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The Japanese Cabinet Ministers: Change and Continuity,

1885 through 1964

Choong-sik Ahn

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty
of Political Science, Columbia University

1973

ABSTRACT

The Japanese Cabinet Ministers: Change and Continuity,

1885 through 1964

Choong-sik Ahn

The main theme of this study is the change and continuity in the recruitment and composition of the members of the Japanese Cabinet from its inception in 1885 to the end of the third Ikeda cabinet in November, 1964. The objectives of this study are twofold: First, some social attributes and characteristics of the members of the Japanese Cabinet which have been hitherto impressionistically observed by researchers of modern Japanese politics are to be tested on the basis of empirical data. Secondly, it is hoped that an investigation into the social attributes shared commonly among those individuals represented in the political leadership of Japan in a given period and over different periods might throw some new lights on the nature and extent of political development and change that took place in Japan since her emergence as a modern state.

Various biographical data for 501 individuals who had served in the Japanese Cabinet with or without portfolio between 1885 and 1964 were collected and processed to determine what common social characteristics were shared among them in a given period and over different periods; what specific characteristics were associated with varying styles of Japanese regime; and whether or not any of the characteristics was a factor

contributing to the emergence of these persons as members of the Cabinet in a given period or under a specific regime. Also, some comparisons were made, wherever relevant, between the composite character and characteristics of the members of the Cabinet and those of other groups of political leaders in Japan to determine a unique social attribute of the Cabinet Ministers vis-a-vis other political actors of Japan.

One aspect of social characteristics of the Japanese Cabinet Ministers to which attention was drawn in Part-I of this study pertains to their Han-origins and regional origins. The dominance of the "Han-clique", a well-acknowledged feature of Meiji politics, was evaluated in quantitative terms; and the intra-group differences among the members of this clique and their implications were analyzed. The gradual waning of this parochially based political elite and its effect on the cabinet composition were traced through different periods. Also included in this Part of the study is an investigation into the "regional representativeness" of the cabinet composition in different periods.

In Part-II, which deals with the educational background of the Japanese Cabinet Ministers, some changes brought about in the composition of the Meiji cabinets by the emergence of modern-educated elements in the body politic of Japan were examined. Also examined in this Part are the levels of formal education attained by the members of the post-Meiji cabinets and the types of undergraduate institutions attended by them. In these examinations, a particular attention was paid to the

emergence of Tokyo University graduates in the top strata of the Japanese political leadership, another well-known feature of Japanese politics but in need of a closer scrutiny.

Another focal point of interest covered in this Part is the assessment of the relationship between the different levels of formal education attained by the members of the Cabinet and the varying channels of cabinet recruitment.

While the surveys covered in Part-I and Part-II are more or less "macroscopic" studies of the recruitment and composition of the Japanese Cabinet, some "microscopic" observations on the career patterns and the career routes of the Japanese Cabinet Ministers were made in Part-III. Different patterns of career were sorted out, and different typologies within a particular pattern of career were closely scrutinized. Different routes of political ascent followed by different groups of cabinet ministers and the varying lengths of time required by these groups in reaching the cabinet posts were compared in a given period and over different periods. The main emphasis was put in these examinations to find out what sorts of changes were brought about in the recruitment and composition of the Japanese Cabinet as a result of the political reconstruction in post-war Japan.

The main current of changes that could be found through this study is the erosion of various "parochial", "sectarian", and "particularistic" traits in the composite character of the members of the Japanese Cabinet through several successive

stages of political development. There is a discernible tendency that the composite character of the Japanese Cabinet is becoming increasingly homologous to the social characteristics and attributes of the Japanese population as a whole. If, therefore, one is to subscribe to a formula that the best interest of the citizen body in a country is better realized when it is ruled by a group which mirrors closely the diverse social attributes of the people, then the changes and evolutions that could be observed in the composition and recruitment of the Japanese Cabinet during the past eight decades are in line with such desired direction.

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INTRODUCTION:

The Scope and Nature of the Study

and

Notes on the Methods and Sources

The 'leadership' of a society is a criterion of the values by which that society lives. The manner in which the 'leadership' is chosen; the breadth of the social base from which it is recruited; the way in which it exercises the decision-making power; the extent and nature of its accountability--these and other attributes are indicators of the degree of shared power, shared respect, shared well-being, and shared safety in a given society at a given time. By learning the nature of the elite, we learn much about the nature of the society. Changes in the elite structure are... indexes of revolution.¹

The main theme of this study is the change and continuity in the recruitment and composition of the members of the Japanese Cabinet from its inception in 1885 to the end of the third Ikeda cabinet in November, 1964. It was hoped that an investigation of various social characteristics of persons represented in the political leadership of modern Japan in a given period and a comparison of such characteristics over different periods and under varying regimes might throw some new lights on the nature and extent of political development and change that took place in Japan since her emergence as a modern state.

Of various categories of leaders active in the political arena of modern Japan, the Cabinet Ministers were chosen as the subjects of this study for two reasons. First, although there is a considerable degree of difference in the power and functions of the Cabinet between the pre-war and post-war re-

¹ Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and C. Easton Rothwell, The Comparative Study of Elites (Stanford, California, 1952) p. 1.

gimes, the Cabinet, nonetheless, had been the central and most essential decision-making organ in the political process of both pre-war and post-war Japan. Secondly, of a variety of high-level decision-making organs existent under the pre-war regime, the Cabinet is the only organ whose existence was not affected by the post-war reconstruction of political institutions in Japan. Therefore, the personnel circulated in the Japanese Cabinet during the past eighty years could serve as a group of study subjects best suited for examining change and continuity in the top strata of political leadership of Japan throughout the pre-war and the post-war periods.

The Cabinet as an institution was first brought into existence in Japan in 1885, in anticipation of the enactment of the Meiji Constitution four years later. It was organized by an Imperial Ordinance, and only later justified in the Meiji Constitution and by usage. The pre-war cabinet, compared to its post-war counterpart, was more limited in its power and competency. It was partly due to the diffusion of executive responsibility set forth by the Meiji Constitution, and partly because of the extra-constitutional bodies such as Genro which exercised informal control over the executive decisions of vital importance. In the conducting of foreign affairs, for instance, a cabinet decision could be thwarted by the Privy Council which asserted its constitutional prerogative in supervising foreign policies. In the realm of military affairs, the pre-war cabinet was liable to the dic-

tate of the Military Supreme Command which set itself apart from the control of the civil authority under the claim of Tosuiken. The power of the pre-war cabinet was also curtailed by Genro and other coteries of men behind the Imperial screen who gave "weighty advices" to the Emperor, in whom the constitution vested all executive powers. Although a variety of legal and extra-legal bodies were thus in competition and conflict with the Cabinet in the decision-making process, the Cabinet remained as the governmental organ of the first importance in the political process of pre-war Japan. For, inasmuch as the Cabinet was the top administrative agency of the state, control of the Cabinet was essential to any group, within or without the government, which desired its policies to be enforced. The primacy of the Cabinet under the pre-war system of government could be also explained by the fact that it served as the chief link between the "unseen organs of state" surrounding the Emperor and the formal machinery of government.

The ambiguous position of the Cabinet under the Meiji Constitution was corrected by the Post-war Constitution. Executive powers which had been assigned to an amorphous collection of agencies under the old constitution are now clearly vested in the Cabinet. The Privy Council, the Military Supreme Command, the Imperial Household Ministry, and Genro no longer exist as rivals or superiors of the Cabinet within the executive branch of the government. The post-war cabinet, being

the highest agency of the unified and integrated executive machinery, functions as the pivot of the governmental process in post-war Japan. Compared to its pre-war counterpart, therefore, the post-war cabinet is a more clearly definable and more positively identifiable locus of power in the body politic of Japan.

All-told 501 individuals who had served in the Japanese Cabinet with or without portfolio between 1885 and 1964 were singled out as the study population. Of 10 to 17 portfolios existent in the pre-war Japanese Cabinet, the portfolios of Army and Navy were held by generals and admirals in the active list under the provision of an Imperial Ordinance. These generals and admirals holding the service portfolios were regarded primarily as members of the Military Supreme Command and only secondarily as members of the Cabinet under the "dualism" of the pre-war regime. They were nonetheless included in the study population.

Various biographical data for these 501 individuals were collected and processed to determine: 1) what common social characteristics were shared among them in a given period and over different periods; 2) what specific characteristics were associated with varying styles of the Japanese regime; 3) whether any of the characteristics was a factor contributing to their emergence as members of the Cabinet in a given period or under a specific regime. Some attempts were also made to compare, wherever relevant, the composite character and charac-

teristic of the members of the Cabinet with those of the high officials and political leaders serving in other agencies of the Japanese government.

One aspect of social characteristics of the Japanese cabinet Ministers to which attention is drawn in Part-I of this study pertains to their Han-origins and regional origins. Nearly all the informed writers of modern Japanese politics pointed out the fact that politics in the Meiji period was dominated by those Samurai from a few feudal domains (Han) which were instrumental in bringing about the Meiji Restoration. While it is thus a well-acknowledged feature of the Meiji politics, the characterization of the feature has been impressionistic, not furnished with quantitative data. What proportion of the personnel serving in the cabinets of the Meiji period was drawn from these Han, and to what extent the dominance of this parochially based group among the members of the Japanese Cabinet had diminished after the Meiji period have not been answered previously. These questions were answered in Period-I. Some attempts were also made in this Part to relate the regional origins of the members of the Japanese Cabinet to the regional distribution of the Japanese population as a whole, so that a regional "representativeness" of the persons represented in the Cabinet in a given period and over different periods could be evaluated. Also included in the Part are some comparisons of the Han/regional origins between the members of

the Cabinet and those officials serving in other high agencies of the pré-war Japanese government (e.g. the Privy Councillors, the military bureaucrats, the Imperial Appointees to the House of Peers).

In Part-II, which deals with the educational background of the members of the Japanese Cabinet, an examination was made as to what effects were brought about to the parochially based group dominant in the cabinets of the Meiji period by the emergence of modern educated elements in the Japanese body politic. Included in Part-II are surveys on the levels of formal education attained by the members of the Cabinet over different periods, and on the different types of undergraduate institutions attended by them. In these surveys, a particular attention was paid to the emergence of Tokyo University graduates as a dominant group in the Japanese Cabinet, another well-acknowledged feature of modern Japanese politics but not always supported by quantitative data. Some comparisons were made in this Part between the Cabinet Ministers and other political leaders (e.g. the Diet leaders) to determine whether varying characteristics in their educational backgrounds were related to their different routes of political ascent.

While the survey covered in Part-I and Part-II are more or less "macroscopic" observations of the composite characters

of the Japanese Cabinet Ministers through different periods, some detailed investigations on their career backgrounds were made in Part-III. Different patterns of career were sorted out, and the attributes characteristic to particular patterns or typologies of career were closely scrutinized. Different routes taken by those having the same pattern of career in reaching the Cabinet were studied in detail; and the length of time they required in reaching the cabinet posts was measured to compare with other groups having different patterns of career. The main emphasis was put in this Part to find out what changes were brought about in the composition of the Japanese Cabinet by the political reconstruction in post-war Japan.

The importance of Keifu (personal connections or links to personal factions) in the political process, especially in the recruitment process, of Japan has been mentioned frequently by many students of Japanese politics. Although some efforts were made to gather informations on this topic, the data collected were not sufficient enough or appropriate enough to present in this study. Omission of this topic was not, therefore, by choice but by necessity.

The Methods of Research and Sources:

In selecting out the 501 individuals who had served in the Japanese Cabinet between 1885 and 1964, the following sources were utilized:

1. Kindai Nihon Seijishi Hikkei (A Handbook on Modern Japanese Political History), edited by Toyama Shigeki and Adachi Yoshiko, Tokyo, 1961.

The names, the dates of incumbencies, and the kinds of portfolios of the members of the Japanese Cabinet between 1885 and 1945 were taken from the listings in pp. 28-43 of this reference work.

2. Nihon Kindaishi Jiten (An Encyclopedia of Modern Japanese History), edited by Kyoto Daigaku, Bungakubu, Kokushiken-kyushutsu, Tokyo, 1958.

The names, the dates of incumbencies, and the kinds of portfolios of the members of the Japanese Cabinet between 1945 and 1958 (the end of the first Kishi cabinet) were taken from the listing in the Appendix of this work.

3. Shokuin Roku (Roster of Personnel), published by the Bureau of Printing, Ministry of Finance, annually or semi-annually since 1886.

These rosters of government officials were used to make some "spot-checks" on the listings in the above sources in order to insure the accuracy of the informations. No major discrepancy was found in the checkings.

4. Asahi Nenkan (The Asahi Yearbook), published annually by the Asahi News Publishing Company, volumes 1958-1965.

These yearbooks were used for finding out the names, the dates of incumbencies, and the kinds of portfolios of the members of the Japanese Cabinet between 1958 and 1964.

One 6x4 index card was prepared for each of the 501 individuals selected from the above sources, and the following categories of biographical information were sought for each of them:

I. Data on Birth;

1. Year of birth
2. Han of birth
3. Prefecture of birth, if born after 1871
4. Town or village of birth
5. Sibling-order and adoption
6. Father's occupation or social status

II. Data on Education;

1. Level of formal education
2. Kind of undergraduate institution
3. Faculty, department, or specialization in higher education
4. Year of graduation from university or college
5. Study abroad

III. Data on Career (with inclusive dates);

1. Passage in civil service or bar examination
2. First occupation and sequence of occupations
3. First civil service post and sequence of posts
4. First election to the Diet and election record
5. Experience in local elective assemblies or offices
6. Membership in the House of Peers
7. First cabinet entry and sequence of cabinet appointments

IV. Data on Affiliation;

1. Membership in political parties and party posts
2. Membership in associational organizations and posts
3. Religious affiliation

V. Miscellaneous Data;

1. Relation to prominent persons
2. Arrest relating to political activities or public affairs
3. The post-occupation purge
4. Foreign travel
5. Publication
6. Year of death.

In compiling the above categories of biographical data, a great variety of sources were used. The main sources fall into the following three types;

(I) Multi-volume Biographical Reference Works;

Most extensively used sources for collecting uniform background-information for the bulk of the study population were two different editions of Heibonsha's multi-volume biographical dictionary: (1) Heibonsha, (ed.) Shinsen Dai Jimmei Jiten (Newly Selected Great Biographical Dictionary), Tokyo, 1937-1941, 9 volumes; (2) Heibonsha, (ed.) Dai Jimmei Jiten (Great Biographical Dictionary), Tokyo, 1953-1958, 10 volumes.

While the coverage of biographical information in these dictionaries was fairly inclusive for those persons who had deceased by the time of the publication of these works, the coverage for those living was rather sketchy. To supplement this, additional information for those persons who were living between 1934 and 1962 was obtained from the Japanese Who's Who published annually by Jinji-Koshin-jo: Jinji Koshin Roku (Whos' Who), Issues 1934 through 1962. Also derived from this who's who were the data for those persons whose entries could not be found in Jimmei Jiten.

Some of those who became prominent only very recently (e.g. after 1960) were not entered either in Jimmei Jiten or the last available issue of Jinji Koshin Roku at the time of this research. Data for these persons were obtained from one of the following: Kojunsha, (ed.) Nihon Shinshi Roku (Roster of Gentlemen in Japan), Tokyo, 1959-1964. Nihon Kankai Johosha, (ed.) Nihon Kankai Meikan (Who's Who in the Japanese Officialdom), Tokyo, 1962; 1964.

(II) Biographical Directories and Roster of Public Officials;

In filling some details of the civil service records of some cabinet ministers (e.g. specific posts held and dates) Shokuin Roku (Roster of Personnel), published by the Ministry of Finance annually or semi-annually since 1886, was used. Also used for the same purpose were some other rosters of officials compiled by private persons: Ijiri Tsunekichi, Rekidai Kenkan Roku (Records of the Generations of Outstanding Officials), Tokyo, 1925. Shishido Sinzan, Meiji Taisho Showa Taikan Roku (Records of High Officials in the Meiji, Taisho, and Showa Periods), Tokyo, 1931.

In filling the election records of those cabinet ministers who had been the members of the House of Representatives or of the House of Councillors, and in filling the dates of incumbencies of those cabinet ministers who had been the members of the House of Peers, the following biographical directories published by the Japanese Diet were used: Shugin Giin Meikan (A Biographical Directory of the Members of the House of Representatives), Tokyo, 1962. Kizokuin Sangiin Giin Meikan (A Biographical Directory of the Members of the House of Peers and the House of Councillors), Tokyo, 1960.

(III) Biographical Works on Individuals; Personal Memoirs; Biographical Histories (Jimbutsushi); and the Political and Regional Histories containing Biographical Information:

Sources of this type were used for gathering "piece-meal" information infrequently covered in the multi-volume biographical reference works (e.g. father's occupation, relations with prominent personalities, etc.). The large number of these sources precludes their exhaustive listing here. The following are some representative samples, putting off the listing of the remainder of the bibliography at the end of this volume.

- Jiji Tsushinsha, ed. Sandai Zaisho Retsuden (Biographies of Three Generations of Prime Ministers), Tokyo, 1958-1959, 17 volumes.
- Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, ed. Watakushi no Rirekisho (My Resume), Tokyo, (Serialized since 1957; 24 volumes as of 1965).
- Nihon Kindaishi Kenkyukai, ed. Kindai Nihon Jimbutsu Seijishi (A Biographical and Political History of Modern Japan), Tokyo, 1955-1956, 2 volumes.
- Nihon Kokuseijiten Kankokai, ed. Nihon Kokusei Jiten (An Encyclopedia of Japanese National Politics), Tokyo, 1953-1957, 9 volumes.
- Onishi Shiro, ed. Nihon Jimbutsu Taikei (A Great Web of Personalities in Japan), Tokyo, 1960, 7 volumes.
- Araki Kuwano, Kumamotoken Jimbutsushi (A Biographical History of Kumamoto Prefecture), Tokyo, 1959.
- Iwateken, ed. Iwatekenshi (A History of Iwate Prefecture), Morioka, 1962-1964, volumes 5 through 8.
- Teraishi Masaji, Tosa Ijinden (Biographies of the Great Men of Tosa), Tokyo, 1932, 2 volumes.
- Yamaguchi Kenjinkai, ed. Yamaguchiken Jimbutsushi (A Biographical History of Yamaguchi Prefecture), Tokyo, 1933, 3 volumes.
- Yoshino Tekkenzen, Tojin to Kanryo (Party Politicians and Bureaucrats), Tokyo, 1915.

Of the various categories of biographical data sought, education was a category for which most complete data were obtainable. Of data on birth, while it was possible to have complete returns on the year of birth and the Han or Prefecture of birth, it was most difficult to obtain data on the father's occupation, or on the town or village of birth. Information on a series of occupations and/or civil service posts held by individuals was relatively easy to obtain in bulk from the multi-volume biographical reference works cited above. However, detailed information on the dates of incumbencies for civil service posts and election records had to be collected in "piece-meal" from various other sources; then to be integrated to the initial information obtained from the first source(s). While it was not possible to obtain every category of data for every one of the study population, there was no case for which data were totally unavailable.

The classificatory scheme used for tabulating data will be explained as the specific categories of material are presented.

PART I THE REGIONAL ORIGIN.

CHAPTER I The Parochial Basis of the Leadership
Recruitment: The Politics by the Han-
Cliques.

The politics of Japan during the Meiji period was often characterized as "Hanbatsu sei-ji" --meaning the politics by the Han-cliques. It was a term applied to the oligarchic rule by a group of men who had come from Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, and Hizen Han, the western and the southwestern feudal domains of pre-restoration Japan. Toward the end of the Tokugawa period, the leaders of this oligarchic group were mostly young Samurai who had become active in the anti-Tokugawa politics of their own Han. Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa and Hizen were traditionally dissident Han under the Tokugawa system of government which had been forced to recognize Tokugawa supremacy for two and a half centuries. Without ever becoming reconciled to Tokugawa authority, these intransigent Han, led by a group of young Samurai, began to plot against the Tokugawa ruler after the latter was compelled to adopt the unpopular policy of opening the land to foreign intercourse, a policy that ran counter to the expressed wishes of the Emperor. When the Tokugawa regime finally came to an end in 1867, it was these young activists from Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, and Hizen Han who assumed the task of doing away with the feudal system under which they had grown up, and helped establish a new centralized government in Japan under the Emperor. Mostly through bureaucra-

tic careers, they rose rapidly to positions of power and influence in the new government, and within a short while the leadership and the backbone of the new regime were provided by this group. Among the best-known personalities of this group were the "Three Greats of the Restoration": Saigo Takamori of Satsuma, Okubo Toshimichi of Satsuma, and Kido Takayoshi of Choshu, all of whom predominated in the early Meiji government. Then there were Ito Hirobumi of Choshu, who was to head the first cabinet in Japan and later serve in the premiership three more times; Yamagata Aritomo of Choshu, the Father of the modern Japanese Army, who was to become the prime minister two times; Okuma Shigenobu of Hizen, twice prime minister and many times cabinet minister; Itagaki Taisuke of Tosa, many times Sanyo and Sangi¹ and later cabinet minister, who founded the earliest political party in Japan. Aside from the political roles these men played together before and after the Restoration, there was another common denominator among them: Of some 260 Han of Tokugawa Japan, they were invariably from the four Han of Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, and Hizen.

In 1871 when these men were at the top posts of the Meiji government, a new prefectural system was adopted to overhaul the existing local government units into more cen-

¹ The equivalents of cabinet minister in the earlier Meiji government before its reorganization on a western model.

tralized and integrated ones.² This new system took away the last vestige of political power from the Han government and Chihanji,³ and at the same time it immensely strengthened the power of the central bureaucracy. It was at this juncture that the leaders from Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, and Hizen at the top echelon of the central bureaucracy consolidated their power by appointing their friends and followers from their own Han to the important posts of the reorganized government, thereby bringing forth the backbone of the Han-cliques in the Meiji government.⁴ As to this "cliquish mentality" of the Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa and Hizen leaders, Professor Oka explains:

The antagonism and the mutual distrust among different Han and among their members which were actively cultivated under the Tokugawa system of government had been the accustomed habit of mind for the people during the past three centuries. It was not the sort of thing that could be easily forgotten in a short span of time even after the establishment of the new government. Therefore, it was only natural for the new leaders from the four Han to attempt to protect and expand their power and influence

² Haihan Chiken of July, 1871.

³ After the Restoration, most Daimyo (Hanshu) were "re-appointed" by the Emperor as the governors of their own Han. Under this system, the Chihanji (the new title for the governor) retained considerable measure of local autonomy on such affairs as fiscal, military, police, and appointment. Hence, up to the time of the local reorganization of 1871 (Haihan Chiken), the Chihanji was, in many respects, the old Daimyo in a new garb.

⁴ For a concise analysis on the origin and the formation of the Han-cliques, see Oka Yoshitake, Kindai Nihon Seijishi (A Political History of Modern Japan) (Tokyo, 1962), I, 102-113. A more detailed and extensive treatment of this topic is in Hasegawa Ryo, Meiji Ishin ni okeru Hanbatsuseiji no Kenkyu (A Study on the Politics of the Han-cliques in the Meiji Restoration) (Tokyo, 1966), chapters 2 and 3.

by maintaining an exclusive alliance among the men from the same Han, by recruiting the men of the same Han origin and appointing them to important positions in the government, and by grooming their proteges among the followers from their own Han.⁵

The coalition among the leaders from the four Han and their cooperation for the task of adjusting Japan to the modern world seemed to be going well for a while. As early as 1873, however, a rift appeared among them over issues of power as well as policy, which resulted in a series of defections by some of the leaders from the government. Most of the defectors were the leaders from Tosa Han and Hizen Han, the single exception being Saigo Takamori of Satsuma. Antagonized by the favoritism displayed by the Satsuma and Choshu leaders for men from their own Han, and defeated on the issue of the Korean Campaign by the predominant Satsuma and Choshu men, the disgruntled leaders from Tosa and Hizen resigned from the government in the hope of rallying the growing opposition outside the government.⁶ Interestingly enough, it was these dissident leaders from Tosa and Hizen who furnished some of the earliest and most severe critics of the oligarchic base of the Meiji government. The monopoly of power by the Satsuma and Choshu cliques --now labeled as "Sat-Cho Batsu"⁷ by its antagonists-- was to become

⁵ Oka, p. 112.

⁶ Hasegawa, pp. 171-183 gives a detailed account of this conflict. The political motivations of the dissidents behind the Korean Campaign controversy and the socio-political implications of this issue are fully analyzed in Oka, op. cit., pp. 153-196.

⁷ "Sat-Cho" is an abbreviated form of Satsuma and Choshu.

the focal point of attack by the dissidents from Tosa and Hizen whenever they dealt with the group still in power and their politics. Determined to break ~~the~~ Sat-Cho oligarchy by enlisting wider support for their cause, some dissidents such as Itagaki Taisuke of Tosa and Okuma Shigenobu of Hizen launched popular movements under the banner of civil rights and representative government, which gave birth to a variety of political parties and party movements in Japan. Thus ended a brief honeymoon among the founding fathers of the new Japan, thereby setting the stage for a new conflict between the Satsuma-Choshu leaders and the Tosa-Hizen leaders.

On the other hand, some Tosa and Hizen men still remaining in the government continued to collaborate with the Satsuma and Choshu men even after the split. For example, of the eight persons who served in the post of Sangi during the period between 1877 and 1884, four were from Satsuma, two from Choshu, and two from Tosa. During the same period, 19 persons headed the eight central ministries, of whom six each were from Satsuma and Choshu, three from Tosa, two from Hizen, and two from other Han. When the Cabinet was set up in the Meiji government in 1885 after a western model, the first cabinet formed by Ito Hirobumi of Choshu included five Satsuma men, four Choshu men, and one Tosa man. Three years later when the Privy Council was established to function as the highest advisory organ of the Emperor, its 16 members were composed of four from Satsuma, four from Tosa, three

from Hizen, and the remainder of three from other Han.⁸ Even the dissident leaders of Tosa and Hizen who were leading the most vociferous opposition outside of the government against the Sat-Cho oligarchy were not entirely excluded from sharing power occasionally with their former associates from Satsuma and Choshu. Whenever the Satsuma and Choshu leaders provided opportunities to the opposition leaders primarily for the sake of appeasement, the latter showed no misgivings about the prospect of sharing power with their rivals. Okuma Shigenobu of Hizen, for instance, in response to Ito's call for help, entered Ito's cabinet in 1888 as Foreign Minister after abandoning his nascent party of opposition. He remained in the succeeding cabinet which was headed this time by a Satsuma general, Kuroda Kiyotaka. Goto Shojiro of Tosa, who had been calling for a united opposition movement of the Tosa-Hizen men and others against the Sat-Cho oligarchy, joined the Kuroda cabinet in 1889, and remained in the four subsequent cabinets all headed by his arch-rivals from Satsuma and Choshu. Likewise, Itagaki Taisuke of Tosa entered Ito's second cabinet in 1896 as Home Minister, though his cooperation with Ito lasted only for a brief period.

While this small group of men from the four Han continued to circulate in the highest posts of the Meiji govern-

⁸ The sources utilized for obtaining the background information on the pre-1885 Sangi and Kyo (Head of Ministry) and the members of the Privy Council are the same as the ones listed in the Introductory Chapter.

ment and made important public policies, they represented no one, nor were they responsible to any one. Before the promulgation of the Meiji constitution there was no popular representative institution of any kind. Even after the establishment of the constitutional government in 1889, the Japanese Diet could not function as an effective machinery of popular control over the government. Under the Meiji constitution, the Cabinet and other executive decision-making bodies were not responsible to the Diet. Nor did the Diet have any constitutional or other measures of control over the executive organs. Even the Diet itself was not a genuinely representative body, the upper house of the Diet being composed of the hereditary peers and imperial appointees with equal power to the elected members of the lower house.⁹

Under this system of government, to what extent were the high offices of the Meiji government "monopolized" by the men from Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa and Hizen? First, when we examine the Han-origins of the Japanese cabinet ministers who served during the first 20 years of the cabinet's existence, and tabulate them with some information on the minister's careers in Cabinet, the results are as shown in TABLES -1, -2, and -3. From the first Ito cabinet of December, 1885

⁹ For the best description on the institutional aspect of the government under the Meiji constitution, see Harold S. Quigley, Japanese Government and Politics (New York: Century, 1932). Also, George Akita, Foundations of Constitutional Government in Modern Japan (Cambridge, 1967).

TABLE-1: * The Han-Origin and the Frequency of Participation in Cabinet, the Japanese Cabinet Ministers: 1885-1906.

Han	Number of Participation						Total N
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5) or more	More than (1)	
	N	N	N	N	N	N	
Satsuma	2	2	2	3	3	10	12
Choshu	3	4	2	0	4	10	13
Tosa	4	3	1	0	2	6	10
Hizen	4	1	0	0	1	2	6
Sub-total	13	10	5	3	10	28	41
Others	17	3	2	1	0	6	23
Total	30	13	7	4	10	34	64

TABLE-2: The Han-Origin and the Over-all Length of Participation in Cabinet, the Japanese Cabinet Ministers: 1885-1906.

Han	Over-all Length of Participation						Total N
	Less than 1 yr	1-2 yrs	2-3 yrs	3-5 yrs	More than 5 yrs	1 yr or more	
	N	N	N	N	N	N	
Satsuma	1	1	2	2	6	11	12
Choshu	1	1	2	4	5	12	13
Tosa	3	5	0	0	2	7	10
Hizen	3	0	2	1	0	3	6
Sub-total	8	7	6	7	13	33	41
Others	13	5	3	1	1	10	23
Total	21	12	9	8	14	43	64

* Unless specified otherwise under each table, the sources utilized for obtaining data shown in all tables are the same ones as explained in the Introductory Chapter.

TABLE-3: The Han-Origin and the Portfolio held, the Japanese Cabinet Ministers; 1885-1906.

	Portfolio held				Sub- total	Only other(s)**	Total
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			
Han	Prime* or Navy, Minister	Army and/ but not (1)	Finance and/ or Home and/ or Foreign, but not (1) or (2)	N	N	N	N
Satsuma	2	6	2	10	2	12	
Choshu	3	2	6	11	2	13	
Tosa	0	0	4	4	6	10	
Hizen	1	0	1	2	4	6	
Sub-total	6	8	13	27	14	41	
Others	0	0	7	7	16	23	
Total	6	8	20	34	30	64	

* The post of Acting Prime Minister is not included.

** Includes the following portfolios: Justice

Education

Commerce and Agriculture

Communication

Colonial Affairs (from 1896 to 1897)

Ministers without portfolio (Hanretsu) are not included in this column, because all of them --four-- had served in the preceding cabinet(s) with a portfolio(s).

to the end of the first Katsura cabinet in January, 1906, 11 cabinets were formed and 64 persons served as ministers. Of the 64 cabinet ministers, 41 had come from Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa or Hizen Han. When we correlate the Han-origin of the 64 cabinet ministers with the frequency of their participation in the 11 different cabinets of this period, it shows that those from the four Han served much more frequently than those from other Han. As shown in TABLE-1, 28 of the 41 cabinet ministers from the four Han had served in more than one cabinet, whereas 6 of the 23 cabinet ministers from other Han served in more than one. As the number of participation in cabinet increases, the contrast between those from the four Han and those from other Han becomes increasingly sharp: There were 30 cabinet ministers who served in cabinet only once during this period. Of the 30, 13 were from the four Han and 17 from others. There were 13 cabinet ministers who served in two different cabinets during this period; of these, 10 were from the four Han and 3 from other Han. Of 7 cabinet ministers who served in three different cabinets during this period, 5 were from the four Han and 2 from others. Of 4 cabinet ministers who served in four different cabinets, only one came from a Han outside the four Han. Finally, there were 10 cabinet ministers who served in five or more cabinets, and all of them were from Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, or Hizen Han. Thus, we can find not only the preponderance of those from Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa and Hizen among the cabinet ministers of this

period, but also a polarization between those from the four Han and others in terms of the frequency of their cabinet participation. A similar result can be found when we correlate the Han-origin of the 64 cabinet ministers and the over-all length of their service in cabinets during this period. As indicated in TABLE-2, of the 64 cabinet ministers, 43 served in cabinet(s) for the over-all length of a year or more during the period between 1885 and 1906, while the remainder of 21 served for less than a year. Of the 21 cabinet ministers who served for less than a year, a majority (13) were those who had come from the Han other than Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, or Hizen. In contrast to this, of the 43 cabinet ministers who served for a year or longer, a great majority (33) were those who had come from the four Han. The most stark contrast between those from the four Han and the others can be found among the cabinet ministers who served more than 5 years: There were 14 cabinet ministers who served in cabinets for more than 5 years during this period, and all but one of them were from the four Han. When we look into the kinds of portfolios held by the 64 cabinet ministers of this period and correlate them with their Han-origin, another contrasting tendency appears between those from the four Han and the others. As indicated in TABLE-3, the premiership was held exclusively by those from the four Han. So were the portfolios of Army and Navy. Of the 20 cabinet ministers who held the portfolios of Finance, Foreign Affairs, and/or Home Affairs during this

period, 13 were those from the four Han. On the other hand, 16 of the 23 cabinet ministers who had come from the Han other than Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, or Hizen remained in such less influential portfolios as Justice, Education, Commerce and Agriculture, Communication, and Colonial Affairs.

To sum up: 1) nearly two-thirds of the cabinet ministers circulated during the period between 1885 and 1906 were those who had come from Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa or Hizen Han; 2) these men from the four Han had circulated for a greater length of time and more frequently among the cabinets of this period than those from other Han; 3) the cabinet ministers from the four Han held more influential posts in the cabinets than the others; and 4) the premiership and the portfolios of Army and Navy were held exclusively by the men from the four Han. Restated in more descriptive terms: The Japanese cabinets from 1885 to 1906 had been overwhelmingly dominated by the men from Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa and Hizen; the influential posts of cabinet were under the virtual monopoly of these men; some from other Han were included in the cabinets of this period, but most of them were discarded after a brief service in peripheral posts.

If we examine TABLES-1, -2, and -3 more closely, the superiority of the Satsuma-Choshu group over the Tosa-Hizen group becomes quite apparent. The ratio between the cabinet ministers from Satsuma-Choshu and those from Tosa-Hizen was 25 to 16. In terms of the frequency and the over-all length of service in cabinet, a clear discrepancy can be seen be-

tween the two groups: A larger number of Satsuma-Choshu men served in cabinet more frequently and for a longer time during this period than Tosa-Hizen men. In terms of the kinds of portfolios held by the Satsuma-Choshu men and by the Tosa-Hizen men, the latter were decidedly inferior to the former. All but one of the 6 prime ministers of this period were the men either from Satsuma or Choshu. No one from Tosa or Hizen held the portfolio of Army or Navy; they were totally monopolized by the men from Satsuma and Choshu. Among the 41 cabinet ministers who came from Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa or Hizen Han, 14 remained in the "peripheral posts" (i.e. Column-4 in TABLE-3) without ever holding one of the influential posts; of the 14, 10 were the men from Tosa or Hizen. It thus appears that if there was a Han-clique consisting of those from Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa and Hizen Han in the Japanese cabinets of this period, its members from Tosa and Hizen were at best the "junior partners" of the Satsuma-Choshu men.

The dominance of those from Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa and Hizen was by no means confined to the Cabinet. When we investigate the Han-origin of the members of the Privy Council who served during the corresponding period (from the establishment of the Privy Council in 1888 to the end of 1905), we can find an even larger percentage of those who had come from the four Han among them than that among the cabinet ministers. As shown in TABLE-4, 70% of the Privy Councillors of this period (38 persons out of 54) were those from Satsuma,

TABLE-4: The Han-Origin of the Privy Councillors (1888-1905)*, the Highest Military Officials (1885-1905)**, and the Imperial Appointees to the House of Peers (1890-1905)*, compared with the Cabinet Ministers (1885-1906)†† and the Population of Japan (1903).

Han	Cabinet Ministers		Privy Councillors		Highest Military Officials		Imperial Appointees to H. P.		Total	Population of Japan in 1903 (in '000)		
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)				
Satsuma	12	(19)	18	(33)	20	(48)	36	(19)	86	(24.5)	1,184	(2.6)
Choshu	13	(20)	9	(17)	12	(29)	17	(9)	51	(14.5)	1,015	(2.1)
Tosa	10	(16)	6	(11)	0	(0)	7	(4)	23	(6.5)	646	(1.3)
Hizen	6	(9)	5	(9)	1	(2)	4	(2)	16	(4.6)	655	(1.3)
Sub-total	41	(64)	38	(70)	33	(79)	64	(34)	176	(50.1)	3,500	(7.2)
Others	23	(36)	16	(30)	9	(21)	127	(67)	175	(49.9)	45,043	(92.8)
Total	64	(100)	54	(100)	42	(100)	191	(101)	351	(100.0)	48,543	(100.0)

* From April 30, 1885 to December 31, 1905.

** From December 22, 1885 to December 31, 1905.

† From September 29, 1890 to December 31, 1905.

†† From December 22, 1885 to January 6, 1906.

Sources: For determining the persons who had served in the Privy Council, the ten highest posts of the Military (see fn. 10 for the selection), and the Imperial Appointees to the House of Peers in this period, the listings in Kindai Nihon Seijishi Hikkei, pp. 91-121, were used. For data on the Han-origin of these persons, Heibonsha's Jimmei Jiten (editions 1937-1941 and 1953-1958) were utilized. Data on population were compiled from the table in Irene B. Taeuber, The Population of Japan, Princeton, 1958, p. 48.

Choshu, Tosa or Hizen Han; compared to 64% among the cabinet ministers. As for the ratio between the privy councillors from Satsuma-Choshu and those from Tosa-Hizen, the percentage of the latter was much smaller (20%) than that of the former (50%); as it was the case among the cabinet ministers.

The Privy Council was not, however, the agency in which the highest percentage of men from the four Han had been represented. The height of the Han-clique dominance could be seen in the top stratum of the military bureaucracy. As shown in the same table, of the total of 42 persons who held the ten highest posts of the military bureaucracy from 1885 to 1905,¹⁰ nearly 80% (33) were those from Satsuma and Choshu. But, unlike the Cabinet or the Privy Council, those from Tosa and Hizen had little chance to share power with the Satsuma-Choshu men in the control of the Japanese military during this period. There was only one Hizen man among the 42 military leaders, and no Tosa man at all among them.

Aside from the Cabinet, the Privy Council, and the military high command, one of the highest appointive posts of the Japanese government after the promulgation of the Meiji constitution was the Imperial Appointee to the House of Peers (Chokusen-Giin). From September 29, 1890 to December 31, 1905, all-told 191 persons were appointed to the

¹⁰ The 10 highest posts selected are: the Ministers and the Vice-Ministers of the Army and the Navy, the Chiefs and the Deputy-Chiefs of the Army and the Naval General Staffs, the Inspector-General of Military Education, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleets.

House of Peers as Chokusen-Giin. Were those from the four Han equally dominant among these appointees? As can be seen in the same table, persons who had come from Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa and Hizen constituted 34% (64 persons) of the imperial appointees --a much smaller percentage than the comparable one among the cabinet ministers, the privy councillors, or the military bureaucrats; yet, a substantial portion considering the size of the group. The following might be the reasons --aside from the larger size of the group-- for the lower percentage of the men from the four Han among the imperial appointees. First, the appointment was supposed to be made by the Emperor from the men of "erudition or of meritorious service to the state". Although the actual power of selection was entirely in the hand of the Cabinet, because of such criteria set forth for the appointment, it was less likely that the appointees had been selected solely on the basis of the "cliquish" consideration of the appointers than it was in the selection of the cabinet ministers or the privy councillors.¹¹ Secondly --probably a more important reason than the first, the appointive seats in the House of Peers were not as influential or powerful as the posts in the Cabinet or in the Privy Council; hence, for the top leaders of the Meiji government who had been accused of

¹¹ An investigation into the careers of the 191 appointees showed that 167 of them (87%) were former career civil servants, 14 were scholar-educators, 6 eminent jurists, 1 nationally well-known scientist, and 2 businessmen. No significant correlation between their careers and their Han-origin could be established.

their Han-cliquishness, awarding the seats to the men of different Han-origin might have been the best means of alleviating such charge and of broadening their basis of rule without weakening their control of the government.

If we add up the numbers of all the persons who had been circulated in the Cabinet, the Privy Council, the military high command, and the appointive seats of the House of Peers between 1885 and 1905, the total stands at 351. Of these persons, 50.1% had come from the four Han, which contained only 7.2% of the total population of Japan in 1903 (see TABLE-4). Conversely, the areas of Japan outside of the four Han which contained 92.8% of the total population had produced only 49.9% of the officials who had served in one of the four high agencies of the government between 1885 and 1905. This meant that the rate of producing the officials from the population of the four Han was approximately 1 from each 19 thousand people, whereas the comparable rate from the population outside of the four Han was approximately 1 from 256 thousand people.¹² It also meant that a person born in one of the four Han had about 13 times more chance of becoming one of the officials than a person born outside of the four Han.

¹² If we compute the rate for each of the four Han, the result is:

Satsuma:	1 from each 14,000
Choshu :	1 from each 20,000
Tosa :	1 from each 26,000
Hizen :	1 from each 38,000.

The idea that one's "right" Han-origin is a passport to his advancement and success in government and politics might have sounded quite absurd to a modern-minded Japanese. Nevertheless, it had to be a primary consideration if he was contemplating a successful career in the government services. For instance, Fukuzawa Yukichi, the noted liberal philosopher and educator of the Meiji era, wrote in 1885 to his son who was studying in the United States at that time and had asked his father the possibility of finding a government job on his return:

It is extremely difficult to become a government official in Japan nowadays. If you were a Satsuma man or a Choshu man, you might be able to get a good position in government even if you were a big ass with no talent. Otherwise, it is utterly futile to try to become one.¹³

Hara Kei, who was to become the first commoner prime minister of Japan in 1918, also seemed to have experienced some frustration during his early career because he had come from a "wrong" Han. One of his biographers, Maeda Renzan mentions:

Once I asked Hara (who was an official in the Foreign Ministry at this time) why most of the officials from the Tohoku region (of whom, Hara was one) had become Foreign Service Officers. Without any hesitation, he answered: 'for the simple reason that we, the people of Tohoku, could not get into any other ministries than the Foreign Ministry.'

