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INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (IDIS)

**THE ROLE OF AFRICA STANDBY FORCE IN SECURING AFRICA: A CASE OF
THE EASTERN AFRICA STANDBY
FORCE**

BY

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DECLARATION

I, Loise Makato, hereby declare that this research project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this study to my sons Ryan Muoki, Eythan Makato & Dylan Kimonyi (RED) and in a very special way to my husband Kenneth Mule.

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I would like to thank the Almighty God for giving me the zeal, privilege, wisdom and guidance to conduct this study. I pay tribute to my family, my sons who endured my absence most of the evenings and weekends over the past year, at times accompanying me to school. My good-hearted husband Kenneth Mule who enabled my study as a moral and financial backer deserves a special mention in this regard. Alex Makato and Victorine Kyalo, your support was incomparable, thank you.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

APSA	Africa Peace and Security Architecture
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ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
C(CPX)	Command Post Exercise
CADSP	Common Defense and Security Policy
CAR	Central African Republic
CASF	Central African Standby Force
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
COPAX	Security Council in Central Africa
CSSDCA	Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa
EASBRIG	East African Standby Brigade
EASF	East African Standby Force
EASFCOM	Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FTX	Field Training Exercise
GTD	Global Terrorism Database
GTZ	German Society for Technical Cooperation

IDPs	Internally Displaced People
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
LOGBASE	the Logistics Base
LogMAPEX	Logistics Mapping Exercise
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated stabilization mission in
MSC	Military Staff Committee
NARC	North Africa Regional Capability
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PLANELM	planning element
PLANELM	Planning Element
PoW	the Panel of the Wise
PSC	Peace and Security Council
REC	Regional Economic Communities
RM	Regional Mechanisms
SADC	South African Development Community
SASF	South African Standby Force
SROs	sub regional organizations

UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNEF	United Nations peacekeeping force
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in the Sudan
UNOC	United Nations Operation in Congo.
UNOMUR	United Nations Observer mission in Uganda and Rwanda
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision organization
UPCD	Uppsala Conflict Data Base

ABSTRACT

The research attempts to proffer solution to an armed conflict whose perpetuity is crippling and stifling Africa's peace, security and sustainable developmental thrust. Using both qualitative and quantitative research methods through interviews and questionnaires respectively, and buoyed by an encompassing literature review the research set-out to proffer solution in arresting recurrent armed conflict in eastern Congo. The solution is the role of East African Standby Force (EASF) and the SADC Standby Force (SSF) under the authority and command of the African Standby Force (ASF); can play in dealing with armed conflict in Kivu. The collective security theory was used to provide a guideline and framework within which the envisioned synergy of regional Forces can work in bringing to an end an armed conflict that has spelt-out dire consequences towards African aspirations towards development. The researcher concluded that; African mechanisms towards peace and security need to be given all the internal support Africa through the African Union (AU) can muster in making the ASF viable, vibrant and vigilant in attending to Africa's endemic crises such as the continued unrest in Kivu. Further, the researcher argues that; "bringing an end to the Kivu unrest will bode well for African aspirations towards meeting her developmental pathway ensconced in declarations such as Agenda 2063". Finally, the researcher calls on the AU to institute contributions of US\$ 2 million each from Member States towards making Africa less reliant on foreign funding. The contributions are reasonable and within the capacity of AU Member States to contribute towards the realization of making the ASF a reality. US\$ 2 million is a modest figure, considering how much money Africa's economies lose out through international crime, for example. Thus, it is the thrust of this paper to advocate the institution of home-grown solutions to home-grown problems.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER

1.0 Introduction

This study seeks to look at the past, current and the future of peace and security matters in the Eastern Africa region with its focus on one of the institutions entrusted with securing the region- The Eastern Africa standby Force (EASF). With a view of identifying the place of Eastern Africa Standby Force in securing its region covered under background of the study. Also, in this chapter, problem statement, research objectives, research questions, review of literature on the subject and the justification will be covered. It further integrates the theoretical structure and methodology and lastly provides the chapter summary.

1.1 Background to the study

Peace keeping operations can be traced back to 1948, initiated by the UN's Security Council. Their first deployment under the United Nations Truce Supervision organization (UNTSO) was to the Middle East where the armed forces were to maintain ceasefires, stabilize the situation on the location and provide critical support to the political mission to resolve the conflicts in non-violent ways between Israel and its Arab neighbors. United Nations peacekeeping force (UNEF 1) was the first peace keeping force set up by the first emergency special session of the General Assembly held in the 1956 in the month on November with authorization to secure and supervise the termination of conflict.

In addition to terminating conflict, other responsibilities included the pulling out of the armed forces of France, Israel and the United Kingdom from Egyptian terrain and, after the pulling out, to serve as a cushion between the Egyptian and Israeli forces providing unbiased monitoring of the ceasefire. The force was withdrawn in 1967 between the months of May and June as requested by Egypt.¹ Another first for the UN was in 1960, where it deployed the largest peace mission in Congo with nearly 20,000 military personnel under UN operation in Congo (UNOC).²

¹<https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unef1mandate.html> accessed on 10th may 2018 at 12:52hrs

²<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/our-history> accessed on 10th may 2018 at 11:40hrs

Between the years 1989 and 1994, there was a swift rise in the number of peace keeping operations, this is a period where the form of conflicts had also altered from the interstate conflicts to intra-state conflicts and civil wars. This can be demonstrated by the significant cases of Nigeria, Sudan, republic of the Congo, Somalia among others. The UN had also to change their approach and methodology in tackling the peace operations.³ This saw it (UN) include other disciplines like; economists, police officers, legal experts, communication and information experts, humanitarian workers, election observers, human right monitors, governance specialists and civil affairs.

Towards the 21st century, large and more complex peace keeping operations were established in African countries with the examples of; United Nations Angola Verification Mission 1 (UNAVEM) from the year 1988 to the year 1991, United Nations Observer mission in Uganda and Rwanda (UNOMUR) beginning June 1993, United Nations mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) which began in month of October 1999 and ended towards the end of 2005, United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) which lasted for over six years, between March 2005 and July 2011 another notable and also a current one is the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated stabilization mission in Central African Republic (MINUSCA) from the month of April 2014 up till now.⁴

Increment in number of clashes and the need for more interventions to curb the conflicts in Africa saw the setting up of the APSA which happened in the framework of the revolution of the OAU to the AU.⁵ This resolution resulted from developments in Africa and also globally with the ending of Cold War. The OAU had accepted a Declaration on Political and Socio-Economic situation within its region and the essential alterations happening globally in 1990. That move changed the manner in which the OAU intended to handle human rights, democratic state, peace,

³ Ibid

⁴ <http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/African-Peace-Security-Architecture-Background-Note-ECDPM-2016.pdf> accessed on 10th may 2018

⁵ <http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/African-Peace-Security-Architecture-Background-Note-ECDPM-2016.pdf> accessed on 10th may 2018

protection and growth.⁶Nevertheless, the field of peace and security was still seen as the restricted domestic field of member states. Every instant OAU was required to intercede in domesticdisagreement or systematic violations of civil rights; it backed off, maintaining on the setideology of autonomy and noninterference in domesticmatters (Article III of the OAU Charter). Examples of the painted scenarios include theclashes in Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the genocide in Rwanda which highlighted the gaps.

The steps by African countries to build, prevent and maintain peace in the continent have been positively received by both the UN through its steps to advance its headquarters capability as well as set up more effective strategies for conducting transnational operations in the continent. The EU by setting up of an Africa Peace Support operation Facility to fundoperations is also an indication of supporting Africa in resolving its conflict issues.⁷Following the setting up of the AU and the APSA, more organs werealso established to actlike the organizational frame of the AU's and REC's everydayinvolvements and actions in peace and security withinthe continent.

The PSC is theverdictgivingorgan of the AUin the avoiding, management and resolution of clashes (PSC Protocol, Art. 2(1)) The ASF is the multidimensional force of the APSA including police, military and civilian components. The force isfoundedunder Article 13 of the PSC Protocol²⁵ composing of five regional and multidisciplinary units that includeEASF, SASF, CASF, NARC and ESF. The PoW is the advisory element of the APSA with its key areas of engagement being 'silent' and preventive diplomacy. The Peace Fund is a financial toolformed under Article 21 of the PSC protocol and it required to provideessentialmonetary resources for the operationalization of the APSA. The CEWS is the AU's early warning system thattargets to offerapt and dependable data to caution the PSC and the AU Commission of prospective clashes and occurrence of hostility.

⁶Dersso, S. 2013. The African Peace and Security Architecture in Murithi, T. (Ed). Handbook of Africa's International Relations Publisher. London: Routledge.

⁷ Weiss, Thomas G., and Don Hubert. The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, (2011) pp 45 -78.

The ASF was intended to assist the PSC in prevention as well as management of conflicts through preventing spreading or acceleration of the same. Additionally, the force was to help in peace processes, impose its verdict in instances of grave circumstances, help in peace building actions, and to take on humanitarian action, adversity managing and rebuilding.⁸ The EASF, as it is the case with the other RECs and RM under The ASF is expected to handle issues concerning peace and security in the member countries that include, Burundi, Comoros, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. South Sudan being an observer from the year 2013.

The EASFCOM was established in 2007 with its Secretariat and Planning Element (PLANELM) based in the capital city of Kenya, and the Logistics Base and Force Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. A dispute had emerged with some countries; Kenya and Rwanda opposing IGAD being the convening mechanism for the Eastern Africa standby Brigade and it was after it was resolved by having the body independent from any Economic block (regional block - IGAD), that it was renamed to Eastern Africa standby Force which reflected its multidimensional nature.⁹ A major issue that contributed to the dispute was the fact that some member countries to the force (Comoros and Seychelles) were not members of the region's economic community (IGAD). The regional force would then fit in as a Regional Mechanism (RM) as oppose to a Regional Economic Community (REC) as the other four.

Peace and security are key determinants for long lasting growth to be realized. The levels of conflict in the Eastern Africa region include intra-state like the case of Somalia and Sudan-South Sudan, inter-state conflicts like that between Ethiopia and Eritrea and also transnational security threats which include but are not limited to terrorism, human and drug trafficking and illegal use of artillery. The region is marked the most affected with prolonged violent conflicts a position is stressed by the heavy presence UN and AU peace support processes that have more than 50,000 troops within the continent. Other factors of distrust include, border disputes that bring

⁸<http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/African-Peace-Security-Architecture-Background-Note-ECDPM-2016.pdf> accessed on 10th may 2018 at 15:38hrs

⁹<http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/EASF-Background-Paper-PEDRO-Political-Economy-Dynamics-Regional-Organisations-Africa-ECDPM-2017.pdf> accessed on 11th may 2018 at 15:40hrs

instabilities that have wider regional repercussions with some of the disputes escalating to border wars that have led to military invasions.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

African member states created a Protocol to enhance peace and security in the Continent after the transformation of the OAU to the AU. Members showed their purpose to increase their readiness to risk for peace, showing they were prepared to be responsible for safeguarding long term growth of their region, mainly on the area of peace and security. The procedure founding the PSC wanted to come up with a number of units, that would include the ASF and the Military Staff Committee, strategy outline was formulated and revised by AU regional economic communities and other African and external partners. Efforts by the UN and AU to resolve the conflicts in this region are notable.

However, even with the efforts made, people continue to lose their lives, human rights are being violated, properties destroyed, massive displacement of people that has resulted to people settling as Internally Displaced People (IDPs.) across Africa. Burundi for instance, since gaining her independence in 1962, has experienced several violent conflicts, that include a civil war that which is projected to have caused more than 300,000 deaths and over 1 million displacements. The country continues to face awful public safety and humanitarian crisis, as well as instability and forced migration in the build-up to the 2020 election if another event of violent political unrest is not prevented.

As recorded by the Heidelberg conflict gauge, sub-Saharan Africa area has the majority high-density level of clashes with 14 out of 38 conflicts globally (in this category). Data recorded on Global Terrorism Database (GTD), a growth in terrorism attacks is notable on the higher side in Africa with primarily civilian deaths within the period 2010-2015. 2014 is the year that marked the highest number. Following the wave of post-cold war democratization and the recent pressure for democracy in Africa, cases of challenging quality of multiparty democracy and election outcomes have increased. Up to the year 2017, election violence has been experienced in Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Burundi, Sudan and South Sudan. This study seeks to establish EASF position in securing peace in its region which is still curbed with conflicts.

1.3 Research Questions

- i) What efforts have been made towards securing Africa before the establishment of the EASF?
- ii) How as the EASF performed as an instrument of securing peace in its region?
- iii) What are the key factors influencing the EASF capacity in enhancing peace and security operations its region?

1.4 Research Objectives

The general objective of the study is to determine how peace can be achieved in Africa by examining and analyzing the Eastern Africa Standby Force as a mechanism of securing and maintaining peace in the Eastern Africa region.

1.4.1 The Specific Objectives to the Study

- i) To examine efforts made to secure Africa before EASF was established.
- ii) To assess the EASF as an instrument of securing peace in the Eastern Africa region.
- iii) To critically analyze the key factors that influence EASF's capacity for enhancing peace and security operations in its region.

1.5 Literature Review

The internet has witnessed information boom whereby there is an increase in the numbers of articles being published, open access to the same articles making it impossible to navigate even the more specialized areas. The volumes are overwhelming at individual levels and retrieving information has become a challenge which can be solved through literature review that allows one to locate, evaluate and use information effectively.¹⁰ Literature review helps in many ways including placing each work in the perspective of how it adds to comprehension of the subject being reviewed, demonstrating how each work relate to the others under deliberation,

¹⁰ Andrew booth, Anthea Sutton and Diana Papaioannou (2016). Systematic Approaches to a Successful Literature Review. 2nd Edition. 2(3):13-14

spot different methods to interpret identifying the gaps in previous research, points the way forward for further research as well as locating one's original work within the existing literature.¹¹

This study has reviewed and analyzed different studies, which include:

A study conducted by Dr. Thomas Mandrup on *State fragility and its regional implications for peace and stability: The Case of the Greater Horn of Africa* describes the Eastern African region as one characterized by heterogeneous units and one that is conflict ridden. Drawing from UNDP 2012, he describes the region that is not only the most burdened by conflicts but also the most destitute globally, highest fertility rate yet the low life expectancy. Giving the example of the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia of 1970, he argues that the conflict left a security void in the region. Porous borders, fragile states and bad governance are some of the challenges he outlines within the region. His study recommends that the states (all) within the state through regional institutions are the solution to the state of the region.

