



UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Managing Persistent Conflicts in Africa: A Case Study of South Sudan

By

Hans Dickson M Nyange

(Reg. No. R50/ 5082/2017)

Supervisor:

Prof. Amb. Maria Nzomo

Thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of degree of

Master of Arts in International Studies

01 November, 2017

DECLARATION

This Thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

Signature:

Date:

Hans Dickson M Nyange

Reg. No. R50/5082/2017

This Thesis was submitted for examination with my approval as the University supervisor.

Signature:

Date:

Prof. Amb. Maria Nzomo

Director,

Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies,

University of Nairobi

DEDICATION

I wish to dedicate this Thesis to my family, especially my late mother Dinah Gombe Nyange, for their understanding and support during the period of this research. They not only stood with me, but also gave me special encouragement during the entire period I was busy working on this project. To my parents, in particular, their singular, focused and unwavering dedication to my success in life, was demonstrated in their personal sacrifices, parental guidance and full support for my education.

I wish also to dedicate this Thesis to all International Studies scholars, researchers and students whose daily endeavors seek to understand and resolve persistent conflicts in Africa. Lastly, I wish also to encourage institutions of conflict studies, such as the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS) of the University of Nairobi (UoN), not to relent in their noble roles of nurturing and developing such academic talents, knowledge and capacities towards conflict resolution.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

It is with great humility and gratitude that I wish to acknowledge the many sources of moral and intellectual encouragement I benefited while undertaking this study. First, I wish to offer my sincere appreciation to my supervisor, Prof. Amb. Maria Nzomo, for her wise counsel, guidance, and encouragement, that has shaped my academic progress. Second, I remain grateful to the National Defence College – Kenya (NDC - K) for according me the opportunity and support to undertake this study. Third, I wish to acknowledge all resource persons from the various institutions who lecture at NDC – K for their invaluable insights and encouragement. Dr. Patrick Maluki, in particular, took me through “Diplomacy and Conflict Management,” which was an eye-opener in this study. Lastly, I wish to thank my family, once again, for their support and understanding while undertaking this study.

LIST OF APPENDICES, FIGURES AND TABLES

<u>APPENDICES</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
APPENDIX 1: INTRODUCTION LETTER.....	93
APPENDIX 2: RESEARCH AUTHORISATION	94
APPENDIX 3: RESEARCH PERMIT	95
APPENDIX 4: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MANAGING PERSISTENT CONFLICTS	98
APPENDIX 5: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE	103
APPENDIX 6: CONSENT FORM.....	104

FIGURES

Fig. 1: Response rate.....	20
Fig. 2: Gender of the respondents	21
Fig. 3: Age of the respondents	22
Fig. 4: Education level	23
Fig. 5: Political orientation.....	24
Fig. 6: Political positions rally	25
Fig. 7: Economic factors	27
Fig. 8: Cultural factors	29
Fig. 9: Framework for analysing International conflict management.....	56

TABLES

Table 1: Political Orientation.....	26
Table 2: Socio-Economic Factors.....	28
Table 3: Social Factors.....	30
Table 4: Logit Regression	39
Table 5: Changing Conflicts Model 1	40
Table 6: Changing Conflicts Model 2.....	42
Table 7: Outcome Durability.....	43
Table 8: Number of Conflict Management Efforts.....	49

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AEC	Assessment Evaluation Commission
AU	African Union
AUCISS	African Union Commission in South Sudan
AUHLP	African Union High Level Panel
CA	Conflict Analysis
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
GONU	Government National Unity
GOS	Government of Sudan
GOSS	Government of South Sudan
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority on draught and development
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
NCP	National Congress Party (Sudan)

NDP	National Democratic Party
OAU	Organization of African Unity
RPF	Regional Protection Force
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UK	United Kingdom
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan

ABSTRACT

This study examined the management of persistent conflicts in Africa using the case study of South Sudan, in particular, the factors causing the persistent conflicts, initiatives adopted to manage them, as well as the role of international and regional interventions, with a view to making recommendations on how to find lasting solutions. Two theoretical perspectives: neo-realism and conflict analysis were used. The former situated the study within the horizon of the state as an actor in an anarchic international system where self-interest is primary; an approach that recognizes the importance of empiricism in data analysis. The latter framework analyses at the practical work of establishing the status of the conflict with a view to helping the parties in the conflict to work towards healing and stability. These two complementary frameworks helped to focus on both the international and local actors in the South Sudan conflict. Both qualitative and quantitative research methods were used. Primary data was collected from selected informants, including key players in the conflict such as key informants from the South Sudan Government. The analysis revealed that conflicts in Africa, in general, and South Sudan in particular, were largely fueled by ethnic strife, political exclusion and inequality in distribution of resources, human rights violations/injustices, and incompatible leadership. International and regional actors play an important role in encouraging negotiations, humanitarian assistance and peace building efforts. The study recommends a seamless nexus between international, regional and local processes, to yield a just federal system of government in South Sudan and a revisit of the cross-fertilization efforts of the two theoretical frameworks used, to engender theoretical synergy on how to resolve violent conflicts in international politics.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TITLE.....	i
DECLARATION.....	ii
DEDICATION.....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.....	iv
LIST OF APPENDICES, FIGURES AND TABLES	v
ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS	vii
ABSTRACT	ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS	x
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY	1
1.1 Background of the study	1
1.2 Statement of the Problem.....	3
1.3 Research Questions.....	5
1.4 Research Objectives.....	5
1.5 Justification	6
1.6 Literature review	6
1.7 Theoretical Framework.....	11
1.8 Research Hypotheses	16
1.9 Research Methodology	17
1.10: Scope and limitations of the study.....	17
1.11 Chapter Outline.....	18

CHAPTER TWO: NATURE AND TRENDS OF CONFLICTS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA	19
2.1 Introduction.....	19
2.2 Causes of conflict in South Sudan	23
2.3 Analysis of South Sudan conflict.....	31
2.4 Conclusion	34
CHAPTER THREE: MANAGEMENT OF PERSISTENT CONFLICTS IN SOUTH SUDAN.....	37
3.1: Introduction.....	37
3.2 Logit Modelling of the conflict in South Sudan	37
3.3 Structure of Conflict Management in South Sudan	45
3.4 Historical outline of the conflict in South Sudan.....	48
3.5 Factors Affecting Conflict Management In South Sudan.....	50
3.7 Conclusion	57
CHAPTER FOUR: ROLE AND IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL INTERVENTIONS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF PERSISTING CONFLICT IN SOUTH SUDAN.....	59
4.1 Introduction.....	59
4.2: UN involvement in South Sudan conflict resolution.....	60
4.3 Recent Developments in South Sudan.....	61
4.4 U.S. Policy and Foreign Assistance	62

4.5 International Responses to the Crisis	62
4.6 Humanitarian interventions, problems, prospects, and political dilemmas	63
4.7 Efforts to stabilize the country	66
4.8 Sanctions	69
4.9 Challenges ahead	70
4.10: Conclusion	71
CHAPTER FIVE: DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION	73
5.1 Introduction.....	73
5.2 Analysis.....	73
5.3 Key findings.....	74
5.4 Conclusion	75
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS	76
6.1 Conclusion	76
6.2 Recommendations.....	80
BIBLIOGRAPHY	82
APPENDICES	93

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Background

Conflicts within States in Africa might be attributed to several factors. One of these factors is the powerlessness of governments to provide essential administration and security services within their territories. In many cases, powerless governments have had little ability to stop the emission and spread of viciousness. Another causative factor is the struggle for power among the elite, especially within dictator frameworks or one-party control regimes. In Africa, States burdened by war have endured sharp inequalities among social, ethnic and regional groups, also similarly reflected in unequal access to political power without avenues for peaceful change.¹

In most cases, conflicts within African States are political and involve subjects battling for inward change including secessionist movements, by and large, led by a gathering of individuals, as a rule, a minority inside a group, who wage war to battle for the foundation of either a self-sufficient substance inside a current State or a completely new and independent State of their own. Such conflicts also occurred in Asia and Europe in 1991 – 1992, where Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina withdrew from Yugoslavia following the civil war in the former Republic of Yugoslavia.

¹ Gilley, B. (2004). "Against the Concept of Ethnic Conflict". *Third World Quarterly* 25 (6), pp 1155 – 1166.

In the case of South Sudan, peace has persistently remained elusive, amidst numerous peace efforts and agreements, even as fighting continued. The critical issue for South Sudan today, therefore, is to embrace democracy. Consequently, in 2007, the United Nation's Secretary General's (UNSG) Policy Committee defined several peace building strategies tailored for specific needs of South Sudan, based on countrywide possession, and a carefully prioritized implementation sequence. Additionally, the 2015 UNSG conflict review report of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) identified a complex set of political, security and institutional challenges that, if not closely monitored and addressed, could undermine the transition and adversely affect the timely and effective implementation of any peace agreement.

Major political difficulties were witnessed in adherence to the set dates by the IGAD Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) of 17 August, 2015; such as the question of the centralization of power around the Presidency at State level.² In general, most conflict-generating political systems in Africa can be attributed to poor governance, unjust social and economic systems, socio-economic inequalities and abuse of fundamental human rights and South Sudan is not an exception. It is for these reasons that South Sudan has not experienced peace and stability since the former unitary State of Sudan gained independence from the British on 1st January, 1956.

Earlier, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) were invited to negotiate in Naivasha, Kenya, resulting into the Comprehensive Peace

² Briefing to the IGAD Extraordinary Summit on the Situation in South Sudan by UNMISS Head of Mission, David Shearer, on 12 June 2017.

Agreement (CPA) of 9 January, 2005, and ending more than 20 years of civil war. A transitional Government of South Sudan (GOSS) was set up in Juba, led by Dr. John Garang. South Sudan gained independence on 9 July, 2011, after a referendum, yet has since faced political wrangles and fierce conflict to date. There has, since then, been enormous international and external pressure to end the war, especially from countries such as the USA, UK, Norway, and Italy. It is worth noting that the new State now outperforms Somalia on the Fragile States Index³.

It is worth noting that after the peace agreement of August 2015 (ARCSS), Riek Machar went back to Juba in 2016 to resume his role as the Vice-President, but there was high tension culminating in the second civil war in Juba, which saw Machar flee and eventually replaced by Taban Deng Gai as First Vice President. An estimated 300,000 people are believed to have been murdered and another 3.5million have since become internally displaced or refugees, while conflict persists in this young nation.⁴ It is against this background that this study seeks to examine the causes, nature and trends of the conflict with a view to making recommendations on how to manage it.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Conflicts and instability within States have been issues of great concern, not only to Africa as a region, but the international community, in general, for several decades. Sources of these internal conflicts have been singled out to include weak governance structures, the internecine struggles for power among the elite, and socio-economic exclusion. Within Africa,

³Foreign Policy magazine. <http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/indicators/>, "Failed States list 2007". Retrieved 5 June, 2017.

these conflicts have sometimes manifested themselves in secessionist movements such as the Igbo conflict in Nigeria, the insurgency within the Kabinda enclave in Angola and the Kasamanze strife in Senegal. In Europe, a similar tide of secession was evident from 1991 – 1992, where Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, withdrew from Yugoslavia following the civil war in the former Yugoslavia. Efforts to settle the violent conflagrations in Africa have largely been led by regional organisations such as ECOWAS, IGAD, and SADC, with support from the UN and world powers.

When the international community welcomed South Sudan as its new member among the community of States on 9 July, 2011, little was anticipated of the civil strife that followed. By June, 2017, the ruling party, SPLM, which was founded by the late Dr. John Garang in 1983, had already split into two warring groups: President Salva Kirr’s faction, the SPLM in Government (SPLM-IG) and former Vice President Riek Machar’s faction, the SPLM in Opposition (SPLM-IO). The outbreak of fighting between SPLA forces loyal to the two opposing factions of President Salva Kirr and Vice President Riek Machar in 2011 prompted the UN into action. The UN Security Council through Resolution 1996 of 8 July, 2011 (UNSCR 1996/2011), set up UNMISS from 9 July, 2011, with peace building and restoration of security as its core mandates.

As stated earlier in the introduction, the conflict in the South Sudan has since expanded to hitherto peaceful regions like Western and Eastern Equatoria. The intensification of the conflict saw the UN pass Resolution 2155 (UNSCR 2155/2014) on 27 May, 2014, which allowed UNMISS to protect civilians, check on human rights and bolster the humanitarian effort. The outbreak of heavy fighting in Juba, between SPLA and SPLM-IO, in July 2016, effectively set

the stage for the sharp deterioration in the human rights situation across the country. The violations have taken a worrying ethnic angle, with the ruling Dinka tribal group of Salva Kiri going after the opposing Nuer of Riek Machar. The problem this study seeks to investigate, therefore, is what causes persistent conflicts in Africa, using the case study of South Sudan, and the role and impact of international and regional conflict management mechanisms in resolving them.

1.3 Research Questions

In this study I am guided by the following research questions:

- 1.3.1 What is the nature and trends of conflict and conflict management in Africa?
- 1.3.2 What are the causes of conflict in South Sudan and challenges of managing them?
- 1.3.3 What are the roles and impact of international and regional conflict management mechanisms employed in South Sudan?

1.4 Research Objectives

- 1.4.1 To establish the nature and trends of conflict in Africa.
- 1.4.2 To examine the causes and challenges of managing persistent conflict in South Sudan.
- 1.4.3 To establish the roles and impact of international and regional interventions in the management of persistent conflict in South Sudan.

1.5 Justification

This study seeks to fill existing gaps in knowledge on the persistent conflicts in Africa, using the case study of South Sudan, and how they can be managed. This will be done through exploring the underlying causes, mapping the key protagonists and the main hot spots, and by reviewing the regional and international conflict management efforts towards finding lasting peace in South Sudan. Overall, the study will seek to identify challenges facing conflict management efforts in South Sudan with a view to making recommendations on how to achieve durable peace in the country. The findings of this study are also expected to contribute to policy making and hence, improve strategies for resolving the persistent conflict in South Sudan and, in turn, lead to sustainable development of the country.

1.6 Literature Review

1.6.1 The concept of ‘world peace’ as stipulated by developed nations

Smith examines the idea of ‘world peace’ within the geo-political adjust of power as was obvious when then world powers, the USA and Russia, represented by Presidents Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev respectively, met to discuss the strategic weapons contest of the 1980s. It is an idea that sees nuclear weapons as the main risk to peace. It is an idea which sees peace as an adjunct of dread. This approach which has dominated peace inquiries in Europe and the United States is a representation of the predominance of this point of view as well as of its constancy. It follows that Europe and America engage this idea of peace as the privileged and rightful position; whose definition they have forced on the rest of the world. This shouldn't imply

that the perils of nuclear war ought to be thought little of, yet without precedent for history, humankind has created instruments of savagery which can possibly demolish all species a few times over. Nonetheless, to view this as the main issue is to genuinely distort the issue. From my perspective, it is less nuclear weapons which represent a danger, the social frameworks which bring nuclear weapons into being and the battles for control of nuclear assets which make nuclear weapons vital.

There is a focal gratefulness that it is less demanding to get concurrence on constraining nuclear weapons or to look for their cancellation than to acquire an agreement on fitting social and political frameworks; yet this is a position which, if received, still leaves the casualties of persecution where they are. I support, and all humanity should keep on supporting endeavors, as far as possible that cancel the utilization of nuclear weapons. Be that as it may, I am likewise agonizingly aware that before nuclear weapons were created we were ruled by Europeans through subjugation, imperialism and now neo-colonialism. Christopher⁵ posits that much work in peace studies has now moved focus from armed conflict amongst East and West countries, and has started to handle North-South connections, which is more a mainland European perspective than a British or North American one.

Young⁶ argues that insofar as individuals are mistreated, the premise of genuine conflict exists. It is this which influences us to state that a point of view on the peace hazardous which delivers itself just to the specialized inquiry of the instruments of viciousness without taking a gander at the more profound auxiliary issues, for example, the arrangement of power, both at national and worldwide levels, is not prone to accomplish much. This is the reason we say that for us the pulverization of nuclear weapons is just a moderate condition for the fulfillment of peace. It is this origination of peace which the African position rejects: an origination which considers peace to be the tranquility of Europe, or just as the non-appearance or administration of conflict or as nuclear peace random to surviving social and material conditions.