The posts in the Foreign Ministry at that time were the least desirable of the government jobs for anyone who had an ambitious career objective in the government services. For, the ministry's budget was always small and the duties of the Foreign Service Officers were regarded as a pitiable role of currying favor with the Europeans. ... Naturally, the privileged members of the Han-cliques

¹³ Fukuzawa Yukichi Zenshu (Collected Works of Fukuzawa Yukichi), Vol. XXVII: Shokanshu (The Collection of Letters), ed. Keio Gijuku (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1961), p. 757.

shunned a post in the Foreign Ministry, and entered more prestigious and lucrative ministries.¹⁴

Even the unappetizing Foreign Ministry's post became open to Hara, according to the Maeda's account, mainly because he had an excellent command of the French language, a rare qualification among his contemporaries, which Hara had acquired as a student at a French seminary in Japan.¹⁵

A poignant expression of the frustrations and grievances felt by those who were politically active but excluded from positions of power and influence because of their "wrong" Han-origin could be found in an article titled "Nihonjin" (the People of Japan) written by Mutsu Munemitsu, a well-known Meiji politician from Kishu Han, who once plotted against the Han-cliques government. It read:

Since the Restoration, so many things are said of Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa and Hizen. These four Han became the focus of our attention because some leading figures from these Han had performed such courageous and righteous deeds when this nation was faced with unprecedented crisis. For all the gallant acts and the difficult tasks performed by the four Han and the leading men from the Han, many credits and commendations are due to them. Especially, Satsuma and Choshu deserve the largest credit of all among the four. However, this does not warrant the members of Satsuma and Choshu Han to occupy most of the influential posts of the government under the claim of the past deeds and services their Han rendered to the nation. For, the raison d'etre of public offices is not to reward the members of certain Han for its past deeds and services to the nation; they exist for the sake of performing the present and future tasks and responsibilities; hence, the fitness for public offices should be judged by one's ability to meet the responsibilities of the present and future. ... It is this unfair and cliquish practice of the group

¹⁴ Maeda Renzan, Hara Kei Den (A Biography of Hara Kei) (Tokyo, 1943), I, pp. 279-281.

¹⁵ Ibid.

in power that engenders the ill-feelings and discontents against the government which are so prevalent among us since the Restoration.... Look into the make-up of our government. Those officials serving above the rank of Sangi are invariably the members of these cliques; the highest posts of the Army and the Navy, and other essential posts of the government are occupied exclusively by the members of these cliques; most of the students sent abraod by the government are also the men from these cliques' Han. There are no affairs of state, small or big, that are not tainted by the cliquish motivation and the arbitrary whim of these cliques..... There was a saying during the heydays of the Taira family [the 12th century ruler of Japan] that one who was not born of the Taira clan was not a full-fledged human being. This is the very fitting description of today in regard to those who were not born of the Satsuma-Choshu cliques.¹⁶

¹⁶ Quoted in Oka, op. cit., p. 172, fn.

CHAPTER II

The Erosion of Parochialism: A Regional
"Representativeness" in the Cabinet Com-
position.

** (I) **

How long had the predominance of men from Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa and Hizen in the Japanese Cabinet lasted? Was there any sign of receding of these men from the Cabinet after the original members of the Meiji oligarchy began to retire from active politics at the turn of the century? It is commonly believed that the control of government by the Meiji oligarchs finally came to an end with the formation of the first party cabinet under Hara Kei in 1918. Can we find any vestige of the Han-cliques after 1918? Shown in TABLE-5 are the changing proportions of men from the four Han among the members of the Japanese Cabinet through four different periods covering from 1885 to 1945. In TABLE-6, data on the Prime Ministers are separately tabulated. Period-I in the tables covers the period we have already examined in the preceding chapter. In the following, we shall examine Period-II through Period-IV with some explanations for each of the demarcated periods.

TABLE-5: The Han-Origin of the Japanese Cabinet Ministers: 1885-1945, and the Population of Japan in 1918.

	PERIOD				TOTAL PERIOD 1885-1945	Population in 1918 (in '000)++
	PERIOD-I* 1885-1906	PERIOD-II** 1906-1918	PERIOD-III* 1918-1932	PERIOD-IV** 1932-1945		
	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)
Han (Prefecture) +	1885	1906	1918	1932	1945	1885-1945
Satsuma (Kagoshima)	12 (18.8)	6 (11.5)	5 (6.4)	3 (2.3)	26 (8.1)	1,462 (2.5)
Choshu (Yamaguchi)	13 (20.3)	9 (17.3)	4 (5.1)	5 (3.9)	31 (9.6)	1,099 (1.9)
Tosa (Kochu)	10 (15.6)	2 (3.8)	2 (2.6)	1 (0.8)	15 (4.7)	709 (1.2)
Hizen (Saga)	6 (9.4)	1 (1.9)	2 (2.6)	2 (1.6)	11 (3.4)	679 (1.2)
Sub-total	41 (64.1)	18 (34.6)	13 (16.7)	11 (8.6)	83 (25.8)	3,949 (6.8)
Others	23 (35.9)	34 (65.4)	65 (83.3)	117 (91.4)	239 (74.2)	54,137 (93.2)
Total	64 (100.0)	52 (100.0)	78 (100.0)	128 (100.0)	322 (100.0)	58,086 (100.0)

* From the 1st Ito Cabinet of December 22, 1885 to the end of the 1st Katsura Cabinet in January 6, 1906. **From the 1st Saionji Cabinet of January 7, 1906 to the end of the Teruchi Cabinet in September 28, 1918. #From the Hara Cabinet of September 29, 1918 to the end of the Inukai Cabinet in May 26, 1932. **From the Saito Cabinet of May 27, 1932 to the end of the Suzuki Cabinet in August 16, 1945.
 + For those who were born after 1871 (mostly in Period-IV), their "Han-origin" was determined by the prefectures corresponding to the old Han(s), from which they had originated.
 ++ Source: Compiled from the table in Irene B. Tauber, The Population of Japan, Princeton, 1958, p. 48.

TABLE-6: The Han-Origin of the Japanese Prime Ministers: 1885-1945.

Han (Prefecture)	PERIOD I*	PERIOD II	PERIOD III	PERIOD IV	Total
	1885-1906 N (%)	1906-1918 N (%)	1918-1932 N (%)	1932-1945 N (%)	
Satsuma (Kagoshima)	2 (33)	1 (20)	1 (10)	0 (0)	4 (13)
Choshu (Yamaguchi)	3 (50)	2 (40)	1 (10)	0 (0)	6 (19)
Tosa- (Kochi)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (10)	0 (0)	1 (3)
Hizen (Saga)	1 (17)	1 (20)	0 (0)	0 (0)	2 (6)
Sub-total	6 (100)	4 (80)	3 (30)	0 (0)	13 (41)
Others	0 (0)	1 (20)	7 (70)	11 (100)	19 (59)
Total	6 (100)	5 (100)	10 (100)	11 (100)	32 (100)

* The periods demarcated in this table are the same as in TABLE-5.

Period-II (1906-1918):

A period covering from the formation of the first Saionji cabinet in January, 1906 to the end of the Terauchi cabinet in September, 1918 was demarcated as Period-II. By the time the first Saionji cabinet appeared in 1906, the original members of the Meiji oligarchy --e.g. Ito, Yamagata,[?] Matsukata-- had withdrawn from the forefront of politics while they were still maintaining the control of government as Genro. It was neither a formal rank nor an office title; but, it became a quasi-institutional body giving advice to the Emperor on the state affairs of vital importance, including the selection of the Prime Minister.¹ During Period-II, the premiership was held mostly by the proteges of these Genro. Of seven cabinets formed during this period, the first four were headed alternately by Saionji Kimmochi and Katsura Taro, the well-known proteges of Ito and Yamagata respectively; the remaining three were headed by Yamamoto Gombei, a Satsuma admiral, Okuma Shigenobu, the renowned Hizen leader, and Terauchi Masatake, a Choshu general. Of these five persons who held the premiership between 1906 and 1918, Saionji was the only man who had not come from

¹ For an exposition of the Genro institution and its roles in the Japanese politics, see Roger F. Hackett, "Political Modernization and the Meiji Genro", in Political Development in Modern Japan, ed. Robert E. Ward (Princeton, 1968), pp. 65-102.

any of the four historic Han.² Thus, men from the four Han were still predominant among the prime ministers of Period-II. In the seven cabinets formed during this period, 52 persons held the cabinet post(s). Of the 52, those who had come from the four Han totalled 18 or 35%; thus indicating a decrease of nearly 30% from the percentage shown in the preceding period. As a result, the composite characteristic of the members of cabinets in Period-II became diametrically opposed to the one in Period-I: Approximately two-thirds of the members of cabinets serving during Period-I were those from the four Han, whereas approximately the same proportion of the members of cabinets serving during Period-II were persons who had come from the areas outside of the four Han. Indicative of these are the fact that the cabinet posts became far more open to those from the areas outside of the four Han during Period-II, while the premiership was still being pre-empted by men from the four Han during the same period.

² Born of a Kuge (court noble) family and having played an important role in the Restoration, Saionji had been closely associated with the original members of the oligarchy, especially with Ito Hirobumi. Saionji served in three cabinets which were headed by Ito, and in one headed by Matsukata. When Ito was called into the Privy Council as its president in 1903, Saionji succeeded him as the head of the Seiyukai Party which Ito had founded in 1900 as a means of mitigating the deepening clash between the oligarchy-controlled administration and the increasingly hostile popular forces represented in the Diet.

Period-III (1918-1932):

A period covering from the formation of the Hara cabinet in September, 1918 to the end of the Inukai cabinet in May, 1932 was demarcated as Period-III in the table. This period is known as an "era of party government". Prior to this period, the cabinet government in Japan had no popular basis. Many cabinets were made and unmade by the oligarchs who had no support from the popular forces represented in the Diet. The personnel serving in these cabinets were mostly career bureaucrats with no membership in the elective lower house of the Diet, nor were they responsible to the Diet. Naturally, this kind of cabinets could not function as operative link between the administration and the representative body dominated by political parties. The Japanese cabinets thus remained "transcendental" (Chozen Naikaku), as they were called, until 1918. The emergence of Hara Kei as the Prime Minister and the formation of his cabinet in 1918 marked a major departure from the hitherto practiced "transcendentalism". Unlike his predecessors, Hara had been a member of the lower house of the Diet for 16 years when he took the premiership, having been elected 7 times consecutively since 1902. At the time of his appointment to the premiership, Hara was the head of the Seiyukai, the largest political party represented in the lower house of the Diet. When Hara formed the cabinet, all of the portfolios in his cabinet, except the two service Ministries and the Foreign Ministry,

were filled from the Seiyukai Party men; of whom five were the members of the lower house, and three were the members of the upper house. In short, a veritable parliamentary cabinet government was inaugurated for the first time in Japan.³ The precedent set by the Hara cabinet was followed by most of the cabinets formed during Period-III, although there were some lapses and deviations. There were 11 cabinets formed between 1918 and 1932, of which probably all but three could be rightfully called party cabinets. When we examine the Han-origins of those who had served in these cabinets, it shows continual decreases of Satsuma-Choshu-Tosa-Hizen men. In the premiership, for instance, 10 persons served during Period-III, of whom one each was from Satsuma, Choshu, and Tosa; and the remaining seven were from the areas outside of the four historic Han. For the first time since the establishment of the Cabinet in 1885, the post of Prime Minister became thus wide open to persons who were not from any of the four Han. As for the members of cabinets, there were 78 persons who held cabinet post(s) during this period; of these, persons who had come from the four Han totalled 13 or 17%, which was 18% points less than the percentage shown in Period-II, and 47% points less than the one in Period-I.

³ For the evolution of party governments in pre-war Japan and the relationship between the political parties and the Meiji oligarchs, see Robert A. Scalapino, Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1962), esp. pp. 146-293. For the best treatment of the same topic in Japanese, see Royama Masamichi, Seijishi (Political History), in Gendai Nihon Bummeishi (History of Contemporary Japanese Civilization Series) (Tokyo, 1940).

Period-IV (1932-1945):

A period covering from the beginning of the Saito cabinet in May, 1932 to the end of the Suzuki cabinet in August, 1945 was demarcated as Period-IV. This period was marked by the rise of militarism in Japan and the outbreak of the wars of territorial aggrandizement which culminated in the Pacific War. The "transcendental cabinets" were revived during this period and most of these cabinets were dominated by the militarists. From May, 1932, to August, 1945, 13 cabinets were formed, in which an unusually large number of military men held various cabinet posts, including those which were ordinarily reserved to the civilian ministers. These political changes did not affect, it seems, the ebbing tide of Satsuma-Choshu-Tosa-Hizen men from the Cabinet. Data in the table indicate a further decrease of these men among the members of the Cabinet during this period. The percentage of those persons from the four historic Han (or from the Prefectures corresponding to the four Han) stood at 9% (11 out of 128) among the cabinet ministers of this period; which was 8% points less than the percentage shown in Period-III, 26% points less than that in Period-II, and 55% points less than the one in Period-I.

To what extent had the Satsuma-Choshu-Tosa-Hizen men "overrepresented" in the Japanese Cabinet in earlier periods, and to what extent and when was the "overrepresentation" corrected? To provide an answer to this question, indices of

overrepresentation were computed in the following way:

$$\frac{\% \text{ of cabinet ministers from X-Han}}{\% \text{ of population in X-Han}}$$

An index of 1.0 means "perfect" representation: the percentage of cabinet ministers from X-Han is in exact proportion to the percentage of population in X-Han. An index of 2.0 indicates twice the expected proportion (i.e. overrepresentation); an index of 3.0 three times, and so on. An index smaller than 1.0 means "underrepresentation". The following are the indices of overrepresentation (or underrepresentation) computed from data in TABLE-5:

<u>Han</u>	<u>Period-I</u>	<u>Period-II</u>	<u>Period-III</u>	<u>Period-IV</u>
Satsuma:	7.5	4.2	2.6	0.9
Choshu:	10.8	8.7	2.7	2.0
Tosa:	13.0	3.2	2.2	0.8
Hizen:	7.7	1.4	2.1	1.3
Satsuma-Choshu- Tosa-Hizen:	9.4	5.1	2.5	1.2
Others:	0.38	0.70	0.89	0.98

During Period-I, the indices for Satsuma-men, Choshu-men, Tosa-men, and Hizen-men showed widely varying degree of overrepresentation; ranging from the highest of 13.0 for Tosa-men to the lowest of 7.5 for Satsuma-men (13 to 7 and a half times the expected proportion). During Periods-II, -III, and -IV, the indices dropped down consecutively (with a slight varia-

tion in the case of Hizen-men). By Period-III, the range between the highest index and the lowest one narrowed down, standing at 2.7 (Choshu-men) and 2.1 (Hizen-men). Although the extent of overrepresentation of those from the four Han thus became far lower in Period-III, they were still over-represented roughly two to three times the expected proportion in this period. It was only in Period-IV that indices came down to the points closest to "perfect representation". The changes in the over-all index for Satsuma-Choshu-Tosa-Hizen men (put together) show a clearer picture: The index stood at as high as 9.4 in Period-I; it came down to 5.1 in Period-II; then to 2.5 in Period-III; and finally in Period-IV to 1.2, a proximity to "perfect representation".

** (II) **

We have ascertained the receding of Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa and Hizen men from the Japanese Cabinet after 1906, and the inflow of new personnel from the areas outside of the four historic Han into the Cabinet replacing the former. Did any particular region or regions become a new provider of bulks of the new personnel, thereby giving rise to a new regional force comparable to the old Han-cliques? Or, had the new personnel come diffusely from all regions of Japan? Can we find any dominant characteristics among the new per-

sonnel in regard to their regional origins? If so, what possible meaning could we find in them? We shall examine these questions in the following.

Shown in FIGURE-1 are the 11 geographical regions of Japan, and in FIGURE-2 the prefectural subdivisions within the regions. Data on the prefectural origins of the Cabinet Ministers were subsumed into the 11 regional categories, and the results were tabulated in TABLE-7.⁴ Two more PERIODS were added in the table: Period-V covering from the Higashikuni cabinet of August 17, 1945 to the end of the third Yoshida cabinet in October 30, 1952; Period-VI covering from the fourth Yoshida cabinet of October 31, 1952 to the end of the third Ikeda cabinet in November 9, 1964. The changing proportions of those cabinet ministers from each of the 11 regions over the six periods (i.e. data in TABLE-7) are graphically illustrated in FIGURE-3. We shall discuss the four pre-war periods first.

Of the 11 regions shown in the table, Kyushu and Chugoku stand out to be the two most prolific regions, invariably providing the largest or the second largest percentage of cabinet ministers through Periods-I, -II, and -III. The percentage of the cabinet ministers from these two regions add

⁴ The Han-origins of those cabinet ministers who were born prior to 1871 were converted to the prefectural categories by using the chart in the Appendix of Nihon Kindaishi Jiten, ed. Kyoto Daigaku, Kokushikenkyushitsu (Tokyo, 1958), pp. 655-671. In some "borderline-cases" in which the prefectural categories could not be determined by the chart, Nihon Chimei Daijiten, ed. Sawada Hisao, 6 Volumes (Tokyo, 1937), was utilized.

FIGURE-1: The Regions of Japan.





FIGURE-2: Prefectures of Japan.

Bold Lines: Regional Demarcation.

Shaded Areas: The Prefectures tabulated separately in TABLE-7.

TABLE-7: The Regional Origin of the Japanese Cabinet Ministers: 1885-1964.


Region- Prefecture	PERIOD-I	PERIOD-II	PERIOD-III	PERIOD-IV	PERIOD-V*	PERIOD-VI**	Total
	1885-1906	1906-1918	1918-1932	1932-1945	1945-1952	1952-1964	
	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)
Kyushu:							
Kagoshima	12 (18.8)	6 (11.5)	5 (6.4)	3 (2.3)	2 (1.8)	2 (1.2)	30 (5.0)
Saga	6 (9.4)	1 (1.9)	2 (2.6)	2 (1.6)	3 (2.7)	2 (1.2)	16 (2.7)
5 others	7 (10.9)	5 (9.6)	13 (16.7)	14 (10.9)	9 (8.2)	20 (12.2)	68 (11.4)
Sub-total	25 (39.1)	12 (23.1)	20 (25.6)	19 (14.8)	14 (12.7)	24 (14.6)	114 (19.1)
Chugoku:							
Yamaguchi	13 (20.3)	9 (17.3)	4 (5.1)	5 (3.9)	5 (4.5)	5 (3.0)	41 (6.9)
4 others	1 (1.6)	6 (11.5)	9 (11.5)	14 (10.9)	9 (8.2)	21 (12.8)	60 (10.1)
Sub-total	14 (21.9)	15 (28.9)	13 (16.7)	19 (14.8)	14 (12.7)	26 (15.9)	101 (16.9)
Shikoku:							
Kochi	10 (15.6)	2 (3.8)	2 (2.6)	1 (0.8)	1 (0.9)	2 (1.2)	18 (3.0)
3 others	1 (1.6)	2 (3.8)	3 (3.8)	5 (3.9)	8 (7.3)	8 (4.9)	27 (4.5)
Sub-total	11 (17.2)	4 (7.7)	5 (6.4)	6 (4.7)	9 (8.2)	10 (6.1)	45 (7.6)
Kanto:							
Tokyo	3 (4.7)	2 (3.8)	5 (6.4)	23 (18.0)	12 (10.9)	17 (10.4)	62 (10.4)
6 others	1 (1.6)	3 (5.8)	6 (7.7)	12 (9.4)	9 (8.2)	19 (11.6)	50 (8.4)
Sub-total	4 (6.3)	5 (9.6)	11 (14.1)	35 (27.3)	21 (19.1)	36 (22.0)	112 (18.8)
Kinki:							
Kyoto	1 (1.6)	1 (1.9)	2 (2.6)	2 (1.6)	5 (4.5)	4 (2.4)	15 (2.5)
Osaka	0 (0.0)	1 (1.9)	2 (2.6)	3 (2.3)	3 (2.7)	2 (1.2)	11 (1.8)
4 others	4 (6.3)	3 (5.8)	4 (5.1)	7 (5.5)	8 (7.3)	9 (5.5)	35 (5.9)
Sub-total	5 (7.8)	5 (9.6)	8 (10.3)	12 (9.4)	16 (14.5)	15 (9.1)	61 (10.2)
Tohoku-6#	2 (3.1)	6 (11.5)	9 (11.5)	11 (8.6)	11 (10.0)	13 (7.9)	52 (8.7)
Hokuriku-4#	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	6 (7.7)	15 (11.6)	6 (5.5)	13 (7.9)	40 (6.7)
Tosan-3#	1 (1.6)	1 (1.9)	4 (5.1)	8 (6.3)	12 (10.9)	12 (7.3)	38 (6.4)
Tokai-3#	2 (3.1)	4 (7.7)	2 (2.6)	1 (0.8)	6 (5.5)	13 (7.9)	29 (4.9)
Hokkaido	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	2 (1.2)	4 (0.7)
Okinawa	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
Total	64(100.1)	52(100.0)	78(100.0)	128(99.9)	110(100.0)	164(99.9)	596(100.0)

From the Higashikuni Cabinet to the end of the 3rd Yoshida Cabinet.

** From the 4th Yoshida Cabinet to the end of the 3rd Ikeda Cabinet.

The number of prefectures within a region.

FIGURE-3: The Regional Origin of the Japanese Cabinet Ministers: 1885-1964.



up to 61% in Period-I, 52% in Period-II, and 42% in Period-III. On the average, therefore, roughly one-half of the cabinet ministers serving in the three periods had come from the regions of Kyushu and Chugoku, which together contained less than one-quarter of the total population of Japan.

What account for this preponderance of Kyushu men and Chugoku men among the cabinet ministers of Periods-I, -II, and -III? The explanation for the high proportion of the Kyushu-originated ministers and the Chugoku-originated ministers in Period-I --but not in Period-II or Period-III-- is simple. If we look into the prefectural origins of those Chugoku men who had been represented in cabinets during Period-I, it shows that almost all of them had come from the particular prefecture of Yamaguchi. Since Yamaguchi Prefecture corresponds to the old Choshu Han, the preponderance of Chugoku men among the cabinet ministers of Period-I is nothing more than a reiteration of the dominance by Choshu men --a trait we already discussed-- only with a new and broader geographical category. Likewise, of the Kyushu men represented in cabinets during Period-I, more than two-thirds had come from the prefecture of Kagoshima and Saga, which correspond to the old Satsuma Han and Hizen Han respectively. Hence, the preponderance of Kyushu men among the cabinet ministers of Period-I was, in large part, a reflection of the dominance by Satsuma-Hizen men, which we are already familiar with.

The same explanation can not be applied, however, in re-

gard to the preponderance of the Kyushu-originated and the Chugoku-originated ministers during Period-II or Period-III. For, unlike in Period-I, a majority of the Kyushu men and the Chugoku men represented in cabinets during Period-II or Period-III were those who had originated from the areas of Kyushu and Chugoku other than the prefectures of Kagoshima or Saga (in Kyushu), or the prefecture of Yamaguchi (in Chugoku). The following are the relevant data taken out from TABLE-7 to illustrate this point:

Cabinet Ministers from Kyushu-Chugoku:	<u>Period-I</u> 61%	<u>Period-II</u> 52%	<u>Period-III</u> 42%
(from Kagoshima-Saga- Yamaguchi prefectures)	(48.5%)	(30.7%)	(14.1%)
(from other prefectures of Kyushu-Chugoku)	(12.5%)	(21.1%)	(28.2%)

As can be noted above, while men from Kagoshima, Saga, and Yamaguchi prefectures were decreasing in a large proportion during Period-II and Period-III, there were substantial increases during the same periods in the proportion of those who had come from the areas of Kyushu-Chugoku other than the three prefectures. The sustenance of the high percentage of Kyushu-Chugoku men at large was thus maintained during Periods-II and -III primarily on the strength of the persons who had come from those prefectures of Kyushu-Chugoku other than Kagoshima-Saga-Yamaguchi. To put it another way, it meant that while the share of the "Han-cliques" (i.e. Kagoshima-Saga-Yamaguchi men) was decreasing in the Cabinet during Periods-II and -III, the share of "the other Kyushu-Chugoku

men" was increasing during the same periods almost in an inverse proportion.

Why had the Kyushu-Chugoku regions at large had a greater share in producing cabinet ministers than any other regions of Japan even after the "Han-cliques" began to taper off? Could it be attributed to the unique socio-political milieu created in the Kyushu-Chugoku regions at large on account of the direct involvement of Satsuma, Choshu and Hizen Han in the Restoration movement? More specifically, would it not be probable that the revolutionary activism, the innovational behaviors, and the political pre-eminence of Satsuma-Choshu-Hizen men during and after the Restoration could have affected the consciousness, the behavioral orientations, and the career choices of their fellow Kyushu-Chugoku men more immediately and to a far greater extent than those of the people in other regions? Such difference could have been, if that be the case, one of the factors contributing to the greater mobility and success of Kyushu-Chugoku men in government and politics.

Data in TABLE-7 indicate that the focal area of providing the largest percentage of cabinet ministers had shifted from the Kyushu-Chugoku regions to the Kanto region by Period-IV. From the Kanto region which comprises the metropolitan prefecture of Tokyo and six other prefectures surrounding it, had come 27.3% of the persons represented in cabinets during Period-IV. The percentages of Kyushu men and Chugoku men in cabinets during this period stood at 14.8% each; thus, the

proportion of the Kyushu-originated ministers, or of the Chugoku-originated ministers, (separately) amounted to roughly one-half of that of the Kanto-originated ministers during Period-IV. Through Periods-I and -II, the proportion of those from the Kanto region among cabinet ministers was relatively small, amounting to less than 10%. It was during Period-III that the percentage of Kanto men showed a substantial increase, thereby ranking only next to Kyushu men and Chugoku men in the magnitude of proportion. If we look into the percentage distribution between Tokyo and other six prefectures within the Kanto region shown in TABLE-7, the dominance of Tokyo in the region becomes apparent: Even during Periods-I, -II, and -III when the Kanto's share of providing cabinet ministers was not very large, a good part of the Kanto men represented in cabinets were those from Tokyo. During Period-IV, while the percentage of the cabinet ministers from the prefectures of Kanto other than Tokyo showed only a small increase from the preceding period, those from Tokyo tripled in proportion. As a result, Tokyo men alone came to occupy 18.0% of those serving in cabinets during Period-IV; which was even larger than the proportion of the Kyushu men or that of the Chugoku men represented in cabinets during the same period. The high percentage of the Kanto-originated ministers in Period-IV was thus based mainly on the large contingent of men from Tokyo.

An interesting point to be noted in this connection is

the fact that many of the Tokyo-originated ministers serving during Periods-III and IV were sons of well-known or influential families. Because of the unique status of Tokyo as the hub of political, economic, intellectual, and cultural activities in the nation, many prominent and influential families gravitated into it since the Restoration, and their children born and raised there had many social and intellectual advantages not available elsewhere in Japan. Of 28 Tokyo-originated persons represented in cabinets during Periods-III and -IV, ten came from outstanding families and/or had fathers who had been influential in government and politics. While all of the ten were born and raised in Tokyo, most of their fathers (all but two) were those who had originated from some other areas.⁵ For example, three of the fathers were old feudal lords who became hereditary peers after the Restoration; two were well-known Meiji statesmen each from Choshu and Hizen; one was the ennobled son of Kido Koin, one of the "Three Greats of the Restoration"; another was a medical man

⁵ The following is the list of the ten cabinet ministers and the information on their fathers:

<u>Name of the cabinet ministers</u>	<u>Father's name</u>	<u>Father's status or occupation</u>	<u>Father's place of origin</u>
Arima Yoriyasu	Yoshiyori	Hanshu; Count	Kurume Han
Ishiguro Tadaatsu	Tadanori	Privy Councillor	Iwashiro Han
Ishiwatari Sotaro	Bing-ichi	Privy Councillor	Edo (Tokyo)
Kido Koichi	Takamasa	Marquis	Choshu Han
Konoe Fumimaro	Atsumaro	Kuge; Prince	Kuge (Kyoto)
Maeda Toshisada	Toshiaki	Hanshu; Viscount	Nanukaichi Han
Oku Tokichi	Takato	Privy Councillor	Hizen Han
Sakai Tadamasu	Tadakuni	Hanshu; Count	Himeji Han
Terauchi Hisaichi	Masatake	Prime Minister	Choshu Han
Tojo Hideki	Hidenori	Lt. General	Tokyo.

from an obscure Han (Iwashiro) who, having founded the modern Medical Corps in the early Meiji Army, served as the first Surgeon-General of Japan, and later as a Privy Councillor. Thus, many of the Tokyo men represented in cabinets during Period-IV were sons of the old establishment, or of the new elite who had participated in building of modern Japan after the Restoration. In a sense, therefore, the conspicuous increase of men from Tokyo noted in Period-IV was a signpost for the new arrival of these sons of the old and the new establishment in the political arena of Japan.

A region which contains one of the four historic Han, aside from the Kyushu or the Chugoku region, is the island of Shikoku. It comprises 4 prefectures, and one of them is Kochi Prefecture which corresponds to the old Tosa Han. The percentage of men from the Shikoku region among the cabinet ministers of Period-I was quite large --17.2%. As can be noted in the table, almost all of these Shikoku men were from Kochi Prefecture --i.e. Tosa Han. Unlike the Kyushu-Chugoku regions, however, Shikoku had ceased to provide a large number of cabinet ministers after the Han-cliques (e.g. the Tosa men) began to recede from the Cabinet in Period-II. As a result, the share of Shikoku men at large among cabinet ministers was greatly reduced since Period-II. The percentage of Shikoku men at large dropped down to 7.7% in Period-II, and it remained well below that level through Periods-III and -IV.

The percentages of cabinet ministers from those regions other than Kyushu, Chugoku, Kantō, and Shikoku remained rela-

tively low throughout the four periods, ranging from the highest of 11.6% to the lowest of 0%. Within the low limit, however, men from some of the regions showed steady increase in each successive period. Typical of these are men from the Tosan region: Starting from 1.6% in Period-I to reach 6.3% in Period-IV. Another is the case of Hokuriku men, but with a slight variation: 0% in the first two periods to 7.7%, and then to 11.6% in the last two periods. The case of Tohoku men is slightly different from these two, but conforms to the general pattern: From 3.1% in Period-I to 11.5% in Periods-II and -III; then, a small decrease in Period-IV to stand at 8.6%. Indicative of these evidences are the increasing flow, though not in a large volume, of the men of diverse regional origins into the cabinet posts with the receding of the "Han-cliques" from those posts after Period-I.

Two regions which do not show any meaningful pattern of percentage-changes in the table are Kinki and Tokai. The percentage of cabinet ministers from the Kinki region ranged from 7.8% to 10.3% throughout the four periods. The low percentage for Kinki men is rather surprising, in view of the fact that this region is one of the most heavily populated regions of Japan, containing two great cities, Osaka and Kyoto. Even more surprising is the low percentage of men from the urban prefecture of Osaka, the second largest city in Japan. The percentage of men from Osaka remained less than 3% throughout the four periods. So did the percentage of men from Kyoto, the third largest city in the nation. Judging from these examples,

it seems that the high percentage of men from Tokyo we noted before had no bearing on the great size of the population of Tokyo. As for the percentage of cabinet ministers from the Tokai region, it fluctuated at a low level through the four periods, ranging from 1.6% to 7.7%. Even more unprolific than the Tokai region in producing cabinet ministers was Hokkaido. There was only one native son of Hokkaido represented in the Cabinet throughout the four periods -- a military man (Hata Shunroku) in Period-IV. An even worse case than Hokkaido was Okinawa. There was no one from Okinawa represented in the Japanese Cabinet up to 1945.

Based on an over-all survey of the regional origins of the cabinet ministers for the four periods, the following general statements can be made: (1) No "regional force" commensurate to the old Han-cliques had emerged after their waning. After 1918, no single region provided a bulk of cabinet ministers as large as the one provided by the Kyushu region or by the Chugoku region prior to 1918; no single prefecture matched the record-high percentage of the cabinet ministers provided by Kagoshima prefecture or by Yamaguchi prefecture prior to 1906. (2) Kyushu-Chugoku remained as the main area of providing the bulk of cabinet ministers as late as 1932. However, the make-up of the Kyushu-Chugoku men represented in the Cabinet after 1918 was significantly different in terms of their prefectural origin from before. Kyushu-Chugoku men serving after 1918 had come diffusely from various prefectures in the regions; while those serving prior to 1918 were from

a few focal prefectures in the regions --i.e. Kagoshima-Saga-Yamaguchi. (3) Since 1918, men from the Kanto region showed a marked increase among the cabinet ministers, and after 1932 they became the largest group from a single region among the cabinet ministers; but, the extent of their preponderance remained lower than the one maintained by the Kyushu men or by the Chugoku men prior to 1918. (4) The polarization between those regions showing high percentages and those showing lower percentages became much less after 1918, compared to the one existed before (the charts in FIGURE-3 graphically illustrate this point). (5) All in all, after 1918 the composition of the members of the Cabinet became more diffuse in terms of their regional origin than it was before. In short, the composite characteristics of the members of the Japanese Cabinet after 1918 do not show the strong parochial basis that existed prior to 1918.

Did the proportion of cabinet ministers from each of the regions become more proportional to the percentage of the population in that region after 1918 than it was before? Indices of overrepresentation (underrepresentation) for the 11 regional groups were computed to examine this, using the same methods as explained earlier. The result was tabulated in TABLE-8. The indices for the 11 regions in Period-I show a distinct polarization between three highly overrepresented regions and seven "highly" underrepresented regions: Kyushu, Chugoku, and Shikoku had been overrepresented roughly from two to three

TABLE-8: The Indices of Regional Overrepresentation (under-representation) for the Members of the Japanese Cabinet: 1885-1945.*

Region (Prefecture)	PERIOD I 1885-1906	PERIOD II 1906-1918	PERIOD III 1918-1932	PERIOD IV 1932-1945
Kyushu:	2.7	1.6	1.8	1.1
(Kagoshima)	(7.5)	(4.2)	(2.6)	(0.9)
(Saga)	(7.7)	(1.4)	(2.1)	(1.3)
(5 others)	(1.0)	(0.9)	(1.6)	(1.0)
Chugoku:	2.4	3.2	1.9	1.6
(Yamaguchi)	(10.8)	(8.7)	(2.7)	(2.0)
(4 others)	(0.2)	(1.6)	(1.6)	(1.5)
Shikoku:	3.0	1.4	1.1	0.9
(Kochi)	(13.0)	(3.2)	(2.2)	(0.8)
(3 others)	(0.4)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(0.9)
Kanto:	0.3	0.5	0.7	1.4
(Tokyo)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(1.0)	(2.8)
(6 others)	(0.1)	(0.4)	(0.6)	(0.8)
Kinki:	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.6
(Kyoto)	(0.7)	(0.8)	(1.1)	(0.7)
(Osaka)	(0.0)	(0.4)	(0.5)	(0.5)
(4 others)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(0.7)	(0.7)
Tohoku:	0.3	1.1	1.1	0.8
Hokuriku:	0.0	0.0	1.1	1.6
Tosan:	0.3	0.3	0.9	1.1
Tokai:	0.4	0.9	0.3	0.2
Hokkaido:	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2
Okinawa:	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

* The population of each region (or prefecture) of Japan in 1918, upon which the above indices were calculated, is from the figures shown in Irene B. Taeuber, The Population of Japan, Princeton, 1958, p. 48.

times above the point of "perfect representation" (i.e. 1.0 point); while all other regions were extremely underrepresented, ranging from none to four-tenth times below the point of perfect representation. The indices in Period-II show a barely perceptible extent of the lessening of the polarization existent in the preceding period; but, the two poles remained wide apart. Compared to this, the changes in Period-III were much more visible: The two poles --Kyushu, Chugoku, and Shikoku on the one hand; and Kanto, Kinki, Tohoku, Hokuriku, and Tosan on the other (excluding Tokai, Hokkaido, and Okinawa)-- were converging toward the point of perfect representation. By Period-IV, all regions except Tokai, Hokkaido, and Okinawa had reached within the range of 0.6 from the point of perfect representation. If we look into the indices tabulated for the prefectural subdivisions in the table, an even more stark contrast could be noted between Period-I and Period-IV: In Period-I, the highest index was 13.0 registered for Kochi prefecture, and the lowest was 0.1 for the 6 prefectures of Kanto outside of Tokyo (not considering non-representation for Osaka). The discrepancy between the highest and the lowest was, hence, 12.9 points. In Period-IV, the highest index was 2.8 registered for Tokyo prefecture, and the lowest was 0.5 for Osaka prefecture. The discrepancy between the two was, in this time, only 2.3 points. An over-all tendency we could discern from these evidences is that the composite character of the members of the Japanese Cabinet was becoming more homologous to the regional

distribution of the Japanese population in each successive period since 1906.

Was there any significant extent of change in the composite character of the members of the post-war cabinets? Data in TABLE-7 indicate no radical change in the post-war cabinets. The largest group of cabinet ministers from a single region, for instance, was still those from Kanto in Period-V, though its percentage dropped somewhat in this period. A majority of these Kanto-originated ministers were from Tokyo, although the share of Tokyo men became much smaller than it was in the preceding period. Both the group of Kyushu men and the group of Chugoku men showed a slight decrease in percentage in Period-V; but, both "regained" the percentage in Period-VI. Of the prefectural origins of the Kyushu-Chugoku men, no significant change from the pattern established since Period-III could be noticed: A majority of the Kyushu-Chugoku men were from those prefectures other than Kagoshima-Saga-Yamaguchi in the regions.

If we look into the percentage-change for each region registered in Periods-V and -VI, an interesting, if not significant, tendency could be noticed. The percentage increases and decreases which had been registered during Period-V were being "cancelled out" during Period-VI. For example, five regions --Kinki, Tohoku, Shikoku, Tokai, and Tosan-- gained in percentage during Period-V, ranging from 1.4% to 5.1% points; in Period-VI, all but one of the five regions "lost" in percentage, ranging from 2.1% to 5.4% points. On the other hand,

four regions --Kanto, Kyushu, Chugoku, and Hokuriku-- "lost" in percentage in Period-V, ranging from 2.1% to 8.2% points; in Period-VI, all of the four regions gained in percentage, ranging from 1.9% to 3.2% points. As a result of this "cancelling out", the percentage point for each region shown in Period-VI came back very close to the one in Period-IV. We can see this point better in FIGURE-3: All the curves shown after Period-IV except Tokai form symmetrical waves with Period-V as their central axis. Thus, the basic characteristics we have found among the cabinet ministers of Period-IV were not significantly altered among the post-war cabinet ministers.

PART II THE EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND

CHAPTER III The Emergence of the Modern-Educated Leaders.

Unlike the modernizing leaders of the emerging countries in the post-colonial regions of Asia and Africa today, Meiji oligarchs who began the modernization of Japan were not themselves the product of modern schools. They were samurai of the feudal order who had been educated at orthodox fief schools (Hanko or Hangakuryo) or private tutorial academies (Shijuku) specializing mostly in the traditional learning.¹ These men of the ancien regime, keenly aware of the need for a unified system of modern education to catch up with the West, introduced a western type of schools with modern curricula into Japan. In 1872, four years after the Meiji Restoration, the Fundamental Code on Education (Gakusei) was promulgated, laying out a blue print for a modern educational system to be inaugurated in Japan. The Preamble of the Code read in part:

¹ Although there was much diversity, especially toward the end of the Tokugawa period, the curricula of these schools were, in general, based on the Confucian classics, "national learning", calligraphy, composition, and etiquette, etc. For a concise description in English of the school system during the Tokugawa period, see Herbert Passin, Society and Education in Japan (New York, 1965), pp. 13-49. Also, R. P. Dore's chapter on "Education" in Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, ed. Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (Princeton, 1964), pp. 176-204.

Language, writing, and arithmetic, to begin with, are daily necessities in military affairs, government, agriculture, trade, arts, law, politics, astronomy, and medicine; there is not, in short, a single phase of human activities which is not based on learning.... Centuries have elapsed since schools were first established, but man has gone astray through misguidance. Learning being viewed as the exclusive privilege of the samurai and his superiors, farmers, artisans, merchants, and women have neglected it altogether and know not even its meaning. Even those few among the samurai and his superiors who did pursue learning... indulged in poetry, empty reasoning, and idle discussions, and their dissertations while not lacking in elegance, were seldom applicable to life. This was due to our evil traditions and, in turn, was the very cause which checked the spread of culture, hampered the development of talent and accomplishments, and sowed the seeds of poverty, bankruptcy, and disrupted homes. Every man should therefore pursue learning; and in so doing he should not misconstrue its purpose. Accordingly, the Department of Education will soon establish an educational system and will revise the regulations relating thereto from time to time; wherefore there shall, in the future, be no community with an illiterate family, nor a family with an illiterate person. Every guardian, acting in accordance with this, shall bring up his children with tender care, never failing to have them attend school.²

Under the Fundamental Code, the nation was to be demarcated into eight university-districts with one government university in each district; each university-district was, in turn, to be divided into 32 middle school-districts, containing one public supported middle school in each; each middle school-district was, finally, to be subdivided into 210 elementary school-districts with one public elementary school in each.³ Thus, the Code put forth an ambitious plan of establish-

² Quoted from Passin, *op. cit.*, Documents on Japanese Education, Document 17, Preamble to the Fundamental Code of Education, 1872; pp. 21-211.

