

**THE INFLUENCE OF CONSTITUENCY-SPECIFIC FACTORS ON THE
UTILIZATION OF DEVOLVED FUNDS IN KENYA: THE CASE OF
THE CONSTITUENCY DEVELOPMENT FUND (2007/2008)**

BY

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DECLARATION

This research project is my original work and has not been presented for award of a degree in any other university.

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DEDICATION

To

Keith Simari

The apple of my eye and the main motivation behind most of my endeavors, I wish you love, peace, long and healthy life, great success and God's abundant provisions and blessings in your life. I pray that you accomplish all that you are wishing for and much more.

I love you,

Mama

My late parents, Mr. & Mrs. Ladaru Soldenya

I am because you were. You might not be here to congratulate me, but I believe wherever you are, you are proud of me.

May your dear souls, continue resting in peace.

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ABSTRACT

This study sought to establish the influence of constituency-specific factors on the utilization of CDF. The study was based on rational choice theory, and used the cross-sectional design to determine the effects of constituency-specific factors on CDF utilization. It also largely used secondary data. Data analysis was done through the graphical displays and descriptive statistical techniques. Descriptive analysis included the mean, frequency and percentages which were used to reveal data patterns. The research established that there is a positive and significant correlation between constituency size and CDF utilization. The study also found a significant positive correlation between constituency political participation levels and CDF utilization. However, the study found a negative correlation between poverty levels and CDF utilization. The study concludes that CDF utilization in Kenya is influenced by constituency size, political participation and poverty levels. The study therefore recommends that the government should consider these factors while allocating CDF funds and should also develop policies to support effective project implementation at the constituencies' level which would in turn ensure CDF achieves its ultimate goal of supporting grass-root development.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CDC	-	Constituency Development Committees
CDF	-	Constituency Development Fund
CDFB	-	Constituency Development Fund Board
CDFC	-	Constituency Development Fund Committee
CFC	-	Constituency Fund Committee
CDI	-	County Development Index
CRA	-	Commission on Revenue Allocation
DDG	-	District Development Grant
DFRD	-	District Focus for Rural Development
DPC	-	District Project Committee
IMF	-	International Monetary Fund
KIPPRA	-	Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis
KNBS	-	Kenya National Bureau of Standards
LATF	-	Local Authority Transfer Fund
MDGs	-	Millennium Development Goals
MP	-	Member of Parliament
NARC	-	National Rainbow Coalition
NG-CDF	-	National Government Constituency Development Fund
PAF	-	Poverty Alleviation Fund
PLADFS	-	Parliament Local Area Development Fund Scheme
PMC	-	Project Management Committee
RCT	-	Rational Choice Theory
RML	-	Road Maintenance Levy
SAP	-	Structural Adjustment Program
SDDP	-	Social Dimension of Development Program
SEBF	-	Secondary School Education Bursary Fund
SID	-	Society for International Development
SRDP	-	Special Rural Development Program
UPE	-	Universal Primary Education

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Study Background

The immediate post independent African states engaged in various strategies with the aim of attaining development. However, some of these efforts tended to enhance central control rather than promoting local autonomy (Tordoff, 2002). With moves towards political pluralism, focus turned to various types of local participation emphasizing on decentralization. For instance in Nigeria, Constituency projects were created to ensure a minimum presence of government in every constituency by having some grass-roots projects in each constituency sited during budgeting process (Udefuna et al, 2013). Decentralization was preferred in Africa as a means to advancing political democratization and promoting socio-economic development (Green, 2015). Arguments supporting decentralization reform included the fact that it can improve public service delivery, reduce wastages, and tailor public service and spending patterns to the local needs and preferences (Kimenyi, 2005). It was argued that the countries which successfully implemented administrative reforms such as decentralization were able to significantly reduce absolute poverty (Booth, 2012).

Kenya, like most other African states embraced decentralization and made attempts to implement it in different forms since independence, beginning with deconcentration in the immediate post-independence period, to Local government, and the District focus strategy. Specific programs include the District Development Grant Program (1966), the Special Rural Development Program (1969/70), the Provincial Development Committees (1968), Special Rural Development Program (1970), and the District Focus for Rural Development (1983) (Kibua and Mwabu, 2008). Despite decentralization efforts, development remained elusive not only for Kenya but for most African countries, hence continued effort towards the search for suitable types and forms of decentralization. In the post Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) era, efforts were made to improve services by involving citizens, either by enhancing popular participation and public accountability or by decentralization of services. Several measures were instituted as interventions to improve access to better services (Ribot, 2002). Some of the interventions that have been used in Kenya from 1989 aimed at decentralization of services

through direct financing. Such strategies included Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF), Poverty Alleviation Fund (PAF), and Roads Maintenance Fuel Levy Fund. The funds were managed either at the constituency or district level (Kibua and Mwabu, 2008). It was argued that devolution of funds not only empower the community, but also increase growth in annual revenue of a community (World Bank, 1999).

Against this background, the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) was set up in Kenya through an Act of Parliament, known as the CDF Act in 2003. CDF became a key decentralization effort by the Kenya government through its envisaged management process of devolved funds at the constituency level (Kimenyi, 2005). It is in line with the strategies for attaining United Nations-driven Millennium Development Goals (MDG) of poverty reduction and enhanced literacy (GA Resolution A/54/2000). The Act allowed legislators to set up Constituency Development Committees (CDCs) through popular participation drawn from each electoral ward to not only identify projects but also manage them based on approved budgetary allocations. At the national level, the CDF Management Board (CMB) monitors governance of devolved funds for local development (Republic of Kenya 2007).

CDF schemes appeared to breach separation of powers by conferring executive powers of budget implementation on MPs (Zyl 2010). Article 174 (a)-(i) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, highlights nine objectives of devolution. However, only two promote socio-economic development, service delivery and equitable resource distribution. The other seven revolve around strengthening democracy, including reducing and checking the power of the national government (Ndi, 2010). Some opposed the idea of incorporating CDF in devolved system of government, noting that involving legislators who are national level actors in control and management of CDF, which targets local level, violates devolution ideals (Zyl, 2010).

The CDF Act has been repealed by the CDF (Amendment) Act 2007, the CDF Act, 2013 and the National Government Constituencies Development Fund (NG-CDF) Amendment Act 2016. The law governing CDF is now aligned with the devolution as provided for by the constitution (NGCDF 2018). The goal was to provide funds for the implementation of development projects

at the constituency level. This study focuses on the CDF in its original form as envisaged and executed in 2003 before subsequent amendments were made to it.

1.2 Statement of Problem and Research Question

Kenya has since independence targeted illiteracy, poverty, ignorance and disease for elimination largely through centralized strategies coordinated by the national government (Court and Kinyanjui, 1980). These efforts were largely intended to address both equity and redistribution and appropriation of national resources across the county through establishment of various institutions and grants for this purpose (Mapesa and Kibua, 2006). In this regard, CDF was created out of the need to redress the imbalances caused by prior development models. It was established through the Constituency Development Fund Act of 2003, which gave it political, policy, legislative and institutional anchorage which the previous funds did not have. The fund was designed to support constituency-level and grass-root development projects, particularly those aiming at combating poverty at the grass-root levels in Kenya (Republic of Kenya, 2013). CDF proved to be more resilient and vibrant in project planning and implementation in various constituencies. It aimed at equitable regional distribution of resources and control of regional development imbalances caused by partisan politics, hence reducing poverty and improving the lives of local communities (Mapesa and Kibua, 2006).

Despite the reasonable success cases registered through CDF run projects at the grassroots, most of these projects have remained either incomplete or dogged with problems relating to misappropriation of the funds. The Audit reports by the Auditor-General's Office and the civil society indicate increased cases of stalled projects funded by constituency development committees across the country. A report by the Kenya Tax Payers Association for the fiscal year 2007/08 indicated that up to 40% of the CDF could not be accounted for, and only 35% had been well utilized. This indicates further that the effective utilization of CDF is still a huge challenge whose magnitude varies from one constituency to the other (Kimenyi, 2005).

If the utilization of CDF varies from one constituency to the other, then two questions arise: What factors account for variations in the utilization of CDF across different constituencies? Are the factors that determine whether or not a constituency will effectively utilize CDF unique to

each constituency? Reflections on these two questions yields the following broad research question that this study seeks to address: *How do Constituency-specific factors influence the utilization of CDF?* Since there are several factors which are unique to each constituency, the study narrows down to three which seems to have greater potential for influencing CDF utilization, namely, constituency size, poverty levels and political participation levels.

Against this background therefore, this study seeks to address the following specific research questions:

- (i) How does the constituency size influence the utilization of CDF?
- (ii) What is the influence of constituency poverty levels on the utilization of CDF?
- (iii) How does a constituency's level of political participation affect CDF utilization?

1.3 Research Objectives

1.3.1 General Objective

To establish the influence of Constituency-specific factors on CDF Utilization

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

- (i) To establish the influence of constituency size on the utilization of CDF.
- (ii) To determine how the constituency poverty levels influence CDF utilization
- (iii) To find out how a constituency's levels of political participation influence the utilization of CDF.

1.4 Study Justification

The study was justified both on Theoretical and policy considerations.

1.4.1 Theoretical Justifications

This study is important to researchers as it will help them develop additional literature in the areas of fiscal devolution, especially the management and utilization of devolved funds. On the other hand future researchers and academicians will benefit as it will provide reference information for further studies. Lessons learnt from successful CDF implementation will be used as foundation for designing other decentralization schemes to aid development.

This study seeks to establish new information on how constituency-specific factors namely; poverty levels, population size and political participation influence the utilization of CDF. This information is important in increasing organizational and individual awareness on factors that affect CDF utilization. Understanding what factors affects effective utilization of CDF is important in helping the fund achieve its main objective of grass root development and alleviation of poverty. This will be done by ensuring that these factors are put into consideration while allocating of the fund is being done both at the local and national level.

The study will hopefully enhance our understanding of the Rational Choice Theory (RCT) in the context of political decision making and public project implementation. RCT assumes that all political actors are rational and self-interest driven when making political decisions and when taking political actions. The fact that politicians can pay more attention to political factors with direct electoral consequences (like political participation levels) when deciding whether or not to implement a CDF project, instead of economic factors (like poverty levels), imply that individual rationality and self-interest can sometimes undermine public good. If politicians value public good, we would have more CDF projects implemented in poorer constituencies than in the richer ones, especially considering that CDF has equalization fund component which seek to bridge the gap between poorer and richer constituencies. However, if it is self-interest that matters, then poorer constituencies can remain poor as long as their political participation levels do not threaten the self-interest of the sitting legislator.

The original CDF design was the first of its kind in the region and attracted several countries which borrowed it. For instance, Zyl (2010) observes that apart from Kenya, over twenty other countries have adopted or were considering adopting CDFs, including Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania, Ghana, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Southern Sudan, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Bhutan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines and Solomon Islands. Focusing on the original CDF design would enable us to draw lessons from Kenya which can be valuable to these other countries that adopted it. Focusing on the original CDF design is also important because it will enable us to tell whether the subsequent legal and policy reforms targeted the real problems facing CDF.

