

**UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**  
**INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

**TOPIC:**  
**THE ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATION IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT:**  
**THE CASE OF AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA**

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**A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT FOR**  
**THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT**  
**MANAGEMENT**

**OCTOBER, 2017**

**DECLARATION**

This research project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.

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This exploration venture has been submitted for examination with my endorsement as the college boss.

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Date.....

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**SUPERVISOR**

## **DEDICATION**

This work is dedicated to my family, encouragement to soldier on and complete my studies despite the demands and the nature of my work. It is specifically dedicated to my dear wife Shamsa, who always encouraged and taught me that even the largest task can be accomplished if it is done one step at a time with commitment and zeal, those words of encouragement and push for tenacity have always been a driving force for me. To my lovely kids Sadhra, MohaAmin and Bushra you are very special to me not forgetting your inquisitive ways, asking why daddy is going to school at such age.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

First of all, I thank Almighty Allah for his favours, strength and ever present mercies over my life that enabled me complete this study and blessing me with the gift of knowledge. I would like to sincerely thank my supervisor, Dr. Anita Kiamba. I would also like to thank my University of Nairobi IDIS lecturers for enlightening me and giving me the foundation that enabled me complete my study. Thanks to my colleagues of ICM class of 2015 for your support and encouragement in more than one way.

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## ABSTRACT

Among various focuses on, the African Union, as per the political flawless of African responses for African issues, was depended upon to resist the scourge of disputes that had been the most abominable part of political, money related and social headway in the landmass. In particular, The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was a need of the Somalia ethnic conflicts. Its plan was with the purpose of enhancing peace and quality as time goes on. The African Union revealed that the peace keeping mission relationship in Somalia has increased little ground in light of the capriciousness region of Somalia. This thusly proposes that in all probability the action could have been enhanced the circumstance if certain locales were made progress. This examination thus kept an eye on the running with examination questions: What are the certifiable difficulties looked by AU in dealing with the contention in Somalia? In like manner, which changes are required to update the AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia? This examination will profit the African Governments exemplified under African Union by giving productive figuring out how to comprehend the adequacy of the bit of typical relationship in refereeing. Outcomes ought to make talked among basic accessories and instigate change of an inconceivably improved game-plan system for heading of provincial affiliations' interventions in refereeing in future. This mull over relied upon the Functionalism and Neofunctionalism theories with a cases contemplate investigate design. The consider used both basic and discretionary data. Basic data was accumulated with a guide of a game plan of semi-sorted out review. The optional information was gathered from different books on typical relationship in peace making, approach From this examination, the achievement of relies on the cooperation of a little subtle gathering of basic. This mirrors the gigantically uneven levels of help for peacekeeping over the region. Notwithstanding, it is comparatively, to some degree, an impression of states' choices about which relationship to contribute their warriors. In the endeavor to coordinate strife.

## ACRONYMS

AFISMA:	African-led International Support Mission to Mali
AMIB:	Peace Operation in Burundi
AQAM:	Association Quebecoise des Archivistes Medicales
AU:	African Union
DRC:	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOMOG:	Economic Community of West African States positioned the
ECOWAS:	Economic Community of West African States
ECSC:	European Coal and Steel Community
EEC:	European Economic Community
FOI:	Freedom of Information
LRA:	Lord's Resistance Army
OAU:	Organization of African Unity
SADC:	Southern African Development Community
SNM:	Somali National Movement
SPSS:	Statistical Programme for Social Sciences
SSDF:	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
TFG:	Transitional Federal Government
UN:	United Nations
UNAMID:	UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur
UNSCR:	United Nations Security Council Resolutions
USA:	United States of America

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY**

#### **1.1 Introduction**

For any peace keeping mission to engage or intervene in any country, there must be a clear plan on how and why they must intervene. Any conflict usually occurs in rising stages of severity. During the bud stages of its occurrence, it can be tackled with ease and an answer quickly found. Conversely, when a conflict has sprout up, an external party intervention is necessary so as to come up with a final solution.

At the start, the people usually realize that there is an occurrence of a problem. This level is usually called the discomfort stage. There may be no much conflict exposed to the public limelight, though there is existence of considerable tensions of “not right” in the relationship. At this stage, little activities or none at all of any problem exists. In this stage, the normalcy is highly seen and prevails. Conflict is inevitable as even in the strong relationships conflict is manifested. When a conclusion or acceptable verdict has not been reached, then the conflict perseveres to greater length. Albeit, it is only at this stage, a conflict can be solved amicably via a direct contact with the conflicting parties. The conflicting parties must soften their hearts and agree to enter to a dialogue at this stage to solve the matters causing the conflict.

The next stage is the Incidents stage, which is the following level of acceleration of the contention. Usually, at this stage, a conflict is in the public limelight and the acceptance that indeed there is a problem is easily seen. At this stage, the conflicting parties are not

in terms. Each side of the party wants their priority put forward before the other parties. It is only at this point whereby; the conflicting parties only consider what favors oneself not considering the other party. Commonsense and appreciation are employed in an effort to come up with an acceptable solution to both parties. During the process, in case of an occurrence, the other party is involved as it believed to be achievable to come to an end acceptable conclusion. This can only be realized only if the parties are open, peaceful and patient throughout the process. It is said to be of help if you begin with a statement like “I would like to discuss what is happening as it appears there is a problem.” At this point, a predicted outcome should not be seen or foreseen.

Where an amicable decision or solution has not been reached the conflict moves to the next stage of the Misunderstandings stage. It is only at this stage, that the conflict is caused and a product of misunderstanding. Confusion may exist from prior proceedings that may cause a sham understanding to those occurrences. The truth, usually is vague on presentation. A tactful and effective strategy is employed where one or more parties are engaged to elucidate of the occurrences. A question such as “When Created you said what, what did you mean?” or any other that is relevant to the situation at hand. The aim at this point is to remove any confusion arising from the issue at hand. If there is no vagueness of the problem, then the degree of the problem can be easily comprehended. It is vital at this point, to apologize for any displeasing remarks that possibly one may have made to the problem and then finalize and close the matter.

The last point is the Tension level, at this point the conflict is at its highest, and which is a resultant of mistrust between the parties. Normally, tension usually occurs in their agreements. At this level, behaviors in the parties occur via mistrust in their relationships. At this level, a negative attitude and hard line positions of each party is easily noticeable. Hope is at its lowest level, and an amicable solution can possibly not be seen. There is hostility between the parties. An impartial person is sought as the degree of conflict has risen to a high and difficult level. The mediator however must be agreed upon by both parties.

Lastly, the conflict sky rockets to the crisis level, the hostility reaches at an alarming point where a solution and agreement must be sought urgently. This level is characterized via no interactions and instead gestures are widely used. It is prudent that an external party is sought immediately to solve the problem at hand as the parties are utterly unable to come to an agreement. The conflicting parties are not willing or are not ambitious to come to an amicable solution.

From 1990, distinctive African affiliations which include: Monetary Community, Intergovernmental Authority on Development and African Union have fantastically been locked in with the peace began works out.<sup>1</sup> There have been numerous missions undertaken by the regional peace keeping missions. Though, there have been many peace keeping missions, have the missions really achieved their goals or aims? What are the

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid 91-118.

blocks that the peace keeping face, what are the solutions?<sup>2</sup> This study will therefore identify the mistakes, the challenges faced, and the key solutions on the undertakings of the peace keeping missions. This study will thus aid the future undertakings of the regional peace keeping missions after a careful and in-depth analysis.

## **1.2 Background of the Study**

This investigation will leave on the part of territorial bodies in peace making and will particularly be intrigued on African Union in Somalia. The Ultimate goal of this examination will be to find out whether the African Union has been able to restore peace in Somalia and the steps made in restoring peace. This study also looked into the challenges faced by the peace keeping missions and finally what are the real blocks of reaching their accomplishments?<sup>3</sup>

The regional and sub-regional organizations in Africa immensely participate in keeping peace and security. As the conflict was sparked up in Africa after falling down of the Soviet Bloc which signified an end to the cold war in the late 1980's.<sup>4</sup> Nearly all wars battled in Africa in between early 1990's to late 1990's were the wars among countries, in 1992, statistics showed that wars in Africa contributed almost 46.7 percent of the common wars on the planet.

Subsequently, force of refereeing and intercession developed in the 1990's. This was the situation in 1990's the place situated the ECOMOG, which is its checking gathering to

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid 91-118

<sup>3</sup> Ibid 91-118

<sup>4</sup>Ibid

Liberia to end the civil war that resulted from political issues<sup>5</sup>. The move was seen as a necessary one and the goodwill of African Regional organizations towards ending conflict. This study will therefore examine the role of territorial association in refereeing with a predisposition on the African Union (AU) Peace Keeping in Somalia.

