

EXAMINING THE VULNERABILITY OF NAIROBI TO TERRORISM: 2011 -2015

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DECLARATION

I declare that this research project is my original work and has not been presented in any other institution for any purpose.

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This proposal is submitted for evaluation with my approval as the supervisor.

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DEDICATION

To God Almighty who carried me through. To my parents: Father Bol Makuac Bol and Mother Ajak Kur Oray, and members of my family; to my employer, South Sudan Customs Service.

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ACRONYMS

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ATPU	Anti-Terror Police Unit
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GWOT	Global War on Terror
KANU	Kenya Africa National Union
KDF	Kenya Defence Force
NCTC	National Counter Terrorism Center
NSIS	National Security Intelligence Services
OTC	Overseas Transport Company
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nation Development Program
USA	United States of America
WTC	World Trade Center

ABSTRACT

This study examines the vulnerability of Nairobi to terrorist attacks between 2011 and 2015. The study has two objectives; the first objective is to examine and analyze factors that may explain the prevalence of terror attacks in Nairobi between 2011 and 2015. The second objective is to analyze factors underlying the likely inability of state institutions to deal with terrorism. This study guided by relative deprivation theory; the theory holds that feelings of deprivation and the feeling of frustration motivates individuals or groups decision to engage in collective action. Primary data was collected through questionnaires with open-ended questions and secondary data was obtained from published books, journals, government documents, NGOs documents and media sources. The study concluded that the prevalence of terrorist attacks in Nairobi is a result of combination of factors such as management of immigrants' movement in Nairobi, instrumentalization of religion, social decay and terrorism, poverty and urban marginalization, unemployment and trafficking of goods, and politicization of international and local grievances. It is also found that there are other factors that hindered state institutions to contain terror attacks such as human rights violations, corruption phenomena within security agencies, lack of enough transport facilitation, the deficit in human capacity, lack of corporation among security sectors, low level of engagement of police with technology and poor working conditions. The study recommends that in order to tackle the threat of terror in Kenya, the government of Kenya should make policies which address social economic and political marginalization such as control of religious extremism, youth unemployment, and balance of power respectively. The study recommends that the government of Kenya needs to build the capacity of security agencies by providing suitable training and allocation of adequate resources in order to facilitate surveillance and respond to terror attacks. In order to deal with the problem of immigration, the government of Kenya needs to tackle the issue of refugees being recruited to carry out terror attacks in the country.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

The general definition of terrorism is the use of violence or any kind of threat to bring political change. The issue of terrorism captured the global imagination on September 11, 2001, as a result of dramatic and destruction of America (Bard, 2012). Acts of terrorism and the overwhelming scare it creates during and after the attacks affects every level of modernization (Downing, 2009).

Globally, terrorist attacks have occurred several times and are witnessed in both developing and developed countries. Within the year of 2011 over 11,500 acts of terror around the globe occurred. This is according to a report by the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) worldwide and National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) data trend (Eichstaedt, 2010). These global terrorist attacks that were located in 72 nations resulted in approximately 50,000 casualties out of which 13,200 victims succumbed to massive trauma (Gurr T. R., 2000). In spite of this apparent success by Anti-Terrorism Agencies in different countries, terror attacks are still carried out (Jeremy & Susan, 2003).

The act of terrorism is characterized by its dominance in the Middle East. Between the years 1998 to 2003, there were killings of about 3600 people from the 210 global terrorist attacks in the area (US State Dept., 2004). The area was estimated to face about 25 massive terror attacks (US State Dept., 2009). The most common groups responsible for the attacks are the Hamas, Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and the Al-Shabaab. There are other terror groups like the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria, Kurdistan Worker's Party and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine just like their well-known counterparts (Downing, 2009). Terror groups are continuing a violent struggle between regimes with deep sectarian, ethnic, and tribal tensions and divisions (Carolyne, 2006).

In Africa, terrorism occurs in both wealthy and less privileged nations and in authoritarian states where there is no democracy (Awitta, 2003). There is no common existence of the root cause of terrorism. Nevertheless, a good number of some factors according to many surveys have led to the formation of different forms of terrorism. Economic inequalities within the society contribute such great deal to terrorism (Bandura, 2000).

The tendency of domestic terrorism has been witnessed much in such countries as Nigeria with dreadful terror attacks by the Boko-Haram (Martin, 2010). This nation has experienced an endless history of ethnic conflicts and religious attacks led by Boko Haram which is a Muslim dominated group. Its aims are to wage war against the Federal Republic of Nigeria generally, to create a pure Islamic state ruled by Sharia Laws and which is deeply-rooted in anti-Western civilization (Walker, 2012).

East Africa on the other hand in the whole of sub-Saharan Africa is the most vulnerable region to terrorism compared to all other regions (Bashir, 2007). Terrorism has been experienced in almost all East African countries. For example, the region witnessed series of terror attacks such as the attack on Norfolk Hotel, Kenya; the 1998 US Embassy attack in Kenya and Tanzania; attacks on Paradise Hotel and Israel-bound aeroplane in Mombasa; World Cup finals held in Kampala, Uganda and a Kampala Coach bus in Nairobi in 2010. People have experienced great losses and deaths of loved ones in these attacks (Rosand & Millar, 2007).

In Kenya, studies show that terrorists are aided by internal support from some sections of the population, enabling it to carry out several well-planned attacks. Also, the continued instability in Somalia has provided a safe haven for Al-Shabaab to operate. It is also argued that the external financial aid which is the livelihood of terrorism provides resources needed for recruitment, training, indoctrination, and execution of violent acts. Some commentators have advanced that this is a major area in which counterterrorism efforts should be emphasized in order to cut short their sources of livelihood (Benjamin, 2001).

1.2 Problem Statement

Kenya has been experiencing terrorist attacks which the experts in political leadership and the executive attribute to Al-Shabaab militia operating in Somalia. This led to the deployment of Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) as part of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2011. Despite the deployment to create a buffer zone inside Somalia and to enable easy capturing of the strong base in strategic port of Kismayu by KDF, Nairobi continued to witness an upsurge of terrorist attacks especially between 2011 and 2015. The major and minor attacks ranged from grenades and bombs in hotels, bus stops, shopping malls, churches to educational facilities; hence Nairobi has primarily been a soft target (Princeton & Stephen, 2015). A grenade attack in Mwauras disco in Nairobi on October 2011 injured 14 people (Andrews, 2015). On September 2012, Sunday school at St Polycarp's church in Nairobi was attacked with grenades resulting in the death of a child and injuring many (Matt, 2014). From September 2013, Al-Shabaab associated gunmen targeted and shot customers at Nairobi's Westgate Shopping Mall killing at least 67 people. The last major attack occurred at Gikomba market in May 2014 killing at least 12 people and injuring many. An examination of these attacks points to the fact that they have been directed at the social, economic and communication areas.

Although the government of Kenya deployed the Kenya Defence Force in Southern Somalia to protect Kenyan sovereignty from Al-Shabaab attacks, Nairobi still witnessed terrorist attacks between 2011 and 2015. As such, this study seeks to understand the dynamics that explain these attacks in response to the three questions in section 1.3.

1.3 Research Questions

- i) What factors explain the prevalence of terrorist attacks in Nairobi between 2011 and 2015?
- ii) What explains the inability of the state institutions to contain the attacks?
- iii) How can the terrorist attacks in Nairobi be contained?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The broad objective seeks to examine the vulnerability of Nairobi to terrorism between 2011 - 2015.

Specific Objectives

- i) To examine and analyze the factors that explain the prevalence of terror attacks in Nairobi between 2011 and 2015.
- ii) To analyze the factors underlying the state`s inability to deal with terrorism.
- iii) To explore and analyze research based recommendations in order to contain further attacks.

1.5 Research Hypothesis

- i) The prevalence of terrorist attacks in Nairobi have been caused by Socio-economic and political factors.
- ii) Lack of adequate resources and proper training of security agencies have hindered capacity of state institutions to contain terrorist attacks.

1.6 Justification of the Study

Kenya has had a number of ratifications on the international treaties and protocols to fight war on terror such as African Union Convention on the Prevention and Combating Terrorism, 1999, and its 2002 Protocol (Ferstman, 2009); and the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 of 2001. There are also a number of domestic Acts and policies. Despite the enactment of laws, Kenya still faces a challenge of emerging forms of terrorism threats which include violent extremism and radicalization that are facilitating terrorist activities. At the local level, Kenya enacted national laws and regulations such as Kenya Defence Force Act 2012 (Government of Kenya, 2012) and the National Police Service Act (Government of Kenya, 2011) as well as the National Counterterrorism policy in 2011 (Ferstman, 2009). The main assumption behind those Acts was it would help in reforming the institutions especially in their core function of assuring national security as well as countering terrorism. However, the government of Kenya changed from legal strategy to adopt a military strategy as demonstrated by an

operation known as "Linda Nchi". Despite this military operation, there was an increment in terrorist attacks especially in Nairobi (Andrews, 2015).

In many instances, the military response by the government seems to further trigger tension and create more chances for terrorist groups to recruit more (Onuoha, 2013). In addition, the role of citizen participation has not been fully utilized by policy and security agencies as well. A strong corporation concept is crucially important for the prevention and combating of counterterrorism. This requires intensive cooperation among various intelligence, security services in Kenya and foreign partners, and community as well (Rosand, 2008).

It appears that the counter-terrorism strategies adopted by the Kenyan government are only confronting the symptoms of the problem rather than addressing the factors that facilitate terror attacks in Nairobi. Therefore the study seeks to understand the reason for the increment of terrorist attacks, despite the enactment of laws and military measures which had been put in place by the government to prevent the country from continued terror attacks. This study conceptualizes that the prevalence of attacks has been caused by social, economic and political factors.

1.7 Scope and Limitations of the Study

This study carried out in Nairobi city; covered the period between 2011- 2015, which is characterized by the prevalence of terrorist attacks. This period is selected because it marks the beginning of direct military campaigns. The year 2014 frames the period of major attacks in Nairobi city, such as the incident of Westgate Mall. While much of the discussions concentrated on the period between 2011 to 2015, the study also examined flows of actions in the year 2015 to put into context the events between 2011- 2015. Including a limitation of the short four years covered by the study, the study hardly finds limitation to key documents from the state key insinuations. Therefore, the study tackled this challenge by using data from published reports by the National and International organizations on Al-Shabab/Al-qaeda terrorist attacks in Nairobi.

1.8 Definition of Terms

Terrorism

This study adopts Osterburg and Ward definition of terrorism. According to the two authors, terrorism is the use of violence against people and property to attain political or social change. It is mainly aimed at intimidating people and government so as to change their policies for their own good (Osterburg & Ward, 1992). The strength of this definition lays in its ability to draw a link between means and ends. What it does not explain to us are supply and demand factors of terrorism. For this study we point to factors such as huge pools of alienated youth and institutions weaknesses respectively.

Vulnerability

The study defines vulnerability as a measure of the closeness to which a community, structure, service or geographical area is likely to be attacked and disrupted on account of its closeness by acts of terrorism (District Disaster Control Management Plan, 2014). The significance of this definition to the study is that it shows the most target goals by terrorists. What this definition does not explain is how the target goals are being closed to terror attacks.

1.9 Literature Review

1.9.1 Introduction

This literature review examines the theory and practice of terrorism threat in relation to Kenya and the Global War on Terror (GWOT). It examines the factors that explain the prevalence of terrorism at the domestic level and explains the state's inability to deal with terrorism threat. It analyzes criminological and root cause theories while taking into account inherent policy flaws. The research seeks to offer insight into the importance of Kenya's counterterrorism strategy in containing the challenge of terror.

The motivation by religious goals to engage in violent activities is what the Kenyan government defines as terrorism (Mogire & Agade, 2011). Bruce Hoffman indicates that terrorism is an act of instilling fear by use of violence or threat to gain political change

(US Government, 2003). There have been challenges in defining terrorism as a concept by different authors and institutions since it is difficult to separate terrorism from simple criminal acts.

Kenya is one of the countries to be affected by a great wave of terrorism in the Sub-Saharan Africa. Together with Tanzania, Kenya has had more than 250 people killed and more than 5,000 injured in terrorist attacks in US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 (Muendo, 2003). The issue of terrorism captured the global imagination on September 11, 2001 as a result of the dramatic and destructive attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) and Pentagon, the core symbols of the world's only remaining superpower, the United States of America (Bard, 2012). The discussions on literature review are divided into three sub sections. These include: prevalence of terror activities in Nairobi, inability of state's institutions to contain terrorism attacks in Kenya and measures to contain terrorism in Kenya.

1.9.2 The Prevalence of Terror Activities in Nairobi

Nairobi County has been facing major terrorism challenges witnessed throughout a series of attacks both on large scale and on small scale with a direct target on embassies, hotels, shopping malls, open-air markets as well as bus stations. There have been series of suicide bombing and attacks by use of hand grenades in bus terminus, public service vehicles and entertainment joints. All these have been causing loss of lives of both civilians and the police force and destruction of property belonging to innocent Kenyans. In all these attacks, the radical Islamist group Al-Shabaab has been claiming responsibilities. Andrews (2015) indicated that there are a number of political and social-economic factors that facilitate activities of organized gangs groups to carry out the attacks. The above factors are generic and therefore the study seeks to specifically explain factors that motivate terrorists to carry out deadly attacks against people and property in the country especially in Nairobi.

This is also echoed by US Government in 2003 which indicated that terrorist activities are commonly associated with warfare. Both Bard (2012) and US government national strategy for combating terrorism do not explain factors underlying the intensity. Our study seeks to explore this gap and is interested in explaining the extent to which this prevalence could be attributed to the broad strategy of Al-Shabaab group. It is notable that the said prevalence seems to have gone down. We seek to determine the extent to which we can attribute Al-Shabaab prevalence to attempt to raise attention. There are factors that have bred terror acts. The commonest which are mentioned in most writings are political, social and economic conditions (Downing, 2009). This is in the interest of the study to examine the globalization of the factors in the context of terror attacks in Nairobi.