³ "Gakusei (School System)", in *Nihon Kindaishi Jiten*, ed. Kyoto Daigaku, Kokushikenkyushitsu (Tokyo, 1958), p. 80.

ing immediately 8 universities, 256 middle schools, and 53,760 elementary schools. Of the administration of these school-districts, the Code set up a highly centralized system after the French model, giving the final control of all levels of education to the Ministry of Education which had been established in 1871. The Code also required four years of compulsory education for all Japanese children between the age of six and nine. In 1877, five years after the promulgation of the Code, though the planned number of government-supported schools at all levels had not been reached,⁴ public and private school of various levels numbered 25,459 elementary schools, 389 secondary schools (government and private), 92 normal schools (mostly government), 2 higher normal schools (government), 70 Semmon or Kotosemmon Gakko -- "colleges" (mostly private), and 1 university (government).⁵

As to the number of enrollment at schools, available statistics indicate that in 1880, 58.7% of the Japanese boys of the ages of 6 to 9 (the age group for compulsory education) had enrolled in elementary schools; by 1900, the percentage of enrollment in elementary schools for compulsory education among the boys of the same age group reached 90.6%. Compared to this, those enrolled at secondary schools remained a very small minority among the age group for secondary education during the

⁴ Passin indicated that about 52% of the planned number of elementary schools had been built by 1879, op. cit., p. 73.

⁵ These figures are taken from Mombusho (Ministry of Education), Nihon no Seicho to Kyoiku (Education and the Growth of Japan). (Tokyo: Bureau of Research, Ministry of Education, 1962), Appendix, Table 1, p. 170.

same period. In 1880, for example, those enrolled at the upper division of secondary schools constituted 1.8% of the Japanese boys in the age between 14 and 16. In 1900, the percentage of those enrolled in new five-year secondary schools among the boys in the age between 12 and 16 reached only 5.2%.⁶ Students enrolled in the college-level institutions were, understandably, even smaller in proportion, compared to the secondary school attendants. In 1880, only 0.6% of the Japanese males in the age between 17 and 20 were enrolled at various college-level institutions in Japan. Twenty years later, in 1900, the percentage of attendants at the college-level institutions among an enlarged age-group of Japanese males between 17 and 22 amounted to 1.0%.⁷

After 1880 the new educational system began to produce a substantial number of graduates from the college-level institutions. During the ten-year period between 1880 and 1890, for instance, all-told 12,748 graduates were produced by the nation's various institutions of higher learning above the level of secondary school. By 1900 the cumulative total of graduates from these institutions since 1880 reached 35,047.⁸ A majority of these graduates were educated at Semmongakko or

⁶ The percentage of secondary-school attendants among the exactly corresponding age-group for 1880 and 1900 are not available.

⁷ These figures are taken from Mombusho, op. cit., pp. 180-181. See TABLE-9.

⁸ Calculated from figures in Ibid., pp. 170-173; 192-195. See TABLE-10.

TABLE-9: Percentages of Japanese Male Students enrolled at various levels of school among the Same-age Male Population: Selected Years*

Year	Primary Schools		Secondary Schools		College-level Institutions	
	%	(Age-Group)	%	(Age-Group)	%	(Age-Group)
1880	58.7	(6-9)	1.8	(14-16)	0.6	(17-20)
1885	65.8	(6-9)	1.4	(12-15)	0.7	(16-20)
1890	65.1	(6-9)	1.2	(12-15)	0.8	(16-20)
1895	76.7	(6-9)	2.1	(12-16)	0.7	(17-22)
1900	90.6	(6-9)	5.2	(12-16)	1.0	(17-22)
1905	97.7	(6-9)	6.9	(12-16)	1.7	(17-22)
1910	98.8	(6-11)	22.8	(12-16)	1.8	(17-22)
1915	98.9	(6-11)	27.2	(12-16)	1.9	(17-22)
1920	99.2	(6-11)	32.6	(12-16)	3.0	(17-21)
1925	99.4	(6-11)	39.6	(12-16)	4.7	(17-21)
1930	99.5	(6-11)	42.9	(12-16)	5.3	(17-21)
1935	99.6	(6-11)	45.6	(12-16)	5.4	(17-21)
1940	99.6	(6-11)	51.5	(12-16)	6.5	(17-21)

Source: Adopted from Mombusho (Ministry of Education), Nihon no Seicho to Kyoiku (Education and the Growth of Japan), Tokyo, Bureau of Research, Ministry of Education, 1962, Appendix, Table 3 and 4, pp. 180-181.

TABLE-10: Number of College-level Institutions and the Cumulative Total of Graduates From 1880 to 1940.*

Year	Number of College-level Institutions				Total	Cumulative Total of Graduates from College-level institutions since 1880
	Higher, Normal School	Koto-Gakko	Semmon-Gakko	University		
1880	2	0	74	1	77	206
1885	2	1	75	1	79	3,029
1890	2	7	36	1	46	12,748
1895	2	7	52	1	62	23,875
1900	2	7	52	2	63	35,047
1905	3	8	63	2	76	56,188
1910	4	8	79	3	94	95,369
1915	4	8	88	4	104	140,991
1920	4	15	101	16	136	203,652
1925	4	29	135	34	202	320,309
1930	4	32	162	46	244	508,235
1935	4	32	177	45	258	739,916
1940	4	32	193	47	276	1,004,596

Source: Compiled from Mombusho (Ministry of Education), Nihon no Seicho to Kyoiku (Education and the Growth of Japan), Tokyo, Bureau of Research, Ministry of Education, 1962, Appendix, Tables 1 and 7, pp. 170-173; 192-195.

its equivalents, rather than at universities. University graduates constituted only a small fraction of the total number of graduates from the college-level institutions, since there was only one university in the nation until 1897. Tokyo Imperial University, which was established in 1877 and had been the only university until the founding of Kyoto Imperial University in 1897, produced about 5,000 graduates by 1904; and the newer Kyoto Imperial University only 100 by the same year.⁹ These early products of the nation's universities and Semmongakko were immediately drawn in to the expanding bureaucratic posts in the Meiji government and other modern sectors of the Japanese society.

The influx of a new generation of men educated at the nation's higher educational institutions into government since the 1880's undoubtedly had the effect of changing the tenor of the Meiji bureaucracy. However, it did not immediately affect the power of the Meiji oligarchs, who were in full control of the government at the top posts as late as 1901. Nor did it bring about drastic change in the composition of the members of the Japanese Cabinet while the oligarchs were in power. Until 1901 the premiership, for instance, had been rotated among five well-known personalities of the Restoration, Ito, Yamagata, Matsukata, Kuroda, and Okuma; of whom none had been educated at modern schools either in Japan or abroad. As to the members of cabinets serving under these men, an in-

⁹ Passin, op. cit., p. 122.

Investigation of their educational background shows that, of the total of 56 persons who held cabinet posts between 1885 and 1901, 34 (61%) were those whose education had been confined to the traditional schooling or who had no formal education at all; 7 (12%) were those who had attained their college-level education exclusively in Europe or in the United States; 5 (9%) were those who had some schooling in Europe or in the United States; and 6 (11%) were ones who had received their college-level education in Japan (see TABLE-11). Thus, the marked characteristic among the 56 cabinet ministers was the predominance of "pre-modern elements" --i.e. those with no background of modern-formal education. Of the modern-educated elements among the 56, they were mostly the products of the European or American universities. Only a handful among the cabinet ministers were those produced by Japan's own modern schools of higher learning, and all of them made their entry into cabinets only after 1898. The first man to reach the cabinet post among the early products of the nation's higher schools was Ozaki Yukio, who was born in 1859, educated at the Engineering Division of Keio Gijuku (the precursor of Keio University), and appointed as Minister of Education in the first Okuma cabinet of 1898. Two years later, Hara Kei, who was born in 1856, educated at the Justice Ministry's Law School, and later to become the first commoner prime minister in 1918, entered the fourth Ito cabinet as Minister of Communication. Included in the same cabinet was Kato Takaaki, who was born in 1860, graduated from Tokyo Imperial University, and later

TABLE-11: The Educational Background of the Japanese Cabinet Ministers: 1885-1918.

Educational background	1885-1901*	1901-1913**	1913-1918*
	% (N)	% (N)	% (N)
Modern-formal education received:	32% (18)	72% (28)	86% (31)
College-level exclusively in Europe or U.S.A.	12% (7)	20% (8)	6% (2)
College-level in Japan** plus education abroad	2% (1)	8% (3)	8% (3)
Some schooling in Europe or U.S.A.+	9% (5)	0% (0)	0% (0)
College-level in Japan** with no education abroad	9% (5)	41% (16)	66% (24)
Only secondary level education in Japan	0% (0)	3% (1)	6% (2)
Confined to traditional schooling++, or no formal education received	61% (34)	28% (11)	14% (5)
Unknown	7% (4)	0% (0)	0% (0)
Total	100% (56)	100% (39)	100% (36)

* From the 1st Ito Cabinet to the end of the 4th Ito Cabinet.

** From the 1st Katsura Cabinet to the end of the 3rd Katsura Cabinet.

* From the 1st Yamamoto Cabinet to the end of the Terauchi Cabinet.

** Army Cadet School, Naval Academy, and their precursors are included; also included are Keio Gijuku, the precursor of Keio University, and Kaisegakko, the precursor of Tokyo University.

+ Included are those who studied in Europe or U.S.A., but the level of their education abroad could not be determined; or those who attended European military schools not as regular students.

** Included are those educated at Shijuku, Sonjuku, Hanko, and Hangakuryo.

to become the first Tokyo University graduate to hold the premiership in 1924.

While the early crops of Japan's modern schools began to emerge in the elite stratum of the Japanese body politic at the turn of the century, the oligarchs who had dominated the political arena of Japan for more than 30 years were about to retire from active politics, handing down the reins of government to their proteges. After the termination of Ito's fourth cabinet in 1901, Katsura Taro, the renowned protege of Yamagata, succeeded Ito as prime minister. When Katsura resigned from the premiership in 1906, Saionji Kimochi, who succeeded Ito as president of the Seiyukai Party in 1903, formed a new cabinet. Since then, these two proteges headed the subsequent Japanese cabinets alternately until 1913, Katsura three times and Saionji two times. It was under the premiership of these two men that a great extent of the turnover of personnel took place in the Japanese cabinets. In the five different cabinets headed by Katsura and Saionji between 1901 and 1913, all-told 39 persons held cabinet posts. Of the 39, as shown in TABLE-11, 49% or 19 persons were those who had received the college-level education in Japan, nearly five times the percentage shown in the preceding period; whereas those whose education had been confined to the traditional schooling or who had no formal education amounted to 28% (11 persons), a decrease by 33% points from the period before. Persons who had attained their college-level education exclusively in Europe or in the

United States constituted 20% (8 persons) of the members of cabinets during this period, approximately the same percentage shown in the preceding period for the foreign-educated elements. The composite characteristics of the members of cabinets during the Katsura-Saionji period, thus, became diametrically opposed to the one during the preceding period. It was the modern-educated elements, in this time, that showed a preponderance over the "pre-modern elements" among the members of the Katsura-Saionji cabinets. Of the modern-educated elements, those ministers who were educated in the Japanese universities or Semmon-gakko outnumbered the ones educated abroad by two to one in proportion during this period.

The inflow of the modern-educated elements and the eclipse of the "pre-modern elements" in the Japanese cabinets continued further after 1913. As can be noticed in the same table, of the total of 36 persons who held cabinet post(s) in the three subsequent cabinets formed by Yamamoto, Okuma, and Terauchi between 1913 and 1918, 74% or 27 persons were those who had received their college-level education in Japan, an increase of 25% from the Katsura-Saionji period; whereas the "pre-modern elements" totalled only 14% (5 persons), which was one-half the percentage shown in the Katsura-Saionji period. Aside from this change, another change to be pointed out is the marked decrease of persons who had attained their college-level education exclusively abroad among the cabinet ministers of this period. The percentage of these persons stood at 6% (2 persons), about one-fourth of the percentage shown in the

Katsura-Saionji period. After 1913, therefore, the predominant trait of the members of the Japanese cabinets was not only their attainment of modern higher education, but also their attainment of the indigenous modern-higher education.

In the preceding chapters we have discussed the predominance of men from Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa and Hizen among the members of cabinets during the period of 1885-1906, and the waning of these men after that period. Are these phenomena in any way related to the educational background of the "Han-cliques"? If we correlate the Han-origins of those who served in cabinets between 1885 and 1918 with their educational background, some illuminating points emerge. Tabulated in TABLE-12 are the Han-origins and the educational background of those who served in cabinets between 1885 and 1906, and those who served between 1906 and 1918. Among the members of cabinets serving between 1885 and 1906, we can find a definite correlation between one's attainment or lack of modern-formal education and one's Han-origin: There were 64 persons who held cabinet post(s) during this period, of whom 41 were from the four historic Han, and the remainder of 23 from other Han. Of the 41 who had come from the four Han, 30 (79%) had no background of modern-formal education, and 8 (21%) did receive modern-formal education --the educational background of the remaining 3 could not be ascertained. In contrast, of the 23 cabinet ministers who had come from other Han, 7 (32%) had no background of modern-formal education, and 15 (68%) did receive modern-formal education. In other words, the dominant

TABLE-12: The Educational Background and the Han-Origin of the Japanese Cabinet Ministers: 1885-1906; 1906-1918.

	1885-1906		1906-1918					
	Han-Origin		Han-Origin					
	Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, & Hizen	Others	Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, & Hizen	Others				
	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)
Modern-formal education received:	21%	(8)	68%	(15)	78%	(14)	82%	(28)
College-level or above in Europe or U.S.A.		(3)		(8)		(4)		(5)
Some schooling in Europe or U.S.A.		(3)		(2)		(1)		(0)
College-level in Japan with no education abroad		(2)		(5)		(8)		(22)
Only secondary level education in Japan		(0)		(0)		(1)		(1)
Confined to traditional schooling, or no formal education received	79%	(30)	32%	(7)	22%	(4)	18%	(6)
Total known	100%	(38)	100%	(22)	100%	(18)	100%	(34)
Unknown		(3)		(1)		(0)		(0)
Total		(41)		(23)		(18)		(34)

characteristic among the "members of the Han-cliques" was the lack of modern-formal education, whereas that among the "non-members" was the attainment of modern-formal education. When we examine, on the other hand, the data for the cabinet ministers serving between 1906 and 1918, we can no longer find such correlation: Of the total of 52 persons who held cabinet posts during this period, 18 were from the four Han, and 34 from other Han. Of the 18 from the four Han, 78% (14) had received modern-formal education, and 22% (4) had not. Similarly, of the 34 from other Han, 82% (28) had received modern-formal education, and 18% (6) had not. Thus, among the cabinet ministers of this period, the modern-educated elements crosscut between the "members of the Han-cliques" and the "non-members" with more or less equal proportions. This evidence seems to indicate that after 1906 the primary qualification to be a cabinet minister became one's attainment of modern higher education irrespective of his Han-origin. To put it another way, one's "right Han-origin" ceased to be the primary consideration in recruiting the members of cabinets after 1906; it was superseded by a new achievement-oriented criterion, viz., one's attainment of modern higher education. The receding of the "Han-cliques" from the Japanese Cabinet after 1906 thus appears to be an attendant effect of such change in the recruitment of the members of cabinets.

CHAPTER IV

The Levels of Formal Education attained
by the Cabinet Ministers of 1918-1964.

In the preceding survey on the educational background of the members of the Japanese Cabinet from 1885 to 1918, we could find evidences that the attainment of a modern higher education was becoming an increasingly dominant characteristic among them. Could we assume this to be an ongoing trend after 1918? If so, to the extent that every member of the Japanese Cabinet would eventually be a college graduate?

Shown in TABLE-13 are the basic levels of education attained by those who served in the Japanese Cabinet during four different periods covering from 1918 to 1964. Periods-III, -IV, -V and -VI correspond to 1918-1932, 1932-1945, 1945-1952, and 1952-1964 respectively.¹ Even from a casual glance at the table it becomes apparent that the college-level education became almost an absolute prerequisite for anyone to reach a cabinet post in Japan since 1918. More than 90% of the cabinet ministers in all of the four periods, and approximately 95% or more of the cabinet ministers in the last three periods had attained a college-level education. Fluctuation in the percentages of college-educated ministers remained within a small margin throughout the four periods, reaching

¹ See the notes for TABLE-13 for the demarcation.

TABLE-13: The Levels of Education attained by the Japanese Cabinet Ministers, 1918-1964.

Highest level of schooling	PRE-WAR PERIOD		POST-WAR PERIOD		TOTAL PERIOD 1918-1964
	PERIOD III* 1918-1932	PERIOD IV** 1932-1945	PERIOD V* 1945-1952	PERIOD VI** 1952-1964	
	% (N)	% (N)	% (N)	% (N)	% (N)
College-level education† or above	91.1 (71)	99.2 (127)	94.5 (104)	94.5 (155)	95.2 (457)
Secondary school education	1.3 (1)	0.0	4.5 (5)	4.9 (8)	2.9 (14)
Primary school education	0.0	0.0	0.9 (1)	0.0	0.2 (1)
Confined to traditional schooling, or no formal education received††	7.7 (6)	0.8 (1)	0.0	0.6 (1)	1.7 (8)
Unknown	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total	100.1 (78)	100.0 (128)	99.9 (110)	100.0 (164)	100.0 (480)

† Includes Semmongakko, Kotosemongakko, and equivalents (e.g. military cadet schools).
 †† Included are those who attended Hanko, Hangakuryo, Sonjuku, Shinjuku, also those who studied the Chinese Classics under private tutors.

* From the Hara Cabinet to the end of the Inukai Cabinet.

** From the Saito Cabinet to the end of the Suzuki Cabinet.

From the Higashikuni Cabinet to the end of the 3rd Yoshida Cabinet.

** From the 4th Yoshida Cabinet to the end of the 3rd Ikeda Cabinet.

the highest point of 99.2% in Period-IV and the lowest of 91.1% in Period-III. The lowest percentage point in Period-III was due to the fact that a considerable number of persons who had not attained modern-formal education were still present in cabinets of this period. During Period-III, 78 persons served in cabinets, of whom 6 (7.7%) were those who had no formal education or whose education had been confined to the traditional schooling. The juxtaposition of the "pre-modern elements" and the modern-educated elements, which was characteristic among the members of cabinets prior to 1918, could still be found in Period-III, though the proportion occupied by the "pre-modern elements" became much smaller in this period, compared to the one prior to 1918. These "pre-modern elements" seem to be, however, the last vestige of such kind represented in Japanese cabinets. After Period-III, persons with no background of modern-formal education nearly disappeared from Japanese cabinets --only one each in Period-IV and Period-VI (in terms of percentage, less than 1%), and none at all in Period-V.

While those who had no background of modern-formal education became almost extinct from Japanese cabinets after Period-III, a small number of persons whose formal education was limited to the secondary-school level --i.e. middle school graduates-- began to appear in post-war cabinets. For instance, 5 (4.5%) of the 110 cabinet ministers serving during the first post-war period (Period-V) were secondary-school graduates. There were 8 secondary-school graduates (4.9%)

among the 164 cabinet ministers serving during the second post-war period (Period-VI). Compared to this, secondary-school graduates were extremely rare among the cabinet ministers of the two pre-war periods. There was only one secondary-school graduate (1.3%) among the cabinet ministers of Period-III, and none at all among the cabinet ministers of Period-IV. What could be the explanation of this? Could it be that the possibility of reaching a cabinet post by secondary-school graduates is enhanced, though slight, in post-war Japan, because the ladder of political success became significantly altered under the new parliamentary government? To reach a cabinet post under the pre-war regime, one had to be very successful in climbing up the bureaucratic ladder, since appointments to pre-war cabinets were usually made from the personnel serving at the top echelon of the Japanese bureaucracy. In turn, inasmuch as the career civil service posts were open only to college graduates or their equivalents after 1890's, it was very unlikely for anyone without college education to reach a cabinet post under the pre-war regime after the Meiji period. Under the parliamentary government of post-war Japan, on the other hand, the first requisite for anyone to enter the Cabinet was to be elected as a member of the Diet. To be elected to the Diet, one's lack of college education would not be an unsurmountable barrier, because there are many factors which are more essential than, or compensatory to, a college education, such as, a regional bastion of support, a popular base in a mass movement, or financial power.

Once elected to the Diet, one's chance of gaining prominence and power in the parliamentary party organizations, and thereby entering a cabinet would depend, once again, more on his political skill and political worth than on his qualification in formal education, i.e. a college degree.

An investigation into the careers of the 13 secondary-graduates who entered post-war cabinets seems to confirm this explanation. The 13 cabinet ministers' careers from the time of their graduation from secondary school to their first election to the Diet could be classified into the following four general patterns: (i) A long period of economic activities as small-scale entrepreneur or as self-employed business man; thereafter, entry into local politics as elected member of city councils or prefectural assemblies; then, election to the Diet.² (ii) Employment as technical or clerical personnel in local co-op organizations (e.g. fishery union, credit union, rural co-op), therefrom promotion to the office of an official or functionary of these organizations (local or national); entry into local politics as elected member of a prefectural assembly; then, election to the Diet.³ (iii) Starting out as reporter of local news paper, and advancement to the directorate of a local news paper firm;

² The careers of the following cabinet ministers belong to this pattern: Yamamura Shinjiro, Mori Kotaro, and Hayashi Kamejiro.

³ The careers of Iwamoto Nobuyuki, Suzuki Zenko, and Sengoku Yotaro belong to this pattern.

entry into local politics as an elected member of a city council; then, election to the Diet.⁴ (iv) Entrance to a private corporation as clerical or technical personnel, therefrom advancement to a managerial post in a business corporation; a prominent career in the business world as the official or the representative of a business association (e.g. chamber of commerce, manufacturers' association); then, election to the Diet.⁵ It is evident that persons with such careers as described above would have had little chance of becoming a cabinet minister if the cabinet appointments had been made mostly from the top career bureaucrats of the government ministries. Most of the 13 cabinet ministers were what Professor Scalapino called "pure politicians", whose political career had started out as local politicians, and whose political power was built on independent economic means, mass support, and electoral successes.⁶

⁴ The career of Tokuyasu Jitsuzo belongs to this pattern.

⁵ The careers of the following cabinet ministers belong to this pattern: Kawamura Matsusuke, Murakami Isamu, Hiratsuka Tsunejiro, Takazaki Tatsunosuke, Okada Seiichi, and Ezaki Masumi.

⁶ As for the party affiliation of the 13, all but one of them were members of conservative parties --e.g. the Liberal Party, Democratic Party, Liberal-Democratic Party. The exception was the one who was a member of the Socialist party up to his second election to the Diet, then became a member of the Liberal Party at his third election, and remained as such until his entry into the Cabinet. In other words, all of the 13 were the members of conservative party cabinets.

For the explanation of the typology of a "pure politician", see Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1962), pp. 56-65 and fn. 6.

While secondary-school graduates or primary-school graduates were extremely rare among the cabinet ministers of Periods-III and -IV, the same was not the case among those who had been represented in the leadership strata of the House of Representatives during the same periods. In TABLE-14, the levels of education attained by the Speakers, the Vice-Speakers, and the Chairmen of the Standing Committees of the House of Representatives were compared with those of the cabinet ministers. Data in the table indicate that about 7% of these leaders of the House serving in Periods-III and -IV had terminated their formal education at the secondary or the primary school level. Additional 7% to 10% of the leaders of the House of the same periods were those who might have in all probability terminated their formal education below the college level, though they were treated as "unknowns" in the table.⁷ With or without including these "unknowns" into consideration, it is apparent that the leadership posts

⁷ Some inferences could be drawn as to the educational background of these "unknown" cases. First, all of the "unknowns" are partially unknown cases: The biographical data on these persons are not totally lacking; only on their educational attainment, there is conspicuous silence. Secondly, the initial occupations held by the men were in most cases those types which are unlikely to be pursued by the persons with the college-level education. These "circumstantial evidences" strongly suggest that the educational attainment of these "unknowns" is likely below the college-level. The following are a few examples of the entries of "unknown cases" in biographical directories: Miyazawa Saikichi; born in 1892, at Nagano Prefecture; engaged in farming; becomes the chief of the farm co-op in Naritsu village; later, the head of the village.... Tange Mojuro; born in 1880, at Aichi Prefecture; county-clerk, county-technician (Gun-Gishu); part-time staff of Prefecture (Ken-Zoku).... Yamahana Hideo; born in 1900, at Hyogo Prefecture; roller-worker at Daifu Rubber Factory; later, an official of trade union....

TABLE-14: The Levels of Education attained by the Leaders of the House of Representatives*, compared with the Cabinet Ministers: 1918-1964.

	PERIOD-III 1918-1932		PERIOD-IV 1932-1945		PERIOD-V 1945-1952		PERIOD-VI 1952-1964		TOTAL PERIOD 1918-1964	
	CM	Rep.	CM	Rep.	CM	Rep.	CM	Rep.	CM	Rep.
Highest level of schooling	% (N)	% (N)	% (N)	% (N)	% (N)	% (N)	% (N)	% (N)	% (N)	% (N)
College-level ed., or above	91.1 (71)	73.6 (92)	99.2 (127)	83.0 (112)	94.5 (104)	74.6 (91)	94.5 (155)	78.5 (139)	95.2 (457)	77.6 (434)
Secondary school ed.	1.3 (1)	7.2 (9)	0.0 (0)	5.2 (7)	4.5 (5)	16.4 (20)	4.9 (8)	15.9 (28)	2.9 (14)	11.4 (64)
Primary school ed.	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.7 (1)	0.9 (1)	1.6 (2)	0.0 (0)	0.6 (1)	0.2 (1)	0.7 (4)
Confined to traditional schooling, or no formal ed.	7.7 (6)	9.6 (12)	0.8 (1)	3.7 (5)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.6 (1)	1.1 (2)	1.7 (8)	3.4 (19)
Unknown	0.0 (0)	9.6 (12)	0.0 (0)	7.4 (10)	0.0 (0)	7.4 (9)	0.0 (0)	4.0 (7)	0.0 (0)	6.8 (38)
Total	100.1 (78)	100.0 (125)	100.0 (128)	100.0 (135)	99.9 (110)	100.0 (122)	100.0 (164)	100.1 (177)	100.0 (480)	99.9 (559)

* Persons who had served in the Speakership, the Vice-Speakership, and the Chairmanship of the Standing Committees of the House of Representatives were selected. In selecting out these persons and obtaining their biographical data, the following sources were utilized: Gikaiseido Shichi-junishi, Shiryohen (A Seventy-Year History of Parliamentary System; the Source Book) and Shufjin Gimmelkan (A Biographical Directory of the Members of the House of Representatives), published by the Japanese Diet in 1962. For post-1960 information: Asahi Nenkan (Asahi Yearbook), Volumes 1960 through 1964; and Nihon Kankai Keikan (Who's Who in the Japanese Officialdom), Volumes 1962 through 1964.

in the House were more open to those who had a limited level of formal education than the cabinet posts during Periods-III and -IV. If, therefore, the members of the Cabinet had been recruited mostly from the House of Representatives during these periods, the paucity of secondary-school graduates in the cabinets of these periods might not have been the case. The "blue-ribbon cabinet" of Periods-III and -IV (especially the latter period) was undoubtedly a result of "transcendentalism" which had been the prevailing modus operandi of Japanese politics during most of the periods.

The emergence of the secondary-school graduates in the Japanese Cabinet notwithstanding, the educational gap between the people and the members of cabinets has remained vast in Japan since 1918. Whereas 95.2% of the Japanese cabinet ministers in service from 1918 to 1964 had attained a college-level education, the same level of education was achieved by only 0.8% of the total working-age population of Japan in 1925; or by 1.6% of the same age population in 1935. Even as late as in 1960, those who attained the college-level education amounted to only 5.5% among the total working-age population of Japan (see TABLE-15). Does the high level of educational attainment by the cabinet ministers account for their relatively high class origin? Unfortunately, this question can not be satisfactorily answered, because relevant data collected for this question (e.g. father's occupation) are extremely sparse. Of the total of 412 individuals who served in cabinets between 1918 and 1964, their father's occupations

TABLE-15: The Levels of Education attained by the Working-Age Population (Age 15-54) of Japan Selected Years, #

Highest level of education attained	1895 %	1905 %	1925 %	1935 %	1950 %	1960 %
Graduated from college-level institutions	0.1	0.2	0.8	1.6	3.3	5.5
Graduated from secondary level schools	0.2	0.9	4.9	9.3	15.7	30.1
Graduated from primary schools	15.7	41.7	74.3	82.5	78.5	63.9
Not graduated from primary schools, or no schooling	84.0	57.3	20.0	6.7	2.5	0.5
Total %	100.0	100.1	100.0	100.1	100.0	100.0
Total number of working-age population (in '000)	2279	2437	3293	3825	4735	5699

* Compiled from Mombusho (Ministry of Education), *Nihon no Seicho to Kyoiku (Education and the Growth of Japan)*, Tokyo, Bureau of Research, Ministry of Education, 1962, Table 13, p. 58.

(or social status) were ascertainable only in 104 cases, which are listed in TABLE-16. Needless to say, the 104 "known" cases are not representative samples of the total population of 412 cabinet ministers; hence, it is not likely that the data in the table portray a true picture of the class origins of the Japanese cabinet ministers as a whole. Although the evidence is far from conclusive, the limited data suggest that a high proportion of the Japanese cabinet ministers were from relatively well-to-do families or from the social classes of some distinction. Of the 104 cabinet ministers whose father's occupations (or social classes) were ascertainable, 23 were sons of those who could be collectively called proprietors --e.g. landlords, entrepreneurs, merchants; 24 were sons of government officials in a broad sense --most of them were obviously very successful officials in view of the high positions they held; 5 were sons of professional men; 6 came from the families of nobility; and 38 were sons of Hanshi, the privileged Samurai of pre-Restoration Japan which had constituted 5% of the total population of Japan toward the end of the Tokugawa era.⁸ Only a handful among the 104 cabinet ministers were those from the families of lower-middle or possibly lower class origin. For instance, 2 were sons of

⁸ The social status of Hanshi in pre-Restoration Japan can not be, of course, a reliable index of determining the economic well-being of the former Samurai in the post-Restoration society, because it is well-known fact that some Samurai fared badly after the Restoration.

TABLE-16: Occupations (or Social Status) of the Fathers of the Japanese Cabinet Ministers: 1918-1964.

<u>Father's Occupation (Social Status)</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>(%)</u>
TRADITIONALS:	47	(11%)
Imperial Prince	1	
Hereditary Peer (2nd generation)	2	
Hanshu (Daimyo)	3	
Hanshi (Samurai)	38	
Confucian Scholar in Traditional Schools	3	
OFFICIALS:	24	(6%)
Cabinet Minister	6	
Member of the House of Representatives	5	
Ennobled High Official	5	
Army Officer (general)	3	
Naval Officer (admiral)	1	
Judge or Procurator	2	
Civil Servant	2	
PROFESSIONALS:	5	(1%)
University Professor	2	
Kotogakko Instructor	1	
Lawyer	1	
Medical Doctor	1	
PROPRIETORS:	23	(6%)
Landlord	5	
Banker	2	
Industrialist	3	
Shipping Firm Owner	1	
Construction Firm Owner	1	
News Paper Publisher	1	
Brewery Owner	6	
Tatami Manufacturer	1	
Bakery Owner	1	
Lumber Merchant	1	
Silk Merchant	1	
OTHERS:	5	(1%)
Farmer	2	
Stone Mason	1	
Buddhist Priest	2	
Total known	104	(25%)
Unknown	308	(75%)
Total	412	(100%)

farmers, one a son of stone mason, and 2 sons of Buddhist priests.

Incidentally, there is a sample survey of the social origin of 100 Japanese political leaders of the Taisho period (1912-1926) presented by Professor Mannari for a comparative purpose in his work on Japanese business executives. According to this study, 30% of the political leaders were sons of landlords; 20% sons of Hanshi (Samurai); 16% sons of entrepreneur (large or small scale); 14% sons of government officials; 9% sons of professionals; 6% sons of white-collar workers; and 5% sons of tenant- or free-holding farmers.⁹ The same study indicates that, of the gainfully employed population of Japan in 1883, 66.1% were tenant- or free-holding farmers and 3.4% were unskilled manual workers.¹⁰ It meant that, therefore, 95% of the political leaders of the Taisho period had come from those classes which were socially and/or economically better off than those farmers and unskilled workers which together constituted more than two-thirds of the Japanese population in 1880's (the decade in which most of the political leaders of the Taisho period were in their twenties). The 100 samples in the study did include not only cabinet ministers but also other high officials of government and prominent politicians of the Taisho period; hence, the

⁹ Mannari Hiroshi, Bizines Erito (Business Elite) (Tokyo, 1965), pp. 88-89.

¹⁰ Ibid.

findings of the study have only a limited validity with reference to the social class origin of cabinet ministers. Nevertheless, the findings could serve as a reasonably reliable index for inferring the relatively high class origin of the Japanese cabinet ministers.

There is another clue, aside from father's occupation, from which we could make some inferences as to the family background of some cabinet ministers. Professor Inoki, in his study of the civil bureaucracy of Japan, mentions:

An investigation into the occupations of the fathers of [1,961] civil and judicial officials... proved impossible to undertake. A few significant facts are available, however: 138 (10 percent) of the civil servants and 70 (12.0 percent) of the judicial officials were adopted children, adoption being one of the traditional means in Japan by which an education is made available to the talented sons of poor families.... This suggests that a large proportion of the civil servants in particular come from upper-class families.¹¹

If we follow the same line of reasoning as suggested by Professor Inoki, we would come to a similar conclusion in regard to the cabinet ministers. Of the 412 persons who served in cabinets between 1918 and 1964, their birth-order and/or adopted status were ascertainable in 269 cases. These are tabulated in TABLE-17. Of the 269 known cases, 55 were adopted sons. This meant that 13.3% of the Japanese cabinet ministers serving between 1918 and 1964 might have been born in poor families, but raised in well-to-do families as adopted sons.

¹¹ Inoki Masamichi, "The Civil Bureaucracy", in Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, ed. Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (Princeton, 1964), p. 297.

TABLE-17: The Natural or Adopted Son Status of the Japanese Cabinet Ministers: 1918-1964.

<u>Status</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>(%)</u>
NATURAL SON:	212	(51.5%)
First son, or only son	87	
Other than first son	93	
Birth-order unknown	32	
ADOPTED SON:	55	(13.3%)
Mukoyoshi	17	
Mukoyoshi-status unknown	38	
UNKNOWN:	143	(34.7%)
FEMALE:	2	(0.5%)
<u>Total</u>	<u>412</u>	<u>(100.0%)</u>

The high level of education attained by the Japanese cabinet ministers might be, in part, the result of their greater opportunities, being born or being raised in affluent families at least well enough off to support them in school. However, this factor alone does not explain fully the educational achievements of the cabinet ministers: For not only was their level of education high, but also their higher education was attained, in most instances, at exceedingly competitive "elite schools"; thus indicating their exceptional academic ability, motivation, and achievement, as well as their greater opportunities. We shall discuss this in the next chapter.

CHAPTER V

The School-Background of the Cabinet
Ministers: 1918-1964.

It is a readily recognizable phenomenon that in every country in the world has grown a certain prestige-scale or hierarchical distinction among the nation's universities and other institutions of higher learning. Japan, to be sure, is no exception from this phenomenon. In fact, Japan probably is a typical country where the most accentuated form of such hierarchy has developed. One western observer of Japan once remarked: "No major people in the world places greater emphasis on hierarchy than do the Japanese. Nippon-ichi, 'the first in Japan', is a ubiquitous phrase applied to anything or anyone from the nation's leading poet down to the biggest eater of raw fish.... Almost anyone can tell you the order of prestige of the Japanese universities."¹ As to the prestige scale and the elitism among Japanese universities, Professor Passin reports:

Among the 45 pre-war universities, the "Imperial" universities ranked highest, and among the Imperial universities Tokyo stood unchallengeably first; next in rank came the remaining government universities plus a small number of private schools; well below these came the 23 remaining private universities. The result of this elitism was not only the crushing competition for the good schools but a concentration of the best students in the small number of prestige schools.... Tokyo University concentrated in its halls the flower of the Japanese university world.²

¹ Edwin O. Reischauer, The United States and Japan, 3rd ed., (New York, 1965), p. 163.

² Passin, op. cit., p. 107.

In 1924, Kato Takaaki, the first Tokyo University graduate to hold the post of Prime Minister in Japan, was reported to have said in a party given by his former classmates congratulating him on his appointment to the post, that Tokyo University graduates would take over all of the cabinet posts within three years.³ At the time he made this remark, there were 34 universities and 135 college-level institutions (Sem-mongakko or Kotosemmongakko) in Japan, bringing forth a great many graduates every year. Was Kato exaggerating? Perhaps his prediction might have not been fulfilled literally, yet it was not a too fanciful exaggeration. For Tokyo University graduates became a formidable force which predominated in the government and politics of Japan for years to come.

There were several reasons for the predominance of Tokyo University graduates in the government and politics of modern Japan. In the first place, it could be attributed to the unique history of Tokyo University and the role it played vis-a-vis the government during the initial period of the modernization of Japan. Tokyo University was conceived and founded by the government with a specific purpose of training those personnel who were needed by the government in its programs of adjusting Japan to the modern world. For instance, the law concerning the establishment of the Imperial University (Teikoku Daigaku Rei) provided in Article I: "the aims

³ Masuda Takaharu, Gakubatsu: Nihon o Shihaisuru Akamon (The School-Clique: the Red-Gate that rules Japan) (Tokyo, 1957), p. 94.

of the Imperial University are to teach such knowledge, arts and skills as are in accordance with the necessity and the demand of state, and to conduct studies and researches for the inmost aspects of the said subjects."⁴ Under this spirit, Tokyo University was established in 1877 with six Faculties --Law, Letters, Science, Medicine, Engineering, and Agriculture. The Faculty of Law, the largest among the university's faculties, was to serve primarily as a school for training modern bureaucrats.

In order to draw those who were trained at the Law Faculty of Tokyo University effectively into the government services, the Imperial Ordinance of 1887 stipulated that the graduates of the Law Faculty would be exempted from the competitive examination in securing civil service posts.⁵ Until this practice was finally ended in 1894, graduates from the Law Faculty were able to enter the civil service simply on the basis of their school records. Even after the ending of this preferential treatment, the Law Faculty graduates continued to have some other advantages. For instance, when they were competing with others in the civil service examination, most of the members of the examination committee (written and oral) were professors from the Law Faculty of Tokyo University, and the required subjects to be passed in the examination were not much different from those legalistic

⁴ Shimbori Michiya, Gakubatsu: Kono Nihontekina Mono (The School-Cliques: This Japanestic Feature) (Tokyo, 1969), p.

⁵ Ibid.

curricula taught by the examiners themselves at Tokyo University.⁶ To the Law Faculty graduates, therefore, the civil service entrance examination was, psychologically and academically, almost tantamount to a senior comprehensive examination of their own university. The preference given to the Law Faculty graduates and other conditions favorable for advancing their careers in the government services not only had resulted in the flow of a great many graduates from the Faculty into the Japanese bureaucracy, but also had attracted, in turn, many ambitious young men aspiring to become high officials to that Faculty from all over the country. The Law Faculty thus became the main recruiting station for modern bureaucrats as well as the principal channel leading into high civil service posts in Japan.

Available statistics indicate that from the time of Tokyo University's founding in 1877 to 1910, the number of graduates produced by the six faculties of the university totalled 10,486 in all; of the total, 3,331 (29.9%) were graduated from the Law Faculty. Various occupations held by these graduates as of 1910 are tabulated in TABLE-18. According to the tabulation, 23.4% of the total graduates from the Law Faculty of Tokyo University were serving as civil servants in the executive branch of government (Gyosei Kanri) as of

⁶ Ike Nobutaka, Japanese Politics (New York, 1947), p. 147. Also Ike's work in Major Government of Asia, ed. George McT. Kahin (Ithaca, 1963), p. 196.

TABLE-18: Occupations of All Graduates from Tokyo University (1877-1910) as of 1910.*

Occupation	Graduates from the Faculty of:							Total %
	Law %	Letter %	Science %	Medic. %	Engin. %	Agric. %		
Administrative official	23.4	1.3	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.9	7.7	
Juridical official	16.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.3	
Imperial Court official	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.8	0.2	0.1	0.3	
Member of the Diet	0.9	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.4	
School official, Prof., & Teacher	1.8	77.3	54.7	9.2	6.6	18.5	18.6	
Medical personnel in public hosp.	0.0	0.0	0.0	44.5	0.0	5.6	8.1	
Technological personnel in go'vt.	0.0	0.0	13.9	2.9	37.9	43.8	14.1	
Sub-total (OFFICIALS):	42.7	79.2	68.8	57.6	44.8	69.2	54.5	
Lawyer (private)	5.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6	
Physician (private)	0.0	0.0	10.0	20.8	0.0	0.0	3.5	
Engineer or Technician in corp..	0.0	0.0	1.7	0.0	35.7	2.5	8.7	
Employee in corp. or bank	14.8	0.9	1.3	1.0	1.5	1.1	5.5	
Other occupations	8.8	6.8	3.0	0.7	4.3	8.7	5.7	
Graduate student	1.8	5.7	6.0	3.8	0.5	3.2	2.7	
Study abroad or Emigration	0.3	0.3	1.3	3.4	1.5	0.8	1.2	
Unknown or undecided	20.5	2.1	6.4	1.9	4.5	4.8	9.0	
Deceased	5.9	5.0	11.2	10.8	7.0	9.8	7.5	
Total %	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.8	100.1	99.9	
Total Number	3,331	1,376	605	1,786	2,470	918	10,486	

* Source: Calculated from the tables in Shimbori Michiya, Gakubatsui Kono Nihonteki Mono (The School-Cliques: This Japanistic Feature), Tokyo, 1969, pp. 62-63.

1910; 16.6% of the graduates as juridical officials (judges and procurators); and 0.2% of the graduates as officials in the Imperial Court. Hence, altogether 40.2% of the graduates from the Law Faculty were career bureaucrats as of 1910. If we exclude such categories as graduate students, emigrants, unknowns, and the deceased from the computation of percentage in the table, those in the bureaucratic careers would be well over 50% of the total graduates. Among graduates from other faculties of Tokyo University than the Law Faculty, those who became career civil servants were only a small fraction. However, as can be noticed in the table, high proportions of graduates from the Faculties of Science, Medicine, Engineering, and Agriculture of Tokyo University were also serving in the government as scientists or technical personnel. If all of the persons with those occupations which were related to government services in one way or another were to be subsumed into the broadest meaning of the Japanese term "officials" (Komuin), the percentage of "officials" among the graduates from the six faculties of Tokyo University would amount to 54.5% in all.

Another reason for the predominance of Tokyo University graduates among the top personnel of the Japanese government, especially among cabinet ministers, might be attributed to the non-development of a genuine parliamentary government in pre-war Japan. With a few exceptions in the 1920's, most of the cabinets formed in pre-war Japan were so-called "tran-

scendental cabinets", i.e., cabinets formed with no basis to the popular representation or the party alignment in the Diet. Inasmuch as the members of these "transcendental cabinets" were mostly those persons selected from the top echelon of the bureaucracy in which Tokyo University graduates were predominant, it would be hardly surprising to find a preponderance of the latter among the cabinet ministers of pre-war Japan.

Although there are numerous remarks made by students of modern Japanese politics concerning the preponderance of Tokyo University graduates among the top personnel of the Japanese government, they are mostly impressionistic characterization unsupported by quantitative data. Precisely what proportion of the top personnel of the government has been occupied by graduates from Tokyo University has not been clear. In addition, there are many unanswered questions as to this well-recognized feature of the Japanese politics. For instance, could we find any varying degree of dominance by Tokyo University graduates in different periods? If one of the reasons for their predominance among the members of the cabinets was the non-development of a parliamentary government during the pre-war period, was there any significant change in this respect in post-war Japan where a parliamentary democracy seems to have become a veritable *modus operandi* of the national politics? We shall examine these questions in the following.

Shown in TABLE-19 are various college-level institutions from which the Japanese cabinet ministers of the four periods were graduated. The most salient feature noticeable in the table is, as has been anticipated, the preponderance of Tokyo University graduates. The proportion of Tokyo University graduates among cabinet ministers stood at 46.2% in Period-III; 47.7% in Period-IV; 40.9% in Period-V; and 45.7% in Period-VI. Considering the fact that Tokyo University students represented approximately 12% of the total university population in pre-war Japan⁷ --but, not including those students at numerous Semmon-gakko or Kotosemmongakko-- Tokyo University produced far more than its share of cabinet ministers. No single university -- nor single Semmongakko for that matter-- surpassed Tokyo University in producing cabinet ministers in terms of absolute number or in ratio to the total number of its graduates. A question was posed previously whether or not the inauguration of parliamentary cabinet government in post-war Japan had the effect of reducing the proportion of Tokyo University graduates among the members of post-war cabinets. No such change was apparent in the post-war periods: Even though there was a slight decrease in the percentage of Tokyo University graduates among cabinet ministers during the first post-war period (Period-V) --a decrease of 6.8% points from the period before, the extent of the decrease was not so

⁷ This figure was taken from Passin, op. cit., p. 127.

TABLE-19: Kinds of College-level Institutions Graduated by the Japanese Cabinet Ministers: 1918-1964.

Kind of college-level institution	PRE-WAR PERIOD			POST-WAR PERIOD			TOTAL PERIOD
	PERIOD-III 1918-1932	PERIOD-IV 1932-1945	PERIOD-V 1945-1952	PERIOD-VI 1952-1964	PERIOD 1918-1964		
Graduated from:							
Government Universities (Tokyo University) (Kyoto University) (Others)	46.2 (46.2) (0.0) (0.0)	51.6 (47.7) (3.9) (0.0)	50.9 (40.9) (10.0) (0.0)	57.9 (45.7) (7.9) (4.3)	52.7 (45.2) (6.0) (1.5)		
Private Univ. in Japan (Waseda or Keio U) (Others)	5.1 (3.8) (1.3)	6.3 (6.3) (0.0)	14.6 (7.3) (7.3)	23.2 (10.4) (12.8)	13.8 (7.5) (6.3)		
Universities abroad (Europe or U.S.A.) (Others)	3.8 (3.8) (0.0)	0.8 (0.8) (0.0)	3.6 (3.6) (0.0)	2.4 (2.4) (0.0)	2.5 (2.5) (0.0)		
All Universities: Graduated from:	55.1	58.7	69.1	83.5	69.0		
Semmon/Kotosemmon-gakko	10.3	10.9	11.8	5.5	9.2		
Military Cadet Schools	19.2	26.6	4.5	0.0	11.3		
All Semmon-level Inst.:	29.5	37.5	16.3	5.5	20.5		
Not graduated, but some education at Universities	3.8	2.3	6.4	5.5	4.5		
Semmon/Kotosemmon-gakko	2.6	0.8	2.7	0.0	1.3		
All College-level Dropouts:	6.4	3.1	9.1	5.5	5.8		
No College-level education, or Unknown	9.0	0.8	5.4	5.5	4.8		
Total %	100.0	100.1	99.9	100.0	100.1		
Total Number	78	128	110	164	480		

marked as to suggest any significant change. Moreover, during the second post-war period (Period-VI) the percentage of Tokyo University graduates rose back to the level almost as high as the ones in the two pre-war periods. Thus, irrespective of the changed career route to cabinet posts under the new parliamentary system, Tokyo University graduates remained as preponderant in post-war cabinets as they were in pre-war cabinets.

Compared to the large contingent of the Tokyo University-educated ministers, graduates from other Imperial Universities occupied only a small proportion among the members of Japanese cabinets. Most of these graduates were from Kyoto Imperial, the university next to Tokyo Imperial in prestige and age among the five Imperial Universities existent in pre-war Japan.⁸ Starting from Period-IV, a small number of Kyoto Imperial graduates began to appear in cabinets: of 128 persons who served in cabinets during Period-IV, 5 (3.9%) were Kyoto University graduates; in the two post-war periods, the proportions of Kyoto University graduates among cabinet ministers somewhat increased, totalling 10.0% (11 out of 110) during Period-V, and 7.9% (13 out of 164) during Period-VI. There was no Kyoto University graduate among the cabinet ministers serving during Period-III. The relative scarcity of Kyoto University graduates in the pre-war cabinets could be attrib-

⁸ There were all-told 7 Imperial Universities in Pre-war Japan, if those in the colonies were included.

uted to the relatively short history of the university. Kyoto Imperial which was founded in 1897 --twenty years after the founding of Tokyo Imperial-- produced its first graduating class only in 1900. It meant that those who belonged to the first graduating class of the university were mostly in their forties by Period-III, and in their fifties by Period-IV. As we shall see in a later chapter, those who made their cabinet entry through the bureaucratic ladder had required usually more than 25 years of continuous service in government to reach a cabinet post. The first brood of Kyoto University graduates were, therefore, "due to arrive" at the Cabinet only after 1925, if they had taken the bureaucratic route of ascent to the Cabinet.

Other Imperial Universities were even shorter in their histories than Kyoto Imperial. For instance, Tohoku Imperial was Founded in 1907, Kyushu Imperial in 1910, and Hokkaido Imperial in 1918. Undoubtedly, this was the reason for the total absence of other Imperial University graduates among the members of the pre-war Japanese cabinets. It was only in the post-war period that a tiny trickle of other Imperial University graduates emerged in the Cabinet: two Tohoku Imperial graduates entered the Cabinet in Period-VI. With the exception of these two, all of the Imperial University graduates represented in the Japanese Cabinet during the entire period between 1918 and 1964 were either from Tokyo Imperial or Kyoto Imperial.

As for those who were graduated from the government universities other than Imperial Universities, they constituted only a negligible fraction of the Japanese cabinet ministers. Prior to Period-VI, there was no other government-university graduate serving in cabinets than those from Imperial Universities. During Period-VI, 5 of the 164 persons who served in cabinets were graduates from the government universities other than Imperial Universities. All but one of the five were from Tokyo Commercial University, one of the "Big Three" government universities.⁹

If we compute the proportions of Tokyo Imperial graduates, Kyoto Imperial graduates, and other government-university graduates among Cabinet Ministers for the entire period (1918-1964), the result is: 45.2% (217 out of 480) for Tokyo Imperial; 6.0% (29) for Kyoto Imperial; and 1.5% (7) for other government-universities --i.e. other Imperial Universities plus all of the non-imperial government-universities. All of these three categories --viz. government-university graduates at large-- add up to 52.7% (253 out of 480).

The proportion of those who were graduated from private universities in Japan among Cabinet Ministers was far less than that of the government-university graduates. Of the 480 cabinet ministers in service from 1918 to 1964, 13.8% (66)

⁹ The "Big Three" are Tokyo Imperial, Kyoto Imperial, and Tokyo Commercial Universities. See Passin, op. cit., pp. 127-129.

were graduates from various private universities in Japan; less than one-third of the percentage occupied by the government university graduates. While the proportion occupied by the government university graduates remained more or less constant throughout the four periods, there were conspicuous changes in the proportion of private university graduates among Cabinet Ministers over the four periods. During the two pre-war periods (Periods-III and -IV), 5% to 6% of those serving in cabinets were the graduates of private universities. During the first post-war period (Period-V), the percentage of these graduates increased to 14.6%, more than two times the percentage shown in the pre-war periods. An even greater increase was shown during the second post-war period (Period-VI): The proportion of private university graduates among cabinet ministers in this period stood at 23.2%, approximately four times the percentage shown in the pre-war periods.

Nearly all of the private university graduates represented in the cabinets during the two pre-war periods were either from Waseda or Keio, the two most distinguished universities among some 30 private universities existent in pre-war Japan. During the first post-war period, Waseda and Keio graduates represented exactly one-half of the private university graduates serving in cabinets. Only during the second post-war period, Waseda and Keio graduates were outnumbered by other private university graduates among the cabinet ministers with a private university education. Thus, during the post-war periods, there was not only a sizable increase in

the proportion of private university graduates among cabinet ministers, but also a diversification of the universities from which these graduates had come.

Approximately 10% to 12% of the Japanese cabinet ministers serving during Periods-III, -IV, and -V were those who were graduated from various Semmongakko or Kotosemmongakko. During Period-VI, the proportion of these men somewhat decreased among cabinet ministers. 5.5% of the cabinet ministers serving during this period were graduates from Semmongakko or Kotosemmongakko. In the educational hierarchy of pre-war Japan, the Semmon (or Kotosemmon) education was considered to be decidedly inferior to university education. Unlike university, Semmongakko or Kotosemmongakko was not the type of institution disposed to academism. It was essentially a vocational channel of higher education geared to producing technological personnel and other professionals in order to meet the growing demands of the expanding industrial community in the nation. Whereas university education had to be preceded by three years of university-preparatory education at Higher School (Kotogakko) after graduation from middle school, Semmon education required no such preparatory schooling: After middle school, one could immediately proceed to Semmongakko or Kotosemmongakko, which provided a wide range of professional curricula. Although one could become a lawyer, doctor, engineer, pharmacist, or dentist after four years of education at Semmongakko or Kotosemmongakko, he would be liable to have gone through a somewhat cursory

course of training, compared to those professionals trained at university via preparatory school, which involved six years (in some cases, seven years) of schooling. Primarily for this reason, the Semmon graduates were not rated on the same level as the university graduates.

Despite the lower prestige assigned to Semmon graduates, to those who could ill afford the financial burden of going through the six-year (or seven-year) period of preparatory schooling and university education, the channel of Semmon education provided an important outlet for getting their higher education with lesser financial strain. It does not mean, however, that the entrants to Semmongakko or Kotosemmon-gakko were always from a less affluent background. In all probability, those who chose the Semmon education rather than the university education solely on the basis of the financial reasons belonged to a minority of the Semmon entrants. In a majority of cases, it would be more because of one's weakness in academic proficiency than his financial reason that made him enter the channel of Semmon education. For, those who chose the channel of university education were subject to far severer competition than those entering the Semmon channel, due to the fact that facilities for university education were far below demands. The narrowest gateway to university education was at the transition from middle school to higher school (the university-preparatory school). There were only 33 higher schools existent in pre-war Japan, and it was re-

ported that "only one out of 13 middle school graduates could expect to enter higher school, and only one out of 25 was admitted to the prestigious higher schools that opened the way into the Imperial Universities. Normally, there were about seven times more applicants than the openings."¹⁰ For those who were not successful in gaining admittance to one of the higher schools --i.e. those who failed in the entrance examinations or those who were discouraged from taking the examination on account of deficiency in their academic ability or preparation-- the only alternative left in pursuing their higher education was, though less attractive, to enter the channel of Semmon education.¹¹ Semmongakko or Kotosemmongakko in general, thus, had a tendency to recruit something less than the "cream of the Japanese students". Probably, it was also for this reason that Semmon graduates were being rated as second class in comparison to university graduates.

A sizable portion of those who served in the pre-war cabinets were graduates from the Army Cadet School (Rikugun-Shikangakko) or the Naval Academy (Kaigun-Heigakko). As shown in TABLE-19, nearly one-fifth (19.2%) of the cabinet ministers serving during Period-III, and more than one-quarter (26.6%) of those serving during Period-IV, were graduates from the military cadet schools. These military schools were

¹⁰ Passin, op. cit., p. 104.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 105.

rated on the same level as Semmongakko rather than as the university-level, because the cadet school education was charted on the same plane as the Semmon education: middle school graduates could proceed immediately to the cadet schools, and after four years of training there they could be appointed as commissioned officers in the Imperial Army or Navy. Students entering the cadet schools were, however, much different in quality from those entering Semmongakko or Kotosemmongakko. The military officer's career which promised prestige and power in pre-war Japan attracted many able and ambitious young men, to whom the cadet schools were the only pathway to their aspiring career. Moreover, the cadet school education which was free of any expenses (e.g. tuition, room-and-board, and others) had a great appeal to many middle school graduates who were bright enough but too poor to continue their formal education.¹² Consequently, competition at the entrance examination to the cadet schools was no less severe than the one at the prestigious higher schools which provided access to the Imperial Universities. For these reasons, the cadet schools were much better disposed to recruit superior students than Semmongakko. For those students who had successfully gained admittance to the cadet schools, their elitist image of themselves was as strong as, if not stronger than, that of the Imperial University students.

In pre-war Japan, a successful military officer could

¹² Ibid.

reach a cabinet post by way of his military career, since the post of Army Minister and Navy Minister were regularly open to the high ranking officers of the Imperial Army and Navy. It had been a rule under the pre-war system of government that the portfolios of Army and Navy were to be filled from the career officers in the active list who held the rank of Lieutenant General or Vice Admiral, or above.¹³ Most of the cadet school graduates represented in cabinets during Period-III were these career officers who were serving as Minister of Army or Navy: There were 15 cadet school graduates represented in cabinets during Period-III, and all but two of them were generals or admirals in uniform who were holding the portfolio of Army or Navy. The two exceptions were retired military men who were serving as the Prime Minister during this period. (But, even these two had once served as Army Minister or Navy Minister prior to 1918 when they were still in the active list.) There was a substantial increase in the proportion (also in number) of cadet school graduates among cabinet ministers during Period-IV. 26.6% (34) of those who served in cabinets during this period were graduates from the military schools, compared to 19.2% (15) during the previous period. This increase was due to the fact that, in addition to the regular number of those military men who served as Army Minister or Navy Minister, many other generals and admirals held, unlike in the previous period,

¹³ The Imperial Decrees 193 and 194 of May, 1900.

some of the non-military portfolios of cabinet in this period: of the 34 cadet school graduates represented in cabinets during Period-IV, 19 held the portfolio of Army or Navy (some of them held the Premiership concurrently); others were generals and admirals, either uniformed or retired, who held non-military portfolios, such as Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Education, Welfare, Communication, Transportation, Industry and Commerce, and others. The marked increase of military men among cabinet ministers, and the entrenchment of professional soldiers in those portfolios which were ordinarily reserved for civilian ministers, are indicative of the militaristic trend which culminated during this particular period (1932-1945).

Data in TABLE-19 show a rapid dwindling of military school graduates in the post-war cabinets. The percentage of military school graduates among cabinet ministers plummeted to a mere 4.5% during Period-V; and then it went down to the zero point in Period-VI. This abrupt change was largely due to the political reconstructions wrought in post-war Japan by the Allied Powers. With the occupation of Japan by the Allied authority, the Imperial Army and Navy and their respective Ministeries in the Cabinet were abolished as a part of the Allied programs for demilitarizing the country. Moreover, all of the commissioned officers of the former Imperial Army and Navy were debarred from taking any public offices as one of many cate-

gories of "pugees".¹⁴ The result was the sudden fading out of professional soldiers (i.e. the pre-war military cadet school graduates) from the political arena of Japan during the Occupation period. It must be pointed out, however, that the "puge" of former military officers during the Occupation period can not be the sufficient explanation for the total extinction of military school graduates among the cabinet ministers of Period-VI (1952-1964). For, in this particular period, Japan was no longer under the Occupation; hence, the "purgees" (e.g. former military officers) were no longer subject to the restriction imposed by the Occupation authority. As a matter of fact, many of the former civilian purgees had returned to the political arena after the ending of the Occupation in 1952, and some of them made entry into the Cabinet after 1952. For instance, of 164 persons who served in cabinets during Period-VI, 21 were former "purgees". It seems that the complete disappearance of military school graduates from the cabinets of the post-occupation period could be attributed not only to the "puge" itself, but to some other factor as well. Perhaps, it might be the changed political milieu and the changed political ladder of success in post-war Japan to which former military men were less likely to adapt themselves than the civilian purgees --e.g. party poli-

¹⁴ See Kawai Kazuo, Japan's American Interlude (Chicago, 1960), pp. 91-97.

tics and electoral success.¹⁵

It was noted previously that the proportion of those educated at European or American universities among cabinet ministers had decreased appreciably after 1913. Data in the table shows that it decreased further since 1918; of the 480 cabinet ministers circulated between 1918 and 1964, only 12 (2.5%) were graduated from universities (or colleges) in Europe or in the United States. There was no significant fluctuation in the percentage of foreign university graduates among cabinet ministers over the four periods covering from 1918 to 1964. The percentage remained less than 4.0% throughout the four periods; reaching the highest point of 3.8% during Period-III, and the lowest of 0.8% during Period-IV.

¹⁵ The number of former purgees among the total of 532 individuals who served in the Cabinet or in the leadership posts of the two houses of the Diet (the Speakership, the Vice-Speakership, and the Chairmanship of the Standing Committees) between 1952 and 1964 is as follows:

	<u>Total number of persons</u>	<u>Number of former purgees</u>
Cabinet Ministers: 1952-1964	164 (100%)	21 (13%)
Leaders of the House of Representatives: 1952-1964	177 (100%)	20 (11%)
Leaders of the House of Councillors: 1952-1964	191 (100%)	5 (3%)
<u>Total</u>	<u>532 (100%)</u>	<u>46 (9%)</u>

Of the total of 46 former purgees serving in the Cabinet or in the leadership posts of the Diet between 1952 and 1964, only one was the former military man graduated from the Army Cadet School: Matsumura Shuitsu, who was elected to the House of Councillors in 1956, and had served as the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee of the House.

If we investigate the educational background of political leaders in some of the non-western countries for the purpose of a comparison with Japan, it shows that far larger proportions of the leaders of these countries had received their higher education in Europe or in other western countries. In Turkey, for instance, it is reported that one-third of the members of the Turkish cabinets from 1920 to 1957 had received formal education at the lycee or university level in Europe.¹⁶ In Thailand, 48% of the Thai cabinet ministers serving during the period between 1932 and 1960 had attained higher education in Europe or in other western countries.¹⁷ In Ceylon, 22% of the members of the Legislative Council (later the Parliament) who served between 1924 and 1960 were educated abroad.¹⁸ There are many indications that in these non-western countries a university education in Europe or in other western countries is considered more desirable than the one in the native countries. In Japan, on the contrary, a university education abroad seems to have been regarded as "inferior" to the native one. For instance, it is reported

¹⁶ Frederick W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), pp. 279 and 299.

¹⁷ Choong-sik Ahn, "Political Elite and Parliamentary Democracy in Thailand," unpublished Master's thesis, Columbia University, 1963, Appendix, Table-IX, p. 73.

¹⁸ Marshall R. Singer, The Emerging Elite: A Study of Political Leadership in Ceylon (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), Appendix-9A, p. 169.

that:

Many ambitious young men and women, finding themselves unable to enter the university channel in Japan, went abroad, and often to the United States, for their higher education. Unfortunately, their expectations were frustrated by the fact that oversea education was considered inferior to Japanese, and American university graduates were often treated in business and government at the same level as Semmongakko, rather than as university graduates.¹⁹

This "self-confidence" might be a reflection of the maturity of the indigenous system of higher education for training a leadership capable of governing modern Japan. The decrease of foreign-educated persons in the Japanese cabinets since 1910's seems to be an indication of such maturity.

So far, we have dealt with only those cabinet ministers who had completed their college-level education --i.e. the graduates. Were there any "college-drop-outs" among cabinet ministers? Of the total of 480 cabinet ministers circulated between 1918 and 1964, 5.8% went to universities or Semmongakko, but were not graduated from them. Among these cabinet ministers who had not finished their college-level education, "university-drop-outs" outnumbered "Semmongakko-drop-outs" by approximately three to one in proportion. Perhaps, this disparity might be a tendency common among the "college-drop-outs" at large in Japan, because the longer period required for completing the university education --3 years for Kotogakko plus 3 or 4 years for university-- would be more prone to bring

¹⁹ Herbert Passin's chapter on "Japan", in Education and Political Development, ed. James S. Coleman (Princeton, 1965), p. 280.

about drop-outs than the shorter period involved for the completion of the Semmon education. When we compare the proportions of "college-drop-outs" among cabinet ministers between the pre-war and the post-war periods, it shows an overall increase of the drop-outs among those who served in the post-war cabinets. The increase was especially conspicuous during Period-V. In this period, the percentage of the drop-outs among cabinet ministers stood at 9.1%, nearly three times the percentage shown in the preceding period. A probable reason for this increase might be similar to the one already offered in regard to the increase of secondary-school educated persons in the post-war cabinets --i.e. the changed career route to the cabinet posts in post-war Japan.

To sum up: a salient feature we could observe from the foregoing survey was the elitistic school-background in the composite character of the Japanese Cabinet Ministers. Nearly one out of every two persons who held a cabinet post in Japan between 1918 and 1964 was the graduate of the nation's "un-challengeable first", Tokyo University. Graduates from the equally prestigious military schools had constituted about one-fifth to one-quarter of the members of the Cabinet during the two pre-war periods. Graduates from the distinctively less prestigious schools such as private universities, foreign universities, and Semmongakko had a much smaller share in the Japanese Cabinet. It was especially so in the pre-war cabinets.

The combined total of these "non-elite-school graduates" amounted to less than one-fifth of the persons circulated in the pre-war cabinets. Among the members of the post-war cabinets, however, the proportion of these non-elite-school graduates increased by more than 10% points; while that of Tokyo University graduates remained more or less unchanged. This increased share of the non-elite-school graduates in the post-war cabinets was derived largely from the portion previously occupied by the military school graduates in the pre-war cabinets. During the two pre-war periods (Periods-III and -IV), the combined total of Tokyo University graduates and military school graduates stood at 65% to 74% among the members of the Cabinet; while that of private university graduates, foreign university graduates, and Semmon graduates stood at 18% to 19%. The ratio between these two combined groups was, therefore, roughly seven to two, on the average, among the members of the pre-war cabinets. The ratio changed to approximately four and a half to three among the members of the post-war cabinets as a result of the drastic decrease of military school graduates, and of the substantial increase of those who were graduated from private universities, foreign universities or Semmongakko. The composite characteristic of the post-war cabinets might be called less "elitistic" than that of the pre-war cabinets, because the share previously occupied by the elitistic military-school-graduates in the Cabinet was largely taken up by the graduates of "non-elite-schools". Because of this change, however, the composite

characteristic of the post-war cabinets came to show more diverse school-backgrounds than that of the pre-war cabinets.

What account for the persistent dominance of Tokyo University graduates in the Japanese Cabinet? Could it be their superior ability or better education? Some noted sociologists seem to suggest that the predominance of Tokyo University graduates in the elite strata of the Japanese society resulted not so much from their exceptional ability as from their "cliquishness". Professor Shimbori, for instance, maintained in his recent work that "Gakubatsu" (the cliquishness based on the same school-affiliation) had been, and still is, the most important determinant in the recruitment of personnel in business, industry, government, and the educational world in modern Japan; and through this cliquish practice, the "Todai-batsu" (the university-clique made of Tokyo University graduates) became predominant in the sphere of government and politics after the old "Han-cliques" faded out from the political scene toward the end of the Meiji era.²⁰ What is the nature of a "Gakubatsu"? A succinct explanation was furnished by Professor Passin as to the nature of "Gakubatsu" in general:

²⁰ Shimbori Michiya, Gakubatsu: Kono Nihontekina Mono (The School-Cliques: This Japanistic Feature) (Tokyo, 1969), esp. pp. 1-70.

The universities not only provided training and connections, but life time identification with a clique. These cliques, or Batsu as they are called, are intimate, informal groups based on personal loyalties that span many fields from the university into business, the professional world, government and politics. A person without a batsu faces Japanese society unsupported, with no one to sponsor him or help him in times of crisis. It is one's batsu that opens the closed doors. Characteristically, each batsu has its own sphere of influence, which it guards jealously against outsiders and opens only to its intimates. Universities form their own batsu, and even individual departments within the university may have batsu of their own.²¹

Although "Gakubatsu" seems to be a well-acknowledged part of the social system of Japan, how it actually operates at various stages of the recruitment and the promotion of personnel within the government is not altogether clear. According to Professor Shimbori, "a particular school had hegemony among the staff in certain offices or schools who exclude graduates of other universities irrespective of their ability. This is a subtle survival of feudalism amidst the rationalistic form of bureaucracy."²² Conceivably, "Gakubatsu" thus functions as a conscious determinant in the initial stage of recruiting young graduates from universities into the government bureaucracy. Also at the stages of promotion within the bureaucracy, it is imaginable that a junior civil servant might be promoted on the basis of favorable service ratings turned in by his seniors who were from his alma mater. To quote a complaint

²¹ Society and Education in Japan, p. 125.

²² Quoted in Passin, op. cit., p. 135.

made by a recent graduate of a private university:

As everyone knows, Chuo University students passing the judicial officer examination exceed those from Tokyo University by a wide margin, but when they become judicial officers, they find very few seniors from their alma mater. ... Soon after the war, a senior graduate of our own college managed to become under-secretary in the Construction Ministry, but even then he was about six or seven years behind the graduates of Tokyo University.²³

Perhaps, the predominance of Tokyo University graduates in the Japanese Cabinet might be the cumulative effect of such cliquishness and favoritism operating among the members of the "Todai-batsu" within the Japanese officialdom for a long period of time. However, this explanation is plausible only so far as the pre-war cabinets are concerned. Because, only under the pre-war system of government, it was possible for the career civil servants at the upper echelon of the bureaucracy (who were predominantly Tokyo University graduates, presumably) to move up regularly to the cabinet posts. Now that the parliamentary system under the post-war constitution requires the members of a cabinet to be selected from the popularly elected members of the Diet, it is difficult to imagine how the cliquish behavior based on the same university-affiliation could still be applied in the process of forming a party-based cabinet. (Although it is conceivable that the same cliquish behavior might still be a dominant modus operandi within the confines of the bureaucracy even under the post-war parliamentary system of government.) We shall give some more atten-

²³ Quoted in Passin, op. cit., p. 131.

tion to this topic when we investigate the career patterns of the cabinet ministers in a later chapter.


How different was the composition of the leaders of the Diet from that of the Cabinet Ministers in terms of their school-background? Were Tokyo University graduates equally predominant among them? Shown in TABLE-20 are various college-level institutions from which the leaders of the House of Representatives --the Speakers, the Vice-Speakers, and the Chairmen of the Standing Committees-- were graduated. The main differences between the leaders of the House and the Cabinet Ministers were figuratively illustrated in FIGURE-4. A striking feature we can notice in the figure is a diametrically opposed tendency in the composite characteristics of the two groups: Whereas Tokyo University graduates constituted 41% to 48% of the cabinet ministers of the four periods, and the graduates of private universities, foreign universities, and Semmongakko 18% to 31% of the same; the corresponding percentages among the leaders of the House were 18% to 27% for Tokyo University graduates, and 41% to 46% for the graduates of private universities, foreign universities, and Semmongakko. This contrasting feature between the Cabinet Ministers and the leaders of the House was much more pronounced in the pre-war periods than in the post-war periods. For instance, in Period-III (1918-1932) the ratio between Tokyo University graduates and the "non-elite-school graduates" among the leaders of the House was 18% to 46%, whereas that among the cabinet ministers was

TABLE-20: Kinds of College-level Institutions Graduated by the Leaders of the House of Representatives* 1918-1964.

Kind of college-level institution	PRE-WAR DIET			POST-WAR DIET			TOTAL PERIOD 1918-1964 %
	PERIOD-III 1918-1932 %	PERIOD-IV 1932-1947 %	PERIOD-V 1947-1952 %	PERIOD-VI 1952-1964 %	PERIOD 1918-1964 %		
Graduated from:							
Government Universities	17.6	31.9	24.6	32.7	27.4		
(Tokyo University)	(15.2)	(27.4)	(17.2)	(23.7)	(21.3)		
(Kyoto University)	(2.4)	(4.5)	(4.9)	(4.5)	(4.1)		
(Others)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(2.5)	(4.5)	(2.0)		
Private U. in Japan	8.0	17.0	26.2	28.8	20.8		
(Waseda or Keio U)	(4.8)	(9.6)	(8.2)	(8.5)	(7.9)		
(Others)	(3.2)	(7.4)	(18.0)	(20.3)	(12.9)		
Universities abroad	6.4	4.5	4.9	4.6	5.0		
(Europe or U.S.A.)	(6.4)	(4.5)	(4.9)	(4.0)	(4.8)		
(Others)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.6)	(0.2)		
All Universities:	32.0	53.4	55.7	66.1	53.2		
Graduated from:							
Semmon/Kotosemmon-gakko	31.2	22.2	11.5	7.4	17.0		
Military Cadet Schools	0.0	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.7		
All Semmon-level Inst.:	31.2	25.2	11.5	7.4	17.7		
Not graduated, but some education at:							
Universities	4.0	3.0	6.6	3.3	4.3		
Semmon/Kotosemmon-gakko	6.4	1.5	0.8	1.7	2.5		
All College-level Dropouts:	10.4	4.5	7.4	5.0	6.8		
No College-level education, or Unknown							
	26.4	17.0	25.4	21.6	22.4		
Total %	100.0	100.1	100.0	100.1	100.1		
Total Number	125	135	122	177	559		

* For the selection and the sources, see the notes for TABLE-14.

FIGURE-4: The School-Background of the Cabinet Ministers and the Leaders of the House of Representatives compared: 1918-1964.



46% to 19%, almost exactly the reverse ratio; in Period-VI (1952-1964) the ratio between Tokyo University graduates and the "non-elite-school graduates" changed to 24% to 41% among the leaders of the House, and 46% to 31% among the cabinet ministers. Thus, the stark contrast shown between the two groups in the pre-war period became somewhat blurred in the post-war period; indicating a tendency, though slight, of convergence of the two groups in their composite characters. The primary factor responsible for this convergence is the substantial increase of the "non-elite-school graduates" among the members of the post-war cabinets. This increase of "non-elite-school graduates" in the post-war cabinets is undoubtedly related to the post-war change in the main source of cabinet recruitment: a change from the upper echelon of the bureaucracy to the Diet.

PART III THE CAREER BACKGROUND

CHAPTER VI The Career Patterns and the Career Routes of the Pre-War Cabinet Ministers, 1885-1945.

It was suggested many times in the previous discourse that the political ascent to the Japanese Cabinet under the pre-war regime was accomplished primarily through the bureaucratic channel. It was also suggested that the preponderance of Tokyo University graduates among the members of pre-war cabinets after 1910's was a result of this bureaucratic channel of political ascent which had provided the former with a variety of headstarts, owing to the historical affinity and other ties established between the Japanese bureaucracy and Tokyo University. Specifically, what proportion of those entering the Japanese Cabinet during the pre-war period had gone through the bureaucratic channel of ascent? What other channels, if any, were available for those who had not associated themselves with the career civil service to reach a cabinet post under the pre-war regime? If the career civil service was a route predominantly followed by those from Tokyo University to reach a cabinet post, would it be an equally predominant career route among those cabinet ministers who were not from Tokyo University? Among those who had reached the Cabinet through the bureaucratic ladder, what specific routes were followed most frequently? Could we find any specific attribute characteristic to a group of cabinet ministers who had a similar pattern of career or a similar ascent route in the

bureaucracy? In the examination of the career backgrounds of the pre-war cabinet ministers that follows, attempts were made to answer these questions.

Those cabinet ministers serving prior to the Hara cabinet of 1918 and those serving after were treated separately, and the main emphasis was put on the latter in the treatment. A great majority of the "pre-1918 cabinet ministers" had started out their bureaucratic careers in the beginning of the Meiji period when the Japanese bureaucracy was in a state of organizational fluidity and the civil service system was not standardized. As a result, the series of posts held by most of the pre-1918 cabinet ministers on their way to the cabinet posts showed a high degree of inconsistencies and irregularities, which precluded a meaningful comparison of their different ascent routes within the bureaucracy in specific terms. For this reason, the treatment of the pre-1918 cabinet ministers was confined to a presentation of their career profiles by means of depicting several typologies without delving into specific details of the bureaucratic ascent routes followed by those who had a civil service career. For the cabinet ministers of 1918-1945, on the other hand, a close attention was paid to the specific bureaucratic routes followed by those who had a civil service career in order to establish and compare varying routes to the Cabinet among them.

We shall start with the career profiles of the pre-1918 cabinet ministers.

I. The Career Profiles: the Cabinet Ministers of 1885-1918.

From the first Ito cabinet of 1885 to the end of the Terauchi cabinet in September, 1918, all-told 105 individuals had served in the Japanese Cabinet. Of these 105, those who made their cabinet entry through the parliamentary channel (i.e. the House of Representatives) totalled only 9 --to list their names: Hoshi Toru, Hayashi Yuzo, Oishi Masami, Inukai Tsuyoshi, Ozaki Yukio, Matsuda Masahisa, Motoda Hajime, O-oka Ikuzo, and Minoura Katsundo. All other (96) made their first cabinet entry through the bureaucratic channel with no experience of serving in the House of Representatives (see TABLE-21). Even of the 9 who had entered the Cabinet via the Diet, 5 had served briefly in the early Meiji bureaucracy before embarking on their parliamentary careers. It meant that persons who had never associated themselves with the civil service career up to the time of their first cabinet entry numbered only 4 among the 105 cabinet ministers of 1885-1918.

Of the 96 persons who made their cabinet entry through the bureaucratic channel, 47 were Samurai who had entered the Meiji bureaucracy immediately after the Restoration with no modern-formal education. All of these "Samurai-bureaucrats" were born in the decade of 1840 or before, and they were in their twenties or thirties at the time of the Restoration. Although some of them had specialized in "western knowledge" under private tutors (e.g. Aoki Shuzo, Okuma Shigenobu) or

TABLE-21: The Career Background of the Japanese Cabinet Ministers, 1885-1918.

Career background (with educational difference)	Period served		Total	No. of persons serving between 1885 and 1918	
	1885-1906 N	%		1906-1918 N	%
BUREAUCRATIC CAREER:					
Samurai-bureaucrats with no modern-formal education	39*	61%	10	19%	49
Bureaucratic career with foreign schooling	11	17%	7	13%	18
(Civil)	(9)		(6)		(15)
(Military)	(2)		(1)		(3)
Bureaucratic career with higher education in Japan	4	6%	23	44%	27
(Civil)	(2)		(12)		(14)
(Military)	(2)		(11)		(13)
Bureaucratic career pre- ceded by professions	4	6%	7	13%	11
(Professor)	(3)		(3)		(6)
(Journalist)	(1)		(3)		(4)
(M. D.)	(0)		(1)		(1)
Sub-total	58	90%	47	89%	105
PREDOMINANTLY PARLIAMENTARY CAREER PRECEDED BY:					
(Lawyer)	6	9%	5	10%	11
(Journalist)	(1)*		(2)		(3)
(Gov't off.)	(3)*		(3)*		(6)
()	(2)		(0)		(2)
Total	64	99%	52	99%	116
					105
					101%

* Includes 2 Samurai-bureaucrats whose educational background is unknown.

* Includes those who had a sort career in government services before embarking on their professional careers.

had been abroad before entering the government service (e.g. Sano Tsunetami, Yoshikawa Akimasa), none of them had a formal training in European or American schools. They were the products of traditional fief schools (Hanko or Hangakuryo) or private tutorial academies (Shijuku or Sonjuku). In Han-origin, all but six of them were from the four historic Han of Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, and Hizen.

Within seven years of the Restoration, 9 of these "Samurai-bureaucrats" had reached the top-ranking posts of Sangi (councillor) and/or Kyo (head of ministry) in the pre-constitutional government of Meiji Japan. By the time the cabinet system was instituted in 1885, 8 others had reached the same level of posts. Thus, 17 out of the 47 "Samurai-bureaucrats" had held the equivalent of a ministerial post before the Cabinet came into being in Japan. Included among these 17 were all of those who held the Premiership between 1885 and 1901 (Ito, Yamagata, Matsukata, Okuma, and Kuroda) and most of those who became Genro. While most of these 17 men had started out their post-Restoration career as a prominent member of the central bureaucracy (e.g. Sanyo, Ho, or Hanji), the remainder of the "Samurai-bureaucrats" made their way up from relatively minor posts. Since the Meiji bureaucracy was in a nascent stage of development with organizational fluidity while they were serving in it, the series of posts held by these men on their way to the Cabinet were curious assortments of incongruities and oddities. In the first place, many of them held the military posts and the civil posts interchangeably. For example, Oura Kanetake

from Satsuma became a district chief (Ku-cho) of Tokyo Prefectural government at the age of 20 in 1868; from this post he was commissioned as an Army lieutenant, then to be retransferred to a civilian post as the head of the Politice Department in Osaka Prefectural government, and later to serve as a prefectural governor. Of those who had remained in the military posts, some served in the Army and the Navy interchangeably: Kabayama Sukenori from Satsuma was commissioned as an Army major in 1868 at the age of 21 after commanding a Satsuma detachment against the Tokugawa force in the Boshin war of 1868; after 13 years of service in various Army posts, he was promoted to the rank of Major General of Army at the age of 34; therefrom he was transferred to the Navy with the equivalent rank. The most interesting career history showing an amazingly varied series of posts crisscrossing the military, administrative, judicial, and legislative-consultative branches of government could be found in the case of Iwamura Michitoshi from Tosa. Starting out his official career in 1868 as the Superintendent of the Imperial Guard (Goshimpei Torishimari-yaku) at the age of 28, Iwamura had held the following series of major posts before his first cabinet appointment in 1889: Inspector of the Army (Gun-kan); Judgeship in the Hakodate Hearings Court; Hokkaido Colonial Officer; Fourth-Grade Officer in the Ministry of Engineering; Chief Judge of Yamaguchi District Court; Prefectural Governor of Kagoshima; Councillor in Genroin; Director of the Account-Auditing Agency; Chief of the Bureau of Pension; Chief of the Hokkaido Development Agency;

and the Vice-Minister of Agriculture and Commerce. A distinctive impression one could get from the investigation of the series of posts held by these "Samurai-bureaucrats" is that the functional specialization had not yet developed in the civil service while they were serving in the Meiji bureaucracy. As a result, a majority of these "Samurai-bureaucrats" had served in the government in the manner of a "jack-of-all-trades".

Of these who had entered the Cabinet through the bureaucratic channel, 15 had their schooling in Europe or in the United States. Some of these Western-educated men were Bakushin (Tokugawa officials) who were sent abroad to study by the Tokugawa authority before the Restoration (e.g. Enomoto Takeaki, Hayashi Tadasu). Some were sent abroad secretly by anti-Tokugawa Han before the Restoration in violation of the Tokugawa ban on emigration (e.g. Mori Arinori by Satsuma Han). Most were, however, sent abroad shortly after the Restoration as government-sponsored students or junior civil servants. Unlike the group of "Samurai-bureaucrats" with no modern schooling, this group of Western-educated bureaucrats were more often than not from the areas outside of the four historic Han (8 out of the 15).

All of these men with a European or American schooling had entered the Meiji bureaucracy within ten years of the Restoration, and had served continuously in non-elective government posts until they reached a cabinet post. The series of posts held by these men before reaching the Cabinet were some-

what more consistent and standardized than those held by a majority of the "Samurai-bureaucrats". First, diplomatic posts were predominant among the series of posts held by these Western-educated bureaucrats. For instance, 9 of them had served as Minister Plenipotentiary in various European countries; 11 of them had served in the Foreign Ministry one time or another before entering the Cabinet; and 5 of them held the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet (Saionji Kimmochi, Hayashi Tadasu, Komura Jutaro, Enomoto Takeaki, and Motoda Ichiro). Secondly, many of the men with a Western schooling had served in the Bureau of Legislation or in other related agencies for drafting laws during the early part of their careers (e.g. Sone Arasuke, Hachisuka Moriaki, Hirata Tosuke, Suematsu Kencho, Yamagata Isaburo, Makino Nobuaki). It seems that these Western-educated bureaucrats were assigned primarily to those posts in which their expertise on European languages, cultures and laws could be fully utilized. In this respect, they seemed to have performed the role of "specialists" in their bureaucratic services; while the majority of the "Samurai-bureaucrats" served the government as "generalists" or "jack-of-all-trades".

About one-quarter of those who had entered the Cabinet through the bureaucratic channel had been educated at Japan's own institutions of modern higher learning. Most of them were born in the 1860's, about one generation after the "Samurai-bureaucrats". As can be noted in TABLE-21, most of these

bureaucrats from modern schools of Japan had entered the Cabinet between 1906 and 1918, whereas most of the "Samurai-bureaucrats" had served in the Cabinet before 1906. The group of "Western-educated bureaucrats" was, as can be noticed in the same table, more or less an intermediary between these two different generations of bureaucrats.

Of this new generation of bureaucrats trained at modern schools of Japan, about one-half (11 out of 24) were the military officers who had entered the Cabinet as service ministers. Most of these military men belonged to the very first brood of career officers produced by the modern military schools of Japan. For instance, 4 of them were the members of the first graduating class of Rikugun Shikangakko (the Army Cadet School) or Kaigun Heigakko (the Naval Academy) --Uehara Yusaku, Ishimoto Shinroku, Kigoshi Yasutsuna, and Kato Tomosaburo; 3 others were graduated from Heigakuryo, the precursor of these military schools --Terauchi Masatake, Yamamoto Gombei, and Saito Makoto. As for the remainder of 13 who were not military men, all but three were educated at the Law Faculty of Tokyo University. All of the Tokyo University men were graduated from the university between 1881 and 1892 (between the first graduating class and the 11th), and all but one had joined the civil service in the same year of their graduation from the university. They were the harbingers of the Tokyo-University-trained bureaucrats who were to "flood" the Japanese Cabinet in a later period.

The series of posts held by these Tokyo University gradu-

ates on their way to the cabinet posts clearly showed that the civil service route became standardized and the service functions became specialized by the time they entered the civil service. For example, Sakata Yoshiro, who had entered the Ministry of Finance in 1884 (the year of his graduation from the university), held the following vertical line of posts within the ministry before his entry to the Cabinet in 1906 as the Minister of Finance: Intendant (Shukeikan); a section-chief in the Bureau of Paymaster; the Chief of the Bureau of Pasymaster (Shukeikyokuchō); the Chief of the Genral Affairs Bureau (Somukyokuchokan); and the Vice-Minister of Finance (Okurajikan). To sample one who had entered the Foreign Ministry: Ishii Kikujiro entered the Ministry in 1890 (the year of his graduation from the university) as a Foreign Service Officer Candidate (Kosaikan Shiho); thereafter, he held two consular posts, two Second-Class Secretary's posts, and one First-Class Secretary's post abroad before becoming a section-chief in the Ministry; from the section-chief's post, he was promoted to the Chief of the Bureau of Foreign Trades, then to the Ambassadorship in France; after 5 years of service in the ambassadorial post, Ishii entered the Cabinet in 1916 as the Foreign Minister. To sample another who had joined the juridical service: Matsumuro Itasu was appointed as a Practicing Judge (Hanji Ho) in the year of his graduation from the university (1884); starting from a district court, he worked up through all of the three tiers of courts and a

maritime court either as a judge or procurator until he reached the post of the Attorney General (Kenji Socho) in 1906; six years later, Matsumuro entered the Cabinet as the Minister of Justice via the directorship of the Administrative Tribunal (Gyoseisaibansho Chokan). In these examples, we could thus observe the inauguration of a new bureaucratic route to the Cabinet with a point of entry at the Law Faculty of Tokyo University in the 1910's. This route was to become, as we shall see later, the most common route being followed by a great majority of those entering the Japanese Cabinet after 1918.

Unlike the groups of cabinet ministers we have examined so far, a small number of persons (10) who entered the Cabinet between 1885 and 1918 had started out their career in the professional fields. At some point in their professional career, these men entered the government services, which eventually led them to the cabinet appointment. More than a majority of these "professional-turned bureaucrats" had been university professors before their entry to the government services, and mostly at Tokyo University (e.g. Kikuchi Dairoku, Kaneko Kentaro, Ichiki Kitokuro). Some had been engaged in the journalistic profession (e.g. Takada Sanae, Hara Kei, Komatsubara Eitaro). One had been a medical doctor (Goto Shimpei). Whatever their initial professions, all but one of them had entered the government services within ten years of the commencement of their professional career, and had served in the government

for more than ten years before they made their first cabinet entry. Thus, their careers prior to the cabinet entry were predominantly bureaucratic rather than professional. One possible exception from this was the career of Kikuchi Dairoku. Educated at Cambridge University, Kikuchi became a professor of mathematic at Tokyo University in 1877 (the year of the founding of the university); as a renowned scholar and educator, he was appointed to the House of Peers as Chokusen Giin (Imperial Appointee) in 1890; four years later, he was given a post in the Ministry of Education as the Chief of the Higher Education Bureau, then as the Vice-Minister of Education; in 1901, Kikuchi entered the Cabinet as the Minister of Education via the Chancellorship of Tokyo University. These "professional-turned bureaucrats" were, in terms of generation, an intermediary between the "Samurai-bureaucrats" and those Tokyo-University-trained bureaucrats emerging then in the Cabinet. All but one of them were born between the mid-1850's and the early 1860's. In educational background, they were either the products of European or American universities or that of the early modern schools of Japan which antedated the founding of Tokyo University (e.g. Keio Gijuku, Justice Ministry's Law School, Sukagawa I-gakko).

As mentioned earlier, there were only 9 persons who had entered the Cabinet via the House of Representatives among the 105 cabinet ministers of 1885-1918. A conspicuous feature to be noted among these men is the fact that they were mostly

the "charter members" of the Japanese Diet: All but two of the nine were elected to the House of Representatives in the very year of the inauguration of the House (1890). Also, most of them had an impressive veteran record in their parliamentary careers: All but one of the nine had a record of consecutive election to the House at the time of their first cabinet entry; six were elected to the House more than 10 times in their lives; and three more than 20 times (Ozaki, Inukai and Motoda). Before embarking on their parliamentary careers, four of the nine had been engaged in a journalistic profession; three had been practicing law; and the other two had been in the civil service (prior to the establishment of the Diet). Although some of those who were pursuing the journalistic or legal professions at the time of their election to the House had had an association with the non-elective government services in their early careers (e.g. Matsuda, Hoshi), none of them had a prolonged career in the regular civil service.

If we look into the specific cabinets which these nine men were first recruited into, it shows that more than a majority of them made their first cabinet entry to the short-lived Okuma cabinet of 1898, which was the first "quasi-party-cabinet" formed in the Japanese history by the principal challengers of the Sat-Cho oligarchy (Okuma Shigenobu and Itagaki Taisuke) by enlisting the support of the growing opposition forces in the

Diet.¹ Thus, the small group of men who had entered the Japanese Cabinet through the parliamentary channel prior to 1918 was largely composed of those who had aligned themselves with the dissident members of the original Meiji oligarchy in the latter's attempt to unseat the Sat-Cho clique from power.

¹ For the formation of this "quasi-party-cabinet" and the political settings behind it, see Robert A. Scalapino, Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1962), pp. 146-199.

II. The Career Patterns and the Career Routes: The Cabinet Ministers of 1918-1945.

While the careers of the 105 persons who had entered the Japanese Cabinet between 1885 and 1918 fell mostly into the three broad patterns --(1) a bureaucratic career, (2) a bureaucratic career preceded by a professional career, (3) a parliamentary career preceded by a professional career, the career patterns of those entering the Cabinet between 1918 and 1945 were somewhat more varied. From the Hara cabinet of September, 1918 to the end of the Suzuki cabinet in August, 1945, all-told 189 persons had served in the Japanese Cabinet. From the investigation of the careers of these 189 persons, eight broad patterns could be established. They were labelled as: (1) "Pure Bureaucratic Career"; (2) "Bureaucratic-to-Parliamentary Career"; (3) "Bureaucratic-to-Business Career"; (4) "Professional-to-Bureaucratic Career"; (5) "Professional-to-Parliamentary Career"; (6) "Business-to-Parliamentary Career"; (7) "Professional or Business Career"; and (8) "Hereditary Peer Members of the Diet".² The percentages occupied by those

² In establishing these career patterns, some methodological problems had to be resolved. Of the 189 cases, about 8% did not fit exactly into one of the eight main patterns established above. Most of these "deviatory cases" were due to the peripheral line(s) of occupation one had held during a relatively short period of transition (e.g. less than three years) between the main lines of his career. To avoid superfluous complexity, these "deviatory cases" were classified into the closest one of the eight main patterns, rather than establishing separate patterns for them. The following is an example: Tanaka Ryuzo entered the Ministry of Agriculture and

belonging to each of these eight patterns of career are shown in TABLE-22. We shall discuss each of the patterns in some detail in the following.

(1) "Pure Bureaucratic Career".

Of the 189 persons who had entered the Japanese Cabinet between 1918 and 1945, 113 or 59.8% had started out their career as civil servants and had remained in the non-elective government posts until the time of their first appointment to a cabinet post. There was no interruption in the bureaucratic careers of these men until they had served their first cabinet post. This pattern of career was labelled, for the lack of a better terminology, as "Pure Bureaucratic Career". This category includes those who served in the military agencies (i.e. Army and Naval officers), the juridical agencies (i.e. judges and procurators), as well as the administrative agencies of the pre-war government. Of the 113 "pure bureaucrats" singled out from the pre-war cabinet ministers, 43 were military officers, 10 juridical officials, and 60 administrative officials. We shall treat these sub-groups separately.

Commerce in the year of his graduation from Tokyo University (1889); thereafter, he served in various civil service posts until 1910 when he resigned from the post of the Vice-Minister of Agriculture and Commerce. From 1910, Tanaka set out to practice law while holding at the same time several executive posts in private corporations, until he was elected to the House of Representatives in 1912. After 17 years of service in the House, Tanaka entered the Hamaguchi cabinet in 1929. Tanaka's career was classified into the "Bureaucratic-to-Parliamentary Career", rather than establishing a "bureaucratic-to-professional-to-parliamentary career" for this case.

TABLE-22: The Career Patterns of the Pre-War Cabinet Ministers: 1918-1945.

<u>Career Pattern</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent.</u>
BUREAUCRATIC CAREER:		
Pure Bureaucratic	113	59.8%
Bureaucratic-to-Parliamentary*	14	7.4%
Bureaucratic-to-Business	6	3.2%
Professional-to-Bureaucratic	8	4.2%
<u>Sub-total</u>	<u>141</u>	<u>74.6%</u>
NON-BUREAUCRATIC CAREER:		
Professional-to-Parliamentary*	19	10.1%
Business-to-Parliamentary*	11	5.8%
Professional or Business	11	5.8%
Hereditary Peer Members of Diet	7	3.7%
<u>Sub-total</u>	<u>48</u>	<u>25.4%</u>
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>189</u>	<u>100.0%</u>

* "Parliamentary" in this case indicates only the House of Representatives.

(A) Administrative Officials:

First, looking into the background of the 60 persons who had reached their first cabinet post through the administrative services, one is struck with the amazing homogeneity in their school-background. As shown in TABLE-23, of the 60 pure bureaucrats with the background of administrative services, all but 8 were the graduates of Tokyo Imperial University. Included in the 8 exceptions were 4 non-college-graduates. Among the college-graduates alone, therefore, those who did not belong to the alumni of Tokyo University numbered only 4. Even more surprising is the fact that, of these bureaucrats from Tokyo University, all but two were graduates from the university's Law Faculty. Thus, one is almost tempted to say that those who reached a cabinet post through an uninterrupted career in the administrative services were "invariably" from the Law Faculty of Tokyo University.

Of these 60 pure bureaucrats, their passage in the Higher Civil Service Examination (Kotobunkan Shiken) or the Foreign Service Entrance Examination (Gaikokan oyobi Ryojikan Toyoshiken) was ascertainable in 26 cases. There is a strong probability, however, that the actual number of the persons who did pass either of these examinations is much higher than the number ascertained, because the civil service posts held by most of these 60 men within a period of a few years after their graduation from universities were the upper-grade services belonging to the officials of the Soninkan rank, the attainment

TABLE-23: The School-background of the Pre-War Japanese Cabinet Ministers with "Pure Bureaucratic Career": 1918-1945.

School-background	Administ. officials		Judicial officials		Military officers		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Tokyo University Graduate:	52	87%	7	70%	2	5%	61	54%
(Faculty of Law)	(50)		(7)		(0)		(57)	
(Faculty of Letter)	(1)		(0)		(0)		(1)	
(Faculty of Engineering)	(1)		(0)		(1)		(2)	
(Faculty of Medicine)	(0)		(0)		(1)		(1)	
Kyoto University Graduate	1	2%	1	10%	0	0%	2	2%
Army Cadet School Graduate	0	0%	0	0%	21	49%	21	19%
Naval Academy Graduate	0	0%	0	0%	20	46%	20	18%
Other College-level Graduate	3	4%	2	20%	0	0%	5	4%
Non-College-Graduate*	4	7%	0	0%	0	0%	4	3%
Total ¹	60	100%	10	100%	43	100%	113	100%

* Includes college-dropouts.

of which usually required the passage in a higher civil service examination. Only a handful (3 persons) among the 60 had started out their government services from lower posts, and they were invariably the men of the pre-Restoration generation who began their career in government in a very early part of the Meiji period. Typical of these was Kiyoura Keigo, who had started out from a 14th grade clerical post in 1873 to become Minister of Justice and Prime Minister.

As for the government ministries and agencies in which these 60 bureaucrats had first entered, most frequent ones were the Ministries of Home Affairs, Finance, and Foreign Affairs; 17 had entered the Home Ministry; 15 each the Finance Ministry and the Foreign Ministry; 5 the Agriculture-Commerce; 3 the Communication; 2 the Education; 2 Government Corporations (the Bank of Japan and the Southern Manchurian Railway); and 1 the Cabinet Secretariat. Hence, more than three-quarters (78%) of those who had reached cabinet posts through the administrative services had started out in the Home, Finance, and Foreign Ministries (see TABLE-24). Various routes taken by these 60 to reach their first cabinet post could be classified into three main types. The first type might be called a "straight-route"; the second a "sidetrack-route"; and the third a "via-House-of-Peers-route".

Falling under the first type are those who had reached their first cabinet post through steady promotions within the same ministry they had first entered in up to the Minister's

TABLE-24: The Career Description of 60 Pre-War Cabinet Ministers; the "Pure Bureaucrats" in Administrative Services, 1918-1945.

Description of Career	Fin- For- Other Other					Total
	Home	ance	eign	Mins.	Agen.	
	N	N	N	N	N	N
1) Ministry of 1st entrance	17	15	15	10	3	60
2) Continuous service in (1) through Minister's post	2	4	8	0	-	14
3) Reached 1st cabinet post via other Min. or Agen., but not (4)	5	5	5	6	2	23
4) Reached 1st cabinet post via House of Peers*	10	6	2	4	1	23

Details of Line (3)

5) Held Vice-Minister's post at:

(1)	2	1	1	4	-	8
Only other than (1)	1	0	1	0	0	2
None	2	4	3	2	2	13
<u>Total</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>23</u>

Details of Line (4)

6) Post held when appointed to the House of Peers:

Vice-Minister in (1)	4	3	0	2	-	9
Other high post in (1)	2	1	2	0	0	5
Others**	4	2	0	2	1	9
<u>Total</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>23</u>

7) Between the appointment to H.P. and to 1st cabinet post:

With intervening post(s)	5	2	1	2	1	11
Without	5	4	1	2	0	12
<u>Total</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>23</u>

* Refers to the appointive seats (i.e. the Imperial Appointee).

** Include the Secretary-General of the Cabinet, the Director of the Legislative Bureau, the ranking offices in the Colonial Administration, the Directorate of Government Corporations, and the Vice-Minister in the ministries other than one's first entry.

post. To illustrate with a typical example: Kaya Okinori. Kaya's career was as follows: entered the Ministry of Finance in 1917 after passing the Higher Civil Service Examination; from 1917 to 1932, Okura Shokikan (administrative officer of finance) assigned to the Budget Section (Shukeika) of the Budget Bureau (Shukaikyoku), promoted to chief of the section, then transferred to be Chief of the Budget Settlement Section (Yosankessanka) of the Bureau; in 1933 promoted to Chief of the Budget Bureau; in 1935 transferred to be Chief of the Finance Bureau (Rizaikyoku); in 1936 promoted to Vice-Minister of Finance (Okurajikan); in 1937 appointed Minister of Finance. Or take Sato Naotake's career: entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1905 after passing the Foreign Service Entrance Examination; from 1905 to 1907, Gaikokan Ho (Foreign Service Officer Candidate) assigned to the Ministry; from 1907 to 1926, served as Third Secretary of the Embassy in Russia, Consul in Harbin, a section-chief in the Bureau of Treaties in the Ministry, First Secretary of the Legation in Switzerland, First Secretary of the Embassy in France, Charge de'Affaires in France; from 1926 to 1937, Minister to Poland, Chief Delegate to the League of Nations, Ambassador to Belgium, Ambassador to France; in 1937 appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. Of the 60 who had entered administrative services, 14 or 23% had reached their first cabinet post in this manner; and this "straight-route" was found most frequently among those who had entered the Foreign Ministry, and somewhat less frequently

among those who had entered the Finance Ministry or the Home Ministry. There was no one who reached the first cabinet post through this "straight-route" among those who had entered Ministries other than the Foreign, the Finance, and the Home (see the same table).

Those who had taken a "sidetrack-route" veered away from the ministries of their first entry either at a relatively early phase of their career or at a point which was within a short reach of the Minister's post. Some had returned to the original ministries of their entry to hold the Minister's post, while others arrived at the Minister's post in ministries other than the original ones. There were numerous variations in this route, but the following cases typify this route. Tanabe Harumichi: entered the Ministry of Communication (Teishin Sho) in 1906; from 1906 to 1924, Teishinsho Shokikan (administrative officer in the Communication Ministry), promoted to the Chief of the Postal Insurance Division (Kan-I Hokenbuchō) of the Bureau of the Postal Savings and Exchange (Kawase Chokinkyoku) in 1924; in 1927 transferred to the Ministry of Home Affairs and appointed the governor (Chiji) of Osaka Prefecture; in 1933 appointed a State Councillor (Sangi) of the Manchukuo State Council; in 1939 appointed Minister of Communications. Hirose Hisatada: entered the Home Ministry in 1914 after passing the Higher Civil Service Examination; from 1914 to 1937, served in two section-chief posts, two prefectural governorships, and two bureau-chief posts of the Ministry; in 1937 (June) promoted to Vice-Minister of Home Affairs (Naimujikan);

in the same year (December) appointed the Vice-Minister of Welfare (Koseijikan); in 1939 appointed the Minister of Welfare. Those who followed these "sidetrack-routes" were found in 23 cases (38%) out of the 60 persons who reached their first cabinet posts through the administrative services; and these "sidetrackers" were found less often among those who had entered the Home, Finance, or Foreign Ministry than those who had entered other ministries (see TABLE-24).

Falling under the third type of career route were those who arrived at their first cabinet posts via the House of Peers. Of the 60 who had entered the administrative services, 23 (38%) were appointed to the House of Peers (i.e. the Imperial Appointees) before reaching their first cabinet posts. Up to the time of their appointment to the House of Peers, the careers of these men were not different from the other two types (save that they had not yet reached a Minister's post). As shown in TABLE-24, Line-6, a majority (14) among the 23 were appointed to the House when they were holding the post of Vice-Minister or other equally high posts³ at the ministries of their original entry through continuous service and steady promotions there (hence, a route similar to the first type up to that point); the rest (9) had veered away from the ministries of their first entry and came to hold high posts in other ministries or agencies, from which they

³ Such as the Superintendent-General of the Metropolitan Police Board (Keishi Sokan) in the Home Ministry and Ambassadorship in the Foreign Ministry.

were appointed to the House of Peers (a route similar to the second type up to that point). The posts that the latter were holding at the time of their appointment to the House included the Vice-Ministership, the Secretary-General-ship of the Cabinet (Naikaku Shokikancho), the Chief of the Legislative Bureau (Hoseikyoku Chokan), the ranking offices in the colonial administration, and the directorates of government corporations. Subsequent to their appointment to the House of Peers, 11 of the 23 appointees had continued to circulate in various posts (concurrently with their service in the House) before arriving at their first cabinet posts; while the remainder of 12 had no intervening post in between (see the same table, line-7). In the latter cases, there was usually (but not always) an interval between the post that one held at the time of his appointment to the House and his first cabinet post, during which he was holding no other governmental post than the appointive post in the House of Peers. This interval lasted, on the average, for less than five years, but in a few exceptional cases it was as long as ten years. The following cases are some examples: Goto Fumio was appointed to the House of Peers in December, 1930, when he was serving as the Chief of the General Affairs Bureau in the Governor-General's Office in Formosa; his service in this post was terminated shortly after the appointment to the House; thereafter, he served only as an Imperial Appointee to the House of Peers until his appointment to the post of Minister of Agriculture

and Commerce in July, 1932. In this case, the interval had lasted for less than 17 months. On the other hand: Yamano-uchi Kazutsugu was appointed to the House of Peers in March, 1914, when he was serving as the Secretary-General of the Cabinet Secretariat, from which he was relieved in April of the same year, thereafter holding only the appointive post in the House until he was appointed to his first cabinet post (Minister of Railways) in September, 1923. The interval, in this case, was 9 years and 6 months.

How many years did it take for the "pure bureaucrats" to reach their first cabinet posts from the time of their entry into the civil service? Were there any differences in the required length of time according to the different routes one had followed? Data in TABLE-25 provide an answer to these questions. The average length of time required by those who had followed the "straight-route" to reach a cabinet post was 28 years; and the same number of years were required, on the average, also by those who had followed the "sidetrack-route". This similarity on the average length conceals, however, some important differences in particular configurations between the two groups: As can be seen in the table, of the 14 who had followed the straight-route, 6 or 43% had required 26 to 30 years to reach their cabinet posts; the remainder of 8 were equally divided between those who had required 20 to 25 years and those who had required 31 to 35 years (29% each). The percentage distribution in these cases thus showed a heaviest

TABLE-25: The Length of Service in Government up to the First Cabinet Post, the "Pure Bureaucrats" in Administrative Services: 1918-1945.

	Years needed from the entry to the civil service to the 1st cabinet post						Total	Ave- rage YRS. YR.	Med- ian YRS. YR.
	Less than 20 (%)	20-25 (%)	26-30 (%)	31-35 (%)	36-40 (%)	More than 40 (%)			
Different route to the 1st cabinet post	N	N	N	N	N	N			
Continuous service in the ministry of 1st entry to the Minister's post	0	4	6	4	0	0	14 (101%)	28	28
Served in more than 1 Min. (Agen.), but not in H. of Peers* before the 1st Minister's post	1 (4%)	9 (39%)	3 (13%)	8 (35%)	2 (9%)	0	23 (100%)	28	27
Served in the House of Peers* before the 1st Minister's post	0	4	5	8	4	2	23 (100%)	30	34
Total	1 (2%)	17 (28%)	14 (23%)	20 (33%)	6 (10%)	2 (3%)	60 (99%)		

* Refers to the appointive seats (i.e. Imperial Appointees).

concentration on the 26-30 years range. For those who had followed the sidetrack-route, on the other hand, the percentage distribution showed an inversion from the former. The proportion of those who had required 26 to 30 years to reach a cabinet post was relatively small among the 23 "sidetrackers", totalling 13% (3); while a much higher percentage was registered both at the 20-25 years range and the 31-35 years range. 39% (9) of the "sidetrackers" had required 20 to 25 years to reach their first cabinet posts; and 35% (8) had required 31 to 35 years. Indicative of these evidences was a general tendency that a "sidetracker" was apt to reach a cabinet post either much faster or much slower than the one who had followed the straight-route. There was other evidence reaffirming this tendency; among those who had followed the straight-route, there was no one who had reached a cabinet post within less than 20 years of one's entry into the civil service; nor was there anyone who had required more than 35 years to reach a cabinet post. In contrast, of those who had followed the sidetrack-route, one (4%) had reached a cabinet post within less than 20 years of his entry into the civil service, and two (9%) had required 36 to 40 years to reach their first cabinet posts. It thus appears that the sidetrack-route could be either a short-cut to the cabinet posts or a detour to them, in comparison with the straight-route.

Those who had followed a "via-House-of-Peers-route" had required an average of 30 years to reach their first cabinet

posts, which was two years longer than the average length of time required by those who had followed a straight-route or a sidetrack-route. Among the latter, as we have just seen, it was rather unusual to find one who took more than 35 years to reach his first cabinet post. This was not the case, however, among those who had followed the "via-House-of-Peers-route". Of the 23 bureaucrats who had taken this route, 17% (4) had required 36 to 40 years, and 9% (2) more than 40 years, to reach their first cabinet posts from the time of their entry into the civil service. A similar tendency for tardiness in reaching a cabinet post among those who had taken the via-House-of-Peers-route could be found in some other evidences as well. For instance, those who had reached their first cabinet posts within 25 years of their entry into the civil service totalled 29% among those who had taken the straight-route, and 43% among those who had taken the sidetrack-route; compared to these, the corresponding figure among those who had taken the via-House-of-Peers-route was only 17%. As noted earlier, a majority of those bureaucrats who had taken the via-House-of-Peers-route had to "wait" for a certain length of time in the House before being appointed to their first cabinet posts. It was this "waiting period" that had resulted in the general tendency for tardiness in reaching a cabinet post among these bureaucrats.

In connection with the recruitment of pre-war cabinet ministers, the House of Peers seems to have served many interesting functions. In the first place, the very practice

of sending those career bureaucrats who had been promoted to the rank of Vice-Minister or other equivalent rank from various government ministries and agencies into the House of Peers as Imperial Appointees built the House into a central reservoir of top ranking bureaucrats from which the members of the "transcendental cabinets" of pre-war Japan could be recruited with a wide range of choices. In this regard, the House of Peers had been a rich storage house of "ministerial timber" suited for manning a non-party cabinet. Secondly, the House of Peers seems to have served as a political training ground for potential cabinet ministers. For those career bureaucrats who had reached their cabinet posts via the House of Peers, their service in the House as Imperial Appointees was the only parliamentary experience they had acquired before entering a cabinet. Although it was not a requisite for a member of a pre-war cabinet to hold membership in the Diet, it would have been certainly desirable for him to have some parliamentary experience even under the transcendentalism of pre-war politics. Such needed experience in parliamentary politics was provided to those career bureaucrats while they were serving in the House of Peers as Imperial Appointees prior to assuming their cabinet posts. Thirdly, the House of Peers seems to have served as an "anteroom" for many ex-Ministers to await an opportunity to re-enter a new cabinet. Of the 37 bureaucrats who had reached their first cabinet posts either through the straight-route or the sidetrack-route, 19 were appointed to

the House of Peers either during or after their service in the first cabinet posts; of these 19, 13 made re-entry into a different cabinet(s) after an interval(s). Likewise, of the 23 bureaucrats who had reached their first cabinet posts via the House of Peers, 9 had re-entered a different cabinet(s) after an interval(s). In all, 22 out of the 60 pure bureaucrats thus served in the House of Peers during the interval between their first cabinet posts and their subsequent cabinet posts. The continuance of service in the House of Peers by these men after the termination of their first cabinet appointment was probably an important factor contributing to their re-emergence in later cabinets. For, the House of Peers being the main assemblage of top officials and influential personages in the political establishment of pre-war Japan, it would have been expedient for an ex-Minister serving in the House to muster whatever political resources and connections necessary for opening his chance of entering another transcendental cabinet. All in all, the House of Peers thus appears to have palyed a variety of supportive functions needed for the making and remaking of a bureaucratic non-party cabinet in pre-war Japan.

(B) Juridical Officials:

Of the total of 113 "pure bureaucrats" represented among the pre-war cabinet ministers, 10 had reached their cabinet posts through juridical services. As was the case among those who had reached the cabinet posts through administrative services, the graduates of the Law Faculty of Tokyo University were preponderant also among this group: 7 were graduated from the Law Faculty of Tokyo University, 1 from the Law Faculty of Kyoto University, and 2 from Semmongakko specializing in law (see TABLE-23). Measured in terms of percentage, however, the share of Tokyo University graduates among this group was somewhat smaller (70%) than that among the 60 officials who had reached cabinet posts through the administrative services (87%).

Passage in the Higher Civil Service Examination or the Juridical Officer's Entrance Examination (Hankenji Toyoshiken) was ascertainable in 4 out of the 10 cases. However, the fact that all of the ten were appointed to a judgeship or a post of public prosecutor within three years of their graduation from universities or semmongakko suggests a likelihood that all had passed some qualifying examination of one kind or another prior to their appointment as juridical officials.

Initially, 7 out of the 10 had entered the service as public prosecutor (kenji) at the level of the District Court, and the other three as judge at the same level. Of the latter, two had transferred to the line of public prosecutor's service

later, and remained in that line until they reached their first cabinet posts. Of the 7 who had started out as public prosecutor, two had likewise transferred to a judgeship; but, in these cases, both had returned later to the original line. Thus, those who had served in the line of public prosecutor were definitely dominant among the 10 juridical officials who became cabinet ministers. Only one out of the 10 had reached his cabinet post by serving exclusively in the judgeship.

Most of these juridical officials moved up along the three tiers of courts, from the District Courts (or their branches) to the Appellate Courts (Kosoin), then to the Highest Court (Daishinin). Typologically, the following is the most representative case: Koyama Matsukichi; appointed as the Practicing Juridical Officer (Shihokan Shiho) in 1894 after passing the Juridical Officer's Entrance Examination (1893); in 1896 appointed as Public Prosecutor at Kumamoto District Court, thereafter served in the same capacity at Nagasaki and Tokyo District Courts; in 1901 transferred to the Judgeship at Nagasaki District Court, then promoted to the Appellate Judgeship at Nagasaki Appellate Court; in 1906 re-transferred to Public Prosecutor assigned to Tokyo Appellate Court, and later promoted to the Chief Public Prosecutor (Kenjicho) of Nagasaki Appellate Court; in 1917 appointed as the Public Prosecutor of the Highest Court (Daishinin Kenji); in 1924 appointed as the Public-Prosecutor-General (Kenji Socho); in 1932 appointed as

the Minister of Justice. There were two cases of deviation from the above pattern: these skipped the service at the Appellate Court level, and served instead in administrative posts in the Ministry of Justice as Section-Chief, Bureau-Chief, and/or Vice-Minister; but, returning to the juridical services at the Highest Court after serving in these administrative posts.

The most common post from which these juridical officials had entered a cabinet was the Public-Prosecutor-General. Five held this post immediately before their entrance to a cabinet. Two others had held the same post prior to, but not immediately before, entering a cabinet; in these instances, both held an intervening post of Head of the Highest Court (Daishinincho) between the Public-Prosecutor-General and the cabinet post. All of the 10 juridical officials held the portfolio of Justice in their first cabinet appointment; 6 had remained in the same portfolio throughout their entire cabinet career (2 had served in more than one cabinet), while 4 others held portfolios other than Justice at their second and/or third cabinet entry. In the latter cases, the portfolio of Home Affairs was most frequent. Three out of the four held the portfolio of Home Affairs as their second or third cabinet post.

While it was very frequent among those who had entered the administrative services to reach a cabinet post via the House of Peers, the same was not the case with the juridical

officials. Only one among the 10 juridical officials had been appointed to the House of Peers before entering a cabinet; and this one, unlike most of the juridical officials, had held some high administrative posts (Bureau-Chief and Vice-Minister in the Ministry of Justice) in an intervening period between his juridical services at the District Courts and at the Highest Court (one of the two "deviatory cases" referred to earlier). In spite of the fact that the "via-House-of-Peers-route" was not a common route followed by the juridical officials, the average length of time required by these officials to reach their cabinet posts was considerably longer than the average length required by the 60 officials who had reached cabinet posts through the administrative services. It was even longer than the average length of time required by those 23 who had taken the "via-House-of-Peers-route", the "tardiest group" among the 60 administrative officials. Eight out of the 10 juridical officials had required 31 to 35 years to reach their first cabinet posts from the time of their entry into the juridical services; as for the rest, one took 37 years and the other 39 years. The average length of time among the 10 comes out at 33 years, which was 5 years longer than the average among those who had taken the "straight-route" or the "sidetrack-route"; and 3 years longer than the one among those who had taken the "via-House-of-Peers-route".

While it was rare to find one who had served in the House of Peers before entering a cabinet among the juridical officials,

most of these officials did serve in the House after the termination of their cabinet appointment. Six were appointed to the House of Peers as Imperial Appointees after termination of their first cabinet appointment, and another after the termination of his second consecutive cabinet appointment. Of the six, two had re-entered new cabinets after a period of "waiting" in the House. The House of Peers thus served as an "anteroom" also for some of the juridical officials.

(C) Military Officers:

Forty three of the pre-war cabinet ministers with a "pure bureaucratic career" were military officers. All but two of them were professional soldiers by training: 21 were graduated from the Army Cadet School (Rikugun Shikangakko) and 20 from the Naval Academy (Kaigun Heigakko). The two exceptions were a medical doctor and an engineer, both trained at Tokyo University; each had entered the Army and the Navy as a Military Surgeon and a Naval Engineer respectively right after his graduation from the university, and served in that line until he reached a cabinet post (see TABLE-23). All of the 43 military men entered their first cabinet posts when they were holding the rank of Lieutenant General or Vice Admiral, or above.

The pre-war practice of appointing the Ministers of Army and Navy from the generals and admirals in the active list was explained earlier. Although it was primarily because of this practice that a large number of military men had entered the pre-war cabinets, not all of the military men represented in the pre-war cabinets had served exclusively in the portfolios of Army and Navy. As shown in TABLE-26, of the 43 military men who entered the pre-war cabinets since 1918, only 20 had served exclusively in the portfolio of Army or Navy; 9 others had served initially in the portfolio of Army or Navy in the cabinets they had entered first, but later served in other portfolios as well in other cabinets; the rest (14) had served only in those portfolios other than Army or Navy. The kinds

TABLE-26: The Kinds of Portfolios held by 43 Military Officers in the Pre-War Cabinets: 1918-1945.

Portfolio(s) held in cabinets	Army	Naval	Total
	officer	officer	
	N	N	N
Only the Army or Navy	10	10	20
Initially the Army or Navy, then others later	5	4	9
Initially those other than the Army or Navy, then the Army or Navy later	0	0	0
Only those other than the Army or Navy	7	7	14
Total	22	21	43

TABLE-27: The Period of the First Cabinet Entrance and the Kinds of Portfolios held by 43 Military Officers: 1918-1945.

Portfolio(s) held in cabinets	Period of 1st cabinet entry			Total
	Before			
	1918	1918-31	1932-45	
	N	N	N	N
Only the Army or Navy	0	7	13	20
(Army officers)		(3)	(7)	(10)
(Naval officers)		(4)	(6)	(10)
Initially the Army or Navy, then others later	3	4	2	9
(Army officers)	(0)	(3)	(2)	(5)
(Naval officers)	(3)	(1)	(0)	(4)
Only those other than the Army or Navy	0	1	13	14
(Army officers)		(1)	(6)	(7)
(Naval officers)		(0)	(7)	(7)
Total	3	12	28	43
(Army officers)	(0)	(7)	(15)	(22)
(Naval officers)	(3)	(5)	(13)	(21)

of portfolios held by these military men were definitely related to different periods in which they had entered the Cabinet. As shown in TABLE-27, of the total of 15 military men who had first entered the Cabinet prior to 1932, all but one had held either exclusively the portfolio of Army or Navy from the first to the last cabinets they served in, or initially the portfolio of Army or Navy in the cabinet they had first entered, then other portfolios in later cabinets. Prior to 1932, military men thus entered the Cabinet in the first instance only as the Minister of Army or Navy; but once they had served in these posts, they later re-entered a cabinet with non-military portfolios. The same was not the case, however, during the period between 1932 and 1945, a period characterized by the military domination of Japanese politics. Of the total of 28 military men who had entered the Cabinet for the first time between 1932 and 1945, nearly one-half had held non-military portfolios in the very first cabinet they entered, and remained in the non-military portfolios throughout their cabinet careers. Thus, military men penetrated into, as well as, proliferated in, the "civilian compartment" of a cabinet during the era of the military ascendancy.

Of the 43 men who had reached the cabinet posts through the military services, 29 or 67% were graduated from the Army or Naval War College, the highest military schools in pre-war Japan. Since the establishment of the Army War College (Rikugun Daigaku) in 1883 and the Naval War College (Kaigun Daigaku)

in 1888, about fifty entrants to each of these staff colleges were selected annually from the promising career officers with some field experience on the basis of the recommendations made by their superior officers and two rounds of competitive examinations.⁴ Graduation from these staff colleges meant, therefore, not only the attainment of the highest professional training that the officers of the Imperial Army and Navy could vouch for, but also a hallmark of excellence as professional soldiers. As indicated in TABLE-28, War College graduates were represented more heavily in the army group of those military men who had entered the pre-war cabinets than in the navy group: Of the 22 men from the Army, 18 or 82% were graduated from the Army War College; whereas graduates from the Naval War College totalled 11 or 52% among the 21 men from the Navy. In this respect, the army group was a more "select" group than its counterpart from the Navy.

While these naval officers who served in the pre-war cabinets were less often from the "select group" of War College graduates than their army counterparts, they seemed to have had more "cosmopolitan" experience in their career than the latter. More than half of the naval officers (13 out of the 21) had served as the Naval Attache to the Japanese Embassies in Europe

⁴ Roger F. Hackett, "The Military", in Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, ed. Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (Princeton, 1964), p. 337.

TABLE-28: The Career Description of 43 Pre-War Cabinet Ministers; the "Pure Bureaucrats" in Military Services, 1918-1945.

Career description prior to cabinet entrance	Army	Navy	Total
	N	N	N
Difference service:	22	21	43
Graduated from War College	18	11	29
Served as Military Attache in foreign countries	7	13	20
Administrative or Staff Posts;			
(1) Served as a Bureau-Chief at the Army or Navy Ministry (at the Military Affairs Bureau)	9 (4)	9 (8)	18 (12)
(2) Served as the Vice-Minister of the Army or Navy	8	9	17
(3) Served as a Division-Chief at the Army or Naval Gen. Staff	3	3	6
(4) Served as the Deputy-Chief of the Army or Naval Gen. Staff	3	4	7
(5) Served as the Chief of the Army or Naval General Staff	0	1	1
(6) Served in any one of the posts from (1) to (5)	16	17	33
Commanding Posts;			
(7) Served as the Commander of the Field Army in Korea, Formosa, or Kwangtung	9	-	9
(8) Served as the Commander of the Combined Fleet, or the Naval Base at Yokosuka	-	13	13
Served in any one of the posts from (1) to (8)	18	19	37

and America when they were Commander-grade officers (see the same table). Of various countries they had served in, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States were most common (in that order). Compared to this, those with the experience in the military attache service abroad were far less frequent among the army officers who entered the Cabinet. Only 7 out of the 22 army men had served as an Army Attache abroad. Of the 7, two had served in no other countries than China. Perhaps, the Army leadership's outlook which was discernibly more chauvinistic than that of the naval counterpart in the pre-war Japanese military had some bearings on this difference in their experiences.

Of a variety of the commanding, staff, and administrative posts held by the 43 military men before entering the Cabinet, Bureau-Chief's posts in the Ministries of Army and Navy were most common. 18 of the military men (42%) were Bureau-Chiefs in one of the two service ministries when they were major-generals or rear-admirals (see TABLE-28). Of the 18, 12 headed the Military Affairs Bureau (Gummukyoku), a "master" bureau of the military bureaucracy.⁵ An equally common post was the Vice-Minister-ship in the Army or the Navy Ministry, in which 17 of the military men (40%) had served as lieutenant-generals

⁵ For a concise introduction to the Japanese military bureaucracy, see Roger F. Hackett, op. cit. For a detailed discussion of the structures and workings of the Japanese military bureaucracy in the pre-war period, see Yale C. Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy: A Study of Civil-Military Rivalry, 1930-1945 (Berkeley, 1957).

or vice-admirals. Unlike the bureaucrats in civilian ministries, however, these military men who served as the Vice-Minister of Army or Navy did not always have the previous experience of serving as Bureau-Chiefs in their ministries. Those who had served both in a Bureau-Chief-ship and the Vice-Minister-ship in the ministries numbered only 10 among the 43 men (23%). Of these 10, only one had served in a Section-Chief-ship in the service ministries (the Army Ministry in this particular case). Thus, among the military bureaucrats, it was extremely rare to find those who had passed through the "four-rung ladder" of ascent starting from a Section-Chief to a Bureau-Chief, therefrom to the Vice-Minister, then finally to the Minister; which was routine among those bureaucrats serving in the civilian ministries.

The usual manner of ascent in the military bureaucracy seemed to be a "zig-zag course" alternating between the field-commanding posts and the staff or administrative posts at the Center (i.e. the Ministries of Army and Navy, or the Army and the Naval General Staffs.) To illustrate this with some representative cases: Ugaki Kazunari; commissioned as a second lieutenant after graduating from the Army Cadet School in 1891; assigned to the Second Infantry Regiment of the Imperial Guard Division; after graduating from the Army War College in 1900, served as a staff officer at the Army General Staff; from 1903 to 1905, served as the Army Attache to the Japanese Embassy in Berlin; during the Russo-Japanese War, served in

the Northern Korean Front; from 1911 to 1923, served successively as a Section-Chief in the Military Affairs Bureau of the Army Ministry, the Commander of the Sixth Infantry Regiment, the Chief of the General Affairs Division of the Army General Staff, the Commandant of the Infantry School, the Commandant of the Army War College, the Commander of the Tenth Infantry Division, and the Commandant of the Military Education Headquarters; in 1923, appointed as Vice-Minister of Army; therefrom appointed as Minister of Army in 1924.

To sample a case from the Navy: Yoshida Zengo; commissioned as a second lieutenant after graduating from the Naval Academy in 1904; thereafter to 1932, served successively as a staff officer in the Third Fleet, an Instructor at the Torpedo School, the Staff Officer of the First Torpedo Flotilla, a Section-Chief in the Education Bureau of the Navy Ministry, the Captain of the Hirado (Cruiser), the Chief of Staff of the Maizuru Naval Base, a Section-Chief in the Military Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry, the Captain of the Kongo and Mutsuo (Battleship), a staff officer at the Naval General Staff, and Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet; from 1933 to 1939, served successively as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau in the Navy Ministry, Commander of the Second Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet; therefrom appointed as Minister of Navy.

While a majority of the 43 military men had an experience of serving at the Army General Staff Headquarters (Rikugun Sambohombu) or the Naval General Staff Headquarters (Kaigun Gunrei-

hombu) when they were junior officers, those who had held the top-grade posts at the headquarters as generals or admirals were relatively infrequent among them. For instance, only 6 of them (15%) had held a Division-Chief-ship (Bucho) at the General Staff Headquarters, a post equivalent to a Bureau-Chief-ship at the service ministries. Likewise, only 7 out of the 43 men (17%) had held the post of the Deputy-Chief of the General Staff (Sambojicho), which was comparable in rank to the Vice-Minister at the service ministries (see TABLE-28). Compared to the top-grade posts in the Ministries of Army and Navy, the similar posts in the Army and the Naval General Staffs thus appeared to have served less often as stepping stones to the ministerial posts.

Shown in TABLES-29 and -30 are those posts held by the 43 military men immediately before they were appointed to their first cabinet posts. The army group and the navy group were separately tabulated in TABLE-29 and TABLE-30 respectively. First, examining the army group of 22 men, 6 had entered the Cabinet from the post of the Commander of Field Army (in Korea, Formosa, or Kwangtung); 5 from the Vice-Minister of Army; 3 from the Inspector-General of Military Education; 2 from Commandant of the Military Education Headquarters; 1 from Deputy-Chief of the Army General Staff; and the remainder of 5 from other military or non-military posts. Thus, two most common posts from which a majority of the army men made their entry into the Cabinet were the Field Army Commander and the Vice-

TABLE-29: The Length of Service in reaching the First Cabinet Post and the Posts held immediately before the First Cabinet Entry by 22 Army Officers: 1918-1945.

	Portfolio held at 1st cabinet appointment		Total	Length of service from commissioning to the first cabinet entry		
	Army	Others		Average	Shortest	Longest
	N	N	N	Yrs.	Yrs.	Yrs.
Commander of the Field-Army in Korea, Formosa, or Kwangtung	4	2	6	37	35	38
Vice-Minister of Army	4	1	5	33	32	35
Inspector-General of Military Education#	3	0	3	37	36	38
Commandant of the Military Education Headquarters##	2	0	2	34	33	35
Deputy-Chief of the Army General Staff	1	0	1	33	-	-
Others*	1	4	5	36**	30	44**
Total	15	7	22	35	33	38
Average				35	33	38

* Kyoiku-Sokan.
 ** Kyoikuskokan-hombucho.
 * Include the Commander of Army Division, the Surgeon-General of the Army, the Director-ate of Government Corporation, the President of Koain, and the Vice-President of Tai-Seiyokusanhai.
 ** A period in which one had served in non-military posts (but, government posts) after becoming a reservist was included in the calculation.

TABLE 30: The Length of Service in reaching the First Cabinet Post and the Posts held immediately before the First Cabinet Entry by 21 Naval Officers: 1918-1945.

	Portfolio held at 1st cabinet appointment		Total	Length of service from commissioning to the first cabinet entry		
	Navy	Others		Average	Shortest	Longest
	N	N	N	YRS.	YRS.	YRS.
Post immediately preceding the 1st cabinet entry						
Commander of the Naval Base at Yokosuka or Kure	9	0	9	36	33	38
(Yokosuka)	(7)		(7)			
(Kure)	(2)		(2)			
Vice-Minister of the Navy	2	1	3	33	30	35
Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet	2	0	2	36	35	36
Deputy-Chief of the Naval General Staff	0	0	0	-	-	-
Others*	1	6	7	40**	25	56**
Total	14	7	21			
Average				37	31	44

* Include a staff post at the Imperial General Staff Headquarters (Daihonei-Sambokan), the Governor-General of Formosa, the Privy Councillor, the President of the Peer School, and the Directorate of Government Corporations (3).

** A period in which one had served in non-military posts (but, government posts) after becoming a reservist was included in the calculation.

Minister of Army. As can be noticed in TABLE-29, there were some relations between the posts from which one had entered the Cabinet and the kind of portfolios one had held in the Cabinet: All but one of those who held the portfolio of Army had entered the Cabinet from one of the five posts specified above; while a majority of those who held non-military portfolios had entered the Cabinet from other posts.⁶

As for the navy group, the most common post from which the navy men made their entry into the Cabinet was the commanding post at two largest naval bases (Yokosuka and Kure). Of the 21 navy men, 9 had entered the Cabinet from the post of the Commander of the Yokosuka Naval Base or the Kure Naval Base; 3 from the Vice-Minister of Navy; 2 from the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet; and the remainder of 7 from other military or non-military posts. As it was the case with the army group, the posts from which the navy men had entered the Cabinet had some bearings on the kind of portfolios they had held in the Cabinet. As shown in TABLE-30, all but one

⁶ Some of these "other posts" were outside of the military establishment; hence, normally to be held by non-military personnel. During the era of military ascendancy and the war time, however, uniformed officers held some posts outside the military establishment, and therefrom entered the Cabinet. For instance, the Vice-Presidency of Taiseiyokusankai, the quasi-fascist party organization, was held by a uniformed general between 1941 and 1943, who entered the Tojo cabinet in 1943 as the Minister of Home Affairs. Also, Koa-in (Asia Development Board), which handled Chinese affairs under the jurisdiction of the Cabinet, was headed by a uniformed general between 1938 and 1940, who entered the second Konee cabinet in 1940 as Minister without Portfolio.

of those who held the portfolio of Navy had entered the Cabinet from one of the three posts specified above; on the other hand, all but one of those who held non-military portfolios had entered the Cabinet from other posts.

Indicative of the above is the fact that the service minister's "points of entry" into the Cabinet were more or less standardized: for the Minister of Army, most commonly the Field-Army commanding post and the Vice-Minister's post, and somewhat less frequently the top posts at the Military Education Headquarters; for the Minister of Navy, most commonly the commanding post at large naval bases, and less frequently the Vice-Minister's post and the commanding post of the Combined Fleet. Both for the army and the navy men, the least likely post from which one was to enter the Cabinet as a service minister seemed to be the Deputy-Chief of the General Staff. Only one out of the 15 army men who held the portfolio of Army had entered the Cabinet from this post; and none of the 14 navy men who held the portfolio of Navy had entered the Cabinet from that post.

From the time of their commissioning to their first entry into the Cabinet, most of the military men had spent 33 to 38 years in the military services (see TABLES-29 and -30). There were several exceptional cases, however, in which one had required a considerably longer time than most in reaching the first cabinet post. All of these exceptions --5 cases-- were those who had retired from the Army or the Navy after reaching

the rank of General or Admiral and thereafter had served in non-military government posts until they reached the cabinet posts. Of these men, an extraordinary case was Suzuki Kantaro. Since his commissioning as a naval officer in 1889, Suzuki had served in the Navy for 40 years when he retired in 1929 at the rank of Admiral; therefrom to 1936, he had served as the Grand Chamberlain at the Imperial Household Ministry; from 1936 on he had served as a Privy Councillor until he was appointed as the last pre-war Prime Minister of Japan (and the Foreign Minister) in 1945. In all, Suzuki had spent an unbelievable length of 56 consecutive years in government service before his first cabinet entry in 1945. The average length of time computed for the 43 military men in reaching their first cabinet posts stood at 36 years (35 years for the army group and 37 years for the navy group, if computed separately). It was 7 years longer than the average among the administrative officials, and 3 years longer than the one among the juridical officials.

While the House of Peers had played various "supportive functions" in the process of recruiting experienced civilian bureaucrats to the cabinet posts, it played a relatively limited role in the similar process for the military bureaucrats. None of the 43 military bureaucrats had served in the House of Peers prior to his first cabinet entry. After the termination of their first cabinet appointment, only 9 (21%) were appointed to the House; of whom 4 had re-entered new

cabinets after an interval. At their re-entry to later cabinets, all of the four held non-military portfolios.

(2) "Bureaucratic-to-Parliamentary" Career.

Of the total of 189 persons who had served in cabinets between 1918 and 1945, 14 or 7.4% had a bureaucratic career followed by a career in the House of Representatives. These men had started out their career as civil servants, as had the "pure bureaucrats"; but, unlike the latter, they terminated their bureaucratic career before reaching a cabinet post, thereafter entering the Cabinet as parliamentarians after being elected to the House of Representatives. At the time their first cabinet entry, all of the 14 had held some important party posts, such as Somu or Kanjiicho, in the Seiyukai or the Kenseikai (later Minseito), the two major political parties in pre-war Japan. In short, these 14 men were "bureaucrat-turned parliamentarians" who became influential in pre-war party politics. More than two-thirds of these men made their first cabinet entry between 1918 and 1931, the era of party governments. The specific cabinets they had first entered are listed in TABLE-31, which shows that 10 had entered the party cabinets formed either by the Seiyukai or the Kenseikai-Minseito between 1918 and 1931, and the remainder of 4 the non-party cabinets formed after 1932.

Characteristically these "bureaucrat-turned party politicians" were the graduates of the Law Faculty of Tokyo University, who had advanced to the top-grade posts in the government ministries when they terminated their bureaucratic career.

TABLE-31: The Kinds of Cabinets first entered by those with "Bureaucratic-to-Parliamentary Career": 1918-1945.

<u>The kinds of cabinets first entered</u>	<u>Number</u>
PARTY CABINETS:	10
Seiyukai Cabinet under Hara (1918-1921)	2
Kenseikai Cabinets under Kato (1924-1926)	3
Minseito Cabinets under Hamaguchi and Wakatsuki (1929-1931)	4
Seiyukai Cabinet under Inukai (1931-1932)	1
NON-PARTY CABINETS:	4
Okada Cabinet (1934-1936)	1
Yonai Cabinet (1940)	1
Tojo Cabinet (1941-1944)	1
Suzuki Cabinet (1945)	1
<u>Total</u>	<u>14</u>

As shown in TABLE-32, the graduates of the Law Faculty of Tokyo University numbered 9 among the 14. Of the remainder, two were graduated from other faculties of Tokyo University; one from Kyoto University; one from Chuo University; and one from a normal school. As for the posts held by the 14 at the time of their resignation from the civil service, 4 held the Vice-Minister's post or its equivalent; 4 the Bureau-Chief's post; 1 prefectural governorship; 2 the Section-Chief's post or its equivalent; and 3 those posts below the Section-Chief level. All of those who held the posts of the Section-Chief level or above were either from Tokyo University or Kyoto University (see the same table).

Most of those who had held the top-grade posts in the civil service (e.g. Vice-Minister-ship and Bureau-Chief-ship) seemed to have "switched" from their successful bureaucratic career to a parliamentary career and party politics in response to the changing tenor of Japanese politics in the Taisho era and its accompanying effect on the channel of political ascent. As can be noticed in TABLE-33, seven of those who had been serving at the level of Bureau-Chief or above resigned from the civil service between 1914 and 1924; and most of them were elected to the House of Representatives within less than a year of their resignation from the civil service. The very timing of their resignation from the civil service and the swiftness with which they accommodated themselves to the new career of parliamentarians strongly suggest that their career

TABLE-32: The School-Background and the Highest Civil Service Posts held before Election to the Diet, the Pre-War Cabinet Ministers with "Bureaucratic-to-Parliamentary Career": 1918-1945.

Civil service post held at the time of resignation	School-Background						Total
	Tokyo U. Graduate	Kyoto U. Graduate	Chuo U. Graduate	Normal Sch. Graduate	Law Fac. Others	N	
Vice-Minister, or equivalent*	4	0	0	0	0	0	4
Bureau-Chief at Ministries	2	1	1	0	0	0	4
Prefectural Governor	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Section-Chief at Ministries, or equivalent**	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
Post below the Section-Chief level#	1	0	0	1	1	1	3
Total	9	2	1	1	1	1	14

* Included is the Director of the Railroad Administration (Tetsudoin-Sosai).

** Included is the Head of the Tokyo Bureau of Tax Administration.
 # Included are the Division-Chief at the Prefectural Government and the Police Superintendent (Keishi) at the Formosan Colonial Administration.

TABLE-33:

Time Lapses between the Resignation from the Civil Service and Election to the Diet and between First Election to the Diet and First Cabinet Entry, by the Levels of Posts held at the Resignation, the Pre-War Cabinet Ministers with "Bureaucratic-to-Parliamentary Career": 1918-1945.

Levels of post held at resignation	Time of resignation from the c.s.				Years spent from resignation to 1st election to Diet				Years spent from 1st cabinet entry to 10 yrs tal				
	Be-fore 1914	ween 1914 and 1924	Aft-er 1924	To-tal	Less than 1 yr	1-3 yrs	4-6 yrs	More than 6 yrs	To-tal	Less than 5 yrs	5-10 yrs	More than 10 yrs	To-tal
Vice-Minister	1	3	0	4	3	1	0	0	4	1	2	1	4
Bureau-Chief*	1	4	0	5	4	0	0	1	5	0	3	2	5
Section-Chief**	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	2	2
Below Section Chief#	2	1	0	3	0	1	1	1	3	0	0	3	3
Total	5	9	0	14	7	2	1	4	14	1	5	8	14

* Included is prefectural governorship.

** A head of Local Bureau of a central Ministry was included in this category.

A Division-Chief or below in the Prefectural Government was included in this category.

change was a calculated move to readjust themselves to the changing milieu of Japanese politics in which the political prospects of career bureaucrats were getting limited. These once successful bureaucrats from Tokyo University were perhaps anticipating, while in the civil service, to enter a "transcendental cabinet" as did many of their predecessors. The upswing for party politics and parliamentary cabinet government in the Taisho era undoubtedly changed such prospect. The "switch" to a parliamentary career on the part of those who had been serving at the upper echelon of the bureaucracy appears to be a result of these political change brought about in Taisho Japan. Career profiles of a few would better illustrate this point: Tokonami Takejiro, a graduate of the Law Faculty of Tokyo University, had been promoted, after more than 20 years of service in the Ministries of Finance and Home Affairs, to Vice-Minister of Home Affairs by 1911; then to Director of the Railways Administration by 1913. He resigned from the civil service in 1914, and was elected to the House of Representatives in the same year (in a by-election). Joining the Seiyukai Party after the election, he entered Hara's Seiyukai cabinet in 1918 as the Minister of Home Affairs. Another case very similar to this: Tawara Magoshichi, a graduate of the Law Faculty of Tokyo University and a successful candidate at the Higher Civil Service Examination, was holding, after 27 years of service in the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Headship of the Colonial Affairs Bureau in the Prime Minister's

Office when he resigned from the civil service in 1924. He was elected to the House of Representatives in the same year under the Kenseikai ticket. Five years later, he entered the Minseito cabinet under Hamaguchi as Minister of Commerce.

In these two cases, a transition from a bureaucrat to a parliamentarian, then to a member of a party cabinet was made within five years. The career of Hamaguchi Osachi, who became the Prime Minister in 1929, was also similar to these cases, although the interval between his resignation from the civil service and his first cabinet entry was somewhat longer than the two: Hamaguchi (a graduate of the Law Faculty of Tokyo University) had been serving in the Ministry of Finance for nearly 20 years when he resigned from Vice-Minister of Finance in 1915. He was elected to the House of Representatives in the same year, and joined the Kenseikai. After nine years of service in the House, having been elected 4 times consecutively, he made his first cabinet entry in 1924 as the Minister of Finance in the Kenseikai cabinet under Kato Takaaki.

A typology distinctly different from these examples could be found among those who had terminated their bureaucratic career before reaching the level of Bureau-Chief. Characteristically, these men had resigned from the civil service well before the onset of the era of party governments; and they had spent a considerable length of time before they were elected to the House of Representatives. As shown in TABLE-33, of the five men who had resigned from the civil service at the lower-

ranking posts, 3 had spent more than six years before they were elected to the House. During this transitional period between the bureaucratic and the parliamentary careers, most of them had been engaged in business activities. After their first election to the House, all of the 5 had spent more than ten years before they made their first cabinet entry, requiring an average of 6 consecutive elections in the duration.

To sample a representative case: Sengoku Mitsugu (a graduate of the Faculty of Science, Tokyo University) resigned from the civil service in 1898 when he was holding a Section-Chief's post at the Bureau of Railways in the Ministry of Communications. Therefrom until his election to the House of Representatives in 1908, he had served in the directorate of various private corporations. He joined the Kenseikai when it was founded in 1916; and after 3 consecutive elections, he made his first cabinet entry in 1924 as the Minister of Railways in the Kenseikai cabinet under Kato. To sample another: Hara Shujiro (a graduate of Chuo University) terminated his bureaucratic career in 1904 when he was serving as a police superintendent at the Governor-General's Office in Formosa. Thereafter, he had managed his own business establishment for 8 years. In 1912, he was elected to the House of Representatives. After 7 consecutive elections, and joining the Minseito in 1927, he made his first cabinet entry in 1931 as the Minister of Colonial Affairs in the Minseito cabinet under Wakatsuki Reijiro. In these two examples, a transitional period of 8 to 10 years

was required to start their parliamentary career after terminating their bureaucratic career; and a period of 12 to 19 years of continuous service in the House of Representatives was required to make their first cabinet entry. An over-all impression we could make out from these evidences is that those ex-bureaucrats from the lower-ranking posts had to build their political and financial resources for a considerable length of time to start their parliamentary career, and they had to serve a long period of apprenticeship in parliamentary politics before entering a cabinet. For these men, an "overnight switch" to a parliamentary politician, then to a member of party cabinet was a rarity, while it was fairly common among those ex-bureaucrats from the high-ranking posts.

(3) "Bureaucratic-to-Business" Career.

A small number of pre-war cabinet ministers had a bureaucratic career followed by a career in the business world. Unlike the "pure bureaucrats", this group of men did not make their cabinet entry through the bureaucratic ladder, from which they disassociated themselves long before the time of their cabinet appointment. Nor like those men with the "bureaucratic-to-parliamentary" career, this group of men had never been elected to the House of Representatives. At the time of their appointment to the Cabinet, they were ex-bureaucrats having a career in the business world. Men with this pattern of career totalled 6 or 3.2% among the 189 pre-war cabinet ministers. Although numerically insignificant, their career route to the cabinet posts is something of interest for its unusual nature. First, it was unusual in the sense that, when these men were appointed to the Cabinet, they had no formal link whatsoever with any organ of the government: They were not the high-ranking civil servants promoted to the minister's posts from the vice-minister's posts or the equivalents; nor were they the members of the Diet, elected or otherwise. In fact, they did not fit into either of two stereotypes, the one usually to be found in a "transcendental cabinet" and the other found in a party cabinet. Secondly, it was unusual in the sense that most of these men made their cabinet entry during the "unusual time": Five of the 6 had entered the wartime cabinets of Tojo and Suzuki. This seems to indicate

that the normal channel of recruiting the members of a cabinet could be supplemented during the wartime.

The career profile of Goto Keita would best serve to illustrate this career pattern: Goto, a graduate of the Law Faculty of Tokyo University, had entered the civil service in 1911. After more than ten years of service in the Ministry of Railways, he resigned from the civil service when he was holding a section-chief's post at the Ministry. Thereafter, he became an executive of various private railway companies in Japan (e.g. the Musashi, Tamagawa, Kyohei, and Oda-Kyu Electric R. R. Companies). After founding the Greater Tokyo Express through numerous mergers of private railways and becoming its president, he came to be known as one of the two kings of private railways in Japan by the end of the 1930's. In 1944, Goto was appointed as the Minister of Transportation in the Tojo cabinet.⁷

⁷ Five others who belonged to this career pattern were: Terashima Ken who entered the Tojo cabinet from the executive post of the Uraga Dock Company; Yasui Toji and Shimomura Hiroshi who entered the Suzuki cabinet from the Executive posts of the Teikoku Petroleum Company and the Asahi News Publishing Company respectively; Ogura Masatsune who entered the third Konoe cabinet from the directorate of the Sumimoto firms; and Yuki Toyotaro who entered the Hayashi cabinet from the directorate of Yasuda Bank and Nihon Kogyo Bank.

(4) "Professional-to-Bureaucratic" Career.

Those cabinet ministers we have examined so far had all started out their career as civil servants. Unlike these men, some pre-war cabinet ministers had started out their career as professionals, and later joined the government services, which led them to a cabinet appointment. Persons with this pattern of career totalled 8 or 4.2% among the 189 men who served in cabinets between 1918 and 1945. Before these men began their bureaucratic careers, 4 had been university-professors, 2 Kotogakko-instructors, 1 medical doctor, and 1 journalist. The teaching profession was thus preponderant among them.

The university-professors, all of whom were the graduates of Tokyo University, seemed to have joined the government services to render their technical expertise to the government. Two of them were law professors at Tokyo University who entered the Bureau of Legislation (Hoseikyoku) as Sanjikan (Counsellor); both of them remained in the Bureau until they became its Director, from which they were appointed to the Cabinet (one as the Minister of Justice and the other, who was a specialist in corporation law, as the Minister of Commerce). Another was a law professor at Hosei University, who became a secretary of a Prime Minister; after joining the Cabinet Secretariat as Naikaku Shokikan (Cabinet Secretary), he was later promoted to its Secretary-General (Naikaku Shokikan-Cho); therefrom entering the Cabinet as the Minister of Education. The last one was a professor of engineering at Tokyo University, who

entered a government-operated steel mill in Manchuria as a technical expert; sidetracking to administrative posts first in the government corporation then in the Ministry of Navy, he entered the Cabinet as the Minister of Railways.

While these professor-turned bureaucrats had served in their initial profession usually longer than in their later governmental career, the contrary was the case with the others: Their initial career in the professions was very brief; in their governmental career, on the other hand, they spent 15 to 25 years in climbing up the bureaucratic ladder to reach a cabinet post. Save that these men had been briefly engaged in the professions in their early career, the route taken by them to reach the Cabinet was essentially the same as the one taken by the "pure bureaucrats". Among the men who had this particular pattern of career were such well-known figures of Taisho politics as Hara Kei and Goto Shimpei. Although Hara became better known as a parliamentary party politician, he had not been elected to the House of Representatives up to the time of his first cabinet entry. Hara started out his career as a journalist. After six years in that profession, he entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1884. Therefrom until his first cabinet entry in 1900, he served successively as a Consul in Tiensien; the First Secretary of the Japanese Legation in Paris; the Charge d'Affaires in France; the Chief of the Bureau of Foreign Trade at the Foreign Ministry; and the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs. Goto Shimpei, who was a

medical doctor, had worked in a hospital for seven years before he joined the government services in 1883 as a public health official. He made his first cabinet entry in 1908 after serving as the Chief of the Public Health Bureau of the Home Ministry, the Head of the Civil Affairs Bureau of the Governor-General's Office in Formosa, the President of the Southern Manchurian Railway Co., and the Director of the Railway Administration.

Some common characteristics among the men with this particular pattern of career --i.e. a brief professional career followed by a long period of bureaucratic service-- were: (1) all of them were born between 1855 and 1865; (2) all of them were educated at modern institutions of higher learning in Japan, but none of them was a graduate of the Law Faculty of Tokyo University; and (3) all of them made their first cabinet entry prior to 1918. These meant that they were the first brood of modern-educated men to reach the cabinet posts through the bureaucratic ladder before the arrival of the "pure bureaucrats" trained at the Law Faculty of Tokyo University. Since there was no regular channel of recruiting modern-educated personnel into the Japanese bureaucracy before the establishment of Tokyo University, the early Meiji government seemed to have absorbed some of its needed personnel equipped with modern education from the professional world. It was a result of such transitional measure taken by the early Meiji government that those persons with a long bureaucratic career pre-

ceded by a brief career in the professions had emerged in the
"transcendental cabinets" of Japan by the turn of the century.

(5) "Professional-to-Parliamentary" Career.

Thus far, we have treated only those groups of pre-war cabinet ministers who had been in the civil (or military) services either for the whole or a part of their career up to the time of their first cabinet appointment. The remaining groups of pre-war cabinet ministers we shall discuss in the following had no part of their career associated with the civil services. They were professionals or businessmen who entered the Cabinet through the House of Representatives or some other non-bureaucratic channels. We shall treat those with the "professional-to-Parliamentary" career first.

19 out of 10.1% of the 189 pre-war cabinet ministers had entered the Cabinet after a long period of service in the House of Representatives as parliamentary politicians, preceded by a career in the professions. Prior to their elections to the House of Representatives, 7 of them were practicing law; 7 others were engaged in journalism; 4 in the teaching profession (2 university professors and 2 Kotogakko instructor); and the remaining one in engineering. The career pattern of these men approximates a prototype prevalent among the cabinet ministers of those western countries with a working system of parliamentary cabinet government.⁸

⁸ See, for instance, W. L. Guttsman, The British Political Elite (New York, 1963), esp. Chapters 4 and 8. Also, Mattei Dogan, "Political Ascent in a Class Society: French Deputies 1870-1958," in Political Decision-Makers, ed. Dwaine Marvick (Glencoe, Ill., 1961), pp. 57-90.

First, looking into the university-background of these 19 men, we could find that they were radically different in this respect from the "pure-bureaucrats" or the "bureaucrat-turned parliamentarians". Preponderant among these men with the "Professional-to-Parliamentary" career were those educated at private universities in Japan or at foreign universities, contrary to what we have found among those men with a bureaucratic career. As shown in TABLE-34, persons from Waseda, Keio, Chuo, or foreign universities outnumbered those from Tokyo University by two to one. As can be noticed in the same table, there were some relationships between one's university-background and the kinds of professions one had pursued before entering politics. For instance, those who had practiced law were either from Tokyo University or Chuo University (or its precursor). Of those who had been working in the field of journalism, most were from Waseda University. The preponderance of journalists among the Waseda-educated leaders of the Diet had been reported by some observers.⁹ Journalism thus appears to be an indispensable profession for a Waseda-educated man to prepare himself for a parliamentary career.

Looking into the ages at which these professionals were first elected to the House of Representatives, we find that those who had practiced law entered politics at earlier ages than the others. As indicated in TABLE-35, of the 7 lawyers

⁹ For instance, see R.P. Dore's chapter on "Education", in Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, ed. Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (Princeton, 1964), p. 183.

TABLE-34: The School-Background and the Profession before Election to the Diet, Pre-War Cabinet Ministers with "Professional-to-Parliamentary Career": 1918-1945.

Profession before elec- tion to Diet	School-Background						Total N
	Tokyo Univ.	Waseda Univ.+	Keio Univ.*	Chuo Univ.*	Univ. abraod	Oth- ers	
	N	N	N	N	N	N	
Lawyer	4	0	0	3	0	0	7
University- professor	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
Kotogakko instructor	0	0	0	0	1	1**	2
Engineer	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Journalist	1	3	1	0	1	1**	7
Total	6	4	1	3	3	2	19

+ Includes its precursor, Tokyo Semmongakko.

* Includes its precursor, Keio Gijuku.

* Includes its precursor, Tokyo Hogakuin.

** A graduate of Higher Normal School.

** No formal higher education; but had passed Kentei-Shiken.

TABLE-35: Age at First Election to the Diet and the Profession, Pre-War Cabinet Ministers with "Professional-to-Parliamentary Career": 1918-1945.

Profession before elec- tion to Diet	Age at first election to Diet					Total N
	31-32	33-35	36-39	40-44	45-48	
	N	N	N	N	N	
Lawyer	3	4	0	0	0	7
Univ. Professor	0	0	1	1	0	2
Kotogakko Inst.	0	1	1	0	0	2
Engineer	0	0	0	0	1	1
Journalist	0	2	0	3	2	7
Total	3	7	2	4	3	19

represented in this group of professionals, 3 were elected to the House at the age of 31 or 32, and 4 between the age of 33 and 35. Since the minimum age for candidacy in the election of the Representatives was 30 under the pre-war election law, it meant that most of these lawyers were elected to the House either in the first or the second election held after they had reached the required age. Unlike these men in the legal profession, those who had been working in the field of journalism were elected to the House mostly in their middle age: of the 7 journalists, only 2 were elected in their early thirties; the other 5 were elected between the age of 40 and 48. Of the latter, all but one were holding an executive post in the news publishing or wire-service companies by the time of their election to the House. Embarking on the career of politics by a young reporter thus appears to be a less likely occurrence than by a young lawyer. The reason may be partly financial. Or, it may be that a prominence in one's profession is less essential for a lawyer to be successful in an election than it is for a journalist. For a young lawyer could have, by virtue of the nature of his profession, a better chance of building his political base in a local constituency than a young reporter. As for those who had been in the teaching profession, 3 were elected to the House in their late thirties or early forties, and the remaining one in his early thirties. In general, therefore, these men in the teaching profession entered politics in somewhat earlier ages than the journalists, but in

later ages than the lawyers. The only engineer represented in this group of professionals was elected to the House in his mid-forties. Thus, with the exception of the lawyers, most of the other professionals had embarked on a new career of parliamentary politician at some point between the ages of 35 and 45.

How many times had these men been elected to the House of Representatives up to the time of their first cabinet entry? The answer is provided in TABLE-36. Of the 19 men, 5 were elected for 4 to 5 times; 8 for 6 to 7 times; 4 for 8 to 9 times; and 2 for 10 times or more. The minimum number of times elected was 4 times; the maximum was 14 times; and the average was 7 times. After their first election to the House until they made their first cabinet entry, all but four of the 19 were consecutively elected. Even of the four exceptions, the number of elections they had missed was at the minimum: each of the four had missed only once. It meant that, therefore, 15 out of the 19 men had served in the House of Representatives continuously from the time of their first election up to the time of their first cabinet entry; and the remainder of 4 had served with an interruption of a few years in the same duration. How many years did they serve in the House of Representatives before they made their first cabinet entry? Since most of them were elected to the House consecutively, the lengths between the time of their first election and the time of their first cabinet entry were measured to answer this question, which was

TABLE-36: Age at First Election to the Diet and the Frequency of Election before the First Cabinet Entry, Pre-War Cabinet Ministers with "Professional-to-Parliamentary Career": 1918-1945.

Age at 1st election to the Diet	No. of times elected before 1st cabinet entry				Total N	Average times (TM)
	4-5 N	6-7 N	8-9 N	10 or more N		
Between 31-35	0	5	3	2	10	(8)
Between 36-39	1	1	0	0	2	(6)
Between 40-48	4	2	1	0	7	(5)
Total	5	8	4	2	19	(7)

TABLE-37: Age at First Election to the Diet and the Length of Time between the First Election and the First Cabinet Entry, Pre-War Cabinet Ministers with "Professional-to-Parliamentary Career": 1918-1945.

Age at 1st election	Length of time between 1st election and 1st cabinet entry				Total N	Average length (vrs)
	7-11 vrs. N	14-19 vrs. N	21-24 vrs. N	30 yrs or more N		
Between 31-35	0	2	6	2	10	(22)
Between 36-39	1	1	0	0	2	(15)
Between 40-48	3	2	2	0	7	(15)
Total	4	5	8	2	19	(19)

tabulated in TABLE-37. An average length of service in the House of Representatives before these men first entered the Cabinet was 19 years. The shortest length among them was 7 years, while the longest one was 33 years!

Did those who had been elected to the House at earlier ages enter the Cabinet also at earlier ages than the others? Evidences indicate otherwise. Data in TABLES-36 and -37 show that the number of time elected to the House and the length of service in the House up to the time of one's cabinet entry were in an inverse relation to the age at which one was first elected to the House. In other words, persons who were elected to the House in earlier ages entered the Cabinet after a longer period of service in the House than those elected in later ages, and vice versa. For instance, those who were elected to the House between the age of 31 and 35 had served in the House for an average of 22 years before they made their first cabinet entry, requiring an average of 8 elections in the duration; whereas the corresponding average for those who were elected between the age of 40 and 48 was 15 years of service with 5 elections in the duration. As a result, the ages at which these men made their first cabinet entry converged to a relatively even range: their mid-fifties. It seemed to indicate that "seniority" in the membership of the House of Representative was not a necessary criterion in recruiting parliamentarians to a cabinet.

As for the party affiliation of the 19 men, 9 had origi-

nally belonged to the Seiyukai, 7 to the Kenseikai-Minseito, and 3 to a few splinter parties of the 1910's. 5 men crossed the party lines afterward. By the time these 19 made their first cabinet entry, 10 were serving in the executive posts (Sosai, Somuiincho, Kanjicho, Somuiin, and Kanji) of the Seiyukai, 8 in the similar posts in the Kenseikai-Minseito, and the remaining one was an independent. Although most of these men thus entered the Cabinet as leaders of major political parties, it was not always a party cabinet that had recruited them at first from the House. As shown in TABLE-38, those who made their first cabinet entry into those party cabinets formed by the Seiyukai or the Kenseikai-Minseito between 1918 and 1931 numbered only 10; the others made their first cabinet entry in non-party cabinets formed mostly after 1931. It is noteworthy that almost every non-party cabinet formed after 1931 had recruited at least one (but usually not more than one) party politician from the House. An examination of TABLE-38 and TABLE-31 makes this point clear. Of 12 non-party cabinets formed between 1931 and 1945, all but three had recruited either one of these parliamentarians or one of those "bureaucrat-turned parliamentarians" we have discussed earlier. Apparently, these "transcendental cabinets" formed after the era of party governments made some attempt to give a token representation to the party men from the House, possibly for the sake of putting up the facade of all-inclusiveness in that transcendental body.

TABLE-38: The Kinds of Cabinet first entered by those with "Professional-to-Parliamentary Career": 1918-1945.

<u>The Kinds of cabinets first entered</u>	<u>Number</u>
PARTY CABINETS:	10
Kenseikai Cabinets under Kato and Wakatsuki (1924-1927)	3
Seiyukai Cabinet under Tanaka (1927-1929)	2
Minseito Cabinets under Hamaguchi and Wakatsuki (1929-1931)	3
Seiyukai Cabinet under Inukai (1931-1932)	2
NON-PARTY CABINETS:	9
1st Yamamoto Cabinet (1913-1914)	1
2nd Yamamoto Cabinet (1923)	1
Saito Cabinet (1932-1934)	1
Hirota Cabinet (1936-1937)	3
1st Konoe Cabinet (1937-1939)	1
Abe Cabinet (1939-1940)	1
2nd Konoe Cabinet (1940-1941)	1
Total	19

Some of the better-known party politicians among these 19 men with the "Professional-to-Parliamentary" career were: Inukai Tsuyoshi, Motoda Hajime, Machida Chuji and Hatoyama Ichiro.

(6) "Business-to-Parliamentary" Career.

A small number of pre-war cabinet ministers had started out their career in the business world either as owners of small enterprises or employees of large firms. Mostly in their late thirties or early forties, they embarked on a new career of parliamentary politician, which paved the way to their cabinet appointment. 11 or 5.8% of the 189 pre-war cabinet ministers had this pattern of career.

A feature unique among these men with the "Business-to-Parliamentary" career was the total absence of Tokyo University graduates or any other government university graduates. Of the 11 men, two were educated at private universities in Japan (one each at Keio and Waseda); one at a foreign university; 5 at Semmon or Kotosemmon-gakko; and the remainder of three had no college-level education. As we have noted, Tokyo University graduates were ever present in all of the five groups of pre-war cabinet ministers we have examined up to now, although their proportion varied from one group to another. They were most densely represented, for instance, among the "pure bureaucrats", reaching a proportion of near-monopoly within the "non-military sector" of that group; while they were most sparsely represented among those who had the "Professional-to-Parliamentary" career, to be outnumbered by others by two to one. Unlike the civil service or the professional fields, the business world appeared to be a very unlikely line of occupation in which the Tokyo University-educated men of

the pre-war cabinet ministers' generation would start their career. Tokyo University graduates were unrepresented not only in this particular group of pre-war cabinet ministers with the "Business-to-Parliamentary" career, but also among other pre-war cabinet ministers whose career had started in the business world, as we shall see shortly when we deal with the next group.

Of the business careers of the 11 men, two broad types could be differentiated among them. The first type, to which belonged a majority, consisted of those who had owned or operated small-scale enterprises in their home regions before their entry into politics. Some of these men had first entered local politics as prefectural assemblymen, therefrom reaching out for a seat in the House of Representatives; others were elected to the House without going through an apprenticeship in local assemblies. To show some representative cases: Sakurai Hyogoro, after graduating from Waseda University, set up a firm manufacturing patented ink. He also founded and operated a company making heat-resistant bricks in his home region. In his late twenties, he was elected to the Prefectural Assembly of Ishikawa, his home prefecture. When he ran for the House of Representatives from Ishikawa Prefecture in the election of 1912, he was a 32 year-old vice-president of the Hokuriku News Publishing Company. Elected to the House in the election, Sakurai commenced a long career in the House of Representatives that lasted for 28 years. This case seemed

to exemplify an innovational entrepreneur making a successful transition to a career of parliamentary politician, first by building his financial base to launch a political career at a local level, then to enter national politics from his financially and politically reinforced regional bastion.

To cite a case quite different from this: Mochizuki Keisuke, born in 1867 and educated at the Meiji English School, had managed a coastal transport flotilla owned by his family at Ozaki Island of Hiroshima Prefecture before his entry to politics. At the age of 32, he ran in the election of the House of Representatives from his home district (1898). Elected to the House, he had subsequently served in it for more than 40 years winning 13 elections in the duration. Unlike the first case, this one seemed to be a beneficiary of the financial establishment of his family in the region and, together with it, perhaps a local eminence as well in his successful bid for a parliamentary career.

Belonging to the other type of business career were those who had started out in large corporations or firms as ordinary employees. After having been promoted to executive posts in the companies they had entered on, some had set up their own independent concerns. Persons who had this type of business careers usually entered politics at much later ages than those who owned or operated small-scale enterprises, and they had rarely held local elective offices (i.e. prefectural assemblymen) before their election to the House of Representatives.

A typical example of this type of career could be seen in the case of Uchida Nobuya. Uchida, a graduate of Tokyo Commercial Higher School, had entered the Mitsui Firm, one of the four largest Zaibatsu of pre-war Japan, where he was eventually promoted to a head of the Rental Vessels Division. Upon leaving the Mitsui, he founded his own steam ship company, and later a ship building company. At the age of 44, he was elected to the House of Representatives (1924), in which he had subsequently served for 21 years winning 7 consecutive elections. Another outstanding case was the career of Kuhara Fusanosuke, who became one of the "New Zaibatsu" by founding the Nit-Tatsu Manufacturing Company, although his parliamentary career was much shorter than that of the former.

Tabulated in TABLE-39 are the ages at which these men from the business world had first entered the House of Representatives and the number of times they were elected to the House prior to their first cabinet entry. In TABLE-40, the ages at which they had entered the House were cross-tabulated with the over-all lengths of their services in it prior to their first cabinet entry. In both tables, we can find the same relationships as the ones found among those cabinet ministers with the "Professional-to-Parliamentary" career: persons who were elected to the House in earlier ages entered the Cabinet after a longer period of service in the House requiring a larger number of elections in the duration than those who were elected in later ages. For example, those who were elected to

TABLE-39: Age at First Election to the Diet and the Frequency of Election before the First Cabinet Entry, Pre-War Cabinet Ministers with "Business-to-Parliamentary Career": 1918-1945.

Age at 1st election to the Diet	No. of times elected before 1st cabinet entry				Total	Average Times (TM)
	4 or less	5-7	8-10	Over 10		
	N	N	N	N		
Between 32-35	0	0	2	1	3	(9)
Between 36-39	0	2	2	0	4	(8)
Between 40-45	1	0	1	0	2	(6)
Over 45	1	1	0	0	2	(4)
Total	2	3	5	1	11	(7)

TABLE-40: Age at First Election to the Diet and the Over-all Length of Service in the Diet before the First Cabinet Entry, Pre-War Cabinet Ministers with "Business-to-Parliamentary Career": 1918-1945.

Age at 1st election to Diet	Over-all length of service in Diet before 1st cabinet entry					Total	Average length (yrs)
	Less than 10 yrs	10-15 yrs.	16-20 yrs.	21-25 yrs.	26-28 yrs.		
	N	N	N	N	N		
32-35	0	0	0	0	3	3	(27)
36-39	0	0	2	2	0	4	(20)
40-45	0	1	0	1	0	2	(16)
Over 45	1	0	1	0	0	2	(10)
Total	1	1	3	3	3	11	(19)

the House between the ages of 32 and 35 had served in the House for an average of 27 years by the time they made their first cabinet entry, requiring an average of 9 elections in the duration; whereas the corresponding average for those who were elected between the ages of 40 and 45 was 16 years of service with 6 elections in the duration. A result was the convergence of the ages at which these men made their first cabinet entry to the proximity of late fifties, regardless of the length of one's service in the House. A "seniority in age" rather than a seniority in the membership of the House thus seemed to be at work in recruiting members of the Cabinet from the House. It might be an indication that one's prominence and experience prior to becoming a parliamentarian counted as much as the longevity of one's service in the House in determining the qualification for leadership.

As for the party affiliations, 8 out of the 11 men had belonged to the Seiyukai, and the others to the Kenseikai-Minseito. Of the 8 Seiyukai party men, one had served in the vice-presidency of the party, five in the general-secretaryship (Kanjicho), and two in the executive board (Somukai) before their first cabinet appointment. Of the 3 Kenseikai-Minseito men, one had served in the general-secretaryship of the party and the other two in the executive board prior to their cabinet entry. Not all of these party men had made, however, their first cabinet entry to the party cabinets, as it was the case among those cabinet ministers with the "Professional-to-

Parliamentary" career. Some of these party men were the recruits of the "transcendental cabinets". The specific cabinets that were first entered to by these men are listed in TABLE-41. It shows that 7 had first entered the party cabinets formed either by the Seiyukai or the Kenseikai-Minseito between 1918 and 1929, and the remainder of 4 made their first cabinet entry to one of the "transcendental cabinets" formed after 1931.

TABLE-41: The Kinds of Cabinets first entered by those with "Business-to-Parliamentary Career", 1918-1945.

The kinds of cabinets first entered	Number
PARTY CABINETS:	7
Seiyukai Cabinet under Hara (1918-1921)	1
Kenseikai Cabinets under Kato and Wakatsuki (1924-1927)	4
Seiyukai Cabinet under Tanaka (1927-1929)	2
NON-PARTY CABINETS:	4
Okada Cabinet (1934-1936)	1
Abe Cabinet (1939-1940)	1
Yonai Cabinet (1940)	1
Suzuki Cabinet (1945)	1
Total	11

(7) Professional or Business Career.

All of the pre-war cabinet ministers we have discussed thus far had been either career civil servants or members of the House of Representatives, or both, before they were appointed to the Cabinet. Some pre-war cabinet ministers had none of these career backgrounds when they entered the Cabinet. They were "pure professionals" or "pure businessmen" recruited to the Cabinet, whose careers had in no way associated either with the civil service or the electoral politics. Persons with this pattern of career totaled 11 or 5.8% among the 189 pre-war cabinet ministers.

An interesting feature to be noted among these men was the preponderance of those whose careers had been long associated with the best-known Zaibatsu firms of pre-war Japan. Among them were, for instance, Ikeda Shigeaki who had worked for the Mitsui Bank for 41 years, holding various top executive posts; Hara Yoshimichi who had been an attorney for the Mitsui and Mitsubishi firms for 36 years; Fujiwara Ginjiro who had served in a variety of executive posts at the Mitsui Merchandising Company before becoming the president of the Oji Company, the paper monopoly concern; and Nakajima Kumakichi who had spent most of his career at the Furukawa Firm. Some others had worked in equally well-known, though not identified as "the Zaibatsu", concerns. For example, Murata Shozo who served in the presidency of the Osaka Merchant Marine Company and later of the Nisshin Steamship Company; and Hirao Hachisaburo who became the president

of the Kawasaki Shipbuilding Company after a brief career in the teaching profession.

A minority among the 11 men were those who had distinguished themselves in various professional fields. Among them were Hashida Kunihiro, a well-known physiologist and a professor at Tokyo University; Kamada Eikichi, an educator who became the president of Keio University; Ogata Taketora, a journalist who held the Editor-in-Chief-ship and the Vice-Presidency of the Asahi News; and Otani Sonyu, a Buddhist priest, recognized as the patriarch of the Shinshu-Honganji Sect.

In TABLE-42, the school-backgrounds of these 11 men were cross-tabulated with their career backgrounds. As alluded earlier, no Tokyo University graduate was to be found among those who came from the business world. Of the 6 men who were recruited from the business world, 3 were educated at Keio University or (Keio Gijuku) and the other 3 at Tokyo Commercial Higher School. Those from the professional fields, on the other hand, did include Tokyo University graduates: two were graduated from Tokyo University (a professor and a lawyer); one from Keio (an educator); one from Waseda (a journalist); and one from the Honganji Seminary.

These men were appointed to the Cabinet in two different ways: Six of them were recruited to the Cabinet directly from the business or professional fields; while the other five were first appointed to the House of Peers in recognition of their

TABLE-42: The School-Background of the Pre-War Cabinet Ministers with "Professional or Business Career": 1918-1945.

Career prior to cabinet entry	School-Background					Total
	Tokyo Univ.	Keio Univ.*	Waseda Univ.	Tokyo Comm. Higher	Other	
	N	N	N	N	N	
Business	0	3	0	3	0	6
Profession	2	1	1	0	1*	5
Total	2	4	1	3	1	11

* Includes its precursor, Keio Gijuku.

* A graduate of Honganji Seminary.

TABLE-43: The Kinds of Cabinets first entered by those with "Professional or Business Career": 1918-1945.

Kinds of cabinets first entered	Number
PARTY CABINETS:	1
Seiyukai Cabinet under Tanaka (1927-1929)	1
NON-PARTY CABINETS:	10
Kato Tomosaburo Cabinet (1922-1923)	1
Saito Cabinet (1932-1934)	1
Hirota Cabinet (1936-1937)	1
1st Konoe Cabinet (1937-1939)	2
Yonai Cabinet (1940)	1
2nd Konoe Cabinet (1940-1941)	3
Koiso Cabinet (1944-1945)	1
Total	11

merits and achievements in the professional or business fields, then recruited to the Cabinet therefrom. Predictably, almost every one of these men was a recruitee of a non-party cabinet. As shown in TABLE-43, all but one of the 11 men made their first cabinet entry in the non-party cabinets formed mostly between 1932 and 1945. The only exception was Hara Yoshimichi who had entered the Seiyukai cabinet of 1927 under Tanaka Gi-ichi.¹⁰ Of the 10 entrants to non-party cabinets, five had entered the Konoe cabinets formed in 1937 and 1940. It was no mere coincidence to find many of these men with a "pure professional" or "pure business" career in Konoe's cabinets, because Konoe Fumimaro, who was committed to the idea of a "national concensus cabinet" (Kyokoku Itchi Naikaku), was intent on building a wider base for his cabinet by including those who "represented" the professional and business communities beyond the concentric circle of the bureaucrats in the administration or the party politicians in the House of Representatives.

¹⁰ According to Matsumoto Gokichi, a behind-the-scene dispenser of political intelligence during the Taisho period, the inclusion of Hara Yoshimichi, who was not a member of the Seiyukai, in the Tanaka cabinet was insisted upon by Hiranuma Kiichiro, then the Vice-Chairman of the Privy Council. See Oka Yoshitake and Hayashi Shigeru, ed. Taisho Demokurashi-ki no Seiji: Matsumoto Gokichi Seiji Nisshi (Politics in the Era of Taisho Democracy; A Political Diary of Matsumoto Gokichi) (Tokyo, 1959), p. 568.

(8) The Hereditary Peers.

A small number of pre-war cabinet ministers were the oldest sons of the members of the Japanese peerage. After inheriting their titles, they became members of the House of Peers either by right or by an election in the rank. While in service in the House of Peers, they were appointed to the Cabinet. There were 7 persons who reached the Cabinet in this manner among the 189 pre-war cabinet ministers (3.7%).

Of these 7 peers, one was a Prince (Konoe Fumimaro); three were Counts (Arima Yoriyasu, Sakai Tadamasa, and Oki Tokichi); two Viscounts (Maeda Toshisada and Watanabe Chifuyu); and one a Baron (Fujimura Yoshiro). Three of these men became members of the House of Peers between the ages of 25 and 30, and remained in the House for most of their lives. Three others entered the House of Peers at much later ages, between 42 and 48; and the remaining one at 36.

Of those who had entered the House after the age of 30, none had held a sustained line of career in one field, a characteristic uncommon among the commoner cabinet ministers. In terms of the diversity of activities and occupations pursued by one individual, the career of Arima Yoriyasu was most interesting: Arima, the son of the old Kurume Hanshu, studied in France after graduating from Tokyo University. Upon return home, he devoted himself to a social work ameliorating the lot of the Eta people. In his early thirties, he entered the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce as a part-time staff (Shoku-

taku), while holding a teaching position at Tokyo University (the Faculty of Agriculture). He also ventured in the business field, holding executive positions in a few corporations. At the age of 39, he ran in the election for the House of Representatives, and was elected. Three years later, he was disqualified from membership of the House due to his inheritance of the peerage at the death of his father. As a Count, Arima entered the House of Peers at the age of 42, elected from his own rank. Although this might not be a case typical of those hereditary peers who became cabinet ministers, it certainly was atypical of the career lines being followed by the commoner cabinet ministers. The backgrounds of some other peers were also "unusual" in different ways. For instance, Oki Tokichi, the son of an ennobled bureaucrat of the Meiji period, had no formal education at all even though he belonged to the post-Restoration generation (born in 1871), hence had an accessibility to modern schools in Japan. Prior to his entry to the House of Peers at the age of 36, he had no definitive career to speak of. If he were born of a commoner, probably his chance of becoming a cabinet minister might have been nil. One who had a relatively consistent and definitive line of career was Fujimura Yoshiro. Fujimura, a graduate of Cambridge University, had started out his career in the teaching profession. After three years of teaching in a Semmongakko, however, he switched to the business field, where he remained for 21 years until he entered the House of Peers at the age of 48.

Even in this "most normal" career, an unusual side-line could be noted: When Fujimura was heading a business establishment of the Mitsui Firm in Shanghai, he was elected and had served as a councilman of the International Concession of the city. He thus seemed to have performed a quasi-administrative function as well as the business duties while in Shanghai.

Looking into the educational background of the 7 peers, we find that the case of Oki Tokichi cited above was a single exception among them. Not only all others were university graduates, but also they were graduated from prestigious universities; three from Tokyo University; two from Kyoto University; and one from Cambridge University.

All of the 7 men had served in the House of Peers for at least 8 years before they made their first cabinet entry. One who had the longest service in the House before becoming a cabinet minister was Konoe Fumimaro. Entering the House at the age of 25 (by right and for life), he had served in the House for 21 years when he was appointed as the Prime Minister in 1937. Two other peers who entered the House between the ages of 25 and 30, Maeda and Sakai, had served in the House for 18 years and 16 years respectively before their first cabinet entry. Those who entered the House of Peers in their forties had spent a much shorter length of time in the House before becoming a cabinet minister --a tendency similar to the one found among those who entered the Cabinet through the House of Representatives. An average of 9 years was spent in the

House of Peers by those who entered it in their forties by the time they were first appointed to the Cabinet.

While in service in the House of Peers, five of the 7 peers belonged to the Kenkyukai, the most dominant parliamentary group within the House which made a shifting alliance with the Seiyukai or the Kenseikai-Minseito in the lower house from time to time.¹¹ Two of the five made their first cabinet entry to party-cabinets: one each to the Seiyukai cabinet of 1918 (Oki Tokichi) and the Minseito cabinet of 1929 (Watanabe Chifuyu). The rest of the peers were the recruits of non-party cabinets.¹²

¹¹ For the alliance of Kenkyukai with the two major parties in the lower house, see Scalapino, *op. cit.*, pp. 200-245.

¹² The following is the list of the specific cabinets that were first entered by the 7 peers:

<u>Cabinet</u>	<u>Number</u>
Party Cabinets:	2
Seiyukai cabinet under Hara (1918-1921)	1
Minseito cabinet under Hamaguchi (1929-1931)	1
Non-party Cabinet:	5
Kato Tomosaburo cabinet (1922-1923)	1
Kiyoura cabinet (1924)	1
First Konoe cabinet (1937-1939)	2*
Abe cabinet (1939-1940)	1
<u>Total</u>	<u>7</u>


* Includes the Prime Minister himself.

By way of a summary, the various career routes taken by the pre-war cabinet ministers are schematically illustrated in FIGURE-5. Of the 189 persons who entered the Japanese Cabinet between 1918 and 1945, all-told 74.6% or 141 had served in the Japanese bureaucracy either for the entire span of their careers up to the time of their cabinet entry or only a part of it. These persons with a bureaucratic career-background had entered the Cabinet through four different "points of entry": As shown in the figure, 51.3% had entered the Cabinet directly from the upper echelon of the bureaucracy; 12.7% had entered it from the upper echelon of the bureaucracy via the House of Peers; 7.4% through the House of Representatives; and 3.2% through the business world

Those who had been in no way associated with the Japanese bureaucracy in their careers constituted 25.4% of the persons entering the Cabinet between 1918 and 1945. They were, prior to entering politics, professionals, businessmen, and the members of the Japanese peerage with or without definite occupation. Of these persons, 15.9% had entered the Cabinet through the House of Representatives; 6.3% through the House of Peers; and 3.2% directly from the professional or business world.

If we look at only the "points of entry" to the Cabinet without differentiating the career-backgrounds of the 189 persons in the figure, it shows: 51.3% had entered the Cabinet from the upper echelon of the bureaucracy; 23.3% from the House of Representatives; 19.0% from the House of Peers; and 6.4% from the professional and business world.

FIGURE 5: The Career Routes taken by 189 Pre-War Cabinet Ministers: 1918-1945.



CHAPTER VII Changes in the Career Patterns and
the Career Routes of the Post-War
Cabinet Ministers: 1945-1964.

In the preceding survey, we have noted that three-quarters of the persons entering the Japanese Cabinet between 1918 and 1945 had a background associated with the career civil service. Also noted was the fact that only less than one-sixth of the persons entering the Cabinet during the same period were members of the House of Representatives who had never associated themselves with the career civil service. Inasmuch as "transcendentalism" had been the prevailing mode of Japanese politics under the pre-war regime and the "transcendental cabinets" accounted for nearly two-thirds of some 25 cabinets formed between 1918 and 1945, the predominance of career bureaucrats and the negligible representation of parliamentary politicians among the pre-war cabinet ministers were not something of unexpected nature. Could we then expect a complete reversal of this characteristic among those entering the post-war cabinets of Japan? To be sure, the parliamentary system of government instituted in post-war Japan was to alter the main avenue of cabinet entry, and accordingly the career patterns of those entering the Cabinet. The likelihood of a person entering a post-war cabinet from the upper echelon of the bureaucracy became practically nil, not only because of the new constitution which makes it a requisite to select a majority of the members of a cabinet from the Diet, but also owing to a full-fledged

operation of party politics in post-war Japan. As a result, a drastic decrease of persons with a "pure bureaucratic career" and at the same time a great increase of those with a parliamentary career would be an obvious change we could expect to find among those entering the post-war cabinets. Beyond this obvious change we could logically deduce, however, there remain some other questions to be answered after looking at the empirical evidence. For instance, what kinds of careers did those entering the post-war cabinets have before they were elected to the Diet? What proportion of them were career bureaucrats, if any, prior to their entry to the Diet? Did these ex-bureaucrats consist mostly of those who had "switched" to a parliamentary career in order to accommodate themselves to the "new rules of game"? Could we find a new group of men whose career backgrounds were distinctively different from any of those entering the pre-war cabinets? Did the change in the mode of political operation from "transcendentalism" to "parliamentalism" bring about a fundamental change in the typology of persons entering the Japanese Cabinet? Or, did it merely have an effect of bringing out more or less similar casts in different costumes? We shall examine these questions in this chapter.

From the first post-war cabinet beginning in August 17, 1945 to the third Ikeda cabinet ending at November 8, 1965, some 18 different cabinets were formed. In these 18 cabinets, all-told 244 persons served with or without portfolio. Of

these persons, those who had already served in a pre-war cabinet(s) numbered 21. Therefore, of the total of 244 persons who had circulated in the Cabinet between 1945 and 1964, 223 were new recruits of the post-war cabinets. The careers of these 223 men were sorted out by using the eight basic patterns of career found among the pre-war cabinet ministers as main typologies; and the results were shown in TABLE-44, together with the career patterns of the pre-war cabinet ministers.

As has been anticipated, the most salient change to be noticed in the table is the near-extinction of "pure bureaucrats" among those entering the post-war cabinets. Persons with the "pure bureaucratic career", who had constituted 60% of the pre-war cabinet ministers, shrivelled to almost nothing, totalling only 4.9% or 11 among the 223 post-war cabinet ministers. Of these 11 "pure bureaucrats", all but one had entered the first three cabinets formed shortly after the War --the Higashikuni, Shidehara, and 1st Yoshida cabinets. Since these cabinets were formed prior to the promulgation of the new constitution in May, 1947, it meant that only one "pure bureaucrat" had entered the Cabinet after the inauguration of the new constitutional regime in post-war Japan. Even in this single exception, it was noticeable that the career history of this particular man was somewhat different from the typical one among those pure bureaucrats entering the pre-war cabinets: Ichimada Naoto, who entered the first Hatoyama cabinet of 1954,

TABLE 44: The Career Patterns of the Pre-War Cabinet Ministers (1918-1945), Compared with the Post-War Cabinet Ministers (1945-1964).

Career Patterns	Pre-War C.M. (1918-1945)		Post-War C.M. (1945-1964)		Total %
	%	(N)	%	(N)	
BUREAUCRATIC CAREER:					
Pure Bureaucratic	59.8%	(113)	4.9%	(11)	30.0% (124)
Bureaucratic-to-Parliamentary	7.4%	(14)	30.9%	(69)	20.1% (83)
Bureaucratic-to-Business	3.2%	(6)	2.3%	(5)	2.7% (11)
Professional-to-Bureaucratic	4.2%	(8)	0.0%	(0)	1.9% (8)
Sub-total	74.6%	(141)	38.1%	(85)	54.7% (226)
NON-BUREAUCRATIC CAREER:					
Professional-to-Parliamentary	10.1%	(19)	23.3%	(52)	17.2% (71)
Business-to-Parliamentary	5.8%	(11)	23.8%	(53)	15.6% (64)
Professional or Business	5.8%	(11)	4.5%	(10)	5.1% (21)
Hereditary Peer Members of Diet	3.7%	(7)	0.0%	(0)	1.7% (7)
Others* (to-Parliamentary)	0.0%	(0)	10.3%	(23)	5.6% (23)
Sub-total	25.4%	(48)	61.9%	(138)	45.2% (186)
Total	100.0%	(189)	100.0%	(223)	99.9% (412)

* Include "pure politicians", the trade union functionaries, and private secretaries, etc.

had been working in the Bank of Japan since 1919; after 27 years of continuous service in the Bank, he was promoted to its presidency in 1946; from this post, he entered the first Hatoyama cabinet as the Minister of Finance. (A year later, however, while in the minister's post, he ran for the House of Representatives, and was elected to the House.) Although Ichimada's career could be thus classified as "pure bureaucratic" under the definition originally set forth, it was slightly off-track in the sense that he was not, unlike most of the "pure bureaucrats" entering the pre-war cabinets, a regular civil servant coming from the government ministries.

Aside from these "pure bureaucrats", there were two other groups of men who had entered the post-war cabinets without ever being elected to the Diet: those with a "Bureaucratic-to-Business" career; and those with a "pure professional" or "pure business" career. Persons with the "bureaucratic-to-business" career (i.e. ex-bureaucrats who had entered the Cabinet from the business world where they had been working since the termination of their earlier civil service career) totalled only 5 or 2.3% among the 223 post-war cabinet ministers; and all of them were the recruits of the first three post-war cabinets formed prior to the commencement of the new constitutional regime. Persons who had a "pure professional" or "pure business" career numbered 10 or 4.5% among the post-war cabinet ministers. Seven out of the 10 were also the recruits of the first three post-war cabinets. Of the remain-

ing 3, one each had entered the third and the fourth Yoshida cabinet (Amano Teiyu and Mukai Tadaharu) and the other the first Kishi cabinet (Fujiyama Aiichiro). The total number of persons who had entered the post-war cabinets without a membership in the Diet adds up to 26 (11.7%) among the 223 post-war cabinet ministers (11 with the "pure bureaucratic career", 5 with the "bureaucratic-to-business career", and 10 with the "pure professional or business career"). Of these 26 men, 22 were the recruitees of the first three post-war cabinets which came into being while the old constitution was more or less still in effect. Since the new constitutional system became operative, only four persons entered the Japanese Cabinet without a membership in the Diet.

Of the 223 post-war cabinet ministers, 88.3% or 197 had a membership either in the House of Representatives or the House of Councillors when they had first entered the Cabinet. The careers of these men prior to their election to the Diet fell into four broad categories: (1) the civil service career; (2) a career in the professions; (3) a career in business; and (4) others, which included a "pure political career", a career in the trade union or other voluntary associational organizations, and a career as the secretary of prominent persons. Most numerous among the four were those who had a civil service career prior to their election to the Diet (i.e. "Bureaucratic-to-Parliamentary Career"), totalling 69 (30.9% of the total number of post-war cabinet ministers). Those who had a career in

the professions before their entry to the Diet (i.e. "Professional-to-Parliamentary Career") and those who had been engaged in business before their election to the Diet (i.e. "Business-to-Parliamentary Career") numbered 52 and 53 respectively (23.3% and 23.8% respectively of the total number of post-war cabinet ministers). Persons who entered the Diet from the career lines other than the civil service, the professions, and business numbered 23 or 10.3 % among the 223 post-war cabinet ministers.

Among the pre-war cabinet ministers we have examined earlier, ex-bureaucrats who made their cabinet entry through the House of Representatives (i.e. men with "Bureaucratic-to-Parliamentary Career") occupied only a small fraction (7.4%). In contrast, nearly one-third (30.9%) of the post-war cabinet ministers were ex-bureaucrats who made their way to the Cabinet through the parliamentary channel. Among those ex-bureaucrats who had entered the pre-war cabinets via the House of Representatives, it was possible to distinguish two typologies of men: ones who made an "overnight switch" to a parliamentary career from the top ranking civil service posts at the turn of the political tide during the Taisho period; and the others who had resigned from lower civil service posts, possibly unconnected with the political change, and had "built" their new career in politics. Could we find a parallel of this sort among those ex-bureaucrats who had entered the post-war cabinets through the Diet? Data in TABLES-45 and -46 were provided to look into this question.

TABLE-45: The Time of the Civil Service Entrance and Termination and the Highest Level of Civil Service Post held, Post-War Cabinet Ministers with "Bureaucratic-to-Parliamentary Career": 1945-1964.

Highest level of post held	Time of Civil Service Entrance				TOTAL N	Time of Resignation from C.S.	
	Before 1920	1920-1929	1930-1935	1936-1941		Before the end of WWII	After the end of WWII
Vice-Minister	1	13	0	0	14	2	12
Bureau-Chief's post in Ministries, or equivalent*	9	21	3	0	33	7	26
Below Bureau-Chief level	7	6	4	5	22	10	12
Total	17	40	7	5	69	19	50

* Includes Prefectural Governorship, the Directorship of Independent Agencies, and the Procurator's Office at the Highest Court.

TABLE-46: The Highest Level of Civil Service Post held and the Time of the First Election to the Diet, Post-War Cabinet Ministers with "Bureaucratic-to-Parliamentary Career": 1945-1964.

	Time of 1st election to Diet						Total
	Before 1946	1946	1947	1949- 1952	1953- 1956	After 1956	
Highest level of post held	1946 N	1946 N	1947 N	1949- 1952 N	1953- 1956 N	After 1956 N	Total N
Vice-Minister	1	0	1	8	3	1	14
(Elected to lower house)	(1)	(0)	(1)	(8)	(1)	(0)	(11)
(Elected to upper house)	(-)	(-)	(0)	(0)	(2)	(1)	(3)
Bureau-Chief level	2	3	6	16	6	0	33
(Elected to lower house)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(11)	(1)	(0)	(21)
(Elected to upper house)	(-)	(-)	(2)	(5)	(5)	(0)	(12)
Below Bureau-Chief	5	3	3	8	3	0	22
(Elected to lower house)	(5)	(3)	(2)	(6)	(1)	(0)	(17)
(Elected to upper house)	(-)	(-)	(1)	(2)	(2)	(0)	(5)
Total	8	6	10	32	12	1	69
(Elected to lower house)	(8)	(6)	(7)	(25)	(3)	(0)	(49)
(Elected to upper house)	(-)	(-)	(3)	(7)	(9)	(1)	(20)

An examination of data in TABLE-45 shows that more than two-thirds of the ex-bureaucrats who entered the post-war cabinets through the Diet had served in the upper echelon of the Japanese bureaucracy. Of the total of 69 ex-bureaucrats who entered the post-war cabinets through the Diet, 14 had held the post of Vice-Minister and other 33 the bureau-chief's posts in the Ministries or equivalent posts while they were in the civil service. Most of these bureaucrats holding the top-grade posts, as can be seen in the same table, had joined the civil service in the 1920's; and only 9 of them had terminated their civil service career prior to the end of World War II. If we look into the times at which these high-ranking ex-bureaucrats were first elected to the Diet (TABLE-46), it shows that all but one of the 14 ex-Vice-Ministers, and all but five of the 33 ex-Bureau-Chiefs (or equivalents), were elected to the Diet after 1946. It meant that, therefore, of the 47 ex-bureaucrats who had held the Bureau-Chief-ship or the Vice-Minister-ship, 41 entered the Diet only after the new constitutional system was instituted. In all probability, if it had not been for the post-war political change, and therefore the "transcendental cabinet" had remained in existence in post-war Japan, a majority of these top-ranking bureaucrats could have made a cabinet entry by the 1950's by staying in their original career. To illustrate this point, it may be better to cite a few cases of well-known personalities of post-war politics: Ikeda Hayato, who became the Prime Minister heading a Liberal-Democratic Party cabinet in 1960, had entered

the Ministry of Finance in 1926; through steady promotions, he came to hold the post of the Chief of the Master Taxation Bureau of the Ministry by the end of the War; therefrom he was promoted to Vice-Minister of Finance in 1947; after serving in this post for a year, he resigned from the civil service and ran for a seat in the House of Representatives under the Liberal Party ticket in 1949; elected to the House, he entered the third Yoshida cabinet in the same year as Minister of Finance. Sato Eisaku, another Prime Minister who was to head a Liberal-Democratic Party cabinet from 1964 to 1972, entered the Ministry of Railways in 1924 after passing the Civil Service Entrance Examination; after more than 20 years of continuous service in the Ministry, he had advanced to the Chief of the General Bureau of Railways in the then reorganized Ministry of Transportation by the end of the War; promoted to the Vice-Minister of Transportation in 1947, he served in this post for a year before resigning from the civil service in 1948; a year later, Sato ran in the election of the House of Representatives under the Liberal Party ticket, and was elected to the House; in 1952, he entered the third Yoshida cabinet as the Minister of Tele-Communication concurrently holding the portfolio of the Postal Service. To cite the case of a lesser known person: Okazaki Katsuo had entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1923 after passing the Foreign Service Entrance Examination; after serving in various posts in the Embassies and Consulates abroad as well as in the Ministry itself

for more than 20 years, he came to hold the post of Chief of the General Affairs Bureau in the Foreign Ministry, then the Vice-Minister-ship, shortly after the War; in 1948 he resigned from the civil service, and a year later ran for a seat in the House of Representatives under the Liberal Party ticket; elected to the House, Okazaki entered the third Yoshida cabinet in 1952 as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Thus, many of the high-ranking ex-bureaucrats who entered the post-war cabinets through the parliamentary channel were the type of persons who could have entered a "transcendental cabinet" of the pre-war variety as "pure bureaucrats". The post-war change in the avenue of cabinet entry seemed to have obliged them to make a "detour" through the electoral politics and the new career of parliamentary politician to reach the cabinet posts.

A typology of career distinctively different from these could be found, though in small number, among those ex-bureaucrats who had terminated their civil service career while they were still in a relatively lower echelon of the bureaucracy. As shown in TABLE-45, 22 of the 69 ex-bureaucrats who had entered the post-war cabinets through the Diet were holding a post below the level of Bureau-Chief in Ministries when they terminated their civil service career. Of the 22, 10 had resigned from the civil service before the end of the War -- a far larger proportion than that among the high-ranking ones. Of these 10, one-half had entered the House of Representatives long before the War (see TABLE-46). The careers of these 5 men were different from the others in that, by the time the

War had ended, they were already veteran parliamentarians of a long standing record. To cite, once again, a representative case: Makino Ryoze, who entered the third Hatoyama cabinet in 1955, had terminated his civil service career in 1914 when he was holding a section-chief's post in the Ministry of Communication; thereafter practicing law for six years, he was elected to the House of Representatives in 1920; from then on to the time of his cabinet entry in 1955, he was elected to the House ten times, missing only two of the twelve elections held in the duration. Very similar to this case were: Yano Shotaro, who entered the Katayama cabinet of 1947 after 7 consecutive elections to the House since 1930; and Ota Masatake, who entered the third Hatoyama cabinet of 1955 after 6 elections to the House since 1930. Also belonging to this typology of career, though varied slightly, were: Masutani Hideji, a former district court judge, who was elected to the House first in 1920 and five more times before his cabinet entry in 1948; and Tsurumi Yusuke, a former Section-Chief in the Ministry of Railways (as well as a renowned author of numerous books), who was elected to the House of Representatives four times off and on before the War and to the House of Councillors after the War, from which he entered the first Hatoyama cabinet in 1954. It thus seemed that some of the lower-ranking ex-bureaucrats who had entered the post-war cabinets through the Diet were, unlike most of the high-ranking ones, the "passive beneficiaries" of the post-war political change that opened up the parliamentary channel of cabinet entry, in which they had estab-

lished their new career long before the political change took place.

In the preceding chapter we have noted that persons with the "Professional-to-Parliamentary Career" constituted 10.1% of those who had entered the pre-war cabinets between 1918 and 1945. Persons with this pattern of career had increased considerably among those entering the post-war cabinets. Of the 223 persons who had entered the post-war cabinets, 23.3% or 52 had a career in the professions before their election to the Diet --more than twice the percentage shown for the pre-war cabinet ministers. Unlike the group of ex-bureaucrats we have just examined, this group contained a large contingent of men whose parliamentary careers antedated the post-war political change. As shown in TABLE-47, of the 52 post-war cabinet ministers who had started out their career in the professions, nearly one-half (25) entered the House of Representatives in the pre-war period. Of these pre-war entrants to the House, 14 were lawyers, 7 journalists, 3 teachers (2 university professors and 1 primary school teacher), and 1 medical doctor (see the same table). Thus, most dominant among were those from the legal profession. Of the remainder of 27 who embarked on a parliamentary career after the War, most (21) were first elected to the Diet either in the first post-war general election of 1946 or in the second one in 1947 (the first election under the new constitution). Among these post-war entrants to the Diet, most numerous were those from the journalistic profession, numbering 12 out of the 27. Next

TABLE-47: The Time of First Election to the Diet and the Kinds of Professions prior to the Election, Post-War Cabinet Ministers with "Professional-to-Parliamentary Career": 1945-1964.

Kind of profession engaged in before election to Diet	Time of first election to the Diet*						Total
	Before 1932	1932-1942	1946	1947	1949	1952 or after	
Lawyer	7	7	3	0	0	0	17
Teacher	2	1	5	4	0	0	12
(University)	(1)	(1)	(2)	(3)**			(7)
(Semmon-Kotogakko)	(0)	(0)	(2)	(0)			(2)
(High School)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(1)			(2)
(Primary School)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(0)			(1)
Journalist	6	1	2	5	4	1	19
Physician	1	0	0	1#	0	0	2
Engineer	0	0	0	1	0	1#	2
Total	16	9	10	11	4	2	52

* All cases except those indicated otherwise were elected to the House of Representatives.

** Two of the three were elected to the House of Councillors.

Elected to the House of Councillors.

to the journalists were those from the teaching profession, totalling 9. Of these 9, seven had taught at universities or other college-level institutions and the other two at high schools. Both of the teachers from high schools were women (Nakayama Masa and Kondo Tsuruyo), and they were the only femals represented among the members of the Japanese Cabinet since 1885. Lawyers, who were most numerous among the pre-war entrants to the House, numbered only 3 among the post-war entrants. Most of the lawyers who entered the post-war cabinets were, therefore, those who had embarked on a parliamentary career before the War. If we make a tally of the 52 men who had entered the post-war cabinets through the "Professional-to-Parliamentary Career" according to their specific professions without differentiating the time of their entry to the Diet, the result is: 19 journalists, 17 lawyers, 12 teachers, 2 medical doctors, and 2 engineers. The ratio of men represented from each profession in this group of post-war cabinet ministers was not radically different from the one in the corresponding group of pre-war cabinet ministers we have examined in the preceding chapter.

While there was no socialist among those ex-bureaucrats who had entered the post-war cabinets through the parliamentary channel, there were four members of the Japan Socialist Party among the 52 men who had entered the post-war cabinets through the "Professional-to-Parliamentary Career". Although this number might be insignificant in absolute terms, it represented one-third of the total number of socialists represented among

the entire population of post-war cabinet ministers. Three of the four socialists who entered the Cabinet through this particular pattern of career had been practicing law prior to their election to the Diet (Katayama Tetsu, Mizutani Chosaburo, and Suzuki Yoshio); and the other had been teaching at a university (Hatano Kanae). Two of the socialists had entered the House of Representatives long before the War (Mizutani in 1928 and Katayama in 1930), while the other two embarked on the parliamentary career only after the War. All of the four made their first cabinet entry in 1947 when the coalition cabinet of the Socialists and the left-wing conservatives was formed under Katayama Tetsu.

Along with the "Professional-to-Parliamentary Career", another career pattern to which a large proportion of the persons entering the post-war cabinets belonged was the "Business-to-Parliamentary Career". Of the 223 persons who had entered the post-war cabinets, 53 or 23.8% had a "business-to-parliamentary" career. Compared to this, persons who had the same pattern of career constituted only 5.8% of those entering the pre-war cabinets between 1918 and 1945. Thus, the business world, together with the professional world, became the great provider of post-war cabinet ministers. A great majority of these cabinet ministers from the business world were the parliamentary politicians of "post-war vintage". As shown in TABLE-48, of the 53 post-war cabinet ministers who had a "business-to-parliamentary" career, more than two-thirds (37) were first elected to the Diet only after the War. The pre-war en-

TABLE-48: The Time of First Election to the Diet and the Types of Business Careers prior to the Election, Post-War Cabinet Ministers with "Business-to-Parliamentary Career": 1945-1964.

Type of business career before election to Diet	Time of first election to Diet						Total
	Before 1932	1932-1942	1946	1947	1949	After 1949	
Owner and/or operator of small enterprises	4	4	3	7	0	0	18
(Elected to lower house)	(4)	(4)	(3)	(1)			(12)
(Elected to upper house)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(6)			(6)
Directorate of large enterprises	4	4	10	11	3	3	35
(Elected to lower house)	(4)	(4)	(10)	(4)	(3)	(1)	(26)
(Elected to upper house)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(7)	(-)	(2)	(9)
Total	8	8	13	18	3	3	53
(Elected to lower house)	(8)	(8)	(13)	(5)	(3)	(1)	(38)
(Elected to upper house)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(13)	(-)	(2)	(15)

trants to the Diet were a minority among them, totalling 16. In this respect, this particular group of post-war cabinet ministers from the business world was more akin to the group of ex-bureaucrats who had entered the post-war cabinets through the parliamentary channel than to the group of those from the professional world, of whom about one-half were the pre-war entrants to the Diet.

A feature of some interest we can notice in TABLE-48 is that a large number of those cabinet ministers who entered the Diet from the business world after the War made their entry to the Cabinet through the Upper House (the House of Councilors). Of the 37 post-war entrants to the Diet represented in the group of cabinet ministers from the business world, 13 were first elected to the Diet in 1946 when the House of Councilors was not yet instituted. Of the remaining 24 who entered the Diet after the elective bicameral system was inaugurated in 1947, 15 were in the Upper House. This meant that more than 60% of those who embarked on a parliamentary career from the business world after 1946 were entrants to the House of Councilors. Such a high proportion was unparalleled in other groups of post-war cabinet ministers we have examined so far. For instance, in the case of those ex-bureaucrats who entered the post-war cabinets through the parliamentary channel, the entrants to the upper house constituted 36% of the post-1946 entrants to the Diet -- 20 out of the 55 who entered the Diet after 1946 (see TABLE-46). In the case of those professionals who entered the post-war cabinets through the Diet,

the percentage of the entrants to the upper house was even smaller, amounting to 24% among the post-1946 entrants to the Diet --4 out of 17 (see TABLE-47 and the notes). Why did those from the business world enter the upper house more often than others? There seemed to be a rather simple explanation for it. Because of the large size of the constituencies from which the members of the upper house are elected (i.e. the prefectural and the national), it is usually much more costly to conduct election campaigns for the upper house than for the lower house; to offset this disadvantage, however, the members of the upper house could enjoy, once elected, a longer term of office (6 years) and more secure tenure (not subject to dissolution) than the members of the lower house. Consequently, those from the business world who are better disposed to meet the financial drawback of the upper house election tend to run for it more often than others.

As for the types of business careers followed by the 53 post-war cabinet ministers prior to their entry to politics, about one-third (18) of them were operating relatively small enterprises; the rest (35) were holding a directorate in large industries or corporations (see the same table). Many of the small-scale entrepreneurs seemed to have joined their family businesses. In eight cases, it was positively identifiable that the enterprises they had operated before their entry to politics were their family-owned businesses.¹ Though the evi-

¹ They were: Ide Ichitaro (sake brewery), Nishikawa Jin-

dence is not conclusive, it seems that those who had started out their business "from scratch" were rather exceptional cases among these small-scale entrepreneurs. Discernible among those who had been holding the managerial positions in large industries or corporations before their entry to politics were two different types of business careers. Belonging to one type were those who might be called as "corporation bureaucrats". Characteristically, these men had entered large firms or corporations as white-collar workers immediately after finishing their higher education, and had advanced to the managerial positions after long years of service either in one company or in a series of companies. The other type comprised those who had founded their own concerns relatively early in their career and had successfully expanded them to a large enterprises. More often than not, these men had started out their career from a humbler station than a typical "corporation bureaucrat", being less educated than the latter. A representative case is the career of Okada Seiichi, the Minister of Transportation in the Ashida cabinet of 1948, who had started out as a diver in a salvage company, later to found his own salvage company and a merchant fleet company. Proportionally, the "corporation bureaucrats" outnumbered the other type nearly by four to one.

goro (tatami and mosquito-net manufacturing), Kogure Budayu (hot-spring spa operation), Kurokawa Takeo (pastry bakery), Onogi Hidejiro (textile and woodwork), Yamaguchi Kikuichiro (brewery and dairy), Mori Kotaro (sericulture and hatchery), and Matsuura Shutaro (lumber mill).

Of the 18 post-war cabinet ministers who had operated small-scale enterprises before embarking on their parliamentary careers, 8 (44%) had been elected to a Prefectural Assembly or a City Council, or both, prior to their election to the Diet.² In contrast, none of the 35 holding a directorate in large enterprises had been elected to any of the local assemblies before their election to the Diet. Those who had been engaged in small-scale enterprises thus showed an inclination to start out their political careers in the local level, then to reach out for the national office from the constituencies in which they already had a tested ground; while those from the managerial positions in large enterprises usually bypassed local politics. Undoubtedly, this difference stemmed from the varying compatibility of the two business careers with a career in local politics. For the operators of small enterprises who were self-employed or "family-employed" and whose business was more or less localized, it was possible to combine their business careers with a career in local politics on a part-time basis. The same would not have been the case for those who had entered the business world as a member of a "corporate bureaucracy" and had advanced through the routinized hierarchy to reach the top managerial positions.

As for the party affiliation of these 53 post-war cabinet ministers from the business world, as might be expected, there

² They were: Yamaguchi Kikuichiro, Takeuchi Yuki, Yamamura Shinjiro, Furuhata Tokuya, Hirokawa Kozen, Kobayashi Eizo, Mori Kotaro, and Matsuura Shutaro.

was no socialist among them. When they were first elected to the Diet, 6 belonged to the Minseito, 5 to the Seiyukai, 23 to the Liberal Party (Nihon Jiyuto, Minshu-Jiyuto, and Jiyuto), 11 to the Democratic Party (Minshuto) or its recursor, the Progressive Party (Shimpoto), one to the Cooperative Party (Kokumin-Kyodoto), and 7 were independents.

Among those who had entered the post-war cabinets through the parliamentary channel was a group of men whose careers could not be fitted into any of the career patterns that had been found among the pre-war cabinet ministers. They were a new "species" of parliamentary politicians emerged in the post-war cabinets. A common trait among these men was the predominantly "political" nature of the career lines they had followed before embarking on their parliamentary careers. If we were to give a label to this group of men, the most suitable generic name would be "professional politicians". This group of "professional politicians", comprising 23 persons in all, can be classified into a few sub-groups. Members of one sub-group, comprising 13 men, had worked as the organizers, functionaries, or officials of labor unions, farmers' unions, or other voluntary associational organizations before they were elected to the Diet; all but three of whom were socialists. Some of these socialists had served exclusively as officials in the mass movement. They joined the movement during their student days or immediately after the graduation from universities (e.g. Kato Kanju, Hirano Rikizo, Tomiyoshi Eiji). Others had been briefly engaged in a manual work or a salaried occupation before becoming

a functionary of the mass organizations (e.g. Nishio Suehiro, a latheman; Yonekubo Mitsusuke, a merchant seaman; Nagae Kazuo, a social worker). All of the three non-socialists represented in this sub-group had worked as the officials of farm organizations (landed farmers) before their entry to the Diet. Two of them had been managing their own farms along with serving in farm organizations (Iwamoto Nobuyuki, Akagi Munenori), while the other had been serving as a town executive as well as a head of a local farm organization (Hayashi-Joji).

While the mass organizations were the principal medium through which these men built their political base to embark on their parliamentary careers, another group of "professional politicians" obtained political support by serving in the elective local assemblies or by working as a private secretary to prominent politicians. A typical and well-known example of the former is Ono Bamboku, who became the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Vice-President of the Liberal Party, and a cabinet minister in the post-war period. While a student at Meiji University, Ono was a member of the Seiyukai Party in Tokyo; and within a few years after graduation, was elected to the City Council. Thereafter, he served as a councilman for more than ten years until his election to the House of Representatives in 1930. A good example of a person who entered a parliamentary career by working as a private secretary for prominent politicians is Koizumi Junya. In the year of his graduation from Nippon University (1930), he became a private

secretary of Koizumi Matajiro, then the General Secretary of the Minseito and the Minister of Communication in the Hamaguchi cabinet. After six years of such service, the younger Koizumi and his boss ran for election to the House of Representatives from the boss's district (the Second Kanagawa District). As it was a multi-member district, both were elected to the House. There were seven persons with one of these two typologies of career or a hybrid of them among the "professional politicians".³ The remainder of the "professional politicians" --three in all-- were those persons who had started out their career as a member of the House of Representatives. Among them was the youngest person ever elected to the pre-war House of Representatives: Miki Takeo, who entered the House at the age of 30, prior to which he had been a student in Japan and abroad.⁴

When were these "professional politicians" first elected to the Diet? Did they contain a larger proportion of those who had entered the Diet during the pre-war period than the other groups of post-war cabinet ministers we have examined earlier?