Inside clashes or inter-conflicts greatly affect the stability of the region. It is this realization, which precipitated the configuration of the regional organizations on the ground of cooperation<sup>6</sup>. The interventions are geared towards controlling the conflicts which arise in different states. Conflict management is mainly interested in neutralizing the effects of conflict and not unearthing the source of conflict. The military forces are used in preventing further conflict in conflict management.<sup>7</sup> Negotiations and bargaining are the most preferred means in conflict management. The deeply entrenched sources of conflict are thoroughly dealt with to completely tackle violence, hostility and exploitation.<sup>8</sup>.

There are many reasons that led to the formation of the regional organizations. The reasons included: bringing together and reconstructing war-torn countries, spirit of a continuation in the spirit of togetherness in the limelight of the world. The reasons for the formation of the regional bodies are not strong and unviable this was the case the European states and the non-communist states of South East Asia in the 1960's. Albeit, in the case of South Asian, the South Asian countries did not see the need to form a regional

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid 91-118.

<sup>6</sup> *States Working Papers Series 33*

<sup>7</sup> Ibid 8325-332

<sup>8</sup> Ibid 91-118



organization till 1980. Though the regional organizations have inhomogeneous outcome in conflict management worldwide, they have gained popularity due to the engagement they give to the conflicting parties.<sup>9</sup> In the modern days, regional organizations have become the chief source of organizing the politics of the world.<sup>10</sup>

A partnership with the UN in re-building peace after cold war led to the popularity of the organizations in most conflicts.<sup>11</sup> In 1992, General Boutros Ghali, the then UN Secretary General, involved the regional organizations and the UN in enhancing international peace in line with. The emphasis was the prospective of regional organizations being decisive especially in managing conflicts at the crucial decisive point.

The formation of AU is a distinctive case of similar regional organizations formed on same grounds. Before the formation of AU in 2002, African actors heavily relied upon the UN in managing security and conflict. Albeit, the United Nations' obligation globally and its self strategic interests resulted in inappropriate responsiveness to Africa's conflict.<sup>12</sup> The foreign actors in Africa was a resultant of strategic interests of the powerful states in Africa. Furthermore, the (OAU) establishment in 1963 saddled with the duty of battling colonialism and racial discrimination. It was formed to aid the African countries that were still being colonized. Albeit, it did not achieve much but it assisted in ending dominance of the colonialists.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>Ibid (ECOWAS), Unity (OAU) (1995).

<sup>11</sup> *States Working Papers Series* 33, No.2 (March 2008).

<sup>12</sup>Ibid 91-118

<sup>13</sup>Ibid 91

All things being equal, OAU was not able handle the post-cool war because of out of date points and stringent recognition to the rule of non-intercession according to the directs of the OAU's 1963 Charter. All part states as indicated by the OAU contract are commanded to together advance peace and security in Africa in accordance with the non-intercession standard. The power and autonomy of any individuals are the rule that have been laid out as the constraining components of OAU mediation in any part state. This was the fundamental motivation behind why OAU did not take an interest in strife determination particularly in the 1990's. The prelude of the OAU contract directed the obligation of part states in advancing peace however in strict adherence to non-mediation. The restriction on power, regional honesty and the autonomy of the part states, obliged the OAU's exertion . That was the sole reason with reference to why OAU did not intercede. It is consequently that the African part states thought that it was important to frame a strong association in 2002 Therefore, an investigation on the part of local association in refereeing with an attention on the AU peace keeping in Somalia is essential.

### **1.3 Statement of the Research Problem**

Among various focuses on, the African Union, as indicated by the political immaculate of African reactions for African issues, was required to stand up to the scourge of question that had been the most discernibly dreadful thing about political, money related and social change in the landmass. The African Union influenced a gigantic perspective to move from its pioneer's - OAU - accentuation on expel in the endeavors of part states to non-nonattendance basic to within issues of its part states. Through the methodology guarantees its advantage to partake in peace and security interventions in its part states as

settled in the control of the feeling of obligation with respect to guarantee. conditions, to be particular: masses, genocide and wrongdoings against humanity' furthermore a genuine hazard to true blue deal with. In this way, offers controls on AU requiring obliging mediation.<sup>14</sup>

The AU has embraced a large group of political and mediatory interventionist instruments in accordance with its inclination for arranged answers for the contentions in the landmass<sup>15</sup>. In help of its political and mediatory intercessions, the AU embraces military interventionist system – as peace bolster operations – to contain clashes, ensure non military work force masses and influence secure stages for peace to process.

AMISOM was a necessity of the Somalia ethnic conflicts. Its formation was. The African Union revealed that the peace keeping mission organization in Somalia has made little progress due to the intricacy state of Somalia.<sup>16</sup>This in this way infers most likely the activity could have been improved the situation if certain ranges were improved. This think about accordingly addressed the accompanying examination questions: What are the significant difficulties looked by AU in dealing with the contention in Somalia?<sup>17</sup> Also, which changes are expected to upgrade the AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia?

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid 90

<sup>15</sup> Ibid 91

<sup>16</sup> Ibid 91

<sup>17</sup> Ibid 91

## **1.4 Objectives of the Study**

### **1.4.1 Main Objective**

The expansive goal was to inspect the part of territorial association with center of the AU in refereeing the instance of the mission for Somalia.

### **1.4.2 Specific Objectives**

The study will concentrate specifically to accomplish the below objectives:

1. Investigating the major challenges that the AU goes through in managing the conflict in Somali
2. Determining the improvements that ought to be undertaken in the AU mission for peacekeeping in Somali

## **1.5 Literature Review**

The idea of peace promotion and territorial association will be evaluated in this section. It will intensively analyze the interventions undertaken by the regional organizations in conflict management and the measures put in place to intervene. Thus, the review will mirror the possibility of success or failure of the interventions of conflict management by the regional organizations.

Varied views, wants, contentious needs and contesting interests are outlined as the chief source of conflict.<sup>18</sup> In a wide sense, the idea of refereeing sets that contentions result from profound situated threats and long haul forms that frequently can't be subjected to

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid 6

quick determination. It concentrates on limiting the negative impact of dissension and fierce clash and amplifying the open doors for continuing peace. Peace promotion involves the worldwide group's measures to limit experiencing and prevent conflict heightening. Or maybe than aspiring to handle the hidden reasons for strife as struggle determination goes for accomplishing, refereeing goes for dealing with the malicious impacts of contention without intruding with the inside structure and particularities of the host state.

Refereeing appreciates more prominent support because of its objective of not just diminishing the threats of contention for the group straightforwardly associated with the contention yet in addition for groups that are not specifically included, for example, neighboring states and the general assembling on the loose. Aside from being a one track sort of all inclusive intervention, peace advancement is similarly instrumental in making quiet and stable condition for strife assurance and political responses for happen. In light of this outline of the reason for refereeing, this examination will assesses the piece of affirmation of general people, keeping struggle from heightening and building up stages for the serene determination of disputes. In disdain of the AU's endeavors security and administration issues are as yet widespread in the district. The "Afro-Arab spring", in 2011, finished the fascism administration in most youthful nation, Sudan was made in 2011, however political precariousness went before the making of the nation. Of late, there have been military upsets in Madagascar, Mali and Guinea-Bissau. The region has been marred by immense conflicts especially in Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan. The process of peace re-building has been unfinished in most West African

countries, Algeria, Angola, Rwanda and Burundi. African Union (AU) like other regional organizations has undertaken various peace missions, though little accomplishments can be seen.<sup>19</sup> African Union has managed to reduce the wars from <sup>20</sup> in the 1990 to 4 in 2010. The first AU mission was sent in Burundi where advance to self-lead was delineated by ethnic heartlessness between the Hutu greater part and the Tutsi minority. The mistake of. It endeavored to keep away from genocides in the Great Lakes zone, and expected a basic part in the ceasefire systems. AU troops secured returning chairmen acknowledged 2010. Around the aggregate of the AMIB mission, peace was restored to most by a long shot of the Burundi regions, alongside the locale, where prepared national open entryway powers remained an issue.

As showed by Africa Briefing Report, there remains an oversight between past what many would consider conceivable on paper and its genuine impact in crisis conditions. The impediments entwine lacking tools, sustenance and strategy. The deferral was a speedy postponed outcome of the AU's choice that the passing on states anticipated that would bolster their own specific troops. Over yet again, correspondingly has a certifiable advancement and connection issue and this choked out the quick verification of the Burundi clashes. There is poor pro, a nonattendance of assent in the AU and delicate early denouncing purposes of repression in the learning field.