Terrorism exercises are regularly a prelude to the change of peaceful dissent developments to outfitted insubordination (Jeremy and Susan, 2003). The change of challenge to outfitted conflict gives a strategic specialty to demonstrations of terrorism. The emotive substance of terrorist inspiration makes it good with either political and otherworldly legitimization or avocations. Terrorist movement can be doubly emotive as the good and moral measurements of terrorist activity must be accommodated in the psyche of a terrorist (Bringing down, 2009). Therefore the study desires to examine how terrorists attract and recruit people to their organizations and how they conduct their training and indoctrination in the context of study in Nairobi.

Terrorism is not just a Kenyan problem alone. In Africa, terrorism occurs in both wealthy and un-wealthy states (Awitta, 2003). Bandura (2000) indicated that economic inequalities in the society contribute a great deal to terrorism. In fact, Campbell and Flournoy (2005) acknowledge the roles played by Muslims in terrorist activities. They also point out on the emergence of Islamic NGOs funded by the Saudi government and other Persian Gulf states and individuals which have addressed and continue to address the challenges faced by Islamic communities in general (Agina, 2008).

In the context of the study, religious conflicts include identity, beliefs, networks and institutions that have been believed to play an important role in how terrorism is perceived and the basis of acquiring resources and a source of the safe haven for the protagonists. In this regard, religion as a primary causal factor is empirically dubious and should be approached with caution (Awitta, 2003). Thus, besides religion being a factor causing prevalence of attacks in Nairobi, there are many other factors causing the prevalence of terror attacks such as human rights abuses and Kenya military intervention in Somalia which Somali nationals see as occupation of their land. As such, this study is desirable to analyze those factors.

Kenya's terrorist attacks have largely been triggered by the contest that is between the Christian and Muslim communities in sub-Saharan Africa. Most of the countries at the horn of Africa are Muslim dominated whereas Kenya stands out as the only country that is Christian dominated. This therefore stands out as a challenge to the Muslim community that desire to take over Kenya and offer its Sharia laws and ensure that they dominate its socio-economic activities (World Faiths Development Dialogue, 2016). In this regard, the study seeks to examine whether religion is push factor for terrorism attacks in Nairobi.

1.9.3 Inability of State's Institutions to Contain Terrorism Attacks in Kenya

Kenya is experiencing the major challenge of being primarily a soft target or a source of terrorism in the Horn of Africa. Nairobi being the capital city of Kenya has been the main target for terror attacks. The city concentrates on providing business, transportation and as a tourist hub in East Africa. Most of the global companies and Aid groups have their offices in Nairobi. The United States, Middle East and Asia have their embassies located in Nairobi and other western countries (Agina, 2008). Thus, the study is desired to focus on the vulnerability of Nairobi as the capital city of Kenya to terrorist attacks.

There have been challenges in policy frameworks to create best approaches and strategies to mitigate and create an informed security collaboration to combat the terrorist threat. The series of terrorist attacks in Kenya demands protective and preventive measures. For Kenya to deal with the terrorism sources, institutional changes need to be adopted (Awitta, 2003). Cross-border issues, refugees and issues involving immigration are the key aspects to dealing with terrorism and enhance the anti-terrorism policy. Long and short-term strategic plans need to be adopted (Bergesen & Lizardo, 2013). Kenya needs to borrow experience and expertise of Ethiopia in addressing counterterrorism measures (Bard, 2012). In this regard, the study desires to examine measures concerning national terrorism prevention laws or regulations in place to protect citizens from terrorist attacks.

A porous border helps Al-Shabaab target Kenya. In spite of the fact that the Kenyan government has declared plans to construct a divider wall along parts of the 424 mile-long fringe with Somalia, the structure could cost as much as \$17 billion and it wouldn't address other glaring issues. Kenya's police service is among the most degenerate in East Africa and individuals from Al-Shabaab and other dread gatherings can without much of a stretch purchase entry and visas from authorities (Zeisler - Vralsted, 2009). Payments to officers made up just about half of all rewards in Kenya in 2014. Garissa County is especially helpless. The range is home to Dadaab, one of the world's greatest exile camps with more than 336,000 Somalis. Garissa was the casualty of more than a fifth of Al-Shabaab's attacks in Kenya in the vicinity of 2009 and 2013 (Bergesen and Lizardo, 2013). Regardless of the enactment of the police acts in 2011 to redesign the police, insight and protection powers in Kenya, the very little advance has been made (Ken, Al-Shabab's Capabilities Post-Westgate, 2014). The above is philosophical and not empirical, which is why this study seeks to examine whether or not corruption was one of the factors that hindered Kenya to deal with terror attacks.

1.9.4 Measures to Contain Terrorism in Kenya

For the response to terrorism, Kenya published a draft Suppression of Terrorism bill on April 30th, 2003. Kenya has also engaged Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, the Police Act and other elements of Kenya's criminal code as the bill has not yet been

enacted to law (Kelley, 2003). The engagement of executive powers is also being used to deal with terrorism issues. The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act is playing a major role in dealing with terrorism issues in the country. The nation has additionally ventured up safety efforts (Bergesen and Lizardo, 2013) and its powers have done brave missions that have figured out how to grab some terrorist suspects from Somalia (Agina, 2008). Border watches particularly along the troublesome Kenya-Somalia border and joint Kenya-U.S. naval force watches of Kenya's Indian Ocean regional waters (Awitta, 2003) have been upgraded so as to prevent the penetration of terrorists from Somalia and to check illicit migration and the pirating of opiates and other booty merchandise like weapons along the drift. From the above measures which had been carried out by the government of Kenya to tackle terrorism issue, the study notes that there is a need for additional measures such as inter-community dialogues program and state-community dialogues as well.

On the police side, the legislature has taken various measures meant for reinforcing the power's capacity to battle terrorism. These measures incorporate the production of an Anti-terrorism Police Unit (Kelley, 2003); the opening of a National Counterterrorism Center to give an institutional system to battle the terrorist dangers (Kelley, 2003); the substitution of staff at the best echelons of the power like the arrangement of an Army Brigadier to head the power (Kelley, 2003); security bolster for Kenya has as well originated from the US as counter-terrorism endeavors incorporating specialized joint effort in identification and incapacitating of bombs; insurance of government pioneers and prisoner transactions (Bard, 2012). Airplane terminal security has likewise been upgraded by the US arrangement of PC frameworks for Kenyan air terminals that enable every voyager's character to be immediately checked against a refreshed terrorist watch-list (Bergesen and Lizardo, 2013). With regard to the above measures to contain terror attacks in Kenya such as establishment of Anti- Terrorism Police Unit, National Counter Terrorism Center, the study seeks to examine the nature of corporation among security sectors on one hand and corporation between communities and Security sectors on the other hand for the exchange of security information.

1.10 Theoretical Framework

This study adopts Buzan Barry trilogy of ideas, institutions and physical base as object of security to provide understanding of the problem of terrorism. According to Buzan, states are organized around ideas. Ideas whether economic, political or social explain the type of structures and institutions for state development. The institutions of the state are important in providing values (economic, social and political) to the physical base of the state (Buzan, 1983). Under the physical base, Buzan points to the population, material resources and territory. Part of state securitization implies the ability of the leadership to protect ideas, institutions, and the physical base from attacks. These attacks can be made through ideas. In the case of terrorists groups, the ideas preached include armed violence against those classified as infidels. The ability of those groups to succeed is as a result of institutional weaknesses due to corruption, poor leadership and bad governance. Buzan points to effects of ideology on population. Buzan theory implies that the more the youth are captured by the ideas of the enemy the more the vulnerable a state is to eternal attacks.

What Buzan does not tell us is why some people are easy to capture and participate in terrorism, and others are not. Ted Robert Gurr provides us with an answer. He points to what he calls relative deprivation, decremental deprivation and aspirational deprivation. People suffer differently from those deprivations. However, as Buzan notes, you need ideas to bring those people who suffered differently together to organize and execute terror (Gurr, 1970). If people are deprived, they can be easy to recruit in carrying out terrorism, you do not need many people to be deprived, yet the few if they target the physical base that is the population, material resources and state institutions, they will have an impact (Gurr, 1970).

The theoretical framework adopted is relevant to the current study that examines vulnerability of Nairobi to terrorist attacks. The first theory by Buzan on ideas, institutions and physical base relate to the issues and factors that make Nairobi vulnerable to terrorist attacks. This interplay of the three variables is clearly demonstrated in the government's efforts in its war against terror. On the other hand, Gurr's theory on

deprivation is also applicable to the study. Gurr explains why individuals take part in political acts of violence like the case of terror acts. He further makes an exploration on how states respond to such actions. He says, “Just as frustration produces aggressive behavior on the part of an individual, so too does relative deprivation predict collective violence by social groups”. The applicability of the theory finds its place within the reasons and factors that bring about radicalization. Issues of unfairness, inequality and social injustice make people to be aggressive. Some of the factors identified in the study included unemployment and marginalization. This shows that the people are deprived of their economic well-being and hence result to acts of terrorism. Based on the issue under study, the two authors present two clear arguments: one on the factors for vulnerability to terrorism and second on the response and strategy to address terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, the theories have their shortcomings.

1.11 Methodology of the Research

1.11.1 Introduction

This section deals with data collection procedures which are described as follows: Study sites, target population, sampling techniques, research design and data collection techniques, primary data, secondary data, and data analysis.

1.11.2 Research Sites

The focus of this study is the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, the National Counter Terrorism Center, Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, and the University of Nairobi.

Review of secondary data showed that the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, the National Counter Terrorism Center, and Anti-Terrorism Unit, are the key institutions involved in combating terrorism in the country, especially Nairobi City (Republic of Kenya & UNDP, 2015; Mbogo, 2008). This study purposively selected these institutions such as Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, NCTC, ATPU and the University of Nairobi as the case study in Nairobi City because they have all the facilities and expertise to provide the data.

Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government was created by Executive Order No.2 of 20th May 2013. The Ministry has two state departments namely: Department of Interior and the Department of Coordination of National Government. The Department of Interior has ten units as follows: Internal Security, National administration, Directorate of Immigration, Internal Offices, Government Press, National Cohesion and Integration Commission, Integrated Population Registration System, National Authority for Campaign against Alcohol and Drugs Abuse, Kenya National Disasters Operations, and State Functions. The Department of Coordination has three units as follows: Kenya Prison Services, Probation and After Care, and Betting Control and Licensing Board.

The National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) was established in 2008 to lead efforts in combating terrorism in the Horn of Africa and East Africa region. The National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) is headquartered in Nairobi City. The NCTC is operating under the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) of Kenya (Republic of Kenya & UNDP, 2015; Mbogo, 2008).

Kenya established a department of Anti-Terror Police Unit in 2004 in order to counter terrorism activities in the country after receiving a fund from the USA as a corporation between USA and Kenya in their fight against terror (Office for Global Concerns, 2014).

The University of Nairobi was established by an act of parliament titled: The University of Nairobi Act, Chapter 210, 1972 (UON Act revised, 2012).

1.11.3 Target Population

The population of the study was comprised of 13 staffs of the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, and 5 staffs from the National Counter Terrorism Center of Kenya. There are two departments and thirteen units within the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government. This study used the departments and units as the population frame to choose the sample size of the Ministry. The National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) has a head officer and subordinate officers which the study selected samples. The study also sampled 13 police officers from the CTPU. From the University of Nairobi, 14 students from the department of political science and Public Administration were sampled.

1.11.4 Sampling Technique

Purposive sampling technique was adopted in selecting respondents for the survey and administered questionnaires with open-ended questions. This study selected the sample from the personnel assigned within the units of the interior department of the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, the staff of the National Counter Terrorism Center in Nairobi City, police officers from CTPU, and students from the University of Nairobi department of political science and public administration.

1.11.5 Research design and Data Collection Techniques

Data was collected from both primary and secondary sources. The study reviewed secondary sources by looking at existing data which include online content, journal materials, academic books, newspaper articles, and policy material on terrorism. The advantage in this method lies in looking at materials that are already available while its major weakness lies in the fact that given the security nature of the study, some materials are inaccessible due to confidential classification. We intend to employ primary data to fill in this gap through making use of expert through an administered questionnaire with individuals who hold theoretical and practical knowledge in the areas of counterinsurgencies drawn from security sector and academia.

1.11.5.1 Primary Data

The primary data was obtained through the questionnaire with open-ended questions. Open-ended questions facilitated the collection of qualitative data, thus allowing the respondents to express their views in writing. This type of data collection allows for more explanation of questions by respondents.

1.11.5.2 Secondary Data

Secondary sources of data have entailed the analysis and review of published books, journals, papers, periodicals, and published works; government documents including policy documents and Sessional Papers, media sources and the internet. The study used

secondary data in the form of documented information from libraries and other relevant institutions.

1.11.6 Data Analysis

The primary information/data collected from the field was checked for correctness, organized, analyzed, and categorized in accordance with the objectives of the study. The assessment of the objectives and findings of the study was done and built on this categorization.

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TERRORISM TRANSITION IN KENYA

2.0 Introduction

The study examines the historical transition of terrorism in Kenya. The study will concentrate on examining past terrorism's incidents while attempting to show how they inform the current terrorist incidents. The idea of terrorism transition in Kenya is that two forms of terrorism can be discerned, that is local and external incidents, and examine their successes in executing their objectives largely across the country in terms of targeting social, economic and infrastructure sectors. The chapter is organized into four core parts. Part one focuses on terrorism during the Kenyatta Harambee era which runs from 1963 to 1978. Part two focuses on the transition of terrorism from local to international mode during the first Moi era that runs from 1979 to 1990 and part three examines terrorism under the second Moi era; the multi-party era from 1991 to 2001.

2.1 Jomo Kenyatta Harambee Era: 1963 to 1978

Under the Kenyatta regime, most terror activities were geared towards state consolidation. This is illustrated in the controversial murder of Tom Mboya and Josiah Kariuki. Tom Mboya's was preceded by eerie ethnic oathing exercises in Kikuyu areas under the agenda of preserving the presidency from moving away from Kikuyu (Mathangani, 2016). On Josiah Kariuki's death in 1975, the kidnapping and murder actions were preceded by an explosion at the overseas transport company in which there were 27 fatal casualties and several injuries. This was considered to be the first bomb to strike Kenya in independence Kenya (Dann, 2013).