1.6.2 The African perspective of ‘peace’

The African point of view sees peace and improvement as personally related; it sees peace as the determination of contention as well as the change of surviving social frameworks at both national and global levels. It is an idea which relates peace to the physical, social and existential needs of individuals. It is an idea of peace which, however, emerging out of our specific chronicled conditions reacts to the necessities not simply of our own kin but rather of the mass of mankind.

‘Business Week’ magazine posited that exclusive saying that this viewpoint, which speaks to an agreement of the perspectives of African researchers, underlies the examinations

⁶ Young, J. (2014). “The White Army: An Introduction and Overview.” *Small Arms Survey*. Retrieved 30, December 2016.

displayed in this study. I know that specific people and certain peace associations likewise hold such a position. As per Mazurana, Susan, McKay, Khristopher, Carlson, Janel and Kasper, there is no contrast between the peace dangerous and the improvement hazardous. We know that even inside peace development there are numerous people and peace associations whose idea of peace is near what I have portrayed as the foundation viewpoint and which ought to be rejected if the world is to achieve any significant and enduring peace. To state this is not to denounce such peace developments but rather to express a recorded certainty. The point of view on peace I have laid out here educates my scholarly stance and political conduct and is the idea of peace which I will try to examine; it is the idea of peace which advises this examination.

1.6.3 Regional bodies and their contribution to peace in Africa

Dianna basically analyzes the idea of peace working as a lucid methodology custom-made to particular needs of the nation concerned, in light of national possession, and involving a precisely organized, arrangement. The example of contentions creating inside Africa is both discouraging and energizing. It is discouraging in light of the fact that contention, at whatever level, involves death toll, as well as serious diversions from the difficulties of Africa's advancement. It is energizing since strife likewise carries with it the need to reassess connections. It flags much that is flourishing, or rotting, in the body politic, and thus postures applicable difficulties for future activity. Further, the levels of different individual clashes must be unraveled, and the interfaces between various sorts of contention, e.g. amongst political and ecological clash, distinguished. Inside this expansive approach, the reasonable premise on which

investigation and pragmatic peace making must be implanted ought to be characterized; for, without a sound calculated premise any sort of refereeing will undoubtedly originate.

Saferworld argues that due to lack of good leadership in Africa, the continent has persistently suffered violent conflict. Leadership that is visionary should be embraced in Africa. This type of leadership must express willingness to fight the various ills that the continent has experienced over the years. The ills to be addressed include corruption, bad governance, dictatorial rule, and staying in power forever. This must be the kind of leadership that should pack the capacity to use the available resources in a transparent, honest, accountable and frugal manner. If African leaders could mobilize their resources and use them adequately while involving their populations, and allowing civil societies to grow and to flourish, then Africa could progress in the right direction.

Additionally, various regional organizations in Africa, such as ECOWAS, COMESA SADC, EAC, and IGAD do organize inter-governmental conferences which primarily focus on cooperation between member states. These regional organisations, therefore, need to be more robust in their pursuit of economic integration and growth, which in turn, might contribute to the reduction of violent conflicts while contributing to regional stability.

1.6.4 The correlation between trade and peace in Africa

Christopher believes that in Africa, there has been generous decrease in the normal level of protectionism, both towards outside nations and in addition inside Africa itself. Local exchange generously changes after development of exchanging alliance. What's more, the

expansion that is acknowledged is to the detriment of exchange with these provincial nations. Accordingly, exchange diverse districts of Africa between individuals have been developing substantially quicker than with non-individuals.

Notwithstanding, with local incorporation, areas outside Africa offer additional advantage. Inner and outer exchange progression prompts quick ascent inside and outside exchange. Exchange creation in Africa has turned out to be substantial because of peace in territories that were significantly influenced by conflicts. This is exhibited by noteworthy inward and outside exchange advancement in Africa. It has prompted huge ascent in intraregional exchange as well as in exchange with created nations. Concentrates by Diao and Somwaru demonstrate that welfare among part nations of Africa has ascended because of the expanded venture, creation, and utilization. These impacts of the local exchange have been sure and this is because of the commonness of peace in these districts.

Egemi and Pantuliano argue that the fiasco in South Sudan is the after-effect of a political question between two pioneers that has swelled into a contention inundating a great part of the world's most current country. This contention is established in the uncertain pressures of many years of common war in what was Sudan. It is exacerbated by the proliferation of arms and the absence of improvement in human development in one of the poorest nations on the planet.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

This study is anchored on the Neo-Realism theory, as formulated by Kenneth Waltz. Kenneth Waltz re-formulated Realism in International Relations (IR) in a new and distinctive

way, in his book 'Theory of International Politics' (1979). His contribution was in response to the notable defects within classical theory of Realism by Hans Morgenthau⁷. Waltz adopted a more scientific approach, now referred to as 'Structural Realism' or 'Neo-Realism'. Unlike Morgenthau, who rooted his theory of Realism in the struggle for power among States, and which he related to human nature, Waltz, on his part, avoided reference to human nature, and built his perspective on international politics in a manner similar to, say, micro-economics.

Waltz argues that States in the International System (IS) are like firms in a domestic economy, and have the same fundamental interest; i.e. to survive. "Internationally, the environment of States' actions, or the structure of the IS, is set by the fact that some States prefer survival over other ends obtainable in the short run and act with relative efficiency to achieve that end."⁸ It is worth noting that Waltz's neo-realist conception of international politics is largely inapplicable to domestic politics, and may not be of service to the development of domestic policies. From his theory, we discern why States behave in similar ways despite their different forms of governments and diverse political ideologies, and also why, despite their growing inter-dependence, the overall picture of IR is unlikely to change.

According to Waltz, States tend to behave with some measure of uniformity due to constraints imposed on them by the structure of the IS. Waltz holds that a system's structure is defined first by the ordering principle by which it is organized, then by the differentiation of its units, and finally by the distribution of capabilities (power) across these units. Anarchy or the

⁷ Morgenthau, Hans J. (1978). *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Fifth Edition, Revised, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. pp. 4-15.

absence of central authority is, for Waltz, the ordering principle of the IS. The units of the international system are States.

Waltz also recognizes the existence of non-State actors, but dismisses them as relatively unimportant. Since all States want to survive, and anarchy presupposes a self-help system in which each State has to take care of itself, there is no division of labor or functional differentiation among them. While functionally similar, they are nonetheless distinguished by their relative capabilities (the power each of them represents) to perform the same function. Consequently, Waltz sees power and State behavior in a different way from the classical Realists. As for Morgenthau, power was both a means and an end, and rational State behavior was understood as simply ‘...that course of action that would accumulate the most power’. In contrast, neo-Realists assume that the fundamental interest of each State is security, which compels them to concentrate on the distribution of power.

What also sets neo-Realism apart from classical Realism is methodological rigor and scientific self-conception.⁹ Waltz insists on empirical testability of knowledge and on falsificationism as a methodological ideal, which, as he himself admits, can have only a limited application in IR. The distribution of capabilities among States can vary; however, anarchy as the ordering principle of IR remains unchanged. This has a lasting effect on the behavior of States that become socialized into the logic of self-help. In trying to refute neo-Liberal ideas concerning the effects of interdependence, Waltz identifies two reasons why the anarchic IS limits

⁸ Waltz, Kenneth. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, p.62.

⁹ Guzzini, Stefano (1998). *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold*. London: Routledge. pp. 127–128.

cooperation, i.e. insecurity and unequal gains. In the context of anarchy, each State is uncertain about the intentions of others and is afraid that the possible gains resulting from cooperation may favor other States more than itself, and thus, lead it to dependence on others. In his words, “States do not willingly place themselves in situations of increased dependence. In a self-help system, considerations of security, subordinate economic gain to political interest.”¹⁰

In this study, I have also aligned my thinking to Ken Booth, a post-realist, who argues that the IS is anarchic in structure, and therefore, it imposes some kind of a 'self-help' survivalist logic on States. From this perspective, wars occur because there is nothing to stop them when a State believes it must defend or further a 'vital interest' by force. This study, also, recognises some of the weaknesses of neo-Realism theory. For instance, after the collapse of the former USSR, the bipolar world turned out to have been more precarious than most realist analysts had supposed. The end of the cold war opened new possibilities and challenges related to globalization, which have led many critics to argue that neo-Realism, like classical Realism, cannot adequately account for changes in world politics.

The new debate between neo-realists and neo-liberals is now about the extent to which State behavior is influenced by the anarchic structure of the IS rather than by institutions, and other such factors that are conducive to cooperation. In his book ‘International Institutions and State Power’ (1989), Robert Keohane accepts Waltz’s emphasis on system-level theory and his general assumption that States are self-interested actors that rationally pursue their goals. He argues that patterns of interdependence can affect world politics, thus, he calls for systemic

¹⁰ Waltz, Kenneth. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill. p.107.

theories that would be able to deal better with factors affecting State interaction, and with change.

Similarly, ‘Critical theory’, ‘Post-Modernism’ and ‘Feminism’ also take issue with the neo-realist notion of State sovereignty and envision new political communities that would be less exclusionary vis-à-vis marginal and disenfranchised groups. Since Critical theories and other alternative theoretical perspectives question the existing status quo, make knowledge dependent on power, and emphasize identity formation and social change, they are also called ‘Reflectivist’ or ‘Post-Positivist’¹¹ and represent a radical departure from the neo-realist and neo-liberal “rationalist” or “positivist” IR theories.¹² Further, Alexander Wendt, a ‘Constructivist’, while countering neo-realist ideas, argues that self-help does not follow logically or casually from the principle of anarchy. It is socially constructed. As a constructivist, he holds that “self-help and power politics are institutions, and not essential features of anarchy: anarchy is what States make of it.”¹³

In this study also, and in addition to the neo-Realist theory, I am also guided by the ‘Conflict Analysis’ (CA) perspective. This perspective focuses on the ultimate transformation of the conflicted societies once wars have come to an end. Therefore, CA addresses the challenges

¹¹Weaver, Ole (1996). “The Rise and the Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate,” in *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, Steven Smith, Ken Booth, and Marisa Zalewski (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 149–185.

¹²“Political Realism in International Relations”. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl-relations/>. Accessed Wed May 24, 2017.

¹³Wendt, Alexander, 1987. “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization*, 46: 391–425.

posed by intra-State violence and other instabilities that lead to civil wars. Two questions are important here: What are the factors fueling these intra-State wars? What can CA do to resolve existing intra-State violence and prevent future outbreaks?¹⁴ CA holds that conflicts among groups result from antagonistic perspectives on the ideal way of organising political communities. While powerful groups have the ability of shaping how political communities are organized, their permanence is dependent on the satisfaction with the established order. In this respect, it can be determined that war is an expression of one group's dissatisfaction with the established communal order.

In summary therefore, this study is informed by both the neo-Realist theory and CA. The neo-Realist theory will be useful in situating the conflict in South Sudan within a regional and international context, especially in recognition of the ongoing efforts by regional and international actors to resolve the civil war. CA will be helpful in the analysis of the causes of the conflict and in designing recommendations for its resolution.

1.8 Research Hypotheses

1.8.1 The nature and trends of conflict in Africa are positively influenced by both external and internal factors, and to resolve them, it would require synergy of both external and internal factors.

¹⁴Yordan, L. Carlos. (June 2003). "Towards Critical Theories of Conflict Analysis: What the "Critical Turn" in International Relations Can Teach Conflict Analysis". *Journal of International and Area Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (June 2003), pp. 59-74. Institute of International Affairs, Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University. Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43107072>. Accessed: 18-09-2017 07:52 UTC.

1.8.2 The causes and challenges of managing persistent conflicts in South Sudan are largely influenced by internal factors.

1.8.3 International and regional conflict management interventions have a positive impact in resolving persistent conflicts in South Sudan.

1.9 Research Methodology

This study adopted both qualitative and quantitative methods. The study has used primary data collected from selected informants, including key players in the conflict and conflict management effort. These include key informants from the South Sudan Government, regional bodies and the international players. A representative sample of 50 respondents was drawn from three levels of management in public universities in Kenya and was given the questionnaires to fill in.

1.10 Scope and Limitations of the Study

The study profiled the management of persistent conflict in Africa by taking a case study of South Sudan. The respondents and interviewees were selected from the South Sudan government, regional and international stakeholders. The scope of study centered on the stated objectives, and did not attempt to prove or disprove any related theory. Although the best possible methods were employed to achieve the objectives of the research, there were limitations that were encountered.

The current situation in the country, characterised by fresh fighting in many regions, sporadic attacks on highways, kidnapping and killing of foreign aid workers, and general lawlessness constrained my freedom of movement across the country. Therefore, I was not able to interview some of the important actors, especially, on the side of the SPLIO-IO. On the government side, lengthy protocol and unpredictability of the respondents also affected my data collection. To address the challenges experienced in both cases, I made efforts to engage respondents, representing the two protagonists, but who were based in Nairobi.

1.11 Chapter Outline

Chapter 1.0: Chapter details the Background to Study, Problem Statement, Objectives of the Study, Justification, the Literature Review, Theoretical Framework, Study Methodology used and finally the Chapter Outline.

Chapter 2.0: Nature and Trends of Conflicts and Conflict Management in Africa

Chapter 3.0: Management of Persistent Conflict in South Sudan

Chapter 4.0: Role and Impact of International and Regional Interventions in the Management of Persisting Conflict in South Sudan

Chapter 5.0: Data Analysis and Presentation

Chapter 6.0: Conclusion and Recommendations

CHAPTER TWO

NATURE AND TRENDS OF CONFLICTS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA


2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the findings derived from my analysis of the primary and secondary data collected on the nature and trends of conflict in Africa, in general, and discusses the causes of conflict in South Sudan, in particular.

2.1.1 Response rate

An agent test of 50 respondents was drawn from open foundations in Kenya and South Sudan and was offered polls to fill in. Out of these, 42 respondents filled and restored the polls influencing a reaction to rate of 84%. This falls inside Mugenda and Mugenda's recommended noteworthy reaction rate for factual investigation, set up at an insignificant limit of half. Fig.1 underneath represents the reaction rate accomplished.

Fig. 1: Response Rate



2.1.2 Demographic analysis

In the demographic analysis, the study examines the gender of the respondents; the age of the respondents, sex of the respondents and the level of education. The findings are presented in the subsequent subsections as follows.

2.1.2.1 Gender of the respondents

The study sought to determine the gender of the respondents. The findings are presented in Fig.2 below:

Fig. 2: Gender of the respondents





Fig. 2 above reveals that the male respondents were the majority representing 69%, while their female counterparts accounted for 31%, of the sample. This indicated that there were more male leaders in South Sudan. The disparity, however, was not sufficient to create any bias to the findings.

2.1.2.2 Age of the respondents

The ages of the respondents are summarised in the in Fig. 3 below:

Fig. 3: Age range of the respondents




The majority of the respondents (45.24%) were aged between 31-40 years old, with those aged 41-50 years representing 33.3%, while 14.29% of the total respondents were aged more than 50 years. A much smaller segment of 7.14% of the respondents indicated that they were aged less than 30 years.

2.1.2.3 Highest education qualification

The education levels of the respondents are summarised in Fig. 4 below.

Fig. 4: Highest level of education



It is revealed that 76.19% of the respondents had a graduate degree, 19.05% of them had post graduate qualifications, while 4.76% of the respondents a diploma as their highest level of education. From these findings, we were confident that most respondents had sufficient educational qualifications to enable them to provide informed responses.


2.2 Causes of conflict in South Sudan

While war and its outcomes are famously conspicuous, characterizing war is not straight forward. Since contemporary intra-state wars are not proclaimed, and in light of the fact that much of the time they don't take after from an unmistakable or official choice to go to war, it is regularly not in the slightest degree evident whether a nation is in reality "at war." Thus, any push to tally wars, and along these lines recognize patterns, should clearly incorporate the utilization of some sensibly objective, quantifiable criteria for deciding when a war starts and

when it ends¹⁵. The purpose of tallying wars, subsequent to having characterized them as per specific and fundamentally subjective criteria, is not to figure out which conflicts "make the cut" and in this way infer just those warrant conciliatory are struggle determination consideration. The fact of the matter is to consider patterns and examples with a specific end goal to illuminate peace-building efforts¹⁶.

2.2.1 Political orientation and escalation of conflicts

Fig. 5: Political Orientation and escalation of conflicts




From the analysis of the data, I established that the majority of the respondents (60%) indicated that political affiliations influenced conflict to a very large extent, with 30% of them reporting that political affiliations influence escalation of conflict to a large extent, while 10% indicated

that such considerations had a moderate influence on conflict. I, thus, concluded that political affiliations did influence the escalation of the conflict.

