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COUNTERING TERRORISM THROUGH YOUTH DERADICALISATION IN AFRICA: CASE STUDY OF KENYA

BY

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DECLARATION

I, **Francis Blessings Kakhuta-Banda,** hereby declare that this dissertation is my original work and has not been presented for any award of Diploma or Degree in any other University.

Signature…………………………………..……Date…………………………….……..…

Francis Blessings Kakhuta-Banda

This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as university supervisor.

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DEDICATION

This work has been dedicated to my wife Vitowe Kakhuta-Banda and children for enduring my long absences during my numerous study trips abroad, and to all the youth whose innocence was either taken or forced to give it away.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ABSTRACT

Kenya currently finds itself on the frontline fighting youth radicalization. Over the past 29 years Kenya has faced this challenge which includes horrendous terrorist attacks at Garissa and West Gate Mall among others. Young people who had been radicalized by a network of people born in Kenya carried out the attacks. The attacks exposed that the youth continue to be radicalized in the country and remain vulnerable. This has become a serious threat to national security.

This research project looks objectively on why young people are being radicalized in Kenya and become terrorists; and how governments can counteract it; also to determine the causes of terrorism and sources of finance. Additionally, the study aimed to investigate youth radicalization and extremism in Africa. Furthermore, to examine counter-terrorism measures against youth radicalization. The conceptual framework of Relative Deprivation is used to inform the study in understanding the phenomenon of radicalization, data collection and analysis guidance.

The findings of the study show that young people continue to be radicalized due to relative deprivation because of unemployment, marginalization, poverty, religion and peer pressure among others. The Kenyan government is called to step up efforts by promoting economic emancipation among marginalized communities by addressing youth unemployment and involving them in politics. The government needs to neutralize extremist indoctrination efforts, prevent and counter hate speech, extremist propaganda and conspiracy theories grounded on the internet. Furthermore, efforts on domestic politics to demystify Islam should increase. There is need to consider inclusion of radicalization in school curricula. The focus should include teaching human rights, upholding respect and diversity as a way to shape one's identity and counteract the negative influence like violent extremist ideologies. Funding for organizations and institutions should be increased and the government should continue to monitor the phenomenon of radicalization of youth in mosques, schools, universities and social media.

ABBREVIATIONS

ATPU	-	Anti-Terrorism Police Unit
CVE	-	Countering Violent Extremism
FARC	-	Armed Forces of Colombia
FBI	-	Federal Bureau of Intelligence
HDI	-	Human Development Index
ICT	-	Information, Communication and Technology
IIRO	-	International Islamic Relief Organization
ISIS	-	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
LEIA	-	Law Enforcement and Independent Agency
MUHURI	-	Muslim for Human Rights
MRC	-	Muslim Republic Council
NGO	-	Non Governmental Organization
PLO	-	Palestine Liberation Organization
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Program
UN	-	United Nations
VERLT	-	Violent Extremism and Radicalization Leading to Terrorism
VNSAS	-	Violent Non-state Actors
WAMY	-	World Assembly for Muslim Youth

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CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

1.0   Introduction

Youth radicalization is turning into the most domineering risk to the global security framework on the planet today and is due to an intricate link of political, religious, and ideological grievances.[1] Socially isolated in some cases, disenchanted youth fall back on fanaticism with a point to find their identity, usefulness and gain acceptance.[2] Youth radicalization is a menace to modern humanity. As such, it is a common problem faced by both security and police agencies around the world. Religious motives are the driving factor for this global problem. These motives seek to influence the youth to radical ideas and violent extremism. Despite peaceful coexistence and tolerance among world populations with different origins and opinions, extreme violence which is preceded by radicalization processes remains a threat to the world. Radicals can organize, plan and recruit much more effectively in around the globe using the internet in a broad propaganda effort. For well over two decades, terrorist groups have utilized the means of radicalization, incitement, and propaganda that lead to violence as their operational tactic.[3]

However, youth radicalization in the Western world particularly in United States, Europe and Australia, is attributed to the presence of charismatic "hate preachers" like

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[1] Maha Azzam, The Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Europe: Local and Global Dimensions, *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 13(2), (2007): 123-134.

[2] Margarita Bizina & David H. Gray, Radicalization of Youth as a Growing Concern for Counter-Terrorism Policy, *Global Security Studies,* 5(1), (2014).

[3] Carl Ungerer, Current Trends in International Terrorism an Australian Perspective. *SEARCCT'S Selection of Articles.* 2, (2011). Available:
http://www.searcct.gov.my/images/PDF_My/publication/searccts_selection_of_articles_vol2.pdf#page=118. Accessed: 14-07- 2017.

Omar Bakri in London and Abdul Benbrika in Australia. [4] These pose threats to public order, indoctrinate others to commit violence, propagate ideas about Islamic caliphate and in general undermine fundamental values. [5] In most cases they may use social media to peddle their extreme views. Their presence and sermons are key to converting some young people towards becoming violent. According to Security Watch, in 2014 it was reported that about 5000 individuals from Europe went to fight with the militias in Syria and Iraq, with France as the biggest contributor to the jihadist. An estimated 325,000 Muslims are at risk of becoming radicals.[6] Africa contributes a big number of Jihad fighters due to its higher youth unemployment rates. In terms of susceptibility or vulnerability to radical ideas, youth around the world are doubtlessly 'at risk' because radicals usually control the equipment of private and public institutions such as local governments, universities and mosques. In addition, the extremist groups, especially young women, represent an opportunity for continuity of their organization in future to strengthen and propagate the radical ideologies and values as they cannot easily be suspected or identified.[7] Therefore, there is need to combat platforms and mechanisms for terrorist recruitment and planning from abroad and the self-radicalized, informal networks which feed off terror ideologies to the youth. Eventually, these interventions will reduce

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[4] Carl Ungerer, Current Trends in International Terrorism an Australian Perspective. *SEARCCT'S Selection of Articles.* 2, (2011). Available:
http://www.searcct.gov.my/images/PDF_My/publication/searccts_selection_of_articles_vol2.pdf#page=118. Accessed: 14-07- 2017.
[5] Security Watch, How many Muslim extremists are there? January 13, 2015. Available: https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/terrorism-security/2015/0113/How-many-Muslim-extremists-are-there-Just-the-facts-please. Accessed: 14-07- 2017.
[6] Security Watch, How many Muslim extremists are there? January 13, 2015. Available: https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/terrorism-security/2015/0113/How-many-Muslim-extremists-are-there-Just-the-facts-please. Accessed: 14-07- 2017.
[7] Remy Mahzam, Youth and Women Radicalisation in Singapore: Case of SyaikhahIzzah, RSIS Commentary No. 119, 15 June 2017. Available: https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/CO17119.pdf. Accessed: 20-07-2017.

the appeal of extremist narratives that provide alternative pathways for young individuals being incited by terrorist propaganda.

1.1   Background to the study

The definition of the word terrorism still remains unresolved. However, it has often denoted political violence that has led many to challenge its definition. Others want the word "terrorism" to be called "freedom fighters", "holy warriors" or "revolutionaries" based on what is being defended.[8] There is a consensus among many scholars such as Schmid, Lutz just to mention a few, that terrorism is disputed hence the variations of its meaning.[9] A study done in 2003 came up with 109 definitions of the term terrorism which covered 22 different elements of definition. In all these definitions, violence is central and is used for political gains by all actors.[10] However, to it is not easy to determine whether the violence is legitimate and for what purpose.

Scholars like Berg, Stephens, Best, Nicella and Schmid define terrorism to be an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individuals or groups for personal, criminal or political reasons, whereby, in contrast to an assassination, the direct victims are not main victims.[11] Prompt human casualties are arbitrarily targeted from the population. Very few of those labeled terrorists describe themselves as such because they trust that they are battling for a noble cause while it ends up noticeably regular for rivals to call and portray the other side practicing it as terrorists.

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[8] Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response*. 2nd Ed. (USA and Canada: Taylor and Francis Group, 2006): 1.
[9] Alex P. Schmid & Albert J. Jongman*, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, databases, Theories and Literature*, (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1988): 5; and James M. Lutz & Brenda J. Lutz, *Global Terrorism*, 2nd Ed, (London and New York, Routledge, 2010): 7.
[10] Schmid, AP, etal, Academic Consensus definition of Terrorism, (United Nations Website: 1998).
[11] Ibid.

The word "terrorism" was first used in the era of Jacobins during the revolutionary state known as "the French Revolution reign of Terror", where violence was used not only to force noncompliants, but also to threaten enemies to the current regime.[12] At that time the term was associated with violence and intimidation of the state and in the mid-19th century, non-governmental groups started being associated with the term. However, non-state actors seeking to undermine or destroy a legitimate government by means of coercive intimidation pose a major threat of terror in an operative democracy.[13]

Globalization and opposition to Western occupation in Muslim countries have led to international and national terrorism. The first concerns citizens of different countries; while the second is confined in a single state and does not involve foreign citizens. However, all protracted domestic terrorist campaigns have an important international dimension as it creates a support network abroad for raising finances, personnel, arms and other resources for the struggle. Most of these terrorist groups want to topple governments perceived as not obliging to the fundamentals of 'true Islam' and cooperating with USA and its allies.[14] This is because they feel that the Western Muslim community is underrepresented in public life and experiences injustice;[15] for example, they believe that prisons have more Muslims than other faith groups and are poorly housed.[16] This is probably the crucial factor contributing to tensions between Western community and Muslims, which in turn propagates violence. Therefore, its main purpose is to introduce a

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[12] Gerard Chaliand, *The History of terrorism: from Antiquity to al Queda*, (University of California Press, 2006).

[13] Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response*. Op Cit, pp 3.

[14] Ibid., 5

[15] Murshed, S. M., & Pavan, S. Identity and Islamic Radicalization in Western Europe. *Civil Wars,* 13(3), (2011): 259-279.

[16] Awan, AN., Antecedents of Islamic Political Radicalism among Muslim communities in Europe. PS: *Political Science & Politics*, 41(1), (2008): 13-17.

caliphate that brings together all Muslims. In this respect, some terrorists strongly believe that terrorism will work for them in the end and this encourages them to intimidate their opponents into submitting to terrorist demands.

African states like Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania previously thought terrorism was a western issue as it was believed to be a struggle between the West, mainly the USA and the Muslim world due to illegal occupation by the Israelis of Palestine. Many African states have been victims of this scourge called "domestic terrorism" which includes; "Terrorist acts commonly perpetrated by local groups within the state to overthrow a government or gain local political advantage".[17] In Africa, terrorism is multi-dimensional and is used to destroy, kill, maim and affect the fabric of the state. States like Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, and Somalia have suffered in one form or the other due to insecurity problems from terror groups with roots from Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab. School children, security personnel, churches and the local populace have become victims of attacks in addition to indiscriminate abduction and murder.

Different people have been the target of extremist propaganda and radicalization efforts for long time. Women's radicalization and their roles in terrorism have also been noticeable. The youth are targeted as they are frustrated with life and this vulnerability is exploited by the terrorist organizations. Moreover, membership provides sense of identity, prestige or pride, and acceptance regardless of economic and social status. Therefore, there is need to put in place measures to stop any extreme radical threats, especially

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[17] Wafula Okumu & Anneli Botha, Domestic Terrorism in Africa: Defining, Addressing and Understanding it's Impact on Human Security, *Institute for Security Studies,* (2007).

strategies to address youth interactions online.[18] Extremist messages are easily made available with the use of digital technology and social media networks which can be accessed by all age groups. The youth are the most vulnerable due to being the most active media consumers.[19] The media exposes them to extreme religious radical ideologies. Prolonged exposure to terrorist propaganda enables the youth to explore their identity, interact with peers and develop relationships through social network sites, online chats and blogs, which consequently deepen youth radicalization over time.

The type of radicalization in this context is about resorting to terror which is different to the one that rejects terrorism and violence. Azzam notes that in many cases, the radicalized minority ideology has been driven by a sense of alienation and isolation from the host community. Terrorist groups capitalize on political disaffection to conduct recruitment exercises, and theology provides an accessible lexicon for political discourse. However, their "revolutionary" ideology enables to step outside their adopted societies and participate in violence.[20] Therefore, concerns shared by others in society are causes of radicalization which makes it a central issue. As such, radicalization development is believed not to occur in isolation but rather together with other societal patterns worldwide.[21] According to Weimann, "There are different local and global groups and networks that provide channels for recruitment and radicalization through the mosque, the

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[18] Remy Mahzam, Youth and Women Radicalization in Singapore: Case of Syaikhah Izzah, RSIS Commentary No. 119, June 15, 2017. Accessed Aug 20, 2017: https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/CO17119.pdf.

[19] Remy Mahzam, Youth and Women Radicalization in Singapore: Case of Syaikhah Izzah, RSIS Commentary No. 119, June 15, 2017. Accessed Aug 20, 2017: https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/CO17119.pdf.

[20] Maha Azzam, Op Cit.

[21] Maha Azzam, Op Cit.

Internet, or even the sports center."[22] To deal with this challenge; countries are coming up with counter-terrorism efforts to try and address youth radicalization. These counter-terrorism measures include practices, tactics, methods and strategies that governments adopt to deal with terrorist threats or radicalization.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Terrorism pervasiveness globally has been a worry for various nations. According to Institute for Economics and Peace; in 2014, 32,685 individuals died from terrorist attacks around the world.[23] The world has heard, perused, watched and experienced terrorism. The USA, United Kingdom (UK), France, Kenya, Nigeria, Egypt, and Algeria are among some of the nations that have been affected and encountered the torment of terrorism. The most difficult part of it all is that terrorists have started recruiting the youth into their groups and persuade them to perform fatal attacks for the good of God and wounded philosophies. Numerous young people regardless of their scholastic background, race, religion or financial status have fallen prey to the propaganda engendered by terrorist groups. Therefore, authorities face challenges to counteract and curb youth radicalization while terrorists continue to develop strategies to target and attract the youth.

In Kenya, issues to do with ethnicity and religion among others have divided the country politically and socially since independence with Kikuyu as the largest ethnic group. The Kikuyus represent about 22 %, Luhya 14%, Luo 12.38%, Kalejin 12 % and

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[22] Gabriel Weimann, Terrorist Dot Com: Using the Internet for Terrorist Recruitment and Mobilization, in *The Making of a Terrorist,* ed. James Forest (Westport and London: Praeger Security International, 2006), 53-6

[23] Melissa Clarke, Global Terrorism Index, The Institute for Economics and Peace, 2014. Available: http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2015/s4353664.htm. Accessed: 23-05-2018.

Kamba 11%, kisii and Meru 6 % respectively of the national population.[24] This has developed into serious threat to security as some feel being oppressed by those in authority as the majority are from certain tribes. Furthermore, the rural-urban divide continues to polarize politics in Kenya. Consequently, Somalia's growing Islamist radicalism with Al-Shabaab movement has spread to Kenya. This movement has established a cross-border presence and a clandestine network among Muslim populations in Kenya where the youth are radicalized and recruited by capitalizing on enduring complaints against the government. These youth suffer from unemployment, poverty and political marginalization. There are high youth unemployment levels and high rates of political disenchantment. About 75% of young people are unemployed.[25] Despite Kenya being a secular country, historical and political marginalization has kept the youth in the periphery on matters to do with national issues.[26] A good example is Kenya-Somalis in northeast Kenya who have been marginalized. The area has been neglected for many years in terms of development as it has been profiled as bleeding ground for violent extremism. Such influences of marginalization and segregation have contributed to youth radicalization. Consequently, these radicalized youth have turned into terrorists. To that end, this study intends to understand; why young people are being radicalized in Kenya and become terrorists; and how governments can counteract so that the youth are not radicalized.

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[24] Nixon Aswani, Kenya population by tribe as of 2018, Tuko 2018. Available: https://www.tuko.co.ke/269810-kenya-population-by-tribe-2018.html#269810. Accessed: 23-05-2018.

[25] USAID, Education and Youth, http://kenya.usaid.gov/programs/education-and-youth/51, (2013).

[26] Anneli Botha, Assessing the vulnerability of Kenyan youths to Radicalization and Extremism, ISS Paper 245, ISS, Pretoria. (2013).

1.3   Objectives of the Study

The main objective of the study is to understand youth radicalization and how terrorism can be countered through youth de-radicalization. More specifically, the study seeks:

a.   To understand the causes of terrorism and sources of finance.

b.   To investigate youth radicalization and extremism in Africa.

c.   To understand why many youths are recruited, radicalized and turn into terrorists.

d.   To examine counter-terrorism measures against youth radicalization in Kenya.

1.4   Literature Review

This section of the study focuses on reviewing literature on youth radicalization and terrorism. It will discuss the undercurrents of youth radicalization and motivations for the youth to participate in violent fanaticism, the evolution and factors surrounding radicalization.

1.4. 1   Undercurrents of Youth Radicalization and Motivations

The world has experienced terrorism and in Africa; Kenya, Nigeria, and Algeria have encountered the torment of terrorism. The most difficult part of it is that terrorists are now recruiting the youth into their ranks and file. A growing trend of child exploitation in the world has resulted in disruption of families and ruining lives of vulnerable and impressionable young children. Youth are targeted, groomed and coerced into committing serious acts of violence which may lead them to become instruments of radicalization.

Youth radicalization is a multifaceted phenomenon that can't be ascribed to anyone clarification or set of components.[27] There are growing debates surrounding radicalization and the factors behind it. Hoffer suggested that for the 'genuine devotee' (somebody so dedicated to a reason that he or she is eager to irrationally die for it), it was the disappointment of life which drove them to join, a reason that gave them significance to their own existence. The more disappointed the youth felt, the more pulled in and powerless they were towards extreme revolutionary answers for their issues.[28] This remark precisely portrays the progression and relations between youth radicalization and terrorism.

1.4.2 Ideological and Political Positions

There are shared ideological and political positions which tend to be well thought-out in the investigation of radicalization. The orientation awareness of radicals is embedded in concerns shared by others publicly and must be central to our comprehension of radicalization. This implies that radicalization development is believed not to occur in isolation but rather together with other societal patterns worldwide. Violent extremism is not related to a specific religion, nationality, human advancement or ethnic gathering. In actuality, because of its worldwide dimension, radicalization poses danger to the security and central privileges all citizens of societies. Therefore, urgent need to address youth-based radicalization and extremism prompting violence is required.[29] All relevant

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[27] Raeesah Cassim Cachalia, Irene Ndung'u & Uyo Salifu. The Dynamics of youth radicalization in Africa: Reviewing the current evidence. *Institute for Security Studies.* ISS Paper 296, August 2016.

[28] Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements*. Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2010.

[29] Preventing violent extremism and radicalization of youth, A message from Ahmad Alhendawi, UN Secretary General's Envoy on Youth. Available: http://en.unesco.org/ConfQcUNESCO/home. Accessed: Aug 20, 2017.

stakeholders nationally and internationally require a strong commitment, cooperation, and coordination to deal with this complex challenge.

There are two categories of recruitment. The one that benefits the terrorist group and the other that benefits the youth. Youth recruitment and radicalization enables the terrorist groups to fill their ranks and file, which is essential to their continued presence. In addition, it reduces the risk of detection by security forces and this allows them to achieve their mission.[30] However, no evidence suggests that a terrorist group face significant adverse repercussions for youth recruitment to advance its objectives. The youth who are frustrated and facing vulnerabilities are likely attracted as the group offers to meet their personal needs which their social or familial networks have failed to address or assist.