1.4.2 Policy Justifications

The study draws on the work of Baskin et al (2010) on the role of legislators in facilitating grassroots project. The report was compiled from the 56th Commonwealth Parliamentary conference held in Nairobi in September 2010. The report notes lack of accountability and transparency in the implementation of CDF projects, although citizens have the mandate through public participation to identify and monitor CDF project implementation. There has been lack of a clear and effective mechanism for oversight of CDF projects. It is clear that since CDF was introduced in 2003, most of the constituencies have not registered significant local development as expected. Understanding factors affecting effective CDF utilization is important in helping CDF to achieve its objective of development and poverty alleviation.

The information why CDF did not achieve its intended purpose will help the legislators to make proper use of the fund. This means that it will help promote accountability and transparency because the legislator of each area understands the fact that if the funds are well utilized, it will encourage his/her constituents to re-elect him/her. On the other hand, voters will learn to make right decisions to elect leaders who will develop the society. This will be the case for instance, if the study finds that better CDF utilization is correlated with higher voter turnout. Every MP would like to maximize on this since voters are the key to winning.

The findings of the study can tell where the loop holes are and how they can be managed to help the fund be more effective. This in turn will inform the policy makers on what should be incorporated in the fund to take into considerations the factors affecting the fund and know how to handle them at the policy level. The government and policy makers will also find this study an invaluable source of information that would assist in developing and implementing policies that promote proper and informed implementation process for devolved funds.

This study will help in measuring effectiveness of the CDF implementation framework. A proper implementation framework should highlight how CDF projects will be implemented especially now that CDF has been aligned to devolution. The purpose of devolution policy is to improve implementation of devolved system of government to optimize service delivery.

1.5 Scope and Limitations of the Study

As explained under study methodology, this study uses cross-sectional research design which requires a focused study of phenomena over a very limited period of time. This is one of the reasons that led to selecting and focusing on only one fiscal year – 2007/2008. To evaluate the performance of CDF require a reasonable period from the time of inception to the time of evaluation. By 2007, the original CDF, which is the focus of this study, had lasted four years, was now established, and hence suitable for evaluation. 2007/2008 was therefore the best earliest time for it to be evaluated. It is notable that shortly afterwards, the original CDF set-up was reorganized through legal amendments. Therefore, to add even one more fiscal year to the study would mean studying two different versions of CDF.

This study sought to assess the influence of constituency-specific factors on the utilization of CDF in Kenya in the fiscal year 2007/2008. There are some reasons for selecting this period. First, This period was important because 2007 witnessed not only the first election since the inception of CDF, but it was also an election where the country experienced election violence whose underlying causes were inequality in allocation of benefits from the available national resources, which were further aggravated by corruption and impunity. The year 2007 was also important because it was an election year and hence it is easy to use the election outcome data to measure variables such as levels of political participation. Again, it was during this time, according to Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA), when there was a massive increase in budgetary allocations to CDF amounting to more than Kshs. 58 billion (KIPPRA, 2007). This could have been a political strategy to raise campaign funds, lure voters and sway their behavior, rather than to initiate meaningful development projects.

One of the limitations to the study was time required to gather the required data and the cost of obtaining the same. Some of the data needed was not readily available and the process of acquiring necessary permissions took longer. There was also the challenge of missing data due for certain constituencies. Persons in charge of CDF reports at times delayed in releasing them thus affecting their availability at the expected time. The researcher mitigated this by making cross-checks with various sources where possible and replacing the few sampled constituencies for which some required data was missing.

Data on political participation was obtained from voter turnout. It is likely that some of the records on voter turnout may not be accurate due to previous allegations of doctoring. The researcher countered this by maximizing available sources of secondary data that would provide reliable and accurate information through content analysis. In analyzing turnout, the figures for presidential and parliamentary turnouts differed. Sometimes the presidential voter turnout is more than parliamentary and *vice versa*. You find that the same number of people voted but you find the voter turnout for presidential is higher than parliamentary or vice versa. This makes accuracy of the results problematic. This being the case however, it doesn't change the fact that they gave indications of what happened at the polls. Thus, the researcher mitigated this by using both spearman correlation which computes the correlations by ranking turnout and Pearson correlation which computes correlations by using raw turnout data. The assumption is that even if votes were manipulated, it did not go to the extent of altering ranks.

Furthermore, the study had initially proposed to perform regression analysis to go beyond mere correlation analysis and establish the causal relationships between constituency-specific factors and CDF utilization in Kenya. However, upon inspecting the data, it became clear that the three independent variables (constituency size, poverty levels and political participation levels) are strongly correlated with each other. Using such strongly correlated independent variables in a regression model would lead to the problem of multi-collinearity. As a remedy to this problem, the methodology section was reorganized to remove regression as method of analysis and hence the study only performed correlation tests between each of the three selected constituency-specific factors and CDF utilization in Kenya.

1.6 Definition of Terms

CDF Utilization - CDF utilization generally refer to the extent to which the money disbursed from the CDF kitty to specific constituencies are used for the budgeted projects. CDF utilization is therefore used in this study to refer to the number of projects completed in a constituency using CDF funds during the fiscal year 2007/2008.

Constituency Development Fund (CDF)—The CDF is a program that was established in 2003 through an Act of Parliament with the aim of ironing out regional imbalances brought about by patronage politics by providing funds to constituencies to fight poverty (Bagaka, 2008). CDF refer to one of the devolved funds used in Kenya to provide resources for local level development to the constituencies under the management of local communities.

Constituency-Specific Factors- These are specific features of a constituency that contribute towards the achievement of CDF as a decentralization model in Kenya. For purposes of this study, it refers to factors like poverty levels, political participation levels, and constituency size which are unique to each constituency.

Constituency Size –The size of a constituency has many dimensions including geographical size and population. Constituency size is used in this study to refer only to the population dimension of size, defined in terms of the number of people living in a constituency.

Poverty levels- The KNBS and SID Abridged Report of 2013 on exploring Kenya’s inequality define poverty levels as a threshold below which people are deemed poor. In this study, poverty level is used to refer to the number of people living below poverty line.

Political Participation –political participation refers to the involvement of people in making decisions and taking actions on matters that affect them. In this study, political participation is used to refer to the number of people who turned out to vote in each constituency during the 2007 general elections or what is commonly referred to as voter turnout.

1.7 Literature Review

This section reviewed the literature on CDF studies with a view to identifying gaps to be filled by the study. Specifically, the review focused on the three specific independent variables; size of constituencies, levels of poverty and political participation in regard to the utilization of devolved funds

1.7.1 Constituency Size and Resource Utilization

In his study of CDF projects in Kenya, Kimenyi (2005) established that service delivery and efficiency depend not only on poverty levels but also on population size, spatial distribution and other socio-economic factors, scope of economic activities, degree of urbanization, and education levels. These were facilitated through communities' participation in decision making, monitoring, and evaluation of expenditures. For example, demands for projects in urban areas with a high population density, may differ from those in sparsely populated rural areas. Likewise, requirements and expectations of a day secondary school could differ from those of a boarding school when it comes to determining where to place a service within the constituency. Whereas Kimenyi (2005) has shown how constituency-specific factors impact on efficiency of CDF and thus service delivery, it has not, however showed how constituency specific factors influence the utilization of funds and this is where this study comes in handy.

Keefer and Khemani (2009) argue that other than adopting a similar approach to Kenya, Tanzania went further to include geographic size and population size (in addition to poverty indices) as factors in the allocation formula. In contrast, the CDF schemes in India, Zambia, Malawi, Uganda and Southern Sudan allocate funds equally or on population basis. Although India allocates an equal amount per Member of Parliament (MP), the development policy objectives are promoted through ministry guidelines which require MPs to set aside a certain amount for vulnerable groups with particular development needs within their constituency. As these factors are being considered in the allocation of the fund, it is not clear in the literature on how they influence utilization of the fund. The outcome of this study however, will enable us to establish how for example, population size influences the utilization of CDF. Does it mean that the larger the population size of the constituency, the better the utilization CDF? These authors have not answered this question. Thus, this study will try to answer it.

Bagaka (2009), investigated whether CDF allocations per constituency were based on district population characteristics such as size and poverty levels. He found that densely populated districts with high poverty indices receive more funds than less populated districts with fewer people living in poverty. He attributed this to the distribution formula which he argued enhanced equity and efficiency. His study shows that size and poverty determine the amount of CDF to be allocated to a certain constituency. However, it has also fallen short of explaining whether the utilization of CDF is also affected by the two factors. This is a huge gap in the study which the present study sought to fill.

Tshangana (2010) noted that constituencies differ in sizes. Other factors remaining constant, the larger the constituency the more it would get a bigger allocation of development funds. However, in some countries the fund is equally distributed while in others like Tanzania have included an equity and redistribution objective in the CDF legislation and have thus provided for an allocation process which is biased towards poorer areas. In Kenya, 75% of the Fund is equally divided amongst the constituencies while the balance is allocated equitably taking into consideration the poverty index. Some smaller constituencies could therefore have more allocation than bigger ones. Tshangana talks about how the size of a constituency affects the amount of fund allocated to it. This study on the other hand, goes a step further beyond mere allocation of funds on the basis of constituency size to establish whether constituency size also influences how the CDF disbursed to that constituency is effectively utilized.

Baskin et al (2010) argued that a key goal of CDFs was to nurture the integration of diverse communities into a common set of political and social values in support of existing system. Political interests by some MPs have led to some CDF projects to stall despite being given priority by the community. This was experienced in Cambodia, and in the military regimes in Nigeria and Pakistan when leaders' aims were to garner political support at the local level by introducing new projects. Clearly, Baskin et al (2010) focused on why some CDF projects are started but never get completed and how political interests are to blame for stalled projects. What Baskin et al (2010) do not do, and which this study seeks to do, is to establish whether there is any definite pattern in CDF project completion by seeking to answer the following questions:

First, what sort of constituencies complete more CDF projects? Secondly, do those constituencies with larger population perform better than those with smaller population when it comes to completion of CDF projects? Thirdly, do constituencies with higher poverty levels perform better than those with lower poverty levels when it comes to the completion of CDF projects? Finally, do constituencies with higher political participation levels perform better than those with lower participation levels in terms of completing CDF projects?

A study by Juma (2011) revealed that huge monetary allocations towards the decentralized programs including CDF were being returned to the treasury at the end of each financial year. This raises concern when funds are returned to Treasury and yet constituencies like Samburu West have not registered significant change in devolved services like health as revealed by Cheruyot et al (2016) study. However, knowing that some devolved funds are never utilized and knowing that such funds are often returned to the treasury each year is not good enough. This study will compliment Juma (2011), by digging deeper to find out for instance, which type of constituencies (in terms of size, poverty and participation) utilize their funds better.

1.7.2 Levels of Poverty and Resource Utilization

Olukoshi and Nyamnjio (2005) notes that it has not been easy to come up with uniform criteria for CDF disbursement across countries, hence the marked differences by country. In Zambia, the uniform allocation across the board has had its share of challenges. The criterion means that a constituency like Kabwata in Lusaka, where only one percent of its population is without access to proper water supply, gets the same level of funding as Sikongo in Western Province, the most deprived constituency, where 91 percent of the population lacks access to water supply. On the other hand, more heterogeneous communities are likely to select many diverse projects to cater for the diversity of preferences. The study reveals that poverty index alone is not a sufficient parameter to facilitate equity in terms of resource mobilization. Other variables like population heterogeneity and level of urbanization are necessary in order to capture variations in the population characteristics that may impact on project choices across constituencies. The paper does not show how utilization of CDF would be influenced by poverty levels, a gap that this study aims to fill. Also considering the fact that the research was done in Zambia, it might still be useful to do a related study in Kenya.