2.2.2 Political positions rally

The study also sought to establish if the respondents knew people who rally their clans' against others. The results of the analysis are illustrated in Fig. 6 below:

Fig. 6: Political positions rally



From the analysis, the majority of the respondents (80%) reported that people who wanted political positions rallied their clans against others, while only a mere 20% of the respondents indicated that they did not know whether such practices were happening.

The study also sought to establish the link between political orientation and the escalation of conflicts. The results were summarised in table 1 below:

Table 1: Political orientation escalation of conflicts

	Mean	Std Deviation
Clan supremacy and chauvinism plays a big role in political relations	4.667	0.045
Politicians fuelled conflicts for their benefit by making members of their clans to distinguish themselves from others.	4.576	0.721
Own clansmen/women best dispense political, social and economic benefits	4.478	0.575
Clan affiliation is very instrumental fermenting clan violence	4.401	0.565
Clan affiliation results into the politics of excessive rivalry between clans	4.254	0.184
Political clan affiliations can explain the characteristics of violence in South Sudan	4.093	0.323


The above discoveries were created from a SPSS examination, and the outcomes demonstrated that most of the respondents trusted that tribe matchless quality and pettiness assumed a major part in any political relations, with a normal mean (4.667).

It developed that lawmakers fuelled the contentions for their advantages by making individuals from their families to separate themselves from others. This was bolstered by the mean esteem figured of 4.576. A critical number of the respondents additionally trusted that political, social and monetary advantages are best apportioned by their clansmen or ladies. The standard deviation of 0.575 figured in the SPSS showed little variety in the reactions of the respondents. In conclusion, the examination additionally settled, from most of the respondents that the faction alliance was extremely instrumental in maturing between family viciousness. The standard deviation of less than 1.5 shows that there was little difference from the mean.

2.2.3 Economic factors and the escalation of conflicts

The role of natural resources such as water and pasture in fueling inter-ethnic conflict is summarised in Fig. 7 below.

Fig. 7: Economic factors and the escalation of conflicts



From the analysis of the above findings, the majority of the respondents (40%) indicated that, to a large extent, the availability of water and other natural resources fuelled conflicts. Another 30% reported that the availability of natural resources such as water and pasture fuelled inter-ethnic conflict to a very large extent, with those moderately attributing resources to conflict standing at 20% of the respondents.

The link between economic factors and inter-ethnic conflicts is captured in table 2 below:

Table 2: Economic Factors

	Mean	Standard deviation
Resources that support livestock are often at the center of conflict	4.146	0.2132
Permanent water sources are rare thus resulting to scramble of the existing ones	4.221	0.4814
Cattle rustling and banditry have changed from low intensity to high-intensity conflict	3.587	0.3859
Flourishing arms markets from where arms find their way to Kenya enhance conflict	4.596	1.096
There is no systematic division of resources	4.331	0.496
Disagreement in boundaries has led to fighting over limited resources	4.225	0.558


Most respondents, speaking to with a high mean of 4.596, consented, as it were, that the thriving arms advertise through neighboring nations fuelled the contention. The standard deviation ascertained for this situation of 1.096 showed consistency in the reactions.

It was additionally settled from the examination that most respondents consented, as it were, that assets that help animals are regularly at the focal point of the contention. This was built up by the high mean esteem figured at 4.146 and the standard deviation of 0.2132 demonstrates consistency in their reactions. A remarkable section of the respondents, represented by a mean of 4.331, reported that resources were not systematically divided among the warring clans as shown. I also deduced from the data that disagreement over boundaries also led to fighting over limited resources, a fact that was confirmed by a mean of 4.225 of the respondents.

2.2.4 Cultural and social factors

The study also established the following cultural sources of conflict between Dinka and Nuer communities as shown in Fig. 8 below.

Fig. 8: Cultural Factors



From the analysis of the above findings, the majority of the respondents, constituting 40%, indicated that the main cultural sources of conflict were lack of meaningful cooperation, with 30% citing territorial disagreements, and a further 10% singled out religion and lifestyle, while an identical set pointed out ethnic stereotyping as the causes of cultural conflict. Finally, 10% of the responses blamed ethnic language differences as a cause of cultural conflict, while no respondent indicted cultural differences in norms and values as a driver of conflict.

The study also examined the social factors fuelling inter-ethnic conflicts and the responses were captured in Table 3 below:

Table 3: Social Factors

Statement	Mean	Std Deviation
Discrimination against each other	4.5892	0.8493
High level of suspicion to non-ethnic members	4.4233	0.7456
Poor judicial mechanism in place to determine offenses	4.3842	0.0399
Protection of individual and ethnic interest results to conflict	4.1093	0.1837
Unfair distribution of natural resources	3.9478	0.8494
Lack of security	3.8575	0.5731
Weapons are easily traded across adjacent borders of neighboring war-torn countries.	3.7456	0.4492
Small arms and light weapons are readily available at a low prices	3.6348	0.8483
Communities create a demand for small arms as groups compete for scarce resources and protect their livelihoods	3.2213	0.3932
Weak governance structures influence insecurity and small arms proliferation	3.1393	0.3456
Small arms have inflamed low-intensity conflicts characterized by a high incidence of banditry, inter-ethnic clashes, and cattle rustling.	3.0384	0.4995

After running an SPSS analysis, the highest number of respondents with a mean aggregate of 4.862 confirmed that discrimination against ethnic groups led to strife. There was a high level of suspicion to those perceived to be outsiders to the dominant ethnic group, an observation confirmed by a mean aggregate value of 4.4233. A significant number of the respondents blamed poor judicial mechanisms in conflict resolution as another factor worsening inter-ethnic conflicts, with a mean value of 4.3842 and a standard deviation of 0.0399. The study noted that generally, social factors have a significant influence on inter-ethnic conflicts and should be taken into account when designing interventions.

2.3 Analysis of the South Sudan conflict

Causes of conflict can be characterized as those elements which add to individuals' grievances; and can be additionally depicted as: basic causes and unavoidable variables that have turned out to be incorporated into the approaches, structures and texture of a general public and may make the pre-conditions for violent conflict proximate causes. Extended conflicts, also, do have a tendency to produce new causes e.g. weapons flow, war economy, and a culture of brutality, all which help to draw them out further. As the fundamental drivers and variables adding to struggle and to peace are distinguished, recognizing that conflicts are multi-dimensional and multi-causal helps to discern that there is no single reason for strife or conflict.

It is, likewise, fundamental to build up linkages and cooperative energies amongst causes and factors, so as to distinguish potential regions for mediation and further organize them. Many instruments produced for conflict examination, likewise, order conflict causes or issues by political or administration, economic, security and socio-cultural components. Specific consideration ought to be paid to spoilers, that is, those political gatherings with an enthusiasm for the upkeep of the negative norms. If not sufficiently tended to inside the structure of preventive procedures, they may turn into an obstruction to peace activities.

Additionally, it is imperative to distinguish existing institutional capacities with respect to peace, keeping in mind the end goal to additionally characterize section focuses to address reasons for rough clash. Capacities with respect to peace regularly allude to establishments, associations, instruments and strategies in a general public for managing strife and contrasts of intrigue. Specifically, such performers should be evaluated in connection to their ability for

peace promotion, their authenticity, the probability of their engagement, and the conceivable parts they can receive adopt.

The foregoing insights are aided by CA, which deliberately seeks to examine the challenges posed by intra-State violence and other instabilities that lead to civil war. The above analysis has looked at the factors fueling these intra-State wars, and potential actions for resolving existing intra-State violence. As explained elsewhere, CA holds that conflict is exacerbated by antagonistic perspectives, among communities, on the ideal way of organising their political system.¹⁷

2.3.1 Conflict dynamics

Understanding conflict dynamics will help recognize windows of chance, specifically using situation building, which expects to survey distinctive conceivable advancements and thoroughly consider proper reactions. Situations essentially give an evaluation of what may occur next in a given setting as indicated by a particular time span, expanding on the examination of contention profile, causes and actors. It is good practice to reflect on three situations: (a) the most ideal situation (that is, one depicting the ideal result of the present setting; (b) the center case or business as usual situation (one portraying the proceeded with advancement of current patterns); and (c) the most dire outcome imaginable (depicting the most exceedingly bad conceivable result). In the event that history is the way to understanding conflict dynamics, it might be reasonable to utilize the course of events to distinguish its primary stages.¹⁸ CA gives

only a preview of a profoundly liquid circumstance. Consequently, it is imperative to consolidate a top to bottom examination with more powerful and persistent types of investigation to give data from which to gauge the connection between the specific situation and the intercession.

2.3.2 Personality differences amongst South Sudan leaders

The war in South Sudan has been caused by the uncertain debate from the common war for liberation from Sudan that went on for two decades.¹⁹ Even before celebrating half a decade of independence from Sudan, the ruling party, SPLM, started experiencing divisions thus causing major social and political upheavals with violent conflict being witnessed in different areas of the country. These divisions were largely between the SPLM and a section of its army that was not loyal to President Salva Kiir fuelled by the deep and bitter rivalry between the two main communities; the Dinka, supporting Salva Kiir and the Nuer supporting Riek Machar.

It escalated in 2013 after a vicious struggle to control the State between Salva Kiir and Riek Machar. In July 2013, Salva Kiir decided to evacuate the official forces of his Vice President, Riek Machar, from Juba. The war also has largely been waged by the two major ethnic gatherings that hold sway in South Sudan: the Dinka and the Nuer. Juba, the capital city, was settled along ethnic fault lines, and the killings mounted by the Dinkas towards the end of 2013, were systematically conducted house to house in areas predominantly settled by the Nuer. It appears that the political design informing these killings was to purify Juba of its Nuer populace, and to isolate the citizens of the nation along ethnic lines.

The bottom line here is that civilians are directly or indirectly being influenced by the conflict and therefore the study presents a foundation from which we build an understanding of the threats, risks and how vulnerable the civilians are. Without understanding what the root cause of the conflict is we cannot manage to contain the situation. The civilians should be understood first in order for researchers, government and non-governmental organization may know what their priorities are to enable them focus their efforts on them achieving a peaceful and politically stable country in the process.

2.4 Conclusion

This section has analyzed the reasons for war in Africa for the most part and South Sudan, specifically. I have noticed that, as other African common wars, South Sudan's strife has been because of a drop out between match groups of the decision SPLM. At freedom, the SPLM political elites introduced a framework, which the 'Enough Project' calls 'a rough kleptocracy.' The CA display causes us to inspect how this degenerate framework flourishes since establishments that could give balanced governance have been forced to serve the individual interests of tip top lawmakers and senior military authorities. Therefore, groups developed in the decision SPLM party competing for control of the state. Poor administration of the desires of these groups brought about the challenge for State catch being communicated in rough terms.

At last, an answer for the contention must go for disassembling the motivating force structure set up that advantage the nation's first class lawmakers and security boss who have captured the state for their own advantage. Different endeavors to acknowledge peace in South Sudan have fizzled. The missing fixing is use that will discourage the nation's government

officials from seeking after war for peace. In actuality, thusly, this section has exhibited how the ethnic structure of the nation has been abused by the legislators to heighten the common strife. The emergency isn't helped by the unsheathed insatiability and defilement in tip top circles that are set on appropriating the returns from the nation's valuable asset – oil.

This chapter has also explored the initial role of the international community in trying to resolve the crisis. To this end, this study submits that the resolution of this conflict should involve ingredients that cultivate ethnic harmony, check elite greed and provide for a strengthened role of the international community as guarantors of the peace. In the following chapter, this latter issue will be given special attention. This finding confirms my hypothesis that the persistent conflicts in Africa, generally, and South Sudan, in particular, are caused by both external and internal factors, to resolve which would require synergy of both external and internal efforts.

The words of Ken Booth ring true here, when he asserts that the state system is anarchic in structure and will search for some kind of 'self-help' survivalist logic to defend itself or further a 'vital interest' by force.²⁰ In the same vein, too, the words of Kenneth Waltz are vital in the analysing the state as chiefly concerned with survival. “Internationally, the environment of States’ actions, or the structure of their system, is set by the fact that some States prefer survival over other ends obtainable in the short run and act with relative efficiency to achieve that end.”²¹ In the case of South Sudan, the survival of the current president and his supporters, largely from

the Dinka group, appears to inform the intractable hardline position taken against his opponent, the former vice president and his Nuer group.

CHAPTER THREE

MANAGEMENT OF PERSISTENT CONFLICTS IN SOUTH SUDAN

3.1 Introduction

Many initiatives have been made to manage the persistent conflict in South Sudan with a view to achieving durable peace. The process has proved difficult on account of many challenges. For instance, the ARCSS has reported that the rebels do not accept both the existing and recommended power structure, which retains Salva Kiir as the president. It might be safe to aver that potentially, there are some actors, regional or international, who are hesitant to take policy positions on Kiir's government: such ambivalence has somewhat undermined their capacity to help push the peace process forward. Therefore, without powerful international and regional support for the peace process, treacherous circumstances may intensify. In specific terms, the ensuing disruptive conflict in South Sudan appears to pose policy challenges even for the U.S.²²

3.2 Logit modeling and the South Sudan conflict

This study evaluated the management of persistent conflicts in South Sudan using the Logit Model and Tables 4, 5 and 6 display the results of this evaluation. On account of the dichotomous idea of the result variable, the understanding of the parameters related with the logit, be that as it may, is not exactly clear. The parameter gauges were changed into appraisals of likelihood that a given peace promotion exertion was effective.

In each example, the parts of our hypothetical contentions are for the most part upheld by the information, a special case being the issue of substantial quality. All are measurably powerful and substantively significant, again except for issue substance. The logical factors of the power uniqueness amongst soldiers and the extended idea of the contention are related with a diminishing likelihood of an effective result in peace promotion. Behavioral factors, like mannerism, additionally bear a solid relationship to the result of administration endeavors. The more extraordinary the contention, for instance, the more outlandish it is that a particular refereeing endeavor will succeed.

The specific way to deal with refereeing seems to impact the possible result of the administration exertion. While controlling for different elements, coordinate arrangement will expand the likelihood of an effective settlement over intervention endeavors. Also, when an intervention methodology is received, the specific intercession system influences the imaginable result, with a procedural technique having the best likelihood of progress, trailed by a mandate and afterward an open technique. As said before, in any case, an immediate elucidation of these coefficients is troublesome without changing them into a declaration of the adjustment in the likelihood of moving to an effective settlement given an adjustment in the free factors.

Table 4 exhibits these changes, utilizing as the benchmark a contention: a) not related with a continuing adversary, b) one pursued over elusive issues, (for example, belief system), c) between moderately similarly able performers, and d) associated with a low power strife. The kind of administration procedure for the base in Model 1 is intercession, while in Model 2 the base for the intervention methodology is correspondence assistance.

Table 4: Results for Logit Regression on the Success or Failure of Management Attempt		
Variable	Model 1	Model 2
Enduring	-.47*	-.68*
	(.13)	(.17)
Power Disparity	-.05*	-.05*
	(.009)	(.012)
Issue Tangibility	.03	.018
	(.11)	(.14)
Dispute Intensity	-.00003*	-.00008*
	(.00001)	(.00002)
Negotiation	.32*	
	(.11)	
Directive Strategy		.49*
		(.14)
Procedural Strategy		.74*
		(.19)
Constant	.05	-.13
	(.10)	(.14)
Model 1:	Model 2:	
Log-Likelihood Function = -1033.9	Log-Likelihood Function = -663.0	
Log-Likelihood (0) = -1058.1	Log-Likelihood (0) = -699.4	
Likelihood Ratio Test = 48.4; 5 d.f.	Likelihood Ratio Test = 72.8; 6 d.f.	

*p < .05; numbers in () are standard errors

Here we see, for instance, the likelihood of a fruitful settlement under the base conditions in Model 1 is half, however the presence of a persevering competition, holding all else steady at the base conditions, decreases the likelihood of achievement of the intercession endeavor by 12% (Table 4).