The 1975 series of explosions in Nairobi were accompanied by implicit political statements. Firstly, J.M Kariuki in the aftermath of the February explosions that took place at Starlight nightclub and a travel bureau near Hilton Hotel. Another blast followed in March of the same year in which 30 fatalities were reported. JM was accosted by

security officials including Ben Gethi the GSU commandant and was found after several days later murdered (Mayabi, 2011).

From this early on, Kenya began to see the instrumentation of violence for political gains in the country, and poor adherence to objective examination and analysis of cases on its own merit, thus the weakening of institutional development to professional confront of such similar incidences in the future. In 1976 though, Kenya had the first experience with international terrorism when Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine and the Baader Meinhof group attempted to shoot down the El AL passenger plane during takeoff from Jomo Kenyatta International Airport. The plot was however thwarted through intelligence sharing between Israel and Kenya (Agade, 2011).

In the same year, Kenya was joined in international terrorism when the country allowed the Israel Defence Forces to use its airspace and even to refuel to Entebbe where a bold rescue mission was carried out to save Israeli citizens aboard the hijacked Air France that had landed in Uganda. Thus, Kenya's support for foreign values and interests that were at crossroads with extremists began to be discernible this early, something that would attract retaliation later on Kenyan soil against Israeli assets (Vittori P. V., 2009).

In this component, we realize that most terrorism's incidents which took place during Kenyatta era were mostly politically motivated, and Kenya had come to be identified as a fertile actor in the terrorism matrix as the indecencies indicate that the state did not have adequate resources in order to fully carry out accurate and thorough investigations of incidences that spanned out of petty crimes and enter the realm of complicated political crimes.

2.2 Daniel Arap Moi First Era 1978 to 1990

When President Kenyatta died in 1978, the then Vice-President Moi took over the leadership in accordance with the Kenyan constitution provision. The death of Jomo Kenyatta in 1978 indicated a period of political uncertainty and created tension in the country. Moi emphasized his position as Kenyatta's loyal follower, and recommended

previous government policies and announced that he would follow Kenyatta footsteps popularly known as 'Nyayo' (Footsteps) to assure his commitment to the founding father of the nation's vision. Most of Moi's foreign policy and economic development schemes were just a continuation of Kenya era policies (Mahaney, 2010). Moi continued with Kenyatta's style of leadership in terms of consolidation of power in the executive, he exaggerated the concept of togetherness to limit the ideas and emergence of political opposition by establishing more strength of the one-party system (Mahaney, 2010).

During Moi's regime, the country had experienced international terrorism, as a result of the Entebbe incident that rolled over into Moi's regime when sympathizers of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) carried out retaliation attacks in Kenya. Again, the Norfolk hotel in Nairobi which is owned by a prominent member of the Jewish community in Nairobi was attacked on 31 December 1980. The bomb killed 15 people of several nationalities and wounded several others. It was believed that the PLO committed this act in revenge for Kenya's assistance to Israel during the rescue operation to free hostages at Entebbe Airport in Uganda in 1976 (Mogire & Agade, 2011).

Moi's regime had also witnessed several atrocities, especially during and after the aftermath of 1982 "Failed Coup attempt" when a group of soldiers from Kenya Air Force took over the radio station (Voice of Kenya) and announced that they had overthrown the government, which the regime responded to it by committing much violation through terrorizing the country. Officers who died were 159 but there were speculations that the number was higher than that (The Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission, 2013).

In the early 1980s, major incidences were recorded such as the massacres during the burning of Bulla Karatasi village and many other areas by security forces in Garissa which followed the revenge killing of six government officials. In February 1984 in Wajir, a second major massacre occurred where about hundreds of Somali men were taken to detention centres, tortured or even killed, and burning of the houses and looting

of property was systematic against civilian's population and thus qualified as a crime against humanity (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995).

In general, first Moi's era experienced political unrest such as detention (Bjorgo, 2005) Anderson (2002) indicated that a few years after taking over the presidency, Moi began to exercise his style of authoritarianism by detaining a number of Kenyans who criticized his government. This included use of detention without trial as an instrument for suppressing his opponents in the 1980s and 1990s. Some of these detainees were former or sitting MPs who were arrested for demanding general reforms or other things, such as the introduction of multiparty politics.

In the first Moi's era 1978-1990, there were many factors that facilitated terror incidents in Kenya by local and international terrorists. From our literature review above it's clear that terrorism incidents were caused or motivated by political uncertainty, besides the international attack carried out by PLO as retaliation against Kenya-Israeli corporation. Local incidents were triggered by authoritarian style of government which was introduced by the regime especially when Moi limited a freedom of establishing political parties and many other atrocities that took place as government responded during and after a coup attempt in 1982.

2.3 Aftermath of Section 2A of Constitution and Second Moi Era of 1990-2002

In this era, the study looks into the introduction of multi-party politics in Kenya and power-sharing through democratic practices and its implications for terrorism's incidents in Kenya. On December 1992, Kenya held its seventh national election since the granting of independence in 1963. The national elections were the first multi-party elections. In December 1991, the ruling party Kenya African National Union (KANU) repealed section 2A of the constitution which had before prohibited the formation of other political parties in Kenya (Gibson, 1994). The repeal came after spirited local and international pressure to force KANU to allow multi-party system in the country. A constitution amendment had made Kenya a single party state in 1982, thus Kenya moved from the de facto one-party state to a multi-party democracy. Although multi-party system demand

was initiated for the democratic and political rights, it has weakened the loyalties to the nation and it has eroded the state ability to maintain its cohesion (Widner, 1992).

When the country moved from single-state party to multi-party democracy, the ethnic patterns developed along party line. It was indicated that even though with the adoption of multi-party democracy in Kenya, practices of poor governance still in terms of corruption became widespread and insecurity mostly caused by ethnic tension. Multi-party democracy appears to have paved way for ethnic nationalism and has been associated with ethnic violence. In Kenya, many elections except for 2002 had witnessed ethnic violence after the country formally adopted multi-party democracy in 1991 (Muigai, 1995). The multi-party system has been a preface to ethnic competition and has facilitated absolute conflict in Kenya. Many scholars and observations have raised questions concerning how multi-ethnic African countries manage multi-party democracy without provoking ethnicity groups to engage in violence during elections. Such violence has created much fragile State (Ndegwa, 1997).

In addition, the absence of ideology or policy has increased ethnic emotions and corruption at the expense of nationalism in the country which has further created the perception of inequality or exclusion within the political system. Therefore, the weakness of interparty democracy affects the entire political system and negatively affects important decisions at the national level (Friedrich, 2010). The absence of policy and real political agendas during multi-party system has created more ethnic emotions and lessened loyalty to the nation. This has weakened the state ability and concentration on vital issues such as the security of the country like counter-terrorism strategies and other preemptive measures to prevent any anticipatory threat. Among those weaknesses during second Moi's era was the terrorist attack on the United States of America's embassy in 1998.

The American embassy attack in Nairobi was planned and both the U.S. and Kenyan governments were more aware of the threats posed by foreign terrorists. This terrorist incident led to the death of more than 200 people including 12 Americans and injured thousands. The explosion damaged the embassy building and collapsed the neighboring buildings where most victims were killed, mainly students and staffs of the secretarial

house. The attack provoked Kenya to begin concentrating on counter-terrorism strategy (Krause & Otenyo, 2005). After a thorough investigation which was carried out by the US and Kenya Government, the perpetrators behind this incident came as a surprise to the investigators. Initially, the Government of Kenya neglected the possibility of the involvement of international terrorism (Pretholdt, 2011). The incident assumed that the suspects responsible for the bombing were from Swahili and Muslims culture. This announcement was not to any extent of the creative energy false; besides the exact examination by U.S., Kenyan pros found a colossal and enormous arrangement of overall terrorists that worked inside Kenya. The examination revealed that the shelling was masterminded over a five-year time traverse. The organizing of the attack included Osama bin Laden, who was by then passed on to the thought of U.S. Government experts. With the help of Palestinian al Qaeda from Jordan and a past Egyptian policeman, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, a man from the Comoros Island chose the two suicide airships, who were Saudis (Vittori and Vittori, 2009). This operation had been upheld by a few Kenyan residents and additionally was remote operation and support.

During second Moi's era, according to this literature review, several terror attacks had taken place due to many different reasons, ranging from mainly social and political factors. The multi-party system had weakened the loyalties to the nation, and it had eroded the state's ability to maintain its cohesion. It was seen as a preface to ethnic competition and had facilitated absolute conflict in Kenya. The ethnic patterns developed along party lines and many citizens under their political parties paid allegiance to their parties rather than to the nation. Ethnic violence has created much fragile state under second Moi's multi-party system. Although the main functions of political parties are representation of societal interests, political education and working towards national cohesion, the absence of ideology or policy has increased ethnic emotions which led to terrorist incidents in the country by local and international terrorist groups.

2.4 Terrorism during Kibaki Era 2002 to 2012

In December 2002, Kenya proved that fair elections and peaceful change could be achieved even after long years of one man rule. Former president Daniel Arap Moi

handed over power to Mwai Kibaki and his opposition coalition, the National Alliance Rainbow (NARC) replacing KANU which had been in power since the independence of the country for almost 40 years. Kibaki promised to tackle issues that hindered the development of the country such as corruption, unemployment, high crime rate and many other important issues for the betterment of the country (Bertelsmann Transformation, 2006).

War against terrorism continued during the NARC government and under the leadership of Kibaki through the legislature and institutional attempts including military intervention to Somalia. Kibaki regime in its role for countering terrorism threat has tabled the suppression of terrorism bill in 2003 in parliament. The bill allowed the police to carry out arbitrary arrests including searching property of suspected people. Suspected people were allowed to be detained up to 36 hours. The bill was rejected by the Kenyan parliament due to religious and other human rights issues. In 2006, the state reintroduced an amended bill as Anti-Terror bill 2006 but was rejected by the parliament at the committee level. In 2012, the state reintroduced the bill in parliament under Prevention of Terrorism bill and it was passed by an Act of parliament and signed into law by President Kibaki in October 2012. Nevertheless, the country continued to witness series of terrorist attacks in different parts of the country especially in Dadaab Refugee camp, Garissa Town near First Community Bank, Mugdi Market in Garissa Town and Ifo Refugee camp in Dadaab. All these attacks were claimed by al-Shabaab terrorist group (Kenya Media House, 2012).

Similarly, Kenya established National Counter Terrorism as one of the instruments for countering terrorism activities and began preparing its military capacities. In 2011 Kenya made the unprecedented step of intervening in Somalia. From various perspectives, Kenya's intercession in Somalia seemed to satisfy a demotic and district interest for the firm and conclusive activity against a long changeless danger. Flimsiness in Somalia added to theft in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, terrorist action in East Africa and the colossal Lakes Region, and most instances of seizing of visitors and helpless laborers and huge convergence of outcasts to Kenya to escape dry season and starvation.

Likewise, there is an honest and goodness requirement for Kenya to safeguard the nation's regional sway from the Al-Shabaab and other transitional terrorist gatherings (Lesley, 2011).

Intervention of Kenya Defence Force to Somalia in 2011 has its huge consequences on Kenya. It had made Kenya more vulnerable on the domestic front as the country risked its national security as a result of the offensive action in Somalia. It has indicated that between 2011 and 2014 Kenya has witnessed almost 133 terrorist attacks which are quite big compared to the previous years before intervention in Somalia (Wafula, 2014). The following are the major attacks that took place during Kibaki era between 2002 and 2012.

2.5 Kikambala Hotel Bombing and Arkia Airlines Missile Attack in Mombasa, 2002

During this era, major terrorist attacks took place in Kenya and other separate minor terrorist attacks which were affiliated with foreign Al-Qaida group. Suspected al-Qaida operatives attempted an attack on 26th November 2002 in Mombasa at the Paradise Hotel (Adan, 2005). They were also responsible for bombing an Israeli owned Hotel in Mombasa known as Kikambala Hotel. The bombing took place during high season for tourists. The attacker was broadly known as Fazul Abdullah Mohammed who arranged and facilitated the attack. However, he thought of it as a disappointment on the grounds that the surface-to-air rocket missed the plane (Adan, 2005). The attack on the Kikambala hotel happened soon after about 60 guests had registered with the lodging, every one of them from Israel. The inn authorities showed that 13 individuals were murdered and 80 harmed. Ten Kenyans died, nine of whom were utilized by the inn. The vast majority of them were said to be customary artists who came to welcome the 140 visitors touching base from Israel by the state-sanctioned stream and three Israelites, two of whom were youngsters. In an overnight operation that went ahead into the early hours, four Israeli military Hercules planes with groups of specialists and clinicians flew into Mombasa and cleared harmed Israeli sightseers and each one of the individuals who needed to leave (Adan, 2005).

As Kenya government under Kibaki regime continued to fight the war on terror and maintained its relations and corporations with western countries in many fields, the harsh actions of Kenyan police in countering terrorism and sending its troops to Somalia for the purposes of fighting the Al-Shabaab group, these factors meant that Kenya continued to witness terrorist attacks. This was especially by international terrorism such as attacks on Kikambala Hotel, and Arkia Airlines Missile attack in Mombasa, 2002.

After Kibaki's era, since 2013 Kenya has continued to witness the greatest effect of terrorism among other countries in the region. In recent years, there has been a series of attacks by the terrorist in Kenya's counties with the concentration of most of the attacks in the capital city, Nairobi. Since Kenya's deployment of its military in Somalia in order to prevent the country from threat caused by al-Shabaab, the Somalia-based jihadi organization attacks have multiplied with more concentration in Nairobi (Mogire & Agade, 2011).

CHAPTER THREE

FACTORS THAT FACILITATE TERRORIST ATTACKS IN NAIROBI

3.0 Introduction

This chapter interrogates the dynamic of terrorist attacks in Nairobi between 2011 and 2015. It responds to the task of our first question: what factors explain the prevalence of terrorist attacks in Nairobi between 2011 and 2015. Its objective is to examine and analyze factors that explain the prevalence of tourist attacks in Nairobi.

