

**TERRORISM AND THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS: A CASE OF
KENYAN EXPERIENCE SINCE SEPTEMBER 2001**

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R50/86946/2016

**A RESEARCH SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE AWARD OF DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES TO THE INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
(IDIS), UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**

2018

DECLARATION

This research is my own original work and has not been submitted for a degree award to any university or institution of higher learning.

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This research has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor.

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DEDICATION

To my family, friends and colleagues who supported and encouraged me throughout the research process as well as the entire fraternity of the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS), University of Nairobi.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I acknowledge the support accorded to me by my family especially during the long hours I would stay awake while writing this research. I feel extremely indebted to Dr. Mumo Nzau for his support and guidance without whose efforts the skills so candidly expressed in this work would not have been realized.

Above all, I sincerely thank God the almighty who accorded me good health and renewed energy each new day I laid my hands in writing this research.

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ABSTRACT

Although Kenya has put in place some mechanisms to address terrorism through domestic policies and international laws, there is minimal studies done on Kenya and it is international relations. For a better understanding of the problem that would lead to more informed suggestions on how to manage the problem, there is need for a detailed study that lays bare terrorism and the conduct of foreign relations in Kenya. In lieu of the foregoing, this study sought to; first, locate the place of terrorism in the discourse of foreign relations in the international arena; secondly, examine the dynamics of terrorism and its impact on foreign relations in Africa; and finally, examine the conduct of Kenya in foreign relations in the wake of terrorist activities.

The study was guided by the game theory in explaining the phenomena of terrorism in relation to conduct of foreign relations. From the analysis of the data presented in the study concerning the influence terrorist activities have in conducting the country's foreign relations, participants in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs totally disagreed that terrorism activities have changed or influenced on how countries conduct their foreign relations as six percent of the participants disagreed that terrorism activities have influenced the manner in which countries conduct their foreign relations. They argued that as long as terrorism groups have been in existence so are foreign policies. Although they gave another explanation that since the 9/11 bombing in the United States of America, the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, the end of cold war, and end of bipolar power politics, the conduct of foreign relations have really changed where of late countries have resulted to do it on line. Relating to terrorism and other transnational crimes, majority strongly agreed that terrorism activities have a strong link with other transnational security threats such as, drug smuggling, corruption, laundering of money, and climate change, proliferation of weapons; both light and small, migrant smuggling and human trafficking. This is to either protect their activities, obtain money to finance their activities, and also neutralize government officials who happen to challenge their activities.

The study further examines how Kenya has responded to terrorist attacks and how this has shaped Kenya's foreign policy within the last two decades. The study finally concludes in chapter five by giving a deep and didactic conclusion, summary of the findings and recommendations that moving forward may be vital for various agencies, practitioners, scholars, security operatives among others that deal with matters of terrorism.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

1.1 Background

Terrorism is being regarded as one of the worst forms of violence with far reaching social, economic and political impact on states. Terrorists are using political objectives which have a religious connotation and a surprise element which draws resemblance to unorthodox guerilla tactics. Their weapons and global network are unmatched.¹ For example, the Hamas, Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, Al Shaabab and the new Islamic State (IS) and (ISIS) are terror groups that blend their political aspirations with religious undertones. Globally, the long stretched out war between Israel and Palestine has continued to sour diplomatic relations between the United States of America and the Muslim states found in the Middle East hence used as motivation for mass recruitment of individuals by different terror groups so that they can see the destruction of Israel and embarrass America's military might.

Africa, for a long time seemed to be immune from terror attacks but lately it has borne the brunt of these attacks. In addition, Africa is been targeted as a breeding ground to some dangerous terror groups such as the Al Shaabab and Boko Haram leading to recruitment of young men and women been lured with promises of financial and material gains. Bombs exploded outside the American embassies in Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi; Tanzania and Kenya respectively on 7th August of 1998. This was as result of a massive terrorist attack that left the world in shock. 224 people lost their lives - including 12 Americans - and injuring 5,000. After a quick investigation, Al Qaeda was found culpable of the attack². In less than half a decade later, Al Qaeda operatives were at it again, this time attacking an Israeli owned hotel in Kenya's second largest city; Mombasa. The attack claimed the lives of 15 people. During the attack an Israeli passenger jet faced the wrath of the attacker when missiles were fired at it; luckily the plane took off without being hit by any of the missile. This soured the foreign relations not only the affected countries directly but countries throughout the world. Since then, in Kenya the small

¹ Aronson, S. L., United States aid to Kenya: A study on regional security and counterterrorism assistance before and after 9/11, *African journal of criminology and justice studies* 5 (1) , 119 – 126, 2012.

² J.S Omutola, —Accord, Assessing Counter terrorism Measures in Africal *A Journal of Conflict Trends*”, Issue1 no 2 pp 45, 2008.

scale attacks have been on the increase indicating that the problem of terror in Kenya is not about to end any time soon.³

The aftermath of September 11th 2001 Twin Tower attacks in the U.S. and the proximity of Kenya with Somalia, the US acknowledged Kenya as a major player in the international war on terror. This proximity of Kenya with war-torn Somalia justified the important evolving foreign policy aimed at combating terrorism. The Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) – invasion of Somalia worsened the already sour relationship between the Kenyan government and Muslims in the Horn of Africa. Subsequently, attacks on Kenya were being carried out using the pretext of this invasion of Somalia by Kenya.⁴ As Isaac Newton's third law of motion alludes that for every act undertaken, there is an equivalent and opposite response. Somalia's invasion by the KDF has led to Kenya's foreign policy changing with Kenya suffering more than fifty separate attacks supposedly carried out by the Al-Shaabab and its sympathizers.

There are five interlinked pillars that hold together Kenya's foreign policy. They include; peace, economic, diaspora, environmental and cultural pillars. The peace pillar advocates for the harmonization of Kenya's legacy in ensuring the county's development and prosperity through maintenance of peace and stability.⁵ The economic pillar is concerned with the achieving of a robust economic environment in order to turn Kenya into a middle income and industrialized economy by 2030 as stipulated in the Vision 2030 document. The Diaspora pillar aspires at bringing together assorted skills and capabilities of Kenyans who are living overseas while environmental and cultural pillars are concerned with the process of ensuring development of a sustainable environment.⁶ Kenya's foreign policy unfortunately is more slanted on the economic pillar determined to attract more foreign capital rather than having a security pillar which can give directions on dealing with terrorist and terrorism atrocities. Therefore Kenya's economic dependence on the western states has shaped her foreign policy behavior.

³ Davis, J. *Africa and the war on Terrorism*, (Aldershot, Burlington: Ashgate 2007)

⁴ David H. Shinn, —Terrorism in East Africa and the Horn, *Journal of Conflict Studies*, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, Vol 23, No 2, 2015.

⁵ Rono Jona, *Kenya Foreign Policy" Africa Foreign Policies Stephen Wright* (ed.) (Colorado: West view Press,1999)

⁶ Global Terrorism Index. *Measuring and Understanding the impact of Terrorism*. New York: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2014.

1.2 Problem Statement

Kenya's position on terrorism and its affiliation to the west has attracted terrorist attacks on its interest and citizenry at large. Its geo-position among other East African states and unstable Somalia specifically has witnessed strained relations with alias due to steps taken against Kenya especially frequent travel advisories by the United States, United Kingdom and other states from the west affecting trade, and tourism at large.

Although the country has put in place some mechanisms to address terrorism through domestic policies and international laws, there is minimal studies done on Kenya and its international relations. This will foster a better understanding of the problem that would lead to more informed suggestions on how to manage the problem, there is need for a detailed study that lays bare terrorism and the conduct of foreign relations in Kenya. This study intends to proceed from this gap in local research and seeks to examine Kenyans strategies that have been initiated to tackle the problem of terrorism and its effects on the conduct of international relations. The study further attempts to provide an evaluation of the impact of terrorism and the conduct of foreign relations taking into account Kenya's geo-positioning in unstable neighbor's porous borders. This area has witnessed limited research and therefore the need to carry out research on terrorism and the conduct of foreign relations not only in Kenya but globally.

1.3 Research Questions

Research Questions

1. What are the trends of terrorism in Kenya between 1998 and 2015?
2. To examine Kenya's conduct in foreign relations in the wake of terrorist activities?
3. What are the impacts of terrorism on foreign relations in Africa.

1.4 Research Objectives

The main objective of the study examined the effects of terrorism and the conduct of foreign relations.

1. To examine the trends of terrorism in Kenya between 1998 and 2015
2. To examine Kenya's conduct in foreign relations in the wake of terrorist activities?
3. To examine the dynamics of terrorism and its impact on foreign relations in Africa.

1.5 Justification

1.5.1 Academic Justification

In Africa and mostly vulnerable countries like Kenya, terrorism has continued to be witnessed more often than before, and now focusing more on hurting the populations and how people interact globally. A deep and didactic insight on terrorism and its impacts have been done in this study with a focus on Africa and the conduct of foreign relations. Scholars in international affairs shall benefit from this study.

1.5.2 Policy Justification

The endless attacks in African countries by terrorist groups can only mean that due to propaganda spread by the groups will result to conflict and animosities between countries, that is, Muslim versus Christian countries. Therefore, the current existing policies do not address propaganda spread nationally and regionally in combating terrorism activities. Therefore the study shall help government and other policy makers in policy making as far as matters of terrorism are concerned. Particularly, the study will address the role and impact of terrorist activities in conduct of foreign relations. The recommendations of this study will hopefully add value to the 21st century diplomats and other foreign affairs technocrats.

1.6 Scope and Limitations

The study examined the influence terrorism activities have in the conduct of foreign relations in Africa. It then critically focused on the impacts of terrorism in various sectors within the Kenyan society, economic, political, psychological and social sectors and how they have had a bearing as a factor of terrorism within Africa. It also evaluated the various discourses on terrorism in foreign relations, measures that have been set up internationally and regionally in addressing terrorism and the challenges and opportunities that present themselves in combating terrorism in Kenya. The actualization of this research exhibited some limitations due to financial and time constraints to reach a much wider population than was covered, some interviewees were reluctant to participate in the interview since the topic for discussion was sensitive. Also there were challenges in booking appointments with some of the senior government officials.

1.7 Literature Review

Literature on the formulation and conduct of foreign policies proffers an increasing role of non-state actors in shaping the trajectory of foreign policy orientations as well as foreign relations. According to Savun and Phillips, the conduct of states in the international realm will determine states that exhibit a certain type of foreign policy behavior, regardless of their regime type, are likely to attract transnational terrorism. States that are actively involved in international politics are likely to create resentment abroad and hence more likely to be the target of transnational terrorism than are states that pursue a more isolationist foreign policy.⁷

According to Pemberton and Pantazis who are key analysts of foreign relations in the West, 'Islamic fanaticism' is a great threat to the existence of Western liberal democracies. This, they argue, has prompted the United Kingdom to label Muslims by labeling theory as the new 'enemy within and without' in their foreign relations is enough evidence for the current counter terrorism witnessed around the world and the securitization of Muslims; which is mainly socially constructed as 'suspect community'. The two scholars; Pantazis and Pemberton conclude that seclusion and branding of Muslims as suspect to terror is more detrimental than beneficial. This categorization according to them is one of major threats to both national and international security systems.⁸

According to Gadarian, the key driver of foreign relations in the post 9/11 era is the media which drives agendas on a given issue area. Gadarian argues that a fundamental characteristic of foreign relations is a fetish attachment to what the media portrays or feeds the masses. The environment beyond September nine eleven has brought the media close to the public. The media set public agenda, warns of a looming crisis and calls for public support through the political class.⁹

Gadarian argues that the role of the media is today ambiguous far much more than just being used as a conduit of whistle blowing on morass in the society. He says that the elites have masqueraded the media hence advancing their interests hence shaping public opinion on some

⁷ Savun, B., Phillips, Brian J. (2009). Democracy, Foreign Policy, and Terrorism. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol 53, No. 6

⁸ Pantazis, C., Pemberton, S. (2009). From the 'Old' to the 'New' Suspect Community: Examining the Impacts of Recent UK Counter-Terrorist Legislation. *The British Journal of Criminology*, Vol. 49, No. 5, 1; Pp. 646–666

⁹ Shana Kushner Gadarian, "The Politics of Threat: How Terrorism News Shapes Foreign Policy Attitudes," *The Journal of Politics* 72, no. 2 (April 2010): 469-483

critical matters. Therefore according to him, the media should revise modes and methods by which they disseminate information to the public.¹⁰

According to Wesley W. Widmaier, it is difficult for any U.S president to balance between the liberal tradition of the U.S founded on the constitutional principles and ideals and national interests definition. He argues that the rhetoric of the president of constructing a phenomenon can be used to construct a narrative intended to achieve some national interest.¹¹

In the case of the Middle East, Oğuzlu demonstrates that Turkey's has had a shift in her foreign policy currently Middle Easternized. Turkey has realized that it is better to be at peace and in the same team with countries viewed world wide as terrorist supporters in the Middle East to guarantee her security. A policy that is more pragmatic and practical in its approach rather than romantic. Going to bed with bed with the West would leave Turkey more isolated in the lens of her "friends" in the Middle East. Turkey therefore chose to keep friendship with friends in adversity; what may be termed as friends in crime.¹²

In general, terrorism makes the world a hostile place to live in whereby humanity is forced to live in fear of either becoming either directly or indirectly affected. These changes have changed the way foreign relations are being conducted today; making foreign relations, complicated, sophisticated and murky. The change of polarity in the international system has been a contributing factor to the current menace of terrorism. 21st century politics is both multi-polar and non-polar; power is fluid and the state is unable to cling on all instruments of power in various vital facets of power. There is a gradual rise of some non state actors who have great impact on world politics hence making world politics difficult. Terrorism activities in one country have managed to spill over to the neighbourhood. Terrorist activities have impacted negatively to Kenya's economy; investors have fled the country so as to run their businesses in safe territories. Impacts of terrorism still remain a big issue. East African states remain the most vulnerable states in Sub-Saharan on issues to deal with terrorism. It is also clear that there is absolutely no country in East Africa that has never faced the wrath of terrorists. Efforts by regional actors to try and mitigate on the issues of terrorism has hit between a rock and a hard

¹⁰ Shana Kushner Gadarian, "The Politics of Threat: How Terrorism News Shapes Foreign Policy Attitudes," *The Journal of Politics* 72, no. 2 (April 2010): 469-483.

¹¹ Wesley W. Widmaier (2007). *Constructing Foreign Policy Crises: Interpretive Leadership in the Cold War and War on Terrorism*. *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 51, No. 4; pp. 779-794

¹² Oğuzlu, Tarik (2008). *Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?* *Turkish Studies*. Volume 9, 2008 - Issue 1. 3-20

place, counter terrorism initiatives seem to be yielding very minimal success. Sequential episodes of terrorist acts is still common in the region¹³.