Poverty, lack of shelter and food and inadequate access to education are some of the difficulties that the youth continue to face in Africa.[31] The terrorist groups have capitalized on these difficulties facing the youth by offering them a relief using martyrdom. However, there is no direct correlation between the radicalized youth or those susceptible and poverty-stricken areas, or conflict zones to one's education advancement. Both the rich and poor youth may lack some social amenities such as a sense of community, family, or friendships which are provided through membership in terrorist groups.[32] Therefore, membership in such groups offers the youth identity, status or self-importance, acceptance, obligation, outlets for frustration, and excitement. Additionally, it has been observed that the common view of mistreatment, exclusion, denial, and

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[30] Homeland Security Institute, Recruitment, and radicalization of School-Aged Youth by International Terrorist Groups, 23 April 2009, Final Report Prepared for U.S. Department of Education, Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools. Homeland Security Institute.
[31] Dipak K. Gupta, *Understanding Terrorism, and Political Violence: The Lifecycle of Birth, Growth, Transformation, and Demise,* (London and New York, Taylor and Francis Group, 2008): 11-12.
[32] Ibid.

marginalization frequently breeds radicalism which consequently prompts well organized violence in societies.[33] Issues to do with anger, alienation, national or religious rights may enhance extreme radicalization and this may lead to violent activities.[34]

Some argue that "while discrimination and racism are factors like in the USA where race, religion, and politics are some Americas most divisive issues, it is frequently individuals from accomplished, white-collar class backgrounds who end up noticeably associated with Islamic terrorism."[35] This is religious terrorism while other forms are State, Right-wing and Left-wing terrorism. However, Amghar argued that "this can seem contradictory and does not fit with the perceived theory but most of those involved are not from the working-class backgrounds."[36] This should be completely astounding as in the 1970s the Red Brigade which was a terrorist organization in Italy had middle-class members among its ranks as well as intellectuals and were responsible for murders and violent incidents. The present relative absence of opportunity for Islam discourse can help in explaining how the ideology can lead to terrorism.

Locuzi has pointed out that traditional Islamic doctrine of celebrated self-immolation and martyrdom which incorporates targeting and executing Jews and Christians. Jews have been targeted in Israel, Ukraine, and Kenya- Mombasa. The doctrine tells Muslims to fight infidels or be condemned to hell.[37] Such teachings provide a perfect ground for conscription to violence and terrorism and develop into a root cause

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[33] Amidu Sanni, Institutionalising Terror in the Name of Religion and Polity: The Nigerian Youth and the Cosmos of Violence. *Africa Development*, Vol. XXXVI, Nos 3 & 4, (2011): 39-54, Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa.
[34] Ibid.
[35] The Brussels Times, Brussels debate on the factors behind radicalization and jihadist violence in Europe, 27th November, 2015. Available: brusselstimes.co./eu-affairs/4582/brussels-debate.on-the-factorsradicalisation-and-jihadist-violence-in-Europe. Accessed: 7-07-2017.
[36] The Brussels Times, Ibid.
[37] Ibid.

for Islamic radicalization. Religious violence is as old as history and; religion and political issues are perfect partners or associates and the collaboration between both makes positive and negative improvements.[38]

Historically, many irate (those who feel deprived because of being oppressed, excluded, denied and marginalized) and combative youth in the Muslim world have had many causes willing to die for. Al-Qaeda's achievements and other various Islamist movements and groups have influenced and contributed to radicalization in Europe. This is the case when their mission and objective of conducting the attack is successfully achieved. Moreover, Salafism and Wahhabism which are every now and again placed as radical translations of Islam have propelled an aggregate religious reason for action. Salafism is just an "orthodox" ideology of Islam and numerous radicals in Europe recognize this translation as a method for touching what they see to be an Islam unsullied by degenerate society.[39] It likewise needs to be noted that moderate Muslims would likewise view themselves as Salafi in soul. Then again, Wahhabism is a generally strict type of Islam honed mostly in Saudi Arabia. Its alleged anti-modernist stand is prevalently seen as perfect source of radical Islamists, through the madrassas in Pakistan. Nonetheless, huge numbers of the fundamental Wahhabi scholars in Saudi Arabia have been among the earliest and most vocal adversaries of suicide bombings, because suicide is theologically undesirable. The concern with concentrating on Salafism and Wahhabism as wellsprings for radicalization is that this kind of thought postures excessively a wide

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[38] Poland Jacquard, In *the Name of Osama Bin Laden: Global Terrorism and the Bin Laden Brotherhood*, translated by George Holsch, Durham, (NC/ London: Duke University, 2002).
[39] Maha Azzam, Op Cit.

attack on what are basically traditionalist religious conventions. These customs constitute a moderate perspective onto which youthful radicals join their legitimization of violence.

1.4.3 Factors for Radicalization

Studies on radicalization have implicated factors such as fury due to injustice and moral superiority. Additionally, identities, purposes, promises of adventure and becoming heroes among groups have equally been implicated.[40] Religion and belief system enhance and propagate conflicting attitudes among citizens. This brings rationalization for violence against those who belong to groups that are regarded "the enemy".[41] Such groups of people further argue that if radicalization to brutal fanaticism was exclusively a matter of religious conviction, at that point we would need to accept that elective religious translations could guide individuals from violence. Shockingly, the youth are pulled in by a feeling of injustice and wind up plainly persuaded that Islam condones violence and need to wage war to demonstrate their dedication. In these special cases, the youth are influenced by the teachings and consequently think about some other elucidations of Islam to be untrue. In addition, sensible sheiks and their devotees are named as mavericks and partners of the west, and not as a component of "genuine" Islam.

1.4.4 Psychological Factors

Segaller contends for need to conduct a psychological study of terrorist motivation, personality, and character to understand the phenomenon of terrorism and

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[40] Anne Aly, The Role of Islam in Radicalisation is grossly overestimated, Available: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jan/14/the-role-of-islam-in-radicalisation-is-grossly-overestimated. Accessed: 13-07- 2017.
[41] Anne Aly, The Role of Islam in Radicalisation is grossly overestimated, Available: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jan/14/the-role-of-islam-in-radicalisation-is-grossly-overestimated. Accessed: 13-07- 2017.

radicalization.[42] Careers and personalities of terrorists and radicals in Italy were analyzed by assessing the demographic, sociological and life history detail of the cases to observe the social trends towards terrorism and applied detailed psychological tests. If we consider a repressive society, common sense may indicate that many people will go against it. On the off chance that we think about an abusive society or cause, good judgment may demonstrate that numerous individuals will conflict with it. If the problem of terrorism is to be solved terrorists should not be labeled crazy or insane. It was observed that if a teenager starts behaving anti-socially, then he or she is more likely to move on towards terrorism and getting involved in an extreme-right group. However, Post observed this is more descriptive than prescriptive and notes the absence of one terrorist "mindset."[43] The expression of aggression to strike is because the terrorists feel that someone is responsible for their suffering and inadequacy.

The acts of terrorism by the anarchic-ideologies are taken in retaliation against the genuine and envisioned damages against their general public and guardians while some like nationalists will counter against society for the hurt done to their people. Therefore, these are deeds of allegiance to parents hurt by the administration. This approach allowed Post to generalize combination of factors which may make youth be radicalized and become terrorists. It can be concluded that an individual who is dedicated to his or her parents who are devoted to the regime will not be radicalized and become a terrorist; whereas if not faithful to parents who are loyal to the regime may become a terrorist as well as being loyal to parents who dissent from the regime may become a terrorist.[44]

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[42] Stephen Segaller, *Invisible Armies: Terrorism in the 1990s*, (London, Michael Joseph, 1986): 75-77.
[43] Ibid. pp 78.
[44] Ibid. pp 79.

Furthermore, there is an inclination for marginal, secluded and deficient people from hurt family foundations to be radicalized and take the lane of terrorism as they feel upset with society. This is supported by a research report "Belonging Nowhere: Marginalization and Radicalization Risk among Muslim Immigrants" conducted by Professor Sarah Lyons-Padilla of Stanford University who interviewed 198 first and second generation Muslim immigrants residing in the US and found that Muslims who feel marginalized often experienced loss of meaning or loss of belonging, meaningful existence, control and self-esteem, feelings of humiliation, shame, despair and anger; are at greater risk of radicalization.[45] For example, if someone is coming from a tribe which is marginalized or from a very poor family, will likely be radicalized. In that case, they may feel that a terrorist group represents a family.

Some are radicalized due to superficially ideological reason as they need to be loyal to the cause. However, the normal trend is for the terrorist to come from the middle class and lower middle class, broken families from migrant families from rural areas and from families where a father was absent; and will be educated to university level in Humanities, Political Science or Law.[46] Women who belong to the left also join on equality basis and bear arms, plant bombs and conduct killings. On the contrary, some come from stable families with untroubled personal histories like Osama bin Laden, best known terrorist and richest from powerful and wealthy Saudi family, with personal fortune estimated to be 300 million US dollars. While some manifest symptoms of inadequacy, history of deprivation, deficient sense of self-esteem, narcissistic wounds, and

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[45] Sarah Lyons-Padilla, Marginalization, discrimination create greater risk of radicalization for immigrants April 5, 2016. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and responses to Terrorism. Available: http://www.start.umd.edu/news/marginalization-discrimination-create-greater-risk-radicalization-immigrants. Accessed: 25-02-2018.
[46] Ibid. pp 81.

extreme extroverts; and conceited with no respect for the sentiments of others. In this case, group psychology offers more insights on how the youth are radicalized, and how terrorists operate as there is uniformity of terrorist behavior and dynamics of group psychology. This is so because for the first the new recruit to terrorism feels belonging to a group. Therefore, people are radicalized for personal reasons and not mainly due to ideological reasons. This is the refuge for the lonely, rejected and sad, and a key concept in the psychology of the recruit is the relief at joining. Post proposes that the attraction of terrorist group membership operates in the same way, to the marginalized individual: 'if the only time you have really felt good about yourself is when plotting the destruction of the establishment, then however you get in-youthful adventures, the drug culture, or really aggressive/ paranoid bent- the group takes over, and the individual differences melt away.'[47]

Therefore, the terrorist group represents the first real sense of belonging after a moment of rejection and becomes the family for emotional support and protection from danger. The "us against them" framework also helps to sort out differences and motivates the group to destroy others in order to bring justice to the world and increases group solidarity. The other issue to be radicalized with is the willingness to shed innocent blood. The terrorist thinks that he or she is in a state of war with the enemy or the state and that in war there will be innocent causalities. This can be due to a heritage of struggle, family or cultural tradition or history of generations who have fought before. Otherwise, there is no personal element in violence but an attachment to something like a group or family. Whatever the individual motivation to commit an act of murder or violence, remains a

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[47] Ibid. pp 83.

process of the group as there is no an isolated terrorist. The individual is pushed by the group pressure to participate in violent actions and gain respect from the members. The personal commitment to terrorism submerges the individual to the collective policy or view and without any flexibility.

1.4.5 Globalization Factor

According to US State Department report "Patterns of Global Terrorism,"[48] there is a surge of terrorism in Africa. This information has been further supported by the Global Terrorism Barometer, 2015 which noted that since the early 1990s, a new threat stemmed from groups of individuals with comparable foundations and convictions, who resort to terror as a method for striking against their enemies.[49] While Cilliers observed that early effective countermeasures from North Africa were able to halt the expansion of radical terror further afield;[50] globalization remains a critical factor in the spread of international terrorism through internet, mobile phones and online networking by terror groups in recruitment, organizing attacks and spreading fear in a particular country or region, as seen with ISIS. However, the realities of shootings, assassinations, kidnappings or hijackings are popular modus operandi for terror in Africa.[51] According to Botha and Solomon, Islamic extremism does present a real threat to regional and international security on the African region due to the establishment of terror links that have devastating consequences, as witnessed in the terror activities in Eastern Africa.[52] They further claim that the reason behind these terror attacks lies in the arguments that Africa is

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[48] Patterns of Global Terrorism, United States Department of State, May 2002, Available: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10319.pdf. Accessed: 07-09-2017.
[49] Global Terrorism Index. Institute for Economics & Peace, (New York, 2015).
[50] Cilliers, J., Terrorism, and Africa. *African Security Studies*, 12(4), (2003): 91-103.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Anneli Botha & Solomon, H., Terrorism in Africa. *In Defense Journal*, Centre for International Political Studies, (2005): 129.

source of transnational terror activities as well as due to deficiency or lack of interest and political will of some African governments to pro-actively counter this threat.

1.4.6   Challenges Facing the Youth

There are currently three main groups that are highly active and generate terror in the North, West, and East of Africa, namely Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the North, Boko Haram in Westen Africa mainly Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in East Africa. Al-Shabaab which means "the Youth", targets mainly the youth due to their vulnerability to recruitment and are at that stage in life of trying to establish the political "self" and more vulnerable to different forms and beliefs of radicalization. Further, young people are more idealistic as they face a lot of challenges and grievances. They also become easy targets for recruitment and radicalization because of lacking political and socioeconomic participation.[53] The youth in Somalia face a lot of challenges due to socio-economic conditions, lack of education, unemployment and lack of political space. The issue of collective identity and sense of belonging contributes to the radicalization of almost complete societies in the region of East Africa, of which the major contributing factors are the economic conditions, killing of Muslims in Iraq and Palestine.[54] The other important thing to note about Al-Shabaab is that it operates differently from the other terrorist groups. While it has highly invested in intelligence-gathering capabilities, its use of coercion, intimidation, bribery and direct murder to collect information, forces many youths into co-operating out of the fear of being killed. Al-Shabaab has managed to conduct terrorist attacks within Somalia. It has managed to attack hotels used by government officers as offices and accommodation as well as marketplaces all over the

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[53] Anneli Botha, A & Abdile, M, The Radicalisation and Al-Shabaab Recruitment in Somalia. *Institute for Security Studies*, ISS Report, (2014): 266.
[54] Ibid.

country. This has elevated fear among the people and encumbers government operations. Additionally, clan and family networks are being used to recruit informers.

The main huge indication of the developing danger of radicalism in post-independence East Africa can be followed back to 7 August 1998 assaults on the US government offices in Nairobi, Kenya; and in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, which were credited to al-Qaeda.[55] However, Islamist/violent extremism which is an act of organizing, encouraging, engaging in, or backing ideologically justified or motivated violence to further political or socio-economic goals appeared in Kenya after the military intervention in Somalia in 2011. This was later followed by Al-Shabaab's assaults on Kenyan eateries, community places and places of worship. During the early attacks, foreigners and locals were both involved in the attacks. Since then, number of foreigners has reduced while regional and local extremists has increased in Kenya. It is seen that Kenyans and Ugandans have additionally been specifically engaged with enlisting their kindred nationals to join the association's ranks and files. At first, these people left their nations to battle in Somalia.

This pattern additionally bit by bit changed in the sense that locally sidelined, radicalized and enlisted people began being utilized to execute assaults in their own particular nations.[56] By betraying their kindred friends, this implies these radicalized people are relating to an option that is other than being Kenyan. Although Al-Shabaab has a foothold in Nairobi, it has managed to recruit from other areas in the country. This can be due to ethnic and religious division, as well as to marginalization, frustration and

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[55]Anneli Botha, Radicalisation in Kenya: Recruitment to Al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council, *Institute for Security Studies*. ISS PAPER 265, September 2014.
[56] Ibid.

resentment. This social disintegration and continuous hostile competition for power between ethnic groups are instigating people, predominantly the youth, to view brutal rivalry as a legitimate tool.[57] The sense of national identity of people living in the country is threatened by the religious identity (reflected in Al-Shabaab) and ethnic identity (reflected in Mombasa Republican Council (MRC). Lately, youth radicalization has turned to be debilitating by virtue of the expanded terrorist activities in the region with earlier assaults arranged and executed by Kenyans. Regardless of religious affiliation or ethnic background, youth living in the shantytowns are regularly drawn nearer by Al-Shabaab or ISIS scouts. Youths with little expectation of education and employment are predominantly easy target.[58]

Additionally, the issue of denial in the local conditions in Kenya has added to the radicalization of Kenyan nationals. Moreover, security in Kenya is progressively being politicized, which influences the manner by which the Kenyan government responds to terrorism. For instance, following the executing of 15 individuals in the town of Poromoko close to Mpeketoni on the Kenyan coast on 15 June 2014, President Kenyatta faulted official political rivals, despite Al-Shabaab claiming responsibility.[59] Politicians are capitalizing on political dissections for their benefit instead of attempting to bring people together and this threatens national unity. The Kenyan government has not stepped in to address rising radicalization as it could have prevented the current radicalization process and reduced attacks in Kenya. The government's failure to fully recognize the

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[57]Sirkku Hellsten, Radicalization and terrorist recruitment among Kenya's youth, The Nordic Africa Institute, Policy Note No 1: (2016).
[58] Ibid.
[59] Washington Post, Kenya's President denies al-Shabaab is behind attacks, blames politics, 17 June 2014, Available: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/kenyas-president-deniesal-shabab-is-behind-attacks-blamespolitics/2014/06/17/0b6e63d6-f64d-11e38aa9-dad2ec039789_story.html. Accessesd: 13-07-17

threat in the country has facilitated growing frustrations among the youth, therefore, enabling Al-Shabaab to gain ground in the country. In that capacity the outcomes of the nation's failure to address developing radicalization have not just empowered Al-Shabaab to enlist foreign fighters in Kenya but has additionally encouraged the spread in the nation and the broader region.[60] Confronted with this developing risk, both security policymakers and professionals are encouraged to painstakingly reassess the procedure and strategies they utilize to counter Al-Shabaab. Individuals in Kenya are still helpless against enlistment and radicalization on the basis that the entire procedure has moved from the mosque to the internet. Truth be told, Kenyans contribute more foreign fighters to Al-Shabaab, than any other nation.[61]

1.5 Justification of the Study

The study investigates how terrorism can be countered through youth de-radicalization in Africa and specifically in Kenya. The study considers why many youths in Kenya are radicalized and turn into terrorists and how they can be kept away from terrorism. To understand this complex phenomenon, need to delve into terrorist motivation, personality, and character to comprehend why youths becomes terrorists. What is clear today is that terrorist establishments are enlisting and persuading young people to conduct fatal acts in God's name and twisted ideologies. Consequently, numerous young people independent of race, religion, education or financial status have become prey to the propaganda spread by terrorist establishments, for example, Al-Qaeda,

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[60] Anneli Botha, op, Cit.
[61] Nick Schifrin and Zach Fannin, How Al-Shabab is recruiting young men from Kenya, PBS News Hour, April 10, 2016, Available: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/how-al-shabaab-is-recruiting-young-men-from-kenya/. Accessed: 29-07- 2017.

Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab. Youth radicalization towards violent fanaticism is a worldwide phenomenon that undermines peace, security, and stability.[62]

This study makes contribution to understanding of factors leading to youth radicalization and why youth are radicalized and become terrorists. It will further assist on how to develop counter-terrorism measures to capture them before they become terrorists, how they can be kept away from terrorism so that Africa can be secured from youth radicalization. The study will additionally help in expediting more mindfulness of youth radicalization and suggest counter-terrorism measures to de-radicalize the youth in Kenya. This study will likewise try to add to a developing assemblage of knowledge exploring the connection between youth and radicalization. Moreover, it will deepen and broaden respective understanding on the issue and further strengthen its importance to policymakers and in the academic discourse. Additionally, the study will supplement the endeavors of stakeholders who are giving help to the radicalized young people like national governments, civil societies, international and local Non-governmental (NGOs), and United Nations (UN) agencies; and make sure those who are not radicalized are kept away from this threat. Above all, the study seeks to provide new insights to contribute to theory building in academia and in policymaking.

1.6   Conceptual Framework

In understanding the roots that propel people towards terrorism, the study will be guided by the concept framework of Relative Deprivation. The Relative Deprivation concept clarifies the sentiment of being denied something and alludes to the disparity

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[62] Raeesah Cassim Cachalia, Irene Ndung'u and UyoSalifu, The Dynamics of youth radicalization in Africa: reviewing the current evidence. *Institute for Security Studies*. ISS Paper 296, (2016).

between esteem desire and esteem accomplishment.[63] Schaefer defined it as "the conscious experience of a negative discrepancy between legitimate expectations and present actualities".[64] It is more about emotions or measures of political, social or economic hardships that are relative rather than absolute. It has essential significances for both conduct and states of mind, including sentiments of stress, political dispositions, and participation in aggregate action. Sentiments of relative deprivation emerge when wants wind up plainly as real desires and those wants are hindered by society.