According to Awiti (2008), CDF is disbursed equally to all constituencies irrespective of geographical size, population and levels of poverty. Constituencies in rural areas lack basic necessities such as adequate access to social amenities. Although it may be argued that this arrangement tend to favor rural more than urban constituencies due to the fact that the former have qualitative differences in terms of demands and density of the population compared to that of the rural folk. In that respect, allocating a proportionately higher level to the rural constituency will be preferable since that will provide opportunities for them to catch up with urban centers in terms of better amenities. It is probably in this respect that the distribution of CDF funds in Kenya considered the poverty index in each constituency. From this study, it is evident that poverty is a critical factor in the allocation of CDF. However, the study does not show whether poverty levels are also considered when selecting CDF projects in Kenya. It is therefore important to determine the extent to which poverty levels influence CDF utilization.

According to Tidemand and Steffenson (2010), decentralization has a positive impact on poverty through increased efficiency in the provision of services such as health, education and utilities by reducing the cost of provision, improving responsiveness to local needs and better targeting of the poor. They further state that decentralization can reduce poverty directly provided it empowers the poor and improves their access to services. This can be achieved through improved governance for economic growth and income distribution. The arguments by Tidemand and Steffenson (2010) sound more theoretical and lack empirical backing. This study however, attempts to establish empirically whether the much glorified positive effect of decentralization on impact poverty has empirical support. More specifically, this study will examine the extent to which the utilization of CDF varies with poverty levels.

Kinuthia and Laking (2016) insisted that all decisions concerning resource utilization should be judged according to the degree to which they accord with the principles of fairness and the quality of the justifications provided for the decision. They went further and gave three options that can be used to arrive at fair decision as follows: the available revenue to be shared equally, available revenue to be shared based on percentage of poor people and finally the available revenue to be allocated to the wards with highest percentage of poor people. To resolve such

issues, the Division of Revenue Act 2014 was developed to ensure that the funds for CDF do not come out of the resources for counties, but only from the national share. The CDF Act 2003 allows roughly half of it to be allocated to non-capital items like bursaries. Like most studies, Kinuthia and Laking (2016) focused more on revenue allocations for the devolved functions. It however leaves a gap in the sense that it does not address whether the revenue allocated for the devolved functions are efficiently and effectively utilized. This study hopes to fill that gap by providing information relating to how devolved funds are used.

Kinuthia and Laking (2016) insisted that fair distributions should take into consideration basic principles like need and effort and giving equal amounts to people or regions with unequal needs is not necessarily fair. They also revealed that there were large differences in the number of poor people in each constituency, even among those with similar poverty rates. Their study however, does not show how utilization of CDF would be influenced by poverty levels, a gap that this study aimed to fill. Also considering the fact that the research was done in Zambia, it might still be useful to do a related study in Kenya based on lessons learnt.

1.7.3 Political Participation and Resource Utilization

According to Takao (2005), the constituency is a unit of political representation in Kenya. It comprises several locations for local administrative purposes. The constituency is therefore a parallel structure in the local development process. However, unlike administrative districts which had formal structures for executing development functions having been prominent under District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD) Strategy, the constituency does not. It is in response to this that Constituency Development Committees (CDC) were established to enhance popular participation in articulation and aggregation of development interests within the constituency under the supervision of local Member of Parliament. Under CDF, the constituency functions as a development unit with resources channeled towards building of institutional capacity at the constituency level to support CDF. This study appreciates Takao's (2005) view of constituency as a political and development unit and the fact that substantial funds are channeled to support local projects. However, as much as the emphasis is on community-based projects and CDF utilization, Takao (2005) does not bring out how community participates politically to

make projects successful. It does not show how political participation influence CDF utilization, and this the gap that this study attempts to fill.

According to Mwangi (2005), CDF differs from other funding strategies in its grassroots approach in terms of its governance ranging from issue identification, planning to implementation hence. It is therefore designed to stimulate local involvement in development projects. This approach appreciates the different choices realized with respect to areas of jurisdiction, priorities and stakeholders involved. He however, acknowledges that attaining optimum CDF utilization is still a challenge since projects are prioritized not because of the immediate socio-economic needs but for political capital. This encourages patronage and citizen exclusion from the development process. Mwangi (2005) however, does not attempt a comparison of constituencies in terms of why some utilize the funds more than others. This study was thus done to establish how political participation influences CDF utilization. For instance, are CDF project decisions made for the good of the entire constituency (in terms of need for poverty alleviation for instance) or are they guided by narrow political self-interests?

Mapesa and Kibua (2006) identified self-interest and ignorance among stakeholders for lack of political participation. While some politicians take credit for projects, citizens fail to hold them accountable for the choices made. Ignorance among constituents affects how much of CDF a sitting MP can use in public projects. Politicians dominate project prioritization and selection decisions and edge out public participation processes. In India, the objective of Parliament Local Area Development Fund Scheme (PLADFS) is to enable MPs recommend development projects without community committee establishment at grassroots level. MPs do not have any obligation to solicit community input or to create structures which enable representation and involvement by constituents in project selection. It therefore means that political participation is crucial for successful CDF implementation, which is often ignored. Politicians can frustrate the realization of CDF objectives. Such political factors are what this study wanted to establish and how they influence effective utilization of CDF.

According to Mustapha and Whitefield (2009), corruption is a major hindrance that prohibits CDF projects from achieving development goals. They reveal that all constituencies were involved in corrupt deals especially in procurement of goods. Some projects were stalled due to political interests especially where a constituency elected a new MP who stops some of the projects started by their predecessors. This is clearly an attempt to implicate political factors in the failure of CDF Utilization. This study takes this further and introduces other political factor-political participation levels - to see whether they also influence CDF utilization.

Tidemand and Steffenson (2010) insisted that local election of local government councilors is the most basic precondition for effective use of devolved funds. However, in many countries, the condition is partially fulfilled. They further state that effective local accountability require citizens and politicians to participate decision-making relating to the use of devolved funds through access to information, as well as institutional provisions for politician's oversight of planning, finances and staff. In essence, their focus is on how to ensure local accountability in the use of devolved funds. The study however, leaves out an equally weighty issue, namely, what explains the variations in the levels of usage of CDF across constituencies and whether there are constituency-specific factors which ensure that even with accountability measures in place, some constituencies do better than others. This is the task undertaken by this study.

Nyaguthii and Oyugi (2013) explain that under CDF, the constituency is functioning as a development unit with resources being channeled towards building up institutional capacity at the constituency level to support the fund. CDF is devoted to community based projects, which ensure that the prospective benefits are available to a widespread cross-section of the inhabitants of a particular area. It therefore means that political participation plays a crucial role in successful CDF implementation. A similar position is supported by IMF (2010) which argues that community empowerment is achieved by encouraging participation of the people towards a priority and needs-responsive development. This goal is enhanced by increasing the amount, efficiency and effectiveness of devolved funds and also increasing public participation and the voice of the poorest members of local communities so that development issues of concern to such members can be channeled into public policy.

Nyaguthii and Oyugi (2013) as well as IMF (2010) appreciate the constituency as a political and a development unit through which considerable resources are channeled to support local projects. As much as their emphasis is on community based projects and how CDF can be spent on them, they do not explain how community participates politically in order to make projects successful. In other words, they do not show how political participation influences CDF utilization. How do political patron-client factors within the constituency influence equitable distribution of resources, notwithstanding the MP's self-interest? How has the carrot and stick approach been used by the dominant political class operating under the CDC to distribute CDF to particular projects within specific areas in the constituency? They are equally silent on how popular participation influence CDF utilization in an effort towards a prioritized and needs-responsive development. This gap is what this study aims to fill.

According to Obosi (2015) good governance influences public service delivery with specific regard to provision of water services in Kenya. He argued that the quality of public service delivery is to a large extent proportional to popular participation. The popular participation was facilitated through decentralization of services which enhanced community participation in the management of water services to the extent that Water Service Providers (WSPs) which decentralized their services and involved more popular participation showed better public service delivery as indicated by enhanced customer service and increased access to affordable water services than those which had not. Decentralization is intended to increase both efficiency and effectiveness of the delivery of Public services by providing opportunities for political participation (Obosi, 2015). He was referring mainly to the direct popular public participation of citizens in project identification and implementation, rather than the levels of political activity in a constituency in terms of how politically mobilized the residents are.

Mwenzwa (2015) confirmed that CDF is simultaneously an organizational and a political structure which means conflict between organizational and political goals. The organizational goal has to do with uplifting social welfare, but there is the likelihood that the area Member of Parliament (MP) would often support, and influence the support of, projects that ensure maximum political returns to them. Such a politically guided approach would obviously ignore critical factors that need to be considered when making CDF spending decisions. It is therefore

important to examine how pertinent issues such as constituency size and poverty levels for instance, influence effective utilization of CDF. This is what this study addresses.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

The study was guided by the Rational-Choice Theory.

1.8.1 Rational Choice Theory (RCT)

The origins of Rational Choice Theory (RCT) can be found in the classical political economic thought of Adam Smith and David Ricardo. However, it was brought into the mainstream political science by scholars such as Anthony Downs and Mancur Olson who were essentially responding to the arguments of the above scholars. Its incorporation in political science began when Anthony Downs proclaimed in 1957 that Individuals behave in politics just the same way they behave in economics. That is, they approach and make political decisions the same way they do to economic decisions. Olson added that when individuals are confronted with these two sets of decisions to make, they act rationally, and are guided by self-interest and cost-benefit calculations. Individuals are also utility maximizers (Asingo, 2018). RCT was introduced in political science to analyze party competition and voter behavior, but has been extended to areas like collective action and coalition building (Lichbach, 2003).

RCT holds that the decisions of individuals, interest groups, bureaucrats, and politicians are influenced by self-interests to the extent that, like in a market place, decisions depend on the cost-benefit analysis of action taken to the extent that they maximize net self-benefits. RCT assumes that individuals are purposive and goal-oriented as they hierarchically order their preferences to enable them adopt behaviours that would maximize the utility of their choices (Turner, 1994). It is the chosen behaviour that influence the distribution of resources and opportunities to individuals and institutions. Relatedly, people tend to act rationally for the best cause of their interests and that choices that individuals make are always constrained by various institutional mechanisms and scarcity of resources (Scott, 2000).

Generally, RCT is anchored on four assumptions namely; individual rationality, consistent and ranked preference, Methodological individual and deductive reasoning (Griggs, 2007). The first assumption is that individuals are rational agents such that when faced with distinct courses of action or policy options, they will choose the most feasible, which is most likely to maximize their own utility (Klugman, 1994). Secondly, individuals are consistent and have rank-ordered preferences and hence are purposive and goal-oriented.

They also have capacity to hierarchically order their preferences to enable them make choices that maximize their utility. In this case, choices are made by individuals on the basis of the utility of alternatives (Klugman, 1994). Thirdly, the theory is based on methodological individualism which states that social reality is conceptualized as the intentional behavior of individuals (Scott, 2010). Finally, RCT is based on deductive reasoning so that political outcomes are explained in terms of motivational assumptions underlying individual behaviors (Turner, 1994).