In Model 2, where we control for the particular way to deal with intervention, the presence of a persisting clash diminishes the likelihood of a fruitful settlement by 17% to 33%

(Table 5). Both of these outcomes are reliable with our contention in regards to the negative impact of obstinacy on peace promotion. Strikingly, and counter to our instinctive musings, arrangement has a fundamentally higher likelihood of achievement than intercession inside persevering contentions. Exceptionally extreme clashes and those with a vast uniqueness in abilities between on-screen characters have very low prospects for the fruitful settlement of question (Model 1: 8% and 16%, individually; and in Model 2: nil and 16%).

Table 5: Individual Effects of Changing Conditions for Conflict Management On the Probability of Success		
Model 1		
Base	Prob. of Success	Change of Prob. Success
Non-Enduring		
Mediation		
Low intensity		
No power disparity	50%	
From: Base		
To: Enduring Conflict*	38%	-12%
From: Base		
To: Negotiation*	58%	8%
From: Base		
To: High intensity	.08	-42%
From: Base		
To: Tangible	.50	0%
From: Base		
To: High Disparity*	.16	-34%

*p<.05

When examining those cases in which intercession basically was utilized, the specific strategy immovably impacts the achievable achievement of this sort of peace progression. At the base conditions, where an open system is utilized, there is again a half probability of a gainful

settlement. An 'ask for' system broadens the chances of an effective result by 12% to 62%, while a procedural approach has a 69% likelihood of accomplishment. In any case, even that system has just a 51% believability of propel when a contention is unmanageable between continuing with adversaries.

Since one of our worries here is the impact of hanging on clashes on peace exercises, we drive the examination well past. Table 6 exhibits the aftereffects of a bivariate examination of the quality of a settlement under conditions related with question and non-contentions. The standard shrewdness would be that contentions are clashes in light of the way that the adversaries can neither settle question nor keep the terms of settlements if and when these are refined. Notwithstanding, once a suitable result has been refined, the probability of that settlement holding for a broadened time allocation increments when the parties are somewhat of a proceeding on struggle. Table 3 disconnects the heartiness of all effective association tries into times of short of what one month, up to one month yet less than two months, and two months or more.

The movement of this data is to such a degree, to the point that it ends up being obvious that customary adversaries are essentially more slanted to keep up the terms of any understandings than are non-rivals. For example, non-rivals are inclined to continue going for not over a month as they are to have one last no under two months (40% versus 46%), while proceeding with enemies are four times more slanted to have a productive outcome hold for no under two months as they are to have one hold for a short term (17% versus 70%). This is an

astounding result and, as it were, clashing with the conflict that enduring conflicts overall work as information instruments, with negative interchanges managing future dangers.

Table 6: Individual Effects of Changing Conditions for Conflict Management On the Probability of Success		
Model 2		
Base	Prob. of Success	Change of Prob. Success
Non-Enduring		
Low intensity		
Intangible Issues		
No power disparity		
Communication	50%	
From: Base		
To: Enduring Conflict*	33%	-17%
From: Base		
To: High intensity	0%	-50%
From: Base		
To: Tangible Issues	49	-1%
From: Base		
To: High Power Disparity	16	-34%
From: Base		
To: Directive Strategy	62%	12%
From: Base		
To: Procedural Strategy	69%	19%

* $p < .05$

At first understanding it may make the feeling that a two month settlement isn't for the most part a strong result, and that especially with preceding on enemies this ought to be not too much. However two focuses ought to be raised to address this issue: a) the coding of the information did not allow an open-finished term for the delayed consequence of intervention endeavors, obviously leaving endless understandings in the "two months or more" course of

action staying in drive for stunningly longer eras, and b) the quality we look at intimates the settlement of a particular common contention and set of issues, not only the confirmation of the contention. A coordinated détente that proceeds for two months or more might be a basic accomplishment for a few disputants (e.g. Bosnia rings a ringer here). The specific need is that in the event that it can hold for two months by then there is a true blue credibility that it will hold for continuously and differing issues would then have the ability to be tended to.

Table 7: Outcome Durability in Enduring and Non-Enduring Conflicts

	0-3 weeks	4-7 weeks	8+ weeks	Row total
Non-enduring	181	59	204	444
	40%	13%	46%	72.5%
	86%	74%	63%	
Enduring	29	21	118	168
	17%	12%	70%	27.5%
	14%	26%	37%	
Column Total	210	80	322	612
	34.3%	13.1%	52.6%	100%
		Chi Sq	d.f.	P
Pearson		33.3	2	.000
Likelihood Ratio		35.4	2	.000

The issue of edited information reflected in the open-finished coding system has an end product in the writing on global clash. Also, in spite of the fact that the possibility of term reliance is not without counter-confirmation or its faultfinders²³, the idea that a settlement which goes on for two months has a sensible shot of enduring considerably more, would appear to be sensibly very much grounded. Utility hypothesis, for instance, may recommend that until

the expenses of existing conditions or advantages from getting off of this balance are adequately huge, at that point business as usual should hold.

By and large, what emerges from investigation is a feeling that the administration of persisting clashes is made troublesome generally by the recurrence and length of antagonistic cooperation between the warring groups. To put it plainly, those engaged with obstinate clashes are unwilling to settle the hidden issues that fuel their violence. That the negative cooperation coming about because of the contention does for sure work as some kind of an input system, which thus proposes that the disputants will probably depend on coercive intends to determine fundamental issues. This finding appears to agree with those of Goertz and Diehl (1992)²⁴ (1993)²⁵ who show that continuing adversaries represent a lot of the savagery inside the universal framework. Given the degree of this worldwide savagery, one may guide policymakers to concentrate on the methodology with which they attempt to settle question in these long-running clashes.

These outcomes, in any case, are weightier than the straightforward induction that under some relevant conditions, certain contentions stay extended on the grounds that the gatherings can't deal with their question effectively. Those peace promotion endeavors that do bring about a settlement are extensively more inclined to have the understandings maintained when the rivals have a long history of contention. This may propose that the impact of earlier

antagonistic connections is not all that direct, and actually, the fruitful administration of a contention and the probability of those administration endeavors to bear seem to work by completely unique elements.

3.3 Structure of conflict management in South Sudan

The political leadership of South Sudan has been having difficulties, as demonstrated above. Besides the ethnic faults, the other causes of the crisis is the political intolerance of opposition, inequitable distribution of services and resources, perceptions of marginalization and general absence of justice.²⁶ After the CPA (2005) and subsequent independence (2011), the foregoing issues/grievances were not addressed, leading to the ruthless eruption of violence. The current conflict, however, has been complicated by longstanding personal differences between the warring leaders that have remained unresolved.

Edward Azar²⁷ has written on the exceptional components of what he named ‘extended conflicts.’ One of the characterizing qualities of these conflicts was the trouble of overseeing them gently. On the same note, Kriesberg²⁸ discusses recalcitrant conflicts which frequently sink into self-sustaining vicious enmities and opposes any system of arrangement or intercession, or for sure different techniques for serene administration. Another analyst, Waltz²⁹, considered all interstate clashes as being basically the aftereffect of one reason just (the structure of the

framework), and as displaying comparable examples regardless of the performing artists included or the life cycle of the contention. We trust that there are crucial contrasts between interstate conflicts; contrasts that might be communicated as far as causes, issues, members, and the history, or life-cycle, of a contention. Each of these distinctions may have prescriptive results for worldwide refereeing. Little work, be that as it may, has been done on how these elements of a contention influence its end. Here we wish to look at peace making in the setting that represents the best educated and useful obstruction; that of immovable or persevering conflicts.

Creating ways in which future and present conflicts can be resolved without the use of violence, the State needs to come up with laws that will provide a platform where issues can be channeled through a democratic process which should be the best way of giving a solution to the State. These laws when applied give confidence to the people together with the State that all the conflicting issues will be solved peacefully and that there would be no mistrust between two conflicting parties.

An enabling trustable environment should be generated in order for the social relations to properly function. This revolves around the question of leadership, when there is good governance it means the structures of the government will relate without any mistrust issues rather than when we have corrupt leaders, greed being the order of the day injustices and even religious imposition. The space of politics should be free and not necessarily limits the few; this creates an environment that South Sudan can get direct investment. This can only be achieved by the top leadership through good governance hence earning people's confidence and trust.

To ease this relationship between the conflicted parties, there should be deliberate efforts to assist them to immediately end their violent military exchanges. This can be achieved through decommissioning of arms, reintegration programs and rehabilitation. The protection of Human rights must be upheld as a priority and as a right not a favor by the state. When people are denied human security they become insecure but when it's restored people are not easily threatened into being protective of themselves and threatened by others. Government's foremost agenda should be to provide Security and other related services to its citizenry. When the government provides this, the citizens will focus on other issues and will not be worried about their safety.

Victims of extremely severe atrocities of war should be provided with trauma or psycho-social healing services. This is vital because when the victims still have trauma memories or post-traumatic stress disorders their healing process may be hampered and they may cause harm to themselves and those around them. The resettling of internally displaced persons should be fast tracked and refugees repatriated in an orderly and timely manner with co-operation from the various governments hosting them.

According to Waltz, aiding in economic reconstruction is mainly achieved by the support of the international community to aid in reconstruction process and also reduces pressure for the government to provide the basic needs to the society and further clear the war memories. He recommended that Institutions should be maintained and be on operation after built to provide such services. This will enable groups to work in one direction. Conflicts have a past, (which may cast an overwhelming shadow on the present events). In most cases, states associated with

an immovable leader (clash figure) tend utilize coercive means against dissent. An obstinate or persevering clash is along these lines a procedure of aggressive connections that stretch out over some undefined time frame, and includes threatening recognitions and periodic military activities. The term itself goes about as a coordinating idea hinting a focused social process where states end up noticeably enmeshed in a web of negative communications and antagonistic introductions. This example is rehashed, in fact declined, sometimes, with the on-screen characters included unfit to check, or deal with, the acceleration of their connections.

Gochman and Maoz³⁰ have written about conflicts and demonstrated experimentally how a generally modest number of states have been associated with an excessively vast number of mobilized debates. Moreover, they demonstrated this was an example that was probably going to rehash itself.

3.4 The Historical outline of the Crises in South Sudan

The concept of “enduring conflict” has been given significant consideration in political analyses. The idea indicates a focused connection between two states where the relationship is once in a while punctuated by the real utilization or danger of power. The transient measurement is very huge here, for continuing conflicts pass on the idea of a long haul marvel, more often than not, at least 15 years amid which unfriendly communications are joined with quiet periods and peace-making efforts. Military showdowns and efforts to build up tranquil relations happen as solid occasions accentuating the life cycle of the contention.

An operational meaning of a persisting clash must, in the event that it is to enable us to build up a universe of cases for experimental research, determine the quantity of on-screen characters, least span, and level of antagonistic vibe. Albeit some inconsistency might be observed among the operational definitions now surviving in the writing, they all stipulate fleeting limits, coherence, question action and a dyadic cooperation. In accordance with these, I characterize a continuing contention as a conflictual relationship that endures no less than twenty years and shows at least five mobilized question, from the earliest starting point to the finish of a competition

Table 8: Conflicts, and the number of peacemaking efforts

Enduring Conflicts and Number of Conflict Management Efforts

	<u>Rivalry</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Conflict Management Efforts (N)</u>
1.	China-USA	1949-1969	20
2.	Greece-Turkey	1955-1988	91
3.	Iraq-Iran	1953-1992	41
4.	China-India	1950-1992	41
5.	Afghanistan-Pakistan	1949-1992	18
6.	Egypt-Israel	1948-1979	75
7.	Argentina-Chile	1952-1984	22
8.	Peru-Ecuador	1951-1986	10
9.	Jordan-Israel	1948-1986	24
10.	Syria-Israel	1948-1992	38
11.	India-Pakistan	1947-1992	98
12.	USSR-USA	1945-1986	18
13.	China-USSR	1963-1988	60
14.	Somalia-Ethiopia	1960-1988	19
15.	Sudan-South Sudan	2000-2016	575
Total number of conflict management efforts			

List of enduring conflicts adapted from Geller (1993) and Huth and Russett (1993)

My stress with these contentions is that states proceeding with conflict wind up in disagreeable collaboration in which the likelihood of uplifting is truly high. Such connection outlines make a negative dependence of acknowledgments and lead whereby more issues are staked together on the arrangement, strong issues advance toward getting to be infused with unimportant massiveness, the parameters of dispute broadened, perceptions wind up evidently buzzword, and ordinary cash sparing favorable position calculations are supplanted by a uniform need to hurt the adversary and evade any position or reputational hardships. . In such a situation the swing to violence can every now and again be seen as the primary strategy for dealing with the conflict.

Constancy of refractory clashes is evidently one of a kind. They are much the same as hurtful social strategies which ensnare states in a web of risks and uplifting moves that can't be viably passed on to an end. Enduring clashes parallel countless characteristics of a zero-add up to redirection. They may be contrasted with a drawn out methodology of catch. Whichever way we look at them, they unmistakably speak to the most genuine risk to the all inclusive structure. Broadened or proceeding with clashes furthermore give different opportunities to peace advancement. Duplications of performing specialists, going from private individuals to different worldwide affiliations have energy for settling or serving to de-increase unmanageable clashes.

3.5 Factors affecting conflict management in South Sudan

Peace making is generally comprehended as an endeavor by performing artists associated with the struggle to decrease the level of threatening vibe and produce some request in their relations. Fruitful peace promotion may prompt (a) a total determination of the issues in struggle

(an adjustment in conduct and mentalities), or as is more typical in worldwide relations, to (b) an adequate settlement, truce or fractional assertion.

In any case, peace promotion means a system that is worried about characterizing (an) a contention as finished (at any rate briefly), and (b) choosing the dissemination of qualities and assets. To that degree, peace promotion is a judicious and cognizant decisional process whereby gatherings to a contention, with or without the guide of untouchables, find a way to change, de-escalate or end a contention in a commonly satisfactory manner. This is the situation with recalcitrant or different conflicts.

The full scope of strategies and instruments that constitute peacemaking is very wide.³¹ It shifts from coercive measures, through legitimate procedures to outsider intercession and multilateral meetings. For explanatory purposes it is valuable to separate every one of these strategies to (a) one-sided techniques (e.g. one-party dangers), (b) respective techniques (e.g. dealing and arrangement, prevention), and (c) multilateral techniques (e.g. outsider mediation). Quite compelling would be the part of variables that influence the decision of a reaction, or an approach, to strife, and how specifically certain conditions, for example, being in a continuing clash and all that it infers, affect on the decision of peace promotion strategy or its result.

Components influencing the course of a contention or the way of its administration are various. They include the way of reliance, sort of performing artists, and sorts of issues. For our motivations, these components are best conceptualized as (a) relevant elements, and (b)

behavioral variables give us a chance to look at each set in a word. Relevant elements that influence global peace promotion to incorporate i) the character of the worldwide framework, ii) the nature of a contention, and iii) the inner attributes of the states included. The character of the universal framework influences the desires of states, and the procedures they may use to break out of a contention. Components, for example, extremity of the worldwide framework, examples of arrangements, and dispersion of energy capacities are altogether connected with various ways to deal with strife. A bipolar universal condition, for example, is probably going to be steadier than a multipolar framework in empowering a harmony amongst alert and resolve in reacting to conflicts. The end of recalcitrant conflicts can be expressly connected to the idea of the worldwide condition in which they happen.

The idea of a contention or the qualities of the issues that are its concentration, are plainly critical in deciding how it is overseen. Certain issues, for example, convictions, center esteems and regional respectability have a high saliency, and are adept to urge leaders to acknowledge more elevated amounts of expenses. This makes it substantially harder to oversee such conflicts through customary discretionary techniques. Conflicts over salient issues are probably going to be enduring and to involve the utilization of coercive strategies as a method for achieving a result. Different angles, for example, the quantity of issues in the struggle, the unbending nature with which they are seen, regardless of whether they identify with substantial interests (e.g. asset struggle) or immaterial ones (e.g. struggle over qualities) may influence both the span and additionally technique for end.

The third logical measurement that influences peace making is that of the inner attributes of the on-screen characters included. This alludes to how certain basic properties of states influence their inclination to take part in coercive or different types of peace making. The idea of the country has pulled in the most consideration as of late (Maoz and Russett, 1992; Ember, Ember and Russett, 1992; Dixon, 1993). Here the contention is that popularity based states are more disposed to utilize quiet strategies for peace promotion (due to interior standards, liberal experience or constituent limitations), though non-vote based states will probably use coercive techniques for administration.

