has providing room for terrorism to thrive across the country. Kenya's legal framework is not satisfactory to effectively regulate and mitigate terror attacks.

Opon, Okoth and Onkware (2015) notes the government has been reluctant to strengthen the present law to avoid breeding grounds for corruption and room for terrorism attacks. Specifically, little has been done to counter border attacks. These results are in support of the objections by Orttung (2013), who posit that corruption among agencies of security and official across the borders are key factors that pave way to terrorist entry in the country leading to attacks.

Table 4.7: Factors Influencing Vulnerability to Terrorism Attacks

Factors	No Extent	Little Extent	Moderate Extent	Slight Extent	Great Extent	Total Percentage	Mean
Corruption	6.5	3.3	2.2	26	62.0	100	4.34
Inadequate technological tools	3.3	5.4	6.5	33.7	51.1	100	4.24
Weak border controls	4.4	8.7	20.7	35.8	30.4	100	3.92
Weak legal framework	3.3	8.7	19.6	28.3	40.2	100	3.93
Poor counter-terrorism strategies	4.3	4.3	15.2	44.6	31.5	100	3.95

The results also show the perceptions of the respondents in terms of the poor counter-terrorism strategies adopted. The government has already implemented military response strategies. Mephram (2002) opines, purely military responses to terrorism are likely to fail and that a successful precaution against it requires a well-developed policy response and robust measures. One of the most effective actions in fighting terrorism is to identify the factors that are related to the formation of terrorism and to determine the conditions that enable terrorist groups to operate and find support for their activities (Feridun & Sezgin, 2008).

According to the key informant, there were several factors that contributed to vulnerability of the business district to terror attacks.

Public ignorance of the county laws that prohibit street vending and other activities

Lack of integrated electronic crime monitoring systems with the different law enforcement and security agencies.

Traffic congestion and illegal parking within the Central Business District Hawking in the city

A large group of unemployed youth

4.3 Risk Reduction Strategies

4.3.1 Types of risk reduction strategies adopted

The types of risk reduction strategies cited by the respondents were Automation of services (13.0 %), Metal detectors and electronic detect system in buildings (40.2 %), frequent checks and search in interest areas (29.3 %), Closing of major/significant roads (7.6 %) and managing random security checks in public places as presented in Table 4.8.

In terms of closing major/significant roads as a risk reduction strategy has been suggested by Odhiambo, Maito and Onkware (2013) recommendation that the most fundamental action that can be taken to protect or deny physical access to vulnerable points sometimes may be as easy as locking gates or buildings, or reducing public access to sensitive locations. The government should station law enforcement officers at “critical sites” to manner the movement of the public entering and leaving the buildings.

Table 4.8: Risk Reduction Strategies Adopted

Response	Frequency	Percent
Automation of services ie installation of CCTV Cameras	12	13.0
Metal detectors / electronic detection systems in buildings entrances and public places	37	40.2
Frequent checks and search in interest areas like government offices	27	29.3
Closing of major/significant roads entering and leaving the city	7	7.6
Managing random security checks in public places like shopping malls and bus terminus	9	9.9
Total	92	100.0

According to the key informant, there were risk reductions strategies adopted to counter terrorism activities and attacks. These included;

Intensifying surveillance through closed circuit television (CCTV) in points of interest.

Intensifying patrols and clear streets of street vendors

Enforcement of the traffic county laws to reduce vehicular congestion within the streets

4.3.2 Effectiveness of Risk Reduction Strategies

The study sought to determine the effectiveness of the risk reduction strategies adopted by the county government as an opinion of the researcher. As shown in Table 4.9, 45.7 % were no extent at all, 31.5 % were little extent, 9.8 % were neutral and 13.0 % were to a large extent, this implies that most of the respondents are not aware or don't understand which risk strategies are in place.

Table 4.9: Effectiveness of risk reduction strategies

Response	Frequency	Percent
No extent at all	42	45.7
Little extent	29	31.5
Neutral	9	9.8
To a large extent	12	13.0
Total	92	100.0

4.4 Challenges of implementing risk reduction strategies

4.4.1 Security Personnel Challenges

In regards of the challenges facing security personnel, the study found that 22.8 % were salary related issues and lack of motivation, 18.5 % were poor working conditions, 6.5 % were management issues, 9.2 % were social security issues, 32.6 % were technological issues and 10.4 % were all the above as illustrated in Table 4.10.

Table 4.10: Security Personnel Challenges

Challenges	Frequency	Percent
Poor remuneration thus lacks motivation to work harder	21	22.8
Poor working environment and lack of working tools	17	18.5
Lack of involvement in management programs like decision making and implementation	6	6.5
Protection and security of the personnel as they perform their duties	8	9.2
Old and outdated technology with many breakdown of equipment	30	32.6
Inadequate skills and development due to lack of training and advancement	10	10.4
Total	92	100.0

The majority of the respondents cited technological issues as a major challenge. Kalu (2009) agrees that due to increased wave of terrorist attacks, many counter terrorism measures such as use of programmed ‘smart’ cameras, positioning snipers at specific locations, undercover security operatives and multiple checks using different operational methodologies have been implemented with little success.

According to Opon et al. (2015) study on immigration border control, human resource challenges and opportunities affecting counter-terrorism strategies in Kenya were some of the significant finding of the researcher. The study found that 10.4% of the respondents agreed that they were not provided with adequate training relevant to their jobs. 18.5% of respondents said they had insufficient working tools and 22.8% of the respondents said their remuneration was not attractive and no motivation and 32.6% attributed old and outdated technology with many breakdown of equipment. Thus not able to match with the modern technology used by the terrorists attackers.

4.4.2 City Security Staff Challenges in Implementing Risk Reduction Strategies

Table 4.11 shows the challenges of the city inspectorate staff which included Lack of cooperation from the public (26.1 %), Poor/inadequate equipment (19.5 %), inadequate financial resources (24.0 %), Poor inadequate training (20.6 %) and All the above (9.8 %).

Table 4.11: City Inspectorate Staff Challenges in Implementing Risk Reduction Strategies

Challenges	Frequency	Percent
Lack of cooperation and support by the public	24	26.1
Inadequate equipment and tools which are old and outdated	18	19.5
Inadequate financial resources and funding to implement programmes	22	24.0
Inadequate training and development to match the world standards	19	20.6
All the above	9	9.8
Total	92	100.0

According to Oino and Sorre (2013) prior to the recent terrorist acts in the country, there were certainly counterterrorism units that existed in both the law enforcement and intelligence arenas. The main problems, however, were based on lack of funding, inadequate resources and lack of well-coordinated efforts. The National Security Intelligence Service was established following the US embassy bombings attacks in 1998, after which Kenya was added to the U.S. Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (Mogire & Agade, 2011).

Although The Kenyan Government created an Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU), a Joint Terrorism Task Force-that has since been disbanded (Aronson, 2012), a National Counter-Terrorism Centre, and a National Security Advisory Committee. However, the problem still remains that the infrastructure has yet been seen to affect authorities' ability to identify terrorists, foil terrorist plots, and bring criminals to justice (Prestholt, 2011). This has instilled fear and lack of confidence from the public and thus lack of cooperation.

Lack of cooperation and participation from the public is also a challenge to the implementation of risk reduction strategies and the fight against terrorism. Oino and Sorre (2013) argue that the public does not trust the security officials when it comes to terrorism and security matters in general. Intelligence officials have been accused

numerous times of unlawfully detaining suspected terrorists for lengthy periods of time and torturing suspects in attempts to gain confessions and further intelligence (Prestholdt, 2011).

According to the key informant, there were recommendations that would improve the effect of the risk reduction strategies, these included;

Provision of adequate equipment and workforce that would be able to handle the large numbers of the people who are not willing to comply with the county laws

Increase the capacity and frequency of public forums to sensitize the public on need to respect and honour county laws through; public awareness campaigns to educate and sensitize them on the importance.

Training and refresher courses for the security team, in order to keep up with the world standards of anti-terrorism.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the summary of the study, discussion of findings, conclusions and recommendations of the study.