Measures for countering terrorism can barely ignore the dynamics surrounding youth radicalization and terrorism. Islamist radicalization can best be explained by grievance-based models though are not the only approach. However, they are clearly the most often encountered and basis of most counter-radicalization policies. The youth are not pushed towards involvement under certain circumstances, but indeed appreciate in a calculation of cost and benefit of what the gains and potential losses of getting involved might be. This is not necessarily in material terms, but the so-called 'selective incentives', non-material gain in the form of, for instance, group belonging or status.[65] To the youth, this becomes the best way as compared to not being involved to be adopted, as it takes care of the problems at hand as well as by assuming deterministic relationships between external factors and individual behavior. Wiktorowicz presents a three-stage radicalization model. The first is the development of an enthusiasm for the radical development which rises up out of an intellectual opening which 'shakes certitude in already acknowledged convictions' and makes a readiness of introduction to 'better approaches for thinking and

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[63] Iain Walker & Heather J. Smith *Relative Deprivation: Specification, Development, and Integration,* (Cambridge University Press, 2001).

[64] Richard T. Schaefer, *Racial and Ethnic Groups*. 11th Ed., (Pearson Education, 2008): 69.

[65] Daniela Pisoiu, *Islamist Radicalization in Europe: An Occupational Change Process, Political Violence* (New York: Routledge, 2012): 40.

perspectives'. The second stage is 'religious seeking' understood as a stage of coping with the state of cognitive crisis in which answers are sought through 'religious meaning'; and the final stage is engagement in risky activism.[66] Therefore, the youth believe that salvation or 'paradise' can be achieved by engagement in violence. This type of thinking is determined by various crises that the youth go through, for instance economic (losing a vocation, blocked versatility), social or cultural (social shortcoming, bigotry, embarrassment), political (restraint, torment, political segregation) and individual emergencies, for example, death or exploitation by crime. This can be due to conflict between Islamic law and western culture, racism, exclusion, unemployment and relative deprivation. In other words, engaging in specific acts is motivated by self-interest, and engagement in the radicalization process as such is determined by specific grievances which trigger crises and cognitive openings for the radical message.

In circumstances of absolute or relative deprivation, the youth reacts to perceived injustice and cultivates feelings of solidarity or revenge. Socio-cultural or subcultural dimension involves a need for cohesion. Grievances also make their way into the radicalization process. According to Post, most youth feel that by joining A1-Qaeda, they will have more benefits in regards to their social and economic grievances: 'The appeal of al-Qaeda is to estrange the youth, frequently feeling that they are obstructed in social orders where there is no genuine probability of progression.'[67] Therefore, socio-economic discontent may lead the youth into violent extremism or radicalization. However, individual economic markers alone do not seem, by all accounts, to be firmly associated

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[66] Quintan Wiktorowicz, *Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West*, (USA, Rowman& Littlefield Publishers, INC, 2005): 5-6.
[67] Jerrold M. Post, *The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to al-Qaeda*, (St. Martin's Griffin, 200: 65.

with terrorism. However, the collaboration impact of a monetary variable, for example, joblessness and a social variable like education may give better knowledge into understanding terrorism.[68] Therefore, relative deprivation can be utilized to portray an inconsistency in what an individual has in economic products and also what he or she accepts might be entitled to have. As such, the youth may contemplate that expanded universal connections could fill in as a successful answer for their grievances.

Therefore, the concept of Relative Deprivation can help explain why many youth continue being radicalized and how terrorism can be countered as it guides us toward an immediate relationship between radicalization; destitution and economic hardship. In other words, it is the world of grievances that is the underlying driver of the issue.

1.7 Hypotheses

This study is guided by the following hypotheses:

a. If there are high levels of unemployment then many youth are likely to be recruited and later radicalized.

b. If there are high levels of grievances (historical injustices, economic, religious, social and political) then more people but mainly the youth are likely to be radicalized.

c. If there are counter-terrorism measures then few youth will be radicalized.

1.8 Methodology

The methodology of this study is qualitative and inductive in nature. As indicated by McRoy, qualitative research is tied in with investigating issues, understanding social

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[68] Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, (Princeton, NJ: Center for International Studies, 1970).

phenomena, answering questions, and is more concerned with non-statistical methods of inquiry;[69] and an inductive technique is tied in with moving from particular perceptions to more extensive speculations and hypotheses, and it is therefore called a "bottom-up" methodology. The study depended on primary and secondary data acquired from memoirs, expert surveys, books, electronic journals and many more. The UN and other reliable websites was utilized for acquiring data. The National Defense College-Kenya library and University of Nairobi library were both be used extensively. A structured questionnaire was administered on key informants. This was delivered in person or mailed. The questionnaires were administered at the following study sites around Nairobi; National Intelligence Service, Muslim for Human Rights (MUHURI), National Counter Terrorism Centre, Regional Counter Terrorism Centre and Counterterrorism Police Unit.

1.9   Scope and Limitation of the Research

A survey mode of research was adopted for this study. The study involved primary and secondary data collection. Desktop research was conducted for background study of the phenomena, and primary data to ascertain the hypotheses of the study was conducted through survey and key informant interviews. The study findings though done in context of countering terrorism through youth deradicalization in Kenya will be generalized as it will be of great importance for other countries like Malawi to draw lessons due to the nature of radicalization and terrorism. Researching an issue like terrorism and youth radicalization is fraught with difficulties due to its complexity and rapidly evolving manner as some may be reluctant to provide information. Nevertheless, the research will

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[69] Ruth G. McRoy. (2005). Qualitative Research. (2008). Available:
http://www.uncp.edu/home/marson/qualitative_research.html. Accessed: 23-08-2017.

allow me to look at the issue in depth; and efforts will be made that the study is of good quality.

1.10   Chapter Outline

The study is divided into five chapters.

Chapter 1: Background of the Study.

Chapter 2: Concept of Terrorism and Non State Actors.

Chapter 3: Youth Radicalization and de-radicalization measures against Al-Shabaab.

Chapter 4: Challenges and Efforts in Countering Youth Radicalization in Kenya.

Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPT OF TERRORISM AND NON-STATE ACTORS

2.0 Introduction

This chapter examines the concept of terrorism. It will discuss the dynamics and complexities in the definition of terrorism or violent extremism, as well as its evolution. Further, causes of terrorism and non-state actors will be discussed and how terrorism is being financed and sustained to have that global reach.

The concept 'terrorism' has become public number one threat in the international security agenda. Terrorism has brought an ideology of destruction worldwide and has been elevated to the status of international security threat. However, the concept of "terrorism," by its very nature, challenges theorists and practitioners alike.[70] The literature on the term described varies as both tactics and strategy are vast and changed. It reflects the proliferation of mainstream and alternative interpretations of definitive terms, ranging from political crime to all-out war.[71] These include coercion, repression or systematic destruction and intimidation. This antagonistic conduct is caused by a variety of contributing factors including nationalistic fanaticism, religious animosities, imperial adventurism, racial prejudices, ethnic hatred, tribal arrogance and ideological extremism.[72] The individual feels a sense of privation in society and a strong relationship between socio-economic deprivation and terrorism. Mass media as well as politicians in most countries have created unnecessary confusion as the word terrorism, which is a highly disputed concept, is used in same way as political violence. Some who use it as a weapon

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[70] Mustapha B. Marrouchi, Terrorism Inc.: *Violence and Counter-Violence (of the letter), in Securing Africa: Post-9/11 Discourse on Terrorism*, Malinda S. Smith, (Routledge, 2016): Chapter 2.
[71] Yonah Alexander, *Terrorists in Our Midst: Combating Foreign-Affinity Terrorism in America*, (Santa Barbara, CA, Praeger Security International, 2010): 7.
[72] Ibid.

like to be called 'holy warriors,' 'freedom fighters' or 'revolutionaries' in relation to the cause.[73] However, people can identify terrorist activity like suicide bombings, hijacking, hostage takings aimed at civilians using common sense. Due to its premeditated nature and the need to create an environment of fear and its targeting of civilians; terrorism can easily be differentiated from violence and conflict. According to Segaller, "the violence of terrorism is positively verbose: always accompanied by threats, communiqués and manifestos, and succeeded by historical argument and political reaction. First the violence, then the claim; first the blood, then the bluster. Violence is the megaphone for terrorists and their claims."[74] Therefore, it is a unique form of violence by unanimous group of people in response to political impotence to a position of weakness due to continued deprivation and marginalization. Terrorism does not target mainly people who are protected like members of the armed forces but the general populace the terrorists are attempting to win over. In this way terrorists will target people in open place, building or public transport for media attention.

2.1   The Concept of Terrorism

Since the French Revolution of 18thCentury, the Jacobins who were the most radical and ruthless of the political groups formed in the wake of the French Revolution used the term *'régime de la terreur'* in a positive sense when speaking and writing about themselves.[75] It was designed to intimidate revolutionaries as a counter measure in consolidating and entrenching a revolutionary state by those dissidents regarded as 'enemies of the people.' The enforcing agency called the Revolutionary Council had authority to arrest, judge and

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[73] Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response*. 2nd Ed. (London and New York, Routledge, 2006): 1.
[74] Stephen Segaller, *Invisible Armies: Terrorism into the 1990s*, (London, Michael Joseph, 1986): 1.
[75] W Laqueur, The age of terrorism, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1987, p 11.

demise of all considered traitors of the state and 'enemies of the people' by execution. It was a considered view by the revolutionary leader at that time to combine revolution and terror in order for democracy to triumph. It was declared that "terror is nothing but justice, prompt, severe and inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue."[76] The Revolution had two main characteristics. The '*régime de la terreur*' was neither random nor indiscriminate as its enforcers were organized and displayed a systemic approach. Moreover, their actions and goal were deliberate in the search for a 'new and better society.' Therefore, terrorism was seen as the solution to internal anarchy by other European monarchs. As such, people were arrested and expelled from France for the revolutionary cause based on little evidence.

This reign of terror came to an end in 1974. Thereafter, the lexicon became identical with abuse of office and power. People who attempted to further their views by a system of coercive intimidation were identified as terrorists. Originally, terrorism was performed by the state and later was employed to describe a variety of violence.[77] The only difference with the early incarnations was that it involved horrific act of killing that was pre-meditated and instilled fear in the population. Therefore, due to the French Revolution, the agency of terrorism changed to sub-national groups from the state in many places around the world. As such, terrorism was considered a left-wing strategy until World War I, as the concept was directly related to revolutionary change. As a strategy, it was considered that it would lead to a capture of political power from the state while bringing fundamental political and social change. This kind of terrorism became a new

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[76] B Hoffman, Defining terrorism, in R D Howard & R L Sawyer, *Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, Connecticut, 2002, p 4.
[77] Ibid, 5

phenomenon and was different from the political assassinations practiced throughout history. It was distinctive on the roles the terrorists believed they fulfilled and the perceived significance of their actions.[78] Therefore, terrorism is highly subjective, dynamic and mostly a Western construct that has encompassed different meanings over the years.

Since then, the notion of terrorism has been deeply challenged. Scholars like Richards and others have failed to reach a clear, consistent and agreed definition about terrorism or "who" is a terrorist.[79] For a long time, it is linked with myriad forms of political violence. These have included violence of repressive government, assassinations, armed rebel attacks, hijackings, kidnappings and suicide bombings. Individuals, groups, states, and non-state actors have committed terrorist acts.[80] In all these circumstances, the understanding of these political acts of violence has been shaped mainly by the theoretical lens, cultural and ideological commitments of the interpreting subject-scholar. Conceptual lenses through which scholars have attempted to understand the phenomena of terrorism include, among others; religion, politics, crime, war, and communications.[81] These lenses are not commonly exclusive or necessarily exhaustive. However, individual scholars have therefore shaped how concept of terrorism is understood. Generations of political and social theorists have defined and redefined the concept of terrorism. Still, myths and misconceptions on this issue persist.

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[78] C Townshend, *Terrorism: A very short introduction*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002): 55.
[79] Anthony Richards, Conceptualizing Terrorism, *Journal of Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 37(3), (2014).
[80] Malinda S. Smith, *Securing Africa: Post-9/11 Discourses on Terrorism*, (London: Routledge, 2016): 3.
[81] Alex P. Schmid, Framework for Conceptualizing Terrorism, *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 16(2), (2004): 197–221.

Many governmental and non-governmental organizations have focused much energy at improving cooperation against terrorism. It is difficult to deal with terrorist crimes due to its sophisticated and complicated nature as those involved have become more skilled at evading detection. Moreover, terrorism is socially constructed and need to understand the constant changing tactics of terrorists. However, the US government defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience;" and international terrorism "… as involving citizens or the territory of more than one country."[82] Regardless of terrorism being defined differently; it involve use of violence on innocent people and property. It is not with anger or hate, but to produce fear with the intention of determining change. It is not war as terrorists ignore the rules of war which define neutral territory and non-combatants, and forbid taking of hostages and ill-treatment of prisoners. Furthermore, terrorists will always take the responsibility for their actions because failure to do so their actions become useless.

According to Segaller, terrorist activities or campaigns mainly have two levels of objectives. At a tactical level, the goal of the terrorist group is advertising and recognition of the problem. At that level, the aim is to promote the cause they are fighting for. Therefore, terrorism without advertising is considered a weapon that shoots empty spaces. On the other hand, at a strategic level, the goal is an absolute change. The terrorist group may be fighting for freedom, independence or revolution.[83] Therefore, terrorism is different from state terror and guerilla warfare. The number of incidents and victims is more than terrorism, in state terror is basically due to abuse of power by the state.

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[82] Stephen Segaller, Op Cit. 11.
[83] Ibid, 11.

However, state terror can be a bleeding ground for guerilla warfare. On the contrary, guerilla warfare operates in semi-developed states while terrorism has an urban setting. The guerrillas may hold territory, abduct or coerce civilians to join them while terrorists are extremely careful to screen their recruits. In guerilla warfare, mostly the state will respond by using the military; and the police in terrorism.[84]

Terrorist groups that engage in violence want to achieve a variety of goals. These goals are primarily specific and can be classified in different ways. On one hand, can be grouped basing of what part of the political system are trying to change such as the structure of the system, policies, and political leadership. On other hand, can be classified due to the cause they are fighting for which can be; religious issues, ethnic concerns, or ideological beliefs.[85] In this case, we must understand the causes first before understanding the goals of terrorism or terrorist group though it is very complex.

2.2   Causes of Terrorism

The growing number of individuals and especially of young people attracted by militant Islamism requires asking why some individuals radicalize and adopt violent behavior and engage in the killing of innocent civilians in the name of religion. To find the answer have to clarify the factors that contribute to the change in the mentality of the radicalized individuals and the consequent violent behavior. The investigation into terrorist behavior and its causes will be a step towards finding solutions and possible preventive measures for this global phenomenon.[86]

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[84] Ibid, 15-17.

[85] James Lutz and Brenda Lutz, *Terrorism: The Basics*, (London: Routledge, 2011): 16.

[86] KhouwagaYusoufzai and Franziska Emmerling, How identity Crisis, Relative Deprivation, Personal Characteristics, and Empathy contribute to the engagement of Western individuals in Islamist terrorist behavior, *Journal of Terrorism Research,* 8 (1), 2017: 68–80.

The is no single cause that can fully explain terrorist behavior. This is mainly because terrorism is used as a technique by different political groups that are not satisfied with the way things are in a country or in the current political context. Terrorism is then used as the alternative means of addressing the issue. However, there are broad causes of terrorism at the individual and group level. At the individual level; Rational, psychological and cultural origins have been identified. Rational terrorists think about their goals and options; and do a cost-benefit analysis while the psychological motivation for terrorism comes from the personal dissatisfaction of the terrorist with his life and his achievements. Cultural determinants of terrorism are the perception of "outsiders" and anticipation of their threat to the ethnic group survival.[87]

At the group level, terrorism can be the result of political activism when the goal is to force government to address grievances of the social movement. These social movements could be in a form of mass action for a cause like the Irish Catholic Civil Rights Movement in North Ireland in the 1960s, which was due to the frustration at the slow rate of change. It may also occur when a group or an individual suffers from a traumatizing event like victims of political violence can grow to oppose the oppressors perceived with violent Palestinian intifada. Sociologically, terrorism is a group based issue chosen by a weaker group as a strategy to address issues of deprivation; and relative deprivation theory provide useful explanation for this process. Feelings of deprivation and frustration motivate individual decisions to involve in collective action and the group's reaction can include political violence. This can be due to feelings of deprivation.

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[87] Ibid.

Psychological approaches to explain terrorism look at the dynamics of the internal psychology of the group or individual behavior such as moral convictions and meaning of good and evil. In this case, they are driven to the need to conform to group pressures to engage in terrorism even when victory is logically impossible. The fact that terrorists suffered from psychological disabilities is not true as individuals with the problem have not normally been present in terrorist organizations.[88] Therefore, terrorists are not crazy or suffering from mental problems. Moreover, terrorist organizations avoid those individuals as they are unreliable and may become dangerous to the group.[89]

However, while there is no one cause of terrorism, in some cases it seems that several factors contribute to violence. Taspinar observed that, "breeding grounds for radicalism and terrorist recruitment emerge not necessarily under conditions of abject poverty and deprivation, but rather when negative social, economic, and political trends converge."[90] Only when the factors of socio-economic and political deprivation are available together, terrorism and radicalism will get the support of society. Therefore, social and economic factors as root causes of radicalism should not be excluded because some middle class terrorists may be simplistic and deceptive. Terrorists like to operate in poor countries and not in developed countries of the West. These are mainly weak, failing, ungoverned spaces, failed states and all countries experiencing civil wars like Syria, Iraq and Somalia. Terrorism is not primarily caused by socio-economic problems only; there is

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[88] James M. Lutz & Brenda J, Lutz, *Global Terrorism*, 2ndEd, (London and New York: Taylor and Francis Group, 2008): 17.

[89] Horgan, J., the Search for the Terrorist Personality, in A Silke (ed) terrorism, *Victims and Society: Psychological perspectives on terrorism and its consequences,* (Chichester: Wiley, 2003): 3-27.

[90] Ömer Taspınar, Fighting Radicalism, not 'Terrorism': Root Causes of an International Actor Redefined, *SAIS Review*, XXIX no. 2, (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).

also correlation between deprivation and radicalism.[91] In this case, relative deprivation, which is the lack of opportunities linked to expectations is the main challenge particularly in Arab world and in Africa.[92] In the context of globalization, emphasis should be placed on relative deprivation because poverty is no longer an absolute concept because globalization creates more opportunities.

The young people from disadvantaged backgrounds, who are mostly frustrated young Muslims, victims, without education and without work, can easily be recruited. When the frustration is compounded by growing expectations and lack of opportunities; the youth feel great sense of deprivation. This socioeconomic decay and the absence of constitutional liberties therefore gives rise to Islamic networks with political agendas and in the end it brings a "political" aspect to relative deprivation mainly in the Arab world.[93] It is problematic to have educated young people but unemployed because educated young people have the higher political aspirations and expectations, and end up being frustrated when their expectations are not met; and this situation could end up creating a class of "frustrated achievers" who could end up radicalizing themselves in the search for a political cause to cling to.[94]

Another explanation can be due to government's exploitative economic system, discrimination and repression. In this case, a group may see its position in society being taken over by another and may cause major grievances. In some circumstances this may be real or perceived. The basis of the problems can be based on ideological issues,

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[91] Ibid.
[92] Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1970).
[93] Ibid.
[94] Carol Graham & Stefano Pettinato. Frustrated Achievers: Winners, Losers, and Subjective Well-Being in *New Market Economies*. Brookings CSED Working Paper, no. 21, 2001.

religious beliefs, ethnic concerns or a mixture of all. Therefore, groups in society which is affected by loss of position or status may resort to terrorism in an effort to preserve their position either in absolute or relative terms. However, according to Gurr, "the adoption of terrorism is a conscious choice for a course of action; it is not an automatic response to economic deprivation."[95]

According to Lutz and Lutz, "Poverty has often been considered a basic cause of terrorism."[96] Most individuals engage in political violence due to economic circumstances or because of the economic circumstances of the group they belong to. Furthermore, many terrorist groups engage in violence because of social and economic injustices. While some studies have found connection between poverty and terrorism, most have found no direct connection.[97] Some terrorist groups attract poorest individuals while some do attract the middle class and others both the poor and the rich. Terrorism has not occurred in countries where the gap is big, but even in developed countries like the USA, UK, France and Spain.

