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INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (IDIS)

**THE ROLE OF RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN ELECTORAL
CONFLICTS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA REGION: A CASE STUDY OF
NCCK IN KENYA'S 2017 ELECTION**

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**A research Project presented in partial fulfillment for the Degree of Master of
Arts in International Conflict Management.**

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DECLARATION

I Philemon Kipkogei Samoei, hereby declare that this research project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.

Signed **Date**

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This research project is hereby submitted for examination with my approval as a University Supervisor,

Signed **Date.....**

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION.....	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.....	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	iv
LIST OF TABLES.....	ix
LIST OF FIGURES.....	x
ABBREVIATIONS.....	xii
ABSTRACT.....	xiii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY ..	1
1.0 Introduction.....	1
1.1 Background to the Study.....	1
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem	4
1.3 General Objective	6
1.3.1 Specific Objectives	6
1.4 Research Questions.....	6
1.5 Scope and Limitation of the Study.....	6
1.6 Literature Review.....	7
1.6.1 Role of Religious Organizations in Conflict Resolution	7
1.6.2 Challenges Facing Religious Institutions in Mitigating Post-Election Conflict.....	9
1.6.3 Pertinent Issues Surrounding Electoral Conflicts	10
1.6.4 Social, Economic and Political Impact of Electoral Conflicts.....	11
1.7 Theoretical Literature Review	13
1.8 Summary of Research Gaps.....	15
1.9 Hypothesis.....	15

1.10 Justification of the Study	15
1.10.1 Academic Justification.....	15
1.10.2 Policy Justification.....	16
1.10.3 The General Public	16
1.11 Theoretical framework.....	16
1.11.1 Social Conflict Theory.....	17
1.11.2 Dual Concern Model of Conflict Resolution	18
1.12 Research Methodology	20
1.12.1 Research Design.....	21
1.12.2 Research Site.....	21
1.12.3 Target Population.....	21
1.12.4 Sampling Design.....	22
1.12.5 Sample Size.....	22
1.12.6 Data Collection Methods	23
1.12.7 Instrument Reliability	23
1.12.8 Instrument Validity	24
1.12.9 Data Analysis and Data Representation.....	25
1.13 Legal and Ethical Considerations	25
1.14 Chapter Outline.....	26

CHAPTER TWO: ROLE OF NCCK IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

DURING THE 2017 POST-ELECTIONS CRISIS IN KENYA.....	27
2.0 Introduction.....	27
2.1 Response Rate.....	27
2.2 Demographic Characteristics	28

2.2.1 Gender of Respondents	28
2.2.2 Nationality of Respondents	28
2.2.3 Age of Respondents	29
2.3 Level of Education of Respondents	29
2.4 Findings from the Likert-Type Statements	30
2.4.1 Religious Organizations and their Leaders have Trust and Moral Authority	30
2.4.2 Effectiveness of NCKK in managing the 2017 Post-Election Conflicts in Kenya	32
2.4.3 Religious Organizations can be employed in Non-Violent Conflict Transformation.....	33
2.4.4 Religious Organizations in Conflict Mediation in Divided Societies.....	34
2.4.5 Religious Organizations as Watchdogs for Human Rights and Strong Advocates for Integrity in Government	35
2.4.6 Religious Leaders in Promoting Sustainable Peace, Reconciling Conflicting Societies and Enhancing Social Cohesion during Electoral Conflict	36
2.4.7 Religious Organizations Have Immense Intellectual and Material Resources	37
2.4.8 Religious Organizations Can Complement the Efforts of Other Secular Organizations in Peace Making	38
2.5 Role of NCKK in the 2017 Kenyan Post-election Conflicts According to Interviews.....	39
2.6 Chapter summary and Key findings	39
 CHAPTER THREE: KEY STRATEGIES APPLIED BY NCKK IN KENYA’S 2017 ELECTORAL CONFLICTS	 42
3.0 Introduction.....	42

3.1 Findings from the Likert-Type Statements	42
3.1.1 Proper Strategies Were Identified and Used by Religious Organizations to Mitigate the 2017 Post-Poll Conflict	42
3.1.2 Issues underlying the 2017 Post-Election Conflict as mapped out by NCKK44	
3.1.3 Socio-Economic Inequalities Identified as the Main Cause of Electoral Conflict	45
3.1.4 Negative Ethnicity and Sectarian Polarization as Pertinent Causes of the 2017 Post-election Conflict.....	46
3.1.5 Participation of Religious Organizations in the Democratization Process and Peace-Building Initiatives.....	47
3.1.6 NCKK Advocated for the Strengthening of Political Institutions	48
3.1.7 NCKK Tackled Perceived Injustices by Incumbent Leaders.....	49
3.1.8 NCKK Voiced the Plight of Victims Affected by the Post- Elections Chaos	50
3.2 Measures taken by Religious Organizations in Kenya’s 2017 Electoral Conflicts According to Interviews.....	51
3.3 Summary and Key findings	51

**CHAPTER FOUR: KEY CHALLENGES FACED BY NCKK IN RESOLVING
THE 2017 KENYAN POST-ELECTIONS CONFLICT**

4.0 Introduction.....	54
4.1 Findings from the Likert-Type Statements.....	54
4.1.1 Religious Organizations are faced with Numerous Challenges.....	54
4.1.2 Religious Leaders and Inter-Religious Institutions are often divided along Ethnic Lines	55
4.1.3 Religious Leaders are often seen as Being Bipartisan by the Differing Groups	56

4.1.4 Lack of Financial Resources Inhibit Religious Organizations in Undertaking Conflict Resolution Mitigation Measures	57
4.1.5 Inter-Religious Tension Undermines the Role of Religious Institutions in Conflict Resolution Due to the Internal Bureaucracies	58
4.2 Key Challenges Faced By NCKK in Resolving the 2017 Kenyan Post-Elections Conflict According to Interviews.....	60
4.3 Chapter Summary and Key findings.....	60
‘CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY OF THE KEY FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	62
5.1 Introduction.....	62
5.2 Summary of Key Findings	62
5.2.1 Role Played by NCKK in the 2017 Kenyan Post-Election Conflicts	62
5.2.2 Key Strategies Applied by NCKK in Kenya’s 2017 Electoral Conflicts.....	64
5.2.3 Challenges faced by NCKK in Resolving the 2017 Kenyan Post-elections Conflict	65
5.3 Chapter Summary and Key findings.....	65
5.4 Recommendations.....	67
REFERENCES.....	69
APPENDICES	74
Appendix I: Questionnaire.....	74
Appendix II: Interview guide.....	78
Appendix III: Authorization letter	79
Appendix IV: Permit	80

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1 Response Rate.....27

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1 Genders of Respondents	28
Figure 2.2 Ages of Respondents	29
Figure 2.3 Level of Education of Respondents.....	30
Figure 2.4 Religious Organizations and their Leaders have Trust and Moral Authority	31
Figure 2.5 Effectiveness of NCKK in managing the 2017 Post-Election Conflicts in Kenya	32
Figure 2.6 Religious Organizations can be employed in Non-Violent Conflict Transformation.....	33
Figure 2.7 Religious Organizations in Conflict Mediation in Divided Societies	34
Figure 2.8 Religious Organizations as Watchdogs for Human Rights and Strong Advocates for Integrity in Government	35
Figure 2.9 Religious Leaders in Promoting Sustainable Peace, Reconciling Conflicting Societies and Enhancing Social Cohesion during Electoral Conflict	36
Figure 2.10 Religious Organizations Have Immense Intellectual and Material Resources	37
Figure 2.11 Religious Organizations Can Complement the Efforts of Other Secular Organizations in Peace Making	38
Figure 3.1 Proper Strategies Were Identified and Used by Religious Organizations to Mitigate the 2017 Post-Poll Conflict	43
Figure 3.2 Issues underlying the 2017 Post-Election Conflict as identified by NCKK	44
Figure 3.3 Socio-Economic Inequalities Identified as the Main Cause of the Electoral Conflict	45

Figure 3.4 Negative Ethnicity and Sectarian Polarization as Pertinent Causes of the 2017 Post-election Conflict.....	46
Figure 3.5 Participation of Religious Organizations in the Democratization Process and Peace-Building Initiatives	47
Figure 3.6 NCKK Advocated for the Strengthening of Political Institutions	48
Figure 3.7 NCKK Tackled Perceived Injustices by Incumbent Leaders	49
Figure 3.8 NCKK Voiced the Plight of Victims Affected by the Post- Elections Chaos	50
Figure 4.1 Religious Organizations are faced with Numerous Challenges	55
Figure 4.2 Religious Leaders and Inter-Religious Institutions are often divided along Ethnic Lines	56
Figure 4.3 Religious Leaders are seen as Being Bipartisan by the Differing Groups ..	57
Figure 4.4 Lack of Financial Resources Inhibit Religious Organizations in Undertaking Conflict Resolution Mitigation Measures	58
Figure 4.5 Inter-Religious Tension Undermines the Role of Religious Institutions in Conflict Resolution Due to the Internal Bureaucracies	59

ABBREVIATIONS

ACK ANGLICAN CHURCH OF KENYA

AI - AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL

AU - AFRICAN UNION

BBI – BUILDING BRIDGES INITIATIVE

DCM -DUAL CONCERN MODEL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

ECOWAS - ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES

IDP - INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

IEBC - INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL & BOUNDARIES COMMISSION

IGAD - INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGENCY ON DEVELOPMENT

JAP – JUBILEE ALLIANCE PARTY

NASA – NATIONAL SUPER ALLIANCE PARTY

NCCK - NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES IN KENYA

NCIC - NATIONAL COHESION AND INTERGRATION COMMISSION

NPS - NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE

OCPD – OFFICER COMMANDING POLICE DIVISION

PEV- POST ELECTOIN VIOLENCE

ROs – RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

SUPKEM - SUPREME COUNCIL OF KENYAN MUSLIMS

UN - UNITED NATIONS

US - UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ABSTRACT

The Horn of Africa's political landscape has been marred by protracted conflicts, which are worsened by lack of effective ways to manage them. With the management bodies in place, which are seen to be weak due to political influence, Kenya may lose its strategic importance if electoral conflicts continue to occur in every electoral process. Regrettably, and despite the fact that Religious Organizations (ROs) can play a critical role in checking post-election conflicts, no documented study has assessed the roles and challenges facing such organizations in the highly contested presidential elections of 2017 which resulted in the loss of human lives and property in some areas in Kenya. This study therefore identified the role played by NCKK during the 2017 electoral violence and made recommendations on how best the government can incorporate these institutions in future conflict management and resolution. The study is guided by specific objectives which include to; investigate the role played by NCKK in the 2017 Kenyan post-election conflicts; explore the key strategies applied by NCKK in Kenya's 2017 electoral conflicts and; examine the key challenges faced by NCKK in resolving the 2017 Kenyan post-elections conflict. This study adopted two theoretical foundations: the Conflict Theory and the Dual Concern Model of Conflict Resolution. Based on the exploratory research design, data was collected from 110 persons (21 permanent staff of NCKK, 37 employees of the IEBC headquarters in Nairobi, 2 OCPDs and, 50 community leaders. The community leaders were drawn from Kawangware and Kibera areas of Nairobi, the two areas were hard hit by the 2017 post-election violence in Kenya. Data was collected from primary and secondary sources using interviews, questionnaires as well as desk-review of existing literature. Such data was analyzed using descriptive statistics as well as conceptual content analysis techniques. The findings obtained show that NCKK in the 2017 played a vital role in the Kenyan post-election conflicts. This is due to the fact that religious leaders had some form of trust and moral authority, though not much, that could be used to check conflict in electoral disputes. Regrettably, there is no clear evidence that ROs used proper strategies to mitigate the 2017 post-poll conflict. However, ROs under the auspices of NCKK were pivotal to the democratization process and peace-building initiatives in Kenya. Lastly, it is evident that most cases ROs face numerous challenges such as lack of moral authority to talk against postelection violence in some instances due to bipartisanship, lack of adequate financial resources to successfully undertake conflict resolution strategies as well as internal bureaucratic tendencies that bred inter-religious tension were also major factors inhibiting effective conflict resolution by ROs. As such, ROs such as NCKK should put in place strategies for strengthening their trust and moral authority and technical as well as financial capacity so as to be effective in checking post-election disputes and the associated violence.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

1.0 Introduction

Violence has plagued the human race throughout history. The world over has witnessed violence emanating from a range of factors. Such conflicts are mainly due to social-political, institutional and economic imbalances. This chapter presents the background to the study, the problem statement, justification of the study, the research objectives and the questions; furthermore, the chapter reviews the available literature including the theoretical literature on the electoral conflicts in the Horn of Africa with a special focus on the state of Kenya in 2017 general elections. Moreover, the chapter includes the scope of the study as well as the summary of literature gaps; finally, the chapter presents the theoretical framework, hypothesis, the methodology of the research as well as the research design, data collection techniques, data analysis and lastly the chapter outline.

