THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF TANGANYIKA: ORIGIN, CHARACTERISTICS, AND EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

by

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Note on Approach and Method

It seems desirable to weigh carefully, before embarking upon any academic inquiry, the objectives sought to be achieved, and the most advantageous means of achieving them. A mere recitation or categorizing of events obviously will not be enough. These are the functions of journalists, archivists and others whose interest or obligation it may be to make primary source material available to those who may wish to use or act upon them.

Analysis and commentary upon the primary source material is a necessary and more intellectually demanding function, but its successful performance need not entail systematic classification or rigorous uniformity of approach and method. Insistence upon the latter essentials is the distinguishing mark of the scholar and scientist.

The political scientist shares with his colleagues of other disciplines the desire to understand, to interpret, and to predict phenomena and events relating to the subject matter of his study. There are various traditional methods by which these goals are sought to be achieved. One may

search in the new Republic of Tanganyika, as Plato did in his imaginary Republic, for the ideal of justice and discover it, or its absence, in the relations between its diverse races, many tribes and different social, political and economic groups and associations. Or one may concentrate upon particular manifestations of political activities of the State of Tanganyika, for example, as a sovereign (sometimes called the study of "Government"), in conjunction with other sovereigns ("International Relations"), vis-à-vis its own citizens ("Constitutional Law"), as a living organism ("Political Dynamics"), as a functioning machine ("Public Administration"), and discovering how unique or, how common, is its political behavior ("Comparative Government").

Whatever method is used, every inquiry by a political scientist has as its focus the arrangements whereby men govern themselves. As such, it is a study of power--its apex of concentration, its branches of distribution, and the instruments and methods of its exercise. But this is usually not its sole concern. For men have been concerned, at least since Augustine, not only to know how men are governed, but how well. When this additional inquiry is neglected, its author is subjected to obloquy, even if, like Machiavelli, the excellence of his study may not otherwise be denied.

In approaching the study of a nation-state, a formidable challenge is faced. If one would qualify as a scientist, systematic verification and compilation of observable data must be rigidly insisted upon. Yet the student of political events is all too dependent upon the preliminary researches of scholars in other disciplines. Historians--to name but the most obvious, contribute indispensably to the success of the political scientists' task by compiling the lore which the latter probes and classifies into patterns and categories useful for generalization.

Should the particular country or nation chosen for one's study have been inadequately researched by one's colleagues in the companion disciplines, one risks impalement, in his dilemma, either on the horn of audacious amateurism in seeking to supply his own needs or on the horn of speculation under cover of abstract reasoning. The latter method is more generally condemned, hence the title, "Father of Political Science," denied to Plato, is not usually withheld from Aristotle.

These general considerations, applicable to all branches of political science, apply with particular force to that branch known as comparative government. The student who wishes to describe political institutions and methods in a selected country in terms which will be meaningful to his colleagues who have studied other countries, faces difficulties which are increased by the lack of consensus as to

the language in which communications should be made. A mounting protest in recent years has inveighed against the rigidity of the forms in which studies of comparative government have been prematurely frozen.

> The major criticism relating to the traditional approach to the study of comparative politics is that it is centred upon the description of the formally established institutions of government; that the expression "comparative government" signifies the study of the legal instrumentalities of government and of political processes conceived as the result of the interaction between the proper constitutional organs of government--the electorate, the legislature, the executive, the administration, and the courts; that the traditional approach is in general singularly insensitive to informal factors and processes such as the various interest groups, the wielders of social and economic power and at times even of political power operating outside of the formal governmental institutions, and the more complex contextual forces that can be found in the ideological patterns and the social organization of the system. It lacks a systematic approach.[1]

The kind of criticism exemplified by the above quotation has resulted in a search for new concepts, new categories and a different language to express the findings and generalizations of this branch of study. Where formerly scholars spoke of their subject as "comparative government," they now refer to it as "comparative politics" or "comparative political systems." The greater scope and depth of the latter terms are indicated by the definitions proposed.

> Politics is the process by which a community deals with its problems. A community exists among people who are aware of pursuing common goals. Problems are

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[1] Roy C. Macridis, The Study of Comparative Government (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1958), p. 21.

> obstacles perceived on the road toward goals. . . . In almost all communities, disagreements occur. Disagreements present issues. A political system, therefore, is a community that is processing its issues. . . .[2]

Such definitions of "politics" and "political system" represent a refreshing tendency to focus attention upon other units of political integration besides the nation-state. This need is recognized by Professor Almond, particularly with reference to studies of the "new" or "emerging" countries, for the inclusion of which a comprehensive definition of political systems has been proposed, applicable alike to varied kinds of regimes.

> . . . The political system is that system of interactions to be found in all independent societies which performs the functions of integration and adaptation (both internally and vis-à-vis other societies) by means of the employment, or threat of employment, of more or less legitimate physical compulsion.[3]

It is possible to have reservations concerning each of the definitions of "political system" proposed above. Spiro's is over-simplified, and fails to take into account, among other things, the struggle for power purely for its own ends, and among people who are not consciously pursuing common goals. Almond's unnecessarily includes the concept

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[2]Herbert J. Spiro, "Comparative Politics: A Comprehensive Approach," American Political Science Review (Sept., 1962), p. 577.

[3]Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 7.

of "independence," and overlooks the possibility of other sanctions than physical compulsion. However, both of these scholars have enriched the literature of political science by contributing or popularizing new concepts and categories, and suggesting new theoretical frameworks within which more fruitful inquiries can be conducted.

In one of the major recent works in this field, a team of specialists, under the editorial guidance of Professors Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, have suggested methods for classifying and analyzing "the developing areas" of Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Using a theoretical approach based upon various functional categories, certain concepts provide the terms by means of which "the actual performances" of the different political systems are analyzed. By these means, the authors seek, inter alia, "to improve our capacity for explaining and predicting the directions of political change, and in particular the prospects of democratic modernization in these areas." The functional categories chosen are as follows:

A. Input functions
    1. Political socialization and recruitment
    2. Interest articulation
    3. Interest aggregation
    4. Political communication

B. Output functions

5. Rule-making

6. Rule-application

7. Rule adjudication

The conceptions of "input" and "output" are used to attribute particular properties to the political system within any given society. For Dr. Almond, legitimate force is the thread, running through the inputs and outputs, and giving the political system its special quality, its salience and its coherence.

> The inputs into the political system are all in some way related to claims for the employment of legitimate compulsion, whether these are demands for war or for recreational facilities. The outputs of the political system are also all in some way related to legitimate physical compulsion, however remote the relationship may be. Thus, public recreational facilities are usually supported by taxation, and any violation of the regulations governing their use is a legal offence.[4]

The particular functional categories are examined and analyzed in detail later in this study. They were developed for the purpose of comparing "modern Western" political systems with others, described as "transitional," "traditional," or "primitive." The implicit assumption throughout the book is that all non-Western political systems are in different stages of evolution towards Western systems, preferably on the British or American models. This "Anglophile fallacy," as it has been called, is a major flaw

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[4] Ibid.

in the theoretical framework of the book, although the value of the study is still great, owing to its seminal character.

Another writer of creativeness and perspicacity in this field is Dr. Spiro, who has proposed the use of certain selected concepts as standards of comparison of political systems. The four concepts, stability, adaptability (or flexibility), efficiency and effectiveness are considered to be the basic goals of political systems: stability over time, adaptability to changes in the environment, efficiency in dealing with problems, and effectiveness in gaining acceptance for policies from the population.[5] Dr. Spiro proposes that one should examine the major problems facing a particular political system, and the most important issues figuring in its politics, together with the groups concerned with the resolution of these issues. Some problems, seemingly almost identical in two given political systems, give rise to different types of issues, generate controversies of different intensity, and are resolved in different ways. These differences may be analyzed in a typology comprising four headings: Pragmatism, Violence, Ideologism, and Legalism. This typology may be used as an index to the political style which is an important determinant of the success or failure of the system. The relative success of

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[5]Herbert J. Spiro, Government by Constitution: The Political Systems of Democracy (New York: Random House, 1959), pp. 41-42.

political systems (or of one system at different times) can be gauged by the degree to which they manage to sustain a dynamic equilibrium among the four basic goals. The purpose of Spiro's inquiry is to draw certain conclusions from the older established "constitutional democracies" which may be useful to the newer states in the underdeveloped areas, "and that other area which, constitutionally speaking, is the most underdeveloped area of all, namely the global community of mankind." As such, his theoretical conclusions may be flawed because of unconscious assumptions regarding or neglect of material conditions or cultural values (which may or may not be valid). However, his work is a useful stimulus to fresh thought.

The contributions discussed above, and others in this same direction, have been made in the course of the examination of, or with reference to, particular countries when several have been compared together. A question arises as to the relevance of these methods to the study of one particular country alone. Will not different concepts and categories be required and a completely new approach? The answer seems to depend upon the purpose of one's study.

The purpose of the present study is to contribute to a greater understanding of political processes in the "emerging" countries, by focusing attention upon one such country, its problems and the manner and method of their solution. To achieve these ends, answers are sought to the

following questions, which are thought to be of paramount interest:

1. What are the chief characteristics of the present political system?
2. How does it differ from others which preceded it?
3. How does it differ from other systems in other countries with which we are familiar?
4. What are the main problems faced?
5. How have they been or is it proposed to solve them?
6. What are the future prospects of the system?

The concepts, categories, and language of writers on comparative politics have been found to be helpful in suggesting the method and approach here adopted, which consists, in substance, of an attempt to compare successive political systems within the same country, Tanganyika, over different periods of time. For this purpose, there have been selected, within the limits prescribed by available sources, the main chronological periods into which the country's political history may most conveniently be divided. Three such periods have been chosen and appropriate terms have been assigned to distinguish them.

The term "feudal" has been chosen as the most appropriate to describe the period, prior to and including part of the 19th century, when political authority in most

parts of Tanganyika was exercised by a variety of tribal and group heads, more or less autonomous in relation to one another but generally less than sovereign in their relationships with and powers over persons and territories nominally subject to their jurisdiction. The term "colonial" refers to the period, commencing in Tanganyika ca. 1885, when political authority became centralized under an alien military and administrative regime. "Post-independence" is the term used for the current period, commencing December 9, 1961, when control of the centralized political power passed into the hands of an indigenous, locally responsible body or group of persons. The political system of each period is analyzed in terms of the categories and concepts developed by Almond and Spiro, as described above, and of other writers in this area of inquiry. The results of each system are then weighed in an attempt to assess its relative merits and defects.

Note on Bibliography

The comprehensive and dynamic approach to the study of comparative government which has been the inspiration for the methods used in the present study was convincingly advocated by Roy C. Macridis in his book, The Study of Comparative Government (1955). Support was given by Gabriel A. Almond's article "Comparative Political Systems," which appeared in the Journal of Politics in August, 1956, and suggested the application of sociological and anthropological

theories and concepts in the comparison of political systems. In Government by Constitution (1959), Herbert Spiro put forward proposals for measurement and evaluation of political systems, which were refined and elaborated in his article, "Comparative Politics: A Comprehensive Approach," in the September, 1962, issue of the American Political Science Review. A sustained attempt to formulate a theoretical framework and an appropriate language for the newer approach was the book, The Politics of the Developing Areas, co-edited by Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman.

Among works on African political systems, the early work of M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, African Political Systems (1940), is the point of reference for many later writers. However, their classification of types of political systems in Africa--distinguishing between (1) those where the largest political units embrace people all of whom are related by kinship, (2) those with specialized political authority that is institutionalized, and (3) societies in which political authority is uncentralized--is too rigid for unanimous acceptance.[6] With Lord Hailey's An African Survey (1938, revised edition, 1956), one enters the tranquil area of public administration. African political entities are

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[6]The classification has been abandoned by their former colleague, I. Schapera, in his Government and Politics in Tribal Societies (London: Watts, 1956), as well as by their disciples, John Middleton and David Tait in editing Tribes Without Rulers (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957).

here viewed from the perspective of those whose task it is to impose good government upon more or less passive, although sometimes recalcitrant, recipients. However, the vast experience and comprehensive scope of the work has made it a classic in its field and a mine of information about varied aspects, including the politics of African societies.

It is usual to begin one's researches on the early history of Tanganyika with Reginald Coupland's East Africa and Its Invaders: From the Earliest Times to the Death of Seyyid Said in 1856 (1938) and The Exploitation of East Africa 1856-1890 (1939). However, the former authoritativeness of this author has been shaken by later researchers. Zoe Marsh and G. W. Kingsworth have greater authenticity, although their chief contribution to the literature to date, An Introduction to the History of East Africa (1957), is comparatively slight. For detailed accounts of particular periods, one may refer to such works as G. S. P. Freeman-Grenville's The Medieval History of the Coast of Tanganyika (1962), with special reference to recent archeological discoveries, Portuguese in South East Africa, 1600-1700, by Eric Axelson, and Utenzi wa Vita vya Wadachi (The German Conquest of the Swahili Coast) by Hemedi bin Abdallah bin Said el Buhry (translated with notes by J. W. T. Allen, 1955).

Attempts to reconstruct the patterns of political life in Tanganyika during feudal times must rely heavily

upon the researches of anthropologists. The writings of travelers and missionaries give us some clues, the value of which may be reduced by poor memory, unscholarly standards, and innocent evangelical zeal. One can also find a rich mine of materials in the volumes of Tanganyika Notes and Records, Journal of the Tanganyika Society, published periodically in Dar es Salaam. Most issues contain accounts of traditional tribal societies of Tanganyika, although the standards of scholarship vary. Some of these accounts can be tested against those of German missionary-anthropologists, although some of these latter may be treated with reserve as their authors served occasionally as advisers to the German Colonial Administration. Even with reservations, however, such studies as Bruno Gutmann's Das Recht der Dschagga (1926) and Die Stammeslehren der Dschagga (1932) impress with sheer industry and painstaking attention to detail. The tradition of anthropologist-consultants was continued on behalf of the British Colonial Administration by such experts as Roland Young and H. A. Fosbrooke in Land and Politics Among the Luguru of Tanganyika (1960) and Hans Cory, whose Sukuma Law and Custom was published in 1953. In later years, the link with Government has been broken completely, and a series of studies by independent scholars has added to the store of anthropological lore. Among these is Seven Tribes of British Central Africa (1951), edited by Elizabeth Colson and Max Gluckman, and East African Chiefs

(1959), under the editorship of Audrey Richards. Unfortunately, the opportunity was not seized to impose a common theoretical framework upon the separate essays of which these latter two works are composed, brilliant though the individual essays may be. In some later anthropological studies in this field, a comradely hand is held out to political scientists while at the same time re-establishing links with major theoreticians in their own field. Two such works stand out: Shambala: The Constitution of a Traditional State (1962) by Edgar V. Winans, and The Sonjo of Tanganyika: An Anthropological Study of an Irrigation-Based Society (1963) by Robert F. Gray. In a foreward to the former work, Walter Goldschmidt asserts that the nature of anthropological inquiry has been subtly but significantly changed by reformulation of the questions asked. Instead of concerning himself primarily with the nature of entities and viewing political institutions in terms of structural units, as anthropologists have been prone to do, Winans has directed attention to the jobs that must be done if there is to be a viable state, and the functional requisites for a political system. Gray, whose study was based on the assumption that the geographical environment has a significant effect on the forms of organization of human society, examined several previously advanced theories, including Karl Wittfogel's thesis that hydraulic societies inevitably develop despotic types of government, before arriving at his own hypothesis

regarding the development of the political system of the Sonjo.

Attempts at evaluating the two successive colonial administrations in Tanganyika will no doubt begin with the official documents of the German Government. Of these, the most important was the Deutsches Kolonialblatt, published in Berlin from 1890 to 1921. This was published by the Colonial Office, and contained reports from missionaries, commanders of troops, heads of expeditions, and explorers. It also contained proceedings of the Kolonialrat and a store of statistical information. The stenographic reports of the Reichstag debates contain all of the debates on colonial questions, and the Anlagebande contained varied material, including committee reports, texts of treaties and texts of proposed laws. Until 1900, these volumes also contained the colonial budgets, but after that the budgets may be found in the Haushalts-Etats für die Schutzgebiete. Among semi-official publications, the most important was the Kolonial Handels-Addressbuch, published from 1898 to 1912. These volumes contained the official reports submitted by the Colonial Office to the Reichstag each year, as well as narrative accounts of each colony's development, and numerous statistics. Among unofficial sources the newspaper, Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Zeitung, published at Dar es Salaam from January, 1901, through July, 1915, and thereafter in Morogoro, Tanganyika, is valuable but copies are rare.

Most of the commentaries on the German administration of Tanganyika must be read with wariness, owing to the partisanship of their authors. This caveat applies, for example, to Die Gründung von Deutsch-Ostafrika by the brilliant explorer, Karl Peters, Die Deutschen Kolonien vor, in und nach dem Weltkrieg (1939) by the last German Governor of Tanganyika, Heinrich Schnee; and to Theodore Gunzert's Native Communities and Native Participation in the Government of German East Africa (1926). The continuing need to justify, or deny, Germany's need for and claim to, colonies also caused exaggerations in such works as The Black Slaves of Prussia (1918) by Frank Weston, former Anglican Bishop of Zanzibar, and Judgment on German Africa (1939) by George L. Steer. For calm, scholarly inquiry, the works of Mary Evelyn Townsend stand out in the field: Origins of Modern German Colonialism, 1871-1885 (1921), and The Rise and Fall of Germany's Colonial Empire, 1884-1918 (1930). In the midst of such a desert of scholarly fare, one would be churlish to complain that Dr. Townsend's works are mainly historical, especially when it is history of such a high standard.

The best introduction to the British colonial period is the Handbook published by the British Foreign Office in 1920, Tanganyika (German East Africa). The historical and geographical account therein given is, of course, more reliable than the political review, which is subject to the same

need for caution as the contemporary publication, Treatment of Natives in the German Colonies, another Foreign Office Handbook, 1920. Since the international status of Tanganyika was legally that of a mandate, there was the necessity for periodic accounting to the supervisory authority. Hence there was issued in 1921 the Report by H.M.G. on Tanganyika Territory Covering the Period from the Conclusion of the Armistice to the End of 1920 (Cmd. 1428), a similar report for the year 1921 issued in 1922 (Cmd. 1732), and thereafter a series of Reports submitted annually to the Council of the League of Nations until 1938. Similar reports were issued to the Trusteeship Council after the establishment of Tanganyika as a Trusteeship Territory, and this series, more comprehensive and detailed in scope and nature than the pre-World War II series, comprised the annual Reports by H.M.G. on the Administration of Tanganyika for the years 1947 to 1961.

Several official studies were made by the British in attempting to formulate policy for the Trust Territory as part of an East African complex rather than as an entity in itself. Among these was the Report of the East Africa Commission (Chairman: Hon. W. Ormsby-Gore), 1924 (Cmd. 2387), and Future Policy in regard to Eastern Africa, 1927 (Cmd. 2904). There is also considerable material on the controversial plan for uniting the administrative machinery of the three East African Territories or even possibly federating

them. This subject may be pursued in the Report of the Commission on Closer Union of the Dependencies in Eastern and Central Africa (Chairman: Rt. Hon. Sir E. Hilton Young), 1929 (Cmd. 3234); the Report of the House of Commons Joint Select Committee on Closer Union in East Africa, 2 vols. (H.C. 156), 1931; Inter-Territorial Organization in East Africa, 1945 (Col. No. 191), and Revised Proposals of the same (Col. No. 210), 1947.[7] Later developments in British administrative policy may be traced in the Report of the Commission on the Civil Services of Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda and Zanzibar, 1947-1948 (Col. No. 223) and the Report of the Commission on the Civil Services of the East African Territories and the East African High Commission, 1953-1954 (Chairman: Sir David Lidbury), 1954.

The changes in social, economic and political conditions following World War II may be noted by referring to The British Territories in East and Central Africa, 1945-1950 (Cmd. 7987), 1950, and the Report of the East Africa Royal Commission, 1953-1955 (Chairman: Sir Hugh Dow), 1955.

A valuable complement to the official documents mentioned previously is the annual Tanganyika Government series entitled Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners. These contained details on the provinces, reviewing progress or reverses in various fields. One may also

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[7]Other related material may be found in Cmd. 3574 (1930) Col. No. 57 (1931) and Cmd. 4141 (1932).

gain knowledge of various aspects of the social and economic system in Tanganyika through the annual reports of the major departments of government, as for example, the Annual Report of the Labour Department, which were supplemented when necessary by monographs on the particular subject, such as the Report on Labour in the Tanganyika Territory by Major G. St. J. Orde Brown, 1926, and the Report of the Minimum Wages Board, 1962. Until 1960, a record of proceedings was kept of Legislative Council Debates (Hansard), which was continued under the new name of National Assembly Debates (Hansard) after independence. Of the other publications of the Tanganyika Government, note should especially be made of the controversial Report of the Arusha-Moshi Lands Commission (Judge Mark Wilson, Commissioner), 1947, which sparked Tanganyika's first oral petition to the United Nations, and the Report of the Committee on Constitutional Development, 1951, which marked a milestone in the political development.

Of the several English- and Swahili-language newspapers and periodicals which chronicle and comment upon current happenings, the daily Tanganyika Standard is the most reliable, the daily Uhuru is the mouthpiece of TANU, and East Africa and Rhodesia the spokesman (at least until recently) of the more conservative members of the European settler community. The fortnightly Reporter has a good reputation for its balanced analysis and wide perspective.

Political studies of Tanganyika are rather rare, although a spate of articles have appeared since independence. An excellent work on political development as affected by its international status is B. Chidzero's Tanganyika and International Trusteeship (1961). Ansu Kuma Datta's earlier work, Tanganyika: Government in a Plural Society (1955), is attentive to the Asian point of view, as it existed until then. Since independence, there has appeared Political Development of Tanganyika (1962) by J. Clagett Taylor, which gives an historical account, though rather superficial, of major constitutional progress. A good, if compressed, description of Tanganyika's present political structure is "Tanganyika" by M. L. Bates in African One-Party States (1962), edited by Gwendolin M. Carter. Unfortunately, Dr. Bates' much more comprehensive doctoral thesis, "Tanganyika Under British Administration (1920-1955)," 1957, is still unpublished, as is also J. Liebenow's "Chieftainship and Local Government in Tanganyika: A Study of Institutional Adaptation," 1956.

No study of modern Tanganyika can be complete, of course, without reference to the writings and speeches of President Julius Nyerere, many of which, fortunately, have been published in pamphlet form, although the time is perhaps over-ripe for a collection in book form.

Organization of the Remainder of this Work

The next chapter will contain background material of historical, geographical, demographical, and other aspects of Tanganyika, in order to prepare the way for the ensuing examination of the political processes. In Chapter III, the feudal period is described and analyzed, with reference to the concepts and categories previously mentioned. In Chapter IV, the same methods are utilized for the colonial period, using this term very broadly to embrace not only the period of German domination alone, but also the years of British mandate and trusteeship. The post-independence period is dealt with in Chapter V, stressing wherever possible comparisons and/or similarities with previous periods. The result should make possible some generalizations and hypotheses regarding the political system which Tanganyika enjoys, and these are summarized and elaborated upon in the concluding Chapter VI.

A map of the main tribal groups of East Africa may be found in the pocket in the rear.

CHAPTER II

THE BACKGROUND

Environmental Framework

The physical environment of Tanganyika discloses striking features. A vast land, four times the size of the United Kingdom, juts upward between deep chasms, valleys, and gorges and falls in a series of broad steps to the Indian Ocean. Massive mountain ranges in the northeast and south reach elevations exceeding, in one spectacular instance, 19,000 feet. In the west and southwest, the waters of three great lakes divide Tanganyika from its neighbors. These mountains and lakes are peripheral to an extensive central plateau, between 5,000 and 9,000 feet above sea level, the result of earlier convulsions of the earth surface affecting the whole of the eastern part of the Continent.

> This region comprises the roof of Africa, the adjacent plateau walls, and the land at the base of them. As if the uplift and arching of this part of Africa had been excessive, the land has been rent by deep, double faults that have riven the surface as no other place on earth has ever been riven. The main fault system trends southward from the Red Sea through Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanganyika to Nyasaland. A secondary system runs to the west of it and takes

in Lakes Tanganyika and Albert, and part of the Upper Nile valley.[1]

Climatically, three main zones may be distinguished: (1) the warm, humid coast region with the immediately adjoining hinterland in which conditions are tropical: here the average yearly temperature is 78 degrees Fahrenheit; (2) the hot and dry zone of the central plateau: this climate varies greatly in parts, but is generally characterized by low humidity and low rainfall;[2] (3) the slopes of Mounts Kilimanjaro and Meru in the northern part of the country and of certain other highland massifs including the Usambara, Uzungwa, Rungwe, and Livingstone Mountains: these districts, where frosts occur at the higher altitudes and the nights are cold, were for a long time considered the only ones healthy for Europeans.

In widely separated areas of proved fertility lives the major part of Tanganyika's population of nine millions. The great plateau comprising the heartland of the country is mostly uninhabited: its soils are sandy and acid, and most of the area is the domain of the tsetse fly.[3] In many

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[1]George H. T. Kimble, "Land and Livelihood," in Tropical Africa, Vol. I (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1960), p. 32.

[2]In the Central Province, right in the heart of this zone, between 1941 and 1945, there was only one year (1944) when there was a good harvest providing sufficient crops to last the year. Provincial Commissioner's Report (1946), p. 1.

[3]The tsetse fly causes the disease known as sleeping sickness and spreads rapidly in areas of congested bush

regions of the country famines and floods recur with terrifying regularity. The cold in the higher areas can be invigorating; in coastal areas the humid heat may be enervating.

Tanganyika has a plentiful supply of water, though unevenly distributed. In addition to the portions of the great lakes which lie within its territory--the southern portion of Lake Victoria, the lower eastern shores of Lake Tanganyika, and the northern and northeastern shores of Lake Nyasa--there exist smaller lakes and numerous rivers which drain either into the great lakes or into the Indian Ocean. Among the principal rivers are the Pangani or Ruvu, which rises in the snows of Kilimanjaro and flows southward to the Indian Ocean; the Ruvumu, which is 500 miles long and has its source in the mountains east of Lake Nyasa; and the Kagera, which is 400 miles long and forms the headwaters of the Nile.

Despite magnificent scenery (in places), abundant water, and perhaps the world's largest surviving reserves of big game, it cannot be claimed that Nature has been overly kind to Tanganyika. On the one hand, much of its area of 937,061 kilometers lies barren and unproductive because of uncertain or inadequate rainfall; on the other hand, a considerable portion of the remainder is rendered

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vegetation, affecting both man and beast in its path.

uninhabitable by the formidable tsetse fly. Only in the north, northeast, northwest and southwest are the hills, lakes, rivers and forests juxtaposed with valleys and plains in such rich profusion as to excite admiration or envy. There is evidence to suggest the existence of mineral wealth which may to some extent supplement Nature's other gifts. Throughout the country there are useful reserves of gold, silver, diamonds, coal, iron ore, kaolis, phosphate, rock, salt, gypsum, tin, and niobium-bearing pyrochlore.[4]

Tanganyika is bounded on the north by Kenya and Uganda; on the west by Congo (Leopoldville); on the southwest by Zambia and Malawi; and on the south by Mozambique. To some of these neighbors, traditionally, Tanganyika has been a gateway or stepping-stone. In this respect, two features of a geographical nature have been of major importance. One is the manner in which the African coastline indents to form in Tanganyika several good harbors, entrance to which is guarded (or commanded) by the islands of Pemba, Zanzibar, and Mafia.[5] Such is the propinquity and strategic

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[4] Report by H.M.G. on Tanganyika Under United Kingdom Administration, in the United Kingdom to the United Nations for the year 1960 (London: H.M.S.O., Col. No. 349, 1961).

[5] The name of the largest island, Zanzibar, meaning "Land of Zinj" or "Land of Zanj" (i.e., "Land of the Blacks") is said to have been given first by Arabs to the eastern mid-African coast in general and afterwards to the island which still bears it. Reginald Coupland, East Africa and Its Invaders: From the Earliest Times to the Death of Seyyid Said in 1856-1890 (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), p. 20.

location of these islands--10 to 30 miles from the coast and from each other--that the security of the mainland is foredommed when the islands fall into the hands of a predatory power. The second feature was of greater significance in the earlier, pre-steamboat period: namely, the regularity and direction of the monsoon wind cycle, which attracted foreign traders from Arabia, the other side of the Indian Ocean, and countries as far to the north as China.

> Ever since the earliest days [Sir John Gray affirms], when men of the East first began to go down to the sea in ships and to occupy their business in great waters, they have learnt that sailing vessels bound to East India, or the Persian Gulf, or Southern Arabia must avail themselves of the north-east monsoon, by setting out before that wind begins to die down and is followed by variable winds rendering navigation uncertain. Similarly, the return voyage can only be made whilst the south-west monsoon is blowing.[6]

Historical Outline

The overwhelming majority of Tanganyika's inhabitants are Africans.[7] Among these, some 120 tribes are distinguished, according to linguistic and cultural differences. These "tribes" are vestigial remnants of feudal units which, in the pre-colonial period, comprised the social and political systems. Throughout the seven and a

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[6]Sir John Gray, History of Zanzibar: From the Middle Ages to 1856 (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 2.

[7]According to the 1957 census, in addition to the Africans, of whom there were 8,665,335, the population was comprised of the following three main groups: Asians, 76,536; Europeans, 20,598; and Arabs, 19,100.

half decades of colonial over-rule, the tribal systems persisted, subjected though they were to internal and external pressures of varying intensities which distorted their traditional structures and functions. Indeed, up to the eve of independence, tribal loyalties and tribal susceptibilities lingered, not without artificial fostering, although there had been considerable admixture of blood and culture, resulting in a highly diversified pattern of inter-tribalism and de-tribalism.

Whence had these tribes developed? The origins of Tanganyika's inhabitants go back to the beginning of Man himself: some anthropologists think that this country may have been his first home, about a million or more years ago.[8] When the first political systems began to develop is unknown, but civilized communities existed from very ancient times. A small tribe living in Kondoa District in central Tanganyika at the present time, akin to the Bushmen of South Africa, is thought to be closest to the aboriginal stock of the country.[9] The majority of the African population today are described by anthropologists as being of Negroid,

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[8]Much of this thinking is based on the discoveries of Dr. L. S. B. Leakey and his wife at Olduvai in northern Tanganyika in recent years.

[9]Annual Report on Tanganyika for 1920, pp. 4-5. This tribe may have been of Hottentot, rather than Bushmen, ancestry. Or, they may be part of the original stock from which both Hottentot and Bushmen sprung. Eric A. Walker, A History of Southern Africa (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1959), pp. 6-7.

Nilotic and Hamitic origin. They apparently came to their present home in different streams of migration, at different times and for different reasons. The Negroid group is derived from the Negroes, of whom none is said to exist in East Africa today in any "pure" form. Their ancestry can be observed, however, according to ethnographers, in such physical appearances as dark skin and woolly hair. The origin of the Negroes is far from certain; some think they originated in Asia, possibly India; others think they are indigenous to tropical Africa, originating in the Lake Region of East Africa. The Nilotic people are thought to be the product of a mixed group, which originally developed in the Valley on both sides of the Nile from Sennar to Lake Victoria, whence they penetrated into East Africa. The Hamites (sometimes also called "Cushites") are thought to have come from Arabia, perhaps appearing in East Africa as early as Upper Paleolithic times.[10]

The universal search for better living conditions, lure of adventure, pursuit of conquest, and flight from oppression are some of the reasons which determined the movements and migrations of tribes into and within Tanganyika, as was the case in other African areas.[11] Despite

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[10] G. W. B. Huntingford, "The Peopling of the Interior of East Africa by its Modern Inhabitants," in History of East Africa, R. Oliver and G. Mathew (eds.), Vol. I, Ch. III (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 58-93.

[11] Cf. the discussion by George H. T. Kimble in

their tribal diversities, most of the tribes in Tanganyika eventually developed (either spontaneously or by borrowing) certain similar culture patterns and basic linguistic roots and grammatical structures. Generally speaking, the tribes-people were agriculturalists; a minority were pastoralists; and some combined the two occupations. They were also workers of metal, made pottery by hand, and carved ivory and wood. They had elaborate social codes, supported by religious ritual, and lived under a number of separate chiefs who were regarded as semi-sacred and ruled with the aid of councillors.

> The Bantu languages are united by two outstanding features not found in other African languages. The first is the grouping together of words in classes distinguished by pairs of singular and plural prefixes (so that the beginning of the word changes to form the plural). . . . The second feature is the agreement of adjectives, pronouns, and verbs with the noun to which they refer by means of a prefix derived from the class-prefix of the governing noun, a method known as "concord."[12]

From the word, "ABAntu" (People), which appears in all Bantu languages in this or a similar form as the plural of "UMUntu" (person), has been derived the name which is given to all those who speak these tongues.

The Bantu peoples of the hinterland of Tanganyika have remained largely homogeneous. In the coastal areas

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Tropical Africa, op. cit., pp. 101-106; and by Kathleen M. Stahl in History of the Chagga People of Kilimanjaro (London: Mouton & Co., 1964), pp. 43-50.

[12]Huntingford, op. cit., p. 80.

the population has become heterogeneous.

The East African coast, roughly from Cape Guardafui (in present-day Somalia) to Cape Delgado (just south of Tanganyika) was known as Azania. Hindus are thought to have been trading with and settling in these areas as early as the sixth century B.C.[13] During the first century, ships from Egypt regularly brought to Azania wheat, rice, ghee, sesame oil, cotton cloth, girdles, honey, hatchets, swords, awls, and glass vessels. They took back ivory, rhinoceros horn, tortoise-shell, coconut oil and cinnamon, "as well as the better part of slaves."[14] The closest ties--religious, commercial and political--were with Arabia. As trade and other relations grew, foreign influence along the coast waxed and waned, at times and in places amounting to political dominance, at other times dwindling to mere cultural and religious allegiance. Dynastic disputes among the tribes of Oman who, like other tribes in Arabia, participated in the spiritual and political upheavals subsequent to the introduction of the Islamic faith, caused some of those on the losing side to take refuge on the East African coast. There, their political fortunes prospered, enabling them to enjoy great predominance around the eighth century A.D. From about the tenth century on, Persian influence prevailed.

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[13] Coupland, op. cit., p. 16.

[14] The Periplus of the Erythraen Sea (ca. A.D. 80).

Hassan bin Ali, who sailed from southern Persia in A.D. 975 with his six sons is credited with founding the settlement of Kilwa Kisiwani on the Tanganyika coast.[15] From the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries, the Sultanate of Kilwa rose to great prosperity and power, controlling the trade of a long stretch of the coast.[16]

When the Arabs and the Persians settled on the Azania coast, some of them took into their harems women of the local African tribes. Their offspring in turn married local tribeswomen or intermarried among themselves. From this stock there gradually evolved a rather indefinite group consisting of persons of mixed Arab or Persian and African descent, speaking a language compounded of Arabic and Bantu elements. This language came to be known as Swahili, or Ki-swahili, and the former name was also applied to those persons who spoke it. Such persons generally adopted the religion of their paternal ancestors, and such traces of their culture as survived the transmigration from Arabia. The Wa-Swahili lived for the most part scattered among the coast-dwellers, with no sort of political union; nevertheless (or perhaps therefore) they exercised a widespread influence, disseminating Islamic religion and culture

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[15] Zoe Marsh and G. W. Kinsworth, An Introduction to the History of East Africa (Cambridge, 1957).

[16] Ruins of its major cities, Kilwa and Sonjo Mnana, and coins of its sultans which are still being unearthed, serve as present-day reminders of its former greatness.

amongst the local tribespeople and their fellow coast-dwellers.[17] The interaction between Arab and African cultures in the coastal regions has well been described as follows:

> The coastal civilization was something unique, neither wholly Arab nor exclusively African, eclectic but not cosmopolitan. In Swahili, civilization is spoken of as ustaarabu, being like an Arab. Until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the immigrants, absorbed in trade, had their faces turned towards the homelands to which they exported goods, just as their religion turned their faces to Mecca. They were essentially trading communities, and were contented to let the trade of the interior flow to them. It is only about 1780 that the first traders seem to have gone inland. As they intermarried, and employed African serviles, or enfranchised African surias, concubines by whom they had had children, so they unwittingly and unconsciously absorbed African ideas, African religious practices enshrined in the witchcraft of the coast, and turned to their own use African words in the creation of the Swahili language. It is some measure of the strength of African influence that this language, in absorbing foreign words, has perfectly preserved a Bantu form of grammar. Inevitably there were differing degrees of Africanization: they were the very essence of the Swahili civilization.[18]

At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the new age of European exploration was heralded by the appearance of Portuguese conquistadors. Vasco da Gama's epochal voyage from Portugal to India brought him twice to East Africa.

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[17] Dr. R. Reusch asserts that in Kilwa the WaSwahili formed a nation "representing the bulk of the population of the Zeng Empire during the 12th to 16th centuries." Tanganyika Notes and Records, XXXIV, No. 20, (1953). But his views are generally treated with caution.

[18] G. S. P. Freeman-Grenville, "The Coast, 1498-1840," in History of East Africa, Ch. V, op. cit.