Globalization has contributed to outbreaks of terrorism as it is associated with modernization due to its growing connections between societies and cultures in terms of economic, social, political, and communication linkages. In the world, globalization continue to create problems for all societies, both rich and poor. Some are becoming richer while other poorer and to some their group status change for the better while other groups lose. Some societies are challenged by the appearance of outside religions which

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[95] Ted R. Gurr, Economic Factors, in L Richardson (ed), *The Roots of Terrorism*, (New York, Routeledge, 2006): 85.
[96] James M. Lutz and Brenda J, Lutz, Op cit, 16.
[97] Maleckova, J., Impoverished Terrorists: Stereotypes or Reality, in T. Bjorgo (ed.), *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality, and Ways Forward*. (London: Routledge, 2005): 33–43.

threaten existing domestic practices. The appearance of secular ideas also threatens the more religious elements in some countries. New ideas due to globalization or westernization can also upset cultural or societal norms and patterns. Globalization also entails greater migration and societies often react negatively to the presence of strangers. Debates on immigration in the US and Europe are just a recent example of the negative reactions to immigrants that may occur.[98]

In other cases, lack of prospect for political involvement has been considered a cause of terrorism. While this has generated violence including terrorism; authoritative or repressive states with very limited participation or none at all have managed to prevent and control terrorism. This is because authorities and security forces do not care about civil liberties or protect the rights of people suspected of terrorism. The authoritarian states are even able to control, to a certain extent, how the media cover terrorist actions and may even prevent the publication of information on terrorism. In this respect, a good example was Soviet Union. However, democratic states with many opportunities for participation in politics like western countries are often targets for terrorism. Terrorist groups use the civil liberties associated with democracies, as there are limits on security forces to deal with alleged terrorists and are mostly treated fairly when captured. The Guantanamo Bay base in Cuba by the US is an obvious exception in which the alleged terrorists are detained and subjected to inhuman treatment contrary to democratic values.

Moreover, freedom of movement facilitates attacks; freedom of press guarantees knowledge of their actions and influences the target audience. Right to fair trial means they may escape punishment even if they are caught. Moreover, during trials, the suspects

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[98] Ibid, 17

would even have the chance to further publicize their cause, even though mostly the rights of the defendants are not respected as much as they should. Authoritarian states have generally been able to control current and potential dissidents.[99] Some terrorist groups such Al Qaeda attack targets to bring change in foreign policy while some want change in domestic policies of a government. Terrorist groups want to reverse the current US government policy that allows abortion in some circumstances. Al Qaeda and some groups want the US and its allies to change their foreign policies towards Muslim states, including at least a partial Western withdrawal from Muslim areas. Anti-abortion groups in the US are an example of such a group that has used violence to force the government to change its domestic policy. These groups may want government to follow domestic policies more in line with either conservative, or more leftwing. Cuban anti-terrorist groups in exile attacked targets associated with foreign governments that had recognized or could be seen as supporters of Cuba.

2.3   Non-State Actors

Vicious non-state actors have become ubiquitous challenge for nation-states in fighting radicalization and terrorism. Sometimes may be called non-state armed actors or non-state armed groups or individuals. They are totally or partially independent of the state and may threaten or use violence to achieve their goals. Other tactics used to obtain violence such as abduction, use of improvised explosive devices or hacking in computer systems. Recent events around the world have highlighted the threat posed by violent non-state actors who commit mass crimes, such as genocide and crimes against humanity. In many parts, the state of Westphalia is under siege by Vnsas, like Al Qaeda, ISIS, Boko Haram and al-

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[99] Ibid, 18-19.

Shabaab. Non-state actors are defined as individuals or groups that do not act under the control of, or on behalf of, a state.[100] Therefore, their conduct is not attributable to a state. Schwenkenbecher has observed that, "terrorists have been, and still are often defined exclusively as non-state actors."[101] Some may include drug trafficking organizations, warlords, militias, youth gangs and insurgents like the Colombian and criminal groups. However, despite their divergent forms, these violent non-state actors share some characteristics and represent a common challenge for national and international security. The rise of Vnsas could be understood as a political and social epidemic with a great deal of imitative behavior. Several factors explain this phenomenon, such as the importance of the context with respect to the problems of weak and dysfunctional states and "the law of the few". These are key individuals who play an important role in mobilizing support for a cause called "identity entrepreneurs". They are above all charismatic leaders who attract loyalty and passion, give their followers a unified purpose and create a feasible organizational structure to achieve that goal. Indeed, Vnsas often provides psychological empowerment to those who have no power, are marginalized and deprived of their rights.[102] This is common due to the "youth bulge" of whom most are unemployed.

2.3.1 Dimensions of Non-state actors

Non-state actors like terrorist groups differ from each other and must identify different vital dimensions of these actors. These dimensions include motivation and purpose, strength and scope, organizational structure and what drives these actors, their goals and how to achieve them. Moreover, some groups are not equal in term of strength and scope.

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[100] Noam Lubel, *Introduction: Extraterritorial use of Force against Non-state Actors*, (2010): 14
[101] Anne Schwenkenbecher, *Terrorism: A Philosophical Enquiry*, (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012): 21.
[102] Malcolm Gladwell, *The Tipping Point*, (New York: Little, Brown, 2000).

Some are small and operate in a limited geographical area, and others have a wider transnational reach. Their purpose can be extended from local to national to transnational. How they get funding or access to resources are also different. In many cases, funding is subject to larger objectives and is nothing more than a means to an end. In other cases, the acquisition of wealth is a central goal. Examination of funds for Vnsas often requires examining their relationship to the illicit economy at the national, regional and global levels. In terms of organizational structure, Vnsas have no single structure. Some are hierarchical and centralized; others are networked and distributed; and some composed of hybrids of networks and hierarchies. Moreover, organizational structures are not static; they adapt and shift over time in response to opportunities and constraints in the operating environment.

2.3.2 Characteristics of Non-state actors

Terrorist Organizations use terror as a tactic. However, for terrorist act to become effective, must be conducted with the aim of exploiting fear, intimidating and forcing for political purposes.[103] They also gain legitimacy by using a variety of strategies. This includes filling the perceived shortcomings in state performance such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia, using nationalist and religious ideological narratives to build a shared identity. The use of force against civilian targets is not only fundamental to their strategy, but also to their defining characteristic, since they seek change by the use of violence. However, terrorist groups differ because of origins and goals. In most cases the state is the dominant frame of reference for these groups because they want a state of their own. This is so when groups have popular sympathy, a certain degree of legitimacy and some territorial control.

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[103] Anne Schwenkenbecher, *Terrorism:* A Philosophical Enquiry, Op Cit.

However, the most dangerous terrorist organizations are not nationalist ones but groups rooted in militant Islam like al-Qaida, who wants to replace the regimes in Middle East with new governments that adhere to Sharia law and are more religious than profane in their perspective. For example, Al-Qaida has a transnational global presence with transnational network organization. However, its relationships with states vary considerably. While it targets certain states, al-Qaida also tries to maintain sanctuaries in countries that have sympathy for its aspirations and are willing to accept its presence. The organizational structure of al-Qaida is more horizontal. Most of the groups lack hierarchical authority and formal structures. They must exercise patience, flexibility and ability to keep low while operating in small size with decentralized command.

2.4   Sources of funding.

Terrorists need financial resources to operate properly. According to Vittori, "though terrorism is a cost-effective means of making a statement, there remains the need for some minimum level of resources for the organization to survive and conduct operations."[104] Terrorists need the economic base to survive and be able to conduct its operations and not only depend on idealism alone as they require to eat and buy weapons such as ammunition. However, the problem of ideology remains the critical center of gravity to many groups, as is the question of leadership. Terrorists require minimum resources which could classified into three categories; money, tangibles and intangible resources. The tangible resources can be given monetary value while the intangible resources are not materials and the group cannot operate without like expertise in bomb making. For example, Irish Republican Army exchanged its experience in bomb making by sending

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[104] Jodi Vittori, *Terrorist Financing and Resourcing*, (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2001): 13.

out three of its operations to help the Colombian Revolutionary Group of the Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 2001 for two million USD.[105]

The budget of terrorist organizations varies from one group to the other. This may depend on the type of operation that will be performed, which can be from a simple knife attack to September 11 attacks by Al-Qaida, which is considered the most expensive attack in history, which cost between 300,000 and 500,000 USD. Terrorist organizations pay their operations differently depending on their source of funding, such as Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), known for its "good life", which can spend billions. Other groups are generous with members and families of terrorists killed or imprisoned by others.[106] Byman et al noted that, "money has a powerful effect on insurgent movement and terrorists: it could be used to buy weapons, bribe local officials, pay operatives, provide a social network that builds a popular base, and otherwise fill a myriad of purposes."[107] Apart from money, terrorists require tangible goods and life's necessities like food, accommodation and medical care. In regards to intangibles, terrorist need operational space to operate from, intelligence, security, a political or ideological narrative, a recruitment pool, command and control structure, training and expertise. Therefore; money, tangible goods, and intangible goods form basic requirements for a terrorist group to achieve its mission. If any of these three is not available, it will be difficult for the organization to survive and will be threatened with extinction.

Terrorism rely on diversified sources of funding. This is due to the decline in the importance of the state and popular support for terrorism after the end of the Cold War,

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[105] Ibid, 13-14.
[106] Ibid, 14.
[107] Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman William Rosenau, and David Brannan, Trends *in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements* (Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation, 2003):87.

which symbolized the change in the nature of terrorist finances. Terrorists currently rely on licit and the illicit means of financing. During Cold War, terrorists depended on state sponsors for their funding, but this changed during the 1990s, which forced them to rely on crime and self-financing methods.[108] This change in funding sources was due to the end of superpower rivalry, which reduced the incentives for Washington and Moscow to finance representatives in the pursuit of their ideological and geopolitical goals. Secondly, other sponsor countries, such as Libya and Syria, have faced a less polarized international environment, where they are more available and able to sponsor against terrorism and its sponsors.[109]

Therefore, the general flow of money for terrorist organizations was more throughout the Cold War period than after, especially if the insurgents groups were involved in superpower proxy wars like in Afghanistan. In addition to the funding provided by the superpowers, oil-rich regimes notably Libya, during Colonel Muammar al Gaddafi era in the 1970s, and Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini, in the 1980s financed a lot of money for terrorist organizations. More importantly, in the history of terrorist financing an important shift happened at the end of Cold War. It simultaneously removed the last obstacles to globalization which led to the proliferation of failed states and non-governed regions. Globalization has facilitated terrorist groups in a highly integrated international financial system, which has made it easier for people to circulate through Internet communication and mobile phones. Globalization has facilitated the assembly of terrorist operations and the development of terrorist financial activities. Since September 2001

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[108] Jeann K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas, *Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective*, (Stanford, CA.Stanford University Press, 2007): 9.
[109] Ibid.

terrorist attacks on the US, terrorism financing is either formal or informal and can easily be manipulated. Various and dispersed sources of financing and methods of cash transfer are used by decentralized and flexible terrorist networks who cannot easily be detected. Most contemporary terrorist organizations exploit funding sources that do not require ideological understanding or consent from the supplier, as they depend on a variety of more impersonal and autonomous mechanisms, such as independent criminal enterprises, the diversion of funds from charitable organizations and legal companies. [110]

2.4.1   Methods of financing

According to Freeman and Ruehsen, six main methods have been identified which are used to finance terror activities and are informal cash transfer systems, money service businesses, couriers, formal banking and false trade invoicing of high value commodities. These processes are attributed by volumes, risk, convenience, simplicity, costs and speed. However, other methods include stolen value cards, prepaid debit cards, casinos and digital currency.[111]

ISIS has managed to use pre-existing government structures by using former government employees of Saddam Hussein regime to get money. ISIS has greatly depended on oil which has become the main source of its funding as many opposition forces depend on ISIS for diesel as it is sold directly to independent traders. Other sources of income are extortion and taxes from persons who crosses the territories under its control. Furthermore, food crops have been used as source of financing as ISIS controls over 40% of Iraq's wheat cultivating land and the richest archaeological sites in the world.

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[110] Ibid, 11

[111] Freeman, M., & Ruehsen, M. Terrorism Financing Methods: An Overview. *Perspectives on Terrorism,* 7(4), (2013): 5.

Human trafficking, kidnapping and smuggling remain one of the top activities in financing terrorists.[112]

The diversified financial portfolio of ISIS has made it the richest terrorist organization in history, with an estimated wealth of 2 billion US dollars. ISIS has become effective because they run its criminal or terrorist operations with a business expertise that has no historical precedent. This enterprise is based on what it learnt from its predecessor, whereby it identified the failures of Al-Qaida in utilizing its financial resources effectively. For example, Al-Qaida failed to distribute funds to local cells and the inability to acquire a regular funding source. This has motivated ISIS to redesign a modern business strategy to run its enterprise in a professional manner, which includes a corporate plan, structures, source coding, and recruitment plan.[113]

There are accusations that ISIS generates a billion dollars in heroin trafficking between Afghanistan and Europe in the region. ISIS has been accepting grants of up to $ 40 million from the government or private sources in oil-rich nations. These donations are presumed to be recycled through unregistered charitable associations as "humanitarian aid" with ISIS members coordinating geographic delivery points for collection using mobile phone applications like WhatsApp and Kik. These two applications can be used around the world. In Kik's case, no phone number is required to sign up.[114]

The biggest financial coup that ISIS achieved so far was the looting of the Central Bank in Mosul where it managed to get funds approximated at $ 429 million in cash. This

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[112] Ibid.

[113] Liang, C.S. *ISIS: A Portrait of a Modern Terrorist Enterprise,* Emerging Security Challenges Programme, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, GSCP. (2015): 17.

[114] Giovanni, J., Goodman L.M & Sharkov, D., How Does ISIS Funds Its Reign of Terror. *http://europe.newsweek.com/how-does-isis-fund-its-reign-terror-282607?rm=eu.* October, 2017. ((2014): 2.

was apart from the other forty-five banks plundered regularly in Mosul by ISIS. ISIS has become the richest terror group ever after such events. Moreover, ISIS exports approximately 9000 barrels of oil in a day at price ranging from $25 to $45. It is believed that Gulf States continue to fund ISIS to carry out its operations. The motivation for the Gulf States to financially support ISIS is to fight against the regime of President Bashar al Assad in Syria.

In regards to al Shabaab's primary sources of funding; the group has been taxing merchants to finance its assaults on the government's forces from the areas that it controls like Bakara. Although Al-Shabaab has been forced to withdraw from some areas, it still controls the southern and central parts of Somalia and the port city of Kismayo, which is the source of income for the group. The group can collect taxes from supplies arriving at the port. Other sources include state sponsors, charities, Somali diaspora, other terrorist groups and corporations. Generally, funds are transferred through *hawala*, a traditional system of informal remittances for many Islamic communities, regular banking channels and courier. The money is primarily intended to support group members by training, recruiting, arming and purchasing equipment to conduct jihad against unbelievers.[115]

It is further believed that Eritrea continues to sponsor Al-Shabaab in an attempt to counter the regional power balance with Ethiopia which is a long time enemy. According to reports, Eritrea provides weapons, military training and troops to fight Al Shabaab militants. Furthermore, a UN report indicates that Eritrea has been sending $ 80,000 a month to some al-Shabaab members using Eritrean embassy in Nairobi for nearly a

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[115] Geoffrey Kambere, Financing al-Shabaab: The Vital Port of Kismayo. Available: https://globalecco.org/financing-al-shabaab-the-vital-port-of-kismayo. Assecced: 14-10-2017. (2016).

decade.[116] It is also believed that countries like Yemen, Syria, Iran and Qatar are providing funds and weapons to Al-Shabaab. In addition, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states continue to be important external sources of funds for the Al-Shabaab organization.[117] Terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and other militant organizations supply funds to Al-Shabaab to spread extremism.[118] Other non-governmental organizations like World Assembly for Muslim Youth (WAMY) and the International Organization of Islamic Aid (IIRO), Somali societies working in different countries around the world are active financiers of Islamic radical movements in the Horn of Africa.[119]

2.5   Conclusion

Many contemporary conceptualizations of terrorism is that it has become number one threat in international security agenda. It has brought in and canonized an ideology of destruction in the world though academics have failed to come up with a single agreed definition. However, there is consensus that includes coercion, repression or systematic destruction and intimidation of social lives and property. This hostile conduct of terrorists is caused by a variety of factors which include nationalistic fanaticism, religious animosities, imperial adventurism, racial prejudices, ethnic hatred, tribal arrogance and

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[116] Gabe Joselow, All Eyes on Eritrea as Arms Shipment Reaches Al-Shabab, *Voice of America*, (2011). Available: http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/east/All-Eyes-on-Eritreaas-Arms-Shipment-Reaches-Al-Shabab-133079288.html. Accessed: 07-08-2017.
[117] Ibid.
[118] Abdulkadir Abdiraham, Islam AU Summit: A/S Carson's meeting with Somali President Sheikh Sharif Tripoli, *The Telegraph,* February 3, 2011, Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/somalia-wikileaks/8302247/au-summitas-carsons-meeting-with-somali-presidentsheikh-sharif-tripoli-00000561-001.2-of-002.html. Accessesd: 07-08-2017.
[119] Abdisaid M. Ali, The Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahidiin: A Profile of the First Somali Terrorist Organisation, InstitutfürStrategie-Politik-Sicherheits-undWirtschaftsberatung (ISPSW), June 2, 2008: Available: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=55851. Accessed: 07-08-2017.

ideological extremism. More to these lies social and economic grievances like poverty and unemployment which brings feelings of deprivation.

Funding is important to terrorist groups to be able to carry out their missions. Therefore, terrorism relies on diversified sources of funding. This is the result of the decline in the importance of state and popular support. As such, terrorists rely on their own means of financing. This change in funding sources is due to the end of the Cold War rivalry between the superpowers, which reduced the incentives for Washington and Moscow to finance the powers to pursue their ideological and geopolitical goals. On the other hand, globalization has facilitated terrorist groups to take full advantage of a highly integrated international financial system, which has facilitated the movement of personnel and financial transactions more easily through the use of internet and mobile phones.

CHAPTER THREE

YOUTH RADICALIZATION AND DERADICALIZATION IN AFRICA

3.0   Introduction

This part of the study will examine the concept of radicalization in detail, the radicalization process including the drivers, roots and bases for radicalization in Africa and Kenya in particular. Finally, deradicalization will be discussed as an effective response to radicalization.

Radicalization of youth is inherently on the increase. Poor, disillusioned and socially isolated young people feel marginalized and insignificant.[120] Therefore, may turn to extremism as a way out of poverty, in search for cultural identity, acceptance and purpose in life.[121] The continued involvement of youth in violence is a major concern and an important issue economically, politically and psychologically. The radicalization of youth towards violent extremism as a global phenomenon threatens peace and security. Therefore, it is a complex problem that cannot be attributed to any explanation or set of factors. The most worrying thing is that so many people around the world have fallen into the trap. Therefore, young people participation in political and religious violence requires special attention due to actors outside of violence, such as organized crimes and terrorist networks, since terrorist organizations are recruiting and influencing young people to perform deadly acts in God, name and distorted ideologies. This has resulted in many

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[120] Sarah Lyons-Padilla, Michele J. Gelfand, Hedieh Mirahmadi, Mehreen Farooq, & Marieke van Egmond, Belonging nowhere: Marginalization & radicalization risk among Muslim Immigrants. Behavioral   Science   &   Policy,   1(2),   2015.   Available: http://www.gelfand.umd.edu/papers/BSP_2_Lyons_2p%20(002).pdf. Accessed: 21-05-2018.
[121] Margarita Bizina & David H. Gray, Radicalization of Youth as a Growing Concern for Counter-Terrorism Policy, *Global Security Studies,* 5(1), 2014.

young people, regardless of their race, religion, academic background or economic condition, falling prey to the rhetoric propagated by these terrorist groups. It is crucial therefore to identify the risks and vulnerability of the youth under risk of getting involved to understand why they radicalize.