RCT as a theory has its own strengths and weaknesses which this study took into consideration while choosing it to guide the study. Rational approach to decisions allow informed decision-making, reducing the chances of errors, distortions, assumptions and all major causes for poor or inequitable judgments. Such information and knowledge based approach promotes consistent and high quality decisions and reduces the risk and uncertainties associated with decisions. The theory assumes that human beings are purposive, goal oriented as they hierarchically order their preferences to enable choose their lines of behaviour and to maximize utility of the choices (Turner, 1994). It is the chosen behaviour that influence resource distribution and opportunities to individuals and institutions. Relatedly, people tend to act rationally for the best cause of their interests and that choices individuals make are always constrained by various institutional mechanisms and scarcity of resources (Scott, 2000). Arche and Tritter (2000), affirmed that application of RCT to policy-making was approved to be efficient in provision of services. This resulted to decline in expenditure by public pursue and instead cost-shifting to grey sector. MPs are the policy makers and they are in the right position to amend the existing laws related to CDF Act to ensure that CDF intended goal is achieved or in favors of their interests.

RCT greatest weakness is its assumption that individuals make choices and decisions that they see as rational, not minding that the circumstances and situations in which these decisions are made have a large impact on whether or not such decisions are rational, also the values, beliefs and philosophy of the individual influence the rationality of choices and decisions made by individuals. individuals hardly follow the steps provided in the rational model to reach decisions; choices and decisions are made simply by muddling through as long as the decisions made would likely lead to the perceived best possible outcome. Hence, rationality is subjective, as individuals can be both rational and irrational in reaching decisions from time to time. Additionally, RCT has never succeeded in explaining certain phenomena such as voting. When people vote an individual's vote has a practically zero probability of influencing the outcome of an election. In such cases, the anticipated consequences of individual action cannot easily be taken for the cause of the action. (Boudon, 1998)

1.8.2 Applications of the Rational Choice Theory to this Study

The first reason for selecting rational choice theory for this study lies in its prominence in the political science literature. It has been noted for instance that “rational choice theory (RCT) is widely viewed as the most dominant paradigm not just in political science but in the social sciences” (Asingo, 2017: 578). Scholars have also noted that “the only theory in comparative politics today that is sufficiently powerful and general to be a serious contender for the unified theory is rational choice” (Wallerstein, 2011: 1). These claims make it important to seek to test some of the assumptions of RCT and their applicability to this study. A major RCT assumption that this study embraces is that of decision-making as a rational process guided largely by the actors' individual self-interests rather than pretense of a common good. In selecting and designing CDF projects for instance, it is expected that politicians involved would be rational, guided by self-interest, and hence go for projects that maximize political capital as opposed to those that genuinely seek to address common good issues like poverty. It would not be surprising for instance if a legislator starts several projects in a constituency but completes none of them so that he can maximize support across the constituency. This may explain why constituencies vary in terms of CDF projects completed in one fiscal year.

Rational Choice Theory is relevant to this study since it helps to address how constituency-specific factors affect CDF utilization. The RCT implies that an action is taken only after its benefits and costs have been weighed. Actors have goals or ends towards which their action is aimed. The primary goal in most cases is self-interest. The actors make their decisions and choose their actions rationally based on a hierarchy of preferences, or value utilities, that promises to minimize cost.

This is precisely what MPs and CDF management boards often do when implementing CDF projects. RCT enable us to understand how self-interest deviate the focus of CDF from poverty alleviation for instance, to the pursuit of political self-interests. By 2008, MPs were the conveners of Constituency Development Committees (CDCs) in their respective constituencies and had the option of being the chairperson or allowing the CDC to elect one member as chairperson. The CDC is responsible of coordinating and supervising CDF projects. A possible rational choice in terms of development include whether location of CDF projects are to be guided by poverty index, population or political participation levels.

RCT can help to examine provisions of public goods to the extent that choices made could result in outcomes that conflict with the preference of the general public while consistent with the interests of the decision makers. In this study, development as a public good can be achieved through diverse actors including politicians who make certain decisions to all the way from funds allocation to composition of CDCs and CDF project implementation. The CDF Act allows MPs to set up CDCs through popular participation drawn from each electoral ward to not only identify the projects but also to manage the same based on approved budgetary allocations. In the process, they can skew these decisions to favor their preferences. The MP, who is the CDF patron, may be interested in rewarding his cronies through appointments and also ensuring the promises are delivered to the electorate to his credit. CDF disbursement itself is a product of rational decisions made not only on the basis of their utility value but also through a carefully crafted method that ensures that preferences are ranked based on rational factors like poverty index, size and population. The assumption is that constituencies that have rationalized their choices of CDF disbursement and project selection are likely to effectively utilize their CDF

funds. However, even as MPs pursue their self-interests, they are also conscious that they can be rewarded or punished for choice made in the course of performing their CDF-related tasks.

1.9 Hypotheses

1.9.1 General Hypothesis

Constituency-specific factors influence utilization of CDF

1.9.2 Specific Hypothesis

- (i) The larger the *Constituency Size*, the greater the *Utilization of CDF*
- (ii) The higher the *Constituency Poverty Levels*, the greater the *Utilization of CDF*
- (iii) The higher the *Constituency Levels of Political Participation*, the greater the *Utilization of CDF*

1.9.3 Operationalization of the Dependent and Independent Variables

The table below show how the independent and dependent variables stated in the hypothesis have been measured.

Table 1.1: Variable Operationalization

Variable Type	Major Variables	Specific Variables	Variable Indicators
Dependent Variable	Constituency CDF Utilization	Constituency CDF Utilization	Number of CDF Projects Implemented in a Constituency in the Year 2007/2008
Independent Variable	Constituency-Specific Factors	Constituency Size	Number of people living in a Constituency
		Constituency Poverty Levels	Number of people living below poverty line
		Constituency Political Participation Levels	Voter Turnout in the 2007 Elections

Source: Author, 2018

As already indicated in the section on scope and limitations of the study, *constituency size* has several dimensions including the geographical size and the population size. However, as a variable in this study, *constituency size* is used to refer only to the population dimension of size. It is thus defined in terms of the number of people living in a constituency. The reason for taking the population rather than the geographical dimension is because the study is about CDF whose main target is the people and whose primary goal is to improve people's living conditions.

Geographical size of a constituency may be a less useful dimension in this case since some large constituencies, including North Horr which is the largest constituency, are known to be very sparsely populated. Yet some smaller constituencies such as in the Nairobi County are densely populated. For instance, a constituency like Bondo (Siaya county), which happens to be part of the study sample may seem to be fairly large but nearly a third of it is water and since there are no people living in water, you cannot start projects on the parts of the constituency covered by Lake Victoria! In fact, the first hypothesis in which this variable has been used was aimed at detecting whether there is any correlation between the number of people living in a constituency and the number of projects completed in that constituency.

1.10 Study Methodology

1.10.1 Introduction

This research methodology section comprises of the research design, data collection methods of and the methods of analyzing the collected data.

1.10.2 Research Design

Research design gives a generalized plan and arrangement of the study so devised in the mind of the researcher as to secure convincing solution to research questions (Kothari, 2007). This study used cross-sectional design to determine the effects of constituency-specific factors on CDF utilization. According to Creswell (2014), Cross-Sectional design allows comparison of many different variables at the same time. Hence suitable for the study as it aimed to explore the effectiveness with which CDF was used as measured by number of CDF projects implemented in the fiscal year. CDF in Kenya was introduced at 2.5 percent of the national governments ordinary revenue and has grown along with the overall size of the of the government budget

(Zly, 2010). CDF utilization shall refer to the extent to which the amount from constituency Fund (CDF) is utilized for the budgeted purpose.

1.10.3 Data Collection Strategies

Secondary data was used in this study which was obtained from CDF published reports, relevant journals, research reports, published textbooks, internet sources and government publications. The study used stratified random sampling technique. The first step was to regroup all the 210 constituencies into their respective former provinces. Kenya had eight provinces namely; Nairobi, Eastern, North Eastern, Coast, Rift valley, Western, Nyanza, and Central. The next step was to randomly sample a number of constituencies from each former province. To ensure equal representation, large provinces with many constituencies were assigned bigger sample sizes than smaller ones. The sample also took into consideration the urban-rural and population density diversities to ensure unbiased representation and helped in making generalizations. This was necessary because constituencies are expected to have different characteristics and hence the need to categorize them for unbiased representation. As explained in the scope, the study covered the fiscal year 2007-2008, with all the 210 constituencies in eight provinces constituting study population. The researcher appreciates the fact that after the promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 provinces were replaced by counties and the number of constituencies was also increased. In view of this, the study was restricted to the year 2007-2008. In fact, all the issues pertaining to this study have been treated, as far as possible, as they were in 2007/2008. Table 2.1 below represents the selected sample of constituencies from different provinces.

Table 2.1: Distribution of Respondents and the Sample Size

Old Provinces	No. of Constituencies	Sample Size
Nairobi	8	2
Eastern	36	7
North Eastern	11	2
Coast	21	4
Rift valley	49	10
Western	24	5
Nyanza	32	6
Central	29	6
TOTAL	210	42

Source: Research Field, 2018

1.10.4 Data Analysis

Data collected was initially analyzed using basic quantitative techniques such as mean scores, percentages and frequencies. In addition, tables and graphs were also used to present data and give visual impression of the relationship between various variables. Thereafter, correlation tests were used to determine and quantify the degree of relationships between dependent and independent variables. In this regard, Pearson product moment correlation coefficient and the Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient were used to test and help explain relationships between dependent and independent variables. As already indicated in the study limitations, I had initially planned to push the analysis beyond correlation to establish causality through the use of regression analysis, but the independent variables turned out to be so inter-correlated that using them in a regression model would lead to multicollinearity. Therefore, the idea was abandoned and the study has only performed correlation and not causation tests.

CHAPTER TWO

A HISTORICAL AND CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

2.1 Introduction

The Kenyan Constituency Development Fund (CDF) was introduced in 2003 during the Kibaki presidency. The fund was designed to support constituency, grass-root development projects. It aimed to achieve equitable distribution of development resources across regions and to control imbalances in regional development brought about by partisan politics. It targeted all constituency-level development projects, particularly those aiming to combat poverty at the grassroots. The CDF has facilitated the putting up of new water, health and education facilities in all parts of the country, including remote areas that were usually overlooked during funds allocation in national budgets (Jeffrey & Steeves, 2002).

2.2 Electoral Representation in Kenya: An Overview

Nationwide elections have taken place in Kenya since 1920, when the first elections to the Legislative Council were held. It led to the election of eleven Europeans, with three members being appointed to represent Indians and Arabs. The next elections were held in 1924 where representation for the Arabs and Indians were expanded with five seats given to the Indian community and one to the Arabs. By 1952 elections, the number of European seats had been increased to 14 and the Indian seats to six, with six African members appointed. The same system was used in 1956. However, in March 1957, elections were held for eight African seats, the first time the African population had been able to vote (The Times, 1957).

