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THE IMPACT OF THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT ON THE
JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY, 1961-1968

A Dissertation
Presented to
the Faculty of the Graduate School
University of Missouri

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

by
Sei Young Rhee
August, 1973

Dr. Soon Sung Cho, Dissertation Supervisor


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
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	ii
LIST OF TABLES	ix
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	xii
 Chapter	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
Statement of Purpose	1
Dissertation Thesis	3
Dissertation Scope	4
Research Methodology	8
Analytical Framework	10
Special Features of Communist	
International Relations	10
Operational Variables for an Analysis	
of the Sino-Soviet Conflict	17
Interaction Model of the JCP,	
the CPSU, and the CCP	19
Hypotheses	23
II. EARLY HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE OF THE JCP AND	
THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS, 1922-1945	24
Dawn of the Japanese Proletarian Party	
Movement and the Impact of the Bolshevik	
Revolution	24
Origins of the Japanese Proletarian	
Party Movement during the 1900's	24
The Comintern and Its Early Effort for	
the Establishment of the JCP,	
1918-1921	29
Initial Formation of the JCP, 1922	35
Origin of the JCP, July, 1922	35
Formulation of the Draft Platform of	
the JCP	37
The Comintern's Urge to Form a Legal	
Communist Party in Japan	41
First "Round-Up" of the JCP and the	
"White Terror" of September, 1923	43

Chapter	Page
Dissolution of the JCP (1924-1925) and Its Resurgence (1926)	45
Background	45
Intra-Party Doctrinal Disputes: Yamakawaism versus Fukumotoism	48
The Comintern's Criticism and Bukharin Thesis of 1927	54
The Demise of the JCP (1928-1939)	57
Second Wave of Mass Arrests (1928, 1929)	57
Mass Defection of the Party Leaders	62
Moscow Thesis of 1932 on the Strategy and Tactics of the JCP	65
The Japanese Communists in Yanan, 1940-1945	68
Summary Appraisal	78
 III. RESURGENCE OF THE JCP DURING THE POSTWAR ERA, 1945-1955	 83
Internal Setting	83
Reorganization of the Party and the "Peaceful Revolution" Strategy of Nosaka Sanzo	83
Cominform Criticism of "Peaceful Revolution" Strategy and Internal Dissension in the JCP, 1950-1951	99
Shift to the Left-Wing Adventurism and Guerrilla Warfare, 1951-1953	109
Reshuffling of the Party Leadership	112
External Setting: the JCP between Moscow and Peking, 1945-1955	116
The JCP and the Soviet Union	116
The JCP and the People's Republic of China	122
Summary Appraisal	132
 IV. THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT: SCHISM AND CLEAVAGE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM (1956-1969)	 137
The Chronological Background of the Sino-Soviet Conflict	139
Five Major Issues of the Sino-Soviet Conflict	146

The Dispute over Different Roads to Communism	148
The Dispute over Global Strategy and the Nuclear War	155
The Dispute over the National Liberation Movement	161
The Dispute on Intra-Bloc Organization, Decision-Making, and Leadership	164
The Dispute over Russo-Chinese Boundaries and Territories	173
The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Conflict . . .	179
The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Conflict on East-West International Relations	179
The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Conflict on Intra-Bloc Relations	182
The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Conflict on the Asian Communist Parties	184
 V. THE JCP IN THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT, 1961-1968	 188
 The Status of the JCP in the Midst of the Sino-Soviet Conflict	 189
Unique Patterns of Socio-Economic Conditions of Japan and the Major Weaknesses of the JCP	190
Legacy of the Past and Divided Loyalty toward the Sino-Soviet Conflict	197
The Politics of Internal Adjustment by the JCP in the Sino-Soviet Conflict	199
The Politics of Accomodation: Incremental Change and Cautious Neutrality, 1960-1962	199
Pro-Peking Orientation by the JCP, 1963-1965	207
The Decline of the CCP Influence on the JCP, 1965-1966	219
The Politics of External Adaptation by the JCP in the Sino-Soviet Conflict Since 1966	227
The JCP Reaction to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 1966-1968	227
The Broken Dialogue of the JCP with the CPSU Since 1966	234
The Politics of Intra-Bloc Coalition with the Asian Communist Parties	240

Chapter	Page
The Politics of "Self-Assertion" by the JCP in the Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1966- . . .	245
Summary Appraisal	253
 VI. PERCEPTION OF THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT BY THE JCP ORGAN: CONTENT ANALYSIS OF <u>AKAHATA</u>	257
Data Collection and Research Methodology . . .	259
Frequency Measurement of <u>Akahata</u> Articles on the USSR, CPR, and DPRK, 1961-1968	260
Frequency Measurement of <u>Akahata</u> Articles on Politico/Military, Economic, and Cultural/Scientific Affairs on the USSR and the CPR, 1961-1968	271
Attitudinal Scale Measurement of <u>Akahata</u> Editorials on the USSR and the CPR, 1961-1967	276
Multi-Variable Frequency Measurement on Ten Major Issues Related to the Sino- Soviet Conflict, 1961-1967	290
Summary Appraisal	297
 VII. LEADERSHIP TRANSFORMATION OF THE JCP: AN ELITE STUDY OF THE PARTY CADRES, 1922-1970 . .	302
Data Collection and Research Methodology . . .	307
Comparative Elite Study of the First- Generation Politburo/Central Executive Committee Members of the CPSU, CCP, and JCP	310
Moscow-Trained Middle-Echelon JCP Leadership Group, 1922-1937	334
Leadership Transformation of the Postwar JCP Central Committee/Secretariat/ Presidium Members, 1945-1970	338
Summary Appraisal	364
 VIII. CONCLUSIONS	372
 APPENDICES	388
A. Biographical Profiles of the JCP Central Executive Committee Members (1922-1926) . . .	389
B. Roster of the Japanese Communists Trained in the Soviet Union (1922-1937)	393

	Page
C. Biographical Profiles of the JCP Presidium Members, Eleventh Congress (1970)	397
D. Roster of the Postwar JCP Members of the Politburo/Presidium, the Secre- tariat, and the Central Committee (1945-1970)	400
BIBLIOGRAPHY	408

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. JCP Official Delegations' Visit to China and the Soviet Union, 1962-1965 . . .	213
2. JCP Individual and Group Visitation to China and the Soviet Union, 1962-1964 . . .	214
3. The Status of the JCP, 1962-1966	249
4. Electoral Strength of the JCP in House of Representatives Elections, 1955-1972	251
5. <u>Akahata</u> Articles Pertaining to the USSR, PRC, and DPRK, 1961-1962	262
6. <u>Akahata</u> Articles Pertaining to the USSR, PRC, and DPRK, 1964-1965	263
7. <u>Akahata</u> Articles Pertaining to the USSR, PRC, and DPRK, 1966-1967	264
8. <u>Akahata</u> Articles Pertaining to the USSR, PRC, and DPRK, 1968	265
9. <u>Akahata</u> Articles on Politico/Military, Economic, and Cultural/Scientific Affairs Pertaining to the USSR and PRC, 1961-1964	272
10. <u>Akahata</u> Articles on Politicl/Military, Economic, and Cultural/Scientific Affairs Pertaining to the USSR and PRC, 1966-1968	273
11. <u>Akahata</u> Editorials on the USSR and PRC, 1961-1962	277
12. <u>Akahata</u> Editorials on the USSR and PRC, 1964-1965	278

Table	Page
13. <u>Akahata</u> Editorials on the USSR and PRC, 1966-1967	279
14. Frequency Measurement of <u>Akahata</u> Articles on Ten Major Issues Pertaining to the Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1961-1967	291
15. Father's Occupation of the Politburo Members of the CPSU (1917-1950)	311
16. Social Origins of the Politburo Members of the CPSU (1917-1950)	312
17. Father's Occupation of the Politburo Members of the CCP (1921-1945)	315
18. Father's Occupation of the Central Executive Committee Members of the JCP (1922-1926)	317
19. Social Origins of the Central Executive Committee Members of the JCP (1922-1926)	318
20. Average Ages of the CPSU, CCP and JCP Elites (1917-1928)	320
21. Educational Background of the Members of the Politburo of the CPSU (1917-1950) and the Central Executive Committee of the JCP (1922-1927)	322
22. University Attended by the CCP Politburo Members (1921-1945)	324
23. Occupation of the JCP Central Executive Committee Members (1922-1927)	327
24. Delegates to the First CCP Congress (July 1921)	330
25. Politburo Members of the CCP (Fifth Congress, April 1927)	331

Table	Page
26. Politburo Members of the CCP. (Reorganized July 13, 1927)	331
27. Politburo Members of the CCP (Sixth Congress, July-September 1928, Held in Moscow)	331
28. Organizational Affiliation of the JCP Members Trained in the KUTV, Moscow 1922-1930	336
29. Educational Background of the Central Committee Members, JCP Tenth Congress (1966)	352
30. Occupational Background of the Central Committee Members, JCP Eighth Congress (1961) by Percentage	353
31. Average Age Distribution of the JCP Politburo/Presidium Members (1946-1970) . .	354
32. Average Age Distribution of the JCP Central Committee Members and the Alternate Members (1964-1970)	355
33. Educational Background of the JCP Presidium Members, Eleventh Congress (July, 1970)	359
34. Occupational Background of the JCP Presidium Members, Eleventh Congress (July, 1970)	360

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure		Page
1.	Major Operational Variables for an Analysis of the Sino-Soviet Conflict for the Control of the JCP	18
2.	Models of Inter-Nation Linkages	21
3.	JCP-CPSU-CCP Interaction Linkage Model (Party and Government Level), 1961-1968	22
4.	Frequency Measurement of Total Akahata Articles on the USSR, PRC, and DPRK	266
5.	Centralized Organizational Structure of the JCP (1966) in Theory and Practice	343
6.	Length of Service, Presidium Members of the JCP Eleventh Congress (1970)	362

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of Purpose

A process of profound ferment and change has been under way in the Communist world for the last seventeen years. The fundamental causes of this change are threefold: First, Communist China's rise to power as a Titanic giant in intra-bloc affairs; second, Stalin's death and the subsequent breakdown of the monolithic control of the Soviet Union over the Communist bloc members which resorted to various forms of "polycentrism"; third, the intensity of the Sino-Soviet conflict over the different paths toward Communism.

Though there are, at present, numerous books and monographs on the general topic of the Sino-Soviet conflict, too little effort has been made toward a substantial description of the particular impact of the Sino-Soviet conflict on the various Asian Communist parties. So viewed, this research is undertaken with a specific desire to apply the general focus of the Sino-Soviet conflict to the specific setting of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) during

the seven year period, 1961-1968. As far as English-language publications on this topic are concerned, a study of the contemporary Japanese Communist movement suffers from intellectual sterility. Compared with the abundance of studies of the JCP up to the 1950's,¹ the works dealing with the impact of the Sino-Soviet conflict on the JCP during the 1960's are rather scattered and fragmentary, consisting of several journal articles and monographs. Only Robert A. Scalapino's The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966 (1966) and Paul F. Langer's Communism in Japan (1972) have some scattered remarks on the Sino-Soviet conflict and its impact, on the JCP. Yet Scalapino's book contains only two chapters solely devoted to the study of the Sino-Soviet conflict on the JCP. Langer's book devotes only one chapter to the subject. Surprisingly no dissertation has been written on this topic as yet.

With respect to Japanese publications on this topic, similar contention can be made. Though there are numerous publications on the JCP in general, books covering

¹ Among the noteworthy publication of materials covering the pre-war origins of the JCP and the 1950's are: Paul F. Langer and Rodger Swearingen, Red Flag in Japan (Cambridge, Mass.: The Harvard University Press, 1952); George M. Beckmann and Okubo Genji, The Japanese Communist Party, 1922-1945 (Stanford, Calif.: The Stanford University Press, 1969); Robert A. Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966 (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1966); Evelyn S. Colbert, The Left Wing in Japanese Politics (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1952). Most of these books are now very much out of date, but they are still useful standard references.

the specific impact of the Sino-Soviet conflict on the JCP are scanty.² It is to bridge this gap that the author proposes to study the impact of the Sino-Soviet conflict on the JCP during the 1961-1968 period.

Dissertation Thesis

Stimulated by the growing sense of nationalism and by the pragmatic views of Marxist-Leninist ideology adaptable to the advanced socio-economic conditions of Japan, the JCP has skillfully maneuvered the Sino-Soviet conflict by adopting various "fence-straddling" tactics. Thus its

²On the general discussion of the JCP, the following books are useful reference sources: Murakami Kanji, Nihon Kyōsantō (The Japanese Communist Party) (Tokyo: Hōbunsha, 1956); Ichikawa Shōichi, Nihon Kyōsantō Tōsō Shōshi (A Short History of the Struggles of the JCP) (Tokyo: Shōkō Shoin, 1946); Tateyama Takaaki, Nihon Kyōsantō Kenkyō Hishi (Secret History of the JCP Arrests) (Tokyo: Bukyōsha, 1929); Fujioka Junkichi (ed.), Nihon Kyōsantō Tēze (The Programs of the JCP) (Tokyo: Seiki Shobō, 1951); Iizuka Shigetarō, Nihon Kyōsantō (The Japanese Communist Party) (Tokyo: Sekka-sha, 1959); Shisō Undō Kenkyūsho (ed.), Nihon Kyōsantō Hombu (The JCP Headquarters) (Tokyo: Zempō-sha, 1967);

On the materials dealing with the specific impact of the Sino-Soviet conflict on the JCP, see Hirotsu Kyōsuke, Chūso-Tairitsu to Nihon Kyōsantō Byōbi Kakushin Jin'ei eno Eikyō (The Sino-Soviet Conflict and Its Impact upon the JCP and the Renovationists) (Tokyo, Mimeographed, 1963); Naigai Josei Chōsakai (Domestic and Foreign Conditions Investigation Committee), Chūso Ronsō no Gekika to Nihon Kyōsantō no Dōkō (The Intensification of the Sino-Soviet Dispute and the JCP's Responses) (Tokyo: Mimeographed, 1963); Japan International Politics Association (ed.), Chūso-Tairitsu to sono Eikyō (The Sino-Soviet Conflict and Its Influences-Monograph) (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1965).

fluctuating behavior in the Sino-Soviet conflict is symptomatic of its strong desire and growing capacity for autonomy and independence in intra-bloc relations among the Communist parties.

Having shed the past image of subservience, the imperative motive for "Self-Assertion" of the JCP leads to its new dynamism in intra-bloc affairs.

Dissertation Scope

The dissertation is organized into six main chapters, each relating to a certain aspect of the JCP's attitudes toward the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Chapter II deals with a brief historical background covering the period from the late 19th century up to 1945. It discusses the early Japanese proletarian party movement preceding the foundation of the JCP in 1922 and shows how the JCP was established under the Comintern's guidance and was affected by incessant Japanese government suppression, intra-party schism, and its own organizational weaknesses. Furthermore, this chapter will analyze the extent to which the JCP was continuously controlled by the Comintern, and how much Chinese Communists influenced the early Japanese Communist movement during 1940-1945.

Chapter III is devoted to the JCP's resurgence in the postwar setting from 1945 to 1955. It analyzes Nosaka Sanzō's short-lived strategy of "peaceful revolution" as an indigenous attempt to adapt Marxism-Leninism to fit the unique conditions of Japan and draw mass support to boost electoral strength by posing itself as an "untainted" progressive party which has fought Japanese militarism. Particular attention is given to the Sino-Soviet collusion to criticize the "peaceful revolution" strategy and to reorient the JCP in carrying out the overall global strategy of a "hard-line" policy as conceived by the Soviet Union and Communist China. The subsequent shift of JCP strategy to left-wing adventurism during 1951-1953 and its damaging effect on the further growth of the party will then be discussed.

Chapter IV discusses the overall aspects of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Rather than covering the whole gamut of the Sino-Soviet disputes in detail, this chapter will deal with them in the manageable context of three dimensions of analysis: a) the background of the Sino-Soviet rift and the level of escalation; b) five major issues of the Sino-Soviet conflict—dispute over transition to Communism, global strategy, national liberation movement, intra-bloc organization and hegemony struggle, and the traditional unsettled Russo-Chinese boundary issues; and c) subsequent post-

crisis assessment in terms of the specific impact of the Sino-Soviet conflict on East-West relations, intra-bloc relations of international Communism, and the Asian Communist parties.

Chapter V begins with the surfacing of the deteriorated Sino-Soviet inter-party diatribe in 1961, and attempts to analyze its specific impact on the JCP up to 1968. In particular, this chapter analyzes the JCP policy of "autonomy and independence" (1966) in the growing Sino-Soviet conflict and the degree of maneuverability by the JCP to exploit the situation to further its own goal. An extensive analysis of the following factors will be attempted: a) the various political, ideological, and environmental stresses accountable for the shift of alignment of the JCP during the peak of the Sino-Soviet struggle (1961-1968); b) the dimensions of the politics of "muddling through" and "fence-straddling" adopted by the JCP Mainstream faction in the Sino-Soviet conflict; c) the politics of the external adaptation of the JCP with other Asian Communist parties for intra-bloc coalition; d) the assessment of the JCP policy of "autonomy and independence" with respect to the membership increase and financial self-sufficiency.

Chapters VI and VII are exclusively devoted to empirical research of the JCP official organ Akahata and

the overall elite transformation. In particular, chapter VI includes a time series analysis of the content of Akahata articles, editorials, official party statements, and polemical essays pertaining to the Sino-Soviet conflict. Frequency and intensity measurements of total Akahata articles, an attitudinal scale measurement of Akahata editorials, and a multi-variable frequency measurement on ten major issues related to the Sino-Soviet conflict are employed. Chapter VII attempts to analyze the general transformation of the JCP elites from the Party's inception in 1922 to the Eleventh Congress of the JCP held in 1970. Based on the available biographical data--socio-economic origins, age distribution, educational background, membership in the Central Executive Committee (1922-1926), Politburo (1945-1955), and Presidium (1958-1970)--the JCP elites were divided into three-groups--24 members of the Central Executive Committee of the JCP (1922-1927), 45 Moscow-trained middle echelon activists of the 1930's, and 154 post-war members of the JCP Central Committee and the Politburo/Presidium members (1945-1970). Also a comparative elite study of the first-generation Central Executive Committee (JCP) and Politburo members (CCP and CPSU) is attempted. As for the post-war JCP elite study, an extensive coverage of the JCP party congresses (Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh) is undertaken to

analyze the specific impact of the Sino-Soviet conflict on the leadership conflict, factional alignment, intra-party coalition, and elite cohesion/turnover.

Research Methodology

First, aside from the English source materials, this author has relied heavily on documentary research of the Japanese primary source materials such as the JCP documents (Nihon Kyōsantō Jūyō Ronbun Shū, Vols. I-VII, 1963-1968, Nihon Kyōsantō Ketsugi Kettei Shū, Nos. 8-19, 1961-1968, Kokusai Kyōsanshugi Undō Ronsō Shuyō Mondai, Vols. I-XI, 1961-1968), Party organ (Akahata), and periodicals (Zenei, Sekai Seiji Shiryō, Kaizō, etc.) published by the JCP Central Committee Publication Bureau. Some attention will also be paid to the study of the pro-Soviet splinter party organ (Nihon no Koe), the pro-Chinese splinter party organs (Chōshū Shimbun, Jinmin no Hoshi, and Heiwa to Dokuritsu), and the anti-mainstream literature published by these group.³

³ Nakano Shigeharu and Kamiyama Shigeo (eds.), Nihon Kyōsantō Hihan (A Criticism of the JCP) (Tokyo: Sanichi Shobō, 1969); Asakura Fumio and Tsuchino Hajime, Nikkyō Ideology Hihan (A Criticism of the JCP Ideology) (Tokyo: Kobushi Shobō, 1970); Anzai Kuraji, Miyamoto Shūsei Shugi Hihan (A Criticism of Miyamoto Revisionism) (Tokyo: Tōhō Shoten, 1968); Kanazawa Sachio, Miyamoto Kenji Uragiri no Sanjū Yonen (Thirty-Four Years' Betrayal by Miyamoto Kenji) (Tokyo: Tōhō Shoten, 1967); Kameyama Kōzō, Yamanabe Kentarō, and Kasuga Shōjirō et al., Nihon Kyōsantō Shi: Watakushi no Shōgen (History of the JCP: My Testimony) (Tokyo: Nihon Shuppan Center, 1970).

Second, utilizing the pertinent political science literature on the strategy of decision,⁴ the author attempts to delineate the tactical alternatives available to the JCP leaders during the initial stage of the Sino-Soviet conflict and analyze the various decisional strategies adopted by the JCP leadership echelon. Here the author's underlying assumption is that they, facing the crisis of international Communism, chose cautious neutrality as an escape route from alignment with either of the two Communist parties, to both of which the JCP owed its existence and survival. In so doing, an imminent goal of adaptability far outranked others.

Third, in assessing the intensity of the Sino-Soviet conflicts as perceived by the JCP leaders, content-analysis will be undertaken to measure the cognitive aspect of verbiage, selection of specific vocabularies, symbol manipulation, and frequency and intensity of the statements adopted by the leadership echelon of the JCP during the peak of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Since it is assumed that decision-makers are prisoners of their own belief systems and expectations, one area which expresses this view is the way they perceive the focal issues of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

⁴David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision (New York: Free Press, 1967).

Finally, utilizing aggregate data on the socio-economic origins, age distribution, educational background, and the place of residence during the political exile period of the JCP leaders, an elite study will be undertaken. Major concepts borrowed from the comparative elite study method as developed by the Stanford scholar group⁵ will be extensively applied to analyze behavioral patterns and recruitment processes of the JCP elites.

As is the general practice in quoting Japanese names, the surname is given first and the first name follows. In the romanization of Korean words this study follows the McCune-Reischauer system. When citing Korean names, with few exceptions, the surname is presented first, and the first and middle names are hyphenated.

Analytical Framework

Special Features of Communist International Relations

As a general take-off point for this dissertation it is necessary to indicate the unique aspects of intra-bloc relationships among the Communist countries. Because the author starts from the basic assumption that inter-

⁵Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and C. Easton Rothwell, The Comparative Study of Elites (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1952). Also Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (eds.), World Revolutionary Elites (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1967).

national relations among the Communists are distinctive within the entire field of international relations, an extensive analysis of the various factors attributable to this uniqueness will become a useful guideline in understanding the complexities of the Sino-Soviet competition to control the JCP. In general, there are four distinct characteristics of the international relations among the Communist countries: 1) historical differences; 2) the role of ideology; 3) the power struggle over the control of the fraternal Communist parties; and 4) the party-to-party relationship.

Historical Differences.—A distinct phenomenon under this category is the unique and dominant position of the Soviet Union as the first and most successful Communist state. The real power that the CPSU possessed and the prestige that it enjoyed among Communists were so enormously greater than those of any other national party that the history of international relations among Communists was peculiarly preoccupied by the problem of the relations of the USSR to Communist movements elsewhere. Many of the tactical or strategic questions with which other Communist movements were faced after coming to power, even if under substantially different conditions, had been experienced by the CPSU. Its leaders naturally felt qualified to comment authoritatively on the domestic policies of the new regimes.

However, Communist China and Yugoslavia were the exceptions to this pattern, and integral relations were maintained essentially on the basis of the special Soviet ideological standing.⁶ Unlike the East European regimes which owed their existence to the Soviet Union, the fact that the Communist regimes in these two states were basically indigenous diminished their power dependence on Moscow, although their common subscription to the doctrine made close ties with the USSR possible for Yugoslavia until 1947 and until 1956 for Communist China.

Role of Ideology.—According to Communists themselves, the foundation of their special international relationship is their common adherence to the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. However much they abuse ideological tenets in twisting them to suit their own aims, they remain attached to the premise that history is moving toward the replacement of the capitalist socio-economic order with a socialist one, and that the countries possessing the new order ought to maintain a special fraternal relationship among themselves—and with their cobelievers in countries that are still capitalist.

So viewed, unlike the relatively unarticulated ideology of non-Communist states, the ideology of

⁶Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 397.

Communist bloc nations is explicitly related to political action. Therefore, defining the relationship between ideology and political action is not merely relevant, but is crucial. To quote Brzezinski:

Modern revolutionary ideology is essentially an action program derived from certain doctrinal assumptions about the nature of reality and expressed through certain stated, not overly complex, assertions about the inadequacy of the past or present state of social affairs. These assertions include an explicit guide to action outlining methods for changing the situation, with some general, idealized notions about the eventual state of affairs.⁷

This definition provides a doctrinally stated program in which the degree of commitment may be measured in terms of the link between word and deed. This ideological tenet has been a source of both strength and weakness, and is certainly a marked peculiarity of Communist international relations.

Intra-Bloc Power Struggle.—Linked with the problem of ideology is the power struggle between the Soviet Union and Communist China over the control of the fraternal Communist parties. At this juncture, such pertinent questions may be asked as: Does a major ideological conflict exist within the Communist grouping of nations, or is the conflict caused by

⁷Ibid., p. 384.

traditional Sino-Russian rivalry and merely obscured by a smokescreen of high-sounding phrases and utopian objectives? In short, is there a classic case of a "balance of power" struggle within the bloc? And does this struggle evoke ideological arguments whose principal function is to justify national policies while masking national motives that only secondarily involve ideological goals?

In answering some of these questions Brzezinski's systematic study of intra-bloc relationship of the Communist countries develops a basic frame of reference to analyze the cross-cutting relationship between the ideological orientation of the Communist regimes on the one hand, and the imperatives of their political power on the other.⁸ Also Stuart Schram traces the origins of the Sino-Soviet conflict as basically a struggle for power by the tradition-bound preindustrial Communist China as an Asian power and the post-industrial Soviet Union as a European power.⁹ David Floyd and O. Edmund Clubb develop a similar theme in

⁸ Ibid., especially chapter 16, "Ideology and Power in Relations among Communist States" and Epilogue.

⁹ Stuart Schram (ed.), The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965).

their analyses of the Sino-Soviet conflict.¹⁰ According to Donald Zagoria, the specific power conflict within the Sino-Soviet bloc was disguised under the smokescreen of the divergent strategies in the so-called "colonial and semi-colonial" areas.¹¹ The Chinese wanted to place greater emphasis than the Russians on an armed liberation struggle. But an underlying political issue was whether or not the Russians would concede a Chinese Communist sphere of influence in Asia and in some other parts of the underdeveloped world. The Chinese Communists wanted a sphere of influence in Asia because most of their short- and middle-run objectives related to that continent. They had come to realize that the priorities they assigned to these objectives were not always the same as those assigned by the Russians.

Party-to-Party Relationship.—As the institutional feature of the conceptual framework, the unique role of the political parties among the Communist countries becomes the central focus of attention. Here the general definition of

¹⁰ O. Edmund Clubb, China and Russia: The "Great Game" (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971).
David Floyd (ed.), Mao against Khrushchev (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964).

¹¹ Donald S. Zagoria, "Some Comparisons between the Russian and Chinese Models," in A. Doak Barnett (ed.), Communist Strategies in Asia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 15.

political party as applicable to the Western world has to be modified. According to Sigmund Neumann:

We may define political party generally as the articulate organization of society's active political agents, those who are concerned with the control of governmental power and who compete for popular support with another group or groups holding divergent views.¹²

The main purpose of the fully developed party organizations in the Communist countries is to struggle for a new political order and for a new society. Therefore, the revolutionary function of a dictatorial party before its seizure of power is to operate as the "revolutionary vanguard" of the future state. Once the dictatorial party is in power the functional foci will shift to the organizing of the "proletariat," directing this task through a pure one-way propaganda stream from above, through the party's secret agencies in securing control, and through the selection of the party elites.

According to Brzezinski, the party-to-party relationship among the Communist parties is aptly described as an integral relationship.¹³ Relations among the ruling Communist parties are integral in the sense that the policies of any party are derived interdependently from

¹² Sigmund Neumann, "Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties," in Sigmund Neumann (ed.), Modern Political Parties (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 396.

¹³ Zbigniew Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 395.


its power purposes and ideological concepts, neither of which regards any aspect of society as outside its purview and both of which are related to a "universally" valid process of historical change. Given the theoretical orthodoxy of Marxism-Leninism as a specific policy guideline, a policy of a given regime either helps to validate the policy of another regime or, if at variance with it, constitutes a threat to its legitimacy and ideological orthodoxy. Therefore, because the total social impact of revolutionary change makes almost every activity a potential policy, the traditional international relations principle of non-interference in the domestic political affairs is inapplicable to relations among Communist parties.

Operational Variables for an Analysis of the Sino-Soviet Conflict for the Control of the JCP

The aforementioned four factors—historical differences, Marxist-Leninist ideology, power struggle, and integrative party-to-party relationship—are considered as the external variables which affect the decision-making process of the JCP. At this juncture, it is assumed that there are continuous interactions among various elements of the JCP leadership group to adjust to external environmental stresses. Hence how the internal adjustment has been made in the context of the strenuous effort by the JCP in the midst of the Sino-Soviet conflict is indicated by the

FIGURE I

MAJOR OPERATIONAL VARIABLES FOR AN ANALYSIS OF THE SINO-SOVIET
CONFLICT FOR THE CONTROL OF THE JCP



preceding three internal variables—perception of the Sino-Soviet conflict, factional struggle by the splinter groups (power struggle), and elite cohesion/turnover (political recruitment). The schematic form of these operational variables in analyzing the specific impact of the Sino-Soviet conflict on the JCP is illustrated in Figure 1. In short, the JCP policy of shifting alignment in the Sino-Soviet conflict is viewed as a dependent variable, while the seven pattern variables are considered as independent and intervening variables.

Interaction Model of the JCP, the CPSU
and the CCP

To describe the continuous and tridirectional interactions among the JCP, the CPSU, and the CCP at an abstract level, the author has modified the linkage model in international relations theory as originally developed by James N. Rosenau.¹⁴ The utility of the linkage model is derived from the fact that it stands in explicit contrast to traditional models which view nations as closed systems and international relations as the interactions of

¹⁴ James N. Rosenau, Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International System (New York: Free Press, 1969). J. Stephen Hoadley and Hasegawa Sukehiro apply Rosenau's linkage model to the specific setting of Sino-Japanese international relations. See "Sino-Japanese Relations 1950-1970," International Studies Quarterly, XV, No. 2 (June 1971), 131-57.


governments only. In the linkage view, nations are not encapsulated, nor are their domestic actors insulated from influences from abroad. Linkage politics treats as permeable the boundary between a nation's political actors and the international political environment. It also utilizes systems theory with its notions of a nation's input from, output to, and feedback through the environment.¹⁵

The author has modified Rosenau's linkage model for an analysis of the JCP-CPSU-CCP interaction in connection with the Sino-Soviet conflict. The reason for using the linkage model is the difficulty in operationalizing other foreign policy models which basically deal with the traditional state-to-state interactions. As discussed in the preceding section, this study is concerned with the intra-bloc relations among the Communist parties, and thus traditional foreign policy models are not applicable. On the other hand, this author believes that, with a drastic modification of Rosenau's linkage model to the


¹⁵ Most works on foreign policy acknowledge the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy decisions processes and review some of the internal linkages, but in concentrating on the flow of influence from inside to outside, they overlook the importance of continuous and bidirectional interactions. See, for example, Roy C. Macridis (ed.), Foreign Policy in World Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; Prentice-Hall, 1967) and K.J. Holsti, International Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 21-22.

Sino-Soviet conflict, complicated interactions among the three Communist parties could be explainable in a simplified schematic model. For illustrative purpose, the contrast among (1) traditional models, (2) Rosenau's linkage model, and (3) the JCP-CPSU-CCP interaction model used in this study is shown by diagrams (see Figures 2 and 3).

FIGURE 2
MODELS OF INTER-NATION LINKAGES



Traditional models




Rosenau's Linkage Model

Note: Squares represent nations; dark areas represent the national government; letters represent domestic political actors or link-points; arrows represent linkages.

FIGURE 3

JCP-CPSU-CCP INTERACTION LINKAGE MODEL
(PARTY AND GOVERNMENT LEVEL),
1961-1968



* On October 19, 1956, the ~~Hatoyama-Bulganin~~ Joint Peace Declaration formally ended the war between the USSR and Japan. The Joint Peace Declaration restored diplomatic and consular relations, but Peace Treaty was not signed. The territorial issues are still unsettled.

Hypotheses

In the course of this study, evidence will be offered in support or rejection of the following three hypotheses which are interrelated and interacting:

1) The Sino-Soviet dispute has increased the bargaining leverage of the minor-bloc actor (JCP) between the feuding super-bloc actors (CPSU and CCP), and has enhanced its ability to pursue an autonomous policy.

2) The coverage of the JCP organ Akahata on the Soviet Union and Communist China is manipulated through selective reporting or omission to reflect the JCP Mainstream's views on the Sino-Soviet conflict.

3) The greater the intensity of the intra-bloc struggle for the control of the minor-bloc actor (JCP) by the super-bloc actors (CPSU and CCP), the more intra-party schism among the leadership group of the minor-bloc actor.

CHAPTER II

EARLY HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE OF THE JCP AND THE SINO-SOVIET PARTY RELATIONSHIP, 1922-1945

Before undertaking the analysis of the JCP attitude in the Sino-Soviet conflict, a brief survey of the prewar history of the JCP is necessary. For if the JCP since 1966 seemed to have lost much in common with the party born in 1922, it nevertheless retained its indelible experience of historical legacy. As such, an extensive analysis of the prewar JCP movement and its early relationship with both the Comintern and the CCP are indispensable to show the nature of its tie with international Communism. The author contends that the conclusions derived from a study of prewar relations have direct bearing upon postwar relations.

Dawn of the Japanese Proletarian Movement and the Impact of the Bolshevik Revolution on the Japanese Radicalism

Origins of the Japanese Proletarian Party Movement during the 1900's

The early intellectual awakening of the Japanese socialist movement could be traced back to the vast socio-political changes of Japan following the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and the subsequent modernization of this epoch-making

event. In a frenzied zeal to emulate the West that had proved materially superior to feudal Japan, the Japanese intellectuals began to read a wide range of Western writings and to examine the social and political philosophies of the West. Soon they came in contact with the rising tide of socialist thought in Europe. But, except for a short-lived attempt to establish a socialist party, the Japanese socialist movement as a political force remained largely in the realm of theory until the war with China toward the end of the nineteenth century.¹ Socialism became predominant among the Japanese intellectuals in the decade following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, when industrialization and urbanization began to have a noticeable impact.

A major blow to the development of the early Japanese labor movement proved to be the promulgation of the (Public) Peace Police Law (Jian Keisatsu Hō) of March 1900,²

¹ Rodger Swearingen and Paul F. Langer, Red Flag in Japan: International Communism in Action, 1919-1951 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 3.

² Article 17 of the Peace Police Law (Jian Keisatsu Hō) was specifically aimed at suppressing organized labor activity. It is interesting to compare this with the British Combination Act, which treated organized action on the part of the workers as interference in the process of bargaining between the employer and each employee. In contrast, the Japanese law treated similar action as a disturbance of the public peace. The Peace Preservation Law (Jian Iji Hō) and the Disputes Arbitration Law (Sōgi Chōtei Hō), which were later enacted, were based on this same principle. See Ujihara Masahiro et al., Kyōiku: Nihon no Mondai (Education: Problems of Japan), II (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1952), p. 218.

which declared it a crime to agitate for higher wages or lower land rents and prohibited workers and farmers from organizing for collective action. With the opportunity for labor agitation closed by this repressive parliamentary legislation, the Japanese socialists realized that the only course of action lay in concerted political activity. On May 22, 1901, Katayama Sen, Kōtoku Shūsui, another prominent socialist with a strong inclination toward anarcho-syndicalism, and four others founded the Social Democratic Party (Shakai-Minshutō), the first socialist political organization in Japan.³ However, the subsequent government order to disband the Social Democratic Party left no room for even moderate political reformist activities. The socialist movement after 1901 was confined to educational and propaganda activities. The Japan Socialist Party (Nihon Shakaitō) was founded in 1906. Soon the leadership fell from the hands of the more moderate and organizationally minded Katayama Sen and it was taken up by the more anarchistic and intellectually

³Five of the six initiators of the party were Christians. These were Abe Iso-o, Katayama Sen, Kawakami Kiyoshi, Kinoshita Naoe, and Nishikawa Kōjiro. Kōtoku Shūsui was the exception. Humanitarianism, especially emphasized by the Unitarians at the time, made the Japanese converts see their environment in a new light. Feeling shocked at the inhuman labor conditions in Japan, they took an interest in labor problems and the socialist theories for their solution. See Okōchi Kazuo, Reimeiki no Nihon Rōdō Undō (Dawn of the Japanese Labor Movement) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1952), p. 89.

inclined Kōtoku Shūsui and his close disciple, Sakai Toshihiko. Pointing out this trend, George O. Totten in his study of the prewar Social-Democratic movement in Japan comments:

In the decade after 1900 the authoritarian attitude of the government and the weakness of labor inevitably inclined the socialist movement toward intellectualism rather than activism. . . . The resultant tendency toward radical theorizing rather than practical activity became a marked characteristic of the Japanese socialist movement.⁴

Kōtoku Shūsui's "direct action" agitation⁵ was carried into practice during the Ashio Copper Mine disturbance of February 1907, which initially was a spontaneous expression of dissatisfaction of the miners. The incident served to increase the government's fear of the socialist movement and led to the immediate reprisal of disbanding

⁴George O. Totten, III, The Social Democratic Movement in Prewar Japan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 27.

⁵George Totten contrasts the peculiar brand of anarcho-syndicalism of Kōtoku Shūsui with its European prototype. European syndicalism was born mainly out of a feeling that the social democratic parties had become compromising and ineffective within the national legislatures, that politics was a set of tricks by which the bourgeoisie distracted the working class, and that direct action by well-organized and synchronized labor unions was the only thing that would get results. In contrast to this, Japanese syndicalism expressed the feelings of frustration that arose from the inability to get even a voice in the Diet, the prompt police suppression of any kind of labor activity, the all-pervading ideology of the "emperor system" that restricted any fundamental criticism of the state, and finally, the prevalence of scattered, spontaneous strikes that resembled small-scale uprisings more than modern organized action. See ibid., p. 30.

the newly established Japan Socialist Party by the Saionji Cabinet.

Following the so-called "Red-Flag Incident"⁶ of 1908, ten socialists—including Arahata Kanson, Sakai Toshihiko, Yamakawa Hitoshi, and Ōsugi Sakae—were arrested and convicted. Finally the remaining anarcho-syndicalists received the coup de grâce during the High Treason Trial of 1910-11 in which Kōtoku Shūsui and eleven other anarchists were condemned to death for allegedly plotting against the life of the Emperor. This trial now appears to have been framed by the Katsura government.⁷ Thereafter a series of governmental suppressions of anything connected with socialism followed. In complete frustration, Katayama finally left Japan to the United States in 1914, never to return.⁸

⁶On June 22, 1908, the combined forces of the Japanese anarcho-syndicalists and the socialists, in an unusual display of unity, paraded through Tokyo waving red flags and singing revolutionary songs.

⁷Sakamoto Kiyome, "Gyakutō to Iwarete Zaigoku Nijūgo Nen: Kōtoku Jiken no Shinsō" (Being Called a Traitor: The Truth about the Kōtoku Incident for Which I Was in Prison for Twenty-Five Years), Chūō Kōron, X, September 1952, pp. 120-27.

⁸Katayama subsequently became a Communist after his arrival in the United States. Having been converted to Bolshevism under the strong influence of his Dutch financial sponsor S.J. Rutgers, Katayama met the prominent Bolshevik exiles Trotsky and Bukharin in New York and was active in the American Communist Party and Mexican Communist Party until his sojourn in the Soviet Union in 1920 where he became a member of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern until his death in Moscow on November 5, 1933. His activities at the Comintern are extensively discussed by Hyman Kublin, Asian Revolutionary; The Life of Sen Katayama (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 261-315.

Meanwhile, as World War I with its great stimulus to industrialization brought unprecedented prosperity to Japan, the discrepancy between war-inflated prices and low wages was leading to general unrest. The radicalism thus generated was further stimulated by the country-wide Rice Riots of 1918. Added to this internal discontent was the external stimulus of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, which had convinced a number of Japanese radicals of the superiority of Communist ideology to their previous beliefs. A small underground group was formed consisting largely of students of radical leanings. Others who at this time were working toward the establishment of a Communist organization were Watanabe Masanosuke, Ichikawa Shōichi, Sakai Toshihiko, Sano Manabu, Arahata Kansō, Yamakawa Hitoshi, and Tokuda Kyūichi.

The Comintern and Its Early Effort for the Establishment of the Communist Party in Japan, 1918-1921

In tracing the early Japanese Marxist movement, one unique phenomenon becomes apparent; it is the relentless efforts by the Comintern to establish a Communist party in Japan under its strict guidance and control. In November 1918, while Bolshevik activities put a priority on the revolution in Europe over Asia, the First Congress of Communist Organizations of the East was convened in Moscow. A resolution adopted by the Congress provided for a Department of International Propaganda with twelve divisions, one

of which was to be devoted solely to Japan.⁹ Although socialist groups in Japan had been invited to send representatives to the Congress, no Japanese delegates were present. While an avid interest of the Communist Party of Soviet Union had been focused on Japan as early as 1918, substantial attention of the Comintern did not start until 1920. After an initial failure of the frontal attack against capitalism in Europe, the Comintern leaders focused more attention on Asia. They reasoned that nationalist and Communist movements there would weaken the strength of European capitalism and eventually lead to its destruction. The basic strategy for Asia was determined at the Second Congress of the Comintern in August 1920, which approved Lenin's "Theses on the National and Colonial Question." According to Lenin:

The Communist International should form temporary understandings, even alliances, with the bourgeois democracy of the colonies and backward countries, but not merge with it, unconditionally preserving the independence of the proletarian movement, even in its most embryonic form. . . . We, as Communists, must and will support bourgeois emancipation in colonial countries only when, in those areas, these movements are really revolutionary, when their representatives will not hinder us in educating and organizing the peasantry and the large masses of the exploited

⁹For the original context of the proceedings of the First Congress of Communist Organizations of the East, see document 27, X.L. Eudin and Robert C. North, Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-1927 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1957), pp. 162-63.

in the revolutionary spirit.¹⁰

The Comintern made its first attempt to establish direct contact with Japanese leftists late in the summer of 1920. The Shanghai Bureau of the Comintern dispatched a Korean, Yi (Lee) Ch'un-sŏk, to meet with Japanese bolsheviks and anarcho-syndicalists and to extend an invitation to attend a conference of "Far Eastern revolutionaries" to be held in the fall in Shanghai.¹¹ Ironically, it was the anarcho-syndicalist Ūsugi Sakae who accepted the invitation to establish contacts with revolutionaries abroad. Although he was still outspokenly critical of the Soviet regime, Ūsugi left Japan for Shanghai in October 1920. Subsequently he participated in a Far Eastern Socialist Conference held at Shanghai at which the Russian Comintern representative Gregory Voitinsky was present.¹² Before returning to Japan, Ūsugi received Comintern funds for the publication of a radical paper after having agreed to take on a Communist editor and visit Soviet Russia later.¹³ Upon his arrival

¹⁰Communist International, The Second Congress of the Communist International: Proceedings of the Petrograd Session of July 17 and the Moscow Sessions of July 19-August 7, 1920 (Moscow, 1920), p. 579.

¹¹Robert A. Scalapino and Lee Chong-sik, "The Origins of the Korean Communist Movement (I)," The Journal of Asian Studies, XX (November 1960), 23.

¹²Kazama Jōkichi, Moskō to Tsunaragu Nippon Kyōsantō no Rekishi (A History of the Moscow-linked Japanese Communist Party) (Tokyo: Tenman-sha, 1951), Vol. I, pp. 39-40.

¹³Arahata Kansō, Kyōsantō o Meguru Hitobito (Men Around the Communist Party) (Tokyo: Hayakawa Shōbō, 1950), p. 8.

in Japan, Ōsugi joined forces with Katayama's protégé and a budding Bolshevik Kondō Eizō,¹⁴ and a student activist Takase Seidō to publish Rōdō Undō (Labor Movement) early in 1921. Being disappointed by Ōsugi's anarcho-syndicalistic intransigence and his continued criticism of the Russian Communists, Kondō began to advance his plans for the establishment of a Communist party in Japan. By the spring of 1921, he had succeeded in drawing the recognized leaders of Japanese socialism--Sakai Toshihiko, Yamakawa Hitoshi, and Arahata Kanson--on his side and they began preparations for the founding of a Communist party in Japan.

While these preparations were in progress, a second Korean, Yi (Lee) Chōng-rim, arrived from Shanghai in order to establish contact between the Comintern and the new Japanese movement. Toward the end of April 1921, draft

¹⁴Through his profession as a salesman of Japanese art supplies in the United States Kondō Eizō met Katayama Sen in New York City in 1917 and became a convert to Bolshevism upon the latter's strong influences. Being in touch with Katayama and other left-wingers such as Agnes Smedley, John Reed, Louis C. Fraina, and S.J. Rutgers, Kondō developed deep sympathy and admiration for the Russian Revolution. After the events in Japan, particularly the Rice Riots of 1908, greatly excited Japanese radicals in the United States for the imminent sign of social revolution, Katayama and Kondō decided that one of them should go to Russia for assistance and the other proceed homeward in order to push the revolutionary movement. Thus Katayama left for Russia, while Kondō returned to Japan in May 1919. See Travers E. Durkee, "The Communist International and Japan, 1919-1922," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1953), p. 14.

regulations were approved for a Japanese section of the Comintern.¹⁵ Afterwards, Kondō, disguised as a Nisei merchant, arrived in Shanghai. There he met with a Comintern committee consisting of twelve Chinese and Koreans presided over by another Korean, Pak Chin-sun, sent from Moscow. The latter listened to Kondō's report on the situation in Japan and, ruling out the possibility of further cooperation with Ōsugi Sakae's anarcho-syndicalism, gave him funds for organizational and propaganda purposes.

In October 1921, Voitinsky sent Chang T'ai-lei, a Chinese agent of the Comintern, to Japan to establish closer Comintern contact with the Japanese revolutionaries. There he asked Kondō, Sakai, and Yamakawa to select a number of workers as delegates to the Conference of the Toilers of the Far East scheduled to meet in Irkutsk in November 1921.¹⁶ The Japanese delegates reached Irkutsk in mid-November 1921; from there they proceeded to Moscow and then to Petrograd, where they were joined by Katayama Sen, who had recently arrived in Moscow from the United States, and other Japanese representatives from the United States—Watanabe Haruo, Maniwa Suekichi, Nonaka Masayuki,

¹⁵ George M. Beckmann and Ōkubo Genji, The Japanese Communist Party, 1922-1945 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 31.

¹⁶ The only workers available were two anarchists, and three printing workers, but this did not bother Chang, who may have assumed that they could be converted once they reached Russia. Other delegates included Tokuda Kyūichi and Takase Kiyoshi.

Nikaidō Umekichi, and Suzuki Mosaburō (socialist)—to constitute the full Japanese delegation to the Congress.¹⁷ Katayama, the aging Japanese revolutionary in his early sixties, received the title of honorary chairman along with Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Stalin; it was apparent that the Russian leaders expected him to be useful in advancing the Communist cause in Asia.

The First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East, which opened in Moscow on January 21, 1922, marked the first real contact between high Comintern leaders and the Japanese Communist movement, and the first serious Soviet attempt to analyze Japanese society.¹⁸ Zinoviev put special emphasis on the role of the Japanese proletariat in the solution of the "Far Eastern problem." He expressed pleasure that a workers' movement had been launched in Japan, but he recognized that it was still very weak and suffered from the "infantile sickness" of anarcho-syndicalism. The Comintern took concrete steps at this Congress to assure the successful formation of a Communist party in Japan. Before the Japanese delegation left Moscow, it received the draft of a party platform, party regulations and funds.¹⁹

¹⁷Beckmann and Ōkubo, op.cit., pp. 39-40.

¹⁸Eudin and North, op.cit., p. 153.

¹⁹Arahata Kanson, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

Initial Formation of the JCP, 1922

Origin of the JCP, July 15, 1922

The JCP was formally organized on July 15, 1922, at a secret meeting in Tokyo. From its inception it can be noticed that the embryonic apparatus of the JCP was not based on the genuine mass labor movement, but was a mere out-growth of the support given by the young radicals' revolutionary fervor. This weakness would continuously impede the success of the party afterwards. The meeting has come to be regarded as the first party convention, although only a small group was in attendance. Sakai Toshihiko was named party chairman, and Yamakawa Hitoshi, Arahata Kanson, Yoshikawa Morikuni, Hashiura Tokio, Akamatsu Katsumaro, and Kondō Eizō, members of an executive committee.²⁰ The group adopted a tentative constitution based upon that of the British Communist Party. Also the new party pledged "to act positively as a branch of the Comintern and as a leader of

²⁰ Tokuda Kyūichi's membership in the Executive Committee of the JCP in 1922 is rather dubious. Although most of the English source materials acknowledge Tokuda's membership in the Executive Committee, two Japanese sources deny this. According to Takase Kiyoshi, Kondō was appointed instead of Tokuda. See Takase Kiyoshi, "Kyūyū Tokuda Kyūichi," (Old Friend Tokuda Kyūichi) Jiyū (Freedom), February, 1964, p. 144. Also Arahata has asserted that Tokuda was not on the Executive Committee. See Arahata Kanson, Kanson Jiden (Autobiography), (Tokyo: Ronso-sha, 1961) p. 288.

the revolutionary movement of the Japanese proletariat."²¹

The party membership in these early years rarely exceeded fifty in number.²² Soon it fell heir to much of the factionalism of the radical left-wing movement and was hardly a party at all, in the sense of a unified organization with an accepted platform and operational tactics. There was little solidarity, and no effective central leadership. The party members continued to work primarily in their own cliques, the most influential of which were the intellectual (Wednesday society) and publishing circles around Yamakawa Hitoshi and Sakai Toshihiko, and the labor union leaders like Yamamoto Kenzō,²³ Kokuryō Goichirō, Nakamura Yoshiaki, Watanabe Masanosuke, Sugiura Keiichi, Nabeyama Sadachika, and Tsujii Taminosuke. Other prominent groups included members of the Enlightened People's Communist Party (Gyōmin Kyōsantō)²⁴ and the Japan Federation of Labor (Nihon Rōdō

²¹Tateyama Takaaki, Nihon Kyōsantō Kenkyo Hishi (Secret History of the Japanese Communist Party Arrests), (Tokyo: Bukyōsha, 1929), p. 100.

²²Beckmann and Ōkubo, op. cit., p. 49.

²³One of the original founders of the JCP with a genuine "working class" background; after extensive labor union activities in Japan until 1928, Yamamoto fled to the Soviet Union and attended the Sixth Comintern Congress. There he became a representative of the Profintern and the Comintern later. He died in the Soviet Union in April 1941.

²⁴Being established by Kondō Eizō in August 1921, it failed to obtain the Comintern recognition and never was considered as a genuine Communist party in Japan in spite of its early founding date which preceded the JCP.

Sōdomei) to which Nosaka Sanzō belonged. Upon his return from Russia in 1922, he became the head of the International Section of the Federation.

Formulation of the Draft Platform of the JCP
by the Comintern, November 1922

In November 1922 the standing committee of the JCP met and brought forth a program. Also it was decided to dispatch Takase Kiyoshi and Kawauchi Tadahiko to Moscow to report the formation of the JCP to the Comintern and represent the Japanese branch at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern. The Comintern leaders, being aware of the deficiency of the embryonic Japanese Communists who had not yet worked out their strategies and tactics for revolution, turned their attention to drafting a platform for the JCP. The Japanese delegates also heard Zinoviev, the President of the Comintern, describe the new party to the delegates:

In Japan there is a small party that, with the assistance of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, has united its forces with the best syndicalist elements. This is a young party, but it represents a strong nucleus. It should now provide itself with a platform.²⁵

The Fourth Congress of the Comintern, which had convened in Moscow in November 1922, recognized the JCP as a branch of the Comintern, and a special committee formulated a draft platform--the so-called "Bukharin Theses" of 1922-- to be adopted by the party in Japan. There is no evidence that the

²⁵ Eudin and North, op. cit., p. 154.

Japanese delegates played any role in its actual preparation, except perhaps Katayama Sen who had extensively analyzed the political and socio-economic conditions of Japan along the Marxist line of interpretation.²⁶ The platform was the product of the collective judgment of the Comintern leaders, especially Bukharin, Zinoviev, Radek, and possibly Trotsky. In perusing the content of the platform, the following condensation can be made:

1) On State Power and Social Class Relationship in Japan.—It began with an analysis of the development of Japanese society, in which it was noted that there were "peculiarities" in the development of Japanese capitalism. The "peculiarities" were the feudal relationships that still remained in the hands of semi-feudal big landlords and the emperor. Remnants of feudal relationships were manifested in the structure of the state, which was controlled by a bloc consisting of a definite part of the commercial and industrial capitalists and of the big landlords;

2) On the Nature of Revolution and the Imminent Strategy by the Japanese Communist Party.—Because of the above "peculiarities" of the state power relationship in Japan it was urged that the bourgeois-democratic revolution precede the proletarian (socialist) revolution. The bourgeois-democratic revolution would succeed only with the emergence of the strengthened proletariat and the revolutionary peasants;

3) On the Relationship of the Japanese Communist Party with the Labor Unions.—The immediate task of the party was to win over the labor unions by destroying "the influence and power of yellow, patriotic, social reformist leaders in the labor movement" and, at the same time, elevating "its own prestige and power among the broad mass of workers organized into unions." Furthermore, "the party must make every effort toward a firm tie with the working masses and avoid anything that might isolate it from the workers. On the other hand, "as long as anarchists and syndicalists have influence within the labor unions of Japan, the party must form a solid bloc with them and conclude an agreement for the carrying out of a joint struggle." ²⁷

²⁶Kublin, op. cit., p. 295.

²⁷Draft Platform of the Japanese Communist Party, November, 1922, Appendix A, Beckmann and Okubo, op. cit., pp. 279-82.

Other radical features of the Comintern-directed draft platform were the abolition of the imperial system and the House of Peers, universal suffrage for everyone over eighteen, total freedom for labor organizations, the abolition of all existing armed forces, including the police, and the nationalization without compensation of the emperor's lands, as well as those of the big landlords and the temples. This draft platform has historical significance in view of the fact that, up until then, the Japanese Communists were vaguely shouting the slogan of the overthrow of the bourgeoisie in Japan and were naively contemplating that with the formation of the Communist party they would acquire the reins of power to overthrow the existing state apparatus of militarism without contemplating the course of revolutionary strategy and the assessment of existing socio-economic conditions of Japan in the 1920's. This draft platform, in a positive sense, contributed as a specific guideline to strategic-tactical problems of the early Japanese Communist movement. On the other hand, it undermined the indigenous viability of the JCP from its inception.

Following the return of Takase and Kawauchi to Japan, a number of conferences and special sessions were necessary to thrash out individual differences before members of the Party could agree upon a basic program, and the Japanese Communists did not formally discuss the draft platform for several months. Meanwhile, the Second Convention (Congress)

of the JCP was held at Ichigawa (near Tokyo) in February 1923²⁸ with 17 members in attendance.²⁹ At this Second Convention the following issues were discussed:

- 1) Drawing up new party regulations;
- 2) Nomination for the Japanese Communist Youth League Selection Committee members;
- 3) Reshuffling of the Executive Committee of the Japanese Communist Party;
- 4) Other problems pertaining to the organization and activity of the Party.³⁰

The Second Convention also mentioned the need to establish "cells" in order to provide a solid foundation for the Party. The Fourth Congress of the Comintern had declared in 1932 that no Communist party could be regarded as a "serious and solidly organized mass communist party" unless it had "stable" Communist cells in the factories, plants, mines, and railroads.³¹ The Convention, aware of this dictum, appointed a number of members to be cell leaders, including Kondō,

²⁸ Nabeyama Sadachika, Watakushi wa Kyōsantō o Suteta (I Deserted the Communist Party) (Tokyo: Daigo Press, 1949), p. 62.

²⁹ According to one source, the members present were Sakai, Kondō, Arahata, Hashiura, Yoshikawa, Takase, Takatsu, Tokuda, Ueda, Tadokoro, Kawauchi, Watanabe Masanosuke, Sano Manabu, Nakasone, Urata, Koiwai, and Tashiro. See Nihon Rōdō Nenkan-1924 (Japan Labor Yearbook-1924) (Tokyo: Ohara Shakai Mondai Kenkyūjo, 1925), p. 604. A list in Tateyama has the same names with one exception: Watanabe Mitsuzō appears in place of Watanabe Masanosuke. See Tateyama, op. cit., p. 107.

³⁰ Gendaishi Kenkyukai, Nihon Kyōsantōshi (senzen) Kōan Chōsachō Shiryō (Document Compilation by the Public Safety Investigation Bureau on the Pre-War History of the Japanese Communist Party) (Tokyo: Kōan Chōsachō, 1962), pp. 44-49.

³¹ Kermit E. McKenzie, Comintern and World Revolution, 1928-43 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 96-97.

Takatsu, Sano Manabu, Inomata Tsunao and seven others.³²

However, despite the party's good intentions, the cells that were founded were little more than personal factions centering around the leading figures of the study and discussion groups, publication circles, and labor unions.

The Comintern's Urge to Form a Legal Communist Party in Japan, 1923

Unable to reach agreement on the course of the revolutionary strategy and tactics of the JCP at the Shakuji meeting (March 15, 1923), the leaders of the Party dispatched Arahata Kanson, new chairman of the Executive Committee of the Comintern's Branch in Japan, to Moscow to furnish an interim report and to seek additional instructions from the Comintern in the early spring of 1923.³³ Arahata attended the Third Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern which opened at the end of June 1923. The Comintern's view toward the major problems of the JCP was:

In view of the imminent situation in Japan, the proletarian mass has to start an open political activity. For that matter it is also necessary to start an immediate political activity to acquire universal suffrage thereof.³⁴

³²Nihon Rōdō Nenkan-1924, p. 605.

³³Arahata Kanson, Sa no Menmen (Faces on the Left) (Tokyo: Hayakawa-Shobō, 1951), p. 123.

³⁴Eudin and North, op. cit., p. 275.

Zinoviev, the President of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, and Arahata engaged in heated polemical disputes over the Comintern insistence for legal political activity and the subsequent establishment of a legal Communist party in Japan. The contenders in the debate took diametrically opposed stances. Arahata opposed the formation of a legal Communist party in Japan by arguing that such an action would be premature in view of the weak organizational strength of the working class movement. He contended further that such a legal activity would alienate the militant anarcho-syndicalist group in Japan. On the other hand, Zinoviev insisted on legal activity of the Japanese Communists to draw the attention of the Japanese petty bourgeoisie, working class, and the peasants. He was probably repeating the major slogan "To the Masses" which had been previously adopted by the Third Comintern Congress.

Following Zinoviev's argument at the Third Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, the Comintern had maintained the official position of urging the formation of legal worker-peasant parties until the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928. Perhaps it was an utterly misleading guidance to urge the legal formation of mass-based worker-peasant party to link the Communist party and the major social classes--workers, peasants, and the petty bourgeoisie--in Japanese politics. The Party remained

exclusively a tiny group of radical intellectuals (combining elements of anarcho-syndicalists, social democrats, and the Bolsheviks).³⁵ However, unless the genuine nature of the worker-peasant party and its relationship with the Communist party were clearly defined, there was the imminent possibility of confusion. Furthermore Zinoviev's rash comment--"a large number of the bourgeoisie are in strong opposition to the existing regime"--and his proposal for a legal party in Japan soon revealed that the Comintern leaders were projecting their wishful thinking without substantial understanding of the internal situation in Japan. It was in the midst of the Third Plenum of the Executive Committee in 1923 that the news reached Moscow of mass arrests of Communists in Japan, and Arahata prepared to leave for Tokyo.³⁶

First "Round-up" of the JCP and the
"White Terror" of September 1923

The JCP organization was crushed through mass arrests

³⁵In describing the intelligentsia-dominated JCP Robert A. Scalapino aptly points out that only five of the twenty-nine individuals convicted in connection with the first Communist Party Incident (June 5, 1923) could be classified as workers. He further mentions that at this stage the movement was predominantly an intellectual one, springing out of the innumerable study groups and the general radical ferment in Japanese university, literary, and journalistic circles . . . significantly larger number of Japanese intellectuals were finding emotional and intellectual stimulus in Marxism See Robert A. Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966 (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1967), p. 19. Also Swearingen and Langer, op. cit., pp. 17-18.

³⁶International Press Correspondence, No. 45, June 22, 1923, p. 440.

in 1923, 1928, 1929, and even more regularly during the 1930's. On June 5, 1923, Tokyo police arrested over a hundred individuals for radical activities. Particularly hard hit by the arrest was the JCP, many of whose leaders continued to languish in prison months after the other seditious suspects had been released.³⁷ Altogether twenty-nine JCP members were brought to trial under the (Public) Peace Police Law (Jian Keisatsu Hō) and were found guilty and received the sentences from eight to ten months. About the only members to elude the police were Sano Manabu, Kondō Eizō, and four accomplices who already had embarked upon a well-timed trip to Russia. Upon their arrival in Moscow, both Sano and Kondō served as representatives to the Comintern and the Profintern respectively.³⁸

Within three months of the June arrests came the Kantō earthquake of September 1, 1923, a tragedy which, coupled with an attempt on the life of Prince Regent Hirohito, gave the police ample excuse for rounding up "undesirable elements" in Japan. During the confusion and tension that

³⁷Watanabe Kango, Nihon Shakai Undō-shi (A History of Japanese Socialist Movement) (Tokyo: Chigun Shobō, 1955), p. 122. Sekine Etsuro, Rōdō Undō Musan Seito-shi (A History of Labor Movement, and Proletarian Party) (Tokyo: Kawaide Shobō, 1954), pp. 95-96; Ichikawa Shoichi, Nihon Kyōsantō Tōsō Shōshi (A History of the Japanese Communist Party Struggle) (Tokyo: Ozuki Shobō, 1955), pp. 81-82.