Another factor here identifies with the power capacities of states. In spite of the fact that there is very little observational proof to propose a solid relationship, control abilities can be connected to various peace making conduct (e.g. a contention between two similarly solid nations might be drawn out on the grounds that both have the material and HR to go ahead, and the ability to endure high expenses). All these relevant components influence straightforwardly the air to take part in various types of peace making, and how a contention will end.

The impact of some relevant factors on the beginning, character and advancement of a contention has been archived broadly. Some studies have examined more specifically their effect on conflict management. A few examinations have inspected all the more particularly their impact on peace promotion. Various suggestions connecting, for example, the length, force, fatalities, and issue unmistakable quality to successful interventions got significant hypothetical and exact help. Different investigations connected the gatherings' interior attributes (Gregory,

1994) or control abilities between them (Bercovitch, 1985) to various types of peace promotion by outsiders.

Yet, what of the impact on peacemaking of the second measurement, that of containing behavioral components? What is the pertinence of past interactions and how does past conduct influence current peacemaking? It is similarly conceivable to contend that experience strife experience may hose, or elevate, gatherings' attitude to depend on a specific strategy for peace making. At the point when overwhelming misfortunes had been experienced amid past clash conduct; lessons might be drawn by each state viewing the viability of compulsion as a method for managing strife. Assuming, nonetheless, coercive strategies were effective in accomplishing fundamental goals before, there is justifiable reason motivation to trust that leaders may discover it an appealing choice in their present clash.

States in a persisting clash are compelled to consider whether to raise a contention or not, which refereeing technique to utilize, and regardless of whether to respond in kind? What are the outcomes for peace making of being in a "serial showdown"? Does delayed understanding of contention evoke an inclination for a specific technique for peace making, or does this experience create so much 'contortion', push and intellectual unbending nature, that the states included gaining little from their past experience, and utilize a similar old strategy, rehashed after some time, uselessly? This is the example of a relationship that we wish to inspect.

In the end, administration of continuing clash is to a great extent outstanding for its quickness and aberrance. Deutsch (1973; 1994) claims that states engaged with a negative relationship, as states in a continuing clash without a doubt seem to be, tend to utilize pressure to


deal with their conflicts. Leng showed observationally that states in rehashed conflicts build up a power introduction and utilize progressively more coercive techniques for managing their contention with each progressive erupt. Neither the demeanors nor the peace promotion conduct of persevering states are ventured to change much. Persisting conflicts seem to end their very own existence. Another collection of writing, in any case, proposes that do states learn, as well as under specific conditions they can overlook their prior antagonistic interactions and grasp a helpful introduction.

There is need to reflect on the broader question of whether recalcitrance makes states to depend for the most part on coercive techniques that strengthen existing interactions and convictions, or whether there are some sorts of discoveries that support some countries to utilize an assortment of instruments to settle their conflicts. It is unquestionably worth investigating how the experience of being in a recalcitrant conflict influences peace-production efforts at the worldwide level.

In this inquiry, we adopt a model (see Figure 9 beneath) that joins the relevant and behavioral components talked about above. These components influence the idea of conflict administration - relationally or globally. We separate conflict administration exercises into two general classes; rough (i.e. power, pressure) and peaceful (e.g. arrangement, intervention). At first, we regard conflict administration as the needy variable to look at how frequently states in obstinate and non-recalcitrant conflicts utilize administration procedures. At that point, we measure the fleeting results of conflict administration, and here our reliant variable is conflict administration results, and our worry is with deciding if there is a connection between sorts of

conflicts and results. These can be of two sorts; achievement or disappointment. Achievement is conceptualized as conflict administration that lessens the level of brutality and threatening vibe (in any event for the time being), and disappointment is characterized as conflict administration action that has had no impact on the essential level of conflict.

Figure 9: A Framework for Analyzing International Conflict Management



For motivations behind calculated clearness we wish to indicate three speculations that stipulate conceivable connections between the recalcitrance of a conflict and the result of conflict administration efforts;

H (1) Conflict administration was less fruitful the more obstinate the conflict. Unmanageable conflicts deliver over-dependence on negative acts; these thus increment threatening vibe and decrease the odds of a fruitful result.

H (2) when controlling for the immovability of conflict, the best methodology by an outsider or middle person is an order technique. A solid, dynamic intervention procedure can have a greater amount of an effect on the adversaries required than fewer order methodologies.

H (3) once a fruitful result has been accomplished in a recalcitrant conflict, there is a higher probability that the gatherings included will cling to its arrangements for a long stretch. The challenges of accomplishing such results are with the end goal that once accomplished; the gatherings may encounter war-exhaustion and be too very much aware of the expenses of their conflict, to renege on their assertion.

3.6 Conclusion

In this Chapter, I have examined the relationship between political and military actors in the Sudan/South Sudan Civil war (1983-2015), and reflected on how their actions have contributed to the crisis. The separation of South Sudan from Sudan influenced the violence cycles between the intra Nuer groups and Nuer-Dinka groups and this led to mass arming of both of the two conflicting parties. Political rivalry continued into the post Comprehensive Peace Agreement period sparking insurgencies in the aftermath of the 2010 elections that continued.

This chapter has analysed the nature of the conflict in South Sudan, using both the neo-realist and conflict analysis perspectives. It has emerged, from the study, that the conflict in South Sudan is rooted in the rough history of the country (Sudan), predatory governance structures, ethnic hostilities, and general injustices. We have also noted that the international

community has not clearly analysed the issues affecting the country, hence, the need to conduct in-depth consultations with all the stakeholders before proposing solutions. Similarly, any peace agreement that does not address the imperial powers vested in the presidency will come to naught.

The findings confirm my hypothesis that the causes and challenges facing conflict management efforts in South Sudan are both internal and external. I am informed in this conclusion by neo realism perspectives of Ken Booth and Kenneth Waltz, who separately foreground the instinct to survive as pivotal in understanding conflict. I also drew on Carlos Yordan's conceptualization of conflict analysis, which helped to examine the twin questions of causes of conflicts and strategies for resolving them. Therefore, in South Sudan, the violent conflict pits two key political communities, one of which is dissatisfied and is seeking redress, while the other is keen to maintain the status quo. In summary, greater understanding of the causes and nature of this conflict, by those involved in conflict management, will most likely yield a durable solution.

CHAPTER FOUR

ROLE AND IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL INTERVENTIONS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF PERSISTING CONFLICT IN SOUTH SUDAN

4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I analysed the nature of current and previous conflict management initiatives in South Sudan. In this Chapter, I delve into the substantive efforts by regional and international actors to restore durable peace in the country. I begin by noting that there have been many efforts to resolve the crisis in South Sudan, but with little success. The UN Security Council, with other international partners, has tried to come up with a political solution to the ongoing crisis: there have been additional peacekeepers, threats of sanctions on main leaders of the two sides, freezing of assets, travel bans and the embargo on sale of arms to South Sudan. All of these efforts were aimed at protecting civilians, sustaining humanitarian relief operations and reinforcing the peace process. One of the major donors, the United States, has allocated almost \$2 billion in emergency relief since the beginning of the war.

According to the UN, an estimated \$1.4 billion was the cost for the humanitarian partners' responses to the worst crisis that threatens life and needs attention³². The South Sudan humanitarian response has been the world most expensive since it experienced a lot of

³² Meyjes, P. (May 2007). "Plan "C" is for Culture: out of Iraq – Opportunity". *Land power Essay 07-4* (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army).

challenges, some of the challenges were accessibility to the affected areas, the funding process was a challenge too and the government also had restricted movement within the affected areas.

4.2 UN involvement in the South Sudan conflict resolution

Conflict in South Sudan, has increasingly made the region remain an inhospitable environment for international NGOs, local peace-building organizations which are essential for the population of Sudan, now more than ever. Indeed, UN authorities recognize their own security inadequacies and have since pushed for the strengthening of the mission. Hervé Ladsous the then Under-Secretary-General for UN Peacekeeping Operations had been calling for changes to UNAMID for a considerable length of time, however committee diplomats said past progress was negligible. The UN led effort has activated peacekeeping, diplomatic and humanitarian resources to protect the civilians on the ground.

After the July fighting in the year 2016, there was a request by the USA to the East African communities to increase the number of UN peacekeepers to Juba, the fight had led to an international diplomatic reaction and it required an immediate action. Under the UNSCR 2304, in the month of August, there were 4,000 additional troops that were drawn from countries within Africa and which formed the Regional Protective Force (RPF). When the idea of the adding more troops for the peacekeeping mission in South Sudan came about, the South Sudan government opposed the move, viewing the RPF's presence in Juba as a big threat to its sovereignty. The East African region under IGAD's watch made a big step by trying to mediate between the warring parties, with the support from the AU, the UN Security Council and other international partners. To date, the supporting role that the AU has played has been of great

significance, with the engagement of a commission of inquiry, there were more revelations on the causes of war and it offered suggestions on how accountable the government should be and the reforms required in various institutions.

The UN has been a noteworthy partner in protecting lives, decreasing human suffering, reconstruction of livelihoods and supporting grassroots peace building systems. The UN works through all of Sudan, making utilization of a range based way to deal with distinguish and concentrate on need zones for helpful, formative and recuperation mediations. The general motivation behind UN help is to "advance a quiet situation that empowers the satisfaction of the privileges of Sudanese individuals to survival and security, to have the capacity to practice educated options, and to appreciate measure up to nobility and improvement.

4.3 Recent developments in South Sudan

I noted earlier that the recent spasm of fighting started on July 8, 2016 between the forces loyal to Kiir and Machar, while the two leaders were holding a press conference in Juba.³³ I have also noted how the UN itself became a victim of the fighting. In short, Riek Machar was forced to flee Juba and South Sudan altogether. He is reportedly in exile in South Africa, even as his forces continue to engage those of Salva Kiir to date.

³³ Wayman, Frank W. 1982. "Power Transitions, Rivalries and War". Study presented at the Institute for the Study of Conflict and International Security. Urbana, Illinois.

4.4 United States policy and foreign assistance

The US has played a significant role in South Sudan, with its serious engagement during the negotiation of the CPA, provision of humanitarian aid and continued support to peace efforts. The administration of former president, Barrack Obama, clearly supported the "birth" of the new state. The Congressional Caucus on Sudan and South Sudan has equally focused energies on safeguarding human rights and justice in the two countries. The present conflict and past claims of human rights violations have strained reciprocal relationship with the US.

The State Department has asked for \$225 million in FY2017 remote guide for South Sudan (excluding philanthropic guide) to convey basic wellbeing and instruction administrations, moderate conflict, cultivate strength and recuperation, and advance changes. Notwithstanding its help for the compassionate reaction and continuous improvement programs, the US is the biggest money related supporter of UNMISS and a key benefactor for truce observing and different endeavors to relieve conflict. The US support for the UNMISS during the FY2016 is estimated at \$400 million.

4.5 International responses to the South Sudan crisis

The international community has intervened in the country by assembling peacekeeping assets to secure vulnerable people while also supporting peaceful negotiations to end the South Sudan conflict. IGAD, UN and AU are leading players in these efforts. The AU, for instance, has played a supporting role to this process, despite the fact that its Commission of Inquiry was important in fact finding. The U.N. Security Council has tried to reinforce the regional endeavors to encourage a political answer for the emergency, including support for the deployment of

additional peacekeepers. There are many hurdles to the noble efforts to assist the country. For instance, bureaucratic bottlenecks imposed by the government on UN activities, such as humanitarian flights, stands out for particular notice. Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) have also reported some restrictions or confinements of their local and international staff, which affects their operations.

4.6 Humanitarian interventions, problems, prospects, and political dilemmas

Prior to the crisis in South Sudan, the cost of humanitarian operations was already more than \$1.2billion. This amount invested in South Sudan showed that it is one of the countries that host the world's largest humanitarian operations. The indicators of development were among the worst in the world. Food security was already a threat, people were at war and nobody could do farming, the fertile area in South Sudan was the place where war was at its best. By 2013 half of South Sudan's population; there was an improvement in the situation the war complicated the humanitarian process. The complexity of the country's crisis and challenges requires a long term commitment to the problem because we need to meet humanitarian needs rather than focus on long term development of providing infrastructure and social amenities.

According to the UN human rights official reports, civilians, UN personnel and other diplomats were targets of the attacks. Most of the attacks were both from the opposition forces and the government forces and this kind of attacks would result into crimes against humanity. It further stated that there was a massive scale of serious humanitarian violations, gross human rights violations since violence began. Civilians were not only just trapped in the skirmishes; they were targeted directly, often along ethnic lines. Social amenities and humanitarian

organizations were being attacked. Most of the structures that belonged to these groups came under attacks more often than is: relief compounds, religious sites, U.N bases and Hospitals. There was a particular concern which the mission raised with a new way of extreme violence in 2015 where the whole village and the stored foods were destroyed, with an intention to scrap off any source of livelihood belonging to the civilians in the area.

Children do suffer most during wars some are recruited as child soldiers because they are easily manipulated and their mind corrupted so fast that they become extremists of war. During the SOUTH Sudan war, an estimated 16,000 children were recruited that's according to UNICEF. The government was accused of recruiting child soldiers and it raised a lot of concerns, though most of the children were recruited and linked with the opposing forces. A number of children have been reportedly been killed during attacks. According to the UN, the total number of children recruited to be soldiers was more than 17000. A lot of efforts are being made to disarm and release children later demobilize them, this majorly done by the international organization partnering with the UN. Concerns were raised particularly on sexual violence which was sort of an ethically targeted rape and it was reported to be prevalent. The UN Board of Experts, built up under UNSCR 2206, discovered that all gatherings to the conflict have focused on regular citizens "as a major aspect of their military strategies," including through the consideration of assault. There was a narrative discharged by the UN a sum of 217 sexual savagery cases were accounted for and some were by the officers from the government. The responsibility for the misuse amid the conflict has been little regardless of a dedication by the two sides to equity. In April 2016, the UN Secretary-General emphasized that there was "no confirmation of any honest to goodness exertion by the gatherings to examine, arraign and rebuff genuine human

rights infringement and misuse identifying with the conflict, some of which add up to war crimes.

At the pinnacle of the war, a commission of request was framed and there fundamental work was to examine infringement against human rights. The commission was to influence proposals and come to up with approaches to accommodate, the recuperating procedure and responsibility. Driven by previous Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, the AUCISS openly discharged its last report in October 2015. It found that human rights infringements were submitted "in an orderly way and by and large with extraordinary ruthlessness. In different reports, the regular citizens and Nuer warriors were killed by government security powers and there were outrageous torment and assault cases amid the main days of conflict. A different feeling composed by one of the commissioners expressed that "of the Nuer who stayed in Juba, few survived the slaughtering binge of December 16-18, 2013." A recorded report by AUCISS demonstrated both of the warring gatherings focused on the other adversary group, the regular folks, instigation to savagery, utilization of detest discourse, and pack assault was a typical mishandle submitted. The AUCISS report was set up preceding an influx of outrages that apparently happened in mid-2015, amid a sharp heightening in savagery as the warring sides attempted to pick up and hold an area to enhance their position in peace transactions. The wrongdoings submitted in the Upper Nile and Unity states include: executing of kids and ladies, assault, torment and notwithstanding consuming individuals alive.

4.7 Efforts to stabilize the country

The UN Security Council respects the August 2015 understanding ARCSS as "the framework for strong peace, trade off and national union." On its part, the US, at the request of East African countries, has been pushing for extra UN peacekeepers to Juba. The additional 4,000 troops, endorsed in UNSCR 2304, are to be attracted from African countries to shape another Regional Protection Force (RPF) inside UNMISS. The RPF's summon is give a secured circumstance in the capital, with the desire that the power's quality may make conditions more great for more broad alteration tries. The South Sudan government was at first vocal in its confinement to the proposed improvement of the present peacekeeping mission, seeing the RPF as a hazard to its influence however grudgingly surrendered consent after a visit by an UN designation.

The UN designation has embraced the proposed organization of the RPF, including its battle equipment. The legislature purportedly continues dissenting the speculation of neighboring countries in the power, which speaks to a test given that two of the three countries that have evidently offered troops; Ethiopia, Kenya, and Rwanda; which are all starting at now UNMISS troop givers are neighbors. Apparently, an association affirmed under Chapter VII of the UN contract does not require having government support, but instead for all intents and purposes, such underwriting may be vital to ensure supply lines and a tolerant area. In reference to the RPF, government experts have communicated that any person who enters without their consent is an interloper.

