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**INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT**

**THE NATURAL RESOURCE-VIOLENT EXTREMISM NEXUS: CASE OF  
BONI FOREST BORDER AREA BETWEEN KENYA AND SOMALIA**

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**2018**

**DECLARATION**

This research project is my original work and has not been presented for any academic award in any other university.

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## **DEDICATION**

This research project is dedicated to my family for the financial support and encouragement they accorded me in order to pursue my degree program.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

<b>AMISOM</b>	African Union Mission in Somalia
<b>ATPU</b>	Anti-Terrorism Police Unit
<b>CAP</b>	County Action Plans
<b>CoK, 2010</b>	Constitution of Kenya, 2010
<b>CVE</b>	Countering violent extremism
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>GWoT</b>	Global war on terror
<b>IED</b>	Improvised explosive devices
<b>NCTC</b>	National Counter Terrorism Centre
<b>NPS</b>	National Police Service
<b>NPSC</b>	National Police Service Commission
<b>VE</b>	Violent extremism
<b>YNEET</b>	Youth Not in Employment, Education, or Training
<b>SPSS</b>	Statistical Package for Social Scientists

## ABSTRACT

The study aimed at identifying the relationships between the context of Boni forest as a forest occupied by violent extremists on the well-being of both the multiagency team and local communities. The methodology approach was quantitative with sample comprising of 163 respondents with data analyzed using SPSS version 23. Operation Linda Boni, formed after the deadly Mpeketoni attacks, has affected security of local communities with resultant behaviors emanating from fear of both the security forces and the violent extremists. Boni forest has, through the on-going multiagency operation and frequent attacks by the violent extremists inhabiting it, affected the socio-economic wellbeing of the communities. The study shows radicalization of the youths as a negative relational reciprocity in response to a number of push factors catalysed including harassment. By extension the study shows that due to poor relations between the security services and the communities, there is no sharing of critical information pertaining to the violent extremists. Although the Bonis know the forest terrain and the behavior of the violent extremists, their lack of cooperation with security agencies complicate the on-going operation. The study reveals a need for bridging the gaps between the communities, between communities and security officers, and a proactive approach towards involving the communities in the sustainable utility of the natural resources as a form of natural resources governance systems.

**Keywords:** Boni forest, violent extremism, communities, youths, security, radicalization, government, natural resources, Operation Linda Boni, marginalization.

# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Introduction

This chapter is made up of a number of sections delineated as; Background of the study; Research objective; Research hypotheses; Problem statement, Justification of the study, Literature review and Research methodology. This research study sets out to empirically investigate the nexus between natural resources and violent extremism in the context of Boni forest in Lamu County, Kenya.

### 1.2 Background of the Study

Sustainable development has been and remains one critical area of focus in the global, continental, and national leadership processes involving the stewardship of basic natural resources geared towards ensuring sustainability in meeting future human needs.<sup>1</sup> There exists a plethora of global conflicts threatening the stewardship of natural resources as seen in terrorism-related conflicts<sup>2</sup> that permeate the globe, with devastating effects on developing nations owing to diversion of development funds towards the global war on terror and violent extremism.<sup>3</sup> Terrorism a complex global phenomenon has radicalization into violent extremism as part of its growth curve and has been on the increase targeting both Muslim and non-Muslim for radicalization impacting negatively on nations.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Bastan, M., Ramazani Khorshid-Doust, R., Delshad Sisi, S., & Ahmadvand, A. (2018). Sustainable development of agriculture: a system dynamics model. *Kybernetes*, 47(1), 142-162.

<sup>2</sup> Asongu, Simplice, and Oasis Kodila-Tedika. "Trade, aid and terror." *International Journal of Development Issues* 16, no. 1 (2017): 2-24.

<sup>3</sup>Efobi, U., & Asongu, S. (2016). Terrorism and capital flight from Africa. *International Economics*, 148, 81-94.

<sup>4</sup>Rahimullah, R. H., Larmar, S., & Abdalla, M. (2013). Understanding violent radicalization amongst Muslims: A review of the literature. *Journal of Psychology and Behavioral Science*, 1(1), 19-35.

There has been a sharp increase, of over 13% in the expenditure of the gross domestic product (GDP) of nations and particularly in developing nations to manage violent activities,<sup>5</sup> with most of these activities being terrorism-related conflicts following the concerted efforts of Global War on Terror (GWOt) strategies. Global Peace Index analysis further shows increasing trends in terror activities.<sup>6</sup> Kenya has not been spared in this wake of terror attacks as seen in the September, 2013 Westgate Shopping Mall attack<sup>7</sup> and the April, 2015, Garissa university lethal attack owing to Kenya's role in the GWOt, following the strategic response of the United States to the September, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers.<sup>8</sup> This brings in the urgent need captured in various strategies of GWOt of nations towards preparedness against violent extremist's actions including terror activities,<sup>9</sup> which call for root cause analysis, and related empirical studies, which have been minimal globally.

In Somalia there has been illegal taxation on charcoal as well as illicit international trading in charcoal controlled by Al-Shabaab leaving in its wake severe environmental destruction.<sup>10</sup> The intervention by Africa Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has curtailed this trade among others resulting in need for the violent extremists to look for alternative sources of funding. Boni forest with its vast area of over 1, 339 square kilometers, close proximity to entry points from operational bases like Kismayu and rich biodiversity makes it a unique natural resource. Lamu County through Boni forest

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<sup>5</sup>Anderson, M. (2015). Global cost of conflict reaches \$14.3 tn, says report. *The guardian*.

<sup>6</sup>Aly, Anne, Stuart Macdonald, Lee Jarvis, and Thomas M. Chen. "Introduction to the special issue: Terrorist online propaganda and radicalization." (2017): 1-9

<sup>7</sup>Aronson, S. L. (2013). Kenya and the global war on terror: Neglecting history and geopolitics in approaches to counterterrorism. *African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies*, 7(1), 24-35.

<sup>8</sup>Goepner, E. W. (2016). Measuring the Effectiveness of America's War on Terror. *Parameters*, 46(1), 107-120.

<sup>9</sup>Holgerson, A., Sahovic, D., Saveman, B. I., & Björnstig, U. (2016). Factors influencing responders' perceptions of preparedness for terrorism. *Disaster Prevention and Management*, 25(4), 520-533.

<sup>10</sup> Anderson, D. M. (2014). Why Mpeketoni matters: al-Shabaab and violence in Kenya. *Noref Policy Brief, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center*.

has more than 10 % forest cover in line with the CoK, 2010 but with the unfortunate illegal and criminal exploitation of Boni forest by violent extremists a probable contagion of the need for alternative sources of getting finances.

There has been increased insurgency of terror attacks targeting non-Muslims particularly in Lamu County, who inhabit areas close to the Boni forest as witnessed in the Mpeketoni attack of June 15, 2014.<sup>11</sup> This might be part of a contagion of the preference of the extremists' choice of natural resources coupled with strategic positioning premised on exploiting youths living in close proximity to such natural resources by targeting them for radicalization through a narrative of marginalization by county and national government.

This paper sets out to identify the causal effects of natural resources towards the conflicts of violent extremism and terrorism through the use of radicalization of locals inhabiting such natural resources and biomes by focusing on Boni forest.

### **1.3 Problem Statement**

The entry into Boni forest by violent extremists has been worsened by the very nature of complex violent extremism-related strategies of leveraging on basic natural resources, probably a strategy, as a form of their preference for asymmetrical warfare.<sup>12</sup> Boni forest with its vast acreage of 1339 square kilometers, close proximity to entry points to and from Somalia and rich biodiversity including indigenous trees, lack of proper management including manning by the KFS, offers an easy and rich opportunity for the extremists. The vast forest has become a natural resource of strategic choice for

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<sup>11</sup>Rivera, J. (2014). Understanding and Countering Nation-State Use of Protracted Unconventional Warfare. *Small Wars Journal*, 2014, 25.

<sup>12</sup>Lele, A. (2014). Asymmetric Warfare: A state vs non-state conflict. *OASIS: Observatorio de Análisis de los Sistemas Internacionales*, (20), 6.

violent extremists, with increased activities as seen in the many documented cases of attacks in Lamu County.<sup>13</sup> The increased frequency of fire exchanges within the Boni environs, between the extremists and the well-coordinated Kenyan security teams, and daring day-time ambushes<sup>14</sup> are indicators of a growing presence and resilience of the violent extremism group.

Despite the innovative approaches by the national government in conjunction with the county governments which include the setting up of the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) and the development of an elaborate National Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism (NSCVE) the menace of the presence of violent extremists and violent extremism attacks in the Boni area persists. Failure of locals in coastal areas to identify violent extremists as a key source of insecurity instead pointing towards street gangs and security forces as the key sources of insecurity makes the issue of understanding violent extremism from the context of the Boni forest critical. This is made worse by the lack of consensus among local communities on the definition of terms such as violent extremism and violent extremists. The implication thereof is that there is a challenge in placing the context of violent extremism into the context of locals through intervention processes such as public participation resulting in conflicting perceptions about violent extremism.

On the other hand, there are a myriad of factors that drive or attract individuals towards radicalization into violent extremism. They include high levels of unemployment and poverty resulting in increased number of dropping out from school which serve as push

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<sup>13</sup> Ahmed, M & Kazungu, K. (2017). November 28). Two APs killed in attack by suspected Shabaabmilitants. *Daily Nation*. Retrieved online: <https://www.nation.co.ke/counties/lamu/APs-die-Shabaab-attack-Lamu/3444912-4206804-1qqctiz/index.html>

<sup>14</sup>Mugambi, J. (2018 January, 14). Woman killed, officer missing in Lamu terror ambush. *Standard Media* Retrieved from: <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001265867/woman-killed-officer-missing-in-lamu-terror-ambush>

factors towards radicalization as an escape route from poverty besides the allure of pull factors such as promise of; quick riches, retaliation against injustices such as torture from security officers, escape from justice for criminals, and fame.<sup>15</sup>

This is a scenario that describes Lamu County and this could be one reason as to why the violent extremists occupying Boni forest continue to undertake violent activities against selected groups of people in Lamu County. Perceived historical injustices including the land based conflicts and structural marginalization, coupled with the breakdown of moral and family fabrics, and political incitement through politics of hatred add to the factors that increase the chances of successful radicalization into violent extremism.<sup>16</sup> The strategies used by extremists have included the use of customary marriages, businesses, education, religious scholarship, and refugee status.<sup>17</sup>

The fact that the incursion into Boni forest has taken long to quell despite being a serious threat to national security warranting it's being titled '*Operation Linda Boni Forest*' launched in September, 2015 and handled through a national multiagency approach, adds to the problem statement making the research tenable. The daring attack against a convoy escorting a senior government officer of the level of a Permanent Secretary (PS) who was a native of the area resulting in her death<sup>18</sup> among other fatalities further catalyses critical thinking into why the violent extremists would not

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<sup>15</sup> Black, D. (2011). *Moral time*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Speckhard, A. (2012). *Talking to terrorists: Understanding the psycho-social motivations of militant jihadi terrorists, mass hostage takers, suicide bombers, and "martyrs"*. McLean, VA: Advances Press.

<sup>16</sup> Kiprono Kemboi Kevin, (2015). *Deconstructing Terrorism: Exploring Alternative Responses to Counter Violent Extremism in Kenya*. Interuniversity Institute of Social Development and Peace.

<sup>17</sup> HAYNES, JAMES (2005): "Islamic Militancy in East Africa." *Third World Quarterly*: 1321-1339.

<sup>18</sup> Cherono, S. (2017 September, 17). *Mariam Al Maawy dies in S. Africa after Al-Shabaab attack*. = *Daily Nation Online*. Retrieved from <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/PS-Maryam-El-Maawy-dies-in-South-Africa/1056-4114736-10g1q6dz/index.html>



only do daring attacks on security forces during the day but also target some of the natives who work for the national government.

The locals who are beneficiaries of various proactive government efforts against marginalization, in line with CoK, 2010 and the County Government Act, 2012, that focus on; women, persons living with disability, youths, the aged, orphaned and vulnerable children, professionals, universal health care and national exams candidates in both primary and secondary schools are yet to reciprocate this through relevant patriotic behaviors. Some of the locals including; businessmen, religious leaders, youths and professionals have been involved in the violent extremism activities which warrant empirical research into the complex Boni forest- violent extremism problem.

This then calls for critical research towards understanding the nexus between Boni forest, a critical natural resource towards sustainable development and its unfortunate utility in curtailing development, leaving in its wake untold human fatalities and suffering and environmental degradation through violent extremism related activities. It will be core towards coming up with findings that factor in a trans-disciplinary approach towards countering violent extremism in innovative, inclusive and sustainable ways of natural resources ownership and utility from the indigenous communities.

#### **1.4 Research Questions**

- i. What are the perceptions of the Boni community on the effects of Boni forest to their socio-economic wellbeing?
- ii. What are the linkages between Boni forest and the security of the community?
- iii. What are the challenges of radicalization of locals through the exploitation of the Boni forest by violent extremists?

- iv. What reasons have made violent extremists use Boni forest as an operational base?

### **1.5 Research Objectives**

- i. To find out the perception of the community on the effect of Boni forest to their socio-economic wellbeing
- ii. To find out the link between Boni forest and the security of the community
- iii. To identify the challenges of radicalization of locals through the exploitation of the Boni forest by violent extremists.
- iv. To investigate reasons that have made violent extremists use Boni forest as an operational base.