³⁸As a sister organization of the Comintern, the Profintern was founded in Moscow on the initiative of the CPSU in March 1919 in order to control and coordinate all left-wing labor union activities against capitalist governments.

followed the great earthquake, approximately seven thousand Koreans and hundreds of Chinese were massacred by the angry Japanese mobs, incensed by the wild rumors that these foreigners were responsible for subsequent looting and arson. In the midst of the confusion and anarchical situation, the Japanese police found this an excellent opportunity to round up scores of socialists, anarchists, Communists, and radical labor leaders. Ten labor union organizers were summarily shot, and the anarchist Ōsugi Sakae and his mistress Itō Naoe were murdered at military police headquarters in Tokyo. Thus the police assaults of September 1923 literally crippled the fledging JCP. With the exception of those leaders who were out of the country, few Communists of note escaped the political persecution. "By this time," as has been aptly remarked by Swearingen and Langer, "a Party convention might well have been held at Ichigawa' prison in Tokyo where. . . most of the important Communist had taken up forced residence. What was left could scarcely be called a Party."³⁹

Dissolution of the JCP (1924-1925) and
Its Resurgence (1926)

Background

As a result of police arrests and government repression in 1923, the ardor of many of the Japanese Communist

³⁹Swearingen and Langer, op. cit., pp. 19-20.

leaders for Bolshevik-style revolution ~~was~~ quickly cooled off. Overwhelmed by fear and discouragement, they had begun to question the very need for the existence of Communist party in Japan. During the winter of 1923-1924 heated arguments were raised over the issue; Arahata Kanson, who had recently returned from a tour of Soviet Russia, found himself almost alone in opposition to the main trend.⁴⁰ Those who favored the dissolution argued that the party had been built on personal relationships rather than on a mass basis. Hence, it was better to dissolve it and encourage each individual ex-member to enlarge and develop the mass movement in his own environment.⁴¹ Finally at the Morigasaki Conference in March 1924, the "dissolutionists," led by Sakai Toshihiko and Yamakawa Hitoshi, had their way, voting to liquidate the Party. As Hyman Kublin discusses the dissolution of the party, "this was an extraordinary action, perhaps the only one of its type in the history of the Third International."⁴² Only a small "caretaker" group was established to clear up business matters with the Comintern and others.

The Japanese Communists were now prepared to pursue without distraction the task of molding the broader pro-

⁴⁰Arahata Kanson, Kyōsantō o Meguru Hitobito, pp. 42-46, gives a detailed account of the controversy.

⁴¹Durkee, op. cit., pp. 52-53.

⁴²Kublin, op. cit., pp. 301-2.

letarian party and labor movements to fit their principles. This course of action, however, met with the violent disapproval of the Comintern authorities. To abandon "the only true party of the proletarian masses," even for tactical reasons, was completely unacceptable to the Comintern leaders. A similar theme was reiterated in the Comintern manifesto of May 5, 1924. In an intensive effort to urge the reorganization of the JCP which had voluntarily dissolved by then, the Comintern manifesto revived Zinoviev's 1923 argument of the formation of the legal Communist party in Japan:

You have shown a good fighting spirit. . . . But that is not enough. You must storm the citadel of reaction. Organize your forces for the fight for your civil liberties. Hasten the formation of your workers' and peasants' parties, which alone will enable you to carry on your fight for freedom. Your party must be independent of the "radical" bourgeoisie. Carry on an untiring struggle for your programme until you have put it through. Demand a democratic government, universal franchise, the right to form unions and to strike and to make collective agreements, freedom of political opinion, and the right of assembly. . . . 43

Late in June 1926, Tokudá Kyūichi, who had luckily eluded the June and September 1923 arrests by escaping to Russia and having served as a Japanese representative to the Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI) of February 1926, returned to Japan, armed with the Moscow Thesis of 1926 and with specific instructions

⁴³Jane Degras (ed.), The Communist International Documents, 1923-1928 (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), II, pp. 92-93.

to re-establish the JCP. Shortly thereafter he was imprisoned; nevertheless, preparations for party reorganization continued.⁴⁴ On December 4-5, 1926, a small number of Communists gathered together at the remote hot-springs resort of Goshiki in Yamagata Prefecture in northern Honshū. This secret gathering was actually the Third Congress of the JCP. In their hideout the assembled Communist leaders formally reconstituted the Party and drew up a platform of thirteen planks. The Third Congress formally organized the JCP as a branch of the Comintern.⁴⁵

Intra-Party Doctrinal Disputes on JCP Strategy and Tactics: Yamakawaism versus Fukumotoism

In the study of the early Japanese Communist movement the doctrinal disputes between Yamakawa Hitoshi and Fukumoto Kazuo far overshadowed other intra-party debates over the

⁴⁴While Tokuda was serving his sentence, Watanabe Masanosuke assumed Tokuda's responsibilities and established close contact with Janson, the Comintern agent at the Soviet Embassy. Kazama Jōkichi, Mosukō to Tsunaragu, I, p. 159.

⁴⁵Roster of the Central Committee of the JCP at the Third Congress is as follows: Sano Fumio, Chairman and Chief of Peasant's Department; Fukumoto Kazuo, Chief of Political Department; Watanabe Masanosuke, Chief of the Organizational and Labor Departments; Sano Manabu, Editor of the Proletarian News; Tokuda Kyūichi, Comintern representative in Japan; Ichikawa Shōichi and Nabeyama Sadakichi were also on the Committee. Nakao Katsuo, Mitamura Shirō, Sugiura Keiichi, and Kawai Etsuzō were elected candidate members. See Home Ministry of Japan, Shōwa [19--]- Nenjū ni Okeru Shakai Undō no Jōkyō (Condition of the Social Movements in the Year, 19--), (Tokyo, 1928-42).

strategy and tactics of Japanese Communism. For this reason it is worthy of an extensive study of their theories in view of the fact that the Comintern frequently intervened to correct the doctrinal errors of these hybrid theories of Japanese Marxists.

During the early Japanese Communist movement (1922-1924), Yamakawa Hitoshi's theory prevailed as the most predominant one among the Communist writers. In his famous article, "A Change of Direction for the Proletarian Movement," Yamakawa Hitoshi struck hard at the vulnerability of Japanese anarcho-syndicalism and asserted the need for political action both inside and outside of the Diet.⁴⁶ His main theme was "To the Masses!" and his central arguments could be summarized as follows:

Thus far, the Japanese proletarian movement consisted of a few pioneers. But beyond this first step, socialist pioneers had isolated themselves from the masses. Ten or twenty enthusiasts get together, dream about the next day of revolution, and make big talk. . . . At best they would satisfy their "rebellious spirit" by taking "revolutionary action" against a policeman and spending a night under the police detention. Although they reject the capitalist system, they actually do not even lay a finger on it. As long as they adhere to such a passive attitude, they become isolated from the proletarian masses.⁴⁷

The most immediate task was to take up the urgent economic problems of the masses, combining realistic economic programs

⁴⁶Yamakawa Hitoshi, "Musankaikyū Undō no Hōkōtenkan," (A Change of Direction for the Proletarian Movement), Zenei (Vanguard), July-August, 1922, pp. 16-25.

⁴⁷Yamakawa's article as quoted in Beckmann and Ōkubo, op. cit., p. 51.

with meaningful political action and cultivating a practical, positive, and militant approach that accepted a stage-by-stage development of socialism. Moreover, in opposing the intellectual's penchant for abstract theory, Yamakawa's emphasis upon the need to link the socialist and labor movements with the everyday demands of the masses influenced radical and moderate leftists alike. He was particularly anxious to free labor leaders from the hold of anarcho-syndicalism, and therefore began to put more emphasis on the political role to be played by the proletariat. On the other hand, he was not clear about the nature of that role, as was evidenced by the fact that he continued to advise the proletariat to put no faith in parliamentarianism and to abstain from voting, should universal suffrage become a reality.

Starting with the re-establishment of the JCP at the Goshiki Convention (Third Congress of the JCP) in 1926, a new figure emerged to dominate Japanese Marxism. Fukumoto Kazuo, a brilliant Law School, Tokyo Imperial University graduate (1920) who rose quickly from obscurity to prominence among the Japanese Communists, was considered as one of the most influential writers in the left-wing movement between 1925 and 1926.

Beginning as a disciple of Yoshino Sakuzō and his theories of social democracy, Fukumoto had gradually moved toward Marxism-Leninism. Pertaining to his early intellectual

predispositions Robert A. Scalapino gives a detailed biographical account:

In the course of his peregrinations, he [Fukumoto] had been touched by a variety of influences—Bertrand Russell, G.D.H. Cole, Scott Nearing, Edwin Seligman, and Kawakami Hajime. He prided himself, however, on having turned quickly to original sources, the writings of Marx and Lenin. When he went to Europe in 1922, Fukumoto was already a budding Marxist. His experiences and contacts in Europe strengthened his new position, and when he returned in 1924 to take up a teaching position in Yamaguchi Commercial Higher School, Fukumoto threw himself tirelessly into the study of Marxian literature. In such journals as Marx Shugi no hata no moto (Under the Banner of Marxism) and Marxism, he began to set forth his views to the radical circle. His first contribution to the important journal Marxism was published in December, 1924, and from this time on, Marxism carried a Fukumoto article in almost every issue. Quickly, disciples began to gather.⁴⁸

Thus, at a time when the Party's recognized leaders were temporarily in prison, Fukumoto's views came to guide the radical intellectuals who formed the core of the recreated party. Undertaking a comparative study of capitalism in Europe and Asia Fukumoto started with an assumption that Japanese capitalist society already had entered the advanced stage which characterized the "declining and disintegrating capitalist societies of the West," a thesis which baffled other Japanese Marxists and conflicted with the Comintern view of the stage of development in Japan. Given this situation, Fukumoto concluded that the Japanese proletariat, which had grown with the development of capitalism, had an opportunity to make a "great leap forward to the stage of political

⁴⁸Scalapino, op. cit., p. 27.

struggle"—a leap that had to be based on the attainment by the proletariat of "genuine class consciousness."⁴⁹ As for the political action to be undertaken by the proletariat, Fukumoto, while overtly attacking Yamakawaism, indicated the following specific tactics:

First, we must fight politically. Our movement must become total and united. Second, the present struggle must be carried on as part of a historical process leading to the complete victory of the proletariat. Third, to achieve the immediate goals of the struggle, a mass united front, led by the proletariat, must be developed among the proletariat, peasantry, and petty bourgeoisie. This united front, with particular emphasis on cooperation between the proletariat and peasantry, is eventually to prepare for a government of workers and peasants in the struggle for the complete victory of the proletariat. . . . But we must not let the left-wing spirit [Marxism] become dissolved among the masses because of the need to cooperate in a front. We must not hesitate to stage a bold political struggle against all types of opportunism—so-called "realism," petty bourgeois ideologies, unionist ideologies, parliamentarianism, etc.—and thereby expose their substance to the masses.⁵⁰

According to Fukumoto, the key issue of the political struggle was the problem of engaging in a correct, unified theoretical struggle for the proletarian movement before the mass-action phase could be successfully undertaken. Out of this argument came the theory of "separation and unity" ("Bunri to Ketsugō"). First, he called for the separation of genuine Marxists from false Marxists and reformists as

⁴⁹Fukumoto Kazuo, "'Hōkōtenkan' to 'Shihon no Genjitsuteki Undō,'" ("The 'Change of Direction' and the 'Actual Movement of Capital'"), Marukusushugi (Marxism), August 1925, p. 24.

⁵⁰Fukumoto Kazuo, "Tōmen no Ninmu" (Present Tasks), Marukusushugi (Marxism), July 1926, p. 32.

a prerequisite to the achievement of unity. He quoted Lenin in support of this principle: "Before people unite themselves, they must separate themselves cleanly." Second, he urged the true Marxists to make theoretical struggles their major activity: "Revolutionary Marxism must fight persistently against every form of bourgeois thought influencing the proletariat."⁵¹ To Fukumoto, the Communist party was the only instrument that "could use, direct, promote, or transform all political opposition, thereby making the proletarian movement a genuine class movement."⁵² Furthermore, Fukumoto's emphasis on the study of Marxian theory and his contention that a thorough understanding of Marxian writings should be considered a sine qua non for party membership threatened to turn the JCP into an organization of completely indoctrinated, professional revolutionists, thereby isolating it from the masses.⁵³

Fukumoto's main charge against the views of Yamakawa was that Yamakawa, like Sakai and so many others, did not understand the basic need to concentrate upon "Unity through

⁵¹Fukumoto Kazuo, "Ōshū ni Okeru Musankaikyū Seitō Soshiki Mondai no Rekishiteki Hatten-Sono Hōhōronteki Kōsatsu" (Historical Development of the Problem of Proletarian Party Organization in Europe--A Methodological Study), Part III, Marukusushgi (Marxism), June 1925, p. 98.

⁵²Fukumoto Kazuo, "Tōmen no Ninmu" (Present Tasks), Marukusushgi (Marxism), July 1926, pp. 31-32.

⁵³Swearingen and Langer, op. cit., pp. 25-26.

Separation." He branded Yamakawa's concept of "Change of Direction" an "eclectic theory"--a compromise between socialism and unionism. Fukumoto charged that Yamakawaism represented a reversion to reformism and parliamentarism, and that Yamakawa was a victim of the very danger against which he had continually warned.

The Comintern's Criticism and Bukharin
July Thesis of 1927

According to Tōyama Shigeki et al., the Bukharin July Thesis of 1927 was of historical significance in the overall Comintern guidance for strategic-tactical problems of the Japanese Marxist movement. The July 1927 Thesis, in following formulas laid down in the 1922 draft platform by the Comintern, specified the correct direction toward Marxism-Leninism for the newly reestablished JCP in 1926. The Thesis also contained an extensive criticism of the right-wing and left-wing deviations by Yamakawa and Fukumoto.⁵⁴

When the reports of the intra-party conflict between Yamakawa's and Fukumoto's factions had reached Moscow, the Comintern authorities summoned the JCP leaders to Moscow. A special commission was convened to deal with the "Japanese

⁵⁴Tōyama Shigeki et al., Kindai Nihon Shisō Shi (History of Contemporary Japanese Thoughts), III, (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1956), p. 551.

problem."⁵⁵ By this time overwhelming changes had taken place in the Moscow leadership: Zinoviev had been removed from office, Trotsky discredited, and Bukharin elevated to new responsibilities. Bukharin himself headed the special commission which met with Fukumoto Kazuo, Tokuda Kyūichi, Watanabe Masanosuke, Sano Fumio, Nakao Katsuo, and Kawai Etsuzō to help the JCP overcome its deviations and take a correct political and organizational course.⁵⁶

During early meetings of the commission, Fukumotoism was the chief subject of criticism. Because of the inherent isolationist tendency of the JCP under the influence of Fukumotoism in 1926, the Comintern criticized the "utopian and ultra-left sectarian" tendencies implicit in Fukumoto's doctrine.⁵⁷ After Fukumoto was subjected to relentless pressure, he confessed the error of his thinking. As the sessions progressed, various phases of the Japanese question were also considered--the past history of the party, revolutionary strategy and tactics, and the structure of Japanese society.

The Thesis represented the first full-scale Comintern analysis of the situation in Japan and the role and duties

⁵⁵Swearingen and Langer, op. cit., p. 26.

⁵⁶Eudin and North, op. cit., p. 278.

⁵⁷Tōyama Shigeki et al., op. cit., p. 549.

of the JCP. In short, the argument was that over recent years Japanese imperialism had transformed the country into a first-class imperialist power in Asia, governed by a bloc of the bourgeoisie and the landlords under the leadership of the bourgeoisie.⁵⁸ But, contrary to the Bukharin Draft Platform of 1922, which had urged temporary support of the liberal bourgeoisie, the July Thesis of 1927 stated that "the hope that the bourgeoisie can in any way be utilized as a revolutionary factor, even during the first stages of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, must be abandoned now."⁵⁹

Shifting to an analysis of Japan's domestic situation, the July Thesis of 1927 pointed out that Japanese capitalism had developed with unusual rapidity and, in contrast with Great Britain and the capitalist countries of Europe, was "undoubtedly now on the rising curve of development."⁶⁰ This was quite different from Fukumoto's view of the decline of Japanese capitalism. As for the specific criticism of two "dangerous deviations"--Yamakawaism and Fukumotoism--Yamakawa's policy was criticized for its refusal to appreciate the "evident need for an independent, disciplined Communist Party," whereas Fukumoto's views were

⁵⁸ See Document 94, "Theses of the ECCI on Japan, July 15, 1927," in Eudin and North, op. cit., p. 338.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 339.

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 338-39.

attacked for "going too far in the opposite direction, and thus exposing the Party to the danger of isolation from the masses." ⁶¹

The July Thesis of 1927 came to the significant conclusion that while Japan's economic and political development--"the objective revolutionary situation"--had prepared the way for a bourgeois-democratic revolution, Japan's backwardness in ideology--"the subjective revolutionary situation"--was a "great impediment and stumbling block." Under this circumstance, an important task of the JCP was to win control of trade unions and mass parties from within, by united front tactics.

The Demise of the JCP (1928-1939)

Second Wave of Mass Arrests (1928, 1929)

Meanwhile, the Japanese government, hand in hand with the continued suppression of the Communist movement, realized that concessions to popular movements were necessary if the growth of the leftist movements was to be checked. Suppression and concession--"whip" and "candy" as the Japanese historians called it--were best symbolized by the almost simultaneous passage by the Diet of the Peace Preservation and Universal Manhood Suffrage Laws in the spring of 1925. The introduction of universal suffrage was,

⁶¹Appendix to Marukusushugi, March 1, 1928; also quoted in Swearingen and Langer, op. cit., p. 26.

with all its limitations notwithstanding, a political milestone in modern Japanese history. The number of qualified male voters was quadrupled, more than 10,000,000 subjects of the Emperor now receiving the franchise.⁶²

The first general elections under the new law, scheduled for February 1928, were viewed by the Communists as an opportunity to acquaint the common man with the party's plans for Japan. The illegal JCP now began to utilize for the first time the apparatus of legal political parties, although the "seizure of political power through mass struggle, civil war, and revolution continued to constitute basic policy."⁶³ An active Communist minority had been successful in infiltrating one of the several proletarian parties formed by left-wing labor groups,⁶⁴ preparing for

⁶²For discussion of the Universal Suffrage Law, see Yanaga Chitoshi, Japan Since Perry (New York: McGraw Hill, 1949), pp. 405-06, and Hugh Borton, Japan's Modern Century (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1955), Yanaga indicates that number of votes was increased from 3,300,000 to 14,000,000 while Borton states that the increase was from 3,000,000 to 13,000,000.

⁶³Nihon Kyōsantō Chuōinkai Ajipurobu (Propaganda and Agitation Section, Central Committee of the JCP) Nihon Kyōsantō Tosōshi (Official History of the JCP Struggle) (Tokyo, 1932), p. 72.

⁶⁴According to Evelyn S. Colvert, there were four legal proletarian parties that had been set up by the end of 1926--the rightist Shakai Minshūtō (Social Mass Party), the centrist Nihon Nōmintō (Japan Farmers Party) and Nihon Ronōtō (Japan Labor-Farmer Party), and the leftist Rōdō Nōmintō (Labor-Farmer Party). These parties existed until the 1928 national election despite occasional efforts within one or another of the parties to bring about amalgamation. See Left Wing in Japanese Politics (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1952), pp. 20-25.

the forthcoming elections. This was the Labor-Farmer Party (Rōdō-Nōmintō), an organization controlled by Communists and under the leadership of Ōyama Ikuo, a Communist sympathizer. By the time the campaign got under way, the Party had succeeded in placing the names of ten of its members on the ballot in the guise of Labor-Farmer Party candidates. The Party's efforts were rewarded when, on February 20, 1928, despite police interference and intimidation, half a million votes were cast for the proletarian parties. Although none of the Communist candidates was elected, the Labor-Farmer Party received 193,027 votes and gained two seats in the Diet.⁶⁵ This substantial showing caused increased fear and apprehension to the Japanese government authorities that the revolutionary movement might get out of hand. Then came the second political dragnet for the Japanese Communists. After an extensive effort of collecting evidence and compiling the lists, the Japanese police rounded up some 1,200 individuals. Approximately 500 were kept in jail and persecuted.⁶⁶ Although many of those arrested were not genuine revolutionaries, a large proportion of Communist leadership was also jailed as a result of the police campaign. Communists arrested in 1928 and 1929 included Fukumoto Kazuo, Nabeyama

⁶⁵Seiji Keizai Nenkan 1920-1930 (Politico-Economic Yearbook 1920-1930). (Tokyo: Gendō Press, 1949), p. 50.

⁶⁶Scalapino, op. cit., p. 34.

Sadachika, Kasuga Shōjirō, Shiga Yoshio and Tokuda Kyūichi. In a follow-up action, on April 10, 1928, the Home Minister ordered the dissolution of the Japan Labor Union Council (Nihon Rōdō Hyōgikai), the Labor-Farmer Party, and the Proletarian Youth League as Communist-front organizations. The Japanese government, in need of more stringent legislation governing political agitation and an even more "efficient" police system, had undertaken two important steps. First, on June 29, 1928, an emergency decree signed by the Emperor amended the Peace Preservation Law (Jian Iji Hō) to include the death penalty. Second, an independent centralized administration for the control of social movement, the Special Higher Police or Thought Police (Tokubetsu Kōtō Keisatsu) was created.

Notwithstanding the relentless efforts by the Japanese authorities to root out the Communists there was one weakness in the government's position: the real source of doctrinal training as well as political funds needed by the Japanese Communists lay in the Soviet Union. Robert A. Scalapino traces the Moscow-based training activities during 1920's:

Beginning in this period [1928], the Japanese Communist Party was forced to draw its "leadership" from the students returning from Moscow. As the veterans were decimated in repeated dragnet operations, no other source of guidance existed. In the period between 1924 and 1928, some forty Japanese youths had studied at the Far Eastern Workers' Communist University in Moscow. They were first sent to Shanghai in groups of two or three. After making contact with the Bureau, they were transported to Vladivostok. Here, they often stayed

at the International Seaman's Club for a short time and then took the Siberian railway to Moscow. Their course generally lasted a year, sometimes longer. When finished, they received final instructions from Comintern officials, including Katayama or at a later point, Yamamoto Kenzō and Nosaka.⁶⁷

However, few of these young men survived long once they returned to Japan. Almost without exception, they were caught by police within a few months and given long sentences. On April 16, 1929, a third wave of nation-wide searches followed, resulting in the arrest of more than one thousand suspects. On April 28 the police arrested Ichikawa Shōichi in a Tokyo home. The following day Kitaura Sentarō and Nabeyama Sadachika were also arrested. Of the leaders, only Yamamoto Kenzō, Sano Manabu, Nosaka Sanzō, and Hakamada Satomi remained at large. With the arrests of Sano in Shanghai on June 16, 1929,⁶⁸ and Hakamada in March 1935,⁶⁹

⁶⁷Robert A. Scalapino, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-35. An additional important Japanese source for this period is Kazama Jōkichi, *Moskō Kyōsandaigaku no Omoide* (Memories of the Moscow Communist University) (Tokyo: Sangensha, 1949).

⁶⁸Sano Manabu had been serving on the staff of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern since March 14, 1929. He was apprehended by Chinese police at the request of the Japanese authorities. Extradition proceedings were initiated at once and Sano subsequently was returned to Japan to await trial.

⁶⁹Hakamada Satomi was also a Moscow-trained Japanese Communist Party leader. His memoir, "Tō to Tomoni Ayunde" (Striding with the Party) was published in eighteen series of article in *Zen'ei* (Vanguard), the JCP theoretical monthly journal, since August, 1966 and later it was published as a one volume book, *Tō to Tomoni Ayunde* (Striding with the Party) (Tokyo: Shin Nippon Shuppan-Sha, 1968).

the government felt it had completed smashing of the "inner circle" of party leaders, as Yamamoto, Japanese representative to the Profintern in Moscow, was known to be seriously ill and Nosaka, Japanese representative to the Comintern, was beyond the reach of the Japanese authorities. With Hakamada's arrest in 1935, party activities practically ceased on an organized basis. Japanese Communism, from this point until 1945, consisted mainly of "secret thoughts nurtured in the minds of a few 'true believers,' most of whom were in prison"⁷⁰ or "a small group of desperadoes, advocates of total violence, determined to resist arrest at all cost."⁷¹

Mass Defection of the Party Leaders

Defection of the JCP cadres has been a harassing problem not only paralyzing the organizational base but also undermining the reputation of the party. Early defection of the party cadres occurred in 1924 when Yamakawa Histoshi and Sakai Toshihiko, following the defeat on the debate of the dissolution of the party, decided to withdraw their membership from the party and formed a legal united front proletarian party (Rōdō Nōmintō) with followers in December 1927. Arahata Kansō also deserted the party by

⁷⁰Scalapino, op. cit., pp. 43-33.

⁷¹Swearingen and Langer, op. cit., p. 38.

joining the Yamakawa and Sakai faction in 1927.

However, the definite blow to the organizational basis and the prestige of the JCP occurred on June 10, 1933 when two imprisoned senior theoreticians of the Party, Sano Manabu and Nabeyama Sadachika, announced the total severance of connection with the JCP. According to the Japanese Communist official party history:

Specific motive of defection by Sano and Nabeyama must have been aroused by the fear and desire for personal safety after the public prosecutor had asked the death and life sentences respectively.⁷²

However, the real motives for defection must have been more complex than this.⁷³ After charging that the international Communist movement had been a mere instrument for Russian national interests and that the JCP had never been allowed to exercise any independence, the Sano-Nabeyama statement argued that traditional and socio-psychological factors must be taken into account in the conduct of revolution. subsequently, their version of socialist revolution in Japan would be a one-country socialist revolution under the imperial family.

⁷²Nihon Kyōsantō no Yonjūgonen (Forty-Five Years of the Japanese Communist Party) (Tokyo: Nihon Kyōsantō Chūō Iinkai Shuppan Kyoku, 1970), p. 42.

⁷³According to an account in Kaizō (Reconstruction) by Nakano Sumio, Sano was the first to consider defecting. Nakano claimed that two events were particularly upsetting to Sano—the Ōmori Bank Incident and the assassination of Prime Minister Inukai. News of the defection was first reported in several Tokyo newspapers on January 26, 1933. Nakano Sumio, "Sano-Nabeyama Tenkō no Shinsō," (A True Account of the Sano-Nabeyama Conversion), Kaizō (July 1933), 200-04.

Immediately thereafter, a series of defections among the second-echelon leaders of the Party occurred, which included Mitamura Shirō, Takahashi Sadaki, Nakao Sumio, Sugiura Keiichi, Tanaka Seigen, Sano Hiroshi, Kazama Jōkichi, Kodama Shizuko and others. The substantial numbers of the mass defection soon became staggering. Of the 393 Communists in jail who had been convicted, 133 or approximately 35 per cent, defected in the month following the Sano-Nabeyama announcement.⁷⁴ According to an official source, of the 741 Communists awaiting trial, 469, or approximately 65 per cent, defected by the end of 1934.⁷⁵ Only a few hard core members of the JCP remained in the prison, stubbornly refusing to capitulate to the constant conversion efforts by the Japanese authorities. Among those who refused to collaborate were Ichikawa Shōichi, Kokuryō Goichiro, Tokuda Kyūichi, Shiga Yoshio, Miyamoto Kenji, and Hakamada Satomi. This hard-core group would play an important role during the postwar Communist movement in Japan with the exception of Kokuryō and Ichikawa, who prematurely died in prison in 1943 and early 1945.

⁷⁴Shakai Keizai Rōdō Kenkyūjo (Institute for Research on Society, Economics, and Labor), Kindai Nihon Rōdōsha Undō Shi (History of the Workers' Movement in Modern Japan) (Niigata: Hakurin-sha, 1947), p. 137.

⁷⁵Naimushō (Home Ministry), Japanese Government, Sano-Nabeyama Tenkō Riron no Kenkyū (A Study of the Conversion of Sano and Nabeyama) (Tokyo, 1934); Also cited in Beckmann and Okubo, op. cit., p. 250.

Moscow Thesis of 1932 on the Strategy
and Tactics of the JCP

For the Japanese Communists, being isolated from the fringes of Japanese society and desperately attempting to survive in the midst of the continued suppression by the government, this state of isolation was further aggravated by the pervasive Soviet influence over the JCP, which disregarded the specific internal conditions of Japan in defense of Soviet national interests.

The developments culminating in the abandonment of the 1927 Bukharin Thesis in favor of the 1932 Moscow Thesis on the Situation in Japan and the Tasks of the Communist Party reflected the shifts in Soviet strategy and the changes in Soviet leadership and outlook rather than changing conditions in Japan itself. By 1929, Bukharin had fallen victim to Stalin's purge and everything associated with Bukharin now became automatically a mistake. In the summer of 1930, a special committee under Georg Safarov, the Comintern expert on the Far Eastern affairs, drafted a new thesis for Japan which, however, never advanced beyond the draft stage. Barely a year later, Safarov, too, had lost the confidence of the Russian leaders, and, finally, the 1932 Thesis was drawn up by Katayama Sen and Nosaka Sanzō in Moscow in consultation with Otto Kuusinen, the Chief of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern, and the final approval by Stalin.

The 1932 Moscow Thesis was adopted by the Comintern and it appeared in the various foreign-language editions of International Press Correspondence dated May 26, 1932. Like prior statements of strategy, the 1932 Thesis began with an analysis of Japanese imperialism.⁷⁶ In this case, the major focus was recent Japanese aggression in Manchuria. According to the 1932 Thesis, the military adventure of Japanese imperialism was directly connected with a sharp aggravation of internal contradictions, all of which had grown more intense as a result of the severe economic crisis. The Japanese proletariat and the Communist party were called upon to combine the struggle against imperialist aggression with the struggle to emancipate the workers and peasants. Their task was to convert the imperialist war into a civil war to overthrow the bourgeois-landlord monarchy.⁷⁷ The Japanese Communists were amply warned that the character and the tasks of the coming revolution in Japan could not be properly judged "without analysis and without taking into consideration the peculiarities of the ruling system in Japan, which combines strong elements of

⁷⁶The English text of the 1932 Moscow Thesis appears in Beckmann and Okubo, op. cit., pp. 332-51.

⁷⁷"Thesis on the Situation in Japan and Tasks of the Communist Party, May 1932" as appeared in ibid., p. 335.

feudalism with highly developed monopolistic capitalism." This assessment of the relative strength of the elements constituting the "ruling class" led the framers of the 1932 Moscow Thesis to different conclusions from those reached in the previous thesis by the Comintern. After being rebuked for the mistaken understanding of the nature of the forthcoming Japanese revolution, the JCP was advised to "correct lukewarm views."

Also the JCP was severely criticized for the statement made in its own 1931 Draft Political Thesis, that: "The coming Japanese revolution is by its character a proletarian revolution with a great scope of bourgeois-democratic tasks." According to the 1932 Moscow Thesis:

The Japanese Communist Party must clearly understand that the path to the dictatorship of the proletariat in present Japanese conditions can only pass through the bourgeois-democratic revolution, i.e., through the overthrow of the monarchy, the expropriation of the landlords, and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasants.⁷⁸

The Comintern maintained that, at this point, only the substitution of soviets of workers', soldiers', and peasants' deputies under the leadership of the JCP for the whole state apparatus would prevent the Japanese bourgeoisie, especially the leftist social democrats, from limiting the revolution by declaring a bourgeois republic and preserving the bourgeois landlord dictatorship and the police bureau-

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 338.

cratic apparatus for the oppression and enslavement of the people.⁷⁹ The formation and strengthening of the powers of the soviets and the assumption of leadership by the Communists would make possible the rapid transition to the dictatorship of the proletariat and the achievement of socialism.

In publishing the Japanese translation of the 1932 Moscow Thesis in a special issue of Red Flag (Sek'ki) in 1932, Kazama and other members of the Central Committee of the JCP announced their unconditional acceptance of the decisions of the Comintern.⁸⁰ They grudgingly admitted that they had underestimated the importance of the monarchy and of the agrarian revolution, and therefore had erred in defining the nature of the coming revolution.

The Japanese Communists in Yenan, 1940-1945

According to Colbert, there were two centers of Japanese radicalism during World War II—one in the Kuomintang area of China and one in the area under Communist control:

In Nationalist China, Japanese radical activities hardly constituted a movement, since they were confined

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 341.

⁸⁰ "Nihon Mondai ni Kansuru Shin Tēze Happyō ni Saishi Dōshi Shokun ni Tsugu" (Announcement to Our Comrades on the Occasion of Publishing the New Thesis on the Japanese Problem), Sek'ki (Red Flag), July 10, 1932. The announcement is also included in Ishido Seirin and Yamabe Kentarō, Kominterun Nihon ni Kansuru Tēzeshū (Texts of Comintern Thesis Pertaining to Japan) (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōron-sha, 1961), pp. 120-28.

to a very large extent to the assistance rendered by allied psychological warfare by two extremely small groups of Japanese prisoners led respectively by Kaji Wataru and Aoyama Kazuo, both exiled radicals. In the Communist area, on the other hand, use of Japanese prisoners in psychological warfare led to the organization of a movement that, although small and limited in its activities, was important because of the training it gave its members in organizational and indoctrination techniques and the groundwork it established for postwar Communist united-front efforts.⁸¹

After the Sino-Japanese Incident of 1937 and the subsequent participation of the Chinese Communists with Nationalist Chinese in a joint struggle against the Japanese Army, an extensive use of psychological warfare techniques--particularly those directed at converting the enemy as well as demoralizing him--was adopted by the Chinese Communists. Late in 1937 serious attention was given to this problem by the Political Affairs Department of the Eighth Route Army⁸² when it was announced that the general population in Communist areas and all troops were to be instructed in "anti-enemy work" together with the formation of "anti-enemy units" for psychological warfare. Having failed in the initial attempt to induce the voluntary surrender of the Japanese soldiers, the Chinese Communists shifted to another method, an extensive use of the indoctrinated Japanese prisoners and by providing more extensive training in the Japanese language

⁸¹Evelyn S. Colbert, op. cit., p. 57.

⁸²The Chinese Communist Army which was reorganized after the United Front Coalition with the Nationalist Chinese.

and Japanese attitudes for Chinese specialists in anti-enemy work.⁸³ By 1939 small groups of Japanese prisoners were working actively with the Eighth Route Army and had organized themselves into so-called Awakening Leagues. These groups in 1940 decided to merge with the Anti-War League (Hansen Dōmei), which Kaji Wataru had founded in Nationalist China in December 1939.⁸⁴ With the increasing participation of members of the Anti-War League and the increased number of voluntary surrenders by the Japanese soldiers hitherto unknown, the Chinese Communists felt that their psychological warfare method was advancing.

However, the turning point in the early CCP-JCP relationship began with the arrival of Nosaka Sanzō in Yen-an in April 1940. Nosaka (known throughout the Yen-an period by his pseudonyms Lin Che and Okano Susumu) was, by then, a renowned Japanese Communist with a substantial background of distinction in international Communism.⁸⁵

⁸³Colbert, op. cit., pp. 58-59.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 59.

⁸⁵In London as corresponding secretary of the Yuaikai in 1920, Nosaka Sanzō had joined the British Communist Party and was forced to leave England in 1921. After returning to Japan via Moscow in 1922, he had become a charter member of the JCP. After a period of activity in left-wing trade unions, he left Japan in 1931 after serving two years of imprisonment. Coming to Moscow, he succeeded Kātayama Sen in 1933 as the key Japanese Communist in the Comintern after the latter's death. In 1935 Nosaka was elected to the Executive Committee of the Comintern and to the Presidium of the Executive Committee. See Nosaka Sanzō Shiryō Hensan Iinkai (ed.) Nosaka Sanzō no Ayunda Michi (The Road Walked by Nosaka Sanzō) (Tokyo: Shin Nippon Shuppan-sha, 1965), pp. 50-67.

According to Nosaka's own statement, his original destination from Moscow was Japan (where he could revive the defunct Japanese Communist activity) via Yen-an, but unavoidable circumstances compelled him to live in Yen-an for five years:

Two years had passed since the outbreak of the China incident and I had come to the conclusion that I must find a way to reenter Japan. The Moscow comrades supported this idea. . . . During nine years in the Soviet Union, I had spent relatively little time in Moscow. I operated in a number of areas closer to Japan, engaging in various activities directed against that country. . . . Liaison with Japan was becoming increasingly difficult. . . . Therefore it was up to me to enter the country. But from where? And how? . . . Then, unexpectedly, I learned that a certain Chinese Communist leader was to visit Moscow for a short time. . . . I met him and his group and inquired about the situation. Of course, they could not guarantee anything, but they felt that once I had reached Yen-an, something could be worked out. Even if I should be unable to reach Japan, at least I might fight militarism in the battle field of China and give revolutionary training to Japanese prisoners of war--a significant and challenging prospect! I submitted this plan to Comrade Dimitrov, then Secretary-General of the Comintern. He fully approved and was most helpful in the implementation of my plan.⁸⁶

Nosaka's arrival meant that for the first time there was a Japanese in Yen-an who not only had received advanced education but also was an experienced Communist with the support of the Comintern and with prestige sufficient to establish him as an equal of the Chinese Communist leaders. Immediately after his arrival Nosaka took over direction of psychological warfare against the Japanese forces in North

⁸⁶ Nosaka Sanzō Shiryō Hensan Iinkai (ed.), Nosaka Sanzō no Ayunda Michi, pp. 68-69; also Swearingen and Langer, op. cit., pp. 73-74.

China, especially the indoctrination of Japanese prisoners. Soon Nosaka was in charge of operating a "Japanese Peasants' and Workers' School" which was established for the political education of the Japanese Army prisoners brought to Yen-an.⁸⁷ In addition, he undertook to reorganize the Anti-War League to place greater emphasis on its united front aspects and its postwar mission. At the same time, Nosaka prepared analytical studies on the military, political, and economic situation in Japan. By July 1943, he began to feel that Japan's defeat was imminent and that her defeat would enable the progressive forces led by the Communist Party to establish a free and democratic society. The blueprint for the organization which was to implement the establishment of a people's government after the defeat of Japan emerged in his active role of setting up the Japanese People's Emancipation League (Nippon Jinmin Kaihō Remmei) at Yen-an in 1944. Thus, according to Colbert:

The program proposed by Nosaka as the basis upon which postwar Japan might reconstruct itself emerged more clearly at the beginning of 1944 when the Anti-War League was dissolved and the Nippon Jinmin Kaihō Remmei (Japanese People's Emancipation League) was set up in its place. The new organization, although for the moment composed of the same group that had made up the Anti-War League, was designed to attract the support of Japanese all over the world and to serve as the nucleus of the united-front movement that might lead Japan toward a people's government in the postwar period.⁸⁸

⁸⁷Swearingen and Langer, op. cit., p. 77.

⁸⁸Colbert, op. cit., p. 63.

When the United States government observers arrived in Yen-an in the summer of 1944, Nosaka considered that the presence of these Americans offered the first opportunity to establish official contact with the United States forces and to impress Washington with the potential usefulness of his Emancipation League as a vehicle for the democratization of Japan. Confidential documentary evidence of the United States government pertaining to Yen-an activity substantiates Nosaka's early contact with the United States government observer.⁸⁹

During the war period, Nosaka was the only member of the JCP who was in a position to state his views as a Communist⁹⁰ with regard to the future of Japan. In view of his

⁸⁹U.S. Government, Office of War Information, China Division, Yenan Report, No. 10, September 8, 1944.

⁹⁰There was one other member of the JCP in Yen-an, Sawada Jun, who escaped from Japan after a period of imprisonment and made his way to North China in 1943. Though the Japanese Communist League in China (Zaika Nihon Kyōsanshugisha Dōmei) was organized in Yen-an in 1942 by twenty-five progressive ex-Japanese POWs who had received an extensive political education, it was felt that they should not be admitted to the JCP until after their return to Japan. See "Zaika Nihon Kyōsanshugisha Dōmei no Seiritsu," (Foundation of the Japanese Communist League in China) Publication Bureau, JCP Central Committee (ed.), Nosaka Sanzō Senshū: Senjihen (Collections of Nosaka Sanzō's Wartime Writings) (2nd ed., Tokyo: Shin Nippon Shuppan-sha, 1971), pp. 293-95. Another Japanese source material concerning the Japanese Communist activities in China during the wartime is Nosaka Sanzō, Heiwa e no Tatakai (A Fight for Peace) (Kiryū, Taiwan: Akatsuki-shobō, 1947). The book consists mostly of front-line reports and diaries of members of the Japanese Anti-War League. Since throughout the account fictitious names are used, the book proves useless in so far as determining the identities of the Japanese Communists at Yen-an is concerned.

post-surrender activities in Japan, his Yenán views, particularly those regarding the Emperor and the nature of the transition to socialism, are worthy of in-depth scrutiny. In his report to the Seventh National Delegates Congress of the CCP in April 1945, Nosaka presented his views on the analysis of the progressive Japanese political forces, the status of the Emperor, and the strategy of Communism in the postwar Japan. On the political forces of Japan Nosaka summarized Japan's "long history of liberalism" and pointed to the presence of "progressive forces" led by the JCP. He emphasized that these forces had continued to struggle against Japanese fascism and were now ready to shoulder the burden of democratization.⁹¹ It is this group, Nosaka emphasized, rather than the "moderates" or the "pro Anglo-American faction," which constitutes the most reliable basis for democracy in Japan.⁹²

With regard to the Emperor, Nosaka expressed a cautious view. Reiterating his argument during his sojourn in Yenán, Nosaka emphasized the necessity of making a distinction between the political and religious aspects of the imperial system and between the imperial lineage and the reigning emperor. Nosaka also acknowledged that as a semi-religious symbol, the monarchy was deeply rooted in the

⁹¹Nosaka Sanzō, "Minshuteki Nihon no Kensetsu," (Establishment of Democratic Japan), Nosaka Sanzō Senshū: Senjihen, p. 423.

⁹²Ibid.

minds of the Japanese masses. On the future of the Emperor system, Nosaka did not present a positive view:

Our demands cannot be realized against the wishes of the majority of our people. If the majority of our people fervently demands the perpetuation of the Emperor, we must concede to them. Therefore, we propose as a suggestion that the question of maintaining or abolishing the Emperor be decided after the war by plebiscite. Then, even if the outcome of the plebiscite is perpetuation of the Emperor, such a Emperor must be one who does not possess power.⁹³

Of the Emperor Hirohito, Nosaka expressed quite a radical view arguing that in view of Hirohito's direct implication in the war against the Allies he must at least abdicate and might even be tried as a war criminal.

The gradualism of Nosaka's approach to the Emperor question was paralleled in his statements concerning the strategy of Japanese Communism to be carried out during the postwar period. Nosaka's strategy of Communist revolution in postwar Japan was announced as a three-stage program leading from the destruction of the feudal-militaristic order through a bourgeois-democratic revolution to the ultimate establishment of a socialist state. Colbert describes Nosaka's three-stage communist revolution scheme:

In the first stage, the war would be ended and the government would be democratized by the revision of the constitution. This revision would provide for universal suffrage; a sovereign Diet to which the cabinet would be responsible; reduction of the powers of the Emperor, the Privy Council, the House of Peers; and guarantee of civil liberties. In the economic sphere, the armaments industry would be liquidated, industrialization intensified and diversified, and agriculture mechanized. . . .

⁹³Ibid., p. 456.

A long period of time would be required for development from this stage to the second stage, that of the achievement of the bourgeois democratic revolution. This revolution would complete the liquidation of feudal remnants, including the Emperor, the nobility, the Privy Council, and the Jushin, and would establish complete democracy on a capitalistic basis. The third stage would involve the complete liquidation of capitalism and the transition to socialism. This transition, too, would be gradual and peaceful unless in the second stage the government had come under the control of monopoly capitalists, in which case violent revolution might occur.⁹⁴

Eventually Nosaka's three-stage revolution strategy formulated during his stay in Yen-an would be carried out as a guideline for the postwar JCP policy. To this, he added the notion of parliamentarism to implant the image of the "lovable Communist Party" under a tolerant American occupation policy of legalizing all political party activities, which hitherto would have never been granted to the Japanese Communist activities.

In summarizing Nosaka's activity in China, it was in Yen-an during the years of "anti-war work" with the Chinese Communist armies that he formulated a Communist policy for occupied Japan. Nosaka's gradualism on the three-stage revolution of Japanese Communism, which bore strong traces of Mao Tse-tung's "New Democracy," was based on the conviction that success in transforming Japanese society could be achieved only through a cautious approach in which "mass support is the key to success or failure." It is the author's

⁹⁴Colbert, op. cit., pp. 67-68.

contention that Nosaka's experience with Japanese prisoners, where the desired result could only be achieved through the painstaking process of political education, must have contributed to the gradual metamorphosis of his Communist strategy in postwar Japan. Just as Mao Tse-tung's "New Democracy" stressed the concept of a four-class coalition of the proletariat, peasant, petty bourgeoisie, and national bourgeoisie during the bourgeois-democratic revolution stage, Nosaka's "Peaceful Revolution" advocated a broad united front including the "progressive" bourgeoisie and democratic nationalism. As a result of his frequent discussions with both Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai in Yanan concerning the political education of the Japanese POWs and the strategy and tactics of Japanese Communism, Nosaka's concept of postwar Japanese Communism had a strong overtone of Chinese influence.

Nosaka, left Yanan in September 1945 and finally returned to Japan on January 10, 1946, after sixteen years of exile abroad. En route to Japan, while still in Manchuria, Nosaka learned that the American occupation authorities had granted a legal status to the JCP and that his old comrades Tokuda Kyūichi, Shiga Yoshio, Kasuga Shōjirō, Hakamada Satomi, Miyamoto Kenji and other leaders had been released from prison.⁹⁵ By the time he arrived in Japan, the JCP

⁹⁵Nosaka Sanzō, Bōmei Jūrokunen (Sixteen Years in Exile) (Tokyo: Jiji Tsūshin-sha, 1946), pp. 83-85.

had been reorganized, with a registered membership of more than 1,000 and had held its Fourth Congress--the first in nineteen years. A new era for the Party had begun.

Summary Appraisal

So far, this chapter has analyzed various internal and external factors affecting the rise and demise of the JCP during the prewar period.

In this context, the early phase of the origin of the JCP has to be studied against the background of the early socialist movement in Japan, beginning in the late 1890's and continuing in the early decades of the twentieth century. Marxism-Leninism took root in Japan in a critical period following the Bolshevik Revolution of Russia in 1917 and World War I. At that time, the modernization process--industrialization and urbanization--was showing signs of backfire and was creating new forces that were demanding fundamental changes for the socio-economic conditions of the Japanese working class and the peasants. Some of Japan's revolutionary intellectuals during the early socialist movement of the 1900's were motivated by a strong sense of social justice and Christian humanitarian feelings, urging the thorough reform of Japanese society, while the firebrand type of anarcho-syndicalists under the leadership of Ōsugi Sakae and Kōtoku Shūsui sought more radical "direct action" tactics which could not survive the ruthless suppression of

the Japanese police.

To the left-wing intellectuals like Yamakawa Hitoshi, Sakai Toshihiko, and Arahata Kanson, the Marxist proposition that, through the dialectic process, progress was inevitable seemed to satisfy their intellectual yearning to analyze the Japanese society and contemplate radical social change according to the Marxian framework. However, as one Japanese scholar has noted, Marxist intellectuals put too much faith in theories: "Theories were too often mistakenly identified with reality itself."⁹⁶

From the initial period of the foundation of the JCP in 1922, it has operated under extremely hazardous conditions. In the 1920's already the direction of the JCP was preconditioned by the domineering Comintern policy as one segment of the international Communist movement, extremely limiting an independent line of action. Added to this was the prewar political environment of outright suppressions and the persecution of the Party cadres by the Japanese government. Still another unfavorable condition for the growth of the Party was the dimension of factional strife and the doctrinal dispute over the strategy and tactics of the Communist revolution in Japan. Especially damaging was the personal rivalry and the doctrinal disputes between Yamakawa Hitoshi

⁹⁶Maruyama Masao, "Japanese Thought," Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan, April 1964, p. 47.

and Fukumoto Kazuo and the subsequent Comintern intervention to rebuke both of these theoreticians of the JCP.

During the 1920's, the Japanese Communist movement floundered in the midst of endless doctrinal disputes and a series of mass arrests of party members by the Japanese government. Some of these wavering signs of demise of the Party could be attributed to an extraordinarily inept direction from the Comintern, while others were to the fact that the movement's leadership in Japan was drawn largely from the ranks of academicians who were more concerned with theoretical polemics than with the arduous task of building a popular mass base and gaining power.

During the 1930's, the movement ceased to exist as an organized force in the politics of Japan. What remained was a leadership in jail or in refuge abroad, a disorganized, largely underground remnant existing in an extremely hostile environment and seeking external support from the Comintern-- support to which were attached ideological strings which further alienated the movement from the mainstream of Japanese thought.

The external setting incurred certain impact on the policy formation process of the JCP. By far the most distinct feature of the JCP was the continuous and extensive Soviet control over party leadership and basic policy through the formulation of the Theses on the strategy and tactics of the Japanese proletarian revolution.

On the Comintern's policy guideline pertaining to the Japanese revolution, one can point out the misguided direction; the Comintern created serious difficulties for the Japanese Communists by its insistence on the two-stage theory of revolution with initial emphasis on the revolution against the imperial system and that system's economic basis—"feudalistic" landlordism. Given the harsh and hostile social setting against Communist activity, no social movement advocating revolutionary changes in the imperial system could survive long.

By studying the numerous Theses adopted by the Comintern—the Bukharin July Thesis of 1927, the Draft Political Thesis of 1931, and the Moscow Thesis of 1932—one can draw the conclusion that the Comintern was never able to take the long-range view with regard to the Japanese revolution, but instead was preoccupied with the policy of expediency that suited the particular national interest of the Soviet Union, i. e. the 1932 Moscow Thesis. The Comintern issued frequently contradictory directives, that made it extremely difficult for the JCP to maintain its identity as the vanguard and, at the same time, cooperate with other left-wing parties and organizations.

Therefore, by the middle of the 1930's most of the Comintern activities ceased to have any impact on the JCP. With the arrival of Nosaka Sanzō in Yenan in 1940, only one overseas operation center of the JCP remained intact and

independent from the Japanese authorities. It was during Nosaka's Yen'an sojourn that a spark of the postwar "peaceful revolution" theory was slowly being kindled.

CHAPTER III

RESURGENCE OF THE JCP DURING THE POSTWAR ERA 1945-1955

Internal Setting

Reorganization of the Party and the "Peaceful Revolution" Strategy

The surrender of Japan on August 15, 1945, marked the opening of the new era for the JCP. Shedding the prewar images of the Party as an isolated and conspiratorial association of radical intellectuals, for the first time it emerged as a legal organization. It laid the foundations for a mass party and subsequently turned the unsettled economic and political situation of defeated Japan to its advantage. Also the JCP claimed to be the "progressive" party and "untainted" by the prewar militarism in Japan. Thus, in the immediate postwar setting, the Party became the only political organization which could disclaim any responsibility for the war and its consequences.

As an integral part of democratization of Japan, on October 4, 1945, the SCAP (Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers) ordered that all political prisoners be released.

Starting October 10, 1945, sixteen JCP leaders, some of whom had been imprisoned for nearly two decades, were released.¹ Upon their release from prison, they started to reorganize the Party as a legitimate political party under the protection of the Allied Occupation authorities.

In the first postwar issue of Akahata (Red Flag), Tokuda Kyūichi, Shiga Yoshio² and other released Communists issued "An Appeal to the People," dated October 10, 1945. In it,

¹Robert A. Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966, p. 48. From Fuchū Prison, Tokuda Kyūichi, Shiga Yoshio, Kuroki Shigenori, Nishizawa Ryūji, Matsumoto Ichizō, Yamanabe Kentarō et al. were released; from Toyotama Prison, Kamiyama Shigeo, Nakanishi Kō, Takakura Teru; from Yamanashi Prison, Takenaka Kōsaborō; from Yokohama Prison, Kasuga Shōichi; from Kyūjō Prison, Hakamada Satomi, Kasuga Shōjirō; from Asosu Prison, Miyamoto Kenji. For the factional alignment of the JCP leaders based on their early prison location, see Iizuka Shigetaro, Nihon Kyōsantō (The Japanese Communist Party) (Tokyo: Setsuka-sha, 1969) p. 32.

²One of the top leaders with Nosaka Sanzō and Tokuda Kyūichi; after graduation from Tokyo Imperial University in 1925, joined the JCP and frequently contributed to Marxist publications and gained fame as a theorist; served as chief editor of Marukusushugi (Marxism) until arrest in 1928 and imprisoned for eighteen years until his release in 1945; as a member of International faction of the JCP clashed with Tokuda and Nosaka over party policy in 1950; broke with the JCP Mainstream faction in 1964 over issues related to the Sino-Soviet split and, as a leader of the pro-CPSU faction, set up a splinter group, JCP (Voice of Japan). For a more extensive biographical profile of Shiga Yoshio, see George M. Beckmann and Okubo Genji, The Japanese Communist Party, 1922-1945 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1967), p. 382; and A. Roger Swearingen and Paul F. Langer, Red Flag in Japan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 115-17. For Shiga's own account of his prison life, see Shiga Yoshio and Tokuda Kyūichi, Gokuchū Jūhachinen (Eighteen Years in Prison) (Tokyo: Jiji Tsushin-sha, 1947).

the following points were emphasized:

- 1) Gratitude for the opening of the "democratic revolution" in Japan as a result of the Allied Occupation;
- 2) A pledge to overthrow the Emperor system and to establish a People's Democracy;
- 3) Promises to eliminate militarism and police politics, to confiscate "parasitic" and idle land, distributing it to the peasants, to establish free labor unions, to abolish the old security laws, to remove the military and bureaucratic cliques from power;
- 4) An attack on "phony liberals" and "pseudo socialists" who had supported the Emperor system, declaring them unfit for leadership;
- 5) A call for the creation of a united front under Japanese Communist Party leadership of all those who shared the above objectives.³

What was the JCP's attitude toward the American Occupation and U.S. policies? Likewise, what was the American Occupation policy toward the JCP? What was the basic JCP program at this time? These three questions contain the essential issues that characterized the subsequent development of the immediate postwar Communist movement in Japan.

First, the fundamental decision by the JCP leaders was to regard the American Occupation as a liberation force and to seek cooperation with it. In tactical terms, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) was simply part of the "progressive" bourgeoisie, whose historic function was to complete the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Japan.⁴ The immediate tasks of the JCP were to eliminate

³Akahata (Red Flag), October 20, 1945, p. 1; also reprinted in Nihon Kyōsantō Shiryō Taisei (Materials on the JCP), (Tokyo: JCP Central Committee, 1951), pp. 3-4.

⁴Scalapino, op. cit., p. 54.

the imperial system, democratize Japan, and carry out land reform to achieve the genuine socialistic revolution. This strategy provided a theoretical basis for the Japanese Communists to cooperate fully with the American Occupation authorities in demilitarizing and democratizing Japan.

Second, as the SCAP policy in Japan was to achieve two primary objectives--the destruction of Japanese militarism and democratization of Japanese society--the American Occupation policy toward the JCP was carried out within the framework of this goal. The untainted history of the struggle against the Japanese militarism was an additional credit given to the JCP by the American Occupation authorities. Moreover, the international situation was relatively calm. The spirit of wartime alliance between the Soviet Union and the United States had not disappeared in the jubilant mood of allied victory. In Europe (particularly Czechoslovakia, France, and Italy), coalition government among the Catholic centrist party and the reformist left-wing parties seemed to work. Given this congenial atmosphere of the immediate post World War II period, it was not surprising that the American Occupation policy toward the JCP was characterized by political tolerance. After all, the fact that the minimum program of the JCP and the objectives of the American Occupation were basically identical--land reform, demilitarization, and democratization of Japan--made cooperation

not only expedient, but desirable.⁵

Third, with their energies devoted almost entirely to the task of reorganizing the Party, the Communists paid little attention to questions of over-all strategy for awhile. In November 1945, after the National Consultative Conference, the JCP published drafts of its first postwar program of action, its party rules and regulations, and a "popular front" program. These documents,⁶ which were formally adopted at the first postwar Party Congress (labeled the Fourth National Congress to maintain the continuity with the Prewar Third Congress held nineteen years before) the following month,⁷ made clear that the initial strategy of the newly revived Communist party was based mostly on the 1932 Thesis with slight modification. Thus, the main enemy of the revolution was, as before, the "semi-feudal" Emperor system with its reactionary components and allies: the bureaucracy, landlords, and monopolistic capitalists. The

⁵Beckmann and Ōkubo, op. cit., p. 275.

⁶All three documents appeared in Akahata, November 22, 1945.

⁷The following is the list of the new JCP top hierarchy members elected during the Fourth Congress (December 1945): Tokuda Kyūichi (Secretary-General); JCP Central Committee members (6)—Hakamada Satomi, Kamiyama Shigeo, Kin Tenkai (Kim Chōn-hae), Kuroki Shigenori, Miyamoto Kenji, Shiga Yoshio; JCP Central Committee candidate members (6)—Inamoto Iwao, Kasuga Shōichi, Kasuga Shōjirō, Kurahara Koreto, Matsuzaki Kumaji, Munekiyo Tetsu.

postwar Japanese government still represented these forces who were obstructing the democratic reforms introduced by the Allied Occupation. Accordingly, the revolution in Japan remained in the "bourgeois-democratic" stage and imposed upon the Communist party the essential task of mobilizing "all groups and organizations with democratic aims into a united front directed against the anti-democratic forces."⁸

The major internal problem faced by the Party was that of the tactics of the united front, especially the question of how to handle the Socialists and the thorny issue of the Emperor system. Although the Communists were making repeated overtures to the Socialists to form a "united front from above" during this period, their propaganda continued to attack Socialist leadership and policy and to discuss joint action in terms of a "united front from below." In his general report to the Party Congress in December 1945, Secretary-General Tokuda, after denouncing the Socialist leaders as "class traitors," "adventurers," and "incompetents" whose influence among the working class must be destroyed, showed an ambivalent attitude:

However, we as a party should not hesitate to form a common front even with the Socialist Party, if they agree to accept the following three principles: first, that the demands of the workers will not be ignored; second, that agreements will not be betrayed; and

⁸Nihon Kyōsantō Shiryō Taisei, p. 11.

third, that freedom of mutual criticism will be guaranteed. We must not be self-conceited. Where there are workers and peasants, we must be ready to join a common front with anyone. A popular front is absolutely essential.⁹

The Communists' insistence on Bolshevik principles of party organization--stressing the elitist vanguard character of the Party and imposing fairly rigid requirements for admission to Party membership--their efforts to establish undisputed hegemony over the trade union movement, their unbridled attacks upon their Socialist rivals and their adamant stand on the Emperor question militated against the success of the broad "common front" which they professed to seek.¹⁰ Tsukahira aptly describes the problems of maladjustment of the Japanese Communist leaders to the changing situation and subsequent inability to draw a mass following:

Despite the widespread distrust of the existing government and a genuine desire on the part of a large portion of the populace for changes advocated by the Communists, Communism was still suspect in Japan as an extremist, unpatriotic and subversive conspiracy advocating violence and dictatorship. The policies of party leaders such as Tokuda and Shiga, who had been schooled in the pre-1935 "left strategy" of the Comintern and who, having languished in prison since 1928, had no practical experience with and little understanding of popular front tactics, tended to reinforce the popular prejudice.

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The initial postwar policy of the Japanese Communists,

⁹Tokuda Kyūichi, Naigai Jōsei to Kyōsanto no Nimmu (The Domestic and Foreign Situation and the Tasks of the Communist Party) (Tokyo: Shinri-sha, 1949), p. 259.

¹⁰Tsukahira G. Toshio, The Postwar Evolution of Communist Strategy in Japan (Monograph) (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, M.I.T., 1954), p. 9.

which has been described as "still smelling of the underground and the prison cell," had to await the return to Japan of Sanzo Nosaka from his long exile abroad for more effective adjustment to the realities of the current domestic situation.¹¹

By January 10, 1946, following the return of Nosaka Sanzō to Japan and under his direction, the strategy and tactics of the Communist movement in Japan were given a "new look" designed to make the Party and its program more acceptable to the Japanese masses. Thus began the "soft line" period of Nosaka's so-called "lovable Communist party," an era that lasted until early 1950. It was characterized by the "Japanese Communist Party's heavy emphasis on the exigencies of the local situation often at the expense of attention to the Communist cause abroad."¹² At the Fifth Congress of the JCP held in February 1946, Tokuda Kyūichi formally endorsed Nosaka's plan and the subsequent Tokuda-Nosaka alliance put them in a leading position in party policy formation. The membership of the JCP during the Fifth Congress increased to 6,847 as compared with 1,083 of the previous Congress.¹³ The Fifth Congress reelected Tokuda Kyūichi as JCP Secretary-General and the size of the Central Committee was expanded to twenty as compared

¹¹Ibid., pp. 9-11.

¹²Paul F. Langer, "Independence or Subordination: The Japanese Communist Party between Moscow and Peking," in Doak A. Barnett (ed.), Communist Strategies in Asia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 71.

¹³Mizushima Takeshi, Jimbutsu Sengo Nihon Kyōsantō Shi (History of Postwar JCP Personnel Profile) (Tokyo: Zempo-sha, 1968), p. 54.

with six during the previous Congress. The Political Bureau was established for the first time.¹⁴

What was the substance of the JCP program expressed through Nosaka's "peaceful revolution" strategy? Nosaka extended his new interpretation to the Party's original concept of the "popular front," which had tended to defeat its own ends with its strong "leftist" overtones. In his initial message to the Party, he declared that the existing situation in Japan called for a "democratic people's front" which would embrace the great majority of the Japanese nation, and unite all the democratic forces seeking the completion of the democratic revolution.¹⁵ According to

¹⁴The roster of the JCP top hierarchy members elected during the Fifth Congress (1946) is as follows: Tokuda Kyūichi (Secretary-General); JCP members of the Secretariat (5)—Itō Ritsu, Kuroki Shigenori, Nosaka Sanzō, Shiga Yoshio, Tokuda Kyūichi; Political Bureau members (6)—Hakamada Satomi, Kin Tenkai (Kim Chōn-hae), Miyamoto Kenji, Nosaka Sanzō, Shiga Yoshio, Tokuda Kyūichi; Central Committee members (20)—Hakamada Satomi, Hasegawa Hiroshi, Itō Kenichi, Itō Ritsu, Kamiyama Shigeo, Kasuga Shōichi, Kasuga Shōjiro, Kin Tenkai (Kim Chōn-hae), Konno Yojiro, Kurahara Koreto, Kuroki Shigenori, Matsuzaki Kumaji, Miyamoto Kenji, Mizutani Takashi, Nishizawa Ryūji, Nosaka Sanzō, Okada Bunkichi, Shiga Yoshio, Tokuda Kyūichi, Uchino Takechiyo.

¹⁵Cited in Tsukahira G. Toshio, op. cit., p. 15.