In this chapter we will look into factors underlying the vulnerability of Nairobi to terrorist attacks. The chapter is organized into three sections to examine economic, social and political factors. Section one looks at social factors such as management of aliens' movement in Nairobi, instrumentalization of religion and social decay. Section two which is on economic variables, examines factors such as issues of poverty and urban marginalization, unemployment and trafficking. Section three analyzes factors such as politicization of international and local grievances, recruitment, training and indoctrination.

Nairobi became a centre for commercial activities and its infrastructural development led it to be named the regional capital in 1907. With an approximate population of 20,000 in the 1910s from mainly the locals, British immigrants, the railway constructors from Africa, India and Pakistan, Nairobi had grown to be a cosmopolitan town. For instance, the Indians came to occupy the eastern portion of the city next to the Europeans. Such a huge immigrant to a relatively smaller town by then posed both a demographic pressure and economic challenges in surrounding rural especially in the central province leading to the internal displacement of the locals (Claire, 2010).

3.1 Social Factors that Facilitate Terror in Nairobi

3.1.1 Management of Immigrants Movement in Nairobi

The prevalence of terrorist attacks in Nairobi is associated with the management of aliens' movement in Kenya. It is overwhelming due to the huge number of different migrant population hosted by the country in the region. Historically, Kenya has been a destination for migrant traders and travelling people. Post-colonial conflict in the Horn of Africa led to a significant number of mixed migrations into Kenya which led to issues of insecurity. This immigration is believed to have been caused by many factors (Nguvulu, 2010).

Based on the information displayed by the World Bank in 2010, the aggregate vagrant stock in Kenya assessed was at 817,747 from UNDESA. As indicated by the Migration DRC's Global Migrant Origin information base and UNDP information, the biggest loads of transients in Kenya are from Somalia, Nigeria, Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Burundi, the DRC, and South Sudan (Nguvulu, 2013). It is likely however, that this neglect is to bring with account the substantial populace of evacuees in Kenya. The larger part is Somali, in addition to different nations for example, Nigeria, Congo, Ethiopia, Eretria, Burundi and South Sudan. As indicated by the UNHCR's latest gauge, the quantity of displaced people in Kenya stands at around 547,612 with, by a wide margin, the biggest offer starting from Somalia 492,105 (Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, 2013).

Although many members of armed groups from Somalia voluntarily lay down their arms in order for them to join a camps life in Kenya as refugees. The evidence shows that others seek to return to their previous groups and fight, and often use the refugee camps as a base to regroup or reorganize to strengthen their movements any time (Ndege, & Odiyo, 2002). The population of Nairobi has also grown more than ten-fold since 1960 representing some of the highest population growth rate in Africa (Metcalf, 2011). Despite the encampment policy, a considerable number of refugees have been moving to urban areas with time. The number of the urban refugees has been increasing over the years in big numbers as mentioned above, ranging from registered refugees to unknown

number of unregistered refugees or migrants (Pavanello, Samir & Sara, 2010). The term urban refugee is defined as persons from recognized refugee producing countries who have settled in urban centers (Refugees Commission of Kenya, 2005, p5). In this context, urban refugees refer to individuals who settled specifically in Nairobi who might include both asylum seekers, refugees and rejected asylum seekers (Refugees Commission of Kenya, 2005, p8).

It has also been indicated that it is very hard to identify where the refugee community starts and stops (Campbell, Crisp, & Kiragu, 2015). As underlined by Compbell, (2009), the group urban refugees are very diverse in their nationality, ethnicity and socioeconomic background, and those who represent the majority are the most vulnerable and suffer the most, being victims of extortion or bribery. There is also scare knowledge about how many they are, who they are, where they are, where they come from, how they survive and earn living and their refugee status is also unknown. UNHCR estimated that about 50,800 mostly Somali refugees currently reside in Nairobi (Akin, 2014).

According to an empirical investigation carried out by this study in Nairobi where respondents drawn from the Ministry of Interior, National Counter Terrorism Center, University of Nairobi and Anti-Terror Police Unit, the study found that majority of the respondents accounting for 44.45% did acknowledge that the management of aliens' movements has caused the high incidence of terror attacks in Nairobi in the period 2011 and 2015. For instance, most of these respondents cited the high rate of rural-urban migration which reduced the ratio of police to citizen ratio, hence stretching the work of the police. The increase of local migrants in Nairobi leads the police to concentrate on the local migrants more than the aliens' movements causing some vulnerability to exploitation by terror networks (Research Interviewees, 2017). With the huge number of immigrants hosted by Kenya which is estimated at more than 800,000 refugees, it has helped terrorist groups to exploit this situation of vulnerability of refugees to be recruited to terrorist organizations.

3.1.2 Instrumentalization of Religion

Religion becomes an instrument of terror where those motivations and objectives have main religious influence. Religion is considered by many scholars to be one among many other factors such as politics, culture, and psychology that lead radicals to target innocents and harm their life in the process (Gibson, 2011). Terrorism took a stronger direction due to the increase of religious factors in the 1990s. Religious radicalization, indoctrination and violence have taken over in the terrorism issue. The main characteristics of violence in most areas especially the Northern Ireland is due to religious factors. Terrorism does not involve Islamic and Christianity conflicts only but it should also be noted that there was the conflict between Catholics and Protestants in North Ireland (Gould, 2010).

According to the Kenyan National Bureau of Statistics and the United States government, it is estimated that Kenya has a general population of about 45 million people (July 2014). From the population, 82% are Christians whereas 11% are Muslims. The Islamic population mostly lives in the North and Coastal regions. In the Dadaab camps, there are about 355,000 Somalis living there who are Muslims. In Kakuma there are 177,000 refugees who are Somalis, South Sudanese, and Ethiopians, as well as other regional refugees. In Nairobi-Kenya, the Madrassa teachings have been seen as a source of radicalization of young Muslims. Many youths have been radicalized through some religious organizations, convening them that they will be heroes if they join terrorism (Taaliu, 2017).

Although Kenya 2014 International Religious Freedom report indicated that the Muslims especially of Somali origin was the target by the government by carrying out extrajudicial killing and arbitrary arrest, detention and deportation, these charges have raised a level of hatred between Muslim community and government of Kenya, though the government denied those claims (Human Rights groups, 2014). Harassment and ill-treatment of Muslim communities by security officials took place such as brief closure of some Mosques in Mombasa and threats to close other Mosques or Madrassa across the country especially the Mosques which are associated with or linked to incitement of violence

extremism. Those acts by security organs provoked Muslim community and Muslim leaders as well and human rights organizations who stated that these kinds of operations are unfair; the target of Somali and Muslims communities (United States Department of State, 2014, p2).

Religious tension becomes high in some areas in Kenya including capital city Nairobi due to several incidents that have been taking place based on religious motives. For instance, On September 2012, a Sunday school at St Polycarp's church in Nairobi was attacked with grenades resulting to the death of a child and injuring many (Matt, 2014). In the Likoni suburb of Mombasa, some armed men opened fire on Sunday worshipers at a church killing six and wounding more others in 2014. There are also other many cases of threatening those of ethnic Somali origin who converted to Christianity (Winnie, 2014).

From the interviews conducted on instrumentalization of religion as a factor that facilitate the prevalence of terror attack in Nairobi, this study found that majority of respondents representing 48.89% indicated that many people were recruited based on religious motivation. One of the respondents indicated that religion and poverty drove many young people to join extremist groups in Kenya for financial gains. Another respondent indicated that misinterpretation of Quran verses by some Muslim clerics or "Imams" used such verses or doctrines to radicalize the minds of the faithful especially the youth leading them to engage in violent extremist activities, therefore increasing terrorist phenomenon in Kenya (Reserch Interviewees, 2017). Terrorist groups have used and exploited the concept of holy war against non-Muslims and the situation of Muslims being a minority faith group within a Christian majority society in Kenya as a tool for them to achieve their goals.

3.1.3 Social Decay and Terrorism

According to Wilner and Dubouloz (2007), individuals adopt extreme social beliefs. Social decay is a situation where an individual, a group or a society within a country feels marginalized or excluded from social, economic, and political processes and development by government and other members of the society (Bjorgo, 2005). Although this situation

of social decay could lead to radicalization and violence extremism, nevertheless there is no consensus among policy makers, governments, researchers and security practitioners on the definition of radicalization and violence extremism. Hopkins (2009) argues that it is not surprising that there are diverse opinions about the causes of radicalization and violence extremism. Radicalization is rooted in a consensus towards reformist changes in the society where people divert from using ordinary and legal processes to using extreme and illegitimate means to attain a goal (Wilner & Dubouloz, 2007; 2010). Radicalization and extreme violence results from extremely complex, multifaceted, extensive and often intertwined factors. It is vastly reportedly that it is within a marginalized, excluded and desperate social, economic, and political setting that radicalization and violence extremism emerge (Australian Government, 2015).

Kenya has experienced numerous terror attacks and violent extremism in different levels since the first case in 1980 of Norfolk Hotel Bombing (Botha, 2014). These attacks have affected security and development in the country. Radicalization and extremism especially the Al-Shabaab, plan and carry out their atrocious activities with increasingly assistance and support from local citizens (Gichuru, 2015). Al-Shabaab terrorist group in Kenya expanded its attacks to include not only Muslims of Somali origins, but also non-Muslim communities in Kenya.

By 2012, it was estimated that there were about 600 Kenyans among the Somali Al-Shabaab with a high percentage belonging to non-Muslim communities (International Crisis Group, 2012). Botha (2014) argued that Al-Shabaab have also recruited Kenyans to carry out violence extremism activities and terror attacks outside Kenya such as the attack of Ethiopian army base and Somali's ministry of education in Mogadishu in 2007 and 2011 respectively. This extreme turn of Kenyan non-Muslim individuals by joining Al-Shabaab group illustrates how radicalization and violence extremism has become embedded within the Kenya society.

Out of the empirical data collected on the social decay as a factor influencing terror attacks in Nairobi, the study found that a number of respondents representing 26.67%

said that social decay was in deed a factor leading to terrorism. Others indicated that the feeling of social, economic and political exclusion motivated some sections of the society to join and conduct terror activities in Kenya. This included those who said that moral decay was also a factor where some reported that some people no longer respect human life and dignity and anyhow kill and destroy property indiscriminately. It was also indicated that non-Muslim Kenyans join terror groups to support jihadist movements against their own government, religious and moral beliefs (Reserch Interviewees, 2017).

3.3 Economic Factors

3.3.1 Poverty and Urban Marginalization

Poverty and urban marginalization are among economic factors behind terrorism in Kenya, criminal acts are basically attainment of another person's property. Another inspiration or factor is the journey of unlawful exercises even at the danger of being caught and rebuffed. Subsequently, criminals are probably going to be found among the individuals who generally have more to pick up from these exercises and moderately little to lose in the event that they are caught. The greater part of people who confer, for example, these apparently have a place with the neediest gatherings in the public eye (Nene, 2014).

A community perception of violent extremism in Kenya after a survey carried out by the Foundation for Equity and Compromise found out, that the respondents gave more sudden answers when asked whether they knew about characterized savage fanaticism. Numerous respondents did not recognize Al-Shabaab, others referred to them as cases of gatherings honing rough radical acts (Human Rights Watch, 2015, p8). In Eastleigh, numerous respondents had doubts towards the police in groups, which was constrained by vanishing and additional legal killings. A few respondents said that the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) was in charge of constrained vanishing of youth. Respondents in Majengo in Nairobi expressed their profound feeling of disdain in light of human rights misuse by the Kenyan government, no formal examination was done, and the Kenyan government had authoritatively prevented allegation from claiming broad human rights misuse (Human Right Watch, 2015, p9).

Terrorism in Nairobi is also a result of social segregation by police against Somali. According to the views of some respondents, ethnic profiling of Somali-Kenyans was a noteworthy reason for frailty. The lion's share of the individuals who live in Eastleigh area individuals from Somali, both Somali-Kenyans and Somali nationals and are a considerable lot, of whom are displaced people. Operation known as "Usalama Watch" and the continuous cover focusing on Somalis of ethnic origin were depicted to extremely harm the connection and trust amongst police and group individuals. Numerous respondents asserted that, packs in the zone effectively targeted Somali-Kenyans, as they probably are aware they are hesitant to look for help from police and other security authorities. Respondents of Somali inception in Eastleigh communicated their disappointment at not being dealt with an indistinguishable path from Kenyans of another ethnicity, and passed on a feeling of minimization from more extensive Kenyan culture (Amnesty International, 2014).

In Nairobi city, nearby road groups and numerous different characters who take part in theft, assault and other savage wrongdoings were likewise depicted as a wellspring of instability in all examination regions. Respondents in Eastleigh additionally depicted that across the board gangsters, thefts, and frivolous wrongdoing these laid out a connection between these criminal demonstrations, police debasement and rough radicalism in their group. For instance they clarified that Al-Shabaab targets people who are individuals from nearby groups for enrollment, expressing that this happens for two reasons: First, posse individuals are for the most part as of now distant from their groups and have demonstrated they will carry out wrongdoings for purpose of getting cash; second, Al-Shabab is claimed to have been having existing connection with road packs in Eastleigh, which may help encourage enlistment (Nordic Africa Institute, 2016). Therefore, urban marginalization, frustration, poverty with slow pace social reforms, corruption, joined with poor government and lack of social services, facilitate the proliferation of terrorist groups meant to offer to the poor living conditions. People who live on less than a dollar a day are likely to lose hope and engage in acts of terrorism and many other crimes. Some people in the society have the tendency to dominate over others in order to realize their

wishes; they resort to any kind of activities including terrorism activities to prove their supremacy in society (Sandler, & Enders, 2002).

Analysis of the empirical primary data collected from interviews indicated that poverty and urban marginalization were major economic factors that influenced some Kenyans to join terror groups. The study found that majority of the respondents (53.49%) supported this argument. Many of the respondents blamed inflation as an economic factor that motivates many to support terror activities. They indicated for instance, that inflation leads to increase in government expenditure which causes high cost of living, increased unemployment and poverty, therefore many especially the young people are motivated to join terror groups as a way of earning living through engaging in terror activities (Reserch Interviewees, 2017). People join criminal acts including terrorism due to a feeling of frustration either of extreme poverty or being deprived of many other rights such as political participation.