### **1.5 Justification**

#### **1.5.1 Academic Justification**

Despite the increased complexity of Operation Linda Boni characterized by; increased attacks on the KDF and NPS by violent extremists, fatalities and casualties; prolonged period of the operation, and government directive to have the Bonis move out of Boni forest, there has been no empirical research to investigate factors related to the Boni natural resource and increased activities by violent extremists. Such approaches need to be evidence based through empirical approaches that will stimulate further researches into different aspects of natural resources governance for sustainable stewardship, against rising resources based conflicts<sup>19</sup> an aspect of investigation that this research study set out to achieve. Consequently this study then elicits the academic need for interrogation of existing governance policies on natural resources thus setting out to

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<sup>19</sup> James, A., & Teichler, T. (2014). Defence and security: new issues and impacts. *Foresight*, 16(2), 165-175.

bring a paradigm shift in the integrated focus of managing other natural resources that can become operational bases for violent extremists locally and globally.<sup>20</sup>

### **1.5.2 Policy Justification**

The role of innovative natural resources management policies through co-management approaches and co-designing processes involving all stakeholders is vital in relation to rethinking the natural resources governance in Kenya owing to emerging natural resources based conflicts.<sup>21</sup> This role calls for the need to rethink the natural resources governance model which involves; institutions, policies, legislation, directives, and strategies if the management and leadership of natural resources such as Boni forest is to have positive; socio-economic, socio-cultural, and socio-ecological outcomes.

Placing Lamu communities strategically as custodians of peace through ownership of Boni forest as well as other natural resources is part of the approaches towards CVE and CT, which would reduce the chances of radicalization of communities against the government, a safety net for national security. This is a strategic policy change from the use of reactions that involve use of security operations whose effects and impacts are not only negative but also costly to the government, in line with the Lamu County Plan for CVE.<sup>22</sup> Dynamic policies as focal points of this research are needed in coming up with integrated approaches towards enhancing a sustainable nexus between high value natural resources, government agencies, and local communities.

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<sup>20</sup> Boga, H. I. (2016). Lamu County Plan for Countering Violent Extremism.

<sup>21</sup> Yeboah-Assiamah, E., Muller, K. and Domfeh, K.A. (2016), "Rising to the challenge: a framework for optimising value in collaborative natural resource governance", *Forest Policy & Economics*, Vol. 67, pp. 20-29.

<sup>22</sup> Mwanguzo, K., & Boga, H. I. (2017). BRICS PHASE III Lamu County Plan For Countering Violent Extremism.

## 1.6 Research Hypotheses

1. H<sub>a</sub>: Boni forest is embraced with a positive attitude by the neighboring community owing to its contribution to their socio-economic wellbeing
2. H<sub>b</sub>: Boni forest is a source of security for the neighboring community
3. H<sub>c</sub>: Boni forest has contributed to radicalization to violent extremism of members of the neighboring community.
4. H<sub>d</sub>: Boni forest has a unique niche for violent extremists that disadvantages “Operation Linda Boni Forest” multiagency team

## 1.7 Theoretical Framework

The role of theory in research is to function as a guide to the researcher on the place of theory in investigations undertaken previously,<sup>23</sup> from both a contextual as well as a conceptual perspective. Theory focuses the theoretical thought processes of the researcher through linkages between variables such as cause-effect relationships, resulting in stimulating the researcher into looking for new knowledge leveraged on already existing knowledge. Linking the independent variables and dependent variables aids in establishing pathways critical towards relevant abstractions achieved through the empirical relationship between the various variable as well as the phenomenon under study. This linkage is through a framework that places empirical studies and literature on the researcher’s area of study thus identifying the gap in a graphic manner through independent variables, moderating variables, and dependent variable.

This section will look at the theories that are core towards a holistic understanding of the drivers of violent extremists into their activities through relevant contexts and concepts in order to guide relevant, literature review and research methodology. The

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<sup>23</sup>Boris Blumberg, Donald R. Cooper and Pamela S. Schindler *Business Research Methods*. Paperback– International Edition, March 1, 2011.

main theory that this study will leverage on is class theory owing to the nature of dichotomy right from the; ideals, values, beliefs, attitudes, behaviors, and conflict management strategies between the violent extremists on one hand and the state actors on the other. It will be supported by the relative deprivation theory that looks at the identification of inequality between groups, reasoning about consequent disadvantages and ultimately having feelings of unfairness and consequent reactions.

### **1.7.1 Class Theory**

The nature of terrorism and violent extremism is that there are two sets of distinct players namely state and non-state actors, pitted against each other with different clear cut goals in the conflict, which have a dichotomy in terms of; ethical, moral, constitutional, and continuity perspectives. The trail of destruction left behind by violent extremists in 21<sup>st</sup> century is telling as evidenced by orgies of bombings in; Arab, Western, European, and African nations where devastating effects have been documented in terms of fatalities, casualties, and destruction of critical infrastructure. Major cities of target nations have been bombed and they include; London, Nairobi, Dar Salaam, New York, and Washington.<sup>24</sup>

The pull and push factors of radicalization to violent extremism have a congruence with the nature of twentieth century conflicts that were based on social class antagonism.<sup>25</sup> It is a conflict between the lower class, otherwise referred to as “The Wretched of the Earth” by Franz Fanon, against the elite capitalists representing the ruling elite. From the Kenyan context, various dimensions relating to the class theory exist with particular focus being historical injustices characterized by historical grabbing of the land by

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<sup>24</sup> Ogunrotifa, A. B. (2013). Class theory of terrorism: A study of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. *Research on Humanities and Social Sciences*, 3(1), 27-59.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 29

colonizers even before Kenya got independence.<sup>26</sup> This has been made worse by further marginalization after independence through alienation where the same land found its ownership into non-coastal communities, a natural resources ownership status that is emotively alluded to by indigenous communities. Majority of the local communities are employed as laborers in these businesses with a society whose poverty index is high with attendant issues like failure to have relevant formal education and have access to basic services. By extension, the fact that majority of those who own large productive tracts of land in the Lamu county as well as businesses happen to be described by Aboud Rogo as non-believers who have populated Mpeketoni with churches while the locals can only afford one to build one mosque,<sup>27</sup> illuminates a social class stand. The dichotomy is further seen in the narrative of need to use Jihad to root out the non-believers with threats by Sheikh Aboud Rogo of dire consequences for those Muslims who will focus on socio-economic activities at the expense of committing themselves to Jihad.

This demarcates the non-believers against believers from a context of religion but leveraged on use of violence that is premised on verses from Koran. The divide is further seen in the declaration through a Sheikh, who is therefore a champion of leadership in the Muslim community, that for the Muslims, the only valid constitution is the Koran and that they must not follow the CoK, 2010.<sup>28</sup> It paints a picture of two classes from a legislative and constitutional context. Rebelling against a legally promulgated constitution that was reached at through the free will of Kenyan people in

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<sup>26</sup> Kemboi, Kevin Kiprono (2015). "Deconstructing terrorism: exploring alternative responses to counter violent extremism in Kenya."

<sup>27</sup> Zelin, A. Y. (2015). Picture or it didn't happen: A snapshot of the Islamic State's official media output. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 9(4), 85-97.

<sup>28</sup> Mahmood, S. (2011). *Politics of piety: The Islamic revival and the feminist subject*. Princeton University Press.

a democratic process is an indicator of “us” versus “them” mentality, perception, attitude and behavior and therefore resonates well with the class theory. The narrative by Mombasa Republican Council that “Pwani si Kenya” meaning “Coast region is not part of Kenya” signifies a secession stand that could result in civil wars based on natural resources of land and land ownership from a historical perspective, despite a definite constitutional order.

The suspected profiling of members of one community during the Mpeketoni attack signifies yet another line of social class categorization in violent extremism, and coming a few days after the radical preaching in Lamu at Mpeketoni by Sheikh Aboud Rogo on the need to take a Jihad attack against the non-believers in the Koran<sup>29</sup> who are believers of the CoK, 2010, shows clear dichotomy. The dichotomy part of the violent extremists in the Kenyan context of Lamu is based on; perceptions of past injustices, current injustices as stated by violent extremists on the discrimination of Somalis and Muslims in the GWOt, “Operation Linda Nchi”, “Operation Linda Boni Forest”, enacting of anti-terrorism legislation, and setting up of the anti-terrorism police unit (ATPU). Such counter-terrorism responses and measures have ended up being counterproductive owing to the counter-narrative weaved out of them by the violent extremists, a scenario that could easily win the hearts of the local indigenous communities towards sympathizing with them. Part of these sympathies could become push and pull factors into radicalization to either cognitive extremism were one gives support that is non-violent such as funding and planning or violent where one participates in violent activities.

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<sup>29</sup> Zelin, *Supra* note 11, at 87

Such pull and push factors coupled with radicalization undertaken using a religious based approach might result in members of some religion and community sympathizing and empathizing with the violent extremists operating from Boni forest. This can make the soft approaches by national and county governments among other collaborating actors in the CVE ineffective besides making the success of “Operation Linda Boni Forest” an impossible task. This then justifies not only the need to understand and apply the class theory from a Kenyan context perspective of the Lamu county, but also focus on natural resources governance from a holistic perspective that factors in empirical approaches on historical perspectives and need for relevant evolution in managing natural resources through equity.

### **1.7.2 Relative Deprivation Theory**

Relative deprivation (RD) is a social psychological concept based on a comparative perspective which is a subjective behavior in; individuals, and groups resulting in anger due to perceived social differences related to what the individual or group lacks.<sup>30</sup>

Relative deprivation at a national level is seen in scenarios where minorities experience varieties of discrimination including; access to vital services such as health and education, land ownership rights, economic marginalization, suppression of their cultures and religion, and representation.<sup>31</sup> The reactive anger may catalyze; collective protests in form of ethno-national conflicts as seen in demonstrations demanding for social justice, ill health, and resentment which serves as a driver towards propensity to join violent extremism.<sup>32</sup> The three perspectives of the RD are; comparative analysis by an individual, group or community; cognitive analysis to identify the status of being

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<sup>30</sup> Smith, H. J., & Pettigrew, T. F. (2015). Advances in relative deprivation theory and research. *Social Justice Research*, 28(1), 1-6.

<sup>31</sup> Saleh, A. (2013). Relative deprivation theory, nationalism, ethnicity and identity conflicts.

<sup>32</sup> Smith, H. J., Pettigrew, T. F., Pippin, G. M., & Bialosiewicz, S. (2012). Relative deprivation: A theoretical and meta-analytic review. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 16(3), 203-232.



unequal with the source of comparison and identifying the aspect of being at a disadvantage; and perceiving the identified disadvantage as unfair.<sup>33</sup>

From the Kenyan context of Boni, the narratives of historical injustices premised on unfair distribution of land where, non-believers as defined by Aboud Rogo, have even built one hundred churches against one mosque,<sup>34</sup> is a comparative analysis between non-Muslims and Muslims, with inequality in number of worship areas, seen as unfair from a perspective of religion and historical ownership of resources. The consequent reaction is the appealing by Aboud Rogo to the believers to leave socio-economic activities and instead take a collective remedy through Jihad against the non-believers, a violent extremism approach to perceived unfairness. Such collective actions representing group relative deprivation (GRD) behavior have the potential as seen in Mpeketoni in Lamu County to catalyse violent extremism against the group or community perceived to be at an unfair advantage. This theory is core in the study in line with the fact that the interventions by national and county governments towards partnering with the Boni community in countering violent extremism seems to be taking longer than anticipated. By extension “Operation Linda Boni Forest” which was meant to take a short duration has taken longer with continuous attacks on the multiagency teams by the extremists. There is then need to investigate the scenarios that might be disadvantaging the multiagency team from the perspective of the Boni community as an innovative theory based empirical approach core towards sustainable development of the Boni area. It also elicits the need to identify if there are any disadvantages that

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 204

<sup>34</sup> Zelin, *Supra* note 11, at 89

the Boni community might be having relative to the presence of the security forces which could result in increased radicalization of locals into violent extremism

### **1.7.3 Complexity Theory**

This research focuses on conflicts between violent extremists and the community of Lamu, and the national government of Kenya through the context of extremism leveraged on the assumed strategic use of Boni forest. Violent extremism has been one of the major causes of organizational, national, regional and global complexity with contagions seen in the use of social media as a critical strategy towards; clandestine communication between individuals and groups of violent extremist across the globe.<sup>35</sup>

There is further complexity in the use of social media in the planning, recruitment, training, radicalization and spreading of fear,<sup>36</sup> not to mention the daring behavior of having operational bases within the soils of sovereign states as seen in the Boni forest incursion.

Complexities in organizations, nations, regions and the globe radiate into all sectors of the world as witnessed in; climate change, violent extremism and financial downturns, with resultant need for adaptability, learning and consequent change for sustainability in line with the complexity theory.<sup>37</sup> The complexity theory further elaborates on the need for dynamic learning approaches and processes geared towards creating new

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<sup>35</sup>McMillan, R., (2016). "Facebook's WhatsApp Launches 'End-to-End' Encryption. WhatsApp texting service strengthens encryption so only sender and receiver can read message contents."

<sup>36</sup>Conway, M. (2017). "Determining the role of the internet in violent extremism and terrorism: Six suggestions for progressing research." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 40, no. 1 77-98.