Nosaka, the over-all goal of the "democratic people's front" was to be the achievement of a "new democracy of the people" in which the toilers--the workers, peasants, working intellectuals, and the medium and small merchants and manufacturers--would hold power.¹⁶

On the appropriate tactics to be pursued by the Party, Nosaka's new program espoused the theme of "peaceful revolution." It meant the abandonment of the violent methods and eschewal of the soviet-type dictatorship envisaged by the 1932 Thesis and, instead, relying exclusively on peaceful and parliamentary means both to complete the democratic revolution and to carry it rapidly on toward socialism. Such tactics, Nosaka pointed out, were already current in Europe, where, in the "people's democracies," coalition government had been established and the first steps toward socialism were taken by peaceful and constitutional means.¹⁷ Nosaka also attempted to relieve misgivings that stress on peaceful methods would weaken the discipline and militancy of the Party. Peaceful means, he explained, meant refraining from overt violence, such as armed uprisings, but did not mean passivity or gentleness. "The Communist Party," he said, "is a revolutionary organization. . . . We have great

¹⁶Nosaka Sanzō, Nihon Minshuka no Tame ni (For the Democratization of Japan), (Tokyo: Jinmin-sha, 1948), pp. 78-79. [Cited hereafter as Minshuka.]

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 103-104.

obstacles and many enemies which we must crush. We must be militant to the last degree."¹⁸

On the question of what type of revolution the JCP should make, Nosaka's new strategy and tactics were expressed through the "manifesto" issued by the Fifth National Congress held in February 1946.¹⁹ The "Manifesto" issued by this Congress declared that the immediate objective of the Party was "to complete the bourgeois-democratic revolution now in progress in Japan by peaceful and democratic means," and that it did not seek the immediate overthrow of capitalism in order to set up a socialist system. This note of moderation permeated the entire document. In tactical terms, even the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers was simply part of the progressive bourgeoisie, whose historic function was to complete the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Japan. Nosaka opened his report with a discussion of the stages of Communist revolution in postwar Japan. He stated that, prior to the Thesis of 1932, Japan had been defined

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 106.

¹⁹ The April 1-15, 1946, issue of Zenei (Vanguard), entitled "Dai-gokai Tō Taikai Sengen," (Manifesto of the Fifth Congress) was devoted exclusively to the Party leaders' speeches and reports at the Fifth Party Congress, held February 24-26. The general report, delivered by Tokuda, appears on pages 2-13. The report on the Party Declaration by Nosaka is printed on pages 14-21, with a brief statement on the united front by Nosaka on pages 21-22; also reprinted in Nosaka Sanzō, Senryaku Senjutsu no Sho-Mondai (Problems of Strategy and Tactics), (Tokyo, Dōyu-sha, 1949).

as a mature capitalist state in the same category as Great Britain and the United States. As a result, the call had been for a proletarian revolution. The purpose of the 1932 Thesis was to crush the "Trotskyite elements" in Moscow and Japan who, describing Japan as a fully developed capitalist state, had prescribed for it an immediate proletarian-socialist revolution. The correct position was that Japan was a highly developed capitalist state with many feudal remnants. Consequently, it was necessary to complete the bourgeois-democratic revolution before proceeding to socialism. In a personal exposition of the Party Congress Manifesto,²⁰ Nosaka elaborated further on the methods by which the Party would seek to attain socialism after the completion of the "bourgeois-democratic" revolution, and sought to show that the strategy and tactics of "peaceful revolution" were justified both by precedent and by current practice in the Communist world.

Nosaka also pointed out that, in order to carry out the "peaceful revolution" effectively, it was essential for the Party to win elections and to gain strong mass support outside of parliament. Hence a major departure from the tactics of the 1932 Thesis was the incessant effort to establish "unity with all political parties and political forces going in our direction" through a "democratic

²⁰Nosaka Sanzō, Minshuka, pp. 96-113.

front."²¹ Expressed in specific political terms, this meant a union between the Communist and Socialist parties.

The Japanese Communists saw in an alliance with the Socialists a convenient means of rapidly gaining mass support. Socialists were traditionally strong within labor and many farmers' unions, and they could count on considerable support from the intelligentsia and the lower middle class. A Socialist-Communist coalition, operating under the slogan "union of all truly democratic forces," would control millions of votes, but, more important, the Communists would dominate the labor scene. However, the JCP faced numerous difficulties in applying this simple theory of "united front" with the Japan Socialist Party owing to the complex make-up of the Socialist Party. Swearingen and Langer cogently analyze the factional alignment of the Japan Socialist Party:

The postwar Japanese Socialist movement, although organized into a single political party, split on most vital issues into three factions: the right wing, under the leadership of Nishio Suehiro, Mitsutani Chōsaburō, and Matsuoka Komakichi, was openly opposed to an alliance with the Communist Party; the moderate, middle-of-the-road Socialists, represented by the Christian leader Katayama Tetsu, preferred to face right but, reluctantly and under special circumstances, might have considered a coalition; and the left-wing, comprising the Party's most dynamic figures, veterans of Japan's popular-front movement, Katō Kanjū and Suzuki Mosaburō, despite many bitter experiences in the past, was at times attracted to the concept of "people's government."²²

²¹Ibid., p. 105.

²²Swearingen and Langer, op. cit., p. 139.

The Communist plan appears to have been to force the right-wing out of the Socialist Party and to effect a coalition with the remaining sympathetic center and left elements. However, other factors played a contributing role in preventing the Japanese Socialists from making common cause with the Communists. According to Paul F. Langer, Socialist caution sprang from a complex combination of factors and considerations including:

- 1) the relatively small size of the JCP, which make an alliance unprofitable for the Socialists;
- 2) the comparatively large number of Socialists who are suspicious of the Communists or even strongly anti-Communist, raising the specter of a further deepening of the schism within Socialist ranks should an alliance with the Communists ever be concluded;
- 3) the clumsiness and haste with which the Japanese Communists generally pursue their objectives whenever they succeed in building up or taking over a front organization.²³

Formation of the Katayama Cabinet in the spring of 1947 marked the end of any thought of a Socialist collaboration with the Communist Party. The JCP's failure in the abortive general strike of February 1 (prohibited by Allied headquarters) and the Socialist Party's relative success in the national election of April 1947 (the Socialists won 143

²³Paul F. Langer, "Independence or Subordination; the Japanese Communist Party between Moscow and Peking" in A. Doak Barnett (ed.), op. cit., p. 69.

seats in the Diet, the Communists only 4)²⁴ convinced even the left-wing Socialist leaders Katō and Suzuki that it would be both impractical and undesirable for the Socialist Party to ally itself with the Communists.

Thus, although Nosaka's strategy of "peaceful revolution" may have been successful in so far as it helped to broaden the base of the Communist Party, it did not convince the Socialist leaders of the Communists' worth as partners in a coalition and as a result failed to produce any significant Socialist-Communist cooperation. Nosaka's "peaceful revolution" strategy remained the basic JCP policy until 1950, although minor adjustments were made at the time of the Sixth Congress of the JCP in December 1947.²⁵ The

²⁴The composition of the new House of Representatives was as follows (valid votes and percentage of popular vote in parenthesis): Socialists, 143 (7,170,484; 26.2%); Liberals, 132 (7,260,377; 26.5%); Communists, 4 (996,507; 3.6%); Minor parties, 18 (1,562,213; 5.7%); Independents, 12 (1,362,213; 5.0%). Figures cited from Swearingen and Langer, *op. cit.*, p. 140ff.

²⁵The following is the list of the JCP top hierarchy members elected during the Sixth Congress (1947): Tokuda Kyūichi (Secretary-General); Secretariat members (5)—Hasegawa Hiroshi, Itō Ritsu, Kameyama Kōzō, Nosaka Sanzō, Tokuda Kyūichi; Political Bureau members (9)—Hasegawa Hiroshi, Itō Ritsu, Kin Tenkai (Kim Chōn-hae), Konno Yojiro, Miyamoto Kenji, Nosaka Sanzō, Shida Shigeo, Shiga Yoshio, Tokuda Kyūichi; Central Committee members (25)—Hakamada Satomi, Hasegawa Hiroshi, Itō Kenichi, Itō Ritsu, Kameyama Kōzō, Kamiyama Shigeo, Kasuga Shōichi, Kasuga Shōjiro, Kim Tenkai (Kim Chōn-hae), Kishimoto Shigeo, Konno Yojiro, Kurahara Koreto, Matsumoto Kazumi, Matsumoto Mimasu, Miyamoto Kenji, Nosaka Ryō (Mrs. Nosaka Sanzō), Nosaka Sanzō, Satō Satōji, Shida Shigeo, Shiga Yoshio, Shirakawa Haruichi, Takakura Teru, Takenaka Tsunesaburō, Tokuda Kyūichi, Tosaka Kan.

JCP, operating under the favorable political conditions of postwar Japan, increased its mass membership to 150,000 by the time of this Congress. Again the Sixth Congress re-elected Tokuda Kyūichi as Secretary-General and the Central Committee included twenty-five members as against twenty after the Fifth Congress and six after the Fourth.

The Sixth Congress of the JCP was held in the midst of the rapidly changing East-West relations. With the deterioration of Soviet-American relations by late 1947, the cold war had begun. In the Far East, conflict over policies toward Korea and Japan had become intense, matching the grave problems in Europe. In China, the civil war between the Communist and Nationalist Chinese had begun. In Japan, most of SCAP-directed reform measures having been completed, the American Occupation policy was aimed at long-term reconstruction and politico-economic stabilization. Scalapino gives a detailed description of the shift of the American Occupation by late 1947:

. . . there were already indications that the political orientation of SCAP would be increasingly conservative. SCAP reforms had encompassed a wide range of problems and had truly changed the sociopolitical outlook for the Japanese nation. . . . Now, with the emphasis on reconstruction, SCAP was likely to turn toward the conservatives, because there was no long-range basis for an alliance between SCAP and the Japanese "Progressives," especially the more radical segment.²⁶

²⁶ Scalapino, op. cit., p. 58.

In spite of these external and internal situations, the Sixth Congress program showed no basic shift in Nosaka's "peaceful revolution" strategy. Even though SCAP was now regarded with suspicion, there was no attempt to deal openly with the problem of "American imperialism." The author's speculation on the cautious approach during the Sixth Congress is that the JCP leaders must have been apprehensive of the possible crackdown on the Party by SCAP.

Cominform Criticism of the "Peaceful Revolution"
Strategy and Internal Dissension in the
JCP, 1950-1951

Impact of the Cominform Criticism.—With the further deterioration of the cold war in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, the Soviet Union stepped up Stalin's "hard line" policy toward the West. Andrei Zhdanov's famous "two camps" speech in September 1947, signaled a major Soviet policy change.²⁷ Following his speech, a new Communist international organization, the Cominform,²⁸ was set up to coordinate and enforce policy decisions within the Communist world.

²⁷Zhdanov's speech, delivered at the founding meeting of the Cominform in Poland at the end of September 1947, was published in For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!, November 10, 1947, pp. 2-4 under the title "The International Situation."

²⁸The Comintern, its precedent organization, was dissolved in May 1943, largely as a gesture of goodwill by the U.S.S.R. when it started receiving Lend Lease aid from the United States.

Suddenly in January 1950, Moscow "suggested" a shift from "peaceful revolution" to a more positive and militant policy with an anonymous editorial in the official Cominform organ, For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!²⁹ The article contained a sharp criticism of Nosaka and his views. He was accused of trying to prove that all of the necessary conditions were present in Japan for effecting a peaceful transition to socialism, even with the American Occupation present, and of further arguing that this approach represented "the naturalization of Marxism-Leninism on Japanese soil."³⁰ In the concluding part of the article, the attack on Nosaka was quite acrimonious:

All this "naturalization" of the Marxism-Leninism is nothing more than a Japanese variation of the Anti-Marxist and anti-Socialist "theory" of the peaceful growing over of reaction to democracy, of imperialism into Socialism. . . . Nosaka's "theory" is the theory of embellishing the imperialist occupation of Japan, the theory of boosting American imperialism, and consequently a theory of deception of the popular masses in Japan. As we see, Nosaka's "theory" has nothing whatever in common with Marxism-Leninism. Actually Nosaka's "theory" is an anti-democratic, anti-Socialist theory. It serves only the imperialist occupiers in Japan and the enemies of the independence of Japan. Consequently, the Nosaka's "theory" is simultaneously, an anti-patriotic, anti-Japanese theory. ³¹

²⁹This Cominform thesis, entitled "On the Situation in Japan," was published under the byline "Observer" in the January 6, 1950 issue of the Cominform's journal, For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!, p.3. The fact that this thesis was written at the initiative of Joseph Stalin was revealed in a letter, dated April 18, 1964, to the JCP from the CPSU.

³⁰Ibid., p. 3.

³¹Ibid.

The confused reaction of the JCP to the Cominform attack indicated that the Party had not anticipated it. On January 7, 1950, Central Committee member Takenaka Tsunesaburō described foreign press dispatches as "ill-designed propaganda stuff." On January 8, the Party's Central Committee and Political Bureau in a joint statement described press reports of the attack on Nosaka as "clearly provocative activities of the enemy to smash the unity of the Party."³² However, given the ominous sign of continued pressure by the Soviet Union to pursue the militant policy and the similar echoing by the CCP,³³ the Japanese Communists had to accept the stark reality. On January 20, in a published statement, reprinted in Pravda on January 21, the Central Committee of the JCP announced that it had unanimously accepted the "positive significance" of the Cominform's criticism and had approved Nosaka's statement of self-criticism. In this statement Nosaka admitted that

³²Evelyn S. Colbert, The Left-Wing in Japanese Politics, p. 288. Also for the initial reaction by the Japanese Communists, see the JCP Central Committee statement of January 8, 1950, published in Akahata and republished by the JCP in the 3-volume Nihon Kyōsantō Gojūnen Mondai Shiryō Shū (A Collection of Documents Concerning the Japanese Communist Party Incident of 1950), I, p. 3. This work is very good documentary source for this period. Another English-language study of this general period is Tsukahira G. Toshio, op. cit.; Tsukahira's study covers the period October 1945-July 1952.

³³On January 17, 1950, Peking's Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily), the official Chinese Communist newspaper, published on p. 1 an editorial supporting the main themes of the Cominform article; also in Nihon Kyōsantō Gojūnen Mondai Shiryō Shū, I, pp. 9-11.

his theory had been fundamentally wrong and added:

Subsequently, I recognized my mistakes and tried to overcome them, but committed further errors when I made public views concerning my theory piecemeal, regardless of my subjective intentions, without publicly and clearly liquidating it. I therefore will try not to repeat such mistakes and endeavor to live up to the expectations of the international proletariat.³⁴

Nosaka's recantation was the price he had to pay for remaining a major party leader. While this recantation made his survival possible, it also meant that the Party's leadership would be subservient to international control.

Thereafter, the JCP, belatedly following other Asian parties, abruptly switched its tactics from "peaceful revolution" to a militant anti-American line. The new platform adopted by the JCP in 1951 was formulated under the guidance of Stalin and with the concurrence of the CCP.³⁵ In this platform the JCP defined Japan's status as a "country under the colonial domination of American imperialism" and stated that "to think Japan's liberation and democratic revolution can be achieved through peaceful means is a mistake."³⁶ It was in accordance with this platform that the JCP, at the

³⁴Colbert, op. cit., p. 290.

³⁵This was revealed by Secretary-General Miyamoto Kenji of the JCP in an interview published in the July 30, 1967, issue of the Asahi Journal.

³⁶Omori Shigeo, "Realignment of the JCP," Japan Quarterly, XIV, No. 4 (October-December, 1967), p. 444.

height of the Korean War, launched its "people's liberation war" and, copying the CCP's revolutionary formula, pushed its unlawful "armed struggle," using guerrilla tactics. It was during this period that the JCP, suppressed by the Occupation authorities, split up, and the internecine factional conflict pushed the Party to the verge of collapse. According to Ōmori Shigeo, the JCP's split and its "extreme left adventurism" aroused popular resentment, and party membership, which in 1947 was about 150,000, dropped to about 50,000 by 1952.³⁷

Factional Strife and Internal Dissension.—As one Japanese political scientist, Maruyama Masao, rightly observed, power elites in Japan were traditionally characterized by extreme factionalism, with the groups engaging in polemical disputes, dog-fights, and schisms resulting from differences in personal ties and loyalties of the boss-follower (oyabun-kobun) relationship.³⁸ Several consequences follow from this state of affairs. First, factionalism has resulted in a highly fragmented society composed of innumeral "cellular units" in which individuals are clustered around a leader

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ As cited in I.I. Morris, Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. xxii; also in Robert A. Scalapino and Masumi Junnosuke, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 18-20.

or a few leaders. Second, large groups and organizations are often affected by the formation of cliques and factionalism. Large organizations are thus often nothing more than a conglomeration of small groups. With this general pattern of distinct Japanese political culture in mind this section will focus on the intra-party schism and the leadership struggle within the JCP.

From 1945 to the beginning of 1950, the JCP seemed to present a solid bloc of unity behind its leaders. From the outset, the postwar Party mainstream was dominated by the Tokuda-Shiga combination, enlarged in January, 1946 to a triumvirate by the arrival of Nosaka, whose shorter prison record, compared with Tokuda-Shiga's eighteen years of imprisonment, was offset in the eyes of the Party by more than a decade spent in working for the Japanese revolutionary movement with Stalin and Mao Tse-tung. Therefore, the direction of the Party, up to 1950, was firmly in the hands of these three men, whose long personal acquaintance with each other greatly reduced the likelihood of personal friction within the Politburo. This does not imply that the postwar JCP was homogeneous in character and united in every respect. Other prominent leaders of the Party were Shida Shigeo, Itō Ritsu, Hakamada Satomi, Miyamoto Kenji, Hasegawa Hiroshi, Konno Yojirō, and Kin Tenkai (Kim Chōn-hae). At times, the JCP middle-echelon leaders did not hesitate

to express opinions differing from those held by the triumvirate.³⁹ Some of them, especially among the Kansai Faction⁴⁰ led by Kasuga Shōjirō and Kamiyama Shigeo, who had maintained the clandestine Communist groups in the Ōsaka and Nagoya area during the war years when Tokuda and Shiga were in prison and Nosaka abroad, were accustomed to independent action and found it difficult to follow their superiors. Some of the major grumblings were aired, more specifically, against the so-called "patriarchal and individual-centered leadership" by Tokuda Kyūichi and his whimsical favoritism in allotting Central Committee membership to his protégés, Shida Shigeo, Itō Ritsu, and Nishizawa Ryūji.⁴¹ But there were none who could challenge the leader-

³⁹Kamiya Shigeo's doctrinal dispute with Shiga Yoshio, centering around the respective merits of the 1927 and 1932 Theses and the correct interpretation of the nature of authority in Japan in Zenei, October 1947; Nakanishi Ko's support of a violent socialistic revolution in preference to Nosaka's "peaceful revolution" in 1947.

⁴⁰JCP faction based on regional ties around the industrial belt of Western Japan (Ōsaka, Nagoya). Besides Kasuga and Kamiyama, the prominent leaders of the Kansai faction included Kasuga Shōichi, Yamada Rokuzaemon, and Kameyama Kōzō (Central Committee members). The JCP Politburo member Shida Shigeo was originally identified with the Kansai faction. However, due to his alliance with Tokuda Kyūichi's Mainstream faction, he was no longer identified with the Kansai faction. For details of Shida's role in weakening the Kansai faction strength, see Mizushima Takeshi, op. cit., pp. 38-44.

⁴¹Itō Ritsu, after joining the JCP in 1932, was arrested twice, but was released after he had collaborated with the Japanese authorities. Itō's swift promotion to the Politburo, Secretariat, and Central Committee of the JCP was due to Tokuda's support. Nishizawa Ryūji was Tokuda's son-in-law. For his personal profile, see Mizushima Takeshi, op. cit., pp. 49-53.

ship of the Tokuda-Nosaka-Shiga triumvirate. Although factions founded on personal friendship and regional ties existed within the Central Committee, internal conflicts of a serious nature did not occur until 1950.

With the Cominform criticism in January 1950 of Nosaka's "peaceful revolution" strategy, an open schism occurred within the JCP for the first time. On January 18, 1950, the Central Committee met to determine the Party's attitude toward the Cominform's blast against Communist strategy in Japan. In an earlier Politburo meeting, Tokuda had attempted to placate the foreign Communists and to settle the incident by justifying the Party's lack of aggressiveness in pointing out that "subjective and objective conditions in Japan" forced the Party to choose "zigzag actions and words" in order to achieve "a certain goal."⁴² Shiga and Miyamoto had refused to endorse such a lukewarm attitude and Tokuda, in danger of being considered a Japanese Tito by the JCP International faction,⁴³ had agreed to place the issue before an enlarged plenum of the

⁴²Akahata, January 13, 1950.

⁴³Anti-Mainstream faction which was led by Shiga Yoshio and Miyamoto Kenji. Other important figures were Kasuga Shōjiro, Kameyama Kozō, and Hakamada Satomi. Kamiyama Shigeo is generally considered to have embraced in 1950 a considerably more "leftist" point of view than in 1947. He refused, however, to support fully either Tokuda or Shiga.

Central Committee session for the final decision.⁴⁴

During the enlarged Central Committee of the JCP held on January 19, 1950, a fiery debate ensued, with Shiga, Miyamoto, and various other members of the International faction pressing the attack against the Mainstream (Chūō) faction.⁴⁵ Shiga demanded that the Party seriously reconsider its past policy in the light of the "valid criticism" expressed by the Cominform. He further urged the Party to admit openly that "grave mistakes" had been made and to adopt certain corrective measures in line with the Cominform directives.⁴⁶ Given the solidarity between the CPSU and CCP on the "hard line" and militant approach, the Mainstream (Chūō) faction had no choice except to capitulate. After Nosaka issued his apologetic self-criticism making all of the necessary concessions, the Party Central Committee passed a unanimous resolution as follows:

⁴⁴Swearingen and Langer, op. cit., p. 222.

⁴⁵Centering around Tokuda Kyūichi, Nosaka Sanzō, Itō Ritsu, Shida Shigeo, Shiino Etsurō, and Konno Yojirō. See Tsukahira Toshio, op. cit. for an excellent discussion of factional alignment within the JCP during 1950-1952 period.

⁴⁶Akahata, April 15, 1950.

We will make every effort to avoid the mistakes we have made in the past and we do pledge to live up to the expectations of the international proletariat.⁴⁷

While a semblance of surface unity had been maintained, subsequent developments indicated that the intra-party schism brought in a new factional alignment. The Mainstream (Chuō) faction, confronted with massive external intervention against its policies, capitulated on the basic issues, but managed to preserve its leadership intact. Thus the Politburo continued to have five Mainstream leaders (Tokuda Kyūichi, Nosaka Sanzō, Shida Shigeo, Itō Ritsu, and Konno Yojirō) and only three members of the International faction (Shiga Yoshio, Miyamoto Kenji, and Hasegawa Hiroshi). Soon an Akahata article of April 15, 1950, sharply attacked Shiga and Miyamoto as "Trotskyites" and retaliation by the Mainstream faction occurred. Miyamoto, head of the powerful Control Commission, was removed from his position, followed by a massive demotion of the International faction members. Miyamoto's place was taken by Shiino Etsurō, a loyal Tokuda man. Shiga, also threatened with expulsion, was forced to apologize for some of his actions and attitudes in late April. Subsequent events in early June 1950 found the JCP

⁴⁷Dai-jūhachikai Kakudai Chuōinkai Hōkoku Kettei-Shū (Reports and Resolutions of the Eighteenth Plenum of the Central Committee of the JCP) (Tokyo: JCP Central Committee, 1950), p. 41.

badly split, with International faction elements disregarding headquarters instructions in many cases. Headed by Shiino Etsurō, the eight-man Party Directorate that replaced the Central Committee ousted by SCAP on June 7, 1950,⁴⁸ was composed entirely of Mainstream representatives. Immediately a drastic purge within the Party was undertaken. Hundreds of International faction supporters were ousted from party posts and, in many cases, excluded from party membership. In retaliation, the International faction published numerous pamphlets and other forms of polemic literature denouncing the Mainstream faction, and even formed their own splinter organization, "National Unity Committee, the Japanese Communist Party" in July 1950.⁴⁹

Shift to the Left-Wing Adventurism and Guerrilla Warfare, 1951-1953.

The three-year period from the Cominform criticism in January 1950 until 1953 was confusing and transitional. In the course of adjusting a major factional dispute within the Party between the left wing, the Internationalists (Kokusai-ha) and the more moderate elements, the Mainstream

⁴⁸ As one integral SCAP policy of anti-Communism in Japan (directives of June 6, 1950), 24 members of the Central Committee were ousted from the public office. All of them went to underground activities thereafter.

⁴⁹ Iizuka Shigetarō, op. cit., p. 48.

faction (Chuō-ha), the orientation of the whole Party moved steadily to the left. This shift to a more radical and internationally oriented policy was marked by the change of tone in Akahata coverage of the period, by the increasing number and larger scope of Communist incidents in Japan, and of other acts of violence.⁵⁰

Shortly before the Korean War of June 25, 1950, most of the Party leaders disappeared. Starting with General MacArthur's order to remove and exclude from public service the twenty-four members of the Central Committee of the JCP, the Japanese government prohibited all political activities of the radical and foreign-oriented organizations. Immediately, the Party set up an interim Central Directorate as its overt headquarters to carry on openly for the SCAP-ousted Central Committee and vast new Japanese Communist underground structures--including military committees, special units, labor unification committees, an expanded clandestine press, undercover business firms to supply the Party fund for militant activities, and systematic underground railway contacts to

⁵⁰ Among others, slaying a policeman at Nerema Police Station (December 27, 1951); slaying police Lieutenant Shiratori in Sapporo (January 21, 1951); raid on Arakawa Police Station (February 28, 1952); bloody May-Day Incident (May 1, 1952); May 30 Shinjuku Station Incident (May 30, 1952); Molotov Cocktail Incident at the Eastside Police Box, Shinjuku Station (June 25, 1952).

provide sanctuary for the Communist fugitives--were established.

Under the banner of the "National-Liberation Democratic Revolution," the Molotov Cocktail strategy prevailed; Communist terrorists in the metropolitan areas bombed police stations, sabotaged factories, assaulted both Japanese law enforcement officers and American Occupation personnel,⁵¹ and conducted various other acts of violence. Also, the Party undertook an even more ambitious program for the countryside. Seeking to imitate their Chinese comrades, Party leaders encouraged the creation of "activist units" in selected mountain villages, areas with a potential for defense that could be developed into guerrilla bases. These were to be Japan's Yen-an. In assessing the impact of this guerrilla activity by the JCP, Robert Scalapino comments:

The uniform result of these activities was catastrophic failure. Japan circa 1950-1952 was not China circa 1935-1939--in terrain, in socio-political conditions, or in international involvements. Most of the young terrorists, if they did not manage to escape to China, were captured and sentenced to lengthy prison terms. The party rapidly became a symbol for extremism, and all except the most firmly committed fell away. Party membership dropped precipitously. Election results spelled disaster. All of the sacrifices were being made to no avail. Not a single act undertaken by the Communists during this period had any political significance except to make the task of those fighting

⁵¹Colbert, op. cit., p. 300.

communism easier; not a single "guerrilla base" lasted more than the briefest period.⁵²

Reshuffling of the Party Leadership: Emergence of Miyamoto Kenji after the Sixth National Party Conference, 1955

By 1953 many Japanese Communists had begun to doubt that armed struggle represented a promising tactic for the JCP. The search began for modifications, if not basic alterations, in strategy and tactics. International developments in the 1953-1955 period, particularly those involving the world Communist movement, were of critical importance, too. Following the death of Stalin in 1953, a period of intense maneuvering for leadership in the Kremlin marked the great uncertainty in Soviet leadership over other fraternal Communist parties. The end of the Korean War in 1953 also marked the beginning of the détente.

In 1955, the Chinese Communists launched a major diplomatic offensive at the Bandung Conference, with primary emphasis on peaceful coexistence and other symbols of moderation. Formal negotiations to prepare a Soviet-Japanese peace settlement began in London in June 1955. Among their extreme demands, the Russians insisted on the military neutralization of Japan, while the Japanese insisted on the return of the Kurile Islands occupied by the Soviet Union

⁵²Scalapino, op. cit., p. 87.

as a result of World War II. During the diplomatic negotiations it is plausible that the Soviet Union demanded the Japanese lift the ban on the JCP activity in return for the swift repatriation of the Japanese ex-POWs detained in Siberia.⁵³

This was the international setting which had a direct impact on the "new look" of the Party image during its Sixth National Party Conference, July 27-30, 1955.⁵⁴ After commenting on "favorable" developments in the international scene (such as the Geneva and the Bandung conferences), the Party resolution dealt with several fundamental problems and errors, identified the danger of factionalism,

⁵³After sixteen months of diplomatic negotiations, a major breakthrough occurred when the Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichirō went to Moscow in October 1956. He was unable to achieve a settlement of the territorial dispute and no peace treaty emerged from the summit conference. However, on October 19, 1956, Hatoyama and Bulganin signed a Joint Peace Declaration which formally ended the war, restored diplomatic and consular relations between the two countries, brought the fisheries agreement into force, and committed the Soviet Union to support Japan's application for membership in the United Nations. For a detailed discussion of the negotiations, see Donald C. Hellmann, Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics: The Peace Agreement with the Soviet Union (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 29-40.

⁵⁴Documents concerning the Sixth National Party Conference are published in the July 30, 1955 issue of Akahata and the September 1955 issue of Zenei (pp. 8-36).

admitted the tactical error of "ultra-leftist adventurism," and deplored the inability to strengthen ties between the Party and the masses. The Sixth Party Conference Resolution concluded by pledging that the Party would seek national unification on the basis of "the struggle for independence and peace."⁵⁵ Thus the Sixth National Party Conference marked the official end of the "left" swing and marked the return to legalism once again. The noteworthy achievement of this Party Conference was the reshuffling of the party leadership and the subsequent victory for the old International faction, which now stood on the "right."⁵⁶ With the death of Tokuda Kyūichi in Peking in November 1953, the Mainstream (Chūō) faction lost much of its influence. Shortly before Tokuda's death, a power struggle between Itō Ritsu and Shida Shigeo—both Mainstream leaders—aggravated the situation further. Ultimately, by September 1953, Shida emerged victorious, and Itō Ritsu was ousted from the Party on charges of being a spy and informer. He subsequently disappeared in what remains one of the great mysteries of JCP factional strife.⁵⁷ Two years later, Shida Shigeo

⁵⁵Scalapino, op. cit., p. 89.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 90.

⁵⁷For the formal declaration on the purge of Itō, see Akahata, September 21, 1953, p. 1 and Zenei, September 1955, pp. 38-39. Itō was accused of selling out the Party to foreign and domestic reactionaries and it was rumored later that he was liquidated at party orders.

and other Mainstream leaders were pressed hard by the International faction for the "self-criticism" on misguided leadership of the JCP underground activities of 1950-1953. Also, Shida Shigeo was under suspicion of embezzlement of Party funds during the Sixth National Party Conference in 1955.⁵⁸

The International faction, benefiting from the absence of the key Mainstream leaders, gradually strengthened its position within the Party. Miyamoto Kenji, erstwhile International faction leader, emerged as the new Secretary-General during the JCP Sixth National Party Conference in 1955, partly owing to his astute compromise with the Mainstream group. Hakamada Satomi, another International faction leader, also joined Miyamoto. Nosaka Sanzō, although a Mainstream leader, quickly adapted to changing circumstances and allied with the Miyamoto-Hakamada group. The so-called "Miyamoto era" had begun.

⁵⁸ Shortly after the Sixth Party Conference, Shida Shigeo was formally charged with the embezzlement of Party funds. Shida lavishly spent Party funds for his "nightly-orgy to Geisha house" during the underground period. He also disappeared and the Party deprived him of his membership. It was believed that Miyamoto Kenji, the International faction leader, engineered the anti-Shida movement. See Mizushima Takeshi, op. cit., pp. 139-40.

External Setting: The JCP between
Moscow and Peking, 1945-1955

The JCP and the Soviet Union

Before examining specific evidence indicative of a direct connection between the JCP and the CPSU during the postwar period, it may be necessary to review briefly the ostensible desire for autonomy so frequently expressed by the top leadership of the JCP and the stated position of the Party on foreign policy.

At the first postwar Party convention, in December 1945, Secretary-General Tokuda said: "Direct liaison with the Soviet Union will harm rather than assist our movement."⁵⁹ At the next Party convention, in 1946, Tokuda made the point even more strongly:

At present, we have no relations whatsoever with the Soviet Union. . . . I should like to state here that in the future, as well, our Party will never have relations with the Soviet Union.⁶⁰

The JCP clearly defined its position in a major foreign-policy statement released to the press on April 4, 1946, as the following passages from it indicate:

We will endeavor to maintain and strengthen friendly relations equally with all peace-loving and democratic foreign nations. . . . The Party will reject such a

⁵⁹Tokuda Kyūichi, Naigai Jōsei to Nihon Kyōsantō no Nimmu (The Domestic and Foreign Situation and the Mission of the JCP), p. 247.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 236.

policy as will plunge our nation into the turmoil of international strife, and absolutely opposes any kind of imperialistic war of aggression, neither supporting nor joining it in any form whatsoever. . . . Other parties are spreading malicious propaganda which gives the impression that our Party still has some connection with the Comintern, or Third International. As is well known, that organization was dissolved in June 1943. It is, therefore, evident that our Party today has no relationship with any kind of international organization. We hereby declare that our Party is a party of the Japanese people and a party which devotes itself to the liberation of the working class of this country.⁶¹

This official statement suggested, ostensibly, an abrupt departure from the tainted prewar legacy of complete subordination to the Soviet Union. The most plausible explanation for the lack of specific direction from Moscow during the immediate postwar period was given by Tsukahira:

In the first place, channels of communication were slow in being established. . . . American-Soviet agreement on the proper form of the control machinery for occupied Japan was not reached until December 1945. It was thus not until February 1946 that an official Soviet military mission was established in Tokyo. Secondly, all indications were that the Kremlin had no specific party line for Japan. Soviet public discussions of the situation in post-surrender Japan dealt mainly with problems of demilitarization and democratization along lines which rarely touched upon the role of the Communist Party or upon the question of revolutionary strategy in Japan.⁶²

⁶¹Akahata, April 7, 1946; reprinted in Nosaka Sanzō, Minshuka, pp. 151-53.

⁶²Tsukahira G. Toshio, op. cit., p. 10.

However, a closer study of the period from 1945 to the beginning of 1951 discloses contrary documentary evidence, indicating that this apparent break was simply a shift in tactics. To substantiate the JCP-CPSU collaboration during the 1945-1951 period, Swearingen and Langer give the following point-by-point material evidence to refute the JCP official statements:

- 1) Continued unwillingness of the Soviet Union to repatriate the Japanese prisoners of war who were detained in the hundreds of camps in Siberia and the subsequent political indoctrination of them shortly before their return to Japan with the collaboration of the Japanese Communist Party;
- 2) close programmatic conformity between the Japanese Communist Party and the Soviet Union such as radio broadcasts and the Tass press releases which supplied the Japanese Communist press;
- 3) the Russian Mission, which at the peak strength was at least five times as large as any other, included many news analysts and interpreters with valuable Japanese Communist contacts;
- 4) strong evidences of Russian secret liaison with the Japanese Communist Party members--especially Shiga Yoshio's secret meeting with the chief of Soviet Mission in 1949--and of numerous "secret Party instructions."⁶³

Furthermore, the JCP's acceptance, early in 1950, of the Cominform's criticism of Nosaka's policy and the Party's active support of Communist aggression on the Asian

⁶³Swearingen and Langer, *op. cit.*, pp. 231-34; also *idem*, "The Japanese Communist Party, the Soviet Union and Korea," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XXIII, 1950, pp. 339-50. Swearingen and Langer discuss the unresolved repatriation problem of the Japanese POWs, arguing that these 300,000 prisoners constituted a political hostage for the future rather than a potential force for the rehabilitation of the Russian economy; prevalence of illness and malnutrition among the Japanese greatly reduced their usefulness as a labor force.

continent have further clarified the nature of the relation between the JCP and the international Communist movement, led by the Soviet Union. The Cominform criticism of 1950 was clearly designed to galvanize the Japanese Communists into a more radical and militant posture and to force them to assume a more active and dynamic role in the Kremlin's worldwide offensive against United States influence. Tsukahira's cogent analysis of the JCP strategy assesses the internal political situation of Japan by the end of 1949, maintaining that there were disquieting indications that the Communist advance had begun to falter:

Anti-communism in Japan was growing, and non-communist elements (Japanese Socialist Party) had already wrested control of the Japanese labor movement from Communist hands.

.....
 Another patent fact was that the efforts of the United States to hasten the economic recovery of Japan and to build her up as a bulwark against communism in the Far East were beginning to show results. At the same time the prospects of an over-all peace treaty which would end U.S. control of Japan and allow Communist China and the Soviet Union to deal directly with a demilitarized and helpless Japan were growing dimmer. In short, the trend was clearly toward a diminishing of both internal and external Communist influence on Japanese affairs.⁶⁴

Under these circumstances it was not strange that the Kremlin, dissatisfied with the policies that the JCP leadership was following, desired to reorient the Party toward a more aggressively anti-American program. But the

⁶⁴Tsukahira G. Toshio, op. cit., p. 53.

sudden and dramatic means by which the Soviet leaders sought to effect this reorientation suggested that a factor of considerable urgency had entered the picture. This factor was the Soviet decision to launch the invasion of South Korea.⁶⁵ Once this decision had been made, it became necessary for the Kremlin to take immediate steps to convert the JCP into an effective auxiliary striking force. As the local Communist party in the country which was the principal base for United States forces in the Far East and which was possibly the ultimate target of the thrust into South Korea, the JCP had a vital role. It could serve Soviet interests not only by carrying out espionage and sabotage against U.S. defense forces in Japan, but also by promoting anti-American sentiment among the Japanese people. Such a role could not be effectively fulfilled by a party which was overly concerned about legal and constitutional action or preoccupied with efforts to attain power by parliamentary means.

The JCP-CPSU relationship during the 1953-1955 period was noted for the prevailing uncertainty following the death of Stalin in March 1953 and the subsequent power

⁶⁵ Allen Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950), pp. 37-40; Soon Sung Cho, Korea in World Politics 1940-1950 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 270-75. Nikita Khrushchev's memoir sheds new light on the interpretation of the Korean War by stressing the primary role of Premier Kim Il-sung of North Korea in initiating the idea of invasion during his meeting with Stalin at the end of 1949. See Khrushchev Remembers, trans. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), pp. 367-68.

struggle among Beria, Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Bulganin, and Khrushchev. The Soviet Union, which had for so long been a symbol of authority, power, and unity for the fraternal Communist parties of the world, now emerged as an unpredictable patron state devoid of a strong leadership over international Communism. Within the JCP, following the coincidental death of Tokuda Kyūichi in Peking in November 1953, the leadership vacuum further aggravated the situation. Though Shida Shigeo emerged victorious in the power struggle against Itō Ritsu, Shida did not possess the caliber of leadership quality as the late Secretary-General Tokuda, nor did he have the reputation acceptable to the CPSU leaders.

Given these factors, it was discernible that there were not many contacts between the JCP and the CPSU during this period. In these years the People's Republic of China gradually acquired some of the symbolism formerly held by the Soviet Union, especially for the JCP.⁶⁶ Pertaining to the deep involvement of the Chinese Communists in the

⁶⁶ Rodger Swearingen's survey of Akahata for the period June 1952 through December 1953 shows 85 articles on the USSR (many of them devoted in part to relations with China) as against 168 articles exclusively on Communist China. See "Japanese Communism and the Moscow-Peking Axis," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCVIII (November 1956), 68.

internal affairs of the JCP by mid-1955, Scalapino explains:

There is, of course, no indication that Soviet leaders objected to these Chinese advances. Indeed, it is entirely possible that in Soviet opinion Japan represented a legitimate Chinese "sphere of influence."⁶⁷

The JCP and the People's Republic of China

In 1948 Nosaka Sanzō, who spent nine years in Moscow and then five years in Yen-an, said:

Japan and China are inseparably linked together by strong cultural and economic ties. . . . In order to grow, Japan must cultivate an intimate and brotherly relation with the People's China.⁶⁸

As indicated in the above speech, the Japanese Communist must have felt closer affinity to his comrades in Peking. This was not only a matter of latent hostility of the Japanese toward Russia and the attraction and admiration that they felt toward China, although these feelings were by no means negligible in their political implications. There was also, even without Nosaka's personal attachment

⁶⁷Scalapino, op. cit., p. 96.

⁶⁸Nosaka Sanzō, Senryaku, Senjutsu no Shomondai (Various Problems Pertaining to Strategy and Tactics), p. 282. Nosaka's Chinese background and his acquaintance with the men who controlled Communist China made him the Party's spokesman on Chinese affairs. Nosaka worked with Li Li-san and other Chinese Communists during his stay in Moscow. During his stay in Yen-an (1940-1945) he had close contacts with Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, and other members of the CCP; also cited in Swearingen and Langer, op. cit., p. 235.

to Mao Tse-tung, the strong cultural affinity between the two nations and the geographical proximity and sheer size of the new power center on the continent after the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. With the victory of the Chinese Communist armies on the mainland of China, what was once a relation between equals⁶⁹ during the prewar days had developed in the postwar period into one of the master and disciple.⁷⁰

To what extent did the CCP exert its influence in the formation of the postwar strategy of the JCP? How effective was it? The establishment of the People's Republic of China in September 1949 marked the appearance of a new Communist power center in the Far East. Using the Trade Unions Conference of the Asian and Australian Countries of the World Federation of Trade Unions which met in Peking (November 16--December 3, 1949) as their forum, the CCP now proclaimed to the Asian Communist parties that the Chinese path to victory was to be the model for all colonial and semi-colonial countries. In the keynote address to the Conference, the Chinese Chairman Liu Shao-ch'i outlined a

⁶⁹In the early 1940's, the Japanese Communists in Yen-an were no longer, as they had been in Moscow, mere translators, researchers, or "yes men," but were active fighters for a common cause whom the Chinese honored and frequently consulted.

⁷⁰Swearingen and Langer, op. cit., p. 235.

program of action for the Communist parties of Asia:

The path taken by the Chinese people to defeat imperialism and its lackeys and to establish the People's Republic of China is the path that should be taken by the peoples of the various colonial and semi-colonial countries, in their fight for national independence and people's democracy.⁷¹

He made it clear, moreover, that an armed struggle was essential--anyone attempting to take an easier path "would be committing a mistake." The evidence is clear that in the 1949-1950 period, Soviet and Chinese Communist views on the strategy and tactics in Asia were identical. Both the CPSU and the CCP were then pursuing a "left" line, one that emphasized the creation of united fronts, the seizure of united front leadership by the Communist party, and the overthrow of imperialist or "reactionary" regimes by force, using the techniques of guerrilla warfare and "national liberation" movements.⁷² Also there is well-documented evidence to show that already by mid-1949, Moscow, impressed by the growing victories of the Chinese Communists and by the usefulness of their strategy in advocating its anti-American foreign policy, had accepted the Maoist

⁷¹"Speech by Liu Shao-chi at the Conference of Trade Unions of Asia and Oceania," For a Lasting Peace, For a Peoples Democracy!, December 30, 1949; also in Pravda, January 4, 1950, translated in Soviet Press Translations, V, No. 6 (March 15, 1950), 168-72.

⁷²Scalapino, op. cit., p. 66.

strategy as the one to be adopted by the Communist movements in colonial and semi-colonial Asia.⁷³

The strategy of the JCP—adhering to a policy of peaceful tactics and insisting on the goals of national independence and people's democracy not by militant revolution but by legal and constitutional means—by the end of 1949 was essentially not in conformity with the approach prescribed for the Asian Communist parties by both Peking and Moscow. Thus, early in January 1950, the JCP found itself the major target of a sudden and bewildering attack by the Cominform and the subsequent harsh criticism by the Chinese Communists.⁷⁴ On January 17, 1950, the CCP organ, Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily) published an editorial entitled: "The Road toward the Liberation of the Japanese People." Concurring fully with the Cominform's criticisms, but stressing particularly the "fatal error" of leading the people to believe that state power could be captured by peaceful means and through a bourgeois parliament, the editorial stated:

Under no bourgeois rule and still less so under the rule of American imperialism, is it possible for the

⁷³John H. Kautsky, Moscow and the Communist Party of India (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1956), pp. 86-117.

⁷⁴Scalapino speculates as to how far the Tokuda-Nosaka group might have carried their defiance of the Cominform had not the Chinese comrades joined the Soviets in interfering in the internal affairs of the JCP. See Scalapino, op. cit., pp. 63-64.

workers' struggle to seize power to be otherwise than a violent revolutionary struggle. The parliament in this struggle is nothing more than a supplementary means to be used only as a forum for exposing the enemy.⁷⁵

It rebuked the JCP leadership for its unrepentant attitude and urged full submission to the Cominform's criticism. The language of the Peking editorial was more restrained and less ruthless than that of the Cominform article, but the viewpoint was essentially the same. So it may be surmised that the Chinese Communist intervention in support of Cominform criticism of the JCP at the height of the 1950 crisis probably proved decisive insofar as the Mainstream leaders of the JCP were concerned.

With the shift of the JCP to a militant policy and the subsequent guerrilla warfare tactics between 1950 and 1953, the Chinese Communists exhibited an increasingly active interest in developments in Japan. Articles bearing such titles as "To Our Japanese Comrades" appeared regularly in the Peking Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily), were reprinted by Pravda, and were apparently designed to guide the Japanese party over the difficult transitional period.⁷⁶ The nature of the Japanese party's reaction to this guidance

⁷⁵ Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily), January 17, 1950. A Japanese translation is in Nihon Shakai Undo Kenkyukai (ed.), Nihon Kyōsantō no Bunkenshū (Collected Documents on the JCP) (4 volumes, Tokyo: Nikkan Rōdō Tsūshin-sha, 1951-1954), I, pp. 30-34.

⁷⁶ Swearingen, loc. cit., p. 66.

from the mainland, as well as the increasing volume of publications in Japan about and from Communist China, suggested strongly that the JCP was prepared to accept Peking as the new ideological focal point in Asia. The sheer size of the new power center in China might alone make such a development inevitable, but the ideological factor appears at least as important as geo-political considerations.⁷⁷ In the geo-political perspective, the formidable presence of Communist China with dynamic and militant policies in Asia offered hope to other Asian Communists—in and out of power.⁷⁸ Added to it was a certain degree of Asian nationalism that stimulated the Japanese Communists. For example, the thesis that Japan was a quasi-colony dominated by American imperialism and that the struggle against the United States took precedence over all other issues naturally appealed to many Japanese Communists, playing as it did on nationalism and to those xenophobic, racial sentiments which have long formed a part of Japanese political culture. In short, the elements

⁷⁷ According to a survey by the Cabinet Research Office, the number of Japanese visitors to Communist areas was 2 in 1951, 34 in 1952, 225 in 1953, and 249 in 1954. This number suddenly increased in 1955 to 898—209 to the Soviet Union, 464 to Communist China and 225 to other Communist countries. Yomiuri Daily, March 24, 1956.

⁷⁸ Robert A. Scalapino, "Moscow, Peking, and the Communist Parties of Asia," Foreign Affairs, XLI (January 1963), 323-25.

of nationalism, Asianism, and militancy explicit in Chinese doctrines, the fervent anti-Westernism, and the racial overtones served as a powerful magnet, especially to younger Japanese Communists.

Then how did the actual dominance of the CCP in the control and guidance of the JCP take place? How effective were these efforts? To what extent was the pro-Peking faction developed within the JCP? As the JCP moved underground during the Korean War, the Secretary-General Tokuda Kyūichi, and most of the Party leaders transferred their headquarters from Tokyo to Peking, where they could direct the guerrilla warfare strategy under the guidance of the CCP.⁷⁹ Putting bits of information together through

⁷⁹Though there were wide speculations in Japan about Nosaka Sanzō's second sojourn in China during the early 1950's, Nosaka was hiding at the home of Professor Matsuura Hajime in Hokkaidō, Japan. Nosaka was reported to have said to the Party cadres, just before he went in to hiding: "In so far as my theory of revolution was criticized by the Cominform, I would not hide in Peking like comrade Tokuda until such time as the rectification of my theory was made. I would rather remain in Japan and try to correct the mistakes." Notwithstanding this statement, Nosaka severed all contacts with his Party members during the turbulent and confusing militant era of the JCP and reappeared at the Sixth National Party Conference in 1955 when it once again adopted legalized and parliamentary policies. During the vacuum period of the leadership between 1950-1953, de facto control of the Party was in the hands of the middle-echelon leaders like Itō Ritsu and Shida Shigeo. A detailed account on Nosaka's whereabouts during the militant period is given in Mizushima Takeshi, op. cit., pp. 120-124.

available English and Japanese source materials, we can reconstruct the following account of the possible "underground railway" system:

The JCP leaders facing detention or young terrorists wanted for acts of violence suddenly disappeared with the help of "underground railway" network, and Japanese police were unable to locate them. Thereafter, these people boarded the small fishing fleet clandestinely owned by the JCP (so-called "People's Fleet" or Jinmin Kantai) at inconspicuous ports like Yakizu, Ito, and Shirahama. When these ships reached the international water, the Chinese Communist convoy ship appeared at the prearranged spot. After one week voyage they arrived at Shanghai. In Communist China, the younger Japanese Communist cadres received an intensive training at the Marx-Lenin Institute of Peking, while older leaders worked closely with their Chinese comrades.⁸⁰

In addition to this training of the JCP members in Peking, the Chinese Communists also helped their Japanese counterparts with a substantial amount of financial aid through undercover Chinese trading firms located in Japan.

⁸⁰ According to Robert Scalapino, most Mainstream leaders of the JCP and nearly one hundred younger cadres went to exile in Peking after 1951. See Scalapino, op. cit., p. 93; Thereafter, the number of the China-trained JCP members increased substantially. According to Hirotsu Kyōsuke, China is said to have received about 1,500 Japanese Communists from 1953 to 1957. Many of them returned home in the spring of 1958. See "Strategic Triangle: Japan" in Leopold Labedz (ed.), International Communism after Khrushchev (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1966), p. 128; On the operation of the "People's Fleet" Mizushima indicates that the JCP owned about ten ships between 1951 and 1955, mostly consisting of 10-30 ton delapidated fishing ships replenished with powerful engines and radar equipment. See Mizushima Takeshi, op. cit., pp. 102-106.

But by far the most extensive effort by the CCP was the development of the China-trained leaders among the young JCP members who later, holding the most sensitive and vital posts in the Party in the 1960's, would push the direction of the JCP to a Peking-oriented policy in the midst of the Sino-Soviet conflict.⁸¹

To the Chinese Communists, the end of the Korean War in 1953 lessened the immediate necessity for the disruptive activities against American forces in Japan. The end of war in Indochina in 1954 and the successful diplomatic maneuvering by Chou En-lai during the Geneva Conference elevated the prestige of Communist China. From the Bandung Conference of 1955 to 1958, the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China was characterized by the primary emphasis on peaceful coexistence and moderation. Pertaining to the extensive efforts by Chou En-lai during the

⁸¹ Among the most important China-returnees of the 1950's in the JCP were Doki Tsuyoshi, Chief Editor of Akahata in the 1960's; Ishida Seiji, Assistant Editor, Akahata; Anzai Kurazi, Chief of the Personnel Section of the Party; Fujii Teiji, Chief of the Finance Section of the Party; Inoue Hayashi, Editor of Sekai Seiji Shiryo (Documents on World Politics) during the 1960's; Okada Bunkichi, member of the JCP Control Commission. Okada was in charge of the operation of the underground railway, "People's Fleet." Other JCP cadres trained in China during 1951-1955 were Kameda Togo, Kaneko Kenta, Kawada Kenji, Kikunami Tsuyoki, Nakamura Motouemon, Nishizawa Ryuji, Omura Einosuke, Takakura Teru, and Tsuchibashi Kazuyoshi. For the further details on the China-trained JCP members, see Mizushima Takeshi, op. cit., pp. 104-105.

Bandung Conference to impose a new image of China, Scalapino draws an interesting parallel with Nosaka's "peaceful revolution" theme:

Chou En-lai's campaign to make the CCP lovable on an international scale bore a surprising resemblance to Nosaka's earlier efforts on the Japanese domestic front.⁸²

Together with this tactical shift of the Chinese foreign policy and the receding influence of the CPSU over the JCP during this period, it was quite possible that the JCP's policy change from "hardline" (1950-1953) to legal struggle beginning with the JCP Sixth National Party Conference (1955) was not conflicting with the prevailing goal of the Chinese foreign policy. By mid-1955, the Chinese Communists were deeply involved in the intra-party affairs of the JCP. After all, the CCP maintained a closer contact with the JCP leaders and had better knowledge of the JCP's internal problems than the CPSU by this period. Furthermore, there is good reason to believe that the promotion of Miyamoto Kenji to the post of Secretary-General during the Sixth National Party Conference was, in addition to his astute political skill, partially due to the CCP support given him.⁸³

⁸²Scalapino, op. cit., p. 88.

⁸³This view was expressed by Kasuga Shōjirō in his November 26, 1963 interview with Scalapino. See ibid., p. 96. In view of the fact that Kasuga was ousted from the JCP after the polemical debate over "structural reformism" by this time, he might have conveyed this view to smear Miyamoto.

Summary Appraisal

Up to now, this chapter has discussed the turbulent ten year period of the postwar Japanese Communist movement in the context of domestic conditions and international Communism that affected the strategic change of the Party.

During the immediate postwar period, the JCP emerged for the first time as a legal organization to lay the foundations for a mass party in the midst of the unsettled political, social, and economic dislocation of defeated Japan. Ironically, it was due to the American Occupation policy of the "democratization" of Japan that the left-wing political movement blossomed. With their energies devoted solely to the reorganization of the once-defunct Party, the Japanese Communist leaders under the patriarchal one-man rule of Tokuda Kyūichi paid little attention to galvanizing an over-all strategy during the initial period. A basic, strategic guideline was set without substantial changes from the prewar 1932 Thesis.

The postwar JCP movement passed through three phases from the beginning of the Occupation. During the first phase of 1946-1950, Nosaka Sanzō's "peaceful revolution" (in making the "lovable Communist Party") symbolized the "new look" of the JCP and gave it a fresh image to the Japanese populace. It was a pragmatic approach to increase the popular basis of the Party, simultaneously aiming to

shed the old image of the prewar Party as being directed by the Comintern for radical overthrow of the existing political system.

The second period (1951-1953), highlighted by the Cominform blast of Nosaka's "peaceful revolution" strategy in the wake of the Korean War, was characterized by the JCP's abrupt shift to "hard-line" operations that were directed from underground and overseas. That attack, symbolizing the intervention of both Moscow and Peking in the internal affairs of the JCP, proved conclusively how little independence the JCP had. In addition to this, the constant crisis of leadership caused by the internecine factional strife between the Mainstream (Chūō) faction and the Anti-Mainstream (Kokusai) faction, doctrinal disputes over the revolutionary strategy in Japan, and endless mutual recriminations contributed to the eclipse of the Party and the dwindling of mass membership. Also it was the "left-wing" adventurism to recreate a Yenan in Japan under totally different local conditions which brought a major disaster to the JCP. As a result, the Party, even after it became legalized once again in 1955, continued to be a minor splinter party, polling about three percent of the national vote on a regular basis, and no more than ten percent (1949) under the most favorable conditions.

The third period (1953-1955), following the Korean Armistice and the subsequent international détente after the

death of Stalin, witnessed the JCP's return to legalism. The Sixth National Party Conference held in 1955 was the key event for the emergence of the Miyamoto-Hakamada group from the old International faction. Nosaka, though previously identified with the Mainstream faction, quickly switched sides and collaborated with the Miyamoto-Hakamada group. Ever since, Nosaka has remained as the titular head of the Party, while Miyamoto Kenji's leadership has been gradually consolidated thereafter.

As for the collateral ties of the JCP with Moscow and Peking at the international level, the Japanese Communists have been subjected to constant interventions emanating from the Communist power centers.

Notwithstanding the manifest statement of the JCP for autonomy and independence by Tokuda as early as 1945, an acrimonious Cominform criticism of "peaceful revolution" five years later conclusively proved that the center of basic policy guidance was Moscow. Also Peking's Jen-min Jih-pao editorial in supporting the Moscow criticism was a decisive turning point to force the strategic shift congruent with the Moscow-Peking "hard-line" policy.

The emergence of Peking as a second major Communist power center has fundamentally altered the situation in Asia. The geo-political importance, the common cultural bond, and the the attraction of the Chinese revolutionary model contributed to the gradual acceptance of the Peking dominance

over the JCP. Starting in 1950 and particularly after 1953, the People's Republic of China was more deeply involved in the internal affairs of the JCP than the Soviet Union, which was undergoing the period of domestic political uncertainty after the death of Stalin. During the underground activity period of the Japanese Communists, the Chinese compatriots provided a safety haven for fugitive Japanese Communists, trained more than one hundred first- and second-generation Japanese Communist leaders, and unwaveringly supplied funds for the operation of the illegal JCP. Up until the middle of the 1950's there was no substantial evidence to doubt the CCP-CPSU collusion over the control of the JCP.

In the final assessment of the impact of the CCP-CPSU influence over the direction of the JCP the author asserts that neither the Soviet nor the Chinese Communist road to power had much relevance for Japan as compared with other Asian countries--North Korea, North Vietnam, India, and Indonesia--which have had substantial Communist party influence at one time or another. Paradoxically, the political and socio-economic conditions faced by Western European Communists seemed to be closer to those in Japan. This was especially true of Italy and France, where the Communists operated in a similar context of rapid modernization (urbanization and industrialization), where they could count, as in Japan, on some degree of cooperation from

the Socialist left, and where they must overthrow a seemingly permanent conservative government. So viewed, it is not quite surprising that Togliatti's "Structural Reform" theory was to be extensively debated during the doctrinal dispute in the 1960's between the Mainstream and Anti-Mainstream factions over the strategy of Japanese Communism.

CHAPTER IV

THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT: SCHISM AND CLEAVAGE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM (1956-1969)

Since the Second World War, there has been much concern over the "Cold War" issues of East-West tensions caused by the threat of monolithic Communist bloc unity. However, the death of Stalin in 1953, the subsequent secret speech on de-Stalinization and "peaceful co-existence" by Nikita Khrushchev during the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in February 1956, the unleashing of polycentrism in Eastern Europe, and the Sino-Soviet rift marked the end of the supremacy and undisputed leadership of the Soviet Union in the intra-bloc relationship among the world Communist parties. In view of the fact that there have been numerous publications concerning the Sino-Soviet

conflict in general,¹ this chapter will treat the issues of the Sino-Soviet conflict to the extent that they have some relevance for the JCP's behavior. Regarding the source materials, besides the primary emphasis on English publications, additional efforts were made to include Japanese source materials.

It is the purpose of this chapter to discuss briefly the origin and exhalation of the Sino-Soviet rift, to present five major issue cleavages, and finally, to assess the specific impact of the Sino-Soviet conflict on three areas: 1) East-West relations; 2) intra-bloc relations of international Communism; and 3) Asian Communist parties.

¹On the Sino-Soviet dispute, see Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961 (New York: Atheneum Press, 1964); idem, Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi (Pegasus, N.Y.: Western Publishing Co., 1967); David Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964); William E. Griffith, Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1963); idem, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1964); Alexander Dallin, Jonathan Harris, and Grey Hódnett. (eds.), Diversity in International Communism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); G.F. Hudson et al. (eds), The Sino-Soviet Dispute (New York: New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961); Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (rev. ed.; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 409-42; U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sino-Soviet Conflict: Report on Its Implications, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., House Document No. 237 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965); Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Patterns and Limits of the Sino-Soviet Dispute," Problems of Communism, IX, 5 (September-October, 1960), 1-7; Richard Lowenthal, "Schism among the Faithful," Problems of Communism, XI, 1 (January-February, 1962), 1-14; Robert A. Scalapino, "The Sino-Soviet Conflict in Perspective," The Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCL (January 1964), 1-14; Shikai Shugi Seiji-Keizai Kenkyūsho (ed.), Chūso Ronsō (The Sino-Soviet Dispute) (Tokyo: Godō Shuppan-sha, 1963); Japanese International Politics Association (ed.), Chūso Tairitsu to Sono Eikyō (The Sino-Soviet Conflict and Its Influences) (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1965).

The Chronological Background of
the Sino-Soviet Conflict
(1956-1969)²

Since Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech on de-Stalinization and his use of the "peaceful co-existence" theme at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956, to which is attributed the crumbling of the monolithic control of the Soviet Union in the intra-bloc relations of the world Communist parties, the Sino-Soviet dispute has evolved in six stages. Each stage is noted for its special characteristics.

The first stage (1956-1957) was marked by primary reliance upon private bilateral relations in which Russian and Chinese authorities sought to persuade each other of the necessity to find peaceful means of ideological conflict resolution by communications and visitations strictly on a party-to-party level of negotiation.

The second stage, starting from the fall of 1957, marked the beginning of formal Sino-Soviet disputes, which quickly were carried into openly acrimonious denunciation, spreading its effect on the rest of the international

²Acknowledgment is made of the influence of Robert A. Scalapino's five-stage development of the Sino-Soviet dispute in his article "The Sino-Soviet Conflict in Perspective," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCLI (January 1964), 1-14, as a limited frame of reference for the chronological tracing of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Communist movement. This stage was noted for the truly fierce interparty and interpersonal attacks that took place at the Bucharest and Moscow international conferences of Communist parties in 1960.³ As a result, the Sino-Soviet dispute produced a realignment of the European, Latin American, and Asian Communist parties. Incessant attempts were made by both sides to support "antiparty" elements

³Professor Onoe Masao of Kōbe University contends that the CCP started the Sino-Soviet polemical dispute as early as April 1, 1960. He cites a series of articles by the CCP on the Lenin anniversary controversy: "Forward Along the Path of the Great Lenin," article by the editorial department of Jen-min Jih-pao, April 22, 1960, as translated in Peking Review, 17 (April 26, 1960), pp. 29-30; Long Live Leninism (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1960), p. 22; Liu Ting-yi, "United under Lenin's Revolutionary Banner," ibid., p. 103. Liu Ting-yi's article severely criticized the tendency toward modern revisionism by a certain party [CPSU] in naively believing that the objectives of capitalistic imperialism changed. By shifting to this modern revisionism, Liu's article pointed out, a certain party was diluting firm Leninist principles of the inevitability of war between the capitalist and socialist camp and straying toward opportunism. The CPSU rebuked the CCP criticism: "Leninism is the Banner of Our Era," Izvestia, April 22, 1960; "Realization of the Leninist Thought," Pravda, April 22, 1960. For the further discussion of the initial inter-party debate during April 1960, see Onoe Masao, "Chuso Ronso ni Taisuru Hitotsu no Kaishaku," (An Interpretation on the Sino-Soviet Dispute) in Japan International Politics Association (ed.), Chuso Tairitsu to Sono Eikyō (The Sino-Soviet Conflict and Its Influences), p. 1.

within the opposing camp. This global competition was marked by the growth of old and the emergence of new pro-Chinese factions in most of the non-ruling and ruling Communist parties of the world, and by mounting evidence that many of them were receiving encouragement and aid from Peking. Likewise the CPSU was busy counterbalancing the pro-CCP factions by whipping up support among the orthodox fraternal parties and by calling for an additional international conference to put the CCP in a minority position. Thus, party-to-party relations were now deeply involved.