3.1   Concept of Youth Radicalization

Violent extremism has become a concern to some countries like the US, UK, France, Nigeria, Somalia and Kenya just to mention a few and its due to its link with terrorism and religious fundamentalism.[122] Radicalization is conceived as a preliminary phase or as a process to engagement in terrorism. Radicalization is conceptualized as process of individual evolution towards certain ideology and sometimes accompanied by a corresponding behavior of violence. The concept of radicalization emphasize the individual and, to a certain extent, ideology and the group.[123] According to Ongering, "radicalization is a process of personal development whereby an individual adopts ever more extreme political or politic-religious ideas and goals, becoming convinced that the attainment of these goals justifies extreme methods."[124] In this context, it is understood as a process in which people adopt points of view and ideas which, in the end, lead to legitimation of political violence. However, Neumann and Rogers see it as a process of an individual or a group that comes to "political extremism", and changes in attitude that lead

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[122] Lynn Davies, Educating against Extremism: Towards a Critical Politicisation of Young People, *International Review of Education*, 55(2/3), (2009): 183.

[123] Mark Sedgwick, The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion, *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 22 (4), 2010.

[124] Ongering, L., *Home-Grown Terrorism and Radicalization in the Netherlands: Experiences, explanations and approaches*, testimony before the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Available: www.investigativeproject.org/ documents/testimony/292.pdf. (2007): 3. Accessed 16-10-2017.

to sanctions and, ultimately, participation in use of violence with a political objective.[125] Therefore, this is the process by which people and organizations adopt violent strategies or threaten to do so in order to achieve political goals. This may be done with the mission to change society in a drastic way by the use of unorthodox means with a view to replacing it with another. Therefore according to Pisoiu, radicalization can be differentiated with extremism and fundamentalism in that radicalism implies sweeping change and resort to some basic principles; while extremism and fundamentalism are more specific in the type of change and the ideological principles on which they rest. Additionally, extremism is largely dependent on, and conceptualized in relation to concrete and localized ideologies.[126]

However, according to International Human Rights Law, radicalization is not a threat to society if it is not connected to violence or other illicit acts, such as hate speech. Radicalization can therefore be a force for beneficial change. For example, during the abolition of slavery the defenders of decisive political and human rights and those who defended universal suffrage were at some point considered radical, as they opposed the prevailing views in their societies.[127]

3.2   Process of Radicalization

Radicalization of youth is a complex issue that cannot be attributed to one explanation or set of factors. Most experts agree that there is no simple formula or model that explains

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[125] Neumann, PR., & Rogers, B. *Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamist Militant Movement in Europe*, (London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, 2008): 5-6. Available: www.icsr.info/ publications/papers/ 1234516791ICSREUResearchReport_Proof1.pdf. Accessed: 15-10-2017.
[126] Daniela Pisoiu, *Islamist Radicalization in Europe: An Occupational Change Process*. (New York, Routledge, 2012): 14.
[127] Harriet Allan, et al. *Drivers of Violent Extremisms: Hypotheses and Literature Review*. (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2015).

how people become radicalized. Each case is different and the path of each individual must be examined according to its own merits. However, this does not mean that the concept is "unfounded" or is a "myth".[128] According to Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) there are four distinct stages of radicalization; pre-radicalization, identification, indoctrination and action stages or jihadisation phase.[129] Efforts have been made by researchers to identify a number of drivers that seem to be common in regards to radicalization. The perception of grievance in relation to conflicted identities, oppression, or socio-economic exclusion, injustice and other deprivations can make people receptive to extremist ideas and ideology that speaks of the grievances and provides a convincing reason. Another important area to focus is social issues and group dynamics. This is because radicalization often occurs in small networks of friends. In addition, extremist ideas are likely to resonate if articulated by a credible or charismatic leader.[130]

There are different points of view in regards to the process of radicalization, as well as a significant diversity in those recruited for terrorism. According to Precht, for many in Western Europe, the process of radicalization begins when they are adolescents seeking to strengthen Muslim identity and causes; and find the answer in the ideology of Islam. People are often secular before they begin the process of radicalization, which takes place mainly within social networks.[131]

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[128] Faiza Patel, *Rethinking Radicalization, Brennan Center for Justice*, (New York University, 2011) and *Targeted and Entrapped: Manufacturing the 'Homegrown' Threat in the United States*, (Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, New York University, 2011): 7-8.

[129] Federal Bureau of Investigations. *The Radicalization Process: From Conversion to Jihad*. (2006): 4. Available: http://cryptome.org/fbi-jihad.pdf. Accessed: 28-10-2017.

[130] Jarret Brachman, *Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice,* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009): 52-78.

[131] Tomas Precht, Home grown Terrorism and Islamist Radicalization in Europe. Research report funded by the Danish Ministry of Justice. December 2007. Available:
http://www.justitsministeriet.dk/sites/default/files/media/Arbejdsomraader/Forskning/Forskningspuljen/201

An important factor in radicalization process is availability of charismatic preachers capable of holding persuasive speeches not only in mosques, but also in schools, universities or even in prisons. The evidence indicates that many Islamists of US origin were radicalized during their detention, including members of the prison that formed the cell of Jamiyat al-Islam al-Sahih in California, which was found guilty in 2007 of their plans to attack the synagogues and the Israeli Consulate in Los Angeles.[132] Ironically, prisons provide a favorable terrain for recruitment, as well as a breeding ground for radicalization. These places produce more applicants and rebels than any other environment. Things get worse in prisons when terrorists are not separated from other criminals. Terrorists use physical and ideological space to recruit and indoctrinate potential young people in their groups. The most worrying fact is that many of these potential young radicals do not fully know the history of their country, lack adequate knowledge of Islam and have not read the Qur'an to see if Islam is a violent religion. Preachers, mainly from Wahhabi Islam, take advantage of these disenchanted young persons who do not know the full extent of religion which they want to embrace.[133]

Another important factor to consider is the part played by social networks like *Facebook*, *Whatsup* or *Twitter* in process of radicalization. According to Sageman, "Social links are key to the dynamics of terror networks."[134] In addition, Hoffman observed that, "in today's world, every terrorist group has a website and, in many cases,

1/2007/Home_grown_terrorism_and_Islamist_radicalisation_in_Europe_-n_assessment_of_influencing_factors__2_.pdf. Accessed: 17-10-2017.

[132] Myriam Benraad, Facing Homegrown Radicalization. *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch #1575.* September 3, 2009. Available: http://www.ciaonet.org.library.norwich.edu/pbei/winep/0017485/f_0017485_14968.pdf>. Accessed: 17-10-2017.

[133] Margarita Bizina & David H. Gray, Radicalization of Youth as a Growing Concern for Counter-Terrorism Policy *Global Security Studies,* 5(1), 2014.

[134] Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks, (*Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).

multiple sites using different languages tailored to specific audiences."[135] Whereas in the past, indoctrination, recruitment and terrorist training were heavily based on a face-to-face meeting between the recruit and the recruiter; The Internet has neglected this process by providing quick connections easily. This has significantly changed the way terrorists operate and has improved their modus operandi. This is possible because young people and the internet are intertwined, as statistics show that internet usage among young people has increased. Terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda have managed to entertain the questions posted on their websites by the public by issuing audio declarations, as well as using YouTube and blogs. The internet has also become a pivotal point for all terrorists around the world in their fight for a common cause. For example, in Singapore, a twenty-year-old military man, Muhammad Fadil Abdul Hamid, was arrested for contacting Anwar al-Awlaki, the preacher born in the US and expressesd interest in joining the terrorist group operating in Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine. A terrorist group can now identify, cultivate and develop a raw recruit into a full-fledged terrorist by using internet. In this way, radicalization through use of internet is used as a way of self-radicalization.[136] However, many young people enter the radical circles after society has rejected them or deprived them by finding virtual networks online, in youth clubs and in places of worship. If the local community remains disinterested in its youth, it will be difficult to recognize the signs that could indicate the process of radicalization.

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[135] Bruce Hoffman, *The Use of the Internet By Islamic Extremists*. Testimony presented to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, on May 4, 2006. Available: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/congress/hoffman_testimony4may06.pdf. Accessed: 17-10-2017.
[136] Ibid, pp 3-8.

3.3   The Causes of Radicalization

There are different opinions on the real causes of radicalization. Some authors like Maclean are of the opinion that radicalization is typically an internal journey driven by the discontent and anger of adolescents and has little to do with the geography, religion or heritage of the individual. People who are radicalizing do so due to the desire to act and do something meaningful. Moreover, their vision of the world is in black and white and align themselves with a virtuous cause.[137] For example, the Tsarnaev brothers in Boston bombing in the USA turned to radical ideology in order to project the blame for their internal suffering on the society around them. The demise of their parents' marriage and the subsequent abandonment of the teenagers in America left them without financial or social support under conditions of rapid deteriorations.[138] In this case, radical Islamist ideology became the best cause of action and offered an outlet to their anger against a country that supposedly failed them and this led to the bombing and the sudden end of the Boston marathon. Sageman supports this proposal since the reason behind the young who join the Salafi jihad is because of the alienation experienced while living in foreign countries and not having good employment. Therefore, joining the jihad allowed them to escape the personal feeling of resentment and humiliation.[139]

In Western Europe, a similar cause for radicalization exists as second generation Muslims continue to be considered immigrants regardless of staying there for so long and fail to integrate in the society. The French model of integration of its immigrants was

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[137] Maclean, Why Terrorism Can Grow In Any Soil Including Our Own. *Maclean 126, no. 15* (April 12, 2013): 1.

[138] Janet Reitman, Jahar's World. *Rolling Stone 1188,* (July 17 2013): 46-57.

[139] Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks,* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).

different with the British model. The French model was based on secularism in politics in which every citizen was identified as the first French, and this helped to put the issues of ethnicity and religion not as a priority. The British model failed to bring ethnic and religious communities together with each other.[140] The lack of integration of ethnic communities in Britain has made it difficult to provide information to law enforcement on possible radicalization among young people. This means many young Muslims in Europe feel deprived of their rights in a society that could not fully accept them and ends up transforming Islam into a symbol of cultural identity, resulting in being radicalized by clerics.[141]

Regardless of the integration model, however, "parallel societies" were created in which immigrants live in poor neighborhoods and continue to practice religion and cultural norms of country of origin.[142] This failure to share common values with the host country has made them easy prey to radical propaganda as these marginalized societies are full of young Muslims ready to be recruited by Islamic extremists.[143] The most terrifying thing is that "the most vulnerable potential recruits, if they are Muslims born or converted to Islam, are those who are in a stage of life in which they seek an identity while seeking approval and validation. They are looking for causes that can be justified from the religious and cultural point of view, which provide them with a way to identify who they are and that provide a clear demand for action."[144] In this case, internal terrorism is due to

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[140] Kepel, Gilles. French Lessons in Londonistan, in *National Interest no. 106* (March 2010): 42-52.
[141] Kristin Archick, John Rollins and Steven Woehrel, Islamist Extremism in Europe, *Congressional Research Service.* July 29, 2005. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS22211.pdf>
[142] Kristin Baker, James Mitchell and Brian Tindall, Combating Islamic Terrorism in Europe, American Diplomacy. November 2007. Available:
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2007/1012/bake/bakeretal_islameurope.html>.
[143] Ibid.
[144] Ibid.

sociological problems in which issues related to identity, belonging, dynamics and group values are important elements in the transformation process. Therefore, a common denominator is that the people involved are at a crossroads in their life and wanting a cause.[145]

Research in Britain suggests that, in relation to Islamist terrorism, young people and people with low incomes and socio-economic groups; see the conflict between the being British and its cultural identity; and those who perceive discrimination, experience racial or religious harassment, and are particularly vulnerable.[146] It is important to understand that radicalized people come from different backgrounds. Recent research, for example, indicates that only five women were convicted of Islamic crimes between 1999 and 2009 in the United Kingdom. Al Qaeda is "launching specifically and targeting women for violent acts of radicalization" and that "there is no gender imbalance" in terms of supporting extremism.[147] In terms of age, most people are aged between 13 and 25 and over two thirds of all terrorist crimes committed since 2001 have been committed by people under 30, but the age of criminals varies from 16 to 48.[148] However, education levels and the economic status vary. Those particularly vulnerable to radicalization include converts to the Muslim faith, which means they originated from many different

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[145] Tomas Precht, *Home grown terrorism and Islamist radicalization in Europe*. Research report funded by the Danish Ministry of Justice. December 2007.

[146] Home Office Occasional Paper 98, *Understanding vulnerability and resilience in individuals to the influence of AQ violent extremism*, November 2011.

[147] Robin Simcox, Hannah Stuart, Houriya Ahmed, Islamist Terrorism,(The British Connections, Centre for Social Cohesion, 2010).

[148] Ibid.

ethnic communities rather than in what we would consider "traditional" Muslim communities.[149]

There are many drivers and routes into Islamist radicalization. These are divided into four main categories: ideology, theology, grievance and mental health problems. The additional evidence underscores the grievance and its links to social exclusion. For example, terrorism drivers in Northern Ireland, Al Qaeda related terrorism and far-right extremism have been the combination of personal ideology and vulnerability. In recent years the supremacist ideology has increasingly included Islamophobia. This includes the pressure of the group and the prospect of personal advantage, with the people involved who tend to be men, with little education and unemployed, in some cases with a criminal record. However, demographic data may vary depending on the supported organization. Supporters of right extremists are more united and concerned about immigration issues, effects on society, high levels of dissatisfaction with politics, and the anxiety about role of Islam in society. Some of the challenges young Muslims face is they are not being listened to and do not have the tools to express their grievances in the right way. Furthermore, they feel powerless and unable to make changes or influence what is going on in their lives. [150]

In short, the causes of radicalization can range from identity crises, personal traumas, discrimination, segregation and alienation to misinformation about Islam and Western foreign policy. However, there are other important factors that must be present because process of radicalization takes root as discussed above.

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[149] HM Government, Prevent Strategy, June 2011, para 9.23; Robin Simcox, Hannah Stuart, Houriya Ahmed, *Islamist Terrorism*: (The British Connections, Centre for Social Cohesion, 2010).
[150] House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, *Roots of violent Radicalization*, Nineteenth Report of Session 2010–12, Published on 6 February 2012 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited.

3.4 Places for Recruitment and Radicalization

The Islamic radicalization cannot be fully understood without looking in the places where recruitment takes place. Recently, there have been the emergence of a leaderless movement, significantly marked by self-enrollment and inspired by the "al-Qaeda classic" to join the Salafi global jihad. Until the contexts are better understood, it will be difficult to bring about effective and appropriate response measures.[151] Ideology becomes the lifeblood among citizens and radicalization potentially take place without knowing it. This poses a unique set of threats, since potential terrorists could be anyone exposed and vulnerable due to social, psychological and other factors of the Jihadist Salafist ideology and, often, are difficult to detect until such persons are ready to perform acts of violence.

There are various ways of radicalization. Historically, prisons have served as incubators for extreme ideas. "Prison populations offer another entry for extremist groups to promote their ideology."[152] In this case ideology propels terrorists' recruitment. Ironically, the prison offers a good environment for the recruitment of terrorists, since they are considered fertile ground for radicalization. Western prisons were the main reasons for the recruitment of Al Qaeda, partly due to relatively negligent practices. However, things get worse when the terrorists are not separated from the young population. For example, in Pakistan, 92,000 prisoners share 41,000 places with little or no distinction between juvenile delinquents and adults or minors. Therefore, detained terrorists who are not physically separated from other criminals and, in particular, minors

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[151] Frank J. Cilluffo, Sharon L. Cardash & Andrew J. Whitehead, Radicalization: Behind Bars and Beyond, *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 13(2), 2007): 113-122.
[152] U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, Analysis of the Response by the Federal Bureau of Prisons to Recommendations in the OIG's April 2004 Report on the Selection of Muslim Religious Service Providers, July 2004.

have used the time to recruit and indoctrinate potential young people into their groups like in the United States prisons which has the highest incarceration rate globally with over two million prisoners, is another example where youth radicalization has taken place.

Far-right extremist groups, including the Posse Comitatus, the Order and various militia movements, have been trained or recruited in US prisons. This is because prisoners become easy targets for extremists. Prisoners form a captive audience often present many characteristics that make them vulnerable to radicalization, including alienation, antisocial attitudes, cultural disillusionment, social isolation and violent tendencies. In addition, prisoners are obligated to join gangs in prison to protect them, giving the extremists another chance to exercise influence. Kevin Lamar James, a prisoner of the New Folsom State Prison in California, created the extremist group *Jam'iyyatUl-Islam Is-Sahih* (Assembly of Authentic Islamic Assembly or JIS) while in prison and recruited other inmates while other members were recruited outside of the prison after being put on probation. The group planned a series of attacks in Los Angeles area, including US military installations, Synagogues, and Israeli Consulate.[153] It is also believed that the idea of ISIS was conceptualized within an Iraqi prison and that the initial plans of the group were coordinated within the prison.[154]

It is worth noting that a detainee's radicalization vulnerability does not end after the release from the prison. The fact that people are released with very little financial, emotional or family support makes them the target of radicalization, as they have to rely

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[153] Frank Cilluffo, Gregory Saathoff, et al, *Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization*, report by the George Washington University's Homeland Security Policy Institute and the University of Virginia's Critical Incident Analysis Group, 19 September 2006.
[154] Martin Chulov, ISIS: the inside story, *The Guardian,* 11 December 2014, Available: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/11/-sp-isis-the-insidestory. Assessed: 21-10-2017.

on the support often provided by the community and religious groups. Terrorist groups use the advantage of this situation to establish links with former prisoners. For example, Haramain, an extremist group, maintained a database that contained information on over 15,000 prisoners considered vulnerable to the group's message, including names, release dates, and addresses to which individuals would be released.[155]

Religious institutions offer another path for radicalization. These are primarily institutions that preach the distorted and misinterpreted interpretation of religion. These institutions aim to win the hearts and minds of young people. The so-called "men of God" exploit the minds and hearts of young people and suggest that the only alternative left is violence. Therefore, young people are manipulated to believe that their struggle is for a noble cause. Higher learning institutions like universities and colleges have become a recruitment ground for terrorists. Some teachers use lecture sessions to describe the atrocities and injustices that occur in countries in which there is conflict. This is also exacerbated by local students who go abroad to study but end up being indoctrinated and radicalized. Furthermore, these ideas are imported to their local environment.

Internet has been an important tool for radicalization in reaching the youth and attracting new recruits. The internet, with its enormous scope and its universal role in modern society, offers extremists a precious means of spreading the message. This is so because the internet is cheap, anonymous, pervasive, unregulated, and uncensored in most cases therefore allowing instantaneous communication with potentially huge audiences.[156] For example, in December 2007 Al-Qaeda's multimedia arm as-sahab announced that

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[155] Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, *Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Cell*, (testimony, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 19 September 2006).
[156] Frank J. Cilluffo, Sharon L. Cardash and Andrew J. Whitehead, *Radicalization: Behind Bars and Beyond*, Op Cit.

Ayman al-Zawahiri who was Al-Qaeda's second –in-command entertained questions from the public posted on militants websites and managed to solicit more than 900 entries.[157]

In addition, the internet is used for recruitment and for fund raising, training, planning and attacking vulnerable IT systems. The late leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi used the disseminated the carnage in Iraq by videotaping and posting on blogs and YouTube.[158] However, radicalization and recruitment are main online activities for most extremists. The internet gives extremists direct access to the public, allowing them to bypass the main media and institutions not in their control. The public is exposed to the extremist message about an Islam under attack, a West hostile to Muslims and the need to declare jihad as a moral and religious imperative.[159] In the videos, Muslim women and children are represented as victims of Western aggression while Muslim men, are often depicted as resistant to Western aggression. The message is a direct call to Muslims youth to join the jihadist movement.