<sup>37</sup>Mitleton-Kelly, E., (2011) "A complexity theory approach to sustainability: A longitudinal study in two London NHS hospitals." *The Learning Organization* 18, no. 1: 45-53.

resilient structures against complexity<sup>38</sup>, a response witnessed in the global war on terror.<sup>39</sup>

Systems suffer from two types of complexities<sup>40</sup> namely; internal and external complexity also referred to as environmental complexity<sup>41</sup> with the outcomes being either to stabilize or destabilize the system.<sup>42</sup> Boni forest can be viewed from the context of complexity from three contexts: as an ecosystem crucial to the profile of national natural resources critical for sustainable development, a source of livelihood for the Boni community and finally as an operational base of violent extremists who are a threat to national security. This context has two pivotal variables made up of the violent extremists and their choice of Boni forest a critical part of the national natural resources infrastructure. This is further worsened by the nature of conflicts that this incursion has resulted in thus building a contagion of both external and internal conflicts from a county, national, regional, continental and global perspective.

A clear understanding through an empirical approach of the matrix of relationships between violent extremism and the daring choice of Boni forest as an operational base made more complex by the nature of attacks and ambushes executed by the extremists then warrants the use of a theoretical framework premised on the complexity theory.

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<sup>38</sup>Raghavendran, S., & Rajagopalan, P. S. (2011). Sense making of complexity: leadership in financial services. *Journal of Business strategy*, 32(3), 19-28.

<sup>39</sup>Kana, R., & Dore, R. (2014). Countering Radicalisation Across Europe—The Pioneering ISDEP Project. *Journal for Deradicalization*, 1(2014), 23-25.

<sup>40</sup>De Toni, Alberto Felice, Giovanni De Zan, and Cinzia Battistella. "Organisational capabilities for internal complexity: an exploration in the Coop stores." *Business Process Management Journal* 22, no. 1 (2016): 196-230.

<sup>41</sup>Collinson, S., & Jay, M. (2012). *From complexity to simplicity: unleash your organisation's potential*. Palgrave Macmillan.

<sup>42</sup>Solansky, S. T., Beck, T. E., & Travis, D. (2014). A complexity perspective of a meta-organization team: The role of destabilizing and stabilizing tensions. *Human relations*, 67(8), 1007-1033.

#### **1.7.4 Social Exchange Theory**

Operation Linda Boni was mooted as a warfare strategy as a reaction towards the consistent attacks by violent extremists within Lamu and Tana River counties. With increased attacks against the security forces using IEDs and ambushes, the national government gave an order for the Boni's to move from their traditional livelihood environment, Boni forest, to the open lands around the Boni forest. This change, as an order, was not mediated with the Boni's and local communities and thus resulted in an attitude and perception among the Boni and Swahili communities of government marginalization with consequent expression of the same. By extension the alleged increased disappearance of youths with fingers pointing towards various government security agencies, and alleged torture of communities including rape created further complexity of suspicion of the security forces.<sup>43</sup> The accusations by the director of the operation that some medical personnel were aiding the violent extremists with drugs as well as that of the locals assisting the extremists by the regional commissioner are clear indicators of lack of cooperation between the security forces and the Boni's, and communities neighboring Boni forest. Lack of cooperation is an indicator of negative reciprocity between the groups owing to poor conflict management strategies.

This research study then set out to investigate whether there are any socio-economic activities carried out by the Boni's and the neighboring communities that were adversely affected by the operation Linda Boni. By extension the study set out to find out the extent of cooperation through models such as public participation between government agencies such as KFS, KWS, county security committees, Operation Linda Boni multiagency team, and the local communities. This is with a view of identifying

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<sup>43</sup> Mogire, Edward, and Kennedy Mkutu Agade. "Counter-terrorism in Kenya." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 29, no. 4 (2011): 473-491.

whether such cooperation was of strategic significance towards achieving sustainable conflict management or whether it aggravated the objectives of the operation. This was viewed from the perspective of either increasing chances of radicalization or reducing them having in mind the fact that the operation was dealing with a high value natural resource occupied by violent extremists. This was then a critical basis of identifying reciprocity between the communities and the government agencies involved directly in the Boni forest security operation as well as the agencies core towards undertaking innovative approaches towards CVE and PVE.

## **1.8 Research Methodology**

### **1.8.1 Introduction**

Research methodology is a procedural way through which data is collected, analyzed and presented to ensure coherence, consistency and accountability.<sup>44</sup> This study purports to investigate the natural resource-violent extremism nexus: case of Boni forest border area between Kenya and Somalia. This chapter outlines analysis plan, data collection instruments, sample population, ethical analysis and the research design deployed.

### **1.8.2 Research Design**

The choice of a research design is dependent on the personal experiences of a researcher, appropriateness of the research problem being investigated and the target population.<sup>45</sup> In this case, the researcher investigates the natural resource-violent extremism nexus: case of Boni forest border area between Kenya and Somalia. There

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<sup>44</sup> Neuman, W. L. (2013). *Social research methods: Qualitative and quantitative approaches*. Pearson education.

<sup>45</sup> Gravetter, F. J., & Forzano, L. A. B. (2018). *Research methods for the behavioral sciences*. Cengage Learning.

are different types of research designs namely: experimental, exploratory, and descriptive and observation.<sup>46</sup>

Exploratory research design is recommendable when conducting a study on a project whose subject is unknown to the researcher or has high level of uncertainty. The uncertainty is often due to inadequate existing research that has been conducted previously on that particular subject. Conversely, the descriptive research design is advocated for conducting study due to its ability to provide accurate data that captures the variables of the research problem being investigated. For this study, the descriptive research design will be employed due to its accuracy and its focus on the group's opinions, beliefs and values that help shape their behavior.

### **1.8.3 Population**

A population is defined as all essentials meeting the sample measures for annexation in a study. Population is a collection that the researcher wants to generalize as the group of people that are selected to be in the study. The population of this study will be residence within Boni center and its environs.

### **1.8.4 Target Population**

The target population of a research refers to a sample chosen from a particular group of individuals that the study seeks to investigate as a representation of the entire audience. This study targeted sample audience from Boni center as a representation of the entire population of the region.

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<sup>46</sup> Lawrence, B., B., & Lune H., (2004). *Qualitative research methods for the social sciences*. Vol. 5. Boston, MA: Pearson.

### 1.8.5 Sample Size

The sample size of a study refers to a selected number of units or individuals who are involved in the study as a representation of the entire group to manifest the features of the whole population.<sup>47</sup> It is actually a subgroup of the population in query and encompasses a range of associates from that specific population. For this study, the chosen sample size is 163 participants from Boni center as the table below shows. This sample size of 163 respondents is 25% of the total population targeted prior to conducting the research. Given that the study is under the social sciences this sample is considered sufficient and therefore can be used. According to Mugenda and Mugenda, an inclusion of 10% of the reachable population in a social science research as representation of the entire population validates the study.<sup>48</sup>

**Table 3.1: Sampling Frame**

<b>Residents of Boni</b>	<b>Sample size</b>
Religious leaders	20
Business men/women	48
Youths	70
Government Units	15
Civil society organization	10
Totals	163

Source: Author 2018

### 1.8.6 Sampling Techniques

Sampling refers to the process of predetermined observation whereby the elements of a statistical population are taken for keen examination.<sup>49</sup> The sampling procedure

<sup>47</sup> Mugenda, O. M and Mugenda, A. G (2003). *Research Methods: Quantitative and Qualitative approaches*. Nairobi, Acts Press.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid

<sup>49</sup> Kombo, Donald Kisilu, and Delno LA Tromp. "Proposal and thesis writing: An introduction." *Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa* 5 (2006): 814-830.

identified by the researcher is based on the characteristics of the group and its ability to portray such characteristics to enhance distinctiveness of the whole population. Sampling facilitates quick data collection process which in turn becomes cost friendly and saves on the time.

This study deployed a stratified random sampling whereby the respondents were engaged through interviewing and observation. Strata refer to the smaller groups that have been created after the identified sample population is divided. The essence of partitioning is to ensure the strata created bears similar characteristics.<sup>50</sup> For example in this study the strata comprised of religious leaders, civil society organizations, businessmen/women, government units and youths.

### **1.8.7 Types of Data**

In cases where special technique is adopted as the data collection method, the data composed can either be primary or secondary. According to Bryman and Bell, the researcher obtains primary data from tests, questions and interviews while secondary data was sourced from previous literature and studies such as articles, journals, books and publications.<sup>51</sup> This survey took primary data into consideration in addressing the research problem being investigated.

### **1.8.8 Data Collection Instruments**

The tools for collecting data usually act as a mutual medium flanked by the objectives identified, the sample population being targeted as well as the field subjects. In this study, the researcher sought after to determine the most appropriate methods of

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<sup>50</sup> Aborisade, Olubunmi Philip. "Data collection and new technology." *International Journal of Emerging Technologies in Learning (iJET)* 8, no. 2 (2013): 48-52.

<sup>51</sup> Bryman, Alan, and Emma Bell. "Business research strategies." *Business research methods* (2007).



gathering information. In research the following instruments are considered common: questionnaires and interviews schedules. A questionnaire includes a series of structured questions that have been designed and presented in forms for the respondents to easily fill. The questionnaires are appropriate for research due to their economical nature, easiness during analysis and ability to provide the participants with options in the case of close-ended questions.<sup>52</sup>

The structured questions entail both open-ended and close-ended questionnaire whereby the respondents are given options to respond with complete freedom of their choice of words or as guided by the close-ended type of questions. In this research, the structured questionnaire that integrated both open-ended and close-ended questions was deployed owing to the nature of the contexts of the scope in regard to cultural diversity and security threats. The researcher used items whose choice of answers were from a Likert-like scale having; *Yes, No, Not Sure* as the choices to the questions so as to collect specific data that contribute to the particular issue.<sup>53</sup>

### **1.8.9 Data Collection Procedures**

Five research assistants assisted in administering the questionnaire. They are highly trained on how to administer questionnaires which was done through two methods. There was the use of drop and pick-up method, for those who had a level of education above form four while for all the others the research assistants had to help the respondents fill through translation into Kiswahili. This necessitated the use of two locals who are good in Kiswahili. After being filled, the questionnaires were collected for analysis.

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<sup>52</sup> Mugenda, *Supra* note 20

<sup>53</sup> Berg, Bruce Lawrence, Howard Lune, and Howard Lune. *Qualitative research methods for the social sciences*. Vol. 5. Boston, MA: Pearson, 2004.

### **1.8.10 Data Analysis Plan**

The process of data analysis involves analyzing, coding, organizing and summarizing data. This research used Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) for analyzing data. SPSS is widely used and was preferred for this study due to its ability to output data in organized forms. Once the questionnaires were gathered, they were coded and entered into the SPSS software for analysis. The interpreted data utilized descriptive statistical techniques that determined standard deviation, mean and frequencies.

### **1.9 Scope**

The scope of this research study is Lamu county focusing on the environs of the Boni forest with the purposeful sampling of respondents to represent key stakeholders. This is from the context of Boni forest as well as that of violent extremism from a security perspective. The stratification of the local population was in terms of; gender, leadership, businesses, socio-economic activities, religion, level of education, county government, national government, and civil society organizations. The research used a quantitative approach to the study although mixed methods would have given in-depth underlying issues of the phenomenon under study. However qualitative research is time consuming and calls for enough bonding and rapport for the interviewees to have confidence in the researcher and the topic in order to share their experiences. This would have required more time and resources, a disadvantage in relation to the geographical location of the area, security threats, different cultures and timelines given for the study

### **1.10 Limitations**

Due to the violent nature of violent extremism coupled with the trauma that some of the target populations may have gone through there was likelihood that some of the

respondents may not be sincere, while others may opt not to fill in the questionnaires thus reducing the number of duly filled returned questionnaires. This would affect the credibility of the findings. The researcher consequently tackled this by using credible relevant networks to have rapport with various respondents in order to have high levels of cooperation. This included the purposeful use of; civil society organizations, local leaders, education officials, members of the “Operation Linda Boni”, religious leaders, student leaders, transporters, elders, and businessmen.

Fear of reprisals by the extremists on both the respondents and the researcher was a limitation that was envisaged with the researcher undertaking a critical ethical approach to make sure that the persons picked for the exercise were not in any way exposed to any threats of attacks. Suspicion from locals against strangers could hamper data collection a scenario the researcher address through the use of networks around Lamu town and the areas surrounding Boni forest. The researcher gave his word to the locals on confidentiality of their identity by making sure that there is no place on the questionnaire where the national identity number, cell phone number, photographs, and home location was elicited for. The researcher used wordings in the questionnaire that had a neutral language which would not elicit; extremist thoughts, suspicions, and fear related to the complexities of violent extremists and Operation Linda Boni.

There are former inhabitants of the Boni area displaced due to terror attacks who would have served as critical sources of data but since they have since relocated to areas outside Lamu county the researcher had to trace a few of them and meet them away from the Lamu and Boni areas.

A high number of respondents are only conversant in using Kiswahili as a mode of conversation, a limitation addressed by the researcher having research assistants who

were equally conversant with the language. This limitation also necessitated the filling of the questionnaires to involve guidance by the researcher and his research assistants as a way of making the respondents agree to participate in the study.

### **1.11 Ethical Considerations**

It is important for every study to uphold ethics when collecting data to ensure that the data collected is used for intended reasons, enhance confidentiality and integrity.<sup>54</sup> The researcher treated all information from respondents with utmost confidentiality. In this study, a cover letter from National Commission for Science, Technology, and Innovation (NACOSTI) was attached to inform the participants that the research was validated and for academic reasons. The researcher and research assistants ensured that basic respect for respondents was accorded by factoring in the diverse cultures of the inhabitants of the different areas visited. The researcher will have basic respect for people, in that anyone in view of involvement would have permissible capacity to give approval, have satisfactory knowledge and knowledge of elements of subject matter. They ensured that anyone considering participation in the research study as respondents had legal capacity to give consent and that the respondents did not feel coerced. The researcher as earlier mentioned got consent from relevant bodies before embarking on the study. These included getting a research permit from NACOSTI and visiting all the relevant national and county government offices within the area that was designated as the scope of the research.