The public attack by Khrushchev on Albania in October 1961 during the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU marked the third stage, which was noted for the official entry of the controversy into the public arena. The Soviet Union had started denouncing "sectarianisms" of Albania and Communist China, and desperate efforts were made to stop their defiance of Soviet leadership. Likewise Communist China criticized the "modern revisionism" of the Soviet Union and its rapprochement with Yugoslavia. The language used in the controversy was also becoming more extreme, although polemical disputes were limited to the publication of a series of anonymous articles by both parties. During this heated polemical dispute between the CPSU and the CCP, Albania and Yugoslavia were used to symbolize China and the

USSR respectively, and the full range of the dispute-- the harsh tone of mutual denunciation--was progressively explored to smear one another. Soon Communist parties in the world were forced to take positions on many of the burning issues. Some parties, notably in Asia, sought to establish a neutralist position. Robert A. Scalapino gives the following assessment of the Asian Communist parties in the aftermath of the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU:

History may well record that the truly significant aspect of this great crisis in the Communist world has been the attitudes and policies of Asian Communist leaders--not just those of Peking, but those of Djakarta, Pyongyang, Hanoi and Tokyo as well. If Khrushchev had hoped to isolate China on the issue of Albania, he failed. And nowhere did he fail more resoundingly than in Eastern Asia where only the parties of Outer Mongolia and Ceylon came quickly to his side. Elsewhere he called for full support in vain. A new phenomenon emerged--neutralism within the Communist bloc. The great bulk of the Asian Communist movement chose to remain non-aligned between Moscow and Peking, and this was in itself a defeat for Khrushchev, especially when, as in many cases, it was non-alignment that leaned toward Peking.⁴

⁴Robert A. Scalapino, "Moscow, Peking and the Communist Parties of Asia," Foreign Affairs, XLI, No. 2 (January, 1963), 324. On the other hand, Donald Zagoria gives a rather cautious assessment of the nonalignment of the Asian Communist parties: "It is extremely important also to qualify the Asian parties' 'support' for Peking. Abstention is after all a middle-of-the-road position. None of the Asian parties followed Chou En-lai's example by criticizing the Russians implicitly for their attack on Albania. The Congress, therefore, made it plain that the depth of commitment of the European, Middle Eastern, and Latin American parties to the Russians is for the most part greater than the depth of commitment of the Asian parties to Peking." See Zagoria, op. cit., p. 381.

With the exception of Albania, most of the European, Middle Eastern, and Latin American Communist parties supported the Soviet Union during the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU.⁵ Following this Congress, state-to-state relationships between the Soviet Union and China deteriorated rapidly, with each side accusing the other of subversive activities and interference in internal affairs.

The fourth stage of the Sino-Soviet dispute developed in the fall of 1962, in the midst of the simultaneous incidents of the Sino-Indian border clash and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The vicarious denunciation of Albania and Yugoslavia ceased, and the main targets were focused around stinging criticism of each other by use of anonymous writers' polemical articles. In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the CPSU, furious at Chinese criticism of the Soviet Union and more specifically of Premier Khrushchev (first, for his resorting to "reckless adventurism" and, then, capitulating with disgrace in the wake of a nuclear threat by the U.S.) retaliated by using various party congresses in Eastern-Europe for open criticism of the CCP. Meanwhile, the CCP was gathering support from most Asian parties and building pro-CCP splinter factions throughout the world Communist parties, while the CPSU held firmly to most of the official party

⁵Ibid., p. 381.

organizations outside the Far East.

The famous June 14, 1963, letter from the CCP Central Committee to the CPSU⁶ and the abortive Moscow Conference of the International Communist Parties of July 1963 marked the fifth stage in the annals of the Sino-Soviet dispute. For the first time the Chinese openly and vehemently attacked Khrushchev by name, demanding his total repudiation by true Communists as a revisionist and a traitor to the movement. Russian sources answered with direct and vigorous attacks upon the CCP, although no Chinese leaders were mentioned by name. State-to-state relations deteriorated further. By this time, the Soviet Union's technical and economic aid to China had been diminished to a minimal scale, and China appeared to be turning increasingly to the non-Communist world for her needs. Large quantities of wheat were purchased by Communist China from Australja and Canada. The Sino-Soviet cultural exchange was minimal and political relations

⁶The CCP general line in the Sino-Soviet dispute is set forth in detail in the "Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Reply to the Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of March 30, 1963" (hereafter referred to as the June 14th Letter of 1963), (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963). The complete text of this letter by the CCP Central Committee is also available in William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1964), Documents Collection, No. 2, pp. 259-88.

remained strained. The reverberations of the split within the international Communist movement continued to be very serious. Some orthodox Communist parties uncovered pro-Peking splinter factions significant enough to be troublesome, but, outside of East Asia and the Pacific, the Soviet Union held its earlier wide support. However, gradually, as a direct impact of the Sino-Soviet rift, a new trend of independence was beginning even among the East European Communist parties which had hitherto supported the Soviet Union at international conferences.

Lastly the sixth stage of the Sino-Soviet conflict was marked by the open rupture of the state-to-state relationship following the Russo-Chinese territorial dispute which culminated in the Ussuri River border clash in March 1969. For awhile, there were repeated skirmishes, mutual casualties, and a wave of war hysteria in Moscow and Peking. Although formal diplomatic rupture had not taken place, each side recalled its ambassador. Although the violence subsided after awhile and China has followed a cautious course in foreign policy in spite of her verbal aggressiveness, the conflict is still smoldering under the surface.

Five Major Issues of the Sino-Soviet Conflict

Having sketched the historical background of the Sino-Soviet dispute, it is necessary to analyze the roots of the polemical dispute on major issues that impair unity. Different lists of the issues might differ drastically, depending upon each one's conceptual focus in analyzing the dispute.⁷ In this section of the chapter, five major issues

⁷William E. Griffith in The Sino-Soviet Rift: Analyzed and Documented (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1964), pp. 20-23, points out ten recognizable issues in the Sino-Soviet Conflict—Inter alia, different views on "the fundamental nature of the present epoch," different views on "the qualitative change in the nature and destructiveness of the thermonuclear war," different views on "peaceful co-existence," clashes of state interests between China and the Soviet Union, different views on "the transition to socialism and national liberation in underdeveloped countries," the leadership struggle between Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung, different claims of the "leading" role of the CPSU and the CCP in international Communism.

Donald Zagoria in The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961 (New York: Atheneum, 1964) concentrates on six major issues of the Sino-Soviet conflict, namely, the debate over de-Stalinization and intra-Bloc relations (chapter 1), the dispute over communes and the road to Communism (chapter 3), the origins of the dispute over global strategy: November 1957 (chapter 5), the dispute about a détente with the West (chapter 9), the dispute about the "National Liberation Movement" (chapter 10), Khrushchev's attack on Albania at the 22nd Party Congress of the CPSU (chapter 16).

Robert C. North in Moscow and Chinese Communists (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1963), pp. 282-91, discusses the Sino-Soviet controversy after the 20th Congress of the CPSU on five crucial issues: 1) different views on the achievement of power by the Communist party in the advanced industrial state and in the underdeveloped nation; 2) different views on the transition to socialism; 3) different views on the peaceful co-existence of states with differing political systems; 4) competition for the control of India and the Indian Communist Party; and 5) different views on nuclear war.

of the Sino-Soviet conflict will be extensively discussed. However, it should be emphasized that these five categories--though not necessarily the dominant problems of the Sino-Soviet conflict--are closely interrelated. For the analytical purpose of linking the Sino-Soviet dispute to the JCP's attitude, the following issues are omitted: the leadership struggle between Mao Tse-tung and Khrushchev, diatribes on racism, the Soviet Defense Aid issue and atomic development of China (1957-1959), the Sino-Soviet dispute over the Formosa Strait issues (1958), and Sino-Soviet competition in economic aid to underdeveloped countries.

Before undertaking the analysis of the five major issues of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the author wishes to state the major hypothesis that the basic incongruity between pluralism in the Communist world and monolithism in Communist ideology had a direct impact on the Sino-Soviet conflict. Given this incongruity of theory and reality, we can further posit here that the basic roots of intra-bloc schisms in international Communism already existed well before the Sino-Soviet conflict. These roots were different histories of national Communist movements, different national environments, nationalism, different qualities of indigenous leadership, different perceptions of Marxist-Leninist ideology to fit the particular conditions of each country,

and different interest calculations.⁸ These schisms might not have occurred so rapidly or at all had it not been for that conflict. In this sense, the Sino-Soviet conflict was both a direct stimulant of a larger phenomenon, the crisis of international Communism, and a major catalyst that brought the overall changes in intra-bloc organizations and decision-making processes of both the ruling and non-ruling Communist parties prompting the road toward "national Communism."

The Sino-Soviet Dispute over
Different Roads to Communism⁹

Implicit in this dispute was the controversy over the bypassing by the CCP of unilinear historical stages of development from socialism to Communism and its challenge to the CPSU's supposedly advanced stage toward Communism.

⁸ Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, Communism in Korea, Part I (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972) develop an interesting thesis that in analyzing the Communist movement whether in Korea or in comparable societies it is necessary to consider three factors: Communism, emergence, and tradition. Their use of both historical and social science methods enables them to treat each of these forces in a definitive manner. The present author, though basically agreeing with Scalapino and Lee's thesis, takes a much broader position in presenting the multi-faceted roots of the indigenous development of Communism in many countries.

⁹ This part relies largely on the lecture materials by Professor Charles E. Timberlake in the course of History 341 "Sino-Soviet Conflict" given at the University of Missouri-Columbia during the Second Semester 1970 and his article titled, "The 'Transition to Communism' As a Factor in the Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1949-1964," pp. 1-13 (paper presented to the Missouri Valley History Conference in Omaha, Nebraska, March 15, 1969).

The main focus of the dispute over "transition to Communism" was the people's commune movement as an integral part of the collectivization of agriculture and the "Great Leap Forward" of industrialization by the CCP in 1958. In assessing the overall importance of the Sino-Soviet conflict over the Chinese people's commune as a contest over power, over economics, over the pace of domestic revolutionary advance, and over basic ideology, Donald Zagoria stresses it as a major factor in the Sino-Soviet conflict:

The conflict over the communes and the "transition to Communism" cannot be viewed as a marginal element of the overall Sino-Soviet conflict. . . . To minimize the importance of the dispute over the communes is to miss some of the basic factors producing conflict. . . . It is a contest for power because the Chinese Communist Party has strongly suggested that Mao has solved the problem of building Communism in an underdeveloped country with a large peasant population and that this solution is valid for all underdeveloped countries. For the Russians to concede this would be tantamount to conceding to Peking the leadership of the revolution in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The Commune controversy is a contest over economics because the Chinese "general line" is based on economic conception radically different from that governing the Soviet Five Year Plans. . . . It represents a carefully considered conclusion by the Chinese that their economic problems cannot be solved by following the Soviet model, that China in fact has to develop a new and unique model for socialist and Communist construction. It stands thus as a challenge to basic Soviet economic planning. The commune dispute is, thirdly, a contest over the pace of domestic revolutionary advance. They [Chinese] hope, via the communes, to speed the transition to Communism and, accordingly, to sustain popular enthusiasm. Finally, the dispute is one of basically different ideological perspectives. Adapting general Marxist-Leninist principles on the construction of Communist society to the specific framework of Chinese society, Mao has produced a Chinese variant of Marxism-Leninism. By 1960, Chinese journals were once again, as in

1949-1951, claiming that Mao had "sinified" Marxism-Leninism."¹⁰

As a revolutionary device for total political mobilization of the agrarian Chinese society, the "Great Leap Forward Movement" in industry and agriculture started under the Second Five Year Plan of the People's Republic of China in 1958. One of the prominent features of this new industrialization drive was the emphasis on heavy industry and steel production through the processing of scrap iron by backyard steel furnaces. Simultaneously agricultural collectivization started with the transfer of 500 million Chinese peasants to balanced agricultural-industrial communes of about 5,000 to 6,000 families each. This ambitious dual plan--industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture--was justified by the CCP as a shortcut to speed up the transition from socialism to Communism by greater, faster, and more economical ways. The official justification for the creation of the people's communes was announced in the Central Committee of the CCP resolution of August 29, 1958:

The overall and continuous leap forward in agricultural production in the whole country and the growing elevation of the political consciousness of the 500 million peasants. . . . Agricultural production is leaping forward at high speed, and the output of agricultural products is increasing by one hundred per cent, and

¹⁰ Donald Zagoria, op. cit., pp. 77-78.

several thousand per cent. This has further promoted the ideological liberation of the people.¹¹

Whereas all previous measures were justified in terms of what they would do to construct socialism, this resolution emphasized the role the people's communes would play in building Communism.¹² The people's commune, the resolution continued further, will develop into:

the basic social unit of the future communist society. . . . It appears now that the realization of communism in our country is no longer a thing of the distant future. We should actively employ the form of the people's commune to produce a concrete path for the transition to Communism.¹³

This was a direct challenge to the Soviet Union as the forerunner of the rest of the socialist countries in its advanced socialistic stage at the threshold of entering Communism. With respect to the CPSU's leadership role in building Communism, Timberlake has made the following comment:

By virtue of having been first, the CPSU became the historical and ideological leader of the international Communist "movement." Since the historical process was unilinear, any other party which seized power was

¹¹"On the Establishment of the People's Communes in the Rural Areas," August 29, 1958, in Daniels (ed.), A Documentary History of Communism, II (New York, 1962), pp. 374-75; also cited in Timberlake, "The 'Transition to Communism' As a Factor in the Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1949-1964," p. 3.

¹²Ibid., p. 3.

¹³"On the Establishment of the People's Communes in the Rural Areas," in Daniels, op. cit. II, pp. 375-77.

obliged to undertake the same programs the CPSU had pursued in the USSR: Collectivization, industrialization, purges, and so on. While other parties were implementing such programs, the CPSU would be moving farther along the road to Communism. It appeared, therefore, that all the way to Communism the Soviet Union was predetermined to be the leader of the movement, and that a master-apprentice relationship would continue to exist between the CPSU and other Communist parties. 14

How then did the CPSU react to the Chinese people's commune movement? Donald Zagoria gives the following detailed account:

First, the Soviets began a revival and intensification of Moscow's own ideological claims. . . . Second, they largely ignored, distorted, or minimized the communes and particularly the ideological claims for them. Third, the Soviet press began subtly to increase its stress on the enormous material and technological prerequisites for Communism and the impossibility of tampering with the "superstructure" before a radical increase had taken place in production "forces." Finally, they began polemically to stress the importance of material incentives in building Communism and the impossibility of introducing distribution according to "need" until the highest phase of Communism had been reached. 15

When members of the CPSU resorted to open criticism of the Chinese people's commune, they compared them to their own unsuccessful experiment with agricultural communes in the 1920's and called the Chinese efforts "reactionary."

¹⁴Timberlake, loc. cit., p. 2.

¹⁵Zagoria, op. cit., p. 109.

The pungent tone of the inter-party dispute over the Chinese version of the shortcut transition to Communism was brought to an open arena during the Twenty-First Congress of the CPSU in February 1959. In his address to the Congress, Khrushchev announced what was obviously a harsh criticism of the CCP:

The transition from the socialist phase of development to a higher phase is, first of all, a natural historic process which cannot be intentionally violated or bypassed. . . . Society cannot switch over to communism from capitalism without passing through the socialist phase of development. Lenin said. . . socialism must inevitably develop gradually into communism, on the banner of which is written: From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs. . . .¹⁶

In the same speech, Khrushchev referred to the Chinese as "building socialism," the phrase the Soviet press consistently applied to the Chinese and all other socialist countries, thereby ignoring Chinese claims based on the communes.¹⁷

The second round of the Sino-Soviet dispute over "transition to Communism" came about shortly after the CPSU had adopted the New Program following its Twenty-Second Congress in 1961. Timberlake indicates the prime motive of the adoption of the New Program by the CPSU:

The Soviet Union attempted to solidify its leadership position in the international communism movement by writing into the New Program solutions to the problems

¹⁶"Political Report to the Twenty-First Congress of the CPSU, January, 1959," in Daniels (ed.), op. cit., pp. 178 and 280; also cited in Timberlake, loc. cit., p. 5.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 281; also Timberlake, loc. cit., p. 6.

which had arisen between the CPSU and the CCP between 1958 and 1961.¹⁸

In defining the stages toward Communism, the New Program altered Khrushchev's statement made in 1959 at the Twenty-First Congress of the CPSU that all socialist countries would have a "more or less simultaneous" entry into Communism. Instead the New Program implied in a circuitous manner the primacy of the Soviet Union as the leader of the socialist countries because of its early historic emergence:

The fact that socialist revolutions took place at different times and that the economic and cultural levels of the countries concerned are dissimilar, predetermines the non-simultaneous completion of socialist construction in those countries and their non-simultaneous entry into the period of the full-scale construction of communism.¹⁹

The New Program of the CPSU also indicated that the Soviet Union was at the threshold of the Communist stage. The CCP, while by this time acknowledging the failure of the Great Leap Forward movement and the people's commune, retorted that the Soviet Union, in its rush to enter Communism alone, neglected the duty and obligation of bringing together other hapless fraternal socialist countries

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 7.

¹⁹ The New Society: Final Text of the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New Leader: Paperback, 1962), annotated by Herbert Ritvo, p. 23; also cited in Timberlake, loc. cit., p. 8.

trailing behind the Soviet Union in economic development. Hence, according to the Chinese criticism, the Soviet Union was plodding the road to Big Power Chauvinism. Another focal point of the pungent CCP criticism of the New Program of the CPSU was, Timberlake says,

the claim made by the leadership of the CPSU that the New Program was the blueprint for all parties to follow during the transition in their respective countries and the claim that the New Program superseded all other documents signed at inter-party congresses, even the Declaration (1957) and the Statement (1960).²⁰

The Sino-Soviet Dispute Over Global Strategy and the Nuclear War

In this section of the analysis, issues stemming from the debate over Communist revolutionary strategy and tactics in the mid-twentieth century will be discussed. During the Sino-Soviet dispute over the correct global strategy for the Communist bloc, an open schism occurred on the following points: What is the nature of the present epoch? What is Communist strength vis-à-vis the strength of the enemy? What ought to be the scope and plan of the Communist global strategy to triumph over the capitalist camp most quickly and with the least cost over its rivals? How ought the likely consequences of a nuclear war to be assessed?

²⁰Timberlake, loc. cit., p. 7.

The Sino-Soviet polemical dispute on the "nature of the present epoch" opened during the Moscow Conference of eighty-one Communist parties in November 1960.²¹ During the conference the Russians contended that the distinguishing feature of the present historical period was a world socialist system already capable, or soon to be capable of, influencing the development of world society through its manifest economic strength and prosperity. The Chinese held, on the other hand, that the period was still one of imperialism and the proletarian revolution.

With respect to the nature and extent of danger of thermonuclear warfare the Soviet Union, after its first development of the Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile and

²¹Reliable accounts of the whole proceedings of this conference are now available. See William E. Griffith, "The November 1960 Moscow Meeting: A Preliminary Reconstruction," The China Quarterly, No. 11 (July-September 1962), 38-57; Edward Crankshaw, "The Split Between Russia and China," Atlantic Monthly, CCII, 5 (May 1963), 60-65 (for speeches by the Latin American, Middle Eastern, Far Eastern, and European delegates); Idem, The New Cold War: Moscow and Peking (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1963), pp. 11-35 (for a detailed summary of Teng Hsiao-p'ing's two speeches); the full text of Maurice Thorez's December 15, 1960, report to the PCF CC, in Problèmes du mouvement communiste international (Paris: PCF, January 1963), of which the key new passages have been reproduced in Est et Ouest, XV, 294 (February 16-28, 1963), 4-7. The Japanese source on this conference gives an interpretation that the Moscow Statement (1960) was drafted as a compromise measure to reflect both the CPSU and the CCP view. Hence the Moscow Declaration (1957) and the Moscow Statement (1960) were later used by both parties to suit each one's polemical contention. See Asahi Daily Research Institute, Chūso Ronsō (The Sino-Soviet Dispute) (Tokyo: Asahi Daily, 1963), pp. 50-51.

the successful launching of the first earth satellite on October 4, 1957, started a reassessment of the strategic change wrought by these Soviet nuclear weapons developments. The Soviet Union contended that the immense dangers posed by thermonuclear warfare had introduced a "qualitative" change in the nature and destructiveness of thermonuclear war and a resultant change in the nature of imperialism, whose "sober circles" (e.g. President Kennedy) also realized this and therefore also wished to avoid such a war.²² The Soviet Union therefore declared that war was no longer inevitable, and that there now existed a possibility of avoiding war before the final victory of socialism and therefore of achieving general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Union used these views to justify its "general line" of peaceful co-existence as expounded by Nikita Khrushchev during the secret speech of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956. As such, according to the Soviet Union's further contention, every possible effort should be made to avoid inter-state conventional and thermonuclear wars (but not "wars of national liberation"), among other ways by giving priority to the struggle for general and complete disarmament and peaceful economic competition by the

²²"Let Us Strengthen the Unity of the Communist Movement for the Sake of Victory of Peace and Socialism," Pravda editorial, January 7, 1963; also cited in Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, p. 20.

socialist camp against the capitalist camp.²³

How did the Chinese Communists approach these problems? Though the Chinese concurred in the general Soviet analysis of the strength of the socialist camp in the historical epoch--the global power of imperialism has declined, the strength of the socialist camp has greatly increased, and victory is within grasp--the CCP challenged the basic premise of peaceful coexistence as a "general line" of all Communist strategy.²⁴ Thus, according to William E. Griffith:

The Chinese, while accepting peaceful coexistence in theory, declare it a tactic, not a strategy ("general line"), and insist that general and complete disarmament not be given priority over the "national liberation struggle," to which Moscow replies that the two are complementary, not contradictory. In late 1962 the Sino-Indian and Cuban crises and in mid-1963 the [nuclear] test ban treaty provided specific illustrations of differing Soviet and Chinese strategy and tactics on

²³ Robert A. Scalapino's interpretation of the "Peaceful Co-existence" of the Soviet Union is much broader than this. In Scalapino's interpretation, "'Peaceful Co-existence' between socialism and capitalism involves an unremitting ideological, political, and economic struggle, including a class struggle within capitalist societies and the steady advance of the national liberation movement. All Communists, however, have the solemn obligation to prevent a global nuclear war which is neither necessary nor of any conceivable advantage to Communism." See "The Sino-Soviet Conflict in Perspective," loc. cit., p. 9.

²⁴ According to a Japanese source on the Sino-Soviet conflict, both the CPSU and the CCP, while acknowledging the peaceful coexistence concept, differ on definition of the term. The CPSU and the CCP are diametrically opposed on the relationship between peaceful coexistence and the people's liberation movement (domestic revolution). See Asahi Daily Research Institute, Chuso Ronso (The Sino-Soviet Dispute) (Tokyo: Asahi Daily, 1963), p. 74.

this range of issues.²⁵

The explicit official position taken by the CCP on the questions of nuclear weapons and nuclear warfare was that the Chinese, like the Russians, had always held that nuclear war would be "an unprecedented calamity" for humanity.

However, according to an editorial article in Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily) of December 31, 1962, where the Chinese Communists disagreed was over the further conclusions to be drawn on the thermonuclear warfare:

Togliatti and certain others believe that the emergence of nuclear weapons 'has changed the nature of war' and that 'one should add other considerations to the definition of the just character of war.' We [the Chinese Communists] hold that the emergence of nuclear weapons has not changed and cannot change the fundamental Marxist-Leninist principles with regard to war and peace.

.
If, after we have done everything possible to prevent a nuclear war, imperialism should nevertheless unleash nuclear war, it would only result in the extinction of imperialism and definitely not in the extinction of mankind. . . . All Marxist-Leninists believe that the course of history necessarily leads to the destruction of nuclear weapons by mankind, and will definitely not lead to the destruction of mankind by nuclear weapons. [Italics in original.]²⁶

²⁵Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, p. 21.

²⁶Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily) editorial titled "The Differences between Comrade Togliatti and Us," December 31, 1962, dealt at length with the Chinese view on the main "ideological" issues. In terms of the format of the editorial, it was refuting ideas advanced by Togliatti and other Italian Communist leaders at their congress in December 1962, but, substantially, it set forth the CCP view as opposed to the CPSU's trend toward "modern revisionism."

Closely related to the question of nuclear war was Mao Tse-tung's following assessment of the East-West balance of forces during the Moscow conferences of the Communist leaders in November 1957:

I [Mao Tse-tung] am of the opinion that the international situation has now reached a new turning-point. There are two winds in the world today: the East wind and the West wind. . . . I think the characteristic of the situation today is the East wind prevailing over the West wind. That is to say, the socialist forces are overwhelmingly superior to the imperialist forces. [Italics supplied.]²⁷

This famous phrase by Mao Tse-tung—"the East wind prevails over the West wind"—was severely criticized by the Soviet leaders as having certain racial or regional connotations. Another related question of nuclear war was Mao Tse-tung's reported belief that "imperialists" were all "paper tigers." Khrushchev himself had seized on this point to remind the Chinese that, if imperialism was a paper tiger, it was a paper tiger with nuclear teeth. To this, the Chinese replied that Mao's view was a long-term one; that imperialism must be regarded "strategically" as a paper tiger, doomed to

²⁷ This excerpt from Mao's November 18, 1957, speech in Moscow is contained in his Imperialism and All Reactionaries Are Paper Tigers (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1958), p. 28. It is also in Peking Review, 37, November 11, 1958.

defeat, even though "tactically" it must be taken seriously.²⁸

The Sino-Soviet Dispute over the National Liberation Movement

With respect to the revolutionary struggle in the underdeveloped areas, the Russians voiced a doctrine of "national democracy" as a transitional phase on the way to socialism in underdeveloped countries and as the more progressive part of the "zone of peace" (the non-aligned world); where this condition existed, the Soviet Union was willing to give economic and political aid even to the national bourgeoisie which there played an "objectively progressive" role. On the other hand, the Chinese Communists took a much more pessimistic view of the national bourgeoisie and they "tended to discount the revolutionary role of the national bourgeoisie and to depend more heavily than the Russians upon development of the revolution, from the very first, under the hegemony of the proletariat."²⁹

²⁸ "Workers of All Countries Unite, Oppose Our Common Enemy," Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily) editorial, December 15, 1962. Also see both Zagoria, *op. cit.*, p. 304 and Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 257, who quote the same article from Hung Ch'i (Red Flag) of April 19, 1960: "Whichever way you look at it, none of the new techniques like atomic energy, rocketry and so on has changed the basic characteristics of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolution, as alleged by the modern revisionists."

²⁹ Robert C. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists (Stanford, California: Stanford University, 1963), p. 283.

This meant that they were inclined to distrust, as compared with the Soviet Russians, too great a dependency upon collaboration with NON-Communist leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru and Gamal Abdel Nasser. On the other hand, the Russians--as compared with the Chinese Communists--saw more possibilities for the achievement of power through relatively "peaceful" approaches. Thus, according to Robert C. North, in their attitudes toward the underdeveloped countries the Soviet Union placed heavy emphasis upon "revolution from above" by advocating support for "national bourgeois" leaders, even without "proletarian hegemony," and by advocating large-scale technical assistance to emerging nations.³⁰

The Soviet Union's official view on the role of the bourgeoisie in the national liberation movement was aptly expressed by Pravda as follows:

The working class is the most consistent enemy of imperialism. Nevertheless Lenin considered it natural that at the beginning of any national movement the bourgeoisie play the role of its hegemonic force (leader) and urged that in the struggle for the self-determination of nations support be given to the most revolutionary elements of the bourgeois-democratic national-liberation movements. [Italics supplied.]³¹

³⁰ Ibid., p. 283.

³¹ "Pravda on Supporting the 'Bourgeoisie' in New Nations," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XII, No. 34 (September 21, 1960), 18; also cited in Robert C. North, op. cit., p. 284.

From the Chinese Communist viewpoint these arguments were highly erroneous. The bourgeoisie, according to a Chinese Communist theoretician, "can not," "dare not," and "will not" lead the "true peasants' revolution" prerequisite to a "democratic revolution."³² The key to victory, as Liu Shao-ch'i made it clear, depended upon a firm seizure of hegemony by the proletariat through the Communist party. Liu was reminding how the misguided direction by the "right opportunists"—clearly implicating Comintern directives under Stalin's high-handed policy during 1920's—had made the crucial error of "capitulation" to the bourgeoisie in the name of the CCP-Kuomintang coalition of 1924-1927.³³

Also the Chinese Communists were directly challenging the lukewarm attitudes of the Soviet Union concerning the national liberation movement in the developing countries. The Chinese Communists, while admitting the importance of the incessant struggle between the socialist and the imperialist-capitalist camps, contended that an equal emphasis should be placed on the national liberation movement. Thus, according to Scalapino:

These movements (national liberation movement) together with the Socialist revolutionary movement are "the two

³²Wang Chia-hsiang, "The International Significance of the Chinese People's Victory," Ten Glorious Years (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960), p. 275.

³³Liu Shao-ch'i, "The Victory of Marxism-Leninism in China," Peking Review, No. 30 (October 1, 1959), p. 7.

great historical currents of our time," and the whole cause of the proletarian revolution hinges upon the outcome of the revolutionary struggles of the peoples of the non-Western world. ³⁴

The Sino-Soviet Dispute on Intra-Bloc Organization, Decision-Making, and Leadership

The basic issues related to the Sino-Soviet dispute over intra-bloc relationships have been at the center of international Communist politics since the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956. In essence, they involved the following problems: To what extent could the diversity of international Communism in the direction of sovereignty and independence be allowed? What were the different views toward the "centralist" and "confederative" theories of international Communist organization? How did they evolve? What were the limits of Soviet prerogatives vis-a-vis other Communist parties? To what extent did the Chinese challenge the Soviet leadership in intra-bloc affairs?

R An overt expression of the Chinese Communist stance on intra-bloc relationships emerged in November 1957, when the Communist leaders assembled in Moscow for the Fortieth Anniversary of the October Revolution and for an important conference on intra-bloc strategy. The main position of the Chinese Communists on the "centralist" versus "confeder-

³⁴ Robert A. Scalapino, "The Sino-Soviet Conflict in Perspective," p. 9.

ative" approach in intra-bloc organization from 1956 to 1962 was characterized by their vacillating attitudes, shifting from one position to another. A plausible interpretation, in the author's view, for this unpredictable behavior by the Chinese Communists could be ascertained in the light of linkage politics--close-knit connection with the domestic convulsion which compelled an abrupt change in Peking's foreign policy. Another explanation would be the changing nature of intra-bloc alignments in the aftermath of the open Sino-Soviet dispute of the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU in 1961. Faced with the imminent fate of being a minority in intra-bloc affairs, the Chinese Communists tenaciously clung to the "confederative" approach after 1960.

Zagoria mentions that in the light of the past record of the Chinese Communists who, from 1956 to early 1957, had urged the Russians to adopt a more moderate and flexible attitude toward other fraternal parties and who had argued for a confederative as opposed to a unitary solution to intra-bloc relations, the hopes of Gomulka, Togliatti, and Kadar--the exponents of liberal domestic policies within the Communist fraternal parties--hinged on Peking to continue the same stance on intra-bloc affairs.³⁵ To the surprise of the European polycentrists, Mao Tse-tung took a

³⁵Zagoria, op. cit., pp. 145-46.

"Centralist" position on the critical issues involving permissive diversity. Mao Tse-tung's strongest and most unqualified endorsement of Soviet leadership in intra-bloc relationships was voiced in his speech at Moscow University on November 17, 1957. "The socialist camp must have a head," he said, "and this head is the USSR." Moreover, "the Communist and workers' parties of all countries must have a head and that head is the CPSU."³⁶ One week later, the Jen-min Jih-pao editorial of November 25, 1957, summing up the conference, said it was "of great significance" that the Moscow meeting pointed out the central role of the Soviet Union in the solidarity of the socialist countries." The USSR's central position was "an objective reality brought about historically, and not something that someone [had] created artificially."³⁷ Zagoria postulates that it is quite likely that at the November 1957 conference the Chinese successfully forced the Russians to take a stiffer stand against Yugoslav revisionism than the Russians wanted to take.³⁸ In short, not only did Mao take a "hard line" against Gomulka and Tito on Soviet leadership of the

³⁶ Jen-min Jih-pao (The People's Daily), November 20, 1957. The speech was summarized by New China News Agency on November 18, 1957.

³⁷ Jen-min Jih-pao, November 25, 1957.

³⁸ Zagoria, op. cit., p. 149.

bloc, but he also made a major shift from earlier Chinese policy on bloc relations by avoiding any reference to the "equality" or "independence" of bloc members. What accounted for this shift of the Chinese Communist line on intra-bloc relations in November 1957? A plausible explanation is given by Zagoria, who contends that the CCP shift in intra-bloc policy was only one part of the overall strategic revision that occurred in Peking in the fall of 1957:

The CCP Left, which assumed dominance in the late summer and early fall of 1957, made three distinct changes in Chinese Communist policy at about the same time: (1) they moved from a cautious economic policy based on the Soviet model to a frenzied one based on the maximum exploitation of human labor power; (2) they changed from defenders of diversity within the camp to enforcers of unity; (3) and they reversed the cautious, defensive foreign strategy that had characterized Chinese policy since 1954. . . . The new attitude required an intra-bloc policy based on unity and strength. Preparing for a radical step-up in political and military pressure on the West under the cover of the Soviet deterrent, Peking's radicals could no longer tolerate in Eastern Europe the relatively diverse policies they had excused during the Bandung period. They needed a Bloc monolithism designed to bolster outward thrust.³⁹

Three years later, the CCP resorted to a tactical shift on the intra-bloc authority question. As the CCP-GPSU schism became obvious following the Bucharest Conference of June 1960 and the Moscow Conference of eighty-one Communist parties in November 1960, the Chinese Commu-

³⁹ Ibid., p. 150.

nists attempted to set strict limits on, if not cut back, Soviet leadership. The Chinese Communists were beginning to form anti-Soviet factions in Communist parties and front organizations throughout the world. After the enunciation of the Moscow Statement (1960), which acknowledged the principles of equality of bloc members and joint consultation in intra-bloc affairs, the Chinese Communists became the strong advocates of these principles. Now that the authority in the international Communist bloc has become more diffuse and the means of control more subtle, it was the Chinese Communists who wanted to gain maximum support of the small Communist parties by posing themselves as the champions of intra-bloc equality and autonomous decision-making.

A drastic reversal of the CCP position on intra-bloc relationships appeared in the wake of the denunciation of Albanian Party leadership by Khrushchev at the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU in October 1961. Though the CCP-CPSU diatribes were indirectly expressed through the denunciation of Yugoslavia and Albania, it was clear that the inter-party relationship between the CCP and the CPSU had deteriorated to the point of direct confrontation during this congress. The focal issue of controversy centered around bloc membership; the CCP challenged the CPSU leadership's ability to determine membership in the

international Communist movement, through such measures as its excommunication of the Albanians and its reacceptance of the Yugoslavs.⁴⁰ According to William E. Griffith, the Sino-Soviet polemics on the Albanian and Yugoslavian Communist parties evolved as follows:

The Chinese blame Moscow (as Moscow blames them) for the Albanian affair; and they declare that the Yugoslavs are imperialist agents and Khrushchev's attempt to reintegrate them into the international movement is another proof of this plot against Marxism-Leninism. The Russians reply that, while "serious ideological differences" still exist with Belgrade, Yugoslavia is a socialist country and the differences with it are being gradually overcome.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Donald Zagoria mentions, in many respects, that Khrushchev's open denunciation of the Albanians may in fact have been more an admission of weakness than an indication of strength. During the year and a half preceding the 22nd Congress, the Russians had imposed economic sanctions on Albania, and may even have attempted a coup. They had withdrawn (or been forced to withdraw) part or all of their submarine fleet. The Albanian Party continued to side with the Chinese on most outstanding issues of intra-bloc and global policy, evidently fearing above all that Khrushchev's rapprochement with Yugoslavia might ultimately lead to political annexation by Tito. In February, at the 4th Congress of the Albanian Party, there were defiant attacks on the "revisionists" who were trying to turn Albania's geographic encirclement "into an economic blockade and make effective the political isolation of our socialist country." They would not succeed in this attempt, however, because "socialist Albania is not alone." See Zagoria, op. cit., p. 376.

⁴¹ William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, p. 23.

On the question of the expulsion of the Albanian Communist Party from the international Communist movement the Chinese Communists argued that only the unanimity of all Communist nations should be applicable. Furthermore, Peking blamed Moscow for trying to force conformism on Albania instead of allowing national expression, while Moscow counter-charged that Peking had encouraged Albanian intransigence. From this polemical argument on intra-bloc relations it was evident that the Chinese Communists had shifted to the "confederative" approach of Communism, while the Soviet Russians had resorted to the "centralist" position. A plausible explanation for this shift of the Chinese Communists, as the present author conjectures, is that they ought to seek at all costs to avoid isolation within the Communist world. Since there was no guarantee that most of the Communist party delegations attending the Twenty Second Congress of the CPSU could be counted as favoring the Chinese position, the strong emphasis on national expression (unanimity in voting procedure, equality, and independence) had a strong overtone of protecting the Chinese minority views in international Communist conferences.

By 1963, the Sino-Soviet polemics on intra-bloc relations were clearly outlined in the consecutive

publications of the official party views.⁴² Scalapino summarizes the theoretical view of the CCP during 1963 as follows:

Central to the Chinese concept of international Communist organization was the principle that each Communist Party must be regarded as an independent and equal entity, possessing full "sovereignty" with respect to its internal affairs: The old emphasis upon a party as a branch of an organic international unity must be abandoned. Hence, any viable organization of Communist parties must be based upon the principle of universality of membership, with each party having an equal voice and no member being forced to accept decisions against its will. [*Italics in original.*]⁴³

With respect to the decision-making processes pertaining to the intra-party and intra-bloc affairs the Chinese Communists made a clear distinction. Within a single party, the principles of democratic centralism should continue to apply; the minority should accept majority decisions, and authority should flow from the top downward. Among fraternal parties of socialistic countries, however, decisions should be reached on the basis of consultation,

⁴² A strong overtone of the CCP "Confederative Theory of International Communism" was expressed in "The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves," which originally appeared in Jen-min Jih-pao and Hung-Ch'i on September 6, 1963 and was published in English in the Peking Review, No. 37 (September 13, 1963), pp. 6-20; The CPSU polemic on the intra-bloc organizational problem was published under the title of "the Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Central Committee of the CCP," March 30, 1963.

⁴³ Scalapino, "The Sino-Soviet Conflict in Perspective," p. 3.

discussion, consensus, and unanimity. Under no circumstances should one fraternal party interfere in the internal affairs of another.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union, though paying lip service to the equality and independence of each fraternal party, contended that responsibility must go with power. It did not intend to relinquish international Communist leadership to Peking. Although Moscow exchanged its "leading" role for that of a "vanguard" position by 1963, it continued to assert international validity for Soviet pronouncements (e.g., the 20th, 21st, 22nd Congresses and the CPSU New Program of 1961), which its supporters termed the "general line" of world Communism.⁴⁴

In the midst of the heated Sino-Soviet polemics over the leadership role in intra-bloc relations, in 1964 the Chinese Communists issued quite a new interpretation of Soviet leadership, drastically reversing Mao Tse-tung's acknowledgment in November 1957. The CPSU, the Chinese Communists complained, did not understand what Mao had meant when he insisted the Soviet Union be named the head of the socialist camp. "We hold," the CCP said, "the position of head does not contradict the principle of equality among fraternal parties. It does not mean that the CPSU has any right to control other parties; what it means is that the

⁴⁴ William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, p. 22.

CPSU carries greater responsibility and duties on its shoulders. . . ." "But," the Chinese Communists continued, while the leaders of the CPSU say they have no desire to be leaders of the movement "in practice they demand the privilege of lording it over all fraternal parties."⁴⁵

The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute over Russo-Chinese Boundaries and Territories.

Lastly, the Sino-Soviet dispute revolved around nationalistic-territorial differences. It is felt that, stripped of its rhetoric, the Sino-Soviet dispute is not a hair splitting debate over Communist ideology, but a gut confrontation between two intensely nationalistic states— one of which has become a "have" nation contented with the status quo, while the other is a profoundly dissatisfied "have not" nation, attempting to break up the status quo.⁴⁶ Hence, the Sino-Soviet conflict, eventually involved a clash of state interests.

⁴⁵"The Leaders of the CPSU Are the Greatest Splitters of Our Times; Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU (7)," Peking Review, VII, No. 6 (February 7, 1964), 11-13; Also cited in Timberlake, loc. cit., pp. 11-12.

⁴⁶Floyd, op. cit., pp. 194-95; Scalapino, "The Sino-Soviet Conflict in Perspective," pp. 8-9.

A manifestation of this intense nationalism has been the Sino-Soviet border disputes which go back more than a century to the time when Russia's Tsar Alexander II took advantage of the faltering Manchu Empire to seize pieces of territory all along the two nations' 4,500 mile joint frontier.⁴⁷ The Chinese Communists accused the Soviet Union of unjustly holding territory seized from the Chinese Empire and repeatedly urged the reassessment of the territorial boundaries through negotiation. The major geographic areas of dispute included especially parts of Central Asia and the Soviet Maritime provinces. The People's Republic of China further charged that the USSR was exercising an

⁴⁷ An excellent Japanese source material on the Sino-Soviet border dispute is Afro-Asia International Relations Research Institute (ed.), Chūgoku o Meguru Kok'kyō Funso (Border Dispute pertaining to China) (Tokyo: Gannandō, 1967). Iriye Keishirō's article, "Nelchinsuku Jōyaku no Kenkyū" (A Study of Nelchinsk Treaty) has an extensive coverage of the diplomatic relationship which led to the signing of Nelchinsk Treaty between China (Ch'ing Dynasty) and Tsarist Russia in 1689. Whole text of the treaty in Latin is included in pp. 41-43. Yano Jinkaza's article "Seidai Manshū o Meguru Rossia tonō Kok'kyō Mondai Koshō" (Ch'ing-Russia Border Issue Negotiation on Manchuria) discusses the border settlement on Manchuria and the author takes a strong position in sympathy of Ch'ing Dynasty, contending that both Aigun and Peking Treaties were forced by Tsarist Russia on Ch'ing Dynasty. Yano contends further the illegality of Tsarist Russian diplomatic default to attain political and economic advantage. Historical background of the Ussuri River boundary is extensively discussed in this article. Yano's arguments are that the Russian geographic survey units extensively explored this area, moved the Chinese residents there by force, and the Russian settlers were brought in before the signature of Peking Treaty. See pp. 51-55.

improper sphere of influence over outer Mongolia and in 1962 had instigated the open rebellion of tens of thousands of the Chinese nomadic ethnic minority group --the Kazahks-- from Sinkiang Province and brought them to the Russian territory of Kazakhstan.⁴⁸ The Chinese government also made it clear that its swelling population had more need--this argument still continues--of Siberia than Russia and could

⁴⁸ Another Chinese minority ethnic group in Sinkiang Province was the Uighurs. Immediately following the people's commune movement in China, the Uighurs rebelled against the collectivization of the farm by the People's Republic of China in 1958. The Uighurs, primarily having settled as farmers, attempted the separatist movement. However, unlike the Kazahks, the Uighurs did not have large number of ethnic groups in the Soviet Kazakhstan. Eventually the Uighur rebellion was crushed. The Soviet Union did not give any substantial support for the Uighur rebels. Probably it did not want to antagonize the Chinese government by meddling in the internal minority group problems in 1958. However, the situation was changed in 1962. In rebuking the Chinese government accusation of the Soviet Union for enticing tens of thousands of the Chinese Kazahks to the Soviet Kazakhstan and refusing to return them, Professor Sakamoto gives a convincing explanation that no matter how much the Soviet consulate exploited the ethnic friction in Sinkiang Province it was inconceivable that it could bring all the Chinese Kazahks to the Russian territory *en masse*. A plausible explanation, according to Sakamoto, would be that the Chinese Kazahks, being a nomadic group, detested the regimented collectivization during the Great Leap Forward Movement in China and chose the relatively affluent life in the Soviet Kazakhstan. For the detailed account of the Chinese Communist accusation of the Soviet Union in enticing the Chinese Kazahks, see Jen-min Jih-pao editorial, September 6, 1963. On the Japanese scholar's interpretation of the Chinese Kazahks' rebellion, see Sakamoto Koretada, "Shinkō o meguru Chūso Kankei," (The Sino-Soviet Relations on Sinkiang) in Afro-Asia International Relations Research Institute (Japan) (ed.), op. cit., pp. 155-74.

put it to better use. On the other hand, the Soviet Union avoided the issue and branded the Chinese territorial claims as pure chauvinism and accused China of violating the Sino-Soviet boundaries more than 5,000 times in 1962 alone.⁴⁹

The inter-party diatribe between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China arose in 1962 when Khrushchev, hitting back at Peking's criticism of his aborted Cuba venture, taunted the Chinese for allowing such "fragments of colonialism" as Hong Kong and Macao to survive on their soil. In rejoinder the Chinese said, in effect, "speaking of colonialism, what about the Tsars who annexed huge areas of China and rammed treaties down our throats to legalize the theft?" Thereafter, the Sino-Soviet boundaries bulked steadily larger in the disputes between Moscow and

⁴⁹ On the Sino-Soviet territorial disputes, see Alberto Ronchey, The Two Red Giants: An Analysis of Sino-Soviet Relations (New York: W.W. Norton, 1965), pp. 65-78; Klaus Mehnert, Peking and Moscow (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1963), pp. 248-87; J.M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 258-59; Robert E. Evans (ed.), Report from Red China (New York: Bantam Books, 1962), pp. 274-79; Harold C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), pp. 323-39; An Tai-sung, The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1973); Afro-Asia International Relations Research Institute (ed.), Chugoku o Meguru Kok'kyō Funso (Border Dispute Pertaining to China) (Tokyo: Gannandō, 1967); Harold C. Hinton, "Conflict on the Ussuri: A Clash of Nationalisms," Problems of Communism, XI (January-April 1971), 45-59.

Peking.⁵⁰ The most recent incident of border clash was in March 1969 over the control of Damansky Island (Russian name; the Chinese call it Chen-Pao Island). The two Damansky Island incidents--March 2 incident and March 15 incident--were quite different in level of conflict and outcome. Based on various documentation of both the Soviet Union and Communist China concerning these two incidents, the following general interpretation is made as to which side started the clash. The Chinese started the March 2 incident, taking the Russian guards on Damansky Island by surprise, while the Russians initiated fighting on March 15, 1969. A combination of local excesses, regional power struggle, and national-level policy changes motivated the Chinese to initiate action on March 2. The Russians caused the March 15 incident primarily for revenge and as the opening move in forcing the Chinese into border talks. The territory in dispute was a small island, formerly a peninsula, jutting out from the Chinese side of the Ussuri River. In the course of time, the Ussuri's shifting currents changed the peninsula into an island,

⁵⁰ Neville Maxwell, "China and the U.S.S.R. on the Brink," The New Republic (August 16, 1969), p. 17.

which both nations claimed.⁵¹ Following the Ussuri River incidents, the state-to-state relationship rapidly deteriorated, culminating in the recall of the ambassadors of both countries. The specter of a Sino-Soviet war was raised for awhile, but gradually diplomatic negotiation started and, in 1971, both countries resumed exchange of ambassadors.

⁵¹ For an excellent analysis of the Damansky Island clashes, see Thomas W. Robinson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes," American Political Science Review, LXVI, No. 4 (December 1972), 1175-1202. The following sources were used for the documentation of March 2 and March 15 incidents.

On the Soviet side: Yuri Dmitriyev, "Dangerous Provocations," Trud, March 5, 1969 (also TASS of the same day); Idem., "Provocative Sally of Peking Authorities," Pravda, March 8, 1969 (translation in Current Digest of the Soviet Press [CDSP], XXI, No. 10 [March 26, 1969], 4-5); Val Goltsev, "What Happened on Damansky Island," Izvestiia, March 8, 1969 (translation in CDSP, XXI, No. 10, 6-7); "Statement of the USSR Government," March 29, 1969, TASS and Pravda, March 30, 1969 (translation in CDSP, XXI, No. 13, [April 16, 1969], 3-5); Yuri Apenchenko and Yuri Mokeyev, "They Have Defended with Their Hearts! A Report from the Far Eastern Frontiers," Pravda, March 17, 1969; "Provocateurs Rebuffed," Pravda, March 17, (translation in CDSP, XXI, No. 11 [April 2, 1969], 5-6).

On the Chinese side: "Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China to the Soviet Embassy in China, March 2, 1969," New China News Agency (NCNA) Radio, March 3, 1969 (translation in Survey of China Mainland Press [SCMP] 4372 [March 11, 1969], pp. 17-19); "Down with the New Tzars," Jen-min Jih-pao and Chieh-fang-chun Pao joint editorial, March 4, 1969 (translation in SCMP 4373 [March 11, 1969], pp. 17-19); Jen-min Jih-pao, March 19, 1969, six photographs on p.4; "Statement of the Government of the PRC, May 4, 1969," Jen-min Jih-pao, May 24, 1969; "Note of the Foreign Ministry of the PRC to the Soviet Embassy in Peking," NCNA, March 15, 1969.

The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Conflict

The magnitude and intensity of the Sino-Soviet dispute have left indelible marks in international relations between East and West, the intra-bloc relations among the fraternal parties of international Communism, and the future course of Asian Communist parties. The purpose of this concluding section of the chapter is to assess how the Sino-Soviet conflict has affected each of these areas.

The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Conflict on East-West International Relations

Donald Zagoria gives an ample warning against wishful thinking subscribed to by many in the West that the Sino-Soviet conflict inevitably benefits the West:

In 1960 and 1961, at the very same time that Khrushchev's relations with Mao were deteriorating, so were his relations with the West. . . . So long as the Chinese remain on his left, accusing him of going soft on the West, Khrushchev, and any successor, will find it necessary to demonstrate to the Communist world that such charges are without foundation, that the Russians are just as militant in advancing Communist international aims as the Chinese. The Chinese have succeeded and may continue to succeed in forcing the Russians to pursue the offensive more forcefully and to take greater risks than they otherwise might, particularly in the under-developed areas, where the Russians, a white and European power, are at a disadvantage in competing with China for the loyalty of the local Communists.⁵²

⁵² Zagoria, op. cit., p. 399-400.

In so far as the Soviet Union maintained superiority over Communist China in all aspects of economic and military strength except sheer manpower, the former has neither needed nor desired the support of the West against the latter.

The antagonism between Moscow and Peking is an unforeseen, powerful and continuing factor in world politics. The Sino-Soviet rift compels the Soviet leadership to carry out its policies in an international environment that is far more complex and far less predictable than it would like or than it could have imagined twenty years ago. As for the specific impact of the Sino-Soviet border clash in 1969, one thing becomes clear; the whole strategic line of Soviet policy toward the West has been deflected since it has been forced to focus on the Russo-Chinese border defense. So far, according to a Japanese writer's estimate, the Soviet Union

has concentrated its 44-49 army crack-divisions along China's northern and northeastern borders (as compared with only 21 divisions at the time of the Damansky Island clash in 1969) and 150 ships of the Soviet Pacific fleet are cruising the vast area between the Japan Sea and the Indian Ocean, and traversing the East China and South Seas en route.⁵³

Moreover, Communist China's successful testing of nuclear bombs in 1964 and 1965 and the development of the nuclear delivery system must have worried the Soviet leaders.

⁵³Etō Shinkichi, "Japan and China--A New Stage?" Problems of Communism, XXI (November-December 1972), 3-4.

Based on these circumstantial factors, it becomes evident, ever since the Sino-Soviet border clash in 1969, that Moscow has had more reason than ever to seek some accomodation with the United States and the West in direction of an overall détente on major cold war issues. These are diplomatic pressures on Hanoi to come to a negotiated settlement with the United States on Vietnam War, relaxation of tension over "divided Germany," the Soviet leaders' summit diplomacy with President Nixon which led to the SALT agreement and the increased US-USSR trade volume, and the European Security Conference. In spite of these, it would be misleading optimism to speculate that the Soviet leaders will sacrifice any of their long-range traditional foreign policy goals in seeking further accomodation with the West. On many issues Soviet and Western purposes are and will remain at odds. For example, in supporting the Arabs in the Middle East conflict, in supporting the War of National Liberation in Southern African colonies, in protecting Castro's rule in Cuba, and in seeking to woo Nationalist allies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the Soviet Union is acting, in competition with the Chinese Communists, from its own motives and from its own power base, and it does not require or seek the support of either China or the West.

What has been the psychological impact of the Sino-Soviet conflict on East-West relations? Clearly, the Sino-

Soviet conflict has benefited the West. First, the myth of Communism as the wave of the future that prevailed throughout the Third World seventeen years ago has certainly been tarnished. The West has regained some of its lost leverage and self-confidence in its dealings with the developing countries where the ultimate triumph of Marxism-Leninism is no longer regarded as inevitable. Second, the very existence of a Maoist doctrinal challenge to Soviet "revisionism" has further weakened the image of an infallible and unified Marxism, subsequently reducing its appeal to the non-Communist world.⁵⁴

The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Conflict
on Intra-Bloc Relations

According to Zagoria, one of the most significant accompaniments of the Sino-Soviet conflict has been the tendency toward polycentrism in the international Communist

⁵⁴In denigrating the role of ideology as a factor in the Sino-Soviet conflict David Floyd mentions that "it will be difficult for any Communist leader, of whatever persuasion, 'dogmatic' or 'revisionist,' ever again to persuade people of the absolute rightness of his interpretation of Communist doctrine. The whole doctrine has in effect been thrown into the melting pot. . . ." See Mao Against Khrushchev, p. 202.

movement.⁵⁵ In addition to Zagoria's comment, this author contends that the bitter rivalry that has hardened between Russia and China has been both a stimulant and a consequence of this centrifugal tendency in international Communism. As a stimulant of polycentrism the Sino-Soviet conflict charted a course toward "nationalistic" Communism, each fraternal party adapting Marxism-Leninism "creatively" to the specific conditions of its country. As a consequence of polycentrism, senses of uniqueness, special interests, independent decision-making, and sovereignty have steadily grown among most of the ruling and non-ruling Communist parties of Eastern Europe (perhaps with the exceptions of Bulgaria and East Germany), Castro's Cuba in Latin America, and in Asia (with the exception of the People's Republic of Mongolia).

In intra-bloc relations, Communist China since 1960 has become the champion of independence and equality of each party and of the rule of unanimity in international Communist

⁵⁵ Though attributing to the Italian Communist Party leader Palmiro Togliatti in 1956 the origin of the term "polycentrism" to describe a situation in which Moscow would no longer dictate to other Communist parties, Zagoria mentions that the word may not be entirely appropriate for the set of relationships now emerging in the Communist world, inasmuch as there are not many but only two centers: Moscow and Peking. Hence he suggests the usage of "duo-centrism" as a better term except for the fact that it would imply a stable division of labor with lines of authority and spheres of influence clearly drawn. Zagoria, op. cit., f. 10, pp. 452-53.

conferences. That these emphases would be fostered by Communist China is understandable in view of the fact that China is now engaged in the historic task of defending her own sovereignty and minority rights against a Soviet-led majority in intra-bloc conferences.

So long as Communist China continues to set herself up as a rival contender of Marxism-Leninism in Sino-Soviet polemics, the smaller Communist parties, by playing off one big power against the other, will exploit the situation to pursue their own interests and will enjoy greater domestic autonomy and more flexibility in their policy-making processes. Various fence-straddling tactics adopted by Gomulka's Polish Communist Party during 1956-1960, Walter Ulbricht's East German Communist Party during 1958-1960, Miyamoto Kenji's Japanese Communist Party since 1966, and Kim Il-sŏng's Korean Workers' Party since 1966 bore out this possibility. The Sino-Soviet conflict has now attained a dynamic of its own in intra-bloc relations out of which "nationalistic Communism" will be the leading phenomenon in the future.

The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Conflict
on the Asian Communist Parties.

What has been the specific impact of the Sino-Soviet dispute on both ruling and non-ruling Asian Communist parties? What were the new alignments of the Asian Communist

parties in the aftermath of the Sino-Soviet conflict? On these questions the final assessment of the Sino-Soviet conflict indicates clearly that the CPSU was the loser in the competition over control of the Asian Communist parties. In the wake of the fierce polemical disputes following Khrushchev's abrasive frontal attack on Albania during the Twenty Second Congress of the CPSU in 1960, the Asian Communist parties—those of Burma, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaya, Thailand, North Korea, and North Vietnam, but not those of Outer Mongolia and Ceylon—became "Communist neutralists"⁵⁶ who refused to denounce Albania openly and who treated Moscow and Peking equally in prestige accorded and space allotted, but who supported the Chinese on the issues of unanimity, Albania, and Yugoslavia. Ever since, the CCP has constantly increased its influence over the Asian parties; the Asian "Communist neutralists" became increasingly pro-Chinese. In assessing the overall shift of the Asian Communist parties to a pro-CCP alignment until

⁵⁶Robert A. Scalapino mentions that even after Khrushchev had denounced Hoxha and Shehu as false Marxists and vicious tyrants, fraternal greetings flowed to Albania from the Communist parties of such countries as North Vietnam, North Korea, Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, and Malaya. See "Moscow, Peking and the Communist Parties of Asia," p. 324.

1965, Donald Zagoria makes the following comments:

The Communist parties of Asia are [as of 1965], with few exceptions, firmly on the side of the Chinese in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Of the ruling parties in Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam, only the Mongolians remain faithful to Moscow. In 14 other Asian countries where the communist parties are not in power the parties are pro-Peking in eight, and in all of the remaining six there are strong pro-Peking splinter parties or pro-Peking factions within the party. Qualitatively, the strength of the pro-Chinese groups in Asia is even more impressive. The largest and most successful non-ruling communist party in the world, the communist party of Indonesia, is firmly committed to China. So is the Lao Dong party in North Vietnam which controls derivative parties in Thailand. In Japan, strategically perhaps the most important country in Asia outside the bloc, the communist party is firmly allied to China. Finally in India, the newly formed pro-Peking party, although commanding only less than half of total communist strength, has its membership heavily concentrated in certain key states.⁵⁷

Following this swing to a pro-CCP orientation by the Asian Communist parties, the new phenomenon of the third road to international Communism—the declaration of "independence and autonomy"—has been mostly initiated by both the Korean Workers' Party (North Korean Communist Party) and the JCP in 1966.

In Europe, after Khrushchev's de-Stalinization speech of 1956 and the subsequent Sino-Soviet conflict which followed, the Communist parties of European countries adopted a path of "independence and self-determination,"

⁵⁷ Zagoria, "Asia," in Leopold Labedz (ed.), International Communism after Khrushchev (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), p. 89.

and there is a marked trend toward polycentrism by the European Communist parties. In Asia, the same development has taken place ten years later, with the JCP and the Korean Workers' Party moving in that direction. It is to analyze the third road to Communism by the JCP that we now turn to the next chapter.

CHAPTER V

THE JCP IN THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT, 1961-1968

The JCP at its Tenth Congress held in Tokyo in October 1966, adopted a policy of "autonomy and independence" as the "unshakable conviction of the entire party" and announced that this congress would be the "starting point for a new expansion of the Party." In this statement, the strained relations with both the CCP and the CPSU may have contributed to the JCP's bold step toward independence.

It is a major hypothesis of this chapter that the Sino-Soviet dispute has increased the bargaining leverage of the JCP between the feuding superbloc actors and has enhanced its ability to pursue an autonomous policy. Given this assumption, the purpose of this chapter is to analyze the overall impact of the Sino-Soviet conflict on the JCP. In particular, this chapter is concerned with examining the factors leading to the politics of "autonomy and independence" by the JCP. In explaining the principal determinants of JCP behavior in the future, it is further posited that a developing nationalist sentiment, self-sufficiency in party finances, and the expansion of mass membership will reduce

the degree of JCP dependency upon either of the blocs.

The pertinent questions to be asked in this chapter are: What was the situation of the JCP caught in the middle of the Sino-Soviet conflict? How did it resolve its dilemma? What were the internal conditions within the JCP in the formative stages of the Sino-Soviet conflict? How was the JCP leadership group affected by the Sino-Soviet dispute? What sort of polemical disputes over JCP revolutionary strategy and tactics emerged as a consequence of the Sino-Soviet conflict? How did the JCP "fence-straddling" tactics emerge? How did it shift to the policy of "autonomy and independence"? What visible payoffs were there in declaring it? What sort of external pressures were exerted on the JCP from the CCP and the CPSU to regain control? How did the JCP react to these pressures? What sort of coalition strategy has been maintained by the JCP and other Asian Communist parties since 1966? How tenable is it? And, finally, what path will the JCP follow in the future in relation to the international Communist movement?

The Status of the JCP in the Midst of the Sino-Soviet Conflict

Before discussing the specific impact upon the JCP of the Sino-Soviet conflict, it is appropriate to analyze the status of the JCP as a unique Asian Communist party operating openly in a highly modernized socio-economic

environment and the dilemma of a party which has owed its existence and survival to the help of both the CCP and the CPSU in the past. These background factors which faced the JCP in the midst of the Sino-Soviet conflict deserve some attention.

Unique Patterns of Socio-Economic Conditions of Japan and the Major Weaknesses of the JCP

Hans H. Baerwald indicates the insignificant status of the JCP in the international Communist movement. Ostensibly the JCP is blessed with favorable socio-economic and organizational conditions. To quote Baerwald:

The Japanese Communist Party is an anomaly. According to classical Marxist doctrine, Japan's advanced state of industrialization, the superior organization of her labor movement, the early origins of the party itself (1922), and the extent to which Marxist thought has penetrated Japanese academic circles should make this society ripe for the culmination of the processes of historical materialism. Yet, among the 467 members of the House of Representatives only 5 are Communists; and in the 250 seat House of Councillors, only 4 are adherents of the JCP [as of 1964].¹

What were the various factors that contributed to the weakness of the JCP? Some of the Japanese Communists' failures

¹Hans H. Baerwald, "The Japanese Communist Party: Yoyogi and Its Rivals," in Robert A. Scalapino (ed.), The Communist Revolution in Asia (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 198. Also note that the JCP only acquired 14 seats in the House of Representatives after the 1969 general election. During the most recent general election held in December 1972, the JCP won 38 seats in the House of Representatives.

could be explained by certain unfavorable factors inherent in the local and international environment; others must be attributed to a combination of weaknesses peculiar to Communism in Japan.