Through the use of internet, extremists can contact potential recruits by e-mail, chat room or voice chat. For example, the five men from Northern Virginia first made contact with terrorist organizations through emails.[160] In this way, recruiters can involve an individual visitor and can indoctrinate directly. Extremists can also examine potential recruits by eliminating those who are not serious or trustworthy, as well as potential agents of the secret services, and asking questions about Islam, Arabic language and

[157] Evan F. Kohlmann , Al-Qa`ida's "MySpace: Terrorist Recruitment on the Internet, *CTC Sentinel*, January 2008, Vol 1. Issue 2. Available: https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2010/06/Vol1Iss2-Art4.pdf. Accessed: 10-05-2018.
[158] Ibid.
[159] Frank J. Cilluffo, Sharon L. Cardash and Andrew J. Whitehead, Op Cit.
[160] The Washington Post Editorial, December 11, 2009. Combating homegrown terrorism. *The Washington Post.* Available: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/12/15/AR2009121504872.html

extremist ideology.[161] Once a candidate for jihad has been considered legitimate and worthy, will receive further instructions on the next step to take. These instructions will, for example, be like traveling to a certain country, like Iraq, building explosives and fighting.[162] In addition, these websites include information on how to perform conduct and build weapons such as bombs and other devices.

3.5   Radicalization in Africa

This section explains radicalization in Africa in general, and in Kenya in particular. It will focus on explaining the root causes that drive radicalization. 'Radicalization' is understood as the process individuals or groups develop extremist ideologies.[163] Radicalization can be a precursor of extremist activities and manifest itself with violence or direct support for extremist actions, but it can also be non-violent,[164] where a person can have or support radical opinions or beliefs without acting on them using violence.[165] The focus will be on the one that manifest in violence and support extremist actions. The underlying conditions for radicalization may include; inadequate government services, large-scale poverty and unemployment; and insufficient economic, political and social opportunities.[166]

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[161] Daniel Kimmage, Al-Qaeda Central and the Internet, Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper , New America Foundation, March 2010. Available:
https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2371/f/downloads/HSPI_Report_15.pdf. Accessed: 10-05-2018.
[162] Gabriel Weimann, "www.terror.net": How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet. Special Report 116. March 2004. Available: www.usip.org. Assessed: 20-10-2017.
[163] Randy Borum, Radicalization into violent extremism: a review of Social Science Theories, *Journal of Strategic Securit*y, 4:4, (2011). Available:
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1139&context=jss. Assessed: 21-10-2017.

[165]Jammie Bartlett and Carl Miller, The edge of violence: Towards telling the difference between violent and non-violent Radicalization, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 24, 2012, 1–21. Assessed: 21-10-2017.
[166] Institute for Security Studies (ISS), African Counter Terrorism Legal Frameworks a Decade after 2001, (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2011).

Although the radicalization to terrorism can occur at any age, young people seeking belonging, purpose or identity may be more vulnerable to radicalization.[167] This is mainly caused by issues to do with deprivation, negative perceptions of state authorities mainly with security forces like the police as they are seen and perceived to support 'the other'. Some become discouraged and disillusioned; lose patience with conventional means of political action and look for tactics that will have a greater impact. Violent extremists take advantage of these gaps to show themselves as providers of justice and security for "their community" and to pressure young people to participate. In this case, radicalization does not follow a straight path; and the conditions for making them prosper differ from one individual to another according to the situation in which they are found. However, it is a combination of contextual and personal factors, which may include feelings of alienation, exclusion, deprivation, insecurity or persecution. However, young people seem to be particularly vulnerable in this sense.

Radicalization and recruitment can occur mainly on the basis of social bonds rather than ideological reasons. This is the case when young people can choose to join violent extremist groups for recognition, companionship and identity that the community deprives them of. Young people can choose to join a group if they see that they are in a position and are able to take care of their material and socio-psychological needs, such as protection, money and solidarity. Violent extremist groups tend to create an identity and do not provide doubts, critical thinking or self-criticism, since they attribute full

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[167] Youth Engagement to Counter Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism, Report on Findings and Recommendations, Joint OSCE Secretariat – OSCE ODIHR Expert Roundtable Vienna, 23-24 October 2012.

responsibility to the situation of an individual, real or perceived grievances to society in general and tend to place sense of guilty on others.

There are many dynamics that can contribute to extremism in Africa. These can include economic, political, social and individual factors. Issues of religion, identity and gender must be seriously considered to understand youth radicalization. However, to understand that "the emergence of ISIS in 2014 has challenged conventional ideas on radicalization, and those attracted to this group have defied traditional notions about violent extremism, radicalization and recruitment.[168] This has changed the perceived profile of recruits from poor young people to include educated men and women with rich knowledge around the world. Radicalization and conscription has become transnational in nature due to globalization which has facilitated complex networks of terrorist groups across continental boundaries. These dynamics has forced governments across the world to grapple about how to develop appropriate responses to manage this complex phenomenon.

In Africa, young people in particular have been hit by terrorism, as both victims and perpetrators. Many young people have been recruited into extremist groups in recent years and it is estimated that between 15 and 18 years make up about 20 percent of suicide bombers. This is so as terrorist groups currently rely on youth to conduct their mission.[169] Furthermore, groups that have suffered losses in terms of personnel will recruit the youth as older members are too weary and reluctant to continue with the cause and the struggle.

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[168] Raeesah Cassim Cachalia, Uyo Salifu & Irene Ndung'u, The Dynamics of youth Radicalization in Africa: Reviewing the current evidence, *Institute for Security Studies,* ISS Paper 296, August 2016.
[169] Nicole Goldin, Backdrop Boko Haram: what we should understand about youth in Nigeria, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 23 January 2015. Available: https://www.csis.org/analysis/backdrop-boko-haram-what-we-shouldunderstand- about-youth-nigeria. Accessed: 21-10-2017.

For example, Al-Qaeda from the Islamic Maghreb has managed to counter the problem of the decline of adult personnel by recruiting the youth. Young people are also preferred because, if they are captured, will receive mild judgments because of their age and are considered important future leaders to ensure continuity. Moreover, the growth of youth in Africa, together with the various socio-economic challenges, further increase the vulnerability of the youth on the continent.

There are a range of factors that drive the youth to be radicalized. These range from political, economic, social, identity and religious factors. In regards to political factors; government repression, along with the human rights abuses may trigger anger and discontent which may be directed at the state.[170] If the youth are not heard by the government may end up losing faith and despair and may choose to bring change through violent means.[171] The issue of the State abusing its own people brings political and social divisions and the 'us vs them' mentality, leads to the youth seeking identity and cohesion elsewhere, often finding it within extremist groups.[172] In North Africa, particularly in Libya, Egypt and Tunisia autocracy and poor governance, along with state repression, were a strong impetus to the radicalization of youth, as seen during the Arab Spring, while requests were concentrated on civil liberties, economic opportunities and discontent with the brutality of the state.[173] Therefore; marginalization, deprivation, poverty, failure of governance and oppression of security services (arbitrary arrests, imprisonment without

[170] Mombasa Republican Council, ISS, Paper 265, 4 September 2014, Available: https://www.issafrica.org/publications/papers/radicalisation-in-kenyarecruitment-to-al-shabaab-and-the-mombasa-republican-council. Accessed: 21-10-2017.
[171] Ibid.
[172] Kris Jepson, Inside Kenya's death squads, *Al Jazeera,* December 2014. Op cit.
[173] Kenneth Roth, Time to abandon the autocrats and embrace rights: the international response to the Arab Spring, Human Rights Watch, Available: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2012/country-chapters/africa-americas-asiaeurope/central-asia-middle-east/north-africa. Accessed: 21-10-2017.

trial and use of torture) have become sufficient justifications for violence. These same complaints have been cited by many young Egyptians who have joined ISIS or have sympathized with them.[174] Corruption is also another cause of radicalization. The results of widespread corruption manifest themselves in greater gaps in inequality[175] and suffocated socio-economic development.[176] Therefore, socio-political dissatisfaction with perceived corruption or injustice provide fertile ground for radicalization. This is because extremist organizations describe Islamism as solution to corruption and injustice.[177]

Economic and development factors influence the radicalization of youth, although recent evidence has shown that large number of ISIS recruits come from the middle class and have well-paid jobs in developed countries.[178] In this case, socio-economic conditions serve as facilitators. It is not necessarily extreme poverty, but circumstances that do not allow the satisfaction of the aspirations that may be the cause of discontent associated with extremist activities. Therefore, relative deprivation is seen in "frustrated winners". They are young educated and ambitious, but lack real opportunities to move forward.[179] Frustration increases as the youth begin to confront those of rich origins. This kind of marginal exclusion lead to a poor quality of life for certain sectors of society.

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[174] Brian Rohan, In Egypt, disaffected youth increasingly drawn to extremism, *Associated Press*, 4 August 2015. Available: http://bigstory.ap.org/article/548a9a558d9d44f3b4b1d2530483738c/egypts-disaffected-youth-increasinglycalling-violence. Accessed: 22-10-2017.

[175] Transparency International, Tackle instability and terrorism by fighting corruption, 4 February 2015, www.transparency.org/news/feature/tackle_instability_and_terrorism_by_fighting_corruption.

[176] Carlotta Gall, Widespread graft benefited Tunisian leader's family, study says, *New York Times*, 25 June 2015, Available: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/25/world/africa/widespread-graft-expanded-after-tunisan-revolt-studysays.html?_r=1. Accessed: 22-10-2017

[177] Caitriona Dowd & Clionadh Raleigh, Briefing: the myth of global Islamic terrorism and local conflict in Mali and the Sahel, *African Affairs*, 112:448, 2013.

[178] Howard Koplowitz, Islamic extremism in Europe: is high youth unemployment to blame? *International Business Times,* 14 January 2015.

[179] Omer Taspınar, You can't understand why people join ISIS without understanding relative deprivation, The World Post, 25 March 2015. Available: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amer-tapaenar-/isis-relativedeprivation_b_6912460.html? utm_hp_ref=world. Accessed: 22-10-2017.

Consequently, the youth find a sense of common identity or social cohesion both online and through direct contact with extremist groups. Youth unemployment and underemployment also play a role in radicalization. This is a situation in where young people participate in a job they are over-qualified because of lack of adequate opportunities or are temporarily employed. Therefore, young people face a future of uncertainty and despair. Radicalization is also driven by social dynamics. Many young people involved are seen to come from divorced homes.[180] The lack of supervision and care of parents on orphaned and abandoned children forces them to be linked to radicalization.[181] The "absent father syndrome", which is the abandonment or abuse of parents during childhood, contributes to radicalization later. This is to do with parental involvement in an individual's life and feeling that one's family is present, cares and is ready to help in times of difficulty.[182] This has been supported by Bjørgo and Carlsson; and Lützinger who have observed that many young people are lured into radical groups in search for substitute families and father figures; and that many young members of extremist groups have less-than-ideal relationships with their families and their fathers in particular.[183] A good example are the Boston Marathon Bombers who came from divorced family because the father could not agree with the wife's stricter embrace of Islamic

[180] Anouar Boukhars, The drivers of insecurity in Mauritania, The Carnegie Papers, 30 April 2012. Available: http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/30/drivers-of-insecurity-in-mauritania.
[181] Freedom C. Onuoha, Why do Youth Join Boko Haram? US Institute for Peace, Special Report, 348, 2014.
[182] U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Lessons Learned From Canada, the U.K. and the U.S. Arlington, VA July 28-30, 2015. Available: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249947.pdf. Accessed: 10-05-2018.
[183] Bjørgo, T., & Carlsson, Y. Early intervention with violent and racist youth groups. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs(2005). Available: http://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/11275/uploads. Accessed: 10-05-2018; and Lützinger, S. (2012). The other side of the story. A qualitative study of the biographies of extremists and terrorists. Bundeskriminalamt. Available: http://www.niacro.co.uk/filestore/documents/hate_crime_papers/The_Other_Side_of_the_Story-Lutzinger-2012.pdf. Accessed: 10-05-2018.

traditions.[184] Another example is Richard Reid who was recruited into al-Qaida and tried to bring down an American Airlines flight in December 2001 by detonating explosives hidden in his shoes. Various police and intelligence investigations into his life has shown that Reid did not receive adequate attention at home when he was a child because the father was incarcerated for most of that time, and his parents separated when he was young. This suggests some level of dysfunctionality in the family system.[185]

This is mainly influenced by charismatic leaders, men or recruiters who are able to convince young people. Even children who are sent to the Koranic schools by their parents, and those sent to be beggars on the streets, run a high risk of radicalization by strangers trying to escape difficult circumstances. This is common in Northern Nigeria. In Somalia, the absence of paternal figures among men and boys is also significant among Al-Shabaab as children raised up without the guidance of parents and maternal union. Orphans become vulnerable to recruitment and radicalization by ideologues who act as parents' representatives. The group pressure was also identified as a factor in recruitment of young people to Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Many of the recruits in the organization do so due to influence of friends.[186]

A study conducted by Queen Mary University in London showed a correlation between "psychosocial adversity" and sympathy towards violent extremist tendencies. There is a connection between relative social isolation and depression tendencies with

[184] Kirit Radia, Boston Marathon Bombing Suspects' Twisted Family History, *abc News,* April 22, 2013. Available: https://abcnews.go.com/International/boston-marathon-bombing-suspects-twisted-family-history/story?id=19012097. Accessed: 10-05-2018.

[185] Scott Gerwehr & Sara Daly, Al-Qaida: Chapter 5: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment, The RAND Corporation. Available: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reprints/2006/RAND_RP1214.pdf. Accessed: 10-05-2018.

[186] James Fergusson, *The world's most dangerous place: inside the outlaw state of Somalia*, (London: Bantam Press, 2013).

sympathy for extremist groups and ideology. The study has linked radicalization with marginalization, injustice and inequality. It also explains that previous experiences or exposure to violence could also explain vulnerability to radicalism.[187]

Another factor for radicalization is the problem of identity. Extremist groups take advantage of one's continuous search for belonging or acceptance of young people. In this case, issues relating to identity should be understood in the sense that young people try to find a place of belonging and acceptance for a number of reasons. This is because they are at that point between puberty and adulthood, where they are more open to external influence, so are aware of the social and political environment and want to establish their identity.[188] Therefore, these identity struggles are used in the recruitment and radicalization process.

Religion also played a role in radicalization. It has demonstrated the ability to inspire the most powerful acts of kindness and cruelty. However, much emphasis has been placed on role of religious ideology in Africa. Groups such as ISIS, al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, have long used religion as a tool and tactic to attract support for their cause. Religion has either been manipulated or used as a motivator. Religion has been used by terrorist recruiters in presenting their agendas as 'holy wars' thereby attracting young people on their side. These young people become easily attracted and influenced as they are seeking a sense of adventure or purpose in life. In the study conducted by Botha, 87% of those interviewed on why they joined Al-Shabaab cited religion as a motivating factor. In

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[187] Kamaldeep Bhui, Brian Everitt, Edgar Joneses, Might depression, psychosocial adversity, and limited social assets explain vulnerability to and resistance against violent radicalization? PLoS ONE, 9:9, 24 September 2014. Available: www.kcl.ac.uk/kcmhr/publications/assetfiles/2014/Bhui2014.pdf. Accessed: 10-11-2017.

[188] Anneli Botha and M Abdile, Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia, ISS, Paper, 266, 2.

Kenya, 58% of the recruits interviewed saw Al-Shabaab as the defender of Islam against other religions and countries.[189]

3.6   Radicalization in Kenya

In Kenya, violent extremism has been on an upward trend since 11 September, 2001. From the military intervention of Kenya in October 2011 in Somalia to face the threat of Al-Shabaab; there has been intensification of the indoctrination of young people to join violent extremism.[190] This was constructed as an assault on Islam by a 'Christian nation' and hence a motivation for recruitment. Groups like Al-Shabaab cannot sustain itself without young recruits. Furthermore, Al-Shabaab has taken advantage of challenges young people face in the country and focuses on recruitment strategies to exploit young people. In this case, radicalization could be attributed to individual, social economic, political and religious factors as well as external factors affecting the people of Kenya and mainly the youth. Basically, on an individual level, radicalization is fundamentally an individual process, as young people seek a sense of purpose and meaning in their lives and are in constant search and desire for adventure, glory and heroism as seek to break the status quo.[191] The extremist groups capitalize on the search for meaning and build visions of the world that satisfy the youthful desires of self-realization and fulfillment.[192]

The Al-Shabaab terrorist group capitalize on the socio-economic factors that make young Kenyans vulnerable to radicalization. Most youth in Kenya struggle to access

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[189] Anneli Botha and M Abdile, Radicalisation and Al-Shabaab Recruitment in Somalia, ISS, Paper, 266, 11.
[190] John Mwangi, The Process and Trends of Youth Radicalization in Kenya's Mombasa and Nairobi Counties, Department of International Relations, United States International University, 3rd MISR Graduate Students' Conference, July 28-29, 2017.
[191] Elijah OS Odhiambo, Kennedy Onkware & Maito T.Leshan, Domestic Radicalization in Kenya, *Global Journal of Interdisciplinry Science*, 4 (3), 2015: 48-56.
[192] Human Rights Watch, 2012.

employment, education, housing, health services and other needs. The corruption perceived among the security forces has led to disillusionment with public institutions. This has forced young people to seek solutions to their problems outside the country, as they are frustrated by the selective application of the law regarding the approach to impunity among the elites. This leads to look for external means of justice.[193] Statistics have shown that 99% of young people recruited by Al-Shabaab believe that the Kenyan government seeks and protects interests of the few.[194] Therefore, Al-Shabaab use the perceived injustices of corruption in its recruitment campaigns.

Youth unemployment is also seen as a significant driver of radicalization due to high unemployment rates. In 2009, 29 percent of the youth among those aged between 15 and 29 years were unemployed and about 57 percent joined Al-Shabaab. This was the main reason young Somalis from Eastleigh, Nairobi; joined Al-Shabaab. In this it provided a kind of employment as they could get a monthly salary of between USD50-USD150.[195] Furthermore, even the educated youth have been put at great risk of being radicalized due to frustration and relative deprivation. Young people find it difficult to access basic needs, such as housing, education and health services; and this puts them in a bad situation. Young people who are mostly non-elitist, poor and frustrated have difficulty reaching a culturally recognized maturity and as a result end up finding comfort in joining Al-Shabaab.[196] The group give them a sense of adult status through financial compensation and responsibility as well as purpose.

[193] Elijah OS Odhiambo, Kennedy Onkware & Maito T. Leshan, Domestic Radicalization in Kenya. Op cit.
[194] Ibid.
[195] Hassan Muhsin, Understanding Drivers of Violent extremism, the case of Al-Shabaab and Somali Youth, *CTC Sentinel*, 5:8, (2012).
[196] Elijah OS Odhiambo, Kennedy Onkware & Maito T. Leshan, Domestic Radicalization in Kenya. Op cit.

The issue of race and ethnicity also fosters the idea that those who are of Somali Muslims are second class and end up being excluded from political processes. This leads to feeling of deprivation and isolation, and therefore leads to issues of identity and belonging. Somali Muslim youth have faced a lot of problems when applying for identity cards and this has kept them out of the national agenda and treated as if they are not Kenyans. Moreover, they had to undergo extra vetting processes before assessing one to actually prove they are Kenyans. Therefore, those of Somali and Kenyan Muslim identity, have been securitized as being responsible for acts of terrorism after 1998. This has resulted in Somali youth to feel discriminated against, forcing them to join Al-Shabaab because of their religious identity.[197] In this case, religion and ethnic identity drive awareness of relative deprivation and hence becoming the rationale for radicalization.[198]

On the other hand, perceived reactionary responses by security forces after attack have contributed to youth radicalization. These responses have led to the ethnic and racial profiling of young Somalis. For example, during "Operation Usalama Watch" in April 2014; 4,005 young people of Somali origin were arrested in a campaign to eliminate Al-Shabaab. Later, a total of 3, 010 were released after establishing were citizens of Kenya without a criminal record.[199] This type of action leads to humiliation, causes resentment and suspicion towards the government and foment feelings of exclusion; leaving young people vulnerable to recruitment as they seek a way out of their frustration and belonging elsewhere.