Some peacekeeping authorities have addressed whether the proposed RPF can be fruitful (if passed on) without a practical political technique to decide the fundamental drivers of the war. A few specialists propose the UN has not done what's important to respond to risks against UNMISS and confinements on its operations. The UNSG chose a gathering in late August to inspect attacks on exposed nationals in Juba. Mixed messages from the overall gathering on the status of the peace understanding and the realness of the TGNU, in light of Kiir's substitution of protection people from the administration, may confound the path ahead. As showed by the UN Board of Experts, the TGNU has fallen, and some free analysts suggest that the peace deal has folded with it.⁵⁶ However, Secretary of State John Kerry prescribed in remarks in late August (after Machar's substitution) that the legislature in Juba is "presently devoted to the full utilization of the peace assention and that it has recently begun to complete" it.. He also reported that "it's exceptionally sure that genuinely, under the assention, there is settlement for the substitution in a difference in work drive, and that has been influenced with the course of action of another VP." That declaration has been interpreted by some in the district as a confirmation by the United States that Deng's game plan as First Vice President was as per the peace understanding. U.S. Envoy Donald Booth subsequently confirmed before the House Africa subcommittee that "...it isn't for us to uncover to South Sudan who its pioneers should be...and given each one of that has happened, we don't believe it would be clever for Machar to return to his past position in Juba." The worldwide body endowed with checking use of the peace assention, the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), has not made an affirmation on Deng's credibility, communicating that "a change to the administration depends

upon the Opposition itself," and raising stress with the issue of whether Machar's substitution could be an encroachment of the game plan.

IGAD appears to be separated on the request, ensuing to having regarded Deng's guarantee in August to venture down for Riek Machar. Deng has made a trip to a couple of African capitals in his new position, and furthermore talked at the 71st Session of the U.N. General Assembly. Notwithstanding, whether President Kiir's substitution of Machar and other SPLM-IO experts fits in with the terms of the peace assention, is a key request concerning an all inclusive engagement with the South Sudan government. Without assistance from limitation officers or key political pioneers or, more exhaustively, manhandled peoples, famously the Nuer, First Vice President Taban Deng may fight to soundly address the protection in the administration, or to help the consistence of the equipped protection with government decisions or execution of the peace deal. By a couple of records, antagonistic to government estimation has created since the doing combating in Juba in July, given the reports of government controls again concentrating on Nuer standard people and other security oblige abuse, fusing into the Equatoria territory.

Late verbalizations by government specialists suggesting that SPLM-IO powers should now be consolidated into the outfitted power or "abstained from," may additionally confuse the delicate circumstance. With struggle proceeding in parts of the country, with discuss arranged dry-season offensives, supporters may need to investigate the likelihood of placing assets into the administration's proposed recovery and progression attempts. Without promoter engagement, be that as it may, South Sudan's crisis appears to be set to increase propel the International

Monetary Fund has cautioned that without money related changes and political trade off, the budgetary situation will also break down and the legislature was not capable meet key duties. With respect to the contention, the administration's ability to pay rates for its equipped power or to give cash related propelling powers to related state armed force or for surrenders from the confinement are presumably going to be key needs.

4.8 Sanctions

The UN Security Council laid the framework for concentrated endorses on South Sudan in March 2015, when it all in all passed Resolution 2206. The assurance, upheld by the United States, was gotten days before an IGAD due date for the warring social occasions to accomplish a peace deal with a true objective to actuate them to make concessions. The due date abandons a game plan, and the Sanctions Committee began its work in April 2015, asserting the names of six individuals for sanctions in July 2015.

Russia and Angola blocked endeavors to endorse two extra people accepted to maintain the war - General Paul Malong (SPLA) and General Johnson Olony (SPLA-IO). The U.N. Leading group of Experts has continued analyzing the operations of the two gatherings and in its September 2016 report, it singled out Gen. Malong as the one overseeing operations in Wau and who likewise planned the battling in Juba in July. The Panel has likewise exhibited more names for sanctions. It is, notwithstanding, uncertain whether the organization of the RPF and the endorsing of key warriors will prevail with regards to conveying the nation to peace.

4.9 Challenges ahead

Many reports indicate that the government has a serious obligation, because of its military spending. However, the poor worldwide price of crude oil puts additional strain on the delicate economy. While many saw the August 2015 peace understanding as an essential breakthrough toward consummation the conflict, the savagery has kept, prodding new dislodging. The security circumstance in a significant part of the nation is unpredictable.

Analysts point to the demise of political consideration and government responsibility, alongside dug in defilement, as underlying drivers of the progressing conflict. Given the Kiir government's affectability to saw dangers to its power, the way to any major political rebuilding in Juba is vague. President Kiir and his supporters see him as the chose leader of South Sudan; according to 2010 decisions held in Sudan, in spite of the fact that the nation has not held races since autonomy. While some worldwide eyewitnesses have tested the authenticity of his government, his companions in the area still can't seem to freely scrutinize his entitlement to administer. Numerous remote contributors are hesitant to take strategy positions, for example, a more forceful judgment of the Kiir government's practices that could possibly debilitate the capacity of help offices to convey life-sparing alleviation amidst a compassionate emergency. Other key worldwide forces, for example, Russia, regularly restrict strategies intended to strategically segregate hazardous administrations, for example, sanctions, as an issue of approach. Without vigorous universal leadership or more noteworthy worldwide accord on the most proficient method to address South Sudan's proceeding with emergency, the circumstance may exacerbate. Given the nation's auxiliary issues and the heritages of its troublesome conflicts,

South Sudan seems liable to show arrangement challenges for U.S. official branch authorities and Congress for quite a long time to come.

The main objective of the study was to explore the best options on how to manage the conflict in south Sudan. Many strategies should be employed to help tackle the political dysfunctionalities that have dragged down the economic development and national security. Many proposals have been tabled and are in use to help in the reconciliation process, one of which is the proposed National Dialogue of South Sudan (NDDS) which proposes the following: Restructuring/reconstructing the south Sudanese state i.e. a call for a federal system of governance, a new social contract between the state and citizenry., post conflict repatriation, relief, resettlement, rehabilitation and reconstruction, the role of military in politics, interim government of south Sudan and truth and reconciliation.

4.10 Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the initiatives by the UN and IGAD aimed at resolving the crisis in South Sudan. I have noted that the international community has undertaken both diplomatic and military steps to address the mayhem. The strength of the USA has also come in to bear. The main drawback has been the reluctance of both sides to cede ground both on the battle ground and on the negotiating table. With these hard line positions still entrenched, it will be quite some time before the situation improves. It is suggested that the peace process guarantors act more decisively to ensure the combatants adhere to the peace process.

There is no right answer that has been worked out for South Sudan. There are examples of truth and reconciliation models for reconstructing conflicted societies such as in from South Africa, Peru, Rwanda and Cambodia. We hold that South Sudan may need more than truth and reconciliation. Perhaps, a multi-faceted approach could be tried out.³⁴ It is important to take stock of any progress made in this process, however small. Every step forward is a success - indeed, as one practitioner commented, “every silence that is broken is a victory for reconciliation”. There is an agreement, both in South Sudan and the international community, for “the establishment of national efforts aimed at reconciliation to facilitate healing.” It is, however, notable that both parties have no consensus on the type of reconciliatory strategies that should be employed.

My hypothesis was that the causes of the conflict in South Sudan are largely internal but the solution requires synergy between the international and local efforts. The neo realism frameworks propounded by Ken Booth and Kenneth Waltz, have jointly informed my examination of the survival instinct, which has exacerbated the violence between the two antagonistic political communities in the country. At the same time, Carlos Yordan’s conceptualization of conflict analysis model has helped me to analyse causes of the conflict and the ongoing conflict management strategies. In summary, therefore, the findings of this chapter confirm the hypothesis: that the conflict is local but its resolution requires both local and international efforts.

³⁴ Shiraev, Eric B. (2014). *International Relations*. New York: Oxford University Presses. p. 80.

CHAPTER FIVE

DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I present the findings derived from my analysis of the primary data I collected from respondents. The chapter represents the findings and results of the application of the variables using techniques mentioned in chapter two. The chapter also represent data analysis that was in line with specific objectives where findings were investigated, interpreted and implications drawn on them. The analysis of the data was also derived from the responses to the research instruments using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) and a descriptive analysis of the research questions raised in the study will be dealt with in this chapter.

5.2 Analysis

In this chapter, I have presented the findings of the analysis of primary data collected from 50 respondents. The study shows that 31% of the respondents were female while 69% were male: though there was a gender imbalance, the findings were not adversely affected. Most of the respondents were aged between 31-40 years (45.24%) followed by those aged 41-50 years (33.3%), while respondents aged over 50 years represented 14.29% of the sample size. Academic achievements of the respondents were impressive with 76.19% of them having a first degree while 19.05% had post graduate qualifications. The majority of the respondents (90%) indicated that political inclinations were behind the conflict in the country, with a further 80% reporting that people seeking political positions rallied their communities against each other. All the

respondents also drew a link between natural resources and the escalation of intra-ethnic conflicts. Cultural differences were also blamed for some conflicts.

5.3 Key findings

From the analysis of the data, I established that the majority of the respondents (60%) indicated that political affiliations did influence conflict to a very large extent. I, thus, concluded that political affiliations did influence the escalation of the conflict. I also established from the analysis that most respondents agreed to a great extent that resources that support livestock are often at the center of the conflict and that competition over scarce water and pasture had a positive influence on the escalation of the conflict. Linked to this also is the finding from the data that disagreement over boundaries led to fighting over these limited resources, a fact that was confirmed by the mean calculated at 4.225 of the respondents.

Another major finding indicated by the majority of the respondents (40%) revealed that the main cultural sources of conflict were lack of meaningful cooperation between the two main warring communities, the Dinka and the Nuer, with 30% citing territorial disagreements, and a further 10% singling out religion and lifestyle. Additionally, it is also important to note that 10% of the respondents blamed ethnic language differences as a significant cause of cultural conflict. Lastly, the study noted that generally, cultural and social factors have a significant influence on inter-ethnic conflicts and should be taken into account when designing interventions.

Finally, this study analysed the nature and trends of the conflict in South Sudan, using both the neo-realist and conflict analysis perspectives and revealed that conflict in South Sudan

is rooted in the rough history of the country, its predatory governance structures, ethnic hostilities, and general injustices. I also noted that the international community has not clearly analysed the issues affecting the country, hence, the need to conduct in-depth consultations with all the stakeholders before proposing solutions. The findings confirm my hypothesis that the causes and challenges facing conflict management efforts in South Sudan are both internal and external.

5.4 Conclusion

The analysis of the data confirmed my hypothesis that the causes of the conflict in South Sudan are largely internal. Using the two neo realism frameworks propounded by Ken Booth and Kenneth Waltz, I observed that survival instincts drove both the state and non-state actors (ethnic and political communities) into conflict. Likewise, the conflict analysis model expounded by Carlos Yordan helped me to analyse the main causes of the conflict from local to state levels as indicated.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Conclusion

It is instructive to note that while the sub-field of conflict resolution sprang from the traditional International Relations, with well-established theories and concepts; the ensuing efforts at theory-building in the sub field of conflict resolution have been shy to incorporate the already clearly defined concepts and agreed theoretical positions. As a stand-alone, without contextualizing the conflicts being resolved within the broader concepts of international relations such as polarity, and major power national interest, it limits and denies itself the capacity to provide an analytical framework which would incorporate all the nuances and subtlety abound in the international system of states.

In a nutshell, what has come out clearly in this study is that there has been a disconnect between the established theories and concepts in the traditional fields or international relations and the recent studies in conflict management and peace negotiations, with significant implication of such important and key variables as polarity and external major power interest completely being left out of consideration the conceptual models of analysis, altogether.

The net result has been that the profound work that has been done in this new sub field, seems to be left to hung without a sound contextual anchorage and theoretical footing, which a critical analysis of the intervention and mediation of those major powers in violent international conflicts, in furtherance and protection of their national interest in the international system, as

still constituted under the territorially-based, sovereign 'nation- state' Westphalian framework, and by implication polarity, can offer.

A critical piece of the written work on overall peace advancement has been hampered by the sweep for non-particular guidelines, and the supposition that the crises and verbal confrontation which depict a dispute relationship are free of each other. Here I have endeavored to work inside an approach that perceives conflicts on the preface of their endurance and disputatiousness and recognizes an order of disputes proceeding or willful conflicts as by and large not quite the same as various conflicts. I also advanced the examination by asking whether differentiates in the recorded inclusion of States was imparted in the way such States approach and manage their conflicts. The output for convincing refereeing norms should be predicated upon such an examination.

This study also addressed the fundamental attempt to research the speculative and correct repercussions of those requests. Having perceived the traits and consequences of proceeding with rivalries, the study sees peace advancement as the poor variable to answer this request. The behavioral qualities of holding on adversaries unmistakably reveal a change to the demonstration of peace advancement. The data examination reveals that the nearness of stubbornness reduces the probability of productive refereeing.

The study was guided by three key objectives: a) to establish nature and trends of conflicts and conflict management in Africa, b) to analyze the causes of conflicts in South Sudan and challenges of managing them, and c) to establish the role and impact of international and regional interventions in the management of persistent conflict in South Sudan. Three hypotheses

informed this research and these were as follows: a) that the persistent conflict in South Sudan is caused by both external and internal factors, b) that international and regional policies on conflict resolution have a positive effect on the management of persistent conflict in South Sudan, and c) that home-grown mechanisms have a major role and impact in the long-term management of the conflict in South Sudan.

During the data collection and analysis, I sought answers to the following questions: a) What is the nature and trends of conflicts and conflict management in Africa? b) What have been the causes of conflicts in South Sudan and challenges of managing them? and c) What has been the role and impact of international and regional conflict management mechanisms employed in South Sudan?

The research design adopted both qualitative and quantitative methods. I collected primary data from selected informants, including key players in the conflict and conflict management effort. These included key informants from the South Sudan Government, regional bodies and international players. A representative sample of 50 respondents was drawn from public institutions in Kenya and South Sudan and given questionnaires. Most of the respondents filled and returned the questionnaires accounting for 84% of the sample.

In framing my theoretical inspiration, I synergized two perspectives, neo-realism and conflict analysis, to play a complementary role. Neo-realism conceives the state as an actor in an anarchic international system, where self-interest is primary. This approach also recognizes the importance of empiricism in data collection and analysis. The other framework, Conflict Analysis, looks at the practical work of establishing the status of the conflict with a view to helping the warring parties to work towards healing and stability. These two complementary

frameworks allowed me to focus both on the international actors and also the local players in the conflict in South Sudan.

My analysis revealed that conflicts in Africa in general, and South Sudan in particular, are largely fueled by ethnic strife, political exclusion, inequality in distribution of resources, human rights violations/injustices, and incompatible leadership. I observed that the international and regional players (the UN, USA, European Union, AU, IGAD, and the East African Community), were playing an important role in encouraging negotiations, humanitarian assistance and peace building efforts.

On whether the study has achieved its key objectives, I confirm that indeed, the objectives were achieved. The findings also confirmed our three hypotheses; that the persistent conflict in South Sudan is caused by both external and internal factors; that international and regional policies on conflict resolution have a positive effect on the management of persistent conflict in South Sudan; and that home-grown mechanisms have a major role and impact in the long-term management of the conflict in South Sudan.

6.2 Recommendations

6.2.1 Recommendation on policy

The comprehensive reforms envisaged in ARCSS will take time and require real commitment. A rushed process and premature elections, when the conditions are not ready, may lead to more conflict. Therefore, a well-coordinated strategy that addresses the conflict at all levels; the local or sub-national, national level and across the region is essential. Genuine dialogue amongst the people is needed and the conditions must also be ripe for all South Sudanese to feel free to fully engage.

Genuine dialogue means talking to ones enemies as well as ones friends. No constituency can be left out. The conflict going ahead in South Sudan will never be finished with one group of the SPLM groups being prohibited. For the government of Salva Kiir's SPLM-IG group to convey this war to an end, it must acknowledge to grasp different groups of the SPLM Party without special cases. For this, IGAD and the region could consider ways to help to ensure these constituencies are represented at the table. Ultimately, the only way to peace in South Sudan is through a harmonious respect for ARCSS³⁵.

Since renewed fighting has now spread to traditionally peaceful areas, with new armed groups emerging and joining in the fray, it is my recommendation that a seamless nexus between international, regional and local processes be established in order to yield a federal system of government, equitable distribution of resources as well as justice for all citizens of South Sudan.