A primary weakness of the JCP was uncertainty about revolutionary objectives and strategy. Before World War II, the Japanese government's repressive policy forced it to operate furtively, and police action disrupted the continuity of its leadership. In the postwar period, the Party has been racked by internal disputes and by policy changes originating outside Japan. Its leaders have never been able to make up their minds whether their principal role is to work toward seizure of power irrespective of the Communist bloc's larger objectives or to aid the Party's sponsors abroad at the expense of political advancement at home.² As a result, the JCP, vacillating between "rightist" and "leftist," "hard and soft" strategies, remained for much of the postwar period without a formal policy guide. And only after years of fierce polemical debates between the Mainstream and Anti-Mainstream factions did the Japanese Communist leaders finally succeed, in the Eighth Congress of the JCP in

² Paul F. Langer, "Independence or Subordination: the Japanese Communist Party between Moscow and Peking," in A. Doak Barnett (ed.), Communist Strategies in Asia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 63.

July 1961, in coming to an agreement on a strategic formula for Japan—and only after the international Communist congress held in Moscow in 1960 had resolved the JCP's major doubts. Furthermore Paul F. Langer criticizes the intellectualization and the tendency toward "barren scholastic quarreling, intellectual inbreeding, and mental and political isolation".³ of the JCP, which failed to create a solid base of popular support for an actual seizure of power despite circumstances that appeared to favor Communist growth. Nor have Miyamoto Kenji, the Secretary-General, or Shiga Yoshio and Hakamada Satomi, all veteran party leaders, succeeded in creating a reputation corresponding to their high positions and long party records.

Other important factors attributable to the weakness of the JCP are further discussed by Langer:

- 1) Japan's recovery of a fair degree of internal balance and economic prosperity which compel the appeal of "conservatism";
- 2) The party's inability to transform and expand its organization rapidly enough to profit from the temporarily disturbed political, social, and economic equilibrium;
- 3) The prewar "foreign flavor" of the JCP and the popular image of the party as a conspiratorial organization out of place in a democratic Japan;
- 4) the existence of the Communist vote stealing Japanese Socialist Party which still maintains a fervent belief in orthodox Marxist dogma.⁴

³ Ibid., p. 65.

⁴ Ibid., p. 68.

In view of their importance for an understanding of the postwar Japanese Communist movement, further elaboration on these factors is necessary. The first and second factors are directly linked to the unique socio-economic conditions of postwar Japan as a highly industrialized nation.⁵ The very circumstances of the immediate postwar socio-economic setting that facilitated the spread of Japanese Communism have also given rise to new problems for the JCP. In the early postwar period, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) created conditions that incidentally stimulated the growth of the Communist movement. He later set limits to this growth by curbing Communist labor offensives and mass movements, by encouraging the Japanese government to impose a number of measures restricting radicalism, and by carrying out a whole range of social, economic, political and legal reforms as an integral part of the 'democratization plan in Japan. Of SCAP-directed economic reforms in Japan, the land reform was one of the most successful accomplishments

⁵For further exposition on the third factor, see infra, pp. 197-98 of this chapter. See pp. 196, 211-13 for the explanation of fourth factor.

of the Occupation authorities.⁶

By 1952, when the bulwark of SCAP military and administrative control was removed and Japan regained full independence following the San Francisco Treaty, the pendulum had swung back in the direction of political conservatism stirred up by the phenomenal economic growth in Japan. The reshaping of Japanese democracy, which had been going on since the end of World War II, challenged the Marxist analysis and put Marxism on the defensive.⁷ By the late 1950's all Japanese left-wing elements had recognized the rapid

⁶ In December 1945, SCAP directed the Japanese government to initiate a land reform to end the abuses of absentee landownership. Before the war, 46 per cent of the cultivated land was farmed by tenants. Of the total number of farmers, 70 per cent were absentee landlords. Under the land reform program carried out under the supervision of SCAP, absentee landlords were required to sell their land to the government in exchange for bonds. The government resold the land to tillers who paid for it in annual installments. By the end of 1950, only 10 per cent of the farm land was cultivated by tenants, while 90 per cent was cultivated by owners. Owing to this drastic land reform policy initiated by SCAP, the Japanese Communists could never exploit the rural unrest. Thereafter the Japanese farmers voted for the conservative party in general elections. For further details on the SCAP-directed land reform in Japan, see Agriculture in Japan (Tokyo: Japan FAO Association, 1958), pp. 53-55.

⁷ Donald S. Zagoria, "Asia," in Leopold Labedz (ed.), International Communism after Khrushchev (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965), p. 98.

socio-economic development, but while the socialists attempted to respond to the challenge, the Communists did not seem even to have recognized the problem.⁸ Similarly, the extraordinary economic development in Japan put Marxism on the defensive as it was no longer so relevant to Japan's problems, since the country was moving toward a post-Marxist stage. In other underdeveloped countries of Asia, the Communists were not only critics of the existing system but also functioned as catalysts of modernization in fighting to eliminate antiquated political and economic institutions.⁹ In Japan, however, the government itself pre-empted this function.

⁸In the late 1950's a major internal dispute within the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) was focused on the "structural reform" theory advocated by Eda Saburō with the support of younger elements in the party. Eda's "structural reform" theory contended that, in view of the advanced economic condition of Japan, a take-over of the government by the Socialists was not a prerequisite to ameliorating the conditions of the mass; rather, the Socialists would seek to force the concessions favorable to the mass from the conservative government. The "structural reformists" also insisted on broadening the appeal of the JSP to attract the middle class in addition to organized labor. Sasaki Kozō, a principal left-wing leader and ideologist of the JSP, has constantly attacked "structural reform" theory as revisionism and a betrayal of sound Marxist principles. The Japanese Communists were slow to adapt to the changing nature of the Japanese society and only in 1962 was the "structural reform" theory adopted by the right-wing leader of the JCP, Kasuga Shōjirō. For further discussion of "structural reform" theory of the JCP, see *infra*, pp. 203-05 of this chapter. For discussion of the "structural reform" theory within the JSP, see Robert A. Scalapino, "The Left Wing in Japan," *Survey*, No. 43 (August 1962), 102-11.

⁹Paul F. Langer, *Communism in Japan* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), p. 16.

On the other hand, the rapid pace of Japanese modernisation had produced its side effects. The rate of economic growth and technological change had been so rapid that the transformation of the country's social and economic institutions lagged behind. Japan's economy had developed unevenly in the direction of the continuous expansion of industry to a few mammoth corporations; the traditional value system had been seriously eroded but new standards had not yet taken its place; the influx of the rural population to the urban industrial centers created an acute housing shortage, breakdown of the traditional nuclear family ties of the rural-originated population, and "anomic" feelings of the isolated individual in the mass society in Japan. Although these modernization pains were likely to produce a large protest vote during the general election, there was no indication that the Communists would benefit from this. The Socialists were getting most of the protest vote on the left because they were almost as leftist as the Communists without having the stigma of foreign domination. Meanwhile, on the right the protest vote was going to a new political phenomenon in Japan, the Clean Government Party (Kōmeitō), which was a militant Buddhist group supported mostly by the urban lower-middle and working class. This party emerged as a powerful third force in the elections to the House of Councillors (Upper House) in 1962 and since then, it has played a significant role in Japanese politics.

Legacy of the Past and Divided Loyalty
toward the Sino-Soviet Conflict

One of the vastly compounding problems that complicated the situation of the JCP in the midst of the Sino-Soviet conflict was its unbreakable ties with both countries. To start with the Soviet Union, the JCP, from its inception in 1922, was literally "fathered" by the CPSU. Had it not been for the financial contributions, guidances for general strategies and tactics over the revolutionary goals and means during the 1930's, and the JCP leadership training in Moscow, the Party would not have come into existence. From 1922 to 1940, some fifty Japanese Communists had either remained in the Soviet Union as the representatives of the JCP or attended both the Far Eastern Toilers' University (KUTV) and the Lenin Institute.¹⁰ Until 1950, the JCP saw no need to replace or revise its general revolutionary strategy, which had been drafted in Moscow in 1932. Though an agonizing reappraisal of Nosaka's "Peaceful Revolution" theme of the JCP was compelled by the Moscow-directed Cominform criticism

¹⁰ Scalapino's count of the JCP members who studied at the Far Eastern Toilers' University (KUTV) during 1924-1928 is approximately forty. See Robert A. Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966 (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1966), pp. 34-35. This author's research on the whereabouts of the Moscow-trained JCP members during 1922-1940 indicates forty-seven. For detail, see Appendix B of this dissertation.

(to which the CCP concurred), the JCP maintained a role subordinate to the CPSU. No less revealing than the matter of policy was the quality of the Japanese Communist leadership, on which Russian influence had been dominant.

As for the JCP-CCP relationship, Chapter III of this dissertation has discussed the equally strong affinities between the two parties based on geographic, racial, cultural, and historical ties. More important, however, was the fact that a great many of the JCP leaders were trained and educated in China. A detailed study by a Japanese who had traced the whereabouts of the JCP middle-echelon militant activists during 1953-1958 also revealed that, again as was the case during the 1950-1953 JCP "underground" period, Communist China provided a safety haven for them:

In addition to the leaders, a large number of young Japanese Communists, many of them being sought by the police, also left Japan for China. They were sent to the "School of Marxism-Leninism" and given several years of basic party education and training. Altogether, from 1953 to 1957, China is said to have received about 1,500 Japanese Communist "stowaways." Many of them returned home in the spring of 1958. They form the nucleus of the pro-China faction within the JCP, and are said to control a party headquarters, the organization department, the personnel division, the trade union department, the financial committee, and the Akahata editorial board.¹¹

¹¹Hirotsu Kyōsuke, "Japan," in Leopold Labedz (ed.), op. cit., p. 128.

Given the inseparable past relationship of the JCP with both the CPSU and the CCP, the eruption of the Sino-Soviet conflict into the open arena posed a dilemma: the JCP could ill afford to alienate the Soviet Union, its indisputable guide over the formulation of general strategy and tactics, political and economic patron, and, above all, the leader of the socialist camp. Nor could it afford to antagonize Communist China, its cultural mentor, erstwhile comrade-in-arms against Japanese militarism, provider of a safety haven to the JCP top- and middle-echelon leaders in the 1950's, and, most of all, the powerful fellow Asian nation who would play a major role in the East Asian balance-of-power politics. The only way out of this dilemma was to pursue a policy of cautious neutrality.

The Politics of Internal Adjustment by the
JCP in the Sino-Soviet Conflict

The Politics of Accomodation: Incremental Change
and Cautious Neutrality, 1960-1962

If one were to look at the attitude of the JCP leaders during the initial stage of the Sino-Soviet conflict at the Moscow Conference of the Eighty-One Communist party members in November 1960, one would notice the tendency toward "reluctance" and a cautious neutrality, refusing to make a drastic commitment in support of either of the blocs. Robert A. Scalapino describes the agony of the JCP delegates:

. . . the concern of the JCP leaders was over the effect that the widening international cleavage would have on the strength and unity of the Communist Party in Japan. If the JCP were forced into an open declaration of support for the Peking line, the party would be further divided, and the Kasuga-Naitō forces [structural reformist splinter group within the JCP], in addition to gaining new recruits, might garner open Soviet support.¹²

At this juncture Charles Lindblom's theory of disjointed incrementalism aptly applies to the strategy of decision faced by the JCP.¹³ An acute dilemma confronting them arose from the fact that the JCP was an Asian Communist party under the direct influence of the CCP, on the one hand, but historically had been subordinate to the CPSU on the other. Facing the inadequate and uncertain information available to the JCP leaders concerning the essence of the Sino-Soviet conflict and having limited prestige among bloc members, the JCP Mainstream group decided to pursue a tactic of cautious neutralism in the immediate aftermath of the Moscow Conference in 1960. By restricting the variety of policy alternatives and consequences, by reducing unintended consequences, and by adjusting outmoded policies to the new theme of the Sino-Soviet conflict, the JCP leaders adopted a rather cautious policy

¹²Robert A. Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966 (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1966), p. 137.

¹³David Braybrooke and Charles Lindblom, Strategy of Decision (New York: Free Press, 1967), passim.

not to antagonize either of the leading Communist parties. Thus incremental and often disjointed action provided safer and less risky policy alternatives facing the unpredictable future development of international Communism.

The second trial of the ideological stance for the JCP in the international scene came during the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU in Moscow in late October 1961. Khrushchev's public attack on Albania and Chou En-lai's sharp retort represented a significant escalation of the Sino-Soviet conflict. With the Sino-Soviet split now brought into the open arena, every Communist party was under an increased pressure to declare its allegiance. Against this pressure, the JCP Mainstream leaders decided to continue pursuing the tactic of neutralism in the immediate aftermath of the Twenty-Second CPSU Congress. Publicly, the gravity of the Sino-Soviet dispute would be depreciated. In his speech before the Soviet Congress, on October 23, 1961, Nosaka Sanzō refused to criticize the Albanian leaders. Concerning the crisis within the international Communist movement, Nosaka confined himself to urging unity on the basis of the 1957 and 1960 Moscow agreements.¹⁴ Privately, every effort was

¹⁴For the full text of Nosaka's speech at the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU on October 23, 1961, see Akahata, October 26, 1961, p. 1. In his speech, Nosaka mentioned his previous attendance of the Eighteenth Congress of the CPSU twenty-two years before (1939) and indicated the drastic difference of the Soviet Union in 1961. In 1939 the Soviet Union, Nosaka recollected, was heading toward socialism and the realization of Communism was beyond the reach. However, the Soviet Union in 1961, according to Nosaka, has reached closer to achieve Communism.

being made in concert with other Asian Communist parties to contain the dispute and to bring the CPSU and CCP into serious bilateral discussions.

This neutralist tact of the JCP was put into effect very cautiously. In his Tokyo speech on the occasion of the celebration of the anniversary of the Russian Revolution on November 8, 1961, Nosaka was laudatory of the New Program of the CPSU, stressing the fact that it had been adopted by the entire party and nation through a series of meetings and discussions.¹⁵ Nosaka also placed the CPSU ahead of all other parties in pushing forward the construction of Communism. He gave only brief attention to the problems of disunity within world Communism involving Albania, de-Stalinization, and barely mentioned the Sino-Soviet rift when he insisted that Communist parties, "linked by the blood of Marx-Leninism," had an indestructible unity which "no imperialist machinations could destroy."¹⁶

One could not easily have guessed from the tone of this speech that the Mainstream leaders were burning with resentment over certain Russian actions and attitudes, and were deeply suspicious of Khrushchev. In this sense Nosaka's speech was an excellent example of the application of cautious

¹⁵For the full text of Nosaka's speech, see Akahata, November 22, 1961, p. 2 and p. 5.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 5.

neutrality.¹⁷ Then on December 29, 1961, an Akahata editorial for the first time cautiously implied a disapproval of Khrushchev's public criticism of Albania.¹⁸ The editorial admitted that "the beginning of an open dispute" was seriously affecting the relations between several Communist states.

The Intra-Party Polemics on Structural Reform

Theory.—Meanwhile, the JCP was having its internal problems concerning strategy and tactics of the JCP in attaining the goal of a socialist revolution in Japan. The Mainstream group contended that Japanese society was confronted with two enemies: American imperialism and Japanese monopoly capitalism, and that Japan, though highly developed industrially, remained among those countries that were subordinate to American imperialism. Thus a two-stage revolution was envisaged, the first being the "national-democratic revolution" to remove the shackles of American imperialism and only the

¹⁷ Robert A. Scalapino compares this speech with those given by Kim Il-sung and D.N. Aidit at approximately the same time. Kim's report on the 22nd CPSU Congress was also cautious and neutral in general tone, but somewhat less guarded, while Aidit's speeches contained reasonably frank criticism of Khrushchev. See Scalapino, "Moscow, Peking, and the Communist Parties of Asia," Foreign Affairs, XLI (January, 1963), 323-43.

¹⁸ "For the Unity of the International Communist Movement and for the Struggle against Two Enemies," Akahata, December 29, 1961, p. 1.

second stage being the socialist revolution in Japan.¹⁹

Another view, held by the Anti-Mainstream group under the leadership of Kasuga Shōjirō,²⁰ advocated the "one-stage" revolution. The Anti-Mainstream group in 1961 denied the supreme importance of "American imperialism" as the principal obstacle to socialism in Japan. They argued that Japan, like Western Europe, had already had its "democratic revolution" and that the next step would be a socialist revolution. Such a revolution could be accomplished peacefully, by continuous pressure for domestic reforms that would shift the balance of domestic power toward the left. In arguing thus, the Kasuga group was following the "structural reform" theory advanced by the Italian Communist leader Togliatti and also by many Japanese Socialists, among whom Togliatti's theory had found much response. Kasuga Shōjirō, though himself a former International faction (Kokusai-ha) member in the 1950's, attacked Miyamoto Kenji's JCP Mainstream group for

¹⁹ Hans H. Baerwald, op. cit., p. 212.

²⁰ Kasuga and his "structural reformist" colleague Naitō Chishū and other JCP dissidents were ousted from the JCP in 1961 and formed a new action group called the Socialist Reform Movement (Shakaishugi Kakushin Undō). They repeatedly attacked the JCP (which they labeled "the Yoyogi group") in the new periodical, Atarashii Rosen (The New Line). Again after an internal squabble among themselves, the Kasuga group established its own unit, the United Socialist League (Toitsu Shakaishugi Dōmei) in May 1962, and began publishing a monthly journal, Kōzō Kaikaku (Structural Reform). Neither group was of much significance in terms of numbers. For the detailed analysis of the structural reformism within the JCP, see Asahi Shimbun (Asahi Daily), March 25, 1966, p. 1.

putting forward a "two-stage" revolution theory which, he claimed, was irrelevant to an advanced industrial country with a strong labor movement. Eventually the Mainstream's "two-stage" revolution theory prevailed in the intra-party debate and received the direct blessing of the CCP, although Miyamoto Kenji's previous role as the pro-Soviet oriented International faction (Kokusai-ha) member made it somewhat difficult to categorize him as the "yes-man" of Peking. It is at this juncture that a further analysis of the Mainstream group becomes necessary.

The Factional Alignment of the JCP.--By early 1962 the JCP had undergone further fragmentation. In addition to the "right-wing deviationists"--the Kasuga group--the Party itself came to have a new but more troublesome anti-Mainstream group. The Mainstream, comprising some 90 per cent or more of the party leadership, was made up of two major factions. Hakamada Satomi led one group, a faction containing many pro-China elements. A veteran Communist and one of the few with a genuine "proletarian" background, Hakamada had now become one of the top party leaders. Nosaka, commonly associated with Hakamada, but regarded above faction, held the nominal title of Party Chairman with little de facto power. Miyamoto Kenji held the post of Secretary-General and headed the Neutral faction. His policies and his role were critical to the Party during this period.

The pro-Soviet faction, led by Anti-Mainstream groups like Shiga Yoshio, Suzuki Ichizō, Kamiyama Shigeo, and Nakano Shigeharu, comprised less than ten per cent of the total leadership of the Party, but the fact that a number of old intellectuals in or near the Party were inclined in its direction gave it some additional significance. Those Japanese intellectuals, long committed to Marxism-Leninism and emotionally identified with Soviet traditions, proved resistant in a number of cases to the Chinese tides now sweeping over the Party.

To understand the real power structure of the JCP, however, it is essential to appreciate the rising significance of a new generation of postwar Communists, most of whom had been trained in China and who were now occupying key party position. Like the young officers of the militarist era of Japan with whom they were often compared, these men pressured their seniors for a militant program, concentrated on organizational and propaganda activities at the grass-roots level, and many of them displayed an attraction to the Chinese revolutionary model. These men²¹ constituted the

²¹ Inter alia, the pro-CCP young cadres of the JCP included Doki Tsuyoshi, Chief Editor of Akahata; Ishida Keiichi, Assistant Editor; Anzai Kuraji, Chief of the Personnel Section of the Party; Fujii Keiji, Chief of the Finance Section; and Hayashi Inoue, Editor of Sekai Seiji Shiryō (Documents on World Politics). For a detailed description of the pro-CCP group within the JCP, see Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966, pp. 146-47.

new power center within the JCP.²² All of them were China-
returnees. They controlled vital aspects of party work,
and it was generally believed that the senior party officials
were essentially puppets in their hands. Obviously, the
powerful influence of the CCP on the internal affairs of the
JCP was intimately related to this group.

Pro-Peking Orientation by the JCP, 1963-1965

In the midst of the overt Sino-Soviet struggle for
the control of the JCP in the autumn of 1963, there were
signs that the JCP was beginning to line up with Peking on
most issues. A substantial amount of evidence accumu-
lated which pointed to the conclusion that the JCP had
become Peking-oriented. According to Hans H. Baerwald, the
following factors were considered indicative:

- 1) On the issue of the Sino-Indian border controversy,
the JCP supported their Chinese comrades, reproducing
the complete text of China's Denunciation of Nehru in
Akahata;
- 2) During the Cuban Crisis, the JCP maintained a barrage
of criticism against American imperialism. The
"victory of reason" propounded by Khrushchev to
justify the withdrawal of the missiles did not receive
any words of praise. Indeed, Akahata, in its coverage
of the crisis, paid almost no attention to the
position of the Soviet Union. Subsequently, Akahata,
according with the views of the Chinese communists,
appealed for the maintenance of a constant struggle
against American imperialism and emphasized the
dangers of relying on American good sense;

²²For details on JCP personnel, organization and
structure of front groups, see Koan Chosachō (Public Safety
Investigation Bureau), Nihon Kyosantō no Genjō (Current
Conditions of the JCP), Tokyo, July 1, 1962.

- 3) The JCP was considerably more friendly toward its Albanian than toward its Yugoslavian comrades. Akahata, for example, reprinted the whole of the CCP's attack on Tito.²³ Akahata also carried a long article celebrating the Fiftieth anniversary of Albanian independence and had not as yet made any reference in its columns to the Stalinist orientation of the Albanian Party;
- 4) Possibly the most crucial indicator of the pro-Peking proclivities of the JCP was the position that the party ultimately took with respect to the partial nuclear test-ban treaty. Akahata published an article in October, 1963 strongly opposing the treaty. Interestingly enough, Soviet participation in the agreement was barely mentioned, the brunt of the criticism being directed against the United States.²⁴

Robert A. Scalapino elucidates a convincing reason for this trend to a pro-Peking orientation, saying that it was part of a larger trend by the Asian Communists:

. . . Khrushchevism came to symbolize an accommodation to the status quo on the one hand, and a crude, authoritarian attitude toward the Communist world on the other. In reaction and greatly stimulated by Peking, an Asian Communist bloc began to emerge in this period. At first, this bloc—as symbolized by North Korea, North Vietnam, the PKI and the JCP—was dedicated to "neutralism" and a desperate effort to mend the Sino-Soviet breach. As these efforts failed, the bloc gravitated away from Moscow, taking positions that approximated those of Peking and taking them openly.²⁵

²³ "Let Us See the Corruption of Modern Revisionists" was originally published in Jen-min Jih-pao, September 17, 1963, when Khrushchev was attempting to improve his relations with Tito, and was reprinted in Akahata three days later.

²⁴ Hans H. Baerwald, op. cit., p. 214.

²⁵ Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966, p. 212.

Advantages and Disadvantages of the JCP-CCP

Coalition.—Further question arises at this juncture. Why was the JCP attracted to Peking instead of Moscow? A plausible explanation may be that Peking during this period symbolized to other Asian Communists success, power, and commitment. It combined a formidable presence in Asia with dynamic, militant policies that offered hope to other Asian Communists—in and out of power.²⁶ In short, the elements of nationalism, Asianism, and militancy explicit in Chinese doctrines, the fervent anti-Westernism and the racial overtones served as a powerful magnet, especially to younger Japanese Communists.

To this, J.A.A. Stockwin adds the following general factors that produced the pro-Peking policy:

- 1) The appeal of China to Japanese public opinion: Japan's cultural debt to China, the factor of racial similarity, the pre-war economic interdependence of the two countries, and a sense of guilt arising from Japan's aggression against China;
- 2) The "weakness" of Soviet policy: Since termination of the Mutual Security Treaty with the U.S. was the most important immediate aim of JCP policy, Peking's tough anti-American stand was more appealing to the party than the more cautious and restrained Soviet attitude.²⁷

²⁶ Robert A. Scalapino, "Moscow, Peking, and the Communist Parties of Asia," Foreign Affairs, p. 323-25.

²⁷ J.A.A. Stockwin, "The Communist Party of Japan," Problems of Communism, XVI (January-February, 1967), 3.

Stockwin has also argued elsewhere²⁸ that the JCP's decision in 1963-64 to align itself with the Chinese Communists resulted from three contingent factors: first, the triumph within the Party of a "Chinese" faction over a "Soviet" faction; second, the consolidation within the JSP (Japan Socialist Party)—the JCP's chief rival for the allegiance of working-class voters—of a "pro-Soviet" leadership group; and third, vigorous Chinese lobbying for JCP support and a converse lack of Soviet interest in the Japanese party.

As for the first factor, it has already been pointed out earlier in this chapter that there were approximately 1,500 Japanese Communists who were trained in China from 1953 to 1957. After their return to Japan in the spring of 1958, most of them eventually became the pro-CCP activists at the grass-root level. Moreover, the vital posts of the JCP—the organization department, the personnel division, the trade union department, the financial committee, Sekai Seiji Shiryo (Documents on World Politics) editorial board, and Akahata editorial board—were controlled by the young China-returnees. Obviously, the powerful influence of the CCP on

²⁸ Idem, "The Japan Communist Party in the Sino-Soviet Dispute—From Neutrality to Alignment?" in J.D.B. Miller and T.H. Rigby (eds.), The Disintegrating Monolith: Pluralist Trends in the Communist World (Camberra: Australian National University, 1965), pp. 137-48.

the internal affairs of the JCP was intimately related to this group.²⁹ On the other hand, the pro-CPSU faction led by Shiga Yoshio, Suzuki Ichizō, and Kamiyama Shigeo comprised less than 10 per cent of the leadership of the JCP. The major drawbacks of this "Soviet" faction were that it neither had the solid mass basis like the "Chinese" faction, nor controlled the strategic posts of the JCP.

The second factor has to be dealt in the context of the desperate CPSU effort to capture every element of the Japanese left-wing parties. Just as the JCP leadership was split over the issue of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the JSP leadership was internally fragmented during early 1960's. As of 1963, the JSP Mainstream group consisted of a right-wing coalition of the faction's party chairman Kawakami Jōtarō,³⁰ Secretary-General Narita Tomomi, the liberal-minded Wada Hiroo, and Eda Saburō (former Secretary-General and structural reformist).

In 1960, the JSP adopted the "structural reform" policy which was aimed at the gradual rather than the revolutionary recasting of the nation's political and economic structure along Marxist lines. This

²⁹ For the further details on this pro-CCP faction, see supra, pp. 206-07 of this chapter.

³⁰ Kawakami died in 1965 a few months after he stepped down as Chairman of the JSP.

alliance was challenged by radical left-wing adherents of Sasaki Kōzō who showed a strong affinity to the Maoist model of radical social change.³¹ As early as the fall of 1962, the Soviet Union had begun to woo the JSP Mainstream group and its umbrella organization, the General Council of Trade Unions (Sōhyō), in earnest, seeing in them a possible alternative to reliance on the JCP. As the acrimonious inter-party denunciation between the JCP and the JSP mounted over the issue of the nuclear testing since 1961, the Japanese Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuikyō) conference became a battleground between the two parties, the JSP demanding an outright condemnation of nuclear testing while the JCP supported Chinese testing as having a "different character" from tests carried out by the "imperialists." The Ninth World Rally of the Gensuikyō, held in Hiroshima during the first week of August 1963, resulted in the virtual disintegration of it. To the clash between the JCP and the JSP was added the spectacle of delegates from China and Russia

³¹ Following the resignation of Kawakami Jōtarō in 1965, Sasaki Kōzō was elected Chairman of the JSP and his leftist coalition became the new JSP Mainstream faction and the JSP-CCP alignment developed rapidly thereafter. For the further discussion of the factional alignment of the JSP, see Warren Tsuneishi, Japanese Political Style (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 150. For the factional struggles within the JSP over the alignment with the CCP after 1966, see Lee Chae-Jin, "Factional Politics in the Japan Socialist Party: The Chinese Cultural Revolution Case," Asian Survey, X (March 1970), 230-43.

denouncing each other.³² In 1964, after several years of mutual recrimination at its annual congresses, the Gensuikyō movement finally split over the issue of the nuclear test-ban treaty of 1963. The JCP joined China in denouncing the treaty, while the JSP and its labor union (Sōhyō) supported it. The events in Hiroshima underlined the deep fissure between China and the Soviet Union, as well as the fundamental divergences that existed between the JCP and JSP on this issue.

With respect to the third factor, the JCP's shift away from the Soviet Union and toward China was evident from the following table of inter-party visits by JCP delegations to the two countries. (see Table 1). Further research on

TABLE 1
JCP OFFICIAL DELEGATIONS' VISIT TO
CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION,
1962-1965

	1962	1963	1964	1965
China	7	6	16	8
Soviet Union	11	7	4	0

Source: Kōan Chōsachō (Public Safety Investigation Bureau), Nihon Kyōsantō no Genjō (Current Conditions of the JCP), October 1, 1965 (Tokyo: Ministry of Justice), p. 36.

³²For the discussion of the Ninth World Rally of the Gensuikyō, see the following Japanese press coverage: Asahi, Mainichi, and Yomiuri Shimbun, August 7, 8, 9, 1963.

Japanese government publications concerning the JCP individual member and the group visitations to both countries gives a clear picture of the waning interests of the JCP in the Soviet Union (see Table 2). These figures include the

TABLE 2
JCP INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP VISITATION
TO CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION,
1962-1964

	1962	1963	1964
China	65	84	117
Soviet Union	120	87	24

Source: Ibid., p. 40.

visitation of the JCP rank and file members, JCP-dominated cultural associations, and the trade missions to both countries. As the above table indicates, there was a drastic increase in unofficial visitations by the JCP members to Communist China, while visitation to the Soviet Union noticeably decreased. These quantitative data on inter-party visitation provide convincing evidence that CCP influences over the JCP have been quite substantial.³³

Then what were the liabilities of the JCP alliance with the CCP? Implicit in this situation were major paradoxes.

³³For the further details of the CCP attempt to control the JCP, see pp.218-19 of this chapter.

Scalapino points out two paradoxes of the JCP:

- 1) Unlike all other Asian states, Japan was an advanced industrial society. . . . Maoism both in concept and in practice was attuned to a vast, sprawling, backward peasant society. Its essential primitivism bore no relation to the nature of contemporary Japan. Neither its political nor its military principles fitted the stage of development, socioeconomic structure, topography, and communications of Japan. These facts made doctrines like "structural reform" much more logical for Japanese Marxists;
- 2) Historically, the Japanese Communists had had a long record of total subservience to the Kremlin. Thus, the trauma of the break must have been intense. In one sense, therefore, it was natural to seek a substitute for Moscow in Peking, especially since the JCP was fundamentally so weak.³⁴

The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Control of the JCP.--How did the actual Sino-Soviet struggle over control of the JCP take place? What was the nature of the leadership struggle within the JCP in the midst of the Sino-Soviet rift?

The initiation of the limited Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty in July, 1963, marked the shift of the Sino-Soviet conflict from an ideological to a political struggle. In November, 1964, the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the JCP formally criticized the Soviet line as "modern revisionism" and hardened its opposition to the Soviet Union:

The basic cause of the present disunity. . . lay in the trend toward modern revisionism and in the fact that a certain fraternal party had unilaterally violated the rules governing relations among Communist parties. The historic responsibility for the great split had to be

³⁴Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, p. 213.

borne by a few Communist leaders, particularly the leaders of the CPSU. . . subsequent Anti-Marxist actions by the CPSU, extending into state-to-state relations, exacerbated the conflict. These actions included breaking diplomatic relations with socialist Albania, unilaterally abrogating various agreements with socialist China, and aiding the reactionary Indian government while it was engaged in a conflict with China. Another important cause of the cleavage was the partial nuclear test ban treaty, "an unprincipled concession to American imperialism." ³⁵

Shortly before the above criticism of the CPSU in March 1964, talks were held in Moscow between the JCP delegation headed by Hakamada Satomi and the Soviet delegation headed by Leonid Brezhnev. But the meetings broke off and both parties began criticizing each other by name. In May 1964 the central figures in the pro-Soviet faction, Shiga Yoshio (member of the Presidium of the JCP), Kamiyama Shigeo (member of the Central Committee of the JCP), and Suzuki Ichizō as well as a large number of writers and intellectuals who were party members, were expelled for supporting the limited nuclear test-ban treaty at the Tenth World Rally of the Japanese Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuikyō).³⁶ After the expulsion from the

³⁵ Central Committee Report to the 9th Party Congress of the JCP, November 25, 1964; English translation of this report is in Translations on International Communist Development (TICD) 691, Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) 28,456, Office of Technical Services, U.S. Department of Commerce, p. 220.

³⁶ The New York Times, October 4, 1964, p. 9. More specific reason for Shiga Yoshio's expulsion from the JCP was because he, as a member of the House of Representatives, voted in favor of Japan's ratification of the partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty on May 15, 1964. Matsumura Kenzō, "Bridging the Gap to China," Japan Quarterly, XI, No. 1 (January-March 1964), 27-31.

JCP, Shiga-Suzuki-Kamiyama founded a new Communist splinter party in November-1964, calling itself the JCP-Voice of Japan (Nihon no Koe), which immediately attracted substantial Soviet support. This and two other JCP splinter groups³⁷ which had already formed after the 1961 expulsion of Kasuga and his faction joined forces in organizing a Preparatory Committee for a New Party (Shintō Kessei Jumbi Iinkai), but the fact that the committee's efforts did not produce any substantial results afterwards indicated that the dissident groups had little in common except their opposition to the JCP Mainstream group. Added to this was the indecisive attitude of the Soviet Union in resorting to the selective support of the JCP-Voice of Japan faction and the continued double support of the Mainstream faction of the Japanese socialists.

Very soon the JCP-CPSU relations rapidly deteriorated. Just as the Mainstream JCP leaders were busily removing all pro-Soviet elements from key party posts, similarly they began to crack down on the activities of front organizations like the Japan-Soviet Union Friendship Association (Nisso Yūkō Kyōkai). Labeling this association "the last stronghold of anti-party elements," they ordered policy alterations and personnel changes. The Russians fought back

³⁷ Kasuga Shōjirō's United Socialist League (Tōitsu-Shakaishugi Domei) and Naitō Chishū's Socialist Reform Movement (Shakaishugi Kakushin Undō).

in the only manner left open to them. Using their Tokyo embassy as an operations center, they started mailing anti-Yoyogi leaflets directly to prefectural party branches and cells, front organizations, and individual members, seeking to work below the top leadership level. As for the grass-roots campaign by the Soviet Union, some specific information is available from JCP sources, according to which Soviet Embassy staff members frequently attended and spoke at public and private meetings organized by "anti-party elements" and held in universities and various other places.³⁸

Meanwhile, the Chinese Communists were also busily propagating their views at the grass-roots level, sending an unprecedented amount of literature into Japan, some of it disseminated through JCP outlets (with very considerable profits going into party coffers), some of it distributed directly via mailing lists compiled from various sources. And the Chinese were making even greater use of the "cultural mission" technique than their Soviet opponents. Scores of Japanese Leftist groups and individuals were being invited to Peking through the recommendation of the now-active Japan-China Friendship Association (Nichū Yūkō Kyōkai). Indirect financial support of the JCP by the CCP was granted to friendly trade firms which were reportedly controlled by the

³⁸ August 26, 1964 Letter of the JCP CC in Reply to the Letter of the CPSU CC of April 18, 1964. English translation of it is available in TICD 653, JPRS 26,892, p. 19.

JCP-directed Japan-China Trade Promotion Association (Nichū Bōeki Sokushin Kyōkai). As a result, Sino-Japanese friendship trade volume leaped from \$72,901 in 1963 to \$182,062 by 1964 and to \$416,693 by 1966.³⁹ Though the Chinese were drawing the support of the left-wing of the JSP led by Sasaki Kōzō, they, just as much as the Russians, could bypass organizational leadership.

The Decline of the CCP Influence on the JCP, 1965-1966

The Debacle of the Pro-CCP Indonesian Communist Party and the JCP Reaction.—Since 1965, the JCP has conspicuously moved away from its strong pro-Chinese commitment. The first sign of a shift was a report published in the Japanese press late in 1965 to the effect that disagreement had erupted within the Party over interpretation of the abortive Communist coup of September 30, 1965, in Indochina.⁴⁰ According to this report, the majority faction of the JCP, led by Secretary-General Miyamoto, held that the Indonesian Communists

³⁹ J. Stephen Hoadley and Hasegawa Sukehiro, "Sino-Japanese Relations, 1950-1970," International Studies Quarterly, XV (June 1971), 143.

⁴⁰ The report, which emanated from the Japanese Police Department, appeared in Asahi Shimbun, December 22, 1965, p. 2. See also ibid., January 14, 1966, p. 2. Official JCP publications avoided any discussion of the Indonesian Communist strategy and confined themselves to attacking Anti-Communist reprisals in Indonesia. See leading article in Akahata, October 23, 1965, p. 1.

had succumbed to "left-wing adventurism" and launched their attempted revolution prematurely and without adequate preparation. Their fault, it was argued, lay in having followed the Chinese revolutionary line too slavishly.⁴¹ Rallied against Miyamoto's Mainstream faction, according to the report, was an opposition group led by Konno Yojirō. This group, committed to dogmatic support of Peking, rejected the challenge that adherence to Chinese revolutionary doctrine had caused the Indonesian debacle, attributing it rather to the fact that the Indonesian Communists, instead of developing a small, disciplined and resolute elite party, had concentrated on building up a broad mass following, which at the moment of crisis proved lacking in discipline and determination.

The JCP-CCP Disagreements on the Question of the United Front Campaign Against "U.S. Imperialism."—Further indication of a change in the Party's attitude toward China was given in a four-page unsigned article which appeared in

⁴¹ According to a Japanese columnist Kusayanagi, the debacle of the Indonesian Communist Party (ICP) in September 1965 was a definite blow that prompted the JCP road of "autonomy and independence." He gave two reasons for this interpretation. First, the CCP's misguided "violent revolution" strategy without assessing the subjective and objective conditions in Indonesia decimated the ICP overnight. Had the JCP adopted a similar strategy in Japan, it would have met the same fate. Second, after the tragedy of the Indonesian Communists, the JCP Mainstream group realized that the CCP had considered the ICP and JCP as expendable Pacific Rimland parties which were to be used in dispersing the military strength of the U.S. imperialism in the first line of defense. See Kusayanagi Taizō, "The JCP as a Contemporary Kingdom," Bungei Shunju, XLIV, No. 10 (October 1966), 231.

Akahata on February 4, 1966.⁴² The article followed existing party policy in attacking American "imperialism" and criticizing Soviet "revisionists" for believing in the possibility of peaceful coexistence with the United States. It further argued that it was a mistake to regard socialist regimes collectively as the only anti-imperialist force, or underdeveloped areas ripe for revolution as the only regions in which the anti-imperialist struggle should be fought. There were, the article maintained, three basic revolutionary forces: the socialist (i.e., Communist-bloc) regimes; revolutionary movements in capitalist countries; and national liberation movements in nations subject to foreign oppression.⁴³

The most significant point in the article, however, was a proposal for immediate joint action to combat U.S. "aggression" in Vietnam through an international Communist united front including both China and the Soviet Union. Such

⁴² The article was entitled "Amerika Teikokushugi ni Hantai Suru Kokusai Toitsu Kodo to Toitsu Sensen wo Kyōka Suru Tame ni" (Strengthen International United Action and a United Front in Opposition to American Imperialism), Akahata, February 4, 1966, pp. 1-4.

⁴³ One commentator in a non-Communist Japanese weekly suggested that this was roundabout way of asserting the Party's independence from Peking by saying that the JCP, as a revolutionary movement in a capitalist country, was in a different category from the CCP. See "Nikkyō Kambu Hō-Chū to Sono Rosen" (The JCP Executives' Visit to China and Their Line) Asahi Janaru, VIII, No. 8 (February 20, 1966), 7-8.

action, the article declared, should not be postponed until the settling of the Sino-Soviet ideological controversy.

Shortly after the publication of this article, Miyamoto left as the head of a JCP delegation, composed exclusively of members of his own faction, for a visit to Communist China, North Vietnam and North Korea. At Shanghai the delegation had preliminary talks with the Mayor of Peking, P'eng Chen (now purged), who apparently rejected out of hand the JCP's idea of a united front. On the same day, moreover, the CCP organ Hung Ch'i (Red Flag) came out with an attack on the Akahata article of February 4, 1966.⁴⁴ Following its cold-shouldered reception, the Japanese delegation went to Hanoi for a two-week visit which culminated in the signing of a joint statement by the Japanese Communists and North Vietnamese leaders on February 27, 1966. Miyamoto's speech in Hanoi was reprinted in the CCP Central Committee organ Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily) on February 21, but the Chinese version conspicuously deleted a passage in which Miyamoto had said, "we shall continue to strive for Sino-Soviet cooperation in extending aid to Vietnam."⁴⁵

⁴⁴Hung Ch'i (Peking), February 10, 1966; see also Asahi Shimbun, February 12, 1966, p. 2.

⁴⁵On this discrepancy, see "The JCP and the Direction of the Miyamoto Line," Asahi Janaru, VIII, No. 15 (April 10, 1966) 8-9. For a further account of the delegation's tour, see Asahi Shimbun, March 25, 1966, p. 1.

On March 11, 1966, Miyamoto's party went to P'yŏngyang to be greeted with a much warmer reception by the North Korean Communist leaders. There they signed a joint communiqué with the North Korean leaders stressing the equality and independence of all Communist parties, and affirming the principle that no individual Communist party should attempt to exert pressure in the internal affairs of another.⁴⁶

On March 21, 1966, the JCP envoys returned once more to Peking for another round of discussions with the Chinese. Detailed substance of the JCP-CCP summit talks in Peking was not reported in Akahata. However, for the first time, the whole picture of the Peking conference was revealed by Oka Masayoshi (vice-chairman of the JCP delegation in the Peking meeting) in the closed meeting of the JCP policy planning members and the editorial staffs of the theoretical journals held at JCP headquarters in Yoyogi on May 4, 1966.⁴⁷

According to this source, as a result of three meetings in China, mutual agreement was finally reached on

⁴⁶ Text of the communiqué is in Akahata, March 22, 1966, p.-1.

⁴⁷ The whole text of Oka Masayoshi's secret report on the JCP-CCP talks in Peking is printed in Shisō Undo Kenkyūsho (Research Institute of Ideological Movement) (ed.), Nihon Kyōsantō Hombu (The JCP Headquarters), (Tokyo: Zempo-sha, 1967), pp. 92-107.

March 27, 1966 between the JCP and the CCP. The members of the CCP delegation who participated in the third meeting included Chou En-lai, P'eng Chen, K'ang Sheng, Liu Ning-i, and Liao Ch'eng-chih. The joint communiqué agreed upon by the two parties confirmed that the organization of a wide international united front against U.S. imperialism had become an important international problem and, at the same time, in opposing "modern revisionism," stressed the necessity of a struggle to protect the purity of ~~Marrism~~-Leninism against "doctrinairism and sectarianism." When agreement was reached between the two parties, Chou En-lai revealed that text of the communiqué had been sent by telegraph to Mao Tse-tung and said that the communiqué could be announced right after the meeting between the JCP delegation and Mao Tse-tung.

According to Oka Masayoshi's secret report, the rupture of the talks between Mao Tse-tung and Miyamoto Kenji, which took place at his villa near Hangchow at the end of March 1966, was considered as the decisive factor in the further deterioration of the JCP-CCP relations. During the Hangchow meeting, Mao Tse-tung's abrupt comments on the text of the communiqué, which had been agreed between the JCP and the CCP delegates in Peking, took Miyamoto and other JCP delegates by surprise.

According to Oka Masayoshi's detailed account of the Mao-Miyamoto meeting, Mao is reported to have said:

I [Mao Tse-tung] cannot agree to announcing the communiqué as it stands. A criticism against the leaders of the Soviet Union, naming names, must be inserted and an anti-American anti-Soviet stand should be clearly indicated. . . . The JCP has put all its efforts into expanding party strength and has neglected the mass struggle. Has the JCP any intention of launching its revolution by force? The time is ripe in Japan for armed revolution. The JCP should establish a policy of armed revolution and, setting up the Sino-American War that will break out soon and the 1970 struggle [the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty issue] as targets, should launch armed revolution. The platform of the JCP makes no mention of armed revolution. This is revisionism. The JCP's platform should be corrected. ⁴⁸

Further, Mao Tse-tung brought up a new problem of the Soviet military build up in Northern China and Manchuria to threaten the security of China. According to Oka, this was causing further apprehension to Mao and he asked Miyamoto to be ready for guerrilla warfare in Japan. When the JCP delegation refused to accede to his demands, Mao Tse-tung indicated that the joint communiqué would not be issued.

At this point, the Twenty-Third Congress of the CPSU was held in Moscow, and the Japanese press was predicting that, in view of the discord between the JCP and the CCP, the Japanese delegation would defy Peking by attending the Twenty-Third Congress of the CPSU. Nevertheless, the JCP leaders agreed to follow Peking's lead in boycotting the

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 98; also cited in Umori Shigeo, "Realignment of the JCP," Japan Quarterly, XIV, No. 4 (October-December, 1967), 448.

Congress, despite the fact that the North Korean and North Vietnamese parties decided to attend it.⁴⁹

Looking at the Miyamoto leadership's previous moves to reassert the JCP's independence from Peking, this decision was a surprise. It is impossible to say for certain what prompted the decision, but Stockwin gives a plausible explanation by saying that the following three factors must have played a part:

First, in view of the numerous setbacks China had recently sustained in various parts of the world, the Peking leaders must have been particularly anxious to retain the Japanese party's loyalty and no doubt exerted strong pressure on the JCP delegation; second, the Soviet Union was still actively supporting Shiga's Communist splinter group, causing considerable annoyance and embarrassment to the JCP; third, the pro-Chinese "tough" faction within the JCP was conducting a vigorous campaign against Miyamoto's attempts to gain greater independence from Peking.⁵⁰

Based on this analysis, it may be surmised that the Chinese made it clear to the JCP delegates that attendance at the impending Moscow Congress would mean a complete break between the Japanese and the Chinese parties--an event which Miyamoto apparently was eager to avoid. The Japanese Communist leader's real intention appears to have been to place

⁴⁹This decision was apparently reached while the Japanese delegation was in Peking for the second time. According to a Japanese report, it was not until then that the Chinese finally staged an official reception for the delegation. See "Nikkyo, Miyamoto rosen. . ." loc. cit. (footnote 45), pp. 7-8.

⁵⁰Stockwin, "The Communist Party of Japan," p. 9.

the JCP in a more independent footing vis-à-vis Peking, at the same time preserving its basically pro-Chinese orientation.

The Politics of External Adaptation by the JCP
in the Sino-Soviet Conflict Since 1966

The JCP Reaction to the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution, 1966-1968

The inter-party relationship between the JCP and the CCP deteriorated swiftly during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China (1966-1968). This drastic politico-social upheaval was stirred up by Chairman Mao Tse-tung's fear that the control of Chinese society was passing from the first-generation Chinese revolutionary elites to the new technocratic and administrative elites. With the help of Marshal Lin Piao who had controlled the Chinese People's Liberation Army and the fanatic Red Guard youth, Mao Tse-tung appealed to the idealism of Chinese youth to save China from "capitalists" and "right-wing revisionists" of the type found in the West and Soviet Union, who would defy the revolution as defined by him. Subsequent attacks of the youthful Red Guard on Mao's opponents—the so-called "reactionary revisionists" like Liu Shao-ch'i, Peng Chen, Teng Shao-ping, and Lo Jui-ching among others—by public humiliation, effigy-burning, pillage, violence, and disorder generated reprisals and

created internal chaos.⁵¹

It was in the midst of this turbulent internal crisis of Communist China that the attack by the CCP on the JCP's "petty bourgeois revisionism" was renewed. Paul F. Langer describes systematic CCP attempts to bring the JCP back under Peking's control following the breakdown of negotiations between Secretary-General Miyamoto and the top stratum of the Chinese hierarchy (including Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai) in the spring of 1966:

They [the Chinese Communists] used physical violence against the JCP's official representatives in Peking [the so-called Peking Airport incident in 1967 in which the Akahata correspondent Konno Junichi and the JCP representative Sunama Ichiryō were beaten before their departure at Peking Airport by the Red Guard demonstrators and the pro-CCP Japanese Communist youths studying in Peking]; employed dissident JCP elements residing in Peking to launch a radio campaign against the Party leaders; and gave organizational, financial, and propaganda support to an attempt of the pro-Peking

⁵¹For English publications on the background of the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," see James Chieh Hsiung, Ideology and Practice: The Evolution of Chinese Communism (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 200-300; An Tai-Sung, Mao Tse-tung's Cultural Revolution (New York: Pegasus Publishing Co., 1972); Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1968), pp. 41-47; Chi Wen-shun, "The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in Ideological Perspective," Asian Survey, IX, No. 8 (August 1969), 563-79; Victor C. Falkenheim, "The Cultural Revolution in Kwangsi, Yunnan and Fukien," Asian Survey, IX, No. 8 (August 1969), 580-97; Gordon Bennett, "China's Continuing Revolution: Will It Be Permanent?" Asian Survey, X, No. 1 (January 1970), 2-17; John Bryan Starr, "Conceptual Foundations of Mao Tse-tung's Theory of Continuing Revolution," Asian Survey, XI, No. 6 (June 1971), 610-28. For Japanese sources, see Yoshida Makoto, "New Stage of the Great Cultural Revolution," Sekai, No. 256 (March 1967), 112-20; Utsunomiya Tokuma, "Great Cultural Revolution and Mao Tse-tung," Sekai, No. 262 (April 1967), 82-7; Muramatsu Ei, "Mao Tse-tung's Restlessness and Loneliness," Chūō Kōron, No. 952 (February 1967), 88-110.

faction to split the Party by establishing throughout Japan Party [sic] chapters calling themselves "left" and "true Marxist-Leninist." They [the Chinese Communists] vilified the independent JCP leadership as "bourgeois," "revisionist," "parliamentary cretins" conspiring with Soviet and Japanese reactionaries; they split and reorganized Communist front organizations, withheld trade from firms friendly to the JCP, and stirred up extremist leftist elements in the Zengakuren student groups against the JCP. They also threw support behind the left wing of the Japanese Socialist Party to counterbalance the JCP's influence among the extremist left and to prevent Communist-Socialist cooperation except on Peking's terms.⁵²

In retaliation, the JCP resorted to a stepped-up denigration of the CCP. There were conclusive evidences of the deteriorating JCP-CCP relationship. First of all, as disagreements between the JCP and CCP developed, Mao Tse-tung's writings disappeared from JCP reading lists. Second, reports of Peking radio programs in Japanese ceased to appear in Akahata and its editorials practically ignored the much heralded "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" which was shaping up in Communist China at the time.⁵³ Third, circumlocutory tones of Akahata editorials concerning the dangers of "sectarianism" and "dogmatism" in the international Communist movement started appearing in 1966. Fourth, a frontal assault on the CCP appeared in an August 21, 1967

⁵² Langer, Communism in Japan, p. 74.

⁵³ On the further analyses of Akahata editorial during 1966-1967 see chapter VI, pp. 287-290 of this dissertation.

Akahata editorial.⁵⁴ For the first time, the editorial issued an acrimonious criticism of Mao Tse-tung's cult of personality, together with a stinging attack on the "Big Power Chauvinism" of the People's Republic of China.

With respect to the intra-party strife of the JCP between the Miyamoto-Hakamada New Mainstream group (Yoyogi leadership) and the pro-CCP splinter group in 1966, Theodore McNelly elucidates the following events:

By Mid-1966, the JCP adopted a policy of "autonomy and independence." Yoyogi [refers to the headquarters of the JCP in Tokyo; common usage of symbolizing the Mainstream leadership as distinct from the location of various splinter groups of the JCP] began to denounce "sectarian dogmatism" (an alleged heresy of Peking) with the same fervor it had been denouncing Soviet revisionism. A "Japanese Communist Party (Liberation Front)," led by Shida Shigeo denounced the Miyamoto leadership for its "petty bourgeois revisionism," and in reply, the Akahata accused the Shida group of ultra left-wing adventurism and flunkeyism towards the Communist Party of a certain foreign country. [It clearly implied the CCP.] Nishizawa Takaji [sic]⁵⁵ denounced the Yoyogi line and was expelled in late 1966. He and his wife reviewed a Red Guard rally in Peking as honored guests of Mao-Tse-tung. His [Nishizawa Ryuji's] monthly magazine, The Study of the Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung carried letters from all over Japan critical of the revisionist Miyamoto leadership.⁵⁶

The subsequent shake-up of the JCP culminated in the mass purge of the pro-CCP splinter group. In August 1966, JCP

⁵⁴ On the content analysis of this editorial, see chapter VI, p. 289 of this dissertation.

⁵⁵ Nishizawa Ryuji should be correct spelling.

⁵⁶ Theodore McNelly, Politics and Government in Japan (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1972), 2nd ed., p. 116.

headquarters announced the suspension of the membership of four standing members of the Yamaguchi Prefectural Committee (the stronghold of the pro-CCP splinter party activity) on charges of insubordination to the central party directives.⁵⁷ Following the adoption of the "independence and autonomy" slogan by the Tenth Congress of the JCP in October 1966, 40 pro-CCP members of the JCP were expelled from the Party. In addition to these, 40 other JCP students studying in Peking were denounced as "flunkeyists of a foreign party" and officially expelled from the JCP.⁵⁸ After the expulsion from the Party the pro-CCP splinter group of Yamaguchi Prefecture challenged the Yoyogi leadership with the financial support of the CCP and continued their attack on the JCP Mainstream (Yoyogi) group by publishing Chōshū Shimbun (Chōshū News). Based on both Japanese and English sources,⁵⁹ the following organizational sub-divisions of the pro-CCP

⁵⁷ Asahi Nenkan (Asahi Yearbook) (Tokyo: Asahi News, 1967), p. 283.

⁵⁸ Ibid. Certain discrepancy of the exact number of the expulsion of the pro-CCP was noted in the Japanese sources. According to Kōan Chōsachō (Public Safety Investigation Bureau) report published in Asahi Shimbun (December 18, 1966), the JCP had purged a total of 98 pro-Peking party members during 1966.

⁵⁹ On English sources, see Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966, pp. 256-58; J.A.A. Stockwin, "The Communist Party of Japan," p. 10. On Japanese sources, see Zenei, December, 1968; Iizuka Shigetaro, op. cit., pp. 190-91.

faction of the Japanese Communists after 1965 can be reconstructed:

- 1) Communist Party of Japan--Left-wing (Nihon Kyōsantō-Saha). Active in Kyōto, Ōsaka, and Tokyo cities as well as Aichi, Chiba, Fukuoka, Fukushima, Hyōgo, Kanagawa, Saga, Yamaguchi prefectures. Led by Anzai Kuraji and Ōzuka Ariaki. Publication: People's Star (Jinmin no Hoshi).
- 2) Japanese Communist Party--Liberation Front (Nihon Kyōsantō-Kaihō Sensen). Organized in Kyōto in September 1955, with the old Shida Shigeo faction and Yoshida Shirō faction as its nuclei.⁶⁰ Active in Ōsaka, Hokkaidō, and Ehime prefecture. Publication: Peace and Independence (Heiwa to Dokuritsu).
- 3) Japanese Communist Party--Marxism-Leninism (Nihon Kyōsantō-Marxshugi-Lēninshugi). Organized in February 1965. Originally called Japanese Communist Party Reconstruction Committee (Nihon Kyōsantō Saiken Inkai). Active in Ehime prefecture and Saijō area. Publication: Marxshugi-Lēninshugi (Marxism-Leninism). Later merged with the JCP--Liberation Front.

⁶⁰ It will be recalled from chapter III of this dissertation that Shida Shigeo had led the JCP during the turbulent "leftist" era between 1950 and 1953. He had gone into eclipse after 1955 when the party abandoned "leftist adventurism" and the Miyamoto-Hakamada-Nosaka triumvirate assumed power. For a number of years, Shida and such comrades as Shiino Etsurō and Yoshida Shirō had occupied themselves with local cell activities, keeping in touch with each other. Shida was also reported to have received extensive training in Peking by the Chinese Communists following his ouster from the JCP in 1955. Shiino Etsurō had been chairman of the JCP Central Committee during 1950 and Yoshida Shirō had served as head of the Hokkaidō party organization. For further background on the JCP--Liberation Front, see Kōan Jōhō (Public Safety Information), No. 153 (June 1966).

In this fashion, the fragmentation of the pro-CCP splinter party continued to mount in Japan. Since the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" in China in 1966, the CCP intensified the continued support of these splinter groups through pouring in direct party funds and through indirect support such as granting special import licenses given to the undercover Japanese trade firms covertly operated by these groups and bestowing the profit made by the sales of Chinese Communist books in Japan to the coffers of these splinter parties.⁶¹

In spite of the intensified efforts by the CCP, the numerical strength of the Maoist splinter group in the Japanese Communist movement was not significant enough to challenge the JCP Mainstream faction. Added to this was the perennial phenomenon of the fragmentation of the pro-CCP splinter group. Thus the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revo-

⁶¹ It is also interesting to note that the CCP-operated publishing firms (Atōsha, Tōhō Shoten, and Daian Shoten) serve as outlets for the Maoist writings of the pro-CCP Japanese Communists. The following books published by Tōhō Shoten reiterate the CCP line in condemning the JCP Mainstream leaders for their revisionist tendencies: Anzai Kuraji, Miyamoto Shūseishugi Hihan (A Criticism of Miyamoto Revisionism) (Tokyo: Tōhō Shoten, 1968); Kanezawa Sachio, Miyamoto Kenji Uragiri no Sanjūyonen (Thirty-four Years of Betrayal by Miyamoto Kenji) (Tokyo: Tōhō Shoten, 1967); Matsumura Kazuto, Mōtakutō Shisō to Gendai Shūseishugi (Mao Tse-tung's Ideology and Modern Revisionism) (Tokyo: Tōhō Shoten, 1968).

lution" in China led to the breaking point of the JCP-CCP relationship and, finally, the long road to "autonomy and independence" of the JCP seemed to have succeeded.

The Broken Dialogue of the JCP with the CPSU since 1966

With the deterioration of the JCP-CCP relationship, it seemed as if a drift back towards Moscow was in the offing. However, the following events confirm that the JCP leadership has successfully reasserted its right of independence from Moscow as well as from Peking.

The Causes of the CPSU-JCP Entente.—As the inter-party relationship between the JCP and the CCP deteriorated following the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" in China, the Soviet Union resorted to an accelerated effort to exploit the cleavages between the two Asian Communist parties. Also there was an ample evidence that the Soviet Union had shifted from its domineering attitude toward the JCP, which had gained substantial popular support and an increase of membership after its declaration of "autonomy and independence." Added to this was the fiasco of the pro-CPSU Shiga-Suzuki faction (JCP-Voice of Japan) which, to the disappointment of the CPSU, had failed to disrupt the central leadership of the JCP under Miyamoto-Hakamada control.⁶² Having faced these problems, the

⁶² In July 1965, the JCP-Voice of Japan picked Kamiyama Shigeo as a candidate to contest for the parliamentary seat against Nosaka Sanzō in the House of Councillors (Upper House) election. Kamiyama suffered a disastrous defeat by Nosaka. During the Tokyo City Councilmen's election in the same year, the JCP-Voice of Japan group suffered major defeat once again.

Soviet Union decided to adopt a cautious approach toward the JCP; it chose not to antagonize the New Mainstream leadership any further.⁶³ In the light of this interpretation, then, it becomes understandable why the CPSU had suddenly ordered the Shiga-Suzuki group not to organize a splinter party (merging the forces of Shiga-Suzuki's JCP-Voice of Japan [Nihon no Koe], Kasuga Shōjirō's United Socialist League [Tōitsu Shakaishugi Dōmei], and Naitō Chishū's Socialist Reform Movement [Shakaishugi Kakushin Undō]), which was scheduled to have a charter convention in February 1967.⁶⁴

⁶³ Shisō Undō Kenkyūsho (ed.), op. cit., p. 175.

⁶⁴ At the Charter convention of the new Communist Workers' Party of Japan (Kyōsanshugi Rōdōsha Tō) held in Tokyo during November 12-15, 1966, Shiga Yoshio proposed the further delay of the formation of the new party by stating that it might deviate from the international Communist movement and resigned from the Chairmanship of the Organizational Unity Preparation Committee (Soshiki Tōitsu Jumbi Finkai) which had been active in uniting the three splinter factions (JCP-Voice of Japan, United Socialist League, and Socialist Reform Movement) of the JCP. Suzuki Ichizō, Kamiyama Shigeo, Nakano Shigeharu, and Kasuga Shōjirō supported Shiga's statement and refused to join the new party. Based on this fact, it was quite clear that Shiga must have received the directives from the CPSU to halt the formation of splinter party lest it antagonize the JCP Mainstream further. Shiga's proposal was defeated by the majority voting at the convention and the first party convention of the Communist Workers' Party of Japan was held in February 1967. The core group of this anti-JCP (Yoyogi) faction clustered around Naitō Chishū (Socialist Reform Movement), Iida Momo, Kurihara Kōji, Dohara Shunji, and Butō Kazuyagi. Because of the fact that most of the prominent pro-Soviet Japanese Communist leaders had refused to join this splinter party, it could not challenge the JCP Mainstream successfully. The Soviet Union also refused to give substantial support to the newly-organized Communist Workers' Party of Japan. For the further details on the background of the formation of this party, see Shisō Undō Kenkyūsho (ed.), op. cit., pp. 172-76.