5.1 Summary

The purpose of this study was to determine the challenges associated with terrorist risk reduction strategies in Nairobi. The study was guided by four specific objectives: to establish the vulnerability factors that make Nairobi's CBD attractive to terrorist threats; to identify risk reduction strategies employed to counter terrorist attacks in Nairobi's Central Business District; to assess the significance of risk reduction strategies for Nairobi central Business District and to determine challenges of implementing risk reduction strategies in Nairobi's Central Business District. The study adopted the descriptive research design, targeted Nairobi City Inspectorate Staff including Constables, Sergeants, Senior Sergeants, Inspectors and Chief Inspectors in the Nairobi City Inspectorate department who are 1,125 in number. The sample size for the study was 111 respondents and stratified random sampling procedure was used to select respondents included in the sample. The questionnaire was adopted for collecting data for the study as it gathered information from a large population of respondents. The researcher also involved key informant interviews to complement data gathered through the questionnaires. Descriptive statistics were used in analyzing data which represent the information in summary to be able to show trends in the data through means, standard deviation, frequencies and percentages. The qualitative data was presented in verbatim to complement the quantitative data.

5.2 Discussion

5.2.1 Vulnerability factors that make Nairobi's Central Business District Attractive to Terrorist Threats

The study findings show that corruption is a factor that contributed highly to the vulnerability of the business district to terror attacks. The issue of corruption affects the different departments, government agencies and the implementation of risk reduction strategies. For instance, corruption in the Immigration Department and the Registrar of Persons has made it easy for aliens to acquire Kenyan passports and identity cards. To address the problem, the government has undertaken drastic measures to curb corruption,

example formation of independent body to tackle corruption (KACCA) and automation of immigration and registration of persons department.

5.2.2 Risk Reduction Strategies Employed to Counter Terrorist Threats in Nairobi's Central Business District

This includes intensifying surveillance through CCTV cameras in points of interests like round about and major key roads entering and leaving the city. Intensifying patrols in the major target areas and enforcement of Traffic County by laws and reduction of congestion with the CBD area by clearing the streets off street vendors and hawkers.

The government has focused on is guarding airports and seaports against the illegal entry of undesirable material or personnel by increasing of naval patrol in our territorial waters and introduction of detection equipments (CCTV Cameras). However, success in this area depends on a change in attitude by both the personnel and public in order to inculcate a sense of security consciousness, along with the government's commitment to continue with the war on corruption at the ports. Security should be a concern for every individual as it begins with me and you.

5.2.3 Challenges of Implementing Terrorist Risk Reduction Strategies within the Central Business District

With regard to the challenges facing the implementation of risk reduction strategies to terror, the findings showed that lack of cooperation from the public (26.1 %) and inadequate financial resources (24.0 %) were rated as the most significant challenges. Lack of cooperation from the public is due to the lack of trust and confidence with the security agents as they relate them as corrupt. In order to improve efficiency in law enforcement and enhance intelligence gathering, the police should be specially trained in counterterrorism techniques and public relations to inculcate, a high degree of professionalism when dealing with the public. In addition, the government should provide adequate resourcing in terms of technological devices and communication to the police and the intelligence communities to improve their efficiency and be able to deal with the modern sophisticated terrorists attackers who use even smart phones.

Legislation passed to fight terror in Kenya which was watered down and weakened by parliamentarian. Prevention of terrorism act No. 30 2012 is quite vague as compared to UK Legislation. Cost of implementation is prohibitive i.e. cost of gathering and analysing intelligence. Unemployment levels especially among the youth providing extremists with

fertile recruiting grounds in Nairobi. Investing in modern and latest technology and human capital require a lot of resources and development of the national budget which always has to be supplemented by donor funding. Haphazard, uncoordinated response provided by concerned government agencies when an attack is carried out e.g. competing agencies at the Westgate mall. Unresolved regional disputes and conflicts in the regions with focus on Somalia and South Sudan, West Africa country etc. Lack of law and order, legislative legal framework. Violent extremist ideology associated with Al-Shabaab; claiming that non-Muslim governments are sustained by western states who are engaged in global attack. Media propaganda, communication border crossing, airport and other critical areas need to be well protected. Radicalization of youth by extremist groups like Al-Shabab, training youth from non-Muslim communities.

5.3 Conclusion

The study concludes that the security agents in Nairobi city have employed reactionary measures to terrorism, not putting into consideration that terrorism is a well-coordinated activity that requires consistent and robust long-term measures to combat it. Kenya must create more public awareness and participation, involve service providers like Safaricom, Airtel, Orange, advance and embrace good technology like use of programmed smart cameras to help identify and locate terrorists and their groups, make early warnings, protect our borders, and encourage Kenyans to remain resolute in the face of adversity. Acts of terror are not extraordinary or super human activities, they are simple and predictable plans executed by people who throughout the planning and execution stages are in deep fear but preferred to be don't care or carefree.