³⁵Briefing to the IGAD Extraordinary Summit on the Situation in South Sudan by UNMISS Head of Mission, David Shearer, on 12 June 2017.

The ‘violent kleptocracy,’ which thrives through the weakening and emasculation of accountability institutions, needs to be replaced by a more democratic and broad-based system of government.

I further recommend that the management of persistent conflict be extended across other parts of Central, East and the Horn of Africa regions, especially along the Ethiopia-Sudan border to consolidate gains envisaged and that more attention be given to capacity-building initiatives so as to strengthen monitoring and reporting mechanisms as well as systematic dissemination of vital information to key stakeholders involved in conflict management.

6.2.2 Academic recommendation

For academia, a further examination of the efficacy of the seamless nexus between international and local processes towards the formation of a federal government in South Sudan towards a possible strategy for managing persistent conflict in the country is recommended. The examination could revisit the cross-fertilization efforts of the two fields of study, to engender theoretical synergy on how to resolve violent conflicts in international politics. Furthermore, as Ramsbotham, et al³⁶ did note, “geo-political readjustments at the end of the Cold war ended some conflicts fuelled by super power rivalry, but precipitated others, along the perimeters of the former Soviet Union, and in parts of the world where simplifying bipolar structures were suddenly removed”, there is need to focus attention on these new post- cold war waves and forms of conflicts.

³⁶ Ramsbotham, et al (eds) Contemporary Conflict Resolution, Pg. .89.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- AI (Amnesty International). (2012). South Sudan: Strengthen Human Rights and Accountability Mechanisms: Human Rights Council: Establish an Independent Expert Mandate.' AI Index: AFR 65/004/2012. 21 September.
- Arensen, J. (2012). Murle Political Systems and Age-sets, Jonglei State – Strengthening Conflict Mitigation and Peace-Building. Nairobi Conference Study. 19-21 March.
- Arensen, E. (1992). *Mice are Men: Language and Society among the Murle of Sudan*. International Museum of Cultures Publication, 27. Dallas: International Museum of Cultures
- Blench, D. & Roger, E. (2004). Natural Resource Conflicts in North-Central Nigeria. A Handbook and Case Studies.
- Bloomberg. (201). Aid Group Withdraws Staff From South Sudan Amid Militia Attacks. 1 October.
- Business Week. (2012). South Sudan Says 223 People Killed in Upper Nile State Clashes. 13 March.
- Christopher, W. (2015). "Social and Economic Aspects of Peirce's Conception of Science". *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* (Indiana University Press) 27 (4): 501–526.
- Citizen. (2012). CID Police Personnel Clash with Arms Smugglers on Juba-Bor Road. 7 September.
- Dianna J. (2007). *Nuer-American Passages: Globalizing Sudanese Migration*, Gainesville: University Press of Florida
- Duffy, T. (2003). *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Egemi, G. & Pantuliano, W. (2007). The political Economy of Natural Resource-Based Conflict in Sudan.
- Geneva: Small Arms Survey. (2012). *Security Responses in Jonglei State in the Aftermath of Inter-Ethnic Violence*. London: Saferworld. February.
- Gilley, B. (2004). "Against the concept of ethnic conflict". *Third World Quarterly* 25 (6): 1155–1166

- HRW (Human Rights Watch). (2012). 'South Sudan: End Abuses by Disarmament Forces in Jonglei.' 23 August.
- Hutchinson, S. & Jok, M. (2002). "Gendered Violence and the Militarisation of Ethnicity: A Case Study from Southern Sudan". In Richard Werbner, (ed.) *Postcolonial Subjectivities in Africa*. London: Zed Books.
- ICG (International Crisis Group). 2009. Jonglei's Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan. Africa Report No 154. 23 December.
- Jon D. (June, 2007). *Nuer Journeys, Nuer Lives*. Boston: Pearson Education, Inc.
- Kalyvas, N. (2006). *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Maggie McCune (1999). *Till The Sun Grows Cold*. City?: Headline Book Publishing Ltd, ISBN 0-7472-7539-4
- Mahmood, M. (2001). *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Meyjes, P. (May 2007). "'Plan "C" is for Culture: out of Iraq – Opportunity"'. *Landpower Essay 07-4* (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army).
- MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières). (2007). Patients and Family Members Killed Inside MSF Compound. 29 November.
- Nicholas, S. (2001). Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry (Part 1). Ed.? *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 259-282 (p. 263). City?: Publisher?
- Payne, T. (2006). *Explaining Language Structures*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Peter, U. (2015). Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda: Different Paths to Mass Violence, *Comparative Politics*, 253-271 (p. 257).
- Republic of South Sudan. (2012). The Presidential Committee for Community Peace, Reconciliation, and Tolerance in Jonglei State. Bor: Jonglei State Communities Conference for Peace, Reconciliation, and Tolerance. 1–5 May. Conference Resolutions and Recommendations. 5 May.
- Rolandsen, Ø. & Ingrid, M. (2012). "A Critical Analysis of Cultural Explanations for the Violence in Jonglei State, South Sudan". In Ed.? *Conflict Trends* No. 1 (2012). Durban: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes.
- SAFERWORLD (2011). People's Perspective on Peace-making in South Sudan, An initial assessment of insecurity and peace-building responses in Warrap State.

- Sharon, Hutchinson, (1996). *Nuer Dilemmas*, University of California Press, Berkley, CA
- Siddig et al., (2007). *Managing Conflict Over Natural Resources in Greater Kordofan, Sudan: Some Recurrent Patterns and Governance Implications*.
- Writer? (2006). "Anatomy of Civilian Disarmament in Jonglei State: Recent Experiences and Implications". Ed.? *Small Arms Survey: HSBA Issue Brief No. 3*. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. October.
- Smith, D. (2003). "Trends and Causes of Armed Conflicts". In (Eds.) Austin, Alexander, Fischer Martina, and Ropers Norbert. *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*. Berlin: Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management.
- SOS Sahel (2010). *Assessment of resource-based conflict flashpoints along the Babanusa-Muglad-Abyei Livestock Corridor, South Kordofan*.
- SSCCSE (Southern Sudan Centre for Census Statistics and Evaluation) (2011). *Statistical Yearbook for Southern Sudan 2009*. Juba: SSCCSE.
- Writer? (2012). *South Sudan's Machar Launches Jonglei Peace Initiative*. Ed.? *Sudan Tribune*. 2 April. Sudan. HSBA Working Study No. 20. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. April.
- UNMISS (UN Mission in South Sudan). 2012a. *Incidents of Inter-communal Violence in*
- Writer? (2007). "Humanitarian Action, Recovery, and Development in Southern Sudan". Ed.? *Weekly Bulletin, Week 48*. UNOCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). November/December 2007.'
- USAID (2005). *Conflict Baseline Report Conducted in the Karamajong Cluster of Kenya and Uganda*.
- Young, J. (2014). *The White Army: An Introduction and Overview*. Small Arms Survey. Retrieved 30 December 2011
- Warner, Michael (2010). *Conflicts Management in Community Based Natural Resource Project: Experiences from Fiji and Papua New Guinea*.
- Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books*.
- Azar, Edward.1986. "Protracted International Conflict: Ten Propositions" in (Eds.) Edward Azar and John W. Burton. *International Conflict Resolution*, pp.27-39. London: Wheatsheaf Books.
- Bennett, Scott D. and Allan C. Stam III. 1996. "The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816-1985". (Eds.) *American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 2*, pp. 239-257.

- Bercovitch, Jacob. 1985. "Third Parties in Conflict Management: The Structure and Conditions of Effective Mediation in International Relations". (Eds.) *International Journal*, Vol. 55, No. 4, pp. 736-752. Publication details
- Bercovitch, Jacob. 1989. "Mediation in International Disputes" in (Eds.) Kenneth Kressel and Dean G. Pruitt. *Mediation Research*, pp. 284-99. San Francisco: Jossey Bass. Publication details
- Bercovitch, Jacob and Jeffrey Langley. 1993. "The Nature of the Dispute and the Effectiveness of International Mediation". (Eds) *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 670-691. Publication details
- Bremer, Stewart A. 1992. "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965". (Eds) *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 309-341. Publication details
- Bremer, Stewart A. 1993. "Advancing the Scientific Study of War". (Eds.) *International Interactions*, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 1-26. Publication details
- Burton, John W. 1990. *Conflict Resolution and Prevention*. London: Macmillan.
- Cox, Robert W. and Harold Jacobson. 1973. *The Anatomy of Influence: Decisions Making in Industrial Organizations*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Deutsch, Morton. 1993. *The Resolution of Conflict*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Deutsch, Morton. 1994. "Constructive Conflict Resolution Principles, Training and Research". (Eds) *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp.13-32. Publication details
- Diehl, Paul. 1992. "What are they Fighting for? The Importance of Issues in International Conflict Research". (Eds.) *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 333-344. Publication details
- Diehl, Paul. 1985. "Contiguity and Military Escalation in Major Power Rivalries". (Eds) *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 47, No. 4, pp. 1203-1211. Publication details
- Dixon, William J. 1993. "Democracy and the Management of International Conflict". (Eds) *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 42-68. Publication details
- Ember, Carol L., Martin Ember and Bruce Russett. 1992. "Peace Between Participatory Politics". (Eds.) *World Politics*, Vol. 44, No. 4, pp.573-599. Publication details
- Fogg, Richard W. 1985. "Dealing with Conflict". (Eds) *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp.330-58.
- Geller, Daniel. 1993. "Power Differentials and War in Rival Dyads". (Eds) *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp.173-193. Publication details

- Gochman, Charles. 1993. "The Evolution of Disputes". (Eds) *International Interactions*, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 49-76. Publication details
- Gochman, Charles and Zeev Maoz. 1984. "Militarized Interstate Disputes 1816-1976: Procedures, Patterns, and Insights". (Eds) *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 586-615. Publication details
- Goertz, Gary and Paul F. Diehl. 1992. "The Empirical Importance of Enduring Rivalries". (Eds) *International Interactions*, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 1-11. Publication details
- Goertz, Gary. and Paul F. Diehl. 1993. "Enduring Rivalries Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns". (Eds) *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp.147-171. Publication details
- Goertz, Gary and Paul F. Diehl. 1995. "The Initiation and Termination of Enduring Rivalries: The Impact of Political Shocks". (Eds) *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 39, No. 30-52. Publication details
- Gregory, Raymond A. 1994. "Democracies, Disputes and Third Party Intermediaries". (Eds) *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 28-42. Publication details
- Huth, Paul, Chris Gelpi, and Scott Bennett. 1992. "Systemic Uncertainty, Risk Propensity and International Conflict among the Great Powers". (Eds) *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 478-517. Publication details
- Huth, Paul and Bruce Russett. 1993. "General Deterrence between Enduring Rivals Testing Three Competing Models". (Eds) *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 87, No. 1, pp. 61-73. Publication details
- Kriesberg, Louis. 1993. "Intractable Conflicts". (Eds) *Peace Review*. Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 417-421. Publication details
- Leng, Russell. 1983. "When Will They Ever Learn Coercive Bargaining in Recurrent Crises?". (Eds) *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 379-419. Publication details
- Levy, Jack. 1992. "An Introduction to Prospect Theory". (Eds) *Political Psychology*. Vol.13, No. 2, pp. 171-186. Publication details
- Miller, Benjamin. 1995. *When Opponents Cooperate: Great Power Conflict and Collaboration in World Politics*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Mor, Ben D. and Zeev Maoz. 1996. "Learning, Preference Change, and the Evolution of Enduring Rivalries" in Paul Diehl (ed.) *The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Shirayev, Eric B. (2014). *International Relations*. New York: Oxford University Presses. p. 80.

Snyder, Glenn H. and Paul Diesing. 1977. *Conflict Among Nations*. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press

Stoll, Richard J. 1993. "The Evolution of War". (Eds) *International Interactions*, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 99-124. Publication details ...

Thompson, W.R. 1995. "Principal Rivalries". (Eds) *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Publication. Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 195-223. Publication details...

UN Security Council Resolution 1820, 2008

Viechinich, Steven and Jay Teachman. 1993. "The Duration of Wars, Strikes, Riots, and Family Arguments". (Eds) *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 37:544-68. Publication details...

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, Mass: AddisonWesley.

Wayman, Frank W. 1982. "Power Transitions, Rivalries and War". Study presented at the Institute for the Study of Conflict and International Security. Urbana, Illinois.

Books and published works

Arensen, J. (2012). Murle Political Systems and Age-sets, Jonglei State – Strengthening Conflict Mitigation and Peace-Building. Nairobi Conference Study. 19-21 March.

Blench, D. & Roger, E. (2004). Natural Resource Conflicts in North-Central Nigeria. A Handbook and Case Studies.

Bloomberg. (201). Aid Group Withdraws Staff from South Sudan Amid Militia Attacks. 1 October.

Christopher, W. (2015). "Social and Economic Aspects of Peirce's Conception of Science". *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* (Indiana University Press) 27 (4): 501–526.

Egemi, G. & Pantuliano, W. (2007). The political Economy of Natural Resource-Based Conflict in Sudan.

Gilley, B. (2004). "Against the concept of ethnic conflict". *Third World Quarterly* 25 (6): 1155–1166

Hutchinson, S. & Jok, M. (2002). "Gendered Violence and the Militarisation of Ethnicity: A Case Study from Southern Sudan". In Richard Werbner, (ed.) *Postcolonial Subjectivities in Africa*. London: Zed Books.

Jon D. (June, 2007). *Nuer Journeys, Nuer Lives*. Boston: Pearson Education, Inc.

Maggie McCune (1999). *Till The Sun Grows Cold*. City?: Headline Book Publishing Ltd, ISBN 0-7472-7539-4

- Nicholas, S. (2001). Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry (Part 1). Ed.? *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 259-282 (p. 263). City?: Publisher?
- Peter, U. (2015). Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda: Different Paths to Mass Violence, *Comparative Politics*, 253-271 (p. 257).
- Rolandsen, Ø. & Ingrid, M. (2012). “A Critical Analysis of Cultural Explanations for the Violence in Jonglei State, South Sudan”. In Ed.? *Conflict Trends* No. 1 (2012). Durban: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes.
- Siddig et al., (2007). Managing Conflict Over Natural Resources in Greater Kordofan, Sudan: Some Recurrent Patterns and Governance Implications.
- Writer? (2006). “Anatomy of Civilian Disarmament in Jonglei State: Recent Experiences and Implications”. Ed.? *Small Arms Survey: HSBA Issue Brief No. 3*. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. October.
- Smith, D. (2003). “Trends and Causes of Armed Conflicts”. In (Eds.) Austin, Alexander, Fischer Martina, and Ropers Norbert. *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*. Berlin: Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management.
- SOS Sahel (2010). Assessment of resource-based conflict flashpoints along the Babanusa-Muglad-Abyei Livestock Corridor, South Kordofan.
- SSCCSE (Southern Sudan Centre for Census Statistics and Evaluation) (2011). *Statistical Yearbook for Southern Sudan 2009*. Juba: SSCCSE.
- Writer? (2012). South Sudan’s Machar Launches Jonglei Peace Initiative. Ed.? *Sudan Tribune*. 2 April. Sudan. HSBA Working Study No. 20. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. April.
- UNMISS (UN Mission in South Sudan). 2012a. Incidents of Inter-communal Violence in
- Writer? (2007). “Humanitarian Action, Recovery, and Development in Southern Sudan”. Ed.? *Weekly Bulletin, Week 48*. UNOCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). November/December 2007.’
- USAID (2005). Conflict Baseline Report Conducted in the Karamajong Cluster of Kenya and Uganda.
- Young, J. (2014). The White Army: An Introduction and Overview. Small Arms Survey. Retrieved 30 December 2011

