

INFORMATION TO USERS

This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again -- beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.
4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.
5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

Xerox University Microfilms

300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

INFORMATION TO USERS

This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.
4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.
5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

Xerox University Microfilms

300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

73-18,832

NAKAMURA, Akira, 1940-

THE POLITICS OF AIR POLLUTION CONTROL IN LOS
ANGELES AND OSAKA: A COMPARATIVE URBAN STUDY.

University of Southern California, Ph.D., 1973
Political Science, general

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan

© Copyright by

AKIRA NAKAMURA

1973

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED

THE POLITICS OF AIR POLLUTION CONTROL IN
LOS ANGELES AND OSAKA: A COMPARATIVE
URBAN STUDY

by

Akira Nakamura

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

(Political Science)

February 1973

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY PARK
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90007

This dissertation, written by

Akira Nakamura

*under the direction of his Dissertation Com-
mittee, and approved by all its members, has
been presented to and accepted by The Graduate
School, in partial fulfillment of requirements of
the degree of*

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Charles S. Mayo

Dean

February 1973

Date

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

George O. Totten
Chairman
Thomas H. Loren
Wend. Kuhl

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In writing this dissertation, I was fortunate to have received assistance from many people. Among those who helped me in the research, I pay special tributes to Professors George O. Totten and Thomas Greene. Without their constant guidance throughout my academic career at the University of Southern California, I could not have accomplished as much as I have. I am also grateful to Professor John Kirlin. In time of my despair and discouragement, I could always turn to these people and depend on their knowledge.

During a brief research trip to Japan, in October 1972, I received valuable help from Professor Tetsuya Okita of Meiji University and Mr. Toshihide Matsuo. Without their comments and suggestions, I could not have collected sufficient data nor conducted as many interesting interviews in such a short span of time.

Mr. and Mrs. Jack Sheets of Castro Valley, California, read a part of my dissertation and gave me a number of valuable suggestions. I am quite thankful for

their understanding and friendship.

Finally, I must express my deepest gratitude to my wife and to my family in Japan. Their assistance and encouragement have been absolutely essential to the pursuit of my graduate studies at the University of Southern California.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	ii
Chapter	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
Significance of the Study	1
Methodology	3
Limitations of the Study	5
II. LOS ANGELES AND OSAKA: BACKGROUNDS	7
Los Angeles	8
Demography	8
Political Structure	11
Political Process	19
Osaka	24
Demography	24
Political Structure	29
Political Process	34
Conclusions	42
III. AIR POLLUTION IN LOS ANGELES AND OSAKA: A PRELIMINARY STUDY OF ITS CAUSES AND EFFECTS	45
Definition	45
Causes	51
Effects	57
IV. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL: PAST EFFORTS IN LOS ANGELES AND OSAKA	64
Los Angeles	65
Osaka	84
Conclusions	106

Chapter	Page
V. INTEREST GROUP ACTIVITIES IN THE AIR POLLUTION CONTROL OF LOS ANGELES AND OSAKA	108
Los Angeles	111
Ecology Groups	111
Business Organizations	141
Osaka	156
Ecology Groups	156
Business Organizations	184
Conclusions	193
VI. DECISION-MAKING IN AIR POLLUTION CONTROL IN LOS ANGELES AND OSAKA	198
Los Angeles	199
Osaka	234
Conclusions	264
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS	268
BIBLIOGRAPHY	275

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Significance of the Study

Ecological issues have recently become salient in the study of urbanization and industrialization. Since Los Angeles, California, and Osaka, Japan, are both major commercial and industrial centers in their countries, they are facing similar problems of pollution, particularly air pollution, which is mainly generated by automobiles and factories.

As a result, there has been a proliferation of civic groups, both in Los Angeles and Osaka, whose primary campaigns are directed against contamination of the environment. In addition, some local legislators indicate that measures should be taken to curb air pollution in their respective regions.

However, ecological issues are intrinsic to present-day politics and quite often call for a political solution. This is particularly conspicuous in a

democratic political system, where divergent opinions and attitudes prevail. What air pollution is, for instance, provokes more controversies than agreements under such a political setting.

If this is so, a comparative study of Los Angeles and Osaka should be valuable at least for two fundamental reasons. First, although both regions are large seaports in highly industrialized nations, Los Angeles is markedly different from Osaka in a number of important ways. Does this mean that the political process also operates in an entirely different way? To what degree this is so is a critical question integral to the study of cross-national comparisons of urban politics.

Second, Los Angeles and Osaka must seek new alternative approaches to deal with the pollution produced by massive technological expansion and increased population demands for electrical output and transportation. A comparative analysis of these two regions will provide two different cases upon which one can discuss the more advantageous policy for alleviating air pollution.

These intrinsic interests, coupled with this

writer's familiarity with the issue of pollution from two national and regional perspectives, strongly motivated him to commence a comparative study of political styles in the context of metropolitan Los Angeles and Osaka. Although the current analysis lacks scientific rigor and precision, it is hoped that this study will shed new light on and provide enough impetus for others to initiate similar projects for the further development of comparative urban research.

Methodology

This study approaches the smog problem of Los Angeles and Osaka from the view of policy output. In other words, the past efforts against pollution of these respective areas are regarded as dependent variables.¹ The discrepancy found in these programs was then accounted

¹With respect to the policy output study, see Austin Ranney, "The Study of Policy Content: A Framework for Choice," in Political Science and Public Policy, ed. by Austin Ranney (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1958), pp. 3-22; James Q. Wilson, "Problems in the Study of Urban Politics," in Essays in Political Science, ed. by Edward Buchling (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1966), pp. 131-150; also see Brett W. Hawkins, Politics and Urban Policies (Indianapolis & New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1971).

for by means of two sets of the more important independent variables. They are (1) the pattern of interest group activities, and (2) the nature of the decision-making system in the issue of air pollution control.

In this writer's opinion, this approach is highly useful and adds an extra dimension to comparative urban research for a number of reasons. First and foremost, it focuses research on a limited aspect of urban politics. By concentrating on the policy output of air pollution control, it has been possible to zero in on relevant laws, regulations, and enforcement records for comparative purpose in Los Angeles and Osaka.

Second, the present method will provide ample opportunities for an investigator to verify and select relevant explanatory variables. In this study, a number of factors were tested and re-tested until two sets of the most suitable independent variables were found. This could not have been possible if the policy outcome against which to check their validities not available.²

²In terms of advantages of using the policy output analysis, see William Mitchell, "The Shape of Political Theory to Come: From Political Sociology to Political Economy," in Politics and Social Sciences, ed. by Seymour

Limitations of the Study

The parameters of the present study are delimited by several characteristics. Both Los Angeles and Osaka are not typical metropolitan regions of the United States and Japan. Far from being representative, they are unique in their respective countries. The present analysis, therefore, should be interpreted as a case study rather than an inclusive examination of American and Japanese local politics.

In addition, since the primary focus of this investigation is on air pollution control at the local level, different programs on other levels of government, except for those pertinent to the current topics, will not be discussed. In California, for instance, the state government takes charge of air pollution from moving sources and delegates the regulation of stationary sources to Los Angeles County. However important in this study, those state programs which are not directly related to

M. Lipset (New York & London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 101-136; and Ira Sharkansky, "The Political Scientist and Policy Analysis," in Policy Analysis in Political Science, ed. by Ira Sharkansky (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1970), pp. 1-18.

the local enforcement are excluded from the analysis.

Finally, because the local government structure of the United States is different from that of Japan, it poses a serious methodological question; namely, how and why does one determine what structural unit of local government is to be studied for policy making and comparison? The framework of the present study has defined Los Angeles to be the County of Los Angeles and Osaka to be the metropolitan Prefecture (Fu) of Osaka, for the following reasons: (1) these definitions provide a clear-cut geographical boundary; (2) they also make it possible to take into account different governments within their jurisdictions; and (3) the County of Los Angeles and the Prefecture of Osaka are the highest local authorities in charge of air pollution control in their respective regions.

CHAPTER II

LOS ANGELES AND OSAKA: BACKGROUNDS

Los Angeles is different from Osaka in many significant ways. Historically, the former is much younger than the latter. Culturally, too, the dissimilarity between the Anglo-Spanish and the Sino-Japanese heritages are quite pronounced. The major objective in this chapter, then, is to uncover these differences with a particular emphasis on the political system. In so doing, an attempt will be made to demonstrate that Los Angeles is much more fortunate in having the kind of political system which tends to encourage interest group activities and a locally oriented decision-making process. Such a significant gap in the political system seems to underscore the major difference in the stage of development of air pollution control between these two metropolitan regions.

Los Angeles

Demography

Los Angeles is one of the most important metropolitan regions in the United States, not only as a leading area in economy and technology, but also as one of the first in the nation in air pollution, violence, and in the development of hippie subcultures. Because of these reasons, Los Angeles is often regarded as the "Ultimate City" for the future of America.¹

According to the census of 1970, the population of Los Angeles County was in excess of 7 million. This was an increase of one million from the previous figure of 1960. Of the 1970 population, 4.8 million, or 68.5 percent, were White. There are two interesting characteristics about this group of people in Los Angeles.²

¹Christopher Rand, Los Angeles: The Ultimate City (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).

²Los Angeles Times, Marketing Research, 1970 Census: Los Angeles and Orange Counties' Population and Housing Characteristics by City and Unincorporated Place (Los Angeles: Los Angeles Times, Marketing Research, n.d.), pp. 1-4.

First, white persons born in foreign countries were marginal. They were mostly from Russia, Germany, or Italy. The predominant numbers, on the contrary, were the native born. They comprised as much as 83 percent of the total white population in this area. This was slightly higher than the national average and substantially higher than the average of San Francisco and New York.³

Second, most of the white persons in Los Angeles were not Californians but Midwesterners. They moved to Southern California essentially from the Great Lakes, the Corn Belt, and the Southern States. This fact would make a sharp contrast to that of San Francisco, where half of the white population was native Californians.⁴

Because the majority of the residents came from a Midwestern background, the general consensus would suggest that the social climate of Los Angeles was

³James Q. Wilson, A Report on Politics in Los Angeles (Cambridge, Mass.: Joint Center for Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, 1959), pp. I, 5-6.

⁴Ibid., p. 38.

strongly molded from the heartland of the United States. It is essentially predicated upon the idea of agrarianism and the stress on personal responsibility and individual. The preponderance of Protestants, homeownerships, and small communities in Los Angeles are often pointed out as the most succinct evidence of that heritage.⁵

Los Angeles is a representative of urban communities of the United States. It has one of the largest concentrations of minority groups. One of them is made up of Negroes. In 1960, the black residents in this region amounted to 7.6 percent of the total population of 6 million. However, they increased to 10.9 percent of the total in 1970.⁶

Aside from the Negroes, Los Angeles has the largest number of Mexican-Americans in the United States.

⁵See, e.g., James Q. Wilson, "A Guide to Reagan Country," Commentary, XLIII (May 1967), 37-45; Michael P. Rogin and John L. Shover, Political Change in California: Critical Elections and Social Movements--1890-1966 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1969), pp. 54-58; Jerome Cohen and Nathan E. Cohen, "The Social Climate of Los Angeles," in Los Angeles: Viability and Prospects for Metropolitan Leadership, ed. by Werner Z. Hirsch (New York, Washington, and London: Praeger, 1971), pp. 21-50.

⁶County of Los Angeles, Regional Planning Commission, Quarterly Bulletin, No. 113 (July 1, 1971), pp. 1-16.

In 1970, they numbered 1.2 million, or 18 percent, of the entire population of the county.⁷

In addition to these two major ethnic groups, there is a sizable number of Asians. The Chinese constitute 0.5 percent of the total population and cluster in the Chinatown district in the city of Los Angeles. The Japanese in 1970 comprised 1.5 percent, or 104,000 of the total. They reside mostly in the central, northeastern, Inglewood, and Adams sections of the city.⁸

Political Structure

These residents of Los Angeles County are governed by the county government and 77 incorporated communities which maintain their own governing statutes and administrations. Of these the largest is the city of Los Angeles. In addition to these incorporated places, many citizens live in unincorporated areas. Not having their own governing bodies, they are dependent upon the county

⁷County of Los Angeles, Regional Planning Commission, Quarterly Bulletin, No. 111 (January 1, 1971), pp. 1-6.

⁸Ibid.

government for various local services, including the police and fire protections.⁹

The county government was first organized in 1850 concomitant with the inception of the State of California. It was originally construed as a political arm of the state government. Its functions were, therefore, limited to the administration of social welfare, the operation of courts, the registration of property rights, and other state-wide concerns.¹⁰ But over the years, it has extended its scope. Its function can be classified into four categories: (1) those offered to all citizens under its jurisdiction; (2) those rendered to unincorporated areas, which include such municipal services as zoning, urban planning, and building inspection; (3) those offered to incorporated communities on a contractual basis, which is often a package deal of police and fire protection;

⁹League of Women Voters of Los Angeles County, Los Angeles County Government (Los Angeles: League of Women Voters of Los Angeles County, 1968), pp. 3-6.

¹⁰Helen L. Jones and Robert F. Wilcox, Metropolitan Los Angeles: Its Government (Los Angeles: The Haynes Foundation, 1949), p. 8.

and (4) those provided by special districts for the entire county, e.g., flood, fire, and air pollution controls.¹¹

Traditionally, the first two were the prime jobs of the county government. But beginning in 1910, it began to alter its outlook. The important impetus for such a transformation came from a state constitutional amendment of that year, which allowed local polities throughout California to have home rule. Los Angeles County was quick to capitalize on this provision and established its own charter in 1912. This coupled with other legislation enacted in Sacramento authorized the county to enter into voluntary agreements with incorporated communities for the purpose of offering them municipal services.¹²

This was a major breakthrough, because many cities promptly took advantage of county services in tax collection and assessment, library and health programs.

¹¹League of Women Voters, p. 5.

¹²Robert Warren, "The Rise of Los Angeles County as a Producer of Municipal Service," in Government of the Metropolis, ed. by Joseph F. Zimmerman (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1968), pp. 208-219.

Following this were numerous other constitutional changes. All of them contributed to the growth of the role of county government, and by 1935, county government could enter into contracts with city governments for any county services.¹³

The trend of growing county government power has been kept alive even in the post-war period. In 1954, another precedent was established when Los Angeles County made a package deal with the newly incorporated city of Lakewood. According to this plan, the county government would provide various services including law enforcement for the municipalities and receive the full cost from them.¹⁴

This gradual transition of the role of Los Angeles County has resulted in the expansion of the

¹³ John Ries and John J. Kirilin, "Government in the Los Angeles Area: The Issue of Centralization and Decentralization," in Los Angeles: Viability and Prospects for Metropolitan Leadership, ed. by Werner Z. Hirsch (New York, Washington, & London: Praeger, 1971), p. 103.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 93-94. See also Richard M. Cion, "Accommodation Par Excellence: The Lakewood Plan," in Metropolitan Politics: A Reader, ed. by Michael N. Danielson (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), pp. 224-231.

formal structure of government. At present it operates 70 departments and institutions and 321 special districts. These agencies vary from the Department of Adoptions to that of Weights and Measures. More than 60,000 persons, who are selected by competitive civic service examinations, are in charge of agency operations.¹⁵

The administrative cost for the county government in the fiscal year of 1971-1972 was \$2.5 million. The federal and state governments supplied over half of this budget, while the county itself furnished one third through the locally collected property tax. On the expenditure side, the largest amount (58 percent) was appropriated for social services. It covered programs for old age, blind people, and assistance for families with dependent children.¹⁶

¹⁵ County of Los Angeles, Chief Administrative Office, The Government of the County of Los Angeles (Los Angeles: Chief Administrative Office, n.d.), pp. 1-14.

¹⁶ County of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles Data Guide: 1971-1972, 1972, 8-18. See also Jane Gladfelder, California's Emerging Counties (Sacramento, Calif.: County Supervisors Association of California, 1968), pp. 25-52.

This vast political enterprise is administered by a commission type of local government. At the top of the organization sit the five members of the County Board of Supervisors. They are popularly elected on a nonpartisan basis for a four-year term from five respective districts. The supervisors are a combination of the executive, the legislative, and the judicial systems of government. They are thus the nerve center of county government in Los Angeles.¹⁷

The five members of the County Supervisors are assisted by the Chief Administrative Officer in the matter of day-to-day operations of government. Founded in 1938, the Officer is a civil servant appointed by the Board. His main functions entail (1) making impartial policy recommendations to the supervisors, and (2) being held accountable for overseeing and coordinating various departments so as to obtain high efficiency at the lowest cost.¹⁸

¹⁷Ibid., p. 13.

¹⁸County of Los Angeles, Chief Administrative Office, Information Services, Chief Administrative Office: History, Services and Functions (Los Angeles: Chief Administrative Office, 1969), pp. 1-8.

The formal structures of 77 incorporated communities in the county of Los Angeles show a great deal of similarity. Except for the city of Los Angeles, all of them keep an elective board or council which acts as the local legislative and executive. Also, they all have a city manager who is responsible for the daily operation of the respective governments.¹⁹

The city of Los Angeles has a "weak-mayor" system. The chief executive in this community is an elective office from a city-wide constituency and a nonpartisan contest for a four-year term. Although the mayor makes several appointments, he has little control over his bureaucracy. In fact, he is the chief executive in Los Angeles by name only. Instead of the mayor, each department has a board of five commissioners appointed by the mayor for a five-year term on a part-time basis. The

¹⁹ Winston Crouch and Beatrice Dinerman, Southern California Metropolis: A Study in Development of Government for a Metropolitan Area (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 8-9; and Jones and Wilcox, Metropolitan Los Angeles, pp. 21-29.

commissioners are responsible for the administration of public policy.²⁰

The actual operation of the city government is carried out by a corps of professional administrators. This group of people is spearheaded by the Chief Administrative Officer and controls financial and personnel matters in the various departments. The group is to a large extent a self-governing body accountable not to the mayor but to the commissioners.²¹

The legislative power of the city rests in a council of fifteen members. They are chosen from fifteen districts on a nonpartisan basis for four-year terms. Their primary job is to issue city ordinances which may or may not be approved by the mayor. When an ordinance is vetoed, mutual recrimination between these elective

²⁰Francis Carney, "The Decentralized Politics of Los Angeles," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, CCCLIII (May 1964), 107-112. Some people hold an entirely opposite opinion with respect to the mayor's political power in Los Angeles. See, e.g., Los Angeles Times, January 21, 1973, Pt. 2, pp. 1, 7, 8.

²¹Carney, "Decentralized Politics," p. 112. See also Jones and Wilcox, Metropolitan Los Angeles, p. 17, and Ries and Kirlin, "Government in the Los Angeles Area," p. 92.

officials often ensues. The political style and personality of the incumbent mayor of the city, Samuel Yorty, adds an extra dimension to this confrontation.²²

Political Process

In addition to these formal settings of government, Los Angeles has several outstanding features in its political process which are of vital importance from a comparative standpoint. The political process of this region tends to encourage three different types of activities.

First, it places heavy weight on the role of issue-oriented interest groups. In Los Angeles, these organizations, along with the mass media, are important political vehicles which reach out to millions of voters. Second, the political process of this area is also characterized by the resolution of major issues by direct citizen participation. The frequent use of the initiative is an obvious example. Finally, this region stresses

²²Wilson, A Report on Politics of Los Angeles, pp. II, 4-5; and Edward C. Banfield, Big City Politics (New York: Random House, Inc., 1967), pp. 82-83.

personalized politics. Each elective official must evaluate the appeal of his personality and accomplishments to the public. This is much more the case in Los Angeles than in other parts of the United States, in part because of extensive mass media coverage.²³

These conspicuous political styles of Los Angeles are all inextricably connected with a number of anti-party enactments instituted during the administration of California Governor Hiram Johnson early part of this century. Primarily oriented toward dismantling the machine politics of the Southern Pacific Railroad, Johnson's government put forth four reform measures of local politics. They included (1) the inception of initiative, referendum, and recall for all local entities; (2) the establishment of nonpartisan local elections; (3) the home rule proceedings for various levels of government; and (4) the

²³John Owens, Edmond Constantin, and Louis Weschiller, California Politics and Parties (London: McMillan, 1970), pp. 2-10; Richard B. Harvey, The Dynamics of California Government and Politics (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1970), pp. 11-17; Remi Nadeau, Los Angeles: From Mission to Modern City (New York & London: Longmans, Green, 1960), pp. 264-265; and Crouch and Dinerman, Southern California Metropolis, pp. 1-6.

enlargement of the civil service system.²⁴

These reforms have brought an everlasting impact which reverberates even to this date on politics of California in general and Los Angeles in particular. In essence, they have put an end to the functions of political parties in this region. Nonpartisanship, for instance, has made the party organizations irrelevant to local politics. The civil service system, too, has taken away from the parties a prime means of support. And most important of all, the enactment of home rule, initiative, referendum, and recall has apparently brought local governments closer to the people more than ever before. At the same time, these measures have, to a large extent, freed Los Angeles from the influences of outside political

²⁴Owens, Constantin, and Weschler, California Politics and Parties, pp. 31-38. In Los Angeles, the reform movement against the city government was touched off by a physician, Dr. John Randolph Haynes. With respect to his contribution and movement, see Nadeau, Los Angeles, pp. 181-193, and Lorin Peterson, The Day of the Mugwump (New York: Random House, 1961), pp. 234-247.

forces.²⁵

Incidental to these radical changes is the rise of new political styles in the area. First, the absence of parties induces politicians to create their own support organizations. It also means that political aspirants emphasize their integrity and dedication to local politics as much as their platforms and accomplishments. These seem to be a natural development in view of the fact that, without party labels, the voters must refer to the outlook of candidates and their personal dispositions in casting a vote. From this perspective, it is little wonder that all elective officials try hard to appear interested in and familiar with a wide range of issues in Los Angeles. Without such ardent and constant efforts to impress their supporters, their political careers would be short.²⁶

²⁵ Peterson, Mugwump, pp. 234-246; Nadeau, Los Angeles, pp. 252-264; Harvey, California Government and Politics, pp. 11-25; and William H. Hutchinson, "The Legacy of Progressivism," in Consensus and Cleavages: Issues in California Politics, ed. by Charles M. Price and Earl R. Kruschke (San Francisco: Chandler, 1967), pp. 47-51.

²⁶ Wilson, A Report on Politics, pp. II, 5-14; and Banfield, Big City Politics, pp. 80-93.

Second, the lack of parties tends to draw an ad hoc gathering of issue oriented groups to the center of the political process in Los Angeles. In other parts of the United States, the power vacuum left by weak or non-existent party organizations is probably filled by other organized interest groups. But this region traditionally has been devoid of groups powerful enough to take over party functions. Labor unions, for instance, are weak and exercise little political power. Business organizations, too, cannot bring themselves together as a unified political force. This leaves those organizations which are ad hoc in nature and strongly issue-oriented to play a significant part in the political process of Los Angeles. These are the only vehicles in this area to mobilize public support and attention in each election.²⁷

As the subsequent chapters will attempt to demonstrate, these outstanding political features are extremely visible in the issue of air pollution control. It seems apparent that Los Angeles tries to resolve the problem at

²⁷Crouch and Dinerman, Southern California Metropolis, pp. 6-16.

a local level as much as it can while keeping state and national intervention at bay. Also, politicians in Los Angeles are highly attentive to the smog problem. Their concern for this issue from the view of the general welfare is quite impressive. And finally, in this region, there is a high incidence of head-on collisions of two different categories of issue-centered organizations over the problem of air pollution control. The frequency of these confrontations seems to have helped Los Angeles expedite the formation of control policies against smog. In short, these characteristics of the political process of this region provide a major backdrop helping to explain the county's present anti-pollution program.

Osaka

Demography

The area administered by the Prefecture of Osaka, located 300 miles south of Tokyo, is the oldest region in Japan. Its history could be dated as far back as 400 A.D. Since that time, Osaka has been the center of the nation more than a dozen times before the Meiji Restoration of 1868 permanently shifted the capital to Tokyo. Although

the area is rich in history, it is at the same time the smallest in land area among Japanese prefectures. It encompasses a little over 600 square miles, which is approximately one eighth of the land area of Los Angeles County.²⁸

However small, Osaka is on even par with Los Angeles as far as population is concerned. In the census data of 1971, it numbered 7.8 million, which made Osaka the second largest region in Japan. From a historical standpoint, this area had about 1.5 million people at the beginning of this century. The population steadily grew to a level of 4.7 million by 1940. But the war drastically reduced this figure to the total of 2.8 million in 1945. In a few years, however, Osaka regained an upward trend again and kept growing. In 1957, its population

²⁸ A concise history of Osaka can be found in Atsushi Fujimoto, Osaka-Fu no Rekishi (The History of Osaka Prefecture) (2 vols.; Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppan, 1971). For statistical data of Osaka, see Osaka-Fu Kikaku-Bu Tōkei-Ka (Prefecture of Osaka, Department of Planning, Section of Data Collection), Tōkei Ōsaka 72 (Statistical Data of Osaka for 1972) (Osaka: Kikaku-Bu, 1972).

extended the peak of pre-war days, and has been increasing at an annual rate of 200,000 people.²⁹

This rapid population growth of Osaka is attributed to the in-migration of workers from rural sectors of the country. Most of these workers come from the areas west of Osaka, i.e., Sanin, Chūgoku, Shikoku, and Kyūshū districts. They have contributed immensely to the development of those sections peripheral to the city of Osaka. In the last few years, the rate of population increase in these areas has been much faster than that of Osaka City.³⁰

The people of Osaka, and for that matter the Japanese generally, are a highly homogeneous race to the extent that their ethnocentrism often becomes marked. Although they are proud of being Japanese and have pride in their racial purity, there are two minority groups,

²⁹ Osaka-Fu Kikaku-Bu Tōkei-Ka, Ōsaka Fusei Yōran (A Guidebook of Osaka Prefecture) (Ōsaka: Kikaku-Bu, 1971), pp. 28-29.

³⁰ Osaka-Fu Nenkan (A Yearbook of Osaka Prefecture) (Ōsaka: Shin Ōsaka Shinbun, 1972), p. 92.

both of which have been overtly and covertly discriminated against for years. One is the Koreans. In 1970, they numbered as many as 600,000, two thirds of whom were living in the Osaka area.³¹ Although they were born and lived in Japan, they are legally discriminated against and denied equal protection under the law. As a consequence, the Koreans found it difficult to get decent jobs and enough financial means regardless of their adequate education and other vocational training.

The other minority is a socially discriminated group known as Eta, whose highest concentration in Japan is in Osaka. They are Japanese by racial extraction, but there has been no fully convincing explanation as to their being referred to as Eta. One theory is that their ancestors were prisoners or slaves at one point in the ancient history of Japan. Prior to the end of World War II, the Eta group was classified and registered as such. But the post-war constitution eliminated this practice and guaranteed equal rights to all. Therefore, no Eta

³¹Asahi Nenkan (Asahi Almanac) (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun Sha, 1972), p. 227.

should exist in present-day Japan, for there are no public records on this group. Yet, in practice, the Eta Japanese are still to a large extent victims of social injustice. At time of marriage, in seeking employment, and in other social circumstances, these people are identified and discriminated against.³²

As to commercial talent, the people of Osaka are so skillful that they are often ridiculed or despised. One obvious example showing their business-consciousness is their form of greeting. Instead of asking, "How are you?" the people of Osaka say, "Are you making money?" People from other regions are often taken by surprise to hear such phrases uttered so nonchalantly.

The business-oriented social ethos of Osaka is well reflected in its economic history. Osaka was the center of Japanese monetary exchange during three hundred

³²This observation is from this writer's experience living in Osaka. An approximate number of the Eta Japanese is believed to be somewhere around 500,000. For a pioneering study on this social minority group, see George De Vos and Hiroshi Wagatsuma, eds., Japan's Invisible Race (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966).

years of the Tokugawa Era. Also in the Meiji period, a major portion of textiles was produced in Osaka, a prime source of Japanese exports until the end of World War II.³³

In the post-war years, Osaka did not take any new approach to invigorate its war-torn economy. Instead it depended on traditionally strong retail and wholesale businesses, and the area became known as the nucleus of Japan's small and medium sized industry. However, Osaka soon realized that its economic status was slipping by and being overpowered by Tokyo. When this trend became evident, the government, with the help of major corporations, decided to overhaul the entire economic outlook of Osaka. As we will see later, this undertaking succeeded and helped the region regain its status as one of the most important industrial sites of Japan.

Political Structure

The political structure that administers Osaka is the prefectural government, under which are a number of

³³Takeo Kimura, Osaka no Rekishi (The History of Osaka) (Osaka: Osaka Fushi Henshu Shiryō Shitsu, 1970), pp. 55-101.

incorporated subunits. At present, 31 cities and 12 towns are in its jurisdiction. The city of Osaka, which is located in the center of the prefecture, enjoys a unique position. Classified as a special city, on many occasions, it is treated as an equal to the prefectural government.³⁴

The head of the prefectural government is the governor. In pre-war days, this was an appointive office of the national authority. The governor's major function, at that time, was to implement the policies of the central government as faithfully as possible. This was drastically altered when Japan lost the war. In 1947, the governorship became a partisan elective office for a four-year term, and, accordingly, changed his job to representing the public will, and protecting and promoting the general welfare of local residents. Until 1971, all governors of Osaka had been members of the Conservative Party. But the election of that year brought for the

³⁴Osaka-Fu Kikaku-Bu Tōkei-Ka, Tōkei Ōsaka 72, pp. 24-25. See also Kimitaka Kuze, Chihō Jichi Hō (Legal Statutes of Local Administration) (Tokyo: Gakuyō Shobo, 1971), pp. 22-23.

first time a Socialist governor to this prefectural office.³⁵

The governor of Osaka is supported by three assistant governors and the chief controller, all of whom are appointed by the governor. They make up the executive body under which the prefecture operates two special offices and nine departments. These departments range from planning to construction and are further subdivided to more than fifty sections. In 1971 public workers responsible for these operations totaled 137,500.³⁶

From a purely legal point of view, the governor and his administration are assigned a number of important responsibilities. These can be classified into three categories. First is a service function. The prefecture operates hospitals, clinics, libraries, schools, etc. In providing these services, the government actively tries to promote the general welfare of the residents. Second

³⁵ Osaka-Fu Nenkan, p. 98, and Kuze, Chihō Jichi Hō, pp. 166-174.

³⁶ Osaka-Fu Nenkan, p. 98.

is a protective function. The prefecture carries out several projects such as fire and flood control for the maintenance of the security of the people. Third is a representative function. The Osaka prefecture substitutes for the national government as the administrator of certain programs. Funded by Tokyo, it administers a project for the unemployed and the payrolls of public school teachers.³⁷

Except for the last, the prefectural administration must work with its assembly to perform these functions. The legislature of this polity is a unicameral partisan body. At present, it has a total of 110 members who are elected from 54 election districts. Of these, 38 are Liberal Democrats, 23 are Socialists, 17 are Democratic Socialists, 14 are Communists, and 11 are members of the Komeito Party. The social background of these legislators shows that more than half of them are executives of corporations. This quite different from those in the United States, where a majority of lawmakers are in the

³⁷ Kuze, Chihō Jichi Hō, pp. 45-46.

legal profession. The preponderance of businessmen in the prefectural assembly is probably indicative of the extent of commercial and corporative influence on politics in Japan.³⁸

The political structure of the subunits of the prefectural government, including the city of Osaka, exhibits a great deal of conformity to the structure of the prefecture. They all have the partisan office of mayor. He heads the city administration which is staffed by personnel chosen from competitive civic service examination. Confronting this executive branch of government is the partisan legislative body, whose members are popularly elected from a number of multi-membership and medium-sized constituencies.³⁹

Even though the municipalities are structurally similar to the prefectural government, their functions are somewhat different. In fact, these functions are

³⁸ Osaka-Fu Nenkan, p. 95. See also Osaka-Shi Senkyo Kanri Iinkai (City of Osaka, Committee on Election Audits), Toitsu Chihō Senkyō (General Local Elections) (Osaka: Senkyō Kanri Iinkai, 1971), p. 157.

³⁹ Kuze, Chihō Jichi Hō, p. 45.

more specific and closer to the daily lives of the citizens than those of the prefecture. In addition to a general service function, the cities of Osaka are in charge of social welfare, assistance for needy children as well as family registrations and records.⁴⁰

In short, from a structural perspective, the local governments of Osaka are decentralized. The prefectural entity is concerned with area-wide issues, while the municipalities are responsible for immediate problems in their respective regions. In both instances, the administration of these affairs is the result of cooperation between the local executive and legislative bodies, working independently of the national government.

Political Process

In sharp contrast to the formulation of structural decentralization, the policy process of Osaka is highly centralized because it is controlled and dictated by the central government. By means of a number of effective devices, Tokyo keeps a tight grip and makes all entities

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 24.

in Osaka subservient and subordinate to its will.