3.3.2 Unemployment and Trafficking of Goods

Terrorism activities in Nairobi have a direct link to the level of unemployment in the country. Lack of employment has been encouraged and has led many young people to be disappointed to the extent of accepting any promise that can create for them a quick income easily such as being recruited in terrorism. Some youth in Kenya would argue that they would rather live a short life of riches instead of waiting for jobs which are not forthcoming. Some young people will jump into any opportunity that promises them a good source of income and make them busy. Unemployment in Kenya is a very fertile ground for recruiting young people who remain without jobs. Jobless and frustrated youths are more likely to be recruited to foreign terrorist groups. Some young people will argue that being in terrorist groups is equal to being in other armed forces in Kenya, because they think that the chances of being harmed or killed are the same, and both KDF soldiers and recruits in Al-Shabab are both being paid to go and fight which is the same job (Thuranira, 2017).

Also, a research revealed that Kenya experiences a high level of unemployment at 40% as at December 2012 (World Bank). Youth unemployment in the coastal region stands at 70% out of the total population. The research indicated that this high rate of unemployment contributed to the many forms of violence including terrorism. In addition, there has been disdain from the inundation of vagrant groups who wandered into coastal area since the 1970s to profits by the economic open doors accessible, particularly lands resettlement plans (Ngunyi and Katumanga 2012). This aftereffect of unequal improvement has been the presence of powerless foundations, fall of enterprises, profound question of the legislature by the groups and grievances have prompted the arrangement of equipped militia bunches at the drift district by and large.

Trafficking is one of the issues facing the Kenya in its fight against terrorism, and at the same time facilitates terrorism activities. In general, majority of Al-Shabaab's income generates from and is carried out in their activities in Somalia and Kenya as well, at least until their strong base Kismayo was lost in September 2012. Al-Shabaab involvement in trafficking activities becomes clear from the testimonies of ivory poachers and brokers that Al-Shabaab did apply a degree of importance to the ivory trade and quickly imported it into the group's administrative process. Al-Shabaab involvement in the trade was through recruiting members who previously relied on ivory trade, so that was a clear strategic financial planning, as well as a strong contact with international criminal syndicates (Transnational Organized Crime in East Africa, 2016).

Illicit trade and counterfeit companies have been playing a negative role in terms of promoting terror activities. Kenya is considered to be the biggest market for illicit trade in counterfeit goods in East Africa region. Counterfeit goods are sourced mainly from India and China and are valued at about 913 million USD, rivaling key foreign exchange earners tourism and tea and coffee (Kenya National Legislative Assembly, 2007). Manufactures have estimated that they have lost an annual net of 368 million USD as a result of the illicit trade. About 80 percent of all malaria drugs in the Kenyan markets are counterfeit and harmful to users (Kenya Association of Manufacturers, 2010).

Terrorist Organizations like Al-Shabaab did not start elephant poaching or ivory trade in Kenya or their controlled areas during the period 2010 through 2012, but it was started before that time and they did benefit from the trade. Investigative organizations are finding that these groups continue to benefit from the ivory and many other illicit trades today (United Nations Environment Program, 2014).

From the empirical data collected on unemployment and trafficking of goods as a factor leading to terrorism, the study found that majority of the respondents representing 46.51% indicated that unemployment and trafficking of goods was a major cause of terrorism. Unemployed young people resort to terror groups as a way to earn their livelihood. On the other hand, people engage in the illicit trade of goods and services as a way to get resources to support terror activities. This also facilitates trafficking of weapons used to engage in destruction of property and lives. Some of the respondents indicated that corruption has facilitated trafficking of goods through the porous borders. Others indicated that foreign investors start and develop companies in the country with the aim of using the profits to support terror networks (Research Interviewees, 2017). Unemployment and trafficking have played a great role in terrorists' recruitment and source of finances respectively. Terrorists attract those who are unemployed to fight for them and use trafficking means as a way of financing their activities.

3.4 Politics and Terrorism

3.4.1 Politicization of International and Local Grievances

According to Hannah Arendt approaches, political grievances have been considered to be the strongest factors that facilitate terror and political leadership influence terrorism, the issue of real expert and violence in different structures. In her theory, she contends that the specialist, quality, and energy of the state rest upon its authenticity which gives it the ability to encourage aggregate activity among its subjects. State violence, however, it might be defended, recommends that the state needs enough authenticity through non-coercive power (Arendt, 1969).

This could attack some corresponding resistance from many disenchanted groups of the population. This argument resounds with Ted Gurr thesis 1970s when he argues that terror is contrariwise related to power. He also explains that terror as a tactic which has been used by the weak in order to threaten the strength; and by the strong to intimidate the weak. Terrorism as a tactic used against the state shows lack of balance of power to conflict with the state through guerrilla or direct warfare. So any attempt at terror tactics by any state against its own citizens undermines the power and legitimacy of its own civil and criminal processes to enforce without using violence. Terrorism perpetrated by the state shows an absence of true legitimacy to accomplish a political reason and in addition when sub-state performing artists embrace political fear against the express, that is to find political resistance to the express, the restriction likewise express the deficiency of the energy of the state, however dissatisfaction with lumbering nature of true blue types of specialist, power and intimidation (White, 2002).

According to Gurr 1968 lectures, terrorism is both a tactic and also a strategy. Somewhat than an order of armed violence lower than guerrilla and open warfare, terrorism may be a new level of protest, which is violence-protest in order to demonstrate the vulnerability of the state and its citizens and publicize a group or individuals or opposition to the state. Terrorism concentrates more on tactic than tactics strategy in challenging the state because it requires less organization and leadership (White, 2010).

Terrorism had been connected and considered as a response to the existing political regime or system. Furthermore, at the end of the day, terrorism is being viewed as politically persuaded activity. Terrorism is a methodology established in political misery or uncertain grievances, utilized as part of the administration of a wide range of convictions and precepts that assist, legitimize and maintain violence (Leeman, 1987, p45-53). In aggregate, terrorists battle for different reasons which are basically political (Richardson, 2006).

In the case of Nairobi, the transnational terrorist and regional one have exploited international political issues plus internal support that they found from some domestic

groups and individuals that enabled them to carry out some successful attacks in Nairobi and across the country. The external support which had been the lifeblood of terrorism provides the terrorist money needed for recruitment, training, indoctrination and execution of transnational terrorism in the country. The grievances of minorities concerning their alleged lack of political and civil rights can be causing political violence and terrorism as well.

During 2003 meeting in Oslo concerning terrorism issues by international experts, they discussed terrorism root causes. They came up with some things that cause terrorism which included lack of democracy, inequality, illegitimate or corrupt governments and the expression of social injustice and failure or unwillingness of the state to integrate rival groups or emerging social classes (Tore, 2003). The experts made it clear that terrorism occurs in wealthy countries or nations as well as poor countries and democracies as well as authoritarian countries. Therefore, there is no single root cause or even a common set of causes though there are several factors that lead to the emergence of different forms of terror in Nairobi Kenya. In Kenya, there is a perceived political marginalization by some sections of the population, particularly in coastal and northern regions. This gives terrorist groups great environments to widely spread and make them act and carry out their attacks successfully, as it was witnessed by the propaganda being spread by Osama Bin Laden and his lieutenant (Benjamin, 2001).

Nairobi witnessed several terrorist attacks before and after the intervention of KDF to Somalia, and these attacks have been claimed by transnational and regional terrorist groups as punishment mechanism against Kenya because of its relations with western countries and Israel. After the 1998 US Embassy bombing, the government of Kenya became fully cooperated with the US government in terms of intelligence sharing and giving US investigators access to investigate the incident. In the midst of 2013, a series of terrorist attacks took place in Kenya as retaliation. The KDF's challenges in southern Somalia were small compared to the problems emerging back home in Kenya as a result of military intervention to Somalia. From the beginning of the invasion, there was awareness that Al-Shabaab had the plan to carry out retaliation attack in Kenya. Within

the days of KDF's invasion, several attacks using grenades targeted Garissa, police posts and checkpoints around Mandera and explosions in Dadaab refugee camp (Tristan, 2013).

The terrorist threat in Nairobi city is considered to be politically influenced to force Kenya to move out its forces from Somalia and as retaliation as well, which resulted to the death of 67 and many others wounded (Kenya National Assembly, 2013). Several other attacks took place such as Mpeketoni attacks, approximately 30 gunmen in number attacked Mpeketoni on Sunday 15 June 2014, with simultaneous attacks on the Administration Police Divisional Headquarters in Mpeketoni and Mpeketoni town centre. In details concerning this attack, 49 people were killed, 44 vehicles torched and about 26 buildings burnt (Independent Policing Oversight Authority, 2014).

On 2nd of April 2015, between six to ten masked gunmen stormed the Garissa university college campus. The gunmen first killed two security guards who were at the main gate. The terrorists then moved inside the campus and started throwing grenades and shooting any person on sight. Then, the terrorists managed to enter the dormitories where they separated Muslim students from non-Muslim students by asking the students to recite verses from the Quran. They then released the Muslim students and started executing the other non-Muslim students (The African Union, 2015).

Forces from the Kenyan security and police quickly responded to the attack and put a siege in Garissa university college campus, and directly engaged and confronted the attackers in brutal gun battles with the terrorists within the campus and in the dormitories in particular where some students were still trapped. The battle went on for around 15 hours and during that confrontation, four terrorists blew themselves up after Kenyan security forces stormed the dormitory in which they were hiding. The attack left 147 students, 3 police officers, and 3 other soldiers from the army dead, and more than 70 civilians injured. After thorough investigation, it was identified that Mohamed Mohamud, who was an Al Shabaab commander was the mastermind behind the Garissa University college attack (The African Union, 2015).

According to the empirical data collected from the Ministry of Interior, National Counter Terrorism Center, University of Nairobi and Anti-Terror Police Unit, on how political factors led to the prevalence of terror attacks in Nairobi, 3 respondents representing 6.67% said that lack of real democracy in the country motivated some people to use violence means including terror in order for them to gain political interests. On the other hand, 5 respondents representing 11.11% indicated that deployment of Kenya Defence Force in Somalia under the operation Linda Nchi in 2011 caused an increase in the intensity of terror attacks in the country. Also from the empirical data collected, 7 respondents representing 15.56% acknowledge that Kenya was victimized because of its good relations with western countries who have declared war against all terror organization networks and their activities. This means that countries like Kenya who have maintained close bilateral and multilateral relation are considered as enemies by terror networks since such countries are viewed as allies to western nations.

Another group of 9 respondents constituting 20% of the total respondents did acknowledge that tribalism or ethnic violence in the country facilitated terror and created an environment for terror activities. A group of 21 respondents representing 47.67% indicated that political instability in the country has created this situation of vulnerability to terror attacks (Research Interviewees, 2017). Terrorist organizations do not target western countries only, because their war is against western countries and their allies and Kenya is one of the western countries allies based on many treaties Kenya has signed to fight terror alongside UA and Israeli. Terrorist groups also managed to hit Kenya several times through corporation they got within the country from some local groups or individuals who felt being politically marginalized.

3.4.2 Terrorist Recruitment Tactics

To maintain the right number and types of people has become a very important thing for many terrorist organizations. A study indicates that every terrorist organization struggle to be able to meet its future for its activities. Recruitment is one of their important roles which show that terrorist organizations will meet their short and long-term objectives (Botha, 2014). One of the roles of recruitment is identifying, attracting\ and

indoctrinating new members into a terrorist organization. Recruitment has been mentioned in several studies of terrorism as a very crucial step in ensuring the survival of terrorist organization itself (Odhiambo, 2015). Terrorism is a dynamic venture with high attrition rates and hence requires a continuous replacement of personnel and physical resources and assets. Several types of research indicate that many countries spend a huge amount of resources in order to detect and protect from terrorism because terrorism keeps changing its tactics to succeed (Prevent Strategy, 2011).

Researchers indicated that terrorist operations have lost personnel during suicide missions and other several confrontation battles, suicide operations such as 1998 in Kenya and Tanzania United States Embassy bombing and the 11 September terrorist attacks in the USA and much more in Somalia. This makes a strategy of recruitment an important activity for terrorist organizations to ensure that they have the new personnel to execute their plans or objectives (Botha, 2014).

Due to the important role of recruitment in terrorist organizations, the study focuses on how it is carried out. Many types of research have indicated that terrorist organizations recruitment is carried out in many different approaches to get people into their organizations. For example, religion and level of education, sex, age, economic background, individual's experiences, and media are the most important demographic characteristics that terror gives priority (Leshan, 2015). Al-Shabaab group recruit targets Muslims; this includes new Muslim converts. The al-Shabaab ideology resonated well among new recruits and new Muslims converts who know little about the religion in order to prove their self-worth or die as martyrs for the sake of God mission (Badurdeen, 2012).

Most of the Al-Shabaab recruits were male youth; it was revealed that teenagers and early male youth were the most vulnerable. There was not any incident of females recruited by al-Shabaab. Yet new trends of females being recruited are emerging in line with other terrorist group recruitment process. In March 2015 three girls from Kenya and Tanzania were arrested while trying to cross into Somalia to join the al-Shabaab group after being radicalized through the internet (Mann, 2014).

In terms of economic background, it was indicated that the unemployed youth or young people in general, were the most vulnerable and targeted by Al-Shabaab group. The unemployed youth had enough time to venture and join organizations like the Al-Shabaab. Some of the reasons for youth joining had economic gains top the list of reasons as to why individuals join Al-Shabaab. In the empirical study, it was clear that young people are easily lured into terrorism by being offered money, jobs and opportunities (Botha, & Abdille, 2014).

Individual experiences were also linked to the harassment by the police or youth being arrested or being detained under the terrorism efforts. The youth thought that they were targeted on the basis of their religion and ethnicity and some youths from Somali ethnicity indicated that every week they would hear of a raid, police raiding a home and probably harassing people.

The community feels they are aggrieved, and then there is no way that someone comes to their aid and feels more frustrated and completely hopeless. Muslim leaders in the coastal region said that the Anti-Terrorism Prevention Unit, a special police unit, conducted systematic campaigns of harassment targeting Muslims for alleged association with extremist elements. This included the closure and raids of mosques and surveillance on mosques and madrassa (Odula, 2014). Al-Shabaab group also uses various media in order to flourish their propaganda. Apart from traditional radio, the internet is one of the main channels being used by Al-Shabaab and other militants Islamic groups such as Al-Qaeda since it is the easiest and most cost-effective way to reach a large number of audiences, especially youth. Al-Shabaab, for example, uses online forums and chat rooms in order to recruit young followers to their cause. Al-Shabaab has its official website, a platform used by the insurgency group from time to time to post videos and other official statements in different languages such as English, Arabic and Somali as well as online classrooms to educate followers (Ploach, 2011).