However, he is of high doubts if weak states are proficient to set up regional security institutions of even successfully managing regional peace and security issues. He defends this position quoting that, two brittle elements combined do not make something strong a statement that can be interpreted that, the states within this region are weak and their uniting can't make them any stronger. To support his sentiments, he points to the clashes involving Ethiopia and Eritrea, wars in Somalia and Sudan and the regional enmity between the states in the region which he describes as chronic. He is of the opinion that cold war didn't cause conflicts and insecurity not just in the Eastern Africa region but in Africa as a whole explaining that, even after the end of cold war, the conflicts are still there, just taking new forms.

Justifying his arguments, he uses the position of the scholars like Snidal who is of the stand that the presence of a hegemon in global political affairs brings about cooperatively enjoyable effect for all states in the intercontinental arrangement. However, lack of a dominant state is linked to anarchism in the world order and adverse outcomes for states¹² and Nye whose view is that if the dominating state has non-aggressive power and acts in a way that benefits other states, efficient counter coalitions may take time to come up, but if otherwise the hegemon defines

¹¹ ibid

¹² Snidal, Duncan (1985) The units of hegemonic stability theory. *International Organization*, vol39(579-614)

its interests aggressively and manifests its powers unpleasantly, it gives other states more reason to come together escaping its domination.¹³

He argues that, the above is the major reason why the region is the poorest and most conflict ridden among the regions in the world. He continues stating that the reason as to why the many attempts to set up effective and efficient regional institutions have failed is because no institution has taken the lead process of including every state within the area in an effectual regional security arrangement.¹⁴ He gives the example of IGAD which is the largest regional institution with most of the regions states as members as a case in point, and the inability to host the EASF.

Although he recognizes the efforts by IGAD to successfully come up with a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism which deals with small arms proliferation, conflicts associated with pastoral causes, cattle rustling and smuggling, he blames the region for its inability to pick either of the pre-existing bodies (EAC, COMESA or IGAD) to host the EASF. This he sites is due to lack of trust between states.¹⁵ He recognizes the steps made by the APSA and the AU in the establishments of the EASF among the other four in other regions.

He states that EASF setbacks include the division of its structure between Kenya and Ethiopia (the EASFCOM and military planning element is based in Kenya whilst logistics and the HQ is hosted by Ethiopia) a weakness he points to lack of a hegemony. However, he notes that it is commendable that the region has put up a platform (EASF) which offers a platform for member states and governments to come together and share views on security related matters, which has vital assurance building constituent.

His arguments on this region display a very demining perspective on its ability to come up with African remedies to African problems as embolden on the AU's and APSA objectives. If the regions EASF has made tremendous steps in the vision of securing its region which he recognizes then one cannot match the same with his stand on the impracticality of fragile states coming together to institutionalize their security matters.

¹³ Nye J, 1993 (The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Super Power Can't Go It Alone. Oxford. Oxford University Press)

¹⁴ Thomas Mandrup, (March, 2012) State fragility and its regional implications for peace and stability The Case of the Greater Horn of Africa:3

¹⁵ Ibid

Sophie Desmidst and Volka Hauck in a study that focused on *Understanding the Eastern Africa Standby Force: A regional mechanism without a political home* are of the position that, EASF's dilemma results from its lack of association to a specific Regional Economic Community and not being politically associated to one of the RECs. They attributed this as the main product of the many factors defining regional integration on peace and security matters in the EA region. They have argued that despite the many attempts by the secretariat efforts to expand its activities to enable them deal with the many conflicts, political leadership has not given it the necessary support but instead has focused on military aspects.

They take note that, EASF operates within a region with various regional organizations with member countries having overlapping memberships and commitments hence conflict of interests. This factor exposes the young EASF to unnecessary need to compete for its recognition especially with the more established IGAD in terms of political aspects of conflict management and also recognition by the AU. They have also used the 2015 situation in Burundi where the EASF wasn't given a chance to take charge of the conflict matter, a scenario they argue displayed The EASF's rather limited role in the region labeling it a military training facility.

They recognized that The EASF has produced some valued capabilities of military and police kind through the functional cooperation between member states. They also recognize that it has earned trust among key actors through regular exchanges at different political and technical levels.¹⁶ However, their position is that EASF may never function in the context of African Standby Force in presence of too many regional organizations and member countries present displaying diverse interests and the absence of a regional champion who could influence key political decisions on peace and security in the region followed by all parties. They have also pointed out that, external partners have provided a rather low-intensity support with no exact strategic engagement and strong coordination among each other.

Endalcachew Bayeh, in his academic journal on, *The Eastern Africa Standby Force: Roles, Challenges and Prospects* pointed out that, EASF has minimum responsibility in upholding peace and security in the area because as the body has only played supportive function to the UN and

¹⁶Sophie Desmidst and Volka Hauck (2017), *Understanding the Eastern Africa standby Force: A regional Mechanism without a political home*: 12-13

AU peace support missions. He associates the little engagement to the competition between Ethiopia and Kenya for power, the frequency of conflict between and domestic conflicts within the area, repetition of RECs with overlapping membership, lack of a good legal framework, inadequate funding, and cultural multiplicity.¹⁷

He observes that, EASF has a good future prospect judging from the ongoing undertakings as the organization was determined to achieve FOC. He uses conduction of pre-deployment joint trainings and field exercises as examples to the steps EASF was taking. In his study, he proposes collaboration among member countries, encouraging unconditional assurance of member countries to give force, funding and logistics and also unifying training and doctrines in creation of effective transnational forces. At the time of his study EASF had not deployed its independent peace support mission in any of the clashes within region. Finally, the study proposes that member countries, particularly Ethiopia and Kenya put their energies towards security matters other than the competition for power.

A study by Camilla Elowson and Adriana Lins de Albuquerque on *challenges to peace and Security in Eastern Africa: The role of IGAD, EAC and EASF* discuss that EA being the host of African Union headquarters, is the focal point continental collaboration and peace and security matters. However, this region is faced by grave challenges on condition and human safety brought about by equipped clashes, political disaster and democracy and authority shortfalls. As a result of hegemonic competitions among states in the area, lack of a hosting REC for security mechanism.¹⁸ In its place, diverse regional units with different authorization jointly make up EA's giving to the APSA. This presents the main setbacks to peace and security in area in the past five years and how the current regional structures have reacted to such challenges.

They are of the view that, it is the obligation of the organs their study is based on to maintain peace and security. Whereas other forces of the ASF are attached to the REC of the region, EASF is a standalone owing to the fact that there was no REC composed of all the countries in the region among other factors. They suggest that even though EASF would have

¹⁷Bayeh E (2014). The Eastern Africa Standby Force: Roles, Challenges and Prospects. *Inter. J. Polit. Sci. Develop.* 2(9): 197-204.

¹⁸Camilla Elowson and Adriana Lins de Albuquerque (Feb, 2016), *Challenges to Peace and security in Eastern Africa: The Role of IGAD, EAC and EASF*

been the appropriate body to be at the center of resolving the political crisis in Burundi in 2015, the opportunity was given to the EAC which was authorized by the AU to act as the mediator.

Even though the EASF was ready for deployment at this time, this article states that their possibility of deployment was rejected at the AU level citing logistical, tactical airlift abilities and also capacity to contribute troops challenges. Other challenges highlighted by this article include monetary and political shortcomings and the mandating process of EASF which is not clear. The hierarchy between the AU, the other regional organizations and the EASF has also been pointed out as unclear as to what organization has the right to deploy the standby force. Even though all member states have pledged, it is undefined whether the commitments will be sustained in time of an actual peace support operation.

In a nutshell, this paper has displayed that Eastern Africa region peace and security matters are assigned depending on the type of the conflict and the political alienation of the countries involved. They have demonstrated this through the study's direction whereby, IGAD has been heavily associated with dealing with democracy and governance and in a big way terrorism attacks, they were also involved and still are in the Sudan and South Sudan conflict. EAC has been displayed as the one in charge of political crises even though the scenario used to paint the same is the Burundi political crisis. EASF, however recognized as being ready its mandate is not clear.

ECAS 2013 on *East African Standby Force: shortcomings and prospects for the future*, study brings out a broader perspective of the shortcoming of the organ in securing Eastern Africa region. Internal security issues among most of the member countries with 5 out of 10 rated as highly dysfunctional states has been stated as one of the shortcomings, the difference in colonial background, lack of finances both financial and expertise in that field a challenge has made the force to outsource external support which beats the logic of Africa solutions to African problems. An example of Netherland's involvement in C2 CIS development of support capacity and capabilities has been used as an example.¹⁹ The anarchic structure of member states countries, polarity issues, socially constructed enmity have also been discussed in this paper. The article

¹⁹European Conference on African Studies (ECAS). *East African Standby Force. Shortcomings and Prospects for the Future* (2013). 5th edition. 11-12

raises a very important question as to if the ASF is responsible and capable of resolving the issues within the EASF which would in a big way set it free to perform.

Presence of several organizations (IGAD, EAC) within the region that are not well coordinated has also been identified as one of the setbacks, political qualms among régimes, the wobbly political will of state elites and weak legal frameworks.²⁰ The article has taken note of the accomplishments of the member countries of EASF; the setting up of the independent coordination mechanism, the deployment of some troops in Somalia and collaboration with the UN in the country, the founding of a Maritime Cell, effectively conducted exercises, as well as continuous progress of civilian and police components. My study will specifically look at the EASF and try to identify the gaps within the mechanism and how best they can be filled. With a specific body in discussion will avoid the blame games over looking at the responsibility as of different bodies.

Richard, in his occasional paper, argues that it is crucial to take note the AU has taken some important steps to harmonize Africa's numerous security initiatives. He indicates that some of the steps taken is the formation of regionally based multinational forces as part of an ASF, the decision to constrain official collaboration to seven organizations which targeted preventing needless duplication of efforts and to ensure that the region's resources and efforts are focused on priority sectors. He also points to the AU's decisive steps towards establishing a common way to handle peace and security matters within the eastern Africa region through grounding its security architecture on key regional pillars and including prior initiatives as reference points as well as implementing agencies into the regions policy.

Mwanzia Richard in his study on *Securing Africa: The Role of The African Standby Force* notes that, ASF is not the remedy to African conflicts but an important component in the direction of finding the solution. He outlines the challenges to ASF's success as; the competence of the REC is uneven and mandating authority is indistinct, if the AU requires bargaining with RECs/RMs on the engagement of the forces that they have prepared is also not clear.²¹ He also notes that, ASF

²⁰ Ibid

²¹ Mwanzia Richard, (Sept. 2015) *Securing Africa; the Role of the African Standby Force*; University of Nairobi

peace and security tasks are not specific, as the force is needed to attend to several, different purposes, that include observing and monitoring of missions, deterrent deployments, peace building efforts and post-conflict undertakings, and peace support operations and interventions. Other aspects of ASF that are Non-military include a standby competence for civilian police and civilian experts in docket of civil rights, governance, disarmament, disbandment and recovery.

Other key points noted in his study on African Standby Force are; The AU's peacekeeping management capability was being advanced, and within a short period the current structure have it take charge of only small missions. The staff of the AU PSOD were few compared to the tasks done for the operationalization of the ASF and the preparation, running and support of current and new missions. The study concluded that it was necessary for AU to employ to increase the number of specialists and experts, as well as more general staff, so as to improve internal coordination and allow for a more open sharing of tasks.

The study is a bit broad, examining the ASF which covers the whole of Africa. This looks to have limited him in terms of coverage hence the generalization of the findings. In my study, I will be specifically looking at a specific Regional Mechanism which will give specific findings as well as recommendations.

1.6 Research Gap

Several researches have been carried out on securing peace and security in Eastern Africa through several institutions, but little seems to have been done regarding the place of the EASF in securing its region. This study seeks to fill the gap identified through adding knowledge on the same.

1.7 Justification of the study

1.7.1 Policy Justification

Through identification of gaps in the strategies used by the AU and the PSC through EASF, this study will contribute to better designed policies and programs on security both at formulation and implementation levels. Also, through adoption of recommendations given in this study, EASF will be better positioned to secure peace in the East African region, which will result into

a peaceful region that upholds human dignity through observation of human rights, normal human interactions, ensure a conducive environment for developmental projects as well as trade.

1.7.2 Academic Justification

The study will contribute to the existing knowledge through giving a comprehensive evaluation of the EASF prospects, challenges as well as their potential. It will also give information and highlight gaps that can be useful to future scholars as well as researchers who may be interested in this area of study.

1.8 Research Hypotheses

- i) Efforts to secure the Africa before EASF was established were not effective in securing the region.
- ii) The EASF as an instrument of securing peace have no significance influence on the peace and support operations in the region.
- iii) The strategies and mechanism adopted by EASF have negatively influenced its capacity for enhancing peace and security in Eastern Africa region.

1.9 Theoretical Framework

Theories are set of ideas that try to explain facets of social world, are central to one's research methodology and nature of the data one collects.²²This study will use the deductive approach which will be useful in the choice of the research methodology and will also inform on the kind of data to be data collected.

This study will be anchored on the collective security theory in understanding the role of ASF in securing Africa focusing on the case of EASF as a mechanism for peace and security within EA region. The responsibility of ASF in fighting armed clashes in Africa is a collective security approach entrenched in the collective security theory. The theory was propagated by scholars including George Schwarzenberger who argues that, Collective security system is comprehended as machinery intended to shield a certain status quo from being conquered by force or in every

²²Bob Mathews and Liz Ross (2010). Research Methods. A practical guide for the social sciences.1st edition. Pearson Education Limited.A2(36-37)

other unlawful means.²³ Other propagators of this theory include; John Galtung, Elise Golding and Adam Curl.