Then, in battled a normal war against the overwhelmingly reduce masses, the AU was profitable toward the start. AU's intercession gathering and the Abuja Inter-Sudanese

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid 6

<sup>20</sup>Ndiho

Peace Talks planned the run of the mill for the gathering of Sudan and the Sudanese started from examined part states duties, which bolster the AU's operational and running expenses. For whatever is left of the about US\$100 million, the depended on consider duties from part gives (the key supporters being the cash related course of action), and allows from outside providers. General Colloquium report commented that, more than 90 percent of the AU's quietness and security tries are financed by outside on-screen characters. In any case, the AU's nonappearance of impact over outside mediations drove by the UN Security Council and its five continuing with individuals as in many cases as conceivable have their own specific more parochial interests, has every now and then perceived awful results. Once more, AU's central goal in Darfur was shady in setting of the unmistakable perspectives of the comprehensive group from the AU about the mission's motivation. In this manner, AU surrendered its constraint and.

AU's nonattendance of good particular contraptions; alliance most extreme and positive conspicuous quality particularly in the present emergencies in have obliterated the validness, master and overcome nature of the affiliation. As appeared by Africa Briefing Report, the proposed AU regulate for settling the common. The AU seems to have lost believability in setting of the trading of the running with genuine portions: discernment the unmistakable practical discourse in Libyan and the paying little regard to the AU High Panel taking a substitute position; beginning now and into the not so distant, the AU five point guide, which combined a détente, the attestation of general individuals, kind guide, exchange, and an entire, addressing the necessities of the Libyan individuals

amassed much information. The AU's mediation recommendation were dismissed by the Libyan objective asked for Gaddafi's takeoff.

In like way, the AU has other than been investigated for having messed up the vivacious confirmation of the verbal confrontation in. In any case, reliably settled on an expert government (for this condition proGbagbo) approach. Also, Raila Odinga exchanged off his nonappearance of slant as a center individual when he kept up military action before validation by ECOWAS. President Binguwa Mutharika visit to Côte d'Ivoire with a honest to goodness objective to secure the declining some piece of the AU, demonstrated unsuccessful and Teodora Nguema was considered excessively defective, making it hard to be in any capacity related with the confirmation of the crisis in light of his harmed gathering.

The champion among the most capricious and battle tridden parts of the world. Distinctive political writers depict the region as "the hot-bet of the world". The area continues being the setting of a gigantic bit of uncommon interstate and intra-states clashes in the post-wild Africa. Thus, it is an appalling scene of endemic clashes and political discontinuity. Nonattendance of lion's offer run political establishments which enable individuals to value settling on choice has been starting typical war and political turmoil in the domain. Along these lines, the territory has changed into a place where political tumult and typical war is activated and moved around outer forces. Everything considered, political changes, cash related stagnation and organic debasement changed



into the depicting highlight of essentially every nations of the district since circumstance. In such way, the political emergencies and financial.<sup>21</sup>

## **1.6 Justification of the Study**

This examination exemplified under African Union by giving solid making sense of how to grasp the sufficiency of the bit of ordinary organization in peace movement. The and intercession in Somalia and survey whether this was the need at the dispatch of the mission in the concerning make talks among correlated associates and affect movement of a massively upgraded approach structure for course of local affiliations' mediations in refereeing in future.

### **1.6.1 Academic Justification**

This study will also contribute to the academy. Results will build up the existing knowledge as well as providing basis/platform for future scholarly work on conflict management. Over and above, future comparative studies will greatly borrow from this study analytical issues that will act as thematic concerns and variables for the intended studies.

### **1.6.2 Policy Justification**

Notwithstanding the advantage to the legislature, the consequences of this investigation will profit different partners including common social orders and activists to get a more profound comprehension of AU mediation in Somali. In that capacity, they will be more

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<sup>21</sup>Ibid 8

educated in belligerence their cases in supporting or testing provincial organization intervention in a given circumstance of peace promotion.<sup>22</sup> Given that the examination will give data on part of AU in the association of the debate in Somalia; the immense difficulties looked by AU in dealing with the contention in Somali; and redesigns this examination may in like way advantage pros who in future may wish further to instigate learning on the issue of provincial relationship in refereeing. This is in light of the way that the divulgements of this examination might be valuable in inciting future examinations on this issue.

## **1.7 Theoretical Framework**

This study was grounded on the Functionalism and Neo functionalism theories.

### **1.7.1 Functionalism Theory**

The speculation came up after the World War II and was disseminated by David Mitrany, "A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organizations" in 1943 . In his dispute, the basic avocation for the being of any gathering is welfare and security and the necessities of the all inclusive community once fulfilled will guarantee peace . He later gave emphasis on the beginning of mix with specific focus on social and money related issues that include: trade, correspondence, health, sanitation, dietary, legitimate and imaginative fields. This gave a ground to functionalists' argument that a quiet overall conjunction can be discovered in the open places and not by methods for checking understandings in chancelleries.<sup>23</sup> Thus,

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid 7

<sup>23</sup> Ibid 91

influence should be traded to the new pro, which performs utilitarian assignments. Thusly, every one of the units of the mix strategy get and they are along these lines encouraged to demonstrate commitment. Thus, propelling powers for benefits by cooperation surpass the driving forces to act alone.<sup>24</sup>

Gabriel credited the issue of non-taking part in Africa to the money related to battle that utilitarian regular bodies are basic to African cash related blend. The focal skilled worker of, ensured that star should be connected with a specific development with the objective that the standard relationship among pro and an unmistakable space can be broken. Functionalism has a place with the hypothetical class of Wilsonian positive thinking, everything considered performing pro in African general relations and won't purposefully trade imperativeness to utilitarian social affairs, if it isn't to its most vital perfect position. From this time forward, a substance, for instance, the OAU, and AU have constantly made to empower the continent. In enlargement, the functionalist question that unlimited money related and social cause is a fundamental to a persuading methodology regarding political conflicts and the trading of war is all around blocked by the closeness from asserting around nine 'strong' nearby in budgetary coordination since 1975, doing fighting and an expansive variety of fratricidal internecine conflicts have made inside states and from time to time between states. Nonetheless, the functionalism speculation is good 'old fashioned in this examination since it offers civil argument to consistent affiliations and their part. To this degree, the level headed discussion can be explored exposures from this examination.

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid 92

### 1.7.2 Neo Functionalism Theory

The prefix "neo" is depicted as "a recovery of" or "another alteration" a customary fact. Hence, neo-functionalism is a refining of functionalism as kept up by David Mitrany. Consequently, Ernst Haas, maker of neo-functionalism, began by inspecting David Mitrany's functionalism from the 1940's. New functionalism was as needs be a movement of denounces the state-driven perspective, with concentrate on limits rather than forms; the neo functionalist was in the perspective of the cheerful idea of developed functionalism, restored political relationship into the procedure of mix<sup>25</sup>.

Along these lines, neo-functionalism focuses on the autonomy of, and furthermore the expanding interest for, and the participation between states that elucidates the part of local organizations. The overflow impact of the neo functionalist hypothesis was referred to the innovative part of it, that Haas termed as a state where one economic deepens, pressure is exerted on other economic sectors<sup>26</sup>. One of the first shortcomings is the ability to distinguish diverse logics of spill over as Arne Niemann explained<sup>27</sup>. Lindberg brings into perspective the open-ended character and vast twist of spill over. Spill over can be defined as simply an occurrence where the occurrence of an initial aim can be guaranteed as long as extra action that further necessitates extra action<sup>28</sup>. The neo-functionalism theory is suitable as it critically argues in the functionalism view in its disputes for regional organizations. Thus, the disputes will be studied as per the study findings.

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<sup>25</sup>Rosamund, B., *Theories of European Integration*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid 92

<sup>28</sup>Ibid 93

## **1.8 Hypotheses**

The AU plays a considerable role especially in managing the conflict in Somalia.

There are immense hurdles and problems faced by AU in managing the Somalia conflict.

There are considerable imperfections AU is needed to initiate in AU peace keeping mission in Somali.

## **1.9 Research Methodology**

An exploration configuration consolidates accumulation of conditions for gathering and further investigation of information in a way that is line with the reason for the examination and which will be monetarily practical .The exploration configuration utilized in this investigation was a plan of a contextual investigation. Fundamentally, contextual investigations improves definite logical examination of a particular and certain number of occasions or conditions and how they relate. Along these lines, the emphasis on AU peace keeping in Somalia will be extraordinarily emphasized. Yin stressed that a contextual analysis ought to bring out of an appreciation of a multi-feature issue and which one can develop through past research. Therefore, the outline will be appropriate in accentuating with respect to neighborhood relationship in peace promotion. The think about incredibly utilized the essential and optional information. The semi-organized poll was utilized together with the essential information collected. The information was principally investigated utilizing Statistical Program for Social Sciences (SPSS) exhibited utilizing diagrams and tables; and understanding finished with utilization of illustrative insights (frequencies and percentages).There were different wellsprings of data for the auxiliary information that included: arrangement instruments, diaries, past research

papers, magazines, daily papers and online articles. The examine objective was the direction in the gathering and examination of information. The check of information went before hypothetical structure and investigation by means of the work of subjective methodologies. After accumulation of information, the information was painstakingly examined and conclusions were made in regard of the destinations of the investigation.