3.4.3 Terrorist Training

Because of the absence of a solid government in Somali for a very long while, Al-Shabaab has possessed the capacity to do particular activities such as preparation of camps with minimal local obstruction. Through hand to hand battle camp and suicide shelling camps in a few places in Southern Somalia, Al-Shabaab has overseen prisoner preparing the camp in various ranges including Ras Kiamboni. Al-Shabaab additionally started to enroll ladies and send them to the camps for the sole motivations, behind being taken as ladies (US Government, 2010).

Al-Shabaab group has been getting support as far as preparing before it formally swore constancy on al-Qaeda in 2012. A 2011 report by the US House advisory group on homeland security discovered that American enlisted people were accepting preparation from senior al-Qaeda agents. Pakistani conceived al-Qaeda agent Abu Musa was accounted for to be al-Qaeda's head of security and preparing unit which concentrated on dangerous and suicide plane preparing program (US Government, 2010). According to Federal Bureau of Investigation, Al-Shabaab recruits undergo a six months training process. The training includes reading and interpretation of Koran, physical exercise, and weapon holding. Such weapons included Ak-47 assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades. Al-Shabaab utility of Information Communication technology has emerged by the support of al-Qaeda. This kind of training by using ICT is a means which was introduced to Al-Shabaab training for them to interact with global terrorist community. ICT has emerged as one of the primary tools for inspiring terrorist elements across the globe (Salatman, 2008).

3.4.4 Terrorists Indoctrination

Al-Shabaab is an al-Qaeda partnered association that rose quickly to unmistakable quality in Somalia a decade ago and the gathering has encountered two dramatizations changes in its short history. Initially, the little youth civilian army arm of a generally direct islamic association that rose to control mid-2006 in Somalia; Al-Shabaab was radicalized and conveyed to unmistakable quality as a famous Islamist guerrilla development by Ethiopian's intrusion in December 2006. Notwithstanding, since 2008, Al-Shabaab has experienced yet another change, it was to a great extent patriot association centered of driving out Ethiopian powers from Somalia through military intends to a crossover development that has progressively grasped transitional terrorism. It has endeavored to depict itself as a feature of al-Qaeda that drove Global war against the west and its partners (Rob, 2011).

The belief system of Al-shabaab is ordinarily portrayed as a brand of "Salafism" and "Wahhabism" that backings "takfir "the suspension of faithless people or unbelievers. The gathering's influence or philosophy is unmistakably expressed that the gathering battles above all else to make a fundamentalist Islamic State in the horn of Africa which incorporate not Somalia but rather additionally Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia (Abdisaid, 2008). Al-shabaab association sought to assume control of Somalia and put its belief system all through the horn of Africa and ahead to the focal, southern and eastern Africa on the loose. The association expects to expel western impact in the horn of Africa and in the end in Africa to spread Wahhabi Islamic convictions.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE INABILITY OF STATE INSTITUTIONS TO CONTAIN TERROR ATTACKS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter responds to the second question of this study, what explains the inability of the state's institutions to contain the attacks. The chapter essentially analyzes factors underlying the state's inability to contain terrorism. The chapter is organized around three sections. Section one looks into human rights abuses by the state security institutions and how these affect the strategies and tactics for countering terrorism. Section two analyzes the corruption effects on security institutions, and the third section analyzes the working environment and training on security institutions and officers and how these affect morals and capacity.

4.1 Human Rights Abuses and Constraints to War on Terror

Human rights abuses perpetrated under the pretext of combating terrorism such as torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention, racial profiling and many other violations are significant challenges to war on terror. These human rights abuses have damaged the trust between communities and security sectors, created distrust between security sectors and communities due to human rights abuses committed by police and other security sectors. This has made some communities to harbor terrorists and make them move freely and without reporting terrorist's activities to security agencies (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

The Human Rights Report (2015) contains the rights and abuses which are committed by security forces (National Police Service, National Security and Kenyan Defence Force) in the process of cracking down against terrorist activities in the country. As indicated by the report, more than 120 instances of human rights infringement have been conferred including 25 extrajudicial killings and 81 implemented vanishings. These infringements were far-reaching, orderly and very much planned according to the report (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

Some of the onlookers and non-administrative associations blamed part of it on security powers of various constrained vanishings. In a question and answer session on August 2015, the Non-governmental association of Muslims for Human Rights expressed that the quantity of instances of missing people had been on the ascent in the vicinity of 2013 and 2014. This got the report of more than 30 people being missed near the regions' waterfront locale. Relatives of claimed casualties communicated their dissatisfaction by not accepting any data from police and other knowledge bodies working in the nation. The chamber of Imams and evangelists of Kenya approached the administration either to advise families if experts were holding their relatives or to research the vanishings if the legislature was not in charge of such instances of vanishings (Human Rights Watch, 2012). The preliminary Kenyan National Commission on Human Rights report discharged in September archived 81 associated cases with upheld vanishings. A few individuals from parliament, who were speaking to northern and beachfront supporters, noticed that their constituents revealed instances of vanishings. Likewise, there were separate media reports of families on the drift and northern provinces scanning for their relatives who vanished after they were captured and kept for a little while or more (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

In September 2008, Human Rights Watch noticed that the whereabouts of 22 Somali, Ethiopian Ogadenis, Eritreans and Kenyans rendered to Somalia in mid-2007 stay obscure as indicated by the report. The media detailed the arrival of 8 Kenyans from the Ethiopia in spite of the fact that the Ethiopian government guaranteed that they had been grabbed in Somalia and were not rendered from Kenya (Government of Ethiopia, 2008). Despite being outlawed by international law, security organs have been accused of extrajudicial killings, which is killing of an individual by government specialists without the authorized legal lawful process. Extrajudicial disciplines are generally observed by humankind to be unscrupulous since they sidestep the due procedure of the lawful purview in which they happen. Its objective being political, religious and social figures and might be completed by the state or other state specialists like the equipped power or police (Osamba, 2015).

The issue of extrajudicial killings in Kenya came to light in December in 2011 after a journalist from Al Jazeera network interviewed a group of Anti-terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) officers who admitted and confessed that they have been involved in the extrajudicial killings of over 500 people. The officers target people who are suspected to be Al-Shabaab sympathizers. The high profile murders included that of Sheik Aboud Rogo Mohammed, a radical Muslim cleric from Mombasa. He openly preached and supported the holy war fought by Somali Islamic Militant group. He was accused of obtaining funding and recruitment of Al-Shabaab terrorist group. Shiek Rogo was shot in broad daylight while taking his car in the city of Mombasa. He was targeted and assassinated by those who were believed to be Kenyan security forces being funded by the United States in the fight against terror (Center for Global Research Development, 2015).

Other high profile Muslim cleric who was also assassinated in 2012 was Abubakur Shariff Ahammed. He was among 21 Muslims clericals allegedly murdered by the Kenyan police in 2012. The ATPU officers admitted that they resorted to the killings after the Kenyan police could not prosecute the terror suspects (Ajazeera Staff, December 8, 2014). In the court case of Aboud Rogo, the case had been dismissed by the time he was assassinated. The security officers who were interviewed by Al-Jazeera indicated that they acted on direct orders of Kenyan National Security Council which is headed by the president of the country. But the government of Kenya and Security Council members denied the allegations of the extrajudicial killings program (United Nations, 2010). These violations of have constrained the ability of security organizations to gain support from the communities.

4.2 Corruption Effects on Security Institutions.

To fight and contain terror activities, corruption and many other organized crimes could only be challenged if states displayed a collective will to do so. Combatting corruption, trafficking of persons and goods is a key axis to defeat terror (United Nations, 2010). In Kenya, a culture of corruption within the security sector has become the greatest obstacle to the several efforts being done by the government of Kenya to address the issue of insecurity in the country. Available evidence shows that there is an increasing number of

cases of involvement between law enforcement officers and criminals. For example in the course of its field work, Kenya National Commission on Human Rights interviewed state and non-state actors who admitted that there were some security enforcement officers who were working with criminals to defeat efforts to address insecurity. This case was observed in Kisumu, Nairobi, Kirinyaga, Lamu, Kisii, Bungoma, Busia, and Nyamira (Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, 2014, pg 22).

The culture of corruption within the security agencies has significantly eroded the confidence between the law enforcement officers and members of the public who sincerely want to cooperate with the officers from any one of the security agencies to combat crimes. As a result of the distrust between the public and officers, a security vacuum has emerged which has fueled the rise of the subaltern culture of security protection around criminal gangs and militia (Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, 2014, pg27). Several criminal gangs and militia groups end up being some of the worst elements of insecurity due to their good environment for their illegal operations. Within the period under review, the commission documented a number of cases linked to the gang and militia violence. In 2010, research carried out by the National Crimes Research Centre indicates that gangs and militia groups are well and thriving in different locations in the country (National Research Crime Centre, 2012).

Based on empirical investigation carried out by our study in Nairobi, the respondents selected from the Ministry of interior, National counterterrorism center, University of Nairobi and Anti-terror police unit had different views on the factors facilitating terror groups to successfully carry out their attacks in Nairobi. 6 respondents representing 13.33% acknowledge that porous borders led to easy entry of terrorists and weapons, indicating that corruption among the security officers make some of them take bribes and allow terrorists networks and activities to thrive. In addition, 4 respondents constituting 8.89% said that having local sympathizers among Kenyan communities paved way for terrorists to carry out their terrorist activities in Nairobi. Most of the corruption practices do emerge within security sectors due to low pay and compromising of the provisions of laws and regulations. To understand the issue of corruption among the Kenya security

agencies, the study focuses on the cases of corruption from the two institutions such as National Police Service and Kenyan Defence Force.

4.3 Corruption Phenomena in Kenya Police

There is a positive correlation between the increase of corruption in security sectors, especially Police and terrorist attacks in Kenya (New African Magazine, 2015). Police corruption is an international problem that poses challenges to good governance and the fight against crime, violence and effective protection of lives and properties (Police Corruption, 2015). Such negative perceptions of police integrity are damaging the credibility and effectiveness of the agency charged with vital role such as protection of lives and property of the citizens. Police corruption undermines public trust in the institution and impairs the effective enforcement of the law (Pauline, 2016).

The police institution is not the only institution associated with corruption phenomena in the perception of the public, but there are significant number of corrupt institutions and individuals whose main qualification for joining the service was because they were able to bribe their way into it. The 2014 program to recruit nearly 10,000 police officers was the subject of a court case because it was mired with bribery and corruption. All these took place in a service that is supposed to be the first institution of call to the citizens on matters to do with their security (Ombaka, 2015).

A considerable proportion of officers serving in the police service may, therefore, contain people who are not necessarily committed to their duty in the sense that they want to pursue a career in law enforcement but they are people who are out to earn their personal interests. The bribes that they give to get into the system or service, one may not expect them to carry out their duties on a fairly regular basis. It is therefore, a probability or the notion of poor payment of police officers that drive them to corruption which is questionable in such a situation (Dick, 2015).

Police often arrested and stopped citizens in order to extract bribes, they jailed them on false charges, and sometimes people who could not pay were sometimes beaten.

Refugees were frequently targets of police extortion according to Amnesty International 2014. The media and common society groups additionally revealed that the police utilized unlawful constraint, blackmail, physical manhandle and created false charges to fulfill law requirement targets and additionally to encourage illicit exercises. The report likewise demonstrated that the police frequently request drivers to pay rewards to evade fines or the bother of continuing to a police headquarter. It was demonstrated that police acknowledged rewards to create charges against people as a means of setting individual feuds (Human Rights Watch, 2015). Because of those allegations, the public become afraid of police and unwilling to cooperate with them on security matters. As a result, the police miss out on the intelligence, a factor that makes terror cells to remain in the society.

There are also a big number of illegal arms which are contributing to insecurity in the country. There are a number of factors that lead to this kind of corruption in the police service. There is the porous border and police officers are accused of hiring out their firearms to criminals as well as the absence of proper inventory of firearms within the police force and police reservists and the country at large (Kenyan Human Rights Commission, 2017). A 2012 report cited estimates of 210,000 illicit firearms in civilians' hands across the country (Resident, 2017). The 2016 Annual Report State of the National Security Report to Parliament placed the number at over 650,000.

4.4 Corruption phenomena in Kenya Defence Force

Corruption in the armed forces undermines its authenticity and proficiency as well as compound weakness. Broad corruption can debilitate the armed force's capacity to stop terrorist groups, for example, Al-Shabab, Boko Haram, ISIL, and so on especially in nations where troopers are not ponied up of all required funds. It is almost certain that the circumstance is emphatically connected to corruption (OECD, 2016). This study will not provide several cases of corruption which had been taking place within the Kenya Defence Force (KDF), but will focus on some few cases which had been taking place after the operation of "Linda Nchi" in 2011 against Al-Shabaab terrorist group in Somalia.

With the many deaths counted from Al-Shabaab attacks within Kenya rising to over 400, Journalists for justice felt that the operation or the task was to be examined on whether it was actually delivering and achieving its objectives with the protection of Kenyan citizens. The study looks at the behaviors of KDF in some cases of corruption known as sugar and charcoal smuggling which had enabled Al-Shabaab to earn more financially (Journalists for Justice, 2015).

According to the research findings, illicit trade by terrorists has helped them maintain their sources of income. Research indicated that the Kenyan Defence Force made profits from illicit trade that helped Al-Shabaab to benefit through the trade financially. The report suggests that the amount of 400 million dollars was taxed from illegal sugar and charcoal trades that sustain Al-Shabaab in Somalia while fighting the terror group at the same time. The report also indicates that human rights abuses inside Somalia appear widespread and are carried out with impunity. The air strike targeted livestock and wells rather than militants training camps. Kenyan Defence Forces remain in their garrisons rather than fight Al-Shabab. They sit in their bases as senior commanders engage in corrupt business practices with Jubaland administration providing the bulk of funding for terror group Al-Shabaab, which it is meant to be fighting (George, 2015). The corruption phenomenon in the army being practiced by senior officers has decreased morale among soldiers to carry out their duties, especially when commanding officers are involved in various forms of corruption.