The study carefully provides the guiding principle on which collective security machinery can be marshaled subject to EASF. The study also reveals the theory of collective security as a method to attain peace envisaging collective security in the reality of EASF as a mechanism for resolving the endemic armed conflict in the East African Region. The component of EASF which includes military, police and civilians which come with machinery endowment propelling the role of EASF gives the study all the assurance that the force might be the solution to the efforts made in safeguarding peace and security in the area.

In this study, collective security theory will be used to analyze the extent to which EASF as an organization has been effective in solving the challenges facing the Eastern African States in the realm of peace and security. This is in agreement with the collective theory which advocates for states working together with the aim of a common defense and security against any threat.

1.10 Scope and Limitations of the Study

This study will concentrate on efforts, strategies applied and the factors that influence the EASF in executing its mandate to secure its region under the period between 2004 and 2018. Although there are other institutions operating in this region and dealing with matters peace and security, the study will limit its self to the place of EASF in securing its region.

1.11 Research Methodology

This section will be based on the methodology that the researcher intends to apply in conducting the research and will apply a mixed method (the qualitative and quantitative research method) which is the best fit for achieving the objectives of the study. This methodology will help to obtain both statistics as well as wholesome picture of the issue under the study (the role of ASF in securing Africa: a case of Eastern Africa Standby Force). The methodology will help answer research questions that others may not, provides the opportunity for presenting a greater diversity

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of divergent views while maximizing the strengths and reducing the limitations of single methods.²⁴

1.11.1 Research Design

Research design is a group and arrangement of conditions of analysis of data in a way that aims to put together relevance to the research process and economy with procedure. This research will use the case study research design.²⁵

1.11.2 Research Site

The research site will be within Kenya, Eastern Africa Standby Force Secretariat located in Nairobi at the Defense Staff College in Karen.

1.11.3 Target Population

The target population for the study is based on expertise, and professional work experience. EASF secretariat director, Security experts, EASF top officials, personnel within the organization that have participated in interventions involving the EASF team will be targeted.

1.11.4 Sample and Sampling Technique

Sampling is a procedure of picking a number of individual/things/objects for a study in a way that selected will represent target group from which they are picked. The sample size should be adequate to allow for generalization but also small enough for practicality.²⁶

Purposive sampling will be used. In this type, cases of subjects are selected because they are informative or they possess required features. In this approach, no attempts will be made to create a sample size as the cases chosen are those that can divulge and illuminate the most about the research area.²⁷

²⁴www.deakin.edu.au Dr-r- cameron mixed-methodology research. 2014 accessed on 21st may 2018 at 1330hrs

²⁵Kothari, Research Methodology, Methods and Techniques, 2006

²⁶ Kothari (2006) Research Methodology, Methods and Techniques

²⁷Bob Mathews and Liz Ross (2010). Research Methods. A practical guide for the social sciences. 1st edition. Pearson Education Limited. B5(167-168)

1.11.5 Data Collection Methods and Instruments

The study relies on both primary and secondary data for the purpose of gathering information.

Questionnaires are to be administered to EASF secretariat director, Security experts, EASF top officials, personnel within the organization that have been involved in interventions involving the EASF. One on one interview with to EASF secretariat director and Security experts is also to be carried out within the EASF Secretariat in Karen, Nairobi using a semi-structured interview technique. A focus group discussion will also be used as it allows to collect qualitative data on people's experiences, ideas and understanding of the topic in discussion.²⁸Secondary data on this subject matter, in the UN, OAU, AU, ASF as well as EASF documents will also be used. The unit of analysis is EASFs' place in securing Eastern Africa region between 2004 and 2018.

1.11.6 Data Analysis and Presentation

Data obtained from the field will be coded statistically to allow quantifiable analysis. To allow qualitative analysis, the data shall be grouped into comparable themes, which will also be coded to identify specific information in the text to allow the researcher recognize and recover it. An evaluation of the themes will be done by the researcher to decide the sufficiency of the information and reliability, helpfulness, consistency and validity.²⁹

The data will be presented in tables, pie charts, and bar graphs. The interview result will be analyzed through thematic and narrative analysis. Therefore, the reaction will be written down and grouped into similar opinions which will help in drawing a conclusion.

1.11.7 Ethical considerations

Social research is about human beings hence it mostly involves human beings, their ideas, experiences and their participation have an impact on both the researcher and the participants

²⁸Bob Mathews and Liz Ross (2010). Research Methods. A practical guide for the social sciences.1st edition. Pearson Education Limited.c5(235-237)

²⁹ Ibid

calling for ethical considerations when planning any social research. This study will put this into consideration as indicated below.³⁰

The questionnaires used for collection quantitative data will be ethically sensitive, to ensure that the participants don't feel intruded, through seeking informed consent in areas where their identity has to be revealed, explain the content of the questionnaire and the intention of how the data will be used and the wording of the questionnaire will also be checked to avoid the researcher being perceived either judgmental or insensitive. Care shall also be taken during the conducting of the structured interviews and the focus discussion group. A prior brief on the topic shall be given, an agreement reached on the control of the recorder and how to use the off the record statements or not to use the same. Data collected will also be properly stored secured for references and more importantly away from those not authorized to access.

1.12Chapter outline

Chapter 1 has examined various threats to peace and security in Africa over a period of time through the background to the study which also brings out the fragility of the Eastern Africa region on matters peace and security. The place of Africa standby force in securing the region has also been deliberated. A Statement of the problem has been specified, the researcher also explains the general objective and specific objectives of the study that are resultant of the research problem. Literature review on several studies that relate to the subject matter has been done which has helped in identification of research gaps. The researcher uses one theory, the collective security theory in an effort to build a theoretical framework. Finally, the researcher gives an outline of the target population from which information will be obtained. The sample and sampling techniques are also described, data collection methods, instruments to be used during data collection, analysis and presentation are provided.

Chapter 2 examines the efforts made to secure the Eastern Africa region before the establishment of the EASF.

Chapter 3 will assess the EASF as an instrument of peace in the Eastern Africa Region.

³⁰Bob Mathews and Liz Ross (2010). Research Methods. A practical guide for the social sciences.1st edition. Pearson Education Limited.A5(84-85)

Chapter 4 will critically analyze the key factors that influence EASFs' capacity for enhancing peace and security operations in the region.

Chapter 5 will present, analyze and report on data collected from the field.

Chapter 6 will include, summary, findings, conclusion and policy/scholarly recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

2.1 Introduction

This chapter looks at the efforts that were made to secure the Africa region prior to the formation of the African Standby Force (ASF) in 2002. The chapter traces the history of collective security from the United Nations-an intergovernmental body that was formed to rid the world of the scourge of war in 1945, through continental and sub-regional bodies such as the OAU that later morphed into the African Union. It also looks at SROs like the ECOWAS, SADC among others.

2.1.1 The United Nations

The United Nations was created after the end of 2nd world war in 1945 with a particular aim of upholding the general peace and security of the globe. The untold sufferings that were witnessed in during the Second World War hastened its formation. In particular, the effects of modern weapons and equipment including aircrafts that were used extensively to bomb enemy territory as well as the emergence of the atomic bomb with capabilities of wiping out entire cities indiscriminately as witnessed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki shocked the entire world. It made it imperative to have a body that could oversee the collective security of the world effectively compared to its precursor the League of Nations

According to the preamble to the United Nations Charter, the organization was created so as to ‘save succeeding generations from the plague of warfare.’³¹ In essence, the United Nations was supposed to use whichever means was within its disposal, both coercive and non-coercive means in order to preserve international peace and/or restore it where necessary. Nevertheless, as Dag Hammarskjold- a one-time United nations Secretary General once said, the United Nations ‘was not created to deliver us to heaven but to deliver us from hell.’ The words are rather pragmatic and in fact appropriate considering what Gary Wilson asserts about the UN system. To him ‘a far from perfect system meanders like a salamander that its members use to maintain collective security.’³²

³¹ Preamble, United Nations Charter

³² Wilson G.

For the purpose of this paper we, shall look at the aspect of collective security as it pertains to the use of force by various mechanisms the United Nations included. The paper shall limit itself to the aspects that deal with use of force to uphold or reinstateglobal peace as well as the laws and/or institutions that United Nations uses to reinforce this particular mandate.

The United Nations, in order to exercise its collective security role, uses the Security Council (SC) the prerogative and main role of maintaining law and order in the international security arena. The Security Council is composed of five permanent powers who happen to be all permanent members of the SC as well as 10 temporary members. These five permanent members are United States of America, United Kingdom, France, Russia and China coincidentally were on the victors' side of the Second World War. To a keen observer, the United Nations composition was a clear manifestation of power politics disguised as philanthropic gestures to secure the world and protect itself from self-destruction.

From of its history and association, the SC could not divorce itself form States self-interest a fact that came to play through the all-powerful veto power³³, especially during the Cold War. The two great powers would not usually agree on anything that went or perceived to be going against their interests and would routinely veto any decision pertaining to the said matter. The legal framework of the United Nations Charter permits the Security Council the power to maintain and restore international peace by whichever means as delegated by member countries through Article 24 of the United Nations Charter. The specific powers as delegated by the members in Article 24 are as outlined in Chapter VI, VII, VIII an XII.

A brief elaboration of what the above chapters deal with is given; Chapter VI speaks of how members can settle out disputes using pacific means that is all peaceful actions short of war including referrals to the ICJ. Chapter VII deals with all actions connecting to disruptorsof peace and security violations of peace, and acts of aggression that may lead to breakdown of peace in the world. The SC is mandated to take whichever measures to arrest the situation. As per this chapter, the onus is on the SC to determine what constitutes a breach of peace, and to take whichever measures appropriate to restore the breakdown in peace. Chapter VII looks at regional arrangements that allow members to collectively take regional arrangements to upholdas well

³³ Veto power makes it mandatory for all members of the SC to vote in support of a decision before it gets to see the light of day. An issue that require for instance 10 votes must have all five votes from the veto power.

reinstating continental peace and security. Chapter XII looks at issues pertaining to trusteeship particularly in the line of maintaining peace and respect of human rights in the trust.

However, as noted by Omar Touray, the American led War against Iraq in 2003 gave Africa a somewhat of a wakeup call that UN in itself cannot be entirely trusted to secure the world considering the decision to engage in war without being authorized by the United Nations.³⁴ Africa strongly protested via the union of the presidency of South African that it is not right for one country however powerful, however legitimate matters it may have that affect all of us, to unilaterally act on our behalf.³⁵ What this particular war did was to make the weaker countries feel that they could not entirely rely on the United Nations but must urgently find means in which to collectively defend themselves using a universal Defence and security policy.³⁶ Indeed the fears were later confirmed when a US led NATO invaded Libya in circumstances akin to the Iraq invasion.

2.1.2 Involvement of UN in Africa

The United nations, through the Security Council employed various means and actions in order to secure the world and by extension the Eastern Africa region, including the deployment of peacekeepers such as the UNAMIR, UNOSOM. Little can be written in as far as the success of the said operations is concerned with Rwanda erupting into violence almost immediately after the withdrawal of UNAMIR forces. The same is the case with UNOSOM I and II which were a near total disaster.

2.2 Organization of African Unity (OAU)

The debate of which between universalism or regionalism should be the preferred route to secure our world was something that featured prominently in San Francisco. Eventually, universalism is what was given prominence as aptly captured in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, regionalism similarly found a way in as captured in Chapter VIII. In simple terms, every member state was to make efforts to seek peace and security using continental means or agencies before

³⁴ Omar A. Touray; The Common African Defence and Security Policy, *African Affairs*, Volume 104, Issue 417, 1 October 2005,

³⁵ See South Africa regrets Iraqi War <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2868581.stm>

³⁶ See Opening statement by Dr. Dlamini Zuma, foreign affairs minister, at the meeting of experts on common, African Defence and Security Policy, Randburg, South Africa, 2003

resorting to the United Nation's Security Council. The Security Council in itself was to recommend pacific settlement of disputes by encouraging use of regional means as the first resort

2.2.1 Organization of African Unity

OAU was one such body that covered Africa in general and by extension the Eastern African region. African leaders have mooted the notion of African collective defense and security in the past. Kwame Nkrumah suggested that a unified defense system with a centralized military command system be set up. Other leaders were also supportive of the idea going by the myriad bilateral, regional and sub-regional arrangements security and defense mechanism that can be witnessed in the African continent.

The OAU itself was based on the understanding that it will provide a platform through which African leaders could settle their conflicts. Unfortunately, ideological differences amongst the African leaders, which led to two camps-the Monrovia and Casablanca groups meant that the OAU never developed a defense structure as was proposed by Nkrumah. In its place, an entity that we can at best describe as loose was formed to be accountable for the peace and security arm of the OAU.

The Commission on Mediation, conciliation and Arbitration, as the entity was named, had 21 legal professions. Unfortunately, it never effectively took off due to a number of reasons. One, it had a very narrow mandate which was to deal with inter states conflicts. In essence, very few conflicts were inter-state in nature then, and the few that threatened to erupt were rarely referred to the body. Secondly, like most African bodies, it lacked financial muscle to meet its obligations. Members were supposed to fund it through regular contributions but very few met their obligations at least on a regular basis. The body would later fade away despites efforts towards reviving it in mid-1970s mainly due to little interest from the members.

With the dismal results of the commission, the task of resolving conflicts were directed to an ad hoc committee mainly composed of heads of states or ministers. A number of disputes including some in eastern Africa including Somalia-Ethiopia, Rwanda-Burundi dispute. The committee somehow managed to settle the many conflicts some most conflicts without force such as the

Tanzania and Malawi and Burkina Faso and Mali conflicts. Even when the conflicts escalated into full-blown conflict, the OAU managed to maintain a quick ceasefire as the Ogaden conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia.

However, the Achilles heel of the OAU was dealing with internal conflicts. As noted before, the OAU from the onset had a policy of dealing with only inter-state conflicts and had a policy on non-interference with internal affairs of states. Unfortunately, conflicts that were most prevalent were intra state in nature. For instance, in 1996 alone, 14 of 53 African states had various levels of internal armed conflict that resulted in widespread displacements and deaths. In Eastern Africa at various periods, we had internal conflicts in Uganda, Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi.