Outward bound in 1497, he was the first European to circumnavigate the Cape of Good Hope, gazing delightedly at Tanganyika's Usambara Mountains before stepping ashore with mixed fear and fascination at Mombasa, Kenya. Inward bound, he revisited the East African coast, and took back to Portugal such (apparently) glowing accounts that Azania eventually received its initial experience of European adventurers.[19]

The Portuguese made a brave attempt to dominate the East African coast during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and for a time enjoyed considerable success. At its zenith, the influence of their forts and trading posts, their captains and missionaries, extended from Mombasa in the north to Mozambique in the south, and included Zanzibar and Kilwa Kisiwani. By the close of the seventeenth century, however, Portugal's only remaining captaincy in East Africa was Mozambique. Maritime incompetence, miscegenation, and a religion less acceptable to the Africans than Islam (which permitted polygamy) are some of the reasons given for the decline of Portuguese influence.[20] The Portuguese were inhibited by their inability to clearly

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[19] Journal of the First Voyage of Vasco da Gama, 1497-1499 (author unknown, possibly a member of the crew), trans. E. G. Ravenstein for the Hakluyt Society, 1898.

[20] This opinion is advanced by Eric Axelson, of the University of Witwatersrand, Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1600-1700 (Johannesburg: University of Witwatersrand, 1960).

define and execute a consistent policy of colonialism. Far from their home base, harrassed by the local tribes who neither could be subdued nor would be converted, the Portuguese administrators on the spot made the most of the situation by personal fortune hunting. Tanganyika had nothing then to compare with the legendary gold and silver of Zimbabwe and Monomatapa, and interest in the northern areas waned as profits mounted further south. To the list of contributing factors for decline of Portuguese power given above, others have added the establishment in Mozambique of the slave trade, which received official recognition by Portugal in 1645, and the ensuing apathy and moral insensibility of the Europeans on the spot who, "now possessing great wealth in gold, ivory and slaves, appear to have abandoned themselves to a life of Oriental indolence, luxury, and vice."[21]

Arab influence was again dominant during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, although the tie was mainly religious until 1832, when Seyid Sayyid bin Sultan transferred his capital from Muscat to Zanzibar.[22] From this date, there began an intensive and systematic penetration of

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[21] R. C. F. Maugham, Portuguese East Africa (New York: Dutton, 1906), pp. 17-28.

[22] His attention to East Africa is said to have been drawn partly by remembrance of vague ancestral claims and, ironically enough, by requests made to him by the British Government to take measures to curtail the slave trade. Gray, op. cit., p. 111.

the interior of Tanganyika by the Arabs based on Zanzibar, mainly for the purposes of the slave trade but also for ivory which complemented it.[23]

The inauguration of Seyid Sayyid's system of slave-cum-ivory caravans signalled a new phase in Tanganyika's history. Previous to Seyid Sayyid's caravans, communications were open in Tanganyika, and the sight of men and goods from far away places was neither strange nor fearsome.[24] Their comings and goings were not so frequent nor in such numbers as to disrupt the normal way of life. From time to time there had appeared, the odd Arab or Swahili, who claimed to represent some pretender at the coast, with rights of some sort over Azania. No one in the hinterland took these assertions seriously, backed as they were with no correspondingly coercive power. At most they impressed those Arabs and Swahilis who, by inclination or from ties of religion or affinity, were already inclined to be so.

The new ruler of Zanzibar, however, brought ruthless method as well as purpose to his formidable plan of exploitation.

> He set himself, in the first place, to stimulate the export of the chief products of the African

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[23]It has been noted by Allison Smith that, time and again, the demand for the one commodity seems to have stimulated commerce in the other. History of East Africa, op. cit., p. 269.

[24]Chinese porcelain has been discovered at as many as 46 ancient sites in Tanganyika.

> mainland--ivory, slaves, gum-copal, coconuts, copra, and palm-oil. Most of them needed little attention. . . . But ivory and slaves could only be obtained by long, costly, and sometimes dangerous expeditions into the interior; and, though it is not known how systematic or comprehensive Said's methods were, it is certain that during his reign the whole system of inland trade was extended and elaborated far beyond the more or less casual operations in which the Arabs of the coast had been engaged for ages past. More and bigger caravans were organized and they penetrated deeper in to the continent. New trade-routes were explored. New trading-settlements were founded. For all this there is copious evidence.[25]

Well-armed, and consisting of anything from 600 to 4,000 men, the caravans of Seyid Sayyid pushed through the scattered African chiefdoms with irresistible force. In their wake they left depopulated villages, ruined family and social life, inter-tribal strife and deranged political structures. They signalized, as Coupland observes, the first real "invasion" of the East African interior.[26]

The latter part of the nineteenth century witnessed the integration of most of the nation-states of Western Europe, and their development and expansion of power overseas. Imbued with lust for power, or money, or religious converts, adventurous men from the northwest brought to the continent of Africa their new methods of conquest and new visions of immortality. Germany, a comparative newcomer to this field of activity, had acquired enough self-confidence by the 1880's to compete with Great Britain for the prize of

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[25]Coupland, op. cit., pp. 304-305.

[26]Ibid., p. 308.

East Africa. Among the German and English missionaries and explorers who traversed Tanganyika during this period were: Rebmann, Knapf, Burton, Speke, Grant, Cameron, Thompson, von der Decker, Livingstone and Stanley. One can accept as typical of the missionary experiences and attitudes the report of Knapf, German missionary working for the Church Missionary Society, who visited Usambara country in 1848 and again in 1852. He found that the "king" was disposed to admit missionaries to his country and would allow them to select their own locations; that it was a country with many and large villages where a missionary could address masses of people when he had won mastery of the language; and that the local inhabitants were accustomed to order, were peaceable, not without intelligence, and had a desire for improvement. The missionary also noted:

> In our own day a disintegrating process is ever spreading among the nations of Eastern Africa, and the East Africans themselves avow that things went better with them in their fathers' time; that greater kings and chiefs existed then than now, and that a new element must be introduced among them. The descendants of Ham have outlived themselves; it is, therefore, evident that the descendants of Japheth must steer the vessel by the might of Christianity, the only safe rudder for East Africa, as for all other continents. The Gospel alone can save Africa from complete destruction.[27]

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[27] J. L. Knapf, Travels, Researches and Missionary Labours During an Eighteen Years' Residence in East Africa (1860) (London: Trübner & Co.). Knapf himself won enough mastery of the language that he compiled what was said to be the first attempt to reduce the language to writing other than Arabic.

The explorers had the same convictions and objectives as the missionaries, if lacking the philosophical rationalization. There was heavy traffic during these times upon the "slave-path," which cut across the middle of Tanganyika, from the coastal port of Kaole, near the present capital of Dar es Salaam, to Kigoma on the shores of Lake Tanganyika. One might meet, as Burton did in 1857, large caravans of some thousand men traversing up and down the route each week, during the travelling season, between June and April.[28] Force and bluster were occasionally necessary to overcome African opposition to the advancement of science and learning,[29] and guile and tact to outwit one's rival explorers. In 1884, the German explorer, Dr. Karl Peters, concluded twelve treaties with Tanganyikan chiefs, in the course of a six-week journey through the interior. On his return to Berlin, the territory of the chiefdoms concerned was declared to be German, and placed under the protection of the Imperial Government. A clash with the British Government was averted by an arrangement in 1885 defining their respective "spheres of influence." Germany was assigned the southern portion of East Africa from the mouth of

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[28]Richard F. Burton, The Lake Regions of Central Africa, Vol. I (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1860), pp. 95-99.

[29]Cf. The Exploration Diaries of H. M. Stanley, Richard Stanley and Alan Neame (eds.) (London: William Kimber & Co., Ltd., 1961), pp. 40, 50.

the Ruvuma to the Umbo River, while England accepted the northern portion from the Umbo to the Juba River.[30] A ten-mile belt along the coast was regarded as belonging to the Sultan of Zanzibar, but was taken over by Germany in 1890 on payment of £200,000 to the Sultan. The Anglo-Germany Treaty of 1890, which regularized this arrangement, ushered in, for Tanganyika, the era of Colonization.[31]

Severe revolts and uprisings resulted from the German attempts to establish their power in East Africa. The most serious were those of the Arab-Swahili and African combined campaigns along the coast from Bagamoyo to Lindi under Bushiri and Heri of Zigua from 1888 to 1890; those of the WaHehe, who struggled for the defense of their independence under Mkwawa I from 1891 until 1894; and the "Maji-Maji" war which flared in 1905, united almost the whole southern half of the country in the first genuine outburst of Tanganyikan nationalism, and was not overcome by the Germans until 1907, at a cost of some 120,000 casualties.[32]

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[30] Britain recognized the German Protectorate of East Africa in 1886.

[31] A contemporary account of the negotiations and maneuvers between the various European rivals for power is given by J. S. Keltie (the Secretary of the Royal Geographical Society) in The Partition of Africa (London: Edward Stanton, 1895).

[32] R. M. Bell, "The Maji-Maji Rebellion in the Liwale District," Tanganyika Notes and Records, XXVIII (1950), 38-57, discusses this uprising. Cf. also the observations in Tanganyika Notes and Records, IV (1955), 16 et seq.

The Germans highly regarded their East African prize, and after its military pacification, worked hard to make their rule a success.

The motives which determined German policy in Tanganyika showed that mixture of humanitarianism and commercialism familiar to students of European colonialism in Africa. The case for colonization was said to rest upon the necessity of suppressing the Arab slave trade in keeping with the Congo Treaty of 1885, and the duty of civilizing and Christianizing the natives on the one hand; and upon the need for Germany to become economically independent and to develop new fields for activity and expansion on the other.[33] In order to fulfill its humanitarian obligations, the Imperial Power encouraged missionaries to evangelize the Africans and introduced hygienic reforms and educational programs. To attain its more material goals, the German Government fostered European settlement on huge farming plantations and encouraged commercial and industrial exploitation of the country's resources by big European enterprises. The German administrators brought to Tanganyika that thoroughness which is characteristic of their race. Research stations were established for scientific investigation of diseases and plant and cattle breeding, railways

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[33] Cf. Chancellor Bismarck's speeches in the Reichstag, Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages, Jan. 10 and March 16, 1885, and Jan. 26, 1889.

were laid from coast to the interior, and comprehensive surveys were commenced as a basis for geological and economic development. These progressive measures were marred by such practices as the flogging of Africans, alienation of land to Europeans, forced native labor, and other characteristics of imperialism of the early twentieth century. Before the effects of German colonial policies could make themselves fully manifest, World War I intervened. That war was, for Tanganyika, long-drawn out and devastating. All of its human and material resources were involved in the desperate German attempt to stave off defeat.[34] The unsuccessful end of the war provided the opportunity for the extension by Britain and Belgium of their respective zones of influence at the loser's expense.[35] The former German East Africa was divided between the two victorious allies as League of Nations' Mandated Territories. Britain obtained the mandate

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[34]A Protective Force totalling about 3,000 Europeans and 11,000 African "Askari" were enrolled; hundreds of thousands of Africans were impressed into quasi-military service as carriers, bearers, road-builders, etc., and foodstuffs were compulsorily cultivated and commandeered to serve the needs of the military. The story of the war is told, somewhat racily, by Brian Gardner in German East (London: Cassell, 1963).

[35]Nevertheless, von Lettow-Vorbeck, the General in charge of the German East African command, was proud that "we had preserved some part of Germany's soldierly traditions, had come back home unsullied, and that the Teutonic sense of loyalty peculiar to us Germans had kept its head high even under the conditions of war in the tropics." General Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck, East African Campaigns (New York: R. Speller, 1957).

for what is now Tanganyika, while the remainder, consisting of what now comprise the separate states of Rwanda and Burundi, was mandated to Belgium.[36]

British administration of Tanganyika between World Wars I and II was essentially a holding operation. Wavering between grand imperial dreams and apprehension of the need to appease Hitlerite Germany's demands for a return of its colonies, Britain governed Tanganyika as if it were a step-colony, with a minimum of men and means. Her task was facilitated by a relative quiescence on the part of the African population, decimated and exhausted by the slave trade, the German pacification campaigns, and the First World War, which had followed one another in close succession. The pragmatic British never ordinarily tamper with constitutions or alter policies that appear to be working satisfactorily, and satisfaction is presumed in the absence of evidence--in the form of widespread civil disturbance or bloodshed, for example--to the contrary. Hence, Tanganyika slumbered on, its surface peacefulness unruffled by rumors of sinister preparations and Bund-type organization among its still considerable local German community. Fortunately, Tanganyika was spared a repetition of its World War I experiences when the second world-wide conflagration erupted. Thousands of Tanganyika Africans were enrolled into the

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[36]Article 119 of the Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919.

armed services, and Tanganyikan agricultural products contributed to the totality of the war effort. However, the country did not again become a battlefield. Products were sold for cash, and proceeds remitted to the growers, who made the most they could out of the artificially high prices stimulated by war-time demands.

After World War II had ended, the Mandate for Tanganyika was changed into a Trusteeship under the United Nations. British administration continued; so did international supervision; both more real and more determined than they had been before. The former received fresh impetus and sense of direction from a new Labor Government anxious to implement the theoretical policies so hopefully prepared during the long years of opposition; the latter took seriously the lofty ideals and uncompromising goals set out in the United Nations Charter. Meanwhile, the attitudes and expectations of the African population had changed, alerted by the rumblings of nationalism which reverberated from across the Indian Ocean, and the reports brought back by returning servicemen from the Middle East, Pacific, and other theaters of war. The times were ripe for development and change.

> The Tanganyika Territory, as it entered its sixth decade of over-rule by Europeans presented a picture of uneven development. In a few fortunate regions, where soil and water was sufficient, and in places stimulated by new developments, economic and political life was active. In Sukumaland, in the Lake Province, for example, plans were being developed to move large populations into improved land and to stimulate wide-

> spread economic rehabilitation, correlated with social and political changes. In the Kilimanjaro region, where the Chagga were managing most of their own affairs, and many Europeans enjoyed the invigorating climate, there was marked activity. In the Kongwa area, where the Groundnut Scheme was developing, there was vigorous activity. And in certain areas in the vast Southern part of the Territory, active mining and agricultural interests and the building of ports, railways and other facilities for the Groundnut Scheme were making their contribution towards general advancement. But apart from these and a few other active centers, conditions for the 6 million Africans had changed little for generations.[37]

The Age of Colonialism had ushered in a new concept in Tanganyikan social life--racialism, or the plural society. Previous to this time, foreigners who came to Tanganyika, even as conquistadors or slave-traders, had intermingled and intermarried with the indigenous population, although generally distinguishable by their peculiar style and culture. The period which began with German protection at the end of the nineteenth century brought not only permanent resident foreigners in relatively greater numbers, it also witnessed the commencement of an aloofness or apartness, on the part of the alien communities. These conditions were accentuated during the period of British mandate and trusteeship.

At the beginning of the period of British administration, the African population of Tanganyika numbered just over four million. In addition there were almost five

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[37]United Nations Trusteeship Council, "Report of the Visiting Mission to Tanganyika Territory in 1948," Official Records, 4th Sess., Off. Records and Supplement (T/218).

thousand Arabs, nine thousand Indians and two and one half thousand Europeans (of whom roughly one quarter were officials). By the time of the transition from mandate to trusteeship, the African population had almost doubled, the Arabs likewise, while the Indian and European components had almost quintupled. A decade later, while the African population showed little more than a 15 per cent increase, all other communities showed increases of approximately 100 per cent.[38] The substantial increases in non-African population, although in the case of Asians resulting considerably from natural causes, are sufficiently indicative of a liberal immigration policy. In part, this was influenced by pressures, not too well resisted by the British Government, from the well-entrenched European settlers of Kenya and Southern Africa.

A plural society presents problems of a peculiarly intractable nature in periods of great pressures for development and change. Tanganyikan nationalism began to develop as local Africans began to identify themselves with the demands and expectations of their brothers in Kenya, Uganda, and all across the rapidly re-awakening continent. This

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[38]The exact figures as given by the Report of the East Africa Commission, 1925, p. 113, and the Report of the East Africa Royal Commission, 1955, p. 457, and the 1957 Census are as follows:

	African	Other	Arab	Goan	Indian	European
1921	4,107,000		4,780		9,000	2,447
1948	7,410,269	2,184	11,218	2,006	44,248	10,648
1957	8,665,336		19,100		76,536	20,598

nationalism fed on evidence of racial discrimination and social and economic disparity, and fears that the British were resolved to make up for their previous neglect of Tanganyika, by developing it as part of an East African or East and Central African complex, rather than as an exclusive entity with a unique international personality. The Tanganyikan African National Union was founded in 1954 by Mr. Julius Nyerere, who reorganized for this purpose a previously mainly social and welfare organization, the Tanganyika African Association. In the following year Mr. Nyerere, its first President, began the series of pilgrimages to the New York headquarters of the United Nations, which so effectively abetted TANU's political campaign within the Trust Territory.

Although militantly anti-discrimination, the policies of TANU were not racially chauvinistic. Mildness and moderation, combined with sheer political genius, enabled Mr. Nyerere to lead TANU rapidly to a position of dominance in the political scene; one of the best organized mass parties in Africa, TANU had within a few years penetrated every township and almost every chiefdom, arousing the people and firing their imagination and enthusiasm for a change from colonial status to independence. Workers, peasants, and intellectuals (the latter were mostly a few teachers and civil servants) rallied to TANU's banner. Trade unions and agricultural co-operatives were stimulated by the

nationalist fervor, and in turn supported it with militant policies and actions. The British, resigned to the "wind of change," nevertheless attempted to moderate its effects in Tanganyika with policies labelled "parity" and "partnership" and other devices, more or less obviously designed either to slow down the pace of the nationalist movement or capture it for the European settler community and their Asian allies. TANU managed to capture, instead, sufficient support from the Europeans and Asians to sweep the ingeniously handicapped electoral contest of 1960. With the consent of the British Administering Authority and the United Nations, the Trust Agreement was terminated on April 21, 1961. A national government headed by Prime Minister Nyerere then assumed power in an independent Tanganyika.

The Tanganyika which emerged into independent nationhood in 1961 faced a formidable array of social and economic problems. The gross domestic product of its nine million population was less than £200 million sterling.[39] Most of the Africans were peasant farmers, and only half a million were recorded as being in paid employment. Few of the latter commanded a wage enabling the maintenance of a standard of living consonant with human dignity. The

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[39] In 1962, the figure of £195 million represented some £8 million in monetary terms more than the previous year, but expressed in real terms was probably much the same as in 1960, according to Mr. Paul Bomani, the Finance Minister, presenting his first Budget to the National Assembly on June 5, 1962 (Hansard).

average yearly income was less than £20 sterling per head. Agriculture dominated the economy, accounting for some 45 per cent of the total output. By comparison, manufacturing industry accounted for only about 4 per cent. Tanganyika's development came mainly through the growth of exports of primary products, 80 per cent of which came from agricultural and livestock products, as against 13 per cent for minerals.[40] Social and hospital facilities were woefully inadequate, in addition to being outmoded and dilapidated. The life expectancy of the average Tanganyikan was limited to 35 or 40 years. Schools were few and universities nonexistent. Educated and trained manpower was far short of the number required to staff the administration services and serve the needs of commerce and industry.

Complicating and exaggerating the general picture of social and economic underdevelopment was the color-bar which pervaded the entire social and economic structure. In government as well as in private industry, Europeans occupied a disproportionate number of senior posts, which Asians and Africans were prevented from ever reaching by a general practice of filling vacancies in such posts with newly arrived Europeans. In the commercial realm Asians were predominant, maintaining a near-monopoly of the retail trade and the middle posts of banking and industry. To the

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[40]Cf. Development Plan for Tanganyika, 1961/62-1963/64 (Dar es Salaam, 1961), p. 2.

external world, Tanganyika was mainly a supplier of sisal, cotton, coffee, and diamonds, and a market for manufactured goods and textiles. Internally, the Africans supplied the Europeans and Asians as hewers of wood and drawers of water.

The British recognized the backwardness and the insufficiency of Tanganyika's social and economic system and were committed, according to the declared aims of their Colonial policy as well as their trusteeship obligations under the United Nations Charter, to eliminating them. And they had, in the years preceding independence, made determined and, according to their lights, sincere efforts to do so. It was the thesis of Tanganyikan African nationalism, however, that rule by others is contrary to any man's dignity.[41] It was left to prove that an independent nation, led by persons freely and democratically chosen by the people, could best achieve their hopes and aspirations for a better way of life.

After independence, the new government set itself to the task of channeling the people's enthusiasm and energy into fighting their "three enemies": poverty, ignorance, and disease. A Three-Year Development Plan, put into execution soon after independence, was followed in 1965 by the first of three Five-Year Plans. The main objectives of the latter are:

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[41]Cf. Sauti ya TANU (Voice of TANU), published in commemoration of the fifth anniversary of the founding of the party, on TANU Day, July 7, 1959.

By 1980--
(1) to raise . . . per capita income from the present £19.6s. to £45;
(2) to be fully self-sufficient in trained manpower requirements;
(3) to raise the expectation of life from the present 35 to 40 years to an expectation of 50 years.[42]

Modest by American and European standards, the objectives of Tanganyika's Development Plans are ambitious for so underdeveloped a country. The results, if achieved, are expected to effect so great a transformation in the standards of living of such a substantial section of the population as to amount to a revolution.

To achieve its goals, the government relies upon a peculiar blend of pragmatism and ideology. The Cabinet, Parliament, and all branches of the Civil Service are composed of representatives of all major racial groups, with Africans predominating but (according to the official policy of "non-racialism") not discriminating. TANU party membership is open to all, as is Tanganyika citizenship.[43] The ruling philosophy is "Ujamaa wa Kiafrika," which may be translated as "African Socialism" and in Tanganyika means a brotherly concern for the welfare of all citizens. The

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[42] Tanganyika Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1st July, 1964-30th June, 1969 (Dar es Salaam, 1964), from the introduction by the President, Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere.

[43] If non-Africans are apathetic towards party affiliation, and if, as is alleged, there are delays in naturalization, the former are explained on the basis of temporary incredulity and the latter on bureaucratic difficulties.

achievement of government's aims are liable to be affected by its militant and exposed position in the vanguard of the movement for the liberation of the remainder of the African continent.

"Binadamu wote ni ndugu zangu, na Africa ni moja" ("I believe in Human Brotherhood and the Unity of Africa") is the first article of TANU's creed. This is what the present political system is designed to achieve:

> . . . a good life for our people in a world where every citizen can live without fear either of hunger or of his brother man . . ."[44]

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[44]Excerpt from a speech by the President, Julius K. Nyerere, addressing a mass rally in Peking on February 20, 1965, to mark the signing of a treaty of friendship between Tanzania and China. Reported in The Standard Tanzania, February 21, 1965.

CHAPTER III

THE FEUDAL SYSTEMS

It has been indicated earlier that the period prior to and including part of the nineteenth century is considered as the "feudal" period in Tanganyika's history.[1] It is now proposed to analyze the characteristics of the political systems of that period. Despite the absence of a written historical tradition, it is possible to pursue these researches through the tribal legends and sagas preserved by oral tradition and supplemented by the reports of administrators, explorers, or missionaries, the reconstruction of anthropologists and the interpretations of sociologists.

This period has been referred to as the Feudal Period because of the coexistence of many relatively small political units, whose organizations into pyramidal or hierarchical ranks of different degrees of authority and function bears some resemblance to the situation which prevailed over much of Europe in medieval times. Tanganyika had, throughout the period under study, a large number and variety of political units, each differing from the other in greater or less degree.

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[1] Supra, pp. 10-11.

Despite their variety, certain similarities recurred in the numerous political systems which coexisted in Tanganyika during this period, which enable certain generalizations to be made. Although divided into some hundreds of separate tribes, each with its own language, organization, customs and beliefs, an examination of a sufficient sample shows that beneath the specific diversities there are such general similarities that we can constitute and describe in general terms a typical Tanganyika feudal system. Although of course an abstraction, it is an abstraction only a little way removed from the concrete reality.[2]

It is proposed, in this chapter, to begin with a brief outline of some of the major tribes in Tanganyika during the Feudal Period. This section, which will be subheaded "Their Traditional Setting," will be followed by a section subheaded "Their Comparative Anatomy," which will analyze the political structures of some selected feudal systems. A third section, subheaded "Their Comparative Physiology," will analyze the political functions of some selected systems, and will be followed by a fourth section, subtitled "Analysis and Evaluation" which will summarize and make generalizations about these systems.

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[2]The expressions are adapted from A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, who noted the same phenomenon among Australian aboriginal systems. See his Preface to Meyer Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard (eds.), African Political Systems (London: Oxford University Press, 1941).

Their Traditional Setting

One of the first tribal groups encountered by travellers by sea to Tanganyika were the Zaramo, who occupied a stretch of coastal area including what is now the capital city and port of Dar es Salaam.[3] The Wazaramo, with whom are associated the Kwere and the Doe, were primarily cultivators, with an original tradition of a paramount Chieftaincy, but had sustained a gradual weakening of their traditional culture as a result of their frequent contacts with foreigners and the growing cosmopolitan character of parts of the coastal area. By the time the famous English and German explorers arrived, the Wazaramo had been segmented into several small chiefdoms, each of whose chiefs appointed headmen for the villages within his jurisdiction. These villages generally consisted of small clusters of hamlets surrounded by land, property which could be acquired by bringing it under cultivation.[4]

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[3] In Kiswahili and its cognates, the vowel u- prefixed to a root denotes a country or region, as Uzaramo, the region of Zaramo. The letter m- denotes the individual, as Mzaramo, a man or woman of Zaramo. Wa- denotes the plural or the population as Wazaramo. The syllable Ki- denotes anything pertaining to a country, but particularly refers to the language, as Kizaramo. The accent is characteristically placed upon the penultimate syllable.

[4] Richard F. Burton, whose opinion of Africans was consistently low, considered the Zaramo no exception to the rule of "barbarian maritime races" like the Somali, the Gallas, and the Cape Kafirs which had come into contact with civilizations "sufficiently powerful to corrupt without subjugating them." Burton, The Lake Regions of Central Africa,

Some 120 miles inland from the coast, in surroundings of steep, rugged hills, existed the Luguru tribal group. Their area was for long one of the main stopping places en route to the interior. The present township of Morogoro, which is the point of transfer along the Central Railway line for travellers who wish to proceed northward to the Kilimanjaro-Usambara region or southward to the Southern Highlands area, is the successor to an earlier walled and fortified town of Simbaweni, which roused Stanley's enthusiasm. There are today no visible traces of that walled city, nor of the thriving civilization which must have sustained it. The early Luguru came to the area from other regions and other tribes (including possibly the Zaramo and other coastal tribes). Originally occupying the fertile plains, they fled to the refuge of the hills from increasingly hostile encroachments. It is from these early immigrants that the present lineage groups have descended. Having no simple hierarchical organization exercising over-all political control, the principal political units of the segmented Luguru society were the clan and the lineage.[5]

Vol. I (London: Longmans, Green, Longmans and Roberts, 1960), p. 107.

[5]Local groups tend to be identified with descent groups--lineages, clans and sub-clans. The difference between the clan and the lineage is roughly as follows: a lineage is a corporate group of unilineal kin. It is generally named and, within it, an accepted genealogical relationship is known between all members. It includes both living and dead. The clan is the term which usually refers

Further along the historical central route into the interior of Tanganyika were the Gogo tribe, directly in the path of what became the major east-west caravan route. The Wa-Gogo, who are considered to have a marked mixture of "Hamitic" blood and cultural influence, particularly from the larger, aggressive Masai tribe of northern Tanganyika and Kenya, lived in large concentrated villages ranging in population from 1,000 to 5,000. Cattle were the principal measure of wealth and prestige to these pastoral people, all of whose land belonged in theory to their paramount chief. Burton described their assiduous collection of kuhonga or customs-dues from all passing caravans. Although received nominally by the chief, the greater part of the kuhonga had to be distributed amongst his family and counsellors, elders and attendants.[6]

Toward the western end of the central plateau which comprises the heartland of Tanganyika could be found the Nyamwezi group, who were tribally-allied to the more northern Sukuma group.[7] This tribal group, the largest in

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to a unilineal descent group. It consists of several lineages, which may be segmented. Its use is best restricted to unilineal descent groups, or clusters of such groups, within which exact genealogical relationships are not traced, although the clan is usually believed to have a single founding ancestor.

[6]Burton, op. cit., p. 253.

[7]A distinction is made between the "true Nyamwezi and the Sukuma, one of the groups that form the great Nyamwezi tribe," in the Tanganyika Report for 1921, p. 8.

Tanganyika,[8] was settled in picturesque surroundings in savannah land that abutted on the shores of Lake Victoria. The Sukuma-Nyamwezi were divided into multiple chiefdoms. The chiefs' powers were sustained by beliefs in their supposed magic-religious powers, but there were institutionalized checks on their authority.

Around on the other side of Lake Victoria, in a pocket of land where the borders of Tanganyika, Uganda, and Ruanda-Urundi meet, were the Haya tribe, whose traditional culture reflected a congruence of diverse influences. The Haya (also called the Ziba) group included two strata: an immigrant pastoral aristocracy of "Hamitic" origin, known as Hima or Tusi (pl. Bahima and Watusi); and an indigenous agricultural people of Bantu origin called Ivo or Nyambo (pl. Bairu or Wanyambo) who were subordinate to the Hima. The two groups were economically and culturally distinct, but spoke the same language. They were one of the rare tribes in Tanganyika in which land was susceptible of usufructuary rights which involved feudal obligations and service.[9]

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[8]See Table 1 from which one may obtain an idea of relative size of the tribal units as they persisted into the Colonial period.

[9]P. Kollman, The Victoria Nyanza (London: S. Sonnenschein & Co., 1899), pp. 105-126; Audrey I. Richards (ed.), East African Chiefs (New York: Praeger, 1959), pp. 174-194.

TABLE 1

MAIN TRIBES OF TANGANYIKA--1948[a]

Sukuma	888,800	Yao	126,741
Nyamwezi	362,839	Mwera	126,412
Ha	286,112	Zigua	112,113
Makonde	281,320	Ngoni	102,994
Gogo	271,254	Iragw	102,554
Haya	269,142	Pare	98,954
Chagga	237,343	Makua	95,464
Hehe	192,153	Irangi	95,422
Nyakyusa	191,901	Rundi	90,312
Nyaturu	181,739	Ngindo	85,189
Luguru	179,078	Fipa	78,252
Zaramo	173,518	Subi	74,052
Iramba	170,697	Jita	71,433
Bena	157,974	Rufigi	70,969
Sambaa	129,466	All others	2,106,077
Total			7,410,269

[a]From Report of the East Africa Royal Commission, 1953-55 (Great Britain, London, H.M.S.O., 1955), Cmd. 9475, pp. 456-459.

Southward from the Lake Victoria regions could be found tribal groups who probably came closest to representing the aboriginal inhabitants of Tanganyika.[10] Among these were the Kindiga (also called Hadzapi, Hatza, Kongegu, Tindiga), who, with the kindred Bahi of southeast Sukumaland, spoke a click language similar to that of the Bushmen and Sandawe. These small groups--the Kindiga numbered between 500 and 600 in 1957, the Bali less than 100--subsisted primarily by hunting. They had no chiefs of any kind, nor stratification into social classes. Their political

[10]Hans Meyer, Ostafrika (1914); B. Cooper, "The Kindiga," Tanganyika Notes and Records, XXVII (1949), 8-10.

integration did not transcend the level of the local band.

In the Rift Valley at the head of Lake Nyasa, occupying the southwestern section of the country, were the Nyakyusa, closely allied with the Ngoni across the border in Nyasaland. The name Nyakyusa covered at least five widely distributed groups occupying the hills and plains in the region now called the Southern Highlands in Tanganyika. All five groups shared a common language and culture, although distinguished by minor peculiarities of dialect and custom. No over-all tribal authority existed, although there was a paramount chief among the allied Ngoni in Nyasaland. However, Nyakyusa chiefdoms traditionally accorded religious and ceremonial respect to one particular chiefdom where the most important ancestral group--Lubaga--was located.[11]

In the southeastern section of the country lived the Hehe tribe, famed for their military prowess. The Hehe, with whom were linked the Chungwe (or Zungwa) mountain people, were culturally and linguistically close to the Bena and Zonga. Strong chiefships developed in the 1860's when the 26 small tribes, each under a petty chief, were integrated into two powerful states, Iringa in the north and Mahenge in the south, ruled by two lines of the same royal family.[12]

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[11] G. Wilson, "An Introduction to Nyakyusa Society," Bantu Studies, X (1936), 253-292.

[12] A. G. O. Hodgson, "Some Notes on the Wahehe of

Near the northern border with Kenya, in the verdant glades and heady atmosphere of Africa's highest mountain, Kilimanjaro, lived the Chagga tribe. The population was irregularly divided into many chieftaincies, the size of which varied from several hundreds to several thousands, generally decreasing in size as one proceeded from west to east around the mountain. Like some other Tanganyika tribal groups, the many disparate political units of the Wachagga were in the process of being consolidated as the period of Feudalism drew to its close.[13]

Their Comparative Anatomy

Most studies of African political structures begin with Fortes and Evans-Pritchard's authoritative treatise.[14] That tradition is followed here, not because of the infallibility of their methods--indeed, it is hoped to be shown how inadequate, if not fallacious, the authors in many instances were. However, the richness and suggestiveness of their work and its patent sincerity and scholarliness have ensured its continuing high place among Africanist writings.

Fortes and Evans-Pritchard recognized the existence of three types of political societies:

Mahenge District," Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, LVI (1926), 37-58.

[13]Kathleen M. Stahl, History of the Chagga People of Kilimanjaro (London: Manton & Co., 1964).

[14]Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, op. cit.

> Firstly, there are those very small societies, none of which are described in this book, in which even the largest political unit embraces a group of people all of whom are united to one another by ties of kinship, so that political relations are coterminous with kinship relations and the political structure and kinship organization are completely fused. Secondly, there are societies (Group "B") in which a lineage structure is the framework of the political system, there being a precise co-ordination between the two, so that they are consistent with each other, though each remains distinct and autonomous in its own sphere. Thirdly, there are societies (Group "A") in which an administrative organization is the framework of the political structure.[15]

The authors centered their study upon the latter two types, apparently considering the first type--a political community consisting of people all of whom claim to be related--as too rare in Africa to justify detailed analysis.[16] Of the remaining types, one group, Group "A," "consists of those societies which have centralized authority, administrative machinery, and judicial institutions--in short, government," in which cleavages of wealth, privilege, and status correspond to the distribution of power and authority.[17] The societies included within this group by the authors were the Zulu of South Africa, the Ngwato of Bechuanaland, the Bemba of northeastern Rhodesia, the Banyankole of Uganda, and the Kede of Northern Nigeria. Group "B" consists of those societies "which lack centralized authority, administrative

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[15] Ibid., pp. 6-7.

[16] Of this type of society, the Bushmen would be an example and, in Tanganyika, the Kindiga. Supra, pp. 60-61.

[17] Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, op. cit., p. 5.

machinery, and constitutional judicial institutions--in short which lack government--and in which there are no sharp divisions of rank, status, or wealth."[18] In this group were included the Logoli (or the Bantu Kavirondo) of western Kenya, the Tallensi of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, and the Nuer of Southern Sudan.

The authors imply that the existence of "governmental institutions" is the definitive characteristic of a "state," hence the Group "A" should be regarded as "primitive states" and Group "B" as "stateless societies." In the judgment of the authors, the most significant distinction between Groups "A" and "B" is the incidence and function of force in the system. In Group "A" the principal function of a ruler's rights and prerogatives, and of the authority exercised by his subordinate chiefs, is the command of organized force.[19] In the second group of societies, Group "B," there is no association, class, or segment which has a dominant place in the political structure through the command of greater organized force than is at the disposal of any of its congeners. If force is resorted to in a dispute between segments it will be met with equal force. . . . In the language of political science, there is no individual or group in which sovereignty can be said to rest. In such a system, stability is maintained by an equilibrium at every

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[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid., p. 14.

line of cleavage and every point of divergent interests in the social structure."[20]

It is proposed to test the validity of Fortes and Evans-Pritchard's classification, by examining the structures of some of the feudal political societies of Tanganyika as well as two feudal political societies outside of Tanganyika--the Ashanti of Ghana and the Buganda of Uganda--both of which were outstanding examples of political organization in the respective areas of Western and Eastern Africa.

Fortes and Evans-Pritchard studied none of the tribes of Tanganyika, but the kind of political society classified by them in Group "B" would seem to have some of the characteristics possessed by the Arusha tribe of northern Tanganyika. This group of people occupied the southwestern slopes of Mount Meru (14,979 feet above sea level), the western half of the extinct volcanic range which also includes in its eastern extension Mount Kilimanjaro. The occupation by the Wa-Arusha of their present home is thought to date back to about 1830, at which time their ancestors splintered off from the parent Masai tribe.[21]

The Arusha tribe had no over-all centralized

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[20] Ibid.

[21] P. H. Gulliver, Social Control in an African Society: A Study of the Arusha: Agricultural Masai of Northern Tanganyika (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), pp. 5-14.

authority or administrative machinery, nor did they have a paramount chief wielding executive authority. The country which they occupied was divided into a number of delimited areas, each of whose local residents formed a corporate group. The area and its residents together comprised an entity called embalbal, pl. imbalbali (also known as eserit), which Gulliver translates roughly as a "parish." According to Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, one would expect the segmentary lineage system to perform the primary function of regulating political relations between the various parishes. This, however, was only partially true in Arusha society.

Two lineage systems were distinguished among the Arusha: the inner lineage system, consisting of a group of agnatic family heads, who were called engang, "the kin who are near," and the maximal lineage consisting of a group of living people who traced agnatic descent from a common early ancestor. The former comprised an operationally effective group, the members of which granted one another mutual aid and advice and were held to be partially responsible (although not finally) for the actions of their co-members. The founding ancestors of maximal lineages, each of which contained a number of inner lineages, were generally alleged to have been the first settlers of their present home. The maximal lineage was only weakly effective, because of the wide dispersal of its members, although theoretically its members were bound to accord advice and support mutually.

Analyzing the structure of the tribe, Gulliver pointed out that the social needs, rights, and obligations between agnates outside the inner lineage were neither imperative enough, nor sufficiently organized, to create and maintain a high degree of consensus or cohesion.[22]

> There is no economic basis in land holding or control; there is no fixed centre of activities, no common shrine or meeting place; leadership . . . is weak even where it is exercised; little or no cohesive quality or necessity is derived from corporate relations with like groups in the society.[23]

One important function of the maximal lineage was the selection of one of its members as olaiqwenani le ngani, "the spokesman of the lineage," or "the lineage counsellor." His role was twofold: he was the lineage's advisor and conciliator, as well as its representative to the rest of society. Disputes of a political as well as a jural nature were generally settled in public assembly.[24] Although most of these were settled at the local, or parish, level, certain disputes might be important enough to transcend that level. In such cases, lineage counsellors from several lineages

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[22]A collection of studies which refined and modified Fortes and Evans-Pritchard's work was John Middleton and David Tait (eds.), Tribes Without Rulers: Studies in African Segmentary Systems (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958), where two other types of politically uncentralized societies are cited, besides the type found among the Arusha and other Nilo-Hamitic speaking tribes.

[23]Gulliver, op. cit., p. 100.

[24]This public assembly called engiqwara e mbalbal was composed of representative notables of each parish.

might be concerned, involving a wide geographical range.

In fact, the basis of political organization in the Arusha society was to a greater extent regulated on a territorial than a kinship system, contrary to Fortes and Evans-Pritchard's hypothesis concerning Group "B"--stateless societies.

> Membership of a parish has no basis in kinship: Arusha lineages and clanship groups are all widely dispersed territorially. Fundamentally, a parish is a local community: especially on the mountain slopes, it comprises neighbours (elatia) and near-neighbours who in everyday life engage in more or less regular face-to-face contact; and who, out of a historical evolution geographically based, find it mutually convenient and advantageous to recognise, and promote a degree of cooperation and unity. A parish is, however, an organised community. It is politically autonomous; containing its own institutional machinery for determining its affairs, settling internal disputes, and dealing corporately with adjacent parishes in amity, or animosity. Each parish contains its own autonomous age-group system from which is derived the means to self-organisation and social control which, in the context of neighbourhood-community, creates and preserves group identity and cohesion.[25]

At the time of the German invasion of the nineteenth century, there were fifteen parishes, all of whom lived within the area of the mountain slopes. Each of the parishes contained two geographically discrete parts, called engashata, and translatable as "parish-division." These divisions arose as the tribe pioneered in its development of the area. One division, the geographically lower of the two, was the earlier settled and cultivated; the other area--

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[25]Gulliver, op. cit., pp. 19-20.

higher up the slopes--was subsequently settled and cultivated by the sons and younger brothers of the earlier settlers and by immigrants from other settled parishes lower down. Eventually, the two divisions of a parish came to be linked together,[26] for cooperation, in peace as well as in war.

Another important political-regulating factor in Arusha society was the age-set and age-group systems. An age-group comprised the men of roughly similar age in a single parish who underwent initiation during a single four- to six-year period. An age-set, called olporror, was the group consisting of age-groups of all parishes within the tribe whose members underwent initiation during the same period. The age-set had only a loose unity, but occasionally acted as a single entity in ritual matters through an hereditary olaumoni, or "ceremonial leader." Without interfering in parish activities, politically he synchronized the activities of all age-groups of a single age-set throughout the tribe.

It was the age-group system which provided the organizational basis for the administration and integration of the parish. Its role in dispute processes and social control was exercised through selected olaiqweani, "spokesmen," who were skilled in matters of custom and could

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[26] Ibid., p. 24.

suggest compromises between conflicting opinions, and ingaminisi, men of outstanding talent and influence who collectively provided leadership in important matters.[27]

Fortes and Evans-Pritchard's distinction between Group "A" and Group "B" societies in regard to the incidence and function of force[28] is subject to a qualification, in the case of the Arusha tribe. It was certainly the case that no association, class, or segment had or could command a monopoly of force in Arusha society. Disputes, political as well as jural, were settled by public discussion in which the objective was to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. During the discussion solidarity was expected between members of the same lineage as well as between members of the same age-group. Once a settlement was reached, it was sanctioned because of the participation of the corporate groups involved, particularly the age-groups. Pressure was brought to bear upon the defaulter to carry out the terms of the settlement, not only by the other disputant, but also by his own age-group.[29] Fortes and Evans-Pritchard's "equilibrium" theory, therefore, is correct only if we add the age-group system to the lineage system as the "balancer" and stabilizer. These two systems provided the means of decision-making and dispute adjudication, for which organized public opinion provided the sanction.

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[27] Ibid., pp. 25 ff. [28] Supra, p. 63.

[29] Gulliver, op. cit., pp. 58 ff.

Fortes and Evans-Pritchard's classification may be tested also by reference to the Chagga tribe of northern Tanganyika. This group, whose population was approximately 100,000 in the middle of the nineteenth century, was divided into some 30 to 40 chiefdoms, each of which exhibited individually characteristics which Fortes and Evans-Pritchard ascribed to Group "A" societies. They had centralized authority, specialized institutions, and legitimized force--all of which justified their being described as "primitive states"--size being irrelevant to this classification.[30] At the same time, the Chagga tribe taken as a whole exhibited some of the characteristics of Group "B" societies.[31] Because of their location and certain common cultural traits, their habits of neighborliness and intermarriage, and their attitude of exclusiveness towards non-Kilimanjaro peoples, the Wa-Chagga deserve consideration as a single social and cultural group. It was politically a headless group, however, in which internecine fighting occurred sporadically, although never unitedly--either by all chiefdoms against one or all against a non-Chagga enemy.

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[30] Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, op. cit., pp. 7-8.

[31] Cf. also the somewhat similar phenomenon of the political system of the Sonjo agricultural tribe of northern Tanganyika which caused Gray to remark that the typology of African political systems will eventually have to be extended in order to embrace such societies. Robert F. Gray, The Sonjo of Tanganyika: An Anthropological Study of an Irrigation-Based Society (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 132.

The chiefdoms which existed in the mid-nineteenth century had evolved from an earlier "sib" system--equivalent to the "kinship" societies which formed the first of Fortes and Evans-Pritchard's tripartite classification of African political societies--when the number of units had been as many as a hundred.[32]

By dynastic marriages, merger, and conquest, the number of units had been gradually reduced. This process eventually culminated in attempts to achieve a centralized over-all political authority over the tribe. Two outstanding earlier attempts were those of Orombo, Chief of the Keni division in the eastern Kilimanjaro area from about the beginning to the middle of the nineteenth century; and Sina, Chief of Kibosho in western Kilimanjaro from the 1870's until 1897.[33] Each succeeded in uniting approximately half of the tribe and overawing much of the remainder. Neither was able to achieve the complete unification or transmit his territorial empire intact to his successors. Eventually the Chagga tribe did achieve its political unity, but it was not until the 1950's, under the Colonial System. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard would probably see in this process a vindication of their "conquest" theory of political systems, that

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[32]Bruno Gutmann, Das Recht der Dschagga, Arbeiten zur Entwicklungspsychologie, No. 7 (Muenchen: C. H. Beck, 1926), pp. 573 ff. (trans. from the German for the Human Relations Area Files by A. M. Nagler); Stahl, op.cit., p.56.

[33]Stahl, ibid., pp. 165-192, 337.

is to say, that Group "B" societies without central government or administrative machinery develop into Group "A" states as a result of conquest.[34] However, it has already been pointed out that in the case of the Wa-Chagga, it could also be said to be a process of several Group "A" states coalescing or uniting into a single Group "A" state. In any case, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard's "conquest" theory seems to be predicated upon the assumption of heterogeneous cultural groups. This would seem to be inapplicable to the Wa-Chagga, because although their first ancestors may have had diverse cultural origins--Kamba, Usambara, and Masai, according to some--these had been assimilated relatively early.[35]

The analysis of political structures may be carried further by reference to the two non-Tanganyika feudal political systems, the Ashanti and the Buganda. Both of these were the subject of study by Apter, the one in 1955 and the other in 1961. In the study of the Ashanti, whose elaborate military and bureaucratic organization at one time enabled them to dominate much of the area that makes up the modern Ghana, Apter makes an attempt to categorize its society by reference to Fortes and Evans-Pritchard's classification.[36]

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[34]Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, op. cit., p. 9.

[35]Stahl, op. cit., pp. 51 ff.

[36]David Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1955). For what methodology his work possessed, he acknowledged indebtedness to Max Weber and Marion J. Levy, Structure of Society

It seems clear that the structure of Ashanti political society would have justified its inclusion by the latter authors among their Group "A" societies, but for the persistence of one characteristic.

> The Ashanti Confederacy was a decentralized bureaucracy. The Asantehene had a large staff. He was assisted by a queen-mother and the birempon. He had spokesmen and officials. An elaborate pattern of specific relationships existed between the chief and his principal officers in which their various performances were carefully worked out, while their functions were not. The positions were, relative to Western standards, functionally diffuse. The federalized basis of the Ashanti Confederacy in which, for the most part, divisional chiefs exercised most of their traditional prerogatives while recognizing allegiance to the asantehene, permitted the structural maintenance of local units. Formal controls against intrigue and subversion existed all along the line.[37]

The Ashanti political society was a centralized state organization. However--and this is the characteristic which is inconsistent with Fortes and Evans-Pritchard's Group "A" societies--its political unity was built more on the older lineage and clan system than on a territorial basis. The superstructure continued the principle of lineage loyalty into ever higher units until it attained the level of the Ashanti Kingdom as a whole and reached the person of the asantehene. This illustrates further the inadequacy of Fortes and Evans-Pritchard's classification.

The Buganda organization has been described as "the most fully realized political system in the eastern portion

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(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1952).

[37]Apter, op. cit., pp. 114-115.

of Africa."[38] The tribe held together a wide territory and large population by means of a strong ruler and an elaborate and closely-knit bureaucracy. Its distinctive feature was the control of all ranks of officialdom, by the Kabaka (king) from above. Appointed officials held wide administrative and adjudicative power over territorial entities--counties, sub-counties, villages. Their loyalty was not to the constituency but to the Kabaka, whose powers of appointment and dismissal were reinforced by his retaining in his hands both land ownership and adjudicative processes.

Apter considered that both the Buganda and the Ashanti political societies were close to Fortes and Evans-Pritchard's Group "A" states; however, the Ashanti was nearer the latters' Group "B" societies. Apter preferred to use a completely new dichotomy, which had been introduced by Southall.[39] This dichotomy distinguished between pyramidal and hierarchical systems of authority. The former had more diffuse distribution of powers, which were virtually of the same type at several different levels of the pyramidal segmentary structure. The powers of the latter were not articulated throughout the various levels of the system, but inhered at the top.

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[38]Walter Goldschmidt, Foreward to Edgar V. Winans, Shambala: The Constitution of a Traditional State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962).

[39]Aidan Southall, Alui Society (Cambridge: Heffer, 1956), pp. 250-251.

To Southall's dichotomy of political structures, Apter added another taken from contemporary sociology values. He distinguished two basic types of values, according to the relationship of means to ends with which different societies approached their problems. According to this distinction, one could compare political systems having consummatory values with those having instrumental values. Because they were typically geared for war, and required vertical patterns of communications and defense with as few impediments as possible, hierarchical systems tended to have instrumental values, as in the case of the Buganda. On the other hand, because of their built-in local autonomy, close network of roles and social activities, and more complex patterns of checks and balances, pyramidal structures tended to have consummatory values, as in the case of the Ashanti:

> . . . the pyramidal and consummatory combination was an extremely subtle integration of religious and socialties, which, easily frangible, was less adapted to change than the hierarchical and instrumental type. The hierarchical and instrumental type, based upon a traditional bureaucracy and autocratic kingship, was more amenable to change, modernization, and social development, absorbing the consequences of such change so as to strengthen, not weaken, the system. Thus although both systems show political specialization, in sharp contrast to the "stateless" or "segmentary" type, the hierarchical and instrumental is capable of serving as a modernizing autocracy.[40]

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[40]David Apter, The Political Kingdom of Buganda (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 87.

Their Comparative Physiology

The foregoing analysis has indicated some of the limitations of a comparative study of political systems which is based primarily upon their structures. In an attempt to overcome these limitations, some scholars have tried to focus attention upon the functions performed by political systems. Structural comparison alone is considered to be "like a comparative anatomy without a comparative physiology."[41] Hence the subheadings in this chapter.

Apter was aware of the limitations of typological analysis, which he regarded as "the most primitive form of scientific work."[42] In the absence of more abstract models of political behavior of which the feudal systems would become empirical cases, he was content simply to expand the structural dimensions offered by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard and Southall. Other writers have expressed criticism of Fortes and Evans-Pritchard's notion that political organization is based upon kinship in "primitive" societies, and upon territory in "civilized" societies.[43] Schapera considers this to be a fallacy which was derived from Maine,

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[41]Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 7.

[42]Apter, The Political Kingdom of Buganda, op. cit., p. 89, n. 7.

[43]Evans-Pritchard has himself conceded its inadequacy in his Preface to Middleton and Tait, Tribes Without Rulers, op. cit.

whose classic treatise first published in 1861 contained the following much-quoted passage on the origin of political societies:

> All ancient societies regarded themselves as having proceeded from one original stock, and even laboured under an incapacity for comprehending any reason except this for their holding together in political union. The history of political ideas begins, in fact, with the assumption that kinship in blood is the sole possible ground of community in political functions.[44]

Schapera maintained that both kinship and locality serve everywhere--in feudal non-Western as well as in modern Western societies--to link people together, although perhaps in "primitive" societies kinship is often much more important in the regulation of public life.[45] After a comparative study of the Bushmen, Bergdama, Hottentot, and Southern Bantu--four separate groups of people living in South Africa--Schapera summarized his findings as to the workings of their political systems, according to his data:

> They [the data] show that in primitive societies the functions of government may well be what MacIver terms "minimal" but may on the other hand also be very comprehensive indeed and include some, such as priesthood, that are not nowadays usually characteristic of more advanced systems. They show also that apart from maintaining territorial boundaries and resisting external aggression the only function common to all forms of government is the organization and direction of cooperative enterprises often involving the whole community. The enforcement of law and order--what MacIver calls the "police function and the administration of justice"

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[44] H. S. Maine, Ancient Law (Pollock's ed., 1930), pp. 144 ff.

[45] I. Schapera, Government and Politics in Tribal Societies (London: Watts, 1956), p. 5.

> --is not, as he maintains, one of the functions "that all governments always fulfill, on whatever scale."[46]
>
> Communities such as those of the Bergdama and Bushmen are able to lead an orderly existence despite their lack of courts and despite the inability of their chiefs to punish offenders in other ways.[47]

Schapera has been criticized for his inability to offer a methodology of his own to replace that of Fortes and Evans-Pritchard whom he criticized. He is also open to the charge on the grounds of ambiguity in his conception of the subject matter of the study of comparative politics. His criterion for study is "independence." His definition of a political community is:

> . . . a group of people organized into a single unit managing its affairs independently of external control (except that exercised nowadays by European governments).

He then explains his use of the term "independence" as follows:

> No community is completely isolated; its members may exchange visits, trade, and intermarry, with those of other communities, and may also fight against them or as their allies. But so long as it alone decides on matters of local concern, so long as there is no dictation from outside, and so long as its decisions and actions cannot be overruled by any higher authority, it may be said to have political independence.[48]

There is obvious contradiction between the words underlined in the two passages above-quoted.

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[46] R. M. MacIver, The Web of Government (1947), pp. 156, 316.

[47] Schapera, op. cit., p. 217.

[48] Ibid., pp. 8, 218. (Italics mine.)

In fact, confusion is bound to result from the casual introduction into the discussion of political systems of such precise and technical terms from the science of international law as "state," "government," and "independence." These terms have their proper use in relation to mutually-recognized members of the Family of Nations, and their connotations are traditional and well known. They shed little light on the question of what constitutes a political system, although it is generally safe to presume that any society recognized as an "independent state" according to the criteria of international law would have a political system. Whether or not it has a "government," of course, is another and equally technical matter, according to international law.

Professor Goldschmidt attempts to cleave through the obscurities which he sees caused by "failure to ask the right questions of the data." He sees no difference between Maine and Fortes and Evans-Pritchard's works, save in the idiom in which the categories are expressed: whereas Maine wrote in terms of origins, development, and evolution, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard wrote in terms of social relationships. Goldschmidt suggests that the questions should be directed to the functional requisites for a system of governance rather than to the structural characteristics of the institutions of government: What are the things that get done, and the things that must get done if there is to be a

viable state?[49]

Goldschmidt would categorize functional requisites of a state system under three major headings: legitimacy, articulation (organization), and self-maintenance. Firstly, legitimacy which "involves the recognition of the rights of the rulers to rule, of the government to operate. It involves also the commitment on part of the population to accept the rulers and their modes of operation." Myths may be effective here, bearing as they do, the dual sanctions of history and of religious belief. Secondly, articulation, or organization, i.e., "units must be integrated into some larger units in such a way that there is coordination of action. Furthermore, this articulation must be consistent and sufficiently evident that its operations are visible to the community as a whole." This was exemplified among the Shambala, a tribal group of northeastern Tanganyika, by the system of organization which involved (1) a separation of the ruling clan from the common population, (2) the hierarchy of officialdom built on a genealogical basis involving three separate levels, (3) the treatment of commoner lineages as unitary legal entities, and (4) the special relationship between the common lineage unit and the hierarchy of royal chiefs. Thirdly, institutions of self-maintenance, deriving from: "the need for protection from outsiders, the

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[49]Goldschmidt, in Foreward to Shambala, op. cit.

provision of machinery for maintaining and restoring order within the system, the orderly transfer of powers, and the support of public institutions and works." This requirement included the development of military and police institutions, which were under the control of the community.[50]

The functional approach of Almond and Coleman is clearly apparent in their definition of a political system:

> The political system is that system of interactions to be found in all independent societies which performs the functions of integration and adaptation (both internally and vis-à-vis other societies) by means of the employment, or threat of employment, of more or less legitimate physical compulsion. . . . We use the term "physical compulsion" since we believe that we can distinguish political systems from other social systems only by such a specific definition. . . .[51]

It is Almond and Coleman's contention that, despite superficial differences due to physical size and technology, there is a universality of political structures. All the types of political structures which are to be found in "modern," Western systems are to be found in non-Western, "traditional" or "primitive" ones. They exist because of their essentiality; to postulate their non-existence is to deny the performance of the political function itself. Certain things have to be done in every society; the means of social control vary only in matters of degree of specialization. Hence, we will find in every political society certain

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[50] Ibid.

[51] Almond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 7.

functions being performed. These may be categorized as either input or output functions, and may be further categorized as has already been mentioned.[52]

Because of their common functional characteristics, political systems may be compared as follows:

1. According to the degree and form of structural specialization.
2. According to the frequency of the performance of the functions, the kinds of structures performing them, and the style of their performance.
3. According to the degree of specificity of function in the structure.
4. According to the relative dominance of rationality in their cultures as against the sense of traditionality and in the pattern of mixture of the two components.

Almond and Coleman essayed a few generalizations about the political systems of "traditional" societies in their study. Not all of these generalizations are applicable to the feudal systems of Tanganyika. It is suggested, for example, that in traditional systems particularistic criteria are relatively more important in the performance of the political recruitment function than general criteria,

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[52] Supra, Ch. I, pp. 6-7.

and the achievement or performance function less explicitly and generally applied. In Tanganyika feudal systems, although selection for the role of a chief might theoretically appear to be limited to a particular class, that is to say, the royal lineage, in fact the categorization was so widened by the general practice of polygamy as to weaken its particularistic character. On the other hand, achievement criteria (actual or potential) were generally and explcitly applied. The exhortation, given on the occasion of inducting a new Chagga chief into office gives some indication of the criteria applied:

> And while the master of ceremonies lifts the sword, one man in the circle says:
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> "And you, Chieftain, if you should rule us with brutality
> And deprive us of our cattle
> And if you should be unjust
> Then you shall be deprived of this country
> And perish with this rope and this kid!
> But you shall prosper if you are sincere.
> And if you have reached maturity,
> And if I should die, or one of the other men here,
> And leave an orphan behind, an orphan just as you are today,
> And if you should not take care of the child and rescue it . . .
> You shall perish with this rope and this kid!
> But if you shelter the child and protect it . . .
> You shall be preserved.
> Thus we do have a chieftain in the groves."
>
> Chorus of the men: "Hau!"[53]

Similarly, achievement criteria were generally applied to counsellors or spokesmen, who were chosen for

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[53] Gutmann, op. cit., p. 533.

personal qualities of initiative, intelligence and popularity.[54]

Almond and Coleman postulate that

> A high incidence of non-associational interest articulation--in other words, the performance of the interest articulation function intermittently by individuals, in formal groups, or representatives of kinship or status groups, and so forth . . . may represent poor boundary maintenance between the polity and the society, . . .

in modern or transitional political systems, while not in "simple, primitive ones where this form of interest articulation is appropriate."[55] It seems odd that the authors should classify churches as institutional interest groups "and the like" while classifying kinship and lineage groups as non-associational. One would have thought that the inner lineage groups and age-groups of the Arusha tribe were "specialized structures of interest articulation," justifying their classification as associational groups. The high incidence of interest articulation by these groups contributed vitally to the maintenance of the political system.

Almond and Coleman assert that:

> In certain political systems, such as the authoritarian and primitive ones, the three functions of aggregation, recruitment, and rule-making may be hardly differentiated from one another. In what appears to be a single act, a headman of a primitive society may read clues in his people, aggregate different cues

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[54]Cf. Gulliver, op. cit., p. 47, regarding the olaigwenani (spokesman) of the Arusha; and Wilson, op. cit., regarding the olifumu (great commoner) of the Nyakyusa.

[55]Almond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 35.

> and complaints, and issue an authoritative rule. We might say that he is intermittently interest articulator, aggregator, and rule-maker in the course of this process. In other systems, such as the modern Western ones, there are partitions in the process and separate structures or sub-systems with boundaries take a distinctive part. Certainly, in the Anglo-American mass democracies this threefold division in function maintains the flow from society to polity and from polity to society (from input to output to input again) in an especially efficient manner.[56]

This is an unproved assumption which mars the author's work. To associate all "primitive," i.e., traditional political systems with authoritarian systems is an error which could be committed only by those with little detailed knowledge of African feudal political systems. The process which is attributed by the authors to a "headman of a primitive society" is unlike the general way in which the feudal systems of Tanganyika aggregated interests, claims and demands which were articulated by the interest groups within their polities.

What Almond and Coleman have attempted to do is to specify separately the elements of political function and political structure, and to suggest that political systems may be compared in terms of the probabilities of performance of the specified functions by the specified structures. This, it is said, is a step toward "a probabalistic theory of the polity." The mistakes into which they have been led, and the false generalizations, are explicable by insuffi-

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[56] Ibid., p. 39.

cient knowledge and, indeed, were foreseen by them.

> In his efforts at predicting what might happen, or in explaining what did happen, he (i.e. the political scientist) will not only have to know the properties of the systems we call modern, but should be able to call upon, with relative freedom, the experience of the polities of the other non-Western areas as a means of gaining insight into the processes of change in those areas in which he specializes.[57]

Despite the shift of emphasis from structures to functions, Almond and Coleman have not really abandoned Maine and Fortes and Evans-Pritchard's implicit assumption. This assumption, which may be the consequence of understandable cultural bias, is evident in the authors' acceptance of Shils' fivefold classification of the "new states" of the non-Western world: (1) political democracies, (2) "tutelary" democracies, (3) modernizing oligarchies, (4) totalitarian oligarchies, and (5) traditional oligarchies.[58] It is that the objective of all of the other four types of non-Western states is to "modernize," which is interpreted to mean, to turn themselves as quickly as possible into mirror images of the British, American, or French political system, as non-Western states of the first type have done, for example, Japan, Turkey, Israel, and Chile.[59] Further, it is

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[57] Ibid., p. 64.

[58] Edward Shils, "Political Development in the New States" (paper prepared for the Committee on Comparative Polities, Social Science Research Council, 1959). (Mimeographed.)

[59] Almond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 53.

implied that this objective is the best and wisest for non-Western states to pursue.

Spiro at least avoids this particular kind of assumption. The ensuing analysis affirms the general validity of his concepts when applied to the Tanganyika feudal systems. The concept of a political system, according to Spiro, involves at least four constituents.[60] The first constituent is a community. This is said to exist among people who are aware of pursuing common goals.[61] The single man struggling to secure means of food and shelter becomes a community when he is joined by another, be it wife, child or fellow-clansman, whose efforts are directed towards the same objectives. Thus, the minimum unit of a community is two; its simplest form is the family. A clan, a tribe, or a nation may constitute a community--in theory, the entire world could comprise one community. In practice, limitations of size are often imposed by organizational difficulties, which may be a matter of technology and skill.

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[60]Herbert J. Spiro, "Comparative Polities: A Comprehensive Approach," American Political Science Review (Sept., 1962), p. 557; cf. also his earlier work, Government by Constitution: The Political Systems of Democracy (New York: Random House, 1959).

[61]The following definition of a goal has been suggested as applicable both to long-range and short-term objectives: "An event that an actor plans or seeks to bring about or prevent, or a state of affairs that he plans or seeks to bring about or prevent, or a state of affairs that he plans or seeks to establish, maintain or change," Vernon Van Dyke, "Values and Interests," American Political Science Review, LXI (Sept., 1962), 567.

Another limitating factor is the difficulty in achieving a consensus, an identity of views as to ultimate goals among all members of the community--which may relate to ideology. In Tanganyika among the Kindiga, one kind of community consisted of a migratory band comprising two or three men with their wives and children who subsisted by hunting and gathering. Different bands usually existed separated by several hours' march from one another, living in temporary camps of easily constructable materials. The eldest male, or family head, in the band settled disputes among its members.[62] Each band was a community in which its members united their efforts towards shared goals. Whether or not all of the separate bands together constituted a community would depend upon the extent to which they pursued common goals.

A second constituent of a political system, according to Spiro, is problems. These are obstacles perceived on the road toward goals. A community which easily obtains its objectives has no need to submit its individual members to the subordination and discipline which a political system entails. The more formidable the difficulties faced in achieving common goals, the more likely is the community to organize itself as an entity and to arm itself with organs

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[62] F. J. Bagshawe, "The People of the Happy Valley," Journal of the African Society, XXIV (1925), 117-180; B. Cooper, "The Kindiga," op. cit., 8-15.

and parts, which have specified functions. Since obstacles must be perceived before they can be reacted to and tackled as problems, there is a close link between a community's technology, hierarchy of values, and development of political organization.

In the case of the Kindiga, who practised no agriculture and subsisted primarily by hunting game, for which they lay in wait at waterholes and killed with poison arrows, political integration did not transcend the level of the local band. On the other hand the Hehe, an aggressive and warlike tribe in southern Tanganyika, who were agriculturalists and pastoralists as well, developed a political system whereby a chief, assisted by ministers and a council, ruled over groups of adjacent neighborhoods from a capital town.[63] Among the problems recognized by the Hehe community was that of land ownership and usage, since so many of its members depended for their livelihood upon the land. This problem was solved by placing all land in the nominal ownership of the chief, one of whose functions it was to parcel out usufruct rights under control of sub-chiefs. Continuation of land rights depended upon occupation and continuous cultivation.[64]

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[63] G. K. Brown and A. M. B. Hutt, Anthropology in Action (London, 1935); A. G. O. Hodgson, "Some Notes on the Wahehe of Mahenge District," op. cit.

[64] Ibid.

A system of political organization may emerge spontaneously if its apparent advantages become manifest to the community. In this manner, among the Chagga tribe the office of Chieftain grew out of powers that helped to give a sense of security to the community. A man might become a chieftain "because he had devised an ordeal which he declared indispensable for the settlement of all lawsuits" or "because he was in possession of a magic against enemies."[65] Also, a political system might be borrowed. It is partly through borrowing that the institution of chieftainship spread throughout practically the whole of Tanganyika.

> Almost throughout this region a chief was, or could be, known as Ntemihe who cuts short the discussion by giving judgment. Almost everywhere, and even if he only ruled a thousand subjects, the chief could be described as a "divine king," the possessor of special insignia, and of royal fire from which all fire in the kingdom must be kindled. . . .[66]

The third constituent of a political system, according to Spiro, is politics. This is the process by which a community deals with its problems. The process may be casual or formal, haphazard or ritualized, depending to a large extent upon the degree to which the problems are perceived to be basic, and whether they pertain to the environment or to the external relations of the respective

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[65] Gutmann, op. cit., p. 291.

[66] Roland Oliver and Gervase Mathew (eds.), History of East Africa, Vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 191-192. These authors consider that the institution spread in roughly north to south direction.

communities. A problem, for example, might seem to arise from the fact that a particular individual has acquired a disproportionate share of the community's resources. This might not be a very basic problem, and would perhaps pertain only to the internal relations of the community. Among the Wahehe, whose cattle were conceived of as ultimately the property of the chief, this problem was dealt with by giving the latter power to confiscate that of any commoner who accumulated too much wealth.[67]

A more serious problem, but still not crucial and pertaining only to internal relationships, might arise from the death of a tribal chief leaving no eligible male heirs. Should recourse be had to his female heirs and, if so, how to overcome certain natural and traditional handicaps? A Chagga woman, exceptionally, might display such remarkable powers that she was chosen as chieftain. Since, however, "in accordance with an old custom a woman was not permitted to enter the Lawn of Justice," a woman chieftain was obliged to appoint a deputy "to take care of judicial branch." Out of necessity, also, a woman chieftain was obliged to appoint a deputy to act as the wartime leader.[68] Occasionally problems of basic importance arose pertaining to the environment, such as rapidly growing population and limited

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[67]Brown and Hutt, op. cit.; Hodgson, op. cit.

[68]Gutmann, op. cit., p. 513.

supply of usable land. In the less favored regions of Tanganyika, as for example the central plateau where agricultural resources were scanty, segments of the tribe might be forced to migrate in search of more suitable habitation. This could lead to subdivision of kingdoms and multiplicity of small units.

The fourth constituent of a political system, according to Spiro, consists of issues. Whether or not a problem is perceived to be basic, disagreements are bound to arise as to the methods and manner of its solution. These disagreements present issues, that is to say, a choice of possible solutions is offered and must be decided upon. For example, in the engigwara e mbalbal (parish assembly) the Arusha tribe of Tanganyika decided a variety of issues.

> . . . The matters that can be dealt with cover a range, in which a few examples may suffice at this point: the route of a cattle track or path and the enforcement of right of way on it; consideration of a projected anti-witchcraft campaign; the public announcement of information from the chief, a government official, or the ceremonial leader, and the formulation of parish opinion and policy on it; discussion of a further step in the maturation of murran age group; responsibility for a fight, adultery or theft and the compensation to be paid; a field boundary between two neighbours' farms. The assembly, that is, has both a general political function as well as a specifically judicial one.[69]

Where the four elements--a community, problems, politics, and issues--are found, Spiro concludes that there

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[69]Gulliver, op. cit., pp. 53-54.

is a political system. "A political system is a community that is processing its issues."[70]

As a definition which is intended to be comprehensive of all varieties of political systems, some may criticize it for its apparently inadequate consideration of the role of institutions and groups in conflict. Others may criticize the failure to make the absence or presence of violence as a means to settle disputes the main criterion of a community or of a political system. These and other criticisms are anticipated by the author.[71] Whether or not Spiro's approach and methods are invulnerable, they offer a set of tools which enable a facile explanation of some of the differences between political systems.

Analysis and Evaluation

It has been suggested that the goals pursued by modern Western political systems are constitutionalism, power, durability, popularity, and private rights.[72] A similar listing of goals pursued by the political systems of feudal Tanganyika would include constitutionalism and

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[70] Spiro, "Comparative Politics," op. cit.

[71] Spiro, Government by Constitution, op. cit. pp. 31-33, 459-461; and "Comparative Politics," op. cit. 589-590.

[72] The American federal system, its Supreme Court, amending procedure, and Presidence are given as examples of institutions which serve to accomplish these goals. Herbert J. Spiro, "New Constitutional Forms in Africa," World Politics, XXXI (October, 1960), 71.

popularity as primary or basic goals, with private rights, power and durability as secondary or incidental goals.[73]

A constitution expresses a community's choice about problems that are considered to be "clearly more important because they affect more people than other problems, and do so in more basic terms."[74] Fundamental decisions of this nature may be expressed in solemn documents like the Constitution of the United States. Or they may consist of unwritten basic laws and customs of which all thinking people in the community are conscious and which invariably govern the manner and scope of political choice.[75]

What determines whether in any particular political system a constitution or the goal of constitutionality exists? When customs, procedures and roles become so regular and unvarying as to fit into an accepted pattern of expectation and behavior, a political system may be said to

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[73]"Democracy" would be a better term than "popularity." The latter is generally sought not as an end in itself, but as a means to securing popular favor or consent, which is the basis of democratic government.

[74]Spiro, Government by Constitution, p. 5.

[75]One must note, however, that institutional forms and constitutional devices may linger on, unchanged, even though the original purpose which they served may have disappeared or the values which they symbolized may have been abandoned. Political genius may then manifest itself either by circumventing the obsolete devices or adapting them to completely different purposes. Examples are the U.S. electoral college and the Judicial Committees of the Privy Council and House of Lords in England.

have institutionalized or structured its political behavior.[76] And when the institutional devices are reinforced by ritual, myths or ideology which serve the purposes of legitimacy, the goal of constitutionality may be discerned.[77]

Many communities in feudal Tanganyika possessed institutionalized devices as those mentioned above. Some possessed elaborate examples of constitutional structures.

For the purposes of this study "democracy" may be described as a characteristic relationship between government and the governed.[78]

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[76]When discussing comparative political systems, one bears in mind, of course, (1) that one may need to seek the outlines of the political structure of such political systems as feudal Tanganyika in different aspects than in such political systems as now exist in the sovereign states of Europe, and (2) that condition of equilibrium that "only persists by being continually renewed, like the chemical-physiological homostasis of a living organism. . . ." Radcliff-Brown, Preface, African Political Systems, op. cit.

[77]"Legitimacy has two separate but inter-related aspects--it involves the recognition of the rights of the rulers to rule, of the government to operate. It involves the commitment on part [sic] of the population to accept the rulers and their modes of operation," Goldschmidt, Foreword to Shambala, op. cit., p. v.

[78]Goldschmidt would distinguish between the words "government" and "governance." The former word refers to "the specific organization of offices, of powers, of social roles, and the like which exist for the purpose of maintaining order and compliance among a people." The latter word refers to "the regularized procedures and practices of maintaining an orderly way of life among a population," ibid., p. xxii. Using this distinction, governance was universal among the peoples of Tanganyika; governments were found only among some communities.

Among most of the political systems of feudal Tanganyika, democracy was pursued by means of procedures which provided for popular representation in the decision-making councils. The rules relative to the office of tribal chief, for example, although usually providing for hereditary succession, invariably designated a class, within which there was a possibility of popular choice between two or more eligible candidates.[79] Other rules ensured that political authority was exercised openly, with fullest opportunity for persons affected to state their opinions, and in accordance with the traditional mores of the community.[80]

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[79]The constitutional provisions for choice of a chief in the Shambala political system, for example, were as follows: "Chiefly office was restricted to the royal lineage, and this privilege was supported by what Winans calls 'a belief in the inborn fitness of the ruling class to rule.' Flexibility was maintained by a rather wide choice from among the eligible class. Yet disruption was prevented by the importance of the role in the selection played by the council of commoners, which represented the constituency of the office to be filled. The council had the legal right to nominate candidates; the royal clan to accept or veto such nomination. In a very real sense, the Shambala structure provided for democratic selection, despite its elitist bias; and this popular voice must have played an important role in maintaining the integrity of the state and the loyalty of its rank and file." Goldschmidt, ibid., p. xx.

[80]The British Administration commented, in the course of their efforts to resuscitate traditional institutions which had fallen into desuetude in some areas during the German Colonial period, upon "the essentially democratic nature of Bantu institutions," of which the following example of customs and mores in the Mwanza district adjacent to Lake Victoria was given: "The Head or Paramount Chief, it was found, in no way resembles an autocratic individualistic authority. He is, rather, the permanent head of an association or league of lesser chiefs, who deliberate with him in Council and are largely guided by his advice, but who hold

Private rights were not ignored in feudal Tanganyika, but generally these took second place to communal rights.[81] This could, but did not necessarily, mean ownership in common of all sources of wealth. The term "communalism," has been used to signify the feudal Tanganyikan mode of living together in such a way that there was a share by everyone in the community life and resources, and a concern by the community in the welfare of all its members. This was exemplified in agricultural communities by the general provision for nominal vesting of all land ownership in the tribal head, who was responsible for granting usufructuary rights over particular areas to designated

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their offices by virtue of hereditary right and the will of his own people. Moreover, both the Head Chief and minor Chiefs habitually consult their elders and other prominent men in the tribe in administrative and judicial matters and are generally guided and controlled by their advice." Annual Report to the League of Nations for the Year 1929, p. 12.

[81] "The traditional African community was a small one, and the African could not think of himself apart from his community. He was an individual: He had his wife or wives--and children, so he belonged to a family but the family merged into a larger 'blood' family which, itself, merged again into the tribe. Thus he saw himself, all the time, as a member of a community. But, he saw no struggle between his own interests and those of his community--for his community was, to him, an extension of his family. He might have seen a conflict between himself and another individual member of the same community, but with the community itself, never." Julius K. Nyerere, "Will Democracy Work in Africa," African Special Report, V, No. 2 (February, 1960).

individuals.[82] Similar provision existed in respect of other resources which provided the principal means of a community's livelihood.[83]

The relatively low priority of power and durability as values are manifest by the lack of autocratic tradition in most feudal Tanganyikan communities and in the proliferation of small-scale, autonomous political units. It is not that the philosophical elements to support tactics of a Napoleon or even of a Tudor monarch were lacking. However, centrifugal tendencies were encouraged by the apparently widespread custom of mass migration from a tribal ruler or dominant majority that continually flouted what were considered to be traditional rights.[84] Environment and culture

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[82]Traditionally, each African tribesman was entitled to a share of the communal land, forest, and grazing, thereby obtaining sustenance for himself and his family.

[83]Cf. the way in which provision was made for the use of water as a resource, as described by Robert F. Gray, The Sonjo of Tanganyika, op. cit.

[84]An instance is reported of a Luguru tribal head who aspired to empire-building. "He was head of the Luguru because of the noise he made and the way he threatened people. In their cowardice, they chose him as their head, but because of his fierceness and his badness, all hated him. Then they left him." In vain did he lead the Luguru into victorious battle. His followers preferred their liberties to the fruits of his triumph. Cf. the account of a Catholic missionary, P. Mevel, reported in Land and Politics Among the Luguru of Tanganyika, by R. Young and H. Fosbrooke (London, 1960), pp. 42-43. Individual emigration might also occur in flight from justice or from unjust laws. Thus, rather than suffer the penalty prescribed by very ancient Chagga law for the crime of killing an illegitimate child (impalement), a guilty couple might flee. Social disapproval of the severity of the sentence usually secured

also played an important role. The relative abundance of unoccupied land in some areas was a constant reminder to rulers and to ruled alike of the ready alternative to tyranny. In other areas, the failure to develop the means of rapid extensive and accurate transmission of communications over vast areas imposed limits upon a ruler's control of, and cooperation with, his subordinate officials and agents.

A relatively large number of separate political units seemed to be coalescing and developing during the beginning of the nineteenth century.[85] As this period witnessed the commencement of large-scale and systematic slave-raiding, it is possible that this movement toward unity was based upon a common fear of the enemy slave-raiders.[86] Alternatively, it could have been a spontaneous development, similar to and occasioned by motives parallelling the rise

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assistance from relatives of the couple in arranging for an escape, as well as an open reception for the fugitives upon arrival in another community. Gutmann, op. cit., p. 119.

[85]For example, Young and Fosbrooke report the manifestation of this political trend among the Luguru in precolonial days, particularly in the case of one political leader whose claim to authority was buttressed by his traditional religious role as head of his lineage system, op. cit., pp. 41-43. Cf. other examples cited of the Hehe, supra, p. 67; and of the Chagga, supra, pp. 91-92.

[86]Goldschmidt suggests that the unity of the relatively highly organized political system of the Shambala was due to its obvious advantage as a positive protection against the depredations of slave traders, op. cit.

of nation-states in Europe, that was arrested or aborted by the commencement of the slave trade.[87]

Whichever reason is correct, the movement toward unity of feudal Tanganyikans was too late to affect the course of historical events. That unity was eventually achieved by alien forces, armed and sustained by the technological methods and the cultural values of nineteenth and twentieth century Europe.

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[87]Some idea may be derived from contemporaneous reports of the degenerative effects of the slave trade upon the Wanyamwezi, Tanganyika's largest tribe and, through them, upon smaller, weaker tribes: "The guns sold to the Wanyamwezi by the Arabs for slaves and ivory have transformed them into many detachments of bandits. Stern depopulation goes forward. Fired by avarice and blood, whole hosts of masked, armed Wanyamwezi ravage and depopulate extensive lands, and drive despairing files of slaves to the Arab markets. Ivory is precious and scarce, but slaves are plentiful, women are prolific and swarm in the interior, and there are broad lands where people are disunited, have many chiefs, and consequently are weak, and fall easy prey before crackling fusillades of musketry which awake in midnight hours from slumber. . . ." The Exploration Diaries of H. M. Stanley, ed. Richard Stanley and Alan Neame (London: William Kimber and Co., Ltd., 1961), p. 124.

CHAPTER IV

THE COLONIAL POLITICAL SYSTEM

In this study, the period of Tanganyika's history extending roughly from 1885 to 1960 is called "the colonial period." Although the formal, constitutional nature of the regimes which wielded paramount political power in the country varied during this three-quarters of a century--from protectorate to colony and from mandate to trust territory--the essential nature of those regimes was the same. That essence lay in the colonial relationship between the territory and its indigenous inhabitants on the one hand and the metropolitan or imperialist Power and its agents and beneficiaries on the other. The colonial relationship has been variously defined and may manifest itself in different forms. Its invariable characteristic, however, is:

> . . . the direct and overall subordination--political, economic, military and cultural--of one country by another, on the basis of state power being in the hands of the dominating foreign power.[1]

Colonialism came to Tanganyika with the granting of an Imperial Charter in February, 1885, to the newly-founded

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[1]Jack Woodis, Africa: The Way Ahead (New York: International Publishers, 1963), p. 40.

German East Africa Company on the strength of "treaties" which the explorer Dr. Karl Peters was alleged to have signed with tribal chiefs during a journey through Usagara, Nguru, Uzigua, and Ukami from November, 1884, to January, 1885. Following Bismarck's retirement and the signing of the Agreement with England in 1890 over jurisdiction in East Africa, a Protectorate of the German Empire was proclaimed. The territory of Tanganyika then included the areas which have subsequently become the independent states of Rwanda and Burundi.

The period immediately preceding this proclamation was one of transition characterized by considerable transformation of the several feudal political systems. The Arab rulers of Zanzibar, after securely establishing themselves in that island following the transfer of the seat of the dynasty in 1833, asserted vague claims of superiority over the coastal areas and parts of the interior of Tanganyika. They established and maintained some show of power at a chain of trading stations extending from the eastern mainland coast to the Congo and the Nile. Nevertheless, the Arabs cannot be considered to have established a constitutional structure because of its flimsy skeletal nature as a political system. They either could or did not have as their goal the desire to conquer the interior. They did succeed in establishing and maintaining sufficient dominance to accomplish their main objective--the monopoly of the

external traffic in slaves, and, to a lesser extent, ivory.[2] Their system may therefore perhaps be labelled "proto-" or "quasi-imperialism."

In the ensuing pages of this chapter, an outline is given of the political system in the territory under colonialism. The material is divided into three sections: The first section analyzes the constitutional framework of the system which was devised to rationalize its goals and is subheaded "The Institutional Structure." The second section discusses some of the problems which were obstacles to the goals of the political system and the issues to which these problems gave rise. It is subheaded "Problems and Issues." The third section, which serves the purposes of a summary, is subheaded "The Functions of the Colonial Political System."

The Institutional Structure

The goals of the Germans, who ousted the Arabs from their position of dominance in Tanganyika, were more ambitious and their resources and technology superior. The goals were in general those of European colonialists of that period, namely: wealth, power, and durability (for the

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[2]Vivid descriptions of the system in operation are given in the contemporaneous accounts of explorers, including The Exploration Diaries of H. M. Stanley, ed. Richard Stanley and Alan Neame (London: William Kimber & Co. Ltd., 1961), p. 124; and Richard F. Burton, The Lake Regions of Central Africa, Vol. I (London: Longmans, Green, Longmans and Roberts, 1860), p. 7.

Europeans).[3] The political values of democracy, popularity, and justice were not unappreciated by the colonialists. Indeed, in the nineteenth century, "Europe lurched forward to a new realization of beauty, a new freedom of thought and religious belief, a new demand by laborers to choose their work and enjoy the fruit."[4] But it was thought that the realization of the first-mentioned goals (wealth and power) for Europeans required the assignation of a subordinate role for all others.

Hence the primacy given to the maintenance of law and order among the non-European, indigenous population of the territory. The high priority given to these goals by the Germans resulted in their administration acquiring a notoriety for severity. The German rulers were known by the indigenous inhabitants as watu wa hamsasherini (the people of 25 strokes) because of their generous use of flogging as a punishment.[5]

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[3]Cf. Margery Perham, Lugard: The Years of Adventure, 1858-1898 (London: Colling, 1956), p. 80, who distinguished "the five main motives for colonial annexation" as "trade, strategy, colonization (in the sense of emigration), philanthropy and the less definable political impulse of nations bent upon asserting their power and energy, and scoring off their rivals, which might be called prestige."

[4]W. E. Burghardt Dubois, The World and Africa (New York: The Viking Press, 1947), p. 19.

[5]It was the practice to give 25 strokes as a punishment even for debt. Cf. Richard Kandt, Caput Nili (Berlin: Dietrich Riemer Verlag, 1914), trans. by P. H. Yeo in Tanganyika Notes and Records, No. 63 (Sept., 1964), p. 208. A European settler in Tanganyika during this period explained

Hence an institutional structure was devised which ensured speedy and accurate transmission of instructions from superiors to subordinates, and efficient methods for sanctions and reprisals.[6] No provisions were considered necessary for the reverse flow of communications or for popular representation or participation in decision-making or reward-sharing.

The result, even if not deliberate, was the almost complete breaking down of cultural and political patterns already severely strained by the formidable incursions of the slave trade: open and public decision-making preëmptorily gave way to colonial edict; the authority of popularly selected clan and tribal leaders was replaced by that of employers and officials, civilian and military; criminal law and penal sanctions replaced customary law and traditional sanctions.

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this proclivity with the comment that German officials "had been nurtured in the Prussian theory that the mailed fist is the best emblem of authority." Ferdinand S. Joelson, The Tanganyika Territory (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1921), p. 202.

[6]Richard Kandt, op. cit., gives an account, in his report of his travels in the territory in 1897, of two examples of German punitive methods. The first described his satisfaction at seeing his former cook put in a chain gang at Tabora in central Tanganyika, for breach of contract. Subsequently, he witnessed a German punitive expedition against a tribe in the Tuzizi valley, all of whose huts were burnt and cattle carried away until the chief of the tribe retracted his hostility to German rule.

The pattern of European colonization in East and Central Africa has been succinctly described as follows:

> The pattern in nearly every case was the same. The Kaiser's or the Queen's man promised protection and freedom from outside interference if the indigenous chief would sign over his lands and most of what were later considered his inalienable rights. Without realizing it, perhaps without even understanding the document he was signing, the chief proceeded to devolve upon Europeans his authority to decide allocation of lands, the application of tribal law, and the eventual policy-making role of the chief or headman himself. . . .
>
> What did colonial law entail? Africans were taxed in each colony in order to raise revenues and in order to force them to work for Europeans. Africans were deprived of their lands and eventually restricted to crowded and less fertile reserves. They became subject to alien laws that were not always administered equitably. More crucially, Africans were deprived of elemental self-respect in their own country. . . . The cruder forms of discrimination were perfected, especially in mission stations, and segregation of every variety was practiced.[7]

The Protectorate Government was headed by a Governor, who was assisted by an advisory council (Gouvernementsrat) which met twice annually at Dar es Salaam. Representatives of the 5,336 Europeans in the territory were allowed to participate in the advisory council, composed of three officials and five to twelve unofficial members indirectly elected from three districts. The Council expressed opinions on budget drafts and such laws as were placed before it.

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[7]Robert I. Rothberg, "The Rise of African Nationalism: The Case of East and Central Africa," World Politics, XV (1962), 77.

Each of the more important townships, in addition, had a municipal council (Bezirksrat) having an unofficial elected majority which assisted in the administration of local affairs.[8]

For purposes of administration, German East Africa (i.e., including the portion which subsequently became the Belgian mandated territory of Ruanda-Urundi) was divided into 24 administrative districts, which did not necessarily take into account tribal boundaries or affinities.[9]

Because of the strength of the traditional (feudal) political systems in Ruanda, Urundi, and Bukoba, the Germans retained these as "Residencies." In addition there were 19 civil districts and two military districts, called Bezirke, among the irrepressibly warlike tribes of Mahenge and Iringa. The residencies were administered by their traditional (indigenous) rulers under the supervision of German Residents. Elsewhere, the German policy was to obliterate the indigenous political systems by replacing traditional rulers with Akidas or Jumbes (Area Headmen) directly appointed to rule as agents of the Central Government. These intermediaries were usually Arab or Swahili

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[8]For a contemporaneous discussion of the system, cf. N. D. Harris, Intervention and Colonization in Africa (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1914), pp. 105-107.

[9]On the contrary, it has been suggested that the Germans deliberately designed their system in order to diminish the possibility of the tribes combining against the Central Government.

officials who were under the general direction of a District Commissioner or administrator (Bezirks-amtmann), responsible for the maintenance of peace and good order.[10]

The Akida system represented an extension and elaboration of the skeletal system originally introduced into Tanganyika by the Sultan of Zanzibar in the 1840's and 1850's. Each Akida had magisterial jurisdiction over natives and was responsible for the collection of taxes in a prescribed area. Jumbes were generally subordinate to Akidas but were, in exceptional cases, responsible directly to the Bezirks-amtmann, and possessed of magisterial powers similar to an Akida's.[11] In the coastal towns there were also Liwalis, who were superior Akidas.

An economic explanation of the German administrative system has been given which, although rather lengthy, is worth quoting in full because of the light it throws on various aspects of the colonial system:

> It was not until the turn of the century that new economic development and requirements led to a partial reorganization of the native administration. The caravan trade died out after the supplies of ivory and rubber in the interior had given out. In place of this a net of European plantations, which is constantly becoming closer, developed in the coastal zone, the only one suitable owing to the development of its communications, especially in Tanga and Mombass, thanks

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[10] A comprehensive account of the German administration is contained in the Annual Report of the British Government for the Year 1920.

[11] Their chief duty was to find labor for the government or for the European plantations.

> to the Northern Railway then under construction. The inherent social cleavage between the coast and the interior then appeared once more with regard to economics. The idea of energetically administering only the former as a "colony" but leaving the rest in its natural state as a "protectorate" and labour reservoir was realized at least on the one hand in the newly instituted, complicated civil administration of the coast districts. In them, Asiatics, non-tribal natives, tribesmen, Mohamedans, and heathen were jumbled together in confusion. . . . The small village chiefs were unable to maintain their position either in face of these alien elements or in face of the financial influence of big European undertakings; they were unfit to deal with the constantly increasing written correspondence with the administrative offices; and least of all were they in a position to assess and collect the native hut tax which had just then been introduced to replace the vanishing customs receipts. The formation of them into efficient groups was a pressing problem which could not then be solved within the tribes themselves, as they possessed no educated men and local rivalries excluded mutual subordination. Moved by these considerations, the district administration of Tanga was the first to have recourse once more to the akida system. . . .[12]

The difference between the German and the British colonial administrations lay not in their goals but in the respective styles which, in turn, reflected the differing values of their own (metropolitan) societies.[13] Thus,

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[12]Theodore Gunzert, Native Communities and Native Participation in the Government of German East Africa (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Eingeboren-enkunde, 1926?), pp. 10-11.

[13]Mary E. Townsend has analyzed in detail the changes in Bismarck's colonial policy in Africa and in his advocacy of this policy in the Reichstag. Its original justification was made to rest upon the necessity of suppressing the Arab slave trade in the interests of humanitarianism and Christian Kultur, and upon the duty of keeping faith with the other powers in implementing the Congo Act against slavery. Subsequently, however, the case for colonies was defended by stressing the economic aspect, their ability to increase German national wealth by the winning of

whereas the Germans idealized efficiency and logical consistency as values, the British idealized "justice" and "fair play" as values, and assigned high priority to the outward forms of justice and democracy. These characteristics have always been present, in however attenuated a degree, in British colonial policy.

The nominal differences between mandates, colonies, and protectorates did not overmuch trouble the British rulers. Former Governor Cameron expressed a typical attitude:

> The terms of the mandate in the case of Tanganyika did not trouble or preoccupy my mind in any way; the principles embodied [in the Mandate Agreement] were in complete accord with what I had become so accustomed in the administration of Nigeria--the ordinary and recognized principles of British Colonial Administration.[14]

They were strengthened in the Tanganyika administration by the increasingly insistent international demands for the implementation of policies that would lead to the termination of the colonial relationship.

The simultaneous pursuit of inherently conflicting goals led to the development, during the British colonial

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new markets for German industries, the expansion of trade and new fields for German activity, civilization and capital. The Rise and Fall of Germany's Colonial Empire, 1884-1918 (New York: Macmillan, 1930), pp. 118-120.

[14]Sir Donald Cameron, My Tanganyika Service and Some Nigerian (London: Allen & Unwin, 1939), p. 20.

period, of "nominal" and "façade" (fake) constitutions.[15] The period of "nominal" constitutionalism lasted roughly from the beginning of the Mandate system until the arrival in the Territory of Sir Donald Cameron, who assumed the Governorship in 1925. Until that time the plenary political power was concentrated in the hands of a governor who was also Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, and legislated for the territory, with the assistance of an Executive Council, whose advice he need not follow.[16] At first this advisory group, the Executive Council, consisted entirely of senior civil servants--the Chief Secretary, the Attorney-General, the Treasurer, and the Principal Medical Officer. Gradually it expanded to include a limited number of non-official persons, mostly prominent in the commercial or industrial activities of the territory.

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[15]The terminology here is borrowed from Giovanni Sartori, "Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion," American Political Science Review, LXI (1962), 860, who in turn adapted them from Karl Lowenstein's Political Power and the Governmental Process. "Nominal" constitutions are merely organizational constitutions, i.e., collection of rules which organize but do not restrain the exercise of political power in a given polity. They frankly describe a system of limitless, unchecked power. On the other hand, "façade" constitutions take the appearance of "true constitutions." "What makes them untrue is that they are disregarded. . . ." Actually they are "trap-constitutions." As far as the techniques of liberty and the rights of the power addressees are concerned, they are a dead letter.

[16]Ordinances, as the legislation was called, were transmitted to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in whom was vested the power of disallowance. Tanganyika Order-in-Council, issued July 22, 1920.

The German system of direct control of native political systems was gradually replaced by a British system of "indirect rule." Under the latter system, there was set up in each tribal area what was called a "Native Administration," a tribal authority vested with legislative, executive and judicial powers. One of the early British administrators has written of this system:

> Indirect rule was in actuality no entirely new device, it was rather the systematization of a long-standing British colonial practice. For we never ruled directly. Always we controlled subject races--unholy word in these days--through their indigenous authorities. So indispensable had they seemed to us that where we did not find such authorities we created them.[17]

Sir Charles Dundas continued with this comment on the system:

> Bogus or genuine, the native authorities we recognized were expected to carry out our behests and be our general agents. But we had not put them in a position to maintain their authority nor equipped them to cope with new conditions resulting from our intrusion into their communities.[18]

Under the British Governor, Sir Donald Cameron, a "façade" constitution was introduced which provided for a Legislative Council, consisting of a majority of "official" members and a minority of "unofficial" members. The Governor's instructions were to choose "unofficial" Legislative Councillors "without regard to representation of

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[17]Sir Charles Dundas, African Crossroads (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1953), p. 133.

[18]Ibid., p. 134.

particular races, interests, or public bodies," who were "particularly fitted to be of assistance to the Governor in the exercise of his responsibilities, having regard to the interests of all communities in the Territory, native and non-native."[19]

The authority of the Governor was in no way diminished by the introduction of the Legislative Council but, in theory at any rate, he was more informed and the political system more democratic as a result.

The 1926 Legislative Council Order-in-Council neither required nor forbade African participation. Until 1945 no Africans were appointed. The official reason for excluding them from membership was that in the entire native community, not one could be found with sufficient command of the English language to take part in the debates of the council, indeed to understand what was being said. However, Governor Cameron did not regard the Africans as being altogether unrepresented, since their interests were directly in the hands of the Secretary for Native Affairs, the Chief Secretary, and himself.[20]

With the development of this system the transition of the Tanganyikan constitutional system under the British

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[19] Tanganyika (Legislative Council) Order-in-Council, 1926.

[20] Legislative Council, Official Report of Debates, Hansard, December 7, 1926.

from a prerogative state (i.e., rule by prerogative) to a "nominal" constitution, and then to a "façade" constitution progressed. Political power in the political system was not really shared between Government and Legislative Council as it was made to appear. Under the constitutional façade, it was in fact wholly retained by the Governor. The traditional tribal rulers possessed no real powers of independence or autonomy under the system of indirect rule as they had in the feudal (pre-colonial) period: they were subject to the over-all supervision of administrative officers and owed their appointment and retention in office ultimately to the pleasure or discretion of the Central Government.

The arrangement whereby colonial governors invited certain local citizens to join them in making laws for the order and good government of their communities was one of those typically British institutions which no one bothered to analyze or define too precisely so long as it worked. And work it generally did--with more or less smoothness and efficiency depending upon the relative administrative competence and diplomatic tact of top ranking officials and the influence, discretion and amenability or aggressiveness of the local citizens.

In Tanganyika, government officials tended to be as honest and industrious as most British colonial civil servants and, in some instances, as for example Sir Donald Cameron and Sir Edward Twining, the governors possessed

superlative imagination and drive. That they would dominate their Legislative Councils as well as their administrative organizations might be the expected consequence--at least until, halfway through his administration, Sir Edward Twining acceded to suggestions that he should no longer personally preside over the meetings of the Council.[21]

Official Members of the Legislative Council (who were all senior civil servants) were expected to and invariably did support government policies. Their unanimous potential, even if unused, block of votes to ensure passage of proposed measures was the principal reason--while the government retained an official majority--for some critics to dub the Legislative Council a mere "talking shop," ineffective to resist a determined governor.

Unofficial members possessed some powers to influence legislation and government policy. However, rarely did they grasp the full implications of their "representative"--even if nominated--status, and determine to use to the utmost

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[21]The governor conceded that there were good reasons for having elected a speaker to replace him as presiding officer. "Although it has been a great honour for the Governor to preside over the Legislature, it has placed him in an anomalous position as at one and the same time he has had to combine the position of the personal representative of the Sovereign, duties similar to those of a Prime Minister and to perform the functions of Mr. Speaker. During the period in which it has been my privilege to preside over this Council it has been my good fortune never to encounter a situation which would make these three duties conflict. . . ." Hansard, November 17, 1953.

whatever rights and privileges the spirit, if not the letter, of their constitutional status permitted.[22]

The first prerequisite for effectiveness as an unofficial member of the Legislative Council, then, was to know whom or what one represented. Members' attitudes on this point varied considerably. There were those, for instance, who considered that an unofficial member's main function was to represent the special interests and views of a particular industry or trade, while others conceived it his duty to represent a particular racial group or the geographical area which constituted his residence or his place of business.[23]

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[22]In the face of an attack by unofficial members which was sufficiently severe, and sustained, and which seemed to represent objections on fundamental matters of principle, government might defer to their wishes by withdrawing the proposed legislation, at least temporarily. Cf., e.g., the objections of unofficial members to government's first proposals to reduce corporal punishment, or to raise tax rates in order to ensure uniformity with neighboring British East African Territories. In the latter instance, when the question was put to the vote the twelve unofficial members voted en bloc against the proposed rates, the fourteen official members abstained, and the motion was defeated. Hansard, November 13, 1954.

[23]Cf. the remarks of the Hon. O. B. Soskice (Dar es Salaam): "as a nominated Member of this Council one is faced with the problem of whom one represents, and whose opinion one is voicing besides one's own. The localities printed after Honourable Members' names represent in some cases places of residence rather than constituencies. In my case I feel that my main function is to represent the interests and views of the mining community. . . ." Hansard, August 27, 1952. Cf. also the debates on the Report of the Constitutional Committee, Hansard, November 14 and 15, 1951, and of the Special Commissioner, Hansard, October 1, 1953, and the speech by the Hon. I. C. Chopra, Hansard, November 26, 1953.

The second prerequisite for effectiveness as an unofficial member--determination to exploit his constitutional privileges--was rarely exercised in Tanganyika. Although outbursts of sharp criticism might occasionally be provoked, particularly when budget proposals were being considered, Legislative Council Members tended to conduct their legislative activities in a relatively mild, non-partisan atmosphere which they liked to call "the Tanganyika Way."[24]

Little change in the atmosphere of the Legislative Council or the tone of its debates was apparent even after, ca. 1945, the government appointed the first two African members.[25] Although they sat on the side of the council allocated to unofficial members, some of the earliest African nominees, who were invariably Chiefs, or Liwalis, tended to adopt what could be described almost as a policy

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[24]One of the leading non-official members, the Hon. E. C. Phillips expressed this typical attitude: "At times . . . it will undoubtedly be necessary for the unofficial members to criticize government. Criticism is vital to progress. It should be stimulating and keep people on their toes. I trust . . . however, that any criticism that may come from this side of the House will be a help and not a hindrance to good government of the Territory . . ." Hansard, July 16, 1949.

[25]The Legislative Council consisted in 1948 of the governor, 15 official members and 14 non-official members. All of the official members were English civil servants. Of the non-official members, seven were European and three were Indian. The first African representatives were appointed on December 3, 1945. In 1947 the number of African representatives was increased to three, and in May, 1948, to four. United Nations Visiting Missions to Tanganyika, Report, 1948, p. 9.

of collaboration, although they could be vigilant and outspoken whenever it was required to protect the authority or prestige of the Native Authorities.

A study of the membership of the Legislative Council during the years 1948, 1951, 1954, and 1955 permits some interesting observations to be made on the style and function of the system.[26]

Thus, until the end of the Second World War, which marked the transition, in international legal terminology, of Tanganyika from a Mandate to a Trusteeship, the central administration of the Territory was carried on in a political vacuum, as far as the wishes and opinions of the indigenous Africans were concerned. The policy-making organs of the central government, the executive departments, the judiciary, and the advisory legislative bodies all excluded Africans from effective participation. Africans were confined to the lower rungs of the civil service in both the Territorial and Provincial Administration, and to the European-supervised "Native Authorities," which comprised the system of the Indirect Rule. What Africans thought and felt about over-all political activities and conditions in their country was, therefore, largely unknown and, apparently, not necessarily worth knowing, to the early British administrators.

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[26]See Tables 2 through 5 on the following pages.

TABLE 2

TANGANYIKA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
1948 MEMBERSHIP[a]

H.E. The Governor (Sir William Battershill, K.C.M.G.), presiding:

The Chief Secretary to the Government, Mr. E. R. E. Surridge, C.M.G.
The Member for Law and Order, Mr. C. Mathew, K.C.
The Member for Finance, Trade and Economics, Mr. S. A. S. Leslie
The Member for Agriculture and Natural Resources, Mr. R. W. R. Miller, C.M.G.
The Member for Education, Labour and Social Welfare, Mr. B. Leechman, O.B.E.
The Member for Lands and Mines, Mr. D. R. McDonald
The Member for African Affairs
The Co-ordinating Secretary, Mr. R. A. J. Maquire

Nominated Official Members:

Dr. A. McKenzie, Acting Director of Medical Services
Mr. J. R. Farquharson, O.B.E., General Manager, Railways
Mr. L. L. R. Buckland, Acting Deputy Ch., Development Commission
Mr. J. C. Muir, O.B.E., Director of Agriculture
Mr. W. H. McLuckie, Director of Public Works
Mr. M. J. B. Molohan, M.B.E., Labour Commissioner

Unofficial Members:

Rev. Canon R. M. Gibbons, O.B.E., Minaki
Mr. E. C. Phillips, C.B.E., Dar es Salaam
Mr. V. M. Nazerali, Dar es Salaam
Mr. J. H. S. Tranter, Ruvu
Mr. I. C. Chopra, Mwanza
Chief Abdiel Shangali, Moshi[b]

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[a] Proceedings of the Legislative Council, 22nd Sess., Part I (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, April 20-21, 1948), pp. 1-2. This was the first meeting to be held following the introduction of the Membership System.

[b] Cf. the tribute of H.E. The Governor, Sir Edward Twining, on the last occasion on which Chief Abdiel Shangali sat on the Council: "It is always difficult in these early stages of our political development to get adequate representation of people who can spare the time, who have the

TABLE 2--Continued

Unofficial Members (continued):

Chief Kidaha Makwaia, Shinyanga
Chief Adam Sapi, Iringa
Major S. E. Du Toit, M.C., Arusha
Brigadier W. E. H. Scupham, C.M.G., M.C., Iringa[c]
Mr. M. A. Carson, Tanga
Mr. Juma Mwindadi, Dar es Salaam[d]

Observations

No women.

Predominance of O.B.E.s, C.B.E.s and M.B.E.s, indicating loyalty and previous services to administration.

Three out of four African representatives are chiefs, government servants or official members.

Interests represented include the church (Gibbons), the diamond mining industry (Chopra) and the settlers (Du Toit).

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ability, who have the knowledge of the English language, and have the confidence of their people and their colleagues. We have been fortunate in the honourable member in his possessing all these qualities (cries of 'Hear Hear'), and I am grateful for the contribution which he has given to the development of the Territory in the last few years. (Applause.)" Hansard, November 23, 1950.

[c]He had first come to Tanganyika early in 1920, almost since the beginning of British administration, as a Second Grade Assistant Political Officer, when he went to Iringa, where he had since made his home, and had spent many years in the Tanganyika Administration.

[d]In 1952, Mr. Mwindadi was replaced by Mr. Frank Mhina, Tanga.

TABLE 3

TANGANYIKA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
1951 MEMBERSHIP[a]

The Chief Secretary to the Government, Sir Rex Surridge, C.M.G.
The Member for Law and Order, Mr. C. Mathew, C.M.G., K.C.
The Acting Member for Finance, Trade and Economics, Mr. C. E. Tilney
The Member for Social Services, Mr. B. Leechman, O.B.E.
The Member for Local Government, Mr. R. De Z. Hall
The Member for Lands and Mines, Mr. N. H. Vicars-Harris
The Acting Deputy Chief Secretary and Member for Development and Works, Mr. T. F. R. Hill
The Acting Member for Agriculture and Natural Resources, Mr. C. E. J. Biggs

Nominated Official Members:

Mr. A. M. B. Hutt, C.M.G., O.B.E.
Mr. N. R. Reid, M.B.E., Director of Veterinary Services
Mr. M. J. B. Molohan, M.B.E., Labour Commissioner
Mr. J. P. Attenborough, O.B.E., Director of Education
Dr. A. T. Howell, Director of Medical Services
Mr. J. R. P. Soper, Acting Director of Agriculture
Mr. F. H. Woodrow, O.B.E., Acting Director of Public Works

Unofficial Members:

Mr. E. C. Phillips, C.B.E., Dar es Salaam
Mr. V. M. Nazerali, O.B.E., Dar es Salaam
Mr. C. W. Carnegie Brown, O.B.E., Dar es Salaam
Brigadier W. E. H. Scupham, C.M.G., M.C., Iringa
Chief Kidaha Makwaia, Shinyanga
Mr. I. C. Chopra, K.C., Mwanza
Chief Adam Sapi, M.B.E., Iringa
Major S. E. Du Toit, O.B.E., M.C., Arusha
Mr. Juma Mwindadi, Dar es Salaam
Mr. I. C. W. Bayldon, Mbeya
Mr. A. Y. A. Karimjee, Dar es Salaam
Mr. G. N. Houry, K.C., Dar es Salaam
Liwali Yustino D. Mgonda, Newala, Lindi
Mr. R. W. R. Miller, C.M.G., Lushoto

[a]Hansard, 26th Sess., October 31, 1951.

TABLE 3--Continued

Observations

Of the total membership of 29 (30 including the Governor, presiding) after eliminating the ex-officio Members (civil servants of the highest executive level), the nominated official members (civil servants of a slightly lower level, bureaucratic heads), the chiefs (including Liwali Mgonda, who replaced Chief Abdiel Shanghali), the M.B.E.s, O.B.E.s, and C.M.G.s (for past or present services indicating commitment to the regime), there were really only five unofficial members, and these, presumably, were as anxious as their fellow-members had been to earn the accolade of a grateful sovereign and Empire.

No less than six of the fourteen "unofficials" were from the capital Dar es Salaam, in addition to the fifteen "officials"--a total of 21 out of 29 total membership (22 out of 30 if Governor included).

TABLE 4

TANGANYIKA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
1954 MEMBERSHIP[a]

The Speaker[b]

Ex-Officio Members:

The Chief Secretary, Mr. R. de S. Stapledon, C.B.E.
The Member for Legal Affairs, Mr. A. T. Gratton-Bellew, Q.C.
The Member for Finance and Economics, Mr. C. E. Tilney
The Member for Social Services, Mr. B. Leechman, C.M.G., O.B.E.
The Member for Agriculture and Natural Resources, Mr. A. E. Trotman, C.M.G.
The Member for Communications, Works and Development Planning, Mr. T. F. R. Hill
The Member for Local Government, Mr. F. H. Page-Jones
The Member for Lands and Mines, Mr. A. H. Pike, O.B.E.

Nominated Official Members:

Mr. C. E. T. Biggs, Director of Agriculture
Dr. A. T. Howell, C.B.E., Director of Medical Services
Mr. A. A. Oldaker, C.B.E., Senior Provincial Commissioner
Mr. E. C. S. Dawe, Director of Veterinary Services
Mr. K. L. Sanders, O.B.E., E.R.D., Acting Labour Commissioner
Mr. R. E. Ellison, Acting Director of Education
Mr. R. C. Marc, Acting Director of Public Works

[a]Hansard, 29th Sess., May 12, 1954.

[b]In deference to suggestions made during consideration of the Report of the Constitutional Committee, the Tanganyika (Legislative Council) Orders-in-Council (1926) was amended in 1943 to provide for a Speaker to preside in the normal course of its business. The Speaker had neither an original nor a casting vote. Brig. W. E. H. Scupham was the first Speaker appointed October 26, 1952. He was congratulated at the opening of the 28th Sess., November 17, 1953, on the distinction of "having been appointed Speaker of the only Colonial Legislature with an official majority." Hansard, November 17, 1953. Provision was retained in the Order-in-Council for the Governor to address the Legislative Council at any time while it was in session after giving prior notice.

TABLE 4--Continued

Nominated Unofficial Members:

Sir Charles Phillips, C.B.E., Dar es Salaam
Mr. V. M. Nazerali, O.B.E., Dar es Salaam
Mr. G. N. Houry, Q.C., Dar es Salaam
Mr. I. C. Chopra, O.B.E., Q.C., Mwanza
Chief Adam Sapi, M.B.E., Iringa
Mr. I. C. W. Bayldon, Mbeya
Mr. A. Y. A. Karimjee, Dar es Salaam
Liwali Yustino D. Mgonda, Newala
Mr. F. Hinds, Arusha
Chief H. Msabila Lugusha, Tabora
Mr. A. L. LeMaitre, O.B.E., Tanga
Mr. J. H. Baker, Kahoma
Mr. J. K. Nyerere, Kisarawe

TABLE 5

TANGANYIKA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
1955 MEMBERSHIP[a]

The Speaker (Brigadier W. E. C. Scupham, C.M.G., M.C.)

Ex-Officio Members:

The Chief Secretary, Mr. R. de S. Stapledon, C.B.E.
The Member for Legal Affairs, Mr. A. J. Gratton-Bellew, Q.C.
The Member for Finance and Economics, Mr. C. E. Tilney
The Member for Agriculture and Natural Resources, Mr. A. E. Trotman, C.M.G.
The Member for Communications, Works and Development Planning, Mr. J. F. R. Hill, C.M.G.
The Member for Local Government, Mr. F. H. Page-Jones
The Member for Lands and Mines, Mr. A. H. Pike, O.B.E.
The Member for Social Services, Mr. J. P. Attenborough, C.B.E.

Nominated Members:

Sir Charles Phillips, C.B.E.
Mr. V. M. Nazerali, O.B.E.
Mr. D. P. K. Makwaia, O.B.E.
Mr. G. N. Houry, Q.C.
Chief Adam Sapi, M.B.E.
Mr. I. C. Chopra, O.B.E., Q.C.
Chief Amri Dodo
Mr. R. E. Ellison, E.D., Deputy Director of Education
Mr. H. S. C. Gill, Senior Provincial Commissioner, Tanga
Mr. R. J. Harvey, Secretary for Trade and Economics
Sir James Henry, Bt., M.C., Q.C., Solicitor-General
Mr. F. Hinds
Mr. A. M. A. Karimjee, O.B.E.
Dr. J. M. Liston, M.B., B.Ch., Director of Medical Services
Mr. C. Mace, O.B.E., Director of Lands and Surveys
Mrs. E. M. Marealle
Mr. N. M. Mehta
Liwali H. Saleh El Busaidy, M.B.E., Liwali of Dar es Salaam
Mr. K. L. Sanders, O.B.E., E.R.D., Labour Commissioner

[a] Hansard, 30th Sess., Vol. I, 1955-56.