### **1.10 Scope of the Study**

The examination will research the bit of adjacent relationship in peace progression. The particular concentrate examination watched out for the bit of AU in the association of the contention in Somalia, research the critical impediments AU faces in the attestation of a serene Somalia and the areas should have been done.

### **1.11 Limitations of the Study**

For the most part, the capacity of the investigation will concentrate just on the African Union (AU) part in the Somali's peacemaking case. There could emerge a few issues the investigation won't touch that might be of assistance in examining the part of territorial associations in peace promotion. The discoveries may contain a few one-sided components as the comprehension of analysts' recovered information whereby conclusions will be made. Different researchers may see diversely contingent upon one's view accordingly the conclusions will likewise be different. Sum up limit of the consider divulgences is restricted by flawlessness that the examination just concentrates on one centrality) and not others while there are a few that have had an area progression case. There could be unmistakable issues that may not be alluringly tended to by the

information that were analyzed in this examination that may in like way be critical depicting the bit of neighborhood relationship in peace headway. The disclosures may in addition contain sections of inclination since it draws on the stars' understanding of the analyzed pro may disentangle the very information in a substitute point of view; accordingly, the conclusions drawn may not watch objectivity fundamentally.

### **1.11 Chapter Outline**

Chapter I it will entail the examination foundation, proclamation of the issue, goals, speculation and strategy. The underscore of the avocation of the investigation, writing audit and the hypothetical system will be sketched out in the examination.

Chapter II will focus on the meanings of the idea of peace making. This will be situated in the perspective of territorial associations.

Chapter III it will have an audit of the part of AU with particular concentration of its administration in the Somali clash and jump into the obstacles it faces in dealing with the contention in Somalia.

Chapter IV will accentuation on section two and three to draw out the ranges of upgrade in the AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia.

Chapter V it will involve an outline of the investigation, conclusions from the discoveries and give proposals and recommendations for cutting edge examines.

## CHAPTER TWO

### CONCEPTUALIZING OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

#### 2.1 Introduction

This chapter will give a clear picture of some features of conflict management. Particularly, it will define and techniques of conflict management. Later in the chapter, the involvement of regional organizations in conflict management will be discussed.

#### 2.2 The New Wars Debate

The existing literature features new war as a result of state failure that originates from the macro-societal and economic aspects that include: demographic pressures, the refugee movements, the decline of the economy, state of criminalization of the state, illegitimate use of force, human rights violation and an upsurge in paramilitary groups and private armies<sup>29</sup>.

Ideology as a political aspect in new wars has become insignificant unlike the social aspects like ethnicity and religion<sup>30</sup>. The people on the receiving side of war are mainly the women and children as they are mostly targeted. The new wars have been characterized by genocide and ethnic rinsing<sup>31</sup>. There has been an upsurge of displaced people in the late conflicts witnessed<sup>32</sup>.

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<sup>29</sup>The Funds for Peace 2002.

<sup>30</sup>Huntington, S.P., 1993

<sup>32</sup>Ibid 7



In the case of Rwanda, the war cannot be defined as intrastate conflict as Rwanda has far and wide links with many countries in the economic, political and military aspects. A misunderstanding may arise when one bases a civil war as one that occurs within the borders of a country. Thus, thorough and cautious study is necessary.

The involvement of the national governments in civil cannot solely define civil war, this was pointed out as one of the methodological shortcomings in several quantitative studies. Scholars<sup>33 34</sup> and datasets like COW, PITF and UCDP said that governmental forces are part and parcel of civil war. Contemporary conflicts are also present in failed states hence the methodological presumption cannot be fully relied on. Also, national governments can't be connected with fizzled states as the distinction amongst government and non-government powers and open and private soldiers has not be plainly separated . However Mueller can't help contradicting the said incline and rather said that an excess of players in current wars like on account of Bosnia that included "groups of astute raiders enrolled by political pioneers and working under their general direction," "road packs... groups... and culprits particularly discharged from jail" including the political pioneers in the perspective of assuming a part in merciless messiness.

### **2.3 Conflict in Somalia**

Intense competition for resources and power are the main source of conflicts. Interpersonal struggles are unavoidable even where the societies and institutions are result of the people. The incursion of refugees was as result of the government failure to

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<sup>33</sup>Singer

<sup>34</sup>Ibid

maintain peace after independence in 1960<sup>35</sup>.The heavy reliance on agriculture and livestock has been identified as the root cause of conflict further compounded with drought. Results into conflict. The chief Somali's industry was identified as the processing industry which deals with agricultural food products<sup>36</sup>. It was in the 1980's where a long and severe drought occurred, the Ogaden War with Ethiopia and later destabilization of the country was last. In a UN<sup>37</sup> report, Somalia was identified as the "least developed country". There are many clans and sub-clans present in Somalia. The clan is said to be the vital social unit in Somalia and thus the membership to any clan is crucial in Somali's culture and politics. Clans are further subdivided into sub clans and subdivisions. The size of clan varies from one to another; there were up to 10,000 people in a particular sub-clan in the twentieth century. Particular clans are said to be "noble clans" as they had one common ancestor while the minority are said to have a combination of different parentage. It is believed that, the noble clans are the descendants of Samaale and are times called by his name. The noble classes are four namely: Darod, Dir, Hawiye and Isaaq. Sab is the minority term for the minority unlike in Samaale. The disputes are solved by the clan elders and they strictly use the customary law in dispute resolution process. A confirmation by Dr. Menkhaus, said that," Military units would regard a contention as an attentive occasion, they'd get the group seniors, they would take a seat and make a peace, there would be a file to exhibit it, and after that there would be peace and we could all leave, when in conviction that wasn't the circumstance. In Somali political culture, peace advancement never closes, they are reliably in talk, they're

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<sup>35</sup>Ibid 11

<sup>36</sup>DND

<sup>37</sup>Ibid

constantly meeting and it required us a critical long venture to appreciate that to force in helping them manage their conflicts." All accords and game plans must be made by the group and if not they are deemed to be illegitimate and seldom recognized. Therefore, the peace conferences held either in Nairobi, Addis Ababa or Mogadishu are considered void as they do not have the input of the clan<sup>38</sup>. Accords and plans struck without approval by the family are not seen as genuine and are once in a while maintained. Along these lines, peace gatherings held at a separation (in Nairobi, Addis Ababa, or Mogadishu) that were not reviewed by the neighborhood populaces were not viewed as official.

## **2.4 Conflict and Conflict Management**

To understand conflict management, it is vital to appreciate what is conflict. Dougherty and Platfgraff <sup>39</sup>viewed conflict one group is engaged in the awareness of a particular group that have certain goals. In his definition, Miall et al <sup>40</sup> posited conflict as the manifestation of the varied interests and beliefs which come up due to the formations of groups that are interested in social changes though with intrinsic constricts. As such, conflict is viewed as the aspect of the society which cannot be disregarded in the search of various goals by various groups<sup>41</sup>.

In all definitions conflict is unavoidable as various groups try to satisfy their interest in various ways. In the social view, conflict is a necessity for a proper functioning society<sup>42</sup>. Albeit, conflict is also considered as a stumbling block to any development in any

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<sup>38</sup> Testimony of Dr. K. Menkhaus, Transcripts vol. 7, p. 1277.

<sup>39</sup> New York

<sup>41</sup> Ibid

<sup>42</sup> Alli., 2012

country as its nature is that of destruction. Hence, it is critical to understand conflict management holistically.

John Burton<sup>43</sup> views conflict management as various conflict prevention measures. In Best<sup>44</sup> definition of conflict is a process of neutralizing the effects by having a consensus with the conflicting parties. Generally, conflict management is inclusive of reducing the unfavorable effects but increasing the favorable effects. Conflict can only be managed and regulated.<sup>45</sup>

## **2.5 Methods of Conflict Management**

Conflict management is similar in some aspects with conflict regulation as both involve tackling conflicts in a positive way and the effects made. It is also inclusive of negotiation, mediation, arbitration and reconciliation.<sup>46</sup> Due to diverse culture and religion in Africa similar to other continents, thus conflict management is unavoidable. This also affects the nature of conflict management. In Africa, Ikyase and Olisah the handling of conflicts usually takes different and amalgamation of strategies.<sup>47</sup>

### **2.5.1 Negotiation**

Negotiation is one of the methods that solve conflict. Negotiation is a process where various parties come to resolve their differences. In Best (2012), negotiation is of two

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<sup>43</sup>Ibid

<sup>45</sup>Ikyase

<sup>46</sup> Ikyase

<sup>47</sup>Ibid

conflicting parties where a direct process of dialogue and discussions prevail. The main aim of negotiation is to reach consensus among the parties conflicting.