1.1 Background to the Study

In contemporary conflict transformation processes, state and non-state participants at the state, national, and global heights identify a broad range of factors that cause conflicts.¹ A clear understanding of this range of factors is critical in instituting a proper foundation for conflict resolution in the pursuit of positive peace amongst people within societies and states.

¹ Flores, T. (2014) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI, voting under gun elections. Signalistgatan. Solna Sweden.

The Horn of Africa region is among the worst hit areas in the continent of Africa and rated among the poorest regions in the world due to wars and conflict. The study will delve into the electoral conflicts in the region and how some of the actors or institutions charged with addressing them have responded.²

Kenya, like several other states in Africa, has experienced a series of conflicts, and in particular, electoral conflicts.³ The state of internal conflict in Kenya has prevented the maintenance of peace in the country. Since independence in 1963, the country has experienced electoral reprisals and tensions. This has led to a situation in which peace is mostly absent, or, if present, is just negative peace. The negative peace is, however, periodically interrupted by periods of manifest conflict, especially during general elections.⁴

As a multi-ethnic country, Kenya's pluralist elections are inevitably marked by ethnic undercurrents and strategizing. Since the re-birth of pluralist democratic politics in Kenya in 1991, the country once defined as the beacon of peace in Africa has repeatedly suffered electoral conflict. During the 1992, 1997, 2007, 2013 and 2017 general elections, the country experienced electoral conflicts that led to loss of lives and internal displacement of persons.⁵ While the triggers of these conflicts in the country are multi-dimensional and include historical, structural, institutional, legal, and cultural factors, they have always reflected an underlying ethnic-identity problem.⁶ This is because the foundation of pluralist democratic politics in the country was anchored on political party structures and strategies that originally segmented the country along ethnic alignments.

² Berhanu, K. (2013). Conflicts in the Horn of Africa and implications for regional security. In *The Horn of Africa: Intra-State and Inter-State Conflicts and Security*, 71-94. London: Pluto Press.

³Lakhany, F. (2013). *How important are Non-State Actors*. Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 59(3), 37-46

⁴Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNHCR) (2017)

⁵ Commission of Inquiry into Post-election Violence (CIPEV)(2014).

⁶Ibid

In the context of Post-election Violence (PEV), Religious Organizations (ROs) play numerous roles in conflict resolution and advocacy for peace. Literature shows that religion can be a vehicle for promoting conflict as well as building peace. In this regard, the capacity of ROs to promote peace during times of violent electoral conflicts cannot be gainsaid. Studies in Mozambique and Nigeria have shown the centrality of the roles played by religious leaders in promoting sustainable peace, reconcile conflicting societies and enhance social cohesion in otherwise volatile regions.⁷

The centrality of the role played by ROs in addressing post-election conflicts is enhanced by the fact that such organizations have human and material resources that can also be used to promote peace during electoral violence. This has been exemplified in countries such as Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria and south Sudan among others where Christianity has been used to promote peace, peaceful coexistence, truth and reconciliation as well as in conflict resolution. In this regard, the sway that religious leaders and, the organizations they head have on the general population can be used in promoting peace in times of conflict.⁸

In areas with volatile political environments, religion has been used in conflict resolution efforts. Indeed religious based approaches to conflict management have been found to yield valuable results in conflicts with extreme religious connotations such as Israel, Palestine, Iraq, Macedonia, Nigeria, and Sudan. As such, these approaches have also been found to highly complement the efforts of secular peace making. This is usually buttressed by the fact that in most cases ROs and their leaders

7 Haynes, J. (2009). "Conflict, Conflict Resolution and Peace-Building: The Role of Religion in Mozambique, Nigeria and Cambodia", Department of Law, Governance and International Relations, London Metropolitan University, Vol. 47, No. 1, 52-75, 2009.

8 Smock, D. (2008). 'Religion in World Affairs Its Role in Conflict and Peace', Special Report, United States Institute of Peace.

have trust and moral authority that can be used across conflicting parties.⁹ In this regard, this current study sets to find out the role played by ROs such as the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK) in mitigating post-election conflicts in Kenya.

In the 2008/2009 post-election violence in Kenya, NCCCK played a key role in promoting peaceful co-existence. In this light, NCCCK established partnerships with religious leaders from Hindu and the Muslim communities (SUPKEM) to promote peaceful co-existence among warring communities in Kenya through peace meetings and dialogue forums. The council also played key roles in complimenting the efforts of the African Union (AU) in mediation efforts targeting the two key disputants of the crisis namely Raila Odinga and President Mwai Kibaki.¹⁰

With all the undeniable benefits associated with leveraging the influence of religious institutions in solving post-election conflicts, the evolving role of NCCCK and other ROs in addressing such conflicts has not been systematically studied. In this light, this current study sets to investigate the role played by such organizations in post-election conflicts in the Horn of Africa. This is vital since in most cases, the role played by such institutions in checking these kinds of conflicts has often been overlooked.¹¹

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

The Horn of Africa's political landscape has been marred by protracted conflicts, which are worsened by lack of effective ways to manage them. With the management bodies in place, which are seen to be weak due to political influence, Kenya may lose its strategic importance if electoral conflicts continue to occur in

9 USAID (2009). Religion, conflict & peace building: an introductory programming guide.

10 Ibid.

11 Smock, D. (2008). 'Religion in World Affairs Its Role in Conflict and Peace', Special Report, United States Institute of Peace.

every electoral process. The country plays key roles in the region. It is the hub for regional trade as well as a transport link for countries located along the horn of Africa and the Great Lakes. It is also known as a major destination for tourists. Before the post-election violence occurred between 2007 and 2008, Kenya had been categorized as a very peaceful country among other countries which were politically unstable and had civil wars in the region. It was also known to have hosted peace talks in Somalia and Sudan.¹²

However, over the years socio-economic realities have become challenges to stability and cohesion. Recently Kenya has been faced with an economic crisis which has led to low agricultural productivity, reducing arable lands, dormant manufacturing sector, poor roads and utilities, inadequate food and global downgrading.¹³ Additionally, Kenya has been faced with political predicament described as lack of being legitimate, weak institutions such as the judiciary and parliament, untrustworthiness in judiciary and security forces, poor service delivery despite high taxes, and high levels of exploits due to ethnic and regional differences.

Regrettably, and despite the fact that ROs can play a critical role in checking post-election conflicts, no documented study has assessed the roles, strategies and challenges facing such organizations in the highly contested presidential elections of 2017 which resulted in the loss of human lives and property in some areas in Kenya. This study therefore will identify the role played, strategies employed and key challenges faced by NCKK during the 2017 electoral violence and to make recommendations on how best the government can incorporate these institutions in future conflict management and resolution of such conflicts.

¹² West Africa Non-state actors Institute, Resolving community Conflicts in Ghana: The Role of Non State Actors, (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2011)

¹³ African Union (2013). DRAFT Roadmap for the Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), Addis Ababa: AU.

1.3 General Objective

To examine the role played, strategies applied and challenges faced by NCCK in the electoral conflicts in Kenya's 2017 elections.

1.3.1 Specific Objectives

1. To investigate the role played by NCCK in the 2017 Kenyan post-election conflict
2. To explore the key strategies applied by NCCK in Kenya's 2017 post-election conflicts
3. To examine the key challenges faced by NCCK in resolving the 2017 Kenyan post-elections conflict

1.4 Research Questions

1. What role did the NCCK play in conflict management during the 2017 post-elections crisis in Kenya?
2. What key strategies were applied by NCCK to manage the electoral conflicts in the 2017 elections?
3. What were the key challenges faced by NCCK during Kenya's 2017 post-elections conflict

1.5 Scope and Limitation of the Study

Data was collected from NCCK headquarters in Kilimani and from the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC). Herein, the 21 permanent staff of NCCK and the 47 employees of the IEBC headquarters in Nairobi were targeted. In addition members of the general public from Kibera and Kawangware, the two areas mainly affected by the 2017 post-elections violence were targeted. 2

OCPDs (Kilimani & Dagoretti) and 50 community leaders from these areas were also purposively targeted. This makes a total of 120 persons.

Data was collected using questionnaires and interviews from these persons as well as from publications on the study topic. Data collection was influenced by time constraints, limited resources within the researcher's reach and to a great extent non-responsiveness by some of the respondents.

1.6 Literature Review

This part reviews the literature on the roles played and challenges facing ROs in resolving post-election violence. The literature is reviewed against the study objectives.

1.6.1 Role of Religious Organizations in Conflict Resolution

The nexus between religion and the lives of people in conflict is undeniable. The world over, religion has been used to agitate for sectarian war. Conversely, it has also been used as a tool to advocate for lasting peace. Critiques of religion see it as a tool for fueling religious based intolerance and extremism, which often lead to war. However, the central role played by ROs in conflict mediation is also undeniable.¹⁴

The fact that ROs have extensive networks and resources that can be deployed in PEV has been studied by Smock. In this case, studies undertaken in several African countries such as Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria and south Sudan show that

¹⁴ Rasul, A. (2009). "The Role of Religion in Peace Making", Presented at the CSID 10th Annual Conference, May 5th, 2009.

Christianity can be employed to enhance peace, tolerance and peace coexistence in conflict zones. This goes on to foster conflict resolution and reconciliation.¹⁵

A similar study by Jeffrey shows that although religion can be employed in agitating for war, it can also support peace-building efforts during conflicts. To this end, religious leaders in Mozambique and Nigeria have played critical roles in enhancing peaceful coexistence, reconciling warring communities and promoting social cohesion in deeply divided societies.¹⁶

The moral authority and trust enjoyed by religious leaders has also proved to be invaluable in conflict management. In societies faced with religious extremism and terrorism, these leaders have often complemented the efforts of secular peace keepers in conflict management in numerous Asian and African countries.¹⁷

During civil war, the centrality of the efforts of ROs in conflict resolution has also been shown in numerous civil wars in selected West African countries. To this end, various interreligious councils composed of Muslims, Protestants and Catholics have been employed to facilitating the rebuilding of war torn societies. This has also been the case in Kenya where NCKK played pivotal roles in peace building initiatives during the 2008/2009 PEV.¹⁸ As such, it is evident that ROs play vital roles in mitigating violent conflicts the world over. Since most existing literature has focused on developed countries and other parts of Africa, it is important to carry out this study that focuses on Kenya.

15 Smock, D. (2008). 'Religion in World Affairs Its Role in Conflict and Peace', Special Report, United States Institute of Peace.

16 Haynes, J. (2009). *Conflict, Conflict Resolution and Peace-Building: The Role of Religion in Mozambique, Nigeria and Cambodia*. Department of Law, Governance and International Relations, London Metropolitan University, 47 (1), 52–75, 2009.

17 USAID (2009). Religion, conflict & peace building: an introductory programming guide.

18Githigaro, J.M. (2012). "Faith-based peace building: a case study of the national council of churches of Kenya". 19, 1-5.

1.6.2 Challenges Facing Religious Institutions in Mitigating Post-Election

Conflict

Religious organizations are however faced with numerous challenges as they undertake mediation activities during conflicts. In the Kenyan post-election violence of 2007-2008 for example, religious leaders and inter-religious institutions were often found to be divided along ethnic lines. This made it hard for them to authoritatively speak out against ethnic violence ¹⁹

In some other instances, religious leaders are often seen as being bipartisan by some differing groups since they supported the prosecution of those who had instigated the post-election violence.²⁰ When this happens, any peace process supported by these leaders could fail easily. Divisions between religious groups can also fuel conflict when the persons being prosecuted are seen to subscribe to a particular religious faction or sect which is perceived as being against them.²¹ The same is also likely to happen when a particular group is seen to support the other side of the divide.²²

In other cases, lack of financial resources could also inhibit the capacity of ROs to initiate and oversee conflict resolution mitigation measures during post-election violence.²³ This emanates from the fact that election violence needs immense resources to resolve. Furthermore, interreligious tension could also undermine the role

19 Throup, D. (2015). 'Politics, religious engagement, and extremism in Kenya' in Cooke, J. G. and R. Downie. (eds) *Religious Authority and the State in Africa* (pp.29-48). Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic Studies

20 Kilonzo, S.M. (2009). 'Silent religiosity in a snivelling nation: The role of religious institutions in promoting post-conflict reconciliation in Kenya'. *Africa Media Review*, 17(1-2), 95-107.

21 Cox, F. D. and Ndung'u, J. (2014). *Social fault lines: Identity and insecurity in modernising Kenya: DRAFT*. University of Denver.

22 Deacon, G., & G. Lynch (2013). 'Allowing Satan in? Moving toward a political economy of NeoPentecostalism in Kenya'. *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 43, 108-130.

²³23

of religious institutions in conflict resolution due to the internal bureaucracies of particular denominations.²⁴

1.6.3 Pertinent Issues Surrounding Electoral Conflicts

Post-election conflict has been found to emanate from challenges related to five major factors. These include absence of free and fair elections; international influence; issues related to political and electoral systems and; socio-economic factors and negative ethnicity.²⁵ However, and as posited by Khadiagala, the main challenges are related to ethnic and sectarian polarization. This is usually followed by the consequence of imperfect electoral rules in which some political parties readily manipulate electoral results.²⁶ In the same accord, post-election violence in Zimbabwe, Kenya, Ivory Coast, Togo and Gabon among other African countries has been ascribed to tribalism.²⁷ This has led to the loss of millions of human lives and property worth millions of shillings.

Electoral violence is usually propagated by the electorate as well as the government and political parties over grievances related to vote tallying and manipulation of election results.²⁸ An external agitation during the electioneering and elections periods can result in violence especially in countries with weak political institutions which often translates to political instability in the developing world.

²⁴Cox, F.D., & Ndung'u, J. (2014). Social fault lines: Identity and insecurity in modernising Kenya: DRAFT. University of Denver.

²⁵Timmer, S. (2012). *Causal Factors of Election Violence in Africa A Comparative Analysis of Kenya's 2007 Elections and Zimbabwe's 2008 Elections*. Master's Thesis. University of Stellenbosch, South Africa.

²⁶Matlosa, K., Khadiagala, G., & Shale, V. (2010). *When Elephants Fight*. EISA Johannesburg.

²⁷Human Rights Watch. 2011. Nigeria: Post-Election Violence Killed 800. Retrieved from the World Wide Web on 13-09-2011: <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/16/nigeria-postelection-violence-killed-800>.

²⁸Mwagiru, M. (2001). Political and Electoral Violence in East Africa. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung & Centre for Conflict Research Retrieved from the World Wide Web on 20-04-2011: <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/kenia/01398.pdf>

Since most African countries do not have developed democracies, the ability to design and implement coherent policies is limited. As a result, political power is personalized rather than being embedded in political institutions. In this regard, it is easy for leaders to fuel violence after contesting elections results.²⁹

In some instances, incumbent leaders jail their opponents. Such perceived injustices often fuels violence. Furthermore, the electoral process is often seen as a way to get to power and loot state resources, often with impunity. In this regard, it is easy for cutthroat competitions to arise in pursuit of leadership. The actual violence that erupts is however fueled by nature of politics in conflict societies, the nature of competitive elections, and the incentives created by the electoral institutions.³⁰

1.6.4 Social, Economic and Political Impact of Electoral Conflicts

Study upon study has shown that election based conflicts, which often are fought along tribal lines have numerous negative conflicts to the communities involved. Indeed significant relationships have been found between post-election conflicts and socio-economic development of any country. This emanates from the fact that any meaningful development requires a peaceful environment. Furthermore, when the citizens who should take part in economic development are embroiled in conflicts, they cannot fulfill their roles in nation building. In addition, conflicts destroy what had already been built during peaceful times. When infrastructure and valuable human resources are lost to conflicts, the country suffers immeasurably. This has been exemplified in countries such as Syria, Congo, Nigeria and, Rwanda among

²⁹Basedau, M., Erdmann, G., & Mehler, A. 2007. Votes, Money and Violence. Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa. NordiskaAfrikainstitutet, Sweden. University of Kwazulu-Natal Press, South Africa

³⁰H glund, K. (2009). Electoral Violence in Conflict-Ridden Societies: Concepts, Causes, and Consequences. Terrorism and Political Violence. Volume 21. pp. 412-427.

others.³¹ This current study sets to test the veracity of these findings in the Kenyan situation.

Oucho argues that when communities are involved in conflicts, there is usually negative backlash on the economy. This emanates from the fact that the economic interests of some of the warring communities could plunge the country in unending vicious cycles of conflict.³² This is reiterated by Eastley who says political conflicts account for most of the slow pace of development in African countries. This is due to the fact that conflicts have negative effects on income, growth and economic prospects of the countries undergoing conflict.³³

Furthermore, armed conflict often drives warring communities to divert valuable resources to the conflict. Such resources could otherwise be used to spur economic growth. In addition, the energies of the combatants are misused in endless conflicts instead of being employed in meaningful economic activities.³⁴ In Kenya for example, the 2007/2008 post-election violence stagnated the Kenyan economy for months. This reiterates the fact that post-election conflicts have adverse effects on economic growth and development.³⁵ This was also witnessed in the 2017 elections.

During the 2017 Kenyan conflict, businesses remained closed; goods and business premises were looted or destroyed. This in effect affects countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, Congo and South Sudan and Uganda who rely on Kenya's port to import their goods. In the wake of such conflict, these countries suffered a shortage of fuel and other essential goods.³⁶ Tourism in Kenya has also been greatly affected as

³¹ Harrison, E.F. (1996). *Economic Development: Theory and Policy Applications*, 1996), P. 12.

³² Oucho, J.O. (2002). *Undercurrents of Ethnic Conflicts in Kenya*. (Boston, UK, African Social Studies Series), 48.

³³ Eastley W.R. (2000). *Can Institutions Solve Ethnic Conflicts?* World Bank Publication), P. 3

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Nyiri, J.K. (2014). *The impact of ethnic conflict on economic development: the case of post-election violence in Kenya, 2007-2008. Master's Thesis*. University of Nairobi.

³⁶ Kenya in Crisis; Africa Report No 137, 21st February 2008. Accessed at 2000hrs 4/4/2014 http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/137_kenya_in_crisis.

hotels and parks remain closed due to travel advisories and insecurity in roads. In the past three elections, tourism has dropped by 60%.³⁷ Horticulture and tea farming which are major backbones of the Kenya economy were also adversely affected. Kenyan flowers for instance, which occupies a major share in European markets, lost over a billion shillings within the two months of conflict.³⁸

1.7 Theoretical Literature Review

Democracy in most cases is seen as a vital conflict resolution tool. It is an incentive which moderates and compromises extreme political actions. It means that disputes can be resolved peacefully without necessarily resorting to violence. Jack Snyder posits that countries which are transiting to democracy are most likely to be affected by extreme appeals and ultimate violence. He theorizes and reviews two popular explanations to this pattern of conflict known as “popular rivalries theory” and “elitist persuasion theory”. The popular rivalries model played out in the 2007, 2013 and 2017 Kenyan elections with two protagonist political camps contesting bitterly. The two groups were pursuing incompatible goals to each other. With the deep rooted ethnic divisions, democratic electoral processes would be won or lost based on the sizes of the two political camps. Snyder theorizes that the best model to deal with conflict of this nature is partitioning or the power –sharing arrangement³⁹

NCKK attempted to apply this theory to resolve the stand-off in 2017. The General Secretary Rev. Canon Peter Karanja in his statement and on behalf of the NCKK committee suggested a constitutional amendment to expand the executive of

³⁷ Conflict Threatens Kenya Tourism” McClatchy News Service., 19th January 2008

³⁸ Horticulture Players decry Naivasha Violence” 98.4 capital News on 28th January 2008

³⁹Snyder, Jack L. 2000. *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*. New York: Norton.

the winning party or coalition and a provision for the President to appoint a Prime minister and two deputies who will sit in cabinet and may answer queries in parliament⁴⁰

In the 'elite persuasion framework, Snyder posits that in the pre-elections period, masses have no strong bond. But on the onset of campaign rallies, political elites rally political support in some way. Nationalism becomes a formidable force to rally support. Religious organizations are swallowed by the elitism. Political rhetoric is manifest with weak institutions to hold leaders accountable. Such leaders with economic, political and military allegiance are so strong that they inhibit even the media from reporting cases of incitement.⁴¹. The ruling coalition had all these resources at their disposal. He further cites that the type of nationalism developed depends on certain factors; level and timing of socio-economic development, the strength of political institutions and international influence. A strong sense of civic nationalism to counter this problem will come about if institutions are strong through formation of counter-revolutionary nationalism. This indeed will facilitate a strong bureaucracy. His book elaborates case studies as well as democratization process in Eastern Europe.

Finally, the two models provide ways of dealing with electoral conflicts. Democracy requires much more than just holding elections. As such, the existences of strong civil society such as Amnesty International (AI) and state institutions which can enforce the rule of law are important elements. The researcher therefore, attempts to reveal some of the gaps left out by the selected theories of conflict and dual conflict management models.

⁴⁰ Statement by the Programmes Committee of the NCCCK, publication of 31st October 2017, article H

⁴¹ Snyder, Jack, elite persuasion paradigm & Nationalism.

1.8 Summary of Research Gaps

Achieving peace, security and stability in Kenya continues to be a monumental task. However, most literature on electoral violence addresses government efforts to bring resolutions with limited literature on ROs. This study therefore, sought to explore whether religious bodies have had an impact in conflict management during the 2017 elections in Kenya.

1.9 Hypothesis

This study is guided by the following hypothesis.

HA₁: NCCCK played a significant role in conflict management during the 2017 post-elections conflict in Kenya

HO₁: The strategies applied by NCCCK in Kenya's post-election conflict of 2017 were not adequate.

1.10 Justification of the Study

This study is very important because it examined the incidences of violence in Kenya during general elections and why ROs have not addressed the recurrent problems. Thus the findings of the study will help in decision making on how to mitigate and get into the epicenter of electoral conflicts in Kenya

1.10.1 Academic Justification

The study also generalized the findings to the rest of the region where similar problems have been encountered. Upcoming scholars also benefited a great deal from this study since it generated new literature for them.

1.10.2 Policy Justification

This study availed empirical evidence where policy makers derive policies from it. The findings were invaluable in the sense that bodies such as AU, IGAD, National Police Service (NPS) and other state actors are able to come up with effective strategies to fight or address conflict whenever there is an election in the country. Similarly, the findings also provide policy makers with relevant evidence of incidences of violence that affect the lives of innocent people who live in these hot spot areas within the region. The assessment of the underlying factors causing violence during elections is meant to be more or less like a yard-stick of measurement to the rate and the number of cases for effective mitigation in similar occurrences which might happen in future. The government is also charged with the sole responsibility of mobilizing the required humanitarian aid resources to the affected areas. For purposes of planning, such information will be used to set up the contingency countermeasures.

1.10.3 The General Public

The study is important to the general public because it will alleviate the problem of conflict during every general election. It will educate them on the need of embracing each other and that politicians always misuse them to gain their political ambitions. Animosity, deaths and destruction of property is a learning experience for the general public.

1.11 Theoretical framework

This study adopted two theoretical foundations: the Conflict Theory and the Dual Concern Model of Conflict Resolution.

1.11.1 Social Conflict Theory

This study was premised on the conflict theory. Conflict theory is known to be closely associated with Karl Marx⁴² Dialectical materialistic account of history states that Marxism theorized that capitalism, just as socio-economic systems of the time, would cause production of internal tensions which would later lead to its own damage. Three underlying assumptions are typical of the conflict theory. First, between individuals or in a group, conflict develops when one has contrasting interests over limited resources. Second, the ensuing conflict can naturally lead to some clusters and individuals being in charge and patterns of subservience and dominion are self-perpetuating. Lastly, main groups excessively impact allocation of resources and the societal organization.⁴³

In regard to this study, the view taken is that social stratification in Kenya along tribal lines has led to the perception that some communities block others from opportunities commonly referred to as the national cake. The stratification has been viewed as a scheme which underpins the dominance of ruling a tribe and subordination of non-ruling tribes. The ruling tribe is perceived to be the elites while the other tribes perceive themselves as getting exploited and controlled against their will. Consequently, the Presidency becomes a coveted price worth paying for with blood in a bid to have a fellow tribe's man ascend to the reigns.

In the scheme of things, Eitzen and Baca Zinn opine that because the Presidency rewards citizens unequally with a heavily skewed bias towards members of his ethnic community, the interests of members of the President's ethnic community are often reflected in national policies as the interest of the nation. Thus,

⁴² Rummel, R.J. (1977). *Understanding conflict and war* vol. 3 *Conflict In Perspective*, chapter 5 Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications.

⁴³ Eitzen, D.S., & Smith, K.E., & Zinn, M.B. (2012). *Conflict and Order: Understanding Society* (13th ed.) Pearson.

the nation develops at the behest of a few thereby deepening the conflict in the minds of the citizenry. The unfortunate result is the prevention of the discovery and realization of the full potential of the majority which wastes their creativity and productivity.⁴⁴

In the Kenyan context, the general thread which runs across all the three assumptions of conflict theory is that tribes form the major sub-groups harbor different sets of beliefs, values, and norms. As a result of social definitions, individuals belonging to a particular tribe being bound by stable social interactions share the feeling of oneness. Thus, tribes constitute constructed realities which are distinct and peculiar to a given tribe. The resulting social construct is the inevitability of inter-tribal conflicts. The failure by the government to harmonize these constructed realities over the years provided a fertile ground for post-election violence as tribes competed for the scarce resource, the Presidency.

1.11.2 Dual Concern Model of Conflict Resolution

In this study, the aspect of conflict resolution is guided by the dual concern model (DCM) as advanced by Forsyth.⁴⁵ Herein, conflict resolution is defined as “the methods and processes involved in facilitating the peaceful ending of conflict and retribution.” In this regard, “the various parties involved in a conflict come together and communicate their conflicting motives or ideologies to one another.” When the underlying motives for the conflict are identified, resolution is then attempted. This is usually through multiple approaches that include but are not limited to” “negotiation, mediation, mediation-arbitration, diplomacy, and

⁴⁴Eitzen, D.S., Smith, K.& Zinn, M.B. (2012). *Conflict and Order: Understanding Society* (13th ed.) Pearson.

⁴⁵ Forsyth, D. (2009). *Group Dynamics* (5thed.). Boston, MA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning.

creative peace-building.”⁴⁶ Within the conflict theory, conflict resolution can be used interchangeably with the term dispute resolution. In this case various non-violent methods are used in the bid to promote effective resolution.⁴⁷ This is however pegged to the assumptions that the parties involved in the conflict will be willing to engage in dialogue without resulting to violence. In this regard, willingness is taken to mean that the conflicting parties could be brought to the negotiation table without challenges.

In DCM various styles and strategies are used by individuals to resolve conflict. These include: “avoidance conflict style; yielding conflict style; competitive conflict style; conciliation conflict style and; cooperation conflict style.” The DCM is pegged on the assumptions that the conflicting parties will have concern for themselves (assertiveness) as well as the others (empathy). This would enhance their propensity to come together to resolve the conflict. Avoidance of conflict style is pegged on the tendency of some groups to have wait-and-see attitudes to conflict. In this regard, mediators have time to assess the issues that have potential to yield the conflict and deal with them in advance.⁴⁸ Failure to do so can lead to escalation of the conflict in the long-run.

Yielding conflict style is characterized “by a high level of concern for others and a low level of concern for oneself.” In this case, it is easy to resolve the conflict since one of the conflicting parties could be easily flexible to the demands of the other parties. In competitive conflict styles are characterized with some groups that are overly assertive and ready to force others to adopt their demands. In this regard, such

⁴⁶Mayer, B. (2012). *The Dynamics of Conflict: A Guide to Engagement and Intervention* (2nded.). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass

⁴⁷Roberts, A.,& Ash, T. (2009). *Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

⁴⁸ Bayazit, M., & Mannix, E. (2003). Should I stay or should I go? Predicting team member’s intent to remain in the team" (PDF). *Small Group Research*. Sage Publications, 34 (3), 290-321.

groups are known to use “competitive power tactics (arguments, insults, accusations or even violence) that foster intimidation.”⁴⁹

In conciliation conflict style, there is tendency to compromise since both parties are more willing to realize personal and others’ outcomes.⁵⁰ On its part, the cooperation conflict style is recommended over others since both parties are willing to put in their best feet forward to achieve the best outcomes for each other. In this regard, both parties are both highly assertive and highly empathetic.⁵¹ This theory relates to this current study since post-election conflict is usually characterized with various stakeholders, the state agencies, politicians and non-state actors among others. By analyzing any conflict and establishing the best styles to use in resolving the conflict, ROs can yield the best outcomes for any post-elections violence. This is particularly so since these organizations have the capacity to look at the conflict from multiple angles and, has a bare minimum of moral authority among most of the conflicting parties.

1.12 Research Methodology

This section presents the methodological approach that was adopted by the study in order to achieve the objectives stated earlier. Herein, numerous sections are included. First and foremost, the study design and the reason for its choice is presented. This is followed by a description of the area of the study as well as the target population. In addition, the sampling design as well as the data collection

⁴⁹ Morrill, C. (1995). *The Executive Way: Conflict Management in Corporations*. Chicago, US: University of Chicago Press.

⁵⁰ Bayazit, M., & Mannix, E. (2003). Should I stay or should I go? Predicting team member’s intent to remain in the team" (PDF). *Small Group Research*. Sage Publications, 34 (3), 290-321.

⁵¹ Morrill, C. (1995). *The Executive Way: Conflict Management in Corporations*. Chicago, US: University of Chicago Press.

methods are also presented. Lastly, pretesting of the study tools as well as data presentation are presented. The section also speaks into the roles of methodology⁵²

1.12.1 Research Design

This is a structure used in conducting the research. The researcher adopted the exploratory research design. This type of research design is applied in studies in which the research does not have a prevailing and vivid idea of the problem under investigation. In this regard, the design applies extreme caution in making definitive conclusions.⁵³ Exploratory research is usually used to address a study problem by generating insights and possible explanations to predetermined hypotheses. In this study, both quantitative and qualitative approaches were used so as to address the research problem adequately.

1.12.2 Research Site

The research site was mainly within Nairobi due to its cosmopolitan nature. The electoral conflict of 2017 was widely felt in Kawangware and Kibera. The agencies charged with management of electoral conflicts are also located in Nairobi. Particularly the NCKK located in Kilimani area which the researcher was most interested with.

1.12.3 Target Population

Target population is “the total number of respondents or institutions within the area of interest to the researcher.”⁵⁴ Data was collected from NCKK headquarters and

⁵² Nachmias & Nachmias 5th ed. *Research methods in social sciences: Roles of methodology* pp. 14-15

⁵³ Cooper, D.R. & Schindler, P.S. (2000). *Business Research Methods*: New York, McGraw Hill.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

a little from the IEBC. Herein, the 21 permanent staff of NCKK and the 47 employees of the IEBC headquarters in Nairobi were targeted by the study. In addition 2 Officer Commanding Police divisions (Kilimani & Dagoretti) from the National Police service (NPS) were interviewed. The general public from Kibera and Kawangware, the two main areas in Nairobi County affected by the 2017 post-elections violence were targeted. Herein, 50 community leaders from these areas were purposively targeted. This makes a total of 120 persons. Data was collected using questionnaires and interviews from these persons. Data collection in the researcher's view was influenced by time constraints, limited resources within his reach and to a great extent non-responsiveness by the respondents especially from IEBC.

1.12.4 Sampling Design

Purposive sampling technique was used to choose the respondents. This type of design, also referred to as "judgment, selective as well as subjective sampling" is a sampling technique that is pegged to the judgment of the researcher in selecting the study participants. Russell and Gregory posit that this sampling technique is best suited for studies where the objective is to identify information-rich cases.⁵⁵ This study applied this non-probability sampling method to identify the 120 respondents from NCKK, IEBC, NPS and general population in Kawangware and Kibera estates of Nairobi City County.

1.12.5 Sample Size

For the purpose of this study the respondents comprised of all respondents targeted by the study. This means that all the 120 persons (21 permanent staff of

⁵⁵ Russell, C., & Gregory, D.M. (2008). Evaluation Of qualitative research studies. *Evidence-Based Nursing*, 6, 36-40.

NCCCK, 47 employees of the IEBC headquarters in Nairobi, 2 OCPDs and, 50 community leaders) targeted by this study were sampled.

1.12.5 Data Collection Methods

This study used primary as well as secondary data. A questionnaire containing both open-ended and closed-ended questions as well as an interview guide were employed in collecting primary data⁵⁶ The purpose of using the questionnaire described above was that it achieved two broad purposes. In this regard, it allowed the respondents to freely give their opinions in some instances while also restricting them to some certain predetermined form of responses. This avails data that is rich and diverse. On its part, the interview guide enable the researcher to obtain good quality data from most of the respondents. This is due to the fact that the presence of the researcher checks refusal rates. It also provides for elaborations of any vague questions. Interviews targeted managerial level employees of NCCCK, IEBC and the NPS. As such 10 interviews from the sampled persons were conducted. On its part, secondary data was collected from desk review of existing literature such as public documents, books as well as journals on the study objectives among other sources.

1.12.7 Instrument Reliability

A pilot study was carried out as for “purposes of checking the suitability of the study design, the research tools, challenges that could be faced as well as cost and time implications of the research.”⁵⁷ Hence a pilot study for this study was conducted by interviewing a few persons from NCCCK, IEBC and key community members in

⁵⁶ Frankfort-Nachmias, C., & Nachmias, D. (1996). *Research Methods in the Social Sciences*. (5thEd.), Arnold, London.

⁵⁷ Hardy, M., & Bryman, A. (Eds.) (2004). *Handbook of Data Analysis*. London, Thousand Oaks, and New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Kawangware and Kibera in Nairobi. According to Mugenda and Mugenda “reliability is a measure of the degree to which a research instrument yields consistent results after repeated trials.”⁵⁸ The pilot study was thus used to “test the ability of the questionnaire to obtain data that could best respond to the study objectives and questions.” The data obtained in the pilot study was testing using the Cronbach’s alpha. This test, which ranges from 0 to 1 indicates the level to which the study tool can be relied upon in collecting data for use in the study. In this study, values greater than 0.7, which is the recommended cut-point were obtained. This shows that the questionnaire could be relied upon for data collection.⁵⁹

1.12.8 Instrument Validity

Validity is the “extent to which a research measures what it purports to do”. In this study, both internal and external validity tests were undertaken in the bid to test the validity of the research instrument.⁶⁰ Ease in answering the research questions by the respondents was used to test face validity. Thereafter, any difficulties encountered in answering any question were identified and appropriately mitigated. Furthermore, the study ensured that enough questions, that related to the literature reviewed and the associated knowledge gaps were included in order to ensure content validity.⁶¹ Lastly, the opinions of the University supervisor(s) were also sought so as to make improvements to the questionnaire.

⁵⁸ Mugenda, M. & Mugenda, O. (2003) *Research Methods: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches*. Nairobi: African Centre for Technology Studies.

⁵⁹ Malhotra, N.K. (2004). *Marketing research: An applied orientation* (4th edition) Pearson Education, Inc: New Jersey.

⁶⁰ Gay, L., Mills. G. & Airasian, P. (2006). *Educational research: Competencies for analysis and application* (8th ed.). New York: Prentice Hall.

⁶¹ Cooper, D.R., & Schindler, P. S. (2003). *Business research methods* (8th ed.). Boston: McGraw-Hill.

1.12.9 Data Analysis and Data Representation

Data analysis is “examining what has been gathered in a survey or experiment and making deductions and inferences.”⁶² Qualitative data, that was collected using interviews, was analyzed through conceptual content analysis. This method is suitable since it examines the information collected to ascertain its relevance to the study constructs and makes suitable conclusions.⁶³ On its part, quantitative data was tested using “the Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS),” which is “a comprehensive, integrated collection of computer programme for managing, analyzing and displaying data. To this, measures of central tendency i.e. frequencies, standard deviations, percentages and means were used to test the data and explaining the prevailing perceptions of the respondents on the study questions.

1.13 Legal and Ethical Considerations

The researcher carried out his research with due regard of ethics and exhibit high standards of integrity, honesty and above all confidentiality of sensitive information. The research authorization from the National commission of Science was sought. All other licensing requirements were sought as well.

⁶²Donald & Denlo 2014.

⁶³ Mugenda, O.M., & Mugenda, A.G. (2003). *Research Methods: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches*. Nairobi: Acts.

1.14 Chapter Outline

This project is structured into five chapters with an introduction and conclusion of the themes discussed in every chapter.

Chapter one gives a general introduction to the study. It provides the background of the study, the problem statement, objectives, hypothesis, theoretical framework, literature review and methodology.

Chapter two presents the role of religious organization (NCCCK) in conflict management during the 2017 elections in Kenya

Chapter three analyzes the strategies applied by the religious organization to deal with the electoral conflicts in the 2017 elections in Kenya.

Chapter four examines the challenges faced by the religious organization in their quest to manage electoral conflicts in Kenya during the 2017 elections.

Chapter five presents the summary of the key findings, conclusions and recommendations of the study findings.

CHAPTER TWO
ROLE OF NCKK IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT DURING THE 2017 POST-ELECTIONS CRISIS IN KENYA

2.0 Introduction

This chapter presents findings on the first objective of the study which was “to investigate the role played by NCKK in the 2017 Kenyan post-election conflicts.” The chapter begins with the response rate of the study; a brief overview of the demographic characteristics of the study participants and findings from the eight (8) Likert-type statements that were presented to the study participants. In this regard, the findings obtained are discussed against the literature reviewed in chapter one. A summary section is finally presented,

2.1 Response Rate

The study targeted 120 people. Out of these, 110 were to participate by filling in the questionnaires while 10 were to be interviewed. In this regard, 110 questionnaires were issued to the study participants. From these, 108 were returned. 5 persons were interviewed. This made a response rate of 98.2% which was deemed sufficient for analysis.

Table 2.1 Response Rate

Questionnaires Issued	Questionnaires returned	Response Rate
110	108	98.20%

Source: Field Data, 2018

2.2 Demographic Characteristics

2.2.1 Gender of Respondents

The study sought to find out the gender of the study participants. Herein, the findings obtained show that most of them were male (65%) while the rest were female, 35%. Since none of the two genders constituted more than two thirds, it can be concluded that each gender was adequately represented in the study.




Figure 2.1 Genders of Respondents

Source: Field Data, 2018

2.2.2 Nationality of Respondents

The study went on to investigate the nationality of the study participants. The findings obtained show that all the respondents (100%) were Kenyans. This means that they could easily understand the issues related to the 2017 Kenyan post-election conflicts.

2.2.3 Age of Respondents

The respondents were required to indicate their age. The findings obtained show that most of them (35.2%) were aged between 41 and 50 years. These were followed by those aged over 50 years (33.3%). The third most represented age group was 31 to 40 years at 22.2%. The least were those aged 21 to 30 years (9.3%). These findings show that the various age groups were well represented in the study. In this light, age based bias could be easily avoided.




Figure 2.2 Ages of Respondents

Source: Field Data, 2018

2.3 Level of Education of Respondents

Most of the respondents were O level graduates (36.1%). These were followed by degree holder (31.5%) and masters and above (21.3%). The least were diploma holders (11.1%). As such, it can be concluded that the respondents had diverse

academic qualifications. More than half had post-secondary school education qualifications. As such, the respondents could significantly contribute to the study subject.




Figure 2.3 Level of Education of Respondents

Source: Field Data, 2018

2.4 Findings from the Likert-Type Statements

The respondents were presented with eight (8) likert-type statements based on the study objective. To this they were asked to state their level of agreement with the statements on a scale of 1= To a very low extent; 2=To a low extent; 3=To a moderate extent; 4=To a great extent and; 5=To a very great extent.

2.4.1 Religious Organizations and their Leaders have Trust and Moral Authority

The respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with the statement, “ROs and their leaders have trust and moral authority that can be used across conflicting parties.” The findings as shown in Figure 2.4 show that most

tendency to agree to a moderate extent to this statement (38%, mean of 3). It can be concluded that religious leaders had some form of trust and moral authority, though not much, that could be used to check conflict in electoral disputes. This agrees with USAID that reports that ROs can be employed in enhancing mediation efforts among various conflicting parties.⁶⁴ Furthermore, the sway that religious leaders and the organizations they head have on the general population can thus be used in promoting peace in times of conflict.⁶⁵




Figure 2.4 Religious Organizations and their Leaders have Trust and Moral Authority

Source: Field Data, 2018

64 USAID (2009). Religion, conflict & peace building: an introductory programming guide.
 65 Smock, D. (2008). 'Religion in World Affairs Its Role in Conflict and Peace', Special Report, United States Institute of Peace.

2.4.2 Effectiveness of NCKK in managing the 2017 Post-Election Conflicts in Kenya

The respondents were asked to respond to the question, “in your own opinion how effective was the NCKK in managing the 2017 post- election conflicts in Kenya?” The findings obtained show that most of the respondents agreed to a moderate extent (43.5%). As shown by the mean of 3, to a moderate extent, it can be concluded that NCKK was only moderately effective in managing the 2017 post- election conflicts in Kenya. In this regard, it is evident that the organization had potential that was not fully utilized in managing the conflict but had put in place some notable efforts. This further agrees with the findings of Smock that shows that ROs have potential (due to the sway they have on their adherents) to contribute to conflict mediation.⁶⁶




Figure 2.5 Effectiveness of NCKK in managing the 2017 Post-Election Conflicts in Kenya

Source: Field Data, 2018

⁶⁶ Ibid.

2.4.3 Religious Organizations can be employed in Non-Violent Conflict

Transformation

To the statement “ROs can be employed in non-violent conflict transformation,” an equal number of respondents showed agreement to moderate and a great extent, each at 36.1%. However, the mean of 3, shows that people thought that such organizations could be used to a moderate extent. In this regard, it can be deduced that ROs may not be left to deal with non-violent conflict transformation alone; their efforts should be complimented by other bodies. This agrees with USAID that reports that religious based approaches to conflict management have been found to yield valuable results and that these approaches have also been found to highly complement the efforts of secular peacemaking.⁶⁷




Figure 2.6 Religious Organizations can be employed in Non-Violent Conflict

Transformation

Source: Field Data, 2018

⁶⁷ USAID (2009). Religion, conflict & peace building: an introductory programming guide.

2.4.4 Religious Organizations in Conflict Mediation in Divided Societies

When asked if “ROs can be employed in conflict mediation in divided societies,” most of the respondents tended to agree to a moderate extent (41.7%), also evidenced in the mean of 3. This shows that the RO could play vital roles in conflict mediation in divided societies. These findings corroborate those of Rasul that show that ROs can be employed in conflict mediation in divided societies.⁶⁸




Figure 2.7 Religious Organizations in Conflict Mediation in Divided Societies

Source: Field Data, 2018

⁶⁸ Rasul, A. (2009). “The Role of Religion in Peace Making”, Presented at the CSID 10th Annual Conference, May 5th, 2009.

2.4.5 Religious Organizations as Watchdogs for Human Rights and Strong Advocates for Integrity in Government

The respondents were asked to show their level of agreement to the statement, “ROs can be employed as watchdogs for human rights and strong advocates for integrity in government.” To this, most of the respondents (40.7%) agreed to a great extent. This shows the capacity of such organizations for human rights and integrity advocacy in governments also in agreement with Rasul who was of the same opinion.⁶⁹ This is vital since it can go on to check postelections violence in the country.




Figure 2.8 Religious Organizations as Watchdogs for Human Rights and Strong Advocates for Integrity in Government

Source: Field Data, 2018

⁶⁹ Ibid.

2.4.6 Religious Leaders in Promoting Sustainable Peace, Reconciling Conflicting Societies and Enhancing Social Cohesion during Electoral Conflict

The study went to pose the statement, “religious leaders can play vital roles in promoting sustainable peace, reconciling conflicting societies and enhancing social cohesion during electoral conflict” to the respondents. To this, most of the respondents (38.9%) agreed to a moderate extent. This shows that although not so strongly, religious leaders could play vital roles in sustaining peace, reconciliation efforts and enhancement of social cohesion in case of electoral conflicts. These findings buttresses the study of Haynes in Mozambique and Nigeria that found that religious leaders can promote sustainable peace, reconcile conflicting societies and enhance social cohesion in otherwise volatile regions.⁷⁰




Figure 2.9 Religious Leaders in Promoting Sustainable Peace, Reconciling Conflicting Societies and Enhancing Social Cohesion during Electoral Conflict

Source: Field Data, 2018

⁷⁰ Haynes, J. (2009). *Conflict, Conflict Resolution and Peace-Building: The Role of Religion in Mozambique, Nigeria and Cambodia*. Department of Law, Governance and International Relations, London Metropolitan University, 47 (1), 52–75, 2009.

2.4.7 Religious Organizations Have Immense Intellectual and Material Resources

The researcher went to ask the level of the respondents' agreement to the statement, "ROs have immense resources both intellectual & material that can also be used to promote peace during electoral violence." The findings obtained also show that most of the respondents (37%) agreed to the statement to a moderate extent. It can thus be deduced the intellectual and material resources that ROs had could be vital in promoting peace during times of elections related violence. These findings are line with those of Smock that show that ROs have immense resources that can also be used to promote peace during electoral violence which was exemplified in countries such as Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria and south Sudan among others where these organizations have been employed in conflict resolution.⁷¹




Figure 2.10 Religious Organizations Have Immense Intellectual and Material Resources

Source: Field Data, 2018

⁷¹ Smock, D. (2008). 'Religion in World Affairs Its Role in Conflict and Peace', Special Report, United States Institute of Peace.

2.4.8 Religious Organizations Can Complement the Efforts of Other Secular Organizations in Peace Making

The study went on to investigate if “ROs can complement the efforts of other secular organizations in peace making.” To this, most the respondents (43.5%) agreed to a great extent (mean of 4). This shows that these organizations have strategic advantaged that can be used to complement the efforts of other secular organizations in peace making. These findings support the report by USAID that shows the capacity of religions organizations to complement the efforts of secular peacemaking since these organizations have trust and moral authority that can be used across conflicting parties as already pointed out.⁷²




Figure 2.11 Religious Organizations Can Complement the Efforts of Other Secular Organizations in Peace Making

Source: Field Data, 2018

⁷² USAID (2009). Religion, conflict & peace building: an introductory programming guide.

2.5 Role of NCKK in the 2017 Kenyan Post-election Conflicts According to

Interviews

The researcher also interviewed respondents who had managerial roles in their organizations. The findings obtained shows that ROs played a vital role in managing the 2017 Kenyan Post-election Conflicts. The initiative was by engaging leaders to build bridges between police and the community, which are key conflict resolution mechanisms undertaken by organizations as posited by Forsyth.⁷³ The organization also played a vital role in enhancing increased presence and partnership with several NGOs and support groups and carrying out community policing endeavors, which are vital in enhancing mediation as argued by Rasul.⁷⁴

Religious organizations also participated in recommending more security sector reforms as well as initiation of direct phone lines for communicating and reporting crimes as well as dealing with specific issues such as justice dispensation. They also took neutral positions in a bid to enhance reconciliation so as to mitigate violence as argued by Kilonzo.⁷⁵ Furthermore, these organizations adopted programmes aimed at healing and uniting Kenyans countrywide. They also instituted early warning mechanisms and held prayers in the parks. Lastly, they played observatory roles and came up with reports that could help in policy making.

2.6 Chapter summary and Key findings

This chapter presented findings on the first objective of the study which was to investigate the role played by NCKK in the 2017 Kenyan post-election conflicts. The

⁷³ Forsyth, D. (2009). *Group Dynamics* (5thed.). Boston, MA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning.

⁷⁴ Rasul, A. (2009). "The Role of Religion in Peace Making", Presented at the CSID 10th Annual Conference, May 5th, 2009.

⁷⁵ Kilonzo, S.M. (2009). Silent religiosity in a snivelling nation: The role of religious institutions in promoting post-conflict reconciliation in Kenya. *Africa Media Review*, 17(1-2), 95-107.

findings show that that religious leaders had some form of trust and moral authority, though not much, that could be used to check conflict in electoral disputes as posited by a report by USAID.⁷⁶ In addition, the sway that religious leaders and the organizations they head have on the general population can thus be used in promoting peace in times of conflict.⁷⁷

The findings also make it is evident that the organization had potential that was not fully utilized in managing the conflict but had put in place some notable efforts which included countrywide campaigns to preach peace. This further agrees with the findings of Smock that shows that ROs have potential due to the sway they have on their adherents to contribute to conflict mediation.⁷⁸

Evidently, ROs may not be left to deal with non-violent conflict transformation alone; their efforts should be complimented by other bodies. This further agrees with USAID that reports that religious based approaches play a prophetic role to conflict management which has been found to yield valuable results and that these approaches have also been found to highly complement the efforts of secular peacemaking.⁷⁹

The respondents also make it clear that the ROs could play vital roles in civic education especially in pre-election conflict mediation in divided societies, which corroborate the findings of Rasul who also found that ROs can be employed in conflict mediation in divided societies.⁸⁰ It was also shown that the capacity of ROs for human rights and integrity advocacy in governments is enormous and thus in

76 USAID (2009). Religion, conflict & peace building: an introductory programming guide.

77 Smock, D. (2008). 'Religion in World Affairs Its Role in Conflict and Peace', Special Report, United States Institute of Peace.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

79 USAID (2009). Religion, conflict & peace building: an introductory programming guide.

80 Rasul, A. (2009). "The Role of Religion in Peace Making", Presented at the CSID 10th Annual Conference, May 5th, 2009.

agreement with Rasul who was of the same opinion,⁸¹ that is to go on to check post-elections violence in the country.

Though not strongly, it is evident that religious leaders could play vital roles in sustaining peace, reconciliation efforts and enhancement of social cohesion in case of electoral conflicts. This agrees with the study of Haynes in Mozambique and Nigeria that found that religious leaders can promote sustainable peace, reconcile conflicting societies and enhance social cohesion in otherwise volatile regions.⁸² In addition, it can be concluded that the intellectual and material resources that ROs have could be vital in promoting peace during times of elections related violence as argued by Smock.⁸³

Lastly, the findings show that ROs have strategic advantaged that can be used to complement the efforts of other secular organizations in peace making. The NCKK in 2017 linked with other state and non-state actors to achieve this objective. Early warnings, SMS alerts and National prayer rallies were some of the tools used by NCKK to mediate the conflict. This supports the report by USAID that shows the capacity of religions organizations to complement the efforts of secular peacemaking since these organizations have trust and moral authority that can be used across conflicting parties as already pointed out.⁸⁴ In conclusion, it is evident that ROs such as NCKK plays a vital roles, though not regarded very highly, in post-election conflicts. In this light, the next chapter explores the key strategies applied by NCKK in Kenya's 2017 electoral conflicts.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Haynes, J. (2009). *Conflict, Conflict Resolution and Peace-Building: The Role of Religion in Mozambique, Nigeria and Cambodia*. Department of Law, Governance and International Relations, London Metropolitan University, 47 (1), 52–75, 2009.

⁸³ Smock, D. (2008). 'Religion in World Affairs Its Role in Conflict and Peace', Special Report, United States Institute of Peace.

⁸⁴ USAID (2009). Religion, conflict & peace building: an introductory programming guide.

CHAPTER THREE
KEY STRATEGIES APPLIED BY NCKK IN KENYA'S 2017 ELECTORAL
CONFLICTS

3.0 Introduction

In this, the findings of the study on the second objective which was “to explore the key strategies applied by NCKK in Kenya’s 2017 electoral conflicts,” are presented. In light of that, findings from the eight (8) Likert-type statements that were presented to the study participants are presented and discussed against the literature reviewed in chapter one. Finally, a summary section which includes the findings from the interviews is incorporated.

3.1 Findings from the Likert-Type Statements

The respondents were presented with eight (8) likert-type statements based on the study objective. To this they were asked to state their level of agreement with the statements on a scale of 1= To a very low extent; 2=To a low extent; 3=To a moderate extent; 4=To a great extent and; 5=To a very great extent. The findings obtained are presented in the following sections.

3.1.1 Proper Strategies Were Identified and Used by Religious Organizations to Mitigate the 2017 Post-Poll Conflict

The respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with the statement, “Proper strategies were identified and used by ROs to mitigate the 2017 post-poll conflict.” To this, the findings obtained as presented in Figure 3.1 show tendency to agree to a moderate extend (36.1%) to the statement. This was followed

by agreement to a great extent at 20.4%. This shows that overall; the respondents have very mixed opinions on the statement. As such, there is no clear evidence that ROs used proper strategies to mitigate the 2017 post-poll conflict. This means that these organizations could not perform well in conflict resolution since organizations involved in such resolution should have the proper strategies in order to be effective as argued by Flores.⁸⁵




Figure 3.1 Proper Strategies Were Identified and Used by Religious Organizations to Mitigate the 2017 Post-Poll Conflict

Source: Field Data, 2018

⁸⁵ Flores, T. (2014) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI, voting under gun elections. Signalistgatan. Solna Sweden.

3.1.2 Issues underlying the 2017 Post-Election Conflict as mapped out by NCKK

The respondents were also asked if issues underlying the 2017 Post-election conflict were mapped out by NCKK. To this, the vast majority (36.1%) agreed to a moderate extent. This was followed by those who agreed to a great extent at 34.3%. These findings signify that NCKK had, to a large extent clear understanding of the issues regarding the conflicts. This could enhance its role in mitigating these conflicts as proposed by Flores.⁸⁶




Figure 3.2 Issues underlying the 2017 Post-Election Conflict as identified by NCKK

Source: Field Data, 2018

⁸⁶ Ibid.

3.1.3 Socio-Economic Inequalities Identified as the Main Cause of Electoral Conflict

Furthermore, the respondents were also presented with the statement, “socio-economic inequalities appear to be the main cause of the electoral conflict.” To this, most of the respondents (36.1%) agreed to a great extent. This shows that all in all, socio-economic inequalities play a key role in electoral conflicts in Kenya, which agrees with Timmer who also identified it as a major factor contributing to conflict.⁸⁷




Figure 3.3 Socio-Economic Inequalities Identified as the Main Cause of the Electoral Conflict

Source: Field Data, 2018

⁸⁷ Timmer, S. (2012). *Causal Factors of Election Violence in Africa A Comparative Analysis of Kenya’s 2007 Elections and Zimbabwe’s 2008 Elections*. Master’s Thesis. University of Stellenbosch, South Africa.

3.1.4 Negative Ethnicity and Sectarian Polarization as Pertinent Causes of the 2017 Post-election Conflict

The study also sought to find out if, “negative ethnicity and sectarian polarization were also identified by NCKK as other pertinent causes of the 2017 post-election conflict.” To this, most of the respondents (33.3%) agreed to a great extent. These were followed by those who agreed to a moderate extent at 28.7%. This shows that one of the main causes of post-election violence in Kenya was negative ethnicity and sectarian polarization mostly on area of origin, key factors also identified by Timmer.⁸⁸




Figure 3.4 Negative Ethnicity and Sectarian Polarization as Pertinent Causes of the 2017 Post-election Conflict

Source: Field Data, 2018

⁸⁸ Ibid.

3.1.5 Participation of Religious Organizations in the Democratization Process and Peace-Building Initiatives

The researcher went on to pose the question, “ROs under NCKK actively participated in the democratization process and peace-building initiatives during the pre & post- elections period.” The findings obtained show that most of the respondents (40.7%) agreed to the statement to a great extent. Indeed most of the respondents agreed to the statement from moderate to very great extents. As such, it is clear that in Kenya, ROs under the auspices of NCKK were pivotal to the democratization process and peace-building initiatives in Kenya. This agrees with the study by Githigaro which points out that in post-election violence such as that of 2007/08 NCKK was involved in peace building initiatives.⁸⁹




Figure 3.5 Participation of Religious Organizations in the Democratization Process and Peace-Building Initiatives

Source: Field Data, 2018

⁸⁹ Githigaro, J.M. (2012). “Faith-based peace building: a case study of the national council of churches of Kenya”. 19, 1-5.

3.1.6 NCKK Advocated for the Strengthening of Political Institutions

The next statement presented to the respondents was, “NCKK advocated for the strengthening of political institutions to avert personalization of political power which is often embedded in political institutions.” As presented in Figure 3.6, most of the respondents (38%) agreed to moderate extent. This was followed by those who agreed to a low extent (27.8%). These findings make it evident that NCKK did not play a strong role in strengthening of political institutions to avert personalization of political power which is often embedded in political institutions. This is contrary to the report by USAID that shows that in areas with volatile political environments, religion has been used in conflict resolution efforts by strengthening political institutions through advisory roles among others.⁹⁰




Figure 3.6 NCKK Advocated for the Strengthening of Political Institutions

Source: Field Data, 2018

⁹⁰ USAID (2009). Religion, conflict & peace building: an introductory programming guide.

3.1.7 NCKK Tackled Perceived Injustices by Incumbent Leaders

The study also asked the respondents if perceived injustices by incumbent leaders which mainly fuels violence were tackled by NCKK. The findings as presented in Figure 3.7, most of the respondents (38%) agreed to a great extent. This was followed by 36.1% who agreed to a moderate extent. In this regard, it is clear that NCKK made some efforts to talk to incumbent leaders to implore them to stop perpetuating social injustices. This is in line with the report by USAID that shows that ROs play pivotal role in guiding political leaders from fueling post-election violence.⁹¹




Figure 3.7 NCKK Tackled Perceived Injustices by Incumbent Leaders

Source: Field Data, 2018

⁹¹ Ibid.

3.1.8 NCKK Voiced the Plight of Victims Affected by the Post- Elections Chaos

Lastly, the respondents were asked if NCKK voiced the plight of victims affected by the post- elections chaos, particularly the IDPs. To this, most of the respondents (39.8%) agreed to a great extent. These were followed by those who agreed to a moderate extent at 23.1% and those who agreed to a very great extent (22.2%). This makes it evident that NCKK played a key role in casting light on the plight of the victims affected by the post-election chaos, which could help in post-violence reconstruction and healing processes. This is in line with the study of Haynes that shows that ROs are pivotal in advocating the sentiments of victims of electoral conflicts which is key in enhancing social cohesion.⁹²




Figure 3.8 NCKK Voiced the Plight of Victims Affected by the Post- Elections Chaos

Source: Field Data, 2018

⁹² Haynes, J. (2009). *Conflict, Conflict Resolution and Peace-Building: The Role of Religion in Mozambique, Nigeria and Cambodia*. Department of Law, Governance and International Relations, London Metropolitan University, 47 (1), 52–75, 2009.

3.2 Measures taken by Religious Organizations in Kenya's 2017 Electoral

Conflicts According to Interviews

Findings from interviews show that religious leaders took numerous measures aimed at mitigating post-electoral violence. These included: cohesion campaigns by all actors, making recommendations on reforming NCIC; advocating for political tolerance; empowering electoral institutions such as the IEBC; advocating for job creation efforts by the government; investing in civic education; advocating for strengthening the NPS and; easing ethnic divisions by advocating for constitutional amendments i.e. loser must have a portfolio. These findings show that ROs played pivotal roles in promoting sustainable peace and reconciling.⁹³

3.3 Summary and Key findings

In this regard, the findings of the study on the second objective which was “to explore the key strategies applied by NCCCK in Kenya's 2017 electoral conflicts,” were presented. To begin with, the findings indicate that there is no clear evidence that ROs used proper strategies to mitigate the 2017 post-poll conflict. This is true to a great extent because NCCCK appears not to have done much even after a lesson learnt from the 2007/2008 post-election conflict which was not fully resolved. This means that these organizations and in particular NCCCK has not performed well in conflict resolution since they form part of the organizations highly charged with providing resolution mechanisms to conflict. They should have embraced the proper strategies in order to be effective as argued by Flores.⁹⁴

93 Haynes, J. (2009).“Conflict, Conflict Resolution and Peace-Building: The Role of Religion in Mozambique, Nigeria and Cambodia”, Department of Law, Governance and International Relations, London Metropolitan University, Vol. 47, No. 1, 52–75, 2009.

94 Flores, T. (2014) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI, voting under gun elections. Signalistgatan. Solna Sweden.

The findings also signify that NCK had, to a large extent clear understanding of the issues regarding the conflicts. This could enhance its role in mitigating these conflicts as proposed by Flores.⁹⁵ Furthermore, the findings shows that all in all, socio-economic inequalities play a key role in electoral conflicts in Kenya, which agrees with Timmer who also identified it as a major factor contributing to conflict.⁹⁶ It was also manifest that one of the main causes of post-election violence in Kenya was negative ethnicity and sectarian polarization which is so much embedded in NCK itself. Regional alignments to political parties by member churches especially those from Mount Kenya region threatened the very existence of NCK. Such key factors are also identified by Timmer.⁹⁷

Furthermore, the findings make it clear that in Kenya, ROs under the auspices of NCK were pivotal to the democratization process and peace-building initiatives in Kenya. This agrees with the study by Githigaro which points out that in post-election violence such as that of 2007/08, NCK was involved in peace building initiatives even though to a limited extent.⁹⁸

On another note, the findings show that NCK did not play a strong role in strengthening of political institutions to avert personalization of political power which is often embedded in political institutions. This is contrary to the report by USAID which shows that in areas with volatile political environments, religion has been used in conflict resolution efforts by strengthening political institutions through advisory roles among others.⁹⁹

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Timmer, S. (2012). *Causal Factors of Election Violence in Africa A Comparative Analysis of Kenya's 2007 Elections and Zimbabwe's 2008 Elections*. Master's Thesis. University of Stellenbosch, South Africa.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Githigaro, J.M. (2012). "Faith-based peace building: a case study of the national council of churches of Kenya". 19, 1-5.

⁹⁹ USAID (2009). Religion, conflict & peace building: an introductory programming guide.