TABLE 5--Continued

Nominated Members (continued):

Liwali Gulamrasul Sherdel, Liwali of Bagamoyo
Mr. J. R. P. Soper, Director of Agriculture
Mrs. K. F. Walker
Mr. F. H. Woodrow, O.B.E., Director of Public Works

Representative Members, Dar es Salaam:

Mr. A. Y. A. Karimjee, O.B.E.
Hakimu S. J. Kiruka
Mr. R. C. J. Maslin

Representative Members, Central Province:

Chief Abdarahamani Gwao
Mrs. S. Keeka
Lt.-Col. C. L. Towne, O.B.E.

Representative Members, Eastern Province:

Mr. G. P. Kunambi
Mr. D. Parker
Mr. J. D. Shah

Representative Members, Lake Province:

Captain J. Bennett
Mr. P. Bomani
Mr. S. R. Tanner

Representative Members, Northern Province:

Mr. S. K. George
Mr. H. K. Virani
Mr. B. J. Wallis

Representative Members, Southern Highlands Province:

Mr. I. C. W. Bayldon, O.B.E.
Mr. R. K. Manji
Mr. G. W. Mwansasu

TABLE 5--Continued

Representative Members, Southern Province:

Liwali J. D. Mgonda
Mr. J. A. G. Versi
Mr. R. W. R. Miller, C.M.G.

Representative Members, Tanga Province:

Mr. M. S. Desai
Mr. A. L. LeMaitre, O.B.E.
Mr. P. C. Mntambo

Representative Members, Western Province:

Mr. J. H. Baker
Chief H. M. Lugusha
Mr. H. L. Sumar

Representative Members, General Interests:

Mr. Amur Omar
Sir Eldred Hitchcock, C.B.E.
Mr. E. D. Lushakuzi

Observations

The new enlarged Legislative Council that was established in accord with the recommendations of a Constitution Committee consisted primarily of two groups: "official" and "representative" members. The "official" consisted mostly of all members of the former Council, moved over "en masse," as it were. Most of those "official" members who were not on the Government payroll sported various symbols or awards to indicate their past and/or continuing services to the Government: i.e., O.B.E., C.B.E., M.B.E., etc. The African representative members were a varied assortment of tribal or quasi-tribal heads (3), co-operative officers (2), and ex- or present school teachers (4). The members appointed for "general interests" (i.e., not otherwise represented) included one African co-operative representative, one European sisal representative and one Arab representative.

The personnel of the top echelons of the executive departments and of the judiciary were invariably nationals of the administering power, whose careers consisted of serving the interests of the Mother Country overseas.[27]

Problems and Issues

"Problems are obstacles perceived on the road toward goals. Problems must therefore be recognized in order to become politically relevant or alive."[28] The values of feudal Tanganyika, and, therefore, the goals of the political systems of that period, differed significantly from those of the colonial period. Some problems were not recognized or regarded as such in the feudal era because of prevalent conditions of culture and technology. What might have been regarded as obstacles to goals by the colonial rulers were often rejected as such by the indigenous Tanganyikans, giving rise to issues whose efficient resolution was hindered by the nature of the colonial relationship.

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[27]Throughout the period of the mandate, civil service personnel were kept to a minimum, primarily because of uncertainty as to whether the Territory would be returned eventually to Germany. This political uncertainty in turn discouraged the investment of private capital and the Territory remained economically stagnant. Report of the East African Commission, Cmd. 2387 (London: H.M.S.O., 1925), pp. 113 et seq.

[28]Herbert J. Spiro, "Comparative Politics: A Comprehensive Approach," American Political Science Review (Sept., 1962), p. 577.

J. Gus Liebenow has analyzed the changes in societal values which must occur for a colonial political system to operate effectively:

> Crucial to the efficient operation of any sustained dependency relationship is the acceptance by the subordinate society of the legitimacy of alien rule. This involves not only acceptance of the values being allocated by the superordinate agents but also the acceptance of the agents personally and of the methods whereby they perform their tasks. Initially, primary resistance or the inability of the subordinate people to respond adequately to the novel demands made of them compel the superordinate administrators to resort to negative sanctions in securing compliance with their commands. . . . Force may indeed secure an outward display of obedience. What may be desired, however, is the inward, unquestioning, and habitual acceptance by the members of the subordinate agents to allocate values for that society.[29]

During the earlier period of the feudal period, the problem of alien relationships was not politically relevant since the foreigners did not present any direct or implied challenge to the existing political system. Those who wished to trade were too transient to be a menace, while those who wished to settle were, at first, easily absorbed within the framework of existing social and political institutions.[30]

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[29]J. Gus Liebenow, "Legitimacy of Alien Relationship: The Nyaturu of Tanganyika," World Political Quarterly, XVII (1959), 64.

[30]Traditionally, an outsider who wished to settle among a tribal group was permitted to share in the fortunes and way of life of the tribe. For example, as a rule the Chagga chiefs would apportion to the immigrant untilled stretches of meadowland. No fee was required for such an allotment. A person who cultivated land that had previously belonged to no one acquired title to it as soon as he

When the increasing number of non-African aliens and relatively greater dynamism of their culture began to effect a subtle undermining influence upon the feudal Tanganyikan societies which were in closest contact with them, recognition of the problem came too late for the development of effective counter-measures.

The Age of Feudalism in Tanganyika ended with the traditional tribal societies in varying states of disintegration and demoralization. The degree of disarray depended partly upon the communal tradition and the inherent strength of the societal structure involved, and partly upon the force and character of the external pressures to which they had been subjected. Tribes with a military tradition, as the Hehe, fought the intruders.[31] The Zaramo, and other coastal tribes, who first faced foreign contact, and many Africans who intermingled with the merchants and other visitors in the great Banyani trading centers adopted some of the foreign customs and went a considerable degree toward assimilating the intruders. This last mentioned reaction was in the long run of crucial importance in the development of Tanganyikan nationalism, for it led to two results:

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planted a banana grove on it; upon his death, the inheritance followed the regular line. Bruno Gutmann, Das Recht Der Dschagga, Arbeiten zur Entwicklungspsychologie, No. 7 (Muenchen: C. H. Beck, 1926).

[31] A. G. O. Hodgson, "Some Notes on the Wahehe of Mahenge District," Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, LVI (1926), 37-58.

detribalization and Swahili. Detribalism was, and is, of itself a purely negative process, the loss or neglect of tribal customs and loyalties, contributing nothing to the development of Tanganyikan nationalism unless and until combined with something more dynamic and positive.[32] Swahili was a synthesizing process which provided an instrument, ready at hand for the use of emergent nationalism at the ripe time.

The same conditions of origin and early development applied in the case of Tanganyika and Kenya; yet today Swahili is the national language of Tanganyika, while it is spoken but poorly and reluctantly in many areas of Kenya. The different results are due to the divergent policies pursued in the German protectorate and the British colony and protectorate. In Kenya, English was developed as a second language to the tribal tongues of the inhabitants.

In Tanganyika the Germans, both officials and missionaries, were at pains to aid the propagation of Swahili. It was, indeed, made the official language for the whole of the Protectorate--except the Ruanda Residency--and in it

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[32]Detribalization has been defined as "the effect on Africans that is occasioned by the separation from family, clan and tribal authority as well as the social codes of behaviour, discipline, custom and perhaps religion which originally guided their thoughts and actions, with the object of making them useful members of the tribe or community to which they belonged," in a report by the District Commissioner of Tanga (Urban), 1955, quoted by M. J. B. Molohan in Detribalization (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1957), p. 11.

were communications made to the Liwalis, chiefs, and headmen. The conspicuous advantage was that the European who had gained a degree of proficiency could be moved at will from end to end of the colony; this general language once acquired, he did not need to learn the vernacular of the various principal tribes.

Only too late did the German authorities, governmental and missionary, awaken to the fact that their policy had had the results of aiding the spread of Islam and of bringing the hitherto disunited native tribes more into sympathy one with the other. The barrier of language having been removed, tribal isolation no longer remained the inevitable rule.

The error of the Germans in fostering Swahili was compounded, from the point of view of potential nationalism, by their system of direct rule, which added to detribalism.

In pursuance of their goal of wealth, colonialists in Tanganyika encouraged large foreign monopolies to acquire valuable mineral-bearing land and establish vast plantations for cash crops, while European settlers were generally granted land in the most healthy and fertile areas for farming. They also permitted the large-scale immigration of Asians from the Indian sub-continent.[33] The latter served

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[33]Tables 6 and 7 show the marked increase in the non-African population during the colonial period in Tanganyika. Of the European population of 2,447 at the time of the 1921 census, 1,598 were British subjects, the remainder

TABLE 6

TANGANYIKA POPULATION: RACIAL COMPOSITION[a]

	1921	1948	1957
African	4,107,000	7,410,269	8,665,336
European	2,447	10,648	20,598
Indo/Pakistani	9,000	44,248	71,760
Goan	(not given)	2,006	4,776
Arab	4,780	11,074	19,100
Somali	(not given)	(not given)	3,114
Colored	(not given)	(not given)	2,257
Other	(not given)	2,184	1,525
Total	4,123,227	7,480,429	8,788,466

[a]A complete census of the population was taken in 1957, the non-African population being enumerated in February and the African in August. The figures given above have been taken from Tanganyika Under United Kingdom Administration, Report by H.M. Government in the U.K. of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the General Assembly of the United Nations for the year 1960, Part II, Statistics, pp. 2-4 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, Colonial No. 349, 1961); Report of the East Africa Commission, Cmd. 2387, 1925, p. 113; Report of the East Africa Royal Commission, 1953-1955, Cmd. 9475 (London: H.M.S.O., 1955), p. 457.

TABLE 7

TANGANYIKA NON-AFRICAN POPULATION BY RACE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, 1957[a]

Place of Birth	European	Indian	Pakistani	Goan	Arab	Somali	Colored	Other	Total
Born in Tanganyika	3,422	36,500	3,865	2,001	11,684	1,884	1,997	577	61,930
Born in East Africa (excluding Tanganyika)	847	6,334	981	420	921	375	96	142	10,116
Born outside East Africa	16,108	22,027	1,418	2,296	6,376	839	152	788	50,004
Not stated	157	502	31	40	107	12	12	16	879
Total	20,534	65,365	6,295	4,757	19,088	3,110	2,257	1,523	122,929

[a]See n. a, Table 6, Tanganyika Under United Kingdom Administration, ibid.

as the accomplices (often unwilling) of the colonialists by facilitating the pursuit of their goals.

There thus developed a class system based on race as well as upon the colonial relationship.

In colonial Tanganyika, the Africans were mainly subsistence farmers, although in later years they became increasingly producers of cash crops. They were also laborers, government servants, and commercial employees, generally performing the most menial and lowest paid jobs. The Asians were mainly wholesale and retail traders and, to a lesser degree, agriculturalists, government and commercial employees, occupying the middle positions in the usual hierarchy of jobs. The Europeans were owners and managers of plantations, mines and other businesses, missionaries, professional men and government servants, for whom the topmost rungs of the vocational ladder were traditionally reserved.[34]

An illustration of the inadequacy and inequity of the class system, which pervaded every sphere of activity

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being chiefly Greeks and Dutch. Report of the East Africa Commission, Cmd. 2387, op. cit.

[34]The leading industry, plantation-growing of sisal fibre, employed 700 Europeans, 300 Asians, and 104,277 Africans in 1947. The total production of 105,600 tons was valued at £6,922,800. Wages of Africans varied from 8 shillings per month for unskilled workers to 100 shillings per month for skilled workers. The total wages earned by Africans, therefore, amounted to less than £521,385. Sisal workers generally received, however, additional welfare benefits, such as free housing, education, and health care. Annual Report for the Year 1947 (London, 1948).

in Tanganyika during the period of colonialism is provided by the working of the educational system.[35]

For the almost four million African children under the age of sixteen in 1959, there existed four schools providing higher secondary education, i.e., two-year courses leading to the Higher School Certificate examination, which is now the normal qualification for entry to a university degree course. One such school existed to serve the almost 6,000 European children, and two such schools served the 35,000 Asian children under sixteen years of age. Comparable facilities existed throughout the educational system right down to the primary level. The result, of course, was that while there were generally enough places in primary and secondary schools in the Territory for all non-African children who wished to enter them, there were never enough even at the primary level for African children of school age.[36]

Despite the availability of places in Tanganyika schools, for a variety of reasons, at the secondary stage

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[35]The legal framework for the organization, structure and finance of the educational system was provided by the Educational (African) Ordinance (Cap. 71 of the Laws), the Non-Native Education Ordinance (Cap. 264 of the Laws), and the Non-Native Education Tax Ordinance (Cap. 265 of the Laws). Tanganyika Territory Laws (rev. ed.; Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1960).

[36]Cf. the Report of the Committee on the Integration of Education, 1959 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1960).

many European parents desired to send their children outside the Territory to study. In this endeavor they were assisted by the policy of the Department of Education, which made grants for this purpose from the European Education Fund. No provision existed by which vacant places in non-African schools could be made available to qualified African pupils.

Problems arising from the geographical environment came to be recognized as such by both the indigenous and the alien inhabitants of Tanganyika, after a certain stage of culture and technology had been reached. Issues arose during the colonial period over the urgency of certain problems and the assignment of priorities in the allocation of the Territory's scarce resources in dealing with them. Incompatibility between the values of the differing alien and indigenous civilizations eventually led to the subordination of all other issues to one--elimination of alien domination.[37]

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[37] Ndabangi Sithole suggests a general pattern of attitudinal change on the part of the indigenous inhabitants of Africa to the alien Europeans. "The first time he ever came into contact with the white man, the African was simply overwhelmed, overawed, puzzled, perplexed, mystified, and dazzled. . . . Motor cars, motor cycles, bicycles, gramophones, telegraphy, the telephone, glittering Western clothes, new ways of ploughing and planting added to the African's sense of curiosity and novelty." Eventually, however, familiarity bred first, a realization of the white man's human weaknesses and ultimately, a feeling of rejection and resentment. In time there arose "a new African," more self-asserting, more enterprising, more aggressive, and more self-reliant, than his forebears, to whom it became a maxim that the maximum benefit could only accrue to a country that was self-governed. African Nationalism (London: Oxford University Press, 1959).

Two separate but ultimately conjoining movements constituted the response of the indigenous Tanganyikan peoples to the colonial political system. On the one hand, there was a groping toward larger tribal political organizations--which represented both a continuation of a tendency and direction that had been noticeable in the immediate pre-colonial period, and a general reaction to the humiliation of alien domination. At the same time, attempts were made to ensure that the enlarged tribal political units were made more democratic and responsive to the popular will. These developments were in line with the declared objectives of British administrative policy at least after World War II, even though occasionally the interests of preserving law and order, or efficiency, operated in conflict with purely democratic objectives in particular instances. On the other hand, there was a paradoxical, ambivalent attitude which manifested itself in a desire for reform and progress coupled with frequent rejection, sometimes violently, of specific measures introduced by the colonial administration.

Political scientists, sociologists and other foreign observers have frequently noted the hostility of Africans during the colonial era to some of the reforms introduced by their alien administrators. In some instances, this hostility has been due to lack of recognition of the problem or failure to comprehend the proposed administrative methods for solving it. Frequently, however, the greatest degree of

hostile opposition has been encountered at times and in places of educational advancement or highest political sophistication.

The view held in some quarters that Africans generally resent pressure to build better houses, to cultivate in improved ways and generally to adopt modern standards--that they prefer to be left in their old traditional ways, in a world where there will be no latrines to be dug, no anti-erosion ridges to be made, etc.--is unacceptable for other reasons than its oversimplification. The opposition engendered by welfare and reform measures in Tanganyika was due to a variety of reasons partly internal to the social system, i.e., arising from the cultural conditions of the indigenous inhabitants, and partly correlated to the political system, i.e., arising out of the tensile reactions of the subordinate-superior colonial relationship.

On the one hand, cultural differences might cause reforms to be rejected when introduced over-hastily and ahead of the peoples' desires. Failure to introduce reforms, on the other hand, or any apparent lengthy delay in implementing reforms keenly desired, tended to foster feelings of frustration and bitterness easily channelled into political manifestations.

When the more educated and more sophisticated elements in Tanganyika's indigenous social groups began to voice discontent with the existing rate and direction of

administrative improvement programs, the attitude and posture of the colonial administrators were not sufficiently flexible to satisfy or pacify them. The ensuing crescendo of rising demands and growing organizational strength led to a phenomenon which, for the want of a better term, may be described as nationalism.

The Maji-Maji rebellion of 1905-1906 had left the spirit of the Territory's inhabitants battered and broken, especially in the southern regions.[38] Little had occurred to raise or revive this despondency when World War I erupted in 1914. The long drawn out conflict between Hun and Briton resembled, as far as the indigenous inhabitants of Tanganyika were concerned, something of the struggle between contending lords of the jungle for the booty one of them had felled.[39]

The period succeeding the First World War had been one of peaceful regeneration for the Territory as a whole, but too little time had ensued and too much uncertainty as to the ultimate political destiny of Tanganyika prevailed, for any substantial uplift in spirit and morale to become

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[38] An apt characterization of the Southern Province as "having been blasted and lain moribund since its people were decimated in the Maji-Maji rebellion" was made in the Provincial Commissioners' Report, 1946, p. 52.

[39] In the Peace Settlement following World War I, the two former Residencies of Ruanda and Urundi were excised from the Tanganyika territory and handed over to Belgian administration as the mandated territory of Ruanda-Urundi.

manifest before the war clouds of the Second World War began to gather. As the external political situation deteriorated, although not as a necessary consequence of it, so did the internal political system begin to experience unmistakable symptoms of a growing malaise.

After the Maji-Maji rebellion, the first serious demonstrations of political discontent by Africans occurred in the 1930's. Although not yet of a nationalistic character (because lacking in any ideology or co-ordination, or overt objectives of nationalist origin) the fact of the occurrences indicated some dissatisfaction with the existing state of things and the form which the outbursts took suggested that other more appropriate constitutional methods of expressing discontent had been bottled up.

The disturbances of the 1930's occurred in the two areas of greatest progress and prosperity among the indigenous population. The Chagga of Kilimanjaro and the Haya of Bukoba were the most advanced in the territory in development of institutions of tribal government and in adoption of modern methods of social and economic intercourse. The bases of their social and political economic development were coffee and cooperation. The growing of coffee for cash by Africans and its co-operative marketing through their own societies had progressed for several years in each of these two areas until by 1934 they had reached a stage where the advantages and feasibility were obvious. Nevertheless,

discontent by some African coffee-growers with the operations of the co-operative associations and Government concern for the maintenance of a high standard of agricultural production led the latter to resort to compulsory methods, which, coinciding with a fall in the price of coffee, in turn caused resentment and demonstrations against the co-operative associations and against the government.

The government claimed that "the discontent was caused not by political considerations, but . . . because people failed to realize the value of and necessity for the rules which government had devised, solely in their own interests, for the production and marketing of the crop. . . ."[40] However, it was difficult to divorce the political from the economic considerations, inasmuch as under the system of Indirect Rule the tribal authorities had become involved in the enforcement measures of the Government, and became the object of the people's wrath as much as the co-operative associations. Further, the frustrations engendered by bottled-up political ambitions caused more heat to be generated by the smoldering economic controversy and made more violent the outbursts which occurred than they would otherwise have been.

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[40] Tanganyika Report for 1937, p. 11. The government subsequently blamed the "political agitation" of a "few malcontents whose primary motive is personal aggrandisement and whose object is the overthrow of established authority." Tanganyika Report for 1938, p. 12.

Elsewhere there occurred even more spectacular examples of politically-inspired opposition to agricultural reform measures designed by the administration to help surmount the obstacle of adverse geographical conditions.[41] At the root of the trouble was the dichotomy of interests between the rulers and the ruled. Resolution of the problem of adverse geographic conditions, like all others, could only be achieved by the willing co-operation of all concerned.

Various factors combined to change the pace and rhythm of movement within the political system of the Territory after World War II. For one thing, many thousands of Tanganyika Africans had served in the armed services at various places in East Africa and overseas.[42] Contact with other Africans from more sophisticated and politically advanced territories had caused a critical awareness of the Tanganyika Territory's relative backwardness. Contact with other races and nationalities and experience of new lands had dispelled some misconceptions and stimulated restless longings and ambitions.

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[41] See, for example, the account by Roland Young and Henry Fosbrooke, in Smoke in the Hills: Land and Politics Among the Luguru of Tanganyika (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960).

[42] In the Mwanza District alone, there were some 3,300 soldiers who returned from service outside the Territory. In Maswa and Musoma Districts, 1,400 and 6,100 respectively returned. Provincial Commissioners' Report, 1946, p. 29.

The returning servicemen created no overt disturbances upon demobilization and resettlement in the various districts and areas of the Territory, but they did constitute a ferment within the body of the indigenous population, which, as some Administration officials noted could be productive of great trouble or great good. Many of the ex-servicemen settled back, without great difficulty, into the pursuits and routine of their previous civilian lives. Others, who had had mechanical training while in the services, hankered after vocations in which this knowledge would be useful. Some wished to try their chances in trade, even though they had little capital and less experience to challenge those already well-established in this sphere.

The increase in social consciousness was particularly evident in the Eastern Province (which included Morogoro and Dar es Salaam). Four societies were started by "de-tribalized" Africans in 1947 in this Province, whose miscellaneous stated objectives were "to unite Africans," "to promote good understanding and cooperation with Government" and "to encourage Africans to take part in matters relating to their own welfare." It was noted that although at least one of these societies had "certain fantastic political aims," there was also "some genuine desire for the improvement of social and economic conditions."[43]

[43] Ibid., 1947.

Many ex-servicemen were comparatively wealthy upon receipt of their demobilization pay. In Tanga Province, for example, a total of almost £51,000 was distributed on discharge among some 2,600 ex-servicemen. However, the traditional communal attitude of most Tanganyika Africans toward personal property resulted, in the majority of cases, in the money being fairly quickly disposed of satisfying the claims or demands of various relatives.[44]

The Administration tried to be helpful, although inevitably the expectations of some met with frustration. The supply of drivers and mechanics exceeded the demands. Would-be traders were faced with shortage of goods and other technical difficulties in any economy itself sluggish from political uncertainty and in a period of transition and adjustment following the war-time hiatus.[45]

It was back to the land for the majority, even though a rising land hunger in some areas, and absence of aptitude or inclination in other areas, limited the desirability or the practicability of this method of solution of the incipient problem.

The small, but continually increasing, educational elite of the African population produced by Makerere College of East Africa and the secondary schools of the Territory

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[44] Ibid., 1946, pp. 16, 69; 1947, p. 26.

[45] Ibid., 1946, pp. 11, 64.

became more and more dissatisfied with the status quo. Associations formed for social and semi-political purposes tended to increase, as did objections when the Administration tried to impose new measures or policies without prior discussion or consent by the people concerned.[46]

Even the chiefs, sensing the rising uneasiness of their tribes-people, pressed the Administration for more scope for their jurisdictional powers, more fees for their treasuries, and more and better services for their people.[47] It seemed, however, to be impossible to break the vicious circle of little revenue, less trained staff, and inordinate expectations and demands during the colonial period.[48]

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[46]The Pare tribe, for instance, waged a successful passive resistance campaign against new tax regulations even though the proposed rates appeared to the Administration to be more equitably based. Ibid., 1946, pp. 61-62.

[47]Education was the social service most insistently demanded by Native Authorities. Many African leaders proposed the levying of local education rates which might be administered locally for purposes of primary and secondary education only. Cf. the remarks of Chief Kidaha Makwaia, Hansard, November 12, 1951, and also the remarks of Liwali Yustino Mgonda, ibid.

[48]"Some of our critics," Governor Twining once complained, "seem to think that education can be turned on at any speed we choose and that the progress which we are making is too slow. Our principal difficulties in moving faster lie in a number of 'bottlenecks.' To one I have already referred, and that is building capacity. Another is the training of teachers of whom we require an ever-increasing number. It takes at least ten years to train a teacher, but we are making progress, and the number of primary school teachers has risen by well over 1,000 in the last four years, the number successfully passing out of the training centres in 1950 alone being 577." Governor's Address, Hansard, October 31, 1951.

Realizing the need for constructive channelling of the awakened social consciousness, the Administration seized the initiative by sponsoring a chain of social centers in all of the major urban areas. These were attended with an early enthusiasm, which soon died down, however, for reasons which were not altogether clear, but which were probably connected with a hunger for more serious and productive activity than the dancing and debating, sewing classes and teas.

Of greater significance and more permanent effect were the reforms which were initiated in various tribal political systems, with the consent in most instances, and sometimes at the initiative, of the tribal authorities and peoples themselves.[49] Thus, the Native Authorities of the Uzaramo District petitioned for the appointment of a Superior Native Authority wielding all the powers of an hereditary tribal chief and nominated for the position Wakili-Yosia Omari, a man regarded as capable and highly respected throughout the district.[50]

In the vast Sukumaland, the desire of the Native Authorities resulted in a giant Federation of the Native

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[49]When the people became estranged from a Native Authority, as for example, the Sambara in the case of Sub-Chief Ali of Mlalo, his position could be made untenable through a determined campaign of civil disobedience, including non-payment of tax and ostracism of the native courts. Provincial Commissioners' Report, 1946, pp. 60-61.

[50]Ibid., pp. 11-12.

Authorities of Sukumaland, comprising the three districts of Shinyanga, Maswa, and Kwimba, and the major portion of the Mwanza District. The formerly separate 52 chiefs of the area pooled their financial resources into one treasury, and elected one of their number, Chief Majebere, to serve as permanent president, but with no greater voice in the affairs of the council than other chiefs. Twelve of the former chiefs were elected to assist the president as an executive committee.[51]

In October, 1946, an important reorganization was also effected in the Chagga tribal structure. Where previously there had been nineteen separate chiefdoms of equal rank though of disparate size and importance, the new Native Authorities consisted of three superior chiefs, called Waitori, each of whom, with a deputy called Anganyi, administered one of the three mountain areas, Hai, Vunjo, and Rombo, into which Kilimanjaro was divided. Within each division lesser chiefs (varying from three to five), called Mangis, administered the fourteen sub-chiefdoms into which the former nineteen had been rearranged. Each Mwitori was assisted by a council composed of the Anganyi, the Mangis of his division and two elders from each Mangiate. Uniting the whole Kilimanjaro areas was the Chagga Council, con-

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[51] At the inauguration of the Federation in October, 1946, the Sukuma tribe was estimated at three-quarters of a million people and the area of Sukumaland covered some 20,000 square miles. Ibid., p. 20.

sisting of the three Waitori assisted by the three Anganyi and one elder from each Mangiate chosen by the Mwitori concerned. No decision of the council was valid unless at least two Waitori and the Anganyi of the third division and one elder from each division was present.

The reforms of the Sukuma and Chagga political systems can be viewed as part of a wider striving on the part of the younger and more literate men for greater participation in the political system of the whole Territory. The reforms in the local political systems, however, while they caused temporary alleviation of discontent, did not cure the basic malaise which erupted in yet other localities.

A serious situation developed in 1947 among the 130,000-strong Sambara Tribe, whose demands for reform of their political system had been overlong ignored.[52] Dissatisfaction of the people with the tribal structure and with the chiefs and sub-chiefs selected or recognized by the government had been noted by the Colonial Administrators, but reform of the political system and replacement of the personnel had been postponed because the incumbents were personally favorable to the Central Government. Activities

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[52]There was much cause for concern in the administration because of the proximity of the Sambara area to Tanga, the Territory's second important city and port, where existed a thickly populated African area, the center of the important indigenous orange-growing industry, and contiguous to the Tanga sisal estates with their large and fluctuating population of migrant laborers. Ibid., 1947.

of the newly-established Lushoto branch of the semi-social, semi-political Tanganyika African Association quickly brought the dispute to a boil.

The Tanganyika African Association (hereinafter referred to as the TAA) was founded as early as 1929. Its branches were scattered throughout the Territory in practically every town of importance. A large proportion of its members were government employees and teachers, hence it was fairly representative of educated African opinion.[53]

Agitations against the alleged incompetence, favoritism, and general unsatisfactoriness of the existing Native Authorities culminated in mass demonstrations, which ceased only when various changes in personnel and tribal organization were effected or promised. The political agitation was confined to areas in which the TAA had obtained a stranglehold, but its effects reverberated with varying intensity throughout the whole of the chiefdom.

The TAA was reported to be secretive in its deliberations and to have resorted to certain methods of intimidation in order to gain adherents, including the boycotting of Africans who refused to join. Continuation of such activities was the reason given for the labelling of the Usambara branch as "subversive" by the Administration, and

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[53] Ibid., pp. 37-39.

its eventual repudiation by the Dar es Salaam headquarters of TAA.[54]

Labor dissatisfaction added to the ranks of malcontents. The emergence of a group, termed the "Kianja Labour Association," which was feared to have political aims sparked salutary changes of personnel among subchiefs in the Bukoba District.[55]

A work stoppage which began in September, 1947, as a strike of wharfage and stevedoring workers on the Dar es Salaam waterfront, arising from an industrial dispute, developed into a general strike when a majority of the African workers in all forms of employment in the capital began a separate strike a few days after the start of the strike at the port. The port strike, which lasted eight days, ended with a referral of the points in dispute to an arbitration tribunal. The separate strike arose not from any trade dispute and no definite claims or grievances were ever formulated. Government believed it to be a result of discontent over the rising cost of living, the shortage of essential commodities and a belief that these commodities were not being fairly distributed. The strike ended simul-

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[54] Ibid., pp. 122-124; 1948, p. 122.

[55] Ibid., 1947, pp. 49-50. In the North Mara District at about this same time, the joining of the younger men in a Kuria Union, linked with a similar association in neighboring Kenya, provided the impetus for proposals to associate some unofficials with the Native Authorities.

taneously with the port strike and subsequently measures were introduced for the controlled distribution of rationed foodstuffs and of certain textile goods in particularly short supply. A scheme was also implemented for the speedy erection of a number of purely temporary houses with a view to relieving the existing shortage of living accommodation for Africans in the capital and the high rentals brought on by the shortage.[56]

Political activity developed at an almost breath-taking rate in the Northern Province in 1949 as a result of two dissimilar issues which frustration and a sense of political injustice caused to be interwoven. The two issues were Native Authorities' structure and land.

In the Moshi District, it had become obvious that economic and educational progress had outstripped political advance. The 1946 reorganization of the tribal structure had been an improvement from the standpoint of administrative neatness and efficiency, but hardly so from the standpoint of representation of popular opinion or leadership by the tribe's rapidly increasing educated younger men. Nor had the appointment in 1947 of Mwitori Abdiel Shanghali to the Legislative Council, admirable and progressive though he was, reflected the optimum in popular sentiment or capacity.

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[56] A comprehensive report of the strike and subsequent developments may be found in the Governor's Address, Hansard, December 1, 1947.

Hence the formation in 1949 of two locally-oriented political organizations, the Kilimanjaro Union, having the declared object of uniting the tribe and furthering its common interests and a rival "Chama Cha Utawala" ("Government Society" or "Chiefs' Society"), as successors to the personnel and activities of the now-defunct Moshi Branch of the TAA.[57]

In Arusha District, what has been described as "a small, intransigent and fanatical group" of the Meru tribe had resisted since 1946 the introduction of a Government-sponsored constitution, unless the government revoked the appointment of their Chief Sante, who had recently been installed in the face of considerable popular opposition.

The prosecution and conviction of eleven of the group for undermining the authority of the chief, and their subsequent deportation from the District in October, 1949, enabled the new chief and the new constitution to function somehow, but left the area still surlily receptive to

[57] "There is reason to suppose," wrote the Northern Province P.C., "that the birth of the associations is due to some extent to a feeling of frustration engendered by the belief that the important Chagga tribe is not receiving its need of recognition and encouragement from official bodies and that Chagga views are overshadowed by European political vociferations widely reported in the local press. Events and ideologies in places further afield, ill-digested and ill-understood, are no doubt responsible for the greater political awakening of the people." Provincial Commissioners' Report, 1949, p. 69.

political agitation by "subversive elements."[58]

Land congestion in the Northern Province had long been a recognized fact. European settlers, attracted by the healthy climate as well as the proximity to the commercial centers of Nairobi and Mombasa in Kenya pressed their demands for increasing land alienation upon a government already searching for additional land to satisfy the rapidly growing African population. A Commission, known as the Arusha-Moshi Lands Commission, was appointed by the Governor consisting of Judge Mark Wilson to study the situation. The Commission recommended a substantial alienation of African-occupied land to form a homogeneous non-native block of farms lying between Mounts Kilimanjaro and Meru, known as the Sanya Corridor. The alienation was in pursuance of a development plan which, it was believed, would ultimately be of great benefit to all communities. Other land was to be made available to the displaced Africans.[59]

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[58] Ibid.

[59] In an outline of the Government's land policy in 1950, it was explained that "the existing machinery was outmoded and that the organization for dealing with alienation of land for agricultural purposes laid too much emphasis on the aspect of settlement for settlement's sake, rather than the utilization of the lands in the Territory for the greatest benefit of the inhabitants of all races." Under the new policy, the emphasis would be "changed from one of who shall have a particular piece of land to a decision in each case as to how that piece of land can best be developed in the common interest of all communities in the Territory." Governor's Address, Hansard, November 15, 1950.

The appointment of an African Settlement Team to speed the allocation of lands to Africans in the Arusha-Moshi and Masai Districts failed to halt a growing political disaffection, manifested toward the end of 1949 by a working relationship, if not a merger, between the Kilimanjaro and Meru Unions, which attracted hundreds of dues-paying members.[60]

By the end of 1950, a Northern Province Lands Committee had managed to remove all of the Chagga from the Sanya Corridor and to allocate to them some 314 vihamba (small farms). Unrest in the Moshi District continued, however, acerbated by the chronic impoverishment of the Native treasury, which precluded "the natural growth of social and other services."[61] The problem of the Meru lands remained. A campaign of passive resistance organized by (what had now become) the Meru branch of the Kilimanjaro Union culminated in an appeal against the Administration to the United Nations.[62] While the appeal was still pending, the Meru

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[60]Although 33,062 acres of land suitable for farming and ranching were alienated to European use during 1948-49, and a further 38,800 acres were designated for alienation, none of the 20,950 acres accruing to the Chagga under the Arusha-Moshi Lands Commission Report was allocated up to 1949, nor had the Meru been able to possess any of the land allocated to them. Provincial Commissioners' Report, 1949, pp. 70, 78.

[61]Ibid.

[62]The Meru complained that the Sanya Corridor lands were sacred to the tribe because they contained ancestral graves, that the land offered to them in exchange was of

were evacuated by the Administration from the Sanya Corridor "with firmness and tact and [it] was expertly handled by the officers in the field."[63] There resulted a legacy of bitterness among the Meru families affected and a stimulation of political sympathetic awareness in the remainder of the Territory.

Kirilo Japhet, the Meru who had been the tribe's spokesman before the United Nations, was sent by the Arusha branch of the TAA, on his return, on a Territory-wide tour to describe his experiences and won greater support for the TAA's organizational efforts.

Politically speaking, the early 1950's were years of upheaval in East Africa, characterized by vigorous nationalist uprisings among Tanganyika's northern neighbors. In Uganda, the Bataka movement had organized demands for greater emphasis on Buganda "protection," and less on British suzerainty.[64] In Kenya, there had begun to gather

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inferior quality, infested with tsetse fly, and in any event already belonged to them. The government disputed these contentions, although admitting there was "a light infestation of tsetse which it is considered can be dealt with easily. . . ." Cf. the speech of the Member for Lands and Mines, Hansard, October 31, 1951. Cf. also the UN/TCOR/11 Sess./431st and 451st meetings.

[63] Provincial Commissioners' Report, 1951, p. 93.

[64] This phase of Uganda's political development is summarized by Kenneth Ingham in the final chapter of his book, The Making of Modern Uganda (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1958), pp. 245 et seq.

those social, psychological and economic forces which manifested themselves in the phenomenon known as "Mau Mau."

Tanganyika's open borders with her northern neighbors, and the constant and reciprocal flow of persons and trade between them, made it inevitable that the dramatic political manifestations in the other territories would stimulate and reinforce the developing nationalism in the Trust Territory.[65]

Political tensions between the British administrators and the indigenous inhabitants were increased by the British assumption that tribalism was the strongest force in African life, and it was therefore appropriate to utilize it in associating Africans with the political system of the Territory.

To the extent that tribalism was a powerful unifying sentiment for rallying together large numbers of persons of a particular geographical area for concerted constructive action, the administration's assumptions were correct. The

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[65]There was normally a steady flow of Kenya Africans, mostly Jaluo, but also some Nandi and Kikuyu down the eastern and southeastern shores of Lake Victoria into Tanganyika. Increasing migration by Kikuyus into the northeastern part of the Territory had resulted in an estimated total of 15,000 from this tribe alone in the Northern Province up to 1952. As a result of the Mau Mau operations in Kenya, a state of emergency was declared in the Province, and many Kikuyus were subsequently expelled. Cf. Provincial Commissioners' Report, 1952 and 1953; also the remarks of the Acting Member for Legal Affairs, Hansard, October 2, 1953.

co-operative organizations and the district branches of TAA all bore witness to this fact.[66]

But the strength of tribalism had lain--in the feudal era--as much upon a personal as upon a territorial jurisdiction. There was a personal allegiance to the clan and tribal heads, as well as rights and duties to other members of the group. In addition, there were rights and duties connected with the communally owned land which gave rise to the territorial jurisdiction.