The JCP-CPSU Top Level Tokyo Conference, February

1968.--In January 1968, a high-level Soviet delegation under CPSU Presidium member Mikhail Suslov visited Japan to patch up the differences and possibly to bring about the normalization of inter-party relations. Following the JCP-CPSU high level conference held during January 31-February 5, 1968, a joint communiqué was announced in Akahata:

. . . The delegates of both parties agreed to reexamine the virtual severance of all ties between the JCP and the CPSU since 1964 and further confirmed to solve the major problems hindering the normalization of the relationship between the parties. Also the delegates of both parties acknowledged the prime importance of the principle of independence, equality, and non-intervention in internal problems of the fraternal parties as specified in the Statement of the Moscow Conference of the Communist and Workers Party in 1960.⁶⁵

Though it might seem that the dialogue between the CPSU and the JCP had resumed, the JCP was not quite ready to improve the strained relationship between the two parties. Following the summit meeting, Miyamoto Kenji, in a press interview of February 7, 1968, indicated that the Japanese delegates would not attend the forthcoming Eighteen-Member Communist and Workers Party Conference to be held in Budapest, Hungary on February 26, 1968.⁶⁶ An Akahata editorial on February 12,

⁶⁵ Akahata, February 8, 1968, p. 1.

⁶⁶ Miyamoto's announcement could be construed as a rebuff to the CPSU delegates' strong urge for the JCP to attend the Budapest meeting.

1968, concerning the assessment of the JCP-CPSU summit conference in Tokyo, reiterated the official view of the JCP: the JCP had not given up its policy positions; it had forced the CPSU to drop its support for Shiga's pro-Moscow splinter group and to acknowledge officially the JCP's right to mutual "equality, independence, and non-intervention."⁶⁷

The JCP-CPSU talks resumed in Moscow in August of the same year. Once again, there were not any substantial signs of an important breakthrough beyond issuing a joint communiqué. Though the JCP official assertions seemed confirmed by an official communiqué published in Pravda August 15, 1968,⁶⁸ subsequent events were to show that the CPSU had not completely withdrawn its support of the Shiga-Suzuki group (JCP-Voice of Japan).

The JCP's Hostility toward the CPSU on the Czechoslovakian Invasion (September 1968).—The mood of the reconciliation between the JCP and the CPSU in early 1968 was soon dampened by the Soviet Army's invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968. For four days the JCP official organ remained silent. Then on August 25, Akahata categorically

⁶⁷"Significance of the JCP-CPSU Conference," Akahata editorial, February 12, 1968, p. 1.

⁶⁸Langer, Communism in Japan, p. 76.

denounced the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty member nations whose troops occupied Czechoslovakia. The denunciation stated that it was a clear cut breach of the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of fraternal parties and the violation of the sovereign independence of another fraternal country; it would not only weaken the prestige and solidarity of the socialist camp but also cause the further disintegration of the international Communist movement; differences among the fraternal parties and the socialist states should be settled by mutual consultation but not by unilateral military action. The JCP strongly demanded the immediate termination of the intervention into the internal problems of Czechoslovakia and swift troop withdrawal.⁶⁹

In the meantime, Shiga-Suzuki's JCP (Voice of Japan) splinter group openly supported the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia. Harsh criticism of this group appeared in Akahata in the form of a polemical debate signed by Fuwa Tetsuzō (real name; Ueda Kenjirō).⁷⁰ In perusing the lengthy "Fuwa article," the following condensation of the argument can be made:

⁶⁹ Akahata, August 25, 1968, p. 1.

⁷⁰ Fuwa Tetsuzō, "Czechoslovakian Issue and Flunkeyists of a Certain Foreign Party," Akahata, September 21, 1968, pp. 2-3.

It is a stark reality that the five-nation (including the Soviet Union) invasion of Czechoslovakia is not "mutual assistance" or "fraternal party assistance," but the illegal intervention by force which trampled Czechoslovakian sovereignty and independence. . . . The Moscow Conference between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia can by no means be construed as a meeting between equal and independent fraternal parties or governments, but as a meeting in which the occupation forces suppressed the occupied by force. . . . If this sort of practice is condoned among the socialist camp, it means that a certain socialistic country can resort to any form of military intervention so long as it interprets unilaterally, [Italics mine] the "danger of counter-revolution" concerning the internal situation of the other socialistic nation. . . . Even using the Soviet definition of the term "aggression," it is nothing but an "aggressive action" in violation of international law as interpreted by the Soviet Union. To achieve its objective of "Big Power Chauvinism," the Soviet Union has come to the point of committing "aggression."⁷¹

Thus the JCP's attitude during the Czechoslovakian crisis was openly hostile to the Soviet Union. Though previously the JCP had been slightly critical about the liberalization of Czechoslovakia, throughout the crisis it attacked the "Big Power Chauvinism" of the Soviet Union and firmly maintained its declared policy of "autonomy and independence." As a result, relations between the CPSU and the JCP once more deteriorated after 1968.

⁷¹-
Ibid.

The Politics of Intra-Bloc Coalition with the Asian Communist Parties: Triad Alliance of the JCP-KWP-VWP

With the further deterioration of the JCP-CPSU-CCP relations, the JCP actively sought to promote coalition with like-minded ruling parties in Asia--notably North Korea and North Vietnam--and in Europe (Italian Communist Party and Rumanian Communist Party) and elsewhere with parties that were seeking independence from Moscow and Peking while working for worldwide Communist unity in the joint struggle against "U.S. imperialism."⁷²

In this intra-bloc coalition formation the JCP-KWP (Korean Workers' Party) relationship is particularly noteworthy. Even before the Sino-Soviet conflict had compelled both parties to take joint courses of action, there were signs that both the JCP and the KWP were maintaining a friendly inter-party relationship. In February 1959, a JCP delegation headed by Miyamoto Kenji visited Pyŏngyang on its way home from Moscow, where it had attended the Twenty-First Congress of the CPSU, and conferred with the leadership of the KWP. In a joint communiqué issued after the conference, Premier Kim Il-sŏng and Miyamoto Kenji voiced complete agreement on major issues and declared their common determination to

⁷²Langer, Communism in Japan, p. 82.

struggle against American imperialism and for world peace.⁷³

When the Sino-Soviet dispute worsened following the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU in October 1961, the KWP, like the JCP, maintained an "ambivalent neutrality" until 1962.⁷⁴ By 1963, as the JCP was leaning closer to Peking in its vehement attack on the Soviet Union's signing of a partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and "Big Power Chauvinism," the KWP again rallied to the defense of the JCP against the attacks of the Soviet Union. Yiu Myung-Kun's doctoral dissertation on "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in North Korea since 1954" examines, among others, the close-knit relationship of the KWP and the JCP during 1962-1964 and contends that there is documentary evidence to substantiate this interpretation.⁷⁵ According to Yiu, the North Korean declaration supporting the JCP virulently accused the Soviet leaders' "unscrupulous" interference in the internal affairs of the JCP (the Soviet Union's support of Shiga Yqshio's splinter party activity). As evidence, Yiu cited a July 27, 1964 Nodong Sinmun editorial that stated:

⁷³Nodong Sinmun (Organ of the Korean Workers' Party), February 28, 1959.

⁷⁴Koh Byung-Chul, The Foreign Policy of North Korea (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), pp. 45-64.

⁷⁵Yiu Myung-Kun, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in North Korea Since 1954," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (College Park, Maryland: University of Maryland, 1969), pp. 177-79.

As is known to everyone, these people, spreading their wrong views, try to force all others to blindly follow them and attempt to put pressure on and plot against those parties which do not obey them. We [North Korea] have already had bitter experiences of such acts by these people. They [the Soviet Union] accused the JCP of starting polemics after they provoked open polemics, and they condemn others as splinterists while they are resorting to splinter machination.⁷⁶

From the above editorial comment of Nodong Sinmun it can be surmised that North Korea emphasized its close collaboration with the JCP.

Before and after the crucial weeks of the JCP-CCP top-level conferences in Peking in March 1966, Miyamoto and his JCP delegations traveled to P'yongyang to consult with their counterparts there. Both the JCP and the KWP agreed on the general strategy of the united front against the "U.S. imperialists" and issued the joint communiqué, strongly urging China and the Soviet Union to lay aside their differences to join this struggle.⁷⁷ Coinciding with the declaration of the policy of "autonomy and independence" by the JCP and "Juch'e" (self-determination) by the KWP in 1966, both parties once again strengthened their friendly relationships. Perhaps the plausible motive for their coalition in the intra-bloc-relationship could be speculated as their mutual

⁷⁶"It Is an Unforgivable Crime to Criticize Japanese Communist Party," Nodong Sinmun editorial, July 27, 1964.

⁷⁷Nodong Sinmun, March 12, 1966. For an editorial underscoring the significance of the visit and reaffirming KWP-JCP solidarity, see ibid., March 22, 1966.

fear of being isolated after their challenges of the "Big Power Chauvinism" of both Communist China and the Soviet Union. However, in the author's opinion, the prime motive of the "autonomy and independence" and "Juch'e" was the positive manifestation of self-assertion for the "creative application of Marxism-Leninism" to national conditions. Thus, at present, both the JCP and the KWP share the conviction that interparty relations within the Communist camp must be marked by independence and non-interference in the affairs of fraternal parties. Also both place world revolutionary struggle against "U.S. imperialism" highest on the scale of priorities and both share the common strategy and tactics of Communist world revolution. Both have insisted that the struggle in Vietnam was the crucial war of national liberation to weaken U.S. imperialism in Southeast Asia and, in their joint emphasis on solidarity of the Socialist camp, both the JCP, and the KWP have urged Moscow and Peking to set aside differences and unite in aiding the Vietnamese Communists.

Also the JCP has maintained friendly ties with the Vietnamese Workers' Party (North Vietnamese Communist Party) since the announcement of the JCP-VWP joint communiqué concerning the united front struggle against "U.S. imperialism" in Hanoi during the JCP delegations' top level conference with the North Vietnamese in March 1966. Both parties

urged Communist China and the Soviet Union to put aside their ideological differences and adopt a united front in helping the North Vietnamese War of National Liberation. Thereafter, the JCP-VWP have continued the cordial friendship and the Akahata editorials on the Vietnam War have repeatedly reassured the North Vietnamese of JCP support. Thus the intra-bloc coalition among the Asian Communist parties as a direct outcome of the Sino-Soviet conflict emerged as a triad relationship: the JCP-KWP-VWP. In this way they have found a viable third alternative in the Sino-Soviet conflict. So far, the three Asian Communist parties are consulting each other on joint action and coordinating their strategic views.

Then what are the common factors that bring them together? First, the three Asian Communist parties share the common fate of small Communist parties (both ruling and non-ruling) caught in the ideological and nationalistic struggle of the two large parties. Second, their nationalistic views are naturally different from both the CPSU and the CCP. Consequently the JCP, KWP, and VWP leaders question whether Moscow and Peking's intents are not primarily to protect their interests, even at the risk of sacrificing their erstwhile small Asian fraternal parties. Third, the three Asian Communist parties perceived the inherent dangers of the international socialist solidarity

caused by the Sino-Soviet conflict and attempted to chart their own course of action. To cite Cho Soon-Sung's comment on Premier Kim Il-song's concept of "Juch'a" as manifested in the intra-bloc affairs:

...Kim maintained his "independent line" policy and continued to criticize both the "revisionism" of the Soviets and the "dogmatism" of the Chinese. He warned against "big power chauvinism" and maintained that the international Communist movement must be based on the principles of equality, sovereignty, mutual respect, and non-interference in another country's internal affairs. Kim has retained close ties with North Vietnam, Cuba, and the Communist party in Japan, all of which support this "independent line."⁷⁸

The Politics of "Self-Assertion" by the JCP
in the Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1966-

Since March 1966, the JCP has progressively asserted its autonomy from the CCP--though not without some conflict within its own ranks. At the same time, the Party has sought to resume a cautious dialogue with Moscow after two years of complete estrangement. According to Japanese press reports, a visiting Soviet trade union official was permitted to break the ice by calling at the JCP headquarters in Tokyo in the Summer of 1966, but this meeting with party officials did not go beyond an exchange of courtesies.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ Cho Soon-Sung, "North and South Korea: Stepped-Up Aggression and the Search for New Security," Asian Survey, IX, No. 1 (January 1969), 37.

⁷⁹ Mainichi Shimbun (Mainichi Daily), June 29, 1966, p. 2 and Asahi Shimbun (Asahi Daily), July 11, 1966, p.2.

Clearly, independence from both sides--though perhaps in different degrees--is the essence of Miyamoto's new policies. Autonomy vis-à-vis Peking in particular would seem to be a logical consequence of the Party's drive to expand its membership and electoral strength. More important, perhaps, the Party's new posture of independence reflects its increasing financial affluence, which seems to come mainly from publications sales and other domestic sources rather than from outside the country. To what extent has the JCP Mainstream faction succeeded in achieving its goals? How tenable are their membership and electoral strengths? To examine these related problems, an extensive analysis of the Tenth Congress of the JCP (October 1966)--the significant party convention which declared the policy of "autonomy and independence" from the Sino-Soviet blocs--might shed some light on the future evolution of the JCP.

The Tenth Congress of the JCP was held in Tokyo from October 24 to 30, 1966, and reaffirmed the Miyamoto leadership's new line of independence from both Peking and Moscow. The Congress reelected Miyamoto Kenji as Party Secretary-General and Nosaka Sanzō as Chairman of the Party, but the latter's position was essentially honorary, with de facto power resting in the Miyamoto-Hakamada leadership structure.

In their addresses to the Congress, both Nosaka and Miyamoto made clear the Party's determination to pursue an

independent course opposed not only to Khrushchev-style "modern revisionism" but also to the "dogmatism and sectarianism" characteristic of the Peking leadership. The Congress endorsed this line without open dissent, amending the party rules so as to add "dogmatism and sectarianism" to "revisionism" as deviation against which party members are pledged to fight.⁸⁰ The Congress also endorsed the leadership's renewed call for the formation of an international Communist united front to aid North Vietnam--a proposal thus far rebuffed by Peking. Furthermore, the Congress adopted the new revolutionary policy of "the Party, responsible for the struggle for liberation of the Japanese people," not blindly following the dictates of Communist parties of foreign countries but being alert to the special characteristics of Japan, which was described as "a vassal of the United States, although a highly developed capitalist country." According to Ōmori Shigeo's extensive coverage of the Tenth Congress of the JCP, the party convention was characterized by the emergence of new guidelines geared to win a popular image for the JCP:

. . . the JCP stressed the fact that the line of action most suited to the present situation [1966] in Japan consisted of large-scale political propaganda, emphasis on the Diet and election struggles, the construction and

⁸⁰ Akahata, October 30, 1966, p. 1. Also the whole text of the proposal for the amendment of the party rule (as submitted by Hakamada Satomi on October 28 Session) is reported in ibid., p. 2.

strengthening of a mass organization and the formation of a strong mass avant-garde party. It is noteworthy that these activities emphasize that aspect of Japan's "reality" of being a "highly developed capitalistic country," rather than the aspect of Japan being a "vassal" of the United States--the aspect on which the JCP had hitherto placed greatest stress.⁸¹

At this Tenth Congress, the JCP boasted that the Party had achieved its greatest organized strength since its founding, a strength consisting of close to 270,000 party members and about a million and a half readers of Akahata.⁸² The JCP also claimed that, as of spring, 1966, 310,000 copies of Akahata were sold daily and 1,190,000 copies of the Sunday Akahata.⁸³ The exact amount of funds the JCP had raised and how these were raised were secret, but the stringent Japanese government reporting requirements for political organizations give rough estimates of the party coffers, as Table 3 indicates:

⁸¹ Omori Shigeo, loc. cit., p. 449.

⁸² Akahata, October 26, 1966, p. 2.

⁸³ Shisō Undō Kenkyūsho (ed.), op. cit., p. 200.

TABLE 3
THE STATUS OF THE JCP, 1962-1966

Year	Party Revenue	Party Membership	Akahata Daily Circulation	Akahata Sunday Edition Circulation
1962	¥ 490,827,958 (\$1,363,411)	80,000	110,000	220,000
1963	744,462,553 (\$2,067,952)	120,000	160,000	350,000
1964	990,734,693 (\$2,752,041)	160,000	200,000	650,000
1965	1,271,000,000 (\$3,530,556)	200,000	250,000	800,000
1966	880,000,000* (\$2,444,444)	270,000	310,000	1,190,000

Source: Adapted from the JCP report (1966) submitted to Japanese Ministry of Autonomy (Jichishō) under the Political Fund Regulatory Law; Data on the JCP status is also available in Shisō Undo Kenkyūsho (Research Institute of Ideological Movement), Nihon Kyōsantō Hombu, p. 200.

*6 months only.

However, the above party revenue column is rather an underestimated figure. It is quite possible that the JCP report was drastically distorted.⁸⁴ According to the official estimates of the Japanese government sources--information provided by the Public Safety Investigation Bureau--actual

⁸⁴This figure would not include, for example, foreign subsidies, which reportedly have been quite substantial as long as the JCP remained in good terms with Peking.

amounts of the JCP total revenue were approximately ¥4 billion (\$11,111,000) in 1965, ¥7 billion (\$19,444,000) in 1966, and ¥8 billion (\$22,222,000) in 1967. Even after the deterioration of the JCP-CCP relationship following the Mao-Miyamoto meeting in March 1966 and the subsequent cutoff of the financial contributions by the CCP, the JCP was able to sustain itself through the revenue coming from the increased sales volume of Akahata and other party publications, fund-raising contributions, special contributions, and membership dues. As Langer indicates:

The JCP is fairly big business today, to judge by the size of its printing plants and the vast amount of literature it issues. . . . Whatever the sources, official statistics indicate that in 1969 the JCP's revenues, amounting to more than \$9 million, exceeded those of all but the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. . . . JCP income was more than five times that of its Socialist rivals.⁸⁵

Another yardstick for assessing the growing strength of the JCP is the results of national elections during the past two decades (see Table 4). It can be seen that somewhere between 2 per cent and 10 per cent of the adult population of Japan supports the JCP,⁸⁶ with the percentage

⁸⁵Langer, Communism in Japan, p. 35.

⁸⁶Support for the JCP is generally much higher in the major urban centers, where it averages 10 per cent and goes in some instances as high as 30 per cent. For example, in the House of Councillors election of 1968, the highest percentages (30%) of Communist votes were cast in the "Red belt" area, Kyōto, Tokyo, Ōsaka, Nagano, Yokohama, and Fukuoka.

TABLE 4

ELECTORAL STRENGTH OF THE JCP IN HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTIONS,
1955-1972

Year	JCP Vote		Seats Won (total=467 to 491)	
	Number (thousands)	% of vote cast	Number	% of total
1955	733	2.0	2	0.4
1958	1,012	2.6	1	0.2
1960	1,157	2.9	3	0.6
1963	1,646	4.0	5	1.1
1967	2,191	4.8	5	1.1
1969	3,199	6.8	14	2.9
1972	5,497	10.5	38	7.7

Source: Langer, Communism in Japan, p. 17; Asahi Shimbun, December 12, 1972, p. 3.

showing a gradual but steady increase. A noteworthy phenomenon of the JCP electoral strength in the general election is the conspicuous increase in parliamentary seats won by the JCP since its declaration of "autonomy and independence" in 1966 in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Following the most recent general election held in December 1972, the JCP leaders were quite elated when 38 JCP candidates won seats in the House of Representatives. Though the official interpretation of the JCP headquarters (Yoyogi) attributed this upsurge to the fresh image of the Party devoid of any foreign Communist party influences, much more complex reasons exist than this simple explanation.

In the author's view, the primary reason for this electoral success was its successful campaign to stir up Japanese nationalism in stressing the withdrawal of the

American military bases in Japan. The unpopularity of the American involvement in the Vietnam War and the subsequent JCP attack on Premier Satō's continued support of the United States position in Vietnam War might have certainly helped the JCP to pick up the "protest vote" in Japan. Second, during the past decade, the JCP has abandoned revolutionary violence as a Communist strategy and instead doggedly worked to adopt the parliamentary form of struggle, though it still maintains the "two-stage" revolution theme in Japan. Third, it now assumes a stance which, while vocally militant on American imperialism, is nonviolent in practice and concentrates on more practical issues⁸⁷ and works at the grass-roots level to draw mass support.

Perhaps based on this analysis of the JCP since the Tenth Congress, one can safely say that the swollen coffers of the party's treasury and the continued increase of the membership (as of the Eleventh Congress of the JCP in July 1970 the total members were 300,000) must have increased the sense of self-confidence of the JCP elites in the direction of further "autonomy and independence" from the Sino-Soviet bloc. Another factor was the increase of the parliamentary seats.

⁸⁷ Industrial pollution controls, compensation for the atomic bomb victims in Japan, massive publicization of the plight of the miners and the fishermen, various social problems of the old aged, the attack on the government bureaucracy, and the cost of living.

Summary Appraisal

So far, this chapter has discussed the specific impact of the Sino-Soviet conflict on the JCP from 1961 to 1968. It has analyzed the "fence-straddling" tactics of the JCP in the midst of the Sino-Soviet conflict and proved the major hypothesis of this chapter—that the Sino-Soviet dispute has increased the bargaining leverage of the JCP between the feuding super-bloc actors (the CCP and the CPSU) and hastened an opportunity to enhance its ability to pursue an autonomous policy. Furthermore, the findings of this chapter concerning the factors which influenced the JCP's policy of "autonomy and independence" lead to the conclusion that it is erroneous to label any single factor as the base for the shaping of JCP policy. Neither one of the following factors—historical ties, cultural affinity, the racial element, the place of leadership training either in the Soviet Union or China, geographic proximity, nor stages of economic development—adequately explain "why" and "how" the JCP Mainstream group has adopted the new policy of "Self-Assertion" in the intra-bloc relationship. At most, in this author's opinion, numerous factors—a developing nationalism which was kindled briefly during 1946-1950, pragmatic views of Marxist-Leninist theory of revolutionary strategy adaptable to the advanced socio-economic conditions

of Japan, transformation of intra-bloc relationships which had already taken place among the Eastern European Communist parties since 1956, and other internal conditions such as expansion of mass membership and self-sufficiency in party finance—have contributed to the shaping of the JCP policy of "autonomy and independence."

The outbreak of the Sino-Soviet conflict has brought a drastic change in JCP policy, not only because altered conditions of intra-bloc relations allowed the JCP greater independence, but because both the CPSU and the CCP began to vie for JCP support. Soviet failures (in setting up the Shiga-Naitō faction as a viable splinter group of the JCP, Cuban Missile Crisis, and Czechoslovakia) and Chinese setbacks (such as the failure in Indonesia, stubbornness of Mao Tse-tung during the Hangchow meeting in 1966, the strife and disruption caused by the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and the abortive attempts at setting up a pro-CCP Chōshū Shimbun faction and other splinter factions within the JCP) further encouraged the JCP to take a more active policy of "autonomy and independence."

What has been the trait of the JCP since 1966? What significance does the policy change have to the party structure? What is the prospective JCP policy in the present context of the international Communist movement? In his speech on the occasion of the Forty-Fifth anniversary

of the JCP on July 15, 1967, Nosaka made clear the Party's determination to pursue an independent course opposed not only to Khrushchev-style "modern revisionism" but also to the "dogmatism and sectarianism" characteristic of the present Peking leadership.

The fact that the JCP has started along its new path of "autonomy and independence" can be expected radically to change the character of the Party in terms of the consolidation of a new leadership and organizational structure. So long as the present trend of the increased mass membership and self-sufficiency in party finance continues, there is little likelihood that the JCP will be drawn back to the control of either the CCP or the CPSU.

In the international Communist movement, the JCP has chosen since 1966, for the first time, a new step in the coalition of the Asian Communist parties (the JCP-~~RWP~~-VWP alliance) in the Sino-Soviet conflict. The JCP leaders have also been active in trying to reestablish an international united front against the United States to help conclude the Vietnam War successfully. They have sought to overcome Chinese resistance to such a front, which would have to include the Soviet Union. As a means toward the united front and to soften Sino-Soviet animosities, the JCP has been advocating an international anti-imperialist conference, at which each nation would be represented by a "unified dele-

gation of all anti-imperialist democratic forces." At present, the prospects for the realization of this JCP version of détente diplomacy seem dubious because of Chinese resistance to any conference in which the Soviets are represented, but it is certainly a drastic departure from the past tradition for the Japanese Communists to take the initiative in matters of international Communism.

CHAPTER VI

PERCEPTION OF THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT BY THE JCP ORGAN: CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE OFFICIAL PARTY NEWSPAPER AKAHATA

This chapter attempts to delineate the internal political dynamics of the JCP through empirical research. As the previous chapter has dealt mainly with the descriptive analysis of the politics of adaptation by the JCP in the midst of the Sino-Soviet conflict, it is necessary to examine these adjustments in terms of "how" the JCP organ Akahata perceived the Sino-Soviet conflict in its sequential reports of the events.

That some trends in Sino-Soviet competition to influence the JCP can be subjected to empirical investigation becomes evident if we consider the possibility of systematically studying—individually or within the framework of multivariate analysis—such empirical indicators of the Sino-Soviet rivalries as (1) monetary contributions to subsidize JCP expenditures, (2) the content of Radio Moscow and Radio Peking broadcasts as directed to the JCP, (3) the scope and frequency of inter-party visitations among the three Communist Party elites, (4) the frequency of cultural exchanges

among the fraternal parties, and (5) the quantity of press coverage by the Sino-Soviet party organs. Even if some of these indicators might be less revealing than other empirical variables they still provide useful factual information for the analysis of the relative importance the Chinese and Soviet leaderships attach to the JCP vis-à-vis other non-ruling Asian Communist parties.

However, in this chapter, the purpose is more modest: it reports a study of the frequency and intensity of Akahata articles about the Sino-Soviet rivalry, with a view toward exploring the relative weight the official party organ of the JCP assigns to various issues in the Sino-Soviet dispute. For reasons of manageability, the precise numbers of words appearing in Akahata articles will not be counted; instead, the frequency of numbers of articles and the attitudinal dimension of Akahata editorials will be assessed and categorized. J. David Singer has noted the utility of content analysis of the mass media: "the frequency with which particular items are discussed reflects the relative importance of these items to the people who formulate and articulate foreign policy."¹

¹J. David Singer, "Soviet and American Foreign Policy Attitudes: Content Analysis of Elite Articulations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, VIII, No. 4 (December, 1964).

It is a major hypothesis of this chapter that Akahata coverage on the Soviet Union and Communist China is manipulated—through selective reporting or omission—to reflect the JCP Mainstream faction's view in the Sino-Soviet conflict. It is further posited that the frequency, friendliness, and hostility of Akahata editorials pertaining to the Soviet Union and Communist China are systematically controlled by the JCP Mainstream faction to express its stance in the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Data Collection and Research Methodology

The monthly issue of Akahata (Shukusatsuhan) contains an index including a sequential compilation of editorials, JCP meetings, resolutions, announcements, party activities, party publications, domestic news, and international events. Most of the international events are arranged in terms of two main divisions, namely, Socialist countries and Capitalist countries. Further geographic sub-divisions follow the ideological divisions.

In content analyzing Akahata, first, a frequency measurement of all articles pertaining to the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) as listed in the geographic sub-division section has been undertaken. Second, a further breakdown of these articles into three sub-categories—

politico/military, economic, and cultural/science--was made. Third, an attitudinal measurement of the Akahata editorials pertaining to the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China was conducted. Finally, a multi-variable frequency measurement on ten major issues related to the Sino-Soviet conflict was undertaken. The period covered in the research ranged from 1961 to 1968, though a certain degree of flexibility was maintained in terms of periodization. Further references to research method will be made preceding the individual data interpretations.

Frequency Measurement of Akahata Articles on the Soviet Union, Communist China, and North Korea, 1961-1968

Tables 5-8 contain a frequency measurement of Akahata articles in time series on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the People's Republic of China, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). The periods chosen for examination were from January 1961, preceding the turbulent crisis of international Communism at the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU of October 1961, to December 1968 when the JCP had finally solidified its official party position of autonomy and independence.

It was found during the field research in Japan that some of the Akahata back-issues were unavailable; particularly a one year and five-month series of Akahata from January

1963 to May 1964 were unobtainable together with several interspersed missing issues. However, this does not constitute a drastic setback, given the length of time studied and the ability to discuss general trends. The articles more frequently counted fell into the following categories: political-military events; reports on economic progress, trade volumes, and industrial fairs; scientific, educational and cultural events; inter-visitation by high-ranking party elites; and the cultural exchange programs among the fraternal Communist party leaders or non-ruling Communist party (JCP) and three dominating Communist party states.

According to Table 5, from the beginning of 1961 to the end of 1962, the distinctive feature is the predominance of Akahata reports on the Soviet Union, which outnumbered the other two Communist political systems, the PRC and the DPRK. In 1961 Akahata devoted 701 articles to the Soviet Union, while the articles relating to Communist China and North Korea were 322 and 64 respectively. In terms of ratio it is roughly: Soviet Union 10; Communist China 5; North Korea 1.1.

The figures in 1962 show some early signs of change in the frequency of Akahata articles on these three Communist political systems; in terms of percentage of Akahata coverage, reports on the Soviet Union have decreased 6 per cent, while those on Communist China have increased 5 per cent.

TABLE 5

AKAHATA ARTICLES PERTAINING TO THE USSR,
PRC, AND DPRK, 1961-1962

	USSR	PRC	DPRK
1961			
January	38	14	4
February	60	11	9
March	39	19	6
April	75	44	0
May	39	10	8
June	49	45	7
July	75	31	13
August	72	36	5
September	72	26	4
October	44	17	0
November	75	39	4
December	63	30	4
Total	701 (64%)	322 (30%)	64 (6%)
1962			
January	67	35	2
February	53	19	6
March	68	23	3
April	71	39	4
May	70	22	3
June	50	25	9
July	78	36	3
August	Not Available		-
September	55	45	6
October	47	42	9
November	36	43	8
December	21	45	12
Total	616 (58%)	374 (35%)	65 (6%)

TABLE 6

AKAHATA ARTICLES PERTAINING TO THE USSR,
PRC, AND DPRK, 1964-1965

	USSR	PRC	DPRK
1964			
January	Not Available	-	-
February	-	-	-
March	-	-	-
April	-	-	-
May	-	-	-
June	5	39	26
July	8	26	20
August	7	42	7
September	9	35	7
October	18	69	26
November	16	73	21
December	10	53	21
Total	73 (13%)	337 (63%)	128 (24%)
1965			
January	7	47	31
February	10	37	17
March	9	41	11
April	2	43	11
May	Not Available	-	-
June	1	21	10
July	2	16	8
August	1	37	15
September	Not Available	-	-
October	Not Available	-	-
November	2	24	7
December	2	25	10
Total	36 (8%)	291 (65%)	120 (27%)

TABLE 7

AKAHATA ARTICLES PERTAINING TO THE USSR,
PRC, AND DPRK, 1966-1967


	USSR	PRC	DPRK
1966			
January	1	22	15
February	6	16	6
March	12	37	22
April	3	29	7
May	2	16	5
June	3	2	7
July	11	16	15
August	9	3	11
September	0	9	14
October	0	4	7
November	1	2	20
December	Not Available	-	-
Total	48 (14%)	156 (47%)	129 (39%)
1967			
January	Not Available	-	-
February	2	6	15
March	0	2	10
April	3	1	21
May	0	2	6
June	11	3	12
July	3	1	12
August	0	0	10
September	0	2	17
October	3	0	11
November	6	0	16
December	0	0	12
Total	28 (15%)	17 (9%)	142 (76%)

TABLE 8

AKAHATA ARTICLES PERTAINING TO THE USSR,
PRC, AND DPRK, 1968

	USSR	PRC	DPRK
1968			
January	3	4	23
February	8	1	11
March	6	1	12
April	7	0	16
May	3	0	6
June	1	0	5
July	Not Available	-	-
August	-	-	-
September	3	1	7
October	-	-	-
November	12	1	12
December	2	2	9
Total	45 (29%)	10 (6%)	101 (65%)

FIGURE 4
FREQUENCY MEASUREMENT OF TOTAL AKAHATA ARTICLES
ON THE USSR, PRC, AND DPRK, 1961-1968



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In 1962, percentage of articles pertaining to North Korea remained about the same as in the previous year.

Noteworthy of the Akahata articles during this two-year period was that the overall tone of the party newspaper was quite cautious and indicated a low-key posture. Careful examination of Akahata editorials and political reporting shows that the high echelon JCP elites were intentionally avoiding commitment in the Sino-Soviet conflict. There was every indication that the gravity of the Sino-Soviet split was intentionally underplayed by the JCP leadership echelon. There was no stinging criticism of the Albanian Communist Party immediately following the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU held during October 17-31, 1961. For two months after the Congress Akahata kept total silence on Albanian issues. Then on December 14, 1961 only two inconspicuous columns were allotted to reporting the recalling of ambassadors by both the Soviet Union and Albania. Passing remarks were made as to the reason for diplomatic strains between the two countries being the pro-CCP attitude by the Albanian Communist Party. Nor did the JCP make any statement that could be construed as a direct criticism of Khrushchev's stinging attack on Albania. On the question of de-Stalinization, the JCP also maintained silence, refusing to commit itself to either side of the CCP-CPSU struggle.

Table 6 (page 263) shows a drastic and overall

change in Akahata coverage of the three Communist political systems during the 1964-1965 period. JCP-CPSU relations deteriorated swiftly following the Ninth Conference on the Ban of Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuikyo) held in Hiroshima during August 1963. These data substantiate the open schism between the JCP and the CPSU. During the seven months (June-December 1964) Akahata articles on the Soviet Union were drastically reduced. Due to the lack of data for the first five months of 1964 it is difficult to assess the exact number of articles devoted to the Soviet Union during 1964. However, it is clear that the JCP had drastically reduced the coverage of the Soviet Union by the latter-half of 1964, a trend that was already evident by late 1962. By mid-1965, the figure has dropped to one or two articles a month. This is quite striking when compared to the enormous number of articles on the Soviet Union during the 1961-1962 period.

On the other hand, the frequency of Akahata coverage of the People's Republic of China increased significantly during 1964.² This can be regarded as at least one indicator of growing JCP-CCP goodwill and friendship.

²Even though the actual frequency as indicated in Table 5 is 337 it should be noted that this figure only covers seven months. Assuming that there were about 30 articles per month during first five months in 1964, total articles would be 487. In contrast, we can speculate that the articles covering the Soviet Union would not exceed nine articles in view of the deterioration of the JCP-CPSU relationship during 1963. In that case, total articles covering the Soviet Union would be only 118.

Another noteworthy phenomenon is the increased coverage of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, starting in 1964. If we were to add 15 articles per month to fill the empty slot of the first five months, the total Akahata coverage on North Korea during 1964 would be 203, about a threefold increase from the 1961-1962 period. Also during 1964, frequent inter-party visitations to P'yŏngyang by the JCP elites (mostly Central Committee members and above) were reported in Akahata. Akahata allotted numerous sympathetic and supporting articles for the repatriation of the Korean residents in Japan to North Korea. Reports on the grievances of 600,000 Korean minority people in Japan increased drastically as compared with the 1961-1962 period. The JCP remains the only Japanese political party that has intimate organizational ties with the pro-North Korea General Federation of Koreans in Japan (Chōsenjin Renmei). Thus it is not surprising that Akahata has given substantial support for the grievances of the Korean minorities, mostly unskilled laborers, who were brought to Japan, often by force, prior to and during the Second World War.

Data during the 1966-1967 period indicate another significant shift in Akahata articles. Following the visitation to North Korea, Communist China, and North Vietnam by the JCP delegations headed by Miyamoto Kenji, during February-May, 1966, an open rupture emerged between the CCP and the JCP over strategy in the War of National Liberation.

In May 1966, a break between the JCP and Peking was made official at the Fourth-Central Committee Plenum of JCP. Subsequent to this break, immediate repercussion was felt in the June 1966 Akahata articles. Suddenly, the hitherto numerous articles on the People's Republic of China disappeared. Frequent mention of left-wing adventurism, sectarianism, and dogmatism became the catchword slogan against the People's Republic of China. For about six months Akahata political articles warned of the equal dangers of left-wing adventurism and modern revisionism, indicating excessive dangers in Communist China and the Soviet Union alike. Although, by this time, Akahata articles were pungently "namecalling" vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, articles on the People's Republic of China were still adopting cautious phrases like "a certain party said. . ." and "a certain misguided directive coming from a certain member of a fraternal party." Starting with February 1967 this cautious tone toward the People's Republic of China abruptly changed to "namecalling" and "mud-slinging." The excessive danger of the Red Guard movement was openly discussed. Phrases like "Mao and his clique" appeared quite frequently.

Table 7 (page 264) shows the abrupt reduction of articles pertaining to the People's Republic of China from June 1966. This trend continued up to December 1968. One exception was July 1966. Out of 16 articles 13 were devoted to the mass rally held in Communist China in support of the

War of National Liberation in Vietnam; two denounced the violation of the territorial water of the People's Republic of China by American ships; one reported the diplomatic protest against the refusal of a visa by the Japanese government for the Chinese Communist delegation to attend the Twelfth Conference on the Ban on Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs to be held in Japan.

Akahata articles concerning North Korea increased steadily up to 1967 and slacked off slightly in 1968. Still, relative to the other two Communist systems, North Korea ranked first. For every 11 article devoted to North Korea in Akahata, approximately three articles covered the Soviet Union, while only one article dealt with Communist China.

Frequency Measurement of Akahata Articles on
Politico-Military, Economic, and Cultural/
Scientific Affairs of the Soviet Union
and Communist China, 1961-1968

Table 9 (page 272) shows the further breakdown of Akahata articles into three sub-categories, namely, politico-military, economic, and cultural events concerning the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China. Again frequency measurements over time have been employed in this table. Due to the manageability of this chapter six-months periods have been examined at intervals of two years, with the exception of the six-months periods

TABLE 9

AKAHATA ARTICLES ON POLITICO-MILITARY, ECONOMIC, AND CULTURAL-SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS PERTAINING TO THE USSR & PRC, 1961-1964

	USSR			PRC		
	Politics/ Military	Economics	Culture/ Science	Politics/ Military	Economics	Culture/ Science
1961						
Jan.	20	10	8	6	4	4
Feb.	19	8	33	5	3	11
March	14	1	24	10	0	9
April	12	2	61	8	0	36
May	11	3	25	3	0	7
June	20	9	20	9	1	35
Total	96 (32%)	33 (11%)	171 (57%)	41 (29%)	8 (6%)	94 (65%)
1962						
Jan.	17	10	40	6	5	24
Feb.	21	6	26	4	4	11
March	32	10	26	9	0	14
April	24	6	41	14	4	21
May	15	6	49	5	2	15
June	26	7	17	14	0	11
Total	135 (36%)	45 (12%)	199 (52%)	52 (32%)	15 (9%)	96 (59%)
1964						
July*	6	2	0	18	1	7
Aug.	5	0	2	25	1	16
Sept.	5	1	3	21	5	9
Oct.	4	0	14	29	6	34
Nov.	12	1	20	48	1	24
Dec.	8	2	20	38	5	10
Total	40 (60%)	6 (9%)	21 (31%)	179 (60%)	19 (6%)	100 (34%)

*The reason for adopting July-December, 1964 period is because of the unavailability of Akahata covering January-May 1964 period.

TABLE 10

AKAHATA ARTICLES ON POLITICO-MILITARY, ECONOMIC, AND CULTURAL-SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS PERTAINING TO THE USSR & PRC, 1966-1968

	USSR				PRC			
	Politics/ Military	Economics	Culture/ Science	Total	Politics/ Military	Economics	Culture/ Science	Total
1966								
Jan.	1	0	0	1	14	1	7	22
Feb.	0	0	6	6	8	0	8	16
March	6	4	2	12	25	2	10	37
April	0	0	3	3	22	2	5	29
May	1	0	1	2	13	0	3	16
June	3	0	0	3	1	0	1	2
Total	11 (41%)	4 (15%)	12 (44%)	27	83 (68%)	5 (4%)	34 (28%)	122
1968								
Jan.	3	0	0	3	4	0	0	4
Feb.	8	0	0	8	1	0	0	1
March	3	3	0	6	0	0	1	1
April	2	0	5	7	0	0	0	1
May	1	0	2	3	0	0	0	0
June	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Total	18 (64%)	3 (11%)	7 (25%)	28	5 (83%)	0 (0%)	1 (17%)	6

in 1961 and 1962, which are only six months apart. The reason for including both of these early periods is to find any discrepancy in Akahata coverage during the immediate pre-crisis and post-crisis situation of international Communism (Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU held in October 1961).

One striking phenomenon in this sub-category analysis is that coverage of economic events are minimal throughout the seven-year period. One plausible explanation is that the statistical record on economic development in Communist political systems is rather fragmentary or unavailable. This is particularly true of the People's Republic of China. Another significant finding is that during the wavering period of the JCP in the Sino-Soviet conflict—1961-1962—a proportionally larger amount of Akahata articles was devoted to cultural and scientific events. The heavy clustering of articles on culture/science of the Soviet Union derives from the repeated coverages of the Soviet space technology and space orbiting by the Soviet cosmonauts, columns on the Soviet educational system, cultural events in the Soviet Union, and the visitation of Soviet theatrical troupes to Japan.

By 1964, the general coverage was giving top priority for politico-military events on the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Tones of the political commentary had also shifted to blatant hostility. Recur-

ring denunciations of intervention in the internal affairs of the JCP by the CPSU have become routine events. Derogatory phrases like "modern revisionsim," "big power chauvinism," and "splittism," implicating the Soviet Union, frequently appeared during the six month period of July-December, 1964. In analyzing the reading materials recommended in Akahata for the rank and file members during 1964 one can detect the drifting of the JCP allegiance to the Chinese Communist Party quite clearly; systematic efforts were made to drive out all Soviet literature from the JCP-affiliated book store, and the basic reading guide was limited to the writings of classic Marxism and Leninism, while the JCP disseminated and actively encouraged the reading of Mao Tse-tung's works in ever-increasing numbers. This trend continued until 1966.

By 1968, we can detect another shift in Akahata article coverage. With the deterioration of the JCP-CCP relationship since May 1966 there had been an abrupt reduction of the numbers of articles on the People's Republic of China. Five political articles on Communist China during two months (January-February 1968) contained acrimonious criticisms on the excessive fanaticism and wanton behavior of the Red Guard movement. As disagreement between the Japanese and Chinese parties heightened, Mao's writings also disappeared from the JCP reading lists. In 1968, Akahata political articles on the Soviet Union remained as frequent

as in 1966.

Attitudinal Scale Measurement of Akahata Editorials
on the Soviet Union and Communist China, 1961-1967

Tables 11-13 (pages 277-279) attempt an attitudinal scale measurement of Akahata editorials on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China. The periods chosen for examination were divided into three parts, covering one and a half years each. The first period started with July 1961, a period immediately following the Eighth JCP Congress, in which a new program was adopted and the Miyamoto-Nosaka leadership was firmly established within the Party. It ended with December 1962 when the JCP was, in the aftermath of the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU, still cautiously treading the path of noncommitment to the imminent intra-bloc polemics over Communist strategy and tactics. The second period started with July 1964, a crucial watershed point in the aftermath of the breakdown of the JCP-CPSU conference in Moscow to patch up differences during March 2-11, 1964, after which the JCP Central Committee started purging the pro-CPSU Shiga-Suzuki faction from the Party due to disagreement over whether to endorse the partial nuclear test ban treaty. Strong support for and identification with Peking policies ensued until December 1965. The third period started with July 1966, three months preceding the announcement of

TABLE 11
 AKAHATA EDITORIALS ON THE USSR & PRC, 1961-1962 (FIRST PERIOD)

	USSR			PRC		
	+	-	Total	+	-	Total
1961						
July	2	0	2	0	0	0
Aug.	5	0	5	0	0	0
Sept.	2	0	2	0	0	0
Oct.	1	0	1	0	0	0
Nov.	0	2	2	0	0	0
Dec.	15	2	17	0	0	0
1962						
Jan.	0	1	1	0	0	0
Feb.	1	0	1	0	0	0
March	1	0	1	0	0	0
April	0	0	0	0	0	0
May	0	0	0	0	0	0
June	1	0	1	0	0	0
July	Not Available	0	1	0	0	0
Aug.	1	0	1	1	0	1
Sept.	1	0	1	3	0	3
Oct.	1	0	1	1	0	1
Nov.	0	1	1	0	0	0
Dec.	4	2	6	5	0	5

Note: "+" indicates favorable, "0" neutral, "-" negative comments.

TABLE 12
 AKAHATA EDITORIALS ON THE USSR & PRC, 1964-1965 (SECOND PERIOD)

	USSR			PRC		
	+	0	-	+	0	-
			Total			Total
1964						
July	0	0	0	0	0	0
Aug.	0	2	1	0	1	1
Sept.	0	0	0	0	0	0
Oct.	0	0	3	1	0	1
Nov.	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dec.	0	0	2	0	0	0
Total	0	2	6	1	1	2
1965						
Jan.	0	0	0	0	0	0
Feb.	0	0	0	0	0	0
March	0	0	0	0	0	0
April	0	0	2	0	0	0
May	Not Available			1	0	1
June	0	0	0	0	0	0
July	0	1	0	0	0	0
Aug.	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sept.	Not Available			1	1	2
Oct.	Not Available			1	0	1
Nov.	0	1	0	2	0	2
Dec.	0	1	1	0	0	0
Total	0	3	3	2	0	2

TABLE 13
 AKAHATA EDITORIALS ON THE USSR & PRC, 1966-1967 (THIRD PERIOD)

	USSR			PRC		
	+	0	-	+	0	-
			Total			Total
1966						
July	0	0	1	0	0	1
Aug.	0	0	1	0	0	0
Sept.	0	0	1	0	0	4
Oct.	0	0	1	0	0	6
Nov.	0	0	1	0	0	2
Dec.	Not Available		-	-	-	-
Total	0	0	5	0	0	13
1967						
Jan.	Not Available		-	-	-	-
Feb.	0	0	0	0	0	1
March	0	0	0	0	0	3
April	0	0	0	0	0	1
May	0	0	0	0	0	1
June	0	0	0	0	0	0
July	0	0	0	0	0	1
Aug.	0	0	0	0	0	1
Sept.	0	0	0	0	0	0
Oct.	0	0	0	0	0	3
Nov.	0	0	1	0	0	1
Dec.	0	0	0	0	0	1
Total	0	0	1	0	0	13

"independence and autonomy" during the Tenth Congress of the JCP held in October 1966, and ended in December 1967.

All Akahata editorials on the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China during these three periods were perused to find and code them according to the one dominant attitude expressed in each. Thus, each article was assigned either a plus (+) for favorability, a zero (0) for neutrality or ambiguity, or a minus (-) for hostility or disapproval expressed toward either the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China.

Editorial articles assigned a "+" chiefly expressed explicit or implicit endorsement of the relevant fraternal party's policies, or favorable references to (or quotes from) the party leaders of the particular Communist political system. Articles assigned a "0" included those which merely mentioned the party, party leaders' speeches, or policies in neutral tone; this category also included routine expressions of formal well-wishes. The category coded "-" included editorials expressing any degree of disapproval or hostility, whether explicit or implicit, toward the CPSU or the CCP by the JCP. Thus, instead of categorizing the variety of expressions within each editorial, the overall attitudinal direction of the editorial was recorded.

First Period (July 1961-December 1962).—During the

first period, 28 relevant editorials were discovered. They are broken down by attitude type in Table 11. The data for the People's Republic of China during the initial period are rather scarce. However, it is possible to observe some interesting trends. In the first place, Akahata editorials express predominantly favorable views toward the Soviet Union during six month period of 1961, with fifteen favorable, two neutral/ambiguous, and no negative accounts. A large number of editorials favorable to the Soviet Union were clustered around the period preceding the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU (October 1961). Out of five favorable editorials pertaining to the Soviet Union in August 1961 three (August 12, 18, 25) were devoted to the welcoming of First Vice-Premier Mikoyan, who came to Japan to give a keynote speech in the opening ceremony of the Soviet Trade Fair. Both of these Akahata editorials urged the strengthening of Russo-Japanese friendship and the broadening of trade relationship between two countries, and demanded that the Japanese government expedite negotiation for a peace treaty and cultural exchanges between Japan and the Soviet Union. Another editorial (August 30) was devoted to Japanese Prime Minister Ikeda's reply to the Soviet Union concerning the diplomatic normalization. It denounced the illegality of the Japanese government's demand for the return of Northern territories occupied by the

Soviet Union. The remainder of the editorial (August 10) praised the successful launching of Vostok 2 and the scientific achievement of the Soviet Union on the space project and concluded that Soviet space technology would contribute to rapid progress toward the Communistic stage.

For about a month after the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU Akahata editorial remained silent on the polemical debate between the CCP and the CPSU. Then, the most significant neutral/ambiguous Akahata editorial during the 1961-1962 period appeared on December 29, 1961, setting forth new JCP views.³ The editorial emphasized urgent need for unity within the world Communist movement. It admitted that "the beginnings of an open dispute" were seriously affecting the relations between several Communist states and were also having some influence on "the democratic movement" in Japan. The solution to this problem lay in the strict application of the Moscow agreements, which provided clear-cut standards for mutual relations among Socialist countries and fraternal parties.⁴ A noteworthy aspect of this editorial was that the substance of the Sino-Soviet polemics during the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU was

³ "For the Unity of the International Communist Movement and for the Struggle against Two Enemies," Akahata, December 29, 1961, p. 1.

⁴ Ibid.

never discussed nor did a single passage mention Albania. Instead, emphatic remarks repeatedly appeared concerning the Moscow Declaration of 1957 and the Moscow Announcement of the Eighty-One Nation Communist and Workers Party of 1960, which had stressed the equality of Communist parties.

Another neutral/ambiguous category editorial was repeated the following day.⁵ After discussing the importance of the Moscow Statement of 1960 it stressed the JCP platform of Independence, Democracy, Peace, and Neutral Japan to be put into reality by the joint efforts of all Party members and the workers. Starting with September 1962, for the first time, favorable accounts of the People's Republic of China become noticeable; out of five favorable Akahata editorials three (September 18, October 1, and October 10) emphasized the Sino-Japanese friendship and the expansion of Sino-Japanese trade and denounced the Japanese government for its lack of enthusiasm in that direction, while two editorials (October 31 and November 24) were devoted to the Sino-Indian border dispute. The October 31 editorial⁶ set the new tone of support for the Chinese Communists by stressing the point that it was "natural" for the Chinese to deny a border fixed by British imperialists, and that

⁵"In Passing the Year 1961," Akahata, December 30, 1961, p. 1.

⁶"The Sino-Indian Border Problem Must Be Settled by Means of Negotiation," Akahata, p. 1.

the Indians had aggravated the border situation by rejecting repeated Chinese peace proposals. However, it is also interesting to note that the October 1 Akahata editorial had a token comment on the October 1 Celebration for the Thirteenth Anniversary of the People's Republic of China. The JCP delegates did not attend the ceremony in Peking; instead a formal congratulatory message was dispatched by the JCP Central Committee.

Second Period (July 1964-December 1965).—This period saw a flood of editorials denouncing the Soviet Union, while the number of favorable accounts of the People's Republic of China remained about equal to that of 1962. A total of eighteen editorials appeared; a breakdown of attitudes can be seen in Table 12 (page 278).

The middle of 1964 was a very confusing period for the JCP in terms of the deteriorating relationship with the CPSU and the massive expulsion of the pro-CPSU Shiga-Suzuki group from the JCP leadership hierarchy. In the one-and-a-half year period (July 1964-December 1965) we can detect the overall shift of Akahata editorials to complete hostility against the Soviet Union; out of fourteen editorials nine were in the hostility category, while the remainder of the five editorials were clustered as neutral/ambiguous. As three months in 1965 were unaccountable for due to lack of material, it is plausible that hostility and neutral/

ambiguity categories might have been higher than this Table indicates. Altogether six hostile editorials (August 14, October 4, October 5, October 9, December 9, and December 20) were found against the Soviet Union during July-December 1964. Overt criticism of the CPSU's modern revisionism and the frontal attack on the misguided Soviet policy by Khrushchev were noted instead of the hitherto adopted phrases like "a certain fraternal party," implying the CPSU; denunciations of the support given to the Shiga-Suzuki anti-Party faction (JCP-Voice of Japan) by the Soviet Union were also noticeable.

The most stinging criticism of the CPSU appeared in the October 5, 1964 Akahata article,⁷ which devoted one whole front page instead of the usual five-column space.⁸ The editorial started criticizing the CPSU for violation of the basic principle of the Moscow Declaration and State-

⁷It is interesting to note that this editorial appeared nine days before Khrushchev's ouster on October 14, 1964. After his ousting was officially announced by TASS on October 16, 1964, a formal press interview with Miyamoto Kenji was held the following day at the JCP headquarters by the request of the Japanese press. Akahata coverage of the Miyamoto interview on October 17 devoted an unusual twelve-column space. Miyamoto's explanation for the downfall of Khrushchev was quite cautious. However he made it clear that it was the inevitable course of the revisionist line pursued by Khrushchev. Miyamoto also made a distinction between the JCP-CPSU friendship and the friction caused by the misguided Soviet leadership under Khrushchev. See Akahata, October 17, 1962, p. 1.

⁸"International Conference of the Communist Party and the Workers' Party Should Be Held to Promote the Unity, Not the Splittism," Akahata, October 5, 1964, p. 1.

ment of 1957 and 1960 which had acknowledged the independence and equality of the fraternal parties together with the pledge that, in the case of disagreement among fraternal parties, mutual consultation should take place. The editorial also expressed open disagreement of the JCP with the composition of the twenty-six member Draft Committee in preparing the forthcoming International Conference of the World Communist and Workers' Party to be held in Moscow in 1965 and concluded by ridiculing the "double talking" device of the CPSU—shouting the unity of the International Communist Movement, while, in essence, splitting it.⁹

In contrast, "friendly" references to the People's Republic of China were found in an Akahata editorial of October 1, 1964, which appeared on the occasion of the Fifteenth Anniversary of the People's Republic of China.¹⁰ The editorial praised the success of the Chinese revolution and the subsequent foundation of the People's Republic of China as having historic significance for the Communist movement comparable to the Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917 in the Soviet Union. The editorial also commented that the victorious step toward socialistic progress in China would change the situation in Asia drastically and count

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ "In Celebrating the Fifteenth Anniversary of the People's Republic of China," Akahata, October 1, 1964, p. 1.

as positive encouragement for the suppressed people in the world and a stepping stone for the Wars of National Liberation in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The remainder of the two Akahata editorials in favor of the People's Republic of China appeared in November 1965; both editorials (November 12, 1965 and November 23, 1965) supported the "One China" policy in the UN and stressed the legitimacy of the government of the People's Republic of China to represent China, urging the expulsion of the representatives of "the Chiang Kai-shek clique" from the UN.

Third Period (July 1966- December 1967).—A clear pattern of hostility is visible to both the USSR and the PRC during this period. The 31 relevant Akahata editorials are broken down in Table 13 (page 279).

The most obvious difference between this period and that in 1964-65 is the rapid increase in editorials expressing hostility toward the People's Republic of China and the sharp decrease in those expressing a favorable attitude. Also a highly significant difference is the drastic decrease in hostile editorials toward the Soviet Union after February 1967. Yet the most conspicuous phenomenon in this Table is the total disappearance of favorable and neutral/ambiguous Akahata editorials on the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Coinciding with the timing of the Tenth Congress of the JCP, which declared the policy of "autonomy

and independence" of the JCP in October 1966, six anti-PRC editorials--the largest number--appeared in October 1966. In the last six months of 1966, 13 anti-PRC editorials appeared, while the number of anti-USSR editorials was five. In 1967 the frequency of anti-PRC editorials remained the same as in the previous six-month period, whereas only one editorial was hostile to the Soviet Union. The total ratio of the anti-PRC to anti-USSR editorials during the Third Period (July 1966-December 1967) was 5:1.

A noteworthy phenomenon is that, following the JCP Central Committee decision of June 4, 1966, reports of Peking radio programs in Japanese had ceased to appear in the columns of Akahata and its editorials practically ignored the much heralded "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" which was shaking Communist China at the time. At this time the overall tone of Akahata editorials was precarious caution; rather than direct denunciation of the CCP and Chairman Mao, it mostly used such implicit phrases as "a certain foreign party," "a certain people," and "a party which resorts to dogmatism and sectarianism in the international Communist movement."

Then, beginning in February 1967, stinging open criticisms of the People's Republic of China started emerging. Four very strong, very direct Akahata editorials appeared; one on February 19, one on March 4, one on March 11, and one on March 26. The first was a warning against

the pro-PRC splinter party element of the JCP and the Japanese counterpart of the Red Guard group that in the event of physical violence to the JCP they would resolutely meet the challenge with similar counterblows.¹¹ There were sporadic references to the excessive violence of the Red Guard movement in the People's Republic of China. The rest of the three editorials commented on the physical attack and vandalism against the Headquarters of the Sino-Japanese Friendship Association by the "reckless" group of pro-CCP Japanese anti-Party elements and overseas Chinese students in Japan. These acts of vandalism, reported the editorials, were clearly manipulated by the CCP.

The strongest anti-PRC Akahata editorial to appear at any time during the Third Period was published on August 21, 1967.¹² In one whole page coverage the editorial was severely critical of "left-wing dogmatism," "sectarianism," and "adventurism" of the CCP and Mao Tse-tung's leadership in international Communism. For the first time, an acrimonious attack on Mao Tse-tung's "cult of personality" was

¹¹ "Determined Counter Strike against the Violence of the Anti-Party Group Is the Inevitable Use of the Right of Self-Defense," Akahata, February 19, 1967, p. 1.

¹² "Firm Answer to the Party Saboteurs: Let Us Crush Mao Tse-tung Clique's Extreme-Left Opportunistic Group and the Party Destruction Activities by the Pro-Mao Renegades of the JCP," Akahata, August 21, 1967, p. 1.

made explicit. After pointing out the "Big Power Chauvinism" of the People's Republic of China, the editorial commented on the internal intervention of the CCP to instigate anti-party sabotage by the splinter group under the leadership of Nishizawa Ryūji, Anzai Kuraji, Fukuda Masayoshi, and Harada Nagasu. The editorial concluded by predicting that, in the imminent future development of Communism, both left-wing dogmatism and right-wing modern revisionism would vanish and the inevitable victory of true Marxism-Leninism would occur.

Multivariable Frequency Measurement on
Ten Major Issues Related to the Sino-
Soviet Conflict, 1961-1967

The reasons given for establishing three periods (1961-1962, 1964-1965, 1966-1967) in the third section of this chapter (see pp. 276-280) apply equally to this section. In examining Table 14 (page 291) numerous discernible facts appear from the analysis. First, there are consistent patterns of perception by Akahata of United States' threat to world peace and of imperialistic intervention. This is quite understandable in view of the fact that the United States is considered as the principal enemy of "progressive and peace-loving people" of the Socialist countries. The peaks of the anti-U.S. articles are

TABLE 14
 FREQUENCY MEASUREMENT OF AKAHATA ARTICLES ON TEN MAJOR ISSUES
 PERTAINING TO THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT, 1961-1967

	U.S. threatens world peace	U.S. engages in imperialism	Articles on Albania	Attack on USSR Revisionism
1961-July	6	7	1	0
Aug.	3	5	0	0
Sept.	8	5	0	0
Oct.	7	8	0	0
Nov.	7	10	0	0
Dec.	8	8	1	0
Total	39	44	2	0
1962-Jan.	7	6	0	0
Feb.	8	9	0	0
March	12	16	0	0
April	14	7	0	0
May	9	12	0	0
June	10	5	0	0
Total	60	55	0	0
1964-July	16	20	0	3
Aug.	20	19	0	3
Sept.	14	14	0	6
Oct.	10	13	2	3
Nov.	6	13	1	2
Dec.	9	10	1	4
Total	75	89	4	21
1965-Jan.	8	12	2	2
Feb.	9	11	1	4
March	14	22	1	2
April	10	13	3	3
May	Not Available	-	-	2
June	8	8	0	2
July	10	12	0	1
Total	59	78	7	14
1966-May	9	14	0	1
June	8	12	0	3
July	6	7	0	1
Aug.	Not Available	-	-	-
Sept.	6	7	0	4
Oct.	9	10	1	6
Nov.	7	6	0	4
Total	45	56	1	19
1967-Jan.	Not Available	-	-	-
Feb.	7	8	0	0
March	5	6	0	2
April	8	10	0	1
May	5	7	0	2
June	8	5	0	0
July	6	7	0	0
Total	39	43	0	5

TABLE 14 (CONTINUED)

	PRC dogmatism & sectarianism opposed	Different routes to Communism	Support 1957 & 1960 Moscow Declarations
1961-July	0	0	0
Aug.	0	0	0
Sept.	0	0	0
Oct.	0	0	2
Nov.	0	0	5
Dec.	0	0	7
Total	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>14</u>
1962-Jan.	0	0	0
Feb.	0	0	2
March	0	1	0
April	0	0	0
May	0	2	2
June	0	1	0
Total	<u>0</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>
1964-July	0	4	3
Aug.	0	2	0
Sept.	0	0	0
Oct.	0	1	2
Nov.	0	0	3
Dec.	0	0	0
Total	<u>0</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>
1965-Jan.	0	0	1
Feb.	0	0	0
March	0	0	0
April	0	0	0
May	Not Available	-	-
June	0	0	0
July	0	0	0
Total	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
1966-May	1	1	1
June	2	2	0
July	1	1	1
August	Not Available	-	-
Sept.	11	9	3
Oct.	20	13	5
Nov.	5	15	7
Total	<u>40</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>17</u>
1967-Jan.	Not Available	-	-
Feb.	6	3	1
March	14	4	0
April	7	4	3
May	10	5	0
June	3	3	2
July	2	2	0
Total	<u>42</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>6</u>

TABLE-14 (CONTINUED)

	Attack on structural reform	Attack-on Shiga & Suzuki faction (pro-CPSU)	Attack on "Chōshū Shimbun" faction (pro-CCP)
1961-July	30	0	0
Aug.	12	0	0
Sept.	4	0	0
Oct.	6	0	0
Nov.	3	0	0
Dec.	4	0	0
Total	<u>59</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
1962-Jan.	2	0	0
Feb.	3	0	0
March	4	0	0
April	5	0	0
May	2	0	0
June	3	0	0
Total	<u>19</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
1964-July	2	30	0
Aug.	0	17	0
Sept.	0	12	0
Oct.	3	19	0
Nov.	0	19	0
Dec.	1	12	0
Total	<u>6</u>	<u>109</u>	<u>0</u>
1965-Jan.	0	1	0
Feb.	2	5	0
March	1	3	0
April	0	17	0
May	Not Available	-	-
June	0	8	0
July	0	16	0
Total	<u>3</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>0</u>
1966-May	0	7	1
June	0	2	1
July	0	4	2
Aug.	Not Available	-	-
Sept.	0	3	90
Oct.	0	7	106
Nov.	0	2	44
Total	<u>0</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>244</u>
1967-Jan.	Not Available	-	-
Feb.	0	3	52
March	0	4	30
April	0	3	27
May	0	3	39
June	0	2	22
July	0	4	14
Total	<u>0</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>184</u>

clustered around the 1964-1965 period, and gradually subside in the following two year (1966-1967) period. Total coverages of the anti-U.S. articles in 1961 and 1967 are about equal, comprising 83 and 82 articles respectively. The JCP, while espousing the theme of "peace and national independence," constantly utilized Akahata to flare up anti-U.S. feelings among the Japanese.