This development is deeply rooted in the history of local government, especially since the end of World War II. Upon termination of the conflict, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers undertook significant steps to "democratize" Japan. In the field of local government, many officials were purged from public posts. The Home Ministry was dissolved along with the highly centralized local political structure. The occupation forces set forth an elaborate plan to foster decentralization with a genuine hope to bring local politics close to the people.⁴¹

As a part of such a scheme, the Allied officials invited Dr. Carl Shoup to Japan in 1949, who had dual purposes in his sojourn. On the one hand, he was commissioned to examine the old local system and to find as many shortcomings as possible. On the other hand, he was authorized to contrive an entirely new local government which would meet the original intention of the Allied

⁴¹Kurt Steiner, Local Government in Japan (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1965), pp. 69-113.

Powers. After months of study, Dr. Shoup brought before them three fundamental policies that they should seek. First, he recommended a clear functional division of each level of government. Second, he called for the financial independence of local entities, and he considered this to be sine qua non for decentralization. Third, he noted a need to emphasize municipalities much more than prefectural governments.⁴²

However, Shoup's report, once it was turned over to the Japanese officials, met with strong resistance. Traditionally, the top administrators in the central government held a strong mistrust of and contempt for local officials. In their opinion, local legislative bodies were full of amateurs who were interested only in their political careers. Also, according to the officials in Tokyo, local administrators were incompetent especially because they were inferior in both education and talent.

⁴²Jiro Tanaka, "Chihō Jichi Nijyū Nen" (Twenty Years of Local Autonomy), in Chihō Jichi Nijyū Nen (Twenty Years of Local Autonomy), ed. by Jiro Tanaka, Shizuo Tawara, and Ryūnosuke Hara (Tokyo: Hyōron Sha, 1970), pp. 24-25.

And most important of all, these top bureaucrats could not believe that the popularly elected heads of local government were able to promote the general welfare of their respective constituencies. These basic reasons motivated the Japanese government to argue strongly against Shoup's recommendations.⁴³

Despite such strong opposition, however, the Japanese officials had to give in to American pressure, at least temporarily and in the first round of the confrontation. Since they were still under the control of the occupation forces, they could not expect any other result. The government, thus, reluctantly put Shoup's plan into practice and initiated a structural reform of local governments. But while such an innovation was underway, there was another significant development which brought a death blow to Shoup's recommendation, and at the same time enhanced the traditional position of the

⁴³ Tanaka, "Chihō Jichi," pp. 20-21. See also Atsushi Sato, Gendai no Chihō Seiji (Contemporary Local Government of Japan) (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōron Sha, 1972), p. 56, and Tetsuya Okita, Chihō Jichi Yōran (Elements of Local Government) (Tokyo: Hyōron Sha, 1971), pp. 249-252.

Japanese bureaucrats.⁴⁴

This was the gradual expansion of communist influence in China and Korea. As the threat of communism loomed large in the Asian continent, American officials began to wonder about the wisdom of their past policies in Japan. In the light of what appeared to be coming, a sudden decision was made to change their top priority. In lieu of democratizing, the officials from the United States wanted to re-make Japan as the last bastion against the spread of communism.⁴⁵

Such a "reverse course" had an immediate repercussion on the local government reforms. Although some of them had already been implemented, a large portion of the innovations was either called off or postponed indefinitely. Consequently, this historical accident has caused the local political system in post-war Japan to become extremely unbalanced.

From a structural standpoint, the political process is decentralized. As noted, each local entity is

⁴⁴Tanaka, "Chihō Jichi," pp. 26-27.

⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 26-27.

assigned specific functions and responsibilities. But the national government has reserved important powers by which to entrench its primary position in local affairs. One of the most crucial among these powers is that of financial control. Even when various local governments can carry out policies irrespective of Tokyo, they do not have the economic means to execute them. Without substantial independent tax bases, they must turn to grants and subsidies from the central administration.⁴⁶

According to a study by Kurt Steiner, "the national treasury collects about 70 percent of the total tax revenue, and the local governments on both levels collect together about 30 percent." But he finds that the national treasury spends only 34 per cent of that total, "while the local entities are the ultimate spenders of 66 percent."⁴⁷ Such financial dependency makes the local governments extremely vulnerable to the central authority of Japan.

⁴⁶Steiner, Local Government in Japan, pp. 294-299. See also Okita, Chiho Jichi, pp. 258-259.

⁴⁷Steiner, Local Government in Japan, p. 292.

Another means by which Tokyo dominates local government is its control over local personnel. The central government can appoint its officials to important posts in the local administrations. These national appointees see to it that the opinion of Tokyo is faithfully reflected in local policies. Although the number and the type of appointments are restricted by law to certain local offices, the scope of such a national penetration has been increasing at a rapid rate. One plausible reason for this is that local entities tend to welcome such national representatives. In the eyes of local governments, they will work as a transmission belt and secure more national grants and subsidies for their respective regions than before. According to the study by Tetsuya Okita, 606 top officials in Tokyo were appointed to local polities in 1964. Of these, 30 percent came down to the governments of Osaka.⁴⁸

Under these conditions, the political process of this region has little significance. It is essentially centered around not Osaka but its subordinate relationship

⁴⁸Okita, Chihō Jichi, p. 255.

with the national government. All local policy processes, for all intents and purposes, must be geared toward such a relationship. Without this fundamental orientation, the governments of Osaka cannot raise enough financial resources to perform their political functions.

Such a centralization, moreover, tends to discourage the political activity of local elective officials and civic-oriented interest groups. The assemblymen in Osaka, for instance, knowing fully well how insignificant their decision-making power is, often become less concerned with area-wide issues than with their immediate political future. Although they participate in those activities which will assure their victories in the next election, they frequently appear ignorant of such important problems as air pollution and urban renewal. For these local politicians in Osaka, these area-wide issues, however vital, are beyond their means and political power.⁴⁹

⁴⁹Local politicians in Japan are frequently criticized as being too concerned with trivial issues at the expense of the general welfare. See, e.g., Asahi Jānaru Henshu Bu, ed., Machi no Seiji Mura no Seiji (Politics in Towns and Politics in Villages) (Tokyo: Kensō Shobo, 1965).

Also, centralization seems to impede the growth of locally initiated and locally based civic action groups. Even if they are formed and involved in the policy process, these organizations must come to terms with the political reality of Japan. The members of action groups sooner or later find out that the local polities of Osaka are devoid of power and money and unable to heed their demands. Not only does this have a great effect on the perception of political efficacy on the part of the residents of this area, but it also accounts for the lack of issue-oriented and area-wide civic action organizations in Osaka.⁵⁰

Conclusion

From the present analysis, we have learned that a number of important differences exists between Los Angeles and Osaka. Among other things, the most conspicuous seems to be the dissimilarity in the political

⁵⁰The lack of development of associational groups in Japanese society can also be explained as a cultural problem. With respect to this point, see Chie Nakane, Japanese Society (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970).

process of these regions. In Los Angeles, the policy process is congenial to locally centered decision-making. It is also conducive to interest group activities. And finally, it makes all elective officials attentive to area-wide issues.

By contrast, the political process of Osaka is extremely centralized. The penetration and involvement of the national government in the affairs of Osaka are substantial. Such a pattern in the policy process tends to produce results diametrically opposed to those of Los Angeles. It militates against the growth of civic oriented groups. It also produces local politicians who are indifferent to area-wide political problems.

In subsequent chapters, we will explore to what extent these differences bear upon air pollution control in Los Angeles and Osaka. Essentially, the principal question relates to how the different styles of interest group activities and decision-making have affected the development of anti-smog programs in these metropolitan regions.

Before we begin to discuss the political aspects of air pollution, it seems imperative to understand the

basic nature of air pollution especially from a scientific point of view. We turn to the next chapter, then, as a preliminary investigation into the causes and effects of smog, particularly in terms of Los Angeles and Osaka.

CHAPTER III

AIR POLLUTION IN LOS ANGELES AND OSAKA:

A PRELIMINARY STUDY OF ITS

CAUSES AND EFFECTS

The causative agents of air pollution vary according to the region's particular geographic and demographic characteristics. However, the sources of air pollution in large metropolitan areas, such as Los Angeles or Osaka, reveal a pattern of pollution reflected in urbanization and industrial expansion. This chapter examines the causes and effects of pollution and the degrees of air pollution that exist in Los Angeles and Osaka.

Definition

The atmosphere that sustains man's life is primarily composed of nitrogen, oxygen, argon, and carbon dioxide. Nitrogen is derived from the decay of vegetation. Oxygen, which is indispensable for human survival, is produced by plant respiration. Carbon dioxide is

generated by man's metabolism. In addition, a large quantity of water vapor is also contained in the atmosphere. Together these gases account for 99 percent of what man breathes.¹

Aside from these massive gaseous substances, air includes numerous other toxicants such as sulfur dioxide, hydrogen sulfide, carbon monoxide, and methane. These toxic gases existed long before man appeared on this planet. Volcanic eruptions and forest fires produced and discharged sulfur dioxide and carbon monoxide into the air. They also contributed to the distribution and suspension of fly ash and fumes.²

As these examples indicate, air pollution is not a modern phenomenon. Air has never been free from contamination, and some degree of pollution has always been present. Yet, the wastes discharged by volcanoes and

¹"A Study of Pollution--Air: A Staff Report to the Committee on Public Works, United States Senate, September 1963," in The Economics of Air Pollution, ed. by Harold Wolozin (New York: W. W. Norton, 1966), p. 193; see also Louis J. Batton, The Unclean Sky (New York: Doubleday, 1966), pp. 55-58.

²Batton, Unclean Sky, pp. 55-58.

fires do not necessarily become a problem because there is an intricate self-cleaning system in man's environment which constantly purifies the air. The contaminants, for instance, are dispersed by winds and washed out by rain; or they are transformed to a less harmful substance and grounded on the earth.

Such a cleaning mechanism is most remarkably demonstrated in the relationship between man and plant. Man inhales 35 pounds of oxygen every day and exhales a large quantity of carbon dioxide, while plants respire oxygen and intake carbon dioxide for their photosynthetic process. As long as this interdependence is not disrupted by an external force, the volumes of oxygen required for man and carbon dioxide for plant are about equal and constant.³

However, industrialization and urbanization have gradually come to undermine such a stable relationship.

³ Robert U. Ayres, "Air Pollution in Cities," in Politics and Environment, ed. by Walt Anderson (Pacific Palisades, Calif.: Goodyear, 1970), p. 79; see also Air Conservation Commission, Air Conservation (Washington, D.C.: American Association for Advancement of Sciences, 1965), pp. 35-36.

Not only have they thwarted the natural balance, but also they have begun to deteriorate the human environment.

From an ecological point of view, one of the major problems inextricable from industrialization and urbanization is that they tend to intensify the energy conversion of various fuels. Industries need coal and oil, while motor vehicles require gasoline. They must convert these fuels to secure energy for their operations.⁴

Such different types of fuel combustion take a large volume of oxygen and, at the same time, emit massive amounts of wastes. It is estimated that "industrialization has multiplied the natural rate of oxygen consumption and (carbon dioxide) production by factors 10 and 7-1/2 respectively in North America."⁵ Under these circumstances, the self-cleaning system fails to function. The pollutants are overwhelming and accumulate faster than the natural mechanism takes effect. The result is the deterioration of the environment to the extent that air

⁴"A Study of Pollution--Air," p. 199.

⁵Ayres, "Air Pollution in Cities," p. 79.

pollution causes damages not only to humans but also to other living organisms.⁶

In both Los Angeles and Osaka, industrialization and urbanization are intrinsically related to their smog problems. As will be examined later, Los Angeles has many unique geographical and meteorological conditions conducive to air pollution. Yet, they had not become a serious problem until the mid-forties when the war effort against Japan resulted in a phenomenal rise in population and industry. The more the region became congested and developed, the greater the probability of polluted air. Such a trend rapidly increased and finally, in 1943, it came to the attention of the people in Los Angeles. In September of that year, the Los Angeles Times, for the first time, noted the smog problem and reported that several thousand residents suffered from eye irritation. This was the beginning of the long history of struggle against smog in Southern California.⁷

⁶Ibid., p. 79.

⁷Lewis Herber, Crisis in Our Cities (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 48-51.

Osaka faced a similar problem of air pollution after recovering from the ruins left at the end of World War II. From the mid-fifties, Osaka gradually began to change its economic outlook, and was transformed from the center of Japan's commercial activities to the important region for her heavy industries. Such a process was accelerated particularly after 1958. In that year, Osaka decided to reclaim its coast line for industrial sites. This was one of the most gigantic projects in the recent history of Japan, costing more than 750 billion yen.⁸

The first stage of the program was completed in 1960, and the newly reclaimed land was immediately sold to various industries. They included electric power plants, iron and steel manufacturers, chemical industries, etc. The success of the original step compelled Osaka to expand the project and to invite large petroleum industries to open industrial complexes there. Upon completion of the entire project, Osaka would expect to have 2,291

⁸ Sakai Takaishi kara Kōgai o Nakusu Shimin no Kai (Association of the People of Sakai and Takaishi Against Pollution) (hereafter cited, Sakai Takaishi), Sakai Senboku no Kōgai (Pollution in Sakai and Senboku (Sakai, Ōsaka: Sakai kara Kōgai o Nakusu Shimin no Kai, 1971), pp. 114-134.

hectares of the reclaimed land. As of the end of 1972, two thirds had been completed; and more than 120 different corporations are now in operation.⁹

It would have been inconceivable for such a massive transformation to have not affected the environment of Osaka. Indeed the program of expansion and industrialization of this land area caused several serious detrimental effects, especially in the area adjacent to the industrial sites. The impact of these effects will be elaborated in a later section.

Causes

What, then, are the specific contributing factors of air pollution? There are at least two principal origins. First, imperfect combustion, and second, the meteorological condition.

. . . [the] occurrence of air pollution is dependent upon the simultaneous occurrence of a number of conditions, the effects of which are compounded by their coexistence. . . . If factors in either category are such as to discourage the accumulation of air contaminants, there is no problem, but when factors in both categories simultaneously enhance the accumulation of

⁹Ibid., pp. 114-134.

air contaminants, the probability of adverse effects due to air pollution increases--definitely to a disagreeable and perhaps even to a potentially dangerous degree.¹⁰

As has been noted, man must convert materials to energy in the form of combustion. Under conditions of perfect burning, the hydrogen and carbon in fuel which are joined by oxygen in the air produce heat, light, carbon dioxide, and water vapor. Impurities in the fuel and/or imbalances in the ratio of oxygen and heat temperatures, however, cause imperfect combustion and discharge several unwanted particles.¹¹

The problem is that perfect burning is only theoretically plausible. Given the present mechanism of combustion, the burning of fuels always results in the imperfect combustion of the fuel. The two salient sources of imperfect burning are stationary and moving sources. First, the stationary sources which include coal and oil

¹⁰City of Los Angeles, Department of City Planning, Comprehensive Planning Section, Health Effects of Air Pollution, by Alice D. Lepis, Staff Paper (Los Angeles: Department of City Planning, 1971), p. 3.

¹¹League of Women Voters of U.S., "A Congregation of Vapors," Facts and Issues, No. 393 (September 1970), p. 1.

burnings in industry and electric power generation utilize fossil fuels and exhaust vast amounts of sulfur and nitrogen. In addition, the fossil fuels are accountable for the increase of particulates in the air. They are contained in smoke and include carbon, soot, fly ash, and oil/grease. The concentration of these substances in the atmosphere has often produced gray cities, because their skies are enveloped by gray-colored clouds almost the year around.¹²

Osaka is one of the best examples of a gray city. Various industries, notably electric power plants, have been using a large volume of coal, oil, and coke. In 1967, for instance, they consumed the total of 1.3 billion gallons of oil, 2.6 million tons of coal, and 1.8 million tons of cokes for energy generation. In 1970, both oil and coke consumption were further increased to 2 billion gallons and 2.5 million tons, respectively,

¹²R. Stephen Berry, "The Chemistry and Cost of Contamination: Perspectives on Polluted Air--1970," in Politics of Neglect, ed. by Roy Meek and John A. Straayer (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), p. 88.

even though coal has slightly dropped to 1 million tons.¹³ From these figures, it is obvious that the combustion of different fuels of such a magnitude would have a devastating effect on the atmosphere of Osaka. According to the report made by the Bureau of Environment in December 1971, it was the most polluted region in Japan. It had the highest concentration of both sulfur compounds and particulates.¹⁴

Another source of imperfect burning comes from moving sources such as automobiles, trucks, and airplanes. Contrary to the stationary sources, however, they tend to create many brown cities whose skies are smeared by gaseous substances from motor vehicles and tinted with a brownish color.¹⁵ The major cause for such an effect is identified as spark-ignited internal combustion engines. They are notoriously inefficient and their combustion is

¹³Osaka-Fu Seikatsu Kankyō-Bu Kōgai Shitsu (Prefecture of Osaka, Department of Environment, Office of Pollution Control), Kōgai Hakusho (White Paper on Pollution) (Osaka: Seikatsu Kankyō-Bu, 1971), p. 18.

¹⁴Asahi Shinbun (Asahi Newspaper), December 25, 1971, p. 9.

¹⁵Berry, "Chemistry and Cost of Contamination," P. 88.

usually far from perfect. Ten billion gallons of gasoline which account for 15 percent of all gasoline sold in the United States simply evaporate without generating any power. Even if they were used, the engines would still generate pollutants.¹⁶

Los Angeles represents the best case of pollution from moving sources. The 4.2 million registered cars consume 8.7 million gallons of gasoline and exhaust 2,500 tons of hydrocarbons and 9,100 tons of carbon monoxide daily. Aside from these toxic gases, these motor vehicles are also responsible for a high accumulation of nitrogen and particulates in Southern California. It is no wonder that the Los Angeles basin has long been regarded as the center of the smog problem of the world.¹⁷

From the above description, it is apparent that the air pollution of Los Angeles is slightly different

¹⁶ Edward Edelson, The Battle for Clean Air (New York: Public Affairs Pamphlet, 1967), p. 4.

¹⁷ County of Los Angeles, Air Pollution Control District (APCD), Profile of Air Pollution Control (Los Angeles: APCD, 1971), p. 3.

from that of Osaka. The problem in Southern California stems from the moving sources and the brown city effect, whereas Osaka's problem comes from the stationary sources and the gray city effect. Although they differ in these respects, they are similar in geographical and meteorological conditions, both of which are another prime cause of air pollution.

Both regions are in a flat basin surrounded by mountains. They are, therefore, badly ventilated. In Los Angeles winds usually blow eastward from the Pacific Ocean, but they tend to stall when they hit the mountains. Once this happens, the warm air close to the ground can not rise above the stagnant layer of clouds. This phenomenon is generally referred to as temperature inversion and is quite frequent in Southern California.¹⁸ Osaka has a similar climatic condition conducive to temperature inversion, especially in late autumn and winter. During these times of the year, it is often covered by both high

¹⁸ Marris Neiburger and James G. Edinger, Summary Report on Meteorology of the Los Angeles Basin with Particular Respect to the 'Smog' Problem (Los Angeles: Southern California Air Pollution Foundation, 1954), pp. 3-7.

pressure and tropical low pressure air which acts as a lid and prevents vertical wind movements.¹⁹

Before elaborating on the effects of the smog problem, it seems necessary to emphasize again that the primary causes of air pollution are stationary and moving sources. In addition, the degree of the smog problem depends on the existence of contributing factors, i.e., the geographical and meteorological conditions. One of the major reasons why the conditions of Los Angeles and Osaka are worse than those of other areas is that both regions have a high degree of both cases. They have a large number of industries and motor vehicles whose contaminants often remain in their atmosphere due to the unique environments in these regions.

Effects

The effects of air pollution on the residents of Los Angeles and Osaka are numerous. These are, first of all, the adverse health effects. In the case of Osaka, the problems are mainly associated with sulfur compounds

¹⁹Osaku-Fu Seikatsu Kankyō-Bu, Kōgai Hakusho, pp. 6-7.

emitted by various industries. When inhaled, these chemicals dissolve in body fluids and deteriorate lung tissues. Thus, even a healthy individual, if he is exposed to such a condition for an extended period of time, may develop such particularly fatal illnesses as asthma, bronchitis and emphysema. According to the report compiled by the Prefecture of Osaka, air pollution was responsible for 450 cases of chronic bronchitis, 1,119 cases of asthma, and 17 cases of emphysema in 1971 alone. The same report also disclosed that, of these numbers of patients, those who were under twelve and over forty years of age suffered much more than any other age group.²⁰

Contrary to Osaka, a high concentration of oxidant is a major cause of the health problem in the Los Angeles air pollution. Oxidant includes certain types of oxygen-bearing substances, of which ozone is perhaps the best known. Under normal conditions this gas is produced at a high altitude and causes little damage. As a matter of fact, it screens out ultra-violet rays from the sun,

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 248-249.

and prevents humans from being burned to death. However, in Los Angeles, there are many environmental factors conducive to the formation of oxidant at a low altitude. They are (1) a large number of motor vehicles and their wastes of nitrogen dioxides and hydrocarbons, and (2) the warm and sunny weather characteristic of Southern California.

In other words, on a sunny day, nitrogen dioxides with a help of hydrocarbons undergo a series of chemical reactions. Nitrogen dioxide (NO_2) is broken up to NO and O . But, since the oxygen so separated is unstable, it will immediately join with O_2 in the atmosphere and form ozone (O_3). When this happens, on a large scale and with high intensity, oxidant produces many detrimental effects on human health. For instance, it causes coughing, choking, headache, and severe fatigue in addition to the long term effect of lung cancer.²¹

This phenomenon is generally known as "photo-chemical smog" and, more often than not, is regarded as

²¹ Thomas Aylesworth, This Vital Air This Vital Water: Man's Environmental Crisis (New York: Rand McNally, 1968), pp. 50-67.

a serious problem peculiar to the Los Angeles basin. In recent years, however, Osaka has also begun to feel the effects caused by the same type of smog problem. Between August and September of 1971, Osaka was attacked by "photochemical smog" more than a dozen times. Because of a sharp rise of oxidant concentration, more than one thousand people were affected and suffered from partial paralysis.²²

Another type of damage resulting from air pollution is economic loss. Smoke and other particles disposed from both stationary and the moving sources have reduced visibility in almost all urban areas. In Los Angeles, this has a special economic implication. The region, known for its beautiful weather and scenery, attracts many tourists and business. However, "the City of Angels" and its surrounding area is now saturated by automobiles and covered by smog. The residents, who moved to the region primarily for its beauty, want to move out of the city. Tourists, knowing that they would not be able to enjoy the healthful urban environment,

²²Asahi Shinbun, November 14, 1971, p. 8.

also try to avoid Los Angeles. As a result, the city, once the thriving center of business, is now experiencing serious setbacks and witnessing its tourist and climatic attractions being undermined by smog.²³

In addition, air pollution produces many other minor financial disadvantages. Sulfur dioxide, which is very prevalent in Osaka, deteriorates iron and steel products two to four times faster in polluted than in nonpolluted areas.²⁴ This chemical also discolors buildings and damages their structures. Dust and soot degrade textiles and increase cleaning bills. Ozone inflicts rubber and nylon materials such as tires and electric insulation and causes incalculable amounts of financial loss.²⁵

²³Southern California Research Council, The New Shape of Southern California: 1985, Report No. 18 (Los Angeles: Southern California Research Council, 1970), pp. 33-53. See also Los Angeles Times, August 1, 1971, Pt. 1, p. 1, and August 23, 1972, Pt. 2, pp. 1 and 4.

²⁴Air Conservation Commission, Air Conservation, pp. 61-65.

²⁵Needed: Clean Air (Greenfield, Mass.: Channing L. Bete Co., Inc., n.d.), p. 6.

Finally, scientists have come to notice several detriments of polluted air on botanical plants. Sulfur and nitrogen gases penetrate plant systems and may cause retardation of growth. In both Osaka and Los Angeles, trees close to freeways and busy intersections have died or are dying because of the emission of toxic substances from automobiles. Agricultural products in these areas are also victims of air pollution. In Los Angeles, for instance, the avocado plants are dwarfed by a mixture of ozone and gasoline vapor.²⁶

In short, in examining air pollution in terms of causes and effects, two significant facts have been disclosed. On the one hand, we have seen that the nature of air pollution in Los Angeles is different from that of Osaka. As far as Los Angeles is concerned, it is produced by moving sources. On the contrary, stationary sources are responsible for most of the smog in Osaka. However, it must be noted that as the moving sources of smog increase, the air contamination of Osaka becomes more complex. The experience of Southern California, for

²⁶Edelson, Battle for Clean Air, p. 4.

instance, has already shown that the control of pollution primarily from stationary sources has given rise to a condition in which smog from other sources is moving eastward causing more damage to the neighboring areas than to Los Angeles itself. This is in part because the effects of emission control devices on automobiles have altered the chemical composition of Los Angeles smog, making it more susceptible to movement by prevailing winds.²⁷

On the other hand, this study has indicated that both Los Angeles and Osaka have been witnessing similar detrimental outcomes of air pollution. They both suffer from adverse health effects, economic losses, and other unaccountable results. One of the most important phenomena to be remembered is that the outcome has been similar in the two regions, in spite of the fundamental differences in the nature of their air pollution.

²⁷ Los Angeles Times, January 6, 1972, Pt. 2, pp. 1, 2, 8, 9, and 10.

CHAPTER IV

AIR POLLUTION CONTROL--PAST EFFORTS IN LOS ANGELES AND OSAKA

The major thrust of this chapter is to examine the history and the effectiveness of various pollution control measures which have been implemented by Los Angeles and Osaka. Three types of information are relevant in order to understand the past measures taken by these different metropolitan regions. First, this chapter will investigate the legislative attempts to regulate the sources of pollution by establishing emission standards and other legal constraints. Second, a structural analysis of the administrative level of government will illuminate the capacities of the executive branch to carry out its policy. Finally, the actual impact of pollution regulations will be evaluated by contrasting the administrative action with the actual legislative policy.

Los Angeles

In Los Angeles, the first smog control policy was established in 1943 when the County of Los Angeles set up a Smoke and Fume Commission to study the nature and the extent of the problem in Southern California. In March of the following year, this Commission submitted a report to the Board of Supervisors of the County of Los Angeles. The report recommended an establishment of an independent office of air pollution control. This report, partly because of public pressure, was well received by the Board and became instrumental in the issuance of two important ordinances. First was Ordinance 4460 adopted on February 20, 1945, which created a Director of Air Pollution Control. Second was Ordinance 4547 which made it a misdemeanor for anyone to discharge smoke, soot, or dust over a prescribed amount.¹

¹U.S., Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Air Pollution Control: Field Operations Manual, ed. by Melvin I. Weisburd, PHS Publication No. 937 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 60; see also County of Los Angeles, Office of Air Pollution Control, Annual Report of Air Pollution Control: 1945-46 (Los Angeles: Office of Air Pollution Control, 1946), pp. 13.

Even though these two county ordinances constituted a landmark in legislation, they contained a serious defect. They could be applied only to unincorporated areas. As far as incorporated cities were concerned, they either had their own programs as did the city of Los Angeles, or they tended to discount the smog problem. However, in the eyes of county officials, since air pollution would not respect artificial political boundaries, its control ought to be as comprehensive as possible and at least cover the entire region of the County of Los Angeles.

Because of such a conviction, county officials tried to persuade the incorporated city governments to adopt the same ordinances as those of the county. In order to encourage such legislation, the Board of Supervisors even promised to underwrite any cost derived from the ordinance adoptions. Unfortunately, it failed to facilitate prompt action on the part of the incorporated cities. This left only one alternative for the county government to follow: that is, state action.²

²County of Los Angeles, Office of Air Pollution Control, Annual Report of the Office of Air Pollution

The county council's office headed by Harold Kennedy drafted air pollution control legislation for the purpose of providing a county-wide single control agency with police power. In 1947, this bill was presented to the California legislature as Assembly Bill 1 by the representatives from Los Angeles, but it met strong opposition especially from railroads and petroleum industries. They both feared that the state air pollution control program might deter their business operations. Once this became known to the public through the Los Angeles Times, however, the industries withdrew their opposition and supported the measure. This expedited the passage of the bill which was approved by the Senate and finally signed into law by Governor Earl Warren on June 10, 1947.³

Control: 1946-47 (Los Angeles: Office of Air Pollution Control, 1947), p. 1.

³County of Los Angeles, Board of Supervisors, The History, Legal and Administrative Aspects of Air Pollution Control in the County of Los Angeles, by Harold W. Kennedy (Los Angeles: County Board of Supervisors, 1954), pp. 1-17.

The California Air Pollution Control Act of 1947 contained two basic objectives. First, it sought to establish air pollution control districts in various counties of California. Yet, since the problem was different in each county, the Act provided that it would be up to the County Supervisors to decide whether or not their respective area needed such special districts. The second objective in the California Air Pollution Control Act was to abate smog primarily from the stationary sources. This was incorporated in the Health and Safety Code and made explicit in the control program of different counties.⁴

As far as the first objective was concerned, the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles held a series of public hearings as prescribed by the Act and on October 14, 1947 determined to establish the Air Pollution Control District (APCD). Upon reaching this decision, the Board named Dr. Louis C. McCabae of the Bureau of Mines as the first Officer of the District. He directed the initial thirteen members of the APCD to carry out ground

⁴Ibid., pp. 19-20.

work, and they were ready for operation by February 1, 1948.⁵

The basic structure of the APCD formed in that year has changed little since then. It is under the authority of the County Board of Supervisors. They serve as ex-officio members of the highest decision-making body in forming policy for the Air Pollution Control Board. The task of daily operations, however, is in the hands of three members of the executive staff of the APCD. They include the Chief Control Officer, the Chief Deputy Control Officer, and the Deputy Control Officer.⁶

Under this body, the APCD is divided into six divisions, each of which is assigned a specific function. The Enforcement Division is one of the most important, for it is in charge of detecting, investigating, and prosecuting any violations of APCD rules and regulations.

⁵County of Los Angeles, APCD, Annual Report: 1947-1948 (Los Angeles: APCD, 1948), pp. 1-2.

⁶Nancy Connick, et al., Smog: Apradox (Los Angeles: Program in Public Policy Studies of the Claremont Colleges, 1971), p. 86.

The Enforcement personnel also prepare documents and data and appear as witnesses if court actions are involved.⁷

The Engineering Division is responsible for three fields. First, it conducts various tests and explores new sources of air pollution. Second, it inspects and evaluates all equipment and processes affecting the air in this area. Third, it is accountable for the permit system. It will see to it that any new installations of equipment and processes meet the county standard. If acceptable, it will issue a permit to the firm concerned.⁸

The Technical Division supervises twelve air monitoring stations in Los Angeles County. It records the level of contaminant concentrations on a 24-hour basis. These data become the basic information for the daily forecasts of air pollution in the basin. They also become a basis for alert warnings which go into effect in the case of an excessive build-up of pollutants.⁹

⁷County of Los Angeles, APCD, APCD: History and Function, Publication No. 1 (Los Angeles: APCD, 1972), pp. 4-11.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid.

The Evaluation and Planning Division, in conjunction with other sections, measures the present state of air quality and explores additional sources of air pollution. In the light of these investigations, this division evaluates the existing control regulations and programs. If it thinks inappropriate or inadequate, it recommends a new rule or reform of the present methods to the Control Officer.¹⁰

The primary functions of the Special Services Division are twofold. The personnel in this division informs and educates the public about the nature of air pollution and the work of the APCD. They distribute materials on these questions and make public speeches if necessary. In addition, the Special Services Division has the task of reporting the level of air contamination daily to the mass media, which in turn publishes or reports it throughout Los Angeles. If pollution exceeds the county standard, this division immediately contacts the media, school districts and other parties and requests appropriate action.¹¹

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

Finally, the Administrative Services Division is in charge of the preparation of the annual budget and the collection and auditing of expenditures and revenues in the APCD. It publishes the financial reports and keeps all accounting documents and records.¹²

The second objective in the California Air Pollution Control Act of 1947 was the stationary source control. For this, Los Angeles enacted the first rules and regulations in December 1947. Authorized by the Health and Safety Code of the State of California, it served as a guiding manual for the Air Pollution Control District. During twenty-five years of operation, forty-five new rules and amendments have been made and added to the original statutes, although the basic form and content have remained the same even to this date.¹³

An underlying purpose of these regulations was to upgrade the quality of the Los Angeles atmosphere to

¹²Ibid.

¹³William Falkner, Special Services Division, APCD of Los Angeles, private interview held in Los Angeles on January 10, 1972.

the pre-1940 level. To achieve this goal, these provisions included many specific prohibitions. Initially, there were only four such restrictions. Rule 50 forbade the discharge of contaminants and set forth the Ringlemann Chart as a standard measurement; Rule 51 provided a legal basis for the Control officers to initiate preventive actions. Rules 52 and 53 restricted the emissions of particulate matter and the use of high sulfur fuels.

In 1949, the Air Pollution Control District instituted two additional regulations aiming at dust and fume control. In 1955, it adopted Rules 57 and 58, both of which were against open-air and incinerator burning in the County of Los Angeles. In addition, partly because of the failure of abatement efforts, the District enacted Rule 62, a controversial rule forbidding the use of sulfur fuels from May 1 to September 30.¹⁴

Although the County of Los Angeles had focused its attention on the stationary sources of pollution, many people began to realize that the real problem in this

¹⁴George H. Hagevik, Decision-Making in Air Pollution Control (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1971), pp. 81-127.

region might lie in the chemical reactions of hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides from automobiles.¹⁵

As soon as this finding was made public, the Los Angeles Air Pollution Control District took prompt action and adopted regulations concerning motor vehicle emissions. Rule 63, which was incorporated in July 1959, for instance, specified the gasoline content sold and supplied in Los Angeles County. Also, Rule 66.2 limited the emission of any photochemical reactive solvents into the atmosphere.

With respect to motor vehicle emission control, however, it must be noted that the Mulford-Carrell Air Resources Act of 1967 of the State of California "pre-empted" the Los Angeles Air Pollution Control District from this problem area. Since its inception, the Air Resources Board instead of the Los Angeles APCD has been responsible for pollution from moving sources. As this example indicates, since the mid-sixties, the role of the

¹⁵U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Public Works, Hearings, before a subcommittee on air and water pollution, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, p. 218.

federal and state governments in the control of motor vehicle emissions has become more and more important. Subsequently, much of the local efforts against this type of air pollution are directed toward local cooperation and coordination with other levels of government.¹⁶

In enforcing the rules and regulations, the County of Los Angeles undertakes several approaches. First is the permit system which consists of two parts. According to Rule 10 of the operation manual of the APCD,

Any person building, erecting, altering or replacing any article, machine, equipment or other contrivance, the use of which may cause the issuance of air contaminants or the use of which may eliminate or reduce or control the issuance of air

¹⁶As a result of two agencies dealing with air pollution control, there have been many reported incidences of administrative in-fighting. Particularly because the APCD in Los Angeles is the first of its kind in the United States, it tends to look down on other government organizations in charge of smog control. Regarding this administrative problem, see Connick et al., Smog Paradox, pp. 67-97. See also State of California, Office of Legislative Analysis, Air Pollution Control in California (Sacramento, Calif.: Office of Legislative Analysis, 1971), pp. 73-96.

With respect to the role of the federal government in the area of air pollution control, see Jeffrey Fromson, "A History of Federal Air Pollution Control," in Environmental Law Review: 1970, ed. by H. Floyd Sherrod (Albany, N.Y.: Sage Hall, 1970), pp. 214-238; and J. Clarence Davis, The Politics of Pollution (New York: Pegasus, 1970).

contaminants, shall first obtain authorization for such construction from the Air Pollution Control Officer.¹⁷

When these projects are completed, the District requires another written permit for operation. To obtain these permits, the owners or operators must pay fees according to the schedule prescribed by the Air Pollution Control District in Los Angeles.

In the fiscal year of 1947-48, the APCD received 86 applications for permits, of which 67 were approved and 3 disapproved. In the fiscal year of 1950-51, the District granted 1,246 permits while denying 118 of 1,611 applications. In the year 1958-59, it processed 2,422 requests. Of these, it authorized 1,175 permits to construct and 3,339 to operate.¹⁸ The latest figures indicate that the APCD has received a total of 117,239 applications for permits in the last twenty-five years. Of these applications, it has issued 35,978 construction

¹⁷County of Los Angeles, APCD, Rule 10.

¹⁸Since each application may often request several different equipment systems, the number of permits granted does not equal the number of applications submitted.

and 119,929 operation permits. At the same time, it has denied 6,674 requests.¹⁹

Another enforcement action by the Control officer is periodic examination of equipment. The Rules and Regulations of the Los Angeles APCD, as well as the California Health and Safety and Motor Vehicle Codes, empowers the officer to inspect any industrial locations at reasonable times. When he finds a violation, he may either issue a citation or arrest the violator. At present there are about 100 such inspectors in the Enforcement Division who are in charge of the entire County of Los Angeles.²⁰

According to the report provided by the APCD for the fiscal year 1969-70, 74 percent of the total number

¹⁹ These figures are tabulated by this writer on the basis of the annual reports of the APCD since 1946. Because the District does not disclose reasons for denial of permits, no patterns can be established to determine types of equipment systems acceptable to the APCD.

²⁰ Connick et al., Smog Paradox, pp. 75-76. Regarding inspections, there have been many criticisms against the APCD. Jane Wilson in "Scenario for a Smog Snafu," West, January 9, 1972, pp. 14-15, for instance, argues that all elaborate "dawn raids" are nothing better than showcases of the APCD to demonstrate its efficiency and effectiveness.

of violations were against Rule 50 of the Los Angeles APCD, which dealt with excessive smoke. The same report also revealed that 10 percent were cited for operating without permits, and 7.2 percent against Rule 51 on the nuisance clause. In terms of the number of violations from a historical perspective, there were 2,369 cases in 1955 and 1,900 in 1956. Since then, the numbers have been in a sharp decline. In the fiscal year 1960-61, for instance, there were 164 cases of violations from stationary sources and in 1970, there were only 409. They seem to indicate a diminishing trend of violators.²¹

Aside from these activities, the inspector can cite or arrest smoking vehicles in Los Angeles County. However, the problem is that there are only six patrol units in operation. Even though the APCD receives many complaints of smoking vehicles from citizens, it cannot do very much about them. William Falkner of the Los Angeles APCD has remarked that the control officer must witness and be present at the time of a violation in order

²¹All figures are tabulated by this writer based on the annual reports of the APCD since 1946.

to make an arrest or give a citation. From his point of view, with only six patrol cars the task seems to be beyond the control of the District. Falkner noted that in the future the APCD should closely coordinate its action with the Los Angeles Police Department which also has power to control smoking vehicles.²²

It was not until 1955 that the Air Pollution Control District broke down the number of citations into two categories, stationary and moving sources of violation. In that year, the stationary source violations amounted to an overwhelming 78 percent of the total number of citations. This made quite a contrast to the relatively marginal number of violations from moving sources in the same year. But this trend was completely reversed in 1957 when 87 percent of violations stemmed from motor vehicles, and has continued so to this date, although the number of violations from both stationary and moving sources has somewhat reduced.²³

²²Falkner, private interview, January 10, 1972.

²³These data are collected and sorted out by this writer on the basis of the annual reports of the APCD since 1946.

A third sanction which the Air Pollution Control District can administer is through the initiation of criminal proceedings. It may bring the case to court should a violator fail to comply with a citation. In 1955 there were 2,349 instances of such action of a total of 3,046 violations. Of these, 2,292 were proved to be guilty of a misdemeanor. In 1965, the District processed 2,365 citations for criminal proceedings, of which 99.4 percent were convicted. In 1970 there were 1,362 court actions with a 94.4 percent conviction rate. Since 1955, the Air Pollution Control District has sent 43,886 violations, or 95 percent of the total number of citations, to the courts.²⁴

The last preventive measure accorded to the APCD is the alert system. Authorized by the County Board of Supervisors in 1955, it enables the Control Office to shut down industries and traffic if a concentration of contaminants reaches a determined level of danger. To monitor this, the Air Pollution Control District maintains

²⁴These figures are tabulated by this writer based on the annual reports of the APCD since 1946.

twelve sampling stations in representative locations of Los Angeles. They operate on a continuous basis and transmit data automatically to the communication center at the Los Angeles APCD.²⁵

There are three stages in the emergency system. The first alert is called when the accumulation of carbon monoxide is more than 50 parts per million units of air (ppm). In the case of nitrogen oxides and sulfur oxides, it is 3 ppm; ozone, which is highly toxic, is limited to 0.5 ppm.²⁶ When the air of Los Angeles deteriorates to one of these conditions, the APCD issues a first stage alert. It then notifies all media and some 450 industries that the alert is in effect. Since this is only a warning signal, however, the Control office will initiate three minor actions: (1) it will prohibit burnings of any combustible refuse; (2) it will encourage the public to "stop all unnecessary use of vehicles"; and (3) it will

²⁵County of Los Angeles, APCD, Smog Alerts: Smog and Health Smog Warnings (Los Angeles: APCD, 1972), pp. 1-9.

²⁶County of Los Angeles, APCD, Rule 151.

ask industries to prepare for shut-downs in the case of a second stage alert being declared.²⁷

If these measures fail to curtail the situation, the Air Pollution Control District will call the Emergency Action Committee into session. The committee is composed of medical, scientific, and enforcement specialists, and establishes contingency plans in the event of a second stage alert. According to Rule 156 of the Los Angeles APCD, it declares such an alert when the carbon monoxide concentration reaches 100 ppm, nitrogen and sulfur oxides 5 ppm, or ozone 1 ppm levels. Once this second stage alert is set into motion, the APCD is empowered to suspend both industrial and vehicle operations. In the event even this cannot alleviate the emergency situation, the Governor of California can declare a state of emergency and take immediate measures pursuant to the Emergency Service Act to prevent a smog disaster.²⁸

Since its establishment in 1955, eighty first stage alerts have been called, although no second and

²⁷Ibid., Rule 157.

²⁸Ibid., Rule 159.

third calls have been issued. The largest number of the first stage alerts, which was in 1955, was fifteen. This was followed by ten in 1956. After these years, the number of calls was substantially reduced to an average of four a year, which was, perhaps, indicative of the effect of the control effort. However, because of the new stringent rule regarding the carbon monoxide concentration in 1970, it has jumped to nine in recent years.²⁹

In short, from the examination of air pollution control in Los Angeles, we can see that Los Angeles was far-sighted in seeing the need for a special office to undertake such a complicated problem as air pollution. We can also note that Los Angeles is relatively advanced in terms of the establishment of rules and regulations, the training of personnel, and in enforcement of smog control. On the basis of these accomplishments, it is fair to conclude that at present air pollution control in Los Angeles is one of the better air pollution control programs in the United States.

²⁹County of Los Angeles, APCD, Profile of Air Pollution Control, p. 71.

Osaka

After studying the record of Los Angeles, let us shift our attention to Osaka. Having done so, this writer was surprised by the lagging smog control program in this southern part of Japan. Until 1969, it had neither a specific program nor the manpower to curtail contamination. However, in the last three years and in rapid succession, a score of rules and regulations have been promulgated resulting in confusion of the issue rather than in cleaning the atmosphere.

Osaka established its first local ordinance governing air pollution in 1878, ten years after Japan opened her doors to the Western world. This regulation was enacted as a direct response to a citizen's complaint about soot from the smoke stacks of public bath houses. The law stipulated that, henceforth, any person who was intending to build and use smoke stacks in his business operation had to secure an approval from his neighbors. Seven years later, the same regulation was altered to mean that any plant owner having chimneys had to move to

a sparsely populated area.³⁰

From the time of this first local ordinance to the end of World War II, Osaka produced seven other regulations. They dealt mostly with soot and gaseous vapors from small factories and, in general, were not specific in terms of enforcement and compliance. The regulation named Kōjō-Hō (the Law for Factories) in 1917, for instance, authorized the local governments to suspend plant operations if they might endanger public health. This did not spell out, however, at what point the regulation could be applied. Similarly, the rule in 1932 established the Ringlemann Chart 3 as the basic standard for smoke from stacks in the cities of Osaka, Sakai, and Kishiwada. But it failed to provide any power for the local authorities to enforce the regulation in case of an apparent violation.³¹

During the period from 1868 to 1945, these eight local regulations, however lenient, might have been

³⁰Osaka-Fu Seikatsu Kankyō-Bu, Kōgai Hakusho, pp. 3-5.

³¹Osaka-Fu, Kōgai no Genkyō to Taisaku (Current Conditions of Pollution and Its Control) (Osaka: Osaka-Fu, 1969), pp. 4-5.

sufficient in view of the level of economic activities in Osaka. Air pollution was not a serious concern; in fact, the people of Osaka often thought that the smoky sky over the region was a good indication of prosperity and affluence. They were extremely proud of Osaka being called "Kemuri no Miyako" or the smoke capital of Japan.³²

But in the post-war era, when Osaka had undergone a tremendous change, especially in its economic outlook, the residents seemed to have an ambivalent feeling about their polluted sky. In the late forties, they were bothered by the noise and smell as much as by smoke and fume from their neighborhood plants. Thus, in 1950, the Osaka Prefectural government, overwhelmed by citizen complaints, decided to take action.³³

In that year, Osaka erected the first local ordinance against pollution in the post-war period. This was Ōsaka-Fu Jigyōjyō Kōgai Bōshi Jyōrei (Osaka Prefectural Ordinance Against Pollution from Factories), which

³²Ōsaka-Fu Seikatsu Kankyō-Bu, Kōgai Hakusho, p. 1.

³³Ibid., pp. 1-2.

covered the entire region including the city of Osaka. Under this regulation, air pollution was narrowly defined as toxic gases, smoke, and dirt emitted from "plants." It totally disregarded many other sources of smog such as garbage burning and motor vehicles. Within this limited sense of air pollution, however, the ordinance established a specific emission standard for over 60 gaseous substances.³⁴ Although it was rudimentary from the standpoint of current knowledge, this was a significant achievement at the time in Japan, because no other local or regional government had yet established such precise criteria.³⁵

According to the regulation of 1950, the governor could order an investigation of any plant should it fail to comply with the standard. And if a violation was evident, the owner of the factory had to remedy the situation and to report his actions to the designated

³⁴Osaka-Fu, Kohō (Public Notice), No. 3371 (August 25, 1950).

³⁵Jichi Daijin Kanbō (Ministry of Local Autonomy), ed., Chihō Kōkyō Dantai no Kōgai Taisaku (Pollution Control Efforts of Local Government) (Tokyo: Daiichi Hōki, 1971), p. 15.

authority. In case of total disregard of the government order, the proprietor could be fined up to 50,000 yen.³⁶

Although this first "modern" regulation against pollution was so organized, it was not enforced as much as some people had hoped. The record, as a matter of fact, shows no government inspection or prosecution of violations of the ordinance since 1950.

According to Yoshio Nishimura, who is the section chief in the Department of Pollution Control of the prefectural government, it was not the intention of the authority at that time to resort to harsh measures against polluters. Nishimura noted that the real idea behind the ordinance of 1950 was to supervise factories and to see to it that they did not emit a large quantity of unpleasant smoke or odor. He thus commented that, even when there was a major violation, he would not have thought of suing the plants' owners or suspending the plants' operations. Instead of complicating the matter, Nishimura preferred to wait for voluntary compliance on

³⁶Osaka-Fu, Kōhō, No. 3371.

the part of the violator.³⁷

The ordinance of 1950 had been in force until 1954 when the government made a substantial reform. In the revised regulation there were two major improvements over the previous one.³⁸

One, the ordinance of 1954 provided a special committee of 21 members, all of whom were appointed by the governor. They included scholars, bureaucrats, and city and prefectural assemblymen. Their primary function was to study air pollution and to recommend any further governmental action to the governor.³⁹

Two, a special section on pollution control was organized in the Department of Public Health. This became the main office in charge of air pollution as well as other public nuisances. By simplifying the administrative organization, it was hoped that the

³⁷Yoshio Nishimura, Ōsaka-Fu Seikatsu Kankyō-Bu Kōgai-Shitsu (Prefecture of Osaka, Department of Environment, Office of Pollution Control), interview held in Osaka on October 18, 1972.

³⁸Ōsaka-Fu, Kōhō, No. 3929 (April 14, 1954), Sections 3 and 4.

³⁹Ibid., Sections 12 and 13.

control effort would be more effective than before.⁴⁰

What actually happened, however, was quite different from the original plan. The Section of Pollution Control became the office to receive public complaints. Some citizens grumbled to the officers about unbearable fumes coming from their neighborhood factories. Others, reporting that soot from the smoke stacks in their vicinities smeared their laundries, wanted the pollution control office to do something about it. Every working day the staff in the section of pollution control was bombarded by these complaints. According to Motoyuki Fukuyoshi of the prefectural government, more than four fifths of his work time was spent listening to public complaints. Under these conditions, he admitted that the office could not undertake enforcement activities, even if there were specific regulations against pollution.⁴¹

⁴⁰Osaka-Fu, Kōgai no Genkyō, p. 4.

⁴¹Motoyuki Fukuyoshi, Ōsaka-Fu Seikatsu Kankyō-Bu Taiki-Ka (Prefecture of Osaka, Department of Environment, Office of Air Pollution Control), interview held in Osaka on October 5, 1972. See also Masakazu Hagino, "Ōsaka-Fu ni okeru Kōgai Gyōsei no Genjyō to Mondai Ten" (Current

Inconceivable as it might seem, such a situation persisted for more than eleven years until 1965. During this period Osaka failed to take any constructive action in preventing air pollution. All that it did was to receive public complaints and to make a few minor alterations in the existing regulations. The lack of awareness and imagination on the part of the Osaka government would have become conspicuous if the rate of pollution in the same period had been taken into account.⁴²

As was noted in Chapter III, Osaka decided to reclaim its beaches along the Bay for industrial sites in 1958. By 1960 the project was half-way completed, and many giant corporations moved in, including Kansai Electric, Yawata Steel, Mitsui Chemical, and Mitsubishi Petroleum. As soon as these industries started their operations, the already polluted sky of Osaka began to show a marked change. Especially in Sakai, adjacent to

Conditions and Problems in the Administration of Pollution Control), in Kōgai Gyōsei (Public Administration for Pollution Control), ed. by Nippon Gyōsei Gakkai (Tokyo: Kensō Shobo, 1971), pp. 177-181.

⁴²Fukuyoshi, private interview, October 5, 1972.

the reclaimed land, the density of sulfur compounds tripled in 1962 over that of 1958. Accordingly, the volume of the soot and dirt fallout in that area of Osaka made a substantial increase to the point of killing plants and other living organisms.⁴³

Such a rapid deterioration of atmosphere was not confined to Sakai. It eventually extended to several sections in the city of Osaka. In addition, these heavy industrial operations contributed to the general degradation of the quality of air throughout the region. Yet, despite these mounting problems, the Osaka Prefectural government did little to check pollution. Instead, the Sato Administration of Osaka encouraged many other corporations to choose their next business locations in the reclaimed land in this southern part of Japan.⁴⁴

It was not until 1965, when air pollution had made extensive visible damage, that the pro-business governor saw the need for some type of preventive action at all. Finally, in October of that year, Osaka produced

⁴³Sakai Takaishi, Sakai Senboku no Kōgai, pp. 12-43.

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 114-126.

a new set of rules and voided past regulations. The latest ordinance, Ōsaka-Fu Kōgai Bōshi Jyōrei (Osaka Prefectural Ordinance Against Pollution), was much more specific and stringent in terms of emission standards and enforcement than any of the previous regulations.

Under the ordinance of 1965, for instance, the government could arrest any violator in addition to imposing a fine upon him. Also according to this regulation, the authority could suspend a plant operation for an indefinite period of time until a readjustment was made to meet the prefectural standard. Aside from restricting pollution, the ordinance of 1965 allowed the government to subsidize private firms for their installations of pollution control equipment.⁴⁵

From a legal standpoint, the latest ordinance was a well thought-out document and looked better than the previous rules. Yet, as in the past, it did not go beyond the code book. In effect, the ordinance of 1965 appeared to be a failure, because it had no record of any punitive actions against polluters. This is hard to

⁴⁵Ōsaku-Fu, Kōhō, No. 43 (October 22, 1965).

believe in view of the rapid build-up of air pollution in these years.⁴⁶

The heart of the trouble in Osaka seems to lie in the lack of attention to the development of a competent pollution control office comparable to the Air Pollution Control District of Los Angeles. Instead of establishing a new organization and training specialists to deal with such a complex problem as air pollution, the prefectural government of Osaka tried to depend on existing offices and staff. Thus, as a new ordinance was brought about, it would keep adding small sections in charge of pollution control to different departments. By the time the ordinance of 1965 was in effect, at least four departments had these small sections in addition to the one in the Public Health.⁴⁷

Such an administrative structure seriously handicapped the pollution control effort. First, it spread

⁴⁶ Nishimura, personal interview, October 18, 1972.

⁴⁷ Ōsaka-Fu Seikatsu Kankyō-Bu (Prefecture of Osaka, Department of Environment), "Kōgai Kankei Soshiki Jinji Hensen Hyō" (Organizational and Personnel Charts Relating to Pollution Control) (Osaka, n.d.), p. 1 (Xeroxed).

financial resources too thinly to wage an effective control action against pollution. Second, the staff members involved in the pollution control were not specialists. To train them for new assignments was impossible as long as each belonged to different departments. The lack of experts certainly undermined the enforcement activities in Osaka. Third, because the pollution control offices were dispersed, there was a high incidence of inter-departmental conflict and rivalry. The pollution control officer in the Department of Planning, for instance, would not disclose his activity to his colleagues in the Public Health Department. Not only was this a waste of talent, but it was also a major obstacle to making a concerted effort by the various departments to curtail air contamination.⁴⁸

Osaka Prefectural officials eventually became aware of the administrative problem and decided to reorganize the structure. The first step, initiated in

⁴⁸Fukuyoshi, interview, October 5, 1972. With respect to the budget and the number of personnel involved in pollution control of Osaka, see Ōsaka-Fu, Kōgai no Genkyō, pp. 171-189.

1966, was to place the Office of Pollution Control in the Department of Planning. Concomitant with this, the comparable sections in other departments were all eliminated. In 1968, the Air Pollution Observatory Center was set aside as a subsidiary of the Office of Air Pollution Control. Further, in 1970, the Office was promoted and renamed the Department of Environment. At present, this is the main office in charge of pollution control in Osaka.⁴⁹

In terms of personnel, pollution control has also made steady progress since 1965. In that year there were only 37 staff personnel, belonging to different administrative units. But when the Office of Pollution Control was organized in the following year, these personnel were gathered and increased to 55. By the time the Observatory Center was formed, the number was doubled to a staff of 110. Finally, as soon as the Department of Environment came into being, a great effort was made to recruit young engineers. This project bore fruit and

⁴⁹⁻Osaka-Fu Seikatsu Kankyō-Bu, "Kōgai Kankei Soshiki Jinin Hensen Hyō," p. 1.

the Department was able to secure 137 members. At present, it has 154 persons working for pollution control.⁵⁰

According to Motoyuki Fukuyoshi of the Department of Environment, in addition to the number of 137, the quality of the staff members has substantially improved over the years. Although he has been involved in pollution control for more than ten years, he is a chemist and does not think of himself as qualified for the job. In Fukuyoshi's view, the colleagues of his age hold a similar opinion. They have received neither training nor education pertaining to the problem of pollution control. But Fukuyoshi notes that the new recruits are in most cases graduates of environmental science and, therefore, well prepared to carry out the assignment. From his perspective, since Osaka has just started to collect these competent members, it will still take another five or ten years before his Department attains a status similar to the Air Pollution Control District

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 1.

of Los Angeles.⁵¹

While the administrative structure has been upgraded since 1965, the rule-making process has not kept up with this development. The ordinance of 1965, for instance, was left intact until 1969 without any break-through in the alleviation of the smog problem. Late in that year, partly due to the pressure from the national government, Osaka undertook a major revision of the rule. Since that time, the Osaka Prefectural government has reformed the ordinance every year, and as a result, Osaka citizens are puzzled regarding the prevailing pollution control regulations for their region.⁵²

In the rapidly changing ordinances of 1969, 1970, 1971, and 1972, there were several characteristics. First, the basic definition of air pollution was still highly restrictive. As in the ordinance of 1950, it was primarily conceived as a by-product of plant operations. For other sources of pollution, the ordinances held a

⁵¹Fukuyoshi, interview, October 5, 1972.

⁵²Since 1969, Osaka has enacted four prefectural ordinances under the title, Osaka-Fu Kōgai Boshi Jyōrei (Prefectural Ordinance Against Pollution).

special committee accountable for their definition. With respect to motor vehicles, Osaka had no regulation. The only thing that it had done was to sponsor a task force to study the method of curtailing auto-exhaust in 1967. This was later expanded to a coordinated council involving the city of Osaka, the Osaka Police Department, and the Osaka Motor Vehicle Bureau. In 1968, this council suggested launching a massive public campaign calling for the readjustment of the idling of all car engines in Osaka.⁵³

Second, no concept of the permit system appeared in any of these changing regulations. In Los Angeles as well as in Tokyo, all firms are obligated to secure permits of construction and operation before they can start their businesses; but in Osaka, the situation was different. Prefectural ordinances required private firms using a machine press, boiler, sand-blaster, furnace, etc. to submit written statements noting their preventive measures against possible pollution. As long

⁵³Osaka-Fu, Kōgai no Genkyō, pp. 7-8.

as these plants supplied this information, they could operate the machines the way they wanted.⁵⁴

Third, the ordinances of the prefectural government covered the entire region of Osaka. All municipalities under its jurisdiction were, by law, required to honor the prefectural regulations. Thus, even when these cities had their own control offices, they could not make independent inspections of potential polluters. This power was exclusively reserved for the prefectural governments.⁵⁵

Such restrictive provisions often gave rise to a peculiar situation. The city of Sakai, for instance, had the industrial complexes in its political boundary. Because of this, it organized a task force to make a routine examination of the operations of giant corporations. But the city officials later learned that they

⁵⁴Sakai Takaishi, Sakai Senboku no Kōgai, p. 138.

⁵⁵Namiko Kamioka, "Kōgai: Jichitai ni okeru Sekinin to Taisaku" (Responsibilities and Policies Against Pollution in Local Governments), in Kōgai Gyōsei (Public Administration for Pollution Control), ed. by Nippon Gyōsei Gakkai (Tokyo: Kensō Shobo, 1971), pp. 71-87.

could not step into the factories. Even when they were right on the spot of possible pollution, they had to wait for the prefectural inspectors to do the job.⁵⁶

In 1971, having realized the problem in the relationship between the prefectural and the municipal governments, the central authority relaxed the rule and allowed the special cities (Shitei Toshi) to have their own control programs. Although this failed to benefit Sakai and other communities, at least it empowered the city of Osaka to undertake pollution control independent of the prefectural government.⁵⁷

Thus, in 1971, the Health Department and the Pollution Control Section in the General Planning Department of Osaka City government were merged to form the Department of Health and Environment. Currently, this office has six sections--research, planning, control,

⁵⁶This information was supplied by Shuji Yamada, Sakai-Shi Kōgai Kanri-Ka (City of Sakai, Office of Pollution Control), in an interview held in Osaka on October 12, 1972.

⁵⁷Osaka-Shi (City of Osaka), Ōsaka-Shi no Kōgai no Genkyō to Taisaku (Current Conditions and Controls of Pollution in the City of Osaka) (Ōsaka: Ōsaka-Shi, 1972), p. 1.

air pollution, water and noise pollution, and environment, employing approximately 130 staff members.⁵⁸

As soon as the Department of Health and Environment was organized, it put forth a new control program called "The Clean Air Plan." According to Toshiaki Hirayama of the Health and Environment Department, this policy is aimed first at reducing the sulfur content in the atmosphere of Osaka to the level of 0.05 ppm by 1980. Next, it hopes to cut down particulate and carbon monoxide concentration to the 0.1 mg and 20 ppm levels, respectively, by the end of this decade.⁵⁹

Hirayama notes that, in order to achieve these objectives, the Department has set two targets. First is Nishi Yodogawa Ward which is the most polluted section in the city. In his opinion, the Health and Environment Department will intensify the patrol and inspection of

⁵⁸-Osaka-Shi Kankyō Eisei-Bu (City of Osaka, Department of Health and Environment), "Kōgai Taisaku Kankei Soshiki Kikō Zu" (Organizational Charts Relating to Pollution Control) (Osaka, n.d.), p. 1 (Xeroxed).

⁵⁹-Osaka-Shi, Osaka-Shi no Kōgai, pp. 196-220.

both small and large factories in that ward. He believes that this will help considerably to reduce the smog problem there. The second target is office buildings. According to Hirayama, they use various fuels for heating, especially in winter, which generate a tremendous amount of waste. Beginning in the 1972-73 cold season, his Department will make a series of routine checks of these buildings and see to it that no massive pollution takes place.⁶⁰

Thus, in 1972, Osaka has two independent control programs. On one hand, there is the plan by the prefectural government. All municipalities except Osaka City fall under this policy. On the other hand, there is the control effort of the city of Osaka. By virtue of its special status, it has been able to seek its own program independent of the prefectural government.

In short, the examination of the pollution abatement program of Osaka has disclosed a number of problems. In terms of rules and regulations, they are still in the

⁶⁰Toshiaki Hirayama, Ōsaka-Shi Kankyō Eisei-Bu (Osaka City, Department of Health and Environment), personal interview held in Osaka on October 6, 1972.

rudimentary stage of development. They are neither comprehensive, nor are they stable enough to help reduce the smog of Osaka.

Upon visiting Osaka in October 1972, the tremendous amount of smoke coming from stacks all over the area was an amazing sight. To add to this, every morning many residents were observed burning rubbish in the street. Some of it was soaked in oil and generated black fumes which blemished the sky. After checking with a control officer to determine if there were any rules forbidding such an incredible act, the reply was "no" in both the city and prefectural governments. In addition, during this short sojourn, it was learned that no motor vehicles in Osaka are equipped with smog-control devices. More than 1.3 million cars are free, it appears, to contaminate the atmosphere. From all of these facts, there is little question that Osaka needs to make a very conscious effort to provide a comprehensive and effective set of rules and regulations against pollution in the immediate future.

Apparently, the administrative structure of smog control in Osaka still leaves a lot to be desired, even

though it has made some headway. One of the pressing problems at the present moment seems to lie in the lack of skilled personnel. Osaka must train as many competent staff members as possible in a short span of time. Since the city of Osaka has decided to take an independent course of action, this may lead to an unnecessary competition over recruitment. This may also give rise to inter-governmental rivalry between the city and prefectural governments in the control effort. An indication of such a trend is already evident, as shall be seen later.

Finally, one of the most disappointing findings of this study has been the absence of enforcement activities on the part of the pollution control officers of Osaka. They seem to have a typical Japanese attitude about legal procedure: to avoid invoking laws as long as they can. Instead, these officials want to settle the issue by either compromise or voluntary compliance. This appears to be one of the fundamental reasons for the poor enforcement records in Osaka. With air pollution being as extensive as it is, those who are responsible for smog control must change their basic attitudes toward

both polluters and regulations. Without such change, air contamination gets worse every year pointing to total disaster.

Conclusions

In the study of the past efforts against pollution, it has become clear that Los Angeles has a better control system than Osaka. From a historical point of view, Los Angeles was far-sighted in perceiving the smog problem and in developing the Air Pollution Control District. This initial effort was highly elaborate, and the APCD has kept polishing its program with minor changes. Such a developmental process has resulted in several important advantages for the residents of Los Angeles. One of the most important, perhaps, is the fact that they can understand a great deal about the regulations as well as the Air Pollution Control District.

In a marked contrast to Los Angeles, Osaka just began its serious program a few years ago. Until that time, it had neglected pollution control for the sake of industrial development. When Osaka finally became aware of the problem, it tended to make hasty judgments on the basis of insufficient information. Consequently, Osaka

has produced one regulation after another without any solid objective from the outset. The residents of Osaka are now bewildered by these ordinances and wonder which one they should honor. When such a condition is compounded by the lack of personnel and administrative development, the outcome of the control program is rather obvious--it fails to curtail smog.

CHAPTER V

INTEREST GROUP ACTIVITIES IN THE AIR POLLUTION CONTROL OF LOS ANGELES AND OSAKA

The major focus of the previous chapter was on the past policies of Los Angeles and Osaka against air pollution. Such an investigation amplified the fact that the control program of Osaka had been lagging behind that of Los Angeles. The subsequent chapters discuss the factors that contribute to this discrepancy.

There seems to be some compelling reasons as to why Osaka has not developed an anti-pollution program comparable to that developed in Los Angeles. Among many conceivable factors, the three most important determinants considered are (1) the interest group system; (2) the decision-making structure and the decision makers themselves; and (3) the decision-making process in the area of air pollution control. The basic framework being so set, the present section deals with the interest group system, leaving the other determinants to the next

chapter.

One of the prime reasons that Los Angeles has such a relatively advanced smog control program seems to lie in the activities of its interest groups. In Southern California, there are two major categories of interest groups in the area of air pollution abatement. The first consists of ecology groups. They are generally nonpartisan and concerned with the preservation of the natural environment. The other consists of business organizations. Since they are directly affected by various restrictive measures, they tend to be apprehensive and ambivalent about ecology issues even if they favor clean air as much as anyone else.