This principle of non-interference in practice made OAU an ineffective organization in so far as securing Eastern Africa was concerned. Resources constraints and unclear legal framework also greatly impeded OAU's capacity to involve itself in peacekeeping operations. However, this would only last into the 1980s when the principle was discarded to some extent. In fact, OAU went as far as expanding the meaning of security to encompass security of individuals from the narrower definition which was merely state-centric.³⁷ This earlier definition never concerned itself with whatever a state was doing to its citizens provided the borders were 'safe' and 'intact.'

It is against this background that the 29th session of the OAU in Cairo adopted the Declaration on the Establishment of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.³⁸ This declaration was embedded within the OAU and was meant to bring a different approach towards handling conflict before they fully erupt. This involved sending a two-pronged team of observers; both military and civilian to conflict zones with the aim of putting off the embers as early as possible.

We also had the Meeting on CSSDCA, which was launched in 1990. This forum was meant to complement efforts by OAU towards finding lasting solutions to Africa's perennial conflicts. Unfortunately, the forum was considered Olusegun Obasanjo's idea and was quickly discarded

³⁷ Harsh Ernest, 'Africa builds its own Security' Africa Recovery 17, 3 (2003)

³⁸ *Declaration of the Assembly of heads of states and Government on the Establishment within the OAU of Mechanism for Conflict prevention, Management and Resolution.*

once he left office. It was not until his second term that CSSDCA was fully embraced by OAU as one of its programs.³⁹

OAU's other initiatives to secure the continent included the Bamako Convention that was meant to stop the importation and regulation of trans boundary movement of dangerous wastes, the Kempton Plan of Action on Land-Mine free Africa, the common position on proliferation and illicit trafficking of arms and weapons. The OAU Convention on fighting and deterrence of terrorism was also another initiative that was meant to secure the continent.⁴⁰

2.2.3 Regional Economic Communities Collaboration

African leaders could be accused of many other things but the need to find a lasting solution towards the many conflicts Africa faced is not one of them. In order to find 'lasting' solutions, OAU saw it fit to collaborate with regional bodies as much as their efforts were not always successful. The regional initiatives in conjunction with OAU's commission spurred the desire to institutionalize a joint defense and security policy through making appropriate legal provisions in the constitutive act of the African Union to be formed.⁴¹

2.3 Intergovernmental Action on Development

IGAD was formed in 1996 with its headquarters in Djibouti City Djibouti. It formally took over from IGADD. IGADD was formed in 1986 in Djibouti with an aim of addressing development and economic issues that were mainly affected by drought. The founding countries were Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia. Eritrea joined in 1993 after gaining independence from Ethiopia. IGAD objectively had now expanded to include peace and stability in the eastern Africa region that rightfully looked at affected economic development that IGADD was initially focusing on. IGAD mandate now includes dealing with issues of mutual concern to the member states in particular peace and stability and deliver the members from threats and actual inter and intra-state conflicts.

³⁹ African Leadership Forum, *the Kampala Documents: Towards a Conference on security. Stability. Development and Cooperation in Africa* Lagos Nigeria 1991.

⁴⁰ Omar A. Touray; The Common African Defence and Security Policy, *African Affairs*, Volume 104, Issue 417, 1 October 2005,

⁴¹ Omar A. Touray; The Common African Defence and Security Policy, *African Affairs*, Volume 104, Issue 417, 1 October 2005

Members first refer disputes to IGAD before they are escalated to organization outside IGAD including AU and or UN. IGAD has been active in trying to resolve conflict in member states including Somalia and South Sudan where it has tried to mediate with some levels of success. Among the success stories that IGAD can claim is the Sudan's Wide-ranging Peace Agreement which helped South Sudan obtain independence from Sudan.⁴² With the conception of CEWARN, its policy institutions have innovative features which bring the IGAD Agreement into working practice. However, the organization has and exercises limited capacities and authority and doesn't have a law-making body for itself which would have assured, internally and externally, a sound legal framework for drafting legal documents.

Most of IGAD's functions, its Secretariat and specific agencies highly depend on global assistance and partners (USAID, the German Society for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and the EU). The financial backing can be interpreted to empowering the donors to influence on the organizations' functioning, which characterizes IGAD as tremendously weak and wobbly organization and with a questionable ownership. However, its presence is helpful in that, it facilitates a platform for discussions and debates on both local and international politics. Through its initiatives on conflict management, moves to restore long-lasting peace in Sudan as captured above and the formation of specific bodies, are of help to the AU and the UN mission

2.4 East African Community

The East African Community is one of the most vibrant Regional Economic Communities in Africa. It has six members states namely Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda and South Sudan. It was re-formed in 1999 after more than 23 years hiatus. Like most RECs, EAC was formed with the aim of integrating the region. According to Luseno S., the 'Treaty establishing the EAC (The Treaty) set out a bold dream of regional integration in East Africa with the

⁴² https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Africa_SudanCPA_rpt_booklet.pdf

following aims: to generate; wealth, improve the living standards of entire population of East Africa and improve global competitiveness of the continent.⁴³

This vision would be realized using the subsequent fusion of the EAC Partner States coalescing around the following common initiatives: business ventures, financial and Fiscal Policy, Infrastructure Environment and Natural resources Managing among others. These key initiatives were intended to develop alongside the evolution of the regional integration that had four major milestones: Customs Union, Common Market was to follow, Monetary Union and finally, a Political Federation.

Indeed, a keener look at the above vision of the EAC will reveal that peace and security was topmost on the priorities of the Community. Article 5 (f) sets out 'to promote peace, security and stability internally, and upright co-existing among neighbors within the Partner States.' A closer look will reveal that indeed peace and development are interconnected and one cannot survive without the other. According to Former United Nations Secretary General Mr. Kofi Annan, 'the human family achieves growth devoid of security, it won't adore security short of progress, and it will not adore either at the expense of respect for human rights.'⁴⁴ As such, the EAC from inception put up measures to try and secure the region in order to achieve their objective of fostering economic and social well-being of its people.⁴⁵

From the onset, the EAC undertook to have in place specific measures and structures to handle peace and security issues in the region. Article 124 of The Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC saw it necessary to have certain fundamental actions that were prerequisite for the presence and continued enjoyment of peace and security among the East African Partner States. The article puts forth a number of measures that if implemented would secure the region including

⁴³Luseno. S. P Factors Influencing Communication Among Stakeholders in The Integration Process of the East African Community, masters' thesis submitted to University of Nairobi

⁴⁴ <https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/kofi-annan-our-world-cannot-have-development-without-human-rights-297355.html>

⁴⁵Peter Anyang' Nyong'o, "Governance and Democratization in Eastern Africa: Overcoming Conflicts and Initiating Political Integration," paper presented at the International Peace Academy, Makerere University/Africa

good neighborliness, joint measures to combat cross border crime, put in place regional measures to deal with regional disasters as well as refugees among others.⁴⁶ When read with article 125 which talks of a common defense strategy to realize the targets outlined in article 5(f) of the EAC Treaty, one can claim that EAC had elaborate measure to deal with peace and security measures in the region. If you add food security issues that are spelt out in article 110, the scope looks elaborate enough.

However, lack of clarity and strategic way on how the collaboration and co-operation was to be realized meant that the measures remained on paper and were not executed as was planned. As such, the EAC did not contribute much prior to the establishments of Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in realization of this weakness, the EAC Council of Ministers in 2006, as recommended by the Sectorial Committee on Interstate Security, sought to have a Regional Strategy that had a clear actionable plan to address the issues raised. The strategy covered partnership on trans-border criminalities, auto theft, drug trafficking, terrorism, money laundering and other crimes. The overall objective was to provide an environment that would support peace and security and therefore provide a springboard for peace and security.

The situation in EAC before the establishment of East African Standby Force was one that was characterized by conflict either caused by intra-state forces or conflict from outside the region and/or countries that spilt over. A cursory look at the EAC region reveals countries that are surrounded by one or more countries that have had a series of conflicts. Kenya has had Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan having prolonged periods of conflicts. The same can be said of Tanzania which has had Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi and Even DRC that have had contracted conflicts. Same as Uganda that had Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan having intermittent or prolonged periods of conflicts.

The said countries were not immune to internal conflicts either. Kenya has had related periods of politically motivated violence especially after the re-introduction of multi-party politics. It has also had cattle rustling related violence with the northern part of Kenya being the most affected region with Pokots, Turkanas and Samburus having various spates as a result of the vice. Uganda has also had several intra state conflicts triggered by many factors including cattle rustling,

⁴⁶ EAC, *Overview*. Available from <http://eac.int/sectors/peace-and-security>

ethnic related violence among others. Tanzania too, which to the outside world seems to be the most stable of the original EAC members had electoral related violence especially in Zanzibar in 1995 and 2000. This chapter will skip the other three EAC Partner states mainly because they were not yet members prior to the formation of the EASF.

With this history of violence that threatened to tear the little gains the EAC nations were (hoping) to achieve, one would expect that concerted efforts would be put in place to have measures to collectively defend themselves but as noted before, the response was just on paper. Attempts to actualize them were at best haphazard at worse lacking. In their defense, the EAC could be said to have been too young to tackle complex issues that had deep historical underpinnings but mostly because it wouldn't be in the main interest of the presidents then to do so. This can be looked at from the perspective of politically instigated violence that the three heads of state used or were perceived to be using to continue staying in power.

2.5 South African Development Community

The SADC is a regional economic bloc that consists of states primarily from the southern part of Africa. From the Eastern Africa region, Tanzania is the only member. The SADC Treaty envisions a region with among other things a surrounding of calmness, safekeeping and steadiness, local collaboration and incorporation based on justness, mutual benefit and solidarity.⁴⁷ To achieve this, SADC borrows a lot from the other global and continental collective security frameworks and principles namely the UN Charter and the Constitutive Act of the African Union (previously the OAU) especially those touching on peace and security. Measures such as continental early warning systems to help it deal with conflicts before they become full-blown are put in place in the region.

To further action this, the SADC region put in place the SADC organ Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation in June 1996. They further committed to a Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation in 2001 and consequently a Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ

⁴⁷ SADC Treaty

(SIPO) was established in 2004 to implement its goals as regarding security.⁴⁸ The SIPO is revised regularly to cope with emerging issues.

In actualizing this, SADC treaty stipulates in Article 4 that ‘human rights, democracy and the rule of law are valuescontrolling the acts of its members States’ and as accordingly made great progress through citizens participation. However, the area has issues in the sectors of politics, defense and security. SADC has political, economic and social short comingsmajorly due tottrade and industry undergrowth and poverty, the preference of HIV and AIDS epidemic,domestic and disputes among countries, consolidation of democracy and good governance, refugees, illegal migrants and internally displaced persons as well as bribery.⁴⁹

SADC’s influence unfortunately not been felt in the Eastern Africa region because it has only one member who has had relatively peaceful existent relative to most of its other members.

2.6 Economic Community of Central African States

ECCAS is a sub-regional organization that comprises mainly states in the Central Africa. Unlike the other regional economic blocs, the Treaty of ECCAS does not indicate peace, security, stability and governance in its institutional structure. However, to handle conflicts and political uncertainty in the region, in 1999 ECCAS adopted the Protocol of Peace and Security⁵⁰ whichpaved way for the formation of the COPAX that had3 key elements, the Commission for Defense and Security, the Central African Early Warning System and the Central African Multinational Force.⁵¹

The procedurefounding COPAX was officially ratified in January 2004 permitting it toincorporate defense and security mechanisms allied with the AU’s Peace and Security

⁴⁸ SADC, *Mutual Defence Pact* (Dar-es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, 2003). Available from http://www.sadc.int/files/2913/5333/8281/SADC_Mutual_Defence_Pact2003.pdf.

⁴⁹ <https://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/sadc-peace-security-stability-and-governance>

⁵⁰ <https://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/eccas-peace-security-stability-and-governance>

⁵¹ African Development Bank. *ECCAS Regional Integration Assistance Strategy for Central Africa 2011-2015*. 2011.

Architecture.⁵² similarly, CEMAC member countries set up a regional peace force in the Central African Republic in 2002 which intended to advance peace and security in the clash-inflicted Central African Republic. The Eastern Africa Region is represented in the ECCAS region by Rwanda which has had an on and off affair. It left the ECCAS region in 2009 to fully concentrate on the EAC but found its way back in 2016. However, for the period under review as far as this chapter is concerned, it was relevant to Eastern Africa since Rwanda was officially a member.

ECCAS was largely silent as the region conflict prior to and during Rwanda's implosion in 1994. Indeed, the influence of ECCAS has not been felt in any way with more than three quarters being involved in one form of violent confrontation or another.

2.7 Economic Community of West African States

ECOWAS is comprised of states on the West Coast of Africa. Its members include all those countries from Nigeria to the East and Senegal to the West. Of all the regions in Africa, none has witnessed the most coups and countercoups than the ECOWAS region. As such, it had to develop means and mechanism of shielding itself from the perennial coups. As such, it came up with a military wing that was responsible for maintaining and rebuilding peace in the region.

Unfortunately, composed of mainly military personnel, ECOMOG-the military arm of ECOWAS did little to make its activities understood by the very people it was trying to protect. This weakness was exploited by dictators such as Charles Taylor who used public sentiments against ECOMOG to portray himself as a liberator from a bunch of military men who were hell bent in extending their tyranny through the guns.⁵³ The fact that the region had witnessed many military officers taking power through coups did not make it any better.

2.8 African Union

The OAU may have noble objectives including being in solidarity with African countries in their quest to gain independence but once the continent was liberated from colonialism in 1994 with

⁵² Angela Meyer. *Preventing conflict in Central Africa - ECCAS caught between ambitions, challenges and reality*, 2015. Institute for Security studies. Central Africa Report ISSUE 3.

⁵³ Report of ECOWAS workshop. Koffi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Accra, Ghana.

South Africa's independence; the OAU had to transform itself in order to remain relevant. In 1999 in Sirte, Libya. The new organization had to have broader mandates that took into shape the emerging challenges and metamorphosis of trends in conflict management and or prevention.

As noted earlier, the American war on Iraq under the disguises of fighting terror, although not involving African countries, was a major catalyst in making Africans to consider having 'African remedies to African challenges' as such, the AU incorporated the conflict prevention and prevention, management and resolutions on of its organs. Mechanisms were also put in place to hold the chairperson accountable. The chair was to review the structures, procedures and methods including considering a possible name change. Indeed, in the inaugural AU assembly in Durban, 2002 there were strong calls to operationalize the clauses in the Constitutive Act of the AU touching on the CADSP.