In Africa, conflict management usually takes the route of negotiation, for instance the Nigeria and Cameroon case whereby, AU and UN via ICJ had crucial task in the resolution process. Nigeria and Benin, South Sudan and Sudan and Libya and Chad have also undergone the negotiation route.<sup>48</sup>

### **2.5.2 Conciliation**

Conciliation is another conflict management technique commonly used in Africa. It involves a third party activity whose objective is to convince the parties to end the conflict.<sup>49</sup> The technique also includes a conciliator who meets the parties independently and also a third neutral party is involved. The ground basis of conciliation is mainly to minimize anxiety among the parties conflicting. There are some instances where the technique has been used including.

### **2.5.3 Arbitration**

It is one of the techniques widely used in conflict management in Africa. The technique uses a third party who is supposed to be neutral, the third party carefully listens to both parties and later gives a verdict, commonly termed as an award, that is suitable to both

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid

parties. The instances in which the technique has been used include: Nigeria and Cameroon whereby the International Court of Justice was involved.<sup>50</sup>

#### **2.5.4 Peace –Keeping**

Peace keeping is one of the techniques widely used in Africa to resolve conflicts. The chief source of the technique was in the United Nations' charter where missions of peace keeping were carried out in volatile places. It is a permanent solution technique measure which ensures long lasting peace in the long last. It is inclusive of deploying a neutral military force and boosts an atmosphere that will enable a conflict resolution process (Furley & May 1998).<sup>51</sup>

It includes a process of careful observation and monitoring. The chief objective of this technique is to have an atmosphere where peace prevails at last. According to Apam<sup>52</sup> peace keeping is a trusted mechanism as it ensures all ceasefire agreements are upheld. In Africa peace keeping missions include: AU, ECOWAS, SADC. Some countries have benefited from the peace-keeping missions; they comprise of: Most East African region countries, the horn of Africa, Liberia, south Sudan and Chad.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> (Ibid)

<sup>52</sup> Ikyase

<sup>53</sup> Ibid

## CHAPTER THREE

### ROLE OF AU IN THE MANAGEMENT OF THE CONFLICT IN SOMALIA

#### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter will investigate the diverse AU's roles of the especially in the management of Somali's conflict. Later, the chief challenges in the process will be identified.

#### 3.2 History of Conflict in Somalia

The past of Somali's history is a revelation of contradiction. This is because various aspects which compel armed conflict play a role in any stage of war. Some aspects have been identified as the reasons for eruption of conflict and included clannism and clan cleavages. Other aspects include: thirst for power and clashes due to few pasture, Due to the many sources of conflict, reconciliation seems to be complicated to accomplish.

There were three major conflicts that were experienced in the country from 1977 to 1991. The first one was the Ogaden War, which was a clash with Ethiopia that happened from 1977 to 1978 whereby the Somali forces and Somali rebel fighters collaborated so as to recover the Ogaden region which they possessed, the war claimed 25,000 lives and Somali lost the war<sup>54</sup>. It is that war that led to numerous internal conflicts that resulted in a coup where Siyad Barre's military was overthrown as it was accused of the loss. The Somali Salvation Democratic Front formed by Abdullahi Yusuf was the first movement. The majority of the members were from the Majerten that involved intermittent fights especially in the northeast of the country that was met with equivalent force<sup>55</sup>.

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<sup>54</sup>Ibid

<sup>55</sup> Ibid

The second conflict was an internal conflict which involved the Somalia military and the Somali National Movement (SNM). The cause of war was said to be over the control of northwest Somalia. In 1981, the SNM was formed and many of its members were from the Isaaq clan. In the 1980's the war escalated due to the military influence by the barre government in the northwest part of the country. The military control was tact to disrupt the Isaaq clan's business. The war in 1988 was the most catastrophic as more than 50,000 lives were claimed, of which most of them were from the Isaaq clan. The bombardments by aircrafts led to a mass exodus from Somalia as more than 400,000 Somali's fled to Ethiopia and others were displaced internally<sup>56</sup>. The war led to the massive campaigns of secession by the Isaaq clan, this was realized as Somaliland which was said to be a self-declared state was formed in 1991<sup>57</sup>.

In 1991, there was a third furnished clash that was between the administration of the day and the developments of the family. In the early 1990's there emerged very strong movements that comprised.

The Barre were still strong and were said to be the clan that gave the war momentum till the modern times in Somalia. The government of the day was said to oppress its citizens and grabbing land of the Somali citizens. This resulted in reconciliation and methods of including every clan in the government but that was futile as mistrust of the clans to the government was very high<sup>58</sup>. The clan was tactful as it carefully calculated ways of dividing the clans right in the middle for twenty years of which was successful. The Barre

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<sup>57</sup>Ibid

<sup>58</sup>Ikyase&Olishah, (Ibid)



clan was favored by the Cold war in Horn of Africa that was present at the time as they were able to get military and financial support. The aftermath of the war was characterized by a disorganized government as the intensity of expenditure needed to sustain blown up bureaucracy. The Somali's value was lost due to the continued cold war in the late 1990's. This resulted in human rights given the task of the donors, as many donors escaped. The foreigners stopped their financial support to Somalia due to the SNM war in the north. The Somali government did not have the funds to run the government that resulted to its downfall. An attempt in 1990 to have reconciliation by the "Manifesto Group" was met with much resistance by the Barre government.

### **3.3 AU Contextualization Mission in Somalia**

In 2007, AMISOM entered Somalia, it is said to be the third force after the Ethiopian troops were unsuccessful in defeating the Islamic courts in. The TFG was formed in 2010 as a resultant of intense fighting among clans due to the hunger of power that had prevailed for almost ten years.

Many international peace conferences have been initiated in an effort to come up with a solution for the Somali people. Despite many peace agreements, none has been accepted by all clans.

With the support of international community, many peace initiated activities have been rolled out. The TFG was the end result of Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD). Ethiopia's aim of aiding the formation of a Somali government led to the

formation of TFG that would wind up after five years. Though, the TFG president was unable to reclaim the quarreled region of Ogaden<sup>59</sup>. The TFG was also backed by United States in attempts to flush out the terrorists<sup>60</sup>.

The deployment of AMISOM was on the ground that it would help TFG to form a new government for all the Somali people. The chief goal of AMISOM was to craft and help the TFG to form a stable government and also ensure a peaceful Somalia that is devoid of war. AMISOM faced many hurdles, among them was that peace had prevailed after formation of TFG thus there was no job for them to carry out. Despite eliminating Islamic courts, there arose dissenting voices against the government. As TFG was not inclusive of all stakeholders thus, AMISOM was crucial to support TFG. AMISOM involvement was seen by many as an invasion by a foreigner. The TFG was marred by rampant corruption which led to any noticeable steps forward<sup>61</sup>.

### **3.4 The Modern Somalia**

After the appointment of a new president in 2012, Somalia has been largely peaceful than previous years. The election of president by 275 members of parliament was seen as the best transparent process in more than two decades.<sup>62</sup> The election was unique in that it was carried out in the country<sup>63</sup>. Despite major milestone in the peace efforts, the future of Somalia still remains vague.

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<sup>60</sup>Ikyase&Olisah, (Ibid)

<sup>61</sup> Ibid

<sup>62</sup> Ibid

<sup>63</sup>International Crisis

The lack of accountability for the human rights has led to a humanitarian crisis. There are various experienced by the security machinery including: existence of Alshabaab, pirates and semi-functional state machinery. The threat of Alshabaab still prevails in some parts of the country. The attacks of the group are experienced in foreign establishments in the country and government buildings. This has led to unforeseeable security in the near future.

As of today, AMISOM and the Somali National Security forces are in full control of the capital city despite regular attacks by Alshabaab. The attacks take place in the nearby districts

### **3.5 Mandate and Deployment of the Amisom**

The main responsibilities of AMISOM were to give a helping hand to TFG in all its activities, aiding the dialogue and peace process and enhancing the humanitarian situation<sup>64</sup>. For AMISOM to fulfill its goals it was mandated to carry out a variety of task<sup>65</sup>: they included supporting AMISOM, managing humanitarian operations and working with various stakeholders in restoring peace in the area.