In Los Angeles, there is a high incidence of these two entirely different categories of ad hoc interest groups fighting head-on, essentially in the electoral process. Although the enterprises, by virtue of their financial resources, often overwhelm the ecology organizations, the frequent collision between them helps Los Angeles keep the issue alive. Not only does this contribute to the growth of public awareness of the smog problem, but also it expedites the formation of scores

of anti-pollution measures. These seem to be the most important underpinnings for Los Angeles in order to possess a comparably good control program against air contamination.

On the contrary, Osaka has not experienced such intensified open conflicts as has Los Angeles. In Osaka, there are no ecology groups equivalent to those of Los Angeles. The organizations involved in the pollution control of Osaka are most often ideological groups affiliated with labor unions and other leftist persuasions. Air pollution, therefore, is not their sole concern, but pollution is primarily conceived as an example of the evils of capitalism.

In addition, business groups in Osaka are also markedly different from those in Los Angeles. These enterprises of Osaka have developed a good ally, the government, which stands behind business enterprises and helps support their interests in policy formation. Even though this coalition has been one of the major driving forces for Japanese modernization, it tends to have a detrimental outcome particularly in the issue of air pollution control. The close alignment between businesses

and government has generated such a tremendous amount of power that no other groups can counterbalance this political force. Under these circumstances, it is quite evident why Osaka has been held up so long in developing an effective control plan against air pollution.

The following section will elucidate these questions by shedding some light upon several interest groups involved in the smog issue in Los Angeles and Osaka.

Los Angeles

Ecology Groups

In Los Angeles, one can count more than ten significant ecology groups. Although they vary in both size and activity, they appear to have several common attributes. If a group is well organized and highly active, it tends to discount Los Angeles as the focus of activity and instead sets its fights on the state government. On the contrary, when an organization is strictly locally oriented, it musters little support and public recognition.

Both the Californians Against Smog and the

People's Lobby exemplify the former case. For these groups, pollution control at the local level has been a complete failure. In their opinion, the best way to alleviate the present sorry state in Los Angeles is to work for state-wide action and not through local government, because the state and federal levels of government have become much more important in air pollution control than in the past.

Californians Against Smog was a political arm of the Tuberculosis and Respiratory Disease Association. In 1972, it was said to have a membership of fifty people. The chief coordinator of this group is Mrs. Gladys Meade, a graduate of the University of California at Los Angeles, and a mother of four.¹ Prior to her present appointment as an Air Conservation Associate in the Tuberculosis and Respiratory Disease Association, she was active in the League of Women Voters and other civic oriented organizations. During those years, her interests in local issues were broad. But since 1968,

¹Gladys Meade, Air Conservation Associate, Tuberculosis and Respiratory Association of California, an interview in Los Angeles on July 3, 1972.

she has become extremely concerned with air pollution and has decided to devote her civic career to this problem.

In the election of 1970, the Californians Against Smog was involved with Proposition 18. This state initiative sought a constitutional amendment in the provision dealing with the Highway Users Fund (Article XXVI of the California State Constitution). Since 1938, all motorists in this state have been paying a highway tax which is included in their purchases of fuel (currently 7 cents per gallon of gasoline). The money, so collected, goes into the coffers of the State Highway Commission and Division of Highways. It has been earmarked and used exclusively for the construction of freeway systems throughout California.

Under this arrangement, these state agencies planned new highways irrespective of the tax contributions that each local government made. Thus, even if Los Angeles County raised more than \$600 million, there would be no assurance that it received a fair share. It would be more likely that freeways would be constructed in rural counties than in Los Angeles. In addition to

this disparity, many people became convinced that California had to find another means of public transportation. If the freeway system was the only alternative, they feared that the entire state would eventually be paved in keeping with the growing numbers of the population and motorists.²

Proposition 18 was a measure to ameliorate these deficiencies in the current Highway Users Fund. According to the proposition, cities and counties could use up to 25 percent of their tax revenues from fuel for projects other than freeway construction. The money would be spent to pollution control programs and studies of rapid transit systems.³

²For detailed information on the highway tax funds, consult State of California, Senate Select Committee on Rapid Transit, Public Transit in California, A Report on Interim Hearings to the California State Senate (California: Senate of the State of California, 1971), pp. 15-24; and Gladys Meade, "Amendment of Article XXVI of California Constitution to Allow Use of Gas Tax Funds for Transit Construction and Vehicular Pollution Control" (unpublished term paper, University of Southern California, 1971), pp. 1-3.

³State of California, Senate Select Committee on Rapid Transit, Public Transit, p. 74. See also Meade, "Amendment of Article XXVI," pp. 9-10.

Mrs. Meade and her colleagues from the Californians Against Smog worked hard at Sacramento. They tried to persuade the state legislators to place the proposition on the ballot of 1970. However, sensing a lack of support at the state level, these activists realized the need for a coalition with other ecology groups. This they did and they worked with such groups as Women For, Write For Your Life, and the Sierra Club.⁴

Because of the concerted efforts of these organizations, Proposition 18 was approved as a state initiative and formally placed on the state ballot. As soon as this was accomplished, Mrs. Meade, as well as the representatives from other groups, held numerous strategy sessions. The first order of business was to print out a guideline for other rank-and-file members to lead public discussions and to engage in fund raisings. This instruction sheet had elaborate explanations on how to organize meetings and how to make appeals effective along with detailing the responsibilities of these auxiliary

⁴Star News (Pasadena), October 21, 1970, p. A4.

organizations.⁵

The Californians Against Smog made a conscious effort to get support from those residents who were about to have a freeway in their "backyards." It formed a number of small gatherings and convinced these people that they should have a "say" in the way that freeways were planned and constructed. At the same time the group stressed the lack of legislative control over the Highway Users Fund.⁶

. . . gas tax reform is essential because (1) the present carmaking primarily for highway construction and maintenance precludes any chance of solving the vehicle emission problem. \$1 billion annual guaranteed income (soon to reach \$2 billion) solely for California highways simply leads to greater vehicle mileage which yields greater air pollution. . . . (2) Gas tax reform is essential because the use of this huge fund is beyond the control of our elected representatives, and represents budgetary delinquency of the highest order.⁷

While busy taking its case to the people, Californians Against Smog garnered a campaign contribution of \$15,375.20 from various sources. Mostly it was "nickels

⁵Meade, interview, July 3, 1972.

⁶Meade, "Amendment of Article XXVI," p. 9.

⁷Ibid., p. 10.

and dimes" from individual donors. As it turned out, however, it had to spend more than it collected and at the end of the campaign the group reported a deficit of \$7,500. The largest expenditure, \$2,400, went for radio commercials; \$1,400 was spent for newspapers and the same amount was expended on television.⁸

Even though Californians Against Smog was short of money, its strenuous efforts soon paid off. It had the blessings of Governor Ronald Reagan and Jesse Unruh, both of the major candidates in the gubernatorial contest of 1970. It also secured endorsements from major newspapers as well as from many mayors and two of the County Supervisors of Los Angeles.⁹

According to the public poll conducted several weeks prior to the election, just over half of the public (57 percent) acknowledged having seen or heard something about Proposition 18. Of those, 53 percent were for and 29 percent were against the initiative. This margin,

⁸ Los Angeles Times, December 7, 1970, Pt. B, p. 10.

⁹ Star News, October 2, 1970, p. A4.

moreover, was wider among those who had not been exposed to the proposition. In this instance, 56 percent said "yes" while 12 percent said "no" on Proposition 18.¹⁰

A different poll recorded by the government of California indicated the same trend. "When a statewide cross section of 774 potential voters was handed a copy of the proposition, they gave approval by a 3-1 margin."¹¹

Yet, in spite of such a wide spectrum of support, the measure was defeated with 3.1 million "no" votes (54.1 percent) compared to 2.6 million "yes" votes (45.9 percent). The full explanation of its defeat is very complex and shall be elaborated later, but an example of the voting patterns can easily be given in the number of negative votes cast by the Los Angeles electorate. One million of them (54.1 percent) rejected Proposition 18 while 914,000 accepted it. This was reversed in the San Francisco area where 137,000 (64.7 percent) approved and 74,000 (35.3 percent) disapproved of the initiative.

¹⁰California Poll, "The California Poll," No. 696 (Los Angeles, 1970) (mimeographed).

¹¹State of California, Public Transit, p. 73.

Such an outcome was, no doubt, indicative of the fierce and successful campaign against Proposition 18 in Southern California.¹²

The election result, however, failed to dismay Mrs. Meade. A day after the election, she was right back at work in Sacramento to solicit support among the state legislators for the reform of the Highway Funds. Because of her dedicated work, the measure was once again brought to the Assembly floor and approved by it. Yet, when it was sent to the Senate chamber, the reform bill encountered a stiff opposition resulting in another defeat on June 30, 1972 with a 20-16 vote.¹³

In an interview, Mrs. Meade noted that, several defeats in the past notwithstanding, the basic idea of the Highway Funds reform was still alive in the state legislature. For her, this was important and gave her an incentive to persuade as many lawmakers as possible to accept this constitutional amendment. In the last

¹² Ibid., p. 73.

¹³ Los Angeles Times, June 30, 1972, Pt 1, p. 3.

minutes of the conversation, she assured me that this would become a reality in the not too distant future.¹⁴

Another Los Angeles based ecology group, which is significant in terms of organization and support, is the People's Lobby. This was incorporated in 1968 by Edward and Joyce Koupal. The couple had lived in Northern California before they moved to Los Angeles. In Sacramento, Edward Koupal had worked for a Japanese auto manufacturer and travelled throughout the United States. In this venture he had steadily become prosperous making \$30,000 a year. Apparently the couple had a happy life until the day they bought a house in Roseville, a wealthy section of Sacramento County.

As soon as they moved in, they found out that they were paying for sewers, sidewalks, and streets which they did not have; and that seven houses, which did have these things, were not paying for them. This was a special deal worked out by land developers in order to lure as many residents as possible to the area. The

¹⁴ Meade, interview, July 3, 1972.

The Koupals were outraged particularly by what they considered to be greedy developers and the politicians who were behind them. Such an incident promptly drew them into local politics and made them instant reformists.¹⁵

Having been politicized, the Koupals began to be heavily involved in civic actions against local government and learned that "things were screwy all the way through in officialdom."¹⁶ In 1968, the couple realized that they had to give up their middle class status if they really wanted to change the existing system. Because of this conviction, they left all their belongings and moved to Los Angeles. Upon reaching Southern California, they decided to start a recall campaign of Governor Reagan. To the Koupals, he represented big business. However, their movement fell short of achieving its objective. They could not collect enough signatures to require a recall election.¹⁷

¹⁵Los Angeles Times, July 30, 1971, Pt. 4, pp. 1, 4, and 7.

¹⁶Ibid., Pt. 4, p. 4.

¹⁷Ibid., Pt. 4, pp. 1, 4, and 7.

After this failed, the Koupals decided to drive back to Sacramento. But on their way home, they drove through Los Angeles and observed a thick layer of clouds hanging over the basin. According to Joyce Koupal, this was a great revelation and had a strong impact on her mind. Instead of going back, the couple were determined to stay in Los Angeles and to fight for clean air. Such was the important background of the incorporation of the People's Lobby in 1968.¹⁸

As in the case of the Californians Against Smog, the prime concern of the People's Lobby is not at the local but at the state level, even though it is intermittently involved in a feud with the Air Pollution Control District of Los Angeles. From the perspective of the People's Lobby, air pollution control in California has been disastrous at all levels of government. The major reason for this, according to Edward Koupal, is that the politicians, who are supposed to be guardians of public welfare, are closely linked with business

¹⁸ Joyce Koupal, an executive director of the People's Lobby, a personal interview held in Los Angeles on June 14, 1972.

groups. In his opinion, these lawmakers cannot make stiff regulations against the will of big corporations. And even if they do, Edward Koupal contends, the rules are not enforced. This being the case, he argues that the present system of air pollution control should be reformed in such a way as to encourage direct participation by the people.¹⁹

Because of this conviction, the People's Lobby determined to put its own version of the initiative, Proposition 9, in the election of 1972. This was significantly different from Proposition 18 in several important respects. With regard to its scope, it was much wider than the previous initiative. It was a package of anti-pollution measures ranging from control over air contamination to the use of pesticides.

In total, Proposition 9 had 23 sections. The first section dealt with the composition of motor fuels. Having set standards, it tried to phase out lead and to

¹⁸ Edward Koupal, an executive director of the People's Lobby, an interview held in Los Angeles on June 13, 1972. See also Los Angeles Times, March 12, 1972, Pt. 1, pp. 1, 18, 19, and 20.

limit sulfur content in Diesel fuel. Following this were provisions against air pollution from stationary sources for which a stringent restriction on variances and an imposition of fines were spelled out. Aside from these, interesting sections were clauses on conflicts of interest. Under these provisions, any person who had an interest in a company which might pollute the air could not serve on the Air Quality Board. In addition, Proposition 9 provided a five-year moratorium on the construction of nuclear fission power plants, banned off-shore drilling, and restricted the use of pesticides.²⁰

For the People's Lobby, it was imperative to secure both sufficient funds and broad support in order that Proposition 9 would be qualified for the 1972 ballot.

²⁰ A copy of the initiative was supplied by the People's Lobby. It was entitled, "Initiative Measure to be Submitted Directly to the Electors" (Los Angeles, n.d.) (mimeographed). In addition, there were several impartial studies on Proposition 9. See, for instance, Women For, An Analysis of Proposition 9 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Women For, n.d.); and Edward C. Wood, Analysis of Proposition 9 (Menlo Park, Calif.: Stanford Research Institute, 1972).

In meeting these requirements, the group originated a unique idea. To raise funds, it invented a program called the "Bike for Life" campaign. The People's Lobby, according to this scheme, set the date for bicycle riding, and March 12, 1972 was selected for the occasion. Once this was done, the group printed "bi-tickets" and sold them mostly to high school and college students who promised to participate in the event.

Moreover, those who could ride bicycles on that day would look for "sponsors" who might pledge to give a nickel or a quarter for every mile that the bicycle riders travelled. The Lobby organized fifteen such programs and raised more than \$200,000 which came from approximately 2,000 donors.²¹

Successful as this method might appear, there were many problems which were well pointed out by one of the participants. Karen Blocker, age 14, was a high school student from Hollywood. Since she loved bicycle

²¹This information was made available by Karen Blocker, a volunteer worker in the People's Lobby, in an interview held in Los Angeles on June 27, 1972.

riding, she bought a "bi-ticket" for the "Bike for Life." Although she knew nothing about the People's Lobby, she was gradually exposed to the group and decided to work for it as a volunteer. Thus, in one of the bicycle-riding programs, she actively solicited sponsors among her friends and neighbors. According to Miss Blocker, this was not hard at all. In fact, everyone she approached was willing to sign a paper and to make a pledge. But the real problem, as she related, arose when she came back and asked for the money. Many of her sponsors either refused to pay or pretended not to have made any such promise.

Another difficulty Miss Blocker experienced, was that even if the sponsor paid the money, he or she would not usually bother to determine the cause for which he was donating. Thus, when her sponsors later realized that their contributions went to the People's Lobby and Proposition 9, they often felt cheated and tended to have an unfavorable view of the group.²²

²²Blocker, interview, June 27, 1972.

One good example of this unfavorable view was a gentleman named E. Goodgame of Encino. He wrote an angry letter to the People's Lobby and attached a cancelled check for \$20. According to him, a young boy in his neighborhood came to his house and asked his wife to pledge for the "Bike for Life" program. This she did and eventually paid \$20 to this boy. When Goodgame came home and found out about the People's Lobby, he was outraged, especially because he thought the group was taking advantage of such a small boy to raise its campaign funds. At the end of the letter, he stated that the Lobby would get neither his family's votes nor his neighbors'.²³

In addition to the problem of securing enough money, the People's Lobby had to broaden the scope of its public support. At the outset, the Lobby could attract many of the younger generation. Some of them shared the philosophy and became the core members of the group, while others contributed their spare time to the cause of the People's Lobby.

²³Letter from E. Goodgame addressed to the People's Lobby.

When the interviews began in the summer of 1972, there were seven permanent staff members. All of them were young and lived in the headquarters with the Koupals. One of them was Margaret Cheap, age 20, from Los Angeles, who had been a junior college student before she joined the group. She was asked what had motivated her to quit school and to undertake a new venture. She replied, "The prime reason was the deterioration of the environment which had been going on at a rapid rate." From her point of view, there was no telling when this destruction could be stopped. In spite of such a horrifying fact, she argued that nothing had been done about it. Especially on campus, she noted that there were many concerned students and serious discussions, but that mere opinions would not help reduce the problem unless some positive action was initiated. According to Miss Cheap, her anxiety and frustration grew day after day. Thus, when she found out about the People's Lobby, there was no reservation in her mind. She immediately joined the organization.

At this point, Miss Cheap was asked why she chose the People's Lobby among a host of ecology groups. She

commented that there were many groups dedicated to the conservation of the environment, but from her perspective, there was nothing similar to the People's Lobby because it was independent, financially and otherwise. "Being independent," she continued, "the People's Lobby has been doing a lot of constructive things, which other ecology organizations could not do." The integrity and dedication of the People's Lobby was unmatched by any other group and merited her involvement.²⁴

Miss Cheap's experience was not considered unique in the course of this research for all of those who came to the People's Lobby, whether permanent or volunteer workers, had a similar story to tell. For them the People's Lobby was the only ecology group through which they could express their concerns and actually do something about the environment. Thus, even though most of the workers were not paid (and even if they were paid, the wages were marginal), they came to the office and

²⁴Margaret Cheap, a staff worker in the People's Lobby, private interview held in Los Angeles on June 28, 1972.

contributed their time for the passage of Proposition 9.²⁵

Aside from these core members, the People's Lobby had to solicit support of the measure from a broad spectrum of voters. For this assignment, a total of fifty workers was mobilized. According to Joyce Koupal, however, it was more important to have a small number of hard-working people rather than a large contingent of campaigners. In the case of Proposition 9, she noted that just five teams of the group were instrumental in collecting more than 325,000 signatures in the time span of five months.²⁶

Since these people were working under heavy pressure and had to be aggressive, they often ran into serious problems. Gladys Meade of the Tuberculosis and Respiratory Association pointed out one of the most frequent complaints against the People's Lobby was that the representatives from the organization often failed to fully

²⁵According to Miss Cheap, the People's Lobby at the height of its election campaign had approximately 100 regular staff members. Only a few of them, however, were paid. In Miss Cheap's opinion, she was one of the rare cases to get room and board in addition to \$1.50 an hour for her secretarial work.

²⁶Koupal, interview, June 14, 1972.

explain Proposition 9 to those registered voters who signed the petition. In her observation, she had noted the workers making only one statement to these people: "If you are against air pollution and want to clean your environment, sign this paper!" But when these voters later realized the complexity and controversy revolving around this proposition, they became infuriated and held a negative view of the People's Lobby.²⁷

In Mrs. Meade's opinion, though, the heart of the trouble was not the campaign workers but the initiative itself. It covered a variety of issues which made it difficult to present a fair account of Proposition 9 in a matter of a few minutes. Also, according to Mrs. Meade, the initiative was hastily contrived and many of the provisions were ill-defined. Therefore, in her point of view, some of the sections, such as the one regarding Diesel fuel, were irrelevant to Los Angeles; while others would lead to litigation and could not be enforced even if the proposition were adopted.²⁸

²⁷ Meade, interview, July 3, 1972.

²⁸ Meade, interview, July 3, 1972.

In spite of these criticisms, however, the People's Lobby succeeded in placing Proposition 9 on the June ballot of 1972. When this was accomplished, the organization set up branch offices in all counties throughout California and utilized several means to solicit public support for its campaign. First was to publish a newsletter, Agenda 71. This had a lot of articles written by the staff members of the People's Lobby which analyzed and criticized existing pollution control programs in California. The paper was sent to all prospective supporters which mostly consisted of college students and professors.²⁹

Second, the Lobby initiated study sessions. A small seminar conducted by either Edward or Joyce Koupal was held every Thursday night at the headquarters. In one of the sessions, there were about ten young people to whom an introductory lecture on air pollution was addressed. This lecture covered the history as well as

²⁹ See, for instance, Agenda 71, January 1971. This semi-newspaper contained such articles as "People's Lobby Wins Supreme Court Case," "Moratorium on Nuclear Power Plants Urged in Pennsylvania," "Poison in Mother's Milk," etc.

the health hazards of air contamination. The people gathered there appeared to be students of one of the junior colleges in Los Angeles. They had come to the session mainly at the initiation of their professor who was an activist in the People's Lobby.³⁰

Third, the organization tried to mobilize support by means of public speeches. Margaret Cheap, for instance, was in charge of schools in West Los Angeles. She made a dozen public addresses to high school students in that area. She was asked whether she had made any attempt to appear before minority groups. Miss Cheap replied that she had attempted to do so on one or two occasions. According to her the reception was good, since she made a point that air pollution was not a "white man's issue." She argued that it would affect everyone regardless of race or color.³¹

It is interesting to note here the experience of Gladys Meade in the case of Proposition 18. She related

³⁰ Personal observation was made by the writer from attending a Thursday session on August 5, 1971.

³¹ Cheap, interview, June 28, 1972.

about the tremendous difficulty she had experienced in convincing minority groups to accept air pollution as an issue. Since "bread and butter" was their immediate concern, they often paid scant attention to what she had to say about the environment. And if they were interested in this issue at all, she noted, these people would ask various questions for which she and her organizations did not have any answers. One good example was the question raised by a black student. He wanted to know how the ecology groups would help the minority population if he would support Proposition 18. Mrs. Meade readily admitted that she was frequently cornered by this type of argument and had to leave the stage with a sense of aggravation and frustration.³²

Margaret Cheap's account notwithstanding, it is predictable that such an experience was also shared by the activists in the People's Lobby. Unless some degree of compromise and compensation could be worked out, the issue of air pollution would seem to be looked on as a white man's problem by the minority groups.

³² Meade, interview, July 3, 1972.

As the above illustration demonstrated, the People's Lobby had many difficulties. But it did steadily mobilize public support. The public opinion poll conducted on May 1, 1972, for instance, indicated that 57 percent of those who had heard about Proposition 9 answered "yes" on the measure. The same poll also showed that three out of four of those who had not been aware of the proposition would support the initiative.³³

However, as will be examined later, during the month of May, a drastic change in the public perception of Proposition 9 took place, and a week prior to the election, the popular attitude was completely reversed. In the poll taken on May 31, 68 percent of those who had heard of the initiative, which amounted to 88 percent of the total respondents, declared they would cast negative votes. Further, 47 percent of the entire sample, which included those who did not know about Proposition 9, would vote "no" on the measure as compared to 35 percent who

³³ Los Angeles Times, June 13, 1972, Pt. II, p. 1.

said they would vote "yes."³⁴

When the election return finally came in on June 6, 1972, it reflected the public sentiment which had been gradually forming in the course of a long and fierce campaign. Proposition 9 was defeated by a 2-1 margin. The official tally read: 2.09 million yes and 3.83 million no votes. Thus, another attempt to change the current air pollution control program went down the drain.³⁵

In spite of the defeat, the Koupals are sanguine in their attempt to challenge the lawmakers. They have already made another plan to bring a similar proposition to the California voters in the election of 1974. The members of the People's Lobby are busy working to analyze their past mistakes and to project new tactics to mobilize public support.

Aside from these groups which work mostly at the state level, there are several organizations whose interests and activities lie exclusively in Los Angeles. The

³⁴A detailed explanation about the change in the public poll and the subsequent defeat of Proposition 9 will be discussed later in the paper.

³⁵Los Angeles Times, June 8, 1972, Pt. I, p. 22.

Earth Action Council, the Ecology Action, and the Environmental Information Center are a few examples of this type. However, these groups do not have a large number of followers, nor do they engage in any grand project of openly challenging the county and other city governments in this area. They are primarily neighborhood associations interested in public education. Providing pamphlets or other informational materials are their major activities.

An interesting characteristic of these locally oriented organizations is that they tend to become vulnerable to the changing whims of public sentiment. They proliferate when citizens' interest in air pollution increases, but when it subsides, they lose supporters and become dormant. The Earth Action Council, for instance, was organized a few years ago when the public outcry against pollution reached its zenith. At present, however, it offers no services and activities; even though the name still remains in many localities of Southern California.³⁶

³⁶In addition to The Earth Action Council, this writer found out that many other groups such as the Californians for Environmental Quality had either scaled down or stopped their operations.

Yet, among these passive groups, there is an exceptionally active and cohesive organization called Women For. It conducts its own studies of the smog problem. It also appears before the County Supervisors and other hearings as witnesses and makes critical comments on the control program of Los Angeles. The latest project that Women For undertook was an evaluation of Proposition 9. About twenty women, all of whom were lay people, got together several times a week and reviewed each section of the initiative. Finally, these discussions resulted in a report affirming Proposition 9.³⁷

According to a member of Women For, it currently has 5,000 members of various social and ethnic backgrounds. Another source revealed, however, that the active membership is much smaller than the official figure, and that the members are mostly from wealthy social backgrounds. The members of this organization pay an annual fee of \$7.50. Since this is not sufficient to sponsor many meaningful activities, Women For holds

³⁷ A telephone interview with a secretary of Women For on August 28, 1972.

several luncheon meetings and hosts fashion shows.³⁸

The president, four assistants, and sixty members of the Board of Directors operate this organization. It has four committees designated as the political, environmental quality, education, and special problems committees. Any member can participate in any of the committees and contribute to the discussion of any topic under examination. Usually, the Environmental Quality Committee has an attendance of twenty women.³⁹

As noted, Women For is an exception from the other dormant groups. It is rather well financed and organized, and remains active in Los Angeles. But it has little public recognition and confidence in comparison to the League of Women Voters, a nonpartisan political activists' group with a nation-wide network. In the issue of air pollution control, Women For does not have any members with professional experience. This is crucial, because whatever constructive comments that Women For makes, they tend to be discounted as nonprofessional remarks not

³⁸Telephone interview with Women For secretary.

³⁹Telephone interview with Women For secretary.

grounded on scientific knowledge. How the organization will overcome such a handicap remains to be seen at present.

In short, from the review of the ecology groups of Los Angeles, we have learned that they are primarily the issue oriented organizations. Their raison d'être hinges on the problem of pollution. We have also seen that the ecology groups of Los Angeles are in most cases nonpartisan and nonideological. This holds true even for the People's Lobby. Although it is critical of government policy on air pollution, its criticisms do not seem to be based on any explicit political persuasion. It is involved in a feud with the officials primarily from the ecological standpoint.

Finally, in the study of several groups in Los Angeles, we have noted that they are highly dynamic and active. Not only do they try to avail themselves of many political means to make their voices heard, but also they contrive varieties of methods to get public attention. The frequent attempts at coalition-building by Californians Against Smog, the unique idea of the "Bike for Life" by the People's Lobby, the independent research programs

of Women For, all seem to dramatize their energies and dedication to the preservation of the natural environment.

Business Organizations

According to a popular belief, business organizations in Los Angeles command little or no control over its politics. The idea holds that the area is so widely spread that these enterprises find it extremely hard to take a unified action. Also, this notion states that the political system, being highly decentralized, has no specific point on which these groups can apply pressure.⁴⁰

Actually, this appears to be a misapprehension of the role that business organizations play in the political arena of Los Angeles. As a matter of fact, such issues as air pollution control help business firms to recognize a common interest and stimulate them to initiate a concerted effort to undermine anti-pollution measures. In addition, there has been another significant development. A number of firms in other parts of the United States keeps a close watch on the pollution control

⁴⁰On this point, refer to Chapter II of this dissertation.

programs of Los Angeles. When the government tries to change the regulations, these outsiders often send delegates and position papers in protest against these new movements. This trend makes a good contrast to those well organized ecology groups which go out from Los Angeles.

Because of the nature of their operations, it is difficult for anyone to assess the extent of political influence that business groups generate. One lacks reliable information and access, since business groups tend to shy away from publicity and prefer to remain anonymous. Yet, there are occasions when even these secretive political operations by business enterprises must come to surface. THEY ARE ELECTIONS. In these instances, private industries usually contribute a large sum of money; or else, they will form an organization to support or defeat a candidate or an initiative. All of these ventures undertaken by business groups must be reported to the Secretary of State of California and made available to the public.

In the following section, we will attempt to elaborate the reasons for the defeat of Proposition 18 in

1970 and Proposition 9 in 1972. Even though both of the propositions were state-wide initiatives, they originated in Los Angeles. The center of electoral politics consequently revolved around this area. Thus, even if the examination of these two state issues does not tell the whole story, it can provide us with an important measure of the relative influence of business in Los Angeles.

A study of these two state initiatives show that private industry employed similar campaign techniques in the elections of 1970 and 1972. First, as soon as the propositions were formally placed on the state ballots, business groups such as the truck industry, the automobile clubs, the petroleum companies, the heavy equipment manufacturers, the cement and concrete producers, the auto manufacturers and dealers, etc. formed a "dummy" organization which spearheaded their campaigns against the initiatives.

In the case of Proposition 18, it was the Californians Against the Street and Road Tax Trap. This was administered by a public relations firm, Milton Kramers and Associates of Los Angeles. In the election of 1972, Whitaker and Baxter Campaigns, Inc. was commissioned to

organize the campaign against the initiative of Californians Against the Pollution Initiative.⁴¹

It is interesting to note the industries which take a leading role in organizing these "front" groups. A confidential letter smuggled out of the Los Angeles office of Whitaker and Baxter suggested that it was usually the petroleum industry that played the central role.⁴² According to the letter, Otto N. Miller, Chairman of the Board for Standard Oil of California, was instrumental in selecting Whitaker and Baxter and in determining the anti-initiative strategy. He stated:

. . . the campaign against the People's Lobby initiative must not be spearheaded by business and industry. It should be publicly launched by responsible conservationists, academicians, labor spokesmen. . . .

This strategy insures greater credibility to the thesis the People's Lobby initiative is so extreme, so destructive of people's lives, that responsible environmentalists are embarrassed by it and urge its defeat. . . .

⁴¹The involvement of public relation firms in these initiatives was described in Los Angeles Times, December 27, 1970, Pt. 1, p. 1, and December 8, 1972, Pt. 1, p. 3.

⁴²With regard to this confidential letter, see Los Angeles Times, December 8, 1972, Pt. 1, p. 3.

A public citizens' committee must be formed and announced quickly under the leadership of men known to be Democratic-conservationists, highly respected scientists and academicians, and key labor leaders of the state to create the people against the People's Lobby posture essential to this campaign.

A public committee of this type, a campaign based on the strategy proposed, can be most effective only if the utilities and the oil industry--the businesses most directly affected by the initiative--take direct control of the direction of the campaign, rather than have a dozen or more well-meaning groups take the lead and in so doing create a big business versus people's issue which can only be self-defeating. . . .⁴³

Following this basic outline, the Californians Against the Pollution Initiative recruited the following people as its nominal heads: Dr. Emil Mrak, Chancellor-Emeritus, the University of California, Davis; Joseph J. Dviny, First President, International Brotherhood of Teamsters; Dr. J. E. McKee, Professor of Environmental Engineering, Pasadena; and Myron W. Doornbos, President of the Southern Council of Conservation Clubs.⁴⁴

⁴³Quoted in People's Lobby, A Product of Standard Oil Company of California: Standard Oil's Secret Plan to Defeat the Clean Environment Act (Los Angeles: People's Lobby, n.d.), pp. 1-3.

⁴⁴Californians Against the Pollution Initiative, Some of Prominent Californians Who Have Urged 'No' on No. 9 (San Francisco and Los Angeles: Californians Against the Pollution Initiative, 1972), p. 1.

As this incident clearly demonstrated, the opinion of the petroleum industry seems to have weighed heavily in the business circles of Los Angeles. Because it would be the one most directly affected by anti-pollution measures, it became highly active in the campaigns. But there was another tangible reason which was closely related to this, i.e., campaign contributions. The petroleum industry usually headed the list of donors to the anti-initiative struggle.

In the instance of Proposition 18, Shell Oil, Standard Oil of California, and Gulf Oil donated a total of \$100,000 to the campaign. In addition to this, these giant corporations made available more than \$75,000 as nameless contributors, even though this was in violation of the California election law.⁴⁵ In the election of 1972,

⁴⁵Los Angeles Times, December 4, 1970, Pt. 1, p. 3. Because of the violation of the election code in the State of California, Standard, Gulf, and Mobile Oils were later sued by both the Association of California Consumers and the Secretary of State of California. Concerning this litigation, see Los Angeles Times, January 31, 1972, Pt. 1, pp. 1 and 18. Also see Daily Breeze (Long Beach), August 20, 1970, p. 1.

the oil companies were again the largest contributors to the Californians Against the Pollution Initiative. Bravo Oil of Houston contributed \$55,930. With this the petroleum industry was shown to have donated more than \$100,000 to the opposition's cause.⁴⁶

At this point, it must be noted that the oil companies are national organizations. Even if their head offices are located in Houston or Chicago, they are extremely attentive to local affairs in Los Angeles. And whenever their vested interests are at stake, they are not reluctant to get involved in the political process of California in general and Los Angeles in particular.