Among the calls was an immediate formation of a team of experts to put to paper the proposals on CADSP. In two years, between 2002 and 2004, after many meetings, a document 'Framework for a Common Defense and Security Policy was formally adopted in Sirte Libya.⁵⁴The CASDP was to deal with three underlying issue that could potentially affect African Countries namely *defense, security* and *common threats*. The three terms were broadly dealt with in order to have a common understanding.

Defense was defined to include all those measures that a state would use to protect is territorial integrity and all those factors critical to it include socio-cultural ones. Security on the other hand was defined as the protection of from harm of individuals, their families and communities as well as their socio-political and economic way of life from attack or threats of attack. Lastly, common threats were defined as all those threats that could simultaneously affect a group of countries whether emanating from within or without the continent, and whether natural or man-made.⁵⁵

Concisely CASDP was to prevent the continent from internal and external threats from issues ranging from regional insecurity, terrorism, international trade regimes and narcotics among others. In principle, CASDP was to be loosely structured in the vein of NATO where an attack

⁵⁴ Ibid p.2

⁵⁵ Framework for a Common Defence and Security Policy para.5

on one was deemed an attack on all. However, events as witnessed in Libya in 2011 where ironically NATO (from whom they borrowed a lot including the working principle) was the aggressor, and that of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria have left CASDP with eggs on their faces. It is from CASDP that the Peace and Security Council (PSC) that would give birth to regional standby forces, including the East African Standby Force (EASF) which is the focus of this research.

2.9 Conclusion

The collective security of the Africa region was achieved by a combination of universal and regional and sub-regional organizations. The United Nations being regional economic communities that although were largely economic in their nature had recognized the need to incorporate peace and security in their structures. This was mainly as a realization that genuine expansion can't be achieved sans peace and security. Continental and global collective security frameworks namely the African Union and United Nations respectively have also complemented the region. The main challenge with witnessed prior to the formation of the EASF was the long time it took to mobilize troops to take action. Secondly, the troops sent, especially by the United Nations had a limited mandate to just peacekeeping. Besides, the troops did not understand the nuances of local political idiosyncrasies, as was the case in Somalia leading to limited achievements at best and complete failure at worst.

Therefore, decision to form a standby force for eastern Africa by eastern Africans was a timely thought idea that runs in tandem with the famous 'African Solutions for African problems' maxim.

CHAPTER THREE

3.1 Introduction

This chapter is going to critically assess the responsibility of East African Standby force as an instrument of Securing Eastern Africa. It will first take a broader view of the mechanism that have been put in place continentally through the African Union's Peace and Security Council as well as APSA. It will finally narrow on the different regional standby forces, including the SADC Standby Force, ECOWAS Standby Force, Northern Africa's NARC. Nevertheless, the main emphasis will be on the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF).

Security issues in Africa have been evolving taking a new turn almost every decade. After periods of being rather static or 'frozen' through the cold war era, the situation exploded immediately the cold war era ended. A number of countries, including Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Democratic Republic of Congo, saw widespread re-ignition of conflicts.⁵⁶ These conflicts cumulatively saw millions of people either being killed, maimed or displaced from their original homes. As the war raged, the rest of the world watched either as the conflicts persisted, reacted too late, used a wrong approach or were simply reluctant to intervene based on earlier experiences. The incidents in Somalia during UNISOM I and II were still fresh in the international community's collective memory when the Rwanda Massacre happened. This saw a reluctance to deploy peacekeepers to contain the situation. When they were finally deployed, it was too late because very many Rwandese had been killed.

Most of these conflicts in the above-mentioned countries were internal in nature and the OAU principle of respecting the sovereignty of its members and the overt non-interference in domestic matters of its members no matter what made it impossible to speedily address issues that needed their (OAU) urgent attention. Concisely, the OAU neither had the statutory authority nor the capability to intercede in matters related to peace and security.⁵⁷

⁵⁶Cilliers, J. and Schünemann, J. 2013. *The future of intrastate conflict in Africa: More violence or greater peace?* Institute for Security Studies. May 2013.

⁵⁷Francis, D. *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems*, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited 2006)

As such, African leaders had to grapple with the idea of respecting the so-called sovereignty and watch as thousands continued losing their lives, or review its legal framework to better cope with the emerging challenges. Through this backdrop, the African Union (AU) was mooted to take over from the OAU with a mandate to solve African problems with African solutions.

In 2002, AU was eventually launched with pomp and color amidst renewed hope that conflict situations would subside or at least deescalate. The AU, which upholds global collaboration and recognizes the pre-eminence of the UN Charter on peace and security, also espoused a broader field of dedication options, from peaceful interventions to using power to intercede in given situations. With the prevalence of conflicts in the continent and the picture painted of a lame duck OAU, one may be left with the impression that African government had been doing nothing in a bid to stop the perennial conflicts. The reality is far from it with the African régimes having tried to form peace and security in Africa through different approaches.⁵⁸ However, several peace and security bodies exist for many years.

Faced with a number of challenges that include; weak governance and natural disasters such as drought and floods that placed a heavier than usual burden on little available natural resources such as water or grazing lands, and the so called ‘curse of resource abundance, Africa has witnessed raging conflicts that threaten to tear the very fabric that holds it together. Besides, the influence of the illicit proliferation, circulation and movement of small arms and light weapons have worsened the situation undermining the efforts to make the living standards of African population better.

3.2 Eastern Africa Region

Eastern Africa has a region covers a vast region that comprise countries as far north as Djibouti and as far south as Madagascar. The countries have been involved in some of the world’s deadliest conflicts such as the 1994 Rwanda Genocide that wiped out almost a fifth of the country’s population, Somalia that has not had a stable government for the better part of 30 years and Democratic Republic of Congo that has witnessed cyclic violence and armed conflict since

⁵⁸Ben, K. The right of intervention under the African Union’s Constitutive Act: from non-interference to non-intervention, (International Review of the Red Cross 85 ,2010), 807

its independence. A complete list of countries in the Eastern Africa region includes Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, and the ocean islands of Seychelles, Mauritius and Madagascar.

One noticeable characteristic with the above-named states is that they fall into multiple economic blocs some overlapping. For instance, the following regional economic blocs are represented in the eastern Africa Region; EAC; Kenya, Uganda Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan, IGAD, COMESA; all except Tanzania SADC; Tanzania, ECCAS; Rwanda and DRC. As a result, overlapping membership poses a challenge in implementation of measures put forth by these blocs. For instance, one of the main challenges that almost all these blocs have been facing is insufficient financial resources to undertake their activities a fact that can be attributed to a state being in too many blocs that all demand a certain level of financial commitment from countries that already are burdened with other competing priorities.⁵⁹

In this chapter, measures that have been done from global level to the sub-regional level in their efforts to secure the Africa before the advent of African Standby force are as captured below.

3.3 Measures to Secure Africa

In chapter two, the research looked at how Africa was secured before the formation of the African Standby force. In this chapter, the research zeros in on efforts that have been put in place to secure Africa after the establishment of the African Union and most importantly the African Standby force. Ultimately, as per the focus of the study, the review concentrates on the role of Eastern Africa Standby Force in securing the Eastern Africa region. The region being the most unique of the five regions that Africa is divided into-north, south, eastern, Central and Western mainly because it has many regional economic communities/sub-regional organizations that have overlapping memberships with neither incorporating fully all the countries.

⁵⁹ Thorne, E.A. The African Standby Force Takes Shape: An Observation of Needs and Necessary Actions,(African Armed Forces Journal, July 2003), p. 2

3.3.1 African Union

AU was founded in March 2002 in Sirte Libya. It is the successor of the Organization of African Union (OAU). The OAU had a much-limited mandate that was mainly centered on liberation of African countries from the yolk of colonialism. With the independence of the last colonized country- South Africa in 1994 the OAU had to expand its mandate to not only remain relevant but also to deal with the myriads of challenges that were facing the African Continent. One of them was conflicts that had seen Africa Top the list of conflict-ridden areas as per the Uppsala Conflict Data Base (UPCD).

Following in the footsteps of the OAU, the AU's Constitutive Act recognizes the territorial integrity of all its Members as well as respect of sovereignty. As such, the AU would ordinarily not interfere with the domestic affairs of its members but this comes with a strong caveat. Unlike its predecessor the OAU, the AU does not in principle look at sovereignty as a Procrustean bed that would force it (AU) to look aside whilst gross violations of human rights are being perpetrated in the name of sovereignty. As such, the AU embraces the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle that calls each nation to 'protect their populations as well as all populations that are exposed to acts of genocide and all other mass atrocity crimes.'⁶⁰ This is in stark contrast to OAU that respected the so-called sovereignty regardless of the atrocities that were committed in the name of sovereignty.

Thus, the AU forms a basis of collective security mechanism in the African Continent. In this regard, the Act provides for the formation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) that is mandated to come up with a force that could be easily and readily be send to conflict burdened countries to restore order. This is the origin of the ASF that will shortly be discussed.

The AU is tasked with the responsibility of coming up with the framework upon which specific regional economic communities to operationalize the vision and mission of APSA. Thus, the AU provides the strategic and policy direction for regional peace and security while the RECs be left with the actualization of these strategies. This is because the AU, mainly because of size and

⁶⁰ www.globalr2p.org

capacity, it cannot effectively manage the continent from a centralized place. It was therefore prudent to delegate the mandate to the RECs. Thus, the two –RECS and Au have a symbiotic relationship whose objective is to operationalize and ensure full functioning of APSA with the ultimate goal of securing Africa

During the Conference CSSDCA, the AU made vowed to contain the escalating conflicts in the region. This was after the realization that conflicts that are armed in nature within Africa have rendered many people to live as either refugees and/or internally displaced persons, depriving them the human dignity. The AU decided to act and, in a bid to contain the situation before it became worse.⁶¹ This led to the institution of a working arrangement for the execution of the resolutions taken in the areas of peace building and maintenance. To effectively achieve this, an African force that was always to be on Standby was mooted but this was to be anchored on the Peace and Security Council.

3.3.2 Africa Peace and Security Architecture

APSA is the vehicle through which AU was to concretize its objective of securing Africa. Unlike the predecessor, that was technically incapable and/or unable to interfere in the domestic dealings of member countries, the AU adopted an ambitious mandate that empowered it to intervene in exceptional case. For instance, Article 4(h) and (j) of the AU Constitutive Act permits member countries to intercede in circumstances including crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.⁶² The AU adopted the Protocol that empowered the Peace and Security Committee through the APSA.

3.3.3 Peace and Security Council

Modelled on the framework of the UN Security council, the Peace and Security Council is the main arm that is authorized to run the affairs of the African Union on matters Peace and Security.

⁶¹Ben, K. The right of intervention under the African Union's Constitutive Act: from non-interference to non-intervention, (International Review of the Red Cross 85 ,2010), 807

⁶²Franke, B. (2010). 'Steady but Uneven Progress: The Operationalization of the African Standby Force' in Besada, H. (eds.) Crafting an African Peace and Security Architecture Addressing Regional Peace and Conflict in the 21st Century Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Group, Pp. 180-181

Borrowing heavily from the Security Council that has the UN secretariat running its daily activities, the PSC has the AU secretariat conducting its dailydoings.

The background of the PSC can be traced to the Constitutive Act of the African Union signed in 2000. It was envisaged as an organ that could make binding decision to respond and manage conflicts in Africa in a timely and coordinated manner. Later in 2002, the AU adopted a protocol that detailed the structures of the PSC. Due to consultations with member states that took several years to achieve, the PSC was not established immediately but had to wait until 2003. As per the AU Protocol, involving to formation of Peace and Security adopted in 2002, the PSC's mandate structure and mandate is clearly spelt out. The PSC's main objective is to provide peace, security and stability in Africa. The objective is majorly anchored on the premise of the UN Charter that delegates the maintenance of regional security to regional arrangements.

The AU adopted the Protocol on setting up of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union in 2002. In late 2003, AU member countries formed The Peace and Security Council as the only decision-making organ for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts. This was aimed at improving the timeliness and efficiency in responding to conflict and crisis situations in continent. This Protocol brings out the responsibility of PSC in the context of the main role of the United Nations and the UN's own acknowledgment of regional preparations in this field.

Borrowing from the United Nation Security Council, The Peace and Security Council has fifteen Members. Members are voted in based on equal representation with each region supposed to be on board. The election is also on rotational basis. The only pre-condition is that the members have to be committed to uphold peace and security. The members of PSC must also be committed to assume the extra responsibility that comes with participating in resolution of regional and continental conflicts and also participate in peace-making measures.

To back the undertakings of PSC are bodies such as the Panel of the Wise, Continental Early Warning System, Special Fund and the AFS. The African Standby Force has a special place in PSC for it is around it (ASF) that PSC has developed mechanisms to not only support peace

support operations but also most importantly to go an extra mile and conduct peace-building efforts.

3.3.4 African Standby Force

The African Standby Force is an important support of the PSC. It was formed in line with the Protocol relating to deployment of peace support mission as highlighted by article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. The Force—a term that we could say it's a misnomer considering it has a crosscutting membership that includes civilians and military personnel, as spelt out in article 13 of the PSC Protocol has to have a contingent of standby forces that are ready to be deployed if abruptly called to countries needing their support.

African Union Peace Support has standard operational procedures as the guidelines, which determine the strength, degree of readiness and composition of such missions. These SOPs are revised periodically to cope with the evolving conflicts in the continent. For example, the conflicts are becoming less inter states and more intrastate although with a growing tendency to spill over across international borders. The ASF is further subdivided into RECs and RMs. Currently, the force has five brigades broadly representing the five African regions as captured earlier in this study.

As much as the operations of the Standby forces have been devolved to RECs, the authority to conduct any mission must have express authority of the PSC. The complexity of each mission including the regional dynamics as well as previous and existing mechanism that are in place to contain the conflict are put into perspective before the PSC authorizes the mission. As a rule, efforts within and without the continent as well as through other organizations including the United Nations are also put in consideration before the final decision is reached. The considerations however must not be too slow to beat the advantage that the standby forces were supposed to have over other measures like UN peace Keeping missions, which are by nature delayed due to among other things unavailability of troops to be deployed as soon as a conflict arises. For the purposes of this paper, we shall concentrate on the role of Eastern African Standby Force (EASF)

The ASF has certain timelines within which it should have been deployed depending on the nature and dynamic of conflicts. For instance, in cases of genocides and similar situations that require urgent interventions, the force should be deployed within 14 days with military personnel that are fully equipped to deal with the situation. This is indeed commendable and short enough to arrest the situation before it becomes worse. It is much faster than the 90 days that it took the international community to intervene in Rwanda- a response that can be termed as too little too late with almost a fifth of its population killed. Other timelines include 30 days for AU peacekeepers and peacebuilding missions and 90 days for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions. However, the military officers will still be required to be deployed within 30 days.

Table 1: Deployment timelines

Scenario	Description	Deployment (From mandate resolution)
1	AU/Regional military advice to a political mission	30 Days
2	AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with UN Mission	30 Days
3	Stand-alone AU/Regional observer mission.	30 Days
4	AU Peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and Preventive Deployment Missions (and Peace Building)	30 Days
5	AU Peacekeeping Force for complex multidimensional Peace Keeping Missions including	90 days with the military component being able to deploy in 30 days
6	AU intervention, e.g. in Genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly.	14 days with robust military force

3.3.5 Eastern Africa standby Force

The EASF is one of the five regional forces that were formed under the APSA. It is mandated to secure peace in the Eastern Africa Region in particular. AU had rightly so identified that building of peace and security in regional blocs will eventually lead to an African Conflict that is free from conflicts. EASF was established in 2004 with amajor focuson providing a force that would

have the capacity to be deployed as quickly as possible as envisaged by the Constitutive ACT of the African Union (AU).

Unlike other regions that had overarching RECS, the Eastern Africa had a unique situation. It had RECs/SROs that did not fully cover the region. The thirteen-member countries of EASF were spread in more than one RECS and this posed a big challenge. Which of the RECs would be given the mandate to prop the standby force in the Eastern Africa Region? Eventually, Intergovernmental Action on Development (IGAD) was chosen as the REC to house the force since it had the majority of the states in the region.⁶³

Like all the other standby forces/brigades, EASF is a multidisciplinary force including civilian, police and military components that are supposed to provide a holistic look at means of securing and building peace in the Eastern Africa region. This was mainly as a realization that peace and security is a broad concept that encompasses more than just use of force. Effective resolution and prevention of conflicts require that the root causes be correctly identified and dealt with something that a military only team may not adequately deal with.

The military wing is supposed to provide standby forces that will be deployed rapidly to conflict ridden areas. They also provide military observers and/or advisors, as they may be needed in the eastern Africa region. The police component acts as observers in the early stages of conflicts to provide accurate feedback on what steps that may need to be taken to prevent a conflict from erupting, and if it has started what measures to take to deescalate the conflict. The civilian component is supposed to assist in humanitarian affairs as well as championing good governance. Good governance if achieved is expected to diffuse conflict situations by providing mechanism through which to resolve and manage the conflict before it becomes fully blown and unmanageable.

The EASF, then called the of East African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) has its origin 2004 when the policy framework that established three structures of the force, the Assembly of Heads

⁶³Bouhuys J, 'The Eastern Africa Standby Force: Enhancing Peace and Security in the Eastern Africa Region', Intercom No.2, 2011, p.28

of States, the Council of Ministers of Defence and Committee of Eastern Africa Chiefs of Defence. This was pursuant to the AU SUMMIT Decision of 6th to 8th July 2004 that obligated the establishment of EASBRIG. In 2007, EASBRIG changed its name from brigade to force. This was mainly to reflect the multi-diversionary nature of the force, which was more than just a military component.⁶⁴

Currently, EASF has 10 members namely in alphabetic order: Burundi, the Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda. Three former members; Madagascar, Tanzania, Mauritius opted to transfer their allegiance to SADC's SSF. On the Other hand, South Sudan would be member but it is an observer. Eritrea suspended its membership after conflicting with Ethiopia which it viewed as a dominant member.

In a bid to secure the eastern Africa region (EAR), the EASF has to adopt to scan and have a holistic view of its operating environment. This involves the holy trinity of physical areas and factors, information environment and systems. Physical areas and factors including everything and anything ranging from land, sea and space domains. It also includes subterranean issues that could potentially cause conflicts. The systems include a mix of political, economic, social, infrastructure and informational issues. Informational environment includes aspects encompassing cognitive, physical and cognitive dimensions to better help understand the why and how of certain aspects that could contribute to conflict, escalate existing conflicts or make resolutions of certain conflicts problematic.

The above efforts are further argument by continuous training of the military, civilian and police staff to equip them to respond to challenges that will come their way. Further to that, they have to acquire modern equipment that will help them in communicating effectively and quickly as well as collect and analyze data in the early warning system to help them respond in a timely fashion. This also involves acquisition of modern software that are capable of coming up with accurate and up-to-date statistics.

⁶⁴African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), '2010 Assessment Study', Addis Ababa: African Union Peace and Security Department, 2010, p.40

3.4 EASF Organs

EASF has three key organs that manage its affairs. The organs are responsible for the strategic direction and guidance in as far as attaining the goals of the EASF are concerned. The organs are as outlined in the Memorandum of understanding (MoU) that was signed during the formation of the EASFBRIG. The organs are Assembly of Heads of States, The Eastern African Council of Ministers of Defence and Security, and the Eastern African Committee of Chiefs of Defence.⁶⁵ The organs are a replica of the ASF that has three organs too.

Arranged in a hierarchical manner, the Assembly of the Heads of States is the apex. Consequently, the Assembly of Heads of States directs the operations of EASF including ordering deployment of troops. It also offers policy direction that guides the functioning of EASF. On the other hand, the Eastern African Council of Ministers of Defence and Security manages the operations of the EASF including appointing of directors and heads of departments of the EASF to undertake day-to-day operations. They also appoint Heads of EASF Commander as well as being the principle signatories of the MoUs. Lastly, the EACDS provides guidance on matters military, oversees the operations of the planning element (PLANELM), the Logistics Base (LOGBASE), advises, and guides the EASFCOM on matters technical.⁶⁶

3.5 EASF Structure

EASF consists of four command and control structures: the EASFCOM, the Planning Element (PLANELM), the Brigade Headquarters and the Logistics Base.⁶⁷

3.5.1 Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM)

Located in Nairobi, the Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM) is the secretariat of EASF. It manages all the activities of the EASF in discussion with the three

⁶⁵Article 3 of the MoU on the establishment of the EASF

⁶⁶Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the M.O.U on the establishment of the EASF.

⁶⁷EASF (2011): Policy Framework for the Establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Force (Accessed on 20 August 2015)

organs. Its director is selected by the Council of Ministers. As a unit within EASF, EASCOM is tasked with overseeing the implementation of all policies and decisions as approved by the Council of Ministers. EASCOM is also tasked with the responsibility of mobilizing resources together with key stakeholders. Besides, it has to publicize activities and all matters EASF

3.5.2 Planning Element

Planning Element (PLANELM) is tasked with planning all the activities of the EASF. It is located in Nairobi-closer to the EASCOM for closer and quicker consultations. With a multinational and multidimensional force, it is tasked with planning for complex operations as may be required. Its personnel include police military and civilians who must be on Standby for deployment. Each member state has to second officers to the force.

3.5.3 Logistics Base

The EASF Logistics Base (LogBase) is located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It acts as the centralized warehouse for storage of logistics that would be useful for operations of EASF troops in the region. The material is what is used either for training purposes or during actual operations. It controls or manages all aspects revolving around logistics. Its position is appropriate considering that Ethiopia is almost the center of EASF

3.5.4 Force Head Quarters (EASF force HQ)

Like the LogBase, the Eastern Africa Standby Force HQ serves as the focal point of the operations of the EASF. It is the nerve center for the command of the EASF's multidimensional force. All its staff including civilians, police and military are seconded to it by member states and are contracted on a two years period. Before it can deploy any troops whether civilian or military, it must receive the formal approval from Assembly of the EASF or AU as per the constitutive Act of AU. In its operations, it must closely coordinate with the planning wing- PLANELM). In total, EASF has a 5200 strong multidimensional team that are ready to be deployed to secure the Peace and Security of the region whenever called upon.

3.6 Conclusion.

From the foregoing discussions, it can be deduced that the task of securing EAR rests on the triple shoulder of the UN, the Au and the EASF. All the three work under the framework of collective security. Through a hybrid system of universalism and regionalism, the three bodies collaborate and cooperate in order to secure the world in general and the EAR in particular. The EASF, with its various organs performs its mandate drawing heavily from the mandates that have been delegated to it by the Constitutive Act of the Au and the UN Charter.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will critically explore and analyze the key factors that influence EASF's capacity for promoting peace and security operations in its region. The chapter looks at EASF as a mechanism for securing peace within its region and explores the challenges, achievements and its future prospects. Critiques to every finding will also be given as well as recommendations where applicable.

4.2 Prospects of EASF

EASF is making efforts to transform into an additional effectual and efficient security approach both in conflict mediation and military intervention in reaction to security threats. Having signed a MoU on force pledges in August 2014, it was declared full operational in December 2014 with an equipped multidimensional force of 5200 personnel, earlier than other standby Forces. This achievement also came earlier than the scheduled timeline by ASF. As Ambassador Issimail Chanfi, the director EASF declared, the EA of the continent then in the position and had the capability to handle all security worries of the region without the need for the intervention by external forces".⁶⁸

4.2.1 Preparatory Exercises

The Force, in an effort to get ready for full deployment within the set time undertook a series of preparatory exercises. It successfully carried out CPX in Nairobi, Kenya in 2008 in the first cycle of the exercises, an FTX in Djibouti in November 2009, and a LogMAPEX in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in November 2010. Endeavoring to enlarge the peacekeeping capability of the area and to assess the extent of readiness and interoperability of the unit, a first one of a kind joint Field preparation Exercise, consisting of about 1,500 troops, police and civilian personnel from 10 countries, was carried out in Djibouti.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ New Vision paper accessed through www.newvision.co.ug/new on 7/11/2018 at 19:42 hrs

⁶⁹ Endalcachew Bayeh. (2014) *the Eastern Africa Standby Force: Roles, Challenges and Prospects*. p5.
International Journal of Political Science and Development

4.2.2 Fully Operational

A second phase of exercises were carried out which started with a CPX in Khartoum, Sudan, a Field Training Exercise known as Mashariki Salam 2013 (FTX13) held in Jinja, Uganda was successful, this aimed at training and investigating the stage of preparedness of the forces that were trained for FOC. These undertakings were founded on the AU working out principle and objectives.⁷⁰ The efforts and determination of the force to get ready for Full Operational Capacity paid off, putting a record as the first standby force to attain FOC within the timelines set by ASF. Whilst this achievement is something to be celebrated there are exceptional setbacks counting the ongoing crises in the region and lack of assets among others that it must unravel prior to an actual deployment in a conflict condition.

4.2.3 Platform for States to Converge

The East African region through establishment of EASF set up a regional element where the member countries and governments can meet and exchange views on security matters an aspect which carries a crucial sureness building element.⁷¹ Alongside the trainings, EASF has also helped to create improved capacity of military personnel of the ten EASF member states, facilitated exchange among military personnel of different ranks breaking down barriers amongst military personnel across borders. Assets have been created over the past years a mechanism through which the AU potentially can request for mobilizing and engaging troops for African peacekeeping operations, as visualized in the original conceptualization of the ASF.⁷²

From the above debate, one can infer that conception of EASF as a local approach to prevent and respond to disputes of the region was vital. The efforts recorded above show that the Force holds a high potential competence to add to efforts made in handling the region's conflict in times to come. Its readiness to deploy in every situation of the ASF set by AU is also an assurance of stability of the region. However, its 'readiness' was questioned when EASF's proposal to be

⁷⁰ Ibid

⁷¹ Dr. Thomas Mandrup. (2012) State fragility and its regional implications for peace and stability. The Case of the Greater Horn of Africa. p20. In a Conference. San Diego

⁷² Sophie Desmidt & Volker Hauck (2017). Understanding the Eastern Africa Standby Force. *A regional mechanism without a political home*. P.29

deployment to Burundi in 2015 was rejected at the AU, even though military experts consider the force ready.⁷³

4.4 Challenges.

4.4.1 Absence of Regional Economic Community covering all 14 countries of the region.

Initially, EASBRIG had been placed under IGAD in 2004 which assumed the coordination role. Although IGAD had more than half the number of countries within the EABRIG as its members, (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda) the non-member states raised complain protesting against the placement. This led to establishment of a separate coordination mechanism in 2007.⁷⁴ The lack of a host REC exposes the force in that, it is easy for a member state to sign out of the RM as the consequences less gross as compared the procedure and limitation of membership in a REC, even though the same has the advantage of it being easy for a country to join the RM without necessarily being a member of a REC.⁷⁵ the existence of two RECs within the region EAC and IGAD who are actively involved in security matters being the grounds of the adversity.

4.4.2 Widening the agenda and implementing challenges reluctantly

There is absence of a coherent strategy amongst member states of the direction EASF should take even though discussions have been held at the level of the Secretariat which have made clear that there are attempts to broaden the agenda. These discussions need to be held at the highest levels of EASF as well. Whether EASF should broaden its mandate is an unclear debate but even so it is not clear to what direction it should be broadened as the MOU on the EASF only mandates the organization to prepare the EASF. A new MoU signed by the ten-member states, EASF is a regional mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution in the Eastern African Region.⁷⁶

⁷³ Camilla Elowson and Adriana Lins de Albuquerque (2016) Challenges to Peace and Security in Eastern Africa: The role of IGAD, EAC and EASF.

⁷⁴ Krzysztof Tlalka, East African Standby Force. Shortcomings and Prospects. ECAS 2013. Institute of Political Science and International Relations. faculty of International and Political Studies, Jagiellonian University in Cracow, Poland.p8

⁷⁵ Ibid

⁷⁶ Sophie Desmidt & Volker Hauck (2017). Understanding the Eastern Africa Standby Force.

4.4.3 Fully operational but not fully appreciated

EASF attained Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in 2010 and Full Operational Capability (FOC) in 2015 before other regions and provided a detailed report and presented its achievement to the African Union. However, during the 2015 crisis in Burundi and during discussions on the regional protection force in South Sudan the secretariat expressed lack of attention from AU and IGAD as the force wasn't involved in the early stages of early warning, crisis mediation and deployment plans which would have been in line with the 2014 Agreement as captured earlier. AU's perceives EASF as a facility and channel to request for troops and resources, requests that are yet to happen with the interface between AU and EASF remaining inept.⁷⁷

4.4.4 Relatively weak legal framework

The standby force operates with two documents; Policy Framework for the setting up of EASBRI which was adopted in 2004 and Memorandum of Understanding on the Formation of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade that was signed in 2005.⁷⁸ The operation under two documents makes the legal framework relatively low with the standby force depending largely on the wave of political will of the country members. Lack of a binding legal document lives the EASF member countries with a low commitment to back the organization. Deployment majorly depends on the political willpower of member states contributing troops as well as how the member state weighs the extent of the conflict condition, if the crisis is a threat, as well as what the state stands to gain or lose from involvement.⁷⁹

4.4.5 The Uncertainty of some member states

Ideally, the Eastern African region consists of 14 members, out of 14 members; only 10 take an active part in the EASF. As Eritrea suspended its membership owing to hostile relationships

A regional mechanism without a political home. P.19

⁷⁷Sophie Desmidt & Volker Hauck (2017). Understanding the Eastern Africa Standby Force. *A regional mechanism without a political home.p.20*

⁷⁸ Ibid

⁷⁹Endalcachew Bayeh. (2014)the Eastern Africa Standby Force: Roles, Challenges and Prospects. P5. International Journal of Political Science and Development

with some member countries principally Ethiopia while others; Tanzania, Madagascar and Mauritius joined the Southern region,⁸⁰ South Sudan has been an observer since 2013. Through this division of the East African region member states, EASF to some extent loses financial, military and other contributions that directly affect the development of the Force.

4.4.6 Political tensions between the countries of the region

This region is characterized by both interstate and intrastate conflicts as earlier captured in this study a factor that creates a climate of mistrust between member states. Examples of conflict include the Sudan hostilities, Ethiopia- Eritrea and Djibouti-Eritrea hostilities besides the crises in Darfur, Somalia, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda. domestic and conflicts among member states affect the development of EASF in that their attention is drawn to resolving internal problems and also the level of importance attached to issues in that the best troops and apparatuses that would have been given to the EASF are used in domestic conflicts. EASF member states participation in UN and AU missions within the region through providing their resources which reduces contribution to the capacity development of EASF of the region.⁸¹

4.4.7 Lack of resources

For EASF to conduct successful Peace Support Operation (PSO) it is critical for it to have sufficient fund. This challenge is not only on scarcity of funds, but also lack of experts within the components that could fully support the EASF as a project. This creates the issue of dependence on external support, which has an effect on local ownership of the standby force hence weakening the responsibility of the force as an “African remedy to African issues”. EASF is supported by a number of countries in different ways and by organizations associated in the forum of “Friends of EASF” which was established in 2007.⁸² This makes EASF highly

⁸⁰Cilliers, J. & Pottgieter J. (2010). The African Standby Force. In Engel, U. and Porto, J.G. (Eds.), Africa’s New Peace and Security Architecture: Promoting Norms and Institutionalizing Solutions p134 Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Group.

⁸¹ Ibid p.4pp3

⁸²Bachmann, O. (2011). The African Standby Force: External Support to an ‘African Solution to African Problems’? p.43-60

vulnerable were the donation to be reduced or if it is absent undermining EASF's multi-national effort towards peace and security of the region.⁸³

The FoE came as a way to facilitate coordination and synchronization of the support given to EASF but it is loosely organized and informal group which limiting its activities to the exchange of information between members of the group.

4.4.8 The Mandating Procedure

The hierarchy between the AU, the regional organizations and the EASF is vague on who is supposed to deploy the standby force. Although the AU has the decision-making part linked to the African Standby Force, the last verdict on if troops can be deployed is determined by the troop contributing countries from where these forces are drawn. Even though all member countries have issued troop pledges, it remains undefined whether these pledges will be upheld once an actual peace support operation is deployed.⁸⁴

4.4.9 Hegemonic Competition

Compared to West Africa South Africa where Nigeria and South Africa are the dominating powers, in that order, East African region lacks a clear hegemonic. Ethiopia and Kenya are the relatively powerful countries within the region but in continuous pursuit to secure supremacy in the region. Their competition was manifested in the allocation of EASF structures leading to division of elements of EASF some to Ethiopia and others to Kenya. The separate location brought about frail harmonization among those units of the EASF and may to some degree delay the rapid deployment of EASF.⁸⁵

⁸³Endalcachew Bayeh. (2014) the Eastern Africa Standby Force: Roles, Challenges and Prospects. p5.
International Journal of Political Science and Development

⁸⁴Elowson and Adriana Lins de. (2016) Challenges to Peace and Security in Eastern Africa: The role of IGAD, EAC and EASF. p.4

⁸⁵Endalcachew Bayeh. (2014)
Ibid p3.

4.4.10 Logistical Problems

For any successful PSOs, sufficient logistics and paraphernalia provisions including artillery assets, air defense capability, helicopter, communication equipment & platform and engineering is required. However, EASF doesn't have most of this competence, compelling it to remain under the clemency of "the friends to the EASF". Therefore, the force is not capable of sustaining its troops logistically as of date.

4.4.11 Cultural Diversity and Lack of Interoperability

Even though a diverse operation of combined forces in the PSOs is important, it is equally challenging principally in Eastern Africa and Africa at large. States of Eastern Africa have diverse background including region ethnic, cultural and religious assortments as well as the Anglophone-francophone divide. It is acknowledged that such diverse attributes have a negative effect on the growth of EASF with the major problem being related with language variations as many individual African nations have several languages used within their borders. This complicates the possibility of coming up with integrated force with the demonstrated kind of diversity in linguistic backgrounds. Interoperability challenges may remain the obstacle for the operationalization and future happenings of the EASF.⁸⁶


4.4.12 Overlapping membership within the region

The existence of several security arrangements in the region certainly intricate the external support for EASF in that, IGAD and EAC continue to engage in peace and security undertakings even after formulation of EASF creating a stiff competition for external funds and other supports. Another issue on membership is that, the existing regional security organizations belong to more than one regional organization. For example, members of EASF belong to IGAD, EAC, COMESA and SADC a scenario that to a larger extent results to divided loyalties and commitments as well as countries giving more preference to the bodies they have more influence e.g. Kenya and Uganda seem to choose dealing with EAC, which reduces their backing to EASF.⁸⁷ A demonstration of the overlapping membership is as captured in the figure below.

⁸⁶ Ibid p.5-6

⁸⁷ Ibid p4.pp5

Figure 1 Overlapping membership



4.5 Conclusion

In order to create more traction for regional integration through the EASF, more involvement in peace building processes would be necessary. This would include its involvement in all phases of the conflict cycle providing inputs at the interface between diplomatic activities, early warning, mediation and the provision of necessary troops for peace support operations. This broader involvement would be in line with the new Agreement, adopted in 2014. However, the creation of such space is not practical given the many contradictory elements and positions amongst EASF member states within the region. If the discussions on merging the IGAD and the EAC were to be realized, EASF would have a better working environment than where it sits today.

The absence of a more strategic course by the EASF member states and the absence of a more substantive political dialogue of the member states with international partners is the major contribution to the loose network of FoE. But the expectations of the international partners in supporting the EASF are also not clear as of to what extent their help can overcome regional hurdles and create more regional integration.

CHAPTER FIVE

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will look into the data collected through questionnaires and interviews. The data will be interpreted, analyzed, presented in modest presentations which will allow easier comprehension of the data. Quantitative and qualitative interpretation and analysis will be done respectively.

5.1 Questionnaire Analysis

5.1.1 Background information of the respondents


Questionnaires were administered to respondents working at the EASF Secretariat located at Karen, Nairobi Kenya. The total numbers of questionnaires send to the site were 70. The questionnaires administered and received back were as captured below.

Table 2: Background information of the respondents

NO. OF QUESTIONNAIRES ADMINISTERED	NO. OF QUESTIONNAIRES RECEIVED BACK	NO. OF QUESTIONNAIRES PROPERLY AND FULLY FILLED
70	66	58

The information in the table above is simply demonstrates in the bar graph below.

Figure 2: Number of Questionnaires



From the information in bar chart above, more than 94% of the questionnaires administered were fully filled and returned for use in the study. Of the 94%, 3% weren't completely filled. Hence the study used 87% of those that were fully filled. The information captured below therefore is derived from 80% of the initial questionnaires administered.


The questionnaires administered were received and filled by the respondents of the age brackets as indicated in the table below.

Table 3: Age brackets

AGE BRACKET(YEARS)	18 - 29	30 - 39	40 - 49	50 -59	OVER 60
NUMBER	6	10	23	19	0

The graph below demonstrates the information as captured in the table on age bracket.

Figure 3: Age brackets



From the bar graph on age brackets, it can be concluded that, majority of the respondents were aged between 40 and 59 with the list age bracket represented being 18-29.


The table below shows the education level of the respondents.

Table 4: Level of Education

LEVEL OF DUCATION	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS
CERTIFICATE	11
DIPLOMA	27
BACHELOR	11
MASTERS	7
OTHERS	2
TOTAL	58

The information on education levels of the respondents is simplified on the pie chart below.

Figure 5: Education level of respondents



The majority of the respondents had attained diplomas as their highest level of education with bachelor and master levels on the pie chart taking up a reasonably big share as well. A very small percentage of the respondents had certificate level of education with 1% indicating others category.


The gender distribution of the respondents is as tabulated below.

Table 5: Gender Distribution

GENDER	NUMBER
Female	9
Male	49
Total	58

The above tabulation is better captured in the bar graph below.

Figure 6: Gender distribution




84% of the respondents were male as demonstrated in the bar graph above with the female only represented by 16%. This shows that this is a male dominated field.

The respondents' years of service as indicated in the questionnaires are as captured in the table and pie chart below.

Table 6: Years of study

YEARS OF SERVICE	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS
Less than 1	15
1 – 2	28
2-3	11
Over 3	4

Figure 7: Years of service



The choice of the year brackets was informed by the fact that those who work for EASF do it on rotational program whereby the senior employees get a three-year contract which is renewable while the junior staffs get a two-year contract.


The respondent's view on whether Eastern Africa Region more secure in the presence of EASF, compared to the period before its establishment was as in the table below.

Table 7: Security comparison

YES	57
NO	1

Their reaction is also represented in the pie chart below.

Figure 8: Security comparison



From the percentages captured in the above doughnut pie chart, almost all respondents are of the opinion that East African region is more secure after establishment of EASF.


EASF has member states from different sub-regional blocs; if does this affects its capacity was responded to as in the table below.

Table 8: Overlapping methods vs capacity

YES	35
NO	16
NOT SURE	7

The bigger percentage of the respondents are of the opinion that, overlapping membership of the EASF member states to the RECs within the region affects its ability to implement its mandate as demonstrated in the pie chart below.

Figure 9: Overlapping methods vs capacity




The respondent's opinion on if they would propose for the EASF to be placed under one of the RECs was as show in the table below.

Table 9: Placement under REC

YES	27
NO	22
MAY BE	9

Figure 9: Placement under REC



Most of the respondents would prefer for the EASF to be placed under one of the RECs citing that, security is intertwined with other fields giving development and Trade as key examples. That said, their opinion was broadening the issue of security would give it more agendas and offer it a bigger bargaining position.


A question on if EASF would be more effective were it to be placed under one of the RECs was reacted to as tabulated below.

Table 10: Effectiveness under REC

YES	37
NO	17
MAY BE	4

The information is simplified in the bar charts below.

Figure 10: Effectiveness under REC



From the above, most of the respondent’s opinions were that, the EASF would be more effective if placed under one of the RECs within the region.


Respondent’s judgment on the clarity of the force’s hierarchy were as tabulated below.

Table 11: Clarity of Hierarchy

YES	57
NO	1

Except for one respondent, all the others were okay with the hierarchy as they noted it was very clear to them.

Figure 11: Clarity of Hierarchy




The respondent's view on Communication equipment and channel for communication in case of deployment were as capture in the table below.

Table 12: Reliability of communication equipment

YES	49
NO	7
NOT SURE	2

Figure 12: Reliability of communication equipment




From the above demonstration, a bigger percent of the respondents appreciates the available communication equipment and channels noting that it would a support EASF in case of a deployment.

The respondent's reaction as to whether the legal framework for EASF was strong enough for undertaking its mandate was as demonstrated in the table and pie chart below.

Table 13: Strength of legal framework

YES	49
NO	7

Figure 13: Strength of legal framework



87% of the respondents reported that the legal basis of the force is strong enough to support its undertakings some of them citing that even if it is enough, it would be better if broadened.


A question on if the EASF have enough recourses to support its operations was responded to as demonstrated below.

Table 14: Resources in Peace Time

DURING PEACE TIME	YES	NO
	55	3

The respondents brought out the factor of in peace time and in crisis time, whereby they indicated EASF’s resources are adequate to support it during peace time which is interpreted as their day to day activities’, trainings as well early interventions to crisis before breaking of wars. The graph below represents their reactions.

Figure 14: Resources in Peace Time




The table below represents the information captured on whether EASF resources are sufficient to support it through operations in war times.

Table 15: Resources in war time

IN WAR TIME(CRISES)	YES	NO
	3	55

Figure 15: Resources in war time



From the above table and bar graph, it is evident that almost all the respondents were of the view that the force is not in a position to support its operations in case of a deployment citing that crisis time require heavy funding.


The respondent’s views on the greatest challenge that affects the performance of the EASF was as demonstrated in the table below.