The 1961 elections were the first held under universal suffrage, although 20 of the 65 seats in the expanded Council were reserved for Europeans (10), Indians (8) and Arabs (2). The electoral system was changed again prior to the 1963 elections, with the creation of a 129-seat House of Representatives and a 38-seat Senate (Kenyan general election, 1963). In 1966, the Senate was abolished, and merged with the House of Representatives to form the National Assembly. General elections took place in 1992, with KANU winning 100 of the 188 seats in the National Assembly (Kenyan general elections, 1992). Parliamentary seats were increased from 188 seats to 210.

A new constitution was introduced in 2010, and the first elections were held under it in 2013 and new positions were created; 47 new constituencies, creating seats for 47 governors, Senate 68 seats of which 47 are elected from single-member constituencies and the remaining 21 are appointed. The National Assembly has 350 members, of which 290 are elected in single-member constituencies and 47 are reserved for women and are elected from single-member constituencies based on the 47 counties and the remaining 13 seats include 12 nominated by political parties based on their number of seats and a Speaker (Republic of Kenya, 2013).

2.2.1 Electoral Representation in Colonial Kenya

General elections were held in Kenya Colony on 2 April 1924. The elections were the first under a new Constitution which saw suffrage extended to Indians and Arabs, who were allotted five and one elected seat in the Legislative Council respectively, alongside the eleven elected seats for the white population, although appointed members were still the majority (The Times, 1924). While all adult Indian residents were given the right to vote, in the Arab community only men literate in Arabic or Swahili and resident in the country for two years were enfranchised, as the community had requested that women not be given the right to vote. One member was appointed to represent the majority black population (The Times, 1924). The Reform Party was one of the parties to contest the election in the white community. Despite their enfranchisement, the Indian community boycotted the election after their leaders forbade registration in protest at being placed on a separate roll to the White voters and the small number of seats given to Indians relative to Whites. As a result no Indians took their seats in the Legislative Council (The Times, 1924).

The Kenyan African population voted for the first time in 1957 during the legislative elections. They voted for eight African seats in the parliament which previously had 14 seats for Europeans, six seats for Indians, one for Arabs and six seats appointed for the Africans. The first universal suffrage was held in 1961 and pre-independence political party the Kenya African National Union (KANU) won majority of seats in the expanded 65-seat parliament despite the European dominance. In the 1963 elections, the system was changed again and seats were increased to 129 House of Representatives and a 38-seat Senate (Kenya, 1965).

2.2.2 Electoral Representation in Independent Kenya (1963-2010)

The country's Constitution provided for the delimitation of constituencies so as to facilitate the conduct of elections in independent Kenya (Section 40 of the Constitution of Kenya, 1963). At that time, the determination of electoral units in Kenya started with creation of 117 Constituencies based on a clearly established principle that all constituencies contain as nearly as possible an equal number of inhabitants. The Constitution provided that no constituency was to form part or more than one administrative unit; or be part of both the Nairobi area and another area. Towards the delimitation of boundaries, the Commission also took into account the following: population density and in particular, the need to ensure adequate representation of urban and sparsely populated rural areas; means of communication; geographical features; community of interest; and boundaries of existing administrative areas (Richard & Waller., 2003).

The Constitutional amendments of 1964 and 1966 resulted in the abolition of the seven regional assemblies and the Senate. The House of Representatives was renamed the National Assembly with 158 Parliamentary Constituencies consisting of the initial 117 plus 41 newly created constituencies following the abolition of the senate. In 1986, Parliament raised the number of constituencies from 158 to 188. (IEBC, 2012).

The Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) established in 1992, published through a Gazette Order the names and boundaries of these constituencies. In 1996, the ECK reviewed the boundaries and names of constituencies and raised the number from 188 to a maximum of 210 as provided under the previous Constitution. Following the disputed results of the Presidential elections in 2007, a National Accord Implementation Committee (NAIC) was established. NAIC recommended a review of the electoral process in Kenya, which led to the establishment of the Independent Review Electoral Commission (IREC), popularly known as the Kriegler Commission (Pinkney, &Robert, 2011).

The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment Act), 2008 established IIEC and mandated it to reform the electoral process. The promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya (2010) saw the formation of IEBC to take over from IIEC in accordance with section 41B and 41C of the Constitution (2010).

The IEBC Commission was mandated to: - determine the boundaries of constituencies and wards using the Criteria mentioned in the Constitution (2010); observe the requirements of Article 89(2) of the Constitution (2010); and ensure that the first review of constituencies undertaken under the new Constitution (2010) shall not result in the loss of a constituency existing on the effective date. Article 89(1) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 provided for creation of constituencies that are supposed to be a maximum of two hundred and ninety (290) constituencies from the initial 210 (Godwin & Murunga, 2011).

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2.2.3 Electoral Representation after the 2010 Constitution (2010 -2018)

The new constitution was approved by the National Assembly in April 2010, endorsed by the electorate in a national referendum on 4th August 2010 and promulgated on 27 August 2010. It reduced of the President's power; abolished the office of Prime Minister (after the March 2013 election); created 47 counties and three elective posts at the county level – Governor, Senator and Women Representative.

The national assembly was also expanded to 290 elected members of parliament representing a constituency, the 47 women elected from each of the 47 counties, and at least 12 members nominated by parties according to their proportion of members to represent women, youth and the marginalized adding up to 349 members. It also created a second-tier legislative chamber called Senate, which currently comprised of 47 elected senators representing each county, 16 women nominated for gender balance, and four representatives of the youth and the disabled. This makes for 67 members. The devolution of power to county government was to be overseen by the Senate (Republic of Kenya, 2010).

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2.3 An Overview of Fiscal Devolution and Decentralization in Kenya

The Kenyan governments through LATF Act, No.8 of 1998, introduced the LATF. The funds were purposely to support the local authorities in improving service delivery, financial management and help in reducing creditors. LATF formed 5% of national income, and was disbursed as; 7% of the fund is shared equally, 60% is disbursed based on the population size, while the balance is shared based on the relative of urban population densities (LATF, 1999).

The Road Maintenance Levy Fund (RMLF) was established in 1993 through the Road Maintenance Levy Fund Act. RMLF caters for maintenance of public roads, including local authority unclassified roads. The fund is made up from a fuel levy on petroleum products and transit toll collections. It is administered by the Kenya Roads Board which was established in 1999 to manage RMLF and coordinate rehabilitation, maintenance and development. It is the

principal adviser to the Government on road matters. The Board assigns the management of roads to designated agencies. 60 per cent of the annual allocation goes to international and national trunk and primary roads, 24 per cent to secondary roads and 16 per cent to rural roads. The latter portion is shared equally among constituencies within a district (Bagaka, 2008).

The Government introduced Free Primary Education (FPE) in 2003. By then it planned for Kenya to realize Universal Primary Education (UPE) by the year 2005 and Education for All by the year 2015 in line with United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) agreed in the year 2000. The program was launched on 6th January 2003, FPE is a response to World Conference Education for all held in Thailand in 1990 and the World Education Forum held in Dakar, Senegal in 2000.

The Government of Kenya, accepted and signed the recommendations of these two international conferences on increased access to education, which made UPE a key part of the national development strategy. With the introduction of FPE in 2003, all the school fees and levies for tuition in primary education were abolished. The Government and development partners meet the cost of basic teaching and learning materials, including teachers' salaries and co-curricular activities (Republic of Kenya, 2003).

A Secondary School Education Bursary Fund (SEBF) was established in 1993/ 4 through a Presidential pronouncement. Its aim was to cushion the country's poor and vulnerable families against the high and increasing cost of secondary education and hopefully reduce inequalities that are brought about and maintained by unequal access to education opportunities. It also aimed at increasing enrolment in and completion of secondary schools. The scheme was also designed to cushion households from the rising impacts of poverty, an increasingly unstable economy and devastating effects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Later, SEBF was converted into Constituency Bursary Fund, to be administered by Constituency Bursary Committees from 2003/4.

The objective of channeling bursary funds through constituencies each financial year is to ensure that all bright and needy students are identified and assisted through a process that involves local leaders. The allocation to each constituency is based on the secondary school enrolment and the Poverty Index of each constituency in relation to the overall national secondary school enrolment and poverty situation in the country. For instance, the national enrolment for 2004 was put at 786,129 students while the poverty index shows that among these 65%, or 471,674 students were poor and in need of assistance (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2003).

2.4 CDF as Fiscal Devolution

To address regional disparities in development, Kenya sought to decentralize planning and funding which saw the introduction of District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD) in 1985 where local people participated in proposing development projects in their districts (Republic of Kenya, 1985). In 2003, the government adopted devolved funds for development in its Economic Recovery Strategy for Employment and Wealth Creation. The objective was to provide funds to local communities, and empower them to participate in development by identifying development priorities. These devolved funds include CDF, Constituency Roads Funds (CRF), Constituency Bursary Funds (CBF) and LATF (Odhiambo & Anyembe, 2003).

The CDF program comprises of an annual budgetary allocation equivalent to 2.5% of the total national revenue, though the Kenya parliament recently passed a motion to increase the fund to 7.5% of the total national revenue. Allocations to the 210 parliamentary jurisdictions are clearly spelled out in the CDF Act, where 75% of the fund is allocated equally among all 210 constituencies. The remaining 25% is allocated based on constituency poverty levels, population size and the size of the constituency. A maximum 10% of each constituency's annual allocation is used for education bursary schemes, 3% for administration and 5% for rainy day fund for each constituency. Since its inception, the CDF kitty has grown from a paltry Ksh. 126,000,000 (U.S. \$1,938,461) for 2003/04 fiscal year to Ksh. 10,304,805,060 (U.S. \$158,535,462) for 2007/08 fiscal year (KNBS, 2007).

The Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA) is an independent Commission set up under Article 215 of the Constitution of Kenya 2010. Its core mandate is to recommend the basis for equitable sharing of revenues raised nationally between the national and the county governments, and among the county governments. Article 216 (4) of the Constitution requires the Commission to determine, publish and regularly review a policy in which it sets out the criteria by which to identify marginalized areas for purposes of the allocation and use of the Equalization Fund. The Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA) has developed a policy for identifying marginalized areas and the criteria for sharing revenue from the Equalization Fund. The policy will be used to allocate Equalization Funds for five years beginning with financial year 2017/18. The policy has identified specific areas where marginalized communities live to benefit from the Equalization Fund. Furthermore, the Policy has recommended the inclusion of education as one of the sectors benefiting from the Fund and marginalized minority communities. Article 260 of the Constitution defines minority communities as those with small population, unique culture, traditional lifestyle of hunter-gatherer's economy and pastoral communities that have suffered relative geographic isolation which hindered them from integrating in the social and economic life of Kenya. In setting out the criteria for identifying marginalized areas, the Commission identified reasons for marginalization, which include: Legislated discrimination; Geographical location; Culture and lifestyles; External domination; Land legislation and administration; Minority recognition groups; Ineffectual political participation; and Inequitable government policies. The Commission further highlights the consequences and impacts of marginalization. These include high levels of absolute and relative poverty, food insecurity, poor infrastructure, poor state of basic social services and poor governance.