This is also true of other industries. The cement and concrete industries, even if they are on the East Coast, are keenly interested in the political affairs of the West Coast and see to it that their businesses are not jeopardized. Without their involvement, it would be doubtful that the Californians Against the Street and

⁴⁶Los Angeles Times, April 27, 1972, Pt. 1, p. 3 and July 10, 1972, Pt. 2, p. 1. In the election of 1972, the People's Lobby sued petroleum industries in their violations of campaign contributions. See on this development in Los Angeles Times, March 7, 1972, Pt. 1, pp. 1 and 5.

Road Tax Trap and the Californians Against the Pollution Initiative could collect \$334,000 and \$1.4 million, respectively, from more than 200 private industries.⁴⁷

These huge sums were in marked contrast to the money raised by the proponents of the propositions.

Californians Against Smog, for instance, collected only \$15,000, about one tenth of what its opponent collected.⁴⁸

By the same token, the People's Lobby, even after raising its fund contributions, could muster only \$233,000 which was far below the \$1.4 million raised by the Californians Against the Pollution Initiative.⁴⁹ It was little wonder that the Los Angeles Times, after the defeat of these propositions, lamentably commented that it would take money to fight money in spite of the broad spectrum of support for passage of the initiatives.⁵⁰

⁴⁷Los Angeles Times, April 27, 1972, Pt. 1, p. 3.

⁴⁸Los Angeles Times, December 27, 1970, Pt. 1, p. 1.

⁴⁹Los Angeles Times, May 3, 1972, Pt. 1, p. 3.

⁵⁰Los Angeles Times, November 6, 1970, Pt. 2, p. 6.

A second campaign tactic of business groups of both 1970 and 1972 was to make tangible issues out of symbolic problems. The central question in Proposition 18 was to alter the distribution of highway funds. Instead of building one freeway after another, the measure was meant to provide the research funds for air pollution control and rapid transit systems. There was no intention in this initiative to suggest a possible tax hike.

Against this proposition, the opponents argued:

(1) those who would benefit directly from the freeways should bear the cost; (2) siphoning off the highway funds for other purposes would result in a deterioration of present road conditions; and (3) California should not waste any money in investing in such a worthless project as the rapid transit or air pollution control since she could never meet the demand for new freeways.⁵¹

Knowing that these contentions would not be enough to convince the voters, the opponents of the initiative tried to transform the entire issue from one of the

⁵¹ Meade, "Amendment," pp. 6-7; and State of California, Public Transit, p. 74.

distribution of highway funds to the issue of taxation. In order to effectively carry this message, it depended heavily on mass media. Through television and radio commercials, billboards and newspapers, Californians Against the Street and Road Tax Trap emphasized that the new proposition would mean a higher tax. "More Tax. No! No on 18" was the catch phrase for its campaign.⁵²

In the election of 1972, business opponents of Proposition 9 faced a much stronger and well organized group than in the previous case. They had two immediate tasks in order to enfeeble the power base of the People's Lobby. It had to arouse the public by pointing out the serious defects and detriments of Proposition 9. Also, it had to secure the endorsement of as many public figures as possible for the opposition's cause.

For the first objective, the Californians Against the Pollution Initiative undertook three direct approaches, all of which were an attempt to bring the issue close to the daily lives of citizens. First was to publish newsletters and to mail them to prospective

⁵²Los Angeles Times, December 27, 1970, Pt. 1, p. 1.

opponents of the measure.⁵³ Second was to get public attention through billboards. In a few miles on Olympic Boulevard in Los Angeles, for instance, there were more than four such signs at the height of the campaign. They were elaborate and seemed to have succeeded in creating a tangible issue out of Proposition 9. One of the boards read, "Losing jobs does not clean the environment. No. No on 9."⁵⁴ Finally, the anti-Proposition group utilized television and radio commercials. They were subtle, since some of them did not mention a word about the initiative. But the message was clear. If Proposition 9 passed, they implied that Californians would have to pay a high price for it.⁵⁵

⁵³The publications by the Californians Against the Pollution Initiative were scientifically insignificant, because only that it did was to reprint speeches, position papers, and findings of other people or organizations. However, the volume of its publications was very extensive. They numbered as many as thirty different papers in addition to a large volume of pamphlets.

⁵⁴This was this writer's personal observation made at the peak of the election of 1972.

⁵⁵There were many radio commercials to this effect in April and May of 1972. They became more frequent as the election came nearer.

The second objective of the Californians Against the Pollution Initiative was accomplished through widely publicized disclosures of the shortcomings of the proposition. Newspapers, TV stations, radio networks, all criticized the measure. In their opinion, Proposition 9 was poorly written and contained many loopholes. Thus, they argued, even if it were adopted, it could not help alleviate the smog problem.⁵⁶

Perhaps because of the influence of mass media, politicians from the governor to the city councilmen of Los Angeles began to take a negative view of the initiative. This attitude was also evident among the state and local agencies in charge of air pollution control. Labor unions, too were against Proposition 9, while many state

⁵⁶See, for instance, "KNBC Editorial," KNBC, Los Angeles, Telecast, February 2, 1972: "Environment Deception," by speaker, James E. Foy. In addition, according to the material supplied by the Californians Against the Pollution Initiative, more than forty local newspapers in California opposed to Proposition 9. Concerning this point, see Californians Against the Pollution Initiative, A Symposium of California Editorial Opinion Urging Vote No on No. 9 (San Francisco and Los Angeles: Californians Against the Pollution Initiative, n.d.).

and local organizations such as the California Tax Payers' Association publicly denounced it.⁵⁷

An interesting development was the policy stand taken by other ecology groups. One of the most respected organizations, with a nation-wide support, the Sierra Club, went through a long process of agony and frustration. Some of the members felt that the measure should be endorsed; but others opposed endorsement. In the end, the Club opted for a neutral position leaving the final decision to individual members. Even though this policy was promptly attacked by the People's Lobby and Ralph Nader, it was all that it could do to avoid a possible rift and disintegration of the Club.⁵⁸

Thus, by the time of the election, Proposition 9 was surrounded by hostile people and groups. Under these

⁵⁷On these aspects of the election in 1972, see the following Los Angeles Times: March 12, 1972, Pt. A, p. 1; May 12, 1972, Pt. 1, p. 3; May 10, 1972, Pt. 1, p. 9; June 1, 1972, Pt. 1, p. 1; June 4, 1972, Pt. 1, p. 1; and June 5, 1972, Pt.1, p. 3.

⁵⁸Los Angeles Times, May 7, 1972, Pt. B, p. 2. See also Sierra Club position paper, Proposition 9: Pros and Cons (San Francisco: Sierra Club, n.d.). With respect to Ralph Nader's allegation, see Los Angeles Times, June 6, 1972, Pt. 1, p. 2.

circumstances, it seemed likely that it would be defeated by a 2-1 margin in California.⁵⁹

In brief, the experiences of Proposition 18 of 1970 and Proposition 9 of 1972 seem highly informative in bringing to light and business group activities of Los Angeles on the issue of air pollution. These two cases clearly demonstrated that the financial power of business was decisive in bringing about the defeats of the propositions. By virtue of their funds, they could wage effective campaigns against the ecology groups. According to Mrs. Meade, the last few weeks of her campaign for Proposition 18 were some of the most tormenting days of her life. The opponents could avail themselves of every kind of mass media to air their case against the initiative. As a result of such a campaign, massive defections from the pro-Proposition 18 camp took place. But Mrs. Meade's group could only sit and wait for the vote.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Los Angeles Times, June 8, 1972, Pt. 1, p. 22.

⁶⁰ Meade, interview, July 3, 1972.

However, it is worth noting that in Los Angeles, economic power in and of itself would guarantee little, if any, of the vested interests of the enterprises. The two cases of the initiatives made it succinctly clear that they had to fight, and fight hard, to win over the opposition in the electoral process. In order to achieve such an objective, the businessmen first had to consolidate themselves. Also, they had to cultivate support for their cause among prominent members of California. At the same time, these people had to extensively depend on mass media, through which to reach millions of voters.

In these processes, the business groups seemed to be fully aware of the fact that it was the electorate that would determine the outcome of the elections. They also knew that their interests hinged on the extent of their involvement in the electoral process of Los Angeles. Thus, even if they wanted to remain behind the scenes, the business organizations had to initiate whatever measures were necessary to lure as many voters as possible to their cause.

By contrast, the economic interests of Osaka are much more entrenched than those of Los Angeles. They are

not usually involved in any open conflict with other organizations. Nor do their political operations appear as obvious to the public as do those of their counterparts in Los Angeles. In addition, Osaka lacks any group which can check the power of these business interests. These significant differences will become clear as we return to Osaka.

Osaka

Ecology Groups

Osaka has been witnessing a tremendous proliferation of groups concerned with the ecological issue in the last few years. Among these mushrooming organizations, approximately fifteen have enough membership support and financial means to be both stable and active. A close examination of these core groups reveals two interesting characteristics.

First, they are, in most cases, not issue-oriented organizations in the sense of many of the ecology groups of Los Angeles. Rather they are ideological groups affiliated with labor unions or other progressive political movements in Japan. The extent of involvement of the

Communist Party is especially striking, even though it attempts to conceal its identity as much as possible.

The Association of the Citizens of Sakai and Takaishi Against Pollution, for instance, is a coalition of the Sakai Public Employees Union and the Senboku Public School Teachers Union with the support of two communist groups, the League of Medical Professions for Democracy and the Association of Young Lawyers. Similarly, the Association of Konohana Against Pollution consists of several public workers unions, in addition to the front organization of the Communist Party called the Group for Good Health.⁶¹

Those members who are involved in these group actions seem to believe that the entire ecological issue should be approached from a wide ideological perspective and not from a purely technical standpoint. For them, air pollution represents one of the major symptoms of social evils inherent in the contemporary society of Japan.

⁶¹The writer is grateful to Toshihide Matsuo, a junior at Kobe College of Commerce for providing this information.

Professor Kenichi Miyamoto of Osaka Municipal University, who is part of the brain trust for the ecology groups of Osaka, expresses the feelings typically shared by these activists. He argues that the present urban crisis of Japan is akin to that of Europe at the time of Marx and Engels, although the expression of the problem takes a different form.

From his point of view, capital accumulation in the hands of a few people has been primarily responsible for the varieties of urban problems in present-day Japan. Under the conditions of such a concentration of wealth, he contends that the social mechanism of the balance of production and distribution has been totally obliterated. This has, he notes, resulted in unaccountable numbers of filthy living environments, especially for the working class in the urban community. From Miyamoto's perspective, therefore, air pollution epitomizes an inner conflict of the capitalistic society.⁶²

Second, the other characteristic of groups inter-

⁶²Kenichi Miyamoto, Nippon no Toshi Mondai (Urban Crisis in Japan) (Tokyo: Tsukuma Shobo, 1971), pp. 6-9.

ested in the pollution control of Osaka lies in the extreme localization of their activities. These organizations are exclusively confined to two locations. The majority of them are found in the city of Sakai, the heart of the industrial complexes, while a small number is in Nishi Yodogawa and Konohana Wards, which are two of the most polluted sectors in the city of Osaka. Between these two points, there are no groups active in the preservation of the natural environment, even though there are some student organizations and medical professional associations which support these core ecology movements.⁶³

This localization seems inextricable from the ideological nature of the ecology group of Osaka. Most of them are not interested in pollution per se. But they are concerned with the issue essentially because they want to use the case for the propagation of their ideology against the "Establishment." Consequently, these groups tend to proliferate only in places where air pollution

⁶³This observation was made by this writer on the basis of a list of the ecology groups of Osaka supplied by Ōsaka kara Kōgai o Nakusu-Kai.

has extreme visible effects. From this perspective, it seems understandable that the most polluted sectors of Osaka such as Sakai and Konohana get a lot of attention by these ideologically inclined ecology activists. It is worth noting, however, that such a disposition among them has a major drawback. It makes Osaka extremely slow in developing an issue-oriented organization whose interest is not only in isolated pockets of pollution but in the entire region.

The first anti-pollution activity in the recent history of Osaka appeared in 1958. This was staged by a handful of government workers in Sakai. It was primarily a protest against impending land reclamation and construction of the industrial complexes. Even though these unionists worked strenuously, they fell short of arousing public support.⁶⁴

In retrospect, two major factors were still missing at that stage of the movement which explain the failure of this first attempt. The movement was as yet no

⁶⁴Sakai Takaishi, Sakai Senboku no Kōgai, pp. 158-159.

visible symbol of the pollution problem. The construction of industrial sites was imminent but had thus far registered little impact on the residents of the area. As a result, the potential supporters did not know what the protest was all about. In addition, the union's strategy lacked sophistication. It launched the protest movement against pollution in conjunction with the annual fight for higher wages. From the view of the residents, this was confusing, because they failed to see the relationship of these two problems. The first group action initiated, then, failed to mobilize many potential supporters.⁶⁵

Such a state of affairs lasted well over seven years, until 1965. By this time, big corporations had already moved into the newly reclaimed land and had begun their operations. Subsequently, the sky as well as the rivers of Osaka became more visibly polluted and brought many obvious physical effects to both human beings and

⁶⁵This information was made available by Ryo Kinoshita, Shikko Iinchō Sakai-Shi Shokuin Rōdō Kumiai (Chairman, Public Workers Union of the City of Sakai), in an interview held in Osaka on October 12, 1972.

plants and animals. The decline of the quality of the natural environment, especially in Sakai, was so rapid that a number of medical doctors decided to speak out on what the industries had done to the citizens' health. These people were mostly from Mimihara Medical Clinic of the city of Sakai and belonged to the Association of Medical Professionals for Democracy. This was, interestingly enough, one of the auxiliary organizations of the Japanese Communist Party.⁶⁶

In 1965, these doctors first travelled to other polluted areas of Japan and investigated the extent of smog in these places. When they returned to Sakai, they organized a lecture tour in which they exhibited the photographs taken during their fact finding trip and discussed the health hazards of pollution.⁶⁷

⁶⁶This background information was supplied by Yoshio Serizawa, Jimu Kyoku-Chō Ōsaka kara Kōgai o Nakusu Kai (Secretary General, Association of Citizens of Osaka Against Pollution), in an interview held in Osaka on October 12, 1972.

⁶⁷One of the results that these doctors registered from their trip was a publication of the research paper: Mimihara Sōgō Byōin Kōgai Gurūpu (The Group Against Pollution in Mimihara Medical Clinic), Taiki Osen to Kenkō Hakai (Health Effects of Air Pollution) (Sakai, Ōsaka:

Even though these two groups, the government workers and the medical doctors, could not accomplish much, they were, nonetheless, of crucial importance because they provided a nucleus and became instrumental in the formation of the first ecology action organization established in 1968.

In 1967, the prefectural government of Osaka reported that it could not confidently establish a significant correlation between air pollution and industrial operations. Basing its action on this assertion, Kansai Electric Power announced that it would extend its power plant facilities by installing additional generators.⁶⁸

Both the report of the Osaka officials and the announcement of the electric company outraged a large number of people, especially scholars. They felt that, unless some civic protest movement was organized, smog would be left unchecked to the extent of total disaster. Because of such a conviction, Professors Hiroshi Maruyama

Mimihara Sōgō Byōin Kōgai Gurūpu, 1970). With respect to other activities of this medical group, see Sakai Takaishi, Sakai Senboku no Kōgai, pp. 160-161.

⁶⁸Sakai Takaishi, Sakai Senboku no Kōgai, pp. 162-166.

of the University of Osaka School of Medicine, and Kenichi Miyamoto of Osaka Municipal University, Department of Economics, jointly called upon labor unions and other organizations to form a coalition of various groups against smog.⁶⁹

The doctors from Mimi-hara Medical Clinic and the government workers of Sakai responded immediately to this proposal. They both took leading roles in recruiting women's clubs, teachers' unions, and other labor unions of Sakai. As a result of their effort, the Association of Citizens of Sakai Against Pollution came into being on January 22, 1968.⁷⁰

With the formation of this association, the members which were about 500 people put forth four major objectives of their movement. They were (1) to seek voluntary restraints of industries to curtail pollution; (2) to

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 163. The text of the appeal made by Professors Maruyama and Miyamoto is found in Sakai kara Kōgai o Nakusu Shimin no Kai, Sakai kara Kōgai o Nakusu Shimin no Kai wa Kōyu Dantai desu (All About the Association of Citizens of Sakai Against Pollution) (Sakai, Ōsaka: Sakai kara Kōgai o Nakusu Shimin no Kai, n.d.), p. 2.

⁷⁰ Sakai Takaishi, Sakai Senboku no Kōgai, pp. 163-166.

demand the cancellation of the expansion plan of Kansai Electric Power; (3) to push the government to make a thorough investigation of the health hazards of smog; and (4) to request public compensation for the more seriously affected victims of air pollution.⁷¹

Once the goals were set forth, the association initiated several projects to realize its objectives. The members of the organization took a direct approach in order to arouse public interest. They stood in busy intersections of Osaka and Sakai and distributed pamphlets to passers-by. These materials described the purpose of the association and included basic information on pollution. At the same time, the group mailed a large number of letters to prospective supporters. The letters urged people to call or write to their respective local governmental representatives requesting prompt action to stop

⁷¹Ibid., p. 164. See also Sakai kara Kōgai o Nakasu Shimin no Kai, Sakai kara Kōgai o Nakasu Shimin no Kai wa Kōyu Dantai desu, pp. 1-2.

pollution.⁷²

Ryo Kinoshita, Chairman of the Public Employees Union of Sakai, was heavily involved in this campaign. According to him, the entire crusade was a complete failure in spite of the intensified effort. He listed several reasons for this evaluation. Among others, he commented that the low level of awareness on the part of the citizens was one of the major impediments. They simply did not pay attention to the campaign, Kinoshita lamented, even though the messages were straightforward and informative.

From his experience, the apathy of the citizens hit the association especially hard in its fund raising drive. Even though Kinoshita's union and others provided a major portion of the fund, it was not enough, and they had to solicit financial support from local citizens. Aware of their indifference, his group made a conscious

⁷²In addition to the pamphlet describing the nature of the association, Sakai kara Kōgai o Nakusu Shimin no Kai printed a large volume of other informational materials; see, e.g., Ōsaka no Kōgai (Pollution in Osaka) and Sanbo Chiku Kōgai Jittai Chōsa no Matome (A Report on the Effect of Pollution in Sanbo Area).

effort to advertise the organization and its principles, for which it had to spend close to ¥500,000 (\$166,000). However, only on a few occasions was the association able to realize a net profit, which eventually totaled approximately ¥200,000 (\$66,000). As Kinoshita recalled, the campaign usually resulted in a substantial loss. He complained that the people would not donate even ¥100 for what he considered to be a worthy cause, although they spent much more than that on inconsequential consumers' items.⁷³

Despite these difficulties, however, Kinoshita's efforts registered one major accomplishment. As his campaign became known to the neighboring areas, similar associations were formed. In Takaishi, fifty members of the Senboku Teachers Union joined with an equal number of members from the women's club to organize the Association of the Citizens of Takaishi Against Pollution which was established in February 1968.⁷⁴ No sooner had this

⁷³Ryo Kinoshita, an interview held in Sakai on October 12, 1972.

⁷⁴Takaishi kara Kōgai o Nakusu Shimin no Kai, Kōgai Nyūsu (News on Pollution) (Takaishi, Ōsaka: Takaishi kara Kōgai o Nakusu Shimin no Kai, 1972), p. 1.

association materialized when action was started against two petroleum companies. The organization demanded:

- (1) an immediate halt to the expansion of plants, and
- (2) a financial compensation for damage to property and health caused by their operations.⁷⁵

The formation of such action groups was not an isolated incident confined only to the area adjacent to the Sakai industrial sites. As a matter of fact, it spread to Nishi Yodogawa and Konohana Wards in the city of Osaka.

In Konohana, for instance, a small-scale campaign had been waging against a fertilizer company for more than ten years. Mineji Shiota, a medical doctor, was the lone crusader, but because of his failure to make an impression, he determined to expand his campaign by inviting a communist organization, the Group for Good Health, to support his efforts. This alliance gave rise to the establishment of the Association of Citizens of Konohana Against Pollution, established in July 1968. This organization currently has the potential to mobilize

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 1.

300 to 500 people, although the active members are somewhere between 50 and 60. The major area of activity of this group has been to publish an open letter to the administrative chief of Konohana Ward (a civil service appointment through the mayor's office) and to inquire what measures have been taken to clean the air.⁷⁶

In Nishi Yodogawa, a comparable organization, the Association of Citizens of Nishi Yodogawa Against Pollution, was established in October 1968. One of the interesting features of this group was the composition of its membership. It consisted of two types, individual and group memberships. The individual members in 1969 totaled 1,200 people. There were about seven groups which came from the Socialist, Democratic Socialist, and Communist Parties in addition to their affiliated mass organizations.⁷⁷

⁷⁶This information was supplied by Toshio Matsuo.

⁷⁷See Nishi Yodogawa kara Kōgai o Nakusu Shimin no Kai, Kōgai o Nakusu Kai Nyūsu (Newsletter from the Association Against Pollution) (Nishi Yodogawa, Ōsaka: Nishi Yodogawa kara Kōgai o Nakusu Shimin no Kai, 1971).

Thus, by the end of 1969, Osaka had a dozen ecology action groups. Although they varied in both the location and the degree of their activities, they shared one characteristic. All of them, without exception, showed a considerable attachment to leftist organizations. These groups, more often than not, constituted the nucleus of the entire campaign against pollution.

According to Chairman Kinoshita, the ecology movement of Osaka up until the end of 1969 was at a low ebb, in spite of the growth of the organizations. He suggested that the absence of coordination among these groups was perhaps as much responsible as the general apathy for their marginal successes. However, from his point of view, a major incident in the early part of 1970 drastically altered this and enabled these organizations to undertake a unified and concerted effort against smog more substantial than ever before.⁷⁸

On February 17, 1970, a flare stack of the Osaka Petroleum Chemical of Sakai exploded and continued to burn for over ten days. This generated tremendous thunder,

⁷⁸Kinoshita, interview, October 12, 1972.

smoke, and blaze horrifying the residents of both Osaka and Sakai. The company officials, fearful of a decline in their public image, were quick to send a large number of cars throughout the area. From loud speakers they tried to assure the people that the flame would be contained in a few days and nothing harmful would result. Such an attempt fell short of satisfying the citizens. Complaints came especially from those who had aged relatives or infants in the family, that the accident was so upsetting for them they could neither sleep nor rest.⁷⁹

In keeping abreast with the mounting general discontent, many ecology action groups began to take advantage of the unprecedented opportunity to reinforce their movement. The members of the Association of Citizens of Takaishi Against Pollution went to the streets and handed out more than 8,000 pamphlets a day for a week. These pamphlets denounced both the chemical company and the governments of Osaka Prefecture and Sakai as too slow in initiating remedial action.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Sakai Takaishi, Sakai Senboku no Kōgai, pp. 166-169.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 167-168.

The organization of Sakai, in a similar vein, mobilized its union members to stage street demonstrations in the downtown area, while its leaders tried to meet government officials to discuss the entire incident. These developments were all published, and printed literature was distributed to the residents. In addition, as the protest was intensified, the association drew a group of young lawyers to its side. This was a great asset, because they brought a new dimension to the movement.⁸¹

As soon as these jurists, most of whom were members of the Communist Party, joined the group, they proposed to take a survey in order to find out the extent of health damage deriving from pollution.⁸² This investi-

⁸¹ Kinoshita, interview, October 12, 1972.

⁸² The leader of this group was Hiroshi Araki, a lawyer and a member of the Communist Party. See his autobiography, Michi Hitosuji (The Only Path) (Sakai, Ōsaka: Araki Hiroshi Kōenkai, n.d.), in which he described how he became interested in the struggle against industrial polluters. It is important to note that Araki ran for the House of Representatives from the fifth district in the December election of 1972. Among eight contenders he captured the first place and became the first communist member to be elected for this highest office from that district.

gation, conducted along with the protest movement, served three purposes. First, it enlarged the volume of information on smog, which would be vital for the future campaign. Second, it educated the members of the Sakai group. Although much was said about pollution, some members had not seen its real impact. The survey would probably help them to witness and visualize this with their own eyes. Finally, the research would increase chances of getting in touch with a broader spectrum of the residents. It would directly contribute to the growth of public interest in the ecology group especially in view of the flare-stack incident which was still fresh in their minds.⁸³

Thus, the entire movement of 1970 showed a remarkable improvement from that of 1958. Not only did its strategy improve in sophistication, but it also had an important case at its disposal. Perhaps because of these reasons, the associations in various places

⁸³ Sakai Gōdō Hōritsu Jimusho, Sakai Takaishi no Kōgai Hantai Tōsō ni Okeru Hōritsuka no Yakuwari (The Role of Jurists in the Anti-Pollution Campaigns in the Sakai and Takaishi Area) (Sakai, Osaka: Sakai Gōdō Hōritsu Jimusho, n.d.), pp. 1-5.

gradually began to get good public reception. Some of the people offered their help in distributing informational materials, while many others started to read these handouts much more carefully than before.⁸⁴

By May 1970, the campaign had reached its zenith by successfully implanting in the minds of people the extreme hazard of pollution. At that juncture, however, a serious problem arose for the activists of the various ecology groups. They were all aware of the fact that public sentiment against smog would not last for long. In order to perpetuate such an interest, they needed a new issue as well as a new method to reach out to a large number of people living in Osaka. To resolve these problems, various groups put forth two proposals: (1) to build a coalition of different organizations, and (2) to focus their unified action on the immediate cancellation of all future plans to enlarge industrial sites.⁸⁵

Thus, on May 21, 1970, the leaders of the citizens' group of Takaishi took the initiative and proposed

⁸⁴Sakai Takaishi, Sakai Senboku no Kōgai, p. 169.

⁸⁵Ibid., pp. 179-180.

to its counterpart of Sakai to form a "united front."

This proposal was well received and facilitated the building of a new group, the Association of the Citizens of Sakai and Takaishi Against Pollution. Soon after its inception, the organization set its target on the first block of the Sakai-Senboku zone in the industrial site, which was soon to develop a large number of new plants. The organization was determined to put an end to such a development.⁸⁶

In achieving its final objective, the newly created citizens' group which had more than 1,000 members undertook several significant steps. One of the most remarkable was the circulation of petitions, which was extremely rare in Japanese politics. These petitions, which were all addressed to the speaker of the assembly of the Osaka Prefecture, called for the immediate termination of the current plan. The members of the group first went to university professors, lawyers, dentists,

⁸⁶Ibid., pp. 179-185. See also Sakai Takaishi kara Kōgai o Nakusu Kakkai Kondankai, Sakai Takaishi kara Kōgai o Nakusu Seigan Shomei no Onegai (An Appeal for the Petition to Eliminate Pollution from the Sakai and Takaishi Area) (Sakai, Ōsaka: Sakai Takaishi Kōgai o Nakusu Kakkai Kondankai, n.d.), p. 1.

doctors, etc. to collect signatures. Once they secured these names, they printed them in a separate sheet of paper. When they approached ordinary citizens, they showed it to them as a reference and could get quick and good results.⁸⁷

Concurrent with this effort, the organization sponsored a number of symposiums and public discussions. One of them was held in the summer of 1970. Professor Kenichi Miyamoto appeared as a guest speaker and discussed pollution control from the view of civic action. In September, Professors Junji Honda and Tei Hosokawa chaired a panel on the role of labor unions in the control of pollution in the seventies.⁸⁸

Another action initiated by the coalition of the Sakai and Takaishi groups was to hold mass rallies, one of which was staged at Sakai on July 5, 1970. Such an occasion was important from the standpoint of the group

⁸⁷A list of persons signed the petition which was published under the title, Sakai Takaishi kara Kōgai o Nakusu Sengan Yobikake Nin Gohomyō.

⁸⁸This information was printed in a material supplied by Sakai Takaishi yori Kōgai o Nakasu Kakkai Kondankai.

movement. It served as an informational channel. Every member involved could exchange his opinion with another from a different area. Also, it helped to solidify group unity by virtue of a large number of people gathered with a single purpose in mind.⁸⁹

The outcome of these campaigns appeared quite impressive. The organization of the people of Sakai and Takaishi garnered more than 3,500,000 signatures for the petitions. They were turned over to the prefectural government at once. Such a phenomenal success was enough to shake up local politicians, conservatives and progressives alike. The city councilmen of Sakai and Takaishi certainly had to realize that they could no longer ignore the power of the ecology action group in their constituencies.⁹⁰

These civic representatives then decided to meet the leaders of the ecology group. From this conference came the proposal that city council members would confer

⁸⁹ Sakai Takaishi, Sakai Senboku no Kōgai, pp. 182-183.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 185.

with and make direct appeals to the governor of Osaka to cancel all present and future construction of industrial plants. Having been confronted with both the overwhelming number of the petition signatures and the determination of the local representatives, Governor Gisen Sato saw no alternative but to give in.

In late 1970, despite loud opposition from the conservative controlled prefectural assembly, the governor announced that the final decision regarding future industrial development would be put off until April 1971. In the meantime, he also noted that all current construction projects would be suspended, even though the plants already in operation could proceed with their production. Thus, at long last, the Association of the Citizens of Sakai and Takaishi scored a major victory.⁹¹

According to Chairman Kinoshita of the Government Workers Union of Sakai, the entire campaign taught him a number of valuable lessons. First, he learned that general apathy could be overcome as long as he possessed a tangible issue. The accidental explosion of the flare-

⁹¹Ibid.

stack, in his opinion, helped the people to internalize pollution as a major problem fundamental to their welfare. This process, he noted, would become a major background for the determination of the degree of success of the movement.

Second, from his vintage point, Kinoshita pointed to the importance of coordinating the actions of different organizations. He suggested that it could assure the growth of the organization on the one hand, and the extension of the scope of its activities on the other. In his opinion, the result of the campaign would have been different had his group failed to recruit the lawyers and to start the movement anew.

These encouraging signs perhaps enabled many other members of the association in the Sakai area to foresee a bright prospect for their movement. Thus, once their victory was confirmed, they became more ambitious than before and tried to initiate another advance for the movement.⁹²

The first step that the group undertook in

⁹²Kinoshita, interview, October 12, 1972.

accomplishing such a design was to form a grand coalition of all ecology organizations in the prefecture of Osaka. On November 20, 1970, the group in Sakai and Takaishi formally appealed to different organizations to create the Association of the People of Osaka Against Pollution. After four months of negotiations, the coalition became a reality on February 17, 1971.⁹³

According to the Yomiuri newspaper, the first mass rally held on that day drew approximately 2,000 participants who represented more than fifty different organizations. They included, for instance, fifteen ecology action groups, sixteen labor unions, six medical associations, and two legal professional organizations, in addition to all progressive political parties and peace movements. In total, they involved more than 300,000 members.⁹⁴

During this initial meeting, the participants nominated the executive board along with the twelve core

⁹³Asahi Shinbun Ōsaka Ban (Asahi Newspaper, Osaka Edition), February 18, 1971, p. 20.

⁹⁴Yomiuri Shinbun Ōsaka Ban (Yomiuri Newspaper, Osaka Edition), February 18, 1971, p. 20.

groups which would spearhead the future campaign. The person elected as president of the association was Professor Hiroshi Maruyama of the University of Osaka. Toraichi Yamaguchi of the Association of the Citizens of Takaishi and Akira Kimura of the Association of the Citizens of Nishi Yodogawa would assist him as vice-presidents. The conference also decided that it would keep a permanent office in the building of the League of Medical Professions for Democracy.⁹⁵

Although the coalition was thus inaugurated with full fanfare, its record since then has been mixed. From the view of the members of the association, they have had a smashing success, not only in ecology but also in other areas of Osaka politics. They pointed to, for instance, massive turn-outs on the ecology days sponsored by the Association of the Citizens of Osaka Against Pollution. They also indicated the crucial role they had played in electing the first socialist to the office of

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 20.

prefectural governor.⁹⁶

However true these achievements may be, the members should take into consideration several discouraging aspects of their movement. One of them is a sharp decline of public interest. With the panic created by the flare-stack incident of 1970 almost forgotten, the citizens do not seem concerned with the ecology problem as much as they used to be.

One of the ways to measure such a change is to examine the background of those who usually take part in the mass rallies. On October 3, 1972, for example, the Association of the Citizens of Osaka Against Pollution held an ecology day in Ogimachi Park of Osaka. According to the official estimate supplied by the organization, more than 10,000 people participated. The figure itself was impressive, but almost all of the participants were from organized labor and teachers' unions. Only a few

⁹⁶One of the data in support of the claim made by the Association of Citizens of Osaka Against Pollution was the election returns of both Sakai and Nishi Yodogawa in the gubernatorial election of 1971. In these areas, Kuroda overwhelmed Sato in the number of popular votes by a margin of two to one.

were unaffiliated with these groups.⁹⁷

This finding reveals the serious dilemma that the ecology movement of Osaka will eventually face in the not too distant future. The participants may be ideologically motivated in the anti-pollution activities, but the people with whom they must deal are significantly unaware of the ecological as well as the political problems. Under these conditions, these activists must continue to present a score of tangible and pragmatic issues so citizens may understand the importance of the problem. This means, in effect, that they must subdue their ideological outlook and become more issue-oriented than has been the case in the past. Without such an effort, the public will turn away from both the group and the issue, as the present trend has already indicated.

In summation, from the study of various ecology groups of Osaka, we have learned two important facts. First, these groups are ideologically-oriented organizations which are closely affiliated with the progressive

⁹⁷Yoshio Serizawa pointed out this problem in the interview held in Osaka on October 13, 1972.

political movements of Japan. The titles used frequently claim to be citizens' associations, but they are actually deceptive, because these groups reflect only the ideological position of the left. Second, the ecology movement of Osaka is extremely localized, being concentrated in two areas of Osaka. However, a recent trend suggests that they have tried to overcome such localization by promoting more broadly-based coalitions.

These conspicuous characteristics of the ecology organizations of Osaka, when checked against the current trend among citizen interest levels, appear detrimental for their future growth. In view of the number of unconcerned citizens, these groups must make a major revision in terms of both strategy and orientation.

Business Organizations

The examination of the political role of business groups in Osaka reveals a distinctive difference from that of business groups in Los Angeles. They are much more entrenched than their counterparts in Southern California. One of the fundamental causes for this comes from their close alignment with local government. On many occasions in the past, business has been accorded many

special privileges and concessions. Moreover, their interests were well guarded by these local political systems, even at the expense of the general welfare. Thus, it often appeared to a large number of people that their governments were simply political arms of the big business corporations of Japan.

This trend is deeply rooted in the development of local government in general and its tax structure in particular. Simply stated, the major problem is the shortage of dependable local fiscal resources. This has plagued all local governments in Japan, regardless of their size and location. In alleviating the problem, many governments have turned to corporations for help and have asked them to build plants in the areas under their administration. This, the government officials hoped, would help increase their local revenues. Although such arrangements could salvage many local governments from their immediate financial trouble, they have at the same time resulted in a large number of problems.

As previously noted, the local polities of Osaka heavily depend on national subsidies and grants in executing a variety of projects. However, in Japan these

financial aids are never given to these governments for their free disposal. Quite to the contrary, all subsidies and grants are carefully earmarked. Behind such stringent financial regulation by the national government lies the rationale that central fiscal control will reduce the regional discrepancies in levels of economic developments and urbanization.⁹⁸

Yet, the centralization of control over local expenditures has produced many problems, especially for those polities in urban areas. These problems have become more and more conspicuous as Japan's economic growth has accelerated. Osaka, for instance, has been confronted by a large number of migrant workers moving into the region from rural areas. Such a rapid increase of the population required both the prefectural and the municipal governments of Osaka to expand their local functions. They had to provide more schools and roads than before, while also enlarging housing units.⁹⁹

⁹⁸Okita, Chiho Jichi, p. 258.

⁹⁹Ibid., pp. 257-259.

Although the problems were substantial, the metropolitan governments could not expect an increase in financial help from the central authority. In the eyes of officials in Tokyo, any special treatment in particular to the urban entities was detrimental to the balanced growth of the country as a whole.¹⁰⁰

As a result, these two conditions placed Osaka as well as many other urban polities in a difficult position. Not only could they not foresee any relief in the rate of in-migration, but also they were confronted by a grave financial crisis.

. . . The term akaji dantai, "local entities in the red," came into frequent use in the official vocabulary. In 1951, 15 prefectures showed a deficit in one form or another; by 1952, their number had grown to 35 and in 1955 it was 36. In 1951, 142 cities were "in the red." The following year 205 of them, including four of the five biggest cities, found themselves in this position. And in 1955, four of the five biggest cities and 313 out of the remaining 487 cities showed a deficit.¹⁰¹

In Osaka the problem was compounded because of the region's basic economic structure. The area had been

¹⁰⁰Ibid., p. 258.

¹⁰¹Steiner, Local Government in Japan, p. 296.

known for the prominence of its commercial activities for many decades. It had been, in fact, the center of the Japanese economy until the end of the war, but in the post-war period this was gradually eroded. Instead of Osaka, Tokyo became the nerve center toward which all business activities were oriented. Along with this transformation, many giant corporations started to shift their operations to the capital while leaving only minor business activities centered in Osaka. Such a change had immediate effects on the treasuries of both the prefectural and the municipal governments to the point that, in the mid-fifties, they had to look for some way of stopping the decline of their economic status.¹⁰²

The ultimate solution of these problems was to reform the fundamental economic orientation of the area. Upon reaching this conclusion in 1958, the government officials from both the prefecture and the municipalities of Osaka devised a plan to develop heavy industries in addition to traditionally strong commercial enterprises. They further elaborated the policy to reclaim the coastal

¹⁰²Sakai Takaishi, Sakai Senboku no Kōgai, p. 2.

zone along the city of Sakai, in which they intended to build a gigantic industrial center.¹⁰³

In such a scheme for industrialization, the public officials of Osaka conceived at least two major advantages. First and foremost was the immediate increase in local revenues. The inhabitants, the enterprise, and the property taxes that the corporations would have to pay could perhaps free Osaka from its financial trouble. Second was the expansion of employment opportunities for the residents, once the industries moved into the area. This could boost the business of the entire region which, in turn, would contribute to an increase in the public treasury.¹⁰⁴

Even if the prospects of the new policy appeared bright, there was a problem. Big firms would not automatically move to Osaka just because the huge empty lot was available in Sakai. They had to see other tangible benefits before they could make final decisions to build

¹⁰³Osaka Nenkan, 1972, p. 704.

¹⁰⁴Sato, Gendai no Chihō Seiji, pp. 98-100.

new plants there. Having become fully aware of the need for such incentives, the prefectural government of Osaka was prompt to announce several important concessions.¹⁰⁵

First, the rent in the new location was determined to be, on the average, ¥4,800 per 3.3 m² (one tsubo), even though the reclamation actually cost more than ¥20,000 for the same lot. Second, all enterprises building their plants in Sakai could have free access to the port of Osaka without any charge. In fact, the piers later assigned to Nippon Steel were constructed by Osaka at the expense of ¥2 billion from the prefectural budget. Third, the corporations in the new site could secure enough water at the substantially low rate of ¥4 per gallon.¹⁰⁶

From these generous offers, it can be seen how desperate Osaka was to resolve its financial crisis. Fortunately for the area, a large number of giant corporations took the opportunity and decided to develop their new industrial factories in Sakai. As previously noted,

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 98.

¹⁰⁶Sakai Takaishi, Sakai Senboku no Kōgai, pp. 121-122.

there are more than 120 firms of various industrial enterprises currently in operation.

Subsequent records show that these corporations have helped improve the financial condition of Osaka to a great extent. According to the official account of 1971, for instance, the prefectural government could raise 84 percent of its total revenue by itself; it depended on the national government for only 16 percent. For all intents and purposes, therefore, the new industrial plan originated in 1958 appears to have been extremely beneficial, at least from the financial standpoint of Osaka.¹⁰⁷

Although this seems to be the case, the special relationship between the governments and corporations which has been developed in the course of the industrialization program undoubtedly presents many imposing questions. This is particularly true in the case of the pollution control in Osaka. Even when pollution is recognized as a significant problem, both the prefectural and the municipal governments tend to be very reluctant to

¹⁰⁷Osaka Nenkan, 1972, pp. 119-120.

regulate industrial polluters.

Such behavior on the part of the public officials of Osaka is probably derived from two sources. On the one hand, since they originally took the lead in recruiting these enterprises, they cannot very easily move to change or suspend industrial operations. In view of the immense problems at the outset, the public officials thought that the people would be glad to have an impressive number of firms in Osaka, instead of complaining about their presence.¹⁰⁸

On the other hand, many Osaka leaders are fearful that the corporations may decide to leave the area once tight regulations against pollution are enacted. This would bring Osaka back to where it was fifteen years ago. It must devise another project to secure the government fund to meet growing public needs. From the officials' perspective, Osaka should tolerate pollution rather than have the region shrinking economically.¹⁰⁹

For these reasons, the prefectural as well as the

¹⁰⁸Sato, Gendai no Chiho Seiji, p. 149.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., p. 148.

municipal governments of Osaka have not been able to curtail pollution. In fact, all that they have done is either to procrastinate or to provide token regulations without any serious effort to enforce them. The financial dependence of the local governments on business is, in the final analysis, the major stumbling block to smog control in Osaka. As long as this problem is not resolved, pollution will be there to stay for the foreseeable future.

Conclusions

This chapter focused its attention on two categories of interest groups, i.e., ecology and business, as they pertain to the issue of air pollution control in Los Angeles and Osaka. The assumption at the outset was that the difference in the political behavior of these groups might explain the dissimilarities in the pollution control programs of these two metropolitan regions.

Based on the research testing this assumption, we have noted that in both Los Angeles and Osaka, the political power of business is substantial. In Southern California, we have found that a group of powerful business organizations, by virtue of their financial resources,

often can overwhelm many attempts to enfeeble their vested interests. In Osaka, too, we have recognized that the business groups are under the protective shelter of local government. This strategically important position can keep them away from public scrutiny. With respect to the political influence of corporate interests, then, we have found that Los Angeles does not seem to be basically different from Osaka.

However, what differentiates Los Angeles from Osaka is the nature of the activities of ecology groups. In Southern California, ecology groups are issue-oriented and concerned only with pollution. They are, at the same time, scientifically informed. And what is more important, they can avail themselves of the initiative process. By means of this important political leverage, the ecology organizations can bring the business organizations out of their secret conclaves and openly challenge their political and economic power.

In Los Angeles there thus is a high-incidence of head-on collisions between the ecology and the business organizations in the political process. Such open conflicts seem to have contributed to the growth of the smog

abatement program of this region in several significant ways. These confrontations have served an important educational function. They have provided the best opportunity for the residents of Los Angeles to learn about air pollution. Particularly the dedicated work of the non-partisan groups is noteworthy on this score. They are perhaps the most instrumental in making the people of Southern California highly sensitive to the issue.

Also, the open contests between two mutually incompatible groups have kept the problem of pollution alive in the county and the city governments of Los Angeles. As will be examined later, in the meetings of the County Board of Supervisors, for instance, there is hardly any session in which smog is not on the agenda. In almost every weekly session the issue is discussed in one way or another. This is probably because these members are laboring under heavy pressure from smog conscious electorates and groups.

Finally, the collisions between the ecology and the industrial groups often have spilled over into the Air Pollution Control District of Los Angeles, which frequently becomes an easy target for the ecologists. As

a result of constant surveillance and criticism, the District at least has to give the appearance of responding with imagination and innovation.

By contrast, the ecology groups in Osaka are not issue-oriented organizations. They are instead ideologically-oriented associations. Consequently, they do not seem to have a commanding knowledge of the issue that they are involved in advancing. This is clearly evident in their activities. Although these groups have held mass rallies and public discussions, they have lacked specific points of criticisms or pragmatic solutions as an alternative to the present control system. Instead, these groups only pointed an accusing finger and charged that pollution was a negative result of the political and economic system of Japan.

It is also important to note that the ecology groups in Osaka are deprived of institutionalized political weapons, such as the initiative, to challenge the status of the business organizations in Osaka politics. Without such an opportunity, the conservation groups must hopelessly watch corporate interests find shelter under the wings of local government.

In conclusion, the present level of sophistication and development in the pollution control programs of Los Angeles and Osaka seems closely related to the styles of interest group activities in both areas. Had Osaka witnessed the frequent confrontations between different organizations characteristic of Los Angeles, it is likely that Osaka would have initiated a much more effective control program against smog than it has to date.

CHAPTER VI

DECISION-MAKING IN AIR POLLUTION IN LOS ANGELES AND OSAKA

In this chapter we are concerned with the decision-making structure and the decision makers in the area of air pollution control, and with the actual decision-making process from the view of a policy change. In exploring these aspects of the decision-making process, we will see that Los Angeles is different from Osaka. In terms of the structure of decision-making, for instance, Los Angeles has a better coordinated system than has Osaka. Also with regard to the degree of awareness about pollution on the part of the decision makers, those in Southern California score higher than their counterparts in Osaka. Finally, in the area of policy change, Los Angeles tends to regard air pollution as a local issue much more so than in the case of Osaka.

From one perspective, the significant contrasts between these two metropolitan regions seem inextricable

from the stage of development of the anti-pollution program. Consequently, these differences should provide another set of reasons explaining why Los Angeles is comparably more advanced than Osaka in controlling smog.

Los Angeles

The political system of Los Angeles has been noted for its extreme decentralization. From the view of both structure and process, it is too fragmented to operate with much singleness of purpose. However, this generalization does not seem to hold true for the issue of air pollution control. In fact, the decision-making structure in this problem area is highly centralized.

The decision-making structure of air pollution control in Los Angeles encompasses five government agencies. They are (1) the Air Pollution Control Board; (2) the Scientific Committee; (3) the Air Pollution Control District (APCD); (4) the Hearing Board; and (5) the Environmental Quality Control Committee. These offices are vested with exclusive authority in the curtailment of smog for the entire region of Los Angeles.

Among these government agencies, the Air Pollution Control Board is the highest organization sitting at the

top of the tier. The five members of this body, who are concurrently the County Board of Supervisors, have three important functions. They are the legislators. They make new regulations and revise old ones. At the same time, the members of the Air Pollution Control Board are the chief executives. They see to it that the program they have authorized is carried out. In order to assure this rule-application, one of these five members takes special responsibility to oversee the entire operation of the air pollution control program.¹

In addition to these prime responsibilities, the Air Pollution Control Board performs a representative function. Even though this is mostly a by-product of the members being the County Supervisors, it is quite significant, especially from the standpoint of cross-national comparisons. In Los Angeles, any citizen or group is able to attend any of the regular sessions of the Board and to present a view as long as pollution

¹U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Air Pollution Control: Field Operation Manual, ed. by Melvin I. Weisburd, PHS Publication No. 937 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 62-72.

control is on the agenda. This privilege is vested in any individual in Los Angeles regardless of his economic or political status. Representatives from Women For as well as those from Standard Oil, for example, can bring their particular opinions to the Air Pollution Control Board. Appearing before the Board, each group has an equal chance of being heard.²

Following these presentations, the Air Pollution Control Board may engage in an intensive study of the issue before the interested audience. If it looks complex and beyond their immediate comprehension, the Board members can summon a member of the administrative staff and ask for his professional judgment. The basic concept underlying this particular political process is that the Air Pollution Control Board listens to an expression of public opinion. Fully taking this into consideration, it will try to provide the best legislation to safeguard

²League of Women Voters of L.A. County, Los Angeles County Government, pp. 8-10. See also County of Los Angeles, Chief Administrative Office, Information Services, The Government of Los Angeles (Los Angeles: Chief Administrative Office, n.d.), pp. 1-2.

the general welfare. In arriving at such an ultimate objective, the Board members may have a long and heated debate, showing that this is one of the more open sounding boards in the political system of Los Angeles.³

Because of the sudden deaths of two members and the elections of 1972, the outlook of the Air Pollution Control Board was drastically altered for the first time in more than fifteen years. This makes an evaluation of the present board highly difficult. But the experience of 1972 provided, at least, a good opportunity to measure the relative weight of pollution as a political issue in Los Angeles.

The election campaigns for the supervisory races, for instance, clearly demonstrated that ecology was one of the major issues in Los Angeles. Every serious contender had to build a strong public image that he was a champion for the preservation of the natural environment. He also had to prove to the voters that he had been working in behalf of this issue throughout his political

³County of L.A., Chief Administrative Office, Government of Los Angeles, pp. 1-2.

career. Without these efforts, it appears that the candidate would hardly ever receive enough public attention to get elected.⁴

In addition, what is interesting about Los Angeles, especially from a comparative perspective, is the fact that such a conspicuous demeanor among public officials tends to be carried over even after they have succeeded in winning the elections. It is not rare, therefore, to observe that a Supervisor in one of the Tuesday meetings lectures on the immense value of the current anti-pollution program that he has created. As if this is not enough, he often will further self-acclamation by pointing out excellent appointments and pieces of legislation pertaining to smog control for which he is responsible.⁵ This significant behavior becomes a critical backdrop as we begin to evaluate the basic orientation of each member of the Air Pollution Control Board toward

⁴See, e.g., a commentary which appeared in Los Angeles Times, September 10, 1972, p. B.

⁵This writer's observation derived from his attendance at a session on August 1, 1972.

smog.

The present board members consist of Peter F. Schabarum, Kenneth Hahn and Ernest E. Debs. The fourth member of this body, Burton Chace, was killed in an auto accident on August 29, 1972, and was replaced by James A. Hayes, who was subsequently elected in his own right on November 1972. The last official is Baxter Ward, ex-television broadcaster, who brought about a major upset by defeating Warren M. Dorn in the November election of 1972.

Peter F. Schabarum was the junior member of the Air Pollution Control Board until two new faces, Hayes and Ward, became a part of this organization. Before his appointment to the County Board of Supervisors by Governor Reagan in March 1972, Schabarum had been a State Assemblyman from Los Angeles for six years. During these years, he was involved in many committees, including the Ways and Means, Transportation, and Government and Administration. The most significant assignment for the purpose of air pollution control that Schabarum held in Sacramento was the co-chairmanship of the Assembly Subcommittee on Air Pollution. In this capacity, "he earned national

recognition as an expert in the fight against smog, and he authored or co-authored meaningful anti-smog legislation which is now the State Law."⁶

Many citizens who have had contact with Schabarum speak very highly of him. Mrs. Gladys Meade of the Tuberculosis and Respiratory Disease Association, for instance, is glad to have Schabarum on the Board. In her opinion, despite the fact that he is a Reagan appointee, Schabarum is not necessarily pro-business. He is instead sensitive to the problem of smog in Los Angeles and accessible to concerned citizens, at least to the same degree, and probably more so, than his predecessor, Frank Bonnelli.⁷

Kenneth Hahn has the longest tenure in the Air Pollution Board, for he has been a County Supervisor for almost twenty consecutive years. Prior to his present political office, he was a college professor and a Los

⁶This information was supplied by Schabarum's office.

⁷Gladys Meade, an interview held in Los Angeles on July 3, 1972.

Angeles City Councilman. In 1952 he was the youngest man ever elected Supervisor.⁸ He is liberal in many issues and quite flamboyant compared to the other board members. Perhaps because of his political style, he was re-elected again in the June election of 1972 with overwhelming support from his constituency.⁹

In terms of his past record on air pollution control, Hahn is regarded as an absolutist, meaning that he is for stringent controls of industrial and auto wastes.¹⁰ In effect, he is extremely proud of the fact that he was the first public official, local and national, to challenge giant auto manufacturers over the necessity of smog control devices. In the United States Senate hearing on Public Works held in 1967, Hahn presented a selection from his correspondence with businessmen and showed their deliberate attempt to procrastinate on

⁸This background information came from the biographical data supplied by Supervisor Hahn's office in Los Angeles.

⁹Los Angeles Times, June 8, 1972, Pt. 1, pp. 1 and 21.

¹⁰Nancy Connick et al., Smog Paradox (Los Angeles: Program in Public Policy Studies of the Claremont Colleges, 1971), pp. 72-73.

further research into vehicle emission control.¹¹ His introductory material to his constituency does not fail to note this accomplishment. It thus records that "Supervisor Hahn has become nationally known for fighting those industries which pollute the air."¹²

Ernest Debs is now serving his fourth consecutive term on the County Board of Supervisors; and he has been with the Air Pollution Control Board more than fourteen years. He was a California State Assemblyman and a Los Angeles City Council member before he reached his present post.¹³ He is conservative and pro-business in his political orientation.¹⁴

Debs' legislative record on air pollution is hard to assess, because he has been undergoing a tremendous

¹¹U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Public Works, Hearings before a subcommittee on air and water pollution, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967.

¹²This was contained in a biographical material entitled Introduction which was distributed by Kenneth Hahn's office in Los Angeles.

¹³This was from a biographical material supplied by Supervisor Debs' office.

¹⁴A comment by Mrs. Meade in the interview, July 3, 1972.

attitudinal change in recent years. In the past, he was a strong advocate of the expanded freeway system for Los Angeles. He was instrumental in the construction of modern "mazes" in this community. This was perhaps a major reason why he would not endorse Proposition 18 in 1970, even though other members of the Board approved of it.¹⁵ This record notwithstanding, Debs is now busy projecting his new image. He is trying to present himself as a major speaker for concerned citizens against industrial polluters. How much he will succeed in this image projection still remains to be seen.¹⁶

The fourth member of the Air Pollution Control Board to be examined here is James A. Hayes. Although he was a State Assemblyman from Long Beach, he decided to run for the supervisory race in the June election of 1972, which was held in conjunction with the impending retirement of Burton Chace. The election result, however, failed to give Hayes a clean mandate. He had to face a

¹⁵ Star News (Pasadena), October 21, 1970, p. A4.

¹⁶ This writer's personal observation made as a result of his attendance at a regular session of the County Board of Supervisors on August 1, 1972.

run-off election in November 1972.¹⁷

In the subsequent campaign, Hayes promised that he would work for the ecological issue once he was elected. This platform was chided by his opponent, Marvin Braude, however, who contended that Hayes represented special corporate interests. At the time of this confrontation which kept growing, Supervisor Chace was killed in an auto accident. Immediately after this incident, Governor Reagan appointed Hayes, over Braude's opposition, to assume Chace's remaining term.¹⁸

Once Hayes took office in August 1972, he surprised a number of people. Hayes stood firm against land developers, contending that since Los Angeles had enough developments, it should henceforth pay more attention to the protection of the environment.¹⁹ This stand, along with the many advantages to being an incumbent, helped Hayes tremendously to advance his lead over Braude.

¹⁷Los Angeles Times, June 8, 1972, Pt. 1, p. 22.

¹⁸Los Angeles Times, August 30, 1972, Pt. 1, pp. 1 and 26.

¹⁹Los Angeles Times, September 1, 1972, Pt. 1, p. 22.

Hayes got 57 percent of the vote and overshadowed Braude in November 1972.²⁰

The last member of the Air Pollution Control Board is Baxter Ward, who defeated veteran Supervisor Warren Dorn in the November election of 1972. Since the central issue in the election was the problem of air pollution, it is interesting to note Dorn's long standing reputation on this issue.

Dorn is from Pasadena. He was first elected as a Supervisor in 1956 and subsequently re-elected in 1960, 1964, and 1968. Dorn regards himself as another absolutist on air pollution control, who has "led the battle against smog."²¹ The fact of the matter was that his original campaign in 1956 was fought over this issue. The people of Pasadena, being conscious of the fact that they lived in one of the most polluted areas in the nation, became receptive to Dorn's platform and gave him

²⁰ Los Angeles Times, November 9, 1972, Pt. 1, p. 22.

²¹ An informational material distributed by Dorn's office.

a chance to clean the air. Since this was his initial commitment, Dorn had been quite active in the smog problem. He was, for instance, the Supervisor in special charge of the Air Pollution Control District until the end of 1972.²²

Despite such public records, Dorn came under fire in the June election of 1972. He had to face the toughest opponent in his political career, Baxter Ward. Ward charged that Dorn had received a large political contribution from the oil industry. According to Ward, this was the major reason why Dorn would not support more rigid smog control ordinances, nor would he be able to press the APCD to enforce its rules more stringently than before. Perhaps this accusation was not the only factor, but it brought enough damage to Dorn to force him into a run-off election in November 1972, which he finally lost to Ward.²³

²²This information came from Dorn's biographical data supplied by his office in Los Angeles.

²³Los Angeles Times, May 11, 1972, Pt. 1, p. 1 and November 9, 1972, Pt. 1, p. 1.

In short, this review of the members of the Air Pollution Control Board has demonstrated that these officers tend to present their keen interests in and familiarities with the smog problem as much as they can to the voters. By any standard, their issue-consciousness in this regard is amazingly high. This particular disposition on the part of the Board members is undoubtedly derived from the political climate of Los Angeles. In addition to pollution being the major political issue, these people must take into account the fact that they will be judged not by party labels but by their legislative records. This compels these officers to personalize their achievements for the smog control program and to upgrade their public images for Los Angeles voters. Such an effort seems to be an integral part of the political process in this region and one of the best approaches for these members to get a broad spectrum of support in their next elections.²⁴

²⁴The pollution-consciousness on the part of the Board members was further confirmed by this writer during the course of the research. In every office of the Supervisors I visited, I found a number of pamphlets on air pollution. They were kept in their offices for any in-

The second organization in the decision-making structure of the air pollution control in Los Angeles is the Scientific Committee. It was established as an advisory body to the Air Pollution Control Board because of the highly technical nature of the problem. Any policy recommendation made to the Board must first be discussed with this committee. The rationale behind this procedure is rooted in the history of the Air Pollution Control District. When it was still in a rudimentary stage of development, the Control Board was afraid that the District might introduce a new rule which would be technically and economically unfeasible. It might, for instance, propose to close the entire freeway system whenever smog came to hang over Los Angeles. In order to avoid such an extreme proposal, the Air Pollution Control Board keeps the Scientific Committee to scrutinize new

terested citizens to read. This practice impressed me a great deal because it showed a striking difference from that of the top decision makers in Osaka.

proposals. This probably smooths out the process of policy making.²⁵

In addition to such an original responsibility, the Scientific Committee has two other functions, both of which are spelled out in APCD Rules and Regulations.

First, it studies "the most suitable method for measurement of air contaminants" and recommends to the Air Pollution Control Board any change regarding the level of smog concentrations for the alert system. Secondly, it serves as a consulting body to the APCD. It especially provides information on the health effects of smog. Thus, the District can take prompt and appropriate action for the welfare of all persons in the county.²⁶

According to Rule 163 of APCD Rules and Regulations, the members of this committee, except for the ex-officio members (i.e., the Air Pollution Control officer and the County counsel) are appointed by the Air Pollution Control Board for a two-year term. But in

²⁵Connick et al., Smog Paradox, pp. 73-74. See also Jane Wilson, "Scenario for a Smog Snafu," West, January 9, 1972, p. 13.

²⁶County of L.A., APCD, Rule 163.

practice, the appointments are usually semi-permanent. At present, the Committee consists of 18 professional people and is headed by Chairman Hurley L. Martley, M.D.²⁷

An investigation into the background of each member reveals two interesting facts. First, it shows no layman on the list. By the very nature of this committee, this may be understandable. Even if a lay person were included, it seems doubtful that he could make much of a contribution. But when this fact is checked against the second finding, it tends to have a significant meaning.²⁸

A cursory examination showed that at least two committee members had a business background. Other materials consulted revealed that there are at least five or six members who represent various industries. As a matter of fact, the vice-Chairman, Ulric B. Bray, is the chief engineer of the Caterpillar Tractor Corporation and a consultant of the Society of Auto-Engineers. In other words, business interests are well represented in

²⁷APCD Digest, I, No. 1 (November 1971), 4.

²⁸Ibid., p. 4.

this organization, while the nonbusiness public is represented only by medical doctors and college professors.²⁹

Third, another agency which plays an important part in the decision-making system of air pollution control is the Air Pollution Control District. Although an outline of this organization has already been presented, it is worth pointing out, again, its major function in this system. Strictly speaking, the APCD is an agent which belongs to an executive branch of the local government. Consequently, its main task is to carry out the decisions made by its superior, the Air Pollution Control Board. But, primarily because of the nature of the problem, the APCD occupies a more important and strategic position than usually assumed.

In this issue area, scientific knowledge on air pollution is critical and to a large degree determines the extent of power that each agency can muster. Since the APCD constantly studies additional pollutants and methods of controlling them, its influence on the entire

²⁹County of Los Angeles, County Board of Supervisors, Minutes of Meeting of the County Board of Supervisors, Meeting of January 1, 1972.

decision-making system looms larger than that of any other organization. The fact of the matter is that the expertise of the APCD enables it to write a major portion of the rules and regulations, all of which it will later execute.

The case involving the rule amendment on the Ringlemann Chart in 1971 clearly illustrates the key role that the APCD plays in this decision-making system. Several divisions of the District, after many years of practical experience, noted a major defect in Rule 50 of the Rules and Regulations of the Air Pollution Control District of Los Angeles. The stationary sources of pollution were growing at a rapid rate and these people strongly felt that the rule should be changed to forbid any contamination which was "dark or darker in shade" and exceeded the level of Number 1 in the Ringlemann Chart instead of Number 2.³⁰

³⁰ This information came from a statement made by Robert Chass, Air Pollution Control Officer of the APCD, in the public hearing before the Air Pollution Control Board on November 4, 1971. See County Of Los Angeles, County Board of Supervisors, Minutes of Meeting of the County of Board of Supervisors, November 4, 1971.

The question was eventually brought to the attention of the executive staff of the APCD, which in turn formed a task force to study the proposed change. This ad hoc committee was comprised of all division heads of the District and representatives of industries which would be directly affected by the rule amendment. After a series of meetings, it was decided to begin a joint research project to find out the technical and economic feasibility of the proposed rule under examination.³¹ Thus, the APCD consulted with railroads, construction, and other industries. Out of this consultation came an agreement in October 1971 to support the proposed rule amendment.³²

Based on such an understanding, the APCD submitted a request for a public hearing on this question to the Air Pollution Control Board. This was granted and the date was set for November 4, 1971. As soon as the

³¹William Falkner, an interview on, January 7, 1972.

³²A statement of Robert Chass before the Air Pollution Board, Minutes of Meeting of County Board of Supervisors, November 4, 1971.

announcement was made public, a large number of firms, mostly from outside Los Angeles, sent cables and letters to protest against the hearing. In addition, probably because these unhappy industries did not feel secure, they determined to present their opinion in person at the meeting.³³

On November 4, 1971, Bill Ryan, the Chairman of the California Manufacturers Association, spearheaded the drive against the rule amendment. He first criticized the APCD by arguing that it had been under heavy pressure from the federal government. In Ryan's opinion, this more than anything else motivated the Air Pollution Control District to initiate an alteration of the current rule. Ryan contended that since the central authority did not understand local conditions, the Control Board should reject such an unreasonable demand.³⁴

Against these arguments, the APCD pointed out

³³These letters are filed in the Administrative Office of the County of Board of Supervisors under the title of air pollution.

³⁴Letter submitted by William Ryan to the County Board of Supervisors of L.A. dated November 3, 1971.

that the proposed change on Rule 50 was a result of the considerable research by both the District and local industry. At the same time, it developed a convincing case that, from both technical and economic points of view, the new regulation could be complied with without causing much burden to business. This, the APCD continued, had already been demonstrated by its collaboration with the business industry. Finally, the APCD emphatically held that the new rule could substantially improve the smog condition of Los Angeles. As this was what everyone hoped to achieve, the business groups should tolerate such a little inconvenience incurred by the rule change.³⁵

Because the entire issue appeared controversial, the Air Pollution Control Board made a motion to hold an additional hearing on January 6, 1972. On this occasion, the Board listened to various opinions from different groups of people. The most important were the testimonies by five members of the Scientific Committee. They all

³⁵A statement made by Robert Chass before the County Board of Supervisors, Minutes of Meeting, November 4, 1971.

came out and supported the rule change. This seemed to have a great impact on the members of the Board. Even though these five scientists were not directly involved in the research, their professional competence was beyond any doubt. And the fact that they sanctioned the measure led the Board members to believe that they should pass the new amendment on Rule 50. Thus, at the end of the meeting on January 6, 1972, the Air Pollution Control Board approved of it unanimously.³⁶

In summation, the experience revolving around the Ringlemann Chart amendment has clearly indicated the important and strategic position that the APCD occupies in the decision-making system related to smog control in Los Angeles. It constantly undertakes research. It also formulates new regulations. Also it tries to facilitate the legislation of these policies with convincing technical evidence. All these functions, as a result, make the APCD the nerve center of the entire smog control program of Los Angeles.

³⁶County of L.A., Minutes of Meeting of the County Board of Supervisors, January 6, 1972.