### **1.12 Demographic Information**

The research aimed at establishing the education level of the participants within Lamu old town and the environs of the Boni forest. Table 1.12 presents the findings.

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<sup>54</sup> Creswell, John W. *Research design: Qualitative & quantitative approaches*. Sage Publications, Inc, 1994.

**Table 1.12: Education level**

School	Frequency	Percentage
Madrassa	53	46.1
Primary School	17	14.8
Secondary school	21	18.3
Certificate	12	10.4
Diploma	9	7.8
Degree	3	2.6
Above degree	0	-

A total of 53(46.09%) reported that they had studied up to the Madrassa education level, 17(14.78%) had attained the primary education level, 21(18.26%) had attained secondary certificate, 12(10.43%) had obtained the certificate, 9(7.83%) had diploma and 3(2.61%) had attained degree. The study also found out that none of the respondents had attained education level above degree.


These results show that the majority of the participants involved in this study had attained education at the Madrasa and could therefore comprehend the questionnaire. However, the results of this study do not imply that all the participants involved had obtained the basic academic qualification such as the primary school level of education. The study recognizes that there is a probability of low literacy level among the respondents of this study. Pearce and Robinson established that conflict can be steered up with ignorance alongside low education levels among the members of a community.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Pearce, J. A., & Robinson, R. B. (1996). Strategic management: formulation, implementation and control. *Long Range Planning*, 6(29), 908.

### **Figure 1; Gender distribution of respondents**

The research aimed at ensuring a sense of gender representation as the feedback and perspectives of different people varies with their gender. Thus, it manifested gender sensitivity and so that different issues brought forth in regard to the questionnaire by the participants could be related to their gender. The figure below shows the results on gender representation of this study.



*Figure 1 Gender distribution*

A total of 98(85.22%) were male while 17(14.78%) were females. The outcomes on the gender distribution ensured there was no aspect of gender biasness in the survey as both males and females are represented.

### **1.13 Hypothesis testing**

The study sought to establish the various results of the study's hypothesis, the findings are presented in Table 1.13.

$H_a$ : Boni forest is embraced with a positive attitude by the neighboring community owing to its contribution to their socio-economic wellbeing.

$H_b$ : Boni forest has contributed to radicalization to violent extremism of members of the neighboring community.

$H_c$ : Boni forest is a source of security for the neighboring community

$H_d$ : Activities around Boni forest give Operation Linda Boni multiagency team advantages against violent extremists

**Table 1.12: Hypothesis testing**

Hypothesis	Chi square value	P value	Decision Rule
$H_a$	34	0.529	Reject
$H_b$	48	0.045	Accept
$H_c$	32	0.675	Reject
$H_d$	37	0.926	Reject

The study reported that hypothesis 1 stipulating that Boni forest is embraced with a positive attitude by the neighboring community owing to its contribution to their socio economic wellbeing be rejected, this is because the  $p$  value is greater than 0.05. The implication thereof is that there is no positive attitude by the neighboring community attributable to the socio-economic wellbeing emanating from the Boni forest. Therefore it can be concluded that there are no linkages between Boni forest and the socio economic wellbeing of the communities. Hence the community does not embrace the high value natural resource.

#### Hypothesis 2

Boni forest has contributed to radicalization to violent extremism of members of the neighboring community was the second hypothesis, it is reported to have a  $p$  value of 0.045, this shows that the null hypothesis be accepted. Therefore, this denotes that it is true that Boni forest has contributed to radicalization to violent extremism of members

of the neighboring communities. The deprivation of vital government services and support as seen in disruption of; schooling, the traditional livelihoods of the Boni's, cash transfer for OVCs, and provision of health services creates a line of divide and conflict between the national government through its agencies and the communities neighboring Boni forest. This has further led to increase in push factors and triggers resulting in increased opportunities by violent extremists for radicalization of the neighboring community.<sup>56</sup> Lack of initiatives towards socio-economic activities of the youth through the high value natural resources of Boni forest and the maritime economy has worsened the condition.

### Hypothesis 3

The third hypothesis focused on whether Boni forest is a source of security for the neighboring community. The study reported that the chi square output had a p value of 0.675, implying that the null hypothesis be rejected. It can be concluded that there are many instances of insecurity emanating from the Boni forest which is the operational and planning environment of the violent extremists. It is reported that there are youths who have disappeared after introduction of the operation Linda Boni, security officers have suffered several serious attacks resulting in fatalities and destruction of different infrastructures, closure of some businesses, and reduced harmony among the different communities living around the Boni area since 2016, are some of the variables that are perceived to show high levels of insecurity in the study.

### Hypothesis 4

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<sup>56</sup> Sedgwick, M. (2012). *Radicalism isn't the problem: it's the move to violence we need to counter*. Lancaster/London: Westminster Faith Debates. [http://faithdebates.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/1329816534\\_Mark-Sedgwick-radicalization-final.pdf](http://faithdebates.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/1329816534_Mark-Sedgwick-radicalization-final.pdf)



The hypothesis on activities around Boni forest give Operation Linda Boni multiagency team advantages against violent extremists is reported to have a p value of 0.926 which is greater than 0.05, this means that the null hypothesis be rejected. This therefore suggests that activities surrounding Boni forest do not give Operation Linda Boni multiagency team advantages against violent extremists. It is reported that there are poor linkages and relationships between the multiagency security officers and the community, perceived co-existence between the Bonis and the violent extremists, minimal involvement of public participation in security matters, and a harsh terrain that is only well mastered by the Bonis who are unwilling to show the KDF the ways within the Boni forest.

#### **1.14 Chapter Outline**

Chapter one provides an introduction and basic structure for this research.

Chapter two discusses the perceptions of the community on the effect of Boni forest to their socio-economic wellbeing

Chapter three presents between Boni forest and the security of the community

Chapter four details of radicalization of locals through the exploitation of the Boni forest as an operational base that coordinates violent extremists activities.

Chapter five provides the conclusions, summary of findings, and recommendations for the study.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **PERCEPTION AND SOCIO ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF BONI FOREST BY THE COMMUNITY**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

This section will look at the following; literature review from empirical studies; theories relevant to the context and concepts under study, data analysis on the research questions and hypothesis.

#### **2.2 Perception of the community towards their socio-economic benefits from Boni forest**

The horrifying turn of events on the night of 15<sup>th</sup> June 2014 in Mpeketoni town of Lamu county characterized by well-planned, and coordinated execution of a terror attack by violent extremists who went on a killing spree that targeted houses, businesses, Mpeketoni police station, petrol stations, hotels, and those walking back home left Kenyans from all walks of life terrified, angry, and sad.<sup>57</sup> There was mass destruction of properties in a hitherto vibrant town with the fatalities, who were mostly males, reaching 49, this despite having security officers from the administration police service, Kenya police service and the Kenya defence forces in the environs of the town.<sup>58</sup>

Before the shocking effect of the massacre could be managed from the fronts of various national government interventions, as well as the vital psychosocial healing process taking off, another attack was executed the following day in a similar manner in Maporomoko village not very far from Mpeketoni, involving shooting and slaughtering that left 9 fatalities.

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<sup>57</sup> Mogire, *Supra* note 17, at 474

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid*

This orgy of massacre was to be seen again a few days after on the 24<sup>th</sup> of June, 2014 in Pandanguo village where the five victims were singled out through profiling, just like in the modus operandi of the other two attacks, and then killed by butchering in the nearby forest. These attacks in Mpeketoni town and villages within the Mpeketoni area resulted in panic among the main ethnic group targeted by the violent extremists with consequent human crisis correspondent to such insecurity and terror attacks with a makeshift feeding camp, closing of businesses, closing of schools, and migration of people who had been labeled as being from upcountry. For each of the attacks the security agencies were blamed by the communities on lack of rapid response as they took many hours to respond despite the close proximity to the areas profiled and targeted by the non-state actors.<sup>59</sup>

Target towns, villages and areas of interest by the extremists included Kibaoni, had a high number of Christians and the fatalities had one ethnic community suffering the highest numbers as seen in the total fatalities distribution of; 37 Kikuyu, 10 Giriama, 5 Kamba, 3 Kalenjin, 2 Luo, 2 Meru and 1 Kisii in the first and second attacks.<sup>60</sup>

The Al –Shabaab through one of their spokesman claimed responsibility explaining that the attacks were retaliation in relation to the disinheritance of Muslims of their land by upcountry people.<sup>61</sup> The land issue bordering on accusations of marginalization and exploitation of the native communities around the Boni area has been a subject of research.<sup>62</sup> There are however other strands of thought linking increased attacks in Lamu by violent extremists to local push factors such as high levels of the

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<sup>59</sup> Boga, *Supra* note 8

<sup>60</sup> Authority, I. P. O. (2014). IPOA Report Following the Mpeketoni Attacks: 15 and 16 June 2014. *Nairobi: IPOA*.

<sup>61</sup> Jeffry Gettleman (6 July 2014). "[Gruesome Attacks in Kenyan Villages Heighten Fears of a Nation on Edge](#)". *New York Times*. Retrieved 7 July 2014

<sup>62</sup> Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA). (2014). IPOA Report Following the Mpeketoni Attacks (15 and 16 June 2014)–Redacted Version.

unemployment of youths torture of Muslims by the security agencies and marginalization by government and the incursion of the Kenya defence forces into Somalia.<sup>63</sup>

Kenya government responded to the attacks by setting a multiagency team to operationalize a security operation geared towards getting rid of the violent extremist of Al-Shabaab from Boni forest dubbed Operation Linda Boni. There was also subsequent evacuation of affected communities following the multiple Mpeketoni attacks, owing to increased fear of further attacks with part of their justification being the audacity show-cased by the extremists in attacking a GSU post at Mokowe town near Hindi centre where a terror attack had earlier occurred.<sup>64</sup>

Following the security operations against the attacks, the security forces were accused of using torturous methods bordering on ethnic and religion-based profiling and extrajudicial killings of particular members from the Lamu county communities. Increased curfews, persistent road block checks by security agencies, disappearance of youths, and directive for the Bonis to move out of their natural habitat Boni forest are among the grievances put forward by the communities around Boni and the Bonis themselves against the operation.<sup>65</sup>

### **2.3 Social Economic well-being of communities around Boni forest.**

The study sought to find out the social economic well-being of communities around Boni forest, Table 2.3 presents the results of the study.

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<sup>63</sup> Bradbury, M., & Kleinman, M. (2010). *Winning Hearts and Minds?: Examining the Relationship Between Aid and Security in Kenya*. Medford, Mass.: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid

<sup>65</sup> Odhiambo, E. O., Onkware, K., & Leshan, M. (2015). *Domestic Radicalisation in Kenya*.

**Table 2.3 Social Economic well-being of communities around Boni forest**

	Yes		No		Not Sure	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
The government promotes youth empowerment around the Boni forest	9	7.83	89	77.39	17	14.78
There are cultural practices regularly held in the Boni forest	-	-	111	96.52	4	3.48
There is partnership between the Boni youth community and the Kenya Forest Service in protecting the forest	-	-	102	88.70	13	11.30
There is partnership between the youth of Boni community and the Kenya Forest Service involving use of the Boni forest in honey farming	-	-	105	91.30	10	8.70
I am aware of a national government cash transfer program for the elderly in Mpeketoni	51	44.35	43	37.39	21	18.26
There is partnership between the Boni youth community and the Kenya Forest Service in butterfly farming	-	-	98	85.22	17	14.78
I am aware of people aged over 70 years in my vicinity	95.00	82.61	16	13.91	4	3.48
There is partnership between the youth and the Kenya Forest Service in training the youth of Boni on environmental conservation	-	-	108	93.91	7	6.09
There are regular awareness programs on HIV/ HIV-AIDS & sexually transmitted diseases in my environment	23.00	20.00	92	80	-	-
There is partnership between the youth and the Kenya Forest Service in empowering the youth of Boni for self-employment	-	-	115	100	-	-
There is a mentorship program targeting youths by the Kenya Forest Service in conservation practices	-	-	115	100	-	-
There is partnership between the youth of Lamu and the Kenya Forest Service in protecting forests	-	-	115	100	-	-
I am aware of religious activities in Boni forest	-	-	88	76.52	27	23.48
I am aware of cultural activities taking place within Boni forest	-	-	98	85.22	17	14.78
There has been a partnership between KWS and the hunters in Boni forest	-	-	108	93.91	7	6.09
There are Imams within the mosques within the villages surrounding Boni forest	-	-	24	20.87	91	79.13

There is increased cooperation between KDF and the youths of Lamu	-	-	96	83.48	19	16.52
Members of Boni community are allowed to do fishing near the Boni forest	20.00	17.39	10	8.70	85	73.91
There is decreased disappearance of youths in Lamu following operation Linda Boni	-	-	92	80.00	23	20.00
There is an increased number of organizations focusing on empowerment of the communities in Lamu county since 2016	25.00	21.74	82	71.30	8	6.96
Socio-economic activities of Boni community have improved upon introduction of the Operation Linda Boni	-	-	72	62.61	43	37.39
There is improved learning for Boni community children following operation Linda Boni	-	-	88	76.52	27	23.48
Boni youths can access playgrounds around Boni forest conveniently due to operation Linda Boni	-	-	96	83.48	19	16.52
There is increased benefits by Boni community from honey gathering following operation Linda Boni	-	-	105	91.30	10	8.70
Health facilities are secure due to operation Linda Boni	-	-	107	93.04	8	6.96
There is a partnership between the youth and Maritime Authority on training of the youth on blue economy opportunities	-	-	84	73.04	31	26.96
There is partnership between the communities living around Boni forest and the Kenya Forest Service in protecting Boni forest	-	-	115	100.	-	-
There is partnership between the community and the Kenya Forest Service involving use of the forest in honey farming	-	-	71	61.74	44	38.26
There are conservation programs between KWS and the local community in Boni	-	-	103	89.57	12	10.43
There are foreign tourists who regularly visit their Boni forest	-	-	107	93.04	8	6.96