Table 16: EASF Challenges

FINANCES	19
OVERLAPING MEMBERSHIP	8
WEAK POLICY	6
LACK OF POLITICAL WILL	13
LACK OF HOSTING REC	9
DONOR INTERFERANCE	3

From the pie chart below, financing was picked as the biggest challenge affecting EASF performance. The respondents cited that, with proper facilitation, it would eliminate most of other challenges. However, the respondents indicated that, if the financing is externally sourced, the force has to be cautious of donor interference putting into consideration it should be a “African solution to an African problem”.

Figure 16: EASF Challenges




When asked to extent the respondents thought EASF was ready for deployment, they rated the force as demonstrated ion the table below.

Table 17: EASF Readiness to deploy

Rating	1	2	3	4	5
No. of respondents	0	1	5	17	35

Figure 17: EASF Readiness to deploy



Qualitative Data Analyses

The researcher obtained qualitative data through conducting interviews at the EASF secretariat based in Karen. Through this, the study established several findings that could support in managing the crises within the EA region with the EASF as the mechanism of restoring and maintaining peace across the region. Lt Col Viator Niyongabo, a human resource officer working with the EASF noted that, for EASF to be effective and efficient enough, member states need to be more cooperative on matters securing the region, the selfish interests of individual states wanting to more superior to others should no supersede the necessity of uniting for the benefit of the entire region.

He also noted that although the force is ready for deployment its ability to support and sustain missions is restrained by financial constrains mentioning that the force can only support such for 3 to 6 months. His call was for all member states to respect their engagement to the force through raising their membership fees accordingly. He picked political will as one of the major challenges of the force citing that, even though the force is ready for deployment, the actual deployment highly depends on political validation.

Lt Col Viator Niyongabo recommends that EASF should focus on coming up with strategies on how to end the conflicts without them getting to a point of necessitating a deployment. He gave the examples of the ongoing crisis in Somalia and South Sudan which are within the EA region. In addition, he suggested that, the efforts to include South Sudan and Eretria to the force should be concluded as this will not only expand the force resource wise but also it will allow the force to extend its involvement hence achieving peace and security in the regions as well.

He concluded that, security involves a lot of elements; economy, policies, social matters, civilians among others noting that, even though EASF being an RM enjoys the advantage of being focused on security matters only the force is limited compared to other RECs who enjoy a broader, more infrastructure and extensive resources. The inclusion of extensively cushions this RECs from politically intrigued challenges.

Steve lalande heading the civilian component of EASF giving his opinion on the overlapping membership of the member states noted that, the factor complicates the issue of coordination among the member states as they have divided attention and loyalties depending on a states interest. He noted that, resources towards the EASF are also affected in that states have several membership fees to pay which then calls them to prioritize. This has affected EASF in that some member states are lagging behind even though they have paid their membership fees to other RECs. However, he appreciates that EASF has allowed development of infrastructure, putting up structures and a platform for trainings and carrying out exercises of the EASF staff.

He further noted that the legal framework and the EASF doctrine is under review both at the AU and ASF levels with a view of broadening its mandate. He recommends that more areas to be reviewed and among them mentioned the reporting mechanism, ministry of Defence and the foreign affairs for clarity purposes. He stated that the EASF is evolving having observed an election in Comoros in 2016. This was in line with the crisis prevention component of EASF's. The main task was to keenly monitor the situation in Comoros as well as carrying out a general assessment on the security situation which is an early warning measure that forms part of the EASF Mandate.⁸⁸

⁸⁸ EASF news www.easfcom.org-comoros-assessment. Accessed on 12th November 2018

Major Rono Vincent, an administration officer at the EASF headquarters, recognized that the EA region is characterized by mutation of security challenges, ranging from intrastate, interstate levels and identifying the Congo Situation and the great lake region as key external threats. His opinion was that the EASF has the potential to be the solution to the EA region peace and security matters as the force has made notable achievements including; establishing of multidimensional standby force that is maintained in member states in a roster ready for deployment, remarking that the force has been conducting trainings both at individual and collective levels to enhance interoperability.

He further notes that the biggest challenge to the EASF capacity has been lack of political will and efforts have been made to marshal political goodwill which will allow the force articulate peace and security agenda within the region. Development of infrastructure including offices in Nairobi and Addis Ababa was also mentioned in the achievements of the force. The Standby Force is in the process of operationalizing its Early Warning Mechanism (E-WARN) which will help it in the preventive stage of handling crises. Even though Rono appreciates the rotational type of the contracts awarded to EASF senior staff, he highly recommends that the same is done on merit and not politically inclined.

5.2 Conclusion

The Chapter forthrightly presented and analyzed the data collected. Tables, graphs and pie charts have been used to represent the data.

CHAPTER SIX

6.1 Introduction

In conclusion, the paper goes great lengths in proffering home sought solutions and remedies to an African problem, focusing on the East African region. From this research, the study is convinced that the EASF backed by the AU and the other RECs within the region can be the solution to the recurrent armed conflict and other threats to peace and security within the region.

This chapter gives summary of the of the chapters covered across the study, a summary of the key findings, conclusions based on the findings and recommendations which will be divided into policy and academic and finally it presents recommendations for further studies.

6.2 Summary

Chapter 1 of the study laid focus on the study proposal. The Chapter played an important introductory role by putting into perception the research topic, background to the study, statement to the research problem, research questions, research objectives literature review on the subject and the justification. The chapter further and finally integrated the theoretical framework and methodology used in the study.

Chapter 2 looked at the efforts that were made to secure the Africa region prior to the formation of the African Standby Force (ASF) in 2002. The chapter traced the history of collective security from the United Nations-an intergovernmental body that was formed to rid the world of the scourge of war in 1945, through regional and sub-regional organizations such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) that later morphed into the African Union. The chapter looked into what Africa has to offer in relation to her peace and security mechanisms as well the existing RECs/RMs within the region.

Chapter 3 chapter critically assessed the role of EASF as an instrument of Securing EA . It took broader view of the mechanisms that have been put in place continentally through the African Union's Peace and Security Council as well as African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Finally, it narrowed on the different regional standby forces, including the SADC Standby Force, ECOWAS Standby Force, Northern Africa's NARC standby force the Central Africa standby

force. Nevertheless, the main emphasis was on the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) as a mechanism of peace and security in EA region.

Chapter 4 critically explored and analyzed the key factors that influence EASF's capacity for enhancing peace and security operations in its region. The chapter looked at EASF as a mechanism for securing peace within its region and explored the challenges, achievements and its future prospects. Critiques to every finding were also given as well as recommendations where necessary.

Chapter 5 looked at the data collected through questionnaires and interviews. The data was interpreted, analyzed, presented in different demonstrations including graphs and pie charts. An overview of the findings was also given.

6.3 Conclusion

Regardless of the efforts made towards securing peace and security in Africa, the continent is still mired by conflicts of different levels. Multilateral peace and security inventiveness exist in the region among them, the standby forces. The focus of this study being on the EASF place on securing peace and security in the EA region, the force was established in 2004 and meant to assume the purposes of maintaining peace and security in the region. The force attained FOC in December 2014 even though it has not been deployed in an actual crisis environment. Its achievement seems not fully appreciated by the AU as demonstrated when AU mandated the EAC to intervene in Burundi during the 2015 crisis only engaging the EASF in the last stages to the process of intervention. The force is yet to deploy its own independent peace support mission in any of crisis situations in the region. From the current preparedness activities, the EASF shows good future prospect to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in its region. However, the member states should increase their cooperation and stop their hegemonic competitions which will allow them to focus more on regional security agendas, come up with proper management and collection of finance, including their wobbly pledge to provide forces, funding and logistics, regulating training and policy to craft a competent transnational force. Besides, the force needs to have an obligatory legal base that will give surety to efficiency and effectiveness in case of a deployment.

6.4 Key findings of the research

The collective security of the Africa was achieved by a combination of universal as well as regional and sub-regional organizations. The United Nations being regional economic communities that although were largely economic in their nature had recognized the need to incorporate peace and security in their structures. This was mainly as a realization that genuine development cannot be achieved sans peace and security. Continental and global collective security frameworks namely the African Union and United Nations respectively have also complemented the region. The main challenge witnessed prior to the formation of the EASF was the long time it took to mobilize troops to take action.

Additionally, the troops sent, especially by the United Nations had a limited mandate to just peacekeeping. Besides, the troops did not understand the nuances of local political idiosyncrasies, as was the case in Somalia leading to limited achievements at best and complete failure at worst. Therefore, decision to form a standby force for eastern Africa by eastern Africans was a timely thought idea that runs in tandem with the famous ‘African Solutions for African problems’ maxim.

From the discussions in chapter 3, it can be deduced that the task of securing EAR rests on the triple shoulder of the UN, the Au and the EASF. All the three work under the framework of collective security. Through a hybrid system of universalism and regionalism, the three bodies collaborate and cooperate in order to secure the world in general and the EAR in particular. The EASF, with its various organs performs its mandate drawing heavily from the mandates that have been delegated to it by the Constitutive Act of the Au and the UN Charter.

In order to create more traction for regional integration through the EASF, more involvement in peace building processes would be necessary. This would include its involvement in all phases of the conflict cycle providing inputs at the interface between diplomatic activities, early warning, mediation and the provision of necessary troops for peace support operations. This broader involvement would be in line with the new Agreement, adopted in 2014. However, the creation of such space is not practical given the many contradictory elements and positions amongst EASF member states within the region. If the discussions on merging the IGAD and the EAC

were to be realized, EASF would have a better working environment than where it sits today. The absence of a more strategic course by the EASF member states and the absence of a more substantive political dialogue of the member states with international partners is the major contribution to the loose network of FoE. But the expectations of the international partners in supporting the EASF are also not clear as of to what extent their help can overcome regional hurdles and create more regional integration.

6.5 Recommendations

From the findings of the study, recommendations are made for both scholars and policy formulators on security matters. Generally, the study notes that, for the EASF to count as an effective mechanism for the management and resolution of conflicts within the Eastern Africa Region, the standby force needs to examine the identified challenges and resolve them as the study has attempted to recommend.

6.5.1 Scholarly recommendations

1. Facilitation of institutions of higher learning and research within the EA region to be financially feasible and apply the finest research skills on issues of peace and security.
2. To have African graduates in the fields of conflict management, security matters, politics, public management, social science and international affairs hired in the EASF and at the AU level as well.

6.5.2 Policy recommendations

1. Integration of regional Security policies with the purpose of spreading peace and security agenda. For example, integrating the EASF, IGAD and EAC to ensure the three bodies replace their competition against each other with complementing one another.
2. EASF to assume firm policies on issues of governance, elections, human rights and leadership all over the region.
3. Gear EASF policies towards a professional driven institution which will see it balance all other aspects that may be politically driven as well as support the force to utilize all the potentials that have not been realized.
4. A policy-driven decision ought to be done on the official language for EASF assignments within its region which will go a long way in enabling effective command and taking charge of the missions in deployment situations.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Research Tools

Letter to the respondents

Loise Makato

C/O University of Nairobi,

Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies

P.O. Box 30197,

Nairobi.

Date: 31/10/2018

Dear Sir/Madam

QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE ROLE OF AFRICA STANDBY FORCE IN SECURING AFRICA: A CASE OF THE EASTERN AFRICA STANDBY FORCE

I am a Masters of Arts student at the University of Nairobi pursuing research information on the captioned subject above. To be able to do this study, I am required to get information from The Eastern Africa Standby Force Headquarters for assistance through responding to the suggested questions contained in the questionnaire forwarded by this letter. I have tried to make the questions precise and short to take a relatively short time to respond to. You can be sure your honest response to each one of the questions; will be invaluable contribution to this study. On my part, I assure you of utmost confidentiality to any responses made. The information so collected will only be available to my research staff and me. Any publication of these findings will be purely for statistical purposes and with formal authorization of the University of Nairobi.

Your assistance will be greatly appreciated and will assist all of us to gain knowledge about the role of Africa Standby Force in Securing Africa.

Yours faithfully,

Loise Makato

Appendix II: Questionnaire

Section A: Background information

1. What is your age bracket?
 - a. 18-29
 - b. 30-39
 - c. 40-49
 - d. 50-59
 - e. Over 60 years

2. What is your highest academic qualification
 - a. Certificate
 - b. Diploma
 - c. Bachelor
 - d. Masters
 - e. Other (please specify.....)

3. Gender
 - a. Male
 - b. Female
 - c. Other

4. Nationality.....
.....

5. How long have you worked with EASF? 0-1 year 1-2years 2-3years

Section B

1. Briefly explain your role in EASF

- 2 a) Is East African region more secure in presence of EASF, compared to the period before its establishment? YES NO

- b) Briefly explain

- 3 a) EASF has members from different sub-regional blocs, does this affects its capacity?

- b) Briefly explain

c) Would you prefer the EASF to be placed under one of the RECs? YES NO

d) If EASF was to be placed under one of the RECs e.g. IGAD, do you think it would be more effective than it is now? YES NO

4. Is the hierarchy of EASF, clear? YES NO

5. Does EASF have a reliable communication channel for effective operations? YES NO

6. Is the Legal framework for EASF strong enough for the undertakings of the Force? YES NO

7. a) Do you think the budget allocation to EASF is enough to support its operations?

YES NO

b) Briefly Explain

8. In your opinion, what is the greatest challenge that affects the performance of the EASF?.....
.....
.....

9. To what extent do you think EASF is ready for deployment? (Highest rating being 5 and lowest rating 1.

Thank you.

Appendix III: Interview Guide

1. Briefly explain how the Africa was secured before the establishment of the ASF?
2. Why was the ASF formed?
3. Other than EASF, could you briefly enumerate the success/challenges of the other standby forces?
4. Briefly describe the structure and composition of EASF
5. How/ what is the legal frame work of EASF? Is it adequate considering its scope and mandate?
6. What is the strategy/mechanism used by EASF in effort to secure the region?
7. What challenges does EASF face in its process of executing its mandate to secure Eastern Africa region?
8. EASF has members from multiple sub-regional blocs does that affect its capacity and mandate?
9. How is the EASF financed? What are the challenges faced in financing it?
10. What communication channels are in place for purposes of smooth message transmission?
11. What's your take on Logistics within EASF?
12. What has EASF journey been like in general?
13. Is the Eastern Africa Region more secure since the establishment of the EASF?
14. In your view, what would be done differently to make EASF better?
15. Comment on EASF's readiness for deployment?