There is a great need to assess and evaluate by comparatively evaluating measures and challenges that come with war on terrorism both regionally and globally. This will significantly assist in coming up with better strategies and mechanisms to help manage and control the Horn of Africa's situation; especially Kenya. The big question one would ask is, why do people inflict pain on other fellow human beings through heinous acts of terror? The answer is self explanatory if not rhetoric. Terrorist are driven by their interests, ideological beliefs among others. Some terror acts are performed with an intention to disorient public's perception about the governments' effectiveness and legitimacy and effectiveness. This is geared towards painting a picture of inability of the government to care and protect her citizens. According to Thomas Hobbes in the Leviathan, the key functions of any government in the world are to create order, protect life and property. He argues that the stature of nature is often anarchic, brutish and nasty and so there is a need for the government to ensure there is order¹⁴. Terrorists criminal acts include: beheadings, bombing, kidnapping and hijacking. All these are merely means of accomplishing the objectives set and laid down goals of terrorist groups¹⁵.

Terrorists main intention is always to spread fear to the public; undermining the existing authority or government by indirectly trying to convince the public that the establishment in place is not only able to protect but also unable to assure the public of safety in the future¹⁶.

From around the world, Terrorists have used bombings and assassinations as frequent weapons in their struggle against autocracy.¹⁷ Such as the 2003 bombings in Istanbul, this reported 60 fatalities.¹⁸ In 2004 Al-shager Ahmed drove a truck into a crowd in Iraqi capital; Baghdad claiming lives of nine persons.¹⁹ In Kenya ,individual sympathetic to the Palestine liberation

¹³ Kimunguyi.P. *Terrorism and Counter terrorism in East Africa* Research Fellow, Global Terrorism Research Centre and Monash European and EU Centre Monash University, (2016)

¹⁴ Thomas Hobbes(Leviathan 1651)

¹⁵ Ibid

¹⁶ Daniel Branch, —Violence, decolonization and the Cold War in Kenya's North –Eastern Province, 1963-1978. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*,8(4) (2014)

¹⁷ Spencer.A. (2006).Questioning the concept of New Terrorism. Peace conflict and development. Issue 8. www.peacestudies.Journal.org.uk.Accessed on 10th May, 2018.

¹⁸ Davis.E. (2003).Bin Laden had direct role in Turkish consulatebombings, suspect claims. By the independent News Paper, December 18, 2003.Washington .USA.

¹⁹ Abu-Nasr, D. (2007).Saudi turns His Back on Jihad. By the Washington Post, July 28, 2007. Washington.USA.pp 24.

organization bombed the Norfolk hotel in Nairobi in December 1980 ,the 1998 American embassy bomb blast in Nairobi, bombing of the Paradise hotel in Kikambala in 2002.²⁰ Terrorist have always aimed at attracting attention for their activities and spreading some ideological differences by use of the media.²¹ An attack many at times is usually followed by a communication taking credit for the act or laying out demands or explaining why it was carried out against that particular target. The 1998 bombings of the American Embassies in East Africa's formidable economies; Tanzania and Kenya. Another attack; the September eleven also attracted wide public coverage. Infact some movies have even been acted about September eleven. Many were rattled when they watched by millions of people globally on live television as the consecutive attacks occurred²².

A further characteristic of terrorism is support that some terrorist groups obtain from the state. There is very little sound and profound research done on this area hence limited data. However there have been claims that some states are in good rapport with terrorist organizations hence support them in their course; this connection however is not fully justifiable.²³ For instance Iran has always been viewed as a state in support of terrorist activities, this has made both Israel and the U.S to be at logger heads for quite sometimes. Managing terrorism isn't easy because terrorist groups are quite dynamic, sometimes they form proxies while other times they mutate into some other groups.²⁴ .This trend of terrorism characteristic within the Horn of Africa and particular in Kenya has not been documented as such. Terrorism is also known to have a clear hierarchical organization with fairly well formidable and defined structure of leadership. These terrorist groups obey the principle of the chain of command, hierarchy and organization. They are like a pyramid where at the top there are "top dogs", senior leaders then at the bottom are their foot soldiers who execute plans and attacks. They more or less resemble drug trafficking where at the top there are drug barons then at the bottom we have the peddlers; micro dealers.

Subsequently, there are those within the terrorism network that support the organizations, for instance by offering financial support, vigilance, transportation, safe houses and weapons of

²⁰ Din.V. (2011).Understanding terrorism in the Horn of Africa. American perception of Somalia, Kenya and Alqaeda. Senior Thesis. Understanding Terrorism in the Horn of Africa American _perception.pdf. Accessed on 25th May 2018.

²¹ Jenkins, B.M. (2008).Will Terrorist go nuclear. By promethers books.Armhest.pp 24-27.

²² Carlisle Barracks, Bounding the Global war on Terrorism. *Strategic studies Institute, US Army War College*. (Record, J. 2016).

²³ Kidder, R.M. Unmasking state sponsored terrorism. *Christian Science Monitor* (2015).

²⁴ Bruce Hoffman : Inside Terrorism, Chap 8 - *The Modern Terrorist mind-set; tactics, targets, tradecraft, and technologies* Revised and Expanded Edition Columbia University (Press, New York) (2016)

destruction. Down at the grassroot are staunch supporters of their cause, those that have been indoctrinated by their ideals.²⁵ Foreign policy analysts have depicted an emerging trend which shall be a threat to international security. Weak, fragile states have been seen as vehicles of cross-boundaries threat like terrorism.²⁶ Inter-state conflicts and statelessness such as the state in Somalia are also believed to be major factors in contribution of terrorist heavens²⁷. Until recently with the New swearing of the current Ethiopian premier, Abby, Ethiopia for quite sometimes had been accusing Eritrea for supporting terrorists organizations such as Al-Shaabab and Al Qaeda.²⁸

The long periods; over two decades of statelessness since 1991 after the ouster of former president Mohammed Siad Barre in Somalia is believed to be one of the key contributing factor for the rise and growth of illicit insurgent violent extremist group such as the Al-Shaabab that now today has made the region insecure²⁹. Kenya has been a stable nation and has not experienced the aspect of statelessness however Kenya has experience inter-border disputes among communities such as the pastoral community. Whether these have any bearing on the advancement of terrorism in Kenya is not documented.

In recent times however, terrorism is not driven by secular politics in the international system but rather religious fanaticism for instance that of trying to eliminate all and promote uncompromisingly the views and ideals of a sect or religion across the globe.³⁰ This however goes against the freedom of worship as stipulated in the Universal declaration on human rights. Religion terrorist violence is inspired by religious fundamental belief justified by the scriptures, for instance some Muslim terrorist group claim to be advancing a “Jihadi”- which according to them is a holy war.³¹ Religious terrorists tend to believe to be fighting the war of good vs evil. In this war there I saw strong consideration that those who do not believe in Islam faith for instance, traditionalists, Buddhists, Christians and pagans as apostates or infidels hence should

²⁵ Fraser, J. (2001) Global terrorism –the complete reference guide by Check mark books.New York .USA. pp 71-72.

²⁶ Wyler, L.S. (2008).Weak and failing States .Evolving security threats and U.S.policy.US Congressional Research Service, RL 34253.www/as.Org/sgp/crw/raw/RL34253.PDF.P.5-6. Accessed 2018

²⁷ McGregor, A. Ethiopia Faces Ethnic Fallout from Somalia Intervention. *Terrorism Focus*, 4, No. 17, 2014, June.

²⁸ Momanyi, B. (2011,). Kenya forces target third Alshabab town. Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya.

²⁹ Ibrahim, M. (2010).Somalia and global terrorism: A growing connection? *Journal of Contemporary African studies*, Vol 28:3, pp.283-295.

³⁰ Ibid

³¹ Hoffman, B (2006).Inside terrorism (2nd Edition) by Columbia University Press New York.USA pp 40-46.

be dealt with ruthlessly³². In Kenya it quite unclear whether the terrorist incidence happening are aimed at propagating any religious afflictions as terrorist demands based on religions afflictions in Kenya are unheard off.

Within the last couple of decades, religious terrorism has significantly escalated. These are always politically motivated with a hidden intention or motive and religion just being used to masquerade the situation. The attacks are political instigated with connotation of freedom to worship and service to divinity.³³ The question is, was religion to better the life of humanity or to undermine and oppress humanity? Religion should support both the humanity and the divinity.

Islam spread in many African countries was visualized as a underdog's religion. The religion definitely has good principles that makes the lives of humanity worthwhile. In it are principles of honesty, good morals, tolerance, peace and compassion. However the principles are tremendously great some factions within the church have for a long time decided to go contrary by the principles anchoring religion. These factions merely advance their own agenda in the name of religion. Some have decided to operate behind the scenes, perpetrating violence among tribes like the case of Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq, Lebanon, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Some "Islamic states" have also got in bed with some African heads of state hence are the ones since the late 20th century have been supplying these governments with weapons, arsenals, explosives among others. These factions have found themselves at the core of leadership in some countries in Africa.³⁴

Many governments today in Africa are grappling with the rampant spread of Islam. Some citizens within some African states are of the notion that the countries need to be Islamic states hence keep on mounting pressure to the governments.

To achieve these some have decided to escalate violence and formation of militant groups to advance the agenda. Examples include, Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, militant groups that have outrageously grown due to citizens demand for autonomy, cry over marginalization, driven by

³² Cronin.A.K. (2003).Behind the curve .Globalization and International Terrorism. *International Security*. Vol 27.No.3.pp 41-42.

³³ Arquilla, J. (2000).Information –Age of Terrorism Current History. By University of Pretoria .Vole 99 pg 168-172

³⁴ Christopher Hill, 'Foreign Policy', in Joel Krieger (ed.), *Oxford Companion to World Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, and Revised Edition, 2001)

religious beliefs. Many Nigerian Muslims believe that the state should operate under Sheria laws.

1.7.1 Terrorist Groups and Categories

There are numerous terrorist groups and categories all over the world. These include Nationalistic terrorists groups, social terrorist groups, international, ethnocentric political and revolutionary terrorist groups. The world is also familiar with the spread of Islam extremism, this has been made public by the media houses.

An example of an ethnocentric terrorist group can be traced to the Ku Klax clan in the United States during and after the American Civil War of 1860. In the war, many peoples' lives were lost³⁵. This turned to be a war between various races hence ethnic cleansing more or less³⁶.

Nationalistic terrorism is terrorism activities fueled by a peoples' desire for self autonomy. It is always anchored on some cultural beliefs were a people feel like they want to stand on their own, a good example is that of Irish Republican Army.

Revolutionary terrorism is the type that mainly anchors itself on ideals to topple a regime that people or a certain group is not comfortable with. United States is widely known as a training ground for many countries' revolutionarists. The country is hugely credited for the spread of democratic ideals and principles across the globe. Good example of a country that had the benefit of her revolutionarists being trained in the United States is Honduras which after the revolution in the 1980s established a constitutional democracy³⁷. Another good example of revolutionary terrorism can be traced to 1789 French Revolution whereby few individuals like Willlliam Maxmillien Robespierre launched a reign of terror with a motive to cleanse the country. A reign that lead to massive bloodbath and even the king; Louis the sixteenth having to face the guillotine which then was referred to as the national razor.

Political terrorism is wide and broad for it comprises of all politically perpetrated terrorism. This is use of terror for political gain or political interest.

³⁵ Aronson, S. L. (2013). Kenya and the Global War on Terror: Neglecting History and Geopolitics in Approaches to Counterterrorism. *African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies*, 7(1).

³⁶ Coutsoukis.P. (2004). Honduras United States Military Assistance and Training. http://www.photius.com/countries/honduras/national_security/honduras_national_security_united_states_milita~32.html. Accessed on 25th May, 2018

³⁷ Cilliers, J. (2003). Terrorism and Africa. *African Security Review*, 12(4), 91-103.

Social terrorism are terror acts in regards to advocating for certain special desires and interest within the community, for instance animal rights, minority rights, abortion, etc.

In the U.S domestic terrorists include Aryan nation and the KKK which are more pro liberal ideals³⁸.

Finally we have the international terrorist groups such as the Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah. These are widely spread and have followers and recruits from almost all over the world. Their membership goes beyond a single country. Some of them have some small appendages and sub groups in various countries. For instance Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa is believed to be an extension of the larger Al-Qaeda³⁹. These ones have the capacity to influence states foreign policy and perpetuate violent extremism in the globe.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

This study was solely guided by game theory, the theory has been used as a corner stone in this study to help explain, understand and analyze international relations in the advent of terrorism. Game theory dissect the terrorism dilemma and phenomenon. On the other hand, the theory analyses formal and informal relations between or among two or more actors. Actors therefore are forced to make a critical decision that is likely to interfere with the interest of other players. This is a clear example for instance the case of Kenya. The national government had no otherwise to establish Kenya counterterrorism policies, which were envisaged to deal with terrorism menace.

1.8.1 Game Theory

The research used game theory in analyzing the terrorism phenomenon.⁴⁰ The theory since time immemorial has been used to study deterrence, war, terrorism, international relations and even economic sanctions all over the world. Game theory posits that states are unitary actors. The theory provides a comprehensive analysis of international relations and ways to which it can result to conflict or cooperation. In this case, the theory analyzed how terrorism has been used as a means to an end hence causing jitters around the globe and also cooperation in equal measure, for instance the resurrection of the idea of “coalition of the willing.” It is cooperative

³⁸ Crawford, M. (2001).MILNET: Domestic Terrorist Group Profiles. <http://www.milnet.com/domestic/dtgmain.htm> Accessed on 10th May, 2018

³⁹ Ibid

⁴⁰ Wagner, R.H, The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation (1989) 77 The American Political Science Review, page 330

where states have binding agreement or alliances and non-cooperative where states cannot form alliances. Dispute resolution presents a more co-operative game.

This is based on the fact that states function separately.⁴¹ International cooperation is unlikely to be achieved without creating a model that incorporates the states together. This is a justification why the war on terror cannot be fought by a single state, it has to take a collectively approach and if possible be anchored on some security regimes. It is impossible to put up a global government in this anarchic system, therefore what is achievable is merely coordination among states by creating anti-terrorism mechanisms. With huge number of states coalescing together then solution to terrorism shall be easy to come up with.

As per game theory, the type of game can be zero sum or non-zero sum. In zero sum game, for one to win, the other must lose. This is a common scenario with the adjudication process of settling disputes. We paraphrase this by saying, for the state to win then terrorists must lose and the reverse to this statement is also true; for terrorists to win then the state has to lose. All these actors cannot have a win-win model.

Arce and Sandler argue that terrorists' actions are immensely influenced by the nature, structure and activities of the state and vice versa.⁴² This therefore makes it possible for the game theory to be the most vital and relevant analytical tool to suitably analyze terrorism. The main reason behind this is that game theory covers the interaction between the government and terrorists. Therefore, terrorists will often be assessing the cost and benefits of their actions while the state while be trying through thick and thin to counter their moves and assuring the public of their security. The game continues as sometimes it can turn to a cat-mouse game.

One the other hand in game theory, there is the non-zero sum game. This has a potential of presenting a win-win situation for both parties. This is highly attainable in negotiation and conciliation. The arbitration process can also produce this result. States that negotiate have a higher potential of reaching an agreement that balances their interest.

Apart from Game theory, other theories have also been adopted to explain, analyze and predict some phenomenon, for instance Alexander Wendt's constructivism theory.

1.8.2 Hypothesis

The research is based on the hypothesis that

⁴¹ Ibid

⁴² Sandler, J., & Arce, D. (2003). Terrorism and Game Theory. *Simulation and Gaming*. Vol. 34 (3), pp. 319-337.

1. Terrorism is a major destabilizing factor, especially to countries' economy.
2. Muslims are terrorists.
3. Terrorism started in the Middle East.
4. War on terror has caused jitters and love of equal measure among states hence making it possible for states to cooperate.

1.9 Research Methodology

The section here in delved into the research design, data management and ethical consideration, data collection methods, data analysis, population site of the study and design of sampling, reliability and validity and data analysis. The study also involved the use of both qualitative and quantitative methodologies in data collection from experts' across-section, for instance those in field of counter-terrorism, foreign policy practice and security. The methodology took cognizance of the possible differences in experiences and perceptions across various demographics.

1.9.1 Desk Research

Review of literature was mandatory so as to obtain sufficient background to the study. Government, scholars, international organisations, government papers among other research works were assessed to inform the next stages of the study.

1.9.2 Study Location

This study was done in Nairobi County, Kenya. The country's capital was founded in 1899 by the colonial authorities. The name 'Nairobi' was derived from Maasai word, meaning place of cool waters. Nairobi is located within 1°17'S 36°49'E and occupies an area of 696km². It is considered the economic hub and beacon of East, Central and Horn of Africa at large with an estimated population of about 3 million as per the 2009 population census, a population that is expected to double by 2010. It is host to many international organizations, foreign embassies and consulates and the headquarters of Kenya security agencies.

1.9.3 Target Population

According to Kothari (2010) a target population is a full and comprehensive set of cases from which a sample is depicted from to help in study. The target population for this study was the employees of Ministry of Foreign Affairs above 18 years who are approximately 5,000 (MoFA data). The study sample size was fifty key informants who were selected based on their roles

in the society and their perspective on matters touching on terrorism and the influence it has caused the country in conducting its foreign relations, their level of knowledge and to a limited extent government, non-governmental, and religious organizational representation.

1.9.4 Sampling Technique and Sample Size

Trochin defines sampling as a process that involves selection of units., for instance organizations or people so as to help in a certain specific study. The sample is therefore selected in accordance with the subject of study. The study employed random sampling since the researcher assumed that the target respondents had knowledge on the effects of terrorism and the conduct of foreign relations. A sample size therefore is that small size of population selected for observation. The sample size for the study was determined using below formula; the sample size was determined using Fisher’s method (Dahoo, 2012) formula for 95% confidence interval shown below;

$$n = \frac{Z^2 p \cdot q}{d^2}$$

Where; n = sample size for infinite population

$$Z = 1.96 \text{ (at 95\% Confidence level)}$$

$$p = \text{estimated proportion of population (0.40)}$$

$$q = 1-p$$

$$d = \text{precision of the estimate at 5\% (0.05)}$$

The sample size was;

$$n = \frac{(1.96)^2 \times 0.40 \times 0.6}{(0.05)^2}$$

$$n = 0.4609 = 368.79$$

$$0.0025$$

The adjusted sample size for the finite population of 5,874 respondents will be;

$$n^1 = \frac{1}{\frac{1}{n} + \frac{1}{N}}$$

Where; n^1 = adjusted sample size

n = estimated sample size for infinite population

N = Finite population size

$$n^1 = \frac{1}{0.0027115703 + 0.0172884297} = 50 \text{ respondents}$$

The sample size for the study was determined to be 50 respondents as shown above by the use of Fisher's method (Dahoo, 2012) formula for 95% confidence interval.

1.9.5 Data Collection

Both primary and secondary data were used in this study. Primary data was basically obtained by means of interviews with responded with avid knowledge on the subject matter. An interview guide was a key document to regulate questions and answers during the collection; it provided for that warm and dry environment for the respondents to express their own thought arising from the questions. Due to sensitivity of the research, it was not be possible to use tape recorder, however, the notes were written down in the process of the interview session. The information was collected through both primary data and secondary data. The secondary data supplemented the primary data. The following Universities were used as the hub for secondary data during the period of study: Jomo Kenyatta Library-University of Nairobi, Kenyatta University's post modern library and the National Archives.

Other sources of secondary data included: journals, government report documents, books, newspapers, theses, Conference proceedings, dissertations, newspapers and magazines, internet, and magazines containing relevant information to this study hence strengthening the analysis of the phenomenon of study. Nonetheless, the secondary data was subjected to critical analysis.

1.9.6 Data Analysis

Descriptive statistics method was employed to analyze the collected data. The analysis was done using SPSS⁴³ statistics 22. Presentation of data was done by use of tables. Textual analysis was used to analyze the secondary data collected after which a thorough textual analysis was done to before interpretation so as to examine and assess the relevance, validity and accuracy

⁴³ SPSS is an abbreviation for statistical package for social science

of the documents used in this study. Report of the analyzed data was done in a narrative form with a bit of quotation from the already collected primary data.

1.9.7 Ethical Considerations

Respondents' were not coerced to participate; participation was voluntarily hence no coercion to answer the questions. It was also made clear to the respondents' that the research was purposefully for education. Respondents confidentiality was reassured, a consent form was later given to the respondents to append their signature after perusing through the rules and guides guiding the study. Findings of this study was submitted for the final examination as acknowledgement was done to the reference for the study.

1.10 Chapter Layout

Chapter One of the study covered the introduction, study background, study objectives, research questions, justification of this study, statement of problem, a review of the previous literature in this study, methodology and theoretical framework.

Chapter Two discussed terrorism activities in Kenya between 1998 and 2015 with reference to 9/11 showing how that has shaped the conduct of foreign relations in Kenya.

Chapter Three examined the dynamics and impact of terrorists' activities to foreign relations; with an eagle eye to Africa.

Chapter Four examined the conduct of Kenya in foreign relations with the current elephant in the room; an elephant of terrorist activities.

Chapter Five provided conclusions of the study, and offer the researchers' various recommendations which can be used to provide solutions in the reduction of terror activities as the foreign policy of the country continues to evolve.

CHAPTER TWO

BACKGROUND: TRENDS OF TERRORISM IN KENYA BETWEEN 1998 AND 2015

2.1 Introduction

This chapter will explore terrorist trends that have taken place in Kenya and how they have completely changed the country's ways in conducting its foreign relations. As many will view Kenya as a soft target, terrorism is an undefined phenomenon where other scholars have tried to depict it as all involving in politics where it is a struggle for power and supreme power will be achieved through violence as C. Wright Mills wrote.⁴⁴ Terrorism is the interjectory of politics and violence is the vehicle for achieving power. This quest for power is meant to take over, compel, scare and control for effective deep-seated political change. Terrorists operate in a manner that is meant to ensure their plans will have maximum shock on the citizens of a nation, impress other terrorist likeminded organization and intimidate nations. Therefore, terrorism is not accidental but rather intentional, well-orchestrated application form of brutality. Armed with this fact of recognition, the terrorist will seek to effect changes in a legally constituted government, reorganize wealth, try to change geographical boundaries, and seek acknowledgment of their religious extremism which is all part of their radical ideology. Terrorists will seek to acquire complete control over the state, and or the people of the state.⁴⁵

Terrorism has become the most preferred weapon by well-organized and informed terror groups against nations that they perceive to have a problem with. It is one of the most violent form of psychological warfare with far reaching psychological impact than its physical impact.⁶⁴ Notwithstanding their political objectives, today's form of terrorism has a religious undertone. B. Hoffman posits that the wrath of the terrorist is rarely controlled, his thoughts well calculated and carefully planned. The terrorist acts are deliberate, planned and executed with the intention of passing on a message, in a manner that will synchronized to reflect the terrorists' group's particular aim and motivation. The cowardice act must fit the terrorist capabilities, resources and the target audience to which the act is directed at. High gathered intelligence is of critical importance for the success of a terrorist act as it is for the terrorist's own survival.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ C.Wright Mills, *The power Elite* (London: Oxford University Press,1956) p.171

⁴⁵ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, Chap 8 - *The Modern Terrorist mind-set; tactics, targets, tradecraft, and technologies* pps229-256

⁴⁶ Ibid

Quite a number of countries have borne the brunt of these terror attacks with Africa having more pronounced attacks especially in Kenya, Somalia, Uganda, Tanzania and Nigeria. As for Kenya, the following are terror incidences which have been evolving for almost three decades.

2.1.1 Incidences of Terrorist Attacks in Kenya

The geo-strategic position of Kenya to the war-torn Somalia and the Middle East has created an easy target and refuge for transnational terrorist groups to infiltrate the country. However, the first transnational terrorist attack happened on 28th January, 1976 plotted by the Front for the Liberation of the Palestine (PFLP) and the Baader-Meinhof Group. In this attack, an El Al passenger plane was to be shot at during a scheduled stop-over in Nairobi.⁴⁷ However, the plans were thwarted as Kenya shared intelligence with the Israel government. The most talked terror attacks of today are the ones that have caused deaths, destroyed property and maimed population. Despite all the measures put up by the government of Kenya to combat terrorism, the country has been and remains a potentially prime target for terrorists. The country has experienced terrorist attacks owing to its alliance with the western powers who are prime enemies of the perceived Islamic dominated countries. In relation to this, Kenya is located at a strategic place which is partially an operational base for Al-Qaeda and the Somali based Al-Shabaab. Another reason as to why Kenya is viewed as a soft target environment is due to the fact that soft targets lack proper defined access denial or protection unlike hard targets. Soft targets may include small businesses, random groupings of individuals, schools, office buildings, hospitals, passenger ships and aircraft, and local and state government buildings. Hard targets have a greater value placed on them because they are special for some reason and hold a high symbolic value to society therefore being properly secured and protected. Soft target therefore is everything a potential suicide bomber can target at any time or place.⁴⁸

2.1.2 The Norfolk Hotel Bombing of 1980

Before the bombing of the most renowned American embassy in Kenya that took place in 1998 by terrorists³; an embassy which was located at Cooperative house along Haile Selassie Avenue opposite Railway station round about there was the bombing which was meted at the Norfolk hotel in Nairobi. Norfolk was then owned by a prominent member belonging to the Jewish

⁴⁷ Mogire, E., & Agade, K.M. (2011). Counter-terrorism in Kenya. *A journal of contemporary African Studies* 29(4), 473 - 491.

⁴⁸ Robert J. Bunker; *Suicide Bombers, Soft Targets and Appropriate Countermeasures* pp98-108

community. This bombing by terrorists took place December 31st of 1980 and the aftermath was 87 cases of wounded people as it claimed the lives of about 20 persons belonging to different nationalities. The building also suffered the wrath of the attack as its West Wing destroyed.⁴⁹ The belief behind this attack was thought to have been a revenge mission by the Palestinian militants who felt rattled by the act of Kenya supporting Israel's Operation in Entebbe; Uganda.

This above was an eye opener to what Kenya was to experience in years to come because its relationship was at stake as Palestinians saw Kenya as working for the Israel's. Also, the attack was a retaliation from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) where Kenya allowed Israel soldiers to refuel their war planes in Nairobi so that they will continue with their operations in Entebbe International Airport to rescue hostages held in an Air France Flight 139 en route to Paris under the controversial president Idi Amin permission.⁵⁰

According to reports which were aired on local and international media houses about the incident, it was deduced that Kenyan security operatives that is the Kenya police together with the international security agencies were able to nail suspects within hours after the attack. The attacker was positively identified as 34-year-old Qaddura Mohammed Abdel al-Hamid; a Moroccan national, who had had checked into the magnanimous Norfolk Hotel during the last week of the same year; 1980. After a thorough investigation, it was found that Mohammed Al-Hamid, the chief suspect had paid for his room all the way to New Year's Day, however the man had vacated the room on 31st December 1980 in the afternoon. He had boarded a Saudi Arabia plane by the time the guests at the Norfolk were assembling for New Year's Eve dinner.⁵¹ As all these instances unfolded, it never acted as a wake-up call for Kenya to enact any legislation in a bid to address terrorism crimes since there was a lull on terrorist related attacks in Kenya between the Norfolk attack and the 7th August, 1998 terrorist attack. The 1998 US embassy terrorist attack acted as a call to institute the necessary policies to counter terrorism in the country. The Norfolk terror incident was casually perceived as just an unfortunate occurrence but in 1998 US embassy attack provoked Kenya to seriously evaluate and come up with policies to counter terrorism.

⁴⁹ Muiruri, S. (2004, January 29th). Counter terrorism Centre Established in Kenya.

⁵⁰ Davis, J. (2007). *Africa and the war on Terrorism*. Aldershot, Burlington: Ashgate.

⁵¹ Torchia, Christopher (19 October 2013). "Kenya mall attack echoes 1980 hotel bombing". *Associated Press*, Retrieved 2nd July 2018

2.1.3 The 1998 Terrorist Attack at the United States Embassy in Nairobi

On 7 August, 1998, Kenya and its counterpart – Tanzania – experienced very devastating encounters where suicide bombers affiliated to terrorists almost simultaneously detonated bombs. The number of people who lost their lives in the attack in Nairobi was close to 213, while in Dar-es-Salaam another 11 were killed.⁵² In Kenya, the damages were massive as the explosion destroyed the American Embassy and collapsed the building that was close to it; Ufundi building where a number of the victims faced the pangs of death. Most of those killed at Ufundi building were students as the building was mainly serving as a college hostel for tertiary education students. A commuter bus was also turned along Haile Selassie Avenue, over four thousand people were wounded in Nairobi while in Dar eighty five people got wounded.⁵³

The launching of terror attack in Kenya was orchestrated with a truck fully loaded with high volatile bomb. Bin Laden and his faction had spent five years planning on how to execute the 1998 suicide bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi. Subsequently after the attacks, a group calling itself the “Liberation Army for Holy Sites” took credit for the bombings. American investigators who were involved in investigations believe the term holy war was a mere cover up and used to masquerade the Egyptian Islamic Jihadists who had orchestrated the bombing.⁵⁴ This aggression brought Abu Mussa Al Zawahiri and Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda terrorists organization to the limelight and the FBI in the United States started an investigation about the two personalities and their terrorist group; Al Qaeda. The FBI⁵⁵, even went farther to shortlist the two in their top ten most wanted fugitives list.

Back to the two countries – Kenya and Tanzania – they had poor security systems at the two embassies which exposed them to be vulnerable and as easy targets. This attack in Kenya acted as an eye-opener leading to the global war on terrorism, although this war gained momentum after the September 11th attack in the US.⁵⁶ In retaliation to these attacks, the United States of America bombed a Sudan-based chemical factory which was suspected to be linked with the then Osama Bin Laden as the Al-Qaeda leader. Kenya on the other hand was shell-shocked to

⁵² "U.S. Embassy Bombings". U.S. Department of State website. Archived from the original on 5 August 2007. Retrieved 4th July, 2018

⁵³ Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc; Inside the Secret world of Osama bin Laden (New York: Free Press, 2001)pp86,132

⁵⁴ Global Briefings, Issue 27, “Osama bin Laden tied to other Fundamentalists”, September 1998.

⁵⁵ FBI stands for Federal Bureau of Investigation

⁵⁶ Muiruri, S. (2004, January 29th). Counter terrorism Centre Established in Kenya, CNSNEWS. Nairobi, , Nairobi.

do anything.⁵⁷ Four men linked to the assault of the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 were tried in New York and from interrogation it was evident that terror networks had taken deep root in Kenya due to the infiltration of immigrants who had integrated themselves with the local communities.⁵⁸

2.1.4 Bombing of Kikambala hotel in Mombasa

Two missiles fired at Israeli's Akia aircraft were narrowly missed; this was on 28 November 2002.⁵⁹ The Israeli passenger airliner was taking off from from Moi Airport; an International Airport located in Mombasa en route to Tel Aviv; Israeli capital. On the same day there was an attack on Kikambala hotel in Mombasa where Israeli tourists were checking in. This culminated to be the third major terrorist attack in Kenya which claimed 13 lives of Israel's and injured 80.⁶⁰ Ten (10) Kenyans also died, nine were the hotel employees, many of the injured were said to be dancers in their traditional regalia who had purposed to cordially welcome close to one hundred and forty Israeli tourists who were to arrive by state-chartered jet.⁶¹ This attack against the hotel and charter passenger jet was coordinated to be simultaneous.⁶² Injured Israeli citizens were evacuated the following day by military planes from Israel.⁶³

The twin attacks led to a shift in attention from US to Israel implying the vulnerability of both states sharing the same enemy. The Kikambala attack came at the duration of two and half months after the first anniversary of the September 11th 2001 attack in the cities of New York and Washington DC.⁶⁴ This attack confirmed to the government of Kenya that the terrorist group of Al-Qaeda was not yet done with Kenya after the 7th August 1998 attack and that more attacks were in the offing. In March 2003, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kenya

⁵⁷ Mogire, E., & Agade, K.M. (2011). Counter-terrorism in Kenya. *A journal of contemporary African Studies* 29(4), 473 - 491.

⁵⁸ Terror in the Horn of Africa. (2004, January 15th). *Special Report*. Retrieved 5th July, 2018, from United States Institute of Peace: <http://www.usip.org>

⁵⁹ Eichstaedt, P. (2010). *Pirate State: Inside Somalia's Terrorism at Sea*. Chicago: Chicago Review Press.

⁶⁰ Daniel Hass, Chronicle Foreign Service, —Terror in Kenya/Stunned Israelis are left feeling nowhere is safe: SFGate.com, Jerusalem, 29th November, 2002 Available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2018-11-29/news/17570566_1_likud-official-tel-aviv-israeli

⁶¹ Terror in the Horn of Africa. (2004, January 15th). *Special Report*. Retrieved July 5th, 2018, from United States Institute of Peace: <http://www.usip.org>

⁶² William Wallis, —Kenya Terror Attacks _Planned from Somalia', *Financial Times*, November 5, 2003

⁶³ Israel evacuates tourists from Kenya. BBC News (29 November 2002)

⁶⁴ Rosenberg, M. (2003, October 24). Al-Qaeda plotted to destroy US Embassy in Kenya in June: Associated press. Washington DC, US.

acknowledged the presence of accomplices as being Kenyan nationals within the country⁶⁵ colluding with the Yemen, Pakistan and Somali nationals who were believed to be behind the planning of the 1998 and 2002 attacks.

As the terrorist attacks intensified in the Kenyan soil, the government of felt curious and later identified that the Dadaab refugee camp (located on the border of Somali and Kenya) was acting as a breeding ground for Islamic extremists training.⁶⁶ It was discovered that a charity group (Al-Haramain) was actively involved in establishing religious schools and social programs suspected of providing the avenue through which funds meant for the terrorist groups were wired. This resulted in the revocation of registration of Muslim Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) including Al-Haramain by the Kenyan government because of their perceived links with Al-Qaeda terrorist group.⁶⁷

2.1.5 Other Terrorist Attacks between 2003 and 2010

In 2003 during the month of June, a terror attack had been planned to be unleashed on the temporary US embassy along Mombasa road which was set up following the 1998 attack.⁶⁸ This attack, just like the 1998, was to be executed using a truck and a plane laden with bombs and explosives and was to be hijacked from the near-by Wilson Airport. However, this attempted attack was thwarted by the Kenyan authorities who arrested a suspect. This suspect was believed to be one of the masterminds behind the 2002 attacks on the Paradise Hotel in Kikambala.⁶⁹ It was now evident that the US embassy was a prime target by terrorists who were determined execute and attack a number of attacks.

The period between 2003 and 2006 saw some relative calmness in terms of terrorist attacks. Minor or small scale terror attacks were witnessed in the period between 2007 and 2010 and which were thwarted by the government, aborted or even left insignificant impact. This period saw the arrest of a Kenyan citizen by the name Mohamed Abdulmalik on February 2007. This was after he was suspected of being a leader of a plot to bomb the World Cross Country

⁶⁵ Mogire,E., & Agade, K.M. (2011). Counter-terrorism in Kenya. *A journal of contemporary African Studies* 29(4) , 473 - 491.

⁶⁶ Ibid

⁶⁷ Ibid

⁶⁸ Rosenberg, M. (2003, October 24). Al-Qaeda plotted to destroy US Embassy in Kenya in June: Associated press. Washington DC, US.

⁶⁹ Terror in the Horn of Africa. (2004, January 15th). *Special Report*. Retrieved June 5th , 2018, from United States Institute of Peace: <http://www.usip.org>

Championships in Mombasa held in March 2007.⁷⁰ Abdulmalik was also suspected of being involved in the 2001 attack of Paradise Hotel in Kikambala. This suspect was later transferred to Guantanamo Bay in the United States of America on 26th March 2007. The Government of Kenya was committed in its cooperating with the United States government on the newly formed Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) by extraditing its citizens to go and answer to charges of terror. The partnership between Kenya and the US through GWOT intensified the evolving of Kenya's foreign policy and fast tracking efforts in arresting Fazul Abdullah Mohammed who was suspected to be the mastermind behind the 1998 and 2002 terror attacks.

2.1.6 The 2011 Kenya Incursion into Somalia and Terror Attacks

From 2011 to date, the country has experienced a chain of terrorist attacks that have claimed lives and destroyed property. Many of which have been carried out by a terrorist group in Somalia known as Al Shabaab. The group came to being after retaliation between Kenya military and Somalia military incursions. Kenya decided to cross the boundary and fight terrorist group. The group has however been dynamic in change of tactics making it difficult for Kenyan soldiers to wipe them out completely.⁷¹

The incursion was necessitated by frequent abductions of Kenyan citizens and tourists were believed to be executed by operatives suspected to be allied to the Somali-based Al-Shabaab. These abductions were not only confined to humans but also the hijacking of cargo ships where the perpetrators were demanding ransom running into millions of US dollars for their release. The funds raised to the Al-Shabaab militants were believed to be used for funding the terror activities against Kenyan citizens and foreigners majorly tourists. A case in point was the abduction of an English tourist by the name Judith Tebbutt in early September 2011, which saw the killing of her husband David Tebbutt when he resisted the kidnapping. Mrs. Tebbutt was later ferried to a remote part of Somalia, where she was held hostage as the abductors demanded ransom from the British Government. A few months later, Al-Shabaab militants from Ras Kamboni in Somalia abducted a French woman from Manda Island where she was enjoying her holiday. The then Minister of internal security, the Late Professor George Saitoti described the hijackings as a gross abuse of Kenya's territorial integrity. Consequently, several countries among them the United Kingdom, Australia and the US issued travel advisories to

⁷⁰ Kenyan-Somali Jihadist Killed With Fazul. *Somalia Report*. 13 June 2011.

⁷¹ Macharia, James (1 June 2014). "Bombings threaten Kenya growth goals, open new strains with wary West". *Reuters*. Retrieved 1 June 2018

their citizens against visiting some parts of the country mainly the Coastal area of Kenya that in turn affected negatively the transaction of foreign relations between Kenya and the globe.

As Kenyan government pursued the incursion arrangements into Somalia, there were retaliatory attacks by the terrorist groups and the first being that of 24th October 2011 in a bar by the name Mwaura's at the downtown Mfangano Street of Nairobi at midnight. The incident claimed the life of one person though with over twenty people having been injured. On the same day another was witnessed at the Machakos country bus station after a hand grenade was tossed from a moving vehicle killing five people and injuring sixty nine others. This happened even after the US government had issued a warning of imminent attacks in the country.⁷² Following these two attacks, a Kenyan Muslim convert 28 year old Elgiva Bwire Oliacha who was arrested and charged in relation to two explosions subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment on 27th October 2011 after having pleaded guilty to the charges of being involved in terrorist activities and the deaths caused by the blasts.⁷³ Just two days before his arrest, police had raided his house in the Eastland area recovering thirteen hand grenades, four pistols, two submachine guns and over seven hundred rounds of ammunition.⁷⁴

2.1.7 The 2012 Terrorist Attacks in Kenya

Following the chronology of terror attacks in Kenya, it is eminent to the government and the officials that terrorism is really and must be fought using every means possible. At the start of the year 2012, Al-Shabaab militants carried out several attacks, with the month of January witnessing three terrorist attacks: the first attack led to the deaths of the chairperson tasked with responsibility of heading communal peace and security team in Hagadera camp together with a number of police officers; the second in the month of February, a security officer and a civilian were killed and several civilians reported to have been injured as Al-Shabaab militants claimed responsibilities for the attacks.⁷⁵

On 29th April 2012 another terrorist attack where the perpetrator used a hand grenade occurred at The God's House of Miracles Church – Ngara Estate in Nairobi. Thereafter, on 28th May 2012 another blast went off at Assanand's House situated at Moi Avenue in Nairobi's central

⁷² Two grenade blasts rattle Nairobi; 1 dead". Associated Press. 25 October 2011.

⁷³ Cyrus, Ombati (2012). "Police link Al-Shabaab to Ngara church attack". Standard Group Limited, 29th May 2012.

⁷⁴ Vincent Achuka: *A look inside terrorists' cells in Kenya's most secure prison* – Sunday Nation 28th August 2016

⁷⁵ Blast rocks Kenyan Capital – Nairobi. Standardmedia.co.ke. 28 May 2012

business district injuring 27 people. On 24th June 2012, a hand grenade was hurled at a bar in Jericho, Mishomoroni, in Mombasa County, at a group of people who were watching a football game between England and Italy.

Also, in the month of July Kenya witnessed terrorist attacks thus on 1st July 2012, gunmen covered their faces attacked two churches in Garissa – the Central Catholic Cathedral and Garissa AIC. The attacks left seventeen people dead and fifty injured.⁷⁶ This attack almost caused religious animosity between Christians and Muslims, forcing the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) to issue a warning against the false impression that the attack was a religious war against Christians.⁷⁷ In the month of August 2012, a day before US secretary of State, Hillary Clinton visiting Kenya, one person was killed and six others being injured in Eastleigh area of Nairobi near the Kenya Air force headquarters.⁷⁸ This attack was done through the detonation of home-made explosives from a safe distance. 30th September 2012, a nine year old boy was killed at St. Polycarp Anglican Church when a grenade was thrown at the Sunday school children in the same church. 18th November, of the same year, ten people were killed when an explosive went off in a Kariobangi minibus at Eastleigh. This attack irked Kenyans of Christian denomination sparking off demonstration and rampage targeting people of Somali origin since a one day old baby whose mother was killed in the blast was among those who were rescued. As the year 2012 came to an end, December 19th a Kenyan Member of Parliament, Abdi Yusuf Hassan suffered injuries inflicted from an explosion that occurred near a Mosque in Eastleigh.

2.1.8 The 2013 Westgate Shopping Mall Terrorist Attack

The Westgate Shopping Mall terrorist attack of 21st September, 2013 was viewed as the defining moment in Kenya's conduct of foreign relations and aligning its foreign policy to factor in the elements of terrorist activities. During the attack, a number of gunmen entered the Westgate Shopping Mall armed with guns and grenades as they drove through the entrance to the mall and down the ramp to a basement area.⁷⁹ The building complex of six floors housed different businesses: shopping centers, eating and leisure centers, offices and a parking etc. at the time the attack was carried out, the Mall was so crowded with shoppers while others were

⁷⁶ Nation Team (2012). "17 dead, 50 injured in twin Garissa church attacks". Nation Media Group, 1 July 2012.

⁷⁷ Reporter, Nation (2012). "Garissa attacks not a religious war, say Muslims". *nation.co.ke*. 1 July 2012.

⁷⁸ Kenyan capital hit by grenade attack — Africa — Al Jazeera English. *aljazeera.com*. 3 August 2012.

⁷⁹ Onuha, F.C. 2013 Westgate Attack: Al-shabab's Renewed Transnational Jihadism. Al-Jazeera Center for studies. Retrived 3rd July, 2018 from <http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports>

taking their lunch. The gunmen moved from one store to another shooting and killing people indiscriminately. By the end of the attack, the Al-Shabaab terror group owned up responsibility for the assault, citing their displeasure in Kenya especially when Kenya soldiers joined and supported AU military efforts against the group.⁸⁰ Some of the rescued people stated that the terrorists had targeted non-Muslims by asking the victims to answer a question related to the teachings of Islam to confirm indeed that they were Muslims. The gunmen allowed the Muslim customers to escape from the mall before executing the non-Muslims shoppers. The terrorist wanted to create a wedge between the Muslims and Christians. The number of people who died in this attack remains up to date unclear however, the Red Cross estimated the number of those who died to be sixty seven with thirty nine people unaccounted for.

2.1.9 The 2014 Mpeketoni and Mandera Terrorist Attacks

By May 2014, the outcome of the growing number of terror attacks began to be felt in the country which mostly was affecting Kenya's tourism industry and Western nations such as US, UK, France and Australia asking their nationals to minimize their travel to Kenya⁸¹ a move that forced hotel establishment especially those in the Coast region lay off staff. The Western nations were straining the foreign policy between them and Kenya. The issue got out of hand to a point of the US reducing its staff level at the Nairobi Embassy while the UK shut down its Honorary Consulate in Mombasa in June 2014 citing security concerns.⁸²

On 16th June 2014, an emotional attack occurred whereby forty eight non local people were killed when Al-Shabab militants from Somalia drove to Mpeketoni. Again in the same year on 22nd November 2014 in Mandera County, sixty-four people were bundled out from a bus en route to Nairobi and killed where twenty eight of whom were teachers and government workers. In December 2nd 2014, in Mandera County again, Al-Shabab attacked and killed thirty-six non-local quarry workers who were caught sleeping.

2.1.10 The 2015 Garissa University College Attack

The Garrisa University College attack of 2015 was the touchiest and impeccable experience that Kenya and the world at large coined as it took longer to rescue the students and it was planned within the vicinity of Garrisa town which accommodates the institution. The attack

⁸⁰ Attack on Westgate Shopping Centre in Nairobi, Kenya, September 2013 *Analysis and Insights*

⁸¹ Macharia James; Bombings threaten Kenya growth goals, open new strains with wary West' Reuters retrieved 1st July, 2018

⁸² Capital News, UK closes Mombasa Consulate over security fears. 13th June 2014, retrieved on 2nd July, 2018

was noteworthy because of the dull response of Kenyan security forces which took seven hours to take full control of the University. By the time they arrived, a huge number of students had been killed.⁸³ This siege began at 5.30 am on 2nd April 2015 a day before Good Friday where some of the students of the university were preparing to sit for exams. It happened after heavily armed attackers stormed Garissa University early in the morning after killing the two security guards then firing indiscriminately at the student. In this attack, students who could not prove they were Muslims were singled out by being asked to answer questions relating to the Islam faith or to recite verses from the Koran.⁸⁴ More than five hundred students managed to escape although seventy nine of them were seriously injured. Four of the terrorist were killed by Kenya security forces with a fifth terrorist, killing himself by detonating his explosive belt.⁸⁵

As a trend, in all the previous attacks unlike the abductions and hijackings, Al-Shabab does not take hostages rather they try to kill as many of their unarmed victims as they possibly to cause terror into the government. As R. Bunker notes there are a number of advantages of suicide attacks over other attacks. The weapon or device meant to kill is precisely delivered to the target hence no room for failure, secondly, there are no wounded comrades since this would create logistical strain on a terrorist group.⁸⁶ This was the most heart wrenching attack ever in our soil firstly, being meted on innocent students, who were taken on by surprise since most of them were waking up whereas others were in bed. Secondly the siege had been masterminded by a former University student who knew so well that students are never armed hence a soft target.

In summary, as Kenya engages in foreign relations, terrorist activities have contributed immensely to its relationship with other countries such as the lawless Somalia and her affiliation to the western block makes her a common enemy of the terror groups hence making Kenya a victim of circumstances and a soft target. This has necessitated change of foreign policy by Kenya's government from a non-interventionist policy to an interventionist policy. This drove Kenya to enter into Somalia so as to address the issue of terror attacks using the military. Most of the terror attacks that have happened are believed to be retaliatory response

⁸³ Cummings, Ryan 2015, 14th April Garissa attacks puts spotlight on Kenya's response to growing terror threat. The global observatory. Retrieved 3rd July, 2018 from <http://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/04/garissa-kenya-al-shabab-westgate>

⁸⁴ Daily Nation, 3rd April 2015, 147 students killed in cold-blooded raid on campus, Fred Mukinda pp 4-5

⁸⁵ Odula, Tom, Muhumuza, Rodney & Senosi, Khalil. (2015, April 3rd) Al Shabab militants kill 147 at university in Kenya. Associated Press. Retrieved July 3rd 2018 from <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/police-gunmen-attack-university-eastern-kenya>

⁸⁶ Robert J. Bunker, Suicide Bombers, Soft Targets and appropriate Counter measures; pp98-108

against the incursion in Somalia. These attacks have at times strained the relationship between the Muslims and Christians because most of the attacks seem to be targeted on the Christians and sparing the Muslims. Despite all the efforts instituted by the government to curb these attacks, the terrorists have proved to be one step ahead of the government by changing tact in the way they carry out their attacks. With the increased terror attacks, the behavior of Kenyans has changed tremendously. Kenyans are no longer the ever trusting lot mostly preferring to be wary and suspicious of people carrying backpacks or bags.

CHAPTER THREE

KENYA'S CONDUCT IN FOREIGN RELATIONS IN THE WAKE OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

3.1 Introduction

From refugee crises, to terrorism and to piracy in the high seas, maladies which have affected Kenya's internal security as well as sabotaged her economy with the adverse effects the latter two vices have had on tourism, the country's second greatest income earner, and trade as well as her pivotal role in being the gateway to the more than two hundred million east and central African population as well as being one of the key gateways to the four hundred million strong COMESA market, Kenya can arguably be said to have adversely suffered from Somalia's state collapse.

The country has however employed a number of measures so as to try to arrest the rising state of insecurity in Kenya. The chapter seeks to investigate the measures in which the country has undertaken to securitize her from the insecurities necessitated by terror activities. The chapter also seeks to assess the effectiveness as well as the efficiency of these methods that Kenya has employed.

3.2 Terrorism and Foreign Relations

Kenya was faced by a of terrorism on 7th August 1998, when the embassy of U.S situated in Nairobi was hit by a bomb blast, which led to the death of 213 people, among them twelve Americans-and injuring over 4,000. Al Qaeda a terrorist outfit was identified as responsible for the attack. Nearly Four years later, the terror group Al Qaeda struck an Israeli owned Kikambal hotel in Mombasa, where fifteen lives were claimed, and thereafter simultaneously fired rocket propelled grenades the outskirts of the outskirts of Moi international Airport in Mombasa targeting an Israeli jet for passangers taking off from the same airport.⁸⁷ The attacks along many others that have followed since the that were orchestrated by arguably one of the greatest terror groups in the world, it became apparent that Kenya's fetish attractiveness to terrorist operatives was due to the fact that the combination of regional, historical, economic,

⁸⁷ Lyman, P., & Morrison, J. (2004). The Terrorist Threat in Africa. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 1 , 75-86.

geographical, economic and socio-cultural factors were an allure to terrorist organizations in Eastern Africa, the Arabian Peninsula as well as those operating in the Arab Maghreb.⁸⁸

The direct roots of terror attacks in Kenya were identified to be; first, Kenyas' close ties with western states and Israel in middle east secondly, Kenya has had a booming coastal beach tourism industry that was threatening the area Islamic way of life and, and thirdly, the terror outfit perceived that the country's populace mainly comprise of hence an impediment to Islamizing the entire horn of Africa as planned by the terrorists' global agenda of establishing a global Islamic caliphate.⁸⁹

To counter terror, Kenya has employed a number of measures. First, the government employed some of its very viable instruments of fighting terror namely; diplomacy, military counter – terror operations, intelligence information etc. international cooperation is generated through diplomacy which is the power instrument that strengthens cooperation in the international arena. Counter terror cooperation is promoted through diplomatic exchanges among states that are friendly and serve each other's common interests. To fight terrorism, governments require each other by forming alliances and forging multilateral approach to fighting the vice. Terrorism is transnational and does not recognize. Diplomatic tools such as extradition treaties among states go a long way in facilitation of transfer of fugitives and other terror suspects. Terrorist activities are greatly discouraged among nations which share intelligence. The government of Kenya fully cooperated with the U.S government in sharing intelligence after the bombing of the U.S embassy in Nairobi Kenya in the year 1998. The government of Kenya helped in apprehension of suspects and allowed American investigators room to operate.⁹⁰

The U.S as well as the Israeli government assisted in rescue operations upon request by the Kenyan government. The United States government used Kenya with the acceptance by the government of Kenya for logistical support as its investigators pursued those who were responsible for the terror attack. Kenya faced a terror attack due to it hosting several US interest within its boundaries. The U.S had to carry out investigations on those behind the attacks due to their capabilities and resource endowment.⁹¹

⁸⁸ Otiso, K. (2009). *Kenya in the Crosshairs of Global Terrorism: Fighting Terrorism at the Periphery*. Kenya Studies Review Vol. 1, No. 1 , 107-132.

⁸⁹ Ibid

⁹⁰ Hared, A. (2005). *Combating Trans-National Terrorism in Kenya*. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

⁹¹ Hared, A. (2005). *Combating Trans-National Terrorism in Kenya*. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Due to the notion and belief that Kenya was a victim of circumstance rather than a source of international terrorist following the terror attacks within its soil, the Government of Kenya did not incorporate other East African states in a unified regional approach to counter terrorism. Kenya was in denial state by failing to acknowledge its weak intelligence agency and appraising what led to growth of terrorism within its borders in the first instance.

Members of the Muslim community were engaged by the government in fighting terror. The Kenyan Muslims complained of marginalization by the government and thus followed this approach. Terror suspects/operatives emanated from this group thus the government felt antiterrorism operations will greatly affect members of the Muslim community. Political risk was greatly feared by the government if it went full board on the war on terror. It put the government in a precarious position. Counter terrorism measures which included measures such as banning of Muslim NGOs and money remittance platforms led to hostility towards the government of Kenya this is despite the obvious evidence of the presence of terror cells and the involvement of Kenyan citizens in terrorist activities.⁹²

The military was not effectively used as an instrument of power after the terrorists attack in 1998 in combating terrorism due to the notion that terrorists actions were negligible at that instance. The state felt the act was a minor criminal activity and an isolated case that did not warrant utilization of all government resources. It had not dawned on the government that terror elements were taking advantage of Kenya's porous land border and its expansive coastline to easily enter and exit from the country. Maintenance of law and order within the borders of Kenya was solely the work of police officers and rarely did the military play any role at that time unlike currently were both the military and police have undertaken extensive counter terrorism training to equip them with antiterrorism skill.⁹³

Other intelligence agencies together with military intelligence in the country joined hands in analyzing and monitoring terror activities in the country. Countering terrorism requires informational campaign to enlighten members of the public on the importance of cooperating with the state. The government had not factored this before and after the 1998 attack.

⁹² See Barkan, J., & Cooke, J. (2001). *U.S. Policy Towards Kenya in the Wake of September 11: Can Antiterrorist Imperatives be Reconciled with Enduring U.S. Foreign Policy Goals?* Retrieved July 3, 2014, from Africa Center for Strategic Studies: www.csis.org/Africa/ANotes/ANotes0112.pdf. See also Hared, A. (2005). *Combating Trans-National Terrorism in Kenya*. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

⁹³ Hared, A. (2005). *Combating Trans-National Terrorism in Kenya*. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

By the fact that terrorist do not operate in a vacuum. It is evident that there was limited campaign to enlighten public information importance. Information campaign was limited to urban areas only and those in rural areas who could not access any forms of media such as print or electronic media could not get information that could expose criminals disguising themselves as businessmen, teachers, preachers and other professionals. This could have helped expose them.⁹⁴

3.3 International Cooperation as a Counter-Terrorism Measure

These terrorist attacks alongside others prompted the government of Kenya to be left with no other alternative other than to fight terror if she was to be in a position to secure her from further aggressive activities emanating from terrorist groups and their operatives. The first step was at the international arena where she rooted for cooperation with the West who arguably had superior counter-terrorism weaponry, able and well trained counter-terrorism manpower as well as superior intelligence collection machineries that easily dwarfed the ones in use in Nairobi. Former US President Clinton ordered an airstrike on a targeted plant which was producing pharmaceutical products in the neighbouring Sudan. Sudan remains on the US radar as a state sponsoring terror activities. It hosted former Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden in the year 1990. Such strikes started all over the globe to counter terror⁹⁵

In addition, the succeeding US government also immensely helped Kenya's anti-terrorism operations especially through increased funding as well as capacity building. The administration of Bush former US President, additionally, in his global war against terror identified Horn of Africa as a potential breeding camp for terrorist activities and together with Kenyan government has been working to dismantle Al Qaeda's infrastructure in the entire region alongside groups such as Alshabaab which are to it.⁹⁶

To counter terror in the H. of Africa, the US government, at the turn of the third millennium formed Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), that included one thousand and eight hundred troops from the US and which was to be backed by the Central Command in the US. The unit which is based in Djibouti whose mission was principally pre-empt, deter, and stop terrorist threats originating principally from, Kenya, Yemen and Somalia was to be

⁹⁴ Hared, A. (2005). *Combating Trans-National Terrorism in Kenya*. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

⁹⁵ Lind, J., & Howell, J. (2010). *Counter-terrorism and the Politics of Aid: Civil Society Responses in Kenya*. Development and Change Vol. 41 (2) , 335–353

⁹⁶ Lyman, P., & Morrison, J. (2004). *The Terrorist Threat in Africa*. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 1 , 75-86

assisted by a naval force from various countries. The US government pledged a one hundred million dollar funding for anti terror operations in the African Horn region. Coastal region and border security programs was to receive half of the funds. The fund administration was to be under united states defence department. Anti Terror Police Unit of Kenya was to receive ten million US dollars and the support of Muslim education and awareness to receive fourteen billion under the program.⁹⁷

The Western support especially from the United States was necessitated by the fact that after September 11, 2001, the Horn of Africa region courted attention from global terrorist groups as a possible new haven for Al Qaeda operatives. Most of the terrorists expelled from other countries seek refuge I the Horn. Furthermore, the ease with which Al Qaeda operatives operate in Kenya are suspected to be due to geographical setting of Kenya,; its proximity to Somalia as well as having similar ease of access to Zanzibar, coastal Tanzania, and the Comoros Islands.⁹⁸

One of the winners of the western financial and logistical support was the police with the formation of the Kenyan Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU) as a specialized unit formed to help fight terrorism and as part of the Kenyan security agencies' reform process of making them relevant in fighting the new wars such as fourth generation warfare in which terrorism forms a pertinent part.⁹⁹

Within the Kenyan military, there were wide sweeping reforms, the first ever since the radical Tonje Reforms, aimed at equipping the Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) to fight terrorism include the acquisition of additional F5 fighter aircrafts to be used in maritime and counter terrorism surveillance. However, then Kenya's Department of Defense (DoD) spokesman

When Mwai Kibaki came into power in 2003, a Suppression of Terrorism Bill was introduced at the floor of the legislature for debate. Muslim community in Kenya felt that they were the main target; this forced the government to take the law back to the parliament for amendments.

3.4 Terrorism in the International Arena

Terrorism is a barbaric way advanced by some social actors to acquire what I may call irrational goals and objectives. However in accordance with the social constructionist viewpoint they

⁹⁷ Ibid

⁹⁸ ibid

⁹⁹ All Africa. (2009, August 6). *Kenya: New Anti-Terrorism Unit Formed*. Retrieved June 25, 2014, from The Republic of Kenya: republicofkenya.org/2009/08/kenya_new_anti-terrorism_unit_formed/

argue that the term terrorism frequently used to construct the evil other. According to them, the word terrorism is a mere construction by the constructivists.¹⁰⁰ Till today, it is still unclear on who terrorists are and what their aims and objectives are. However the word terrorism is often used to categorize those who are not in a certain facet of a social order or group to delegitimize their existence. This is how many countries especially those in the Middle East end up being labeled and branded terrorist states by some states who have enjoined in some conglomeration in the name of “a coalition of peace loving states.” The “terrorists” friendly states are viewed by their counterparts are those that are not peace loving, for instance Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran. It is therefore important for scholars to examine and evaluate the definition of the term terrorism and its derivation, its characteristics and impacts so as to have a wider view of what terrorism really implies and some of the factors that promote it. After which scholars to develop scholarly arguments that will explain the phenomenon more explicitly rather the ongoing stereotyped arguments leading upcoming scholars and policy makers nowhere.

The term is today common and widely used by many societies in the contemporary world. It is ambiguously used hence has become a primary term that is no longer a vocabulary of even the newborn, similar to concepts such as democracy and freedom.¹⁰¹ After December 9/11, the world has seen a scenario whereby the term “terrorism” has been used by American society to advance her interests in diaspora. It is a term used on a daily basis to justify U.S’s foreign policy describes any form of attack and insecurity issue today as terrorism attack; the term however has been marred by a lot of biasness. Alexander Wendt posits that Anarchy is purely a creation by the states and it all depends on what the states make of it¹⁰²; socially constructed to advance some hidden interests and agenda.¹⁰³ Due to the fact that anarchy is a creation of the state and similarly terrorism causes anarchy then is it then justified to conclude that terrorism too is a creation of the state? This is a debate that scholars are still digesting and pondering about. Constructivists like Wendt are the key proponents of the narrative that anarchy is absolutely the creation of the state and so is terrorism. The word terror can be dated to 100BC or 2100 years in ancient Rome. The word terror therefore is even older than both Jesus Christ and Mohammed. In ancient Rome, the term *terror cimbricus* was used to imply a

¹⁰⁰ Jackson.R. Constructing Enemies: Islamic Terrorism in Political and Academic Discourse.-Government and Opposition, vol.55, No.3,2016

¹⁰¹ Nimmer.L. De-contextualization in the Terrorism Discourse: A social constructionist view (2014).

¹⁰² Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics", in International Organization (46:2, Spring 1992), pp.396–399.

¹⁰³ Razaq, N.Z. US. Air Force.1st security forces squadron, emergency services team(EST) lesson guide .paper presented at Langley Air force Base EST (SWAT) team first instructional forum on terrorism in September 2015.

state of discomfort, panic and emergency in response. This was mainly used to prepare Roman youth for the looming war or danger of the coming of the Combi tribe killers to make fellow countrymen and women vigilant. The word terrorism was also used in France in the 18th century. The reign of terror headed by the incorruptible William Maxmillien Robbspierre made many citizens to lose their lives. Many French men and French women faced the guillotine in the period between (1790 and 1795), more so those who were initially loyal to the ousted King Louis the sixteenth faced the wrath of the guillotine¹⁰⁴.

As much as terrorism, a word coined from the term terror has been in existence for long, there is still no explicit definition and contextualization of the term. Various scholars have defined terrorism in various approaches. Terrorism in lay man simply stand for the use of force as a means to achieve certain goals that cannot be achieved diplomatically, it therefore calls for the use of combat, this way pain is inflicted to both the “state” and the victims.¹⁰⁵ Terrorism is the use of violence, threats and intimidation by an illegal organization, psychologically pain is inflicted not only to the victim but to the society around and also the government at large. These sub national groups have a chain that is often sophisticated to understand hence making war on terror a complex and difficult one to deal with effectively. These groups often run their agenda parallel to that of state hence imposing security lapse in the states organ.¹⁰⁶ Unlike assassinations, terrorism activities necessarily doesn't target the main target. For instance Kamau has been offended by Otieno; instead of Otieno and Kamau sorting out their squabbles, Kamau decides to terrorize a third party who is closely related to Otieno to unleash his anger. Like the analogy given herein, terrorism closely operates that way. Immediate victims are often not the main culprits intended to harm. Victims are always used by terrorist organizations as a ladder to help them advance their religious, political and economic interests. Many human beings that are often hit as a result of terrorists strike are chosen randomly without any scientific analogy by the terrorists group. The victims then act as message conveyors, reactions got from the affected state¹⁰⁷ Terrorism is therefore an economically and politically motivated violence geared towards non-combatants target by illicit non states actors; terrorists groups.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴Roberts A. (2002). The changing faces of terrorism .http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/sept-11/changing_faces_ol.shtml. Accessed on 15th may 2018.

¹⁰⁵ Laquer. W. The age of terrorism (5th Edition) by little and Brown Publishers. Boston USA. pp 142-150. (2016)

¹⁰⁶ Hoffman, B. Inside terrorism (3rd Edition) by Columbia University Press New York. USA (2015).

¹⁰⁷ Schmid, A; Jogman. A. Political Terrorism. Anew guide to actors, authors, concept, databases, theories and literature. North Holland, Transaction books. Amsterdam, Neatherlands.(2010)

¹⁰⁸ U S Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism 2010. By the US department of state .Washington D.C .U.S.A, pp 24. (2010)

The definition of the term terrorism has evolved and developed from one epoch to another over time, however the goals be it social, religious, political or economic still remain the same with minimal change.¹⁰⁹ likewise within the Horn of Africa there is no single clear cut hence making it difficult to understand the meaning of terrorism in the horn, thus it would be more prudent to evaluate more trends and patterns of the manifestation of terrorist incidents in order to understand more and come up with a more universal inclusive definition on what terrorism entails evaluating the trends of terrorist incident within the Horn of Africa would add up into the bucket definition of terrorism.

Terrorism imposes costs on the country targeted by the terrorist groups. It derails a country's economy as a lot of evil than good is done. A lot of infrastructure is destroyed in the attack, people lose lives, a lot of property is destroyed, many livelihoods and dreams remain shuttered, etc. Investors too are threatened hence opt to return to their cradle homeland in the case of foreign investors. Terrorism threats have made several countries of the world in the 21st century to invest more on their security rather than trade and commerce. This is a clear indication that states' priorities have changed gradually with the intensification of terrorists attack all over the world. Places at the risk of terrorists attack are often places that are frequently visited by huge number of people.¹¹⁰ The unfortunate bit is that some terrorists' activities are planned and executed by both the non-state actors and the states, especially in the horn of Africa.¹¹¹

Acts of terrorism are detrimental to economies as they hurt the economies in a big way, for instance after the September 11 billions of money was lost, apart from that the impact became macro as it hurt other industries as well e.g. tourism sector¹¹². Consequently the U.S consumer Index significantly dropped from a percentage of 114 to 97 then 85 between the months of August, September and October of the year 2001 consecutively. An estimated number of about 61,000 jobs were also lost during and within the period hence increasing the percentage of the unemployed. Many companies within the U.S stalled from employing new employees for the

¹⁰⁹ Sloan, A. (2006). Terrorism. The present threat in context. by Berg Publishers. Oxford, United Kingdom. pp 5-10.

¹¹⁰ Collier, P., Sambanis, N. (2002). Understanding civil wars. Anew Agenda. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, **46**(1) 3-20.

¹¹¹ Kagwanja.P. Counter terrorism in the Horn of Africa. New security frontiers, old strategies. Africa policy brief No 1, August 2007, [www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/ COUNTER-TERRORISM-IN-THE-HORN-OF-AFRICA](http://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/COUNTER-TERRORISM-IN-THE-HORN-OF-AFRICA)

¹¹² Klein .A. The costs of terror .The economic Consequences of global terrorism. Konrad-Adenauer stitung .facts and finding.no.41,2016

fear of the unknown and uncertainty during this period of total confusion. U.S's stock market was also shaken by the terrorism attack.¹¹³

Apart from developed countries, like the case above of the United States, developing countries also face huge losses in scenarios of terrorism activities. The results include financial flight especially by foreign investors; many investors would like to invest their lives and properties in safe havens, places that are peaceful and tranquil with hope of great returns. Terrorism lowers investors' confidence hence making many of them to transfer some of their companies to countries they consider 'peaceful' and free from terrorism.

With the advancement in technology, terrorism activities have been heightened since terrorists are today able to recruit plan and execute online then just come to a certain country to implement. The internet is today not only used to acquire information but also spread radicalism, fundraise and recruit new members to their respective terrorist groups. Cell phones also make it easier for terrorists to coordinate their activities within and across countries.¹¹⁴ Kenyan coast for instance has many youth who have been radicalized by various terrorism groups and truth be said, technological advancements are key in recruiting them, especially the jobless youth who are almost hopeless.

Apart from the normal attacks, terrorists also invade some critical sectors of a country's economy, for instance launching attacks on energy sector with a key target on electricity transmission lines¹¹⁵. Countries that have been targeted and are in the terrorists' radar include Pakistan, South Sudan, Spain, Columbia and France among many others.¹¹⁶ In the case of Kenya, infrastructural systems have immensely been affected by terrorist attacks something that has hurt the country's economy in almost all sectors. Businesses, commerce and tourism sectors have been at the receiving end of these attacks. In the U.S for instance bond-trading company known as Cantor Fitzgerald. Cantor Fitzgerald was destroyed beyond recovery; the company lost 960 employees in a span of three months after September 11.

¹¹³ Global Terrorism Index.). *Measuring and Understanding the impact of Terrorism*. New York: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2014.

¹¹⁴ Wise, R. (2011, July). Al-Shabaab CSIS. <http://csis.org>. Accessed on 21st May, 2018

¹¹⁵ Zimmerman, R., Restrepo, C., Dooskin, N., Fraissinet, J., Hartwell, R., Miller, J., Remington, W. (2010). Diagnostic tools to estimate consequences of terrorism attacks against critical infrastructure. wagner.nyu.edu/files/faculty/publication/diagnostic/tools/estimates/consequences.pdf. Accessed 2018

¹¹⁶ Ibid

Terrorism has made world politics murky, sophisticated and complicated. This has changed the way foreign relations is taking place, U.S for instance after September 11 rose up to the occasion to become world police. Polarity in the world system is also changing significantly making it difficult to understand on how power keep changing. In general, terrorism makes world politics more complicated and difficult resulting in the change of how foreign relations are conducted. Some scholars see power as fluid with an argument that today's power system is not wholly controlled by the state but also non state actors like the Multinational Corporations. Terrorism has made politics within and around the Horn of Africa complicated, Kenya for instance is seen a s close buddy to the West especially the United States having declared that they shall support the U.S at all; cost to curb terrorism in the region. The proximity of East African countries to the Horn Arica exposes these countries to some of the most vulnerable countries south of Sahara. Terrorism cannot be left to countries affected alone since one can not foresee where terrorist are likely to hit next. Efforts by regional organization to curb the menace have also been too little too late as the region continuously experience terrorist acts¹¹⁷.

Terrorist usually aim at causing jitters, panic and fear; at the same tome attract attention of the media to cover their cause with an intention of amplifying their actions. The end goal is to harass, waken government security and embarrass the establishment to find their way out.

Terrorist groups frequently assess the force in place and analyze the cost benefit of their action. A terrorist will assess what force defense measures are in effect in the environs of a target and decide a cost benefit analysis. From the analysis and forms of study and surveillance, he will segregate weaknesses of a target and take advantage of these weaknesses. Goals and objectives of both terrorist and radical organizations keep varying in various parts of the world. The issue causing unrest between such groups and the government are necessarily not the same in various [arts of the world. U.S has of late attracted extremism¹¹⁸.

From around the world, Terrorists have used assassinations and bombings as frequent arsenals in their struggle against dictatorial regimes and autocracy.¹¹⁹ Such as the 2003 bombings in

¹¹⁷ Kimunguyi.P. *Terrorism and Counter terrorism in East Africa* Research Fellow, Global Terrorism Research Centre and Monash European and EU Centre Monash University, (2016)

¹¹⁸ Daniel Branch, —Violence, decolonization and the Cold War in Kenya's North –Eastern Province, 1963-1978. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*,8(4) (2014)

¹¹⁹ Spencer.A. (2006).Questioning the concept of New Terrorism. Peace conflict and development. Issue 8. www.peacestudies.Journal.org.uk.Accessed on 10th May, 2018.

Istanbul, this reported 60 fatalities.¹²⁰ In 2004 Ahmed Al-shager drove a truck full of bombs in to Baghdad. This claimed the lives of 9 people¹²¹. Norfolk hotel was bombed by Palestine liberation Organization in Nairobi Kenya in 1980, the 1998 American embassy bomb blast in Nairobi, Paradise hotel bombing in 2002.¹²² Terrorists have always aimed at creating publicity for their acts, playing for audience and spreading their ideological message through the media.¹²³ An attack many at times is usually followed by a communication taking with some terrorist groups claiming responsibilities over the attack on the particular target. The 1998 bombings of the Embassies United States in both Tanzania and Kenya attracted a wide public view for the media made it the headline of their news, terrorists seemed to have achieved their mission by having journalists put the World Trade Center bombing on the limelight of every newspaper, television channels, etc. Millions and millions of people therefore watched the attack, after September 11 numerous consecutive attacks started to be seen and heard¹²⁴.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has examined and assessed the place of terrorism in the discourse of foreign relations in the international arena. After which narrowed down to Kenya. Terrorism has changed the way Kenya's foreign relations in the 21st century. Kenya today is part of AMISOM in Somalia, in the war against terror. Kenyan allies such as United States and Britain unanimously support each other in the war against terror.

¹²⁰ Davis, E. (2003). Bin Laden had direct role in Turkish consulate bombings, suspect claims. By the independent News Paper, December 18, 2003. Washington .USA.

¹²¹ Abu-Nasr, D. (2007). Saudi turns His Back on Jihad. By the Washington Post, July 28, 2007. Washington. USA. pp 24.

¹²² Din, V. (2011). Understanding terrorism in the Horn of Africa. American perception of Somalia, Kenya and Alqaeda. Senior Thesis. Understanding Terrorism in the Horn of Africa American _perception.pdf. Accessed on 25th May 2018.

¹²³ Jenkins, B.M. (2008). Will Terrorist go nuclear. By promethers books. Armhest. pp 24-27.

¹²⁴ Carlisle Barracks, Bounding the Global war on Terrorism. *Strategic studies Institute, US Army War College*. (Record, J. 2016).

CHAPTER FOUR

THE DYNAMICS OF TERRORISM AND ITS IMPACT ON FOREIGN RELATIONS IN AFRICA

4.1 Introduction

The chapter will address the dynamics of terrorist activities which has negatively or positively impacted the way countries in Africa do conduct their foreign relations. As methods of operations for terror groups change, so does the way countries as a single entity rhythmically change to the tune or less be isolated with other countries of goodwill. This because, the amount of influence (politically, economically, and socially) exerted by terror groups is enormous and if not managed well and with speed will expose a country to be overran and governed by such groupings. Therefore, it is better in this chapter the study to address these dynamics caused by terror groups in the context of Africa as a continent then look at West Africa, the Horn of Africa, and then East Africa where it will dwell so much on Kenya as the case study.

4.2 The Dynamics of Terrorism and Impact on the Conduct of Foreign Relations in Africa

Terrorism is a serious phenomenon in the 21st century. A lot of attention and scholarly studies are focused on the Middle East. Africa seems to be missing yet a lot of terrorism activities also happen within and around the African continent, making terrorism to be a major concerned to the African continent.¹²⁵ Too much focus in the Middle East makes Africa to be neglected by many scholars in the quest for counter terrorism approaches, ideals and mechanisms despite recent youth radicalization and sectarianism witnessed especially along the coast of Kenya.¹²⁶ There are numerous extremism groups that have followers and networks within the continent, Al-Qaeda in the Maghre, Al-Shabab in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria.

The dynamics of the above groups gains support when all the days the ‘west’ is spreading the gospel of “*democracy*”. This cannot be disputable because many societies in the 21st Century societies with fast growing democratic ideals can harbor terrorism. Democratic principles if misused by citizens then offer bedrock for the growth and spread of terrorism. In democratic societies there is too much freedom for citizens to access information without limitation, civil

¹²⁵ Alfa-Wali, M., Sritharan, K., Mehes, M., Abdullah, F., & Rasheed, S., (2015). “Terrorism related trauma in Africa, an increasing problem”, *Journal of Epidemiology and Global Health*, 5(2)

¹²⁶ Clavarino, T., (2014). “Africa, the new outpost of terrorism”, *RT op-edge*. <https://www.rt.com/op-edge/180996-africa-outpost-islamic-terrorism/> (Accessed: 16/07/2018).

liberties, and freedom to agree and disagree when dissatisfied with the authorities etc¹²⁷ (Ross, 1993). Judicial independence have been argued by some scholars as the weakest link in this war on terror¹²⁸, they further argue that good governance and a stringent judiciary which is impartial can be the best way to deal with the menace.¹²⁹ The rule of law should also be adhered to the latter without any fear of contradiction;¹³⁰ and better conditions for conflict management; to be put in place.¹³¹ Terrorism has been argued by many scholars to be affecting the role of governments hence making the governments unable to provide better social amenities to the electorates.¹³² This has contributed to slower rate of societal growth and development.

4.3 Terrorism and Foreign Relations in Africa

As different administration – different presidents – come into power, they mostly target how to continue fueling the ailing African countries from terror attacks besides other challenges such as, poverty, unemployment, free basic education, lack of basic needs (food, shelter, medical care, clothing, among many. From the year 1993 during the time of president Bill Clinton until today when Donald Trump is the president of the US, hardly do they feel anything positive coming from Africa which of course can be traced back as at the end of WWII. This has affected adversely how African countries do relate internationally through foreign relations with the United States. Clinton administration failed Africa.¹³³ Bona fide African leaders who really wanted to save the continent were not appreciated at all by the West especially the United States during this period. Efforts to liberate African countries from autocratic regimes were not supported by the U.S. At this epoch of time in history there were autocratic governments in various countries in Africa, for instance Mali, Niger, Benin, Nigeria, Sierra Leon, Zambia among others. Enlargement of democracy was soon replaced by a certain group of war loads who masqueraded as peoples' leaders. The most astonishing

¹²⁷ Ross, J. I., (1993). "Structural causes of oppositional political terrorism: Towards a causal model". *Journal of Peace Research*, 30(3), pp. 317-329.

¹²⁸ Eyeran, J., (1998). "Terrorism and Democratic States: Soft Targets or Accessible Systems." *International Interactions*, 24(2), pp.151-170.

¹²⁹ Findley, M. G., & Young, J. K., (2011). "Terrorism, Democracy, and Credible Commitments." *International Studies Quarterly* 55(2), pp.357-578.

¹³⁰ Choi, S-W., & Salehyan, I., (2013). "No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Refugees, Humanitarian Aid, and Terrorism", *Conflict Management and Peace Sciences*, 30(1), pp. 53-75.

¹³¹ Li, Q., (2005). "Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(2), pp.278-297.

¹³² Fosu, A. K., (2013), "Growth of African Economies: Productivity, Policy Syndromes and the Importance of Institutions" *Journal of African Economies*, 22(4), pp. 523-551.

¹³³ Khadiagala, Gilbert M. 2001. "The United States and Africa: Beyond the Clinton Administration." *SAIS Review* 21(1):259-273.

thing is that when Clinton came to Africa in 1998, he applauded the new crop of warlords dubbing them “new leaders.” According to Clinton, there was no problem with the rise of these young African leaders ascending to power, what he outplayed was their ability to govern the continent. This team of “new leaders”, included: Zenawi Melez of Ethiopia, Kagame Paul of Rwanda, Museveni of Uganda and Isiah Aferweki of Eritrea, just to name but a few.

4.4 The Dynamics of Foreign Relations between Africa and America in an Age of Terror

U.S post-cold war foreign policy started shifting with the rise of terrorism. In the year 1998, the U.S bombed a “chemical factory in Sudan”, this was a reaction to the bombing that took place in the year 1998 at the U.S embassies in both Tanzania and Kenya.

According to Clinton administration, there was a menace awaiting the United States as it saw the rise of Muslim seeming to be replacing the good victory of cold war. The situation was further worsened by attacks on Washington D.C. and New York on 11th of September 2001.

U.S after thorough investigations came to conclude that the mastermind behind these attacks were Abu Mussa Alzarkawi and Osama Bin Laden who then were the leaders of the Terrorist group known as the Al Qaeda. U.S decided to put pressure on Sudan where it was said that Osama seems to have resided, this forced the government of Sudan to expel Osama to Afghanistan.

During this time, the Bush government had chosen to operate by the principles of isolationism policy on matters of Islamic states. For instance, the Bush administration hesitated intervening on the poised election of Algeria in 1991. The war on who should control Western Sahara had also aggravated momentum, however Bush had refused to intervene, Morocco had been claiming the territory, the claims were that Western Sahara ought to be party of Morocco referendum was carried out in Western Sahara by the U.N and the country voted in a sounding Yes for autonomy, Morocco had initially acquired this territory illegally since 1975.¹³⁴

The worst case of failure of Clinton’s foreign policy came during the crisis in both Somalia and Rwanda. U.S had taken too long to intervene; these civil wars claimed the lives of very

¹³⁴ Adebajo, Adekeye and Christopher Landsberg. 2003. “South Africa and Nigeria as Regional Hegemons.” In *From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Challenges*, edited by Mwesiga Baregu and Christopher Landsberg. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner.

many civilians. Clinton in secrecy, Clinton botched the mission in an attempt to hunt down Somalia's warlord Mohammed Farah. This was a secret move without the knowledge of the United Nations. By 1993, about one thousand Somalis had lost their lives while eighteen Americans soldiers too had similarly lost their lives. To prevent the Republicans at home from gaining political mileage, Clinton decided to recall the mission. Tactfully, Clinton decided to blame the United Nations hence blaming the disorganization of UN's soldiers in the Horn of Africa, he therefore recalled his soldiers back home. This mission was a total failure of Clinton's administration, it left Somalia in turmoil and up to date the country still remains fragile.¹³⁵

About six months later, Clinton decided to put pressure on the United Nations. The U.N was therefore forced to withdraw close to 2500 soldiers that didn't have any U.S citizen from peacekeeping, missions. He had underestimated the genocide in Rwanda. The genocide escalated and claimed the lives of more than one million Rwandans. These were cynical calculations that led to bloodbath and massacre in Rwanda, if UN had intervened earlier then lots of lives would have been saved, United States decided to bulldoze being the main funder of the organization..¹³⁶ According to Jendayi Frazer-then senior director for African Affairs at the Security Council affirmed the aforementioned argument by positing that Clinton's administration failed the world by not having a coherent policy established to address the genocide in Rwanda and the Somali crisis.¹³⁷

The next heir of the throne in the U.S was George W Bush who came with very weird foreign policies. Some scholars often describe them as arrogant and less informed. After the September 11, Bush decided to amplify the power of his administration in his attempts to nail the culprits.

It is evident that the U.S has been having a war in each and every time the world is in crisis. In the Second World War, the U.S fought Fascism and Nazism in Europe; during the cold war it tries flashing out communist ideals of Yugoslavia while in the post cold war the main elephant in the room has been war on terror.

. George Bush while declaring war on terror told the world that "You are either with us or against us, on this war." The term "axis of evil" was also coined in reference to countries that

¹³⁵ Hirsch, John L. and Robert B. Oakley, 1995. *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace.

¹³⁶ Melvern, Linda, 2000. *A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide*. London: Zed Books.

¹³⁷ Frazer, Jendayi E. 2003. "The United States." In *From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges*, edited by Mwesiga Baregu and Christopher Landsberg. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner.

seemed to hiding, breeding or assisting terrorists in executing their ill motives. Countries such as Iran, Iraq and North Korea were marked. These countries were considered rogue states.

Bush's arrogance heightened when he declared war on Iraq; a move that was opposed by some African's heads of states. Those opposing to Bush's move included Olesgun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Thabo Mbeki of the Republic of South Africa and Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal. They signed a letter to the United Nations, opposing Bush's move. After fear of sanctions from the U.S.D, President Abdoulaye Wade decided to take a U-turn and left his other colleagues. [Burkina Faso, Morocco, Kenya and Algeria also] opposed the war in public.¹³⁸ The U.S suspended military assistance to Nigeria,. Anti war demonstrations were also witnessed in Eritrea and Ethiopia. America crafted a team of her supporters called "the coalition of the willing", a coalition that was widely supported by African despots at that time. Dissent opinions to U.S move were dealt with severely for instance the case of Nigeria.¹³⁹

During Bush's tenure, Africa meant nothing to him, he often refer to it as a nation and not a continent despite his secretary of state Colin Powel being of African American descent.

4.5 Impact of Terrorism in Foreign Relations in the International Arena

According to Robert Malley and Jon Finer in their article on Counterterrorism and the United States' Foreign Policy, the September 11th attacks redefined Americas approach to terrorism leading to the American globalized war on terrorism a key hallmark of foreign policy of United States in the 21st century. It was in lieu of this that America took an undertaking that involved military incursions in Afghanistan and Iraq, torture and incarceration of detainees, and the warrantless surveillance of American citizens during the Bush Jr.'s era. With Barack Obama's political rise at the helm of American political power, there were minor changes influenced largely by liberal democratic traditions by establishing clearer guidelines instead of too much use of force during the Obama administration.. Couple of years later use of hard power was heightened as drones was used; he must have abandoned diplomacy and replaced it by use of force in the later years especially in the war against ISIS.¹⁴⁰

According to Natalia Umansky who assessed the impact of terrorists attacks all over the world and the with a key focus to securitization of migration in the United Kingdom and Spain, today

¹³⁸ *The Guardian* (Lagos, Nigeria), 2003b, "Nigeria to US: Don't Intimidate Us on Iraq." March 22, pp.1-2.

¹³⁹ Ibid

¹⁴⁰ Malley, Robert and Finer, Jon. *The Long Shadow of 9/11: How Counterterrorism Warps U.S. Foreign Policy.* Foreign Affairs; July/August 2018

terrorism and migration have become part of the international agenda. Umansky tried to measure and analyze the frequency by which certain words and vocabularies are used in various legislative arenas. The work delved deep in examining how both existence and non existence speech acts in both the British parliament and the Spanish parliament. This focused in the periods before, after and in between the London (2005) and the Madrid (2004) attacks. She then concluded in her findings that these two attacks had caused jitters and developed a securitization process of migration.¹⁴¹ The attacks made it more water tight for people from Islamic states to access Europe as the Muslims were being seen as a threat to security by some Europeans, especially the conservatives’.

Beall, Goodfellow and Putzel who examine the increasing nexus between security in the international system and international development of policies, particularly in the global North where forums of discussion of the menace have been held especially by the U.S who seem to be championing war on terror. The United States and several other multilateral organizations within the last two decades have changed their tacts on how to deal with issues of terrorism. This move has also been supported and embraced by some bilateral donors who in the past had encouraged selfish and less cooperation among states. In lieu of the foregoing, Beall, Goodfellow and Putzel further postulate, the incorporation of security concerns into development thinking has led to security and more so counter-terrorism to become a key principle in the global development agenda.¹⁴²

Political labelling has also gained traction as a currency of counter-terrorism in the global arena. This is best explained by André Barrinha who assesses Turkey’s discourse and terrorism on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).¹⁴³

According to Ahmet Davutoglu who examines Turkey’s foreign policy problems, the September 11th attacks made it clear that foreign relations in an increasingly globalized world with quite lethal non-state actors was no longer tenable. As such, immediately after the attacks,

¹⁴¹ Umansky, Natalia. What is the effect of terrorist attacks on the securitization of migration? Case studies from the UK and Spain. Student Paper Series No. 31. Retrieved from http://www.ibei.org/ibei_studentpaper31_71449.pdf

¹⁴² Beall, Jo and Goodfellow, Thomas and Putzel, James (2006) Introductory article: on the discourse of terrorism, security and development. *Journal of international development*, 18 (1). pp. 51-67

¹⁴³ Barrinha, André. The political importance of labelling: terrorism and Turkey’s discourse on the PKK. 2010. Retrieved online from <https://estudogeral.sib.uc.pt/bitstream/10316/42991/1/The%20political%20importance%20of%20labelling.pdf>

America was forced to initiate the process of replacing the liberal discourse of international relations that came new international order after the end of cold war.¹⁴⁴

According to Jennifer Mustapha who analyzes the issue of threat construction in Post-September 11th American foreign policy discourse by extrapolating on their implications in the far abroad, the American war on terror has been a salient feature of American foreign relations. Terror discourses, Mustapha argues, not only informs but also shape foreign policy; making terrorism to have massive impact to both non countries and organizations in the international system. Mustapha further contends that irruptions by the September 11 have shaped U.S foreign policy on how they deal with countries especially in the middle East. Securitization of Muslim has really heightened.¹⁴⁵

4.6 Conclusion

The impact of terrorism is widely negative than positive. Terrorism activities have tampered many countries economy. Governments have also been forced to shift their focus from development to security hence minimal development and growth is being registered. Massive lose of lives have been witnessed, destruction of property and change in foreign policy. As posited by Kenneth Waltz, we disagree to agree that the world is anarchic and the truth of the matter is that terrorism makes it more anarchic.