There are documented partnership programs focusing on Boni forest conservation between KFS and the county executive	-	-	28	24.35	87	75.65
There is partnership between the Boni community and the Kenya Forest Service in butterfly farming	-	-	46	40.00	69	60.00
I am aware of the effect of violent attacks on business around the Boni forest	115	100.00	-	-	-	-
I know of government initiatives to secure indigenous plant and animal species in Boni forest	-	-	102	88.70	13	11.30
I am willing to participate in awareness events to conserve Boni forest	12.00	10.43	103	89.57	-	

There is a statistical trend showing lack of government services, partnerships, and strategic concern for the Boni community as attested by the high percentages of respondents who state that there are no partnerships between the youth and KFS in regard to both conservation at 93.9% of the respondents and socio-economic activities at 91.3 % of the respondents anchored on Boni forest, as a high value natural resource. The 91.3 % of respondents indicating no partnerships between KFS and honey harvesting, 62.6% of the respondents indicating lack of improvement of socio-economic activities upon the introduction of operation Linda Boni, and 100% of the respondents disagreeing that there are self-employment activities initiated by KFS for the Boni youth, represent overwhelming empirical evidence of the current deprivations in the socio-economic conditions of the Boni's. Learning in schools attended by the Boni children has stalled as indicated by 76.5% of the respondents who indicated that learning has not improved. Similarly none of the respondents is aware of whether there are Imams in the mosques around Boni an indicator that is reinforced by key respondents of KRC who visit Boni to supply aid services such as food to the Boni community. The low number of those who know is also justified by the fact that entry

to Boni forest is only through permission by the multiagency team heading the operation.

National government departments managing high value natural resources namely KFS and KWS have literally no Boni forest-based partnerships with the youth as seen by the 100% of respondents who say that they have no partnership with KFS on conservation of Boni forest, and 89.5% of the same on KWS. This is despite the legislations that abound including the Forest Conservation and Management Act, 2016, Wildlife Conservation and Management Act, 2013, KWS Act, 2014, coupled with the elaborate NSCVE pillars and county action plans, all of which point towards community involvement in the ownership of the national opportunities. The high percentage of lack of cooperation between the KDF and the communities at 83.5 % further paints a grim picture of the woes and throes that the occupation of Boni forest by the Al-Shabaab and the consequent reaction to have a security operation, have added to the communities around the high value natural resources of Boni forest and the neighboring maritime ecosystem. The fact that 100% of the respondents are aware of the negative effects of the violent attacks implies that the communities have been either directly affected or know of victims of the Boni attacks by AS, a state that is supported empirically by the 100% of respondents who indicate that the health centre's, critical service facilities, are not safe, with 80% respondents further indicating their unawareness of the fact that there is decreased disappearance of youths in Lamu. The effects of the violent attacks other than those on those targeted by the AS also have the consequent effects on livelihoods and the safety of the communities relative to their relationship with security officers of the Operation Linda Boni. This is supported by 83.47% of the respondents disagreeing with the hypothesis item that read "There is increased cooperation between KDF and the youths of Lamu".



The maritime economy of Lamu is one of the key anchors of the Kenya Vision 2030 flagship project of the LAPSSET corridor (LAPSSET corridor Development Authority, 2017) as well as the Big Four Agenda of the presidency on Blue Economy (Kenya School of Government, 2018).<sup>66</sup> This delivers a timely need in line with County Action Plans, as guided through the NCTC, in its regard towards coordinating the implementation of the NSCVE to ensure that there is a dynamic partnership between the national government maritime agencies, developers of the LAPSSET, county government, CSOs, and the community<sup>67</sup>. Unfortunately there seems to be no strategic partnerships of engagement between the maritime authorities as indicated by 0% of respondents who are not aware of any partnership between maritime authorities and the youth, a view strengthened by 73% of respondents who stated that there are no partnerships between maritime authorities and the youth.

Linkages that involve critical health services such as awareness of HIV Aids are of utmost significance in increasing the life expectancy of not only the Bonis but also that of other neighboring communities whose effect is reduced health expenditure at the household, county and national government levels. The high level of insecurity of the health Centre's at 100 % is detrimental to both national and county government initiatives on a Big Four Agenda of Universal Health Coverage. Failure of the elderly to access vital human rights based government subsidy such as the monthly KShs. 2000 by the elderly in Boni further adds to the perception of a new form of marginalization

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<sup>66</sup> Kenya School of Government, (2018). Coming to a Center Neat to You. Kenya School of Government. 2018-Vol.7Issue20. Retrieved from: [http://ksg.ac.ke/images/bulletin/KSG\\_Bulletin\\_18th-24th\\_August\\_2018.pdf](http://ksg.ac.ke/images/bulletin/KSG_Bulletin_18th-24th_August_2018.pdf)

<sup>67</sup> WS Atkins International Ltd., (2017). Preliminary Master Plan for Lamu Port City and Investment Framework. LAPSSET Corridor Development Authority

despite the government's efforts to operationalize the demarginalization themes in the people –driven and moral intent of COK, 2010.<sup>68</sup>

All these form a remarginalization narrative through which the Boni forest, relative to its occupation by Al-Shabaab and consequent knee jerk reaction by the national government to have a security operation, has resulted in the alienation of Boni community and consequent targeting of the upcountry ethnic groups by the Al-Shabaab as seen in the Hindi and Mpeketoni AS attacks.<sup>69</sup>

Globally youths are the main pool from which violent extremists target for radicalization, and with the high percentage of respondents indicating no livelihood based activities targeting the youth and leveraged on the Boni forest, it then leaves them vulnerable. The vulnerability is made worse by the narrative of unemployment, eviction from their natural environment, disruption of their lifestyles such as fishing, and harassment by the security officers involved in the Operation Linda Boni.

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<sup>68</sup> Lind, J., Mutahi, P., & Oosterom, M. (2015). *Tangled ties: al-shabaab and political volatility in Kenya* (No. IDS Evidence Report; 130). IDS

<sup>69</sup> Ibid

## CHAPTER THREE

### HOW BONI FOREST IMPACTS ON THE SECURITY OF THE BONI PEOPLE

#### 3.1 Natural Resources and Conflicts

Natural resources are materials that occur in nature and include; water, air, land, forests, fish, wildlife, and minerals, that can be used for economic production or for consumption by human beings and are categorized as either renewable or non-renewable, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Further categorization of natural resources is in relation to those that are exhaustible such as fauna and flora whose quantity and quality can be diminished with time while inexhaustible ones such as sun and air are unlimited.<sup>70</sup> They serve as; critical national development resources, sources of both national and local community pride, historical symbols of cultural attachment, ecological buffers, and sources of livelihood for local communities through practices such as; fishing, hunting, gathering, and farming. Governments have for a long time been the designated organ in charge of conservation and management of natural resources, a status that is undergoing change in line with emerging trends of co-management of natural resources with communities.<sup>71</sup>

There are many nations whose natural resources have been a curse as seen in Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Colombia on one hand<sup>72</sup> whereas on the other are nations such as Botswana and Norway whose natural resources have been a source of sustained national growth and development without civil wars. Empirical

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<sup>70</sup> Andrea EdoardoVarisco, (2010). *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development* [www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk](http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk) Issue 15,

<sup>71</sup> Yeboah-Assiamah, E., Muller, K., & Domfeh, K. A. (2018). Transdisciplinary approach to natural resource governance research: a conceptual paper. *Management of Environmental Quality: An International Journal*, 29(1), 15-33.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid

studies have shown that from there are two characteristics of natural resources related to their geographical location in relation to; proximity to an administrative government center and the area covered.<sup>73</sup> Natural resources located geographically far away from strong administrative regions of a government and covering vast areas form a set that becomes a prime target for exploitation by criminal gangs and the context is seen in the setting of operational bases by violent extremists in Boni forest.<sup>74</sup> Illegal occupation of natural resources, and consequent exploitation for reasons ranging from; looting through illegal mining of minerals such as gold, illegal trade such as trading in; ivory, charcoal, and sugar, and setting operational bases from where to; plan, train, and execute violence to communities exist today. This has been witnessed in Somalia where the violent extremists have been doing illegal trade in sugar and charcoal export to Middle East running to billions of dollars,<sup>75</sup> as well as the current on-going high-value resources exploitation in DRC by members of Al-Shabaab. It is important to point out that whereas some criminal gangs will exploit such resources with money being the targeted outcome, violent extremists and terrorists have the activities as a means towards a different outcome a scenario that clearly spells a difference between the two lots of criminals.

The case of Boni forest involves non-state actors, violent extremists, exploiting a natural resource of a sovereign state, leveraging on it to unleash violence to selected members of the local community through a deliberate profiling involving radicalized locals, radicalize some members of the community into both violent and non-violent extremism, instill fear, and ultimately forcing the government to react through the

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<sup>73</sup> Andrea Edoardo Varisco, *Supra* note 40

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>75</sup> OECD, *Glossary of Statistical Terms: Natural Resources*, OECD, Retrieved from: <http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1740> [Accessed Nov 10, 2018]

“Operation Linda Boni”, a multi-agency operation. Historical, cultural, political, constitutional, policy, and geopolitical issues relating to Boni forest are yet to be interrogated from an empirical perspective that brings in the context of violent extremism and the concept of natural resources governance. The exploitation through penetration that was not thwarted in good time could be an indicator of a government that; does not have firm control of its natural resources, lacks natural resources governance structures and if any exists then there are inherent weaknesses in operationalization, or lacks vibrant contextual policies and legislations co-management of natural resources. These are assumptions that this research study sets out to investigate through the laid out research objectives.

### **3.2 Violent Extremism and Radicalization**

Radicalization into violent extremism is a process through which an individual is indoctrinated into the use of violence to drive a; political, religious, or ideological agenda which is not acceptable in a free society.<sup>76</sup> It is an individual perspective, complex process involving exposure of an individual to ideologies that are a distinct departure from mainstream and conventional values, beliefs, and ideas with consequent transition in terms of; perception, attitude, beliefs, and behavior.<sup>77</sup> The complex nature of radicalization has seen a wide diversity in the individual characteristics of those targeted for radicalization as well as those radicalized in relation to; gender, religion, level and type of education, ethnicity, social status, and age.<sup>78</sup> By extension the avenues used are equally diverse which may be a strategy in an endeavor to increase the chances

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<sup>76</sup>Harris-Hogan, S., Barrelle, K., & Zammit, A. (2016). What is countering violent extremism? Exploring CVE policy and practice in Australia. *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, 8(1), 6-24.

<sup>77</sup> Police, R. C. M. (2009). *Radicalization: A guide for the perplexed. Ottawa: RCMP National Security Criminal Investigations.*

<sup>78</sup> Bizina, M., & Gray, D. H. (2014). Radicalization of Youth as a Growing Concern for Counter-Terrorism Policy. *Global Security Studies*, 5(1)

of optimal recruitment. The avenues include; social media platforms, sports groups, worship places, schools and universities, markets, working place TGTs and prisons.<sup>79</sup> The mix of those radicalized shows diversity in each aspect of personal characteristics as seen in demographic features of having fourteen year olds, and education differences in relation to having both uneducated and engineers, descriptive data from an Al Qaeda sample.<sup>80</sup> These features of diversity in both personal characteristics and avenues pertaining to radicalization attest to the fact that radicalization has got a wide range of push and pull factors relative to the individual who is targeted.<sup>81</sup> It further resonates with the increasing complexity of both terrorism and violent extremism in terms of emerging trends, processes, strategies, and tactics of radicalization,<sup>82</sup> a contextual perspective of empirical significance in this study. This is in relation to the hypothesized situation in this study of radicalization of communities around the Boni forest in Lamu County, premised on past attacks that have left suspicions of profiling of some communities based on particular community characteristics.

### **3.3 Radicalization into Violent Extremism**

In Kenya the spectrum of those radicalized resonates with the spectrum observed globally with similar diversities in terms of targeted individuals as well as strategies used including; social media, worship areas, universities, and work places all leveraged on the Islam faith.

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<sup>79</sup> Precht, T. (2007). Home grown terrorism and Islamist radicalisation in Europe. *Retrieved on, 11.*

<sup>80</sup> Sageman, M. (2004). *Understanding terror networks*. University of Pennsylvania Press.

<sup>81</sup> Hendrickson, J. (2014). Counter-Radicalization: *Combating Terrorism at the Core, A Study of the Motivations and Inspirational Leaders behind Radicalization to Violent Extremism and the Programs Designed to Combat them* (Doctoral dissertation).

<sup>82</sup> Ndyovu, Hassan. (2013): "The prospects of Islamism in Kenya as epitomized by Sheikh AboudRogo." *Annual Review of Islam in Africa*: 12.