4.5 Environmental and Institutional Challenges Facing War on Terror

To eliminate or to deal with the terrorist threat in the country, the government needs to have building capacity and professional forces in terms of tackling environmental and institutional challenges facing war on terror. These include means of transport, the deficit in human resource capacity, lack of corporation among security sectors, issues of technology and poor working conditions.

4.6 Lack of Enough Transport Facilities

Lack of enough transport is one of the glaring issues which is facing and hindering the police duty to protect lives and property in Kenya. Lack of means of transport has hampered the effectiveness of the police and security in general in responding to emergencies (Jeremiah, 2017).

Kenyan police conditions show or indicate lack of transport facilities. This situation has made it difficult if not impossible for the police to carry out its duty of protecting lives and property properly. Most of the fieldwork indicates that the Kenyan police are facing a real challenge of transport facilities. There are few vehicles for them to carry out their duties properly. It is clear that the few available vehicles are poorly serviced with the problem of fuel scarcity. Most of the respondents informed the fieldwork team that each police vehicle had a little share of fuel a day. As one officer noted, some of their vehicles had been neglected and kept on breaking down so often. The officers admitted that it is not possible for the police to respond to the crimes as much as possible if the transport means are dysfunctional. To carry out a successful campaign against terror, police need new modern vehicles that will help fight terror. Providing police with enough vehicles for security purposes will increase their mobility and level of protection when deployed in unstable areas.

4.7 Deficit in Human Resource Capacity

Kenyan police force is considered to be understaffed which has made it possible for terrorists to easily carry out their attacks against citizens and infrastructure as well. The government should necessarily be committed to investing sufficiently to increase the number of police officers. Better-equipped police officers mean increase in reassurance for the public safety (Kenya Police Service, 2003-2007). The police population is estimated to be far below the United Nation recommended police-public ratio of 1:450 (University for Peace, 2012).

In any case, the information demonstrates that a fourth of the Kenyan police are occupied with office organization work, guarding the political elite and filling in as drivers to top government authorities. Consequently, the dynamic number of police officers may take part in other illicit exercises. Prevention and genuine police is around 30,000 personnel. It is shown that very nearly 2,500 officers are conveyed to the workforce of administration and security of the best political office holders, for example, the president, and different individuals from the clergymen including the elite (Edwin, 2007).

There are different components that influence the work of the Police. Natural whittling down, physical damage, and acquiescence for greener fields somewhere else and in the nation's statistic structure. Notwithstanding, the administration procedures have not reacted continuously to address the policing needs of a state with quickly changing populace. For instance, Kenyan police had three years without enrollment that kept going in the vicinity of 2008 and 2010, waiting for a police benefit commission to be shaped. Yearly, enlistment process was continued again in mid-2011. This commission was to manage police states of administration, enrollment and preparing among others (Police, 2010).

According to the empirical survey conducted by our study in Nairobi on the factors that made terrorist groups to successfully carry out attacks in Nairobi, 7 respondents representing 15.56% indicated that lack of adequate numbers of police forces deployed at public and private institutions facilitated the intensity of the attacks. Here the problem of policing is evident. There are few police officers in relation to the population at one level, inadequate at another level. Most police are only in certain geographical spaces. Thus the presence of terror cells to build strong roots that facilitate attacks. Another group of 2 respondents representing 4.44% also mentioned that Kenyan culture of gathering in social sites, such as churches compared to inadequate numbers of police forces on the ground to protect the crowds made it impossible for police to ensure the safety of citizens and their property (Research Interviewees, 2017). Therefore, the country needs to exert more efforts in terms of recruitment, training more police officers in the country in order to tackle the escalating terror attacks.

4.8 Lack of Corporation among Security Sectors

Corporation is fundamental in the war against terrorists. Terrorists embedded themselves in the society and the state needs corporation for the security to act critically and with intelligence. This cannot be reached without corporation among security sectors and between security sectors and community as well. Counterterrorism, extremist violence should be seen as linked to multiple sectors, while it is also a security issue (Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies, 2016).

Corporation among security sectors including their corporation with the community can help eliminate suspects. Security agencies are the ones to gain more if suspects are turned into counteragents against their old colleagues. Targeting and killing many suspects made many of them go underground and continued to enact more attacks. In any case, the killing of suspects did not stop the ability of terrorists or suspects from carrying out the attacks (Brian, 2016).

Lack of strong corporation among security sectors during West gate Mall attack by Al-Shabaab in Nairobi has shown the challenges facing security sectors in the area of corporation. 21 September 2013 provided the most practical indication of the challenges confronting Kenyan security forces in terms of corporation. Al-Shabaab using small arms and grenades entered the mall on Saturday (Kenya National Assembly, 2013). The attackers started shooting and explosions began. The Kenyan security at first made a speedy and viable reaction, driven by the presidential monitor. Before the end of the day, this unit bound the fundamental attackers, but with disappointments on the second day of the attack, the site was not legitimately secured. It gave off an impression of being no evident on summon structure and vulnerability to techniques. There were a few reports of people moving all through the shopping centre to search for their relatives. Thus, it remains a mystery of the number of attackers and whether some managed to escape (Kenya National Assembly, 2013). As the incident continued, the response of Kenyan security forces appeared scrambled and uncoordinated. Ministerial statements seemed inconsistent and contradictory. Ambiguity in terms of number and identity of the attackers was repeated by spokespersons from different security agencies. Some reports claimed that the attackers had been killed and the mall had been secured (Kenyan National Assembly, 2013).

Finally, the official report identified only four attackers had been killed by the security forces. One was a Norwegian citizen of Somali origin, and the other three described as Somalis, while the attackers killed 67 people and wounded more than 200 others. On the second day, a firefight developed between the presidential guard unit and the KDF soldiers who had been deployed that Saturday morning after one soldier from KDF was shot and killed by a presidential guard unit at a close range. As a result of prolonged battle between the two groups, three KDF soldiers were killed. It was alleged that the fighting was caused by looting of property from the Westgate mall (Paul & Kamore, 2013).

According to empirical data conducted by our study in Nairobi on the factors that made terrorist groups to successfully carry out attacks in Nairobi, 4 respondents representing 8.89% indicated lack of corporation among security sectors to be facilitating terror attacks. This included lack of cooperation between the security agencies and the local communities who failed to provide information and intelligence to security officers for the response (Research Interviewees, 2017). It seems that security agencies focus on their narrow mandates rather than creating and focusing on how to combine their strengths through building workable networks and strong corporation.

4.9 Level of Engagement of Police with Technology.

The use of Technology is very vital in the fight against terror, not only to catch terrorists but to predict and take preemptive measures before the attacks occur or to minimize terrorist attacks by using technology for purposes of monitoring or surveillance of terror and other crime activities. Kenyan government and police leadership have to be critical to ensure effective adaptation of new technology, especially the one that will contribute to improved protection of people and their property (Research Network, 2002). The field survey indicated that the level of formal engagement with information, communication and technology within areas of the National Police Service is low. Interviews with police officers in Nairobi city's casual settlement and focal police headquarters demonstrated that the fuse of new advancements is constrained and sporadic. A few officers are issued with a VHF radio, in spite of the fact that they are most of the time in poor conditions and from time to time underutilized. Kenyan police officers at all levels have individual cell

phones. Most police respondents asserted they were infrequently utilized for official purposes (Research Interviewees, 2014).

The low-positioning police officers have shabby and early age cell phones that they fundamentally use for calls and SMS. From the meetings, road level police officers utilize their cell phones for getting to the web and often come up short on broadcast appointments. Those are youthful police officers who utilize cell phones for online networking, particularly Facebook and twitter. Few youthful police officers additionally seem to have advanced mobile phones and utilize them for online networking for diversion and associating with companions, not for official work (Officers, 2014).

According to empirical data collected by this study in Nairobi on factors that facilitate terrorist groups to successfully carry out attacks in Nairobi, 18 respondents representing 40.56% indicated that lack of strong surveillance mechanisms to respond to early warning signs of terrorist plans before the actual attack and lack of good training on how to deal with terror threats through introducing modern technology to affects the security sector (Research Interviewees, 2017). The same cannot be said about the extensive use of technology to fight terror in the police force. Trained officers who are conversant with internet usage on surveillance of terror activities will be able to respond effectively before, during and after an attack.

4.10 Poor Working Conditions

Terrorist attacks cannot be contained or managed without addressing some urgent need to motivate and modernize the police officers and service, and other security sectors as well. This will enable it to be up to the task to match the sophisticated nature of crime and terrorism. Majority of police officers say that the conditions of service in the country are below standard. They reiterate that they work a lot beyond the 8 hours schedule and they are not paid well, and this hinders their effectiveness. Housing is a challenge; police at the junior levels live in the shared single unit house, such as a two bedroom flat (police, 2010).

Some police officers say that they are Kenyan nationals and their private lives ought to be dealt with. They report that they have youngsters who should feel they are respected residents. Police officer's youngster experiences childhood in a domain that has no arrangement for security. Satisfactory lodging ought to be a need for them. Additionally there is absence of restorative and protective cover for officers. Officers or their families are not remunerated in time and this decreases the inspiration of their power. Some of these issues discourage police officers from doing their obligations legitimately and such poor working conditions breed corruption among the police. Some of these issues affect officers who are on transit as they do their work and even breed corruption in the workforce (Nakuru, 2010). The police force also face challenges in dealing or carrying out investigations due to the lack of forensic laboratory to tackle sophisticated crimes, lack of modern crime-fighting equipment, promotions and transfer among other numerous challenges. This has created weaknesses in terms of responses and coordination during emergencies (Brian, 2015). Terrorist groups do take advantage of this combination of challenges facing police or security sectors, to conduct their terror activities in the country.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter broadly summarizes the findings. It also provides the conclusion and recommendation. The chapter presents two objectives, the first being to examine and analyze factors that explain the prevalence of terror attacks in Nairobi between 2011 and 2015 and the second objective is to analyze factors underlying the state's inability to deal with terror threat.

5.1 (a) Factors Explain the Prevalence of Terror Attacks in Nairobi between 2011 and 2015

This section responds to the task of the first objective; to examine and analyze factors that explain the prevalence of terror attacks in Nairobi. This objective was based on several assumptions: that the prevalence of terror attacks in Nairobi was facilitated by social, economic and political factors. The prevalence of terrorist attacks in Nairobi-Kenya is associated with the management of aliens' movement in Kenya. It is overwhelming due to the huge number of different migrant population hosted by the country in the region. Historically, Kenya has been a destination for migrant traders and travelers. Many members of armed groups from Somalia voluntarily lay down their arms in order for them to join camps life in Kenya as refugees, but the evidence shows that others seek to return to their previous groups and fight, and often use refugee camps as bases to regroup or reorganize to strengthen their movements any time.

Based on data collected, 11 respondents accounting for 44.445% did acknowledge that the management of immigrants' movements has led to the high incidence of terror attacks in Nairobi in the period between 2011 and 2015. For instance, most of these respondents cited the high rate of rural-urban migration as well as the existence of a large number of alien's movement which reduced the ratio of police to citizen ratio, stretching the work of

the police. Therefore, the lack of appropriate security plans in Nairobi city to manage aliens' movement through intelligence efforts for protecting the Nation's borders is causing the vulnerability of Nairobi to terror attacks.

From the investigations on the factors that explain the prevalence of terror attacks in Nairobi, 53 percent of the respondent agreed that historical and recent immigration has facilitated terror activities in Nairobi. They blamed the huge number of refugees, especially from Somalia as the main contributor to insecurity in Kenya including terrorism activities. On the other hand, 44 percent of the respondents pointed out that unmonitored movement of immigrants or refugees from the camps to Nairobi or other cities in Kenya has helped terrorists to easily recruit and use the migrating immigrants for terror activities.

Religion becomes an instrument of terror where those motivations and objectives have main religious influence. Religion is considered by many scholars to be one among many other factors such as politics, culture, and psychology that lead radicals to target innocents and harm their life in the process. In Nairobi-Kenya, the Madrassa teachings have been seen as a source of radicalization of young Muslims. Many youths have been radicalized through some religious organizations, convincing them that they will be heroes or martyrs if they join terrorism.

In addition, the interviews conducted on instrumentalization of religion as a factor that facilitates the prevalence of terror attack in Nairobi, our study found that majority of 22 respondents representing 48.89% indicated that many people were recruited based on religious motivation. In this case, the terrorist groups exploit religion as one of their tools to help them carry out attacks, the absence of real interfaith dialogue among various communities is giving terrorist groups a good environment to easily recruit and conduct their activities.

A majority of the respondents representing 48 percent indicated that acts of terror are aimed at forcing the government of Kenya to withdraw troops it's from Somalia. Some of the sampled statements on the same include; *“Young Muslims joined religious extremist groups in order to force KDF from their land.* Another respondents indicated; *“Young Muslims were misled by some clerics to participate in “Jihadi” war as long as religious war is considered to be holy war in Islamic faith and it is not questionable”.*

According to literature review, social decay is found as a facilitator of terror attacks in Nairobi, social decay is known as a situation where an individual, a group or a society within a country feels marginalized or excluded from social, economic, and political processes and development by government and other members of the society (Bjorgo, 2005). As a result of feeling marginalized according to Wilner and Dubouloz (2007), people resort to radicalization or become radicalize which is a process in which an individual or group adopt increasingly extreme social, economic, political or religious beliefs, ideas, and aspirations that reject or undermine the status quo. By 2012, it was estimated that there were about 600 Kenyans in the Somali Al-Shabaab with a high percentage belonging to non-Muslim communities (International Crisis Group, 2012). Botha argued that Al-Shabaab had also recruited Kenyans to carry out violence extremism activities and terror attacks in Kenya and outside Kenya.