The primary criterion chosen for identifying marginalized counties in this policy is the County Development Index (CDI), which is a composite index constructed from indicators measuring the state of health, education, infrastructure and poverty in a county. The CDI is complemented by two other approaches, namely: expert analysis on historical and legislative discrimination and results of the Commission's county marginalization survey. The policy recognises that there are marginalized communities living in counties which are classified as non-marginalized and thus do not benefit from the Equalisation Fund. Both the national and county governments should, therefore, institute affirmative action programs targeting minorities and marginalized groups

within counties to enable them realise their social and economic rights as enshrined in the Constitution. All actors in government are expected to rally around this policy in order to ensure that we make the country an equitable society as envisaged in the Constitution (Commission on Revenue Allocation).

2.4.1 Genesis and Rationale for CDF

The CDF concept was created in 2003 through an act of parliament immediately after the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) Government of President Mwai Kibaki romped into power. The fund was established within auspices of Social Dimension of Development Program (SDDP) aimed at channeling resources to local levels for poverty reduction and regional development. It aimed at ironing out regional imbalances brought about by patronage politics by providing funds to constituencies to fight poverty. The program was designed to fight poverty and provide basic needs such as education, healthcare, water, agricultural services, security and electricity by dedicating at least 2.5 per cent of all National Government's share of annual revenue towards community projects identified at constituency level by the communities (Ministry of Devolution and Planning, 2015).

CDF is supposed to finance livestock and agriculture development like cattle dips and agricultural collection centers, electricity projects with potential to spur investment and improve the living standards of the people, establish a bursary scheme not exceeding 10% of the funds and the bursary to focus on the post primary institution, education projects like new primary and secondary schools, water projects to improve the people living standards, security issues like police posts, improvement of health facilities and infrastructures like rural access roads and bridges (Republic of Kenya, 2003). Management of CDF is under Constituency Development Committees (CDC) at the constituency, and District Projects Management Committee (DPC) at the district level.

Constituency Development Committee (CDC) comprises fifteen members including the elected Member of Parliament (MP) who represent various interests in the community, for example; youth and women and is responsible for the management of the Fund at the constituency level. District Project Management Committee (DPC) which was composed of MPs, mayors/chairs of

local authorities, the District Commissioner (DC), District Development Officer (DDO), a community representative, District Accountant and District Heads of relevant departments. The role of the DPC is to countercheck project proposals put forward by the CDC in the district in order to avoid duplication and coordinate the implementation of funded projects together with the CDF account managers (Odhiambo and Anyembe, 2003).

2.4.2 An overview of CDF reforms

The CDF was introduced in Kenya in 2003 with the passage of the CDF Act 2003 by the 9th Parliament of Kenya. The CDF Act provides that the government set aside at least 2.5% of its ordinary revenue for disbursement under the CDF program. Three quarters of the amount is divided equitably between all constituencies whilst the remaining quarter is divided based on poverty index to cater for poor constituencies. Each constituency is subdivided into locations for local administrative purposes. Before the implementation of CDF in 2003; the district was considered as the primary unit of local development (Okungu, 2006). Today, CDF is perhaps the most popular devolved funds in Kenya (Republic of Kenya, 2003).

The CDF Act of 2003 provided for use of 2.5% of the national budget to alleviate poverty and equitable distribution of development resources at the constituency level (Republic of Kenya, 2003). CDF is supposed to finance livestock and agriculture development like cattle dips and agricultural collection centers, electricity projects with potential to spur investment and improve the living standards of the people, establish a bursary scheme not exceeding 10% of the funds and the bursary to focus on the post primary institution, education projects like new primary and secondary schools (now referred as CDF schools), water projects to improve the people living standards, security issues like police posts, improvement of health facilities and infrastructures like rural access roads and bridges. Management of CDF is under Constituency Development Committees (CDC) at the constituency, and District Projects Committee (DPC) at the district level (Odhiambo and Anyembe, 2003).

The CDF Act 2003 was later reviewed by the CDF (Amendment) Act 2007, and repealed by CDF Act, 2013 which was subsequently succeeded by the current National Government Constituencies Development Fund (NG-CDF Amendment) Act 2016. The Fund is managed by

the National Government CDF Board at the National level; the NG-CDF committees at the constituency level; and the Project Management Committees (PMC) at the community level. The NG-CDF Board is established pursuant to section 43(1) of NG-CDF Act, 2015. It falls under the Ministry of Devolution and Planning and it's composed of twenty members of parliament including the chairperson and vice chairperson. The main role of NG-CDF Board is to oversee the policy framework and legislative matters that may arise in relation to the Fund.

The Ministry ensures budgetary provisions and offers policy direction to the Fund. The national treasury finances NG-CDF budgets and provides financial guidelines for effective and efficient management of the Fund. The National Government CDF committees develops project proposals in consultation with local citizens through periodic ward level open forums, submits them to the NG-CDF Board for approval and facilitates the PMCs in the planning, implementation, and sustenance of CDF projects. The project Management committees and the NG-CDF committees collaborates for efficient project management through technical support of relevant government department within the sub-county (NG-CDF, 2015).

2.4.3 Major reforms of CDF in Kenya

The Constituency Development Fund was introduced in Kenya in 2003 with the passage of the CDF Act 2003 by the 9th Parliament of Kenya. The CDF Act provides that the government set aside at least 2.5% of its ordinary revenue for disbursement under the CDF program. Three quarters of the amount is divided equitably between all constituencies whilst the remaining 1/4th is divided based on a poverty index to cater for poorer constituencies. The constituency is the unit of political representation in Kenya. Each constituency is further subdivided into locations for local administrative purposes. A district is a grouping of 4-6 constituencies and before the implementation of CDF in 2003; the district was hitherto considered the unit of local development (Okungu, 2006).

CDF fund was established in 2003 through an Act of Parliament, the CDF Act 2003. The Act was later reviewed by the CDF (Amendment) Act 2007, and repealed by CDF Act, 2013 which was subsequently succeeded by the current National Government Constituencies Development Fund (NG-CDF Amendment) Act 2016. The Fund is managed by the National Government CDF Board at the National level, the NG-CDF committees at the constituency level and the Project

Management Committees (PMC) at the community level. The NG-CDF Board is a body corporate falling under the Ministry of Devolution and Planning, which ensures budgetary provisions and offers policy direction to the Fund. The National Treasury finances the NG-CDF budgets and provides financial guidelines for effective and efficient management of the Fund. NG-CDF committees develop project proposals in consultation with citizens through periodic ward level open forums. They then submit them to the NG-CDF Board for approval and facilitate the PMCs in the planning, implementation, and sustenance of the projects once completed. The project Management committees and the NG-CDF committees provide technical support of relevant government department within the sub-county (NG-CDF, 2015).

The objectives of the Fund are now clearly provided for in the Act which clearly defines the Fund as specific to the National Government in the furtherance of its functions (Section 3 of NG-CDF Act). The Act specifies that the Fund is drawn from the National Government's Share of revenue in accordance with the Division of Revenue Act enacted pursuant to Article 218 of the Constitution. This provision serves to correct the view that CDF Act introduces a third level of revenue sharing contrary to the constitution, as noted by the High Court ruling. The eligible projects under the NG-CDF Act are only those entailing works or services falling under the functions of the National Government as provided for in the constitution. This is an important provision in compliance with the ruling of the High Court, which determined that the Act as earlier formulated violated the principle of separation of functions between the National and County governments as provided for in the fourth schedule of the constitution, by connoting that CDF can implement any project regardless of whether it falls under the functions of the County or National government (NG-CDF, 2015). Constituency Committee members serve for two a year renewable term in office. Section 43 of the NG-CDF Act 2015, introduces Social Security Programs as eligible development initiatives under the NG-CDF, and enhances the ceiling of allocation to education bursary schemes, mock examinations, and continuous assessment tests from 25% to 35% of annual constituency allocations. The rationale is to increase focus on education as a national government function and to cater for social security programs under CDF. The Act introduced Constituency Oversight Committee (COC) whose function is to oversee projects undertaken under the Act and sensitize and receive feedback on CDF projects from the public (NG-CDF, 2015).

CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATION


3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the research findings and interpretations on the influence of constituency-specific factors on the utilization of CDF. It also tests the three hypothesis of the study which are; The larger the constituency size, the greater the utilization of CDF, the higher the constituency poverty levels, the greater the utilization of CDF and the higher the constituency level of political participation, the greater the utilization of CDF. The first part of the chapter presents data on the dependent variable, which is, CDF utilization. This is followed by discussions on the independent variables namely, constituency size, poverty levels and political participation. Next is a descriptive analysis of the data.

3.2 The Dependent Variable: CDF Utilization

In this section, findings relating to the dependent variable have been discussed and analyzed. The dependent variable which is CDF utilization has been measured using the number of projects implemented in each constituency during the fiscal year 2007/2008.

Figure 3.1 shows a histogram of CDF utilization in the 42 selected constituencies.



Source: Field Research, 2018

CDF Utilization varies considerably across constituencies. Generally, the histogram trend line shows that as you move from lower to higher CDF utilization, you find fewer and fewer constituencies. However, as you move in the reverse direction you find more and more constituencies. In other words, most constituencies are found at the lower end of the CDF utilization, while very few are found at the higher end of CDF utilization. The fact that $r = -0.947$ shows that this pattern is very strong and that the number of constituencies is inversely related to the level of CDF utilization. Furthermore, the mean CDF utilization in the Kenyan constituencies is 2.76 which indicate that the average number of CDF projects across the 42 sampled constituencies is roughly three. The median level of CDF utilization among the 42 constituencies also stand at three 3. The standard deviation is 1.54 implying that utilization of CDF among the sampled constituencies is clustered around the mean.


3.3 The Independent Variables: Constituency-Specific Factors

This section focuses on three specific independent variables or constituency-specific factors namely, constituency size, constituency political participation levels and constituency poverty levels. The study used constituency population size as an indicator of constituency size. That is, constituency size was measured in terms of population. The study also used voter turnout as indicator of constituency political participation levels, while constituency poverty levels were measured in terms of the number of people leaving below the poverty line.

3.3.1 Data on Constituency Size

This sub-section looks at data relating to the first independent variable - constituency size. Figure 3.2 shows a histogram of constituency size for the 42 sampled constituencies.

Figure 3.2 Histogram of Constituency size




Source: Field Research, 2018

The histogram in figure 3.2 shows a trend line whereby as you move from smaller to larger constituencies, there are fewer and fewer projects. Most of the constituencies are relatively smaller in size and just a few are large. Also, the value of $r = -0.512$ which means that this pattern is fairly strong and that the number of constituencies is inversely related to the constituency size. There are relatively fewer large sized constituencies and many small-sized constituencies. Additionally, the mean constituency size for the 42 constituencies is 181,300 people, while the median constituency size is 161,700 people. Median refers to the central tendency of the sampled data arranged in either ascending or descending order. The standard deviation for constituency size is 177,000 people, implying that constituency sizes varied considerably to a tune of +/- 101,099 people.

3.3.2 Data on Constituency Poverty Levels

This sub-section presents data relating to the second independent variable – the constituency poverty levels. Figure 3.3 is a histogram of poverty levels for the 42 constituencies sampled.