### 3.3.1 Factors Driving Radicalization into Violent Extremism

#### Push Factors

These are factors in the social environment of vulnerable individuals which increase the intensity of an individual's thrust towards violent tendencies and include social breakdown as evidenced in broken families, abject poverty, and perception of perennial persecution by government security forces on suspicious grounds. In Kenya negative profiling of the Somalis by; police documented as police abuse and extra judicial executions, politicians, leaders, and other Kenyans has served as a push factor towards radicalization into violent extremism.<sup>83</sup> In the coast region there has been a past history from early 2000 that was discriminatory against those coast communities of Arab and Somali origin following a terror attack involving the bombing of Paradise hotel.<sup>84</sup> This was counterproductive towards the GWOt resulting in increased attacks against the businesses of those who were non-Arabs and non-Muslims as seen in the attack on with more attacks spreading into Nairobi from the year 2009 when it is believed Al Shabaab initiated terror attacks in Kenya.<sup>85</sup>

Another push factor that has left its imprints in the radicalization to violent extremism was the entry of Kenya Defense Forces into Somalia in October, 2011 under "Operation Linda Nchi" an act of war catalyzed by the kidnapping of Spanish citizens, an action that the Al Shabaab used for increased radicalization against the KDF and the government of Kenya.<sup>86</sup> Although this was meant to put in place a buffer along the Kenya –Somalia border, the Al Shabaab found their way into Kenya as evidenced by

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<sup>83</sup> Okech, A. (2015). Asymmetrical conflict and human security: Reflections from Kenya. *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, 37(1), 53-74.

<sup>84</sup> Otiso, K. (2009). Kenya in the crosshairs of global terrorism: fighting terrorism at the periphery. *Kenya Studies Review*, 1(1), 107-132.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid

<sup>86</sup> ALJAZEERA (2011). Kenya sends troops into Somalia, Retrieved from: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/10/20111016115410991692.html>

their occupation and consequent operations from Boni for a scenario in existence to date.<sup>87</sup>

Similarly the perception that “Operation Linda Boni Forest” and the curfews imposed once in a while on night movements are discriminatory behaviors against the local community whose religion is Islam may complicate the attempts by various actors against terrorism and violent extremism. This adds towards the pool of push factors and when fortified by radicalization from preaching by violent extremists and ‘respected’ Sheikhs like Aboud Rogo they can result in crystallization of decisions towards joining Al Shabaab by locals.<sup>88</sup>

### **Pull Factors**

They are factors arising from emotional narratives pertaining to doctrines put across by champions of leadership in society including religious leaders, politicians, and educators which elicit historical and cultural perspectives of a society such as hatred to government due to marginalization of community a context that has been witnessed in Kenya.<sup>89</sup> There is deep use of imagery and symbolism often with connotations reflecting inequitable distribution of national resources resulting in “us” versus “them” lines, a scenario that has linkage to both the equity and class theories. The preaching of the late Sheikh Aboud Rogo had extremism targeting Christians in Mpeketoni whom he referred to as “non-believers’ who had overcrowded Mpeketoni with churches while the local Muslims only had a single mosque, whipped up emotions based on religious diversity and soon after the fatal Mpeketoni attack by violent extremists followed.<sup>90</sup>

This links the former Sheikh to violent extremism as he guided the local community to

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<sup>87</sup> Kiprono, *Supra* note 5

<sup>88</sup> Ndyovu, *Supra* note 43

<sup>89</sup> Mbugua, J. K., & Misiani, M. G., (2013). An Appraisal of the Responsiveness of Countering Violent Extremism Measures.

<sup>90</sup> AL-KATAIB, (2015). Mpeketoni- *Reclaiming back muslim lands under Kenyan occupation*.



try Jihad now that democracy had failed through marginalization of the locals, a clear indicator of radicalization into violent extremism premised on past historical injustices in the Boni area of Lamu County. Violent extremists through their leadership, which may not be violent, but is radicalized to whip up emotions, has thus served a critical role of being pull factors through narratives of historical injustices as seen in the Aboud Rogo's case, with disastrous fatalities as witnessed in the Mpeketoni attacks.<sup>91</sup> This could be through; political, religious, or socio-economic narratives. Aboud Rogo went further in his ideological radicalization disguised as Jihad teachings to incite the Muslims in Mpeketoni against the CoK, 2010, citing the Koran as the only constitution that Muslim owed allegiance to<sup>92</sup> an incitement against the free will of Kenyans who voted for the CoK, 2010.

He further incites, through a religious route involving quoting verses from the Koran, the Muslim community against socio-economic activities such as farming and cattle herding and instead justifies the need to give Jihad top most priority if one is to escape the wrath of Allah.<sup>93</sup> Sensational statements in his preaching depicting the GWOt in Kenya as war against Islam serves further as a pull factor towards him and violent extremism as a reaction towards the government, with Muslim scholars citing such teachings as a threat to the survival of Islam. This resonates well with the definition stated in the study of radicalization and particularly in respect to; perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, and ideas that are totally incongruent to those of a sane society. The use of Jihad in violent extremism that is religious based, is a total departure from the teachings of

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<sup>91</sup> Ford, J. (2011). African counter-terrorism legal frameworks a decade after 2001. *Institute for Security Studies Monographs*, 2011(177), 114.

<sup>92</sup> AL-KATAIB, (2015). *Mpeketoni- Reclaiming back Muslim lands under Kenyan occupation*.

<sup>93</sup>. Ibid

the Holy Koran, and has been documented in cases where the violent extremists in Boni forest have time and again, taken time to preach to the locals about the essence of Jihad.

By extension the activities of groups that clandestinely supported violent extremism such as Muslim Youth Centre (MYC), which served the advocacy role of agitating for the recognition and supports of young Muslims who were impoverished and marginalized finally saw it morph into a lethal network of the Al Shabaab. The implication herein is that factors such as socio-economic exclusion if not holistically addressed could see such youth groups morph into lethal violent extremism outfits with far reaching ramifications to both safety and security of not only assets of development but also natural resource. Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), an outlawed group, with its characteristic demand for secession through its popular slogan “*Pwani si Kenya*” served a further role of flooding the coastal community with perception of a marginalization magnitude that could only be sorted out through violent means of seceding and disruptions of normal activities.

Consequently as hypothesized in this study, the socio-economic role of Boni forest to the community is of significance in understanding the nexus between the natural resource and violent extremism.

### **3.4 Natural Resources and Radicalization**

#### **3.4.1 Illegal Trade in Natural Resources**

Most research focuses on natural resources and conflicts focus on civil wars with well laid out narratives on issues of; negative ethnicity, dictatorship, and marginalization of communities from benefitting from the proceeds of natural resources, with consequent agitation of secession resulting in civil wars. Illegal trading in natural resources has been documented across the world as seen in Somalia involving Al Shabaab and the

Middle East, DRC where high-value minerals are being illegally mined and exported with both cases having the common denominator of being managed by violent extremists.<sup>94</sup> The proceeds from illegal trade undertaken by violent extremists aligned to mainstream terror groups are not for self-gratification, rather they are to further the cause of violent extremism through buying of weapons, radicalization, planning, and ultimate execution of violence through; assault, kidnapping for ransom (KFR), and suicide bombing. Every government has the responsibility of not only enhancing sustainable management of its natural resources but of equal significance to also ensure that it has flexibility and agility in coping with emerging complexities such as terrorism and violent extremism in ensuring both national safety and security.<sup>95</sup>

Contemporary terrorism and violent extremism have shown metamorphosis from the earlier modes of operation to new ones characterized by more complex trends, drivers, and techniques evidenced by far reaching and complicated impacts of their violent activities. Their actions as documented in the; West Gate, Mpeketoni, and Garissa university attacks in Kenya, Boko Haram activities in Nigeria, and daring occupation of Boni forest are evidence of the new ways of operations of; ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and Al Shabaab, in Africa and the Arab world<sup>96</sup>. The basis of the actions of these proscribed extremist groups is the restoration of Arab values and religion by use of violent means to destabilize legally elected governments with extremist views against modern lifestyles, education, and governance.

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<sup>94</sup> Horgan, J., (2014). "Don't Ask Why People Join the Islamic State—Ask How." *Vice News*. Retrieved from: <http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1740>

<sup>95</sup> James, K. (2011). The organizational science of disaster/terrorism prevention and response: Theory-building toward the future of the field. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 32(7), 1013-1032.

<sup>96</sup> Byman, D. (2016). ISIS Goes Global: Fight the Islamic State by Targeting Its Affiliates. *Foreign Aff.*, 95, 76.

### 3.4.2 Boni Forest and Violent Extremism

The case of Boni forest involves non-state actors, violent extremists, exploiting a natural resource of a sovereign state, leveraging on it to unleash violence to selected members of the local community through a deliberate profiling of local communities in Lamu County. The profiling involves; radicalizing of particular ethnic or religious groups, using of radicalized locals, radicalize some members of the community into both violent and non-violent extremism, instill fear, and ultimately forcing the government to react through the “Operation Linda Boni Forest”, a multi-agency operation. Historical, cultural, political, constitutional, policy, and geopolitical issues relating to Boni forest are yet to be interrogated from an empirical perspective that brings in the context of violent extremism and the concept of natural resources governance. The exploitation through penetration that was not thwarted in good time could be an indicator of a government that lacks; does not have firm control of its natural resources, natural resources governance structures and if any exists then there are inherent weaknesses in operationalization, vibrant contextual policies and legislations for co-management of natural resources. These are assumptions that this research study sets out to investigate through the laid out research objectives.

### 3.5 Security sources in Boni forest community

**Table 3.5: Boni forest is a source of security for the neighboring community**

	Yes		No		Not Sure	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
I am aware of attacks on KWS officers by extremists in Boni forest	-	-	104	90.43	11	9.57
I am aware of the effect of violent attacks on boat/water transport business	96	83.48	11	9.57	8	6.96
There has been increased security following operation Linda Boni	115	100.00	-	-	-	-

There has been increased security checks upon introduction of operation Linda Boni	115	100.00	-	-	-	-
I usually go for expeditions inside Boni forest	-	-	115	100.00	-	-
There has been improvement in business upon introduction of operation Linda Boni	74	64.35	31	26.96	10	8.70
There has been improved completion at form four upon introduction of operation Linda Boni	33	28.70	25	21.74	57	49.57
There has been improved security around Boni forest in transport following introduction of operation Linda Boni	111	96.52	3	2.61	1	0.87
There has been increased harmony amongst the different communities living around the Boni area since 2016	19	16.52	87	75.65	9	7.83
I am proud of operation Linda Boni	40	34.78	75	65.22	-	-
I have been involved in public participation events focusing on security	10	8.70	98	85.22	7	6.09
I am aware of attacks on National Police Service Officers by extremists around the Boni forest areas	101	87.83	14	12.17	-	-
I know of locals who have relocated due to fear of violent attacks	101	87.83	11	9.57	3	2.61
I am aware of attacks on KDF officers by extremists around the Boni forest areas	96	83.48	19	16.52	-	-
I know of businesses that have been closed due to fear of violent attacks	80	69.57	22	19.13	13	11.30
I know of economic activities by Boni community in Boni forest that are no longer done after introduction of Operation Linda Boni	84	73.04	17	14.78	24	20.87
I know of religious activities by Boni community in Boni forest that are no longer done after introduction of Operation Linda Boni	49	42.61	27	23.48	39	33.91
I have heard of youths who have disappeared after introduction of the operation Linda Boni	109	94.78	3	2.61	3	2.61
I know of locals who have been injured in violent attacks	56	48.70	44	38.26	15	13.04
I know of security officers who have suffered violent attacks	102	88.70	13	11.30	-	-

I am aware of attacks on KFS officers by extremists in Boni forest	-	-	99	86.09	16	13.91
I know of health centers that have suffered violent attacks	79	68.70	25	21.74	11	9.57
There are armed forces protecting Boni forest	115	100.00	-	-	-	-
There are regular patrols by security forces in the waters around Boni	86	74.78	13	11.30	16	13.91
I know of social economic activities in the Boni forest involving a partnership between the youths and KWS	-	-	99	86.09	16	13.91

The high percentage of 80 respondents, 69.6 %, indicating they knew of businesses that had been closed following the introduction of operation Linda Boni is an indicator of business loss a negative effect following the operation.

Knowledge of violent attacks on health service centres is high among the respondents at 79 (68.7%) and this is supported by literature on attacks on health centres that are already documented resulting in fatalities, casualties and theft of medicines and medical equipment. Such medical items are for use in treating injured AS fighters an indicator that some of the employees of such facilities face the threat of attack in their line of duty with the director of Operation Linda Boni pointing a finger at the health centres for alleged medical support to Al-Shabaab.<sup>97</sup>

The high number of respondents at 101 (87.8 %) who know of people who relocated from areas around Boni due to fear of violent attacks is a further indicator of how some members of local communities have been affected negatively by either the operation or by the violent attacks already witnessed.

Among the livelihood activities affected by the operation was honey harvesting by the Boni community within the Boni forest following the orders given by the multiagency

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<sup>97</sup> Mwanguzo, *Supra* note 8

team for the community to vacate from the forest, which was their home. This is supported by data where 86 (74.8%) respondents agree that there were economic activities within Boni forest that are no longer undertaken.

With the introduction of the operation, 109 (94.8%) respondents indicate in the affirmative of knowledge of increased disappearance of youths which adds to an indication of decreased security attributable to the on-going security activities and operations targeting AS in Boni forest.

It was noted that whereas none of the respondents was aware of any attacks on both KWS and KFS officers who are part of the community by virtue of their working and staying there, all the respondents agreed that there have been increased attacks on KDF, with 101 (87.8%) respondents indicating their awareness of attacks on NPS during the on-going operation Linda Boni.