The findings also make it clear that NCKK took effort to talk to incumbent leaders to implore them to stop perpetuating injustices. This is in line with the report by USAID that shows that ROs play pivotal roles in guiding political leaders from fueling post-election violence.¹⁰⁰

Lastly, the findings show that NCKK played a key role in casting light on the plight of the victims (IPDs) affected by the post-election chaos, which could help in post-violence reconstruction and healing processes. This is in line with the study of Haynes that shows that ROs are pivotal in advocating the cause of victims of conflicts which is pivotal in enhancing social cohesion.¹⁰¹

The next chapter looks at the key challenges faced by NCKK in resolving the 2017 Kenyan post-elections conflict

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Haynes, J. (2009). *Conflict, Conflict Resolution and Peace-Building: The Role of Religion in Mozambique, Nigeria and Cambodia*. Department of Law, Governance and International Relations, London Metropolitan University, 47 (1), 52–75, 2009.

CHAPTER FOUR
KEY CHALLENGES FACED BY NCKK IN RESOLVING THE 2017
KENYAN POST-ELECTIONS CONFLICT

4.0 Introduction

The last objective of the study was “to examine the key challenges faced by NCKK in resolving the 2017 Kenyan post-elections conflict.” This chapter presents the findings obtained from the five (5) Likert-type statements presented to the study participants. These findings are also analyzed against the literature reviewed in chapter one. Subsequently, a summary section is included.

4.1 Findings from the Likert-Type Statements

This section presents the findings obtained from the five (5) likert-type statements based on the study objective. The statement were based on a scale of 1-5 as follows: 1= To a very low extent; 2=To a low extent; 3=To a moderate extent; 4=To a great extent and; 5=To a very great extent.

4.1.1 Religious Organizations are faced with Numerous Challenges

The respondents were presented with the statements, “ROs are however faced with numerous challenges as they undertake mediation activities during conflicts.” In response, most of the respondents (40.7%) agreed to a great extent. This shows that in most cases ROs face numerous challenges as they undertake mediation activities as argued by Throop.¹⁰²

102 Throop, D. (2015). ‘Politics, religious engagement, and extremism in Kenya’ in Cooke, J. G. and R. Downie. (eds) Religious Authority and the State in Africa (pp.29-48). Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic Studies.




Figure 4.1 Religious Organizations are faced with Numerous Challenges

Source: Field Data, 2018

4.1.2 Religious Leaders and Inter-Religious Institutions are often divided along Ethnic Lines

The respondents were also presented with the statement, “religious leaders and inter-religious institutions are often divided along ethnic lines which makes it hard for them to authoritatively speak out against ethnic violence.” To this, most of them (36.1%) tended to agree to a great extent. These were followed by those who agreed to a moderate extent at 34.3%. This means that it was hard for ROs to diligently undertake conflict resolution due to such divisions and thus lack of moral authority to talk against post-election violence.¹⁰³

¹⁰³ Ibid.




Figure 4.2 Religious Leaders and Inter-Religious Institutions are often divided along Ethnic Lines

Source: Field Data, 2018

4.1.3 Religious Leaders are often seen as Being Bipartisan by the Differing Groups

The respondents were also asked if religious leaders were often seen as being bipartisan by the differing groups more so if they supported the prosecution of their leaders. As shown in Figure 4.3, most of the respondents (28.7%) agreed to this statement to a great extent. This shows that it was often hard for religious leaders to carry out their mediation efforts if they were considered as being bipartisan.¹⁰⁴ This posed a dilemma to leaders since they are often obligated to stand with justice, which

¹⁰⁴ Kilonzo, S.M. (2009). 'Silent religiosity in a snivelling nation: The role of religious institutions in promoting post-conflict reconciliation in Kenya'. *Africa Media Review*, 17(1-2), 95-107.

includes allowing for prosecution of offenders. This was corroborated by the NCKK during the interview.




Figure 4.3 Religious Leaders are seen as Being Bipartisan by the Differing Groups

Source: Field Data, 2018

4.1.4 Lack of Financial Resources Inhibit Religious Organizations in Undertaking Conflict Resolution Mitigation Measures

Furthermore, religious leaders were presented with the statement, “lack of financial resources could also inhibit the capacity of ROs to initiate and oversee conflict resolution mitigation measures during post-election violence.” To this, most of the respondents (35.2%) agreed to a moderate extent. These were followed by those who agreed to a great extent (28.7%). This shows that ROs could not effectively

undertake conflict resolution measures due to lack of adequate financial resources as argued by Deacon and Lynch.¹⁰⁵




Figure 4.4 Lack of Financial Resources Inhibit Religious Organizations in Undertaking Conflict Resolution Mitigation Measures

Source: Field Data, 2018

4.1.5 Inter-Religious Tension Undermines the Role of Religious Institutions in Conflict Resolution Due to the Internal Bureaucracies

Lastly, the respondents were presented with the statement, “inter-religious tension could also undermine the role of religious institutions in conflict resolution due to the internal bureaucracies of particular denominations”. This was corroborated by Mr. Dan Kimutai’s response of NCKK during the interview. Some denominations

¹⁰⁵ Deacon, G., & G. Lynch (2013). ‘Allowing Satan in? Moving toward a political economy of NeoPentecostalism in Kenya’. *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 43, 108-130.

actually threatened to pull out their membership from NCKK due to regional and ethnic alignments in the political arena.¹⁰⁶ As presented in Figure 4.5, most of the respondents (39.8%) agreed to the statement to a great extent. This was followed by those who agreed to a very great extent and to a moderate extent each at 25%. This shows that internal bureaucracies were major factors inhibiting effective conflict resolution by RO since some of these organizations had internal bureaucratic tendencies that bred inter-religious tension. This corroborates the findings of Cox and Ndung'u who were of the same opinion.¹⁰⁷




Figure 4.5 Inter-Religious Tension Undermines the Role of Religious Institutions in Conflict Resolution Due to the Internal Bureaucracies

Source: Field Data, 2018

¹⁰⁶ NCKK interview with Mr. Daniel Kimutai a communications and strategy officer.

¹⁰⁷ Cox, F.D., & Ndung'u, J. (2014). Social fault lines: Identity and insecurity in modernising Kenya: DRAFT. University of Denver.

4.2 Key Challenges Faced By NCKK in Resolving the 2017 Kenyan Post-Elections Conflict According to Interviews

Lastly, the respondents were interviewed on key challenges that NCKK faced in resolving the 2017 Kenyan Post-Elections conflict. The findings obtained show that the respondents were faced with perception issues. This light, the organizations were often perceived negatively, which led to mistrust hence limiting their performance. There were also high temperatures during elections which made it hard to undertake mediation role. Negative ethnicity within some members of NCKK made it hard to perform its duties, which is a key challenge to peace and reconciliation as argued by Timmer.¹⁰⁸

The organization also faced challenges related to lack of adequate resources. This could thwart its ability to undertake conflict resolution measures as argued by Deacon and Lynch who argue that this as a challenge facing organization during conflict resolution.¹⁰⁹ There were also challenges related to competing interests from other peace actors. Lastly, it was hard to be effective in mediations due to internal wrangles within NCKK with some churches threatening to pull out of it.

4.3 Chapter Summary and Key findings

The last objective of the study was “to examine the key challenges faced by NCKK in resolving the 2017 Kenyan post-elections conflict.” Data was collected using five (5) likert type statements. These findings obtained were also analyzed against the literature reviewed in chapter one. To begin with, the findings show that in

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Deacon, G., & G. Lynch (2013). ‘Allowing Satan in? Moving toward a political economy of NeoPentecostalism in Kenya’. *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 43, 108-130.

most cases ROs face numerous challenges as they undertake mediation activities as argued by Throup.¹¹⁰

Additionally, it was hard for ROs that are often unable to diligently undertake conflict resolution due to such divisions and lack of moral authority to talk against post-election violence.¹¹¹ It was also often hard for religious leaders to carry out their mediation efforts especially if they were considered as being bipartisan.¹¹² This posed a dilemma to the leaders since they are often obligated to stand with justice, which includes allowing for prosecution of offenders. The Anglican Church of Kenya (ACK) leadership was seen as being more aligned to the opposition; NASA going by statements made by the Archbishop in an attempt to resolve the political stalemate¹¹³

On another note, the findings show that ROs could not effectively undertake conflict resolution measures due to lack of adequate financial resources as argued by Deacon and Lynch.¹¹⁴ This was also corroborated by Kimutai of NCKK. Lastly, the findings obtained shows that internal bureaucracies were major factors inhibiting effective conflict resolution by RO since some of these organizations had internal bureaucratic tendencies that bred inter-religious tensions. This corroborates the findings of Cox and Ndung'u who were of the same opinion.¹¹⁵

110 Throup, D. (2015). 'Politics, religious engagement, and extremism in Kenya' in Cooke, J. G. and R. Downie. (eds) *Religious Authority and the State in Africa* (pp.29-48). Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic Studies

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Kilonzo, S.M. (2009). 'Silent religiosity in a snivelling nation: The role of religious institutions in promoting post-conflict reconciliation in Kenya'. *Africa Media Review*, 17(1-2), 95-107.

¹¹³ Church service held at All Saints' Cathedral Nairobi, 9th October, 2017, Provost desk; A call to fruitful co-existence & Ethnicity in Kenya

¹¹⁴ Deacon, G., & G. Lynch (2013). 'Allowing Satan in? Moving toward a political economy of NeoPentecostalism in Kenya'. *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 43, 108-130.

¹¹⁵ Cox, F.D., & Ndung'u, J. (2014). *Social fault lines: Identity and insecurity in modernising Kenya: DRAFT*. University of Denver.

CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY OF THE KEY FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND
RECOMMEDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

Chapter five gives a summary of study outcomes established based on research objectives outlined in chapter one. The findings are contextualized in the broader study objective of examining the role of ROs in electoral conflicts in the Horn of Africa region: a case study of NCKK in Kenya's 2017 election. To this end, the study sought to: investigate the role played by NCKK in the 2017 Kenyan post-election violence; explore the key strategies applied by NCKK in Kenya's 2017 electoral conflicts and; examine the key challenges faced by NCKK in resolving the 2017 Kenyan post-elections conflict. In this conclusion, the researcher gives some policy recommendation suitable for enhancing the role of ROs in mitigating post-elections violence (PEV) in the Horn of Africa Region.

5.2 Summary of Key Findings

Following a detailed examination and consideration of the summary of the findings, the study came up with the conclusions presented hereafter. Recommendations are then presented based on these findings.

5.2.1 Role Played by NCKK in the 2017 Kenyan Post-Election Conflicts

The first objective of the study was "to investigate the role played by NCKK in the 2017 Kenyan post-election conflicts." The findings show of ROs and their leaders had trust and moral authority that could be used across conflicting parties. On its part, the NCKK was only moderately effective in managing the 2017 post- election

conflicts in Kenya. In this regard, it is evident that the organization had potential that was not fully utilized in managing the conflict but had put in place some notable efforts. In most cases, the effectiveness of ROs in dealing with non-violent conflict transformation alone was enhanced if their efforts were complimented by other bodies. Evidently, RO played vital roles in conflict mediation in divided societies. As such, they could be largely used as watchdogs for human rights and strong advocates for integrity in government. These findings show the capacity of such organizations for human rights and integrity advocacy in governments.

Religious leaders could also play vital roles in sustaining peace, reconciliation efforts and enhancement of social cohesion in case of electoral conflicts. This was attributable to the intellectual and material resources from ROs that could be used in promoting peace during times of elections related violence. Due to its inherent attributes, NCKK played a vital role in managing the 2017 Kenyan Post-election Conflicts. This was by engaging leaders to build bridges between police and community. The organization also played a vital role in enhancing increased presence and partnership with several NGOs and support groups and carrying out community policing endeavors, which are vital in enhancing mediation.

Religious organizations also participated by recommending more security reforms as well as initiation of direct hotlines for reporting crimes as well as dealing with specific issues such as justice and dispensation of it. Furthermore, these organizations adopted programmes aimed at healing and uniting Kenyans countrywide. They also instituted early warning mechanisms and held prayers in the parks. Lastly, they collected raw information through observation and came up with reports that could help in policy making.

5.2.2 Key Strategies Applied by NCKK in Kenya's 2017 Electoral Conflicts

The second objective of the study was to, “to explore the key strategies applied by NCKK in Kenya's 2017 electoral conflicts.” The findings obtained show that there is no clear evidence that ROs used proper strategies to mitigate the 2017 post-poll conflict. This shows laxity in the organization to put in place such strategies the organization had, to a large extent clear understanding of the issues regarding the conflicts.