Punishment and imprisonment of offenders should be increased so that others can fear to commit the same offence due to the implications. Military should join hands with other security agents to fight the terrorist threats and attacks in the CBD. The public should be properly sensitized and educated on terrorism threats and how to stay safe and secure from the dangers.

Lack of counter terrorism legislation is a factor influencing vulnerability to terrorism according to the findings of the study. Counterterrorism legislation is an important instrument of an effective counterterrorism strategy, and any government confronted with the threat of terrorism should enact such legislation. The implementation of such laws

expresses the government's political will to combat the threat and protect the public against danger and harm.

The fight against terrorism in Kenya not just Nairobi City requires more personnel, specialized equipment and professional training in counterterrorism. There is inadequate funding resulting in a large strain on the department to adopt best practices in guaranteeing for the safety of the public from terror attacks in the business district.

One of the challenges was lack of cooperation from the public in implementation of terror risk reduction strategies in Nairobi Central Business District. The study concludes that the presence of professional trained and motivated security agents in the NCBD will enhance the public's trust and confidence in the security team and forge a more effective partnership to fight terrorism and other crimes in the country. A structured concept of community policing, supported by clear roles of citizens and other stakeholders, will greatly help the public cooperate in providing intelligence information gaining trust and confidence with security team as a whole, this team work and ownership of the city be all.

5.4 Recommendations

Based on the study findings, the study makes the following recommendations;

1. Public awareness sensitization, education on risk of terrorist attacks and ways of dealing with the attack when it occurs. The government should organize for public participation meeting where public is provided with information on how terrorist attack, means of preventing or reducing the harm which could occur. Train the public on safety and security measures, provision of information through bulletins, pamphlets and other media channels. For example we can borrow some ideas from neighboring country Uganda.
2. Partnership with service providers like Safaricom, Airtel and other communication companies where information can be disseminated through use of sms alerts.
3. Metropolitan policing: train a special force and terrorist police force to protect Nairobi metropolitan against terrorists.
4. Training of all security officers in the country and county on anti-terrorist tactics and handling of new technological equipments.
5. Enhance security along Kenya – Somali border by creating a border patrol road to ease the movement of our forces. Create security check points on all roads leading

from our borders, and equip them with latest security technology on detection of weapons and explosives, in addition to detecting known and unknown terrorist.

6. Advance security technology and equipments: The government should acquire the latest model of technology and equipments which are ways ahead of the terrorist's modern way of operation. This includes internet connections where information can be accessed and transmitted to all security officers all over the country speedily. Acquire and purchase modern smart equipments for security officers and train them on how to effectively use them.
7. Adequate resources: This includes human, capital and finances. Recruit young and energetic youth to handle the terrorist issue, thus prevent them from being recruited by the Al-Shabab and pay them well in order to motivate them to work.
8. The Nairobi county government should have a long term plan to decongest the CBD of public vehicles, hawkers and other unplanned operations. There should be designated bus stops outside Nairobi CBD to cater for all incoming traffic to and from Nairobi to various destinations around the country and neighbouring countries borrow from Tanzania (Modern Dar-es-salaam bus station).
9. Legal and legislation policy framework: the government and anti-corruption polices on terrorist related issues should be criminalized. Severe penalties and imprisonment on those who break the law and regulation imposed upon them by the county government should be implemented.
10. Nyumba Kumi policy: This is a great idea and residents of the city should be encouraged to own it up. The government should enforce and implement the same. For example borrow a leaf from Tanzania where the policy starts from the village level and goes all the way to the council of governors.
11. Recommend a crisis management team, comprising of all security emergency and disaster management, policy makers that is county government police, emergency services providers (St. John Ambulance, AAR, Red Cross) and any other related service providers. This implies team work which involves all personnel in security and safety of Kenyans.

5.5 Areas of Further Study

There is need for research coupled with cooperation from practitioners, government agencies and academicians on the counterterrorism measures adopted by the government and other security agencies.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CITY INSPECTORATE OFFICERS

I am a student undertaking a master degree in advanced Disaster management in the department of Sociology in Nairobi University. I would like to collect data from you using this questionnaire for the purpose of research.