¹⁴⁴ Davutoglu, Ahmet. Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy Magazine. May 20, 2018. Retrieved online from <https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/05/20/turkeys-zero-problems-foreign-policy/>

¹⁴⁵ Mustapha, Jennifer. *Threat Construction in Post-9/11 US Foreign Policy Discourses: Implications for (Critical) Security in Southeast Asia*. 2008 Canadian Political Science Association Conference, Vancouver BC. June 4 2008. Retrieved online from <https://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2008/Mustapha.pdf>

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

5.1 Conclusion

This study observed that the security threats emanating from terrorism have forced the country to rethink its foreign relations as a security response. However, if the recommendations given above are followed and a program of action along their lines is effectuated, we can turn the tide on our favour as a country. The aforementioned recommendations need a collective approach and benchmarking with frequent revision of strategies so as to deal with terrorism menace amicably.

It is evident that terror activities has led to adverse effects on the state of security in Kenya with a “domino effect” on other sectors of this neighbor republic to the failed state that is Somalia. It is of utmost importance that there is a review of the various mechanisms so that we can have a multi-pronged approach to dealing with the various threats posed by terror activities and project the same in our foreign policy.

5.2 Key Findings

From the analysis of the data presented in the study concerning the influence terrorist activities have in conducting the country’s foreign relations, participants in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs totally disagreed that terrorism activities have changed or influenced on how countries conduct their foreign relations as 6% of the participants disagreed that terrorism activities have influenced the manner in which countries conduct their foreign relations. They argued that as long as terrorism groups have been in existence so are foreign policies. Although they gave another explanation that since the 9/11 bombing in the United States of America, the 1989 collapse of the famous Berlin wall, the end of cold war, and end of bipolar power politics, the conduct of foreign relations have really changed where of late countries have resulted to do it on line.

Relating to terrorism and other transnational crimes, majority strongly agreed that terrorism activities have a strong link with other transnational security threats such as, drug smuggling, corruption, money laundering, and climate change, proliferation of small and light weapons, migrant smuggling and human trafficking. This is to either protect their activities, obtain money to finance their activities, and also neutralize government officials who happen to challenge their activities.

From the study also it was evident that terrorists do change their ways of operations as the world evolves. A substantial number were of the strong opinion that as crime trends change government agencies fighting terrorism should also change to remain relevant. This was because due to advancement in technology and governments improving on thwarting the operations of terrorists, they also improved on how to execute their activities in an advanced level. Such levels including using internet to spread propaganda, carrying out recruitment on line, using remote controlled explosives than wire-connected and radicalized suicide bombers.

The analysis further indicated that 28% of the participants agreed with the view that terrorists continue changing their ways of operations and how they execute their activities as 22% of the participants in the study were neutral on the question which was posed on them regarding the operations of terrorism groups and the way they change. 8% of the respondents disagreed that terrorism groups do change their tactics as the world change pointing out that since they have not had direct exchange on how terrorists operate, they believed that they are out to kill, maim and destroy properties of law abiding citizens and that they normally used the same method and tactics to execute their operations. Also, 54% of the participants indicated that majority of the participants in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly agreed that terrorism activities and undertakings has effects on economic, social, psychological and political effects. They noted that economically, terrorist activities do drive away foreign tourists resulting to issuance of travel advisories, destruction of property once they execute a single target translating to loss of hundreds of thousands of shillings, loss of livelihood and destabilization of a country's economic base. Socially, when terrorists activities are carried out, they are aimed at threatening the government by causing massive life loss. When people loss life, they leave behind loved ones who are going to be separated forever. One participant gave an inference where a man of the house who happen to be a bread winner of the household, what huge gap should he leave in terms of parenting, provision of needs and companionship? Also, when youths are recruited to terrorist groups, they become separated socially from their parents this in turn affects people psychologically more so those affected directly by occurrence of terror activity. Majority of terrorist activities are politically motivated which are aimed at destabilizing a legitimately established government.

20% of the participants agreed that terrorism activities have effects to social, political, psychological and economic factors to the wellbeing of the country and its citizens. They said that since terrorists do not mean good to the existence of humanity and stable governments, they strive to cause havoc so that they can thrive and the end result will be to cause adverse

effects to the existing government structures. 10% of the participants were disagreed in regard to effects of terrorism activities to socio-economic, psychological and political factors while those participants who totally disagreed and neutral shared 8% respectively.

The analysis of the data collected also indicated that 6% of the participants' strongly disagreed that because of terrorism activities is the reason as to why Kenya has partnered with neighboring countries while 8% disagreed that Kenya is partnering with neighboring countries to fight terrorism activities but instead pointed out that there are serious crimes which should be dealt with jointly to minimize cases of terrorism. It was also noted from the analysis that 70% of those who took part in the interview strongly agreed that Kenya has tried and is trying to partner with neighboring countries to combat terrorism. They pointed out United Nations Security Council Resolution 1772 of 2007 which authorized African Mission in Somali (AMISOM) to take all necessary measures to *inter alia* protect transitional institutions in Somalia and stabilize the state. AMISOM was authorized to take up this responsibility in accordance to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2036, this was in 2012. So far the mission has really tried to achieve expulsion of Al-Shabaab militants. This case in point created cooperation between Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Sudan.

Participants in the study noted that Kenya's foreign policy has been changing as the world changes to accommodate emerging crimes which include terrorism. 4% of the participants strongly disagreed that while 2% disagreed that Kenya's foreign policy has been changing to accommodate emerging crime trends in totality for terrorism but also to amend and rectify areas which were obsolete and was not in tandem with the current presidential regimes. 6% had no clue the changes which were happening with the Kenya's foreign though they were aware the document existed. It was clear that 52% of those who took part in the interview agreed that Kenya's foreign policy has been changing to cater for other emerging crimes such as terrorism and adoption of international regulations dealing with administration and addressing emerging crimes. Also, from the analysis 36% of the participants strongly agreed that Kenya foreign policies have been changing based on change of presidency, international dynamics in trade and business oriented engagements, climate change and international relations. In totality, the participants agreed that Kenya's foreign policies have been evolving since independence.

In support of what might be making it difficult to fight terrorism, 46% of the participants strongly disagreed that Kenya's foreign relations has been tainted with unscrupulous dealings

which are most perpetuated by security agencies such as the Kenya Defense Forces, the National Police Service and the National Government Administration Officers. They suggested that since the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is a government entity, all its reporting and operations should be supported by evidence which was not available to confirm the allegations. They reiterated that relying on such information was to escalate into propaganda which will act in favor of the terrorist groups and their activities. Also, among the participants 22% disagreed with the statement that security agencies are the ones compromising security situations saying that if such happenings were being conducted they are not aware of such but termed the situation unfortunate. On the other hand, 14% of the participants agreed that Kenya's foreign relations have been so questionable which was squarely caused by security agencies as 6% strongly disagreed whereby they maintained that security agencies in the country have been doing commendable work hence reduced incidences of terrorism activities. They pointed out that being security conscious and governed by the rule of law, security organs will neither work to taint the relationship of Kenya with neighboring countries or perform contrary responsibilities besides the ones tasked; to maintain law and order and maintain the security of Kenyan borders.

Countries in the west (the United States of America, Britain, Russia, France, Italy, Germany and many more) have been so influential when countries in Africa formulate their foreign policies. 20% of the participants totally disagreed that there is influence by the western countries. This was because they focus on formulation of foreign policies as an up-scaled domestic policy which is vested in the globe as the leadership of a country deems it necessary. They pointed out that as the government formulates its foreign policies it must factor in domestic policies which is tied around politics and domestic affairs in that if western countries have interests which conflict with those of a country, such policies cannot be adopted. Also, they argued that a country as a sovereign entity with all capabilities to transact all the relations in the international arena, no any country can infiltrate or interfere with the processes of formulating policies. 14% disagreed that western countries do influence the formulation of Kenya's foreign policies saying that since the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of Cold War, countries have been given a lee way to come up with their own foreign policies and preferential conduct of international relations as the markets were liberalized. They indicated that the geo-politics between the two super powers – the US and Russia – played its magnificent role pre-Cold war. On the other hand, 44% of the participants were neutral in relation to influences the western countries have in formulation of Kenya foreign policy. They

noted that it is the prerogative of a country to either incorporate the interest of western countries or negate: probability of interests in the name of ‘democracy’. It can also be noted from the analysis that 18% of those who took part in the interview agreed that there is some sort of influence by the western countries on formulation of Kenya foreign policy which is informed by international relationships, diplomacy and conducting financial businesses. On the same, the study showed that 4% of participants strongly agreed that there is influence of western countries on the formulation of Kenya foreign policies.

5.3 Recommendations

The following recommendations need to be acted upon by the state in order to curb the issue of terrorism as covered in this study. These will vehemently help all the stakeholders that deal with issues of anti-terrorism, for instance security operatives, intelligence operatives as well as other researchers in the domain of international security and its impact in the international relations. All these are geared towards combating the various vices that are ravaging the Kenyan state and hollowing her and bringing to their knees key sectors of the Kenyan economy such as the tourism sector.

First, the government must stop being reactionary and be proactive in her effort to combat terrorism; this is key in counter terrorism strategy. This effort largely departs from the reactive stance that the government of Kenya and her security agencies has been employing. The main logic in this stance is so as to minimize chances of future attacks by terrorists and as a strategy to the effect that terrorists the world over have been known to lie in wait and ambush or astonish by striking at a time that I least expected and things seem to be normal; terrorists apply the principle of sudden attack. To this effect, this study recommends that the government to use a hybrid of both nontraditional and traditional power instruments in counter terrorism approach, for instance military and diplomacy, intelligence and law enforcement and better legislation.

Secondly, in order to improve the country’s efficiency in law enforcement as well as in enhancing intelligence gathering, the country’s security agencies should be trained well on counterterrorism tactics and techniques so as to be extremely professional while dealing with issues of terrorism. By doing this, the public outrage will gradually depreciate as they shall starts getting appreciations and commendations from the same public that is currently criticizing their actions. Public confidence will be boosted hence creating an opportunity for the security team to partner effectively and more efficiently with the public in not only war against terror but also other crimes within the country.

The government should provide the security operatives with better vehicles and communication tools so as to improve their efficiency in their operations. This is due to the fact that terrorism is attached to other crimes such as radicalization.

The government to invest more in forensic science to help in investigations and nailing of culprits that are involved in terrorists' activities. Construction of well equipped forensic science laboratories with the correct personnel are therefore a basic necessity for they shall facilitate efficient and effective investigations.

Kenya should exploit the financial muscle of her international allies to help. The government should also tackle corruption within the security agencies as well as at the Department of Immigration and Registration of Persons so as to reduce this force multiplier of terrorism.

Additionally, this study also calls for increased police – civilian cooperation as well as a citizen security directed security and the socialization of the populace into an effective security grouping. This is because such cooperation as well as the civic security competence component is critical for any attempt at building up intelligence extraction from society. It is also critical to enhancing citizen resistance to terrorists and criminals.

Finally, this study also recommends that there is a need for a regional approach, synchronized activities among countries and institutions as well as intelligence sharing. Additionally, the de-politicization and de-ethnicization of the country's security sector is also long overdue. There is also need for Kenya to lobby diplomatically for peace efforts in Somalia.

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APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRE

Introduction

I am a student in the University of Nairobi pursuing Master of Arts in International Studies. The purpose of this questionnaire is to collect data to be used in a research that investigates the effects of terrorism and the conduct of foreign relations in Kenya: A case of Kenyan experience since September 2001 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in International Studies.

Instructions:

You are requested to complete this questionnaire as honestly and objectively as possible. Use the space at the back of this questionnaire if you need more space for your responses. The information provided will be treated with confidentiality.

PART ONE: RESPONDENT'S PROFILE

1) What is your Gender?

Male Female

2) Age;

18 – 25 years
26 – 32 years
33 – 39 years
40 and above years

3) What is your highest academic qualification?

K. C.S.E Diploma Bachelors Masters
PhD

4) How many courses have you attended during on job training?

None between 1 and 2 between 2 and 3 above 3

5) For how long have you have you worked in the ministry of foreign affairs?

- Less than 1 year
- 1-5 years
- 6-10 years
- 11 years and above

6) What factors do you believe contributes to terrorism activities?

- Social factors
- Psychological factors
- Economic factors
- Political factors

7) Do you have any experience in relation to terrorist attack(s)?

- Yes
- No

8) If yes, which attack and what was the experience?

.....
.....
.....
.....

9) How do you rate cases of terrorism activities in Kenya?

- Very High
- High
- Medium
- Low
- Very low

PART TWO: EFFECT OF TERRORISM ACTIVITIES IN THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS IN KENYA.

Indicate your level of agreement with the following statements - where 1 represents (total disagreement) 2 (slightly agree) 3 (Neutral) 4 (Agree) 5 (Strongly agree).

	Statement	1	2	3	4	5
1.	Terrorism activities have an influence on the conduct of foreign relations					
2.	Terrorism activities are linked to other transnational security threats					
3.	Terrorists continue changing their ways of operations					
4.	Terrorism has an adverse effect on economic, social, psychological and political factors of countries					

PART THREE: THE STATUS OF KENYA FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH OTHER NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES

Indicate your level of agreement with the following statements - where 1 represents (total disagreement) 2 (slightly agree) 3 (Neutral) 4 (Agree) 5 (Strongly agree).

	Statement	1	2	3	4	5
1	Kenya has tried to partner with neighboring countries to jointly combat terrorism operations					
2	Kenyan foreign policies have been changing as the world changes so as to accommodate emerging crimes such as terrorism					
3	Kenya's foreign relations has been tainted with unscrupulous dealings which are most perpetuated by security operatives such as Kenya Defense Forces, the National Government Administration Officers and the National Police Service					
4	Change in foreign policy has been influenced by the Western countries such as the USA and Britain					

PART FIVE: OTHER INFORMATION

- i) Apart from above issues that affect the conduct of Foreign Relations, what other issues do you think the Kenya government should address the effects of terrorism activities which has an influences conduct of foreign relations?

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.....
.....

What are your recommendations on the identified areas in (i) above?

.....
.....
.....

What do you think should the Kenyan government put in place to reduce terrorism activities in the country to a manageable level or do away with it all together?

.....
.....
.....

THANK YOU FOR YOUR RESPONSE