The man responsible for this important organization is the Air Pollution Control Officer. Currently, it is Robert L. Chass. He is a graduate of Carnegie Institute of Technology and has been with the District since its inception in 1947. Having steadily climbed the ladder in the APCD, he was promoted to his present post in the spring of 1970. After taking over the APCD from Louis Fuller, he was embroiled in many controversies and became one of the most colorful figures in the history of the District.³⁷

For example, Chass spoke against Proposition 18 on the ground that any more research on smog was uncalled for and it would be a waste of precious county funds.³⁸ Similarly, he publicly denounced Proposition 9 and the People's Lobby. He argued that the measure would force him to implement an unworkable and unrealistic set of standards.³⁹ Although Chass's positions on these issues

³⁷APCD Digest, II, No. 2 (July 1972), 1 and 4.

³⁸Star News, October 2, 1970, p. A4.

³⁹APCD Digest, II, No. 6 (June 1972), 1 and 4.

made many people wonder about the proper role of a public official, they failed to become an issue because a large number of other officials took similar stands.

However, Chass's comments on some of the problems quite often became conspicuous to the extent that some people thought of him as an incompetent officer. A good example here is Chass's testimony before the Environmental Quality Control Committee of the County of Los Angeles on November 9, 1971. On this occasion, he contended that the adverse health effects of air pollution had been exaggerated. For him, little medical evidence was available to substantiate such relationships. At the same time, he argued that any major smog disaster in this community was very remote.⁴⁰

These remarks were quite contrary to those given by other medical and meteorological specialists. Thus,

⁴⁰ County of Los Angeles, Environmental Quality Control Committee, Report of Committee Hearings on Air Pollution (Los Angeles: County Board of Supervisors, 1971), pp. 3-4. Also see County of Los Angeles, APCD, Statement of Robert Chass Before the County of Los Angeles Environmental Quality Control Committee on June 14, 1971 (Los Angeles: APCD, 1971).

the official report of the Environmental Quality Control Committee stated:

Mr. Chass spoke before the medical testimony was heard. This Committee feels that he may well review his conclusions on the basis of the massive testimony presented, which showed that larger segments of our population, as much as 10 percent, or 750,000 people, according to Dr. Rokaw's study, do face health impairment effects from smog. In addition, excess deaths for heart patients linked with high carbon monoxide readings have been reported by the State Department of Health. . . .⁴¹

Yet, the same person, Robert Chass, is oftentimes regarded as one of the most reliable officers in the field of smog control in the United States. Perhaps this is the reason why he became the first recipient of the Air Pollution Control Association's award for his outstanding accomplishments. Thus, Chass appears to be a controversial figure. For some people, he is a champion; for others, he is an incompetent engineer of air pollution control.⁴²

The fourth organization to be reviewed here in relation to smog abatement is the Hearing Board of the APCD. This is a quasi-judicial body of three members.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 4.

⁴²APCD Digest, II, No. 2 (July 1972), 1 and 4.

At present, it has two lawyers (Delman R. Richmond and Wendell Schooling) and one engineer (Robert E. Vivian). They are appointed by the Air Pollution Control Board for an unlimited number of three-year terms. Except for Schooling, who was named to the Board in March 1972, the present members have had a long tenure. Chairman Richmond, for instance, has been with the office over fifteen years, ever since its establishment in 1957.⁴³

The primary function of the Hearing Board is to receive petitions for variances and to grant them, if considered necessary. A variance in this context means that if a firm cannot meet the county's requirements for some reason beyond its control, it can then appeal for a temporary exemption from the rules. In availing itself of the provision for a variance, the company which seeks relief must establish the specific reason for and estimate the duration of its noncompliance. It must submit

⁴³Connick et al., Smog Paradox, pp. 87-93; and Wilson, "Smog Snafu," p. 13.

this information in written form to the Hearing Board.⁴⁴

Approximately two weeks after the petition is filed, the Board reviews the case. At the hearing (hearings are held three times a week) the petitioner is usually represented by a private law firm, while the Air Pollution Control District depends on five lawyers from the County Counsel's Office. The stage being so set, the District will appear as an adversary opposing the variance. The firm under examination must prove that it has a program for compliance and shows good intention in eventually complying with the law. Without these efforts, it seems unlikely that the petitioner will secure a temporary suspension of the rules.⁴⁵

In total, the Hearing Board has reviewed more than 4,300 cases since 1957 and granted variances for 3,246 petitions. In recent years, on the average, 10 out

⁴⁴County of L.A., APCD, Rules 76 and 77.

⁴⁵State of California, Air Resources Board, Draft: Report of Special Air Resources Board Panel on Investigation of the Los Angeles Air Pollution Control District (California: Air Resources Board, 1972), pp. 31-34.

of 11 applicants (90 percent) are winning variances. A variance may be granted only up to one year. But this can be extended for an unlimited number of years as long as the applicant can prove that noncompliance is unavoidable for technical and economic reasons.⁴⁶

In recent years, the Hearing Board has come under fire. The major criticism against this institution is that it is too lenient in granting variances. According to this accusation, even if the county made stringent regulations, it could not control pollution because these rules have been exempted one after another by the Hearing Board. This charge is, however, emphatically denied by both the members of the Board and the Air Pollution Control District.⁴⁷ Yet, it remains true that the Board does not publicize its record for granting a variance, a practice frequently attacked by ecology groups.

Finally, in Los Angeles, there is the Environmental Quality Control Committee, whose function among

⁴⁶These statistical data are from the annual reports of the APCD.

⁴⁷Connick et al., Smog Paradox, p. 90.

others is to oversee the entire operation of the air pollution control program. This county organization was established on March 17, 1970, by an act of the County Board of Supervisors. At the outset, the Committee consisted of two groups of people. The first group was made up of five citizen members who were appointed by each of the five Supervisors, while the second group was composed of seventeen department heads of the county administration. All of these members had voting rights.⁴⁸

But this organizational structure soon revealed a serious defect. In 1970, when Proposition 18 became a state initiative, the Environmental Quality Control Committee decided to study the issue. Having heard both sides of the argument, the Committee took a vote. The result indicated that all citizen members were for the proposition, while all ex-officio members were against it.⁴⁹

⁴⁸This information was made available by Robert Soren of the Chief Administrative Office of Los Angeles County in a telephone interview held in Los Angeles on August 8, 1972.

⁴⁹Gladys Meade, "Amendment of Article XXVI" (1971), pp. 16-17.

This experience taught a good lesson especially to those citizen members of the Committee. They felt that it should avoid such a clear schism if it wanted to be a good administrative overseer. Thus, nine months after its foundation, two basic changes were introduced. First, all department heads lost their voting rights and would henceforth serve only as an advisory body. Second, the five citizen members became the core of the Committee and each would have an alternate who was named by the County Supervisors.⁵⁰

Until the end of 1971, the Environmental Quality Control Committee had been very active in making various independent studies on ecology problems. One of the most significant and controversial contributions was its review of the smog control program of Los Angeles. From June 14 to June 24, 1971, the Committee invited more than 35 witnesses who represented different sectors of the community. They included Dr. A. J. Haagen-Smit, the "father" of photo-chemical smog control and the chairman

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 17. Also a telephone interview with Robert Soren on August 8, 1972.

of the Air Resources Board, Robert Chass of the Air Pollution Control District of Los Angeles, Joseph R. Rensch, the vice-president of the Pacific Lighting Corporation, Lawrence Kelbley of the League of Women Voters, and other prominent citizens.⁵¹

These hearings were conducted by Judge Herbert Walker, a retired jurist with many years of experience on the Hearing Board of the APCD, who acted as the chairman of the Committee. Assisting him were Jerry Hilby, an attorney, Dr. Robert Kramer, Dean of Cal Poly Pomona, Martin Waisbren, a businessman and past chairman of the Federal Grand Jury, and Mrs. Ellen Stern Harris, a past member of the Regional Water Quality Control Board of Los Angeles.⁵²

Except for Mrs. Harris, other members were not well versed in the smog problem and it took them more than five months to come up with a final report. Because the report was extremely critical of the current control

⁵¹County of Los Angeles, Environmental Quality Control Committee, Report, pp. 1-4.

⁵²Meade, "Amendment," pp. 17-18.

program in general and the Air Pollution Control District in particular, it was soon attacked by both the District officers and the Supervisors. In fact, the report was so controversial that the Environmental Quality Control Committee was dissolved a few weeks after its publication.⁵³

Yet, in the beginning of 1972, the Committee was reconstituted and new members were appointed. But it has not undertaken any project and has remained dormant up to the present time.⁵⁴

In summary, we have examined decision-making in the organization and administration of air pollution control of Los Angeles, with special emphasis on structure, process, and decision makers. From this investigation, we can draw several important conclusions. In terms of the structure, we have found that the five government agencies related to this issue form a coherent and coordinated system. They are all linked together by their contribution to decision-making with respect to air

⁵³Ibid., pp. 18-22.

⁵⁴Soren, telephone interview, August 8, 1972.

pollution control.

The Air Pollution Control Board makes basic policy. In doing this, it receives valuable technical information from the Scientific Committee. The APCD, at least from the structural standpoint, enforces the rules and regulations concomitant with the legislative actions of the Air Pollution Control Board. The Hearing Board functions as a judiciary organization. It weighs the statutes against technical and economic feasibilities. Finally, the Environmental Quality Control Committee acts as a watchdog seeing to it that the entire system operates properly and helps to solve the smog problem of Los Angeles.

From the point of the decision-making process, we have learned that the position of the APCD weighs more heavily than that of any others in the pollution control system. Not only is it decisive in the proposal and acceptance of rules, but it also enjoys a considerable amount of influence in the rule-making process of the Air Pollution Control Board. This is, as we have noted, primarily attributable to the technical nature of the problem. The in-depth knowledge of the District on air

pollution helps it to assume the most important position in the policy process of Los Angeles.

Another important point to be stressed here is the lack of intervention by the federal government in the local decision-making process. In this region, and for that matter in the rest of the metropolitan areas of the United States, local initiative and responsibility are highly valued. This is clearly the case in Los Angeles, where the five local air pollution control agencies are exclusively involved in the initiative, administration, and review of the program with respect to air pollution control from stationary sources.

Finally, we should also note the general attitude among the top decision-makers on smog. The elected officials in Los Angeles are surprisingly sensitive to this issue and make conscious efforts to discuss and study the problem. Even if this is mainly a political expedience, there seems little doubt that such orientations on the part of the decision makers have already been of decisive importance in helping Los Angeles to institute a relatively better program than many others in the United States.

Osaka

When Osaka is studied in terms of the structure and the process of decision-making in air pollution control, a few conspicuous tendencies are disclosed. From a structural point of view, it is extremely decentralized to the extent that the prefecture and the city of Osaka have two identical make-ups. They encompass advisory commissions, hearing boards, an intra-governmental conference on pollution, and so forth.

However, from a standpoint of the decision-making process, Osaka seems to reveal a totally different picture. In making a good contrast regarding the structural aspect, it has a highly centralized policy process. It is, in effect, under the tight grip of the central government of Tokyo. As previously noted, this is mainly a result of the financial dependence of local entities in Japan. Yet, the problem of Osaka lies not so much with centralization as such. The heart of the problem, especially in the issue of air pollution control, is a proliferation of responsibility at the level of national government. Not only does Osaka have to honor a directive from the Ministry of Construction, but it also must

respect an order from the Ministry of Health and Welfare. The local entities of Japan must be subservient and subordinate to all of these central organizations. If they failed to abide by their rules, these local governments could not secure subsidies and grants from Tokyo. As a result, local governments produce one rule after another in order to ingratiate themselves to the central government, although they are unable to register substantial progress in the alleviation of smog.

In the structure of decision-making of air pollution control, both the governor and the mayor of Osaka assume a commanding position in their respective jurisdictions. They are chief executives responsible for the entire administrative operations, including those related to smog. In addition, they reserve important power to initiate new pieces of legislation. Based on the research and the recommendation of their subordinates, the governor and the mayor of Osaka request the prefectural and the city assemblies, respectively, to enact new rules and regulations against pollution.⁵⁵

⁵⁵Kimitaka Kuze, Chihō Jichi Hō (Tokyo: Gakuyo Shobo, 1971), pp. 168-170.

The present governor of Osaka, Ryoichi Kuroda, took this office in 1970 after one of the most heated elections in the history of the prefecture. Kuroda had been a professor of law at Osaka Municipal University until he was recruited by the Socialist Party to run against Governor Gisen Sato of the Liberal Democratic Party. Compared to the incumbent governor who was, at one point in time, the Minister of Defense, Kuroda was unknown by the electorate. Because of this significant difference in their political status, it was thought that Kuroda had no chance of winning the contest. But the election returns took many people by surprise. He defeated Sato with only a 1 percent edge in the popular vote. Kuroda's unexpected victory was, for the most part, attributed to the work of organized labor.⁵⁶

Since Kuroda's campaign pledge was to alter the pro-business politics of the Sato government, he has been energetic in projecting a number of different policies to bring a citizens-centered administration to Osaka. In the area of air pollution control, for instance, the new

⁵⁶Asahi Nenkan, 1972, p. 593.

governor revitalized the old plan to clean the sky and sponsored many conferences to study the health effects of pollution. And the most important of all, he established more stringent rules and regulations than did his predecessor.⁵⁷

Yet, despite his good intention to eliminate smog from Osaka, Kuroda's accomplishments in the last two years of his administration have been rather unimpressive. Although he put forth many plans and ideas, they have not been able to reduce air pollution, let alone eliminate it. Kuroda's inertia in this respect seems to have little to do with his capabilities. But it is mainly derived from his lack of both political and economic powers.

As will be fully explained later, Kuroda's administration is extremely circumscribed by the central government. Particularly as he is a socialist party member, his dealings with Tokyo are more difficult than those of the Liberal Democratic Party. Thus, even when the governor has a good project to combat air pollution, there is little assurance that he can secure financial

⁵⁷Osaka Nenkan, 1972, pp. 143-148.

help from the central government. Chances are that his proposal will be substantially trimmed or turned down altogether.⁵⁸

This incumbent mayor of Osaka City, Yasushi Oshima, perhaps shares the same experience with that of the governor, because he was a socialist-backed candidate in the December election of 1971. But unlike Governor Kuroda, the mayor has two important advantages which often enable him to get good results from Tokyo.

First, Oshima had been with the central government for many years before he came to Osaka. He was in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as Labor. During his years in the latter office, Oshima even climbed to the rank of department head. Second, contrary to the governor, Oshima has a long practical experience in city government. After his career in the Ministry of Labor, he was picked by Osaka City as a liaison officer to smooth out its relationship with the central bureaucracy. Having executed this difficult job well, he was promoted

⁵⁸ Kenichi Miyamoto, Nippon no Toshi Mondai (Tokyo: Tsukuma Shobo, 1971), pp. 162-182.

to vice-mayor of Osaka, which he held until the time of his election.⁵⁹

Aside from the governor and the mayor of Osaka, another important organization in the decision-making structure of smog control is the Advisory Commission on Pollution, which both the prefecture and the city of Osaka established in 1970. The primary function of this office is to make policy recommendations to either the governor or the mayor regarding the anti-pollution program. But unlike its counterpart in Los Angeles, this Commission deals with all kinds of pollution ranging from air to noise.⁶⁰

In addition to its wide scope of concerns, the Commission is large in terms of the number of people involved. In the case of the prefecture, it currently numbers more than 100 members. Twenty-nine of them serve as regular members. They are mostly scholars and local

⁵⁹Osaka-Shi Senkyo Kanri Iinkai (City of Osaka, Committee on Election Audits), Osaka Shichō Senkyo Kekka Shirabe (The Official Returns of the Mayoralty Elections of Osaka) (Osaka: Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, 1971), p. 12.

⁶⁰Osaka-Fu Seikatsu Kankyō-Bu, Kōgai Hakusho, p. 158.

politicians. The rest are designated as specialized members, as each takes charge of a limited aspect of pollution. Some members, for instance, study air pollution, while others are concerned with the legal problems of smog.⁶¹

In the field of air pollution, these specialized members held six meetings during the fiscal year of 1971-72. These sessions were mainly devoted to the discussions of the health effects of smog from stationary sources. After these lengthy meetings, the members checked their findings against the proposed policy made by the prefectural government. This paved the way for the joint session participated in by all persons involved in the Commission. From such a conference came a policy recommendation requesting a minor change in the proposed policy of government to the governor of Osaka.⁶²

⁶¹Osaka-Fu Seikatsu Kankyō-Bu, Osaka Kōgai Taisaku Shingi Kai Unei Jyōkyō: Shōwa 46 Nen--Shōwa 47 Nen Do (The Current Activity of the Advisory Commission on Pollution of the Prefecture of Osaka in the Years of 1971 and 1972) (Osaka: Seikatsu Kankyō-Bu, 1972), p. 1.

⁶²Ibid., pp. 3-5.

In addition to the Advisory Commission, both local polities of Osaka maintain their own Inter-Departmental Conferences on Pollution, which fall under the direct supervision of the chiefs of the respective governments. In the case of the prefecture, all heads of the more than fifteen departments attend the conferences which are chaired by the Assistant Governor.⁶³

Two major responsibilities are assigned to these conferences. First, they are to provide the format for different divisions of the government to exchange with each other opinion and progress reports. By so doing, they hope to reduce rivalries and overlaps among separate departments. Second, these conferences are empowered to conduct a final review of all propositions against pollution made by various agencies. Since they examine these proposals from the view of government-wide concern, they are thought to be financially and administratively realistic and constructive at the time they submit their propos-

⁶³ Ōsaka-Fu, Ōsaka-Fu Kōgai Taisaku Suishin Honbu Yōkō (A Guide to the Inter-Departmental Conference on Pollution in the Prefecture of Osaka) (Ōsaka: Ōsaka-Fu, n.d.), p. 3.

als to the governor.⁶⁴

In addition to these three organizations (the chiefs of government, the Advisory Commission, and the Intra-Governmental Conference), there are two separate organizations both of which are the most vital agencies in the decision-making structure of Osaka. They are the Department of Environment in the prefectural government and the Department of Health and Environment in the municipal government.

Theoretically at least, these organizations are the nerve centers of the entire control effort in their respective jurisdictions. Both the Environment and the Health and Environment Departments carry out research on air pollution, from which they gather information that is necessary for the formulation of a new and better program. At the same time, these organizations are supposedly integrated into the policy process of their governments and play a major role in advancing their proposals.⁶⁵

⁶⁴Ibid., pp. 1-2.

⁶⁵Toshiaki Hirayama, an interview in Osaka on October 6, 1972.

However, by any standard, both Environment and Health and Environment Departments have appeared passive and have failed to meet their original responsibilities. As we have already touched on some of their problems, the discussion will be confined to another major impediment, the executive staff.

In Osaka, the departments concerned with pollution control are not in the main stream of government operations. They are at most minor organizations, which are often looked down upon by other departments. This is quite different from Los Angeles; and this sense of status differentiation continues to be true, even after the prefectural and municipal governments have consolidated their environmental agencies.

For instance, it is a general tendency among the top bureaucrats of Osaka to regard an appointment to the environmental agencies as a demotion, even though it may raise the wage and the rank of particular personnel. Thus, once transferred to these organizations, an "unlucky" official will often try to take whatever means available to bring himself back to the main stream of government. For him, the personal disaster is worse than

pollution.⁶⁶

Under these prevailing circumstances, the Environmental Departments are severely handicapped. The rate of turnover of executive personnel is extremely high. This has consequently brought about a lack of leadership in the departments, which in turn deters the formation of long-range programs to combat pollution. Also, because the executive members are often half-hearted in their carrying out their assignments, they are not likely to represent their departments with as much forcefulness as might otherwise be the case, particularly at the time of budget allocations. This means that the already meager financial resources of the environmental organizations are seldom if ever augmented.⁶⁷

The immediate task for the government in Osaka, then, is to find a way to encourage the top bureaucrats to seek appointments in the environmental departments.

⁶⁶ A comment made by Judge Yoshiharu Higashimura of the Appeal Court of Osaka in an interview held in Osaka on October 10, 1972.

⁶⁷ Yoshiharu Higashimura, an interview on October 10, 1972.

If this can be done, it will expedite pollution control because the quality and the number of lower echelon officials have been steadily improving.

The fifth organization in the area of smog control to be examined here is the Hearing Board, which only the prefectural government is authorized to administer. It has a similar function to the Hearing Board of Los Angeles, except for the category of cases it adjudicates. In Osaka, the Hearing Board is concerned not with variances but with actual litigation between two parties. One of the more recent and outstanding examples is a case involving the residents of an apartment who brought suit against the semi-public freeway construction corporation. In this suit, the plaintiffs requested an immediate suspension of highway construction in their neighborhood, alleging that it would destroy their quiet surroundings.⁶⁸

It is important to note an interesting provision in the court rules of the Hearing Board in Osaka. It states that, in all cases, the parties involved must

⁶⁸Osaka-Shi, Osaka-Shi no Kōgai, p. 148.

first agree to seek a settlement before they can bring the issue to the Board. This means, in effect, that the plaintiff cannot expect any remedy through the Board if the defendant is unwilling to cooperate. When this happens, he must resort to a normal civil court proceeding, which is more costly and more time-consuming than that of the Hearing Board.⁶⁹

The background leading to the formation of the Hearing Board in Osaka Prefecture typifies the relationship between the central and the local governments in Japan. In 1967, the national authority passed the first comprehensive law against pollution. There was a section, in this statute, calling for the immediate establishment of a judicial body to resolve cases stemming from pollution. Based on this provision, the national commission studied and recommended to the Prime Minister founding of a Central Hearing Board in 1968. This was eventually realized two years later.

Perhaps because the central government liked the

⁶⁹Osaka-Fu Seikatsu Kankyō-Bu, Kōgai Hakusho, p. 250.

idea, it encouraged all prefectural governments to follow suit. The Hearing Board of Osaka was thus installed in 1970 as part of a nation-wide project by the government in Tokyo. Yet, because of the total lack of local initiative, it seems to contain a major defect. The Board has no clearly defined relationship with the local control efforts.⁷⁰ Even though it is a part of the prefectural program, for instance, it has little to do with the Department of Environment or the Intra-Departmental Conference. The Hearing Board, instead, appears to stand alone and apart from the rest of policy-making structure, in sharp contrast to its counterpart organization in Los Angeles.

Finally, in addition to these five organizations, there are two committees in the prefectural and municipal Assemblies which are also an integral part of the decision-making structures of air pollution control in Osaka.

Both the prefectural and municipal Assemblies in Osaka enjoy two fundamental prerogatives. On the one

⁷⁰ Ibid., pp. 250-253.

hand, they reserve an exclusive right to review annual budgets. On the other hand, they are wholly accountable for legislating ordinances. In order to produce the best results in carrying out these two functions, both legislatures maintain a committee system, which was patterned after the Congress of the United States in the post-war period. Thus, whatever proposals reach the Assemblies, these issues must first go through an appropriate committee before they can come back again to the legislative floor for a final roll call.⁷¹

In the case of the prefectural Assembly, all anti-pollution policies initiated by the governor must go to the Committee on Health and Welfare. This committee involves approximately sixteen legislators, ten of whom are Liberal Democrats. The rest are proportionally distributed to different parties according to their seats in the Assembly.⁷²

One of the longest tenured members of the Committee on Health and Welfare is Seihachiro Yagi of the

⁷¹Osaka Nenkan, 1972, p. 95.

⁷²Ibid.

Liberal Democratic Party. His original profession was a dentist. But he left his practice to his three sons and has been devoting his entire time and energy to the prefectural politics of Osaka.

In an interview at his private residence, several specific questions were directed at him. For instance, Yagi was asked about his legislative role in the newly established ordinance against pollution, and his perception of his constituency with respect to air pollution. This question was quite pertinent since he lived in the heart of one of the most polluted sections of Osaka. To these and other inquiries, his answers were quite surprising and stunning.

He claimed to know nothing about the ordinance. After a lengthy explanation by the interviewer of what it entailed, the Assemblyman still could not recall the law under discussion. At this juncture, instead of asking about a specific statute, it seemed more pertinent to find out how much Yagi was aware of the pollution control program of Osaka. To this question, he replied that the problem of pollution was too technical for him to comprehend. Yagi also admitted that he did not have

any information with respect to the current program in Osaka. The only thing that he could comment upon was the fact that his government had been doing a tremendous job to combat pollution.

Since Yagi was one of the most important members of the Committee on Health and Welfare, he was asked what kinds of legislative activities he had undertaken in the area of air pollution. As expected, his answer was that he could understand neither the meaning nor the purpose of the question. Yagi embarrassingly suggested a meeting with an official of the prefectural government of Osaka would be better, and kindly set up an appointment.

Finally, in reply to an inquiry about the extent of public pressure from Yagi's constituency against pollution, the Assemblyman pointed to a couple of visits a month that he normally received from his constituents. They came to Yagi's private residence to request his political power to shut down a neighboring factory which emitted smoke and soot.

In his opinion, however, these complaints were minor compared to the other types of requests that he had

to handle. Yagi noted that he would have an average of one guest a day whose business operation was in violation of the anti-pollution ordinance of Osaka. Because installation of devices to meet the regulations would be costly, the owner of the firm asked the Assemblyman to use his influence on the government to exempt his company from the rules of the prefecture.⁷³ Even though Yagi failed to elaborate on this interesting development, he left the impression that he was successful on many occasions in saving different firms from these expensive undertakings.⁷⁴

In the city of Osaka, prior to 1971, all bills relating to pollution had to be screened by the Committee on Health and Welfare. But in May of that year, the City Assembly set aside a new subcommittee, the Special Committee on Pollution, to take care of these proposals. But because it is a subunit of the regular committee, its

⁷³Seihachiro Yagi, a member of the Prefectural Assembly of Osaka, in an interview held in Osaka on October 11, 1972.

⁷⁴On such an interesting political deal in Japanese politics, see Gerald L. Curtis, Election Campaigning Japanese Style (New York & London: Columbia University Press, 1971), pp. 126-151.

recommendations are not binding although they receive special attention on the floor of the legislature.⁷⁵ At present, the Committee consists of twenty members who are nominated proportionally in accordance with the current strength of each party in the City Assembly.⁷⁶

The Chairman of the Special Committee on Pollution is a veteran member of the city legislature, Iwakichi Awai, of the Liberal Democratic Party. The year, 1971, was his ninth term in this body. During this long career, Awai twice became the Speaker of the Assembly, in 1953 and in 1959. In 1971 he was a recipient of the Order of Merit from the national government for his contribution to local government.⁷⁷

At the appointed time of the interview (October 6, 1972) in his private office in Osaka, Awai had just

⁷⁵This information was supplied by Minoru Wakano, Shichō Shitsu (Office of the Mayor), in an interview held in Osaka on October 11, 1972.

⁷⁶Osaka-Shi, Ōsaka Shikai Kankei Reiki Shu (A Collection of Regulations on the Proceedings of the City Assembly of Osaka) (Ōsaka: Ōsaka-Shi, 1971), pp. 13-16.

⁷⁷This background information was from a biographical note given by Iwakichi Awai.

returned from a session of the Special Committee. The bad experience with Yagi still reverberating, this interview was begun with a series of rudimentary questions. First question asked was the extent of Awai's familiarity with and interest in pollution. He responded that he had a keen interest in the matter, although he continued to say that he had not been fully exposed to the problem. In fact, Awai disclosed that, in the first Committee meeting, he greeted his fellow members by noting that he knew nothing about pollution and proposed that they study it together.

Then Awai was asked about his role in recent years in the matter of pollution at the city legislature in general and at the Special Committee in particular. He immediately shrugged off this question. Instead, he pointed out that the Japanese had become paranoid about pollution, thanks to the exaggerated accounts of the mass media. In his view, the present condition of pollution in Japan was nothing to be concerned with. Awai argued that, if it was as serious as many people suggested, how could they explain the phenomenal rise of Japanese life expectancy in the last few years?

Apparently for Awai, pollution could be measured against the length of one's life, and not the quality of his living.⁷⁸

In short, the present examination of the decision-making structure of air pollution control in Osaka has revealed that it has two parallel structures, which operate side by side in an area which is less than one eighth of the land area of Los Angeles. Other than a duplication of effort, the decision-making structures of Osaka are straightforward in their purposes, from a formalistic point of view.

In the instance of the prefectural government, the Department of Environment supposedly takes the initial step to formalize a new program against pollution. After it lays the groundwork, the Intra-Departmental Conference examines the proposition from several different perspectives. As soon as it approves of the proposal, the governor will forward it to the Advisory Commission. When subsequent review by this Commission is concluded, the governor asks the legislature to act on the new policy

⁷⁸Iwakichi Awai, a member of the City Assembly of Osaka, in an interview held in Osaka on October 6, 1972.

proposal. In the event that it passes the screening process by the appropriate Committee of this body, the governor signs it into law. And finally, if any conflict later arises in relation to the new legislation, the Hearing Board will adjudicate it by taking other legal matters into consideration.

However, once attention is shifted to the modus operandi, the local decision-making process tends to show a marked deviation from its prescribed operation. In effect, not only does it discourage local initiative, but it also frequently becomes irrelevant to the local decision-making structure. The policy process of Osaka, instead, appears to revolve around its subordinate relationship with a number of central administrations in Tokyo.

This seems to be an inevitable outcome of the dissolution of the Home Ministry in the aftermath of World War II. As previously noted, the termination of the war brought an end to this organization. It was completely dismantled in 1946. Concomitant with this change, its various functions with respect to local affairs were all subdivided and delegated to different administrations.

In lieu of the Home Ministry, for example, the Ministry of Construction would take care of road and school construction at both the prefectural and the municipal levels of government. Also, the Ministry of Health and Welfare, in addition to its nation-wide concerns, was involved in the supervision of health problems in the local entities. Similarly, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry also took part in the promotion of local economic activities.⁷⁹

In other words, the dissolution of the central organization gave rise to a situation in which the national ministries in Tokyo were to look after local affairs in their respective areas of concern. This situation has persisted to this date and has come to have an important bearing on air pollution control in Osaka.

When the problem of pollution became a national issue, many administrators in the central government decided to take positive action to control it. They subsequently secured financial means and distributed a large portion of them to local polities. In 1966, for instance,

⁷⁹Okita, Chihō Jichi, p. 239.

the Ministry of Health and Welfare reserved a total of ¥4.5 million for pollution control, while the Ministry of International Trade and Industry made available more than ¥340,000, a half of which could be used for smog abatement by local governments.⁸⁰

In the eyes of the local officials in Osaka, these were significant and great developments. In the light of their financial condition as well as their pollution problem, they were glad to see a large amount of national subsidies and grants flowing into their regions. These financial aids, the officials felt, would immediately contribute to the improvement of local efforts to combat pollution.

However, there were a number of crucial defects in the relationships between the local and the national administration, that seriously undermined the anti-pollution program of Osaka. Even though money became available, the governments of this region later learned that it was not coming from a single source. It was flowing instead from several origins. These included the

⁸⁰Miyamoto, Toshi Mondai, p. 66.

Ministry of Health and Welfare, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. As a matter of fact, in the case of water pollution control, the national subsidies came from twelve different central administrations to the prefectural and the municipal governments of Osaka.⁸¹

In addition to such a multiplication of superiors, the officials in Osaka found themselves drawn into the center of a struggle between these organizations. The Ministry of Health and Welfare, by virtue of the problems it deals with, approached the issue of pollution from the standpoint of health effects. Its fundamental orientation, consequently, was to eliminate the sources of smog. Based on this conceptualization, the bureaucrats of the Health and Welfare Ministry oftentimes requested Osaka governments to contrive an innovative plan to reduce the number of cars and factories.⁸²

By contrast, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry emphasized a harmony between economic

⁸¹Atsushi Sato, Gendai no Chihō Seiji (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōron Sha, 1972), p. 47.

⁸²Asahi Nenkan, 1972, p. 231.

development and ecology protection. For the officials in this office, not only would this be plausible, but it would also be necessary for Japan's national survival. Instead of eliminating sources of pollution, they tended to stress the development of smog control devices. In the opinion of these people these inventions would purify the air while keeping business operations intact. Because of such reasoning, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, in distributing subsidies and grants, encouraged local governments to find these devices.⁸³

Under these conditions, both the prefectural and the municipal governments of Osaka quite frequently faced a dilemma. If they honored and structured the anti-pollution control plan along lines suggested by the Ministry of Health and Welfare, these policies would be reprimanded by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry which might withdraw its financial assistance altogether. By the same token, if the local entities worked too closely with the Trade and Industry Ministry, this would reduce or eliminate their income from the

⁸³ Miyamoto, Toshi Mondai, p. 108.