³ They were: in addition to Ono Bamboku and Koizumi Junya; Honda Ichitaro, Sakata Michita, Tanaka Takeo, Nakamura Sannojo, and Watanabe Yoshio.

⁴ The other two were elected to the House at a later age: Matsuda Takechiyo at the age of 35; and Inukai Ken at 33. Matsuda who had studied at New York University stayed in the United States until his early thirties, serving as the General Secretary of the Japanese Association in New York City and operating a Japanese employment agency in the city. After his return home, he served as a trustee of a community service organization (Yurin-en) in Tokyo until his election to the House in 1924. Inukai Ken, the son of the prime minister, Inukai Tsuyoshi, also had no sustained career until his election to the House, except a freelance writing. He was elected from his father's constituency in Okayama together with his father in 1930.

The answers were provided in TABLES-49 and -50. As data in TABLE-49 indicate, all but five of the 23 "professional politicians" were first elected to the Diet during the pre-war period; and more than one-third of the pre-war entrants were elected prior to 1932. The comparative data shown in TABLE-50 indicate that the group of "professional politicians" contained the largest proportion of pre-war entrants to the Diet among the four groups of post-war cabinet ministers compared. The percentage of pre-war entrants to the Diet among the "professional politicians" stood at 78%; the corresponding percentages for the other three groups were: 48% for those cabinet ministers from the business world, 30% for those from the professional world, and 12% for those from the civil service (i.e. the ex-bureaucrats). Thus, the parliamentary politicians of "pre-war vintage" were most frequently represented among the "professional politicians", while they were least frequent among the ex-bureaucrats. Between these two extremes were the group from the professional world containing the pre-war entrants and the post-war entrants with a ratio of about one to one; and the group from the business world with a ratio of roughly one to two.

In an earlier chapter we have noted the preponderance of Tokyo University graduates in the post-war cabinets as well as in the pre-war cabinets. The main bulk of Tokyo University graduates represented in the pre-war cabinets was found in the group of "pure bureaucrats"; specifically, the non-military portion of "pure bureaucrats" which made up nearly 40% of the

TABLE-49: The Careers of 23 "Professional Politicians" before Election to the Diet and the Time of First Election to the Diet, Post-War Cabinet Ministers: 1945-1964.

Kinds of career prior to the election to Diet	Time of 1st election to the Diet*				Total N
	Before 1932 N	1932- 1942 N	1946 N	1947 N	
Official of labor unions or farmers' unions (socialist)	2	6	1	1	10
Official of farm organizations (non-socialist)	1	1	1	0	3
Local politician and/or secretary of politicians	2	3	1	1	7
No pre-parliamentary career	2	1	0	0	3
<u>Total</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>23</u>

* All were elected to the House of Representatives.

TABLE 50: The Patterns of Career and the Periods of First Election to the Diet.
Post-War Cabinet Ministers: 1945-1964.

Career Pattern	Period of 1st election to Diet		Total % (N)
	Pre-War Period (1920-1942) % (N)	Post-War Period (1946-1959) % (N)	
Bureaucratic-to-Parliamentary	12% (8)	88% (61)	100% (69)
Professional-to-Parliamentary	48% (25)	52% (27)	100% (52)
Business-to-Parliamentary	30% (16)	70% (37)	100% (53)
"Professional Politician"	78% (18)	22% (5)	100% (23)
Total	34% (67)	66% (130)	100% (197)

persons entering the pre-war cabinets between 1918 and 1945. "Pure bureaucrats", as we have seen, all but disappeared from the post-war cabinets. Where, then, could we locate the main bulk of Tokyo University graduates sustaining their dominance in the post-war cabinets? We can find the answer in TABLE-51. More than one-half of Tokyo University graduates represented in the post-war cabinets could be found in the group of ex-bureaucrats who had entered the Cabinet through the Diet. There were all-told 96 Tokyo University-educated men (including a few dropouts) among the 223 post-war cabinet ministers. Of the 96, 51 were found in the group of men who had a "bureaucratic-to-parliamentary" career. The remainder of 45 were distributed diffusely among other groups; 12 were in the group of men who had a "professional-to-parliamentary" career; 11 among those with a "business-to-parliamentary" career; and 18 in the group of men who had entered the post-war cabinets (mostly the first three post-war cabinets) without being elected to the Diet. (i.e. those with a "pure professional or business" career).

The varying school-backgrounds among the four main groups of post-war cabinet ministers with differing career patterns can be noted from the data shown in the same table. It also shows the extremely high proportion of government university graduates among those who had a "bureaucratic-to-parliamentary" career. 90% of the persons who had entered the post-war cabinets through this particular pattern of career had come from

TABLE 51: The School-Background and the Career Patterns, Post-War Cabinet Ministers:
1945-1964.

School- background*	Career Pattern						Total % (N)
	Bureaucra- tic-to-Par- liamentary % (N)	Profession- al-to-Par- liamentary % (N)	Business- to-Parlia- mentary % (N)	"Profession- al Politi- cian" % (N)	Others# % (N)		
Tokyo University	74% (51)	23% (12)	21% (11)	18% (4)	69% (18)	43% (96)	
Other Gov't universities	16% (11)	11% (6)	11% (7)	9% (2)	4% (1)	12% (27)	
Private univ. in Japan, or foreign univ.	4% (3)	52% (27)	34% (18)	43% (10)	8% (2)	27% (60)	
Semmon/Koto- semmon-gakko	6% (4)	12% (6)	11% (7)	18% (4)	15% (4)+	11% (25)	
No college- level education	0% (0)	2% (1)	19% (10)	13% (3)	4% (1)	7% (15)	
Total	100% (69)	100% (52)	101% (53)	101% (23)	100% (26)	100% (223)	

* Graduates and "dropouts".

Include "pure bureaucratic career", "bureaucratic-to-business career", and "pure professional or business career".

+ Includes 3 Army Cadet School graduates.

government universities. Of the 90%, 74% were from Tokyo University (71% from the university's Law Faculty) and the other 16% from other government universities (mostly from Kyoto University). A great majority of these ex-bureaucrats had served, as noted earlier, in the top echelon of the Japanese bureaucracy; and most of them had embarked on the parliamentary career after the end of the World War II. In their characteristics, therefore, this group of ex-bureaucrats was a "lineal descendant" of the pre-war "pure bureaucrats", who made a debut in a new garb of parliamentarian for the changed scenery of party politics in post-war Japan.

A characteristic diametrically opposed to this could be found in the group of "professional politicians". 61% of "professional politicians" were those from private universities in Japan, foreign universities, or Semmongakko; and 13% had no college-level education. Government-university-educated persons totalled only 27% among "professional politicians". As we have seen earlier, three-fourths (78%) of these "professional politicians" were veteran parliamentarians whose entry to the Diet predated the post-war political change; and not of them had spent a good part of their pre-parliamentary careers in local politics of mass movements. Unlike the group of ex-bureaucrats, these "professional politicians" were entirely new elements emerged in the post-war cabinets, having no "antecedents" in the pre-war cabinets.

Approximately two-thirds (64%) of those who had entered the post-war cabinets through a "professional-to-parliamentary"

career were educated either at private universities in Japan, foreign universities, or Seimongakko; most of the rest (34%) were educated at government universities (23% at Tokyo University). This group was thus closer, in school-background, to the group of "professional politicians" than to the group of ex-bureaucrats. It also had a closer affinity to the group of "professional politicians" in that both contained a much larger contingent of veteran parliamentarians (i.e. the pre-war entrants to the Diet) than other groups.

As for those who had a "business-to-parliamentary" career, the proportion of government university graduates was approximately the same as the one for those who had a "professional-to-parliamentary" career, standing at 32% (21% for Tokyo University graduates). Unlike the latter, however, this group of men from the business world contained a considerable proportion of non-college graduates: 19% of the persons who had entered the post-war cabinets through a "business-to-parliamentary" career had no college-level education. In this respect, this group was more alike, in characteristic, to the group of "professional politicians" than to any other group. All of the ex-bureaucrats, for instance, had attained a college-level education. As for those who had a "professional-to-parliamentary" career, only 2% (one person) had no college-level education. The rarity of those who had not attained a college-level education among the ex-bureaucrats or the former professionals would be a self-explanatory feature, since the attainment of a higher education was ordinarily a requisite for en-

trance to the civil service or to a profession. Unlike the civil service career or the professional career, a career in business or "pure politics" was open to those who were not equipped with a higher education, thus providing them with main ascending routes to political prominence and cabinet entry. It was no coincidence, therefore, to find most of those cabinet ministers with no higher education among the former businessmen and "professional politicians".

Could we find any significant relationship between the differing patterns of career followed by the post-war cabinet ministers and the ages at which they made their first cabinet entry? Data tabulated in TABLE-52 were intended to look into this relationship. Persons who made their first cabinet entry at relatively early ages could be found most frequently in the group of "professional politicians". 22% of the "professional politicians" made their first cabinet entry between the ages of 40 and 49; 65% between 50 and 59; and 13% between 60 and 69. There was no one who had first entered the Cabinet later than the age of 69 among these "professional politicians".

Persons who made the first cabinet entry at considerably late ages, on the other hand, could be found most frequently among those who had a "professional-to-parliamentary" career. 14% of the persons with this pattern of career had first entered the Cabinet between the ages of 70 and 79; other 37% between 60 and 69. Ones who made the cabinet entry between the ages of 40 and 49 (the youngest age-group) in this group totalled only 8%, the smallest among all of the groups compared in the

TABLE-52: The Career Patterns and the Age at the First Cabinet Entry, Post-War Cabinet Ministers: 1945-1964.

Age at 1st cabinet entry	Career Pattern						Total %
	Bureaucra- tic-Par- liamentary %	Profession- al-to-Par- liamentary %	Business- to-Parlia- mentary %	"Profession- al Politi- cian" %	Others %	Total %	
40-49 (40-44) (45-49)	18% (6%) (12%)	8% (6%) (2%)	19% (8%) (11%)	22% (9%) (13%)	12% (4%) (8%)	15% (6%) (9%)	
50-59 (50-54) (55-59)	46% (18%) (28%)	42% (23%) (19%)	38% (21%) (17%)	65% (22%) (43%)	23% (4%) (19%)	42% (18%) (24%)	
60-69 (60-64) (65-69)	31% (25%) (6%)	37% (29%) (8%)	40% (19%) (21%)	13% (9%) (4%)	58% (50%) (8%)	36% (26%) (10%)	
70-79 (70-74) (75-79)	6% (6%) (0%)	14% (10%) (4%)	4% (4%) (0%)	0% (0%) (0%)	8% (8%) (0%)	7% (6%) (1%)	
Total %	101%	101%	101%	100%	101%	100%	
Total Number	69	52	53	23	26	223	
Average Age:	56.5	59.1	57.1	54.7	59.4	57.5	

table. Thus, there was a consistent tendency for tardiness in the age of cabinet entry for this group of former professionals, as opposed to the tendency found among the "professional politicians". The average ages of cabinet entry computed for these groups reflect this difference: On the average, the "professional politicians" made their first cabinet entry at the age of 54; while those who had a "professional-to-parliamentary" career made it at the age of 59.

Standing between these two groups showing opposing tendency were the group of ex-bureaucrats and the group of former businessmen. They were very similar in the percentage-distribution of the youngest and the oldest age-groups for cabinet entry: 18% of the ex-bureaucrats and 19% of the former businessmen made the cabinet entry between the ages of 40 and 49; 6% of the former and 4% of the latter had first entered the Cabinet between the ages of 70 and 79. The average age of cabinet entry for the group of ex-bureaucrats was 56; the corresponding one for those who had a "business-to-parliamentary" career was 57.

Did the post-war change in the avenue of cabinet entry from the bureaucratic channel to the parliamentary channel have an effect of lowering the average age of cabinet entry for the post war cabinet ministers? It is conceivable because one's ascent to the Cabinet through the routinized bureaucratic ladder under the pre-war regime had entailed a more or less fixed length of time, whereas the new ascending routes to the

Cabinet under the post-war regime could have provided one with many possibilities of "shortcut", thus permitting the entry of younger persons more often to the post-war cabinets. Evidences, however, point to the contrary. As data in TABLE-53 indicate, the average age of cabinet entry among the pre-war "pure bureaucrats" (non-military) stood at 54.2. Compared to this, the average for those who had entered the post-war cabinets through a "bureaucratic-to-parliamentary" career stood at 56.5; and the corresponding one for those other post-war cabinet ministers who made their cabinet entry through the Diet stood at 56.9. Apart from the average age, other evidences also point to the same outcome. For instance, 21% of the pre-war "pure bureaucrats" made their cabinet entry between the ages of 40 and 49, and other 57% between 50 and 59; the corresponding figures for those ex-bureaucrats who had entered the post-war cabinets through the Diet were 18% between the ages of 40 and 49, and 46% between the ages of 50 and 59. As we can notice by comparing data in TABLES-52 and -53, the only group of post-war cabinet ministers which contained a larger proportion of younger entrants to the Cabinet (i.e. the 40-49 age-group or the 50-59 age-group) than the pre-war "pure bureaucrats" was the group of "professional politicians". Even for this group of "professional politicians", the average age of cabinet entry was slightly behind the one for the pre-war "pure bureaucrats", standing at 54.7 against 54.2.

While the pre-war "pure bureaucrats" had a general ten-

TABLE-53: The Career Patterns and the Age at the First Cabinet Entry, Post-War Cabinet Ministers (1945-1964) compared with Pre-War Cabinet Ministers (1918-1945).

Age at first cabinet entry	Pre-War Cabinet Ministers		Post-War Cabinet Ministers	
	Pure Bureaucrats (Non-military)	Others entering cabinet via H. of Rep.†	Ex-bureaucrats entering cabinet via Diet	Others entering cabinet via Diet**
	%	%	%	%
40-49	21% (15)	5% (2)	18% (12)	15% (19)
50-59	57% (40)	55% (24)	46% (32)	45% (57)
60-69	20% (14)	39% (17)	31% (21)	34% (43)
70-79	1% (1)	2% (1)	6% (4)	7% (9)
Total	99% (70)	101% (44)	101% (69)	101% (128)
Average Age:	54.2	58.4	56.5	56.9

* Include those with a "bureaucratic-to-parliamentary career", a "professional-to-parliamentary career", or a "business-to-parliamentary career".
 ** Include those with a "professional-to-parliamentary career" or a "business-to-parliamentary career"; and "professional politicians".

dency for entering the Cabinet at earlier ages than the post-war cabinet ministers, the same was not the case with those pre-war cabinet ministers who made their cabinet entry through the parliamentary channel. For instance, of the total of 44 persons who had entered the pre-war cabinets through the House of Representatives between 1918 and 1945, only 2 or 5% made their cabinet entry between the ages of 40 and 49; more than a majority (55%) between 50 and 59; and all but one of the rest (39%) between 60 and 69. The average age of cabinet entry among these pre-war parliamentarians stood at 58.4; which was about 4 years behind the average among the pre-war "pure bureaucrats", and about 2 years behind the one among those post-war cabinet ministers who made their cabinet entry through the parliamentary channel. The over-all average age of cabinet entry among the 189 pre-war cabinet ministers came out 56.5;⁵ the corresponding one among the 223 post-war cabinet ministers stood at 57.5 (see TABLE-52).

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It was reported that some prime ministers of post-war Japan had displayed a particular preference to, or discrimination against, persons with a certain type of career background

⁵ The different averages for different groups of the pre-war cabinet ministers are as follows:

	<u>Average age</u>	<u>Number</u>
Pure Bureaucrats (non-military)	54.2	70
Pure Bureaucrats (military)	57.1	43
Those entering Cabinet via House of Rep.	58.4	44
Others	56.9	32

in recruiting the members of their own cabinets. Preference was given usually to those who had a similar career background as that of the prime ministers themselves. Particularly prone to this style of recruiting the members of their cabinets were, according to the report, Yoshida Shigeru and Hatoyama Ichiro. Yoshida, an ex-bureaucrat, had shown an unabashed preference for ex-bureaucrats in recruiting the members of his cabinets, shunning those men stereotyped as "genuine party politicians"; while Hatoyama, a "genuine party politician", holding in turn an indomitable reservation toward ex-bureaucrats, had preferred "genuine party politicians" in his cabinets. The formation of personal factions, especially the formidable clique of ex-bureaucrats under Yoshida and its rival clique led by Hatoyama, within the ranks of the conservative party of post-war Japan, was said to have stemmed from these personal idiosyncracies of the two prominent leaders of the party.⁶ Could we find some evidences giving credence to this obserbation? Or, more generally, could we find any relationship between the different career patterns of those entering the post-war cabinets and the specific cabinets to which they were recruited?

In TABLE-54, the specific cabinets into which the 223 post-war cabinet ministers had been first recruited and their different career patterns were cross-tabulated. First, looking

⁶ Hosokawa Takamoto, Showa Jimbutsushi: Seiji to Jimmyaku (A History of the Notables in the Showa Era: Politics and the Lineage of Personalities) (Tokyo: Bungeishunshu-Shinsha, 1956), pp. 159-164; 108-111; 171-173; and passim.

TABLE-54: The Career Patterns and the Cabinet of the First Entry, Post-War Cabinet Ministers: 1945-1964.

	The Cabinet of the First Entry										Total
	Higashi- kuni/Shi- dehara/or Yoshida (1945-47)	Katayama or Ashida (1947-48)	Yoshida (1948-54)	Hatoyama (1954-55)	Ishibashi (1956-57)	Kishi (1957-60)	Ikeda (1960-64)	%	(N)	%	
Bureaucra- tic-to-Par- liamentary	13% (5)	4% (1)	31% (16)	33% (8)	27% (3)	39% (11)	54% (25)			31% (69)	
Profession- al-to-Par- liamentary	20% (8)	35% (8)	21% (11)	29% (7)	27% (3)	21% (6)	20% (9)			23% (52)	
Business- to-Parlia- mentary	8% (3)	17% (4)	34% (18)	29% (7)	40% (5)	21% (6)	22% (10)			24% (53)	
"Profession- al politi- cian"	3% (1)	44% (10)	10% (5)	4% (1)	0% (0)	14% (4)	4% (2)			10% (23)	
Others*	56% (22)	0% (0)	4% (2)	4% (1)	0% (0)	4% (1)	0% (0)			12% (26)	
Total	100% (39)	100% (23)	100% (52)	99% (24)	100% (11)	99% (28)	100% (46)			100% (223)	

* Include "pure bureaucratic career", "bureaucratic-to-business career", and "pure professional or business career".

into the data tabulated for the Yoshida Cabinet of 1948-1954 and the Hatoyama Cabinet of 1954-1956 in the table, we are struck with a similarity rather than a difference in composite character between the recruitees of the respective cabinets. For instance, of the total of 52 persons who were first recruited into the Cabinet by Yoshida Shigeru between 1948 and 1954, 16 or 31% were ex-bureaucrats; the corresponding percentage of ex-bureaucrats among the recruitees of Hatoyama Ichiro stood at 33% (8 out of 24). The percentage of those who had a "professional-to-parliamentary" career, the career pattern which Hatoyama belonged to, stood at 29% among the Hatoyama recruitees; while it stood at 21% among the Yoshida recruitees. The proportion of former professional men was thus slightly higher among the Hatoyama recruitees than among the Yoshida recruitees, but not so much as to render any significant meaning. Could we arrive at a different outcome if we were to compare the entire members of the Yoshida Cabinet and the Hatoyama Cabinet instead of only those recruitees of the respective cabinets? Data tabulated in TABLE-55 were intended to examine this eventuality. The outcome, however, was almost the same as the one found among the recruitees, as can be noticed in the table. Thus, Hatoyama was no less "guilty" of recruiting ex-bureaucrats into, or of manning them in, his cabinets than was Yoshida.

A prime minister who had literally "flooded" his cabinets with ex-bureaucrats was Ikeda Hayato, an ex-bureaucrat himself, who held the premiership between 1960 and 1964. During his

TABLE-55: The Career Patterns of the Members of Five Post-War Cabinets Compared.

Career Pattern	Cabinet									
	Yoshida		Yoshida		Hatoyama		Kishi		Ikeda	
	(1946-47)		(1948-54)		(1954-56)		(1957-60)		(1960-64)	
	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)
Bureaucratic-to-Parliamentary	25%	(5)	33%	(21)	36%	(12)	44%	(23)	49%	(35)
Professional-to-Parliamentary	30%	(6)	22%	(14)	27%	(9)	17%	(9)	21%	(15)
Business-to-Parliamentary	10%	(2)	33%	(21)	24%	(8)	26%	(14)	23%	(16)
"Professional Politician"	0%	(0)	8%	(5)	9%	(3)	10%	(5)	7%	(5)
Pure Bureaucratic	15%	(3)	0%	(0)	3%	(1)	0%	(0)	0%	(0)
Business-to-Bureaucratic	10%	(2)	0%	(0)	0%	(0)	0%	(0)	0%	(0)
Pure Professional	5%	(1)	2%	(1)	0%	(0)	0%	(0)	0%	(0)
Pure Business	5%	(1)	2%	(1)	0%	(0)	2%	(1)	0%	(0)
Total	100%	(20)	100%	(63)	99%	(33)	99%	(52)	100%	(71)

incumbency, all-told 46 persons made their first cabinet entry, and 25 of them, or 54%, were ex-bureaucrats. Ex-bureaucrats were equally dominant among the entire members of the Ikeda Cabinet, as can be noticed in TABLE-55. During the four years and four months of Ikeda's incumbency as Prime Minister, an unbelievable total of 71 men were circulated in the Cabinet. Of the 71 men, 35 or 49% were ex-bureaucrats. The Ikeda Cabinet was unsurpassed by any other post-war cabinet in the large proportion of ex-bureaucrats it had included among its recruits or among its members.

An antithesis of the Ikeda Cabinet could be found in the Socialist-Democratic Coalition Cabinet of Katayama-Ashida in 1947-1948. Of the total of 23 persons who made their first cabinet entry to the Katayama-Ashida Cabinet(s), only one (4%) was ex-bureaucrat. Aside from the paucity of ex-bureaucrats, another trait unique among these recruits was the relatively small proportion of persons who had come from the business world. Those with a "business-to-parliamentary" career totalled 17%. On the other hand, the proportion occupied by those from the business world among the recruits of other cabinets were much larger. For instance, 34% of the Yoshida recruits (1948-1954) and 29% of the Hatoyama recruits were those who had a "business-to-parliamentary" career. As a matter of fact, the Katayama-Ashida Cabinet was unique among all post-war cabinets in that the bureaucratic and the plutocratic elements were outnumbered by others among its recruits. A great majority of the Katayama-Ashida recruits was made up of "professional

politicians" and those persons who had a "professional-to-parliamentary" career; the former totalling 44% and the latter 35%.

As can be noticed in TABLE-54, the combined total of ex-bureaucrats and those persons from the business world stood between 60% and 76% among the respective recruitees of Yoshida (1948-1954), Hatoyama (1954-1956), Ishibashi (1956-1957), Kishi (1957-1960), and Ikeda (1960-1964); thus indicating a sustained dominance of the bureaucratic and the plutocratic elements in the conservative party leadership throughout the post-war period. The ratio between ex-bureaucrats and those from the business world was roughly one to one both among the recruitees of the Yoshida Cabinet (1948-1954) and those of the Hatoyama Cabinet. There were some significant changes in this ratio, however, among the recruitees of later cabinets. Especially noteworthy were the change among the recruitees of the Kishi Cabinet and the Ikeda Cabinet. Among the recruitees of the Kishi Cabinet, the proportion of ex-bureaucrats became almost twice larger than that of the men from the business world. Among the Ikeda recruitees, ex-bureaucrats outnumbered those from the business world by two and a half to one. It thus appears that the dominance of ex-bureaucrats in the conservative party leadership and the Japanese Cabinet became more pronounced after 1957.

We have already noted that the Yoshida Cabinet of 1948-1954 was not any more crowded with ex-bureaucrats than other conservative cabinets of post-war Japan; hence, Yoshida was not

any more "guilty" than other conservative prime ministers in furnishing the Cabinet with ex-bureaucrats. However, it cannot be denied that Yoshida was the very pacesetter in "bureaucratizing" the conservative party leadership and the conservative party cabinets of post-war Japan. He was the first man to infuse a large volume of ex-bureaucrats to the conservative party leadership as the president of the then still nascent and fluid Liberal Party.⁷ Also, he was the first man to set the precedent of recruiting a large number of ex-bureaucrats into the Cabinet during the sustained period of his incumbency as the Prime Minister shortly after the new constitutional system became operative. The effect of this precedent set by Yoshida in "luring out" many career bureaucrats into politics might have been of some consequences, as one former member of the Diet maintains.⁸ In fact, most of those ex-bureaucrats who made their first cabinet entry to the Kishi Cabinet or to the Ikeda Cabinet had entered politics during the period of Yoshida's incumbency as the Prime Minister and the president of the Liberal Party between 1948 and 1954.⁹ Although it cannot be proven that the entry of these bureaucrats into politics

⁷ See Hosokawa, op. cit., pp. 171-173.

⁸ Hosokawa Takamoto was a member of the House of Representatives between 1947 and 1949. As to this "luring out", see Ibid., pp. 161-162.

⁹ Of the total of 36 ex-bureaucrats who made their first cabinet entry to the Kishi Cabinet or to the Ikeda Cabinet, 28 were first elected to the Diet between 1949 and 1953; 5 between 1955 and 1957; 2 in 1947; and 1 in 1942.

was actually induced by the precedent set by Yoshida, it can not be dismissed at the same time that he had created a milieu in the new land of post-war politics hospitable enough for these bureaucrats to enter and to accommodate themselves for the new career of politics.

With the doing away with the "transcendental cabinets", the "pure bureaucrats" from Tokyo University had all but disappeared. However, their "lineal descendants", the ex-bureaucrats from Tokyo University, continue to dominate the party cabinets of post-war Japan. In the continuance of these related forces between the pre-war and the post-war periods, Yoshida Shigeru seemed to have served as an important linkage.


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The various career routes taken by the 223 post-war cabinet ministers discussed in this chapter were schematically illustrated in FIGURE-6 for a visual comparison with FIGURE-5 shown in the preceding chapter.

FIGURE 6: The Career Routes taken by 223 Post-War Cabinet Ministers: 1945-1964.



SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The most salient characteristic we could find among the first generation of the Japanese cabinet ministers was the predominance of the men with the same Han-origins. Men from the four historic Han(s) of Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, and Hizen held a near-monopoly of cabinet posts until the turn of the century. Because of this, the composite character of the members of the Japanese Cabinet remained grossly "unrepresentative" of the regional distribution of the Japanese population during the first two decades after the ~~inception~~ inception of the cabinet system in Japan.

The entrenchment of this parochially based group in the Cabinet and the sustenance of their dominance for a prolonged period was possible largely because of the institutional safeguard provided under the Meiji constitution. Since the members of the Cabinet were not recruited from the representative organ of the government under the claim of "transcendentalism" provided in the constitution, the possibility of diluting the parochially based group in the Cabinet by injecting the popularly elected leaders representing various geographical regions of Japan was practically nil. Nor could the nucleus of the Han-cliques be removed through constitutional means, for the Cabinet was not responsible to the representative organ of the government under the "transcendentalism". Buttressed by the powerful bureaucracy in which men from the four Han were abundant, the co-optation among the Han-cliques for cabinet posts remained unchecked for a duration of time long enough to lay the basic foundations of Japan as a modern state.

Whether or not such co-optation among the Han-cliques had served as a factor conducive to the successful adjustment of Japan to the modern world by providing a much needed identity and cohesive force among the modernizing leaders during the critical period of transition would be a problematic question. Answering this question affirmatively without isolating relevant evidences would be tantamount to advancing a "post hoc, ergo propter hoc" argument. It is not difficult to see, however, that many political anomalies ~~might have~~ ensued, had the co-optation among the men bound by an essentially feudalistic affinity continued beyond the transitional period with an outright disregard for those who had a legitimate claim to be included in the ruling circle on the basis of their demonstrated merits. The emergence of the modern-educated men coming from the diverse regions of Japan outside of the four historic Han in the Cabinet through the bureaucratic ascending route by the 1900's was indicative of the fact that a standard of achievement and talent rather than the merely ascriptive criterion had been applied in the recruitment and promotion of the members of the Japanese bureaucracy in a relatively early part of the transitional period.¹

¹ Bernard S. Silberman's study on the elite mobility within the early Meiji bureaucracy confirms that the attainment of a modern education was a factor affecting the advancement of bureaucrats. See Minister of Modernization: Elite Mobility in Meiji Restoration, 1868-1873 (Tucson, Arizona: The University of Arizona Press, 1964), pp. 103-107.

The arrival of these modern-educated men in the Japanese Cabinet through the bureaucratic ladder began to erode the parochial character marked in the composition of the first generation of the Japanese cabinet ministers. As a result, the composite character of the second generation of the Japanese cabinet ministers became more "representative" of the Japanese population in the sense that they were composed of men from more varied regions of Japan and they were a group more homologous to the regional distribution of the Japanese population than the first one. The dilution of the Han-cliques and the integration of men from the diverse regions of Japan among the members of the Cabinet was thus achieved through the steady inflow of modern-educated elements to the Cabinet via the bureaucratic channel during the first two decades of the century, while the "transcendentalism" of Japanese politics remained essentially unchanged in the duration.

By the time the last trace of the Han-clique dominance had disappeared from the Japanese Cabinet, its membership became preempted almost exclusively by those who had attained a college-level education. From the early 1920's to the end of the World War II, a "blue ribbon" cabinet became a rule in Japan, leaving a vast educational gap between the members of the Cabinet and the people. Although there is a general tendency for a high level of educational attainment among the political leaders of modern nations, the case of Japan seemed to be rather unusual. For instance, among the British cabinet

ministers of 1916-1955, nearly 40% had not attained a university education.² Among the German cabinet ministers of the Weimar period, 24.7% had no university education.³

In a country like Great Britain where the members of the Cabinet were recruited from the Parliament, the possibility of cabinet entry by those parliamentarians who had built their career through business, mass movement, or pure politics without the benefit of higher education remained open.⁴ The same was not the case in pre-war Japan. Inasmuch as the members of the Japanese Cabinet were recruited mostly from the upper echelon of the bureaucracy during the pre-war period (except the brief interludes in 1918-1921 and 1924-1931), and the accessibility to the upper grade civil service, in turn, became restricted only to those equipped with a higher education after the early Meiji period, the possibility of cabinet entry by those without a higher education was foreclosed when the Meiji period came to the close. As we have ascertained earlier, persons with a limited level of education were not rare in the leadership strata of the pre-war House of Representatives. Hence, had a durable parliamentary system been instituted in pre-war Japan, a "blue ribbon" cabinet might not have been so persistent even after the Meiji period. Although some attempts

² This figure was taken from W.L. Guttsman, The British Political Elite (New York, 1963), p. 106.

³ This figure was taken from Lewis J. Edinger, Politics in Germany: Attitudes and Processes (Boston, 1968), pp. 182-183.

⁴ See Guttsman, op. cit.

were made to steer the Japanese government into a parliamentary system during the Taisho period, they were not long enough and extensive enough to bring out a new breed of political leadership to the Cabinet. In the "party cabinets" of this period, for instance, military bureaucrats continued to make inroads to hold the service minister's posts. Of those men entering the party cabinets of this period via the Diet, many were former career bureaucrats who had switched to the parliamentary career in a response to the changing rule of political game of the time. Persons who had built their political career without associating themselves with the career civil service amounted to only a trickle among the members of the party cabinets of this period. It was only after the new parliamentary system became operative in post-war Japan that persons without a higher education began to emerge, though not in a great quantity, in the Japanese Cabinet. Most of these persons were either "professional politicians" or those who entered politics from a business career. A channel of political ascent and cabinet entry for a new breed of men with a limited level of education thus became open with the ending of "transcendentalism" in Japanese politics.

The first brood of modern-educated elements emerged in the cabinets of the Meiji period were those who had their schooling in the European or American universities shortly after the Restoration. Upon their return home, they were immediately absorbed to the Meiji bureaucracy or to the gov-

ernment university then in a nascent stage of development. They reached cabinet posts either through a pure bureaucratic career or a career of scholar-official. These harbingers were closely followed by the early products of Japan's own modern schools which preceded the founding of Tokyo University. Some of these men, unlike their predecessors, had a career in professions before they were recruited into the bureaucracy, through which they ascended to cabinet posts. Some others, though only a handful, made their cabinet entry via the Diet.

With the establishment of Tokyo University as the main provider of the members of the Japanese civil bureaucracy, the threshold of the ascending routes to the Cabinet became linked with this university, specifically its Law Faculty. Since then, graduates of Tokyo University rather than of any other schools began to gain entrance to the upper grade civil service, therefrom ascending the bureaucratic ladder which led to cabinet posts. In the 1910's, a stream of these career bureaucrats from Tokyo University began to reach the Japanese Cabinet. By the 1930's, a Tokyo University education followed by a pure bureaucratic career became the hallmark as well as the common denominator among the civilian members of the Cabinet. Sharing cabinet posts with these Tokyo University-trained bureaucrats were career military officers either in uniform or in the retired list. Between 1930 and 1945, these civilian and military bureaucrats respectively from Tokyo University and the cadet schools totalled nearly four-fifths among the members of the Cabinet. The composition of the

Japanese Cabinet thus came to show not only a "blue ribbon" character but also a highly elitistic school-background.

Compared to this, the composite character of those persons represented in the leadership strata of the pre-war House of Representatives showed much more diverse school-backgrounds. As we have seen earlier, graduates from private universities in Japan, foreign universities, and various Semmongakko constituted a great majority among the leaders of the pre-war House of Representatives. This dichotomous composite character between the Cabinet members and the Diet leaders was a result of the narrowly compartmentalized route to the Cabinet which remained separate from the wider and more open route to the Diet under the pre-war system of government: It was one's entrance to Tokyo University (or the military academies) rather than one's attainment of a higher education at any school that ushered him into the threshold of the ascending route to the Cabinet; and it was the career civil service rather than a career of politics that opened the door to the Cabinet; hence, anyone failing to enter any of these "right tracks" would forfeit his chance of becoming a cabinet minister, though he could become a parliamentarian. The post-war system of parliamentary government obliterated this compartmentalization by making a pathway from the Diet to the Cabinet; and consequently opening up the possibility of cabinet entry from various lines of career via the Diet unhampered by one's school-background or level of education. The changed composition among the members of the post-war cabinets we have ob-

served in earlier chapters clearly demonstrates this: Approximately one-half of the persons entering the post-war cabinets had entered politics either from professional fields or from the business world; and most of them were educated at private universities in Japan, foreign universities, or Semmongakko. Also a substantial number of the persons entering the post-war cabinets were those who had built their careers in "pure politics" (i.e. the "professional politicians"); and some of them only with a limited level of education.

A remnant of the pre-war bureaucratic regime which emerged as a new political actor in the party politics of post-war Japan was the group of ex-bureaucrats, who constituted no small part of the personnel circulating in post-war cabinets. These ex-bureaucrats were very similar in school-background and career pattern to the pre-war "pure bureaucrats", except, of course, that the former entered the Cabinet via the Diet. Though similar in their social backgrounds, it is likely that the different political framework, mode of competition, and milieu in which the ex-bureaucrats had to make their way into post-war cabinets could have made the latter significantly different in political outlook and behavior from the "pure bureaucrats" who had predominated in the pre-war cabinets. The esprit de corps and the political outlook of the career bureaucrats in general under the pre-war regime were characterized by one keen observer in the following manner:

Conscious of their own prowess, they were arrogant and headstrong. Whatever their family background, they were welded together by their common educational preparation, their common career experiences, and their common pride in having achieved recognized status so that they comprised a highly exclusive, tightly knit, self-conscious, and self-assertive fraternity. It was only natural for members of such an elite group to feel that they had a right to special privileges. As highly selected professionals, they felt they knew best how to govern the nation.⁵

If the ex-bureaucrats had been imbued with this sort of ethos during their bureaucratic career, they could no longer indulge themselves in it with the commencing of a new career in politics. To be successful in elections and other political competitions, they had to cultivate new skills, master new instruments of politics, and accommodate their old habits of being an overbearing bureaucrat to a new role of being a politician. These new experiences could have made the ex-bureaucrats in post-war cabinets a new species of men significantly different from their generic antecedents in the pre-war cabinets.

The main current of changes we could observe in the composition of the members of the Japanese Cabinet since 1885 was the erosion of various "sectarian" characters: a parochialism, a "blue ribbon" character, an exclusive school-background, a uniformity in career background, and an all-male exclusiveness, etc. If we were to subscribe to a formula that the best interest of the citizen body in a country could be better realized when it is ruled by a group which mirrors closely the diverse social characteristics and attributes of the people, then the

⁵ Kawai Kazuo, Japan's American Interlude (Chicago, 1960), p. 118.

changes and evolutions which have taken place in the composite character of the members of the Japanese Cabinet during the past eight decades were in line with such desired direction. If a ruling group drawn predominantly from the career bureaucrats of an elite-school education were to become cliquish, ingrown, and out of touch with social reality so that it show rigidity, vested interest, and narrow mindedness in its public policy-making, then the Cabinet of post-war Japan would be less liable to such maladies than its pre-war counterpart.

It is possible, on the other hand, that a ruling group showing too divergent social background among its members could have a drawback. F.W. Frey, in his study of the Turkish political elite, wrote:

There seems to be little doubt that similarity of social background among politicians many times acts to facilitate clear and rapid communication. Similarly reared, trained, occupied, the politicians possess a common language and shared set of referents that facilitate discourses and minimize conflict and tension. Karpat had recognized that this was in some respects true even for the People's Party and Democrats in Turkey. And one can recall instances, such as when Clydeside labour M.P.'s first stormed into the precincts of the House of Commons, when extreme differences in social background stacked great barriers in front of political communication. It should also be recognized that similarity in social background may foster continuity in policy and smooth the transfer of power from one group or party to another.⁶

How divergent does a ruling group have to become in social backgrounds before communication is impaired and conflict and tension rise among its members to a level of malfunction? How similar

⁶ The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), pp. 398-399.

do the social backgrounds of a ruling group have to be before it becomes clubbish and co-optative? Does the composite character of the members of the Cabinet in post-war Japan show a healthy medium away from either of these excesses? Answering these questions cogently would require attitudinal and behavioral data, which this study was unable to collect, hence could not blend them with the social background data presented in earlier chapters. There are some fragmentary informations, however, indicating that the functions Frey was referring to were much more facile within the group of ex-bureaucrats than between this group and other elements among the personnel circulating in post-war Japanese cabinets.⁷ It is probable that this group of ex-bureaucrats was playing the role of a "core group" or a "basic coalition bloc" maintaining internally cohesion and continuity among its members while aligning externally with other elements or other blocs, thus neutralizing divergent forces within the conservative party leadership as well as in cabinets. As we have seen earlier, approximately one-quarter to one-half of the recruitees of each conservative party cabinet since 1947 were made up of ex-bureaucrats regardless of the varying social backgrounds of the prime ministers. This might be an indication that the ex-bureaucrats were functioning as a unit enabling to maintain "unity with diversity" and "continuity with change" in the conservative cabinets of post-war Japan.

⁷ For instance, see Hosokawa Takamoto, op. cit., esp. pp. 108-137; 157-173.

The post-war change in the avenue of political ascent and cabinet entry is likely to have some significant future implications. Not only it will lead to a further diversification of the people entering the Japanese Cabinet in terms of their educational and career backgrounds, but also it is likely to affect the career planning of individuals and the allocation of intellectual resources in the Japanese society. Now that a career of politics rather than the career civil service became the main route of political ascent, the pre-war trend of drawing the "best talents" of the nation to the Japanese bureaucracy is likely to change. In fact, there are some indications of this change. Professor Inoki, in his study of the Japanese civil bureaucracy, mentioned: "Because of the amazingly high rate of economic growth in Japan during the last ten years... the ablest graduates of first-class universities have come to prefer jobs in big business to civil service posts."⁸ A conspicuous increase of Tokyo University graduates who had specialized in law among the business executives of contemporary Japan was also reported by Professor Mannari.⁹ This new trend might be a result, as Professor Inoki suggests, of the change in the relative prestige and reward between a civil service career and a business career, which has resulted from, in turn, Japan's transformation to a highly industrialized society

⁸ Inoki Masamichi, "The Civil Bureaucracy", in Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, ed. Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (Princeton, 1964), p. 300.

⁹ Mannari Hiroshi, Bizines Erito (Business Elite) (Tokyo, 1965), pp. 126-127.

with a business-oriented culture.¹⁰ It might as well have some bearing on the changed route of political ascent under the post-war regime. If the pre-war graduates of the elite universities had entered the career civil service because it was the only assured route for political ascent and cabinet entry, their post-war counterparts are no longer bound by such constrained route. For the aspirants of political eminence in post-war Japan, any line of career tending to facilitate their entry to politics and electoral success would be suitable as an initial career before launching their political career. A career in the business world could be one of such well-suited lines for those persons with a political ambition to enter and to prepare for their later entry into politics. As noted earlier, nearly one-quarter of the persons entering post-war cabinets had a "business-to-parliamentary" career. Indicative of this feature is the conducive nature of a business career as a stepping stone to launch a successful political career in post-war Japan. If "the ablest graduates of first-class universities" continue to seek a career in the business world, and the business career proves to be the most efficacious way of entering politics and attaining political eminence, then a probable outcome would be a steady increase of plutocratic elements with elitistic self-image in the Japanese Cabinet for years to come, thus phasing out the bureaucratic elements which have been the predominant force throughout most of Japan's modern history.

¹⁰ Inoki, Ibid.

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