There is a definite stand by respondents on whether they are proud of the operation or not with 40 (34.8 %) respondents agreeing while 75 (65.2%) stated that they were not proud of the operation and indictment of the national government. This high percentage of those who are not proud of the operation resonates with the high percentage of 96 (83.5%) of the respondents disagreeing with the hypothesis item that read “There is increased cooperation between KDF and the youths of Lamu”. The implication therein is that there might be operational or even non-operational activities by the KDF that are seriously against the human rights, beliefs, expectations, and ways of life of the communities a situation that had called for a while back. This calls for rethinking of the operation Linda Boni’s strategy with a view of having conflict management.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> Lind, *Supra* note 39

Whereas the level of public participation pertaining to the LAPSSSET corridor is high at 77 (66.96%), lack of public participation approaches in critical areas of; peaceful co-existence, safety, and security are appallingly high at; 102 (88.7%) in mentorship programs for Boni youths by KFS, 104 (90.4%) on safety skilling of youths involved in transport business between Lamu and Mpeketoni by KDF, 103 (89.6%) on security, and 102 (88.7%) on safety skills by KPA for youths in water transport services. This depicts a scenario where inclusion strategies core towards optimal utility of natural resources involving government agencies on one hand and those targeted for radicalization on the other is glaringly lacking around the Boni forest areas.



## CHAPTER FOUR

### BONI FORESTS AS A SUITABLE HABITAT FOR RADICALIZATION AND EXTREMISM

#### 4.1 Radicalization

“Radicalization is the process through which an individual changes from passiveness or activism to become more revolutionary, militant or extremist, especially, where there is intent towards, or support for, violence.”<sup>99</sup> It alienates one’s thinking, beliefs, and actions from the accepted mainstream perspectives into those that are out of the norm a complex process owing to the many causal factors and the different contexts that catalyze violence.<sup>100</sup> The concept and complex nature of radicalization further identifies variables in the radicalization process as;<sup>101</sup> situational, strategic, and ideological factors premised on theories that have been used to explain radicalization. The sheer complexity of terrorism and violent extremism exhibited by the nature of metamorphosis and consequent forms of terrorism coupled with the complexity of the motives behind the terror related activities,<sup>102</sup> has catalyzed a wide spectrum of contemporary academic interest away from the earlier main interest groups.<sup>103</sup> This ranges from attack on military installations, soft targets such as shopping malls, worship areas and markets, exploitation of high-value resources through extractive activities as well as using the same as operational bases, and destruction of critical infrastructure

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<sup>99</sup> Saltman, E. and Smith, M. (2015), “Till martyrdom do us part ‘gender and the ISIS phenomenon”, Institute for Strategic Dialogue, London, pp. 1-75.

<sup>100</sup> Cooney, Mark, and Nicole Bigman. "Terrorism as Gravitational Attraction." In *Terrorism and Counterterrorism Today*, pp. 25-46. Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2015.

<sup>101</sup> Arshad-Ayaz, Adeela, and M. AyazNaseem. "Creating “invited” spaces for counter-radicalization and counter-extremism education." *Diaspora, Indigenous, and Minority Education* 11, no. 1 (2017): 6-16

<sup>102</sup> Horgan, John. "Don't Ask Why People Join the Islamic State—Ask How." *Vice News* (2014).

<sup>103</sup> Braddock, K., & Horgan, J. (2016). Towards a guide for constructing and disseminating counternarratives to reduce support for terrorism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 39(5), 381-404.

through by violent extremists, focusing on meting out violence to innocent human beings.<sup>104</sup>

The social space that is part of the radicalization spectrum, in which individuals are recruited and indoctrinated into violent extremism, is complex owing to the elements that are pivotal towards radicalization namely; narratives on national wealth and skewed distribution, relationships in a diffuse society, culture, and the normative perspective.<sup>105</sup>

The main demographic target for radicalization is the youth who are eager to join violent extremism groups due to several push and pull factors necessitating the critical need of proactive CVE approaches.<sup>106</sup> Radicalization has been identified as an antecedent to terrorism particularly in the Arab world with increased use of social media adding to increased number of those who are in the pool targeted for radicalization.<sup>107</sup>

#### **4.2 Violent Extremism**

Violent extremism is the process through which an individual or individuals who want to achieve; social, political, or ideological goals use violence. Violent extremists are individuals from diverse social networks including online communities, religious groups, and criminal gangs who commit ideologically driven violence with intent to kill, a definition that captures radicalization to violent extremism as both individual and group based.<sup>108</sup> Violent extremism propagates, justifies, and encourages the use of

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<sup>104</sup> Conway, *Supra* note 15, at 77

<sup>105</sup>Cooney, *Supra* note 53

<sup>106</sup> Herik, L. and Schrijver, N. (2014), *Counter-Terrorism Strategies in a Fragmented International Legal Order: Meeting the Challenges*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

<sup>107</sup> Shukla, A. (2009), *Impact of Terrorism on Social, Economic and Legal Structure of the Countries Obstacle to Global Peace*, Invertis Institute Of management Studies, Bareilly, June 3, available at: <http://cportal.com/civilservices/mag/vol-3/article/Imapct-Of-Terrorism>

<sup>108</sup>Moskalenko, Sophia. *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*. Oxford Scholarship Online, 2011.

violence, based on the extremist's ideologies that could be political, religious, or social. Academics in the area of terrorism have different perspectives about violent extremism and non-violent extremism with many applying violent extremism to mean an Islamist based violence,<sup>109</sup> with Schmidt<sup>110</sup> arguing that there are non-violent extremism behaviors that are violent such as intolerance to religions and worldviews of others, while Sedgwick<sup>111</sup> argues from the dichotomy perspective that what is extreme to one culture may not necessarily be extreme from the social norms of another culture.

The African context of violent extremism is unique in relation to the choice of extremists to occupy African territories and use them for; radicalization, recruiting, training and planning<sup>112</sup>. Research into violent extremism has shown that religion can be a key factor towards violent extremism as well as other cultural components including beliefs that are fatalistic, a perspective that also brings in political violence.<sup>113</sup>

### **4.3 Terrorism**

Terrorism has no single definition despite the concerted global efforts in the GWoT that has seen many nations as well as academics develop keen interest in understanding the nature of terrorism. The differences in definition are based on; ideological, religious, and political worldviews. It can be defined as the planned use or threat of extra normal violence by sub national groups to obtain a political, religious, or ideological objective through threats of a large audience, usually not directly involved with the decision

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<sup>109</sup>Andrew g., and Zeuthen, M., (2016). "Violent extremism.GSDRC Professional Development Reading Pack no. 34. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham."

<sup>110</sup>Schmid, Alex P., (2014). "Violent and non-violent extremism: Two sides of the same coin." *Research Paper. The Hague: ICCT* (2014). <http://www.trackingterrorism.org/sites/default/files/chatter/ICCT-Schmid-Violent-Non-Violent->

<sup>111</sup>Sedgwick, *Supra* note 29

<sup>112</sup> Ibid

<sup>113</sup> Ibid

making.”<sup>114</sup> There are different sources of terrorism including; religious, psychological, socio-economic as well as political with terrorism using a set of strategies that involve; suicide bombing, improvised explosive devices (IED), hijackings, assault, and kidnappings, to achieve its set objectives.<sup>115</sup> Terror attacks target soft targets in places such as; malls, markets, hospitals, schools, high traffic areas, and airports leaving a trail of destruction.<sup>116</sup> The resultant destruction and fatalities, impact heavily on; infrastructure, livelihoods, businesses, physiological and psychological wellbeing of casualties and victims, and increases the uncertainty indices of investment in terror prone areas.<sup>117</sup>

To sustain their terror activities terror groups use a variety of strategies including; money laundering, poaching, exploitation of natural resources, kidnappings and holding of hostages, illegal trade involving charcoal, sugar and human-trafficking.<sup>118</sup> The Somalia case of illegal trade in sugar and charcoal has seen billions of dollars in the pockets of terror groups which are used for radicalization, training, buying of weapons, vehicles, forged identification documents, and information.<sup>119</sup>

The perpetrators of terror attacks are violent extremists as seen in the Kenyan cases of; Mpeketoni, Garissa University, Gikomba market, West Gate, and many cases of IED attacks on Kenyan security agents. The Boni forest case involving use of the vast high

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<sup>114</sup> Enders, W. and Sandler, T. (2002), “Patterns of transnational terrorism, 1970-1999: alternative time-series estimates”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 46 No. 2, pp. 145-165.’

<sup>115</sup> Krieger, T. and Meierrieks, D. (2011), “What causes terrorism?”, *Public Choice*, Vol. 147, pp. 3-27.

<sup>116</sup> Aisha Ismail, ShehlaAmjad, (2014) "Cointegration-causality analysis between terrorism and key macroeconomic indicators: Evidence from Pakistan", *International Journal of Social Economics*, Vol. 41 Issue: 8, pp.664-682

<sup>117</sup> Raby, G. (2003), *The Costs of Terrorism and the Benefits of Cooperating to Combat Terrorism*, Paper presented at the secure trade in the APEC region (STAR) conference.

South African Institute of International Affairs, (2017). *Resource Extraction and Violent*

<sup>118</sup> Shukla, A. (2009), *Impact of Terrorism on Social, Economic and Legal Structure of the Countries Obstacle to Global Peace*, Invertis Institute Of management Studies, Bareilly, June 3, available at: <http://cportal.com/civilservices/mag/vol-3/article/Imapct-Of-Terrorism>

<sup>119</sup> Enders, *Supra* note 55 at 146

value natural resources<sup>120</sup> by has taken the GWoT to a new frontier owing to the close proximity of Somalia and the critical role of Lamu towards the Kenya Vision 2030 through the role of Lamu as part of the blue economy of Kenya. By extension the bitter history of death and destruction by extremists who have undertaken terror attacks on Kenyan soils is still live in the minds of Kenyans, reinforced by the fatalities of attacks across the globe calling for both government and academics to have joint efforts in combating the violent extremists in Boni forest. Context –driven factors abound in the terror activities of violent extremists with a unique emerging trend in Africa where they prefer to use African territories for; recruitment, radicalization, training, planning and unleashing of terror attacks.<sup>121</sup> The Boni forest –violent extremism nexus is one such context that calls for empirical and thus evidence-based approach in order to have a better informed approach towards resolving of the conflict with success.

#### **4.4 Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism**

Responses to violent extremism are a key focus of GWoT and involve counter terrorism (CT) activities undertaken through organized efforts of government through relevant security organs such as the military and police services as well as countering violent extremism (CVE) through methods that involve non-coercion and risk reduction approaches focusing on behavioral change approaches.<sup>122</sup> Many nations affected by both terrorism and violent extremism, an antecedent of terrorism, use a combination of the approaches that form a critical matrix towards securing their nations as witnessed in Kenya, where the NCTC is in charge of coordinating the NSCVE through proactive behavioral and CVE approaches, while the multiagency teams are involved in both

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<sup>120</sup> Douglas, L. R., & Alie, K. (2014). High-value natural resources: Linking wildlife conservation to international conflict, insecurity, and development concerns. *Biological Conservation* 171, 270–277

<sup>121</sup> Herik, *Supra* note 54

<sup>122</sup> Sawalha, Ihab Hanna. "A context-centred, root cause analysis of contemporary terrorism." *Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal* 26, no. 2 (2017): 183-202.

combat, covert as well as persuasion perspectives.<sup>123</sup> The use of county action plans (CAPs) which is an integrated and inclusive approach involving all stakeholders is a critical approach towards the Kenyan CVE model. It involves bringing on board all the stakeholders in a county and particularly the locals in ownership programs that are driven by a national values agenda premised on patriotism. The role of county governments in equitable and transparent distribution of county resources to all communities and in particular minorities and the disadvantaged such as the Youth Not in Employment, Education, or Training (YNEET) has been emphasized as a critical intervention point of countering radicalization and violent extremism. Addressing radicalization and particularly of the youth is a critical proactive CVE step in stemming violent extremism.<sup>124</sup>

There are gaps as well as counterproductive approaches towards the CVE and CT interventions and strategies used by the Kenya government, and bearing in mind that this is being used in the Boni area by the multiagency team as well as by the NCTC and CAPs there is need to identify whether there is a nexus between Boni forest as a biome and the prolonged stay and continued violent activities of the violent extremists.<sup>125</sup> Despite the heavy presence of a well-organized multi-agency team and a set of CVE activities including CAPs, increased attacks, fatalities, and casualties has been documented. Root cause analysis that is empirical is then a scientifically acceptable and

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<sup>123</sup>James K., & Zeuthen M., (2014). "A Case Study of Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) Programming: Lessons from OTI's Kenya Transition Initiative." *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 3, no. 1

<sup>124</sup> Idrees., M., (2016). *Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Central Asia And Afghanistan*. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

<sup>125</sup>Anderson, M., D., (2014). "Why Mpeketoni matters: al-Shabaab and violence in Kenya." *Noref Policy Brief, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center*

relevant method of identifying the nexus that this research sets out to achieve an approach that is already acceptable and applicable.<sup>126</sup>

Kenya is a signatory to various global conventions and legislation pertaining to sustainable environmental practices, human rights practices, as well as GWOt, each of these demanding a critical approach towards sustainable development of Lamu County which has hitherto been categorized as a marginalized area. By extension progressive legislation and policies as seen in the CoK, 2010, Public Finance Management Act, 2012, Public Private Partnership Act, 2013, County Government Act, 2012, Urban Areas and Cities Act, 2011, directives on affirmative action towards persons living with disability, women and youth in relation to access to 30% of both county and national government tenders, removal of examination fees for both KCSE and KCPE for public schools, monthly stipend for those aged from 70 years, as well as for orphaned and vulnerable children and the increased intake for both the NPS and the NYS will not impact as per expectation in Lamu County if the menace of violent extremists operating from Boni forest is not looked at from a new set of lenses. In this case the lenses are empirical in order to deliver a manageable and dependable model that this study sets out to deliver.