Second, there were only fragmentary reports on Albania during the initial stage of the JCP indecisiveness in the middle of the Sino-Soviet conflict (1961-1962). During the twelve month period (July 1961-June 1962) only two articles pertaining to Albania were found. One Akahata article (July 17, 1961) reported the industrial development of Albania in a half-column in the corner of page two. Another article (December 14, 1961) reported the mutual withdrawal of ambassadors between the Soviet Union and Albania. Following the deterioration of JCP-CPSU relations in 1964 the total coverage of Akahata on Albania increased to eleven articles by April 1965. The general tone of articles on Albania during this period ranged from "friendly"-- JCP Central Control Committee member Kazita's visitation to Albania to attend the Twentieth Anniversary Celebration of the People's Republic of Albania in November, 1964; and the receipt of the New Year greetings message sent by Enver Hoxha, the First Secretary of the Albanian Communist Party

(January 9, 1965)--to "neutral" category, such as the report on the industrial output of Albania. From May 1966 to July 1967, only one Akahata article concerning the Albanian Economic Assistance Pact to North Vietnam (October 18, 1967) was found. Likewise, there were only three articles--all in one column--about Yugoslavia during the July 1961-July 1967 period. The only plausible explanation for this selective reporting by the JCP toward the two fraternal Communist parties during the initial period is that the JCP leadership echelon was cautiously underplaying or withholding all information pertaining to the Sino-Soviet conflict from party members.

Table 14 (p. 292) also shows some interesting evidence of the JCP desire for "Self-Assertion": the continued emphasis on the independence and equality of each Communist party as agreed upon by the 1957 and 1960 Moscow Declaration and Statement; and the assertion that the different routes to Communism can be achieved without necessarily subordinating the JCP's policy to either one of the two Sino-Soviet super parties. The last assertion particularly became conspicuous in the 1966-67 articles as indicated in Table 14.

Third, consistently regularized patterns and methods of internal cohesion for the Miyamoto-Hakamada-Nosaka Mainstream faction are evidenced. Expulsion of the anti-

Mainstream group was reported in a systematically arranged interval of time. From July 1961 to June 1962, 78 articles were counted in the category of denunciation against Kasuga Shōjirō's "structural reform" theory. In the following June 1964-July 1965 span of time only 9 articles against the "structural reform" theory were found, while the massive onslaught against the pro-CPSU splinter party group led by Shiga Yoshio and Suzuki Ichizō (JCP-Voice of Japan) appeared frequently in Akahata, comprising 159 articles during this period. The cycle, then, shifted to denunciation of the CCP from May 1966 to July 1967. During this period, the total number of Akahata articles attacking the pro-CCP "Chōshū Shimbun" group led by Fukuda Masayoshi and Harada Nagasu (mostly Yamaguchi Prefecture JCP branch members) increased to 428 as compared to 44 articles against the JCP "Voice of Japan" (pro-CPSU) group. Akahata reports during the 1961-1967 period abound with the roster of the expelled members of the JCP.

What inferences can be made from these findings?

It can be answered on three perspectives: first, the Party has lost a number of its members including several of the Presidium and the Central Committee members and several of its more militant cadres; second, the dropping off of the Party's right- and left-wings may have increased its homogeneity and thus its ability to pursue an autonomous course,

eliminating foreign pressures; third, the sequential expulsion of the anti-party groups in three time spans was quite an effective measure for the consolidation of Miyamoto-Hakamada Mainstream faction rather than confronting all three anti-party factions simultaneously.¹³

Summary Appraisal

The aforementioned frequency and attitudinal measurements of Akahata articles and editorials indicate the importance of content analysis of the Party newspaper. As Donald Zagoria said in defense of this sort of Communist communication media study, "Political grain is most likely to be hidden in the chaff of Communist communications."¹⁴

The major finding of the frequency measurement of Akahata coverage of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) has confirmed the hypothesis that Party organ

¹³In this respect, there is a certain resemblance with the consolidation of power as utilized by the Premier of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Kim Il-sŏng, in purging three factional groups--indigenous Korean Communists in 1955, the pro-Chinese Yen-an faction, and the pro-Soviet faction in 1958--in segmented time spans that challenged his leadership. For the further details on the power struggle connected with the intra-party polemics over the Korean unification policy after the Korean War, see Cho Soon-Sung, "The Politics of North Korea's Unification Policies," World Politics, XIX, No. 2 (January 1967), 218-41.

¹⁴Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-61 (New York: Atheneum, 1967), p. 27.

coverage was clearly manipulated to reflect the JCP Main-stream faction's view in the midst of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Following the initial stage of an abrasive Sino-Soviet polemical dispute at the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU in 1961, there was no drastic change in total Akahata coverage of the Soviet Union, Communist China, and North Korea during the 1961-1962 period. There was discernible evidence that Akahata coverage during the 1964-1965 period, both in terms of quantity and substance, manifested open hostility toward the Soviet Union, while the frequency and friendliness of Akahata coverage of the People's Republic of China increased tremendously. Likewise, the frequency of Akahata articles pertaining to North Korea increased about two-fold in 1964 as compared to the previous 1961-1962 period. Since then, coverage of North Korea remained fairly constant until 1968. Following the mass expulsion of the pro-CCP anti-party elements within the JCP, consolidation of Miyamoto leadership, and the open declaration of "autonomy and independence" of the JCP during the Tenth Congress in October 1966, an imminent reverberation of the Japanese Communist sentiment was expressed in the drastic decrease in frequency of Akahata articles on both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

Tables 9-10 (pp. 272-273) attempted a further breakdown of Akahata to three specific sub-topics--politico-

military, economic, and cultural-scientific--as pertaining to the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. The finding of this analysis has generally concurred with the previous frequency measurement of total Akahata articles. There were, however, two distinctive features that called for particular attention. First, coverage of politico-military events predominantly increased following the breakdown of harmonious relations among the JCP, the CPSU, and the CCP. Second, the economic sub-division was strikingly smaller in Akahata coverage than other sub-categories throughout the whole period.

Tables 11-13 (pp. 277-279) attempted attitudinal measurement of Akahata editorials pertaining to the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. During the First Period (September 1961-August 1962) a distinctively favorable account of the Soviet Union was noted. The cautious attitude of the JCP during the initial period of the Sino-Soviet conflict was revealed in the ignoring of the focal issue of the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU. Starting with the Second Period (July 1964-December 1965) an abrupt shift in overall JCP attitude toward the Soviet Union was conspicuous, as indicated in Table 12. During this period an overt criticism of the Soviet Union and a direct challenge to the CPSU were noticeable. In contrast, continuous "favorable" accounts of the People's Republic of

China were detected. During the Third Period (July 1966-December 1967) a clear pattern of "hostility" toward both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China was observed in Table 13. Intensity of the anti-CCP editorials was more acute than of the anti-CPSU editorials throughout this period. However, beginning in 1967, Akahata editorials on the Soviet Union were drastically curtailed. Therefore the Third Period showed mixed feelings toward the Soviet Union. The tendency was toward hostility in 1966; yet the 1967 data were not sufficient to substantiate a trend.

As for the multi-variable frequency measurement of the major issues on the Sino-Soviet conflict, the following findings were observed from Table 14 (pp. 291-293): First, Akahata articles consistently perceived that the United States was threatening world peace and engaged in imperialistic intervention on a global scale. Second, Albania and Yugoslavia, although the focal centers of diatribe by the Sino-Soviet parties during the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU in 1961, were not given much coverage at all. Plausible speculation for this omission would be that the JCP was only bidding time for internal adjustment of its basic party platform and policies. On the other hand, positive manifestations of the JCP attitudes were noted in an emphasis on equality and independence of the fraternal parties, direct references to U.S. imperialist policy, and

different routes to achieve Communism. Third, in the intra-party leadership struggle, a clear-cut pattern of sequential coherence occurred. Successful expulsion of the three anti-Mainstream factions in three time spans (1961-62, 1964-65, 1966-67), rather than facing their challenges in a single time span, indicates the manipulative political skills adopted by the Secretary-General Miyamoto Kenji.

CHAPTER VII

LEADERSHIP TRANSFORMATION OF THE JCP: AN ELITE STUDY OF THE PARTY CADRES, 1922-1970

In analyzing the political elites of any Communist party two basic approaches can be undertaken. One method is the study of personal motives of joining the extremist movement. To engage in this type of research we focus on the attitudinal dimension of "why" they join the Communist party and "how" they view their historic roles in the course of struggle for the achievement of Communism. Adopting this research method, Gabriel A. Almond's pioneering work was done in the 1950's by means of an extensive interview process of former American, British, French, and Italian Communists to attain some insights on motivations, tensions,¹ and loyalties of party members.¹ Lucian W. Pye's case study of captured members of the People's Liberation Front in Malaya also fits in the same category.² Almond's study

¹Gabriel A. Almond, The Appeals of Communism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954).

²Lucian W. Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1956). Recent study of Korean Communism by Scalapino and Lee also adopts in-depth interviews of thirty-four ex-North Korean deserters and captured agents. See Robert A. Scalapino and Lee Chong-sik, Communism in Korea, 2 vols. (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1972).

rejected the idea that the attraction of people to Communist movements was simply that these people had suffered severe economic deprivation; instead he argued that most of the American and British middle-class intellectuals who had joined the extremist party did so because it provided them with an opportunity to express destructive and negative psychological impulses in an intellectually and morally satisfying setting, while, in the cases of the Italian and French Communist intellectuals, they were solving political rather than emotional problems.³ Pye's findings also confirmed Almond's view; the Malayan Communists were from economically well-off families rather than from poverty-stricken ones. In the 1960's, using an extensive survey of refugees from Communist China in Hong Kong, Robert J. Lifton studied both former members of the Chinese Communist Party and non-party members⁴ and attempted a psychoanalytical interpretation of the Chinese Communist Party elites' attitudes during the Great Cultural Proletarian Revolution.⁵

The utility of this type of approach enables the

³Almond, op. cit., pp. 394-395.

⁴Robert J. Lifton, Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism (New York: Norton & Company, Inc., 1963).

⁵Robert J. Lifton, Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution (New York: Random House, 1968).

researcher to examine the set of attitudinal and personality characteristics of members of radical political movements. It also enables the researcher to look at the behavioral pattern of a "true believer"--a person who sacrifices other goals in favor of fanatic devotion to one cause célèbre-- in terms of dedication to a worthy cause. However, the weaknesses of this type of psychological approach are manifold: 1) dubious reliability of the information acquired by the too-complaisant respondents who, under an anomalous situation of captivity, desertion, or confinement in a refugee camp, might try to please the interviewer by an exaggeration of personal experiences; 2) an interview with a full-fledged Communist party loyalist might end up as one-way preaching and exhortation of the party line conveyed to the interviewer by the respondents. The present author has personally experienced this type of reaction during his field research, interviewing JCP members in July 1971.

Another method of study of the political elites of a Communist party is to utilize aggregate data on the personal profiles of party leaders through extensive library and documentary research. For this purpose, an elite study method is quite effective and a fairly objective analysis can be ascertained. In essence, the major purposes of most studies of social backgrounds of political elites are to uncover the identities of the decision-makers in the politi-

cal process (i.e. Who are they? What are their perspectives?), to derive a more reliable picture of how decision-makers are selected, and to understand the process of social and political change. Although the pioneer project of elite study was undertaken by the Stanford study group in the early 1950's,⁶ it was limited basically to the analysis of the political elites of Western Europe and the United States. Subsequent development has generated academic interest in applying the elite study method to the political decision-makers of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. Similarly, in the behavioral studies of the Communist party leadership the elite study method has been extensively adopted mostly by area specialists.⁷ Though some of their findings shed a new light in the inter-

⁶ Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (eds.), World Revolutionary Elites (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1967). Also Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and C. Easton Rothwell, The Comparative Study of Elites (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1952). Lasswell's early interest in political elites dates back to the 1930's when in Politics: Who Gets What, When and How he emphasized the importance of the manipulative skills of the political elites in manipulating masses and symbols, controlling supplies, and applying violence.

⁷ On the 23rd Congress of the CPSU, see Michael P. Gehlen and Michael McBride, "The Soviet Central Committee: An Elite Analysis," American Political Science Review, LXII, No. 4 (December 1968), 1232-41; on the Chinese Communist Party, see Donald W. Klein and Lois B. Hager, "The Ninth Central Committee," The China Quarterly, No. 45 (January-March 1971), 37-56; Chong-Do Hah and James Noble, "The Dynamics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution," World Politics, XXIV, No. 2 (January 1972), 182-220; on the Korean Workers' Party, see Jongwon Alexander Kim, "Soviet Policy in North Korea," World Politics, XXII, No. 2 (January 1970), 237-54.

pretation on the transformation of leadership in the Communist party, a major weakness of this approach is the failure to agree on some unified criteria for cross-national comparison. So far, only an exploratory comparative study of the Asian Communist party elites has been undertaken by Robert A. Scalapino.⁸ Scalapino's study still remains in the rudimentary stage of developing a typology of Asian Communist leaders according to roles—"Ideologues," "Activists," and "Careerists,"—socio-economic class origins, general age spans, and the leadership turnover without empirical verification of these schemes.

This chapter will focus on an empirical analysis of the JCP elites. Rather than adopting the piecemeal approach of covering one or two JCP Party Congresses, overall coverage of the leadership transformation during forty-eight years (1922-1970) will be undertaken. For illustrative purposes the political elites of the JCP are divided into three groups—charter members of the Central Executive Committee 1922-1927, the Moscow-trained middle echelon leadership group of the 1930's, and the post-World War II top leadership echelon (members of the Politburo/Presidium, Secretariat, and the Central Committee) of the JCP 1945-1970.

⁸Robert A. Scalapino (ed.), The Communist Revolution in Asia (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965).

Major concepts borrowed from the Stanford elite study method will be extensively applied to analyze the recruitment processes, behavioral dispositions, and the intra-elite competition for power in the context of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

It is a hypothesis of this chapter that the greater the intensity of the intra-bloc struggle for the control of the minor-bloc actor (JCP) by the super-bloc actors (GPSU and CCP), the more intra-party schism among the leadership group of the minor-bloc actor. It is further assumed that the outcome of the intra-party power struggle by the leading group (JCP Mainstream faction) of the minor-bloc actor depends on the maneuverability, organizational reshuffling of the top level party hierarchy, and political skill. In so far as these politico-organizational abilities are astutely exercised to exploit the ideological dispute of the super-bloc actors, a certain stabilizing effect of the minor-bloc actor leadership is possible.

Data Collection and Research Methodology

This chapter is divided into three sections. Section one attempts a comparative elite study of the first-generation leadership group of the GPSU, the CCP, and the JCP. In the case of the JCP Central Executive Committee members of three party congresses (1922-1926), biographical

data concerning twenty-four persons were collected. In the data collection process both English and Japanese sources were extensively covered.⁹ As for the first-generation Politburo members of the CPSU and the CCP, pioneer works by George K. Schueller, Robert C. North, and Ithiel de Sola Pool were used most frequently for purposes of comparative analysis.¹⁰

Section two focuses on the study of forty-five Moscow-trained middle echelon JCP elites in terms of their socio-economic origins, educational and occupational backgrounds, age distributions, and arrest records after their return from the Soviet Union. In view of the fact that few English sources cover the activities of this group, heavy reliance was made on Japanese source materials in data collection. Among others, official government publications by the Japanese Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Interior pertaining to the pre-war Japanese Communist

⁹From English texts: George M. Beckmann and Okubō Genji, The Japanese Communist Party 1922-1945 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 362-89; Evelyn S. Colbert, The Left Wing in Japanese Politics (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1952), pp. 303-340; Rodger Swearingen and Paul F. Langer, Red Flag in Japan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952), Chapter XII, pp. 107-23. From Japanese texts: Tateyama Takaaki, Nihon Kyōsantō Kenkyō Hishi (A Secret History of the Arrests of the Japanese Communist Party Members), (Tokyo: Bukyō-sha, 1929), pp. 351-98.

¹⁰George K. Schueller, "The Politburo," in Robert C. North and Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites," in Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (eds.), World Revolutionary Elites (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1967), pp. 97-178, 319-455.

activities were carefully scrutinized. Other information was acquired through Tateyama Takaaki's Nihon Kyōsantō Kenkyo Hishi (A Secret History of the Arrests of the Japanese Communist Party Members).

In section three the comprehensive lists of the post-World War II Japanese Communist leaders (covering Fourth Congress, JCP in December 1945—Eleventh Congress, JCP in July 1970) were included. The biographical data on 154 members of the JCP Politburo/Presidium, Secretariat, and the Central Committee were collected from written sources, primarily from two major sources—The Japanese Biographical Encyclopedia and Who's Who (2nd ed.), 1961, and Nihon Shakai Undō Kenkyūkai (Japanese Socialist Movement Study Association), (ed.), Sayoku Katsudōka Bunka-jin Meikan (Who's Who of the Leftwing Activists and Intellectuals), published by Nikkan Rōdō Tsūshinsha in 1969. Other information was obtained by comparing sequential lists of newly elected members of the JCP Politburo/Presidium, Secretariat, and Central Committee as reported by Akahata after each party congress. Also much other information was acquired by examining Japanese primary and secondary source books.¹¹ The data collected on the 154 JCP elites of the

¹¹Mizushima Takeshi, Jimbutsu Sengo Nihon Kyōsantōshi (Biographical History of the Postwar Japanese Communists), (Tokyo: Zemyo-sha, 1968), pp. 223-44; Iizuka Shigetaro, Nihon Kyōsantō (Japanese Communist Party), (Tokyo: Sekka-sha, 1969).

post-war period were classified into 10 variables. Among the more important were socio-economic origins, occupational backgrounds, levels of education, age distributions, dates of admission to the JCP, length of service to the party, and dates of demotion or expulsion from the party. After the data were assembled, frequency distributions were made of all variables and their subdivisions.

Comparative Elite Study of the First-Generation
Politburo/Central Executive Committee Members
of the CPSU, CCP, and JCP

The Politburo (CPSU and CCP) and the Central Executive Committee (JCP) were the highest policy-making organs in the three Communist parties. An extensive analysis of the composition of these top policy-making organs gives a clearcut picture of the leadership transformation in the three Communist parties. As Joseph Stalin said as early as 1925:

The Politburo is the highest organ not of the state but of the party and the party is the highest directing force of the state.¹²

Father's Occupation and Social Class Origins.—The material obtained on the social class of the family reveals some interesting characteristics of the members of the

¹² Julian Towster, Political Power in the USSR, 1917-1947 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 160.

Politburo/C.E.C. of the CPSU, CCP, and JCP. In the Soviet Union, most members of the Politburo during 1917-1950 were of humble social origin (particularly after Stalin's Great Purge of 1937-1938)—sons of workers and peasants—whose rise to eminence was profoundly affected by the opportunities made available to them by the Soviet political system.

TABLE 15
FATHER'S OCCUPATION OF THE POLITBURO MEMBERS
OF THE CPSU (1917-1950)

Father's occupation	Number
Worker	8
Peasant	7
Teacher	4
Engineer	1
White-collar worker	1
Salesman	1
Unknown	5
Total	27

Source: George Schueller, "The Politburo" in Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (eds.), World Revolutionary Elites (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1967), p. 105.

Further breaking down by social class of family, the following information can be acquired:

TABLE 16
 SOCIAL ORIGINS OF THE POLITBURO MEMBERS
 OF THE CPSU (1917-1950)

Social class	Number
Low	16
Middle	9
Unknown	2
Total	27

Source: Ibid., p. 104.

As indicated in Table 16, since it was regarded as valuable to have a proletarian background, it is possible that some of the members of the Politburo could have given their social class origin as "low" intentionally. Also some others might have given no information about their social class backgrounds. As an indication of this reluctance George K. Schueller mentions Malenkov, about whose family no information could be found.

However, further breakdown of this data into specific period (1917-1938) elucidates the overall demise of the middle-class originated Politburo members during Stalin's Great Purge period of 1937-38. Breaking down by the occupation of father of these middle-class Politburo members, one obtains the following facts:

Members of the middle-class origin	Father's occupation
Bukharin	Teacher
Kamenev	Engineer
Krestinsky	Teacher
Lenin	School inspector
Molotov	Salesman
Trotsky	Rich tenant farmer
Voznesensky	White-collar worker
Zhdanov	Teacher
Zinoviev	Unknown

Of these nine middle-class originated Politburo members, four were executed by Stalin (Bukharin, Kamenev, Krestinsky, and Zinoviev), one was exiled and later assassinated (Trotsky), and one was dropped from membership in the Politburo (Voznesensky).¹³ It seems that out of nine members of the middle-class, six lost favor with Stalin. On the other hand, the remaining three members of the middle-class were such highly respected Bolsheviks as Lenin, Zhdanov, and Molotov. Of these three, as of 1950, only Molotov remained in the Politburo. Based on this observation, we may safely conclude that the transformation to the proletarian-dominated Politburo of the CPSU started only after Stalin's Great Purge of 1937-1938 and continued until his death in 1953.

The case of the members of the Politburo of the CCP during 1921-1945 shows an interesting contrast. As Table 17 indicates, the Chinese Communist elites have been most

¹³George K. Schueller, "Politburo," in Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (eds.), op. cit., p. 104.

frequently drawn from a relatively thin upper layer and middle layer of the Chinese population. In this context, both Alexis de Tocqueville and Crane Brinton's theses on the "desertion of the intellectuals" and the "modernizing elites" from the traditional ruling class who play the major backbone role during the initial stage of revolution fit the Chinese Communist elite composition.¹⁴ Distinctively, in socio-economic terms, the Chinese Communist leaders are far closer to both traditional and other modern Asian political elites than they are to the proletarian leadership projected in Marxian theory. From Table 17 we find five sons of landlords (wealthy landlord and other landlords), six sons of wealthy peasants, two sons of merchants, and one son of a scholar. If we arbitrarily set up a social class scale, we find a polarized distribution; about half of the Chinese Communist elites are drawn from upper-class and another quarter from the prosperous section of the peasantry, while the remaining quarter comprises sons of the lower-class--other peasants and workers. Another noteworthy feature is that a large number of the Politburo members of the CCP have avoided giving a clear answer to their father's

¹⁴ Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955), Anchor book ed.; Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (Englewood-Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1952).

TABLE 17

FATHER'S OCCUPATION OF THE POLITBURO MEMBERS
OF THE CCP (1921-1945)

Father's occupation	Number	Percentage
Wealthy landlord or scholar-landlord	3	12.5%
Scholar official	4	16.7
Scholar	1	4.2
Merchant scholar or wealthy merchants	-	-
Other landlords	2	8.3
Other merchants	2	8.3
Wealthy peasants	6	25.0
Other peasants	4	16.7
Workers	2	8.3
Total known	24	100.0%
Don't know	18	
Total	42	

Source: Robert C. North and Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites," in Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (eds.), op. cit., p. 378.

occupation. Perhaps this was due to the conflict of class background in a supposedly proletarian and peasant dominated revolutionary political party. Therefore, if we attributed some of these concealed figures to the wealthier classes, the result would be a much higher distribution of the upper class elements in the Chinese Politburo membership. In another study of the Chinese Communist leaders, an American journalist Nym Wales (Mrs. Edgar Snow) finds, that of the

70 Chinese Communist leaders--including Politburo members-- in the New Democracy period, only 17% are proletarians, while 70% are "hsueh-sheng or 'students' from families of small farmers, professionals, merchants, and even aristocratic official families."¹⁵

This remarkable difference in social origins of the members of the Politburo in the two countries marks the difference of social conditions. In the Soviet Union, proletarian members with some elements of middle-class appeared in the initial stage of revolution, but gradually the middle-class elements were eradicated from the leadership echelon by Stalin. In China, the most noteworthy characteristics are the domination of the rural-originated sons of wealthy landlords and scholar officials--the traditional ruling class,--while the peasants flocked into the rank and file membership.

Pertaining to the father's occupation of the Central Executive Committee members of the JCP during three party congresses of the pre-war period (1922-1926), one can find certain similarities with the Chinese Communist counterparts.

¹⁵Nym Wales, Inside Red China (New York: Doubleday, 1939), p. 335.

TABLE 18

FATHER'S OCCUPATION OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE MEMBERS OF THE JCP (1922-1926)

Father's occupation	Number
Wealthy landlord	2
Medical doctor	1
Prosperous merchant	3
Buddhist priest	1
Minor <u>Samurai</u>	1
Minor government official	2
Small shopowner	1
Peasant	3
Worker	2
Unknown	8
Total	24

Source: Computed from the biographical profiles as indicated in Appendix A of this dissertation.

From Table 18 we find two sons of wealthy landlords, three sons of wealthy merchants, one son of a medical doctor, one son of a Buddhist priest, one son of a minor Samurai, two sons of minor government officials, and one son of a small shopkeeper, while the genuine lower class-originated sons of peasants and workers are only five. Father's occupation of one-third of the JCP Central Executive Committee members are not known. From this fairly large number of the unidentifiable data we can only conjecture that, as is the general assumption in the analyses of the other two Communist parties, they preferred to hide their embarrassing social class background. Again applying a rule-of-thumb speculation, we can assume that there was probably a higher proportion of upper-

or upper-middle class parents among the unidentifiable numbers of the JCP Central Executive Committee.

TABLE 19
SOCIAL ORIGINS OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
MEMBERS OF THE JCP (1922-1926)

Social class	Number
Upper-middle	6
Middle	1
Lower-middle	4
Lower	5
Unknown	8
Total	24

Source: Ibid.

From Table 19 we find the predominance of the JCP Central Executive Committee members drawn from the middle class layers of the Japanese society; in total, approximately two-third of them are recruited from the middle class element, while only one-third came from the bottom layer of the Japanese society. One distinctive feature of the social origins of the Japanese Communists is that there are proportionally larger numbers of the sons of the petite bourgeoisie, or of lower middle class background, than is true of the Chinese Communists. Another difference, in comparison with the Chinese Communist counterparts, is that none of the Japanese Communist elites was recruited from the upper layer of the Japanese society. Again, however,

one-third of the Japanese Communist elites belong to the "unknown" category in social class background.

Age Distribution.—Of the three JCP congresses covered in this study, the average ages of the Central Executive Committee members fluctuated as follows:

<u>Average age</u>	<u>Party Congress</u>
36.8 years	First convention (July 1922)
31.3	Second convention (February 1923)
31.0	Third convention (December 1926)

The average age of twenty JCP Central Executive Committee members (1922-1926) was 33.0 years. From this finding we can make an inference that the leadership echelon of the first-generation Japanese Communists were predominantly men in their early thirties.

For comparative purposes, the average ages of the Politburo/Central Executive Committee members of the CPSU, CCP and JCP are given in Table 20. We can surmise that in both the CCP and the JCP the first-generation revolutionary elites were in their late twenties and early thirties respectively, while the Soviet Politburo members were in their early forties. In terms of the age trend in the Soviet Union, a general upward tendency is found with an exception of 1924, when Lenin, the oldest member of the Politburo died. Likewise, the Chinese Communists show a gradual upward trend, though the margin of difference is not great between 1921 and 1928. A plausible explanation could be that an impact

TABLE 20
AVERAGE AGES OF THE CPSU, CCP AND JCP
ELITES (1917-1928)

CPSU Politburo ^a	Average age	CCP Politburo ^b	Average age	JCP CEC ^c	Average age
1917	39	1921	29.4	1922	36.8
1923	43	1927	29.9	1923	31.3
1924	42	1928	30.0	1926	31.0
1927	44				
Average age	42	Average age	29.8	Average	33.0

Source: a. George K. Schueller, "The Politburo," in Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (eds.), op. cit., p. 111, p. 143.
 b. Robert C. North and Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites," in ibid., p. 383.
 c. Computed from the biographical profiles of the JCP Central Executive Committee members as indicated in Appendix A of this dissertation.

of the mass execution of the CCP elites by the Kuomintang following the split of the CCP-Kuomintang coalition in 1927 might have decimated the top echelon leadership group of the CCP and that new and younger cadres might have been recruited. Another explanation would be the nature of constant factional struggle among the first generation Chinese Communist elites and a high rate of elite turnover.

In the case of the Central Executive Committee of the JCP the trend is rather reversed; there is a steady decrease of the average age in each party convention. Plausible explanations for this downward trend of the age group would be: 1) incessant factional strife which contributed to the

rapid turnover of the leadership group; 2) brutal suppression by the Japanese Thought Police, which resorted to the systematic round-up of suspected radical left-wing groups; 3) effectiveness of the "carrot and stick" policy by the Japanese prison authorities to induce the mass desertion of Japanese Communists. By far the most convincing explanation would be the difference of political milieu; in the Soviet Union, the CPSU was operating in a stable political environment after the Bolshevik Revolution succeeded, while, both in China and Japan, Communist parties were operating clandestinely in a hostile political setting, suffering from heavy casualties of the leadership group. In the Soviet Union, overall transformation of the top echelon leadership did not occur until 1937-1938.

Educational Background.--As indicated in Table 21, a high proportion of the first-generation members of the Politburo of the CPSU attended a university. Six of those who had attended a university were active and prominent in the years preceding Lenin's death. They were: Bukharin, Krestinsky, Kamenev, Lenin, Rykov, and Zinoviev. However, the fate of the university-educated intellectuals in the Soviet Union was tragic during Stalin's Great Purge of the late 1930's; of the above-mentioned six members of the Politburo, only Lenin died a natural death, while the rest were executed as traitors of the Proletarian revolution by

TABLE 21

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF THE MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO
OF THE CPSU (1917-1950) AND THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE OF THE JCP (1922-1927)

Level of education	CPSU Politburo ^a members (1917-50)	JCP CEC ^b members (1922-27)
University (graduates & attended)	9	11
High school	3	1
Other higher schools	3	1
Middle school	-	1
Trade schools	3	-
Religious schools	2	-
Elementary	5	6
Unknown	2	4
Total	27	24

Source: a. George K. Schueller, "The Politburo," in Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (eds.), op. cit. p. 119.

b. Computed from the biographical profiles of the JCP CEC members in Appendix A of this dissertation.

Stalin, Bukharin, Kamenev, and Zinoviev received their education abroad, and this cosmopolitan trait identified them with the deviationists under the infamous Stalinist justice concept of the "objective criteria of guilt," whereby a man could be condemned as a traitor because of the class origin or occupation of his father, his own ethnic origin, or because he had been abroad at some time in his life.¹⁶

¹⁶Peter Merkl, Political Continuity and Change (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 400.

From this, we can see that while in the beginning the number of university-educated members was relatively high, there was a discernible tendency toward anti-intellectualism under Stalin's rule. Out of three university-educated Politburo members who were added during Stalin's rule--Kuibyshev, Beria, and Voznesensky--only Beria remained influential. Among the old Bolsheviks only Molotov turned out to be an exception. Though he was a university graduated Bolshevik who had joined the Politburo in 1925, Molotov remained intact from the Stalinist Purge of intellectual members of the old-guard Bolsheviks.¹⁷ Thus the Soviet Politburo under Stalin exhibited a powerful trend away from the characteristics of middle-class background and higher education. This contention is supported by the fact that of the group that had received the least amount of education--namely, the five who had received only elementary education--there were three still in good standing in 1950: Andreyev, Kaganovich, and Voroshilov. Of the remaining two, Kalinin died a natural death in 1946, while only one of this lower education group (Tomsky) had been branded a deviationist. (He committed a suicide in 1936).

On the other hand, most of the first-generation CCP Politburo members were men of extensive educational back-

¹⁷ George K. Schueller, "The Politburo," in Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (eds.), op. cit., p. 120.

grounds. Aside from two members of the Politburo--Mao Tse-tung and T'an P'ing-shan--all of the Chinese Communist Party elite whose backgrounds are known enjoyed a higher education (see Table 22).

TABLE 22
UNIVERSITY ATTENDED BY THE CHINESE COMMUNIST
PARTY POLITBURO MEMBERS (1921-1945)*

Place of university education	CCP Politburo	
	N	%
Chinese university	13	44.8
Chinese military school		
Chinese classical education		
Japanese university	5	17.2
Japanese military school		
United States	2	6.9
France	6	20.7
Germany	2	6.9
Soviet Union	20	69.0
None	2	6.9
Total known	29	100.0
Don't know	13	
Total	42	

*This Table is nonadditive, since the same individual may go to several universities.

Source: Robert C. North and Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites," in Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, op. cit., p. 382.

From Table 22 we find that about 45% of 29 Chinese Communist Politburo members whose educational backgrounds were known received higher education in China. From this Table it is plausible to speculate that they continued to study abroad afterward. Some attended military schools both in China and Japan. A large number (20) received further higher education in the Soviet Union. Most of the Chinese Communist leaders in the Soviet Union attended Lenin Institute, Sun Yat-sen University, and the KUTV (Eastern Toilers Communist University) for Communist leadership training. Another striking phenomenon is the impact of Western education on the Chinese Communist Politburo members. Out of 29 Politburo members whose educational careers we know, 25 were educated abroad. If we leave Russian- and Japanese-educated Politburo members aside, we still find that 38% of the leaders of the first-generation CCP had been trained in advanced capitalist countries. Based on the large numbers of Western educated Chinese Communist Politburo members, the following aphorism stated by a writer on the Afro-Asian elites might equally fit in the Chinese case:

. . . the nationalist leaders came neither from ancient, oriental traditional palaces nor from restless expanding economic business enterprises; they came from the European schools.¹⁸

¹⁸ Shlomo Avineri, "The Afro-Asian Elites," in Harvey G. Kebschull (ed.), Politics in Transitional Societies (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), p. 180.

There are strong similarities between the intellectual domination of the JCP Central Executive Committee members and the case of its Chinese Communist counterpart. According to Table 21 (p. 322), the educational background of the members of the Central Executive Committee of the JCP (1922-1927) shows a higher cluster of university graduates than in any other categories. Approximately 58% (11) of the first-generation JCP elites whose educational backgrounds were known (19) received university education. From this data we can infer that the initial Japanese Communist movement was led by intellectuals. The JCP, emerging in an era when the labor movement was still in its infancy, drew most of its core leadership from the ranks of left-wing intellectuals and the pauperized sons of the petite bourgeoisie who rallied to the cause of a working class movement against monopoly capitalism under state protection. As such, they were frustrated intellectuals who had challenged the existence of the Emperor system and the prevailing politico-social values of Japan in the rapid path toward modernization. Under the banner of working class internationalism these Marxist intellectuals challenged the nationalistic expansionism (or integral nationalism) of the Japanese political system during the three decades of their struggles. As a result, they could not capture the catchword slogan of National Liberation Front as found in other early

Asian Communist movements.

Further substantiation of the intelligentsia-domination of the first-generation JCP elites is possible by looking at the occupational background of this group (see Table 23).

TABLE 23
OCCUPATION OF THE JCP CENTRAL EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE MEMBERS (1922-1927)*

Occupation	Number
University & college professor	4
Lawyer	2
Newspaper publisher & editor	4
Newspaper reporter	2
Writer	1
Labor & peasant union leader	3
Industrial worker	5
Peasant	0
Unknown	<u>3</u>
Total	24

*Based on the practiced occupation at the time of joining the Central Executive Committee, JCP.

Source: Computed from the biographical data of the CEC members of the JCP as given in Appendix A of this dissertation.

As the occupational data in Table 23 indicates, there is a close fit between the level of education and the "knowledge-intensive" occupations; academicians, lawyers, publishers, journalists, and writers composed a significant portion of the first-generation JCP Central Executive Committee members.

However, there are discernible differences between the JCP elites and their CPSU and CCP counterparts. With the exception of two (Inomata Tsunao and Kondō Eizō), most of the Japanese Communist elites received their education in Japan. Inomata Tsunao had rather an impressive educational background; after completing the study of Politico-Economy at Waseda University (both undergraduate and graduate level), Inomata went to the United States for further education and received a Ph.D. degree in Politics/Economics from the University of Wisconsin in 1920. He studied also at the University of Chicago and Columbia University afterwards. Kondō Eizō, Katayama Sen's protégé, also attended agricultural college in California during his long bohemian days as an anarchist in the United States before his return to Japan in 1919.

With the exception of above two persons, most of the first-generation JCP elites were home-bred types. Tokuda Kyūichi, as the Comintern representative in Japan, travelled extensively to both the Soviet Union and China during his underground activities, but his formal education ended with a law degree from Nippon University. Perhaps the only exceptional persons having rather impressive cosmopolitan background would be Katayama Sen and Nosaka Sanzō. However, Katayama's contribution to the Japanese Communist movement remains in his overseas activity to guide the early Japanese

Communist movement. Nosaka Sanzō, after graduating from Keiō University with a major in Politico-Economics in 1917, went to England to study the labor movement in 1919 and enrolled at the London School of Economics. After his involvement in British Communist Party activity, Nosaka was deported by the British Immigration authorities. Thereafter, following his brief sojourn to France, Switzerland, and Germany, Nosaka attended the Profintern meeting in Moscow at the time of Far Eastern Peoples' Congress (January 1922). After his return to Japan in 1922, Nosaka worked as editor of Sōdomei organs, mainly engaging in labor union activities.¹⁹ During the three congresses of the JCP (1922-1926) Nosaka was not elected to the Central Executive Committee. His major contribution to the Japanese Communist movement did not start until the late 1930's and early 1940's.

Elite Turnover.—As indicated in the analysis of turnover of the CPSU Politburo members, the major watershed point of elite transformation in the Soviet Union was the Stalinist Purge of the late 1930's during which most of the

¹⁹Zenei (Vanguard), the JCP theoretical monthly journal, has a series of autobiographical story by Nosaka Sanzō, covering this period. See "Fūsetsu no Ayumi," (Striding with Wind and Blizzard), Zenei, July 1969-February 1973.

old-guard Bolsheviks—middle-class originated, university-educated, and men with extensive record of overseas residence during the formative stage of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution—were replaced with the men of genuine proletarian social class background. Added to this was the predominance of the CPSU Politburo members with lower education background during the Stalinist period of 1938-1953.

In the case of the Chinese Communist Politburo members the following Tables 24-27 give conclusive empirical evidence of the rapid turnover of the political elites.

TABLE 24
DELEGATES TO THE FIRST CCP CONGRESS (JULY 1921)

Name	Representing	Fate
Chang Kuo-t'ao	Peking	Alive March 15, 1950
Ch'en Kung-po	Kwangtung	Executed June 4, 1948
Ch'en T'an-ch'iu	Wuhan	Alive January 1, 1950
Chou Fo-hai	Japan	Died in prison Feb. 28, 1948
Ho Shu-heng	Changsha	Shot in May 1934 by KMT
Li Han-chun	Shanghai	Killed by KMT in 1927
Li Ta	Shanghai	Uncertain
Liu Jen-ch'ing	Peking	Turned to a Trotskyist
Mao Tse-tung	Changsha	Alive March 15, 1950
Pao Hui-seng	Kwangtung	Alive March 15, 1950
T'ien En-min	Unknown	Uncertain
Tung Pi-wu	Wuhan	Alive March 15, 1950
Wang Chiu-meng	Unknown	Uncertain

Source: The information in the above table was drawn from Hatano Kanichi, History of the Chinese Communist Party, Vol. II (Tokyo, 1936); History of the Chinese Communist Party (Tokyo: Japanese Foreign Office, 1931); Edgar Snow, Red Star over China (New York: Random House, 1938), p. 157; Nym Wales (Helen Foster Snow), Red Dust (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1952), p. 39.

TABLE 25

POLITBURO MEMBERS OF THE CCP
(FIFTH CONGRESS, APRIL 1927)

Chang Kuo-t'ao	Li Wei-han ⁺
Ch'en Tu-hsiu ⁺	T'an P'ing-shan ⁺
Chou En-lai ⁺	Su Chao-cheng ⁺
Chü Ch'iu-pai ⁺	Ts'ai Ho-shen ⁺
Li Li-san ⁺	

+ indicates new member.
Source: Ibid.

TABLE 26

POLITBURO MEMBERS OF THE CCP*
(REORGANIZED JULY 13, 1927)

Chang T'ai-lei ⁺	Li Wei-han
Ch'in Pang-hsien ⁺	P'eng P'ai ⁺
Chou En-lai	Su Chao-cheng
Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai	

+ indicates new member.
* Sources differ as to whether or not Mao Tse-tung was a full member of this Politburo.
Source: Ibid.

TABLE 27

POLITBURO MEMBERS OF THE CCP
(SIXTH CONGRESS JULY-SEPTEMBER 1928, HELD IN MOSCOW)

Chang Kuo-t'ao	Hu Wen-chiang ⁺
Chou En-lai	Li Li-san
Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai	Ts'ai Ho-shen
Hsiang Chung-fa (Secretary-General) ⁺	

+ indicates new member.
Source: Ibid.

From Table 24 we can notice that of the 13 founding members of the CCP in 1921, only one person (Chang Kuo-t'ao) retained Politburo membership in the Fifth Congress of the CCP held in Hankow in April 1927. In total, eight new members were added. An important threshold event was the April 1927 breakup of the CCP-Kuomintang during and after which some of the notable first-generation Chinese Communist elites were executed, causing a temporary leadership vacuum. Further reshuffling of the CCP Politburo following the CCP-Kuomintang split of April 1927 was indicated in Table 26. In total, three new members were added to the remaining four holdovers.

Another intra-party debate over the specific strategy and tactics in achieving Communist revolution in China occurred during 1928-1931. During this period, the polemical dispute concerning the urban and rural uprising was the focal point of conflict between Li Li-san/Ch'en Tu-hsiu (urban uprising) and Mao Tse-tung (rural uprising). When the urban uprising in Wuhan area and the major Chinese cities failed during 1929-1930, the Li Li-san/Ch'en Tu-hsiu group was blamed for the fiasco and Mao Tse-tung gradually increased his power. Therefore, based on this evidence, we can safely say that there were high rates of elite turnover during the formative period of the Chinese Communist movement.

Likewise, the JCP leadership was characterized by incessant factional struggle, mass desertion, and rapid turnover of the party elites. Invariably, these features contributed to further weakening of the party apparatus and continued subjugation to foreign party domination under strict control by the Comintern. The defection rate among the first-generation JCP Central Executive Committee members was extremely high: out of nine original members of the JCP Central Executive Committee who had attended the First Convention (1922), six dropped out during the Second Party Convention (1923), adding eight new members to replace the vacant positions; again, during the Third Congress of the JCP (1926), seven out of eleven members of the previous Convention were dropped.

By far the most striking phenomenon of the prewar Japanese Communist movement was the desertion of the intellectual leaders. Following the intensified roundup of the Japanese Communists by the police and the intra-elite factional strife, out of eleven university educated members of the Central Executive Committee during the three party congresses (1922-1926), four defected from the party,²⁰

²⁰Sano Fumio, Fukumoto Kazuo, and Kawai Etsuzō defected in 1929; Sano Manabu and Nabeyama Sadachika (exceptional case with only elementary education background) defected in 1933. Fukumoto Kazuo rejoined the JCP in 1949, but he did not play a prominent role during the postwar period and left the party again in 1955.

five drifted to the Farmer-Labor Party,²¹ and only two remained loyal to the Party.²² Moreover, as the JCP came under the tighter control of the Soviet-dominated Comintern and diverged ever more from the trends of its own society, the academic Marxists withdrew. This left the more militant activist types in middle-range leadership positions in control, most of whom were young, less-educated, inexperienced and often recent returnees from the Lenin Institute and the Eastern Toilers Communist University (KUTV) in the Soviet Union.

Moscow-Trained Middle-Echelon JCP Leadership Group, 1922-1937

From the autobiographies and memoirs of the Moscow-trained JCP leaders, classified Japanese police archives on the arrest records of the JCP members, and various other documentary sources, bits of information were gathered to make up the roster of the Moscow-trained JCP leaders (see Appendix B).

²¹ Yamakawa Hitoshi, Takatsu Seidō, Inomata Tsunao, Kondō Eizō, and Koizumi Jō joined the Farmer-Labor Party.

²² Ichikawa Shōichi and Tokuda Kyūichi. Though Ichikawa Shōichi resorted to a successful courtroom struggle during the trial of the Japanese Communists in 1933, he died of consumption in prison in February 1945. Only Tokuda Kyūichi played a major role in the postwar Japanese Communist movement.

According to Appendix B, out of forty-five trainees of both the Lenin Institute and the Eastern Toilers Communist University (KUTV), none had held Central Executive Committee positions during the first three congresses of the JCP. Most of them were recruited by Tokuda Kyūichi, who held the position of Comintern representative in Japan for the recruitment of middle-range Communist leadership. Without exception, most were either industrial workers or active labor agitators. Few received higher education in Japan before being trained for a "crash course" in Communism in the Soviet Union. Particular emphasis was placed in balancing the ratio of various occupational groups. Out of forty middle-range JCP leaders trained in the KUTV during 1922-1930, organizational affiliations of twenty-five persons were known.

As the data on their organizational affiliation indicates in Table 28, most of them were recruited from purely proletarian rank and file. While in the Soviet Union, most of the young JCP members who had attended the KUTV received two years education. Academic curricula at the KUTV consisted of History of Labor Movements, Interpretation of Das Kapital, Contemporary World History, Russian Language, and History of Communist Party during the first year. Second year curricula included such subjects as Intermediate Interpretation of Das Kapital, Contemporary

TABLE 28

ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATION OF THE JCP MEMBERS
TRAINED IN THE KUTV, MOSCOW 1922-30

Organizational affiliation	Number
Tokyo Consolidated Workers Union	6
Tokyo Metallurgical Workers Union	3
Osaka Metallurgical Workers Union	1
Sakai Metallurgical Workers Union	1
Tokyo Printers Union	4
Tokyo Printing Workers Union	1
Shizuoka Railroad Union	1
Fukuoka Peasant Union	1
Kagawa Peasant Union	2
Kobe Maritime Union	2
Kobe Sailers Renovation Association	1
Sailers Renovation Association	1
Nagoya Maritime Union	1
Total	25

Source: Tateyama Takaaki, Nihon Kyōsantō Kenkyō Hishi
(Secret History of the Arrests of the Japanese
Communist Party) (Tokyo: Bukyō-sha, 1929),
pp. 329-30.

World History, History of the Comintern, Leninism, and Military Strategy and Tactics. Lectures were given in Russian with the help of Japanese interpreters. After the completion of the two year courses, those who excelled in the Russian language were allowed to pursue their specialized and advanced subjects at various departments. While they were studying at the KUTV, most of them used aliases to conceal their identities. Up to 1924 the Japanese Communists used Japanese pseudonyms, but, starting with the 1925 class, they used Russian names.

Though Japanese Communists could theoretically join the CPSU, rigorous screening devices and oral examinations by the Russian Communist cadres discouraged most of them. Sōma Ichirō and Hakamada Satomi were the only Japanese given membership in the CPSU. Those who attended the Lenin Institute were mostly Central Committee members of the Communist parties from all over the world. It was under the direct supervision of the Comintern. Among the Japanese Communists in Moscow, Takahashi Sadaki and Sano Hiroshi were selected to attend this institute.

From Appendix B we find that most of the middle-range JCP leaders who had been trained in the Soviet Union were arrested immediately following their arrival in Japan. Despite the high casualty ratio of the KUTV trainees, we still find in the following list of the Central Committee members that the nucleus of the JCP leadership was gradually dominated by the KUTV trainees in the 1930's.

- Kazama Jōkichi (KUTV, 1924 class) Chairman, Central Committee, JCP, January 1931–October 1932 and arrested later;
- Yamamoto Masami (KUTV, 1925 class) Chairman, Central Committee, JCP, December 1932–May 1933 and arrested later;
- Hakamada Satomi (KUTV, 1924 class) Central Committee member, JCP, December 1933–March 1935 and arrested later;²³
- Kasuga Shojirō (KUTV, 1923 class) Japanese Communist Band in Osaka (extremist fraction group) December 1937–September 1938 and arrested later.

²³ Miyamoto Kenji became a Central Committee member in April 1932, and during December 1933 he was promoted to the chairmanship of the Central Committee. However, virtual control of the party thereafter until March 1935 remained in the Miyamoto-Hakamada dual leadership.

As for the China-trained JCP leaders during 1940-1945, conclusive empirical evidence could not be drawn, partially due to the fragmentary nature of the information and mostly due to the small numbers of the sample.²⁴

Leadership Transformation of the Postwar
JCP Central Committee/Secretariat/
Presidium Members, 1945-1970

Appendix D gives the comprehensive list of the promotion, demotion, and expulsion of 154 postwar JCP elites. From the Fourth Congress (1945) to the Sixth Congress (1947) undisturbed continuity of Politburo and Central Committee members prevailed. Early signs of an intra-party struggle, if any, were submerged, partially owing to Secretary-General Tokuda Kyūichi's unrivaled

²⁴For the further information concerning the China-trained JCP members (1940-1945), see supra pp. 68-73, Chapter II. of this dissertation.

leadership within the Party²⁵ and, partially, to the urgent need for postwar reorganization of the Party. During this period, Tokuda Kyūichi's Old Mainstream faction was strongly entrenched. His protégés were Itō Ritsu, Hasegawa Hiroshi, Nishizawa Ryūji, Shiino Etsuzō, and Shida Shigeo. In addition, Nosaka Sanzō, Konno Yojirō, Kasuga Shōichi, and Takenaka Tsunesaburō were considered as pro-Tokuda fellow

²⁵ Tokuda Kyūichi was born in Nago, Okinawa in 1894; graduated from Law School, Nippon University in 1920 and practiced law; attended the Far Eastern People's Congress in Moscow in January 1922 as representative of the Communist group; was a charter member of the JCP and active in the Communist Youth League; attended the Sixth Plenum of the Comintern Executive Committee in Moscow; appointed central committee member of the JCP and Comintern representative in Japan of the Second JCP reorganized in 1926; went to Moscow in 1927 to participate in discussions on party strategy and tactics; arrested in 1928 and imprisoned until 1945; upon release from prison in 1945, helped reestablish the JCP and served as Secretary-General; elected to the Diet in 1946, 1947, and 1949; went underground in 1950 following the SCAP-directed purge of the JCP cadres; died in Peking in 1953; major publications include Waga Omoide (My Recollections) (Tokyo: Tokyo Shoin, 1948), Gokuchū Jūhachinen (Eighteen Years in Prison) coauthored with Shiga Yoshio (Tokyo: Jiji Tshin-sha, 1947) and numerous other works. Most of the information concerning Tokuda Kyūichi was based on The Japanese Biographical Encyclopedia and Who's Who (Tokyo: Rengo Press, 1954), George M. Beckmann and Okubo Genji, The Japanese Communist Party, 1922-1945 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 385-86, and Evelyn S. Colbert, The Left Wing in Japanese Politics (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1952), p. 338.

travellers.

Following the purge of twenty-four Japanese Communist leaders by the order of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, General MacArthur on June 6, 1950, most of the Central Committee members went underground, leaving open party activity in the hands of Itō Ritsu and Shida Shigeo. Tokuda Kyūichi escaped to Communist China and died of illness in Peking in 1953. During the early phase of the underground period (1950-1952) Itō Ritsu virtually dominated the remainder of the JCP and directed the terroristic activities. Eventual intra-elite struggle within the defunct JCP culminated in the fierce leadership struggle between Itō Ritsu and Shida Shigeo. Itō lost the power struggle to Shida Shigeo and was expelled from the Party on September 21, 1952.²⁶ Shida, in turn, met a similar fate at the hands of Miyamoto Kenji's International faction, as formalized by the Seventh Congress.

The Seventh Congress (1958) of the JCP marked the rise of Miyamoto Kenji's International faction, which soon was called the New Mainstream group. Ten new members of the JCP Presidium and Secretariat were added. Most of them were Miyamoto Kenji's followers. The Seventh Congress formally acknowledged the expulsion of Shida Shigeo and

²⁶ Itō was ousted from the Party on charges of being an American spy and informer.

Shiino Etsuzō from the Politburo and the Secretariat respectively.²⁷ At the Central Committee level, among others, Nishizawa Ryūji, Konno Yojirō, Takenaka Tsunesaburō, Matsumoto Mimasu, and Hasegawa Hiroshi—all of the Old Mainstream group—were dropped. The total number of members of the Central Committee formally dropped during the Seventh Congress was sixteen.²⁸ In total, 64% of the 25 members of the Central Committee of the Sixth Congress failed to retain their positions. Of the 31 members of the Central Committee of the JCP at the Seventh Congress the number of newly elected was 23 (74.2%). The Seventh Congress revived the defunct post of Secretary-General and Miyamoto Kenji

²⁷ Both Shida and Shiino were accused of misguided adventurist policy in the JCP underground activities during 1950-1953.

²⁸ Tokuda Kyūichi, Kim Chōn-hae, Kasuga Shōjirō, Itō Ritsu, Hasegawa Hiroshi, Itō Kenichi, Shida Shigeo, Matsumoto Ichizō, Matsumoto Mimasu, Takenaka Tsunesaburo, Takakura Teru, Kishimoto Shigeo, Shirakawa Seiichi, Tōzaka Kan, Satō Satōji, and Nosaka Ryū (Nosaka Sanzō's wife). Of these sixteen members, Tokuda Kyūichi died in 1953, Kasuga Shōjirō became the Chairman of the Control Commission during the Seventh Congress, and Kim Chōn-hae, the only Korean in the JCP Central Committee, was purged by the SCAP and, after his return to North Korea, became a member of the Central Committee, Korean Workers' Party of the DPRK.

acquired the powerful post.²⁹ Nosaka Sanzō, who had been elected as the First Secretary during the interim Sixth National Consultative Conference in 1955, was given the merely symbolic title of the Chairman of the Central Committee.

The Eighth Congress (1961) was marked by a drastic increase of the members of the Central Committee. The number of its full members was increase about two-fold (from 31 members at the Seventh Congress to 60 members during the Eighth Congress). The alternate members of the Central Committee also increased from 6 during the Seventh Congress to 35 during the Eighth Congress. Another note-

²⁹ Miyamoto Kenji was born in Yamaguchi Prefecture in 1908; graduated from Tokyo Imperia University in 1931; while a student, won the Kaizō (Reconstruction) Magazine Essay Competition with his "Literature of Defeat"; joined the JCP in 1931; joined the Proletarian Writer's Association (1931) and actively engaged in the cultural movement with his wife Chujō Yuriko, a reknowned writer; became a full member of the JCP CC in 1934; arrested in 1934 and remained in jail until 1945; after his release from the prison, served as Chief Editor of Zenei (Vanguard), Chairman of the Control Committee, and became a full member of the JCP Central Committee and Political Bureau; became a Presidium member in 1955 and Secretary-General of the Party in 1958; after the JCP Eleventh Congress held in 1970, was elected as Chairman of the JCP Presidium, the most powerful position of the Party; major contributions include Nihon Kakumei no Tempō (Outlook on Japanese Revolution) (Tokyo: Shin Nippon Shuppan-sha, 1968), Genzai no Kadai to Nihon Kyōsantō (Present Task and the JCP), 2 Vols. (Tokyo: Publication Bureau, JCP Central Committee, 1966), and many others. For more extensive biographical profile, see Nihon Shakai Undō Kenkyūkai, Sayoku Katsudōka Bunkajin Meikan (Who's Who on the Left-Wing Activists and Intellectual) (Tokyo: Nikkan Rōdō Tsushin-sha, 1969), pp. 509-10.

worthy event was the reinstatement of the Old Mainstream faction--Nishizawa Ryūji, Konno Yojirō, Takenaka Tsunesaburō, Matsumoto Mimasu--to the Central Committee after they had shifted their loyalty to Miyamoto-Hakamada's New Mainstream faction.

FIGURE 5
CENTRALIZED ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE JCP (1966)
IN THEORY





FIGURE 5 (CONTINUED)

IN PRACTICE



*Beginning the Eleventh Congress (1970), the JCP no longer has a Secretary-General (Miyamoto Kenji's former title). Instead, the new post of Chief of the Party Secretariat (Shoki Kyokuchō) was created and filled by Fuma Tetsuzō. This position wields substantially less influence and enjoys less prestige than that of the Presidium Chairman (presently held by Miyamoto Kenji), on whom it is dependent: under the new arrangement the Presidium and not the Central Committee appoints members of the Secretariat.

Source: Shisō Undō Kenkyūsho (ed.), op. cit., p. 233.

Before discussing the roster of the top-level decision makers selected at Party congresses, it is appropriate to include the organizational chart of the JCP. The structure and function of Party organization are given in Figure 5. In examining this chart it should be noted that the formal organizational subdivision (in theory) is vastly oversimplified and misleading. Instead, close attention should be paid to the organization in practice to understand the workings of the JCP in action. The roster of the new JCP top echelon leadership elected during the Eighth Congress is as follows:

Central Presidium members (9):

Nosaka Sanzō (Chairman)	
Hakamada Satomi	Matsushima Harushige
Kasuga Shōichi	Miyamoto Kenji
Kikunami Tsuyoki	Shiga Yoshio
Kurahara Koretō	Suzuki Ichizō

Alternate members of the Presidium (2):

Anzai Kuraji	Konno Yojirō
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Central Secretariat members (10):

Miyamoto Kenji (Secretary-General)	
Anzai Kuraji	Konno Yojirō
Doki Tsuyoshi	Matsushima Harushige
Hakamada Satomi	Takahara Shinichi
Hiraashi Nobuyuki	Yonehara Itaru
Ii Yashirō	

Miyamoto Kenji's astute political skill in solidifying his leadership within the JCP was proven in the co-optation of new elites to the power center. According to a Japanese source, most of the composite members of the New

Mainstream faction group can be classified into the following three categories:

Category A—a group of disgruntled members of middle-echelon leaders who had never been promoted during the heyday of the Old Mainstream faction control in spite of their devotions to the postwar Communist movement:

Hama Takeshi
Ii Yashirō
Iida Makoto
Iwama Masao
Kaneko Kenta

Kaneko Mitsuhiro
Kikunami Tsuyoki
Murakami Hiroshi
Takahara Shinichi
Takeuchi Shichirō

Category B—a group of local party activists whose unswerving loyalty to the central party directives had not been rewarded with the expected promotions:

Fuziwara Ryūzō
Gesu Junkichi
Hiraashi Nobuyuki
Hiroya Shunji
Hoshino Chikara
Ibaragi Yoshikazu

Ichikawa Shōichi³⁰
Irutani Harumatsu
Iwabayashi Toranosuke
Matsushima Harushige
Sunama Kazuyoshi

Category C—a group of brilliant ideologues and theoreticians who had worked in the party headquarters as specialists in policy-making and policy-implementation:

Anzai Kuraji
Doki Tsuyoshi
Fujii Teiji
Fuwa Tetsuzō (pseudonym of
Kudō Akira
Nishizawa Tomio
Oka Masayoshi
Okamoto Hironobu

Suhō Shigeru
Toyota Shiro
Tsukada Daigan
Ueda Kenjiro
Uchino Takechiyo
Ueda Kōichirō
Watanabe Takeshi
Yonehara Itaru 31

Also, the Eighth Congress marked the demise of Kasuga Shojiro's structural reform theory group from the JCP.

³⁰ Different individual with the same name as the prewar JCP leader who died in prison in February 1945.

³¹ Iizuka Shigetarō, op. cit., pp. 256-57.

Following a direct showdown with the Miyamoto-Hakamada New Mainstream faction at the Sixteenth Plenary Session of the JCP Central Committee in April 1961, Kasuga Shōjirō resigned the chairmanship of the JCP Control Commission and withdrew from the Party. Thereafter other members of the structural reform theory group in the Central Committee—Kameyama Kōzō, Naitō Chishū, Nishikawa Hikoyoshi, Hada Shikari, and Yamada Rokuzaemon—were formally expelled from the Party during the Eighth Congress. Two alternate members of the JCP Central Committee—Uchino Sōji and Hara Zengo—met a similar fate. In total, 6 (19.4%) of the 31 members of the Central Committee elected by the Seventh Congress were ousted from the Party, while 34 persons were newly recruited to the 60-member Central Committee during the Eighth Congress, constituting 56.6% of the new Committee (See Appendix D).

The Ninth Congress was held in Tokyo during November 24-30, 1964. The number of full members of the Central Committee was increased from 60 (Eighth Congress) to 67. Alternate members increased from 35 (Eighth Congress) to 42. Similarly the number of the Secretariat members went up from 10 (Eighth Congress) to 16. The following is the list of the new JCP top hierarchy members elected during the Ninth Congress (1964):

JCP Central Presidium members (9):

Nosaka Sanzō (Chairman)	Matsushima Harushige
Hakamada Satomi	Miyamoto Kenji
Kasuga Shōichi	Oka Masayoshi
Kawada Kenji	Yonehara Itaru
Kurahara Koreta	

Alternate members of the Presidium (4):

Fujiwara Ryūzō	Nishizawa Tomio
Konno Yojirō	Obuchi Masaki

Members of the Secretariat (16):

Miyamoto Kenji (Secretary-General)	
Anzai Kurazi	Nishizawa Tomio
Doki Tsuyoshi	Oka Masayoshi
Gesu Junkichi	Okamoto Hironobu
Hakamada Satomi	Sunama Ichiryō
Ichikawa Shōichi	Takahara Shinichi
Ii Yashirō	Tsukada Daigan
Iwabayashi Toranosuke	Uchino Takechiyo
Konno Yojirō	

During the Ninth Congress (1964) most of the pro-CPSU group of the JCP were expelled from the JCP. Shiga Yoshio, Suzuki Ichizō, Kamiyama Shigeo, and Nakano Shigeharu were ousted from the Presidium and Central Committee positions. Of the 60-member Central Committee of the Eighth Congress, 5 (8.3%) were expelled from the Party during the Ninth Congress, while 12 were newly added to the Central Committee of the Ninth Congress.³² Among the newly promoted members of the JCP top hierarchy, Oka Masayoshi's phenomenal rise to prominent positions draws particular

³² Those who were expelled from the Ninth Party Congress were Kaneiwa Denichi, Kamiyama Shigeo, Shiga Yoshio, Suzuki Ichizō, and Nakano Shigeharu.

attention. From obscurity Oka was suddenly elevated to the top positions. During the Eighth Congress (1961) he had been promoted to dual membership of both the Central Committee and the Secretariat. Again he was promoted to the JCP Presidium membership and became one of the four members of the newly-created Standing Committee of the Presidium during the Ninth Congress (1964). According to a Japanese writer, Oka Masayoshi's rapid upsurge to these prominent positions owes much to his rapid switch of loyalty from his early connection with Tokuda Kyūichi's Old Mainstream faction to Miyamoto-Hakamada's New Mainstream faction, carrying with him invaluable inside information concerning Tokuda Kyūichi, Itō Ritsu, and Shida Shigeo.³³ Other rising stars of the Japanese Communist top hierarchy during the Ninth Congress included the following persons:

Fujiwara Ryūzō and Yonehara Itaru; both elected as alternate members of the Presidium;

Gesu Junkichi, Ichikawa Shōichi, Iwabayashi Toranosuke, Nishizawa Tomio, Okano Hironobu, and Tsukada Daigan: all elected as members of the Secretariat.

The Tenth Congress was held in Tokyo during October 24-30, 1966. The Central Presidium consisted of four Standing Committee members, eleven full members, and eight alternate members. The Secretariat consisted of 18 full

³³ Mizushima Takeshi, op. cit., p. 188.

members and 8 alternate members, while the Central Committee members increased from 67 (Ninth Congress) to 88 and alternate members from 42 (Ninth Congress) to 48 during the Tenth Congress. With the ouster of four of the pro-CCP group from the Central Committee and the Secretariat—Kikunami Tsuyoki, Anzai Kuraji, Nishizawa Ryūji, and Okada Bunkichi—Miyamoto Kenji's New Mainstream faction finally completed its domination of the Party. Altogether 26 (29.5%) new members were elected to the Central Committee during the Tenth Congress.

What was the substance of the "Miyamoto-Hakamada New Mainstream" group? Its nucleus, in addition to Miyamoto Kenji, consisted of the following eight members of the Presidium and the Secretariat: Hakamada Satomi, Oka Masayoshi, Nishizawa Tomio, Yonehara Itaru, Kurahara Koreto, Takahara Shinichi, Matsushima Harushige, and Gesu Junkichi.³⁴

The major characteristic of this newly emerged leadership group during the Tenth Congress was the predominant numbers of new faces whose rapid promotions to the Party decision-making organs were based on their unfaltering loyalty to Miyamoto Kenji during the intra-party leadership struggle. With the exception of Hakamada Satomi and Kurahara Koreto, who were the prewar Communists, the remaining six in-group

³⁴ Nihon Kyōsantō Honbu (The Japanese Communist Party Headquarters) (Tokyo: Zenpyo-sha, 1968), p. 58.

members had been handpicked by the JCP Secretary-General Miyamoto Kenji to increase his power position in the intra-elite struggle. Oka Masayoshi, Nishizawa Tomio, Takahara Shinichi, and Gesu Junkichi had become Central Committee members upon Miyamoto Kenji's personal recommendation during the Eighth Congress (1961). Likewise, Matsushima Harushige and Yonehara Itaru had joined the Central Committee upon Miyamoto's recommendation during the Seventh Congress (1958).

Out of 88 members of the Central Committee of the JCP elected during the Tenth Congress, only 9 were pre-1958 members of the Central Committee,³⁵ while the remaining 79 were newcomers, having been elected to it only after the Seventh Congress. Also all 48 of the alternate members of the Central Committee elected during the Tenth Congress were newcomers, having been chosen for the position either during the Ninth Congress or the Tenth Congress. This meant that out of a total of 136 full and alternate members of the Central Committee, 127 (93.4%) were members of the JCP recruited since the Seventh Congress. Here lies the numerical strength of Miyamoto Kenji's New Mainstream faction

³⁵ From the Old International faction, Miyamoto Kenji, Hakamada Satomi and Kurahara Koreto; from the Old Mainstream faction, Nosaka Sanzō, Kasuga Shōichi, Konno Yojiro, Matsumoto Mimasu, Takenaka Tsunesaburo, and Takakura Teru. All of them were elected to the Central Committee membership before the Seventh Congress (1958).

in the postwar Japanese Communist movement.

A significant aspect of the intellectual-dominated JCP elites could be found by examining the data given by Paul Langer on the educational background of the Central Committee members of the Tenth Congress. Table 29 gives their educational profile:

TABLE 29
EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
MEMBERS, JCP TENTH CONGRESS (1966)

Education	Number
University graduate	22 ^a
University attended	3
Junior college or higher professional school	22 ^b
Teachers' normal school	5 ^c
Old-style middle school (equivalent to the U.S. high school)	2
Junior high school	9
Primary school	5
Unknown	20
Total	88

- a. One (Nishisawa Tomio) is a graduate of the Harbin Institute (in formerly Japanese-controlled Manchuria) and will rank close to the university graduate.
- b. Six did not complete the course, probably due to their radical political activities and subsequent expulsions from school.
- c. Two dropped out before graduation.

Source: Paul F. Langer, Communism in Japan (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 24.

With respect to social background of the Central Committee members of the Tenth Congress (1966), no satisfactory data were available. The latest pertinent information was published by the Japanese Public Safety Investigation Bureau right after the Eighth Congress of the JCP. Table 30 gives the occupational background of these JCP elites.

TABLE 30
OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUND OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS,
JCP EIGHTH CONGRESS (1961) BY PERCENTAGE

Occupation	per cent
Workers	32.0
Public service employees	20.4
School teachers	4.9
Students	9.7
Farmers and fishermen	1.9
Office clerks	14.6
Liberal profession	10.7
Newspaper reporters	3.9
Other	1.9
	100.0%

Source: Kōan Chōgachō (Public Safety Investigation Bureau), Nihon Kyōsantō no Genjō (Current Situations in the Japanese Communist Party) (Tokyo: Ministry of Justice, 1962), p. 145.

From Table 30 it can be noticed that the occupational background of most of the Central Committee members was also skewed to the professions in which some intellectual activity was a prerequisite (e.g. public service, teaching,

liberal profession, and newspaper reporting). Only one-third were classified as workers.

The changing trend of the age of the members of the Presidium and the Central Committee of the JCP is illustrated in the following Tables 31-32:

TABLE 31
AVERAGE AGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE JCP
PRESIDIUM MEMBERS,
1946-1970

Congress	Standing Pre- sidium members		Politburo/Pre- sidium members		Alternate Pre- sidium members	
	N	Average age	N	Average age	N	Average age
5th (1946)			9	44.1 Politburo		
6th (1947)			9	44.5 Politburo		
7th (1958)			9	54.0 Presidium		
8th (1961)			9	57.0 Presidium	2	58.5
9th (1964)	4	58.9	9	58.6 Presidium	4	52
10th (1966)	4	59.1	11	59.3 Presidium	8	56.7
11th (1970)	7	57.7*	24	57.2 Presidium		
Total	15		80		14	

*If we exclude Fuwa Tetsuzō (age 40) from the standing Presidium membership, the average age would be substantially higher: 60.6 years.

Source: Average age was computed from the following list of JCP cadres: Akahata, Dec. 1, 1964, p. 1; Oct. 31, 1966, p. 1; July 8, 1970, p. 1.

TABLE 32

AVERAGE AGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE JCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE
MEMBERS AND THE ALTERNATE MEMBERS,
1964-1970

Congress	Central Committee members		Alternate members of the Central Committee	
	N	Average age	N	Average age
9th (1964)	67	56.8	42	44.8
10th (1966)	88	54.8	48	46.4
11th (1970)	110	55.9	46	47.9
Total	265		136	

Source: Average age of the JCP Central Committee and alternate members was computed from the following reports: Akahata, Dec. 1, 1964, p. 1; Oct. 31, 1966, p. 1; July 8, 1970, p. 1.

The average age of the Central Committee members of the Tenth Congress was fifty-four, and the median age between fifty-five and fifty-six. How great the influence of old-timers had been in the party top hierarchy was indicated in age distribution: only four men were still in their thirties, while the same number were between seventy and eighty, and 22 were in their sixties. This rather surprising image of a revolutionary party directed by the old men of the prewar generation was even more pronounced in the composition of the most powerful party decision-making body, the Presidium, whose members averaged fifty-nine years of age when they were elected in 1966. Presidium alternate members were only slightly younger. Although modest attempts were made in 1966

to introduce new and younger blood—e.g., Ueda Kōichirō and his younger brother Fuwa Tetsuzō (pseudonym of Ueda Kenjirō)—the new appointments have done little to give the JCP a fresh young look: newly elected Central Committee members averaged forty-seven years; the re-elected Central Committee alternate members were on the average forty-five, and their new colleagues only one year younger.

The Eleventh Congress of the JCP convened in Tokyo during July 1-7, 1970. It increased the numbers of the Presidium from 11 to 31 and the Central Committee members from 88 to 110. At the Presidium level, with the exception of Nosaka Sanzō,³⁶ all of the Presidium members of the previous Tenth Congress have retained their positions in the Eleventh Congress. Also all alternate members of the Presidium and full members of the Secretariat of the Tenth Congress were promoted to the 31 member Presidium. The seven member Standing Presidium virtually consisted of Miyamoto Kenji's New Mainstream faction group—Miyamoto Kenji (Chairman), Hakamada Satomi (Vice-Chairman), Oka Masayoshi (Vice-Chairman), Hurahara Koreto, Matsushima Harushige, Nishizawa Tomio, and Fuwa Tetsuzō. Rapid promotion of Fuwa Tetsuzō (40 years old), the youngest member of the Presidium of the Eleventh Congress, from the Alternate Secretariat

³⁶ Although the seventy-eight year old Nosaka Sanzō remained Chairman of the Central Committee and thus Party Chairman, his role in the party was largely a symbolic one. This was reflected in the fact that he no longer was a member of the Presidium which, since the Eleventh Congress has been headed by Miyamoto Kenji, the de facto leader of the Party.

membership during the Tenth Congress to the prominent positions of Standing Presidium membership, Presidium full membership, and the newly-created post of the Chief of the Party Secretariat was quite a noteworthy phenomenon. Paul F. Langer gives a detailed biographical sketch of this rising star in the JCP top hierarchy:

The youthful Fuwa (born in 1930) is a member of the postwar generation of Japanese Communist, but by the time of his elevation to Standing Presidium membership he had accumulated more than two decades of Party experience. He joined the JCP in 1947 while still a student in Tokyo's elite First Higher School. At Tokyo University, Japan's most prestigious academic institution, Fuwa chose the difficult course of the natural sciences; he graduated with a degree in physics in 1953. Thereafter he made labor-union activity his career until 1964, when he was invited to work at Party headquarters. There he specialized in Marxist-Leninist theory and international problems. In 1964 he was also made a candidate (alternate) member of the Party's Central Committee, and two years later he became a full member of that body. In 1966 he was a member of an important Party mission to North Vietnam, Communist China, and North Korea. He has written numerous articles and many authoritative Party statements on international problems and on right and left wing ideological deviations from the Party line. . . . Clearly, Fuwa is considered by the Party leaders to be one of the most promising if not the most promising of the younger Communists. Perhaps the fact that he is the only Standing Presidium member to hold a seat in the Diet has also helped to speed up Fuwa's advancement to the highest level of the Party hierarchy.³⁷

Out of 110 members of the Central Committee elected during the Eleventh Congress, 28 (25.5%) were newly promoted from alternate membership of the previous Tenth Congress,

³⁷Paul F. Langer, Communism in Japan, p. 27.

while the remaining 76 (69%) were hold-overs from the previous Tenth Congress. Only six (5.5%) were dropped.³⁸ Of 46 alternate members of the Central Committee 26 (56.5%) were newly elected members, while 20 (43.5%) were hold-overs from the previous Tenth Congress. The abundance of unfamiliar names at the Alternate Member level was one of the more striking features of the Eleventh Central Committee. It is also to be noted that the Eleventh Congress was one of the least colorful and least boisterous meetings ever held. There were no open challenges to Miyamoto Kenji's New Mainstream faction nor expulsions of any members of the JCP. Ostensibly harmony and unity of the JCP were maintained.

With respect to the age distribution of the Presidium and Central Committee members of the Eleventh Congress there was no visible indication to give the Party leadership a younger image. For the new 31 member Presidium, the average age in 1970 was 57.2 years and, for the elite 7 member Standing Presidium, 57.6 years.³⁹ For the 110 full

³⁸ Nakamura Yoshio, Miura Raitarō, Suzuki Zenzō, and Tayo, members of the Central Committee of the Tenth Congress, never retained their positions during the Eleventh Congress; Kazida Shigeho died in an airplane accident en route to Bulgaria in November 1966 and Kawakami Kansū died of illness in September 1968.

³⁹ This figure would be substantially higher were it not for the inclusion in this group of the 40 years old Fuwa Tetsuzō.

members of the Central Committee, the average age in 1970 was 56 years; and for the 46 alternate members, it was only 47.9 years. It can be expected from these alternate members that the post-war generation JCP members might give some fresh and young images to the Party leadership as they ascend to more prominent positions in the future, but, as of 1970, it seemed unlikely that the grip of the older men on the top layers of the JCP hierarchy would wane rapidly.

As for the educational and occupational breakdown of the Central Committee members of the JCP Eleventh Congress, no satisfactory data were available. However, the July 22-31, 1970 editions of Akahata gave detailed biographical profiles of the newly elected 31 members of the Presidium. Based on this information, the following data were formulated. On the educational level, Table 33 shows a clear-cut pattern of an intellectual-dominant JCP top hierarchy:

TABLE 33

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF THE JCP PRESIDUM
MEMBERS, ELEVENTH CONGRESS (JULY, 1970)

Level of education	Number	%
University graduate	12	38.7
University attended	1	3.2
Teachers' college graduate	1	3.2
Junior college or higher professional school	5	16.1
Old-style middle school (equivalent to the U.S. high schools)	4	12.9
Junior high school	2	6.4
Primary school	3	9.6
Unknown	3	9.6
Total	31	100.0%

Source: Akahata, July 22-31, 1970, p. 1.

With respect to the occupational background of the JCP Presidium members of the Eleventh Congress, Table 34 clearly indicates the predominance of the intellectual-oriented professions rather than the manual labor professions. The percentage of those who engaged in professions which require some intellectual activity (e.g., public service, writing, teaching, and newspaper reporting) is 58%, while that of the industrial workers comprise a meager 16%. Even among the labor union leaders many of them were either college graduates or drop-outs.

TABLE 34

OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUND OF THE JCP PRESIDUM MEMBERS, ELEVENTH CONGRESS (JULY, 1970)*

Occupation	Number	%
University & college professors	3	9.7
School teachers	3	9.7
Newspaper reporters	6	19.4
Liberal professions	4	12.8
Public Service employees	2	6.5
Labor union leaders	6	19.4
Engineers	2	6.5
Industrial workers	5	16.0
Farmers and fishermen	0	0
Total	31	100.0%

*Practiced occupation at the time of joining the Presidium rank.

Source: Akahata, July 22-31, 1970, p. 1.

One interesting finding of Table 34 is that one occupational group--persons engaged in agricultural, forestry, and fishing industries--has not managed to enter the leadership in proportion to its membership which, according to a 1962 Public Safety Investigation Bureau report, made up approximately 11.35% of the total party membership.

Figure 6 shows the length of service to the JCP by the 31 members of the Presidium. The ratio between the prewar and postwar leaders was about equal. Of these 31 members of the Presidium, 13 (41.9%) joined the Party before 1945, while 18 (58.1%) joined it during the postwar period. Only one (Kawada Kenji) was an original charter member of the Party. The average service length by the Presidium members was 31.3 years.

FIGURE 6 (CONTINUED)

Presidium members	1922	1924	1926	1928	1930	1932	1934	1936	1938	1940	1942	1944	1946	1948	1950	1952	1954	1956	1958	1960	1962	1964	1966	1968	1970	Service length
Konno Yojiro*																										41
Murakami Hiroshi+																										23
Obuchi Masaki+																										25
Okamoto Hiroshige+																										21
Sunama Kazuyoshi+																										42
Tada Tomeharu+																										41
Takahara Shinichi+																										24
Takeuchi Shichiro+																										24
Uchino Takechiyo+																										42
Ueda Koichiro+																										24
Yasui Shingo+																										22
Yoshida Tachiharu+																										42
Yonehara Itaru*																										25
Average service length																									31.3 years	

*Holdover from 10th Congress, JCP
 +New members of the Presidium

Note: Nosaka Sanzō was omitted because he was only elected as the Chairman of the JCP Central Committee during the 11th Congress, JCP.

Summary Appraisal

This chapter has analyzed the overall transformation of the prewar and postwar JCP top hierarchy elites, namely the Central Executive Committee members of the three Party Congresses (1922-1927), the Moscow-trained middle-range activists of the 1930's and the JCP members of the Central Committee, the Secretariat, and the Politburo/Presidium from the Fourth Congress (1945) to the Eleventh Congress (1970).

In the first section of this chapter a comparative elite study of the Politburo/C.E.C. members of the first-generation CPSU, CCP, and JCP was undertaken. Four variables pertaining to the social class origins, age distribution, educational background, and elite turnover were applied to delineate and compare the composition of the political elites of these three Communist parties.

With respect to the social origins of the Communist party elites, among the Soviet Politburo members of 1917-1924, large numbers of the middle-class originated persons dominated the top party hierarchy at the initial stage of the Bolshevik Revolution and the early phase of the Soviet Union. During the Stalin era of 1928-1953, gradually they were replaced by proletarian-originated members of the Politburo of the CPSU. In China, the most noteworthy character-

istics of the social origins of the CCP Politburo members (1921-1945) were the domination of the rural-originated sons of wealthy landlords and scholar-officials—traditional ruling class, while those who had genuine proletarian and poor peasant backgrounds comprised a meager one-fourth of the total numbers (24) whose biographical statistics were known. In contrast to the CCP Politburo members, few JCP elites were recruited from the traditional ruling class. Among the first-generation JCP Central Executive Committee members (1922-1926), most came predominantly from what might be termed the middle class.

Findings on the average age of the three Communist party elites indicate the wider fluctuation in the following orders respectively:

<u>Politburo/C.E.C. members</u>	<u>Average age</u>
the CPSU Politburo members (1917-1927)	42 years
the JCP C.E.C. members (1922-1926)	33 "
the CCP Politburo members (1922-1928)	29.8 "

A plausible explanation for this discrepancy could be found from the different history of the Marxist movement; old Bolsheviks of the CPSU had started their political activities much earlier and had spent their adult life already in overseas exile during the Tsarist regime, while genuine interest for Communism drew Asian revolutionaries' interest only after the Bolshevik revolution. In terms of the trend of the age of these three Communist party cadres, the CPSU

Politburo members showed a generally upward tendency, while both the CCP and the JCP counterparts showed intermittently downward trends due to the heavy casualty ratio of the leadership group in the initial stage of revolutionary struggles.

In terms of the educational backgrounds of the three Communist party elites, the following observations were made: During the initial stage of the Bolshevik Revolution and about ten years afterward, the university-educated Bolsheviks played the dominant role in the Soviet Union, but they were subsequently replaced by Stalin after 1938 with lowly educated persons. A discernible evidence of anti-intellectualism was noted during the Stalin era. On the other hand, most of the first-generation CCP Politburo and the JCP C.E.C. members received higher education. In this respect, both the CCP and the JCP elites were far closer to both traditional and other modern Asian political elites in their socio-economic and educational attributes than they were to the proletarian leadership projected in orthodox Marxist theory. Perhaps the Leninist notion of the role of the intelligentsia as a vanguard of the proletarian movement might apply adequately to the Chinese and the Japanese Communist leadership echelon.

As for the elite cohesion/turnover aspect, the CPSU Politburo maintained fairly stable cohesion until

Lenin's death in 1924. But with the consolidation of power by Stalin in 1928 and the subsequent Great Purge of 1937-38 a mass-scale elite turnover within the top party hierarchy occurred. The elite turnover of the CCP Politburo members (1921-1928) was high, due to a high casualty rate and substantial differences over the course of revolution among them. Having been rent by the perennial factionalism based on personalities and disagreements over basic issues of Communist strategy and tactics between the anarcho-syndicalists and the Bolsheviks among the first-generation JCP elites, the JCP Central Executive Committee members (1922-1927) were also characterized by a high rate of elite turnover. Incessant suppression by the efficient Japanese police further aggravated the situation. Thus, the top-echelon JCP leadership group in the 1930's were replaced by Moscow-trained middle-range activists who were younger, inexperienced, lowly educated, and of proletarian origin, which led to the total decimation of the Japanese Communist movement afterwards.

Section two of this chapter has analyzed the background of these Moscow-trained Japanese Communists. In total, 45 of them were scrutinized from the classified documents of the prewar Japanese police archives, and from the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Interior records. Having received the "crash course" in Communism at the KUTV

during their short stay in Moscow, they were ill-prepared to lead the defunct Japanese Communist movement after most of the influential veterans of Japanese Communism were imprisoned or defected following the doctrinal disputes. Most of the KUTV-trained Japanese desperadoes were arrested shortly after their arrival in Japan. Of the 45 KUTV-trainees only four attained some influential position within the defunct JCP operating under the adverse pre-war condition of the 1930's. Of these four, Kazama Jōkichi and Yamamoto Masami defected from the Party after their arrests. Only two--Hakamada Satomi and Kasuga Shōjirō--persistently refused to capitulate to the Japanese authorities even after their arrests and resumed their postwar Communist activities in the top hierarchy of members of the JCP. As for the China-trained JCP leaders during 1940-1945, conclusive empirical evidence is not available due to the fragmentary nature of the information and small numbers of the sample.

Section three of this chapter has dealt with the overall transformation of the members of the JCP Politburo/Presidium, the Secretariat, and the Central Committee from the Fourth Congress (1945) to the Eleventh Congress (1970). With respect to the composition of the post-war JCP top hierarchy, the following generalizations can be made based on research pertaining to class origins, educational back-

ground, occupational status, age distribution, elite cohesion/turnover, and the length of service to the Party:

1. Findings from the class origins and educational background data once again confirmed the fact that the predominant members of the post-war JCP top hierarchy had invariably middle class backgrounds and impressive higher education records. In this respect, there is a certain similarity with the initial members of the three congresses of the JCP Central Executive Committee of pre-war Japan (1922-1926).

2. Occupational data of the Central Committee members of the Tenth Congress of the JCP (1966) indicates that most of them were engaged in "knowledge intensive" professions, i.e. public service, teaching, journalistic career, writing, and other liberal professions. Workers, farmers, and fishermen constituted only 33.9%. This tendency of domination by the "intelligentsia" is more extensively proven in the case of the occupational background of the 31-member JCP Presidium of the Eleventh Congress of the JCP (1970). (See Table 34).

3. Most of the JCP Presidium members of the Eleventh Congress of the JCP are dominated by the old age group in their late fifties and early sixties, which make them comparatively older than other Asian Communist counterparts. This creates the anomalous situation of a revolutionary party directed by old men of the pre-war generation. At present, it seems unlikely that the grip of the older men in control of the Party will subside in the near future.

4. As for elite cohesion/turnover, the JCP top hierarchy has been affected by the various external and internal stresses, i.e. SCAP-directed purges of the JCP leaders in February 1950, the Cominform criticism of the "Peaceful Revolution" theme by Nosaka-Tokuda's Old Mainstream faction during 1950-1951, internal power struggle between Ito Ritsu and Shida Shigeo during 1953-1955. However, with the exception of the expulsion of Ito Ritsu and Shida Shigeo, the power struggle during the 1950's took the form of factional realignment short of mass expulsion. With the intensification of the doctrinal disputes following the Sino-Soviet conflict, indelible scars were marked on the elite cohesion of the JCP top hierarchy during the Eighth (1961), Ninth (1964), and Tenth (1966) Congresses. An abrupt doctrinal dispute ended up with a series of

expulsions of the prewar JCP leaders by Miyamoto Kenji, the Secretary-General of the JCP during this period. Miyamoto Kenji's astute political skill was proven as he exploited the Sino-Soviet conflict to consolidate his power by the reshuffling of Presidium members and the packing of the Central Committee with his own personal followers starting with the Seventh Congress (1958).

5. With respect to the length of service by the present 31 members of the JCP Presidium elected during the Eleventh Congress (1970), the average length of service to the Party is 31.3 years. Approximately 42% (13) of them joined the Party during the pre-war days. The phenomenal rise to the Presidium membership by three post-war generation leaders-- Oka Masayoshi, Fuwa Testuzō (real name Ueda Kenjiō), and Fuwa's elder brother Ueda Kōichirō are especially noteworthy.

In summing up, section three of this chapter attempted to verify the hypothesis that the greater the intensity of the intra-bloc struggle for the control of the minor-bloc actor (JCP) by the super-bloc actors (CPSU and CCP), the more intra-party schism among the leadership group of the minor-bloc actor. It was also anticipated that the outcome of the intra-party power struggle by the leading group (JCP Mainstream faction) of the minor-bloc actor depended on its maneuverability, organizational reshuffling, and political skill. Based on the empirical evidence indicated in findings No.4, a conclusive statement can be made in support of the main hypothesis of this chapter. As for the specific impact of the Sino-Soviet conflict on the overall JCP leadership transformation, two conclusions can be drawn. First, even though it had

a certain de-stabilizing effect on the JCP top hierarchy, Miyamoto Kenji's Mainstream faction experienced continued success in the intra-party power struggle. This was primarily owing to Miyamoto Kenji's astute political skill to exploit the Sino-Soviet dispute to increase his power bases in the JCP. Second, the Sino-Soviet conflict had a "house-cleaning" side-effect of purging the troublesome "left-wing" and "right-wing" deviationists. Thus, a certain degree of political homogeneity is maintained under the present Miyamoto leadership.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

This study has contended that the JCP, stimulated by a growing sense of nationalism and by a pragmatic view of Marxist-Leninist ideology adaptable to the advanced socio-economic conditions of Japan, has skillfully maneuvered the Sino-Soviet conflict by adopting various "fence-straddling" tactics to enhance its ability to pursue an independent policy. Since the overt declaration of the policy of "autonomy and independence" by the JCP in the Sino-Soviet conflict in 1966, its operational thrust and tactical maneuverability have been clearly established to pursue this sole purpose. Having achieved a general consensus on the strategic line of a united front against "U.S. imperialism" with the two other Asian Communist parties (the Korean Workers' Party and the Vietnamese Workers' Party), the JCP has emerged in intra-bloc Communist relations with an ambitious scheme of new dynamism.

Historical Experience

The aforementioned discussion in Chapters II and III amply demonstrated the fact that in analyzing the intra-bloc relationship among the Communist parties, it is important to explore the early roots of inter-party relationships. The findings of Chapter II led to the conclusion that the JCP emerged from its inception in 1922, as an organization in direct response to and with the extensive guidance and support of the Comintern. However, it is contended that had there not been an indigenous intellectual receptivity to adapting Marxist-Leninist theory in eradicating political and social inequalities caused by the disproportionate process of Japanese modernization, the Comintern could not have been so successful. The distinct foreign flavor of the JCP, operating in a harsh and hostile social setting, decimated the Party. Often misguided and contradictory directives given by the Comintern over the JCP, revolutionary strategy and tactics created serious difficulties for the Japanese Communists. The major weakness of the early JCP movement, as compared with the CCP and other Asian counterpart movements, was that it could not attract nationalism. By the middle of 1930's most of the Comintern activities ceased to have any impact on the JCP. With respect to the early JCP-CCP relationship, the arrival of Nosaka Sanzō from Moscow to Yanan in 1940

marked the revival of the JCP overseas operation center. However, the JCP-CCP relationship during 1940-1945 was limited to the joint venture of anti-Japanese militarism and propaganda activities under the direction of Nosaka Sanzō.

Following the stinging criticism by both the CPSU and CCP of Nosaka's "peaceful revolution" strategy in Japan, the JCP briefly adopted the Chinese-inspired formula of clandestine activities and left-wing adventurism during 1950-1953. Rapidly dwindling electoral and membership support must have led to the conclusion that radical activity was ill-suited to Japanese conditions. In short, the strategy of violence imposed on the JCP by Moscow and Peking in 1950 caused the Japanese Communists not only to doubt the wisdom of their patrons, but to suspect the purpose of that strategy.

The Role of Marxism-Leninism As a Guideline for Revolutionary Strategy

In discussing the role of Marxist-Leninist ideology in the intra-bloc relations of the Communist parties, the author has stated in Chapter I that no matter how these parties abuse ideological tenets in twisting them to suit their own particular aims, they remain attached to the premise that history is moving toward the replacement of the capitalist socio-economic order with a socialist one.

Hence the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the Communist bloc is explicitly related to political action in advocating the radical social change of the existing capitalist political system. In terms of intra-bloc relations ideological unity under the guiding principle of Marxism-Leninism becomes the common bond which unifies the bloc cohesion among the Communist parties. However, findings on the broader perspective of the Sino-Soviet conflict and its specific impact on intra-bloc relations and the Asian Communist parties in Chapter IV convince the author to draw the following conclusion concerning the role of ideology in intra-bloc affairs: the more intense the schism between pluralism in the Communist world and monolithism in Communist ideology, the less the appeal of the special role of action oriented revolutionary ideology to provide unity and strength. Hence, the integral relationship breaks down.

Then what has been the repercussion of the Sino-Soviet conflict in the ideological realm of the JCP? After the initial exacerbation of the Sino-Soviet diatribe following the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU in 1961, the JCP sought for awhile to play down the ideological struggles between the CPSU and the CCP. This position proved untenable, and the JCP leadership was soon engulfed in polemical disputes over the correct strategy of

Communist revolution directly stirred-up by the Sino-Soviet rift. For the three-year period (1962-1965) the JCP's reaction to the ideological issues raised by the Sino-Soviet conflict was closer to Peking's than Moscow's position. After a brief struggle, the structural-reform evolutionists (Kasuga-Naitō faction) and the pro-CPSU group (Shiga-Suzuki faction) lost out and were expelled from the JCP top hierarchy. Miyamoto Kenji's Mainstream position on the two-stage revolution coincided mostly with the CCP view of the Communist revolutionary strategy. The official JCP position asserted its commitment to Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy and its opposition to the "revisionist" and pragmatic tendencies of the West European Communist parties. It was rather a paradoxical manifestation of JCP rigidity—adopting orthodox Marxism-Leninism—since the Party ignored Japan's advanced stage of modernization.

During the JCP-CCP alignment period (1962-1965) Moscow's influence on the JCP was limited to the bare minimum of writings by Lenin, while the JCP Mainstream faction actively encouraged the dissemination of Mao Tse-tung's writings. As the JCP-CCP relationship deteriorated after 1966, Maoism was severely criticized by the Japanese Communists. The major criticism of Maoist revolutionary theory—war of national liberation, violent revolution, and guerrilla warfare—was that the Chinese revolutionary

model would not be applicable to the advanced socio-economic conditions of Japan which was in the post-industrialization stage.

After the JCP declaration of the policy of "autonomy and independence" in 1966, relentless efforts were made to discredit both "right-wing revisionism" of the Soviet Union and "left-wing dogmatism" of Communist China, while the JCP Mainstream faction (Yoyogi group) was openly advocating the "creative application of Marxism-Leninism to Japan." As rapid social and political changes are taking place in the post-industrial Japan, even the main tenets of Marxism-Leninism are stringently reexamined by the Japanese Communists. This tendency undoubtedly will undermine the position of the dogmatists in the JCP and reduce the hold of orthodoxy. This may be a slow process, but the symptoms are already apparent.

Dimensions of the Sino-Soviet Power Struggle over
Control of the Intra-Bloc Fraternal Parties

In Chapter I the following questions were asked concerning the power struggle between the Soviet Union and Communist China for control of the fraternal Communist parties: Does a truly major ideological conflict exist within the Communist group of nations? Or is it still largely a case of traditional causes of Sino-Soviet rivalry obscured by a smokescreen of high-sounding phrases

and utopian objectives formed in the heat of ideological conflict? The major findings of the roots of the Sino-Soviet conflict in Chapter IV tend to indicate that the conflict, while ostensibly taking the form of ideological dispute, has developed into the clash of divergent national policies between the Soviet Union and Communist China. The fact that the initial Sino-Soviet conflict revolved around the polemical disputes—Khrushchev's Peaceful Coexistence theme in 1956 and different routes to achieve Communism in 1958—should not blur the author's contention that, in reality, it was an inevitable clash of different national policies espoused by the Soviet Union and Communist China. If one accepts this interpretation, then it becomes evident that the Sino-Soviet dispute over global strategy and nuclear war, the different emphasis on the war of national liberation, the polemical dispute over intra-bloc organization and leadership, and the traditional border dispute were overt manifestations of the conflicting national interests between the status-quo oriented (or satisfied) Soviet Union and the revisionist (or dissatisfied) Communist China, desperate to attain a sphere of influence in Asian balance-of-power politics and in other parts of the underdeveloped world during the 1950's and the 1960's. Other contributing factors which support this contention are the acrimonious Chinese criticism of the

Soviet Union's unilateral breach of the Defense Aid Agreement of 1957, the Sino-Soviet diatribe following the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the Soviet Union's overt support of India during the Sino-Indian Border Conflict of 1962, and the conflicting Russo-Chinese national interest on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963.

In short, the pattern that emerges from an extensive discussion of the Sino-Soviet conflict in Chapter IV leads to the conclusion that the Sino-Soviet conflict was actually a power struggle cogently disguised under the smokescreen of the ideological dispute.¹

The Sino-Soviet Conflict and Its Impact
on the Intra-Bloc Affairs

Besides those factors already mentioned, the shaping of "independent" policy by the small Asian Communist parties—including the JCP—was aided by an alternation in the Communist bloc power structure. Just as the "tight bipolar" system was eroded in East-West international relations during the 1960's, the Sino-Soviet conflict was the major catalyst that brought a similar transformation

¹It is also the main contention of David Floyd that ideology has always played a secondary role in the Sino-Soviet dispute. According to Floyd: "it would be unrealistic in the extreme to believe that the policies of the Soviet and Chinese governments are determined primarily by reference to some ideological guide." See Mao Against Khrushchev (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 199.

of Communist intra-bloc relationships during the same period. This transformation was the evolution of the Communist bloc from the "monolithic and hierarchical system" to the "loose bipolar" system.² Under the "hierarchical" system there was only a single actor (USSR), though the sub-system actors (satellite countries) maintained their existence as administrative and local political units. The emergence of Communist China and her subsequent challenge as countervailing rival power marked the disintegration of the monolithic and hierarchical system. The characteristics of the "loose bipolar" system are the emergence of a rivalry of power between the two dominant powers in the system, and the utilization of this rivalry by certain strategically placed sub-system actors (small Communist parties) to raise themselves to the position of acceptable role partners. Under this new system, intra-bloc relations gradually became subject to the pressure of altered conditions and new requirements. In such a relationship subordination to the

²Acknowledgements are made to Morton A. Kaplan's excellent commentary on six international systems in his System and Process in International Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964), science edition, pp. 21-53 and Yiu Myung-Kun's doctoral dissertation which applies Kaplan's concept of international systems to the politics of Juche in North Korea. See his "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in North Korea Since 1954," unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation (College Park, Maryland: University of Maryland, 1969), pp. 339-41.

entire Communist system has become increasingly intolerable, despite some benefits—the degree of flexibility in autonomous decision-making in policy formation, the emphasis on joint consultation rather than unilateral dictation in intra-bloc affairs—that result from this kind of integration, and the dominant powers have come to prefer persuasion rather than subjugation. The study of a "triad" coalition by the three Asian Communist parties (JCP, KWP, and VWP) in Chapter V explicated the reasons for mutual adaptation in the rapid transformation of the "loose bipolar" system of the Communist bloc. It is a genuine hope of the author that further research projects on other Asian Communist parties in the Sino-Soviet conflict be undertaken to shed more conclusive lights to develop a coherent theory on coalition behavior. Through such an extensive effort, a general picture of the Asian Communist parties can be ascertained.

The Sino-Soviet Conflict and Its Overall Impact on the JCP

The present conflict between the Soviet Union and Communist China within the Communist system offers the JCP an unusual opportunity to assert its political independence and autonomy when the two dominant forces of the Communist system are engaged in an ideological and nationalistic struggle to overwhelm one another. The outbreak of the

Sino-Soviet conflict has brought a drastic change of JCP policy, not only because altered conditions of intra-bloc relations allowed the JCP greater independence, but because both the CPSU and the CCP began to vie for the support of the JCP. Chapter V discussed the magnitude of Sino-Soviet competition in controlling the JCP (in wooing the Mainstream faction initially and in encouraging the splinter party activities) and it analyzed how the Soviet failures and Chinese setbacks further encouraged the JCP to take a more positive part in the policy of "autonomy and independence." The conclusive findings of the impact of the Sino-Soviet conflict on the JCP are that, while weakening the prominent influences of the two erstwhile patron parties, it strengthened the JCP by enabling indigenous movements to relate more effectively to indigenous political and socio-economic conditions in Japan. Based on the data analysed in Chapter V, the findings confirmed the first hypothesis that the Sino-Soviet dispute increased the bargaining leverage of the JCP between the feuding super-bloc actors (CPSU and CCP) and created an opportunity to enhance its ability to pursue an autonomous policy.

The findings in Chapter VI confirmed the second hypothesis that Akahata coverage was clearly manipulated to reflect the JCP Mainstream faction's view (through

selective reporting, distortion, divergent emphasis given to a particular point of contention, and systematic omission) in the midst of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

The findings of Chapter VII supported the third hypothesis that the greater the intensity of the intra-bloc struggle for the control of the minor bloc actor (JCP) by the super-bloc actors (CPSU and CCP), the more intra-party schism among the leadership group of the minor-bloc actor. In general, the intensity of the Sino-Soviet doctrinal dispute had a direct impact on the reshuffling of the JCP Presidium, the Secretariat, and the Central Committee members at the Eighth (1961), Ninth (1964), and Tenth (1966) Congresses. The most noteworthy phenomena were the Secretary-General Miyamoto Kenji's (now Chairman of the JCP Presidium) astute political skill and organizational abilities in exploiting the intra-party schism over the Sino-Soviet dispute to consolidate his powerful position. In particular, Soviet and Chinese attempts to reassert control over the JCP leadership, even if they failed, have had a strong effect. First, the JCP has lost a number of its members (probably no more than a few hundred) and several of its militant cadres as well as the leaders of its right and left wings. It now confronts evolutionary Communists (Kasuga-Naitō's structural reformists), pro-CPSU (Shiga-Suzuki's JCP-Voice of Japan), and pro-CCP (Chōshū-Shimbun

faction in Yamaguchi prefecture, Anzai-Uzuka's CPJ-Left Wing, and Shida-Yoshida's JCP-Liberation Front) splinter groups which seek to undermine its strength. Second, the ousting of its right and left wings may have increased its homogeneity and thus its ability to pursue an autonomous course, devoid of foreign pressures.

Future Prospect of the JCP

Having shed the past image of subservience to foreign Communist parties that it had from its inception in 1922 to the early 1950's, the JCP's long road to attain "autonomy and independence" seems to have reached its goal. Assuming the present conditions favoring JCP growth (the strong nationalist sentiments, the increase in mass membership, the self-sufficiency in party finances, and the electoral support given by the Japanese voters) continue in the future, it is safe to conclude that the JCP will chart its own course of action and refrain from further commitment in the Sino-Soviet dispute. There is also little likelihood that the JCP will be drawn back under the control of either the CPSU or the CCP, although the possibility of continued harassment by both parties is not ruled out.

Because of the new political dynamism of the JCP since 1966, the Party is now at a definite turning point in regard to its role in the international Communist movement. The JCP has chosen, for the first time, to take a new step

by forming the coalition of the three Asian Communist parties (the JCP-KWP-VWP alliance). The JCP leaders have also been active in trying to reestablish an international united front (under the slogan of the solidarity of the Socialist camp) against the United States to help conclude the Vietnam War successfully. With the increasingly autonomous orientation of the JCP, the Japanese Communists will no doubt play a more active role in their future relations with the Italian and French Communist parties and in Communist-oriented international conferences so long as there are no drastic alterations in international Communism in general, and in Sino-Soviet relations in particular.

On the other hand, some inherent weaknesses still exist in the JCP. Although the Party has made impressive progress since its declaration of "autonomy and independence" in 1966, Japan's political, socio-economic, and cultural strengths continue to place the Japanese Communists at a competitive disadvantage. Moreover, specific weaknesses of the Party itself continue to prevail. These are the intellectual orientation of its leadership, its aging top leaders, the weakness of its working class and peasant base, the conflict between the various Communist groups, and the ambivalent attitude toward the parliamentary path to power. With respect to the future of

the JCP in Japanese politics, a determining factor will be the prospect of the electoral success or failure of the rival Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and Kōmeitō in the next parliamentary elections.³ How far the JCP will be able to make a continued thrust in the forthcoming parliamentary election in 1976 will also depend on the degree to which the conservative Liberal-Democratic Party (L-DP) government under Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei can continue to solve Japan's social and economic problems and the domestic and international difficulties it must face.

Research Implications

A study of this sort can, in principle, delineate some general pattern of conflict resolution and coalition formation strategies which could be similarly applied in studying the politics of adaptation and adjustment in the Sino-Soviet conflict by other Asian Communist parties.

³After December 1972 House of Representatives election in Japan, the JCP became the second largest opposition party, superseding Kōmeitō's previous position. The composition of the new House of Representatives (491 member) is as follows (valid votes and percentage of popular vote in parenthesis):

Liberal-Democratic Party	271	(24,563,195; 46.8%)
Japan Socialist Party	118	(11,478,739; 21.9%)
Japanese Communist Party	38	(5,496,826; 10.5%)
Kōmeitō	29	(4,436,755; 8.5%)
Democratic Socialist Party	19	(3,660,953; 7.0%)
Independents	14	(2,645,581; 5.0%)
Other minor parties	2	(143,019; 0.3%)
Total	491	(52,425,068; 100.0%)

Source: Asahi Shimbun (Asahi Daily), December 12, 1972, p. 3.

With respect to the general contribution of this dissertation, it is hoped that the present research product contributes to the study of comparative Communism at the cross-national level and, furthermore, makes a contribution to the study of linkage politics. The author wishes the specific contributions of this dissertation to be:

- 1) Feasibility of the testable hypotheses and generalizations on the issue cleavages and the sub-bloc actor conflict by the JCP which may be applicable to the study of other Asian Communist parties.
- 2) Typology, classification, and comparison of JCP elites at the cross-party level.
- 3) Study of Communist party interaction, communication, and transaction within the framework of Asian international relations.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
BIOGRAPHICAL PROFILES OF THE JCP CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBERS (1922-1926)

First Convention July 15, 1922 Name	Age	Father's Occupation	Social Origins	Education	Occupation
Sakai Toshihiko (Party Chairman)	51	Minor Samurai	Lower-middle	Drop-out, First higher school	Socialist news- paper publisher/ reporter
Arahata Kanson	35	Prosperous teahouse proprietor	Upper-middle	Elementary school graduate	Socialist news- paper reporter
Inomata Tsunao (Shakujii Convention Chairman, March 1923)	34	Prosperous merchant	Upper-middle	Ph.D. (Econ.) Univ. of Wisconsin, U.S.A. (1920)	Lecturer in Economics, Waseda University
Kondō Eizō	39	Minor govern- ment official	Lower-middle	Agricultural college, Calif. U.S.A.	Worker/labor union activist
Yamakawa Hitoshi	42	unknown	-	D5shisha Univ. Publish, <u>Zenei</u> graduate	-
Hashiura Tokio	unknown	-	-	-	-
Takatsu Seidō	29	Buddhist priest	Lower-middle	Waseda Univ. graduate	Socialist newspaper, reporter
Tokuda Kyūichi	28	Peasant	Lower	Law school, Nippon Univ. graduate	Lawyer/labor union activist
Yoshikawa Morikuni	unknown	-	-	-	-
Total (Average age: 37.0)					9 members

APPENDIX A (CONTINUED)

Second Convention February 4, 1923 Name	Father's Age Occupation	Social Origins	Education	Occupation
Sakai Toshihoko* (Secretary General)	52 See First Convention			
Kofwai Jōō	26 unknown	unknown	Law Department Tokyo Imperial University	Lawyer
Nakasone Genwa ^o	unknown	-	-	-
Sano Manabu ^o	31 Medical doctor	Upper-middle	Tokyo Imperial University	University professor
Sugiura Keiichi ^o	26 Peasant	Lower	Elementary school	Iron foundry and machinery worker
Takatsu Seidō*	30 See First Convention			
Tsujii Taminosuke ^o	30 Blacksmith	Lower	Elementary school	Silk weaver
Ueda Shigeki ^o	24 unknown	-	Middle school	Pharmaceutical clerk
Urada Takeo ^o	unknown	-	-	-
Watanabe Masanosuke ^o 24	Tatami maker	(mat) Lower	Elementary school	Celluloid worker
Yoshikawa Morikuni*	38 See First Convention			
Total (Average age: 31.3)	11 members			

APPENDIX A (CONTINUED)

Third Convention December 6, 1926 Regular members	Age	Father's Occupation	Social Origins	Education	Occupation
Sano Fumio ^o (Party Chairman)	34	Prosperous merchant	Upper-middle	Philosophy Dept. Tokyo Imperial University	College professor
Fukumoto Kazuo ^o (Head, Politburo)	32	Prosperous landlord	Upper-middle	Law Dept. Tokyo Imperial University	University professor
Ichikawa Shoichio	34	unknown	-	Literature Dept. Waseda Univ.	Journalist
Nabeyama Sadachika ^o	25	Policeman	Lower-middle	Elementary school	Industrial laborer/labor union leader
Sano Manabu*	33	See Second Convention			
Tokuda Kyuichi* ^o	32	See First Convention			
Watanabe Masanosuke*	27	See Second convention			
Total (Average age: 31)	7	regular members			

APPENDIX A (CONTINUED)

Third Convention December 6, 1926 Alternate members	Age	Father's Occupation	Social Origins	Education	Occupation
Kawai Etsuzō ^o	23	Wealthy landlord	Upper-middle	Economics Dept. Kyoto Imperial University	Peasant union leader
Mitamura Shirō ^o	30	Peasant	Lower	Elementary school	Former policeman/ labor union activist
Nakao Katsuo ^o	35	Small-scale merchant	Middle	Commercial higher school	Newspaper proof reader/labor union activist
Sugiura Keiichi*	29	Demoted from the CEC regular membership;			See Second Convention
Total	(Average age: 30.4)	4 alternate members			

*indicates holdover.

^o indicates new member.

Source: George M. Beckmann and Ōkubo Genji, The Japanese Communist Party 1922-1945 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 362-89, (Biographical Sketches); Tateyama Takaaki, Nihon Kyōsantō Kenkyō Hishi (A Secret History of the Arrests of the Japanese Communist Party Members) (Tokyo: Bukyō-sha, 1929), pp. 351-98; To o Kizuida Hitobito (Tokyo: Publication Bureau, Central Committee, The Japanese Communist Party, 1970), 3rd ed.

APPENDIX B

ROSTER OF THE JAPANESE COMMUNISTS TRAINED IN THE SOVIET UNION, 1922-1937

Alias Name	Date of Entry	Departure	Position
Japanese Communist Residents in Moscow			
Katayama Sen	Jan. 1922	Died there in 1933	Presidium member Comintern Executive Committee
Tanaka Yamamoto Kenzō	1929	Died there in 1942	Profintern Representative & later Comintern Representative
Okano Susumu	Nosaka Sanzō March 1930 Early 1935 1937	1934 (to U.S.) Late 1935 (to U.S.) 1940 (to Yenan, China)	Comintern Representative of the JCP in Moscow
Lenin Institute Students			
	Date of entry	Return to Japan	Arrest date & location
Sano Hiroshi	May 1925	Oct. 1928	unknown
Omura Takahashi Sadaki	May 1925	Oct. 1928	April 1929, Tokyo

APPENDIX B (CONTINUED)

KUTV Institute Students

Alias	Name	Date of entry	Return to Japan	Arrest date & location
	Kitaura Sentarō	1922	unknown	unknown
	Mizunuma Kuma	1922	"	"
Kimura	Chiishi Ryūichi	Late 1923	Spring 1925	March 15, 1928, Ōsaka
	Fukube Muginama	"	unknown	unknown
Ibara	Hori Udetarō	"	Autumn 1928	April 16, 1929, Aichi
Kawamura	Kasuga Shōjirō	"	Autumn 1925	March 15, 1929, Ōsaka
Kishida	Kishimoto Shigeo	"	Spring 1928	March 15, 1928, Kanagawa
Ōnishi	Konishi Shigekuni	"	Autumn 1925	March 15, 1928, Tokyo
	Mukinaka Toranosuke	Late 1923	unknown	unknown
Yamashita	Nakada Masayoshi	"	Autumn 1925	Died in summer, 1927
Kenchi	Omichi ?	"	unknown	unknown
Akida	Sōma Ichirō	"	April 1928	August 1928, Tokyo
Ishii	Yoshimura Ei	"	April 1928	July 1928, Ōsaka
Tsuchida	Funagai Kōsaku	Nov. 1924	April 1928	July 1928, Ōsaka
Kunioka	Hakamada Satomi	"	May 1928	March 1935, Tokyo
Wakayagi	Isoishi Shigerō	"	May 1928	Oct. 1928, Kanagawa
Miyamoto	Kameda Kinji	"	June 1928	Oct. 1928, Tokyo
Takeda	Kazama Jōkichi	"	Nov. 1930	Oct. 1932
	Kohōri ?	"	unknown	unknown
Tsukamoto	Nakagawa Seizō	"	May 1928	July 1928, Ōsaka

APPENDIX B (CONTINUED)

<u>KUW Institute Students</u>		Date of entry	Return to Japan	Arrest date & location
<u>Alias</u>	<u>Name</u>			
Kageyama	Nakagawa Tamesuke	Nov. 1924	May 1928	August 1928, Tokyo
Ivanov	Minami Iwao	"	April 1928	August 1928, Tokyo
Tomida	Sakai Sadayoshi	"	April 1928	April 16, 1929, Tokyo
Tomioaka	Satō Kōji	"	June 1928	Nov. 1928, Tokyo
Sumida	Torada Mankichi	"	June 1928	August 1928, Tokyo
Miyako	Yoda Tokutarō	"	July 1928	April 16, 1929, Tokyo
Smirnov	Itō Manamichi	Sept. 1925	July 1928	April 1929, Tokyo
Sokonikov	Itō Masanosuke	"	July 1928	August 1929, Tokyo
Alhipov	Numada Ichirō	"	July 1928	August 1929, Tokyo
Dmitry	Okamura Keijirō	"	December 1928	January 1929, Tokyo
Peterovsky	Takada Kazuo	Sept. 1925	July 1928	August 1929, Tokyo
Hakurov	Tanaka Matsujirō	"	July 1928	August 1929, Tokyo
Sokolov	Tsugida Masaichi	"	Died in Moscow	in December 1925
Mikhaelov	Yamagami Taneichi	"	July 1928	August 1929, Tokyo
Peterov	Yamamoto Masami	"	Dec. 1932	May 1933, Tokyo
Alioshin	Yamamoto Sakuba	"	July 1928	August 1929, Tokyo
Hyodolov	unknown	"	unknown	unknown
	unknown (Matsumura?)	"	unknown	Later suspected as Japanese police spy

APPENDIX B (CONTINUED)

KUTV Institute Students

Alias	Name	Date of entry	Return to Japan	Arrest date & location
Valovsky	unknown	Sept. 1925	unknown	unknown
Sokolov	unknown	Sept. 1929	Died in Moscow (ca. 929-30)	
Kuznetsov	Kobayashi Yonosuke	July 1936	December 1937	unknown
	Imamoto ?	unknown	unknown	unknown
Vashyry	Iwao ?	unknown	unknown	unknown

Source: Tateyama Takaaki, Nihon Kyōsantō Kenkyō Hishi (Secret History of the Arrests of the Japanese Communist Party Members) (Tokyo: Bukyo-sha, 1929), pp. 329-30; Kazama Jōkichi, Mosko Kyōsandaigaku no Omoide (Recollections on the Moscow Communist University) (Tokyo: Sangen-sha, 1949), pp. 44, 92-95, 147, 152-156, 159-160; Hakamada Satomi, Tō to Tomoni Ayunde (Striding with the Party) (Tokyo: Shinnippon Shuppan-sha, 1971), 7th ed., pp. 50-77.

APPENDIX C

BIOGRAPHICAL PROFILES OF THE JCP PRESIDUM MEMBERS,
ELEVENTH CONGRESS (1970)

Permanent Presidium members	Age	Year of Party entry	Education	Occupation
Miyamoto Kenji* (Chairman)	61	1931	Literature Dept., Tokyo Imperial Univ. graduate	Writer/journalist
Fuwa Tetsuzō†	40	1947	Physics Dept., Tokyo University graduate	Researcher/ labor union activist
Hakamada Satomi*	65	1925	Higher elementary school/ KUTV graduate (Moscow)	Labor union activist
Kurahara Koreto*	68	1928	Tokyo Foreign Language Institute graduate	Writer
Matsushima Harushige*	58	1945	Toyama Prefecture Normal school (withdrew)	Journalist
Nishizawa Tomio*	57	1945	Middle school/ Harbin Institute graduate (Man-churia)	Hitotsubashi College lecturer
Oka Masayoshi†	55	1945	Philosophy Dept., Tokyo University graduate	Hōritsu Jihō (Law Journal) editor
Presidium members				
Ebisuya Harumatsu*	61	1931	Higher middle school graduate	Labor/Communist youth league activist
Fujiwara Ryūzō†	54	1946	Iwate Prefecture Technical Institute	Construction worker

APPENDIX C (CONTINUED)

Presidium members	Age	Year of Party entry	Education	Occupation
Gesu Junkichi ⁺	58	1931	Osaka higher middle school (withdrew)	Industrial worker/labor union activist
Hama Takeji ⁺	49	1946	Osaka Communication Inst.	Labor union activist
Ibaragi Yoshikazu ⁺	45	1946	Kumamoto Higher Technical Inst.	Electrician
Ichikawa Shōichi ⁺	46	1946	Kōbe Higher Tech. Inst.	Railroad engineer
Iida Makoto ⁺	56	1946	Physics Dept., Kyoto University	Research engineer/labor union activist
Iwabayashi Toranosuke ⁺	61	1931	Middle school	Journalist
Kaneko Mitsuhiro ⁺	45	1946	Elementary school	National Railroad Labor Union activist
Kasuga Shōichi ⁺	63	1928	Electrical Inst.	Industrial worker/labor agitator
Kawada Kenji*	70	1922	Elementary school	Industrial worker
Konno Yojiro*	60	1929	Yamagata higher middle school	Labor union leader
Murakami Hiroshi ⁺	48	1947	Communication Inst.	Labor union agitator
Ōbuchi Masaki ⁺	57	1945	Tokyo Physics Inst.	Labor union activist
Okamoto Hiroshige ⁺	61	1949	Economics Dept., Tōhoku University	University professor
Sunama Kazuyoshi ⁺	67	1928	Economics Dept., Tokyo University	Journalist
Tada Tomeharu ⁺	63	1929	Elementary school	Industrial worker

APPENDIX C (CONTINUED)

Presidium members	Age	Year of party entry	Education	Occupation
Takahara Shinichi+	53	1946	Electrical Engineering Dept., Port Arthur Inst. of Tech. (Manchuria)	College professor
Takeuchi Shichirō+	63	1946	Waseda University (expelled)	Journalist
Uchino Takechiyo+	69	1928	Elementary school	Labor union leader
Ueda Kōichirō+	43	1946	Economics Dept., Tokyo Univ.	Journalist
Yasui Shinzō+	52	1948	Teachers college	School teacher
Yonehara Itaru*	61	1945	Higher school (expelled)	Journalist
Yoshida Tachiharu+	66	1928	Technical Inst.	Industrial worker
Total (Average age: 57.4) 31 members				

* indicates holdover from the Tenth Congress, 1966.
+ indicates new member.

Source: Akahata, July 22-31, 1970, p. 2; Nihon Shakai Undo Kenkyukai (ed.), Sayōku Katsudōka Bunkajin Meikan (Who's Who of the Left-Wing Activists and Intellectuals) (Tokyo: Nihon Rodo Tsushin-sha, 1969).

APPENDIX D

ROSTER OF THE POSTWAR JCP MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO/PRESIDIUM,
THE SECRETARIAT, AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE (1945-1970)

Legend

SR: Structural Reformist

A: Pro-CPSU

*: Pro-CCP

X: Purged

II: Died

⊖: Demoted

○: Standing member of the Presidium

⊙: Politburo/Presidium member

⊗: Alternate member of the Politburo/Presidium

⊕: Secretariat member

□: Alternate member of the Secretariat

⊗: Central Committee ex-officio member

○: Central Committee member

△: Alternate member of Central Committee

S-G: Secretary-General

C: Chairman

V.C: Vice Chairman

C-B-S: Chief of the Bureau of the

Secretariat (since 1970)

AC-B-S: Assistant Chief of the Bureau of

the Secretariat (since 1970)

Name	Congresses									
	4th 1945	5th 1946	6th 1947	7th 1958	8th 1961	9th 1964	10th 1966	11th 1970		
Tokuda Kyūichi	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗
Nosaka Sanzō	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗
Miyamoto Kenji	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗
Hakamada Satomi	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗
Kuroki Shigenori	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗
Kin Ten Kai (Kim Chōn-hai) *	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗
Itō Ritsū	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗
Hasegawa Hiroshi	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗
Matsuzaki Kumaji	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗

徳内 栄一
野坂 参三
宮本 武蔵
橋本 虎之助
黒木 重徳
伊藤 律
長谷川 光
松崎 久徳次

APPENDIX D (CONTINUED)

Name	Congresses										
	4th 1945	5th 1946	6th 1947	7th 1958	8th 1961	9th 1964	10th 1966	11th 1970			
Nakano Shigeharu											
Shida Shigeo*		△	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Kikunami Tsuyoki*		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Nishizawa Ryūji*		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Anzai Kuraji*		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Doki Tsuyoshi*		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Okada Bunkichi		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Oka Masayoshi		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Fuwa Tetsuzō (Ueda Kenjirō)		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Ichikawa Shōichi		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Kaneko Mitsuhiro		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Kurahara Koreto		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Matsushima Harushige		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Nishizawa Tomio		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Konno Yojiro* (March 1957)		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Yonehara Itaru		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Kawada Kenji		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Uchino Takechiyo		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Gesu Junkichi		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Sunama Kazuyoshi		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Takahara Shinichi		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Yoshida Tachiharu		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

APPENDIX D (CONTINUED)

Name	Congresses											
	4th 1945	5th 1946	6th 1947	7th 1958	8th 1961	9th 1964	10th 1966	11th 1970				
Nishiyakata Hitoshi			△	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Harada Nagasus*			△	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Kawakami Kanjū				○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Andō Kazushige				○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Aoyagi Morio				○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Iwama Masao				○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Kaneko Kenta				○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Okabayashi Tatsuo				○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Nakagawa Kazuo				○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Hirai Nobuyuki				○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Suzuki Zenzō				○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Tayo Yasukichi				○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Higuchi Miharū				○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Hida Yoshiro				○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Iida Shichizō				○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Ikuda Yaheko				○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Ishida Seichi				○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Endō Yonosuke				○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Tanaka Sakuzō				○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Tanaka Shōji				○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Tanizuchi Zentarō				○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Tokuge Gisaku				○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Eguchi Kan				○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

APPENDIX D (CONTINUED)

Name	Congresses												
	4th 1945	5th 1946	6th 1947	7th 1958	8th 1961	9th 1964	10th 1966	11th 1970					
Terada Mitsugu													
Kojima Yu													
Narita Toshi													
Araiori Hiroshi													
Inoue Teijirō													
Koyama Gesao													
Shigeno Taka													
Seki Sachio													
Takajima Nobutoshi													
Tanaka Toshirō													
Tadakuma Hironobu													
Doya Yoshio													
Toyota Sayaka													
Nakajima Taketoshi													
Hayashi Hyakurō													
Hirada Tōkichi													
Miyabara Fumio													
Miyamoto Tarō													
Miyamori Shigeru													
Yamada Yoshikazu													
Yukino Tsutomu													
Yoshimura Kinnosuke													
Wakabayashi Susumu													

有傳酒不...
 年小...
 成...
 松...
 井...
 小...
 茂...
 國...
 島...
 中...
 四...
 尾...
 王...
 買...
 中...
 教...
 牙...
 東...
 島...
 山...
 野...
 石...
 村...
 坂...

APPENDIX D (CONTINUED)

Name	Congresses											
	4th 1945	5th 1946	6th 1947	7th 1958	8th 1961	9th 1964	10th 1966	11th 1970				
Ōzawa Hisaaki												○
Ōmura Shintarō											△	○
Kōbe Teru											△	○
Kudō Akira											△	○
Sakai Toshio											△	○
Numata Hidesato												○
Ugai Chōju												○
Total: 154 members												

久松義久
大村通久
神谷光
工藤利夫
神田泰雄
森田長雄

* denotes Korean members of the JCP.

Source: This table has been compiled from a variety of sources, the principal ones being Nihon Shakai Undō Kenkyukai (ed.), Sayoku Katsudōka Bunka-jin Meikan (Who's Who of the Left Wing Activists and Intellectuals), Tokyo, 1969; The Japanese Biographical Encyclopedia and Who's Who, Tokyo, 1961-1964; Mizushima Takeshi, Jimbutsu Sengo Nihon Kyōsantō Shi (Biographical History of the Postwar JCP Members), Tokyo, 1968, pp. 239-44; Akahata, July 22-31, 1970, p. 1; Paul F. Langer, The New Posture of the CPJ, Problems of Communism, IX (January-April Special Issue, 1971), 14-24.

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VITA

A native of Seoul, Korea, Sei Young Rhee was educated both in Korea and the United States of America. He was matriculated in the College of Political Science and Law of Korea University, Seoul, Korea in April, 1954. Then in September, 1959, he came to the University of Oregon where he majored in political science and graduated with a B.A. degree in June, 1962. He continued his graduate study in political science at the University of Oregon and graduated with an M.A. degree in June, 1966. From January, 1967, until June, 1967, he was enrolled in the Department of Government and International Relations, New York University. Since September, 1968, he has attended the University of Missouri-Columbia and earned a Ph.D. in political science in August, 1973.

While attending the University of Oregon from September, 1959 to June, 1966, he received the Foreign Student Full Tuition Scholarship. For three and a half academic years from September, 1968, to June, 1972, he was appointed as a graduate teaching assistant by the Department of Political Science of the University of Missouri-Columbia. From September, 1972 to January, 1973, he was appointed as

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During June-September, 1971, he resided in Tokyo, Japan to engage in field research for his dissertation. While in Japan, he attended the Twenty-Third Japan-America Student Conference held in Hachiōji, Japan during August 3-10, 1971 as an American delegate and chaired the "China Puzzle" panel discussion.

He is a member of Pi Sigma Alpha, the National Political Science Honor Society; American Political Science Association; International Studies Association; American Academy of Political and Social Sciences; and Association for Asian Studies.

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