During the colonial era, the personal basis of tribal jurisdiction tended to be progressively weakened by a growing sophistication and acculturation to the more inclusive territorial society, while a more mobile and individualistic economic pattern--together with increasing urbanization and cosmopolitanism--loosened personal ties and tended to make tribal communal rights and obligations superfluous.[67]

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[66]Sentiments of racial solidarity by the Sukuma Tribe growers of cotton against the predominantly Indian buyers of the crop, combined with political opposition to the conservative outlook and methods of the Native Authority, contributed to the spectacular development of the co-operative collection and marketing of cotton in the Mwanza District. "Characteristically, the feeling of strength through unity," commented the responsible administrative officer, "was a heady potion and was used for racial and political animosities." Provincial Commissioners' Report, 1953, pp. 65-66.

[67]In 1931, the ten largest towns in Tanganyika contained 1.2 per cent of the total African population. This percentage had risen to 2.75 in 1952. There were an estimated 90,000 to 100,000 Africans in Dar es Salaam, the

That other bases of association and participation than tribalism were possible had been early proved in Tanganyika by the Mohamedan and Christian evangels, who successfully weaned many Africans away from their traditional tribal religions. It was to be proved even more convincingly in the latter half of the 1950's that tribalism was no longer of sufficient force to bind together persons even of the same geographical and tribal connections and origins, against more powerful, countervailing forces.

The co-operatives flourished because, in addition to a common tribal bond, there was a common economic interest which the tribal nexus was useful in cementing. Similarly, the political branch associations developed because of the opportunity close geographical proximity provided for expressing common grievances against a common foe--the undemocratized Native Authority.[68]

largest town, in 1957. Molohan, op. cit., p. 14. Half a century of labor migration to sisal plantations had left over 5,000 "alien" African men settled on local native lands in Tanga district, nearly 5,000 in the Korogwe Division, and nearly 1,000 in Pangani District. In Muheza chiefdom, "alien" Africans comprised about one-third of the total adult African males; in Pongwe and Mtangata about three-fifths were "alien" Africans. There was a slow process of absorption of "alien" Africans into the local community by intermarriage, religious conversion, etc. "Survey of Tanga," by P. H. Gulliver, Appendix X to M. J. B. Molohan, Detribalization, ibid.

[68]The reactions of some of the traditional and strongly conservative Native Authorities to the political awakening on the part of some of their people caused some administrative alarm lest they fail to realize that, "if they are to continue to enjoy their special positions of

As long as the administration's efforts coincided with those of the developing nationalist movement--however their respective intentions may have differed--that is to say, in the direction of making tribal political systems more democratic and more efficient (through consolidation of units and the introduction of councils)--the real, as distinct from the imagined, strength of tribalism as a constructive factor in the Territory's political life was not seriously challenged.[69]

When, however, the administration made use of the tribal heads in a manner which seemed to range them personally on the side of the colonial regime as opposed to the nationalist leaders on the side of the masses of the people, the prestige and stature of the tribal rulers was irremediably tarnished, together with the image of tribalism, on which the administration had relied.[70]

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responsibility and authority in their communities they must move with the times and ensure that there is no room for charges of favouritism or discrimination." Provincial Commissioners' Report, 1955, p. 1.

[69]There was a parallel development in the sphere of activities of "detribalized" Africans. In the Municipality of Dar es Salaam, for example, an evolutionary process had resulted in the establishment of four WardCouncils, where all or most of the representatives were popularly elected; each of these Councils elected its own chairman and in turn acted as an electoral college to send representatives to the Municipal Council. Ibid., p. 24.

[70]Prosecutions on charges of subversion, for example, were generally brought against political agitators in the Native Courts, alleging offenses against traditional law and custom. The advantages which the administration thought to

The visit of the United Nations Visiting Mission in 1954, and the opportunity this afforded of presenting the views and aspirations of the indigenous inhabitants to the Mission's members, stimulated the nationalist-minded to seek more effective methods of discipline and organization. At the Dar es Salaam headquarters of the TAA, the necessity for presenting matters clearly and cogently to the Visiting Mission led the officials to select as their spokesman a young school teacher, Mr. Julius Nyerere. His outstanding qualities soon gained for him the leadership of the nationalist organization. The TAA was renamed the Tanganyika African National Union (hereinafter called the TANU) and its territory-wide branches taken over and revivified.

The political pace quickened with the visit by Mr. Nyerere to the United Nations headquarters in March, 1955, where he had an oral hearing before the Trusteeship Council. This event marked the first major achievement of nationalism in Tanganyika.[71] Here for the first time, and

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derive were twofold: In the first place, convictions were easier because the laws were vaguer, and accused had no right to legal counsel, as they would have had in the Territorial courts; in the second place, the Native Authorities would serve as a buffer to the administration against the aroused wrath of the population.

[71]Mr. Nyerere addressed the Trusteeship Council as the representative of "the strongest political organization and the only African political organization in Tanganyika," enjoying popular support extending beyond its registered membership. "TANU's major objective was to prepare the Tanganyika people for self-government and independence and to press forward that process within the law. TANU aimed at

before an international audience, recognition was extended to a Tanganyikan representative who claimed to speak on behalf of all of his people. The government-appointed African members of the Legislative Council had nominally represented African interests for upwards of eight years--since 1947, but they neither had nor claimed any popular mandate to do so. Kirilo Japhet had preceded Nyerere before the same international forum, but he had a mandate, albeit popular, to speak only on behalf of one of Tanganyika's 120 African tribes.[72] Nyerere's appearance--like that of Sylvanus Olympio of Togoland--both vindicated the nationalist claims of his organization and consolidated his own position as recognized leader.[73]

Conditions in Tanganyika's political system could never be the same after Nyerere's return from his well-

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eradicating tribal divisions and awakening the Africans' national consciousness. It wished the members of the Legislative Council, the local councils and all other public bodies to be elected. . . ." UN/TC/OR/15th Sess./592nd Meeting. The United Kingdom delegate had no objection to the Council's hearing TANU's representative, but had earlier expressed concern lest the "adventitious prestige which attached to groups or individuals who had appeared before" U.N. organs might be harmful to the political development of the Territory in the long run. Ibid., 576th Meeting.

[72]Indeed, it was alleged by some that Mr. Japhet represented only a fraction of the Meru Tribe, namely, those concerned in the evacuation of their land.

[73]For a comprehensive review of the effects of its international status upon what would have otherwise been a purely colonial relationship, see B. Chidzero, Tanganyika and International Trusteeship (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).

received United Nations hearing. The burdens of colonial and Native Authority sanctions, long borne with relative docility, were more and more openly disregarded or cast aside, civic disobedience and mass disturbances, often avoided in the previously less highly-charged political atmosphere became more frequent, prolonged, and widespread.

In these circumstances, the development of nationalism created in the political system intolerable strains and stresses. The mounting wants together with demands backed by vigorous organized activity internally and international pressures exerted through the United Nations created a crisis in the constitutional structure which rendered its alteration or collapse inevitable. Eventually, the Government was forced to progress to a true (garantische) constitution.[74]

The Functions of the Colonial Political System

Under the colonial political system, political socialization was carried out on two levels--local and territorial. At the local level, the individual was subjected to the influences of his tribal culture. However, the feudal political systems had all been severely shaken as a

[74] A "true" or "garantische" constitution is one which Lowenstein considers to provide real guarantees for the rights it proclaims and to possess effective restriction on the arbitrary exercise of power. Karl Lowenstein, Political Power and the Governmental Process, op. cit.

result of superimposition of direct rule by the Germans. Even under the British system of indirect rule, it was not the original traditional systems which were restored, but distorted versions of those systems. It was as if the head of a great animal creature had been subjected to some violent injury which left it permanently damaged and twisted completely out of shape, while the torso and limbs had been left unharmed and continued to function to all outward appearances as before. Thus the Native Authorities under the British administration continued to "make" rain, sit in judgment, and distribute land. They also molded mores and subjected to severe punishment those who were guilty of offending against "native law and custom." This was a crime of those engaging in "subversive" activities against the colonial government.

At the territorial level, the socialization was less manifest. It occurred through the process of induction into the attitudes and values of the colonial rulers. This function was to a considerable extent performed by the Christian missionaries. Towards the end of the German period of colonization, there were some 465 mission stations, "of all faiths, sizes and shapes," who maintained 1,800 mission schools and claimed a combined total of over 100,000 pupils.[75] Spread out all over the territory, urging

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[75] R. F. Eberlie, "The German Achievement in East Africa," Tanganyika Notes and Records, LV (September, 1960).

adherence to the European's God, and imitation of the European's ways, their combined tendency was to produce at least a confusion of mind and purpose towards the colonial system, if not an attitude of acceptance and submissiveness towards it.[76] This latent political socialization was not necessarily the conscious and deliberate purpose of all missionaries. Nevertheless, it accounts for the association between imperialists and the Church which had been a notable feature in Tanganyika since the time of Livingstone.

This association is generally conceded, although its function of political socialization is not distinguished. Thus, one student of the colonial system writes:

> In the African policy of the European power imperialistic and philanthropic ideas have intersected from the earliest times. The advocates of the former seek raw materials, political advantages, land for settlers, and political power, while the other wants the African! Each of the groups may emphasize its aims differently, but in practical politics they are Siamese twins.[77]

Political recruitment in the colonial system was not open to members of all classes. The German colonial administration was dominated by the military for most of its two and a half decades. Even after most of the rebellions had been crushed, and the territory pacified, the paucity of

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[76]That they also wrought revolutionary changes in the hygienic and educational standards of the Africans is to the missionaries' everlasting credit, as were their humanitarian efforts to abolish the slave trade.

[77]Gunzert, op. cit., p. 1.

numbers of civilian officers necessitated continued use of military officials in civil administration.[78] The classes permitted by the British to participate in the political system were carefully limited by ascriptive and particularistic criteria, even though gradually extended from 1926 on. Mainly senior civil servants, and to a lesser extent leading businessmen, plantation owners, and African chiefs determined the style and function of the political performance. Ascriptive criteria included ethnic ties (in the sense that non-civil servants who were British "kith and kin" had a better chance of being recruited than non-British). To a certain extent recruitment was affected by performance criteria: Wealth tended to be taken as a symbol of success or merit, while possession of a knighthood or honor conferred by the British monarch confirmed it.

Involved in interest articulation in Tanganyika during the colonial system were several groups. Associational interest groups included the organizations of businessmen (such as the Chamber of Commerce in various cities) and plantation owners (the largest and most powerful of which was the Tanganyika Sisal Growers Association). The members of these groups were Europeans and Asians. There were also several associational interest groups composed of members of the Asian population, based on religious or ethnic variation.

[78] Cf. Eberlie, op. cit.

Towards the close of the colonial period, trade unions and agricultural marketing co-operatives began to participate in the interest articulation function. Most of the members of these latter associational interest groups were African.

The most conspicuous non-associational interest groups were the European settlers' organizations in the various regions. The degree of cohesiveness of these organizations differed considerably, as did their ideological coloring. The Northern Province settlers' organization, for example, tended to be tightly organized, highly vocal, and strongly conservative. The settlers' organizations of the Tanga Province were much the opposite in all of these respects. To a certain extent, these differences reflected the national origins of the majority of settlers in the respective regions.

Interest articulation by the Africans was mainly performed by anomic interest groups. There tended to be a high incidence of anomic interest articulation during the first decade of German colonial rule--using these terms to describe the many tribal and Arab uprisings and rebellions. Although there was never a recurrence of such serious outbreaks, various expressions of unrest such as demonstrations against administration-sponsored agricultural reform and in favor of democratizing Native Authorities persisted. Almond has suggested that "a high incidence of anomic interest articulation will mean poor boundary maintenance between the

society and the polity, frequent eruptions of unprocessed claims without controlled direction within the political system."[79] In the colonial political system anomic interest articulation was virtually the only avenue open for the claims of the masses of Africans to enter the political system. For this reason, associational interest groups such as the trade unions and agricultural co-operatives, which in a "modern Western political system" (to use Almond's typology) articulate their own interests, being composed in Tanganyika's colonial period solely of African members, tended to represent as well the larger aspirations of the nationalist movement.

The aggregative function was mainly performed in the colonial system covertly and particularistically. Aggregation occurred by cliques in the highest levels of the civil service and business and financial circles. Since the ultimate authority lay outside of the colony--politically in the Secretary of State for the Colonies and financially, often, in the City of London--the relationship between interest articulation and aggregation was bound to be obscure. As in the case of authoritarian systems, the upward flow of claims and demands by interest groups, was permitted, but the absence of a party system and an electoral process (except in

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[79] Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 35.

the closing stages of colonialism) narrowed the range and effectiveness of the aggregative function. At the same time, the existence of substantial numbers of settlers, highly organized and vocal in some regions, meant that the aggregative function could not be performed exclusively within the bureaucracy. To a certain extent, circulation from the settlers' social needs and demands to articulation, to aggregation, and onwards to output functions was a responsive, even if not fully open and responsible, process.

As would be expected in a political system that suppressed mass participation, the communication system was in the control of the administration. The colonial governments did not themselves perform the communication function; they merely retained the right to suppress undesirable media. The result was a monopoly of the media of communication by non-African businessmen who generally subscribed to the views of, and supported, the administration. Thus, the press was autonomous, but not neutral. It had a double function: to create and sustain an attentive, informed elite of non-African businessmen, educators, settler-farmers, etc., and, at the same time, socialize the African literates and semi-literates into a submissive acceptance of the political decision-making being carried out for them. Among the illiterates and in the rural areas generally, political information continued to pass through an older, traditional communication network. Since, however, the

chiefs were spokesmen for and interpreters of the government policy, the output of messages tended to be the main function of that communication system.

Like other authoritarian systems, the colonial political system tended to concentrate the rule-making and rule-application functions in the executive and the bureaucracy. It resembled traditional oligarchies in its defensive structure.[80] Modernization and democratization were carried out only to the extent necessary to maintain the system.[81] Unfortunately, the output functions of the system never matched the needs and aspirations of the people. The extent of those needs and aspirations could not be fully gauged because of anomalies and defects in the input functions. The impatient Tanganyikans demanded of Britain the renunciation of her imperial role at a time when she, herself, claimed to have consummated the task of trusteeship.

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[80] Cf. Edward Shils' fivefold classification of the "new states" of the non-Western world, cited by Almond, op. cit., p. 53.

[81] One distinguished former British Governor regarded this as one of the virtues of the British colonial system. Sir Alan Burns, In Defence of Colonies (London: Allen & Unwin, 1957), p. 60.

CHAPTER V

THE CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL SYSTEM

This chapter, which discusses the contemporary political system, is divided into three sections. The first, subtitled "Developing National Consensus," describes the process whereby the struggle for independence culminates in the achievement of nationhood, and outlines the framework of the system thereafter established. The second section, subtitled "Problems and Issues," indicates some of the major obstacles which the system must overcome before the desired goals can be achieved. The last section, subtitled "Systemic Tensions" illustrates the functioning of the system and highlights some of its successes and some of its failures.

Developing National Consensus

As the second half of the twentieth century began, the political system of Tanganyika found itself under increasing African pressures for reform and progress.

Thus there were demands that the African members of the Legislative Council might be chosen by some form of electoral system which would ensure their being in touch

with, and responsive to, the needs of the majority of their people.[1]

In response to awakening African political awareness and some United Nations prodding, a committee was set up in 1949 to study and report on constitutional development in Tanganyika.[2] Africans, as well as Europeans and Asians, were stimulated into greater political activity and closer group organization. The Committee's Report in 1951, accepting the principle of elective representation, but making no specific suggestions for its application, set off a round of intense struggles and maneuvering for position among the three main racial groups to maintain or increase the rewards and favors, their respective shares of the outputs of the political system.[3]

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[1]The 1948 United Nations Visiting Mission reported a general consensus on this point in their discussions with African individuals and organizations throughout the Territory. UN/TC/Official Records and Supplement, 1948-1950 (T/218), pp. 12 et seq.

[2]The British Colonial Office felt that the U.N. was putting them "on the spot, so to speak" about the clauses in the Trusteeship Agreement which said that they should introduce democratic principles and work for self-government. So Governor Twining was "abjured," on starting his term of office in Tanganyika, "to introduce democratic principles into local government, particularly the African native administrations, and to reform the old-fashioned Colonial constitution and give it a new look." Lord Twining, "The Last Nine Years in Tanganyika," African Affairs, LVIII, No. 230 (January, 1959), 16.

[3]Report of the Committee on Constitutional Development (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1951) was unanimously agreed to by its members, which comprised all of the unofficial members of the Legislative Council and two

At the time of the publication of the Report of the Constitutional Committee, the only association which aggregated the political interests of the Europeans on a territory-wide basis was the Tanganyika European Council (TEC). This organization had been first organized on the initiative of a group of Europeans in the Northern Province, and developed rapidly under the stimulation of the constitutional inquiry. Although a considerable variety of attitudes were demonstrated by the various regional branches of the TEC in their reactions to the Constitutional Committee's proposals, the following were most prevalent: The community had, up to that time, played a predominant role in the introduction of civilization and in the development of the Territory; the Asian and African communities were still politically immature; the Committee's proposals were unduly favorable to the Asian community; what was needed for the development of the Territory was a period of political stability to encourage economic development, which was the prime necessity of the moment.

The Asian Association, the main associational group of the residents of Indian origin in the territory, in general favored the Constitutional Committee's proposals although there were some minor criticisms of details. The aspirations of the African population were communicated

officials, the Member for Local Government, and the Member for Law and Order (Chairman).

through the Tanganyika African Association: Although not satisfied with parity, the Africans were prepared to accept the Committee's proposals as a temporary phase.[4]

The approval by the Governor and the Secretary of State for the Colonies of the principle of equal representation of the three main races on the unofficial side of the Legislative Council removed the issue of racialism as such from controversy, and substituted what was au fond the question of how rapid should be the tempo of political change.[5] A Special Commissioner was appointed to examine matters arising out of the Report of the Committee. The latter's report, drawn up on the basis of extensive memoranda and testimony submitted by the various racial communities through their respective organizations and leaders, recommended the form of an electoral system which was eventually accepted by the Government. It provided for the gradual transformation of the political system by a series of constitutional reforms, the ultimate goal being a system of

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[4]Cf. the comment on the attitudes of the three main races in Report of the 1954 U.N. Visiting Mission, UN/TC/Off. Rec. 15th Sess., 1955 (T/1142).

[5]In explanation of its proposal for equal representation of the three main races, which came to be known as the principle of "parity," the committee stated that it had "found it impossible, on a basis of numbers, of financial interests or of political maturity, to make any assessment of the relative claims to representation by the three races," hence were guided by the "need to obviate feelings of distrust and lack of confidence and to lay a sound foundation for future political development." Report of the Committee on Constitutional Development, op. cit.

common roll elections with safeguards for minority (i.e., European and Asian) representation.[6] The first national elections were scheduled to be held in accordance with the Special Commissioner's recommendations in two stages, in 1958 and 1959.

As all sections of Tanganyika's heterogeneous population prepared for the 1958-1959 elections, the newly-transformed African political organization, TANU, heightened its nationalist demands. TANU called for an immediate departure from the "parity" formula as a symbol of the Government's intention to progress toward a democratic non-racial state.[7] On the arrangements for the elections, TANU objected to the compulsory "tripartite" principle, which was the obligation placed upon each elector to vote for three candidates one of each race and also to the qualitative franchise restrictions (£150 annual income and/or Standard VIII education), the effect of which, it was contended, would exclude the vast majority of Africans.

During the latter months of 1956, a new political association appeared to challenge TANU. The latter was

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[6]The Special Commissioner was the distinguished constitutional expert, Professor W. M. M. Mackenzie.

[7]Racial provisions were contained in the specific provision that the Legislative Council "shall consist of . . . thirty Representative Members (being ten Africans, ten Asians and ten Europeans) of whom twenty-seven shall represent constituencies and three shall represent such interests as the Governor may think fit. . . ." Tanganyika (Legislative Council) (Amendment) Order-in-Council, 1955.

mono-racial in its membership, and insisted on the essentially African character of the democratic state which it wished to see established. These gave fuel to the charges of the new organization, the United Tanganyika Party (UTP), which was multi-racial in its membership as well as its objectives. Like TANU, the UTP had as its declared objectives the ultimate attainment of self-government on a non-racial basis and with an African majority. It differed from TANU, however, regarding the speed at which progress could be made toward this end, believing that the rate at which Africans could receive increased responsibilities had to depend upon their educational and economic status. UTP considered that the right to vote required a degree of responsibility and political maturity which the majority of Africans did not possess, hence advocated a qualitative vote, rather than universal adult suffrage, as the basis of the electoral system.[8]

It was widely believed that UTP had been started at the initiative and with the support of Governor Twining. Essentially an elitist party, its nucleus was provided by the unofficial members of the existing (i.e., the appointed) Legislative Council.[9]

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[8] Tanganyika Standard, October 4, 1957. See also, Report of the 1957 U.N. Visiting Mission.

[9] A confrontation of the views of the respective parties occurred at a meeting before the U.N. Trusteeship Committee, which heard both Marealle II, Paramount Chief of

As the UTP began to woo and, it claimed, increasingly to win African membership, TANU's redoubled efforts to establish and maintain its hold on the affections and allegiance of the African masses brought it increasingly into conflict with governmental authorities.[10]

Into the 1958-1959 election struggle also entered the African National Congress (ANC) newly organized by a former Secretary-General of TANU, Mr. Suberi Mtemvu. ANC was more militant, leftist and nationalist (racist?) than TANU. The ANC demanded faster and more thorough Africanization, nationalization without compensation, and greater educational benefits for Africans at lower tuition fees.

In the three-cornered election contest, which was in effect to determine the nature of the political system of post-independent Tanganyika, TANU's strategy was to capture the Legislative Council by selecting or supporting one European and one Asian candidate in addition to its own (African) member in each constituency. These tactics paid off handsomely.[11]

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the Chaggas, Member of the Legislative Council and member of the UTP, and Mr. Julius Nyerere, President of TANU. UN/TC/20th Sess./Off. Rec./818-820th Meetings/June 18 and 19, 1957.

[10]During 1957, TANU branches were closed in Korogwe, Pangani, and Handeni districts, and the branch in Lushoto was refused registration. Provincial Commissioners' Report, 1957. Mr. Nyerere himself was prosecuted and fined for sedition in this same year.

[11]For an "inside" account of the campaigning by one of the successful candidates, cf. Sophia Mustafa, The Tanganyika Way (Dar es Salaam: The Eagle Press, 1961).

The two-part electoral series was held in September, 1958, and February, 1959, half of the country going to the polls in each year. Less than 60,000 people were registered under the restricted franchise. The overwhelming support given for TANU and TANU-sponsored candidates in 1958 meant that the following year most of those individuals who opposed TANU decided that it was not worth contesting the seat. As a result, a total of only 24,000 people voted, taking the two years together.[12] TANU secured almost a clean sweep of the available seats in the Legislative Council, its only loss occurring in the Mbulu constituency, where success was achieved by a former TANU member, who ran as an independent after being expelled for not withdrawing in favor of the official party candidate.

Tanganyika nationalism had now matured, and its confidence and determination were reflected in the stepped-up tempo of TANU's activities, and their spread from the urban areas, to which they had hitherto been largely confined, into all parts of the rural countryside.[13]

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[12]The voting figures were quoted by the President in his address to the National Assembly in opening the session on October 12, 1965.

[13]Altogether there were, at the end of 1956, 87 societies of a political character registered under the Societies Ordinance, including all the branches of TANU, UTP, and such smaller diverse groups as the Hindu Council, the Asian Association, the Tanganyika National Society, the Tanganyika Citizens' Union (formerly the Kilimanjaro Chagga Citizens' Union), the Meru Citizens' Union, etc. Report of of the 1957 U.N. Visiting Mission. In 1957, TANU claimed

What may have been regarded as an "unsettled atmosphere" by some government administrators, was looked upon as a period of dawn before the approaching day by the nationalist political leaders.[14] Nature played her part in contributing to the general feeling of optimism by being overly kind for the second successive year in most parts of the Territory, with resultant bumper crops and a flourishing of commerce and industry.

It was possible to discern from the higher standards of clothing, more houses permanently roofed, marked increase in registration of African-owned private cars and tractors, and considerable sums of money invested in farming machinery, that there was beginning to emerge a middle-class of Africans. Shopkeepers and large-scale farmers constituted the core of this new class, but it was swelled by the inclusion of the better-paid Central and local Government employees and an increasing number of enterprising transporters, "company-promoters," and the like.

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a membership of 9,369 or 1.3 per cent of the total population in the Northern Province. By the end of 1958, in the Northern Province, alone, there were twelve registered branches of TANU, and a considerable number of sub-branches awaiting registration. Provincial Commissioners' Report, 1957, pp. 74, 80.

[14]Administrative officers reported that political activity was reflected in an increased disregard for law and order in a number of localities, and politically-inspired industrial unrest, particularly in the sisal industry. Disrespect for the police was not confined to Africans. Provincial Commissioners' Report, 1958, pp. 19, 45, 55-57; and 1959, p. 45.

Throughout the whole of the vast country, there was a turning away from localism and a reaching-out for national problems, national issues, and the tools to grapple with them.[15] For the masses of the people, TANU's village, area, district, and provincial offices provided rallying points, as well as guidance and a steadying influence.

The political tempo mounted considerably during the early months of 1959, following TANU's election successes, and the country braced itself for a possible clash between the dominant party and the Government over the pace and timing of further constitutional reforms.[16] The announcement by the Governor in March, 1959, of the intention to

[15] With a revised constitution and a new chief, the Meru settled down to a program of social and economic self-improvement. By purchasing back some of the farms within the Sanya Corridor which Europeans had been unwilling or unable to make a go of, they eased both their land shortage and sense of outrage. Provincial Commissioners' Report, 1958, pp. 75-76. In the Moshi District, the pro-Mangi Mkuu (Paramount Chief) party lost in the Chagga Council elections to the more progressive, better-educated elements, many of whom were TANU members or sympathizers. The Mangi-Mkuu Marealle II remained an outstanding national figure as Member of the Executive Council and of the East African Central Legislative Assembly (ibid., 1959, pp. 103, 107), but the office of Mangi Mkuu was eventually abolished by the tribe. Even the Masai, long the most conservative of tribes, startled the local Roman Catholic Mission with a request for literacy classes. Ibid., 1958, p. 79.

[16] TANU seized upon the election success as a mandate to demand what would in effect amount to responsible government: an elected majority in the Legislative Council, an elected majority in the Council of Ministers, the abolition of the tripartite constituencies, as well as parity of representation and the introduction of universal adult suffrage. Mustapha, op. cit., pp. 56-57.

introduce self-government in May, 1961, caused an all-round easing of the political tension, but created certain incidental misconceptions regarding the meaning and significance of "self-government."[17]

The appointment of leading political figures as unofficial ministers had its expected steadying effect.[18] Secure in its control of the Central Government, TANU was

[17] It was believed by some, for example, that "uhuru" meant freedom from all the traditional and legal restraints which have customarily governed people's behavior, by others that self-government meant the end of taxation, and some difficulty was experienced initially in the collection of Personal, Cattle, and Local Rates. Provincial Commissioners' Report, 1959.

[18] A ministerial system had been introduced on July 1, 1957: The official side of the Executive Council was increased to nine, consisting of the Chief Secretary, the Attorney General, and seven Ministers (who were then senior civil servants); the unofficial side consisted of six assistant ministers, of whom four were African, one a European, and one an Asian. Although the ministerial system appeared to operate smoothly, Africans were dissatisfied that all the African Assistant Ministers were, or had been, chiefs, that they dealt only with African affairs in their respective ministries, and that they were not allowed to act in the temporary absence of their ministers. For the complaints, and Government's replies, cf. Report of the U.N. Visiting Mission, UN/TC/Off. Rec./21st Sess./Suppl. No. 2 (T/1401), New York, 1958; also the Administering Authorities replies, ibid. Following the elections, Government invited five unofficial members (three Africans, one Asian, and one European) to take up ministerial portfolios. The proposal was accepted with the proviso that "the racial allotment of five ministries should be left to the Leader of the Opposition [Mr. Nyerere] to decide." Mustapha, op. cit.; Hansard, March 17 and 19, 1959. Up until the date of internal self-government, May 1, 1961, the Governor continued to preside over meetings of the Council of Ministers. From the latter date, the Governor was required to act in almost all matters of government in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet. Cf. Report of the Tanganyika Constitutional Conference (Dar es Salaam; London: H.M.S.O., 1961).

now free to direct its attention to satisfying the demands and expectations of the people for a better life.[19]

After independence, the members of the Legislative Council remained as members of the renamed National Assembly. The role of the latter diminished, however, as the government policy was hammered out first in meetings of the TANU national executive, and annual TANU party conferences, leaving little for Parliament to do but ratify decisions already made and discuss minor modifications of detail.

Institutional Framework

What are the characteristics of the post-independence political system of Tanganyika? They are similar to those of certain other African States which are occasionally grouped together and labelled "revolutionary."[20] This category includes Algeria, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, and the United Arab Republic.[21] The major features of the political systems of these revolutionary African States are: strong

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[19]For a full history of constitutional developments leading up to independence, see J. Clagett Taylor, The Political Development of Tanganyika (London: Oxford University Press, 1962).

[20]Cf. for example J. Coleman and C. Rosberg, Jr. (eds.), Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964). Question whether Algeria since June, 1965, still qualifies.

[21]Ghana's interest and influence were manifested early. Her High Commissioner was the first diplomatic representative of an African country to establish himself in Tanganyika.

presidential system, single mass party, socialist ideology and militant pan-Africanism.

The consolidation of the political system of post-independence Tanganyika is signified by the Interim Constitution of Tanzania Act, 1965. This legislative achievement was the culmination of a four-year process of gradual merger of the organs of party and state. The first step in this process was the elimination or absorption of all political parties other than TANU.

In November, 1962, when the nation went to the polls to choose a president under the post-independence republican constitution, TANU's candidate, Mr. Julius Nyerere, was opposed by Mr. Subiri Mtemvu, president of the African National Congress (ANC). As Mr. Mtemvu outlined his party's platform, it appeared likely that nothing less than a thorough-going form of socialism would satisfy the ANC. Its leader complained that the Government was content for Tanganyika to remain a source of raw materials for overseas countries. Despite independence, foreign mining, timber, and agricultural companies continued to drain the country of its mineral and agricultural wealth. No attempt had been made to establish manufacturing and machine building industries in the Territory for the exploitation of the country's natural resources. The three-year plan of development between 1961 and 1964 did not diverge in any significant degree from the pattern of colonial days. No provision was

made for the setting up of any heavy industries; the main item of investment continued to be the communications network. The whole development plan was thus subordinated to the interests of the foreign companies, for it was to facilitate the export of the country's natural wealth that roads were to be built from the interior to the coast. The industries existing in the Territory were still confined to certain minor branches.

In the matter of education, facilities for African pupils were still inadequate. In fact, their position vis-à-vis pupils of other races as far as secondary education was concerned, had deteriorated since independence and would continue to do so unless the Government abandoned its equal treatment of all pupils and embarked upon a heavy subsidization for African pupils, involving the elimination or substantial lowering of fees for them.[22] Mr. Mtemvu was also critical of the strong presidential powers which were prescribed under the new republican constitution.[23]

Viewed in the context of an anti-colonial revolution, the ANC represented the never-say-die idealists, those who never cease to struggle for the purity of their revolutionary ideals. The ANC's adherents resented the consolida-

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[22]The above summary of the ANC's platform is based upon several personal interviews with its leader and party officials in March and April, 1962.

[23]Tanganyika Standard, September 18, 1962.

tory activities of TANU as betrayal of the goals for which the struggle was waged. Had the election results indicated substantial support for his party's views, Mr. Mtemvu might have gone on to be to Mr. Nyerere and TANU what in Kenya Mr. Odinga Oginga is to President Kenyatta and KANU. However, of the approximately two million voters who registered, an overwhelming majority endorsed TANU's candidate (1,123,553 to 21,279).[24]

Shocked by his poor showing, Mr. Mtemvu proposed to dissolve the African National Congress and join TANU, a decision endorsed subsequently by his supporters. The president of the even smaller People's Democratic Party, Mr. C. S. K. Tumbo, was not a candidate, having returned from England (after resigning his position there as Tanganyika's High Commissioner) only after the nomination date had closed.

The People's Democratic Party was more embryonic than real. Its president never participated fully in political life and, because of real or feared harassment, spent more time after his return in neighboring Kenya than in Tanganyika. Nevertheless, it represented the dissatisfaction felt by a considerable number of trade unionists at the Government's policies.

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[24]These were the first national elections to be held on the basis of adult suffrage.

Apart from the three above-mentioned parties, following the quiet post-1960 demise of the United Tanganyika Party, there was a rather ambiguous, semi-political Muslim dominated organization, called AMNUTI, which purported to express the grievances felt by the Muslim community because of alleged under-representation in Government, but disclaimed the normal objectives of a constitutional opposition party, i.e., to provide an alternative to the Government of the day.

To bring the constitutional structure into closer reality with political practice, the TANU annual conference in January, 1963, endorsed a resolution of the TANU National Executive, asking the government to give statutory recognition to the one-party system in Tanganyika.

It was argued that where there is only one party, and that party is identified with the nation as a whole, the foundations of democracy are firmer; members are more freely elected and express their opinions more freely than in a two-party system.[25]

The Government accepted the recommendations of the TANU national executive and the Government took steps to achieve that effect. In order to ensure that the political

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[25]As early as 1960-1961, a political scientist analyzing the Tanganyikan political situation felt justified in regarding it as a one-party system. Cf. Margaret Bates, "Tanganyika," in African One-Party States, ed. Gwendolin M. Carter (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 395 et seq.

system would reflect the widest possible consensus, a Presidential Commission was appointed to study and recommend an institutional framework which might combine democratic principles with a one-party state. After reading and listening to the views and arguments of all sections of the population, ascertained by touring throughout the various regions and after visits to Guinea and Yugoslavia for comparative study of the constitutional arrangements in these two countries, the Commission made its report.[26]

The Commission's recommendations, which were accepted by the Government with minor modifications, proposed the establishment of a republican form of Government with a president and National Assembly elected by universal suffrage. President and National Assembly together comprise Parliament. Executive responsibility to the legislature is ensured by providing for simultaneous choice of parliamentary candidates who are pledged to a particular presidential candidate. At the same time, strength is assured to the presidency by the discretionary power to dissolve parliament. The president is assisted in the exercise of his powers by a Cabinet of Ministers whom he must choose from among the members of the National Assembly, headed by a

[26]The Report of the Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic One-Party State was published by The Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, in 1965.

Vice-President, who is normally the Leader of Government Business in the National Assembly.

Legislative approval to these provisions was given in the Interim Constitution of Tanzania Act, 1965. Under this law, all political activity in Tanganyika, except that of organs of state and local government, must be conducted under the auspices of TANU.

The present Tanganyikan constitution can perhaps be described as a combination of the "façade" and the "true" types. Insofar as it constitutes formal authority in the hands of the President, it is a true constitution, reflecting the actual locus of power in the present President, Dr. Nyerere. The provisions relating to the National Assembly, however, are a façade, because the true decision-makers of legislative policy are the delegates to the meetings of the executive committee and the annual party conferences of TANU. The National Assembly rarely does more than ratify decisions previously reached in these TANU deliberations. In this respect, of course, the National Assembly is little different from the British or any other system involving a cabinet and a majority party.

The National Assembly played its true role on at least one notable occasion. It was in connection with the Illegitimacy Act. Women members of the Assembly sponsored a bill granting greater rights to unwed mothers. Referred to a committee when first introduced, it was passed at the next

meeting of the Assembly after a well-organized nation-wide campaign by women's organizations in its support.

Restrictions on the arbitrary exercise of power are contained in constitutional provisions for popular elections, presidential responsibility to the National Assembly, and the guaranteed independence of the judiciary. These provisions may be considered a safeguard against a too liberal use of the executive powers. An individual Minister, the Cabinet, and ultimately, the President can be held responsible and turned out of office by a disapproving public.

Thus the traditional guarantees of a constitutional democracy, in its historically valid meaning: freedom of speech, of press, of assembly, etc., are not absent from Tanganyika. However, their exercise may occasionally be limited.[27] Their limitations are a concomitance of the priority assigned to the goals of durability and wealth, which are deemed to require the sacrifice of some individual liberties in order to ensure the national survival. The sacrifice of some individual liberties, of course, is a necessary and regular, although not always admitted, feature of all political systems. It is felt that an added urgency

[27]There is criticism, for example, of the Minister of Home Affairs' powers of preventive detention, which may be exercised without publicity or appeal. Controversy has also been aroused by the President's appointment of Mr. Paul Bomani as Minister for Economic Affairs and Development Planning despite his failure to win re-election in September, 1965.

in "new" or "developing" political systems is created by the fear of chaos and/or neo-colonialism as a consequence of failure to secure wealth or ensure durability.[28]

As the governing party the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) performs in the present political system the triple functions of political socialization, recruitment, and communication. Of these tasks, perhaps that of socialization is the most crucial in a state where the masses of the people have no great familiarity with political issues. It was only in 1958, "for the first time," noted the Western Provincial Commissioner, that

> . . . the mass of the people took heed of Territorial affairs as opposed to confining their interests to chiefdom or district matters. Though unsophisticated and indeed uncritical in their outlook, their interest in politics grew steadily.[29]

The function of TANU is to win the people's acceptance of the system's social and economic goals and policies, and to mobilize the territory's human resources to achieve the desired changes in the social framework, establishment of new institutions and building up of the infra-structure and community development.