Ministry of Health and Welfare. In other words, the local governments of Osaka had to put forth a policy which would satisfy all the administrations they dealt with in order to maximize their financial resources for the pollution control programs.⁸⁴

In resolving such a complex problem, the local entities in this region seemed to come up with an innovative idea. They tried to incorporate the fundamental positions of each organization as much as possible in various parts of their rules and regulations. The first half of the prefectural ordinance of Osaka was, therefore, usually devoted entirely to the discussion of the need for a balance between economic development and ecology preservation. In the eyes of Osaka officials, these carefully worded paragraphs could probably buy off the Ministry of International Trade and Industry.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ On this point, this writer is grateful to Professor Tetsuya Okita of Meiji University who supplied this as well as other important materials in Japanese local government.

⁸⁵ See Chapter III of this study.

Even in the main body of the rules and regulations, the difficult position that these people were in was evident. Mindful of the orientations of different ministries, they took a great deal of pain to honor all of them. Thus, many ordinances of Osaka provided specific provisions to control sources of pollution. But they usually left unsaid what that pollution really constituted. And if such a method failed to satisfy any national ministry, the governments of Osaka resorted to another device, i.e., revising their regulations every year until they became acceptable to all organizations concerned.⁸⁶

Even after the governments of Osaka secured financial assistance from the ministries of the central administration, such a problem would continue. As already described, the national subsidies and grants were carefully earmarked as expenditures for specific departments or projects. The Ministry of Health and Welfare tended to finance those local undertakings which were immediately related to the general welfare of local

⁸⁶On these points, see Chapter III of this study.

citizens. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry would usually subsidize the Departments of Construction or Commerce and Industry more than any others.⁸⁷

The net effect of such complex local relationships with the central administration was a total disintegration of the decision-making structure with respect to pollution abatement in Osaka. In the case of the prefecture, the government had approximately five agencies, which operated their own control programs apart from the one operated by the Department of Environment. They included, on the one hand, the projects of the Departments of Construction, Commerce and Industry, and Agriculture and Forestry, all of which were financed by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and on the other hand, the plan of the Department of Public Health subsidized by the Ministry of Health and Welfare. What is more, the similar programs were duplicated in comparable agencies in the city of Osaka.⁸⁸

⁸⁷Osaka-Fu Seikatsu Kankyō-Bu, Kōgai Hakusho, pp. 261-264.

⁸⁸Ibid.

Under these conditions, it seems out of the question to expect Osaka to undertake coordinated efforts against pollution. Financially and structurally, not only would the current systems appear too fragmented, but they would seem also to weaken the position of the organizations which are supposedly the major vehicles of the anti-pollution program of Osaka.

In short, from the study of the decision-making structure and process in the pollution control of Osaka, we have become aware of the significant gap between the two. Even though the region has two separate mechanisms, it has not been able to make use of either of them. Instead, they are more often than not totally discarded, primarily because of the penetration of the national government in local affairs.

The fundamental problem seems closely related to the financial dependence of local entities on Tokyo. The lack of economic resources tends to make the governments of Osaka quite vulnerable to the demands of the central administrations. In getting subsidies and grants, these local entities must respect various directives from different sources of power at the national level. This has,

however, resulted in the lack of consistency, vigor, and coordination in the pollution control program of Osaka.

The entire lesson of Osaka seems to suggest that under a unitary government organization, it is extremely difficult to develop an effective and financially reliable local political entity, whose programs are independent of the national government's programs. Such a task at the local level is more easily accomplished in a federal form of government, as in the United States.

Conclusions

Having investigated the decision-making in air pollution control in Los Angeles and Osaka, we have come face to face with the dissimilarities between these two regions. First, in terms of the decision-making structure, we have noted that Los Angeles has a single system, which is centered around the Air Pollution Control Board. By way of contrast, Osaka has a dual structure. One is in the prefectural and the other is in the municipal government. Both of them are independent entities and have few points of contact.

When we take the pervading nature of smog into

account, the structure of Los Angeles appears superior to that of Osaka. Since pollution does not respect artificial boundaries, local governments must combat air pollution from a broad base, and not from a parochial standpoint. Los Angeles seems to have recognized this and established an integrated system of control. Osaka too must eventually come to terms with this fact and reorganize the present set-up. Instead of two similar structures in such a geographically small area, Osaka should provide one reliable and well-coordinated system for the entire region.

Second, with respect to the decision makers, those in Los Angeles are much more sensitive and alert to the smog problem than their counterparts in Osaka. This difference holds true for both the elective and non-elective officials in these respective regions. One of the major underlying factors responsible for such a dissimilarity seems inextricable from the particular political climate of these areas.

The decision makers in Los Angeles, because they are under heavy pressure for personalized politics, tried constantly to make innovative plans to curtail air

pollution. In contrast, the officials in Osaka are relatively free from public scrutiny and often become half-hearted in the carrying out of their assignments. This is particularly conspicuous among the elected officials. Their lack of knowledge of air pollution is surprising and deplorable. As long as such conditions persist, it seems futile to expect imaginative proposals coming from the decision makers of Osaka.

Finally, in examining the decision-making process, we have learned that Los Angeles is superior to Osaka in several important ways. In Los Angeles, all issues relating to stationary sources of smog control are resolved at the local level. They do not call for the state and the federal governments to participate in the local policy process. Since industrial smog is most effectively controlled at the site of pollution, the degree of local responsibility accorded to Los Angeles is undoubtedly a sound approach and perhaps accounts for the reduction of this type of smog in the area.

In comparison, the decision-making process with respect to air pollution control in Osaka is predicated not upon one single local agency but upon its relation-

ship with the national government. As the governments in this region are financially weak, they must cope with several central ministries and are subordinate to their wishes. As a consequence, the pollution control programs in Osaka are multiple and unstable. They are, at the same time, financially and structurally fragmented.

When the two programs against smog are compared, it is reasonable to conclude that the one in Los Angeles is farther advanced than that in Osaka, at least, at the present time. This difference, from my perspective, may be attributed to the levels of development with regard to the decision-making structure, as well as process, pertaining to air pollution control. In Los Angeles, these political aspects of smog control are more refined and developed than those in Osaka. Such discrepancies are, in turn, inextricable from the differences in the degree of issue-consciousness on the part of the Los Angeles decision makers and public, in comparison to those in Osaka.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS

The major purpose of this dissertation has been to advance, on a comparative basis, an understanding of air pollution control of two metropolitan areas in two culturally different nations. The initial chapter has pointed out the marked discrepancy between Los Angeles and Osaka from the viewpoint of demography, political structure, and political process. A later chapter has indicated how far Los Angeles is advanced over Osaka with respect to the rules and regulations, administrative structures, and enforcement pertaining to smog control.

In this examination, the gap between Los Angeles and Osaka on these scores has been accounted for by two sets of independent variables. First is the pattern of interest group politics. In both Los Angeles and Osaka, the political influence of corporate interests is substantial. By virtue of their economic power, they can, more often than not, thwart many attempts to jeopardize

the position of business in their respective regions.

However, Los Angeles politics appears different from Osaka politics. In Southern California, in sharp contrast to Osaka, there exist many countervailing forces that can prevent the interests of business from becoming politically dominant. The initiative process, the stress on personalized politics, and the importance of mass media, all contribute to occasionally checking the role of business groups in Los Angeles politics.

One of the crucial outcomes of these balance mechanisms is a high incidence of collisions between ecology groups and business organizations, particularly in the electoral process of Southern California. This seems to have had an immediate consequence on the level of sophistication in the anti-pollution programs of the area. These frequent conflicts have kept both the lawmakers and the residents alert to the smog problem. This has, in turn, contributed to the development of comparably effective control measures in Los Angeles.

Conversely, this study has noted that Osaka is devoid of countervailing forces that can deter the political power of business. Instead, the ideological position

characteristic of ecology organizations, the low issue-consciousness of the lawmakers and the public, and the financial position of local government seem to have encouraged the predominance of corporate interests in Osaka politics. Such an important lack of balance mechanisms has, consequently, deprived Osaka of the opportunity to foster innovative policies against pollution.

The second set of variables explaining why Los Angeles is farther advanced than Osaka in smog control programs is the decision-making system. A major difference between these two regions in this respect is the extent of coordination of the system. This study has noted that Los Angeles has a more coordinated and integrated decision-making structure and process than does Osaka. All agencies in Southern California have specific functions and relationships.

By contrast, Osaka has dual decision-making structures, one for the prefecture and the other for the municipality. As they often are not complimentary but instead competitive over manpower and economic resources, they are handicapped in the development of an effective control policy. Furthermore, the decision-making process

of Osaka is to a large extent determined by its subordinate relationship to the national government. Because several central government bodies issue sometimes conflicting directives, the governments of Osaka often fall into a state of confusion and fragmentation. The extreme centralization is undoubtedly one of the major detriments which prevents Osaka from nurturing consistent and integrated policies against smog.

This seems to be an appropriate place to put forward some ideas concerning environmental improvement in Los Angeles and Osaka. With regard to Los Angeles, as previously noted, the Air Pollution Control District is the nerve center of the entire smog control program. Mainly because of its scientific competence, the District occupies the important position and plays a major role not only in the integration of the air pollution control system but also in the attenuation of smog. There seems little doubt that the Air Pollution Control District has made an important and essential contribution to the control effort in Los Angeles.

However, primarily because of its technical competence, there is a possibility that the Air Pollution

Control District will become a self-generating and self-governing body detached from the public and from other government organizations. As a matter of fact, there are many people who argue that the District has already become immune to public scrutiny.¹

To the accusation that the Air Pollution Control District is overprotective of its information on behalf of business concerns, for instance, the District officials typically react with a sense of disdain and look askance at their critics. For the members of the Air Pollution Control District, they are the most competent, and their professional judgment is unassailable, when the matter comes to air pollution. Therefore, in the eyes of the District officials, such criticism is neither scientifically valid nor worth serious consideration.

If this disposition on the part of the Air Pollution Control District members goes farther, it will have a serious consequence on the future development of the smog control program in Los Angeles. Turning deaf ears

¹Nancy Connick et al., Smog Paradox, pp. 67-123. Also Jane Wilson, "Scenario for a Smog Snafu," pp. 10-14.

to criticism will perhaps stagnate research and enforcement. It will also undermine the effort to control pollution from new and yet unforeseen sources.

The officials of the APCD should approach accusations against them in a manner more open than in the past. They should remain accessible and attentive to public opinion. As long as the District members keep this attitude, it will enable Los Angeles to continue the development of its smog control program.

The problems of air pollution control in Osaka are complex, for which no panacea is available. However, both the prefectural and the municipal governments should undertake two projects. First, for the immediate future, they ought to educate the residents more about the real cause of air pollution. Especially, these governments should make every effort to show that smog stems not only from smoke stacks and motor vehicles but also from garbage burning and backyard furnaces. If the idea is promulgated that every form of combustion emission, no matter how small, requires some regulation in order to ameliorate pollution, then this would hopefully bring about a new and decidedly progressive public consciousness with

respect to the deficiencies of the present program. Perhaps an aroused public consciousness could also effect critical support for even more progressive control measures.

Secondly, in the long run, Osaka should work for a merger of the programs administered by the prefectural and the municipal governments. If this can be done, the new extended program will in turn re-direct and invigorate the current control effort against smog.

Under a unitary system of government, once the central authority decides to take a giant stride to curtail air pollution, it will be able to expect a much more speedy result than that in a federal form of government. When such a national decision comes about, the newly combined program in Osaka will be a tremendous help in alleviating pollution in Japan.

In conclusion, on a comparative basis, this study has attempted to show that different political styles produce dissimilar programs for the control of air pollution. This investigation will hopefully provide helpful guidelines for both lawmakers and students of other urban regions in developing policies for solving ecological problems.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Government Publications and Special Reports

- California, State. Air Resources Board. Draft: Report of Special Air Resources Board Panel on Investigation of the Los Angeles Air Pollution Control District. California: Air Resources Board, 1972.
- _____. Office of Legislative Analysis. Air Pollution Control in California. Sacramento: Office of Legislative Analysis, 1971.
- _____. Senate Select Committee on Rapid Transit. A Report on Interim Hearings to the California State Senate. Public Transit in California. California: Senate of the State of California, 1971.
- Los Angeles, City of. Department of City Planning, Comprehensive Planning Section. Health Effects of Air Pollution. By Alice D. Lepis, Staff Paper. Los Angeles: Department of City Planning, 1971.
- Los Angeles, County of. Air Pollution Control District. Annual Report: 1947-1948. Los Angeles: Air Pollution Control District, 1948.
- _____. APCD. APCD: History and Function. Publication No. 1. Los Angeles: APCD, 1972.
- _____. APCD. Rules and Regulations. Los Angeles: APCD, 1971.
- _____. APCD. Profile of Air Pollution Control. Los Angeles: APCD, 1971.

Los Angeles, County of. APCD. Statement of Robert Chass Before the County of Los Angeles, Environmental Quality Control Committee on June 14, 1971.

Los Angeles: APCD, 1971.

_____. Environmental Quality Control Committee. Report of Committee Hearings on Air Pollution. Los Angeles: County Board of Supervisors, 1971.

_____. Board of Supervisors. The History, Legal and Administrative Aspects of Air Pollution Control in the County of Los Angeles. By Harold W. Kennedy. Los Angeles: County Board of Supervisors, 1954.

_____. Chief Administrative Office. The Government of the County of Los Angeles. Los Angeles: Chief Administrative Office, n.d.

_____. Information Services. Chief Administrative Office: History, Services and Functions. Los Angeles: Chief Administrative Office, 1969.

_____. Office of Air Pollution Control. Annual Report of Air Pollution Control: 1945-1946. Los Angeles: Office of Air Pollution Control, 1946.

_____. Annual Report of Air Pollution Control: 1946-1947. Los Angeles: Office of Air Pollution Control, 1947.

_____. Regional Planning Commission. Quarterly Bulletin, No. 111. January 1, 1971.

_____. Quarterly Bulletin, No. 113. July 1, 1971.

_____. County of Los Angeles Data Guide: 1971-1972. Los Angeles: County of Los Angeles, 1972.

Los Angeles Times, Marketing Research. 1970 Census: Los Angeles and Orange Counties: Population and Housing Characteristics by City and Unincorporated Place. Los Angeles: Los Angeles Times, Marketing Research, n.d.

Neiburger, Marris, and Edinger, James G. Summary Report on Meteorology of the Los Angeles Basin with Particular Respect to the 'Smog' Problem. Los Angeles: Southern California Air Pollution Foundation, 1954.

United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Public Works. Hearings before a subcommittee on air and water pollution. 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967.

_____. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Air Pollution Control: Field Operations Manual. Ed. by Melvin I. Weisburd, PHS Publication No. 937. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962.

Books and Articles

"A Study of Pollution--Air: A Staff Report to the Committee on Public Works, United States Senate, September 1963." The Economics of Air Pollution. Ed. by Harold Wolozin. New York: W. W. Norton, 1966.

Air Conservation Commission. Air Conservation. Washington, D.C.: American Association for Advancement of Science, 1965.

Aylesworth, Thomas. This Vital Air This Vital Water: Man's Environmental Crisis. New York: Rand McNally, 1968.

Ayres, Robert U. "Air Pollution in Cities." Politics and Environment. Ed. by Walt Anderson. Pacific Palisades, Calif.: Goodyear, 1970.

- Banfield, Edward C. Big City Politics. New York: Random House, Inc., 1967.
- Batton, Louis J. The Unclean Sky. New York: Doubleday, 1966.
- Berry, R. Stephen. "The Chemistry and Cost of Contamination: Perspectives on Polluted Air--1970." Politics of Neglect. Ed. by Roy Meek and John A. Straayer. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971.
- Carney, Francis. "The Decentralized Politics of Los Angeles." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, CCCLIII (May 1964), 107-112.
- Cion, Richard M. "Accommodation Par Excellence: The Lakewood Plan." Metropolitan Politics: A Reader. Ed. by Michael N. Danielson. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971.
- Cohen, Jerome, and Cohen, Nathan E. "The Social Climate of Los Angeles." Los Angeles: Viability and Prospects for Metropolitan Leadership. Ed. by Werner Z. Hirsch. New York, Washington, & London: Praeger Publisher, 1971.
- Connick, Nancy, et al. Smog: A Paradox. Los Angeles: Program in Public Policy Studies of the Claremont Colleges, 1971.
- Crouch, Winston, and Dinerman, Beatrice. Southern California Metropolis: A Study in Development of Government for a Metropolitan Area. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1963.
- Curtis, Gerald L. Election Campaigning Japanese Style. New York & London: Columbia University Press, 1971.
- Davies, J. Clarence. The Politics of Pollution. New York: Pegasus, 1970.

- De Vos, George, and Wagatsuma, Hiroshi, eds. Japan's Invisible Race. Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966.
- Fromson, Jefferey. "A History of Federal Air Pollution Control." Environmental Law Review. Ed. by H. Floyd Sherrod. Albany, N.Y.: Sage Hall, 1970.
- Gladfelder, Jane. California's Emerging Counties. Sacramento, Calif.: County Supervisors Association of California, 1968.
- Hagevik, George H. Decision-Making in Air Pollution Control. New York: Praeger Publisher, 1971.
- Harvey, Richard B. The Dynamics of California Government and Politics. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1970.
- Hawkins, Brett W. Politics and Urban Policies. Indianapolis & New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1971.
- Herber, Lewis. Crisis in Our Cities. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965.
- Hutchinson, William H. "The Legacy of Progressivism." Consensus and Cleavages: Issues in California Politics. Ed. by Charles M. Price and Earl R. Kruschke. San Francisco: Chandler, 1967.
- Jones, Helen L., and Wilcox, Robert F. Metropolitan Los Angeles: Its Government. Los Angeles: The Haynes Foundation, 1949.
- League of Women Voters of Los Angeles County. Los Angeles County Government. Los Angeles: League of Women Voters of Los Angeles County, 1968.
- League of Women Voters of the United States. "A Congregation of Vapors." Facts and Issues, No. 393 (September 1970), pp. 1-6.

- Mitchell, William. "The Shape of Political Theory to Come: From Political Sociology to Political Economy." Political and Social Sciences. Ed. by S. M. Lipset. New York & London: Oxford University Press, 1969.
- Nadeau, Remi. Los Angeles: From Mission to Modern City. New York & London: Longmans, Green, 1960.
- Nakane, Chie. Japanese Society. Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970.
- Owens, John; Constantin, Edmond; and Weschler, Louis. California Politics and Parties. London: McMillan, 1970.
- Peterson, Lorin. The Days of the Mugwump. New York: Random House, 1961.
- Rand, Christopher. Los Angeles: The Ultimate City. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- Ranney, Austin. "The Study of Policy Content: A Framework for Choice." Political Science and Public Policy. Ed. by Austin Ranney. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1968.
- Ries, John, and Kirlin, John J. "Government in the Los Angeles Area: The Issue of Centralization and Decentralization." Los Angeles: Viability and Prospects for Metropolitan Leadership. Ed. by Werner Z. Hirsch. New York, Washington, & London: Praeger Publishers, 1971.
- Rogin, Michael P., and Shover, John L. Political Change in California: Critical Elections and Social Movement--1890-1966. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1969.
- Sharkansky, Ira. "The Political Scientist and Policy Analysis." Policy Analysis in Political Science. Ed. by Ira Sharkansky. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970.

Southern California Research Council. The New Shape of Southern California: 1985. Report No. 18. Los Angeles: Southern California Research Council 1970.

Steiner, Kurt. Local Government in Japan. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965.

Warren, Robert. "The Rise of Los Angeles County as a Producer of Municipal Service." Government of the Metropolis. Ed. by Joseph F. Zimmerman. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1968.

Wilson, James Q. "A Guide to Reagan County." Commentary, XLIII (May 1968), 37-45.

_____. A Report on Politics in Los Angeles. Cambridge, Mass.: Joint Center for Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, 1959.

_____. "Problems in the Study of Urban Politics." Essays in Political Science. Ed. by Edward Buchling. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1966.

Wilson, Jane. "Scenario for a Smog Snafu." West, January 9, 1972, pp. 10-14.

Women For. An Analysis of Proposition 9. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Women For, n.d.

Wood, Edward C. Analysis of Proposition 9. Menlo Park, Calif.: Stanford Research Institute, 1972.

Unpublished Materials and Pamphlets

APCD Digest, I, No. 1 (November 1971); II, No. 2 (July 1972); III, No. 6 (June 1972).

Californians Against Pollution Initiative. Some Prominent Californians Who Have Urged 'No' on No. 9.

San Francisco & Los Angeles: Californians Against the Pollution Initiative, 1972.

. A Symposium of California Editorial Opinion Urging Vote No on No.9. San Francisco & Los Angeles: Californians Against the Pollution Initiative, n.d.

California Poll. "The California Poll." Los Angeles, 1970. No. 696. (Mimeographed)

Edelson, Edward. The Battle for Clean Air. New York: Public Affairs Pamphlet, 1967.

Meade, Gladys. "Amendment of Article XXVI of California Constitution to Allow Use of Gas Tax Funds for Transit Construction and Vehicular Pollution Control." Unpublished term paper, University of Southern California, 1971.

Needed: Clean Air. Greenfield, Mass.: Channing L. Bete Co., Inc., n.d.

People's Lobby. A Product of Standard Oil Company of California: Standard Oil's Secret Plan to Defeat the Clean Environment Act. Los Angeles: People's Lobby, n.d.

.. "Initiative Measure to be Submitted Directly to the Electors." Los Angeles, n.d. (Mimeographed)

Sierra Club. Proposition 9: Pros and Cons. San Francisco: Sierra Club, n.d.

Other Sources

Debbs, Ernest. Biography. Los Angeles, n.d.

Dorn, Warren. Biography. Los Angeles, n.d.

Goodgame, E. Letter addressed to People's Lobby.

Hahn, Kenneth. Introduction. Los Angeles, n.d.

"KNBC Editorial." KNBC, Los Angeles. Telecast, February 2, 1972. "Environment Deception." James E. Foy, Speaker.

Los Angeles, County of. County Board of Supervisors. Minutes of Meeting of the County Board of Supervisors, November 4, 1971.

_____. _____ . Minutes of Meeting of the County Board of Supervisors, January 6, 1972.

Schabarum, Peter. Biography. Los Angeles, n.d.

Newspapers

Agenda 71 (semi-newspaper, Los Angeles), 1971.

Daily Breeze (Long Beach), 1970.

Los Angeles Times. January 1970-January 1973.

Star News (Pasadena). October 21, 1970.

Interviews

Awai, Iwakichi. Member of the City Assembly of Osaka, in Osaka on October 6, 1972.

Blocker, Karen. Volunteer worker in the People's Lobby, in Los Angeles on June 27, 1972.

Cheap, Margaret. Staff worker in the People's Lobby, in Los Angeles on June 28, 1972.

Falkner, William. Special Services Division, Air Pollution Control District of Los Angeles, in Los Angeles on January 7, 10, and 17, 1972.

- Fukuyoshi, Motoyuki. Ōsaka-Fu Seikatsu Kankyō-Bu Taiki-Ka (Prefecture of Osaka, Department of Environment, Office of Air Pollution Control), in Osaka on October 5, 1972.
- Higashimura, Yoshiharu. Judge in the Appeal Court of Osaka, in Osaka on October 10, 1972.
- Hirayama, Toshiaki. Ōsaka-Shi Kankyō Eisei-Bu (Osaka City, Department of Health and Environment), in Osaka on October 6, 1972.
- Kinoshita, Ryo. Shikko Iincho Sakai-Shi Shokuin Rōdō Kumiai (Chairman, Public Workers Union of the City of Sakai), in Osaka on October 12, 1972.
- Koupal, Edward. Executive director of the People's Lobby, in Los Angeles on June 14 and 15, 1972.
- Koupal, Joyce. Executive director of the People's Lobby, in Los Angeles on June 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20.
- Meade, Gladys. Air Conservation Associate, Tuberculosis and Respiratory Association of California, in Los Angeles on July 3 and 4, 1972.
- Nishimura, Yoshio. Ōsaka-Fu Senkatsu Kankyō-Bu Kōgai-Shitsu (Prefecture of Osaka, Department of Environment, Office of Pollution Control), in Osaka on October 18, 1972.
- Secretary of Women For. Telephone interview in Los Angeles on August 28, 1972.
- Serizawa, Yoshio. Jimu Kyoku-Cho, Ōsaka kara Kōgai o Nakusu Kai (Secretary General, Association of the Citizens of Osaka Against Pollution), in Osaka on October 12, 1972.
- Soren, Robert. Staff member in the Chief Administrative Office of Los Angeles County, in Los Angeles on August 8, 1972.

Wakano, Minoru. Ōsaka Shichō Shitsu (Office of the Mayor of Osaka), in Osaka on October 11, 1971.

Yagi, Seihachiro. Member of the Prefectural Assembly of Osaka, in Osaka on October 11, 1972.

Yamada, Shuji. Sakai-Shi Kōgai Kanri-Ka (City of Sakai, Office of Pollution Control), in Osaka on October 12, 1972.

Publications in Japanese Language

Araki, Hiroshi. Michi Hitosuji (The Only Path). Sakai, Ōsaka: Araki Hiroshi Kōenkai, n.d.

Asahi Jānaru Henshubu, ed. Machi no Seiji Mura no Seiji (Politics in Towns and Politics in Villages). Tokyo: Kensō Shobo, 1965.

Asahi Nenkan (Asahi Almanac). Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun Sha, 1972.

Asahi Shinbun Ōsaka Ban (Asahi Newspaper, Osaka Edition). Daily.

Awai, Iwakichi. Rirekisho (Biography). Osaka, n.d.

Fujimoto, Atsushi. Ōsaka-Fu no Rekishi (The History of Osaka Prefecture). 2 vols. Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppan, 1971.

Hagino, Masakazu. "Ōsaka-Fu ni Okeru Kōgai Gyōsei no Genkyo to Mondai Ten" (Current Conditions and Problems in the Administration of Pollution Control). Kōgai Gyōsei (Public Administration for Pollution Control). Ed. by Nippon Gyōsei Gakkai. Tokyo: Kensō Shobo, 1971.

- Jichi Daijin Kanbō, ed. Chihō Kōkyō Dantai no Kōgai Taisaku (Pollution Control Efforts of Local Governments). Tokyo: Daiichi Hōki, 1971.
- Kamioka, Namiko. "Kōgai: Jichitai ni Okeru Sekinin to Taisaku" (Responsibilities and Policies Against Pollution in Local Government). Kōgai Gyōsei (Public Administration for Pollution Control). Ed. by Nippon Gyōsei Gakkai. Tokyo: Kenso Shobo, 1971.
- Kikaku-Bu Tōkei-Ka. Ōsaka Fusei Yōran (A Guide Book of Osaka Prefecture). Ōsaka: Kikabu-Bu, 1971.
- Kimura, Takeo. Ōsaka no Rekishi (The History of Osaka). Ōsaka: Ōsaka Fushi Henshu Shiryo Shitsu, 1970.
- Kōgai no Genkyō to Taisaku (Current Conditions of Pollution and Its Control). Ōsaka: Ōsaka-Fu, 1969.
- Kōhō (Public Notice).
- Kuze, Kimitaka. Chihō Jichi Hō (Legal Statutes of Local Administration). Tokyo: Gakuyo Shobo, 1971.
- Mimihara Sōgō Byōin Kōgai Gurūpu. Taiki Osen to Kenkō Hakai (Health Effects of Air Pollution). Sakai, Ōsaka: Mimihara Sōgō Byōin Kōgai Gurūpu, 1970.
- Miyamoto, Kenichi. Nippon no Toshi Mondai (Urban Crisis in Japan). Tokyo: Tsukuma Shobo, 1971.
- Nishi Yodogawa kara Kōgai o Nakusu Shimin no Kai. Nishi Yodogawa kara Kōgai o Nakusu Shimin no Kai Nyūsu (Newsletter from the Association of Citizens of Nishi Yodogawa Against Pollution). Nishi Yodogawa, Ōsaka: Nishi Yodogawa kara Kōgai o Nakusu Shimin no Kai, 1971.
- Okita, Tetsuya. Chihō Jichi Yōron (Elements of Local Government). Tokyo: Hyōron Sha, 1971.

Ōsaka-Fu Kōgai Boshi Jōrei (Prefectural Ordinance Against Pollution). 1969, 1970, 1971, and 1972.

Ōsaka-Fu Kōgai Taisaku Suishin Honbu Yōkō (A Guide to the Inter-Departmental Conference on Pollution Control in the Prefecture of Osaka). Ōsaka: Ōsaka-Fu, n.d.

Ōsaka-Fu Nenkan (A Yearbook of Osaka Prefecture). Ōsaka: Shin Ōsaka Shinbun Sha, 1972.

Ōsaka-Shi. Ōsaka Shikai Kankei Reiki Shū (A Collection of Regulations on the Proceedings of the City Assembly of Osaka). Ōsaka: Ōsaka-Shi, 1971.

_____. Ōsaka-Shi no Kōgai no Genkyō to Taisaku (Current Conditions and Controls of Pollution in the City of Osaka). Ōsaka: Ōsaka-Shi, 1972.

_____. Kankyō Eisei-Bu. "Kōgai Taisaku Kankei Soshiki Kikō Zu (Organizational Charts Relating to Pollution Control). Ōsaka, n.d. (Xeroxed)

_____. Senkyo Kanri Iinkai. Ōsaka Shichō Senkyo Kekka Shirabe (The Official Returns of the Mayoralty Elections of Osaka). Ōsaka: Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, 1971.

_____. Senkyo Kanri Iinkai. Tōitsu Chihō Senkyo (General Local Elections). Ōsaka: Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, 1971

Sakai Gōdō Horitsu Jimusho. Sakai Takaishi no Kōgai Hantai Tōso no Okeru Hōritsuka no Yakume (The Role of Jurists in the Anti-Pollution Campaigns in the Sakai and Takaishi Areas). Sakai, Ōsaka: Sakai Gōdō Hōritsu Jimusho, n.d.

Sakai kara Kōgai o Nakusu Shimin no Kai. Ōsaka no Kōgai (Pollution in Osaka). Sakai, Ōsaka: Sakai kara Kōgai o Nakusu Shimin no Kai, n.d.

Sakai kara Kōgai o Nakusu Shimin no Kai. Sakai kara Kōgai o Nakusu Shimin no Kai wa Kōyū Dantai desu (All About the Association of the Citizens of Sakai Against Pollution). Sakai, Ōsaka: Sakai kara Kōgai o Nakusu Shimin no Kai, n.d.

. Sanbo Chiku Kōgai Jittai Chōsa no Matome (A Report on the Effects of Pollution in the Sanbo Area). Sakai, Ōsaka: Sakai kara Kōgai o Nakusu Shimin no Kai, n.d.

Sakai Takaishi kara Kōgai o Nakusu Kakkai Kondankai. Sakai Takaishi kara Kōgai o Nakusu Seigan Shomei no Onegai, (An Appeal for the Petition to Eliminate Pollution from the Sakai and Takaishi Areas). Sakai, Ōsaka: Sakai Takaishi kara Kōgai o Nakusu Kakkai Kondankai, n.d.

Sakai Takaishi kara Kōgai o Nakusu Shimin no Kai. Sakai Senboku no Kōgai (Pollution in Sakai and Senboku). Sakai, Ōsaka: Sakai kara Kōgai o Nakusu Shimin no Kai, 1971.

Sato, Atsushi. Gendai no Chihō Seiji (Contemporary Local Government of Japan). Tokyo: Nihon Hyōron Sha, 1972.

Seikatsu Kankyō-Bu. "Kōgai Kankei Soshiki Jinji Hensen Hyō" (Organizational and Personnel Charts Relating to Pollution Control). Ōsaka, n.d. (Xeroxed).

. Ōsaka Kōgai Taisaku Shingi Kai Unei Jyōkyō: Shōwa 46 Nen--Shōwa 47 Nen Dō (The Current Activity of the Advisory Commission on Pollution of the Prefecture of Osaka in the Years of 1971 and 1972). Ōsaka: Seikatsu Kankyō-Bu, 1972.

Seikatsu Kankyō-Bu Kōgai Shitsu. Kōgai Hakusho (White Paper on Pollution). Ōsaka: Seikatsu Kankyō-Bu, 1971.

Takaishi kara Kōgai o Nakusu Shimin no Kai. Kōgai Nyusu (News on Pollution). Takaishi, Ōsaka: Takaishi kara Kōgai o Nakusu Shimin no Kai, 1972.

Tanaka, Jiro. "Chihō Jichi Nijyū Nen" (Twenty Years of Local Autonomy). Chihō Jichi Nijyū Nen (Twenty Years of Local Autonomy). Ed. by Jiro Tanaka, Shizuo Tawara, and Ryunosuke Hara. Tokyo: Hyōron Sha, 1970.

Yomiuri Shinbun Ōsaka Ban (Yomiuri Newspaper, Osaka Edition). Daily.

73

18832