Evidently, ROs under the auspices of NCKK were pivotal to the democratization process and peace-building initiatives in Kenya. Regrettably though, NCKK did not play a strong role in strengthening of political institutions to avert personalization of political power which is often embedded in political institutions. However, NCKK took effort to talk to incumbent leaders to implore them to stop perpetuating injustices. The organization also played a key role in casting light on the plight of the victims affected by the post-election chaos, which could help in post violence reconstruction and healing processes.

Findings from interviews show that religious leaders took numerous measures aimed at mitigating post-electoral violence. These included: cohesion campaigns by all actors, making recommendation and making recommendations on NCIC; advocating for political tolerance; empowering electoral institutions; advocating for job creation efforts by the government; investing in civic education; advocating for strengthening the NPS and; easing ethnic divisions by advocating for constitutional amendments so that the loser must have a position in government.

5.2.3 Challenges faced by NCKK in Resolving the 2017 Kenyan Post-elections

Conflict

The last objective of the study was “to examine the key challenges faced by NCKK in resolving the 2017 Kenyan post-elections conflict.” The findings obtained show that ROs were indeed faced with challenges. Some of these challenges included: lack of moral authority to talk against PEV, being seen as exhibiting bipartisanship, lack of financial resources and internal bureaucracies of particular denominations.

Lastly, the respondents were interviewed on key challenges that NCKK faced in resolving the 2017 Kenyan Post-Elections conflict. The findings obtained show that the respondents were faced with perception issues. This light, the organizations were often perceived negatively, which led to mistrust hence limiting their performance. This perception was also tested and measured with the NPS- OCPDs, who corroborated that the same challenges affected the Police in executing their mandate. There were also high temperatures during elections which made it hard to undertake mediation role. Negative ethnicity within some members of NCKK made it hard to perform its duties, which is a key challenge to peace and reconciliation.

The organization also faced challenges related to lack of adequate resources, as already pointed out. This could thwart its ability to undertake conflict resolution measures. There were also challenges related to competing interests from other peace actors and internal wrangles within NCKK with some churches threatening to pull out of it.

5.3 Chapter Summary and Key findings

In conclusion, and emanating from the first objective of the study which was to investigate the role played by NCKK in the 2017 Kenyan post-election conflicts, it

is evident that religious leaders had some form of trust and moral authority, though not much, that could be used to check conflict in electoral disputes. In addition, the sway that religious leaders and the organizations they head have on the general population can thus be used in promoting peace in times of conflict. It is also evident that the NCKK had potential that was not fully utilized in managing the conflict but had put in place some notable efforts.

In line with the second objective of the study which was, “to explore the key strategies applied by NCKK in Kenya’s 2017 electoral conflicts,” it can be concluded that there is no clear evidence that ROs used proper strategies to mitigate the 2017 post-poll conflict. However, ROs under the auspices of NCKK were pivotal to the democratization process and peace-building initiatives in Kenya. However, NCKK did not play a strong role in strengthening of political institutions to avert personalization of political power which is often embedded in political institutions. We also tested the NCKK strategies along those put in place by the NPS. It can also be concluded that, NCKK took effort to talk to incumbent leaders to implore them to stop perpetuating injustices as well as in casting light on the plight of the victims affected by the post-election chaos, which could help in post violence reconstruction and healing processes.

Based on the last objective of the study which was “to examine the key challenges faced by NCKK in resolving the 2017 Kenyan post-elections conflict,” it is evident that most cases ROs face numerous challenges such as lack of moral authority to talk against PEV in some instances. This is often brought about by bipartisanship. These organizations are also faced with lack of adequate financial resources to successfully undertake conflict resolution strategies. Lastly, the findings obtained

shows that internal bureaucratic tendencies that bred inter-religious tension were also major factors inhibiting effective conflict resolution by RO.

5.4 Recommendations

From the findings of the study established above, this study recommends the following:

- Religious organizations such as NCKK should put in place specific strategies for strengthening their trust and moral authority so as to be effective in checking post-election disputes and the associated violence
- The bodies tasked with reconciliation and national cohesion especially NCIC and the BBI should always exploit the strategic advantage of ROs in peace making so as to check post-election violence in the country. All these bodies should work together to achieve the overall objective of peace and security.
- Capacity building efforts should be undertaken so as to enhance the capacity of ROs to have the right approaches and strategies in post-elections conflict resolution.
- Religious organizations in the Horn of Africa should also put in place the right strategies aimed at checking socio-economic inequalities that contribute to electoral conflict in Kenya and the region at large.
- Religious organizations should also address issues associated with negative ethnicity and sectarian polarization through their constituent denominations. The pulpit should be a useful tool to preach peace and not negative ethnicity.
- There should be efforts to constantly come up with civic education programmes by ROs aimed at supporting democratization process and peace-building initiatives in Kenya. This should be done consistently at peacetime.

- NCKK should also enhance its role through National dialogue in offering advisory services to political institutions to avert personalization of political power which is often embedded in political institutions.
- NCKK should also come up with strategies aimed at enhancing advocacy on the plight of the victims affected by the post-election chaos so as to help in post -violence reconstruction and healing processes. This may include re-settlement and compensation programmes.
- Religious organizations should come up with the right approaches aimed at addressing the challenges they face such as lack of finances through numerous fund-raising efforts both at local and international fronts.
- Efforts should also be taken to mitigate challenges related to bipartisanship in RO so as to strengthen their role in conflict resolution. A multi-ethnic approach should be embraced by all actors.
- Lastly, all internal bureaucracies in some ROs should be tackled so as to avert the associated inter-religious tension.

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APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRE

Instructions

Please read the instructions given and answer the questions as appropriately as possible. It is advisable that you answer or fill in each section as provided. Make an attempt to answer every question fully and honestly.

Section A; Background Information

4. What is your gender?

Male [] Female []

5. What is your nationality? []

6. Indicate your age group(years)

21-30 [] 31-40 [] 41-50 [] above 50 []

7. Indicate your level of education

O level [] Diploma []

Degree [] Masters and above []

8. What is your organization/Occupation

NCKK Employee [] IEBC Employee [] Community Leader []

Section A: Role of Religious Organizations in Post-election Conflict

9. The following are some of the roles taken by religious institutions in post-election conflicts. To what extent do you agree? Use a scale where 1- To a very low extent, 2- To a low extent, 3- To a moderate extent, 4- To a great extent and 5-To a very great extent (please tick appropriately).

	1	2	3	4	5
1. Religious organizations and their leaders have trust and moral authority that can be used across conflicting parties					
2. In your own opinion how effective was the NCKK in managing the 2017post-election conflicts in Kenya?					
3. Religious organizations can be employed in non-violent conflict transformation					
4. Religious organizations can be employed in conflict mediation in divided societies					
5. Religious organizations can be employed as watchdogs for human rights and strong advocates for integrity in government.					
6. Religious leaders can play vital roles in promoting sustainable peace, reconciling conflicting societies and enhancing social cohesion during electoral conflict.					
7. Religious organizations have immense resources both intellectual & material that can also be used to promote peace during electoral violence					
8. Religious organizations can complement the efforts of other secular organizations in peace making.					

Section B: Strategies used by religious organizations to manage Electoral Conflicts

6. The following are some of the strategies used by religious organizations to resolve the 2017 post-election conflicts in Kenya. In your opinion what extent do you think the strategies have worked? Use a scale where 1- To a very low extent, 2- To a low extent, 3- To a moderate extent, 4- To a great extent and 5-To a very great extent (please tick appropriately).

	1	2	3	4	5
1. Proper strategies were used by religious organizations to mitigate the 2017 post-poll conflict					
2. Issues underlying the 2017 Post-election conflict were positively identified and tackled by NCKK					
3. Socio-economic inequalities were identified as the main causes of the electoral conflict					
4. Negative ethnicity and sectarian polarization were identified by NCKK as pertinent issues hindering the realization of peace in the 2017 post-election conflict					
5. Religious organizations under NCKK actively participated in the democratization process and peace-building initiatives during the pre& post- elections period					
6. NCKK advocated for the strengthening of political institutions to avert personalization of political power which is often embedded in political institutions.					
7. Perceived injustices by incumbent leaders which mainly fuels violence were identified and tackled by NCKK					
8. NCKK voiced the plight of victims affected by the post- elections chaos					

Section C: Challenges Facing Religious Organizations in Handling Post-election

Conflict

8. The following are some of the challenges facing religious institutions in handling post-election conflicts. To what extent do you agree? Use a scale where 1- To a very low extent, 2- To a low extent, 3- To a moderate extent, 4- To a great extent and 5-To a very great extent (please tick appropriately).

	1	2	3	4	5
1. Religious organizations are however faced with numerous challenges as they undertake mediation activities during conflicts					
2. Religious leaders and inter-religious institutions are often divided along ethnic lines which makes it hard for them to authoritatively speak out against ethnic violence					
3. Religious leaders are often seen as being bipartisan by the differing groups more so if they support the prosecution of their leaders					
4. Lack of financial resources could also inhibit the capacity of religious organizations to initiate and oversee conflict resolution mitigation measures during post-election violence					
5. Inter-religious tension could also undermine the role of religious institutions in conflict resolution due to the internal bureaucracies of particular denominations.					

Thank you for your time and participation

APPENDIX II: INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. What are the main factors contributing to post-election conflicts in Kenya?
2. What are the negative socio-economic and political impacts of post-election conflict in Kenya
3. What are some of the major roles played by your organization in electoral conflict resolution?
4. In what ways did you participate in Kenya's 2017 electoral conflicts?
5. Has your participation in Kenya's 2017 electoral conflicts brought any positive impact? Explain.
6. What are the major threats/hindrances to electoral conflict resolution by your organization in Kenya and how have these threats affected your mitigation strategies? Explain.
7. What measures can be taken to ease threats to peace and security in Kenya during electoral conflicts? Explain.
8. The current political tolerance emanating from the 'building bridges initiative' is one of the strategies in high gear. Do you think this will bring about lasting peace in Kenya?

APPENDIX III: AUTHORIZATION LETTER



NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION

Telephone: +254-20-2213471,
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Website: www.nacosti.go.ke
When replying please quote

NACOSTI, Upper Kabete
Off Waiyaki Way
P.O. Box 30623-00100
NAIROBI-KENYA

Ref: No. **NACOSTI/P/18/13216/25261**

Date: **11th October, 2018**

Philemon Kipkogei Samoei
University of Nairobi
P.O. Box 30197-00100
NAIROBI.

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Following your application for authority to carry out research on *“Role of religious organizations in electoral conflicts in the horn of Africa. A case study of NCCK in 2017 Kenyan Elections”* I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in **Nairobi County** for the period ending **11th October, 2019**.

You are advised to report to **the County Commissioner and the County Director of Education, Nairobi County** before embarking on the research project.

Kindly note that, as an applicant who has been licensed under the Science, Technology and Innovation Act, 2013 to conduct research in Kenya, you shall deposit a **copy** of the final research report to the Commission within **one year** of completion. The soft copy of the same should be submitted through the Online Research Information System.


BONIFACE WANYAMA
FOR: DIRECTOR-GENERAL/CEO

Copy to:

The County Commissioner
Nairobi County.


The County Director of Education
Nairobi County.


COUNTY COMMISSIONER
NAIROBI COUNTY
P. O. Box 30124-00100, NBI
TEL: 341666


Approved
[Signature] 23/10/2018

APPENDIX IV: PERMIT

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT: **Permit No. : NACOSTI/P/18/13216/25261**
MR. PHILEMON KIPKOGEI - SAMOEI **Date Of Issue : 11th October, 2018**
of UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI, 3715-506 **Fee Received :Ksh 1000**
NAIROBI, has been permitted to conduct
research in Nairobi County
on the topic: ROLE OF RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN ELECTORAL CONFLICTS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA. A CASE STUDY OF NCCK IN 2017 KENYAN ELECTIONS
for the period ending: 11th October, 2019.


Applicant's Signature


Director General
National Commission for Science, Technology & Innovation



THE SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION ACT, 2013

The Grant of Research Licenses is guided by the Science, Technology and Innovation (Research Licensing) Regulations, 2014.

CONDITIONS

1. The License is valid for the proposed research, location and specified period.
2. The License and any rights thereunder are non-transferrable.
3. The Licensee shall inform the County Governor before commencement of the research.
4. Excavation, filming and collection of specimens are subject to further necessary clearance from relevant Government Agencies.
5. The License does not give authority to transfer research materials.
6. NACOSTI may monitor and evaluate the licensed research project.
7. The Licensee shall submit one hard copy and upload a soft copy of their final report within one year of completion of the research.
8. NACOSTI reserves the right to modify the conditions of the License including cancellation without prior notice.

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