I hereby assure you that your responses shall be treated with total confidentiality. Your genuine response will go a long way in assisting this study. Your cooperation is highly appreciated in advances.

Instructions

Please tick (√) or fill the most appropriate response.

Section 1: Social Demographic Statistics

1. Gender

Male Female

2. Age

Under 25 41-50
25-30 Over 50
31-40

3. Education

Certificate Bachelor degree
Diploma Postgraduate degree

4. Experience (number of years in profession)

Less than 5 years More than 11 years
6-10 years

5. Religion

Christian []

Buddhist []

Muslim []

Other (*Specify*)

Others []

6. Rank of respondents

Constables []

Inspectors []

Sergeants []

Chief inspectors []

Senior sergeants []

Section 2: vulnerability factors that make Nairobi’s CBD attractive to terrorist threats.

7. Below are some of the factors that make Nairobi County attractive to terrorist threats.

Please rate as appropriate.

Factors	No Extent	Little	Moderate	Slight	Great
Corruption					
Inadequate technological tools					
Weak border controls					
Weak legal framework					
Poor counter-terrorism strategies					
<i>Other (Specify)</i>					

8. What other vulnerability factors do you think that make Nairobi Central Business District attractive for terrorists attacks/threats

.....
.....
.....

Section 3: Risk reduction strategies employed to counter terrorist attacks in Nairobi's Central Business District

9. Are there any risk reduction strategies adopted by the Nairobi County Government to counter terrorism?

- Yes []
- No []
- Not sure []

10. If yes, what are some of these risk reduction strategies that have been adopted?

- Automation of services like the CCTV Cameras installation []
- Metal detectors in the entrance of buildings and other facilities []
- Frequent checks and search in interest areas like government offices []
- Closing of major/significant roads entering and leaving the city []
- Random security checks in public places like shopping malls & bus terminus []
- Other (*Specify*)

11. To what extent have these risk reduction strategies contributed to low terrorists threats?

- No extent at all []
- Little extent []
- Neutral []
- To a large extent []

12. In what ways have these strategies contributed to reducing threats of terrorism in the Nairobi Central Business District?

.....
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13. What do you think needs to be done to improve the effectiveness of these strategies in reducing terrorism threats in the Nairobi Central Business District?

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Section 4: To assess the significance of terrorism risk reduction strategies for Nairobi Central Business District

14. What other terrorism risk reduction strategies do you know that have been implemented in Nairobi Central Business District?

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Section 5: To determine challenges of implementing risk reduction strategies in Nairobi's Central Business District

15. Challenges faced by security personnel in the county government of Nairobi County

Poor remuneration, thus lacks motivation to work harder []

Poor working environment and lack of working tools []

Lack of involvement in management programs like decision

- making & implementation []
- Protection and security of the personnel as they perform their duties []
- Old and outdated technology with many breakdown of equipments []
- Inadequate skills and development due to lack of trainings and advancement []
- Others (*Specify*)

16. What are some of the challenges faced by city inspectorate staff in terrorism risk reduction strategies?

- Lack of co-operation, support and participation by the public []
- Inadequate equipment's and tools which are old and outdated []
- Inadequate financial resources and funding to implement the programmes []
- Inadequate training and development to march the world standards []
- Other (*Specify*)

17. What do you think can be done to overcome some of these challenges?

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18. Can you give any other comments/suggestions on terrorism risk reduction strategies in the Nairobi Central Business District?

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Thank you for your participation

APPENDIX 2: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR DIRECTORATE

1. What are some of the challenges that make the Nairobi Central Business District vulnerable to terrorism attacks?
2. What are the risk reduction strategies that are adopted by your department?
3. What factors influence your department to implement these risk reduction strategies?
4. Are there best practices in risk reduction strategies? Have the Nairobi Inspectorate department adopted these?
5. What are some of the militating factors in the implementation of these risk reduction strategies?
6. Is there any significance to the adoption of these risk reduction strategies?
7. What are some of the significance (rate/rank according from the highest to the lowest)
8. What challenges do you face in implementing these risk reduction strategies in the Nairobi central business district?
9. How do you address these challenges? Has this been effective?
10. In your opinion, what support do you think you need or recommendations would you make to improve the effectiveness of these strategies?