#### **4.5 Radicalization into violent extremism of community members**

The study purposed to find out the prevalence of radicalization as well as determining the violent extremism of individuals involved within the high valued natural resource in the study, Boni forest.

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<sup>126</sup>Sawalha, *Supra* note 57, at 184

**Table 4.5: Radicalization and violent extremism of Boni forest community members.**

	Yes		No		Not Sure	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Youths who do boat transport business are fully supported by Kenya Ports Authority to get coxswain licenses	11	9.57	60	52.17	44	45.37
Youths who run transport businesses from Lamu to Mpeketoni have been trained on safety skills by the KPA	0	-	107	93.04	8	80.91
I am required to have business permits to run my business	62	53.91	27	23.48	26	20.42
Youths who run transport businesses between Lamu and Mpeketoni have been trained on safety skills by the County government of Lamu	0	-	109	94.78	6	82.42
Youths who run transport businesses between Lamu and Mpeketoni have been trained on safety skills by the national police service	0	-	107	93.04	8	80.91
The Boni community co-exists with the extremists	100	86.96	13	11.30	2	9.83
Youths who run transport businesses from Lamu to Mpeketoni have been trained on safety skills by the KDF	0	-	114	99.13	1	86.20
Youths and women in Lamu can easily access youth /women funds provided by the national government	15	13.04	90	78.26	10	68.05
I can easily access government legal documents such as national identity cards, and birth certificates	86	74.78	11	9.57	18	8.32
There is partnership between the youth of Lamu county and the Kenya Forest Service in empowering the youth for self-employment	0	-	115	100.00	0	86.96
There is partnership between the schools around Boni forest and the Kenya Forest Service in conservation practices	0	-	101	87.83	14	76.37
There is a mentorship program by the Kenya Forest Service in	0	-	102	88.70	13	77.13



environmental conservation practices around the Boni area						
There is a partnership program between KFS and Ministry of education on early childhood education around the Boni area	0	-	52	45.22	63	39.32
Youths from all communities were given an equal opportunity in the recent recruitment .to NYS	31	26.96	20	17.39	64	15.12
Youths from all communities were given an equal opportunity in the recent recruitment.to National Police Service	55	47.83	39	33.91	21	29.49
Youths from all communities were given an equal opportunity in the recent recruitment .to Kenya Defense Forces	36	31.30	73	63.48	8	55.20
Youths from all communities were given an equal opportunity in the recent recruitment .to Kenya Forest Service	18	15.65	86	74.78	11	65.03
I know of a training school for boat coxswains in Lamu by KPA	0	-	81	70.43	34	61.25
I have been involved in public participation meetings on security	12	10.43	103	89.57	0	77.88
I am willing to give information concerning any source of insecurity	23	20.00	92	80.00	0	69.57
I am aware of a national government cash transfer program for the elderly in Boni community	24	20.87	84	73.04	7	63.52
I am aware of a national government cash transfer program for orphaned and vulnerable children for the Boni community	0	-	87	75.65	28	65.78
I have been involved in public participation meetings on safety through operation Linda Boni	2	1.74	113	98.26	0	85.44

The citizenship behavior of volunteering information is an indicator of patriotism and the fact that 80% of respondents answered in the negative for the item “I am willing to

give information concerning any source of insecurity”, is an indicator of a social behavior of withholding information. The fact that most of the respondents have only Madrasa level of learning at 46.1 %, with only 20.9 % of the respondents having a level of education beyond secondary school, coupled with the high number of respondents indicating that there is no support of the youths to get coxswain licenses by KPA at 52.1 %, with support on safety skills by KPA at 0%, clearly shows a high level of neglect of the youth. Lamu county native youths who live around; the cultural world heritage site of Lamu old town, Mokoye, and Hindi towns, heavily rely on water transport services using boats and fishing as their key sources of livelihood. Failure to have relevant strategies on the youth geared towards; empowering them, engaging them, and including them in programs that make them more patriotic through; services to their customers, the environment, and improvement of their socio-economic wellbeing and security is detrimental to the on-going operation Linda Boni. It further becomes a threat to other on-going projects such the LAPSSET corridor mostly through increased opportunities towards radicalization by violent extremist based in Boni forest. This is despite the many opportunities offered by the natural resources through the maritime economy, the Boni forest in terms of its wide biodiversity, vast knowledge of the Boni people of the Boni forest terrain, its fauna and flora, and the agribusiness activities on-going around environs of Boni forest.

Delivery of government services meant to alleviate poverty levels which are push factors towards radicalization was partly captured through items focusing on cash transfer programs for the elderly and the orphaned and vulnerable children (OVC). Only 20.8% of the respondents were aware of any cash transfer to the elderly while none was aware of any cash transfer for OVC. 73.0 % of the respondents were not aware of any cash transfer programs for the elderly while 75.7 % were not aware of any

cash transfer programs for the OVC. The cash transfer programs other than being a safety net for the elderly, the OVC, and those taking care of both groups, also serves as a critical bridging role between national government and communities in areas that have suffered historical injustices of marginalization.

Recruitment into government agencies shows a high level of no awareness as seen in 55.6% of respondents not being sure of the fairness level to communities in the recruitment process of youths into NYS, with 62.6% of the respondents indicating that recruitment into KDF was unfair to the youths of different communities, and 74.7% of the respondents stating that recruitment to KFS did not offer equal opportunities. Perceptions about inclusivity in employment opportunities by national government are core towards countering the narratives of exclusion and marginalization used by violent extremists in the radicalization process. With a majority of the respondents having the perception that there is lack of equal employment opportunities by critical government agencies such as NYS, KFS, NPS, and KDF, this could be part of the reason as to why there is minimal sharing of information on insecurity which stands at 80% of the respondents. This is supported by the correspondingly high percentage of 83.4% of the respondents disagreeing with the hypothesis item that read “There is increased cooperation between KDF and the youths of Lamu”. By extension this could partly explain the high number of responses in the negative that implies increased disappearance of youths after introduction of operation Linda Boni and coupled with the high level of knowledge of attacks on KDF at 83.4% of the respondents .This observation is crowned by the perception of respondents to the questionnaire item reading “The Boni community co-exists with the extremists” where 86.9% of the respondents wholly agree resonating with the earlier observation of a behavior of not being ready to offer information on insecurity to the security forces. This points to a

community that then to a certain extent supports the Al-Shabaab, an indicator of having been radicalized.

During the Mpeketoni and Hindi violent attacks by the extremists it was noted that the attackers knew both the target houses and their targets by name an indicator of locals who were collaborating with the Al-Shabaab and thus were already radicalized. The claim that Mpeketoni and hence the Boni area was formerly owned by Muslims and hence the grounds for targeting the upcountry inhabitants further adds to the narrative of the Boni forest as a source of radicalization in line with its being the area where the Al-Shabaabs operate from, a stand point supported by the 100% of respondents stating that the Boni community co-exists with the Al-Shabaab.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **SUMMARY FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **5.1. Introduction**

This chapter presents the summary of findings, conclusion, and recommendations of this research. The discussions on these topics are presented in the subsequent sections of the chapter.

#### **5.2. Summary of Findings**

Depriving communities of vital government services, irrespective of whether it is as a result of security operations, results in the construction of a social barrier between government and communities exemplifying the principle of the social deprivation theory. In Boni forest, the order by the national government for Bonis to move from their natural environment of Boni forest has resulted in their lack of traditional socio-economic activities that include; hunting, herbal medicinal practices, gathering fruits, and harvesting of honey. This was not only an unanticipated environmental change but also a socio-economic change both of which were negatively disruptive and which to a certain extent explains the high level of perceived co-existence and thus collaboration between the Bonis and the AS. The disruption of learning for school-going children and the close proximity of the villages to the AS serves as a potential matrix towards increasing the chances of push factors for the households and in particular the children and youths. It also exposes the young children to early forced marriages by the AS, an AS practice that is already empirically documented. Further to this the high number of respondents indicating that the Boni community does not receive cash transfer services for both the elderly and the OVC indicates a scenario of social deprivation which can

breed the narrative of hatred and marginalization by government, from both the Boni's and AS perspectives.

Inclusive development that aims at transforming the livelihoods of all communities through infrastructures such as highways, schools, hospitals, colleges, water supply and modern business markets will go a long way in making the communities look at the government positively. Similarly joint utility of such infrastructure by the communities and consequent benefits across all ages will serve to reduce the gaps always pointed out as historical injustices.

Multiagency teams will require to change strategy and have a framework that gives the locals relevant roles that enhances positive relational practices that delivers a perspective of open systems in line with systems theory. This calls for an assessment of the cultural intelligence of the multiagency teams in order to reduce chances of dissonance between the multiagency teams, communities, county governments, CSOs, and religious groups. This will inform high relational efficacy and consequent ownership of sustainable patriotic practices.

### **5.3 Conclusion on the study**

It is concluded that the high value natural resource and violent extremism nexus coexist due to a number of factors that have been discussed such as failure of the community members to benefit directly from Boni forest projects that are championed by the government. Boni forest is observed as a high valued resource that if well tapped can be of great importance in the lives of the marginalized communities living within Boni forest, hence there exist a chance to change their socio-economic status if only there is a gap filled to regulate the interests of the violent extremist groups and the government multi agency security groups.

## **5.4 Recommendations**

### **Local strategic partnerships**

There is need for strategic partnerships between different generational groups of the communities living around Boni forest in regard to the communities'; elders, youths, women, school-going children, religious leaders, scholars, business community and political leadership. These local partnerships would be anchored on the need for mutual understanding of the diversities between the communities including; the diversity on land acquisition, utility, and compensation. This should use a cross-generational approach with intergenerational meetings being held to explain the historical land issues with the sole objective of achieving the national values of celebrating the diversities of Kenyan people. The need for a business model for the youths in Lamu old town involved in different levels of businesses and employment needs to be a priority towards relevant youth empowerment and engagement programs.

### **National strategic partnership**

The KFS and KWS need to develop a partnership programs with the local communities that target different community categories. Such projects will call for public participation approaches and frameworks right from the schools to the businesses. They should have an overarching focus on the unique roles of youth, women, political leaders, and religious leaders in the sustainable utility of high value natural resources that abound in Lamu. Formation of groups that reflect interethnic, inter-gender, inter-religious, inter-business membership will play a pivotal role in bringing on board shared experiences and knowledge from different perspectives. The CVE work plans for the Lamu County will need to factor the role of the multiagency team in having a soft

approach towards coming up with a win-win strategy between them and the communities.

### **Natural resources as a link towards conflict management strategies**

In line with the social exchange theory, relationships between government agencies, and the community, calls for delivery of conflict management strategies that deliver a win-win lasting outcome. In this regard then, there is a need for the national government to come up with a strategy that wins the perceptions and attitudes of the; youth, women, religious and political leaderships, business community, civil society organizations, and professionals living within Lamu, relative to their role in the inclusive management of high value natural resources. The benefits by the community will result in consequent reciprocity through ownership of government projects, peace initiatives, safety practices, education, absorption of vital government services such as schooling and health. Other benefits through opportunities to the youth for employment in the many on-going flagship projects, empowerment through collaboration between CSOs and both county and national governments, talent tapping, and development will develop a patriotic paradigm away from the current feelings of marginalization.

The KFS then needs to undertake public participation approaches geared towards the socio-economic empowerment of the Boni community by enhancing their sustainable exploitation of the Boni forest while linking it to government services such as education. Use of the Bonis and Swahili Muslim people in teaching the Bonis conservation partnership practices in a well thought-out and planned strategy needs to be rolled out with political and religious support from the local community.

In regard to the KWS, there is every need for the organization to enhance strategic partnerships with the Boni community from an animal protection perspective with well



thought –out learning activities that will involve the Bonis in such activities like counting of animals among other biological practices. This would involve the critical traditional knowledge that the Bonis have of the forest and its fauna and flora.

The ministry of education will have a critical role to play in developing learning models that aid in winning the minds of the learners to the formal education in such a way that it aids them ventilate what they have been going through. The need to have feeding programs in school will score the goal of countering narratives of marginalization through value-added learning. Boarding schools in which the parents play vital roles of supply and mentoring could add further value to the role of education as both a PVE and CVE tool.

By extension the ministry of health will need to have a fruitful partnership that focuses on maternal health care, ante-natal care, and provision of high impact health services through training of the locals and synergizing with their traditional health services delivery systems.

### **Development projects**

The national government in conjunction with the county government should have the flagship projects aiming at increased infrastructural development which has a focus on optimal utility of resources including the; blue economy, wild life, agribusiness, and education. To this end the national government should open up closed areas of the areas surrounding Boni forest using high ways that have a frontage that offers safety and security for travelers as well as the security forces. Compensation for land should involve a more community inclusive approach through training of locals on land marketing principles where families, local community leadership, religious leaders, and business community are involved. There is need for the national to have government to

have a firm grip on the delivery, and absorption of early child hood development education to ensure that the children use the national curriculum. By extension the national government must have a firm implementation program for secondary schools by ensuring that the schools are not only well equipped but also have qualified personnel. Data on schools should be interrogated regularly to ensure that the completion rates of cohorts are monitored and analyzed as a vital component of tracking absorption of educational services

By extension the ministry of health will need to have a fruitful partnership that focuses on maternal health care, ante-natal care, and provision of high impact health services through training of the locals and synergizing with their traditional health services delivery systems.

### **5.5 Further research**

1. Research on the role of women in sustainable management of high value natural resources
2. Research on the integration models for sustainable inter-ethnic co-existence
3. Research on the effect of CSOs on the socio-economic wellbeing of the communities they operate in.

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