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[197] Anneli Botha & M Abdile, Radicalization and Al-Shabaab Recruitment in Somalia, *ISS,* Paper, 266, 11. Op cit.

[198] Anneli Botha, Radicalization to Terrorism in Kenya and Uganda: a political Socialization perspective, *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 9:5, 2015.

[199] Anneli Botha, Political Socialization and Terrorist Radicalization among Individuals Who Joined al-Shabaab in Kenya. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 37(11), (2014): 895-919.

Mobilization of youth before elections by politicians to gain the youth vote has contributed to youth frustration. The youth are promised a lot but after that they are ignored and forgotten. These frustrated youth may similarly be exploited by other politicians inciting them to violent protests or armed resistance. This political manipulation has led young people to feel disillusioned with electoral politics and politicians. Therefore, the youth end up finding solutions to their problems outside of mainstream politics and in most cases through violent extremism.[200]

Religion has played part in radicalization of the youth in Kenya. Religious ideology has made young people believe that the wars in Somalia, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and the conflict between Israel and Palestine are part of world campaign against Islam as a religion. This has led young people to think that the problems affecting Muslims are worthy of their participation. This spirit of universal Muslim brotherhood has led young Kenyans to become radicals and recruited as mujahidin. This provided fertile ground for young Muslims to radicalize and join extremists groups. This has been influenced by a group of radical preachers that have been justifying violence in recruiting the youth that Islam was under siege and needed to be defended. In linking religious ideology to violence, charismatic figures are said to have been influencing the process.[201] Furthermore, the internet has also been aiding the radicalization process by facilitating a number of online platforms where radicalization processes has been initiated. Al- Shabaab

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[200] Human Rights Watch, 2012.
[201] Amble, J.C. & Meleagrou- Hitchens, A. Jihadist Radicalization in East Africa: Two Case Studies, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,* 37 (6), (2014): 523-540.

has used videos, online platforms, and new media outlets like Twitter to shape public opinion.[202]

Peer pressure among the youth also played a role in radicalization. Peer networks help in pushing individuals to join terror networks. Friends easily influence each other in adopting radical beliefs. In addition to conforming to peer pressure, the issue of group think reduces rationality on an individual to make decision. In this way, young people begin to discuss the life experiences and aspirations and how to address their perceived injustices. This may create opportunities to accept violent extremism ideas and may end up joining if they see evidence of material gains through their friend. Previous research by Botha in 2014 on individuals who had joined the Al-Shabaab in Kenya found that friendship was key motivating factor to join.[203] This has further been supported by Rink and Sharma who conducted a study in Nairobi's Eastleigh area on radicalization who observed that exposure to radical networks, and through peer networks remained main predictor of religious radicalization.[204]

3.7 Deradicalization

According to Odhiambo et al, "Kenya's ability to craft effective long-term counter-radicalization and de-radicalization strategies is dependent on the degree to which it is able to understand the phenomenon of radicalization."[205] In this case, counter-terrorism tactics should not be taken as the only effective response to radicalization. Counter-

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[202] Darlington Mutanda, What Makes Terrorism Tick in Africa: Evidence from Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram. *Jadavpur Journal of International Relations*, 21(1), (2017): 1-21.
[203] Anneli Botha, Political Socialization and Terrorist Radicalization among Individuals Who Joined al-Shabaab in Kenya. Op cit.
[204] Anselm Rink & Kunaal Sharma, The Determinants of Religious Radicalization: Evidence from Kenya. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, (2016): 1-33.
[205] Elijah OS Odhiambo, Kennedy Onkware & Maito T. Leshan, Domestic Radicalization in Kenya. Op cit.

radicalization and deradicalization should be understood as long-term processes that require tact and patience, as they are at the center of competition to shape the future of Islam and Muslim societies. Therefore, fight against radicalization could be won only if all stakeholders adopt an integrated approach. Moreover, it must be done tactfully and in partnership with Muslim organizations in support.

However, these are not to change the religious beliefs of the radicals; but seeks to change strategic use of violence to achieve its goals that must be pursued.[206] It is about separating people from their path to radicalization, which may or may not lead to violence.[207]Ashour defines deradicalization "as the process in which a radical group reverses its ideology and de-legitimizes the use of violent methods to achieve political goals, while also moving towards an acceptance of gradual, political and economic changes within a pluralist context."[208] In this case, the behavior of the individual could be changed to reject violence as means of achieving his goals. It is worth remembering that the process of deradicalization does apply that the individual automatically returns to original state before radicalization. The individual may still remain with radical views but may not turn to violence.

From this point of view, efforts to disengage people as soon as they are identified or suspected and not wait until they have participated in illegal or violent actions. Releasing people at the beginning of the process is more likely that such preventive measures could prevent them from radicalizing to the point that they see violence as the

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[206] Ashour, O. *The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming armed Islamist movements*. (New York: Routledge, 2009): 6.

[207] John Horgan, *Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of disengagement from radical and extremist movements*. (New York: Routledge, 2009):152.

[208] Omar Ashour, *The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming armed Islamist movements*. Op. Cit, 5-6.

only means of expressing their political opinions and / or ideologies.[209] Therefore, it is important that law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies (LEIAs), as well as governmental and non-governmental organizations, work together to create and implement successful programs that prevent young people from continuing on a radicalization path that could lead to violence. However, needs to note the difficulties inherent in detecting individuals on that road.[210] If there is an inter-institutional collaboration between law enforcement and the community, there are potentially more opportunities to identify the problems faced by these "problematic" people, and therefore a greater chance of identifying intervention strategies that can prevent them from looking for violence as a way of potential retribution. However, instead of trying to tackle the drivers of radicalization, the government seems to be in a constant rush to avoid extreme violent action that is not necessary to tackle the main problem. Governments and the LEIA should enter once people are identified as potential for radicalization. This is the best position to interpose and try to prevent the continuation of radicalization process that leads to violence.[211] It is very important to identify all the factors that motivate people to disassociate themselves from radical paths in order to develop effective disengagement and de-radicalization programs.[212]

In this sense, therefore, objectives of the de-radicalization efforts are not the terrorists, but the strengthening and emancipation of the community from which they emerge. This could be achieved through such programs that can seek to improve social

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[209] Jason-Leigh Striegher, The Radicalization of Terrorists, *Salus Journal,* 1 (1), 2013.

[210] Ibid.

[211] Ibid.

[212] John Horgan, *Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of disengagement from radical and extremist movements*, (New York: Routledge, 2009). And; Fink, N., & Hearne, E. (2008). *Beyond Terrorism: Deradicalization and Disengagement from Violent Extremism*. Available: http://www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/publications/beter.pdf. Accessed: 28-10-2017

cohesion, improve community resilience through empowerment and capacity building, and encourage stronger lines of communication between government and vulnerable communities.[213] In this way, it prevents those who are fundamentally and ideologically motivated to get away from their radical trajectories, and to identify people who are following a radical path to violence.

3.8 Conclusion

Despite efforts by the government of Kenya to counter terrorism, the main focus should be on countering youth radicalization. Young people in Kenya are becoming socially isolated and marginalized. This encourages them to resort to extremism in search for identity, acceptance and purpose. The participation of young people in violence has become a major concern to security. It is important to analyze the factors, and issues of religion, identity and gender to be able to understand this complex phenomenon of radicalization of youth. Kenya's ability to design effective counter-radicalization and de-radicalization strategies depends on the degree to which it understand the phenomenon of radicalization. Therefore, the struggle against youth radicalization will only be won if the state as well as non-state actors adopt an integrated approach. Moreover, it must be done tactfully and in partnership with Muslim organizations in support.

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[213] Schmid, A. P. Radicalization, Deradicalization, Counter-radicalization: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review, (Hague, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2013).

CHAPTER FOUR

EFFORTS AND CHALLENGES IN COUNTERING YOUTH RADICALIZATION IN KENYA.

4.0   Introduction

After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, much of the reaction, especially in the West, has focused on the aesthetic character of terrorism. Terrorism has been tackled by various players with varying degrees of effectiveness, especially at the military level, which has done little to weaken its ideological appeal. The dominant idea then was that the capture of terrorists would eliminate the threat of further attacks. However, as time went on "policy makers began to realize that this approach could only be so effective until it was coupled with programs to address the ideological underpinnings that foment and foster violence, meaning force alone could not wipe out the threat of terrorism so long as its radical ideology remained intact."[214]

Radicalization is a complex phenomenon and reasons for joining organizations vary among social groups.[215] Like many other countries, Kenya has not remained immune from threats arising from domestic acts of terrorism. This has been given prominence due to the dominance in recent years of younger individuals radicalizing to violent extremism. It is estimated that in 2014 about 200 youth were reported missing; and in 2015 about 255 youth aged between 15 and 30 years are believed to have joined

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[214] Leila Ezzarqui, De-Radicalization and Rehabilitation Program: The Case Study of Saudi Arabia, (2010).
[215] Adrian Cherney, ReemSweid, Michele Grossman, Alexia Derbas, Kevin Dunn, Clarke Jones, Jason Hartley & Greg Barton, Local service provision to counter violent extremism: Perspectives, capabilities and challenges arising from an Australian service mapping Project, *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, (2017).

terrorist groups.[216] Therefore, a variety of counter-measures are needed to help prevent and reverse youth radicalization and to free young people from participating in terrorist activities. However, these programs vary from one country to another according to the preferences and the political context of the state in question. Some are nascent while others are mature and well-developed. One of the common mistakes made by states and security agencies is to copy what other countries or regions are doing in this regard. This does not imply that countries cannot borrow other successes from other countries, but must understand that the circumstances of each country are unique.

In this case, the situation in Kenya is different and unique and cannot be treated like other countries. The circumstances and the impact of the local dynamics are different. As a result, although several stakeholders are willing to participate in practices that could help prevent young people from radicalizing to extremism, a number of limits and capacity gaps have been identified. States have also responded to the radicalization of youth with the intention of preventing or interrupting the emergence of ideas that could support terrorist violence through anti-radicalization initiatives. Sometimes they are called "soft measures".[217]

A variety of countermeasures involving multiple actors is needed to successfully counter the radicalization of youth in Kenya towards violent extremism. The first step is to address the factors or circumstances that allow for radicalization. This chapter analyzes the interpretation and presentation of the results obtained from the field. The qualitative and quantitative analysis was used to analyze the results of the

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[216] Continental study on the Impact of armed conflict on children in Africa, the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, unpublished, (2016): 47.
[217] Katherine E. Brown, Transnational Terrorism, in Stephen McGlinchey, *International Relations*, (Bristol, England: E-International Relations Publishing, 2017): 154.

study. The study sought to establish how terrorism can be counteracted through the de-radicalization of youth in Kenya. The study focused on the causes of radicalization of young people and on how to avoid being radicalized to violent extremism. The focus is on those measures and programs that seek to address the problems of violent extremism before individuals or groups of people are radicalized in violent extremism or after "committing the crime". In addition, the study analyzed the programs or strategies that can be put in place to counter the radicalization of young people.

4.1 Causes of Youth Radicalization

According to findings presented in Figure 1 below; 20.8 % of Kenyan youth are radicalized due to unemployment, 16.7% feel are being marginalized in society, 12.50 % due to poverty, 8.33 % are radicalized through Islamic teachings and poor parenting respectively.[218] Therefore, this shows that the main cause of radicalization of young people is unemployment.

These findings have been supported by earlier statistics which indicates that in 2009, the unemployment rate for young unemployed was 29% among those aged between 15 and 29. It is also indicated that around 57% have joined Al-Shabaab. This has led young Kenyan Somalis from Eastleigh to join Al-Shabaab, as the group has provided a type of employment with a salary ranging from $ 50 to $ 150 a month. Currently, youth unemployment in Kenya is around 39.1 percent according to the UN Human Development Index (HDI) report for 2017. This is the highest in the East Africa region compared to Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi which as of last year youth unemployment stood at 5.2 per cent, 4.0 per cent, 3.3 per cent and 3.1 per

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[218] Interview with an official (Analyst) from National Counter Terrorism Centre on 8 February, 2018. Naiorobi, Kenya.

cent respectively.[219] Even those who are educated but unemployed are also radicalized due to frustration and feeling of relative deprivation.[220]

Marginalization of the youth is another cause of radicalization.[221] The youth in Kenya are marginalized and this has led to feeling of frustration. This include inadequate government services and insufficient political, economic and social opportunities. Due to this the youth become disillusioned. Young people feel a sense of alienation, exclusion and deprivation. In Kenya, young people have no chance of progressing compared to those of wealthy families. This type of social cohesion leads to a poor quality of life and young people want to find a sense of identity. This is made worse when combined with unemployment and underemployment as they either take a job for which are overqualified because of lack of opportunities or are employed on temporary basis. These marginalized youth end up not fitting in anywhere. Therefore the young people face a future of uncertainty and despair and end up being easily radicalized.[222]

Poverty has been established as another cause of youth radicalization.[223] Young people feel that by joining terrorist groups their lives will be better than before. This is the case when young people find it difficult to access basic needs such as housing, education and health services. Therefore, they find comfort in joining Al-Shabaab as the group gives them a sense of adult status through financial compensation and

[219] Keziah Kinuthia, Youth unemployment threatens Kenya's role as Regional Powerhouse, *Business Daily*, September 11, 2017. Available: https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/economy/Youth-unemployment-threatens-Kenya-role-as-regional-powerhouse/3946234-4090902-14p3ugmz/index.html. Accessed: 09-3-18.
[220] United Nations. Human development Index 2017 Report. Available: http://data.un.org/DataMartInfo.aspx. Accessed: 07-03-2018.
[221] Interviews with officials from Counterterrorism Police Unit on 06 February, 2018, Nairobi, Kenya.
[222] Anouar Boukhars, The drivers of insecurity in Mauritania. Op Cit.
[223] Interviews with officials from Counterterrorism Police Unit on 06 February, 2018, Nairobi, Kenya.

purpose. This is tied to the perception of economic benefits of fighters enlisting with terror groups. The theme of religion, which was also emphasized by the respondents, demonstrated the role of religion in the radicalization.

Islam also plays a central role in the radicalization of young people towards terrorism through radical teachings. Issues to do with race and identity, peer pressure, corruption by those in authority and youth mobilization before election to gain their vote.[224] After winning the elections, politicians ignore or abandon the youth in that way leaving a semi-organized and politically charged youth cohort idle. In the same way, politicians who lose elections exploit their followers by inciting them to violent protests. This kind of political manipulation leads young people to feel disillusioned with politicians and electoral politics. This feeling leads the youth to think that their problems can be achieved outside of mainstream politics, perhaps through violent extremism.[225] It has also been observed that the general condemnation of Muslim youth has attracted the sympathy of many who are unwilling to commit themselves but who help in providing the resources for radicalization. The engagement of the security authorities to counter terrorism has literally pushed the youth into the arms of Al-Shabaab.

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[224] Interviews with officials from Anti-terrorism Police Unit Research, March, 2018, Nairobi, Kenya.
[225] Human Rights Watch, Al-Shabaab is now taking advantage of Kenyan security officers' outdated belief that all Al-Shabaab are Somali looking by infiltrating non-Somali members into the province to carry out attacks, (12 January 2012).

Figure 4.1: **Causes of Youth Radicalization in Kenya.**

Source: Author, 23 March, 2018.

4.2 Breeding grounds for Youth Radicalization

Youth radicalization in Kenya happen in a number of places or breeding grounds. The results shown in Figure 4.2 below, shows that 41.67 % believe that youth radicalization in Kenya occurs mainly in mosques and madrasa.[226] The role of these institutions is crucial in the recruitment of Al-Shabaab as they play a prominent role in Muslim communities, providing education, social assistance, employment and social gatherings.[227] Some sermons conducted in mosques have been the main factor in turning young men and women into violence. Preaching of the distorted and misinterpreted religion has the potential to capture the hearts, minds and imagination of

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[226] Interviews with officials from Anti-terrorism Police Unit Research,National Intelligence Service and National Counter terrorism Centre, March, 2018, Nairobi, Kenya.
[227] Fathima Azmiya Badurdeen, al -Shabaab Terrorist Recruitment in Kenya: Contributions from the Social Movement Theory, Op Cit.

young people. In most cases, recruiters identify and target more promising youth in which a comprehensive indoctrination program would be conducted without arousing the suspicion of moderate members of the congregation. So young people are manipulated to believe that they are fighting for a noble and precious cause, with the assurance of victory.[228]

Furthermore, some are recruited though the use of social networks mainly internet. This is because the use of internet by young people has risen dramatically. Facilities on the net may include e-mails, chat rooms, and forums. These provide an online forum for indoctrination as well as distribution of manuals, instructions and data. Other means are through friends and in schools and Churches respectively.

Figure 4.2: Grounds/Places of Vulnerability

Source: Author, 23 March, 2018.

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[228] Donasius Pathera, Why many Youth have turned into Terrorism, Op Cit.

4.3   Counter Radicalization Measures

Kenya's efforts in countering youth radicalization has attracted mixed feeling among the people. Some believe that the Kenyan government is doing enough to prevent the youth from being radicalized while others have contrary views as indicated in Figure 4.3 below showing an equal response of 50% for a 'yes' and 50% for a 'no' on the question. To counter the threats, the government has put in place number of policies and initiatives like the task force on antimoney laundering and on the financing of terrorism.[229] A good understanding of radicalization as well as the policies in place have been demonstrated by those interviewed. This can be attributed to the fact that mostly those who participated are senior policy making positions in government or organizations which deal with terrorism.

The government has put in place programs in schools, with religious leaders and community workers on anti-radicalization. Furthermore, the government is initiating developments in all counties through the devolved system and use of the military to dismantle the networks. Other programs to counter radicalization are rehabilitation and settlement of radicalized youth returning from Somalia using the National Youth Fund to empower them. The government is also engaged in youth talent hunt across all the counties and creation of life skills institutions like Polytechnics and equalization fund for the marginalized.[230] However, there is still more to be done to make a serious impact. To support this position, the respondents alluded to the fact that the number of young people traveling to join terrorist organizations such as Al-Shabaab and terrorist

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[229] Khadiagala, G. Kenya: Haven or helpless victim of terrorism. in Special Report 113, Terrorism in the Horn of Africa. United States Institute of Peace. (2004) Retrieved from www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr113.
[230] Interview with an Official from Ministry of Interior Kenya on 25 March, 2018.

attacks has reduced, although no data was provided to support the claim. This has been attributed to the open discussions and engagement on radicalization in the country.

On the other hand, it was felt that the government is not doing enough cited the failure of government in addressing youth unemployment. The government does not offer sufficient alternatives that attract young people not to join radical groups and instead speak too little with little action. Furthermore, many government initiatives are more reactive than proactive because they are designed to treat young people after they are already radicalized. It was also cited that there is no civic education to inform the public about what is happening about youth radicalization and the fight against terrorism.

Figure 4.3: Is Government doing enough to counter youth Radicalization in Kenya?

Source: Author, 24 March, 2018.

4.4 Challenges in countering Youth Radicalization in Kenya

The study further sought information on the challenges that hinder countering youth radicalization in Kenya. It has been noted that it is difficult to maintain programs due

to lack of sufficient funds and experience in de-radicalization. Inadequate funding of security agencies is one of the factors hindering the fight against radicalization and that the whole issue of radicalization is politicized in the country. [231]The other challenge is the changing nature of radicalization and mistrust among the various Muslim sects in the country. This is mainly between Shiites and Sunnis. The problem lies in the attractiveness of violence in the form of suicide bombings, perceived as a means of reward and as a politically successful method of resistance in the world, where alternative channels can provide little or nothing in the way of radical change.[232]

The ability to run programs without making it look like a religious profile was also mentioned as another challenge. Young people feel that the government does not trust them because of past experiences. Furthermore, young people are not primarily involved in anti-radicalization programs. The intervention of the security forces impose state of fear on ordinary civilians. Such operations help terrorist groups by providing them with a narrative to spin their agenda around, reinforcing local fears of aggression on local people in societies that must be opposed.[233] It is believed these measures by government of punishing law-abiding citizens reduce civil liberties and restrict human rights.