Initially, 8, 000 peace keepers were sent to Somalia but later adding and re-enforcing the troop was carried out in a slow pace. The mission began with Ugandan and Burundi soldiers in 2007 but after an year the number rose to 2,613. The reasons cited for the slow

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<sup>65</sup>e study

pace in re-enforcing the troop was inadequate finances for the participating troops and also the AU.

No sooner had the AMISOM organized themselves than they were attacked by the illegal sect which resulted in high number of casualties. This led to a lack of goodwill of the regions members to send their troops. The second force from Burundi arrived in 2008, the late arrival was due to lack of equipment<sup>66</sup>. AMISOM for a number of years operated with few soldiers as the region members had refused to deploy their troops. (AMISOM Bulletin, 2010). In 2012, UN Security Council came to the help of AMIOSOM by sending their forces.

### **3.6 Achievements in Somalia**

In the early 2010, AMISOM had managed to re-capture some areas in spite of the various challenges. Though, the force for a long time was unable to move outside Mogadishu due to the presence of militants<sup>67</sup>.

A huge step made by the force was evident in 2011 whereby Alshabaab lost ground of Mogadishu which they had held for over two years. The bowing out of Alshabaab out of Mogadishu was a huge step made and has provided an opportunity for the government to operate with minimal disturbance<sup>68</sup>.

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<sup>67</sup> Ibid

<sup>68</sup> Terrorism

After Mogadishu was recaptured, the Al-shabaab have suffered huge blows as AMISOM had strategic control of the region thus able to force the militant group further in other Somalia regions<sup>69</sup>. Another setback for the Al-shabbab was seen after AMISOM reclaimed Kismayu which was believed to be the chief source of funds of its operations. Despite Al-shabaab being flushed out, its presence is still felt especially in the non-urban areas and in Puntland areas.

The AMISOM achievements of recapturing the two areas were highly recommended by the African Union. This was a huge milestone in achieving peace in Somalia, as only African member states had contributed both in terms of finance and military personnel. An interview between International Crisis Group and Washington Times stated that Al-shabaab could move to Mogadishu only when AMISOM moves out of the region and a legitimate government cannot be realized<sup>70</sup>. In military and security view, AMISOM has immensely contributed to noticeable and felt transformation in Somalia.

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<sup>69</sup>Ibid

## CHAPTER FOUR

### A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF AU SOMALIA

#### 4.1 Introduction

This section exhibits a basic investigation on the part of territorial associations in refereeing with concentrate on AU's Mission in Somalia. Essential information was chiefly dissected utilizing Statistical Program for Social Sciences (SPSS); presented using graphs and tables; and interpretation done with use of descriptive statistics (frequencies and percentages).The chapter is divided into sections based on research objectives.

#### 4.2 Demographic Information

**Table 4.1: Gender of Respondent**

	Frequency	Percent
Male	19	63.3%
Female	11	36.7%
Total	30	100.0%

According to the discoveries on the sex of the respondents, greater part were male (63.3%) while the minority were female (36.7%)

##### 4.2.1 Age of the Respondents in Years

Most by far of; others were in the area of 31 and 40. The age fragment in the area of 20 and 30 were the minority. The repercussions of the basic war realized mercilessness towards the customary individuals and colossal removals. Right now, there are about 2.7

million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) while more than 4.7 million are in desperate need of philanthropic activity. In mid 2016, just 65 percent were effortlessly open by the helpful associations.

#### **4.2.2 Academic Qualifications**

The findings revealed that the majority of the citizens have reached the secondary education while just a handful has proceeded to the tertiary level. This is an indication of high illiteracy level, this result to difficulty in resolving the conflict.

### **4.3 AU Mission Conflict Management Findings in Somalia**


**Table 4.2: Appropriateness of AU Mission Timing in Somalia**

	Frequency	Percent
Yes.	20.0	65.50
No.	6.0	20.70
I don't know.	3.0	10.30
No response.	1.0	3.50
Total.	30 .0	100.00

About 65% supported the peace process in Somalia unlike the twenty percent who felt that the peace process was wrongly timed. Majority of the respondents, who filled in the affirmative question, believed that the timing was appropriate of the peace process as this would help in taming the situation. Those who disagreed with the timing of the peace process said that the peace process was ill-motivated as Ethiopia kick-started the talks

with an ill motive of undermining the TNG. Many respondents were annoyed by the involvement of Ethiopia in the peace process due to her participation in the formation of SRRG. The formation of SRRG was aimed at frustrating the efforts of the Arta peace process and crippling TNG's activities and also obstructing the formation of the Somali state. "It could be said, the SNRC was a seizing of the TNG", as one of the respondent said in his summary. This was a crystal clear indication that the peace initiative was a hasty one just from the start.

**Figure 4.1: Regardless of whether there was an impression of expanded enduring by every single clashing gathering in Somalia**



As per the consequences of the above diagram, 58.6% of the respondents in Somalia that there was no observed familiarity with extraordinary enduring or "harming stalemate" showed in the gatherings clashing before the peace procedure was initiated. Albeit, several respondents revealed that there was a stalemate on one-side (the TNG's authority were unable to go past Mogadishu while SRRC was boosted by Ethiopia both in finances and military personnel but the latter was still defeated by TNG), the stalemate was said to



be the factor that initiated negotiations. Actually, the stalemate was non-existence as there were some agreements signed many years before such as the cessation agreement reached upon by the twenty-four faction leaders and the fighting still had existed even before. There were just 37.9% of the respondents said that a "stinging stalemate" of the gatherings won earlier and that it was just a medium for encourage arrangements.

**Table 4.3: Any perception of increased suffering the conflicting parties in Somalia**

	Frequency	Percent
Yes.	13.0	43.30%
No.	11.0	36.70%
I don't know.	4.0	13.30%
No response.	2.0	6.700%
Total.	30.0	100.00%

Only 43.3 percent of the respondents agreed that indeed suffering had escalated in the parties engaged in the conflict, this supported the view of the escalating conflict, and however 13.3 percent were in disagreement. About 6.7 percent failed to give any response. It can be concluded that the process of peace negotiation resulted into more suffering between the conflicting parties.

**Table 4.4: Regardless of whether the clashing gatherings were ready to consult in compliance with common decency in Somalia**

	Frequency	Percent
Yes.	5.0	16.70%
No.	18.0	60.00%
I don't know.	2.0	6.70%
No response.	5.0	16.70%
Total.	30.0	100.00 %

The researcher further studied on the willingness of the conflicting parties to negotiate in good faith. According to majority of the respondents (60.0 percent) were in the view of the unwillingness of the conflicting parties to negotiate unlike 16.7 percent who were in the view that the clashing gatherings acted with great confidence in the transaction. The other 16.7% percent gave no reaction while the staying 6.7 percent had no clue about the contention. This revealed that the peace initiated process was futile as parties were unwilling to come to the negotiating table. Thus, when a conflict occurs the conflicting parties must be willing to engage harmoniously so as to come up with a solution.

#### **4.3.1 Regardless of Whether the Clashing Gatherings were Eager to Consult in Compliance with Common Decency in Somalia**

Correspondingly, the parties involved in the conflict had no willingness to engage in the negotiation in good faith. It is assumed that the willingness of the parties conflicting

plays a big role in a successful mediation result<sup>71</sup>. In the results, 58.6% were in the view that the parties conflicting were unwilling and entered the negotiating table in bad faith<sup>72</sup> unlike 20.7% of the respondents who said that the respondents were not fully willing to negotiate in good faith, the remaining 13% were in the view that the negotiating partners did so in good faith.

On further questioning, the respondents said that the reason for the unwillingness on the part of the faction leaders is that they were former SNRC members and that they were only interested in the benefits they would get individually and were looking for a way not to escape the International Criminal Court. One of the respondents candidly asked the specialist, "How would you accomplish peace with twenty-four group pioneers?"; this was an inquiry that put credibility of the faction leaders into doubt in the eyes of the Somali Public. The remarks of the respondent revealed that there was a decline in the warlords as a winner by one side was unpredictable and negotiations was a tactic of passing time as they craft better strategies.

**Table 4.5: Portrayal of the Clashing Gatherings in the Peace Procedure in Somalia**

	Frequency	Percent
Government was more spoken to	5	16.7%
Dissenting was more spoken to	8	26.7%
Both parties were fully more spoken to	17	56.7%
Total	30	100.0%

<sup>71</sup>Ibid

<sup>72</sup>In good faith

The level of portrayal was likewise looked for by the scientist in the peace procedure. The greater part (56.7 percent) of the respondents said that the two sides were spoken to dissimilar to the 26.7 percent who were actually. The remaining (16.7 percent) said that the government had a considerable representation. This is evident that the two sides had a significant representation. The two conflicting parties ought to be adequately represented for a solution to be reached and the government should not interfere with the negotiations in any way.