Poverty and urban marginalization are among economic factors behind terrorism in Kenya. Criminal acts are basically appropriation of somebody else's property. Another motivation or factor is the quest for illegal activities even at the risk of being caught and punished. Therefore, criminal offenders are likely to be found among those who have relatively more to gain from these activities and relatively little to lose in case they are caught. Most of the individuals who commit such seemingly belong to the neediest groups in society.

Terrorism in Nairobi is also a result of segregation and urban marginalization. Police harassment against Somali in Nairobi and many other cities in Kenya has damaged relations between police and Somali community. According to the views of some respondents, majority of those who live in Eastleigh are people from Somali origin, both

Somali-Kenyans and Somali nationals and many of whom are refugees. The operation known as “Usalama Watch” which took place recently and the ongoing blanket targeting of Somalis ethnic were described to severely damage the relation and trust between police and community members. Many respondents claimed that gangs in the area actively target Somali Kenyans, as they know they are reluctant to seek assistance from police and other security officials.

From the empirical research, 53 percent of the respondents mentioned poverty as a major contributing factor that lead to exploitation of young people to join terror networks for economic empowerment. This is supported by the following sampled responses, “*Young people who joined terror groups are mostly forced by poverty as they join terror networks to earning living through engaging in their activities*”. Another respondent indicated that; “*Some people join terror organizations due to a feeling of marginalization and that they have nothing to lose in case if they are arrest*”.

From the literature review and empirical data, it is clear that poverty and urban marginalization factors have played the biggest role in terms of insecurity in the country. Many young people who have been experiencing poverty and urban marginalization had resorted to joining terror in order to for them to gain income. Terrorism activities in Nairobi have a direct link to the level of unemployment in the country. Lack of employment has been encouraged and led many young people to be disappointed to the extent of accepting any promise of a means that can create for them a quick income easily such as being recruited in terrorism. Some youths in Kenya would argue that they would rather live a short life of rich riches instead of waiting for jobs which are not forthcoming. Also, research revealed that Kenya experiences the highest level of unemployment at 40% as at December 2012 (World Bank). Youth unemployment in the coastal region stands at 70 % out of total population.

Trafficking is one of the issues facing the country (Kenya) in its fight against terrorism, and at the same time facilitates terrorism activities. In general, majority of Al-Shabaabs’ income is generated from illicit taxing and extortion and illegal trade in various

contraband. Most of Al-Shabaab revenue also comes from illicit charcoal trade and the unofficial taxation of movement through checkpoints and ports.

In the empirical data collected on unemployment and trafficking of goods as a factor leading to terrorism, 20 respondents representing 46.51% indicated that unemployment and trafficking of goods was a major cause of terrorism. Unemployed young people resort to terror groups as a way to earn their livelihood. On the other hand, people engage in the illicit trade of goods as a way to get resources to support terror activities. Some of the respondents indicated that religion and poverty drove many young people to join extremist groups in Kenya for financial gains. Trafficking is a result of unemployment in the country which has been exploited by Al-Shabaab group to finance its activities; it's conducting trafficking through the huge network which includes some of the unemployed Kenyan youth.

From the survey, 46 percent of the respondents indicated that unemployment is one of the contributing factors that facilitate the prevalence of attacks in Nairobi. Some of the sampled responses include; *“Unemployed young people resort to terror groups as a way to earn their livelihood to support their families”*.

Another respondent indicated that, *“Young people who join terror groups do not even understand the objectives of terror groups and do not know even single leader of those organizations but are just searching for a quick income as long as they remain unemployed for so long”*.

According to (Leeman, 1982), terrorism had been considered as a response to the existing political regime or system. In other words, terrorism is being seen as a politically motivated action. Terrorism is a strategy rooted in political unhappiness or unresolved political grievances, used in the service of many different beliefs and doctrines that help legitimize and sustain violence. The literature review also indicated that terrorists fight for various reasons which are mainly political. The prevalence of terrorist attacks in Kenya is much associated with political marginalization by some sections of the population, particularly in coastal and northern regions. This gives terrorist groups great environments to widely spread and make them act and carry out their activities

successfully, as it was witnessed by the propaganda being spread by Osama Bin Laden and his lieutenant.

According to the empirical data, a group of 21 respondents representing 47.67% indicated that political instability in the country has created this situation of vulnerability to terror attacks. Another group of 3 respondents representing 6.67% said that lack of real democracy in the country motivated some people to use violent means including terror in order for them to gain political interests. Kenya's political instability whereby some local communities feel marginalized especially people residing in coastal region has created weak national cohesion in the country. As a result, many people from those areas have to join terrorist organizations as a result of frustration after being feeling marginalized.

Several respondents representing 47 percent indicated political instability as a major contributing factor to prevalence of terror activities in Nairobi. Some of the sampled responses include the following; *“Political instability and election post violence in Kenya has created this situation of vulnerability to terror attacks”*.

Another respondent indicated that; *“The sense of political marginalization from some sections within the country has created a conducive environment for terror activities to flourish”*.

To maintain the right number and types of people has become a very important issue for many terrorist organizations. Various studies indicate that every terrorist organization struggle to be able to meet its future for its activities. Recruitment is one of their important roles which show that terrorist organizations will meet their short and long-term objectives. Due to the important role of recruitment in terrorist organizations, the study focuses on how it is carried out. Research has indicated that terrorist organization recruitment is carried out in many different approaches to get people into their organizations. For example, religion and level of education, sex, age, economic background, individual's experiences, and media are the most important demographic characteristics that terror gives priority. Terrorists' recruitment is being done through many approaches, but religion, level of education, age, economic background, and

individual experiences have a great role in terms of recruiting people to their organizations.

Al-Shabaab group has been getting support in terms of training before it formally pledged allegiance on al-Qaeda in 2012. 2011 report by the US House Committee on Homeland security found American recruits were receiving training from senior al-Qaeda operatives, Pakistani born al-Qaeda operative Abu Musa was reported to be al-Qaeda's head of security and training unit which focused on explosive and suicide bomber training program.

According to Federal Bureau of Investigation, Al-Shabaab recruits undergo a six months training process. The training includes reading and interpretation of Koran, physical exercise, and weapon holding. Such weapons included Ak-47 assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades. Al-Shabaab utility of Information Communication technology has emerged by the support of al-Qaeda and this kind of training by using ICT is a means which was introduced to Al-Shabaab training for them to interact with global terrorist community. ICT has emerged as one of the primary tools for inspiring terrorist elements across the globe. In the absence of strong government in Somalia for many decades, Al-Shabab and many other transnational terrorist groups found it a suitable environment for them to conduct their training before attacking neighboring countries in Somalia.

In the context of Al-Shabab terrorist group, the ideology of the group is typically described as a brand of "Salafism" and "Wahhabism" that supports "takfir" "the excommunication of apostates or unbelievers. The group's indoctrination or ideology is clearly stated that the group fights first and foremost to create a fundamentalist Islamic State in the Horn of Africa which includes not Somalia but also Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia. Al-Shabab ideology is fundamentally based on religion before being a militant group. Therefore, fighting is required in engagement with religious leaders in the communities and religious organizations as well to address the issue.

5.2(b) Factors that explain the Inability of State Institutions to Contain Terrorist Attacks in Nairobi

Human rights abuses perpetrated under the pretext of combating terrorism such as torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention, racial profiling and many other violations are significant challenges to war on terror. These human rights abuses have damaged the trust between communities and security sectors. Distrust has been created between security sectors and communities due to human rights abuses committed by police and other security sectors and this has made some communities to harbour terrorists and make them move freely and without reporting terrorist's activities to security agencies. According to the report, more than 120 cases of human rights violation have been committed including 25 extrajudicial killings and 81 enforced disappearances took place. These violations were widespread, systematic and well-coordinated according to the report. Police here need to be well trained not only on how to fight terror on the ground but also on how to respect human rights in the process of fighting terror. Individual experiences in terms of human rights abuses could push more people to join terrorist groups.

In addition, the culture of corruption within the security sector has become the greatest obstacle to the several efforts being done by the government of Kenya to address the issue of insecurity in the country. Available evidence shows that there are increasing number of cases of corruption involving law enforcement officers and criminals. Tackling terror issue cannot be isolated by addressing corruption phenomena. It is clear from the literature review and data collected that many terror incidents took place due to corruption spreading among security sectors.

Kenyan police condition shows or indicates lack of transport facilities. This situation has made it difficult if not impossible for the police to carry out its duties of protecting lives and property properly. Most of the fieldwork indicates that the Kenyan police force is facing challenges of transport facilities. To eliminate the threat of terrorist attacks in the country is extremely associated with the availability of movement facilities and how the forces are well equipped as well. The deficit in human resource capacity in the Kenyan

police force is one of the factors that undermined the strength of police in terms of civilians' protection. Kenyan police are considered to be understaffed, and this made it possible for terrorists to easily carry out their attacks against citizens and infrastructure as well. The government should necessarily be committed to invest sufficiently to increase the number of police officers as better-equipped police officers mean increased reassurance for the public safety.

From the empirical data collected by the study, 6 respondents representing 13.33% acknowledged that porous borders led to the easy entry of terrorists and weapons. Respondents indicated that corruption among the security officers made some of them take bribes and allow terrorist networks and its activities to thrive. Another group of respondents representing 15.56% indicated that lack of adequate numbers of police forces deployed at public and private institutions facilitated the intensity of the attacks. Enactment and signing of several laws only cannot address the threat of terror thus more police officers need to be recruited to the service to cope with the rising challenges of terrorism.

Lack of cooperation among security sectors in its war against terror is remaining a challenge as the cooperation is fundamental in the war against terrorists. Terrorists embedded themselves in the society and the state needs cooperation for the security to act critically and with intelligence. This cannot be reached without cooperation among security sectors and between security sectors and community as well. Counterterrorism, extremist violence should be seen as linked to multiple sectors, while it is also a security issue.

According to empirical data conducted by the study in Nairobi on the factors that made terrorist groups to successfully carry out attacks in Nairobi, 10 respondents representing 26.89% indicated lack of cooperation among security sectors to be facilitating terror attacks. This included lack of cooperation between the security agencies and the local communities who failed to provide information and intelligence to security officers for the response. Terrorists are not acting alone to carry out the attacks in the country, it is a

network, and the government needs to fight this terror network by creating network too. Cooperation among security sectors and communities is a great network to tackle terror activities including technology companies to shut down the cyberspace frontlines of terrorist's recruitments and incitements.

The level of formal engagement with information, communication and technology among large sections of the national police service is very low. Interviews with police officers in Nairobi central police station indicated that the incorporation with new technologies is limited and irregular. To fight terror activities, the police and many other security sectors need to be well trained on how to use technology means such as the internet, Facebook, twitter, and many other important means of technology, not only to catch terrorists but to predict and potentially stop their attacks.

On the success of terrorists groups to carry out their attacks in Nairobi, 40 percent of the respondents indicated lack of suitable training on the police service and other security officers has contributed to vulnerability.

An example of such response include; *“Majority of police forces do not have the technical know-how to use modern technology in detecting and preventing terror activities”*.

The Police force faces poor working conditions in terms of working condition. They work for long hours whereas they are supposed to work for eight hours. The promotion system is not based on merit but on nepotism and there is no health insurance. Some police officers say that the conditions of service are below standards, they say that they work a lot beyond the 8 hours schedule and they are not paid well, and this hinders their effectiveness. Housing is a challenge; police at the junior levels live in shared single unit houses, such as a two bedroom flat. Equipping police forces with advanced technology, providing them with modern arms and so forth may not enhance their capacity to fight terror and other crimes but will boost their morale. There is also need to address other challenges facing police such as the issue of housing, salary increment, promotion, transfers, and health and a set schedule each week.

5.3 Conclusion

This study sought to explain factors underlying prevalence of terrorism in Nairobi and the inability of state institutions to contain the situation. The study noted that the underlying prevalence is socioeconomic and political factors such as instrumentalization of religion, mismanagement of aliens, social decay and the economic and political marginalization that has left many unemployed. Equally, contributing factors are corruption and working environment within security institutions which constrain their operational competence. The main arguments in this study are: First, the prevalence of terrorist attacks in Nairobi has been caused by socio-economic and political factors. Second, lack of adequate resources and proper training of security agencies have hindered capacity of state's institutions to contain terrorist attacks. Our first task recapitulates on the two study objectives. The second looks at the two hypotheses. The third provides a base for conclusion and the fourth provides the recommendation of the study.

According to this study, based on literature review and empirical data collected, it was found that socio-economic and political factors were behind the motives of the prevalence of terrorist attacks in Nairobi. Instrumentalization of religion has played a major role and facilitated the prevalence of terror attacks. The literature review also indicated that most of the terror activities have been facilitated by local citizens due to the politicization of local and international grievances which led some domestic groups and individuals to collaborate with terrorists that have enabled them to carry out a number of successful attacks in Nairobi and across the country. The study found out that there is lack of cooperation among security agencies on one hand and lack of cooperation between security sectors and the community. This indicates that cooperation is fundamental in the war against terror. Terrorists embedded themselves in the society and the state needs to cooperate with the local community for early warning, actionable intelligence and response. This mechanism cannot be achieved without cooperation among security sectors and community as well.

Police/security personnel lack modern technology to carry out their duties properly and lack of clear and well-defined channel of disseminating actionable intelligence gathered.

There is a deficit in the number of police forces serving in the service, a high percentage of unemployment among the youths, corruption phenomenon within security sectors, lack of proper monitoring of the movement of immigrants and refugees in the country and lack of sensitization of the general public on police-civilians cooperation in the fight against terror to eliminate terrorist activities.

5.4 Recommendations

Based on the study findings, the following recommendations are submitted in order to address the vulnerability of Nairobi to terrorist attacks as follows:

First: In order to tackle the threat of terror in Kenya, the government of Kenya should implement policies which address social, economic and political marginalization such as control of religious extremism, youth unemployment and balance of power respectively.

Second: The study recommends that the government of Kenya needs to build the capacity of security agencies by providing suitable training and allocation of adequate resources in order to facilitate surveillance and hence respond to terrors attacks effectively.

Third: In order to deal with the problem of immigration, the government of Kenya needs to tackle the issue of refugees being recruited to carry out terror attacks in the country. This can be achieved by strict control of refugees in the camps and support repatriation policy to reduce on the number of refugees in the country.

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