The study also asked respondents whether communities had a role to play in fighting the radicalization of young people in Kenya, how they are involved or what role they can play. All respondents agreed that communities have a role to play. At

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[231] Interviews with officials from Anti-terrorism Police Unit Research,National Intelligence Service and National Counter terrorism Centre, March, 2018, Nairobi, Kenya.

[232] Maha Azzam, The Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Europe: Local and Global Dimensions, *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 13(2), (2007): 123-134.

[233]Coll, Steve, The Unblinking Stare: The Drone War in Pakistan. *New Yorker,* 24 November, 2014. Available at: www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/11/24/unblinking-stare.

family and community levels they can help teach young people the right values and morals. They can also help detect or identify radical changes in behavior well in advance so they can be dealt with fairly early. Furthermore, the community can help identify the most vulnerable young people in the community who may be at risk of radicalization, as well as those involved in radicalization.

4.5 Other measures in countering Youth Radicalization

The government could be adopt other measures in countering youth radicalization. This is due to the facts highlighted above that youth radicalization has only been reduced, programs are reactive and not proactive; and impact is low. The government has to improve on youth employment and engaging the youth in gainful activities by empowering them. The issue of radicalization to be in cooperated as a subject in school curriculum and training of more experts to deal with counter radicalization effectively.[234] Furthermore, the youth should be included in deradicalization programs and in the decision making processes. There must also be a constant commitment among young people, the community and the government. In this way, they will feel a sense of inclusion and belonging in society, since most of the cases felt marginalized. Youth forums must be activated at all levels and that the government should keep the promises made to young people and stop politicizing them. Furthermore, efforts to create nationhood, encourage religious tolerance and avoid extrajudicial executions. [235]Finally, young people should be given the opportunity to manage the affairs of the country.

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[234] Interview with an official from National Couter terrorism Centre, 24 March, 2018, Nairobi, Kenya
[235] Interview with an official from National Intelligence Service, 25 March, 2018, Naiorobi, Kenya.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter focused on analyzing and discussing data. The data established the causes of the radicalization of youth in Kenya, the fertile ground for radicalization and anti-radicalization measures. The challenges to counter the radicalization of youth and other measures that could be taken into consideration were also examined. The next chapter focuses on the summary, the conclusion and the recommendations.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0   Introduction

This chapter presents summary of the study, conclusion and recommendations on the research study. This study investigated how terrorism can be countered through youth deradicalization in Kenya. The main objective of the study was to understand youth radicalization and how terrorism can be countered through youth de-radicalization. Specifically, the study focused on understanding the causes of terrorism, sources of finance in relation to youth radicalization and extremism in Africa in general, and Kenya in particular. Furthermore, the study tried to understand why many youths are recruited, radicalized and turn into terrorists.

The study was guided by three hypotheses which are that high levels of unemployment and high levels of grievances (historical injustices, economic, religious, social and political) may drive many youth to be recruited and radicalized. The third hypothesis is that if there are counter-terrorism measures then few youth will be radicalized. The hypothesis were formulated to provide an educational guess or predict the final outcome of the investigation. Therefore, the research activities were planned to verify the hypotheses.[236]

This is against the background that, while counter-terrorism measures exist to counter the radicalization of youth into violent extremism; young people continue to be radicalized by Al-Shabaab, the Republican Council of Mombasa and the Council of

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[236] Yogesh Kumar Singh, Fundamental of Research Methodology and Statistics, (New Age International, 2006).

Young Muslims.[237] This is the case because of social economic deprivation relative to the expectations of a group or individual which is a significant grievance and should be assessed in relation to a certain type of expectation.

5.1   Conclusion

Kenya faces dynamic and complex radicalization challenges. This is because of its link with terrorism as a form of commitment. Radicalization has been conceptualized as a process of individual evolution towards certain ideas and sometimes accompanied by a corresponding behavior of violence.[238] The concept of radicalization emphasizes the individual and, to a certain extent, the ideology and the group. It is defined as a "process of personal development whereby an individual adopts more extreme political or religious ideas and goals, becoming convinced that the attainment of the goals justifies extreme methods."[239] As such, it is a process during which people gradually adopt points of view and ideas that eventually lead to the legitimization of political violence.

The radicalization of youth towards violent extremism is a global phenomenon that continues to threaten peace, security as well as stability of a country. This complex problem cannot be attributed to an explanation or a series of factors. The most worrying thing is that people have fallen into the trap. Therefore, the participation of young people in political and religious violence requires special attention. Terrorist organizations are recruiting and influencing young people into terrorist groups. This has resulted in young people, regardless of race, religion, academic background or economic condition, falling

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[237] Sirkku Hellsten, Radicalization and terrorist recruitment among Kenya's youth, The Nordic Africa Institute, Policy Note No 1: (2016). Op, Cit.

[238] Federal Bureau of Investigations. The Radicalization Process: From Conversion to Jihad. (2006): 4. Available: http://cryptome.org/fbi-jihad.pdf. Accessed: 28-10-2017.

[239] Ongering, L., Home-Grown Terrorism and Radicalization in the Netherlands: Experiences, explanations and approaches, Op Cit.

prey to the rhetoric propagated by these terrorist groups. Therefore, it is crucial to identify the risks and vulnerabilities of young people who run the risk of being involved to understand why they are radicalized.

The study established that the main cause of youth radicalization in Kenya is youth unemployment. The youth in Kenya experience high unemployment rates. In 2009 the rate of unemployed youth was 29 percent and mainly were those aged between 15 and 29 years.[240] This resulted in about 57 percent young Kenyan Somalis from Eastleigh joining Al-Shabaab as the group was providing a kind of employment with a salary of about 50 USD to 150 USD a month. Currently, youth unemployment in Kenya stands at about 39.1 per cent according to the UN Human Development Index (HDI) 2017 report. This is the highest in East Africa compared to neighboring countries Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. Even those who are educated but unemployed are also being radicalized due to frustration and feeling of relative deprivation.

Other causes established are due to marginalization of the youth. The youth in Kenya are marginalized and this lead to feeling of frustration. This is mainly due to inadequate government services and insufficient political, economic and social opportunities. The youth become disillusioned, feel a sense of alienation, exclusion and deprivation. Mostly, the youth from poor families lack the opportunities to move forward as compared to those from rich families.[241] This leads to poor quality of life and young people are forced to find a sense of identity. This is made worse when combined with unemployment and underemployment as they either take a job for

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[240] USAID, Education and Youth, http://kenya.usaid.gov/programs/education-and-youth/51, (2013).
[241] Ömer Taspınar, Fighting Radicalism, not 'Terrorism': Root Causes of an International Actor Redefined, SAIS Review, XXIX no. 2, (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).Op, Cit.

which are overqualified because of lack of opportunities or are employed on temporary basis. Therefore young people face a future of uncertainty and despair and end up being easily radicalized.

Poverty is another cause of youth radicalization. Young people feel that by joining terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab their lives will be better than before.[242] This is the case when young people find it difficult to access basic needs such as housing, education and health services. Therefore, they find comfort in joining Al-Shabaab as the group give them a sense of adult status through financial compensation and purpose. This is tied to the perception of economic benefits of fighters enlisting with terror groups. The theme of religion, which was also emphasized by the respondents, demonstrated the role of religion in the radicalization of the youth. Islam plays a central role in radicalizing young people towards terrorism through radical teachings. Other responses were race and identity, peer pressure, corruption by those in authority and youth mobilization by politicians before election to gain votes.[243] After winning the elections politicians ignore or abandon the youth. In that way leaving a semi-organized and politically charged youth cohort idle. This kind of political manipulation leads young people to feel disillusioned with politicians and electoral politics.[244] This feeling leads the youth to think that their problems can be achieved outside of mainstream politics, perhaps through violent extremism. Furthermore, the general condemnation of Muslim youth has attracted the sympathy of many who are unwilling to commit themselves but end up in providing the resources for radicalization. The

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[242] James M. Lutz and Brenda J, Lutz, Op cit, 16.

[243] Caitriona Dowd & Clionadh Raleigh, Briefing: the myth of global Islamic terrorism and local conflict in Mali and the Sahel, African Affairs, 112:448, 2013.

[244] Amble, J.C. & Meleagrou- Hitchens, A. Jihadist Radicalization in East Africa: Two Case Studies, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 37 (6), (2014): 523-540.

engagement of the security authorities to counter terrorism has literally pushed the youth into the arms of Al-Shabaab.

The study also established that youth radicalization in Kenya is carried out mainly in mosques and   Madrasa.[245] The role of these institutions is crucial in the recruitment process. These institutions play a prominent role in Muslim communities, providing education, social assistance, employment and social gatherings. Some sermons conducted in the mosques have been the main factor in converting young men and women to join violent extremist groups. Preaching of the distorted and misinterpreted interpretation of religion has the potential to capture the hearts, minds and imagination of young people.[246] In most cases, recruiters identify and target the most promising young people, and a comprehensive indoctrination program would be conducted without arousing the suspicion of the moderate members of the congregation. These young people are manipulated to believe that they are fighting for a noble and precious cause, with the assurance of victory. Other established drivers are the use of social networks, mainly internet. This is because the use of the internet by young people has increased dramatically and offers an online forum for indoctrination, in addition to the distribution of manuals, instructions and data.[247] Other places of vulnerability where young people are radicalized are through friends, schools and churches.

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[245] Maha Azzam, Op Cit.
[246] The Brussels Times, Brussels debate on the factors behind radicalization and jihadist violence in Europe, 27th November, 2015. Available: brusselstimes.co./eu-affairs/4582/brussels-debate.on-the-factorsradicalisation-and-jihadist-violence-in-Europe. Accessed: 7-07-2017.
[247] Gabriel Weimann, Terrorist Dot Com: Using the Internet for Terrorist Recruitment and Mobilization, Op Cit.

With regards to counter radicalization measures by the government; the study established that the government is not doing enough though it has programs with schools, religious leaders and community workers on anti-radicalization. The government has initiated developments in all counties through the devolved system, use of the military to dismantle the networks, rehabilitation and settlement of returnees from Somalia using the National Youth Fund to empower them. The government also hunts young talents in every county. Much more needs to be done to impact and avoid radicalization of young people, even if the number of young people traveling to join terrorist organizations like Al-Shabaab and the terrorist attacks in the country have been reduced, although no data have been provided to support the statement.

On the other hand, the study established that the government is not seriously addressing the issue of youth unemployment. The government is not providing enough alternatives to attract young people not to join radical groups. However, there is too much talking with little action. Moreover, many government initiatives are more reactive than proactive, since they are focused on the relationship with young people after being radicalized. It has also established that there is no civic education to inform the public about what is happening with regard to youth radicalization and the fight against terrorism. The study established that countering youth radicalization in Kenya is being hindered due to lack or inadequate funds to security agencies and expertise in deradicalization.

The other challenge faced is the changing nature of radicalization and the mistrust between the various Muslim sects in the country. This is mainly between the

Shia and Sunni.[248] The ability to carry out the programs without making it look like religious profiling was also mentioned as another challenge. Moreover, the youth feel that the government do not trust them due to past experiences and are not involved in counter radicalization programs. The intervention of the security forces imposes a state of fear on ordinary civilians. These operations provide Al-Shabaab and other terrorist groups with a narrative to spin their agenda, reinforcing local fears of aggression against the local population in the societies that oppose. The study further established that the communities have a role to play. At family and community levels can help in teaching the youth right values and morals and in detecting or identifying radical changes in behavior so that it can be dealt with early enough. Further, the community can help identify the most vulnerable young people in the community who may be at risk of radicalization and those involved in radicalization.

It was further established that the government needs to do more in countering youth radicalization as the issue has only been reduced and not fully addressed. Programs are reactive and not proactive; and impact is low. This is so as state actors start too late for push back when damage has been done. It has been suggested that the government must improve the employment of young people and engage them in profitable activities by empowering them. The issue of radicalization must be co-operated as a subject in the scholastic program and training of more experts to effectively tackle ideological deradicalization. The youth should also be included in deradicalization programs and in the decision making processes. Constant engagement between the youth, community and government must be encouraged. In doing so, the

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[248] Margarita Bizina & David H. Gray, Radicalization of Youth as a Growing Concern for Counter-Terrorism *Policy Global Security Studies*, 5(1), 2014.

youth could feel a sense of inclusiveness and belonging in society as most cases have felt marginalized. Youth forums to be activated at all levels and government to keep its promises to the youth and stop politicizing the issue. Moreover, efforts to create nationhood, encourage religious tolerance and avoiding extrajudicial killings by the Kenyan Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) to be encouraged. Finally, young people should have the opportunity to participate in running the affairs of the country.

Countering youth radicalization and violent extremism efforts have not solved completely the problems the country is facing. It calls for fresh thinking to overcome youth radicalization and risks that lie ahead. In this case, it would be an error to assume that there is a single approach to understanding and mitigating terrorism and violent extremism. Radicalization is on the rise given Al-Shabaab's growth in neighboring Somalia. As such, Kenya has become a prime location for recruitment and radicalization mainly due to high number of unemployed youth among many others.[249] It has been observed that while the government is engaged in the fight against terrorism through deradicalization of young people, it has not fully addressed the problem of youth unemployment, poverty and political marginalization. Al-Shabaab and other terrorist groups have taken advantage of it to recruit the youth. As noted by respondents, terrorist recruiters are exploiting socio-economic conditions and the government's inability to provide basic services to position themselves as providers of care.

The study also concludes that the fight against terrorism does not exclusively concern the state. Civil society and everyday actions of ordinary people also play a

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[249] Anneli Botha and M Abdile, Radicalisation and Al-Shabaab Recruitment in Somalia, ISS, Paper, 266, 11.

role. This requires a comprehensive and multifaceted approach that includes the continuous exchange of ideas, intelligence and commitment at all levels and the international community. Addressing the challenge of youth radicalization and terrorism requires multilateral cooperation, capacity building; and considered efforts to counter violent extremism at all levels of society and government. Therefore, the main objective of efforts to counter radicalization is not the terrorists, but rather the strengthening and empowerment of the community that might emerge and, if neglected, can be considered as a potential support for them.[250] Therefore, the findings of the study have confirmed the objectives and the hypothesis set at the beginning of the study.

5.2   Recommendations

Countering terrorism through youth deradicalization in Kenya requires multidimensional approach. This study recommends the following in order to address youth radicalization:-

5.2.1   Economic Emancipation

Economic emancipation can be described as the freedom to determine one's own financial position and future. Therefore, the Kenyan government must do more to promote the economic emancipation of marginalized communities, in particular by addressing youth unemployment as a priority issue and enabling their active participation in public life, including through civic and democratic engagement. Socioeconomic deprivation related to the expectations of a group or individual can be a significant grievance.

5.2.2   Countering Extremist Propaganda

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[250] Alex P. Schmid, Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation and Counter-Radicalisation, Op Cit.

It is vital for government to neutralize extremist indoctrination efforts by improving governance. This can be achieved by addressing corruption, growing unemployment, improving democratic institutions, preventing and countering hate speech, extremist propaganda and ill-founded conspiracy theories in the public sphere and on the Internet.

5.2.3 Dialogue

Increased dialogue focused on domestic politics to de-mystify Islam will help in fighting youth radicalization. This should go hand in hand with the need to address relative deprivation and alienation. Poor people care about surviving and putting bread on the table, they prioritize material gains, not politics. The commitment of the local community is vital in this battle for the minds of young people.

5.2.4 Inclusion of Radicalization in School Curriculum

The government should consider the inclusion of radicalization as a subject in schools curriculum. Education is central in developing and promoting shared narratives of tolerance and mutual understanding which are instrumental in tackling discrimination and hate speech. A special emphasis should be placed on teaching human rights, promote the respect and appreciation of diversity as positive way of shaping their identity building and countering negative influence, such as violent extremist ideologies. In doing so, more emphasis should be placed on the development of key skills and competences, such as critical thinking, dialogue and peaceful conflict resolution. These skills are essential to enable young people to reflect, interact with others, channel and express their opinions peacefully, reject calls to violence,

intolerance and violent behavior. This can be achieved by having properly trained staff with a range of professional expertise.

5.2.5   Use of Internet

Youth and the internet are closely intertwined as they are the biggest consumers. Therefore, they are exposed online to a high volume of violent content and behavior that are extremist, xenophobic and intolerant. While freedom of expression must be respected, it has been observed that there are fewer initiatives by governments or civil society to address incitement to hatred online rather than offline, and this gap must be closed. In addition, young people must be educated to use the internet responsibly and safely, including risk awareness, to identify and reject intolerant, hateful and violent extremist content. This can be done by training the youth in non-violent response to violence and hate online, as well as linking online and offline efforts.

5.2.6   Funding of Security Agencies

Security agencies countering youth radicalization and extremism are underfunded. Government must consider increasing funding of security agencies to be able to perform effectively and endeavor to do what it say and say what it will do. There should be no credibility gap between declaratory policy and actual policy; also double standards must be avoided at all costs if policies want to retain credibility.

5.3 Area for further Research

New media is increasingly used by terrorist groups to recruit, for indoctrination and distribution of terrorist manuals, instructions and data. Online radicalization has become a difficult terrain in counter radicalization. Young generations are particularly at risk of being radicalized through use of social media and the internet, combined with

various personal and contextual factors. However, the phenomenon of terrorist radicalization of youth facilitated by the internet needs particular research and attention.

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Appendices

Appendices 1: Questionnaire

Iam **Francis B. Kakhuta-Banda** (Colonel) currently studying at National Defence College-Karen, Kenya and pursuing a Master's Degree in International Studies with the Institute for Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS); University of Nairobi. For my final project, I am examining **"CounteringTerrorism through Youth de-radicalization in Africa: Case Study of Kenya."** I am inviting you to participate in this research study by completing the attached Questionnaire. This Questionnaire will require approximately about 25 minutes to complete. There is no compensation for responding nor is there any known risk. In order to ensure that all information will remain confidential, please do not include your name.

This research is intended for academic purposes only.

Please kindly tick the correct answer **(√)**and or,writing a brief statementin the space provided

Section A: Radicalization of Youth in Kenya

1. What is radicalization?

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2. What do you think are the causes of youth radicalization in Kenya?

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3. The youth are radicalizedmainly through (list in order of importance)

Friends, Mosques, churches, social networks, schools

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4. In the order of priority, what are the issues that are of concern to the Youth in Kenya?

(a) Security (b) Corruption, (c) Youth unemployment, (d) Race and ethnicity, (e) Religion, (f) Youth mobilization before elections, (g) Peer pressure (h) Poverty

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5. Do you know any group or groupsengaged in youth radicalization? Yes ( ) No ( )If yes name them.

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6. What in your view is driving youth radicalization in Kenya?

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Section B: Counter Radicalization Measures and Strategies

7. Do you think the Kenyan government is doing enough to prevent the youth from being radicalized? Yes ( ) No ( )

Explain…………………………………………………………………………………

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8. What programs are there to help the youth from being radicalized?

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9. Do you think the counter-radicalization initiatives/programs are succeeding in Kenya? Indicate your level of agreement

Scale	1=Strongly agree	2=Agree	3=Moderate	4=Disagree	5=Strongly disagree

Explain..

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10. what are the challenges in countering youth radicalization in Kenya?..

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11. In your opinion, do you think communities have a role in countering youth radicalization in Kenya? Yes ( ) No ( )

If yes, how are they involved or what role can they play?

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12. In your opinion, what other measures can be adopted in preventing or stopping youth radicalization in Kenya?

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13. Any other comments?

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Thank you for your time

Appendices 2: Research Authorization Letter