To also choose whether intervention of the Somali conflict was looked for after at a "prepared" moment and a perspective of extended continuing by the conflicting get-togethers existed, it was in like way essential to concentrate to "spoilers" of the peace procedure were seen and joined into the peace methodology. As featured in the composed work audit, intercession in resolute clashes will in all likelihood be serious if there are no parts in each social affair focused on the continuation of fierceness. Recalling a definitive goal to pick the potential for spoilers amidst the SNRC, it was essential to consider how entire the peace system was regarding including the key accessories.

#### **4.3.2 Portrayal of the Civil Society in the Peace Procedure**

In Somalia, 27.6% felt that typical society were completely tended to, 27.6% idea they were not tended to, and 24.1% imagined that essential culture were genuinely tended to. An enrapturing wisdom made was that a sweeping piece of the respondents proposed the need to reconsider the likelihood of "normal society" in the Somali setting. It was recommended that the likelihood of ordinary society should be exhausted to meld

delineation from the key able portions of the Somali society (i.e. specialists, instructors, canny people). This was not done in Somalia and there had every one of the reserves of being bedlam on what really constituted "standard society". Most respondents who felt that Civil Society was to a restricted degree or not tended to suggested this contention.

#### **4.3.3 Portrayal of the Private Part/Business Group in the Peace Procedure**

Results displays that 27.6% felt that the private segment was unimaginably tended to, 48.3% idea they were by and large tended to, while 3.4% imagined that the private division was not tended to. Respondents who granted that the business collect was generally tended to or not tended to at all struggled that the specialists had pulled in the business store up in the peace strategy at a late stage amidst the third and last time of the exchange off meeting. It was seen that a couple of administrators had benefitted from the unregulated and untaxed war economy amidst the fundamental war and along these lines were inherently masterminded to restrict the recovery of a focal government that could debilitate this thriving. In such way, their full idea in the meantime and purchase in was respected basic yet dismissed by the middle people.

Exactly when the researcher approached the respondents for what legitimate reason they felt that this voting statistic was not completely or not addressed a combination of elucidations were given. For instance, some informed that Ethiopia and a couple of warlords had deliberately maintained a strategic distance from religious operators from the once-over of collaboration at the peace technique. In the midst of a meeting with a gathering pioneer, he communicated that he had regarded it neither reasonable nor

imperative to consolidate religious depiction in the midst of the peace technique. Still others felt that, not in any manner like today, in the midst of the period of the SNRC there was no unmistakable political Islamic social event; rather, religious pioneers had inundated themselves inside the get-togethers or under some get-together pioneers. This unmistakably demonstrates the immensity of religion had been had a poor assessment of amidst the SNRC. By the affirmation of Kenyan Delegation, "We didn't grasp the centrality of the religious fragment. Somalis did not see religion as an essential issue; rather, control sharing was raised as the most crucial factor". The aftereffect of this, as indicated by a few respondents, was that the quick religious pioneers who had not been completely required with the SNRC (i.e. Al-Islah gathering) later formed piece of the Islamic Court Union that had later nullified the TFG in 2006 after the total of the SNRC. Despite the way that not in the class of "spoilers", it is in any case basic to incorporate that distinctive respondents proclaimed that Somaliland was likewise among the key assistants deficiently had with the peace system; in this manner undermining the solidarity of Somalia.

**Table 4.6: Level of Cooperation at the Au-Drove Peace Process**

	Frequency	Percent
leaders	4	13.3%
Delegates	1	3.3%
Political leaders	3	10.0%
Civil societies	16	53.3%
Outside country	5	16.7%
No responses	1	3.3%
Total	30	100.0%

Disclosures on the respondents' evaluation on the level of energy at the AU-drove peace process, dominating area (53.3 percent) went about as would be expected society delegates while others 16.7 percent shared as masters of those in diaspora. The analyst in like way observed that 13.3 percent went about as farthest point pioneers. It is besides basic that 10.0 percent shared as political pioneers while 3.3 percent went about as administrators at the AU-drove peace process. The staying 3.3 percent however gave no reaction on whether they shared and at what level. This exhibits lion's offer of the general open in Somalia took part in AU-drove peace process as typical society experts.

The AU started to send few screens to Somalia following a détente set apart in April 2010 in N'Djamena, Chad. A dedication in pre-fall 2010 to become the checking vitality to around 3,500 went unfulfilled for over a significant piece of a year, and amidst this time the AU was not able secure from Khartoum a charge for standard national insurance just a demand to screen the, everything considered, nonexistent truce.

Concerning whether the respondents took an interest in any AU Mission lead peace practices in Somalia between 2010-2016, a common segment (73.3 percent) shared while 10.0 percent had not taken an interest. The staying 16.7 percent did not give their reaction on paying little notice to whether they had shared. This shows colossal amounts of the general open in Somalia acknowledged an area in AU Mission led peace practices between 2010 - 2016. Countries that have encountered clashes and nonappearance of peace for drawn out stretches out of time dependably have one dream in like way: peace and quietness. At whatever point along these lines an open door which is by all accounts

driving them towards their coveted dream presents itself, many individuals from such countries are continually eager to do everything conceivable to see their blessing from heaven.

**Table 4.7: Do you feel that the intercession procedure was effective?**

	Frequency	Percent
Yes, very successful	5	16.7%
Partially successful	12	40.0%
Not successful	6	20.0%
No response	7	23.3%
Total	30	100.0%

On whether the intercession technique was to some degree viable, 40.0 percent of the respondents agreed that the method was productive while 23.3 percent couldn't give their response on whether the strategy was productive or not. The other 20.0 percent said that the mediation method did not succeed while the remaining 16.6 percent agreed that the strategy was to a great degree productive. This proposes larger piece of the overall public in Somalia did not experience the impact of the intervention method as they had anticipated.

On whether the AUs had an appropriate intervention framework to propel the general security in Somalia, larger section (53.3 percent) of the respondents said that there was no fitting system to propel security while 20.0 percent said that the mediation method was



mostly reasonable. 13.3 percent were of the supposition that the intervention system to propel general security in Somalia was fitting however the remaining 13.3 percent gave no response on the same. This recommends larger piece of the occupants of Somalia felt untrustworthy in the midst of the peace strategy attributed to dissatisfaction by the AUs to set up an appropriate intervention system to propel general security. At whatever point there is a basic development, event or process happening in any state, locale or condition, security ought to be given need at all cost. This is in light of the fact that with every single movement taken in any condition, there are a couple of individuals who are against the same for reasons unknown and they have a tendency to use all techniques open to render the whole system unsuccessful.

Prior to the sending of the joint peacekeeping force, masters had certifiable reservations about the limit of the AU peacekeepers to work effectively. "Everyone knows this has been an amazingly undermanned, understaffed, under-arranged, and under-resourced drive," Cohen said in 2006.

**Table 4.8: Is the go between impact/use on the clashing gatherings imperative for effective intercession result in the Somali Context?**

	Frequency	Percent
Very important	16	51.7
Partially important	5	17.2
Not important	1	3.4
No response	8	27.7
Total	30	100.0

#### **4.3.4 Is the Go Between Impact/Use on the Clashing Gatherings Critical for Fruitful Intercession Result in the Somali Setting?**

A staggering 51.7% reacted in the positive. 17.2% considered use to be incompletely imperative in accomplishing an effective intercession result while 3.4% guaranteed use isn't a vital factor by any means.

#### **4.3.5 Did the AU Technical/Facilitation Committee and International Community Use Particular Sorts of Effect/Use on the Conflicting Social Occasions?**

As fought by Rothchild, inspirations contain material and non-material stock offered by a referee to impact performing specialists to modify their slants and, accordingly, their direct. Sparks are expected to affect foes' methods along fated lines. The inspirations used by a center individual may reach out along a continuum of energy from non-coercive to coercive or be joined in a "carrot-and-stick" form. Finally, inspiring powers may well incorporate a period part (i.e. due dates).

Given that a few respondents did not quickly get a handle on the issue of intercession use, the analyst needed to contextualize the inquiry by giving genuine situations amid the SNRC procedures. The scientist solicited: "Amid particularly stage two from the SNRC when the transitional sanction was under consultation, we saw some genuine and delayed halts in the process with group pioneers on occasion boycotting the arrangements. Too, it was noted in a few events amid the procedures of the SNRC that some group pioneers left amidst the procedure and came back to Somalia to keep battling in spite of having marked the suspension of threats understanding. In minutes, for example, these, did the


middle people or the global group apply sanctions, strategic weight, dangers of military intercession or money related impetuses to get the gatherings to change their conduct?"