Through the party newspaper, Uhuru, and in continuous

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[28]The objectives sought to be attained by the post-independence constitutional provisions were described in Proposals of the Tanganyika Government for a Republic, Government Paper No. 1 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1962).

[29]Provincial Commissioners' Report, 1958, p. 79.

exhortations of party officials, TANU performs the function of communicating the main ideological tenets of the system. These include the beliefs that all citizens together possess all the natural resources of the country in trust for their descendants; that in order to ensure economic justice the State must have effective control over the principal means of production; and that it is the responsibility of the State to intervene actively in the economic life of the Nation so as to ensure the well-being of all citizens, and to prevent the exploitation of one person by another or one group by another or the accumulation of wealth to an extent which is inconsistent with the existence of a classless society.[30]

In its structure and role, TANU is a good example of the "mass" party type, distinguished by Hodgkin.[31] The three dominant personalities--Nyerere, Kambona, and Kawawa--are "of the people." The first two are former school teachers and the third a former trade unionist. All are professional politicians who early renounced their respective vocations for party service.[32] The basic unit of the party

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[30]Cf. The Constitution of TANU, which is contained in the First Schedule to the Interim Constitution of Tanzania, 1965.

[31]Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa (New York: New York University Press, 1957), pp. 158 et seq.

[32]Nyerere's being the son of the chief of one of the smaller tribes of Tanganyika has been of no particular significance in his rise to national leadership.

is the local branch, and in towns the "cells" (consisting of the residents of a group of ten houses). The pyramidal organization is governed by its elected national and district executive committees and its annual delegates' conferences. Important branches are the TANU Youth League, and elders' and women's sections. The last-mentioned dovetails into the Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanzania (Union of Women of Tanzania, or U.W.T.). TANU also maintains close associational links with the Co-operative Movement in Tanganyika (C.U.T.). This Movement, which is one of the oldest and strongest in Africa, has played a major role in enabling Africans to participate in and control certain sectors of the economy which would otherwise have remained in the hands of immigrants or foreign countries.[33] The Secretary-General of C.U.T. is an ex-officio member of the National Executive Committee of TANU, and the TANU District Committees may co-opt members of the Co-operative Movement where adequate Co-operative representation might otherwise be lacking.[34]

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[33] In 1960, the number of co-operative societies and unions in the territory was 719. They handled approximately £13 million worth of agricultural produce, mainly cotton and coffee. The co-operatives' role has traditionally been that of marketing products of the country, but the government has fostered its expansion by organizing co-operative farming, establishing a Co-operative College and a Co-operative Bank. Figures quoted were given in a speech by Mr. A. Z. N. Swai, Minister of Commerce and Industry, UN/TC/Off. Rec./27th Sess., July 12, 1961.

[34] The importance of the Co-operative Movement is commented upon in the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic One-Party State, op.cit.

Problems and Issues

The principal problems facing political leaders of the newly independent nations have been described as follows:

1. Definition of the physical proportions, the geographic configuration, the legal limits of the unit within which the nation is to be built.
2. The structure of the state.
3. The approach and techniques to be employed in constituting the nation, in investing disparate groups within the state with a consciousness and sense of national identity, and in forging a national consensus.
4. The extent to which political power is to be dispersed throughout the society.
5. The degree to which social and cultural differences are to be tolerated.[35]

To be complete, however, the list should include another important problem:

6. The most effective means of rapidly ensuring

[35]Arnold Rivkin, "The Politics of Nation-Building," Journal of International Affairs, XVI, No. 2 (1962), 132.

a substantial improvement in material living standards of the inhabitants.[36]

Problem 2--the structure of the state--has been discussed earlier in this chapter. Problem 1 was easily resolved in the case of mainland Tanganyika. The "artificially contrived but nevertheless vested boundary lines" (to use Rivkin's phrase) which had delimited successively the mandate and Trust Territory were sufficiently clear and unchallenged to be accepted without reservation by the nation's inhabitants as well as those of its neighboring territories.

There was the existence upon the attainment of independence of a general feeling that there were certain inviolable territorial and demographic units which comprised the political conception of Tanganyika, that these units had been designated long enough ago to be practically indisputable now, and that the continued association of these units through all the vicissitudes of pre-independence had invested this association with the aura and authority of

[36]For a reminder that even under the colonial system efforts had been initiated to resolve this problem, cf. James S. Coleman: "One of the several features differentiating Sub-Saharan Africa from other non-Western areas is the fact that most of its peoples have been the beneficiaries of positive, social, economic and political development initiated and carried through by colonial powers not only chastened and reformed by imperial disintegration elsewhere but subject to ever-increasing African nationalism." "Sub-Saharan Africa," The Politics of the Developing Areas, ed. Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 320.

rightness. Soon after the independence of Tanganyika, however, problems had to be faced in connection with the large offshore islands of Zanzibar and Pemba.

The two last-named are small islands between twenty and thirty miles off the eastern coast of mainland Africa, which formed part of a chain of Islamic settlements developed along coastal Tanganyika and Kenya as early as the thirteenth century. After a period, during which Portuguese influence vied successively with that of Arabs from Oman, Zanzibar emerged during the eighteenth century as the capital of Oman power, with Pemba as a subordinate part. Fratricidal rivalry split Zanzibar off from its Oman origin, but the islands prospered under its Arab sultanates and feudal aristocracy. Ivory and slave-trading raids into the interior of the mainland formed the main basis of the islands' wealth until British "protection," imposed in 1890, put an end to slaving activities. Cloves, of which Zanzibar (and more particularly Pemba) produced most of the world's supply, maintained Zanzibar's prosperity during the ensuing 73 years of British overrule, but latterly a blight affecting the clove trees and dwindling demand from Indonesia and India, the main markets for the export crop, have caused economic difficulties and chronic budget deficits.

On December 9, 1963, Zanzibar gained independence from the British, its area (1,020 square miles), population (320,000), and poverty (an annual budget of £3.2 million and

exports of £20 a head) making it one of the world's tiniest and least viable of independent States. Prior to independence, the islands had been torn by racial strife between the majority Africans and the minority Arab ruling class. Elections for the Legislative Council in 1961 had occasioned disturbances in which 68 people died, 64 of whom were Arabs. In 1963, pre-independence elections had been carried out peacefully, thanks to the intimidating presence of British troops from Kenya, but the results had foreshadowed trouble. The Afro-Shirazi Party, supported by most of the Africans on the islands as well as mainland politicians in Kenya and Tanganyika, gained 54 per cent of the popular vote but only 13 of the 31 seats in the National Assembly. The Zanzibar Nationalist Party, which had not managed to poll more than 35 per cent of the popular vote in any of the four elections since 1957, despite the feudal atmosphere on the large Arab-owned estates, formed a coalition government with the Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party which polled 11 per cent of the popular vote.[37]

Shortly before the 1963 elections, the former secretary-general of the Z.N.P., Sheikh Abdul Raman Mohammed Babu, resigned to form the Umma Party. This Party published a statement shortly after independence indicating the kind

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[37]For a detailed discussion of the island's political situation, cf. Michael Lofchie, Zanzibar: Background to Revolution (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964).

of socialist society which the Party would establish when it was in a position to rule. Peasant ownership of all land in rural areas, establishment of co-operatives, and Government take-over of all commercial and industrial enterprises were among the measures proposed.[38] The Party was banned by the coalition Government under Sheikh Muhammad Shamte Hamadi; and it was while Babu was in Dar es Salaam to seek advice from his lawyers regarding the constitutionality of the ban on January 12, 1964, that a coup d'état was carried out in Zanzibar.

Within twenty-four hours of an uprising by a band of armed insurgents led by "Field Marshall" John Okello, the Sultan's regime was toppled and a republic proclaimed under Sheikh Abeid Amani Karume, former Leader of the Opposition, as President. Other members of the Cabinet included Kassam Hanga as Vice-President and Babu as Minister of External Affairs and Trade. A three-sided power struggle appeared to be occurring in Zanzibar subsequent to the coup, between Okello, Babu, and Karume. Okello, as the leader of the only armed forces in the islands, was initially in a strong position to dictate terms. The dispatch of more than 100 Tanganyika Police and the subsequent deportation of Okello removed him from the power scene. Babu's strength derived from his political shrewdness and his hold on the extreme

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[38] Sunday News (Dar es Salaam), December 22, 1963, per J. Pascoe.

left-wing thinkers and trade union circles. Karume has long had a firm place in the affections of his African countrymen and is regarded as a genuine nationalist, if rather moderate in his policies. Hanga (Moscow educated at Lumumba University) is thought to be the link between Babu and Karume. Prior to the coup Karume had come under fire from some opposition M.P.s who complained that he was disregarding educated elements within his Party. Two of these, Hassan Makame Mwita and Othman Shariff were given Ministerial posts in the first Cabinet formed after the coup, but were subsequently designated ambassadors to the U.N. and London respectively. The removal of these relatively moderate and nationalist-minded men may have indicated a weakening of Karume's position in relation to Babu's.

Within a few days of the coup, Kenya and Uganda recognized the regime, followed closely by Communist China, Cuba, East Germany, Ghana, and North Korea. Material and financial aid from Communist countries has subsequently flowed into the country, as well as technicians and advisers. British civil servants number about 118, whose contracts had been guaranteed by an agreement signed soon after independence, were asked to leave by the end of April, except for doctors, dentists, and ship officers operating vessels on the inter-island circuit.

Presidential decrees subsequent to the coup established a Revolutionary Council of 31 members including all

members of the Cabinet, who have full legislative powers as an interim measure. The Courts were declared to be free to decide issues before them solely in accordance with law and public policy. A constituent assembly was to be convened not later than January, 1965, to enact a new Constitution. The movement of money out of the country was prohibited and, on March 8, 1964, the whole of the land of Zanzibar was nationalized, as well as all racial clubs.

Strategically, Zanzibar commands the route to the Indian Ocean, and could serve as a grave threat to all of the surrounding lands as a submarine or rocket base. This, and the leftist tinge of some members of the Revolutionary Council, has led foreign observers to refer to Zanzibar as Africa's Cuba.

Two interpretations, or rather two interpretations in one, have, so far, been given to the Revolution in Zanzibar and the subsequent changes in the system of land tenure, of economic organization, and government.

The first one states that the revolution in Zanzibar was the heroic uprising of an oppressed majority against an oppressing ruling feudal minority. To those who hold to this point of view, the revolution represents the triumph of the force of popular will. Then there are those who starting from the same premise, read into the situation the predominant factor of race, so that the revolution would

represent the uprising of an oppressed majority race against an oppressive oligarchic minority race--the Arabs.

The one would see in the revolution the redressing of undemocracy (the legacy of British administration) and the introduction therefor of democracy--in the sense of government representative of the majority of the population. The other would see in addition, however, the beginning of class struggles in Africa, or the consolidation of the alliance between the "working class, the poor peasantry and the intellectual revolutionaries."

From the Tanganyika standpoint, it mattered little whether the Zanzibar revolution represented a democratic revolution or a communist revolution. The important question was: After the revolutionaries had established themselves as an effective government, where were they going to take the country in relation to the mainland countries of East Africa in particular and the continent of Africa in general? And, to extend the question a little further, where were the mainland countries, and specifically Tanganyika, going to take this people's republic?

Prior to Zanzibar's independence, close ties had existed between TANU and the Afro-Shirazi Party, and their respective presidents reciprocated admiration and fraternal feelings.[39] Intense discussions following the coup resulted

[39]Efforts by TANU to assist the Afro-Shirazi leaders led to the banning of TANU's newspaper, Uhuru, in pre-independent Zanzibar.

in a decision to merge the two states of Zanzibar and Tanganyika into one.

The former two states now comprise the United Republic of Tanzania, whose Head of State is the President, Mr. Julius Nyerere. The latter is assisted in his functions by the First Vice-President Sheikh Karume and the Second Vice-President, Mr. Rashidi Kawawa. There is a single legislative body for the whole of the Republic, in which members of the Revolutionary Council of Zanzibar sit by appointment of the President. The legislative power extends to Zanzibar, however, only on certain subjects designated "Union matters."[40] In all other matters the powers of the Executive and Legislature for Zanzibar remain in force as they were prior to the Union.[41] It is expected that a Constitutional Assembly will shortly meet to draft a permanent constitution for the United Republic.

Problem 3 involves the task of political integration, as that term is used by Coleman and Rosberg.[42] On the approach and techniques to be employed in national integra-

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[40]The subjects which are "Union matters," such as foreign affairs, are specified in the Articles of Union signed on behalf of their respective countries by Mr. Nyerere and Sheikh Karume, and ratified by the Revolutionary Council of Zanzibar and the National Assembly of Tanganyika on April 12, 1964.

[41]Interim Constitution of Tanzania Act, 1965.

[42]Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, op. cit., p. 10.

tion arose some of the major issues and controversies of the immediate post-independence period. The large number of tribal systems, traditionally separate, raised the specter of "tribalism"; ethnic differences gave rise to the issue of "Africanization"; cultural differences led to the issue of "colour-bar" and discrimination; economic differences precipitated the issue of "muzzling" trade unions.

Resolution of these issues required diversion of energy from other basic tasks of nation-building. Failure to resolve them, however, would have undermined the national consensus which is a prerequisite of the continued stability and efficiency of the political system.

Tanganyika has not escaped the blighting influence of "tribalism" which has bedeviled many other African States, but its severest consequences have been avoided. Without going so far as to assert that all of Tanganyika's citizens today consider themselves Tanganyikans first and Wa-Chagga, Wa-Sukuma, or Wa-Zaramo second, it may nevertheless be suggested that loyalty to the national entity is increasingly being recognized as having, in post-independence Tanganyika, a superior claim to loyalty than the tribal unit.[43]

Among the factors contributing to the superiority of nationalism over tribalism as a political force may be noted

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[43]The existence of multiple loyalties may be caused, of course, by sentiments other than nationalism, as for example, the influence of religion.

the large number of tribal groups. Unlike some African countries, where there are a small number of tribes, some of which are quite large and politically predominant, Tanganyika possesses some 120 tribal groups, most of which are relatively small and innocuous.[44] The largest tribe, the million-plus Sukuma, has never been politically dominant, hence did not arouse the suspicion or resentment of other tribes. The acutely political Wa-Chagga had, until fairly recently, deployed most of their talents locally rather than nationally, reorganizing and modernizing their tribal system.

Another factor contributing to the weakness of tribalism is the widespread knowledge of Swahili, the lingua franca of vast areas of Eastern Africa, but especially of Tanganyika. This flexible and, by Bantu-speaking Africans, easily acquired language is used daily in both written and spoken communication, officially and unofficially. All observers agree on its vital role in overcoming tribal barriers and fostering a feeling of oneness.[45]

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[44] A tribal analysis based on the 1956 census showed that the largest tribe, the Sukuma, numbered 1,093,767--12.6 per cent of the total population of Tanganyika, and three times the size of any other tribe. Seven other tribes showed totals of over a quarter of a million: Nyamwezi, 363,258; Makonde, 333,897; Haya, 325,539; Chagga, 318,167; Gogo, 299,417; Ha, 289,792; Hehe, 251,624. Tanganyika Under United Kingdom: Report by H.M. Government in the U.K. of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the U.N. General Assembly for the Year 1960, Part II, Col. No. 349 (London: H.M.S.O., 1960), p. 2.

[45] Dr. Nyerere has stated that, while President of TANU, in eight years (i.e., since TANU was first started) he

Tanganyika shares with Algeria, South Africa, and some other African countries the problems of a multi-racial society. Substantial numbers of Europeans and Asians live in Tanganyika, many of whom have been born there and some of whom trace their ancestry back through several generations of Tanganyika settlers.[46] During the period of colonialism the problems inherent in a multi-racial society were exaggerated by the class structure or "colour-bar" produced by social and economic traditions.

The policy adopted by the Tanganyika Government to cut the Gordian knot of multi-racial problems is "non-racialism." This implies that all citizens are entitled to equal rights and privileges, and subjected to the same obligations, irrespective of racial or former national origin. The Citizenship Ordinance, enacted in 1961, provides simply that the qualifications for Tanganyika citizenship are birth or five years' residence in the Territory.

This policy faces its severest test when the question of political recruitment is involved. Some critics of

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needed an interpreter only twice, in the Masai and Mbulu areas. Otherwise, he was able to express himself anywhere in Tanganyika directly in Swahili. (Excerpt from an address by Mr. Julius Nyerere at Makerere College, April 9, 1962, reported in the East African Standard (Nairobi), April 10, 1962.

[46]The family of the Hon. Abdulkarim Karimjee, C.B.E., former Speaker of the National Assembly, for example, traces its history back through five generations settled in Tanganyika.

the Government allege that only lip service is paid to this policy of "non-racialism," citing the non-selection of European or Asian citizens for top political posts. Others criticize the Government for not pushing ahead rapidly enough with a policy of "Africanization," and for failing to root out zealously enough vestigial traces of colonialism. Government and TANU party officials claim that they are doing their best to promote their ideal of non-racialism, the difficulties of applying which has led some other countries to deny either its desirability or practicability.

TANU insists that it has proved its bona fides by its opening of membership to Africans and non-Africans alike. The Government points to the composition of the Cabinet, which is a blend of representatives of all major racial, tribal and religious groups, as well as geographical regions, within the country.[47] By embracing the ideal of non-racialism, the political system has attempted to resolve that aspect of the problem of national integration which has been characterized as territorial integration.[48] Another

[47]The Tanganyika Cabinet includes one European, Mr. Derek Bryceson (Minister of Agriculture), and one Asian, Mr. A. H. Jamal (Minister for Finance). (There was an Asian Junior Minister, Mr. Al Noor Kassum, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Education from 1961-1964.) In addition, there are many Europeans and Asians occupying high positions in the Civil Service. Cf. Tanganyika Government Directory (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1966).

[48]Coleman and Rosberg, op. cit.

aspect of this problem is that of political integration. The way in which the political system has approached its resolution may be illustrated by the manner in which the labor movement has been brought under control.

Tanganyika had been fortunate, since before independence, in having a strong and well-organized trade union movement.[49] Its development began in Tanganyika around about 1955, and it steadily grew with the active encouragement of the British Labour Government and the powerful trade union movement in the United Kingdom.

As the nationalist movement gained momentum in Tanganyika, trade unionists joined forces with political leaders, and as in many other African countries the workers often provided valuable organized support for political demands.[50]

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[49]There were, at the end of 1960, 40 registered trade unions, including 13 formally registered associations of employers. The estimated trade union membership was approximately 95,000 which represented about 24 per cent of the total employee population. Labour Department, Report, 1962.

[50]Thanks largely to trade union activity, there was a steady rise in Tanganyika wage rates, causing employers to make more effective use of labor. Thus, during 1960, there were substantial wage rate increases in all major agricultural industries, with correlative reductions in labor forces in most of the affected undertakings. The average monthly cash earning for all branches of industry rose from Shs. 70/- to Shs. 80/-. The total number of men, women, and children employed declined by 9.13 per cent and 16 per cent, respectively, compared with 1959. Ibid. See Table 8.

TABLE 8

TRADE DISPUTES INVOLVING STOPPAGES OF WORK--1960[a]

a. Classification by Industry

Industry	Number of Disputes	Number of Workers Involved	Number of Man-Days Lost	Duration of Disputes (Days)			
				1	2	3	Over 3
Agriculture (General)	52	10,619	51,334	16	7	6	23
Sisal	82	59,970	552,963	5	11	25	41
Mining	6	995	6,595	--	1	1	4
Manufacturing	12	614	3,842	2	--	--	10
Construction	22	2,081	21,450	3	1	1	17
Commerce	14	1,063	6,028	2	1	1	10
Transport	8	1,067	7,969	1	--	1	6
Services	3	664	6,614	1	--	--	2
Government	4	12,422	838,878	--	--	--	4
Total	203	89,495	1,494,773	30	21	35	117

[a]Labour Department, Report, 1960, Part I (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer), pp. 88-89.

TABLE 8--Continued

b. Classification by Causation

Causes	Agriculture (General)	Sisal	Mining and Quarrying	Manufac-turing	Construc-tion	Commerce
Rates of Remuneration	19	14	5	6	13	9
Ration	2	--	--	--	--	--
Tasks	10	18	--	--	1	--
Supervision	--	7	--	--	--	--
Terms and Conditions of Work	3	3	--	2	2	--
Miscellaneous	18	40	1	4	6	5
Total	52	82	6	12	22	14

Causes	Transport	Service	E.A. High Commission	Local Government	Total
Rates of Remuneration	7	3	2	--	78
Ration	--	--	--	--	2
Tasks	--	--	--	--	29
Supervision	--	--	--	--	7
Terms and Conditions of Work	1	--	--	--	11
Miscellaneous	--	--	--	2	76
Total	8	3	2	2	203

With the achievement of uhuru, the relationship between trade unionists and political leaders underwent a change, subtle at first, later more overt and foreboding. Where they had been almost equal partners working co-operatively for the overthrow of alien domination, socially and economically as well as politically, the political leaders now were invested, so to speak, with the power and the glory of nationalist messianism, while the trade unionists seemed to be expected to play the roles of supporting cast. In politico-constitutional terminology, most of the political leaders became overnight "the Government," while the trade unionists remained what they had been before Independence Day, "the governed." But did this mean that they had to be "submissive and supine subjects"? What about the possibilities of being economically a spur to quicker and more thorough-going socialism and Africanization and politically a sort of loyal Opposition?[51]

The alternative courses open to trade unionists in Africa were discussed in a seminar conducted by the East African monthly magazine, Spearhead, in its issue of January, 1962. "How closely should Trade Unions work with Government and how can African Trade Unions best serve their countries

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[51]The relationship between party and trade unions, and the political position of the latter in the post-independence political system has been analyzed by Elliot J. Berg and Jeffrey Butler in the chapter "Trade Unions," in Coleman and Rosberg, op. cit.

and mother Africa . . . ?" asked John K. Tettegah, Secretary General of the All African Trade Union Federation.[52]

Mr. Tettegah gave the following answer to his question:

> ". . . Where self-government has been or is about to be achieved, the unity of purpose of the nationalist movement predetermines the ultimate attitude of labour to national issues especially those appertaining to the Government.
>
> There is then an initial marriage of national interest for urgent social reconstruction. The Government of the State is the people's government with their mandate, and the extent to which Trade Unions should accept restrictions on their development and social progress which in the long run are essential for the betterment of the working class. But in so doing they should not sacrifice trade union freedom of action, otherwise they would be forgetting their responsibility toward the workers."

In the six-month period following Independence Day, trade unionists exercised to the full their "traditional" rights and freedom of action. Work stoppages, strikes, and miscellaneous labor demonstrations were used in order to raise prevailing rates of wages, as well as to better working conditions generally.[53] In addition, an ominous trend

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[52]The All African Trade Union Federation was inaugurated at a Preparatory Conference opened by Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, President of the Republic of Ghana, in Ghana in 1959.

[53]Spokesmen for employers' federations, who held a regional conference in Dar es Salaam during the latter part of March, urged that workers should use strike action as an ultimate action, "a last resort," and not as a way of curing all ills. Unions should show more stability in seeking wage increases and it was also important for governments, particularly in young countries, to take a firm line to ensure good industrial relations. "They should not allow such relations to be embarrassed or strained because problems

appeared with the reported drawing-up of several "master secret plans" and "black-lists" by trade unionists in various industries as a lever to accelerate the pace of Africanization.[54]

The Government responded with a variety of tactics to these demonstrations of trade union independence. In important industries, when work stoppages or strikes appeared to pose a serious threat to the public welfare or national economy, the Government adopted the practice of appointing a conciliator or arbitrator who would attempt to effect a settlement sufficient to restore normal industrial peace. Government spokesmen also attempted to educate labor leaders and urged greater responsibility.[55]

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assumed a false aspect of racialism or appeared to conflict with nationalism." None of the East African representatives, however, felt that their governments should introduce legislation banning strikes and freezing wages. Tanganyika was represented at the conference by Mr. Martin Lewis, executive director of the Federation of Tanganyika Employers. The East African Standard, March 31, 1962.

[54]On April 11, 1962, Mr. Peter Kisumo, General Secretary of the Tanganyika Transport and General Workers Union, announced that employees of TANESCO throughout the country had given the Union lists of European supervisors who were considered to be "unrequired." The Union was considering whether to call a country-wide strike of members employed by TANESCO over wage and Africanization demands, during which it would press for the removal of these men. Tanganyika Standard, April 12, 1962.

[55]On April 14, 1962, the Minister for Commerce and Industry, Mr. George Kahama, addressing the annual meeting of the Tanganyika Mineworkers' Union at Mwanza, warned that an attempt to force the managements of mines in Tanganyika to improve facilities for workers and increase wages beyond an economic limit could only lead to one result--the closure

In April, 1962, the Tanganyika Minimum Wage Board appointed by the Government, under the chairmanship of Mr. Donald Chesworth, reported a series of recommendations designed to improve labor's general economic position vis-à-vis the rest of the national community.[56]

In what was widely regarded as a masterly political maneuver, the General Secretary of the Tanganyika Railway African Union (TRAU), Mr. C. S. K. Tumbo, one of the most

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of the mines. This he said, would be a sad thing for the Government, for people employed, and for national prosperity. Sunday News (Dar es Salaam), April 15, 1962. On another occasion, the Minister for Commerce and Industry, speaking in the National Assembly during the Budget session, emphasized that in economic and financial terms Tanganyika was still a poor country. Tanganyika must have capital investment from overseas if the country was going to make any real progress and "it is our duty to recognize the part private investment plays in our plans." The confidence of overseas investors depended on what the political and trade union leaders in the country said and did and "the way we behave toward capital investment." Hansard (Debates), June 8, 1962.

[56]The Board recommended minimum wages of Shs.150/- a month in Dar es Salaam and Tanga, Shs. 125/- in Arusha, Moshi, Mwanza, Tabora, Dodoma, Mtwara, Lindi, Mbeya, Kigwa, Bukoba, Korogwe, and Liodi, and Shs. 100/- in all other areas. It was estimated that nearly 200,000 adult workers would be affected and the cost would approximate £2,684,000. Observing that "It is quite clear that at the existing lower wage level, without additional supplementations, at least in urban centres, families with children cannot possibly escape malnutrition at whatever food scale is regarded as the necessary minimum," the Board also recommended, inter alia that minimum wages should be regularly reviewed so as to enable families to live together at a reasonable standard, that wages should be paid weekly to help reduce indebtedness, the setting of industrial courts to settle disputes, and vigilance by the Government to ensure that there was no sudden rise in the cost of living. Tanganyika Minimum Wages Board, Report (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer).

outspoken of the Government's critics in the National Assembly, and the author of the "Master Plan" for TRAU, was appointed Tanganyika High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, and Mr. Michael Kamaliza, celebrated as a negotiator while President of the Tanganyika Federation of Labour (T.F.L.), became the new Minister for Labour.

Still the strikes, work stoppages and "secret plan" threats continued.[57]

The Government finally moved to "muzzle" the trade unions by two Bills, passed into legislation in June, 1962, despite vigorous labor opposition.

The first Bill, the Trade Unions Ordinance (Amendment) Bill provided for a designated federation, to which the check-off system, already in operation, was made legally operative, and the Registrar of Trade Unions was given powers to enable him to suspend officers of a trade union.[58]

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[57]Commenting on the Minimum Wages Report, Mr. R. T. Magonges, General Secretary of the T.F.L., expressed "deep regret" that the Board had recommended a minimum wage of Shs. 150/- for the two largest towns, Dar es Salaam and Tanga only. The minimum wage of Shs. 150/- should also include the towns of Moshi, Arusha, Mwanza, and Bukoba, while workers in plantations who obtained their supplies from neighboring towns should be paid at urban rates. The T.F.L. felt that the proposed wage rates "by no means" restricted the unions from embarking on negotiations and the suggestion that there should be a standstill was "not acceptable." Tanganyika Standard, April 20, 1962.

[58]The Minister of Labour, Mr. Kamaliza, explained that the whole purpose of this Bill was to strengthen the trade union movement. Prior to the present legislation, when a union failed to submit its annual returns the law gave the Registrar power to cancel the union's registra-

The second Bill, the Trade Disputes (Settlement) Bill, laid down the procedure to be followed by both employers and employees before they could declare a legal lockout or strike. Where a conciliator was unable to effect a settlement in a dispute, the Minister might refer the matter to a tribunal or, if it is not an essential service, appoint a board of inquiry. Any employer "locking out" or any employee striking before this procedure has first been followed is liable to a fine of up to Shs.500/- and/or imprisonment not exceeding three months. Where an award made by a tribunal has been objected to, the Minister may refer it back or appoint a new tribunal.[59]

An award or negotiated agreement is binding on both parties, and, except with the permission of the Minister, no

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tion. The Government felt that instead of penalizing a whole union in this way, the individual officer responsible should be penalized by suspension from office. In order to remove the unions' doubts the Government had decided to withdraw a proposal that the Minister of Labour should have the power to give directions on how the funds of the designated federation should be used. They had also accepted representations by trade unions against the right of the Minister to revoke the designation of the trade union federation. Tanganyika Standard, June 23, 1962.

[59]Conceding that this legislation made strikes and lockouts "very difficult," Mr. Julius Nyerere expressed the opinion that "lockouts are evil, strikes are evil things." Referring to "this mystical belief that the strike is a right and that it is somehow connected with freedom," he declared that strikes or lockouts are "a trial of strength; the law of the jungle. We are trying to legislate for the welfare of our people instead of asking them to fight it out." Tanganyika Standard, ibid.

application to vary such award can be made within twelve months of its publication.

Integration of the trade union movement into the political system has now been completed by the organization of the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA). In place of the former multiplicity of separate trade unions, there is now a single union, of which the Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General are appointed by the Government.[60] Associational link with TANU is provided by the Secretary-General of NUTA's ex-officio membership of the National Executive Committee of TANU and the authority, provided by the Constitution of TANU, for its District Committees to co-opt members of NUTA, as they do members of the Co-operative Movement.

The fourth of the principal problems mentioned above, viz. the extent to which political power is to be dispersed throughout the society, involves the function of political recruitment. Under the colonial system, recruitment had been limited to two main classes at the territorial level--the senior civil servants and the wealthy business and plantation owners. At the local level, recruitment was limited to the class of hereditary chiefs. The separation of the territorial and local systems was perpetuated by a division of responsibility for local government between

[60]The first Secretary-General of NUTA is the Minister of Labour, Mr. Kamaliza.

urban (or town) and rural councils. The former tended to be dominated by non-Africans while the latter was wholly African. Government had attempted during the colonial period to bridge the gap between the three main races at the local government level by the creation of regional or provincial councils. These remained non-functioning mainly because of African suspicion that this was a device to give non-Africans control of African land and other interests.

In 1957 the Government sponsored a Territorial Chiefs' Convention, and two meetings of Provincial Conferences of Chiefs and Native Authorities in each province to discuss matters of local interest and make recommendations to Government. Viewed alongside the rapidly developing African nationalism and the concurrent existence of the Government-sponsored Provincial and District Councils, not to mention the Legislative and Executive Councils, the inauguration of Territorial and Provincial Chiefs' Councils could hardly be seen as necessary measures. The Government represented the Chiefs' meeting as attempts to increase the administration's awareness of the problems and aspirations of the indigenous people. The latter suspected the moves as additional evidence of continuing attempts on the part of the administration to bolster the colonial regime by misusing traditional tribal institutions.[61]

[61]The inherent conflict between tribalism and nationalism demanded that one give way if the other were to

The establishment of a central government controlled by the indigenous population provided an opportunity to reconcile traditional tribal leadership with the new political leadership that nationalism had produced. The terms on which agreement might be reached were not predetermined, but worked out gradually in a manner calculated to cause least harm to traditionalist sentiments.[62] The result leaves tribal leaders free to perform those social, religious and ceremonial functions with which, by tradition and custom, they have always been associated.

Political leadership and administrative powers are now open to all persons popularly selected or delegated by

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be strengthened. There was nothing in tribalism per se which demanded its preservation in a modern nation-state. "It must not be thought that tribal rule was equivalent to local government and in that way a half-way stage to parliamentary rule," wrote one of Tanganyika's earlier administrators. "To the African his tribe is his nation, he has as yet no conception of larger grouping. The tribe has its own distinctive traditions, organization, laws, language, even its own gods. In short, the tribe has all the attributes of nationhood and these were confirmed, even strengthened, in the practice of Indirect Rule. By its nature tribal rule also puts peculiar obstacles in the way of representative government, the same as those which make the institution of a Commonwealth Parliament impracticable." Sir Donald Cameron, My Tanganyikan Service and Some Nigerian (London: Allen & Unwin, 1939), pp. 135-136.

[62] Cf. address by Mr. Julius Nyerere at Chatham House, July 29, 1959, reprinted in International Affairs, XXXVI (1960), 43-47. Some chiefs have lent the strength and prestige of their traditional office to the nationalist regime, as for example, Al-Haj Chief Fundikira, Minister of Justice. Others who opposed the new political order have had recognition withdrawn from them or, in at least two extreme cases, removed into exile under the Preventive Detention Ordinance.

the national government for those purposes.[63]

The post-independence reorganization of the regional administrative system is designed to link it more directly with the central government. The British Provincial and District Commissioners' positions have been abolished and in their place have been established Regional and Area Commissioners--political appointees, whose duties are to execute, explain and interpret national government policies in the provincial areas, and in turn to act as conduit pipes for the communication back to the central government of the views of the local people.[64]

The progressive introduction of conciliar government at the local level, which had been gradually developing in

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[63]When on December 9, 1962, Dr. Nyerere was sworn in as first President of the Republic of Tanganyika, African traditional ceremonial was blended with modern military display and judicial swearing-in. Two tribal chiefs presented the President with a spear, shield, and robe and annointed him with watered flour symbolizing his status as Father of the Nation and the wish that his rule should bring peace and prosperity to Tanganyika. Tanganyika Standard, December 1, 1962.

[64]Cf. the series of public meetings held by the Area Commissioner, Mr. A. B. Suedi in 1962, in a tour through the Bukoba District following indications that people in these areas had shown a disappointing response to the tea-growing campaign. The Area Commissioner urged the local people to start tea planting immediately. He explained that it was planned to introduce a tea industry in the region as an alternative to the coffee industry; government had already spent £25,000 to establish tea nurseries which would be wasted if current attitudes continued. Unless the task was willingly undertaken, he might have to close down all the local bars, as drinking was in his opinion "the cause of much laziness," and take other necessary measures to implement the tea scheme. Tanganyika Standard, January 24, 1963.

Tanganyika since the Second World War, has been continued and expanded in post-independent Tanganyika, to promote both the principles of local democratic government and of inter-tribal, interracial co-operation.

Where previously there had been considerable reluctance on the part of Africans in the rural areas to abandon the existing Native Authority councils in favor of the proposed provincial and district councils, such bodies are now a fully accepted and functioning part of the political system. Interracial councils at the urban level had always been more successful than those proposed for the rural areas. The Municipal Council of Dar es Salaam and urban councils in other townships have continued their activities since independence, generally with an African majority and presiding officer.[65]

The fifth and sixth problems mentioned above are so interrelated that the methods adopted for their resolution have been conjoined. Independence provided the opportunity for the development of a political style more appropriate to the needs and demands of the times. The style which has been adopted is made more acceptable by an accompanying ideology, which explains and rationalizes the constitutional

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[65] In 1960 the local government franchise was revised and extended to enable persons of both sexes to exercise the vote in urban local government elections if they are adult, and have either resided in the town for two out of the preceding three years or own or occupy premises in the town.

structure and political methods, on the grounds of national aims (welfare, material well-being, political stability, etc.) as well as available resources (underdevelopment, technological backwardness, insufficient capital, etc.).[66]

To achieve the national goals, a strong, centralized executive government has been instituted with considerable discretionary powers to marshall and deploy the nation's resources of manpower as well as materials. The justification for such strong powers, as well as the underlying objectives determining and guiding the mode in which they are exercised, is the concept of ujamaa--an ideological expression of democratic African socialism.

> Socialism--like democracy--is an attitude of mind. . . . Apart from the anti-social effects of the accumulation of personal wealth, the very desire to accumulate it must be interpreted as a vote of "no confidence" in the social system. For when a society is so organised that it cares about its individuals, then, provided he is willing to work, no individual

[66] On the interrelationship between ideology and political style, Spiro suggests that "the political style of the new system will reflect the nature of the independence struggle." If, for example, violence was used to achieve independence, it will be used to crush political opposition after independence. On the other hand, "If, before achieving their only agreed goal, they have been 'chewing their ideological cud' for many years, they are likely to go on making and justifying their decisions in terms of the ideology of independence, long after this has been achieved." Herbert Spiro, Government by Constitution: The Political Systems of Democracy (New York: Random House, 1959), pp.435-436. This observation seems to be borne out by the absence of violence in post-independence Tanganyikan political style, following its relatively peaceful independence struggle. Regarding ideology, cf. the query raised in the editorial, "No Party System," Spearhead (Dar es Salaam), Vol. II, No. 2, 1963.