Figure 3.3: Histogram of Constituency Poverty Levels




Source: Field Research, 2018

Figure 3.3 above shows that the 42 constituencies sampled were fairly uniformly distributed across different poverty levels. Indeed, $r = -0.163$, which shows a very weak pattern in the correlation between poverty levels and the number of constituencies that fall under each poverty level. Even a casual look at the histogram reveals that the data seems to fit in the normal curve. This suggests that there are almost as many constituencies with lower poverty levels as there are those with higher levels. Furthermore, the mean poverty level is 49.9%. The standard deviation for poverty levels is 16.6% implying that constituency poverty levels vary considerably to a tune of +/- 16.6%.

3.3.3 Data on Constituency Political Participation Levels

This sub-section outlines findings that relate to the final independent variable, which are the constituency political participation levels. Figure 3.4 is a histogram of constituency political participation levels for the 42 selected constituencies.

Figure 3.4: Histogram of Constituency Political Participation Levels



Source: Field Research, 2018

Given the histogram trend line and the fact that $r = 0.02$ as shown in Figure 3.4, it means that there is virtually no correlation between the political participation levels and the number of constituencies that fall in each political participation level. This implies that the selected constituencies were uniformly distributed across different political participation levels. The histogram reveals that the political participation level data seems to fit in the normal curve. In other words, there are almost as many constituencies with lower political participation levels as those with higher political participation levels. Besides, the mean political participation level is 57,676, with a standard deviation of 19,587 people, implying that there is a huge variation in the political participation levels among the 42 sampled constituencies.

3.3.4 Testing Correlations among the Independent Variables

Before looking at the correlation between the dependent and the independent variables, it is important to check the relations between the independent variables themselves. This serves a number of purposes. First, all the three specific independent variables (constituency size, constituency poverty levels, and constituency political participation levels) are supposed to be indicators of one major independent (constituency-specific factors). Thus, how closely related

they are to each other may reflect how well they serve as indicators of the same phenomena. Secondly, if they are closely related to each other, then it is not possible to include all of them together in the same regression model and hence this study cannot perform causality tests between the dependent variable and all these independent variables simultaneously in a model. This is because using correlated independent variables in a model results into multicollinearity. Thirdly, testing correlations among the independent variables also helps to understand the sample and by extension the population of study much better. Table 3.1 shows a matrix for correlations among the independent variables.

Table 3.1 Bivariate correlations among independent variables.

Constituency Size		
r = - 0.328; α = 0.03 rho = - 0.218; α = 0.17	Constituency Poverty Levels	
r = 0.620; α < 0.01 rho = 0.650; α < 0.01	r = -0.576; α < 0.01 rho = - 0.518; α < 0.01	Constituency Political Participation Levels

Source: Field Research, 2018

The first observation is that all the three independent variables (constituency size, poverty levels and political participation levels) are strongly correlated with each other. The larger the constituency size, the lower the poverty levels. In Kenya, some of the constituencies which are very large in terms of population or which are densely populated such as in central Kenya actually have very low poverty levels. It is the sparsely populated but geographically very large constituencies such as North Horr or Moyale which tend to have very high poverty levels. This suggests that to fight poverty more effectively, more focus should be directed to geographically large constituencies as opposed to the constituencies with large population. May be this is why the equalization fund which is part of the CDF seems to target these areas.

At the same time, the larger the constituency size, the higher the political participation levels. This is fairly obvious because when a constituency has a large population it is expected that even if it does not record huge percentage of voter turnout, the number of people who will turn out to

vote will be many as compared to constituencies with low population. Finally, the higher the poverty levels, the lower the political participation levels. Very poor constituencies tend to register very low voter turnout perhaps because the majority may have since lost hope that elections cannot change their situation. This close relation among the independent variables show that they are fairly good indicators of constituency-specific factors.

Furthermore, the close relation among independent variables mean that it is not possible to include all of them together in a regression model and hence this study cannot perform regression analysis to establish causality between dependent and independent variables simultaneously. To do regression analysis using correlated independent variables result into multicollinearity. As a result of this problem, the study only performed correlation tests between each of the three selected constituency-specific factors and CDF utilization in Kenya in the next section.


3.4 Testing the Correlations between Dependent and Independent Variables

In this section, correlation analysis has been done between the variables to test the correlation between the dependent variable (CDF utilization) and each of the independent variables (the constituency size, constituency poverty levels, and constituency political participation levels). In other words, this section tests the three specific study hypotheses listed in chapter one.

3.4.1 Correlating Constituency Size with CDF Utilization

This section is testing the first hypothesis which states that the higher the constituency size, the greater the CDF utilization. This section first began by plotting a graph of the Constituency size against CDF utilization to give a visual impression of the relationship between them and note anomaly that can sway their correlation. The graph in Figure 3.5 links CDF utilization to constituency size.

Figure 3.5. A Polygon Graph of Constituency Size and CDF Utilization



Source: Field Research, 2018

First and foremost, figure 3.5 shows that the 42 selected constituencies are fairly well packed together. However, three constituencies (Mwea, Embakasi and Juja) not only seem to stand out from the rest but also give contrasting patterns of relationships between constituency size and CDF utilization. Although Mwea constituency is relatively smaller in size, it has the highest CDF utilization which stands at seven projects. On the other hand, Embakasi constituency is the largest but with relatively fewer projects - three. However, Juja constituency is both large in size and also has one of the highest CDF utilization levels which stand at six projects. It is not surprising that these two large constituencies (Embakasi and Juja) were later subdivided.

According to the hypothesis, it was expected that a constituency like Embakasi which is very large would have high CDF utilization, while a constituency like Mwea which has the highest CDF utilization levels would be bigger in size. Thus, among these three constituencies, it is only Juja constituency which fits within the hypothesis. This means that some large constituencies have lower CDF utilization, while some smaller constituencies have higher CDF utilization. Yet, some large constituencies have higher CDF utilization, while some small constituencies have lower

utilization. Generally, figure 3.5, does not give a very good impression of the relationship between constituency size and CDF utilization.

For better understanding of the relationship between constituency size and CDF utilization, this study performed Pearson correlation analysis (r) as well as Spearman's correlation tests (ρ). The Pearson correlation analysis reveal that there is a strong and statistically significant positive correlation between constituency Size and CDF utilization as measured by number of projects ($r = 0.322$, $\alpha = 0.04$). Spearman correlation analysis also reveal that there is a strong and statistically significant positive correlation between constituency size and CDF utilization as measured by the number of projects ($\rho = 0.400$, $\alpha = 0.01$).


In order to take care of the possible influence of extreme cases like Embakasi and Mwea, a trimmed correlation was performed, which yielded nearly similar results for Pearson correlation ($r = 0.343$, $\alpha = 0.04$), and Spearman correlation ($\rho = 0.399$, $\alpha = 0.02$). The small difference between the two sets of results may be because the trimmed correlations eliminate extreme cases and therefore use a slightly smaller sample size than the normal correlations. Yet, the sample size influences the strength of any correlation, whether Pearson or Spearman.

Essentially, both pairs of Pearson and Spearman tests reveal the existence of positive correlation linking CDF utilization to constituency size as measured by population size, which leads to the rejection of the alternative hypothesis that the smaller the constituency size, the greater the utilization of CDF. Hence the hypothesis which states that the higher the constituency size, the greater the utilization of CDF is accepted. Thus, population size is positively correlated with CDF utilization in the constituencies in Kenya. The larger the constituency, the higher the level of CDF utilization. This is in line with Baskin et al (2010) finding that CDF dedicates funds to benefit specific political sectors through allocations and spending decisions influenced by their representatives in national assembly. This encourages patronage and citizen exclusion, especially those from low population density areas. It also agrees with Tshangana (2010) who argues that the size of a constituency affects the amount of fund allocated to it.

3.4.2 Correlating Constituency Poverty Levels with CDF Utilization

This section is testing hypothesis two which states that the higher the constituency poverty levels, the greater the utilization of CDF. This section began by plotting a graph of constituency poverty levels against CDF utilization to visualize the relationship between the dependent variable (CDF utilization) and independent variable (constituency poverty levels). The graph is shown in Figure 3.6 linking CDF utilization to constituency poverty levels.

Figure 3.6. A Polygon Graph of Poverty Levels and CDF Utilization



Source: Field Research, 2018

First and foremost, figure 3.6 shows that the selected constituencies are fairly packed together along the negative diagonal, creating the impression that constituency poverty levels is inversely correlated with CDF utilization. That is, as constituency poverty levels increase, CDF utilization decreases. This is just a visual impression. However, Embakasi, Kamukunji and Kangema are three of the few constituencies which do not seem to be in line with this impression. Since these three constituencies have relatively lower poverty levels compared to the others in the sample, it was expected that they would have high CDF utilization. Yet, each of them had relatively low CDF utilization. Kamukunji and Kangema only had one complete project, while Embakasi had

three in the fiscal year reviewed. Once again, the graph in figure 3.6 does not give a good indication of the relationship between poverty and CDF utilization.

To have a better understanding of the relationship between constituency poverty levels and CDF utilization, Pearson correlation analysis (r) and Spearman correlation tests (ρ) were performed. The Pearson correlation analysis reveal a strong and statistically significant negative correlation between constituency poverty levels and CDF utilization as measured by number of projects ($r = - 0.462, \alpha < 0.01$). The Spearman correlation analysis also reveal that there is a strong and statistically significant negative correlation between constituency poverty levels and CDF utilization as measured by the number of projects ($\rho = - 0.447, \alpha < 0.01$).

To take care of the possibility that extreme cases like Embakasi, Kamukunji and Kangema may have significantly influenced the correlations above, a trimmed Pearson and Spearman correlation analysis was performed. Both the trimmed Pearson and Spearman correlation analysis reveal a much stronger negative correlation between the constituency poverty levels and CDF utilization ($r = - 0.516, \alpha < 0.01$; $\rho = - 0.489, \alpha < 0.01$). The difference between the two sets of normal and trimmed correlations show that the few extreme cases eliminated by trimming were significantly influencing the correlations.


However, the correlations generally remain the same - constituency poverty levels are inversely correlated with CDF utilization so that as poverty levels increase, CDF utilization decreases. Both Pearson and Spearman's tests reveal a strong negative correlation between constituency poverty levels and CDF utilization as measured by the number of CDF projects. Hence, the hypothesis which states that the higher the constituency poverty levels, the greater the utilization of CDF is not supported by the results. Instead, the results show that the poorer a constituency is, the poorer the utilization of CDF. This should be a concern for the policy makers because it means that CDF may not be meeting one of its key objective which is to fight poverty. It means that constituency poverty gap continues to widen since the richer constituencies are becoming even richer as the poorer constituencies continue to lag behind. This agrees with the concerns raised by Awiti (2008), that CDF disbursed equally to all constituencies irrespective of geographical size, population and levels of poverty brings problems of inequality as

Constituencies in rural areas lack basic necessities such as adequate access to social amenities. In that respect, allocating a proportionately higher level to the rural constituency will be preferable since that will provide opportunities for them to catch up with urban centers in terms of better amenities. It also supports (Kinuthia and Laking ,2016) insisted that all decisions concerning resource utilization should be judged according to the degree to which they accord with the principles of fairness and the quality of the justifications provided for the decision. They gave three options that can be used to arrive at fair decision as follows: the available revenue to be shared equally, available revenue to be shared based on percentage of poor people and finally the available revenue to be allocated to the wards with highest percentage of poor people.