Dominant part of the respondents brought up that neither the go betweens nor the global group connected coercive motivators (i.e. sanctions) to soften halts or impact switch up the conduct of the clashing gatherings when it was required. A few respondents, in any case, noticed that non-coercive types of use and particularly political weight from the IGAD Ministerial Committee, was sufficiently used to keep the peace method on track. This is particularly associated with the request the pro moreover acted: Did the go betweens and the overall gathering have a convincing system of recognizing and managing the "spoilers" of the peace methodology? Inquisitively, every one of the respondents responded that the go betweens and the overall gathering did not have a capable strategy of perceiving and managing the "spoilers" of the peace methodology. Enthralled by this, the master asked with reference to why the respondents felt this to be the circumstance? Two guideline responses created.

Initial, various respondents trusted that the absence of lack of bias and personal stakes with respect to the middle people (particularly by Ethiopia and to some degree Djibouti) and a few individuals from the universal group was the fundamental obstruction in successfully dealing with the "spoilers" of the peace procedure. Because of absence of lack of bias and personal stakes, a few respondents called attention to that lone "lip benefit" was apparent with respect to getting the "spoilers" to alter their way of life. Truth be told, it was indicated out that a substantial degree a portion of the go betweens and

individuals from the universal group agreed with one group against the other, while proceeding to supply arms to their intermediaries. One respondent put it well as an inquiry: "How could the go between and a few individuals from the global group have dealt with the "spoilers" when they themselves were the "spoilers"? The following is a table that delineates to what degree the respondents trusted the middle people (AU in such manner) to be impartial agents.


**Figure 4.2: Extent of the Unbiasedness/Nonpartisanship of the AU Technical/Facilitation Board**



The results above exhibit that 65.5% felt that the center individuals were passably impartial, and 10.3% thought they were significantly reasonable. In addition, and as per the dispute more than, a couple of respondents assumed that the nonappearance of authority utilize was, all things considered, attributed to a nonattendance of a coordinated approach and rather battling approaches by the go between and all inclusive gathering versus the assurance of the Somali conflict. Thirdly, others like the Kenyan

Delegation battled that AU's basic insufficiency had been the nonappearance of sufficient political sponsorship and worldwide offer assistance. This ended up being particularly evident in the midst of the execution time of the peace understanding.

**Figure 4.3: Did the Au Technical/Facilitation Board have what it takes to Intercede the Somali Conflict?**



The above results exhibit that 24.1% felt that the center individuals had a couple of capacities to intercede the Somali conflict, while 17.2% thought they had no aptitudes. Only 13.8% conveyed that the leading body of trustees had the required aptitudes. Generally, the respondents especially felt that Kenyan Delegation was more experienced in intercession emerged from the other two Special Envoys from Ethiopia and Djibouti. Precisely when asked in regards to for what valid reason they trusted the IGAD middle people did not have what it takes to mediate the Somali conflict, respondents taught it was by virtue of they didn't truly appreciate the principle drivers of the Somali conflict

and the changing thought of the dispute, which along these lines provoked imperfect intercession framework.

**Table 4.9: Did the go between have a fitting intercession procedure?**


	Frequency	Percent
Yes	5	17.2
Partially appropriate	6	20.7
No	13	44.8
No response	5	17.3
Total	30	100.0

A fantastic 44.8% of the respondents envisioned that the center individuals did not have a fitting mediation strategy, 17.2% thought the go betweens had the reasonable technique while 20.7% felt that the intervention framework was to some degree appropriate. Respondents who had answered in the negative had been requested to give reasons. Most responded that there was a nonattendance of Somali ownership in setting the arrangement of the peace methodology. For instance, one respondent reflected that "the SNRC was a fait a compli". Ethiopia had expected to supplant the TNG with gatherings, for instance, the SRRC that it could control and control".


Likewise, overlooking Somaliland from the peace method was respected to be a basic stumble by a couple of respondents. They perceived that while Somaliland had without a doubt conveyed reservations in sharing in the SNRC, regardless the overall gathering and

the go betweens (i.e. Djibouti, Ethiopia) should have polished a touch of utilization in inducing the Somali landers to secure. Somaliland's nonattendance moreover played into the inspiration of Ethiopia to keep a unitary Somali state.

**Figure 4.4: Was a Warlord-focused approach the best methodology to determine the Somali clash?**



**Figure 4.5: Was a Bottom - up approach (building piece approach) suitable in settling the Somali clash?**



Respondents felt that the mediators gave exorbitantly vitality to the warlords in fundamental authority in the midst of the system which overwhelming piece of the

respondents felt was imprudent as it undermined the inclusivity and genuineness of the technique, as appeared in the figure 21 above. From figure 22 above, it is in like manner saw that respondents upheld for a base up approach as opposed to a warlord driven approach.

#### **4.3.6 Was the 4.5 Tribe Based Equation Utilized as a Part of the Peace Procedure Delegate and Straightforward?**

A couple of respondents pointed out that the selection of specialists in the peace gathering was skewed, as larger piece of those included were accomplices of one particular gathering; to be particular SRRC. As well, 41.40% of the respondents assumed that the 4.5 group formula grasped by the referees to pick key issues, for instance, venture and association of parliament was not operator and not clear. For instance, limiting the speculation of the minority amass versus distinctive gatherings was viewed to be out of line and as a social shamefulness.

A couple of respondents felt that while the 4.5 formula appeared to be sensible toward the begin a similar number of trusted bargain could be acknowledged by sharing the royal gems of war and power among the tribes. Regardless, rather than develop bargain the 4.5 formula caused more strain.



## CHAPTER FIVE

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

#### 5.1 Conclusions

The different guerrilla bunches in Africa are of totally factor significance and limit with regards to political change, running from totally outside financed and guided like the Chadian gatherings to miniaturized scale exceptionally patriot bunches with no remote surface like the littler Ethiopian gatherings. Incomprehensibly it is frequently those gatherings with the littlest social base – like the Chadian gatherings – who have the best potential for military effect. In such cases they can practically been viewed as outside soldiers of fortune. On the inverse, profoundly socially established gatherings like the Somalia guerrillas have just restricted military potential, yet a tremendous political potential should things betray the legislature. In aggregate, a considerable lot of the Horn guerrillas can be viewed as military jokers in a befuddled pack of political cards, dubious shadowy outlines one day and the following day battling in the capital just like the case in N'Djamena amid the principal seven day stretch of February 2008. The outcome is that the Horn can be considered as a to a great degree unpredictable political condition.

As a performer in its own right, the AU has now directed countless peace operations, particularly when contrasted with its forerunner. While the AU still experiences a portion of an indistinguishable basic hindrances from the OAU—reliance upon outer financing and inadequate civil servants, standing powers, and calculated abilities—it has sought after a considerably more dynamic peacekeeping motivation. The AU's tranquility

operations have extended from little eyewitness missions to two missions including more than seven thousand troops in Somalia.

AU peace operations rely upon the support of a little modest bunch of principle troop-contributing nations. This mirrors the tremendously uneven levels of help for peacekeeping over the landmass. Be that as it may, it is likewise, to a limited extent, an impression of states' choices about which associations to contribute their troopers.

## **5.2 Recommendations**

The following were the final recommendations of which will be of great importance to the Regional organizations in managing the conflict in the Horn of Africa.

The parties involved in the conflict ought to soften their hearts so as to bring the conflict to an eternal end. This will simplify the task of the parties uniting.

The neighbours of the countries engaged in conflict should intervene and help the country that is in conflict so as the country to regain peace.

The senior officers of the government should act as a good role model. They ought to advocate for peace in all their undertaking and activities. This will aid in reducing the cases of conflicts in the region.

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## APPENDIX

### APPENDIX 1: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Gender of respondent:        Male     Female
2. Age of respondents in years \_\_\_\_\_
3. Academic qualifications of respondents \_\_\_\_\_
4. Whether the timing of AU Mission conflict management was appropriate in Somalia  
Yes     No
5. Whether there was a perception of increased suffering by all conflicting parties in Somalia  
Yes     No
6. Whether the conflicting parties were willing to negotiate in good faith in Somalia  
Yes     No
7. Whether the conflicting parties were willing to negotiate in good faith in Somalia  
Yes     No
8. Representation of the conflicting parties in the peace process in Somalia  
Government was more represented   
Dissenting was more represented   
Both parties were fully represented   
Do you feel that the intervention process was successful?
9. Is the mediator influence/leverage on the conflicting parties important for successful mediation outcome in the Somali Context?  
Very important



Partially important [ ]

Not important [ ]

No response [ ]

10. Is the mediator influence/leverage on the conflicting parties important for successful mediation outcome in the Somali context?

11. Did the AU Technical/Facilitation Committee and International Community use