- Warner, Michael (2010). *Conflicts Management in Community Based Natural Resource Project: Experiences from Fiji and Papua New Guinea*.
- Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *Evolution of Cooperation*, Basic Books.
- Azar, Edward. 1986. "Protracted International Conflict: Ten Propositions" in (Eds.) Edward Azar and John W. Burton. *International Conflict Resolution*, pp.27-39. London: Wheatsheaf Books.
- Bennett, Scott D. and Allan C. Stam III. 1996. "The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816-1985". (Eds.) *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 90, No. 2, pp. 239-257
- Bercovitch, Jacob and Jeffrey Langley. 1993. "The Nature of the Dispute and the Effectiveness of International Mediation". (Eds) *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 670-691. Publication details
- Bremer, Stewart A. 1993. "Advancing the Scientific Study of War". (Eds.) *International Interactions*, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 1-26. Publication details
- Burton, John W. 1990. *Conflict Resolution and Prevention*. London: Macmillan.
- Deutsch, Morton. 1994. "Constructive Conflict Resolution Principles, Training and Research". (Eds) *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp.13-32. Publication details
- Diehl, Paul. 1992. "What are they Fighting for? The Importance of Issues in International Conflict Research". (Eds.) *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 333-344. Publication details
- Ember, Carol L., Martin Ember and Bruce Russett. 1992. "Peace Between Participatory Politics". (Eds.) *World Politics*, Vol. 44, No. 4, pp.573-599. Publication details
- Geller, Daniel. 1993. "Power Differentials and War in Rival Dyads". (Eds) *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp.173-193. Publication details
- Gochman, Charles and Zeev Maoz. 1984. "Militarized Interstate Disputes 1816-1976: Procedures, Patterns, and Insights". (Eds) *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 586-615. Publication details
- Goertz, Gary and Paul F. Diehl. 1992. "The Empirical Importance of Enduring Rivalries". (Eds) *International Interactions*, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 1-11. Publication details
- Goertz, Gary. and Paul F. Diehl. 1993. "Enduring Rivalries Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns". (Eds) *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp.147-171. Publication details

- Goertz, Gary and Paul F. Diehl. 1995. "The Initiation and Termination of Enduring Rivalries: The Impact of Political Shocks". (Eds) *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 39, No. 30-52. Publication details
- Gregory, Raymond A. 1994. "Democracies, Disputes and Third Party Intermediaries". (Eds) *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 28-42. Publication details
- Huth, Paul, Chris Gelpi, and Scott Bennett. 1992. "Systemic Uncertainty, Risk Propensity and International Conflict among the Great Powers". (Eds) *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 478-517. Publication details
- Huth, Paul and Bruce Russett. 1993. "General Deterrence between Enduring Rivals Testing Three Competing Models". (Eds) *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 87, No. 1, pp. 61-73. Publication details
- Kriesberg, Louis. 1993. "Intractable Conflicts". (Eds) *Peace Review*. Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 417-421. Publication details
- Leng, Russell. 1983. "When Will They Ever Learn Coercive Bargaining in Recurrent Crises?" (Eds) *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 379-419. Publication details
- Levy, Jack. 1992. "An Introduction to Prospect Theory". (Eds) *Political Psychology*. Vol.13, No. 2, pp. 171-186. Publication details
- UN Security Council Resolution 1820, 2008
- Viechinich, Steven and Jay Teachman. 1993. "The Duration of Wars, Strikes, Riots, and Family Arguments". (Eds) *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 37:544-68.

Journals and articles

- AI (Amnesty International). (2012). South Sudan: Strengthen Human Rights and Accountability Mechanisms: Human Rights Council: Establish an Independent Expert Mandate.' AI Index: AFR 65/004/2012. 21 September.
- Arensen, E. (1992). *Mice are Men: Language and Society among the Murle of Sudan*.
- International Museum of Cultures Publication, 27. Dallas: International Museum of Cultures
- Business Week. (2012). South Sudan Says 223 People Killed in Upper Nile State Clashes. 13 March.
- Citizen. (2012). CID Police Personnel Clash with Arms Smugglers on Juba-Bor Road. 7 September.

- Dianna J. (2007). *Nuer-American Passages: Globalizing Sudanese Migration*, Gainesville: University Press of Florida
- Duffy, T. (2003). *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Geneva: Small Arms Survey. (2012). *Security Responses in Jonglei State in the Aftermath of Inter-Ethnic Violence*. London: Saferworld. February.
- HRW (Human Rights Watch). (2012). 'South Sudan: End Abuses by Disarmament Forces in Jonglei.' 23 August.
- Kalyvas, N. (2006). *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Mahmood, M. (2001). *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières). (2007). Patients and Family Members Killed Inside MSF Compound. 29 November.
- Payne, T. (2006). *Explaining Language Structures*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Saferworld (2011). People's Perspective on Peace-making in South Sudan, An initial assessment of insecurity and peace-building responses in Warrap State.
- Sharon, Hutchinson, (1996). *Nuer Dilemmas*, University of California Press, Berkley, CA
- Bercovitch, Jacob. 1985. "Third Parties in Conflict Management: The Structure and Conditions of Effective Mediation in International Relations". (Eds.) *International Journal*, Vol. 55, No. 4, pp. 736-752. Publication details
- Deutsch, Morton. 1993. *The Resolution of Conflict*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Diehl, Paul. 1985. "Contiguity and Military Escalation in Major Power Rivalries". (Eds) *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 47, No. 4, pp. 1203-1211. Publication details
- Dixon, William J. 1993. "Democracy and the Management of International Conflict". (Eds) *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 42-68. Publication details
- Gochman, Charles. 1993. "The Evolution of Disputes". (Eds) *International Interactions*, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 49-76. Publication details
- Miller, Benjamin. 1995. *When Opponents Cooperate: Great Power Conflict and Collaboration in World Politics*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Mor, Ben D. and Zeev Maoz. 1996. "Learning, Preference Change, and the Evolution of Enduring Rivalries" in Paul Diehl (ed.) *The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Shirayev, Eric B. (2014). *International Relations*. New York: Oxford University Presses. p. 80.

Snyder, Glenn H. and Paul Diesing. 1977. *Conflict Among Nations*. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press

Stoll, Richard J. 1993. "The Evolution of War". (Eds) *International Interactions*, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 99-124. Publication details.

Thompson, W.R. 1995. "Principal Rivalries". (Eds) *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Publication. Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 195-223. Publication details.

Unpublished reports

ICG (International Crisis Group). 2009. Jonglei's Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan. Africa Report No 154. 23 December.

Meyjes, P. (May 2007). "Plan "C" is for Culture: out of Iraq – Opportunity". *Landpower Essay 07-4* (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army).

Cox, Robert W. and Harold Jacobson. 1973. *The Anatomy of Influence: Decisions Making in Industrial Organizations*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

APPENDIX I

INTRODUCTION LETTER

Hans Dickson M Nyange,
P.O. Box 42597 – 00100,
Nairobi – Kenya.
Email: hansnyange@gmail.com
Cell: +254729388566

Dear Participant,

I am a student at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS) of the University of Nairobi (UoN), and in order to complete my studies for the award of Master of Arts in International Studies (MAIS), I need to conduct research. My research topic is ‘Managing persistent conflicts in Africa: A case study of South Sudan.’

Your input is, therefore, important to this research because it will help inform an overall picture of the conflicts in South Sudan. This questionnaire attached is developed to gather information for the purpose of this research and will take an average of 20 – 25 minutes to fill out. Your answers will be handled in strict confidence and will exclusively be used for the purpose of this research.

I request you to answer the questions as honestly and objectively as possible in order to contribute to the success of this research.

Thank you for your time and support.

APPENDIX 2 RESEARCH

AUTHORISATION



UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
College of Humanities and Social Sciences
Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies

Tel : (02) 318262
Telefax: 254-2-245566
Fax: 254-2-245566
Website : www.uonbi.ac.ke
Telex : 22095 Varsity Ke Nairobi, Kenya
E-mail : director-ids@uonbi.ac.ke

P.O. Box 30197
Nairobi
Kenya

June 15, 2017

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN


RE: DICKSON M. NYANGE - R50/5082/2017

This is to confirm that the above-mentioned person is a bona fide student at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS), University of Nairobi pursuing a **Master of Arts degree in International Studies**. He is working on a research project titled, **"MANAGING PERSISTENT CONFLICTS IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF SOUTH SUDAN"**.

The research project is a requirement for students undertaking masters' programmes at the University of Nairobi, whose results will inform policy and learning.

Any assistance given to him to facilitate data collection for his research project will be highly appreciated.

Thank you in advance for your consideration


Professor Maria Nzomo,
Director, IDIS
&
Professor of International Relations and Governance



APPENDIX 3

RESEARCH PERMIT



NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION

Telephone: +254-20-2213471,
2241349, 3310571, 2219420
Fax: +254-20-318245, 318249
Email: dg@nacosti.go.ke
Website: www.nacosti.go.ke
When replying please quote

9th Floor, Utalii House
Uhuru Highway
P.O. Box 30623-00100
NAIROBI-KENYA

Ref. No. **NACOSTI/P/17/90689/18306**

Date: **18th July, 2017**

Hans Dickson Mbogho Nyange
National Defence College
P.O. Box 24381-00502
NAIROBI.

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Following your application for authority to carry out research on "*Managing persistent conflicts in Africa: A case study of South Sudan*," I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in **all Counties** for the period ending **18th July, 2018**.

You are advised to report to **the County Commissioners and the County Directors of Education, all Counties** before embarking on the research project.

Kindly note that, as an applicant who has been licensed under the Science, Technology and Innovation Act, 2013 to conduct research in Kenya, you shall deposit **a copy** of the final research report to the Commission within **one year** of completion. The soft copy of the same should be submitted through the Online Research Information System.

GODFREY P. KALERWA MSc., MBA, MKIM
FOR: DIRECTOR-GENERAL/CEO

Copy to:

The County Commissioners
All Counties.

The County Directors of Education
All Counties.

CONDITIONS

1. The License is valid for the proposed research, research site specified period.
2. Both the License and any rights thereunder are non-transferable.
3. Upon request of the Commission, the Licensee shall submit a progress report.
4. The Licensee shall report to the County Director of Education and County Governor in the area of research before commencement of the research.
5. Excavation, filming and collection of specimens are subject to further permissions from relevant Government agencies.
6. This License does not give authority to transfer research materials.
7. The Licensee shall submit two (2) hard copies and upload a soft copy of their final report.
8. The Commission reserves the right to modify the conditions of this License including its cancellation without prior notice.



REPUBLIC OF KENYA



National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation

RESEARCH CLEARANCE

PERMIT

Serial No.A 14961

CONDITIONS: see back page

APPENDIX 4

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MANAGING PERSISTENT CONFLICTS

Dear Sir/ Madam,

This is an academic research which investigates the management of persistent conflicts in South Sudan. Please use a tick (✓) to indicate your response where appropriate.

PART A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. What is your age?

Less than 30 years () 31 – 40 years ()
41– 50 years () More than 50 years ()

2. What is your gender?

Male () Female ()

3. What is your highest Education qualification?

Untrained () Diploma ()
Graduate () Post Graduate ()

PART B: POLITICAL ORIENTATION ESCALATION OF CONFLICTS

4. To what extent does political affiliation influence the escalation of conflict?

Little extent () moderate extent () Large extent () To a very large extent ()

5. Do people who want political positions rally their clans against others?

Yes () No ()

6. To what extent do you agree with the following statements in regard to political orientation escalation of conflicts?

Statement	Very great extent	Great extent	Minimal extent	Very Minimal extent	No extent at all
Clan supremacy and chauvinism plays a big role in any political relations					
The politicians fuelled the conflicts for their own benefits by making members of their clans to distinguish themselves from others.					
Political, social and economic benefits are best dispensed by own clansmen/women					
The clan affiliation is very instrumental fermenting clan violence					
Clan affiliation results into the politics of excessive rivalry between clans					
The political clan affiliations explain the characteristics of violence in South Sudan					

SECTION C: ECONOMIC FACTORS ON ESCALATION OF CONFLICTS

7. To what extent do you agree that availability of natural resources such as water and pasture fuel inter-ethnic conflict?

Little extent () moderate extent () Large extent () to a very large extent ()

8. On a scale of 1-5 rate the following statements in regard to the idea that economic factors results to inter-ethnic conflict.

Statement	Very great extent	Great extent	Minimal extent	Very Minimal extent	No extent at all
Resources that support livestock are often at the center of conflict					
Permanent water sources are rare thus resulting to scramble of the existing ones					
Cattle rustling and banditry have changed from low intensity to high intensity conflict					
Flourishing arms markets from where arms find their way to Kenya enhance conflict					
There is no systematic division of resources					
Disagreement in boundaries has led to fighting over limited resources					

SECTION D: CULTURAL FACTORS

9. What is the main cultural source of conflict between Garre and the Murulle communities?

Territorial disagreements ()

Lack of meaningful cooperation ()

Religion and lifestyle ()

Stereotyping ()

Ethno language differences ()

Differences in cultural norms, values ()

10. On a scale of 1-5 rate the following statements in regard to the idea that cultural factors results to inter-ethnic conflict.

Statement	Very great extent	Great extent	Minimal extent	Very Minimal extent	No extent at all
Social barriers between the clans and chronic mutual animosity makes them mistrust others					
Mistrust and insecurity has always marred inter-clan economic and trade transaction					
Trivial accidents and minor brawl leads to major confrontations					
Different perception and way of life has been resulting to conflict					
Lack of cultural leaders forums foster misunderstandings					

SECTION E: SOCIAL FACTORS

11. To what extent do you agree with the following social factors results to inter-ethnic conflict?

Statement	Very great extent	Great extent	Minimal extent	Very Minimal extent	No extent at all
Discrimination against each other					
High level of suspicion to non-ethnic members					
Poor judicial mechanism in place to determine offenses					
Protection of individual and ethnic interest results to conflict					
Unfair distribution of natural resources					
Lack of security					
The weapons are easily traded across adjacent borders of neighboring war-torn countries.					
Small arms and light weapons are readily available at a cheaper price					
The communities creates a demand for small arms as groups compete for scarce resources and protect their livelihoods					
Weak governance structures influence insecurity and small arms proliferation					
Small arms have inflamed low-intensity conflicts characterized by a high incidence of banditry, inter-ethnic clashes, and cattle rustling.					

SECTION F: MANAGING PERSISTENT CONFLICTS

11. To what extent do you agree with the following statements in regard to steps taken to address conflict?

Statement	Very great extent	Great extent	Minimal extent	Very Minimal extent	No extent at all
local leaders especially elders from both sides have been spear heading peace forums					
Using mediators to build bridges across the dividing lines					
Government intervention					
Find out the causes and grievance of each party and recommend possible solution out of this dilemma					
Tackling the underlying issues head on					
Resolving boarder issues once and for all					
Encouraging trade partnerships between the conflicting communities					
Enhance intermarriages					

APPENDIX 5

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. Do leaders participate in conflict resolution committees in South Sudan?
2. Are the members of the community willing to surrender their firearms to the authority?
3. What are some of the conflict issues discussed in the conflict resolution meetings?
4. Do you involve religious leaders in the peace resolution meetings?
5. How do you solve the issue of boundaries?
6. Is there any sign of agreement on sharing of the available natural resources?
7. Do members of the community encourage intermarriage?
8. What is the best possible method of ending the conflict?
9. Does clan supremacy and chauvinism plays a big role in any political relations?
10. What is the role political leadership in conflict resolution?

APPENDIX 6

CONSENT FORM

(Research Permit S/No **NACOSTI/P/17/90689/18306**)

I am a Masters student from the University of Nairobi; currently undertaking an academic research study and it is a requirement that I collect field data for my research work.

The purpose of this study is to analyse the management of persisting conflicts in Africa using South Sudan as a case study and you have been selected to be part of the research.

The findings generated in this study are expected to inform policy makers on new strategies for the management of conflicts in Africa; therefore, this study is expected to generate new information, contribute to theory and add to the body of knowledge for further policy advancement on matters of conflict management. Kindly take your time to fill this questionnaire.

Confidentiality is guaranteed and the data sought will be used for academic purposes only.

Your consent is thus welcome and it is assured that all your details and the information you provide will be treated with utmost privacy and confidentiality and will be strictly used for the purpose of this study only. Your cooperation and support is most appreciated.

If you agree to participate in the study, please put your signature or thumbprint below, confirming that you have read and understood the nature of the study, your responsibilities as a

study participant, the inconveniences associated with voluntary participation in the study and that all your questions and concerns concerning the study have been answered satisfactorily.

Participant's Statement:

I do hereby give consent to participate in this study that is aimed at understanding the management of persistent conflict in Africa: A case of South Sudan. I have read or have been taken through the information in this informed consent as well as having all my queries answered and I fully understand my role as a participant. I also understand that withdrawal from the study at any point is voluntary and not subject to any penalty.

Name(s):

Sign:

Date: