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FRENCH EDUCATIONAL STRATEGIES FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
THEIR INTENT, DERIVATION, AND DEVELOPMENT

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF EDUCATION
AND THE COMMITTEE ON THE GRADUATE DIVISION
OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

By

Jerry B. Bolibaugh

June 1964

I certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opinion, it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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CHAPTER I

THE STUDY

The Purpose. The drive for formal political independence by the territories of Sub-Saharan Africa has necessarily been followed by the difficult task of evolving viable nations through socio-economic development. Two major objectives of this development are the creation of national unity and the establishment of a modern economy with education viewed as an essential instrument for the pursuit of both of these aspirations. This vigorous focus upon education, a worldwide phenomenon, has publicized the primitive state of our knowledge of the educational process and the outcomes of its use in such circumstances. As the enormous complexities posed by the acceleration of modernization through education became increasingly apparent, the interdisciplinary study of the role of education in national development evolved.

To date, insufficient research-based literature exists in many aspects of this important activity. Hopefully, this study will make a minor contribution to the understanding requisite to effective educational programming for newly developing countries. It is based upon the assumption that much can be learned from the experiences of the European powers in the realm of colonial education. And, as the prevalent educational systems and philosophies in the newly developing countries are largely derived from European models, it may provide American educational advisers with a greater understanding of the

continuing influence and interests of one European power, France. In addition, the study attempts to reveal certain basic problems which may be inherent in all bilateral and multi-lateral educational programs.

However, since the research is oriented toward an inquiry into French¹ intentions and plans for Sub-Saharan education, it deals with the complex problems of policy implementation at the grass-root level in Africa only as an element influencing the metropolitan policy process.²

The Problem. The study, then, consists in the chronological reconstruction of French educational strategies for Sub-Saharan Africa in their developmental context and an analysis of this history to clarify French intentions through time and to determine, in so far as possible, the causal factors and the developmental patterns contributing to the evolution and to the characteristics of the identified strategies. The history commences with the events leading to the first educational planning for French Sub-Saharan Africa in 1815 and terminates with those occurring in 1962.³

The inquiry seeks to explore these basic questions:

1. What were the French educational strategies?
2. What intentions or purposes motivated the formulation of these strategies?

¹The term "French" refers to the indigenous people of metropolitan France.

²The phrase "policy process" refers to the development and implementation of policy.

³To the knowledge of the writer and of various French officials questioned about this matter, no such study has been previously conducted.

3. What factors led to the development of the identified intentions or purposes?
4. How were these intentions translated into explicit policy and programs?
5. What factors hindered the policy process pertaining to Sub-Saharan educational development?
6. To what extent may the findings be generalized beyond the French experience in Sub-Saharan Africa?

Although, as stated above, these questions are primarily concerned with French metropolitan¹ attitudes, objectives, and actions rather than subsequent events and outcomes in Africa, it is impossible entirely to divorce metropolitan policy-making from colonial-level personnel and events. Thus, the interaction between metropolitan and colonial officials and the occasional detailing of African conditions and events become necessary ingredients of the study.²

Definitions. Although the application of the word "strategy" to the field of education is a relatively recent phenomenon, the concept of rational educational planning is not at all new. Certainly, the French, who frequently refer to themselves as rationalists, have practiced the art in relation to their colonies for well over a century. According to their own testimony, as the text will reveal, they have best been able to prescribe rational social development plans where they have met the

¹"Metropolitan" is derived from "metropole" which refers to the motherland.

²The role of key French colonial officials and the coopted African elite in the metropolitan policy process will be described in the historical chapters and analyzed in the concluding chapters.

least cultural resistance; Sub-Saharan Africa is one such place. Hence, it is believed the term "educational strategies" may be accurately employed in this text. Such strategies are defined as the planning and directing of educational development based upon socio-economic objectives derived from French colonial policy which, in turn, may be considered as one aspect of French national policy.

Another term frequently employed throughout the study, "the policy process," refers to the development and implementation of policy. Since policy is defined as goals and guides for actions, the policy process consists of the formulation of goals and guides to action and the inauguration and direction of appropriate programs to implement policy.

Procedures. Conducted in three phases, the study proceeded as follows:

Phase I. The preparatory work consisted in the survey of the relevant literature available at Stanford, the formulation of the problem, and the establishment of overseas contacts.

Phase II. The second stage, made possible by a Bureau of Cooperative Research Contract, United States Office of Education, with Stanford University, was conducted during the 1961-1962 academic year in Paris, France, followed by a brief period in Dakar, Senegal. It involved the following activities:

1. Study of the Literature. Official documents furnished the bulk of the information for the study, although other sources played a vital role in filling voids and in providing critical analyses.

2. Interviews. Interviews were held with leading French officials and with some Africans in France and in Senegal. These

discussions primarily pertained to French strategies and Franco-African politics of the post-World War II period and particularly to the most recent and projected French educational projects.

3. Participation-Observation. The writer was able to participate regularly in activities such as a seminar on educational planning designed to prepare Frenchmen as overseas technical advisers and to groom Africans for important educational positions within their own countries. Such opportunities provided insights into a variety of problems confronting both the African and the French, although some of these are peripheral to this specific study.

4. Visits to Educational Institutions. Various types of schools and educational administrative and service centers were visited in France and in Senegal.

Phase III. After returning to the United States, the research data were analyzed and prepared in the dissertation form. Conclusions were drawn and suggestions for further research were made following the reconstruction and analysis of the history of French educational strategies for Sub-Saharan Africa.

The Literature.¹ The literature employed in the study may be divided into official and unofficial categories. In turn, the official literature may be sub-divided into a primary group of original official texts while the secondary collection consisted of commentaries and reports largely summarizing past accomplishments in quantitative form, but occasionally reviewing policy and problems of policy implementation. These materials are described below:

¹For specific titles and sources, see the bibliography.

Primary:

1. Ministerial reports to the President of the French Republic and statements of purpose prefacing executive decrees.
2. Executive decrees and ordinances.
3. Ministerial correspondence and instructions to colonial officials.
4. Laws and treaties.
5. Records of parliamentary debates and committee reports.
6. Records of meetings of colonial directors of education.
7. Intra-ministerial memorandums.
8. Ordinances and instructions of colonial governors and education officials.
9. Reports of official bodies and individuals in official publications.
10. Specific development and education plans or projects.

Secondary:

1. Reports compiled primarily for public consumption.
2. Comprehensive intercolonial reports primarily designed for wide-spread official consumption.

The bulk of these materials emanated from the ministry responsible for the colonies with some of the decrees being cosigned by a number of ministries. Other important sources include the Ministry of National Education, the Ministry of Cooperation, the General Secretariat of the Government, the Journal Officiel, the University of Paris, the Government General of French West Africa, and the Republic of Senegal.

The unofficial literature may be divided according to subject matter into a category pertaining directly to Sub-Saharan education and one bearing indirectly upon the topic. Much of this material, particularly

that on education, actually represents a shadowland between the strictly official and unofficial extremes due to the extensive nature of French "Statism" which encompasses both the scholars and educators. Further, some of the journals and conference reports carrying the materials were or are partially subsidized by the government. Nevertheless, much of this literature is critical of official operations. In general, the writer found that the French material directed toward metropolitan consumption was much more critical than that aimed at an international audience.

Sub-Saharan Education-oriented Literature. These writings, primarily the product of high French colonial educational administrators, are largely focussed upon the development and implementation of educational strategies at the colonial level. In these cases, references to the metropolitan role in the educational policy process are usually brief and incidental.¹ The most accessible to the public, this literature tends to lead the reader to the assumption that educational policy originated at the colonial level. This impression is furthered by the structure and function of French administration which will be discussed in the chapter on the development of educational strategies.

Since some of these authors, as chiefs of education, were frequently responsible for the restricted and unavailable annual and special education reports to the Ministry, their critical unofficial publications probably reveal generalizations of the detailed information fed back to the Metropole in the official, confidential form. Thus, when combined

¹One French dissertation on the educational development of Senegal from 1817-1854 deals with the metropolitan policy for that epoch. It was particularly helpful due to the inadequate documentation in the subject for this early period. It also was the only dissertation on the topic uncovered by the writer.

with a study of the official metropolitan literature, these works assist in the clarification of the total metropolitan-colonial policy process relationship. The reaction of the Ministry to feedback and the response to metropolitan policy within the colonies become more apparent.

A few articles prepared by Africans in the late 1950s provide abbreviated and extremely critical versions of the educational development in French Sub-Saharan Africa. They indicate the attitude of, at least, one vocal faction of the indigenous peoples to the French educational endeavor at a time prior to independence.

Other-oriented Literature. This category of the unofficial literature includes a wide range of topics published in the form of scholarly books, journal articles, and dissertations. Although predominantly comprising French publications, American and English sources provide important supplements to this material. The major topics investigated are listed below:

1. French history.
2. French colonial policy.
3. French national character.
4. The structure and function of the metropolitan government.
5. The structure and function of French colonial administration.
6. The development of French Sub-Saharan Africa.
7. The French Union.
8. Post-World War II French aid programs.
9. Biographies of pertinent French personalities.
10. Metropolitan education.

The Organization. The dissertation falls into two major parts totaling eight chapters with each part comprising four chapters. The introductory and three historical chapters make up the first section while three analytical chapters and the conclusion compose the second.

The history divides itself into three definite periods forming the three chapters which have been entitled the Primitive, Formative, and Modern Periods. An attempt has been made to integrate in this chronology of events the various raw materials to be analyzed in subsequent chapters. Thus, the concern goes beyond the sequential description of educational strategies to include the conditions, the events, and the attitudes which led to their formulation, activation, and modification. While this tends to produce a potpourri, the writer believes the wider context provides a more realistic background for the following chapters than a mere recitation of educational plans.

The first historical chapter, designated as the Primitive Period, covers the period from 1815 to 1870 beginning with the conception of the first development plan for Senegal and concluding with the Franco-Prussian War. This fifty-five year span was characterized by major political changes within the Metropole and shifting policies for Sub-Saharan Africa. Another distinguishing feature of this era was the concentration of metropolitan attention upon one colony, Senegal.

The second historical chapter, the Formative Period, covers the life of the Third French Republic, commencing with its inception in 1870 and concluding with the Brazzaville Conference of 1944. This period witnessed the development of a permanent colonial administration, the popularization of colonialism within the Metropole, and the establishment

of a comprehensive educational plan for West Africa based upon clearly defined objectives. For the most part, Equatorial Africa remained on the fringe of the French educational endeavor with the missions permitted to dominate the field. Only near the end of the period did the government begin seriously to structure public education.

The third and final historical chapter, the Modern Period, beginning with the conclusion of the Second World War and continuing through 1962, marked the rise of the coopted African elite to the metropolitan policy-making level. This phenomenon forced a reorientation of the educational strategies for Sub-Saharan Africa resulting in problems and conflicts which remain to be resolved.

The three historical chapters attempt to expose the raw materials to be analyzed in the three subsequent chapters which form, with a concluding chapter, the second half of the dissertation. The first analytical chapter is concerned with the presentation of the intentional aspect of the educational strategies for Sub-Saharan Africa. Obviously, plans are devised for purposes and these purposes constitute the subject matter to be made explicit. Since the study covers almost a century and a half, the problem arises as to the consistency of intentions through time and poses the following question: Did the ends remain essentially the same despite changing conditions and variations in the means throughout the period?

The second chapter of the section deals with the derivation of the educational strategies. The problem involves the identification of their source or origin with the central question being the following: What causal factors brought about the formulation of given strategies?

These factors range from the nebulous, the French psyche¹ or world of mind, to more definitive elements such as economic and political aspirations and needs.

The third chapter considers the modes of development of given educational strategies, noting particularly the characteristics of both private and public organizations and their roles in the formulation and implementation of national policy. Inter- and intra-organizational friction and tendencies to abort rather than support stated policies are demonstrated as well as conflicts between different aspects of colonial policy.

The concluding chapter consists of a succinct restatement of the most significant findings of the preceding chapters with an emphasis upon continuing and emerging French educational strategies for Sub-Saharan Africa, including those factors which operate for and against their successful implementation. An attempt is also made to abstract from these findings those entities which appear to have universal relevance for cross-cultural educational endeavors. A final statement concerns the needs for further research.

¹The French psyche refers to certain assumptions and attitudes appearing with sufficient consistency throughout the study to be classified as a national phenomenon which definitely affected the policy process. The French national character is another term which could be employed here.

CHAPTER II

THE PRIMITIVE PERIOD: 1815-1870

Introduction. This chapter is organized into six chronological periods with each division signaling the commencement of a significant metropolitan governmental change or policy reorientation or both. Since these changes affected, either immediately or eventually, the educational strategies devised for French Sub-Saharan Africa, each serves as a departure point for an account of subsequent innovational and continuing policies and practices.

This fifty-five year period was characterized by the concentration of metropolitan attention, as far as education is concerned, upon one Sub-Saharan territory, Senegal. The French had contact with the West African coast as early as the fourteenth century and a permanent trading post was established at the mouth of the Senegal River near the close of the sixteenth century. A few other trading posts developed as French ships ranged south along the Guinea Coast. But these small and isolated stations could hardly be classified as colonies. Paradoxically, the fall of Napoleon Bonaparte and the subsequent treaties of Paris and Vienna opened the way for the development of a French Sub-Saharan Africa. Napoleon had been too involved elsewhere to be concerned with such trivial trading posts. But after his fall and when the Treaties of Paris and Vienna brought token restoration of the Empire in the form of a few scattered and small islands, five cities in India, and the posts located

in Senegal, the French regained a slender symbol of grandeur.

Primarily for reasons of national prestige, the Constitutional Monarchy, known as the Government of the Restoration, tenaciously pursued the repossession of these territories which were reluctantly returned by the temporary occupants, England and Portugal.

The First Development Plan for Senegal. In 1815, Louis XVIII appointed Baron Portal, a shipowner from Bordeaux, as the head of the General Direction for the Colonies,¹ the administrative section of the Ministry of Navy exclusively responsible for colonial affairs. Portal proceeded to devise bold development plans for Senegal and two other colonies based upon the pacte coloniale, the pre-Revolutionary mercantile doctrine under which the colonies traded exclusively with France using only French ships to export raw materials and to receive manufactured goods in return. As a consequence, the development of Senegal was to be directed toward the establishment and expansion of local agricultural and mineral production. Nevertheless, it was an ambitious plan aimed at the immediate social as well as economic transformation of Senegalese life.

This initial development project for Senegal was particularly motivated by the terms of the Treaty of Vienna which made the abolition of the slave trade mandatory by 1820. This trade had hastened the development of the recipient West Indian colonies, but not that of Senegal. In a speech to Parliament, Portal declared the new situation imposed by the Treaty would leave on the coast of West Africa ". . . slaves without jobs

¹Usually referred to as the Central Administration in this text.

and chiefs without revenue."¹ The French government, therefore, proposed a logical new formula: ". . . instead of transporting labor to where there is work, transport work to where there is labor."²

Despite a growing awareness of the obstacles to effecting immediate profit for the Metropole in Senegal, Governor Schmaltz was convinced of the great potential of the colony, given sufficient funds and manpower to develop it. Gaining permission to return to France in 1817 for consultation with the Minister of Navy, Molé, and Baron Portal, he succeeded in persuading them to give further support to an expanded colonialization plan based upon the following four points: (1) increased military support, (2) huge land purchases from native chiefs, (3) institution of a European plantation system similar to that initiated in Java by the Dutch, (4) a parallel development of indigenous agricultural production based upon metropolitan needs.³

Although the metropolitan colonial budget contained no funds for this program, the initial financing was obtained by borrowing revenue from the city-colonies in India. In 1818, Baron Portal, the originator of the basic colonial policy and intimate of Governor Schmaltz, became Minister of Navy in the government of the Duke of Richelieu. This should have increased the vigorous pursuit of the plans, but by 1819 the lack of substantial progress and adverse reports from the local military commander combined to undermine Portal's confidence in the project. And

¹ Georges Hardy, La Mise en Valeur du Sénégal de 1817 à 1854 (Paris: E. Larose, 1921), p. 11.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., p. 48.

confidence was needed to overcome the Parliament's persistent opposition to heavy expenditures for colonial development. Portal, replacing Schmaltz in 1820 with Governor Le Coupé, instructed the latter to effect all economies possible in the pursuit of the program. The fall of Richelieu and, consequently, of Portal, in 1821 led to an even more cautious approach to such plans and signaled the end to an era of resolute and systematic colonial policy. Under the government of Minister Villèle, the post of Minister of Navy and the Colonies went to the Marquis of Clermont-Tonnerre who admitted ignorance of naval and colonial affairs. The Director of Colonies, Edme Mauduit, and his immediate successors were career civil servants with neither the strong purposes nor the influence of Baron Portal. As a consequence, the policies of Portal remained on paper, but without consistent application. Ends and means for the colonies were generally viewed in terms of immediate economic return rather than long-range balanced socio-economic development.

The Introduction of Formal Education. The basic written instructions of May 18, 1816 to the first Governor of the reoccupation period, Colonel Schmaltz, contained no mention of formal education. The initial social strategy called for a conversion of indigenous customs and mentality through extensive Christian evangelization and fruitful economic development. The role of Christianity was cited in the message as follows:

The purity of its spirit would favor the progress of civilization by softening the customs and character (of the indigenous population). . . . Nothing could be more proper to bring men together in harmony than a religion which works unceasingly for peace and the happiness of men.¹

¹Georges Hardy, L'Enseignement au Sénégal de 1817 à 1854 (Paris: E. Larose, 1920), p. 4.

However, two and a half months after the issuance of these instructions, the Ministry informed Colonel Schmaltz of its intention to send a lay school teacher to Senegal with the mission of initiating elementary education and of determining the most effective means for its rapid expansion. This expansion was to take place once the natives had been partially acculturated through the medium of Christianity and the new economic structure.

During the same month that it had communicated its new intentions to the Governor of Senegal, the Ministry began negotiations with the Superior of the Sisters of Saint-Joseph of Cluny, R. M. Jahouvey, for the service of the Order in the field of colonial education. As a consequence, the first sisters arrived in Senegal on March 19, 1818. Their first efforts were directed into the operation of a hospital, with the education of a few girls being an incidental activity. It took a personal visit of Mother Jahouvey to Senegal before the nuns' serious pursuit of native education was officially sanctioned. In his ordinance of July 13, 1826, establishing the first girls' school, the Governor of that time made this observation: "In these countries, women exercise the greatest influence upon customs and education; the training of good mothers improves the next generation."¹

In the meantime, Colonel Schmaltz, an experienced administrator from Southeast Asia, had quickly sensed the inherent dangers of a direct attack upon Islam in Senegal and communicated his beliefs to the Ministry. By the end of 1818, the Ministry had endorsed the Governor's position

¹France, Ministère de l'Instruction Publique et des Beaux-Arts, Recueil des Monographies Pédagogiques (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1889), Vol. VI, p. 659.

and reversed its strategy to employ direct religious conversion as a major implemental instrument in the early stages of the colonization plan. The new vehicle of social transformation, to work in conjunction with the institution of free labor and a cash crop economy, was to be elementary education.

The Ministry anticipated no formidable problems in the rapid development of education in Senegal, for the method to be employed was the monitorial system devised by two Englishmen, Joseph Lancaster and Andrew Bell. The Minister of Navy, in a communication to Schmaltz, stated that the system appeared to be gaining universal acceptance and that, in his opinion, it was particularly suitable for application in the colonies. After listing other values he saw in the system, the Minister emphasized the most pleasing aspect of it:

The costs of initiation are small and the advantage of having to employ a single teacher for fifty or five hundred pupils gives this system of education a great superiority in every respect.¹

The Minister instituted a recruitment and personnel policy to ensure his control of the operation. His approval was necessary on all actions pertaining to teacher appointments, salary schedules, and promotions. Teacher candidates were supplied by the Ministries of Public Instruction and of the Interior. †

Reports from the Governor indicated that the first teacher, a Monsieur Dard, was diligently applying himself to his assigned task. Not only had the latter mastered the indigenous tongue, Wolof, but he had compiled a voluminous vocabulary and constructed a grammar for the

¹Hardy, *L'Enseignement au Sénégal . . .*, op. cit., p. 6.

language which had no written tradition. In requesting the metropolitan government to publish Dard's linguistic work, Schmaltz noted that, in addition to its significance in the formal learning process, the availability of a language book would enable the local French officials to learn sufficient Wolof to facilitate communication with the natives. Approval by a committee of Orientalists, appointed by the Minister to examine the texts, resulted in the publication of a vocabulary text and a grammar book in 1825 and 1826.

However, not all the reports received in the Ministry praised the teacher, Dard; the Apostolic Prefect of Senegal attacked him viciously. Dard's crimes, as cited by the priest, included marriage to a native woman through local custom and the extensive employment of Wolof as the medium of instruction in the school. Although the priest was recalled to the Metropole because of his indiscriminate attacks upon high officials including Governor Schmaltz and Acting Governor Fleuriau, Dard was apparently discouraged by the incident, and requested and received permission to return home.

Thus, in 1820 a second teacher, Dasprés, who had been sent to Senegal shortly after Dard, left the schools he had founded at Galam and Goree to assume the direction of the main school at Saint-Louis, the government seat.

The departure of Dard left Dasprés as the only fully professional lay teacher in the colony. The new Governor, Capitain Le Coupé, under pressure to reduce expenditures, advised Paris that one teacher sufficed for the time being in Senegal. Unfortunately, Dasprés died in 1825 after long periods of illness and the next Governor appointed an auxiliary clerk

of the colonial administration, de Perreuse, as the new teacher-principal, subject to confirmation from Paris. With the approval of this appointment as permanent, the Ministry set a precedent--the reliance upon non-professional personnel as teachers.

Meanwhile, in France, Dard did not forget the mission to which he had been assigned in 1817 and presented the Ministry with his plan for the rapid development of Senegalese education in 1822. Insisting the results of his teaching had proved the excellent academic ability of many Wolof Negroes, Dard's program¹ included the following three points: (1) establishment of a secondary school at Saint-Louis; (2) extension of Afro-French schools into the interior as soon as textbooks in Wolof were published; (3) reliance upon natives trained by Dard as founders and teachers of interior schools. Dard further indicated that the plan could be realized only if he were appointed head of the colony's education system; his knowledge of the language and culture and his numerous contacts with interior chiefs made him alone competent.

The Ministry requested the advice of the new and esteemed Governor Roger in the matter. The latter hedged, stating he did not understand what Dard meant by African schools and could not advise upon what he did not understand. Roger did, however, persuade the Minister to employ Dard in France rather than return him to Senegal. Apparently Governor Roger's action was motivated by the lingering questionable reputation of Dard rather than a disbelief in native education. In 1823 the Governor enthusiastically described to the Minister the scholastic successes of

¹France, Archives de l'ancien Ministère de la France d'Outre-Mer, Sénégal, Series X file 2a, April 20, 1822. (This source is subsequently referred to as: France, Archives F.O.M.)

seven hostage sons of chiefs, and his plans ultimately to return them to their native regions as agents for French commerce.

At about the same time (1822), the Ministry was approached by the General Superior of the Sisters of Saint-Joseph, R. M. Jahouvey. She desired to bring Senegalese boys and girls to France in order to educate them as priests and nuns or teachers. The Minister requested the opinion of Governor Roger on this as well as on a project to send four natives to the Royal School of Arts and Trades at Toulouse. The Governor's approval set these plans in motion. However, while indicating a need for teacher training, he questioned the advisability of sending pupils to France where they might be rendered ineffective for their task in Senegal. In theory, Roger stated he would prefer the establishment of a teacher training institution in Africa with a European staff, but the prohibitive costs of such an undertaking made it impractical. For at least the first year he recommended that only ten pupils of each sex, half mulattoes and half Negroes with the boys from seven to fifteen years old and the girls, seven to thirteen, be sent to France. And he cautioned the Ministry: "Don't send us back 'petit messieurs' who have added the taste for European luxury and the softness of a convent education to the softness already so natural to the natives."¹

When Dard's language books were published in 1825 and 1826, the former school-master reopened his campaign to win acceptance of his plan proposed in 1822. He not only insisted upon the intelligence of the natives and the academic progress they had made under his tutelage, but he attacked the school principal at Saint-Louis as producing pupils

¹Hardy, *L'Enseignement au Sénégal . . .*, op. cit., p. 41.

knowing neither French nor the sciences. The former auxiliary clerk, de Perreuse, defended himself by replying that the blacks were equipped only with a great patience. "Some can comprehend work with their hands, but if they have to think, they cannot apply their attention. . . ."¹ Further, the principal reported he could not discover any of Dard's former pupils to support the latter's claims. Governor Gerbidon was even more emphatic in refuting Dard's statements as to the intelligence of the natives and the supposed knowledge they had acquired from the first teacher-principal. Gerbidon believed the natives too near barbarism for secondary education. The issue was closed.

A Policy Shift for Senegal, 1829. When an ambitious young lawyer was appointed as the first civilian governor of Senegal in 1821, largely through the influence of Mother Superior Jahouvey, his initial instructions from the Ministry indicated a continuation of Baron Portal's policy. The promotion of profitable crop production remained of paramount concern, but the Ministry, sadly experienced in the results of pre-conceived planning, cautioned the young Governor to base his projects upon carefully researched data.

Soon after his arrival in Senegal, the energetic Roger embarked upon his task with great determination. He set up experimental agricultural stations, persuaded the Ministry to send him technicians, used soldiers as both technicians and laborers over the protests of the officers, built farm equipment, encouraged Europeans to start plantations, and attempted to stimulate agricultural education through the establishment

¹France, Archives F.O.M., Series X, File 2a, Dec. 6, 1827.

of an agricultural society. When the shortage of indigenous manpower became apparent, the Minister proposed the use of malcontents from the West Indies, but Roger saw this supply as precarious and insufficient. He counterproposed that French traders be permitted to procure slaves from the interior to be used as indentured laborers for fourteen years. The Minister was afraid to do this in view of the recent abolition of the slave trade by the Treaty of Vienna. Meanwhile, Roger had resorted to the use of convict and free labor, obtaining the latter through recruitment tours into the interior. Actually the manpower problem was never resolved satisfactorily.

Near the end of 1826, after five years of effort, Roger asked to be replaced. Despite a substantial increase in scientific knowledge concerning tropical agriculture, Roger's tenure had not produced the anticipated results. Very few plantations had been able to show a profit and some of the French colonials wrote to the Ministry denouncing the Governor.

As on previous occasions, the production statistics upon which a Minister depended to defend his colonial policy before an unsympathetic Parliament in no way correlated with the enthusiastic correspondence from a Governor. This continued frustration of its objectives in Senegal induced the Ministry to make an investigation of the colony's potential value in order to decide if further metropolitan investments were warranted. Without new products capable of replacing the former revenue derived from the outlawed slave trade, Senegal would have to be relegated to a colony of trading posts.

A naval purser attached to the Central Administration of the Colonies was sent to Senegal in the capacity of temporary Governor to conduct this investigation. After two months on the scene, Governor Gerbidon's correspondence to the Minister became conclusive: "My experience has not confirmed the expressed expectations, and it does not appear that Senegal is ever destined to become a colony of cultivated lands."¹ The bad climate and poor soil conditions, the low quality of the indigenous manpower, and the harassment of hostile tribes were listed as reasons for this strong opinion. Further, Gerbidon argued that the production costs of the few crops suitable for growth in Senegal would be prohibitive.

The Minister hesitated to accept such a radical opinion without further confirmation. Therefore, in 1828, he appointed the Assistant Director of the Central Administration, Jubelin, to conduct a second investigation in the role of Governor. Remaining in the colony for a year and a half, Jubelin informed the Minister that Senegal had promise, but that considerable time and further support would be needed before substantial return on the Metropole's investment could be realized.

Having neither time nor further support available, the Minister in 1829 reversed the policy inaugurated in 1815 and called a halt to the socio-economic development of Senegal. France had been in an economic depression since 1826 and the Constitutional Monarchy was in serious political trouble.

The Subsequent Reform of Native Education. Among the inquiries initiated by Governor Jubelin was one concerning the status of native

¹Hardy, La Mise en Valeur du Sénégal . . ., op. cit., p. 240.

education. Since the departure of the first teacher-principal, Dard, in 1821, little or no progress had been made in the field of formal education. The form, but not the spirit, of his methods had been continued by his successors who, for the most part, were former clerks or non-commissioned officers. Governor Roger had attempted some on-the-job training of Africans in agriculture, but Gerbidon reported the results as completely negative.

After a preliminary survey, Jubelin reported to Paris the existence of only one official school which had maintained an enrollment of some sixty to one hundred pupils for several years. He had found only a few natives who retained anything from their school experience. These were employed in the administration or in business while the vast majority had returned to the native way of life.

A major task of local colonization, reported Jubelin, was "to gradually erase the differences of education, language, and customs which represent the sole obstacles to the . . . social fusion of all classes."¹ According to the Governor, the means of accomplishing this objective was to introduce natives to the French language and way of life through the annual production of a young indigenous elite who would, in turn, gradually propagate civilization to the peoples of the interior.

In order to gain more information as well as detailed recommendations concerning native education, Jubelin appointed a commission for this purpose. Chaired by the colony's controller, Roussin, the commission's report² contained the following points: (1) the aptitude

¹Hardy, L'Enseignement au Sénégal . . . , op. cit., p. 22.

²Ibid., pp. 23-25.

of the native children for learning is unknown; (2) the use of the native language as the medium of instruction accounts for the failure of the students to absorb and retain their lessons; (3) French should be the medium of instruction and its comprehension, the essential objective of native education; (4) the native pupils should be boarders in order to ensure the assimilation of the French language and customs; (5) a distinguished head of the educational system was needed.¹

The Minister, undoubtedly impressed by the logic and thoroughness of the report, reacted immediately and selected a Professor Ballin, formerly of the Ecole Militaire, to reform the school to meet the well-defined objective: elimination of cultural-linguistic differences among the pupils through the acquisition of the French language, customs, and attitudes.

Although Ballin began his task with considerable promise, he returned to France after a few months. During the ensuing decade (1829-1839), one metropolitan teacher died on the job and another left the colony after a brief sojourn. Former non-commissioned officers, hired and fired locally, filled the position during most of this decade. In 1835, the Minister approved a reform plan² based upon the 1829 recommendations of Jubelin and Roussin. In addition to specifying the curriculum and the division of classes, the plan called for the subsidization by the colony of a maximum of ten native boarders with the criteria for their selection being lack of parental resources, adherence to the

¹Roussin's suggestion that a lay system be organized to conduct the education of women, which had made little headway under the Sisters of Saint-Joseph, was rejected because Governor Jubelin pointed out the difficulties inherent in the recruitment and retention of lay teachers.

²Ibid., p. 33.

Christian religion, and intellectual and moral worth. The teacher-principal was to submit a quarterly report to a newly created supervisory board composed of colonial officials, the local head of the Church, and the mayor of Saint-Louis. This principal was to be appointed by the Minister with assistant teachers being recruited locally and monitors chosen from among the best pupils. The Saint-Louis School was to become the model for existing and all future schools.¹ In a gesture of concrete support, the Ministry sent twenty-five books, dealing primarily with French grammar and Christianity, along with its endorsement of the plan.

Native Education in the Metropole. The program instigated by Mother Jahouvey for the education of selected Senegalese natives in France had met with unexpected outcomes. Six of the original group died within three years, forcing the relocation of the school to southern France. At this time, Mother Jahouvey asked for financial support from the government. The Minister relayed this to Governor Saint-Germain as well as another request from the Mother Superior for more pupils. While asking the Governor's advice about an appropriate curriculum for the African students, he wrote that they seemed to be directed exclusively toward literary subjects and the art of manners.

The Governor and his Privy Council in 1833 decided in favor of a partial subsidization and continuance of the program, reasoning that the pupils at the Saint-Louis School could neither escape nor effectively combat the prejudices of their families and the superstitions and customs

¹At least one unofficial school, with a non-commissioned officer serving as the teacher, existed on the Island of Gorée.

of Africa. The officials assumed metropolitan-educated Africans could do this upon their return and with more success than the French.

At the same time, the Governor requested a reorientation of the curriculum placing the emphasis upon the development of attitudes conducive to industrious and efficient work habits; the polishing of manners and the study of dead languages were unneeded luxuries, according to the Governor. Solid subject matter should replace religious instruction as the core of the curriculum. Sailing masters and workers for the rubber industry were needed, not priests. The Governor advised against the inclusion of agricultural instruction for, by 1830, the Metropole had abandoned its plans to develop Senegal into a model agricultural colony and the rubber trade had become the new hope for the source of profit.

However, the programs were not modified and parents, worried over the health of their children and generally opposed to the priestly profession, continued to reclaim them. By 1835 only three Senegalese remained in France. They were all males preparing for the priesthood.

The July Monarchy, 1830-1848. The bourgeois liberals, ascending to power in 1830, were largely anti-colonial while Louis-Philippe, the Constitutional Monarch who carried an umbrella instead of a scepter and sword, was a pacifist resolutely opposed to offending the British. The initiative for colonial expansion and development from 1830 to 1842 came from the Director of the Central Administration for the Colonies, Filleau Saint-Hilaire, a disciple of Portal and of the Pacte Coloniale. According to Blet,¹ the role of this administration was never more important

¹Henri Blet, Histoire de la Colonisation Francaise (Grenoble: B. Arthaud, 1946), Vol. II, p. 87.

than during Saint-Hilaire's tenure of office. Although some of his projects failed because of lack of support and others were vetoed outright by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, some tangible if fragmentary results were obtained. In Sub-Saharan Africa these included the establishment of French settlements in Guinea, the Ivory Coast, and Gabon. Saint-Hilaire's successor, Galos (1842-1847), was more prudent and simply followed the policies of Guizot, the strong man behind the government from 1840 to 1848 and Prime Minister in 1847 and 1848. Guizot's colonial policy was one of cautious expansion, obtaining what was available at negligible cost. Nevertheless, the increased significance of the colonies was implicit in the government's act of 1847 establishing the post of Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies. Jubelin, who had instigated the reform of education in Senegal, was the first man to hold the new position.

The Government of the July Monarchy took no impressive action concerning further development of Senegal. It followed the policy adopted by the preceding metropolitan regime just prior to its overthrow. That policy relegated Senegal to a commercial colony, subject neither to extensive nor intensive internal development.

The Slavery Question. Although the slave trade had been officially abolished in 1815, clandestine traffic continued during the Restoration Government. The Law of March 4, 1831, voted by the Parliament of the July Monarchy, brought an end to most of these illegal operations. However, the continued existence of slavery itself resulted in constant friction between the metropolitan liberals and the conservatives and French colonials. The struggle was intensified in 1834 when

England suppressed slavery in its colonies. The anti-slavery campaign was led by the Republican parliamentarian Schoelcher joined by others such as de Toqueville, de Broglie, Passy, and Lamartine. Mother Jahouvey added her voice to this group through a personal appeal to Louis-Philippe, who declared after the interview: "This nun is a great man. . . ."¹

Nevertheless, the outright universal abolition of slavery was avoided during the life of the July Monarchy (1830-1848). However, among the laws passed which were aimed at improving the lot of the slave was that of January 5, 1840 organizing moral and religious instruction for the Negroes.²

A New Strategy for Native Education. The failure of the Ministry to keep Senegal supplied with teachers had brought several requests from the governors for professional personnel including one in 1839 asking for "experienced teachers who teach by desire and choice."³ The recommendations of 1829 as incorporated in the 1835 educational reform for Senegal instituted French as the language of instruction which meant a dependence upon metropolitan teachers. The scarcity and instability of lay personnel led the Ministry in 1837 to negotiate with a religious teaching order, the Brothers of Ploermel. A formal agreement to this effect was signed by the Minister of the Navy and the General Superior of the Brothers on May 16, 1837.⁴ When asked to endorse the introduction

¹Ibid., p. 94.

²Ibid., p. 95.

³Hardy, L'Enseignement au Sénégal . . ., op. cit., p. 48.

⁴France, Ministère de l'Instruction Publique et des Beaux-Arts, Recueil des Monographies Pédagogiques, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 638.

of the Brothers in Senegal, some members of the Governor's ~~Privy Council~~ were unenthusiastic. After their approval had reached the Ministry, the implementation of the plan in Senegal was delayed because the Superior of the Order balked at sending the Brothers to a place where Moslems as well as Christians were admitted to the schools. However, the Ministry finally prevailed and the new system was inaugurated.

Soon after the arrival of the first contingent of Brothers, the religious domination of education was completed by the ordinance of July 23, 1842, which officially placed the system under the supervision of the local head of the Catholic Church, a priest named Maynard. The latter made his first comprehensive report on native education to the Governor in 1844 who, in turn, forwarded it to the Ministry. In it, the priest emphasized moral education should precede intellectual instruction and that this priority required the residence of the pupils at the schools in order to keep them away from their families. Referring to the native child, he wrote: "It grows up without any idea of order, truth, virtue, or even of civilization."¹

Father Maynard also advocated a two-track system in which the best pupils would receive practical arithmetic and geometry in order to prepare them for river and coastal navigation and for management of the interior trading posts. The others would be subjected to an apprenticeship training based upon native industries which the government would develop. To further this latter program, he proposed the Brothers set up workshops devoted to the manual arts and that a model working community be established as a training ground for the neighboring tribes. The

¹Hardy, L'Enseignement au Sénégal . . . , op. cit., p. 57.

report concluded with a plea: "Is it not wise, is it not most proper of France to make these social arrangements at the earliest and to put an end to the precarious state of the colony?"¹ The Ministry appeared to have been unmoved by the priest's eloquence for it did not respond to these recommendations.

An Experiment With Secondary Education. Perhaps due to the law of 1840 organizing moral and religious instruction for Negroes, the Ministry took a special interest in the three remaining Senegalese students in the metropole who had been ordained as priests. While sponsoring additional education for the young ecclesiastics, it suggested to the Governor that more young Senegalese might be sent to France to be trained for the priesthood in view of the services they could eventually render. At about the same time (1841-1842), the Father Superior of the Saint-Esprit Seminary proposed to the metropolitan government the establishment of secondary education in the colonies.

Thus, it seemed appropriate in 1842 to send the African priests home to do just that, although the Minister advised a cautious and unpublicized approach to the task. Later events verified the wisdom of such counsel, but it went unheeded. Assigned the mission by Governor Bouet of establishing a metropolitan-type secondary school, the clergymen set about their job with energy and fanfare. Father Boilat, the appointed principal, invited the notables and the populace to a ceremony featuring a sermon in which he equated the opening of the school with the regeneration of Senegal.

¹Ibid., p. 61.

The main subject of the secondary curriculum consisted of Latin with thirty enrollees in the first class. Unfortunately, they represented the best students from the elementary school and, as Father Maynard remarked in his annual report of 1844,¹ the progress of the other pupils in the primary school was paralyzed, since every monitor, regardless of whether he had completed his course work or not, had been recruited for the secondary school!

A feud developed between the elementary and secondary school teachers with Maynard's successor, Father Arlabosse, supporting the Brothers of Ploermel. The local government viewed the elementary school teachers as "demi-savants,"² and initially backed the Senegalese priests and the secondary school. In 1846, the Governor reported to the Ministry that Arlabosse, in a graduation speech, had denounced the secondary school as a consequence "la politique batarde"³ of the government.

Historically, the Ministry had given priority to primary education in the colonies and it remained consistent in this case. At first, the metropolitan agency merely questioned the utility of stressing a dead language where a curriculum of commercial subjects appeared more appropriate. A few months later it took direct action by cutting the scholarship allotment for the secondary school and by prohibiting the addition of the highest three secondary grade levels; this latter act

¹Ibid., p. 67.

²The Brothers, members of the Institute of the Brothers of Christian Instruction with headquarters at Ploermel, France, were trained solely for elementary and elementary-vocational teaching.

³Hardy, L'Enseignement au Sénégal . . . , op. cit., p. 68.

reduced the institution to a junior high school status. At the same time, the Ministry curtailed the number of Senegalese graduates permitted to continue their studies in the metropole. In addition, the Minister proposed the colony set up a trade school which would receive one half of the best graduates from the elementary school with the other half being assigned to the secondary school. Interestingly enough, these restrictive actions took place after Jubelin, the inaugurator of investigation of Senegalese education in 1829, became Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1847. The cumulative irritations generated from the inception of the high school ensured its eventual downfall. Contributing to the latter event were the scandals arising from the personal conduct of the three Senegalese priests involving intemperance, women, and the misappropriation of funds. Local support for the school was completely withdrawn in 1849 with ministerial approval following a review of the dismal postgraduate history of ten students who had been sent to France.

Educational Intentions Beyond Senegal. With the acquisition of numerous coastal trading posts along the Gulf of Guinea through treaties with native chiefs from 1837 through 1840, the Minister of the Navy became interested in strengthening French influence in these localities and began negotiations, in 1843, with a Catholic teaching order to this end. The Superior proposed a comprehensive scheme for the widespread introduction of education along the Sub-Saharan African coast and to the interior, with the establishment of a large missionary teacher-training center at Gorée, Senegal, constituting an essential feature of this strategy. Strong opposition from the Brothers of Ploermel induced the Ministry to limit this new operation to the cluster of small villages

at Dakar, Senegal, but, according to Hardy,¹ this decision did not lessen the conflict and rivalry between the two orders. Since the widespread introduction of education along the Gulf of Guinea actually occurred many years later, it appears reasonable to assume that the rivalry and the resultant decision did contribute to a delay in the implementation of ministerial intentions. In any case, the deterioration of the metropolitan political situation made the time inopportune for ambitious new colonial projects.

The Revolution of February, 1848. The collapse of the Constitutional Monarchy (1814-1848) was brought about by the ineptitude of the old regime and the zeal of Parisian liberalism. Organized in February, 1848, the Provisional Government resigned in June as a consequence of the conflict between radicals in three days of savage street fighting. In November, the Constituent Assembly adopted an American-type constitution despite misgivings that it might lead to a dictatorship. On the tenth of December, Prince Louis Napoleon Bonaparte was elected President of the Second Republic by the conservative votes of the provincial middle and peasant classes. During these months of drastic upheaval, profound changes in colonial policy occurred although the brevity of the Provisional regime limited the implemental phase of these changes.

The philosophy behind the colonial policy of the Provisional Government may be summarized as a desire to extend the benefits of French democracy beyond the Metropole. A symbol of such idealism, Victor Schoelcher, advocate of the abolition of slavery under the Constitutional Monarchy and newly appointed Under-Secretary of State

¹Ibid., p. 80.

for the Navy and Colonies in the Provisional Government, figured prominently in the enactment of liberal colonial legislation.

The executive decree of March 4, 1848, later confirmed by the new Constitution of November, declared that "slavery could not exist in any French territory."¹ As a result of the work of a commission chaired by Schoelcher, a decree was pronounced on April 27, 1848 which rendered this principle operational. Immediate freedom was granted to all slaves and those under light penal sentences were pardoned. Under an old law of 1833 granting French citizenship to all free men in the colonies, an estimated five hundred thousand slaves received new civil and political rights. Hence, the natives of the free communes of Senegal (Goree and Saint-Louis, and later, Dakar and Rufisque) gained the right to vote for one representative to the French Parliament.

The metropolitan government also suppressed the conservative local colonial councils consisting of high colonial administrators and colonial businessmen who acted as advisers to the governors. In a symbolic reduction of the status and power of the governorships, the government changed the designation of the position from Governor to Commissioner of the Republic.

The Beginning of Vocational Education. With the emancipation of a half of a million slaves, the metropolitan government recognized the need to complement this social reform with others designed to mold this potentially explosive group. Hence, the implemental emancipation decree of April 27, 1848, prescribed that each colony establish a large trade school.

¹Blet, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 162.

Since the introduction of education in Senegal the curriculum had been restricted to academic subjects. True, at least ten pupils had been sent to France to be trained as steamboat mechanics in 1840, but only four managed to complete their courses. As previously mentioned, near the end of the Constitutional Monarchy, the Minister had suggested the colony open a trade school, but this recommendation had not been acted upon by local authorities. Early in 1848 the Ministry of the Provisional Government had informed the Governor of its desire to see a trade school. The Brothers were congratulated for their efforts, but Governor Duchâteau was informed that the Minister regarded their shops as insufficient. The latter desired a large trade school analogous to those in France, run along military lines with at least one hundred and twenty pupils. The Governor, realizing the issue could not be avoided, reported to the Metropole the appointment of a commission to organize the school. One member of the commission desired to place the direction of the school under the Brothers of Ploermel, but he was over-ruled by the other members because of the Order's anti-Moslem bias. The plan, as finally reported to Paris, included forty-eight instead of one hundred twenty scholarships with the theoretical teaching to be done by officers and the practical instruction by non-commissioned officers at the local military workshops. However, the plan was never put into operation and, Hardy reports¹ that there is no evidence to indicate the Ministry even took the trouble to respond to it. A major political shift was in process. The election of Louis Napoleon as the President of the Second Republic at this time ended the grandiose plans of the metropolitan

¹Hardy, L'Enseignement au Sénégal . . . , op. cit., p. 89.

liberals. Schoelcher, the prime mover of native policy within the Ministry, had been elected to the Parliament only to be exiled by Napoleon as a result of the coup d'etat of 1851.

Certainly the French in Senegal had no desire to implement the plan. The emancipation of the slaves had had little effect in the colony where the harsh plantation system of the West Indies was largely unknown. Governor Baudin informed Paris that only twelve thousand slaves were awarded citizenship in the communes and that they continued to function exactly as previous to their emancipation. The Governor's report to the Minister was summarized thus by Hardy: "A type of voluntary slavery had replaced legalized slavery."¹

At about this time, Father Arbalosse tried to enlist the Ministry's support for the creation of a model religious, agricultural village which he felt would furnish the natives with an operational example to imitate. Paris refused to cooperate because of the dismal failure of past agricultural projects, until the priest proposed to locate the village along the Senegal River far into the interior. Perhaps the idea of strengthening French influence in the hinterland proved sufficiently seductive to outweigh the negative considerations of cost and earlier misadventures. However, Father Arbalosse died before the project could be initiated and it was buried with him.

Education in Theory and Fact. The reform-oriented Provisional Government's decree of May 4, 1848² applied to all French colonies and

¹Hardy, La Mise en Valeur du Sénégal . . ., op. cit., p. 335.

²France, Ministère de l'Instruction Publique et des Beaux-Arts, Recueil des Monographies Pedagogiques (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1889), Vol. I, p. 248.

stipulated that each commune was to maintain two public elementary schools providing free compulsory education for all children from six to nine years old. In addition, the Ministry desired uniform instruction in all colonial schools. On the latter point, Governor Duchâteaux pointed out the majority of the natives in the colony were Moslems and that the local government exercised no control over Koranic schools. On November 16, 1848, he addressed the Minister as follows:

These schools escape the supervision of the colonial authority and it appears to be very important that the local government exert action which can offset the anti-civilizing influence of the marabouts. . . . In Africa, as in our civilized country, the education of children should be considered as one of the best channels to civilization.¹

Notwithstanding these words of the Governor and the decrees and recommendations of the metropolitan regime from February through June of 1848, educational development lagged in Senegal. The secondary school had been abandoned; the trade school project and the free, compulsory elementary education law remained on paper only. Even the Saint-Louis elementary school run by the Brothers of Ploermel had fallen into difficult times due to a severe shortage of personnel. In addition, the Brothers' morale was low due to a reduction in their annual salary imposed by the Minister in the fall of 1848. It took a year of protests before one-half of the cut was restored.

The Rise of Louis Napoleon, 1848. The brief rule of the Parisian liberals ended as the conservative forces in France regrouped after the sudden collapse of the Constitutional Monarchy. The public was unwilling to support the royalists, so that group threw their votes to Louis Napoleon

¹Hardy, L'Enseignement au Sénégal . . . , op. cit., p. 92.

as a President whom they could depose at the proper time. The socialists, discredited by the bumbling of the Provisional Government, also contributed to the cause of Napoleon because of his liberal tendencies. Garnering votes from all factions for different reasons, Napoleon carried the presidential election of December 10, 1848 by a wide margin. The Legislative Assembly elected in 1849 was divided between a reactionary majority and a radical minority. The President allowed the conservatives the brief day of power. Then, on December 2, 1851, he dissolved the National Assembly and exactly one year later formally became Napoleon III, Emperor of France.

The African Commission of 1850. After the failure of the agricultural development plan, the Metropole had, as previously mentioned, regarded Senegal as a colony of commerce where, through mutually satisfactory trade arrangements with the various tribes along the rivers, profits could be obtained for France without heavy investments. Through various incentives the natives were to be encouraged to expand their production of raw materials as desired by the Metropole. But from 1845 to 1849, the volume of commercial traffic between France and the colony had dropped from over 13,800,000 francs to a little over 7,200,000 francs.¹ Figures such as these brought serious challenges from the Legislative Assembly on the value of the retention of small unprofitable colonies.

As far as making Senegal a profitable colony, several governors had referred to the serious need for at least two actions: the investment of money to improve the transportation and communication facilities and

¹France, Archives F.O.M., Sénégal, Series XIII, file 2b, December, 1850.

the use of military force to pacify the tribes harassing the French trading operations. But the Ministry remained unenthusiastic to these suggestions and warned more than one governor not to embark upon military missions. However, the rise to power of Louis Napoleon led to a major policy shift.

In July, 1850, the Minister of the Navy, Admiral Desfossés and the Minister of Commerce, Dumas, formed an inter-ministerial commission to examine the commercial potential of French colonial possessions beginning with West Africa. This high-powered group, The Commission for the African Settlements and Commerce, headed by the Vice-President of the National Legislative Assembly, was composed of legislators, businessmen, and delegates from the Ministries of the Navy, Finance, Commerce, and Foreign Affairs.

In a preliminary statement to the group,¹ Director Mestro of the Central Administration for the Colonies, pointed out that trade with Senegal was already significant and the waterways leading from the coast into the interior promised a rich and fertile future for the colony given a more positive and aggressive policy on the part of the Metropole. After a year of detailed studies, the report² of the Commission clearly supported this point of view. It recommended renewed attention to agricultural development favoring oleaginous crops, the restructuring of commercial arrangements, the expansion of the zones of influence, the reoccupation of abandoned military forts and the pacification of marauding tribes, and a separate colonial administration situated at Gorée, for the

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., File 3c, June 12, 1851.

emerging trading posts along the Gulf of Guinea.¹

Pro-Catholic Education in Senegal. The downfall of the liberal Provisional Government of the Second Republic and the subsequent rise of power of conservative forces halted the implementation of the extensive educational plans of the socialists and resulted in a pro-Catholic, anti-Moslem orientation of education in Senegal. The Brothers of Ploermel, understanding the sympathies of the new metropolitan regime, lost little time in making religious proselytization a main function of the school. Moslems complained that the school refused to accept their children and one father protested his son was baptized by force. In face of this friction, Governor Baudin proposed a dual system of schools, including a secular system for the Moslems. Minister Romain Desfossés vetoed this idea as well as a request for permission to build a new mosque. He wrote as follows: "It conforms to our civilizing mission in Senegal to encourage Catholic propaganda as long as it is done wisely and without violence."² In the spring of 1851, the Minister gave Governor Protet further instructions:

The mixing of the children of both sexes, apparently permitted in the Moslem schools, in my opinion, should be forbidden. You should keep yourself informed of the moral influence that these teachers exercise on the children and close those schools where the evidence warrants it. . . . It is the Government's duty to inform the families about the conduct of the teachers . . . citing publicly in these cases the contrast offered by the schools, which the Government has opened in a spirit of true solicitude for the population.³

¹The seat of the Governor of Senegal was located at Saint-Louis at the mouth of the Senegal River and near the northern border of the present nation. Gorée is a small island off the city of Dakar one hundred and fifty miles south of Saint-Louis.

²Hardy, L'Enseignement au Sénégal . . . , op. cit., p. 93.

³Ibid., p. 95.

In the same letter, the Minister expressed his disappointment with the stagnant condition of the schools, recommending to the Governor an increase of support to the institutions operated by the Brothers of Ploermel and the Sisters of Saint-Joseph of Cluny. The Governor was further urged to ensure regular meetings of the inactive school supervisory committee established in 1838 and to encourage the colony's Apostolic Prefect actively to assume the role of chief supervisor of education. A subsequent message emphasized the necessity to train and employ native clerks in order to reduce administrative costs.

Acting upon the Minister's recommendations, Protet, Governor from August 1850 to December 1854, revitalized the school supervisory committee and forwarded the records of its meetings to the Ministry from 1851 through 1854. In June of 1851, the head of the Central Administration submitted a detailed report to the Minister of the Navy on the organization and curriculum of the Saint-Louis elementary school together with an evaluation of pupil achievement made by the Apostolic Prefect.¹ The school had approximately one hundred pupils organized into four grades. The curriculum was dominated by religious instruction and the language arts with French grammar emphasized in all but the beginning class. In the highest grade, in addition to a comprehensive catechism and grammar, the pupils received cursive and gothic writing, reading in Latin, arithmetic, algebra, geometry, geography, the history of Christianity, and French history. The Apostolic Prefect's analysis of pupil achievement was quite negative; he reported the students grasped almost nothing aside from handwriting

¹France, Archives F.O.M., Sénégal, Series X, File 5a, June 13, 1851.

with a small minority showing promise in arithmetic. Nevertheless, the priest recommended the reestablishment of secondary education or the addition of a humanities class to the elementary school.

When the Apostolic Prefect left for France, the Chief Magistrate of the colony as chairman of the school supervisory committee temporarily assumed the post of chief supervisor of education. Instead of questioning the ability of the pupils, the Judge attacked the methods of instruction which were based upon memorization with no development of reasoning power. "The pupils, thanks to the repeated efforts of the teachers, have become robots and nothing but that,"¹ he claimed. Despite such reports, the Ministry complied with the earlier request to send a humanities teacher to the colony and by 1854 twelve to sixteen pupils were reported to be progressing satisfactorily in the study of Greek.

The minutes of the local school supervisory committee meeting held in August of 1854 indicate the group was seriously concerned by the failure of the government schools to attract the large Moslem element. It expressed its regret as follows:

A majority of the Senegalese population does not participate in the precious advantages of a Christian education; we are referring to the Moslem element, unfortunately too numerous, which has need to seek the warmth of our religion and civilization, this breath which should rekindle the hearts frozen by Mohammedism and, little by little, lead them to an understanding of the beauty of our holy religion.²

The committee requested the government to limit the Koranic schools by subjecting the teachers to examinations and the schools to close supervision. Parents would then be forced to channel their children into the

¹Hardy, L'Enseignement au Sénégal . . . , op. cit., p. 104.

²Ibid., pp. 107-108.

official schools. In addition, the Ministry was asked to attach a teacher of Arabic to the Saint-Louis school as an added inducement to the Moslems.

However, the Brothers of Ploermel were not content with some of the native pupils, particularly the sons of chiefs serving as hostages and placed in the school as boarders in 1854. The new Apostolic Prefect relayed to the Minister the Brothers' request for the removal of these natives, who were described as undisciplined and rebellious to conversion.¹ The appointment of Army Captain Louis Faidherbe as Governor on December 16, 1854 led to the resolution of this problem the following year. He organized a special lay school for these hostages.

Recommendations for Native Secondary Education. The addition of the first stages of secondary education to elementary school of Saint-Louis probably was more the consequence of the recommendations of the African Commission of 1850 rather than those of the Apostolic Prefect, mentioned previously. The Commission met on January 7, 1851 with the objective of reducing the metropolitan budget for Senegal in order to gain funds needed to finance the military campaign it had recommended for that territory.² The minutes of the meeting reveal the Central Administration was financing the metropolitan secondary education of six Senegalese. This had come about after the abandonment of the secondary school in Senegal when the governor had requested the Central Administration to apply the small metropolitan subsidy formerly for that school toward metropolitan scholarships for promising indigenous pupils. Since

¹Ibid., p. 109.

²France, Archives, F.O.M., Sénégal, Series XIII, File 3b, January 7, 1851.

the Governor had taken the liberty to send six African students to France with his request, the Central Administration, after unsuccessful attempts to persuade the Ministry of Public Instruction to assume the financial burden, had accepted the responsibility.

The Chairman of the Commission suggested that the addition of two or three lower-secondary grades to the Saint-Louis elementary school would better serve the development of education in Senegal than a few metropolitan scholarships. The members concurred with this proposal. Bouet-Willlaumez, a key colonial policy-maker, made clear his conviction that the only successful way to combine the instruction and moralization of the African was to establish boarding schools in Africa for each sex. "This separation from their families is the only means of removing them (the pupils) from the daily precedents which they receive from the recently emancipated blacks."¹

The Status of French Sub-Saharan Education in 1854. By the end of 1854, official French schools in Senegal numbered four with some five hundred ninety pupils. A rapid increase in enrollment had followed the prodding of the Minister in 1851, with a high percentage of the pupils being Christian mulattoes. Two schools were located at Saint-Louis and two on the Island of Gorée, and a fifth mission school opened near Dakar in 1855. Formal education remained virtually non-existent elsewhere, aside from the activities of a few missionaries scattered along the coast southward to Gabon. A small number of chiefs' sons from the Ivory Coast had been sent to France to be educated, but the future of all settlements

¹Ibid., p. 16.

south of Senegal was too undecided for substantial investments in education.

Colonial Affairs Under Napoleon III, 1850-1870. The expansion of education in Senegal, directly attributable to the African Commission's recommendations to strengthen the French hold on Senegal and to the subsequent ministerial orders to this effect, was indirectly due to the new colonial policy of Louis Napoleon. The timidity of the previous regimes following the downfall of Napoleon I was replaced by a decision favoring overseas expansion. Designed to promote the prestige of the Emperor and Imperial France, the new policy suffered from a precise definition which, in turn, led to diverse and, sometimes, contradictory actions. The failure of the Emperor closely to supervise the policy process left the program dependent upon the initiative and interpretation of subordinates.

The Constitution of January 14, 1852, eliminated colonial representation to the Parliament and placed colonial legislation as the responsibility of the Senate, a group handpicked by the Emperor. By their law of May 3, 1854, most of the colonies including Sub-Saharan Africa were to be ruled by executive decree. This important legislation reestablished an ancient practice which, except for minor alterations, was continued under the Third and Fourth Republics.

During the Second Empire (1852-1870), the Ministry of the Navy continued to be responsible for the colonies except for a period of over two years (1858-1860) when a Ministry of Algeria and the Colonies existed primarily as an accommodation for Prince Jerome Bonaparte. The Prince, who had a dislike for the clergy and the military, outlined a policy of

liberalism and assimilation, and was actively interested in the development of Senegal. But shortly after his departure for Italy, the military, anxious to rid themselves of civilian control, persuaded the Emperor to abolish the new agency and return the colonies to the Navy.

The colonial policy of the Second Empire as conceived by Chasseloup-Laubat, Minister of the Navy and Colonies for eight years (1860-1868), was stated as follows:

It is a veritable Empire which must be created, a condition of suzerainty, of sovereignty, with free trade, accessible to all, and also a mighty structure from which our Christian civilization shall radiate.¹

From this text it may be seen that the Emperor broke the pacte colonial through a commercial treaty with the English and subsequent legislation. The industrial revolution swept France to rising tides of prosperity and Senegal participated in this economic boom as trade conditions were improved in the Fifties and Sixties. In 1855, Governor Faidherbe modestly-credited Bouet-Willaumez of the Commission for the African Settlements and Commerce of 1850 and two Ministers of the Navy and Colonies as the men responsible for the prosperity of Senegal.

The Policy for Senegal. Since Faidherbe had only been Governor for about a month at the time of the above statement, what he said was true enough. Actually the basic policy was derived from the imperial dreams of Louis Napoleon. While still in the role of President of the Second Republic (1851), he had adopted the recommendations of the Commission of 1850 which were based upon the aggressive policies advocated by Bouet-Willaumez.

¹Blet, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 171.

years, an army captain who had shown promise in a local military campaign as well as through his excellent reports to the Metropole, received a field appointment as Governor, replacing Protet.¹ Captain Faidherbe had already justified his appointment by the time Prince Jerome Bonaparte became Minister of the newly created Ministry of Algeria and the Colonies in 1858. The Prince and the Captain had similar points of view. The former was interested in Senegal and wrote lengthy instructions to Faidherbe concerning its development. The Prince envisioned the colony as a center of great agricultural production with the natives as producers and the French as traders:

The earth cultivated by them can yield products which will become the object of a lucrative traffic for the European, the only type of work the latter can perform under the climatic conditions.²

The Prince added that the natives should be employed in the army and that pro-French Africans should replace hostile chiefs wherever this could be accomplished without drastic action.

Prince Jerome, according to Duchène,³ took a personal delight in being more progressive than the Emperor and injected a degree of liberalism and direction to colonial policy which continued for several years after his brief tenure of office. After a short-term temporary successor, his post was filled by Count de Chasseloup-Laubat who continued the Prince's attempt to build the power of the Ministry of Algeria and the

¹Usually a newly appointed governor received his initial and basic instructions at the Ministry in Paris.

²Ladreit de Lacharrière, op. cit., p. 256.

³Albert Duchène, La Politique Coloniale de la France (Paris: Payot, 1928), p. 212.

colonies by gaining control over colonial services under the jurisdiction of older, more established ministries. But, lacking Prince Jerome's personal power, he failed and on November 24, 1860, the Ministry was suppressed, with the management of Algeria returning to the Ministry of War and that of the colonies relegated once again to a departmental status within the Ministry of Navy. Although the Count received appointment as the Minister of Navy, he became absorbed with his primary responsibilities. In Senegal, he was inclined to allow the continuation of the policies formulated by his predecessors as applied by Governor Faidherbe, but with increasing caution. His attitude is indicated in the following postscript which he added to an official text of June 22, 1864 to Faidherbe:

You know how much my confidence resides with you; thus, I am always disposed, a priori, to give my approval to your proposals. But you must understand how difficult it is for me to approve projects which could lead us into considerable expense or commit us to a course where the least failure would force us to conduct major expeditions. You know all that my Ministry has to do in Mexico, Cochin-China, even in New Caledonia; hence it is necessary for us to employ caution even in the accomplishment of the best projects.

The Parliament is disturbed to see us engaged in so many affairs and we must take into serious consideration their preoccupation and the ever increasing expenditures imposed upon us.¹

Faidherbe's Accomplishments. Faidherbe, during his years of government, managed to accomplish many of the objectives defined by policy-makers from Baron Portal through Prince Jerome Bonaparte. By the time of his departure for France, Senegal was a relatively compact colony extending along the coast from approximately sixty kilometers north of Saint-Louis to about thirty kilometers south of the Casamance River. Roughly this represented more than four hundred kilometers of coastline,

¹Ladreit de Lacharrière, op. cit., p. 261.

with French control extending into the interior for an estimated average of fifty kilometers to much greater depth along the rivers.¹ This control extended several hundred kilometers inland along the Senegal River to beyond Medina.

Such territorial acquisition was partially based upon energetic military response to hostility which so many governors in the past had proposed only to be denied by the Metropole. But an enlightened native policy contributed significantly to Faidherbe's success. Faidherbe was a Republican enthusiast of the Provisional Government of the Second Republic, and a friend and admirer of Victor Schoelcher, the symbol of the anti-slavery movement. Hence, one of his main concerns was the betterment of the position of the Negro, of whom he wrote:

The black man is a man naturally kind, of an intelligence comparable to that of the white races, but, lacking in character, will always be at the mercy of races better endowed in this respect.²

Because of this humanitarian interest, Faidherbe studied the native customs and developed an unusual command of two of the major indigenous languages, Wolof and Peuhl. His linguistic abilities, his obvious empathy and honorable reputation, unexpectedly gained for France the allegiance of many Africans.

Agricultural production and commerce flourished under the conditions of peace and free trade established by the Governor. Transportation and communication facilities were expanded and improved, with founding of the Port of Dakar in 1862 being of particular significance.

¹Blet, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 200-201.

²Jacques Stern, The French Colonies (New York: Didier, 1944), p. 156.

However, in addition to formidable adversaries such as El-Hadj-Omar and the growing financial limitations imposed by the Metropole, Faidherbe faced other annoyances. Despite the unprecedented era of prosperity, public opinion at Saint-Louis became increasingly hostile to the liberal and creative Governor. As early as 1858, Faidherbe had offered his resignation rather than accede to a metropolitan proposal to recruit Negroes for work in the Antilles. At that time, the Ministry received a letter from him which stressed his concern for the native peoples: "I am convinced that France can make it [Senegal] a prosperous and useful possession if we continue to consider the interest of the natives as our paramount object."¹ Since this project was dropped, Faidherbe remained as Governor.

Nevertheless, he was never popular with Napoleon III, who considered him a utopian radical. Stern² reports the Government always gave the Governor's reports special scrutiny in view of the Emperor's attitude. Hardy attributes Faidherbe's final resignation in 1865 to the "underhanded persecutions"³ inflicted upon him by the Ministry of the Navy. In any case, it became evident to Faidherbe, through the letters from the Ministry and the rising internal political dissension brewing at home, that he could no longer expect the degree of support necessary to implement his plans.

Native Education Under Faidherbe. Education was viewed by the Governor as one of the basic means of colonization. This means was lost

¹ Ibid., p. 157.

² Ibid., p. 156.

³ Hardy, Histoire Sociale . . . , op. cit., p. 127.

as long as the formal system of education remained a Christian monopoly in a predominantly Moslem country. Almost as soon as he became Governor, Faidherbe set about to create a lay system and tried to reassure the Moslems of its non-religious character with statements such as this:

"There is no relationship between the religion of the French and the metric system."¹ Despite the fact that the Emperor posed as the protector of the Pope and that the Metropole had officially recognized the supremacy of the Church in French education by the Law of 1850, colonial education for certain colonies including those of Sub-Saharan Africa remained under the jurisdiction of the Ministry. Thus, Faidherbe acted with approval as indicated by one of his school graduation addresses:

Following the principle outlined for us by the Emperor's Government, we have been particularly concerned with native education. In this, as well as other matters, we have but to imitate what is being done in Algeria.²

In Algeria, Franco-Arabic and native schools were being created for the Moslems while the French and assimilated children attended the schools conducted by the religious orders. The obvious problem generated by this dual system was the need for lay instructors. For these, Faidherbe turned to the military and issued the following explicit instructions:

(1) Mark each stage of advance of our columns by the opening of a school under a non-commissioned officer or a soldier where the French language will be taught and learned after a fashion.

(2) Give to the chiefs' sons of the conquered countries a more carefully prepared education capable of rendering them useful and devoted instruments of our influence.

¹J. Mazé, La Collaboration Scolaire des Gouvernements Coloniaux et des Missions (Alger: Imprimerie des Peres Blancs, 1933), pp. 138-9.

²Ibid., p. 139.

(3) Recommend to the officers, post commanders or administrators, to supervise the schools opened in their districts with particular care, to take an interest in the pupils, their progress and material well-being.¹

From this, it may be seen that Faidherbe desired to establish communication with the masses and to train a native elite to second the administration and extend French influence. To accomplish this latter objective, in 1856 he established the famous School of Hostages at Saint-Louis for the sons of chiefs.² In an attempt to control the Koranic schools in Saint-Louis, he issued an ordinance on June 22, 1857 requiring all marabouts holding school to apply for a government permit. To obtain one, they had to prove they were born in Saint-Louis or had been in residence for seven years, demonstrate sufficient knowledge before an official board, and produce a certificate of good behavior from the mayor. In addition, girls were not permitted to attend the Koranic schools, although Moslem women were allowed to open schools for girls with the government's sanction. Further, the Koranic school pupils were obliged to attend French classes at night. Franco-Moslem schools were developed with French instruction included along with the traditional religious and Arabic curriculum.

In 1857, a school board and director of the lay system were appointed. Under the Governor's personal and energetic supervision the system grew rapidly. By 1860, the school population of Saint-Louis alone numbered eight hundred sixty pupils excluding those attending obligatory

¹Government General of French West Africa, L'Enseignement en A.O.F. (Corbeil: Editions Crete, 1906), p. 11.

²This practice did not originate with Faidherbe as is sometimes inferred; cf. p. 10.

night courses. By 1864, the public schools outnumbered the religious ones.

The Decline of Secular Native Education. With Faidherbe's departure in 1865, the system began to decline. Under Colonel Vallière, the School for Hostages was merged with the public primary school of Saint-Louis and eventually eliminated. One by one, the interior schools dropped out of existence, followed by the lay schools in the coastal towns which were abandoned or taken over by the missionaries. By 1883, all the schools of Senegal were in the hands of the Church according to one governmental report.¹ Another² listed only two lay instructors in the colony as of 1889.

Although the local authorities repeatedly mentioned the development of education as the most powerful means of civilization and assimilation in their reports to the Central Administration of the Colonies, they seldom translated their words into action. No doubt this was so because the Central Administration itself offered little encouragement or leadership. The entire regime of the Second Empire was tottering under the ailing Napoleon III and the bitter conservative-liberal political struggle. The perceptive Bismarck shrewdly characterized the Imperial Government as follows: "From a distance, it appears to be something; from up close, it is nothing."³

¹Government General of French West Africa, op. cit., p. 12.

²France, Ministère de l'Instruction Publique et des Beaux-Arts, Recueil . . . , op. cit., Vol. I, p. 251.

³Duchène, op. cit., p. 232.

Summary, 1815-1870. Crude beginnings and frustrated plans mark this era as the primitive period in the history of French educational strategies. The term "primitive" does not refer to the Africans, but to the French knowledge of Sub-Saharan Africa and their efforts to organize themselves as well as the natives. The limited technology at their disposal and the high rate of personnel turnover, as well as the changing metropolitan political scene, obviously contributed to the relative discontinuity in theory and practice. After the failure of the initial development plan in Senegal, uncertainty of purpose as well as of methodology plagued the French, until the policy recommendations of the African Commission of 1850 were endorsed by the imperialistic regime of the Second Empire. Even then, the fate of the settlements to the south of Senegal remained in doubt.

In such circumstances, substantial investment in native education could hardly be expected. Nevertheless, the Metropole, in the form of the responsible ministry, sporadically exhibited considerable interest in the educational development of Senegal and viewed the endeavor as an integral part of the total colonialization scheme. During a peak period of this metropolitan concern, native education in Senegal received a fresh impetus, although this often proved to be more in theory than fact. But a rough pattern of cause and effect does emerge with a correlation between metropolitan and subsequent colonial events. Obviously this pattern cannot be reduced to a simple metropolitan stimulus and colonial response relationship. Certain governors played a part in the metropolitan policy process, particularly at this time when a limited technology, a weak bureaucratic system, and a lack of precedence handicapped decision-

making and policy control. However, the evidence indicates that the independence of the governors was more limited than sometimes inferred.

After the rejection of the unique educational proposals of the first principal, Dard, the educational plan of 1835, based upon the outcomes of the metropolitan inquiry of 1829, provided Senegal with its first significant educational direction and organization. The firm decision to employ French as the language of instruction and to use French education as an instrument to restructure the indigenous society along French lines was made at this time.¹ Such a decision meant that metropolitan teachers had to be employed in large numbers and the past experiences with lay personnel caused the Government of the July Monarchy to turn to religious teaching orders. This strategy led to considerable confusion as to the ends and means of education since the purposes of the Church and the State were not entirely compatible. The liberal philosophy and actions of the short-lived Provisional Government of 1848 resulted in the advent of formal vocational education in Sub-Saharan Africa, but only on a token basis. The rise of Louis Napoleon beginning in 1848 brought a period of colonial expansion which made possible the inquiry of the African Commission of 1850 and the implementation of its recommendations in Senegal by Louis Faidherbe. Old ideas and practices such as the education of the hostage sons of chiefs and the development of a secular system

¹Although the reformation of the native way of life was an explicit objective of the original development plan for Senegal, Dard, with the mission of determining the methodology for its realization, had confused the issue. By choosing the native tongue as the medium of instruction and advocating the wholesale dependence upon indigenous teachers, he began an approach to native education which ran counter to the Gallic penchant for cultural imperialism.

employing the military as teachers were reactivated and perfected by the energetic and precise Governor. His return to France and the progressive decay within the Government of the Second Empire halted this last high point of educational activity during this fifty-five year era.

It is interesting to note that this rise and decline in the development of educational strategies for Sub-Saharan Africa generally paralleled the rise and decline of the metropolitan governments. Hence, there existed waves of theoretical and practical activity representing progress over the preceding ones from the quantitative standpoint. If the global qualitative and quantitative progress for the period may be characterized as limited, certain of the experiences and policies did provide a basis for the development to follow.

CHAPTER III

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD: 1870-1944

Introduction. The second historical period, covering the life-span of the Third Republic, lacked the basic political disruptions of the first era. Therefore, this chapter does not divide itself into periods based upon national political upheavals, but rather it exposes the chronological development of metropolitan attitudes and policies related to colonialism and overseas education. It also reveals the difficulties of implementing national policy in the field of native education. These attitudes, policies, and difficulties provide an insight into the Gallic psyche as well as into the basic problems of intercultural enterprise.

The Third Republic, a result of the ignoble defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War, was plagued by several years of political struggle between the Royalists and the Republicans until the latter group emerged completely victorious in 1879. During this first post-war decade, considerable popular antagonism was directed toward colonialism, for the colonies had been of little or no assistance in the war. Expansion abroad became viewed as a waste of resources and manpower which should be devoted to avenging the French defeat and the regaining of Alsace-Lorraine. When Jules Ferry protested: "Must we hypnotize ourselves with the lost provinces, and should we not take compensations elsewhere?", his answer from a prominent anti-colonist was: "That is

just the point. I have lost two children and you offer me twenty domestics!"¹

Under these circumstances, colonial affairs were left in a state of vegetation. In the Parliament, the Left opposed colonial economic exploitation in the name of free trade while the Right opposed it as harmful to the interests of French agriculture. As far as Sub-Saharan Africa was concerned, the Government was negotiating with England to exchange French interests along the Guinea Coast for British Gambia which bisected Senegal. Yet, when Governor Brière de l'Isle of Senegal attempted to penetrate to the interior of that colony, the Ministry denied him support. The situation was aptly characterized by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Decazes, when he said: "France is reconsolidating itself and waiting."²

Popularization of Colonialism. With the Right and the extreme Left generally opposed to colonialism, it remained for a few ardent pro-colonialists to garner support from the vacillating moderates in Parliament. Composed of a small but powerful group of politicians, intellectuals, civil servants, and military men, the pro-colonialists eventually engineered new colonial acquisitions by presenting the nation with faits accomplis while engaging in a persistent campaign of public persuasion at the same time. This latter effort was aided by the growth of a grass-roots nationalism throughout France as a reaction to the defeat of 1870.

¹Stephen H. Roberts, History of French Colonial Policy (London: P. S. King and Son, 1929), Vol. I, pp. 11-12.

²Henri Blet, France d'Outre-Mer (Grenoble: B. Arthaud, 1950), Vol. III, p. 8.

The dramatic increase in the number of societies and conferences devoted to colonial affairs prior to the turn of the century demonstrates the success of the movement. The Geographic Society of France offers a case in point. Founded in 1821 at Paris, it never had more than 300 members until 1860. The local membership grew from 780 in 1873 to 2,000 in 1881. Between 1871 and 1881, eleven other societies were established in the provinces and, by the latter date, the total French membership stood at 9,500. The first addition to the Parisian society was founded at Bordeaux in 1874 by Pierre Foncin, an educator and key figure in the future development of colonial education. Foncin explained that he saw in the movement a means to rehabilitate France. Presidents of other local societies expressed themselves similarly. "To remain a great nation or to become one, a people must colonize."¹ This statement by one of these local leaders sums up the general attitude. The proposition was fortified by the argument that expansion in Europe proper was no longer feasible. The civilizing mission of France and the economic advantages to both the motherland and the backward territories were motives echoed and re-echoed across the land. Contributing to this propaganda were an increasing number of dramatic and popular books by explorers and persuasive journal articles by economists and other intellectuals.

With the emergence of the French Republicans as the dominant political force in 1879, colonial expansion began anew. Jules Ferry, a politician of strong convictions and a skillful parliamentarian, led this new imperialism for six years. No nation, he maintained, could be classified

¹Henri Brunschwig, Mythes et Réalités de l'Impérialisme Colonial Français (Paris: Armand Colin, 1960), p. 24.

as a first, or even a second-rate power without overseas expansion. The Industrial Revolution was well under way in France and the prosperity of the nation was dependent upon colonial outlets for manufactured goods and upon colonial sources for key raw materials according to Ferry, who succinctly remarked: "Colonial policy is the daughter of industrial policy."¹

Nevertheless, Ferry, who had been a key participant in the reform and major extension of French public education, stressed that colonial acquisition entailed serious responsibilities for the imperial power. Among these duties was that of education. In a Senate report of 1890, Ferry wrote: "Very rarely are the colonials concerned with the educational and civilizing mission which is the responsibility of the superior race; even more rare are those who think it possible to improve the indigenous race."² Ferry had earlier maintained that the ultimate goal of colonialism was not conquest or exploitation, but the raising of the level of the indigenous population to that of the motherland. Thus, idealism and self-interest were allied in the colonial cause.

But this particular concern was premature in most instances because France was primarily preoccupied with conquering rather than in developing colonies at the time. Although Ferry's government fell in 1885, his work was continued by others. By 1895, in Sub-Saharan Africa, Sudan, Guinea, and the French Congo were conquered; the occupation of Dahomey was well under way and Lake Chad had been reached. By 1905 the Sudan, Guinea, the Ivory Coast and Chad had been organized on a permanent basis. Twenty-five

¹Blet, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 13.

²Ibid., p. 14.

years after the founding of the Third Republic, the French Empire was second only to that of the British.

In the 1890's several associations were formed to further the cause of colonialism. The most influential of these were the colonial group of the Chamber of Deputies, The Committee for French Africa, and the French Colonial Union, as well as the French Colonial Party.

The founder and President of the Chamber of Deputies group was Eugène Étienne, former Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies (1887-88, 1889-92). In 1896, ninety-one of 576 Deputies were listed as members, with the majority representing the moderate parties, but with both the Right and the Left contributing to the membership. They were united to assure "the force and the grandeur of imperial France."¹ In 1898, thirty Senators organized their group and elected Senator Siegfried as President. These groups were unofficial and their activities are not well documented.

The Committee for French Africa was founded in 1890 as a protest against the Franco-English Treaty of August 4, 1890. Although the Committee was organized by a group, Brunshwig² suggests that the instigator was the Under-Secretary for the Colonies, Eugène Étienne, who surreptitiously was encouraging opposition to the policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Seemingly that policy inclined toward the abandonment of efforts to link the colonies of the Guinea Coast with those of North Africa. In addition to publishing a periodical, the Committee sponsored explorations into Central Africa.

¹Brunshwig, op. cit., p. 113.

²Ibid., p. 116.

Established in 1893, the French Colonial Union was composed of representatives of French companies and banks with substantial investments in the various colonies. This rich and powerful organization was dedicated to the "development, prosperity, and protection of the various branches of industry and commerce in the colonies."¹

The French Colonial Party, which held its first meeting in 1894, was not a party at all, but an occasional gathering of individuals and groups such as those discussed above. The purpose of this loose association was to promote communication between the rapidly increasing number of pro-colonial organizations and to provide a common channel for the promulgation of the colonial cause.

The Establishment of the Ministry of Colonies. The growing metropolitan interest in colonial affairs during the last two decades of the nineteenth century was more than matched by the growth of the Empire. The problems of administering the new colossus became formidable, particularly as the problems evolved from those of military conquest to others related to consolidation and development. With men such as Jules Ferry stressing the economic importance of the colonies, their control by the admirals of the Navy appeared to be anachronistic.

Under the Prime Ministry of Gambetta, the Administration of the Colonies was raised to the status of an Under-Secretariat and placed under the Ministry of Commerce in 1881. After his fall, the Navy reacquired the Under-Secretariat in 1883 only to lose it on two further occasions to the Ministry of Commerce. During these exchanges, the Under-Secretariat developed its own services and gradually divorced

¹Ibid., p. 125.

itself from dependence upon those of the wider Ministry. Étienne, the most outstanding Under-Secretary, fostered this development, claiming that to be effective, the agency had to be independent and concern itself primarily with economic development. In a further concession, the government granted the Under-Secretary the unique right of signing decrees without the counter-signature of the responsible Minister, leading to the claim that the Under-Secretary had power without responsibility.

The years of 1886 and 1887 were particularly important in the evolution of the colonial services. The Central Administration for the Colonies was expanded and the civil service status of its personnel regularized as a distinct and permanent entity. Shortly thereafter, a decree established an independent fund for the operation of the Central Administration. In the fall of 1887, a distinct corps of colonial administrators was created. During the same year, a law had been introduced in Parliament proposing the formation of a Ministry of Colonies, but it was not acted upon.

However, the latter issue was brought to a head by the resignation of Under-Secretary Lebon in 1894 with the dramatic and publicized announcement that he found it impossible to govern the colonies under the existing organization. Lebon claimed he had neither responsibility nor power! The Government took advantage of this incident to rush a law through the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate forming an independent Ministry of Colonies as of March 20, 1894.

The formation of the Ministry grew out of a belated recognition that France, having acquired a vast colonial empire, had to govern it. The new organization faced almost insurmountable obstacles. Frequent

reorganizations of the Central Administration indicate a dissatisfaction with internal effectiveness. Parliament presented constant but expected problems, particularly when it came to expenditures. The intervention of other ministries in colonial affairs, occasionally without even consulting the Ministry of Colonies, led to serious conflicts. The development of new structures and functions within the colonies generated difficulties between the colonial and central administrations as well as among the various services of the individual colonies. The evolution of colonial education could but proceed at a slow and uneven pace under the circumstances.

The Development of a Colonial Financial Policy. In the long run, financial policy affected the development of education more than organizational dislocations. The division of revenue and expenditure between the metropolitan colonial budget and the budgets of the colonies had been of concern to every French government since the reoccupation of the colonies, but no definitive policy had crystallized from the overseas experiences prior to the Third Republic.

However, with the great expansion of the Empire, resultant problems were so acute as to demand a solution. The rising costs of military campaigns and internal development projects, as reflected in the annual colonial budgets passed upon by Parliament, became a cause of major concern to the legislators. This concern was not eased by the inability of the Central Administration to obtain regular and complete financial reports from the colonies. Periodically the Under-Secretary, and subsequently the Minister, was forced to admonish colonial governments for failure in

in this regard. For example, in an 1892 communication to all governors,¹ Under-Secretary Jamais stated that most colonies forwarded the required financial statements for the metropolitan colonial budget either very late or very irregularly. Stressing the reports often contained inaccuracies and were incomplete, Jamais closed this particular admonition with the classical comment that such delays and irregularities were extremely prejudicial to the service. Apparently this communication had little effect because similar but more direct messages were conveyed regularly for several years thereafter. In a communication of 1895, Minister of Colonies Chautemps began by emphasizing the Ministry of Finance had strongly criticized the financial accountability of his Ministry. He went on to state that, despite previous warnings, the colonies continued to forward all types of financial documents late or with irregularities. Chautemps concluded with equally classical, but more threatening, words: "Unless corrected immediately, I will not hesitate to charge the chiefs of the guilty services with negligence and hold them responsible for irregularities and delays."²

The Ministry was further embarrassed by the failure of the colonies to keep it informed of local expenditures of an emergency nature payable in France. In reference to this situation, a communication, sent in 1897 to all governors, concluded as follows:

¹France, Bulletin Officiel de l'Administration des Colonies (hereafter referred to as France, B.O.A.C.), No. 195, August 11, 1892, p. 594.

²Ibid., No. 180, p. 610.

The Administration continually receives demands for the payment of bills without being able to indicate even an approximate date of settlement rendering difficult the relations between the Administration and French commerce and industry.¹

Financial irresponsibility within the colonies manifested itself in other forms as well. Deficit local budgets were being voted by the colonial general councils and approved by the governors. To stop this practice, the Central Administration announced in 1892 that it would take steps to balance all such budgets in the future. Noting that these general councils wished neither to halt the mounting expenditures nor to vote tax increases to offset them, the Under-Secretary had submitted the question to the French Council of State which had ruled that the governors alone possessed the power to set the budget, while the general councils were limited to voting the tax rates.

The Decree of November 20, 1882, which permitted the colonies to obtain unlimited advances from the metropolitan treasury, had led some colonies annually to borrow funds which they could not repay. Although saddled with a mounting debt to the Metropole, the colonies were reluctant to forego this source of revenue. The Under-Secretary characterized the phenomenon as a dependence upon an irregular resource which was prejudicial to the interests of the Metropole and compromising for the finances of the colonies. Since a decision to limit the amount of any advance in 1890 failed to eliminate this abusive practice, the Ministry of Finance, in conjunction with the Under-Secretariat for the Colonies, ruled that as of January 1, 1893, all colonies would repay all such annual advances

¹France, B.O.A.C., No. 125, 1897, p. 510.

through compulsory monthly payments to the metropolitan treasury. The continuation of these fiscal problems resulted in the Ministry of Finance intervening directly in colonial financial matters through the placement of its own personnel in the Central Administration and in the colonies to watch over financial operations.

The trend to tighten metropolitan expenditures for the colonies took explicit form in the 1887 decrees establishing a corps of colonial administrators. According to the decree of December 12, 1887, the members of this corps working in a colony would be paid from the local colonial budget as of 1890. During the summer of 1890, a committee of officials of the Central Administration for the Colonies was organized to study the local colonial budgets in order to identify and eliminate all expenditures shown to be without incontestable utility and to determine the maximum local tax potential in order to decide how much of the metropolitan colonial expenditures could be diverted to each colony. The Under-Secretary stated the situation as follows:

Despite the diversity and multiplicity of the taxes, it is not clear that the colonial taxpayers support a taxation equal to their fellow citizens in the Metropole and proportionate to their means.¹

The Financial Law of April 28, 1893 extended the principle of partial colonial self-support by providing that the colonies would contribute to the locally incurred civil and military expenses as well as to the general expenses of the Metropole derived from colonial affairs. When the Ministry of Colonies was reorganized in 1896, the following paragraph was included in the description of the functions of Direction of Administrative

¹France, B.O.A.C., Report of August 8, 1890, pp. 922-923.

and Political Affairs:

Finally it should exercise a particularly close control over the formulation and operations of the local budgets with the objective of progressively reducing the sacrifices imposed upon the Metropole and of hastening the moment when our colonies can, to a large extent, be self-sufficient.¹

Induction of self-sufficiency began to be accelerated shortly after the passing of the Law of April 13, 1893. For example, in addition to paying the salaries and allowances of French administrative personnel in residence, the Decree of September 5, 1893, stipulated that the colonies had to pay travel expenses of such personnel to and from France or another colony as well.

Once the principle of self-sufficiency had been officially sanctioned and partially activated, the total application of this policy proved irresistible. Hence the Law of April 13, 1900, approving the metropolitan budget for the fiscal year, included in Article 33 which began as follows: "All civil and internal security expenses are, in principle, the responsibility of the budgets of the colonies."² Military expenses incurred in any colony could also be charged against the local budget. In addition, the expenditures of the colonial budgets were divided into two categories, obligatory and optional. The Metropole established the obligatory expenses which pertained generally to the maintenance of the local administration and the repayment of the metropolitan debt. The local general councils retained the right to decide all local tax matters exclusive of customs. These local tax decisions were not applicable until approved in the form of a metropolitan decree

¹ France, Bulletin Officiel du Ministère des Colonies, Administration Centrales des Colonies, No. 46, 1896, p. 114. (This bulletin will hereafter be referred to as B.O.M.C.)

² Ibid., Budgets Locaux, No. 92, 1900, p. 314.

by the French Council of State. Further, if the Council of State disapproved, the general councils were obliged to reopen their deliberations and present new proposals to the Metropole.

The Law of April 13, 1900 provided an opportunity for the colonies to apply for metropolitan loans. However, as Hardy points out,¹ the metropolitan government was obliged to limit these grants to such an extent that, for many years to come, the colonies had to rely upon their own resources, not only for their operating expenses, but for the initiation and development of economic and social projects as well.

Hence, the development of education became largely dependent upon local tax revenue which, in the case of the relatively poor and underdeveloped colonies of Sub-Saharan Africa, remained quite meager for years to come. In addition, the expenditures ruled as mandatory or obligatory by the Metropole had to be met prior to those for development programs. Then educational projects had to compete with other needs for priority in the local budget. What emerged was a vicious circular situation with socio-economic development dependent upon local revenue and local revenue dependent upon socio-economic development.

French Overseas Education as a Measure of National Defense. With the colonial expansion during the first decades of the Third Republic, the French became acutely aware of foreign competition in the struggle for power and grandeur. Contact with the British became particularly irritating along colonial frontiers in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the natives frequently appeared to favor the English rule and language. Such

¹Hardy, Histoire Sociale . . . , op. cit., p. 147.

incidences did not shake the French assumption that their culture represented the apex of civilization and had, with their language, universal validity. However, it had become obvious that, unless the peoples of the world became exposed to the French language and culture, they would accept other linguistic and cultural forms. This would not only deprive foreigners of acquiring the highest form of language and culture, but it would increase the power of other nations at the expense of France. As stated by Eugène Étienne, the overseas extension of the French language and culture constituted "a measure of national defense."¹ As this attitude prevailed, reports of the expansion of non-French schools and missions in colonial areas assumed a character similar to terse battle reports of enemy action.

Dissatisfaction with official efforts to develop French overseas education as a means to spread the French language and culture prompted a few men, mostly educators, to form an organization known as L'Alliance française for that purpose. One of the founders, sometimes referred to as the originator of the movement, Pierre Foncin, Inspector General of Public Instruction and first General Secretary of L'Alliance française, wrote² that the organization was founded in July, 1883 and that it actually began to function in January, 1884. There were nine people at the first meeting, but after some five years the membership had grown to over fifteen thousand. By a decree of October 23, 1886, the organization

¹From a letter published in Revue de l'Enseignement Colonial, No. 2, March-April 1904, p. 51.

²France, Ministère de l'Instruction Publique et des Beaux-Arts, Recueil . . . , op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 713.

was recognized by the government as one of public utility and the State eventually absorbed it as an official agency. Today it functions under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and continues its worldwide activities based upon its original objective: the propagation of the French language in the colonies and in foreign territories.

Foncin noted that, although independent of the government, the Association could reinforce official activities in the colonies and act in other localities where the government could not. He stressed the movement was open to all factions for a common purpose: "unity within, peaceful radiation without."¹ Foncin hoped the movement would help dissipate French internal disunity through a focus upon improving the French image abroad. The concluding sentence of his article expressed a common French sentiment:

If it is true that all men have two homelands: his own and France, it is possible to hope that one day French, without abolishing the national languages, will become the universal language.²

The Alliance supported both the government and mission schools in Sub-Saharan Africa and, in turn, the government encouraged the efforts of the organization to open schools in the interior. Reports of the Alliance illustrate the competition between the French and the British. Some note with satisfaction the local colonial governments' actions in forcing British and Portuguese missions to instruct in French. Others point up the danger of the presence of English schools. One report of the French schools in southern Senegal gave the following account:

¹Ibid., p. 845.

²Ibid.

They have to combat the redoubtable influence of the English schools of Sierra Leone in this region. The struggle between the two languages becomes more intense as one moves to the South, invaded by English natives, the Accous, and by their Methodist pastors.¹

Another report, concerning the Ivory Coast, regretted the fact that after forty-seven years of the French presence, very few of the natives spoke French. Only one school was operational in 1899; this condition was contrasted with that of the Gold Coast:

The English, less indifferent and better advised, open schools everywhere. . . . The British agents even go so far as to discourage the natives from sending their children to the only French school on the coast. The Blacks, graduates from the English schools, are our worst enemies; they come to trade in our colony and neglect no occasion to prejudice the people against us.²

Despite its cooperation with the metropolitan government and the fact that many members were officials, the Alliance often attempted to pique the government into greater efforts in the area of native education. For example, it did not hesitate to point out that in Senegal, the most developed of the Sub-Saharan colonies, educational opportunity was largely limited to the children of the French administrators and of a few assimilated natives. It complained that, although the General Council of Senegal maintained sixty boys' and forty girls' scholarships for study in metropolitan secondary schools and convents, these scholarships were distributed, for the most part, among the French children including those of the General Council members. The Alliance further noted how costly such scholarships were and how they profited a rich minority, but not the mass of the native population. Through goading the government and

¹Ibid., p. 728.

²Ibid., p. 740.

constructive action, the organization was determined to accelerate the progress of native education.

Organizational Actions Affecting Sub-Saharan Education. As the consolidation of French influence within the growing Empire became increasingly necessary, the development of formal education as a means to this end grew in urgency. As already noted, when the government failed to respond energetically to this situation, prominent individuals took up the challenge through unofficial channels by the establishment of the Alliance française. For many years the government was content to entrust the responsibility for colonial educational development to a bureau within the Central Administration staffed with two or three officials with clerical assistance. Usually this bureau was also responsible for problems related to justice and religion. Obviously, policy decisions were made by the responsible Minister and his advisers. But with the growth of the Empire, educational problems became too complex and varied for simple procedures or solutions.

Hence, during the summer of 1893, an attempt to supervise and control the development of colonial education led to the creation of an Office of General Inspection of Public Instruction in the Colonies. Two Inspectors-General were appointed to visit all of the colonies through constant inspection tours. Their purely technical instructions were to come from the Ministry of Public Instruction as transmitted by the Central Administration of the Colonies. Their reports were to be communicated directly to the Central Administration rather than through the colonial governors. However, after two years, the Office was suppressed by Minister

of Colonies Lebon, who stated that the advantages procured from the Service were outweighed by the heavy costs its function placed on the local colonial budgets. Later, Foncin condemned this action as being premature and arbitrary, claiming it was taken strictly for budgetary reasons and without profound discussion even though the Office had shown promise despite a short existence.¹

A second metropolitan body, organized in 1894, to be of specific service to colonial education, was the Superior Committee for Public Instruction of the Colonies. Its function was to advise the Minister on all questions related to colonial education including the curriculum, methodology, organization, and personnel. In addition to its permanent membership, which included Pierre Foncin as Vice-Chairman, the Committee had a temporary membership composed of French educators in France on leave from their positions in the colonies. A year later the body was enlarged to include officials concerned with political, commercial, and agricultural affairs.

On June 16, 1899, the Ministry of Colonies issued an important decree which established, for the first time, the means for French elementary and vocational teachers to instruct in the colonies without losing their metropolitan status. Although temporarily attached to the Ministry of Colonies while overseas, they were guaranteed their regular seniority and positions upon return to the Metropole. Decrees in 1902 extended the same conditions and rights to all school administrators and secondary

¹Pierre Foncin, De l'Enseignement aux Colonies (Paris: Charles Tallandier, n.d.), p. 4.

teachers. These decrees made feasible the creation of public education systems in the colonies.

The Status of French Sub-Saharan Education, 1870-1900. A variety of official and unofficial sources concur in their general accounts of educational developments in the Sub-Saharan French territories prior to the turn of the century. Development proceeded at an extremely uneven and occasionally retrogressive rate. Within serious financial and personnel limitations, the governors or their equivalents were relatively free to encourage or discourage educational programs. What one accomplished, his replacement might destroy, deliberately or, more often, through neglect. Where successful lay systems were developed by energetic governors, such as Gallieni and de Trentinian in Sudan and Binger on the Ivory Coast, they generally floundered under successors with less interest and zeal. Aside from the missionaries, the teaching personnel varied from a few French professionals sent by the Alliance française to custom officials, soldiers, native clerks, and interpreters. Teaching often was a part-time, off-duty job for extra pay. Frequently school supervisors were non-professional administrators, custom officials and army officers. Financial and material support varied according to the region. In the hinterlands, populated by the Moslems, the support largely came from the Alliance and local budgets as well as from the Ministry of War (Army). Schools along the coasts were usually conducted by Catholic Orders subsidized through the local budgets, by the Alliance and the metropolitan government. A synopsis of the situation in various colonies follows.¹

¹The sources occasionally vary in detail. For example, three different sources give the opening date of the first school in Libreville as 1850, 1864, and 1880. The first instance involved a one-teacher affair

In Senegal, the oldest of the Sub-Saharan French African colonies, ten primary schools with less than 1,000 pupils existed in 1900. With one exception, they were conducted by missionaries in the coastal region, usually in non-Moslem areas or where a significant number of French resided. The Brothers of Ploermel at Saint-Louis ran a modest junior high or higher primary school endowed with twelve boarding scholarships. The local government provided about 100 scholarships for secondary studies in France, but these were primarily allotted to French children. About twenty natives attended trade schools in France on local scholarships. Aside from this, approximately 500 natives followed adult education courses to learn French.

In Sudan the school situation varied according to the military commander's zeal as well as to events beyond his control. Between 1886 and 1888, the Commanding Officer there, Lieutenant-Colonel Gallieni, followed Faidherbe's system and opened six schools under the supervision of local district military commanders. The teachers were soldiers or native interpreters and the pupils were usually sons of the local chiefs and their subjects. The schools were referred to as language schools because the main subject was French. Due to the lack of equipment and materials, the method of instruction often consisted of taking the pupils on walks and linking French terms to concrete objects and actions. This active and concrete method appears to have contributed to the success of the schools, all of which contained thirty to forty pupils. In each case,

which appears to have died out. A Catholic source states that the Sisters of Saint-Joseph of Cluny founded the first school there in 1864. The year 1880 appears to be the approximate date marking the beginning of local continuous mission education.

between seven to twelve children were reported to read and write French fairly fluently and perform the basic operations of arithmetic. A small annual cash grant from the Alliance française supplemented the buildings, equipment, and food rations provided by the Ministry of War. The school plants were primitive, often without desks and chairs. The pupils slept on the floor of their classrooms in many cases. According to an official report,¹ ink wells, pens, pencils, maps, and books were valued as priceless objects in the territory.

A reorganization of the financial structure of the territory moved the next governor, Lieutenant-Colonel Archinard, to close all the military-operated schools in 1890 with the exception of the School of Hostages at Kayes. This institution survived only because it was directly supported by the Alliance. Admitting his neglect of the school in a letter to Pierre Foncin dated 1894,² Governor Grodet, the first civilian in the position, wrote that he hoped to alleviate the poor condition of the school by means of the local budget. However, no action was taken until the arrival of the next governor, Lieutenant-Colonel de Trentinian, in 1895. In a letter to all his district commanders, de Trentinian stressed the political value of educating a native elite:

Give to these young men, who already possess prestige because of their name, a training and an education which will, in the future, render them precious agents of our government. . . . While giving their life a simplicity which is proper for the black society, it is necessary at the same time to maintain the distance which exists between them and the other classes of the society. . . . As soon as they [the principles of French civilization] have penetrated their minds, the pupils shall be quite

¹Government General of French West Africa, L'Enseignement en A.O.F., op. cit., p. 12.

²Ibid., p. 13.

superior to their fellow citizens and forever devoted to our cause.

In order that we may profit from this superiority and devotion, it is necessary that, at the age of maturity, they return to their milieu without too many regrets . . . and find the means of rapprochement between the white and the black, in short, be the intermediaries or the missionaries who will slowly but surely sow the seed of the future civilization.¹

The governor went on to claim that the Moslem graduates would make much better missionaries, as far as converting the Islamic population to the French cause was concerned, than the White Fathers operating in the region. He explained that the former pupils could circulate freely with the Koran in hand, proving that the God of Mohammed and Christ were the same and that the Prophet never preached hatred for the infidel. After completing the rehabilitation of the Kayes school, de Trentinian established twenty small schools in an attempt to provide the masses with the rudiments of French. In order to include some vocational education, he also opened a school at the Army Engineer and Artillery workshop at Kayes and at the Navy shop at Koulikora in 1896 and 1897 respectively. Unfortunately, when the metropolitan decree of October 17, 1899 divided certain regions of Sudan among the coastal colonies, the division of responsibility and distance from the government seats retarded further educational progress.

In Guinea, Catholic schools were established beginning in 1886, with the first one being subsidized by the colony of Senegal. Except for those in the city of Conakry, these were boarding schools. The Chief of the Customs Service of Guinea, the acting School Supervisor, reported the following to the governor in 1901 after visiting two of these schools:

¹Ibid., pp. 14-15.

"The pupils are used like servants. They are taught to speak Latin, but they do not know a word of French."¹

The children of the best families of Conakry were sent to an English school situated on a nearby island. In Conakry itself, because of the closeness of Freetown, Sierra Leone, a good portion of the population spoke English and English money and measures were employed in commercial transactions. In December, 1901, Governor Cousturier passed an ordinance making it obligatory to teach French in all private schools. At the same time, he invited the Brothers of Ploermel from Senegal to open a school in a large public building in Conakry. When the religious zeal of the Brothers brought accusations of intolerance from the Moslem, Protestant and pagan elements, the local administration invited the French Protestant missionaries to accommodate these factions. By 1902 the Protestant school proved so successful it had to be moved to larger facilities.

The first school was established in the Ivory Coast in 1887 and six years later three schools were in existence. Governor Binger saw that schools were opened in all major population centers of the colony. As a result, a total of thirteen schools were soon operational. The teachers, in all but two of the schools, were customs service personnel who received a monthly salary supplement of twenty francs for their work. Native monitors taught in the other two schools.

The successors to Governor Binger failed to follow up his intensive efforts in the field of education and, as the original lay teachers

¹Ibid., p. 17.

returned to France, mission schools replaced the public institutions.

In Dahomey the first schools, a public and a Catholic school, opened in 1865. The former failed after a few months because of poor direction. At about the same time, a Protestant school was opened. The next recorded educational event of significance was the establishment of a permanent commission of public education, which promptly advised Governor Ballot that the language of instruction in the Protestant school was English. Governor Ballot then forced the school to import French-speaking instructors. After 1890, a half-dozen village schools operated intermittently in the interior, with the instructors first being military personnel and then native interpreters.

The first schools in Gabon were operated by French Catholic and American Protestant missionaries. Control over these schools was established by the ordinance of April 9, 1883 which stipulated that instruction was to be given exclusively in French and that French language study was to consume at least one half of the instructional time. The same ordinance instituted a certificate of primary studies to be awarded after a public examination. This examination naturally was based upon a French curriculum. By 1890 there were ten Catholic and two Protestant French mission schools in the Gabon-French Congo coastal regions.

This brief review of educational progress in the various colonies demonstrates the confused and atomistic approach to Sub-Saharan colonial development characteristic of the period. The colonies had obviously outgrown the organizational structures designed for their administration, both in the Metropole and in the field. Hence, the establishment of the Ministry of Colonies in 1894 was almost immediately followed by the

formation in 1895 of a federal government to coordinate the development of West Africa. However, it was not until 1902 that the supremacy of the government-general was clearly defined. It is not surprising, therefore, that the comprehensive plan for French West African education was formulated and inaugurated in 1903.

The Major Reform of Colonial Education. The struggle between the conservative and liberal political forces within the Third Republic concluded in 1879 when the former lost both the Senate and the Presidency after losing the Chamber of Deputies in 1877. The liberals proceeded to establish a more universal and democratic system of education. For example, a law of June 16, 1881 stipulated that public primary education should be free while that of March 28, 1882 instituted compulsory education for all children between the ages of six and thirteen. Other laws were passed to establish public normal schools. A law of October 30, 1886 prescribed that teaching positions at all levels in the public schools should be confined to lay personnel. The reaction of the Church, which provided clergy as teachers for the public schools and considered education its prerogative, forced the Republicans into a more extreme anti-clerical position. The conviction of Captain Dreyfus in 1894 and the ensuing crisis, which found the clergy as a group on the losing, conservative side, served to reinforce the anti-clerical attitude culminating in the Parliamentary measure separating Church and State in 1905.

During this same period from about 1880 to 1900, certain leaders interested in colonial affairs were growing increasingly concerned with educational activities of the Church abroad. These men voiced pragmatic arguments for the curtailment of government support of the overseas

missionaries. Their arguments are summarized below:

(1) The missions were primarily engaged in extending the influence and interests of the Roman Catholic Church rather than those of France.

(2) The education offered by the missionaries met neither the needs of the native nor those of the government.

(3) The clergy had little sympathy for indigenous customs and antagonized the natives, particularly the Moslems, but also the animists.

(4) The missionaries had been unable to multiply their schools even with the government support.

(5) A secular system would be inoffensive to the natives and welcomed by them.

One official report¹ stated that after fifty years in Senegal, the Brothers of Ploermel and the Sisters of Saint-Joseph had demonstrated themselves incapable of raising the mental level of the native children. The accusation was also made that the missionaries often exploited the native children as a labor force and taught almost exclusively by rote memory. Instruction of Latin instead of French and the inability to progress in the Moslem areas brought sharp criticisms of the missions by the Metropole.

Many of the most critical were members of the Alliance française, but this organization, being committed to an effort which included religious groups, could not serve as the vehicle for the active expression of such criticism. Hence, on June 8, 1902, the constitutional general assembly of a new organization met for the first time. The new body was

¹Ibid., p. 35.

named the Mission Laïque Française and within seventeen months of its initial meeting, the membership had grown to three thousand. Its first president was Pierre Foncin, who was president of the Alliance française at the same time. The number of powerful political personalities joining the movement, while too great for individual citation, indicate the popularity and strength of the philosophy and purpose behind it. The stated objective was the propagation of secular French education in the colonies and in foreign nations. To implement this goal, the Mission took the following actions:

- (1) The presentation of qualified teacher candidates for positions in primary education to the governors of the colonies and French representatives in foreign nations.
- (2) The establishment of secular schools under the direct control of the Mission in the colonies and in foreign nations.
- (3) The encouragement and subsidization of other secular schools with similar aims.
- (4) The creation of a normal school dedicated to the preparation of teachers for overseas posts.

While engaging in all of these activities, it also carried on a campaign of persuasion in governmental and public circles. The Mission, as in the case of the Alliance, received the sanction and cooperation of the government, although its controversial nature and difficulties inherent in the implementation of its aims rendered such cooperation difficult.

The advent and activities of the Alliance française and the Mission Laïque Française, vehicles of an aggressive, nationalistic elite of educators, intellectuals, and politicians, contributed to an explicit

formulation of national purpose in terms of overseas education. These activities also helped publicize the competition between France and other powers, notably England but including, in a minor way, America, in the struggle to capture the minds of the natives in Sub-Saharan Africa. The inadequacies of official French efforts in this warfare and the problems of effecting functional education in the colonies drew considerable attention as well.

Both of these organizations had a common objective: the world-wide propagation of French culture by overseas education through official and private channels. The Alliance represented a united French attack on the problem, while the Mission Laique advocated a secularized and official approach to it.

In Pierre Foncin one finds the exemplar of all these expressions. Founder, first Secretary-General, and subsequent President of the Alliance, he became first President of the Mission Laique. In his official capacity, Foncin was the Inspector-General of French Education and Vice-Chairman of the National Consultative Committee for Colonial Education. His statement of the purpose of French overseas educational strategies, made in 1900, was as follows:

If the administrative, economic and financial autonomy of the colonies appears to me to be very desirable, it is perhaps all the more necessary to attach them to the Metropole by a very solid psychological bond, against the day when their progressive emancipation ends in a form of federation as is probable--that they be, and they remain, French in language, thought, and spirit.¹

Starting with this ultimate objective, Foncin proceeded to detail the measures required for its implementation. Its achievement necessitated

¹Foncin, op. cit., p. 3.

that the control and conduct of colonial education rest with the State, according to Foncin. However, he stressed that the secularization of education in the colonies should proceed gradually in order to avoid jeopardizing France's position in the race for the conquest of indigenous minds. He suggested organizational reforms at both the metropolitan and colonial level to carry out the program and a means of transferring metropolitan teachers into the colonial service. He thought that educational costs should be classified by the Metropole as obligatory expenditures of the local colonial budgets and that the Metropole should contribute to the costs by annual subsidies. Such subsidies would not only encourage local financial efforts, but cause the Parliament and metropolitan public opinion to reflect upon the problems of colonial education. Foncin noted that, despite its capital importance, there existed a general apathy toward the question in the Metropole.

He proposed a nuclear organization of colonial schools with the main regional schools being conducted by French teachers with native assistants. The French teachers would also supervise the smaller elementary language schools located in the region. These language schools, together with adult language courses, should be conducted on a mass scale. As the title suggests, the curriculum of the language schools would consist primarily of French while that of the regional schools would combine a more complete elementary education with vocational-technical training. Foncin stressed the importance of avoiding the development of malcontents and rebels. If this could be done, he pointed out, the colonial administrators hostile to native education could no longer repeat the classic

phrase: "Instruction is not good for the people."¹

Referring to colonial secondary education, largely reserved for the French youth, Foncin decried the classical curriculum of such schools.

It is very true but little understood, even in France, that education should be appropriate to those destined to receive it. Failure to meditate upon this fundamental verity, has led to the creation, at great expense, of a deluxe education for the young colonials, an education too slavishly copied from the models of Paris or Carpentras, and unrelated to what is most important for them to learn.²

Foncin proposed a new type of secondary education for the colonies which would be neither classical, because of the absence of the dead languages, nor modern, because of the de-emphasis of literature. He dubbed his creation colonial secondary education because the emphasis would be upon professional preparation for colonial careers such as plantation management and engineering. Many of Foncin's proposals were incorporated into the comprehensive West African Educational Plan of 1903. Secondary education for the French colonialists, however, followed the edict of a former Minister of Industry, Commerce and the Colonies, Jules Roche, who had pronounced the following concerning colonial education at secondary level in 1890: "It is important that the course of studies followed in our colonies be the same as that followed in the Metropole."³

The pressures upon the metropolitan government culminated on January 22, 1903 when the Chamber of Deputies passed a resolution calling

¹Ibid., p. 9.

²Ibid., p. 10.

³France, Archives F.O.M., File SA 240, Report to the President of the French Republic, November 18, 1890.

upon the Minister of Colonies to secularize the schools in all the colonies. Before the year was out, comprehensive plans to this effect were officially enacted in both French West Africa and Madagascar.

In response to the resolution, the plan for West Africa was worked out by the Minister of Colonies and the Governor-General in the fall of 1903. This was revealed by Minister Doumergue in a speech before the Mission Laique on November 22, 1903,¹ in which he confided that Governor-General Roume had agreed with him upon a plan for the organization of a secular system of education for West Africa. The Minister added that Roume had recently left Paris with approximately thirty-five primary teachers in order to implement the new policy at once. On November 28, 1903, Roume issued two ordinances organizing public education in the colonies and territories of West Africa.

The new plans were aimed at reversing the literary character of education which had been thoroughly condemned by Governor Camille Guy of Senegal as ineffective and destructive. One of his reports included the following paragraph:

A young Senegalese who knew all about the towns situated on the Loire and the principal events of the Hundred Years' War could not tell the principal stages of the Senegal River or give any indication of the actual institutions of France. Everywhere there was a verbal and conventional education and a constant appeal to mechanical memory and nowhere was there an education adapted to the needs of West Africa and of the populations who received it.²

The Organization of West African Public Education, 1903.³ The new system, as detailed in two ordinances dated November 24, 1903 and

¹Gaston Doumergue, "L'Enseignement Laique et les Colonies," Revue de l'Enseignement Colonial, No. 1, January-February, 1904, p. 5.

²Roberts, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 320.

³This system is presented here as a manifestation of metropolitan policy and as a basic, continuing model of public education in French Sub-Saharan Africa.

published four days later,¹ included four levels of education divided into one track for the Africans and another for the French and selected assimilated Africans and mulattoes. This latter track conducted by French personnel followed a metropolitan course of study. Native schools in Moslem areas were to include instruction in Arabic. The system consisted of the primary, the vocational, the first-cycle secondary and commercial, and the normal school levels.

At the primary level, the schools were of three types: village, regional, and urban. The village schools, to be established wherever sufficient children were concentrated, would have Africans as teachers except in the schools large enough to warrant a Frenchman as a teaching principal or full-time principal. The curricular emphasis was upon oral French followed by reading, writing, and arithmetic, with the language instruction including terminology centering on agriculture.

The regional schools, to be located at district administrative centers and other important towns, were to have a broader curriculum with an emphasis upon a more formal study of French. Recent French history, particularly as it related to West Africa, was to be taught as well as an introduction to the physical and natural sciences. These latter subjects were to include information about local agriculture and industries. A special vocational course was to be attached to those schools where the existence of a local workshop made this feasible. These schools were to have French principals assisted by French or African teachers according to the situation. In addition to pupils from

¹Senegal, Journal Officiel du Sénégal et Dependances, No. 152, 48th Year, November 28, 1903, pp. 678-682.

the immediate locality, the best pupils from the rural village schools could be sent to the regional school for further training.

The third type of primary school is described below:

Article 12: Schools opened or to be opened in all towns with a sufficient European or assimilated element to justify their establishment will receive the name of "urban schools."

In principle, the personnel of these schools are to be exclusively European. The course of study is to be that of the primary schools of the Metropole although certain modifications may be permitted to meet local needs.¹

No annual promotions were to be effected in these metropolitan-type schools without the approval of both the principal and the teachers after a review of the grades received by each pupil throughout the year. If a pupil failed to be promoted upon a second attempt, he could be dropped from school. A school-leaving examination with a certificate analogous to that of the Metropole was to be established. For those graduates receiving the certificate, further study was available in a special course within the school.

Vocational education was to be provided in two types of schools, although as the ordinance reveals, the first type of school was, in fact, a course to be initiated by each colony wherever existing workshops made it feasible.

These elementary vocational schools, in any case, are not to be organized as distinct institutions; they are to constitute simply a special section of the regional school. . . .²

A Higher Vocational School, the Finet-Laprade School at Dakar, was to serve all of the colonies of West Africa. Its objective was to produce skilled craftsmen in wood, metal, and stone work.

¹Ibid., p. 678.

²Ibid.

First-cycle secondary and commercial education, given at the Faidherbe School at Saint-Louis, was to be organized into a common general education track followed by three specialized tracks. A commercial track and an administrative track to prepare native students for employment in the Public Works, Customs, Postal, and Secretariat-General Services of the colonies were to be supplemented by a track of lower secondary studies to prepare French students for the upper grades of the metropolitan secondary schools. In order to gain admittance to this latter track, the students had to take a special examination after their first year at the Faidherbe School before a committee of teachers headed by the Chief of Education for West Africa. The curriculum of this track was to consist of Latin, Greek, history, and geography, similar to the first cycle of the metropolitan secondary schools. The school personnel was to include two teachers with degrees in literature, one of whom was to be the principal, two foreign language teachers, two science teachers, and one teacher for commercial subjects.

The normal school at Saint-Louis had responsibility for preparing West African native elementary school teachers for the training of interpreters, Moslem magistrates, and chiefs. An entrance examination was required for all candidates except the sons of chiefs. A common course of study was to be followed by special professional education. The teacher-training program was to be similar to that of the Metropole except for local modifications. After student-teaching, in the schools of Saint-Louis whenever possible, the teacher-candidates were to serve as assistant teachers in the regional schools for one year prior to being assigned to a village school.

The ordinance established a parallel system for girls, although its development remained more a matter of local option. Special provisions for the education of French and selected assimilated girls were similar to those arranged for the boys.

The Mission Schools as Instruments of French Imperialism. On March 21, 1904, a bill was passed in the Chamber of Deputies after a lively debate which continued governmental financial support for the training of Catholic mission teachers for service in the colonies and in foreign lands. The rationale for the support, at a time of strong French reaction against the Church, was explained by Eugène Étienne, Vice-President of the Chamber, in a letter to the executive committee of the Mission Laïque. Étienne, President of the Colonial Group of the Chamber as well as of the Mission Laïque, defended the action as follows:

The amendment of M. Leygues, for which I voted, is not aimed at destroying secular education as you seem to fear. It is designed to permit mission education to combat against the education of the foreign missionaries in certain colonies and foreign nations until we are able to replace it with secular education.

If it had not been adopted, we would have witnessed this spectacle: in Egypt, in Asia Minor, in Asia, in Madagascar, on the west coast of Africa, all of the children would have passed from the hands of French missionaries into those of the English, Norwegian, Italian, German, and American missions. . . . It is a delaying action and a measure of national defense, nothing else.¹

A Major Policy Statement for the Congo, 1906. If the situation in West Africa appeared to be satisfactory, that in the Congo was not. The abuse of the natives by both the concessionaire companies and government officials became so extreme and notorious that a national scandal resulted. The report of de Brazza, sent by the metropolitan government

¹From a letter published in Revue de l'Enseignement Colonial, No. 2, March-April, 1904, p. 51.

to investigate the situation in 1905, was so strongly critical that it was never published. However, de Brazza's assistant, Challaye, gave this summation:

The Congo natives live in a regrettable condition. The concessionaire companies make them labor for a trifle, using menace or even violence to secure their services; and the government, without rendering a single service, crushes them with taxes and corvees. Instead of being drawn towards the Europeans, as formerly, they doubt them and flee as far as possible.¹

This inquiry of de Brazza did cause the Metropole to define its policy for the region, considered as the most backward of the entire Empire. On February 11, 1906, Minister of Colonies Clémentel outlined this policy of reform in lengthy instructions to the Commissioner-General. He began by pointing out that in the past in the Congo it had been necessary to improvise continually: "Events have constantly modified our action; instead of dominating them, we have always been dominated by them."² In order to reverse this state of affairs, the Minister ordered administrative and financial reforms intended to ensure better local control through the creation of four government seats and four local budgets and one general budget. The personnel to staff the enlarged administration was to be borrowed from other African colonies; at the same time, the Colonial School, founded in Paris in 1889 for the training of colonial administrators, was to be expanded to meet long-range personnel needs.

The Minister noted that the existing evidence did not indicate the French would uncover the necessary resources to generate the economic

¹Quoted in Roberts, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 353.

²France, B.O.M.C., No. 43, 1906, p. 142.

takeoff of the Congo in the near future. Clémentel saw the most urgent requirement as the establishment of postal and telegraphic communications, for he claimed:

There are no communications in the Congo; one cannot be informed about what is going on there. . . . My Ministry does not possess sufficient information to know under what conditions, and with what priorities, other public works should be undertaken in the Congo.¹

He did make it clear, however, that the concessionaire companies should be carefully supervised and that the authorities should remember that they alone were responsible for the political situation.

The Minister declared native policy should be different from that proposed for the indigenous peoples of more advanced colonies.

The role of the public authorities is to absolutely prevent the unfortunate consequences of a too abrupt introduction of our customs and of our culture. . . . In the Congo, a long preparation is necessary; we find a population in its infancy and its entire education must be undertaken.²

The Minister did see some advantages in this situation, which he listed as the lack of a national conscience and of the vested interests of an aristocracy. But he quickly added the following warning:

But I also consider that it would be an error to think that, because he has no culture of his own, the Black African should be directly oriented to the French culture. The policy of assimilation, in short, should not be repeated here. Too many differences of mentality, of aptitude, of temperament, separate us from our subjects for us to think of seeing them, even in the distant future, ruled by institutions calculated upon those of the Metropole.³

The task of education, Clémentel pointed out, would be particularly

¹Ibid., p. 148.

²Ibid., pp. 148-149.

³Ibid., p. 149.

delicate under the circumstances. As far as formal education was concerned, he desired it to be oriented strictly toward utility. Noting that he had insisted the concessionnaire companies provide elementary schools in their regions devoted to vocational education, the Minister stated the companies would thereby derive an immediate benefit through the production of semi-skilled labor.

Official schools, to be located in the more accessible regions near French administrative posts, would offer a more advanced vocational and technical education as well as a stress upon French. The educational pyramid was to be topped by a school for the elite which would include such studies as French, industrial and commercial subjects, geography and political organization.

The major obstacle to the development of the economy and education in what became known as French Equatorial Africa was the financial one and the Minister offered two pages of verbiage on this matter which contained little hope for its solution. Public works, he hinted, might be financed through loans. But, with the increase in government personnel of all types, Clémentel admitted the local and general budgets would be heavily burdened. On the other hand, he reasoned, the new personnel would mean an increase in local revenue.

Further, he contended that as the French authority penetrated deeper into various regions, income taxes would be increased and that, with the development of civilization, revenues from indirect taxation would rise as well. The final page of this document amounted to an exhortation for the efficient collection of head taxes. Clémentel suggested the Commissioner-General instruct his tax agents to provide the

natives with the following explanation as to its benefit:

It is first of all a means of acknowledging the Sovereignty of France, a mode of tribute paid to the protecting power; also and above all, it is an assessment for the benefits derived from his submission; among the most important of these benefits are security, justice, acts of assistance, of education, and of economic development.¹

This clear-cut policy, the poverty of the territory, and the principle of locally financed internal development combined to insure the slow development of education in the region. Despite the secularization of education in the Metropole, in French West Africa, and a series of paper ordinances to that effect in French Equatorial Africa, the lack of funds and personnel left the initiative in formal education to the missionaries in the latter colony. While the emphasis, as expressed in the ordinances of 1911, was upon primary and vocational education, the stagnation of the colony resulted in extremely small enrollment figures for many decades.

Native Policy for West Africa. A brochure published by the Government-General of French West Africa in 1912 included a review of native policy which gave the goal of this policy as the moral conquest of the native. The document quoted at length a speech of Governor-General Ponty because of its precise statement of this policy. Excerpts of this speech are reproduced below: ;

Today indisputable principles clearly indicate the direction in which we should seek new progress: respect for the native life, liberty, and family without abandoning him to his native barbarism but, on the contrary, by straining ourselves to gradually elevate him to a better status.

Our duty, in this case, is that of a tutor with his charge, a child occasionally suspicious, often churlish, sometimes cruel,

¹Ibid., p. 153.

but who, to use a favorite expression of mine because it expresses so completely my thoughts, above all needs to be made tractable.¹

The key to this process, according to Ponty, was the selection of good native chiefs. These chiefs should be chosen from the tribal groups which they were to command. Ponty stressed that the effectiveness of French native policy was dependent upon the effectiveness of the native chiefs. Then he emphasized the need to destroy certain native leadership structures:

We must destroy all dominance of one race upon another, one ethnic group upon another. We must fight the influence of the local aristocracies in order to ensure for ourselves the sympathies of the communities. We must suppress the major native laws which almost always represent a barrier between us and the mass of our subjects, to the advantage of the Moslem clergy in those countries where Islam already has deep roots.²

The document reinforced Ponty's policy expression by concluding that, in order to give the native confidence that his best interests lay with the French, it was necessary to "remove the forces which suppress him in his own milieu, notably the major political and religious leaders."³

This effort to replace indigenous rule with French supremacy obviously placed the schools in a strategic role. Noting that French administration and French justice ran the risk of remaining unrecognized as long as the interpreter continued to be the medium of Franco-African communication, the section of the document dealing with native education carried this statement:

¹L'A.O.F.: Gouvernement Général, L'A.O.F. au début de 1912, 1912, p. 13.

²Ibid., pp. 13-14.

³Ibid., p. 14.

The circulars of February 21, 1909, of August 30 and October 31, 1910 testify to the Government-General's concern for the diffusion of our language which it regards as the critical necessary condition to the success of our action in West Africa.¹

The French Spirit of Evangelism. The strong evangelistic impulse to share the values of French civilization with the rest of the world received a new impetus through the channels of the Alliance Francaise, the Mission Laique Francaise, and the new elaborate plans for public colonial education. These channels gave promise of promulgating civilization on a worldwide scale. Lucien Hubert, prominent member of the Chamber of Deputies, expressed it this way in a speech before a general meeting of the Mission Laique:

If, in the areas of military, administrative, and economic colonization, we can have, not superiors but rivals, in what I would call intellectual colonization our superiority is incontestable.²

After referring to how the Gauls assimilated their early military conquerors through the strength of their culture, Hubert noted that long after the abandonment of former French colonies such as Canada and Louisiana, "the French language, thought, and spirit remained intact; there our former compatriots . . . have never forgotten their old fatherland, France, the fatherland of humanity."³ Speaking of the indigenous peoples of the colonies, Hubert made a prediction:

The day will come when these peoples, numbed by long suffering, shall awaken to civilization and shall regard our country as its true source.⁴

¹ Ibid., p. 15.

² Lucien Hubert, "La Colonisation Intellectuelle," Revue de l'Enseignement Colonial, No. 1, January-March, 1905, pp. 1-3.

³ Ibid., p. 2.

⁴ Ibid., p. 3.

He concluded by comparing France's action toward the backward peoples to the influence of ancient Greek civilization upon France and the rest of Europe. Hubert's attitude was not a singular one, as an article by an overseas educator, Brangier, indicates. The latter, writing on native education in 1906, made the following comments:

France, a long time ago, assigned herself a role which she shall continue to fulfill, . . . the role of assisting the weak, freeing the slaves, instructing the ignorant, rendering dignity to the outcast, demonstrating by practice that fraternity is not an empty word. She is today at the head of the nations desiring universal peace. . . . She shall remain the great fraternal and generous nation, ready to spill her blood or her gold in the cause of justice.

Our role, as colonial teachers, is first to demonstrate the preceding verities to our native students; then to stimulate the noble desire to imitate that in which we excel, and, finally, to fortify this desire through all the resources of a rational pedagogy.¹

Brangier then proceeded to the means of accomplishing the task:

One of the powerful means which will aid us to fulfill our role is the rich and varied literature of our country--literature appropriate to all ages, all conditions, I would say, almost to all peoples. Numerous are the principles planted in the world by French books and, if it is true that, to obtain perfection in a work, one must add to a solid content, clarity, order, and elegant form, how many of our books--it has been said that France alone knows how to create them--how many of our books are, from every standpoint, worthy of being read or studied by our black and yellow school pupils.²

Next treating the question of whether French should be taught to the mass or only the elite, Brangier listed three general principles including the following:

All have the right to the moral and intellectual development which French provides, the language par excellence of broad and elevated ideas, of a rational and complete culture.³

¹M. Brangier, "But et Methode de l'Enseignement du Francais aux Indigenes des Colonies," Revue de l'Enseignement Colonial, No. 6, 1906, pp. 39-40.

²Ibid., p. 40.

³Ibid.

One serious question which faced the French in the field of native education was the problem of transferring the native from the indigenous to a form of the French culture without turning him into a product useless to the French and to himself. Brangier, along with most of the experts, agreed that acculturation had to proceed slowly. Speaking of relations with the natives, Brangier cautioned his countrymen:

. . . Be provisionally respectful of their more or less strange traditions, of their more or less absurd prejudices (at least, when they hold no danger for them and for us). . . .¹

If these suggestions were heeded, Brangier believed the natives could be developed more or less according to the French wishes. And, he pointed out that acculturation was a necessity.

But, if we should not deracialize them or make them social outcasts, it is proper to Frenchify them to a certain degree; they will not be really useful except in this condition.²

The Opposition to Native Education. If the liberals, the intellectuals, and the educators favored native education, they were not unopposed. The opposition, while rather inarticulate, was real and effective. Indeed, there existed little need for eloquence, for the opposition operated from positions of importance at the colonial level. In 1904, the Chief of the Education Service in Senegal, Risson, blamed the long indifference of the local administration and the lack of concern of the great commercial interests for the stagnation of native education.³ Other authors agree that the principle of native education was generally

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³M. Risson, "La Reforme de l'Enseignement au Sénégal," Revue de l'Enseignement Colonial, No. 5, September-November, 1904, p. 131.

avored in the Metropole, but came in for sharp criticism at the colonial level. For example, a former Chief of Education in French India, in an article on the role of the school in colonization, stated the problem as follows:

It is not rare to hear criticism, even clear disapproval of the metropolitan efforts to maintain and expand education in our overseas territory. These criticisms, few and moderate on the continent, sometimes assume a character of marked hostility in the colonies.

How many times have I not had to refute opinions such as the following: "What need is there to educate the natives? You will make them lazy; and then, you give them the weapons with which to destroy you."¹

As the flow of teachers to West Africa began through the efforts of the Alliance, and the Mission Laïque, and subsequently, of the Government, feedback from these educators brought to light many conditions in the field which had previously found space only in confidential official reports or which had gone unnoticed outside of a very small circle of interested parties. The lack of funds, equipment, and adequate school plants obviously drew comments. The organization and competence of the colonial civil administration came under sharp criticism, for France was in the throes of organizing Sub-Saharan Africa in the decades immediately preceding and following the turn of the century. The new overseas educators often found themselves in a conflict of philosophy and interests with the local administrators. One report from Guinea reveals this problem. The reporter, M. Deshayes, began by stating that, while seeking to keep the report objective and impartial, he was obliged to point out the hostility which the educators had encountered. Contending that a troublesome

¹M. Ferrier, "Colonisons par l'Ecole," Revue de l'Enseignement Colonial, No. 1, February 1907, pp. 13-14.

atmosphere prevailed in the colonies, he gave the following explanation:

There exists two categories of civil servants: those of the native administration (administrators, assistants, clerks) and those belonging to a metropolitan staff such as postmasters, customs officials, doctors, and teachers. An extreme jealousy divides these two groups and creates a state of permanent warfare between them.¹

He then told of witnessing three or four Frenchmen, at a post in the bush, living in a state of perpetual dispute. This state of affairs, Deshayes insisted, was not limited to a vendetta between the teachers and the administrators but existed between the other services and the administrators as well. The effect of this situation was reported as follows:

It is one of the great secret evils of our colonies; these daily quarrels paralyze our efforts and impede effective collective action.²

Deshayes described the administrators in the bush as being endowed with an absolute authority which they usually lacked the competence to apply with intelligence and justice. Teachers, for example, were supervised and evaluated by these administrators, whom Deshayes characterized as typically former butchers, gardeners, and non-commissioned officers. He suggested this problem might be partially solved by the creation of a chief of education within each colony to whom the teachers would be directly responsible. This, however, would not remove the friction with the administrators, whom Deshayes continued to attack:

If it is necessary to uncover further reasons for the disputes to which I have referred, I would seek them in the avowed hostility to native education on the part of far too many administrators, irreducible partisans of the systematic stultification of the indigenuous peoples.³

¹M. Deshayes, "L'Enseignement Laique en Guinée," Revue de l'Enseignement Colonial, No. 4, August, 1906, p. 109.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

He gave as an example the passive resistance of the local Governor who, though accepting a group of educators directed to the Colony by the Government-General at Dakar, was unaware of their arrival and did not know where to use them once they had arrived. The Secretary-General of the Colony was described as being more active in his opposition:

He sent a circular to all the district officers ordering that no expenditures be made for the schools, and he expressed his doubts to me by sharply recommending that I restrict myself to "oral lessons given in the shade of a tree." We all found, at the various posts, requests were opposed by the force of inertia. It was then that I turned to you (the Mission Laïque) and had the pleasure of receiving a little more sympathy; but your collaboration must have been without results because today, after seventeen months, the only equipment the school possesses is a blackboard.¹

The reaction of the natives to the school posed another problem, according to Deshayes. In general, the natives associated French schools with education in the Christian religion; this assumption was difficult to dispel because the available textbooks dealt primarily with Christian subjects and the native parents were, at the time, insufficiently sophisticated to distinguish a secular school from the Catholic mission schools. Governor Camille Guy of Senegal had referred to the same problem in terms of the French themselves when he noted that there had always existed considerable confusion as to whether native education had as its objective religious conversion or national assimilation.² Deshayes noted that, aside from the religious problem which was particularly pronounced in the Moslem regions, the native parents were fearful that French education would tend to cause a psychological or cultural separation between

¹Ibid.

²Guy advocated the latter objective along with Governor-General Roume, who initiated the Comprehensive Public Education Act of 1903 for French West Africa. Both Guy and Roume were members of the Mission Laïque.

them and their children. Since the French schools were often boarding schools, they also expressed concern over the physical separation from their children.

The problems recited by Deshayes were not distorted accounts by a malcontent, for other narratives contain similar substance. Their nature was treated at length by the late Georges Hardy, who encountered them during his service as Inspector of Education for French West Africa. After crediting the support of several governors-general as significant in the development of West African education despite many obstacles, Hardy had this to add:

. . . But it has not been the same with all the representatives of the Administration; there are those, of very good faith, who are persuaded that education and domination are antithetical. . . . It is their right to reason badly, but their philosophy translates itself into the suppression of schools, a diminution or stagnation of educational budgets and a thousand annoyances. And one can do nothing against this underhanded opposition.¹

Hardy recounted that a long and perilous path lay between the orders or instructions of a governor-general and their ultimate application. This problem was particularly acute in the field of education because of local opposition and the seldom known fact that neither the Chief of Education for the Federation nor those of the local colonies had any direct authority; they were merely advisers to the Governor-General or the local governors, and powerless to act directly as in the case of their counterparts in the Metropole. To these particular obstacles, Hardy added a long and varied list which cannot be treated here.

¹Georges Hardy, Une Conquête Morale (Paris: Armand Colin, 1917), p. 24.

Pre-War Concern for Colonial Education. During the first decade of the twentieth century, interest and activities in colonial education resulted in the production of a great volume of information on the subject. In addition to a mass of unofficial reports from the field carried in professional journals, the advent of metropolitan colonial education, that is, education in France to prepare Frenchmen for service overseas in areas such as administration, education, and tropical agriculture, generated numerous pertinent commentaries. A small sampling of such information has already been presented.

From the many criticisms of French overseas education, there emerged two consistent suggestions for the improvement of the service. One was the need to establish a special agency for colonial education within the Ministry of Colonies headed by a high-ranking French educator, while the second related proposal consisted of the establishment of a similar structure in each of the colonies. Educational development was pictured as being at the mercy and whims of the governors and district officers in the colonies and without adequate professional leadership derived from the Metropole.

In 1907, Minister Leygues, in a move to meet such criticism, established a permanent secretariat for the Superior Consultative Committee for Public Instruction in the Colonies. According to a Parliamentary report, the Committee was responsible for the examination of all questions relating to colonial education. The permanent secretariat, to be chaired by the Vice-President of the Committee, was placed under the direct authority of the Secretary-General of the Ministry. It was charged with the study, advisement, and follow-up of some ten

specific activities including these listed below:

Correspondence of the Minister and instructions for the governors regarding education.

Preparation of ministerial decrees and ordinances, examination of local ordinances (of each colony) concerning the organization of education and the personnel situation.

Examination of the courses of study.¹

The effectiveness of this type of system was subjected to serious criticism because of the problem of convening the various Committee members who had other primary responsibilities. By 1914 the situation of colonial education caused Deputy Candace to introduce a bill for its improvement in Parliament. Candace noted that various colonial representatives had frequently called the attention of the Parliament and the Government to the necessity of organizing the colonial education system upon a solid basis. He then referred to various metropolitan educational reforms which had never been extended to the colonies and commented as follows:

We know that, in certain colonies, the teaching personnel is discouraged; in others the educational equipment has fallen into ruins or is almost non-existent.²

Pointing out that the Minister of Colonies was, without a doubt, aware of these problems, Candace continued:

He must be affected by the absence of an agency within the Central Administration of the Ministry of Colonies specializing in the administration of a service so important as that of education, by the lack of a pedagogical section sensitive to the modern development and the moral and material needs of our various colonies.³

¹Extract of a Parliamentary Report by Deputy Gervais published in Revue de l'Enseignement Colonial, No. 2, April, 1907, p. 34.

²M. Candace, Proposition de Loi, No. 3601 (Chambre des Deputes, Session de 1914), pp. 1-2.

³Ibid., p. 2.

In a review of the Central Administration of the Ministry, Candace concluded that educational affairs received inadequate treatment because the responsibility for resolving the problems fell upon a variety of administrative sections with other primary interests. The proposals contained in Candace's bill included the creation of a special education service within the Central Administration headed by an Inspector-General of Public Instruction and the automatic application of metropolitan educational personnel laws and school equipment regulations to the colonies. It also would have rendered as compulsory expenditures of the local colonial budgets, the costs of educational development as prescribed by the Metropole. The drastic nature of these provisions, particularly the latter two, caused the bill to be shelved.

Educational developments in French Sub-Saharan Africa were not to receive a fresh impetus until near the conclusion of the First World War. At least an extensive framework for public education had been developed for West Africa based upon the cumulative experiences of almost a century. If the problems and obstacles blocking the complete and smooth functioning of the structure remained unresolved, few people were seriously concerned, because educational development was viewed as a long-term project.

The Impact of the First World War. The important part played by the colonies in the First World War stirred the imagination of the whole of France. The stay-at-home Frenchman had concrete evidence of the existence of the Empire for the first time in the form of masses of colonial troops. The widespread anti-colonialism in the Metropole which had been reactivated by the dramatic Congo Scandal of 1905¹ and the

¹Roberts, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 355.

concurrent vagueness in the mind of the average Frenchman as to the value and role of colonies was greatly dissipated. The spectacular evidence of the viability of the Empire shifted the balance of public opinion and made a more vigorous pursuit of colonial affairs possible.

In addition to this manpower contribution, the colonies provided tangible support of the war effort through significant purchases of war bonds and substantial flow of raw materials. Beyond these efforts, many of the colonies adopted the destroyed French villages and subsidized their rehabilitation. With the realization of the colonial economic value went the understanding that production depended upon the skills and goodwill of the native. Both humanitarian and purely economic considerations reinforced one another and focused French attention upon native policy. Henry Simon, Minister of Colonies, commented as follows:

The interest of France . . . necessitates that we develop to the highest possible degree the natives of those territories where we know that the French will never immigrate except in small numbers. Universal opinion, after a war in which men of all colors and all regions of the globe have given their lives for the same just cause, has fixed its attention upon the lot of the populations of inferior or retarded civilizations; it will no longer tolerate delays or negligence in the task of moral and material improvement which is the responsibility of all civilized nations.¹

Simon left no doubt as to the importance of education in this postwar colonial policy:

The basic, the first requirement of this task lies with education. The development of our colonies must begin with the development of the individual through education.²

The Minister indicated that the pre-war accomplishments marked only the beginnings of a huge and necessary undertaking. Included in this new

¹France, B.O.M.C., Instruction Publique, May 8, 1919, 1919, p. 750.

²Ibid.

effort as outlined by Simon was to be the rapid expansion of elementary education until enrollment reached a normal figure, and the development of secondary and higher education. Noting that the colonial governments had generally understood the importance of vocational and technical education, in certain cases more so than the Metropole, the Minister nevertheless stressed the need to greatly extend these efforts until the indigenous populations not only could provide their own skilled labor but also their own foremen and even their own engineers.

Inseparable from this task of native education was that of scientific research and preparation of overseas specialists conducted in the Metropole. Simon pointed to the needs in this field:

The dignity of France, its tradition of an intellectual nation par excellence, at the same time, its own interests, demand that it consider Overseas-France as an object of first importance for its savants and its thinkers. In this regard, the accomplishments in certain universities and special schools are still too rare.¹

He proposed that this type of endeavor be multiplied and coordinated to ensure the training of sufficient overseas specialists and to increase scientific research activities relevant to colonial development in breadth and depth. Both the knowledge and the expertise would then be available to assure competent decision-making and effective implementation.

The first step to implement this policy was the inevitable reorganization of the Superior Consultative Committee of Public Instruction for the Colonies. This committee with a larger membership of distinguished authorities, with a variety of skills, would by its composition alone indicate to the colonial populations France's whole-hearted and definite intention to provide them with the instruments of prosperity, according

¹Ibid., pp. 750-751.

to Simon. The committee would contain three sub-committees of seven to fifteen members dealing with the affairs of personnel, administration and technique.

The Making of Selected Africans into Complete Frenchmen. Simon did not wait long before activating his policy in Sub-Saharan Africa by ordering a complete secondary track for the assimilation of an elite in Senegal. He indicated some pressure from the Africans had been at least partially instrumental in this decision:

Due to the sacrifices of the Africans during the war, it is time to respond to the desires expressed by the populations, and lately with particular insistence, for equality in terms of public education.¹

The Minister noted that the Senegalese had a good case in their demand for equality due to their long and loyal association with France and the excellent results obtained thus far in the provision of a complete French education for a few selected natives. He reasoned further as follows:

There, we shall encounter neither in the intellectual traditions nor in the political aspirations any obstacle to a complete assimilation. In this Africa where France has recently expanded and where an immense future is open to our activities, we should dedicate ourselves to the establishment, wherever possible and as rapidly as possible, of secondary centers of French civilization in the fullest meaning of the term.²

Simon stated that secondary education, which should be reserved for a veritable elite, would be structured in the metropolitan tradition, beginning with primary classes and terminating with a literary or scientific emphasis. Thus, the Minister concluded: "the best indigenous elements, as well as the sons of our colonials, can become complete Frenchmen."³

¹France, B.O.M.C., Instruction Publique, Report of June 20, 1919, 1919, p. 941.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 942.

Actually the ministerial decree effecting the institution of secondary education ordered the establishment of vocational and teacher-training courses as well as a complete traditional metropolitan track from kindergarten through the terminal high school year. The courses of study and regulations for the upper elementary, secondary and teacher-training courses were to be the same as their counterparts in the Metropole except for minor modifications. The administrative staff was to be organized by the Minister of Colonies, but all expenses fell as the responsibility of Senegal. Upper elementary and secondary teachers were to have metropolitan teaching certificates.

Economic Development and Native Education. The appointment of Albert Sarraut to Minister of Colonies on January 20, 1920, was an act completely expressive of the times. The postwar popular recognition of the colonial empire had been followed by an emotional new economic Zeitgeist typified by Premier Millerand's appeal that France had to produce more or disappear as a nation. The Parliament, largely through the efforts of Lucien Hubert, came to realize that the colonies should and could produce more and that the colonial trade should be a monopoly of France. Hubert likened the waste of resources in the colonies to a military defeat. Preceding Ministers of Colonies Andre Maginot and Henri Simon both had planned the economic regeneration of the colonies, but not until after the debates of February 1920, did the Parliament as a whole view economic development as a high-priority necessity. French destinies were seen as dependent upon increased production in which the colonies were to become reservoirs of raw material and outlets for home manufacturers. Albert Sarraut, the master planner, argued as follows:

If France desires to maintain the position in the world to which her past, her power, and her victory entitle her, she must support a general policy based upon a strong program of public works.¹

Sarraut then employed the historical examples of the Romans and Napoleon to lead up to this point:

While the great metropolitan public works contribute only to the "augmentation" of production, the great colonial public works will result in the "creation" of production through the tapping of unexploited riches which are immediately utilizable once they become accessible; these developments, in turn, will permit the progressive exploitation of riches with less immediate return.²

Sarraut and the entire Millerand ministry, composed primarily of technicians with economists playing a leading role, sought to replace the patchwork, discontinuous policy-making practices of the past with coordinated, long-term planning. Thus, a blend of economics and a philosophy of totality resulted in viewing the colonies as a factory system in which each colony became a specialized machine. The principles of mass production were applied to the colonial apparatus. Each region was assigned to a certain range of products and was to receive the necessary public works projects to facilitate that production. The major works were to be in the larger colonies such as Indo-China and West Africa. Equatorial Africa, the most backward of the French colonies, was to be released from its dependence on Belgian Congo through the construction of a railroad from Brazzaville to the sea. The extension of the central railroad in the Cameroons was planned.

The entire package was passed by the Parliament during the spring of 1921. The bill consisted of a statement of principles and detailed list

¹Albert Sarraut, La Mise en Valeur des Colonies Francaises (Paris: Payot, 1923), p. 77.

²Ibid., p. 80.

of public works to be undertaken. The financial aspect of the problem was not considered in the bill. In accordance with French law and tradition, the colonies were to finance their own development. West Africa and Indo-China, with the most ambitious schemes, were in the best financial condition. Equatorial Africa and the Pacific Islands represented the other end of the spectrum, but their projects were both less extensive and less important in the total picture.

Loans from the Metropole financed the overseas economic development and Sarraut, in collaboration with the Minister of Finance, had prepared the way by tightening the metropolitan control over colonial monetary operations through a series of decrees in 1920. In essence, these executive orders established a close, direct relationship between the local controllers and the Ministry of Finance as well as with the Central Administration of the Ministry of Colonies.¹

Sarraut and the Development of Native Education. In the fall of 1920, the dynamic Sarraut proceeded to revitalize colonial educational activities. First, he organized a special section for education within the Ministry of Colonies, an adjunct which various critics of education in the colonies had demanded for decades. The new organ was called the Inspection-Counsel of Public Instruction and was headed by the Inspector-Counselor. Shortly thereafter, Sarraut defined both the national policy for colonial education and the role of each metropolitan and colonial participant in its implementation.

¹Metropolitan loans had been granted prior to this time, but not on the scale required for the implementation of the postwar policy. For example, French Equatorial Africa had been permitted to borrow 21,000,000 francs in 1909 and 171,000,000 in 1914 because of the war emergency, but in 1925 it obtained a loan of 300,000,000 francs.

In a statement to all the colonial governors, Sarraut's opening sentence left no doubt as to his intentions:

The moment has arrived for a new effort, both powerful and methodical, in the development of education in our colonial domain.

My eminent predecessor, Mr. Henri Simon, posed the principle that the basis of native policy lies in education, and that the economic development of our overseas possessions first demands the development of the individual through education.¹

After describing a recent pronouncement of his own in which he reinforced Simon's policy, Sarraut re-emphasized his original appeal:

It is the firmly ordered development of native education which I ask you to strongly promote as a task which, as an aftermath of the war, imperatively demands our concern both from a standpoint of duty and interest.²

The Minister noted that France was under a moral obligation to carry on this work with persistence in gratitude for the war service of the colonies and as a natural duty imposed upon an imperial power, particularly since the Treaty of Versailles had extended the French colonial domain. After concluding his moral appeal, Sarraut turned to the material advantages to be had by the implementation of his policy:

But the fundamental duty to educate our subjects and our indigenous proteges is in harmony with our economic, administrative, military, and political interests.³

In four subsequent paragraphs, the Minister explained how increased native education would serve each of these interests:

First of all, education would considerably improve the value of colonial production by increasing the intellectual capacities and the variety of skills in the mass of colonial laborers; beyond this, it should select and train an elite of auxiliaries from this

¹France, B.O.M.C., Instruction Publique, Circular of October 20, 1920, 1921, p. 5.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

mass who, as technicians, foremen, supervisors, and clerks, would supplement the insufficient numbers of Europeans available at this level and thus satisfy the growing demands of colonial agricultural and commercial enterprises.

A more methodically expanded education should also prepare native personnel for government service, easing the heavy burdens on our colonial budgets which flounder under the numerical increases in European salaries.

It should, in the same way, train the native non-commissioned officers indispensable to the formation of the increasing numbers of colonial troops and to the diffusion throughout the ranks of a clearer perception of the benefits of our civilization--of the profound reasons why it should be served and defended.

Finally, and at the moment when, through the generous and wise application of the policy of association, we progressively open access to the consultative assemblies to native representatives where they will deliberate on collective interests, education should develop within them the faculties and capacities necessary for fruitful collaboration with us.¹

Sarraut informed the governors that they should see to it that education was adapted to local needs and the mentalities of the local races. He noted past experience had demonstrated that the uniform application of identical courses of studies and methods was a serious error. Education should vary according to the degree of evolution of specific populations and knowledge should be fed according to the capacity for its assimilation.

However, Sarraut called attention to a fundamental principle basic to all native education; above all, he emphasized, it should have a practical and realistic nature. While recognizing the need for granting a carefully selected elite access to higher learning, Sarraut left no doubt where the priority lay:

It is of first importance to recognize the economic utility of educating the mass and, in keeping with this essential goal, your efforts should be directed, above everything else, toward an ample development of primary, vocational, and technical education.²

¹Ibid., pp. 5-6.

²Ibid.

The governors were requested to implement this priority without delay and to accelerate the educational progress made to date in their colonies.

While granting the governors initiative in the organization and execution of local education and encouraging them to act, the Minister reminded them that he had a responsibility to direct this task, "upon which the very future of our colonies depends."¹ He added what may have been a warning by noting the importance of the endeavor would force him to exercise a close vigilance over their programs.

First, he explained, there would exist a permanent supervision of local step-by-step efforts leading to the encouragement of progress and to quick reaction in the case of negligence and error. Next, there would be a counseling service on the technical nature of projects which the governors were encouraged to submit to Sarraut whenever they felt the need to consult the source of science and of modern pedagogy which the Metropole represented. Finally, there would be assistance in the matter of personnel and material procurement.

The Office of the Inspector-Counselor was to act as a liaison between the Ministry and other metropolitan agencies to assure the cooperation of the various ministries² in this third area. Sarraut emphasized the priority of the Office was that of recruiting and training personnel required by the governors. Sarraut stressed that the selection of teachers could not remain based upon chance or the exigencies of the moment. He desired a carefully organized recruitment system in order

¹ Ibid., p. 7.

² The Ministries of Public Instruction, Agriculture, Commerce, and the Under-Secretariat of Technical Education.

to obtain teachers of the highest quality and preparation. In order to secure and retain quality personnel, Sarraut observed that the career of the colonial educator had to be made more attractive. Both the problems of recruitment and teacher morale had seriously handicapped the development and quality of overseas education.

The Minister did not leave the application of his enunciated principles entirely to the discretion of the governors. He ordered them to submit to him with the least delay and, at the latest, within five months, a comprehensive report of the actual status of education in their colonies along with a plan for future action. These plans were to include the progressive steps for their implementation and the financial allotments to be made in future budgets for their realization. Sarraut added this word of advice: "You should plan with the profound conviction that expenditures of this nature constitute the most productive of investments."¹

Sarraut advised the governors to include their overseas educators in the development of these plans because of the latter's intimate experiences with the natives. He then included the following questionnaire which the governors should use to survey teacher opinions:

In the training of the native as a man and as a producer:

1. What results have you obtained?
2. If these results appear to be insufficient, why are they?
3. What other or better result do you think possible?
4. By what means could you obtain them?²

The governors were instructed to include the individual responses along with a general analysis of their content in their report to the Ministry.

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 8.

After once again urging the governors to expedite this preparatory work, Sarraut concluded with the following appeal:

I have promised the Parliament an energetic action in this matter. Everywhere much has been accomplished, but nowhere has it been sufficient. France, as its colonies, is counting upon your creative and organizational drive.¹

In a complementary action, the Ministry instigated a campaign of teacher recruitment. Each colony was to submit its needs for personnel quarterly and the Minister would recruit accordingly. The Ministry published a quarterly balance sheet showing the supply and demand situation for all colonies. By 1923 the situation had become sufficiently stabilized to change the recruitment system from a quarterly to an annual basis.

Sarraut's close attention to overseas educational development soon revealed some general weaknesses at the colonial level. For example, the Inspector-Counselor, Paul Crouzet, had to call the attention of the governors to their failure to submit adequate annual reports on the recommendations for teacher promotion. These reports were used as a basis for the final recommendations submitted by the Superior Consultative Committee of Public Instruction for the Colonies on behalf of the Ministry of Colonies to the Ministry of Public Instruction which actually made the final decisions. The reports from the colonies were characterized as incomplete or irrelevant, revealing ignorance or neglect of current metropolitan teacher promotion regulations. As a result, overseas teachers eligible and deserving of promotion were passed over for the year. Subsequent messages from the Central Administration to the governors indicate that this problem was not immediately resolved.

¹Ibid.

Sarraut himself found it necessary to address the governors on the problems of teacher recruitment and placement. His opening statement suggests how the governors were apparently responding to his policy of rapid expansion of native education. Instead of a shortage of metropolitan personnel interested in teaching in the colonies, the Minister stated there existed a large pool of teachers enthusiastic with prospects of overseas service. He became quite blunt at this point:

It is therefore inadmissible that the pretext of a teacher shortage serve as an excuse to retard the development of colonial education as has been the case too often.¹

Sarraut shifted to another problem, the provision of accurate information as to the actual working conditions in the colonies to the teacher candidates and their indoctrination upon arrival. He stressed the absolute necessity of a pre-service initiation to the conditions and methods of native education. The following practices he condemned:

Sometimes teachers have been placed, immediately upon disembarkment and without any preparation, not only in a native school but also in a normal school or in a teacher-training course where, having known only education in France, they are . . . the unprepared instructors of native teachers or monitors in the art of colonial education.²

Metropolitan teachers, Sarraut believed, needed to make a serious study of the native character and aptitude as well as the adapted courses of study and methods prior to teaching. To this end, he instructed all colonies to gather pertinent information for presentation to metropolitan teachers considering overseas employment. The Ministry would also work on this problem, and Sarraut concluded his message on an optimistic note:

¹France, B.O.M.C., Instruction Publique, Circular of February 24, 1921, 1921, p. 354.

²Ibid.

A new era is opening for the noble profession of educator to the indigenous races; but, first, this profession must be precisely defined.¹

A Statement of Priorities and Attitudes. In a message to the Rectors of French universities, Sarraut and Leon Berard, Minister of Public Instruction, notified them of the pending intense development of colonial education which would require a unified effort in order to assure the recruitment of adequate personnel. The Ministers explained their strategies as follows:

Therefore, in the colonies, it is necessary to first plan the extension of primary and vocational education for the mass of the workers, then that of higher primary and technical education for a selection of foremen, and finally that of secondary and even higher education for a carefully selected elite.²

Sarraut and Berard stressed the need for the cooperation of all educational leaders because of the increased needs for teachers both in the Metropole and overseas. They concluded with this proud thought:

For several years, the course of French education has assumed a new nature which is no longer limited to a provincial or even a national horizon. It extends its attention and its action over the entire world and appears, like the French spirit itself, to aspire to the universal. In this expansion of French civilization, the education of the indigenous races under our authority would serve as a capstone.³

Advances in Secondary Education. In 1922 the colonies were permitted to enter the national academic competition for junior and senior secondary students for the first time. According to the announcement, the motives were twofold: to tighten the political ties between

¹Ibid., p. 356.

²France, B.O.M.C., Instruction Publique, Interministerial Circular of July 11, 1921, 1921, p. 1289.

³Ibid., p. 1290.

the motherland and the colonies and to generate an improvement in secondary track education in the colonies. After the first year's competition, with no winners from West Africa, the Ministry of Colonies reported that serious weaknesses in colonial entries were noted in philosophy, Greek, Latin, drawing, and mathematics.

In the spring of 1924, a secondary school-leaving certificate corresponding to the baccalaureate and known as the brevet de capacite colonial was established for West Africa through a decree cosigned by Sarraut and Berard. The initial decree stipulated the juries had to include two members from French higher education ranks, but the following year this was made optional because of the travel distance involved. This decree included provisions for exchanging the brevet for the baccalaureate upon the payment of a fee, evidence of scholastic superiority, and a copy of the candidate's birth certificate. Metropolitan authorities would make the decision and, in questionable cases, the candidate was extended the right to take the baccalaureate examination in France. However, brevet-holders were granted the right to take up to four semesters of course work at a French university prior to regularizing their position by obtaining the baccalaureate. The details of the requirements for the exchange indicate these arrangements were primarily made to benefit French rather than African students.

The Reorganization of West African Education (1924). In 1924 the Governor-General of West Africa was ready to adjust the Federation's system of education to implement the principles of native education as defined by Sarraut. Effected on May 1, 1924, the reorganization represented a moderate revision of the basic 1903 plan which had already been slightly modified

by previous ordinances in 1912 and 1918. It put further emphasis upon the expansion of spoken French for the masses, the incorporation of more practical knowledge in the curriculum, notably in the fields of hygiene and agriculture, and in the preparation of native civil servants.

In reference to the first goal, Governor-General Carde proclaimed the following:

French should be imposed upon a greater number of natives. Its study is hereby made mandatory for all future chiefs. In addition, one should be able to meet, in the most distant villages, not only a chief, but at least a few natives capable of expressing themselves in rudimentary French.¹

The village schools were responsible for the mass diffusion of spoken French which was to be taught in a minimum time of three to four years in order to produce a maximum number of French-speaking natives. The elementary and regional schools, providing five to eight years of study, had as a goal the more formal and complete instruction in French. In addition, native education was to stress personal hygiene for the first three years of school and practical agriculture at the intermediate elementary level. Regional schools were to introduce the manual skills if shop facilities existed nearby. One vocational upper elementary school was to be established in each colony to train apprentices, and, subsequently, skilled craftsmen and foremen. Schools at the technical level were to produce increased numbers of elementary teachers, medical assistants, and marine mechanics. Metropolitan education through the secondary level for the French and the assimilated elite was operational but not publicized.

¹M. Davesne, "Rapport sur l'Afrique Occidentale Française," in L'Adaptation de l'Enseignement dans les Colonies, Congrès intercolonial de l'Enseignement dans les Colonies et les Pays d'outre-mer (Paris: Henri Didier, 1932), p. 86.

Educational Planning in Equatorial Africa. Sarraut's demand for a long-term educational plan from every colony resulted in a comprehensive attempt to organize public education in French Equatorial Africa. The plan, similar to but less ambitious than that of West Africa, emphasized mass primary education to teach a rudimentary French and an introduction to the manual trades and agricultural techniques. An upper elementary, or higher primary school opened at Brazzaville in 1927, but was closed soon after, until 1935. Although much more detailed than those of Clémentel of 1906, the plans of 1925 remained largely on paper, as had a colonial level plan of 1911. The agricultural apprenticeship center (1901) and the normal-administrative-commercial school (1907) at Libreville and the small vocational school (1903) at Brazzaville were the Federation's only public education institutions beyond the lower primary schools.

The Adaptation of French Education to Colonial Needs. Referred to by both official and unofficial sources from the inception of French Sub-Saharan education to the present day, the problem of adaptation received particular attention during the first two decades following the first World War through the colonial economic development campaign, the comprehensive planning for colonial education, and the worldwide economic depression.

Sarraut had emphasized the need to retrain metropolitan educators for colonial service regardless of the number of French degrees they held or of their teaching experience in France. He had also insisted upon an adapted curriculum. In 1928, Minister of Colonies Leon Perrier informed the governors of a mounting metropolitan criticism of the failure to adapt

colonial education to local needs and realities. He gave as a typical example of such criticisms, the popular account of the natives reciting this statement: "The Gauls, our ancestors, had blue eyes."¹ To counteract such propaganda, the Minister advised the governors to send him all documents concerning adaptation in order that he could gain an overview of the true state of affairs and publicize the efforts carried on in this area throughout the colonies. Noting that, in the past, the Ministry received samples of adapted materials irregularly and often from sources other than the official channels, Perrier ordered such material to be forwarded regularly in the future. If no adapted textbooks were available, the governors were requested to seek out and forward less formalized materials, particularly those pertaining to local geography, history, and agriculture. Where no materials were available, the governors were to prepare statements upon the degree of local educational adaptation.

Parliamentary debates over the 1930 metropolitan budget provoked further demands by the Ministry upon the governors. The debate had revealed a mass of documentation existed on colonial economic questions, but very little on colonial education. Each colony was advised to prepare a complete report concerning the past and present local educational situation, since colonial education was increasingly becoming an object of attention in the Metropole. The resultant report from West Africa pronounced education there successful in training native civil servants and in disengaging a native elite, but admitted little success in the essential goals of vocational education and education of the masses.

¹France, B.O.M.C., Instruction Publique Circular of January 18, 1928, p. 72.

Obviously, success had occurred where education required the least adaptation.

The question of the adaptation of education for colonial needs and realities was the subject of an intercolonial conference held in Paris in 1932. The testimony of educators from many of the French colonies provided evidence of a lack of adaptation. In the "old" colonies, the metropolitan system had been copied intentionally, but in the "new" colonies, including Sub-Saharan Africa, national and local policy directives were filled with repetitive phrases about adaptation. After a comprehensive, critical analysis of the adaptation of education in French West Africa, Davesne, the Inspector of Primary Education for the Federation, made these remarks in the conclusion of his conference report:

Nevertheless, for the past several years, while remaining dominated in theory by these same preoccupations (adaptation), education has, in fact, evolved with increased acceleration towards an imitation of metropolitan education. . . .¹

Although national policy, faithfully repeated on paper at the colonial level in Sub-Saharan Africa, gave priority to providing the masses with a rudimentary French, personal hygienic practices, and improved vocational skills through native education, the system, in fact, was failing to implement the very objectives for which it was founded. The village school, in order to reach more children, released its pupils too soon; returning to the bush, they forgot what little French they had acquired. The native teachers lectured abstractly upon the principles of hygiene to pupils covered with filth and taught obscure French

¹Davesne, op. cit., p. 95.

poetry to young bush children without a command of French, according to reports. The elementary and regional schools, according to Davesne, had become dominated by the "fetishism of the diploma"¹ at the expense of functional education. He noted that education in these schools was bookish in spite of the official recommendations to the contrary. Consequently, they indoctrinated the students with a bureaucratic mentality which assigned a low status to manual activities. Although most of the schools had gardens for the development of skills and attitudes conducive to the improvement of agriculture, a vast majority of the teachers had received no agricultural education and were unable to do more than have a garden according to native practice. In many cases, the children learned nothing except distaste for the heavy labor imposed by this type of activity.

Davesne, remarking that the courses of study were adapted, added these words of caution:

But the courses of study are worth only as much as the teachers responsible for their application and one would risk being deceived if one hoped to find the constant concern for adaptation in the classrooms that existed during the preparation of the instructions and courses of study now prevailing in French West Africa.²

The Inspector stated another fact which worked against adaptation: virtually all of the textbooks were imported from the Metropole or French Algeria.

The metropolitan teachers also presented a problem. They arrived without knowledge of Africa or native education. A special workshop

¹Ibid., p. 86.

²Ibid., p. 90.

organized to prepare these arrivals for their new teaching work had been dropped shortly after its inception because of a shortage of funds. According to the Inspector, many of these teachers also found it difficult or impossible to supervise properly the native teachers serving under them. Most of the native teachers were condemned by Davesne as not knowing their job. They taught without planning or evaluation. What they taught was described as frequently an automatic repetition of metropolitan subject matter learned by the native teachers while preparing to pass an examination. And the recipients were children without a command of French or any insight into the Western conceptual world. These indigenous teachers were not directly responsible, according to the Inspector; the normal school at Gorée prepared the natives in the image of the Metropole. He flatly condemned the teacher education program in these words:

It is incontestable that the training of native teachers as it is conducted at the Normal School of Gorée leaves much to be desired for it is in no way adapted to the role these teachers have to fulfill.¹

After pointing out that the general objectives of the teacher education program as contained in the Educational Plan of 1924 stressed a practical training, Davesne explained why these objectives were completely refuted in practice.

First, the location of the normal school on the island of Gorée proved to be a poor choice. Called the "Goreen Necropolis" by Governor-General Carde, the island isolated the teacher-candidates from the African milieu to such a degree that the graduates felt they were being exiled

¹Ibid., p. 93.

when returned home to teach in a bush school. Secondly, student teaching was carried out in the local primary school which, being located in one of the four French communes of Sub-Saharan Africa, had a purely metropolitan curriculum. Thus the students learned to teach in a school which represented the negation of adaptation. Thirdly, agricultural training was carried out in a miniature garden, since the water for it had to be transported from the mainland. Further, the garden resembled one in a Parisian suburb because all the vegetables raised in it were European. Finally, the majority of the French instructors, with very little professional experience themselves and fresh from the Metropole without any knowledge of the realities of Sub-Saharan Africa, generally presented the same material they had so recently acquired in a metropolitan normal school. This trend was encouraged by the institution in 1928 of metropolitan-type examinations and certificates for the best students.

To remedy the situation, Davesne proposed the creation of rural normal schools in each colony where the locale and a practical curriculum would properly prepare the native teachers for their task. He claimed that metropolitan teachers, used to measuring their success by the numbers of their pupils passing academic examinations, should be placed in an interior regional school for a few weeks of observation upon their arrival in Africa in order to grasp the need for a different philosophy and approach to native education. Unless changes were made in the teacher-education program, the Inspector saw little hope for the adaptation of French education to local needs.

The Depression and the Reform of Native Education. The Inspector's severe criticism of native education in Sub-Saharan Africa reflected a

a national mood as, of course, did the conference topic of adaptation. In France itself, efforts were being made to correlate education with economic needs through the development of vocational-technical education. The Ministry of Colonies was preoccupied with the same question and, therefore, it is not surprising to discover a reflection of this concern at the colonial level.

In French West Africa, the development projects inaugurated during the Ministry of Sarraut were progressing. As the infrastructure began to take concrete form, such as in the development of the railroads, new concern was focused upon the human factor. In a 1930 policy statement, Governor-General Brévié noted the successful production of a Francophile native aristocracy and a native administrative auxiliary. The remaining urgent educational problems centered upon vocational-technical education and the instruction of the masses. Governor Brévié reiterated the French social goals of assimilating an elite and of cultivating a Franco-African culture and stressed the importance of the latter aspect as a prime necessity for extensive economic development. Production was ultimately dependent upon the cooperation and skills of the masses. Calling for greater vocational-technical education emphasis, he declared: ". . . The economic value of manpower is, considerably on the increase. A skilled workman is a living form of capital."¹

A reappraisal of native education in terms of the Act of 1924 was in progress. The rural primary schools became known as the rural farm or

¹W. B. Mumford and G. St. J. Orde-Brown, Africans Learn to Be French (London: Evans Brothers Limited, n.d.), p. 91. (Translation of an official document.)

popular schools, with attempts being made to include a viable program of semi-vocational training based upon local occupations. Usually this program amounted to an introduction to agriculture and animal husbandry. After a tour of these schools in 1935, Brévié observed that they were becoming centers of community life and orienting the people to a new, simple, and practical culture.¹

To produce the type of primary teacher needed for these practical rural schools, plans called for the formation of three rural normal schools strategically located in the interior of the Federation. A vocational school, modeled on the Craftsmen's Institute at Bamako, was to be developed within each colony as well. A higher technical school for the Federation would serve as the capstone to this track. Unfortunately, the depression seriously cut into the implementation of such plans. In 1932 the Ministers of Finance and Colonies agreed upon the need for a particularly prudent financial management in the colonies and for an effective preventative control of all local supplementary expenditures. In 1934, noting the Metropole had found it necessary to extend regular financial assistance to the colonies because of the depression, Minister of Colonies Laval issued a decree aimed at encouraging the maintenance of balanced budgets in the colonies. In a report to the President, Laval mentioned the colonies had, some time ago, suspended all recruitment of personnel and reduced salaries as well as area hardship allowances in a determined effort to reduce expenditures.

¹This type of program was abandoned after the second World War because of the objections of the coopted African elite. These objections are presented in the next chapter.

The depression, however, spurred the Blum Government to organize a French Imperial Conference in 1934-35 which included a broad cross-section of private and public interests. The purpose was to establish an integrated imperial economy somewhat similar to Sarraut's proposals and it resulted in the creation of a Colonial Development Fund to expend fifteen billion francs over a period of fifteen years. The first years were to be devoted to the development of complementary economies within the colonies based primarily on the production of raw materials needed in France, such as cotton and edible oils. The funds were to be invested in large-scale cultivation projects such as the Niger Bend project and in the improvement of communications to permit the flow of production to the Metropole. Obviously, such an event had repercussions in the field of colonial education.

In 1935 the French government established an interministerial committee to survey the results of the brief metropolitan experience in vocational-technical education in order to suggest applications in the colonies. This inquiry was a direct result of the recommendations of colonial chambers of commerce attending the metropolitan conference. In January, 1936, Minister of Colonies Rollin called for action: "The hour has come, it appears to me, for a new methodical effort to develop vocational and technical education in all the colonies."¹

While noting that the metropolitan recommendations should be adapted rather than adopted in the colonies, Rollin made some definite suggestions. He pointed out that virtually no teachers from the

¹France, B.O.M.C., Instruction Publique, January 20, 1936, 1936, p. 385.

metropolitan technical education service were employed in the colonies and suggested that their presence was needed to assure economic progress.

The Minister then suggested an educational scheme designed to produce a vocationally oriented mass and an elite of technicians. According to this plan, vocational education would be integrated into the primary curriculum; certain colonies, Rollin observed, had already begun such an integration. In order to render the program effective, the Ministry would undertake the special training in vocational subjects of primary teachers destined for the colonies. Upon completion of the training, a special diploma would be awarded to the teachers. The governors were requested to inform the Ministry of their particular vocational needs so that this program could be developed.

From the vocationally inclined primary pupils, a selection could be made for secondary technical education. At this level, the colonies would be required to hire teachers from the Metropole. Minister Rollin noted that colonial classical secondary studies were sanctioned by diplomas equivalent to those of the Metropole, but that no such arrangement existed for technical education. He reasoned that the extension of such privileges to technical education might lead to its acceptance by the natives and French colonial youth as well. Not only would it lend more prestige to the local endeavor but access to metropolitan higher technical education would be opened. In 1934 the Metropole had created a diploma or brevet of industrial education and another in commercial subjects; the Minister proposed equivalent diplomas for the colonies and set exchange formalities for their metropolitan counterparts. He pointed

out the significance of this act: "Thus, colonial technical education would have, like the other types of secondary education, a regular control from the Metropole."¹

Rollin concluded his message to the governors with this appeal:

In closing, I need not remind you of the essential fact that, in all the colonies, economic progress will not be assured without a continuous perfecting of existing vocational education and without the development of new efforts designed to furnish indispensable and capable collaborators in the areas of agriculture, industry, and commerce.²

The response of the Government-General of Equatorial French Africa to the metropolitan demand for a reorientation of native education was somewhat similar to that of French West Africa. Two governors-general of the pre-World War II decade attempted to revitalize and reorganize the educational system. The first, Governor-General Antonetti, condemned the village school teachers as extremely incompetent and noted the regional and urban schools were too examination-conscious to undertake proper vocational education. However, it remained for Governor-General Reste to take drastic steps. In January of 1937, he removed the control of education from the Directorate of Political Affairs and established, for the first time in Equatorial Africa, a genuine education administration or inspectorate. More village schools were to be opened with an emphasis upon vocational education through the addition of farm plots and manual training. This represented a copy of the West African rural farm schools inaugurated a few years previously. A secondary course was opened in Brazzaville and admission to West African secondary schools was made possible, although

¹Ibid., p. 386.

²Ibid., p. 387.

this arrangement had little practical effect because of the lack of qualified pupils in the territory.

Restrictions on Foreign Education in Equatorial Africa. In comparison with West Africa, education in French Equatorial Africa was retarded quantitatively and qualitatively. The latter Federation had generally been considered as a "white elephant" and the most backward of French possessions by the Metropole. Although the format and policies for a public secular system of education had been duly prepared on paper within the Federation, the shortage of manpower and money hindered its extensive development.¹ And the absence of a large Moslem element antagonistic to Christian education in the more important southern regions of the Federation had rendered the need for such a system less immediate.

The Act of Berlin (1885) and the Act of Brussels (1890) were international agreements guaranteeing free access to the region to legitimate missions of all the signing powers. These agreements made it difficult to enforce the French national policy of native psychological assimilation through exclusive use of the French language. Elsewhere in French Sub-Saharan Africa, the foreign missions had been forced to teach in French and institute a French curriculum or to abandon their posts. Restrictions to this effect in French Equatorial Africa had been more timid. But by 1938 the Metropole was prepared to extend this policy to the areas covered by international agreement, as educational activity in the region was on the increase.

¹Although attendance at public schools had increased from 1,688 in 1924 to 9,290 in 1938, the private school enrollment in 1938 stood at 12,605.

Minister of Colonies Steeg explained how this could be done legitimately in a foreword to the actual decree. He referred to the small type in the wording of Article XI of the Protocol of Saint-Germain of 1919 which he quoted:

The application of the conditions of the preceding two paragraphs (free access and equal protection) does not apply to other restrictions such as those necessary for the maintenance of security, public order, or which arise from the constitutional rights of each occupying power in the African territories.¹

In prefacing his decree, Steeg noted that it would apply without discrimination to all missions, French as well as non-French and thus was a legitimate control measure over all private education. As such it was merely a measure of internal security in accordance with the international agreement previously quoted. The first article of the decree² stipulated no private education or assistance to children could be instituted in Equatorial Africa without the approval of the government. Further, all existing institutions had to comply with the remaining regulations within one year. These remaining rules,³ in addition to other requirements, made it mandatory to teach the officially approved curriculum and to instruct exclusively in French.⁴ Further, all teachers recruited after the announcement of the decree had to provide evidence of being knowledgeable in French education.

¹France, B.O.M.C., Instruction Publique, January 31, 1938, 1938, p. 71.

²Ibid., p. 72.

³Ibid.

⁴A metropolitan decree a few months later made it possible to instruct in the indigenous tongue in certain low-level practical courses.

The Actions of the Vichy Government. After the fall of France in 1940, the Vichy Government commenced a series of measures to extend its control over colonial education and to ensure the penetration of its conservative philosophy into the schools. First, it suspended a requirement that colonial officials heed the advice of any local consultative committee on education. This was followed by a redefinition of the duties of the Inspector-Counselor of Public Education for the Colonies, the top educationalist within the Ministry of Colonies. Then, Petain himself signed a decree requiring that all books used in the colonial schools be submitted to a metropolitan committee for review. This same decree granted the governors-general and the local governors authority to ban any book temporarily, and such actions could be made permanent upon approval of the metropolitan committee. A month later, in June 1941, a metropolitan law made it mandatory to offer religious instruction in all colonial schools. Overseas officials were ordered to make the necessary arrangements with the local Church heads to implement the new law. A few weeks later, another law was passed stipulating that no one could teach in the colonies without the approval of the Secretary of State for the Colonies and that of National Education. Further, the authorization could be revoked at any time without appeal and the schools closed. In a move to indoctrinate colonial teachers, an ordinance was issued which required all such teachers vacationing in France to take a month's training course prior to returning to the colonies. Other moves were taken to restrict the access of Jews to education and to control all religious activities overseas. Among these measures was one which restricted the languages to be used in any religious service to French,

Latin, or a locally-spoken native dialect.

But the overseas educational influence of the short-lived Vichy regime was limited. Even prior to the voluntary abdication of the last Parliament of the Third Republic in July, 1940, Major-General De Gaulle had announced from London the formation of a Free French regime. In August 1940, Tchad, Cameroon, Ubangi-Shari and the Middle Congo joined his cause. Within a short time De Gaulle found himself no longer a mere military commander, but a political leader of significant parts of the French Empire.

Prelude to the Postwar Period. Felix Éboué, a Guiana-born Negro, as Governor of Tchad led the revolt against the Vichy regime in Equatorial Africa. As a reward as well as in recognition of his abilities, he was named Governor-General of the Federation. An ardent advocate of a liberal colonial policy, Éboué called a conference in November 1941 of some fifty leading officials and natives of the territory, to develop a new native policy. In his opening address, Éboué expressed these sentiments:

I have spoken of innovation, perhaps one could employ a more direct term, the word revolution, in that it signifies the renunciation of certain errors, of practices, of fixed prejudices. The revolution consists precisely of breaking with the errors and practices which imply stagnation and, therefore, regression, and to renounce the prejudices. . . .¹

After three days of deliberation, the conference approved a lengthy declaration of policy submitted by the Governor-General. In the opening statement, Éboué stressed the building up of the indigenous society as the necessary condition to the emergence of prosperity. He wrote of saving French Equatorial Africa.

¹Felix Éboué, La Nouvelle Politique Indigène pour l'Afrique Équatoriale Française (Paris: Office Français d'Édition, n.d.), preface.

I did say: "save." The colony is menaced, menaced from within, like a granary emptying itself. The cause may be found in the prolonged system of the great concessionaires, in the disordered economic exploitation, in the occasionally blundering proselytism, in the putting to sleep of education, finally and above all, in the neglect, one could say the contempt, of the indigenous political and social structures. . . .¹

After detailing the importance of conserving the traditional social and political forces, Éboué turned to the inadequacies of education, stressing the need for a complete system within each of the far-flung colonies of the Federation. Noting the educational program had improved considerably in the recent past, he pointed out the military mobilization of metropolitan teachers had slowed the trend just as it was being born. The Governor-General advocated and effected the return to substantial subsidization of private education. In urging a strenuous and continuous effort in native education, Éboué wrote as follows:

We do not have one indigenous doctor or veterinarian; we lack a large number of skilled workers and, even more, of foremen. I will not speak of the non-existent engineers or writers, but how many secretaries, accountants, or clerks worthy of the name do we have?²

Éboué optimistically predicted it would take ten years before desirable results would commence to appear and wondered if the long and continuous effort required had not caused his predecessors to delay the inauguration of the task. Despite the war, he managed to substantially increase school enrollments in Equatorial Africa and, more important, to inspire a new direction to Sub-Saharan native policy.

¹Ibid., p. 11.

²Ibid., p. 41.

Summary. The first three decades of the Third Republic were marked by the political and economic consolidation of the Republic, the emergence of metropolitan free compulsory elementary education, and the sudden expansion of the Empire. This latter event, generally described as the accomplishment of a few ardent imperialists rather than as the result of public demand, left the Metropole with extensive overseas possessions, but with neither the popular desire nor the organization to develop them.

A small but brilliant group of ardent imperialists inaugurated national campaigns to popularize the cause of colonial possession based both upon altruistic and self-interest arguments. The French were told it was their duty to export their universally valuable culture and that the maintenance of France as a first-rate power required an imperial status. Through persuasion based upon idealism, economics, and national prestige, an expanding hard-core support was garnered for the cause. Thus, the problems of colonial development received increasing attention and from the welter of ensuing conferences, debates, and opinions arose certain firm colonial policies. Among these was the crucial principle of financing overseas socio-economic development through locally produced revenue. Metropolitan loans were to be available for this process, but they were based upon the estimated local capacity to repay such loans.

In any case, because of the multiple needs of the colonies, native education received only sporadic development until the pressures of societies such as the Alliance Francaise and the Mission Laique publicized the situation and marshalled public opinion. Of course, the struggle between the Church and the State over the control of education

precipitated the planning of comprehensive public systems of education in the colonies. In general, these systems were only activated in colonies where considerable indigenous cultural resistance to missionary education was prevalent. The high costs, manpower requirements, and complex personnel problems of the public systems made such a priority necessary. For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa, French West Africa had the two prerequisites for the immediate institution of public education: Moslem resistance to Christian infiltration and sufficient local revenue for its support. In Equatorial Africa, both of these factors were lacking for the most part, and hence public education remained largely on paper for many years.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, national policy dictated the organization of a two-track system, a metropolitan track for the French and the assimilated Africans and an adapted practical track for the masses. The objectives were to create a completely assimilated elite and a Franco-African culture for the masses. Through time, the popular culture was to shift increasingly to a French orientation without losing entirely its African flavor.

Immediately after the First World War, native education was viewed as a crucial factor in colonial economic development largely through the leadership of Albert Sarraut. His attention to colonial education brought renewed attempts to expand the public school system and increasingly to adapt it to environmental and economic needs. The relative failure of this adaptation and of the mass education movement in general was brought to light during the worldwide economic depression. As a result, more drastic attempts to adapt French education were inaugurated in Sub-Saharan

Africa during the Thirties and were carried on until the conclusion of the Second World War.

From the quantitative standpoint, total school enrollment figures¹ jumped considerably, particularly in the Twenties and Thirties in West Africa and in the Thirties and early Forties in Equatorial Africa. However, the percentage of the school age population in school remained very low throughout the period. In West Africa, school attendance had risen from about 1,000² in 1870 to 77,000 in 1938³ and reached about 107,000 in 1944. But the statistics indicate that, in 1938, a vast majority of the pupils received a rudimentary primary education and a mere 500 students were enrolled in vocational and technical courses or schools. Only 1,855 students were in normal school courses, normal schools, and high schools. In Equatorial Africa during the 1938-39 academic year, almost 9,500 pupils were listed as attending public schools and slightly under 11,700 were in private institutions. Of the public school pupils, it should be noted that only 90 were in secondary education and 43 in vocational-technical schools. The mandated territories, Togo and Cameroon, had separate systems with enrollments in public and private institutions given as 5,000 and 6,000 for Togo and 10,600 and 96,400 for Cameroon. In this latter case, only 3,950 of the 96,400 private school pupils were in recognized institutions.

¹France, M.F.O.M., Annuaire Statistique de l'Union Francaise d'Outre-Mer, 1939-1949 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1950), pp. 222-227. All figures were taken from this source except the one for 1870.

²All of these figures are rounded off.

³Of the 77,000 pupils, 65,000 were in public schools and 12,000 in private schools.

From the qualitative standpoint, the statistics are deceiving. Most of the pupils received a brief primary education given by poorly educated and trained African monitors. Both French and African commentaries rate this type of education as very poor. At the other extreme, many of the small number of high school children were French.

Nevertheless, the enduring characteristics of native education had been established in French Sub-Saharan Africa; the fundamental policy and the basic form or organization had crystallized. In West Africa, at least, the production of an assimilated elite and of an indigenous auxiliary administrative corps was viable. Popular education for the masses and vocational-technical education, the prime objectives continually stressed after World War I, remained largely on paper and of doubtful success where in operation. The metropolitan policy remained to be fulfilled.

CHAPTER IV

THE MODERN PERIOD: 1944-1962

Introduction. Before the conclusion of the Second World War, General de Gaulle opened a conference of high Free French officials in Brazzaville (1944) to formulate recommendations for a new colonial policy for Sub-Saharan Africa to be presented to the legal government of metropolitan France, once it had been re-established in Paris. The preamble of the accepted recommendations emphatically stated that the colonies were to remain within the French Empire, and it was within this principle that all colonial policy was conceived until the fall of the Fourth Republic in 1958. The advent of the Fifth French Republic, marked by the return to power of General de Gaulle, resulted in the formation of the French Community and the ultimate independence of the Sub-Saharan territories in 1960.¹

These political changes are identifiable by the change in the names of the Ministry primarily responsible for French relations with Sub-Saharan Africa. In 1946, the Ministry of Colonies was renamed the Ministry of Overseas France and, in 1961, this latter agency was replaced by the Ministry of Cooperation as far as Sub-Saharan Africa was concerned. Under the regime of the Ministry of Overseas France, the colonies, in turn, became known as territories.

¹French Guinea voted for and received independence in 1958.

As the term "Overseas France" implies, the former colonies were conceived as extensions of metropolitan France with certain political reservations which ensured the Metropole's control over affairs within the territories. During this period, the assimilated native elite began to play an important political role and they demanded equality for the Africans, particularly in terms of education.

As a result, the post-war period witnessed a rapid extension of secondary education throughout French Black Africa¹ and the reform of primary education along metropolitan lines. With the coming of independence, the African leadership, believing that modernization and unification are largely dependent upon education, requested and received increased educational assistance. However, the high cost of extending a metropolitan-type school system throughout the poor countries of French-speaking Sub-Saharan Africa has posed a dilemma yet to be solved.

The Restoration of France as a World Power. One of the chief concerns of the Free French regime under General de Gaulle was to restore France to the rank of a world power. This goal was viewed as dependent upon the unity of France and her overseas possessions. The attitude of the government, in 1945, appears to be well expressed in the following statement addressed to the concurrent and future members of the teaching profession:

Certainly, during the preceding war, the fidelity of our overseas territories was proved to us, but we did not imagine that these peoples, whom we considered a little too much as eternal children, could put in their word, and even more, bear a decisive

¹French Black Africa is another designation for French Sub-Saharan Africa.

role in the destiny of the motherland.

. . . France can still, if she manifests a continuous will of work and recovery, retrieve an enviable position in the post-war anarchic world by depending upon these overseas territories and associating them intimately with our work of political and economic reconstruction.

It is you, members or future members of education, who are called to train the men of tomorrow. It behooves you to demonstrate to the French youth what a country of forty million people represents, faced with the American Federation and the Soviet Union which have emerged even more reinforced from the common struggle and victory. Regardless of how glorious her past has been, of how old and beautiful her cultural traditions are, she [France] would be only a little state of Europe without the seventy-five million overseas Frenchmen whose young force has revealed itself to the world in such a remarkable manner.¹

The role of the colonies and colonial troops had been an impressive one in both the First and Second World Wars; motivated by both gratitude and self-interest, the French government determined to further cement the ties between the Metropole and the colonies.

The Brazzaville Conference (January 30-February 8, 1944). Opened by General de Gaulle and chaired by the Commissioner of the Colonies, René Pleven, the Brazzaville Conference prepared recommendations for a new colonial policy in the realm of political, economic, and social development. In a keynote address, de Gaulle spoke of raising indigenous standards of life and preparing natives for eventual participation with the French in the management of local affairs.² However, neither de Gaulle nor the Conference membership, some forty-four colonial governors, high civil servants and delegates from the Provisional Consultative Assembly

¹France, Ministère de l'Education Nationale, Généralités (Carnets de Documentation sur l'Enseignement dans la France d'Outre-Mer, Carnet No. 1, n.d.), p. 7. (Hereafter, Ministère de l'Education Nationale will be referred to as M.E.N. and the Ministère de la France d'Outre-Mer as M.F.O.M.)

²Stewart C. Easton, The Twilight of European Colonialism (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 336.

at Algiers, intended to espouse a policy leading to local autonomy. The preamble to the adopted resolutions clearly denied such intentions:

The goals of the civilizing act accomplished by France in the colonies discard all ideas of autonomy, all possibility of evolution outside of the French Empire; the eventual constitution, even in the distant future, of self-government in the colonies is to be averted.¹

The recommendations included the establishment of a colonial or federal parliament which would guarantee "the infrangible political unity of the French world,"² increased indigenous role in local policy-making, increased development of the native populations through greater metropolitan technical assistance, modernization of administrative methods and extension of the powers of the colonial governors with concomitant overall administrative decentralization of the empire, improved labor laws, public works programs, economic development, and extended educational opportunities.

Actually, the educational recommendations, consuming only three and one-half pages of the thirty-page conference report, amounted to a reaffirmation of previously enunciated principles. However, on this occasion, the principles emanated from a public conference of high-level officials rather than from a single official addressing a limited audience as in the past.

A point of disagreement centered upon the allocation of priority to primary or to secondary education. While reiterating the necessity of educating an elite, the delegates favored primary education by advocating the establishment of a school in every village containing a minimum

¹Hardy, Histoire Sociale. . ., p. 235.

²Ibid.

of fifty school-age children. They also agreed that the education of boys and girls was of equal importance. French was approved as the language of instruction with "the use of locally spoken dialects absolutely forbidden, in the private as well as in the public schools."¹ According to the delegates, the means to increase teacher-training output and the recruitment of metropolitan teachers needed to be studied in the immediate future. But the most significant of these and other educational resolutions was the commitment to the principle of universal primary education.

As a followup to the Conference, a meeting was held in July, 1944 at Dakar to detail further the resolutions adopted at Brazzaville. As a consequence, an ambitious educational plan for French West Africa was approved which called for the opening of 50,000 schools and the recruitment of a minimum of 50,000 teachers in order to provide primary education throughout the territory. In addition, the plan envisaged the establishment of 200 upper primary schools and 75 normal schools. All of the institutions were to be operational within twenty years and universal primary education was to be achieved within fifty years.²

During the same month as the Dakar meeting, the Free French regime was preparing the way for the colonial educational reform by establishing a Direction of Education and Youth within the Commissariat for the Colonies. In a decree of July 24, 1944, this agency was given wide responsibilities over virtually all aspects of colonial education

¹Jean de La Roche and Jean Gottmann, La Fédération Française (Montreal: Editions de L'Arbre, 1945), p. 546.

²Ibid.

including the development of higher education.

Major executive legislation affecting colonial education was enacted by the re-established Ministry of Colonies during the summer of 1945. On May 30, 1945, a decree was issued detailing an extensive scholarship system for colonial students to study in the Metropole or North Africa. An ordinance of August 4, 1945, provided all veterans, including those of the colonies, with five years of free education and a subsistence allowance according to need. These acts generated an awkward situation, for it was painfully apparent that the severely limited opportunity for secondary education in French Sub-Saharan Africa was incompatible with the enacted policy of the post-war period.

The Instructions of August, 1945. The urgency of the problem was reflected in the telegrams sent during the month of August, 1945, from the Ministry of Colonies to the governors-general of Equatorial Africa, West Africa, Madagascar, and to the Governor of Cameroon. In general, these messages requested specific information as to the number of native students in all secondary classes, including those eligible to commence the first and second cycles of secondary level education and those passing the colonial examination roughly equivalent to the baccalaureate. The minimum number of secondary level scholarships for indigenous students was stipulated for each colony or territory and certain governors were instructed to open additional freshman secondary classes. The number of native students passed on to second cycle secondary education was to be increased by means of special lessons in certain cases. Elsewhere, junior high schools were to be converted into complete secondary

institutions. An extract from the telegram sent to Brazzaville illustrates the point:

Cable before September 10 (1) results BCC¹ first session native candidates (2) new proposals relative to number of native pupils scholarships admitted to sixth Stop Plans in your report of June 22 very insufficient Stop Consider it is necessary to open liberally access to secondary education to the natives and in addition to places planned maintenance of twelve scholarships constitutes minimum below which we should not descend without breaking our promises and feeding criticism on sincerity our action.²

In the message to Dakar, detailed information as to the number and type of native secondary school graduates was requested as well as the number of metropolitan scholarships allotted to such students for further study in France. This particular telegram noted measures had been taken to ensure an environment for the Africans conducive to study, particularly at the Universities of Montpellier, Toulouse, Bordeaux, and Paris. The immediacy of the situation was reflected in all of the cables by remarks such as action was expected "as of now."

The Problems of Bureaucratic Coordination. These telegrams, actually sent by the Director of Education and Youth under the Minister of Colonies' name, brought a reaction from the Director of Political Affairs, in the form of a caustic memo to the former official. After noting that he had become aware of these messages, the Director of Political Affairs continued as follows:

¹BCC is an abbreviation for Brevet de Capacité Coloniale, the high school-leaving certificate formerly issued in the French Black Africa in lieu of the metropolitan baccalaureate. Granted in West Africa shortly after the First World War, it was extended to Equatorial Africa by a Ministry of Colonies decree of August 23, 1945.

²France, Archives F.O.M., Politique de l'Enseignement, 1945, File SA 6659.

I regret that you have not thought it necessary to first discuss this important question with me. I consider it as absolutely inseparable from the totality of the new policy which the department has to advance in the overseas territories and the principles of which have been elaborated by the Director of Political Affairs.

I would therefore be particularly obliged if you would come and inform me, as soon as possible, of your overall program regarding native education.¹

In a lengthy reply, the Director of Education and Youth pointed out that he had consulted the Direction of Political Affairs, referring to his two memos of January 17 and July 20 and the responses to them of March 2 and August 2. He further noted that at least one of the messages had the stamp of the Political Affairs section prior to its departure for Africa and added the following:

I willingly admit that your services have not kept a record of it (the transaction) and that, under such circumstances, it was possible for them to be astonished at not having been consulted.²

To this memo, the Director of Political Affairs began an answer which was crossed out with a blue pencil and a notation that the incident was closed. In the incomplete message, the Director of Political Affairs emphasized that he desired to discuss the role of education in overall colonial policy, not whether a particular cablegram had been approved by his service. This episode not only reveals the bickering between two high officials within the same ministry and the lack of coordination between their respective branches, but indicates the existence of a considerable inter-departmental communication time lag if the dates cited above are representative. This incident serves to illustrate how human relations and

¹Ibid., Memo of September 14, 1945.

²Ibid., Memo of September 22, 1945.

bureaucratic problems enhance the difficulties of policy formulation and implementation.

Post-War Educational Reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa. New ordinances, reflecting the policy of increased emphasis upon native primary education, appeared in the colonies shortly after the end of the war. The comprehensive ordinance, effected in West Africa on August 22, 1945, offers a case in point. Concerned with primary and upper primary schooling, the training of primary teachers, and adult education, it stressed the principle of accelerating the evolution of the native population. However, the expansion of the school system, it noted, was dependent upon the availability of teaching personnel.

To meet this problem, in addition to the regular normal schools and the normal sections attached to secondary schools, special normal courses to produce monitors were to be activated by the Governor-General. These special, sub-standard courses were to be dropped as soon as the normal school output could meet the demands for primary teachers.¹

Primary school attendance was made compulsory for all children of native civil servants and military personnel. The local governors were to determine how this measure could be applied to the children of the native chiefs.

All primary schools were to have six years of courses, to be followed by a primary school-leaving examination and certificate. The regulations stipulated that the pupils had up to eight years to complete this program, allowing two extra years to repeat any of the six grade levels.

¹Unfortunately, this supply, as of 1962, had not caught up with the demand.

Several of the articles of the ordinance indicate the rigid measures of control featured in this system.

Article 16. During the hours of work indicated in the time schedule, neither the teacher nor the pupils may, under any pretext, engage in other than their scheduled activities.

Article 19. No book, brochure, printed or handwritten publication unspecified in the course of study may be introduced in the schools without the approval of the chief of the service.

Article 27. Only the education administrators and the administrative authorities have access to the school.

No other individual is allowed in the school without authorization of one of these authorities or the principal.¹

No doubt in anticipation of the influx of metropolitan technical assistance personnel, the ordinance provided for the establishment of primary schools with a metropolitan curriculum wherever the French school population justified it. This distinction between native and metropolitan education was condemned as discriminatory by the Africans and became a cause célèbre. However, the abolition of the rural farm schools, tacitly accomplished by the ordinance, constituted a victory for the African elite. According to a variety of French sources, the abandonment of this vocationally oriented primary program was equally welcomed by many French officials because of its ineffectiveness.

Courses of study, annexed to the ordinance, contained the usual heavy emphasis upon French language at the primary level and upon French language and literature at the upper primary level. History, beginning in the third and fourth years but receiving more attention in the fifth and sixth years, appeared to be oriented around a simplified version of French history noting the French contributions to civilization. This

¹France, Journal Officiel de l'Afrique Occidentale Française, Arrêté No. 2576, August 22, 1945, September 15, 1945, p. 706.

included Sub-Saharan colonialization until the end of the nineteenth century which should, according to the text, demonstrate "what French West Africa owes to France."¹ History in the upper primary school commenced with Egypt, but emphasized the history of Western civilization dwelling chiefly upon Greece, Rome, and the various stages of French evolution. The French role in the development of West Africa received attention each year as well.

Sprinkled throughout the ordinance were such qualifying phrases as "in principle," "eventually," and "within the limits of the resources;" these appear to be tacit recognition of the enormous problems of eliminating the gap between principle and fact. While this gap itself was not new, the wide public dissemination of the principles of increased educational opportunity and the growing numerical and political strength of the African elite were new factors which made increased progress in the field of education imperative.

The Growing Political Role of the African Elite. During the post-war period, the Sub-Saharan African elite exerted themselves politically through several channels. African deputies were elected to the French Chamber and Senate and were often able to obtain concessions, despite a lack of numerical strength, by occupying a crucial position in the political balance between the Right and the Left. As they gained political experience through participation in the French Parliament and the Assembly of the French Union in France, and the Territorial and Grand Councils in Africa, their influence increased. Even though the Councils held only advisory power with the French governors remaining the local supreme

¹Ibid., p. 713.

authority with legislation enacted, as before, in France, the very existence of these elected Councils led to the organization of indigenous political parties in Sub-Saharan Africa with the Rassemblement democratique Africain (RDA) emerging as the dominant one. Not only did these developments provide needed political and legislative experience, but it enabled the Africans to break away from membership in metropolitan political parties. By the 1950's, Sub-Saharan Africans were wielding considerable influence in the metropolitan government in the roles of assistant ministers and secretaries of state.

The Loi-Cadre of 1956. The African expectations for the Africanization of the colonial political and administrative structures, based upon the liberal policy expressions made by the French near the close of the Second World War, were not liberally fulfilled in the decade from 1946 to 1956. The weak governments of the post-war era and a resurgent metropolitan conservatism eliminated the possibility of strong reforms as desired by the Africans. However, in January, 1956, the new Socialist Premier, Guy Mollet, announced his support of an overseas reform program and appointed two West Africans to his Cabinet.¹ Shortly thereafter, the Minister of Overseas France,² Gaston Defferre, introduced the famous Loi-cadre (enabling act) to the Parliament. This bill, in which Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast and other Black Africans had had a part in drafting, consisted of general principles which would serve as guidelines for executive decrees embodying specific reforms in the governmental structure of the Overseas Territories, those colonies administered by the

¹Houphouet-Boigny and Hammadoun Dicko.

²Formerly the Minister of Colonies.

Ministry of Overseas France. These executive decrees were to be published in the Official Journal and if the Parliament took no action to modify or annul them within three months of their publication date, they would become law.

Defferre argued that this law, a method of legislation, was the only expedient way to institute the necessary reforms.¹ Experience had shown the Parliament had taken months and even years to pass specific pieces of overseas legislation; parliamentary procedures were obviously inadequate to deal with the wide range of needed legislation in the colonial realm. The war in Indochina and the revolts in North Africa might be repeated in Black Africa in time unless constructive, preventive measures were taken. The logic of the arguments could not be denied; both the Assembly and the Senate passed the bill.

Thus, the Loi-cadre of 1956 may be regarded as the real turning point of French colonial policy;² the general and relatively restrained resolutions of the Brazzaville Conference were not made by a body representative of metropolitan France and the Constitution of 1946 was sufficiently vague to allow for a wide latitude of interpretation.

This fundamental decision of 1956 by the French Parliament soon led to a major revision of the political structure of French Black Africa. The Federations of French West and Equatorial Africa were dissolved and

¹Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, French West Africa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 78.

²Several French officials expressed this opinion during interviews with the author.

were designated Groups of Territories to symbolize the fact that the territories had become semi-responsible, separate governments with the former advisory Territorial Councils becoming Territorial Assemblies with legislative powers and elected under universal adult suffrage. The French governors were retitled as heads of territories and lost much of their power to an Executive Council chosen by each Territorial Assembly.

Certain members of the African leadership, such as Senghor of Senegal, warned that this decentralization would lead to the balkanization of French Black Africa while others viewed this move as a clever French device to postpone independence through the creation of impotent and dependent small states. However, the pattern was set by the French government and it offered innumerable political opportunities for the less established African politicians.

Education and Politics. During the post-war period, education became increasingly important as a political symbol. Not only was it necessary for upward political and social mobility, but it represented an entity which could be relatively easily compared with the system in France. Equality had concrete meaning in terms of educational opportunity and a metropolitan, rather than an adapted, curriculum.

The political significance of education became evident immediately after the war. Through the Constitution of 1946 the natives of the overseas possessions obtained French citizenship, but under the Electoral Law of October 5, 1946, the voting requirements excluded the vast majority of the natives. This fact obviously pointed to the inadequacy of the educational system and the need for mass primary and adult education. On the

other hand, Africanization of the colonial administration and the development of indigenous professional personnel required an expansion of secondary education. This dual dilemma placed French Black Africa in a situation somewhat parallel to that of France after the French Revolution when Danton is credited as having said: "After bread, education."

The Plan for Modernization and Equipment. The development of education, however, was limited by the old principle of colonial financial self-sufficiency, which implied that all internal development depended upon local financing. Although some loans from the Metropole had been made for this purpose after the formation of the Federations of West and Equatorial Africa, it was recognized that they were insufficient to meet the needs existing after the Second World War. Therefore, by an ordinance of April 6, 1945, a Direction of the Plan for the Economic and Social Development for the Colonies was established within the Ministry of the Colonies. This agency was to work with the other services within the Ministry to develop specific plans for colonial economic and social development. It consisted of three bureaus;¹ the first was primarily concerned with the evaluation of existing and potential resources, and a study of the means for financing new projects. The second bureau was responsible for agricultural and mineral production planning, industrialization, and public works while the third dealt with health, education, and urbanization.

One year later, on April 30, 1946, the French Parliament passed a law establishing a Plan for Modernization and Equipment for the Overseas Territories. The law stipulated that the Ministry of Overseas France

¹France, BOMC, Administration Centrales des Colonies, Ordinance of April 6, 1945, p. 357.

(formerly the Ministry of Colonies) would establish plans for overseas economic and social development to cover a ten-year period and designed "to transform the territories into modern countries."¹ The Ministry was to work in coordination with the General Commissariat of the Plan which was responsible for the metropolitan plan. The overseas plans would be approved by the French cabinet of ministers after submission by the Ministry of Overseas France which, in turn, would first obtain the opinions of the local territorial (colonial) authorities and the French Planning Commissariat. The law further stipulated that the ten-year plans were to be prepared within six months.

In addition, Article 5² of the Law established a special agency to approve and supervise the execution of the plans. Known as FIDES (Fonds d'Investissements pour le Développement Economique et Social des Territoires d'Outre-Mer), the organization was headed by an executive committee chaired by the Minister of Overseas France; other members included a representative each from the Ministry of Finance and Secretary of State for the National Economy, the directors of the Commissariat of the Plan (a metropolitan agency) and the Central Bank for the Overseas Territories, the directors of the planning and economic affairs agencies of the Ministry of Overseas France, four legislators, and two technical experts chosen by the Ministries of Overseas France, National Economy, and Finance.

¹France, B.O.M.F.O.M., Administration Centrales des Colonies, Law of April 30, 1946, p. 405. (B.O.M.F.O.M. refers to the Official Bulletin of the Ministry of Overseas France.)

²Ibid., p. 406.

Controversy over the FIDES operations began almost immediately. The Africans maintained the program was dominated by the French-controlled executive committee which approved projects favoring French business interests rather than those contributing to the African welfare. Subsequently, the powerful decision-making body was enlarged to include ten legislators, but the African accusations continued. On the other hand, the FIDES authorities intimated that the Territorial Assemblies consistently underestimated the costs of the projects the Africans favored.¹ Despite an enormous amount of criticism from both the French and the Africans, the very existence of the Overseas Plan and FIDES constituted a break with the traditionally parsimonious policies of the past. Even though the program was slow in getting underway and was progressively modified and limited, it definitely became a stimulant to French Sub-Saharan development.

For example, during the initial years of operation, the program was oriented around large projects in the urban areas; the omission of substantial assistance to the rural areas led the territories of French West Africa to establish their own assistance program. Known as FERDES (Fonds d'Équipement Rural et de Développement Économique et Social), the program was dedicated to the "huge problem of little projects."² These

¹Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *op. cit.*, pp. 254-255. The program is also analyzed in a second book by the same authors: The Emerging States of French Equatorial Africa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960). A critical analysis of the organization of FIDES and of the Plan from 1946 to 1953 by an anonymous African author appeared in the December 1956-January 1957 (pp. 47-56) and February-March 1957 (pp. 142-162) issues of Presence Africaine. Both official and unofficial French sources are too numerous to be mentioned here.

²France, M.E.N., M.F.O.M.; "Le FERDES En A.O.F.," Bulletin de Liaison, No. 10, 1956, p. 19.

projects started at the grass-roots level with the local villagers or cooperatives initiating the plans and contributing one-third of the total cost in labor, materials, and money. One-third of the total came from the local territorial budget and the other third from the general or federal budget. These self-help programs were characterized by simple procedures and rapid implementation; as a result, the total expenditures by the eight territories involved in the program rose from almost 140 million francs C.F.A. (French African francs) in 1949 to close to 708 millions in 1955.¹

FIDES and Education. Under the original overseas ten-year plan of 1946, twenty-five per cent of FIDES allocation was assigned to social development projects and ten per cent of this amount was to be devoted to education. However, neither of these percentages was actually reached² and, by a decree of June 4, 1949, the ten-year planning concept was replaced by four-year planning periods. Nevertheless, through FIDES during the first four-year plan (1949-1953), substantial numbers of secondary-level school plants were constructed in French Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in West Africa.

Indeed, the rapid rise of secondary institutions placed a heavy strain upon the general or federal and local territorial budgets since the cost of maintenance and of staffing these schools was a federal or local responsibility. As these schools were generally boarding schools staffed by French teachers, these expenses were considerable. In addition,

¹Ibid., p. 22.

²Thompson and Adloff, French West Africa, p. 521. (Confirmed by a survey of official statistics.)

the costs of primary education, including school construction, were borne by the local territorial budgets with some assistance from the general or federal budgets. The subsidization of mission schools and of scholarships for study in the Metropole added to the financial problems of French Sub-Saharan territories. The average expenditure for education in the budgets of the colonies of French West Africa rose from 2.8% in 1930¹ to 17% by 1953.² The proportionate expenditures of the combined individual territories of French West Africa for education in 1952 as compared to those of the federal government and of the Metropole, through FIDES, for that same year are indicated below:³

Territories (combined)	=	3,505,000,000 francs C.F.A.*
Federal	=	205,500,000 francs C.F.A.
FIDES	=	725,000,000 francs C.F.A.

*excluding subsidization of mission schools

Dissatisfaction with the first four-year FIDES plan was expressed in the recommendations of the Third Conference of the Directors of Education of French Black Africa and of Madagascar held at Paris (May 12-19, 1952):

That, under the first FIDES plan, only a little more than half of the planned investments for education were committed and that the division of these reduced credits between the various types of education was accomplished to the detriment of primary education which, in turn, obtained only half of the planned percentage.

While acknowledging that it is proper to have the local communities participate in the financing of education at the primary level, the conference members believe that the next

¹France, Ministère des Colonies, Afrique Occidentale Française, 1931, p. 34.

²France, M.F.O.M., L'Afrique Occidentale Française, 1953, p. 228.

³Ibid.

four-year plan should uphold the promises of the first plan, to wit: ten per cent of the total investments devoted to education with fifty per cent of it allocated to primary education.¹

The second four-year Plan (1954-1957) sanctioned by FIDES placed more of an emphasis upon construction at the primary school level. As a result of the post-war African demand for equality in education, the primary cycle had been raised to a full six-year course, necessitating considerable additional school construction at this level. This need for primary school construction was featured in the goals of the five-year Educational Development Plan of French West Africa (1952-1956)² and coincided with the goals of the FIDES second four-year Plan mentioned above which emphasized the development of the rural economy.³

The matter of school construction illustrates the dilemma of matching factual progress in Sub-Saharan education with the principles enunciated in high-level political conferences such as that held at Brazzaville in 1944. The costs of developing an extensive European-type educational system and the accompanying facilities vastly exceed the means available for its accomplishment. The FIDES-type primary schools built at high cost per unit, meant that comparatively few of the schools could be built.³ On the other hand, primary schools constructed locally

¹France, M.F.O.M., "Recommandations de la 3e Conférence des Directeurs de l'Enseignement d'Afrique Noire et de Madagascar," Enseignement Outre-Mer, No. 4, December, 1952, p. 24.

²Ibid., p. 241.

³France, B.O.M.F.O.M., Plan de Modernization et d'Équipement, Decree of May 20, 1955, 1955, p. 738.

⁴René Dumont, L'Afrique Noire Est Mal Partie (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1962), p. 33. Dumont claims these primary schools are luxurious enough, with their attached lodgings for the teaching-principal, to incur the jealousy of the regional indigenous chiefs.

of indigenous materials were frequently so poorly built that their upkeep absorbed from twenty to twenty-five per cent of the local territorial budgets.¹

Thus, the increase in the French Sub-Saharan school population during the first ten years of the FIDES (1946-1956) fell substantially below the rate of growth² required to meet the educational goals generalized at Brazzaville Conference (January-February, 1944) and those specified for French West Africa at the Dakar Conference (July, 1944).³ Nevertheless, the funds from FIDES were significant in the construction of post-primary facilities throughout French Black Africa, particularly within the Western Federation.

The Problems of Technical, Secondary and Higher Education. The post-war educational reforms in French Sub-Saharan Africa had two major goals: a quantitative expansion to provide for educational opportunity and a qualitative improvement to establish a parity between the systems of the colonies and of metropolitan France. Both goals were motivated by political necessity, derived in principle from the policy declarations of the French government and the Constitution of 1946 and forced by the demands of the African elite and their liberal supporters in the Metropole.⁴

¹Thompson and Adloff, French West Africa, p. 522.

²The school population for West Africa stood at 5.3% of the estimated school age population in 1947 and 13.4% in 1956 according to official statistics. See France, M.F.O.M., Afrique Occidentale Francaise, 1956, p. 105.

³The plan for West Africa called for 50,000 primary schools, 200 upper primary schools, and 75 normal schools by 1964 and universal primary education by 1994-5. See de la Roche and Gottmann, op. cit., p. 546.

⁴Confirmed through interviews and many documents, e.g., France, M.F.O.M., op. cit., p. 60.

At the primary level, courses were extended to six years and capped by a Certificat. d'Études Primaire (Primary School-leaving Certificate) "equivalent to the same certificate in the Metropole."¹ The primary level courses were somewhat adapted since the curricular emphasis was upon the French language and the recipients were, for the most part, of a non-French origin.

At the secondary level, pre-war opportunities for the complete cycle² were largely limited to French children and those of the assimilated elite. Even in 1946, only 174 of the 723 pupils attending the lycées (high schools) of Senegal were Africans.³ Graduates were granted colonial diplomas which could be exchanged for the metropolitan baccalaureate upon evidence of good character and scholarship. The post-war era saw a rapid expansion of secondary education, particularly at the first-cycle level. The nature of secondary education in French West Africa was described as follows in 1948:

Secondary education is now aligned with that of the Metropole, not only in regard to the duration of the studies and the constitution of the curriculum, but in the realm of diplomas as well. These are granted (Brevets for the first cycle studies and the Baccalaureate for the second cycle studies) by juries organized by the University; they are rigorously equivalent to the diplomas granted in the Metropole and their value is recognized throughout the French Union.⁴

¹Ibid.

²This complete cycle is divided into a first (preliminary) cycle of four years (6e, 5e, 4e, 3e), and a second (higher) cycle of three years (2e, 1e, Terminal).

³Thompson and Adloff, French West Africa, p. 538.

⁴France, M.F.O.M., loc. cit.

The development of all phases of education proceeded at a much slower pace in French Equatorial Africa. Considered the most backward of French colonial possessions prior to the Second World War, the Federation possessed only a small secondary course, at Brazzaville, primarily for the benefit of French youth. Through FIDES, eight secondary schools, including one complete lycée at Brazzaville, were fully operational by 1955 with a total enrollment of 1,315 African students.

However, over half of the secondary school places remained unfilled at this time because of the inability of the Africans to pass the secondary school entrance examinations. This fact led the Africans to demand both the reformation of primary education and the temporary easing of the entrance requirements to secondary education pending such a reformation. The French government refused this latter request, pointing out the discrepancy between this demand and the demand that local secondary education be identical with that in France.¹ However, the French did abandon the rigid metropolitan age limitation for admission to secondary schooling. The Africans argued that it was unfair to expect the native child to assimilate the French language and the other educational requirement on the same time-table as the French child. It had long been claimed that the French used this device to limit the educational opportunities for the natives.

Vocational and technical education in French Equatorial Africa remained relatively undeveloped until after the Second World War. Through the funds from FIDES after 1946, a few vocational institutions

¹Thompson and Adloff, The Emerging States . . ., p. 298.

were developed along metropolitan lines, with more attention devoted to theory and general culture than previously. Graduates received a certificate (Certificat d'Aptitude Professionnelle or C.A.P.) equivalent to the same diploma in France. This certified them as skilled workers and, until 1947, the graduates were absorbed into the government as teachers for the apprenticeship and manual training classes of the territorial schools. Thereafter, attempts were made to place the graduates in private employment, but the graduates preferred white-collar positions and the employers preferred to hire their own native apprentices or French skilled laborers. Although the curriculum in the vocational schools was rendered more practical in 1954, apparently the position of both the graduates and the employers remained essentially the same.¹

In French West Africa, vocational and technical education was also reformed along metropolitan lines and consisted of three levels. The lowest level produced skilled laborers and consisted of three years of study beyond primary education. The middle level, producing highly skilled laborers and future foremen, required two years of special study beyond the first cycle of secondary education. The highest level developed technicians and the course consisted of the baccalaureate and two years of additional study. The technician-candidates attended the one Higher Technical School of French Black Africa (technical high school) with the best graduates having the opportunity to study for engineering degrees in the Metropole. Unfortunately, the enrollment in this school in 1948 consisted of only fifty-seven students.²

¹Ibid., p. 269.

²France, M.F.O.M., Afrique Occidentale Francaise, 1948, p. 63.

According to an official report,¹ vocational and technical education was equal to that of the Metropole in quality, organization, and diplomas. Nevertheless, none of the secondary-level establishments was equal in reputation to those of the Metropole.² This fact and the desire of many students to pursue their studies at a higher level resulted in a substantial demand for scholarships to study in France. The following official statement indicates that this demand was liberally met in the years immediately following the war:

The efforts of the local and general budgets of French West Africa concerning scholarships are so great that one may say: whoever has the required diplomas to study at a higher level receives a scholarship.³

While this statement did not imply that all categories of diploma holders could study in France, it serves to illustrate the policy which permitted increasing numbers of African students to study there.⁴ However, this trend led to financial and political problems.

According to French officials, the cost of maintaining one African student in France represented the equivalent of operating a class of forty to fifty students in Africa.⁵ This cost did not include the wastage

¹Ibid., p. 62.

²A common charge, that the teachers as a group held degrees inferior to the comparable group in the Metropole, appears justified according to official statistics, e.g., see preceding reference, p. 64.

³Ibid., p. 61.

⁴For the years 1948, 1951, and 1955, the scholarships awarded or renewed for study in France from French West Africa were 638, 760, and 1,272 respectively. (These figures were obtained from the Annual Reports of French West Africa for the years of 1948, 1952, and 1956.)

⁵Thompson and Adloff, French West Africa, p. 545.

caused by the failure of a significant number of African students to adjust psychologically and academically to metropolitan studies or to those who sought continued residence in France upon conclusion of their scholarships.¹

To this financial burden was added a political one. The African students in Paris organized a Federation of Students of Black Africa (FEANF) shortly after the close of the war. Breaking its initial affiliation with the moderate Union of French Students, the Federation aligned itself with the communist-oriented International Union of Students. Its relations with the Ministry of Overseas France deteriorated to the point where the latter organization denounced it as irresponsible and withdrew recognition of the Federation.² While the bitter relations with the Black African students and the Ministry were partially resolved by time, the radicalism of the students remained and this, along with the other difficulties generated by their presence in France, apparently induced the French government to expedite the development of higher education in French Sub-Saharan Africa.

The project invoked mixed reactions from the African elite. Although aware of the financial problems of maintaining increasing numbers of scholarship holders in France, they feared the institution of local higher learning would result in another inferior educational product in the colonial tradition, that is, adapted to the needs and mentality of

¹This problem still exists, according to French officials interviewed in Paris by the researcher in 1961 and 1962.

²Thompson and Adloff, French West Africa, p. 544.

enrollment of 1,811 students.¹ However, these figures are deceiving in that almost one half of the student body in the late 1950's were French and, during the 1961-62 academic year, they accounted for almost a third of the students. During the latter year, only Senegal (587 students), Dahomey (227 students), Cameroon (54 students), and Togo (48 students) had substantial national representation at the University. For example, the countries of former French Equatorial Africa (Congo, Gabon, Republique Centrafricaine, and Tchad) had a combined total of only five students in attendance.² Thus, although the University is under the jurisdiction of the French Ministry of National Education rather than that of Senegal, the balkanization of French Sub-Saharan Africa and the superior reputation of the metropolitan universities has frustrated the French plan to develop the institution into the University of Central Africa, serving all of French Black Africa.

Assimilation and the Educational Recommendations of 1952. At the third annual conference of the directors of education of French Sub-Saharan Africa and of Madagascar, recommendations were made to the French government urging that the curriculum and textbooks be aligned with the constitutional provisions of 1946. Among these recommendations were the following:

- a) That the teaching of civic history and of geography recognize the following facts:
 1. That France, in the proper context, or the "French Republic" (Article 1 and 60 of the Constitution) comprises the overseas departments and territories with the same rank and in the same manner as the metropolitan departments;
 2. That the processes of forming and of unifying France into an establishment of national unity does not stop at the

¹Students enrolled in both the University and an Institute have been counted twice.

²Université de Dakar, Statistiques . . ., p. 4.

metropolitan level but is particularly pursued in the overseas territories;

3. That the French people is not composed exclusively (or essentially) of metropolitans, but of the totality of French citizens (Article 80 and 3 of the Constitution) and that it appears necessary that all the children of France (extended in this sense) be recognized as compatriots and as equal.

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5. And finally, that in general, the vocabulary employed in the courses of study, in the textbooks, and in the classroom be made to conform with the Constitution and, particularly, that the geography texts and the maps cease to represent the Metropole as the sole constituent of France but, to the contrary, that they refer or represent France as a totality (including all overseas departments and territories); and when they refer to a part of France (or represent only a part even if this part is the Metropole) that they stress that the reference is only to a part of France (such as metropolitan or of Europe, of Africa, of America, of Oceania, etc.).

- b) And that especially in the overseas territories, the ensemble of Frenchmen be enabled to know and to understand that they have one fatherland (all of France) and that they are all French of the same rank without any distinction of color or civil status.¹

The recommendations continued stressing the need to stop making distinctions in history, civics, and geography which created artificial local sentiments and noting that local adaptation of the courses appeared mainly to be a matter of the presentation of the material. In the concluding paragraph of the above section, the directors recommended:

- d) That education be dispensed to all under the same conditions, with the same programs in the same institutions or schools without distinction of ethnic origin or civil status, with the sole reservation being where adaptations may be required --such as the legal situation of the territories (mandated territories) or the transition from a mother tongue other than French.²

¹ France, M.F.O.M., "Recommandations de la 3e Conference des Directeurs de l'Enseignement d'Afrique Noire et de Madagascar," Enseignement Outre-Mer, December, 1952, pp. 31-32.

² Ibid., p. 32.

UNESCO and Africanization. France has traditionally used cultural expansion as a weapon of international politics, according to Senator Pezet, former Vice-Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate.¹ This policy brought conflicts with Islam, the English, and with American missionaries in Sub-Saharan Africa in the past, as has been demonstrated in this text. The advent of UNESCO brought another threat to the monopoly of the French language and education in French Black Africa.

This began when UNESCO commenced to urge the worldwide development of basic or fundamental education shortly after its inception. The French reaction was to establish the French Center for the Study and Information on Basic Education. Pilot programs were developed in French Sub-Saharan Africa as early as 1949 and, in 1956, a Higher Council for Overseas Basic Education was formed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Overseas France. This Council was to expedite the transition from the stage of experimentation to that of action.²

However, the idea never became popular with either the French or the Africans. Many of the latter group believed the project was a ruse to substitute inexpensive education for the genuine article and preferred to vote funds for the expensive French system. When some African politicians suggested that UNESCO finance further experimentation, the French government apparently opposed the move because they feared foreign propagandists would be included among the UNESCO technicians.³

¹Ernest Pezet, "L'Expansion Culturelle Facteur de la Politique Internationale," Cahiers Francais I' Information (France: Secretariat General du Gouvernement, No. 145, December 1, 1949), pp. 15-20.

²France, M.E.N., M.F.O.M., "Principes d'une Doctrine d'Education de Base," Bulletin de Liaison, No. 10, 2e Trimestre, 1956, p. 5.

³Thompson and Adloff, French West Africa, p. 547.

As the vogue of fundamental education declined, the apparition of African nationalism brought a new trend, the Africanization of culture. With the coming of independence, this move was encouraged by UNESCO, which offered printing facilities and language experts to develop and print the indigenous languages. This policy is generally deplored by high-level French officials¹ who contend that the Black Africans have neither the cultural heritage nor the modern languages to make such a policy feasible. One French official stated that this UNESCO policy is derived from the Anglo-Saxon leadership, but that it is partially negated at the level of implementation since the UNESCO field workers in French-speaking Black Africa are French.

The UNESCO-sponsored Inter-African Conference held at Tananarive, Madagascar (September 3-12, 1962) and attended by forty-five experts representing twenty-eight countries indicates a recent example of UNESCO policy. The theme of the conference was "The Adaptation of General Secondary-Level Courses of Study in Africa." The conference had as an object, according to an official French source, "a cultural emancipation permitting the affirmation of the African personality."² This French report included the following paragraph:

Among the reasons evoked which render the reformation of the courses of study necessary was "the cooperation between Africans, the required reinforcement of African unity through a mutual understanding. At the present, knowledge of the former colonial powers is more developed in each country than that of the neighboring African countries."³

¹These high-level officials are chiefs of directions, bureaux, services, or institutes, within the French government, interviewed by the author during the 1961-1962 academic year.

²France, M.E.N., "Les Conférences de Tananarive," Coopération Pédagogique, No. 1, January-February-March, 1963, p. 38.

³Ibid., p. 39.

A major problem exists in this regard since the secondary curriculum is closely tied to the European examination systems. Although, since independence (1960), the French African demand for equivalence of secondary education and for liberal access to French higher education has been maintained, a move to substitute African subject matter for the French, wherever possible, has grown in strength. To this end, various French Black African nations have established national committees and, during a conference of French African Ministers of Education held in Paris (February 20-25, 1961), the Ministers requested the formation of an international committee to work on the problem.¹ This resulted in the creation of a French committee titled "The Committee for the Study of the Adaptation of the Courses of Study in Africa." The French committee, which had its initial meeting on April 13, 1961, was to work independently of the various African groups but the end results would be examined and coordinated through an international conference of the various groups.² At the secondary level, course of study revisions were undertaken in the fields of natural science, French, history and geography.³

The obvious problem to be resolved is the extent and the direction of this adaptation. The French have no objection to the adaptation of education on their own terms, that is, as long as it does not seriously interfere with keeping the Africans in the French tradition. Indeed, in

¹France, M.E.N., "La Conférence des Ministres de l'Éducation Nationale des États Africains et Malgache d'Expression Française," Bulletin de Liaison, No. 21, n.d., p. 4.

²Ibid., "Le Comité d'Études pour l'Adaptation des Programmes Scholaires en Afrique," p. 9.

³Ibid., p. 10.

1955, the French were working on the modification of the first (preliminary) cycle of secondary education in French West Africa in order to render it a complete, terminal unit for most of the Africans who would not continue to the second (higher) cycle.¹ However, the Africanization movement, if carried to extremes, could mean a progressive de-emphasis of French civilization in the curriculum. Only at the second or higher cycle of secondary education are the French secure, since these three years are firmly tied to the baccalaureate examination.

The Political Steps to Independence. Increasingly close ties between the French-speaking nations of Sub-Saharan Africa and UNESCO became possible with the independence of these states in 1960. During the Fourth Republic, the Loi-cadre of 1956 opened the door for extensive African political activity and territorial semi-responsible government. The door was further opened in the months thereafter because of the inability of the weak French governments to cope with the problems of Algeria and inflation. In mid-April, 1958, the French government entered its nineteenth cabinet crisis since the official inauguration of the Fourth Republic in January, 1947. On May 30, 1958, de Gaulle became premier and received the power to act without recourse to the National Assembly and to submit constitutional reforms directly to the people. The Constitution of the Fifth French Republic, approved by the people in the referendum of September 28, 1958, removed the balance of power from the Parliament and concentrated it in the hands of the executive.

¹G. H. Camerlynck, "L'adaptation de l'enseignement dans le second degré (Premier Cycle)," L'Education Africaine, No. 26-27, 1955, pp. 7-13.

Under the new Constitution, the French Union of the Fourth Republic was replaced by the French Community. The concept of the French Union reflected the centralizing and assimilative tradition of the Third Republic while the Community, in contrast, acknowledged the right of self-government and even of secession.¹ However, affairs of common interest, such as foreign and monetary policy, defense, inter-state communications and transportation, and higher education, were controlled by the Executive Council of the Community composed of the chief executives of the various territories and presided over by the President of the Community who was also the President of France.

The modification of the Constitution, permitting complete independence of the Sub-Saharan African states in 1960, meant that further relations between France and these nations would be arranged through treaties and contracts. Among the accords so arranged were those in the areas of "the development of culture and of education" and of technical assistance.²

New French institutions were formed to match these political changes. The new funding agency, replacing FIDES in April, 1959 and titled the Funds for Aid and Cooperation (FAC), received the authority to finance a much greater variety of operations than its predecessor possessed.³ By a decree of June 10, 1961, the Ministry of Overseas France was replaced by the Ministry of Cooperation and the Minister of

¹Gwendolen M. Carter, The Fifth French Republic (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959), p. 14.

²France, Ministère de la Coopération, France, Afrique, Madagascar, Solidarité et Coopération, 1961, p. 5.

³Ibid., p. 14.

this new agency became chairman of the executive committee of FAC. The Ministry of Cooperation differed from its forerunner in that it deals solely with the new states of Sub-Saharan Africa including Madagascar.¹ French contributions for the development of these nations rose from 1,568 million francs in 1960 to 1,740 millions in 1961 and to about 1,900 millions in 1962.²

The establishment of the European Community brought another source of aid to the French-speaking Sub-Saharan countries through the European Development Fund for the Overseas Countries (FEDOM). Maintained by the six member states for the benefit of any overseas nation associated with one of the members, the Fund receives approximately one-third of its support from France, a third from West Germany, and the remaining members contributing the final third. However, most of the aid dispensed was allocated to countries in the French sphere of influence, with the first financial assistance agreement for Sub-Saharan Africa being concluded on April 7, 1959.³

Present French Educational Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa. In ultimate terms, French policy in the field of education clearly remains one of assimilation.⁴ Occasionally this general policy is described as continuation (of assimilation) and adaptation, implying assimilation to

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³European Community, The European Development Fund and the Associated Overseas Countries (Brussels; European Community Information Service, 1962), p. 1.

⁴Based upon interviews with high French officials close to the ministerial level.

the French language and cultural tradition with adaptation of specific strategies to meet the needs and means of the Africans.

The main efforts of adaptation are being conducted to ensure the achievement of universal primary education. Although politically committed to this goal, the African countries generally lack the funds to fulfill it while maintaining the complete primary cycle of six years. As pointed out by Dumont, basing education upon models from the most developed nations requires expenditures beyond the means of the French Sub-Saharan states. He cited the example of Upper Volta which, in 1960, took twenty-three per cent of its budget to educate eight per cent of the school age population. He noted it would have required three times the actual total national budget of that year just to have universal primary education without any further levels and types of education.¹

In addition to the cost factor, Dumont attacked the inadaptation of primary education, remarking that, even in France, education is undergoing heavy criticism. Following a comment upon the bookish character of French education, Dumont continued his criticism: "Thus France trains in her schools, . . . ten-fingered cripples, without understanding that a purely cerebral intelligence . . . cannot be complete."² After outlining the French failure to adapt successfully the African rural primary school, Dumont noted the following: "I have had much trouble getting the African minister to admit the inadaptation and even the insufficiency of our methods of education because many [of those responsible] are former teachers."³

¹Dumont, op. cit., p. 75.

²Ibid., p. 74.

³Ibid., p. 75.

In a review of a Social and Economic Development Plan for the Republic of Tchad, the Chief of the Service of Educational Research for Newly-Developing Countries made this statement:

It must be acknowledged: classical French education is not adapted for African and Tchadian society, a society essentially rural with a rapidly increasing population and with a weak financial capacity.¹

While such statements, particularly those of Dumont, may be questioned by some French educators, there can be little doubt that the need for an adapted rural primary education is recognized and advocated by the majority of metropolitan-based French officials concerned with educational development in Sub-Saharan Africa. In addition to numerous persuasive articles to this effect appearing in official French journals distributed in Africa, the French government has taken direct action to further its viewpoint through various channels. The Africans have been encouraged to invite French teams of economists and educators to devise national plans for economic and social development in which rural primary and vocational education strategies figure prominently.² Also, French technical assistance personnel in various countries have proposed the establishment of a special four-year rural primary cycle in order to expose more of the school age population to an education which is terminal for the majority and not merely a first preparatory step in the academic ladder. Many other specific measures³ have been advocated by the French

¹Roger Gineste, "Le Plan de Développement Économique et Social de la République du Tchad," Bulletin de Liaison, No. 20, n.d., p. 55.

²Such plans had been devised for Tchad, Upper Volta, and Dahomey by the summer of 1962. Only the plan for Upper Volta had been accepted by that time and, according to involved French officials, with some reluctance.

³Many of the specific reforms are to be found in the Bulletin de Liaison (op. cit.), as well as in the plans listed in the preceding footnote.

authorities in order to make universal primary education both financially feasible and of practical value. Universal exposure to the French language and the development of a popular Franco-African culture remain dependent upon the expansion of the primary school.

The African elites have not, as yet, accepted these proposals with enthusiasm since they generally are politically committed to providing equal primary education to all their peoples and the reforms are often considered as "watered down, inexpensive" versions of education reminiscent of the colonial era. Dumont cites a specific example:

The Minister of Education of Senegal has accumulated a large number of degrees. When the preliminary report of the plan . . . proposed a rationalization of his rural education, he instinctively rejected it, horrified.¹

This type of reaction is occasionally supported by traditional French educators serving in high technical assistance positions in Sub-Saharan Africa, with the obvious result that the implementation of metropolitan French policy is not always furthered in the field, becoming the victim of French individualism or the lack of adequate communication, or both.²

In a reform paralleling that in France, the French are encouraging the strengthening of the vocational-technical educational tracks in Black Africa, where the lack of technicians is particularly acute. The traditional colonial-era preference for French rather than indigenous technicians,³ the weakness of French technical education, particularly overseas,⁴ and the promotion of the few existing African technicians to

¹Dumont, op. cit., p. 75.

²Verified through personal interviews and observations in France and Africa.

³For example, see Roberts, op. cit., Volume I, pp. 166-167.

⁴See Charton's article in Mumford, op. cit., p. 91.

high-level and, often, political positions with the coming of independence, have resulted in a great shortage of personnel in the middle-level occupations. Realistically enough, the French officials of the Ministries of Cooperation and National Education recognize that a substantial number of the African graduates of higher technical education will prefer political positions as long as easy access to such careers is available.

This situation adversely affects the secondary-level teaching field, where a large majority of the teachers are French. At the primary level, ninety-five per cent of the teachers are African, but many promising teachers enter the political field or accept high governmental administrative posts. However, a more significant problem appears to be the desire of the primary instructors to teach in the major cities as opposed to the rural areas. To counter this urge, the French officials have advocated a system of rural normal schools in some African states.¹

With the rapid expansion of primary education, the quality of instruction has suffered because of the shortage of trained teachers and the lack of in-service education programs. According to a French authority, this first situation is largely a financial problem because it is possible to hire three poorly educated monitors for the salary of one qualified teacher. He refers to this practice as "a solution alluring for the financier, tragic for the educators."²

To meet the intricate problems of priorities and investments, the French government is encouraging the Sub-Saharan African nations to

¹As in Senegal.

²Roger Gineste, "Les Problèmes de l'Enseignement du Premier Degré dans les États de la Communauté," Bulletin de Liaison, No. 20, p. 27.

train educators in national educational planning at the University of Paris. It is hoped they will become accustomed to viewing education as an integrated aspect of national economic and social development--gaining sophistication in planning effective educational strategies based upon realistic analyses of existing deficiencies in the educational system, well-defined needs, and the means at hand.

While increasing African access to a wider variety of metropolitan institutions of higher learning, including the renown Grands Écoles, the French are pursuing a policy of greater overseas technical assistance in the field of education, in spite of a teacher shortage within France. As of 1961, the French planned to increase the number of French educators in Sub-Saharan Africa by ten per cent annually for ten years while gradually withdrawing other forms of technical assistance.¹ For example, from January 1960 to January 1961, French technical assistance personnel decreased from 10,500 to 8,701, but for the same period, the number of French educators increased from 2,534 (24.2%) to 3,447 (39.5%).²

Summary. French efforts in the field of education in Sub-Saharan Africa were greatly stimulated as a result of the Second World War. Although the First World War had a similar effect, the greater sophistication of the African and his growing demands after the second war as well as the French public commitments at the Brazzaville and Dakar Conferences, and in the French Constitution of 1946, made a relaxation of the overseas educational endeavor impossible as in the previous

¹Based upon interviews with French officials at the head of their departments or services within the Ministries of Cooperation and National Education.

²France, Ministère de la Coopération, France, Afrique . . ., p. 20.

instance. Through the operation of the Overseas Plan for Modernization and Equipment, the Metropole made substantial grants and loans to the Sub-Saharan territories which permitted the construction of many secondary-level school buildings. Indeed, the immediate French strategy appeared to be aimed at eliminating the flow of African secondary students to France by providing facilities for their education at home. With the development of a university at Dakar, Senegal, it was hoped all but certain specialized and graduate students of French Black Africa could be educated in Africa.

As the African elite grew in political acumen, they were able to exert considerable influence upon the weak and divided governments of the Fourth Republic, demanding and obtaining, in principle, the right to education in the territories exactly the equivalent of that in France. This sentiment had led to the abandonment, in 1946, of the rural farm schools in which attempts had been made to incorporate basic agricultural instruction with an adapted primary curriculum. French officials generally agreed with the Africans that this program had proved unsuccessful.

The reorganized rural primary system consisted of a six-year cycle of instruction which placed it theoretically on a par with the city schools in Africa and with those of metropolitan France. In 1950, the school system in the West African territories was provided with the same administrative structure as that in France. However, the costs of maintaining and staffing this expanded and equivalent system had begun to weigh heavily upon territorial budgets and the school construction program, financed by the Metropole, was cut sharply. In spite of the

and all colonial peoples as Frenchmen in all school texts, maps, and in oral references by teachers, may be outdated, but the spirit behind them burns as zealously as ever.

Indeed, the present multiform efforts of the French in the field of overseas education constitute an effective continuation of their historical grand strategy of employing language and culture as an instrument of international power and politics. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, one must agree with Senator Pezet's remarks to the effect that this instrument becomes increasingly important and active as more direct means of influence diminish.¹

¹Pezet, op. cit., p. 15.

CHAPTER V

THE INTENT OF FRENCH EDUCATIONAL STRATEGIES

Introduction. Educational strategies, or the planning and directing of educational developments, are conceived and placed into operation to achieve certain purposes. The concern in this chapter is to render explicit the French intent and its degree of consistency from a long-range aspect. This intent will be considered primarily in terms of ultimate or more distant goals rather than in the form of immediate outcomes related to specific strategies.

While the French intentions will be presented as applicable to their former Sub-Saharan territories as a whole, certain distinctions should be recalled between the former Federation of West Africa, the mandated territories of Cameroon and Togo, and the Federation of Equatorial Africa. Considered the most retarded of French colonies, the latter federation received scant attention from the Metropole, as compared to the other colonies, until after the Second World War. Its educational development was left largely in the hands of the missionaries and only by 1944 had the meager school population of the public schools surpassed that of the private institutions.¹ The mandated territories

¹The detailed comparative educational statistics of all these Sub-Saharan territories for the years of 1937-8, 1944-5, 1948-9, and 1949-50 may be found in the following source: France, Annuaire Statistiques de l'Union Francaise Outre-Mer, 1939-1949, pp. 211-228.

of Cameroon and Togo fared much better because of their unique status, but the Federation of West Africa has played the dominant role in the French educational effort in Black Africa. Generally speaking, the endeavor in West Africa has produced the models for public education in the other territories.

However, this distinction in the degree, as well as some differences in the specific means of educational development, does not reflect a significant variation in the French intentions. The ends remain the same even though the means and the time-tables differ.

The Ultimate Intentions of French Educational Strategies for Sub-Saharan Africa. The failures of Louis XVIII and of Napoleon Bonaparte successfully to establish French hegemony on the European continent led the French imperialists to seek other means of asserting and maintaining France as a world power. Following the example of England, France turned to other continents where military conquests met less resistance and which might furnish the Metropole with the raw materials and the markets deemed necessary for a nation entering into the industrial revolution.

At the same time that France, from a military standpoint, was being repulsed on the European continent, her language and culture were gaining international recognition as the highest expression of Western civilization. French had replaced Latin as the international language; French culture set the standards for the European aristocrats, while the ideals of the French revolution enthralled the European liberals.

As the students of French history and their publications testify, no one was more impressed by this cultural ascension than the French

themselves. Under the circumstances, the constant references in French publications to France's "civilizing mission" are not surprising. Thus, the following quotation of the remarks, made in 1949 by a former vice-chairman of the French Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, constitutes a representative, rather than an isolated, expression of French opinion:

In all French assemblies, approval is unanimous when an orator exalts the eminent national, and human, utility of our cultural expansion in the world, and this is an honor to the political finesse, the psychological intuition, and the patriotic inclination of the French. They instinctively understand, if they do not know by experience, . . . that the worldwide prestige of France has been primarily acquired, maintained, and restored after eclipses of glory and power, by the moral authority and the intellectual attraction of her culture.¹

Since the French consider their language as a major aspect of their culture, it represents the key to the cultural assimilation of less civilized peoples. The French school, in turn, acts as the medium through which that language and culture are acquired. Hence, in 1962, when French officials concerned with the development and implementation of educational strategies for Sub-Saharan Africa, assert² that the purpose of their work is to continue the assimilation of the Black African, they are confirming the central purpose maintained by their predecessors for approximately 150 years.³

It is important to distinguish political from cultural assimilation as a clarification of the ultimate French intent in the field of

¹Pezet, op. cit., p. 15.

²As interviewed by the author.

³The exception to this statement may have been the first French lay educator sent to Sub-Saharan Africa by the French government. He advocated educating the natives in their indigenous tongues, at least in the initial stages.

education. Political assimilation, when carried to its logical conclusion, would have shifted the control of the French government from the peoples of the Metropole to those of the overseas territories by the weight of sheer numerical superiority. Thus, political assimilation proceeded as far as it could in the years following the Second World War and then gave way to the French Community concept and, subsequently, to independence with continuing close economic and cultural ties when the peoples of Overseas France demanded greater representation at the political level.

The very fact of the impossibility of genuine political assimilation argued well for the need for cultural assimilation as an enduring instrument for maintaining French dominance. The statement made at the turn of the century, by a prime mover of French cultural imperialism, Pierre Foncin, bears repeating as an illustration of the above point:

If the administrative, economic, and financial autonomy of the colonies appears to me to be very desirable, it is perhaps all the more necessary to attach them to the Metropole by a very solid psychological bond, against the day when their progressive emancipation ends in a form of federation as is probable--that they be, and they remain, French in language, thought, and spirit.¹

The idea of Gallicizing the natives was obviously conceived, and under way, long before Foncin's time. After the initial naive assumptions of the Ministry of the Navy and Colonies, that the Senegalese could be converted rapidly to Christianity and educated en masse by the monitorial system, were dispelled, a more sophisticated policy emerged. In 1822, the idea of educating an African elite, who in turn would educate their fellow countrymen, led to the sending of several Africans to France.

¹Foncin, op. cit., p. 3.

In 1823, Governor Roger reported that he was educating several young Senegalese to be French commercial agents in the interior.

But only by 1829 was a comprehensive plan of native education devised and approved. The plan called for the ultimate eradication of indigenous linguistic and cultural differences through the annual production of a French-educated indigenous elite which would gradually civilize their brothers. This elite was to be educated in local boarding schools to ensure isolation from the African environment and the acquisition of the French language and culture.¹

As the French extended their influence and their educational facilities in Sub-Saharan Africa, the principle of "disengaging the elite and instructing the mass"² became explicit. In terms of cultural assimilation, this meant the total assimilation of an indigenous elite who were to become "complete Frenchmen"³ and the partial but progressive assimilation of the masses through the development of a Franco-African culture which, in time, would evolve ever closer to French civilization.

The former Inspector-General of Education of French West Africa, Albert Charton, stated the problem as follows in 1934:

It is necessary to go beyond the immobile and closed indigenous way of life. This results in a double problem: that of a black elite which, due to the impotence of its original culture, cannot but be directed toward the European culture and ordered, oriented, and incorporated into the national [French] life; then, in the second instance, the problem of elaborating a type of Franco-African

¹These events are detailed in Chapter II.

²Thompson and Adloff, French West Africa, p. 518.

³France, B.O.M.C., Instruction Publique, Report of June 20, 1919, 1919, p. 941.

culture which . . . will expand little by little, under elemental but viable forms, throughout the mass itself.¹

The Inspector continued by stressing the need for a constant surveillance and readjustment of the developing civilization to ensure its viability. In the search for the proper educational formulae, he cautioned against the extremes of empiricism and of idealism, noting the former lacked any direction while the latter suffered from attempts at direct assimilation. In reference to the second situation, he was particularly caustic:

The systems of education of the Metropole have been imported down to the details of the hourly schedules and of the courses of study. The policy of the table rase has been practiced and the young native has been considered like a statue of Condillac, fit to receive from the master all his ideas, perceptions, and thoughts.²

On the other hand, Charton did not reject the idea of assimilation as the ultimate goal:

Assimilation cannot be defended as a point of departure but . . . , as a result, a success which is necessary to pursue, to win, to consolidate. The prerequisite condition for this final assimilation is precisely an adaptation.³

In terms of organization, the adaptation of French education had resulted in the emergence of a two-track school system about the middle of the nineteenth century: a metropolitan-type education for the children of the French colonials and of the assimilated natives as well as for the sons of chiefs and other native notables, and a more adapted, rudimentary education for the mass. In general, the former

¹Albert Charton, *Rôle Social de l'Enseignement en Afrique Occidentale Française* (Paris: Librairie Larose, 1934), p. 6.

²Ibid., p. 7.

³Ibid.

track existed in the larger urban and administrative centers while the latter radiated out into the interior. Because of both the acute need and the relative ease of development, the system of educating the French children and an auxiliary elite evolved first.¹

The Education of an Indigenous Elite. Throughout the French colonial literature, reference is made to different types of colonies primarily based upon whether or not the territories were suitable for settlement by large numbers of French people. Frequently, lands in which conditions were favorable for French migration were known as colonies of colonization and the others were referred to as colonies of exploitation.

In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, it was rapidly discovered that the colonies were unsuitable for French emigration. Charton employed the term "colony of natives" in pointing out that, there, the French constituted essentially a management group or headquarters ultimately dependent upon native collaborators and auxiliaries for the execution of policy.² The initial aim of primary education and that of secondary education, once it was developed, lay in the formation of an African elite which would serve as intermediaries between the French and the indigenous mass.

Three categories of natives were channeled into the schools under the elite-building process: the sons of the chiefs and of other

¹The education of this elite required less adaptation of the school to indigenous conditions and developed in the more comfortable urban environment rather than in the bush.

²Charton, loc. cit., pp. 1 and 5.

native notables, the sons of the already assimilated natives employed by the French and the mulattoes, and other pupils demonstrating scholarly achievement and the proper attitude toward Frenchification. However, only the students from the first group were exempt from taking the entrance examinations which opened the door to secondary education.

Historically, the sons of chiefs were taken as hostages and educated in the French tradition regardless of their desires. As the French sphere of influence grew, the sons of chiefs were compelled¹ to complete primary education and were then selected for enrollment at the secondary level based upon a report prepared by the district administrator and verified by the inspector of administrative affairs. A committee of the highest colonial officials made the final selections. The report, furnished by the district administrator to higher authorities, had to contain the following:

. . . precise information on the parents of the candidate, on the authority, the political prestige and influence of the family group, on the past history of his ancestors and on the services rendered by them to the French administration.²

The schools or sections for sons of chiefs were usually under the jurisdiction of the highest political rather than the educational authority. For example, in French West Africa, the lieutenant-governor of Senegal had direct authority over the school; the inspector of administrative affairs exercised the disciplinary needs instead of the

¹While primary education was compulsory for these children, this is not meant to imply that they were, as a group, opposed to French education.

²Government-General of French West Africa, Recueil des Textes Officiels relatif à l'Enseignement et au Personnel de l'Enseignement, 1919, p. 24.

inspector of education, and the final decisions for promotion or release from the school were made by the governor.¹

The graduates, if they wished, were granted positions as secretaries of the native administration directly under the district administrator. After a minimum of four years' service, they could be appointed "canton chiefs, tenth class."²

The other native students received less delicate handling from the French authorities in that they succeeded to the ranks of the elite by merit through a competitive academic process. Many of these students came from assimilated families which, obviously, gave them an advantage over those whose backgrounds afforded less early and substantial contact with the French language and way of life.

These students were usually educated as primary teachers, interpreters, medical assistants, and as administrative aides of various types. After the Second World War, increased opportunities for a more academic secondary and higher education provided greater access to professions such as law, medicine, and engineering.

The Franco-Arabic schools, or medersas, represented a special adaptation of elite education to coopt the Islamic portions of the Black African populations. According to Hardy, these schools were established upon the erroneous assumption that Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa rested on the same strong bases as that in North Africa. Once it was understood that the Sub-Saharan Moslems had a superficial, ritualistic, rather than

¹Ibid., pp. 25, 27, 30.

²Ibid., p. 31.

a deep, intellectual commitment to the religion, the planned expansion of the schools was dropped.¹

The original goal of these schools was given by Hardy as follows:

. . . Between the Koranic schools and the French schools, the Franco-Arabic schools or medersas were placed, designed to make the former forgotten and the latter accepted.²

After noting that only three of these institutions remained in French West Africa in 1917, Hardy explained that these three continued in existence only because of a revision in the curriculum:

Their programs have been completely transformed. They are no longer Moslem universities, but Franco-Arabic schools in which the French language and sciences take precedence more and more over the Arabic language and sciences.³

The Education of the Mass. As previously noted, the ultimate objective of mass or popular education was the creation of a Franco-African culture which would progressively evolve toward French civilization. While the French have generally considered this purpose as a long-range and difficult goal to achieve, they have recognized a relative lack of progress in this area as compared with the education of the elite.

Aside from the substantial attempts to use Christianity as a medium of partial acculturation,⁴ the French have employed, to varying degrees, three major strategies in the education of the mass: regular primary schooling, adult education, and fundamental or basic education.⁵

¹Hardy, Une Conquête Morale . . ., p. 107.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 110.

⁴Conversion was important in non-Islamic regions, particularly in the coastal states of French Equatorial Africa.

⁵Other strategies, such as the ordinance issued by Faidherbe compelling the pupils of Koranic schools to attend French language classes at night, are not included because of their transitory nature or relative lack of importance.

Neither of the latter two means has had the moral or monetary support of the French as compared to that devoted to the primary school system. Because of the perennial scarcity of funds, the priority was continually granted to the formal school system.

It is quite possible that the French considered these means as less effective in the achievement of a Franco-African culture than the formal education of the young native where French was the language of instruction. While one of the chief activities of basic and adult education was the instruction of elementary French, the development of concepts in such areas as sanitation and agriculture necessitated the use of the vernacular language.

After a visit to the British Sub-Saharan territories in 1955, Senghor made this significant statement:

. . . We have much to learn from the English in the domain of economic and social development. Employing concrete methods, they have succeeded in provoking a veritable mystique of Social Welfare and Community Development. Basic education is not only the teaching of reading and writing and the masses do not expect everything from the administration which manages . . . neither their sweat [Labor] nor their money.¹

Senghor's remarks not only indicate the French constancy in employing all means to instruct indigenous peoples in the French language, but suggests the minute control over indigenous initiative and affairs, maintained by French officialdom.

Basic education did not escape from this official management once the British and the UNESCO programs received notoriety. Organizations for its control were developed within the Ministries of Overseas

¹Leopold Senghor, "Report Extracts," L'Education Africaine, No. 37, 1956, p. 6.

France and National Education, at the federal or territorial group level, and within each colony or territory. To assure the scientific development of a basic or elementary French, a special ministerial committee was established as well as a Center for the Study of Elementary French at the *École Normale Supérieure de Saint-Cloud*.

However, as admitted in an official bulletin, the French have always regarded basic vocabularies and grammars with a "certain suspicion, sometimes even with a strong hostility"¹ since they represent a distortion of pure language, thought and culture. Indeed, as previously mentioned, the whole concept of basic education appears to be conceived as ineffectual and as an unsatisfactory solution to the education of Africans by many French administrators and educators. This opinion, echoed by the majority of the African elite, limited the extensive development of this strategy.

On the other hand, adult education, primarily concerned with French language instruction and basic arithmetic, had been sponsored by the French many decades prior to the advent of basic education and community development. Classes were usually formed wherever enough adults could be collected and signed up for a minimum of one month's attendance. However, such courses were generally restricted to the urban areas and large administrative centers where the advantages of speaking French were obvious to the indigenous adults.² In 1900, Foncin wrote: "Everywhere there should be language schools and adult courses, directed

¹"Le Français Élémentaire," *Bulletin de Liaison*, No. 11, 1956, p. 1.

²In 1929-1930, 180 adult courses with 8,160 auditors were operational in French West Africa. France, *Commissariat de l'Afrique Occidentale Française, L'Afrique Occidentale Française*, 1931, p. 2.

mainly by monitors trained in normal courses."¹ In his opinion, these were the twin basic vehicles for education of the native mass and they had the same objectives: instruction in the French language.

The language schools represented the lowest echelon of the formal school system and while their actual organization and official designation varied through the years, the major intent remained constant: "diffusion of French in the mass of the population."² The blanketing of the Sub-Saharan territories with a network of such schools represented a goal traditionally pursued by the French.

The strategy was succinctly expressed by one governor in 1930 in his call for a new effort in mass education: "In order for the native to go to school, the school must go to the native."³ While envisaging the establishment of a school in every village, the same governor expressed the following spirit: "We have the intention of bringing more progress in a few decades to the native than he has accomplished for himself during milleniums."⁴

This difficult task has received priority, on paper if not in fact, throughout most of the French presence in Sub-Saharan Africa. Following the Second World War, this priority was reaffirmed periodically in French policy statements based upon the new rights accorded to the natives:

¹Foncin, op. cit., p. 9.

²France, Commissariat de l'Afrique Occidentale Francaise, op. cit., p. 7.

³Ibid., p. 5.

⁴Ibid.

The acquired rights would be illusionary and the real participation in the political, intellectual, and social life of the nation practically impossible without this knowledge of the language of the community.¹

In extending the practical arguments for the universal usage of French rather than the indigenous languages, the same document noted as follows: "Without the usage of an elementary French, the African is diminished and withheld from the French community."²

Access to the elite class, it was further argued, was dependent upon primary-level instruction in the French language:

There are no studies possible for the African elite, particularly in the sciences and the technical fields, without the usage of French; but this elite cannot be determined in advance due to the democratic character of the Constitution. It follows that, in order to allow equal opportunity for all pupils, it is necessary to permit them the usage of a common language of culture.³

The weaknesses and diversity of the local languages were also referred to in terms of a Franco-African culture. Citing the lack of a fixed or written African literature, the article concluded on this point: "On the other hand, a literature in French by Africans is the point of departure of a neo-African culture."⁴

Basically, there has been little change in the French reasoning for the extension of French education and language in Sub-Saharan Africa since independence. According to the present rationalization, this system and language now serves as a liberating channel which enables the

¹France, M.F.O.M., L'Afrique Occidentale Francaise, 1950, p. 37.

²Ibid., p. 38.

³Ibid., p. 37.

⁴Ibid., p. 38.

Africans to develop modern and coherent nations. Fulbert Youlou, the former President of the Congo (Brazzaville), echoed the French line through the following statement in 1960:

In expressing myself spontaneously in French, I do not have the feeling of betraying the African culture. I simply provide an incomparable means of rendering it intelligible to the entire world.¹

The Criterion of Utility. The paramount goal of cultural assimilation was not without immediate utilitarian implications at either the elite or mass level of education. Indeed, the French fear of producing a "useless product" was voiced consistently in the literature.

However, only after the organization of the Federation of French West Africa in 1903 and the formulation of the comprehensive educational act of that year was the criterion of utility specifically and consistently applied to public native education. Reaching its peak in the 1920's and 1930's, this policy had to be modified after 1944 because of the political situation which found the Africans demanding a replica of the metropolitan school system.

In economic terms, the creation of a Franco-African culture largely implied the eventual development of a productive rural population oriented to a cash crop economy. As one explanation of the failure of efforts at large-scale rubber and cotton production, Roberts cited the lack of French control over the natives, to whom the dictates of metropolitan policy meant nothing.²

¹France, Ministère de la Coopération, France Afrique, p. 36.

²Roberts, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 324.

World War, a strict quantitative control over the output at this level was enforced to avoid the creation of unemployed intellectuals.

Prior to 1945, all of the complete secondary courses for the whole of French Sub-Saharan Africa were located in Senegal. In addition to the regular lycées, technical institutions existed there to produce primary teachers, assistant doctors, marine mechanics, and a few other types of technicians. The output of these schools was extremely small.¹

This fact held true for the entire vocational-technical track of French Black Africa, since there existed little need for skilled labor because of the lack of industrialization and the French practice of employing metropolitan personnel in positions which other colonial powers reserved for natives. Dumont develops the former point under this provocative heading: "Industry sacrificed; Colonial Pact prolonged."² After noting that, through 1961, the French development funds of FIDES and FAC included no assistance for industrialization, he made the following comment:

The absence of any title relative to industrialization was revealing. Thus, the aid to development leads to the prolongation of the primary character of the tropical African economy, based upon agriculture and the extraction of raw materials.³

When Dumont proposed a revision of the principles of fund allocations to the chairman of the FAC committee in 1961, the reply pointed out that such a reorientation would require long studies. These studies, according to Dumont, should have commenced in 1947.⁴

¹The total enrollment of the normal schools and courses in French West Africa for the 1937-1938 academic year stood at 146 students. France, Annuaire Statistique de l'Union Française d'Outre-Mer, 1939-1949, p. 225.

²Dumont, op. cit., p. 37.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

Thus, the absence of a strong vocational-technical education track constituted a reflection of the character of the French Sub-Saharan economy to some extent. The demands for semi-skilled and skilled native manpower were sufficiently low and spotty to permit a reliance upon a method of informal apprenticeship training. However, after the war, the shortage of skilled labor and technicians was cited as one of the principal obstacles to the modernization of French Black Africa,¹ and the abandonment of the "empirical method of vocational training" in French West Africa was officially announced in 1951.² A metropolitan system of accelerated training was to be installed until the output of the formal vocational-technical track reached substantial proportions.

While the French educational system in Sub-Saharan Africa proved to be woefully inadequate in meeting post-war needs, it should be kept in mind that the phenomena of accelerated development and Africanization of the civil service were outcomes of the Second World War. Prior to that time, despite periodic ambitious policy statements, educational output in French Black Africa was largely geared to, or below, the immediate absorptive capacity of the local public and private sectors. This criterion of utility, stemming from pre-war concepts of economic and social development growth rates, left the colonies with vast educational needs after the war.

The Implication of Adaptation. The installation of a European system of education in Black Africa obviously required some form of

¹France, L'Afrique Occidentale Francaise, 1951, p. 181.

²France, L'Afrique Occidentale Francaise, 1950, Education Annex, p. 1.

adaptation. However, as Professor Gourou pointed out, the word "adaptation" is sufficiently vague to carry at least two connotations.¹ First, it may imply the creation of a virtually new and distinct system based upon a disinterested response to local conditions and needs. Fundamental education might be considered an example of this type of adaptation. Second, adaptation may be viewed as an imposition of a foreign system with a minimum of modification, initiated primarily by motives of self-interest.

The adaptation of French education to the needs of the natives implied that the indigenous requirements consisted of progressive Frenchification. As conceived by the French, adaptation at the level of mass education was particularly crucial because the native required partial acculturation without de-racialization. Theoretically, adaptation consisted of a delicately balanced process which would bring carefully controlled change.

The management of the dynamics of change was seen to involve a continuous evaluation of the school system to avoid both under- and over-education. This was conceived as a long-term process of correlating pedagogical sophistication with cultural change. The progressive reorientation of the indigenous culture to a European-type civilization would require the consistent re-adaptation of popular education to continue and to further the orderly shift in values, skills, and institutions. In short, adapted education was to be geared to produce the evolution of the mass and to avoid mass revolution.

¹M. Gourou, "L'Adaptation de l'Enseignement dans les Colonies," Rapport Général (Paris: Congrès Intercolonial de l'Enseignement dans les Colonies et les Pays d'Outre-Mer, September 25-27, 1931), p. 308.

Since the French themselves could be little more than the directors of this evolution, the assimilated elite were to be prepared as the implementors of the program, or the active agents of change. This again involved a delicate task of acculturation without culturally isolating the Gallicized intermediaries from the mass. Periodically, the French policy-makers and pedagogues voiced fears of forming a modern native leadership completely divorced from their traditional culture.

Prior to the Second World War, the problem of adapting secondary education was partially resolved by restricting the availability of the full classical program. For example, only thirty-two lycée students in French Black Africa passed both parts of the baccalaureate examinations during the 1945-1946 academic year and the statistics do not indicate how many of these candidates were African rather than French.¹ Those few Africans gaining access to secondary education usually received the first cycle of secondary education, normal school training, or other forms of technical training.²

After the Second World War, the stress upon adaptation gave way before new political pressures and it came to be regarded as a matter of methodology to be applied at the teacher's discretion rather than as a system of curricular and organizational modification. The theory of, controlled change, denounced by the Africans as a tool of colonialism and paternalism, was replaced by the theory of equality or identity.³

¹France, Annuaire Statistiques de l'Union Francaise Outre-Mer, 1939-1949, p. 224.

²In addition, small numbers of Africans received secondary and higher education in France between the two World Wars.

³Identity implied the right for all territorial units of the French Union to have identical institutions to those of the Metropole.

The metropolitan system was endorsed and the school populations of the various territories increased by 100% to 300% between 1946 and 1956.¹

At the present time, the French and African purposes for educational adaptation appear to be somewhat in conflict. In general, the Africans seem desirous of Africanizing the curriculum; the French appear more anxious to modify the rural primary school organization in order to make it economically feasible to achieve universal primary education and, thereby, to extend the usage of the French language.

Conclusion. As so clearly stated by Senator Pezet in 1949, the French have instinctively and deliberately employed cultural expansion as an instrument of foreign and colonial policy. Hence, it is not unduly surprising that the history of French educational strategies for Sub-Saharan Africa at the intentional or policy level reveals a remarkable consistency of purposes, particularly after the metropolitan inquiry into the status and potential of Senegal in 1829.

At that time, the necessity of restructuring the native society and of reorienting the indigenous mentality through French education was enunciated. The report of the board of inquiry into education called for the exclusive use of French in the schools and the establishment of boarding schools as a requisite for the creation of a modern elite ; through isolation from the indigenous way of life. After completing their studies, the newly created elite were to become the secular missionaries to promote the French presence and the auxiliaries to the colonial administration.

¹During the ten-year period (1946-1956), the percentage of the school age populations receiving some education increased as follows: Equatorial Africa--5.3% to 21.3%; West Africa--4.4% to 11.6%; Cameroon--27.1% to 54.1%; Togo--12.2% to 40.4%. France, M.F.O.M., Enseignement Outre-Mer, No. 8, December, 1956, p. 19.

As Senegal evolved from a colony of trading settlements to one of exploitation around the middle of the nineteenth century, the education of the mass was begun as the second step in the promotion of a Franco-African culture.¹ This became particularly necessary after the failure of Governor Roger's experiment with the plantation system in the 1820's. It demonstrated that the development of West African agriculture would be dependent upon the mass of the indigenous peasants without the immediate supervision of a French overseer. Since communication had to precede effective innovation on a massive scale, the rural primary school was viewed as a major instrument to effect native collaboration.

From these early beginnings, the French developed a series of strategies for the education of both the elite and the mass. At the elite level, measures were taken to ensure the cooptation of the traditional native leadership while, at the same time, a modern elite was being developed through the regular channels of competition and selection. In the former instance, French primary schooling became compulsory for the sons of chiefs and influential families and admission to secondary education was based upon political considerations rather than on entrance examinations. Indeed, when and where such programs were put in operation, the local French administrative authorities superseded the education officials as supervisors. Representing a special strategy for the Moslem-dominated regions of northern West Africa, the Franco-Arabic schools were instituted to produce a French-aculturated Moslem religious and legal leadership.

¹ A colony of exploitation was a territory designated to be extensively developed within the empirical economic scheme.

The modern elite, arising through academic competition, were absorbed into the French administration, where primary school teaching offered the most opportunity and considerable prestige prior to the Loi-cadre of 1956.¹ Their role was to serve the colonial administrative needs and to collaborate in the development of a new popular culture. As primary teachers, they were placed in a position to fulfill both of these purposes.

The primary school system was devised as a selective mechanism for the modern elite and as a long-range instrument for the creation of a Franco-African civilization. Until 1946, the system actually consisted of rural and urban components, with the former having an adapted organization and curriculum and the latter resembling the metropolitan schools.

It should be remembered that France did not intend to pay for African human resource development from metropolitan funds, and this principle forestalled the rapid expansion of public education until 1946. In fact, outside of French West Africa, public education remained largely a system on paper prior to that time. Religious orders, initially solicited by the metropolitan government and subsidized through local colonial revenue, were relied upon to conduct the educational endeavor in accordance with regulations provided by the state. These regulations, ensuring French as the language of instruction and the adherence to a prescribed curriculum, were aimed against the employment of indigenous languages in the mission schools and of English by the foreign missionaries in those zones where international agreement permitted their presence.

¹The Loi-cadre of 1956 marked the beginning of widespread opportunities for advancement of native personnel in civil service and politics.

The consequences of the Second World War forced an acceleration of the French educational efforts, and this endeavor has been maintained and extended in order to further the psychological assimilation of the Africans. The dictum of one of the chief architects of French overseas education, Pierre Foncin, is more pertinent today than in 1900. Through French learning, an indelible French presence is maintained irrespective of political events. The philosophy behind the metropolitan Sub-Saharan educational strategies might be summarized in the following words:

To think in French is to be French.

Zeitgeist (literally, "the spirit of the times")¹ could be defined as an inclusive term covering several of the other phenomena. Conversely, the concept of Zeitgeist might be considered as a vague generalization which should be replaced by an analysis of its specific components. The employment of the concept here represents a compromise between these two extremes. It is used as the most convenient and adequate means of describing the climate of opinion of a specific era. But certain of its constituent elements are treated separately because of their special importance in the formulation of given educational strategies.

Ethnocentric Idealism. The assimilative goals of French educational strategies may be accounted for partially by the intensity and nature of French ethnocentricity. National myths in France probably have been more overtly rationalized and explicitly defined than in Anglo-Saxon countries.

In essence, the national myth established France as the standard-bearer of western civilization, a role inherited from Greece and Rome. In this myth, French culture as the exemplar of western achievement is considered to have a universal quality which renders it applicable everywhere. This assumption of incontestable superiority and universality appears somewhat akin to expressions made on behalf of communism. Indeed, its ardent advocates regard communism as a limited philosophy and a transient force inferior to French universalism. A Franco-American historian exhibited this quality in the following quotation:

¹Zeitgeist is a conceptual term derived from German philosophy, adopted into English and for which there is no adequate equivalent in French. Since this study is written in English, the use of the term seems acceptable. In French literature and philosophy the term "le Zeitgeist" is a relatively common one.

France is a traditional attitude of mind, a psychological entity. . . . It (the French smile) expresses the joy of understanding, the pride of not being duped, bitter though the truth may be. . . . That smile is deadly to pretenses and pricks every metaphysical bubble. It is a challenge to the absolute, and to all forms of absolutism: Leon Blum was a marxian--but with a smile.¹

In this concept, France is seen, not as a race or nation, but as a mature world of being and a sophisticated way of thought and action open to the world at large. Rejecting such contemporary forces as Russian communism and American materialism as transitory extremes, this state of mind reflects a critical but open attitude which sifts the universal from the parochial in the Socratic tradition. This lack of parochialism has provided France with a unique role in the world, according to one interpretation of French history:

. . . The highest achievement of the national spirit, in France, is the cosmopolitan. Geography has made her a meeting ground; history has made her a common denominator. That is why people throughout the world enjoy France not as a land of strange exotic charm, but as an extension of their home.²

Prior to citing the search for the universal which has characterized French history since the Middle Ages, the same historian offered an explanation for the phenomenon noted above:

The fundamental reason for the privileged position of France was the renunciation of privilege. At their best, the French did not divorce nationality from humanity.³

Regardless of the validity of French claims to universalism, the fact remains that the acceptance of this theory has influenced French colonial policy, particularly in the field of education:

¹Albert Guerard, France--A Short History (New York: W. W. Norton Inc., 1946), p. 49.

²Ibid., p. 24.

³Ibid., p. 26.

Frenchification was never a brutal process. It was an opportunity, so the French see no reason why the same method should not be extended to their vast colonial empire. . . . We shall see that one of the main assets of greater France, within the colonial empire and beyond, is the French language. Whoever reads French anywhere in the world, whatever his race or flag may be, becomes in some degree a part of the French culture group.¹

In this context, the French language is often conceived as an outstanding instrument of precise thought and expression and as the necessary condition for the initiation to the universal spirit and tradition of France. The saying, "What is not clear is not French," refers to both of these values.

This cultural tradition has made it difficult for many French educators concerned with Sub-Saharan Africa to support revision in basic or elementary French and any adaptation of the curriculum. For example, efforts to include the publications of modern authors, either African or French, whose works related to the African environment, have been resisted on the grounds of mediocrity. After a brief discussion of this latter problem in 1956, one educator expressed an attitude which is still prevalent today.²

The sentiments expressed by our great writers, particularly by our classical ones, are valid for all time and all places and it is the French authors who distort thought the least.³

In a footnote attached to the above sentence, the writer substantiated his thesis:

¹Ibid., p. 48.

²Based upon the author's experience in France and Senegal.

³Marcel Barral, "De la Recitation à l'École primaire," L'Education Africaine, No. 37, 1956, p. 34.

of the French psyche or world of mind, should be considered as real and motivating forces significant in the formulation and implementation of French policy.

Hayes, in his study of French national psychology and its derivation, claimed that the common consciousness of national being is nowhere more deeply rooted than in France, and he emphasized the belief in the uniqueness of the French position: "All Frenchmen take it equally for granted that France is the leader and champion of the world's civilization."¹ He noted how this assumption makes it possible for French writers to reject nationalism as descriptive of general French national psychology:

They [the French] are so certain of meriting foreign praise that they can comfortably refrain from praising themselves. They can likewise be sincere and eager internationalists, for they assume that a whole world of nations must revolve around France.²

In his comprehensive analysis of the derivations of French patriotism, Hayes gave considerable attention to the far-reaching effects of the role of the State in all areas of the national economic and social life including the control of culture and education. Convinced that the schools constitute a major factor in the formation of the rather unique attitudes of the French, Hayes conducted a detailed study of various types and levels of curriculum and of the content of many of the textbooks. His research findings reveal a degree of indoctrination of nationalism unknown in the United States. Patriotic content monopolizes every subject in the curriculum which lends itself to interpretation and this content is

¹Carlton J. H. Hayes, France, A Nation of Patriots (New York: Columbia University Press, 1930), pp. 1-2.

²Ibid.

studied and restudied until the French child may literally conceive of France in the terms which have been previously noted.¹

After a study of textbooks, classified as Catholic, non-Catholic, militaristic, and pacifist, Hayes concluded that the texts in general were even more nationalistic than the courses of study. After discussion of the differences in the themes of the various types of texts, Hayes made this observation:

The means are different, but the end is the same. It is French genius which is discussed, French civilization which is extolled.²

The author was also impressed by the strong moralizing tendency of the textbooks in history, reading, and civics. Following a description of the variations in the moral themes, he continued:

. . . But most often present is a moralizing about the pre-eminent services of France to the world and the paramount duties of Frenchmen to France. We gather from these textbooks that the preeminent services of France to the world are personal liberty, equality, national solidarity, democracy, manners, art, learning, religion, morals, and science. We note conspicuously among the services of France its excellent, unselfish colonial undertakings and among the duties of Frenchmen, their obligation to know and prize the French colonial empire.³

Hayes further found that the books invariably represented France as right in all international disputes, but, of course, this practice is not limited to France. More important perhaps was what the books did not say:

¹While Hayes' book was published in 1930, its thesis is accepted by this writer as still substantially valid today.

²Hayes, op. cit.

³Ibid., p. 53.

By their omission they make it difficult for a French youth to be critical of French institutions or conduct, or to know of any services rendered to the world by modern foreign nations, or to understand how or why a foreign people should love its fatherland and serve its national government.¹

The indoctrination is continued by other governmental and quasi-public agencies after the Frenchman completes his formal education. The armed forces were among the examples of such institutions studied by Hayes and he quoted the following text from an official handbook (1927) for soldiers and non-commissioned officers as an illustration of the type of direct propaganda they received:

The love of the Fatherland is the source of all virtue. . . . This love is innate in every Frenchman who feels the heartbeat in his breast. One must, however, have crossed the frontiers, lived in other climates, and followed roads which are not those of France in order really to know what attaches us to our native land. We suffer when far from our fatherland, and when we return to it we are like an invalid who has been restored to health. Our enemies themselves know how sweet it is to live here, how beautiful, fertile and attractive it is.

A famous foreigner could say: every man has two fatherlands, his own and France. We should be proud of the French fatherland, which has always been the leader of human conscience and dignity. It has sponsored the noblest ideas and has poured out without measure its gold and its blood for altruistic causes. Its brilliant genius, so attractive and seductive, the true home of intelligence and feelings, radiates over the whole world the glory of the French name.²

The pervasive and intense nature of this national message appears to account for the French assumptions of cultural superiority. The evidence indicates that, among many Frenchmen, the spirit of universalism, Gallic style, reaches a degree of evangelism which manifests itself in an urge to assimilate peoples of other cultures wherever the opportunity presents itself.

¹Ibid., p. 55.

²Ibid., p. 77.

While this may be considered as an ethnocentric pursuit of a narrowly conceived type of universalism by non-French peoples, it should be recognized that it is partially motivated by a spirit of idealism transcending self-interest. This spirit of conviction lends a force to French cultural imperialism which an insincere motive could not provide. But it should also be noted how successful the French have been in creating an idealistic rationale which coincides with, or affirms, national interests.

Culture as an Instrument of Foreign Policy. The documents over the years consistently stress the national advantage of educating foreign peoples in the French tradition. In fact, the metropolitan government has partially subsidized French schools all over the world, including the United States, in the conviction that the creation of a group of Franco-philés among the upper classes of any country would be of service to the French cause.

Thus, the French have consciously employed their education system and language as an instrument of foreign and colonial policy. They have waged a persistent campaign to capture men's minds as the most enduring and complete means of ensuring the French presence, regardless of economic, political, and military events. Indeed, as early as 1900, psychological assimilation through French education was viewed as the ultimate weapon to continue French influence in the colonies as they moved toward an autonomous status. Shifts in the general colonial policy from assimilation to association had little effect upon the fundamental objectives of French educational strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Prior to the second World War, association implied a decentralization of power and responsi-

bility from the Paris ministries to the local colonial authorities in order to provide for a flexibility of action according to the situation in a given colony or group of colonies. In the field of education, it had real significance only in those regions of the Empire where strong ethnic traditions forced modifications in the mode and intensity of French cultural imperialism.

It will be recalled that the French, according to their own testimony, felt relatively little or no cultural resistance in Black Africa and were able to develop a system of education based entirely upon their own rationale. It is interesting to note that only France, among the colonial powers in Sub-Saharan Africa, insisted upon the universal employment of the metropolitan tongue as the language of instruction at the primary school level. In defense of this decision, the French have periodically provided lengthy pedagogical and practical explanations for indigenous and foreign consumption. However, as pointed out by Professor Gourou at the 1931 Conference on Colonial Education, the choice of language was actually a political rather than a pedagogical decision.¹ In his report upon education in French West Africa at the same conference, the primary inspector for that territory concluded his arguments for the use of French as follows:

Finally let us add that France thus (by using the native languages) would deprive herself of one of the most justified means of extending her influence in the world. Whatever fate the future holds for our colonies, it is proper that, in Black Africa, the French language be firmly enough implanted to be able to resist eventualities.²

¹M. Gourou, op. cit., p. 309.

²M. Davesne, op. cit., p. 106.

This often-echoed theme of the long-range political value of imposing the French language and education was reinforced by the early recognition that the usefulness of Black Africa was dependent upon the collaboration of the native, since large-scale French migration was impossible:

The civilizing of the native through the school was an idea familiar to the first and great pioneers of French Africa: Faidherbe, Gallieni, Lyautey. The conquest, the political domination, is transformed into a kind of moral annexation. The problem of this moral conquest is first of all a task of education.¹

This moral and mental annexation or assimilation of the African was viewed not only as a device to strengthen the ties between France and the colonies, but also as a weapon to increase the prestige of France as a world power. After the death of Louis XIV and the downfall of Napoleon Bonaparte, the Gallic leadership recognized that French hegemony in Europe could not be maintained through direct military action on the continent. Following the lead of England, France sought to fashion a colonial empire which would provide her with the qualifications to play the game of international power politics on a par with countries possessing greater intra-national strength.

From the French point of view, these qualifications required the production of indigenous colonial populations which would identify psychologically with France. As the enormity of this task in Sub-Saharan Africa became apparent, the development of a Frenchified elite assumed an initial priority which was to be followed by the progressive assimilation of the native mass. Hence, the political motivation for a Greater France reinforced the assimilation tendencies generated by the idealistic faith in French universalism.

¹Albert Charton, op. cit., p. 4.

The Zeitgeist.¹ The Zeitgeist, or prevailing climate of opinion, constituted the indirect effector of several Sub-Saharan educational strategies. For example, at the time the initial decision was taken to invest in the development of Senegal (1815-1816) the monitorial system of Lancaster and Bell was receiving worldwide notoriety as the ultimate solution to the education of the masses. The Ministry of the Navy accepted the validity of this system without question and decided, a priori, on its applicability to the colonies. Hence, the first educational strategy for Senegal consisted of the employment of the monitorial system, and it operated for many years before being discarded.

The metropolitan climate of opinion prevailing around the turn of the nineteenth century certainly stimulated the institution of public education in French Sub-Saharan Africa. Following the final political defeat of the conservatives in 1879, the trend toward secularization in France gained momentum and the Dreyfus scandal, occurring during the last decade of the nineteenth century, served to arouse the national anti-clerical sentiment to unprecedented heights. On January 22, 1903, the Chamber of Deputies passed a resolution calling for the secularization of the schools in the colonies. Interestingly enough, the first president of the Mission Laïque, the organization founded for that very purpose, was Pierre Foncin, the leading policy adviser on overseas education, and the second president was none other than Gaston Doumergue, the Minister of Colonies. Hence, it is no surprise that the first comprehensive and

¹As noted at the beginning of this chapter, Zeitgeist may be translated as "the spirit of the times." While "the prevailing climate of opinion" may have a slightly different connotation, the terms are used interchangeably in this study.

successful plan for public education in French Sub-Saharan Africa went into effect in November, 1903 and that over thirty lay teachers arrived in West Africa during that same month to implement the new policy. Earlier attempts to establish public secular education in West Africa had ultimately failed because of the lack of consistent, vigorous metropolitan support. These endeavors had proved premature in terms of the Zeitgeist.

Another era of importance in terms of this rather nebulous but historically important factor was the period following the second World War. The sequence of events prior to the conclusion of that struggle impressed the Free French with the loyalty of the Black Africans and of the importance of the colonial empire in salvaging the grandeur of France. Thus, the aura of post-war metropolitan goodwill toward Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as the attempt to coopt the colonies into a Greater France capable of vying with the United States and the Soviet Union, created a climate of opinion receptive to changes in colonial policy. At the same time, the events of the war caused the growing French Black African elite to demand policy changes. Thus, the coincidence of these developments in France and Africa, as well as the worldwide climate of opinion, made possible the emergence of a new educational goal in French Tropical Africa. In essence this new goal, constituting a reversal of the previous stress upon the adaptation of education, granted the principle of equivalence to Black Africans. The post-war strategies in the field of education were designed to meet this target.

Politics and Economics. From the preceding discussion it is apparent that political and economic factors contributed largely to the

development and nature of the Zeitgeist of a given era. Hence, such factors constituted causes of change in educational strategies. For example, it has been demonstrated that the political ascendancy of the metropolitan liberal forces, within one decade after the establishment of the Third Republic, led to the inauguration of a genuine system of public education in French West Africa. This major strategy, along with its antecedent causation, marked the beginning of what has been designated in this study as the Formative Period (1870-1944) in French Sub-Saharan education.

In like manner, the strategy of developing French Tropical African education in the metropolitan image, a distinguishing feature of the Modern Period (1944-1962), was a result of the political situation generated by World War II. Indeed, the prevailing political climate in France consistently affected the status of French Sub-Saharan education.

Similarly, metropolitan economic factors played a significant role in the initiation and development of French education in Tropical Africa. The first development plan, devised for Senegal in the second decade of the nineteenth century, was based upon an assumption that a cooperative and partially westernized labor market could be formed through apprenticeship training in a cash crop economy, Christianization, and formal education.

The metropolitan inquiry of 1829, motivated by the lack of agricultural production anticipated by the plan, led to a significant new and lasting educational strategy in French Sub-Saharan Africa. According to the chief investigator, Jubelin, social change constituted a major task of local colonialization and such a change, he reported, could only

be brought about through introducing the natives to the French language and way of life.¹ This, in turn, could only be accomplished through the assimilation of an indigenous elite who would gradually civilize their fellow Africans. Jubelin's commission on native education reported that the formation of such an elite depended upon three conditions: the use of French as the medium of instruction, the isolation of the students from the native way of life through the institution of school boarding facilities, and the recruitment of a distinguished metropolitan educator to direct the needed reforms.

Almost one hundred years later, when the coordinated economic development of France and the Empire was viewed as of primordial importance by the technicians and economists dominating the governments following the first World War, overseas education was rejuvenated and given a practical, vocational orientation. The fact that human resource development through education was a prerequisite to overseas economic development was clearly perceived by one minister of colonies after another. The practical orientation of formal education was further stimulated by the depression. In French Sub-Saharan Africa, a serious attempt to integrate agricultural training into the curriculum of the rural primary schools was inaugurated in 1930 and was only abandoned at the close of the second World War when the political situation demanded the reversal of this strategy.

Thus, the interaction of politics and economics greatly influenced the initiation, pursuit, and status of French educational strategies

¹It will be recalled that previously instruction had been given in the indigenous language.

in Black Africa. A dramatic, compact example of this process occurred in 1848 following the revolution signaling the collapse of the Constitutional Monarchy. The revolt, largely generated by the Parisian working class, led to the formation of the liberal Provisional Government of the Second Republic, which almost immediately abolished slavery in the overseas possessions. Believing that this act would release thousands of slaves without skills or jobs, the government ordered the establishment of a large trade school in every colony.

In Senegal, the central mission school reacted by forming a small vocational section. However, the metropolitan government insisted upon a large secular establishment, but by the time the governor of Senegal submitted the detailed plans for such an institution to Paris, a resurgence of French conservatism had forced the resignation of the Provisional Government, and the projected trade school was promptly forgotten. Inspired by one political situation, it became a victim of another.

The Influence of Non-Governmental Organizations. The nature of the educational strategies devised for Sub-Saharan Africa was partially determined by non-governmental organizations, which may be categorized as religious, professional, and commercial.

Up until the last two decades of the nineteenth century, the Catholic Church and the French State worked closely together in the matter of colonialization. The government utilized the French branch of the Church to civilize native populations who, as Christians, were much more cooperative with French authority than were the non-Christian elements. The Church, in turn, sponsored by the metropolitan government and subsidized to a large extent by local colonial revenue, was provided

the means of extending Christianity throughout the world. Even the split between the Church and the State during the Third Republic did not completely destroy this mutually beneficial relationship in Sub-Saharan Africa. The metropolitan government continued to finance the training of those novices who were destined for overseas instructors' posts, and the local colonies continued subsidies to mission schools.

Powerful secular organizations which greatly influenced the nature and extension of French overseas education were the Alliance Francaise, founded in 1883, and the Mission Laique, established in 1902. Both bodies were organized by influential educators, other intellectuals, and politicians who were dissatisfied with the official efforts in French overseas education. The Alliance membership included Church officials, but the Mission Laique was founded to encourage the development of secular overseas education. Both of these agencies sent funds, teachers, and textbooks to support the endeavor in Tropical Africa. Further, they publicized throughout France the lamentable state of French education in the area, and pressured the metropolitan government to give more attention to the problem. Indeed, since many of the leaders of the government and Parliament were included in the membership, the organizations rapidly assumed a quasi-official status. There is no doubt that the Mission Laique had a direct influence in the establishment of the comprehensive public education system of French West Africa in 1903, for Pierre Foncin, Minister of Colonies Doumergue and Governor-General Roume, the chief architects of the plan, were all leading members of the organization.

French commercial and industrial groups had a less discernible effect upon the educational strategies. However, the Chambers of Commerce

of the leading port and industrial cities were frequently consulted by the metropolitan governments concerning colonial affairs and various firms occasionally provided vocational-technical training for the Black Africans. Officials dealing with commercial and agricultural affairs were appointed to the Superior Committee for Public Instruction of the Colonies during the second year of its operation and, subsequently, businessmen were represented directly on the Committee. The effect of these groups upon education was a practical one in that they were concerned with colonial economic development and favored an emphasis upon vocational and agricultural training.

The Role of Individuals. To determine precisely the role of identified individuals as causal agents or originators of any specific educational strategy would require numerous narrow studies in depth. However, the research conducted for this study has revealed certain individuals who appear to have played such roles or who, at least, were partially instrumental in the activation of certain strategies. Generally speaking, such personages stand out during the earlier decades of the history because of a simplicity of organization and the involvement of relatively few individuals. With the passage of time, the progressive increase in organizational complexity renders such identifications more difficult and tenuous.

Baron Portal, head of the General Direction for the Colonies, and subsequently, Minister of the Navy, and Colonel Schmaltz, first Governor of Senegal for the five years following the French reoccupation of the colony in 1815, appear to have been responsible for the initial educational strategies inaugurated in French Sub-Saharan Africa. Portal,

architect of the development plan for Senegal, sent a professional educator to the territory to prepare an educational program based upon the monitorial system of Lancaster and Bell. According to Portal's original scheme, the institution of formal education was to be preceded by the partial acculturation of the natives through a labor apprenticeship program and a widespread, intensive campaign of Christianization.

However, Governor Schmaltz, with extensive overseas experience in the East Indies, induced Portal to abandon this latter strategy because of the Moslem presence in Senegal. Thus, from the planning standpoint, formal education replaced evangelization as an initial major instrument of social transformation.

Mr. Dard, the first French educator sent to the West African colony to develop the educational program, proved to be an unusual man with an affinity for the local indigenous culture. Hence, he employed Wolof, instead of French, as the language of instruction for the elementary school. After creating a written form for Wolof, Dard proposed a rapid expansion of elementary education as soon as textbooks in the indigenous language were published. Although this strategy was ultimately rejected by the metropolitan government upon the advice of Governors Roger and Gerbidon, the system of elementary education initiated by Dard in Senegal continued until 1830.

Governor Roger (1821-1826) attempted to institute a limited system of on-the-job training in agricultural education, but according to his successor, these efforts failed to produce satisfactory results. During his tenure of office, Roger also weighed the feasibility of opening a teacher-training school in Senegal, but dismissed the idea as too expensive.

R. M. Jahouvey, General Superior of the Sisters of Saint-Joseph, exerted considerable influence upon the education of Africans for several decades. In 1816, the Ministry of the Navy negotiated for the services of the Order in the field of native education and nursing. Two years later the first Sisters arrived in Senegal, but it took a personal visit of R. M. Jahouvey to the colony before the first girls' school was opened in 1826. Prior to that time the local government had been content to limit the Sisters' activities to nursing.

The Mother Superior appears to have had considerable contact with the highest echelons of the metropolitan government, for her recommendation was instrumental in the appointment of Roger as Governor of Senegal in 1821. In addition, she persuaded the metropolitan government and Governor Roger to initiate a program of secondary education for selected Senegalese at the Order's school in France. Governor Roger remained sceptical of the value of this program and, in terms of the outcomes, his scepticism was justified. The Governor was more enthusiastic over a proposal, emanating from the Ministry of the Navy in 1822, to train four Senegalese at the Royal School of Arts and Trades at Toulouse. This latter strategy constituted the first of a series of sporadic efforts during the nineteenth century to train small groups of Black Africans at metropolitan vocational-technical schools and through on-the-job apprenticeship programs.

The metropolitan inquiry of 1829 into the economic potential of Senegal marked a decisive turning-point in the character of French educational strategies for Sub-Saharan Africa. The key figure in this event was Assistant Director Jubelin of the Colonial Administration within the

Ministry of the Navy. Appointed as Governor of Senegal on a temporary basis to conduct the survey, Jubelin initiated a thorough investigation into the status of native education. Concluding that a transformation of the native way of life constituted a major task of colonialization in Senegal, he envisioned formal education as instrumental in the accomplishment of this goal. Consequently, strong recommendations were made to the Ministry, leading to the reversal of the strategies of Dard. French became the medium of instruction as well as the core of the elementary school curriculum. Boarding facilities were accepted as indispensable for the isolation of the students from the influence derived from a daily contact with the indigenous culture.

Louis Faidherbe, Governor of Senegal from 1854 to 1865, emerged as the next important figure influencing native education, although his role as an innovator in this area of endeavor has been exaggerated. Almost forty years of French thought and effort in the field of Senegalese education had occurred prior to Faidherbe's governorship, and virtually every educational strategy which he developed had a precedent in theory or fact. Nevertheless, his intense interest and persistent activity in the field of native education set an example in terms of implementation. He demonstrated how initiative and organizational ability could offset many of the limitations imposed by meager financial and human resources. His development of secular education serves as a case in point. Convinced, as several of his gubernatorial predecessors had been, that only a lay system of education could successfully penetrate the Islamic population, Faidherbe organized an extensive and viable secular school system. To overcome the perennial personnel problem, he employed selected French

soldiers as classroom teachers. The use of army personnel itself was not new, but the scope and organization of the system established a pattern which was copied by later enthusiasts of native education such as Galieni and de Trentinian. Indeed, through demonstrating the advantages and feasibility of a public secular education system in French West Africa, Faidherbe unknowingly paved the way for the Education Act of 1903.

That act consisted of the legalization of a plan devised in Paris by the leading proponents of public overseas education. The most noteworthy of these leaders was Pierre Foncin, a professional educator who stands as a giant in the history of French cultural imperialism. A founder, first Secretary-General, and second president of the world-renowned Alliance Francaise, Foncin was also the first president of the Mission Laique. At the same time, he served as Inspector General of Public Instruction of the Colonies. Foreseeing the day when the colonies would be at least semi-autonomous, Foncin impressed the metropolitan leadership with the need to assimilate the indigenous populations psychologically prior to such autonomy. Exhibiting a keen insight into the needs and problems of education in the colonies, he proposed a system of colonial secondary education, omitting the dead languages of the metropolitan classical track and the literary character of the modern track. The curricular emphasis was to be on agriculture, management, and engineering, but even the esteemed Foncin was unable to overcome the force of traditionalism in this case.

Any discussion of individuals prominent in the derivation of Sub-Saharan educational strategies must include Albert Sarraut, master planner

of colonial economic development following World War I. Sarraut not only associated human resource development with his economic planning, but he instituted a system of teacher recruitment to overcome the perennial personnel shortage. Emphasizing the economic utility of educating the general populace, he demanded that priority be given to primary, vocational and technical studies and that the curriculum be adapted to local needs and mentalities. This orientation dominated French Sub-Saharan education until the close of World War II.

Felix Eboué, appointed Governor-General of Equatorial Africa for his leadership in swinging that Federation to the Free French regime, inaugurated the drive for increased and better native education in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1941. Believing the reinforcement of the indigenous society constituted a prerequisite to the emergence of prosperity in Black Africa, Eboué called for the establishment of complete systems of education in each of the French colonies. His sudden death ended a personal campaign for an enlightened native policy.

Behind the recent figures more immediately concerned with the advancement of French education in Sub-Saharan Africa in the period following World War II and subsequently to 1958, the presence of General de Gaulle must be taken into consideration. His determination to establish a third world force under French leadership has had an obvious effect upon the policy governing overseas education. In brief, that policy has been to give a priority to overseas education even at the expense of the metropolitan system. For example, at a Paris meeting of high officials in April 1962, Lucien Paye, former Rector of the University of Dakar and then Minister of National Education, ordered

an intensive national effort to recruit teachers for overseas schools despite the existence of an acute teacher shortage in France.¹ The long-range strategy for the continuation and extension of French education in Sub-Saharan Africa calls for the annual increase in number of metropolitan teachers employed in that region by ten per cent for ten years (1961-2--1970-1), while other forms of French technical assistance are to be progressively reduced.² To pursue such a policy, and to complement it with considerable effort in overseas school construction at a time when scarcity of teachers and lack of school facilities in the Metropole caused continuing and mounting criticism at home, requires the resolute leadership which at present only General de Gaulle can provide.³

Conclusion. Attempts to trace the derivation of the identified educational strategies generally lead to the causally related sources which have been presented above. The evidence indicates that endeavors derived largely from a unique source were not sustained over any long period of time because of lack of broad bases of metropolitan support. Thus, those strategies devised by individuals such as Dard and Faidherbe flourished only during their terms of office. This same generalization holds true in the case of short-lived regimes such as the Provisional Government of the Second Republic. Its ambitious plan for native vocational education was never implemented.

¹Reported to the author by a high-level French Ministry of Education official.

²Related to the writer by a senior official of the Ministry of Cooperation.

³Based on interviews with senior officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, National Education and Cooperation.

In Dard's case, his employment of Wolof instead of French as the language of instruction and his other proposals constituted a contradiction of French ethnocentric idealism. His concept of native education was more compatible with the English philosophy of colonialization than that of the French.

Faidherbe, a political liberal, launched a system of secular education which was premature in terms of the metropolitan political climate. The system began to deteriorate as soon as he left Senegal in 1865.

Conversely, strategies derived from a multiplicity of the sources presented above received more substantial and sustained implementation. The institution of a West African public school system in 1903 and the quasi-vocational orientation given to native education after World War I have been cited as notable examples. These strategies were compatible with the Zeitgeist, which is a convenient way of stating that a complex of factors led to their emergence during a specific era and created conditions favorable to their implementation.

Because of Moslem opposition to mission schools, several colonial governors attempted to establish a secular school system in West Africa, and other governors advised the metropolitan government of the necessity for such a program. Yet, until the crisis between the Church and State in France near the end of the nineteenth century prompted the metropolitan government to plan and implement such a strategy, the colonial governors' efforts and appeals were negated. The validity of the rationale for this endeavor was less of a determinant for its initiation and support than the political factors active in France.

Thus, a correlation existed between the derivation and the implementation of the educational strategies. Educational plans for Sub-Saharan Africa generated from metropolitan sources usually constituted more of a timely response to the psychological, political, and economic conditions prevalent in France than those emanating from colonial sources. This was particularly the case during the nineteenth century when the technology of communications permitted the colonial administrators more autonomy, but less knowledge of concurrent developments in the Metropole.

While it is true that recommendations for a renewed emphasis on native education emanated from the conferences at Brazzaville and Dakar near the close of the second World War, the form and substance of this policy was developed in Paris following the reoccupation of France by the Free French regime. Thus, with few exceptions, the search for causality and derivations has led to the metropolitan scene, where generating personalities and organizations reflected the popular attitudinal trends of the given era. This conclusion is not surprising in view of the French tendency toward the centralization of initiative and authority.

CHAPTER VII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRENCH EDUCATIONAL STRATEGIES

Introduction. This chapter sketches the development of the French educational strategies including those factors, related to the involved mechanics, which tended to abort the achievement of policy goals. Thus, it deals with the nature of the policy process, defined as the formulation and implementation of policy, and those obstacles to implementation which may be characterized as bureaucratic in nature.

The topics include the nature of the policy process, the development of the metropolitan colonial services, problems of the central administration, bureaucratic centralization and control, criticisms of the bureaucracy at the colonial level, and conclusions.

The Nature of the Policy Process. The lack of research into the metropolitan policy process concerning overseas education as well as the relative abundance of limited studies concerning French schooling in Sub-Saharan Africa itself have created the impression that the central government in Paris played little or no role in the development of education in Black Africa. This impression was enhanced by the procedure for the dissemination of metropolitan-initiated laws, decrees, ordinances, and instructions in the colonies. As the agent of the central government, the colonial governor-general or governor promulgated these regulations under his own name.

The historical chapters of this study demonstrate to the contrary that the metropolitan regimes were engaged in the formulation of educational policy for Sub-Saharan Africa with the intensity of activity fluctuating from era to era. In general, the process consisted of policy formulation in the Metropole with the implementation being the responsibility of the highest colonial administrator. Obviously, both the metropolitan and the colonial agencies became involved in the entire range of the policy process with the vigorous governors contributing significantly to the formulation of policy, particularly during the period of primitive communications and organization, and with the metropolitan regimes usually assuming more control over the implementation of policy as these impediments were removed.¹

From the legal standpoint, three systems of legislation existed for the regulation of the French Empire. The first was the system of rule by laws enacted by the Parliament; the second consisted of the rule of decree by the executive branch of the metropolitan government; the third was the rule through gubernatorial ordinances and local colonial legislation.² While most French political regimes tended to employ all three of these systems, rule by metropolitan executive decree proved to be the dominant practice.³ Although this tradition developed prior to

¹The exceptional conditions during the Second World War made it possible for Governor-General Éboué to assume the position of a dominant policy-maker.

²George H. Kelly, The Political Development of the French Overseas Empire (unpublished dissertation, Stanford University, Stanford, n.d.), Part I, p. 384.

³For a concise history of the French colonial legislative system through the Fourth Republic, see Kelly, pp. 384-399.

1854, the famous Senate Law of the third of May of that year served as the fundamental legal justification for the colonial rule by the executive for over one hundred years. In essence, the bill granted the executive the power to decree all matters not legislated by the Parliament; since the latter body passed relatively few laws concerning colonial affairs, this gave the French executive, usually in the form of a prime minister and the cabinet ministers designated by him, significant power in the realm of colonial policy-making. The minister responsible for the administration of the colonies was the pivotal point for the formulation and the direction of colonial policy, although this official was subject to the pressures and the concurrence of governmental and non-governmental organizations.¹ The cumbersome mechanics of legislation, and the disinclination of the legislators as a body to become preoccupied with colonial affairs, meant that the Parliament took little initiative in the direct formulation of foreign and colonial policy. Its chief means of indirectly influencing executive actions was financial, since the budget was voted by the Parliament.²

The Development of the Metropolitan Colonial Services. The regularization of the policy process for overseas education roughly paralleled similar developments in the field of general colonial policy. With the marshalling of public opinion behind the colonial endeavor during the first three decades of the Third Republic (1870-1900), the government was able to establish the legal means and the bureaucratic apparatus

¹France, B.O.A.C., Loi portant création d'un Ministère des Colonies, March 20, 1894, pp. 395-6.

²John E. Howard, Parliament and Foreign Policy in France (London: The Cresset Press, 1948), pp. 15-16.

necessary for the systematization of the colonial operation.

Prior to that period, the responsibility for colonial affairs had been shunted about from one ministry to another, each with other primary preoccupations. The recruitment of personnel for colonial service was haphazard and ineffective; officials in the field were attached to different ministries and subject to a confusing variety of regulations and salary schedules.

During the 1880's and 1890's, a whole series of decrees and laws were enacted to establish an autonomous colonial service. For example, in 1882 a semi-autonomous Under-Secretariat of State for the Colonies was established and by 1894, the Ministry of Colonies was created. A decree of January 3, 1887 regularized the civil service status of the employees of the central administration of the colonies and organized the agency into three divisions and seven bureaus. Another decree of September 2, 1887 instituted a special corps of colonial administrators. During the same year, a decree aimed at eliminating the confusion concerning the duties and authority of high-level officials in the colonies themselves was published. The colonial financial structure was undergoing scrutiny and revision at the same time. This process culminated in the famous Law of April 13, 1900 which fixed all civil and internal security expenses as the responsibility of the colonial, rather than the metropolitan, budgets.

The same type of activity was taking place in the realm of overseas education. Beginning in 1881, a series of executive decrees and ordinances appeared on personnel problems, the courses of study, examinations, and policy direction began to appear with increasing regularity.

A few of the more important ones established an Educational Inspectorate-General of Public Instruction for the Colonies (1893), a Higher Committee for Public Instruction in the Colonies (1894), a comprehensive system of detaching metropolitan elementary and vocational teachers from the Ministry of Public Instruction to the Ministry of Colonies (1899), and a similar system for secondary teachers and school administrators (1902).

Internal organization within the ministries responsible for French Sub-Saharan education also evolved over a period of time. During the later decades of the nineteenth century, overseas education was administered by a bureau of two or three officials responsible for other affairs, such as justice and religion, as well. In the twentieth century, there was set up a special department for overseas education under the Ministry of Colonies and the Ministry of Overseas-France. With the establishment of national independence in French tropical Africa in 1960, the Ministry of Cooperation was organized to administer French economic and cultural assistance for these new nations. The Department of Technical and Cultural Cooperation includes a large Education and Training Service with a central bureau and a desk officer for every two or three countries.

Within the Ministry of Education, a special liaison department was organized to recruit teachers for overseas service and to reintegrate them into the metropolitan system upon their return to France.¹ This agency, presently known as the Department of Cooperation with the Community

¹There were 17,915 teachers serving overseas in 1960, including 2,809 in Sub-Saharan Africa. These figures do not include those in Algeria. Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Cooperation.

and Foreign Nations, works directly with overseas professors of higher education, since the latter do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Cooperation.¹

Beginning with the turn of the century, attention was also being given to "colonial education," the term employed by the French for metropolitan studies of the colonies. With the advent of a special corps of colonial administrators, a National Colonial School was established in 1889 to prepare a cadre of such personnel. In 1902, a National Higher School of Colonial Agriculture was created. In addition, the French universities were encouraged to develop a variety of courses on the colonies.

Despite the large number of educators being sent abroad, no satisfactory preparatory training course has been devised for this group.² A pre-service training school established in Senegal in the nineteenth century was closed after a year or two of operation because of lack of funds. The school sponsored by the Mission Laïque in Paris around the turn of the century soon passed out of existence for the same reason. At the present time, about half of the teachers annually sent to Sub-Saharan Africa attend a week's orientation course at the University of Bordeaux.

¹According to a Ministry of Cooperation official, French professors of higher education are noted for their freedom of thought and action and they prefer working directly with the Ministry of Education.

²No French official interviewed thought a satisfactory solution to the problem had been devised. The establishment of an orientation school for teachers at Dakar has been proposed.

On the other hand, a small group of educators being groomed for roles as educational advisers receive excellent training in national educational planning at the University of Paris, where the emphasis is placed upon education as an integral part of national economic development.

Problems of the Central Administration. Though these developments facilitated the colonial policy process, they did not resolve all of the problems inherent in such a complicated endeavor. For example, the Ministry of Colonies was reorganized at least twenty-six times during its first thirty-six years of existence.¹ Apparently there existed a relatively consistent, if naive, conviction that the basic difficulties of the colonial operation could be resolved through reorganizations of the central bureaus.

Further, during its first sixteen years of life, the agency had thirteen changes of Ministers, and an excessive rate of turnover became the established pattern.² Regismanset illustrated the extremes of this practice by referring to the enthusiasm generated by the appointment of the young and capable Maginot as Minister of Colonies and the subsequent frustration when he left the position after a total of five weeks in office.³ This continual turnover of ministers and governments gave rise to the maxim: "Governments change, the administration remains." According

¹Charles Regismanset, Questions Coloniales, 1912-1919 (Paris: Emile Larose, 1923), Vol. I, pp. 155-6.

²Pierre Ma, "L'Organisation du Ministère des Colonies," Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales, 1910, Vol. XXX, p. 299.

³Regismanset, op. cit., p. 78.

to numerous students of the French bureaucracy, the preceding factors gave the elite class of French civil servants an unusual degree of control over the policy process.

Inter-ministerial relations also left the Ministry of Colonies at a disadvantage. One administrator referred to the agency as "a dying ministry" because it lacked the traditions and prestige of the older ministries which constantly undercut it.¹ The process was made easier by the Ministry's dependence upon other agencies for its technical services. The Ministry of Finance could be cited as an outstanding example of such an organization, although the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, War, Navy, and Education should not be omitted.

Another problem which plagued the conduct of colonial policy was the separation of responsibility for the colonial territories between the Ministries of the Interior, Foreign Affairs, and the Colonies. In French Africa, these three Ministries had control over three adjoining territories, Algeria, Morocco, and West Africa. Friction and lack of coordination between these agencies often resulted in conflicting policies to the extent that one prominent legislator compared the ministries to opposing snipers, concluding his criticism as follows: "There is only one word to define our administrative situation in Africa: absurd."²

This bureaucratic divergence had been periodically criticized for many years previous to the above statement, which was made in 1914.

¹Ibid., p. 154. The Ministry of Cooperation is also subject to this problem, as described above.

²Maurice Besson, "Un Ministère de l'Afrique et des Colonies," Revue Politique et Parlementaire, December 1917, Vol. 93, p. 333.

Brouillet pointed out that, in 1898, a decree authorized the Governor-General of Algeria (Ministry of the Interior) to correspond directly with his counterpart in Morocco (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), but that neither could communicate directly with the Governor-General of French West Africa (Ministry of Colonies), even though the three territories had common borders and problems. In the same article, Brouillet provided another example of inter-organizational rivalry by citing the fate of a special inter-ministerial organization attached to the office of the Prime Minister and designed to centralize information about Islam and to direct a uniform Moslem policy:

The authority of its inventor (Eugene Etienne) led to the successful establishment of the institution; the utility of its role did not succeed in making it live. M. Albert Duchene told us the story about its life and death which he should know about first hand: "At the Ministry of Interior suspicion was shown toward the head of a new service which sought relationships with other administrations; at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they wished to ignore it; at the Ministry of Colonies, in order to assure its success, they ended up by monopolizing it completely." In this manner, the organization ran out of gas--another example of what can be expected from interministerial services.¹

The operations within the Ministry of Colonies was confused by the extensive use of consultative bodies. At one time, thirty-three of these committees existed, with some having a membership of forty individuals drawn from numerous organizations in the public and private sector. According to one critic, this system resulted in the perpetual and slow circulation of huge amounts of paperwork and in confusion as to the point of responsibility for various actions.² Included in this cumbersome

¹René Brouillet, "L'Algérie au Ministère des Colonies," Revue Politique et Parlementaire, 1904, Vol. 41-2, pp. 500-1.

²Regismanset, op. cit., p. 159.

operation was the Higher Consultative Committee for Public Instruction for the Colonies. First established in 1894 under a slightly different title, the committee went through periods of activity and inactivity and became a favorite target for reorganization by ministers desiring to modify the policy process for overseas education. Occasionally, the committee was enlarged to give it more prestige and a membership with a broad spectrum of skills; at other times, it was reduced in size to endow it with more operational efficiency.

As previously noted, the internal organization of the Ministry proper was also subject to constant modification. Arguments persisted as to whether the central administration should be organized by technical divisions such as political affairs, economic affairs, justice, education, and religious affairs, or by geographical areas. Reorganizations were made as one argument prevailed over the other.

The Ministry of Overseas France (1946-1960) and the Ministry of Cooperation (1960-), succeeding agencies responsible for French Sub-Saharan Africa, did not escape from these problems of structure and function. As a consequence of the war and the loss of a goodly number of bureaucrats because of their service with the Vichy regime, the government agencies of the post-war period suffered from a serious shortage of experienced personnel. In addition, the Fourth Republic (1945-1958) was plagued with an excessively high rate of governmental failures.

This situation tended to increase the difficulties arising out of the implementation of the accelerated educational development program formulated for Sub-Saharan Africa in 1944 and 1945. The inter-departmental friction and the lack of coordination between the Director of Education

and the Director of Political Affairs in the Ministry of Colonies, shortly before it became the Ministry of Overseas France, serves as a specific example of this problem.¹

In replacing the Ministry of Overseas France in 1960, the Ministry of Cooperation has suffered from organizational troubles derived from its hasty formation during the period when the French Sub-Saharan territories opted for independence. Suddenly detached from other ministries, key officials in the new organization found themselves with neither the experience nor the staff effectively to carry out their tasks. Even such mundane requirements as office equipment could not be obtained in adequate amounts after a year of operation.² Because of these handicaps and the tendency to depreciate new agencies, the Ministry of Cooperation has acquired a widespread reputation for inefficiency.³

Its prestige undoubtedly suffered further than one of its three original departments, that of political affairs, was taken over by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, the Ministry of Cooperation has to compete with that of Foreign Affairs for teachers and funds, as

¹This situation is detailed in Ch. IV.

²Established through interviews with Ministry of Cooperation officials. According to them, a considerable amount of the work, which should have been done within the Ministry, had to be contracted out to other agencies because of these deficiencies.

³Volunteered by French officials in various agencies of other ministries. The writer was interviewing one such official when the latter received a call from the Ministry of Cooperation for certain information. The interviewee informed the caller that the information was available at his own ministry and, after the conclusion of the conversation, volunteered that the Ministry of Cooperation had a poor reputation.

both of these agencies operate overseas education programs. Since the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the more established and prestigious agency, is responsible for relations with, and operations in, former colonies of more importance to France than those in Sub-Saharan Africa, the officials in the Ministry of Cooperation find themselves handicapped in this competition. They question the wisdom of having two independent agencies operating similar programs of foreign aid but for a different set of countries.¹ These situations, derived from a traditional division of bureaucratic responsibilities, illustrates how organizational complexities add to the problems of the policy process.

Within another area of interministerial relations, the Ministry of Cooperation officials have noted the tendency of French educators serving in Africa, as well as their African counterparts, to bypass the agency and to conduct their affairs directly with the Ministry of Education.² To correct this situation, the Ministry of Cooperation has resorted to the practice of returning proposals and dossiers to the originating source to be re-submitted through the local Cooperation mission, which screens such proposals prior to forwarding them to the parent agency in Paris for action.³ Attempts to bypass the proper channels, on one hand, and the resultant delay on the other, disturb the harmonious and effective operation of the policy process.

¹Based upon interviews with Ministry of Cooperation officials.

²Institutions of higher education are not under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Cooperation and deal directly with the Ministry of Education.

³Based upon interviews with Ministry of Cooperation officials.

Bureaucratic Centralization and Control. A constant characteristic of the French bureaucratic system which has affected the policy process is the extreme centralization of intra-ministerial authority and the elaborate measures of control. A study of past colonial administrative and financial directives reveals that tendencies to relax the central control in order to encourage local colonial initiative were invariably followed by new restrictive measures which could only curtail it. Every action in recognition of the desirability of increased local autonomy appears to have provoked a reaction based upon an urge to exercise greater control at the central ministerial administrative level. This phenomenon often resulted from a newly appointed minister's desire to stimulate greater progress within the colonies, followed by a counter-urge on the part of the civil servants in the central bureaus to control the local activities in their area of responsibilities. Because of the rapid turnover of governments and ministers as well as the relatively permanent presence of the bureaucrats, the end result appears to have consisted of a great deal of lip service to the principle of local initiative without a corresponding degree of practical implementation.

Many students of the French colonial policy process have noted and criticized this phenomenon. Roberts, in his study published in 1930, commented as follows:

The bureaux (of the Ministry of Colonies) determine and enforce policy, the only check coming from parliament which is extremely averse to touching colonial questions. . . . The French system comes to mean a centralized, permanent bureaucracy, resisting both the institution of lesser services in Paris and any delegation of its powers to the colonies themselves. . . . The central body seeks, not to coordinate, but to control, and views every concession wrested by the colonies as a backward step. Though the critics of many schools have demonstrated the weakness of this situation,

everything goes on as before. Messimy and Viollette showed how there had never been a consistent policy in the sense of adapting the machinery of control to changing circumstances: Jules Harmand pleaded for a Colonial Constitution, with the Ministry superintending instead of executing details: Lucien Hubert deplored the lack of vitality in the central French organizations; and Regismanset showed how the Ministry interrupted colonial development.¹

Regismanset, in his study of ministerial operations, stated that the system discouraged all initiative and sense of responsibility, citing the constant shift of ministers, the cumbersome committee-work, the vast amount of paperwork, and the "forests" of laws, decrees, ordinances, and administrative regulations and circulars.² This combination of circumstances, according to many of the authorities cited above, as well as others, permitted a small core of bureaucrats covertly to dominate the policy process. The impact of policy innovations was reduced, delayed, or diverted unless the minister exercised strong and consistent supervision over the administrative procedure. The evidence gained through this study indicates few ministers were able, or inclined, to take effective follow-up measures to ensure the full implementation of their policies in the field of overseas education.³ Of course, the rapid turnover of ministers greatly impeded their capacity to control the implemental process.

Control of another type was more than adequate; France has

¹Roberts, op. cit., pp. 154-155.

²Regismanset, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 19.

³Based on a study of ministerial policy declarations, and the subsequent impact on French Sub-Saharan education in so far as this could be determined from metropolitan and colonial official reports, professional literature, and interviews.

maintained an elaborate system of inspection which, according to Regismanset, is derived from the natural French tendency to be suspicious and critical of the public administration.¹ He claimed the inspectors are not only quantitatively excessive, but that they are not held sufficiently accountable for their work which, typically, exerted negative influence upon the policy process.² Following a review of the types of colonial inspectors, Roberts condemned French inspection and control practices as being characteristic of Latin officialdom and as a phenomenon which works against individual initiative.³

Noting that the institution of the government-general was established because of the recognition that direct metropolitan control and administration of the colonies was not feasible, Regismanset stated that the pressures to reassert metropolitan control soon led to the undermining of the autonomy of the governors-general.⁴ Roberts referred to this same situation as the defeat of decentralization.⁵

Three decrees of March 22, 1907, applying to the governments-general of West Africa, Indo-China and Madagascar, specifically illustrate this tendency. Previous to these executive laws, the Director of Control, responsible for the supervision of financial matters within the government-general, submitted a monthly report to Paris through the Governor-General. Part of the text concerning these decrees is illuminating:

¹Regismanset, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 222.

²Ibid., p. 223.

³Roberts, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 144-145.

⁴Regismanset, loc. cit., p. 218.

⁵Roberts, loc. cit., p. 136.

The present organization of the services, which place the financial controller under the immediate orders of the governor-general, does not permit him sufficient independence vis-à-vis the chief of the colony; it appears necessary to return, in this regard, to the principle which inspired the decree of June 26, 1895 and under which the financial controller serves as a direct agent under the direct authority of the metropolitan government.¹

A decree of March 24, 1920 affirmed the merits of the above arrangement by specifying that experience since 1907 had demonstrated the necessity of the local controllers maintaining direct and close relations with the Ministries of Finance and Colonies. This decree granted the right of local controllers to go to Paris for consultation upon their own request.² Further, the controllers were appointed directly by the Ministry of Finance.³ Hence, not only were the governors-general bypassed but the Ministry of Finance regained and maintained its own control mechanism over the operations of the Ministry of Colonies which, in turn, had another completely internal inspection system.

Criticisms of the Bureaucracy at the Colonial Level. The structure and function of the local colonial governments was the object of as much criticism as the central administration in Paris. Scholars and former administrators attacked the high rate of gubernatorial turnover as well as a host of other characteristics. The ministry frequently chided the colonial regimes for their inadequate response to metropolitan regulations; the governors complained of their lack of control over certain colonial sectors such as finances and the military, and, more

¹ France, B.O.M.C.; Budgets Locaux, Decrees of March 22, 1907, 1907, pp. 184-185.

² Ibid., 1920, pp. 784-785.

³ Ibid., 1920, pp. 414-415.

pertinent to this study, certain educators complained of the local bureaucratic resistance to native education.

Delavignette, former director of the *École Nationale de la France d'Outre-Mer* and Director of Political Affairs within the Ministry of Overseas-France when he first published his book on French West Africa in 1946, indicted bureaucratic indifference as follows:

We have reached a point where the administrative mind, that is to say, the bureaucratic mind, has lost sight of human beings. It is unable to coordinate and harmonize its rigid and fragmentary notions; it lacks courage and loses its grip whenever human necessities encroach on its routine of paper work. Thanks to excessive regulations it has become incapable of independent thought; it is to all intents and purposes already mummified. Faced with a demand for reforms which everyone admits to be necessary, it can only propose a rearrangement of regulations.¹

Referring to the educational policy process in West Africa, Hardy commented as follows in 1917:

A long and perilous voyage exists for the governor-general's ordinance or circular designed at educational reform; when the poor text arrives at the end of its journey, it has been jostled by so many hands, sequestered by so many bureaus that it is often diminished, distorted, and unusable.²

While remarking that the personnel making up the French West African educational inspectorate system had been vastly improved since 1913, Hardy stated that he did not expect the general colonial administrative operation to change for a long time. This operation, according to Hardy, was detrimental to the educational program because of excessive red tape, slowness in the transmission of orders, and the distortion of the original instructions. More important, certain administrators,

¹Robert Delavignette, Freedom and Authority in French West Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 151.

²Hardy, Une Conquête Morale . . ., p. 20.

convinced that native education and domination were antinomic, actually impeded the development of education.¹

Included in Hardy's colorful description of what he termed the enemies and parasites of native education was the following:

Mr. Lebureau: He is everywhere, this tragic person, this traitor to modern administration. He delays and bungles everything. He barricades himself behind the paperwork, basely destroys initiative and petrifies regulations in order to make them into weapons.²

After listing a series of such stereotypes, including one of the color-prejudiced French colonial, Hardy arrived at this conclusion:

Such are the principal enemies and parasites of our educational expansion, one hundred times more redoubtable than the so-called Islamic peril, than the climate, than all the causes of delay ordinarily invoked.³

After completing his service in French West Africa, Hardy became recognized as a leading authority on French overseas education; as such, in 1955 he was asked to respond to criticism of this education based on its severely limited quantitative results. Among the points made in the reply was the essential need for a resolute bureaucratic decentralization with a corresponding development of local initiative. While noting that certain administrative heads resisted progress by juggling specific problems with a thousand imaginary ones, Hardy particularly criticized the persistent centralizing habit and the concurrent reluctance of

¹Ibid., p. 20.

²Ibid., p. 37.

³Ibid.

officials to divide authority with those at lower levels and of other services.¹

He stated that the development of mass education required a deep knowledge of the indigenous milieu, persevering initiative, prompt decisions, and constant recourse to the "means at hand" which could be effected only through a thoroughly decentralized system.² A second prerequisite was the abandonment of the metropolitan system as the model for overseas education. Louis Vignon had decried this copying of the French model some three decades earlier. Denouncing the tendency to "faire grand," "digne de la France," Vignon claimed that educational policy was derived from political rather than pedagogical considerations.³ Referring to the governors and the colonial directors of education, he stated:

Looking to Paris, they are worried about what the legislators are thinking instead of only considering the true ⁴ intellectual capacities and the real needs of the natives.

On the other hand, some of these former colonial education administrators, presently serving as advisers in Sub-Saharan Africa, are resisting attempts by the Ministry of Cooperation to develop special educational strategies which deviate from the traditional French pattern. These traditionalists, supporters of high standards and the classical

¹ Georges Hardy, "Une Solution paresseuse sous des dehors ambitieux: L'expansion scolaire outre-mer sur le modèle de l'Europe," Marchés Coloniaux du Monde, March 12, 1955, p. 696.

² Ibid., p. 695.

³ Louis Vignon, Un Programme de Politique Coloniale. Les Questions Indigènes (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1919), p. 502.

⁴ Ibid.

curriculum, apparently are unaware of or unconcerned about the need to relate human resource development to manpower requirements and cultural realities. In certain Black African countries their presence at the level of implementation has tended to abort the emerging metropolitan concern to develop a financially feasible system of mass elementary education related to national economic development.¹

Thus, from the real initiation of French education in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1816 until the present day, difficulties related to colonial organizational structure and function have beset the educational endeavor. If one accepts Hardy's thesis, officials opposed or indifferent to given policies for native education, as well as the weaknesses of the centralized bureaucracy, have hampered the development of education as much as the natural impediments imposed by the environment and financial limitations.²

Conclusion. A review of the history of French Sub-Saharan educational strategies indicates that, in general, policy formulation was a metropolitan function with the implementation of policy being the responsibility of the authorities at the colonial level. For about eighty-five years (1815-1900), neither the metropolitan nor the colonial governments had substantial, formal organizations specifically designed to initiate and implement educational policy. This lack of mechanism was not a widely recognized hindrance as long as the operation remained limited; but with the conclusion of the military conquest and pacification

¹Ministry of Cooperation officials, aware of this problem, speak of the systematic replacement of the "old-type" French education advisers.

²Hardy, "Une Solution paresseuse . . .," pp. 695-696.

phases of Sub-Saharan colonialism, the void became so obvious that pro-colonial intellectuals and politicians formed pressure groups to influence public opinion and to force the government into action.¹

As a result, the metropolitan specialized agencies began to take form in the 1880's and 1890's and the formal organization of French West African public education was instituted shortly after the turn of the century.² These structures made possible the transfer of large numbers of metropolitan educators to overseas positions with a minimum of professional dislocation. It also made it practical for the metropolitan government to supervise overseas education more closely than previously.

However, the central administration in Paris had maintained an interest and a degree of control over the development of Sub-Saharan education from the post-Napoleonic era. Without repeating the details of this involvement, the following events are worthy of mention in this regard. In 1816, it was the unilateral action of the central administration which led to the employment of a lay educator to formulate the initial system of education in West Africa and to the subsequent establishment of contracts with teaching religious orders for service in that area. The first major reform of French Sub-Saharan education was a direct result of the metropolitan-initiated inquiry of 1829 and the Provisional Government of 1848 forced the inauguration of vocational training in West Africa.

¹The Alliance Francaise and the Mission Laique.

²As noted in Ch. III, the organization of the education services of the Ministry of Colonies was strengthened in 1907 and after the First World War.

The experience of Governor Faidherbe demonstrated the difficulties of creating or maintaining a secular system of education through measures of expediency. In his role as governor and as military commander, Faidherbe was able to ensure a consistent and active participation by the military in the field of native education. However, with his departure in 1865 and the coincidental decay of the metropolitan regime of Louis Napoleon, the secular schools, which had quantitatively surpassed the missionary institutions, either were disbanded or turned over to the religious orders.

To overcome the deficiency of systematic metropolitan support for French Sub-Saharan education, two prerequisites were necessary: the generation of public support for colonialism and, subsequently, the establishment of the necessary official financial and structural means. These prerequisites were achieved through the emergence of private organizations which fought successfully for both of these causes, aided by such events as the increased nationalism following the defeat of 1870 and the clash between the State and the Church around the turn of the century.¹

The firm establishment of public education in French Sub-Saharan Africa definitely was planned in detail at the metropolitan level, although Governor-General Roume subsequently promulgated the plan as ordinances of the French West African Federation in 1903.² The next

¹The private organizations in the forefront of the campaign for French overseas education, L'Alliance Francaise and the Mission Laique, were assimilated into the government and still exist as agencies within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

²Detailed in Ch. III.

major educational reform was initiated by Ministers of Colonies Simon and Sarraut following the first World War, when serious attempts were made to relate French overseas education to economic development. The subsequent major shift in educational policy for Sub-Saharan Africa, based upon the principle of the colonies' right to unmodified French education, had its roots in the colonies because the Free French regime was based outside the Metropole. This shift, however, was based on de Gaulle's strategy to reassert the grandeur of the Metropole through coopting the colonies into a Greater France. With the reoccupation of France, the implementation of this policy was controlled in the Metropole directly by the Ministry of Overseas-France and through the funding agency for the overseas development plan, FIDES.

With the advent of independence, France reoriented a part of its policy and encouraged the new nations to extend the French language by adopting modified systems of elementary education as devised by specialists of the Ministries of Cooperation and National Education. Through two existing funding agencies, FAC of the Ministry of Cooperation and FEDOM of the European Economic Community, France is able to exercise a substantial degree of influence over the educational strategies of the many French-speaking Black African countries.

However, the development of educational strategies according to the dictates of metropolitan policy has left much to be desired. Although this will be discussed further in the concluding chapter, it is pertinent to emphasize in the context of this chapter that bureaucratic dissonance has handicapped the execution of the policy process.

As mentioned previously, that process generally consisted of policy planning by metropolitan politicians at the ministerial level and of the planning and supervision of policy-implementing actions at the level of the governments-general. In this procedure, both the quantitative and qualitative implementation of major policy objectives met with considerable bureaucratic resistance. In addition to the inherent delays and limitations imposed by the bureaucratic distance between policy conception and grass-root implementation, civil servants, particularly at the colonial level, deliberately frustrated policy intentions.

For example, many French colonial administrators opposed the quantitative expansion of native education on the grounds that education would lead to a revolt against French authority. Further, considering the perennial limitations of funds, they preferred to grant priorities to infrastructure projects related to communications, transportation, and agricultural production. Since colonial and social development had to be financed by local revenue, they possessed the means to place limitations upon the expansion of native education. Thus, the financial aspects of French colonial policy severely limited the pursuit of the social objectives of that same policy.

In turn, many French educators in the colonial service resisted policy aimed at the modification of the metropolitan curriculum and organization. There is no doubt that over the years a significant number of these educators have viewed the adaptation of the French system as undesirable distortion and an unnecessary destruction of quality education. Even today, as previously indicated, the educational strategies

drawn up by teams of economists and educators within the Ministry of Cooperation are being resisted by tradition-minded French education advisers in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Thus, the development of educational strategies has been subject to significant organizational problems involving poor communication, inter-agency friction and jealousy, and the constant turnover of the policy-makers at the ministerial level which has placed power in the hands of the permanent bureaucracy and weakened the implementation of policy innovations.

In short, these characteristics, as well as others to be discussed in the concluding chapter, have tended to frustrate the development of educational strategies in accordance with policy objectives. Hence, the discrepancy between metropolitan policy and colonial grass-root implementation has been caused in part by the mechanics of the policy process and the attitudes and actions of the officials staffing the structures and executing the functions.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

Introduction. Despite the title of this chapter, no effort has been made to repeat all of the findings revealed in the previous chapters. In this sense, the preceding three chapters, as well as this final one, constitute the conclusion because they represent the analysis of the historical material.

The first topic dealt with below is the important one of emphasizing, in a summary fashion, the quantitative and qualitative discrepancies between goals and outcomes previously detailed. In the same general approach, reasons are suggested for these discrepancies. However, in keeping with the orientation of this research, these comments pertain more to the problems generated by the French themselves than to those derived from the African cultural and physical environment. A third section reviews the ultimate intent behind the French educational strategies for Sub-Saharan Africa and refers to the present status of the fulfillment of these objectives. The fourth section presents a synopsis of the findings of the study, and the following one lists seven generalizations derived from the study and judged to be of universal pertinence. The chapter concludes with a brief indication of the areas needing further study.

The Discrepancies Between Goals and Outcomes. The comparison of policy objectives with actual outcomes reveals a significant

variance between the two. This fact holds true whether one employs metropolitan-stated goals or those detailed in the annual reports of the French Sub-Saharan governments.

From the quantitative point of view, the small percentages of school attendees in relation to the school age population have been noted by numerous authors.¹ Of less common knowledge is the fact that the rapid expansion of primary education has been a high priority target in French Black Africa for at least the past forty-three years (1919-1962). Indeed, through the entire period under study (1816-1962), generalized policy statements refer to the urgency of developing extensive systems of mass and vocational education. Even if one discounts many of the earlier statements of objectives as being ambitious, long-range goals without definite target dates, and focuses on relatively recent development plans, the quantitative achievements have not measured up to projected outcomes. For example, as late as 1946 the education development plan, incorporated in the General Plan for Modernization and Equipment for the Overseas Territories, called for the enrollment of 30% of the total school-age population of Sub-Saharan Africa within ten years.² Yet, at the end of ten years, in December 1956, the figure for Equatorial Africa stood at 21.3%³ and the eight territories comprising French West Africa had a school population of 13.4% of the estimated school-age

¹For example, Thompson and Adloff, French West Africa, p. 518.

²France, Annuaire Statistique de l'Union Francaise Outre-Mer, 1939-1949, p. 211.

³France, M.F.O.M., Enseignement Outre-Mer, No. 8, p. 19.

population.¹ Also, at the end of the ten-year plan, French West Africa was supposed to have 50% of the school-age population completing six years of primary education and this goal has not been achieved even today.² From 1938 to 1956, the school population as compared to the school-age population in French West Africa rose from 3.2% to only 13.4%.³ In Senegal, where French education was initiated in 1816, only 28% of the school-age population was enrolled in school by 1960.⁴ A target of the first four-year plan of Senegal aimed at passing the 50% mark in 1964 as far as primary-age pupils are concerned.⁵

A second major area of discrepancy between objectives and outcomes is found in the qualitative adaptation of French education to local realities and needs. Except for brief instances during the Primitive

¹France, L'Afrique Occidentale Francaise, 1956, p. 105. The figure of 13.4% may be too high, since the total population may have been underestimated and only 15% of the total figure were estimated as being of school age. The source cited in the preceding footnote places the figure at 11.6%.

²France, loc. cit., 1948, p. 69. The 1961-62 figures were obtained through the Ministry of Cooperation and the University of Paris.

³France, loc. cit., 1956, p. 105. Enseignement Outre-Mer, No. 8, places the 1956 figure at 11.6%.

⁴Republique du Sénégal, Plan Quadriennal de Développement 1961-1964, 1961, p. 2.

⁵Based upon interviews with Ministry of Education officials, Republic of Senegal. Statistics for some nations of Equatorial Africa such as Gabon have shown spectacular increases within the past few years; however, these questionable statistics do not reflect the quality of such education where from 75 to 150 pupils may be found in one first-grade classroom, with enormous dropout rates after the second grade. (Based upon 1961-62 unpublished research reports, Seminar of Educational Planning, Institute for the Study of Economic and Social Development, University of Paris.)

Period (1816-1870) and the era from the Second World War to 1960, metropolitan policy supported the theory of adaptation.

Despite this emphasis at the level of theory or policy, and the special structural organization of the French Black African rural school system, the curriculum, methodology, and examinations progressively assumed the characteristics of the metropolitan system. Oddly enough, many significant officials including ministers of colonies, colonial governors, and high echelon educators were aware of this tendency, condemned it, and attempted to counteract it. In this study at least sixteen of such officials have been cited between 1900 and 1962.¹ Nevertheless, as the historical record has revealed, their efforts, even when backed by formal policy doctrine, generally did not prevail against the forces of tradition.

Suggested Reasons for Discrepancies Between Theory and Fact.

When one compares the texts of the major policy declarations and of the comprehensive French Sub-Saharan education acts with the educational statistics, the commentaries of critics, and the results of personal, on-the-spot inspection, the discrepancies between theory and fact become very apparent. Among the reasons for this distinction lies the French tendency to place theory before reality.² The characteristic of employing the rational rather than the empirical method naturally leads to a gap between the expressed ideal and the accomplished fact. If one

¹The following list is representative but by no means exhaustive: 1900-1910--Foncin, Guy, Roume, Clémentel; 1910-1920--Hardy; 1920-1930--Sarraut, Perrier, Carde, Rollin; 1930-1940--Brévié, Gourou, Davesne, Charton; 1955--Hardy; 1960-1962--Gineste, Dumont.

²Paul Giran, De l'Éducation des Races--Étude de Sociologie Coloniale (Paris: Augustin Challamel, 1913), p. 309.

accepts the following thesis as valid, the French are unconcerned with such gaps: "Principles and ideals are the heart and soul of our politics, but their eventual application often remains a matter of quasi-indifference."¹ (Author's italics.)

This gap is further widened under a highly centralized system in which the ideational innovators are far removed from the operational implementors. Further, when the policy-makers are subject to frequent displacements, the chances of obtaining a successful implementation are reduced because the permanent bureaucracy exerts an unusual control over the policy implementation process in that those most concerned with translating plans into action, the policy formulators, do not remain in the position of authority long enough to supervise the execution of policy. Siegfried observed that the civil servant wins over the minister in the end because only the former knows the technique and routine. He claimed that the ministerial influence is greatly reduced in actual practice.² This enables the bureaucracy, a composite of groups of human beings, effectively to resist policy to which it is opposed.

In this study, the evidence indicates that significant numbers of colonial administrators opposed the extensive development of native education because they believed it constituted a threat to the continued dominance by France, as well as to their own job security. On the other hand, the French educators, as a group, tended to resist educational

¹ André Siegfried, France, A Study in Nationality (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), p. 25.

² Ibid., p. 107. The author was referring to practices of the Third Republic and earlier. This generalization probably remained valid during the Fourth Republic and, to a lesser degree, in the Fifth Republic.

changes running counter to their traditional training and rigid concept of quality education.

The French colonial financial policy was a formidable ally of the first group, in the retardation of native education. As previously noted, this policy, finalized in 1900, obligated each colony to pay for all its own expenses other than those arising from the presence of military forces designed to resist external military invasions. In brief, the colonies were self-supporting and, in addition, had to contribute to metropolitan expenses incurred in connection with colonial affairs such as the training of French colonial administrators.¹

Further, through metropolitan decrees, certain types of expenditures were ruled as obligatory categories of the colonial budgets and had to be financed before non-obligatory categories could be supported.² Since native education fell under the latter classification, it not only suffered from being classified as an optional expenditure, but it had to compete with similarly categorized activities which were often more appealing to colonial administrators.

The education of the mass was the hardest hit as a result of

¹Siegfried remarked that the Frenchman may wear his heart on the left but his pocket is always on the right. He likes to keep his money and his children at home. Ibid., pp. 42, 49.

²The salaries of the European administrators were obligatory and constituted a heavy load for the colonial budgets. Roberts (1930), op. cit., p. 167, noted that France had an estimated three European officials employed where England had one and, as a consequence, no less than a third of the general (federal) budget and a half of the local budgets were allotted for remuneration of such officials. He cited Messimy's sarcastic comment on this situation in a 1910 address to the Parliament: "It would appear from the budget that one was concerned more with discovering work for the officials to do than in finding suitable officials for the work."

this policy, because the support for elementary education was derived from the local colonies' budgets. Head taxes constituted the major source of revenue for these budgets, already inadequate to meet the multiple requirements imposed upon them.

Thus, colonial financial policy conflicted with the colonial social policy. Ministers of colonies issued eloquent declarations related to the development of education, but seldom became so specific or persistent in their statements and follow-up procedures as to force significant upward revisions in local colonial expenditures for native education. Obviously, the French colonial administrators had to respond to metropolitan policy and, while it should be recognized that many significant changes resulted from this stimulus, frequently the responses took the form of modifications which, if requiring substantial additional funding, were set up for long-term implementation without definite deadlines. The important exceptions to this pattern occurred following major upheavals or events in the Metropole when new, or renewed, policies were pursued with a vigor emanating from the preceding period of turbulence and the resultant forces of change.¹

The implemental difficulties encountered by the policy-makers in the adaptation of metropolitan education to Sub-Saharan cultural realities and socio-economic needs, as interpreted by the French, came from other sources. The most potent of these was the colonial cadre of French educators who tended to transmit the metropolitan educational tradition despite formal policy and the adaptation of the organizational

¹Such as in 1848, 1903, 1919-1920, and 1944-1946.

structure of the French Sub-Saharan school system outside of the city centers.¹

The teachers, as a group, opposed the principle of adaptation on several grounds. By and large, they represented the politically liberal French faction which tended to advocate equal rights for the colonial indigenous peoples. Obviously, this implied the right to an equal, or metropolitan, education. Further, accepting the right of the native to be educated, the French teacher saw little or no value in diluting the quality of metropolitan education through the inclusion of elements of an inferior culture.

In this regard Giran noted that, although the French were willing to socialize with the native, they would not learn their languages or customs: "From this point of view, we are often in the most complete ignorance; in those countries where we are established, we remain veritable strangers."² Delavignette also decried the fact that the French colonial society of West Africa had failed to understand the African culture: "Consequently it has not known how to reorganize the masses to whom it has brought disintegration."³

¹The Primary Inspector of French West Africa's remarks, made in 1932, bear repeating a second time in this regard: "Nevertheless, for the past several years, while remaining dominated in theory by these same preoccupations [adaptation], education has, in fact, evolved with increased acceleration towards an imitation of metropolitan education. . . ." Davesne, *op. cit.*, p. 95, and the following: "But the courses of study are worth only as much as the teachers responsible for their application and one would risk being deceived if one hoped to find the constant concern for adaptation in the classrooms that existed during the preparation of the instructions and courses of study now prevailing in French West Africa." *Ibid.*, p. 90.

²Giran, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

³Delavignette, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

Referring specifically to the metropolitan teachers, Professor Gourou sagely concluded that there could not be an adapted system of education without adapted teachers.¹ Concerning the special training of teachers for overseas education, Hardy reached the same conclusions in 1917 as do many high officials presently concerned with French Sub-Saharan education:

The colonial normal schools in the Metropole will never render but poor results; it is important that our colonies possess, at the side of their normal school for indigenous teachers, a normal class reserved for European teachers; thus put under the real conditions of the milieu, the professional training of the teaching personnel will become both more rapid and more serious.²

However, even the indigenous normal schools suffered from the lack of adaptation, according to other officials cited earlier.³ Along with this problem of the reorientation of teachers lay the crucial obstacle of the examination system.⁴ When the French educators began to introduce this system in French Sub-Saharan Africa, they automatically brought to the curriculum a rigidity resistant to the innovations of

¹Gourou, op. cit., p. 310.

²Hardy, Une Conquête Morale . . ., p. 16.

³For example, Inspector Davesne and Governor-General Carde.

⁴In this regard, one official text noted as follows: "Criticism derives from the fact that most of the teachers do not take into account what constitutes a course of study. Generally it is too complete, too full. Certain teachers, incapable of grasping the spirit, can only see the letter of it. They wish to employ it in its entirety and omit nothing, as woodcutters who indiscriminately cut down all the trees to exploit the forest. Others, excessively scrupulous or haunted by the examinations, also refuse to allow any portion of the curriculum to escape. They cram their pupils with an indigestible nourishment while not daring to give the latter certain lessons which they judge to be useful, under the pretext that such lessons are not prescribed." (Government-General of French West Africa, Recueil des Textes . . ., p. 181.)

adaptation. Obviously, there could be little or no curricular modification without a prior elimination, or substantive modification, of the examination system.

The application of the principle of adaptation was also hindered by the lack of textbooks written specifically for Tropical Africa. Since French educational methodology demands a relatively close adherence to the textbook, the average classroom teacher was unlikely to be concerned with innovation except in the absence of textbooks.

The greatest degree of innovation was required in relating French overseas education to colonial economic development. Despite the recognition of this need by the metropolitan governments as gauged by their policy statements, the actual quantitative and qualitative outcomes in Sub-Saharan Africa indicate that their attempts to convert principle into fact met with very limited success. One of the major reasons for this lack of achievement stems from the anti-technical bias of French education.¹ Giran deplored this fact in his book on overseas education:

But it is always necessary to avoid falling in the error of giving a too literary education. For we French, therein lies our most serious shortcoming. Mr. Raymond Poincaré said one day: "Our secondary education is excellent to produce lawyers, men of letters, and also civil servants. It is insufficient to train men capable of assuring the physical health of the country. My colleague, Ghebart, said that he would give forty Masters in Letters or in Law for one good traveling salesman. I would not give, without regret, forty Masters in Letters but would gladly give one hundred Masters in Law."²

¹Since the end of the Second World War, the French Government has waged a consistent campaign to improve the quality and prestige of technical education.

²Ibid., p. 219. The Master's Degree is equated here with the French License.

Giran further claimed that the French state of mind tends to conceive of innovations as the artificial product of reason rather than as the outcome of experience. This tendency, according to this writer, has been applied to the instruction of science and technology which the French teach by the book and the memory, not by experience and judgment. Giran decried the fact that this bookish method was employed in the vocational and technical schools of the colonies as well as in those of the Metropole.¹

Thus, the French educational system lacked the flexibility to adapt to the needs and realities of Sub-Saharan Africa, even as determined by the French themselves. Of course, the subject of educational adaptation is one which lends itself much more readily to generalization than to practical application. A review of the literature concerning the problem suggests a schizoid tendency on the part of the French alternately to espouse and reject the principle. On one hand, the French attempt to assimilate the indigenous peoples into what they consider the most universal of cultures, argued against much of a curricular adaptation. On the other hand, the French concern not to sow the seeds of indigenous discontent through an inappropriate education argued for such an adaptation.²

For example, one aspect of this conflict is reflected in discussions concerning the teaching of history. The study was viewed as a

¹Ibid., p. 309.

²Actually the strategy of assimilating an elite and of instructing the mass permitted the concurrent application of both of these tendencies, but within the framework of each of these tracks, there still remained the question of the degree of adaptation.

key instrument in rendering the Africans better subjects: "It is an excellent means of reducing this natural vanity for which he [the native] is reproached, to render him more modest while, at the same time, inculcating a solid and reasoned loyalty in him."¹ Yet, the instruction of certain historical episodes was persistently questioned as being potentially dangerous. A hint of this concern was revealed in the following official text:

We allay the anxiety of those who fear that the story of the revolutionists storming the Bastille will inspire the natives with the idea of seizing the military posts through the use of force. There is no longer any question of relating confusing accounts of European and civil wars, although, very often, the wars sustained by France have that privilege of being presentable as beneficent struggles against war itself in favor of civilization.²

The policy of assimilation, re-established after World War II as the means of creating a Greater France capable of vying on equal terms with the United States and Russia, temporarily ameliorated the complexities involved in the adaptation of education. The Black African, whose grandfather probably had resisted the idea of a French education, demanded and received, in so far as it was possible, the equivalence of the metropolitan school system.

However, with the advent of the independence of the Sub-Saharan states, the French reverted to the policy, and hence to the problems, of adaptation because of the impossibility of extending education, and the French language, to the Black African masses via the high-cost metropolitan system. But the problems of adaptation--of funding, and

¹Government-General of French West Africa, Recueil des textes. . ., p. 217.

²Ibid., p. 219.

of obtaining in general a better correlation between centralized planning and grass-root implementation, among the most significant reasons for the discrepancies between planned objectives and actual outcomes--remain to be solved.

The Achievement of the Ultimate Intent. It will be recalled that the ultimate intent of French educational strategies for Sub-Saharan Africa has been to assure the psychological or cultural assimilation of the Black African in order to maintain French influence and prestige regardless of political and economic eventualities. The object has been to create a Gallicized world which will provide France with the means to participate in international politics on equal terms with the other great powers of the world, and to project the image and prestige of France as the torch-bearer of universal civilization.

Whether progress toward the implementation of this intent has been sufficient to predict a successful final outcome is a matter of conjecture. Certainly, the fact of independence has preceded the completion of the task of Frenchification, but the evidence gathered in this study indicates the metropolitan leadership remains optimistic concerning the ultimate outcomes.¹ Attempts at the Africanization of culture are viewed as a natural consequence of independence, but as an impossibility beyond a superficial degree. The real interest of the Black African leadership is interpreted as finding expression in their attempts to unify and indoctrinate the masses and to develop viable,

¹Based upon interviews and observation in Paris and Senegal in 1961-62.

modern economies. The extension of French as the national language of the new Sub-Saharan states serves these interests as much as it does that of the French policy.

Nevertheless, the French are not complacent in terms of their pursuit of the ultimate goal. They have planned the long-term expansion of technical assistance in the field of education, and the efforts of UNESCO to encourage the development of indigenous languages as the medium of mass literacy programs are opposed covertly.

A Synopsis of Findings. One of the most obvious conclusions emerging from the study is the consistent effort of the French to employ culture and language as a subtle means of permanent imperialism. In this context, the most formidable enemy has been the English-speaking nations. The current manifestation of disengagement from England and the United States appears to be a natural outcome of the present position of French strength which permits her openly to pursue an independent policy of aggrandizement based upon the third world power theme.

This theme in itself has a foundation in the French belief in the universality of their culture, which is viewed as presently offering a haven for those peoples seeking refuge from the dictates of the American and Russian international power struggle. However, this belief has been accompanied by more ulterior motives, such as the struggle for international political power and economic gain. For example, in 1889 Pierre Foncin, describing the utility role of the Alliance Francaise, made this statement: "But it is directed, at the same time, to French commerce, of which it is the natural ally because the propagation of

the French-speaking Black Africans from extensive contact with cultures other than their own.

In this last regard, it can be expected that the French will oppose, overtly in specific instances but covertly in most cases, the intrusions of English-speaking powers in former French colonies, particularly in the realm of cultural projects. The French policy in this matter has a lengthy and consistent history which cannot be ignored.¹

The policy of psychological or cultural assimilation must be differentiated from the concept of assimilation as generally employed in connection with French colonial policy. The latter principle remained impossible to implement because, carried to its logical conclusion, it implied the complete socio-economic assimilation of the colonies into a Greater France, which meant that the colonies in fact would control the Metropole through a numerically superior political representation in a common government. The impasse of ultimate political assimilation argued for the vigorous pursuit of psychological or cultural assimilation, particularly in Black Africa where the resistance derived from the indigenous cultural tradition was virtually non-existent as compared to that of North Africa or the Far East.

As viewed by the French, the major problem of assimilation in Sub-Saharan Africa lay in the uprooting of the masses from the land and in the unintentional creation of a revolutionary leadership through the overproduction of an intellectual elite for which no employment could be guaranteed. Although the fear is expressed frequently in the documentation,

¹The sole exception might be instances in which these powers offer financial aid without significant implications for cultural deviation.

the point of overproduction of an intellectual elite was not reached in Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole.¹

In similar fashion, the problem of uprooting the mass through an exposure to education² never reached the dangerous stage during the French rule because of the limited educational opportunities available to the rural youth.³ Nevertheless, the French policy-makers stressed the adaptation of education and in fact, prior to 1945, the French Sub-Saharan schools were organized into a rural and an urban track, with the latter subdivided into indigenous and metropolitan subdivisions.⁴

However, this structural adaptation was not complemented by a successful curricular and methodological adaptation. Though there appear to be many contributing causes for this latter failure, the

¹Based on the writer's interpretations of the statistical documentation, and on Dumont, op. cit., p. 72.

²Apparently the French were less concerned about other types of uprooting: "On the basis of official figures, we can say that between 1920 and 1930 nearly 189,000 able-bodied men in the prime of life, representing the best twentieth of the population, have been torn from marriage, from the villages, and from the fields. Those heads of subdivisions, commandants of cercles, and governors who wanted to arrest this flowing away of the peasantry, were suspected of disloyalty and deprived of means of action. They were compelled to look on helplessly while the territories in their charge were bled white. They saw the resurgence, in modern form, of the serfdom and slavery which they thought to have cured. The temporary governor of the Ivory Coast, Richard Brunot, who denounced forced labour and organized voluntary work, was recalled and disgraced. Apparently he was asked if he thought he was Jesus Christ." Delavignette, op. cit., p. 113.

³Dumont gives an example of this problem by citing the 75% enrollment of the school-age population in Bamako, the capital city of Mali, as compared with 3% in the distant bush country. Dumont, op. cit., p. 76.

⁴Wherever there were enough French children to warrant the establishment of a purely metropolitan curriculum.

non-adaptability of the French educator and his African counterpart seem to have constituted a major factor. In turn, this lack of flexibility appears derived from the omission or inadequacy of specialized training for overseas education as well as from a natural inclination to resist innovation.

The policy of educational adaptation was abruptly abandoned after the Second World War for political reasons--the creation of a Greater France through assimilation. With the advent of Sub-Saharan independence in 1960, the metropolitan policy-makers renewed the policy of adaptation because it is obvious that the African nations could not attain their quantitative educational goals if they retain replicas of the metropolitan system with its high per-pupil cost ratio.

The present French strategy, based upon a more rapid Frenchification of the mass and a closer relationship between education and economic development, stresses a four-year rather than a six-year primary education, a special literacy-agricultural program for the adolescent illiterate rural youth, and the training of educators and economists in the skills of educational planning in order to assure a school system more responsive to the national development needs of emerging nations. However, major reforms of the curriculum, of the teaching methodology, and of the training of teachers would seem to be indicated if the French are to reverse their pattern of paper reforms without significant local change.

One of the most notorious failures of the adaptation of the curriculum resulted from the attempt between the two World Wars to introduce rudimentary agricultural education in the rural schools at the elementary level. In terms of both the plans as stated in metropolitan

policy declarations and the analyses of French critics, vocational and technical training should be included in those educational endeavors in French Sub-Saharan Africa which failed to produce adequate results from either quantitative or qualitative standpoints.

A major cause of these quantitative and qualitative failures in primary, vocational, and technical education was the failure to implement metropolitan policy with metropolitan funds. Although the policy was defined in clear and remarkably consistent terms between 1903 and 1946, and the derived strategies planned in logical detail, the grass-root implementation lagged because of lack of funds in the colonies to pursue the policy and fulfill the plans.

The assignation of the funding of native education as a financial responsibility of the colonies placed a weapon in the hands of colonial administrators who, as a group, sided with the French colon or petit blanc in opposition to the education of the Africans because this threatened the continued domination of France and their own job security.

These bureaucrats were able to maintain an unusual influence over the implementation of policy because of the consistently rapid turnover of governments, ministers, and governors. Through a knowledge of the jungle of regulations, the control of the administration of the implemental services, and the realization that the rapid displacement of policy-makers allowed the latter little means of supervising the policy process, the bureaucrat remained a serious obstacle to be overcome by policy innovators.

Both the innovation of policy and metropolitan insistence upon

the implementation of such policy occurred in a cyclic fashion. After a major upheaval and the ensuing resolution of the crisis in the Metro-pole, a fresh impetus to overseas education often was imparted. But each period of vigor was followed by a stage of progressive stagnation or inactivity.

In concluding this review of findings, the following comments summarize the above discussion. The French educational endeavor in Sub-Saharan Africa had many positive aspects: a firm ultimate purpose, guidance from time to time by perceptive planners of grand strategy, and a continuing organization based on logical educational plans from 1903 on. These constructive factors were counterposed by a serious lack of financial support for the education program in the colonies, miserably inadequate implementation at the grass-root level, and rapid turnover in the top administrative echelons. Until the past few years, the net effect was that of a paper phantom, possibly best described by Bismarck's blunt and crude analysis of the government of Louis Napoleon: "From a distance, it appears to be something; from up close, it is nothing."¹

Generalizations. It should be pointed out that the following statements might be referred to more accurately as hypotheses abstracted from the French experience and requiring further verification in comparable studies. Further, these generalizations, derived largely from historical colonial experiences, are expressed in terms of current events. In this attempt to relate the past to the present, it is recognized that a difference exists in the variables.

¹Duchene, op. cit., p. 232.

1. Overseas education serves as a significant weapon in the international power struggle to influence foreign peoples. Whether one refers to the colonial education of the past or the overseas development education of the present, this activity constitutes an instrument of foreign or colonial policy. The investment in such educational endeavors is proportionate to the calculated return to the donor nation rather than to the needs of the recipient, although clearly the latter factor may be closely related to the former.

2. Foreign assistance is subject to cyclic fluctuation. The amount of foreign assistance granted by a nation is determined largely by its internal political and economic zeitgeist, although this internal condition is affected significantly by external events. Donor nations tend to render assistance in cyclic patterns, with surges of quantitative increases after periods of major upheavals being followed by progressive declines during periods of relative national and international tranquillity.

3. Foreign assistance agencies suffer from the reorganization syndrome. Foreign assistance is inherently a controversial activity because it expends national funds internationally, usually without the concrete, measurable returns expected by the general public. Therefore, the administering agencies are subject to periodic reorganizations in order to institute reforms and meet criticisms.

4. Bureaucratic resistance tends to abort the implementation of policy. Policy-makers at the head of complex bureaucracies frequently lack the ability or the means to control the implementation of policy. Policy innovations may be partially or wholly negated if they threaten the security of the bureaucrats or require a substantial adaptation on

the part of the latter. Policy-makers are subject to frequent displacement and lack the powers of reward and punishment as well as the degree of supervision necessary to ensure vigorous implemental action.

5. Centralized planning has tended to fix targets but not to assure outcomes. Centralized national or high-echelon planning has suffered from a priori rationalistic or highly statistical approaches which have tended to neglect the resolution of the problems of implementation.

6. Education for economic development has emphasized structural, but not curricular and teacher training, modification. The adaptation of education to meet the needs of economic development in the emerging countries have consisted largely of organizational modifications. For example, in general the conversion of the core of the elementary school curriculum from a classical language arts to a socio-economic emphasis has not occurred, nor has the training of teachers been modified sufficiently to enable them to deviate from the literary tradition.

7. Educational systems in emerging countries require technical schools with a flexible curriculum and polyvalent instructors. To train skilled technicians in a variety of specialities such as electro-mechanics and telecommunications, emerging nations need to supplement the outdated classical technical school, with its annual production of the same type of specialists, with well-equipped schools capable of enough flexibility to change from one course to another according to the priorities emanating from manpower requirement forecasts.

Recommendations for Further Study. By the nature of its scope, the present study has been limited to exposing the problems and complexities

related to the French educational policy process for Sub-Saharan Africa. There is a need to research, in greater depth, certain periods and programs briefly mentioned in this presentation.

A study of educational development in Black Africa under the impetus of the FIDES and FERDES programs following the Second World War should reveal a host of insights pertinent to current educational problems in the region. For example, if it is true that the FIDES school construction program had to be halted because the African territories could not pay for their operation and maintenance, how will the new nations be able to assume the financial burden imposed by the rash of elaborate educational institutions now being constructed through foreign grants or long-term, low-interest loans and staffed through technical assistance?

Obviously, a study of this type might be conducted by a financial expert; however, there is a need for several varieties of specialists to conduct research in the field. Historical research into the grass-root implementation in the colonies is required. According to Hardy, the study should focus upon the following:

While looking at the noble perseverance and clear-sighted initiative, it should place the spotlight upon those responsible for all the retreats, for all of the discouragements. It should explain, without reticence, the irregular progress made in recruitment, the sabotage of the programs, the blundering division of schools in certain regions, the absence of principles for the enrollment of classes, the false experiences, the abuse of paperwork, the lack of unity of, the lie and instability behind appearances, the poor utilization of personnel, the abuse of power, the unnecessary complications and all sorts of absurdities.¹

¹Hardy, Une Conquête Morale . . ., p. 38.

The purpose of such a focus would not be to vilify the French but to comprehend the sociological and educational problems involved in the obviously difficult task of adapting a school system to a completely foreign cultural and physical milieu. Related to this topic is the effect of this schooling upon the students and their families from the psychological and sociological point of view. Although progress has been made in this type of research, more comprehensive and sophisticated studies need to be conducted. The same verity applies to the sociology of formal organization; the unanticipated consequences of organized action and the discrepancies between policy and outcomes noted in this study require an analysis in depth if sufficiently detailed and accurate findings are to be made available for comparative studies.

Further explorations in the relationship between education and politics also are pertinent. The evidence indicates that French political factors and events greatly influenced the development and the initiation of many of the significant strategies described in this study.

Manifestly, the relationship between economic development and education needs to be studied in Sub-Saharan Africa. The techniques of forecasting manpower requirements and of educational planning to schedule training according to these requirements have been introduced in the region, but results of this introduction should be evaluated.

Studies are needed also in many other phases of the current educational endeavors in French-speaking Black Africa. The reasons for the extremely high dropout rate should be determined in order that a remedy may be found. The same need applies to the high per-capita cost

of Franco-African schooling which frustrates the best intentions to extend education to the indigenous peoples. Research into the effectiveness and adaptation of the curriculum would be of significant value as well.

Indeed, if there is one safe conclusion to be drawn from this present study, it is that the research has raised many more questions than it has answered. Education is a complex process; when applied cross-culturally, the increased complexities offer innumerable significant research opportunities which have yet to be explored.

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