> within that society should worry about what will happen to him tomorrow if he does not hoard his wealth today. Society itself should look after him, or his widow, or his orphans. This is exactly what traditional African society succeeded in doing. Both the "rich" and the "poor" individual were completely secure in African society. Natural catastrophe brought famine, but it brought famine to everybody--"poor" or "rich." Nobody starved either of food or of human dignity, because he lacked personal wealth; he could depend on the wealth possessed by the community of which he was a member. That was Socialism. That is Socialism. There can be no such thing as acquisitive socialism, for that would be another contradiction in terms. Socialism is essentially distributive. Its concern is to see that those who sow, reap a fair share of what they sow.[67]

The task of building up the nation's material assets is considered to be the responsibility of every citizen. This responsibility starts at the village level, where development committees have been formed with the task of carrying out all village development schemes. In order that these schemes should be properly guided and coordinated, all government officials as well as unofficial organizations and individuals are urged to pool their knowledge and skills and work together.[68]

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[67]Julius K. Nyerere, "Ujamaa," the Basis of African Socialism (Dar es Salaam: The Tanganyika Standard, 1962).

[68]As a result of the "self-help" schemes instituted since Tanganyika became independent, within a period of slightly less than a year, 9,725 miles of new feeder roads had been built, 4,397 miles of old roads had been repaired, and 1,471 buildings and 308 dams had been constructed, resulting in savings to the nation amounting to "thousands of pounds." Cf. the statement of the Prime Minister, Mr. Kawawa, to the National Assembly, Hansard, November 26, 1962. Penalties are provided by law for interference with or discouragement of the voluntary self-help schemes.

The conception of society which inspires the government in its endeavors, that of ujamaa, signifies "a community" or "family way of living." It implies concern for the welfare of each member of society and for the welfare of the society as a whole, and is based upon traditional African attitudes.

For the majority of the African inhabitants of Tanganyika, the country has always yielded a living grudgingly, after long hours of patient toil. The estimated yearly income per head in Tanganyika in 1964 was just under £20; the life expectancy of the average citizen was between 35 and 40 years.[69]

Such circumstances did not permit the luxury of apathy, lethargy or wasted effort on the part of individuals, nor of idle or parasitical classes in the social systems. The characteristic slogan of post-independent Tanganyika, uhuru na kazi ("independence and work"), is intended to impress upon everyone that independence by itself will not result in any automatic improvement in the nation's material welfare, but that it provides the opportunity for improvement through initiative and sustained effort.

The territory had shown an increasingly favorable economic picture in the years immediately preceding inde-

[69]These figures were quoted by President Nyerere in his Address to Parliament in presenting the Five-Year Development Plan on May 12, 1964.

pendence.[70] However, a large proportion of its trade was still in the hands of a small, non-indigenous section of the community. A continuation of this state of affairs would have meant increasing alienation of one class of citizens from another. The government attempted to resolve these problems of social and economic differences by policies which, while bridging the gap between citizens, would not frighten or do injustice to either domestic or foreign owners of property and capital.

An illustration of these policies was provided by the government's approach to the question of land tenure. The generous alienation of land traditionally owned by Africans on a communal basis to non-Africans on an individual basis during the colonial era outraged feelings to such an extent that the initial impulse, after independence, was to take steps to reclaim as much alienated land as possible. A more cautious approach was adopted, however, as a result of the frightened reaction of some non-African building investors as well as the increasing dominance of TANU over

[70] In the decade 1950-1960, the economy grew at an annual rate of over 5 per cent, as against an annual population increase of about 1.7 per cent. The Economic Development of Tanganyika, report of the Economic Survey Mission to Tanganyika (Washington: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1960). The gross domestic product increased by £8.3 million to a total of £185.4 millions in 1960, while the volume of overseas trade reached £94.4 millions with a visible favorable balance of trade just under £19 million. Cf. the speech of Mr. Swai, op. cit.

the more radical ANC party. Eventually Government issued a White Paper inviting comments and suggestions from the general public.[71] These were taken into consideration before implementing the decision to convert freehold land to leasehold and to make rights of occupancy granted for agricultural purposes subject to revised Land Regulations.

Another illustration is provided by the method of resolution of the issues of differences in educational facilities. The Government established a Committee to study and recommend such changes as might be necessary for the Integration of Education. Its proposals, namely, that any child should be eligible for admission to any school in the Territory, "if his aptitude for the language of instruction" is such that he is able to maintain his place in the school, and that admission to all secondary schools should be by competitive examination, were accepted by the Government. The changes officially took effect in 1962. In practice, of course, it will be half a decade or longer, before full integration can be achieved. The first university to serve the Territory opened in Dar es Salaam in October, 1961, without racial restrictions.

The Government's determination to raise living standards substantially has been reflected in the two

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[71] Cf. Proposals of the Tanganyika Government for Land Tenure Reform, Government Paper No. 2 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1962).

Development plans adopted since independence: the Three-Year Plan, covering the period 1961-1964, and the Five-Year Plan, covering the period 1965-1970. The latter, launched in the second half of 1964, has as its main objectives the raising of the per capita income to £45 by ₱980, self-sufficienty in trained manpower requirements, and extending the expectancy of life of the average Tanganyikan to 50 years. The Government and Party regard the attainment of these objectives with the same degree of urgency as previously the struggle for independence was regarded. President Nyerere has thus expressed this attitude:

> This Plan, and its successors, can be the means through which we shall obtain independence from the worst of the poverty our country now experiences. It is a declaration of war; and everyone of us is a soldier. Our weapons are our hands and brains; our ammunition is our discipline and our determination.[72]

Systemic Tensions

Because there is no complete consensus, even within a one-party State, on the solution of the problems besetting the nation, politics continue to revolve around them. The elimination or absorption of all other political parties means therefore that disagreement on issues must be expressed either inside the party (constitutionally) or outside the party (extra-constitutionally or unconstitutionally).

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[72]Address to the National Assembly, May 12, 1964.

Within TANU there is no homogeneous body of opinion, and no attempt is made to censor or inhibit freedom of expression. At TANU executive meetings and at the annual delegates' conferences, full and free debate occurs on issues ranging widely over the whole field of national policy. The views expressed often indicate two or more conflicting factions. For days the debate may persist, until in the end a consensus is obtained, upon which all sides may agree. This policy is then translated into action by the Parliamentary party in the National Assembly.

An illustration of the resolution of disagreements within TANU was provided by the resignation of Mr. Nyerere as Prime Minister of Tanganyika, barely six weeks after the country became independent. Restlessness within the country over the moderation of the Government's policies at the grass roots level of the masses was supported and given expression to by the opposition ANC as well as by some of the more militant trade union leaders. The national uneasiness was the more difficult to cure or counteract because of the weakening of TANU which had resulted from the generous appointment of TANU officials to Government positions. The expressions of criticism were reflected in self-searching speeches by TANU members both within and outside of the National Assembly. Eventually things came to a head at the meeting of the National Executive Committee. For days the debate raged. A crisis-like atmosphere was created by

rumors which raced through the capital of the actual or impending arrest of the Governor and leading officials. To quell the issues, Nyerere proposed his resignation and ultimately secured acceptance of this solution from his reluctant party. The former Prime Minister was then able to devote his full time and energies as President of TANU to reorganize and revitalize the party.[73] His inauguration as Head of State under the new republican constitution approximately a year later signified at least a short-term resolution of the issues involved.

The Army mutiny of January, 1964, may be considered as an example of the resolution of disagreements outside of TANU. On the attainment of independence, Tanganyika was given a proportionate share of the King's African Rifles (K.A.R.), a British-officered army composed of volunteers from all of the East African territories administered by Britain. That force, which became the nucleus of the new Tanganyikan army, known as the Tanganyikan Rifles, continued to have the same conditions--including pay scale and British officers--as had existed in the parent K.A.R.[74] Repeated complaints by the men of the Tanganyikan Rifles against

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[73] Cf. the editors of the confidential report on Africa 1962, who divide TANU into three groups: "the rank and file, which is out and out pro-Nyerere, the trade unions, and the up-and-coming few." "Tanganyika: A Plea for Silence," Africa 1962, No. 8 (April 19, 1962).

[74] Up to the time of the revolt, no Tanganyikan non-European had reached field rank.

these conditions brought no reforms, whether because of inefficient political communication or misjudgment as to the severity of the issue.

On January 20, 1964, the First Battalion of the Tanganyikan Rifles, which constituted two-thirds of the Army and was quartered on the outskirts of Dar es Salaam, staged a mutiny. The mutineers took control of all major Government buildings, including the Airport, the broadcasting station, and the grounds of State House. They also arrested a number of citizens, as well as their own officers. Two Ministers, Mr. Kambona, the Minister for External Affairs and Defence, and Mr. Lusinde, the Minister for Home Affairs, were taken by the mutineers, apparently either as hostages or for bargaining. The soldiers were eventually prevailed upon to return to their barracks after the British officers were deported and assurances were given for pay increases and other benefits.

Shortly before the mutiny, a Government Circular had been issued, reaffirming non-racialism as a policy and foreshadowing its strict implementation by legislative and other measures to eliminate discrimination against any classes or sections of Tanganyika citizens. It is not clear how much, if at all, this circular, with its implied renunciation of Africanization, influenced the original mutinous actions. In the course of the next few days after January 20, however, dissident civilian groups began conspiring with the

ringleaders of the mutiny, encouraging further illegal action by the soldiers. The latter, intoxicated by the easy success of their original moves, were on the verge of essaying a veritable coup d'état, when the Government called for the assistance of British troops, which promptly quelled the disorders.

The Government was at pains to disavow that the mutinous soldiers were the spearhead of a "popular revolt," and it is clear that a shocked citizenry rallied to the support of the constitutional regime.[75] Nevertheless, the mutineers were undoubtedly performing the functions of an associational interest group, even if they were for the time being acting in an anomic, rather than institutional role.[76] That the original objectives of the mutiny were limited to pay and other conditions affecting their military life, may be regarded as an indirect tribute to the quality of the

[75] Cf. President Nyerere's Address to the O.A.U. Emergency Meeting of Foreign Ministers, in January/February Events, 1964, published by the Tanganyika Information Services (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1964), p. 33.

[76] Some of the young Sandhurst-trained African officers of the Tanganyikan Rifles were reported to have remained loyal to their British commanders during the mutiny. William F. Gutteridge suggests this may have been due to the effectiveness of cultural transfer, i.e., the retention of values acquired overseas. Military Institutions and Power in the New States (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964), pp. 128-129. If true, this explanation would heighten the political character of the actions of the mutinous rank and file.

political leadership.[77]

As Zolberg has noted:

> Under a one-party system concerned with bolstering its legitimacy by means of mass support, elections remain important but have functions other than their primary one as a mechanism for choosing representatives or rulers.[78]

In 1965, the citizens of Tanganyika went to the polls when general elections were held simultaneously to choose Members of the National Assembly and a President of the United Republic. As the only candidate permitted by law was TANU-sponsored Julius Nyerere, the only interest of the election lay in the number of negative votes cast or in the abstentions, which were few. Real interest lay in the Parliamentary elections where for the first time the electorate had a fair opportunity to express its judgment by its votes on the personality of its representatives.

In the 1958-1959 elections the will of the electorate was thwarted by the restricted franchise as well as by the issues: The choice was between TANU and the rest of the

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[77]According to Edward Shils: "If the civilian political elite is self-confident and forceful, the military will be less inclined to intrude in the civil sphere. . . . When, conversely, the civilian politicians seem demoralized and bewildered, . . . or corrupt and cynical, . . . the military is more likely to intervene in the political sphere." "The Military in the Political Development of New States," in The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed. John J. Johnson (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 40.

[78]Aristide R. Zolberg, One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 268.

parties, rather than between particular candidates. The same was largely true in the pre-independence elections of 1960. The position was changed with the 1965 electoral provision permitting intra-Party contests for constituency seats, after screening of candidates by District and National Executive Committees.[79] The result was that voters were permitted to express their judgment on individuals without their loyalty to TANU being called into question. This compromise between democratic freedoms of assembly and opinion and one-party dictatorship is what Tanganyikans regard as a unique achievement of their political system.

> In the Tanzania political system, it is not enough that the Parliamentary Elections should be completely free. If we are to have democracy in our nation the Party must also be democratic. TANU and the Afro-Shirazi Party are absolutely central to our system of Government. It is the annual Conference and the National Executive which finally selects which of the many persons nominated shall actually be submitted to the people's choice. It is these organs of the Party which lay down the basic principles of our national policy.
>
> It is therefore of fundamental importance that all citizens of Tanzania who are willing to accept the aims and objects of the Party, as set out in Article II of the Party Constitution, should be able to join the Party. If the Party drifts into becoming an elitist organization, with special privileges for founder members or others, then democracy in Tanzania will die. Within the Party, as in national institutions, Members must have absolute freedom to choose their representatives in the highest offices. Further, they must be able, both directly and through those repre-

[79] Interim Constitution of Tanzania Act, 1965, S. 28.

sentatives, to express their views on basic policy questions.[80]

In the 1965 elections, 2,266,000 persons voted for the Parliamentary candidates and 2,612,000 for the Presidential candidate.[81] The result was a heavy blow to the re-election hopes of many incumbents, including two of the Ministers, Mr. Paul Bomani and Mr. J. Kasambala, and two Parliamentary Secretaries (who in Tanganyika have the status of Junior Ministers), Mr. E. Barongo and Bibi Titi Mohamed. Several Asians and Europeans were elected, including the two Ministers, Mr. Jamal and Mr. D. Bryceson.

The Government drew two conclusions from the 1965 election results. Firstly, that there was a national consensus in favor of non-racialism; and secondly, that there had not been sufficient political communication between M.P.s and their constituencies.[82] When, however, it is borne in mind that in a one-party state, there is no constitutional opportunity to express disagreement with the Government's policies, large-scale rejection of the incumbents may be interpreted as one way of indicating or relieving mass frustration.

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[80] Excerpt from the Address by the President, Mr. J. K. Nyerere, at the opening of the National Assembly after the General Election, October 12, 1965.

[81] Ibid. Citizens in Zanzibar participated in the Presidential elections but not in the choice of Parliamentary members.

[82] Ibid.

Support for the latter interpretation is given by the close association between one of the rejected Ministerial candidates and the country's economic conditions. Mr. Paul Bomani was Minister of Finance throughout the four-year period following independence. In that period, which saw the launching of two successive Development Plans, taxes had been raised in a number of categories and plans had been announced for the breaking-away of Tanganyika from the East African Currency system which had led to widespread uneasiness among local business and financial circles. A review of the second Development Plan one year after is launching indicated that it was considerably behind schedule in its hoped-for goals.

> The Plan had envisaged an investment expenditure by Central Government of £17.2 million by the end of the first year. However, only £11.0 million had been invested by the end of June, 1965. This constitutes a shortfall of £6.2 million of the 1964/65 Plan target. Moreover, £2.3 million of the £11.0 million realized total investment was expenditure on non-Plan projects. That means that investment on Plan projects amounted to only £8.7 million or 50.6 per cent of the projected Central Government investment expenditure during the first year of the Plan.[83]

There were technical and administrative difficulties which explained and accounted for (indeed, made almost inevitable) the slow progress of the Plan. They could not hide or alter the stark fact that the regime had been only

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[83] First Year Progress Report on the Implementation of the Five-Year Development Plan (Public Sector), 1st July, 1964 to 30th June, 1965 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1965), p. 1.

50 per cent effective in achieving the goals it had set itself, and which reflected the national consensus for a rapid and substantial improvement in material living standards.

If the preceding analysis is correct, then the Ministerial reappointment of Mr. Paul Bomani would appear to have been an error of judgment.[84] The present mood and temper of the new African States is one of impatient anger against inefficient political systems. This is the moral of the series of military coups d'état in Africa since 1960:

> Il importe . . . de concevoir un système étatique propre au continent, qui permet le libre jeu d'une démocratie authentique et associe veritablement le peuple à l'exercise du pouvoir. Il faut lever l'hypothèque de la peur et instituer un libre dialogue au sein des masses comme entre gouvernants et gouvernés, et dans le même temps s'attaguer au problème majeur de l'Afrique: le sous-développement.
>
> It is important . . . to create a political system appropriate to the continent, which permits the free play of an authentic democracy and truly associates the people with the exercise of power. It is necessary to raise the mortgage of fear and to begin a free dialogue in the heart of the masses as between those who govern and those who are governed, and at the same time to attack Africa's major problem: underdevelopment.[85]

[84] Significantly, in the constituency, Mwanza East, where Mr. Bomani lost by 14,146 votes to 9,639 in the 1965 elections, there were 1,771 votes cast against Mr. Nyerere's presidential candidacy to 19,984 in favor. This was a relatively high percentage of 9 per cent compared with 4 per cent in Tanganyika as a whole (2,303,678, Yes; 90,885, No). In another constituency, Rufiji, where a junior Minister, Bibi Titi Mohamed, was defeated by 18,145 votes to 7,343, 10 per cent voted against Mr. Nyerere's presidential candidacy (23,154 for and 2,333 against). Figures cited are taken from The Standard (Tanzania), October 2, 1965.

[85] Fikri Meleka, "Les capitales Africaines devant le

The present National Assembly is composed of a Speaker and 171 other Members. Of these, 40 (including the whole of the 33-man revolutionary Council) were appointed by the President to represent Zanzibar. Of the remaining 131 members, in addition to 26 Ministers and Junior Ministers, 16 are ex-officio, being Regional Commissioners, and 6 were nominated by the President.[86] The last-named include, besides the Minister for Economic Affairs and Planning, Mr. P. Bomani, his brother, the Attorney General, a European woman, an ex-traditional Chief, and a Principal Secretary in the President's Office. If the Zanzibar Members are discounted, the net result is that more than one-third of those who will be performing the rule-making function are committed to the regime, and will also be involved in rule-application. How adequately will the remaining majority of the legislature transmit the needs and aspirations of their constituents?[87]

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fait accompli," Jeune Afrique, No. 265 (January 23, 1966), p. 23. (Writer's translation.)

[86]For a list of names of Ministers, see Table 9.

[87]The return, unopposed, of the Second Vice-President and four other Ministers (including Mr. O. S. Kambona) may indicate an unintended gap in the electoral system. Carefully designed to ensure a genuine contest between the two candidates who survive the District and National Executive Committees' screening, the system yet fails (perhaps inevitably) to guarantee that more than one candidate will be nominated in each constituency. This, of course, is not necessarily undemocratic unless it is the result of intimidation or becomes the rule rather than the exception.

TABLE 9

MINISTERS OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA[a]

Ministers	Constituency
Speaker: Chief Adam Sapi Mkwawa	
Sheikh Abeid A. Karume (The First Vice-President)	Zanzibar
Mr. R. M. Kawawa (The Second Vice-President)	Nachingwea
Mr. A. H. Jamal (Minister for Finance)	Morogoro North
Mr. D. N. M. Bryceson (Minister for Agriculture, Forests, and Wildlife)	Dar es Salaam North
Mr. P. Bomani (Minister for Economic Affairs and Planning)	Nominated
Mr. A. Z. N. Swai (Minister for Industries, Mineral Resources and Power)	Arusha Urban
Mr. O. S. Kambona (Minister for Regional Administration)	Morogoro East
Mr. J. M. Lusinde (Minister for Communications and Works)	Dodoma South
Mr. S. N. Eliufoo (Minister for Education)	Kilimanjaro Hai West
Mr. F. V. Mponji (Ministry of Communications and Works)	Masasi West
Mr. A. M. Maalim (Ministry of Home Affairs)	Zanzibar
Mr. S. S. Rashid (Ministry of Finance)	Zanzibar
Mr. R. S. Wambura (Second Vice-President's Office)	Musoma East
Mr. A. S. Mtaki (Ministry of Commerce and Co-operatives)	Mpwapwa

[a]The National Assembly (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1965).

TABLE 9--Continued

Ministers	Constituency
Mr. S. A. Maswanya (Minister for Lands, Settlement and Water Development)	Tabora West
Mr. M. M. Kamaliza (Minister for Labour)	Kilosa East
Mr. L. N. Sijaona (Minister for Home Affairs)	Newala (Pachoto)
Mr. A. K. E. Shaba (Minister for Housing)	Mtwara
Mr. A. K. Hanga (Minister for Union Affairs)	Zanzibar
Mr. A. M. Babu (Minister for Commerce and Co-operatives)	Zanzibar
Mr. I. A. Wakil (Minister for Information and Tourism)	Zanzibar
Mr. I. A. Bhoke Munanka (Minister of State, President's Office)	North Mara East
Mr. H. Makame (Minister for Health)	Zanzibar
Mr. C. Y. Mgonja (Minister for Community Development and National Culture)	Pare
Miss Lucy S. Lameck (Ministry of Health)	Kilimanjaro Central

Among the non-Ministerial Members of the National Assembly, local government officers, district councillors, local party stalwarts, co-operative society representatives and trade unionists predominate. Merchants, lawyers, and other members of "liberal" professions are few.[88] The majority of "backbench" M.P.s are between 30 and 39 (44). Many of those over 40 (24) have records of participation in movements of self-help and/or protest during the colonial period.[89] Those under 30 (26) have generally devoted most of their adult lives to service in the party or one of its major affiliates, NUTA, UWT, CUT, or TAPA (the Tanganyika African Parents Association).[90]

The outstanding characteristic of the new National Assemblymen, besides youthfulness, is a proven quality of popular leadership. In the role of representing the people,

[88] See Table 10 and Fig. 3 for vocational and age-group breakdowns.

[89] Cf. Crawford Young's comments on the lasting credit which may attach to a man for having had the courage to express nationalist feelings during the colonial period. Politics in the Congo (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 387-388.

[90] Fig. 3 shows age categories. This trend will be strengthened in the future. The new leaders of the party will be reared in Youth Camps, which are primarily aimed at bringing together the youth in the call for nation-building, and in the National Service where after training, they will return to the TANU Youth League as well-oriented people who can support themselves. Cf. Address of the Second Vice-President, Mr. Kawawa, when addressing a seminar of TANU District Chairmen at Kivukoni College, Dar es Salaam, reported in the Nationalist, January 27, 1966.

TABLE 10

BREAKDOWN OF THE NON-MINISTERIAL MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY INTO CATEGORIES BY VOCATION[a]

Professional Politician	1. Ole Mejooli	3. Saileni	5. Kihiyo
	2. Kassano	4. Dollah	6. Mhaville
Civil Servant	1. Mgazza	4. Mkwawa	7. Nyembo
	2. Kondo	5. Kwilasa	8. Kumala
	3. Rulegura	6. Hoza	
Ex-Chief	1. Kulwa		
District Councillor	1. Ole Mejooli	5. Nabahan	9. Yamo
	2. Kassano	6. Linje	10. Msonde
	3. Kinyonga	7. Madilia	11. Phillipo
	4. Kisusi	8. Lomo	
TANU District Committee	1. Kassano	3. Ng'awanang'walu	
	2. Ole Mejooli	4. Imerezi	
Area Commissioner	1. Kasuswa	2. Bakampenja	
TANU Executive Committee	1. Kassano	2. Mponda	
Farmer	1. Kiyonga	3. Nabahan	5. Sarwatt
	2. Mjili	4. Akerali	
Co-operative Official	1. Nghusule	4. Kibuga	7. Walwa
	2. Mponda	5. Ndobo	8. Anangisye
	3. Sazia	6. Magotti	
Business Executive	1. Masha	3. Mabawa	
	2. Kibogoyo	4. Mandia	
Women	1. Kisusi	2. Makota	3. Baraka
School Teacher	1. Nalingigwa	4. Maskini	7. Mangenya
	2. Nkurlu	5. Aidi	8. Sadiki
	3. Bwenda	6. Mponda	9. Nyamubi

[a]Occupations are those listed in The Standard (Tanzania), October 2, 1965.

TABLE 10--Continued

Local Government Officer	1. Luhinguranya	6. Sokoine	11. Mbembela
	2. Kaneno	7. Kwilasa	12. Nzingula
	3. Ruhinda	8. Nzowa	13. Kaombwe
	4. Muliriye	9. Kihampa	
	5. Rusimbi	10. Magomele	
Labour Union	1. Kida	4. Jengaa	7. Omari
	2. Bungara	5. Vumu	8. Diwani
	3. Kiwato	6. Dodo	9. Eranga
Clergyman	1. Mwakalukwa		



Fig. 3.--Breakdown of the Non-Ministerial Members of the National Assembly into Age Groups[a]

[a]Ages of Members of the National Assembly were given in The Standard (Tanzania), October 2, 1965.

this may be reflected in greater efficacy in transmitting political communications from the top downwards rather than the reverse.[91] Should this occur, it would do so despite, rather than in conformity with, the ideal of the Tanganyika political system. That ideal is of a united, democratic community whose problems are processed to resolution through the instrumentality of the party but with the eager and informed participation of all. The party leaders have the responsibility of dispelling fears and apprehensions in the people so that they are free to air their views on building the nation. They also have the duty to explain to the people what policies have been or may be adopted. Given such a dialogue, the creative and productive energies of the people may be fully utilized to attain the goals of the political system.

While the structure of a political system may be similar to that of others, the peculiar quality of that system is a matter of political style. To a certain extent the political style of Tanganyika derives its method and flavor from the personality of its president, Julius Nyerere.[92] At

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[91] This would confirm the thesis regarding the direction flow in a "transitional society," viz., that the output of messages tends to be far larger than the input of messages from the society. Cf. Almond and Coleman, op. cit. pp. 51 et seq.

[92] For Mr. Nyerere's biography and detailed analysis of his personality, see Judith Listowel, The Making of Tanganyika (London: Chatto and Windus, 1965).

the same time it should be noted that Nyerere is such an effective leader because he shares and embodies what appear to be the dominant traits in the people of his country. Tolerance, flexibility, unpretentiousness seem to be the characteristic of the people as well as of their leader, with democratic instincts and tradition deeply embedded. Tanganyika's record, since independence, compares favorably with other newly-emerging states if the success of its political system is to be gauged by the degree to which it has managed to sustain a dynamic equilibrium among the four basic goals of stability, flexibility, efficiency, and effectiveness.[93]

The two leaders next powerful after President Nyerere at present appear to be Oscar Kambona and Rashidi Kawawa. The former is Secretary-General of TANU (of which Nyerere is President) while the latter is Second Vice-President of the United Rebpublic. The Western press likes to picture Kambona as a radical leftist and Kawawa as a steady middle-of-the-roader or rather passive buffer between Kambona's (pro-Eastern) "extremism" and Nyerere's (pro-Western) "moderation." As with so many pictures done in strongly contrasting colors, these respective portraits are oversimplified and insufficiently qualified. It is true

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[93]This is the standard for rating political systems suggested by H. J. Spiro, "Comparative Politics: A Comprehensive Approach," American Political Science Review, LXI, No. 3 (September, 1962).

that Kambona quickly and effectively Africanized the two most important Ministries he has supervised to date (Home Affairs, External Affairs and Defence). It is also true that most of the Asians and Europeans in Tanganyika look upon Nyerere as the staunchest guarantor of their rights. And Kawawa has managed to retain the respect and admiration of all in the performance of the heaviest responsibilities of state entrusted to him by the President. What are more important than ideology or personal prejudice, however, are the problems which Tanganyika faces--problems common to all of the Third World--and the existence of various groups in Tanganyika society which perform interest articulation functions. The stubbornness of those problems and the strength of those forces are such that whichever individual or individuals succeed the present leaders, as long as they are genuine nationalists--which rules out people like Tshombe--something like the present system will survive.

Like many other newly-independent African states, Tanganyika practices a militant anti-colonialism and a tolerant neutralism. Dar es Salaam was the headquarters of the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East, Central, and South Africa (PAFMECSA), and is the present headquarters of the African Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity, as well as of diverse other African nationalist and

internationalist groups and movements.[94]

Tanganyika is unaligned in the East-West struggle, the Arab-Jewish struggle, or the Sino-Soviet Cold War.[95] In each case, it is a friendly impartiality, not an unfriendly isolationism.[96]

What will be Tanganyika's formal relations with her northern and southern neighbors must await the further political evolution of all of these.[97] At present, there

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[94]Apparently, there is a "secret refugee route" travelled by thousands of refugees from South Africa and all the remaining colonial territories in the southern portion of the continent into Tanganyika. Cf. Tanganyika Standard, January 23, 1963.

[95]The Tanganyika Government attended the conference in May, 1963, in Addis Ababa, at which the Charter of the Organization of African Unity was signed by the African States attending. Members are bound by the Charter to a policy of non-alignment.

[96]Dar es Salaam maintains diplomatic relations with Washington, London, Moscow, Peking, and ten other capitals. The first United States Peace Corps project was established in Tanganyika and the first long-term loan commitment made by the Kennedy Administration was given to Tanganyika. The first United States Ambassador, Mr. William Leonhart, has expressed delight with the Tanganyika Government's policy of attracting new private foreign investment. Tanganyika Standard, January 24, 1963. At the same time, the country's overseas trade has benefitted considerably from recent purchases on behalf of the Peking Government of a sizable part of the cotton crop.

[97]In the neighboring territories to the south, during the closing stages of the colonial period, Tanganyika collaborated harmoniously with Kaunda's United National Independence Party of Northern Rhodesia, Banda's Malawi Congress Party of Nyasaland, and Nkomo's banned Zimbabwe African People's Party of Southern Rhodesia. In the northern neighboring territories, TANU seemed closer ideologically to Kenyatta's Kenya African National Union than to Ngala's

are certain limited institutional and economic ties with Kenya and Uganda,[98] and informal political agreements with sympathetic party organizations and leading individuals in some of the other neighboring territories.

Kenya African Democratic Union, and to Obote's Uganda People's Congress than the Kabaka Yekka of Buganda.

[98]Prior to Tanganyika's independence, it had been linked with Kenya, Uganda, and Zanzibar by means of the East African High Commission and the Central Legislative Assembly, the East African Court of Appeal and the various services and activities jointly carried out, in a de facto confederation. Although the arrangement had many obvious advantages, it had never commanded full approval in Uganda and Tanganyika--even among non-Africans--because of the manner of its institution (without the full and free consent of the inhabitants concerned) and because the method of its operation seemed deliberately to favor Kenya at the expense of the other territories. Since federation, economic and administrative co-operation has been continued, although the name of the East African High Commission has been changed to the East African Common Services Organization. However, its former smooth operation has been hampered by prolonged vacillation in Kenya, while closer political ties are feared in some political circles in Kenya and Uganda because of Tanganyika's "one party system." Cf., e.g., the recent declaration unanimously passed by the Buganda Lukiko. Tanganyika Standard, January 28, 1963. Cf. also the East African Common Services Organization Agreement (Implementation) Ordinance, 1961, and the East African Common Services Organization Agreement (Implementation) Ordinance (Amendment), October, 1962, providing, inter alia, that the executive authority over the common services and activities of the three territories may be exercised jointly by "the Prime Minister of Tanganyika, the Prime Minister of Uganda, and such Ministers of the Government of Kenya as may be designated by that Government."

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The period of the present study covers the last three periods of Tanganyika's political history. It has thus been possible to make a comparative study of those structures which, within the political systems of each period, have performed basic regulatory roles. The broad terms of reference have been in relation to each political system, to ascertain: "Who gets what, when, and how?," because the study of politics is the study of power. It has also been remembered, however, that ethical considerations are never wholly absent from human endeavor. Hence the scope of the inquiry has included the ends as well as the means, the goals as well as the mechanisms of the political systems of the feudal, the colonial, and the contemporary periods.

In order for any community to attain its goals or solve its problems, whatever they may be, it is necessary for the community to organize itself as an entity and to aim itself with organs or parts, which have specified functions. What distinguished the colonial system from the feudal systems which preceded it was the successful integration of a multiplicity of tribal units into one. The fruits of that

success, i.e., the maximization of power and the marshalling of economic resources, were enjoyed by a small minority of the people under the colonial system. The extension of the bounds of the circle within which rewards and favors are enjoyed is the goal of the contemporary political system.

The more readily to attain the last-mentioned goal, the parliamentary structure has been scrapped and replaced by a presidential system. Whereas the parliamentary structure was never more than a façade to conceal the true nature of the internal relations between the polity and the society, the presidential system has made irrelevant, without formally abolishing, the interest articulation function in relation to the legislature. The consummation of TANU supremacy as "the" party, and its increasing multi-functionality--aggregation, socialization, recruitment, rule-making, etc.--tend to blur the pattern of increasing differentiation of specialized structures, which some political scientists suggest to be the hallmark of Western political systems.[1] The blending of the new roles of party official and administrator, as in the contemporary system of Tanganyika, is thought to be reminiscent of African traditional political roles.[2]

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[1] G. Almond and J. Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 18 et seq.

[2] L. Gray Cowan makes this point in relation to Guinea, in African One-Party States, ed. G. Carter (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 227.

The stability of the feudal political system was continually circumvented in the feudal political systems by a process of fission--so that the shadow of unchanging constitutional structures remained, while the substance of accretion of wealth, skills, and power eluded them. The colonial systems achieved relative success with their goals of flexibility and efficiency in the short run. Their Achilles heel was cultural disintegration, which in the long run proved their goal of effectiveness a will-o'-the-wisp.

For feudal Tanganyika equality was a relative, rather than an absolute, value. Thus, status and roles were assigned according to a hierarchical, rather than egalitarian, pattern. Within particularly prescribed limitations, however, there was equality of opportunity to be chosen for or to be assigned to a desired status or role.

This pattern was adopted in the interest of stability: to reduce, if not eliminate, controversies and crises over succession to political offices. The pattern was only overtly aristocratic because there was never any doubt of the reality of the democratic sanction--the assumption that the preferences of the majority should prevail. The extent to which the masses acquiesced in the aristocratic constitutional structure determined the strength and stability of the state and was determined by the adherence of the constitutional rulers to feudal values of freedom and justice.

The colonial political systems lacked interest in equality as a value, hence the aristocratic elements of the constitutional structure tended to be accentuated. The magisterial functions associated with the office of tribal chief continued to be exercised during the colonial period although they were, first, minimized under the German administration, and then renovated and greatly enhanced under the British system of "indirect rule." Having proved to be a rallying point for colonialism and conservatism, the feudal chiefly offices were divested of power, although their traditional religious and ceremonial functions remain for all who may care to utilize them.[3]

During the colonial period, Tanganyika came to face two problems which had been absent or only latent during the feudal period: adverse geographical conditions and alien relationships. The interrelatedness of the two problems only fully came to light when the processes of integration had to be implemented within the contemporary political system. The difficulties encountered in resolving the issues created by these problems led to the rise of extra-constitutional methods. The resort to violence as a political style indicated a desire, symptomatic of the peoples of Africa today for immediate, short-run solutions to current

[3]In this respect, Tanganyika differs from her neighbors Kenya and Uganda and her model in some respects, Ghana.

problems which reflects excessive concern with the goal of efficiency.

Tanganyika is occasionally described as an authoritarian, one-party state, thereby implying a lack of democracy although perhaps conceding a certain strength or stability to the political system. At other times its political leaders are criticized for strong ideological conviction in formulating guiding principles to the policies from day to day applied in the workings of the political system.

Such criticisms are no doubt sound enough--as criticisms. Whether they add much to an explanation or understanding of the Tanganyikan political system depends, probably, upon one's angle of perspective. From the viewpoint of some Western political systems, Tanganyika displays a lack of virility in the form or substance of opposition to the governing party and an extraordinary reliance upon the self-restraint, benevolence, and discretion of the person holding the office of Chief Executive.

Guide lines may impose greater uniformity in policy-formulation and predictability in decision-making. At the same time they may impede flexibility and experimentation, highly important at times in a "developing" new state, while at the same time providing a point of focus and a target around which opposition may crystallize and strike.

The Tanganyikan situation can best be appreciated when contrasted with some other developing states, either

born of revolution or peacefully achieved, where class and racial or tribal conflicts abound, where great contrasts of wealth and poverty exist, where corruption and violence are rampant, and ideology conceals or excuses a stagnant, insensitive political system.

What has been attempted in Tanganyika is the establishment of a type of political system which revives the virtues of traditional African society, while adapting to it those necessities and beneficient achievements of more modern societies. Wherever the traditional values and attitudes may be preserved, the fear of being different from the East or from the West does not inhibit the political leaders of the "new" Tanganyika. At the same time, the best of the techniques of the latter-day twentieth century are sought to be retained, because to fail to do so might jeopardize the independence or survival of the political system itself--which was the fatal flaw of the "old" Tanganyika.

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

KENYA
34°
36°
38°
Eldama Ravine
Solai
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NANYUKI
MERU
KISUMU
LONDIANI
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MT. KENYA
Chuka
KERICHO
Elmenteita
Gilgil
NYERI
EMBU
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Rangwe
KISII
NAIVASHA
FORT HALL
Kombo
Karungu
Kijabe
THIKA
KIAMBU
NAROK
NAIROBI
Dagoretti
Ngong
Kitui
Shirati
NORTH MARA
Zombe
Konza
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Ol Balbal
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