3.4.3 Correlating CDF Utilization with Political Participation Levels

This section is testing hypothesis three which states that the higher the constituency level of political participation, the greater the utilization of CDF. This section began by plotting a graph of constituency political participation levels against CDF utilization to have a visual impression of the relationship between political participation levels and CDF utilization. Figure 3.7 shows the relationship between political participation levels and CDF utilization.

Figure 3.7. A Polygon Graph of Political Participation and CDF Utilization



Source: Field Research, 2018

Figure 3.7 shows that the selected constituencies are fairly well aligned along the positive diagonal, giving the impression that constituency political participation levels are positively correlated with CDF utilization. As the constituency levels of political participation increase, CDF utilization also increases. However, Embakasi and Kamukunji, which are the only ones from the former Nairobi province (now Nairobi County), do not seem to be in agreement with this impression. Embakasi is only second to Mwea in terms of levels of political participation, yet it had on three complete projects in the fiscal year 2007/2008. Similarly, Kamukunji has a fairly level of political participation, but had only one complete project.

Figure 3.7 depicts a clearer and stronger positive relationship between the dependent variable (CDF utilization) and the independent variable (political participation). To get the actual strength of this relationship, Pearson and Spearman correlation tests were performed. Pearson correlation results reveal a strong positive correlation between political participation measured in terms of voter turnout and utilization of CDF ($r = 0.788, \alpha < 0.01$); while Spearman correlation results also show a strong positive correlation between political participation and CDF utilization ($\rho = 0.761, \alpha < 0.01$).

To check whether extreme cases like Embakasi and Kamukunji may have influenced the above correlations, a trimmed Pearson and Spearman correlation analysis was done. Both the trimmed Pearson and Spearman correlation analysis reveal a much stronger negative correlation between the constituency poverty levels and CDF utilization ($r = -0.855, \alpha < 0.01$; $\rho = -0.814, \alpha < 0.01$). Once again, the difference between normal and trimmed correlations show that the few extreme cases trimmed had significant effect on the correlations. However, even the trimmed correlations support the third hypothesis which states that the higher the constituency levels of political participation, the greater the utilization of CDF. This supports (Mapesa and Kibua, 2006) argument that political participation is crucial for successful CDF implementation. According to them, citizens at the community level should be involved in ensuring that MPs are held accountable in effective CDF utilization. They argued that ignorance among constituents affects how much of CDF a sitting MP can use in public projects. (Tidemand and Steffenson, 2010) argue that for effective use of devolved funds local accountability should be maintained where the citizens and politicians participate in decision-making relating to the use of devolved

funds through access to information, as well as institutional provisions for politician's oversight of planning, finances and staff.

3.5 Putting the Findings Together

The general objective of this study was to determine whether the constituency-specific factors influence CDF utilization. To do this, three constituency-specific factors were selected, namely, constituency size, constituency poverty levels, and constituency political participation levels. On the basis of this, three hypotheses relating to each of these factors were developed and tested. . The rationale was that the cumulative effect of these factors on CDF utilization would show how the constituency-specific factors generally influence CDF utilization. The results in the previous sub-sections show that all these three factors individually affect CDF utilization. Specifically, constituency size and constituency political participation levels enhance CDF utilization, while constituency poverty level reduces CDF utilization. These results support the first hypothesis stating that the larger the constituency size as measured by population, the greater the utilization of CDF as measured by the number of CDF projects ($r=0.322$; $\rho=0.400$). Results also support the third hypothesis stating that the higher the constituency political participation levels as measured by voter turnout, the greater the CDF utilization ($r=0.788$; $\rho=0.761$). However, the results negate the second hypothesis which states that the higher the constituency poverty levels, the greater the CDF utilization. Instead, it finds that the higher the poverty levels, the lower the CDF utilization ($r= - 0.462$; $\rho= - 0.447$). Given the strength of the coefficients, it seems that political participation has a greater influence on CDF utilization than the other two variables. Thus, political considerations (like constituency size and political participation levels) seem to have a much more significant influence on how CDF is used than the economic factors (like the poverty levels).

CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Summary

This research was aimed at establishing the influence of constituency size, poverty levels and political participation on CDF utilization. The study used cross-sectional research design and used data for the year 2007/2008. Data analysis was done using basic quantitative techniques which were used to draw conclusions on the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. The descriptive statistics established that the average number of projects is three while the average population size for the 42 selected constituencies is 181,300. Similarly, the average poverty levels is 49.9%. The analysis also established that the average participation level is 57,676. The analysis established a strong positive correlation between constituency size and CDF utilization ($r = 0.322$, $\alpha = 0.04$; $\rho = 0.400$, $\alpha = 0.01$), and an even stronger positive correlation between political participation and CDF utilization ($r = 0.788$, $\alpha < 0.01$; $\rho = 0.761$, $\alpha < 0.01$). However, the analysis show a strong negative correlation between poverty and CDF utilization ($r = -0.462$, $\alpha < 0.01$; $\rho = -0.447$, $\alpha < 0.01$).

4.2 Conclusions

The study aimed at finding out the effect of constituency-specific factors on CDF utilization. In this respect, it explored the effects of constituency size, constituency poverty levels and political participation on CDF utilization. The study results support the first study hypothesis that: the larger the constituency size, the greater the Utilization of CDF. More specifically, the research findings reveal that there exists a positive correlation between constituency size as measured by population, and the utilization of CDF. This implies that areas with high population utilize CDF more efficiently and have more development projects than less populated areas. Mwendwa (2015) confirms that CDF is simultaneously an organizational and a political structure which means conflict between organizational and political goals. The organizational goal concerns uplifting social welfare but there is a likelihood that area MP would support, and influence the support of, projects that ensure maximum political returns.

However, the study results contradict the second hypothesis which state that: the higher the constituency poverty levels, the greater the utilization of CDF. On the contrary, the research findings reveal a strong negative correlation between poverty levels and CDF utilization. This means that contrary to the hypothesis which state that the higher the poverty levels, the greater the utilization of CDF, actually the higher the poverty levels, the lower the CDF utilization. This concurs with Olukoshi and Nyamnjo (2005) study which noted that poverty index alone cannot facilitate equity in terms of resource mobilization but other intervening variables like population heterogeneity and level of urbanization are necessary to capture variations in population characteristics that may impact project choices in constituencies.

Finally, the study results support the third study hypothesis which states that: the higher the constituency level of political participation, the greater the utilization of CDF. It reveals a strong positive relationship between political participation and the utilization of CDF. The Kenyan political scene is dominated by regions and tribes which are highly populated, and which translates to high voter turnout over the years. This has led to some areas being more developed than others. The introduction of a devolved system is expected to play a key role in closing the development disparity gap that has existed over the years.

4.3 Recommendations

From the study findings the researcher recommends the following:

1. To fight poverty more effectively, poverty intervention strategies such as equalization fund needs to be directed more to sparsely populated constituencies since as shown in table 3.1, more poor people tend to live in sparsely populated constituencies. Commission revenue allocation allocates more funds to highly populated areas with the understanding that the higher numbers of people require more resources than in less populated areas. The researcher therefore recommends that the allocation of CDF should be based on the poverty index rather than use of population density in order to reduce the gap that exists in terms of economic development.

1. Based on the study findings, there is a negative correlation between poverty levels and CDF utilization. That is, there is very low utilization of CDF in poorer constituencies and hence, there is need for more efficient monitoring of CDF projects in such constituencies. Poverty level is one of the parameters considered while allocating equalization funds by the Commission on Revenue Allocation. This being so, it should ensure that close monitoring is done to ensure the funds allocated are effectively utilized.
2. The study also shows that there is greater CDF utilization where more people tend to turn out to vote. Therefore, people need to be sensitized to participate in large numbers and meaningfully in elections since large turnout at elections is only meaningful if voters use them to reward or punish elected based on their immediate past performance. Project Management Committee need to ensure that all CDF projects they undertake use standard government tender documents. Project committee should implement the projects under the fund. Government officers need to offer adequate and relevant technical advice to the Project Management Committee. Government officers should supervise CDF projects under the Project Management Committee.
3. The researcher recommends that a study be conducted on the effective utilization of CDF under the new Act National Government Constituency Development Fund, 2015 which has greater focus on social security programs and education.
4. The study further recommends the deepening of citizen engagement in the CDF processes at various levels; including selection of committee members, budgeting project and identification. This will enhance a sense of ownership and accountability. Committees both at national and local level should play a role in monitoring of the projects. They need to ensure that every project they start is completed within the stipulated time.

4.4 Suggestions for Further Research

Drawing from the findings of this study, a number of issues are recommended for further research. The pursuit of these issues may facilitate better and more effective intervention strategies in promoting effective CDF utilization at the constituencies and in promotion of social economic and political development in Kenya.

- i. To build on existing work, it is suggested that studies be conducted on the influence of other constituency-specific factors on CDF utilization, especially those incorporating variables like party membership and political campaigns.
- ii. There is need to expand the sample to cover more constituencies to find out the relationship between constituency specific factors and CDF utilization.
- iii. Further studies should be done on ward development funds to provide a wide pool of findings that can be compared across counties for policy optimization.
- iv. There is need for further studies after the new constitution to assess whether trends are changing with regard to political, social and legal environment for devolved funds in Kenya. Such studies would help to identify and monitor the direction in the development of effective devolved funds system.
- v. There is need for studies of a comparative nature on the status of devolved funds and its impact on Africa.

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Appendix I: Data

Constituency	Population	Poverty	Turnout	Projects
Embakasi	615923	22.5	98457	3
Kamukunji	261855	22.5	78376	1
Kathiani	160406	59.6	44194	1
Kangundo	218557	59.6	43328	2
Matungulu	124739	59.6	50082	3
Machakos Town	199211	59.6	83332	5
Makueni	193802	64.1	72002	3
Kibwezi West	165933	64.1	63799	2
Kitui central	149207	63.5	52601	2
Garissa Town	96336	49.2	37173	1
Moyale	103999	83.2	44938	1
Kisauni	194665	37.6	75493	4
Likoni	166008	37.6	49986	2
Malindi	162712	71.4	56069	3
Kaloleni	155739	71.4	38120	1
Suboti	193038	69.8	56394	2
Cherangany	226306	57.4	59439	2
Turbo	210409	51.3	81913	6
Moiben	157032	57.4	52322	2
Kimini	231191	50.2	57105	3
Samburu North	83759	73.0	19055	1
Rongai	163864	40.1	59479	3
Molo	302612	40.1	57497	3
Turkana Central	254606	94.3	32940	1
Budalangi	66723	53.0	30092	1
Funyula	93500	52.9	35399	2
Ikolomani	143153	53.0	36675	2
Luanda	95923	41.8	35926	1
Mumias West	111862	53.0	35431	3
Teso	137974	53.0	61342	4
Rongo	100547	46.7	42573	3
Gem	160675	44.7	65800	4
Bondo	157522	35.3	75184	4
Ndhiwa	172212	35.3	72710	5
Muhoroni	145785	47.8	57857	3
Nyatike	144625	46.7	52531	3
Gatanga	163597	29.9	82874	5
Kangema	76988	29.9	42455	1
Kabete	265829	27.2	72862	4
Juja	486121	27.2	93420	6
Gatundu North	107742	32.7	59737	3
Mwea	190512	25.2	105440	7

Source: KNBS, IEBC, 2010